The Political Ideology of Green Parties: From the Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics

The Political Ideology of Green Parties From the Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics

Gayil Talshir

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999–), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Louise Haagh and Camilla Helgø (editors) Social Policy Reform and Market Governance in Latin America Gayil Talshir THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF GREEN PARTIES From the Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics E. K. Dosmukhamedov FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN Politico-Legal Aspects of Post-Communist Transition Felix Patrikeeff RUSSIAN POLITICS IN EXILE The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924–1931 He Ping CHINA’S SEARCH FOR MODERNITY Cultural Discourse in the Late 20th Century Mariana Llanos PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA An Analysis of President–Congress Relations Michael Addison VIOLENT POLITICS Strategies of Internal Conflict Geoffrey Wiseman CONCEPTS OF NON-PROVOCATIVE DEFENCE Ideas and Practices in International Security Pilar Ortuño Anaya EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND SPAIN The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 Renato Baumann (editor) BRAZIL IN THE 1990s An Economy in Transition Israel Getzler NIKOLAI SUKHANOV Chronicler of the Russian Revolution Arturo J. Cruz, Jr NICARAGUA’S CONSERVATIVE REPUBLIC, 1858–93 Pamela Lubell THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION The Case of the Sixty-One Renegades Mikael af Malmborg NEUTRALITY AND STATE-BUILDING IN SWEDEN

Klaus Gallo GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26 David Faure and Tao Tao Liu TOWN AND COUNTRY IN CHINA Identity and Perception Peter Mangold SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY Evaluating the Record, 1900–2000 Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi REFASHIONING IRAN Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography Louise Haagh CITIZENSHIP, LABOUR MARKETS AND DEMOCRATIZATION Chile and the Modern Sequence Renato Colistete LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL Greater São Paulo, 1945–60 Peter Lienhardt (edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi) SHAIKHDOMS OF EASTERN ARABIA John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (editors) TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC VIABILITY The Bolivian Experience Steve Tsang (editor) JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG Karen Jochelson THE COLOUR OF DISEASE Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1880–1950 Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85

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The Political Ideology of Green Parties From the Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics

Gayil Talshir The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

© Gayil Talshir 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the new global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–91986–6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Talshir, Gayil, 1968– The political ideology of green parties: from the politics of nature to redefining the nature of politics/Gayil Talshir. p.cm. – (St. Antony’s series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–91986–6 1. Grünen (Political party) 2. Green movement – Germany. 3. Green Party (Great Britain) 4. Green movement – Great Britain. I. Title. II. St. Antony’s series (Palgrave (Firm)) JN3971.A98 G723763 2002 324.241⬘0987–dc21 10 11

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

To my parents who planted me in a fertile soil My father, for inspiring me to blossom in learning My mother, for encouraging me to bring it to fruition

No single ideological formulation could possibly corral such a rich variety of experience and feeling and still preserve the independence and authenticity of everyone’s protest. Theodor Roszak

Contents Acknowledgements

viii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Introduction: Reconceptualising ‘Ideology’?

xi

Part I 1 2

The Greens: the Emergence of a Compound Collective Political Actor A Green Ideology? From Exclusive Models to an Inclusive Framework

Part II 3 4 5 6 7

3 17

From Praxis to Theory: the German Greens

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route Philosophy: the Greening of the New Left Discourse: New Spirituality and Ideological Conversion Ideological Diversification: the Green Spectrum Politics: Consolidating a Green Niche in the New Germany

Part III 8 9 10 11 12

The Political and Theoretical Settings

33 51 89 108 144

Ideology in Search of Politics: the British Greens

The British Peculiarity: non-Ideological Politics ‘The Movement’: from Survivalism to Sustainability Politics: Seeing Green – the Simplicity of Radical Realism Coalition Building: Ideological Currents or Political Strategy? Modular Ideology: a Green Caterpillar Turns into a Colourful Butterfly?

173 184 201 225 242

Part IV Ideology, Politics and Discursive Strategies: a Comparative Assessment 13

The Dual Reflection of Modular Ideology

255

Conclusion: from Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics

267

Notes

271

Bibliography

295

Index

304

Acknowledgements The 2002 new Basic-Programme of the German Greens reads: ‘we link together a circle of basic-values, not an ideology.’ The updated (2001) founding document of the British Greens – Manifesto for a Sustainable Society – commences with a Philosophical Basis – the word ideology is never mentioned in this or any other party document. Extracting theory out of praxis is always a problematic task. The persistent refusal of Green Parties – and their members – to acknowledge their own ideology is instructive for a political scientist. It makes the journey in search of the political ideology of Green Parties ever more challenging. It sharpens the critical faculties and maintains a distinct line between the analyst and her subject matter. I wholeheartedly thank the Wingate Foundation for providing me the means to engage in this fascinating intellectual journey. I also thank the British Council, AVI Scholarships and the Feher Foundation for helping at different stages of the way. Special thanks to Grüne Gedächtnis, the Greens archive in Widdig, for letting me spend days – and nights – in the stacks, and to the archives in-the-making of the UK Green party at Teesside University. Warm regards to all Greens on both sides of the Channel who willingly engaged in self-reflection on their ideological path (despite their reluctance to profess an ‘ideology’). In particular, to Chris Rose, the gardener and guardian of the British Greens. It is a pleasure to acknowledge St Antony’s College, which was my home; the in(di)visible University of Oxford, for providing me navigation maps to the mountainous world of knowledge; and Oxford’s parks, meadows and rivers where I spent much time walking my thoughts. I am indebted to my teachers and colleagues in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who tempted me to nomadic life in a ‘wanderland’, especially to Avner de-Shalit, an enthusiastic tutor and fellow-traveller. Most of all, I want to thank Prof. Michael Freeden of Mansfield College, Oxford, who endowed me with direction and freedom to develop a critical perspective. I shall always relish those hours of intense discussion, eye-opening rare insights and support throughout the way, witnessing the pleasures and pains which found their way into this book. Last but not least, warm thanks to Ruth Friedman and my ‘bestest’ friend, Nadia Sayed-Ali, for Anglicising my text.

viii

List of Abbreviations A3W AL APO AUD B90 BBU

BDK BGP BP BUS

BuVo

Aktion Dritter Weg Alternative Liste Ausserparliamentarische Opposition Aktion Unabhangiger Deutscher Bündnis90 Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen für Umweltschutz Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz Basisprogramm die Grünen, 1980 Basisdemokratische und undogmatische Sozialist/innen in den Grünen Bundesvorstand

The Third-Way Action Alternative Lists Extraparliamentary Opposition Independent Germans’ Action Alliance90 Federal Association of Citizens’ Initiative for Environmental Protection Federal Delegates Conference British Green Party Basic-programme, the Greens 1980 Grassroots and undogmatic Socialists in the Greens

Federal Party Executive Committee CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Christian Democratic Union CIs Citizens’ Initiatives CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament CSU Christlich Soziale Union Christian Social Union DA Demokratischer Aufbruch Democratic Awakening EU(79) Manifesto for European Parliament, 19(79) FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party FIU Freie Internationale Universität Free International University (Berlin) FoE Friends of the Earth FRG Federal Republic of Germany Fundis Fundamentalists GAZ Grüne Aktion Zukunft Green Action Future GDR German Democratic Republic GE(80) General Election manifesto 19(80) GLSH Grüne Liste Schleswig-Holstein Green Lists of SchleswigHolstein

ix

x

List of Abbreviations

GLU

Grüne Liste Umweltschutz

IDJ Jusos K-Groups KB KBW

Initiative Demokratie Jetzt Jungsozialister Kommunistische Gruppen Kommunistischer Bund Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschlands Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands

KPD NATO NSMs NVDA PDS Realos SB SDS SED SPD Spontis SPV UFV USP WGA

Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus Sozialistisches Büro Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Die Sonstige Politische Vereinigung (Die Grünen) Unabhangiger Frauenverband Umweltschutz Partei Wahlergemeinschaft Atomkraft, Nein Danke!

Green List for Environmental Protection Initiative Democracy Now Young Socialists Communist Groups Communist Federation Communist Federation of West Germany Communist Party of Germany North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Social Movements Non-Violence Direct Action Party of Democratic Socialism Realists Socialist Office Socialist German Students’ League Socialist Unity Party of Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany Spontaneists Other Political Union (The Greens) Independent Women’s League Environmental Protection Party Voters’ League Nuclear Power, No Thanks!

Introduction: Reconceptualising ‘Ideology’? This book traces the formation and transformations of a late twentiethcentury political ideology that evolved in advanced industrial democracies. It examines the rise of a newly formed compound collective political actor – the Green Party – and its struggle to establish its own political niche in an already occupied ideological sphere, to develop distinct historical analysis and social vision, and to pave a political road for the transformation of the polity. The route leads from the ex-territorial political waters of protest movements, sailing on board the ecological ship, to the shores of parliamentary and governmental power. It is the way from politics of nature – taking ecological problems as the extreme manifestation of the shortcomings of the established political system – to challenging the nature of politics itself – establishing an alternative vision of participatory, multicultural democracy. Issues of environmental degradation, cultural autonomy, Third World concerns, women’s equality, foreign workers’ rights and participatory democracy hardly seem to cohere. Moreover, the advocates of these concerns – social movements, citizens’ initiatives, environmental organisations and protest cells – do not appear to share a political action-plan. Yet, entrenched as they are in the norms and practices of institutionalised democracies, such conflicts require a process of politicisation. Raising awareness of hitherto neglected disadvantaged and exploited subjects within advanced industrial democracies and redefining the nature of politics so that these issues and groups would have a political stake was a project the Greens undertook. The evolution of the ideas of the Greens, the configuration of political concepts and the structure of their ideology is traced through a diachronic analysis of the main corpus of publications and programmes, within two different political environments – Germany and Britain. The comparative perspective provides a mechanism for examining the influence that the respective political cultures have had on the evolution of Green Party ideologies. At the same time it provides a matrix for understanding the differential impact. The two distinct discursive strategies undertaken by the Greens in Germany and Britain expose a fascinating realm for tracing national attitudes to politics, surprisingly, given their post-national political discourses. On the theoretical level, the book examines the political ideology of the Greens as a case study for the theory of ideologies. In view of the variety of conflicts, the question could have been whether Green Parties merely represent the aggregated concerns of a wide subculture of protest, or whether they form a genuine ideology along classical lines. However, as the analysis developed, it became evident that a new type of ideology has in fact emerged, and that a reconceptualisation of the concept of ‘ideology’ was xi

xii Introduction

necessary. A Modular Ideology was thus devised, encompassing a double structure: first, an ideological frame, that is, the shared ideological premises of the Greens, including the following principles: primacy of ecology, respect for others, pluralism – or multiculturalism – tolerance and participatory democracy. Second, the sub-ideologies, that is, the various ideological currents, which subscribe to the ideological frame, yet emphasise a module of their own sub-ideology. The tension between these two levels proved instrumental in explicating the internal dynamic of the ideological currents coalescing within the Greens. The analysis in this book suggests that two different modes of development – the one from political praxis to theory, in the German case, the other from theory to praxis, in the British case – have led to the emergence of a new type of political ideology, the modular ideology of Green Parties.

The end of ideology – and beyond Has a new political ideology originated since the ‘End of Ideology’ thesis became the common wisdom?1 Is such an ideology ‘new’ due to its adherents, the issues it addresses, or has a new type of ideology, necessitating a reconceptualisation of the concept of ‘ideology’ itself, emerged in advanced industrial democracies? What is the function of the Greens within this ideological arena? These questions call for theoretical contextualisation of the debate which ensued in the 1960s, and which was later resurrected in the wake of the political collapse of the USSR and the theoretical accounts of the ‘End of History’.2 Tellingly, the controversy has itself confounded various political frameworks and diversified the concept of ideology. Daniel Bell concluded his original piece, ‘The End of ideology in the West’, thus: In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of the Welfare State; the desirability of decentralised power; a system of mixed economy and political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended.3 Likewise, Lipset argued that ‘the differences between the left and the right in the Western democracies are no longer profound … the very stuff of the internal struggle within stable democracies … are hardly matters to excite intellectuals or stimulate young people who seek in politics a way to express their dreams’.4 Clearly, the context was the withering of ideological politics within industrial democracies. Others identified the locus of the end of ideology debate in terms of West vs. East – in the form of liberalism vs. socialism,5 with regard to the triumph of Capitalism over Communism,6 or in the struggle between democratic and totalitarian regimes.7 Still others saw the debate against a background of the emerging ideologies in Asia, Africa and South America.8

Introduction xiii

Beyond the different political frameworks within which ideology was considered, there was the theoretical contention over the concept of ideology itself.9 Some scholars stressed the over-rationalisation tendency of ideology. The systemisation of ideas suggested that reality was being viewed from within a preconceived set of rigid beliefs about the world, leading one commentator to claim that ‘ideology projects wish-fulfilments where knowledge is unavailable’.10 The abyss between political reality and ideology deposited the claims of distortion, self-deception and interest-oriented rationalisation at the ideologist’s door. This was most powerfully evident in Marx’s critique of ‘natural rights’ as being merely bourgeois ideology.11 Others chose rather to emphasise the emotional, passion-oriented role of ideology, and therefore its irrational components:12 ‘The word ideology is a pejorative word; it describes unrealistic, prejudice-begotten thought.’13 Many concentrated on the action-orientation of ideology when it is channelled to transform the political order,14 or on its being held by, or attributed to, a certain actor.15 Recently, the holistic aspect of ideology, and its ultimate claim to universal truth as the symbol of modernism, has been attacked by postmodernists and deconstructionists. Each approach perceived its own concept as the ‘correct’ definition of ideology. Nevertheless, a conceptual pattern of the meaning of ideology, notwithstanding the different emphases, can be roughly sketched. Ideology, in the end-of-ideology context, is viewed as a preconceived, truth-claiming system of beliefs,16 infused with actionoriented energies and passions which seeks to transform the political order through the universal appeal of an alternative ‘good society’.17 This general notion, which established a common ground for the debate, was introduced thus: The end-of-ideology thesis involves two basic premises. The first, and in this most agree, is the statement of the actual situation; namely, the absence of ideological politics in modern industrial society … The second premise at least implicit in the end-of-ideology thesis is a positive valuejudgement about this reality.18 Indeed, the reason for the alleged actual withering of ideological politics lies at the nexus of the external and internal circumstances.19 Externally, the horrors of Stalinism, and later the disintegration of the USSR, given Marx’s insistence on the interrelation between practice and theory, made it ‘plausible, though not necessarily conclusive, to argue that the failure of Marxist regimes in practice amounted to their refutation in theory, and most people have certainly taken this view. That is why the end of communism might plausibly be taken as the final proof of the end of ideology.’20 Internally, the welfare State seemed to have ended the debate between liberalism, socialism and conservatism within democracies. Democracy had triumphed in winning

xiv Introduction

the ideological battle against totalitarianism, and was pronounced unideological; within it was room enough for controversy among catch-all parties,21 but a lack of profound differences between Left and Right. The advocates of the end-of-ideology thesis thus christened democracy ‘the good society itself in operation. Only the give-and-take of a free society’s internal struggles offers some guarantee that the products of the society will not accumulate in the hands of a few powerholders, and that men may develop, and bring up their children, without fear of persecution.’22 Yet, the growing discontent with ‘the good society itself in operation’ was well in evidence. Most of these authors acknowledged the advent of the New Social Movements (NSMs) and the extraparliamentary opposition, but simultaneously dismissing it as new ideological phenomena, for different reasons. Bell wrote of the New Left: ‘In the search for a “cause” there is a deep, desperate almost pathetic anger … Ideology, which by its nature is an all-or-none affair … is intellectually devitalised, and few issues can be formulated any more, intellectually, in ideological terms. The emotional energies – and needs – exist … Politics offers little excitement’.23 Lipset regarded these developments as social, rather than political,24 and O’Sullivan located them within civil society,25 and confined ideology to the established political realm. Bracher, rejected the end-of-ideology thesis precisely because the re-ideologisation of the ‘Neo-Marxist garb’,26 had reinstigated ‘an alleged crisis of legitimation’.27 He argues that ‘the real difference continues to lie in the issue of democratic or authoritarian policy’.28 The self-declared anti-system movements of the 1960s and 1970s, despite professing anti-authoritarianism, inevitably led either to compliance with the system or to authoritarian solutions. Hence, whether it was explained by the exhaustion of political ideologies, or by declaring these developments non-ideological for being a-political, the ‘ideological’ status was not granted. Waxman wrote: There is a world of difference between protest groups, or even a protest movement, and a positive political theory or ideology. Not one of these groups has come up with a new positive alternative based upon a new political philosophy or social theory. Certainly there is no political theory which they all share … political protest as it is currently manifested … is actually not based on any new conceptions of society or of man, especially political man.29 This book explores whether a new ideology, presenting a positive political theory, has nevertheless emerged within advanced industrial democracies. If so, the question arises, does this ideology embrace a new conception of society and of man, and, significantly, are there new political conceptions of woman and of nature, which challenge the classical understanding of what constitutes politics. Yet, as is already clear from this short exposition, the question cannot be answered affirmatively at the outset. In the course

Introduction xv

of this study, it became clear that the new worldview demanded a rethinking of the conventional concept of ideology. This necessitated developing a new type of ideology, with a unique conceptual framework and theoretical structure, as well as attempting to reconceptualise ‘ideology’ itself. The body of the book is devoted to a systemic, diachronic analysis of the ideational evolution of this new type of ideology, the modular ideology. It is based on two concrete case studies of Green Parties which gradually developed a modular ideology and accounts for the explanatory force of such a conceptual tool.

The comparative perspective The subject matter of this book is placed, therefore, within the theoretical framework of the study of ideologies. The ideology sought is the political ideology of a compound collective actor – the Greens. It is a compound actor, since it entertains diverse groups and different sub-ideologies. A major task is therefore to account for the shared ideological and political structure which maintain together these variant associations and ideas and turns them into a collective actor with a distinct political identity. To establish whether indeed a new political ideology has evolved, and to delineate its ideational framework, the study focuses on the ideological writings of the parties. The locus of the analysis is the collective writing of the Greens, and those of their constitutive subcurrents. Ideologues, in the Green case, are not necessarily individuals who wrote comprehensive philosophies, but rather the collective outcome of an ideological process which transcends any one particular point of view of the individuals or groups participating or collaborating in the Green ideological discourse. Since it is the shared political ideology – constituted in a common historical analysis, a social vision and a political route for its realisation, which lies at the heart of this study, the book confines itself at the outset to Green Parties. ‘The Greens’, as a collective name, is a vacuous term, since it is not clear what it means to be Green (are the peaceniks, environmentalists, vegetarians, anti-road campaigners, ramblers and New Age people, all of whom might define themselves as Greens, one significant collective? Do they share any social vision and political action-plan?). Green Parties are defined, by the very nature of parties, as political actors that strive toward social change (or preservation), and are competing – in the political system of advanced democracies – within an ideological field. The newcomer is thus encouraged to crystallise its own ideological collective identity. Green parties therefore provide a microcosm for investigating whether this political collective has indeed developed an ideological creed. It might well be the case that the assortment of social movement activists, concerned citizens and environmental conservationists are merely seeking to register their protest vote on the parliamentary system, and to this end have formed a party, without developing any coherent social vision and political

xvi Introduction

transformation plan. Given their tremendous diversity, which professes self-definition of all their constituent parts, and their uneasiness about institutional orthodoxy, it might well stand to reason that the Greens would purposefully abstain from developing a coherent party ideology. Alternatively, they might have developed an ideology enhancing this ‘politics of difference’. The study is conducted within two different political environments – Germany and Britain. The reason for this comparative perspective is twofold. First, political parties are active in a particular political system, governed and legitimised through certain manifestations of political culture, ideological traditions and political institutions and practices. The political newcomer would therefore need to establish a path on the national map, even if the issues addressed – ecological problems, gender issues and way of life – are universal in character. Thus, social change is intimately related to the political context in which it evolves. Moreover, the Green Parties have had to challenge prevailing ideological assumptions, political practices and public debate, while using these very channels in order to qualify for playing in the same political playground. They participate while seeking not only to score goals, but to change the rules of the democratic game, and to reshape democracy’s relationships to the field – the environment – itself. The way they justify the need for a new worldview, their characterisation of the problems embodied in the established system, and their attempts to define and change the prevailing conventions and convictions, comprise the subject matter of this study. Tracing the evolution of the Green Parties in two advanced industrial democracies with distinct political environments will serve to test whether different political cultures and practices indeed created a significant impact on the evolution of the ideologies of the Green Parties, and at the same time will provide a matrix for understanding the differential impact. Secondly, the comparative perspective will demonstrate the limits of the approach of the structural school of thought, when applied to Green Parties. The growing body of literature on New Politics Parties explains their emergence as the outcome of a structural change in advanced industrial societies and applies structural analysis to account for differences between Green Parties: the differential success of Green Parties is explained in the context of the respective electoral systems and the structure of the political opportunities and partisan alignment in these specific nation states.30 As will be argued, this structural approach cannot answer a range of complex questions, and specifically, it fails to define the ideological project which New Politics parties undertook. New Politics themes are presented as separate, single-issue campaigns. This book will establish the scope and coherence of the ideology of New Politics parties highlighting the paucity of the structural approach. The intention, however, is to enrich rather than reject it. Political institutions, practices and parties are taken to

Introduction xvii

be manifestations and embodiments of ideological convictions and value systems. Therefore, studying the political ideologies of the Green Parties – through their interconnections with the political culture and prevailing ideological traditions – will further the understanding of the relationships between political ideas and political actions, and the outlook for social change. A comparison of the German and British Green parties provides an interesting contrast through which we can account for the evolution of a newcomer party to the established ideological field. These are not ‘typical’ representative cases of Green Parties. They manifest two distinct models, acting within fundamentally different electoral systems and political cultures. The German Greens emerged as a coalition of value-conservatives, right-wing ecologists, Citizens initiatives, anthroposophists, Christians, members of NSMs, alternative lists, New Left activists and former Communists. Their British counterpart was established as an environmental party, with a particular interest in the issue of overpopulation. The German Greens act within an electoral system based on proportional representation, and an incentive to cooperate in order to pass the 5 per cent threshold. The British system is a first-past-the-post system, with little chances of election for non-regional parties. Most importantly, the German and British political cultures differ substantially. Thus, the German case seems to be a classic locus for a frame-party31 with diverse groups, whereas the British Greens seem to be an exclusionist, merely environmental party. The analysis of the German Greens – encompassing many distinct collective actors and sharing parliamentary power which eventually led them into government – is much more complicated, in that respect, from the study of the UK Greens. Yet, this is the first systemic analysis of the British Green Party and the only comprehensive account of the political ideology of Green Parties. The very different electoral systems, political cultures and ideological frameworks within which these parties act provide a sensitive context in which to examine the ideological evolution of Green Parties, and require an inclusive, systemic analysis with reference to their respective political environments. The process by which these two untypical cases of Green Parties developed two different ways to arrive at the same viable political ideology is especially telling for other Green Parties. The political conditions in both cases were such that the Green Parties had to undergo an ideological rethinking process and to crystallise their worldview beyond single-issue or ecological politics. It is this ideological process which is at the centre of this study. Argumentative strategies: Thinking Green and Seeing Green Three tasks confront a new collective political actor trying to establish itself in the national political arena. First, the newcomer should explicate what, from its point of view, is wrong with the existing order, accounting for the historical processes embedded in the dominant ethos that led to the

xviii Introduction

current state. Second, a new party would have to put forward its vision, based on its professed value-system. Third, it should offer a route for political transformation which is not merely a change of policies, but one which changes people’s way of thinking about the agenda, projecting what it defines as the most salient political issues onto the national priorities map. It thus has to diagnose the problems within the current system, design an alternative political plan and offer a way to achieve transformation. Notice the dual role played by the political newcomer. The attempt to construct its own political identity against the background of the established parties in the political system requires that the newcomer both reject the established parties, in order to justify its own existence, and also play by the very rules of the game it rejects in order to acquire a niche of its own from which to challenge the system. The newcomer must also convince the public of the need for change, appealing to the existing political discourse – norms, ideologies, common sense – in its efforts to advocate social change and the need for reassessing its way of life, thereby instigating a restructuring of the political order. For the Greens, the different political discursive environments – Germany and Britain – determined not only the institutional rules of the game, but the strategy for transforming the political order. As a newcomer, it had to account for the faults of the existing political order and to justify its own penetration of the same system, as an agent of social change, a move usually based on magnifying the discrepancy between the ruling ideology and its detachment from the socio-political reality. To accentuate the gap between worldview and world, the new party can either challenge the presuppositions of existing ideologies, with reference to a new idea for the good polity, or it can highlight changes in the world that have rendered prevailing ideologies untenable. It is in the matter of this choice that the German Greens can be distinguished from the British Greens, through the discrepancy between ecological and social processes, as misrepresented in the existing political worldview. The German Greens analysed the ways in which the prevailing political ideology constitutes and maintains specific modes of socio-economic practices, thereby proving the failure of the prevailing ideology and arguing for a change in political worldview, which would, in turn, facilitate a change of reality. The British Greens suggested that reality had changed, and therefore that certain political norms must inevitably change too, in order to remain consistent with reality. Therefore, while in the German case, their analysis of the ‘dominant’ ideology serves to expose its weaknesses, prompting a change in practices and ideologies from ‘below’, in the British case a ‘natural’ change in reality which axiomatically should induce a change in political concepts was acknowledged, conveniently neutralising the need for change by supposedly calling for ‘the voice of reason’, or ‘common sense’ to be heard in the political arena. This is clearly reflected in the titles of two books written by prominent

Introduction xix

representatives of the respective Green Parties. Compare Petra Kelly’s Thinking Green, suggesting a need for reflection, historical analysis and consequent change of social practices and ideology,32 with Jonathon Porritt’s Seeing Green – suggesting unreflective ‘seeing’ that reality has transformed, implying that our ideas too need to follow.33 The complex relationships between ideologies, that is, the distinctive configuration of political concepts which illuminates reality from a particular perspective, and socio-political practices, should be at the centre of political investigation. They can be disentangled by close attention to the framework of the political concepts, and by the political discourse that shapes them. This is especially the case when a collective political actor seeks both to introduce transformative change to the polity and to challenge the conception of what constitutes the political. Conceptual and discursive analyses account for the perceptions of the political reality, the dominant actors and ways to realise a transformative change.

Conceptual and discourse analysis Here, a further crucial issue concerning the study of ideologies comes to the fore. Usually, ideology analysts have considered themselves to be historians of ideas, without recognising a need to establish their methodology, let alone justify it. Yet, specific methodologies are useful for different tasks and analysing political ideas is not straightforward. In other words, language can no longer be taken as transparent, since processes of awareness, ideology and identity are mediated through certain patterns of thought behaviour which must be analysed. This shift of emphasis can be identified with the ‘linguistic turn’. In recent years, two innovative paradigms of analysis have been offered for analysing ideologies, both of which draw heavily on renewed focus of attention to language. The first is the conceptual approach to the morphology of ideologies, the second is discourse analysis, particularly the school of critical discourse analysis. The morphology of ideologies and the Green terrain The conceptual approach developed by Freeden perceives political concepts to be the basic units of thinking about politics.34 Ideologies ‘are distinctive configurations of political concepts … (which) create specific conceptual patterns from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited combinations’.35 The conceptual approach goes beyond traditional attitudes which have ascribed a static structure to ideology, and remained confined to a single major concept, around which an ideology has revolved. It allows the dynamic of any given ideology to be seen in relation to other, competing worldviews, or to the different stages through which an ideology has evolved. Such stages are seen in the changes in conceptual morphology that have been exposed by the structure of the internal power-relations existing between its concepts.

xx

Introduction

Thus, ideologies are ‘characterised by a morphology that displays core, adjacent and peripheral concepts’.36 The internal relationships of the ‘ineliminable’ concepts37 comprising the core of an ideology, are crucial for distinguishing different families of ideologies (conservatism, socialism and so on). Additionally, they provide a sensitive theoretical tool for accounting for the differences between members of each ideological family (different liberalisms, socialisms and so on). While this is a highly sensitive conceptual device for analysing ideologies, when applied to the Green ideology, it does not appear to solve the main problem encountered by other ideological studies of the Greens. Yet, the problem may be rooted not in the methodology, but in the (ideological) preconception that Green ideology is an environmental ideology. Consequently, analysts either attempt to deduce political views from ecological principles (as suggested by our critique of Dobson and Van Hüllen)38 or merely conceptualising those ideas that concern the environment (as in the case of Freeden’s analysis). The result is a thin-centred ideology having little or nothing to say about politics and society.39 One of the main goals of this study is to challenge the premise that Green ideology is basically an environmental ideology. Ecological problems indeed pose a serious challenge for the Greens, and ecology represents a cluster of conceptions which forms a central part of the core. Crucially, though, the ideology cannot be reduced to the analysis of a single conceptual cluster. Nevertheless, the conceptual approach is best equipped to reflect the modular ideological structure of the Greens, as it allows for distinction between the core of the Green ideology, to which the various currents adhere, and the sub-ideologies. Each sub-ideology accepts the common ideological core, the ideological frame, but has chosen to furnish its own core with additional yet different adjacent and peripheral concepts. The conceptual approach thus offers theoretical tools for representing the morphology of the Green ideology, but only within a historical analysis which does not presuppose the environment as the central concept. This factor determined the diachronic manner in which this study is conducted. The main effort of this book then, would be to describe the evolution of two historical cases of Green ideologies, in order to account for the role of the environment in their worldview, but especially to unravel the underlying political and social values on which the ideological consolidation of this new worldview is based. This is precisely why the comparative analysis is of crucial importance: whereas the German case evolved from the outset as a multifaceted coalition of different currents incorporating socio-political principles into their ideological core, the British Greens began their ideological journey with the premise that their task was to construct an ecological worldview. Yet, twenty years after its foundation, and after a long ideological and political evolution, the British Green Party (BGP) similarly realised that a Green

Introduction xxi

ideology could not be narrowly confined to an environmental ideology, but that it had to address social, economic and political problems as independent ideological ingredients so as to generate a comprehensive ideology. Thus, the historical evolution of the ideology of the political actors themselves allows us to challenge the view held by activists and analysts alike. Ecology is but one pillar of Green ideology, and can only be sustained within a broader political project which challenges the ecological and social patterns of exploitation within advanced democracies. Discourse analysis: political identity and transformation strategies Discourse analysis presents itself as the best methodology which would provide the tools for this evolutionary analysis and thus complement the conceptual approach. As a major critical approach for understanding both theory and praxis of social sciences,40 discourse analysis focuses indeed on the interaction between written and spoken language and society. Discourse is perceived as social practice since ‘discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’.41 Thus, what is crucial for the analysis of ideologies is not only the ideology’s internal evolution, but its relation to social practices and political processes as well as to the competing worldviews that are played out on the same ideological field. According to Pêcheux, discourse ‘is the place where language and ideology meet, and discourse analysis is the analysis of ideological dimensions of language use, and of the materialisation in language of ideology’.42 By focusing on the power-relations embedded in discursive strategies and linguistic practices, discourse analysis provides an instrumental tool for analysing the domination of certain practices over others. It thus sheds light on the problem of transforming these practices in that it highlights the dependency of a new political actor on the conventions of the dominant discourse, even if the actor’s cause is the transformation of these very practices. Hajer applied discourse analysis to environmental discourse, using the rain forests for his case study.43 He analysed a set of different political actors involved in the same environmental discourse and demonstrated how the plurality of actors has facilitated the penetration of ecological problems into the dominant political discourse, draining it of its radical social agenda. This process Hajer calls ‘ecological modernisation’: Ecological modernisation explicitly avoids addressing basic social contradictions that other discourses might have introduced. Ecological modernisation does not call for any structural change but it is, in this respect, basically a modernist and technocratic approach to the environment, that suggests that there is a techno-institutional fix for the present problems.44

xxii Introduction

Our study differs since Hajer was interested in environmental policy, substantiated through the case of the rain forests, while we account for the role of the concept of the environment as facilitating the emergence of a new political ideology. Hajer analysed different actors’ attitudes to the same problem; this analysis, however, is interested in how a single political actor plays within two different national cultures. Hajer demonstrated how ecological modernisation has enabled the dissociation of ecological problems from social problems, whereas the thrust of the Green ideology is to generate a worldview in which social and ecological processes interact within a framework which transcends purely environmental concerns, necessitating major political reconstruction. Thus, while both studies utilise discourse analysis to expose political processes related to environmental problems, Hajer is interested in the policy process, and this study explores an independent ideological phenomenon in which the environmental cluster of problems represents only one component of a plurality of conflicts emerging in advanced democracies. Hajer deals strictly with environmental discourse, while this book examines the way environmental discourse is used to mould a new, comprehensive political ideology. The two studies are nevertheless interconnected, insofar as the former represents the discursive processes within the political scene in which the Green Parties have assumed a major role. Ecological modernisation, recognising ecological problems as policy issues, has undoubtedly been facilitated by the role of the Green Parties. Their mission, however, was to establish an alternative political ideology which would overcome the techno-institutional fix and the complacency of the establishment. The need to understand the relationship between the social and the ecological was an ideological battlefield left solely to the Greens. Other studies have also examined the programmes of the Green parties. However, their analyses mainly focused on policies, even when attempting to go beyond specific environmental issues.45 However, discourse analysis provides perceptive tools which transcend the content of particular policies, so that the interaction of society and a political newcomer can be revealed through the subtexts of programmes and manifestos. The underlying value-system, the main controversies and the alternative political concepts can be decontested by paying close attention to the main concepts, metaphors, references and climate contributing to the ideological picture. Discourse analysis can be utilised to investigate two major functions of the Green programmes. The first of these involves moulding the political identity of a compound actor. The obvious discursive mechanism for forming an identity is providing a characterisation of the ‘other’ – in this case, the established parties, their ideologies and their underlying ethos. The political identity is thus a negative, a mirror image of the dominant ‘super-ideology’ which the new political actor seeks to uproot and replace. The second function is related to the first, and concerns the discursive strategy which the Green Parties developed for facilitating the transformation of the dominant

Introduction xxiii

political discourse. A crucial difference between the British and German Greens would thereby be exposed: the former, hoping to utilise the existing convictions of the dominant discourse – the belief in science, progress, growth and so on – in order to convince the British public that environmental problems, newly discovered by science, demanded a change in priorities. The German Greens, on the other hand, developed an alternative ethos which condemned the premises of growth, materialism and science-led technocratic solutions, in the hope of convincing the Germans to change their value system itself. These two discursive strategies which adhere to the line of the political cultures of the respective nations will be revealed during the course of the analysis.

Sources and methodological resources The main effort of this book centres on a systemic analysis of the developments of two Green Parties’ ideologies – the German and the British. The primary sources are the evolving corpus of writing produced by the two parties and their electoral platforms and political programmes which are analysed diachronically, providing the backbone of the study. The programmes of the Green Parties transcend, in their importance, the manifestos of other parties, since they perform a major role in shaping the political identity of the new political actor. Through a systemic analysis of the evolution of the Green Parties, as reflected in their political programmes, we will show the function of crystallising a political identity, defining the faults of the existing parties and their worldviews, and generating a strategy for transformation – first and foremost changing the value- and beliefsystem. The analysis will suggest that the uniqueness of the Green ideology is, in part, due to the fact that the Greens have evolved as a compound political actor, and that internal diversity thus constitutes one of the central pillars of their ideology. A complementary volume of literature, produced by the various ideological currents will therefore serve as the supporting material for this book. However, the two cases in point differ substantially in terms of the material available. The German Greens have, indeed, endorsed from the beginning a plurality of actors, thereby encouraging ideological activity among the various independent currents. In this case, the main effort has been to establish these materials, hitherto not thoroughly analysed as a constitutive part of the analysis of the ideology of the Greens while providing a framework for analysing this massive body of literature.46 Secondly, there was a need to construct a conceptual tool which would account for the selection process experienced by the different currents over the years. The modular ideology, which exposes the tensions between the common ideological frame and the sub-ideologies, has been instrumental in providing the vehicle for understanding the internal dynamic among the different German Green currents.

xxiv Introduction

In the British case, two problems have emerged in this respect: first, from the political point of view, the UK Greens adopted the strategy of presenting the British public with a unified message, which meant that they worked hard to conceal their internal plurality. On the ideological front, the British Greens indeed thought of themselves, for over a decade, as the party of the environment, with nothing substantial to say about society or politics, beyond environmentally related policies. It was therefore the case that ideological differences were not discussed, and a unified leadership sought to draw media attention to a single, comprehensive message concerning the environment. Only in the late 1980s did both the political and the ideological fronts change: subsequent waves of new supporters imported into the British Greens the cadres of the New Left and the NSMs. Moreover, their own ecological analysis led them to realise that ecological issues can only be addressed in relation to other social and political processes occurring in advanced democracies, necessitating a reassessment of their worldview. Accordingly, the main diversification of the supportive materials for the modular ideology in the British case emerged in recent years. These materials do not take the form of ideological documents produced by the various streams within the party, but in books and articles published in other fora by individuals within the Green Party. Thus, in the German case, the ideologies of the currents were evident in the form of platforms, their books and writings (published by a party-associated publishing house)47 and magazines (such as the Kommune and Schrägstrich, which were identified with the Greens) provided a platform for ideological debate. Their British counterparts, however, discouraged internal diversification as part of their political strategy for generating a unified public face, and even party-related publications (such as Econews and Green World) focused mainly on direct-action events and analysis of environmental problems or policies therefore contributing very little to any ideological analysis. It has therefore been necessary to complement written material with interviews and long discussions with the members and leaders of the BGP, in order to discern a diversification process which is, in fact, only in its infancy. Thus, the BGP entered the diversification stage, the trademark of its German counterpart since 1979, only in 1992, after the dominant leadership left the party. Nevertheless, the very existence of the diversification process – both on the political and ideological fronts – confirms the hypothesis that a Green ideology will only survive in the ideological universe in the form of a modular ideology. The difference between the two cases is also apparent in the available analytical literature. Whereas the German Greens have captured the imagination of many analysts, the British Greens have attracted very little attention. In both cases, however, analysts have largely ignored the ideological developments and resorted to political issues. An important manifestation of this is the account of the major controversies that have erupted within the two parties. Most analyses

Introduction xxv

of the German Greens have concentrated on the Fundis–Realos controversy, similarly, the Centralist–Decentralist controversy was the centre of focus in Britain. However, as this study would establish, this fault line actually overshadows other political, economic and social cleavages with much more significant ideological implications. Methodologically, this difference between the two parties bears directly on the approach used in each case. When dealing with the German Greens’ ideology, we shall first explore how the same political platform can be read by different political groups through their own ideological jargon. How, for example, the understanding of the concept of ‘ecology’ differs in the worldview of the socialists, feminists, grassroots activists, Christians and conservative Greens. However, trying to read the British manifestos in these different ways would be to miss the target completely. Instead, the investigation will focus on how the Greens avoided existing ideological jargon, trying not to alienate, while simultaneously safeguarding themselves against allegations of, affiliation with radical ideologies (Marxists, anarchists, feminists and so on). The evolution of the Green ideology, and the transformations it underwent in both cases, would thus be established.

The structure of the book The first part of the book sets the political and the theoretical stage. The first chapter presents the emergence of the Greens as a collective political actor, and suggests the problems of analysing its worldview given its diverse sources and histories. The second chapter critically examines the state of the art by reviewing the main approaches to the ideology of the Greens. It then provides a theoretical framework for the study of ideologies and introduces the modular ideology – the explanatory tool for addressing the problems identified in the first chapter. The second part reviews the formation and transformation of the ideology of the German Greens, focusing in each stage on a different aspect of the evolution of the party. The third chapter traces the formation phase, in particular the considerations leading to the establishment of the party and analyses the extreme-Right to radical-Left coalition of the Greens. The fourth chapter accounts for the philosophical transformation which the New Left underwent, creating the basis for a new political philosophy. The fifth chapter traces the discursive processes which allowed for a Green language, as well as a supposedly new paradigm, to develop among the different Green factions, leading also to the beginning of a political selection. The sixth chapter provides a review of the conversion stage of the Green Ideology, while the seventh chapter accounts for a thematic analysis of the Green spectrum by carefully differentiating the ideological currents and constructing the overarching worldview which commonly emerges. The final chapter looks at the political scene in Germany, in view of the 1989

xxvi Introduction

reunification process, the federation with Bündnis90, and the fall – and resurgence – of the party in 1990 and 1994. Finally, the concept of Greens in power sharing government with ministerial positions is analysed and the viability of the Green Party within the German political system in the beginning of the new Millennium is reassessed. The third part analyses the British Green Party. Chapter 8 accounts for the British particularity – the distinct electoral system and the traditional suspicion of the British political culture towards ideologies. The tenth chapter traces the formation of the party, after the failure of establishing an environmental movement, analysing its Right-wing nationalism. The next chapter explores the political strategy of centrism, adopted by the Ecology Party, and the ideological shift towards radical realism. The eleventh chapter provides an account of the belated ideological diversification process, and the opening up of the Green worldview in the 1990s to issues of social justice. Chapter 12 analyses the conceptual transformation into a modular ideology of the 2001 BGP. The fourth part offers a comparative discussion of the two different political cultures within which the Green Parties have created their own political niche, examining the ideological discursive strategies used by the two parties in their political environments. The modular ideology is critically discussed in the Conclusion, positioned as a post-liberal and post-Marxist political ideology.

Part I The Political and Theoretical Settings

1 The Greens: the Emergence of a Compound Collective Political Actor

The first part of the book critically observes the emergence of the Greens – or rather the problems of devising an analytical framework to account for this emergence – and demonstrates the need for a reconceptualisation of ideology, thus providing a theoretical framework for the discussion. The analysis of the new compound political actor may be approached from three different perspectives: the historical circumstances of the emergence of its bearer – and the consequential structural implications; the perceptions of its practitioners and ideologues; and a conceptual approach which illustrates the alternative worldview. The theoretical level is placed within this context – considering the different approaches of social scientists to Green ideology and reflecting on the problems of applying the classic concept of ideology to the Green case.1 Throughout these perspectives the internal tensions that call for a new theoretical framework will be demonstrated. It will be argued that all these perspectives point to the shortcomings of the available studies of the Green parties, as well as of the concepts of ideology, and suggest a different approach to the theory of ideology. The first three perspectives, offering the political and conceptual background, are discussed in this chapter, while the theories of ideology will be analysed in the second chapter.

Structural perspective: historical situatedness Attempting to provide the historical background within which we may consider the development of a distinct ideology by the NSMs and the extraparliamentary opposition is inherently problematic. Which ‘history’ should be considered – that of each individual social movement – peace, the women’s and human rights movements, the Third World and the environmental movements – or their co-active efforts? What should be the starting point – with, say, the Green feminists of the 1980s, the secondwave feminists of the 1960s, first-wave women’s movements of the nineteenth century or with the status of women since early human history? 3

4

The Political and Theoretical Settings

Within which geopolitical boundaries should they be analysed – individual nation states, industrialised countries or the global village? Which manifestations should we discuss – local, national or international – and which materials ought to be examined – written documents, social patterns of behaviour or political actions? And finally, what criteria should be adopted for taking these decisions? These questions indicate that the political actor dealt with in this book is comprised of autonomous collectives with independent agenda, interconnecting in a complex way.2 Crucially, the fact that it is a compound collective political actor is a central feature predisposing its social modes of behaviour, political action and ideological inclinations. It is a compound actor as there is a shared platform on which different, sometimes contradictory groups coexist. While the different histories of the NSMs could be individually reviewed, part of what makes them one collective political actor, is the historical context which drew the different movements together under the political circumstances of the 1970s. Thus, the historical situatedness, namely, the political setting which sparked the contemporaneous reaction of different collective actors to the philosophical and institutional grievances of the existing order within advanced industrial democracies, is an immanent factor in the emergence of the compound actor – the Greens. The umbrella organisation representing all of the different movements came to be identified with the ecology movement. As one commentator put it: ‘the ecology movement has created a climate of opinion in which nobody can be or wants to be against ecology. An ecological awareness has taken hold of society.’3 The penetration of environmental consciousness into the political realm is therefore a good point from which to approach the intersection of the different movements under the historical circumstances of the 1970s. The environmental setting Environmental exploitation has always been an integral aspect of human activity, a natural part, as it were, of our way of life. However, the radical transformations in demographic, geographical and socio-economic patterns which matured in the late nineteenth century, led the Western industrial Empires to rely heavily on global natural resources for their rapid growth. World resources were gradually incorporated into a single, central pool of capital managed largely through the mechanisms of the international markets, the consequence of which was the rapid depletion of resources on a world-wide scale. Only after the recovery from two world wars did relatively affluent and stable advanced industrial democracies emerge.4 Nevertheless, they were under the sway of the new balance of power which resulted from the Cold War, and which exacerbated environmental problems, and paved their way onto the political agenda.5 By far the most profound concern, which led to environmental awareness taking root in Western

The Emergence of the Greens 5

societies, was the very real prospect of global destruction by nuclear war, which posed an existential threat to each and every individual.6 The culmination of this global threat and personal anxiety, in the name of national interest, was the driving force behind the widely popular realisation that a thorough assessment of environmental issues was fundamental for a humane future. However, nuclear war, disposal of nuclear waste, ABC weapons and the accelerated arms-race are only the tip of a rapidly melting iceberg of environmental problems threatening to flood the shores of the global village.7 Thus, colonial powers inflicted irredeemable damage on the regional ecosystems, local communities and cultural traditions of the so-called Third World. This inheritance was abandoned, in the wake of post-colonialism, largely to the will of the multinationals, the World Bank and market forces. Development-led economies, the dictum of all national governments, sought growth, even at the expense of depleting limited natural resources, the oil crisis being only a case in point. The growth-oriented approach dictated rapid industrialisation, facilitated by international trade agreements and the construction of massive infrastructures for local mass production and transitional transportation. The side-effects were, inter alia, the hole in the ozone layer, global warming, damage to the world’s green lungs and increasing pollution of air, water and soils. Consequently, natural landscapes were drained, leading to the eradication of ecosystems, the abolition of diverse habitats and the extinction of species. The advances of late capitalism and its providers were complemented by the demands of a fully fledged consumer society. This was in turn fuelled by aggressive advertising, business centres and shopping malls, decisively changing the spatial, temporal and psychological settings of entire regions within the developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. The spread of consumer culture produced pleasant working, shopping and leisure environments within an increasingly crowded, impoverished and polluted world. Decreasing supply and increasing demand delivered consumer goods wrapped in environmentally related health problems, bound with questions concerning the quality of life. Grave environmental issues may, hence, be detected on varying scales, ranging from the atmospheric, to the global, regional, national, local and personal realms. Crucially, the disregard for the environment in advanced democracies is inscribed in the very letters of democratic theory, and spelled out in the main political institutions and practices of this system of government. Three features are especially telling in this respect. First, being a non-social entity, the environment can, at best, achieve second-order representation. It is therefore, by and large, excluded from the discourse on rights, interests and justice.8 Secondly, environmental problems do not necessarily coincide with national borders, and affected segments of the population are not usually congruent with the dominant socio-economic cleavages within parliamentary politics. Thirdly, environmental considerations are, in most

6

The Political and Theoretical Settings

cases, at odds with basic economic drives, which are dominant in the political system in terms of national economic interests, the Left–Right continuum, and the political culture. Thus, the process of institutionalising democratic political systems and thereby significantly constraining the ability of environmental issues to be politically addressed, has been entrenched.9 Ecology as the forerunner of New Politics issues Despite the uniqueness of the environmental case, and the apparent discrepancy between the natural world and social problems, ecological concerns were instrumental in facilitating the interrelations of the different NSMs constituting the locus of political protest.10 Ecological issues were the most radical example of the above problems within advanced democracies. The discourse on rights excluded not only Nature, but foreign workers, ethnic minorities and, arguably, women. Issues of nuclear war, endangered cultures and immigration transcend national borders. Economic interests usually dominate the public agenda, rendering it impenetrable to new political demands centred on identity, culture and community. Ecological problems also exemplified the interconnectedness of economic, social and environmental processes, hitherto outside the scope of the political realm. The failure to address ecological problems is disturbing particularly since they pose a threat to human existence, health and the quality of life on the individual, local, national and international levels. This exposed the need to extend political discourse to new issues, thereby establishing the politicisation of the personal, the communal and the global. Furthermore, the historical events of the 1970s, the oil crisis of 1973–74, the subsequent emergence of nuclear power stations and the stationing of missiles in Europe at the turn of the decade, provided a linear escalation which led to the accumulation of the critical mass of the NSMs, and united them in their struggle. The framework of the political order, both within and between nation-states, was challenged. Finally, global–ecological argumentation provided a systemic framework for a comprehensive critique. For example, nuclear power stations were not analysed solely for their contribution to atomic war. The risks they posed to the local community and the population into which nuclear waste would be transported, the possible implications for future generations, and the moral aspects were all mutually considered. The ecological perspective provided the NSMs with a new theoretical advantage for political critique. Thus, environmental concerns represent only one facet, albeit diverse and complex, of a cluster of problems – New Politics issues – that arose simultaneously with other social demands, and which radically challenged the political agenda in institutionalised democracies during the 1970s and 1980s. Crucially, the Limits to Growth thesis, the anti-nuclear campaign and the peace demonstrations challenged the dominant worldviews of both Left and Right. The absence of a straightforward partisan affiliation of the

The Emergence of the Greens 7

movements, proved instrumental in their struggle against the establishment. This wide wave of protest was sometimes supported by the opposition parties, and backed by a broad popular front of no particular political affiliation. The vast coalition of extraparliamentary opposition included remnants of the student and Marxist movements, but was also strongly backed by the churches and the traditional non-political organisations such as the women’s movements and environmental groups.11 Massive popular pressure piled up against the doors of national governments from outside the institutional walls of the established political system. The explicit and implicit institutional constraints conditioned the modes of political action of the NSMs. Furthermore, both the level of action and the subjects or objects of regard were overlooked by national democracies. NSMs targeted varied issues at the grassroots level – from road construction to forest protection, from minority rights to women’s self-defence, from peace demonstrations to Third World aid groups. All these issues dealt with policy areas related to disadvantaged groups or perspectives neglected or underrepresented by established political institutions. The NSMs specialised at generating mass mobilisation, launching their critique through unconventional means, inventing new political tools and employing a vast arsenal of means.12 Their decentralised, one-issue battles were gradually transformed into an anti-system war marked by deep alienation from established institutions and material culture, and inflamed by anxiety about the potential effects of the ruling system. For citizens active in the NSMs, traditional politics was distanced from the real concerns of ordinary people. Life and death, peace and war, hope and fear were the most striking binary oppositions which, in the face of apathy and despair, mobilised public support and celebrated direct political action against the politics of war.13 Tellingly, evidence of the worsening situation came not from statements of politicians, but from the outside world. The mounting environmental problems exemplified the impotence of political institutions. While national governments were locked into the international arena with issues of security and economics, environmental concerns traditionally at the margins of established political territory, took their place in the vanguard of extraparliamentary opposition. Significantly, this ‘environmental wasteland’ – the hitherto apolitical ground par excellence – did not mark a withdrawal from politics, but instead provided the battlefield for the struggle to shift the political grounds of the debate. Environmental issues provided the banner under which the struggle to define the ‘political’ itself was fought. Structural implications – a critique of institutional democracies We are now in a position to reconstruct the argument and examine its structural implications. That there are different histories from which to consider the emergence of the Greens, provides the first indication that our

8

The Political and Theoretical Settings

subject matter is a compound collective political actor. One of the multiple histories of the Greens, that is, that of the ecological movement, facilitated the integration of different social movements, for environmental problems were universal concerns. Moreover, these issues constitute the most radical example of the exclusion of new political issues from the public agenda. The ecological movement challenged the value-system of economic development, materialism and exploitation – the bedrock of advanced industrial societies. In this historical context, different collective actors responded to the varied grievances of mature democracies, and gradually realised their shared critique of the structures of the political system. The emergence of the Greens as a compound collective political actor transformed the individual, environmental and social battles into a political struggle concerning the meaning of politics itself. Indeed, New Politics, as it came to be known, was characterised by alternative forms of political action, including demonstrations, sit-ins, campaigns, the development of alternative media and information channels and the mobilisation of grassroots support on the one hand and international cooperation on the other.14 Structural mechanisms and co-ordinating frameworks, such as umbrella associations, local and national parties, and international NGOs provided the political arms of the social movements. The inability of the ruling institutions to provide efficient channels for immediate political influence, and the highly bureaucratic and centralised political organs accessible only to the few, were inversely reflected in the very nature of the growing NSMs. Their quintessential feature was their grassroots base, which was attuned to local politics, and could target specific policies, projects or plans. The movements were decentralised, volatile and dynamic in terms of issues, activists and leaders, but, if called upon, were available for mobilisation when regional, national or international issues arose on the agenda.15 Thus the structural problems of institutionalised democracies prompted a reaction from a wide-ranging extraparliamentary opposition. The diversity of this opposition is reflected in the internal composition of the Greens, a compound collective political actor, which, while maintaining the diversity of the new political issues, cooperates in the struggle to transform the political system. Any ideological account of the Greens would therefore have to reflect this internal duality.

An attitudinal perspective – the self-perceptions of the practitioners The fact that historically and analytically we can detect the emergence of a new collective political actor does not automatically entail a unified actor with a collective ideology. Traces of their worldview might, however, be detected in the political praxis itself.16 In the unique case of the Greens the rejection of the institutional political order was undoubtedly a unifying

The Emergence of the Greens 9

dimension. One central aspect was – beyond the diversity of issues and of modes of action used by the Greens – the varied types of collectives which were established. Citizens’ initiatives, ad hoc support groups, protest cells, non-governmental organisations and new social movements embodied a reaction against the unidimensionality of national party systems. The multiplicity of the forms of organisations of the Greens can certainly be understood as part of an alternative way of thinking about politics. In a dialectic way, therefore, the rejection of the established political institutions stirred a reactionary endorsement of the diverse groupings; in turn, the very diversity of the new collective actors suggested its unifying consciousness of one compound political actor – comprised of different groups. ‘Unity in diversity’ was the name Greens gave this idea.17 This dialectic process, by which the Greens rejected a certain aspect of the established system, formed a counter-reaction based on a diversity, diversity which had both autonomous ingredients and unifying principles, and thus established itself as a compound collective actor, is typical of New Politics. Note that this new compound actor may in itself be characterised as a new form which enriches the existing political order (rather than providing an alternative). In this section two crucial facets of this phenomenon are introduced; one, the foundation of New Politics Parties, two, the problem of ideology from the point of view of the Greens. Party, ideology and the logic of non-ideological anti-parties’ party While alternative modes of political action typically characterised the Greens, their establishment of what they called ‘alternative alliances’, in effect political parties, was a crucial and controversial move within the extraparliamentary opposition. Political parties – the building blocks of the existing order – were the embodiment of all what the Greens were against: interest-oriented institutions striving for political power and economic benefits by dividing – and ruling – the population through a reduction of politics into a one-dimensional Left/Right spectrum. The inaccessibility of the political system to non-traditional stances, the dominance of the political parties, the limited access into the established channels, and the reduction of civil participation to a vote every few years symbolised everything the extraparliamentary camp fought against. Consequently, for the Greens to found a political party could be regarded as actually legitimising the criticised system. They offered three main justifications for this.18 First, they had no alternative – given that they failed to exert any significant political influence, despite mounting pressure and the mobilisation of millions of people – but to establish alternative parties. This means of change from within seemed to be the only way by which the protest movement could bear on a political arena that is based on a party-system. Secondly, the Alternative, Rainbow, Left-libertarian and Green parties were only one element within a wide range of non-traditional modes of political action.

10 The Political and Theoretical Settings

The parties were therefore one weapon in the arsenal of the Greens, not the only, or even the central, means for their public activity. As Garner puts it ‘Although movements are not themselves institutionalised, they often use institutionalised means for attaining their goals; for example, forming political parties or winning court cases.’19 Thirdly, the Green Parties were structurally and perceptually constituted on principles which countered the major problems embodied by the traditional parties. Tellingly, the Greens defined themselves as an anti-parties’ party. As a movement party, a coordinating body tuned to the grassroots, they had (at least in theory) a mechanism for countering the features of the traditional parties. The agenda was to be set by the issues and activists on the ground, rather than by some established body motivated by interest-oriented, reality-distorting ideology. Here comes to the fore a more subtle feature of the Greens which has vital analytical significance. The constitutive feature of the established parties, in the eyes of the Greens, was the fact that they were ideological. That is, they perceived the political arena through the interests of their electorate, subjecting the public sphere to particular economic demands. While repudiating ideology in principle, the Greens, who perceived themselves as ‘neither Right nor Left but up front’,20 also rejected the actual ideological spectrum. All the established parties, according to the Green viewpoint, in fact adhere to the same ‘super-ideology’, differing only in questions of redistribution. They all presuppose an infinite world which can be exploited further to produce ever-accelerating growth. Economic growth, causing competitiveness, alienation, materialism and consumerism, reflects the policy of advanced industrial societies and leads to the global crisis. It was, therefore, conceptually unthinkable to generate a Green ideology.21 This tension has far-reaching analytical implications. It indicates the Green self-denial of their own political worldview and implies a disjunction between the analysis of Green ideology and their self-awareness of this ideology. A major difficulty with analysing the ideology of the Greens surely lies with the fact that its practitioners and theoreticians perceived ideology as an embodiment of the shortcomings of the system. Thus, the study of the political ideology of the Greens was neglected, not least due to the fact that the Greens themselves adamantly denied professing an ‘ideology’. They claimed that the ruling conventional parties, whose quintessential feature is their different ideologies, and the political system whose dominant characteristic is the choice between these ideologies, is by nature inclined to disregard the real world. Parties pursue their own interests of political and economic power, while inflicting damage on people, on society, and on the environment – the supportive life-system on which humans and the natural world depend. The proof of this destruction, the Green argument went, was not rooted in yet another ideology, but in reality itself. The growing evidence of the damage lay in the underlying

The Emergence of the Greens 11

belief of the Enlightenment creed – from science itself. Through its investigation of processes in the external world, science provides evidence of the impact of ecological issues on the personal, local, national and global levels. Ecological problems thus added a unique aspect to the traditional view of ideology. They demonstrated the existence of a dichotomy between the ideological discourse on the one hand, and the real world on the other. The failure of the political power holders to recognise the severity of the problems and to address them was reinforced by the rationale offered by self-interested parties. The Greens pointed to the political system’s failure to account for the problems which, in their view, necessitated a new Realism, rather than another ideology. The limits of an attitudinal perspective and a structural account So far, the discussion exposed the reluctance of the Greens to establish political parties and their inhibitions about forming a Green ideology. In the former case, the argument can either be that the Greens have succumbed to the system, the fact being that they eventually established parties, or that despite the force of the system, they merely used the traditional channels instrumentally, to communicate their message. Forming new kinds of parties, which are but one facet of a range of New Politics phenomena, contributes to the change of balance between power-relations within the political sphere. However, the case is more difficult where ideology is concerned, as ideology is ‘the ideas held by the people who see themselves as connected to the movements.’22 How can one detect an ideology when the people themselves adamantly deny professing an ideology? Part of the answer was in the example at the opening of this section: the fact that the Greens celebrated diversity by forming alternative movements, organisations and parties embodied their rejection of the established political system and exposed principles of direct action, political participation, rejection of hegemony, and endorsement of political pluralism as ideological views. As is already clear, in many cases the analysis of Green ideologies is not a description of what Greens say about ideology, but the translation of their political praxis into ideological principles. Another example of that is the discrepancy between Green perceptions of themselves and analytical approaches to them as is evident in the different conceptualisations of a very fundamental aspect of the Greens, namely, their diverse roots and concerns. The assortment of issues addressed by the Greens – environmental degradation, women’s inequality, Third World exploitation, armaments, cultural diversity, foreign workers’ rights – hardly seem to form a coherent platform. Making a virtue out of this necessity, the Greens rejoiced in their diversity and nonconformity to a single worldview, and in their spontaneous direct-action approach. For the Greens, the fact that people could unite in common concerns, regardless of their ideological inclinations, was

12 The Political and Theoretical Settings

a virtue.23 Consequently, they conducted action-oriented, issue-led politics, which was also reflected in the programmes of the New Politics parties and platforms. These often included a comprehensive critique of the establishment, combined with concrete policies on specific problems. This apparent eclecticism was therefore seen by the Greens as embodying a new valuesystem. It offered a counter model to the ideological parties, insofar as it lacked systematisation, lucidity, interest-orientation and hegemony which the established parties stood for. However, whether the array of conflicts in point have any common feature, and whether Green activists share any structural features which unite them in a politically significant way, are independent of the question of whether the Greens provided the answers to these queries. My contention is that the emergence of these conflicts is rooted in two features of advanced industrial democracies.24 The first is the changing nature of the international economy and the job market in advanced industrial societies, which gave rise to issues such as foreign workers, the underclass, unequal pay and massive unemployment. The second is the institutionalisation of democracies into rigid political structures which limited political mobilisation, participatory politics and empowerment of people thereby creating a new set of conflicts related to the rights of ethnic minorities, the disabled, refugees, women and homosexuals. Thus, Green parties provide a provisional explanation to all the issues they address, while perceiving it as a reclamation of the system. Nevertheless, these varied issues result from structural changes in advanced industrial democracies which have given rise to a new set of conflicts generated by new collective actors.25 Therefore, the attitudes of the Greens towards the ideological parties suggest, first of all, that they regarded ideology as the quintessential feature of the party-based political system. Secondly, that they rejected ideology in both principle and practice. The entire ideological spectrum was condemned by the Greens, since the underlying premise of both the Left and Right is that infinite growth and progress are possible. Challenging the ethos of materialism, the Greens thus questioned the very foundation of the current political culture represented by the classical parties and have therefore consciously abstained from developing their own ideology. Thirdly, that the Greens’ self-denial of ideology has hindered, in their early years, the crystallisation of their own political worldview. The practitioners could not be regarded as fully aware of their own ideology. Hence, there is analytical work to be done to bridge the gap between Greens’ self-perception and a conceptualisation of their political ideology. A central aim of this book is to trace the formation of the Green ideology and to examine its transformations. The study seeks to account for the structure of an ideology which continuously allows new political issues to be incorporated into it. Furthermore, the changing attitudes of the Greens towards their own political ideology will be exposed.

The Emergence of the Greens 13

As is apparent from the structural and attitudinal perspectives, the subject matter of this book is a new compound political actor which emerges against the backdrop of institutionalised industrial democracies. Whereas a plausible course of study would have been an independent analysis of its different autonomous components in an attempt to discern the ideology of each part, followed by designing the implied shared worldview,26 the route which was chosen here is different in kind. For while each of the new social movements and non-governmental organisations emerging in the 1970s–1980s, had its own aims and beliefs, and – beyond short-term or ad hoc campaign coalitions – did not attempt to find the interconnections with the other movements, New Politics parties were the only bodies aspiring to represent the collective worldview of the extraparliamentary camp, and pursuing a comprehensive change of the system itself – not just this or that policy area. As O’Neill observes: ‘The emergence of Green parties which have tried to assimilate the various, occasionally competing, strands of the new politics within a cogent party framework, has been the most serious attempt yet to address this problem.’27 They were also the only part of the non-partisan opposition which sought to establish direct links with other parts of the diverse movements and to form a participatory mechanism that would enable cooperation on how to instigate the political change. The main problem that their attitudinal perspective exposed is the reluctance of the Greens to engage themselves with developing an ideology, in the sense which characterises the established parties. The mere foundation of parties could still be taken as a part of a larger strategy which enhances the diversity of New Politics. In the case of ideology – not merely a form of institution, but also a content and value-laden framework – the problems were of a different kind. An illustration of what an alternative worldview might look like, and how it does not merely replace one central ideological concept with another, but attempts a comprehensive change of the framework of ideology itself, is the subject matter of the next section.

The conceptual perspective – an illustration The two perspectives introduced above may be seen as contextual approaches insofar as they reflect a reaction to an existing mode of political practice and philosophy. Arguably, while each of them is structurally or attitudinally explicit, they both derive from a conceptual rejection of some fundamental aspect of the prevailing political order. Thus, the structure of the Greens, as a compound collective political actor, embodies the rejection of the main features of the established political parties. Green attitudes toward ideology – as an interest-oriented set of perceptions that ignore reality – stem from a conceptual rejection of the concept of ideology itself. Conceptual thinking is indeed at the basis of all contextual perspectives. Nevertheless, the ideational system of the Greens is still far from clear. A conceptual illustration should

14 The Political and Theoretical Settings

indicate what an alternative ideological structure might consist of. This may be achieved by analysing a critique of one of the core concepts of the so-called dominant ideology. By extrapolating from the principles which underlie the Green resentment towards that concept, a proposal for guidelines for an alternative worldview will be put forward. Curiously, a good starting point is provided by Bell himself, who contrasts the ideologies of the nineteenth century with those of the twentieth century, thus: ‘The driving forces of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the largest sense, freedom. The impulsion of the new ideologies are economic development and national power.’28 What characterises mass ideologies in Asia, Africa, Russia and China, and also in the West is ‘no longer the old idea of the free society but the new one of economic growth … “economic development” has become a new ideology.’29 Economic growth is one of the basic concepts, which more than any other, reflects an inverse image of the ideology of the Greens. The notion of economic growth exposes us to the sensitivities of the Greens in terms of the scope, the issues, the political mode of action and the ethos of the current system. Crucially though, the Greens did not replace economic growth in toto with its supposed counterpart, concern for nature. Rather, the very principles of the positive ideology of the Greens are embedded in their critique of the different aspects of economic growth, and not in an alternative, comprehensive conceptual system based on ecology. If economic growth had a facilitating role since the Enlightenment, it emerged as the name of the game in the aftermath of the Second World War. The limits to growth thesis, underlying the notion of the impossibility of infinite progress in view of the limited resources of the global ecosystem, was pivotal in disputing this ethos. Rejection of the impulse of economic growth conveys a multi-level critique of the prevalent material culture. On the international level, the globalisation of the markets led to the creation of a common pool of natural resources, manpower and goods. It imposed a standardisation based on GNP and levels of development, creating a unitary ladder for judging all nations and peoples. Consequently, cultural traditions and local knowledge were devalued as Western culture imposed itself on the rest of the world. Within advanced industrial nations, the ethos of materialism was strongly linked to changes in job markets, the emergence of the new middle classes and the culture of consumerism which took hold of affluent society.30 On a national level the materialist ethos was markedly manifested in the fact that the entire ideological spectrum of Left and Right endorsed the cause of economic growth, differing only on the margins of redistributive measures. Economic interests, therefore, determined the political representation of citizens, and their political identity reduced to that of bettering their economic lot. On the communal and personal levels, individuals are thus defined by their jobs, and well-being is measured in terms of material prosperity, wealth and economic prospects.

The Emergence of the Greens 15

A crucial point emerges from a comparison between ecology, as analysed in the first section, and economic growth. There certainly is an environmental dimension to the international, national, local and personal levels of the analysis. In fact, the ecological dimension strengthens the global aspects and endows the analysis with an interconnected framework of reference based on the (eco)system approach.31 Many analysts and Greens have therefore concluded that the very notion of economic growth should be abandoned and replaced by a contrasting core concept, namely, regard for Nature. Importantly though, whereas an ecological perspective may provide an elegant theoretical anchoring for an alternative ideology, the ideology of the Greens is not an ecological ideology per se. The ecological dimension is but one of many areas used to criticise economic growth. Thus, the different dimensions – the economic, cultural, social and moral – are no less important and certainly cannot be reduced to the environmental critique. Indeed, the multiplicity of dimensions from which the critique is imbued, and the fact that each dimension represents an independent and comprehensive realm, is one of the most important lessons. In other words, the critique is directed not only against the economic manifestations of the dominant material culture, but against its unidimensionality. By conducting the critique on different levels, and exposing the damage from diverse dimensions, a fundamental message of the Greens is revealed. Since they reject the imposed (economic) unidimensionality, it is unlikely that their alternative worldview would revolve around a different single dimension, ecology notwithstanding. The diversity of perspectives is itself an ideological mainstay, and the plurality of realms comprising the individual and the society provides a helpful insight into their philosophy of life. If, however, one were to choose one arena in which the implications are the most radical, the choice might well be politics itself. For, notably, whereas each dimension stands on its own as a critique and an alternative discourse from which to approach the public good, the claim is that, in addition, each of these dimensions is political. Put differently, the political arena cannot be left for the economic interests of power holders alone while cultural, social or environmental issues are perceived as non-political. Rather, aspects of the quality of life, sustainable development, cultural traditions, natural ecosystems and moral considerations should be regarded as part of the politics. These are competing fields on resource-allocation and should be included in the public agenda by expanding the political discourse. Thus, the current political system is criticised for identifying economic growth as dominating public life, although the protest is not merely directed against the product of the material culture, namely the onedimensional man,32 but against one-dimensional politics which entrenches personal and social modes of behaviour in their material sphere. While at first sight such demands echo traditionally liberal strands of pluralism and self-realisation, they diverge on a crucial point. ‘Politics of

16 The Political and Theoretical Settings

difference’ is not confined to the level of the individual, but to the selfdetermination of collective actors. It further accepts cultural, moral and environmental stances as constituting one’s political identity. Moreover, since a person is not restricted to one political affiliation, the close identification between a political party and individual identity can be broken. Thus, the claim is that the liberal divide between the public and the private not only limits politics to economic interests, but also replicates patterns of subordination from the public sphere to the private. The personal is the political, since the individual’s identity is constrained and constructed upon the opportunities and priorities dictated by the political realm. The classic liberal distinction is ideologically condemned for reiterating discrimination patterns under the guise of the private. Reflecting on this conceptual illustration suggests several consequences for an alternative ideology for the Greens. First, the concept of economic growth is not random, but represents the very essence of the criticised material society. The fundamental rejection of consumerism, given the limits to growth, calls for a rethinking of the notions of progress and quality of life, and consequently of the political order ingrained in this non-viable ethos. Second, the one-dimensionality of material culture is criticised from diverse perspectives, each of which suggests itself as an alternative social discourse, and all of which call for a change from a unilateral judgement about social life to a more compound worldview, where public sensitivities are channelled into a wider array of realms. Third, changing the public agenda is a political task, at whose centre lies the task of changing what is regarded as political. If health, natural environment, tradition, schooling, work and leisure-time are taken to be criteria for public decisions concerning the allocation of resources, then the political culture itself is in dispute. Finally, a political ideology which endorses these guidelines must have, from the outset, basic principles such as respect for others, pluralism and tolerance, while bestowing autonomy to its ideological currents regarding the issues, realm, preferences and identity from which they approach the political. If there is an ideological structure which can hold such a complex ideational construction together, it cannot be sustained by the traditional concept of ideology. The context of the emergence of the Greens demonstrates the complexity of analysing their ideology: the historical development of the Extraparliamentary Opposition and the Greens’ self-perception of the political leg of the movements; their abhorrence of the established political parties, identified by their dominating ideologies; and the rejection of the underlying concept on which the whole ideological axis is founded – economic growth. The theoretical implications call for the introduction of a new type of ideological structure into the study of ideologies. For that to take place, the state of the art in analysing Green ideology should be discussed.

2 A Green Ideology? From Exclusive Models to an Inclusive Framework

The theoretical stage for a new type of political ideology can now be set. At the outset, it was already demonstrated that the ‘end of ideology’ thesis left little room for newly emerging traditional ideologies to be established, dismissing the possibility that the extraparliamentary opposition and the New Left have anything new to offer on ideological grounds. The emergence of the Greens as a compound political actor, and their very reluctance to admit having to mould an ideology, suggest that the traditional understanding concerning the concept of ideology might be inadequately equipped, as it is, to encompass the political worldview of the Greens. This chapter tackles the problem of the ideology of the Greens from two further angles. First, the attempts of political theorists to account for a Green Ideology are classified and critically reviewed. The state of the art in terms of the dominant approaches to the ideology of the Greens explicates the spectrum of analytical attitudes, demonstrating – by the sheer incompatibility of the different models – the need for a synthetic framework for the analysis. Second, the analytical perspective is then complemented by a theoretical one, which re-examines the study of ideologies, introduces the modular ideology and places it within a different approach to the theory of ideologies.

Ideological perspectives: the state of the art A consideration of the different analytical approaches to Green Ideology should demonstrate the limited applicability of the conventional concept of ideology to the Green case. Despite the inhibitions of the new political newcomer itself, analysts have attempted to account for its ideology by way of using traditional categories available to the study of ideologies. Four approaches have dominated the field. The first argued that the Greens did not form any positive political ideology. The second suggested that they merely reiterated socialist ideas, reconstructing Marxist socialism. The third claimed that a new ideology has emerged whose touchstone some believed 17

18 The Political and Theoretical Settings

to be the cluster of Man–Nature relations, but which others saw as the emergence of New Politics. The short exposition of these approaches should not serve to refute or support one or the other, but to suggest that the very possibility of their coexistence illustrates the singularity of the political ideology in question. This, in turn, requires an altogether different approach to ideology.

The Greens – a multifaceted opposition? The Greens were established as a ‘heterogeneous coalition whose eclectic origins were clearly manifest’1 and which expressed diverse political demands. This self-perception of the Greens and particularly their rejection of the established ideological parties2 and claim to represent a new type of party, has led many researchers to accept this claim uncritically and – as captured in their characterisation of the Green Parties as ‘a parliamentary alliance’3 or ‘Sammelungspartei’4 – to dismiss the search for an ideological pattern altogether. This was reinforced by the lack of a ‘mechanism which automatically aggregated interest and goals into a coherent ideological or organisational framework’.5 The uncritical adoption of Greens’ self-perception is noted by Kolinsky: The tendency of authors with political affinities to the Greens to adopt as analytical criteria the keywords given out by the party of their choice has been encouraged by the findings of Inglehart and others on the emergence of new values and political orientations … a match between Green pronouncements and Green party realities has simply been assumed, not investigated.6 Curiously, Kolinsky takes this statement to repudiate attempts to search for a comprehensive ideology: ‘the Green party organisation seems little more than a convenient label for a disjointed and divided assortment of policies and a multifaceted opposition’.7 Such observations appear to coincide with the characteristics of the Greens as presented above, namely, their own rejection of ideology and their issues-oriented politics. This suggested, for many analysts, that the features of the NSMs did not allow them to withstand long-term political processes. These problematic features were first and foremost their social mobilisation around contentious, but shortlived subjects, and their alternative politics, which flourished on fluctuating waves of protest.8 Indeed, the decline of partisan affiliation suggested that the NSMs sought to provide an alternative to traditional institutions and were therefore unlikely to promote political patterns of the establishment which they rejected.9 More perceptive analysts, however, did not dismiss the ideological manifestations of the Greens out of hand. Thus, Kuechler and Dalton argued

A Green Ideology? 19

that ‘in essence, there is one ideological bond uniting the core members of the peace, the environmental and the feminist movements … . This ideological bond has two major traits: a humanistic critique of the prevailing system and the dominant culture … and a resolve to fight for a better world’.10 The drawback, they argue, is the following: Their concept of the future society is largely negatively defined. They know what they don’t want but they are unsure and inconsistent with respect to what they want in operational details. The absence of a strict doctrine may suggest that we could call these movements ‘post-ideological’.11 Thus, while the impetus of the NSMs is entangled with an ideological critique substantiated on different content levels, the lack of social vision suggests that the Greens might be post-ideological. Is this the case? First, such attitudes tend to accept the traditional dichotomy between the political and the social. They analyse the Greens more as a social than as a political phenomenon, and the challenge to the political order is viewed in terms of alternative modes of public mobilisation. They therefore disregard the ideological claim of the NSMs, that the social, the personal and the environmental are in themselves political, and consequently, that belonging to a social movement is a political, rather than a cultural, declaration.12 Secondly, such analyses fail to account for historical dynamics. While in the late 1970s, NSMs mobilised political protest on concrete issues, and did not profess any comprehensive worldview, it stands to reason that, by the late 1990s, the political offspring of the movements, namely the alternative parties, would have rethought their positions. Thirdly, such developments justify a systematic consideration of their ideological manifestations. While such an investigation should not imply at the outset that a distinct ideology exists, such a task is long overdue. The Greens – updated Marxism? Some of the better studies have maintained that the Greens are essentially left-libertarians, and that their project is to reconstruct Marxist socialism with due adaptations to ecological problems.13 The thrust of the argument is not that the Greens have actually developed a distinct ideology, but that their ideational configuration updates social democratic convictions, refashioning them in an adequate form for the 1990s. Markovits and Gorski argued that the Greens’ conviction that they were inventing a completely new politics was not only concocted from Marxist ingredients (‘complete restructuring’ of a ‘new society’) but that, in retrospect, ‘this claim seems exaggerated (and even a bit ironic) in light of the leftist pedigrees which most green activists and supporters earned in the Social Democratic Party, the K-groups or the ‘undogmatic’ Marxist organisations of the 1970s.’14

20 The Political and Theoretical Settings

They therefore argue that ‘green ideology in all its variants has been defined by the attempt to develop a theoretically grounded synthesis of ecological and socialist politics. Put differently, green ideologues aimed to reconstruct Marxian socialism’.15 While these issues will be comprehensively addressed in the next two chapters, suffice it to say here that both claims rest on a partial view. For example, Markovits and Gorski skilfully show that the Greens should be seen as a reaction to the Left. Yet, such a portrait does not convey the whole picture, since the main effort of the Greens was not merely directed against the Left, but rather against post-war post-industrial society at large. The Greens, as these authors demonstrate, were an obvious product of affluent society, and the political and social order of that society represented the Greens’ main concern. In other words, seeing the Greens merely as a Leftist phenomenon involves running the risk of mistaking their emergence solely as a reaction to the internal developments of the Left. Reducing the Green project to an evolution within Social Democratic politics marginalises the Green impact on the party-system and on political culture as a whole. Secondly, arguing that Green ideology aims solely at reconstructing Marxist socialism imposes a socialist creed on an ideology which is largely concerned with problems transcending Marxist socialist premises. The authors presume that post-Marxist developments are nevertheless Marxist, even if they are at odds with Marxist socialism itself. At this stage, suffice it to say that though Green concerns can be expressed in Marxist terminology, they also ‘speak’ with Christian, Feminist, Value-conservative and Radical-democrat voices. By disregarding these discourses, The German Left mistakes a Marxist perspective for the whole picture, which inevitably amounts to a conceptual distortion, especially when it claims to be the future European ideology of progressive politics. Thus, the fact that the Greens are a compound collective political actor proves instrumental in illustrating that a partial presentation of their worldview presents only one aspect that coexists alongside others. As the analysis itself attempts to demonstrate, even the socialist creed of the ex-Marxist Greens has undergone a transformation which has served to deconstruct Marxist socialism, refute its basic position and to reconstruct its insights and shape them into a different ideology. A new, ecological ideology? These two approaches to the question of the Green ideology have been complemented by a third, arguing for the emergence of a new ideology. Importantly, the advocates of this view can be divided into two distinct groups, which, as far as the analysis is concerned, have very little in common. The first group, mainly comprising political philosophers, has argued for an ecological ideology, the second, made up of political scientists in the

A Green Ideology? 21

main, has promoted a New Politics ideology. Different sets of problems are posed by both these approaches, and a slightly more thorough exposition is therefore needed to critique these two predominant approaches to Green ideology and the common misconceptions they entail, starting with the ecological approach to Green ideology. Rethinking ‘Green Political Thoughts’ On the face of it, books such as Dobson’s Green Political Thought, Eckersley’s Environmentalism and Political Theory, Goodin’s Green Political Theory, Hayward’s Ecological Thought and others suggest themselves as the soughtafter explication of Green Ideology.16 However, ecologism exhibits an inherent ideological deficiency, which undermines the exclusive position of this school of thought as interpreters of Green ideology. Thus, Eckersley introduces Environmentalism in the following manner: the ecological crisis has exposed the hitherto unexamined flip side of our Western humanist heritage. In the face of accelerated environmental degradation and species extinction, environmental philosophers are now asking: are we humans the only beings of value in the world? Does the world exist only for our benefit?17 The main danger of environmental philosophy is the attempt to establish, on the basis of man–nature relationships, the principles of the good society. Can, and should, man-to-man values be deduced from man-nature relationships? Even by ‘accepting that we must indeed widen the ambit of political discussion to include the question of our relationship to, and impact on, the nonhuman world’,18 like Eckersley does, one cannot decide, on this basis only, what the social, political and economic arrangements of society should be. Ecological awareness might be critical for social thinking, but ecology should not determine the principles of the good society. The limited role of ecology within Green ideology is here at stake. A brief critique of the argument of Green Political Thought further illustrates this point. ‘Ecologism’, argues Dobson, ‘makes the Earth as physical object the very foundation-stone of its intellectual edifice, arguing that its finitude is the basic reason why infinite population and economic growth are impossible and why, consequently, profound changes in our social and political behaviour need to take place’.19 Ecologism, we learn, is based on a fundamental critique of industrialism and offers in its place, a vision of a sustainable society. Thus, rethinking the relationship between humans and nature, in light of the limits to growth thesis, provides the cornerstone of Ecologism. Consequently, the importance of nature to ecologism … is not exhausted by the reasons why we should care for it. Ecologism’s thoroughgoing naturalism rests

22 The Political and Theoretical Settings

on the belief that human beings are natural creatures. On the one hand, this may involve the recognition (already canvassed) that there are many natural limits to human aspirations; on the other – and even more controversially – there is often a strong sense in which the natural world is taken as a model for the human world, and many of ecologism’s prescriptions for political and social arrangements are derived from a particular view of how nature ‘is’. This view, not surprisingly, is an ecological view.20 Dobson shows that social values can be extrapolated from nature, as follows: Diversity – toleration, stability and democracy Interdependence – equality Longevity – tradition Nature as ‘female’ – a particular conception of feminism.21 This approach can be criticised on three grounds. First, it is obvious that this interpretation of ecology is, to say the least, incomplete. Ironically, after the horrific consequences of social-Darwinism on human societies (which took pseudo-scientific conclusions based on ecological observations and projected them onto human societies, singling out the survival of the fittest, competition and Lebensraum – living-space – as justification for the most despicable atrocities against humans and humanity), it is curious that a new and supposedly enlightened ideology would seek refuge in another partial view of ecology. The choice of diversity and interdependence, while ignoring the struggle for survival, predatory, and parasitic relationships, suggests a highly selective perception of ecology at work in that ideology. The German Greens, to whom the Nazi legacy was a first-hand experience, usually avoided deriving social principles from ecological processes, leading Dobson to put forward ‘the apparently heretical suggestion that the West German Green Party is not a party of ecology in the sense in which I think we ought to understand the word’.22 The British Greens, less aware of the problem, given their historical inexperience with deriving social principles from supposedly natural perceptions, were more prone to adopt nature as a model for human behaviour. Second, even if these features were fundamental aspects of natural ecosystems, there is no reason why humans should seek to behave in that way, or deduce these, and not other, social principles from the natural world. Humans are part of nature, but the very way we conceive nature is an interpretation. One cannot just imitate nature; humans act on the basis of their beliefs, and therefore an argument is needed for why we should adopt supposedly natural rules. The reasoning cannot simply be ‘because this is the way nature is’. Third, and most important, Dobson himself cites Pirages, who maintains that social planning leading to a sustainable society

A Green Ideology? 23

is a process that ‘can be carried out within present authority structures whether they be democratic or dictatorial’.23 Nature, in principle, does not entail either dictatorship or multicultural democracy. As the argument unfolds, it will become clear that different social groups deduce quite opposite political imperatives from apparently the same understanding of nature. The very foundation of ecologism – the finitude of the earth – may suggest to some that a strong central, global government should be in charge of distribution of resources, and to others, that self-reliant communities are the best way to ensure a sustainable future. This explains the main point: environment in and of itself lacks social prescriptions. The political values an ecologist chooses are a projection of his or her moral and political values, hidden behind the screen of ‘naturalism’. Dobson argues that ‘authoritarian solutions to the environmental crisis have been abandoned by the movement … it would therefore be quite wrong to see it in such a light’.24 This means that the historical context, which he rightly emphasises,25 is instrumental to our understanding of the political prescriptions of Green ideology. Thus, environmental principles are indeed a sensitive seismograph for political beliefs, but they cannot provide the basis for a political worldview. If Eckersley is right, and ‘a democratically accountable nation State’ is merely ‘much better placed than a large number of autonomous local governments when it comes to providing ecodiplomacy, interregional and international redistributive justice’,26 then democratically accountable States are not intrinsically implied within environmentalism. A different set of values and social beliefs is needed to justify this political framework. For that reason, constituting Green ideology solely on a reconsideration of human–nature relations, overlooks the fundamental ideological deficit of the concept of the environment. The radical worldview, shaped by ecological problems and perceptions, provides a fierce critique of industrialism, and presents a new vision of a sustainable society. Even if we agree with Hayward that ‘to live in communities whose economies and politics are of human scale, whose principles embody the aim of living in a closer relation to nature, and where belonging is a relation of reciprocity and membership rather than ownership, are desirable ends’,27 these social and political beliefs cannot be deduced from, or reduced to, ecologism, despite the argument of most ecologists and their analysts. A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the ecological critique, which necessitates a politics of ecological awareness, and the alternative worldview which cannot be constituted solely on so-called environmental values. The term ecologism itself perpetuates the ‘is-ought’ fallacy, and proffers it as the centrepiece of Green ideology. Whereas toleration, stability, democracy, equality, tradition and feminism can use natural metaphors to enhance themselves, these political values are independent core concepts of an emerging Green ideology, and cannot be derived from perceptions of ecology. Even if

24 The Political and Theoretical Settings

political ecologists genuinely believe that nature does provide a model for society, political analysts should recognise ecologism’s ideological deficits, and seek the roots of the political values which the ecological movement adheres to elsewhere. If this is not done, environmental theorists will tend to reinforce the ‘is-ought’ fallacy, rather than challenging it critically. Finally, Dobson reconstructs ecologism as a comprehensive ideology in which the philosophical basis (limits to growth), the ethical perspective (ecocentrism), the social vision (a sustainable society) and the political strategy (radical transformation, rather than reformism), provide a coherent and cohesive ideology. The main problem for Dobson is that ‘bringing about that kind of sustainable society is an infinitely more difficult task than simply putting environmentalism on the political agenda’.28 It seems that although the ideology is in place, the politics is missing. However, a striking feature of the Greens is that they evolved from a diverse array of protest actions and the most extraordinary repertoire of politics. Indeed, social protest precipitated the Green ideology, while rejecting the notion of ideology as a feature of established parties. Its varied roots produced a diverse range of nascent ideologies, as well as an acknowledgement of this diversity and a rejection of a unitary ideology. That is an essential element of the Greens’ repudiation of the conventional notion of the ideology of political parties. In contrast, different sub-ideologies are maintained within the same ideological frame. Thus, ecologism itself is a family of ideologies, manifested in different shades of green – from environmental reformism, which merely seeks to reform the existing political order by using the available economic mechanisms, to deep ecologism which perceives ecology as a comprehensive, alternative worldview.29 Yet, it is but one ideological family coexisting within the clan of Green ideology, together with a family of feminisms, a range of minority-rights organisations, and a variety of radical conceptions of democracy. Here the alternative research strategy indicated by Dobson is undertaken, in which ‘the history of the ideology and the people and the movements that have carried it are present throughout, and the plurality of meanings … is preserved’ in the hope that ‘if the method is followed wisely, it can also be used explicitly to stress the essential historicity of ideologies’ even if this should make the thesis ‘very awkward to read’.30 The theory of ideology itself is reconsidered in the process, and the modular ideology which is developed throughout the book is inherently different from that proposed by the Green activists and their analysts. ‘New Politics’: a structural approach bereft of ideological structure? Whereas political philosophers tried to construct Green ideology based on ecology, the New Politics approach sees the Greens as a new type of party with a distinct New Politics ideology. Although the explanatory model interacts with national historical conditions, it proclaims to transcend state

A Green Ideology? 25

boundaries and to stem from the structural change in advanced industrial societies. The argument, in a nutshell, runs as follows: the emergence of New Politics in advanced industrial societies is due to changes in the socioeconomic structure which gave rise to the new middle classes. A corresponding set of values – postmaterial values – characterises these new middle classes, raising new political demands. The new themes advocated by a fresh category of political parties, were responsible for introducing New Politics issues to public debate thereby influencing the political agenda. Thomas Poguntke’s Alternative Politics presents the ideal New Politics party, and then examines the German Greens as a case in point: ‘The central argument is that parties like the German Greens represent a new, distinct type of political party which is clearly related to a new dimension of political conflict structurally anchored in Western societies’.31 According to Poguntke’s account, the New Politics ideology carries six themes: ecology, individualism, participatory/direct democracy, Leftism, Third World and unilateral disarmament. Even though the author uses the word ‘ideology’, as opposed to ‘ideas’ or ‘themes’, no account is given of the structure of this ‘ideology’ or of the relationships between the different themes. Furthermore, no ideological reason is provided for abstaining from any such integrating ideological structure. Applying this New Politics analysis, it may be argued that the New Politics ideology is ideologically inclined to provide eclectic themes, since its political adherents to that ideology, the members of postmodern society, tend to reject any claim of a coherent worldview that offers a comprehensive way of understanding the world. Since the theoretical construct of the New Politics thesis is at stake, the different themes will be explained individually, in their relation to the integrative model, namely, how they fit into the hierarchy of needs model and into post-industrial value change. We can see some of the problems with Poguntke’s analysis by examining his treatment of ecology: Ecology is one of the most prominent themes of New Politics. The link with the underlying causes of the New Politics is quite evident. First, an intact environment caters to aesthetic needs. Second, persons who are less concerned about the functioning of the economy are likely to shift their attention to non-material problems like the protection of nature.32 This provides the most striking example of trying to apply Inglehart’s appliance of the hierarchy of needs to political ideas. It is curious to see that rising environmental concerns are perceived as stemming primarily from ‘aesthetic needs’ and ‘non-material problems’. Ecological mobilisation is strongly connected with the most fundamental pre-needs condition: life. The existential and perceptual fear of death – whether ‘real’ or ‘imagined’ – as a result of nuclear weapons, atomic war, ecological disaster or global

26 The Political and Theoretical Settings

environmental effects – seems to have much better explanatory force in accounting for the mass mobilisation of the late 1950s to the 70s. The ‘protection of nature’, as an aesthetic perspective, belongs to the long tradition of post-nineteenth-century romanticism, national aspirations and indeed leisure time activities.33 The ecological thinking of the 1970s emphatically transcended ‘protection of nature’. It was concerned with conceptually changing the environment–humanity relationship, urged on by the threat to human health and existence arising from technological developments and industrial global effects, which both represent the ill-conduct of humanity. Ideologies have to be considered in a comprehensive manner. The analysis of Alternative Politics does not account for the following questions: Why are these issues, and not others, identified as New Politics issues? What are the relationships between them? What is the ideological structure holding them together? In short, beyond the six themes no ideological conceptualisation is provided. These questions need to be accommodated within a framework which accounts for the interrelations of the ideas in an evolutionary perspective, taking into consideration the dynamics through which such an ideology evolves. Thus, each of the analytical approaches to Green ideology has fundamental flows. Most importantly, however, is the coexistence of fundamentally different analyses of the same ideology, suggesting that the ideology is more complex than each approach, taken on its own, would imply.

A theoretical perspective – the study of ideology It is clear from the analytical illustration that the conventional notion of ideology cannot sustain the complex theoretical structure needed for conceptualising the ideology of the Greens. However, during the 1970s, arguably due to the waning of ‘ideology’ as a useful conceptual term in the aftermath of the ‘end-of-ideology’ debate, the concept became open to another interpretation, this time, one indicative of a broader political phenomenon. Against the exclusive, or critical notion of ideology, an inclusive, or neutral concept of ideology developed, which seems to be more useful for the analysis of the ideology of the Greens.34 Seliger, for example, construed the inclusive conception of ideology as applicable to all political belief systems: What defines the inclusive use of ‘ideology’ in the context of social and political theory and science is that it covers sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order.35 Hence, any collective actor may have a set of political concepts, beliefs and values – once the critical, or subversive tone of the term ideology has been

A Green Ideology? 27

resolved. Does this conception provide a matrix for understanding the Green ideology? What is its relation to the exclusive conception of ideology? Before addressing these issues, three further points are in place. Thompson notes two major problems with the neutral concept of ideology. First, ideology was traditionally assigned to, provided a critique of, the dominating forces of society. The analysis of ideology thus served as a tool for discarding their mechanisms of infiltrating public discourse with their set of beliefs. The new approaches took ideology to be the conceptual system of all social groups regardless of their status, thereby drawing ideology’s sting as an analytical tool. Furthermore, the neutral concept of ideology could reinforce the existing order of domination, insofar as it dismantles the connection between ideology and the domination of a polity, by assuming ideology to be a neutral characteristic of all collective actors. Second, the inclusive conception of ideology is inherently connected with established politics, and therefore fails to account for the ideological manifestations embedded in everyday life.36 In light of these two, almost contradictory problems, ideology appears as both a non-restricted feature of collective actors, and as limited to formal politics. The inclusive concept of ideology might endow ‘ideology’ with more theoretical scope, but it in fact promotes yet another (restricted) notion, albeit one that defines the borders of what is ‘ideological’ differently. However, a third point might illustrate more clearly the limitations and usefulness of the concept, by observing two of the phenomena included in this notion of ideology. Taking ideology to mean an action-oriented set of political beliefs is most useful for the comparative analysis of the ideologies of political parties such as Liberalism, Conservatism or Socialism, without having to label any of them ‘subversive’ or ‘dominant’ at the outset. Thus, the persistence of political parties as the prevailing actors in the political system of industrial democracies lends itself to such a notion of ideology. Another example is the anthropological interpretation of ‘ideology’ as a cultural system providing a collective conscience.37 It reflects the need for a conceptual tool which can account for the distinctions between institutions and social practices in less complex societies. A fundamental insight into the study of ideologies thus emerges: the concept of ideology used by the analyst is closely related to the phenomenon in question. Both the historical context and the observed phenomena are hence reflected in the concept of ideology applied to them. Just as the subversive notion of ideology emerged from the context of the struggle between totalitarian and democratic regimes, so too did the concept of a neutral ideology emerge from the context of established democratic societies. These examples, clearly show the inherent relationship between the phenomenon, which attracts the analyst’s interest, and the conceptual tool chosen to explain it. This calls attention to the theory of ideology itself.

28 The Political and Theoretical Settings

The modular ideology introduced This book argues that a new type of ideology, namely, modular ideology, has developed since the late 1970s in advanced industrial democracies. This new ideology belongs to a compound collective political actor, the Greens – a fact instrumental for perceiving its ideology. A main feature of such an ideology is a mechanism which allows different sub-ideologies to coexist within the same ideological structure, provided that certain ideological principles are accepted by all the collective participants. Thus, the structure of the modular ideology would have to be double-layered: the first layer is an ideological frame containing the fundamental principles, the second one relates to the sub-ideologies coexisting within the ideological frame. The tension between the sub-ideologies, as well as the contrast between this ideology and the established ideologies of the ruling parties, would thus constitute the modular ideology and reflect the phenomenon of the compound political actor. Since the Greens have denied upholding any ideology, it is obvious that modular ideology is an analytical construction conceptualised neither by Green practitioners, nor by its ideologues. Yet, modular ideology would prove an heuristic tool to explain the development of the Green ideology, its formation and transformations. It will also be argued that only such a theoretical construction as this can provide an ideological framework for the Greens. Any other concept of ideology would fail to account for the multiplicity of sub-ideologies, either by mistaking one sub-ideology for the entire Green ideology, or by dismissing altogether the possibility of a Green ideology. Finally, the positive worldview of the Greens, an analysis of their history, their social vision and the political route for realising their worldview reflects diversity, pluralism and autonomy as public goods for the society at large. Towards a theory of ideologies Assume the study of ideologies takes place on four levels. The first would analyse the practitioners of ideologies, the people who practise the ideology consciously, unconsciously or in a subconscious way. The second would examine the ideologues – people or groups who have written, lectured or acted in a way that has come to be identified with a certain ideology. They may have written as ideologues, politicians, philosophers or leaders, or they may have been adopted later on as proponents of the ideology. The third level would consider the analytical approaches to ideology: the conception of ideology used, the phenomena chosen for analysis, the analyst’s school of thought and the approach to ideologies undertaken. A fourth level is hereby suggested, namely, the theory of ideologies. This level makes no argument for the ultimately ‘true’ concept of ideology, but gradually seeks to provide the semantic field of ideologies. It should

A Green Ideology? 29

classify the different approaches to ideology and the methodologies by which they are investigated. It should account for the evolution of different ideologies and concepts of ideologies, and explain the different uses of ideologies, in genealogical, analytical and theoretical terms. Thus, the theory of ideology which is here proposed is not simply another competing concept of ideology through which a particular ideology can be analysed. Rather, it demarcates the semantic field of the ideological phenomena and their analyses. Such an account presents several challenges to the current study of ideologies. First, it disputes other theories of ideology which have attempted to justify the ultimate concept of ideology. ‘Ideology’, the present approach suggests, is a product of the historical situation, the political phenomenon and the analytical attitude. The theory of ideologies is not concerned with choosing between concepts, but with unravelling different ones, explaining the circumstances under which each concept was used and providing criteria for analysing the varied phenomena clustered under the term ‘ideology’. In that respect, the seminal work by Freeden provides a fertile framework for conceptual-based ideological analyses.38 Second, the concept of ideology itself thus receives an historical dimension. The reasons why certain historical periods lent themselves to specific notions of ideology, and the different incarnations of the term, including possible anachronisms and transformations, are thus exposed and discussed on a theoretical level. Third, the theory of ideology should gradually develop a stock of methodologies, concepts and rationales which could provide a matrix for the study of ideologies.39 The theory of ideologies is therefore a living sphere of research, which changes and reflects upon its own theoretical field. Fourth, it forces the analysts of ideologies to be accountable for the concept, the method and the generality with which they approach their subject matter. Finally, it allows us to propose a new kind of ideology, modular ideology, which, I would claim, has emerged in the context of the late twentieth century.

Part II From Praxis to Theory: the German Greens

3 Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route

The 1970s’ ecological awareness triggered anxieties on different levels: global (acid rain, Ozone layers, global warming, extinction of species, environmental degradation, depletion of natural resources), national (planning, construction, pollution), local (forests, rivers, roads), and personal (health, quality of life). Germany’s unique geopolitical and historical condition added a distinct feature to what may be termed the ‘Politics of Angst’ phenomenon. Thus, whereas in the Cold War context, the arms-race escalated and nuclear weapons threatened most countries, Germany, positioned on the front-line between the power blocks, with its special ties to the West, was pressurised to remilitarise.1 This generated a wave of anti-militarism, in addition to antiAmericanism, anti-imperialism and an identification with Third World movements, as part of a general condemnation of material society represented by the USA. At the European level, Germany’s geographical situation divided it between the West and the East, with a potential war between the two factions of the one nation. Many Germans called for a neutral, unified Germany in the tradition of Mitteleuropa. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the mounting disillusionment with the political system’s ability to provide existential security, reinforced by the recession following the oil crisis, questioned the system as a whole and gave momentum to the protest movements. The oil crisis manifested the new salience of the natural limits to economic growth. The mounting dissatisfaction with the political system made heretofore non-political, ecological issues the new banner for political protest. However, the sentiment of protest has taken many forms of action and shades of green and red before it has reached its political end. The initial stage of this process encompassed the formation of new political groups, some of which coalesced to form ‘The Alternative Political Alliance, the greens’ (Sonstigen politischen Vereinigung Die Grünen – SPV) in 1979. This tactical coalition comprised conflicting – sometimes contradictory – worldviews, but shared two principles: a resentment towards the established political system and a concern for the environment. The green cover, however, could have lasted only that long before the ideological conflicts would surface. 33

34 The German Greens

Transplanting ecology into politics The Programme of ‘The Alternative Political Alliance, the greens’, the first federal platform introducing the Greens onto the political scene of the first European elections in 1979, declares at its opening: The new European politics must be a holistic politics, considering longterm future aspects and encompassing four dimensions: it must be ecological*, social, basisdemocratic and nonviolent oriented. Until 2002, these four dimensions of holistic politics – the ecological, social, basisdemocratic2 and nonviolent – were the self-professed pillars on which the German Greens based their worldview.3 What is the ecological dimension of the holistic politics? What might its relation be to the other three political dimensions? This is the key to unlocking the communality and the main ideological differences within the Greens. Each group’s understanding of ecology, and their reinterpretation of the social and political questions in view of the ecological perspective, will be reviewed to expose the evolution of a shared worldview, and the role ecology played in its foundation. The asterisk, opening the immediate next paragraph, seems to offer an explanation of the ecological dimension: * Ecology should be understood as the theory of the household of nature; better still, the interrelations of the life-forms with one another and with the environment. The first definition is that used by Haeckel in 1866 to introduce ecology into the science of biology. Why did this definition of a nineteenth-century natural science reappear in a 1979 electoral manifesto? How does the use of a natural science as an ideological pillar reflect on the politics of the ‘alternative alliance’ in contrast to conventional political parties? Haeckel’s original scientific definition is one interpretation of ‘ecology’, utilised to change the conflictual political grounds by alluding to reality as revealed through science; but also, perhaps unconsciously, it denies any changes that ‘ecology’ had undergone as a scientific concept. Presenting ecological processes as political problems is in itself a specific way of argumentation. In addition to generating ecological awareness, it allows to transcend ‘ideologically’ (contaminated) politics by alluding to natural sciences – the epistemological tool which deals directly with reality. The second half of ecology’s definition elaborates on the first, stressing the interconnections among and between living creatures and their environment, providing the main feature necessary for developing a politico-ecological awareness. Is it only a coincidence that holistic politics encompass an ecological dimension – that is, the science of environmental interconnections – as its first pillar? Is it merely

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 35

linguistically permeated by the trademark of the ecosystem approach of ecology – focusing on the mutual interrelations within a system? Or is this holistic politics dominated and determined by the nature of its first dimension? The answers from the different Green perspectives will determine ecology’s political role in the evolving political ideology. The next sentence of the manifesto reads: The most important task of Europeans in this densely populated continent is the preservation of the ecological basis of life for the people, and for the world of animals and plants. Nature is here especially endangered. The two scientific, objective definitions are followed by a highly political claim concerning the ‘most important European task’: prioritising the protection of the ecological basis of life. However, the political poignancy is neutralised by the objective observation: nature is endangered (not least by overpopulation) and, as the basis of all life, has to be protected. The survivalist implications are clear: this must be the most important European task as it is a condition for life itself. There is no political argument – just the ‘pure’, factual comprehension of the need to survive. We are told it is a new kind of politics, free from interests or ideological argumentation, namely, politics of survivalism. Do these three definitions of ecology introducing the SPV manifesto – the scientific, the interconnected and the political – clarify the relations between ecological and other dimensions of holistic politics? While the primacy of ecology is emphasised, it does not, in itself, entail that the social, grassroots and nonviolent dimensions of politics are philosophically derived from, subjected to or constrained by it. The interrelations of the four self-professed political dimensions have not been determined, so the structure of the political ideology encompassing them has yet to be explored. This chapter traces the role of the concept of ‘ecology’ in moulding the German Green Party’s political ideology in its formative stage, through an analysis of the political programmes drawn between 1977 and 1980, from the perspectives of the different ideological and political collective actors incorporated into the SPV. It examines a threefold question: how was the concept of the ‘environment’ interpreted by the various co-actors participating in the formation of the Greens; how radical a political change was required in the existing political order; and what was the uniquely German dimension of their concept of ecology-cum-politics? The input of the parties coalescing to form the Greens on the 1979 platform, namely, the interaction of their diverse understandings of the environment, which affected the formation of a shared political worldview, will be discussed. Crucially, this initial coalition – of the extreme Right and the radical Left, nationalists and cosmopolitans, traditionalists and radicals, conservatives and anarchists – provides a remarkable exemplar of New Politics in its formative stage.

36 The German Greens

The Gesamtalternativebewegung (whole alternative movement) In 1977 the ‘Federal Union of Citizens’ Initiatives for Environmental Protection’ (Bündesverband der Bürger-initiativen für Umweltschutz – BBU),4 initiated the launch of the SPV. It was seen by activists as an attempt to politically integrate the Gesamtalternativebewegung.5 The formation of the electoralmovement, and its abortion, encapsulates the problems faced by the later Greens, while demonstrating the contingency of the emergence of the Greens as a powerful electoral force. In particular, it illustrates the discrepancy between the reality of the social movements (spontaneity, pluralism, diversity, grassroots and so on), and the transformation needed to mould them into ideological principles. The BBU was formed in 1972 as the coordinating body of 16 independent Citizens’ Initiatives (CIs).6 Environmental problems, always part of the second, rapid phase of industrialisation, acquired special international dimension, during the 1973 oil crisis. International reports (for example, Limits to Growth, Global 2000) served to raise awareness of the thesis of the ‘finitude of Earth’, and were transmitted into German consciousness through a series of environmental best-sellers.7 Significantly, they came both from the Right and Left of the conventional political spectrum, and contributed to increasing popular environmental protest. Public opinion was especially susceptible, given the Left’s disappointment with the Schmidt government, and the natural antagonism of the Right. It intensified general political disillusionment generated some 15,000–20,000 different citizens groups, tackling diverse issues: urban planning, education, the protection of nature, transport, women’s defence etc. Among these were three thousand environmental groups of which one thousand organisations participated in the BBU with a membership of over 300,000.8 As one commentator stated, ‘The ecology movement has created a climate of opinion in which nobody can be or wants to be against ecology. An ecological awareness has taken hold of society.’9 Thus, at a time when the debate over nuclear power-stations escalated, both the climate of ideas, and the organisational structures, were in place for a mass mobilisation of thousands in protest against the installation of power plants.10 The support of more than 50 per cent of Germans for ending construction of more nuclear power stations,11 manifested in ‘spontaneous mass-actions,’12 based on strong environmental awareness, united organisations for the protection of nature, the anti-atom and the peace movements into the, by now, self-conscious one ‘ecology movement.’13 Yet, this had limited influence on the established political stage as none of the three main political actors, the SPD, FDP and CDU/CSU were willing to represent this growing popular mood. This had a particularly destructive effect on legitimising the established party-system, and stimulated the

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 37

movements to channel the extraparliamentary route of protest into the parliamentary corridors of political power.14 Environmental inroads to electoral contest Whilst tactically – given the irresponsiveness of institutional politics – contesting elections to ensure that the vast popular protest influenced the political system was straightforward, strategically it was complicated. It was the first of a series of highly formative dilemmas marking the political route of the Greens, from the ex-territorial waters of protest, to the watershed of political power.15 Embracing the proclaimed illegitimate political system by fighting federal elections could only have been legitimised not by promoting a narrow ecological agenda using established political means, but through challenging the very worldview, power-relations and rules of the political game itself. Despite the protest movements’ call for empowering people and further decentralisation, the question whether this agenda was democratic remains open. Alongside highly progressive forces of the Left, were extreme currents of both the far Right and far Left, and a vast popular anti-political mood, which could have tipped the balance either way.16 Ironically, as long as there was no defined political party challenging the democratic authorities based on quasi-legitimate popular support, the anti-political mood could have stayed in ideological flux without being politically articulated.17 Since the whole endeavour of extraparliamentary opposition and NSMs was, in practice, which became a principle, highly estranged from the established political system, the initiative had to be justified by the initiators themselves, a characteristic feature of the later Greens. Their political position and ideological evolution were products of fierce internal debates and discussions, a Streitkultur – culture of disputes – praised by the activists. This moulded and refined the Greens’ perceptions and common political identity more than any external condition, and is highlighted in the attention and importance attached to the programmes and manifestos.18 The two arguments for contesting the European elections were provided by Roland Vogt and Petra Kelly – members of the BBU’s executive at the time, candidates for the SPV’s list, and later Green members of the Bundestag. Vogt stressed: We, who came from the CIs or other emancipation movements, had doubts … about the foundation of a party. For the European election, 1979, we could still say we were not a party but an electoral alliance.19 The BBU’s role, coordinating protest against the political system, which in a parties-state – Parteienstaat – is defined by political parties, explains the reluctance to engage in a party, and the preference for a ‘political alliance’. Such a device is much more akin to the BBU’s historical coordinating role. Whereas traditional CIs were usually spontaneous gatherings of local

38 The German Greens

groups targeting a specific objective, a common ad hoc interest rather than sharing a worldview, the conglomeration of single-issue activities substantially changed. They recognised a common structural complaint, namely, opposition to the centralised political mechanism which relies on technocratic and bureaucratic solutions detached from the affected people.20 The second self-justification for supporting the electoral initiative, concerns the unique circumstances existing in the 1979 European elections. As Kelly commented, ‘after all, the Greens were established in the context of the European elections and developed cooperation with other greens and alternative groups abroad.’21 It is no coincidence that the BBU considered the possibility of contesting the European elections: it was the first European election supposedly not contaminated by the conventional politics against which the protest movement was directed. European politics could be constituted upon different principles from those underlying national politics.22 By contesting European elections, three goals might be achieved. First, the main claim that ecological issues transcend local and national borders, and therefore pose an international political task, gains strength. Second, international politics undermines the importance of the national level, allowing the movements to register their discontent with national governments, and secure cooperation with like-minded alternative and Green organisations. Third, by testing the political waters in a relatively safe constituency, there is no need to cooperate with the much criticised national party system. The harsh critique of national politics, rooted here in ecological argumentation, avoids the ‘German question’, which played a significant role in the construction of their ideology and generated much internal opposition. The U-turn However, the fact that in 1977 the BBU considered the possibility of electing candidates has to be taken with reservation, not least because the Gesamtalternativbewegung involved varied and heterogeneous movements; it was unclear whether the movements would have supported this initiative. Thus, the support for the protest movement on nuclear issues or on uncontested grounds, for example, peace and environment, does not in itself suggest a shared worldview. As there was no political pressure on the movements to formulate their ideology constructively, they were led by the events and were proud of their ‘spontaneous’ reaction to them. Initially at least, the lack of a comprehensive ideology was considered positively by the activists. Whether ideological indeterminacy, plurality, decentralisation of power, and issues-led politics can be elevated into ideological principles, is still to be examined. The BBU set the first ‘German Environmental Conference (1978)’, bringing together all the environmental movements and regional parties. It called for ‘unity in the ecological movement,’23 but typically, the question of a federal party formation was not discussed.

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 39

A coordination committee was established, and at its first meeting a catalogue of common actions – distinguishable from a political programme – was drawn up, characterising the BBU’s role as an action-oriented coordinating body. By 1979, BBU had decided to withdraw from the election initiative, and the regulation that no BBU executive member could hold a position in, or be a member of, any political party was formulated.24 Both Vogt and Kelly had therefore to resign from the BBU in order to take their positions in the SPV. The BBU opted for a traditional interest group position of partisan neutrality,25 justified on pragmatic grounds. As Leinen explained, an environmental party has no chance of achieving a majority of the votes, and parliamentary protest is ineffective, unless directed at the government. The BBU, as an extra-parliamentary movement, could mobilise direct pressure, and be supported by other political organisations which could be mobilised on environmental issues – but would not support a party.26 Thus, as Raschke observed, a comparison of the relationship between the environmental protection organisations and the Greens with that of the trade-unions and the SPD, or with that of the churches and the CDU was premature.27 Testimony to this is the fact that the BBU had virtually died out by 1985.28 One final qualification concerning the comprehensiveness of the BBU is in order. Environmentally concerned protest does not constitute the entire spectrum of the protest movement. Vogt criticised the environmental parties for making no effort to embrace the alternative lifestyle groups, the women’s movements, the undogmatic Left, the Third World or the peace movements.29 This is of primary importance to our investigation as it is one thing to look for a coherent political worldview among environmental critics of the political order, quite another to confront the same existing world order from the perspective of the varied environmental, social and political movements. It is this latter, more complicated task that the political ideology of the German Greens targeted, as will become apparent. The BBU’s crucial function as a coordinating body and mobiliser of public opinion and support was critical, but offered neither a holistic environmental political conception, nor a substantially radical and non-conventional politics. The problems that existed in their embryonic form were intensified, and made inescapable by the young Green Party, which was to become the Schmuddelkinder of German politics. Nevertheless, it embodied in its political actions and confrontation with the political reality, the principles which were to mould future Green political ideology. The diversity of the movements was in fact a political reality. The characteristic features of the Gesamtalternativbewegung are the independence of its components, its plurality and ‘diversity in unity’. Crucially, there is a gap between the mere reality of plurality and making plurality into an ideological principle. Tracing of the ideological evolution which crystallised the diversity of the protest groups into a holistic movement without compromising the independence of the

40 The German Greens

parts is the subject matter of this book. The process which moulded the diversity of the movements into a political ideology will be explored.

The way to a federal party The second meeting of the newly formed political alliance, following the 1978 conference, raised the question of establishing a federal Green party. This was rejected both by the traditional environmental movements (which were still clinging to their conventional political role as coordinating interest groups) and the Left-alternative grassroots movement (which suspected that a party with a rigid programme would exclude other forces from the movement and be detached from its base). The initiative was seized by the four state parties – Green Lists for Environmental Protection, Community Action of Independent Germans, Action for a Green Future and the Green Lists of Schleswig Holstein – which established the federal party and therefore had crucial input into its public image and initial programme. Each of these parties saw itself as an environmental party, despite their different conceptions of the environment and of politics. From an environmental party to the Green Lists The experience of the environmental lists in Lower Saxony was typical of the three main extraparliamentary bodies, all of which were conceived on state level in protest against nuclear plants planned by the federal government. The relations between them and the ideological baggage which they brought into the shared programme is a microcosm of the Greens’ advent in Germany. The Environmental Protection Party – USP (Umweltschutz Partei) was a typical conservative citizens’ initiative group, consciously formed to distinguish itself from the ‘chaotic, vandals and anarchists’ of the anti-nuclear movement active in Lower Saxony.30 The Green Lists for Environmental Protection, the GLU (Grüne Liste Umweltshutz), was a conglomerate of Centre, Left, ecological and social groups, founded as a reaction against an alleged infiltration of communists to the Protection of Life and Environment group. It was cautious not to open its ranks to radical Left groups, but in general favoured cooperation. The third – ‘Voters’ League Nuclear Power: No Thank You’ – WGA (Wählergemeinschaft Atomkraft Nein Danke!) was a radical Left list party which tried to pressurise the GLU to incorporate other groups, alleging that the principles of decentralisation and plurality to which the GLU adhered would be otherwise breached. The GLU, faced with imminent elections, opted for a coalition with the Environmental Protection Party. In the aftermath of the elections, having won 3.9 per cent of the votes,31 the decision was made to open membership to other groups. WGA people could now get in, while the hard core of the USP left the GLU. These more tactical considerations conceal a more profound dimension revealed through a programmatic perspective.

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 41

USP – backyard environmentalism The first political party for environmental protection was established in Lower Saxony by a citizens’ initiative group in early 1977. Their programme stated that the party ‘takes on board the biggest social task of the present: the protection of life through the protection of the environment’.32 The six-point programme of the USP demanded: changing the (mis)handling of Nature to favour environmental protection; stopping authorisation of atom works and nuclear-waste sites; ending water pollution, using purified sewage to reduce the damage to rivers in the countryside; effectively protecting forests, plants and animals and especially endangered species; preserving residential areas intact within cities and adding gardens, sports facilities and protecting green plans, urban natural water areas; ending the ‘mammoth’ management at the expense of the citizens.33 The concept of environmental protection that was emerging – protecting water, forests, plants and animals, adding gardens to cities and enlarging urban green space – is a very traditional one. Thus, private, local citizens were concerned with their own backyard, which had been chosen to accommodate a nuclear-waste site. While backyard environmentalism was hardly a new, comprehensive ecological or political concept, its novelty was its establishment as a party. Significantly, this was in itself a manifestation of the internal struggle among environmental organisations: in founding a political party the conservative nature conservationists have drawn the red line between radical protesters and respectable citizens concerned with their backyard environment. GLU – Coalition for Ecology and Society In contrast, the Green Lists were established as an environmental coalition party seeking to work side by side with the movements. It therefore included very different groups, ranging from the hard Right, via moderate and centrist factions, to Left groups. The political incentive (overcoming the 5 per cent threshold) and ideological cause (environmental criticism) favoured a broad coalition and cooperation among the individual groups. Whereas it is possible to describe the GLU in terms of what it opposed – the traditional model of politics – it is more difficult to determine the purpose it actually served. The Green Lists ‘were united in their definition of ecological goals, but not on how these goals were to be achieved’.34 The coalescence of varied environmental groups from the whole political spectrum, motivated by a politics of angst in the face of nuclear reactors, and strengthened by hostility towards the police force which the government deployed in demonstrations, meant that the political project could not have been that of a traditional environmental party. It demanded a close relation with the movements, that is, the extraparliamentary base, and articulated a more blunt critique of the government’s use of force, demanding in effect a reconsideration of both the monopoly over power and the

42 The German Greens

decision-making process.35 The meagre chances of the USP and the GLU to independently surmount the 5 per cent hurdle, led to the merger in December 1978, despite the reluctance of the USP. Tellingly, the new party kept the name ‘Green Lists for Environmental Protection’, but programmatically, at least initially, adopted the USP’s six-point programme, thus manifesting an ideological vacuum. In contrast, the 1978 programme was fundamentally different. Whereas ‘the most important task of our time’ in the USP’s programme was ‘protecting life by protecting the environment’, in the GLU’s words, it is ‘preserving and improving the basis of life’.36 The balance is thus shifted from narrow policies aimed at protecting the environment in the former, to a comprehensive critique in the latter, calling for a long-term project of building a sustainable future. The Greens perceived industry as a threat to ecological life-cycles, exploiting the world’s resources and generating pollution. Politics was seen as short-termism, with economic growth as the sole measure of success. Society was criticised for causing alienation. The critique of industry, politics and society introduced a fundamentally new dimension into the political discourse: ‘The key problem in this context is the question about the basic values of the private and public life and lifestyle.’37 These values underlie the demand for a holistic worldview, a different normative perception, as the critique is not merely environmental, but also undermines the whole dominant Weltanschauung. ‘Politics must be the art of securing the survival of humanity’ it reads. The quality of life plays a central role, here in its embryonic form, and later in the Greens’ development an increasingly important one. This critique is followed by highly specific environmental concerns and demands concerning the economy, energy, environmentally friendly production, transport, unpolluted soils, air and water which make up the main body of the document, reflecting the general environmental dissatisfaction within the various Green Lists.38 Thus, at this stage, the comprehensive critique is not coupled with an integrative alternative worldview. Another GLU characteristic was its quasi-ecological language, emphasising the survival of humanity, the stress on cyclical-natural processes, resources, the celebration of diversity, and the adoption of a holistic, systemic perspective. This became more prominent in the Green ideology as pressures for an alternative worldview in a terminology different from that of the traditional political establishments intensified. GLU’s contribution to the 1979 European election programme was twofold. First, it facilitated a coalition of the centre-Left, thereby issues of human rights, Third World concerns, equality for women, and unemployment – issues hardly associated with environmental concerns – penetrated the programme. Second, its global ecological critique, complemented by organicist discourse, was endorsed by the platform for the European elections (EU79). In a programme drawn up after the

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 43

European elections, the GLU clearly states its ideas concerning the four Green pillars: The basic pillar of the whole movement is ‘ecological’, of which the other three basic pillars ‘basisdemocratic’ (decentral), ‘social’ and ‘nonviolent’ are derived … ‘basisdemocratic’ – this organisation expression of decentrality in all social realms … is structurally prior even to the principle of ecology, and should be the first pillar.39 Basisdemocracy thus took centre-stage in the GLU’s concerns. Interestingly, their emphasis on social movements and decentralisation aligns them with a more democratic worldview, and their demand for freedom, their critique of centralised, technocratic management suggest a more open and plural democracy. While this indeed was the line most analysts have taken, and indeed as the more mature Green project turned out to be, in the mid-1980s this may not be the only possible interpretation of decentralisation. This is apparent if the NSMs are compared with the social movements of the late nineteenth century – which were all for autonomy and yet hostile to democracy. The ideologically indeterminate social movements are a reservoir of social unrest which can, under different political circumstances, shift their political support to opposite ends.40 One such regional party which oriented itself directly to this anti-modern, social populism and nationalism, was the AUD. The German question: ‘Community’s Action of Independent Germans’ The very name of the third party which co-founded the SPV – Community’s Action of Independent Germans – AUD (Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutschen) – draws attention to the parties already discussed: neither the USP, nor the GLU’s programmes mentioned community, Germany or foreign policy. Although a state party, the AUD started life at the federal level. It stressed the role of the environment as a non-political issue: environmental politics facilitated the avoidance of a direct confrontation with fundamental postwar questions regarding the German past, national identity and world order. This was fundamental for gaining support from a population which had distanced itself from politics in the wake of the Nazi period. Environmental issues provided a route for a repoliticisation of Germans through the non-political issue of the environment. Whereas the USP and the GLU could ignore these issues by attacking the abstract ‘system’ and focusing on concrete environmental demands, the AUD provides a fascinating example of the way the national question was disguised – behind the ecological façade – to voice traditional views and a reactionary critique of modernism itself in postwar Germany. The AUD, a self-proclaimed first German environmental party, was established in 1965, by three parties. While it first incorporated environmental

44 The German Greens

themes into its programme in 1973,41 its central theme had always been a nationalistic concept of German neutrality.42 This was part of a long tradition with regard to Germany’s particular geopolitical position in Central Europe,43 and was an attempt to adapt this position to post-1945 FRG. The force of the argument for national neutrality in early postwar Germany lay in the claim for reunification, which, subsequent to division, became an ultimate claim for neutrality – the divided Germany refused to be dragged into the superpowers conflict. This carried strong nationalistic undertones disguising one particular separatist nationalism, which was seen to be nonlegitimate in the climate of opinion under Adenauer’s leadership.44 The German question was concealed beneath the pacifistic call for neutrality. As other political parties voiced different kinds of Ostpolitik in the first half of the 1960s, the AUD began searching for attractive themes and an alternative base of support – though crucially not for a different message. The emergence of the extraparliamentary opposition, with its resistance to German rearmament and nuclear weapons, instigated the first change within the AUD. By stressing the ‘neutrality’ component of its nationalistic message, the AUD sought to coordinate the popular protest movement, and to serve as its parliamentary arm. This necessitated a shift towards the Left with which the APO was mostly associated. Thus, AUD changed its 1970 ‘Programme for Germany’ to ‘Socialism for the Future’ in 1971. This socialism, however, was never a Marxist-type theory but rather middle-class citizens’ anti-capitalism,45 which stressed a vision of a utopian ‘new society’ comprised of an organic community and romantic sentiments of the return to a pre-industrial, small community, nature-loving secure world. This vision, reintroduced in the late twentieth century, has striking similarities to the popular anti-modernism of the nineteeth century, appealing to the lower-middle classes threatened by ‘big capital’, and expressing its hatred of politics through the reactionary rejection of the symbols, not the practices, of modernism: industry, science, progress, liberal-democracy.46 Popular antimodernism is an extremely elusive concept, more of a dominant sentiment than a cohesive ideology, due to its proposed rejection of rationality and ‘organic’ order. AUD voiced a deep discontent with a political system based on political parties, interest groups and trade unions with centralised power,47 which had been imposed on the Germans by a coercive Western force seeking to repress the German tradition. The AUD sought to capitalise on the alienation of the economically weak lower classes through its appeal to a premodern order. The Left was to provide the vehicle to power for the AUD, as a representative of the discontent with the traditional forms of political activity. When it was clear that the APO could not be won over, the AUD underwent a reconsolidation phase with the programme of the 1974 ‘democratic, life-protecting movement’: the new trading horse was to be the movement for the protection of life. Nationalism was replaced, rhetorically,

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 45

by the ‘protection of life’ without changing the ideological aim of a united independent Germany in the middle of Europe.48 The major thrust of the 1980 AUD programme was to instigate angst which connects, through existential fears stimulated by the environmental crisis, to the AUD’s wider agenda.49 This agenda, following one tradition of German thought, took sustenance from both external and internal enemies.50 Germany’s external enemies included the threat to the environment, a likely Third World War, mega-capitalism which threatened to jeopardise the German economy and in particular, the fear of the West–East German confrontation. Interestingly, the internal enemies included: fragmentation (‘prime’ social enemy), interest groups, journalists, economic companies and the split between government and parliament – all of which would instigate internal power struggles thereby undermining German unity. This extraordinary reactionary, anti-democratic, anti-enlightenment rhetoric sought refuge in the prime principle of the Gemeinschaft of independent Germany, namely, a neutrality which leads inevitably to German independence. A peaceful world-order in which Germany would find its own path between capitalism and socialism, in the best tradition of Mitteleuropa, was advocated. The German Volk would then be able to rule itself, dismiss its fragmented parliament and directly choose its representatives, who would act on behalf of the Volk. Thus, animosity toward democracy was clearly in evidence. The wide political disillusionment with existing politics was to be harnessed, according to the vision of the AUD, to the ultimate cause of the ‘end of democracy,’51 and to the re-establishment of a unified Germany in the centre of Europe. AUD attempted to mobilise resentment towards technocracy, bureaucracy and liberal-democratic politics by evoking the Volksgemeinschaft – the German people’s community. While no militaristic tones are to be found in postwar Germany, the yearning for a restored German identity in the guise of block-neutrality was an attempt to harness the anti-politics sentiment of the ecological movement to a nationalistic cause. Nevertheless, throughout the AUD’s programme, the environment is mentioned only twice. The concept of ‘life-protection’ is clearly a disguise for the AUD’s nationalistic message. However, it garnered minimal support and the nationalistic sentiment it represented is an important reminder of the movement’s anti-democratic potential. Thus, the AUD, in itself a coalition of anti-system forces, with representation from the moderate Third Way and anthroposophists, to the nationalistic cohorts, sought to use protest as a means of reinvigorating the debate on German nationalism and positively endorsing a German Sonderweg. The AUD advocated popular anti-modernism, the regeneration of the preindustrial artisan community of an independent Volk, and hardly adapted any of the rhetoric of nineteenth-century nationalism since both perceptions share the concepts of nature, blood and soil and the tribal belonging

46 The German Greens

of a people to its land.52 The AUD has successfully focused attention on two fundamental issues which the Greens will now have to address in the future: first, the close ‘natural’ bond between nationalism and environmentalism,53 and second, the hidden agenda of German nationalism. Science against the Enlightenment: ‘Actions for a Green Future’ All the parties examined so far challenged political ideologies indirectly. Only the fourth party which joined the Greens – ‘Action for a Green Future’ – GAZ (Grüne Zukunft Aktion) under the leadership of Herbert Gruhl presented a major ideological challenge: the central problem is the principle of economic growth which both Left and Right, and East and West, take for granted. Industrialisation is based on the assumption that resources are unlimited. The differences between the political ideologies of the Left and Right centres upon ways of achieving economic growth, and issues concerning distribution. Environmental problems are a manifestation of the inherent false logic on which the political and the economic order is based. Crucially, the discourse used by Gruhl presents the issue thus: Economic growth is the ultimate goal, the dominant idea underlying the ‘totalitarian ideology’54 to which the Left and Right adhere. In a finite world, Earth’s resources are limited. The struggle for greater production, more consumption, more material goods and generally more progress is in fact selfdestructive, a total war of man against Earth. Since 1945, the real war between East and West is the battle for resources, in which material growth and the ‘fetishism of production’55 are but ‘opium for the masses’, serving the ‘religion of progress’ in a total war waged by humanity against the Earth, a war whose ultimate victory will be: the total destruction of life. Humanity as a whole endangers its own life.56 Human beings, argued Gruhl, are a natural species which, in the course of economic development, have forgotten the fact that it is part of nature and dependent on natural resources. Human hubris, in its pursuit of growth, is founded on fundamental errors. Only if humanity restricts itself to living within the limits of the planet’s resources, will human existence be secured. The main concern is not the protection of the environment, but the survival of humanity.57 Since ecology encompasses the whole of life and everything is dependent upon it,58 the laws of nature must be obeyed, so we are told. The central concepts in Gruhl’s positive worldview are derived from ecology. Humans, like any other biological species, need Lebensraum59 and are involved in a war of survival60 in which the foundations of life – natural resources, energy, natural environment – are in the balance. Gruhl lists 19 criteria by which every state can be examined, including military capacity to control overpopulation growth, and food and energy resources.61 The ideological consequences of such a worldview are many. First, while the obvious solution advocated by Gruhl is a sort of ecodictatorship, his

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 47

way of justifying his brand of anti-modernism and anti-democratism is much more sophisticated than the AUD’s. The failure of the Enlightenment is proved not by the soft ‘back to nature’ and romantic Volkish aspirations, but by science itself. Modernism is self-annihilating, since science has turned against the logic of scientific progress as being the only limitation to growth. Science itself provides evidence of the overused resources and the limits to growth: the project of the Enlightenment is doomed. Behind the veil of scientism, however, as in the case of the AUD, there is emphasis on the image of war. Note the difference: it is not the Third World War, but the ultimate war of man against nature. This trivialises both the Second World War and Germany’s role in it: it was after 1945 that the total war between East and West for world resources entered its final phase. The evils of National Socialism are minor compared to the ultimate war of self-destruction. The highly scientific language promulgating this apocalyptic view conceals a reactionary nationalism which comes conspicuously close to the Nazi idea of Lebensraum, war of survival and dictatorial rule – a nationalism that could only be articulated in the post-Second World War era through the allusion, not to war between peoples, but to the ultimate war against nature. This survivalism justifies a contempt for democratic institutions. The divisions of power, interests and political parties which are based on the self-interest of certain sectors become irrational once the Limits to Growth thesis is acknowledged, ultimately entailing the death of industrial societies. The only remedy lies in a strong state, in an Ecodictator who will deal with the problem of population growth and who will control the usage of resources. The primacy of ecology Simultaneously with their devotion to awakening environmental awareness and developing an alternative worldview, the Greens sought to separate the historical analysis, and the prognosis of reality advocated by GAZ (and adopted by the Greens), from the political consequences and its Ecodictatorial implications. The fourth party to join the SPV, the Green List of Schleswig Holstein – GLSH – uniquely embodied some of the most extreme manifestations of all the parties surveyed here, as well as some of the tactical problems which were to become central in future fights among the Greens. Baladur Springmann, a former lieutenant in the Black army of the Reich, and since the 1950s, an organic farmer involved with the AUD, was chairman of the GLSH. His notion of the ‘Primacy of Ecology’ – that ecology can be the only measure of all political decisions62 – meant that the GLSH would accept anyone who endorsed the primacy of ecology. Allegations of the Left concerning the Neo-fascist faction within the GLSH increased, together with the fear of party infiltration by communist groups led to the GLSH ruling out dual membership, and excluding members of both the Neo-fascist and the Communist groups. This determined the

48 The German Greens

political scope of the party, and that of the future Green Party. It represents a broad coalition ranging from the far Left to the far Right, but without the extremes at either end – all united behind the idea of the Primacy of Ecology. This principle, however, has been accompanied by an ideological suspicion on the part of the Green Left, that ‘the primacy of ecology would reinstitute social-Darwinism and notions of blood and soil …’. This fear heavily influenced the ideological course that the future German Green Party was to pursue.63 The task was not only to place ecological issues onto the political agenda, but to detach them from the reactionary ideology so entrenched in nationalism. It was a struggle toward the shaping of a Green identity; a political identity, but also a national one.

Ecology-cum-(anti)-politics: theoretical implications and programmatic input The above analysis of the programmes of the environmental parties which were eventually to cooperate in the SPV, substantiates the underlying contention of this book – the immanent deficiency of the environment as the basis for a political worldview. Despite the fact that all parties adopted basic features of ecology, such as the interconnectedness of processes, the Limits to Growth (entailing postmaterial values) and the overall need to reconsider Man–Nature relations, they advocated different political solutions, and held different ideas as to the meaning of the concept of Nature. The analysis demonstrates that their concept of nature allows their preferred political conduct to be inferred. Their interest in the environment was genuine, but they read their preconceived political views into Nature – the phenomenon we refer to as ‘ecology-cum-politics’. In the context of the unique postwar German situation, that is, the denunciation of the Nazi legacy and the imposed democracy, Germans were reluctant to express any direct interest in politics. The a-political concept of the environment thus facilitated critical political attitudes both on the part of the anti-democrats and, more importantly, on the part of the participatory democracy enthusiasts. This we call ‘Green-cum-Germanness’. Our discussion of the German Greens opened with a question derived from the first sentence of the German Green 1979 European election manifesto: what was the ecological dimension of holistic politics, and what was its relation to the other three pillars – social, basisdemocratic and nonviolent politics. We have considered the five basic models of the founding SPV parties in an effort to locate the ‘environment’ within the political framework of the German political scene of the late 1970s. This is summarised in Table 3.1. The Green-cum-Germanness factor is clearly illustrated: the USP came up with a narrow political agenda, highly restricted to concrete environmental issues, which sought to cast a warning vote against the established parties, while blaming mega-management and the bureaucracy for environmental

Formation: Ecological Roots of a Political Route 49 Table 3.1 Interpretations of the four Green pillars in the formative stage Ecological politics

Social politics

Basisdemocratic politics

(Non)violent politics

‘Germanness’

backyard environment

citizens’ welfare

self-interested anti-technocracy

against police ⫹ anti-terrorists

apolitical

GLU⫹ global GLSH interconnectedness

social spheres politicised

decentralisation

against state violence

civic society (hatred of institutional politics)

AUD

national environment

popular ‘People’s antiDemocracy’ modernism

neutrality

free, united, neutral FRG in Mitteleuropa

GAZ

anti-growth natural laws for humans

future generations

control of resources

(eco)dictatorship

USP

–

damage. All this was done while cautiously avoiding any direct critique of politics. The GLU directly confronted the political system, declaring that politics was putting democracy at risk by being short-sighted and growthoriented. It posed a comprehensive critique corresponding to the global ecological perspective, and demanded a holistic alternative constituted upon a completely new set of principles. Their response to established political processes was wholesale rejection. The demand for social decentralisation, however, was not complemented with an alternative vision of the political order. The vision of self-subsisting, decentralised communities avoids a confrontation with Realpolitik. In terms of the AUD and the GAZ, the discontent with the current political system is clear. They both detested the factional, profit-driven, partyideological system. AUD, relying on the national sentiment toward the national environment, called for the abolition of the current system and the foundation of a ‘people’s democracy’. The GAZ was the only party which actually related directly to the ideological spectrum through an ecological critique, but it defied both Right and Left, thus dismissing the whole spectrum that constitutes the Parteienstaat; again, a wholesale rejection of the current system. This approach of total rejection, demanding a complete alternative, is not new in German attitudes to politics.64 While the democratic creed accepts conflict as a welcome starting point, and tries to provide a way of resolving, rather than solving, tensions, the idea that by overthrowing the current system, a new order can be imposed and a harmonious community can emerge is still part of the postwar German mindset. Thus, reading between the lines of the environmental parties highlights a host of distinctive German ideas on the concept of politics in postwar FRG. A fascinating area of political interpretation is opened up by the fact that the four basic political concepts of the Greens – ecological, social, basisdemocratic and nonviolent – were given a different political reading once

50 The German Greens

they were set within a distinct sub-ideology. While the same concepts were used, the configuration of these concepts, and the political order advocated were substantially different. This anomalous situation could only prevail at the formative stage of the Greens’ ideological route, as it entailed ideological inconsistencies which had to be resolved. The shared SPV programme for the European elections advocates a stress on the environment that transforms it into an overriding political concern. The programme justified New Politics, avoiding the conventional politics, by forming a negative coalition founded on environmental awareness and drawing attention to the failure of established politics to deal with the real world. The ‘Politics of Angst’, reinforced by possible ecological catastrophe, legitimised an overall rejection of politics, opting for a holistic alternative based on ecological imperatives. Clearly in evidence are the characteristics which later emerge as the hallmarks of the Green platform: a radical, comprehensive critique coupled with a concrete list of demands. The programme carved a political niche for the SPV, by drawing attention to the fundamental problems of the existing system, and calling for the politics of survivalism. To summarise, the Alternative Political Alliance, ‘the Greens’, contested the 1979 European elections.65 It was a centre-Right political party, with a strong environmental message, which concealed the German question. The principle claim of the Green Lists for Environmental Protection to represent the environmental movement as a whole already suggested the possibility of opening the party to the Left. The eagerness of the AUD and the GAZ to gather as much public support as possible, also favoured the enlargement of the party. It is no surprise, therefore, that the party which emerged after the foundation conference in 1979 was of a very different kind.

4 Philosophy: the Greening of the New Left

In 1980, The Federal Party of the Greens accepted the Basic Programme which has remained the principal Green ideological document up to 2002. Its opening statement reads: We are the alternative to the traditional parties. We grew out of a coalition of alternative groups and parties. We feel solidarity with all those who have become active in the new democratic movement: the life and nature groups, the environmental protection groups, the citizen initiative organisations, the workers’ movement, the Christian initiative organisations, the movements for peace, human rights, women’s rights, and Third World rights. We consider ourselves a part of the Green movement which is rising up throughout the world.1 Why did this new democratic movement abstain from participating in the SPV in the European elections of 1979? There are three main reasons for this: first, the traditional hostility of the Left to European integration which was hitherto driven by common market considerations; second, the commitment of the NSMs to the decentralisation of power and grassroots activity – which opposed any further centralisation at federal and European levels; third, a deep suspicion that the newly created SPV was, in fact, a reincarnation of a Right-wing environmental party – anti-democratic, nationalistic and possibly fascist. Why, then, did the groups composing the new democratic movement endorse ‘the Greens’ shortly after the European elections, and join it en masse? Tactically, the answer is more than obvious: the SPV gained 3.2 per cent of the vote, thus convincingly proving its electoral potential. Not only did the possibility of hurdling over the 5 per cent look plausible should the New Left join the newly formed party, but the founders of the SPV learnt that their own forces were not adequate for this task. The two sides came closer together in a series of meetings in the months immediately following the elections.2

51

52 The German Greens

However, the crucial test for this new tactical alliance would be its ability to produce a shared and innovative philosophical basis. Only on such a sound foundation could a political ideology be built. While the ecological roots of the formative stage were – despite the new issues of ecological politics – conservative and reactive, the philosophical depth was to come from the Greening of the New Left. Three ideological spearheads were highly significant: the ex-communists, the sponti-scene, and the women’s movements. The way each of them remoulded its philosophical worldview faced with the double challenge of ecology-cum-politics, filtered through the German question, the disappointment with the established political system and the initial seizure of ecological issues by the Right-wing of the SPV, is at the centre of the political ideology of the Greens.

The march in the political desert: politics in extraparliamentary territories The endorsement of the environmental party by the new democratic movement was facilitated through three interwoven processes: the internal evolution of the German Left, the gradual alienation of the radical Left from the SPD and the deep disillusionment with the centralised, poweroriented established German political system. These processes gave rise to anti-system sentiments and a dispersed protest movement, which generated the growing resentment of some Germans, notably the young generation and intellectuals, to the way in which the established system had come to terms, or rather had avoided coming to terms, with the concealed Nazi past and their consequent growing doubts as to whether Germany has really internalised its professed democratic regime. Each of these processes entails an internal tension. First, the New Left evolved largely due to disillusionment with the SPD, adopting organisationally and ideologically a different set of modes of political action,3 while still seeing itself as part – or even as an authentic representative – of the Left. Second, the antisystem movements strongly rejected the established political system, as well as the rigid extraparliamentary organisations which led, after the student revolt, to terrorism and authoritarian communism. Yet, they sought a political influence on policy-making, given what they took to be a rapid deterioration in German politics. Third, while the NSMs were diametrically opposed to Right-wing fascist and Neo-Nazi practices, they wanted to relegitimise prominent, hitherto characteristic, features of these ideologies, for example, environmental concerns, the focus on movements, and an appreciation of emotions, spirituality and intuitions. These processes were not necessarily interconnected, though the conditions of postwar German politics caused them to interact. Comprising the diverse ‘new democratic movement’ induced their coalescence under ecological themes, and conditioned their emerging worldview.

Philosophy: Greening the New Left 53

The lost child of the SPD The point of departure was 1945 – the Stunde Null; however, part of the Green effort has been to question the supposed decisive break with the German past. In a nutshell,4 the major historical circumstances which led to the emergence of an extraparliamentary opposition were, first, the consolidation of the CDU/CSU as the governing party. Playing the delicate role of semi-sovereignty5 with its Western Allies, Germany went through a process of remilitarisation. This prompted a wave of protest initiated by the churches,6 which encompassed different social strata, and was initially supported by the SPD. Secondly, however, four successive electoral defeats obliged the SPD to choose between complying with the CDU model of the Volkspartei, or remaining a 30 per cent, partisan-closed opposition party. The SPD – in a series of decisions – gradually but decisively opted for the former, becoming increasingly alienated from its radical wing. Third, the KPD, the communist party, was barred in 1956, its Marxist jargon was delegitimised and discredited,7 thus depriving the radical Left of a parliamentary route. Perhaps the most influential issue, which led the New Left to believe that the SPD had become ‘a faithful servant of the established capitalist order’8 was the debate over the Emergency Laws, which sought to increase government power during a period of severe internal unrest. The SPD, though determined to tame the laws, tended to practise its new image as a reliable catch-all party: in return for supporting the new – tamed – legislation, the SPD was incorporated into the Grand Coalition of 1966. The New Left, seeing the Emergency Laws as a serious infringement of democratic rights and freedoms, perceived this move as a betrayal of social democracy. Electorally, it was the right choice – the grand coalition showed the SPD to be a party ‘capable-of-governing’.9 Ideologically, it meant further alienation, though not yet a final break, from the radical Left wing of the party. The anger of the radical Left and the young socialists with the SPD was evidenced in the 1960s’ student rebellions, instigated by the SDS – the SPD’s student organisation. Similarly, the disarmament campaign of the Easter March movement, which drew increasing public support manifested in mass demonstrations against nuclear armament, refused any connection with the SPD. Both the SDS and the Easter March – the leading bodies of the protest movement – opted for the SPD-alienated extraparliamentary opposition. Reformists were given another chance in 1969, when the reform government of Willy Brandt came into power. It was only a shortlived political renaissance, and the collapse of these aspirations – due to the global oil-crisis and the recession, during which the SPD shifted from innovative reforms towards an attempt merely to sustain previous achievements – brought about the final break of the young generation with its established political godfather. Indeed, Brandt was right in seeing the Greens as the lost-child of the SPD.10 The break, nevertheless, was decisive and went beyond the point of repair.

54 The German Greens

The extraparliamentary Left found itself in ex-territorial political waters which were not primarily Leftist, being inhabited by several different groups: the politically disillusioned silent majority of the Germans; the CIs concerned with personal security, environmental problems and peace; the NSMs, critical of the FRG’s political framework and culture; and the highly educated potentially Left cadres which had witnessed the radicalisation of the Communists associations, the student revolt and the descent into terrorism, and were disillusioned with both established politics and traditionally organised opposition. These groups, enthused for political renewal, but disappointed with the traditional political actors, were a radical, creative and active political force which was to have a tremendous impact on Green thinking. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, Germany, a consolidated and rigid parties-state, was faced with growing opposition from diverse groups concerned with national identity, relations with the other Germany, militarisation and prospects for a social-democratic Germany. This primordial sea included some islands of organised political activity, like the revived communist gatherings, the student organisations, the pacifist churches, the women’s movements and the ecological organisations, but with no centre of power or defined ideological project. The New Left’s enclaves of organised and politicised forces, as this unfolding chapter will show, produced the framework for the future ideological project of the Greens. The New Left, itself fractured and non-cohesive (both by nature and by an active resentment of any unitary organisational structure) ended behind the bars of extraparliamentarism. This political reality did not, however, automatically mean rapprochement with the other forces, notably the CIs. Both the potential conservative reactionism of these groups, and the Left’s political tradition of devoting their energies to internal-ideological battles between different Leftist factions made it still impossible for such an exchange to occur.11 The two stages which the different wings of these radical cadres underwent, before the coalescence with the apolitical forces in the anti-political camp could ripen, were anti-state terrorism (instigated by some of the orthodox Marxist groups trying to ride the wave of popular protest to its revolutionary ends), and the retreat from political life (stemming from disgust with the anarchist-type spontaneous movements). The collapse of the first led to a reconsideration of the foundation of social change and the meagre prospect of proletarian revolution. The realisation of the alternative movements that a retreat from society was an illusion, given state-interventionism in social and personal realms, made politicisation of these realms the only way of generating a social change. The shedding of both tendencies was to be mediated through the salient issue of the environment. Philosophically, ecological problems necessitated either rehabilitation of human-based ideologies, or a thorough reconsideration of the environmental impacts and their incorporation into political theories. Practically, the severity of potential environmental problems generated

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a large base-of-support alienated from the existing political order and ready for political action. It was a historical contingency, not a necessary political outcome, that the forces taking over the fluid anti-political camp were the politically oriented, though ideologically disenchanted, cadres of the Left. This ideological disillusionment, in view of the new environmental and political conditions, provided the necessary ideological openness and the political will to develop an ideology capable of electoral contest and social renewal in the German political system.

Politics-cum-ecology The developments within the Left and outside the established politics have little to do with the environment. Underlying their emergence and concerns is German politics, rather than any particular environmental ideology. In that respect, the achievement of the Gruhl type ideology – attempting to transcend both the Left and the Right by pointing to the inherent flaw in their belief in economic growth – seems more radical an ideological project than one embedded in the distributive debate concerning economic growth. The ideological radicalism of the environmental project appears undermined when approached from a Left position. However, we have already seen that even a ‘pure’ environmental perspective is mediated through a worldview which is not inherently environmental, but encompasses a political order held by its adherents and presented in environmentally derived terms. Alluding to the ‘natural order’ is a particular kind of conservatism. The urgency of the ecological crisis justified, in the environmentalists’ view, abandoning other social issues and devoting all political resources to environmental matters. While this draws the hitherto nonexistent political attention to environmental concerns, the ecological crisis discourse is used to transcend politics. The New Left introduced into the environmental politics of the Greens due caution regarding environmental claims concerning the natural order and natural laws. Sensitivity to the propensity of environmental themes, incorporated into national ideologies in the German past – which the value-conservatives tried to overcome by alluding to ‘scientific’ arguments – has aroused deep suspicion within the Left. Indeed, it was perceived as an achievement by Leftist Green activists, as described by Jutta Ditfurth, a leading Ecoradical: By founding the Greens over a decade ago, we were able to forestall the establishment of a Neo-Fascist or right-radical environmental party. Today it is maybe forgotten that once there was a real danger that the Green Lists would emerge as a right to radical-right party. Had we not brought the SPV under the grip of the Left, a populist rightist theory of ecology, a modernisation of the old blood and soil ideology with a social readiness for Neo-Fascist would result.12

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While the scenario of a ‘central control over resources or else an ecological catastrophe’ is compelling, tackling the ecological crisis without abandoning the main humane achievements of the political order is more complicated. How could a realistic vision, not conclusively rejecting the existing order, while seeking a transformative change of it – given the urgency and severity of the ecological crisis – be achieved? How would a Left-leaning worldview tackle environmental issues? How fundamental a change of ideas is needed, and how radical a transformation? The rest of the chapter accounts for the philosophical Greening of the New Left by analysing its contribution to the ideological project of the German Greens. Given the traditional Right-leaning tendency of environmental ideas stressed by conservative and extreme-Right groups, particularly in the German context of blood and soil ideology, the New Left had to reclaim environmental issues. It incorporated the environment into the analysis, by making it into the banner under which a transformative change in German politics was sought. We referred to this before as Green-cumGermanness, and indeed the relations between the environmental, social and political goals of the Greens, and its national project is therefore at the heart of the analysis. A socialist perspective cannot disregard social problems in favour of environmental ones, but has to develop a framework which will allow a contemporaneous dealing with both clusters of problems, incorporating them into the analysis without reducing the one to the other. The Ecosocialist answer to the opening question will probably be thicker than that of the Value-conservatives. The question being: What is the nature of the relationship between environmental issues and the Greens’ social and political attitudes? The discussion unravels the incorporation of the environmental cluster into the ideology of three main tendencies of the diverse New Left, namely, the ex-Communists, the Spontis (undogmatic Left) and the feminists. This is in line with the attempt at establishing the ecologycum-politics approach of the different groups associated with the Greens. The question of whether the environment was merely hijacked for internal ideological reasons, or whether their ideology underwent major shifts will be examined. These three currents were amalgamated into the Alternative Lists which finally joined the Green party in 1980. The input of the New Left environmental and political ideology traced through the Green manifestos will be analysed at the end of the chapter.

Ecosocialism: Communism under a new guise? Drawing the thin, sometimes imagined line between tactical considerations, sheer political reality and ideological principles is a central problem in the analysis of the Greens, for much of their ideological project consisted of filtering political necessities through an ideological prism to generate a worldview capable of challenging the problems of the FRG’s political system.

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Thus, political ideas are conceived under a particular set of conditions – historical memories, political realities, social experiences – which are drawn together into a worldview. Given that diverse political elements joined the Greens’ conglomerate, what for some are highly ideological motives, can be mere tactical considerations for others. Anti-communism: a German state ideology The charge of instrumentally and cynically using others’ ideological convictions for their own ends was made against the communist groups which, reluctantly, sought to integrate within the Greens. Indeed, the question arose whether it was integration they sought, or mere infiltration of the new party with old communist ideas. Thus, Van Hüllen, for one, accused them of using the ‘old hat’ socialism, through conspiratorial organisational measures derived from the Marxist-Leninist experience, to overtake the original and innovative ecological project and subvert it to communist ends.13 Notwithstanding power struggles, ideologically it is more fruitful to investigate how the Greens’ project was enriched by the input of orthodox Marxist analysis, while fundamentally restructuring the latter itself. The transformation of the communist ideas and their contribution to the Green project was especially significant in terms of the compound relationship between environmental and social concerns within the ideological debate. Before tracing the concept of the environment in the communist, later Ecosocialist, the function of anti-communism within postwar Germany has to be recapitulated, to facilitate a better understanding of the Green-cum-Germanness factor. Given German anti-communism, the acceptance of communists into the Greens – despite the difficulties it generated for the new party – is a significant dimension of the Green project of rethinking the FRG’s political heritage. Indeed, defending the rights of minorities to hold collective views, regardless of one’s sympathy towards them, has become a fundamental characteristic of Green politics. In this respect, the communists are but an example illustrating this principle of open societal discourse which could equally be applied to minority groups, foreign workers, immigrants, Third World associations, homosexuals and those living alternative lifestyles. The communists, more so, provide a paradigmatic example, given the role of anti-communism in postwar Germany, since anticommunism in postwar Germany grew into a ‘national ideology.’14 However, the rapprochement between the SPV and the communists was reluctant on both sides. The K-groups themselves had an internal debate about their relation to the Greens. The KB (Communist federation) expelled the executive of the Hamburg list due to their support of the new Green party. The executive, on its part, (known as the Z-Fraktion) did not adhere to this expulsion, arguing that they were interested in ‘securing the maximum possible influence in the Green electoral movement, in order to ensure the survival of communism in the present day situation’.15 Out of

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the 700 KB members, 200 joined the Greens, in 1979, en bloc. It was after the Greens’ basic programme was formulated that the KB chairman informed his followers that he favoured mass participation in the Greens. By 1984 the KB invited its members to join the Greens16 ‘individually but jointly’. But did the communists wholeheartedly share the Green project? What did they take it to be and what does ‘ensuring the survival of communism in the present day situation’ consist of? Merely tactical considerations, taking the Greens to be a political host to the parasitic communists? Forging a coalition to get into powerful positions? Surely, these thoughts prevailed amongst the highly skilled conspiratory K-groups, value-conservatives and commentators alike. In order to come to any opinion, a thorough analysis of the ideological transformation of the communists, if there was one at all, is necessary. Ecosocialism and Marxism – an ideological extrapolation? A document named ‘overcoming capitalism’ written by the two prominent Z-Fraktion leaders and the later Ecosocialists within the Greens, Ebermann and Rainer, proposed 12 theses on ‘the ecological crisis and social change’. The first two read: 1. Humanity is presently destroying the natural foundations of life. 2. This destruction obviously has to do with the laws inherent in capitalism.17 Does placing environmental destruction at the top of the agenda present merely a tactical adaptation, an appropriation as it were of environmental themes into communist ideology? Fogt, concluding his account of the influences of Left Extremism on the German Green Party maintains: ‘the “Ecosocialist” camp in the Greens has not undergone an “inspirational change of heart”. Their programme is little more than an adaptation of classical Marxist ideology to a notion of “crisis development in late-capitalism”, this time overshadowed by increasing ecological dangers.’18 Likewise, many Green members and analysts implied that this is the case, and doubtless also communist activists believed that incorporating environmental degradation into Marxist analysis only reinforces the analysis and proves its inclusiveness. By contrast, reading the Ecosocialists’ theses, bearing in mind the Marxist project, suggests that a thorough readjustment, with the consequences of an ideological transformation, had to be made in order to accommodate environmental provisions. The inner rules of late-capitalism might still have been structural processes bringing about environmental degradation. However, this very recognition of the destruction of nature as a crucial political problem poses difficulties for a ‘classic’ Marxist theory. A crucial endeavour of Marxism, in light of the Enlightenment project, was isolating ‘history’ from ‘nature’, seeing human development in the realm

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of freedom, and away from the realm of necessity – an emancipation from Naturwüchigkeit – the embeddedness of man in nature.19 External nature, for Marx, was a fundamental ‘other’ for humans, the ‘world out there’ against which man’s nature was defined. The Gattung – human species – is characterised by an ability to mould nature in the process of production, man as Homo Faber. Indeed, the very freedom of humans – inherent in their human nature – is to mould Nature, according to their needs, in the course of the process of production. Nature is a substance, a given, an object through which – in the process of cultivation – the subjectivity of man is established. Nature is the world of necessity, from which man, in entering the world of freedom, has to be released. Indeed, for Marx, the kingdom of freedom begins where work dictated by needs and derived from external ends ends.20 Clearly, making the destruction of nature into the first Ecosocialist thesis opens serious theoretical, and consequently practical, questions for a Marxist analysis. It seems that the realm of ‘history’ collapses back into the realm of ‘nature’, as freedom is challenged by existential natural constraints which are, nonetheless, caused by humans. Humans are firmly embedded in nature which they themselves destroy. One would therefore expect much of the Ecosocialists’ effort to be devoted to expanding the Marxist theory to include nature, particularly since nature – by occupying a central analytic space within their analysis – acquires an independent status – that of an agent of exploitation, as opposed to the mere substance of production. The incorporation of nature into the socialist worldview, one would have thought, would be the focus of the analysis, for what does ‘exploitation of nature’, or the demands to develop ‘considerate and meaningful relations with nature’ (thesis 8; my translation) actually amount to? Intuitively, expanding exploitation and alienation to include nonhumans, thus making nature into a moral client – an object, or maybe a subject – is a central challenge for an explicitly anthropocentric theory like Marxism. Surprisingly, the Ecosocialist analysis abstains from taking issue with these matters. Instead, an unproblematic transition from intra-human discourse to a human/nature interrelationship, using concepts like ‘exploitation’ and ‘consideration towards nature’, is assumed. In the Ecosocialist discourse, nature is taken as an equal counterpart to man, both being subjects of abuse and exploitation under late capitalism. Assertions like ‘technique is in itself already a domination (over nature and over humans)’,21 or ‘the plundering of work-force and nature can be limited only through social resistance’,22 equalise the subordination of nature and men under capitalism. In the communist analysis, the exploitation of nature is taken for granted, and therefore the main argumentative effort is to extrapolate from nature’s destruction to the exploitation of man: ‘Just as surrounding nature is merely a means, so is man himself, and the behaviour between people is subordinated to the dominant social ends setting.’23 The understanding of the instrumentalisation of human beings is constituted upon the comparison

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with the exploitation of nature. Structurally, anchoring environmental degradation and human exploitation in processes inherently connected with the development of capitalism has led the communists to advocate a two-stage transformational process: first, a transformation of the process of production; second, having achieved this transformation, the conditions for environmental change – awareness, attitude and praxis – will mature. Environmental change requires social change as a precondition. Were, therefore, the critics right? Are we witnessing a mere appropriation of the destruction of nature to gain support for the hidden communist agenda after all? Not necessarily. A major contribution of the Ecosocialists to the environmental debate is that they have provided a structural social explanation for the environmental crisis, thereby reinforcing the connection between the latter and a radical social transformation. By this, they bring a sober perspective into the otherwise naive Green discourse, which tries to avoid a realistic account of society by isolating the environmental crisis from other social processes, as we shall shortly see. Extending the Marxist analysis to include the natural environment as an independent, though interconnected, variable requires a substantial ideological shift of emphasis – even if this was not fully grasped by the communists themselves. However, the incorporation of ‘nature’ into the relations of domination (so far reserved for intra-human relations within Marxism) is not the only significant adaptation of the Marxist theory to environmental thinking. Not only does nature acquire an independent status as an agent of exploitation, but for the counterpart of nature in the first thesis, namely, ‘humanity’, there are repercussions in a Marxist theory: the centrality of class struggle is superseded, for the focus is transferred to a shared suffering of humanity. Surely, the main endeavour of Marxism was in analysing the intra-classes struggle within the realm of ‘history’. Juxtaposing humanity to nature, focusing on the destruction humanity is inflicting upon itself and upon nature by destroying its own natural basis of life (even if the causes are still rooted in the dominant classes’ drive for maximisation of profit and capital accumulation) is a major shift of emphasis. It is no longer the case that the main concern lies with the realm of freedom, where exploited workers have nothing to lose but their chains. What is at stake now is the very survival – that of the realm of necessity – of humanity at large. While the Ecosocialists will still maintain that ‘the characterisation of the present ecological crisis is a problem for the survival of humanity’, this does not conceal the fact that ‘the formation of capitalist society has to be overthrown’.24 For the destruction of nature is causally inflicted by the market economy: there is an obvious relativisation of the internal class struggle in view of the shared interest in survival. Furthermore, the urgency of the transformative change of society no longer lies in the material conditions of the proletariat, which, in the Marxist analysis, brings about the radical negation of their human nature, but in the danger of destroying humanity’s own existence. Thus, the

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reason for the sought revolution is now rooted in external nature rather than human nature, a major shift in the materialistic analysis. The finitude of natural resources implied that processes of production should be restricted, thereby introducing a foreign element to Marxist analysis. It forces ‘history’ to transcend itself back into ‘nature’, making class struggle a necessary condition for the larger cause of sustaining humanity and nature. Another option, requiring less fundamental adjustments to Marxism, might have been to perceive the degradation of nature as, indeed, a further development of late capitalism: one which necessitates constraining the use of natural resources, but which maintains that nature is merely a substance of production, not an independent client which compels ‘treating nature as ends rather than as means’. If this were the case, ‘history’ would have been required to acknowledge provisions for the ‘natural basis of life’, but it should not have made ‘nature’ into a moral object of humanity. However, nature is recognised, in the Ecosocialists’ writings, not only as a scarce resource, but as a moral client for, we are told, ‘Considerate behaviour towards nature will be possible only when the threat to radical needs is obsolete’ (thesis 8). The communists seek, at the end of the day, to provide basic needs for the population at large. This is a precondition for treating nature not merely as a means, but as an end. It is, nevertheless, an end in itself. The goal of ‘treating nature meaningfully’,25 apart from capturing the sentiment of the environmental movements in the FRG, has another crucial function for this Neo-Marxist theory: it illuminates the main thesis of relations of domination. The relentless exploitation of nature and people is anchored in patterns of domination serving the interests of the dominant class.26 Demanding to treat nature and humans as ends, not merely as means, questions the whole pattern of relations of domination and undermines the two major façades of the system, the economic – international markets and monopoly capitalism – and the political – ‘despotic and dictatorial state’ (thesis 10). ‘Exploitation’, ‘instrumentalisation’, ‘subordination’, ‘means’ – all expose the hidden discourse ingrained in the dominant pattern of ideology that legitimates the current state of affairs. Transforming society would inevitably require dispensing with this pattern of domination embedded in the contemporaneous way of thinking. This raises the question of consciousness in general, and the relation between environmental and class consciousness. The communists, on the one hand, hope to mobilise the latter by alluding to the former, but also suggest that social problems need to be solved before a considerate relation toward nature is established. Juxtaposing nature with humanity further provides a unitary framework for the analysis of late capitalism, not least in terms of the encroachment of natural resources and environmental degradation on a global scale. The relations of domination transcend the internal nation-state level onto the international sphere. The analysis of the limited natural resources leads to

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another extension of Marxist theory: from the influence of capitalism in industrial countries, to the Third World – both in terms of natural resources and human societies (theses 5, 6). When asked what the communists had learnt from the process of coalescing with the Greens, Ebermann curiously replied: ‘Consumer accommodation in imperialistic metropolitans and the violent means of food imports of the Third World.’27 These had not been previously central to orthodox Marxist thinking. Carrying the analysis into the Third World entails several basic consequences: the influences of late capitalism on underdeveloped societies with endangered natural resources expose a different kind of exploitation, which has much more to do with international markets and global environmental destruction than with the internal dynamic of the classes within advanced capitalistic societies. Put differently, the distinction between the rich world, and the exploited poor world, marginalised yet again the central role of the proletariat and with it the centrality of labour/capital divide. It further anchors the analysis within the realm of ‘necessity’, while extending its scope to include relations of domination based on preventing people from fulfilling their basic human needs. Indeed, the discussion of the Third World reveals how Ecosocialists define basic needs: the provision of food, clothing, accommodation and a life worth living – an interesting mixture of the realms of necessity and freedom to which we shall return. The way forward is now apparent: emancipation of these peoples should be by means they themselves choose. The fierce resistance to internationalhomogenising-capitalist markets is evident, bringing to the fore also the right to self-determination undermining the prospect of a unified proletariat revolution. Advanced capitalism threatens communities which have not yet undergone a process of industrialisation. Whereas a global perspective on a world-wide scale of the influence of capitalism (via imperialism and international markets) is forwarded, the solution advocated is a decentralised one, derived from the propensity for self-determination. The problem inflicted by capitalism is unified, the sought solutions should be pursued, in the Ecosocialist analysis, on the local level. Notice that beyond the declarative position, it is not quite clear what ‘emancipation’ might mean for an indigenous remote tribe or, indeed, whether advocating the counter process to globalisation – decentralisation – is realistically viable or just politically correct. Using a mirror image reflects more what one opposes, and possibly, what one espouses, than the actual means of bringing about the sought transformation. In conclusion, it is possible to recapture the points which were hitherto made by alluding to the capital/labour divide, for it best represents the thread of a socialist analysis. Changes in capital markets have influenced the realms of nature – threatening to deplete natural resources, hence undermining the natural basis of human life. They also expanded underdeveloped societies – threatened by international markets and exploitation

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of the rich world. However, the other side of the coin – labour – is not kept intact either. Whereas the SPD and the workers’ organisations have seen work in itself to be the single most important principle of their political struggle – a view underpinned philosophically by Marx’s notion of man as a productive creature and the centrality of ‘work’ in his worldview – the Ecosocialists have shifted the emphasis.28 They argue that there is a need to fulfil radical needs – ‘human creativity, community, enjoyment of nature etc.’ (thesis 9) – that is, the needs essential to human nature but which are still undermined by the prevailing consumer society which deliberately generates ‘manipulative’ needs to maintain the socio-economic order. Interestingly, the emphasis is transferred from ‘work’ as such, to creative and meaningful work as the ultimate realisation of human nature. What we witness is a curious shift of emphasis from productivity to creativity and ‘life worth living’.29 The root cause for this change is the environmental crisis: the limited natural resources require limitations on consumption and therefore production, which can be achieved by shifting the focus onto meaningful work and leisure time, and away from compulsive growth. Thus, ‘free time’ and leisure activities are indicated as central to fulfilled human life (thesis 12). The demand for a shorter working week, again an old socialist policy, carries far-reaching ideological implications, for it is not only work which dominates the analysis, but free time and selffulfilment outside work. Life styles and private life therefore acquire legitimation as an adequate arena of political interest, along side with the socio-economic realm. This was a significant ideological development – especially in light of the post-Marxist project of shifting political energies to the personal and civic spheres – and was to become the focal point of German Green politics. Both ‘real existing socialism’, and the existent achievement-oriented society in advanced industrial societies are criticised, and a more egalitarian, just society advocated (thesis 3). Given that natural resources are limited, the creative forces of humans, not merely the productive ones, come to bear. Meaningful, creative work is sought, a possible goal only in an ‘ecologically enlightened’ society freed from despotic-dictatorial state measures against the people (thesis 10). Again, the traditional enemy – the State – is attacked, but the cause is extended into ecological wisdom. The reason that an ecologically enlightened society is conditional upon the transformation of the State, is apparent in other analyses by Ebermann and Rainer, where they show how the forces of the market, and the mechanism of the state, lead to a preference for profit considerations over humane and ecological ones. For example, the exploitative approach to forests, which are used for industrial purposes and suffer successive replanting, disregards the forests’ natural ecosystems and diversity of life, and ignores the ecological processes of soil erosion, water pollution and acid rain. The death of the forests, irreversibly degrading natural ecosystems and depriving humans of their natural and traditional environment, is not

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decided upon by the local people, but by federal governments, economic companies and by the whims of the international market economy. Thus, there is a recurring pattern to the Ecosocialists’ ideological transformation: the advocacy of a traditional Marxist stance, in the context of the ecological crisis, introduces an extension which carries the analysis beyond class struggle, but which remains within the realm of the relations of domination. Hence, late capitalism leads to the exploitation of man and nature; class domination threatens human nature and human life; international markets devastate both the working class and indigenous societies in their natural environments. In the same fashion, the envisioned society would provide for both human productivity and creativity; there would be shorter working hours and meaningful work and leisure time; it would be socially humane – and ecologically enlightened. The social and the ecological – interrelations Innovative as it may be for a Marxist analysis to undergo these changes, the main elements incorporated into the Ecosocial theses, so it seems, were already introduced in the analysis of the value-conservatives, especially in that of Gruhl’s: rejection of economic growth, the historical analysis of capitalism and industrialism as the principal cause for environmental degradation and finally the urgency of the ecological crisis. Gruhl himself has emphasised that it is economic growth, based on material consumerism, rather than environmental problems per se, which lie at the heart of the problem. Is it the case that Marxist analysis changes so substantially that it converges with the environmental critique? If the underlying principles of the analyses are the same, then what do the Ecosocialists contribute to the environmental analysis, and how does one differ from the other? Taking first the relationship between social and ecological problems, the 8th thesis of the Ecosocialists stresses that changes in behaviour towards nature cannot occur until society’s basic material needs are satisfied. The 9th thesis reads: ‘the important factor is that the present system-of-needs belongs to the current social system (and its outcomes). They can be criticised and they are changeable.’ In the Ecosocialist analysis, therefore, social realities are not merely an indication of the problems of the consumer society that produced the ecological crisis, but rather realities which have to be comprehensively tackled as social problems – by accommodating the basic needs of people. This is a precondition for environmental transformation. Gruhl’s analysis seeks to disregard the social problems by alluding to the survivalist thesis: environmental problems threaten the basis of life, therefore they are most urgent and postpone any other problem. On the face of it, an Ecosocialist analysis interested in basic social needs should agree that the basis of life is a more fundamental issue than other levels of social problems.30 For how could any social need be more basic than a threat to life itself?

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However, the revised communist analysis provides two insights which account for the entanglement of the environmental crisis with the issue of prevailing social conditions. First, by arguing that mobilising a more considerate behaviour toward nature necessitates limiting the usage of natural resources in the process of production, it establishes that environmental change is conditioned upon a transformation of the modes of production.31 Since the process of production underlies economic, social and political realities, all these spheres have to be concomitantly transformed in order to generate any significant ecological change. Secondly, the Ecosocialists provide a fascinating account as to why social needs, embedded within the market structure, precede existential needs – unreasonably as it may sound. For example, taking the market demand for chemical factories, Ebermann and Rainer analyse the choices presented to workers in factories with greater exposure to pollution and higher risks of contracting lung disease and cancer. The workers are faced with the choice of unemployment, or being able to provide for their families. If, however, they choose the latter they would expose both themselves, who come in direct contact with poisonous substances, and their families who live in the vicinity of the polluting factories – to higher levels of pollution and a health-risk environment. The immediate needs of food and maintenance will transcend the even more fundamental needs of health and life expectancy. This also explains why disadvantaged groups are likely to suffer more than others: they are also less likely to afford private health care in the not-unlikely eventuality of contracting cancer. The weaker layers of society are more vulnerable and less able to change their lifestyle due to the structure of the socio-economic system. People are trapped in the structure of the system. Environmental and social injustices overlap, thereby deepening the subordination of the poorer social strata. In contrast to Gruhl’s analysis, social problems are not mere indications of the crisis. Environmental problems are not equally distributed in society and they are mediated, embedded and filtered through the current structure of socio-economic processes. Thus, whether one accepts the falseconsciousness analysis of the communists, or not, (namely that the dominant class knowingly generates consumer impulses and profit-driven policies in order to further the exploitation of other people and nature for their own benefit), one is inclined to admit that the system tends to exert these combined effects on the weaker fragments of society. The Ecosocialist analysis points to a major fault in the narrowly focused environmental position: the survivalist thesis tends to overlook society, insisting that a conclusive overthrow of politics is needed. The Ecosocialist analysis disputes this tendency and enriches the ecological analysis by raising the concern of social justice in relation to environmental problems. The Ecosocialist analysis further contests environmentalists’ attempts to refer directly to natural order and natural laws, hoping thereby to ignore

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the social problems. Environmentalists have applied the discourse of the science of ecology to the human species, taking it to be no different from any other animal species, engaged in a war of survival over resources. Such a naturalistic discourse serves to transcend the social discourse – an avenue found compelling by Gruhl and his ilk since the discourse of growth and progress treated nature exclusively as a means, ignoring altogether the ecological constraints on humans. The Ecosocialist analysis makes apparent the flaw of this argument: society is founded on socio-political order, and any transformation of this order cannot be justified by the quasi-fascist elements of a transpolitical ‘natural order’. While recognising that hitherto there had been a failure on the part of political discourse to address environmental questions, and that the exploitation of nature was built into the socio-economic system, the Ecosocialists, interestingly, called for transformation from within, and not for wholesale annihilation of the system in place. The naturalistic discourse does not lead beyond the designation of the problems. Addressing the ecological crisis has to be from within the political order, even if it does, in a communist fashion, take the violation of basic needs as a valid foundation for ‘rebellion against the system’ (thesis 9). We have already seen how the groups that participated in the original SPV either rejected the system, or avoided it. The former communists are no different in that respect: they seek rebellion, which in effect means doing away with the existing system. However, Gruhl’s survivalist thesis implies that war or an authoritarian regime are both a conceivable way of controlling resources on a global scale, and moreover, this is the only means of securing sustainable development and provision for future generations. A classic mobilisation around an enemy has to justify a rejection of the system. The Ecosocialist theory, which advocates decentralisation and self-determination, sought a radical social transformation which would give way to a more just, humane and ecologically enlightened society (thesis 7). It relied upon principles of social justice and human rights, endorsing the legacy of the Enlightenment, rather than rejecting it.32 Gruhl used the natural science of ecology to undermine modernism itself: the Enlightenment project encouraged the exploitation of nature, using science and technology to generate ever-increasing growth. Science, by exposing the limits to growth, the irreversibility of ecological processes and the inability of science itself to regenerate natural resources, discredited the open-ended future progress of the modern era. The ecological crisis carries an apocalyptic vision, the end of human horizons. In contrast to Gruhl’s repudiation of the Enlightenment project, the Ecosocialist analysis provides an optimistic note: ‘This is today very possible’ reads the 11th thesis, ‘as the ability of humanity to reproduce in a productive dialogue with Nature its basis-of-life has grown substantially. With that also the objective freedom develops, making it possible to redefine the interrelations between work and life without having to distribute only the deprivations.’ Thus Ebermann, in

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an interview argued: ‘engaging in radical-Left politics is always excessively optimistic and has little readiness to disregard reality’.33 The Ecosocialists reject Gruhl’s doomsday ideology which conceals the desire for an authoritarian regime and an all-out war on resources, and reflects little faith in human nature or in a social future. Instead, the belief in human progress and in the ability to change, given the already achieved technological and scientific progress, and a growing environmental awareness, may generate a transformation towards a better, more egalitarian and just society. The crisis means that although action needs to be taken urgently, the overall view is one of an optimistic belief in a humane future. The marked difference in attitude is obvious. In the final analysis, what did ‘ensuring the survival of communism in the present day situation’ amount to? While preserving the fundamental pillar of Marxist analysis – perceiving the developments within capitalism as the root cause for changes in history, including the ecological crisis34 – Ecosocialists have practically abandoned the concept of the revolution for one of transformation, following the ‘crisis of the Left’ in the late 1970s. A fundamental aspect of this has been the change in working-class consciousness, which incorporated manipulative needs, instead of basic needs, thus coopting the workers to the ethos of the consumer society. Radical social and environmental change, necessitates, therefore, fundamental transformation of consciousness.35 Significantly, Ecosocialists sought to achieve this by decentralising political and economic power and thereby empowering local people, exposing them to solidarity and communal direct experiences which decrease alienation and release the workers from the effects of false consumer impulses and the market mechanism. As Markovits and Gorski explain: The ecosocialists, who until the early 1980s considered themselves the heirs of Lenin and Mao, changed their views in the course of that decade toward espousing the decentralisation of power as a key step toward socialism. The political agenda underlying ecosocialism was to forge an alliance between organised labour and the new social movements based on the shared goals of ecologising and humanising production.36

The Spontis: ‘Why don’t they let us simply be happy?’ In contrast to the organised extraparliamentary cadres of the student organisations and K-groups, a growing segment of the disillusioned Left found itself increasingly dismayed at both the state system and the organised Left. The reaction of the undogmatic Left (the remnants of the student upheaval of the late 1960s, the politically uprooted intelligentsia and the highly educated young generation growing up in the FRG),37 was to establish a Gegenöffentlichkeit – an alternative public sphere. Their effort was an

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inward-looking one, which involved trying to live differently and thereby construct a viable alternative to the consumer society, the capitalist market economy, the bourgeois family and the conventional media.38 This subculture which developed at the margins of the FRG resonated deep into the German mainstream.39 The highly active, vocal and vivid participatory lifestyle has reached beyond the boundary of its self-erected ghetto walls, in that it embodies an alternative culture which many Germans found appealing, and was accessible through its diversity of alternative shops, publications and street-art exhibitions. The Sponti scene and the alternative movement – the offspring of the anti-authoritarian APO – were an open protest against the political culture of the FRG. The most characteristic of the different activities was a deep disdain for the established institutions of politics and administration,40 a rejection of Machtpolitik41 – power-driven politics – and in particular the monopoly of the State, all of which were experienced to different degrees by the population at large. The reluctance of the New Left to involve itself in activities beyond their own private public-sphere was a manifestation of their high self-criticism and autonomous, individualistic ethos, which was at once their creative driving force and a hindrance. While the main concern of the Ecosocialists was ideological transformation, the position of the alternative movements is more problematic. Their initial reaction was a total rejection of theory and a focus on practice. The principles adopted as guidelines for their Lebenswelt – lifeworld – were eventually translated into political and ideological concepts. In order to understand their response to the crisis of identity and the instrumental role of the environment, the analysis of Joschka Fischer, a Sponti activist, leader of the German Greens and currently foreign minister of the FRG, is most compelling. ‘Identität in Gefahr!’42 – Identity in Danger – analyses the extraparliamentary opposition formed outside Modell Deutschland. The meeting point between the radical, politicised New Left and the CIs’ resistance to atomic power plants that arose in the 1970s. According to Fischer, questions at the cutting edge of technological and scientific developments, not least the ecological questions, have served to widen the gap between the present and the silenced German past. ‘The modern and the old Germany stand in irreconcilable contrast.’43 The prospect of Germany, after two world wars and Auschwitz, being placed at the forefront of another, possibly nuclear world war, places a special burden on Germans and has substantially increased support of the protest movements.44 Thus, Fischer argues, while ecological crisis exists in all industrial societies, as do Green and ecological parties, it is only in Germany that an identity problem is so inextricably linked with it, and explains the strength and moral weight of the Greens in Germany. ‘For the future the question remains whether the solution to the problem of German identity will arise from the Right or the Left. Here lies the main responsibility of the project of

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the Greens in West Germany.’45 The Green-cum-Germanness aspect provides an insight into the phenomena of the German Greens; it is therefore an instrumental aspect to understanding their evolving worldview. Theory: praxis as a mirror image The attitude of the Spontis to the environment must be sought in their praxis, rather than in theory. The first area which embodies their interpretation of the environment is their alternative way of life. Everyday practices, resonating from the members of the alternative movement through to the public at large, were significant: alternative food, alternative health, organic farming, recycling projects, country-style furniture, ramblers’ associations, alternative education and nature-based communes have become part and parcel of the life-experience of many Germans (encompassing at one stage or another 61 per cent of the general population aged 22–25).46 Changing one’s way of life, transforming the individual and the family, are the trademark of the ‘politics in the first person’ which the alternative movements embodied. This required a growing awareness that environmental issues are political, just like quality of life and brought about the ultimate politicisation of hitherto non-political issues. Thus, the concrete concepts of what an alternative way of life might consist of had direct bearings on different aspects of nature. Instead of the highly abstract interpretation of the ecological crisis found in the theories of Gruhl and the Ecosocialists, or the purely national symbolism which nature offered the anti-modernist forces, the alternative movements perceive nature as a concrete, tangible entity related to the physical environment and basic human needs. The ‘politics of place’ came closest to capturing this notion of nature,47 emphasising the direct link between lifestyle and government policies. Concentrating on everyday activities as well as on personal and communal experiences, led to new forms of alternative culture: communes, theatres, galleries, shops, clubs, food, music, looks, literature, clothes and so on.48 Curiously, these phenomena, precisely due to their under-theorisation, might have been classified – if taken out of context – as a pure cultural, non-political retreat from the State into society. However, this very ‘retreat’ represented a political declaration, a protest against the State and the organised Left. Instead of constructing a theory of revolution and social change, the Alternative scene created a different subculture and lived according to the principles they believed in. Theory, especially Marxism, was condemned for its fixation on objective, structural changes within a meta-historical perspective. The class-struggle and the internal evolution of capitalism, the Spontis claimed, overshadowed the experience of the individual, and pigeon-holed people within stratified social layers, which in effect, though not in theory, demonstrated little patience for the individual or for her lifeworld. It was not only objective structure but the revolutionary subject which was contested. Fischer,

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following Gorz, suggested that the proletariat is an abstract general idea ‘not the Class works, lives, loves, suffers, fights but a concrete individual of flesh and blood, a man’.49 The class as a unity is an imagined subject, it is the individual who is the only real subject. Consequently, the theoretical reliance on rationality, was condemned, and a poignant critique of the abandonment of emotions, intuitions, spirituality and imagination took its place. In the view of the New Left, rigorous rationality and scholarly analysis completely ignored the central role of other humane faculties. Authenticity, spontaneity and subjectivity were reclaimed.50 This phenomenon also had a peculiarly German aspect to it, insofar as it represented the struggle to rescue emotionality and spirituality from the long shadow of the Nazi past. As one Sponti activist put it: The myth of fascism is not of any danger to us. What is dangerous is if the Left does not take up mythology and thereby throws out emotionality. Fascism was a combination of myth and technocracy, centralisation and military apparatus, which did not contain individuality and the destruction of centralised structures. We refer to folk mythology in the sense that within a region, mythological ways of thinking are conveyed in the relationship to the countryside, in the relationships which I have with others, and that is so far removed from fascism as anything else.51 The regulative ideal was hence derived from ecological principles, supporting self-subsisting communities which were incorporated into their local environments. Ecological problems presented an opportunity to disengage from the haunting Nazi past, and constituted a formative identity mission for the movements, not least since the SPD and Trade Unions’ leaders remained suspicious of the extraparliamentary movements which reminded them of the Brown Shirts of Hitler’s SA.52 Not only reality, but myths and fears needed to be addressed: movement, spirituality, relationship with Nature were all largely associated with Nazism. The alternative movements were persistent in reclaiming these forms of action, while vehemently rejecting other features of National Socialism – the position of the leader, the disciplined uniformity of the mass movement, mass communication, the contempt for the ‘other’, racism, the centralisation of power and the reliance on technology and capitalism.53 The fierce critique of the consumer society propounded by the NSMs, explains why the emphasis on subjectivity, autonomy and emotions did not lead to extreme individualism. This was because individualism channelled personal and social concerns into the politically impotent sphere of material wellbeing. The NSMs resisted the consumer-oriented culture which dominated the postwar era, thus calling into question the ethos of advanced capitalist societies, and of West Germany, in particular. Material society had bred a certain kind of individualism, along with a particular

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brand of liberty and choice – the consumer’s choice between commodities. The deep hatred of the educated radical milieu for this pursuit of improving personal living standards – a prospect yearned for by the war generation, but resented, though enjoyed, by the postwar generations – led the alternative movement to diverge from crude individualism. The alternative models exhibited different manifestations: the establishment of communes and the creation of a network of alternative projects. ‘The best state is no state’54 – politics of the affected Why did the ‘fun’ alternative scenes choose to return from their retreat and contribute to and transform a broader Germany? The mechanism which facilitated the transition from the social to the political sphere was the mass demonstrations against nuclear plant construction which acted as the most significant link in forging the negative coalition of the APO forces. For what is the value of retreat if one’s state might actively be involved in a nuclear war, or might be exposing its citizens to an existential threat following, say, a nuclear disaster or higher levels of radiation harmful to the public health? It was this sense of existential helplessness in the face of government policies with their all-invasiveness which brought the alternative scene out of their self-imposed ‘ghetto’. Retreat from society is but an illusion, an excuse for escapism which turns its back on the state’s intervention in the most fundamental aspects of the human world: existence, health and the quality of life. The controversial atomic plants illustrated the all-invasiveness of the government, and its interference in the private lives of its citizens in the most extreme way, namely threatening their very existence. Ecological problems on a variety of scales serve as a daily reminder of this all-invasiveness: pollution, environmentally related diseases, acid rain, global warming, contaminated foods, radiation and so on, all demonstrate that government policies have a direct bearing on people’s lives – even if these people want nothing to do with the state apparatus. The ecological crisis, with its tangible effect on ordinary peoples’ lives, contributed substantially to the realisation that the struggle had to be a political one geared towards the political system, and given the political conditions of postwar Germany, geared toward parliament and the party system. Tellingly, it was this same angst, following its direct confrontation with the state police forces, which occasioned the Alternative movements to rethink their political position. Moreover, the encounter with the bureaucracy, judiciary and especially the police served as a direct experience of the horrors of the State, in all its omnipotence and supremacy over the individual.55 Thus, it was the immediate experience of unmittelbare Bettrofenheit – unmediated affectedness – ‘that which directly affects, impacts and upsets’56 which became the new principal guiding action. Power, wrote Fischer, is not a subject but a structure.57 Instead of one class of people exploiting another, the individual subject is faced with the structure of power, with the apparatus.

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The notion of the individual confronted by the structures of power has a double effect: it generates a sense of helplessness on the one hand, but it also suggests the route of political action to the affected citizen. The need to act despite the realisation that there is no particular entity deliberately generating injustice, argues Fischer, was fundamental to the New Left’s emergence from its identity crisis. The New Left’s commitment to nonviolence was not at all straightforward.58 The student riots of the 1960s, and the terrorist cells, which chose armed confrontation with the state, are obvious counter-examples. Fundamentally, however, the commitment to nonviolence closely coincided with the total rejection of the established system. For their part, the protest movements adopted civil disobedience and direct action as the characteristic mode of political activity. Whereas nonviolent political means prevailed in the alternative milieu, it was ideologically anchored in a perception of violence as an immanent feature of the system. Face-to-face confrontation with the police was only the concrete manifestation of a deeper structural problem: the police were one facet of the state monopoly of power, power with which, arguably, the state has been endowed by its citizens and which it uses to abuse them. This sense of betrayal and abuse stands at the core of the critique. Thus, violence is not reduced to physical confrontation. Violation of human and civil rights, displayed for example in the Emergency Laws, the Berufsverbot, and even in article 218 against abortions, are inherent parts of the same phenomenon: violence is structurally anchored within the current system. It brings to bear Fischer’s analysis of power as a dominant feature of the political system, and directs the Green agenda not to tackling isolated aspects of the system, but to the active transformation of the political system itself, while denying the route of retreat.59 The belief that injustices were structurally embedded in the system meant that if a change was sought, nothing short of influencing the political system could deal with these problems at source. Fischer’s logic regarding the need to influence the structure of power directly is clearly in evidence. But how can the environment be included in the discourse of political representation if the sole subject of democracy is the individual? What claims can be made with regard to representing the environment? Crucially, the ecological crisis is a radical case of the problem of representation in democracies: the environment is both the ultimate non-subject, while being at the same time most in need of protection.60 This is instrumental to the comprehension of the Green project. In contrast to the dark Greens, and the vast body of literature that proliferated in the last two decades, which attempt to perceive nature as a moral client and to include natural environments and species in the discourse of rights and intrinsic values, the position which is developed by the New Left is far more clear-sighted and extreme. Nature, contrary to the implications of Marcuse and other heroes of the student revolt,61 is not a Subject.62 Nevertheless, calling attention to the

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distinction between the individual subject and his or her relations to others, among them nature, reinforces awareness of the environment. Nature confronts political activists with the starkest mission, namely to try and represent an agent which by definition can not express self-interest – there is no genuine ‘nature’s point of view’. The environment in this respect is the ultimate underrepresented agent, it is the first sacrifice of the industrial world, hitherto untried unpolitical grounds par excellence – and an ideal banner for the alternative movement which sought to shift the political arena. This realistic view of nature did not prevail within the alternative movements which, more commonly, featured nature as a subject brutally suppressed by the System. The peculiar relationship between nature and other political struggles central to the project of the New Left, and the existence of yet another perception of nature is exemplified in the Women’s movement to which we now turn.

The nature of the women’s movements The project of the alternative milieu, with its emphasis on the subjective individual, sensitivity to difference and self-expression of identity through lifestyle, appears to capture the sentiments of the women’s movement. However, the emergence of the alternative movements had mixed repercussions on women’s endeavours, enhancing their principles and undermining their political poignancy at one and the same time. The fortunes of women’s equality are closely entwined with those of political liberalism. Throughout the nineteenth century, political liberalism did not prevail as Germany’s dominant ideology. Parliament remained an isolated institutional arena of conflicting interest parties, and did not project onto the political culture of society as a whole. This highlighted the extreme separation between the political and the cultural, as our discussion of the social movements in that period has shown. In the twentieth century, the two World Wars geared people towards national unity and cohesion, but the division of roles between women and men, despite facilitating the mass employment of women, only entrenched their identity role models as nurses and soldiers. The ideology of the Third Reich further served to sanctify the dominant role of the woman in the traditional sense of wife, mother and provider. The bitter defeat of the Second World War left Germans nationally exhausted, yearning for privacy and the rehabilitation of their own family and communal lives. These were now centred around consumerism which carried its own problems of commercialised sexual roles. Indeed, as late as 1964, 75 per cent of German men, and 72 per cent of women still thought that ‘the woman’s place is in the home’, and only in 1975, in the wake of the 1968 worldwide student protest, did the figures drop to 42 per cent and 35 per cent respectively.63 This change has to do with the emergence of the NSMs, which politicised the gender conflict.

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However, the very impetus to retreat into the purely cultural, even if it was – as we insist – a political declaration, still prevented women from having a significant input into Germany’s political culture. The communities as well as the subculture gave women autonomy in their own quarters, but not outside the alternative ghetto. Two important reasons come into play: first, women were an integral part of the radical political cadres – be they communist, Marxist, anarchist or liberal – and consequently, women saw themselves ‘socialists first and women second’.64 In these circles, women issues came to be regarded as a respected cause, but also as part of a larger ideological struggle which offered women equality within these groups, but at the same time hindered their independent political mission. The other impediment was an ideological objection, on the part of women, to the dominant patterns of behaviour of the ‘boys’ clubs’, which led women political activists to reject, in line with their worldview, the familiar hierarchical, competitive and power-seeking political organisations, thus severing themselves from these means of influence. The politicisation of women’s issues in Germany was, and to a large extent remains, based on article 218 of the German law. In the summer of 1971 the anti-abortion clause of the German criminal code generated a wave of protest which, for the first time brought women – as women and not as another ideological subgroup – face to face with the political apparatus. At the time, it was Alice Schwarzer’s controversial act – assembling 374 women who had had abortions and were ready to publicly declare it – which removed the veil of secrecy from this usually private, intimate issue, and raised the salience of women’s concerns to an unprecedented degree. ‘Action 218’ gained force and 2,000 more women came forward, encouraged by 86,000 declarations of solidarity and support.65 This was followed by women’s congresses, women’s magazines, alternative women’s projects and accelerating media attention, all of which served to introduce, and to substantially increase, the debate on women’s issues within the FRG, as well as to raise public awareness of the political aspects of the private, familial and social realms. Still, the great sensitivity of women to politics of difference and identity, and their abhorrence of hierarchical and institutional structures, were reinforced by a history of latent institutional discrimination. To date, article 218 – which recurred in the row over the unification of Germany and the abortion law – remains the most salient issue around which women have been mobilised. From a Green perspective, this debate was closely connected with two other issues: sanctity of life and the class struggle. The basic programme of the Greens read: Pregnancy (article 218): Concerning the question of abortion, two fundamental goals of Die Grünen come into conflict with one another: on the one hand, we vigorously support the right of self-determination for

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men and women; and on the other hand, we desire to protect life in all its aspects.66 Others have characterised the debate as part of a fight over who has the right to decide: the woman, the state’s health committee, the doctors or the lawyers. It is a class issue, argued Marxist ecofeminist Ditfurth, since rich women can afford private abortions, and it is only the poor that are at the mercy of the state.67 However, the ‘action for the liberation of women’ refused to be a side-protest matter – Nebenwiderspruch – as Schwarzer called it. This refusal constituted a genuine part of radical feminism as seen throughout the advanced democratic world. In the words of a British radical feminist: Women’s oppression can be fought independently of other oppressions … we can say ‘feminism’ is the belief that women’s oppression is first, foremost, and separable from any particular historical context.68 This ahistorical statement could be contested, since it was only the Enlightenment creed which universalised human equality, only the Industrial Revolution and wars which sent women en masse to join the paid working force, and only recently developed medical devices which endowed women with greater control over childbearing.69 Nevertheless, the historical analysis of the oppression of women is critical to developing awareness and justifying the necessity for change in all spheres of human activity. Much of the effort of German feminists was indeed directed toward establishing such a history, and accounts of the ‘history of women in Germany’ and of the development of the women’s movement have proliferated. Feminists were conscious of the instrumental role played by these endeavours in establishing a common cause. As Schwarzer put it: ‘History is not only past, it is also the future, without history we are rootless and have no identity.’70 The fact that this came about only in the 1970s shows its inherent interconnection with political protest in the German context. Thus, the historicity of the evolution of the women’s liberation movements is no more contingent than the fact that workers’ movements developed during a period of rapid industrialisation. This very ‘historical situatedness’, if we may call it that, points to the contemporaneous emergence of different new political struggles in the second half of the twentieth century in advanced industrial democracies. Each issue took the form of a comprehensive battle, fought on its own terms, although the war was a common venture attacking institutionalised democracies. In other words, even though women were essentially interested in their equality, minority groups in their rights, middleclass citizens in their backyard countryside and students in ‘changing the world’ in general, all were alert to the problems which had sprung up due to

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the institutionalisation of advanced industrial democracies, principles which the democratic creed itself once professed to endorse. The uneasy relations between the women’s movement and other NSMs were therefore a structural problem of the emerging new political actor, the Greens. It is no wonder that Schwarzer declared: ‘Ending the threat of a nuclear war does not mean automatically the ending of the domination in the gender war: this war where they, men, who are the powerful, daily fight against us.’71 The complex relationship between the different New Politics issues and their communality is at the centre of this study. The women’s issue hence exemplifies this uneasy coexistence of independent side-ideologies within the Greens. The feminist struggle is of special interest to the examination of the particular relationship between women’s political endeavour and the concept of the environment. It shed light on their compound philosophical relations: the role of the concept of nature in the feminist discourse, and the interrelationship between the ecological and the feminist struggles. The structural affinity – as well as the difference of content – of these political struggles, and the singularity of the environment in relation to other New Politics issues will be examined. I take issue with the feminist movements only in relation to our central problem, namely the different perceptions of the environment, and its political implications; here we will not dwell on the serious political mission of the women’s movements as such. Giving birth to nature One pillar of the anti-authoritarian, student and alternative movements involved the challenge to the dichotomisation of values in which the cluster of power, domination, competition, hierarchy, ambitiousness, violence and so on was superior to that of empathy, solidarity, cooperation, equality, giving, caring, compassion and emotionality. The alternative movements sought to change the order of priorities by ‘feminising’ society, that is, by politicising the personal, the communal, the different, the concrete and the immediate, in their lifestyles. By elevating the cluster of ‘feminine’ values and adopting them, they hoped to supersede the dichotomy. How is the so-called feminine cluster of values connected to nature? One obvious connection, is that the term ‘nature’ is derived from the Latin natura, nasci – to be born – and only women can give birth. The late Petra Kelly, the wellknown German Green figure, and a leading activist in the feminist, environmental and peace movements, took this one step further, arguing that Woman must lead the efforts in education for peace awareness, because only she, I feel, can go back to her womb, her roots, her natural rhythms, her inner search for harmony and peace, while men, most of them anyway, are continually bound to their power struggle, the exploitation of nature, and military ego trip. Our timidity must end for the earth has no emergency exit.72

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Nature prefigures in three different ways, each with major philosophical and political implications: the biological nature of women and the issue of natural division; the communality resulting from the suppression by the Western culture of both women and nature; and the relationship between the feminists and the environmental struggle. These will be discussed in turn. Nature and human nature Manon Maren-Grisebach argues in her Philosophie der Grünen, that women are perceived by nature to be more receptive, sensitive, less active and achievement-oriented, more emotional, less violent and closer to earth.73 But are they? By ‘nature’? Curiously, examined on its own merits, the relationship between feminine values and nature – clustering emotionality, compassion, nonviolence with being ‘closer to nature’ – is philosophically problematic. To explore the so-called natural bond between women and nature, physical facts seem to be a good starting point. The lives of women, some argue – presumably because of their womb and menstrual period – are closer to the natural cycles of Nature than are those of men. The issue of women’s natural, that is biological, inclination toward child-bearing and arguably toward child-rearing and its social implications, has produced two different feminist responses: one which celebrates womanhood, centring on the body, the womb and motherhood, and one which seeks to divorce the physical capability of women to give birth from the social implications of child-rearing with its subsequent socio-economic impediments. Many ecofeminists dwell on the former, advocating an inward-looking transformation of the Self which is less potent in terms of social change. The more radical political agenda belongs to those maintaining the latter argument. Thus, Kelly maintains: We do not need to abrogate our positive feminist principles of loving, caring, showing emotions, and nurturing. Every individual has both feminine and masculine qualities. We should not relieve men of their responsibility to transform themselves, to develop caring human qualities and become responsible for child care, housework and all other essential support work.74 In this case, it seems that the cluster of ‘feminine’ features, with the exception of child-bearing, are not immanently female features (referred to by Kelly as principles, and later as values). Notice, therefore, that there is a confusion between ‘natural’ in its biological sense, and ‘natural’ as an abbreviation of ‘human nature’, and in this respect, of the female and male nature. In the feminist discourse, many references to ‘nature’ actually mean ‘human nature’. We therefore need to distinguish three levels: physical features, fe/male qualities, and feminine values. The relationship between the natural, that is, physical abilities, and its relationship to both

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human nature and social roles is crucial to the discussion of the natural division. The mere physical given, argue feminists, should not affect the social and economic status of the woman. Thus, the feminists expose the social implications of the natural division, and its economic impositions. The fact that the economic unit, at least in the welfare state, is the family, and not the individual, has been challenged since the entire edifice of socio-economic structures has unjustly been imposed on women. Note here that the liberal distinction between the public and private spheres (in itself designed to protect the right to freedom from intervention) serves, in this case, to further entrench women’s subordination in the private and social spheres. Feminists have to fight not only socio-economic injustices, but the political perceptions which indirectly serve to reinforce them. Posing the question in this way demonstrates that a major endeavour of the feminist struggle is exactly to divorce the mere natural, that is the physical given, from its social and economic implications. The discussion so far suggests that women being ‘closer to nature’ entails a problem for feminists: on the one hand, they want to abolish the social implications of the seemingly ‘natural’ division by detaching the ability to bear children from the attached social responsibilities. In that respect, they join the Ecosocialists as fierce opponents of any doctrine of the so-called ‘natural order’ or ‘natural society’. The value-conservatives’ concept of nature, and the natural division within the human species, is highly objected to by the feminists, who believe that ‘natural order’ is but a code for subverting the social construction of gendered identities; a tool used to neutralise highly ideological arguments for purposes of political domination. On the other hand, they seek to elevate what is perceived as ‘feminine features’ to the status of acknowledged social values, to feminise men and society. Culture–nature/men–women The tense relations between feminine and masculine features has some parallels with the dilemma with which we opened the discussion on the German Greens – namely, the dichotomy between man and nature. We saw that in order to emphasise the interrelations between man and nature, ‘nature in itself’ was at once transcended and reintroduced. In a parallel fashion, feminine values are contrasted with masculine ones and re-evaluated as positive and desirable, thus, however, further reinforcing their ‘independence’. Notice that while in the man–nature case, one wishes to draw attention to the interconnectedness in order to preserve nature in its non-human component, in the women’s case the social task is more ambiguous. On the one hand, one wishes to change the value judgement on ‘feminine values’ – to feminise society as it were – while at the end of the day to revoke, not evoke, the dichotomy, and to make men, women and society more enmeshed with the different values, balancing them rather than preserving the separation. On the other hand, the task of ‘feminising’ men and society

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has to allow also the maintenance of the difference between the genders, not in a degrading way, which encourages exploitation, but in a constructive way, which helps members of each gender to retain their sexual identity without domination and without a crude levelling of men and women. It contains the same potential as in the discussion of community – one of transcending the dichotomy between equality and individuality by seeking to establish a society which is more egalitarian and less violent and powerdriven, as well as more sensitive to difference and positive toward plurality of identity, not least gendered identities. While this is a feminist social vision, it has nothing to do with nature, indeed, it rejects the social implications of the claim that women are closer to nature. In the context of relation to nature, we turn now to the cultural argument. It runs as follows: women, being less susceptible to masculine social values, are more likely to understand and have compassion for nature, and can therefore mediate a ‘return to nature’ and a retreat from a chauvinist society which is based on control and exploitation. As Manon MarenGrisebach puts it, women are perceived as more natural, and in a world where nature is fast disappearing, every human being has to be closer to nature – a mission in which women can have a ‘natural’ lead. There is a need, according to this interpretation, to take advantage of the contingent fact that these qualities have hitherto been perceived to be connected with women, and to therefore make use of them in order to bring about the change necessary to resolve the crisis of meaning, economy and ecology.75 What has always been perceived as subordinate should be preserved, and awarded a central role in bringing about social change through a change of ecological consciousness. Is the relationship between women and nature reducible to misconceived perceptions regarding feminine features and human nature, or is there a more profound correlation between the two? The discussion so far suggests that if the only link between feminine features and nature is the assertion that ‘women are closer to nature’, it will be subject to a double error. The first is that of identifying inner nature with external nature via human nature (a woman has menstrual periods therefore she is closer to Nature which is part of her human nature); and the second that derives ethical valuations from physical facts (women are closer to nature and it is desirable to be closer to nature in the way that women are). There is, however, a more significant way in which the correlation does hold true. Maren-Grisebach goes on to argue that the commonality between women and nature is one of shared fate: both were conceived by men as objects, both were exploited by men and both were romantically admired, but were also subordinated – by men.76 The argument here is not that women are naturally closer to nature, but that women and nature have been subjected to different but parallel exploitation by men. It is the analogy between the cultural exploitation of nature and men’s domination over women, both

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derived from a chauvinistic ethos, which is highlighted. The best advocator of this approach is again Petra Kelly, who argued that: There is a clear and profound relationship between militarism, environmental degradation and sexism … Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states and countless cases of private suffering … We want to end these forms of oppression by doing away with the power and mentality that produced and maintains them … Male dominance is typical of other patterns of domination across all cultural divides. It is the basis of the system of politics that have brought the world to its present, extreme state. It is the pattern that connects acts of individual rape with the ecological rape of our planet.77 For ecofeminists, then, male domination as practised through political rule has led to the exploitation of women as of mother Earth herself. The structure of power – patriarchal hierarchy – armed with a chauvinist, aggressive mentality, culminated in consecutive rapes. It is only feminising society – elevating the value of the feminine features – that will help ‘to restore balance and harmony between women and men, and between masculine and feminine values in society and within each of us’.78 Notice, however, that accusing men of incest of our own Mother Earth is the kind of manipulation of images that feminists seek to abolish. More importantly, we know a great deal about how society will function, if the feminist principles were implemented: it will be less competitive, feminine features will be valued and rediscovered in men and in women and greater emphasis will be placed on sharing and caring, thus reducing patterns of rule and domination. However, we know very little about environmental politics. How would environmental degradation be dealt with? What policies are needed to address acid rain and global warming, and what political entities should enforce them? What does ‘stopping the rape of our planet’ actually mean? Do feminists, then, appropriate Nature and instrumentally use it to forward their own cause? On the rhetorical level, the answer is Yes.79 However, there is a deeper sense in which their case is well argued: ‘The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century contained in it the seeds of today’s oppressive technologies. If we can trace the myths and metaphors associated with the conquest of nature, we will realise how much we are under the sway of masculine institutions and ideologies.’80 Here, the material analysis which the feminist critique was developing superbly, and the insights into the analysis of discourse which reveal modes of domination, provide a viable weapon in the environmental struggle: it is the environmental debate which is enriched by the techniques endowed it by the feminists. Even though the material analysis of the subordination of women will not resemble that of the exploitation of nature – a point that should be kept in mind – they both share the same way of arguing their

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different cases. While the content of the analysis is different, the method is similar: exposing, through political discourse and social practice (placed within historical contexts), the ideological convictions which serve to convey, ingrain and justify patterns of dominance and modes of production. Since the same Western society is in question, it is very likely that in both cases the prevailing rhetoric (that is, the ideological justification) will be quite similar. Likewise, the transformation of society, in an attempt to change patterns of domination, and given the awareness of different kinds of oppressions and injustices – women and environment being only two cases in point – might, at the end of the day, allow a better society to evolve. New Politics – the environmental and the social Let us pause for a moment to reflect upon the difference between environmental and other New Politics issues which comes to the fore. While the feminist struggle is a social one, as is often the case with New Politics issues (for example, foreign workers’ and immigrants’ rights, gays’ and lesbians’ rights or multiculturalism), the environment, by definition, is a non-social subject. To be sure, misconduct towards the environment indeed inflicts severe damage on the health, integrity, social cohesion and sustainability of social communities. Social conduct has repercussions for the environment, the environment must be treated as a political concept entailing changes in communal and personal life, environmental awareness should be developed and environmental responsibility stressed. However, in all these cases, we are talking about regard for nature – a second-order apprehension. Thus, references to ‘ecological rape’, or to ‘Mother Nature’, in the environmental debate, are only metaphors since no conscious subject is either in pain or experiencing compassion. These metaphors provide a discursive vehicle for raising awareness of different human attitudes (for example, by evoking remorse and compassion in people) towards the environment. But Nature itself is neither a moral nor a conscious subject, in marked contrast to women, indigenous people or environmentally suffering communities. The feminist critique highlights the diversity of New Politics claims and suggests that the environmental case is different in kind – not just in content. The environment is inherently a non-social agent, though social practices do influence it. While the term ‘injustice’ can only metaphorically be used in the environmental case, real social injustices are at the heart of the New Politics critique. In that case, the question comes to mind: why take environment as the centrepiece of the Green political identity?

Politics beyond the environment – implications Three main functions of the concept of the environment have been identified in the Green discourse: first, an asset brought by the ‘environment’ to the political discourse of the Greens is exactly the fact it can be ‘appropriated’

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by different groups of the negative coalition on different grounds, without having any ‘genuine’ representatives. The environment, as one commentator put it, ‘is at once most pregnant and vexing’.81 In the discussion of the New Left, we have seen how the Ecosocialists interpreted the ‘environment’ mainly with reference to the ecological crisis as enhancing the exploitation and degradation inherent in advanced capitalistic societies; how the environment acquired concrete and diverse aspects of ways of life for the alternative movements; and how the feminist discourse referred to nature both in its symbolic role and as sharing the fate of women under the general pattern of domination of the masculine culture. While the concept of the environment had a quintessential role in each of the discourses of the different NSMs and the CIs studied in the previous chapter, it also enabled the different groups to sympathise with one another on the grounds of the primacy of ecology. Second, beyond the separate struggles of each of the social movements which served to emphasise their differences and distinctiveness, which themselves were elevated to a political value, environmental issues concern every man and woman regardless of their political affiliations. The environment has direct repercussions on health, quality of life, natural surroundings, and therefore transcends idiosyncratic, factional discourse, and provides a tangible political concept with which to contest government’s policies. Indeed, the all-invasiveness of politics, and the crucial role of the environmental crisis in challenging the political system, were fundamental to the negative coalition of the Greens. The environment, the hitherto apolitical issue par excellence, provided alternative political grounds on which to base a radical critique. Third, and most acutely, the environment best exemplified the New Left’s claim that everything is political, that is, that relations of domination are not solely manifested in socio-economic patterns, but beset the private, communal and civic levels. The environment, in that respect, is the ultimate disadvantaged agent for it is not suppressed by one or another interested party, but exploited by the ‘system’ itself, an exploitation which affects all people and necessitates a change of attitudes, norms and practice. The environment thus became the banner of the New Left, as it had of the Greens. The basic programme – a Marxist overtake? While for each of the subgroups within the Greens the environment was a core concept, it acquired a different position in relation to other social and political beliefs. As the previous chapter revealed, the right-wing and valueconservatives hoped to transcend other social problems in order to stress the primacy of ecology and form a united front against the establishment. However, the most significant contribution of the New Left to the politicisation of environmental problems lay in providing a more complex analysis of the relations of environmental and social issues. Whether it was the Ecosocialist attitude, which exposed the enhancement of social exploitation

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by environmental problems, or the alternative and women’s movements, which drew attention to the embeddedness of environmental wrongdoings in the political culture and social practices of materialist societies, the impracticality of postponing social problems in favour of ecological ones was strongly argued. The most decisive influence of the New Left on the manifesto of the Greens is the 1980 Basic Programme (Basis programm – BP) holding as the Greens’ basic programme up to 2002. However, the New Left was accused by many analysts of overtaking the programme, that is, using it to put forward their socialists concerns. Whether this was the case should be considered critically. Fogt argued that: The extreme Left succeeded in incorporating classical features of Marxist ideology into the Green party programme. Thus we find a version of Marx’s theory of impoverishment: ‘Our social conditions produce social and psychological poverty of the masses.’ The section on the economy stresses ‘the exploitation of people by people’ as typical for the ‘economic crisis of industrial societies’; and blames ‘short-term interests in profit’ for the ‘destruction of nature’. Production is not determined by the needs of the people but by the interest of monopoly capital.82 There are double grounds for refuting his assertions regarding the infiltration of the radical Left. First, we already know that Gruhl and the value-conservatives were fierce opponents of high finance capital and wholeheartedly accepted the condemnation of capitalism and its destructive consequences on nature and people. Anti-capitalism was not uniquely Marxist.83 Second, by citing only the last part of the sentence in the programme which reads: ‘This (ecological and economic) crisis is characterised by the increasing destruction of the biological basis of life for human beings and the exploitation of people by people’, Fogt ignores the internal transformation of the Ecosocialists who, in this very sentence, express the changes in their concept of base and superstructure (the idea of the base as the biological basis of life which constrains production), stressing the parallelism between exploitation of man and nature, with its far-reaching ideological consequences, which they reviewed. This demonstrates that the open dialogue was not only a rhetorical declaration, but that it also transformed the outlook of each of the ideological streams. As for the BP itself, the preamble suggests that the ‘destruction of the basis on which life and work are founded and the disintegration of democratic rights has reached such threatening proportions that a fundamental alternative is called for in the areas of economics, politics and society’.84 The New Left’s agenda for social transformation which links environment and work, while putting their trust in democratisation and decentralisation of power which would release people’s creative forces, is well embedded in the ideological opening statement of the BP. The programme contains four

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chapters – economy and work; foreign policy and peace; environment and nature; and, the individual and society – the latter encompassing a volume and scope equal to that of the first three. Was Gruhl right therefore in arguing that instead of concentrating on themes of survival, like the EU79 programme did, ‘they gathered all the possible actual themes just like the old parties’,85 that the basic programme was little more than a political ‘shopping list’? In contrast to the EU79 manifesto, in which the four pillars of Green politics – ecological, social, basis-democratic and nonviolent politics – were presented as aspects of environmental concerns, the BP provides socioeconomic cohesion, in keeping with the argument that environmental problems are interconnected with social and political ones. The exposition of the four pillars, juxtaposed to their EU79 description, best exemplifies this change. First, the section on ecological politics, interestingly opens with the words ‘based upon the laws of nature and above all the realisation’ that growth must be limited, rejects ‘exploitative economy and the unscrupulous plundering of natural resources and raw materials’; it opposes exploitation of nature and of other people, advocating ‘active partnership with both nature and human beings’.86 The separation, driven from the Ecosocialist analysis, between nature and fellow humans is to be preserved – while both are advanced. This will be achieved by ‘using small, self-regulating and selfgoverning administrative and economic units’ oriented to basic human needs. ‘We foresee a truly democratic society in which people become more aware of their relationship to one another and to nature, and actually put this growing awareness into practice.’ This would bring about a change in existing power structures through a ‘genuinely democratic movement’ which stands against ‘life-endangering competition and hierarchical and achievement dominated ways of thinking’.87 The main thrust of New Left politics is evident: the need to politicise environmental and social issues by raising awareness of the problems embedded in the dominant discourse and in social practices as a fundamental stage on the way to uprooting them. Second, future-oriented social politics sets the goal of ‘a stable social system’ (an ecological metaphor), opposing the imbalance due to unequal distribution between rich and poor dictated by leading economic powers and which causes impoverishment in human life due to environmental destruction, competition-oriented economy and concentration of power in state and private capitalistic monopolies. Consequently, the very conditions of human life are threatened. ‘It is only through the self-determination of those directly affected that the ecological, social and economic crises can be counteracted.’88 The social is taken as a facet of economics. Material analysis prevails in the New Left discourse and their social vision consequently seeks a transformation into postmaterialism: Because we favour self-determination and free development of every human being, and support the idea that people should be able to

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determine their own needs and wishes creatively, free from outside pressure, in communities of shared respect for everyone and in harmony with the natural environment, we strongly support human and democratic rights, both here and abroad.89 This emulates not only the New Left’s perception of human nature but also the new emphasis on creativity, human needs, solidarity and human rights. Thus, in the social chapter, the environment prefigures as a degraded human environment, although the account is separated from the ecological reference frame. Environmental and social degradation are interlinked, but social problems are tackled on their own terms. Third, in its basisdemocratic politics, the BP advances decentralised direct democracy of the autonomous local and regional arena. Interestingly, they recognise that this ‘type of democracy also requires comprehensive organisation and coordination, however, if ecologically-minded policies are to be successful in gaining public recognition despite strong opposition’.90 This suggests that possible conflict between radical democracy and radical ecology can be solved by regulations and coordination on the national, federal and international levels. Nevertheless, they go on to argue that, in contrast to other parties: We have therefore decided to create a new type of party structure founded upon grassroots democracy and the principle of decentralisation. These two ideas are inseparable from one another. We believe that a party which lacks this type of structure will never be able to convincingly pursue a policy of true environmental concern within the context of parliamentary democracy.91 Here comes to the fore a fundamental aspect of ecology-cum-politics. Gruhl, for one, perceived environmental survivalism as a means of legitimising control over resources and power, and adamantly rejects a decentralised party structure which distracts itself from ‘purely’ environmental ends. In contrast, the BP adopts the view, that – short of Ecodictatorship – laws and coercion will not be able to change environmental reality. Environmental problems as one cluster among other social problems, necessitate a change of attitude and patterns of behaviour in everyday life. Participatory democracy is best equipped, in this view, for such changes, hence it became an independent pillar of the BP. Fourth, nonviolent politics – rejecting violence, advocating peace and opposing foreign rule over minorities throughout the world while supporting active social resistance – likewise constitutes a separate pillar within Green politics. Violent and dominant relations are prevalent in environmental degradation, oppression of other people, women’s subordination and militarism. Environmental issues are but one facet of the political

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system’s violence. Thus, while the programme is certainly ecologically enlightened, it is not ecologically determined. Each of the pillars entails an environmental dimension, but the vision of the ‘good society’ is based on socio-political principles which provide depth to their political ideology – beyond its environmental imperative.

The founding consensus: ‘the wide rainbow from Dutschke to Gruhl’ Given that EU79 was essentially an ecological programme, and that the BP demonstrated the interrelatedness of ecological and social politics, was the founding consensus a mere tactical consideration, with no ideological rapprochement between the right-of-centre and the New Left? Reflecting on this question ten years after the 1980 foundation congress of the Greens, Ecosocialist Ebermann took the view that there was only one founding consensus of the Greens: ‘if we were splintered we could not have managed the 5% hurdle’.92 Many commentators indeed contended that the Greens were in effect an artefact of the 5 per cent hurdle.93 In contrast, Wilhelm Knabe (originally a CDU member who co-founded the GLU, later becoming a member of the executive and speaker for the Greens) maintained that the founding consensus of the Greens was ‘above all in the readiness and ability to learn from one another’.94 Ebermann himself went on to argue that the 5 per cent was ‘the negative, meagre and despicable aspect of the founding consensus and beyond that there were obviously forms and ideas which one, despite the great difficulties, could learn from the others’.95 Ecoradicals Ditfurth clarified: ‘out of the necessity to work with one another an openness to the other side’s stimulus developed from which all the participants benefited’.96 Thus, while the electoral constraint provided the 5 per cent incentive to coexist within the framework party, making this necessity a matter of principle was altogether a different ideological stage. Crucially, the ideological components upon which all the parties in the Greens agreed, namely, the primacy of ecology, entailed a rejection of ‘one-dimensional political man’ as an economic creature, and demanded postmaterial values sensitive to the quality of life and the particular needs of different groups. This brought about a process of ideological thinking which went beyond pure environmental and anti-system approaches. Once they had gathered in the same conference hall ‘the wide rainbow from Dutschke to Gruhl’, as Vogt pointed out, stretching from the radical Left to the value-conservatives, had become a matter of principle. It was an electoral necessity, but crucially served as an alternative model to the ideologically divided, and much despised reigning parties in Bonn. The ideological adherence of political parties to either the Right or the Left, bitterly divided on powerpolitics and distributive issues but blind to the existential and human

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needs of the citizens, was rejected by most trends cooperating within the Greens. This inclination to transcend the Right–Left divide further characterised the Green principle of open dialogue97 and tolerance.98 Indeterminacy of political futures In this chapter we envisaged the development of philosophical principles, which were anchored in the political reality, buttressed by the determination to provide a counter-model for traditional ideological parties and elevated into the status of ideological principles. The hope of the final stage of conversion, 1981–83, was that the action-oriented politics, and the evolving philosophical unity would cement the ideological diversity. From an analytical point of view, there are three alternative analytical approaches to the evolution of the extraparliamentary opposition that developed in the late 1970s. Each emphasises one of the three main tendencies with which we introduced this chapter. The first (advocated by Markovits and Gorski, and Hülsberg) perceives the vacant party space to the left of the SPD as the natural political niche for the emerging radical opposition movement. This analysis of the Greens as a Leftist phenomenon shows the initial seizure of the Green political leadership by the value-conservatives, and the selfportrayal of the Greens as a ‘completely new political type of party beyond Left and Right’ to be a false consciousness in light of the Leftist pedigrees of later Green leaders.99 The Greens, this view contends, is a radical Left party which partly replaces the banned communist party and partly introduces new political issues onto the public agenda, notably the environmental crisis. The second approach (supported by Stöss, Kolinsky and Bracher)100 suggested a model of the Greens as a quasi-oppositional party. It sees the party as forging a negative coalition and casting a vote of no confidence in the political system itself. The mass-movement of anti-system sentiments did develop into a vast political protest movement broader than the radical forces of the Left. The different groups upheld this anti-system approach for various (sometimes incompatible) reasons; all shared the negative coalition and sought to overcome the system. The third model (less often considered but hinted by Pulzer and Linse)101 perceives the political potential of the NSMs and the politicised cohorts of the New Left as leading to the reinvention of a liberal democratic tradition, in its political, rather than economic, traditional sense. The main concerns over regard for others (including Nature), participatory democracy, and minorities have the ring of an adapted classic liberalism. The radicalism of this project is derived from the unique German context in its rejection of the dichotomy between high and low politics and the perception of the people as subjects rather than active citizens. It also firmly rejects patronising attitudes adopted by the ruling political elites since Adenauer who were afraid of involving the Germans directly in politics in the light of their historical record. The Greens offered a critical, opinionated politics which

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questioned the ideological path of the FRG; especially its attempted depoliticisation of the German public, which concealed an incompetence to deal openly with the German past, and to generate a participatory democratic culture, by opting instead for a politically safe consumer society. Correspondingly, the ideological implications for each model are quite different. A quasi-oppositional party would vehemently reject any unifying ideology, and would function as a negative coalition protesting against the existing structures of politics. A radical Left party would seek to adopt a socialist creed which attempts to incorporate ecological problems into the theory. A politically liberal party would hope to build upon a new paradigm, transcending the Left/Right continuum, creating new politics of the centre based on a political interpretation of ecology. The tension between the Greens as a radical Left party, the Greens as a principal opposition party and the Greens as a political liberal party – alternating in significance through different stages in the Greens’ development – determined the path of the party, and its main factions and quarrels. In the early stage of conversion, the SPV pursued an anti-system approach, strengthened and reinforced by the input of the New Left, as these radical forces were alienated from the established system, especially from the SPD. The forged coalition was negative and based on two fundamental principles: rejection of the established political system and the role of the ecological crisis as a unifying message. The tension between a Left-Green party and a political ecoliberal party still defines the main divide among the Greens to date. However, both these perceptions share much more than an anti-system approach. The foundations of a positive ideology and the attempt to construct a new philosophy for the Greens justifying the diversity of their roots while offering an alternative political paradigm is the subject of the next chapter.

5 Discourse: New Spirituality and Ideological Conversion

If the Greens had merely represented a ‘New Left’ phenomenon, it is doubtful whether they would have come to play a key role in Germany’s political culture. The facts that the party originated on the Right wing of the political spectrum, and that the message of converting the personal into the political, in the context of ‘Politics of Angst’, appealed to different groups, explain why the Greens captured the sentiment of a varied public strata. They rode the crest not only of the ecological wave, but of political and spiritual revival, importantly incorporating these groups not only in political praxis, but by devising a conceptualisation which necessitates a social change in view of ecological problems. This chapter explores the input of the spiritual and religious movements into the Greens.1 Two further features of the concept of the environment, both facilitating the emergence of a new worldview, will be explored: first, the importance of providing an alternative, organicist discourse. Second, the philosophical attempts to establish an alternative paradigm – applicable to politics – based on ecological humanism. The input of the alternative discourse of ‘ecological thinking’ is manifested in the 1980 election platform and the 1982 Peace Manifesto. The significance of this phase is in setting the cooperative mood which emerged beyond the diversity of Green tendencies in the first stage. The second part of the chapter organises this apparent ideational eclecticism into an ideological framework and reviews the conversion stage of the German Greens.

Politics of salvation The New Left attitude shifted the emphasis from productivity to creativity, from objective socio-economic structures to subjectivity and ways of life. It recognised that the personal is also political, given the all-invasiveness of the political system. However, it fell short of claiming that the political is psychological, that ‘history is psychodynamic’ or of propagating a ‘politics of salvation’.2 Nevertheless, the move from the New Left to New Spirituality 89

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was less inconceivable once non-material self-realisation became the focal point. Indeed, some of the veterans of the Left argued, as seen in Petra Kelly’s passionate language, that ‘we must strive for the harmonious interaction of the physical and the intellectual and the spiritual. In a world where practically everything is planned, where everything is seen and valued in terms of its utility, the erotic must become the spiritual dimension of our physical being.’3 The most systematic account which exemplifies this move is the transformation reflected in the books of the late Rudolf Bahro, the GDR dissident who in 1979 crossed the borders from the communist party of the ‘other Germany’ into the Greens, and became the prophet of a ‘salvation movement’. His philosophical path is well demonstrated in his writings – The Alternative in Eastern Europe (1979); Socialism and Survival (1982–84); From Red to Green (1984); Building the Green Movement (1982–85) and the Logic of Salvation4 (1987). Bahro’s approach was initially anchored in socialism, arguing that West European civilisation is doomed: Unless a broad concentration of political forces comes into being, mobilising the power of the masses to change our overall direction … The psychological revolution that we all see as urgently needed is precisely directed against the mode of consumption created by capitalism. It cannot be broken if we leave the economic motor untouched … It requires a mass movement, but a movement that will encompass the whole range of forces who can be made sensitive to these problems.5 This speech, given at the Green party conference (Offenbach, November 1979) encapsulated Bahro’s later thought: civilisation is heading for ecological disaster rooted in the very mode of capitalistic consumption embedded in the culture – that is, the second nature – of every individual. Putting a stop to the motivational motor of the Big Machine is conditioned upon a psychological revolution to be generated by a mass movement encompassing all of the forces that become aware of the problem. The last nail in civilisation’s coffin is its exterminism (Thompson)6 manifested in the arms race which is no longer under rational control. For Bahro, this exterminism is interconnected with militarism and economic aggression: ‘The destruction of nature by industrial accumulation, the danger of nuclear war, the impoverishment of marginalised masses in the Third World, mental impoverishment in the metropolises – these are the horsemen of the apocalypse at the end of the second Christian millennium.’7 Since the ecological crisis strikes humanity’s clock at a ‘few minutes to midnight … in terms of the whole human history to date’,8 what is needed is ‘a movement of conversion that combines the most diverse alternative attempts in thinking and living, a movement that attains a degree of cohesion and agreement such as was reached in the past only through the claims of religion’.9 Socialists, Bahro argued, resented religion because of the church, but the

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theology of liberation proved itself in bringing about social change. He hence called for reunification of two strands: ‘emancipatory thought and faith.’10 Bahro offered an ‘historic compromise’ which avoided ‘both sectarianisms, the political and the spiritual’,11 put forward in Building the Green Movement. Its aim was ‘the politicisation of this psycho-scene and the spiritualisation of politics’.12 He advocated the ‘journey to the interior’13 which was conditional upon the material change essential for the Turn-Around, as presented in the Logic of Salvation. The precondition for survival (suggestively, in German the same word as salvation – Rettung) is the will for change. However, while this will is externally motivated by the instinct for survival and the threat of ecological catastrophe,14 it is the internal, deep psychic structure which needs to be changed.15 Tellingly, by using ‘logic’ in conjunction with ‘salvation’, the role of spiritualism is only instrumental in Bahro’s account. All the same, he did conceptualise the bond, and in 1980, presented a ‘greenprint’ for historic compromise – given humanity’s disposition for self-extermination – between emancipatory thought and emancipatory faith, between the political and the spiritual movements. Bahro was a leading figure who addressed the basic problem of the NSMs – mobilisation. His project was one of generating the broadest consensus for social change. He tried to unite the spiritual and social movements under the ecological cause. Whereas the bond between New Age and spiritual movements, and the New Left and ecological movements, is less clear than writers such as Capra and Spretnak and others have advocated, what is of interest to our analysis is the way some forms of ecological thinking penetrated into the discourse of the German Greens. One representative was Bahro himself, who had tremendous personal impact within the Greens. Another is the anthroposophic movement which had decisive influence on the philosophy of the German Greens in the beginning of their political way.

Anthropocentrism: incorporating Earth, integrating the Greens The images of the all-encompassing crisis, the apocalyptic vision resulting from exterministic weaponry and nature’s degradation, the urgent need for transformation anchored in a change of awareness, and the holistic, lifeoriented ecotopia, are all fundamental to Green philosophy in its formative stage. Whereas Bahro is only a recent convert to the prophetic mode, other traditions in Germany, not least those of Christianity and mysticism, have adopted and adapted to ecological themes under the broad ‘church for life’. ‘Life’, in a rudimentary though compelling way, became the pedestal of Green philosophy. Its advocators ignored Bahro’s warning that cherishing life itself, with its survivalist undertones, might lead to an ecodictatorship, and his argument that meaningful life should be the goal16 (thus placing Bahro’s theory at the heart of socialist emancipatory thought after all).

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The project of a conscious change to the pursuit of a meaningful, creative life lies at the heart of anthroposophy, which, despite meagre electoral power, had an important impact on the Greens. The reader will recall how various moderate anthroposophist organisations17 joined the SPV just prior to the 1979 elections, thus impeding significant input into the European programme.18 The strong influence of the New Left also diluted their effect on the Basic Programme. However, the growing tensions within the Greens after the Offenbach congress provided the opportunity for anthroposophist, holistic thinking to acquire a central role on two fronts: it facilitated an alternative discourse, another way of thinking, a lifeworld highly embedded in ecological terminology, and it offered a way for making a virtue out of the necessity – the fact that different ideological streams shared a political home – by focusing on the process of reciprocity and ‘unity in diversity’. This was translated into the Greens’ ideology in two ways – in the holistic notion of ecological humanism as reflected in the 1980 electoral manifesto, and in their interpretation of ‘the party as a learning process’ which was incorporated within the ideological framework of the Greens. Ecological thinking was adopted as distinctly Green in the formative stage, and different currents resorted to ecological thinking throughout the 1980s, whenever an internal crisis erupted within the party. Surprisingly, the features of Rudolph Steiner’s 1920s’ anthroposophy have been incorporated almost intact into the 1970s discourse, principally focusing on the social organism, and the therapeutic interpretation of seeking to ‘heal’ problems at source: ‘If we were conscious of the roots, we would also know the therapeutic consequences of an alternative plan through which to remove it.’19 Thus, features, which are seemingly distinctive of contemporary ecological discourse – interconnectedness, holism, reciprocity of processes, evolutionary development (biodiversity), an intact environment to enable each organism (biological or social) self-fulfilment and the emphasis on awareness – are present in the organicist discourse of the beginning of the century, with its abhorrence (notwithstanding fascination) of the mechanistic worldview. Illustratively, Heidt, one of the leading anthroposophists in the Greens, advocates perceiving our Earth as ‘ecological, that is a live, organic, limited system rather than unlimited accumulation of pure physical-chemical facts.’20 Crucially, simply describing ecological systems as a social organism is not sufficient, since the organicist discourse is wholly centred upon the human individual and society. Although enriched by fashionable ecological concepts, organicist anthroposophy was inadequate for conceptualising contemporary ecological problems of the natural world and its interrelations with society. Ecological humanism – a political project Nevertheless, holistic discourse stemming from anthroposophist thinking established fertile grounds for ecological thinking which would develop a

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distinct political project for ecological humanism. This task was undertaken by Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, who after 11 years of SPD membership joined the AUD in 1977, co-founded the Greens in Baden-Württermberg, and was their state-parliamentarian as early as 1980.21 Analysing the socio-political situation in view of the ecological crisis, Hasenclever argued for a new social principle which would provide a new direction, capable of mobilising a political majority and fulfilling two fundamental tasks: ‘it must provide a discernible, concrete political alternative and it must develop a new, convincing values-system which can serve as orientation-pole for personal and social conduct’.22 Crucially, ecological humanism was to provide this new political paradigm. Hasenclever defined humanism as the concern with moulding individual and social life according to a humane value system, seeking to provide the means for self-development and fulfilment of human potential:23 Ecology encompasses ‘today a political comprehensive meaning as the theory of unity of nature and human-world’.24 Hasenclever recognised the dialectic relationship between human dependency on nature embedded in ecology and the striving of humans for freedom and self-realisation. In the same way that individual freedom is limited by other people’s freedoms, he argued, it should also be compatible with the natural laws, ecosystems, and limited resources of Earth. Instead of a bureaucratic, centralised industrial life-ideal, a new leitmotiv, emphasising ecological and humanistic order, should be developed, based on responsibility for others and for nature, and respect for diverse forms of life.25 One of the core concepts of Green ideology is hence formulated: ecological humanism does not merely place ecological discourse within the practice of humanism, but it places ecological problems, understood within the context of the urgency and irreversibility of environmental processes, at the top of the political agenda, arguing for ‘primacy of ecological conduct’.26 Individual self-realisation and values-system transformations are to be achieved from within existing traditions modified by ecological primacy, and by replacing linear with ecological thinking. According to Hasenclever, understanding the interconnectedness of processes exposes the need to preserve energy and resources. Cherishing the complexity, diversity and interrelatedness of ecosystems is part of a new alliance which social responsibility entails, and a radical change of political conduct in the direction of ecological humanism is called for. This is based on cooperation between all churches, parties and associations which strive for concrete achievement rather than toward an abstract, coherent political ideology.27 This interpretation of ecological humanism does not relinquish the hope of comprehensive transformation, to which other anthroposophists have aspired. It adopts anthroposophist understanding of individual and social life and can coexist with concepts of global ecological awareness, of cosmic ethics and even suprahuman spirituality of the

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antroposophist brand. However, it provides an ecological emphasis sufficiently defined for constituting a political project based on awareness, responsibility and respect for others at the centre of which is striving for a sustainable future.28 These principles, which were incorporated to a certain degree within all Green programmes, were most emphatically responsible for moulding the federal electoral platform in 1980. Politics of life – the manifesto for the federal elections 1980 In the wake of the Saarbrücken congress and the Leftist BP, the main effort of the programme commission for the federal elections in 1980 was to reintegrate the Greens.29 The resulting document is a more cohesive platform, centred upon political ecology and designed to criticise the established parties which, after successive Green successes in breaking the 5 per cent hurdle on the state level, incorporated environmental themes into their own manifestos, and at the same time portrayed the Greens as a narrow environmental interest group not worthy of a vote. The platform opens: What do the Greens want? We want to offer a reasonable and life-necessary (lebensnotwendige) alternative in all political realms … Against the present one-dimensional growth-politics, we set the goal of restoring, that is preserving human well-being … An ecological politics can, in contrast (to single-issue environmentalism) only materialise when all essential realms of human existence in our society and of the whole world are considered. This is an unconditional necessity, for the ecological crisis is a global crisis, intensified by the worldwide cling to nuclear material in the military realm.30 This comprehensive view, which counters the portrayal of the Greens as a single-issue party, demonstrates that participating in the political game, even as a protest party that objected to what they derogatively called ‘ideological’ parties, challenged the Greens to provide a multidimensional, comprehensive worldview. Their understanding of ecology as an interconnected perspective which has a direct influence on ‘all essential realms of human existence’ justified the claim that ecology encompassed a totalistic, holistic alternative: the politics of life. Importantly, they reject the ideology of the established parties – employing a pejorative, subversive Marxist interpretation of the concept. Nevertheless, they attempted to conceptualise an alternative, comprehensive worldview which is in effect a competing ideology. In contradistinction to the Volksparteien – which are narrowly focused on the political interests which lead to the destruction of life – the Greens have no sectorial interest and instead act on behalf of life itself, the common future of humanity and Earth. This is significant for understanding the ideological impetus of the Greens – they can hardly be seen as an interest

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group with specific demands as to their economic or sectorial interests. Rather, they represent a universalistic call on behalf of the underrepresented subjects of society, and their main project to raise awareness of these neglected realms as a condition for a social and environmental change. Whereas the four pillars – ecological, social, basisdemocratic and nonviolent politics – were presented as primarily economic-oriented principles in the BP, the same concepts were depicted in an ecologically centred GE80: Ecological politics means giving priority to preservation of natural lifefoundations for us and for future generations, oriented towards human needs and their creative capacities. It objects to the exploitation of man and nature in the capitalistic competitive economy and in the existing centralised planned-economy.31 The anthroposophist principles are clearly evident: taking ecology as a life-foundation while maintaining anthropocentrism, emphasising needs and creativity, and condemning both East and West. As one commentator put it ‘The concept of Life is as central for Greens as “freedom” is for liberals, “justice” for socialism and “order” for conservatives.’32 Likewise, GE80’s economic chapter emphasises the ‘psychological and physical poverty’ caused by the destruction of nature and puts forward an alternative ‘cyclical economy’ which is coordinated with natural cycles, and where production responds to human needs on decentralised local levels: recycling and the thrifty use of energy and natural resources are also advocated.33 In other words, a classic application of organicist ‘nature-oriented’ thinking with regard to economy. Most tellingly, ‘Education and Research’ presents the Green view of human nature: ‘Education means the self-searching of humans. Instead of a holistic personality, school machines, technocratic teaching, learning-contents and stress produce unease and sickness.’34 The platform advocates decentralised, responsible learning environments, developing interest in social and individual conflicts, a solidarity-based way of solving problems, establishing ecological, social and democratic awareness, emphasising peace, solidarity and tolerance towards other people and other nations and humane-oriented research. The prime principle of ecological politics, it concludes, is treating not merely the symptoms of environmental problems, but uprooting the sources. Note that GE80 tried to project a synthetic interpretation of political ecology – providing simultaneously categorical rejection of the prevailing political discourse, and seemingly, an alternative holistic worldview. The ‘holistic’ perspective did provide a comprehensive critique of the limits of growth, exploitation and global ecological problems. However, their proposed utopian construction (decentralised, human-needs and a natureoriented economy; a war and exploitation free world) dealt with a narrow spectrum of ecological-political problems (‘cyclical economy’ or animal

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rights). It is a social vision that seeks to replace existing building blocks. They urged a change of value-system, along with a change in perception of environment, society and politics. The Green project is about suspending short-term profit considerations for long-term effects. The politics of life is motivated by a threat to survival, but proposes a change in the lifeworld based on ecological and political awareness which shifts politics from sectorial interests (condemned as ‘ideological’) to common interests: a sustainable future and social justice. Unity in diversity: the German context The Sociological Green profile of educated middle classes living comfortably enough to carry a ‘long-term perspective’ matches the philosophical inclinations to consider the ‘general good’ while being sensitive to the need not to talk ‘on behalf of’ but to let the grassroots speak and act politically for themselves. The corresponding ideology should therefore simultaneously address the disadvantaged, while seeking to preserve the diverse identities of the groups. Did GE80 provide an ideological centre ground for the warring Green factions? While value-conservatives were discontent with prioritising humanistic, individualistic and democratic principles, the manifesto endorsed ‘the primacy of ecology’ which was their main concern. As for the Left, the demands to change the system of production and to uproot relations of domination were present in the programme, although they were obscured by a quasi-religious, vitalistic and holistic discourse which, in attempting to act harmoniously, overshadowed the main task of changing the power-structures. Ecological humanism provided a dynamic equilibrium, the balance of which could easily be disrupted given the highly ideologised tensions within the Greens. However, the condemnation of the established parties as ideological parties, and the consequent determination of the Greens not to be a Weltanschauung party,35 produced greater willingness to cooperate, and less pressure to resolve ideological contradictions at this stage. The problem was, as Hasenclever observed, that ‘In the basis existed a will to establish an ecological reconstruction of society. But it remained unclear which direction this reconstruction should follow.’36 The result was that during 1980–81 some of the State Green parties chose to campaign on the BP platform, while others on GE80.37 The internal tensions required a problem-solving model. Working towards such a model was the second significant contribution of the anthroposophists. Hasenclever, praising the diversity of the Green’s roots, inferred that the process itself – solving problems and reaching decisions – has to be a democratic process in which new methods are developed through experiencing and experimenting continuous discussions. A comprehensive catalogue of aims was thus developed, which also expressed minority demands.38 According to this view, diversity is an indication of a healthy, vital system, and an important ingredient for a stable life-community (which matches the ecosystem’s

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biodiversity). The process itself is seen to be more important than the endproduct, so that, for example, the actual content of the programmes was less significant than the process of producing them collectively.39 Indeed, in numerous Green writings, the collective effort invested in books in the hope of contributing to the ongoing debate is emphasised.40 A central pillar of the Greens was praising diversity. In the German context it provided a voice for minorities and disadvantaged groups and by so doing accepted their input into the political realm.41 It transcended both the traditional differences between political elites vs. subjective citizens, and represented a breakthrough into the political culture, standing against conformity and the foe/friend model embedded in the hate for the ‘different’ and the ‘other’. Thus, concepts of ‘unity in diversity’, ‘process of learning’, ‘dialogic and communicative framework’ and ‘active tolerance’, based on respect for others, were central to the self-perception of Greens-cum-Germanness. An interactive communication approach did not only make the most radical ideological streams part of an ongoing learning process, but enhanced ‘Green particularity’, integrating their identity both internally and externally. In contrast to the ‘established’ parties, seen by the Greens to possess narrow ideological interests which they sought power to fulfil, the Greens were both attentive to their ‘base’ – social movements, CIs, people – taking the participatory political process to be a real locus of learning, rather than as a vote-capturing machinery for party elites. Ironically, the ‘anti-parties-party’ (Kelly), which was a ‘non-Weltanschauung’ party, was highly ideological in its striving for ideational-purity, ‘meaningful’ politics, commitment to moral action, comprehensive critique and an alternative holistic worldview. Perceiving themselves as ‘neither Left nor Right but up front’ (Gruhl), suggests that the existing ideological spectrum (given that the Greens criticised growth which underlies the Left–Right axis) was superseded by Green ideas. However, it was not the ‘end of ideology’ but the opening of a new ideological niche encompassing different political principles and comprising core concepts of an ideology in-the-making.

The Ecopax alliance and the new paradigm From Lebensbewegung to Überlebensbewegung The widest protest wave, which brought the Greens the critical mass which carried them into the Bundestag in 1983, crystallising their ‘neither Left nor Right’ position, was the new peace movement and the issue of missile deployment in Europe. Among the ‘new’ social movements which the opening of the BP listed as coalescing within the Greens, the reference to the ‘Christian initiatives’ is the most curious. Their participation in the Greens was certainly not a foregone conclusion, despite Bahro’s strategic logic. The philosophical bond was one of regard for nature, ingrained in

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the Judeo-Christian tradition which cast humans in the role of saviour of all creation. These anthropocentric undertones are foreign to mainstream ecologist rhetoric. Indeed, ecology, being a natural science inherently related to the theory of evolution, perceived man as part of nature, not as the crown of creation to whom the rest of the world belongs. This gave rise to caused conceptual tensions between Christian and Green thought.42 However, the churches themselves were searching for a role in post-industrial society, and many Christians and theologians joined the Greens from the outset, even though the Christian interpretation of the four pillars differed. To the Christians, ecology entailed the responsibility of man towards God’s creation; social justice was the obligation to relieve the human suffering and hunger, with special reference to the Third World; basisdemocracy conveyed the message of Christ’s emancipation and fitted the decentralised form of action to which the churches were accustomed; and non-violence encapsulated Christian compassion and caring for society’s poor, sick and needy.43 The bond had deeper roots still. The role of the Christian churches in the struggle for peace and disarmament was prominent throughout the history of the FRG. Indeed, the first open public debate against German rearmament was instigated by the Protestant church, which called upon Adenauer to conduct a plebiscite on rearmament as early as 1950.44 In 1955 it joined forces with pacifist and communist organisations in the Paulkirche Bewegung (Paul’s Church movement), calling for the rescue of ‘unity, peace and freedom!’.45 The second wave of church involvement in the disarmament issue, was in the new peace movement, following the FRG’s support for the NATO double-track decision in 1979, with regard to the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles on European soil. The Ecopax alliance was thus forged, an influential strand of which were the Christian organisations46 which circulated a petition for ‘Life without Armaments’ (Ohne Rüstung Leben) which 13,000 Christians signed. A nationwide peace week was organised in October 1980, and due to its success, was repeated annually.47 The endorsement of the peace movement by the churches was crucial in the legitimisation of the peace movement and the Greens by non-radical elements in society. As one activist put it: ‘It was not a long path from the self-understanding of the ecology movement as a life movement (Lebensbewegung) to the peace movement as a survival movement (Überlebensbewegung).’48 The faction ‘Christens bei den Grünen’ was established in 1984, and Antje Vollmer, a theologian, became the first Green vice-president of the Bundestag ten years later.49 The Ecopax alliance of the early 1980s also included independent grassroots organisations (anarchists, anti-imperialists and anti-militarists) which advocated civil disobedience and, importantly, incorporated the leaders of the ecology and peace movements. The acts of hundreds of thousands of activists for peace, anti-nuclear and environmental extraparliamentary protest were thus united. The alliance was cemented through congresses

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and grassroots cooperation in 1979–80. All these movements agreed on non-negotiable opposition to the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on German soil formulated in the Krefeld appeal and signed, within 18 months, by well over two million people, marking the high point of the peace movement’s mobilisation phase.50 The years 1981 to 1983 saw the largest demonstrations ever to be held in Germany, starting with the October 1981 Bonn demonstration for a nuclear-free Europe, in which 95 organisations and 300,000 people participated; followed by nationwide Easter marches, in which 500,000 took part in 1982, and 650,000 in 1983 following the Bundestag confirmation of missile deployment.51 However, once this decision had been taken, there were no more concrete policy issues capable of remobilising the extraparliamentary opposition. 1983–85 thus witnessed the waning of this wave of the peace movement. Its input into the Greens, however, was now already well incorporated into the fastrising fourth party in the FRG. The Peace Manifesto – a chance for survival The Peace Manifesto was a non-election programme,52 drafted by the Green Party’s Offenbach Congress (1981), which sought to establish the Greens as the political wing of the peace movement, and cement the politics behind the protest actions of the Ecopax alliance. The Manifesto stated: A new peace movement has arisen. The apathy caused by the weapons of unimaginable destruction has begun to thaw. We may hope that despite our feelings of helplessness towards the omnipotent military destruction, there is still a chance of survival.53 Ecopax advocated that the ‘principle that all life should be respected and valued – the protection of life and nature – as the basis of our political aims both for ecology and for peace’.54 It saw the threat to life as emanating both from the arms-race and, more importantly, from the mode of production and consumption which characterises the industrial world’s irresponsible use of natural resources, and which only ecological politics, directed toward reducing tensions, was capable of overcoming.55 The problem was therefore to awaken the ‘good in each of us’,56 and raise awareness by explaining the NATO resolution and its dangers in detail, while emphasising the educational process underlying Green politics.57 The Ecopax agreement included: All sections of the population from CSU members, trade unions, and churches to DKP members proving that the appeal offers the chance of directing the force of all opponents to the NATO resolution, Whatever their political differences, towards a common goal.58

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Not only internal, but external differences were being bridged: ‘We want to free ourselves from the logic of this powerblocks confrontation. We replace loyalty to the powerblocks by loyalty of the people to one another and their peace movement.’59 Consequently, solidarity with the Third World – embracing the Christian organisations with their strong input into the Third World movement,60 as well as the peace and ecology movements – became important. ‘Our real objective is the creation of a non-violent society.’61 The need to change perceptions emphasised a way of life that needed to be conveyed by using language in a specific way: ‘Civil disobedience must begin with our own language, which is permeated with jargon: we must free ourselves the modes of thought expressed in terms such as “making a common front”, “pincer-movements”, “finish them off” ’.62 Freeing the individual from the dominant modes of thinking (‘As teachers in the natural sciences we shall set ourselves against the dominant ideology of technological progress’)63 was justified since ‘we cannot any longer leave the matter of peace in the hands of a power elite. Every man is an expert when it comes to survival.’64 In the German context, the Peace Manifesto stressed that Greens want to make a recognisable break with the German tradition of subjection, war and genocide and find a way of our own’,65 and reflected a complicated attitude toward ‘Germany’s special way’ (Sonderweg), in seeking to transcend the past German history (given that the two available options represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been discredited) by creating a new German uniqueness – namely, ‘a way of our own’. Part of replacing the tradition of subjection involved the Greens in an effort to coordinate the activity, but ‘It is in our view decisively important for the success of the movement that it should be one from below, namely, from the basis effecting the organisation of the movement at all levels which excludes the danger of dominance or absorption by other individual parties or trends.’66 Thus, the importance of Ecopax lay in forging a coalition of diverse groups representing some kind of family resemblance. The exposure of animosities in other parties’ ideologies raising political awareness of hitherto non-political issues and non-political people and promoting a non-violent, diverse and plural society was the principal goal. The stronghold of Ecopax was its ability to forge an alternative action-based discourse which posed itself in opposition to the growth- and war-oriented dominant forces. By legitimising peace, solidarity, care, responsibility, non-violence, diversity and a critique of the established political system, the Greens created a value-led and action-based discourse, providing them with a new language to mould their worldview. But does this diversity, some would argue – eclecticism – portray any ideological unity beyond the rhetoric of ‘unity in diversity’?

Ideological conversion: moulding a modular ideology If political ideology is taken to mean an action-oriented system of political beliefs, a worldview designed to provide a collective plan of action, which

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counter to philosophy, should have an aim beyond itself – presumably social change – then the analysis so far has exposed a range of possibilities which incorporates the ecological crisis into ‘green’ prints for ecology-cum-politics. In seeking to establish which Green ideological clusters have been identified, and whether they indeed coalesced to form a distinct political Green party ideology with a lucid configuration of political concepts, social vision and political plan, it is time now to reflect on the ideological journey up to this point, and to examine its consequences in terms of Green ideology. The analysis of the German Greens so far has taken us along two principal routes. One exposed the political agenda behind the varied ecological tendencies which coalesced within the Greens. Surveying these tendencies67 diachronically, they were presented in the order of appearance on the Green stage, accounting for their input into the Green discourse. This in turn paved the second route, that of disclosing the different roles that ecology played in the evolution of the Greens as a political party. Thus, a rather different map, moulded by the ecological prism, has unfolded. While each of the tendencies which composed the Greens had its own ideational evolution, they also had the collective history of Green ideas which was notably different. The evolving shared ideology, in turn, imposed constraints on the sub-ideologies of the tendencies. The following discussion summarises the different roles of ecology in the political context of the emergence of the Greens, and then turns to the main ideological clusters, outlining their idea of the collective action plan and role of the Green party, and examining the selection process they underwent from within the common ideological framework. The manifold of the environment The Politics of Angst of the 1970s produced the motivational trigger for mass political action. Since the anxieties existed on the deepest levels of survival, subsistence, quality of life and the German question, the reaction gave way to a comprehensive critique of German politics. Mass demonstrations and public protest were in themselves a departure from the traditional submissive civic culture. Ecology played a crucial role in eroding the image of German politics as ‘expertocracy’, given the scientific disputes over natural resources, the fate of the earth and nuclear weapons.68 As a science, ecology was seemingly dissociated from the striving for power which politics is about. It further transcended the political discourse since it was directly about the world – the physical world on which humans depend, but which growth-oriented politics disregards (mistakenly, as the Limits to Growth debate proved). Additionally, ecological problems fit uneasily into representational politics, not being confined to specific interest groups, though applying (if not equally) to all living creatures. Thus, ecology was perceived as an objective benchmark, grounded in the bare necessities of life, and providing a yardstick for a comprehensive critique, and potentially for an alternative political perspective.

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The resulting historical analysis has been wide ranging. Given the inherent ideological deficit, ecological problems can at best provide a diagnosis rooted in economic and political processes. Ecology inspired anti-capitalism, which was otherwise unpopular in the FRG in the Cold War context. This anti-capitalism was shared by both the value-conservatives and former communists, and generated a peculiar coalition of anti-system trends, precariously uniting the far Left and Right. The role of capitalism in Nazi Germany has been addressed, but since there was a strong environmental emphasis in Nazi ‘blood and soil’ ideology,69 ideologising ecology had to come to terms with this heritage, and expose the German dimension of Green politics. For some, this enabled the return to anti-modernist ideas under scientific guise while others launched a fierce critique on the official silence in the FRG with respect to the Nazi period. Thus, the long-term history of civilisation, the German Sonderweg and the FRG’s record came under scrutiny. Ecology also made it possible to shift the political perspective into realms hitherto unpolitical:70 environment, lifestyles, gender, food, waste, resources and the Third World. This sheds new light on the relations of domination, drawing attention to the behavioural manifestations of ideology, thus extending the political discourse and bringing about the politicisation of traditionally non-political sectors. Ecological awareness justified social change, thereby facilitating a coalition of heretofore hostile camps – namely emancipatory thought and faith. The New Left’s approach denounced consumerism, and demanded social transformation based on non-material values (modifying its political programme to stay in line with ecology); the spiritualist movements incorporated God’s creation into their mission, reinstating their own role in post-industrial societies; both trends, despite having rather different social visions, sought social change based on a transformation of the value-system. An organicist discourse, contrasting the mechanistic-materialist one, was extrapolated from Ecology. It provided a language which emphasised interrelations, diversity, change and evolution, ideationally expressing the new thinking. Ecopax, the vision of a pacifist, ecologically sustainable society, forged an intellectual bond between ecology, the politics of life, and peace: the politics of survival. This growing social force found in ecology a new holistic paradigm encouraging internal tolerance and a wall of solidarity set against the destructive system. Ecological processes offered a range of spatio-temporal scales: global ecological crisis (biospheric and atmospheric), arms-race between powerblocks, transborder pollution, international resources and production, local environments and the individual’s lifestyle lent themselves to political perspectives other than the nation-state framework. Likewise, the urgency of ecological problems, the possible consequences of pollution on health and quality of life and the threat to future generations suggest time spans different from the election-oriented short-termism of the political system. The Green party, apart from coordinating mass protest, had a potential role in

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crystallising these multidimensional scales into an alternative worldview. It is, however, insufficient simply to embrace this manifold perspective, given that a viable political way of transforming the current system is required from a political party. In this respect, Kelly’s label ‘anti-parties party’ (rejecting the traditional parties’ role as mediators of interest groups which sanctify the monopoly of the state over power and decision-making) was short of providing an agenda and a positive role for the party in the established political sphere. Thus, setting out the party’s role, offering an ecological and social vision and proposing a political route for transformation are integral parts of the Green programme. Archetypical ideological clusters There are three archetypes of Green political ideologies: the first was the family of ‘naturalist’ attitudes which saw the ecological crisis as Gattungsfrage (a species question) superseding other political realms. Often arguing that (their interpretation of) natural laws should be applied to society, the human species was perceived from within an ecological model of war over resources, Lebensraum and survival. This cluster of ideas frequently blames the combination of modernity and hubris for ignoring humans as a natural species, and entertains an apocalyptic view of the future, suggesting that authoritarian rule might be necessary and that state monopoly over power should be employed to ensure the survival of current and future generations. The agenda is often nationally based, underlying the natural and cultural affinity of the organic nation and rejecting immigration on ecological grounds, for example, carrying capacity, emphases on natural division in gender roles and the commendation of tradition, order and control. Viewed in the wider political context, it is clear that such an ideology strongly relies on the notion of crisis and ecological disaster to sustain public support. It was responsible for inroads into German public awareness in the early 1970s in the wake of the oil crisis; in the late 70s, with the nuclear threat; and in 1986, after Chernobyl. However, as a political ideology it is a classic teiloppositionelle perspective, that is, opposition to the political system and contemplation of populist authoritarianism. Within the Greens, this combined view of naturalism and moralism was widely resonated, particularly in the early stages. But Bahro’s warning against sanctifying the survival of life rather than humane society71 distinguished between humanistic Green trends and the Right wing, populist and antimodernist trends which used this Gattungsfrage to stress ‘pure’ political solutions to ecological problems. The various ‘value-conservative’ tendencies first established a ‘working group’, in order to further the primacy of ecology within the Greens. Manifestly, this ideological tendency was increasingly apprehensive towards other Green trends on two levels. One of these was the tensions between its type of radical ecologism, and the other clusters, for example, ecological

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humanism. The other was being fundamentally at odds with the evolving ideological structure, based on tolerance towards other ecological and social concerns. Not surprisingly, Gruhl argued against the Greens that since 1980 ‘instead of handling survival themes they collect all the possible actual themes just like the traditional parties’.72 The Green ‘shopping list’ was clearly incompatible with this perception of an ecological politics of survival. Neither was the dialogic process of politics compatible with the sense of ecological emergency at the basis of survivalist ideology. The role of the Green party in this view was to head the ecologically conscious camp, and to develop an alternative ideology to growth, based on a cyclical economy. A core group of Gruhl supporters left the Greens and established the Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP) in March 1982, which campaigned on ‘the survivalist necessity of ecological politics’ programme73 and in subsequent elections, never achieved more than 1–2 per cent of the vote. The second archetype of Green ideology derived its concept of ecologycum-politics from the ecological problems underlying human existence and the quality of life, ignored by the established political system. The growing dismay of the CIs and NSMs with the technocratic, bureaucratic and institutionalised mechanisms which produced policies that were fundamentally at odds with people’s daily concerns, reached a climax in the nuclear debate. The political role of the Greens was thus to provide a political channel for expressing these concerns. Since the critique centres on the rigidity of the political system and the need to decentralise and democratise political processes, this view of the politics behind ecology is both segmented as well as guided by the conviction that the grassroots should have immediate access to the political agenda and should actively participate in the political discourse. Ideally, political institutions, including parties and issues at the local and regional levels should be emphasised. Revitalising political culture encourages participatory democracy, but not necessarily party politics, and thus forces the party to press for grassroots action on the federal level. Accordingly, this concept of politics tends to depend on protest waves, and to thrive on campaigns such as the 1971 ‘Action 218’, the anti-nuclear campaign of the late 1970s, and the peace movement of the early 1980s which follow in the wake of protest. The politics therefore tends to be the politics of issues, and serves to propel pressure groups onto the parliamentary scene. Hence the political ideology deliberately lacks cohesion, preserving the parliamentary niche for the input of the grassroots while lacking any platform, apart from what related to the urgent concerns of the day. Whereas the survivalist ideology is exclusive, this kind of grassroots ideology accepts an ideological infrastructure, in effect reducing the need for a comprehensive ideology, by allowing diverse political concerns to coexist. Party institutions ought therefore to provide a mechanism for channelling grassroots demands toward the established political system.74

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An offshoot of this approach is the view which sees the party’s own political process as an asset in itself, and thus acknowledges the role of the party, not simply as an open platform for expressing concerns, but as a forum of debate and political activity – in other words, as an end in itself. This, in turn, has tended to involve discussion (rather than action), and risks becoming a debating forum as opposed to a political ideology. We can call this process the politics of identity, that is, politics as part of the process of self-fulfilment. Insofar as it values pluralism, diversity, tolerance and debate, it opposes all rigid ideological programmes, apart from that of the political process itself. It offers a framework for political activity and invigorates the political culture in the absence of any particular action plan. The third archetype of Green political ideology perceived ecological problems as the tip of an iceberg emanating from the structure of power in advanced industrial democracies to expose a wide range of social problems requiring comprehensive political change. In this view, distribution of burdens means that ecological problems are greater for the disadvantaged sectors of society. The relations of domination affect a range of underrepresented sectors in advanced democracies, Nature being only an extreme case (atypical case since nature, by definition, cannot represent itself). These sectors are either prevented from having access to political representation, (immigrants, foreign workers) or, due to the aggregating nature of Volksparteien politics, their concerns are ignored (ethnic minorities, women, sexual minorities, people with disabilities), thus exposing a fundamental flaw in representative democracies and demanding a transformation of the political culture and a more decentralised and participatory democracy. This carries a peculiarly German element, in that it seeks to be a minorities party and advocates political liberalism, which is largely lacking from German political traditions.75 For such a minorities party, the ideological framework is essential in accommodating diverse groups and generating a more dynamic political process, which at the same time, is cohesive in its overall ideological agenda: challenging the structures of power and exposing the inherent nature of power-relations in social and economic practices and their underlying materialist ethos. Thus, there is a distinct role for a Green political party in challenging the established strongholds of power. Its social vision involves a more decentralised society and advocates the principle of subsidiarity (making decisions on the appropriate level), thus proving its commitments to the grassroots and movements.76

Conceptual analysis It is now time to place the ideas that developed during the conversion stage within their conceptual framework. It is clear from the discussion that the core concept from which the Greens embarked on their ideological quest was the primacy of ecology. This concept itself combines several

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notions new to the political discourse, for example, the reconsideration of Man–Nature relations, the recognition of the interrelationship between environmental and social processes, the threat to the basis of life which might result from ignoring ecological problems and the irreversibility of violated natural processes. Perhaps most significant in political terms, the Limits to Growth thesis suggests that growth-oriented politics, based on economic interests and substantiated by a materialist creed, has been fundamentally criticised. Postmaterial values are therefore a core concept arising from an awareness of ecological problems on the global, national and individual scales. Thus, changing the blind belief behind anthropocentrism – as if man’s interests are the only measure of one’s quality of life and success – necessitates changing the value system on which the consumerist society flourishes. Since the political system is basically situated on the Right–Left continuum, which in effect represents economic interests concerning the (re)distribution of resources, and since the system is reluctant to respond to the protests of people, let alone environmental issues, a strong anti-system critique became the hallmark of the Greens. Decoding the ideational configuration therefore exposes three core concepts – the primacy of ecology, postmaterialism, and the anti-system critique – all of which have been accepted by all parties comprising the Greens. However, the present analysis has demonstrated how these core concepts, translated into the four pillars of the German Greens – ecological, social, basisdemocratic and nonviolent politics – were interpreted quite differently to form diverse notions of ecology-cum-politics. The citizens’ initiatives, new social movements, nationalists, survivalists, ex-communists, Spontis, feminists, anthroposophists and Christians all formed their own construct of Nature as a political concept, and correspondingly, fashioned the political system to their liking. This was facilitated by the indeterminacy of the political essence of concept of the environment. Thus, each of the sub-ideologies had different concepts of Green ideology. For example, backyard environmentalists presented private property as a basic concern; New Leftists saw social justice as a fundamental right; nationalists and anthroposophists emphasised the organic community; feminists stressed the dominating masculine culture. Hence, in each sub-ideology relationships between the shared core concepts and the adjacent sub-ideological concepts resulted in a unique ideological construction. Three ideological clusters of ecological politics – the survivalist, the grassroots and the relations-of-domination were identified. However, given the conditions of the late 1970s, the trinity comprising primacy of ecology, postmaterialism and political critique produced an ideological bond between the different groups and, importantly, initiated an ideological rapprochement, resulting in an acceptance of open dialogue signifying tolerance, pluralism and diversity for as long as the participants deemed democratic modes of party decision-making to be a core principle embedded in praxis.

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The result has been the unique ideological structure, which may be called the modular ideology. It is composed of two levels – an ideational framework and a level of coexisting sub-ideologies. The ideological framework contains the core concepts to which all the sub-ideologies adhere: the primacy of ecology, postmaterialism (a change of values system), a critique of the political order and pluralism, tolerance and open dialogue within the party. This has provided ideological space for groups subscribing to different interpretations of what the ‘good society’ entails, as long as they accept the framework. Thus, the coexisting sub-ideologies have accepted the conceptual framework as part of their own core concept, but the configuration of these ideas, and adjacent concepts which composed their comprehensive worldview remained distinct. The principle of accepting the legitimacy of other sub-ideologies to hold on to their unique ideational configuration is therefore a unique characteristic of the modular ideology. The one-dimensional political man is dismissed as being an economic creature, and every individual is required to be treated as a self-determining human being. A unifying philosophy, based on the ecological paradigm, had been developed. However, this shared ideology needed to provide a political action plan, and not just an ecological critique. Essentially, the modular ideology theory provides the conceptual tool for determining the dynamic among the sub-ideologies: once a group ceases to accept the legitimacy of the other groups to hold on to its own analysis, and rejects the democratic procedure as determining the shared route of the party on grounds of principles, that group would depart – on its own initiative – from the Greens. With the departure of the survivalists, it became clear that the fundamental philosophical tensions between the humanist and anti-humanist traditions within the Greens had largely dissolved. The project of the Greens was determined to target the political culture, the institutional structures of German democracy, and the relations between ecological and social dimensions. The main division which dominated Green thinking after that revolved around the question of how to achieve a change in the political structure, and how to accommodate the grassroots within the federal party. As long as the Greens were not represented in the Bundestag, these tensions would remain latent. However, the fortunes of the party changed in 1983. Entering the Bundestag intensified the clashes over the route for social change, and gave rise to the realignment of ideological currents to which the discussion now turns.

6 Ideological Diversification: the Green Spectrum

Schematically, a political ideology can be said to include an historical analysis, a social vision and a political plan to transform (or preserve) the system. Thus far, the analysis of Green tendencies has been a common critique of the project of modernity, based on the Limits to Growth discussion. Industrialisation, economic growth, and exploitation of nature and people by a profit and power-oriented materialist society were renounced by all Greens, regardless of differences in opinion as to whether the project of modernity itself had been discredited. With the departure of the valueconservatives from the Greens, the ideological communality was extended beyond the historical analysis, into the utopian social vision. It envisaged democratic, decentralised, self-sufficient communities, with the subsidiarity principle coordinating environmental and social measures on local, regional, national and international levels. It foresaw a diverse and plural universe of needs-oriented production and communal life, enabling crossfertilisation of different lifestyles and cultures within boundaries of ecological sustainability and justice. Thus, a process of conversion characterised the formative stage of the Greens’ ideological evolution. Originating from a shared political critique, a complementary social vision emerged, the evolution of which excluded some of the adherents of that same historical analysis. Concomitantly, an ideological framework was developed reflecting this complex understanding of reality. The modular ideology facilitates the coexistence of different political clusters within one ideological frame, which includes as core principles the primacy of ecology, respect for others, tolerance and pluralism. Consequently, the active choice to belong to the Greens (acknowledging the plurality and differences of other adherents), constitutes an essential trademark of their project, transforming Green politics into a politics of difference, whilst enhancing their ‘politics of identity’. Given their diverse origins, and the ‘politics in the first person’ commitment, Greens developed a unique discourse, celebrating diversity, whilst simultaneously being a distinctive ideological language. Green inner-politics was so charged and 108

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involving, that it consumed most of the communal energies, delayed the evolution of a competent political strategy for realising the social vision. Similarly, the development of a more mature interpretation of the sphere of politics (for example, the economy, society, politics) was suspended until external pressure, of political challenge and electoral competition, prompted internal debate. The strategic-political discussion and the disputes concerning policy areas generated diversification and realignment of the emerging ideological currents. The ideological currents, in order of their founding, were: Ecosocialism (1979), Ecofundamentalism (1982), Ecoradicalism (1983), Ecolibertarianism (1984) and Realism (1986). The strategic paralysis between Fundis and Realos resulted in the establishment of Breakthrough88 and the Left Forum (1988). With German reunification, Alliance90 – the GDR’s Green counterpart – joined the Greens. In contrast to the early stages of Green establishment, the evolving ideological currents generated more coherent political plans for realising the Green project. Differences regarding state–society relations, economic transformation and delivering ecological sustainability in a just society fragmented the shared worldview. This chapter traces the ideological evolution of these currents within the Greens. Their independent clusters of political beliefs are analysed comparatively, exposing the overlapping and intersecting discrepancies within the Greens. In the process, both the general Green project and the theory of ideology hitherto developed will be revised.

The Fundi-Realo controversy revisited The strategic debate dominated German Green politics throughout the 1980s and the Fundi-Realo ‘controversy’ was resurrected as a paradigmatic cleavage for Green parties throughout Europe.1 However, a closer analysis of the actual warring camps reveals an underlying complexity. Van Hüllen identified the main ideological discrepancy between ecologists and socialists, and characterised Green development after the departure of the ecologists in 1981, as Linkskurs – the course of the Left – ‘the currents representing a realignment of the historical New Left’ in terms of reform vs. revolution. He discerned three basic camps: the reformist wing (Ecolibertarians and Realos); the middle-groups (Zentralos, Aufbruch 88, Frauenscheine); and the revolutionary wing (Fundis and Ecosocialists).2 Markovits and Gorski distinguished between the Fundis, who believed in dogmatic naturalism – moralism, ecotopia, total system change and apocalypse – and Reformist Humanism – Ecosocialists, Realists and Ecolibs, who potentially embodied progressive reform-politics.3 Raschke differentiated between the radical wing – Radical ecologists, Ecosocialists and Ecofundis; and the progressive-reformist

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wing – the Realos and Ecolibs.4 Hülsberg described the diversification of the Greens in the following way: Today [1988 (G.T.)] the Greens are divided into four main currents, disputing the future of the party. They are often diametrically opposed to each other on strategic issues, while sometimes separated from each other only by nuances on tactical issues. On the Right of the party are the ecolibertarians, who advocate a radical politics without reference to class and declare war on the ‘dictatorial Jacobinism of the socialists’. On the Left are the Ecosocialists, who insist on the relationship between social and ecological questions, and on the need to resist and defeat the bourgeois state. In the middle are the political realists, who argue for compromise with the SPD and feasible ‘policies of reform’, to one side; and the fundamentalists on the other, closer in temper to the Ecosocialists but divided from them over the relations with the labour movement.5 The differences in delineating the camps derive from different theoretical approaches: the debate is not a straightforward strategic controversy between the Fundis and the Realos ecological questions. The fundamentalist position, that equated with ‘revolution’, is rooted in the analysis of the ecological crisis, and not in the class-struggle, which means the absence of a revolutionary agent.6 For the post-1968 generation, the tactics of a political revolution were largely discredited. Thus, while there might be a political correlation, the ideological and tactical considerations in the two cases differ substantially. Markovits and Gorski emphasise two ideological developments in Marxism, one relying on dogmatic, deterministic features combined with apocalypticism and naturalism, which although typical of Germany, are foreign to Marxism; and the other which resolves new political problems by reinstating the progressive middle and working-class alliance. Raschke’s analysis is more complex, seeking to discern the internal and external ideological fields through a three-dimensional system of analysis: Left/Right dimension (traditional Labour/Capital cleavage), a strategic dimension – reform or radicality; and a problems dimension (ecology, gender, lifestyles) – dominant or marginal.7 The system incorporates old vs. new politics, political strategy and orientation of issues to the analysis. Hence, the Fundis emerge as Left radical, with prominence accorded to lifestyles, while the Realos emerge as Right, moderate, ascribing less significance to lifestyles. However, this clearly contradicts our previous analyses: Bahro propounded a post-Left/Right society, and was especially displeased with the Left, while Fischer was an authentic representative of the New Left, which emerged from the alternative lifestyle scene. The role of lifestyles was dominant, though different in both accounts – for Bahro, lifestyle represented a political strategy while for Fischer it was a social end. This demonstrates why, in an ideological analysis, concepts like ‘Left’ and

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‘radical’ must be decoded within a comprehensive structure, as a configuration of political concepts requiring consideration both in their internal relations and in comparison to other ideological currents. Raschke contended that the ‘half-structured’ ideology, or the ‘fluid’ ideologies within the Greens, do not amount to a mature political ideology, and hence do not justify an analysis of the configuration of the political concepts. His scepticism was based on the fact that the Greens see themselves as a ‘radical plural party’:8 they are sceptical of their own capacity to adhere to a coherent political ideology9 and, as an ‘intellectual party’, they stress the individualist, ‘do it yourself’ ethos. However, this does not justify making the notion of ideology redundant. Instead, it requires a more complex ideology with an inbuilt ideological mechanism to secure pluralism, engender an open, discursive ideology, and strengthen the commitment to self-fulfilment. This should give ideological content to the frame-party which Raschke has aptly developed. Hülsberg’s analysis is a confused mix of strategic issues (fundamental opposition vs. reform politics), tactical considerations (cooperation with the SPD) and ideological convictions (coopting the working class; fighting the bourgeois society; radical democracy). This mixture suggests overlapping and intersecting cleavages (for example, strategic differences but tactical congruence), highlighting the multidimensionality of the Fundis–Realos controversy. These complex analyses, which divide and define the currents in relation to one another and delineate the Green project, are explored here. The discussion will demonstrate that the strategic debate exists at the surface level of deeper controversies over ideology-cum-politics. It is a struggle which embraces the Green project itself, its aims, its political role, its relation to the social movements and society at large and its peculiar German dimension of the Green project. It provides an insight into the transformation of Green currents, examining whether they still pertain to a shared ideology and redefines the Green political niche within the German political system. A methodological note In contrast to the diachronic approach used so far, this chapter unfolds thematically, for three reasons: first, while exhaustive detailed historical analyses of the strategic paralysis are abundant, an elucidation of the ideational configurations of each of the currents, and an elaborated account of their understanding of the Green project are lacking. The explication of the ideological differences which conjointly created this paralysis, rather than the history of the strategic paralysis, is required. Second, Raschke described the Ecoradicals as follows: ‘if one compares the ideological testimonies of this group from the early 1980s with the beginning of the 1990s, one sees that the positions have practically not changed.’10 Irrespective of whether the issue is ideological conviction or an inability to learn and adapt, it suggests

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that an analytic approach is preferable to an historical one. Further, while the strategic debates moved from state to federal level, the options of opposition, namely tolerating an SPD government or participating in government, remained the same, as did the logic behind the diverse currents’ positions. Most crucially, the ideological model developed so far can be applied to disclose the guidelines for the political selection process within the Greens. Rooted in the very structure of the Modular Ideology – the conceptual frame which requires cooperation, pluralism and tolerance, simultaneously recognising others’ perspectives as legitimate, while perceiving politics as a process which facilitates discussion and debate – three principles can be discerned. First, consider the experience of the survivalist ecologists, and the fact that though contemplated, a radical-feminist current within the Greens was never formed,11 though ecological and feminist principles became an ideological trademark of the Greens. This suggests that ideologically exclusivist currents will face difficulties with the ideological convictions of other currents and with the tolerant frame characterising Green ideology, since encouraging different ideological currents to coexist prevents any one current from gaining dominance. Both radical feminists and survivalists defined their subject as an ‘oppression (which) is first and foremost separable from any particular historical context’.12 Exclusivist currents can be expected to exclude themselves from a pluralist party. Second, ideologically exclusivist, but tactically inclusivist currents, like the K-groups in the Alternative Lists of the late 1970s, and some Ecosocialists in the Greens, could coexist politically, but would generate an ideological paralysis, causing discursive immobility rather than a constructive learning-process within the party. Third, the more inclusivist ideological currents would probably adopt pragmatic, issues-oriented politics and perceive the very political process as having value in itself. These principles, emanating from the logic of the ideological frame itself, sketch the contours which historical details colour, freeing the analysis to focus on greyer areas of Green politics. Despite the different methodological approach, the analysis of programmes remains the backbone of this chapter. The federal programmes present the united-front of the party and project a clear, radical and distinct Green voice, they exemplify the state of Green art, but need to be complemented by an analysis of the programmatic publications of the currents, to uncover the political disputes. While the federal programmes serve a secondary role in explaining the ideological differences, once the Greens crossed the 5 per cent hurdle, policy areas were developed and presented in the programmes, reflecting the changing role of programmatic analysis. Each of the following sections is devoted to a theme, with the focus on one of the currents, in comparison to the other ideological currents. The analysis starts with the theme of verbal radicalism in the 1983 programme,

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and the role of the fundamental opposing tendency within the Green discourse. The second theme is economic policies, particularly the ecosocialist critique of the fundamentalists’ position. The third theme is the role of the Green party, emphasising the ecoradical critique and the ecoliberal response. The fourth discussion re-evaluates the Green project itself, focusing on the Realos position, and questions its ideological coherence beyond fragmented issues-oriented politics. The last theme is German reunification and the Green identity in the post-1990 era. The currents are placed on a spectrum and their position on this diverse, partially incompatible array is contrasted with the wider political context, asking whether there is uniqueness in diversity when ascertaining the consolidating role of the Greens within the German political system.

The structural field of Green politics: some paradoxes The internal dynamic of the ideological currents, observed from the principles suggested by the modular ideology, were dictated by the wider political context within which Green politics operated. First, the dynamic of state and federal levels was a dominant feature of the German federal system which field candidates, issues and trends from state to federal levels. While at the state level, the politics is usually issue-oriented (for example, Frankfurt’s airport extension), more tuned into local activists, it also projects personalities and conflicts onto the federal level. This was most conspicuous in the Realos/Fundis controversy itself, with an interesting twist. The controversy emerged as an early 1980s local Hesse phenomenon, and was projected onto the federal level by the personalities involved (Fischer, Ditfurth). At the federal level, it was a theoretical debate, and should have remained marginal, as had been the case during the 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1994 elections, when the SPD and the Greens failed to raise a majority, rendering negotiations between them unnecessary. The Greens were an opposition party – a virtue to the fundamentalists, and an all too real reality for the realists. The strategic debate was futile on the federal level. The second factor was the composition of the external power-relations between the SPD and the CDU and their relation to the Greens. Whereas Green discourse frequently borders on the idiosyncratic, their instrumental role lay in the power-configuration between the two party blocs. Historically, both parties largely ignored the Greens, the political Schmuddelkinder, in their campaigns, until 1983, when the situation in Hesse obliged the SPD to recognise that the Greens were after all its offspring: the SDS emerged as an integral part of the SPD and the German Left. Only in the wake of Chernobyl did the CDU actually refer to the Greens as a fixture in German politics. Tellingly, the CDU in its negative campaign challenged, not the Green’s environmental policies which all major parties had by now appropriated into their platforms, but their social agenda. Emphasising Green

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policies on peace, feminism, immigrants and anti-statism, helped crystallise the Greens’ political niche in the German political system, which was effectively transformed from a 2.5 (SPD, CDU and the small FDP) to a 4-party system (with the Greens effectively changing the balance of power). It also shifted the political agenda, facilitating change in the manifestos of the other parties.13 The Greens’ role was thus not entirely determined by their own internal discourse, on which this research focuses, but by the reactions of the other political actors. Third, the media played a crucial role in highlighting conflicts, raising activists to federal figures, and defining the issues of the debate. Bahro and Kelly, but also Ditfurth, Schily and Thomas Schmidt lacked any base on either the state or federal levels, but all the same, succeeded in making a considerable impact thanks to media exposure. The public debate was thus influenced by prominent Green spokespersons, facilitating the Greening of the political agenda. The media also proved more susceptible than the institutional sphere to the new political style, introduced to the political culture, by the Greens, and became a major facilitator of Green politics.14 However, the media also chose to highlight personal struggles and in-party squabbles, projecting the image of a fragmented party, despite the cohesiveness and innovativeness of the Green agenda. Responsibility for the exaggerated weight given to the Fundis–Realos debate lies at least partially with the media. Fourth, internal Green institutions, designed to embody the principles of basisdemocracy, attentive and open party, provided the internal structures through which the alignments and disputes could be felt. The BDK, the parliamentary faction and the BuVo significantly influenced the powerpositions held by different Green currents. Alas, the ‘division of labour’ between the Fundi-dominated BuVo and the Realo stronghold in the Bundestag, entrenched and institutionalised the divide. This was at odds with the will of the majority of activists, members and supporters,15 another paradox for a self-professed grassroots party. Finally, whereas the federal system, relations with other political parties, the role of the media and the internal party organs indicate the external constraints and structures of Green politics, and the opportunities, framework and rules of the political game, the publications produced by Green ‘promis’ (prominent figures), ideological currents and in party’s programmes explain the content of the Green project. The struggle over defining the Green project was an essential dimension of the politics of identity and the attempt to reshape German political culture. The most sensitive seismograph for tracing the emergence of the Greens, not only the eruption above the media surface, but the ideological fault lines which caused them, is the corpus of Green writing. The programmes that shaped the Green terrain, revealing its topography and unearthing the available political routes are herewith analysed.

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‘This time the Greens – why?’ (1983) While the 1983 manifesto for the federal election (GE83) was a landmark in terms of Green discourse, it was not especially significant for the election as its effect on the 0.6 per cent margin over the 5 per cent is debatable. Rather, it represents a watershed in two respects: first, even in the title-question: ‘Diesmal die Grünen warum?’ – the Greens acknowledged for the first time, their role as a party competing for votes, seeking to appeal to the ‘alternative scene’, Green adherents, and the public at large. Second, there was a clear attempt to develop policy areas which had not been derived from their own idiosyncratic framework (for example, ecologyrelated policy arena), but which took issue with wider socio-economic problems that partly emerged in reaction to the Green cause, especially the economy vs. ecology theme. Consequently, the programmes reflect a radical and distinct Green agenda, with the voice of the radicals setting the tone and sentiment, and the realpolitik driving the development of policy areas and influencing the more complex attitudes to politics. The coexistence of the visionary, uncompromising grand-ideology and the concrete policies, has characterised Green programmes since 1979, providing a combination of holistic ecological philosophy and concrete environmental steps. During the 1980s this was complemented by a radical and comprehensive social vision together with detailed policies on ecological, civic culture, employment and political realms. The programmes drawn up in 1983 contain a radical critique and detailed economic policies. Radical discourse – redundant at the point of realisation? GE83 reflects the state of Green art at the peak of the social mobilisation around the new peace movement, actively supported by millions who participated in demonstrations, petitions and public protest. The programme, uses a radical, black versus green, absolutist, language to argue its case, and justify the necessity for a Green niche on the political spectrum. However, in the very realisation of its cause – generating awareness and attracting support – this form of verbal radicalism is self-annihilating, as it cannot answer the question of ‘what’s next’ in political terms, yes/no type questions, and calling for immediate cessation (of nuclear usage; withdrawal from NATO; Third World exploitation) lacks the ability to produce politics or policies. Constructive change is impossible as it demands nothing short of total transformation. It is therefore characteristic of the Fundis phenomena within the Greens. Nevertheless, harsh retrospective judgements would be misplaced on two grounds. First, these radical demands, with their appeal to simple truth and moral intuitions, mobilised the public and induced an otherwise unimaginable change in the political agenda. Second, politically, the Greens counted on a counter-force as ‘everything was predicated on the positive dynamic emanating from the new social

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movements, then at the high point of their mobilising capacity. No thought was given to the limited possibilities of the mass movements, to the possibility that the dynamic would decline, leaving the party as the central agency of the struggle.’16 In answer to ‘Why this time the Greens?’ GE83 launched a comprehensive attack on the system: We are not simply at the end of our economic system, but we are in a crisis of our whole industrial civilisation which has proved so conclusive because we were not ready to change our total course (Gesamtkurs).17 Echoing Bahro’s prophecy, GE83 condemns industrial civilisation while presenting personal readiness as a prerequisite for changing the human lifeworld. Beneath the evils of unemployment and social disintegration lurk nuclear exterminism, biological and chemical weapons and cruise missiles – potential causes of mass destruction. The inequitable economic order finds its victims in the Third World, in the death of children, and in hunger, while Europe continues destroying the global natural resources. ‘When the tree dies’, say the Greens, ‘man will not survive either.’18 The tree, represents the German forest, and Third World rain forests and resources. Skilfully using the politics of the affected, GE83 stirs the German public’s affection for the symbolic and real German forest, to provoke compassion for the Third World’s trees, rain forests and people. Worldwide redistribution is justified by the historical analysis of exploitation and by the compassion and sense of social justice generated through this discursive method. Changing course is necessary; its totality encompasses the global village and how individuals think, urging people to let the symbols and concerns which affect them to morally guide them. Emotive intuitions on which to act and erotic politics provide the subtext supplementing the crude material analysis of the ecological crisis. However, the manifesto claims, the immediate route to change is by voting Green.19 The Greens will put questions of life to the Bundestag, and propose a new, comprehensive plan. Adopting the USP (1978) notion of Denkzettel – a thought-provoking vote – they exposed the dominant ideologically charged statements by declaring the truth of the political matter – there is no ‘little peace’ or ‘some environment’ – German politics needs a new impulse and a comprehensive alternative: We will make no compromise where it revolves around the interest of life and survival. We know from experience that there is no ‘small ecological wisdom’ and a ‘responsible pacifism’ à la Josef Strauss, because there is no ‘bit of cancer’ and ‘small death’.20 This classic rhetoric of Petra Kelly directly expresses a fundamental ‘truth’ with compelling power over the movements. It also entrenched its

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adherents in a ‘purist’ moralist position from which there was no obvious political way forward. The blunt assertion ‘we will make no compromise on issues of life and survival’ was likely to generate a political conflict once the 5 per cent hurdle was passed, as indeed happened. As rightly observed by Offe ‘The style of discourse and action is characterised by militant rhetoric, spontaneity, decentralised experimentation and often vehement confrontation … (it is) phrased in an absolute language, that is, a language using phrases such as ‘no’, ‘never’, ‘stop’, ‘ban’, and ‘end’, which does not leave room for processes, gradual accomplishment, or compromises, but insists upon immediate fulfilment of demands’.21 Nevertheless, for an awarenessoriented politics, this kind of discourse was instrumental in generating a change in social and ecological perceptions, exposing the inherent disadvantages. At the height of social mobilisation, the possibility of an alternative to the established parties with a majority among the affected people – namely everybody – was presumed by the Greens. Thus, radical Green discourse penetrated public consciousness, but at realisation, became a hindrance rather than a constructive tool for generating the change in praxis sought (change of awareness is part of change of praxis, but this change cannot rely solely on this perceptual change). The Green’s radical worldview, also demanded a shift of perspective, projecting a clear internationalist voice even as a national party. In the Green worldview, wealth redistribution and the ending of exploitation of the world’s resources are required. Respect for other cultures, consistent with the principle of self-determination, advocates solutions by the people affected by the policies, rather than imposition by the rich countries. Capitalising on the Peace movement, GE83 used its slogans to introduce foreign politics as peace politics: ‘Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen’ (creating peace without weapons) and presented the Greens as the political arm of the movements. Deploring the struggle of the power blocks, Greens advocated a nuclear-free Europe, a non-violent FRG and a solidarity-based, decentralised German society. They called for the defection of the two Germanies from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and for solidarity with the peoples of the Third World by striving for equality across continents, stressing disarmament and local production against multinational trade. Just as the foreign politics were taken from the peace-manifesto, so the economic policy summarised the economic programme composed at the 1983 BDK. The policy will be discussed in the next section. The domestic politics section called for an alternative democratic culture, responsive to its citizens’ concerns, decentralised, and catering for direct democracy in a nonviolent society. It encouraged self-determination, responsibility, decentralisation of the media and asylum rights and opposed monopoly over economic and political processes. The Greens also promised to bring into the Bundestag a pacifist, ecological and social opposition. Committed to the movements, the grassroots and the Greens offered to

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represent these constituencies at the federal level, to endow the movements with a parliamentary voice, focusing on peace, ecological issues, citizens, anti-nuclear matters, women, workers and Third World movements. The Greens, they argued, were ready to take responsibility, but not to ignore the life-threatening politics of the irresponsible parties in the Bundestag. They forwarded an open discussion on survival issues and their willingness to consider cooperation, though they did not want ‘to help repair the industrial super-production and the bureaucratic institutions, but to urge the SPD to terminate its grand-coalition with the CDU concerning growth politics and armament plans’. The programme ends: ‘People who oppose the forces of destruction, who join us in our resistance and seek a breakthrough into another, saving (rettende) civilisation – should vote this time for us. Vote Green.’ Ecofundis: ideological reliability, political liability GE83 exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of the ecofundamentalists and their relation to the Greens, and reflects a radical perspective derived from a basic understanding of ecology as Gattungsfrage – a question of the biological species. In contradistinction, the Ecofundamentalists emphasised the human aspect rather than the naturalistic biologism. Ecofundamentalism referred to three aspects of humanity. Firstly, humanity as a whole, emphasising a global perspective and the relation to the Third World. The ecological and social understanding of the Ecofundamentalists is deeply informed by the global aspects of the ecological crisis. It is hence understandable why the role of the Greens – advisedly never ‘The Green Party’ – is portrayed as that of an arm of the international Green movement.22 The Ecofundis denounced the traditional politics that was caught within the growthoriented paradigm and structurally constrained within managerial functions, arguing instead for fundamental change. The anti-parties party, coined by Kelly, intended to use the parliamentary stage for only one scene of the international Green movement’s act. Humanity could not be aided by a ‘Scene Party’, as Bahro labelled what he took to be Fischer’s project. Thus, humanity was equated with the global village and the Greens, part of an international movement with the comprehensive task of changing the course of civilisation. The second aspect of humanity referred to by the Ecofundamentalists was the human condition. The Greens had to unmask the motivational engine of civilisation, and to expose the dominant ideology which insinuated materialistic messages into socio-economic structures. The human capacity to be self-aware, to understand and to change its behaviour was instrumental to the Green project. Correspondingly, the mission of the archEcofundis Bahro and Kelly was to convey the Green message, using their oratorical skills and charismatic leadership to enlighten, alert and redirect people toward a post-materialist culture. The ecofundis were, ‘a tendency,

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though long since they have been characterised as a current. They had in Bahro and Kelly articulate representatives, but they have never connected themselves with any current’23 and without either a regional or federal cadre of supporters. Rather, they used the media, the movements, the BDKs and countless demonstrations, gatherings, marches and speeches to convey their messages. Both were individualists, and yet devoted to the Green movement. The third aspect was the transformation into a humane society, which necessitated unravelling the structures of domination in discourse and perceptions, either by advocating a transformation of the self (Bahro), or by stressing activism and grassroots participation (Kelly) to unite the Gesamtalternativebewegung (Vogt). Kelly’s speeches criticised structural hierarchies, institutions of domination (for example, the system, church, economic multinationals), seeking to emancipate the subordinate strata from the establishment’s hold. Both she and Bahro, sought an alternative majority which could transform the polity without being corrupted by it. Their radical position was therefore fundamental opposition, and cooperation with the ‘bankrupt system’24 was inconceivable. That Green discourse was saturated with the ecofundis’ positions was not surprising. The scope of their analysis, its goals and sentiment helped to create a Green consensus. Obviously, an election manifesto, that would emphasis the distinct Green worldview whilst attracting broad support, would use the most powerful advocators to introduce the most radical messages, to demonstrate the need for comprehensive change, appeal to a wide audience and to present the unique ideological niche of the Greens on the party political spectrum. While instrumental in raising political awareness, once support for the overall agenda was forthcoming, the tools of the Ecofundamentalists were useless. As Fischer remarked, in politics testimonies are not enough. Green politics needed to change, as Offe observed, from an expressive and naive style to complex attitudes of problem-solving.25 The Ecofundis’ idea of politics, while instrumental in creating awareness and propagating the Green message to wider audiences, became a liability once the parliamentary role was assumed. It took another decade before the resentful fundamentalists quit a party which was fundamentally sympathetic to their positions.

‘Working meaningfully, living in solidarity’: from work-world to life-world The need for a more detailed economic plan accounts for another change in Green perceptions.26 Until 1983 the programmes had essentially been part of an ongoing internal discourse within the Greens. Drawn up months before the elections, the programmes had little connection with the political agenda of the ruling parties. Indeed, it was part of the Green role as agenda setters to foreword their own agenda, thereby invigorating the

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German political debate. However, the very realisation that they were competing for votes – albeit reluctantly, given their abhorrence of competition and power struggles – obliged them to produce more competent policies and to address responses to their initiated agenda. Economic politics – ecological, social, basisdemocratic Economic critique had always been the focal point of the limits to growth debate and therefore at the heart of the Green project, notably uniting the value-conservatives and ecosocialists. However, the economic policy statement, directly addressing unemployment was a clear reaction to the political debate in Germany, which juxtaposed environmentally friendly policies with unemployment.27 It generated a long-overdue debate within the Greens, which was moulded into the economic programme in the Sindelfinger congress ‘Working Meaningfully – Living in Solidarity’ (Sinnvol arbeiten – solidarisch leben, Work83). The economic programme was introduced, in a typical Green manner: This policy statement does not represent a strict economic programme of the Greens, rather an emergency measure to counter unemployment and cutbacks in social services. We would like to present these measures for public discussion … Such public discussion … lies at the heart of the political philosophy of the Greens.28 This opened up a Pandora’s box as ideological inclinations, heretofore concealed under the shared critique of the ruling ‘system’ resurfaced. It was the cornerstone for the factionalisation of the Greens on policy areas, exemplifying the diversification process, which caused different ideological currents to develop virtually incompatible political stances. Simultaneously, however, it presented a strikingly radical economic worldview, which confronted the ruling parties’ economics of full-employment, secure work, lifetime work and so on, with an alternative perspective, providing innovative insights and moulding the debate in the 1980s and 1990s. Not surprisingly, Bahro’s reaction to Work83 was that: The Sindelfinger programme is really the best social-democratic programme possible … but it is not a Green programme … . Our message can only be to say ‘you need no working places in the industrial system, you don’t need this job-system, but nurturing, dwelling etc.’ If we involve ourselves in the unemployment problem, with the whole blackmail of society, then we renew social-democratic politics.29 On one level, this ecofundamental position is flawed: that there are structural faults within the system does not entail that opting-out is either possible or sought.30 On another level, it facilitates a shift of perspective,

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challenging the prevailing debates produced by the established system, into areas of ecology, nurturing, and housing lifestyles. Though the Ecofundis position rejects the attempt to deal with unemployment, to which Work83 is devoted, the programme upholds the sentiment behind Bahro’s stance, incorporating it into the new lifeworld perception. The Ecosocialists strongly opposed the programme, and argued convincingly that ecological problems have social facets which will not disappear by simply bracketing them with political realities. From this perspective, tackling unemployment was a prerequisite for the ecological reconstruction of society. The pendulum of Green programmes swung back and forth. If EU79 was ecologically oriented, BP radical Leftist and GE80 ecologicalpolitical, Work83 (also incorporated into GE83) placed the pendulum at both poles simultaneously but were these really two opposing poles? The document clearly states that ‘Forced unemployment and reduced social welfare is a combination intolerable for the Greens … Accompanying the economic crisis is the ongoing and increasing destruction of the environment, the natural base of human existence.’31 This places socioeconomic concerns at the heart of Green policy and takes environmental issues as side-effects, connecting the two by asserting that ‘Production, motivated solely by profit, endangers jobs and simultaneously destroys the natural preconditions for life. No economic policy to date has taken the global damage resulting from human activity into consideration’32 and thereby presenting global economic analysis as uniquely Green. However, in arguing that ‘there is too much rather than too little production’ it implies that ‘What is ecologically necessary is also economically sound’33 but does not substantiate this sweeping generalisation. Having revealed the economic crisis as the root cause, condemning environmental issues as industrial by-products and identifying the problems with production, they focus on the social consequences of ecological destruction: pollution, noise, tension, mental and physical sickness, depression, cancer, allergies and heart and respiratory diseases, rather than harm to ecosystems, threat to other species and so on. The framework is constituted upon social and ecological problems which are underlined as industrially caused. While accusing the established parties of playing into the hands of profit-seeking organisations, bureaucracy and multinationals, the Greens put forward three dimensions to their economic politics: ecological, social and basisdemocratic. Ecological economics means regulating human intervention in natural processes ‘so that the laws of nature are observed and that nature itself – the very base of our existence – is protected’.34 ‘Observing natural laws’ remains, unstated, but the ecological facet of economics definitely calls for state intervention. ‘An ecological economic perspective includes within the idea of social prosperity the preservation and recovery of nature as a part of human life.’35 In economic terms, the ecological imperative requires a shift in the notion of prosperity: ‘An ecological-based

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economy does not measure the prosperity of a society in terms of the greatest possible number of goods produced (indicated in GNP) but rather in production methods which conserve the environment, protect human health and result in durable consumer goods.’ This will reduce production levels and increase free-time ‘for social and artistic activities … and will give the opportunity to develop a more free and self-determined lifestyle’.36 Thus, while production is highlighted, replacing and discarding of the work-ethic for alternative lifestyles, or community and societal life, suggests the alternative agenda.37 In other words, while state intervention is an ecological necessity, individuated lifestyles and communal decentralisation are advocated on another level, marking the two coexisting streams of thought. Social economics ‘must provide a foundation of genuine equal opportunity of development for all members of society’. Commercialisation of all life-spheres, including profit-motivated economic interests and alienation were attacked, redistribution of responsibilities in housework and childrearing were advocated, and the inequality of gender-based wages was denounced. This was a radical social vision: concealed is a critique of the centrality of working life as determined by economic-political powers; it emphasises lifeworld: ‘the Greens want to draw attention away from work as a means of earning money, and instead emphasise its importance as a free, self-motivating activity or opportunity to develop one’s own personality’. The critique is carried through to relations with the Third World, whose populations are exploited by the labour division imposed by the industrial countries, and calls for a reduction in world trade. The Greens also promote ‘equal social, political and legal status among foreigners and Germans’ – an attack on the biased notion of citizenship under German Law. Basisdemocratic economics forwarded a bottom-up notion of economic development to ‘guarantee that work and the distribution of its products is oriented to the needs of all people in the society’.38 The Greens introduced their concept of a grassroots economy: ‘A democratic economy is the cornerstone of a democratic society. It is our goal that those involved in production can decide for themselves what is to be produced as well as how and where it will be produced.’39 Having favoured regulatory state intervention as a means of ensuring ecologically sustainable production, the plan for economic decentralisation and democratisation – two separate but often confused concepts – was presented as the heart of self-subsisting communities, and a ‘prerequisite for the development of the many-sided human capabilities and interests both on the job and in private life’.40 Curiously, it continues: ‘A further prerequisite for individual freedom is the private ownership of those items which are helpful in shaping one’s life.’ The Greens favoured private ownership as opposed to corporate or government ownership which control other humans and destroy nature. They were for ‘new, social forms of ownership’ of land, natural resources, means of production, and banks; and they rejected forms of nationalisation

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‘since they do not allow for grassroots democratic control’.41 The unit was neither the individual, nor the state, but the community. Community is identified as the locus of discussion, but what constitutes a ‘good community’ – its size, population, values, and so on, is never explicated. Finally, they declared: ‘Without actually wanting or being able to completely eliminate the free market … the damaging effects of such a market should be abolished. All non-renewable resources (for example, air, water, minerals) should be placed outside the market economy.’42 Ultimately, the choice of whether or not to abolish the free market; to create jobs or shift to self-fulfilling activities; to abolish private property or endorse it as a necessary ingredient in self-fulfilment (albeit marginal, as materialism is strongly opposed on all Green accounts) are all decisive factors in determining an ideological worldview. The Green economic spectrum Work83 presented unitary economic policies along ecological, social and democratic lines, reinforced by policy measures. Work83 is a composite of several very different economic views subscribed to by Green currents. The ideological spectrum which emerged within the Greens is traced through exploring these economic clusters, to determine whether the emerging Green spectrum actually enables unity-in-diversity. Under ‘Measures for Immediate Implementation’, seven categories are forwarded: redistribution of work, ecological and social investments, production conversion, alternative projects and self-organisation of the unemployed, guaranteed social income, teenage unemployment and education and finance. In an alternating pattern, two distinct approaches reveal themselves. One set of economic measures addresses work and unemployment. To counter these problems a redistribution of available work (which eliminates excessive production) through an ‘immediate and drastic reduction in the work week’,43 to 35 hours is devised. ‘Our long-term goal is the elimination of piecework and assembly-line work.’44 The Greens promote overall reduction of the workload, encouraging flexible work timings, and therefore greater control over life. Nevertheless, the Greens ‘oppose the increase … of part-time work in its present form … (used) to achieve maximum production … to shift operational risks onto the workers, to intensify production performance and to require an unpaid ‘on call’ status as part of an employee’s regular duties’.45 While supporting lowering the permissible retirement age, they reject retiring senior employees out of the system, suggesting instead a ‘reduced weekly and yearly work requirement for older employees’. Ending unsafe working conditions and time off during working hours ‘for workers to discuss factory or business related matters’ are advocated.46 The package of problems addressed is the classic domain of socialdemocratic trade union concerns, which the Greens partially endorse and

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partially radicalise, referring to ecological production and workers’ welfare as prerequisites. In 1983, qualitative innovations – included promoting workers’ concerns regarding work safety and ecological conditions without jeopardising their work place, through workers’ rights;47 differentiation in work-load and flexibility during different periods of the working life (notably reduction for elderly people and parental leave); and social safeguards to enable flexible worktime accommodating workers’ needs rather than profit considerations. Complementing this was a comprehensive view regarding ‘production conversion’ which ‘is principally concerned with a critique and transformation of presently manufactured products … we have nothing in common with those who fight for the creation of more jobs without considering what is to be manufactured’.48 They therefore advocated reductions in the defence, automobile, steel and shipbuilding industries, while forwarding alternative manufacturing methods ‘with an eye to satisfying the needs of people, especially in the Third World’. Work is the cornerstone of an economic analysis aimed at facilitating political alliances: We are not prepared to allow the social question to be played against the ecological problems or vice versa. For us, the fight against unemployment is simultaneously a fight for ecologically and meaningful investment. It is exactly here where ecological groups and workers’ movements must join hands.49 ‘Ecological and meaningful investments’, are complementary measures aimed at changing the world of work, for example, free time made available through the redistribution of work ‘can then be used for one’s own purposes … the thorough self-determination of one’s lifestyle at work, at home, and in the community’.50 However, it constitutes an alternative economic agenda geared to the values of the lifestyle and ecologist movements and embraces an alternative worldview. Under ‘alternative Projects’, a host of small-scale production facilities, biological agriculture projects, leisure time activities, alternative media, care-centres and self-help groups, self-organisation of the unemployed and citizens’ initiatives are presented as a reaction against ‘the organisational and technological alienation of work in large industries and offices … bureaucratic social services (and) the quantitative and qualitative lack of sufficient care in social services’.51 These projects are central to communities: Developing new forms of communal property in the commercial area. Using this new concept of property as a foundation, they attempt to define their own work methods, what work they actually want to accomplish and what for. In addition these projects are interested in reducing hierarchies, competition, and the alienating over-specialisation of work … oriented towards socially meaningful needs.52

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Thus, these initiatives constitute in effect a critique of the existing workcentred society with its organisational systems. They seek to establish an alternative network of working opportunities, as part of social and political experiments, changing centralised structures into decentralised, needsoriented and self-fulfilling work structures. An inherent part of this transformation are the social and ecological investments advocated by the Greens. Forwarding alternative schemes for energy, traffic, housing, social infrastructure, recycling, water and agriculture, they focus on policy areas that can be subjected to ecological critique. A new social reality emerges through the departure from ‘big business’ to communal work. Despite their different perspectives, both the socialist and lifestyle approaches agree on the need for a social security net dealt with under the ‘Guarantee of Social Income’, and on progressive, social and ecological taxation.53 One model of the industrial system, ascribes to work the central role within society. In this view, politics should control economics, state intervention ensures redistribution and trade unions are the principal vehicle for ensuring workers’ rights. The other model distances politics from economy by providing basic income, allowing the government to demand more in terms of ecological standards and to encourage alternative projects without taking sides in the work/capital conflict. It also focuses on individual choice, alternative projects and dissociation from work-centred life. Another stance emerges from the manifesto – that of the critique of relations of domination, particularly in its feminist mode, which, despite its being the official line of the Greens, implicitly undermines the other two currents whose focus is work or alternative work. The preamble states: The existing division of labour not only produces social inequality but also deprives people of the chance to develop their potential … Because work is divided according to sex, work is undervalued and is considered to be inferior to work in the commercial sector … This work in the private sphere is performed mainly by women. For free … The result is a complete economic and social dependency of women on men. The expulsion of women from the work force is practically programmed into the system … As the crisis in human interrelations grows, the problems inherent in the cultural and political forms of our communal life are becoming more serious.54 The demand is for ‘the creation of true equality’ and ‘basic redistribution of the responsibilities for housework and rearing children. Our goal is the equal participation of women and men in this socially necessary activity’,55 emphasising equal employment opportunities. However, a major trend behind this perspective is the radical critique of what is ‘work’ and what, since it is unpaid work, is less valued, and thus sexually discriminating. This calls for a major shift of the concept of ‘work’ itself: ‘The current economic

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significance of work is merely that of earning wages … (it) serves to secure the needs of daily life and has very little to do with a concept of work as means of personal self-development’.56 The demands for a change in definition of ‘work’, the emphasis on meaningful work, and the idea of a social basic income amount to a shift in perspective from a work-centred world to a lifeworld in which work forms part of life-activities and is not earning dependent. Breaking hierarchies, bureaucracies and technocracies, thus creating more diverse and flexible activities based on a different conception of community, familial roles and labour, provides an alternative concept of the lifeworld. Complemented by the ecological requirement of reducing production and redistributing wealth within industrial societies and the call for solidarity with the Third World actually suggests that a different worldview is evolving. Internal diversification, external innovation Thus far, four basic ideological stances have been explored: the first criticised the Green attempt to deal with questions of unemployment and social cutbacks, arguing that this was the traditional social democratic course. The Green agenda, according to this view should confine itself to questions of ecology, lifestyles and the Third World. Only the Greens address questions of life and survival. The second position sees both ecological and social problems as anchored in the system of production. Reducing production has to be centrally directed by addressing workers’ concerns, which will also enlist their support for the ecological project. The third view advocates decentralisation of employment and seeks alternative meaningful, self-fulfilling work centred upon community and self-organised groups as the means of advancing the vision of self-subsisting communities which produce locally, according to needs. The fourth position challenges organised work vs. alternative work, and demands a transformation of the definition of work, suggesting that housework, child-rearing and caring are underestimated (unpaid) work. Here, a shift of values away from earning-oriented jobs into the lifeworld is advocated. These attitudes do not overlap directly with the ideological currents, but in the main, the first correlates with the Ecofundamentalists, the second with the Ecosocialists, the third with the Ecolibs and the fourth with the New Left and the Realist position. These positions differ acutely on fundamental questions. The relations of state and economy align the Ecofundamentalists, who reject any cooperation with the system, with the Ecolibs, who seek minimal state intervention. The Ecosocialists clearly favour state intervention, and the New Left seeks a change in power structures – hierarchies, domination and institutions – for which a seizure of power is necessary. On the question of capitalism, the alignment is different yet again. Whereas Ecofundis, radical New Left and Ecosocialists oppose the capitalist state, Realists and Ecolibs see the

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inevitability of working from within the system to change it, and from within the market to ecologise it. The Ecolibs also see private property and entrepreneurs as part of community-based economy and the self-realisation of people, even though all currents reject materialism and consumerism and advocate post-material society. Thus, the spectrum of ideological-cum-economic positions produces currents with fundamentally different and at least partially incompatible positions. Each of these currents has a different configuration of political concepts which furnishes its worldview. Nevertheless, these incompatible views, when analysed from a conventional economic perspective, constitute a genuine radical, shared economic agenda which shifts the common platform of the ruling parties – advocating a full employment, growth-oriented, profit-seeking economy – toward a different perception of the lifeworld. Green economics demands reducing production by shortening the working week and providing workers with rights; flexible working times which address workers’ needs and provide a flexible working lifestyle (parental leave and elderly workload reduction); investing in alternative technology, energy, agriculture, transportation and production methods; encouraging alternative, small-scale projects and decentralising production and consumption; condemning certain types of works and re-evaluating familial and communal work within a participatory, sexually equal society; and instituting ecological supervision commensurate with the subsidiarity principle. This is actually a common Green agenda which radically transforms the concept of working life, advocating state provision of social security, basic income and ecological regulations via progressive taxes, reduction in production and cuts in security budgets. At the same time, it focuses on the local communities, strengthening the social fabric and supports an environment that dissolves the boundaries between caring roles, house work and paid work. Thus, the plural – ideologically incompatible – stances within the Greens, generate endless political debates, producing an interesting and innovative perspective on the economic world in the twenty-first century.

The parting of the ways: from movement-politics to parliamentary politics? The question of the role of the Green Party, so far, obscured behind the benign title Die Grünen, became acute, after the Greens secured 5.6 per cent of the popular vote on the federal level. Since the Greens were conceived as the illegitimate child of the political system, an inherent part of their ‘politics of identity’ was the ‘adolescence crisis’57 of redefining their political role and assuming responsibility for their parliamentary mandate. The tremendous mobilisation of NSMs gave the impression that an alternative to institutionalisation – with which the lion’s share of Green critique lies – was possible. While the movements provided the new constituency

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which supported the Greens, movement-politics became a hindrance to effective Green politics. Just as verbal radicalism later severed their political prospects, the mobilisation of the movements was instrumental in posing a radical challenge to dominant ideological norms – in the formative stage of Green politics but subsequently became a hindrance to effective political change. The discussion now turns to interpreting the debate through the questions put by the Ecoradicals and the different answers given by the Ecofundis, Ecosocialists, Ecolibs and Realos. Ecoradicals: movement-party, perspective-party ‘The Greens Stand before a Historical Decision on Course’ read the title of Kühnert, one of the founders of the radical-ecologist current within the Greens.58 The entry of 27 new Bundestag members after the March 1983 election, and the anxious ‘Hessen experience’, convinced a group around the former BUS people, Ditfurth, Zieran and Kühnert, to establish themselves as a federal ideological current. Ditfurth, in her account of ‘Why we established this forum’ identifies a fundamental theoretical deficit within the Greens which was manifested on three levels: first, because the Greens comprised a conglomerate of groups, ideological clarification was necessary, despite reluctance to engage in theoretical accounts. Second, a discrepancy between the political goals and the pragmatic considerations which normally dictate Green politics. Third, Green discourse had proved permeable, due to the lack of coherent ideological stances, to the new terminology of ‘politicability’, ‘parliamentary rituals’ and parliamentary ‘success’ which had penetrated Green language, consciousness and sense of direction.59 For Kühnert, the Greens’ role within the political system of the FRG, their relation to the social movements and the Greens’ future perspective were key questions. To address the theoretical deficit, answer these questions, offer an alternative perspective and provide a federal forum for ongoing debate, the radical-ecologist (also named ecoradical) current was established. The first forum, held in Hessen on 12–13 November 1983, debated three issues – parliament, established parties and the self-understanding of the Greens. The parliament was highlighted as a centralised organ, the focal point of representative democracy which undermines other forms of democratic participation such as direct democracy, decentralisation, subsidiarity and plebiscite.60 Parliament’s autonomy, is highly influenced by capitalistic processes representing the interests of the bourgeois, impairing its ability to genuinely represent the workers or affected people. Parliament effectively took sides in the capital/labour divide.61 Beyond the worn-out phraseology, their concerns were real. Seeking to strengthen parliament against management, ecoradicals worried that merely representing Green interests in the Bundestag might stabilise the political system rather than transform it.62 The Greens, argued the ecoradicals, had reacted against the parliamentarian and established parties creed. The Greens were a genuine movement-party,

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an action party which is part of the social movements (both the old movement – the workers, and the new – women, ecology, peace and antinuclear movements).63 They regarded professionalisation and leadership selection as an objectionable process, believing instead that the party needed to be open to direct input from its base. The party’s internal structures should prevent the power accumulation resulting from such mechanisms as rotation and limited mandates. The goal should be to provide a long-term perspective based on the fundamental issues of life, rather than power.64 The party is not designed to compete over votes, but to ensure maximum participation, decentralisation and alternative lifestyles, ecological practices and production on local, regional, state and federal levels. Finally, Green ideology should reject growth-politics and seek social justice and ecological sustainability. According to Zieran, all Greens want a real change, but neither Bahro’s way of adopting the features of a religious sect, nor the realpolitik path of cooperation with the SPD are viable. The latter route fails because the SPD is part of the ruling bloc and a supporter of growth-politics. It therefore must change radically for rapprochement to be possible. Greens should not compromise on questions of survival and life. They should, however, transform themselves from a protest party into a ‘perspective party’, projecting a long-term view into parliament.65 Indeed, in her sketch of the ecoradical position, Ditfurth masterfully manipulates the image of power – Macht – and doer – Macher – to imply that Green realists are Politik Macher. These are perspectiveless, new-doers, opportunists, falsely creating hopes for minimal real progress, adhering to the ‘little evil ideology’ instead of fighting for a feasible utopia, for a life free from exploitation and poverty, in respectful partnership with the natural environment. Naming the Ecolibs Neo-Liberals, and the Realos Neo-Pragmatists, she accuses their politics of being patchwork, and describes the Greens as ‘ganz stinktnormale Partei’ – an utterly ordinary party.66 By practising Machtpolitik, Realos actively cooperate with the ruling bloc of growthpolitics and the forces of capital, accepting the ‘plutonium-economy’ and the state’s monopoly over power. They merely ask to improve the state as it is, instead of seeking fundamental change. Realos are merely a brand of social democracy, making Greens farcical. There is no possible way of social emancipation from above, argue the ecoradicals; by merely being a parliamentary faction, the Greens will not achieve structural change. In Ditfurth’s judgement, fundamental change can only be achieved by acting through the protagonist – the movements – thereby establishing a social opposition and a real counter-force (Gegenmacht). The Green transformation has to be free from capitalistic structures to create concrete change, to uproot the causes rather than manage environmental problems: ‘The social opposition, the readiness to resist, is awakening. If only we do not weaken ourselves with adaptation, our chances of concrete change of the way to reconstruct this industrial society into an ecological, social and

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democratic society are not bad.’67 The historical ecoradical decision was to remain a movement party, a hasty decision given that in the early 1980s, the movements had peaked and might well have been seen as an appropriate protagonist. However, the ecoradicals also wanted the movement-party to be a perspective-party. There is an inherent tension between a party which seeks in principle to be open to its grassroots and which rejects the idea of a distinct ideology, and a party interested in establishing a comprehensive perspective.68 Importantly, the deficits described by the ecoradicals – basisdemocratic commitment and comprehensive perspective – can only be understood if the ecoradicals themselves are taken to be the antagonists of the Realist wing. The ecoradicals argued that the Realos had the wrong end of the stick, but in fact seem to want to hold the stick at both ends, and indeed tended to use both sides to whip the realists. For the ecoradicals, Green fundamentals are commitment to the movements, the fundamental critique of post-capitalistic society and the conviction that ecological problems should be tackled comprehensively, not piecemeal, or by a technocratic-managerial environmental approach. Their self-characterisation as ‘radical-ecologists’, seeking to distance themselves from fundamentalism in its fanatic mode, also accounts for their difference from the ‘ecological fundamental opposition’ Greens. Ecoradicals were determined to guard ideological fundaments against pragmatic considerations, literally seeking a radical solution – one that uproots the causes. They have not, though, ultimately demanded ‘fundamental opposition’. Fundis: differences within an alliance We are now in a position to draw some general conclusions about the Fundi camp. The ecological fundamental opposition tendency was adamant about its categorical oppositionist stance regarding the ‘system’. In Bahro’s account, the Greens should further their cause among new support groups beyond Left and Right by directly confronting Christians, to ‘engage in debate with the conservative voters themselves, in their own language’.69 The perception of the Greens’ function as furthering the ecological cause into new ideological territories demonstrates Bahro’s qualities as a prophet and charismatic leader whose politics is one of conversion, not of paving a political route for the converted. Kelly argued for a principal opposition party, on rather pragmatic grounds of political integrity: only by declaring themselves an opposition party would the Greens be able to denounce the established parties for their will to power, and still run for elections. Only then, could they still use the parliament as an important platform for conveying the Green message without betraying their principles.70 Whereas the ecoradicals saw the Greens as a movement-party seeking to represent their demands in parliament, the ecofundis envisaged an opposition party, merely using parliament as a stage, hoping for a majority outside conventional

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politics, before becoming involved in traditional politics. Both currents put their trust in the alternative movements: Bahro and Kelly in religious movements or the international Green movement; Ditfurth in social movements. Whereas the latter is in effect confined to the ‘alternative scene’, the former were interested in realignment beyond Left/Right, rich/poor, North/South. The ecosocialists also placed trust in the movements, though their political plan was entrenched in the parliamentary tradition. They sought to capture the workers’ movement by providing a better deal for trade unionists and workers, hoping to dissuade them from the consumerist impulse into which social democracy had falsely led them. This necessitated a clear dissociation from the SPD. Consequently, all three currents, each with its own perceptions, of the Greens as a movement-party, an opposition party and a radical-Leftist party, converged on tactical questions, resenting coalition and reformism, and were thus clustered together as the Fundis. The Fundis asked the right questions, out of a radical critique which challenged the traditional political frameworks – based on the exploitation of nature and people by advanced capitalistic societies. The fundamental flaw lay in their trying to apply the same (politically transcendent) logic to politics. Still, for an alternative party calling for a ‘new political style’ (civil disobedience; social resistance; demonstrations), based on New Politics issues (environment; gender; minorities; Third World) and constituting a new type of political party,71 it is no surprise that the Greens were terrified of being described as ‘stinktnormale Partei’ – a fairly normal party. Since these fundamental issues were formative to the Green identity, the Realos found themselves in an apologetic position vis-à-vis the Fundis. They both held the same socio-political positions, came from the same alternative culture, however, the Realos saw the basic flaw of the strategic stance. The struggle for ‘total transformation of the system’, they believed, should be simultaneously fought from within the structures of power themselves, and independently, from the extraparliamentary scene, without the illusion that the party is the movements.72 Realos: reform and reconstruction The Realos camp emerged as a reaction to the Fundis, composed of the Ecolibs, New Left people and non-affiliated centre groups. The unapologetic, unequivocal endorsement of the parliamentary role of the Greens as a party, came from the Ecolibs, who in 1984 organised themselves as an ideological current. In their 1984 founding declaration, ‘Unity and Green and Freedom: Ecolibertarian Greens’, they sought to develop a theoretical and practical perspective centred upon ecological politics and freedom. Criticising industrialism, they attack socialism, which has throughout history perceived nature as an object, and depends on accelerated progress for its realisation making socialism part of the problem, not the solution.73

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The movement-party, they maintain, is a myth. ‘The movement’ which relies on ‘the base’ to fight ‘the capitalistic-system’ captured by ‘the bourgeois interests’ are mere reifications, abstractions that are part of the rhetorical self-justification of the representatives of the Alternative Scene, which is only one brand of NSMs coalescing within the Greens. Green socialists, eager to portray parliament as a tribune of the class struggle, delude themselves, since ‘it is well-known that the green Party is essentially supported by citizens – notably from the middle class’.74 The Greens should distance themselves, argued the ecolibs, from two authoritarian strands: biological ecologism and socialist Jacobinism. Green leaders should depart from the alternative ghetto, open up to the wider citizens’ movements and, based on essential and true dialogue, reclaim Green politics. The Green Party has its role, and the movements have theirs. The ecolibs saw ecological politics as ‘totally new politics’. The essence of this innovation lay in self-realisation, self-imposed limits on growth, exploitation and large-scale planning. Such self-awareness can only be achieved through dialogue, among the Greens’ grassroots, within the movements, with the established parties and the general public. The Greens must therefore, assume political responsibility for the electoral mandate and realise their political role democratically. Choosing the electoral path means choosing the democratic path. Democratic transformation, the ecolibs maintained, could only be achieved from within the system, through compromise, dialogue and reform. In ‘The Way to a Volkspartei’75 Schmidt and Hoplitschek, the principal ideologues of this current, and Hasenclever, further argued that given that the German democratic system had been imposed on the German people in 1949, it was the Greens’ role to generate a value-change, and create an open society which endorses democracy as a process. Politics, is not about realising visions; vision is dangerous in political daily activity, as German history shows only too well. The solutions to the ecological problems can be found in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The ecological crisis should therefore be taken as a learning process to be realised in a democratic way. The ‘Politics of Angst’ risk throwing out the democratic baby with the institutional bath water. It is the rigidity of German political institutions about which the Greens protest, but representative democracy is essential for the Green cause since the Greens are a conglomerate of minorities, seeking refuge from the State, and trying to convince the general public of its stake in an ecologically sustainable and socially just society. Citing Mill, the Ecolibs argue that the political institutions protect minorities from the wrongdoing of the majority and are therefore necessary for Green political action. How much politics is therefore needed? – ‘Only as much as necessary’. According to the ecolibs, the Greens are the only party with a radical understanding of political ecology, and they should actively try to become a people’s party in the genuine sense – taking care of people’s concerns,

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fulfilling the mandate they have received. Sharing in government is not an end in itself, but a pragmatic vehicle for transforming society and for forging a new political consensus around a new political culture. The only way to proceed is through reform and influence by persuasion. The success of politics is measured by witty slogans and self-indulging programmes, and actual political change.76 In contrast to the ecoradicals and ecolibs who were both organised on a federal level, publishing manifestos and magazines and developing their own fora, the Realists were formally established in 1986, and their views either emerge from the individual writings of Fischer, Schily, Wiesenthal and Kostede, or can be analysed via their political activity within the parliamentary faction; they were indeed political Macher rather than political statement-makers. Their political attitude resembles that of the ecolibs, in that they perceived a unique role for the German Green Party as a reform, democratic, minorities party, with responsibility for its electoral mandate and for generating social change from within the system. However, the State is a major vehicle for reform and redistribution, concurring with the ecolibs regarded as the illusion of the Left, namely that once political control is assumed societal reconstruction begins. The Realos could thus combine both the worldview of the New Left and the various movements with the political impetus of the ecolibs. The best examples of this combination are the ‘Programme for Reconstruction of the Industrial-system’, written by the parliamentary faction, and the record of the parliamentary faction’s activity, to which we now turn. Parliamentary realism Umbau der Industriegesellschaft (Reconstruction86) was an extrapolation of Work83 seeking to establish ‘Practical steps towards transcending unemployment, poverty and environmental destruction.’77 The programme, comprising 117 pages, provides ‘concrete and realisable answers to the constitutive problems in the economy and society …’, combining both the long-term perspective sought by the ecoradicals, and the concrete, realisable measures demanded by the ecolibs. Based on a critique of the ‘ruling relationships’, they incorporate proposals of the movements – workers, women, anti-nuclear, environmental – and integrate them into a comprehensive political programme. ‘We, Greens, promote with Reconstruction86 a concrete, realisable utopia.’ The programme is a mature plan for economic reconstruction built on the transformation of production to achieve an ecologically sustainable and humane work environment; decentralisation of production, technologies and energies and self-help, alternative projects emphasising community and individual self-fulfilment, and the feminist attempt to change the concept of work, protecting women from redundancy in paid work, and changing the concept of ‘private’ realms to that of a comprehensive lifeworld. Reconstruction86 has five sections

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setting out the range of the subject, the emphasis, the order of priorities and the scope of the reconstruction plan: 1. Securing the natural basis of life (air, water, soil). 2. Steps towards an ecological economy (agriculture, health, housing, transport, waste, energy, chemical time bomb, armaments, alternative research). 3. Steps towards a democratic and social economy (just distribution of labour between men and women, extending employment rights, abolishing the steel industry, encouraging working initiatives and responsible enterprises, regional construction, new media, education, and democratisation of the credit economy). 4. Steps toward social security and justice (reorientation of medicines, rights for the needy, children, humane pensions and basic income, equitable taxation). 5. Summary (what will reconstruction86 change? which actions are being used? how can the changes be financed?). Each of these sections has the same structure: a problem scheme; concepts of the old parties; alternative concepts; vehicles for reconstruction; outcomes. This demonstrates the political environment in which they wished to establish themselves. They sought to provide a systemic analysis and prove the applicability of Green ideas and the unitary framework which combined the three prevailing attitudes of the workers, the ecological and the women’s movements into a comprehensive plan of reconstruction. The focus remains on ‘reconstructable’ issues, and central questions relating to economy and society, such as crowded urban areas, services and business are not addressed. However, starting the reconstruction from the accessible loci, rather than from the ‘roots’, was a realist principle. It takes the logic of the system-approach and stands it on its head: it is precisely because the system is so complicated and interrelated, that there is no chance of one, comprehensive, holistic change. Transformation should therefore start from the system’s weakest points, on a variety of levels, gradually generating reconstruction.78 The other source which accounts for Green MPs’ perceptions is the record of their first parliamentary term in office, 1983–87. Thus, 31 per cent of bills tabled and 77 per cent of questions put to ministers were forwarded by the Greens, versus, 22 per cent and 6 per cent put by the coalition, and 39 per cent and 6 per cent put by the SPD, respectively. The inquiries related to environmental politics (air, atomic energy, chemical industries, waste); armaments, peace and international politics; Third World (developmental help, South Africa, ammunition export); German politics; domestic politics (citizens’ rights, minorities, ‘more democracy’ in environmental areas, compensation of the Nazi regime’s victims, punishment laws); transport; labour markets and agriculture.79 Of these, only one measure was legislated for – a ban on the import of sea turtles into Germany.80

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This record shows an attempt to deepen ecological awareness, described by Fischer as the major shift of the first Green decade, and to proceed beyond it to actual realisation of environmental politics.81 For that, argued Fischer, twofold radical ecological pragmatism is needed: radical internal goals but also radically undogmatic routes out of the crisis, involving political partnerships and coalitions.82 These two kinds of radicalism directly tackled ecoradical stances. While radical internal goals were reclaimed from the Fundis, the way to achieve radical change was through breaking away from the dogmatic ‘no alliance’ position. By forming flexible coalitions, using political means to materialise these radical demands, real radicalism persisted in the political context. Ecological pragmatism became a philosophical stance and coalition, with the SPD a Realo obsession.83 However, the monopoly of the ruling politics lay in actual decision-making, and in the monopoly over definitions (of limited values, risk, danger). Challenging the political order by democratising the public sphere, technocracy and science was an instrumental measure to facilitating the change.84 Thus, if the first stage on the way to ecological and social reconstruction was raising awareness of realms heretofore unpolitical, the second phase consisted of two complementary steps: ecological pragmatism manifested in the skilful handling of the available political means; simultaneously, democratising the rigid institutions of politics, society, economy which, together with research, would allow new ideas to be introduced. Public debate would generate a more accountable, sensitive, critical and open system. While the first phase of the Greens characterised them as a self-aware protest party, the 1983 electoral success motivated a renewed debate concerning the role of the party. While Fundis emphasised anti-parties’ party, opposition party and movement party, the Realos demanded parliamentary responsibility, division of labour between the movements and the party, and politics of reform aiming towards an ecologically sustainable and socially just society. Only after Chernobyl did the Fundis abandon the idea of an alternative majority, and reassess the Green project.

The Green project contested: Chernobyl and after The nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl which, ‘has taken the anti-nuclear movement out of the ghetto of the Left-alternative minority and planted it firmly in the majority of the population, even among CDU voters’85 was assumed to be the ecological disaster which would mobilise the population to support the Greens as the spearhead of an urgent ecological force for change. The majority of the population indeed converted, supporting the cessation of all nuclear power-stations, but a Green panacea was not found. Internal debate escalated, and ‘verbal radicalism’ mounted86 as ‘it is a rule of thumb for inner-party life of the Green party that the radical currents are at their strongest when they can feel at their back the wind of social

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protest and mobilisation, while the reformists have their day when what is at stake is the party’s existence in parliament’.87 In the Hannover BDK (1986), radical contributions to the Bundestagplatform of 1987 (GE87) were added, in which NATO was denounced as ‘an alliance of war’. Resolutions calling for the immediate shutdown of all nuclear power-stations and condemnations of the SPD, demanding an end to the coalition, were passed.88 Vollmer’s proposal, refraining from stating preconditions for a coalition, was accepted and left the door open for post-election BDK discussion, thus preventing the SPD from capturing Green votes, by accusing the Greens of assuming a non-cooperative stance. Furthermore, the spirit of the programme, accepted the Greens as a fixture of the German political system, providing the party with a new self-image.89 While the Greens went on to gain 7.5 per cent in the federal election, the dream of an alternative-majority mobilised by an ecological catastrophe had to be abandoned. The Fundis’ attitude was: ‘if the majority of voters remained too stupefied (verdummt) to see the light even after Chernobyl, that was hardly the fault of the enlightened few’.90 The Green project had to be reconsidered. Vanguardism: Left or radical or ecological? The illusion of an alternative majority was now gone and the ideological currents were forced to rethink their positions: what did they see as the Green project and where did they place the Greens within the ideological spectrum of the political parties in the FRG? The events hardly influenced the ecosocialists: for them the Green project remained, to subsist as a radical-Left vanguard party engaged in the public debate and ideologically committed to ecosocialism. Hoping to attract the workers’ movement by offering a better deal than the SPD, the ecosocialists sought to enlighten and attract workers away from the consumerist ethos. Reduction in production levels, required on ecological grounds, coincided with gaining better employment conditions for workers. The Marxist alliance between workers and enlightened middle-class intellectuals was reinstated. For the ecoradicals, the choice was harder. Their trust had been in the new social movements. The renewal of the anti-nuclear movement strengthened their identity as a movement-party and, giving up on the alternative majority, they sought a party attentive to its base. Their image of the Greens was as a loose coalition of ‘the movements’ – feminism, Third World, Peace, ecology – which the party represented in parliament, while seeking a longterm perspective which would radicalise the political debate, while work went on at the grassroots level to mobilise political activism, influence the political culture and generate transformation from below. For the ecofundis ‘self-righteous 7 per cent sectarianism’91 provided the answer. Kelly explained in 1990 that ‘my wish has always been for the Greens to have four or five themes, which they pursue with no compromise,

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even if they do not receive more than 7 or 8% … if the Greens…succeed in abolishing our army, then I am happier with the 8% than with the 20% who are for the small reform of NATO. The Greens do not need a limitless majority which does not lead out of the ecological crisis, their task is to remain the vanguard of an ecological, pacifist transformation.’92 Green appeal was to affected people, ecologically aware and beyond the Left/Right, poor/rich, North/South divides, as the debate transcended political interests and constituted a Gattungsfrage in which all people have equal stake. This vision of an open party, beyond Left and Right was close in sentiment to the ecolibs, as Hülsberg somewhat cynically maintained: ‘The leaders of this current, Ernest Hoplitschek and Thomas Schmidt, had always wanted an orientation towards the farmers and the Catholics who, in their view, had voted CDU/CSU not because of the latter’s programme but because of the hope and security they promised.’93 Hülsberg’s analysis, pertains to a class-based view of society. The Green project, as the ecolibs saw it, could transcend the class-struggle. ‘The Gattungsfrage vs. the classquestion: wealth can be redistributed, the radioactive fallout of Chernobyl knows no classes.’94 Kretschmann further argued that decentralisation and ‘small is beautiful’ were never the leitmotif of the Left.95 Despite the departure of large segments of the value-conservative and anthroposophist wing of the party, the Greens’ programmatic core defined it as a Left project. He therefore concludes: ‘The Greens are not a Left party, they are a new project, neither Left nor Right, a project that pursues new questions, raises old and new, mixes anew left and conservative positions.’ However, he clarifies, we are ‘Left’ inasmuch as we want to solve ecological questions in social and democratic ways.96 For the ecolibs, the distinct Green feature, and the potential to expand support, were embedded in the nature of the ecological question. They hoped to appeal to the new middle classes and the hitherto ‘unpolitical’ strata which needed to be organised and become politically active.97 However, part of the purpose of this politicisation, is to allow diversification, decentralisation, politicisation of everyday life, that is, ‘anarchism’, which can only be advanced via political reformism, and communalisation of power. The Greens would replace the FDP as the third force of German politics: they are ‘the heir of liberalism’.98 Since the Greens played an important role in combating the comprehensive crisis, slogans that simply denounced the death of the forests, the exploitation of the Third World or which demanded meaningful, humane work would not be enough. It is a social plan which has to be developed and implemented, and this cannot be achieved by a 5 per cent party:99 The supporters base should at least be 15%, better 20–25% of the votes. It is only with such support in the population that the Greens will be able to carry through their claim to ecologically-oriented reorganisation

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in core areas of economy and society, to acquire credibility in the public domain and to influence their ruling-partner.100 Thus, for the ecolibs, the Green project centred on the ecological question, using poignancy and urgency of ecological politics to transform Germany into an open, democratic society, in which freedom and citizens’ rights are observed, and decentralisation of power and structures achieved. It is a new party, given the new Green questions transcending sectarian interests and affecting everyone. The historical innovation of the Greens lay in that ‘for the first time a politics is forwarded that self-consciously seeks to dismantle its own power’101 and self-imposed restrictions upon its own economic growth. Green politics rely heavily upon the notion of democracy as a dialogue, and politics as an ongoing learning process in which discussions are crucial in raising awareness and penetrating heretofore unpolitical segments, enabling a reformistic implementation of the Green project. ‘The Ecolibs wanted to see the Green Party at the political centre of a new politics.’102 Ideological eclecticism – Weltanschauung eclipsed? The Realos’ conceptual analysis agrees with the ecolib view that the Greens’ project marks a new advent in human history necessitating, selbsterhaltende Vernunft – self-preserving reason.103 However, whereas the ecolibs believed ecological politics to be a new project resonating from self-preserving reason, namely the democratically pursued project of ecological sustainability, the Realos had a broader ideological commitment, stemming from a critique of the inheritance of the Left of which they feel a part. Fischer anchors the immanent gap between radical idealism and pragmatic reformism within the Left in the Marxist idea of the proletariat. The concept of the working class is the centrepiece of radical socialists’ ideology, rather then flesh and blood workers. The latter are mainly interested in small improvements in their conditions, alas, the ecological crisis requires fundamental changes. The prospect of gradual progress achieved by better technological exploitation of nature is no longer viable.104 The consumer revolution has caused the bourgeoisification of the workers, thus placing more pressure on the limited resources of the earth. It has also led to universalisation and homogenisation, crushing other cultures and traditions.105 The Greens were conceived as a vehicle to combat these two faces of the consumer revolution – the relentless exploitation of resources through growth-politics due to ignorance of Earth’s finitude, and the homogenising impact of consumerism. The Green project addresses this dual challenge, recaptured here mainly through Fischer’s analysis. First, environmentally destructive growth-politics leaves humanity only one choice: self-imposed limits on growth, population and exploitation. Otherwise, natural population explosion and destruction of resources

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threaten all nations. Socialism has constituted itself on a vision of utopia, especially a technological utopia, which, after the realisation of the limits of natural resources and Chernobyl, became outmoded. The realism of survival comes to bear, in the face of a vanished utopian vision, self-preserving reason becomes the only viable route for a sustainable future. The project of the future Left must be to circumscribe power and fight for the just distribution of life chances.106 This can only be achieved by the principle of freedom, tolerance and peace, the principle of equality, and social justice. The principles of democracy and human rights are its core principles.107 ‘The reason for self-preservation is the reason for disenchanted (entzauberten) modernity after the end of utopia’ this is Realism.108 Second, the effects of homogeneity, uniformity and conformity produced by consumerism proved formative for the Greens with a twofold vengeance. The effects of material society, characterised by globalisation, universalisation and mass culture oriented to consumer goods, had brought about the not-so-‘Silent Revolution’ of the 1960s, the forebear of the Greens, with its anti-materialist, anti-imperialist and nonconformist tendencies. This received another twist in the German context, where high-culture and highpolitics were always guarded from wide participation; it developed an ‘alternative culture’ outside mainstream politics. ‘Modell Deutschland’ embodied the unity of the people, whose extreme, perverted form had gained expression under Nazism. Postwar statehood maintained order and uniformity through the mechanisms of power and the institutions, although a mild form of pluralisation had developed.109 Thus, in the FRG, economic growth and consumerism provided a substitute for political choice and participatory democracy. Hence the diversity of the Greens’ roots in the FRG (the APO – the ecological and peace movements; the radical, alternative subculture of the large cities; and the citizens’ movements with their concern for quality of life issues)110 was both a contingent historical fact induced by the 5 per cent clause, and an ideological stance. Diversity, pluralism and radicality were German Green philosophical principles, emerging against a background of ‘Modell Deutschland’, but addressing the deeper grievances of German politics. According to Fischer ‘All the many tendencies, factions, regions, persons and genders bitterly fought over interparty power and identity restricting themselves and uniting only out of electoral necessity.’111 To the Realos, the Greens represented a party of minorities in a country where the fortunes of minorities had been especially bleak at the time of the tragic and barbaric extermination of the Jews.112 The party’s task is to represent minorities in the political and parliamentary reality: ‘The Green minorities’ party is an expression of the tradition of the New Left and its subculture. I find it right and valuable that this party, left of the SPD will also take its own, parliamentary, form.’113 Transformation is possible only by creating an alternative coalition with the SPD. It is a party of minorities (as opposed

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to a ‘protest party’ defined by what it is against – the system – instead of what it is for), which tries to generate and legitimate a plurality of cultures, ways of life and production to achieve a new consensus from below, one that is guided by self-preserving reason. But is it a Weltanschauungpartei? Is there any greater coherence beyond the representation of pluralism and the implementation of ecological politics? Fischer has reservations: ‘The Weltanschauung question should be resolved on a few general consensus points.’114 Helmut Wiesenthal, a leading Realo, and a social scientist of the Bielefeld school, outlined a complex view of socio-political reality which explains why this is the case: Given both the multiplicity and the individual peculiarities (particularity) of the conflicts, the emergence of identical protagonists who can be ‘unified’ across what would seem to be all conflicts and issues, is an impossibility.115 Hence, there is a readiness to act, but given that the ‘participants only ever participate in the totality of the conflicts in a specific and partial way’, there is no unified plan for comprehensive social change which can radicalise a homogeneous part of the public (say, a class) and form a unified Weltanschauung. Moreover, a ‘change yourself’ approach is always associated with changing one aspect of one’s identity in regard to the specific conflict or issue at stake. ‘What remains therefore is merely the existing preferences for specific rejections and concrete ‘utopias’, that is to say for multiple but particularised conflicts.’116 Thus, in contrast to the labour/ capital gap which can create internal unity, a defined enemy and a recognised ‘system’, the new conflicts are diverse, scattered around the social economic and political systems and do not affect the same people, in the same way, at the same time. Recognising the Green’s political need to produce continuity between particularised conflicts, and to highlight the goal common to all movements, Wiesenthal reluctantly singles out the threesome of preservation– emancipation–lifestyle.117 He argues that grassroots democracy and the vision of socialist institutions regarding power and distribution (the latter serves as a working definition of what is ‘Left’), are instrumental, rather than ends in themselves. Pluralism – given the multiplicity of specific issues, their unequal evolution and the heterogeneity of social activists – is a precondition for Green existence. Internal pluralism and external openness are imperatives, but they also constitute problems for the Greens as a party. The overall aim in transforming the system should be the creation of qualitatively better possibilities for action, opening windows of opportunity, providing additional choices in shaping the individual and collective life and moulding living conditions in accordance with ecological preservation and social emancipation.118 The strategy is a division of labour between

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the movements and the party, each functioning in a different environment – civil society and parliamentary politics respectively. Abandoning the ideals of ‘total change’, revolution and fighting the State, implies a multifarious strategy of pragmatic challenges, judged on the merits of the individual case; the Greens channel serving to set conflicts upon the parliamentary table. Wiesenthal’s view demands further scrutiny.

A Green project? Theoretical implications Wiesenthal’s analysis takes a strategic view accounting for the plurality of the conflicts and the partiality of the participants in issue-oriented politics, and stressing the impossibility of shaping the issues underlying these conflicts into a cohesive creed. Ideologically, an alternative pattern is emerging whereby new, disadvantaged groups respond to grievances manifested in disparate aspects of the advanced industrial democratic system. Two factors interplay: the changing structures of the labour market and their effects on foreign workers, women, unemployed people, the underclass and nature; and the rigid institutionalisation processes of the political organs once set for ensuring democracy, for example, power accumulation and centralisation, dominant economic and political elites, expertocracy, bureaucracy and parties’ monopoly characterise such institutionalisation. A peculiar feature of the latter in a Parteienstaat is that, given the dominance of the labour/capital divide in shaping the political ideological spectrum, other aspects of people’s identities – which cut across the economic dimension – remain latent and receive no political representation. Thus, the ‘new’ conflicts typically pertain to women, minorities, elderly people, parents, students, foreign workers, the Third World, sexual minorities, disabled people and so on – that is, social constituencies excluded from the political game whose concerns remain unaddressed. There had been a violation of the fundamental function of political parties, namely, aggregating concerns, thereby facilitating rationalisation and prioritisation, and providing a delicate balance between giving people a say and ensuring the professional handling of politics. A new balance therefore had to be negotiated. The groups sensitive to this array of grievances were the educated middle classes demanding, on behalf of the disadvantaged, working rights, solidarity, just redistribution of resources and wealth, a curb to growth and ecological reconstruction. In the process, they embodied a change of the political culture itself, demanding decentralisation of power, democratisation, and participatory democracy. In short, the criterion of ‘exploitation’ was removed from the class quarters and to other areas of the complex socio-economic polity. The task involved drawing political attention to these latent issues, thereby politicising them, enshrining these changes in laws and ensuring their implementation in praxis. The most comprehensive account, providing the Green ideology with cohesiveness, was that of

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the Realists, encompassing all currents belonging to the Green ideological spectrum within one ideological frame. The Realos firmly believed that the Green project was not confined to ecological politics, but related to a transformation of the domination relations, and was concerned with the exploited and disadvantaged groups within advanced industrial democracies. The ‘Left’ aspect was its adaptation of the post-Marxist project of incorporating the exploited into the struggle of the enlightened strata; its pursuit of a material historical analysis to account for the exploitation; its exposure of the latent forms of domination in ideology, language and practice and its control over political structures to correct centralised forms of power and enable a more decentralised, democratic and self-fulfilling life within the communities. This Green project also had a peculiarly German aspect to it, seeking to be a minorities party and to recapture political liberalism, with updating which included provisions for ecological sustainability and social justice. Since its main impetus was to celebrate diversity, different ways of life and self-fulfilment of the individual within supportive communities, it was estranged from the old Left, though not from young Marxist sentiments of collectivism, unions and capitalised struggle (against the State, Capital, the System). It was the New Left, inasmuch as progressive politics of reform with an interplay of social justice and freedom of the individual are indeed Left. Ideologically it is crucial to understand that the Realos provided a comprehensive perspective on the Green ideological spectrum, while other currents stressed specific parts of this spectrum. The overriding principle of the Realos was transformation of the relations of domination within the FRG. The Ecosocialists were more concerned, within that spectrum, with the workers; the New Left with the NSMs; the Ecoradicals with the environment; the Ecolibs with minorities. They all participated in the same ideological project, but prioritised different aspects. Consequently, Realo’s priorities were unclear – were the environment, discriminated groups, minorities or women, the main priority? This chapter has explicated a unique phenomenon within Green ideology: it described the diverse spectrum of Green ideas with regard to alternative groups, an alternative approach to economics and a different kind of politics. Each ideological current was shown to hold a unique perspective on these issues. Furthermore, the overall continuum of Green ideas represents a significant shift from the traditional ideas regarding these issues, and constitutes an alternative Green spectrum. On the subject of economic growth, four different attitudes were introduced: the Greens favoured strengthening the workers’ movements to change the priorities of the current system; those who call for an alternative work structure, to shift the economy’s focus away from the destructive, growth-oriented culture and provide an ecologically friendly job market; feminists rejected the very centrality of work-ethos in life, suggesting the

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alternative concept of lifeworld in which self-realisation is not centred upon work, but the community; and finally, those who think that the Greens should influence the government to reject the free-market by which it abides, and to change the markets by working politically through the mechanisms of the current system. While each of these attitudes projects a different way of tackling the economy, together they form an alternative approach which in effect shifts the focus away from a growth-oriented to a sustainable economy, by changing the very perceptions on which the system relies and questioning its premises. The diversity within Green attitudes actually generates an alternative spectrum of ideas and therefore shifts the terms of the debate. As Fischer claimed, ‘the Centrists have always been the Realists’.119 This is true in terms of the internal dynamics of the Greens, and of the ideological spectrum. The Green project emerges, as a hybrid of updated Marxism and updated liberalism. Content-wise, the Greens broadened the concept of exploitation from class to embrace other disenfranchised groups. Simultaneously the Greens reclaimed political liberalism, expanding it into social and environmental spheres lacking in the original version of classical liberalism. The different ideological currents have distinctive features: a configuration of political concepts, an idea as to what the Green project should be, and a specific support base. However, as the discussion of economics has demonstrated, while fundamental differences exist among the currents, a distinct and different Green perspective emerges, which nevertheless constitutes a clear, distinctly Green orientation, different from that of other parties. The ideological clusters cohabiting in the Greens seem to have diversified following the institutionalisation of the party as a fixture in German politics. The disparate images of opposition party (Ecofundis), radical-Left vanguard party (Ecosocialists), movement-party (Ecoradicals), ecological politics party (Ecolibs) and minorities party (Realos) amount to strategic differences among different currents. The analysis suggests that beyond the strategic divisions, the Green project itself, and the role and identity of the Greens as a collective political actor, were at stake.

7 Politics: Consolidating a Green Niche in the New Germany

A theory of ideology? An interim assessment While 1979–83 was characterised by a process of conversion, 1983–89 clearly entails a diversification process, producing several ideological clusters which differed on prime political questions, such as the relationship to capitalism, the role of the party and the way to realise ecological change. Moreover, it seems as if each of these ideological currents developed its own ‘modular ideology’ – as in the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, modular ideologies seeming to multiply and a plethora of these ideologies emerging from the analysis. Thus, while ecofundis perceive the array of new political issues as constituting Green ideology (for example, global ecological crisis; the Third World; hierarchical domination), the ecosocialists and ecoradicals see a host of movements as coalescing within the Greens (workers, women, ecological, anti-nuclear movements). Ecolibs think rather of diverse citizens’ initiatives and decentralised, local projects which compose the Green vision while the Realos conceive of disadvantaged groups and exploited subjects (minorities, foreign workers, women, nature) as Green consistencies. Can a Green ideology be said to sustain these diverse, conflicting ideological clusters? The first thing to note is that in each of these Green visions, the core concepts which comprise the ideological frame still hold: respect for others, pluralism, tolerance and the primacy of ecology are constitutive of them all. This strengthens the viability of the theoretical framework of Green ideologies presented in this discussion, and also the double-layered structure of the ideology. First an ideological frame which accommodates a number of different ideological clusters and proves instructive for the theory of Green ideologies. Second, the incompatibility between the different ideological currents with its complex form of overlapping and interwoven differences. This allows internal flexibility and ad hoc coalitions to be forged on different issues. Thus, whereas on subjects such as using the market economy to generate ecological change, Realos and ecolibs might forge a coalition, the Realos might support the ecosocialists’ 144

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demand to fight for the rights of the workers. On other issues, for example, women’s quotas, the right to asylum and anti-racist policies, all Greens converge. The internal pluralism and the variety of opinions thus provide room for an internal dynamic and guarantee the viability of the Party. Third, the fact that Green energies were applied both to the grassroots level and to different parliamentary and international levels provided enough room for a variety of activities in which people could engage, depending on their beliefs. It is little wonder that as a general rule, Realos dominated the Bundestag faction, ecosocialists – the federal executive and ecofundis – the city squares. The structure of an ideological framework which sustains different ideological currents is substantiated. Each of these currents has its own distinct configuration of concepts and beliefs, each stressing different issues, conflicts or views. Each of these currents nonetheless adheres to the overall ideological framework of the shared core concepts. This does not preclude the possibility that individual currents will differ in the internal configuration of their political concepts. For example, the primacy of ecology might be ranked second in ecosocialist strategic thinking (taking elevation of poverty as a precondition for ecological sustainability). Likewise, the interpretation of the same concepts varied. All Green currents share a historical analysis and a social vision of a more democratic, decentralised, socially just and ecologically sustainable society. Moreover, the shared perceptions regarding German society were so deep, that even in the height of the internal political paralysis that gripped the Fundis and the Realos in the late 1980s, they still forged an electoral programme which presented a clear ideological position and an important political and moral stance against the dark side of German democracy by adapting the social fabric to the processes of immigration and social diversification. Within the German political system, the Greens came to occupy the niche of the critics and justice fighters of the establishment. Their internal struggles could not overshadow the viability of their collective political identity in the German context, as they fulfilled a role conspicuously lacking in the political culture since the Weimar Republic. This chapter is dedicated to this dimension of Green identity. It traces the Fundis–Realos paralysis, the Green response to German unification and the consolidation phase, post-1992, highlighting the niche they carved out for themselves in the reunited FRG.

Programmatic unity, strategic paralysis and undogmatic breakthrough Federal Elections 1987 – Farbe bekennen The programme for the 1987 elections (GE87), known as ‘Colour Declared’, presented Germans with a stark choice with respect to the grey areas of

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German society. GE87 contained six sections, starting with a preamble calling, in the wake of Chernobyl, for a redefinition of what ‘normal life’ is, and alluding to the Green take-over of the FDP’s traditional role as human rights advocate. The other five parts were: democracy and rights, women’s programme, internationalism, unilateral disarmament, and ecology, economy, society.1 This shift of emphasis towards a strong profile as a socialjustice party was to dominate Green politics in the changing German environment well into the 1990s and would establish the role of the Greens firmly as defenders of the rights of minorities in face of growing levels of racial disquiet, immigration, asylum seekers and Neo-Fascism. Tellingly, by taking up the issue of human rights, the Greens sought to complement institutional rights with social practices, and thereby eliminate the manifestations of practical discrimination that lurk beneath perfectly sound legal rights. It was a lesson learnt from institutional liberalism and the experience of the women’s movement. Democracy could only materialise by securing social rights as well, for example, employment rights, building up democratisation based on open, active and direct participation on the grassroots level and by the reintroduction of referenda.2 GE87 lengthily addresses the development of the right-wing ideology, racism, fascism, anti-Semitism and hatred of minorities that are entrenched in German politics, as exemplified by the fact that former Nazi officials were reincorporated into public office in the FRG. The Greens, a selfprofessed anti-fascist party, perceive themselves in the role of reminding Germans of their Nazi past, in carrying on the resistance to fascism and in confronting racism.3 However, social defence is broader than that. The Greens advocate rights for disabled people, asylum-seekers, immigrants, gays and lesbians. In a combative Women’s Programme entitled We Want It All!, the Greens call for a society free from gender discrimination, domination, women’s subordination, violence and the sexual division of labour. They propound meaningful work, self-determination of the individual – treating women as individuals not as wives, mothers or family-carriers – and self-determination of lifestyles. Advocating 50 per cent quotas for women in politics, they highlight the Green Feminat – the all-women parliamentary faction of the Greens in the Bundestag. GE87 ‘Greenism’ declares itself in its distinctive German profile, coming out of the exclusively ecological closet to open up an ideological niche which they see as long awaited in German politics. The global ecological crisis, the Greens argue, is not an inevitable fate, but an economically induced crisis, to do with agricultural and industrial policies. GE87 presents a very distinct ideological plan in terms of human and minorities rights, social equality, ecological sustainability and global economic considerations. By broadening Green discourse to embrace progressive areas of the polity, GE87 provides a strong anchor for liberal ideas, detached from economic liberalism, but with an emphasis on individual self-fulfilment.

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While requiring state intervention in matters of legal rights, ecological regulation, and redistribution by progressive taxes, it seeks to devolve power back to the communities, and to decentralise, democratise and empower individuals. This would result in a more participatory democracy, sensitive to minorities, and enlightened in its social policies. However, before a smoother political practice of such a complex interactive process could be positively carried through, the exclusionist elements within the primarily Fundis factions of the Greens had to depart. Indeed, the crisis which dominated the late 1980s and paralysed the Greens could have conceivably ended in a split rather than a consolidation.4 The course of events brought another phase of exclusion, reshuffling and consolidation in the aftermath of the Realos–Fundis paralysis. Blockade with no breakthrough The favourable results of the 1987 federal election, left the Greens with 7.5 per cent of the vote but yet again fell short of a SPD-Greens’ majority. This gave rise to a renewed struggle between the Fundis and the Realos. The word ‘split’ dominated Green internal discourse and they have virtually ceased to function as a party, due to a grassroots revolt against the leadership’s discursive warfare, waged on the back of the membership.5 In view of the paralysis, a group centred around former pastor, Antje Vollmer, incorporating Greens of all currents, organised itself into a third, middle current. The Aufbruch ’88 (A88) manifesto opens: ‘the Greens are in a crisis. This crisis is not like the others. The period of first love between society and the Greens is over. Surprising election results, dramatic environmental catastrophes or a short-term moratorium of the struggle in the wings will not ‘save’ us this time.’6 In contrast to other ideological currents, A88 clearly had one aim in mind, that of creating a middle group to ‘disarm’ the Greens’ two blocs. Their principles were explained by Vollmer in the 1988 Perspectives Congress in Bonn: We must overcome the bloc-logic in the Greens. We are trying to build a magnet-field for the unity of the party … We acknowledge that we need in our group people from many different currents in order to bring together this current. We neither are nor understand ourselves to be a junior partner of the Realos, nor as the illegitimate bastard of the Fundis. We have another picture of ourselves which is: we must find a new roof for the four green pillars.7 Resurrecting the four Green pillars – in particular, the attempt to revoke ecological thinking as the constitutive feature of the Greens – had clearly to do with attempting a strategic breakthrough away from the bloc-paralysis. Vollmer became ‘the Greens’ mother’,8 and A88 a weak third force within the party, providing stabilisation without any breakthrough since, despite

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seeking ‘democratisation from below’, they lacked a structural base within the party.9 While after 1990 A88 often aligned itself with the Realos, thereby losing its neutrality, another, less pretentious attempt, provided the needed breakthrough. The Left Forum anti-dogmatism prevails, the Party survives In the aftermath of the 1987 federal and state elections, the self-professed non-dogmatic Left of the Greens established the ‘Left Forum’ in 1988.10 In their first manifesto, Linken Forum campaigned against A88’s initiative of mixing the programmes of the party’s three wings. It explained that such a move would simply mean a compromise among the leaders of the currents – without genuinely mobilising the entire party base.11 Unlike A88, the Left Forum constituted an ideological opposition to the Realos tendency to be, what Fischer saw as an ‘ecological citizens’ rights party’,12 seeking instead to be a Left Green project. As was noted in Linken Forum, ‘the answer of the socialist left was: system-relativisation, reform politics and an ecological mass movement’.13 Their strategic innovation was their readiness to judge coalition and political cooperation, as well as reform politics, on the merits of the concrete issues, rather than adopting the stance of a blanket refusal.14 Ludgar Volmer, Left Forum Promi and an elected speaker of the Greens, exposed the differences concerning the role of the State. Realists believe that the state guarantees the general good and therefore that state reforms in themselves can humanise society.15 This, Volmer argues, drives Realos to present tactical considerations as ideology, and to withdraw from a radical ecological change into the management of ecological catastrophes from within the current political structures. The Fundis, on the other hand, merely stick to their ‘truth’ and reject any political compromise.16 In contrast, the undogmatic Left perceives the state as more closely connected with economic interests and therefore social forces are seen as the ultimate base for transformation. However, the only way forward is to broaden the Green base, both conceptually and in terms of mobilisation. What Volmer advocated was to transform the Greens from an opposition party into a concept party by revising the contents, rejecting the SPD’s ideological poverty and allowing the expansion of the Green niche by making the Greens a ‘system-critic concept party’.17 Notably, this characterisation was quite similar to that adopted by Realos. The two differences lie in their attitude toward the state, therefore their critique, and on the issues of providing resources and maintaining the links with the movement. Thus, the difference was a practical, rather than a theoretical one. This Left-wing agenda provided a clearer alternative to the Realos project; by distancing themselves from the uncompromising strategy of the Fundis, the way for the Green Left to achieve a constructive influence on German politics was opened. It was against this agenda that the Realos Manifesto, ‘To Be or Not to Be’ was conceived.

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‘To be or not to be’ – if need be, what? The Realos manifesto of June 1988 sees the Green role within the German political scene as one of advancing the debate on environmental destruction, unemployment and peace by presenting a radical democratic profile, addressing Germany’s Nazi past and by reinforcing the concepts of rights and reforms.18 The Greens tackle questions of ecological politics, democracy, the industrial system, work, education and culture, German history, peace and foreign policy, democracy and republicanism, and reflect a distinctly feminist profile.19 The Greens therefore play an indispensable role in the German political system, as a major catalyst of change and as an advocator of minorities and human rights. To escape the Fundis–Realos paralysis, the Realos advocate dividing political activity between the movements and the party. The party, the Realos argue, is not merely a leftof-the-SPD party, but a coalition centred round the primacy of ecology as a Gattungsfrage, the commitment to heterogeneous lifestyles and the dialogue-based relationship to society. In short, the Greens are an ecological reform party,20 for which the opening up of the Greens to new ideas and new members is essential. Thus, the ideological map of Green currents adjusted itself in the wake of the Fundis–Realos controversy. On the radical–moderate axis, the spectrum included the Ecofundis, Ecoradicals, Left Forum, Realos, A88 and the Ecolibs. However, the most radical change which was to shake both the foundations of the Greens and German society was the reunification of the two Germanies to which we now turn.

The writing on the falling wall: the decline and rise of Green-cum-Germanness The Green project, this book has maintained, is as much about German politics as about ecological conduct. During the 1980s, the Greens had an invaluable influence on the political agenda, by changing not only the issues, but the perception of what is political, and by reshaping the public landscape of the Federal Republic. The signs of Green change can be seen in the public agenda of the FRG, in the Greening of the programmes of the established parties, in increased numbers of women in political positions, and in the change of climate in the media. The Greens have come to occupy a distinct ideological niche which strongly resonates from their programmes. In this respect, the 1990 federal election platform (GE90) forms a direct continuation of the 1989 European election manifesto (EU89). Against European New Nationalism (EU89) Under ‘Europe – Nightmare and Dream’ the Greens write: The historical achievement with which the European continent has ‘gladdened’ humanity in the past century consists especially of developing

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worldwide forms of domination, oppression and exploitation … In the 20th century the destructive wars in human history started in Europe. Germany’s striving for world power was in both world-wars the driving force … The expansionist politics of the EC remains … a threat and a burden to the peoples of the world.21 The threats of war, the worsening of work conditions, unemployment, uncontrolled social and ecological outcomes, discrimination against women and threats to private ways of life are all listed as the nightmarish scenario of the then EC. The Greens certainly portray themselves as the principal champions of the oppressed, exploited and disadvantaged in the political, economic, social, ecological and international arenas. In a fierce attack on the common market they declared: ‘We reject a Europe that practices through the common market world-power politics. A new nationalistic ideology is being mapped as well’.22 ‘A Europe for Peace and Democracy from Below’ states: The Greens reject a ‘European nationalism’ as well as keeping-out the so-called ‘Third World immigration’ … The Greens advocate instead international solidarity with the countries of the Third World, and the idea of a multicultural democratic society. Borders must be open for people and ideas.23 Launching a swingeing attack on the liberalisation of the single-market on the grounds of ecological protection (‘environmental pollution knows no borders’), workers’ rights, the threat to livelihood, homogenisation of cultures, the imperilment of weaker strata and deepening exploitation of the Third World, the Greens clearly sought to separate political liberalism from economic liberalism, implicitly discrediting FDP infighting over the liberal niche. Instead they advocated a ‘house of Europe’ which would enact ecological regulation and taxation, where the emphasis would be on democracy from below – stressing the idea of Europe of the regions – and where human rights policies would be implemented. The Greens were ‘against the levelling of the European common market, against the economic-growth ideology, for strengthening the rights of the regions, for an ecological, solidaristic and radical-democratic politics’.24 Against the New Nationalism (GE90) The 1990 Federal Election Manifesto for the reunified Germany takes issue with discrimination, inequality, poverty, unjust distribution of public wealth, ecological exploitation and subordination of women. It unequivocally condemns discrimination against immigrants and refugees, particularly in respect of German citizenship laws. Moreover, the Greens clearly called for the second step in the process of Greening German environmental

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politics: while all political parties had by this time copied environmental slogans and policies from the Greens, this merely rhetorical adaptation has done nothing to change the real world. GE90 distinguished between environmental protection and the causes of the ecological crisis, namely the economic politics which needed addressing.25 They demanded a comprehensive and radical rethinking of the reasons underlying the ecological crisis, a restructuring of the production processes, and the modification of the socio-political concept. The first section of GE90 relates to ecology, which regained its primacy in GE90: ‘With every pollution cost, with every landscape, every species that becomes extinct, a little piece of human quality of life also dies; with every dead tree our experience-world, our life is also impoverished.’26 Substantial effort was given to explaining the greenhouse effect, the depletion of Ozone in the atmosphere, global warming and the measures needed to overcome them. The programme has six sections: ecology, peace, work and social justice, women’s politics, democracy and rights and internationalism. Note that GE90 was the Green manifesto for the gesamtdeutschen Wahl – the all-German election. Curiously, in all its 40 pages, there was only one paragraph which specifically referred to this fact: The German federal government has only one offer: not social utopia, not humane solidarity and help, no sincere engagement in the solution of the immanent problems, but only the obscene persuasive force of the DM with which the (government) shamelessly pursues the GDR and the other transitional societies of the former ‘Eastern bloc’ in the pose of a pimp to prostitution, that is, to surround and sell themselves. This naked Machtpolitik reality is, therefore, swearing by the empty, chauvinistic phrase ‘one people and one fatherland’.27 ‘… We talk about the weather’ – cloud-cuckoo-land revisited The Greens’ electoral slogan in 1990 was ‘Everybody talks about Germany, we talk about the weather.’ The bold avoidance of the issue on the German agenda was anything but coincidental. On the face of it, the reason for this seems straightforward enough: the issues on which the Greens campaigned, and on which a distinct Green political profile was constituted – ecology, peace, work and social justice, women’s politics, democratic rights and internationalism – comprise a post-material cluster, completely devoid of the issues of national and economic unification, the ‘old politics’ materialist agenda par excellence. As it was noted: ‘… the breaching of the wall, and the rapid psychological transition from ‘Wir sind das Volk’ to ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ left the Greens (West) on the wrong side of history’.28 However the analysis is somewhat more complex. The Green project was a critical re-examination of the German question, openly contesting the silent generations and the legacy of Nazi Germany. It sought to make the

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imposed democratic laws a genuine feature of German political culture. As the fiercest critic of the federal-republic, the Greens were also a distinct product of it: ‘By generation, outlook, spirit, behaviour, total habitus (sociology of membership, structure of organisation, programmatic outlook) the Greens were completely bundesrepublikanisch.’29 It was a declared minorities’ party seeking reform and a new vision for Germans, one which politicised the private and the social, one of politics in the first person. It was a politics of identity, if decisively not a politics of national identity. Alas, the Green writing on the wall, inasmuch as it was internationalist, justiceseeking and critical of German history, needed the Wall as part of its identity. The Berlin Wall blocked the national dream and was a constitutive part of the new German identity. Thus, the ‘truth is that to most Greens, being a quintessential creation of the Federal Republic, the GDR had over the years become a foreign land … the legitimacy of the GDR as a country was never in doubt in the Federal Republic’s green and social democratic milieux. As such, the GDR was just another German-speaking country like Austria.’30 The Greens’ disgust with the ‘one people in one fatherland’ is hardly surprising. The portrayal of the government’s attempt to buy the GDR by offering them the Deutsche Mark, symbolic national unification and an extension of the FRG eastward to engulf the former GDR, justified Green abhorrence of Machtpolitik completely. Throughout the years the Greens helped GDR dissidents, expressed solidarity, adopted German dissidents (Bahro is only one example) and encouraged protest and peace movements on the other side of the wall.31 They consistently advocated two Germanies freed from the power-blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They therefore called for an independent GDR with possible federal links with the FRG. It was only natural for the Greens to reject the abrupt, colonising imperialism of the other FRG parties towards their GDR counterparts. In a symbolic gesture, they decided, after it became clear that reunification would go ahead, to form an alliance with their Eastern counterpart a day after the election.32 The decision had fatal consequences, as the Greens received 4.8 per cent in the West and 6 per cent in the East.33 Had they united a day before the elections, they would have conjointly received over 5.1 per cent and 40 seats in the all-German Bundestag. In the event, the East German Alliance90’ entered the detested centre of power with eight new members while the (West) Greens found themselves outside the walls of the new Bundestag.

Dissidents – once and for all? Just as the Greens carried the birthmarks of a young collective political actor conceived within an industrially advanced, politically institutionalised and culturally homogenising political culture (naturally, as a rebellion

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against these features), so did the dissident community of the GDR, which was conceived against the Communist regime. The different strands of this community coalesced within Alliance90 (Bündnis90 – B90) and eventually united with the FRG’s Greens. Within the GDR dissent movement, it was the relentless, democratic resistance to the Stalinist totalitarian regime which characterised the activists. By nature of the regime, resistance during the 40 years of ‘real existing socialism’ in the GDR was individualistic. Cells of resistance catering for dissident communities were ideologically fragmented, complicating a future move towards collective opposition, much along the lines of the Greens’ origins in the late 1970s.34 The only alternative organisation to enjoy some independence from the GDR state and party-controlled domains was the Lutheran church which provided an existential and spiritual space for activism. Following the Protestant tradition, two fundamental principles guided its adherents: individual civil rights, as a prerequisite for acting morally; and resistance to the degradation of God’s creation, the environment.35 These two themes – human rights and ecology – became the pillars of the opposition alliance. While in the 1970s, local activities dominated the church’s actions, postChernobyl 1986 brought a resurgence of environmental activity on a larger scale.36 In 1988, an environmental umbrella organisation, ‘Network Arc’, was established whose members were some 80 organisations working toward the protection of nature. The other mechanism for what was considered unpolitical activity, to gain a degree of state approval, was the ‘Society for Nature and the Environment’ which, in October 1989, established a network of super-regional working-groups. Both cooperated in establishing a Green Party on 5 November, 1989.37 Concurrently, a first group of dissidents, christened the New Forum began acting outside the auspices of the church for the first time. In its founding declaration, the group clarified that its actions ‘are based on the desire for justice, democracy, peace, as well as the protection and conservation of nature … [for] the reconstruction of our society’.38 Their clear aim was reconstructing the GDR, not a united Germany. Being the only genuinely credible opposition to the former regime, they sought a leading role in restructuring the country into a democratic, multiparty state, pristinely socialist and committed to civil rights. This was not to be. Initially, New Forum explicitly rejected the idea of founding an electoral party, as had its Western counterpart in the early days. It preferred to remain a citizens’ movement, a loosely connected network of activism seeking a third-way solution for GDR people.39 The ‘people’ had different plans. Masses of them voted with their feet – crossing the border to the capitalistic FRG. Others saw reunification as the only road to prosperity. Reality forced the opposition movements to comply, and to form electoral lists. When reunification became the only game in the political town, the Eastern and Western sister parties came rapidly together, in time for the

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first all-German election on 2 December 1990.40 In every case, reflecting the pattern in both countries, a de facto annexation by the West took place. There were only two exceptions: the Greens and the PDS. The latter was a reincarnation of the former SED, the communist GDR party which was to command regional support in the East as a protest vote – a belated romanticisation of the former regime. The former were the Greens, who, on both sides of the now-gone wall, preferred a two-state solution, and supported self-determination which meant, in practice, rejecting hasty unification. The Greens won an appeal in the constitutional court, which allowed the East to run separate lists, which would secure representation if over 5 per cent of the Eastern votes were forthcoming. The parties contested separately, although Die Grünen/Bündnis90, as the name implies, shared a platform for the 1990 elections (added to GE90 as a joint declaration) which stated: For the 1990 all-German elections citizens’ movements and social movements from the FRG and the GDR present a comprehensive election platform. Out of our experience in opposition to one-party rule in the GDR and economic parties’ democracy in the FRG we want to present together an alternative … we argue for a solidaristic and ecological, radicaldemocratic and just, emancipatory and feminist, nonviolent and multicultural society. The platform rejected ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles!’ and ‘growth above all’, vehemently opposed Kohl’s nationalistic, growth-oriented and unsocial Germany which, through unification of the DM, offered Ansclub politik – the politics of annexation. It put forward five issues: ecology, peace, economic development with solidarity and social justice, democracy and emancipation, emancipation and self-realisation for women. On 3 December the unification agreement was adopted and eight Alliance90 representatives entered the Bundestag.41 The ‘gang of eight’ were a vocal opposition, applying pressures on human-rights issues, on coming to terms with the Stasi, on environmental questions in a clear anti-fascist tone.

The last battle? Respect for the self-determination of others, and the critique of what the Greens saw as colonisation of the Eastern parties by their Western counterparts cost them their parliamentary seats in the first all-German elections. There were, obviously, other contributing factors. For one, the party was bitterly divided and worn out by internal struggle. In 1989 Realo Otto Schily left for the SPD, and by early 1990 the two prominent Ecosocialists – Ebermann and Rainer – left the Greens to establish a radical eco-Leftist local party. Another group left for the PDS.42 The anti-leadership party had exhausted its personal capital and the public was fully aware of the inner factionalisation.

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Furthermore, the SPD candidate for the 1990 elections was Lafontaine – himself an Ecosocial-democrat,43 and all three established parties adopted, to differing degrees, environmental policies and democratic measures such as women’s representation, borrowing Greens’ distinct features, and transforming their success into the Green demise. Above all, however, the 1990 all-German elections were about unification – the resurfacing of a national yearning which both the SPD and the Greens had completely failed to anticipate.44 Given that the distinctive feature of the Greens was their emphasis on diversity, pluralism and self-realisation, it is no wonder that they failed to address national identity issues. Here again, disregard for national politics was in itself a political statement of disapproval. Did this mark the end of the Green project, the decisive marginalisation of the Greens on the German political scene? The Greens were not sure themselves,45 yet this was far from being the case. Not only did the former GDR face grave environmental problems, but reunification brought a real challenge to the citizens’ rights minority party, and with it redetermination of the role of Alliance90/Greens; the two parties united officially in 1993.46 They adopted the name Bündnis90/Die Grünen and chose one speaker from each party as a gesture of goodwill and respect for the Ossis. However, in terms of membership, the proportion of Alliance90 to Greens was 1 : 15, and that of the delegates to the united Hanover BDK, 100 : 750. Alliance90 had essentially little influence on the political profile of the Greens.47 The continued internal-struggle was over the party’s project itself – its organisation and political philosophy. Organisationally, the Realos sought to maintain the changes which had dislodged the Fundis from their stronghold in the BuVo. This could only have happened after the Hessen election, in 1991, which stood to challenge Green viability in the post-1990 era. Concentrated efforts by the Realos in a well-organised and focused campaign, aided by the Gulf War and the consequential rebirth of the peace movement, returned the Greens to the state-parliament with 8.8 per cent of the vote.48 In the aftermath of this election, Jutta Ditfurth left the party and founded an ‘ecological Left/Alternative List’. The party was now decisively an ecological reform party.49 The ideological struggle, nonetheless, continued and took on another dimension: Alliance90’s pragmatism and their detestation of Left-oriented politics.50 In their ‘Ecological Manifesto’, Aufbruch88 sought to resurrect the primacy of ecology, seeking a firm bridge between the Greens and Alliance90’s ecological human-rights party: We want a new meaning to the Green identity … We want to recreate a place within the Greens for an ecologically-founded conservatism and to reestablish politics on the other side of Left–Right polarisation.51 Seeking to occupy the politics of the Centre, they argued: ‘We do not need reduction to, but concentration on, the problematic of ecology.’52

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The rhetoric of the founding phase and the attempts to rejuvenate the role of ecology as a comprehensive, self-sufficient political field are apparent. The debate which followed the publication of the ‘Ecological Manifesto’ poignantly demonstrates the last battle in the Green project between holistic ecology and progressive reform politics. While the former circumvents the latter, the latter ideologically accommodates ecology, a reminder of the inclusionist nature of Green ideology. The debate itself exposed the misconceptions haunting the Left/Right debate in its Green manifestation. Norbert Kostede, the third member of the Bielefeld school which comprised social-scientists and prominent Realos, argued that A88’s manifesto provided a narrow and theoretically impoverished account of ‘holistic ecology’ which avoided a host of social theories and ignored the very nature of a complex and functionally differentiated modern society. He exposed the endeavour by the Ecological Manifesto to reduce human rights and social justice to mere constraints on ecological policies. Kostede concluded that ‘the primacy of ecology does not transcend the left–right axis. The end of socialism is not the end of the left.’53 This was precisely the issue: A88, the Ecolibs and the Alliance90 people identified the Left with socialism and therefore sought a reformist ecological project which went beyond Left and Right. The Left was divided. Ecosocialists consciously accepted this characterisation and supported the old Left’s project of seeking to incorporate workers and traditional problems of socialism into the Green project. The New Left – Realos and Left Forum – perceived the left as broader than just socialism. In effect they sought a progressive politics based on widening the social-democrats’ traditional concern for disadvantaged groups to embrace other domains (not class-based) suffering from relations of domination. Thus, Jürgen Tritten, elected ‘Leftist’ speaker of the Greens in 1994,54 explained that the Greens should stop playing the ‘good guys’ – that is, they should abandon their slogan of ‘neither left nor right but ahead’. The Greens, by organising a majority of minorities, represented the only counterforce which could generate a change of the political paradigm against the conservative majority which supports the erosion of rights, and therefore should not hide their Leftist identity.55 The uniquely Green spheres, he maintained, were such issues as the struggle for a right to asylum and the protection of other cultures: ‘a radical democratic politics is in the core of the Green identity’.56 This niche ‘is neither a divorce from the ecological orientation of the Greens nor a plea for a transformation of the Greens to a traditional left party. It is about expanding the political fields of the Greens.’57 Whereas A88 and Alliance90 contemplated expanding to the centreright, the New Left insisted on the ideological essence of the Green project, even though the constituencies in question (immigrants, foreign workers, residents without citizenship) had no vote in the meantime. In fact, this

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inequality was predominantly the reason for the Greens’ keenness in taking up the struggle. Thus, Tritten argues that the Greens need to build a bridge between the outsiders – the marginalised, and the educated – the comfortable middle classes who, albeit being ‘insiders’, have social solidarity. Since one-third of the population is not a partner in society, there is no way it can drive the debate ‘from below’. ‘Who, if not the Greens, should lead this debate?’58 The Greens he argues are the only force capable of combating the ‘Danger from the Middle’, that is, the conservative hegemony. This position was not restricted to the undogmatic Left. Since 1991, the themes of immigrants and refugees (in the face of waves of immigration from the former USSR and foreign workers), became central in the public discourse.59 In Fatherland Babylon, the Risky Business of Multicultural Democracy, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a long-standing Realo and Frankfurt minister of Multiculturalism, and Thomas Schmid, the Ecolibs ideologue, comprehensively tackled the subject of Germany as a country of immigration, examining the problems of asylum-seekers, foreigners, and the laws of immigration and citizenship in Germany and outlining the way to a multicultural democracy.60 A united front within the party opted decisively for a comprehensive role for the Greens in the German polity. If the Greens were to occupy a vital political niche in German politics, if their Green-cum-Germanness was to manifest itself, it would be through their fierce critique of the political conduct of the established parties in Bonn and through an unequivocal renunciation of the resurrection of the racist, Neo-fascist and anti-Semitic attitudes which took their toll in the 1990s. If, in the late 1970s, the Greens had struggled to dislodge ecological politics from the fascist grip, in the 1990s, ecological politics lay at the heart of the consensus; the battle against the anti-humanist forces themselves had been resumed. Indeed, in ‘Political Principles’ which declared the unification of the Alliance90/Greens in 1993, the basic values were presented in the following order: human rights, ecology, democracy, social justice, gender equality, nonviolence and new political culture.61 We can therefore characterise the Green project as involving a threefold politicisation process: First, it raised awareness of previously neglected areas of exploitation and discrimination, by exposing their entrenchment in the prevalent ideology and cultural practices. Second, it pressured decision-makers to change legislation through strong public protest and media attention. Third, it stressed the needed change of praxis, complementing political awareness and legislation. Thus, if ecological matters had moved during the 1980s, to the second and third phases, other issues, notably citizenship and multiculturalism, had only entered the first. Citizenship and multiculturalism entailed their own double-edged lesson: advanced industrial democracies were generally flooded with immigrants, refugees and foreign workers. In Germany, this was acute due to reunification, the country’s geographical location in the centre of Europe, the vanishing

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border between East and West and the attraction of German economic prosperity. It was also a dominant issue of Greens-cum-Germanness since the peculiar German citizenship rules do not award citizenship to second generation immigrants but do award it to people of German origin. It is an issue at the heart of the struggle over German identity.

Politics for life Defining the programmatic debate within the Greens, Fischer distinguished between ‘pure Greenism’ and wider aspects of contemporary Green reform-politics. To his mind, in the super-election year of 1994, the Greens could only succeed with a wide-ranging programme62 since it was not only a fight against Kohl, but above all, a fight for the ecological and social renewal of Germany. This positive emphasis is indeed the trademark of the 1994 manifestos, confidently abandoning protest politics and promoting a fully fledged Green politics. The federal election programme of 1994 (GE94) begins on a pragmatic note: ‘Alliance90/Greens … want to take shared responsibility for the future. Our foremost goal is to oust Kohl in order to lead a socially and ecologically correct course for the federalrepublic.’63 It sends a clear signal to the SPD. It positively suggests a plan for social and ecological politics. In striking difference to votes-oriented parties and issues-oriented politics, GE94 also advances a new kind of politics: ‘we want with our electoral programme to create passion for politics’. Politics is not only what parties do, nor is it merely a means for tackling political matters; politics is a life-long process, politics is for life. The Green project, with its eye to the political culture of Germany, finally expresses its affirmative relationship with politics, thereby attempting in typically Green fashion to reformulate the concept of politics itself: Parties and politicians have lost much of their standing over the last years. We would like to contribute to generating renewed trust of citizens in those whom they elect to represent them. We also, however, want to represent foreigner citizens, who, despite living in Germany for many years, still can not vote.64 The bridge Tritten envisaged is endorsed by the programme: the Greens aspire to be trustworthy politicians, and to represent citizens’ concerns, while challenging the very notion of citizenship. Institutionalised democracies conceal a range of groups, all existing for a long time within the same country, but which have no political and human rights. Participatory democracy, with its goal of involving and reviving civic society, appeals to the educated middle classes; the politics of the oppressed is a vital dimension of such human-minded politics. Since much of the Green project related to ecological reconstruction, gender politics and peaceful international

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relations, as emphasised in GE94, have already been analysed, the discussion will now end by introducing two new facets of Green politics: politics as a way of life (Preamble) and the multicultural democracy (Section Two) which advanced industrial societies have to develop in order to fully include their citizens in the vision of a decent society. Passion for politics Professional politicians work long hours in the service of society; this is meaningful, argue the Greens, only if many more people are willing to take responsibility for society, not leaving politicians to their own devices. ‘We should not decide for our future only in the ballot box, but everywhere and every day.’ It is necessary and meaningful to get involved, with patience and courage, as the Greens ‘want to make politics with people, not only with their votes’. For that, GE94 claims, an open debate on the most important question of our time is required and through it, a search for solutions. The debate should include parties and also the affected people, the representatives of different interests and the professionals. Alliance90/Greens, despite their different life experiences and backgrounds, are united about one thing: political responsibility. The programme itself seeks to present ways out of the crisis, however, the Greens reckon that ‘for many of the standing problems there is no immediate solution. Part of democracy is to learn to live with the problems.’65 Gone are the days of Sofortismus, of demands for immediate withdrawal, for ending, banning, ceasing. Long-term problems necessitate long-term treatment, and the very idea of ‘solution’, let alone a radical solution, is finally expunged from the German Green discourse. The preamble outlines three crises – ecological, social (in the context of reunification) and democratic. GE94 explains the latter thus: ‘More and more people, especially those with a different skin colour, different culture or with disability must endure right-wing extremism which threatens their security. The politics of the FRG promotes segregation and discrimination.’66 The Greens plead for a new beginning for Germany, for a change of course, for the reform of politics and the politics of reform. They want a solidaristic, ecological, democratic, multicultural, tolerant, emancipatory and peaceful society. Instead of a two-thirds society from above we must begin an interconnected, solidaristic society from below … We know: many people would be ready to give up increasing material affluence if they knew that the means will be put into social and ecological programmes. They know that their quality of life could be improved only through the ecological and social remoulding of society and only thus would future generations have chances for life.67

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Thus presented, the Green project embodies the postmaterial values anchored in advanced industrial democratic culture. The project is based on caring and participating individuals willing to take responsibility and pay the price for achieving solidarity and ecological and social reconstruction. Democracy, on this understanding, means living with conflicts, respecting and tolerating others, and using self-preserving reason to limit growth and create a sustainable society for all current citizens and future generations. Each of the components is endorsed with a change of emphasis: instead of a rigidly institutionalised democracy, a more open and participatory democracy is advocated; the consumerist society is contrasted with postmaterial values, advancing quality of life, rather than material accumulation of wealth; growth politics is replaced by ecological sustainability and concern for future generations; competitive, segregated and alienating society is replaced by solidarity and equality, endorsing difference rather than fighting it. The core principles of Green ideology – respect for others (nature, minorities, women, immigrants and so on), pluralism, tolerance and the primacy of ecology clearly dominate GE94. The ideological currents are accommodated within the programme, emphasising the kaleidoscope of Green concerns, all within the same political niche. A multicultural democracy In ‘Reinforcing Democracy and Citizens’ Rights, Strengthening Minorities, Living together Freely and Securely’ the Greens take issue with segregation and support self-determination, tolerance and solidarity. Amidst the competitive power politics the outsider groups stand the least chance: Immigrants and refugees, Rumanians and Gypsies, Jews and Muslims, gays and lesbians, the disabled and homeless are the victims of Rightwing violence. As the party of citizens’ rights Alliance90/Greens wants to sound, in a comprehensive politics of equality a clear signal against Right-wing reactionaries and segregation. Forwarding equal citizens’ rights for all the long-standing minorities here is for Alliance90/Greens a central question of democracy.68 The Greens strongly condemn the politics of hatred, and ideologies of inequality and nationalism.69 This best explains the Green resentment of the concept of ideology associated with a closed system of ideas clearly defining in absolutist terms the good and the bad, and more crucially, who is included and who is excluded from the group – thus maintaining the foe/friend dichotomy. For Greens, political ideology in its milder form signifies power politics and the pursuit of profit by representatives of economic interests. This chapter has traced Green political ideology (often concealed behind the phrase ‘the Green project’) during its period of consolidation. This has meant abandoning commonplace notions of what

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ideology is, in order to formulate an alternative ideological framework which is plural, diverse, dynamic and changing. It accommodated different political clusters, not necessarily compatible with one another, but which nevertheless define a distinct political ideology. One of the peculiar features of Green politics is that it is a microcosm of the multicultural democracy they envisage. The Green project is a double-helix in which the inner discourse and internal political experience of plurality, tolerance and living with conflicts exemplify politics as a process, as a way of life. They thus practise politics within, while seeking to project their own concept of a tolerant, open, cross-fertilising decent society onto the German public at large.

Theoretical implications: the heuristic role of the modular ideology What consequences do these changes bring to bear on the theory of Green ideology developed here? Both thematic and analytical conclusions can now be drawn. A quick reminder of the ideological frame may help in seeing how the thematic expansion of the ideology of the Greens came to embrace multiculturalism and human rights as its principles. According to the theory presented here, the set of core concepts underpinning the ideological currents are: respect for others, pluralism, tolerance and the primacy of ecology. Indeed, a central focus of this book has been to account for the expansion of the moral discourse, facilitated by the emergence of the Greens, which politicised ecological issues and innovatively included nature under ‘respect for others’. However, as was clear from the beginning, the concerns of Greens have always been broader than the ecological scope. Ecological and social transformation were jointly elements within the Green project. Even the Value-Conservatives pressed for attitudinal change, thus inevitably including social change as part of their ideological ends. This was all the more true for the NSMs, feminists, the citizens’ initiatives and the New Left, which sought a comprehensive political project in which ‘respect for others’ included other disenfranchised constituencies like women, minorities and the Third World. In the course of the late 1980s, new conflicts gained salience, broadening the scope of the same core principle, reinforcing their centrality. Thus, multiculturalism conforms to the Green project and is a natural expansion, from an ideological point of view, of the project. Since it belongs to the shared core of principles, the ideological framework is actually strengthened, gaining an additional dimension, reinforcing its centrality. While on the thematic level there was a process of ideological expansion, in line with Green principles, on the structural level the tendency was toward contraction, based on the same principles. Analytically, the explicatory role of the modular ideology finally comes to the fore. Starting in

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1979, the German Greens underwent a process of political selection. Significantly, although conditioned by the external political opportunities structures and electoral demands, the modular ideology framework proves an extremely useful device for tracing – and (admittedly in retrospect) for predicting – this evolutionary process. Thus, the guidelines for the selection process were inherent to the unique ideological framework uniting the Greens. Crucially, hence, the modular ideology is not merely the outcome of this analysis; it is an explanatory tool of the internal dynamics of Green ideological currents. The basic double-layered structure of the modular ideology comprises the ideological framework – the common conceptual core – and the subideologies – which adhere to the fundamental ideological values but emphasise certain of the concepts within the party’s core and peripheral concepts. The tension between the principles of the shared ideological framework, and the exclusionist tendency of the various currents, each anxious to concentrate on its own unique concerns, were to determine whether a particular ideological current would remain in the Green Party, or depart. The principles of respect for others, pluralism and tolerance – the core concepts of the ideological framework – suggest that exclusionary currents, either ideologically fundamentalist, or politically unwilling to engage in a cooperative route and seek segregation, would eventually expel themselves from the party. Inclusionist currents which perceive politics in itself as an invaluable process, would tend to remain within the party, adhere to its ideological frame while furthering their own causes. Thus, the ideological principles explain the evolutionary path emanating from the ideological analysis. The historical evolution essentially comprised three phases: the conversion stage (1977–81), when different ideological tendencies coalesced, primarily under the negative coalition and (differing) interpretations of the ecological crisis, to form the Green Party. By 1981, however, the valueconservatives, who opted for the exclusionist ecological theme, departed from the coalition party. The second stage was a phase of diversification (1982–90), which essentially entailed the formation of the major ideological currents within the Greens: Ecofundamentalists, Ecoradicals, Ecosocialists, Ecoliberals and Realos. Each developed a unique stance on questions of ecology, economics, politics and the role of the Green party, however, they all represented, together, a Green spectrum independent of other established political forces in the FRG. During the 1980s, as the analysis demonstrated, different currents gradually departed when they felt they could no longer compromise their principles. Thus, the Ecofundamentalists left in 1984, arguing that the Greens favoured the party over the ideology. In 1990, when the Communist Party was finally re-established on German soil, some Ecosocialists departed, and by 1991, the Ecoradicals had set up an independent radical party on the state level. For the illustration of the political selection within the German Greens, see Fig. 7.1.

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Communists

Anthroposophy

New Left

Popular anti-modernists

Social and Christian movements

1977–81

Ecologist ‘Survivalists’

Value conservatives

Conversion

Ecology-cum-Politics Conservatives

Ecofundis 1984

Ecosocialist Realos

1981

Ecoradicals Ecolibs

1991

Breakthrough

Left Forum

Diversification

1992

Alliance90 1993

Undogmatic Left

Realists

Consolidation Figure 7.1 Political selection process

The present and final phase so far is the consolidation phase (1990 onwards), in which two camps have basically survived within the party – the Left Forum and the Realists, with a secondary split having occurred between the former GDR Greens and their Western counterparts. Thus, the German Greens have become a definite fixture within the FRG political system. The party still combines two conflicting attitudes – one which perceives the party as the bearer of political liberalism in Germany, emphasising the Greens as a minorities party; the other, which understands itself as a radical Leftist party working toward social transformation. Both advocate

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the primacy of ecology. The Green ideology was postmaterialist, rejecting the goal of economic growth to which both liberalism and socialism adhere. It is therefore possible to acknowledge the internal diversity and plurality of political stances within the Greens as a characteristic feature of the Green future.

A governing party? The Green road to power During the 1990s, Bündnis90/Die Grünen consolidated their position within the party-system and established their collective identity within Germany’s political culture, paving the way for the once unimaginable concept of ‘Greens in power’. The gap between the public image and the internal self-perception of the party was narrowed, as the emergence from the ‘adolescence crisis’70 was marked by a withdrawal from movementpolitics, anti-institutionalism and principal opposition positions. Crucial to political maturity was its ideological ‘self-rationalisation’. While Offe’s observation that this ‘mélange of diverging conceptions and positions is held together neither by a set of common basic convictions nor by a generally recognised compromise-making procedure’,71 was applicable to the late 1980s, by the late 1990s, the Greens, through a process of ideological self-realization, finally moulded a coherent social vision and political worldview with which they could identify and could be identified with. Its principles embody, at last, the conceptual framework of the modular ideology. The 1998 election programme ‘Green is the Change’ (GE98) demonstrates both the ideological and political facets of their collective identity as a party. Ideologically, GE98 establishes the Greens as a New Politics party with a distinct worldview: If politics wants to influence and make a change, it needs guidingmodels (Leitbilder). Our guiding model for new Politics is: sustainability, social justice, democracy and equal rights. Only this model can secure the rights and future opportunities for the youth and future generations.72 Each of these concepts is further developed into an ideological stance entailing radical structural changes. Sustainable economics necessitates restructuring production – ‘a new philosophy of industrial production’73 – recognising the limited natural resources and ecological costs, seeking to comprehensively address the gap between the poor and rich.74 Social justice entails a different concept of work – one which transcends paid income and includes salary, private, communal and voluntary work; shared and social work are especially emphasised in advocating a structural change in the work world.75 The social net should include basic income for all and a progressive tax-system. The education system has to provide

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professional education as well as social participation – suggestive of a model of participatory democracy. A reform of civil rights and the law of citizenship are urged as fundamental components of a new German identity.76 The Greens portray themselves as the party of civil rights.77 In terms of civil society, ‘The Greens’ answer to the social change in the last decade is one of self-determination, justice and sustainability leading to a new direction of social politics.’78 Crucially, self-determination here applies to groups, though deduced from the self-realisation of individuals: ‘Solidarity politics is more than sheer welfare. The possibility and capability for individual self-determination is a leading tenet of Green politics. This is true of all social groups, the alleged weaker groups included.’79 In line with the idea of self-determination, the party advocates the notion of active democracy, with a special emphasis on demonstrations and protest,80 enabled by a ‘climate of tolerance’. Significantly, the context is one of repenting the German past, rehabilitating the national memory and resurrecting a future political identity. The idea of Germany as an immigration country81 should be perceived as part of reconciliation with the German past – and the Nazi period in particular.82 The social vision, hence, is one of ‘a capable multicultural society’ which could also deal with conflicts,83 within a climate of tolerance and a strong attitude of anti-discrimination. Thus, GE98 exemplifies a distinct, comprehensive ideology – theory-led political praxis – identifies its core principles and radical policies. Sensitive to structural problems of advanced industrial democracies in general, and to the peculiar German situation, it offers a vision of social participatory democracy to address these grievances and provide a framework for the challenges ahead. In terms of political theory, ecological justice is encompassed in social justice, individual rights are extended to disadvantaged minorities to ensure an active participatory democracy and multiculturalism applies to national, ethnic, cultural, religious and sexual minorities alike. These transitions, however, are problematic, and the programme does not address the conflicts between, for example, individual’s rights and the overriding group’s power.84 Nevertheless, GE98’s worldview differs from the traditional conservative, liberal and social-democratic ideologies, the latter presenting a special problem for the 1998 Greens, who simultaneously sought cooperation and to provide an alternative. Politically, the Greens attempted three interconnected tasks: first, to distinguish themselves from the movements and explain why the ‘principle opposition party’ is running for government positions; second, to challenge the existing coalition without repudiating the party-system itself; third, to offer a coalition partner to the SPD without losing the Greens’ singularity or voters. The strategy was to use their ideological stance to their political end. Thus, the title of GE98 – ‘Green is the change’ – refers not only to their ideology of structural social change, but to their pivotal position within the party spectrum: ‘vote Green and you take Germany out of

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the stalemate of the CDU–FDP coalition. Voting SPD is not enough, since the real issue is providing a partner that is going to make ‘the’ difference. Voting Green is hence the change.’ GE98 is a political breakthrough in terms of the self-perception of the Greens – as a party contesting for government for the first time – with grave consequences for the ideological movement to which power-relationship is a prime cause. While the Greens have always protested against the ruling elite, the dominant culture and power-holders, Greens in power means that they are part of this very ruling elite, the dominating minority, justified only by their self-positioning as the defenders of the weaker strata of society, the disadvantaged and the minority groups. In order to convince the extraparliamentary opposition that Greens should be voted into power, GE98 emphasises its ability to change political praxis. Even ‘Women Politics – for an Emancipatory Society’ opens with a description of party quota policies,85 thereby stressing the difference between the movements and the party, and the organisational behaviour patterns achieved by the party. Twenty years after its establishment as the arm of the movements, the anti-parties party finally apprehends itself as a political party capable of governmental power – as a means for generating social change. The mood of the programme is clearly one of change of power. If, in the past, the protest sentiment of the Greens was thought to jeopardise the legitimacy of the established system, GE98 merely rejects the culture of politics put in place by the long-standing Conservative coalition and its chancellor Kohl. The possibility of another grand-coalition is overruled with the call for ‘a different majority,’86 thus signalling the party’s willingness to become the SPD’s minor coalition partner. GE98 opens: ‘It is time for a change. The Federal Republic needs a new, social and ecological politics.’ Crucially, the social politics which the Greens advocate differs from that of the SPD – it seeks structural social reforms, reconstructing the production industry, enriching civil society and so on – but to the lay-person ‘social and ecological politics’ is a red–green coalition. Interestingly, the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens,87 incorporated many themes identified with the Greens’ legacy, though the substance remained identified with social democratic ideas, while the Greens added the colour. The opening emphasises that the ruling coalition stands for ‘economic stability, social justice, ecological modernisation, reliable international politics, inner security and strengthening civil rights and equality for women’88 – an agenda impregnated by themes of the Greens. However, the first two policy areas dominating the agreement were: stabilising the economy and strengthening German unity – hardly typical Green theses. This is followed, almost as an afterthought and amongst other things, with, ‘just taxation and ecological reform’, ‘ecological modernisation’, ‘solidarity politics for all generations’, ‘breakthrough for women’s politics’, and ‘new openness of politics and culture.’89 Further,

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in terms of actual ministries, the Greens received merely three offices – ministries of the exterior, environment and health. If ideologically the Greens had established an alternative political niche, in terms of policies they remained identified with anti-nuclear, peace and ecological policies. In the coalition’s key policies, the Green way was unheeded. Amongst the priorities on the agenda were economic reform, withdrawal from nuclear power, and reform of the citizenship law.90 The latter two, identified with the Greens, had mixed repercussions: no agreement on cessation of nuclear energy was reached despite the heated debate in Germany and to the dismay of the new environment minister – Tritten. The demand for reform of the citizenship law, which crystallised the multicultural position of the Greens, was successful in changing the criteria of citizenship from blood to birth rights, but failed in materialising their demand for double-citizenship for immigrants and foreign workers, inciting a severe backlash against the new coalition. Greens in the future: the new Basic Programme Despite the initial policy failures, the Greens strengthened their position, greatly aided by the popularity of Joschka Fischer and the topicality of international affairs under his care: the Kosovo crisis, the Middle-East conflict, fundamental Islamism and global terrorism. A complementary reconceptualisation process of the Greens’ political beliefs into a new programme which replaced the 20-year-old Basisprogramm was finalised by 2002. The new fundamental programme ‘The Future is Green’ (hereafter Grundsatz)91 is a restructuring of their political beliefs into a new basic programme, providing a new ideational basis.92 Basic Programmes enable parties to rise above short-term politics, and to present a social vision moulded as a political plan. The Grün2020 opening explicates: The process leading to a new fundamental programme is a key project for the future of the Greens … Through a new fundamental programme we can send a signal to the society where Green politics stand at the beginning of the 21st century – and to generate social acceptance. Through a new fundamental programme we can create a new programmatic basis, which would lead our own change of direction and base new impulses – and so would generate a new power for our own political work.93 The process of devising the new basic programme is typical of the Greens’ idea of political dialogue, involving all Green members and coordinating between the grassroots and the federal party. Grundsatz is the product of a three years’ programme-redesigning process, which began with a federal committee, launched at the 1999 Kassel congress. An open virtual discussion in the party’s internet site, and in the local cells, transferred the

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debate to the grassroots of the party, further discussed in a federal conference (Stuttgart, March 2001). A draft programme was published by July 2001,94 sent to all party members via the party magazine, Schrägstrich. A final draft was published by the federal executive committee and some one thousand amendments were discussed before it was approved by over 90 per cent of the party conference members in Berlin on 17 March 2002.95 The project thus reflects a major process in which all party’s strata were involved and not as an isolated event. Crucially, the modularity of their worldview is exemplified in their endorsement of the varied movements and roots: Bündnis90/Die Grünen emerged from diverse roots. We have, as the party of ecology, taken from the tradition of the Left, the value-conservatives and also State’s rule liberalism. The actors of the women’s movement, the Peace movement and Citizens’ right movement of the former GDR have shaped with us the profile of our party. In the East as in the West Christians have taken an active role in developing Bündnis90/Die Grünen.96 The acknowledgement of these diverse roots positions the 1999 Grundsatz debate within the modular discourse of the Greens since the 1960s, endorsing the message of unity in diversity. The six-part Grundsatz – Awakening in the Ecological Age, in the Ecological and Social Market Economy, in Emancipatory Social Politics, in the Knowledge Society, in Democratic Renewal, Gender Rights Society, and Europe and the World – seem to correspond with and endorse the other main tenets of the historical themes of the Greens: ecology-cum-politics, the economic emphasis, post-nationalism in an international perspective and multicultural democracy. However, in order to grasp the different spirit of the new fundamentalsprogramme, the opening sentence is insightful: ‘in the centre of our politics stands the man with his dignity and freedom. Our starting point is his inalienable human dignity’.97 The cornerstone of Grundsatz has shifted from multifaceted politics to the individual, with her dignity and rights. This is a crucial difference in the ideological project, as from it flow all other principles and ideas. Each of the programme’s parts is analyzed by the Greens in relation to three constitutive concepts: self-determination, justice and democracy. This is explained in the draft programme of ‘Grün2020 – wir denken bis übermorgen’, which states: We want to position the concepts of justice and freedom at the root of the humanistic and emancipatory party. We see in Bündnis90/Die Grünen the carrier of politics which acknowledges the consequences of the needs and life-plan of each individual, and at the same time politics which struggles for the equality of freedoms arena for today and tomorrow.98

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For the first time in an ideological document, the individual is placed at the centre of the worldview, and the relations to nature, community, state and the world are deduced from one’s inalienable rights to dignity and freedom. There is a strong injection of political liberalism which simultaneously distinguishes the Greens from Social Democracy and their coalition partner, SPD, by providing a firm philosophical basis for their worldview. The concept of dignity embodies the principle of respect for others, while freedom establishes the pillar of political activism, lifeworld, tolerance and pluralism. Social rights are derived from the individual’s right to selfrealization. What can one make of this curious change in the ideological basis, apparent in Grundsatz? The answer may be in the underlying project of the German Greens – that of constituting a new political identity in post-war Germany. As was implied, many of the dilemmas of the Greens emanated from the problems of identity. Reshaping German identity was the obvious calling of the Greens. It was a constant feature of the debates concerning the role of the movement, the centrality of ecology and, most crucially, the political statement the Greens insisted on making by referring to the ‘unity in diversity’ which was later presented as multicultural democracy. The long march of the Greens has been in search of a political identity. This has been finalized with Grundsatz. The programme crystallises a less radical and more moderate worldview, in the hope of capturing the no-man’s land of the German political system, in the pivotal position of the ideological axis, maybe right of the SPD. It represents a mature political agenda of participatory, multicultural democracy, with a distinct conceptual framework and coherent sub-ideologies, or group interests which commonly amount to a modular ideology seeking social change and the structural reform of advanced industrial democracies.

Part III Ideology in Search of Politics: the British Greens

8 The British Peculiarity: non-Ideological Politics

This part seeks to trace the formation and transformation of the ideology of the British Green Party (hereafter BGP) within the political context in which it evolved. The perception and role of ecology, the breadth of the political analysis and the conceptualisation of the relationship between environmental and social problems will be examined. However, the political context, historical circumstances and theoretical grievances differ from the German Greens’. Where the structural constraint of the 5 per cent electoral hurdle and the concept of the environment in ideational terms facilitated the cooperation of different protest groups during its formative stage, thereby defining the formation, transformation and consolidation of their political ideology. The concept of the environment was prone to different interpretations of ecologism given that nature in itself does not entail rules for human societies. From the same cluster of ecology-derived concepts (for example, limited natural resources, biodiversity and interrelatedness), with the same claim to ‘naturalism’, different currents deduced either dictatorship or decentralised anarchy. Conceptualisation of the environment provided a particularly sensitive seismograph for measuring the German Greens’ beliefs regarding the polity under a naturalist disguise. This, however, did not impair the innovative perspective regarding actual ecological matters. Environmental problems exist ‘out there in the real world’, transcending any idiosyncratic political discourse; the Greens were engaged in changing the political landscape itself, exposing the self-referential political world and highlighting the Earth as a source of concern. This was central to their claim for an alternative worldview and for their reconsideration of ecology, economy, society and politics interrelations. The theory of ideology itself was revised to understand the Green project. A modular ideology was developed, comprising an ideological infrastructure of core concepts, that would sustain several ideational clusters and differing worldviews, whilst adhering to the shared core concepts. Crucially, these ideological currents did not claim to possess the ultimate true interpretation of the political reality, but recognised the different perspectives 173

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from which the world can be experienced. This, in turn, facilitated their cooperation within a common ideological niche and their perception of politics as a way of life. The sensitivity to the ‘other’, and rejection of a closed system of ideas which reinstitutes the foe/friend frame meant that ‘others’ could be included within the ideological framework: the environment, women, minorities, immigrants, refugees and so on, all disadvantaged in advanced industrial democracies. As in the case of the environment the process entailed raising awareness, politicising the problem and seeking to change both legal rules and social praxis. In that respect, the environment is the odd one out, since, by definition it is a non-social entity, and therefore requires representation by ecologically aware people, whereas the ultimate goal with regard to oppressed people is to make them willing participants in the political and moral discourse. In the German case, the emphasis moved from the politics of nature to attempting to change the nature of politics. However, in the British context, the dissociation of the emergence of ecology from other new social movements, the distinct political culture and the electoral system, generated a different national environment through which we can examine the behaviour and evolution of a new collective political actor. What, therefore, justifies us in dealing with the British Green Party after, and in light of the German Greens’ experience, particularly since the former was born six years before its counterpart? The British historical context would later provide the answer in terms of the ideological space opened to the Greens in Britain. In any case, analysts of the BGP confined themselves to a narrow environmental perspective where the BGP was treated as the party of the environment. The German example forestalls the assumption that the Greens were merely an environmental party, enhanced by the analysis of the ideological deficit of environmentalism: there is a conceptual problem in attempting to generate a fully-fledged ideology on the ecological basis. The German case is instructive in three ways. First, by accounting for the many ways in which the Germans modified ‘ecology’ to suit differing political plans, the assumption that the environment entails a new worldview is refuted. Secondly, the British Green theory was underdeveloped in comparison with the German Greens, due to their (at least initial) isolation from other ideological traditions. The BGP political strategy concentrated on an exclusionary Green message, comprehensive in its environmental nature, but devoid of explicit connections to other social problems, and which diagnosed other socio-political problems as rooted in environmental matters. The Ecology Party was unattractive to other social movements given the UK political system and long tradition of extraparliamentary radical activism. Moreover, the Greens themselves sought to play down ideological debates to produce an electorally marketable product. The result was an ideologically small embryo incubated until 1992, when the centrist executive finally resigned and the plural decentralist tendencies,

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less constrained by electoral tactics, emerged. Hence, only in the 1990s has an ideological thinking, still in its infancy, but less constrained by electoral tactics, begun to show a broader social agenda. Third, since currents within the BGP did not publish (apart from the Way Ahead in the 1990s), much of the ideological debate remained latent. The British Greens rarely debated issues of identity, philosophy or ideology, concentrating instead, ironically, on policies – which they were never in a position to implement nationally due to the British electoral system. The polyphonic map of the German Greens will nevertheless suggest possible parallels with the path of the British Greens as ideological currents emerged within the BGP, albeit belatedly. However, the main reason for saving the British case for last is rooted in the nature of this study. From the perspective of the theory of ideology, the BGP – the oldest in Europe – is a test-case for the evolving modular ideology. Was the German case unique, given the German national question which found an outlet in the supposedly naturalistic attitude to the hitherto non-political issue of the environment and the political opportunities structure which encouraged the cooperation of varied ideological groups? Would the political ideology of the BGP devise, despite the differences, a similar ideological framework? Have ecological problems led the British Greens to challenge the political landscape itself, or merely to argue for environmental policies? How different is the historical analysis, the social vision and the political transformation? What discursive strategy was used to generate the change in the values-system? Was there a British equivalent to Green-cum-Germanness? The modular theory of ideology will be tested in the most hostile political environment. If its parallel does not emerge from the British context, and if a relatively closed system of ideas, centred upon ecology, characterises British Greens, then we will have to conclude that Green Parties in different political cultures develop different ideologies, strengthening the typology of ‘pure environmentalist’ vs. Left-libertarian parties. If, despite the political conditions, a form of modular ideology has evolved, then we could argue for the emergence of a new type of Green political ideology within the advanced industrial democracies. The BGP’s investigation is based, as in the German case, on a detailed diachronic study of party programmes. In this respect, the British Greens provide a unique conceptual tool for ideological analysis. Apart from their election manifestos, which were carefully worded to facilitate a breakthrough into public political consciousness, another document – Manifesto for Sustainable Society – was written, first in 1974, and consequently amended in national conferences, with each amendment documenting the ideological evolution of the British Green Party. The survival of some topics – for example, the original Philosophical Basis, which has hardly changed – and the changes introduced in other areas, allow insight, beyond policies, into the overall concerns of the party, and its ideological path inside the hostile British political system. The relationship between

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Green electoral platforms and the Sustainability manifesto will highlight the relationship between the executive, responsible for the party’s public image, and the activists’ worldview. This chapter sets the stage of British Politics within which the BGP acted. The next chapter deals with the formative stage of the BGP’s political ideology, establishing the political context in which the Green Party operates, reviewing the theoretical approaches used in studying the British Greens, and exploring the Blueprint for Survival, adopted as the manifesto of the 1973 PEOPLE party, the forerunner of the Green party. The Manifesto for Survival of PEOPLE and the first draft of Manifesto for Sustainable Society of the 1975 (renamed) Ecology Party, comprise the backbone of its ideological corpus. The next chapter investigates the ‘messenger’ strategy of 1979–89. Chapter 11 accounts for the party’s ongoing process of diversification. The final chapter examines whether the BGP developed an ecological ideology, a New Left ideology, a New Politics ideology, or whether the BGP was a framework party with a modular ideology accommodating different political currents.

The British Green Party: beyond the environment? The British Green Party is a perplexing phenomenon. On the one hand, it was the first European Green party, scoring a historical record of 14.9 per cent of the vote in the 1989 European election (resulting in no MPs). On the other hand, it suffered continuous electoral misfortune, never receiving more than 1–2 per cent of the British vote, was largely unacknowledged by the media, virtually non-existent on the British political stage, and ignored by analysts. Nevertheless, it remained as an electable party,1 devoted to its cause, and resolute in developing its policies. As intriguing is the analysts’ attitude to the British Green Party: to date, not a single book has been written about it, apart from those published by activists. In a handful of articles, usually part of European Green parties handbooks,2 authors obstinately rehearsed its electoral results on parish, national and European levels, inevitably turning the 1989 European elections into the Gordian knot. Their problem was accounting for the spectacular growth in environmental group membership in Britain, an estimated rise from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4.5 million – 8 per cent of the British population – in 1990,3 given the meagre electoral successes of the BGP since the 1970s (notwithstanding the 1989 European election). The usual explanation accounted for the British electoral system which structurally discourages new parties.4 Environmental organisations, however, are fairly well involved – as consultants in the bureaucratic procedures of the institutional system.5 Analysts also maintained that the Green Party’s internal structures have reproduced the Realos/Fundis debate – the electoralists/decentralists divide.6 The electoralists pressed for structural

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reform to enable an effective management by a centralist executive empowered to react freely to the political scene. By 1991, when the decentralists finally gave in, the prominent centralists (most notably Sara Parkin) had left the now centralist party. Most studies therefore complied with The Guardian’s assessment of 28 August 1991, that ‘in one respect, and perhaps only one, the Greens are a real political party. They are good at internal disputes.’ Had the party been more organised, the argument followed, the cadres of the environmental groups might have been attracted to the party, and the Greens would have made their mark on British politics. However, compared to the German Greens, the premises on which the approach to the BGP was based are questionable. First, the identification of the natural base of support for the BGP with environmental organisations – an underlying assumption of the above approach – is disputed. As Raschke argued, it would be a mistake to view the relation of the BGP with the members of environmental organisations as the equivalent of, say, the Labour and trade-unions.7 The analysis of the German Greens demonstrated that whereas environmental groups usually comply with the system and seek incremental changes in environmental policies, the Greens advocate a radical project which questions the very system on which advanced industrial democracies are based. German Greens – Realos and Fundis alike – profess a new worldview, an independent ideological niche within the political system, well beyond environmental policies. The crucial questions are therefore: what is the British Green’s ideological project, is it focused on environmental concerns and what is the relationship between the BGP and the alternative cadres of the NSMs and their social vision? Secondly, the implicit belief that a centralist approach might facilitate a break onto the political stage, that centralisation of power within the party is the key to real influence on national British politics, is precarious. Given the British context, believing that concentrating resources on national elections is politically realistic, ignores the difficulty of a party lacking geographical concentration to achieve electoral majority in any one constituency. From an electoral perspective, two options seem most likely to gain impact – a decentralist approach which seeks to build itself up from grassroots and local support or fighting to change the electoral system, a path many Greens – decentralists and centralists alike – have taken. This need not imply that electoralists were unrealistic. British Greens, centralists and decentralists, by virtue of their political culture, are pragmatic. But, what is their designated project? As shall be demonstrated, the centralists believed that, given the British electoral system and the urgency of ecological problems, the Green Party had to project the message to the wider public via the media and thence gain entry to the House of Commons. This meant concentrating resources and energy at the national level. For the decentralists, the Green project involved self-change, that is, having decentralised network politics, providing a personal example of practical Green

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politics. They therefore preferred to allocate resources for direct action and local politics and to encourage different lifestyles. As the German example suggests, internal distinctions within the Greens cannot be reduced to strategic party roles, but rather revolve around questions concerning political identity. The main question therefore remains: what is the configuration of political concepts comprising the British Green worldview, and what are the relationships between environmental and social problems, heretofore ignored by other analysts. To identify the ideological project of the British Greens, a structural analysis of the political system would be insufficient. Therefore, after the context of the British system is compared with that of the German Greens, an ideological study will be attempted. The British peculiarity The contradictory British record on environmental politics reflects the UK’s overall development as an industrial democracy. The world’s first private environmental group – the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society – was established in Britain in 1865. In 1947, one of Britain’s most comprehensive plans – the Town and Country Planning Acts was developed. The Clean Air Act of 1956 was the world’s first comprehensive air pollution control. The world’s first cabinet-level environmental department was created in Britain in 1970.8 Yet, by 1988, Britain had acquired the reputation of ‘the dirty man of Europe’. Since Britain was both the world’s first democracy and its first industrialised nation, these two processes provide the context in which the UK Green project needs to be understood. Over the past 150 years British political institutions have gradually evolved. The first-past-the-post system sets up the most obvious and overwhelming obstacle for new political parties. Additionally, a deposit of £500, refundable only for those clearing the 5 per cent hurdle (mid-1980s figures), makes it financially difficult for a new party to contest many constituencies. Only parties which contest a minimum of 50 seats are eligible for the valuable election broadcasts on TV and Radio. Thus, the constraints on new parties are formidable, and the overall majority one party gets, once it receives the relative majority of the votes, makes it a two-and-a-half party system, these parties monopolise the political agenda and the media. In contrast, the German political system was more inviting due to the proportional representation mixed system; the 5 per cent threshold was the main incentive for uniting the Greens as a (negative) coalition. Did the financial consideration motivate the BGP in a similar way? A reconsideration of the politics of British protest is required. British extraparliamentary politics While in Germany the contingent but crucial coalition between the peace and the environmental movements was forged on political and ideological

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grounds [drawing support in political protest and cementing the bond between the politics of life (environment) and the politics of survival (peace)], in Britain their historical fortunes differed. The question of nuclear weapons was at the centre of British politics in the late 1950s and 1960s, with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) mobilising hundreds of thousands of people to ‘ban the bomb’.9 But CND was largely identified with the anti-militarist Left wing of the Labour party, not least since the political constraints were such that there was an incentive for Labour to function as an umbrella, incorporating Left radicalism, while it was in opposition. The split did not include the radical wing of the party, as was the case with the German SPD, but rather the Right-wing, thus depriving the BGP of the politically and ideologically experienced elements of the radical Left. By the mid-1980s, Labour began searching for a middleof-the-road image, leaving the more radical issues of nuclear armament, disadvantaged social groups and immigration without a vehicle for political expression. However, PEOPLE had already been established in 1973, before nuclear and peace issues began dominating the political scene again. The natural political home for radical protest remained the Left. The Greens therefore did not benefit from the NSMs until the 1990s.10 The reason for this is complex. Whereas the inclination of the German Left – as convincingly shown by Markovits and Gorski – was the parliamentary route, from which radicals were barred due to the changes in the SPD and the ban on the communist parties, in Britain, where rejection of parliamentary politics under the existing system is part of the long and developed protest culture, it differs. The presence of anarchists, socialists, libertarians and other protest groups at the margins of British politics was always an integral part of the system, and therefore less ‘new’, less explosive and less hostile to political parties. As Otto Frieder, a German MEP told his British Green hosts during the first conference marking the British Green–Left convergence: ‘You British always have a problem with the state, it is your enemy; we, who come from continental Europe, think differently: the state is us.’11 Conditions for Green politics in Britain were unfavourable because the political parties, and especially Labour, tried to achieve wide coalitions without alienating their radical wing; the NSMs, which were always a political actor, rejected party politics, and were therefore unimpressed by the BGP; and the bureaucratic system was open to NGOs and environmental organisations which were coopted in a consultative capacity. Thus, although adamant in their environmental demands, they were less anxious about changing the system. However, the reluctance of the NSMs – women, peace and human rights activists – to join the Green Party, at least initially, had to do with classbased politics and the ideological project as it was first conceived. In her groundbreaking speech of 1988, Margaret Thatcher claimed that Tory philosophy and the case for protecting the environment were the same,

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describing the Conservative Party as ‘friends of the Earth’.12 The conservatives as the party of conserving nature was therefore not an inconceivable concept. The fact that the philosophy of the Tories championed deregulation and low taxes – hardly reconcilable with environmental politics – did not play a major role. In the British context, environmental issues were seen as middle-class niceties, rather than workers’ concerns. The impetus of PEOPLE was against population explosion, economic growth and the use of natural resources. This could be aligned with restricting both immigration and Third World development – highly disturbing to the sensibilities of radical Left activists, so close to the post-1968 protest, and to the romanticisation of foreign liberation movements. The NSMs were suspicious of ecologists, and it was not until 1996 that the head of the CND joined the BGP, and the Green-Left convergence took a hesitant step, highly resented by the Green party, towards reconciliation with the British Left. Finally, the UK party system played a key role. While in the German case, the political breakthrough came from the Greens, changing the German political system from a two and a half, to a four-party system, the promising attempt in the British scene came from, and went with, the SDP and Liberal alliance.13 Given the loosening of the traditional nexus between class and party, albeit less impressive in Britain than in other advanced democracies,14 the historic opportunity to change the Left–Right polarisation was entrusted to the hands of the Alliance which sought to recapture the centre ground of British politics. These events, enjoying limited success in their own sphere, overshadowed the advent of the Ecology Party between 1975 and 1985. By 1989, conditions were ripe for the short upsurge of Green politics in Britain: the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe, recurring environmental problems, food and water safety issues following the privatisation of the water authority, and the prominent place awarded global problems (the greenhouse effect, ozone layer and global warming) by the mass media.15 Only then were the circumstances of party politics favourable to the BGP, as Thatcher mentioned in her surprising 1988 speech, asserting that ‘no generation has a freehold on this Earth. All we have is a life tenancy – with a full repairing lease.’16 The public acknowledged this but the mid-term elections cast a protest vote against her party; the SDP omitted ‘ecology’ from its core issues as they supported a new nuclear plant in 1988; Labour’s own revision of nuclear disarmament policy (1989) better positioned the Greens to appeal to radical anti-militarists in the 1990s.17 The BGP could, at last, be seen as the only party serious about environmental and disarmament issues. However, the prospects for a political revolution, already bleak under the gradualist British culture, and given the failure of the liberal alliance, seemed dim. Ironically, electoral revolution necessitates top-down action which the party holding the majority would have to take, thus undermining its own power. It would then risk a system which might jeopardise its

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chances of obtaining the powers it has under the current system which endowed it with its overall majority. Also relevant to the background of the BGP is the British position in the changing advanced industrial world. First, unlike the prosperous position of other OECD countries, Britain was not chasing ever-accelerated economic growth; and was facing relative economic decline. Deindustrialisation meant that pollution levels were decreasing, while unemployment and economic concerns persistently topped the political agenda.18 Second, still dominated by class-based politics, the traditional animosity between tradeunionists and environmental issues, expressed as ideological estrangement between free-market and environmental regulations, alienated environmental issues from both traditional Left and Right voters. The lack of interest of the radical cadre, the lack of appeal to the traditional classes, and the belated awareness by the BGP of the interrelations between social and environmental concerns, further reduced the chances of the Britons to light up the Green torch. Finally, since 1979, Britain had been in the midst of a radical Right revolution. The Thatcherite revolution propagated values diametrically opposed to Green aspirations: competitiveness, crude individualism, a leisure-oriented lifestyle, self-ownership and wealth accumulation, and a particularly virulent consumerism made the free-market into the ‘political commons’. Consumer-oriented Britain surrendered to the materialist obsession and political disinterest which haunted the emerging middle-classes, planting the seeds for a counterrevolution – when people acknowledged the devastating effect of dismantling the welfare state. Given the context of a rigid institutional democracy in Britain, and its shaky transition to the status of advanced industrial nation, the prospects of a comprehensive Green project, encompassing varied social movements, struggling to elevate environmental issues to political status, and to redefine the political by the revival of participatory democracy seemed gloomy. Should the BGP project be restricted to a confined, more achievable environmental project, less ambitious and yet more attainable? After all, it appears that since 1989 the BGP has been, finally, the only party which can truly claim to focus on environmental matters. Environmental policies vs. Green ideologies The subject of the environment and British politics has been addressed in several books. One is Young’s The Politics of the Environment, which introduces the multidimensional topic of environmental problems on individual and local, regional and national, transnational and global levels. He observes Green protest, particularly the changing nature of the environmental lobby; Green politics, with reference to the failure of the BGP to take off; and international dimensions – the Earth summit and the role of the European Commission. Young further reviews different areas of environmental policies and

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assesses the change, the future prospects of sustainable development and the role of different shades of Greens within the framework of environmental change. Another is John McCormick’s British Politics and the Environment. It addresses the issue of environmental policies in Britain, focusing on the role of the environmental lobby in the British policy process and its responses to the Thatcher administration. On the question of whether the environment is a major policy area in Britain, McCormick concludes: The environmental lobby was big and active, but it was politically marginalised. For many people ‘the environment’ meant simply protection of the countryside … Despite Thatcherite rhetoric, Thatcherite action was hesitant and conditional, and the much heralded white paper (‘The Common Inheritance’, 1990, G.T.) proved hugely disappointing to the environmental lobby. The major opposition parties were beginning to claim improved green credentials, but none could claim a coherent environmental policy … There is still little sign that Britain – under Conservatives or Labour – will move into the first rank of environmental achievers … Political scientists still pay almost no attention to the environment.19 The negligible role played by the Green Party in both areas, might raise the question of whether the Green Party offers a wide enough locus for analysing the British case, or whether the analysis should incorporate the more radical environmental organisations, for example, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Earth First! Environmental policies are indeed a worthwhile area of study, since they surfaced in public consciousness in the 1970s, were acknowledged as political problems during the 1980s, and are likely to remain on the agenda. However, these policies analysed on their own terms, despite their interpretation as an ideological project, will differ depending on the political party in question. Indeed, we challenge the misconception that environmental problems are scientific, and could be dealt with regardless of one’s social and political beliefs. Our project aims to delineate the political ideology of Green parties – in which ecological perceptions play a central role. However, underlying questions remain: what is the ideological project in terms of the historical analysis, the social vision and the political transformation sought by the Green Parties, and has a new political ideology indeed emerged? Thus, raising political awareness to environmental issues, is quite different from taking the politicisation of environmentalism as the basis of a new worldview, which challenges the values-system and the political reality by providing an alternative vision of the good society. The rise of environmental awareness, the acknowledgement of ecological themes as political problems, and the relations between the environmental lobby, the party

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system and the public agenda are essential to the context of this study. However, these issues merely map the political opportunities and electoral constraints in which Green Parties act, exercising an influence on the strategic course and the role Greens claim to play on the national political scene, but they do not render the ideological project superfluous. The next chapter examines the formative stage of the BGP’s political ideology. As was the case in Germany, the first attempt was indeed to form a united ecological movement with which the history of the British Greens commences.

9 ‘The Movement’: from Survivalism to Sustainability

A movement for survival The 1960s saw the last spasm of colonialism in the wake of which an assortment of problems regarding imports and trade, natural resources, population growth and immigration, threatened the balance of the industrial nations. The Cold War, the arms race and the emerging evidence of environmental problems was accompanied by new scientific advice on the interrelated nature of ecological and economic processes. In Britain, the situation was particularly acute, since its waning world power was coupled with a process of deindustrialisation and economic decline. It is in this context that we should consider The Ecologist, a magazine first published in 1970, and which ever since has combined ecological research with a distinctive ecological ideology, strongly influenced by the perceptions of its editor Edward Goldsmith. In 1972, The Ecologist published a Blueprint for Survival, hoping to establish an ecologically-based new philosophy of life which would instigate a Movement for Survival. The newly formed political party, PEOPLE, adopted the Blueprint as its first political manifesto. In 1973 the first national conference was held, and a Manifesto for Survival drafted on the basis of the Blueprint. In 1974 PEOPLE ran five candidates for the national elections (including Goldsmith), and as a result, some one hundred people joined the party. The first tensions arose, the founders of the party departed, and a new Manifesto for Sustainable Society – a document which was to play a central role in the ideological evolution of the Green Party – was written by the newcomers, and ratified by the national conference. The rising tensions among different factions, the defection of the founding group and the emergence of a new leadership led the now Ecology Party down a different political path. The discussion will now trace the ideological developments during this formative stage.

A Blueprint for Survival The Limits to Growth report (1972) written by the MIT project team known as The Club of Rome,1 made the first significant breakthrough into public 184

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awareness. For the first time, a distinguished group of scientists, officials and economists had ratified a thesis for which evidence was gradually accumulating: ‘If the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production and resources depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.’2 The importance of the report, besides the high profile of its authors, which alone added kudos to its thesis, lay in three major areas: it outlined five elements which they called the ‘problematic of the modern world’, focusing on international and global trends; it advanced an integrated model which highlighted the interconnections of these problems and it propounded the necessity of ‘a realistic, long-term goal that can guide mankind to the equilibrium society and the (necessity of) human will to achieve this goal’.3 The argument was that, given the willingness and an interdisciplinary global approach, ‘it is possible to alter these trends and to establish a condition of ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future’.4 While underlying the goal of a sustainable ecological and economic future, the report lacked the political course to attain it. In Britain, the editorial board of The Ecologist took upon themselves to write A Blueprint for Survival which would provide a strategy for change.5 The authors listed four considerations when publishing Blueprint: the inevitability of ‘the breakdown of society and the irreversible disruption of the life-support systems on this planet’; the reluctance of governments to deal with ‘the relevant facts’; with reference to the need to complement the Limits to Growth report, they sensed the need to establish ‘a national movement to act at a national level, and if need be to assume political status and contest the next general election’. They thereby hoped to herald an international movement; and provide an underpinning alternative philosophy as the authors believed that ‘such a movement cannot hope to succeed unless it has previously formulated a new philosophy of life whose goals can be achieved without destroying the environment and a precise and comprehensive programme for bringing about the sort of society in which it can be implemented’.6 Hence, the most ambitious goal was to diagnose the society’s current malfunctions, to influence the government into action, to initiate a political movement on the national level and to provide it with a new philosophy of life. The historical analysis was thrifty: ‘The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sustainable.’7 The radical change needed lay in reducing human numbers and the per capita consumption which were responsible for disrupting ecosystems, depleting resources and undermining the very foundation of survival. If, so far, the analysis goes hand in hand with the Club of Rome aspirations, the explication which follows is cast from within a rationale bearing the fingerprints of Edward Goldsmith, the editor of The Ecologist, based on a peculiar

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understanding of ecology which was to beset the later BGP well into its first decade.8 Humanity, we are told, depends for its survival on the predictability of ecological systems. Fortunately, this predictability is granted since All ecosystems tend towards stability, and … the more diverse and complex the ecosystem, the more stable it is … By stability is meant the ability to return to the original position after any change, instead of being forced into totally different patterns – and hence the predictability.9 Encapsulated here is the new philosophy of life offered by Blueprint. Before examining its social implications, note that in regard to natural ecological systems, these assertions were misleading, albeit expressing the common wisdom of the early ecologists. First, the analysis implies that ecosystems have a goal outside themselves: a system ‘must be regarded as goal-directed, and its goal is the maintenance of stability’;10 however, ecosystems do not function teleologically, and stability is at best an aggregated scientific observation about the way ecosystems operate over time. Second, ‘stability’ alleges a lack of change which is not the case with ecosystems, since evolution is inevitably about change and adaptation to change triggered either by physical change or by interaction between different species. No ecosystem is stable, though patterns of change can be discerned. Third, taking the diversity of species to be an absolute indicator of stability and hence of desirability is contested. Diversity of species substantially differs among ecosystems. Under environmentally extreme conditions – deserts, shores, glaciers – the number of species is usually small even though the ecosystem is in its climax optimal stage; these are not defective ecosystems, just ones adapted to extreme environments. The measurement of diversity of species is context-specific, and can usually provide a good indicator of environmental damage caused by humans – if an equivalent undamaged ecosystem is known. This is significant since The Ecologist based its credibility on its reliance on truth revealed through scientific ecology. However, when ecologists refined their conceptual tools, the primitive model on which the understanding of Blueprint rests remained ‘stable’. An interesting transformation can be traced with regard to the political ecologists’ conception of science. Blueprint was introduced by a ‘Statement of Support’ signed by dozens of scientists, thus basing its reputation on its scientific basis. Science, political ecologists reckoned, could prove a fifth column, the pillar on which the old social construction relies but which would be pivotal in transforming it into the new philosophy of life. However, the changing perceptions of scientists, and the slow movement towards the new worldview, led Goldsmith to argue that ‘the ecologists were subsequently convinced by the government to change the essence of ecology itself’.11 Many political ecologists concluded now, that a new scientific paradigm was

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needed. The prominence of Lovelock’s Gaia theory, ‘Spaceship Earth’ model and Capra’s system theory provided this new scientific paradigm which dominated the environmental discourse of the 1980s.12 In the face of the failure of these models to change humanity’s course, the final resort was to complement it with a new religion, much in the fashion of Bahro’s analysis. Goldsmith’s The Way, but also Schumacher’s call for ‘metaphysical reconstruction’, adopted by many Greens, and the consequent stress on spiritualism, are testimonies to that.13 While this disillusionment was gradual, in the 1970s trust was put in science; the transfer of science into the social discourse produced inherent problems for the new philosophy of life. These problems can be seen distinctly when the ecologically unfounded ‘logic of ecosystems’ is applied to human societies. Indeed, it seemed natural for the authors of the Blueprint to place human and biological systems under a single umbrella. The whole point of the argument was that ‘Homo Sapiens himself depends on the continued resilience of those ecological networks’;14 human beings are part of nature and therefore the ecological system within which people live – their food, territory, population and so on – can be subjected to the same methods of observation used in ecology. It is actually not easy to discern just where the argument becomes flawed. The possible failure of food supplies, the likely exhaustion of resources and the fear of population overgrowth are fundamental to the analysis and well taken. In treating the ‘collapse of society’, Blueprint’s observation that developed nations consume disproportionately to undeveloped ones, and the contention that ‘this vast differential is a cause of much and growing discontent, made worse by our attempts at cultural uniformity on behalf of an expanding economic market’ might be simplistic, but they are nevertheless plausible. It concluded with the assertion that ‘in the rush to industrialise we break up communities, so that controls which formally regulated behaviour are destroyed before alternatives can be provided. Urban drift is one result of this process, with a consequent rise in anti-social practices, crime, delinquency and so on’15 and the greater likelihood of mass unemployment and possible epidemics which cannot be restricted to the undeveloped world due to international mobility and trade. What is the problem then? As long as the analysis tackles human influences on the environment, and the likely outcomes which will in turn affect humans, the argument stands. The problem, surely, lies with analysing distinctive social situations from a pseudo-ecological conceptual framework, imposing as it were the rationale attributed to ecosystems on what human society should do, deducing the ought from their way of reading the is. Note that there are really two problems here, one being ‘reading the is’ – imposing an ecological perspective on how human societies function; the other being to prescribe the ‘ought’ on the basis of this reading. Consider the former: a system in the Blueprint’s analysis is defined as goal-directed – thereby imposing human features on ecosystems; this goal is stability ‘best defined

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as a system’s ability to maintain its basic features – in other words to survive in face of environmental change’.16 Then we learn that ‘perhaps the most important feature of the ecosphere is its degree of organisation’17 and that ‘there is no reason to suppose that this notion of organisation does not apply equally well to human social systems’18 and finally that ‘Hierarchy is another word for organisation.’19 Thus, Blueprint suggests that industrialisation and urbanisation are fundamentally wrong since they breach the ecological logic with which society is supposed, according to the analysis, to comply – in other words, a deviation from the norm: ‘the vast and chaotic human societies in which we are living today are by no means normal. If man has been on this planet for a million and a half years … it is only in the last 150 years that he has become an industrialist’.20 Consequently, the industrial society disintegrates: ‘In a disintegrated society … there will be an increase in delinquency, violence, and all the various forms of retreatism, such as drugs, drink, strange religious cults etc., and mental disease.’21 Social ills are portrayed as a consequence of transgressing the normal way in which societies should behave. The argument is not that societies should be small, integrated and diverse, based on value judgements as to what comprises the ideal society – with which one can argue on a moral or political basis – but that scientific laws are being violated. This violation supposedly results from disrupting the levels of natural control, one example of which is the family: ‘the family, which clearly represents the first level of human organisation is a universal feature of all human societies and there is no example of its suppression without the most serious social consequences’.22 In Bringing Order to Chaos Goldsmith goes further by arguing that ‘if a husband and wife have similar jobs … and willing to fulfil the household duties, then what is to hold them together? Clearly, feminism is merely a symptom of the advanced disintegration of our society.’23 The model against which disintegrated societies are compared is that of traditional societies. The integrity of such societies is secured in cultural and religious patterns which serve to preserve society and to enhance a hierarchical order of prestige in which the functions crucial for its survival are highly valued (for example, hunters in hunter-gatherer societies).24 What is, therefore, to be done with the ‘chaotic and disintegrated societies’ which infringe natural hierarchies? Here the analysis takes an interesting turn, in line with the above assertion that ‘the more diverse and complex the ecosystem, the more stable it is’.25 Thus, the Blueprint argues, there are only two ways of disposing with hierarchy: ‘one is to accept chaos and with it a-systemic controls such as dictators; the other is to reduce the size of the society’.26 Counterintuitively, chaos is identified with dictators while ‘order’ is correlated with small-sized, self-regulating communities, with control mechanisms triggered to ensure survival, the by-product of which is stability. ‘Chaos’ is a historical observation; ‘order’ is the sought social

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outcome achieved through communities. A fundamental recommendation made by Blueprint is decentralisation, which it describes as ‘the most radical change we propose in the creation of a new social system’.27 The vision with which we are by now well acquainted reappears: small, self-sufficient communities relying on their own food supply and at peace with their environment. Why should we suppose that dispersing, say, the population of London all over England in small communities would preserve the environment, rather than, say, abolish whatever non-agricultural land reserves still exist in Britain, is not at all clear. What is apparent, though, is that this conception of environment centres upon humanlaboured landscape rather than natural environment. The notion of ‘pristine nature’, or even natural ecosystems, so central to the perception of ecologists, is missing from this philosophy of life, presumably since the focus is on the survival of people on land, recreating agrarian communities, which despite the romanticism of traditional cultures embody an exploitative rather than ethical perspective towards nature.28 A sense of anthropocentrism prevails throughout the Blueprint, and the environment is perceived from a purely instrumental perspective. Some of the positions set out in Blueprint are extremely reactionary, others anarchic and radical. Two examples will illustrate this. First, in relation to population growth, Blueprint suggests that society should ‘provide contraceptives free of charge, free sterilisation and abortion on demand’29 and bring ‘an end to immigration’. Manifestly, there is no compassion for life as such, which sharply contrasts pro-life lobbies elsewhere. It is a pure survivalist perspective in which morality plays no independent role, but is subordinated to the laws of nature, which, Blueprint argues, are also the laws of God.30 It is, however, innovative in its radical survivalism which defies conventional Left/Right positions due to the new framework from within which the worldview is prescribed. The other example of a position resulting solely from survivalist notions based on the conception of levels of control and ecological perspective is in regard to politics. On the face of it, decentralisation seems to complement democratisation. Indeed, Blueprint stresses that ‘the small community should be the basic unit of society … (but) basic precepts of ecology, such as the interrelatedness of all things … must (provide) an efficient and sensitive communications network between all communities … We emphasise that our goal should be to create community feeling and global awareness, rather than that dangerous and sterile compromise which is nationalism.’31 If we think that the diverse, plural universe of inter-communicating communities is inclined to be democratic, we are told that ‘mass democracy is, in fact, a contradiction in terms,’32 and, in contrast to dictatorially inclined mass democracies, in small communities ‘the closest approximation to a political institution is the council of elders … The absence of formal institutions … is in fact associated with discipline and the strictest possible adherence to the tribal code of ethics’.33 Decentralisation does not entail democratisation.

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More strange still, the endorsement of small, traditional and diverse communities entails neither pluralism nor multiculturalism. An editorial article of The Ecologist, ‘Basic Principles of Cultural Ecology’, explains that cultural patterns have different responses to the same environmental conditions; different ethnic groups cannot, therefore, share the same niche. Consequently, either the territorial or the ecological niches must be separated. The common vision of integration in an egalitarian society in which all enjoy the same education and so on, is undesirable both aesthetically and scientifically, since cultural stability is achieved by cultural diversity just as biological stability is the consequence of biological variety. Taking Northern Ireland as a case in point, the editorial advocates separating the two communities territorially, and asks ‘should we not be willing to accept a measure of inconvenience in order to establish a stable society?’34 The vision is one of separated (homogenous) diverse traditional societies, based on a peculiar ecological interpretation (since in natural systems species interact within the same ecosystem and diversity is among different species, whereas human societies are all part of one and the same species). Comparing the Blueprint’s philosophy with that of the Right-wing German ecologists analysed earlier is striking in two respects. First, while both German value-conservatives and British survivalists attempt to rely on ecological perceptions, and use science to justify their social perceptions through a rejection of economic growth, industrialisation and human hubris, the political conclusions are very different. Value-conservatives like Gruhl have openly warned against a war over natural resources, advocating an Ecodictatorship which would control resources and distribute them centrally. The British Ecologists, however, abhor dictatorship since ‘a dictator gears his society to the achievement of what is usually an arbitrary goal regardless of environmental requirements. This can therefore only increase society’s instability.’35 Thus, in the peculiar concept of Blueprint, ‘in communities small enough for the general will to be worked out and expressed by individuals … people, having learnt the limits of a stable society, would be free to order their own lives within them as they wished’.36 The reason why these diverse homogenous communities would not act arbitrarily, is presumably because the external system would be stable. Secondly, the position of the value-conservatives, as we have seen, had a unique German facet to it. Science was the guise under which nationalistic German positions could be asserted given post-war circumstances. Was there any peculiar British perspective to Blueprint’s stance? Britain supports a population well in excess of the carrying capacity of the land owing to its ability to import large amounts of food … unless we are willing (and able) to perpetuate an even greater inequality of distribution than exists today, Britain must be self-supporting.37

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It is in this context that Blueprint demands that the government acknowledge the demographic problem and put a stop to immigration. Goldsmith, on his part, goes a step further to argue that ‘systems which are sufficiently differentiated such as biological organisms and societies will tend to develop mechanisms which will enable them to exclude foreign bodies likely to menace their integrity’.38 Thus, a picture of an empire in dissolution is perceived by Blueprint. Britain, which had in the past depended on the colonies for trade and imports, and offered Her Majesty’s colonial subjects British citizenship, must change its self-perception and, in view of ecological dangers to survival, should begin to look inward. It should fence itself off from potential disease-carriers from the Third World, deindustrialise not because it has no other choice but to redevelop itself as an agriculturally self-sufficient society, relying on its own oil and food resources. It should adopt an orchestrated plan to implement the Blueprint’s recommendations for controlling population growth, tax usage of raw materials, introduce organic farming, provide an integrated research programme, terminate road building, develop alternative technologies, redistribute government and train teachers in order to establish networks of self-sufficient, self-regulated communities.39 In its conclusion, Blueprint calls for establishing a Movement for Survival. Its aim would be ‘to influence governments and in particular that of Britain, into taking those measures most likely to lead to the stabilisation and hence the survival of our society’.40 The structure envisaged by Blueprint is ‘a coalition of organisations concerned with environmental issues, each of which would remain autonomous’. The best way of achieving its aims was described in the general framework published in the Blueprint for Survival. Here, it explicitly specifies that membership can only be obtained through association in one of the organisations.41 Ironically, the fortunes of the movement for survival were to be somewhat different.

The ‘PEOPLE’ Party On 14 March 1972, Prime Minister Edward Heath announced in the House of Commons that talks were to be held with the Blueprint’s authors;42 the public debate was on its way. However, the environmental organisations, apart from the five which originally endorsed the Blueprint, refused to join in. Instead, Goldsmith was flooded with letters from individuals who had not read the fine print. Among them were the Whittackers, who earlier that year, influenced by an article in Playboy written by Paul Ehrlich, author of The Population Bomb (1968), established the ‘Club of Thirteen’. Six of the club members believed that the only way to rescue society would be to establish a party. To this end, they placed an advertisement in the Coventry Evening Telegraph on 31 January 1973, in which the existence of the PEOPLE Party was announced, and individuals were invited to stand as candidates.43

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At its first national conference, PEOPLE adopted the Blueprint for Survival as its manifesto. Tony Whittacker described the relation with Blueprint: Blueprint was pivotal … Goldsmith was being flooded with ideas, contacts and people and he didn’t know what to do about it. And then he got these two solicitors in Coventry who had an office organisation … He asked us to contact all the people on the list and see what we could do with them. I can’t say we converted much hard interest from those people. The politics frightened them.44 The Whittackers were convinced, back in 1972, that if PEOPLE had not achieved Government by 1990, time would have run out; they tried to portray this message of urgency by seeking to field 600 candidates.45 Not only did the new party fail to learn from the downfall of the Blueprint’s endeavour to create a Movement for Survival, but – trapped within the idea that the natural supporters of the party would be members of environmental organisations – it wrote to virtually all the people on Goldsmith’s list and all the membership of Friends of the Earth, the Conservation Society, the Ramblers Association and vegetarian groups, inviting them to a ‘Survival’ conference. To the dismay of the organisers, the booking remained in double figures. The conference was cancelled. Environmentalist groups were decisively not interested in ecological politics. PEOPLE had to find its membership by other methods; running candidates for election was only one alternative. With the Blueprint for Survival as its manifesto, PEOPLE encumbered itself with what Wall describes as ‘Goldsmith’s problematic and prejudices (which) were to dominate the organisation until the 1979 General Election, giving it a strong yet controversially unique ideological base’.46 Goldsmith, however, failed to produce the new manifesto for the party, despite being signed up for the job, and in 1974 PEOPLE wrote its Manifesto for Survival for the approaching elections. Manifesto for survival Their manifesto introduction seems to adopt wholeheartedly not merely the ecological analysis of Limits to Growth, but the awkward social analysis of the Blueprint: In achieving our sophisticated industrial technology we have brought about a gradual disintegration of society, by over loading the social system with too many people, by increasing mobility which hampers proper socialisation, and by reducing the power of public opinion necessary for society’s capacity for self-regulation.47 ‘The many manifestations of worsening social breakdown’, argues Survival, ‘are mere symptoms of the real problems arising from “the careless

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way in which we have let the obsessive quest for material things dominate the process of industrialisation.” Curiously, PEOPLE believes therefore that a stable, ecologically sound way of life will eventually develop whether we like it or not, but that the risks of allowing it to do so “naturally” are unacceptable – and avoidable.’48 Goldsmith’s logic reappears: it is in the nature of systems to become stable, and this will eventually happen intentionally or not. The social vision promoted ‘a transition from a growthoriented society to one whose guiding principles are minimum disruption of ecological processes; maximum conservation of materials and energy; a population in which recruitment equals loss; and a social system in which the individual can enjoy rather than feel restricted by the first three conditions’49 – a word by word adoption of the Blueprint’s declaration. The rhetoric of Goldsmith’s ideology certainly prevails, however, the manifesto echoes the discourse of the citizens’ initiatives in Germany.50 A strong emphasis on anti-bureaucracy, anti-industrialism and anti-politics discloses a deep-rooted dismay with the system. Interestingly, the notion of crisis which dominated the ecological discourse in the early days of the German Greens does not appear in Survival, but the decisive rejection of utopia is just as strong: ‘There is no such place as utopia and never will be.’51 Thus, a hard-nosed realism is characteristic of the British PEOPLE. Their idea of a Stable Society is one in which ‘We shall aim at a society in which basic needs are met, but sheer luxuries will become harder to obtain.’52 Life will have to be adjusted to limiting factors, notably limited natural resources. PEOPLE rejects, in a radical fashion, the full employment agenda of other parties. A National Income Scheme was among the radical demands it advocated, and was the cornerstone which united Right-wingers with BGP Leftists. The Scheme, which was the brainchild of Clive Lord, the only person to have remained in the party from 1974 to 1997,53 argued for a weekly payment for every person – adult or child – regardless of whether they had a job. It seriously encouraged small enterprise and ‘the “little man” – the painter and decorator, the cobbler, the small shopkeeper, and the rag and bone man who will become the front line in the recycling industries on which much future prosperity will depend’.54 It perpetuated the preindustrial state as a postindustrial vision, and supplemented a strong tendency to support decentralisation and a return to smaller communities. Science and redistribution were both perceived as necessary measures for the transition to a stable society. Thus, a taste of dystopia clearly emerges from the text, reflecting the situation in Britain as experienced by the PEOPLE in the early 1970s: deindustrialisation and job losses, economic decline and the global oil crisis with its recession and grave ecological implications. In terms of politics, PEOPLE did not propose changing the parliamentary system, it only wished parties to address matters of national concern rather than party interests. The manifesto adopted Blueprint’s policies on population,

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the economy, agriculture and transport. Perhaps most revealing, in the defence section, Survival advocates the replacement of the ‘small, technically sophisticated armed services’ with ‘a compulsory national part-time militia. The resulting millions of trained potential guerrillas represents the ultimate deterrent to any would-be occupying power.’55 This is complemented by promoting ‘self-sufficiency in the life of individuals and the nation, initially foreign policy will be … cutting Britain off from some of its links’. Abandoning the EEC is a case in point. Thus, the breakdown of the Empire was clearly reflected in the manifesto: Britain should withdraw from its international stance, and seek to become an inward-looking country, self-sufficient in food and oil, rejecting immigration and preparing for future invasion by making every citizen part of an armed militia capable of self-defence. In sum, the PEOPLE party presented a mixture of radical conservative thinking emerging from the problem of what they believed were questions of survival for humanity as a whole, and Britain in particular. A 1974 election pamphlet read: ‘Put PEOPLE in the parliament and help win today’s “Battle on Britain” … (which is) cleaning up the debris in both the streets and the minds of people … It is time we rid ourselves of the attitudes of “them and us” and give this country back to its citizens. PEOPLE puts politics in perspective.’ Before the 1974 election, the Manifesto for Survival was published and some hundred people joined the party. Five candidates stood for election. A wave of new activists joined the party in the aftermath of the election, and the first serious dispute arose in the June 1974 conference. The Whittackers and Goldsmith were conservatives with pedigrees.56 The new members had a liberal background, and were greatly annoyed by Right-wing policies on immigration, emigration and so on. The ratification of the Manifesto for Survival which was brought before the conference, became almost impossible since the newly founded party could hardly survive its first wave of support, showing even poorer results in the October 1974 elections. Local PEOPLE groups found it hard to survive the internal debates, external economic recession and hostile media. 1975 saw the departure of the Whittackers to self-sufficiency in Devon, proposing, as a departure gift, to change the name to the Ecology Party since, as Lesley put it ‘voters did not connect PEOPLE with ecology’.57 Whereas the German Greens had to wait for the departure of the Green Right-wing authoritarians in order to add to the anti-growth, anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist, anti-bureaucracy and anti-megamanagement critique an agreed social vision, the British case was different. The philosophical building blocks of the Blueprint and PEOPLE were always decentralisation into small, self-sufficient, self-governed communities. These same building blocks supported different worldviews even at this early stage in the life of the party. Thus, while The Ecologist devised a rigid conceptual pseudo-ecological framework in which control, order and stability were cardinal, the founders of PEOPLE were inclined to this analysis, but from the position of their

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own anxieties regarding the survival of society. This was particularly the case in view of the centralisation of economic and political power and anxieties emanating from deindustrialisation. PEOPLE sought therefore to ensure British self-sufficiency in an agricultural artisan society rather than in trade-dependent megalopolises. The view of the newcomers to the party was again informed by ecological problems, but decentralisation, communities and cultural diversity were clustered with anti-statism, anarchism and social justice concerns. All tendencies aspired to sustainable communities and alternative ways of life, if from markedly different political dispositions. The coexistence of their views was to determine the fortunes of the party organisation and its ideological outlook, a fundamental role in the foundation of which was played by the Manifesto for Sustainable Society written by a newcomer Peter Allen, and ratified by the party.58

The Ecology Party’s Manifesto for Sustainable Society The Manifesto for Sustainable Society (hereafter Sustainability) contains, in 1976 as well as in 1996, the philosophical basis for BGP policies. This basis has proved longer-lasting than any of the other parts of Sustainability, even though it was not reflected in electoral results (the party barely survived the 1976 elections). Its subsequent problems were successive changes from the messengers’ strategy in the late 1970s, to the Electoralists strategy of the late 1980s and the Decentralists of the 1990s. Reference to Sustainability will be made in later chapters. Here, the basic philosophy will be reviewed, and an overview of the complementary policies presented. The most significant change already appears in the title itself: the manifesto of 1976 marked a watershed between the doomsday survivalism of PEOPLE, with its emphasis on population and security, and the aspiration for sustainability seen in the positive vision of the Ecology Party in subsequent years. Philosophical basis The philosophical basis of Sustainability opens with the assertion that the aspiration behind the Industrial Revolution, namely that of easing poverty has not vindicated itself. The rich nations had become richer while the poor became poorer. The Ecology Party adopted an unexpected vantage point from which to launch its attack on economic growth. It continues: PB101 The relentless pursuit of economic growth, accompanied by rising material expectations within an ever increasing world population, has brought humankind to the brink of a disaster which is unprecedented in history, and yet, still, so few people realise that we cannot go on indefinitely exploiting and wasting the natural resources of a finite world. PB102 … (T)he Green Party supports the idea of a steady state economy, that is an economy of stock rather than flow. The earth is a steady state

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system, as are the organisms that inhabit it: thus the only natural and probably sustainable economic system is one that obeys the same laws.59 It seems a rather simple syllogism – 1. economic growth is inappropriate in a finite resources world; 2. the Earth, on which humans depend, is a steady-state system; therefore, a steady-state economy is needed. But why should anyone accept the conclusion, given that the behaviour of ‘natural’ systems does not imply that human society should (or can) behave in the same way? Surely, a philosophical argument regarding the good society is needed to convince people to adhere to such an interpretation of economic sustainability. Curiously though, the philosophical basis merely asserts ‘facts’ rather than presenting an ideological argument for a new worldview. The reason lies within the argument itself: it is the only natural thing to do. The failure is not one of action – but of realisation. Hence the task of the Green Party is to open peoples’ eyes; and then to let reality speak for itself. The criticism is not of economic growth itself – it is of its pursuit, ‘rising material expectations’. Changing this consumerist ethos requires a change in the basic philosophy. Thus, the Philosophical Basis is said to be: More than a statement of a new ideal and a list of steps by which it can be achieved, it is a challenge to the established view of the nature of our present social, political and economic system. It is such a radical challenge that it can only be borne by a new, independent political party, for it requires the existing political forces to change too many of their basic philosophies. From henceforward the main political battle will not be between Left and Right in the traditional sense, but between the supporters of steady state economy and growth. (PB103) The challenge of the Greens is hence a challenge to the basic philosophies of growth-oriented parties vs. those seeking a sustainable society. The pessimism of the survivalists and the PEOPLE’s dystopian realists is dismissed: the Ecology Party presents a radical alternative to conventional growthpolitics. The ‘Case Against Economic Growth’, however, does not rely on an historical explanation, since ‘there is no doubt that the industrial world has improved its levels of affluence’. Rather, ‘what is in dispute is the belief that the nations of the Industrialised World can expect to continue … economic growth indefinitely into the future’ (PB201). This cautious, realistic approach is a rudimentary feature of the discourse that came to dominate the party. In marked contrast to the German Greens who harnessed resentment to the system by consistently denouncing the roots of the industrial ethos, blaming it for hubris and the original sin of modernity, the British would-be Greens abstained from passing judgement on the past. Indeed, it is already clear that the problem was one of acknowledging – in view of new evidence – that present levels of growth are unsustainable. It could therefore not have been

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an historical sin, since there was no evidence yet on this score. The project therefore was one of raising the awareness of present and future generations to the problems of economic growth. The focus on economic growth also decisively shifts the debate from issues of population to those of resources, consumption and expectations. Under ‘The Quest for a Sustainable Society’, the focus was firmly on Britain, for realistic reasons, since the party could not hope to influence the world at large: ‘it would seem practical in the first instance to treat Britain as the effective unit’ (PB302). Pragmatism is clearly in evidence even in the philosophical basis of the Ecology Party which the manifesto refers to as part of ‘the ecological movement’. Six principles of a sustainable society are put forward: ‘The overriding, unifying principle is that all human activity must be indefinitely sustainable’; stability; conservation; decentralisation; world-wide democratic coordination; society should guarantee access to basic material security. Even these principles tell the reader nothing about the content of the new worldview, that is, what the ‘good life’ is. It supplies only a framework of thinking about a new world order, leaving the contents to be determined by the decentralised communities themselves. Presented in this way, each of the party’s sub-ideologies could relate to the conceptual cluster from its own perspective. Ecologists could see these measures as derived from ecological models of ecosystems and therefore complying with natural laws; concerned citizens could focus on the basic provision of needs and the decentralised artisan communities; liberals could see them as measures aiming for self-determination, individual rights and privacy; and Left-anarchists could cast them in an ideological frame of libertarian social justice. None of these approaches explicitly dominate the text, although PB309 reads: ‘In summary, the main requirements of a sustainable society are based on these that have been given in A Blueprint for Survival by the editors of The Ecologist.’ The same four principles which PEOPLE’s Manifesto for Survival (1974) copied from Blueprint are incorporated into Sustainability. A distinct identity of the Ecology Party begins to form and the formative stage clearly influences the Party’s direction. In a distinctive Green fashion, the philosophical statement ends: The search for a sustainable society is a new venture: the Green Party is quite clear on the direction we must take, but no one can possibly know all the details from the outset … (it) offers not a panacea, but a foundation for a new way of life. (PB406) The new way of life is fleshed out by the policies which Sustainability offers. The range of policies starting with decentralisation and ending with defence can roughly be categorised as follows: polity (decentralisation, public administration, foreign policy, defence); economy (employment and

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industry, taxation, a national income scheme, social welfare); environment (energy, health, population, pollution, animal rights, natural resources, transport, built environment); agriculture (forestry and food, land tenure). Curiously, nature is not given an independent role in the programme. The environmental issues characteristically deal with human environment rather than with nature as such. Even animal rights issues are taken from a human ethics perspective: ‘The present assumption that animals can be used for any purpose that benefits human beings is not acceptable in an ecological society’ (AN100). Three points might serve to demonstrate the distance travelled from Survival to Sustainability. First, on defence issues, Survival positively encouraged nuclear research, while seeking to dismantle any future reactors. Sustainability unequivocally asserts: ‘the UK should abandon nuclear weapons unilaterally’ (DF300). Second, foreign policy relates to the survival of society in terms of concern ‘both with existing populations and future generations. This involves concern for the survival of the species, and for the safety and health of all peoples and their quality of life’ (F100). It is not mere survival, but meaningful life which is at stake; it is not only Britons, but all other peoples with which the Ecology Party is concerned. Indeed, the humanist input is especially prevalent in the discussion on decentralisation. If, for the survivalists, decentralisation was derived from an ecological principle, Sustainability begged to differ: Decentralisation is about a community-based way of life, embracing principles such as individual liberty, increased self-reliance and selfdetermination, and real control of the government of one’s own life. Nothing should be done at a higher level if it can be done at a lower one. An ecological society will be made up of self-governing communities of a variety of sizes which will regulate their own social and economic activities, limited only by a Bill of Rights approved by the population as a whole which safeguards the liberties of all individuals. (DC200) The manifesto elaborates on the liberty of the individual, local selfreliance, local self-determination, decentralisation of government and the economy, and population decentralisation in terms of redistribution between the rural and urban areas. Thus the democratic face of the Ecology Party was finally established. The libertarian-Leftist who composed the document left the national executive and the party shortly after.60

‘Options for the Ecology Movement’ Had the Manifesto for Sustainable Society been replaced by subsequent programmes, its importance would have been a discursive fossil, a testimony mainly to its time, just like the Manifesto for Survival. The document, however, still holds today, twenty years on, and the philosophical basis remained

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intact until 2000 – either because it successfully captures the sentiment of the different participants in the Ecology Party, or because there is little patience in the party with amending it as the main effort goes into policies. Both reasons interact to explain the longevity of the Philosophical Basis. The deliberate vagueness provides a useful way of accommodating the problems of the diverse groups within the party. The first thing to note is that Sustainability openly refers to the Ecological Movement, and seeks an ecological society. As the introduction to this chapter suggests, Sustainability contests the notion of a single ecological movement, on the grounds that environmental organisations are reluctant to be clustered as part of a greater whole, and instead are eager to fulfil their highly specific political lobby functions.61 Other forms of social movements, on the other hand, were rather suspicious – much in the same fashion that the New Left in Germany was – about the would-be reactionary nature of the ecology movement. Nevertheless, the Ecology Party’s perception of itself as part of an ecological movement is evident, and therefore constitutes its political identity – regardless of the actuality of the movement. The diversity of the party’s adherents, and the question of whether any philosophy unites them, is examined by Skolimowski, who sought ‘a comprehensive philosophy, or a conceptual framework’.62 Seeking to establish this conceptual framework, Skolimowski draws upon the four sub-movements which, in his mind, coalesce in the Ecology Movement, and unites what he defines as the core concepts of each into a comprehensive philosophy. Tellingly, a general remark introduces his analysis: ‘decentralisation … has become one of the unwarranted myths of the Ecology Movement’.63 With it, albeit unintentionally, he identifies the heart of the problem of constituting a united philosophy: decentralisation does not only mean different things to different groups, but potentially carries the seeds of communal self-determination, in which case, a united philosophy would be a misplaced concept: each and every community should be allowed to develop its own worldview.64 This can only occur if an ideological framework is developed, which can in turn accommodate the different currents, rather than providing a prescription for a shared ‘philosophy of life’. Doubt was thus cast on the viability of the party’s project. The theoretical difficulty does not impair the insight he gives into the internal dynamics of the four sub-movements: the decentralisation movement, ‘with its insistence on simplicity, self-reliance, individual redemption ‘do it yourself’; the New Left Movement ‘which insists on changing the parasitic economic system … its road to salvation is social while (that) of the decentralisation movement … is individual’; the environmental movement which ‘insists on the priority of the Ecological Habitat, on the necessity of keeping our (physical) environment and its resources intact’; for if this is not obtained, nothing else will be; and the quality of life movement, which ‘insists on the primacy of human values as the key to it

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all … and also insists that nature and other beings partake in the sacredness of which man is an aspect’.65 Skolimowski compresses these ideas further to conclude that simplicity, politics, environment and transcendence are the core concepts which should unite the ecology movement. The imperatives which he deduces from that are ‘behave in such a way as to preserve and enhance the unfolding evolution, … human life … (and) your own potential and your own spirituality through which you give meaning to your own life and by which you articulate the endowment of life at large’.66 By now, the critique of such an approach to philosophy (a word interestingly chosen by many activists in Britain in preference to ideology, although Skolimowski himself argues that ‘the ecology movement cannot be a matter of mere philosophy. It must be translated into tactics for living … It must also be translated into politics’67) should be readily discernible. Defining each of the movements on the basis of one central concept (simplicity, sociality, environment, quality of life) is simplistic, since each of the four movements relies heavily on all of these concepts. It is the unique configuration, the prioritisation and the translation of these beliefs into a political worldview which distinguishes them. Moreover, all of these concepts can equally be seen in, say, a conservative ideology. The problem is therefore twofold: first, what is the internal value system of each of the sub-movements; second, do they share a conceptual configuration which is distinct from other political philosophies, and yet accommodates them all? The dilemma is clear. On the one hand, there is a yearning for a comprehensive philosophy with a clear worldview and a political plan for transformation. On the other, there are very diverse, self-centred and fragmented sub-movements which provide loci for politics of identity, and are therefore reluctant to engage in any overarching, centralised political plan. There has to be a distinction between the sociological movements, the political strategy and their system of beliefs. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to tell whether all of these sub-movements were actually present within the British Green Party, since they were not forced to crystallise their philosophies. Thus, their shared identity remains inconclusive, due to the strategy adopted by the BGP. This ideological vagueness, frustrating as it may be for analysts of ideologies, was to acquire an ideological stature in and of itself in the era of the new leadership which came into office in 1977 and which attempted to sell a radical good in moderate clothing.

10 Politics: Seeing Green – the Simplicity of Radical Realism

The new national executive changed the logo of the Ecology Party into ECO ‘free of the cumbersome suffix “logy” ’1 because, as Jonathon Porritt, the best-known proponent of British Greens, and the newly elected co-chair conceded, ‘“Ecology” is still a rather daunting word, perhaps too scientific, too specialised to convey the full scope of the green perspective.’2 The controversy over the logo points to the difficulty of balancing scientism with political sound-bite in the hope of legitimating the message and appealing to a wider audience. However, ‘Discussion of type and style revealed a deeper ideological project, Porritt and Fleming sought to show that ‘ECO’ was a serious and professional Party, a Party able to govern, Doomsday was no longer on the agenda.’3 Survivalism proved unsustainable for long-term ecological politics, and the main change of ECO lay in its cautiously optimistic tone: ecologism is a necessity, but it is not too late – provided there is immediate action – to transform society; ecologism is a consequence, not a contradiction to an enlightened democratic creed. Thus, a 1977 pamphlet maintained that ‘Ecological policy making is a job we can do in our armchairs. All you need to do is to take the party’s two basic principles – Ecology and Democracy – plus any area of government policy and an appropriate policy will very often suggest itself quite quickly.’4 It highlighted that ecological awareness is simply the latest stage of science, and its political consequences which should be realised in light of the new evidence. Ecology opens people’s eyes to another reality, but once this happens anyone can recognise the implications. An enlightened democratic regime needs to incorporate this new understanding into its politics. Thus, realism, based on the assumption that all that it takes is merely Seeing Green, as the title of Porritt’s 1984 influential best-seller implied, was the central mode of thinking propagated by the British Ecology Party. For ‘it is surely self-evident that we cannot continue expanding at past rates of growth’:5 the facts speak for themselves. Conveying this ‘self-evidency’ of the new realism became the prime task of the Greens, only that, ‘Persuading people to vote for the inevitable is a remarkably tricky task!’6 201

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The manifesto for the 1979 election argued: ‘The Ecology Party exists not to fight for our survival on any terms, but for our survival through democracy.’7 The indivisible coupling of democracy and ecology was a stark reminder to the surviving founders of the PEOPLE party, notably Goldsmith, that a long-term political perspective could not thrive on the meagre diet of doomsday ecocatastrophe and that the project of the Ecology Party could only operate credibly within the constraints of democracy. The pamphlet continued ‘in attempting to gain the support of the majority of the people for zero-growth policies we must take a stand where all moderates from the “Centre Right” to the “Centre Left” can agree with us’, thus sending a warning sign to the other wing of the party – the adherents of the New Left. The politics of the Centre, targeting the moderate majority, could hardly coexist with anarchic, radical revolutionaries. Thus, if in the 1970s, the Ecology Party sought parliamentary representation for environmentalist organisations, the new leadership hoped to appeal to all moderate people. However, the fortunes of the party changed dramatically. In 1979 ECO could still plausibly target the political Centre, a constitutive choice coinciding with its new line of thinking which sought to appeal to the politically moderate, conventional voters who need only be ecologically enlightened to see green, thus maintaining the centre ground of the political spectrum. With the freshly forged Liberal and Social Democratic alliance holding the new Centre, and with it, the hopes of Britons for political revival, the Ecology Party was marginalised. It faced a twofold challenge: externally, it needed to establish and justify its political niche which had to be neither Left nor Right – nor Centre; internally, it sought to maintain its distance from both survivalist ecologists and New Left activists. The conceptual tool used to achieve this was a redefinition of radical politics which focused on the ecological metaphor of uprooting the causes, rather than the symptoms, of industrial society. Within the Green Movement, as it was then known, Porritt distinguished three types of green activists: ‘those whose lifestyle or whose work may loosely be defined as greens , those in other pressure groups and campaigns whose whole approach to their activities has become increasingly green … And last, there are the politically oriented greens’.8 Thus, the niche of the Ecology Party is distinctly identified as a political one. On the surface, it echoes the debates within the German Greens, alluding to Die Grünen as the political arm of the Green Movement. However, this typology of Green activists, given Porritt’s contention that ‘whether or not all this teeming greenery constitutes as yet a fully paid-up “movement” is anybody’s guess. Mine is that it doesn’t’,9 suggests a different conclusion. According to this conceptual understanding, widely held by British Greens, the NSMs were essentially a social phenomenon, or, at best, pressure groups – not a political force. Whereas in Germany, the NSMs shifted the definition of what constituted the political, in the hope of changing the rules of the

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democratic game and thereby redirecting the impetus towards participatory democracy based on the self-determination of concerned citizens, the British Greens, perhaps mistakenly, understood the social movements as an extrapolitical force, and constituted their own identity as a parliamentary entity. Thus politics is viewed from within the traditional framework of institutional politics, as if the thrust of the New Left revolution – politicising the personal, familial and communal – had been overlooked. Extraparliamentary politics is portrayed as non-political, and politics is equated with parliament, for two main reasons. First, according to ECO’s selfperception at the time, politics is the means to ecological ends. Consequently, the Ecology Party defined itself as the only political ecological force, in contrast to other environmental organisations and social movements. The main difference was that ECO was a political party, since environmental pressure groups, and arguably extraparliamentary protest movements, are political entities. According to this perception of a political tool for environmental ends, ECO retreated, rhetorically, from Blueprint’s ambitious project of providing a new philosophy of life. In the mid-1980s, even Porritt, who outlined a clear green worldview, conceded: ‘there is no God-given requirement which says that a political party has to base its activities on a fixed ideology. Having written the last two general election manifestos for the Ecology Party, I would be hard put even now to say what our ideology is. Our politics seems to be a fairly simple mixture of pragmatism and idealism, common sense and vision. If that’s an ideology, it’s of a rather different sort from those that dominate our lives today.’10 Thus, ‘fixed ideology’ characterises other parties’ creed – a very simplistic notion of ideology. Moreover, the concept exemplifies the effort of ECO to portray its own beliefs, that is, ideology, as the commonsensical, non-ideological worldview which every enlightened person should adopt. The Greens would happily advocate a new way of life, or their own worldview, but ‘ideology’ was regarded as a subversive political tool, opposed to the ‘realism’ which they hoped to project. They had no ideology, only visionary common sense. Furthermore, the Ecology Party’s ‘primary function is still an educative one, the spreading of green politics to as wide an electorate as possible … It just so happens that elections are an extremely practical way of getting one’s message across.’11 Politics was viewed in conventional terms, and becoming a credible party became a pivotal aspect of the Ecology Party’s endeavour. Its self-appointed role, and the best characterisation of its ideological project, was ‘getting the message across’. In course of expressing the message, the Greens discovered that it radically challenged society’s basic understanding of how industrial democracies function. There were, in effect, two parallel routes of realisation: ecological awareness with which ECO hoped to infuse the public agenda, and the self-realisation process within the Ecology Party, that is, realising the scope of the needed change. ECO therefore concentrated on making the public aware of the (scientifically

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revealed) new reality, that is, realism, and providing the comprehensive policies which would allow transformation to take place, that is, radicalism. The first mission dictated a very different approach to the ‘dominant public discourse’ than did the mission of the German Greens. Whereas the German Greens contrasted the dominant ideology with alternative politics, values and vision, the British Greens, convinced that ecological politics was the only commonsense politics of the future, devoted their programmes to converting people to ecology, arguing that ecological commitment was self-evident and compatible with the public’s interest in self-preservation and its belief in progress. They argued for a change in values, but sought to transform the ethical code by broadening the interpretation of key concepts as ‘quality of life’, ‘wealth’, and ‘growth’, rather than by rejecting them wholesale. The second mission of providing comprehensive policies focused the BGP’s internal discussion on their policy papers (which they never implemented nationally). Further, upon realising their affinity to the NSMs, after understanding that ideologically, ecology could not be devoid of social and economic planning, or of ‘traditional’ Leftist concerns with social justice, and after acknowledging the required change in politics itself, they were hard pressed to cooperate with other political traditions since their own policies and worldview were so rigidly defined. Thus, whereas the Green ideology was both comprehensive and inclusionist, in practice, their historical experience and their well-defined creed led them to be suspicious of other political traditions. From the perspective of the theory of ideology, as the next chapter argues, this produced the anomaly of a modular ideology in theory but a ‘pure’ ecological worldview in practice. Thus, the period of 1979–89 was marked by spreading the gospel of the new, ecological, radical realism which was reflected in two ways: converting people to ecologism, refining ecological policies and thereby developing a distinct Green discourse. The Greens’ main endeavour was to introduce this conceptual change into British politics. While their aim was to maintain their uniqueness and portray themselves as a cohesive, unified political actor, ideological diversification occurred in practice, although it was hardly discussed within the party. The only controversy which entered the public debate in Britain, was the Party’s structure (renamed in 1985 the Green Party), its role and its relation to nonviolent, direct action. This chapter will trace these processes through the documents published by the party during that decade. The internal debate within the party, particularly the Maingreen and Green2000 initiatives, which sought more centralised structures of power within the Greens, were latent throughout the decade, even though, after 1986, they dominated the internal life of the party. This debate overshadowed the ideological diversification process which came to bear only after the 1992 elections and the departure of the Green2000 proponents, as we shall see in the next chapter.

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The real alternative – awakening political consciousness Perhaps the most crucial move made by the Ecology Party during the course of its history (1975–85) was the decision to contest 50 seats in the 1979 general election. Electorally, this was a curious decision, since the party had around 500 members, which meant that one in every ten had to be a candidate, and given the non-refundable deposit of £500 per candidate (given the 5 per cent hurdle), this threatened the party with financial disaster. However, the decision coincided with the ideological conviction of the Ecology Party’s urgent message to the people of Britain. Contesting 50 seats was the condition for receiving free public exposure through the TV and radio broadcasts which the new leadership sought most of all. Porritt argued: It must be clear by now that the whole future of the Ecology Party is at stake on this issue. Quite frankly, I don’t believe there is any other way. A campaign of fifty, and the resulting media coverage will totally transform the nature of the Ecology Party, in terms of its national credibility, its overall strength, the calibre of its membership, its range of influence and its whole future.12 This decision was Goldsmith’s last contribution to the party: ‘Porritt was the leader the Green Party needed at the time; I fully recognise it though he was the one who drove me out of the party.’13 Porritt himself embodied a recurring trend in the British Ecology Party, one of standing for office – and winning posts – shortly after joining the party:14 He described his own recruitment to the party thus: ‘I did [join the party, G.T.] for no particularly good reason and a couple of months later found myself press-ganged into standing as a candidate in the 1977 GLC election.’15 Porritt, Tyler and Fleming, led the Ecology Party into its first public test, and wrote the 1979 and 1983 electoral manifestos. The Real Alternative – the 1979 document – set the agenda and the tone of British Green politics into the next decade: We are a new party. This may well be the first time that you’ve heard of us. And we are a small party. 50 candidates is all that we can field this time round. Yet you will find this manifesto confronts you with a real alternative.16 To paraphrase the manifesto, ECO is a party, truthful about itself and the world we are in; despite being small it conveys the real alternative; this is the image the British Greens seek. In contrast to the other parties, whose message ‘is very similar – business as usual … it is clear that the deepening crisis of the industrial world requires a new approach’.17 This creates an awareness of the fact that ‘if we are to protect the world our children will inherit, we must above all create a way of life that we can afford, a way of

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life that enriches us without impoverishing the Earth. This awareness demands a new political initiative. An initiative which asks people to join together now to make a better future.’18 Thus, the basis for electoral appeal was a new awareness of the problems that industrial societies created and consummated in the ecological domain: ‘Ecology is the study of all living things, where they live, and how they live together. Simple though it may sound, this amounts to the most fundamental political reality of all.’19 The relationships between living things and their environment, in particular an environment of unlimited economic growth demanding overconsumption of the Earth’s resources, are the fundamental political reality. They advocate steps toward a sustainable way of life, a stable economy, economic selfsufficiency, a decentralised way of life, long-term perspective and placing ‘less emphasis on material values and more on personal development and achievement’.20 While the problem is the industrial ethos, the solution offered centres on the individual’s way of life. A strong individualism, complementing traditional liberalism and focusing on the act of voting in the public sphere and on the individual’s lifestyle in the private one, are inherent features of UK Green politics.21 Even though industrialism is identified as the root cause of the economic crisis, in contrast to the German Green approach, an historical analysis is not presented. ‘Our industries simply can’t cope any more’, change is vital, despite things being satisfactory thus far, because, the economy depends on imports and has ‘to “grow” merely to stand still’, which generates social disintegration characterised by crude competition, alienation, isolation, and bureaucratisation.22 All social ills are rooted in the original sin against the environment, embodied in economic growth, the deep root cause. Since ‘conventional politics and economics are bankrupt’ ECO ‘looks ahead to the future, so that we face the problems honestly, and in such a way as to involve everybody in the changes that will inevitably occur’.23 This argumentative strategy is based on facing the problems honestly and on merely responding in concert with the changes which would inevitably occur. The Ecology Party discloses the truth that other parties disguise, and advocates action which cannot be avoided. The changes advocated will be agreeable to the individual, and will offer rewarding, enjoyable work, a well-ordered, participatory democracy, ‘a clean and pleasant environment’, ‘good, wholesome food’, a chance to develop personal potential, and so on.24 ECO’s policies related to work, the community, governmental decentralisation, education, health, food, agriculture, energy, transport and the environment, provide a holistic, but narrowly ‘comprehensive’, ecological spectrum.25 ‘So Why Vote Ecology?’ asks the final section: Political loyalty is fine, but it should never stand in the way of political awareness. We cannot make the politicians scapegoats for our own blindness, and must all look at our own way of life, question our own

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values and political convictions, before we can expect anyone else to come up with the solutions.26 The politics of awareness act on the same principle as Plato’s cave allegory: the task is to force the people, who are chained in the warm, damp, familiar cave and can see only the shadows on the wall, the mere reflection of the real world, out into the open air. If they would only turn their heads, they would be struck by the light of truth. Unlike the Platonic world, however, the air has become ever more polluted, threatening to suffocate both the people inside the cave and the outside world. Hence, the urgent message – we must leave the damp, convenient cave, and stop these processes while we still can. Crucially, the educational aspect seeks to convince individuals of their own responsibility, urging them to change their lifestyle. This correlates with the plans for decentralisation and self-sufficiency which are central to the philosophy of the British Ecology Party, and reflects the fact that most of its new national executive and second wave of support – notably Porritt – came from the Liberal Party. Individual responsibility, selfreliance and a wholehearted belief in the democratic system as it stands, that is, the goal of simply projecting an ecological message rather than changing the political perspective, characterise the Ecology Party of the early 1980s. The General Election gamble paid off and, for the first time, the Party penetrated the public political consciousness. ‘The calibre of its membership’ indeed increased tenfold within one year, to over 5000, disproportionally represented by young, radical activists. ‘The post 1968 generation had come to ECO.’27 This, together with the new developments in British politics, forced ECO to rethink its political route, and its ideological niche.

Politics for life – party and beyond The controversy dominating the party for the remainder of the 1980s concerned the support for Non-Violent Direct Action (NVDA). The proponents of NVDA, notably David Taylor, a representative of the generation of activists growing up in the Ecology Party, argued that ‘Direct action is the cutting edge of change’28 and that according to the party’s own principles – being faithful to truth and acting upon its imperatives regardless of public image – NVDA was an essential pillar of the Greens. Traditionalists, on the other hand, believed that NVDA would jeopardise the party’s credibility. This formal question on supporting the NVDA camouflaged another question, namely whether the Greens only supported Green issues, with their narrow environmental front, or whether they endorsed in principle, civil disobedience and the social movements. My contention is that even though the political fortunes of the party led it to support campaigns against nuclear weapons and road construction, it did not identify generally with the host of political battles waged on behalf of women, immigration

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and other social justice issues. Moreover, it was only after the Alliance captured the centre stage of the British political spectrum, that the party took up the radical stance against nuclear weapons. Whereas the 1979 manifesto put forward a cautious policy of doing ‘everything possible to prevent further nuclear proliferation’,29 the 1983 programme advocated ‘unilateral nuclear disarmament – no Cruise, no Trident, no nuclear base, withdrawal from NATO’.30 The only way to survive in the political field was to crystallise a radical ecological politics, and to put forward a comprehensive ideology rejecting conventional politics, Left, Right and Centre alike. Within a short space of time this party, which had targeted the moderate majority was to become the radical vanguard, the far-sighted prophet of New Politics. Politics for life – the physical and metaphysical unearthed The 1983 manifesto opens: This manifesto is addressed to all those who are looking for a new way forward, who have seen through the bluster of most politicians … who feel powerless to do anything about it … who are concerned about today’s spiritual vacuum … who care about other people, who have thought a bit about Planet Earth, who are prepared to look ahead beyond the next election … This manifesto is addressed to YOU.31 In the quest for a new way forward, empowerment, spirituality and human care took precedence over ‘thinking a bit about Planet Earth’ – a curious position for a party which placed ‘a reverence for the Earth and for all its creatures’ first among the criteria for Greenness.32 Moreover, an indubitable anthropocentrism reaffirms ecological concerns: ‘on this fragile planet, every threat to the Earth is a threat to us’. On the first reading of ‘Politics for Life, for Peace, Liberation and Survival’ it would seem that the Greening of the Ecology Party actually occurred two years before the change of name: A new politics is emerging, which does not seek the power of traditional politics (to gain domination over others and over the Earth) but the creative power which comes from understanding the real value of each individual and of the Earth itself.33 This is the first direct reference to domination, the quintessential feature of New Politics. Yet, it is overshadowed, in British Green discourse, by the emphasis on both the individual and the planet. Despite that, Politics for Life was the most comprehensive programme the British Greens had ever produced,34 the personal and the global took centre stage. Politics is a tool for value transformation, yet never viewed as a way of life. The distinction between the private and public spheres, so entrenched in British political culture, is endorsed by the UK Greens. Ecological politics are about

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a change in lifestyle on the personal level, and consideration for the Planet on the global level. The political and social realms are mentioned only insofar as they relate to ecology – no real challenge to the structures of power was made. The essence of ecological politics remains the same: ‘understanding the real value of each individual and of Earth itself’ – it is a project of enlightening and of educating people to seeing the new values as real. Thus, in ‘Embracing the Earth’ ECO advocates: It’s rapidly becoming a nightmare – simply because people refuse to recognise where that state of plenty comes from! Like all other species, we depend for our well-being and survival upon the delicate links with the rest of creation. The web of life – that’s what ECOLOGY is all about.35 A lack of awareness has brought the other parties to share a ‘commitment to a form of progress which destroys the world and degrades the person’.36 Care on the global and personal levels, is the answer. The manifesto’s six sections – Peace, Work, Land, People and Society, the World, and the Spirit – stress ‘thinking globally, acting locally’. ‘We believe that a programme like this is both radical and realistic.’37 Whereas the programmes of other Green Parties in Europe demonstrate the realistic aspects of the ecological vision, the ECO’s ecological philosophy focuses on the radical analysis of these (narrowly defined) six subjects. Thus, in the Peace section, ECO exposes ‘The Roots of War’, arguing that ‘Nuclear weapons … are the logical outcome of an often aggressive, exploitative way of life … (which) exposed a deep-rooted social sickness, bringing many of us to challenge the basic assumptions that lie at the heart of our ‘civilisation’. We challenge the unthinking materialism which compels us to go on producing and consuming more and more.’38 The ‘Work’ section reflects the discursive strategy which dominated the 1987 manifesto: it redefines traditional terms through an ecological perspective, thus hoping to uproot conventional economic thinking by replacing it with ecological wisdom: ‘Economy’ simply means ‘managing our affairs so as to meet our material needs’ – in other words: DOING RIGHT BY OURSELVES DOING RIGHT BY THE PLANET Let’s start with the planet – for that’s where all our wealth starts.39 The main endeavour is not to reject economism, but to redefine it in a way compatible with ecological thinking, which is relevant to the individual whilst preserving the planet. The meanings of ‘Economy’, ‘material needs’ and ‘wealth’ are contested and broadened. The root cause is industrialism, the solution is a change of lifestyle, and a ‘community-based selfreliance: local production for local needs’.40 Decentralisation continues to

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be a quintessential principle of the Ecology Party, as it was in the days of PEOPLE, and self-reliance remains a constitutive value. These policies, however, were not introduced with a plan for transformation, and therefore avoided tackling questions of politics, economy and power. The vision may be comprehensive, but it lacks a structural formula for realising it, relying instead, on personal change to bring about political transformation. If the radical approach to peace and work lay in attacking the roots of the industrial creed, the section on Land provided a window onto a distinct British phenomenon. Beginning with the section on ‘Natural Wisdom’, ECO portrays Earth as ‘our Mother’, maintaining that ‘Land is life’, and arguing for ‘the basic rights of the land’: ‘at the root of all politics lies the vexed question of access to the land’.41 Note, first of all, that ECO demands rights of access to and of the land. The anthropocentrism of the land was a strategy for encouraging an appreciation of the Earth as an entity. By awarding the land its own set of rights, the Earth is recognised as a moral client: the British Greens displayed far greater ecocentricity than their German counterparts. This same discursive strategy is found in this context too: anthropocentrism is not rejected – every harm done to the Earth is harm done to its inhabitants – it is just broadened to embrace the Planet in the moral and political discourse. A gradual process of incorporation thus evolved with radical consequences in terms of morality and politics. Second, radical politics, expressed in terms of finding the root of the problem, was defined as access to land, thereby offering a redefinition of the political. It is only here, that the Ecology Party challenges the concept of the political and provides new grounds to politics – the politics of access to land. It is also only in this context that the rich–poor divide is contested: The fact that most land in the UK is controlled by a few very rich landowners, private and institutional speculators and departments and agencies of central government, denies people their natural birthright of access to the land … an ecological viewpoint … puts the emphasis more on stewardship than ownership, recognising the land as a common heritage to be cared for on behalf of the community and future generations.42 Obviously, by questioning the pattern of ownership, and therefore the distribution of wealth, and by endowing Earth with political rights, a radical worldview is offered which fundamentally challenges the existing power, economic and social structures. However, the Ecology Party failed to take its own beliefs to their logical political conclusion. ECO asked merely for radical land reform, and a change in agriculture, farming and countryside policies. Thus, Peace, Work and Land were intrinsically connected to an ecological perspective which emphasised ‘Act locally – think Globally’. That should be the watchword of politics today.’43 Likewise, the World section tackled the issues of resources, pollution, population and the Third World, advocating ‘new ideals of international

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responsibility and cooperative endeavour … (a) stress on internationalism – at the same time as we stress the need for greater self-reliance and selfsufficiency’.44 Only the section ‘People and Society’ breaks away from the focused environmental perspective, offering a bridge between the social movements and the broader Green project. Green politics puts great emphasis on creating the sort of conditions in which all people can develop their full potentialities of health, happiness, intelligence and self-fulfilment. These goals can be achieved partially through legislation. In the areas of women’s rights and racial equality … we still find these groups are discriminated against and exploited. Equal rights, equal pay, equality of opportunities, equal treatment in law: these are still ideals that need to be converted into realities. Such legislation should be incorporated within a Bill of Rights to safeguard the liberties of all individuals.45 This highlights the difference between the British and the German Greens. The rhetoric is there: concern with the potentialities of all people, particularly disadvantaged groups such as women and ethnic minorities. However, the political tool advocated for realising this concern is legislation. The impetus brought by the new social movements in Germany whereby they sought to demonstrate that legislation does not entail rights, that the public domain conceals discrimination in the private domain, in short, that theory enshrined in laws is far from political praxis, is completely missing from the British analysis. Concern with domination and exploitation are expressed, but the thrust of New Politics – breaking away from the dichotomy of public and private to question political reality – is conspicuously lacking. The most exceptional section in Politics for Life is ‘The Spirit’: We must tread with care when we talk of the spirit. It means many different things to many people, and in the green movement that quality of diversity is respected – unquestioningly. But we are at least united in the conviction that to talk of the future without reference to the spirit is absurd … That spiritual vacuum has a lot to do with politics today … We bow down before materialistic and ‘rational’ values, and correspondingly devalue the natural, the spiritual and the emotional.46 The respect for diversity is endorsed by the British Greens, but the spiritual trend on which Politics for Life chooses to elaborate is ‘the spirit of Gaia’. ‘By choosing to live the way we do, we have ensured that the wholeness of each person is lost, the oneness of all humanity is denied, and the interdependence of all creatures is destroyed. It is the wisdom of ecology that can make us whole again.’47 Thus, spirituality is not otherworldly, but worldly-minded, that is, caring for the world. Spirituality is based on the

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link between lifestyle and the planet, seeking to channel creativity into non-material self-fulfilment. Establishing a connection between the spirit of the individual and that of Earth allows the transformation of the dominant creed to take place. Spirituality complements the inward-looking transformation within each individual, stressing the spiritual against the material in the hope of transforming people’s concerns from the economic standard of living to the quality of life. Tellingly, this falls short of advocating a ‘historical psychodynamic’ à la Bahro: the spiritual is a private matter, not a religious movement according to the British Green perception. Thus, Politics for Life provides a comprehensive, focused ecological perspective, concerned with ‘traditional’ environmental issues – pollution, health, transport, decentralisation, countryside, agriculture and so on, and emphasising the global through relevance to the individual. While it represents radical thinking, which claims to tackle the roots of the problem, it, in effect, neglects central political, social and economic realms, by alluding to individual transformation rather than addressing the structures of power. Essentially, it embodies a liberal mode of political understanding, endorsing conventional politics and enriching it with a new ecological perspective. It carries the seeds of radical Green thinking – especially in its rejection of current patterns of domination and exploitation. It lacks the theory and policies of social change necessary for implementation. Interestingly, Politics for Life – the electoral manifesto – bypassed the main tool for ideological change, the Manifesto for Sustainable Society. Whereas the former outlined a broader socio-political agenda including diversity, spiritualism, a change of values and a Bill of Rights, the original Sustainability ignored them. Thus, the electoral manifesto committed ECO to policy areas which were not to have detailed policies for several years. These roles were reversed in the late 1980s, when most grassroots activists supported ideological expansion into broader social and political realms, while the centralist leadership maintained its electoral plea for an unequivocal, voter-friendly ecological message. Maingreen and the remaining Greens The establishment of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, the party of the centre, economic recession and the Falklands war took their toll on the 1982 Ecology Party, halving their membership to 2500, and forcing political rethinking. First, on whether to extend beyond the environmental constituency through the ‘Campaign for Real Democracy’ which focused on changing the British electoral system. It was described by Sara Parkin, Porritt’s heir as the public face of the BGP: The Campaign for Real Democracy (CaRD) proposed a system of proportional representation for the UK election, a Freedom of Information Act and a Bill of Rights, as well as devolution of powers to local government

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enshrined in a Charter. In particular, the campaign focused on a bill going through parliament which proposed … to raise the electoral deposit for candidates from 150 to 1000 pounds. The Ecology party’s evidence was taken and debated, and was instrumental in lowering the finally agreed deposit to 500 pounds with a return threshold of 5%.48 The same phenomenon that appeared in relation to the issue of women’s equality reappears with respect to political institutions. On the one level, CaRD was an example of non-environmental concerns regarding the nature of the political system itself, and a testimony to the wider ideological project of ECO. However, the party challenged British politics on the issue of the established electoral system – hardly a critique of the political. Moreover, the British Greens proposed further legislation – the Freedom of Information Act, a Bill of Rights, a Charter enshrining the devolution of power. The Greens’ trust in British democracy, and its institutional mechanisms contrasts with the critical approach of the German Greens, who explicitly called for participatory democracy in the domain of the economy and local communities. The British Greens tended to conform to conventional politics without seeking to transform the political system itself, hoping merely to change people’s attitudes to ecological problems via established political channels. This presented a slim chance of being elected and of projecting their environmental message to the public. This prompted ECO to challenge the electoral system and demand a more proportional representation. Second, there was a debate regarding the role of ECO and its relation to NVDA. The issue of internal party structures and the party’s role in extraparliamentary politics was closely related to the question of whether the party should accept the system as is, and seek success within it, or whether it should support extraparliamentary politics and challenge the concept of what is the political and what kind of democracy Britain should have. Civil disobedience had been endorsed by some sections of the party, and Green CND had been established, ‘direct action, feminist and pacifist elements gained strength’.49 Electoral fate, and the success of Green Parties in other countries, led the British Greens to recognise themselves as part of the international Green Movement. The 1984 European manifesto, the common platform of Green Parties across Europe, described the Ecology Party thus: The Ecology Party was formed in 1973 partly as a result of the publication of Blueprint for survival. Although the party began as primarily an environmental party, it quickly broadened its policies to incorporate issues such as employment, health, the economy etc.50 While as Politics for Life clearly shows, issues such as employment, economy and health, were still limited to an ecological perspective, there was

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a shift in self-perception, expressed by Sara Parkin, ‘Queen of the Greens’, in the late 1980s: It is also worth noting that the Green party, despite its marginality, is in fact part of that ‘respectable and responsible’ tradition of handling protest in Britain. After all what could be more respectable than taking part in a democratic process (however flawed) that has inspired much of the world?51 Whereas initially ECO had sought to dissociate itself from the protest movements and to present itself as a governable party, the events of the 1980s led them to seeing themselves as part of protest politics, now emphasising the respectable and responsible tradition of protest in the UK. This was not anarchic, anti-institutional protest, but rather a glorious tradition of protest, compatible with the capable-of-governing image which ECO had always sought. Yet, the assertion of ‘belonging to and being active in different parts of a growing movement in a climate of increasing public awareness about environmental issues has been able to compensate for the inevitable lack of satisfaction that can occur through long-term engagement in minority party politics in Britain,’52 referred to a very specific segment of the protest movement. Quoting a 1984 survey, she noted that 80 per cent of Green Party members belonged to some environmental organisation – CND, FoE and Greenpeace – with no mention of women’s, anti-racial and even the peace movements. Despite the name, the Green movement is still, in ECO’s perceptions, an environmental movement. Since 1982 the Party Organisation Working Group, convened by Ekins and Tyler, developed plans for constitutional reforms which would enable the executive to lead the party in its daily affairs, and sought an able leader for the party.53 The suggestions failed to get a two-thirds majority in the 1985 conference and a centralist faction was established called ‘Maingreen’, arguing that In a strongly centralised society such as ours, local Parties find it difficult to work effectively with a vacuum at the centre … We are committed to decentralisation but nevertheless we believe that it is essential to have a well-organised central body. (It) must project a relevant and representative image through the national media and provide the Party with a sense of direction and leadership.54 Their aspirations of seeking to change the Green Party, or establish an independent party, led to a clash with the three women co-chairs and the resignation of Ekins and Tyler. The confrontational atmosphere, continued haunting the party until 1992. Ekins’s legacy, his substantial work on New Economics, dominated the 1987 General Election Manifesto.

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Creating an ‘Age of Understanding’ Age of Understanding is designed to generate the transformation from the dominant, material world perception, to the Greens. Two prominent features characterise it: first, the overwhelming dominance of an economic programme, the result of the alternative economics think-tank which the Greens set up in the 1980s. Second, in the effort to gain recognition of the need for alternative economics, the documents represent a remarkable attempt at redirecting the prevailing ideological creed away from materialism and consumerism, and toward an ecologically sustainable way of life. Living within our means With regard to economic policies, the manifesto is the first attempt of the BGP at addressing economic issues beyond changes to the individual’s lifestyle – namely central economic structures. Basically, a Green economy would include: incorporating resource usage, waste-treatment and pollution into the national costs; redefining needs to reduce the pressure of material needs; changing the indicators upon which economic measures are based to include ecological sustainability; devolving powers to establish local economies; redressing inequality between people on the local, global and intergenerational levels; breaking down the distinction between paid and unpaid work; securing democratic control over economic decisionmaking; securing workers’ rights; and striving for a sustainable future.55 The BGP discloses its policy regarding inequality, addressing these concerns through the redistribution of resources and the taxation of factories, producers and the ‘City’. The long-term goal is still to create self-sufficient communities. Nevertheless, the Greens propose to use the collective means of the state to facilitate the transformation. The document presents the Basic Income Scheme which had survived since 1974 in the party’s ideology, but complements it with institutional changes, particularly in terms of taxation. The real cost of resources should include dealing with waste and pollution. A change in taxation measures is advocated, as are conservation taxes, consumption taxes, capital taxes, trade taxes, pollution charges and transforming society into community-based economies, with local production, community-banks and socially useful services. Relieving the burden on the Third World is also urged, calling on Britain to: ‘gradually disengage from the international money market and begin to cooperate with like-minded governments, both rich and poor’.56 Self-reliance, in local and national terms, is still far more apparent than international enforcement of ecological and trade-limiting laws, or developing state organs to implement the policies needed for a sustainable future. This is possibly so due to the Greens’ high sensitivity toward self-determination of the individual and the community, and their lack of any practical experience on the national level. Since most of their political experience is gained

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through local politics, in which transport, recycling, preserving the countryside, agriculture and housing are central, their ‘People and the Environment’ section is dominated by these issues. The other marked emphasis is on individual empowerment. Women, anti-racism, disabled people, lesbians and gays are mentioned under ‘personal politics’. The preferred solutions involve new laws, rather than an attempt to tackle the issue of changing practices head on. Overall, the document is a remarkable exercise in changing perceptions. We now turn to the argument of the British Greens. Identifying the dominant discourse The cover of the Age of Understanding reads: Green Politics provide each of us with the challenge to reject the path of false technology and to recapture not the ‘romantic golden age’ but a truly satisfying and sustainable future for both ourselves and our earth. It is a greenprint for an age of understanding.57 This sets out a double rejection of the path of technology which represents the dominant discourse that the Greens argue against, and of the common misconception that the Greens are selling a ‘romantic golden age’. Instead a ‘satisfying and sustainable future’ is offered, with ‘satisfying’ carrying a positive materialist connotation, echoing the idea of self-realisation through which sustainability can be forthcoming. The readers are confronted with three layers of discourse – the dominant ‘material’ discourse, the ‘misinterpreted’ Green discourse and the ‘right’ alternative. But the latter is not self-evident, as the terms ‘false’ and ‘truly’ highlight. The motto also implies that turning away from the false path is not easy, but within individual control – as it involves a challenge for each of us. The choice of path is based on knowledge – once the existence of a choice is recognised, choosing the ‘right’ path is inevitable – since this is ‘an age of understanding’: the facts determine the case. The question of recognising the dominant discourse assumes its existence. While the political sphere is usually perceived as being densely inhabited by rival political ideologies, an important Green stance is the existence of a super-ideology of industrialism to which all the other parties adhere. One technique for identifying this is simply to assert it, using negatively charged adjectives, as in the introduction to the Age of Understanding: Over the years we have set ourselves up to control, dominate and exploit the planet … We need to stop building on the quicksand of materialism, patriarchy, competition and aggression. We are sinking faster than most people think.58

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These are all negative connotation terms – domination, control, exploitation, patriarchy, competition and aggression – especially when juxtaposed with ‘respect for the planet, humility’ and so on. However, the readers are reassured: ‘We need to assure a basic level of material security for all.’ The BGP thus separates the value-judgement concerning material security from materialism: while the material needs will be taken care of in a Green society, materialism is deplored. The heart of the attack is launched in the first section – ‘Green Economics’. When discussing the use of resources, the manifesto states that we need to conserve resources: … rather than consuming them as quickly as we can in the race for ‘consumption’, ‘growth’, ‘competition’ and ‘progress’. An emphasis on consumption leads to even more trees being cut down, even more landscape destroyed. Growth takes power out of the hands of local communities and gives it to multinational corporations which have no connection with the places where people live and work. Competition sets communities and nations against each other, and progress often leads us down untested and unsafe technological paths.59 The Greens do not risk misinterpretation, and separate the ideas under attack with quotation marks: ‘consumption’, ‘growth’, ‘competition’ and ‘progress’. These are evil, they destroy environments, local communities, they set off wars. Therefore, The Green Party is convinced that if nothing is done about the present financial system very soon, collapse with catastrophic consequences will be hard to avoid. The present system is unstable, unjust and unscrupulous.60 But the problem of big corporations taking over local communities, is not confined to economics: The Green Party believes that the cult of bigness and centralisation of political power create a recipe for disaster. The bigger the unit, the further it has to fall and the more widespread is its fallout.61 The centralised government, the multinational corporation, the unjust forces of the ‘free’ market – are all systems that alienate the individual and leave him or her powerless against them. This helplessness in the face of the exploitative multinationals and central government establishes a common cause between people, and enlists the collective effort in the final battle against such systems. The document ends by saying: The Green Party stands for a new kind of politics. We must take control of our own lives and learn to work together for a better future. We cannot

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allow ourselves to be ruled by remote control government, the power of big business and the media, and the lottery market forces … We can only do it by choosing what we know is right.62 Although derogatory adjectives are used, and the dominant discourse is portrayed in grey and smog – both in their metaphors and in the paintings accompanying the text – the Greens abstain from criticising either the roots of the prevailing worldview or the lifestyle it entails. They do not repudiate industrialism, technologism or consumerism as the causes for the way of thinking they criticise. They concentrate their effort on analysing present and predicted results: there is still hope for change. This discourse strategy is a way of maintaining continuity with the past, and of allowing for a smoother transition, not because economic growth is wrong in itself, but because the facts show that the results are devastating. Even though they attack ‘the race for “consumption”, “growth”, “competition” and “progress” ’, they carefully define the reasons for that attack in terms of future impact, without criticising the way of life people currently enjoy. Telling ‘Right’ from ‘Wrong’ The negative characterisation of the material discourse is complemented by exposing the appalling consequences of the present system, using metaphors to stress the devastating results that the future holds, and supporting this with objective facts, graphs and statistics – in other words, telling the ‘objective truth’, and helping the reader to make the ‘only sensible choice’. The consequences of the system are apparent: Fallout from the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl; leaks at Sellafield; catastrophe at Bhopal; destruction of lakes and forests by acid rain – it is plainer than ever that our lack of environmental responsibility is leading to the poisoning of our planet.63 A personal frame of reference is provided through describing conditions under the current ideology: Many of our cities have become hellish places to live: polluted, noisy, litter-strewn, inconvenient and violent. Little wonder that so many people move out as soon as they can afford to.64 Another technique is employing metaphors conveying the implication of a materialistic future: the idea of ‘sinking in the quicksand of materialism’ was cited above; wide use is made of the ‘trap’ metaphor: … the ‘traps’ created by the present system. The ‘unemployment trap’ is created by the withdrawal of benefits when a person finds work … The

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‘poverty trap’ is the result of cut-off points in benefit … ’spendthrift trap’ … ‘idleness trap’ … ‘discrimination trap’.65 Science-oriented data support it, thus providing the ‘objectivity’ that science has to offer. In the name of reality: expanding the dominant discourse The idea is to recruit ‘reality’ to bring about a change, not to fight the multinationals or to stop the global warming, but in the ‘way of life’, in ‘the basic philosophy’. The problem is in convincing an audience that still thinks, lives and believes in the way of life built by the dominant discourse, that it is in its own interest to undertake the change. The British Greens achieve this by building on the dominant, material discourse, expanding the meaning of the terms to embrace the seeds of the ‘new world view’, so the transformation will not be radical. The same terms may still be used, but with slightly different meanings. Change can occur since reality has already been captured in the graphs, figures and charts supporting the arguments of the Greens. Hence, referring to ‘reality’ as a ‘master’ gives the Greens free access, to the adjective ‘real’. They use it to determine the facts, and to decide on the proper value-system. They use ‘is’ where they should have used ‘ought’: Real wealth is not stocks and shares and money in vaults. It is the planet and the life it supports in all its rich array. The basis of economics is learning how to live within our means … A real understanding of wealth offers both us and our children a basis for sustainable policies which will be useful in the years to come as they are today. A Green economy: counts the real cost of resources … breaks down the distinction between ‘real’ (paid full time) work and informal and voluntary work …66 The real question is whether we slow population growth by conscious, humane and compassionate planning, or whether we leave famine and disease to do it for us. The time of choosing is running out fast.67 All these policies (concerning education) are designed to make people ‘fit the system’ rather than creating a system to fit the real needs of the people.68 (my italics) Each ‘real’ serves a different function: the first takes the term ‘wealth’ – a central concept in the material discourse – and adopts it as part of the Green discourse by altering its meaning. This is where the word ‘real’ comes into play – it broadens the idea of ‘wealth’ to embrace life in all its rich array. Neither wealth nor richness are rejected, rather they are changed to convey their ‘real’ value. That the old meanings of wealth and richness,

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together with their implications regarding way of life and thinking are renounced is ignored. This would be too radical at this early stage of conversion. For the time being, the two (contradictory) discourses coexist – wealth is simply stretched to include life’s richness and the consequences are detailed. The second ‘real’ is ‘a real understanding of wealth’ – a change in understanding that benefits ‘both us and our children’. One such change is the third ‘real’, in reference to counting the ‘real’ cost of resources: which should also include the damage to the environment in terms of waste and pollution which should be paid for by the contaminators. This third ‘real’ focuses on the realm of actual policies, arguing that production, as far as the new understanding is concerned, means more than just production costs, and that the extra costs – resources, waste, pollution – are a price we all pay. The fourth use of ‘real’ is a very interesting one: it calls for the elimination of the distinction between ‘real’ (paid full-time) work and informal and voluntary work. This ‘real’ is put into quotes, because it is taken from the dominant discourse. In the dominant discourse, this distinction, which the Greens of course seek to eliminate, plays a role in economics. As with ‘consumption’, ‘growth’, ‘competition’ and ‘progress’, when a term is designated ‘negative’, it is placed between quotation marks – yet another way of focusing on what is real, rather than what only appears to be real, in the dominant discourse. The fifth ‘real’ questions whether we change things consciously, by planning, or whether famine and disease do it for us. This is not a question of choice: once the real issue has been recognised, it must be acted upon, or else reality will run its course – the hard way. The reality in question (reduction in population, in this case) will happen regardless, but we can make conscious plans in this regard – if we understand the implications and make the obvious choice that this understanding brings with it. All these policies (concerning education) are designed to make people ‘fit the system’ rather than creating a system to fit the real needs of the people.69 (my italics) The last ‘real’ introduces a feature for changing the dominant discourse: the way a language of needs is used, and the concept of ‘system’. In the dominant world view, people are made to ‘fit the system’ – for example, education has meant ‘training for a job’70 – the quotation marks in the original text, telling us that this is ‘bad’. In the Green worldview, the system will fit ‘the real needs of the people’, the assumption being that the current system places its emphasis on the wrong needs. However, what ‘real needs’ are and what they tell us about cutting down on ‘wrong’ or ‘inappropriate’ needs, is not stated. The ‘monopoly on reality’ enables the Greens to extend the ‘truth’ they hold on environmental processes (population growth, ecological degradation, poverty expansion etc.) to accommodate a transformation of the political discourse itself. From their point

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of view, this is coherent, for they believe that for processes to change, people need to change their notions regarding reality and lifestyle. An old dream, a new need A similar discourse strategy involves the notion of ‘need’, with its special relationship to the general theme: the Age of Understanding. In ‘Towards Peace and Justice’ the Greens say: one, united world ‘is an old dream, but it is also a new need. Otherwise we may not survive at all’71 (my italics). ‘Need’ is a matter of survival. It goes deeper than either argument or belief. It is beyond question. And the first ‘need’ the manifesto opens with, is ‘the need for a greater awareness’. But, understanding is only the basis for the ‘right’ choice, the starting point, not simply an end in itself. For example: Respect for nature is fundamental to the Green approach, and is inspired by the knowledge that if we were to destroy the ability of the Earth to support life, the Earth might survive in some form, but the destruction of the human race would be certain.72 (my italics) So the need for awareness is a prerequisite for averting the destruction of the human race, and should make people see the need to maintain the Earth as a matter of survival, and as guide for the ‘right’ choices. Thus, the introduction to the Age of Understanding is written mainly in the language of needs: We need to stop … We need to assure … We need to rediscover … We need to recognise … We need to find … The ‘language game’ with ‘needs’ does not stop here. As we saw in the case of ‘wealth’ and ‘work’, ‘needs’ is essentially a term borrowed from the dominant discourse, and the pattern is replicated: the Greens spell out the ‘old’ definition of the concept, negate the narrowness of its application, then widen it to embrace the new ‘real’ meaning of the term. ‘A Green economy … satisfies the full range of people’s needs, not just their financial needs.’73 The implicit statement here is that while the material worldview treats people as financial agents, and only takes notice of their financial needs, the individual (and his/her needs) are seen by the Greens in holistic terms: ‘Education should cater for our creative, physical and spiritual needs, as well as the intellectual.’74 The dominant discourse builds upon the distinction between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ – where needs means the ‘basics’ required

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to survive – ‘wants’ refer to the wealthy people who can afford to consume luxuries and to live affluent lives. The Greens, by insisting that societal, intellectual and spiritual entities are also needs, reject the whole idea of affluence – which is a state beyond covering needs. Everyone’s ‘needs’ would be answered – but only ‘needs’ and nothing further. But the Green ideology goes beyond that for it is not only the individual that has needs: Each community (is) to match its individual needs and proprieties.75 Because taxation policies often affect other countries, we must be aware of their needs.76 Local governments would become the main recipient of tax income, passing necessary amounts to national governments for national needs.77 The Green Party believes that everyone should have access to the transport facilities they need, though this must be considered alongside the needs of the environment.78 (my italics throughout) The community, the nation, other countries and the environment have needs. Whereas in the dominant discourse, needs are usually applied to individuals, and perhaps metaphorically to the nation, in the Green discourse, the community and especially the environment – the inanimate world – have needs, that humans acknowledge and accommodate. This is what the age of understanding is all about: recognition of the other participants in the world transcends the self-interest of individuals alive today: it enfolds future generations and the physical environment within the notion of the world which has been recognised as finite. Thus, the sacrifices that the individual might have to make, upon understanding that the world is an interconnected network of humans within communities within environments, are only implicit when the system tells people that societal and intellectual wishes are in fact basic needs.

The challenge – converting to a new way The gloomy prognosis for the future, supported by a range of scientific research implying devastating environmental and population outcomes, the realisation that not only humans have needs, and that matters to be addressed include an array of policies concerning all realms of life that may necessitate sacrifices, is bleak painted in grey and green. But the Green discourse is about hope. The sub-language of hope is expressed in two ways: the first presents this picture as a challenge – that is, to show that humanity is teetering on the brink of the abyss – and to offer incentives for inducing change. ‘Green politics provide each of us with the challenge.’79 Here, the opening of the Age of Understanding manifesto relies on the dominant

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discourse – the belief that the individual is at the centre of everything, and that life is the pursuit of individual interest and challenge. This is compatible with the Green call for ‘empowering each individual’,80 although it is clear that the individual alone cannot alter what is happening to natural resources or cure pollution. The challenge is pressing: ‘It’s a future we can still change – but we need to start now. Green politics are today’s politics, as well as tomorrow’s.’81 Notice it is presented in terms of a challenge – not as a doomed crisis. The second way to alleviate helplessness in the face of the multinationals, the remote-control government and the hopeless future, is to provide a new sense of belonging. This is achieved by using themes and ideas that sound familiar and comforting to the Christian ear, playing music that strikes a chord in the Christian believer’s heart, providing a sense of the lost community for the scattered flock, a spiritual community, offering a new way in harmony with the rest of creation. The tone is almost religious, with a sense that converts to the ‘righteous’ cause being sought: we are part of the web of life, part of creation, we only have to look inside ourselves to see what is the right path to follow. (Green) policies – all of them – acknowledge the vital importance of our whole environment. That environment – its health, its safety, its wholeness – affect our lives, our politics, and our future, and whenever we damage the environment, we damage ourselves. Like the other forms of life, we depend for our survival and well-being upon a fragile network of physical, social and spiritual links with the rest of creation. Green politics is an acknowledgement of the complexity of that web of life.82 (italics – in the original text; bold – mine) Humans are part of the whole of creation, a whole substantiated by attaching health and safety to it. The individual’s identity is part of this whole, and therefore damaging the environment is equivalent to damaging oneself. The complexity of creation must be acknowledged and respected. Humans have sinned, for: Humans beings are just part of the web, but we have become the dominant strand in it. Over the years we have set ourselves up to control, dominate and exploit the planet … the results of human domination have become increasingly obvious. Now we can ignore the signs no longer – if we do not heed the warnings we have the capacity to destroy the planet, and ourselves in the process.83 It is a sin against creation, that might destroy humanity. ‘Green politics is about building a new way of life, one that is based on respect for our planet and humility about our role in it.’84 Feeling remorse and regret for

224 The British Green Party

an exploitative lifestyle allows one to start a new way of life by going back to the traditions and parish, not perish: ‘We need to rediscover our roots and our histories, and to learn from those cultures which are more in harmony with their environment than we are.’85 Against the alienation of the institutions ‘We need to recognise the importance and value of each and every one of us, working together for the world we want to leave to our children’ – salvation that we could bring not only to ourselves but to future generations. ‘We need to find the core of peace that is within us all, and to extend it to our lives, our communities, and our global connections.’86 The conversion to the right way demands very little of us, as the sense of what is ‘right’ has always been – in our hearts. We may have denied it before, tempted by the glorious material benefits, but we can still find it within us. We need to recognise the spiritual dimension of our lives, just as we need food to eat and friends to love. Whatever our religious beliefs, a vital part of green politics is our love and respect for the Earth and for each other. The power to take responsibility for our own lives and futures, to give equal value to our spiritual and emotional needs as well as our physical ones, lies only within ourselves.87 The added value that the Greens can offer, is the spiritual value. They have no means of providing material benefits or official posts. Spirit and emotions cannot be measured. They appeal to a different realm within human minds. They are helped by this ‘inner faculty’ to translate from ‘creation’ to ‘creator’ from ‘domination’ to ‘sin’ from ‘love for everyone’ to the commandment of the holy texts. But they use this discourse to include their own ideas – ‘The Earth has been served by the wisdom of ecology for millions of years. We can use this wisdom to make us whole again. With it we can restore the balance between the logical and the natural, between ourselves and other people, between all humanity and the planet Earth.’ Creation is based on ecology – natural conduct. The principles of restoration are derived from ecology. And since they are natural, they must be the correct way forward.

11 Coalition Building: Ideological Currents or Political Strategy?

If 1979 marked the breakthrough into British consciousness – facilitated by the decision to contest 50 seats, thereby qualifying for the precious fiveminute broadcasts – in the 1989 European elections the Green Party decided for the first time to contest every seat in Britain. The unexpected 14.9 per cent of the vote, and the now 20,000-strong party membership stirred up unprecedented enthusiasm within the new, third-largest party in Britain. Sara Parkin, who shortly after became co-chair of the Greens, urged the party to prepare for government, declaring ‘we want a sustainable majority’.1 A struggle over the nature of the party and its way to victory was launched: Centralists demanded efficient organisation, Decentralists insisted that only grassroots activity could generate electoral gains. Tellingly, the ‘messenger’ strategy – enlightening the population rather than enlarging the Green vote – was held at bay following the spell of power which the Greens finally felt after 16 years of political twilight. The plans to appeal to the moderate majority were back on the table, and the radical face which the party developed during the 1980s was shelved again. Whereas the party’s internal struggles concentrated on the question of leadership and organisational changes, the public image of the Greens remained purely environmental. The BGP leadership felt that ecological themes could define a Green constituency within the political spectrum, and that issues of social and economic reform would jeopardise new recruits from the other main parties. Ironically, by now, it was realised that environmental policies necessitated a redistribution of resources, taxation and wealth and that any comprehensive Green agenda should tackle social problems; a change of values was recommended with implications for the individual’s lifestyle, communal practices, national laws, international relations and the global environment. However, after the 1989 elections, maintaining the Green vote justified playing down this new ideological clarity in the belief that the party first had to capture the Green votes, and then instruct its new members on the real meaning of being ‘a Green’. Ideological debates were once again demoted to the wings, notably the activist-wing. 225

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Thus, a gap grew between electoral manifestos and the internal Sustainability programme: while the party leadership generated simpler, purely environmental programmes, grassroots activists in party conferences developed the social policies. In 1989, Porritt, chair of Friends of the Earth, urged members to stop wasting their energies on refining the minutiae of party policy. ‘I don’t think the whole ragbag of policy development will advance your case one single jot’ he said.2 The message was clear: Don’t frighten your voters with radical politics. Target them under the environmental banner. While the party council did precisely that, activists were busy refining their policies and adding substantial new articles to Sustainability on social justice, human rights, participatory democracy and disadvantaged groups. The illusion of power, however, disintegrated at the next election. Pockets of discontent led to mutual accusations of responsibility for the disappearing Green vote. Centralists argued that the party had been infiltrated by radical anarchists, while Decentralists claimed that the party executive wasted resources on the national scene instead of building power bases on the local level. The dispute ended in the 1990s, with the implementation of a strategy combining local level activism, while using national politics to coordinate joint campaigns with different local groups, NGOs and Green politicians. This ‘coalition building’ strategy attempted to attract media attention to promote the party profile. In terms of ideological development, however, the internal conflict delayed the evolution of a mature Green ideology within the party. Nevertheless, the ideological transformations may be traced through independent publications by BGP officeholders. Importantly, this analysis will focus on the efforts of prominent Green Party members to project a British Green creed,3 then give an overview of the British Green ideology since 1973 and finally investigate its characterisation as a modular ideology.

Green success, grey reality: ‘Down-to-earth Greens are just too nice for power’ ‘The success of the Green Party in the European elections surprised everyone, not least itself’ read a subtitle of The Times. ‘One thing certain about the Green vote’, declared the Sunday Correspondent ‘it will never go down to its pre-1989 level … The rise in Green voting follows an even more striking rise in the proportion of voters rating the environment among the most important issues facing the country.’4 The membership of environmental pressure groups represented potential Green voters. The unexpected emergence of the Green vote into British politics sent an army of journalists scurrying to characterise them. Alongside ‘Three cheers for a Green wheel slowly grinding’, The Observer’s political editor reported, 17 September 1989, that ‘Polls shows Green voters do not know what the party

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stands for’: The Observer/Harris poll confirms that public knowledge of Green policies is very limited. While 72 per cent of voters know that the Greens favour cleaner air … there is general ignorance about the party’s more radical views. Only 12 per cent know that the Greens wish to leave the EC and … that the party is opposed to economic growth. No wonder, therefore, that overnight Sara Parkin, David Icke, Jean Lambert and Jonathon Porritt became Green media figures or that the number of reporters almost outweighed that of Green activists at their next national conference. The growing media focus on Green personalities contributed to the main debate of the 1989 conference: The real contest at Party Conference … will be between the Centralist and Decentralist tendencies. The Centralists, who have an iron grip on Party Council but are largely ignored by local parties, want to gain total control with a series of sweeping constitutional motions … Centralists argue that life on Earth can only be protected if a strong and effective centre can guide the Party to Westminster … . Decentralists … point out that … the 2 million voters who supported the Greens didn’t vote for a party with leaders … and all the conventional cynical political manipulations. For the Greens to be successful local parties need to be given far more resources.5 The Green2000 affair, which dominated the early 1990s, resulted in constitutional changes sought by the Green2000 people in 1991, in the resignation of ten of the eleven members of the Green2000 party executive, and the departure of Sara Parkin in the following year. In the wake of the 1992 general election, despite playing the Centralist card and adopting a Centralist constitution, it received a mere 1.3 per cent of the vote. With the resignation of the executive the BGP had a Centralist constitution and overwhelmingly Decentralist membership and council. The ideological stage could finally be diversified. Given the success of the Centralists’ supervised 1989 campaign, the 1992 manifesto, New Directions: the Path to a Green Britain Now closely resembled its predecessors with Don’t Let Your World Turn Grey.6 Both used green and grey colours as their prime message. Whereas the 1989 manifesto had ‘Europe of the Regions’ as its central theme, the 1992 document was slender in volume and scope. After its conclusive assertion of ‘Even in Britain we see all around us the signs of environmental, economic and social stress that come from living beyond our means: recession, poverty, homelessness and pollution,’7 the manifesto confines itself to environmental issues (hazards, resources, energy, transport, inner cities, rural communities, peace and the

228 The British Green Party

ecological time bomb, defying free trade and wealth beyond measure). It fails to suggest how to achieve ‘perhaps the single most important thing the Green Party could achieve in the short term … to change the way we measure economic success’.8 While this manifesto was selling Greenism to voters in a short, aggressive and vacuous programme, the party conference, dominated by grassroots activists, passed a series of controversial policy papers, incorporated into Sustainability which contained wider-ranging social and political issues for the first time. Policies on ‘Human Rights and Responsibilities’, ‘Migration’, ‘Refugees and Asylum Seekers’, ‘Nationality’, ‘Workers’ Rights’ and ‘Foreign Policy’ had been proposed and accepted by the conference since 1987. The 1992 conference itself approved a host of motions concerning, among others, proportional representation, AIDS, job-training schemes, local government, greenhouse effect, trade unions, GATT, racism and fascism and the Campaign for Justice for Women.9 Despite the tendency of the media-oriented leadership to project a credible, narrow environmental agenda to capture the 1989 vote, party activists were clearly voting for a wider ideological project. The two main principles were environmental sustainability and social justice, but it would take another five years for them to be addressed in electoral platforms. In the 1997 draft manifesto, social justice issues were included as primary Green concerns, though exempt from the final document. The main ideological currents of the 1990s are analysed in several books written by Green speakers or chairs, which claim to offer a ‘manifesto for the 1990s’. A comparative assessment of the major ideological texts illuminates the role of the party and its relationship to the ‘Green movement’, the relationship between the environment and other socio-political issues, and the BGP’s ideology.

Green futures: ‘a historical trend’ Sara Parkin, the feminine face of the British Greens, was ‘the party’s best all-rounder, the easiest of the Greens to imagine as a minister’, as one commentator put it.10 In Green Futures: Agenda for the 21st Century, Parkin, in an ‘end of century, toward the next millennium’ tone, sets the agenda for the next 100 years. Any such agenda, she claims, ‘will have to address the grave environmental problems which threaten to destabilise every human project … If we are to avoid repeating the past errors which have brought us to our present dilemma, then we’ve got to recognise where we made them in the first place. Green futures sit squarely on a re-think about the past.’11 The historical analysis which had been conspicuously lacking from the British Green perspective, was filled: ‘in the 1980s a new dimension was added – the state of the environment was imposing increasing constraints on our economic activity. The era of ‘uneconomic growth’ had

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begun.’12 Surprisingly, the root cause of environmental problems is a 1980s phenomenon. Why does she emphasise the ‘re-think about the past’? The answer emerges from her historical analysis of scientific developments, concluding: The Green revolution is not, therefore, a brand new phenomenon thought up by hallucinating hippies in the 1960s. It is part of a historical trend. Nicholas Copernicus published his theory a good 200 years before its logical consequences … got into full swing … so current green notions about politics and economics are influenced by the scientific and philosophical notions advanced by Hutton, Lovelock, and the atomic physicists. Therefore … any green future has a considerable body of knowledge and experience on which it can confidently build.13 The historical endeavour is not to trace the origins of environmental degradation, but the respectable scientific roots of the green revolution; in particular, distinguishing it from the ‘hallucinating hippies in the 1960s’. She hopes to construct the credibility of a Green future, by attaching the pedigree of innovative scientific tradition to it. As part of the distinguished chain contributing to the Green revolution, she mentions Blueprint for Survival, from which she adopts the four principles for minimal disruption of ecological processes, maximum conservation of materials and energy, stable population and an enjoyable social system.14 She also adds her own agenda for the twenty-first century, the first principle of which is to make an ‘Historic Compromise’ between rich and poor countries.15 This compromise entails a recognition that humans, as a species, live beyond their means; rich countries should therefore halt their development and pay back the poor countries, while the latter should accept that they cannot pursue the same development pattern as the richer countries.16 Despite the radical agenda, and its crucial implication for international politics, nothing is said about realising this task, since, in ‘any green future, it is the principles which matter; details are always negotiable’. The most urgent need for action, ‘is our absolute numbers, because … there is an inevitable limit to the number of people the biosphere can support’.17 Two guidelines are important for understanding Parkin’s thought. First, thinking about the principles, and deducing the problems from an environmental perspective. She disclosed in 1994: ‘there is no need for the Green Party any more. Our role was to bring into awareness the ecological perspective and set the agenda. Once we achieved that it is the task of scientists to determine the nitty-gritty details of how to bring that about.’18 The Green Party did not fail, it merely fulfilled its principal task and should therefore be dissolved. Second, deducing politics from an environmental perspective is her prime tool to refute the conclusion that a green agenda is politically Left, lest the identification with ‘hallucinating hippies’ be

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implied. Parkin therefore resorts to ecological metaphors to advocate decentralisation: Something which has a much longer history than the nation state is the ecological fact that the stability of any system depends on the various parts of the system fulfilling their functions satisfactorily.19 She extends the example of an organism’s cells to ‘human organisation … (where) is partly translated into the principle of subsidiarity,’20 from which the vision of Europe of the Regions is derived. The fallacy of applying ecological criteria to human societies, and the problem of deriving social imperatives from a single interpretation of the natural world, had already been widely discussed. Yet, clearly, pinning social policies on environmental principles is easier than justifying them on political grounds. A similar argument is presented with regard to the wholeness of the Earth, the interrelations within an ecosystem and biodiversity. Parkin’s main aim is to portray the Green agenda in terms of scientifically valid principles, to provide a respectable pedigree of green ideas, and to avoid being associated with any political tradition, thus establishing an ecological niche for the BGP. Despite the party seeking support from women, Third World groups and other public sectors, and being an enthusiastic initiator of a collaborative campaign undertaken with other opposition parties to promote changing the electoral system to proportional representation, Parkin’s preference for an ‘ecological’ vision forced the deduction of politics from supposedly environmental principles, consequently producing a very poor, if ecologically pure, ideological creed. Policies for a Green future Almost complementing Parkin’s approach, was A Green Manifesto, written by Alec Ponton, a one-time BGP co-chair, and Sandy Irvine, a converted communist, which hoped ‘to translate principles into practicable policies’.21 At first glance, their analysis seems altogether more comprehensive than Parkin’s: The industrial growth society is built upon exploitation within societies, between societies, and between humans and other species. The ones who suffer are those who find themselves in the way of technological ‘progress’. There is also the vicious exploitation of ‘guest workers’. Internationally, a global underclass is being expelled into marginal lands or shanty towns … traditional tribal peoples are being driven from their lands into cultural, if not physical, oblivion.22 This description sounds like a mature Green analysis, focusing on exploitation within industrial societies, as the prime cause connecting domination

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within and among societies, with the added factor of inter-species exploitation, while stressing British biocentrism. Despite being sensitive to multiculturalism, disadvantaged groups and environmental degradation, ‘The greatest issue of our time is resolving the crisis that has arisen between human society and the rest of the environment. All policies must be judged in terms of their contribution to getting this primary relationship right. The starting point of Green politics is the dependence of human beings on the ecological well-being of Earth.’23 Their Manifesto, which promised a potential green agenda, falls back on a narrow environmental platform, as shown by the contention that ‘the explosion in human numbers is the greatest long-term threat to the future of human and non-human inhabitants of Earth’.24 The Blueprint agenda breathes through the Manifesto, and its policies address the ‘comprehensive ecological perspective’ – environmental problems of resources, pollution, population and so on. Though it does call for tackling structures, not just individual lifestyles, the Manifesto presents the green goal: ‘to allow everyone the opportunity to live a fulfilling life, caring for and sharing with each other, future generations and other species, while living sustainably within the capacities of a limited world’.25 It centres on the individual, advocating human rights and decentralised communities. The book inevitably embodies the is-ought fallacy: A Green society would base itself upon the features found in undisturbed ecosystems – a multiplicity of niches, efficient energy use, the recycling of materials – to produce a resilient and satisfying new civilisation.26 Tellingly, ‘From Here to There’ advocates the following: Greens need to overcome any reservations about the idea of leadership. Central coordination is necessary because of the unevenness of awareness, commitment and ability within any group … Green parties are not an embryo of future Green society, but rather, tools with which to intervene in the society of today … Green parties cannot be safe havens providing a political retreat for those distressed by the bleak realities outside.27 Unsurprisingly, Irvine, who wrote the 1992 BGP’s platform, left the Green Party after the Green2000 affair, establishing a new ‘Campaign for Political Ecology’ – ECO – to attract the former Green gurus, Porritt, Parkin and others. ‘ECO was founded in late 1993 by a group of people who believe that a higher political profile for ecological issues is essential … ECO is not a political party nor does it seek to become one, though it accepts that the formation of a new ecocentric party may ultimately be necessary.’28 The Conserver party was launched in 1996.

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Therefore, Centralists, such as Porritt, Parkin, Ponton and Irvine recognised, ideologically, the wider issues of exploitation, domination, political culture and materialism as parts of the needed transformation, but chose, strategically, to portray green politics as purely ecological. They abstained from dialogue with other political traditions to disassociate their unique green niche from the survivalists of the Right-wing and the NSMs of the Left, and employed ecological principles as their philosophical principles, thereby exempting themselves from the need to argue for these politically. Ecological principles are the latest stage of scientific awareness and there is, therefore, no problem with the political system; what is required is to incorporate ecological awareness into the existing system. This approach also determined the discursive strategy of the Greens in the 1980s, which focused on demonstrating the compatibility of ecological imperatives with the liberal-democratic creed, calling for a mere expansion of the meaning of central values and political concepts. Portraying the Green agenda as moderate and democratic also justifies the lack of a political transformation plan. Their writings present the Greens as they would be in power, in the name of an Ecological government, convinced that ecology is the order of the day, or at least of tomorrow. The weakness of this independent brand of ideology is that it abstains from historical analysis, provides a narrow environmental vision and lacks the means to bring this vision about. Such a vision is parasitic on existing political and economic trends, and although it philosophically challenges the economic practices and the value-system on which the materialist creed is based, it has no political plan. Furthermore, the changes advocated are centred on the individual lifestyle or the global level, neglecting the social, economic and political realms. It could be argued that the constraints of the British electoral system brought this brand of Green thinking about. Nevertheless, its ideological paucity is apparent.

Green spirituality – caring and sharing The only significant change which the ‘Philosophical Basis’ Sustainability underwent in 23 years concerns spirituality, incorporated as the seventh principle: PB309 … society should respect belief in the spiritual aspect of existence … Many Greens feel that it only makes sense to talk of the future with reference to deeper values. Green spirituality recognises and accepts a universal human need for meaning and the need to restore the balance through recognising that our Planet and all life are unique aspects of an integrated whole. We humans are responsible for protecting or damaging life on Earth. Green spirituality is a way of being in the world that acknowledges and celebrates our connectedness to the Earth, to each

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other, and to all life. This requires attitudes of love, compassion and humility.29 Emphasising caring, sharing, harmony and wholeness, is a dominant mode of Green thinking that is hard to incorporate into ideological principles. It is shared by all wings of the party, as an ecological principle of wholeness, accepting to varying degrees Porritt’s claim that ‘the crisis is fundamentally a spiritual one,’30 but also accepting the New Left’s emphasis on caring, sharing and spirituality – needed to reconstruct the alienated society. However, the British Greens’ spirituality refers to awareness – nothing otherworldly; spirituality is linked to a change of values rather than to religion. Recognising the value of all life-forms distinguishes the Greens from other political traditions. One of spirituality’s advocates was David Icke, the sports commentator, who became a speaker of the Green Party within two months of joining. In It Doesn’t Have To Be Like That he argues that ‘A quiet, peaceful revolution is going on within millions of people, a revolution of values. Our children’s future may still be secured.’31 Emphasising the balance needed in society between masculine and feminine values, he concludes: ‘Green politics. Politics as if people mattered. That’s the only way to save our souls.’32 Embarrassing for the Greens was Icke’s conversion: ‘At the time I was a television presenter and a spokesperson for the UK Green Party … that spring morning I visited a medium and spiritual healer … and a world opened before me’.33 His new identity was described in The Truth Vibrations and Love Changes Everything. Icke demonstrates the dangers of linking spirituality with politics, strengthened by the detrimental effect that his anti-Semitism wrought on the Green public image.

The parties within the Party – the ideological scope unearthed Waves of radical activists joined the Greens when the Ecology Party was launched, and then after 1979. John Morrissey recalled that ‘we came to the party in 1980, from anarchist, socialist and Marxist groups to join the new party’.34 He described the Green2000 affair thus: A major split developed when the Green2000 grouping, supported by Jonathon Porritt and Sara Parkin, rewrote the party rulebook and took over the leadership in 1991. The defeat of Green2000 by the activists and the departure of its key players left the party battered but intact. The thread running through this tale is that within the fairly conventional structure of the Green Party, there is a different kind of party trying to get out.35 This picture of the party within the party emerges, crucially, not only from a declared Left-wing perspective. Steve Dawe, a key Decentralist

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during the Green2000 debate, argued that while Parkin et al. had executive power, their preoccupation with the management of the public face of the party, left them with little influence on the Green Party’s policies and internal life, as the leadership had no access to grassroots activists.36 Given the lack of an entrenched Marxist tradition in Britain, the BGP’s meagre electoral resources, and the different political culture, the ‘culture of disputes’ of the German Greens, which led to a highly political approach to power, did not prevail. Nevertheless, the ideological undercurrents within the party encompassed the broader social agenda as did their German counterparts, despite ideological differences. The BGP endorsed its internal diversity as an ideological principle a decade after it became the rule in Germany. The discussion starts with the two approaches of the self-professed socialist Greens – one more akin to a traditional Leftist approach, the other clearly within the New Left. It continues with the ideological creed in theory and praxis of party activists, and finishes with the draft of the 1997 electoral manifesto, which explicitly endorsed a Green agenda, suggesting one form of modular ideology. Ideological proliferation was materialising. Nevertheless, the main body of activists, acting on local and national levels, practised Green politics, while thinking very little about ideology; they believed that they did the right thing without immersing themselves in a coherent theoretical analysis. The great autonomy enjoyed by the local parties is certainly one of the pillars of Green politics. The only drawback is that at the local level everyday concerns with transportation, parking spaces, recycling schemes and noise pollution leave little time to construct a social vision or the political means to get there. Old Left, New Left – a new direction? A decade after John Morrissey, John Norris joined the party, being co-author of A New Direction and The Way Ahead – the only newsletter published by an independent faction with the BGP. In private, both disclosed that it all happened too fast for the party to be ready for a Leftist analysis. Norris became party chair in 1992 after the new constitution was put in place by Green2000 shortly before they departed, and Morrissey in 1994, too early for the socialisation of the Greens. Consequently, they were isolated within the party as a Left faction, rather than as leading thinkers of the party. Still, the programme they proposed shared many elements with the ‘native’ Greens – the environmentalists – and their analysis became a party philosophy. A New Direction argues: Politics is about human choices. The Green Party is dedicated to the ecological approach to politics and the overriding importance of sustainability. But sustainability is not a choice; it is a precondition for having choices. Although environmental constraints limit human options, they

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do not necessarily determine them. We therefore argue not only for sustainability itself, but for the Green society as the best kind of sustainable future. Our present society is based on exploitation: exploitation of the environment by industry, of poor countries by rich nations, of workers by employer, of women by men, of black by white, of animals by humans. These forms of exploitation are all linked. None can be addressed adequately if we fail to address the others. Conserving the environment is not enough.37 While A New Direction correctly identifies the link between the different issues mentioned, it also simplistically claims ‘… this exploitation is the result of capitalism’.38 Capitalism is an all-inclusive shorthand – for which no explication is offered. No explanations are offered for why all these conflicts emerged contemporaneously; why they result from capitalism and not, say, from industrialism or from institutionalised democracies; or for the tensions between the different outlined conflicts, their prioritisation or the different means needed to address them. Furthermore, an ecological approach is conspicuously lacking from their ideological pamphlet, as if by merely mentioning sustainability as a precondition ecology was addressed. However, they argued that ‘those who will benefit most from Green policies are the poor, the downtrodden and the exploited,’39 and, in contrast to the pure ecologists, they maintained that ‘Green politics seeks to change the system, not change within the system. Our aim is to challenge, and to replace, existing power structures.’40 A change of power structures, however, amounted to local communities, decentralisation, democratisation of the economy, local production for local needs – an anarchic-socialist vision held by most Greens, but with no political measures to materialise it beyond the known rhetoric of ‘fundamental transformation in the means of production’. Nevertheless, the main problems are identified: ‘equity will not be achieved mainly through Bills and Charters … . Real equity consists of equal access and control over real things and processes: popular participation in a democratic economy. Fair shares in the wealth of society, but also fair shares in production.’41 Sustainability, equity, participation and democracy, are viewed as ends in themselves, thereby highlighting and endorsing neglected areas of British Green thought, such as the daily experience of the poor, the unemployed, the low-waged and minorities. While this might suggest an endorsement of other social movements by the Green Left, Morrissey commented in 1982: ‘the tedious discussion of the footling issues of NVDA and feminism’, revealing otherwise: ‘Some of our potential supporters see us as middle-aged stuffed shirts who prefer words to action. Many more consider us to be dilapidated ex-hippies incapable of running a hamburger stall, let alone restructuring society … Face-painting,

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goats and feminism are not the answer’.42 (Obviously, both Johns, for a fact, were ex-hippies and stuffed shirts.) An interesting facet of their ideology is revealed: the NSMs were not the extra force which the old Marxists hoped for. ‘You cannot expect two middle-aged men to advocate feminism’, they argued,43 highlighting their lack of understanding of New Politics. Whereas feminism for women can also be politics of identity, feminism is essentially an ideological struggle about social justice. Clearly, the Johns expressed a traditional Leftist analysis, focusing on economics and capitalism, and seeking to incorporate them into a sustainable society. They identified the wider potential of Green ideology, but were suspicious of endorsing the New Left. They sought to incorporate socialist economics analysis to enrich the poor Green analysis, while valuing the distinct nature of the Green Party, dissociated from other social forces. They prescribed three functions for the BGP: developing the radical Green agenda, supporting local politics and contesting national elections. Developing a national agenda, empowering people to come together and discuss it, and importantly, seeing democracy as a process were fundamental. Their most recent political strategy, which the party endorsed in 1993, concerns ‘coalition building’. The BGP ‘recognises that the future will be built not by one self-proclaimed vanguard achieving supremacy over all others but by organisations working together and by individuals cooperating across organisational boundaries’.44 The seeds for a modular ideology are planted on fertile green soils. Morrissey summarises his conception thus: ‘The party is itself a coalition between its environmentalist and Electoralist Right-wing, and a Left which is libertarian and anarchistic. The former is comfortable with the traditional party form and conventional political activity. The latter could have rejected the idea of a party, but has tried instead to reinvent it.’45 ‘Consume less. Share more. Enjoy life’ The socialist Greens, a faction active in the late 1980s, encompassed both traditional Leftists who joined the Greens as Leftists, and New Leftists who came, through a process of ideological evolution, to be Left-leaning activists. Within the latter were also Greens who endorsed a radical agenda for social justice while not considering themselves socialists, for example, Derek Wall, a self-declared ‘converted eco-Marxist’,46 perhaps the best example of a Green who later endorsed the wider agenda of the New Left. Speaker of the party in 1989, Wall described the ideological transformation using the German Green example: Green analysis widened. The links between social injustice, international problems and the threatened biosphere were made clear. Support for embattled groups – the unemployed, Turkish immigrants and other ‘guest workers’, gays and lesbians along with inner-city communities struggling for better conditions – became part of Green political practice.47

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In A Green Manifesto for the 1990s, he tries, together with Penny Kemp, cochair of the party in 1988–89, and a passionate socialist Green, to analyse the BGP along the same lines of ideological interest. They outlined three UK Greens roots: The first Greens were … scientists forced into building a political movement by fear of their own data. Green politics is above all politics of survival … The second root of Green politics is social concern, comprising not only the issue of survival but also democracy, justice, freedom from oppression, not just liberation of nature from excessive human demands but also liberation of humanity … A third element of Green politics is spirituality … Greens believe that none of us can really be happy without a spiritual outlet, good creative work and the opportunities to be closer to nature.48 They then argue that ‘The Green movement is very much a women’s movement’ that supports gay and lesbian liberation, Third World concerns and, in contrast to other Left movements, believes in nature’s own rights.49 Greens are also Decentralists, who hope to dismantle bureaucracy as they believe in the empowerment of the individual and the community. However, … above everything else, Greens are holistic; they aim to bring together interacting themes and to avoid providing simplistic solutions to complex human problems. The different individuals, groups and strands of thought in Green politics, while giving rise to tensions, are generally creative rather than divisive, though there is a danger that groups may regard all the world’s problems as symptoms of a single malady for which they have only one cure … Green politics is pluralistic.50 This analysis points to a crucial mistake made by the traditional Leftists, who blamed all problems on capitalism, and saw the solution in terms of changing the means of production; it applies as well to ‘pure’ ecologists such as Goldsmith and Parkin, who saw all human maladies as resulting from the ecological crisis. Given the qualm about the Green creed, Wall and Kemp’s analysis of the history of the British Greens differed from Parkin’s. While the latter hoped to present the Greens as part of a respectable scientific tradition dating to the seventeenth century, they chose to draw on the Diggers, Owenists and Levellers, and individuals such as William Morris, John Ruskin and Kropotkin as the forefathers of the Greens. In the Green Party’s history they chose to recall Fringe, the radical of the 1970s Ecology Party, who said that the first thing a Green government would do is dissolve itself.51 They then mentioned the wave of 1968 activists who joined the party in the early 1980s, the support for civil disobedience, the launching of the campaign for real democracy and alternative economic policies, the

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three women co-chairs of 1988 and the devolution of the Scottish Green Party in 1989.52 The emphasis on civil disobedience, grassroots activism, feminism, decentralisation and challenges to the political system are far from coincidental. It is almost a different party from that presented by Parkin, Ponton or Morrissey: Politics of ecology which doesn’t embrace social justice is meaningless. They are inseparable just as feminism, anti-racism and anti-sexism mean integrated parts of Green politics … The recognition that poverty is linked inextricably with ecological destruction must guide Green policies.53 Surprisingly, despite these strong convictions, the main body of the book tackles traditional environmental issues – pollution, global warming, ozone layer, agriculture and so on – with no analysis of social justice. Whereas traditional Leftists’ analysis ignored environmental problems, New Leftists avoided analysing their self-professed social agenda. Referring in passing to feminism, they assert that ‘a Green government would create a Ministry for Women’s Affairs that would ensure that women are represented at all levels of decision making’.54 The British New Left stops short of challenging the political and a well-entrenched liberalism is a better description of their policy.55 Thus, while the authors state their support for feminism, multicultural society, participatory democracy and decentralisation of power, they fail to provide any political transformation plan. Their brand of libertarianism, of avoiding the analysis of power within the state, and alluding instead to the local community, the change of lifestyle and individual fulfilment, is captured in their answer to the question ‘How to be Green’: ‘It’s really very simple and requires no expert knowledge or complex skills. Here’s the answer. Consume less. Share more. Enjoy life.’56 Hardly a political plan for total transformation. Thus, while the New Leftists of the British Greens identify the wider ideological project, they do not provide a political plan. The difference from ‘pure ecologists’ is clearly manifested in the scope of their agenda: ‘The real problem is not over-population but over-consumption and resource maldistribution … poverty leads to over-population rather than the other Malthusian way round.’57 In contrast to the pure ecologists who took population growth, resources depletion and environmental degradation to be pure ecological problems, socialist Greens argued that these problems are rooted in the distribution of resources. However, the suggested Basic Income Scheme is barely applicable in advanced industrial societies, let alone poverty-stricken Third World countries. Where they differ again from both pure ecologists and traditional Leftists, is on the role of the party and its relation to the NSMs. ‘Greens have to face up to the issue of power’ asserts Wall.58 ‘A Green Party … has a limited role: change cannot be brought about purely through parliament.

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Greens need to work in a holistic way – promoting new ideas, building practical alternatives and contesting elections (for) promoting extraparliamentary action via electoral politics.’59 Socialist Greens endorse not only coalition building, NVDA on particular ecological issues, and the new social movements,60 as part of ‘a much wider strategy of accelerating positive humane and ecological change … . Closely akin to such a holistic model of political practice is the idea of acting as a catalyst rather than a vanguard.’61

The speakers before the camp Two other constituencies explored by the BGP are exemplified by the 1996 speakers, David Taylor and Pegg Alexander. Both represented a generation which politically grew up in the party. Both sought to deepen the party’s connections with Britain’s non-parliamentarian groups. Taylor, however, stressed the connection with NVDA groups, while Alexander emphasised the underrepresented strata of societies. While both hoped to incorporate extraparliamentary politics into the Greens, the question is whether either of them adhered to an ideology which is comparable to New Politics, and whether these constituencies can coexist within a pure ecological perspective. NVDA: which, by whom, for what end A teenager when joining the party, Taylor’s reaction to Electoralist arguments was described in the history of the Green Party thus: ‘Taylor, whose legendary Bath anti-Nuclear Group sabotaged and eventually stopped nuclear waste dumping from the port of Sharpness stated in response “we must be brave because it is only when we are prepared to get arrested for our beliefs that people will notice … Direct action is the cutting edge of change.” ’62 The message is a clear anti-Centralist one, rejecting the narrow electoral focus, and calling for extraparliamentary activity. In a keynote BGP conference speech delivered on 23 February 1996, he said: Look at the issues on the street where popular protest is setting the agenda – the Criminal Justice Act, nuclear power, road-building, live export … which party is out there, rooted in the culture of these movements, embracing them all as an intrinsic part of its political philosophy. We know which party. The Green Party … . There is an enormous gap of perspective, vision and politics between young people in Britain today and the adult world of Westminster politics. Young people are not apolitical. Most care passionately about the world they are inheriting, but they have no voice in parliament so are forced to take to the streets to be heard. Supporting direct action clearly defies the Centralist vision of an environmentally focused exclusionist party. But party role aside, is it ideologically

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incompatible with a pure ecological agenda? Nuclear power, road construction, live export, and the implications of the Criminal Justice Act on access to public paths on private land all cohere with a narrow environmental spectrum. Decentralists can well be pure ecologists. Does NVDA reflect a specifically Green profile? Leftists supporters of CND are politically different from people who protest against the export of livestock, popular with Tory voters. Both differ from anti-road campaigners who live in trees for months in small communities, estranged from mainstream Britain. A strategy which emphasises local communities, direct action struggles and coalition building is endorsed by Taylor, targeting a unique constituency of activists, who, importantly, hardly share a political creed. While the BGP support these campaigns, direct action groups rarely see themselves as politically identified with the Greens. Taylor insisted that the BGP should provide a political philosophy which encompasses all these protest actions, independent of their self-identification. While it could entail a broadening of the ideological project, NVDA in which Green activists usually participated, tended to be environmentally focused: 80 per cent of Green party members were also members of environmental organisations. Nevertheless, even a narrow ecologism such as this must endorse the ideological principles of respect for others, pluralism, tolerance and cooperation, and certainly the primacy of ecology – all of which form the basis of a modular ideology. The structure is there, but a common political action plan is missing. It might therefore fall short of an ideological programme. Social justice from a non-socialist Pegg Alexander, the other 1996 speaker of the Greens, argued, in the Green-Left convergence conference, organised by the Johns in cooperation with a host of non-Green socialist groups, that even if the terminology of the social movements differed, they still converged on issues. She outlined four principles for the Green-Left alliance: money is not the be-all-and-endall; there is a right to shared wealth; all people are equal, all should enjoy equal respect and equal opportunities; the destruction of the Earth is undesirable and redistribution between the rich and poor worlds are necessary. Prior to being re-elected, Alexander said that throughout her term in office, she addressed endless rallies, demonstrations and press conferences in which only she discussed poverty, anti-racism, employment, wages, and women’s issues. ‘I can wholeheartedly say that social deprivation and the ecological crisis are inseparable. We cannot liberate our Earth without liberating the people on Earth.’63 Alexander is perhaps the best example of the recognition that the Greens have no socialist pedigree, that social justice is an inherent part of their political creed, that there is no other political party which endeavours to act for the unemployed, the underclass and the environment, that a party is needed to voice the concerns of the voiceless, or of those who are

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regarded mainly as consumers even though they are also low-waged, mothers, students and/or blacks. Pegg’s kind of politics, although strikingly inarticulate in terms of theory, as she herself confessed, many Greens feel as inseparable from their political ideology. Thus, while Taylor’s agenda could still be purely ecological, Alexander’s plea is a wholehearted endorsement of disadvantaged, exploited and underrepresented strata. It calls not only for tactical cooperation with the social movements, as the traditional Leftists do, but endorses the New Politics agenda and perceives it as a comprehensive worldview, the unique ideological constituency of the Greens. Social justice is the key concern of the Greens, notwithstanding the primacy of ecology. It is only in the 1997 draft electoral manifesto that the BGP explicitly stated these beliefs. The fifth draft of the 1997 General Election manifesto read: Parliament has become a cabaret, growing daily more out of touch with reality. But out there in the real world, powerful forces for change are building up. ‘Environmental’ organisations are becoming more political. ‘Single issue’ campaigns are recognising the need for comprehensive change, People from many backgrounds are gradually coming together, building links; challenging all kinds of oppression, cruelty and environmental destruction. These people are coming together around an agenda which the Green Party set more than 20 years ago … Radical pressure groups need a radical political party to strengthen their efforts by applying electoral pressure. And people everywhere are yearning to liberate themselves. The women’s movement, the disabled people’s movement, the millions who are unemployed or marginalised. Everyone who is fighting against homophobia, racism, animal exploitation or the oppression of the Third World … They all need and deserve a political party which works for them and with them. However, this draft version was not incorporated into the actual election manifesto for fear of antagonising traditional followers, particularly the conservative elements within the BGP. The new ideational configuration, which to all purposes linked together but was portrayed as discrete causes of concern – ‘challenging all kinds of oppression, cruelty and environmental destruction’, remained latent in the published manifesto, as was the proposed modular coalition. Taylor’s ideas of love and interconnectedness prevailed while Alexander’s agenda of opposing discrimination, exploitation and domination – of nature and humans alike – had to wait another term, and for another co-speaker.

12 Modular Ideology: a Green Caterpillar Turns into a Colourful Butterfly?

From a British perspective, the 1996 elections centred upon the modernised Labour lead by Tony Blair. Blair’s agenda, based on Gidden’s thesis of The Third Way,1 appealed particularly to those groups and ideas that the Greens had also targeted. In Germany the separation from socialism occurred in 1956, and led to the independent paths of the SPD and the Greens. In Britain, the socialist clause 4 was removed only in 1996, and the changing agenda of New Labour seemed to address the same structural problems of advanced industrial democracies that New Politics did. It was therefore necessary for the BGP in 1996 to reiterate the distinctly ecological agenda, rather than to market a new worldview of social justice, which was too similar to that of the main party contesting power. Only when the New Labour government commenced its first term, and began to be identified with domination and rule – with no viable opposition to its Left – did the Greens begin to realise their political potential and the vacant ideological niche of radical politics. Only with the election of a new co-speaker, the strengthening of the decentralist wing of the party and the change of the electoral system for the European Parliament which facilitated the first MEPs for the BGP, did the ideological transformation which was well on its way manifest itself publicly. ‘Quality of life’ – no real Green alternative For the crucial 1996 election, the BGP chose to recycle a ‘traditional’ manifesto, ‘The Green Alternative for a Better Quality of Life’, despite the recognition that other social realms – exploitation, discrimination, minorities’ rights and social justice – are inherently connected to Green politics. The cover portrayed Westminster surrounded by sunflowers, a new sun rising on the horizon, symbolising, if anything, the fantastic, and hence unrealistic, vision the manifesto promised. The four main sections of the document, 242

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‘Greening the Economy’, ‘Rebuilding our Communities’, ‘Policies for Health’ and ‘Our Place in the World’, however, shifted the emphasis from an environmentally centred manifesto to a community-focused platform. Despite having no distinct ideological core, it stressed an interconnected, organicist perspective, whereby quality of life and a meaningful way of living were central to their worldview. Surprisingly, the opening phrase of the BGP manifesto was ‘It doesn’t have to be like this’2 – the exact title of David Icke’s book, the false prophet which caused much dismay for the BGP.3 The human-oriented agenda, including the expansion beyond environmental politics into social realms, was incorporated into the platform, but underplayed. Thus, the first sentence read ‘We don’t have to make goods which don’t last and in ways which exploit people.’4 The issue of exploitation remained latent, reappearing occasionally as associated with homelessness, as being at the social and environmental root of illness,5 and in the final section of ‘Exploiting People and the Planet’, which finds the global economy and international trade as the underlying causes of poverty and environmental destruction.6 Exploitation, poverty, health and community are thus treated as independent variables, and are only indirectly related to the ecological crisis. Nevertheless, there is no general philosophy or principled worldview explaining their coherence within the framework of Green thought and social justice is not mentioned in the platform. The programme identifies ‘meaningful ways of life’, ‘quality of life’ and ‘education for life’ as the positive forces of society, while the indicated negative forces are ‘economic growth’, ‘world-trade’, ‘politicians’ and ‘the grey parties’.7 From ecological philosophy to New Politics ideology As Britain entered a new political era under Labour, the Green Party became, for the first time, a conscious opposition party: the Conservatives, having lost the elections and their leadership, plunged into a crisis from which they have not yet emerged, and the Liberal-Democrats were too close to Labour in the elections. In addition, this was the first time that the BGP had the electoral incentive to rethink its position towards the British Left. The new government in office, with its appeal to industrial and economic enterprises, and its overtly non-socialist image, dismayed both the traditional and the New Left in Britain. The ideational grounds of social and economic justice, care for the poor, exploited and disadvantaged groups were unoccupied programmatic territory. Besides, the promises of New Labour to change the electoral system, starting with the European elections as a testcase for Britain, boosted the political morale of the Green Party. The decentralists’ line finally prevailed with the 1997 election of the new co-speaker, Dr Michael Woodin – a psychology lecturer at Oxford and its Green councillor: the party was to work inwardly, rethinking its political and conceptual principles, as well as devoting power and resources at the local

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level. Yet, the two trends pushed in different directions. Local government demands a good electoral infrastructure – put in place by the long-standing national election officer of the party, Chris Rose – and the hard work of individual candidates and local cells: the root and branch activity. Local manifestos contest local policies rather than provide a comprehensive vision. Thus, the ‘Manifesto for a Sustainable London’ included only local issues such as transport, local communities, Heathrow airport and the local economy, with the only inspiring idea being to replace the Millennium Dome with an Urban village mini-model.8 However, ideological reshuffling requires an alternative social and political vision. The balance between the two trends was achieved in local elections and in national party conferences. In terms of election results, Rose described the situation in the aftermath of the May 2000 elections: The Green Parties in the UK now have more elected representatives in more influential positions than ever before: 2 MEPs, 1 member of the Scottish Parliament and 47 Principal Authority Councillors (including 3 Greater London Authority members) on 22 different elected bodies. There are also a number of Parish, Town and Welsh Community Councillors and a member of the House of Lords.9 Ideologically, the first indicator of change was the new Philosophical Basis, rewritten in the long-term Manifesto for Sustainable Society and approved in the party conference of March 2000. The last change to this untouched part of Sustainability was the addition of the spiritual clause in 1995. In 2000, however, the philosophical basis was completely rewritten. The new PB provides conceptual grounds for pursuing environmental and social changes, while contesting the traditional ideological approach of the BGP, which found ecological crisis as the root cause of social harms. This is revealed already in the BP’s structure: ‘Green Politics’, ‘Humans and the Environment’, ‘Humans in Society’, ‘Characteristic of a Sustainable Society’, and ‘Strategy’ social chapters are independent of the environmental ones for the first time. The BGP now reinterprets the human condition, provides a historical analysis, and an alternative political vision: PB109 The Green Party therefore places both personal and political change at the heart of its response to the ecological crisis and is committed to creating a society in which individuals, through their ability to satisfy their basic needs more fully, are then able better to contribute to future sustainability. This principle is reflected in the radical Green agenda both for changes in values and lifestyles, and for reformed social, economic and political structures. When read out of context, this sounds like a text from the German Greens’ ecosocialists. The emphasis on structural reforms – social, economic

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and political – the sought out comprehensive change, and the stress on basic needs seem distinctively New Left agenda. Yet, in context it is a particular worldview of the BGP, positioning the individual as the link between concern for the environment and the societal role. Personal change is the key to the alternative political route, stemming from the individual’s basic needs, explained in PB107: ‘In basic needs we mean not only the physiological needs … but also psychological needs. These include the need for love, respect, autonomy, security, and meaningful activity within our communities.’ Depriving one’s basic needs ‘is expressed as anxiety, insecurity, and aggressive behaviour towards others, and exploitation of the environment’, declares PB108. Crucially, individual self-realisation, rather than environmental destruction is at the root cause of the problem. The analysis continues with the social, economic and environmental changes that would only be achieved with a change in the fundamental condition of humans. Exploitation is extended to include ‘poor nations’ (PB103), the non-privileged, those excluded from the minority of rich people (PB104) and ‘others’ – minorities within the state (PB108). The historical analysis points to two interconnected factors: conventional politics and the industrial revolution – generating the pursuit of economic growth. Since conventional politics is responsible for the ‘malaise that afflicts our land and our people (which) is political, economic and spiritual’, the BGP wants an alternative to our ‘culture (that) is in the grip of a valuesystem and a way of understanding the world which is fundamentally flawed’ (PB102). ‘The relentless pursuit of economic growth has brought humankind to the brink of a disaster which is unprecedented in human history’ (PB104), one which traditional politics exacerbate, by relying on a flawed value-system. Hence, ‘the Green Party seeks healthy interdependence of individual, nature and society’ (PB105). The philosophical separation of the individual from nature and society, allows the BGP to independently address each of these interdependent conceptual components. ‘Humans in the Environment’, the title already presenting an anthropocentric point of view, argues that ‘conventional politics has established human domination of the exploitable environment as the basis of human power and the basis of hierarchies of wealth’ (PB202). Instead, the BGP offers respect for the environment, with all its complexities and potential value. Four core concepts are offered: ‘ecological politics’ – understanding the ecosystem; ‘interdependence’ – recognising the interrelationships between humanity and the environment; ‘diversity’ – in particular biodiversity and the need to preserve it; and ‘sustainability’ – the principal planning factor which instruct long-term assessment to policies and further development. The environmental core, therefore, reflects the ecological perception of an interrelated ecosystem in which humans, the natural environment and the web of life interact, and for whose longevity and endurance humans are responsible.

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‘Humans in Society’ identifies the loci of social change required to progress towards a sustainable society, thereby highlighting the BGP’s social vision: Democracy, Equality, Human Rights, Minorities, Internationalism and Basic Material Security for All. At the core is the individual: ‘The Green Party affirms the importance of individual freedom and self-expression’ (PB401) and his/her rights: ‘The fundamental, inalienable rights of each individual in a democratic society’ (PB304). While this reveals the liberal conception of the BGP, the implications expose its New Left agenda: the party ‘rejects all forms of exploitation’ (PB304). Drawing upon the concept of equality, it advocates cultural pluralism – ‘the legitimate interests of all people are of equal value’ (PB303) – and concludes that ‘we accept the need for social institutions to protect the interests of the powerless against the powerful’. This is the first official BGP document to incorporate the struggle against exploitation, discrimination and domination within the Green agenda, disjointedly from ecological insights, and expands liberal principles to include the care, respect and responsibility towards the Other – be it nature, minorities or poor nations. Significantly, there is no mature concept of participatory democracy or multiculturalism: human rights are to be achieved through a written constitution (PB304) and the political vision stops short of deliberative democracy: ‘voluntary cooperation between equal individuals in a democratic society’. Hence, the role of the Green Party remains instrumental; the relationship to the NSMs is merely mentioned once, under ‘Strategy’: ‘We seek to be part of a wider green movement’ (PB501). The vision of ecological society is of ‘self-governing communities of a variety of sizes which will regulate their own social and economic activities’ (PB203). Yet, no constructive measures of realising this vision are proposed. ‘Characteristics of a Sustainable Society’ begins with restricted freedom: ‘people should be free to make their own decisions on matters which do not adversely affect others’ (PB401). It paves the way for the subsidiarity principle, in which every decision should be made at the lower possible level: ‘valuing the opportunity people have to make their own decisions, accept responsibility for them and develop in their own way’ (PB401). The restrictive element of freedom brings back the New Left agenda: ‘wealth and power are often used to curtail the freedoms of the poor and the powerless’ (PB402). The section includes all the elements embedded in the distinctive discursive strategy of the BGP: the main idea being to take basic core concepts of the enlightenment project and extend their meaning to include new ideas. For example, wealth: ‘our wealth must be more broadly defined’ (PB410) to include natural resources, biodiversity, unpaid work, welfare and meeting basic needs. Similarly, with prosperity: self-realisation replaces material affluence as its indicator. Work is measured not by income but by need, care and self-realisation: ‘the quality of work is as important as its quantity … there is

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an increasing divide between the work that needs to be done and the paid employment which provides income’ (PB462). Finally, progress and technology: ‘we value the processes of researching and developing new technologies. However, they should not be considered self-evidently desirable, nor should lifestyles based on more complex technologies be considered necessarily superior to lifestyles based on simpler ones’ (PB430). Their concept of empowerment encompasses respect and encouragement of different lifestyles, as embedded in the concept of the individual and his/her self-realisation as an alternative value-system. They condemn ‘power over’ someone else – “ ‘power over” remains the dominant force in our hierarchical, competitive society’ (PB441) and therefore encourages protest and civil disobedience. Instead, they call for ‘power to’ – ‘our potential to co-operate and take control over our own lives’ (PB440). The critique is systemic; the route to political change remains focused on the individual rather than on structural changes. The philosophical basis of the BGP incorporates the social and ecological under one philosophical viewpoint, building on the party’s rich foundation of individual routes to social change, the expansion of the dominant culture’s key concepts and the discourse of ecological interdependence. This new worldview is simultaneously distinctive to the BGP and characteristic of the modular ideology of the Greens – it tackles structural problems of advanced industrial democracies by expanding the liberal agenda and emphasising the care and responsibility for the Other – the disadvantaged and exploited. Yet, neither its critique nor its vision, are as radical and structural as its German counterpart: no alternative model of democracy, no conception of cultural pluralism and no systemic political change is discussed. Curiously, the idea of social justice, which could complement environmental justice, is lacking from the philosophical basis of the BGP. Reach for the Future: ‘Justice and only justice you shall follow’ The 2001 election manifesto, Reach for the Future, written by co-speaker Dr Mike Woodin, provides coherence for the political ideology of the BGP under the core concept of justice. The 5-part programme – ‘Just Economics’, ‘the Just Society’, ‘Ecological Justice’, ‘Securing Justice Globally’ and ‘Democratic Justice’ – discloses a unified conceptual framework of the Greens’ worldview.10 For the first time, the election manifesto does not concede to a simplistic message of green vs. grey politics, nor does it offer a mere list of environmental policies without principled overview. Nevertheless, Future demonstrates key characteristics of BGP manifestos: using graphs, tables, facts and official data to project realism, reliability, and a science-oriented approach (‘Greens are honest’);11 presenting pictures of the Green elected representatives – to strengthen identification; emphasising Green policies and opinions, disregarded by other parties yet part of public common sense, to give authority and respectability to their call to

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‘Vote Green’; and writing from a British perspective, for British people, rather than offering a universal programme. Future opens: The Green Party is reaching for the future. We are working to create a caring and secure society in Britain, at peace with itself and the world; a multicultural society, in harmony with nature, where justice underpins every aspect of national life.12 A ‘multicultural society’ precedes ‘in harmony with nature’, and justice is highlighted as the central concept of the BGP, and a new concept of future generations is introduced: ‘This manifesto presents … policies that will provide for our needs without denying those of future generations’.13 The concentric circles of sought justice – personal, social, national, ecological and global – are revealed gradually, each layer exposing more Green principles. This proves that the innovative ideological conception, reflected in the structure of Future, is not always complemented by a radical or distinct Green agenda. The ‘Just Economics’ section offers three supposedly radical stances: the Citizens’ Income programme – ‘non-means tested payment to every citizen, working or not’;14 introduction of new taxes – eco-tax, local taxation and so on; and opposition to the Euro as a symbol of globalisation – signalling to the growing international anti-globalisation camp. This exposes the two wheels of the Green economic wagon: localisation and progressive taxation. While the first has been on the BGP agenda since 1972 (including the Citizen’s Income scheme) the second portrays a quite traditional social democratic perspective. This impression is strengthened in ‘The Just Society’, which rests on the traditional welfare state pillars of housing, education, health and transport. Interestingly, the open sentence promises an alternative worldview, with Basic Needs at its core: The just society will meet everyone’s basic needs. Decent housing, effective health care, imaginative education, efficient public transport – access to these vital services will help everyone make the most of their own life so they can contribute fully to the life of the community.15 The adjectives reveal the worldview: just, basic, decent, effective, imaginative, efficient and vital all enhance Green understanding of the importance of a sustainable, meaningful, community-oriented, quality way of life; of living within one’s means while striving for a meaningful lifestyle. However, the policies themselves fail to embark on an innovative road. Thus, ‘Learning for Life’ lists the usual problems with the educational system – class sizes, infrastructure, test-oriented studies and so on.16 The demand to empower teachers to shape the curriculum in accordance with their pupils’ needs is not complemented with any vision as to how a person, a future citizen,

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should be educated, which values schools should uphold or which concept of individual should be cultivated. Subsidised public transportation and free health care hardly constitute distinctive Green demands, and even the Ecological Justice section tackles issues currently referred to by all parties – safe food, saved energy, recycled waste and natural preservation. ‘Securing Justice Globally’ recaptures the traditional issues of New Politics, defending peace, control of the arms race, revoking the debts of poor nations, providing asylum rights and supporting the self-reliance of Third World countries. The BGP thus attempts to establish itself as the collective political actor of the extraparliamentary opposition, without a firm position on contemporary international conflicts. Most disappointing, from New Politics perspective, is ‘Democratic Justice’. Instead of being the locus for political critique, alternative culture, enhanced participatory democracy and so on, it focuses on constitutional reform (written constitution), proportional representation (Additional Member System) and local government (more authorities).17 Democratisation is only related to the EU, and there is no mention of social justice, women’s equality, minorities’ rights, multicultural society or anti-discrimination measures. The platform provides a new framework, the ideological structure which the BGP was very slow to develop, yet it does not substantiate it with the distinct, equivocal, alternative vision of a multicultural, deliberative democracy. Future entails a new worldview devoid of creative views. The BGP remains a traditional party, lacking radical vision for revitalised democratic Britain, despite the ideological infrastructure that could facilitate such an alternative vision.

BGP: Features of the ideological evolution If in Germany the praxis generated problems later addressed theoretically, in Britain the ideological developments, within the political context, preceded and facilitated the praxis. In 1972, PEOPLE was established in response to the need for a new philosophy of life that would address ecological problems, and was founded by a small group, strongly influenced by a particular conception of ecological laws. Even at that stage, decentralisation, self-reliant communities and diversity were valued, and, political cooperation with environmental organisations was sought. This social vision, and recognition of the primacy of ecology, enabled other ideological groups, from a Liberal and Leftist background, to join the Ecology Party. PEOPLE was exclusionist in its outlook and hence, after the first wave of activists joined the party, the founders themselves departed. ECO became inclusionist, but was as adamant about the need for a new philosophy as PEOPLE was. Beyond environmental organisations, it portrayed its mission as enlightening the public at large: if PEOPLE hoped to have influence by demonstrating the dangers to survival, ECO sought to convert people through realism, by suggesting that the sustainable society is the only

250 The British Green Party

viable option. Hoping to attract votes, it concentrated on its ecological message, seeking to be the party of the moderate centre, while advocating change on the personal level of lifestyle. Politically, though, given meagre resources, it was not able to materially support the activists and focused on projecting the message via the media, for which only a small, professional leadership was needed. The fortunes of British politics, and the emergence of another party of the centre, led ECO to become more radical and to seek its constituency elsewhere. In accordance with its ideological creed, it opened up to direct action and extraparliamentary activity related to environmental issues. Its image changed from respectable party with a self-appointed role of educating the public, to that of a radical party, telling the truth and acting in the streets to achieve its goals. Given the electoral hardship, it also initiated the Campaign for Real Democracy and thus opened up to cooperation with other organisations. For a while, its unexpected success jeopardised the process of opening up, and a reductionist strategy of aggressively marketing a narrow environmental message was adopted between 1989–92. Yet, even during this time, grassroots activists were refining party policies and working to include new social problems into their ideology. It was an internal realisation process, which expanded their ideology beyond a narrowly environmental creed. For example, recognising that ecological problems are interrelated to social problems, that access to land is inherently connected to land ownership, and that decentralised self-sufficient communities need decentralisation of power, resources and control over decision-making to operate. This ideological realisation triggered cooperation with other organisations and endorsement of social realms heretofore neglected. The activists of NSMs, however, remained reluctant to join a party. In the 1990s, a combined strategy developed, concentrating on local politics and reinforcing the Green message through media coverage and national and European elections. ‘Coalition building’ strategy and rapprochement with the Left first became apparent in 1996. In that year, the head of CND also joined the UK Greens, and a rival new party, the Conserver Party, was established by ex-BGP pure ecologists. Thus, the same principles as in Germany apply: exclusionary currents depart and only inclusionary ones, which cherish pluralism and tolerance and perceive politics as an ongoing process rather than a struggle to determine who is ultimately right, remained party activists. PEOPLE’s founders left the party in 1970, Maingreen, the Centralist faction, left in the mid-1980s, and Green2000 adherents in 1992. Each struggle was accompanied by further departures on both sides of the Decentralists/Electoralists divide. Table 12.1 reflects the ideological evolution in the development of the manifestos. Crucially, the diversification process – both on ideological and political grounds – acquired a central role only in the 1990s, so that the major developments in the British Greens still lay ahead.

Modular Ideology? 251 Table 12.1 Ideological transformation of the British Green Party, 1973–2001 Year

Ideology

Constituency

Party’s task

Documents

1973–77

Survivalism

Environmental organisations

A Green government

Blueprint, 1973 Manifesto for Survival, 1974

1977–82

Sustainable society

Moderate majority

Educating

Real Alternative, 1979

1983–89

Radical ecologism

Environmental NVDA

Enlightening

Politics for Life, 1983 Age of Understanding, 1987

1989–92

Reductionist ecologism

Moderate majority

Getting into New Directions, Parliament ⫹ gov. 1992

1992–97

New Politics

NVDA, NSMs, Greens

Voice of the voiceless

1998–2001 Social justice

Sustainability, 1995 New Millennium, 1997

NVDA, NSMs, Reform party – PB Sustainability, 2000 New Left, Greens soc.⫹ env. Justice Future, 2001

The ideological breakthrough came in 2000. The bottom-up change in activity, as reflected in the extension of Sustainability to social and human rights issues, and the top-down change in power, with assignment of Woodin as co-speaker, led the BGP to enhance their modular ideology, the conceptual framework which rests on social justice, environmental sustainability, community-based approach, systemic electoral changes and democratisation of work, health and the EU. This worldview facilitates new political options, including rapprochement with the NSMs, the New Left, Direct Action and anti-discrimination forces. The strong political culture of dissent, however, might still stand in the way for such unification of extraparliamentary and parliamentary opposition.

Part IV Ideology, Politics and Discursive Strategies: a Comparative Assessment

13 The Dual Reflection of Modular Ideology

The Green Parties in Germany and Britain were established and developed under fundamentally different (internal and external) political conditions. While the German Greens encompassed the wide subculture of protest in the FRG and therefore had to mould their ideological niche as an inclusionist party from the start, their British counterparts consistently sought to distinguish themselves from the extraparliamentary opposition – which lacked all trust in established politics – and to carve a niche for themselves within the British party-system. Whereas the German Greens hoped to constitute a coalition from the conservative Right to the radical Left, thereby protesting against the unidimensionality of the materialist political system and endorsing principles of unity in diversity, the BGP hoped to capture the centre ground of the political spectrum. The former sought an alternative worldview, while the latter were determined to market the environmental message as a realistic necessity through parliament. It was, hence, hardly conceivable, that the ideological product of two very distinct species of the same genus would actually develop – independently1 – a very similar political worldview. Our proposed modular ideology therefore needs to prove viable on two levels: politically, in terms of the internal structure of the currents within each party; and ideologically, in terms of the evolution which eventually led to the development of a similar conceptual structure, in which the ideational framework is shared by different sub-ideologies. Such a structure addresses the structural grievances which emerged in advanced industrial democracies during the second half of the twentieth century. The modular ideology is not only the analytical outcome of the study of the Green ideology, but an explanatory tool in terms of the political and ideological transformation which the parties underwent. This dual role is captured in the discussion that follows, in each of the two cases, presenting the ideological and political transformations as they interacted with the wider political system in Germany and Britain, and the distinct discursive strategies – reflecting the two political cultures – by which each party chose to market the modular ideology. 255

256 Comparative Assessment

The German experience – from praxis to theory The evolution of German Green ideology comprised convergence, diversification and consolidation. The first phase was marked by a convergence process in which different political groups coalesced within the Greens on ecological issues. It demonstrated the instrumental role played by the environment in facilitating the cooperation of value-conservatives, New Leftists, ex-Communists and a host of non-political social movements. All these groups converged on the issue of the primacy of ecology and the need to offset the current dominant ideology in order to tackle issues that are central to people’s lives and their quality of life. The analysis of this formative stage provided a fascinating opportunity to account, not only for the political perceptions behind different groups’ supposed naturalism, but for the internal transformation which ideologies such as nationalism, communism, feminism and the New Left had to undergo before incorporating ecology into their political ideology. Two parallel processes were reviewed – the transformation of each ideological tendency and the institutionalisation of their ideological cooperation. Clearly, such a project, encompassing diverse political traditions, had to have principles which enabled cooperation within the same ideological niche. Diversity, pluralism, tolerance, active democracy and respect for the Other became quintessential pillars. Ecological thinking was crucial for suggesting a new paradigm in which diversity is endorsed, difference appreciated and interrelations valued. Therefore, the Right-wing groups which initiated the establishment of the party were the first to depart it, as early as 1981. Ideological exclusionism proved unsustainable within the Greens. Whereas the three main ideological tendencies – the Right-wing, perceiving ecology as a question of survival; the Left-wing, stressing the interconnections of the social and ecological questions; and the middle groups, propagating the ecological paradigm and seeking a third way for Germany and the Green ideology ‘were not “founded” but, as it were, were there’,2 the shared Green experience led to the development of ideological currents. The latent phase – 1980–82 – saw the development of a pluralist and integral leadership. Questions of the relations between ecological and social issues, subsequently dominating Green ideological currents, were subordinated in the attempt to unite the Greens and establish a federal base.3 As long as the Greens were contesting elections with no real prospect of winning parliamentary seats, Greens perceived themselves as part of the larger Gesamtalternativbewegung – the whole alternative movement – and the strategic implications of ideological differences could remain dormant. Once chances of crossing the 5 per cent hurdle increased, grave political differences were awakened. The polarity was first formulated by Bahro: ecological fundamental-opposition with a strategy of opting-out of the system, vs. a strategic and tactical reformist framework. Interestingly, the

Modular Ideology’s Dual Reflection 257

ecofundamental-oppositionists – Bahro, Kelly and Vogt – had no organised base of support in any state or within the federal party. However, their opinions, as part of the ‘plural leadership’ and the intended decentralised organisational structure of the Greens, resonated within and outside the Greens. Ironically, while seeking to dilute the centralised leadership, they indirectly enhanced the prominence of charismatic leaders4 (especially given the yearning of the media to identify ‘authentic’ Green speakers). At this stage, fierce opposition came from the ecosocialists who harboured theoretical misgivings regarding the Gattungsfrage (the species’ question). Ecology is interrelated with social problems. Ecosocialists rejected the strategy of withdrawing from ‘the system’ until a majority beyond Left/Right is achieved. In 1982, before the federal elections, they upheld ‘strategic tolerance’ – supporting an SPD government from the opposition should the Green vote facilitate such a majority.5 The state-level became the centre ground for measuring the Greens’ ability to cross the 5 per cent hurdle, and for examining their relation to the question of opposition, tolerance of a Left majority or cooperation within such a majority.6 The old hostility to the established parties, which cemented the negative Green coalition and repressed ideological differences, was put to the test. The new federal coalition of the FDP–CDU/CSU and Kohl’s chancellorship of 1983 changed the political context. If previously the Greens opposed a social-democratic-led coalition, rejecting the whole ruling ideological spectrum, they now had to consider collaborating with the SPD against Bonn’s Right-wing coalition. The SPD, determined to make the Greens redundant and regain the overall majority, appropriated Green themes, a process which would recur throughout the next decade, and which was known in Green circles as Themenklau.7 The Greening of German politics was underway. After being elected into the Bundestag, the Greens had to remould their philosophy into a political plan, and to produce an ideology, a process which, after 1983, induced diversification. The decision to cooperate politically was not just a tactical consideration, nor did environmental issues provide the full answer. The very cooperation of people from different political traditions within the same protest party was a critique of the political norms in which people are categorised according to party affiliations. Furthermore, it challenged the main feature which determines partisan affiliation, namely economic interests. This was essential to the ideological critique of economic growth. The Greens were sensitive to the different perspectives which people brought, the life experiences of those who do not aspire to political representation or could not find a political niche sympathetic to their demand for politics of identity – for example, mothers, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians. Thus, politics of identity – entailing a politicisation of private identities – coupled with politics of difference – enhancing diversity – became a crucial characteristic of the Green creed and testified to the will to cooperate within the new party.

258 Comparative Assessment

However, the tendencies and groups which coalesced within the Greens underwent a second phase of ideological diversification after 1983. Several ideological currents emerged: Ecofundamentalists rejected cooperation with the political system, lest the Greens be subsumed by it. They advocated personal transformation of lifestyles, communes and an extraparliamentary movement as a replacement. Radical ecologists argued that ecological problems are so fundamental that any change from within the system would be futile. Instead, a transformation of the production system, the value-system or the political system through decentralised politics and the new social movements, was advocated. Ecosocialists maintained that the Greens should position themselves as the main alternative party, left of the SPD, a principal opposition party which would launch a critique of politics, economics and society from within the system in order to generate total change. Ecoliberals thought that the Greens should be the party of the centre, working from within the system to influence German politics and should take advantage of their pivotal position in order to replace the FDP and assume the role of political liberalism. The Realos argued that the Greens are essentially a unique minorities-party, which would lead Germany to reconsidering its Nazi past, generate a change in the political culture and represent disadvantaged elements such as Nature, women, the underclass, immigrants and foreign workers. Each current had developed its own views concerning ecology, politics, economy and society; these views, cutting across cleavages, allowed for internal mobility, strategic coalitions and cooperation. ‘The long march through the institutions – one made it’ read Die Tageszeitung’s headline on 11 December 1985,8 when Joschka Fischer was sworn in as the new environment minister in Hessen’s parliament. The new Green consciousness of itself as an institutional fixture within German politics was boosted when they gained 7.5 per cent of the vote in the 1987 federal elections. However, the struggle among the currents was resumed. The role of the Greens needed to be reconsidered in the wake of Chernobyl which demonstrated that even an ecological disaster which mobilised the majority of the population against nuclear power stations did not translate into a parliamentary majority for the SPD–Green coalition, let alone a Green Alternative.9 The opposition party, movements party, vanguard Left party, minorities’ ecoparty and ecological centre party were the positions that shaped the Green spectrum and enhanced the distinctive Green features in relation to institutional politics. Yet, the strategic struggle between Fundis and Realos almost paralysed the party in the second half of the 1980s. The situation underlined the contemporaneous yearning for both a radical position and concrete reform,10 and highlighted the need for a third force. Vollmer, a ‘mild’ Fundi, established Breakthrough88, and incorporated people of all ideological currents. It hoped to reshuffle the factions around ecologism.11

Modular Ideology’s Dual Reflection 259

However, the Left Forum was the one to break the tie by rejecting both the Fundis’ oppositional position and the Realos’ reformistic way and endorsing parliamentary politics as a vehicle for social transformation. Factionalisation of the party along constructive lines was finally under way. The tearing down of the Berlin wall took the Greens, as all Germans, by surprise. Loyal to their idea of self-determination, in view of the first allGerman elections, the Greens abstained from uniting with their eastern political counterpart – Alliance90 – and decided to run separately and to form an alliance with the SPD the day after the elections. This cost the western Greens their seats, as they received 4.8 per cent in the FRG and 6 per cent in the GDR, instead of a joint average of 5.1 per cent, and 40 seats.12 The party, devoid of a federal office, was bitterly torn between its wings. Reunification opened up political opportunities, notably the paradoxical re-legitimisation of the ex-communist party, reforged as the PDS, which allowed committed communists to return to their ideological homeland. The Ossis, the east German Greens – characterised by pragmatism, impatience with party struggles and hatred for the Left – focused on human rights and ecology. The realigned party, after shedding its fundamental colours, almost threatened replacing the FDP’s position within the new German political system (Even coalition with the CDU was considered.)13 In the 1994 election the Greens made a comeback, with 7.3 per cent of the vote. Two major factions settled down – the Realists and the Left Forum. The ideology of the party of minorities, of the disadvantaged, the exploited and the environment was crystallised, determining the ideological niche of the Greens. With this new consolidated niche the Greens competed in the 1998 elections, determined to become a coalition party, if just to offset another grand-coalition. The three political areas for which they fought in their first term in office – the new citizenship law, eco-taxes and nuclear disarmament, represent their public image. Evidently, the ideological and the political courses are interconnected. The principal tension between the ideological frame – the core which holds the party together – and the subsisting sub-ideologies, actually determined the fortunes of the currents within the party. Reconsidered in terms of the conceptual theory developed here, the principles of modular ideology suggest that exclusionary groups that reject compromise, tended to leave the party of their own accord. Thus, a political selection process started already by 1981, with the departure of the value-conservatives leaving behind a coalition which now stretched from the conservative-Right to the radical-Left. In 1984, Bahro, the arch-Ecofundis departed, claiming that the party was compromising on issues such as animal rights which should not be compromised. Again – exclusionism departs, cooperating factions remain. The post-1990 political changes included: a small group which joined the communist PDS; a group of ecosocialists, led by Ebermann and Rainer, left the Greens and established a radical Left party in Hamburg in 1990; and

260 Comparative Assessment

ecoradicals – Jutta Ditfurth and her followers – founded an independent basisdemocratic party in Frankfurt in 1991. Those remaining organised a new Green current, the Left Forum, to oppose the Realos. The political selection process worked in favour of the cooperational factions which translated their radical ideas into a practical political plan. Ideologically, the process was one of conceptual expansion. The infamous Fundis/Realos struggle actually overshadowed the development of a unique Green spectrum on questions of ecology, economy, politics, citizenship and identity politics in the FRG. The frame-party developed a conceptual framework within which New Politics structural problems were incorporated: respect for Others expanded beyond ecology, women’s rights and the Third World, to include foreign workers, immigrants, sexual and cultural minorities, and the unemployed. Ideologically, therefore, the internal dynamic complemented the conceptual setting of the Green worldview. Indeed, the Greens in Germany today represent the voice of the voiceless, and express the ideas of the minorities.

The British fate – ideological framework awaiting political praxis If ideology includes a historical analysis, a social vision and a political plan for its materialisation, the British Green currents agreed with Porritt’s characterisation of the superideology of industrialism as the creed shared by the parties which the Greens challenged. All Green currents also shared a social vision, one of decentralised, self-sufficient communities living a sustainable life in harmony with their environment. Notwithstanding issues of political tactics (the most effective way of communicating the BGP’s ‘Seeing Green’ message) in terms of the political route for transforming society, the most common change advocated by all currents was a personal change in one’s lifestyle; even the socialist Greens advised ‘Consume less. Share more. Enjoy life’ as their way to Greenism. However, since the BGP did not share national power, its political role focused on local issues, such as recycling schemes, transportation and preservation of the countryside, rather than on a comprehensive ideological worldview behind these policies. This restrained its political viability. Should we therefore conclude that the BGP had a vision of sustainable society, but had not developed a recognisable ideology? The analysis suggested that the BGP underwent an ideological evolution which led from narrowecologism to social justice and New Politics. In this process, the national conditions changed the interrelations between ideology and politics. The 1972 Blueprint for Survival identified the interrelations between ecological and social problems and called for a new philosophy of life by which people could live satisfactorily within the constraints of ecological sustainability. PEOPLE endorsed this plan, thereby inheriting the burden of

Modular Ideology’s Dual Reflection 261

Goldsmith’s cumbersome ecological framework, which suggested that by being ‘natural’, human societies adhere to ecological laws entailing stability among small, diversified, decentralised self-sufficient homogenous communities. But has a modular framework of cooperation among diverse groups emerged? Crucially, already in 1973, the Blueprint envisaged a cooperative political body composed of different environmental organisations with different specialities and interests. In the first wave of activists during the 1970s, PEOPLE incorporated not only like-minded conservatives, like its founders, but Leftists and Liberals as well, because they all adhered to the same social vision of decentralised communities and the primacy of ecology. The 1975 ECO party abandoned the anti-democratic aspirations of Survivalism, but upheld the scientific truth of the ecological message, and the belief that a personal change in lifestyle is essential. It therefore concentrated its ideological efforts on convincing the moderate majority of the new realism which scientific evidence had exposed. It was parasitic on a liberal democratic creed, explaining that the only sensible choice, adjusted to the newly revealed reality, is the sustainable society, exemplified in the 1979 manifesto, The Real Alternative. Politically, the hardship of electoral destiny began the search for other supporters, thus turning to NVDA struggles. This opened the BGP to a range of social groups. At this stage, pluralism and tolerance were political tactics more than ideological pillars. They enabled the party to support others’ campaigns, even if their activists did not agree with the Greens. On the broader political scene, the SDP–Liberal alliance expelled ECO from the niche of politics of the Centre. The renewed programme was to distinguish itself externally from Left, Right and Centre, and internally from the extreme Left and Right, through developing radical politics, which centres on finding the root cause of problems and providing policies for tackling them at their source. Their need for distinction, and their belief in the philosophical viability of their environmental creed, led them to present humanity’s crimes against the Earth as the root of all social evils. Social and ecological problems were interconnected and required restraining economic growth through converting individuals to a new spiritual, non-material lifestyle that celebrates creativity, diversity and self-fulfilment within environmental constraints. Politics for Life and The Age of Understanding conveyed this message, converting people to Ecologism. The BGP was the party of the enlightened, hoping to bring the light of ecological wisdom into British politics. Until 1989, the endeavour had focused on enlightening people to ‘Seeing Green’. But the 14.9 per cent in the European election brought with it the illusion of power, albeit no attained seats, and the feeling that a Green government might lead the UK into the next millennium. The radical agenda was hidden, and a single message was aggressively marketed: vote Green, reject the Grey reality. In the meantime, the Green ideological undercurrents

262 Comparative Assessment

refused to accept this reductionism. They developed the party’s ideological creed, through the ever-evolving Manifesto for Sustainable Society, incorporating policies on Human Rights – Workers, Women, Gay and Lesbian rights. 1992 saw the departure of the main centrist faction. The sub-ideologies of the 1980s were now pronounced: the pure ecologists still believed that ecology in and of itself offers the cure for all social problems and NVDA on ecological problems should be endorsed. They focused on an ecological message due to the primacy of ecology and the nature of the political system, despite recognising that the issues were wider. The traditional Leftists sought to introduce a socialist economic analysis into the Green ideology and identified the interconnectedness of environmental and other types of exploitation, that permeate capitalist society. New Leftists fully endorsed social justice as their ideological pillar; the under-represented, disadvantaged and exploited all became part of their Green analysis. Politically, the centrists and traditional Leftists saw the need to cooperate with other organisations as a tactical necessity; the party indeed voted for a coalition building strategy in its conference. They felt, however, that tactical cooperation on specific matters, a prototype of issue-politics thinking, does not mean ideological cooperation with other ideological groups. The party could remain exclusionist in its membership, while coalescing with other non-Green associations. In contrast, decentralists and New Politics Greens, who gained power with the departure of the centralists, endorsed the coexistence of different ideologies within the Greens as a quintessential feature of the party. A host of voiceless ‘others’ – the underclass, refugees, Third World indigenous peoples and so on – were perceived as inhabitants of the Green ideology. The quintessential features of the modular ideology – an ideological infrastructure which enables the coexistence of different ideological groups within one and the same ideological framework – were thus manifestly, if belatedly, adopted by the BGP. This was embodied in the 1999 changes made in the BGP’s philosophical basis, and finally publicly declared in the 2001 election manifesto ‘Reach for the Future’. For the first time the BGP exposed a modular framework, in which just economics, just society, ecological justice and global and democratic justice were constitutive parts. A curious situation becomes apparent: the BGP officially endorsed a broader ideological programme; the peculiar conditions of British politics, however, meant that the adherents of the new ideological constituencies did not endorse the Greens. On the face of it, this was an obvious consequence of Green ideology, an ideology which hopes to protect the voiceless – refugees, immigrants, nature, the underclass – constituencies which by definition cannot participate in the democratic game as equal citizens. However, in the British case, not only did workers, unemployed people, ethnic minorities and so on ignore the party, but the very people who were supposed to be ‘Other-minded’ – the New Social Movements activists, New Left people, the educated new middle classes – largely abstained from joining the party.

Modular Ideology’s Dual Reflection 263

Thus, the best test for the viability of the Modular Ideology as an ideological programme, rather than as the mere praxis resulting from political associations responding to electoral constraints and coalescing within a frame-party, is found in the British case. In Britain there was no inclination, given the electoral system and the developed tradition of extraparliamentary political activism, to incorporate ideologically different groups into the party. Hence, it was not the practical order of the day, only an ideological realisation which led the Greens to see themselves as the advocates of the primacy of ecology, respect for others, pluralism and tolerance, seeking to include social activists and to represent disadvantaged groups. Since they never shared power, the political transformation plan of the Greens centres on individual change of lifestyle rather than on a collectivist plan. This is also due to the principles of empowering people and decentralising powers, so central to their creed, and so rooted in British tradition of gradual adaptations rather than radical revolutionary, comprehensive change. Hence, despite the fact that the NSMs did not come to the British Greens, and that even anti-road campaigners and protesters against livestock export did not see themselves as part of one Green movement, the BGP itself came to endorse not only these struggles, but the cause of antiracism, women’s issues, lesbian and gay rights, disabled people’s needs and so on. They now had the ideological framework to accommodate these social and ecological issues but without the support of the activists. Change might be forthcoming if Labour were to fulfil its commitment to adopt proportional representation for the UK elections. This indeed happened in the EU elections, and the British Greens had, for the first time, MEPs; this is yet to happen on a national level. Thus, principles of pluralism, tolerance, respect for others – that is, nature, indigenous cultures, immigrants – were endorsed by the party as pillars, together with the primacy of ecology, following the recognition that social and ecological problems are interrelated and that reductionism to environmental issues overlooks the need to draw the political culture away from consumerism and rigidly institutional democracy. The processes, in their infancy, suggest that the BGP is looking for ways of incorporating the NSMs and the New Left, as implied in the first Green-Left convergence conference in November 1996, and the strategic-coalition building of the late 1990s. The ideological currents, evident in the analysis itself, definitely indicate that a political diversification was on its way. The 2001 manifesto symbolises, in that respect, a reach for the future.

Discursive strategies The ideology of the German Greens thus evolved from praxis, that is, from the actual diversity of ideological currents which coalesced within the Greens, into a conceptual framework which endorses plurality as its ideological

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principle. The British Green Party came to realise the necessity of addressing other social problems and cooperating with other social movements on the basis of rethinking its ecological worldview in the context of advanced industrial societies, mediated through their experience within the British political system. This ideological position convinced the BGP of the need to cooperate with other political traditions. Both parties developed a form of modular ideology. Both shared a social vision – one of a participatory democracy with decentralised power in which the subsidiarity principle ensures that decisions are taken at the lowest possible level, thus empowering people in local communities, while simultaneously securing international coordination on ecological restrictions, trade and production. They sought a multicultural society, sensitive to the others, celebrating diversity and pluralism and attentive to the needs not only of fellow humans, foreign workers and immigrants, but of animals, ecosystems and the environment. Local communities would focus on self-fulfilment of talents and creativity, thus shifting from material consumerism to post-material values, entailing a transformation away from work-centred life to a comprehensive ‘lifeworld’. Despite the common vision of both Green Parties, they each envisage a different route for political transformation. A fascinating dimension of comparison is the ideological transformation which both Green Parties sought, and their individual ways of attempting to influence public opinion of the need to become Green, notwithstanding the differences in actual political power. After all, their whole endeavour was to demonstrate that the value-system which sustains the industrial ethos needs to be fundamentally changed. They both sought a holistic worldview, stressing the radical, that is, cause-oriented approach. It is here that the most striking difference between the German and British comes to the fore. The discursive strategy employed by the German Greens provided a critical analysis of historical developments of the industrial ethos which had led to the current crisis. Indeed, the notion of crisis is fundamental to the discourse of the German Greens. It is a crisis which manifests itself in environmental degradation leading into exterminism – to the possibility that human societies would annihilate themselves – but this is but one manifestation. According to their analysis, the economic impetus of ever-accelerating growth and progress, a blind belief in science and technology and the effects of human hubris which allows the environment and other people to be exploited in the pursuit of profit and self-interest of the dominant, capitalistic ideology, are all rooted in a deeper crisis of meaning. The resultant spiritual vacuum prompts people to turn to material gain, and they can only fail to live fulfilling lives given the competitiveness, aggressiveness and alienation of society. Thus, the German Greens provide a historical analysis which requires that the very roots of the material ethos have to be tackled: this is achieved

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by turning to the Alternative. They contrast the world of exterminism, militarism, competitiveness and alienation with the Green vision of harmony between man and nature, and of small, self-subsisting communities. Within these communities individual abilities and creativity can be fulfilled, compassion toward other people is practised, as is solidarity with other cultures and traditions. The choice is presented as an either/or one. Ironically, the main endeavour of the Greens throughout their political career has been to convince Germans of the need to break away from the traditional foe/friend perspective. The impulse to designate an enemy – external or internal – and to build one’s own identity by rejecting the other dominated major strands of German thought. Indeed, the German Green political ideology does precisely that: it establishes itself as the party of the minorities, as the party of the exploited, the disadvantaged, the discriminated against. But it constitutes its identity by using the German attitude of rejecting the existing system wholesale and replacing it with an alternative vision. It is apparent in their attitude to ideology: they tend to reject both Left and Right, questioning not merely their creed but the very notion of ideology; and in their attitude to the political system – they criticise institutional democracies, and despite seeking a more participatory democracy, risk rejecting the democratic system outright. In striking contrast, the British Greens envisaged the transformation by devising a different discursive strategy. They refrain almost entirely from providing an historical analysis, since they perceive themselves not as resisting the enlightenment ethos, but as the carrier of this very creed forward. Since the latest scientific advances in ecology, the common and sensible attitude of enlightened people is to take this new evidence into account, and to act accordingly. People are ignorant of the consequences of their actions. They therefore have to realise there is a need to redirect their efforts in order to create a sustainable future. It is in everyone’s best interests to do this. Thus, the British Greens’ main task is convincing people into Seeing Green. They do that, not by contrasting the industrial creed with their own, post-industrial one, but by helping people understand that they are not required to undergo any radical changes, but merely to grasp that their value-systems already contain the seeds of the new realism. They tried to generate the transformation by showing people that other facets of their values existed which had been overlooked so far. Thus, wealth is not only how much money one has, but the wealth of the earth; standards of living should not be measured only via GNP, but by quality of life, clean environment and the means to self-fulfilment. Needs are not merely economic needs, but spiritual, emotional, communal needs which can provide the individual with a more enjoyable way of life. This expansionist strategy sought to make the transformation gentler, making it possible for everyone to connect to the Greens through the realms they found most attractive. Spirituality, voluntarism, creativity, emotionality were

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mentioned to give the flavour of the quality of life offered by the Green vision, but not as a contrast to how people live now: people can go on living the way they do, but could also incorporate changes which would set society at large on the road to a better, Green, quality of life. The two strategies manifestly reflect two very different national attitudes to politics and political cultures. One presents a utopian vision and calls for a ‘total transformation’ influenced by a Marxist analysis, the other is gradualist and seeks to project realism and portray its message in terms of an inevitable necessity which every individual would enjoy adopting. Ironically, it was the German Greens who were successfully incorporated into the existing system, whereas the British Greens are excluded to date from national politics.

Conclusion: from Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics

This book traced the formation and transformations of the evolving political ideologies of two compound collective political actors, the German and British Green parties, which emerged in the 1970s in advanced industrial democracies. While the British Greens made it to the European Parliament, but never to the House of Commons, the German Greens, after 15 years as a Bundestag opposition party, made it to the coalition. Each party evolved under fundamentally different political circumstances. Both parties developed a modular New Politics ideology. Instrumental to their emergence was the rise in ecological awareness that accompanied the realisation that global natural resources were finite, thereby challenging the underlying ideology of conventional Left and Right parties, and the growth-oriented economy. The traditional parties, however, were reluctant to react to the new ecological critique, and to date, full employment, consumerism and rising GNP remain ideologically the pillars of the governing parties. Since ecological concerns were associated with security issues, notably nuclear weapons, which governments had to continue developing in the context of the Cold War, a host of citizens’ initiatives, New Social Movements and protest groups joined an increasingly active extraparliamentary opposition in the 1970s. They evolved into a compound collective political actor – the Greens, which gradually challenged not only specific policy areas, but the rigidity of institutional democracies itself. Environmental awareness highlighted the interconnectedness of social and ecological processes, while challenging the industrial, material ‘dominant’ ideology. Ecological issues, we argued, entail a peculiar ideological deficit: ecology, in and of itself, cannot provide the social vision or the political plan needed to implement it. The finitude of the earth’s resources, the irreversibility of ecological processes, environmental degradation and so on, can be solved by authoritarian or democratic governments alike. Moreover, it is not the ecological problems per se, but prioritising them relative to other social and political beliefs, that determines the outlook for a 267

268 Conclusion

sustainable society. Ecology introduces a new set of problems, but the political worldview that considers them is mediated through other social principles. Through discourse analysis, this phenomenon of ‘ecology-cum-politics’, by which social principles were hidden behind ecological notions, was revealed. The political origins, presuppositions, values and visions of the diverse groups which coalesced within the Greens were exposed in isolation from their own self-perception (‘naturalism’). Despite its ideological deficit, the ecological perspective provided an alternative, organic discourse instead of the mechanistic outlook of materialism. Environmental awareness also brought together diverse groups which otherwise shared no political creed. In practice, while the attempts to create a pure ecological ideology failed, they facilitated a process of political coalescence, thereby generating a new type of political party and ideology. Part of the problem with analysing New Politics is to explain the relations between the different New Politics issues. What is the relationship between anti-militarism and the rights of disabled people, or the ‘limits to growth’ thesis and feminism, or refugees’ rights and unemployed people? No study of Green parties has addressed these basic questions, beyond attempts by the Greens themselves. The discussion has endeavoured to expose the wider agenda, principles and worldview encompassed by New Politics ideology. Thus, the constituency of the Greens’ ideas proved a curious one, as on the face of it there is very little in common between the issues which the Green ideology addressed. The analytical process revealed a new, comprehensive political ideology, not confined to an ecological perspective, representing a modular type of ideology. The analysis suggested that the issues emerged from structural deficiencies in two main realms: advanced industrial societies and institutional democracies. The former includes problems such as foreign-workers, unemployment, the underclass, the gap between rich and poor, homelessness and equal pay for women. The latter produced issues of ethnic minorities’ rights, gay and lesbian rights, women’s equality, multiculturalism, regard for nature and disabled people’s rights. Thus, while the conflicts themselves have very little in common, and usually affect very different groups of people, they all originate from problems within advanced industrial democracies. The internal changes within the labour market, levels of affluence and the expansion of education gave rise to new, educated middle classes. These classes are the constituency of New Politics ideology: those who struggle for social justice on behalf of the disadvantaged who do not, under the current system, have a voice of their own. While each of these groups has a unique battle – politics of identity – they all share a common struggle against institutional industrialised democracies. This analysis demonstrates that traditional theories of ideology are unlikely to accommodate such an ideology. The independent emergence of the Modular Ideology – from praxis in the German case, and from ideological realisation in the British one – suggested

Conclusion 269

the viability of a twofold theoretical framework: first, an ideological-frame which accommodates diversity and the ‘politics of difference’ of those who also see the need for cooperation. The ideological frame is comprised of several principles: primacy of ecology; respect for Others (nature, refugees, disabled people, women and so on); pluralism (multiculturalism), tolerance, social justice and participatory democracy. Second, within this structure, different ideological currents that, despite varied ideas or interests, shared an ideological frame, join forces against institutionalised democracies and fight to end discrimination and exploitation by uprooting them in practice, not just by law. Does the modular ideology merely endorse the same principles of a liberal creed – respect for others, pluralism and tolerance? The modular ideology does so, but nevertheless transcends liberalism’s traditional limits of discourse. It involves ‘others’ which were not part of the polity when liberal democracies were developed, for example, nature, refugees, Third World. Nonetheless, the Green project may equally be considered as an extension of a Marxist plan, taken out of the confinement of the class-struggle, unearthing exploitation and alienation in other parts of the polity. A critique of Marxism itself is entailed as it takes the personal, familial and social to be political, and refrains from reductionism to the economic interests of classes. Thus, Green ideology provides an interesting synthesis of political liberalism on the one hand, and post-Marxist analysis on the other. The varied conflicts addressed by the modular ideology, and the diversity of groups included under the Green ideological umbrella, which still manage to retain their distinct identities while cooperating to transform society, would suggest that a new type of political ideology, a Modular Ideology, has developed in advanced industrial democracies. The critique entailed by New Politics ideology challenges the rules of the game which were institutionalised within liberal-democracies. The forms of participation, formulation of the public agenda, small elites of power-holders, stagnated civil society, the dominant ideology of economic growth – these were all parts of the central challenge: what is politics. The Greens endeavoured to change the boundaries of the political, expand the authorised players within the political game, and endorse politics as a way of life, rather than a realm of a distinguished minority. The Greens as a compound political actor, with a distinct modular ideology, consolidated a new collective identity within advanced industrial democracies. Whether the vision of an environmentally sustainable, multicultural participatory democracy, advocated by the politicised 1960s generations, is going to facilitate a qualitative impact on democracy, and generate significant social change, is yet to be seen. Many other questions remain open, including the tension between changing the individual vs. structural transformation, the interplay between politics of identity and politics of difference, the inclusion of intolerant social groups, the boundaries of civil

270 Conclusion

society vs. the party-system, and the problem of the multiplicity of criticism which shifts to social and cultural issues thus leaving the established economic and political systems intact. In any case, the resilience shown by institutional democracies to such a fundamental critique, and their ability to incorporate the adherents of such an ideology into the existing political system – the very system which was at the heart of their critique – is a sign of the strength of liberal democracies, and a point for rethinking New Politics.

Notes Introduction 1. The debate was instigated with D. Bell’s The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1960), R. Aron, The Opium of the Intellectual (New York: Doubleday, 1957) and others. See C. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk & Wagnall, 1968). 2. F. Fukuyama, The End of Ideology and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. Bell, 1960:402. 4. S.M. Lipset, ‘The End of Ideology?’, in C. Waxman, 1968:72. 5. M. Harrington, ‘The Anti-Ideology Ideologues’, in Waxman, 1968:342; A. Shtromas (ed.) The End of ‘Isms’? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 6. Fukuyama, 1992. 7. J. Larrain, The Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1979), K.D. Bracher, The Age of Ideologies (London: Methuen, 1984), 191. 8. E. Shils, ‘The End of Ideology?’, in Waxman, 1968:61. 9. Waxman, 1968:3. 10. L. Feuer, ‘Beyond Ideology’, in Waxman, 1968:64. 11. K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, C. Arthur (ed.) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970). See also A. Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (London, 1976), 4. 12. H. Aiken, ‘The Revolt against Ideology’, in Waxman, ibid., 245; Bracher, 1984:xii; Bell, 1960:400. 13. R. Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1958), 53. 14. J. LaPalombara, ‘Decline of Ideology: a Dissent and an Interpretation’, in Waxman, 1968:320. 15. T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), 349; K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest, 1955), 265. 16. The relation between ideology and science is central here. 17. For a range of definitions see T. Eagleton, Ideology, an Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 1–2, 28–30; also in Waxman, 1968:3–4. 18. Waxman, 1968:5. 19. Bell, 1960:402. 20. K. Mingue, ‘Ideology after the Collapse of Communism’, in Shtromas, 1994:6. 21. O. Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177–200. 22. Lipset, in Waxman, 1968:69. 23. Bell, 1960:404. 24. Lipset, in Waxman, 1968:76. 25. N. O’Sullivan, ‘Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism’, in Shtromas, 1994:36–43. 26. Bracher, 1984:195. 27. Ibid., 206. 28. Ibid., 227.

271

272 Notes 29. Waxman, 1968:6–7. 30. D. Richardson and C. Rootes, The Green Challenge (London, New York: Routledge, 1995) and M. O’Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997). 31. J. Raschke, Die Grünen – wie sie würden, was sie sind (Köln: Bund Verlag, 1993). 32. P. Kelly, Thinking Green! (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994). 33. J. Porritt, Seeing Green (New York: Blackwell, 1984). 34. M. Freeden, 1996:2. 35. Ibid., 4. 36. Ibid., 77. 37. Ibid., 62. 38. See Chapter 2. 39. For Freeden’s analysis, see 1996:527–47. 40. For a comprehensive introduction, see T. van Dijk, Handbook of Discourse Analysis Vols 1–4 (London: Academic Press, 1985). For applying discourse analysis to politics, see N. Fairclough, Language and Power (London, New York: Longman, 1989). 41. N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in T. van Dijk, Discourse as Social Interaction (London: Sage, 1997), 258. 42. Ibid., 262. 43. M. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 44. Ibid., 32. 45. See R. Goodin, Green Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 84–113, 181–203; Markovits and Gorski, The German Left (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 152–86; van Hüllen, Ideologie und Machtkampf bei den Grünen (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990). 46. The two studies which analysed the roots of the German Greens are A. Hallensleben, Von der Grünen Liste zur Grünen Partei? (Göttingen: MusterSchmidt, 1984) and R. Stöss, Parteien-Handbuch, I (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983). Neither analysed the different parties as components of the Green ideology, but as independent political actors. 47. For example, Fischer Verlag and Eichborn Verlag – alternative book publishers.

1 The Greens: the emergence of a compound collective political actor 1. For a concise account of these elements, see G. Talshir, ‘Modular Ideology: the Implications of Green Theory for a Reconceptualisation of “Ideology” ’, Journal of Political Ideologies (1998), 3(2), 169–92. 2. For a sociological perspective, see A. Touraine, Return of the Actor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). The difference is that Touraine sought a general theoretical statement about the return of the socio-political actor, while here an attempt is made to designate a type of new political actor, namely, a compound collective actor. 3. W. Hülsberg, The German Greens (London, New York: Verso, 1988), 68. 4. J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1962). 5. This was facilitated by a growing body of literature on ecological problems. See, for example, R. Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); D. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (London: Earth Island, 1972); J. Lovelock, Gaia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); The Ecologist (1972).

Notes 273 6. Hajer, 1995:90. 7. L. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1980); E.P. Thompson, Zero Option (London: Merlin Press, 1982). 8. Notwithstanding attempts of moral philosophers to prove otherwise. See the debates in Environmental Ethics. 9. For a discussion, see G. Talshir, ‘Limits to Growth and the Limits of Democracy’, in Y. Shain and A. Kleinman, Challenges to Democracy (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 10. See Chapter 3. 11. For a comprehensive analysis of the Greens as part of the Left, see Markovits and Gorski, 1993 and Hülsberg, 1988. For a more critical approach, see Chapter 2. 12. E. Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984). 13. See the discussion in Chapter 5. 14. F. Müller-Rommel, ‘New Political Movements and “New Politics” Parties in Western Europe’, in Dalton and Kuechler, Challenging the Political Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 209. 15. Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; S. Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 16. For a theoretical explanation, see Chapter 4. 17. See Chapter 5. 18. See the discussion in Chapter 3. 19. R. Garner, Contemporary Movements and Ideologies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 13. 20. First coined by the German Greens in their foundation conference, after which it was adopted by other Green parties. For a critical analysis, see Markovits and Gorski, 1993:115. 21. See, for example, Porritt, 1984:9. 22. Garner, 1996:15. 23. M. Maren-Grisebach, Philosophie der Grünen (München: Günter, 1982), 58–9. 24. For the relation between the new social movements and modernity, see Garner, 1996:367. 25. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). 26. See Garner, 1996. 27. M. O’Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 9. 28. Bell, 1960:403. 29. Ibid. 30. Galbraith, 1962. 31. See Chapter 5. 32. H. Marcuse, The One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

2 A Green ideology? From exclusive models to an inclusive framework 1. 2. 3. 4.

Markovits and Gorski, 1993:81. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 31. J. Raschke, 1993:42.

274 Notes 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Wiesenthal quoted in Markovits and Gorski, 1993:143. Kolinsky, 1989:3. Ibid., 8. See K.-W. Brand, ‘Cyclical Aspects of NSMs’, in Dalton and Kuechler, 1990:23–42. H. Kitschelt, ‘NSMs and the Decline of Party Organisation’, in Dalton and Kuechler, 1990:179–208. Kuechler and Dalton, ‘New Social Movements and the Political Order’, ibid., 280. Ibid., 281. See the analysis in Chapter 4. H. Kitschelt, The Logic of Party Formation: Structure and Strategy of Belgian and West German Ecology Parties (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Markovits and Gorski, 1993. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:115. Ibid. A. Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 1992, 2000); Goodin, 1992; R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992); T. Hayward, Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). Eckersley, 2. Ibid. Dobson, 2000:15. Ibid., 21. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 1992:5. Ibid. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 32–3. Eckersley, 178. Hayward, 190. Dobson, ibid., 170. See S. Young, ‘The Different Dimensions of Green Politics’, Environmental Politics, 1, 1992:9–44; M. Wissenburg, ‘A Taxonomy of Green Ideas’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 2(1997), 29–50. Ibid., 11. T. Poguntke, Alternative Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), 5. Ibid., 36. See, A. Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989). For restrictive/inclusionist, see M. Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). For the distinction between neutral and critical concepts of ideology, see J.B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 4. Seliger, 1976:14. Thompon, 1984:76–83. C. Geertz, ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’, in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Freeden, 1996. Exemplification of cross-cutting discussions in methodologies of the research of ideologies can be found in Thompson, ibid. and B. Susser, ‘The Domains of Ideological Discourse’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 1(1996), 165–81.

Notes 275

3 Formation: ecological roots of a political route 1. P. Pulzer, German Politics 1945–1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 58. 2. The German basisdemokratisch is usually translated into ‘grassroots’. I propose to use ‘basisdemocracy’ since, as shall become apparent, basisdemocracy is instrumental to the understanding of the self-perception of the German Greens based on the two concepts – base and democracy. Base is fundamental to the way the Greens conceptualised their difference from other political parties, in terms of their relation to their base of support. It has also a distinctive appeal to the New Left groups coalescing in the Greens, due to the connotation of base-superstructure in Marxism. The name further discloses their critique of representative democracy, advocating democratisation of the base, applying the subsidiarity principle. Since these interpretations are entangled with the notion of basisdemocracy, and grassroots discloses only one facet of this rich repertoire I decided to use the original. For an explication of basisdemocracy for the Greens, see D. Salomon, ‘Grüne Theorie und Graue Wirklichkeit: Die Grünen und die Basisdemokratie’ (Freiburger Schriften zur Politikwissenschaft 4, 1992). 3. This does not entail that these are the core concepts of their ideology from a critical perspective. The theory of ideology which I shall attempt to develop has fundamentally different core concepts. It is nevertheless necessary to understand the Greens’ own self-perception in order to discern their political ideology. In post-unification Germany the principles of human rights, the emancipation of women and rights of minorities were added. 4. Van Hüllen, 161. 5. J. Beuys, ‘Aufruf zur Alternative’, in Heidt (ed.), Abschied vom Wachstumswahn (Zurich: Achberger, 1980), 169. 6. Stöss, 1984:1511. 7. H. Gruhl, Ein Planet wird geplündert (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1975); E. Eppler, Ende oder Wende? (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1975); C. Amery, Natur also Politik (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1976). For a discussion, see van Hüllen, 38–47. 8. Stöss, 1984:1510; Hülsberg, 57. 9. Hülsberg, 68. 10. For figures of the different anti-nuclear demonstrations and discussion, see Hülsberg, 58–9, and Markovits and Gorski, 101–4. 11. Kelly and Leinen (eds) Prinzip Leben: Ökopax (Berlin: Verlag Olle & Wolter, 1982), 119. 12. Stöss, 1983:294. 13. Markovits and Gorski, 104–6. 14. Hülsberg, 78. 15. Van Hüllen, 4. 16. Most commentators have readily ruled this possibility out, seeing the APO as a naturally progressive left-wing movement. The more cautious assessment of the ideological potential of this protest movement in its transition to a party, will be taken here. For a pro-democratic discussion, see Markovits and Gorski, and Hülsberg. For a critical perspective, see Stöss (1983) and Kolinsky’s introduction (1989). 17. Stöss, 1983:294–5. 18. Wiesenthal in Raschke (1993). 19. In an interview, in M. Schroeren, Die Grünen (Wien: Ueberreuter, 1990), 172. 20. Markovits and Gorski, 101.

276 Notes 21. In an interview, Schroeren, 186. 22. Or at least posing the possibility of shifting the hitherto economic community into a political, and hence ecologically rather than economically oriented Europe. 23. Van Hüllen, 162–3. 24. Raschke, 708. 25. Ibid., 712. 26. Kelly and Leinen, 118–19. 27. Raschke, 707–8. 28. Ibid., 709. 29. Van Hüllen, 162. 30. Markovits and Gorski, 193. 31. Hülsberg, 83. 32. USP-Programme from 1977, in Hallensleben, A1. 33. Ibid. 34. Hallensleben, 155. 35. Stöss, 1984:1516. 36. Programme der GLU 1978 in Hallensleben, A4. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., A2–7. 39. Beilage zum Rundbrief n. 25 des GLU-Vorstandes, 21 October 1979 in Hallensleben, A38. 40. S. Aschheim, ‘Nazism, Normalcy and the German Sonderweg’, in M. Zimmermann (ed.), Germany’s Singular History (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1989); Stöss, Politics against Democracy (New York: Berg, 1991). 41. Van Hüllen. 42. Stöss, 1983:310. 43. See van Hüllen, 142; Markovits and Gorski, 126. 44. Van Hüllen, 142. 45. Ibid., 143. 46. See S. Volkov, The Rise of Popular Antimodernism in Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). 47. Stöss, 1983:317. 48. Ibid., 316. 49. Programme der AUD in Hallensleben, A23–7. 50. N. Kostede, ‘The Greens and the Intellectuals’, in Kolinsky, 1989:123–39. 51. Stöss, 1983:318. 52. See G. Mosse, The Crisis of the German Ideology (New York: Universal Library, 1964). 53. See A. Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 54. Gruhl, 3. 55. Ibid., 118. 56. Ibid., 216–25. 57. Ibid., 1. 58. In Schroeren, 150. 59. Gruhl, 12. 60. Ibid., 312. 61. Ibid., 320. 62. Stöss, 1984:1521–3. 63. Van Hüllen, 99.

Notes 277 64. For an eye-opening discussion, see G. Kvistad, ‘Between State and Society: Green Political Ideology in the Mid-1980s’, West European Politics 10, 1987: 211–28. 65. On the platform itself, two other anthroposophist organisations are mentioned. They joined shortly before the elections and had no input into the programme. Their impact became instrumental for the Greens later on, and is analysed in Chapter 3 (Van Hüllen, 168).

4 Philosophy: the greening of the New Left 1. Die Grünen, Basic Programme (Bonn: Die Grünen, 1980). 2. H. Fogt, ‘The Greens and the New Left: Influences of Left-Extremism on Green Party Organisation and Policies’, in: Kolinsky, 1989:100. 3. For a detailed analysis, see Markovits and Gorski, 29–112. 4. See Markovits and Gorski; Hülsberg; Schoonmaker and Frankland. 5. P. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semi-sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). 6. See Chapter 3. 7. Hülsberg, 19. 8. Markovits and Gorski, 54–5. 9. G. Smith, Democracy in Western Germany (Worcester: Billig, 1986). 10. Ibid., 81. 11. Schroeren, 214. 12. Schroeren, 232. See also the interview with Ebermann, ibid. 219, arguing that the Communist groups have failed to anticipate in advance the potentiality which ecology has carried for populism, nationalism and fascism. 13. Van Hüllen, 343. 14. Hülsberg, 19. 15. Ebermann cited in Fogt, 102. For the details of the debate, see Fogt, 101–7. 16. Ibid., 111. 17. T. Ebermann and T. Rainer, Die Zukunft der Grünen (Hamburg: Konkret, 1984), 194. Translated in M. Mayer and J. Ely, 1997, The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 223. 18. Fogt, 119. 19. For an excellent discussion, see M. Jay, Fin-de-Siècle Socialism (London: Routledge, 1988), 2–3. 20. Marx, cited in Ebermann and Rainer, 234. 21. Ebermann and Rainer, 231. 22. Ibid., 211. 23. Ibid., 224. 24. Ibid., 209. 25. Ibid., 225. 26. Ibid., 219. 27. Schroeren, 217. 28. Ebermann and Rainer, 227. 29. Arguably recapturing Marx’s original notion of human nature using the metaphor of man as an artist, not as an artisan. 30. An argument which casts doubt on incorporating Maslow’s hierarchy of needs into Inglehart’s thesis on post-material values.

278 Notes 31. See Ebermann and Rainer, 217. 32. They maintain the mission of total transformation without rejecting the ethos of the Enlightenment. See Markovits and Gorski. 33. In Schroeren, 220. 34. Markovits and Gorski, 147. 35. See the discussion in Markovits and Gorski, 121–3. 36. Ibid., 149. 37. Papadakis, 48. 38. Markovits and Gorski, 82. 39. Pulzer, 140. 40. Markovits and Gorski, 83. 41. J. Schütte, Revolte und Verweigerung (Giessen: Focus, 1980), 42. 42. Fischer, ‘Identität in Gefahr!’, in T. Kluge, Grüne Politik (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1984). 43. Ibid., 27. 44. Fischer, Von grüner Kraft und Herrlichkeit (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1986), 10. 45. Fischer, in Kluge, 1984:29. 46. Markovits and Gorski, 83. 47. See M. Kenny, ‘Paradoxes of Community’, in Doherty and de Geus, 1996:19–35. 48. Markovits and Gorski, ibid. 49. Fischer, 1986:67. 50. Schütte, 64. 51. H. Röttgen in an interview in TAZ 19.3.1981, in Papadakis, 33. 52. Markovits and Gorski, 37. 53. This cluster became the core ideological pillars of the German Greens to the point of obsession, as the debates over rotation and leadership of the 1980s demonstrated. See Kitschlet (1989). 54. Papadakis, 37. 55. Fischer, 1986:39. 56. Markovits and Gorski, 86. 57. Fischer, 1986:69. 58. See the discussion of Doherty, 1996:36–55. Also Schütte, 89–90. 59. Fischer, in Kluge, 1984:31–2. 60. Ibid., 75. 61. H. Marcuse, Revolution and Counterrevolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). 62. Note that this does not belittle the project (for example, of the Frankfurt School) of changing instrumental rationality or indeed of trying to treat nature with consideration to internal ecological processes and preserving it not merely for utilitarian ends. 63. U. Frevert, Frauen Geschichte zwischen bürgerlicher Verbesserung und neuer Weiblichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 272. 64. Markovits and Gorski, 87. 65. Ibid., 88. 66. BP, 35. 67. J. Ditfurth, Träumen Kämpfen Verwirklichen (Köln: Kiwi, 1988), 319. 68. J. Mitchell, Women’s Estate (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 66. 69. See S. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York: Quill, 1970), 23. 70. Schwarzer, So fing es an! (München: Deutscher Taschenbush Verlag, 1983), 8. 71. Ibid., 7. 72. Kelly, 1984:104. 73. Maren-Grisebach, 91.

Notes 279 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

Kelly, 1994:11. Maren-Grisebach, 93. Ibid., 95. Kelly, 1994:12–14. Kelly has argued for it in numerous publications and speeches, I use the quotation from a book edited in her honour after her death, but similar ideas are expressed by her in the 1970s, and see especially ‘Women and Ecology’ in her Fighting for Hope (1984). Kelly, 1994:12. See also de-Shalit (forthcoming). Kelly, 1994:11. Markovits and Gorski, 81. Fogt, 1984:106. In that respect van Hüllen, (1990:205), did a better job in drawing attention both to the Marxist and ‘bürgerlich’ anti-capitalism, and to the references to ‘psychological poverty’ of both Marxists and anarchists. BP, 4. In Schroeren, 152. BP, ibid. Ibid., 5. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. In Schroeren, 217. Raschke, 140; Wiesenthal, 92; Kolinsky, 8. In Schroeren, 158. Ibid., 217. Ditfurth, in Schroeren, 1990:228. In Schroeren, 205. Ibid., 185. Markovits and Gorski, 115; Hülsberg, 81. See Bracher, especially part 3, chapter 3; Stöss (1983). Pulzer, 53, 139–40; Linse, 158.

5 Discourse: new spirituality and ideological conversion 1. Whether spiritualism was a Green pillar, as advocated in Capra and Spretnak, Green Politics: the Global Promise (London: Paladin, 1985), 50–3, is hereby contested. Rather, spirituality was a conceptual tool which every Green current interpreted to its own satisfaction. 2. As used by Rudolf Bahro, see below. 3. Kelly, 1984:112. 4. Logik der Rettung, published in English under the suggestive name A Strategy for Human Survival and revised in Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster (Bahro, 1994). 5. Bahro, 1982:21. 6. A concept introduced by Thompson (1982), accounting for the tendency of self-extinction of humanity in which lethal weaponry capable of exterminating humanity is produced under no central control.

280 Notes 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

Bahro, 1982:125. Ibid., 38. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 136. Bahro, Building the Green Movement (Philadelphia: New Society, 1986), 110. Ibid., 108. Bahro, Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster (Bath: Gateway, 1994), 172. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 280. The Third Way, AUD, FIU and the Achberg Circle. Van Hüllen, 1990:164. Heidt, 1980:11. An attitude which later became quintessential of radicalecologists. Ibid., 22. Schroeren, 1990:135. Hasenclever, Grüne Zeiten (Munich: Kösel, 1982), 35. Ibid., 39. Ibid., 43. Ibid., 45–6. Hasenclever, in Kluge, 1984:13. Ibid., 15–17. Hasenclever, 1982:169. Van Hüllen, 1990:307. Die Grünen, Wahlplatform zur Bundestagswahl 1980 (Bonn: Die Grünen, 1980), 2. Ibid. H. Wiebe, ‘Das Grüne Leben Religiöse Konnotationen eines programmatischen Begriffs’, in Hesse, 1988:276. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 13. Schroeren, 1990:143. Ibid., 139. Van Hüllen, 1990:322. For a Lander-based perspective, see H. Kleinert, Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei (Frankfurt: Eichborn, 1992), 40–6. Hasenclever, 1982:47–51. Ibid., 52. For example, Hasenclever, 1982:9; Maren-Greisbach, 1982:78; Fischer, 1986:11. Hasenclever, 1982:53; Fischer, 1986:110. Wiebe, 1988:281. J. Lott, ‘Schöpfungstheologie, “weibliche” Spiritualität, Naturmystik: Religiöse Strömungen bei den Grünen’, in Hesse, 1988:196. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:40. Ibid., 41. Notably the ASF – service for peace, and the AGDP – Action Community Service for Peace established 1958 and 1968 respectively. Ibid., 107–10. Ibid., 108. Ibid. Raschke, ‘Kirchen’, 1993:706–7 and Lott, 1988:196. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:110. Ibid., 111.

Notes 281 52. Accounting for the internal importance of producing Green programmes as a vehicle for forming their own identity and as part of an ongoing process of debate and opinion-formulating (see Raschke, 1993:95). 53. Die Grünen, Peace Manifesto (Bonn: 1981), 2. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 4. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., 5–7. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid., 8. 60. Raschke, 1993:706. 61. Peace Manifesto, 13. 62. Ibid., 14. 63. Ibid. (my italics). 64. Ibid., 16. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I use here ‘tendency’ to refer to ideological groups which crystallised outside the Greens as distinct from ‘currents’ with which I shall signify ideological factions created in the Greens after the phase of conversion. 68. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:42. 69. Bramwell, Blood and Soil (Bourne End: Bucks, 1985). 70. As the discussion disclosed, the very fact that ecological themes were nonpolitical expedited repoliticisation in the aftermath of the Third Reich. 71. Bahro, 1994:280. 72. In Schroeren, 1990:152. 73. Gruhl, 1975. 74. See the articles in Dalton and Kuechler, 1990. 75. See, for example, L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 76. For a historical presentation of the right, middle and left wings of the Greens in the early stage, see Raschke, 1993:144–9.

6 Ideological diversification: the green spectrum 1. B. Doherty, ‘The Fundi-Realo Controversy’, Environmental Politics 1 (Spring, no. 1), 1992:95–120. 2. Van Hüllen, 419–41. 3. Markovits and Gorski, 125–51. Ecolibs include both ecoliberals (even in the economic sense) and ecolibertarians, and therefore the shorthand ‘ecolib’ is hereby used. 4. Raschke, 153–60. 5. Hülsberg, 144. 6. For the analysis of the ideological implications, see Chapter 4. 7. See Raschke’s diagram of ideological–political dimensions of the Greens, 53 and 136. 8. Ibid., 135. 9. Ibid., 131. 10. Ibid., 159.

282 Notes 11. A manifesto called ‘Women in Europe’ was published by the Greens in 1982, stressing the social – rather than the ecofeminist – trend of feminism. A feminist profile was also strong in the 1983–84 programmes. Discussions considering a women’s current were held. The dominance of ideological allegiances, in particular to the Left worked against an independent women’s faction, as well as the conviction that it is society at large, and by implication the party as a whole, that needs to concern itself with gender problems which are not a specific matter for women only. The decision was therefore not to establish a women’s current, but to forge joint cooperation on specific issues. Green women activists came together in the late 1980s to thaw the Fundis–Realos paralysis and created die Feminat – the all-women’s presidium of the parliamentary faction, actualising feminist convictions but unhelpful in terms of the controversy: women were as divided as men. The socialist-feminists referred to the attempts to form all-women lists on state-level as ‘unreflective biologism’. See van Hüllen, 426–8. The Greens are indeed the sole party to date to have 50 per cent quotas on women’s representation which in 1994 pressurised even the CDU to commit itself to quotas of a third of their representatives for the next elections. See Raschke, Geschlechterverhältnisse, 79–87. For a critical perspective, see Kolinsky, 1989:189–221. 12. See the discussion in Chapter 4 on feminism and Chapter 3 for survivalism. 13. Markovits and Gorski, 225; Poguntke (1993); Müller-Rommel (1990). 14. For discussion, see Raschke, ‘Medienbilden der Grünen’, 760–4. 15. Markovits and Gorski, 228. 16. Hülsberg, 142. 17. Work83, 3. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., 4. 21. Offe, 1990:236. 22. A testimony is the vast and totally self-devoting activity of Petra Kelly on international issues – South Africa, Ireland, Tibet, the GDR and so on. See, for example, Parkin, ‘I Have to Keep Flying as I Found the Ground Absurd’ (1994:63–70). 23. Raschke, 159. 24. Kelly, 1984:9. 25. Offe, 1986:40–60. 26. Offe, 1986:55, sees policy-building as a trigger for political adulthood. 27. For a comprehensive analysis, see Wiesenthal in Raschke, 110–14. 28. Work83, 1. 29. Discussion in the Radikalökologisches Forum, Radikalökologisches Politik (Hessen: 1983), 16. 30. For a convincing realist critique of ‘tackling from the source’, see Wiesenthal, ‘Ecological Consumption’, 1993b:155–71. 31. Work83, 3. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 5. 34. Ibid., 6. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 7. 37. Maren-Grisebach, ‘Arbeit und die Grenzen des Wachstum’, 63–70. 38. Work83, 8. 39. Ibid., 9.

Notes 283 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

Ibid., 11. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 12. Ibid. Ibid., 13. Ibid. See the discussion of qualitative innovations in Wiesenthal (1993b), 180–8 and on workers’ rights, 152. Work83, 21. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 23. Wiesenthal in Raschke, 110–14. For his own approach, criticising a left-wing attitude as a Green realist, see ‘Deer at the World Market’, Wiesenthal, 1993b:136–53. Work83, 2. Ibid., 7. Ibid. Coined by Offe, 1986:40. Kühnert, ‘Die Grünen vor historischer Wegentscheidung’, Radikalökologische Politik (Hessen, 1984), 7. Ditfurth, ‘Warum wir dieses Forum machen’, Radikalökologische Politik (Hessen, 1983), 6. Ditfurth, 1983:8–10. Ditfurth, 1984:62. Kühnert, ‘Abschlussplenum’, 1984:26. Zieran, ‘Die Grünen und die sozialen Bewegungen’, in Radikalökologische Politik (Hessen, 1984), 53. Ibid., 17. Zieran, ‘Abschlussplenum’, ibid., 31. Ditfurth, 1984:57–70. Ditfurth, 1985:265. See the discussion at the end of Chapter 5. In Hülsberg, 141. Kelly, 1985:145–58. See Poguntke’s account in New Politics and Müller-Rommel, 1990:209–32. Markovits and Gorski, 124. ‘Die Grünen, Ökoliberaere, Einigkeit und Grün und Freiheit’, Gründungerkärung (München, 1984), 1. Ibid. Schmidt and Hoplitschek, ‘Auf der Weg zur Volkspartei’, in Bickerich, 1994:75–107. Ibid. Die Grünen, Umbau der Industriegesellschaft (Bonn, 1986). The committee had a Realos majority and ecosocialist Stratmann cooperated. The programme was accepted by the BDK in 26–28 September, 1986, Nuremberg. For a partial translation, see Mayer and Ely, ibid., 267–93. See Wiesenthal, 1993:140. In Cornelsen, Ankläger im Hohen Haus: Die Grünen im Bundestag (Essen: Klartext, 1986), 125–46.

284 Notes 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

Markovits and Gorski, 220. Fischer, 1989:133. Fischer, ‘Das Ende der ökologischen Bescheidenheit’, ibid., 56. Fischer, 1984:114. Fischer, 1989:149–51. Cited in Hülsberg, 200. Markovits and Gorski, 212. Hülsberg, 201. See Wiesenthal’s discussion, in Raschke, 106. Markovits and Gorski, 218. Ibid., 215. Ibid. Interview in Schroeren, 191. Hülsberg, 141. Kretschmann, 1988:159. As the analysis of the New Left suggested (Ch. 2), these were precisely some of the changes which made the New Left into ‘new’. Kretschmann takes issue with the ‘old’ left and it merely reinforces, rather than eradicates, the bond between the ecosocialist and New Left wings of the Greens and the citizenoriented libertarian tendencies. Ibid. T. Schmidt, ‘Plädoyer für eine reformistischen Anarchismus’, in Kluge, 1984:80. Ibid., 79. Ibid., 74. Schmidt and Hoplitschek, 102. ‘Die Grünen, Ökolibertäre …’ (1984), 1. Markovits and Gorski, 145. Fischer, 1992:212. Fischer, 1986:71–2. Fischer, 1992:196–9. Ibid., 213–14. Ibid., 216. Ibid., 218. Fischer, 1984:131. Ibid., 122. Ibid., 124. Ibid., 110. Ibid. Ibid., 112. Wiesenthal, 1993:45. Ibid., 49. Ibid., 59. Ibid., 50. In Raschke, 201.

7 Politics: consolidating a green niche in the new Germany 1. Die Grünen, Farbe bekennen (Bonn, 1987), GE87. 2. Needless to say, referenda and direct democracy may encourage populism and omit minorities grievances. It is therefore important to see them merely as complementary measures rather than an alternative to representative democracy.

Notes 285 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

GE87, 7. Raschke, 1993:192. See Markovits and Gorski, 1993:221–8. Die Grünen, Aufbruch ’88 Manifest (Bonn, 1988), 2. A. Vollmer, 1988, Perspektiv-Kongress 17–19 June, part 1 (Bonn: Die Grünen, 1988), 13. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:228. Raschke, 1993:175. For details, see Raschke, 1993:176–8. Linken Forum, Manifest gegen die Urabstimmung (1988), 1. In Raschke, 1993:191. W. Brüggen, ‘Für eine sozialistische Linke in den Grünen’, Linken Forum 4/5, 27–33 (1991), 30. L. Volmer, ‘Trilogie der Rechtsabweichung’, in J. Hippler and J. Maier (eds), Sind die Grünen noch zu retten? (Frankfurt: Förtner & Kroemer, 1988), 67. Ibid., 69–70. Ibid., 82–7. Ibid., 91. Die Grünen: Realos, Sein oder nicht Sein (Bonn, 1988), 3. For a discussion, see Raschke, ‘Frauen’, 416–34. Ibid., 11. Die Grünen, Platform der Grünen zur Europawahl ’89 (Bonn), EU89, 3. EU89, 3–4 (my italics). Ibid. Ibid., 30. Die Grünen, Das Programme zur 1. gesamtdeutschen Wahl 1990 (Bonn), 4. Ibid. Ibid., 5. Schoonmaker and Frankland, 1993:148 (‘we are the people’; ‘we are one people’). Markovits and Gorski, 1993:276. Ibid., 235. Kleinert, 1992:336. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:235. For results, see Frankland and Schoonmaker, 1992:222. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:241. Ibid., 244. Hohlfeld in Raschke, 1993:396. Ibid., 397–9. In Markovits and Gorski, 1993:249. Ibid., 250. For a thorough discussion of the East-German Greens, their roots and conception of democracy, see Padgett, ‘East-German Dimension’, in Parties and Party System in the New Germany, Part III (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993). Markovits and Gorski, 1993:258. Kleinert, 1992b:433. Ibid., ‘Oskar Lafontaine’, 364–71. For a discussion, see Markovits and Gorski, 1993:233–6. Kleinert, 1992b:417. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:256. Hohlfeld, 1993:844. During the Gulf War the Green speaker, Ströbele, said on a tour to Israel that the Skuds are the direct consequences of Israeli aggression against the Arabs.

286 Notes

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

Declarations were made that it would be better to have a million Jews dead than Western involvement in the Gulf War. Ströbele was sacked but the debate illuminated the dark side of anti-Americanism and possibly neo-anti-Semitism, fierce denunciation of the latter from Fischer and others. See Kleinert, ibid., 422; Markovits and Gorski, 280, and especially 360, n. 28. Kleinert, 1992:433. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:260. M. Hustedt, ‘Ökologisches Manifest für eine grüne Zukunft’, Kommune 6 (1990), 39. Ibid., A88. Kostede, ‘Primat der ‘Ökologie – was sonst?’, Kommune 8 (1990), 40. On the row concerning the election of two Wessis as principal speakers, see Schrägstrich (the Alliance90/Greens magazine), for example, 12/94, 5. J. Tritten, Gefahr aus der Mitte (Göttingen: Die Werkstatt, 1993), 176. Ibid., 179. Ibid., 182. Ibid., 184. The discussion of the two-thirds society became a focal point of the political debate in the 1990s. Kleinert, 1992:444. Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, Heimat Babylon: Das Wagnis der multikulturellen Demokratie (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1992). Die Grünen, Politische Gründsätze (Köln, 1993). Fischer, 1994:31–2. Die Grünen, Nur mit uns Programme zur Bendestagwahl 1994 (Bonn) GE94, 4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 5. Ibid. Ibid., 31. Therefore stressing complementary measures on the international level. In their programme for the European election 1994, after receiving 7.3 per cent of the vote and becoming for the first time the third party of Germany, leaving the FDP behind, the Greens strongly advocate democratic Europe, and an ecological reconstruction plan of the economic politics and feminist Europe which cooperated between the east and the south. See Die Grünen (EU94). C. Offe, ‘From Youth to Maturity: the Challenge of Party Politics’, in M. Mayer and J. Ely, The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 165–79. Ibid., 173. Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Programm zur Bundestagwahl 1998: Grün ist der Wechsel (Bonn: Bündnis90/Die Grünen, 1998), 9. Ibid., 28. Ibid., 40. Ibid., 69. Ibid., 9–10. Ibid., 111. Ibid., 69. Ibid., 71. Ibid., 112. Ibid., 121. Ibid., 115.

Notes 287 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Ibid., 122. The kind of problematic discussed by Berlin’s two Concepts of Liberty. Ibid., 89. Ibid., 11. See C. Lees, The Red–Green Coalition in Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). Bündnis90/Die Grünen, †Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschland Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der SPD und Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Cologne: Farbo, 1998), 2. Ibid. Lees, ibid., 112–21. Bündis90/Die Grünen, Die Zukunft ist grün. Grundsatzprogramm von Bündis90/ Die Grünen (Berlin: Clausen & Bosse, Leck, 2002). Hereafter Grundsatz. Bündis90/Die Grünen, ‘Grün2020 – Die Grundsätze neu denken’ (Berlin: Bündis90/Die Grünen, 2000), 8. Hereafter Grün2020. Ibid. Grundsatz, p. 7. Ibid., p. 9 Ibid. Grün2020, p. 9. Ibid.

8 The British peculiarity: non-ideological politics 1. On electability as the prime contribution of the BGP to the result in 1989, see the paper by Rüdig, Franklin and Bennie, Green Blues: the Rise and Decline of the British Green Party (Glasgow: Strathclyde University, 1993), 29. 2. Rootes, 1995:66–90; Frankland, 1990:7–28; Rüdig (1992); S. Parkin, ‘United Kingdom’, Green Parties – an International Guide (London: Heretic Books, 1989), 212–33. An exception is Rüdig’s ‘Ideological Dimensions in British Greens’ in his Green Politics Three to be discussed later. 3. S. Young, The Politics of the Environment (Manchester: Baseline Books, 1993), 18. 4. See O. Rasmussen, ‘They Also Serve: Small Parties in the British Political System’, in F. Müller-Rommel (ed.), Small Parties in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1991), 152–72. 5. For an elaborated approach, see ibid., 17–28 and McCormick, ‘The Environmental Lobby’, British Politics and the Environment (London: Earth Scan, 1991), 28–47. 6. See B. Doherty, ‘The Fundi–Realo Controversy: an Analysis of Four European Green Parties’ Environmental Politics 1 (Spring 1992), 95–120; (1992), No. 2, 292–7; McCulloch, ‘The Green Party in England and Wales: Structure and Development – the Early Years’, Environmental Politics 1 (Autumn 1992), 418–36; Evans, ‘Hard Times for the British Green Party’, in Environmental Politics 2, (1993), 327–33. Evans is the only one to recognise that the Realos–Fundis controversy does not provide a parallel between the centrists and decentralists within the British Greens, 331. 7. Raschke, 1993:707. Following Lowe, McCormick – the analyst of the British environmental lobby – is actually among the few who rebuke the assumption that the environmental lobby and Green support go hand in hand. See McCormick, 1991:124.

288 Notes 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

McCormick, 1991:9. See Freedman, 1980:xiv. Frankland, 1990:10. Private discussion, Green–Left convergence conference, London 9/11/96. See discussion in McCormick, 1991:2 and Young, 1993:55. Frankland, 1990:9. See Pederson, ‘Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1948–1977’, in P. Mair, 1990:195–207 and other articles in Mair (1990). Frankland, 1990:12. See discussion in McCormick, 1989:60–1. Ibid., 25. Rootes, 1995:69. McCormick, 1991:178–9.

9 ‘The Movement’: from survivalism to sustainability 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

Meadows et al., 1972:9. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 184. Ibid., 24. The Ecologist, A Blueprint for Survival, 1972. Ibid., 9–10. Ibid., 15. See Wall, Weaving a Bower against Endless Night; an Illustrated History of the UK Green Party (London: Green Print, 1994), 18. Ibid., 19. Ibid., 69. In an interview, Oct. 96, Oxford. Ward and Dubos, Only One Earth (London: André Deutsch, 1972); Capra, The Turning Point (London: Flamingo, 1982); Lovelock, The Gaia Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). See Porritt, 1984:194–211. Blueprint, 21. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 69. Ibid., 70. Ibid., 97. Ibid., 102. Ibid., 95. Ibid. Ibid., 97. Goldsmith, ‘Bringing Order to Chaos’, The Ecologist 1 (2 August 1970), 19. Blueprint, ibid. Ibid., 99. Ibid., 102. Ibid., 50. See Thomas, Man and the Natural World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). Blueprint, 49. Ibid., 67. Ibid., 53.

Notes 289 32. Ibid., 107. 33. Ibid. 34. Editorial, ‘Basic Principles of Cultural Ecology’ The Ecologist, Vol. 1 (11 May 1971), 3. 35. Blueprint, 108. 36. Ibid., 50. 37. Ibid., 46. 38. Goldsmith, 1970:16. 39. Blueprint, 59. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid., 134–5. 42. Editorial, ‘The Politics of Reality’, The Ecologist, Vol. 2 (6 June 1972). 43. Ibid. 44. Blueprint, 18. 45. Wall, 1994:16. 46. Ibid. 47. PEOPLE, A Manifesto for Survival (Coventry, 1974), 1. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid., 3. 50. See the analysis in Chapter 1. 51. Survival, 2. 52. Ibid. 53. In an interview, Hastings, 10.9.96. 54. Ibid. 55. Survival, 23. 56. Ibid. 57. Interview with Wall, 1994:24. 58. Rüdig and Lowe, ‘The “Withered” Greening of British Politics: a Study of the Ecology Party’, Political Studies 34, 1986:271. 59. Ecology Party, Manifesto for Sustainable Society (London, 1976), PB101–2. 60. Wall, 1994:26. 61. See Porritt and Winner, 1988:18. 62. Skolimowski, ‘Options for the Ecology Movement’, The Ecologist (June 1974), 317. 63. Ibid. 64. As was with the term ‘grassroots’ in the German Greens’ case. 65. Ibid., 319. 66. Ibid., 323. 67. Ibid., 318.

10 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Politics: Seeing Green – the simplicity of radical realism Wall, 1994:33. Porritt, 1984:3. Wall, ibid. The Ecology Party, ‘View from the Ecology Party’, The Ecologist, Vol. 7, No. 6, 1977:223. Porritt, 120. Ibid., xiv. Ecology Party, The Real Alternative (London, 1979), 16. Bold in original. Porritt, 1984:6.

290 Notes 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Ibid., 7. Ibid., 9. Ibid. In Wall, 1994:36. In an interview, Oxford, 21 Oct. 1996. The same experience characterised other Green chairs and speakers, such as David Icke and John Norris. The ability to assume political office shortly after joining the party emphasises its readiness to advance people willing to put their personal time and political effort into the party, congruent with the principle of empowering people, but it also demonstrates how contingent the party positions and its prime figures were. This is as true today, almost 25 years on, as it was true in the early days. Porritt, xv. Ecology Party, Alternative, 1979:2. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 3 (my italics). Ibid. This feature turns up time and again in interviews with active members of the Green party, either as an advantage (interview with Steve Daw, former member of the Liberal Party 22.9.96) or as a critique (interview with John Morrisey, ex-chair and co-initiator of the Left–Green Convergence 21.9.96). Alternative, 5. Ibid., 6. Ibid. See the introductory discussion of the German Greens, ch. 2. Alternative, 16. Wall, 1994:40. Ibid. Alternative, 14. Ecology Party, Politics for Life (London, 1983), 26. Ibid., 2. Porritt, 10. Politics for Life, 2. Interview with Steve Daw (Hastings, 22.9.96). Politics for Life, 3. Ibid. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 13. Ibid. Ibid., 20. Ibid. Ibid., 16. Ibid., 24. Ibid. Ibid., 224. Wall, 1994:48.

Notes 291 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

Ecology Party, Towards a Green Europe (Ecology Party: London), (EU84), 15. Parkin, 1989:216. Ibid. Wall, 1994:58. Maingreen, a letter to Econews, Econews 31. The Green Party, General Election Manifesto (London, 1987), (GE87), 3. Ibid., 9. Age of Understanding, cover. Ibid., introduction, 1. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 8. Ibid., 16. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 17. Ibid. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12. Ibid. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 5. Ibid. Ibid., 18. Ibid., cover. Ibid., 14. Ibid., inner cover. Ibid., 1. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

11 Coalition building: ideological currents or political strategy? 1. W. Schwarz, ‘Why Parkin Sups with Political Devils’, The Guardian, 18.9.1989. 2. C. Hughes, ‘Green Guru Calls for Streamlined Party Manifesto’, The Independent, 23.9.1989. 3. An analysis of BGP members’ opinions was conducted, based on questionnaires designed to reveal ideological dimensions. Still, since the analysis was oriented toward issues rather than belief-systems, it tells us very little about the actual Green worldview; the political concepts, historical analysis, social vision and

292 Notes

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

political action plan, are not addressed explicitly by Rüdig et al. See Rüdig et al., Green Blues: the Rise and Decline of the British Green Party (Glasgow: Strathclyde University, 1993), xxx. D. Lipsey, ‘Who Are the New Ecology Voters?’, Sunday Correspondent, 17.9.1989. D. Wall, ‘Kinnockites for Life on Earth?’, New Ground, Autumn 1989, 17. Green Party, Don’t Let Your World Turn Grey (London: Green Party, 1989); New Directions (London: Green Party, 1992). New Directions 1. Ibid., 11. Green Party, Manifesto for Sustainable Society, Updated after Spring Conference (1992). Schwarz, ibid. Parkin, Green Futures (London: Fount, 1991), 12. Ibid., 40. Ibid., 48. Ibid., 45. Ibid., 53. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 76. Greenscreen (Oxford, Oct. 1994). Parkin, 1991:82. Ibid., 83. Irvine and Ponton, A Green Manifesto (London: Optima, 1988), 3. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 16. Ibid., 134. Ibid., 138. ECO, The Campaign for Political Ecology (London, 1996). Sustainability, updated 1995, PB5. Porritt, 1984:202. D. Icke, It Doesn’t Have To Be Like That (London: Green Print, 1989), 1. Ibid., 204. Icke, Love Changes Everything (London: Aquarian, 1992), 13. In an interview, Dover, 25.2.1996. J. Morrissey, ‘How Green Was My Party?’, Red Pepper, August 1996, 14. Interview with Steve Dawe, London, 22.9.1996. J. Morrissey and J. Norris, A New Direction (Nuneaton: The Way Ahead, 1993), 3. Ibid. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 9. In Wall, 1994:50. In an interview, Oct. 1996. Morrissey, ‘How Green Was My Party?’, Red Pepper (August, 1996), 14. Ibid., 17. Wall, 1994:64. Wall, Getting There (London: Green Print, 1990), 37. Kemp and Wall, A Green Manifesto for the 1990s (London: Penguin, 1990), 18–19.

Notes 293 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Ibid., 20. Ibid., 21. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 27–34. Ibid., 87, 89. Ibid., 94. See the critique of Wall’s work by Mellor, ‘Ecology, Socialism and Feminism’, in Wall, 1990:118–19. Ibid., inner cover. Wall, 1990:35. Ibid., 59. Ibid., 71. An interview with Penny Kemp, Hastings, 22.9.1996. Wall, 1990:76. Wall, 1994:40. Pegg Alexander, Keynote Speech, BGP Autumn conference, Hastings (23.9.96).

12 Modular ideology: a green caterpillar turns into a colourful butterfly? 1. A. Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 2. Green Party, Green Party Manifesto – the Green Alternative for a Better Quality of Life (London: Green Party, 1997), 1. 3. D. Icke, It Doesn’t Have To Be Like That (London: Green Print, 1989). Using this title might suggest a lack of self-awareness on behalf of the British Greens. 4. Green Party, Green Party Manifesto – the Green Alternative for a Better Quality of Life, ibid., 1. 5. Ibid., 8–9. 6. Ibid., 14. 7. Ibid., 17. 8. Green Party, Manifesto for a Sustainable London (London: Green Party, 1998), 6. 9. Chris Rose, ‘Another Leap Forward’, Green World, no. 29 (London: Green Party, 2000), 8. 10. Green Party, Green Party Manifesto – Reach for the Future (London: Green Party, 2001) (Hereafter Future). 11. Green Party, Green Party Manifesto – the Green Alternative for a Better Quality of Life, ibid., 1. 12. Green Party, Future, 1. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 2. 15. Ibid., 5. 16. Ibid., 6. 17. Ibid., 11.

13

The dual reflection of modular ideology

1. Surprisingly, there was not much interconnection among the Green parties in their formative years. It was based more on personal friendships than on institutional relations. It was especially the case with the British Greens, which – under

294 Notes

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

the impression left by Sara Parkin, who was the first European coordinator – were thought of as a suis generis even among their European counterparts. (Interviews with Otto Frieder, a German MEP in the Green–Left convergence conference, London 9/11/96, and with Sara Parkin herself, BGP Spring Conference in Dover, 11/2/1996.) Raschke, 1993:144. Ibid., 146–9. See Kitschlet, ‘New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organisation’, in Dalton and Kuechler, 1990:179–208. Raschke, 1993:149–51. For a very detailed analysis of Länderprofile, see Raschke, 1993:249–385. See Papadakis, 1989:61–85. The Tageszeitung was the newspaper associated with the Greens which first broke through the monopoy of the established papers and succeeded on a federal level. In Hülsberg, 1988:170. Markovits and Gorski, 1993:215. Hülsberg, 1988:141. See M. Mayer and J. Ely, 1997:244–52. Frankland and Schoonmaker, 1992:222. See for example discussions before and after the elections ‘Spekulationen über schwartz–grüne Bündnisse’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20.10.94 and 14.11.94 .

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Index A88 (Breakthrough 88), 109, 147, 148, 149, 155, 156 Adenauer, Konrad, 87, 97 Advanced capitalistic societies, see advanced industrial democracies Advanced industrial democracies, xi, xxi, 12, 13, 25, 28, 75, 82, 102, 105, 131, 141, 157, 160, 169, 174, 175, 181, 238, 242, 247, 255, 264, 267, 268, 269 Anthroposophism, xvii, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 106, 137, 163, 277 n65 Anti-modernism, 44, 163 Anti-nuclear movement, 6, 129, 135, 136 APO, see extraparliamentary opposition Article, 218, 72, 74 AUD (Independent Germans’ Action), 40, 43, 49, 50, 93 Bahro, Rudolf, 90, 91, 97, 103, 110, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 130, 131, 152, 187, 212, 256, 257, 259 Basic Income, 215, 238, 248 Basic programme (BP), 58, 82, 83, 85, 86, 92, 94, 95, 97 Basisdemocracy, 43, 48, 114, 122, 130 BBU (Federal Union of Citizens’ Initiatives for Environmental Protection), 36, 37, 38, 39 BDK (Federal Delegates Conference), 114, 117, 119, 136, 155 Bell, Daniel, xii ‘Blood and soil’, 45, 55, 56, 102, 281 n69 Brandt, Willy, 53 BuVo (Federal Party Executive Committee), 114, 155 Capra, Frijtop, 91, 187 CaRD (Campaign for Radical Democracy), 212, 213, 250 CDU (Christian Democratic Party), 36, 39, 63, 99, 113, 114, 118, 135, 137, 166, 257, 259

Centralists, 176, 177, 195, 225, 227, 232, 239, 250 Chernobyl, 103, 135, 136, 139, 146, 153, 180, 218 CIs (Citizens’ Initiatives), xi, xvii, 9, 36, 37, 51, 54, 82, 97, 104, 106, 161 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), 179, 180, 213, 214, 240, 250 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 157 Communism, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 87, 90, 102, 106, 163, 179, 256, 257, 277 n12 Conserver Party, 231, 250 Consumerism, 10, 14, 16, 139 Dalton and Kuechler, 18 Decentralists, 176, 177, 195, 225, 227, 233, 237, 240, 242, 243, 250, 262 Ditfurth, Jutta, 55, 86, 113, 114, 128, 129, 131, 155, 260 Dobson, Andrew, 21, 22, 23, 24 Dominant ideology, 73, 100, 118, 128, 204, 256, 264, 267 Dutschke, Rudi, 86 Ebermann, Thomas, 58, 63, 65, 66, 154, 259 Eckersley, Robyn, 21, 23 Ecofundis see Fundis Ecoliberal, 88, 109, 110, 126, 128, 129, 137, 138, 143, 144, 149, 156, 157, 162, 163, 258, 281 n3 Ecological awareness, 4, 21, 23, 33, 36, 81, 96, 102 Ecological problems, xi, xvi, xx, xxi, xxii, 7, 8, 19, 25, 36, 89, 93, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 121, 129, 132, 173, 180, 184, 228, 229, 250, 262, 263 Ecologism, 21, 23, 24 The Ecologist, 184, 185, 186, 190, 194, 197 Ecology-cum-politics, 38, 42, 50, 85, 101, 104, 106, 163, 268

304

Index 305 Ecology movement, xxvi, 3, 4, 7, 8, 19, 24, 61, 98, 100, 129, 133, 134, 139, 178 Ecology Party, 180, 184, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 212, 249 Economic development, see economic growth Economic growth, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 21, 46, 108, 138, 139, 142, 164, 180, 181, 190, 195, 196, 197, 206, 218, 227, 243, 245, 257, 261, 269 Ecosocialism, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 109, 110, 112, 113, 121, 126, 128, 136, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 154, 156, 162, 163, 244, 257, 258 Ecoradicals, 111, 128, 129, 136, 142, 144, 149, 162, 163, 258, 260 Electoralists, see Centralists End of Ideology, xii, xiii, xiv, 25 Environmental awareness see ecological awareness Environmental issues see ecological problems Environmental movement, see ecology movement Environmentalism see ecologism EPO see Extraparliamentary Opposition European Elections, 38, 42, 50, 51, 286 n69 Extraparliamentary opposition (APO), 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 37, 44, 53, 68, 71, 87, 166, 249, 251, 255, 267, 275 n16 FDP (Free Democratic Party), 36, 114, 137, 146, 150, 166, 168, 257, 258, 259 Feminism, 3, 19, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 106, 112, 113, 133, 136, 142, 154, 161, 188, 235, 236, 237, 256, 282 n11, 286 n69 Fischer, Joschka, 68, 69, 110, 113, 118, 119, 133, 135, 138, 140, 143, 148, 158, 166, 258, 286 n48 Freeden, Michael, xix, xx, 29 Friends of the Earth (FoE), 182, 185, 186, 190, 194, 197 Fundis (Fundamentalists), xxv, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121,

126, 128, 130, 131, 135, 136, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 155, 162, 163, 176, 177, 258, 259, 260 GAZ (Green Action Future), 40, 46, 49, 50 German question, 38, 52 GLU (Green Lists for Environmental Protection), 40, 41, 42, 43, 49 GLSH (Green Lists of Schleswig-Holstein), 40, 47 Goldsmith, Edward, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 202, 205, 237, 261 ‘Good society’, xiii, xiv, 10, 86, 107, 123, 182, 188, 197 Grassroots, 7, 8, 51, 85, 96, 98, 99, 105, 106, 114, 119, 122, 123, 130, 132, 136, 140, 145, 147, 166, 177, 212, 225, 228, 234, 238, 250 Green-cum-Germanness, 48, 56, 57, 69, 97, 149, 157, 158, 175 Green2000, 204, 227, 231, 233, 234, 250 Greenpeace, 182, 214 Gruhl, Herbert, 46, 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 84, 85, 86, 97, 104, 190 Hajer, Marteen, xxi, xxii Hayward, Tim, 21 Hasenclever, W.-D., 93, 96, 132 Heidt, Vielfrid, 92 Hoplitschek, Ernest, 132, 137 Hülsberg, Werner, 87, 110, 111, 137 Icke, David, 227, 233, 243, 290 n14 Inglehart, Ronald, 18, 25, 277 n30 Irvine, Sandy, 230, 231, 232 K-groups, 19, 57, 58, 67, 112 Kelly, Petra, xix, 39, 76, 77, 80, 90, 97, 103, 114, 116, 118, 119, 130, 131, 136, 257, 282 n22 Kohl, Helmut, 154, 158, 166, 257 Kolinsky, Eva, 18, 87 Kuechler and Dalton, 18 Labour Party, 179, 180, 242, 243, 263 Lambert, Jean, 227

306 Index Left and Right, Left/Right, Right and Left, xiv, 6, 9, 12, 14, 36, 37, 46, 87, 102, 106, 130, 131, 137, 156, 168, 180, 189, 202, 257, 208, 261, 265 Left forum, 109, 148, 149, 156, 163, 259, 260 Liberal Alliance and SDP (Social Democratic Party), 180, 202, 208, 212, 261 Limits to growth, 6, 16, 24, 48, 106, 108 Lovelock, James, 187, 229

Norris, John, 234, 290 n14 NSMs, xiv, xvii, xxiv, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 18, 19, 52, 54, 70, 73, 76, 82, 91, 97, 104, 106, 115, 127, 132, 142, 174, 177, 179, 180, 202, 211, 232, 236, 238, 239, 241, 250, 251, 258, 262, 263, 267 NVDA (Non-Violent Direct Action), 207, 213, 235, 239, 251, 261, 262

MainGreen, 204, 212, 214, 250 Man–Nature, 18, 21, 23, 48, 78, 83, 106, 265 Marcuse, Herbert, 72 Maren-Grisebach, Manon, 77, 79 Markovits and Gorski, 19, 20, 67, 87, 109, 110, 179 Marxism, 19, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 75, 94, 110, 136, 138, 142, 143, 233, 234, 236, 265, 269 Materialism, xxiii, 10, 12 Mitteleuropa, 33, 45 Modular ideology, xii, 17, 24, 28, 100, 107, 108, 112, 113, 144, 161, 162, 164, 168, 169, 173, 175, 225, 234, 236, 240, 242, 247, 251, 255, 259, 262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269 Morrissey, John, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238 Multiculturalism, xii, 23, 81, 157, 160, 161, 165, 167, 168, 190, 231, 238, 246, 247, 249, 264, 268, 269

Parkin, Sara, 177, 212, 214, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 294 n1 Participatory democracy, xi, xii, 85, 87, 88, 104, 105, 111, 139, 141, 147, 154, 158, 160, 165, 169, 181, 203, 206, 213, 225, 238, 246, 249, 264, 265, 269 Peace movement, 3, 19, 51, 76, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 115, 129, 136, 139, 155, 178, 214 Pegg, Alexander, 239 PEOPLE, 179, 180, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 210, 249, 250, 260, 261 Poguntke, Thomas, 25 Political identity, xxi, 14, 16, 48, 81, 145, 165, 178 Political ideology, xi, xii, xv, xvii, xxii, 35, 40, 46, 52, 86, 100, 104, 108, 111, 182, 183, 216, 241, 268, 275 n2 Politics of identity, 105, 108, 114, 127, 152, 199, 200, 236, 257, 268, 269 Ponton, Alec, 230, 232, 238 Postmaterialism (post-material values), 25, 84, 86, 106, 107, 127, 160, 164, 264, 277 n30 Porritt, Jonathon, xix, 201, 202, 205, 207, 225, 227, 232, 233, 260 Primacy of ecology, xii, 35, 47, 48, 82, 86, 93, 96, 103, 105, 106, 108, 144, 145, 156, 161, 164, 240, 241, 249, 255, 261, 262, 263, 269 Pulzer, Peter, 87

Nationalism, 44, 46, 48, 277 n12 Natural order, 55, 78 Nazism (National Socialism), 43, 47, 70, 102, 139, 146, 149, 150, 165, 258 New Politics, xvi, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 35, 37, 43, 76, 81, 110, 131, 138, 208, 211, 236, 239, 241, 242, 243, 249, 251, 260, 262, 267, 268, 269, 270 New Left, xvii, xxiv, 17, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 72, 73, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 102, 106, 109, 110, 126, 131, 133, 139, 144, 156, 161, 163, 164, 199, 202, 233, 234, 236, 238, 243, 246, 251, 256, 262, 263 NGOs, 8, 9, 13, 179, 225

Offe, Claus, 117, 164

Radical democracy, see participatory democracy

Index 307 Raschke, Joachim, 109, 110, 111, 177 Realos (Realists), 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 154, 155, 156, 162, 163, 176, 177, 258, 259, 260, 283 n77 Respect for others, xii, 144, 161, 162, 168, 256, 263, 269 Right–Left, see Left and Right Rose, Chris, 244 Schily, Otto, 114, 133, 154 Schmidt, Thomas, 114, 137, 157 Schrägstrich, xxiv Schwarzer, Alice, 75, 76 SDP (Social Democratic Party), see Liberal Alliance SDS (Socialist German Students), 53, 113 Social change, 79, 91, 95, 146, 151, 154, 164, 166, 169, 195, 197, 204, 208, 225, 228, 236, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 246, 247, 249, 251, 262, 268, 269 Social justice, 96, 98, 101, 102, 106, 114, 129, 139, 142 Socialism, xiii, 57, 58, 63, 90, 131, 139, 179 Socialist Greens, 236, 237, 239, 260 SPD (Social Democratic Party), 19, 20, 36, 53, 63, 87, 88, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 118, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 139, 147, 148, 149, 155, 158, 165, 168, 169, 179, 242, 257 Spirituality, 211, 212, 223, 224, 232, 233, 237, 244, 245, 261, 264, 265, 279 n1 Sponti, 68, 70, 106 SPV (Miscellaneous Political Union – the Greens), 33, 36, 48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 88, 92 Subsidiarity principle, 105, 108, 128, 230, 246, 264

Sustainability, 15, 21, 23, 24, 81, 94, 96, 102, 108, 122, 129, 133, 138, 139, 142, 145, 146, 160, 164, 169, 182, 184, 185, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 206, 215, 216, 219, 225, 228, 231, 234, 235, 236, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 260, 261, 268, 269 Survivalism, 35, 50, 85, 102, 104, 106, 107, 112, 163, 184, 189, 190, 195, 196, 201, 202, 232, 251, 261 Taylor, David, 207, 239, 240, 241 Thatcher, Margaret, 179, 180, 181, 182 Third World, xi, 3, 42, 51, 62, 90, 98, 102, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 131, 136, 137, 141, 144, 150, 161, 180, 191, 210, 215, 230, 237, 238, 241, 260, 262, 269 Thompson Edward, P., 90 Trampert, Rainer, 58, 63, 64, 154, 259 Tritten, Jürgen, 156, 158, 167 Unity in diversity, 9, 92, 96, 97, 100, 123, 255 USP (Environmental Protection Party), 40, 41, 42, 116 Values system, 8, 12, 25 Value-conservatives, 56, 78, 82, 83, 87, 96, 102, 108, 137, 161, 162, 163, 190, 256, 259 Van Hüllen, Rudolf, 57, 109 Vogt, Roland, 37, 39, 86, 119, 257 Vollmer, Antje, 98, 136, 147, 258 Volmer, Ludgar, 148 Wiesenthal, Helmut, 133, 140, 141 Women’s movements, 3, 7, 51, 52, 54, 76, 83, 129, 133, 134, 214, 237 Woodin, Mike, 243, 247 Workers movements, 51, 129, 133 Zieren, Manfred, 128, 129