The Practice of Public Diplomacy: Confronting Challenges Abroad (Palgrave MacMillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy)

The Practice of Public Diplomacy

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Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy Series editors: Kathy Fitzpatrick, Quinnipiac University, USA Philip Seib, University of Southern California, USA

Advisory Board: Nicholas J. Cull, University of Southern California, USA Teresa LaPorte, University of Navarre, Spain Donna Lee, Leeds Metropolitan University, United Kingdom Jan Melissen, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, Netherlands Abeer Najjar, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates William A. Rugh, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and United Arab Emirates, USA Cesar Villanueva Rivas, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico Li Xiguang, Tsinghua University, China At no time in history has public diplomacy played a more significant role in world affairs and international relations. As a result, global interest in public diplomacy has escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional audience for new works in the field. This series examines theory and practice in public diplomacy from a global perspective, looking closely at public diplomacy concepts, policies, and practices in various regions of the world. The purpose is to enhance understanding of the importance of public diplomacy, to advance public diplomacy thinking, and to contribute to improved public diplomacy practices. The editors welcome submissions from scholars and practitioners representing a range of disciplines and fields (including diplomacy, international relations, international communications, public relations, political science, global media, marketing/ advertising) and offering diverse perspectives. In keeping with its global focus, the series encourages non-U.S.-centric works and comparative studies. Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy Edited by Philip Seib Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication Edited by Jian Wang Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia Edited by Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen The Practice of Public Diplomacy: Confronting Challenges Abroad Edited by William A. Rugh

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The Practice of Public Diplomacy Confronting Challenges Abroad Edited by William A. Rugh

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THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Copyright © William A. Rugh, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–11322–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The practice of public diplomacy : confronting challenges abroad / edited by William A. Rugh. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–11322–0 (alk. paper) 1. United States. Foreign Service. 2. Diplomatic and consular service, American. 3. United States—Officials and employees—Foreign countries. 4. United States—Foreign relations administration. 5. United States— Foreign relations. I. Rugh, William A. JZ1480.A5P73 2010 327.73—dc22

2010040667

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: April 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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CON T E N T S

Preface

vii

Acknowledgments

xiii

List of Contributors

xv

Part I Public Diplomacy in Europe and in Southwest Asia 1 Ameliorating Strained Relations: Public Diplomacy in Serbia Lucija Bajzer

3

2 Revitalizing Relations with Turkey Nicole E. Farina

21

3 Iran and the United Kingdom: A Study in Contrasts Sarah M. Riley

37

4 Afghanistan and Pakistan: Public Diplomacy during Conf lict and Instability Rachel E. Smith

55

Part II Public Diplomacy in Africa 5 Kenya’s “Native Son” and Enduring Local Issues Mabel Ntiru

75

6 Sierra Leone: Public Diplomacy Unwired Tulani N. Elisa

91

Part III

Public Diplomacy in Asia

7 The Staying Power of Personal Contact in South Korean Public Diplomacy Yoon-Jeong Huh

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Contents Economic Issues and Anti-Americanism in Japan Yohei Ogawa

125

Part IV New Media or Old? 9

U.S. Public Diplomacy 2.0 in Asia: Beyond Catch-up Takahiro Yamamoto

143

10

New Media or “the Last Three Feet” in Africa? Rachel O. Okunubi

159

11

New Media or Old in Egypt and South Korea? John Rahaghi

175

12

Finding the Right Media Formula—from the Soviet Union to Russia Elise S. Crane

191

Part V New Thinking about Public Diplomacy 13

Should Public Diplomacy Be Privatized? Nicole Gabrielle Kravec

209

14

Do Peace Corps Volunteers Do Public Diplomacy? Minta Madeley

227

15

Conclusion: Field Experiences and Best Practices William A. Rugh

243

Index

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PR E FAC E

This book seeks to convey an understanding of public diplomacy as it is practiced by professionals at American embassies abroad. “Public diplomacy” is a term that has recently acquired new definitions, as respected scholars have sought to broaden the concept to acknowledge new circumstances, by saying that nongovernmental actors also engage in public diplomacy.1 But this book uses the traditional definition—that is, a government’s effort to reach out to the public in foreign countries—because this definition is still in use by the U.S. government, and this book focuses on government practice. Public diplomacy has been the subject of considerable discussion and debate in the United States since the 9/11 events, when many Americans sought to identify the motivation for the anti-American hostility behind the attack, and wanted to address the problem. Media commentators, think tank reports, and the academic literature offered a variety of ideas and reform proposals. Many believed that the attack showed the United States’ failure to communicate its values and policies abroad to foreign publics, and suggested that something was amiss in our public diplomacy. Has the U.S. government failed in its duty to address foreign complaints and misunderstandings about the United States? Was the task so difficult that the government should call upon the American private sector, known to be skilled at marketing and branding, to step in and help repair America’s image? Were officials of the Department of Defense better able to manage communication with foreign audiences than the State Department’s diplomats, because we were now fighting a “Global War on Terror”? This discussion and debate reinvigorated a conversation about public diplomacy, a topic that in the past had failed to attract significant public or scholarly attention. The books and articles on public diplomacy published since 9/11 have provided many new insights and theories

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that constitute a rich literature. Yet one aspect of the topic has received relatively little attention: the actual daily practice of public diplomacy by U.S. officials at embassies and consulates abroad. The central importance of field offices has rarely been stressed.2 There are several reasons for the neglect of public diplomacy practice “in the field.” First, it is admittedly difficult for anyone sitting in the United States to know much about the daily functioning of an American diplomat working at an embassy or consulate in a foreign country. How does an American official charged with carrying out a public diplomacy program abroad go about its planning, execution, and evaluation? What tools and methods are used? Is the official simply a conveyor of U.S. policy as enunciated in Washington, or is there some room for creativity and leeway in the process? Many Americans have heard about the Fulbright Program or VOA, but do they know how useful these and other public diplomacy instruments are in actually communicating with foreign publics? These are important questions, but ones that very few Americans can answer because they have not had an opportunity to observe an embassy operation from the inside. In fact, not even members of Congress, or the administration’s political leaders, have a thorough understanding of how an embassy works. As one experienced Foreign Service officer has written, among the U.S. public, “and even among Washington policy makers and politicians, there is little knowledge of what it [public diplomacy] is, what it can and cannot do, how it is practiced and by whom.”3 Second, the U.S. media have been unhelpful in educating the American public on this topic. Prior to 9/11, the New York Times rarely mentioned public diplomacy; even when it did the writer was often unfamiliar with the topic and it only created “confusion on the part of readers about what public diplomacy is.”4 Today there are very few American correspondents stationed abroad, so media reporting on diplomacy naturally focuses on the more visible actions of officials in Washington. Third, while scholars have substantially increased their research and publication efforts on public diplomacy, they have found it much easier to study the Washington end of the process than to investigate the particulars of our diplomatic missions. Speeches by senior U.S. officials are well documented, as are public statements by members of Congress. While this constitutes an important part of public diplomacy because these are official communications heard by foreign audiences, there is a dearth of material available on public diplomacy

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activities conducted by American diplomats abroad, which is arguably equally important. This book seeks to fill that gap and serve as a companion to other basic works. It does not attempt to make a detailed review of public diplomacy theory, but instead seeks to present the field officer perspective on public diplomacy by means of case studies. These studies offer empirical evidence of field practices as they are taking place today, filling a hole in the literature. They should be read in conjunction with the existing theoretical works in order to form a complete picture of the subject. What about writing by those who have actually practiced the profession of public diplomacy? Although some books have deliberately included essays by practitioners, most of these practitioners have not been career officers with field experience; instead they have been Washington-based policymakers or short-term political appointees.5 It is true that a few retired public diplomacy professionals with field experience have written books about their experiences doing public diplomacy abroad,6 and others have written short articles in the same vein7 These works provide valuable insights into local conditions that shaped public diplomacy programs abroad but they are rare. As one book points out, while the former public diplomats focus on what happens abroad, everyone else focuses only on what happens in Washington, because “Unfortunately there is a dearth of field-based research” on the subject.8 Moreover, most of these accounts by diplomats are accurate for the time periods they are talking about in a particular country; by nature, they deal with divergent eras and are difficult to use comparatively.9 One scholar, concerned that the opinions of public diplomacy experts had not been heard, conducted a survey of more than two hundred former U.S. Information Agency officers who had been professional public diplomacy practitioners between the 1950s and 2007.10 This USIA Alumni Study is valuable, presenting a composite picture of the practitioners’ views and offering generalizations about the practice. The study has been very helpful in analyzing consistent factors through time and across geographic boundaries. But by its nature it does not provide local context. As every public diplomacy practitioner who has worked abroad for the U.S. government knows, his or her working environment and the circumstances of the moment have an enormous impact on the actual public diplomacy strategy and program. Every country in the world is different, and the practice of public diplomacy in the field varies significantly with the public’s concerns and priorities, the political constraints, and the available tools. Most publications

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about public diplomacy, therefore, focus on the macro level and the few existent micro-level studies are selective. Forming a true picture of the micro level at any given moment has been elusive. This book attempts to help fill that important gap by looking closely at several individual countries and by listening to public diplomacy’s practitioners. The studies in this book confirm that the public in each foreign country has a unique set of concerns and priorities, which usually differ from Washington’s. As one experienced career diplomat puts it, Washington does wholesale while embassies do retail, and the perspectives are very different.11 Congressman Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill famously said “All politics is local,” and although not all public diplomacy is local, much of it is. Relying heavily on scores of first-hand accounts collected through interviews, the studies examine the practice of public diplomacy largely from the perspective of American practitioners in different countries. The analyses follow the standard field officer approach, asking systematically: what issues in local public opinion should we be addressing; who should we engage; how can we best engage them; and how well are the programs working? This is an ongoing process at every field post, involving local staff and constant attention to contacts. The studies in this book focus on field operations during one period of time, broadly from the end of the Bush administration to the early Obama administration, so comparisons can be made between them to determine which practices are common and which are unique. They examine salient questions that have recently been posed by those seeking to understand and theorize about public diplomacy, such as: the role of new information technology; the possible role of the private sector; the use of dialogue instead of monologue; the “Obama effect”; and measuring effectiveness; plus some best practices in coping with governmental restrictions and other barriers to communication. Above all, the studies make clear that the work of American officials “on the ground,” who are in a good position to understand the local culture and attitudes, and to engage directly with local audiences, is essential to the public diplomacy task. The first chapters in this book offer analyses of public diplomacy operations in specific countries in Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, and Asia. Four other chapters focus directly on the specific question being asked by practitioners and scholars today: What is the role of the new media in public diplomacy? Two chapters present findings that advance our understanding of the role of the private sector, and the parallel roles of the State Department and the Peace Corps. The final chapter summarizes best practices from recent field experiences.

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Nearly all of the authors have had direct experience living and working in the countries about which they write. In addition, each study presents original material gleaned by interviewing current American public diplomacy professionals with direct knowledge of the subject, as well as some retired professionals who provided historical perspective. These insights offer unique and original material that sheds critical light on the most pressing questions of public diplomacy today. Notes 1. For example, see Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, eds., “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008), p. 6; or “What is Public Diplomacy,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org. See also Philip Seib, Remarks presented at Chatham House, March 3, 2010, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/events/view/-/id/1455/. 2. Two exceptions are William P. Kiehl, “The Case for Localized Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 212–224; and Mike Canning, “The Overseas Post: The Forgotten Element in Our Public Diplomacy,” Public Diplomacy Council, December 1, 2008, http:// publicdiplomacycouncil.org/uploads/canningoverseasposts.pdf. 3. Hans N. Tuch, “Why Americans Don’t Appreciate Public Diplomacy,” Foreign Service Journal, January 1991, p. 11. 4. Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate (Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 28 and 73. 5. For example, Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007); and Cowan and Cull, “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” p. 7. 6. For example, Hans N. Tuch, Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Yale Richmond, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Richard J. Schmierer, Iraq: Policy and Perceptions (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2007); Wilson P. Dizard Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy, The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Allen Hanson, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age, 1989; and William A. Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: the “Soft Power” of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab World (Westport CT: Praeger/ Greenwood, 2005). 7. For example, Peter J. Kovach, “The Public Diplomat, a First Person Account,” in Snow and Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, pp. 201–11; and Dan Sreebny, “Public Diplomacy, the Field Perspective,” in William P. Kiehl, ed., America’s Dialogue with the World (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 2006), pp. 91–102. 8. Fitzpatrick, The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, pp. 176–177. 9. An “Advisory Commission on U.S. Public Diplomacy,” created by Congress in 1948, has been almost invisible to the American public and has not helped them understand what the practitioners are doing. 10. Fitzpatrick, The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, p. 8; she cites her “USIA Alumni Study” throughout this book. 11. Interview with a serving senior State Department official, March 2010.

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AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S

The authors of this book interviewed dozens of American Foreign Service officers currently serving at embassies and consulates abroad and at the State Department in Washington. They also interviewed many retired American diplomats who served in important public diplomacy positions in the past, and who could provide important historical perspective. Some of the current officials spoke on conditions of anonymity because of the sensitivity of their comments. Every one interviewed gave generously of their time and freely shared their firsthand knowledge of the subject, and we are very grateful to them. This book would have been impossible without their support. I want to thank the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for giving me an opportunity to teach there. And special credit also goes to Ms. Elise Crane who ably assisted with the editing of the manuscript, in addition to writing one of the chapters. William A. Rugh

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CON T R I BU TOR S

Lucija Bajzer was born and raised in Zagreb, Croatia. She lived in Croatia during the beginning of the conf licts in South Central Europe in the 1990s before moving to the United States. She holds a BA in political science and organizational communication summa cum laude from Creighton University and an MA in law and diplomacy from Tufts University. In the summer of 2009 she worked at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, assisting in the economic and public diplomacy sections. She is f luent in Croatian and Serbian. Elise S. Crane is a graduate of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where she majored in international relations and Russian studies. She studied in St. Petersburg, Russia, and then taught English in Prague. After that, she was employed for nearly three years as the representative of an international media organization based in Prague. In that position she traveled widely throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including to Russia and the Baltic states, and she met with newspaper editors on six continents. She has also interned in the State Department’s Office of South Central Europe. She speaks French, Russian, and Czech. Tulani N. Elisa was born and raised in Boston, but she spent a number of her formative years in Brussels, Belgium, while her father worked for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She earned a BA in history from Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia, and an MA from Tufts. Between 2006 and 2008 she was a legislative assistant for Congressman Edward J. Markey in Washington, D.C., working on appropriations, welfare, the arts, transportation, and women’s rights/ domestic violence. In 2009 she was an intern in the Public Affairs Office at the U.S. Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone. She is f luent in French.

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Contributors

Nicole E. Farina is a native of Massachusetts. She holds a BA in international studies from Boston College, and has an MA from Tufts University. She has worked for an immigration law firm in Boston, assisting clients with visa and green card petitions, and applications for asylum. She has also worked on several development projects with an NGO in Lima, Peru, and has spent two years in Madrid, where she taught English to civil servants in Spain’s Ministry of the Environment. In 2009 she studied Turkish at the Izmir University of Economics on a State Department Fellowship. She is also f luent in Spanish, and speaks Italian and Portuguese. Nicole Gabrielle Kravec received her BS cum laude with distinction in research from Cornell University, where she studied communication, business, and industrial and labor relations. She graduated from Harvard Business School where she wrote case studies and developed pedagogy as a research assistant. She has worked for the World Wildlife Fund in Kenya. She lived in Prague while studying international business and negotiation, and she has also studied communication, development, and tourism issues in Africa, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. She speaks Spanish, Czech, and Italian, and some Swahili. Minta Madeley is a U.S. Foreign Service officer. Originally from Texas, she grew up in California, England, and Saudi Arabia. She holds a BA in Arabic from Georgetown University and an MA from the Fletcher School. She served in the Peace Corps in Jordan from 2006 to 2008. In 2009 she returned to Jordan to work at the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy’s Regional Centre for Conf lict Prevention, where she prepared case studies on conf lict resolution techniques. She is f luent in Arabic. Mabel Ntiru is a citizen of Uganda. She was born and raised in Nairobi, Kenya, but moved to New York City in 1992. She graduated from Mount Holyoke College in 2004 with a major in English, and she has an MA from Tufts University. She worked as a communications analyst for Mercer, a global human resources consulting firm. She has also taught English to high school students in Hunan, China, and has worked in the corporate public affairs department at ExxonMobil. She is proficient in Swahili and French. Rachel O. Okunubi is a native of Washington, D.C. She received her undergraduate degree from Princeton University and did graduate work at Tufts University. She has conducted ethnographic research regarding sociopolitical transitioning in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,

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Tanzania. She worked in the Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in 2009 and has been accepted into the Foreign Service as a Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellow. She speaks Swahili. John Rahaghi is a graduate of Northeastern University with a degree in graphic design. He worked for an Internet consulting firm for two years as a multimedia designer before joining the U.S. Navy as an intelligence officer in 2002. He has been stationed in Japan, California, South Korea, and Italy serving in such roles as air intelligence officer for an F/A-18 Squadron, weapons of mass destruction analyst, and military liaison officer. Sarah M. Riley completed her undergraduate degree with honors in international relations at Brown University in 2004. She attended law school on a full academic scholarship at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, obtaining her J.D. cum laude in 2007. In 2002 she worked in Washington, D.C. for Congressman Patrick Kennedy and Senator Jack Reed. In 2004 and 2005 she worked for the Rhode Island Office of attorney general. From 2007 to 2009, she clerked for the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. She is a member of the bar in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. Ms. Riley has published several articles in law reviews and journals. William A. Rugh was a Foreign Service officer for thirty-one years, during which he served in several public diplomacy positions in Washington and abroad, and as ambassador twice. He is the author of American Encounters with Arabs: The “Soft Power” of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab World (2005), and the editor of Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy (2004), and has written articles on public diplomacy and foreign policy. He holds a PhD from Columbia University and speaks Arabic and German. Rachel E. Smith graduated from the University of California Irvine in 2007 with a major in political science and economics. She studied at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Grenoble, France, in 2005 and 2006. In the summer of 2006 she interned with the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels, Belgium. Upon graduation she interned and then worked for the Sudan Programs Group within the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs from 2007 to 2008. She worked for Dyncorp International, a U.S. government contractor, from November 2008 until May 2009 where she was the assistant program manager of a U.S. grant that provided logistical support to the

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implementation of Sudan’s two peace agreements and their signatories. In this role, she traveled frequently to the region. Rachel has been admitted to the Foreign Service as a U.S. Department of State Rangel Fellow. She is f luent in French. Takahiro Yamamoto is a citizen of Japan. He holds a BA in international relations from the University of Tokyo and an MA from Tufts University. He has worked as a consultant in a Japanese information technology firm. He has worked in the International Affairs Division of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology as well as at the Russian Division of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2007 to 2008 he worked at Purdue University on a research project in disaster recovery, and has worked as a researcher for a joint project on international migration sponsored by the Hitachi Research Institute and Tufts University. In addition to being a native speaker of Japanese, he reads Chinese. Yohei Ogawa is a citizen of Japan, and a native speaker of Japanese. He is an officer of Japanese Ministry of Finance, where he worked in the Tax Policy Research Division and International Tax Policy Division in 2004 and 2005. He worked as a tax examiner in a regional taxation bureau in Shikoku area of Japan in 2006. He also worked in the Planning Division of the Elderly Health and Welfare Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Health from 2007 to 2009 by interministerial personnel exchange. He holds a BA in international relations from the University of Tokyo. Yoon-Jeong Huh is a citizen of the Republic of Korea, and a native speaker of Korean. She has been a Foreign Service officer in the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for three years. In the ministry she has served in the Consular Systems Division and in the West Europe Division. She received a BA in political science from the Seoul National University, and has done graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University.

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PA RT

I

Public Diplomacy in Europe and in Southwest Asia

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CH A P T E R

1

Ameliorating Strained Relations: Public Diplomacy in Serbia L uc i ja Baj z e r

The headline “Strongest Anti-American Sentiment in Serbia, Pakistan” appeared in the Serbian newspaper B92 in July 2009. The story explained that Serbia and Pakistan shared first place as countries with the most negative opinion of the United States according to a recent Medium Gallup poll of forty-two countries.1 While public opinion of the United States has improved in most of the world since 2006, it has worsened in Serbia.2 Furthermore, negative public opinion of the United States is significantly higher in Serbia than in other countries in the region.3 Given these striking findings, U.S. public diplomacy efforts are particularly relevant in Serbia today. Serbia’s relationship with the United States has changed significantly in the last fifty years as Serbia has undergone several major transitions and conf licts. This chapter provides an analysis of how U.S. public diplomacy toward Serbia has changed since the Cold War and identifies some ways in which the United States can improve its public diplomacy. For the purposes of this study, the term “U.S. public diplomacy” refers to “United States government information and cultural programs for informing, engaging and inf luencing foreign public opinion in support of U.S. objectives.”4 This essay explores public diplomacy practiced by the State Department and its predecessor, the United States Information Agency (USIA), from the beginning of the Cold War to the present.

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4

Lucija Bajzer Historical Relations

In order to place the study of public diplomacy in context this section provides a brief overview of broader historical events in Serbia. The United States’ relationship with Serbia, which was part of the Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1991, became strained when dictator Josip Broz Tito came to power in Yugoslavia in 1945.5 Tito was initially aligned with the Soviet Union; however, after a split between Stalin and Tito, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern Bloc.6 During this period, U.S. public diplomacy focused on bringing information to Yugoslavia about capitalism, democracy, and American values. According to Ambassador John Shirley, who served as an assistant cultural attaché in Yugoslavia from 1958 to 1960, “our function in Yugoslavia was to keep the window cracked. Through that crack in the window, which the regime was trying to keep closed, we passed information in a variety of ways.” 7 As the Cold War continued, the United States and the Soviet Union vied for inf luence in Yugoslavia. Myron Hoffmann, an information officer in Belgrade from 1976 to 1980, emphasized, “Yugoslavia was considered to be a pivotal point between the East and West to an extent that, in hindsight, may seem disproportionate.”8 Following the death of Tito in 1980, the rise of Serbian nationalism led by Slobodan Milosevic caused tension between the Yugoslav republics. The region slid into war after Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina announced their independence from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and Milosevic pursued his ambitions for a greater Serbia. During this period, the relationship between U.S. and Serbian officials were mixed.9 While relationships with Milosevic and Serbia’s leadership were strained, U.S. diplomats had more positive associations with Serbia’s federal-level leadership.10 The war raged on, but in 1995, the United States and other major powers pressured the leaders of the Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian sides to attend negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. The U.S.-led peace conference resulted in the signing of the Dayton Accords and an end to the conf lict in November 1995.11 Following this conf lict, war broke out between the Serbs and the repressed Kosovar Albanian majority in Serbia’s autonomous province of Kosovo. The international community made several attempts at negotiation, but after the breakdown of these talks, NATO launched a bombing campaign of Serbia that lasted from March 22 to June 10, 1999. Milosevic eventually responded by withdrawing Serbian forces

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from Kosovo. In the fall of 2000, Serbian opposition groups organized peaceful demonstrations that succeeded in removing Mislosevic from power, despite his efforts to rig the September 2000 elections.12 U.S.-Serbian relations remained strained in the aftermath of the bombing campaign. The perception that the United States was the chief orchestrator of the NATO bombings was widespread throughout Serbia, and Serbs held the United States accountable for the destruction caused by the bombings.13 In the wake of the conf lict, Kosovo was administered by the United Nations, and its status remained unclear for several years. The United States was a supporter of Kosovo’s independence, and on February 17, 2008, Kosovo successfully declared independence from Serbia.14 Serbs reacted by organizing a peaceful protest in Belgrade on February 22, 2008. Subsequently, a small group of protesters splintered off and attacked the American embassy, causing severe damage to property.15 Although no Americans were harmed, the State Department declared that it held the Serbian government responsible for its inadequate provision of Serbian security forces.16 Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbia recalled its ambassadors from all countries that formally recognized Kosovo. It has since returned its ambassadors, and aside from Kosovo, Serbia has made efforts to improve relations with several countries in recent months.17 Serbian Public Opinion In order to identify the perceptions that create challenges for U.S. public diplomacy practitioners in Serbia, this section presents Serbian public opinion concerning the United States. In the last several years, Serbian negative public opinion of the United States has remained relatively high. About 63 percent of Serbs had a negative opinion of the United States in 2005, which steadily decreased over the next two years.18 When those Serbs who expressed a negative opinion of the United States were asked to provide reasons for their opinion, NATO’s bombing campaign of Serbia was the most commonly cited reason in 2007–2009.19 Despite the fact that the bombings occurred in 1999, the percentage of respondents that selected the bombings as the reason increased from 29 percent in 2007 to 39 in 2009.20 A State Department official explained that U.S. support of Kosovo’s independence “brought the bombings back to the surface.”21 This suggests that the NATO bombings of Serbia have become more salient in the eyes of the Serbian public.

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The next two most commonly cited reasons that Serbs identified for their negative opinion of the United States were U.S. policy toward Kosovo and U.S. imperialism.22 Another factor was the idea that the United States is constantly against Serbia.23 Indeed, a State Department official who works on student exchanges said that before they go to the United States, many students have a preconceived notion that Americans hate Serbs and Serbia. When they visit the United States they are often surprised to find that this is not the case.24 Among those who expressed a positive opinion of the United States, the greatest percentage of respondents (30 percent in 2007 and 2008) selected “they help Serbia” as their reason.25 Despite the fact that a majority of Serbs have a negative opinion of United States, the data available between October 2004 and May 2006 indicate that a plurality of Serb respondents believed it was in Serbia’s interest to get closer to the United States.26 Between October 2004 and May 2006, the range of respondents that held this belief was between 45 and 55 percent, while only between 26 and 34 percent believed it was in Serbia’s interest to distance itself from the United States.27 In a 2009 survey, Serbian citizens were asked to rank order their perception of which countries or groups of countries Serbia should rely on for foreign policy support. The European Union (EU) and Russia emerged with the highest favorable rating as potential supporters of Serbia, while the United States and “some other countries” emerged as the least favorable.28 Approximately 41 percent of respondents believed the EU will offer favorable policy support to Serbia.29 Serbia has pursued this relationship by signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement, which is a prerequisite for eventual EU Membership.30 According to a poll done in December 2008, approximately 61 percent of Serbs support their country’s plans to join the EU.31 Given negative Serbian public opinion toward the United States, public diplomacy efforts in Serbia are particularity important. Polling data help public diplomacy practitioners understand what drives positive and negative sentiments. This enables them to devise strategies to respond to controversial issues and to identify areas of mutual interest. Identifying the Target Audience Public diplomacy practitioners must carefully consider the target audience for their programming in Serbia in order to effectively design and implement programs. This section examines how the target audience

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has changed over time, which groups comprise the current target audience, and which groups public diplomacy practitioners should target in the future. Gatekeepers, opinion leaders, and the youth have remained important target audiences for U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia since the 1950s. Today, public diplomacy practitioners target groups similar to those they targeted during the Cold War; however, there has been a shift from broad-based programming aimed at the general public to an emphasis on creating relationships with more specific audiences. During the Cold War, USIA officers were eager for as much contact as possible, both with the mass public and with the educated elites.32 USIA brought several American cultural performances and exhibits to Yugoslavia as a means of attaining broad public exposure. These programs introduced the Serbian public to American lifestyle and culture.33 Public diplomacy officers also worked to gain access to opinion leaders, but this access was somewhat restricted in Yugoslavia’s communist system. Despite restrictions in other areas, academia remained relatively open and easy to reach in the closed Yugoslav society. Consequently, academics became an important target audience.34 By the 1970s, USIA had an active academic speaker program and the largest Fulbright program in Eastern Europe.35 As the Cold War progressed, public diplomacy officers used technology to track their contact with the target audience. In the late 1980s, primitive computer systems enabled USIA officers to record the target audiences’ attendance at events.36 If USIA officers did not achieve the desired level of contact with an individual, they either discontinued their efforts or found new ways of reaching out.37 When the embassy was closed during the wars in the early 1990s, a great deal of valuable target audience information was lost.38 Today, Serbs have significantly greater access to information and generally a better understanding of American society. However, the NATO bombings of Serbia and the U.S. policy regarding Kosovo remain considerable causes for tension. Thus, along with exposing the Serbian public to American values and culture, public diplomacy programming in Serbia is also aimed at overcoming controversial issues and finding means of building relationships around areas of common interest.39 To achieve these goals, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners have made efforts to target those that are skeptical of the United States because of the NATO bombings and the policy toward Kosovo. As an example, the State Department brought a U.S. Navy band to perform at the Guca Trumpet Festival in the summer of 2009. According to a

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State Department official, “the people who attend this festival are often people who love to hate America and the West. The last thing they would expect was for Americans to come to Guca.” Despite this, the U.S. Navy band was generally well received, and the press was eager to cover the event. The program was a big success because it provided a means of reaching an audience that might otherwise be written off.40 Recognizing that making progress with these skeptical audiences is difficult, public diplomacy officers have also found ways to put serious issues aside and look for ways to create connections between Serbian and American professionals regarding specific policy issues.41 For example, American waste management experts have worked with waste management professionals in Serbia to improve their systems.42 As the future leaders of Serbia, the youth form a crucial target audience. Access to the youth is somewhat restricted insofar as the Serbian Education Ministry has limited U.S. public diplomacy practitioners’ access to schools. Nevertheless, the embassy targets youth using forms of new media and popular student exchange programs.43 Looking forward, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners should continue to target opinion leaders and the general public while looking for opportunities to engage skeptical audiences. Additionally, they should focus specifically on targeting professionals and continue to find new ways to engage youth. Instruments and Programs U.S. public diplomacy practitioners use several instruments and programs to reach desired target audiences. During the Cold War, USIA had significant resources in Yugoslavia because the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for inf luence in this unique nonaligned communist country. The programs were focused on demonstrating how democracy and free market economics would benefit Yugoslavia more than their current socialist approach.44 USIA had a sizable staff in Yugoslavia throughout the Cold War. By the 1980s it had about twenty officers in-country and over a hundred local staff.45 The resources and conditions of public diplomacy programming have changed significantly since the Cold War. Currently, there are three American public diplomacy officers working in Serbia and approximately ten foreign national staff.46 Today, public diplomacy officers understand that tensions over the NATO bombing of Serbia and the U.S. policy toward Kosovo present major challenges. This section

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analyzes the effectiveness of several public diplomacy instruments and programs that have been employed in Serbia from the Cold War to the present. Furthermore, it discusses the potential future utility of these instruments. Face-to-Face Discussion Public diplomacy officers consistently cited face-to-face discussions as one of the most effective tools of public diplomacy in Serbia.47 While it is difficult to reach a broad audience using face-to-face discussions, public diplomacy officers perceive that these discussions are the most helpful means of engaging people in genuine dialogue. Indeed, they are at the heart of public diplomacy. Thus, face-to-face discussions will likely remain irreplaceable as a tool of public diplomacy. Radio Broadcasting The U.S.-government-run Voice of America (VOA) started broadcasting in Serbian to Yugoslavia in 1943 with the mission of providing authoritative and reliable news. In 1994, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) started broadcasting its South Slavic Service to Yugoslavia, “to be a voice of peace and reconciliation.”48 Radio broadcasting played a significant role in Yugoslavia during the 1990s. VOA brought important news to the Serbian people despite President Milosevic’s efforts to repress the media. On December 3, 1995, Milosevic ordered that Belgrade’s independent radio station, B92, be closed in response to its reporting on a large protest against the Milosevic government.49 After the station was silenced, VOA began broadcasting Serbian-language reports by local journalists from B92, essentially invalidating Milosevic’s action and enabling people outside Belgrade to hear the broadcasts.50 The next day, Milosevic allowed the station back on air and upgraded their temporary permit to a ten-year license. Radio B92’s editor-in-chief Veran Matic described the VOA broadcasts as “the ultimate act of media solidarity” and the resumption of broadcasts as the “second victory for democratic forces in Serbia.”51 Following the Kosovo conf lict, Serbs organized massive demonstrations in an effort to remove Milosevic from power. A nationwide survey of Serbs in October 200052 found that international radio had played a major role in informing the Serbian people after the Kosovo conf lict. Approximately 40 percent of Serb adults listened to RFE/RL

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and VOA for news during the Serbian national elections and during the massive street demonstrations in the fall of 2000. During this period, a greater number of Serbs listened to RFE/RL (37 percent) than to the state-controlled radio station, Radio Belgrade (31 percent). On the day prior to the beginning of the demonstrations that eventually removed Milosevic from power, 25 percent of Serb adults listened to RFE/RL and 20 percent listened to VOA.53 Today, VOA and RFE/RL remain active in Serbia; however, Serbia now has free media so their role is not as prominent as it was during the repressive Milosevic era. Radio broadcasting is still a valuable public diplomacy instrument in Serbia because it has the capacity to reach out to a broad audience. Television With its potential for broad rapid information dissemination, television is an important tool of public diplomacy. While satellite television technology was not widely available in Serbia during the beginning of the Cold War, by the 1980s public diplomacy practitioners started to use satellite television to reach a broad audience. USIA officers were able to receive TV signals from Washington, which enabled them to provide Yugoslav television with a variety of TV programming excerpts that were broadcast throughout the country. A former USIA official who served in Belgrade during the 1980s recalled that he used television to demonstrate American democracy.54 During one program, twenty televisions were set up at the American library, and USIA hosted a reception for Yugoslavs on the night of the 1986 elections. Several hundred leading Yugoslav journalists, academics, and political and government officials attended to follow the election in the United States without censorship.55 Today, television in Serbia is widely accessible and Serbian news programs cover important stories, enabling a broad audience to see interviews with the ambassador, speeches from high-level visitors, and other public diplomacy events put on by U.S. public diplomacy practitioners. Thus, it remains an important tool of public diplomacy. Print Media Print media played a significant role in U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia during the Cold War. USIA printed a general interest magazine in

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Serbo-Croatian entitled Pregled, which translates to “Overview.” It was distributed to members of the highly literate population, which helped introduce Yugoslavs to American lifestyle and culture.56 USIA also published a much more politically sensitive journal in Serbo-Croatian called The Problems of Communism.57 Following the Cold War, funding for publications was cut dramatically and both of these publications were discontinued. With the disappearance of these publications, print media became less used as a tool of public diplomacy. The Serbian population today is highly literate, and public diplomacy officers now focus on having conversations with members of the media, arranging press coverage for embassy events, and writing press releases.58 They rely on having these pieces published in Serbian magazines and newspapers. As an example, the public affairs officer in Belgrade Conrad Turner wrote an op-ed that was published in the popular Serbian newspaper Politika.59 The piece discussed NATO’s consensual decision-making process. It is part of a broader effort to educate Serbs about NATO in order to dispel the myth that NATO is nothing more than American bombers that harm innocent people. New Media The advent of new media has enabled U.S. public diplomacy officers to reach out to the Serbian public in new ways. The Embassy in Belgrade utilizes social networking websites such as Facebook to advertise events and provide information.60 Public diplomacy officers have also used YouTube to post interviews with the ambassador. In one interview that was posted on YouTube, Ambassador Munter discussed U.S.-Serbian relations: “We are committed above all to Serbia’s accession to the European Union.”61 He went on to say, “We are also committed to the prosperity of Serbia because we believe that Serbia has a lot to offer, not only to its own citizens, but to the European Union as well.”62 Later in the interview, he stated, “We think that the trauma of the last twenty years is very difficult and we want to make sure that we focus with our Serbian friends on the future. Except for the disagreement about Kosovo, I am optimistic we can do that.”63 Through these statements, the ambassador highlighted the United States’ support for Serbian aspirations to join the EU, a message likely to resonate well with the majority of the Serbian public. His language was consistent with the programming goals and rhetoric used by public diplomacy officers who seek to emphasize

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areas for positive cooperation with Serbia rather than dwelling on the past. The Embassy’s website is another important tool. It enables the Serbian public to access Co.Nx, a forum for multimedia web chats with experts on a variety of topics. Additionally, the website includes a link to a student corner with information about student exchanges.64 Youth are frequent users of many new media outlets, and much of the new media programming in Serbia is targeted at the younger population. As new media continues to evolve, it will likely play a larger role in public diplomacy in the future. Exhibits and Cultural Performances Exhibits and cultural performance were essential tools during the Cold War. For many Yugoslavs, these exhibits and performances provided a first glimpse of American culture.65 Ambassador Shirley recalled the excitement in Yugoslavia when the Jerome Robbins Ballet USA came to perform.66 Ballet was an important form of entertainment during that time in Yugoslavia and it was one area where the Yugoslavs were open despite the relatively closed political system. Speaking about the event, Shirley said, “The crowd went berserk with enthusiasm. Suddenly, in a world of stultified ballet, this lively performance happened. What it said about America and American culture was stunning.” Between three and four thousand people attended the performance and it attracted significant media attention. Cultural presentations generated a great deal of goodwill and demonstrated “the richness of American art and the commonality of American and Yugoslav pursuit of art.”67 Following the Cold War, the funding for these programs was significantly reduced. Movies, television, and the Internet are now more prominent in exposing Serbs to American culture. However, the embassy still hosts smaller exhibitions and brings performers to Serbia as a means of promoting cultural understanding.68 Libraries and American Corners During the Cold War, libraries were an important instrument of public diplomacy. According to John Shirley, in the late 1950s and early 1960s the American libraries were full of people throughout the day.69 He said, “You could go down there any hour of the day and see students cropping passages and looking at reference books. The Yugoslavs were perfectly open about it. As far as we knew, there was no effort to control

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the f low—the libraries had an impact on thousands of people.” These libraries were a useful resource that enabled Serbs to access information that would otherwise be unavailable to them. When the Cold War ended, the libraries were closed and American corners were established in their place. American corners do not have American staff and offer significantly fewer resources. While American libraries were often stand-alone facilities that offered English language classes, lectures, books, and magazines, American corners are usually small designated sections within an existing institution that offer occasional lectures and a few books and magazines. There is still healthy attendance at events held at American corners, but they do not attract nearly as many people as the libraries did on a daily basis. Thus, in their current form American corners are not as powerful a tool of public diplomacy as the American libraries were during the Cold War Era. Exchanges Exchanges have remained a crucial tool of U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia. Throughout the Cold War, exchanges were an important instrument, and by the 1970s, Yugoslavia had the biggest Fulbright program in Eastern Europe.70 At its peak, the program sent more than fifty Fulbright scholars and students on exchanges between the United States and Yugoslavia annually.71 Fulbright scholarships in Serbia were awarded based on merit. This was completely unique at the time in Yugoslavia because there were few meritocracies; rather, people received opportunities through connections with the Communist Party.72 The merit-based Fulbright appealed to Yugoslavs and exposed them to the value that Americans placed on meritocracy. The program was successfully run for almost thirty years and created a vibrant exchange of students and academics between the United States and Serbia.73 Ambassador Pamela Smith, who served as a cultural affairs officer in Belgrade from 1982 to 1986, noted that there was a great deal of scientific cooperation and an active exchange of scientists between the United States and Yugoslavia.74 Other academic, professional, and cultural exchanges were popular as well. One of the important elements of these exchanges was that when Yugoslavs traveled to the United States, they had the opportunity to set up meetings with people and to travel freely throughout the country.75 This was particularly powerful because it taught Yugoslav participants about the openness of the American system. Unfortunately, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Fulbright commission was dismantled and exchanges were halted.76

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In 2002, the Fulbright program in Serbia was reinstated; however, over the last ten years, Fulbright budgets throughout Europe have basically f lat-lined.77 In 2008, the United States sent three American Fulbright scholars to Serbia and received five Serbian scholars. In the following year, seven scholars participated in Fulbright exchanges. Similar numbers are projected for 2010.78 Both student and professional exchanges remain particularly relevant instruments of public diplomacy in Serbia. The State Department sends Serbian journalists, business people, politicians, scientists, and other professionals to the United States through a variety of different programs.79 Embassy Belgrade’s website recently featured two upcoming study tours in the United States: one is for Serbian women’s health professionals and the other is for professionals interested in establishing internships in Serbia.80 Youth exchanges and study abroad programs are also popular among Serbian students.81 One State Department official emphasized that high school exchange programs are particularly important for shaping U.S. relations with Serbia as these students become leaders in the next fifteen years.82 Speaking about youth exchanges, the official said, “I don’t want to say they are magical, but that is how I feel about them.”83 He went on to articulate that while studying abroad Serbian students have amazing opportunities to interact with Americans and that they often return to Serbia with a greater understanding and appreciation for America as well as a commitment to the betterment of their own country. Upon their return to Serbia, public diplomacy officers help students keep in touch with each other and create opportunities for them to build their professional networks by introducing them to older exchange program alumni.84 After experiencing exchanges in the United States, Serbian youth and professionals generally return to Serbia with a more realistic view and deeper understanding of the United States.85 Thus, while exchanges cannot directly reach a broad audience, they tend to have the greatest potential for profoundly altering individuals’ perceptions of the United States. Moreover, if the students or professionals who experienced exchanges become leaders in Serbia, they may hold more favorable opinions toward the United States and consequently foster more positive U.S.-Serbian relations. All of the types of programs discussed in this section have an important role in U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia. Given the analysis outlined in this essay, the tools that will likely be most important in the future of U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia are face-to-face discussion, television, forms of new media, and exchanges.

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Assessment and Implications for the Future of Public Diplomacy The disagreements over U.S. policy during the NATO bombing of Serbia and with regard to Kosovo will likely continue to affect U.S.Serbian relations. Public diplomacy efforts cannot serve as a substitute for policies that engender harmonious relations; however, effective public diplomacy can play an important role in improving U.S.-Serbian relations. In light of the analysis of how U.S. public diplomacy has been practiced in Serbia historically and how it is currently being practiced, this section provides recommendations for the future of U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia. The Serbian public opinion polls indicate the most prominent reason for Serbian negative opinion toward the United States is the NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999.86 While public diplomacy programming targeted directly at this issue is important, it will be very difficult to change these perceptions. Thus, public diplomacy should also focus on building positive perceptions and relationships in other areas. Polling data also show that the perception that the United States helps Serbia was the strongest driver of positive opinion toward the United States.87 Thus, U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Serbia should focus on identifying ways to draw attention to the many ways that the United States is aiding Serbia. The United States can improve the perception that it helps Serbia by continuing to support Serbia’s efforts to join the EU. A majority of the Serbian public supports accession into the EU, and the Serbian government has highlighted accession to the EU as one of its primary objectives. When asked about what could be done to improve U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia, several of the public diplomacy officers interviewed for this study highlighted the importance of U.S. support for Serbia’s effort to join the EU.88 The United States has a vested interest in this goal because, as a member of the EU, Serbia will have a higher likelihood of becoming a stable state that promotes stability in the wider region. In accordance with this goal, U.S. public diplomacy programs should focus on helping Serbia eliminate the final barriers to join the EU. Given this focus, Serbian politicians and professionals are an extremely important target audience for public diplomacy. Study tours and exchanges of professionals are particularly helpful instruments of public diplomacy because they provide Serbian professionals with valuable knowledge and training. Ultimately, this will help ease their transition to making EU-required legal, economic, political, and social reforms.

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Public diplomacy professionals should also continue to reach out to the youth using exchanges and new media. In the coming decades, the leadership of today’s youth will be required to ensure that Serbia remains committed to responsible membership in the EU despite potential setbacks. Furthermore, public diplomacy officers should take opportunities to reach out to the general public as well as to those who are skeptical of the United States. Conclusion This chapter provides an analysis of how U.S. public diplomacy toward Serbia has changed over time and identifies some ways to improve U.S. public diplomacy toward Serbia. Since the Cold War, public diplomacy in Serbia has shifted from trying to undermine communist ideology by exposing Serbs to American culture and the ideals of democracy to more targeted programming designed to overcome tensions that resulted from policy differences over the NATO bombings and Kosovo’s independence. The future of U.S. public diplomacy in Serbia should focus on identifying fields of mutual interest where the United States can support Serbia. Notes 1. “Strongest Anti-American Sentiment in Serbia, Pakistan,” B92, July 7, 2009 (accessed December 15, 2009); available at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php? yyyy=2009&mm=07&dd= 07&nav_id =60329. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. William A. Rugh. American Encounters with Arabs; The Soft Power of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 4. 5. Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 6. Ibid. 7. John Shirley (USIA assistant cultural attaché in Belgrade, 1959–1960; deputy director for Soviet and East European Affairs, 1972–1973; director for Soviet and East European Affairs, 1973–1975), telephone interview, November 2, 2009. 8. Myron Hoffmann (USIA information officer in Belgrade, 1976–1980; public affairs officer, 1992–1994), telephone interview, October 23, 2009. 9. Retired USIA officer (USIA officer in Belgrade, 1988–1991), telephone interview, October 26, 2009. 10. Ibid. 11. U.S. Department of State, Press Conference Following The Initialing Of The Balkan Proximity Peace Talks Agreement, November 20, 1995 (accessed December 2009); available at http:// www.state.gov /www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosconf.html.

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12. Steve York, Bringing Down a Dictator. DVD, directed by Steve York (Washington, D.C.: York Zimmerman Inc., 2002). 13. State Department official, telephone interview by author, November 15, 2009. 14. Dan Bilefsky, “Kosovo Declares Its Independence From Serbia,” New York Times, February 18, 2008 (accessed November 10, 2009); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/ world/europe /18kosovo.html. 15. “US Embassy in Belgrade Attacked,” BBC News, Europe, February 22, 2008 (accessed November 10, 2009); available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7256158.stm. 16. U.S. Department of State, State Department Spokesman Briefs on U.S. Embassy Belgrade, All American Staff Safe and Accounted for, McCormack Tells Reporters. Transcript, Washington, D.C., February 21, 2008 (accessed November 10, 2009); available at http://www.america. gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/February/20080221194905bpuh0.3222315.html. 17. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Serbia,” June 2009 (accessed November 10, 2009); available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm. 18. Medium Gallup TNS, Omnibus Survey, May 2006 (accessed October 20, 2009); available at website for United States Agency for International Development Mission in Serbia. 19. Strategic Marketing Serbia, U.S. Assistance Polling Data, 2009 (accessed October 20, 2009); available at website for United States Agency for International Development Mission in Serbia. 20. Strategic Marketing Serbia 21. State Department official, telephone interview, November 15, 2009. 22. Strategic Marketing Serbia. 23. Ibid. 24. State Department official, telephone interview by author, November 15, 2009. 25. Strategic Marketing Serbia. 26. Medium Gallup TNS. 27. Ibid. 28. Center for Free Elections and Democracy, “Identities of Serbia’s Citizens with the Context of European Integrations,” September 2009 (accessed November 15, 2009); available at http://www.cesid.org/. 29. Center for Free Elections and Democracy. 30. European Commission Enlargement, “News about ‘Stabilization and Association Agreement’ ” (accessed November 15, 2009); available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ press_corner/whatsnew/ stabilisation-and-association-agreement_en.htm. 31. “Majority of Serbs Back EU Bid, but Enthusiasm Loses Steam: Poll,” EUbusiness, January 22, 2009 (accessed November 15, 2009); available at http://www.eubusiness.com/newseu/1232649121.53. 32. Pamela Smith (USIA cultural affairs in Belgrade, 1982–1986), telephone interview, November 2, 2009. 33. Shirley, interview. 34. Ibid. 35. Retired USIA officer, interview, October 26, 2009. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Hoffmann, interview. 39. State Department official, interview, November 15, 2009. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Embassy Belgrade. Embassy of the United States: Serbia (accessed December 9, 2009); available at http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/. 44. Shirley, interview. 45. Retired USIA officer, interview, October 26, 2009.

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46. State Department official, interview, November 15, 2009. 47. Shirley, interview. 48. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (accessed January 9, 2010); available at http://www. rferl.org/section/South+Slavic+Language+Services/168.html. 49. Nora Boustany, “Where Rulers Try to Pull the Plug on Democracy, VOA Makes Waves,” Washington Post, December 20, 1996, A46. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. The Institute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade, conducted a nationwide survey of 1,104 face-to-face interviews for the Intermedia Survey Institute (ISI). ISI used a short questionnaire designed for a crisis situation that would allow quick turnaround and would measure the audience for radio and television. The questionnaire was distributed on October 3, 2000, with results presented three days later. See Edward Kaufman, “A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002. 53. Ibid., 115–127. 54. Former USIA official (USIA officer in Belgrade in the 1960s and the 1980s), telephone interview, November 6, 2009. 55. Ibid. 56. Smith, interview. 57. Ibid. 58. State Department official, interview, November 15, 2009. 59. Embassy Belgrade. Embassy of the United States: Serbia (accessed December 9, 2009); available at http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/. 60. The Facebook, US Embassy Belgrade (accessed October 1, 2009); available at http://www. facebook.com/search/?q=Embassy+Belgrade&init=quick#/usdos.serbia?ref=search&sid= 32500031.1455121620.1. 61. YouTube: Broadcast Yourself, Cameron Munter Part 1, February 2009 (accessed October 10, 2009); available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOStIJlKLYg. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Embassy Belgrade. Embassy of the United States: Serbia (accessed December 9, 2009); available at http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/. 65. Shirley, interview. 66. Ibid. 67. Sol Schindler. (USIA deputy cultural attaché in Belgrade, 1963–1966), e-mail communication, October 31, 2009. 68. Embassy Belgrade. Embassy of the United States: Serbia (accessed December 9, 2009); available at http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/. 69. Shirley, interview. 70. Hoffmann, interview. 71. State Department Office of Academic Exchange Programs, e-mail communication with the author, March 18, 2010. 72. Smith, interview 73. State Department Office of Academic Exchange Programs, e-mail communication with the author, March 18, 2010. 74. Smith, interview. 75. Ibid. 76. Hoffmann, interview. 77. YouTube: Broadcast Yourself. 78. Ibid. 79. State Department official, interview, November 15, 2009.

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80. Embassy Belgrade. Embassy of the United States: Serbia (accessed December 9, 2009); available at http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/. 81. More Serbian students are now choosing to study abroad in Europe because the Serbian higher education system has made it easier for students studying in Europe to get their credits earned in Europe validated in Serbia. It is still difficult for students studying in the United States to get credits earned in there validated in Serbia. 82. State Department official, telephone interview by author, November 15, 2009. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Smith, interview. 86. Strategic Marketing Serbia. 87. Ibid. 88. Hoffmann, interview

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CH A P T E R

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Revitalizing Relations with Turkey N i cole E . Fari na

Although the United States’ commercial and political dealings with the Ottoman Empire began in the nineteenth century, bilateral interactions with Turkey were limited until after World War II1 when it began to establish alliance relations with what had by then become the Republic of Turkey. Traditionally, the United States had taken a somewhat isolationist approach in its foreign policy, while Turkey remained neutral in international politics. But at the culmination of World War II, as the geopolitical arena became characterized by the polarizing forces of the Cold War, the foreign policy of each country underwent significant transformations, which led to the development of an alliance between Turkey and the United States. The primary foreign policy concern of the United States was to confront communist ideology and contain the Soviet Union, whereas Turkey’s foreign policy was motivated by westernization and state survival. Much of what cultivated this alliance was a direct function of several years of turbulent Russo-Turkish relations coupled with the American quest to make capitalism and democracy the dominant ideology.2 Throughout the early years of the Cold War, maintaining close relations with the United States was a priority for Turkey. Though many Turks viewed this relationship as a “necessary evil,”3 the policy was backed by public opinion. But a major turning point came in 1964, when turmoil erupted in Cyprus between Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. The United States appeared to take a neutral stance in this

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situation, undermining the Turkish public’s confidence in it as the sole guarantor of Turkey’s security. Washington sent a strongly worded correspondence to Ankara, warning against potential repercussions of Turkish military intervention on the island. This and subsequent U.S. military policy toward Turkey and the ongoing Cyprus conf lict further aggravated U.S.-Turkish relations through the 1970s, and throughout this period, anti-American sentiment abounded. Throughout the 1980s, Turkish-American relations were defined almost entirely by defense and economic cooperation, which, by the mid-1990s when the Cold War was over, had diversified and evolved into a “strategic partnership.”4 When the Cold War ended, Turkish leaders decisively opted to remain a part of the Western persuasion and chose to align themselves with Washington’s vision of global politics. Because Turkey feared that it was no longer a vital ally now that the Soviet threat had been thwarted, it sought to preserve a strategic partnership with the United States by offering full support during the 1991 Iraq crisis and beyond. Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, Ankara pledged its support to the United States in its campaign against new threats.5 However, when the Bush administration launched a military offensive in Iraq in 2003, both the public and the government of Turkey believed that the invasion and subsequent policies were harmful to their national interests, particularly vis-à-vis internal problems with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Iraq question has led to new political tensions and hostile Turkish public opinion. President Barack Obama and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have continually reaffirmed their mutual status as economic, military, and political allies. But U.S. foreign policy remains widely unpopular among the Turkish public, with anti-American sentiment reaching an all-time low in 2005. Furthermore, the new foreign policy vision of Turkey’s ruling Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (“Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” or “AKP”), which is marked by greater cooperation with Iran and Syria, an affinity toward the Sudan, and harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric, has led many to question Turkey’s longterm orientation.6 The Turkish-American relationship may once again be at a crossroads with an uncertain future. Washington officials regard Turkey as one of the United States’ most fundamental and strategic partners and an important intermediary through which it seeks to reach out to the Middle East and to the Islamic world. As it has recently taken on the role of a mediator between Israel and Syria, it is Washington’s hope that Turkey will play an important part in bringing about a Middle East peace settlement.7

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Moreover, the United States and Turkey have a wide variety of shared security, military, and economic interests that present ample opportunity for bilateral cooperation. Both nations are committed to tackling global terrorism. As Flanagan and Brannen observe, both wish to see a conf lict-free Caucasus, sovereignty in Central Asia, secure energy f lows from the Caspian Basin, and productive relations with Europe.8 Yet the remaining hostility of Turkish public opinion is an obstacle to capitalizing on these shared interests. Therefore, a concerted American public diplomacy effort is called for. Turkish Public Opinion of the United States Turkish public opinion of the United States is among the lowest in the world.9 American public diplomacy officials face a series of problem issues in trying to deal with this situation. Primarily, these are: 1. Iraq: the U.S. decision to invade in 2003 and support of Kurdish interests. 2. The U.S. position on the Armenian genocide claim. 3. Perceived American arrogance and hegemonic ambitions. 4. Turkey’s fundamental distrust of foreign actors. 5. Feelings of betrayal on Cyprus and other issues.10 Interviews conducted for this essay with a number of current and previous U.S. public diplomacy officials, Turkish students, and Turkish professionals indicated that the first two items are the most damaging to America’s image, but all are significant and ref lected in relevant literature. The most difficult issue for American public diplomacy has been U.S. policy in Iraq. In the months leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, 90 percent of the Turkish people asked their opinion of the reported American plan to invade, said they were opposed. One study found that a majority of Turks did not believe that the United States was being sincere in its stated motives, and about 72 percent of the public believed that a U.S. offensive would undercut the UN. Furthermore, the Turkish public viewed the invasion as a violation of international law, which would weaken international organizations and threaten world peace.11 In addition, many Turks believed U.S. Iraq policy would exacerbate Turkey’s relations with its Kurdish population: 60 percent of the public believed that an American intervention would result in the American

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backing of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq that was outside of the country’s central authority.12 The second biggest problem for American public diplomacy in Turkey is the U.S. official position on the Armenian genocide claim.13 The claim maintains that between 1915 and 1923, 1.5 million Armenians died at the hands of the Ottomans when they were systematically marched into the Syrian Desert and elsewhere to be massacred,14 while others died of disease and famine in concentration camps.15 The Turkish official position fiercely rejects the genocide accusation. Turkey argues that the Ottoman government’s decision to removed Armenians from the Eastern border with Russia was a valid security measure and denies that the deaths were the result of civil strife. This controversy is an emotionally charged issue for Turks, and many have expressed their need to know where the current U.S. administration stands on the matter. When Barack Obama first became president, Armenian-American interest groups pressed him to label these events as genocide, as he had done as a U.S. senator. Since taking office, he has indicated that his position has not changed but has not explicitly used the trigger word, stating that he does not need or intend to do so. The Armenian Genocide Resolution, a measure that has been repeatedly introduced in the U.S. Congress, calls upon the president “to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States ref lects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide.”16 The resolution has angered and upset the Turkish public as inaccurate and an inappropriate “legislation of history.” Use of the term “genocide” in the Armenian context by President Obama or in the form of Congressional legislation would be enough to inf late negative public opinion and cause serious damage to already strained political relations. The third most difficult issue for American public diplomacy is the Turkish perception of American arrogance and hegemonic intentions. Turkish nationals responding to questions on U.S. foreign policy and American people used some variation of the word “arrogance,” although they usually expressed respect for American culture and the strategic alliance. For example, one Turkish ex-patriot remarked: People more and more don’t like America because America sticks its nose into our domestic problems. For example, we don’t want to mix politics and religion. They (American leaders) want to

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make us identify as a soft Islamic country. A lot of people know that America promoted Turkey as a good, soft Muslim country. But Turkish people don’t want to hear that from other countries. In Turkey they don’t want to see religion and politics together. They don’t run their government with the church—why should we let our government do that?17 According to one study, 74.4 percent of Turks believed that America’s true motivation for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was to acquire control over oil resources, and retain American political and economic prowess worldwide. Similarly, even though Turkey had cooperated (in some ways) with the United States in 2003, two-thirds of Turks believed that the United States would launch a military operation despite Turkish opposition. Nearly 70 percent of Turks saw America as previous global hegemonic powers who arrogantly invaded smaller countries. The United States promised financial aid to Turkey to mobilize support for the war but that backfired. As Uslu et al. point out, “this exchange was seen as an insult to Turkey’s national honor, as if it were a puppet or mercenary of the world’s superpower.”18 Fourth, American public diplomacy officials recognize that much of Turkey’s negative attitude toward the United States can be attributed to Turkey’s inherent distrust of foreign actors. Since the mid-nineteenth century, foreign powers have repeatedly sought to claim portions of Turkey as their own, whether by conspiring against Turkey as in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which would have left the Turks enveloped in a small piece of Central Anatolia,19 or by imposing an existential threat, as did the Soviets during the Cold War. One Turkish-American citizen expressed her mistrust this way: “It’s a very big danger for Turkey to have America support the current government. When they support this current government, there is a cause, a motive.20 A recent poll asked Turkish respondents which nation they believed was their country’s best friend. One-third of participants responded “None,” while another third replied that they did not know or could not answer. The “winner” was Azerbaijan, with only 5 percent.21 These data remind public diplomacy officials of the unique challenge presented by the Turkish case. The fifth problem area is a Turkish feeling of betrayal stemming from specific past American actions such as the U.S. policy on Cyprus, and the United States’ failure to provide accurate and truthful intelligence on Iraqi WMDs.22

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In 1964, when Greek forces annexed the island of Cyprus, reports that the Turkish minority was brutally attacked by Greek Cypriots23 led Turkey to prepare to intervene; but President Lyndon Johnson advised Turkish prime minister Inönü not to do so. The Johnson Letter warned that the United States might not come to Turkey’s defense if the USSR invaded.24 The Turks believed Johnson’s position to violate the parameters of the NATO contract,25 fueling popular resentment that is still remembered today. When Turkish forces eventually invaded Cyprus in 1974, Washington responded by placing an arms embargo on Turkey.26 Though the embargo was repealed in 1978, its effects were felt throughout the next decade among the Turkish populace and in bilateral political relations. Many Turks blame the violence in Cyprus on the Johnson Letter, convinced that a Turkish intervention a decade earlier would have contained the conf lict and prevented many lives from being lost. This denial of the NATO relationship has never been forgotten.27 Public opinion of the United States plummeted during this era and has remained poor ever since. Despite these numerous causes of Turkish criticism of the United States, there are indications that the situation is improving. Both the Pew Research Center and Infakto have concluded that Turkish confidence in the U.S. president is currently ref lected by at least one-third of the population, up significantly from the 2005 estimate of 8–9 percent.28 Though difficult to quantify, there is ample evidence to support the notion that public diplomacy programming has played a role in improving these attitudes. U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts in Turkey When formulating a public diplomacy program, the Public Affairs Officer first considers the makeup of the Turkish target audience, the members of society that are most inf luential on issues of public concern. According to a senior public diplomacy officer at the embassy in Ankara, Turkey’s target audience includes: journalists, other media professionals, academics, corporate leaders, students (university and youth), and NGO leaders.29 The U.S. Embassy in Ankara utilizes the full repertoire of State Department informational and cultural instruments to carry out its programs.30 Instruments used by public diplomacy staff in Turkey have varied over time but some of the most successful tools today are dealt with in the following sections.

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Online Outreach and Social Networking American public diplomacy officers now use several electronic sources to provide current information about the United States to target audiences. For example, on the website www.America.gov, interested Turks may read about American culture, global challenges, politics, economy, society, and law, as they pertain to the United States.31 This website can be accessed directly or by a link on the U.S. Embassy webpage, which is a source of up-to-the-minute information on policy issues, events, and educational and cultural opportunities. These two websites are managed from the State Department in Washington, and the content is available to anybody in Turkey with Internet access, which is most of the target audience. The same content is available on the popular social networking site Facebook. Through this site, Turks can find up-to-the-minute information on embassy events, news stories, Congressional reports, official statements, and other topics of public interest.32 Facebook is useful to PD officials because of its reach and because it provides users with access to a series of interactive programs with U.S. officials, such as live web chats.33 Similarly, the page offers a virtual forum for open discussion between FSOs and Turkish “fans.” Anyone in the Facebook community can share comments or questions on any given post. Feedback is encouraged and the embassy responds whenever possible. Because social networking sites have witnessed rapid growth in Turkey over the past year, Facebook provides the embassy’s Public Affairs Officer (PAO) with a convenient place to disseminate information and to begin two-way discussions. Though virtual dialogue is not a viable substitute for face-to-face interaction, which is the cornerstone of any successful public diplomacy program, this forum is an effective complement because it offers discourse otherwise unavailable due to logistical or security constraints. The embassy, however, only has one staffer responsible for all electronic outreach, so opportunities in this sphere are missed.34 American Speakers The PD section of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara often sponsors seminars given by experts who can speak with authority on issues pertaining to American politics, education, and so on. For example, Dr. Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently delivered a presentation at the American Corner at the Izmir University of Economics, in

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which he addressed foreign policy during the first year of the Obama administration.35 Dr. Mead also participated in digital video conferences (DVCs) with Turkish officials, academics, and media representatives, which facilitated dialogue with members of the Turkish target audience. The digital video method was employed on January 20, 2009, when guests were invited to join Ambassador James Jeffrey at his residence to witness the historic inauguration of President Obama.36 Ambassador Jeffrey regularly addresses the Turkish press and like all ambassadors, maintains a very public presence in his host country. Public diplomacy officers know that American speakers, who do not speak on behalf of the government or whose views may challenge U.S. policy, can be effective agents of public diplomacy in that they are often accorded a greater sense of legitimacy by their Turkish audiences and demonstrate the American values of pluralism and free expression. Previously, PD officials in Turkey used American Centers and American libraries, which housed a variety of electronic and print informational sources, including American books and periodicals, and were open to the public. However, in recent years Washington has cut back on these centers due to security needs and budgetary constraints. A retired FSO with experience in Turkey reported that with security measures imposed in the years that followed September 11, 2001, it is “almost impossible for a journalist or a professor to drop in and see an officer at the Embassy; it’s easier for the officer to go out and find the contact, but even that is rarely done. Things are handled in a handsoff, impersonal way.”37 Eliminating American Centers and libraries has undermined the most essential component of public diplomacy— Murrow’s “last three feet” doctrine of the importance of face-to-face contact. Public Statements Public diplomacy officers know that public statements by a U.S. official, particularly one of high stature, can be a powerful tool. For example, in October 2009, on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, President Obama issued a congratulatory statement to President Gül. He said: More than fifty years ago, the United States and Turkey began a partnership that is based on shared values, a common vision, and mutual respect. Through this partnership we have worked to resolve conf licts that span the globe. It is my firm belief that

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Turkey and the United States should continue to deepen this partnership to promote peace and prosperity around the world.38 This statement emphasized American and Turkish common values and reaffirmed the American desire to improve its strained relationship with Turkey through strategic collaboration, and it served a public diplomacy function. Turkey’s public scrutinizes the actions of American leadership closely, so this communication had a very positive impact. Official Visits According to a Turkish official, “high level visits are the best public diplomacy” for Turks.39 In March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Turkey, where she spoke publicly on issues of concern in U.S.-Turkey relations in addition to conducting traditional diplomacy behind closed doors. Her visit became a special success when she strayed from her practice of traditional diplomacy by appearing on a popular Turkish talk show. As a high-ranking traditional diplomat taking on a public diplomacy role, Clinton effectively conveyed to her Turkish audience that the United States values open communication. Similarly, President Obama’s visit to Turkey in April 2009 as part of his first trip overseas since taking office had a perceptible impact on public opinion of the United States and boosted Turkish hopes for a positive bilateral relationship. An ostensibly routine activity, it proved to be a very meaningful gesture for his audience and served a public diplomacy purpose. He conducted a town hall meeting, an uncommon format in Turkey. It was an effective PD decision in that it demonstrated to the Turkish public that the United States cares about what they have to say, and because it provided them with a glimpse of the American democratic process. After the visit, Turks proudly reminded Americans with whom they were in contact that Barack Obama had visited their country on his first overseas trip as president. They expressed approval, indicating a possible new positive Turkish attitude about America. Moreover, for public diplomacy purposes, the visit was an excellent conversation starter for American officials at the embassy on both U.S.-Turkey relations and on America in general. The seemingly quotidian undertaking of a presidential visit proved to be the impetus for many cross-cultural dialogues that have since taken place.40 The seeds of conversation have now been planted.

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Because public diplomacy officials are aware that the best way to increase mutual understanding between Americans and Turks is to enable them to experience each other’s cultures first-hand, they arrange a variety of educational and cultural exchange programs. Many such programs are intended to establish long-term relationships between current and future leaders of each nation.41 Fulbright Exchanges The Fulbright Program is by far the most famous one in Turkey. It provides participants with the opportunity to study, teach and conduct research, exchange ideas and contribute to “finding solutions to shared international concerns.”42 Turkey is relatively well represented within the global Fulbright Program. Each year, it sends 200–300 Turks to the United States, the majority of who are graduate students. Nevertheless, one knowledgeable source regards this as a modest level given the challenge the public diplomacy program faces in developing a better understanding of America.43 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Fulbright Program is very effective in enhancing mutual understanding between Turks and Americans, and focus groups conducted by the State Department substantiate this notion. According to one Ankara-based source, the program is very effective at improving perceptions and attitudes among participants, as well as at measuring attitudes of exchange alumni against the attitudes of those who have never been to the United States.44 Youth Exchanges The U.S. government funds a number of youth exchange programs aimed at sending Turkish high school students to the United States to study for an academic year. Programs such as YES (Youth Exchange and Study Programs) collaborate with partner associations such as the American Field Service to send about fifty Turkish students annually to the United States. Students are often placed in homestays with host families who have children of similar ages. The students are given the opportunity to experience unique aspects of American culture, education, and institutions, in addition to developing English language skills and forging new relationships. The public diplomacy staff at the American Embassy in Ankara regards young people as a priority.45 Providing adolescents with such

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opportunities during their formative years will likely result in a more favorable attitude toward the United States in the long run. Critical Language Scholarship Program, Turkey Through the National Security Language Initiative, the US government sends Americans to Turkey on scholarships to increase the number of Americans learning and mastering critical languages such as Turkish.46 A scholar undergoing the Critical Language Scholarship Program (CLS) has the opportunity to study in a Turkish university and to actively engage in a variety of cultural activities with local Turkish students and professionals, a program that is effective in supporting exchange purposes. It offers classroom instruction, as well as a variety of useful cultural activities, such as seminars on topics like Turkish history and politics, including discussions with Turkish students. Exchange programs, including Fulbright, CLS and others, are all two-way streets, providing opportunities for the American participants to convey a great deal of information about the United States, as well as to show respect for Turkish culture, thus serving public diplomacy objectives. The one fundamental problem with these programs is that they are generally only accessible to the elite, the usual target audience in Turkey, because nonelites can inf luence bilateral relations. A relatively new effort that has been effective in reaching nonelites is a “micro scholarship” program, employing Fulbright alumni to provide English language classes to youth who would otherwise be unable to afford them. While the urban elite of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir already send their children to the United States for high school or college, the embassy is reaching beyond these three cities to achieve more balance, because the rest of Anatolia is underrepresented. The main challenge in this effort is the candidates’ lack of English skills.47 By catering to nonelites throughout Anatolia, they hope to diversify the target audience. Popular Culture and the Arts Appealing to Turkey’s affinity for American popular culture has led to many public diplomacy successes. In the past, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara has sponsored visits from renowned musicians, artists, and cultural icons. As one FSO recalls of his tenure in Turkey during the 1960s–1970s, “The cultural presence of the United State was important

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to maintain, and that sort of was a cushion on which we were able to depend in really tough political times.”48 Recently, American artist Leroy Campbell and the Sharon Clark Quintet joined Turkish jazz singer Melis Sokmen in celebrating Black History Month in cultural centers throughout Turkey. Along with other American and Turkish musicians, they conducted workshops for university students, performed in Istanbul, and visited villages. They paid tribute to American female jazz vocalists.49 Recommendations The following recommendations are offered to improve public diplomacy in Turkey. First, shelve the Armenian genocide resolution. Based upon public opinion data, passing a Congressional resolution would stir up political tensions and worsen public opinion about America. The United States should join the international community in supporting the bilateral Turkish-Armenian talks. Although President Obama has done this, if Congress were to succumb to pressure from powerful ethnic lobbies in the United States, U.S.-Turkey relations would suffer an irreversible blow.50 Second, the United States should reopen American centers and libraries. An experienced PD professional argues that by closing down these operations, the United States has abandoned its responsibility to speak for itself.51 It has eliminated the most fundamental component to public diplomacy, namely, face-to-face interaction. As long as there is a demonstrated interest on the part of the Turkish public to take advantage of the many electronic, print, and human resources found in American Centers and libraries, the United States ought to offer them a venue in which they can meet their needs and interact with embassy staff. Third, improve American Corners or close them. The American Corners in some instances are so under-equipped that they ref lect poorly on the United States. The American Corner in Izmir, for example, is inadequate in that it offers the Turkish public little more than a few outdated CDs, DVDs, and books printed in English. Moreover, it is housed inside the library of a private university on the outskirts of the city, making it easily accessible to only a select few. In addition, though it is well-advertised on the embassy website, it is so nondescript that one might be so inclined as to walk past it on a daily basis and remain unaware of its existence.52

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Fourth, facilitate travel and tourism. Tourism is a powerful and cost-effective way to increase mutual understanding between Turks and Americans. Applicants for visitor visas are required to demonstrate “strong familial ties” to their home countries lest they intend to remain in the United States beyond the allowed time frame. Many Turks express frustration over what they perceive to be arbitrary denials of their visa applications. More than one respondent interviewed for this essay reported having an application abruptly rejected, only to resubmit the exact same application and supporting documentation at a later date and receive approval from a different officer. Similarly, stories abound among Turks of curmudgeonly consular officers chiding their applicants for making errors on the confusing paperwork.53 Of course, the job of determining who should have access to the United States is a difficult one that has serious security implications. But as consular officials are the face of America abroad, the manner in which they interact with the Turkish public speaks volumes about America and about Americans in general. This face-to-face contact has significant public diplomacy value if it is handled well. Fifth, the United States should demonstrate publicly that Turkey is a priority. Although Turkey is an important strategic ally, Turkish public opinion of the United States is among the lowest in the world. Strengthening this relationship in public ways should be a top priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and this means increasing appropriations for Turkish public diplomacy programs. The vital PD tool of face-to-face interaction is underutilized and could be enhanced with more funding from Congress. The United Sates must provide public diplomacy FSOs with the resources needed to perform their jobs. In the polarized world of 1946, the magnetism between Turkey and the United States was primarily founded on a mutual aversion to the Soviet agenda. But the geopolitical climate of today is fundamentally distinct from the bipolar model of the Cold War era that gave rise to this alliance. In an integrated international structure, there are infinite variables that may reveal a certain fragility to any bilateral relationship. Though still self-described allies, Turkey and the United States have experienced a variety of tensions over the past few years, and the strength of this bond continues to be tested through evolving trends in global politics. The ideology that once propelled the two powers together has been challenged by the Turkish public’s negative perception of American foreign policies, particularly as they pertain to regional issues, international institutions, and multilateral cooperation.

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Public diplomacy alone cannot change that, but it can help mitigate the negative effects. The depth and breadth of their shared interests suggest that the United States and Turkey are likely to remain political allies for the foreseeable future. But the tense bilateral climate marked by poor public opinion and misaligned foreign policies underscores the need to renew and revitalize this relationship, a critical undertaking that will not take place at the state level alone. Public diplomacy can play a pivotal role in redefining the United States’ long-time friendship with Turkey. The FSOs who serve in Turkey can provide a deeper understanding and appreciation for U.S. policy, culture, and institutions, and positively inf luence the future of Turkish-American relations. Notes 1. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish-American Political Relations,” Edward Ginn Library, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa (accessed November 20, 2009). 2. Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 1. 3. Ambassador Kenton Keith, retired Senior FSO with official experience in Istanbul, telephone interview, December 1, 2009. 4. Mustafa Adyın, “Restructuring Turkish-American Relations,” University of Economics and Technology, Ankara. http://www.tusiad.us/content/uploaded/Mustafa%20Aydin%20 Speech%2008.pdf (accessed November 30, 2009). 5. Nasuh Uslu, “Turkish Public Opinion in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, Article 5 (GLORIA Center, Herzdiva), September 2005. 6. Soner Cağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?” Foreign Affairs (published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.), October 26, 2009. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65634/ soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west (accessed December 5, 2009). 7. William Cohen, former defense secretary, CNN.com, “Obama Says US, Turkey Can Be Model for World.” April 6, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama. turkey/index.html (accessed December 1, 2009). 8. Stephen J. Flanagan and Samuel J. Brannen, “Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations,” Turkey’s Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for US-Turkey Relations (2009), Center for Strategic and International Studies. 9. From the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Opinion of the United States. Favorable combines “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” responses. Unfavorable combines “very unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable.” http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1 (accessed November 9, 2009). 10. This list and the following analysis was compiled through a series of conversations with PD officials, informal conversations with Turkish students, professionals, and public officials, and through my interpretation of the relevant literature on this topic, all of which are referenced in relevant footnotes. 11. Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis, and Ertyan Aydin, “Turkish Public Opinion in the Context of the Iraq Question,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3, Article 5 (GLORIA Center, Herzdiva), 2005.

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12. Ibid. 13. Official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal interview, November 20, 2009. 14. Author unknown, BBC News. “Q&A: Armenian Genocide Dispute,” July 10, 2009. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6045182.stm (accessed December 6, 2009). 15. Armenian National Institute Website. http://www.armenian-genocide.org/genocidefaq. html#How_many (accessed November 27, 2009). 16. “U.S. Representatives Introduce Bipartisan Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.Res 252,” The Armenian Weekly, March 17, 2009. http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/03/17/usrepresentatives-introduce-bipartisan-armenian-genocide-resolution/ (accessed November 23, 2009). 17. Turkish ex-patriot living in the United States, telephone interview, November 14, 2009. It should be noted that her expressions echo the general sentiment of many secular elites, though they do not necessarily ref lect the views of the broader Turkish public. 18. Uslu et al., “Turkish Public Opinion in the Context of the Iraq Question.” 19. After the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the allies signed the Treaty of Sevres, which partitioned the land of the Ottoman Empire among Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Armenia, and other actors. However, it had come to light that France, Italy, and Great Britain had secretly begun partitioning the territory as early as 1915. Turkish revolutionaries forced the Allies to renegotiate the unfavorable terms of the pact, and the Treaty of Sevres was later supplanted by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. But the Treaty of Sevres exacerbated xenophobic causation. A retired FSO with USIA, with extensive official and private experience in Turkey (interviewed telephonically on November 11, 2009) maintains that though the United States was not directly involved in this negotiation, the Treaty of Sevres exacerbated xenophobic concerns and contributed to Turkey’s fear of Western and other powers taking its land. 20. Turkish-American dual citizen, interview, November 7, 2009. 21. Emre Erdoğan and Güçlü Atılgan, “Horizons of Turkey: Opinions of Turkish voters About the US, Americans, and Barack Obama: The Best Friend of Turkey” (Infakto Research Workshop, 2009). 22. These are not necessarily the only examples of Turkey feeling betrayed in its bilateral dealings with the United States; however, these references were the ones that came up most frequently in the literature and in my interviews. 23. Author unspecified. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, “Cyprus History Between 1964–1974.” http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/history/6474.html (accessed November 28, 2009). 24. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish-American Political Relations,” Edward Ginn Library, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa (accessed November 20, 2009). 25. Article 5 of the Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 26. U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies, “Cyprus: The Greek Coup and the Turkish Invasion.” http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+cy0025%29 (accessed December 6, 2009). 27. Retired FSO with USIA, with extensive official and private experience in Turkey, telephone interview, November 11, 2009. 28. Infakto Horizons of Turkey, Confidence in Political Leaders (2000 & 2005); Pew Research Center, Confidence in the U.S. president (all years measured). 29. Senior public diplomacy official, U.S. Embassy in Turkey, telephone interview, November 23, 2009. 30. Source at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, telephone interview, November 23, 2009. 31. http://www.america.gov/ (accessed November 24, 2009). 32. U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Turkey Facebook page (possibly restricted to Facebook users). http://www.facebook.com/#/usdos.turkey?ref=ts (accessed November 2009).

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33. Ibid. 34. Source at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, telephone interview, November 23, 2009. 35. United States Virtual Presence Post, Izmir, Turkey. http://izmir.usvpp.gov/american_corner_izmir.html (accessed November 9, 2009). 36. U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Turkey, website, Events 2009 link. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/ dvc_mead2.html (accessed December 7, 2009). 37. Retired FSO, a public diplomacy specialist with USIA, with extensive official and personal experience in Turkey, telephone interview, November 11, 2009. 38. US Department of State, Consulate General of the United States, Istanbul, Turkey site. Press release, October 29, 2009. http://istanbul.usconsulate.gov/sp_obama_republicday. html (accessed November 14, 2009). 39. Official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed in person, November 20, 2009. 40. Though I am referencing my own experiences in Turkey in the summer of 2009, one can deduce that these dialogues have been replicated often between Turks and Americans. 41. William A. Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The “Soft Power” of US Public Diplomacy in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 16–17. 42. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, “Fulbright.” http:// fulbright.state.gov/ (accessed November 28, 2009). 43. Source at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, interview, November 23, 2009. 44. Ibid. 45. Source at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, interview, November 23, 2009. 46. Information on this program comes from the author’s personal experience as a CLS Turkey participant in 2009. 47. Source at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, interview, November 23, 2009. 48. Keith, interview. 49. U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Turkey, website, events link. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/clark_ sokmen.html (accessed March 24, 2010). 50. It should be noted that this recommendation does not judge whether or not the events in question were genocidal, but is motivated strictly by a public diplomacy objective. 51. Retired FSO with USIA, interview, November 11, 2009. 52. Author’s personal observation. 53. Personal conversations with applicants for U.S. visitor visas, Turkey, July and August 2009.

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CH A P T E R

3

Iran and the United Kingdom: A Study in Contrasts Sarah M . R i ley

Public diplomacy, once considered the “stepchild of diplomats,” has taken its rightful place at the national security table.1 Public diplomacy and public diplomats are important and valuable tools in a country’s foreign policy arsenal and the issues facing the United States since the 9/11 attacks have further underscored their importance. There are multiple ways in which to undertake public diplomacy and deciding which methods are most useful depends on many factors regarding the public toward which the diplomacy is directed. To what extent are public diplomacy programs the same everywhere, and how much are they localized? This chapter tests that question by comparing the approaches used by American public diplomacy professionals in two starkly different countries—the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom. The study focuses especially on four relevant time periods: post-9/11 and the lead up to the Iraq War, the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, the June 2009 Cairo Speech, and the June 2009 Iranian presidential elections. Public Diplomacy in Iran Public diplomacy practitioners start with an assessment of local public opinion toward the United States, but for Iran they face a major challenge because of the difficulty in accurately determining Iranian public

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opinion. Typically, determining local opinion would include personal contact with Iranians by American officials and media reporting and polling, but the United States has no diplomatic presence in Iran. Polls and media are not always reliable indicators. Polls show that Iranian opinion toward Americans is the most positive of any Muslim state, but it is often difficult to gage public opinion regarding American policy.2 Both a State Department official and a respected Iran scholar note that polling is difficult to conduct and that attempts to sample public opinion are unlikely to present the full picture. Iranians may lie to poll-takers—either to give the opinion they believe the poll-taker wants to hear, or to give an opinion that will not offend the government.3 Such data present a mixed picture. A World Public Opinion poll of Iranians found that 60 percent favored the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States, and a similar percentage favored direct talks between the two states. But Iranians do not appear infatuated with President Obama—only 16 percent say that they “have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs.” Despite his June 4, 2009, Cairo Speech, which appealed to Iran, only a quarter of Iranians are convinced that President Obama respects Islam, and 77 percent of Iranians have an unfavorable view of the U.S. government overall.4 These numbers resemble overall Middle Eastern opinion; 83 percent of the public in Middle Eastern states surveyed in 2008 had an unfavorable view of the United States, and 70 percent expressed no confidence in the United States.5 According to a June 2009 poll, 77 percent of Iranians supported normal relations and trade with the United States, 68 percent favored Iran working with the United States to help resolve the Iraq War, and 60 percent percent backed unconditional negotiations with the United States. For more than six in ten Iranians, the most important steps the United States could take to improve opinions of America include: a free trade treaty between Iran and the United States; the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq; and increasing visas for Iranians to study and work in the United States. Despite the overwhelming Iranian desire for a fully democratic system, U.S. intervention to spread democracy inside Iran would not improve Iranian opinion of America.6 Media in Iran are state-run and thus ref lect the government’s position, although there are clandestine blogs and other sources from outside the country that may be accessed.7 The State Department makes available several websites in Persian, and U.S. government broadcasting has a significant presence (see later).8 Yet Iranian media strongly

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inf luences Iranian opinion because they are pervasive and consistent, so it presents public diplomacy practitioners with a significant problem. Iranian media coverage of the 9/11 attack on America ref lected government guidance.9 One headline read the United States was “Paying the Price for its Blind Support of Racist Regime,” although the article did condemn attacks against innocent civilians.10 This paper failed to report on the candlelight vigils that were held by Iranian citizens and reported by other news outlets. On September 15, 2001, a news article by an Iranian news correspondent in New York claimed that American and Western media was attempting to “divert and provoke public opinion against Arabs and Muslims for their alleged involvement” in the attacks.11 The article also made numerous references to “Zionists” and “Zionist control” of the media, claiming that Zionists were making false claims that Muslim terrorists were responsible for the attacks.12 Iran’s position during the lead up to and 2003 commencement of the current Iraq War was more delicate. While the Iranian government could not say it favored U.S. action or would actively assist the United States, Iran “quietly cooperated.”13 Iran deliberately made no effort to prevent the U.S. invasion because while Iran generally dislikes American interference in the region, disposing of its enemy Saddam Hussein was beneficial. Following official guidance, however, reporters portrayed the Iraq War as an energy war for oil and painted then-president Bush as the leader of the “true axis of evil.”14 Articles discussed the humanitarian costs that would face Iraqis after the military actions were completed and opined that the invasion signaled the death of the United Nations.15 The 2008 American election, according to the U.S. State Department official interviewed, aroused considerable Iranian curiosity, as the public was interested in seeing if U.S. policy would change with a new president. One reporter however declared that regardless of who won the U.S. elections, he would inherit President Bush’s “evil policies.” The article called for serious actions and effective interaction, not just “slogans.”16 Iranian media coverage of President Obama’s June 2009 Cairo Speech stressed that he admitted that the United States had been involved in Iran’s 1953 coup. This statement was seen as hugely symbolic but the media added that without U.S. action, the speech was just more “pretty words” and did not represent a watershed moment for Middle Eastern relations.17 The Cairo Speech aired in Iran the same time as a presidential debate between President Ahmadinejad and his opponent MirHossein Mousavi and did not draw great Iranian media coverage.18

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Voice of America’s Persian News Network did provide extensive coverage of the event. In covering the post-2009 election chaos, articles ignored the violent protests. Protests were described as “peaceful,” and the turnout was deemed “miraculous.” President Ahmadinejad acknowledged that those who had supported his opponent were disappointed, but because the vote was so overwhelmingly in his favor, there were no doubts about the results and it was time to move forward in friendship.19 Nonstate media, particularly BBC’s Persian network and VOA’s PNN, provided extensive coverage of the election protests. The Obama administration’s decision to resist the temptation to align itself with the opposition was wise, according to American experts,20 although it was ignored by Iranian media. U.S. support of Mousavi would have undermined opposition and branded him a lackey of the United States, allowing Tehran to say that the United States was again interfering in its electoral process and trying to launch another velvet revolution.21 The State Department official interviewed underscored the power of Iranian media, saying that when President Ahmadinejad made visits to the United States in the past, such as to Columbia University or to the UN General Assembly, Iranian state media ran clips with the sound muted, so the public did not hear the outrageous statements he made. Conducting Public Diplomacy in Iran The goal of U.S. public diplomacy professionals is to effectively inform the Iranian public on U.S. policy positions as well as to discover and relate local public opinion regarding those policies.22 Their most daunting obstacle is the absence of American officials “on the ground” in Iran, so the programs must be conducted from outside. Of great interest to U.S. officials is targeting the youth population in Iran because they have never had contact with the United States, unlike prerevolution Iranians. Understandably, the tools for conducting public diplomacy in Iran are limited and successfully carrying out a public diplomacy program is a challenge. Given the huge power of the state-run media in shaping the stories, and the lack of diplomats on the ground, broadcasting is a major tool in reaching Iranian audiences. While some cultural, educational, and technological exchanges take place, the other major tool that the United States can use currently in Iran is the public statements of high-ranking officials, particularly the president.23

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Broadcasting The U.S. government has two types of broadcasting services for Iran, both supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). One is VOA’S Persian News Network (PNN), which broadcasts in Farsi on radio and television. PNN presents news and features following standard VOA principles of objectivity and balance. PNN television broadcasts twenty-four hours a day, claiming the largest audience of any foreign broadcaster in Iran, while PNN radio has a one-hour program with simulcasts of audio. Both are widely listened to PNN also has a website in Persian (http://ww1.voanews.com/persian/news), and makes heavy use of new media. The other BBG service for Iran is Radio Farda ( “Tomorrow”), which since 2007 broadcasts twenty-four hours a day in Farsi. Radio Farda operates out of Prague and Washington under the umbrella of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. As a surrogate broadcaster, RFE/RL’s mission is “to promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating factual information and ideas.” Radio Farda has an Internet site in Persian (www.radiofarda.com) and since the summer of 2009, it has operated an SMS system, as well as Facebook and Twitter profiles. Since December 2009, the Iranian government has jammed PNN radio and TV and Radio Farda broadcasts, and has been blocking their websites.24 PNN and Radio Farda have been vital tools in countering Iran’s staterun media. It is estimated that some 70 percent of Iranians are under age thirty, comprising the main target audience of PNN. According to PNN acting director Alex Belida25 and to a State Department official, VOA has a well-established audience of older Iranians, who listened to VOA before the embassy crisis. According to Mr. Belida and broadcasting expert Alan Heil,26 PNN reaches its Iranian audience through a variety of programs, including the following: 1. “News and Views” presents accurate, balanced, and unbiased news about the latest developments from the United States, Iran, and elsewhere around the globe, plus authoritative opinions of knowledgeable Americans, Iranians, and others on major issues of the day. 2. “Morning Edition” presents accurate, balanced, and unbiased news about the latest developments from the United States, Iran, and other places around the globe. 3. “Late Edition” targets Iran’s youth population and highlights the concepts of freedom of expression and tolerance, and presents the latest news on style and culture as well as technology.

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4. “News Talk” has in-depth discussion of the most important news of the day, from Iran, the United States, or elsewhere, and encourages engagement as guests from different political perspectives join the debate from inside and outside Iran. It welcomes an interactive dialogue through e-mails. 5. “Straight Talk” examines in-depth a topic of interest to an audience thirty years of age or younger, with the goal of promoting engagement and interaction between Iranians and Americans. The audience can vote on topics of interest through the VOAPNN website, e-mails, SMS, blogs, and phone calls to the show. 6. “Today’s Woman” seeks to inform, educate, and entertain Iran’s young female, and male, populations. It provides a platform for “the new thinking,” and depends on interactivity. Programming features the main themes of Iranian women’s blogs: demands for more personal freedom as well as political freedom, and reports on practical topics such as health, education, marital questions, family legal matters, and child psychology. 7. “48 Hours” is an unbiased talk show committed to fostering public discourse by seeking out different voices and perspectives on issues of importance to Iran. The PNN website engages audiences in Iran and elsewhere in dialogue enhancing understanding of U.S. policies and politics, culture and views of Iran, and the U.S.-Iranian relationship as well as global events relevant to Iranians. PNN Radio broadcasts accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news and information to Iran. Compared to surrogate stations such as Radio Farda and Radio Free Europe, PNN brings in nearly 30 percent of the 96 percent of Iranians who receive their news from television, a number that peaked at 50 percent during the postelection demonstrations. Only 26 percent of Iranians get their news via radio weekly and Radio Farda’s share of that total is 2.5 percent.27 VOA played a vital role in covering events that were not given full treatment by the Iranian press. In covering the 2008 U.S. elections, PNN provided live reports from debates and conventions and on election night, deploying correspondents around the country. In covering the Cairo Speech, PNN carried it live with a Farsi translation. During the 2009 Iran elections, PNN’s viewership peaked at nearly 50 percent, in part due to the coverage of the postelection protests, which were not covered by local media. For Iran’s elections, PNN created a special election team months before the vote to prepare background reports on

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issues and candidates and established a network of reporters inside Iran to provide reports during the vote and immediately thereafter. In the days following the election, PNN called for “citizen” journalist video contributions and, after careful vetting, made extensive use of these images in the postelection period. Public diplomacy officials have found that digital outreach and electronic media have been the best way to reach Iranian audiences, particularly since the 2009 Iranian elections.28 Educational and Cultural Exchanges Before the 1979 revolution, the United States and Iran had a robust exchange program—Iranian students were one of the largest groups of exchange students to the United States.29 Since then political relations have prevented a fully functional exchange program, though academic exchanges continued until the 2009 Iranian elections.30 Currently, the State Department still provides online assistance for Iranian students, but U.S.-sponsored exchanges have been on hold since the elections primarily due to fears participants could be arrested.31 Even the sports exchange program were suspended after the 2009 elections. In the past, Iranian water polo teams were sent to the United States, and American wrestling and badminton teams traveled to Iran, and the State Department found they had a positive impact on overall opinion of the United States. These exchanges resumed in a modest way in August 2010 when an American wrestling team went to Iran.32 Despite Iranian government and media hostility, most data suggest that Iranians overall have a good opinion of Americans although they dislike U.S. policies. Statements of Administration Officials According to the State Department official interviewed, many statements made by former president Bush and high-ranking U.S. officials during his administration were counterproductive as tools of public diplomacy. Many were perceived as being unilateralist and confrontational, for example, referring to Iran as part of the “axis of evil,” even after its assistance with Afghanistan. Insistence on preconditions to negotiations and efforts to “spread democracy to the Middle East” reignited painful memories of American interventionism. Many public diplomats felt that former president Bush and his cabinet members

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misread the Iranian situation and forced relations back to a non-relation status.33 In contrast with the Bush administration, the State Department official interviewed noted that President Obama and his cabinet members “understand the fine line between interventionism and outreach.” The official also explained that the Obama administration has banned the use of particular phrases in making statements about or to Iran. For example, “carrot and stick” is no longer used, nor is the phrase “unelected few.” President Obama no longer addresses only the “people of Iran,” as his predecessor did, but also includes “their leaders.”34 These changes seek to remove impediments to reopening dialogue with Iran. The decision to engage without preconditions has changed the tone of U.S.-Iranian relations.35 Experts note that President Obama’s invitation to engage without overtly threatening the leadership has contributed to dissention in the country and raises questions about how the leadership has behaved. Being anti-American is not enough to satisfy the public, because the United States no longer allows that game to be played. Obama’s approach has helped lead to public questioning and to more division in the leadership today over policy than at any time in Iran’s modern history.36 More importantly, these debates are playing out in public and the public can see what is happening inside its own government and make its own decisions about how Iran should interact with the United States.37 Further, the government’s legitimacy was sharply eroded by the 2009 elections, and President Obama’s messages are generating action inside Iran. As Professor Sick noted, “if public diplomacy includes promoting the openness articulated by the President, then straight reporting will have a big impact on public opinion.”38 It is difficult to determine what success current efforts at public diplomacy have had in Iran. While polls indicate that overall, Iranians like Americans and embrace trade with and travel to the United States as well as full diplomatic relations, polling data might be suspect. Without diplomats on the ground to cross the crucial “last three feet” of personal contact, they will continue to have difficulty assessing and engaging Iranian opinion, so broadcasting and new media will remain the most useful tools of public diplomacy. Interactive shows are particularly useful to PD professionals in determining what issues truly matter to Iranian citizens as they carefully monitor recurring topics of discussion. It is uncertain when the United States and Iran will reopen formal diplomatic relations, but scholars see some hope that current U.S.

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policy of openness and respect is pushing the momentum in the right direction.39 Public Diplomacy in the United Kingdom The story of U.S. public diplomacy in the United Kingdom is entirely different because of differences in British foreign policy and internal circumstances. The British government regards its relationship with the United States as its “most important bilateral partnership in the world.”40 The United States also considers Britain one of its closest allies. Both states point to their heritage, comparable legal systems, and shared respect for human rights, freedom, and democratic values as foundations to their “special relationship,” and the two states have strong economic and military ties. The British and American people also have a strong relationship—in 2008 alone, 2.95 million U.S. citizens visited the United Kingdom and 4 million Britons visited the United States. It is estimated that forty thousand American students study in the United Kingdom each year, and the United Kingdom awards approximately forty Marshall Scholarships annually.41 The official relationship has faced only minor difficulties. President Truman’s remark in 1950 about possibly using nuclear weapons in the Korean conf lict, and President Eisenhower’s opposition to London’s policy in the 1956 Suez-Canal Crisis strained the relationship.42 On nuclear weapons, some in Britain have favored total disarmament but others fear that without its own nuclear weapons, Britain would become dependent on American might.43 In the 1960s, American actions in Vietnam resulted in a sharp downturn in British public opinion regarding the United States, as did American policy in the Persian Gulf.44 Official relations were invigorated under President Reagan and his ideological soul mate, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. However, her consent to the use of British airspace for an American bombing of Libya in 1986 resulted in public outrage, with 70 percent of the British public stating they opposed U.S. policy.45 After the Cold War, official relations remained generally strong, although the British public was unhappy with the government’s involvement in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and American intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo underscored differences between the two states. Prime Minister Blair and President Bill Clinton, however, enjoyed a close relationship and worked to resolve these policy differences.

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After 9/11, Washington had no closer official ally than Great Britain, but that closeness troubled the British public. In addition to opposing U.S. policy, the British public also disliked President George W. Bush. Ironically, the lowest point of British public opinion toward the United States coincided with the British government’s greatest support of American policy.46 The election of President Barack Obama has led to a positive shift, and the two states remain each other’s closest and strongest allies. According to a U.S. Embassy official currently stationed in London, the election of President Obama has made a great difference for U.S. diplomats and increased their ability to communicate with the public. According to this official, by the end of the Bush administration, many audiences in the United Kingdom were simply not listening to American messages, but under the Obama administration’s approach, public audiences are again interested in what the United States has to say.47 In contrast to the Iranian situation, where public opinion is difficult to measure, in the United Kingdom multiple international polls are performed on a variety of topics each year, and their results are assumed to accurately ref lect public opinion. British favorability ratings toward the United States showed a steady decline from 83 percent in early 2002, with a sharp drop from 70 to 58 percent between 2003 and 2004, hitting a low of 51 percent in 2007 and were at 53 percent in 2008.48 One 2001 poll showed that 49 percent of Britons disapproved of Bush’s handling of international relations; 79 percent believed he made policy decisions based solely on U.S. interests without taking into account the interests of American allies, and 75 percent believed his understanding of Europe was very low compared to other U.S. presidents.49 By 2002, 47 percent favored an independent European foreign policy and by 2004, 56 percent of the British favored such a policy. British favorability ratings toward the United States hit a dramatic low of 48 percent in March 2003.50 Opposition to the Iraq War was at 52 percent before the invasion.51 But polling in 2009 showed new confidence in America due to the election of President Obama and British favorability toward the Iraq War hit 69 percent.52 A U.S. Embassy official reported that the British public was highly favorable toward the Cairo Speech and the U.S. position on the Iranian elections.53 American public diplomacy officials use British media, particularly print news, as important tools in assessing public opinion and conducting public diplomacy. During the Iraq War period, media outreach was a key aspect of U.S. public diplomacy in the United Kingdom, and the

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U.S. Embassy was a major source of information for British journalists.54 After the 9/11 attack on America, British media reporting was generally factual and sympathetic, but some British writers said it was good for the United States to feel vulnerable. The attacks were seen as a strike at America’s global reach, noting that Americans are not accustomed to “comprehensive adversity.”55 British media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War clearly indicated deep public dislike of U.S. policy and unhappiness with Prime Minister Blair’s unequivocal support for President Bush. Some editorials called for protests against this “unnecessary war.”56 Other commentators urged that certain weapons not be used—without regard to such humanitarian concerns, the United States and Britain would be no better than the dictator they were seeking to depose.57 British media coverage of the massive peace demonstrations in February 2003 was used to illustrate that the politicians were acting contrary to the will of large portions of the public and causing a crisis of legitimacy for the government.58 Others roundly criticized the United States for ignoring the UN and dragging down Great Britain.59 In covering the 2008 U.S. elections, British editorials gleefully reported the demise of the Republican Party or lamented the difficult situation that President Obama was inheriting from outgoing president Bush,60 ref lecting their dislike of his approach to foreign policy British reporting on President Obama’s June 2009 Cairo Speech was largely supportive. Editorials said it was “pitch perfect” and “tone setting,” placing the onus on Muslim states to respond positively.61 British coverage of the Iranian elections was similar to U.S. coverage and fully discussed the violent protests as well as repression of free speech.62 Conducting Public Diplomacy in the United Kingdom The basic objectives of American public diplomacy professionals in the United Kingdom are similar to those of their counterparts elsewhere.63 Yet since the Iraq War and end of the Bush administration, they also seek to rebuild a wider foundation of trust between the United States and the United Kingdom and address misperceptions and negative stereotypes that threaten the two states’ unique bilateral relationship and shared commitments.64 They seek to engage every audience,65 unlike Iran, where the focus is on youth populations. Every British citizen is considered an audience although U.S. officials in the United Kingdom are particularly interested in the large Muslim population

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living in Britain. Therefore, they have an active outreach program that engages the United Kingdom’s Muslim communities and uses speaker programs, personal and web-based outreach, and targeted exchanges to increase dialogue and mutual understanding. The very strong official relationship the United States enjoys with the United Kingdom and the openness of British society allow public diplomats working in Great Britain to employ all available tools and American public diplomacy staff in London devote considerable effort engaging U.K. print and broadcast media since its output inf luences opinion worldwide. The London Regional Media Hub focuses on pan-Arab and Iran-directed media. The embassy also offers a stream of press briefings and interviews of embassy and Washington officials. Staff also arrange for American speakers in London and in regional offices to have direct contact, and electronic means provide reach to a broader public. The post’s educational and cultural exchange programs including Fulbright and the International Visitor Program are, according to one U.S. Embassy official, among the most vital to the public diplomacy mission.66 The United Kingdom also remains one of the top destinations for U.S. students studying abroad. The United States is also becoming increasingly popular with British students, with about eighty-seven hundred choosing to study abroad in the United States last year.67 Bringing American exhibits or performing groups to the United Kingdom is now rare because many travel there independently, but the United States often helps private groups arrange to work with schools or other institutions in deprived areas.68 The essential ingredient behind all of these programs is active engagement with key target audiences by American and local staff. Without ongoing personal contact, none of these programs would succeed. The Change of Administrations in Washington What has been the impact of the change of administrations from Bush to Obama? According to embassy official 2 in the United Kingdom “the United States had a major image problem during the Bush administration.”69 The greatest challenge for public diplomats stationed in the United Kingdom was Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. Only then did they realize the full extent of the challenge, because before that they had taken British support of the United States for granted. American

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public diplomats had to play catch-up once they realized the level of British displeasure with the policy and with the British government’s participation. During this period, public diplomacy professionals focused on making public face-to-face efforts and reaching out to the British media, particularly the print media. They became a primary source of information for the British press during the lead up to the invasion. However, they sometimes found they received information from the Department of Defense that was not completely accurate, and if that information was used in the press, the Public Affairs Office would have to correct it. These occurrences were “hugely embarrassing” and required public diplomats to rebuild relationships with members of the press. Public diplomats working in the United Kingdom were also burdened with an unsupportive ambassador for much of this time period. Between 2001 and 2004, the U.S. ambassador did not view public diplomacy as an integral part of the embassy’s mission and was unwilling to participate in events that the Public Affairs Office arranged. When the next ambassador arrived in 2005, he brought a welcome change and made it a priority to tour the entire country, making himself available for public events with a variety of groups. Official 2 noted that this change in tone from the embassy had an effect on altering British opinion, which made the task of public diplomats more pleasant. Despite negative feelings toward U.S. policy and leadership at the time, official 2 stressed that the public was always able to separate Americans from American policy, and that overall favorability to Americans did not markedly decrease during this difficult period. Educational and cultural exchange programs were as popular as ever. Scholarly works have suggested that much anti-Americanism during the time period was related to dislike of President Bush and that being anti-American was fashionable because of that dislike.70 One official interviewed agreed that diplomats on the ground also had this impression and that in the official’s opinion, some of the anti-Americanism in Britain was exaggerated, yet strong disapproval of U.S. policy regarding Iraq did exist. Despite public diplomats’ best efforts during this time period, it is clear from news treatment of the invasion as well as polling data that their efforts had little effect on changing British opinion. The best public diplomacy program cannot force a foreign public into liking a particular American policy, and the Bush policy was disliked by nearly all Western European countries. Overall public diplomacy during this

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time period was not a failure—cultural and educational exchanges continued unabated and goodwill toward Americans remained high. The election of Barack Obama71 made a difference in the London Public Affairs Office’s ability to achieve its objectives. By the end of the Bush administration, British audiences were simply tuning out statements made by U.S. diplomats. Many of the issues and policies remain the same, but the British public clearly appreciated President Obama’s multilateralism. According to one official, “it is like night and day with some audiences.” This dramatic shift in opinion further bolsters the theory that dislike of the former president drove dislike of U.S. policy. President Obama’s Cairo Speech was well received in the United Kingdom and was actively promoted by the U.S. Embassy. Given the significant Muslim minority in the United Kingdom, public diplomacy officials ensured that it was aired live on BBC and Sky TV, and they organized a viewing for a cross-section of embassy contacts in the Muslim and interfaith communities. The embassy also filmed YouTube interviews with some of those who watched, and distributed the Speech in various languages. According to official 1, it was very well received by the British press, which noted the difficulty of effecting real change in the Middle East, but agreed the Speech was a good first step. The fallout from the 2009 Iranian election was not a problem for public diplomacy staff because the U.S. and the U.K. governments were in agreement on the policy of noninterference. British officials and the public considered the event a serious human security issue, and approved an approach that would not place British citizens in Iran in further danger. Recent polling data on British public opinion highlight how important the perception of the U.S. president can be, and shows an “Obama Bounce.” As of June 2009, 82 percent of Britons approved of President Obama, compared to 17 percent approval for President Bush in 2008. Since 2008, the United Kingdom is significantly more inclined to favor relying on Washington, D.C. than Brussels, and 72 percent in the United Kingdom believed NATO was an important institution—a ten-point increase from 2006.72 As mentioned earlier, overall favorability toward the United States increased to 69 percent in 2009.73 Despite the fact that many U.S. policies have not significantly changed, the current administration employs a classic public diplomacy approach: it is seen as open, honest, and genuinely interested in dialogue and not monologue, which has led to positive results.

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Conclusions The contrasts between Iran and the United Kingdom could not be greater insofar as circumstances for public diplomacy programs are concerned. Public diplomacy professionals operate freely in the United Kingdom, and can assess public opinion and develop programs using accurate polls and free media as well as unfettered personal contacts. In Iran, there have been no public officials “on the ground” for thirty years because of the continuing political confrontation; polling and the media are unreliable sources and the media is often hostile, so programming must be done at a distance through electronic media and a limited amount of educational exchange. These obstacles severely hamper PD programming. In the United Kingdom, the major problem during the time periods examined was strong public criticism of American policies and public dislike of President Bush, despite the very close official bilateral relationship. In both countries, however, the public diplomacy task has been made easier by the new approach and style of the Obama administration, but much work remains. The success of public diplomacy in the future in both countries, but especially in Iran, depends not only on the effectiveness of its practitioners, but also on the foreign policies of the states involves, and also on their domestic situations. In the United Kingdom, the United States, it is hoped, learned the lesson that it cannot take long-standing allies for granted. The United States must continue to engage in cultural and educational exchange, and keep making efforts to reach out directly to the British public and rebuild the trust that was lost during the lead up to the Iraq War. In looking at the Iranian situation, as one Iran expert notes, a large part of the problem in engaging with Iran is that foreign policy for both Iran and the United States is really domestic policy. From the Iranian perspective, revolutionary rhetoric against the United States and a deep distrust of it is part of their domestic policy, and in the United States, Iran is still often viewed as a pariah state and enemy. Domestic politics are important on both sides. It is too easy for American politicians to take strong positions against Iran and win domestic votes through foreign policy, and vice versa, preventing any progress.74 In Iran, the ultimate lesson learned is that when a moment for rapprochement arrives, the United States must be ready to seize it and its leaders must resist the urge to score domestic points by alienating Iran. For now, the United States must continue promoting VOA and other U.S. information methods in the country, but nothing can replace face-to-

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face interaction, which can only come if traditional diplomacy leads to normalization. As the United States works to maintain old friendships and gain new ones, it is clear that public diplomacy will be an important tool and truly has a rightful seat at the security table. Notes 1. David Hoffman, “Beyond Public Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March–April 2002), 84. 2. Interview with current State Department official working on Iran (State Department official 1) conducted by telephone, November 24, 2009. 3. Interview conducted by telephone with Prof. Gary Sick, Columbia University, November 11, 2009. 4. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/639.php (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 5. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_ east_telhami.pdf (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 6. ht t p://w w w.ter ror f reetomor row.org /upi m a gest f t/TF T %20Ir a n%20 Su r vey %20 Report%200609.pdf (last accessed December 1, 2009). 7. Interview with Prof. Sick. 8. Interview with State Department official 1 conducted by telephone, November 24, 2009; and Alex Belida, acting director of Persian News Network, VOA, interview completed by e-mail on October 22, 2009. 9. Tehran Times articles were used for information in the following section because it is available online in English with an extensive archive. 10. “Paying the Price for Its Blind Support of Racist Regime (Horror in the White House),” Tehran Times, September 12, 2001. 11. “Iranian Correspondent in New York Elaborates on Latest Developments in U.S.,” Tehran Times, September 15, 2001, 1. 12. Ibid., 1–2. 13. Interview with Prof. Sick. 14. Parviz Esmaeili, “Axis of Evil and Declaring War on the World,” Tehran Times, March 18, 2003; “Washington-Riyadh Stand-Off,” Tehran Times, December 1, 2002. 15. “Iraq War Without UN Sanction Illegal: Law Teachers,” Tehran Times, March 8, 2003. 16. Hassan Hanizadeh, “Waiting for Obama,” Tehran Times, November 4, 2008. 17. “Obama Admits U.S. Involvement in 1953 Iran Coup,” Tehran Times, June 6, 2009; “U.S. Ready for Serious Dialogue with Iran: Obama,” Tehran Times, June 6, 2009. 18. Interview with State Department official 1. 19. See “Pro-Mousavi Protesters Take to the Streets in Tehran,” Tehran Times, June 16, 2009; “Unprecedented Turnout Was a Miracle: Leader,” Tehran Times, June 15, 2009; “Ahmadinejad: Now is the Time for Friendship,” Tehran Times, June 15, 2009. 20. Interview with Prof. Sick. 21. Ibid. 22. Interview with State Department official 1, conducted by telephone, November 24, 2009. 23. Ibid. 24. http://www1.voanews.com.english; http://www.rferl.org. 25. Interview with Alex Belida completed by e-mail on October 22, 2009.

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26. Interview with Alan H. Heil, Jr., former VOA deputy director, completed by e-mail on November 11, 2009. 27. Information regarding PNN, its programs, and facts and figures regarding market share were provided by Mr. Belida and Mr. Heil. 28. Interview with State Department official 1. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., www.themat.com/article.php?ArticleID=22343. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Interview with Prof. Sick. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. U.K. Embassy. http://ukinusa.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-usa/us-uk-relations/ (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., 164–165. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., 169. 46. Patrick Deer, “The Dogs of War,” in Anti-Americanism. Edited by Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross (NY: New York University Press, 2004), 168. See also Michael Mosbacher and Digby Anderson, “Recent Trends in British Anti-Americanism,” in Understanding AntiAmericanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad. Edited by Paul Hollander (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 84–105. 47. Interview with current U.S. Embassy official in London (Embassy official 1) conducted by e-mail on November 23, 2009. 48. Global Public Opinion During the Bush Years, Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessed at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=263 (last accessed December 1, 2009). 49. Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateral, Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessed at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=5 (last accessed December 1, 2009). 50. A Year After Iraq War, Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessed at http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID=206 (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 51. Deer, “The Dogs of War.” 52. Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World, Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessed at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 53. Interview with Embassy official 1, conducted by e-mail on November 23, 2009. 54. Interview with U.S. Embassy official formerly serving in London (Embassy official 2) conducted by telephone on November 12, 2009. 55. Mary Dejevsky, “All American Nightmare,” The Independent, September 12, 2001. This newspaper was used as a major source for this section. 56. Natasha Walter, “Don’t Idealise the Soldiers Fighting This Unjust War,” The Independent, March 20, 2003. (Profanity in the original.) 57. “When Democracies Do Battle with a Despot, They Must Hold On To Their Moral Superiority,” The Independent, March 20, 2003. 58. Natasha Walter, “Politicians are Out of Step with the People,” The Independent, February 14, 2003.

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59. David Usborne, Rupert Cornwell, Andrew Grice, and Katherine Butler, “U.S. Preparing to Abandon U.N. and Launch War Within a Week,” The Independent, March 14, 2003. 60. See Rupert Cornwell, “How Bush’s Toxic Legacy Did for His Party,” The Independent, November 5, 2008; Hamish McRae, “The New President Has a Huge Challenge Ahead of Him,” The Independent, November 5, 2008. 61. “Mr. Obama Makes his Case for a Historic Rapprochement,” The Independent, June 5, 2009. 62. “Ahmadinejad Dismisses Violence as ‘Not Important,’ ” The Independent, June 14, 2009. 63. GAO Report to Congressional Committees, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues For Congressional Oversight,” May 2009, p. 9. Accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d09679sp.pdf (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 64. Interview with U.S. Embassy official 1 conducted by e-mail on November 23, 2009. 65. Interviews with U.S. Embassy official conducted by e-mail on November 23, 2009, and Embassy official 2, conducted by telephone on November 12, 2009. 66. Interview with U.S. Embassy official 2, conducted over the telephone on November 12, 2009. 67. Fulbright Commission, http://www.fulbright.co.uk/study-in-the-us (last accessed on December 2, 2009). 68. Interview with U.S. Embassy official 1 completed by e-mail on November 23, 2009. 69. Information in this section provided through interview with U.S. Embassy official 2 completed by telephone on November 12, 2009. 70. See Deer, “The Dogs of War”; Mosbacher and Anderson, “Recent Trends in British AntiAmericanism.” 71. Information in this section provided through interview with U.S. Embassy official 1, completed by e-mail on November 23, 2009. 72. Transatlantic Trends, 2009, accessed at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/countryprofiles.html (last accessed on December 2, 2009). 73. Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World, Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessed at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (last accessed on December 1, 2009). 74. Interview with Prof. Sick.

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CH A P T E R

4

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Public Diplomacy during Conflict and Instability R ac h e l E . S m ith

Upon taking office in January 2009, President Obama quickly established Afghanistan and Pakistan as one of his highest foreign policy priorities. In a situation reminiscent of the 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the United States once again found itself enmeshed in a counterinsurgency campaign. Against this backdrop of war, effective public diplomacy is essential for achieving the United States’ immediate military objectives, and more importantly, long-term interests in the region. How to win the “hearts and minds” and “trust and allegiance” of the Afghan and Pakistani populations has been a topic of hot debate among members of the public and within the Obama administration. But public diplomacy practitioners know that their effectiveness depends on dealing appropriately with local conditions and concerns such as security, governance, and development. The future of U.S. public diplomacy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is uncertain, but it is clear that the United States is not viewed favorably in either country despite significant resource expenditures. Since 2001, the United States has spent over $38 billion1 on reconstruction in Afghanistan and $500 million annually on nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, with a promise to increase that level to $1.5 billion annually for the next five years.2 In spite of this significant assistance, the approval rating of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is low.3

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This essay probes this apparent anomaly through an analysis of the current public diplomacy strategy and efforts. Framing the Debate Context One of President Obama’s principal challenges upon taking office has been to alter the momentum in the war in Afghanistan, which he characterized as a “war of necessity” that is not only worth fighting, but also fundamental to the defense of the American people.4 In March 2009 and again in December, President Obama declared that the primary U.S. objective in the region was to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and [its] allies in the future.”5 In the initial months of his presidency, President Obama added twenty-one thousand troops to Afghanistan, committed billions of dollars in economic and security assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and authorized an inf lux of hundreds of American civilian experts to help rebuild Afghanistan and augment the American presence in Pakistan.6 In December, he ordered the deployment of thirty thousand more troops. However, past experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan has taught the United States that resources alone will not win the military contest. Concurrent to the military campaign, an information war is being fought to win the trust and allegiance of the populations. According to President Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Holbrooke, “we are losing that war.” 7 The United States must develop an effective public affairs strategy for the domestic audience and a public diplomacy campaign for the international audience if it is to succeed in achieving its objectives. Overview of the Public Diplomacy Debate U.S. public diplomacy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is complicated immensely by the many different actors that the U.S. policy officials must take into consideration: governments and publics in both countries and in NATO ally countries, and a concerned American public. Although U.S. policymakers try to craft appropriately nuanced messages for each audience, the messages often conf lict.8 Secretary of State

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Hillary Clinton attempted to assure the American audience that “we’re not interested in staying in Afghanistan. We have no long-term stake there.”9 However reassuring this message may be for an American public torn in its support for the war,10 it is extremely troubling to the United States’ international allies and for the Afghan and Pakistani populations who perceive the United States’ will as weakening.11 The Battle of Perceptions After eight years in Afghanistan, the United States has learned that every action taken by the military in its counterinsurgency campaign could easily lead to unintended public diplomacy consequences, which ultimately further the cause of the insurgents.12 General McChrystal, the commander of the International Security Assistance Forces and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, accordingly characterizes the conf lict in Afghanistan as a “war of ideas and perceptions.”13 Part of the challenge associated with this “battle of perceptions” is that Afghanistan is a “ ‘deeds-based’ information environment where perceptions derive from actions.”14 However, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen noted, the United States’ biggest challenge in establishing credibility in Afghanistan is the gap between what its rhetoric and its actions say, the “say-do gap.”15 Ultimately, communication problems are policy and execution problems. There is little that public diplomacy or strategic communications can do to rectify bad policy or poor implementation of a good policy, but these tools are still very important to how one frames and interprets that policy. Accordingly, public diplomacy and strategic communications are integral elements in this so-called war of ideas and battle of perceptions. Traditional Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications The United States cannot rely on “traditional” conceptions of public diplomacy16 in Afghanistan where the presence of a robust opposition, which is not bound by the restrictions to be truthful, has proved extremely effective at working within local communities to counter U.S. information campaigns.17 In his assessment, General McChrystal described the inherent difficulty of conducting information campaigns in Afghanistan: “Information operations drive many insurgent operations as they work to shape the cultural and religious narrative. They have carefully analyzed their audience and target populations accordingly. They use their Pashtun identity, physical proximity to the

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population, and violent intimidation to deliver immediate and enduring messages.”18 It follows that “trust and credibility” are critical components of the public outreach campaign that seeks to maintain and strengthen the Afghan population’s perception of Afghan institutions and of the constructive, supporting role of the United States and the international community.19 It is in this context that policy officials, particularly within the U.S. military, have called for strategic communications. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are different definitions of “strategic communications.” According to one U.S. diplomat familiar with the debate, strategic communications refer to the use of public diplomacy tools to meet the overall strategic goals for U.S. engagement. Its goal is to accurately communicate, explain, and portray the United States and its strategy through the development of medium-to-long-term ties between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States, and more importantly, the Afghan and Pakistani institutions.20 But former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann cautions that strategic communications, particularly as used in the military lexicon, tends to be a short-term approach that risks becoming superficial and culturally insensitive. Indeed, public diplomacy is a much broader and more comprehensive effort than strategic communications, and includes long-term efforts at communication and understanding through such instruments as educational exchanges, cultural programs, English teaching, and the cultivation of interpersonal relationships. Accordingly, the most effective way to gain and maintain inf luence in Afghanistan is through communication and education.21 In the context of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, strategic communications, as with traditional public diplomacy, should be about credible dialogue, not a monologue, to ensure that the population is part of the conversation.22 Competing Narratives The United States and its allies must contend with the Taliban and other militant groups’ aggressive communications campaigns, which seek to discredit the United States and allied efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the border regions, the Taliban maintain “unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio” and as Ambassador Holbrooke cautions, “we can’t succeed, however you define success, if we cede the airwaves to people who present themselves as false messengers of a prophet.”23 Right now, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other insurgent groups have the

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communications initiative and the United States’ new strategic priority must include actions to protect the population and the official communication channels from insurgents.24 However, Ambassador Neumann cautions that it is important the United States does not “respond to Taliban propaganda in message specific responses.”25 To counter this propaganda, the United States should maintain its traditional public diplomacy messages that reinforce that the United States is here to help the population of Afghanistan and that it is not going to leave before the people of Afghanistan and the United States are safe.26 Public Opinion and Concern in Afghanistan and Pakistan Perceptions of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Region The challenge for public diplomacy is of how to convince the population and local leadership that the United States is committed to achieving its objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A scholar who is a leading expert on the region argues that the United States’ overt and often ostentatious efforts to cater to public opinion in both countries has actually damaged its public image in the region and its ability to conduct effective public diplomacy there in the future.27 It is critical to the success of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the population and local leadership are convinced that it is committed to the local populations for the long term. Afghanistan Afghanistan is an atomized country and the population is divided about the American presence. In the south and the east, some of the population fights with the Taliban against the perceived occupation of the foreign presence, the U.S. and NATO troops. Other parts of Afghanistan consider the United States as “their saviors” and “their best defense against the Taliban.”28 However, throughout the country, the Afghan population is concerned first and foremost with security, followed closely by corruption and governance issues.29 The Taliban have capitalized on the ongoing domestic debate within the United States about the future involvement in Afghanistan and have portrayed themselves as the long-term solution to Afghanistan’s governance problems. Other Afghans fears that the United States and NATO will withdraw before their mission is accomplished and once again leave the country in the lurch.30 Secretary Clinton and other

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Obama administration officials seek to alleviate these concerns through continued reinforcement of the basic message that “no one should doubt our resolve.”31 Although President Obama’s December 1, 2009, announcement of a thirty-thousand-troop surge was well received in Afghanistan, his caveat that the troops would start to be withdrawn within eighteen months of deployment has given Afghans reason to pause.32 The population of Afghanistan is still skeptical of the United States’ military’s ability to make them safer, defeat the Taliban, help reform the government, and counter corruption.33 The inability of the government of Afghanistan to provide basic services, the widespread corruption and abuse of power, factional divisions, and the resulting culture of impunity that has developed has all contributed to a “crisis of confidence” among the Afghan population, which feels alienated from the current government.34 This feeling of alienation is further exacerbated by U.S. actions. The prioritization of U.S. development aid to the insurgency-affected regions of eastern and southern Afghanistan generates considerable resentment toward the United States in more secure regions where the populations feel they are being penalized for being peaceful.35 The August 2009 presidential elections were widely criticized as fraudulent, jeopardizing the population’s trust in democracy and the national government, while at the same time solidifying President Hamid Karzai’s power, and entrenching further the corruption for which his government has come to be known. Washington’s public support for the national elections and President Karzai has negatively impacted the public perception of the United States.36 Pakistan In Pakistan, U.S. officials believe that, at the highest levels of government, the bilateral cooperation is good; however, just below that level, the relationship is “fraught with mutual suspicion and is under pressure so extreme that it threatens cooperation against the insurgent.”37 According to an August 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 64 percent of the people of Pakistan consider the United States to be an enemy while only 9 percent describe it as a partner.38 While many of Pakistan’s westernized elite have strong cultural and family ties to the United States, Pakistani public opinion of the United States is still overwhelmingly negative. The main factors are: a distrust of American intentions in Pakistan, poor public perception of U.S.supported president Asif Ali Zardari, apprehension over American ties with India, and disagreement with American Middle East policy.39

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Pakistani public opinion of the United States continues to be framed by a strong historical narrative that contends that the United States is a “fair-weather friend” and “tactical ally,”40 whose past with Pakistan has been characterized by American self-interest during the Pakistani governments of Generals Zia and Musharraf.41 Pakistanis fear America will again abandon it as soon as American strategic interests are met. Much of the public diplomacy work in Pakistan, according to a U.S. diplomat, necessarily seeks to reinforce the message that the United States wants a long-term partnership with the Pakistani government and people of Pakistan.42 The Pakistani public’s perceptions of the United States are inf luenced by a burgeoning domestic insurgency, growing concerns about extremism, a stalled economy, high inf lation, and a growing distrust in the ability of the civilian leadership to counter these challenges.43 President Zardari, who came to power with strong U.S. support following the ouster of General Musharraf has very low approval ratings among the Pakistani population.44 Pakistanis accuse him of permitting American infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty through the continued drone attacks into Pakistan’s tribal areas and the ill-received conditions attached to the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.45 President Zardari’s unpopularity sharply contrasts with the popularity of the military.46 Many Pakistanis believe only military dictatorships are prepared to handle the challenges facing Pakistan today.47 The Pakistani military has been vocal in its criticisms of the U.S. military actions in Pakistan’s tribal areas and President Zardari’s apparent acquiescence to the U.S. agenda, further complicating U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan.48 Secretary Clinton’s October 2009 visit to Pakistan was emblematic of many of the challenges that U.S. public diplomacy efforts now face in Pakistan. During President Bush’s administration, the United States primarily dealt with General Musharraf and was not as concerned with other elements of Pakistan’s society or by public opinion, and neglected public diplomacy toward the media.49 In contrast, during her three-day visit,50 Secretary Clinton made it a point to engage with the Pakistani public and media, even those outlets that are sharply critical of the United States. Although she received often critical reviews from the Pakistani press, many acknowledged that her openness to engage in active dialogue positively signaled a revitalized relationship with Pakistan and the Pakistani people.51 It also indicated the new administration’s interest in one aspect of public diplomacy, namely, high-level engagement with foreign publics.

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Rachel E. Smith U.S. Public Diplomacy in Afghanistan

While the populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan share much history and culture, particularly along the border between the two countries, they must each be addressed separately for the purposes of conducting effective and relevant public diplomacy programs. Strategy The Obama administration seeks to develop new and innovative strategies to reach out to and earn the trust of the Afghan population while building upon the successful programs of the past. According to a U.S. government official familiar with the subject, the principal goals of U.S. public diplomacy strategy in Afghanistan are to establish an effective, credible, and legitimate government, address the critical issues of employment, economic growth, and development, and counter an aggressive propaganda campaign from extremists. It is an interagency effort to help the United States’ Afghan partners build the trust of their people. There has been a significant emphasis in the recent past on strategic communication to support the traditional U.S. military public diplomacy tools, such as English language programs and cultural exchanges; these continue to be very important for the development of a long-term relationship with the Afghan people.52 Challenges In implementing its public diplomacy strategy, the United States faces many operational challenges: the sheer size of the country, high illiteracy rates, the undeveloped domestic media structure, the robust and effective opposition, and the complications associated with a large-scale coalition effort.53 More important, however, is the strategic challenge of operating in a country that has known only civil conf lict for the past thirty years and has proved difficult for outsiders to understand. When the United States, after 9/11, came to Afghanistan, there was no civil society, only limited institutions, a broken education system, no educated class, a poorly developed state-controlled media, and a large, young population that had never known peace.54 As a result, and despite significant improvements since 2002, according to former ambassador Ronald Neumann, the Afghan population does not place great value in government or media messages, only in action. This challenge is further compounded by the population’s limited understanding

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of bureaucratic processes so much so that it is often discouraged when an announced project does not take shape immediately.55 In order to operate effectively in such a “deeds-based” environment, U.S. government officials must continually repeat messages and work hard to ensure that the United States develops long-term credibility and trust with the Afghan population so that its words will be recognized with as much authority as its actions. Programs American officials in Afghanistan must contend with constant security threats to American personnel and to locally employed staff who risk negative backlash from their families and neighbors.56 The majority of the Afghan population is illiterate. Radio and word of mouth are the primary means through which the population receives their information, making it difficult for the public diplomacy staff to reach them through traditional methods such as print media and press releases. Consequently, the American Press Office focuses its local outreach on visual messages such as pictorial posters and public service announcements that are distributed in partnership with local TV and radio stations, regional security teams, and other U.S. government agencies.57 They also use longer-range instruments to improve the content and quality of the media coverage in Afghanistan. For instance, between 2007 and 2008, the Press Office successfully arranged tours of Afghanistan for NATO country reporters to publicize American efforts and to improve their domestic populations’ understanding of the nature of the conf lict in Afghanistan and the importance of NATO’s involvement. The Press Office also sent Afghan journalists to the United States for training, and it provided materials to the Information Resource Center at the Embassy and to their Lincoln Centers and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams around the country.58 Embassy Kabul supports several educational exchange programs, including the Afghanistan Fulbright scholarship program, the Initiative to Educate Afghan Women, and the Afghanistan Undergraduate Fellowship program, which are intended to provide Afghan students and scholars from high school through post-graduate studies opportunities to attend academic programs in the United States. In 2002, Embassy Kabul began a program to send Afghan high school students to America, and in 2003 it reinstated the Fulbright program after a twenty-three-year suspension.59 Although the security situation in Afghanistan makes cultural exchange programs difficult, the U.S.

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Embassy Kabul makes every effort to improve the cultural connections between the United States and Afghanistan. U.S. Public Diplomacy in Pakistan Strategy The Obama administration knows that the United States needs to develop a deeper, long-term relationship with the Pakistani people to address the concerns that matter most to the public. As one official says, our most important public diplomacy message is that the United States is a long-term partner for Pakistan.60 U.S. public diplomacy has been designed to underscore that the United States wants to have a robust, bilateral relationship and true partnership with the people of Pakistan. Challenges One of most important changes in Pakistan to impact U.S. public diplomacy has been the explosive growth of Pakistan’s domestic media market in the past eight years.61 This growth has produced a news media that is today “more diverse, powerful, and nationalistic” than at any point in Pakistan’s history.62 However, as prominent Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid cautions, the result is a proliferation of conspiracy theorists who “insist that every one of Pakistan’s ills are there because of interference by the U.S., India, Israel and Afghanistan,” rather than an introspective look at long-standing governance mistakes behind Pakistan’s crisis.63 The United States is challenged to find credible voices that can counter the voices of extremism.64 It is in this context of conspiracy theories and a saturated media market that the United States, according to Secretary Clinton, must work to “do much more through media to counter some of myths and misperceptions” about U.S. policies and intentions.65 But as in Afghanistan, American public diplomacy staff also face limits imposed by a tenuous security situation, so they use technology to get into areas of the country that are inaccessible. Programs The U.S. Embassy Islamabad’s Public Affairs Section works closely with the other branches of the U.S. government present in Pakistan and

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the Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar Consulates to develop and deliver cohesive public diplomacy and outreach. In the saturated Pakistani media environment, the United States must be creative in its efforts to connect with the Pakistani public. One such effort developed by the Press Office is Khabr-o-Nazar (“News and Views”), a forty-page color magazine produced monthly by Embassy Islamabad in English and in Urdu, which provides its Pakistani audience with information about the United States, its policies, people, culture, and society.66 The limited budget of the public diplomacy section of the embassy, however, constrains the options available to the staff to develop more expensive programs, such as radio announcements and TV segments. Public diplomacy staff regard educational exchange programs as one of the most important ways to invest in the long-term relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The first Pakistani Fulbright participants traveled to the United States in 1951 and since then the program has become the largest Fulbright Program, in terms of funding, worldwide.67 In 2009, 154 Fulbright grants were issued for MA and PhD study in America. The U.S. Embassy also supports International Visitors Leadership Grants, and promotes English language training throughout Pakistan, since few nonelite Pakistanis are literate in English. The public diplomacy staff introduced new English programs in the politically vital Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) where the security situation has left many students with minimal educational opportunities. These English language programs are designed to help expose the students to an American curriculum and thereby increase their understanding of the United States, as well as to ultimately help them achieve a higher level of English proficiency that might enable them to attend university and possibly even study abroad to develop their ability to contribute constructively to the future of their country.68 U.S. Broadcasting and Regional Information Programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan Broadcasting to Afghanistan and Pakistan is complicated by the fact that several different languages are spoken in each country. In Afghanistan, about half the population speaks Dari, a version of Persian, similar to the Persian (Farsi) spoken in Iran, while another one-third speaks Pashto. In Pakistan, Urdu and English are the two official languages but other

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languages are spoken including Pashto. The U.S. government’s broadcast services, under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), transmit programs in Dari, Pasto, and Urdu, as well as English. Afghanistan is a radio culture. The BBG’s Voice of America (VOA) and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s surrogate service and Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA) provide continuous radio coverage to Afghanistan69 through three radio stations and one TV station. VOA operates two distinct radio stations in Afghanistan—Radio Ashna and Radio Deewa—and is considered, along with RFA’s Radio Azadi, to be a fair and balanced news source.70 Radio Ashna and Radio Azadi are each broadcast nationwide alternatively in Dari, Pashto, and Special English and share the clock to provide the Afghan population, particularly women and youth, with continuous radio coverage through in-depth news, daily call-in shows, music, literature programs, and other programs designed to address all facets of life in Afghanistan. As a complement to Radio Ashna, VOA established TV Ashna in 2006 through an agreement with a Kabul-based station to provide programs in both Dari and Pashto. The combined weekly audience for the U.S. broadcasting for its Dari and Pashto language services make it the most listened to international station in Afghanistan.71 The approximately thirty million Pashtuns72 who live in the AfghanPakistan border region on both sides are mostly uneducated and illiterate and depend on radio.73 Because this area is a vital region for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, both VOA and RFE/RL have special Pashto broadcasts aimed at these audiences. In 2006, VOA launched Radio Deewa as a continuous Pasto service targeted to reach the populations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. As a complement to this program, in January 2010, RRE/RL launched Radio Mashaal in order to “counter a growing number of Islamic extremist radio stations in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the border with Afghanistan.” 74 Together the two stations will provide the Pashto-speaking people of the AfghanPakistani border with 24/7 broadcasting. American radio broadcasts attract listeners even among U.S. critics. As David Rohde, a New York Times writer captured by the Taliban notes, the Taliban “browsed the Internet and listened to hourly updates on Azadi Radio . . . but then they dismissed whatever information did not meet their preconceptions.” 75 Listenership of VOA does not automatically create a positive impression of the United States or of U.S. policy. Like many of VOA’s programs, Radio Ashna and Radio Deewa do not specifically address the United States, but hope to increase the

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public’s access to unbiased news and as a result to encourage an appreciation for the United States and American values such as freedom of expression.76 Conclusion and Assessment In Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the opinions and actions of these two foreign populations shape the United States’ strategic context, effective public diplomacy is critical to the success of America’s shortterm objectives. These short-term objectives—to find a positive conclusion to the war in Afghanistan and to prevent Al Qaeda from ever being a threat to the United States or its allies again—shape the context in which U.S. public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan are developed and implemented. The United States is unable simply to conduct traditional public diplomacy campaigns to effectively promote mutual understanding and to counteract the historic distrust that has developed between the United States and the foreign publics of these two countries. Traditional public diplomacy tools, including the use of educational and cultural exchanges, international broadcasting, print media, and one-on-one contact with the foreign public, constitute a long-term approach to developing mutual understanding between the United States and the foreign publics. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, America’s ability to implement these public diplomacy tools is severely hampered by low literacy rates, hostile local media, a precarious security environment that restricts public interaction, and a historic distrust of U.S. policies and intentions. One-on-one interaction remains one of the most important tools for encouraging mutual understanding in the long-term, and because of the realities on the ground, the United States cannot rely on traditional public diplomacy tools alone. Moreover, the use of military-focused “strategic communications” and attempts to garner public support in the short term is not effective. The populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan perceive U.S. actions taken in the guise of strategic communications to be self-serving and patronizing.77 The operating context of Afghanistan and Pakistan is truly a “deeds-based” environment where actions speak louder than words. The challenge for American public diplomacy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is how to promote mutual understanding in the long term, and trust and allegiance in the short term. Under the present conditions, the

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best way to develop mutual understanding and a more favorable public opinion is to pursue objectives that are seen as genuinely serving the interests of the populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as helping to bring them security and good governance. A major function of public diplomacy is to publicize those efforts and the motivations behind them. The short-term actions taken by the United States in both Afghanistan and Pakistan must be developed to meet the longterm public diplomacy objectives of achieving mutual understanding and not the short-term strategic objectives intended to “win hearts and minds.” The U.S. message to the populations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan is that the United States is interested in a long-term partnership built around mutual interests. The U.S. actions and words must ref lect this message. Notes 1. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Ambassador Seeks More Money for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/11/AR2009081103341.html. 2. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/04/pakistan.aid/. 3. There are no recent surveys that provide specific data on Afghan opinion of the United States as a whole. Public opinion in Afghanistan is largely dependent on whether or not the United States is engaged in military combat in the province, among other considerations. In Pakistan, approval of the United States is 16 percent according to an August 2009 Pew Global survey. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Pakistani Public Opinion.” Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009. Print. 4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama Defends Strategy in Afghanistan,” The New York Times November 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/us/politics/18vets.html? adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1259151432-DMKX18bYPWyk/aRCaOaJtA (ed., sec. 2009). 5. Barack Obama, “The New Way Forward,” The White House, December 2, 2009. 6. Ahmed Rashid, “The Afghanistan Impasse,” The New York Review of Books 56.15Web, November 1, 2009. 7. Thom Shanker, “U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban’s Propaganda,” The New York Times, August 15, 2009 (accessed November 1, 2009). 8. David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Afghan Strategy Will Contain Many Messages,” The New York Times, November 24, 2009, New York Times online, November 25, 2009, http://www. nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/asia/25rollout.html?_r=1&ref=global-home. 9. Interview with George Stephanopoulos of ABC’s This Week, November 15, 2009, U.S. Department of State, November 24, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2009a/11/131939.htm. 10. According to a December 2, 2009, poll, 51 percent of the American public approve of President Obama’s plan for the war. Susan Page, “Poll: Narrow Majority Support Obama’s Afghan strategy,” USA Today December 2, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/ washington/2009-12-03-poll-afghan-strategy_N.htm (accessed December 5, 2009). 11. Ronald Neumann, Former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (2005–2007), telephone interview, November 23, 2009.

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12. USG official 1, telephone interview with USG official familiar with Afghanistan, October 21, 2009. 13. General McChrystal’s view, in “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” Washington Post, September 21, 2009. 14. Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified)—Searchable Document,” The Washington Post, August 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html (ed., sec. 2009: November 1, 2009). 15. Quoted in Marc Lynch, “Mullen’s Strategic Communication,” November 6, 2009, Lynch website, Lynch.ForeignPolicy.com. 16. It should be noted that while, as will soon be evident, there is significant debate about the necessity for strategic communications versus more traditional public diplomacy, for the purposes of this essay, the term “public diplomacy” will be used. 17. USG official 1. 18. McChrystal, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.” 19. Ibid. 20. USG official 1. 21. Neumann, interview. 22. USG official 1. 23. Thom Shanker, Peter Baker, and Helene Cooper, “U.S. to Protect Afghan Population Centers, Officials Say,” The New York Times, November 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes. com/2009/10/28/world/asia/28policy.html?hpw (ed., sec. 2009: November 1, 2009). 24. Ibid. 25. Neumann, interview. 26. Ibid. 27. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview, Medford, MA, December 2, 2009. 28. Lynn Sherr, “Interview with Rory Stewart,” September 25, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/ moyers/journal/blog/. 29. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Afghanistan Opinion Survey,” 2009, http:// www.afghanconf lictmonitor.org/2009/06/afghanistan-opinion-survey-2009.html (ed. 2009 Vol. International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009. Web. November 1, 2009). 30. “The Afghanistan Impasse,” The New York Review of Books, November 1, 2009, http:// www.nybooks.com/articles/23113. 31. “Secretary Clinton Interview with Jim Sciutto of ABC,” October 30, 2009 U.S. Department of State, November 2, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/131144.htm. 32. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview. 33. Joshua Partlow, “McChrystal: Strengthening Afghan Forces ‘Most Important Thing We Do,’ ” The Washington Post, December 2, 2009. 34. McChrystal, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment.” 35. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview. 36. Ibid. 37. Pamela Constable and Karen DeYoung, “Anti-U.S. Wave Imperiling Efforts in Pakistan, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, September 25, 2009. 38. The Pew Global Attitudes Project. 39. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview. 40. Cyril Almeida, “Deciphering the US Aid Bill,” Dawn.com, October 2, 2009, http:// w w w.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-librar y/dawn/the-newspaper/ columnists/14-cyril-almeida-deciphering-the-us-aid-bill-209-zj-04 (ed., sec. 2009: November 5, 2009). 41. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview. 42. USG official 4. USG official familiar with Pakistan, telephone interview, November 18, 2009.

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43. Pamela Constable, “For Pakistani President, Goodbye to Goodwill,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/15/AR2009111502679. html (November 16, 2009). 44. The Pew Global Attitudes Project; Zardari has a 32 percent approval rating compared with the 86 percent for the military. 45. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, is intended to provide Pakistan with $1.5 billion annually for nonmilitary assistance through FY 2014. In addition, the bill authorizes additional funds for security-related assistance subject to results-based restrictions. The bill was signed into law by President Obama on October 15, 2009. Joint Explanatory Statement: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, October 14, 2009, http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=318931. 46. The Pew Global Attitudes Project. 47. Constable, “For Pakistani President, Goodbye to Goodwill.” 48. Sabrina Tavernise, “Pakistan Politics Take Nationalist, Anti-U.S. Tone,” The New York Times, November 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/asia/20mood. html?_r=1&ref=world. 49. USG official 2. USG official familiar with Afghanistan and Pakistan, interview, October 15, 2009. 50. It should be noted that the first day of her visit, October 28, 2009, a car bomb was detonated in a Peshawar market and killed over one hundred civilians. 51. Joe Klein, “Hillary’s Moment,” Time, November 6, 2009. 52. USG official 1. 53. Ibid. 54. USG official 3. Mid-level USG official familiar with Afghanistan, telephone interview, November 17, 2009. 55. Neumann, interview. 56. USG official 3. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. http://fulbright/state.gov/fulbright/regionscountries/whereare/south_and_central_asia/ afghanistan; http://www.americancouncils.org/programs. 60. USG official 4. 61. USG official 2. 62. Adnan Rehmat, “Murder and Mayhem: The Worst Year Ever for Pakistani Media,” May 3, 2008: Intermedia, 2008, http://www.internews.org/pubs/pakistan/StateofMediain Pakistan-AnnualReport2007-08.pdf. 63. Rashid, “The Afghanistan Impasse.” 64. Ibid. 65. Landler, “Clinton Condemns Attack and Hews to Agenda.” 66. U.S. Department of State. 67. The first Americans went to Pakistan in 1952. The American exchange program was put on hold and at this point in time, Americans are not eligible for grants for Pakistan. (http:// usefpakistan.org/.) 68. USG official 4. 69. Through a combination of shortwave, mediumwave, and FM transmissions, these two radios have national coverage. 70. Joan Mower, director of public affairs, VOA, interview, Voice of America, November 6, 2009. 71. Intermedia, “Dari Broadcasting,” Washington, D.C.: Intermedia, February 2009. Print. 72. On the Pakistan side of the border, in the FATA, literacy is 17 percent with just 3 percent female literacy compared with 56 percent literacy nationwide. Rashid, “The Afghanistan Impasse.”

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73. Javid, Ahmad. “VOA Deewa Radio.” 2009.Web. . 74. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/section/Pakistan/1073.html. 75. David Rohde, “Held by the Taliban, Part 1–7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity,” The New York Times, October 17, 2009. 76. Mower, interview. 77. Afghan-Pakistan expert, interview.

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Public Diplomacy in Africa

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Kenya’s “Native Son” and Enduring Local Issues M ab e l N ti ru

The United States and Kenya have enjoyed warm relations since Kenya’s independence in 1963. This relationship was further strengthened during the Cold War, as Kenya became a strategic partner in helping advance American military and ideological interests. However, during the past decade, as the Cold War faded into history, two major issues have come to the forefront in Kenya that have helped shape the U.S.-Kenya bilateral relationship and set the agenda for America’s public diplomacy program in Kenya. The U.S. election of Barack Obama, Kenya’s “native son,” did help improve America’s image in that country, but the issues that have most affected our public diplomacy efforts there are internal ones. One issue is terrorism, which became a major concern for both countries when the U.S. Embassy in Kenya was bombed in 1998, and that took on even more significance for the United States after 9/11. The other issue is Kenya’s internal political development and its struggle with democracy, especially after the 2007 postelection crisis. This essay will discuss how the American public diplomacy professionals in Kenya address these and other issues, what tools they use, and how the resulting messages are perceived by the Kenyan public. Background: Kenya and the United States during the Cold War The majority of African countries began to gain independence from their colonial masters after World War II. As independent countries,

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these newly emerging African states soon became the scene of Cold War skirmishes in which the Soviet Union and the United States competed for their allegiances, mainly through economic and military aid. Kenya and her neighbors were not excluded from these Cold War skirmishes. The United States saw Kenya as the main pro-Western country in the region, and thus became a great ally and aid beneficiary of the United States in the Greater Horn of Africa. After the wave of African decolonization, the United States decided to place an American embassy in every independent African country; and established an embassy in Nairobi in 1964.1 This action accompanied by major aid programs was motivated largely by the fear of communist expansion on the continent. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Carter Doctrine committed the United States to defend American interests in the Persian Gulf, greatly increasing the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. This and Kenya’s need to protect herself from her neighbors led to the signing of a U.S. military Facilities Access Agreement with Kenya in 1980.2 This agreement established the United States as the major supplier of arms and military support to Kenya, a position previously held by Britain, the former colonial power, and paved the way for KenyanAmerican military collaboration on a range of issues, including on antiterrorism in the region. Democracy and Elections in Kenya One major topic that American public diplomacy professionals in Kenya must deal with is the question of democracy and elections. These are major political issues in Kenya and the Kenyan public consequently pays attention to the United States’ view of democracy generally and in Kenya in particular. Democracy promotion, in turn, is a major element in American policy toward Kenya. It is therefore important for the American public diplomacy staff to understand the context in which the Kenyan public sees the question of democracy. In 2002, Kenya held multiparty elections for the first time, and opposition leader Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as president. These elections were regarded as a milestone for democracy in Kenya, and hailed as free and fair by the international community. Observers of these elections from the Carter Center stated that “Kenya’s important role as a leading African nation has been enhanced by these elections, and the country’s newly elected leaders should take immediate steps in the fight

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against corruption, the consolidation of democracy, and the respect for the rule of law to lay the groundwork for Kenya’s economic and political development.” Having successfully campaigned on an anticorruption platform, many Kenyans looked to Kibaki to bring long-awaited reforms to Kenya. But by 2004, disappointment in Kibaki set in as a long-awaited new constitution, meant to limit the president’s power, still had not been delivered. In addition, Kibaki’s anticorruption minister resigned in February 2005, frustrated that he was prevented from investigating a number of scandals.3 In 2007, Kenyans once again went to the polls. This election pitted the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki against his opponent, Raila Odinga. It was projected as a milestone in Kenya’s advance to a more mature democracy. On December 27, Kenyans voted, with Raila Odinga consistently ahead in opinion polls. He won a parliamentary majority, but two days later, delays in counting for the presidential contest and rumors of electoral fraud sparked riots. Kibaki was declared the winner by 231,728 votes, even though Odinga had led by a substantial margin in preliminary results.4 Upon hearing that President Kibaki had been sworn in, violent riots and attacks between opposing ethnic groups rocked the country, culminating in fifteen hundred dead by the middle of January. By January 2008, the two opposing candidates had formed a coalition government and announced that a reform agenda would be the highest priority of this new government. Since then, the United States has been actively using several public diplomacy tools to pressure the Kenyan government to enact reforms in a timely manner. Kenyan Public Opinion of the United States The starting point for American public diplomacy officers in Kenya in planning their programs is to make an assessment of Kenyan public opinion toward the United States on issues of importance to American national interests. They use all available means—public statements by Kenyans, Kenyan media commentaries, and conversations with Kenyan contacts by Embassy Americans and local employees—to gage local opinion. Generally speaking, the main issues that affect Kenyan opinion about the United States involve international, regional and local security, and—because of Kenya’s internal political situation— democracy. Since the Cold War, the government of Kenya has been a

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strong ally of the United States and has been rewarded by the United States for taking a pro-Western, anticommunist stance in the region. The people of Kenya support that cooperation, and Kenyan attitudes toward the United States are overwhelmingly favorable. According to U.S Embassy officials, public perception of the United States has not only been very positive for some time, but it has become more positive since the inauguration of Barack Obama.5 Considered a native son of Kenya, the U.S. president’s election has renewed interest and admiration of America among Kenyans. According to a 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey, 77 percent of Kenyans believe that the United States is taking their country’s interest into account when making foreign policies. Also, 90 percent of Kenyans had a favorable view of America in 2009, and this rating has remained consistently positive over the past few years.6 The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey also found solid support for democratic values and institutions in Kenya, as well as in other subSaharan African countries. For instance, Kenyans overwhelmingly expressed support for the principle of honest multiparty elections— roughly three in four (74 percent) said it was “very important” to live in a country that has such elections. A majority of people also considered it very important to live in a country with freedom of religion (83 percent), an impartial judiciary (79 percent), a free press (72 percent), and free speech (68 percent). Just under half (46 percent) also rated living in a country with civilian control of the military as very important. Prior to the 2007 election, Kenyans were generally satisfied with the state of democracy in their country—72 percent said they were either very or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy was working in Kenya. Moreover, a substantial majority was optimistic about the coming elections—67 percent believed the next presidential election would be conducted fairly, while only 28 percent thought they would be unfair.7 These statistics are significant because they reveal that the majority of Kenyans demanded democracy and fair elections, and having seen a failure of democracy in 2007 are now increasingly vocal and fed up with their government’s performance. Their outrage has been a positive force for the United States, as the embassy can draw upon their support to carry out their goals of speeding up reform. Using Web 2.0 to Address Reform The Kenya reform agenda has become a priority for the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, as the proposed electoral, judicial, and rule of law reforms are

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in line with America’s vision of a more democratic and secure Kenya. The United States is using several tools to keep the Kenyan government on track with these reforms, including online-based instruments such as Twitter and Facebook. One of the most popular online tools in use, Twitter allows users to send and receive short messages, called “tweets,” on Twitter’s website, with instant messaging software, or with mobile phones. When a user is logged in through the web or a cell phone, it asks one simple question, “What are you doing?” and users answer in 140 characters or fewer. Unlike most text messages, tweets are routed among networks of friends. Strangers, called “followers,” can also choose to receive the tweets of people they find interesting. The U.S. ambassador to Kenya Mike Ranneberger uses his Twitter page as a platform to post his thoughts, and by association, the American government’s thoughts about the reform agenda’s progress. These posts vary in style and intent; some make general comments on the reform agenda while others alternately criticize or commend the Kenyan government’s efforts on specific aspects of the agenda. For example, one post mentioned a recent visit by Kofi Annan and stated, “Just wrapped up consultations with Annan . . . his visit to Kenya will keep up the momentum for reforms.”8 Another post that commended the removal of a police chief stated, “Ali’s removal is important first step to reforming Kenya’s police. Fundamental reform still a long way off, as the Ringera saga demonstrates!”9 In this tweet, Ringera refers to Aaron Ringera, the head of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, who was reappointed despite a perceived poor performance by his organization in fighting corruption. In a related post, the ambassador states, “Outraged by Ringera’s reappointment. Indication of impunity. A Kenyan told me it’s a slap in the face of Kenyans. What to do? Suggestions?”10 Although the ambassador asks for suggestions in that post, there is no place on the Twitter page where the Kenyan public can answer his posts and suggest what should be done. The Twitter page is a one-sided conversation that captures the American point of view on the reform agenda but doesn’t present any Kenyan voices. In some instances, we get the sense from the ambassador’s posts that the Kenyan public is in agreement with him about the government’s slow pace of reforms. In one post he writes, “Amazing that the Kenyan government thinks that our efforts to support the Kenyan public’s demands for reforms are interference!” Along the same lines, he also writes, “Despite warnings by some, I will still speak out supporting reforms in Kenya. President Obama and the Kenyan people demand

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nothing less!” These posts give readers the impression that the ambassador is speaking for the Kenyan public and expressing their demands for reform. However, the lack of any Kenyan voices on the Twitter page leads one to wonder whether the Kenyan public is really always in agreement with the ambassador and America, or whether some might disagree. As a public diplomacy tool, Twitter would be more powerful if it allowed for a two-way exchange of ideas and a variety of Kenyan voices to be heard about the reform agenda. Facebook is another online tool that the Embassy uses in their public diplomacy efforts. While similar to Twitter, the main difference between the two mediums is that Facebook has no limit on how much content can be posted per message, and offers more tools such as a photo section, a notes section, and discussion forums on specific topics. One encouraging thing about this page is that you can see the Kenyan public posting their opinions on the page and receiving responses from the embassy. However, these responses do not come fast enough for some eager readers, and some readers have expressed frustration at the lack of response from the embassy. By not responding to posts in a timely manner, the embassy runs the risk of frustrating users and consequently losing this audience’s attention. It seems that the embassy is quicker to respond to posts that mention the reform agenda, but then do not address comments that are critical of the United States. In one post, a reader stated, “Mr. Ambassador. You know these people who have ruled Kenya since 1963 don’t take you seriously! You will talk, but at the end of the day, they know you and all the western foreign missions are mere talkers, and irritants at best. So they will ignore you, and business will go on as usual.”11 This post went unanswered, although it was in response to a question the embassy posed to all users in a discussion forum. While it might be a deliberate strategic move on the embassy’s part to ignore such comments, this strategy could backfire if too many comments that undermine or make light of the embassy’s efforts are left unaddressed. According to an embassy official in Nairobi, they have removed several messages that were considered offensive but generally the give and take has been positive.12 For Facebook to truly function as a forum for open discussion, the embassy needs to make a more concerted effort to respond to posted messages in a timely manner, and to address criticisms. If they only respond to certain topics, and ignore others, then they will run the risk of alienating this audience. It is important to note though that Facebook and Twitter have very small audiences within Kenya, with 574 and 476 fans, respectively. However, this number is

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likely to grow over time as Internet access becomes more widespread in Kenya. Also, these forums reach thousands of Kenyans in the diaspora who are also an important target audience to consider. The reform agenda is currently the highest priority for the American Embassy’s public diplomacy efforts. As the public affairs officer at the embassy stated, The reform agenda is the primary and all encompassing focus of the Embassy, including our PD activities. This really is an historic period for Kenya with the future of the country in the balance. We are doing all we can to encourage leaders to follow through on their commitments to pass a new Constitution, strengthen rule of law, reform the judiciary and police and ensure accountability for those who perpetrated the violence after the last election.13 In pushing the Kenyan government toward reform, the embassy is wisely seizing this ripe moment to draw upon the support of the Kenyan people to further their cause. As one official stated, “We have had overwhelmingly positive public support and surprisingly positive support from many Kenyan leaders. There is a strong desire for positive change and a fear of consequences if the culture of impunity continues as is.”14 Besides the reform agenda, another priority for the American Embassy since 1998 has been promoting security and reducing the spread of terrorism in East Africa. Building upon over twenty years of close military ties, Kenya and the United States continue to work together to find both military and nonmilitary solutions that will lead to increased security in the region. Kenya and U.S. Security Partnerships A major issue for the U.S.-Kenyan bilateral relationship today, both for traditional diplomacy and for public diplomacy, is cooperation on antiterrorism. The Bush administration made the Global War on Terrorism a high policy priority after 9/11, but well before that the United States and Kenya had been cooperating on several levels to combat terrorism, because of the 1998 attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi. On August 7, 1998, simultaneous bombs blasted through the U.S Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 220 people and wounding more than 4,000 others. Since then, American and Kenyan intelligence

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experts have worked closely to track down potential terrorist threats and prevent future attacks. Collaboration between the Kenyan and U.S. forces, as well as the FBI, has been instrumental in identifying and capturing some of the perpetrators involved in the Nairobi bombings. Positive changes in Kenya’s domestic politics, particularly in the areas of democratization and human rights, have made this collaboration possible. As the Kenyan intelligence service has increasingly turned away from merely ensuring regime survival and presidential protection, it has been able to devote more of its time to national security.15 Kenya and the United States have also built closer military ties through the International Military and Education Program (IMET), through which the U.S. government sends foreign military officers to the United States for training. A growing number of Kenyan military officers have benefited from this program.16 Although no Kenyan citizens have been arrested or convicted for participating in the 1998 bombings, authorities believe that the attacks could not happened without some local assistance. Most of the suspicion centered on a small group of Muslims in Mombasa, a coastal town in Kenya.17 It was not until after a second bombing of a hotel in Mombasa that Kenyan and American authorities were able to confirm the existence of an Al Qaeda cell in Kenya, and of connections between Al Qaeda terrorists and a number of Kenyan families. Since then, the American Embassy in Kenya has started specific outreach to Kenya’s coastal community with the goal of preventing religious extremism within these communities. Outreach to Muslim Communities In reaching out to the Islamic community, which constitutes 10 percent of the population, the American embassy is currently developing a communications campaign that stresses religious tolerance, interfaith cooperation, and the origins of Islam.18 The embassy plans to use the full range of PD materials—lectures, printed materials, visits—to communicate these messages. Their strategy is to reach out to moderate Muslims with this message, and specifically target opinion leaders within the moderate Muslim population.19 This strategy is also significant because the Islamic community in Kenya has historically been marginalized from politics, thus this campaign presents a unique opportunity to engage this group and give them a platform to present their opinions.

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While the embassy is in agreement that Islamic outreach is necessary, there is some internal debate currently taking place about what messages are appropriate to send to the Islamic community in Kenya. The embassy would like to develop a consistent set of messages that can be used over time, and if necessary, used for similar purposes in other countries within the region. However, because of the extreme diversity of Islam in Africa, there is some debate over what messages will sound authentic and resonate with the Islamic community. As one official stated, “Islam in Sudan is not the same as Islam in Kenya.” Though these messages are still under debate, they will most likely stress the importance of interfaith cooperation and religious tolerance.20 Another issue the embassy is pondering is how these messages will be received by moderate Muslims, some of who might not want to be viewed as “moderate” by the United States. As one official stated, “Many moderate Muslims might not appreciate being singled out as moderate by the United States. Some may fear that being seen as ‘moderate’ and in solidarity with the U.S suggests a lack of commitment to Islam. That’s why we have to take extra care in crafting our messages so they are well received by the majority of Muslims.”21 In reaching out to Muslim communities, the ambassador has used official speeches as a platform to send his message, and to link the integration of Muslims to the reform agenda in Kenya. As he remarked to a gathering of Muslims at an Iftaar dinner in Kenya on September 6, 2009, I will continue to be outspoken in emphasizing that the Muslim community must be fully integrated into the political and economic life of Kenya. Achieving that is part of the broader effort to bring about fundamental change in Kenya through implementation of the reform agenda. We are deeply concerned about lack of progress in implementing key reforms, and will continue to press for decisive action.22 Some specific initiatives that the embassy has implemented include English language training for madrasa teachers; support for Muslim vocational training schools; speaker programs featuring a number of American-Muslim scholars; U.S. military projects to rehabilitate schools and clinics and to dig wells in Muslim communities; and support for Muslim nongovernmental organizations.23 To support this outreach, the U.S Embassy is also physically establishing a presence on the Kenyan coast. The embassy has argued that there is a need to reestablish

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a U.S. government presence in the Coast Province (the small consulate there closed in 1993) due to the rise in linkages between radical Islamic movements in the Middle East and the Muslim communities of East Africa, which are concentrated in coastal regions.24 The embassy’s political, public affairs, and economic sections have developed contacts along the coast from their base in the capital and have made some progress. For instance, American Corners (U.S. public diplomacy information facilities in local institutions) are operating in Lamu and Mombasa, both coastal towns with large Muslim communities. Ever since the Cold War, Kenya’s regional importance, as well as its relationship with the United States has expanded significantly. One sign of this growth is the official American presence in Kenya. Over the past two decades, the U.S Embassy in Kenya has become the largest in sub-Saharan Africa and the second largest in Africa.25 Like Kenya itself, the U.S Embassy in Nairobi has also taken on regional importance. In addition to managing relations in Kenya, the embassy has played a major role in monitoring the peace process in neighboring Sudan and coordinating U.S development assistance to southern Sudan. In addition, the embassy has primary responsibility for coordinating policy on Somalia and following the peace negotiations between Somalis’ various factions.26 As expected of an embassy of this size, the public affairs officers use a wide range of public diplomacy tools to connect with their audiences. U.S. Public Diplomacy Strategy in Kenya Currently, the embassy’s four main pillars of outreach in Kenya are: education, culture, press, and information. The education effort consists of major programs such as Fulbright student and professional exchanges and extends all the way down to mini-scholarships for exceptional but disadvantaged Muslim students. Culture includes artists and instructors from the United States visiting and teaching in Kenya, as well as Kenyans visiting the United States to meet with counterparts and exchange ideas and support for local cultural activities. Press involves engaging the media through statements, press briefings, and visits to U.S. funded activities. It also extends to training in investigative journalism and press freedom. Information is offered through the embassy library and small resource centers, where Kenyans can find written and recorded products about all things American, including politics, history, culture, and education.27

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While press is the most visible tool used by the embassy, its effects are probably more transient. As one official stated, With a proactive Ambassador, we are in the newspapers, radio and TV almost every day and frequently in the headlines. While this does provide a high profile for our presence and positions, one could argue that our other programs—education, cultural and information—affect people more directly and allow them to have a personal experience with a representative of the USG, which probably inf luences their opinions and thoughts more significantly.28 Educational outreach is one program that has been quite successful in Kenya. The embassy sponsors a student advising center that advises approximately forty-five hundred Kenyans per year on studying in the United States.29 This is larger than any other embassy in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Nigeria. Consequently, more Kenyans are studying in the United States than from any other sub-Saharan country in Africa other than Nigeria. In addition, many Kenyans apply and are accepted to study on several exchanges programs, from the more academic Fulbright and Humphrey fellowships to a range of other exchange programs designed specifically for students, women, and civil society activists. Broadcasting as a PD Tool Another important public diplomacy tool used to connect with Kenyans is international broadcasting, through the Voice of America (VOA). VOA provides programs in English and Swahili, both official languages in Kenya. It is estimated that 12 percent of Kenyans, or 2.6 million each week, listen to these broadcasts.30 VOA played an important role during the postelection violence period in December 2007, as it was able to keep broadcasting even though most media outlets in Kenya had been shut down. As one official stated, “Because we have towers in neighboring countries, we were able to keep broadcasting vital information from the minute the election results were announced up until the violence ended. Since then, the VOA has developed new programs that address the reform agenda in Kenya.”31 In March 2008, VOA launched a new series called “In Focus” that examines issues such as land distribution, the constitution,

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ethnic tensions, national reconciliation, and the future of democracy in Kenya.32 VOA has also expanded Swahili broadcasts to Kenya to include an additional half-hour each day, thus reaching more Kenyans outside urban areas who are more proficient in Swahili than English. This strategic decision is especially significant, as Kenyans from all walks of life are looking for accurate and neutral information about issues pertaining to the reform agenda. In addition to traditional programming, VOA has partnered with mobile phone providers to enable Kenyans to receive VOA news in the form of SMS messages on their mobile phones. Customers can also download VOA-TV’s English language video and audio to their mobile phones. This has proved to be quite popular, particularly with programs about President Obama, whose father was Kenyan.33 With over fourteen million cell phone subscribers in Kenya, VOA’s decision to partner with mobile providers will ensure that programming reaches a wider and more diverse audience. Audiences are very important to consider when crafting a public diplomacy campaign. The embassy in Kenya targets opinion leaders within several groups, such as women, youth, religious groups, and political parties. The youth audience is a primary target for the embassy, and several activities have been planned specifically with this audience in mind. As one official stated, We hold town halls specifically directed to them and we recently helped organize a nationwide youth forum to allow them to discuss and plan among themselves how best to lobby for implementation of the reform agenda. Our education programs, by definition, are almost entirely youth oriented and in our cultural programs we look for things that will appeal to the youth.34 Another official remarked that “the younger a person is, the easier it is to introduce them to new ideas.” As a target audience in Kenya, youth are a significant segment of the population, making up 65 percent of the population under age twenty-five.35 Challenges to Practicing PD in Kenya One challenge that public affairs officers face in Kenya, and across Africa, is a lack of enough resources and staff to support new programs. This has been a problem since the end of the Cold War, when Congress reduced diplomatic and development budgets worldwide, resulting in

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staff shortages, hiring freezes, and reduced training opportunities. Next came the 1999 merger of USIA with the State Department, which many believe has not only failed in its goal to link policy closer to public diplomacy, but has also reduced the professionalism of the PD cone. Concurrently, events such as genocide, famine, conf lict, and terrorism stalked Africa, making public affairs officers’ jobs more challenging. As one official stated, The requirements for PD in Africa continue to grow exponentially with the huge increase in U.S. assistance and attention to the continent over the past ten years. There are a lot of countries in the region so it is always a challenge to stay on top of them all, especially when there tend to be some challenging political and environmental circumstances. The regional offices [at the State Department in Washington] do an excellent job of backstopping our needs and providing us with programming materials and resources. We could always use more resources but that is a perennial problem throughout the Department of State.36 Assessment and Recommendations The American public diplomacy program in Kenya enjoys several advantages because of some fortuitous aspects of the bilateral relationship. Bilateral cooperation on the official level is well established and solid, based on shared interests. Public opinion in Kenya is also quite favorably disposed to the United States and America’s image and reputation are quite positive. That general atmosphere and the lack of serious restrictions imposed by the Kenyan government on American Embassy activities allows for the development of a forward leaning and aggressive public diplomacy program. The American ambassador can make rather strong public criticisms of shortcomings in the local political system without any repercussions, and public diplomacy staff are free to use a variety of means to communicate with their target audiences. Given the opportunities that exist in Kenya, the public diplomacy program is underfunded and should be given more resources to help improve its quality and reach. But it is unlikely that funding for public diplomacy will increase, considering the weakened economy of the United States and its military commitments, so the program will probably have to continue within current budgetary limits.

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In examining America’s PD strategy toward Kenya, special attention should be paid to web/online outreach, as well as outreach to Muslim communities. With regards to web tools, the embassy should make a greater effort to address audience’s remarks on forums such as Facebook or Twitter, in order to send a consistent message that they are in fact interested in their audience’s opinions. Additionally, other vehicles with a wider penetration among the population, such as mobile phones, should be used along with these online tools. The embassy should also take special care in crafting their campaigns toward Muslims, and ensure that their message appears authentic and resonates with communities. This could be a difficult goal to achieve as the past few years have seen an increase in mutual distrust between the United States and many Muslim communities around the world. However, the embassy is in a much better position now than eight years ago, as President Obama has successfully set the stage for an improved relationship between the United States and Muslims around the world. The Kenyan and American diplomatic relationship has matured since the Cold War era, moving farther away from a traditional clientpatron relationship and approaching a more equal partnership based on mutual interests. Despite the challenges to practicing public diplomacy in Africa, the embassy in Nairobi seems to be doing an admirable job during this critical time in Kenya’s history. The election of Barack Obama helped our image in Kenya, but the embassy public diplomacy staff should continue to listen and respond to the local needs and concerns of the Kenyan people in facilitating this important relationship, in support of American strategic interests. Notes 1. East Africa desk officer at the U.S. State Department, phone interview, November 23, 2009. 2. Johnnie Carson, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Edited by Robert Rotberg (Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 175. 3. “Kenya’s Anti-Graft Czar Resigns,” BBC News, February 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/africa/4243619.stm (accessed November 16, 2009). 4. Xan Rice, “Kenyans Riot as Kibaki Declared Poll Winner,” The Guardian, December 31, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/31/kenya.topstories3. 5. John Haynes, public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy Nairobi, interview by e-mail, November 30, 2009. 6. R. Wile and K. Holzwart, Pew Global Attitudes Project, January 3, 2008. 7. Ibid. 8. Comments posted on Ambassador Ranneberger’s Twitter page, http://twitter.com/ USAMB4REFORM.

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9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Comment posted on U.S. Embassy Facebook page, http://www.facebook.com/topic.php? uid=146218063693&topic=9323. 12. Haynes, interview. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Carson, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, 17. 16. East Africa desk officer at the U.S. State Department, interview. 17. Carson, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, 17. 18. East Africa desk officer at the U.S. State Department, interview. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. M. Ranneberger, “Iftaar Dinner Remarks,” http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/speeches_2009/ sp_20090906.html. 23. Ibid. 24. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governments Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection, Embassy Nairobi, July 2007. 25. East Africa desk officer at the U.S. State Department, interview. 26. Ibid. 27. Haynes, interview. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Joan Mower, Voice of America public relations officer, phone interview, December 3, 2009. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Rush PR News. “VOA Swahili Text Messages Available in Kenya through Safaricom,” http://www.rushprnews.com/2009/07/23/voa-swahili-text-messages-available-in-kenyathrough-safaricom/. 34. Haynes, interview. 35. Population Action International statistic, 2009. 36. Haynes, interview.

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CH A P T E R

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Sierra Leone: Public Diplomacy Unwired Tulani N. E l i sa

This study explores the role of U.S. public diplomacy in a developing country, Sierra Leone. It will discuss how Sierra Leoneans perceive the United States and Americans and why U.S. public diplomacy is important there. It will also analyze why public diplomacy is not working as effectively as it could in that country, and presents suggestions as to what modifications to the current public diplomacy strategies in Sierra Leone might improve understanding between the United States and Sierra Leone. This study will also discuss the relationship between public diplomacy and development, since both public diplomacy and development programs work in parallel to help build stronger and more enduring connections with the United States, thereby advancing and promoting American foreign policy. Many studies since 9/11 have concluded that America’s reputation and respect abroad have declined. But there are signs the election of President Obama has led to improvements in America’s image, although much work remains to be done. As one prominent political leader put it: Recent polling suggests that support of the United States throughout the world is on a slight increase but remains well below the fifty percent mark in many countries, even among those nations normally considered strong allies. This less-than-positive attitude toward our nation has impacts ranging from national security threats, to lost trade opportunities, to a significant drop in

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tourism, to parents overseas refusing to allow their children to be educated in U.S. universities . . . The sources of this problem are many. Some of these include honest disagreements with our policies and our actions. But many are based on misrepresentations of our goals, values and motives . . . it is time to re-think how we conduct our public diplomacy.1 These observations apply to Sierra Leone. But while Sierra Leone has some characteristics in common with other countries, in many ways it is unique. The case of Sierra Leone shows that the obstacles and challenges to effective public diplomacy are much greater in developing nations that have been devastated by civil war. These catastrophic events stif le the progress of a nation and undermine the social and economic fabric of a society. Many issues need to be tackled before an effective public diplomacy program can be implemented. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest counties in the world. Its literacy rate is 38 percent.2 It also faces the difficult tasks of dealing with corruption, lack of clean water, crumbling infrastructure, and lack of dependable utilities, including electricity. Given the history and current state of this nation recovering from internal disruptions, the public diplomacy that is practiced here cannot be like work being done in Kenya or even Nigeria. The American ambassador regards the greatest problems in the country to be lack of infrastructure, roads, hotels, and daily amenities as well as communication.3 The embassy’s administrative officer adds that the lack of trained professionals in the country is a serious problem.4 How Are the United States and Americans Viewed in Sierra Leone? The public diplomacy staff at the American embassy in Freetown must first identify origins of negative beliefs or assumptions that need to be addressed, as well as those positive feelings that they can try to strengthen, in order to plan their program. No recent public opinion polls have been undertaken in the country, so they must make these assessments based entirely on monitoring local media and from conversations with the local population. They have concluded that the misunderstandings and stereotypes about Americans and the United States in Sierra Leone are fairly

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consistent across different groups in the population. The only slight variations result largely from background, religion, education level, and personal experience with Americans. The most common generalization is that all Americans are privileged, wealthy, and arrogant. These ideas come from access to American videos, from perceptions of American foreign policies, and in some cases from personal interactions with American tourists or from travel to the United States. Following are some observations by perceptive Sierra Leoneans on how their compatriots view the United States: Most Sierra Leoneans think that the streets of U.S. are paved with actual gold and would do anything to migrate to the U.S, even if illegally.5 In their eyes the U.S. is paradise, due to images from movies and music videos, so when they do see people from the U.S. there is immediately a form of admiration.6 Many people perceive Americans as rich, arrogant and lawless.7 The American policy of “go-it-alone,” particularly during the Bush years, negatively affected its hitherto popular image in Sierra Leone. Many Sierra Leoneans were repulsed by the arrogant, bullish and rather bigoted attitude of the Bush administration.8 From my own interactions, Sierra Leoneans think Americans are rich and maybe a bit self-absorbed, not close to their families, and very lucky or blessed by God (hence becoming rich). When Sierra Leoneans come back from the US, the three things they are surprised about is how hard Americans work, how close we are to our families.9 In the 1990s, many Sierra Leoneans appreciated the role the United States played in the peace negotiations ending their civil war and in the postwar reconciliation process.10 During the eight years of the administration of President George W. Bush, however, the image of America by the people of Sierra Leone was affected, mostly negatively, by the “War on Terror” and what they regarded as a hasty decision to go into a war in Iraq on premises that they believed were not clearly defined. One Sierra Leonean professional in the public diplomacy section of the U.S. Embassy has said: “In view of the current threat posed by global terrorism, particularly against American interests, many Sierra Leoneans understand why the U.S has become an increasingly security

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conscious country. However, some of them believe that the U.S. was somewhat responsible for creating its own monsters and are now paying dearly for it, unfortunately.”11 Religion also plays a role in how Sierra Leoneans view the United States and the American people. Since nearly 60 percent of the population is Muslim, this affects their perception. One Sierra Leonean, who knows his country well, put it this way: “lot of the Muslims in the country see the U.S. as against their religion and judge it based on that.”12 There are, however, indications that the impact of the religious factor is beginning to change since Barack Obama took office as president. On June 4, 2009, President Obama delivered a speech that he addressed to the Muslim world, in Cairo Egypt.13 In this speech President Obama was seeking to make the first step in repairing the many broken relationships between the United States and the Muslim communities around the world. He seems to have had some success in doing that. As one Sierra Leonean public diplomacy professional at the U.S. Embassy put it: “The Obama administration has got off to a good start by engaging the Muslim world as well as reshaping the U.S. government’s foreign policy goals and strategy.”14 Beyond that, Americans are widely perceived as selfish. As one observer put it: “Sierra Leoneans who have worked with Americans think that they only make efforts to sustain relationships/friendships that they consider personally or professionally rewarding. In short, they are somewhat selfish. There could be cultural issues with this observation”15 Americans working in the country often appear to be insensitive to personal relationships and courtesies. To Sierra Leoneans the personal relationships that one creates outside of business with the people with whom they are working are important in forming an impression of the individual and of the United States itself. One complaint that seems trivial but that affects the general reputation and image of the United States is the common refrain, “No one ever gets a visa from the American embassy.” This popularly held belief is often voiced and widely held in Sierra Leone.16 There is a common misconception in Sierra Leone that the embassy acts arbitrarily in refusing visas to people seeking to travel to the United States to visit family, friends, or for an education. One result is that American officials assume many visa applicants lie on their application or during their interviews, believing that is the only way to increase the chance that they will be approved for a visa, and this exacerbates mutual suspicion.

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An additional complication, peculiar to Sierra Leone, is that the chaos and destruction of the war made it difficult to obtain records that consular officers require because many of the records have been lost, ruined, or are not kept in an organized and accessible way.17 There is, however, generally a positive feeling toward the United States and Americans in Sierra Leone despite these underlying beliefs and stereotypes. This is the foundation of a strategy to shape and implement a public diplomacy program in this country. The Target Audience The second step that American public diplomacy professionals take after ascertaining the major characteristics of local public opinion is to identify the priority target audience. They start with the fact that Sierra Leone is a very young country. The median age is seventeen and the host government as well as the U.S. Embassy focus heavily on youth. Many of these young people are unemployed, ex-soldiers from the civil war, or are still in school. Most of them are very vocal and participate actively in politics and public activities. Because of their political activism, and because they seem receptive and willing to listen, change, or learn, they are interesting for PD purposes. The primary target audience for U.S. public diplomacy programs in Sierra Leone is therefore teenagers and young adults, people thirteen to thirty-five years in age. The life expectancy in Sierra Leone is currently forty-seven years making them a community of people who “grow up” quickly. Focusing on teenagers and young adults as a target audience is effective because they are heavily involved in the community, especially college students who organize protests, participate in country politics, and take their school politics very seriously. They listen to the news on the radio and read the newspapers regularly, so the public diplomacy effort focuses on radio shows, cultural events, and speaks to them as much as possible. The public diplomacy program targets young people also because youth were main players in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Many of the soldiers were children. Young girls experienced rape and serious abuse. Many ex-soldiers, still young, are out of work and struggling to make it daily and so the embassy seeks to develop programs that engage them. This is both a public diplomacy goal and also a goal that is perceived locally as helpful for development in a recovering nation.

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The American Public Affairs officer has summarized her effort in this way: “Our audiences vary tremendously based on the program. We do try to focus our attention on people who are already doing something to benefit the country, whether its women who are active in lobbying for legislative reform, university kids who are active in student politics, etc. We don’t have a lot of anti-Americanism here, so our audiences are generally pro-U.S. to begin with.”18 Public Diplomacy Programs The American public diplomacy staff has carried out many standard programs intended to reach their target audiences in Sierra Leone. But one effort they undertook in the summer of 2009 illustrates the country’s special conditions and their creativity. The opportunity was the election of President Obama, America’s first black president, and his two speeches on the African continent in the summer of 2009, one in Egypt aimed in large part at Muslim audiences, and another in Ghana aimed at Africans. The program they decided on was to set up public TV screens, recognizing the fact that all Sierra Leoneans wanted to watch the speeches live but most had no access to television or electricity. Movie Screens The public diplomacy staff erected giant screens around the country on election night in 2008, and for the Obama speeches in Cairo and Accra. In addition on election night they set up booths that gave out information on the candidates.19 The viewings were open to everyone so they reached a wide audience. The embassy’s public affairs officer (PAO) organized a system to monitor reactions from people on the speeches and report on individual comments and media coverage, and she considers this to be her most successful program in Sierra Leone: We partnered with local cinema centers to broadcast the Presidential Debates, inauguration, and Cairo and Accra speeches for the public. For each, we spent about $500 and had an audience of over 1000 people all over town. The event was noted in a white house press briefing as an innovative PD program, and abcnews.

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com mentioned it in their blog about outreach surrounding the Accra speech.20 Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale praised the effort: “Our embassy in Freetown gave microgrants to dozens of cinema centers throughout Freetown that showed the speech live, free of charge, to all comers, reaching thousands in . . . the country.”21 PD professionals also did a lot of prepublic diplomacy work done around Africa before the president’s visit. A State Department official working in the Bureau of International Information Programs’ Africa Office at the State Department noted that the State Department and the White House partnered to do media and virtual outreach before, during, and after President Obama spoke in Ghana. This outreach included reaching African audiences through mobile phones and podcast-to-radio. Before the president made his trip to Ghana, the State Department set up SMS texting throughout Africa and invited people to text the president questions in English and French. During the speech, those who texted in received real-time highlights of the speech, and after the speech, the president answered questions that were sent in via text in a podcast-for-radio.22 But in Sierra Leone, because of very limited technical capabilities, the big screens turned out to be the most effective means of communication. Facebook Pages and Technology Many countries of Africa in the twenty-first century have developed digital communications, online, or Twitter, Facebook, texting, e-mail, or blog and web pages. But Sierra Leone largely missed that revolution because of its civil war. It was cut off from and did not have much access to the Internet or electricity. The situation has improved but still the country seriously lacks the level of wireless, electricity, or Internet usage of many other countries. The Facebook page for the Freetown Embassy has only 188 fans. It is kept up-to-date by the PAO who posts articles and information about the events and programs that the embassy is putting on in Sierra Leone. Most Sierra Leoneans are not even Internet users. As one welleducated Sierra Leonean explained: “The internet is not an effective way to do public diplomacy in Sierra Leone because there is not internet in many places. It is extremely slow and there are is not always electricity there.”23

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The public diplomacy staff therefore had to devise ways to reach their audience without using modern communication tools that are now taken for granted elsewhere. As the PAO puts it: Limited technological capacity in general (forget about internet, many people don’t have electricity) means that we have to try to think outside the box to get virtual programs to work. We’ve had some success, communicating with journalists via SMS, burning podcasts to CD and getting them translated to local languages for radio stations around the country, but the tools that work here are certainly not the same tools that work in Tokyo, or even in Nairobi.24 Elsewhere in Africa, there are abundant and growing opportunities to use new technology, as a senior official in the Africa Bureau of the State Department explained: In terms of new media, Internet penetration in Africa is generally low. But there are still a lot of Africans engaging in this space and we want to be there to engage with them. We have several Embassies with Facebook pages—in sub-Saharan Africa the US Missions to South Africa has the largest membership, and there are about 12 Embassies in sub Saharan Africa with Facebook pages overall, and 5 with Twitter accounts and Flickr pages [established in the last 11 months]. Facebook and Twitter initially attracted the African Diaspora outside the US—but more and more Africans in Sub-Saharan Africa are using them. Twitter, for example, is catching on in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa.25 Such is not the case in Sierra Leone, so the public diplomacy staff must rely on traditional tools that are available including radio, newspapers, billboards, and face-to-face communication for their routine programming, and wait for the day when other tools become available. Fulbright Programs The public diplomacy staff regards the Fulbright exchange program as very effective for local circumstances. Sierra Leonean students and teachers who have an experience in the United States gain not only information and learn new skills but they take back home a much

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better understanding of America. This serves public diplomacy purposes and it also serves development goals because when they return to their country they contribute to their society. A shortcoming in this program however is that after students and teachers return to their home country there is no effective follow up by the public diplomacy staff. Although all of the other stages of the program are carried out successfully, the momentum is not sustained. As the PAO described the process: In planning: We’ve made tremendous strides in this area in the last couple years. We have a recruitment strategy that involves up country in-person outreach, makes use of Americans in Sierra Leone as well as Sierra Leoneans who’ve just returned, and has increased our application numbers several fold. In training: We have tried to help the students prepare for exams and we do conduct pre-departure orientation each year, but I was finding that the exam prep was not sufficient. So we applied for a grant from IIE [the Institute of International Education] to bring in an EFL expert from the US to teach a TOEFL [Test of English as a Foreign Language] Prep train-the-trainer program. So we have trained 23 secondary and tertiary English teachers in how to tutor kids for the TOEFL. It just happened in November.26 But in follow-up: Here’s the hard part. We can’t force people to be involved when they come back. The Fulbright alumni have an association, but they have not done any programs yet.27

Connecting with the Press The U.S. public diplomacy post in Freetown, as at other American Embassies, works to build relationships with journalists, editors, other members of the press and broadcasting organizations. In Sierra Leone the daily newspapers and radio are important sources of information for the people. Whether the information is factual or not, they rely on what they read and hear from the media. The Voice of America and editorials and articles placed in local media by the embassy are vital to the effectiveness of the public diplomacy program. Not all newspapers report accurate or informative stories, however. As the PAO says: “Journalists in Sierra Leone are hugely diverse. Some of them are good, professional, in it for the love of the field. Some of them are bad writers, corrupt, in it to have personal soapboxes and bribes for stories”28 This

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makes the job of the PAO and press staff in the public affairs section difficult. To keep in regular contact with the editors and newspapers in Freetown, the senior Foreign Service National in the public diplomacy press section periodically visits editors-in-chief of newspapers and attends press conferences that government officials arrange. In this way he not only collects information but also fosters personal relationships with the main information sources of the country. The cultivation of relationships with journalists, he knows, is vital to public diplomacy. As he puts it, “The relationship is important because without the media, we cannot reach the vast majority of the people we need to reach. We keep it current by keeping the lines of communication open—visiting their media houses, inviting them to events as guests sometimes, not just as reporters.”29 American Shelves, Corners, and Centers The public diplomacy staff in Sierra Leone makes use of three types of information facility. First, “American corners,” located in Sierra Leonean institutions, provide information on the United States by means of computers, books and magazines, and venues to talk to Americans about America. Second, the “American center” in Sierra Leone is a library in the embassy. It is used by some of the public but being inside the embassy makes it difficult to visit, and it is not very welcoming. The location of the embassy also makes access difficult. The third facility is “American shelves” that are in local libraries and where they display American publications. However, they have little or no other information about the United States and no one is present to explain any of the information that is available. The American shelves are no substitute for an American corner that has trained staff available to provide information to people interested not only in American books, but in policy as well. Helping Preserve the Past The PAO office in the embassy facilitates the distribution of grants to groups in Sierra Leone that have proposals for self planned projects. One such project currently underway at the University in Sierra Leone involves preservation of documents and letters from the slave trade and other events during that time poorly kept in boxes at the University. The Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation enabled the Sierra

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Leone National Archives to rescue the most endangered documents and to digitize many documents relevant to U.S.-Sierra Leone history.30 The embassy also provided a computer to enter all of the information and publish the documents online. This project was publicized during a libraries and technology conference. The public diplomacy value is that it advances the idea of American support for education and the importance of preserving history, and for helping a developing country put together their legacy and create useable records that will be helpful in research.31 Suggestions for Improvements There are several positive aspects of the public diplomacy work being done in Sierra Leone. Most of them also support development, indirectly helping public diplomacy. Improvement that need to be made include: provision for an accessible American Center, a more focused target audience outreach, more visibility of current projects, keeping in contact and using the experience of Fulbright fellows after their experience, continued use of cinemas and films, and increased use of American corners/shelves. American Centers A recent Senate finding applies well to Sierra Leone: [F]ree-standing American Centers were drastically down-sized and re-cast as “Information Resource Centers” (IRCs) most of which were then removed from easily accessible downtown locations due to security concerns following the attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 . . . The State Department—working with Congress and host governments—needs to recreate the American Center system in secure facilities outside our Embassy compounds from which we can provide foreign audiences with greater access to information about the United States through libraries, periodicals and an uncensored Internet.32 Establishing an American center in a central part of Freetown would be extremely beneficial to the U.S. mission and to the people. The U.S. Embassy in Freetown was formerly located downtown, but then moved to a less accessible part of the city. An insightful Sierra Leonean

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observer commented that the location of the embassy “up on a hill” is not only off-putting, but the large compound that it sits on doesn’t encourage the people of Sierra Leone to want to use it or its facilities.33 Making the embassy more accessible would help public diplomacy in Sierra Leone be more visible and useful. More Focused Target Audience Outreach The embassy’s public diplomacy programs have clearly reached the target audience, but from interviews and conversations it is clear that a lot of the programs are going unnoticed.34 There should be more effort to focus on reaching out to the fifteen to thirty-five age group by engaging the university and high school students to determine what kind of public diplomacy programs would be most interesting to them. The PAO could arrange polls or surveys on the attitude of Sierra Leoneans toward the United States to help understand the misconceptions, questions, or issues regarding America and its policies and how best to replace the negative images that they hold with positive ones. Continued Film Series The screens set up in Sierra Leone during the 2008 election and Obama speeches in Cairo and Ghana were successful programs that were widely attended; hence, this approach should be continued. A recent licensing agreement between the State Department and the Motion Picture Licensing Corporation, however, allows movies to be screened for only up to one hundred people at a time.35 The guidelines also stipulate that the program cannot be advertised.36 These guidelines create a new obstacle in Sierra Leone with limited Internet and electricity where films still make a huge difference, and a way should be found to overcome the problem. American Corners/Shelves Currently the American shelves in Sierra Leone are not well marked and are going unnoticed. This is partly due to lack of funding and difficulties in finding space in libraries, but the problem should be fixed. The PAO periodically donates books to the libraries for the American shelves, but there is still a lack of focus on their upkeep and usefulness to the users in the community, and they need better signage. American corners were established in Sierra Leone, as in many countries, because

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of the inaccessibility of American centers. There has recently been a new American corner opened in Kissy, Sierra Leone. Though this is an effective tool, this is only the second American corner in the entire country and additional corners in highly populated communities are necessary. Moreover, many do not know about the programs that the U.S. Embassy is hosting, and the dates, times, and locations of events should be given special publicity in Sierra Leone where information often spreads by word of mouth. Working with Fulbright Fellows The Fulbright Fellowship is outstanding but it would be more successful if more was done after fellows return home from the United States. By keeping in contact with Fulbright fellows after they returned to Sierra Leone, the Embassy would be able better to promote the program, inform others about what they learned in the United States and help dispel local misperceptions about America. Fulbright fellows should be required to document their experiences in America upon their return. The embassy should also hold information sessions with them for Sierra Leoneans who are interested in the opportunity to visit America. Why Public Diplomacy Is Important The effective implementation of U.S. public diplomacy programs in Sierra Leone is important. A senior official in the Africa Bureau at State says that the country is “a priority for the USG because of humanitarian concerns . . . its democratic government . . . its rich potential and the need for stability there.”37 Sierra Leone is still developing its own policy, government, and even societal values. When the U.S. Embassy in Sierra Leone explains U.S. policy and the ideas behind them, this helps form a mutually beneficial relationship. There are countless untapped resources in Sierra Leone, from agriculture to trade, and many of them are underutilized because of lack of motivation, education, and good governance. Creating a stronger relationship through public diplomacy would benefit the two countries in both governmental and business connections. The review of public diplomacy in Africa by the State Department inspector general highlights the need for improvement generally, and this applies specifically to Sierra Leone.38 As elsewhere in Africa,

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reasons include lack of enough funds to do more and the general need to restructure. This report makes it clear that this kind of issue in such a large and inf luential continent is unacceptable. The election of Barack Obama helped America’s image but there is still much work to be done on the ground by U.S. public diplomacy professionals. They cannot use modern communication tools available elsewhere, so they rely more on traditional ones such as exchanges and personal contact. The work being done by individual PAOs and CAOs can contribute to its advancement, and at the same time serve American national interests. Sierra Leone is small, and underdeveloped, but is ready to receive, learn from, implement, and respect American policies, ideas, and inf luences and should be treated as such. Notes 1. Senator Richard Lugar, “U.S Public Diplomacy—Time to Get Back in The Game. A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate,” February 13, 2009. 2. “Human Development Report. United Nations Development Programme,” 2009. 3. Ambassador June Carter Perry, U.S. Embassy, interview, August 7, 2009. 4. Ola Criss, management officer, U.S. Embassy, interview, August 5, 2009. 5. Foreign service national, PAO Section U.S. Embassy, Freetown, Sierra Leone, e-mail interview, November 4, 2009. 6. Aminata Wurie, Sierra Leone, e-mail interview, November 15, 2009. 7. Abdul Kapkra-Massally, FSN U.S. Embassy, Sierra Leone, e-mail interview, November 2, 2009. 8. Foreign Service National, interview, November 4, 2009. 9. Danna Van Brandt, PAO, U.S. Embassy, Freetown, Sierra Leone, e-mail interview, December 3, 2009. 10. “Sierra Leone: Belated International Engagement Ends a War,” U.S. State Department Diplomats Handbook, p. 88. 11. Foreign Service National, interview, November 4, 2009. 12. Sesay Ndeye, graduate student, personal interview, November 3, 2009. 13. “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” The New York Times, June 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes. com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html. 14. Foreign Service National, interview, November 4, 2009. 15. Ibid. 16. Elisa, Tulani, personal experience, June 2009. 17. Ibid. 18. Van Brandt, interview, December 3, 2009. 19. Danna Van Brandt, personal interview, August 5, 2009. 20. Van Brandt, interview, December 3, 2009. 21. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. “Press Briefing By Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale,” Whitehouse. gov., July 15, 2009. 22. Ibid.

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23. Sesay, interview. 24. Van Brandt, interview. 25. Senior official, Africa Bureau, U.S. State Department, e-mail interview, November 7, 2009. 26. Van Brandt, interview. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Lugar, “U.S Public Diplomacy,” 7. 33. Sesay, interview. 34. Author’s observation based on working at the embassy, summer 2009. 35. Lugar, “U.S Public Diplomacy,” 45. 36. Ibid. 37. Jim Hunter, State Department Africa Bureau, telephone interview, November 25, 2009. 38. U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General. “Report of Inspection, Bureau of African Affairs,” August 2009, 28.

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PA RT

I I I

Public Diplomacy in Asia

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CH A P T E R

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The Staying Power of Personal Contact in South Korean Public Diplomacy Yoon - Je ong H uh

The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, has been described as a longtime “blood alliance.” Korea has shared core values such as democracy and liberal economy with the United States, and they also share strategic interests. To help contain communist expansion from North Korea, more than 1.7 million U.S. soldiers1 fought in the Korean War (1950–53). With this memory, South Korea participated in the Vietnam War on the anticommunist side. These experiences helped make relations between the ROK and the United States one of the most successful alliances in the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War, however, posed a new challenge to the ROK-U.S. alliance. Anticommunism, which once served as a strong impetus to close coordination, was also a justification for the South Korean government to suppress domestic discussion of the bilateral relationship with the United States, but that is diminished now. Mutual perceptions on the alliance have changed dramatically, and South Koreans demand more say in the alliance. Sometimes this demand has led to massive demonstrations involving provocative anti-American slogans. American diplomats have tried to deal with their underlying causes through public diplomacy. This study analyzes what caused these public displays of anti-Americanism, and examines what policies the U.S government implemented to deal with them.

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Public Opinion in South Korea and the U.S. Relationship Security Issues The governments of the United States and ROK have successfully maintained a close alliance since the Cold War. The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement of October 1953, right after the Korean War, has symbolized this alliance as a basis for the foreign relations of South Korea.2 But it has been defined as an autonomy-security tradeoff model.3 The United States provides South Korea with security and economic assistance, and South Korea, in return, has given up some autonomy in domestic and foreign policies. For example, critics complain that wartime operational control over South Korean military units belongs to the commander in chief of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), who is a U.S. military officer. In recent years, however, as South Korea experienced rapid growth in its economy and democratization in its society, this asymmetric relationship resulted in growing complaints that Korea had given up critical elements of its sovereignty that became a significant public diplomacy problem. These complaints boiled over in 2002 when two Korean middle school girls were accidentally run over and killed by a U.S. military vehicle on Yangju highway. This incident led to massive demonstrations against the United States. According to Article 22 of the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the U.S. government had primary jurisdiction over these U.S. servicemen since the offense occurred during the performance of their official duty, participating in a training exercise. Given the sensitivity of this issue in the Korean politics, the South Korean government asked the United States to waive this right, but they declined. Making matters worse was the fact that the ratio of cases over which the South Korean authority exercised jurisdiction was then (2002) below 8 percent. However, the Korean government made continuous efforts to improve the implementation process of the SOFA in order to minimize public inconveniences in hosting American forces and provide a stable stationing environment for U.S. forces in Korea. As a result, the number of cases in which Korea exercised criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed by U.S. soldiers had increased, from fewer than 8 percent of the cases in 2001 to nearly 24 percent in 2004 and 34 percent by 2007.4 When the South Korean government failed to take custody of the U.S. soldiers involved in the 2002 case, however, this triggered a

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feeling among the Korean population that the ROK-U.S. relationship was unfair. These sentiments focused on the U.S. military presence in South Korea and led to strong demands by the Korean public, including slogans during the demonstrations that American troops should withdraw from Korea. One Korean commentator said that at least the rules and procedures should be revised.5 Opinion polls on the U.S. military presence show this changed perception. A Gallup Korea poll6 demonstrated that 40.6 percent of respondents said the U.S. troops should withdraw on a gradual basis and an additional 4.5 percent said that they should withdraw right away. It was seen that 31.2 percent thought the U.S. troops should station for a fair amount of time and only 19.3 percent responded that the U.S. troops should remain. This percentage of responses supporting the withdrawal of U.S. troops was unprecedentedly high in 2003, right after the Yangju Highway incident in 2002.7 These nationwide sentiments that triggered demonstrations in 2002 and 2003 meant that this issue had become not only a security issue but also a public diplomacy one. Economic Issues The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KOR-U.S. FTA), concluded in April 2007, is another major contentious issue for Korean public opinion. The two governments expected that the FTA agreement would lead to a new chapter in the U.S.-Korean relationship and strengthen the alliance itself.8 However, there was speculation among anti-FTA groups that there must have been some kind of pressure from the United States on the Korean government, leading to disadvantages to South Korea.9 Seeking to gain public support for the opposition to the ratification of the free trade agreement in the National Assembly, these anti-FTA groups and opposition parties pledged to rally massive but peaceful demonstrations against it. Opinion polls regarding the KOR-U.S. FTA show this speculation has spread among the Korean population.10 When asked whether this agreement is expected to be good for South Korea, 58.5 percent responded that it would be beneficial in that it would enhance economic competitiveness in the long run, but a majority said the Korean government had done badly in the negotiation. They pointed out possible negative impact on domestic industries (54.4 percent) and concerns about economic and cultural dependence on the United States (23.1 percent) as two major reasons for this negative assessment. Thus although many Korean people expect this agreement will ultimately

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bring benefits to South Korea, they suspect that their government failed to defend national interests at the negotiating table with the United States. This is also an implied criticism of the United States. The Korean public’s unhappiness over trade was exacerbated in 2008 when Korea attempted to reopen its market to American beef imports, and critics warned that this would bring in mad cow disease. The U.S. beef issue was linked to this FTA as a prerequisite for the U.S. congressional ratification of the free trade agreement,11 aggravating public opinion about the negotiations. Public demonstrations, first protesting against the government, and then focusing on the United States, all took place. According to a poll conducted by Gallup Korea in June 2008, right after the conclusion of the beef deal between the two governments, 81.2 percent of the respondents said that their government should renegotiate the U.S. beef import deal to change the importing conditions.12 Rallies in the streets became violent because Korean people were sensitive to the issue of food. Opponents said that this was tantamount to giving up public health in return for economic benefits from the FTA.13 Despite the South Korean government’s position that FTA and beef import issue were separate matters, opposition parties were determined to link the beef issue with the FTA’s ratification.14 These debates and demonstrations against the KOR-U.S. FTA and the U.S. beef import issue show that the Korean public can mobilize itself in an unprecedented way both in terms of size and demographics. On May 2, 2008, when the protests began, the police estimated the total number of participants to be around ten thousand, and it was noteworthy that middle-school and high-school students, who gathered voluntarily by sending text messages to their friends accounted for 60–70 percent.15 On June 10, the number of participants reached a high of sixty thousand.16 This showed the popularity of the demonstration as a tool to inf luence government policy, even where national interests and credibility of the government are at stake. Social Issues In the context of those street demonstrations, American public diplomacy officials have sought to strengthen mutual understanding through the means of educational exchanges, taking advantage of the fact that the United States is already the most preferred destination of Korean students and professionals for study. In 2009 more than seventy thousand South Korean students were in America, sixty thousand in China, and about twenty thousand each in Australia, the United Kingdom,

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and Japan.17 Sponsoring exchanges is especially productive because those students and professionals having first-hand experiences in the United States are those who have the highest chances of becoming leaders in South Korean society, and that experience usually helps them understand America better. Recently, American officials have taken two important steps in this direction. First, on November 17, 2008, the United States made citizens of the Republic of Korea eligible to travel to the United States using the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Any Korean citizen who is traveling for business, pleasure, or transit only and staying in the United States for ninety days or less does not require a visa. This clearly brought greater convenience to Korean travelers, expanded the range of possible interactions between the two peoples, and upgraded the bilateral ties to a substantial partnership, thus serving public diplomacy purposes.18 Second, Korea and the United States established a distinguished student exchange program, called the Work, English Studying and Travel (WEST) program. WEST allows qualifying university students and recent university graduates to enter the United States for a period of up to eighteen months on J-1 exchange visitor visas that will allow them to study English, participate in professional-level internships, and travel independently.19 Unlike other exchange programs, WEST allows participants not only to study English, which is the highest concern of most Korean students, but also to work, which will affect their future careers. Public Opinion in South Korea on the United States and on U.S. Foreign Policies The South Korean people today have mixed views on the United States. There are many economic and personal exchanges between the two countries, but the Korean people engage in anti-American demonstrations when controversial issues emerge. This mixed reaction can be explained by distinguishing their opinions on the United States itself from their opinions of U.S. policies. According to an opinion poll conducted by Gallup Korea20 that asked Koreans which nation they prefer, 15.5 percent named the United States, 9 percent Switzerland, 8 percent Japan, 4 percent New Zealand, and 3 percent China. However, opinion on specific American administrations shows variations. In 2004,21 65 percent of Korean respondents said that they liked the United States, but 72 percent said they hated

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President Bush. It means that they distinguish the United States and the Bush administration’s policies. Korean opinion has improved with the advent of the Obama administration.22 On the eve of the American election, 50 percent of South Korean respondents said that they preferred to see Obama elected president of the United States, showing that they expected he would improve U.S. policies toward South Korea, and only 25 percent preferred John McCain. Therefore, the anti-American sentiment among the public in South Korea does not arise primarily from misperceptions about the United States or its people, but instead from the public’s interpretations of U.S. policies. Critics interpret the negotiations between the two governments as an example of a major power, the United States, exerting pressure on a minor one, South Korea. Challenges to U.S. Public Diplomacy from a New Wave of Anti-American Sentiment New Anti-American Sentiment Anti-American sentiment in the twenty-first century is different from that in the past. First, participation in the demonstrations now has spread to all classes and all age groups. Anti-Americanism in the 1970s and 1980s was ideologically left-leaning, and protests were usually led by university students who had leftist views. For example, in March 1982, the American Cultural Center in Pusan, the second largest city in South Korea, was set on fire by South Korean students. In a statement, the students said they were beginning an anti-U.S. struggle to eliminate U.S. power from Korea and they blamed the United States for causing a “permanent national division of Korea” and for “supporting the military regime that refuses democratization, social revolution, and development.”23 In contrast, in the demonstrations in 2002 and 2008, many Koreans participated regardless of age, gender, and social class. Even family members took part in the rallies together and mothers who were most concerned with food were there with their babies and children. It was an emotional reaction, but that emotion was pervasive at that time. Second, many demonstrators today regard these rallies as simply a kind of cultural festival where they can freely express their opinions, not as serious fights against the Korean government or America. Protesters

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choose candlelight vigils as a tool for demonstration. They sometimes mock the Korean government’s attitude with graffiti on roadblocks that the government installs to prevent demonstrators from coming into the government complex area where the U.S. Embassy is situated. They chant slogans, and sometimes famous musicians participate in the rallies and sing. It is a new form of anti-American sentiment in the twenty-first century—nonviolent but intense and massive. This new kind of sentiment has been manifested as large demonstrations for two reasons. First, an identity change has taken place among the people who no longer regard South Korea as a poverty-stricken country because it successfully achieved economic growth and democracy with unprecedented speed. This brought confidence to the South Korean people and caused them to demand a more equal relationship with the United States. Second, the Internet was crucial in rapidly spreading ideas and news, making it easier for a crowd to be gathered together to speak out on issues of mutual concern. For instance, Internet users and bloggers actively participated in the online debates by means of postings about new information or photographs taken while joining a rally, on Daum communication, the most widely used Internet portal site. There is also an online debate forum named Agora, where heated debates took place in 2008. The number of visitors to the Agora debate forum page reached its highest by the first week of June 2008, when the situation in the street also reached its peak in terms of size of demonstration.24 The U.S. Public Diplomacy Response This new wave of anti-American sentiment constituted a new challenge to U.S. public diplomacy in Korea, and is of considerable concern to American public diplomacy practitioners. One public diplomacy officer who served in Seoul said that anti-American demonstration is an opposition to certain U.S. policies. He explained: I think many of us at the Embassy did not think that so-called “anti-American sentiment” existed in Korea, at least in the way that it was portrayed in the media. Clearly, there were many Koreans who did not approve of or support U.S. foreign policy. There were also many Koreans who disagreed with U.S. actions in the region, such as U.S. Forces Korea basing issues, Embassy construction, bilateral trade, etc. However, to just say that these people were “anti-American” does not really address the fact that many

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Koreans like the United States, want to visit the United States, have family in the United States, and want to study in the United States. I think Korean opinion of the Unites States is far more nuanced that simply “pro-American” and “anti-American.”25 Another public diplomacy official in Washington, D.C. emphasized that public diplomacy is a long-term process. She said, When such incident occurs (Yangju Highway Incident), it is important to make proper apology to Korean people. But, public diplomacy is not merely about reacting to certain incidents. To explain why this issue is important to the both countries is also important, because public diplomacy is constant thing . . . What is important is this. First, find the right audience to target. Second, find the right tone. At last engage people, especially young generation.26 Patrick Linehan, the current public affairs officer in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, however, emphasized that the demonstration in 2008 was much more about left-wing dissatisfaction with a new, conservative president, than with anti-U.S. or anti-American attitudes. In his opinion, the beef issue was an excuse, not a reason.27 Nevertheless, he fears that the mismanagement of information can develop into a great detriment to the U.S. image. If proper information is not successfully provided, the public opinion in Korea could become worse, forming a distorted perception of the United States. “I don’t think we could have ‘fixed’ the summer 2008 demonstrations. I do think many important lessons about public diplomacy were learned from the 2002 incident . . . (In the demonstration in 2008,) We saw how misinformation and disinformation can go viral so much quicker in the new media age.” He reiterated the importance of providing proper information in a timely manner, noting that information spreads rapidly, but sometimes without much concern for journalistic ethics. He cited the case of “PD Notepad,” a well-known MBC documentary program, that aired special reports in April–May 2008 on the dangers of mad cow disease associated with U.S. beef. This report contained many mistranslations and omissions, including the claim that U.S. beef has high chances of mad cow disease and Koreans are more vulnerable to mad cow disease than any other ethnic groups due to their genetic features. This provoked an emotional outcry from the Korean public over the resumption of U.S. beef imports.28 Linehan thinks that this incorrect information

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plus ignorance about U.S. beef led to the 2008 demonstrations. U.S. officials needed at that time to have correct information ready when people came off of the barricades and got over the emotional orgy of the candlelight vigils.29 U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts to Deal with the Challenge Person-to-Person Contact and New Media Programming One of main features of the media environment in Korea is that this nation is one of the most wired countries in the world. According to OECD statistics, Korea at 14,735,375 has the fifth largest population of Internet subscribers as of 2008, after the United States (at 70,345,756), Germany (at 28,781,000), Japan (at 32,720,197), and the United Kingdom (at 18,277,047). Given its comparatively small population, Korea is, therefore, one of the most Internet-friendly countries in the world. In terms of broadband share among total Internet subscribers, almost 100 percent are broadband and not dial-up. Also, 80.9 percent of households have access to a computer at home.30 More important is that Internet is one of the most frequently used media for getting news. A Gallup Korea survey found that more than 20 percent of respondents use the Internet to get political news or to look at political opinions of others nearly every day, and an additional 15 percent do it once to three times a week. Therefore, the Internet has great potential to be a useful public diplomacy tool to reach the South Korean public. And not only traditional media members such as journalists but also Internet users constitute an important target audience for news management activities. Public diplomacy professionals know that dealing effectively with the Korean media requires person-to-person contact with media members. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul, therefore, has held quarterly off-the-record seminars where senior embassy officials have in-depth discussions with journalists on a range of bilateral issues. This proved useful in establishing a good working relationship with various news outlets and individual journalists.31 This is a long-term process of engagement for building trust. If a public diplomacy official wants the public of the host country to listen to his ambassador in a crisis, then he needs to have been working on building trust for a long time before that.32 One of the programs for building long-term engagement with Internet users is “Café USA,” an

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online community, partnering with Daum Communication. It provides sources of news, and the ambassador and other embassy officials regularly participate in web chats. This site also links to Ambassador Stephens’ blog, where she writes not only on policy, like the six-party talks and the NPT, but also about hiking, temple visits, and Korean food.33 These are efforts to build trust, to make friends, to engage, so that they will be accessible when the Americans need friends to listen to them. When there were demonstrations in the streets, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul focused on just quietly providing accurate information. They posted the information on the safety of the U.S. food supply on their website and distributed it to the various listserv audiences and through direct information outreach conducted by Information Research Center (IRC), including seminars and symposia.34 Information Programs: A U.S. Presidential Election Watch Opinion leaders are important target audiences in dealing with antiAmerican sentiment in Korean society. Some with leftist views and suspicions about the United States, including teachers, professors, and other intellectuals have their own audiences that they have special access to, and they can make use of their professional activities to spread their opinions. One example is the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers’ Union (the teachers’ union). In the demonstrations in the 2000s, this group played a role in spreading information and ideas to their audience of middle school and high school students. They attempted to hang banners at elementary, middle, and high schools protesting U.S. beef, to “educate” about the risks of mad cow disease, in an effort to politicize the beef issue in schools to create anti-government and antiU.S. sentiment.35 However, unlike in the past, the 2008 demonstrations were primarily led by teenage girls, rather than by a teacher group. Students mobilized themselves through sending mobile text messages to their friends. According to a survey about political consciousness of these teenage students who participated in the rallies, 51.7 percent of respondents said that their “friends” were the most inf luential in their participation, not any other groups such as teachers and parents from the 386 generation.36 They disagreed with reports in some mainstream newspapers that they were being manipulated from behind the scene not knowing anything about the issue.37

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The public diplomacy section at the U.S. Embassy organized a “U.S. Presidential Election Watch Event” to reach out to this group of opinion leaders since the Korean general public was very interested in the U.S. presidential election. Kathleen Stephens, the U.S. ambassador to Korea, hosted the event at her residence on Election Day, November 5, 2008. It was open to all Koreans, but the target audience was opinion leaders who were interested in U.S. political affairs and Americans; they watched the results of the election together with Americans. The public diplomacy staff also provided the Korean public with pamphlets explaining the election and held special election-related events such as quiz contests. They evaluated the program as effective in spreading American ideas and information on the U.S. political system to the Korean public. New Programs to Reach Out to the Younger Generation University students in South Korea tend to be very active in terms of social and political participation. In the 1980s, this group played a critical role in achieving democracy in South Korean society through political struggles against military authoritarian regimes. The most significant movement was “June Democratic Uprising” on June 10 in 1987, which forced President Chun Doo-hwan to give up an attempt to prolong his authoritarian power. He agreed to rewrite the constitution and to reintroduce direct presidential elections that allowed opposition leaders to compete. Koreans remember June 10, 1987, as a milestone in the nation’s democratic advancement. The general mood of those students at that time was far more left-leaning than that of their parents, or their next generations. Their participation in the democracy movement of the 1980s encouraged them to continue active participation in the social discourse about democracy. Similarly, in the twenty-first-century demonstrations, students were among the main participants. University students staged large-scale memorial marches in association with civic groups on June 10, 2008, to commemorate the uprising of 1987. It was an attempt to link the protests against the U.S. beef imports and the Lee Myung-bak government to the historic pro-democracy movement, and thereby elevate the importance of the demonstrations to the realm of democratic progress in this nation. As a result, participation in the 2008 anti-U.S. beef protests reached its peak on that day.38 American public diplomacy staff in South Korea developed a program they called “The Embassy Youth Forum: Real People Talking,”

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intended to reach out to these politically active university students, and to improve Korean-American mutual understanding of cultures, values, and politics. Korean university students meet American guest speakers and discuss contemporary issues facing each nation, including controversial subjects such as the U.S. beef issue. The first forum started on April 9, 2008. In the second and third forums, held in May and June 2008, respectively, when the situation of protests in the streets reached a serious level, all the debates were about the U.S. beef import issue. Student participants raised the issue of mad cow disease and U.S. beef; American speakers explained that there had not been a single case of death due to mad cow disease in the United States and that only two cases had been confirmed there. Participants regarded this new attempt to engage directly with student audiences as successful because correct information came from the right people. A student participant commented that constructive debate about this issue had never before taken place and said that information and debates from Korean media were very politicized.39 Conclusion The primary source of anti-American sentiment is from opposition to U.S. policies, not from generalized criticism of the United States itself. It is based on popular South Korean frustrations that Korea cannot decide its own fate due to pressure from outside, meaning from the United States. When the United States drew a defense line, the Acheson line, through Korea at the end of World War II, South Korea was left at the end of the Korean War behind a defense perimeter provided by the United States against the continuing communist threat from North Korea, and when the Carter administration attempted to withdraw U.S. troops without any consultation with Seoul in the 1970s, South Korea was left once again a weakened state. This kind of experience enhanced the sense of insecurity and distrust toward the United States. Experienced public diplomacy professionals believe however that anti-Americanism is no longer a major issue in U.S.-Korea relations40 because Koreans are hopeful the Obama administration will bring changes in U.S. foreign policies. American analysts believe that the sentiments shown in the demonstrations in 2002 and 2008 were no more than just temporary phenomena that can be triggered by mismanagement of policy. They concede that the 2008 demonstrations were caused more by sentiment against the Bush administration than by

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hostility to America generally. However, they reason that the Korean public reacted to these issues in an emotional way only because the country in question was the United States and America as a superpower is a big target. Korean frustration regarding their lack of inf luence over the decision-making processes directly related to their lives brought about the massive demonstrations in the streets. This frustration was also seen in the demonstration in 2002, when middle school girls died as a result of an incident involving Americans.41 This kind of emotion was so pervasive at that time that explanations and appeals to the rationality of the Korean public by the U.S. authority failed to dampen the criticism. Overall, U.S. public diplomacy efforts to deal with this anti-American sentiment in Korean society have been partially successful because public diplomacy officers and others at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul directly engaged with appropriate target audience members. They understood the nature of this sentiment and media environment of Korea. They effectively took advantage of the features of the Korean media environment by using new media programming, enhanced by personal contact. The importance of personal contact and local management of the public diplomacy program was illustrated dramatically in 2006 when some remarks by U.S. officials made Korean criticism worse. When bone fragments found in a shipment from the United States were suspected of causing mad cow disease, Korean officials sent back those shipments based on the standard at the time that allowed shipment only of boneless meat from cattle under thirty months. However, Mike Johanns, the U.S. secretary of agriculture, made a comment that such bone fragments were very negligible and criticized this measure of the Korean authorities as an excuse to reject U.S. beef imports.42 This comment was considered very inf lammatory and stirred up anti-U.S. reactions.43 The intention was to make it clear that U.S. beef is safe or that U.S. soldiers are innocent, but the Korean public took the comment emotionally. The U.S. authorities should have dealt with this anti-U.S. sentiment first, but an inadvertent comment by a Washington official preempted that effort. Notes 1. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea, “Korean War & UN Nations,” available at http://new.mnd.go.kr/mndEng/DefensePolicy/625NUN/scale/20071016/1_2007.jsp (accessed November 10, 2009).

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2. The Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America, “Korea-US Relations,” available at http://www.koreaembassy.org/bilateral/political/kor_index2. asp?subgubun=3 (accessed November 10, 2009). 3. James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4 (November 1991), 910. 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “2008 Diplomatic White Paper,” pp. 51–52, available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/whitepaper/index.jsp (accessed November 28, 2009). 5. Han-wool Chung and Nae-young Lee, “Anti-U.S. Public Opinion and Korea-U.S. Alliance: Opinion Polls in December, 2002 and June 2003,” National Strategy, Vol. 80, No. 3 (2003), 57–82 (Korean). 6. Gallup Korea, “Opinion on U.S. Military Presence,” September 2003. All the polls conducted by Gallup Korea are available at http://panel.gallup.co.kr/svcdb/main.asp (Korean; accessed November 2009). 7. According to a similar poll conducted in 1993, 17.1 percent responded that the U.S. troops should withdraw in two–three years and only 4.9 percent said they should withdraw right away; 37. percent responded that the U.S. military presence should be maintained at least for five–ten years, and an additional 33.8 percent said that they should continue to station for more than ten years. Gallup Korea, “Opinion on the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces,” May 1993. 8. Minister for Trade of the Republic of Korea, “Korea’s Economic Policy and Its Implications in the Region,” speech, Microsoft Government Leaders Forum (April 18, 2007, Beijing), available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/speech/trade/index.jsp (accessed October 30, 2009); “All in all, the KORUS FTA will promote not only our bilateral economic relations, but also further strengthen the more-than-50-year alliance between our two countries.” 9. Hae In Shin, “Civic Groups Escalate Anti-FTA Protest,” The Korea Herald, April 4, 2007); at a rally against the conclusion of the KORUS FTA, Oh Jong-ryeol, cochairman of the Korean Alliance against the Korea-U.S. FTA, a coalition of activists, said, “We ask for decampment of the Roh government, which made negotiations in favor of the United States, not Korea.” 10. Gallup Korea, “Assessment of KOR-US FTA,” April 2007. 11. Ha-won Jung, “Cutler Tells Korea: Bring on the Beef,” JoongAng Daily, October 17, 2007, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2881616 (accessed October 30, 2009); Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler said, “The resolution of the issue of U.S.(beef ) imports to Korea would help (the congressional ratification of the free trade agreement).” 12. Gallup Korea, “Opinion on the Necessity of Renegotiation on U.S. Beef,” May 2008. 13. In a TV program “100-Minute Debate” ( June 12, 2008), a female university student, one of the members of a civic panel, said, “President Lee Myung-bak once said that public health is the highest priority, but he recently mentioned that promoting exports of cellular phones or automobiles (to the United States) is important. I think this change of attitude is no more than just a temporary measure . . . The government keeps saying about negative economic impact (resulted from the opposition to the beef import issue). I regard it as threatening the Korean public with negative impact on the economy”; available at http://www.imbc.com/ broad/tv/culture/toron/vod/?kind=image&progCode=1000842100537100000&page Num=1&pageSize=10&cornerFlag=0&ContentTypeID=1&ProgramGroupID=0 (accessed October 3, 2009). 14. When Korean lawmakers in the National Assembly discussed the ratification of the free trade agreement, some made attempts to pressure the government into renegotiation aimed at changing beef import conditions to become more favorable to Korea. Dae-woong Jin, “Beef Dominates hearing on FTA,” The Korea Herald, May 14, 2008.

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15. Ji-sun Yang, “Teenagers Accounted for 60% of the Anti-U.S. Beef Protests” (Korean), Kookmin Ilbo, May 4, 2008, available at http://news.kukinews.com/article/view.asp?page= 1&gCode=soc&arcid=0920895991&cp=nv (accessed January 10, 2010). 16. In Seoul alone, organizers estimated about four hundred thousand people attended the vigils. Police put the figure at around sixty thousand. Hae-yeon Kim, “Largest Candlelight Vigils against U.S. Beef ” (Korean), Yonhap News, June 11, 2008, available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid =0002122750. 17. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2009 Statistics about Korean Students Studying Overseas, available at http://www.mest.go.kr/me_kor/inform/info_data/ cooper/1260853_10833.html (accessed November 30, 2009). 18. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, “Signing of the MOU on Korea’s Joining of the Visa Waiver Program,” Press Release, April 18, 2008, available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/pressrelease/index.jsp (accessed November 11, 2009). 19. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, “Announcement of the Operational Guidelines of the WEST Program,” Press Release, December 15, 2008, available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/pressrelease/index.jsp (accessed November 1, 2009). 20. Gallup Korea, “40 Items That Koreans Like Most,” pp. 17–18, June 17, 2004, available at http://panel.gallup.co.kr/report/main.asp (accessed November 20, 2009). 21. Won-ki Choi, “I Like the U.S. but I Hate Bush,” Joongang Daily, October 14, 2004, available at http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?total_id=400921 (accessed November 20, 2009). 22. Julie Ray, “In Developed Asia, a Clear Preference for Obama,” Gallup, October 21, 2008, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/111223/Developed-Asia-Clear-Preference-Obama. aspx (accessed November 20, 2009). 23. For more information about anti-U.S. struggles in 1980s, see Federal Research Division, South Korea; A Country Study (4th ed), Library of Congress, 1997, p. 24; available at http:// books.google.com/books?id=_adMWevoEq0C&hl=ko&source=gbs_navlinks_s (accessed November 21, 2009). 24. A graph that shows the number of visitors to the Agora webpage is available from the following link: http://kr.blog.yahoo.com/lodemtrees/50715?m=c&no=50715 (accessed November 21, 2009). 25. U.S. public diplomacy official who served in U.S. Embassy, Seoul, interview by e-mail, November 5, 2009. 26. U.S. public diplomacy official, interview, Washington D.C., November 6, 2009. 27. Patrick Linehan, public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, interview by e-mail, December 9, 2009. 28. Hyun-jung Bae, “TV Producers Cleared of Beef Report Charges,” The Korea Herald, January 21, 2010 (accessed January 21, 2010). http://www.koreaherald.com/national/ Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100121000031. 29. Linehan, interview. 30. Statistics are available at http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_2649_34449_3 3987543_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD, “Internet Subscribers in the Total for OECD” (last updated on September 21, 2009); “Households With Access to a Home Computer” (last updated on July 22, 2009). 31. U.S. public diplomacy official, interview, November 5, 2009. 32. Linehan, interview. 33. Café USA and Amb. Stephens Blog are available ar http://cafe.daum.net/usembassy. 34. Linehan, interview. 35. For details regarding the attempts by the teachers’ union to politicize the issue of U.S. beef, see “[Editorial] Teacher’s Place,” The Korea Herald, July 5, 2009.

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36. “The 386 generation” refers to the generation who has experiences of participating as university students in the democracy movement in 1980s. 37. The survey was conducted by the Korean Society Institute of Korea University, led by Professor Chul-kyu Kim. The survey results were analyzed in the following article (Korean). Dong-wook Shin Yoon, “The Teenagers Light Candles Due to the Outrage against the Lee Government,” The Hankyoreh 21, June 23, 2008, available at http://h21.hani.co.kr/section021046000/2008/06/021046000200806230716043.html (accessed 25 November, 2009). 38. For details on the situation on June 10, see Sang-ho Song, “Tension Escalates as One Million Gather for Vigils,” The Korea Herald, June 10, 2008. 39. The Embassy of the United States of America in the Republic of Korea, “The 2nd Embassy Youth Forum : Real People Talking,” May 7, 2008. The video clips are available at http:// seoul.usembassy.gov/eyf_blog2.html. Patrick J. Linehan, minister-counselor for public affairs, was a moderator, and Susan B. Phillips, deputy agricultural attaché, and Heather Grell, economic specialist at the embassy, participated as guest speakers. 40. Linehan, interview. 41. Tae-hyun Kim, “The New Wave of Anti-Americanism in South Korea: Its Political Psychological Roots and Implications for Foreign Policy,” Korea and International Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 20–30. 42. About Mike Johanns’s comment, see Michigan Farmer, “Ag Secretary Disappointed with South Korea,” December 6, 2006, available at http://michiganfarmer.com/story.aspx/ag/ secretary/disappointed/with/south/korea/8/974 (accessed November 25, 2009). 43. The following editorial criticizes Mike Johanns’s comment and urges the United States to make sincere efforts to win back Korean consumers’ confidence. “Fears Over US Beef,” The Korea Times, August 3, 2007, available format http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/ news/opinon/2007/08/202_7706.html (accessed November 25, 2009).

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CH A P T E R

8

Economic Issues and Anti-Americanism in Japan Yoh e i O gawa

Anti-American sentiment—a mixture of hatred and fascination— likely exists in almost all countries. Given public diplomacy’s mission to “inform, engage, and inf luence global audiences . . . to reach out beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics and sustained access and inf luence in important sectors of foreign societies,”1 dealing with popular anti-Americanism in target countries is crucial for U.S. public diplomacy. Japan is one of the United States’ closest allies, and, the Japanese public’s sense of affinity with the United States has remained at a high level compared with other countries. It has been between 70 and 80 percent for almost all the time since the 1980s (even in the worst year, which was 1986, it remained at 67.5 percent), while the sense of affinity to European countries in the 1990s f luctuated between 40 and 60 percent. However, anti-American sentiment in Japan still inf luences its relationship with the United States considerably.2 A series of economic conf licts, which emerged with Japan’s rise as a new economic power after World War II and which escalated since the 1980s as the U.S. trade deficit with Japan increased, have played a large role in raising anti-American sentiment among the Japanese public. Dealing with those economic issues is very important for U.S. national interests. This study will examine the operational strategies and tactics of American public diplomacy officials in doing so.

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Yohei Ogawa The U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship and Anti-Americanism: An Overview 1980s–Early 1990s

Economic relations between the United States and Japan have experienced several major twists in the last few decades. Friction in the bilateral economic relationship became prominent in the 1980s, when the United States experienced sharp increases in its trade deficit to Japan (trade deficit grew more than five times from 10.5 billion dollars in 1980 to 56.9 billion in 1987 at its peak in the 1980s).3 Throughout the 1980s, Japan’s exports and its overall economy boomed while the U.S. economy sagged. This resulted in a gaping bilateral trade difference and a series of testy economic negotiations aimed at narrowing the gap. For example, in 1985 the Reagan administration initiated the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) talks, the first multisector negotiating framework aimed at covering trade negotiations in five sectors simultaneously. The sectors, including telecommunications, medical equipment, and auto parts, were selected because of their potential to facilitate increased U.S. exports to Japan. To increase its exports, the United States required Japan to remove what Washington claimed were “barriers” to the Japanese market.4 Confrontation over the trade imbalance raised popular U.S. concern over Japanese economic growth and provoked criticism of Japanese economic policies and business practices. Such practices as Keiretsu—a group of enterprises with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings—were seen as unique to Japan and, from the perspective of U.S. exporters and manufacturers, “unfair.” This led to an anti-Japanese attitude—described as “Japan bashing”—among the American public. The notion that Japan was outperforming the United States dominated the policy debate and was the topic of many books and journals.5 Accordingly, the American public became increasingly hostile and cautious toward Japan. This, in turn, caused resentment among many in the Japanese public, and it therefore became a public diplomacy problem for the United States. A 1990 U.S. opinion poll conducted by NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation) and ABC shows this trend explicitly. In response to the question “Which do you think is the greater threat to the security of the United States, the military force of the Soviet Union or the economic power of Japan?” 57 percent of respondents chose Japan while 38 percent chose the Soviet Union.6 Concern over

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growing Japanese economic power led the U.S. Congress to develop and pass major trade legislation, such as the Super 301 Provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which introduced retaliatory measures against the unfair trade practices of other countries. These “other countries” were mainly assumed to be Japan.7 Meanwhile, economic prosperity promoted a self-congratulatory tone amongst the Japanese public. Yasushi Watanabe describes the public atmosphere in Japan in the late 1980s: “With the unprecedented prosperity of the Japanese economy and the prolonged downturn of the U.S. economy, the idea that ‘we have nothing to learn from the United States anymore’ f lourished in Japan, and the United States was increasingly perceived as declining, decaying, and falling apart.”8 As an example of this high national self-esteem, Watanabe highlights Nihonjin-ron (theories of “Japaneseness”), a literary genre popular during this period, which emphasized Japan’s uniqueness as a major factor enabling its rapid economic success.9 In reaction to “Japan-bashing” in the United States and coercive U.S. government requirements for change in Japanese policies and business practices, anti-American sentiment emerged among the Japanese public. Watanabe explains that the expression kenbei (嫌米, hating the United States), first appeared in Gendai yogo no kiso chishiki (The Encyclopedia of Contemporary Words) in 1992. Watanabe perceives kenbei as the result of “Japan-bashing” and gaiatsu (outside pressure that required Japan to make its market more accessible to U.S. companies and products) incidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which together destructed the Japanese image of the United States.10 Perhaps the most prominent of the gaiatsu incidents was the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), a comprehensive economic negotiation framework initiated by the George H. W. Bush administration in 1989. Following the 1985 MOSS talks, the SII introduced a broad range of requirements designed to alter Japanese economic policies and business practices.11 In a 1991 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis report, Mike Mochizuki warned that “aggressive liberalism” such as the SII risked “provoking a nationalistic backlash from Japan.”12 As Watanabe showed, such a “backlash” was already visible at that time. 1990s–2000s Beginning in the early 1990s, the economic climate in both Japan and the United States changed substantially. While the Japanese economy dropped into stagnation for more than a decade after the asset bubble’s

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bursting, the U.S. economy boomed after its transformation from a manufacturing to a service base, which allowed it to take a global lead in information technologies.13 According to Watanabe, the image of the United States bashing and pressuring Japan gradually faded in the mid1990s to the early 2000s, ref lecting the reversal of U.S. and Japanese economic conditions. As Watanabe says, “the perception of the United States as the sole winner in the new world order of globalization in terms of culture, finance, information, military, politics, science, and technology became the dominant one.”14 In this period, Watanabe argues that anti-American views spread to various social, political, and ideological groups in Japan. During the Cold War anti-American sentiment “had more to do with liberals and academia, the mass media, labor unions, peace and human rights groups, and activists on the Far Left.”15 But criticism of the United States “became increasingly conspicuous in the 1990s even among the bureaucrats, business leaders, journalists, scholars, and writers who had been known as 知米 (chibei: well-informed about the United States).”16 With most economic issues increasingly embedded in such multilateral processes as APEC and WTO, bilateral economic conf lict became less pronounced until the early 2000s.17 Economic issues aside, however, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent U.S. unilateralism under the Bush administration further damaged its image in Japan. Overview of U.S. Public Diplomacy Instruments in Japan William G. Crowell, who used to work at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, argues that while the U.S. public diplomacy program in Japan is counted as “among the most extensive and complex the U.S. government conducts worldwide,” its programs, structure, and goals “do not differ significantly from those of other major U.S. embassy programs.”18 Crowell describes the activities of the U.S. embassy in Japan in accordance with Joseph Nye’s three dimensions of public diplomacy: daily communications, strategic communication, and development of lasting relationships.19 This section will provide an overview of U.S. public diplomacy instruments in Japan, modifying and updating Crowell’s classification with information obtained by interviews with U.S. State Department and embassy officials actively—or formerly—engaged in public diplomacy toward Japan.

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Daily Communications and Publications In principle, U.S. public diplomacy in Japan is conducted by the Public Affairs Section of the Tokyo Embassy and headed by the Country Public Affairs Officer. The components of the section are as follow:20 ● ● ● ●

Information Office (“Press Office”) in Tokyo Information Resource Centers in Tokyo and the Consulates Cultural and Programming Office in Tokyo American Centers in Tokyo and the Consulates

The Information Office (Press Office) arranges press conferences, briefings, and interviews, and explicitly describes and explains American policies with press releases, background bulletins, official texts, and reference materials. The Press Office also produces American View, a quarterly online Japanese-language magazine that provides readers with articles about the United States and its relationship with Japan.21 Further, embassy and consulate officers, as well as foreign service nationals, maintain daily personal contact with opinion leaders.22 Speaker and Performance Programs Speaker and performance programs organized by the Cultural Section of the embassy are a major tool of U.S. public diplomacy in Japan. According to a former public diplomacy officer in the Tokyo Embassy, the Cultural Section invites 50–60 speakers and coordinates 150–200 programs every year.23 Speaker and performance programs are designed by the Program Development unit, a subsection of the Cultural Section, and are implemented in all the American Centers in Japan that wish to host those programs. Program topics are broad and include security, politics, economics, U.S. society, culture, and music. Gendai America Kiso Koza (Basic Courses on Contemporary America), a series of monthly programs initiated in 2004, is specifically targeted toward Japanese students and young scholars. Speakers are mainly U.S. Embassy officers and American specialists in fields such as U.S. government, presidential elections, East Asian security, university education, ethnic diversity, gender issues, volunteerism, and human rights.24 Information Resource Centers Information Resource Centers (IRCs), or U.S. Embassy Reference Services, are located in Tokyo and four other consulate cities in Japan

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(Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka). Run by American Centers in each city, IRCs play a substantial role in U.S. public diplomacy in Japan. IRCs have replaced the libraries of earlier years and are largely located in American Centers, although in 2006, one IRC in Tokyo was separated from the Tokyo American Center and moved into its embassy. The U.S. Embassy website states the goal of IRCs as “to provide specialized, accurate, and authoritative information about the United States.” 25 Their information resources cover a wide range of subject areas including government, economy, society, and culture. IRCs target people interested in the United States, especially media, scholars and researchers in universities and think tanks, politicians and Japanese government officials, companies, and business leaders. The principal activity of an IRC is its resource service, which provides information about the United States in specific areas such as diplomacy, security, politics, economics, society, and the environment. Such information is available in print and electronically, with ICS’s professional reference librarians as valuable resources to help locate such material. IRCs also receive questions about the United States through the Tokyo Embassy’s website. To supplement the resource service, IRCs provide the U.S. Information Alert, an e-mail service that delivers periodic information bulletins in Japanese to subscribers. Alerts are customized to each subscriber’s indicated areas of interest. Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs In an interview, the aforementioned former Tokyo Embassy officer stressed the importance of long-term person-to-person relationships and cited exchange programs as one of the best ways to increase mutual understanding between Japanese and U.S. citizens.26 The former officer suggested that the United States and Japan have been building a close relationship through various programs over a long period of time, which lays a firm foundation for their bilateral relations. Crowell, referring to Joseph Nye’s emphasis on long-term relationship building through cultural and educational exchanges,27 argued that “while one could offer numerous examples to support Nye’s point, none is more compelling than Japan.”28 Educational and cultural exchange programs are created and administered by the Education and Exchanges subsection of the Cultural

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Section in the Tokyo Embassy. While all programs ultimately aim to increase mutual understanding between the citizens of Japan and the United States, their specific targets vary. The Fulbright Program, which began in Japan in 1952 and is managed by the Japan-U.S. Educational Commission ( JUSEC)—a binational commission established in 1979 and funded by both governments—is one of the best-known programs. Fulbright provides grants annually for approximately forty–fifty Japanese students, researchers, educators, and journalists.29 The Mansfield Fellowship Program, which awards U.S. government officials with a two-year fellowship—including one year of full-time language and area studies training in the United States followed by another of full-time work in Japanese government offices—aims to create networks among leaders of both countries.30 The International Visitor Leadership (IVL or IV) program, considered one of the most important exchange programs,31 brings current or potential leaders in government, politics, the media, education, the arts, business, and other fields to the United States. In Japan, IVL funds approximately fifty participants annually, which makes Japan’s participation in the program among the highest in the world.32 The Mission Strategic Plan and Program Planning Each year the Tokyo Embassy devises a “Mission Strategic Plan” (MSP) or “Mission Performance Plan” (MPP),33 which guides all public diplomacy activities conducted by the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Japan. According to a current public diplomacy officer in the Tokyo Embassy,34 the Program Development unit of the Cultural section in the Embassy writes a program plan for Mission goals. Program plans generally do not change radically from year to year because goals tend to evolve slowly and incrementally. For each fiscal year, plans list themes for programs and suggest prospective speakers. The Program Development unit employs staff that specializes in these subject areas and stays abreast with current thinking in their areas of expertise through substantial reading and by attending speaking programs held by other organizations around Tokyo. The list of speakers does not change substantially from year to year either, but as new thinkers emerge, the embassy staff tries to incorporate them into its programming mix. The Tokyo Embassy asks the State Department Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) to recruit for major programs. For many

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programs, the embassy staff recruits “target of opportunity” speakers. In some cases, these are speakers who have worked with the embassy in the past and who let embassy staff know that they are passing through Japan. In other cases, the embassy staff hears of speakers through outside organizations, or identifies experts or scholars living and working in Japan temporarily. These targets of opportunity allow the embassy to stage several programs each year presenting various points of view in the same thematic area. In some cases, program coverage transcends Mission goals. For example, in recruiting for the Fulbright Program, the embassy strives to attract scholars and students to work on issues of concern to bilateral U.S.-Japan relations. However, it also targets candidates to research, study, or teach in a wider variety of fields. By offering opportunities to young scholars who show leadership potential in their chosen fields, the Fulbright Program aims to impart a greater appreciation for the United States and Japanese culture among scholars serving as “ambassadors” during their tenure overseas. Outreach through New Media The Tokyo Embassy is eager to reach a wider audience by introducing new media to public diplomacy. Examples include the embassy’s Facebook page, the embassy’s deputy chief mission’s Japanese-language blog, and the embassy’s mobile website. How Economic Issues and Anti-American Sentiment Are Addressed in U.S. Public Diplomacy The Priority of Economic Issues in U.S. Public Diplomacy in Japan According to the officials interviewed for this essay, economic issues, along with security issues, have always remained at “the top of the list” of U.S. public diplomacy concentrations in Japan.35 However, the specifics of these economic issues have changed over time. For example, in periods when market liberalization and deregulation were central in U.S.-Japan bilateral relations, these factors were ref lected in such public diplomacy activities as speaker programs. But when emphases in economic relations change, programs evolve accordingly, touching on topics such as foreign direct investment, APEC, energy, and the environment.36

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Public Diplomacy on the Economic Issues of the 1980s and Lessons from Past Economic Confrontations A State Department official engaged in public diplomacy in Japan in the 1980s in an interview ref lected on his experience during a period of acute economic conf lict with Japan.37 According to this official, the general approach of U.S. public diplomacy has not changed fundamentally since the 1980s. Its central goal has been to explain U.S. positions directly to the public to increase understanding of the United States. However, the official noted that methodology has changed as media technology has improved. While the 1980s offered only limited media such as newspapers and television news, today’s media choices— including the Internet—make it much easier for the United States to deliver its message to the Japanese public. The official suggested that in confronting the economic issues themselves, the main U.S. objective in the 1980s was to increase the Japanese public’s understanding of the benefits of open markets and fair trade. By explaining how such mechanisms would provide lower prices and more variety, U.S. officials hoped to increase popular Japanese support for removing trade barriers in the Japanese market. Officials used various instruments to address economic issues, including speeches by senior Washington officials or occasionally by the ambassador. The target audience included politicians, inf luential groups, and consumer groups, although media was also targeted to obtain broader news coverage and thus reach a wider audience. What lessons can be drawn for U.S. public diplomacy from the 1980s, and how should anti-American sentiment be approached? The official emphasized the importance of the Japanese public’s understanding of the U.S. position and the benefit to them from U.S. policies. The official added that considering the U.S. audience—both its politicians and its public—is critical in dealing with economic issues. If the U.S. public fails to understand the importance of its economic relationship with Japan, it may resort to protectionism, which would economically damage both countries. The former embassy officer mentioned in the previous section highlighted a more recent economic conf lict between the United States and Japan: the restriction of American beef imports after BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease”) was discovered in American cattle in December 2003.38 The lesson for U.S. public diplomacy, the former officer indicated, is the imperative of being “proactive.” Japanese consumers’ concern about the safety of American beef

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pushed the Japanese government to introduce stringent restrictions on the import of American beef. These restrictions were stricter than domestic American inspection rules and some U.S. exporters had difficulty satisfying the criteria. While the U.S. government insisted that American inspection rules were sufficient to ensure safety and protested the Japanese crackdown, the Japanese government continued its restriction until 2006; U.S. beef exporters suffered considerable damages due to the restrictions.39 From this incident, the former officer noted that public diplomacy must promote Japanese citizens’ understanding of U.S. policies before their concern rises and provokes harmful economic reverberations. Addressing Economic Issues: Ways and Means The former embassy officer illustrated several ways in which U.S. public diplomacy in Japan addresses economic issues, while emphasizing that specific instruments and the ways in which such issues are addressed vary according to individual situations.40 The first approach is a high-level type of public diplomacy. For example, if a senior official of the U.S. Trade Representative’s office or of the Department of Agriculture visits Japan, the Tokyo Embassy’s Press Office may arrange a press conference or individual interviews to express related U.S. policies and answer questions about those policies. In doing so, the Press Office attempts to increase the Japanese public’s and various concerned interest groups’ understanding of those issues. Press releases, speeches, and articles by the ambassador are also examples of this high-level type of public diplomacy. As Crowell pointed out, Japan has been well served by ambassadors whose stature resonated well in Japan and who had ties with important Japanese well before their appointments.41 Accordingly, communication from the ambassador may be received with more attention and more respect than communication from mid-level officers. The second way to address economic issues is with speaker programs. Because those programs can choose from a broad range of topics and speakers, and can also target specific audiences, speaker programs can be effective tools to address issues of particular concern. In the case of restricted beef imports speaker programs might have addressed to special interest and niche consumer groups, such as members of agricultural cooperative associations, supermarket representatives, or housewives, to increase understanding of U.S. positions amongst targeted audiences.

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The third public diplomacy tool with which to address economic issues is exchange and visit programs. To illustrate, in the case of beef import restrictions, the Education and Exchanges subsection of the Cultural Section might have organized a program to invite targeted special interest groups to the United States. By including visits to slaughterhouses, agricultural cooperatives, the Department of Agriculture, and supermarkets, such a program would aim to demonstrate how beef is processed, beef inspections are handled, and retailers advertise beef safety, thus increasing Japanese comfort with U.S. beef. Target Audiences in Addressing Economic Issues Target audiences also can differ according to the specific ways in which each public diplomacy tool is used.42 In the high-level type of public diplomacy, the target audience can either be the general public (in the case of mass press conferences) or more specific, if high-level officials meet with particular interest groups. Similarly, speaker and exchange programs are not necessarily aimed only at special interest groups. If conducted within more general frameworks such as Gendai America Kiso Koza, which covers a wide range of issues, programs can address broader audiences such as students and journalists. The Relationship between Public Diplomacy and Economic Policy While contemporary U.S.-Japan economic relations are less tumultuous than in the 1980s and early 1990s, economic dialogue frameworks between the two countries persist. In these frameworks, officials from government ministries in both countries meet to discuss their views on contemporary economic issues such as promoting mutual foreign direct investment (FDI).43 According to the current public diplomacy officer in the Tokyo Embassy, U.S. public diplomacy can address economic issues as follows. Economic officers who focus on bilateral negotiations do interact with public diplomacy officers on the working level. However, since economic officers themselves follow the Japanese press closely, they are generally quite knowledgeable about the Japanese public’s views on U.S. policies. As for U.S. public diplomacy programming on economic issues, public diplomacy officers sometimes offer speaker programs that pair an official working on economic negotiations with one or two scholars or think tank representatives. The official speaks about U.S. policy and objectives, while the scholars provide context and fill in

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the background so that Japanese audiences understand the U.S. initiative more comprehensively. The Embassy also schedules press events for visiting officials to enable them to brief the Japanese press on these issues.44 Assessment and Recommendations On the whole, U.S. public diplomacy in Japan is remarkably extensive and comprehensive. Programs aimed both at long-term relationship building and at short-term communications are quite successful and address a wide range of audiences. More importantly, officials seem to embrace the basic principles of public diplomacy, especially the importance of person-to-person communication and long-term relationship building. Economic issues also seem to be addressed in a reasonable manner. Based on such assessments, I suggest two possible areas for improvement in U.S. public diplomacy in Japan, especially with respect to economic issues. Policy Recommendation #1: Promote sympathy, beyond rational understanding, among the Japanese public toward U.S. policies and positions. Studies on U.S.-Japan economic conf licts in the 1980s indicated that Japanese resentment over U.S. requirements for an open market and fair trade persisted even when Japanese understood the potential benefit to them from such requirements.45 While promoting rational understanding of U.S. policies is necessary, understanding alone may not be a sufficient condition to obtain the public’s support for those policies. Long-term relationship building through exchange programs is one way to lay the foundation for favorable attitude toward U.S. policies. However, given the limited audience that can be addressed through such programs, improving public impressions should also be pursued in daily communications. In particular, U.S. public diplomacy should study the psychological impact of speakers’ words and expressions on their audience’s impressions of the United States, and should pay attention to whether the speech would be seen as coercive and to whether it would harm their pride. Given cultural differences, a “humble” presentation manner might be more effective than straightforward expression of the U.S. position or of the position’s benefits to the Japanese public.

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Policy Recommendation #2: Improve communication between officers in economic policy and in public diplomacy, focusing on boosting economic officers’ understanding of public attitudes toward U.S. policies. In bilateral negotiations, it is critical to know the other side’s position—what it sees as more negotiable and what as less—and the interests behind those positions. Since attitudes contribute greatly to the Japanese officials’ negotiation positions, U.S. negotiators would benefit from knowing the attitudes of the Japanese public and of various interest groups. By attending speaker programs and press events, economic officers engaged in negotiation can increase their understanding of the holistic situation and, in doing so, improve the outcome of negotiations on economic issues. By improving the connection between economic and public diplomacy officers, the United States could create a stronger united front and increase the overall effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy in Japan. Notes 1. U.S. General Accountability Office. “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges.” Report to the Committee on International Relations (House of Representatives: Washington, D.C., September 2003). 2. Cabinet Office of Japan. “Gaikoku ni Kansuru Seron Chosa (Public Opinion Poll on Diplomatic Issues).” 3. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce. “U.S. International Transactions Account Data.” 4. For an overview of U.S.-Japan economic relations after the 1980s, see T.J. Pempel, “The Future of U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,” NBR Special Report, No. 5 (March 2004), pp. 15–21; and William H. Cooper, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options,” Congressional Research Service Report ( July 2007). 5. Cooper, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,” p. 8. For example, John K. Emmerson, The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the Twentieth Century (Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1988); and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books,1998), illustrate this trend. 6. NHK Shuzaihan, NHK Supesharu Nichi-Bei no Sh ōtotsu: Dokyumento K ōzō Kyōgi (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan Kyokai, 1990), pp. 45–48. 7. Cooper, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,” p. 8. 8. Yasushi Watanabe, “Anti-Americanism in Japan,” in Yasushi Watanabe and David L. McConnell, eds., Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (New York: An East Gate Book, 2008), pp. 3–17. 9. Ibid., pp. 6–7. 10. Ibid., p. 7. 11. The major requirements included an increase of public investment to reduce the current account surplus, a review of land policy to decrease land prices, and the elimination of exclusionary business practices, including the enhancement of the Anti-Trust Law. After one year of negotiation, Japan conceded—to a certain extent—in each of these areas.

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12. Mike Mochizuki, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations in the 1990s,” in Mike Mochizuki, James E. Auer et al., eds., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1991), pp. 1–21. 13. Pempel, “The Future of U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,” p. 15. 14. Watanabe, “Anti-Americanism in Japan,” p. 7. 15. Watanabe, “Anti-Americanism in Japan,” p. 9. 16. Ibid. 17. Pempel, “The Future of U.S.-Japan Economic Relations,” pp. 15–17; Watanabe, “AntiAmericanism in Japan,” pp. 10–12. 18. William G. Crowell, “Official Soft Power in Practice: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Japan,” in Yasushi Watanabe and David L. McConnell, eds., Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, (New York: An East Gate Book, 2008), pp. 207–223. To show the extensiveness of U.S. public diplomacy in Japan, Crowell cites comparable public diplomacy budget figures for FY2003: Japan, $8,863,000; Germany, $7,226,448; India, $4,386,512; France, $3,482,950; China, $1,826,042; United Kingdom, $1,472,000 (UK figures are for FY2002). 19. For Nye’s three dimensions, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 107. 20. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo website. http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/info/tinfo-pas.html (accessed November 20, 2009). 21. Refer to ibid. 22. Crowell, “Official Soft Power in Practice,” p. 211. 23. State Department official who served as a public diplomacy officer in the Tokyo Embassy within the past decade, telephone interview, November 18, 2009. 24. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo website. http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/irc/irc-kisokoza.html (accessed November 20, 2009). 25. Ibid. 26. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. 27. Nye, Soft Power, p. 12. 28. Crowell, “Official Soft Power in Practice,” p. 212. 29. Japan-U.S. Educational Commission ( JUSEC) website. http://www.fulbright.jp/eng/ index.html (accessed November 21, 2009). 30. The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation website. http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/ index.html (accessed November 21, 2009). 31. For general information about IVL program, refer to the U.S. Department of State website. http://exchanges.state.gov/ivlp/ivlp.html (accessed November 21, 2009). 32. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. 33. Ibid.; and Crowell, “Official Soft Power in Practice,” p. 211. 34. Current public diplomacy officer in the Tokyo Embassy, e-mail interview, December 2, 2009. 35. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. Japan’s security alliance with the United States—combined with the problem and shared cost burden of stationing American troops, especially in Okinawa—is a controversial issue with its public. The alliance and the stationed U.S. troops have been criticized both by liberals, who insist that such an alliance is against the “anti-war spirit” of the Japanese Constitution, and by conservatives who see the stationed U.S. troops as a symbol of “unequal relations” between the two countries. The latter group insists on security “independence” from the United States by enhancing Japan’s own military ability. 36. State Department officials, interviews, November 18 and December 2, 2009. 37. State Department official who was engaged in public diplomacy in Japan in the 1980s, telephone interview, November 23, 2009.

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38. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. 39. Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker, “Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, June 2008). 40. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. 41. Crowell, “Official Soft Power in Practice,” p. 214. 42. State Department official, interview, November 18, 2009. 43. The economic dialogue frameworks called “The U.S.-Japan Investment Initiative” and “The U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative,” both of which were established under the George W. Bush administration in 2001, were still operating in 2009. These frameworks focus on issues such as improving the climate for foreign direct investment (FDI) in both countries and regulatory reform to promote economic growth. 44. Public diplomacy officer, interview, December 2, 2009. 45. NHK Shuzaihan, NHK Supesharu Nichi-Bei no Sh ōtotsu, p. 320; William Watts, The United States and Japan: A Troubled Partnership (Ballinger: Cambridge, 1984), pp. 56–57.

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PA RT

I V

New Media or Old?

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CH A P T E R

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U.S. Public Diplomacy 2.0 in Asia: Beyond Catch-up Takah i ro Yamamoto

Public diplomacy as a form of communication with the public has developed simultaneously with such mass communication technology as radio and television. The invention of radio in the late nineteenth century made distance irrelevant for sending news and opinions, while the advent of television disseminated ubiquitous propaganda during World War II. The Internet is proving to have similar effects on public diplomacy. Video chats, for example, broadcast presidential speeches and connect the president with his worldwide audience. However, the U.S. government has not yet developed a strategy that encompasses all aspects of new media’s application to public diplomacy. This is partly understandable given the speed of technological development and the continuous availability of new services. While new technology benefits and empowers individuals, it also throws them into an incessant cycle of playing catch-up. Institutions are much slower than individual service users in adapting to developments. Bigger institutions are most lethargic to respond to new devices and, thus, most acutely fail to construct an effective strategy with new devices. The U.S. State Department uses new media in its public diplomacy initiative. This initiative was dubbed “public diplomacy 2.0” (PD2.0 henceforth) by James Glassman, under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs.1 Public diplomacy practitioners and scholars have lined up to acknowledge the significance and potential of PD2.0,

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but few have articulated a detailed overarching strategy on how to use it. This essay tries to fill that void. Newness of New Media In distinguishing new media from other forms of media, Bennett identified five characteristics: interactivity, content evolution from user input, asynchronous communication, global accessibility, and mixture of existing media.2 Chun summarized the popular portrayal of new media as being “f luid, individualized connectivity, a medium to distribute control and freedom . . . [I]t was not digitized forms of other media (photography, video, text), but rather an interactive medium or forms of distribution as independent as the information it relayed.”3 The scale of communication is the key feature of new media. For the purpose of this essay, it will be defined as: Internet services that allow many-to-many communication with tremendously greater ease than such conventional media as television, newspapers, or radio. Examples of new media include blogs, RSS feeds, social networking services (SNS) such as Facebook, video-sharing websites such as YouTube, and text sharing websites such as Twitter. The Characteristics of New Media The characteristics of new media are threefold. First is its speed. All the new media listed earlier, provided the users are connected to a broadband network, enables nearly instantaneous communication. Increasing Internet usage through cell phones instead of personal computers also affects communication behaviors. It has never been easier to engage in real time conversation. The second characteristic is a growing culture of sharing. The term “Web2.0” was coined to describe individuals’ ability, with the aid of such affordable devices as computers, digital cameras, or mobile phones, to send information to the web. This resulted in an astronomical increase of information in cyberspace. It has never been more difficult to choose what to read—and what not to read—on the web. As Nye claimed, “[p]lenty of information leads to scarcity—of attention.”4 This “paradox of plenty” led to the scheme within new media that allows everyone to

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work as their friends’ editor. Sending article links to friends and sharing video clips became an integral part of daily communication. This culture of sharing implies the third characteristic of new media, namely, the consolidation of communication patterns. Arsenault notes, “Internet networks are increasingly converging into porous, information rich, and chaotic global information sphere.”5 It is surely porous and information-rich, but from the viewpoint of individual users, there are ways to make it manageable. The chaotic nature of the web behooves us to devise some ways by which to optimize our information inf low. Web-based technology can help us reach that goal. Examples include bookmarking with web browsers, RSS,6 and, above all, sharing links with friends on such websites as Facebook and Twitter. One does not usually share information with strangers at random. Rather, one sends articles and video clips to her Facebook friends, and reads materials posted on Twitter by the people she “follows.” Embedded in this mode of communication is the network of online friends with whom one most likely shares interests and perhaps ideology. Although RSS does not necessarily involve interpersonal communication, by allowing computer programs to aggregate information that individuals want, RSS reinforces a similar pattern of information f low. Such f low of information should have implications on public diplomacy through new media. The following sections will discuss the capability and challenges of the U.S. State Department and its use of new media in recent years, with an emphasis on its effort toward China and Japan. U.S. PD2.0 at Present The U.S. government is preparing an overarching public diplomacy strategy using new media. At present, several sections within the State Department deal with new media for public diplomacy, including its regional offices under the International Information Programs (IIP) bureau; the Office of Innovative Engagement, which handles the operation’s technical aspects; and the Office of Member Communities, which provides content to Facebook, Adobe Co.Nx, and Twitter. Although the State Department utilizes diverse new media tools including Flickr, YouTube, blogs, and X-life, this essay focuses on Facebook, Co.Nx, Twitter, and Short Messenger Service (SMS) conferences as the main tools.

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The prevalence of Facebook as a social networking tool is remarkable. Founded in 2004, it now boasts 350 million registered members worldwide.7 Users in the United States total 42 million as of January 2009.8 It is important for U.S. public diplomacy because global Facebook user demography is skewed toward youth—their key demographic target. The number is especially significant in the Middle East and North Africa, where 62.2 percent (or 9.6 million) of the Facebook users are under twenty-five.9 Moreover, registered members are very likely to check updates frequently. According to Facebook’s official webpage, “[The] average user spends more than 55 minutes per day on Facebook.”10 It is therefore an attractive tool for public diplomacy officers who want to build a lasting connection with their audience. As of the end of 2009, the State Department has more than 130 official Facebook groups. Most pages are created by U.S. embassies abroad. As of December 8, 2009, a Facebook search for “US Embassy” yielded 99 pages. The majority of pages have 1,000 or fewer “fans,” whose Facebook home pages will receive notices of updated posts on the group page(s). By far the most popular group created by the U.S. government is the one by the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, boasting 19,868 fans as of December 8, 2009. Their group page is frequently updated—three or four times a week on average—with links to news articles and video clips and notices of events. Remarkably, the embassy staff engages in conversation with group members through the comment function, which cannot be found on most other U.S. embassy Facebook pages. Co.Nx Co.Nx is a website that the State Department created on Facebook to facilitate online chats with worldwide audiences about U.S. foreign policy. It has been used for online chat events held by embassies as well as bureaus in Washington, D.C. Its strengths are twofold. First, it enables one to engage in virtual face-to-face public diplomacy with people who would otherwise be unreachable. It allows organizers to invite participants from all over the world, even those with limited bandwidth. Depending on the bandwidth with which the viewer connects, the software displays either a full-f ledged video interactive, an audio interactive, or just a text-based web chat.11 Second, the organizer can conduct various types of events. One can have videoconference

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windows, share Power Point slides or audio files, and take questions through a chat box. It thus approximates conventional public diplomacy events in which officers and audiences meet physically. Twitter Since its inception in 2006, Twitter12 users have grown rapidly and were expected to reach twenty-five million by the end of 2009.13 Currently, the State Department maintains about forty accounts on Twitter and provides information about local events or articles on their activities.14 It came on the forefront of international news when protesters in Iran after the presidential election in 2009 used Twitter to share information about government crackdown.15 SMS Conferences In July 2009, after President Obama’s speeches in Cairo and Ghana, IIP and the White House conducted a worldwide SMS-based event. People from across the African continent and around the world texted more than seventeen thousand questions and fifty thousand instant messages to the White House in three languages. President Obama produced a podcast in which he answered some of the questions. Public diplomacy officers in Africa then took the podcast to radio stations, which broadcast it locally.16 These four new media tools are arguably the most important for public diplomacy. Utilizing the development of web technologies that constitute the base for these websites presents ever more tools with which to conduct public diplomacy. How does the State Department choose from and use these tools? Case Studies: China and Japan China and Obama’s Visit U.S. public diplomacy in China is finding utility in new media by incorporating wider audiences than it can physically fit into various venues. When President Obama gave a speech at Fudan University in Shanghai, China, on November 16, 2009, he took questions not only from students in the auditorium but also from Internet users who posted questions on such websites as Xinhuanet, Sohu, and U.S. Embassy in

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China. In this event, President Obama took every other question from the Internet. The meeting’s proceedings were broadcast live on the White House’s website and were also available for post-event viewing.17 The post on the White House blog announcing the event was written in English and Chinese.18 Arguably the event’s most interesting moment came when the U.S. ambassador to China picked up a question about Twitter and China’s firewall. The question read: “Do you know of the Firewall? And second, should we be able to use Twitter freely?” Clearly the U.S. government deliberately chose to discuss China’s censorship. The Internet generates a large number of questions; preselecting from these questions gives U.S. officials a free hand to choose the topic they want to discuss. Answering questions proves more effective than making the same point in a speech, as it shows the audience’s interest in the topic and gives the speaker legitimacy to address the issue. In answering the question, President Obama said that he was a strong supporter of openness in Internet use and noncensorship. He mentioned terrorism and extremist movements as agents restricting information f low. He did not criticize the Chinese government, though the question’s motivation must have been clear to everyone present. Despite such events, the U.S. public diplomacy effort in China has not gone too far. Peter Ford of the Christian Science Monitor says: “Whitehouse.gov . . . was unreliable in Beijing, and though the White House Facebook page also carried it [the video stream of the town hall meeting], Facebook is blocked in China, along with other social networking sites such as Twitter and YouTube.”19 Obama’s later attempt to reach the public through traditional means also met Chinese obstruction. Hei Seki reported that Obama asked Hu Jintao to allow Nanfang Zhoumo, a liberal newspaper based in Guangzhou, to conduct an exclusive interview. Hu agreed, but the result was bewildering. On November 19, 2009, the pages of Nanfang Zhoumo where Obama’s interview was supposed to be printed were left blank except for the following phrase: “if you read this you see China.”20 As a result of the Chinese Communist Party’s pressure, the interview was compressed into a much smaller space than planned, and its contents were little more than recycled official statements. Seki argues this was due to censorship.21 Courrier International, a French weekly magazine, said the interview was not free in the first place.22 Either way, it is indicative of the difficulty in doing public diplomacy in China. This does not mean, however, that the censorship of the Chinese government is insurmountable. As described in the previous section,

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one of new media’s key characteristics is the culture of sharing. Once information is shared on multiple websites, it starts to proliferate on its own; censorship could not keep track of all links and copied-andpasted articles. The key to obviating censorship is thus to be picked up by a major aggregator that masses of people check regularly. Japan: Going Local The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo has begun to employ some online social tools but plans to expand this effort next year. According to an embassy officer, the Tokyo embassy’s PD2.0 program primarily targets those aged between twenty and forty. To date, the embassy has created a Facebook page in Japanese and English, which targets English teachers in Japan, alumni of embassy-sponsored programs, and others interested in relevant issues. The embassy also has a website for cell phone users that has been popular with the younger set. The current deputy chief of mission James Zumwalt writes a blog regularly in Japanese and English and has attracted notable reaction to his views and experiences. Some embassy staff members interact regularly with U.S.-focused groups on Mixi, Japan’s largest SNS with about eighteen million members.23 In October 2009, Mixi became the second most popular website in Japan, following Yahoo! Japan and surpassing YouTube.24 Mixi’s popularity among the younger generation is unmatched by Facebook, whose membership in Japan remains at around three hundred and thirty thousand.25 The primary reason to use SNS is to connect with other people, and since U.S. public diplomacy platforms face a large Japanese competitor, they must consider making use of local platforms. The uniqueness of Japanese web industry can also be seen in the use of search engines. Unlike the United States, where Google and Yahoo are fiercely competing for the largest share, in Japan, Yahoo has the absolute advantage in its scale of users. Statistics from NetRatings, a research company, shows that the total hours spent on Yahoo in October 2009 is about 14.5 billion hours, compared to the runner-up Mixi with only 2.7 billion hours (Google ranked fourth with 2.1 billion hours). Interestingly, despite its popularity in terms of total hours spent, the number of Mixi users ranks only tenth among the most popular Japanese websites. This means that average Mixi users spend much longer time on the website than users of any other websites do. It thus presents a formidable opportunity for public diplomacy, just as Facebook does in many other parts of the world.

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For all its technology and literacy, one major issue for public diplomacy in Japan is language. Although English education is compulsory in junior high and high school, which had an enrollment rate of more than 97.8 percent in 2008,26 the Japanese generally do not feel comfortable using English for research and communication. It is thus wise that the U.S. Embassy employs primarily the Japanese language for conversations on Mixi and Facebook. Challenges in PD2.0 There are three challenges inherent to the current U.S. strategy on PD2.0: potential overstretch in cyberspace, the diffused nature of new media, and the issues of language and localization. Potential Overstretch in Cyberspace The State Department successfully created venues for public diplomacy in a myriad of recently emerged new media platforms. By doing so, public diplomacy reaches an audience that would otherwise have been unreachable. However, one major shortcoming of the current U.S. strategy—which emphasizes its presence on every popular online platform—is that it is not sustainable. None of the aforementioned tools is more than ten years old, and new services will continue to emerge. If the State Department attempts to keep up with the rapid development of Web 2.0 technologies and services, it is doomed to become overstretched in less than a decade. Officers will find themselves bogged down in managing countless accounts, whose audiences may or may not overlap. They will also have to strike an uneasy balance between traditional, face-to-face public diplomacy and PD2.0. We can already see signs of U.S. public diplomacy overstretch in cyberspace. The vast majority of user comments posted on embassy Facebook pages fail to receive feedback. This may be partly due to the lack of guidelines in dealing with new methods of communication or to fear of being misquoted. However, even if there were uniform guidelines for making online comments, it would be impossible to respond to all points raised. The inevitable question is: should the State Department be keeping up with the mushrooming of Web 2.0 tools at all? The State Department has to reconsider the pros and cons of using online platforms for public diplomacy. Granted it is important to keep

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the door open for comments and questions, but the State Department may be causing new grievances by virtually ignoring the users who try to engage in conversation. Even worse, what impression is it going to make if it decides to close the services seen as unproductive? Would it not create a sense of abandonment? One Co.Nx discussion board titled “US refuses to discuss Blackwater mission in Pakistan?” is full of such disappointments.27 The conversation starts on September 5, 2009, with a post by a Pakistani man named Mushtaq Sethi, who quotes an article from a Pakistani newspaper that reports on the Blackwater mission in Pakistan. Sethi writes: “Will the Co.Nx Moderator or some one from the State Deptt [sic] kindly oblige by responding.” Another Pakistani man Mohammad Mansoor Ali Ansari says: “The issue is quite volcanic. I believe the State Department has chosen to glue its lips to speak further on this topic.” Seema Raja then jumps in: “Mr. Ansari if [sic] seems you are quite right! In fact it isnt [sic] only this issue but all the Topics posted here have never recieved [sic] any officials response from them.” Mushtaq Sethi responds on September 19, 2009: “It sure is disappointing.” On October 9, 2009, Seema Raja writes again: “Hello, Hello anyone here from the Co.Nx or the State department without having ears stuffed with cotton sound proofing? Please respond?” After ten days of deafening silence from the State Department, the users seemed to have determined that they would never receive a response from a U.S. officer. They then began conversing with each other on the possible involvement of private military companies in training terrorists in Pakistan, offering skewed opinions not necessarily based on solid facts. By providing a venue for such discussion and failing to provide facts, new media in this specific case does more harm than good to U.S. public diplomacy. Would this case have been better if someone from the State Department had responded? Certainly that may have improved the understanding of Mushtaq, Seema, Mohammad, and others on the discussion board. Yet as long as these websites and Facebook groups exist, there will also be more disgruntled users. Another risk of online communication is its proclivity for misinterpretation. Messages could easily be taken out of context, as could

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comments on traditional media. However, in contrast with printed comments, online comments could spread in a matter of minutes and incite a wave of vehement resentment. In this sense, the Internet becomes a menace for public diplomacy’s attempt to disseminate accurate information. It is critical for public diplomacy to maintain some semblance of control over online comments, which becomes more difficult with increasingly diversified engagement in new media. Diffused Nature of Social Media PD2.0’s second shortcoming is its failure to understand the diffusive nature of new media. The fundamental newness of new media lies in its groundbreaking ability to connect ordinary individuals with tremendous ease. Governments aspiring to engage foreign publics are forced to compete with information sent by people with much less credibility, expertise, or budget. Put simply, it has become very difficult for any sender of information to avoid being buried under a gigantic f low of information. This holds true even for the most resourceful government in the world. Morozov argues that the United States should become an aggregator of information, not a competitor.28 Although this may be a better strategy than blindly sending information without aim, it is not the best strategy. Many other services are trying to become the aggregator of information—such as Yahoo! and Mixi in Japan, Baidu and Sino.com in China—and unlike the U.S. government, this is their specialty. A foreign government cannot compete with homegrown news sites or blog post aggregators. The State Department’s strength lies in its access to official and authoritative information. However, it is unlikely that many people will leave their favorite news websites and access State Departmentmanaged websites for American and international news. Thus the best strategy for the State Department is to place its official, accurate information on its local network hub. Meiguo Cankao, a Chinese listserv that distributes news reports from the Chinese version of America. gov, does a great job in this regard. Since its inception in 2001, major Chinese news agencies—including the state-run Xinhua news agency and Central China Television (CCTV), as well as such independent news websites as sina.com—have subscribed to Meiguo Cankao. Tens of millions of Chinese speakers around the world access these websites. Meiguo Cankao’s potential effect is enormous and is considered one of the most successful PD2.0 efforts in China.29

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Once a news article lands on a major network, the culture of sharing enables the information to be picked up and copied by bloggers. This is the model the State Department should follow to achieve information dissemination. Issues of Language and Localization Information in vernacular languages has a better chance of being shared widely. A Chinese blogger will more easily refer to a U.S. government statement if it is written in Chinese. After all, Chinese bloggers’ main audience is Chinese; bloggers would not expect a high command of English among their readers. Providing public diplomacy contents in local languages is important in two ways. The first reason is to enable people who lack a high command of English to access the information. A less obvious, but equally important, reason is that it shows U.S. eagerness and willingness to engage foreign publics. It also ameliorates perceived U.S. “arrogance,” an image problem from which the Bush administration suffered. As any officer who has conducted public diplomacy would agree, communicating in a local language is a very effective way of breaking locals’ mental barrier. Even if the audience understands English, it is usually much easier for them to read or listen to messages in their native language. Conveying as much message as possible in the local language is thus an ideal way to address image issues. It is not only the information the State Department collects that matters; the fact that it is listening, and that its audience knows that it is being heard, matters equally. Related is the behavior of local Internet users in each country. Such new media tools as discussed here do not carry universal weight. Facebook is not the primary social networking website in all countries. Only a small fraction of the 710 fans of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo’s Facebook page are Japanese.30 Judging from their names, the vast majority of comments seem to come from non-Japanese. The State Department is aware that knowledge of local web users’ behavior is critical. Duncan MacInnes, the principal deputy coordinator of IIP Bureau, noted: I need to know what a college student in Cairo does when he goes on the internet. What sites does he visit? Who does he talk to? Does he IM? Because I want to get into those conversations. If I know the top five places that young people in Cairo go when

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they’re on the internet then I can be there, I can pre-position myself. If I don’t know that I just put stuff up on the internet and hope people come.31 However, the foreign language capability of State Department officials is sorely lacking. Currently, its language capability is spread across several sections. Regional sections in the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) designate one language for each region: Africa has French, Europe has Russian, Near East has Arabic, South Asia has Persian, Western Hemisphere has Spanish, and East Asia has Chinese. Regional sections deploy language capabilities in accordance with this arrangement. For instance, the East Asia section has two policy officers who speak Chinese, three Chinese-language editors, five Chinese-language translators (contractors), and two Chinese-language bloggers (contractors). Budget and personnel constraints prohibit IIP from adding capabilities in other languages. Other regional bureaus, such as the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, have many more people. Although the State Department has an Office of Language Services that handles many more languages, they tend to be used for larger, more cumbersome projects.32 Because language capability beyond the main six languages is centered in the Office of Language Services, few people are involved in day-to-day public diplomacy in less common foreign languages. Budgetary and human resources constraints aside, the State Department will continue to face linguistic constraints. Recommendations This essay recommends two broad principles with which to construct a strategy for PD2.0. First, in response to a potential overstretch in cyberspace, there must be guidelines for new media communication. Second, in order to utilize the diffused nature of new media to its fullest extent, PD2.0 should focus on providing contents to the “local hub.” Within these recommendations, the State Department should work as much as possible in local languages. Basic Approach for Communication via New Media Rule 1: Limit the channels to the ones you are sure to use for a long time. It would leave a bad impression to close a channel that once functioned as a window for communication between a foreign audience

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and U.S. officials. For the same reason, the “discussion” function or its equivalent on these platforms should not be provided unless the State Department can respond in a timely manner. Alternatively, there should be a clear disclaimer that not all feedback or comments will receive a response. Rule 2: Utilize SMS as much as possible. SMS is a great tool for public diplomacy for the following reasons. First, it can reach the remotest audience who may lack Internet infrastructure. Second, because it does not create any permanent cyberspace locations, SMS enables one-time or ad hoc activities. As seen in China and Africa, SMS conferencing allows for town-hall meetings in which the State Department can preselect the questions they would prefer to answer. This effectively taps into local voices without committing to an unmanageable scale of communication. Focus on Sending Information to Local Major Aggregators The State Department should not attempt to compete with other information giants or to become an aggregator of information, but rather should place as much material as possible in information hubs. Meiguo Cancao is a model the State Department should consider replicating and strengthening in other languages. Providing information in local languages creates a better chance for the message to be shared among foreign audiences and also avoids the risk of misunderstandings stemming from translation. One might argue that such a centralized approach does not utilize new media’s ability to enable direct connection with one’s audience. However, it is important to recall the majority of this audience is composed of passive readers and viewers. Talking to U.S. diplomats is not this audience’s first priority, even if it was presented with such an opportunity. The lives of most audience members do not revolve around U.S. foreign policy. Their interests are diverse, divided between local and international news, politics and sports, war and entertainment, and so forth. The State Department should be primarily concerned about how they will reach these silent audiences by using new media tools. Notes 1. Glassman’s speech on YouTube; http://www.newamerica.net/events/2008/public_ diplomacy_2_0. 2. James Gordon Bennett, Design Fundamentals for New Media (New York: Thomson Delmer Learning, 2004), 11–13.

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3. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Thomas Keenan, New Media, Old Media, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1. 4. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 106. 5. Amelia Arsenault, “Public Diplomacy 2.0,” in Philip Seib (ed.), Toward a New Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 135. 6. RSS stands for Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication. It is a web technology that allows users to track newly updated articles on the websites and blogs that they register to. 7. Facebook official profile; http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/info.php? statistics (accessed December 7, 2009). 8. iStrategyLab.com, “2009 Facebook Demographics and Statistics Report: 276% Growth in 35-54 Year Old Users”; http://www.istrategylabs.com/2009/01/2009-facebook-demographics-and-statistics-report-276-growth-in-35-54-year-old-users/ (accessed December 7, 2009). 9. Ben Lorica, “Facebook Demographics: Trends April 15, 2009,” O’Reilly Research; http:// www.slideshare.net/oreillymedia/facebook-demo-20090415 (accessed December 11, 2009). 10. http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (accessed December 11, 2009). 11. “Duncan MacInnes on State Department Public Diplomacy Initiatives.” Posted by Liriel on iDiplomacy, November 10, 2009. 12. Twitter is a website that allows people to instantaneously share short texts of up to 140 characters. By “following” other users on Twitter, one can see an aggregated list of updates, in chronological order, from people he or she is following. Text updates can be sent from personal computers or from cell phones. By posting links, one can also direct others to external online contents such as video clips, websites, and news articles. 13. http://twitter.com/about#about; http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/hackerexposes-private-twitter-documents/?hpw (accessed November 16, 2009). 14. John Matel and William May, “Digital Diplomacy: IIP Engages New Audiences with Social Media,” State Magazine (November 2009), 12. 15. For accounts on how Twitter was used in postelection Iran, see, for instance, Lev Grossman, “Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement,” Time, June 17, 2009; http://www. time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html (accessed January 17, 2010). 16. Matel and May, “Digital Diplomacy.” 17. http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/china-town-hall (accessed November 16, 2009). 18. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/11/15/shanghai-town-hall (accessed November 16, 2009). 19. Peter Ford, “Obama’s Town Hall Talk in China—Not Seen on Facebook, YouTube,” November 16, 2009. 20. Translation by author from Seki’s Japanese article. 21. Hei Seki, “Obama Hatsugen mo Genron Tosei Suru Chugoku Seihu no Ashimoto [The Stance of Chinese Government, Censoring Obama’s voice],” Wedge Infinity, November 25, 2009; http://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/645 (accessed December 11, 2009). 22. “Vraie-fausse censure d’un entretien avec Obama,” Courrier international, November 23, 2009; http://www.courrierinternational.com/breve/2009/11/23/vraie-fausse-censure-dun-entretien-avec-obama (accessed December 11, 2009). 23. As of September 30, 2009. Data retrieved from Mixi, “FY2009 Second-Quarter ( July 1–September 30, 2009) Earning Results Briefing Session”; http://eir.eol.co.jp/EIR/View. aspx?cat=yuho_pdf&sid=1312338 (accessed December 5, 2009). 24. “Mixi Apuri koka de Mixi no so riyo jikan ga kyuzo, Youtube wo nuku [Mixi Viewer Hour Soars Thanks to Mixi Apps, Surpassing YouTube],” Netratings, November 26, 2009; http:// www.netratings.co.jp/New_news/News11262009.htm (accessed December 11, 2009).

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25. Lorica, “Facebook Demographics.” 26. Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “Monbu Kagaku Hakusho 2008 [White Paper on Education]” (Tokyo: National Printing Bureau), 118. 27. http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=26365096875&topic=10194 (accessed December 11, 2009). 28. Evgeny Morozov, “The Future of ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0,’ ” Foreignpolicy.com, net effect, June 9, 2009. 29. Lloyd Neighbors, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, interview, November 2, 2009. 30. US Embassy Tokyo; http://www.facebook.com/usembassytokyo (accessed December 8, 2009). 31. “Duncan MacInnes on State Department Public Diplomacy Initiatives.” 32. Robert Holden, director of Office of East Asia-Pacific Affairs, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, e-mail interview, October 26, 2009.

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CH A P T E R

10

New Media or “the Last Three Feet” in Africa? R ache l O. Okunub i

“Tweets,” “friending,” “fans,” and “followers” were the buzzwords that f luttered around the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (AF/PDPA) during the summer of 2009.1 The gospel of new media had arrived. AF/PDPA had been notified that there would be two major events that would require an overhaul of public diplomacy in Africa: President Barack Obama’s speech in Accra, Ghana, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s multination tour of Africa. To support these two events and the U.S. government objectives behind them, AF/PDPA would have to coordinate an interdepartmental and interagency public diplomacy effort that could keep up with the objectives of the Obama administration. In the midst of the extensive planning for what would prove to be a busy summer for AF/PDPA, the office reached toward new media. Not everyone in the Africa Bureau was welcoming of new media technology in public diplomacy, often seeing it as a “cop-out.” A former U.S. public diplomacy official commented, “I am from the ‘old school’ of PD. I don’t meet people from behind my desk.”2 The interest in new media was balanced by the amount of concern with it. Employees wondered: What are “new media? What is its purpose? Traditionally, public diplomacy professionals have firmly believed in the admonition of Edward R. Murrow, the venerated one-time director of the U.S. Information Agency, that they should depend heavily on “the last three feet,” meaning direct, face-to-face encounters with the audience.

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Would new media be used at the expense of the old?” Analyses from the cases examined within this essay attempt to provide answers to these questions. Dynamic shifts in how global audiences obtain and use information have led many to conclude that the U.S. government must more fully engage emerging social networks and technologies in order to remain relevant. The current under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs Judith A. McHale emphatically stated, “Despite [a] wealth of strategies and resources, we have still failed. We are still being ‘outcommunicated’ by people in caves.”3 The AF/PDPA bureau strategized ways in which to successfully use new technology to aid its public diplomacy goals. This study analyzes the use of new media in public diplomacy in the Africa Bureau, which is responsible for the diplomatic operations of forty-three U.S. missions and five constituent posts located in sub-Saharan Africa. It examines (i) nontraditional audience outreach compared to traditional means; (ii) the amount of active interaction and discussion by both; and (iii) whether new media have increased the visibility of U.S. public diplomacy in Africa. In this study “new media” refers to any form of digital or computerized communication systems (distinct from radio, television, print media, face-to-face dialogue, etc.). U.S. Public Diplomacy and AF/PDPA In August 2009, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released a report of inspection for the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) that was troubling. It said, “AF/PDPA was a failed office in 2002, and, if anything, the inspection team found the situation worse in 2009.”4 Many of the public affairs officers (PAOs) in Africa were handling responsibilities that are beyond their pay grades, undermining their effectiveness. It found that the seventeen-member staff in Washington was underperforming in terms of U.S. policy implementation and resource management, and that there was no real strategic plan for public diplomacy in AF.5 It even suggested that AF/PDPA be closed down and divided amongst preexisting offices.6 The Obama Administration and New Media Much of the momentum that has been put into new media can be attributed to the creativity of the Obama administration. Although the

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initial transition toward new media began under the administration of President George W. Bush, the devotion of resources to new media in public diplomacy came after President Obama’s election. President Obama’s successful presidential campaign demonstrated the usefulness of new media (particularly social media) in rallying support, projecting a favorable image, and connecting with mass numbers of people. After Obama’s election in November 2008, his transitional team worked to find ways to take this new media phenomenon into his first presidential term. Marketing it as a hip, trendy, and modern attribute of the U.S. government, the White House has taken the lead in social media networks. President Obama (a self-proclaimed Blackberry addict) was keen on engaging young populations both domestically and internationally, and thought that new media would be an innovative way of reaching this demographic. Bev Godwin, director of the Online Resources & Interagency Development at the White House New Media Office wrote in a posting on the White House official website, “Did you know your government may be cooler and more approachable than you think?” 7 The White House has links not only to Facebook and Twitter, but also to Vimeo, Flickr, YouTube, LinkedIn, and MySpace.8 There is a U.S. Government Video Channel on YouTube, where the president gives weekly talks on issues of national importance and an online section for the “Open Government” blog. The goal in using these social networking sites is to facilitate more online conversations as well as provide easy access to information about U.S. government agencies. Bev Godwin posted a vlog (video blog) about President Obama’s commitment to transforming the way the U.S. government operates, to an extent by increasing government transparency, and White House initiatives have been followed by other government agencies. Speaking on this vlog, Macon Phillips, White House Director of New Media, says: “There is so much potential for how [the] government uses the web,” and continues, “join your government at their websites and blogs, through videos and photos, and social networks through widgets and podcasts and much more.”9 Public Diplomacy 2.0 The Department of State has determined that it will need to update its strategic communication efforts to ref lect current trends in communication around the globe. This began during the Bush administration,

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when the State Department launched an initiative geared toward using new media techniques to keep up with technological trends. This so-called Public Diplomacy 2.0 is described as an approach to public diplomacy that uses new media technology, particularly online (web-based) social networks. Professionals, academics, and young people comprise the target audience of this initiative.10 James K. Glassman, President Bush’s Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, strongly supported Public Diplomacy 2.0., believing that it could help to improve the image of the United States abroad. He argued that new media tools facilitate the “war of ideas” and address Islamic extremism amongst youth by promoting social networking technology as a way of airing grievances.11 In January 2007, State’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) launched America.gov, an online site that manages web chats, blogs, video, and updates about government events and activities. America.gov then launched Co.Nx, a web conferencing tool where government officials in Washington can connect to audiences from around the world. The Case Studies In light of the harsh 2009 evaluation report issued by OIG, in the summer 2009 the Africa Bureau sought to demonstrate its effectiveness in guiding U.S. policy interests in Africa during separate visits to Africa by President Obama and Secretary Clinton. The fact that these two official visits would draw high-level officials from numerous government agencies and attention from around the globe motivated the Africa Bureau to “pull out all the cards” in its public diplomacy efforts. The bureau used new media for these official visits in different ways. IIP encouraged PAOs at all posts to use new media, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, podcasts, blogs, SMS, and Co.Nx live video chats. Much of the new media used for the speech in Ghana by the president of the United States (called POTUS in Washington) was through mobile devices (SMS),12 web chats, and podcasts. For the secretary’s trip, however, the State Department requested an increased use of online social networking and blogs. Although traditional media were largely used in preparation for both the POTUS Ghana speech and the secretary’s trip to Africa, new media was an added component of engaging foreign audiences throughout these events. The two trips, therefore, tested the use of new media in twenty-first-century U.S. public diplomacy in Africa.

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Obama in Ghana, July 11, 2009 The Obama administration used the president’s trip to Ghana to highlight Africa’s importance and potential in the world, and Africa saw it as a homecoming for one of its “sons.” Much of the new media used for the Obama Speech in Ghana was through mobile devices (SMS) and podcasts.13 Public diplomacy professionals in the Africa Bureau, along with IIP and the entire State Department wanted to strengthen the public diplomacy aspect of the POTUS speech in Ghana by including more Africans in the buildup of the visit. They asked people from around the continent to submit questions to the president about U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Hundreds of thousands of questions were received via SMS, e-mail, and Twitter.14 President Obama responded to three questions via podcast that were subsequently transcribed and translated, then distributed to African posts and circulated to the African press.15 Before his arrival in Ghana, the State Department (with major contributions from Embassy Pretoria) partnered with the private South Africa-based social media company MXit (pronounced “mix it”) to cover opinions about the president’s visit. MXit is a free, mobile text messaging service that allows users to send instant messages (IMs) using their cellular phones. MXit was sought out as a partner in U.S. public diplomacy because its services are trusted and free. This public-private partnership for SMS messaging generated more than fifty thousand responses. Ten thousand additional SMS responses were collected outside of MXit. Public diplomacy officers at the State Department African Regional Media Hub also made an agreement with Safaricom (a leading cellular phone company in Kenya) to stream a live VOA broadcast of the president’s speech. Other posts used FrontlineSMS, a free software tool that is used for sending and receiving SMS messages in massive quantities, but these did not receive discounts from local service providers and were forced to limit the number of SMSes sent. POTUS Follow-up Following the president’s speech, public affairs personnel in the Africa bureau and at posts collected public and media reaction reports from African posts via phone and e-mail, and evaluated responses and reactions to Obama’s foreign policy message. The responses were overwhelmingly positive (a few Kenyans were still a bit disappointed that President Obama did not choose to visit

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Kenya). Some PAOs remarked that there were multiple interruptions during the speech because audience members would applaud one of Obama’s statements, or shout statements like “that’s the truth.” In one situation, a PAO at a small West African post reported that the president’s speech drew so much attention that people delayed a game on their beloved sport of soccer in order to listen to the speech—a huge gesture of interest. During the weeks leading up to Obama’s Ghana Speech, Africa Bureau public diplomacy staff realized that because the speech was delivered on a Saturday, many African journalists were not going to circulate the speech until the following Monday—at the earliest. They feared that Africans would lose interest in the speech, or another world crisis would erupt before the African press could report on the speech and public reactions/responses, so they accelerated their follow-up. Only a few hours after the president had delivered his speech in Accra, IIP had it.16 IIP had it transcribed and less than twenty-four hours later, had it translated into different languages, first into French and Portuguese, and later into traditional African languages, and posted to America.gov and Facebook pages. An audio recording of his speech was converted into a podcast, and delivered to African radio stations so that they could broadcast it. Through SMS texting, PAOs alerted African journalists that the speech had already been transcribed and was available online, greatly helping the circulation of the speech. The method of using mobile phone technology and podcasts was seen as being so successful that it was used to circulate the president’s response to questions from Africans and his preliminary interview with AllAfrica.com. Using SMS messages to support public diplomacy support for the president’s speech was clearly successful. Some PAOs commented that the usage of new technologies substantially helped to hasten the process of collecting public reactions. Had the Africa Bureau and IIP waited for African newspapers and journalists to publish the speech, the speech would have been “out of fashion” by the time it reached the African public. Under Secretary McHale called these public diplomacy efforts conducted for the Obama Speech in Ghana, “a model of creative public diplomacy for the 21st century.” She said, “we broke new ground in using technology to engage nontraditional audiences.” New media will play a major role in the future of U.S. public diplomacy, but McHale also clearly stated that face-to-face, personal engagement will remain at the “heart” of public diplomacy.17

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Secretary of State Clinton’s Trip Three weeks after President Obama traveled to Ghana, Secretary Clinton followed with an eleven-day trip to Africa. It began on August 3, 2009, with the U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, and ended on August 14, 2009, in Cape Verde, with brief stops in South Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Liberia. The purpose of this trip was to reaffirm two broad themes: (i) “African solutions to African problems” and (ii) increased partnerships between the United States and African countries. The secretary spoke on Africa’s responsibility in supporting strong and sustainable democratic governments, promoting sustainable economic development, strengthening public health and education, empowering women and youth, and assisting in the prevention and resolution of conf licts around Africa. The plan for the secretary’s trip differed from President Obama’s visit to Africa. SMS was used less, and public diplomacy staff in Washington and at U.S. embassies in Africa worked to integrate more web-based social media into public diplomacy efforts. One reason for this shift was that they were unable to negotiate more cost-effective SMS rates with local mobile phone companies. (Many Africans disliked having to pay to receive messages from the State Department.) Another reason was the excitement that surrounded the use of online social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. A U.S. public diplomacy official in Washington commented that everyone was “excited about [social media] as if it were a new sports car.”18 The IIP Bureau, in coordination with the Africa Bureau, used Secretary Clinton’s visit to promote interest in discussing issues pertinent to the African continent. Based on the number of comments posted, more people followed her trip through IIP’s America.gov eJournalFacebook site. The State Department provided news articles concerning Secretary Clinton’s visit via Facebook, where people were asked questions such as “Do you see good governance in your own country?” and “Has violence against women affected you?”19 IIP recorded the responses and compiled them in a booklet titled “Comment! Good Governance and other Hot Topics on Facebook” that was used by Washington policymakers. As the secretary traveled in Africa, different embassies transmitted short, online posts by Twitter, called “tweets.”20 The tweets communicated short descriptive sentences about the secretary’s trip and policy messages to people that “followed” their Twitter pages. Blogging was also a

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tool used to engage the African public about U.S. policy objectives. For the first time, the State Department partnered with Afrigator, a South Africa-based blog aggregator. With the slogan “Africa’s talking—Are you listening?”21 Afrigator is a very popular and trusted site in southern Africa. The State Department forwarded postings to Afrigator so that people who do not normally tune into American blogs would see them. Dipnote, the official blog site of the State Department, was also used. On the Dipnote website, senior State Department officials on the continent at the time took turns writing blog entries for the “Travel Diary” of Secretary Clinton’s travels in Africa. Trip Follow-up Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson saw the trip as usefully “having diplomatic discussions and dialogues,”22 but others within the Africa Bureau expressed concerns that the eleven-day itinerary seemed to be too lecturing.23 Secretary Clinton gave roughly forty-one speeches and talks within eleven days, spending less than a day in some countries. In fact, a major complaint about the use of online social networks was the obvious lack of response. Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr messages were posted in real time throughout Secretary Clinton’s travel, but when Africans posted responses and comments, there was no follow-up. Africans were responding to posted prompts in large numbers, but the U.S. government employees were not.24 With low bandwidths in most places in Africa, video and images upload at a slow pace, often discouraging viewers from continuing. Benefits, Challenges, Uncertainties, and the Future of New Media Strategy toward new media shifted in the three weeks between the president and his secretary’s visits, revealing that new media use was highly experimental. Public diplomacy staff afterward analyzed some of the social, economic, and infrastructure-based considerations involved in the use of new media in Africa. New Media Benefits They concluded that there are clear advantages to using new media in Africa, particularly because of its potential to magnify the impact of preexisting public diplomacy tools. New media allow for the rapid

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transmission of information that could take hours, and in some cases days in most African countries. For example, in many cases, it often takes a long time to deliver invitations to embassy events by mail. By using new media tools such as text messaging or online e-mail invitations (called “Evites”), civil society can be easily invited or reminded about future events within minutes, saving paper, money, and time. The nature of new media allows for improved accounting and evaluation of public diplomacy programs. By using new media technology, public diplomats can provide more quantitative evidence for evaluation and funding purposes. With online media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and mobile phone technology, more information about the number of “followers,” “fans,” and subscribers to the State Department pages can be recorded. With blogging and text postings, the State Department can use mapping techniques to follow message penetration to foreign audiences. By mapping the key words and phrases mentioned in messages from U.S. government officials with the key words and phrases used by foreign responders, we can get a better picture about whether U.S. policy messages are being internalized abroad. Connectivity: Internet and Mobile Phone Usage Technological connectivity remains the largest hurdle in using new media in Africa. Electricity in most places in Africa remains unreliable and poor bandwidth lengthens the amount of time required to conduct the simplest of tasks. According to March 2009 statistics gathered through a Gallup poll, only 1 percent of Africans have Internet access in their homes,25 therefore most people in Africa use Internet cafés. Because of the relatively limited access to new media in most areas of Africa, some of the public diplomacy initiatives through new media are not spreading to a significant portion of the African population. With limited money, limited time, and limited Internet speed, checking a U.S. government Facebook or Twitter page is rarely a priority. Because of the poor broadband penetration in a majority of African countries,26 public diplomacy officials are limited in the number of people they can reach via online social networks. Mobile phone use however, is different. By the end of 2008, Africa had the highest mobile growth rate in the world.27 There are currently over 246 million mobile phone subscriptions in Africa. The cost of having a mobile phone has been decreasing over the years, making it a fairly common possession. Because of the decreasing costs, mobile phones have done a better job in reaching people that live in rural

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villages and towns in Africa.28 For these reasons, SMS usually far outpaces any other form of new media in Africa. Legal Framework At present, there exists no formal policy toward the use of new media within the State Department. As the use of new media grows, there will be a greater need to create a guiding framework for engagement with foreign audiences. How will we manage content control? How do we approach inf luential new media users (bloggers, online organizers, etc.)? What are the repercussions if mistakes are made? The Obama transitional team began working to address these new media issues soon after his election. In early spring 2009, a cable was sent out throughout the Africa Bureau encouraging PAOs to “experiment” with new media, particularly online social networks and provide feedback. Can You Hear Me?: Dialogue in New Media A large part of public diplomacy involves a two-way dialogue, which includes a frequently overlooked dimension: listening. In June 2009, Undersecretary McHale stated, “We need to listen more and lecture less. We have to learn how people listen to us, how our words and deeds are actually heard and seen.”29 This statement permeated throughout AF/PDPA. Bruce Wharton, the current director of the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Africa Bureau, stated, “Writing and distributing press releases or speeches will no longer be sufficient, but we will need to help our staff learn to create and make good use of short video, social networking sites, podcasts, blogs and other forms of new media that really offer engaging conversations rather than oneway communication.”30 A significant question is whether or not target audiences were actually being heard. The Africa Bureau seeks to demonstrate whether and how responders are being heard, who exactly is being heard, and what form this actually takes. Public diplomacy staff reviewed the background of the African audiences that tended to respond more to online social media and blogs (not SMS or podcasts), and found that certain demographics tend to dominate. University students, for instance, actively participated in online discussions more than nonuniversity ones. The African press and African professionals have similarly remained tuned in. A significant number of “fans” and “followers” on Facebook and Twitter, respectively, are members of the inf luential

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American or European expatriate community in Africa. In terms of country of origin, a large majority of the responders are from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya or Ghana.31 These countries tend to have a more developed communications infrastructure, and therefore their populations are more comfortable with using these tools. Resource Investment The experiences of people that have worked overseas in African posts have shown that new media use requires more attention and resource investment than previously believed. One of the largest benefits of new media is the speed and ease in generating mass communications. It may seem that the speed and ease of using new media would mean that very little time is necessary in order to maintain online pages, stream podcasts, set up web chats, and so on. When viewed on a deeper level, particularly in the case of the Africa Bureau, these new media tools require more time and resources than expected. In the situation where nine PAO positions were vacant, and four others were being covered by individuals who were managing another cone,32 PAOs stationed at African posts often have little time to dedicate to new media.33 Because of the deficiencies in the communications infrastructure in Africa, PAOs in Africa have exercised creativity in blending traditional media with the new, in most cases downloading podcasts in the embassy, burning them onto CD-ROMs, and delivering them to the press by bicycle. PAOs also post accurate policy information onto online networking sites in order to allow traditional media sectors (radio, television, newspapers) to pick up this information and disseminate it to their own audiences. Improved Access There are signs that indicate that Africa’s new media connection will improve sooner than once believed. In July 2009, SEACOM completed an underwater fiber optic cable system that provides better communications at a much cheaper price to South and East African countries. 34 Additional improvements in communications (spurred on by World Cup 2010 preparations) transformed the average African’s access to new media. More mobile phones in Africa are transitioning to the 3G network, which will open Africans up to more digitized services. It is estimated that Africa’s Internet connectivity will grow quickly.35

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The major conclusions of this study are as follows. Overall, the effectiveness of new media varied. For outreach to nontraditional audiences in Africa, SMS and podcasts were excellent ways of communicating to the general African population, especially those living in rural areas. The accessibility of mobile phones places U.S. policy messages at the fingertips of Africans from all walks of life and podcasts blend very well with traditional radio broadcasts. Online social networks were not as effective as SMS, primarily because of obstacles in Internet access and because there was not enough two-way communication. By working with private organizations such as Afrigator, MXit, and Safaricom, U.S. policy messages reached a greater audience. Active interaction and discussion, however, was severely lacking in these new media tools. In cases where there were massive amounts of responses from Africans (for the POTUS event, e.g.) there was no follow-up. This holds true for SMS, web chats, Twitter, and Facebook; it was as if Africans were eagerly pouring out their feelings and concerns, and the State Department just failed to respond. Last, the criterion of increased visibility was where new media excelled. New media tools such as Twitter, Facebook, and Co.Nx made U.S. interests and objectives in Africa much more visible and much less of a mystery. Also the ease with which quantitative data can be recorded via new media, makes U.S. public diplomacy efforts visible not only overseas, but domestically (especially for Congress, which delights in tangible evidence). Based on these evaluative criteria and the research behind this essay, a number of recommendations can be made for AF/PDPA. 1. Lean more on SMS and podcasts than on social media. Until internet speed and access in Africa is improved, SMS and podcasts will remain leaders in connecting to Africans via mobile phones and radio. 2. Training is necessary. American and foreign employees of embassies in Africa must be trained in new media skills. PAOs must master print, radio, and television media as well as social networking websites, podcasts, blogs, and web chats. It should no longer be an excuse that PAOs do not use new media because of a lack of knowledge or confidence. 3. Work out a legal framework for dealing with new media. The world of technology can often be reckless, so it would be wise for

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the State Department to set clear yet f lexible guidelines for State employees to follow.36 4. Dialogue is essential. It cannot be said enough that new media will not go anywhere without thorough and consistent dialogue. The possibilities to engage African audiences through new media are boundless; therefore the opportunity to get the U.S. message out should not be diminished because of unresponsiveness. 5. Be creative. AF/PDPA should continue to explore creative ways of using new media in Africa. In doing so, it should not overlook the ways in which new media diplomacy can be blended with the traditional. Conclusion It is clear that new media will continue to be the buzz of all U.S. public diplomacy, and there is no exception for Africa. One of the most prominent themes in the president’s policy message to Africa is “African solutions to African problems.” This theme is directed toward a new philosophy of listening more to the voices of Africa. New media, and the wide possibilities of communication and dialogue through it, will therefore become a crucial element of U.S. public diplomacy toward Africa. As Africans expand their knowledge of new technologies, the Africa Bureau will be able to expand its usage of new media. Although Africa is not at the level of communications needed for expanded new media technologies, it is extremely important for the Africa Bureau to be “in on the takeoffs” of these new public diplomacy tools, as Edward R. Murrow would have said New media have proven to be amazingly effective in communicating to large masses and sparking dialogue—but only if used properly. One-way communication in public diplomacy is like one-handed clapping—it does not produce anything and to attempt it is futile. It is not enough to simply post blogs or tweets; effective public diplomacy with social media will require more attention toward listening to our foreign audiences. Although it may only take a few seconds to send an SMS or a tweet, public diplomacy practitioners must follow up with dialogues that they are initiating. These tools will not be useful for public diplomacy goals if they are saying on the surface that these social media networks have the ability to facilitate interactivity and conversation, but they don’t actually use them to do so. They must actively demonstrate that they are listening. Yes, we want to continue

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to tell America’s story, but what and how are we working to understand the stories of others? Finally, it is important to reemphasize that traditional media in Africa are not being replaced by new media tools. It is best to think of new media as a complement (not a replacement or even a supplement) to traditional media and public diplomacy work; in many cases, the traditional and new are blended. When it comes to the widespread culture of communication in Africa, the “last three feet”—as Edward R. Murrow called face-to-face communication—are irreplaceable. Regardless of the means (new or traditional), U.S. public diplomacy toward Africa must engage early and often, and new media will certainly be an exciting way in which to do it. Notes 1. Much of the information in this study is based on personal observation of the author, who was an intern in the State Department’s Africa Bureau in the summer of 2009. 2. State Department 0fficial number 1, telephone interview, October 5, 2009. 3. Judith A. McHale, “Launch of the Public Diplomacy Collaborative,” Remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government upon the launch of the Public Diplomacy Collaborative, September 17, 2009. 4. Office of Inspector General, “Report of Inspection: the Bureau of African Affairs,” Report no. ISP-I-09-63, OIG, August 2009, 28. 5. Ibid., 29. 6. Ibid., 28. 7. Bev Godwin, “Your Government: Open for Business in New Ways and New Places,” Video blog post, The White House, May 21, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/newmedia. 8. The White House. www.whitehouse.gov. 9. Godwin, “Your Government.” 10. James K. Glassman, “Public Diplomacy 2.0,” Video blog post, Policy Innovations, December 1, 2008. 11. Ibid. 12. SMS, or Short Message Service, is a communication tool used to transmit short text messages from one mobile device to another. 13. A podcast is a digital audio or video file that is distributed via RSS (Really Simple Syndication). Podcasts are easily transmittable to radio waves and can be viewed/heard on the computer or through media players. 14. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Examples of What U.S. Embassies in Africa are Doing to Engage African Public on the President’s Ghana Speech, The White House; Office of the Press Secretary, July 10, 2009; www/whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ US-Embassies-in-Africa-Engaging-African-Public-on-the-Presidents-Ghana-Speech. 15. When posts received the podcast, it was downloaded and transferred to disks. The disks were then sent (by bicycles in most cases) to radio stations. 16. “President Barack Obama in Ghana,” speech. Remarks by President Obama to the Ghanaian Parliament. Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana, July 11, 2009. Department of State/IIP. http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/ejs/archives/obama_ in_ghana.pdf.

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17. Ibid. 18. State Department official number 3, telephone interview, October 22, 2009. 19. “Comment! Good Governance and other Hot Topics on Facebook.” U.S. Department of State/Bureau of International Information Programs; http://www.america.gov/media/ pdf/ejs/archives/comment.pdf. 20. Twitter was primarily used by Embassies Maputo, Lusaka, Pretoria, and Kinshasa as other African posts did not have active Twitter pages at the time. 21. Afrigator; www.afrigator.com. 22. Johnnie Carson, “Briefing on Secretary Clinton’s Upcoming Trip to Africa,” speech. Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2009. 23. State Department official number 1, telephone interview, October 5, 2009. 24. eJournal USA Facebook page; Facebook.com. 25. Ian T. Brown, “U.S. Faces Challenges with Communication Users Abroad,” Gallup.com. March 12, 2009. 26. This is with the exception of Cape Verde, Seychelles, and Mauritius, which all have better Internet bandwidth because of their island isolation and small populations. 27. Information Society Statistical Profile: Africa. International Communication Union, 2009, v. 28. Ibid. 14. 29. Judith A. McHale, “Public Diplomacy: A National Security Imperative,” address. Address at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C. June 11, 2009. http://www. state.gov/r/remarks/124640.htm. 30. Bruce D. Wharton, director of the Public Diplomacy Office, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, interview by e-mail, November 30, 2009. 31. Ibid.; also State Department official number 3, telephone interview, October 30, 2009. 32. For example, an embassy employee would be titled as PAO/Political or PAO/Consular officer. 33. State Department official number 3, telephone interview, October 22, 2009. 34. SEACOM is a fiber optic cable linking South and East Africa and South Asia. 35. Wharton, interview. 36. The State Department has taken preliminary steps toward a legal framework with an Internet Steering Committee that is working on “best practices” guidelines that will be used for issues regarding access, privacy. and copyrights.

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CH A P T E R

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New Media or Old in Egypt and South Korea? Joh n R ahag h i

South Korea and Egypt are very different culturally, historically, politically, and socially. One is a Confucian state at the heart of the Northeast Asia trade and security area and the other is an Arab and Muslim nation arguably the media and cultural capital of the Middle East. The U.S. government maintains active public diplomacy programs in both countries, using somewhat similar instruments. Despite the inherent situational differences, there is some overlap in the approach of engagement and dialogue. This study will compare and contrast American public diplomacy in the two countries, analyzing reasons for similarities and differences in the basic approach used by American public diplomacy professionals, and will focus on the media. Although the staffs at the American Embassies in Egypt and Korea make use of a variety of means of communication to engage with the local populations, this study will examine their use of old and new media because both are especially important in these two societies and it is instructive to compare how they are used. For the purposes of this essay, traditional, or old, media will be defined as print and broadcast. New media are defined as the Internet, social networks, video, and SMS.

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John Rahaghi South Korea Bilateral Relations and Public Opinion

The United States has a long history of economic and security cooperation with South Korea. The U.S. military has had troops stationed in the country since the end of the Korean War in 1953. South Korea is America’s seventh largest trading partner.1 Despite some contentious issues, relations remain strong, and the South Korean public generally respects America.2 A recent Pew Global Attitudes Project poll showed a 78 percent approval rating of the United States among Koreans and an 81 percent approval rating of the Obama administration. Additional recent polling showed over 80 percent of South Koreans approve of the presence of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the name given to the U.S. military component on the peninsula.3 Nevertheless, U.S. officials have faced a constant stream of issues that has made South Koreas seem to be anti-American.4 They believe that a Confucian “mindset” can inf luence much of how South Koreans think, meaning that a philosophical system that respects learning, institutions, and elders has an impulse to act by consensus that can make Koreans hard to persuade from the outside.5 This mindset may help explain aspects of the 2008 protests against resumption of American beef imports that despite American assurances had been banned since 2003 due to fears of mad cow disease.6,7 When President Lee Myung-bak lifted the ban on American beef in 2008, a large grassroots political movement exploded with calls for the president to resign and the ban to remain in effect. Opposition political parties seized the opportunity to help turn public sentiment against President Lee. Spurious scientific evidence and rumors helped fuel the protests as fear mounted that American beef could be fatal. Rational arguments seemed to have no effect. Only after President Lee arranged to import only American beef from cattle less than thirty months old (scientists believe older animals are the most likely to be vulnerable) did the protests eventually dwindle and stop. The protests were virtually forgotten a few months after they ended and people are now buying a lot of American beef, which is less expensive than Korean beef.8 In December 2008 an editorial in a Korean daily lamented that the protests “showed that many people in this country lack scientific common sense and chose to believe scurrilous stories instead.”9 “It is our national character to get upset easily and then to forget all about it,”

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remarked one Seoul resident in an article about the issue.10 American public diplomacy officials worked hard on this issue throughout the period but it took time for that effort to have an impact. American officials also had to deal with the fallout from a 2002 incident in which U.S. troops accidentally killed two South Korean schoolgirls. This led to huge protests and demands for a change in the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement. But they were helped because of an underlying public appreciation for the benefits of a long-standing bilateral security arrangement gained through decades of cooperation.11 According to the U.S. Embassy, the issues in the public mind that are currently problematic are the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the status of U.S. bases in Korea, and South Korean contributions to international aid and peacekeeping. The support for the U.S. presence has periodically waxed and waned depending on politics, economics, and the perceived security situation with North Korea at the time.12 One underlying problem that members of American public diplomacy staff are concerned about is a Korean sense of national pride and xenophobia. Many South Koreans refuse to accept a permanent U.S. military presence, or even the idea that North Korea might attack them.13 More importantly, young people today are increasingly getting their news and information from “nontraditional” news sources such as the Internet.14 The U.S. Public Diplomacy Program and New Media The U.S. Embassy in Seoul maintains a full range of public diplomacy programs focused on South Korea to address these and other issues. South Korea is one of the world’s most media-rich environments, and in addition to newspapers and television, web pages, blogs, web casts, and social networking tools are used. Overall, television is rated as the place where most Koreans get their news followed by the Internet and then newspapers.15 Public diplomacy professionals at the U.S. Embassy make intensive use of new media for outreach as well as to showcase events that are conducted in person. The website has options for both English and Korean languages and links to a variety of topical areas. There are links to the ambassador’s blog, her recent speeches and transcripts of interviews with South Korean media, and other stories concerning top U.S. officials.16 Other links have downloadable documents such as audiobooks in Korean about subjects concerning the United States, plus a variety of information on topical U.S, South Korean, and North Korean issues.17

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Video clips are also used to showcase different events that the embassy has participated in or sponsored. The homepage links to social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube as well as two different blogs, called Café USA and Café IRC (Information Resource Center).18 The Embassy Youth Forum is an innovative program that a current State Department official gives as an example of how Embassy Seoul has combined public diplomacy instruments to promote dialogue and understanding through technology.19 Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs Patrick Linehan gathered a group of students together and asked them the best way to reach out and sustain a dialogue with young people about issues that matter to them. Their consensus was that a video posted on the web would be the best method. The initial program allowed panelists to ask questions of U.S. officials. From there, the effort has expanded with more students getting involved and discussions developed concerning free trade, immigration, and educational exchanges. The videos are posted on the embassy website after the events.20 Public diplomacy staff expanded the reach of the program when students using f lip cameras at different campuses filmed their peers who could not attend the forum. The first time this was used was to ask students for welcome messages or advice for the newly arrived U.S. ambassador. The Embassy Youth Forum has continued to grow and students now can suggest topics to the embassy for discussion.21 The South Korean press also reported on this effort to engage South Korean youth.22 Video clips of past forums are posted on the embassy website. By clicking on the link to YouTube, many more videos concerning the Youth Forum can also be found.23 Additionally, social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook allow users to follow postings by the embassy about the latest news of U.S. officials including events attended or sponsored by embassy personnel.24 Broadcasting U.S. public diplomacy through broadcasting in South Korea is a special case. The programs, managed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, are aimed at North Korea and do not include broadcasting intended specifically for South Koreans. However, because the Korean peninsula has a homogenous population of ethnic Koreans despite its political division, broadcasts by the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free

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Asia (RFA) intended for North Korean audiences can be listened to easily by South Koreans as well. VOA Korean provides news about the two Koreas, the United States, and other world events. RFA acts as a surrogate broadcaster for the North, focusing on news inside North Korea to provide an alternative source to the state-controlled news in North Korea.25 South Koreans listen to VOA Korean programs intended for North Koreans through the Internet and a small number receive programming through shortwave. VOA and RFA broadcasting therefore serve as important news sources for many South Koreas even though they are intended for North Koreans.26 In the case of VOA, the stories they report are ones that are on the minds of many South Koreans anyway. According to VOA officials, VOA’s journalistic standards are very highly regarded by both South and North Koreans.27 South Korean broadcasters incorporate VOA news into their own programming because of its high quality. Also, the VOA Korea service website contains updated content of broadcasts and stories in Korean and is accessed by an estimated forty-five thousand visitors per month, up from an estimated fourteen thousand visitors in 2004. The credibility of the service is so high that it is a valuable resource for South Korean journalists because of its journalistic integrity and fair reporting. It is estimated that South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency pulls two–three VOA news stories per day, selecting articles related to the North Korean nuclear program, or reporting on events from the State Department, Congress, and White House. Major South Korean media then share these stories. The South Korean Internet portal “Naver,” a huge search engine, and Yahoo!Korea use VOA stories on a daily basis as well.28 VOA English is also popular in South Korea, especially among students, and is used by educational institutions as teaching material.29 New Media in the Public Diplomacy Program While television is considered the most trusted news source and the ambassador does get involved with TV interviews, Internet usage is already high in South Korea and is increasing.30 Young people increasingly turn to the Internet to get their news.31 The population in South Korea quickly adapts new information technology and South Korea has been called one of the most “wired” countries in the world, with an estimated 37 million Internet users out of a population of 48.5 million.32 As convergence of the media continues to take place, having a well-established Internet presence is going to be more and more critical.

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Further, cell phone usage is already very high in South Korea, and Internet access is now becoming more common on phones.33 American public diplomacy professionals in Korea use all the traditional means including face-to-face interaction and cultural and educational programs, but they also use the Internet to build up an “official cultural presence.” The ambassador using new media tools for outreach helps establish a “presence of respect.”34 The Embassy Youth Forum is an excellent combination of these public diplomacy instruments and it has allowed South Korean youth to actively participate and help craft a program that allows them to sustain a dialogue with U.S. officials about issues of direct concern to them. For example, two months before the 2008 protests erupted over beef imports, the students brought the issue up in the Forum. The PAO was surprised by how much they talked about it, but by posting the discussion on the Internet, the embassy engaged in a useful discussion, and this supplemented the ongoing face-to-face discussions embassy officers were having.35 The embassy’s two blog sites, IRC Seoul (from the Information Resource Center) and Café USA, both in Korean, are additional channels to target audiences. The Café USA site contains the ambassador’s blog and web chat bulletin boards, and boasts over ten thousand registered online members in Korea and abroad.36 However, there are currently fewer than 300 users each for the embassy’s Twitter and Facebook pages, and they mainly have content that is found on the embassy website.37 Moreover, although the embassy says there are over 250 messages posted a day on the discussion boards, there is no indication of whether these messages are part of some kind of greater dialogue designed to enhance mutual understanding or explain policy.38 It may not be possible for the embassy staff to devote the necessary time to answering posts on social networking sites, but it would increase the full utility of the technology.

Egypt Bilateral Relations and Public Opinion Egypt is a key regional ally in the Middle East, and is the beneficiary of the second largest U.S. aid worldwide.39 The major bilateral issues are security, intelligence cooperation, and political and economic reform. Officially there is cooperation with peacekeeping missions, security

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cooperation in terms of the conventional military, and efforts to apprehend extremists.40 Egypt is generally viewed as a cultural and media capital of the region.41 In the minds of the Egyptian public, security issues are of greatest concern. According to a 2009 Zogby poll, the top three issues are: Iraq, the Arab/Israeli conf lict, and American attitudes toward the Arab/ Muslim world.42 Egyptian public approval of America after the 2003 U.S invasion of Iraq fell to the single digits and the United States was widely seen as a big and dangerous presence. Many Egyptians thought President George W. Bush was anti-Muslim and anti-Arab, and criticized him for Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the Arab-Israeli stalemate. In the popular mind in Egypt the United States has enormous power in the country and an inordinate inf luence over people’s lives including over the Egyptian government’s foreign policy.43 Despite the positive image and words of respect offered by U.S. president Barack Obama during his June 2009 visit to Cairo there is still a lot of skepticism on the part of many academics and the general public.44 They have a wait-and-see attitude toward U.S. foreign policy. One of the largest issues weighing on Egyptian and Arab minds is how the Obama administration will push the Israeli/Palestinian peace process forward and adopt a more even hand as they felt the Bush administration clearly favored Israel.45 The Egyptian people have many newspaper, radio, and television options. Newspapers span the political spectrum, but many lack professionalism in their reporting. The Egyptian government controls all terrestrial radio and television channels so they have low credibility even though they have high viewership.46 Satellite television is very popular in Egypt; Al-Jazeera is the most watched network and enjoys the most credibility.47 There is a good deal of skepticism toward Western media, and generally Egyptians will “triangulate” different sources to form their opinion of current events.48 Overview of the U.S. Public Diplomacy Program The U.S. public diplomacy staff in Egypt gives priority to youth audiences because of the “youth bulge” there. A key goal is to demonstrate that the United States seeks a relationship with Muslims worldwide based on mutual respect. The public diplomacy challenge is to sustain a belief that U.S. citizens don’t hate Muslims, and to bridge profound differences with regard to policies.49

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The U.S. Embassy in Cairo combines a full range of traditional cultural and exchange programs with old and new media employed for outreach and dialogue. Many on-the-record interviews are conducted with television and print media, and there is a robust Internet presence, and use of SMS and social networking sites such as YouTube and Facebook.50 Apart from embassy programs, the U.S. Congress funds Alhurra television and Radio Sawa that broadcast to the Middle East and are available to an Egyptian audience. The broadcast programming seeks to address Arab misperceptions about the United States that are found in Egypt and also to report straight news.51 New Media The Public Diplomacy section of U.S. Embassy in Cairo has started to engage in new media. The embassy’s website has both English and Arabic, with a link to a fully Arabic version. There are links to news about educational exchanges, a web chat with the consul general, information and remarks by the ambassador, and other announcements, reports, and services. The web chat option has questions and responses in both Arabic and English with many questions relating to consular matters. The Information Resource Center link leads to a page with many options for learning about the United States, its branches of government, the embassy in Cairo, and also learning materials for teenagers.52 The embassy has an Education USA page on Facebook with links to other U.S. Embassy and America.gov information pages on Facebook containing information about study in the United States and links to other U.S. information pages.53 There is an embassy channel on YouTube that is full of education-related information for users and videos they can watch.54 The embassy is also using Twitter to disseminate news about its activities.55 The embassy website offers a link for journalists to join the embassy SMS service.56 SMS messages are used quite frequently to alert journalists, media, and academic contacts about speeches, and constitute a key tool for public diplomacy staff.57 Prior to President Obama’s trip to Cairo in June 2009, the State Department worked with the private company Clickatell to set up an SMS messaging campaign. According to the State Department: the U.S. Department of State built a website on www.america.gov to register people wanting to receive SMS message highlights from President Obama’s speech from Cairo on June 4, 2009. Thousands

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of people representing more than 150 countries opted-in to the first-of-its-kind SMS campaign, meeting the goals of the US State Department to create open, two-way mobile communications from global audiences—in essence, creating a “Mobile Town Hall Without Borders.” Specifically for this event, Clickatell set up unique mobile routing and tapped into its own existing complex network infrastructure capable of reaching more than 775 mobile operators in over 220 countries. Clickatell worked closely with the US State Department to build the online website and registration process to offer opt-in services for global citizens wanting to participate during the live speech. The service received registrations from thousands of people representing more than 150 countries in four languages, including English, Persian, Urdu, and Arabic. Comments directly from those having signed up to receive SMS speech highlights were posted on the website at America.gov.58 Broadcasting The U.S. government’s public diplomacy programs through radio and television are supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and include the Voice of America English Service, and the Arabic language programs of Alhurra television and Radio Sawa.59 Alhurra officials say that their objective is to report fairly and accurately the news of the day, and to carry talk shows, documentaries, political shows, and programming to illustrate how the American system of government works.60 Alhurra has programming concerning democracy, human rights violations, and women’s rights in the Arab world. The show concerning women’s rights has female talent from Saudi Arabia. “It’s a push forward to have a female from Saudi Arabia talking about a topic like this,” says correspondent Larissa Aoun. And for their “Eye On Democracy” program she explains, “no other Arab networks talk about what we do. It’s the way we cover things in the region that is different.”61 Radio Sawa has more of a pop music format with news segments geared toward a younger audience. “We are producing more political programs for Radio Sawa,” says Chams Eddin, a communications specialist for the Middle East Broadcasting Network that produces Alhurra and Radio Sawa. Radio Sawa has two newscasts every hour and strives to get interviews with people such as members of the Iraqi parliament.62 Alhurra also is expanding into social media with a YouTube partnership showcasing broadcasts and Facebook and Twitter pages. During

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shows broadcasters tell the audience to go to Facebook and post their feedback and comments, and they post videos on sites such as Maktoob and Jeeran in an effort to communicate and be interactive with Internet users. “We are part of public diplomacy,” says Chams Eddin, “similar to open libraries that were a source for information.”63 Analysis of the Public Diplomacy Program U.S. public diplomacy practitioners in Egypt use various instruments to reach their audiences. They know that educational and cultural exchange programs are an effective tool for attracting and informing about the United States, and that broadcasting plays a role, although it is not targeted directly at Egypt. They work hard at personal contact and give many interviews to traditional media outlets dealing with Egyptian concerns about U.S. policy and other matters. This often includes the Arab/Israeli peace process, a topic that comes up in nearly all conversations with individuals, students, and think tank specialists.64 Egypt has many different media options and the public diplomacy staff works hard to engage with many of them, but they also talk face to face with as many people as possible. Al-Jazeera is the most popular satellite channel in Egypt and enjoys a wide viewership as a source of the latest updates on crises and other important events. However, the public diplomacy staff in Egypt does not have the primary responsibility to engage with al Jazeera. Normally, U.S. Government spokespersons from Washington or the media hubs located in Dubai and Europe are the interlocutors with Al Jazeera. Public affairs officials from the embassy have participated in some Al Jazeera programs, and they have occasionally been able to persuade Al Jazeera to do reports on highprofile performing arts events sponsored by the Embassy Public Affairs Section.65 But they devote most of their media efforts to gaining access to Egyptian newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Both Alhurra Television and Radio Sawa have been criticized by Arab analysts, American experts, and even Congressional staffers for their lack of relevance and professionalism. They have a limited impact in Egypt.66 Indications are, however, that Congress will continue to fund them. Larissa Aoun claims Alhurra is improving: “When we first launched, we received a lot of criticism. People were skeptical of anything related to the U.S. Year by year we’ve been getting better. People see what we’re doing.” She adds that the latest A.C. Nielsen ratings are 27.7 million viewers a week in the Middle East. 67 Even though it has been

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slowly trending upward, in Egypt, Alhurra ranked eighteenth out of seventy-two channels in an October 2009 survey that found its daily viewership was only 3 percent while weekly viewership was 11 percent. “We are not trying to compete with Al-Jazeera,” says Chams Eddin, “we are trying to provide accurate, objective news to viewers.”68 Indeed, Alhurra should not try to compete with Al-Jazeera but find its own niche with reporting on all aspects of America that interest Arabs but where Arab networks are weak.69 According to a BBG survey, Radio Sawa listenership has also been sliding in Egypt, going from 10 percent in 2005 to 7 in 2009 for weekly listeners.70 The use of the Internet is clearly of growing importance in Egypt even though penetration is only about 15 percent now. Huge numbers of people are using Internet cafes and have blackberries with web access.71 The website of the embassy in Cairo contains valuable and useful information, but not all of it is in Arabic. Additionally unhelpful technical problems have arisen, for example, the Online Resources For English Teaching link under the Public Affairs section has had periods when it was not functioning. Maintenance of such websites in particular requires constant attention and resources are limited so it can be difficult to maintain all the content on a dual language website. But a web presence should strive to make the user experience as easy and friendly as possible to attract users to it for information. There are special challenges in using social media tools in repressive societies, but they are useful tools if applied within the constraints of the local context and incorporated sensibly into the overall public diplomacy program as Embassy Cairo is trying to do.72 Even though the Facebook site for the U.S. Embassy in Cairo only has just over thirty-one hundred “fans” by last count, and the education page linked from it has just over six thousand, the potential audience is growing rapidly. More use of Arabic is likely to accelerate this trend.73 There is a huge blogger movement in Egypt in addition to heavy use of the Internet by human rights activists who take pictures with cell phones and put them on YouTube. Two years ago the “Six April Group” of opposition activists in Egypt managed to organize a strike via Facebook to protest certain social problems.74 As the use of the Internet and social media continues to grow in Egypt, it is wise for the United States to have that presence and to make it as accessible as possible. Public diplomacy professionals in Egypt know that SMS is the best new technology for their purposes in Egypt. The large number of cell phone users and the infrastructure make this one of the most effective

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ways to reach people. A recent estimate states “as of 2008 there were three mobile-cellular networks with a total of more than 41 million subscribers, roughly 50 per 100 persons.” 75 The public diplomacy staff uses the link on the embassy website to notify journalists quickly of news items, and to communicate directly with their contacts. They used an SMS campaign in innovative ways to give to many people access to President Obama’s speech, and encouraging feedback allowed the full two-way communication potential of the medium to be utilized. Conducting U.S. public diplomacy in Egypt is a challenge, and the innovative use of technology and engagement will be a key toward informing, attracting, and advocating a populace that has many media options for information. Conclusions Public diplomacy professionals in Egypt and South Korea operate in completely different contexts, but there are some similarities in their programs. Both seek to incorporate various new and old media into outreach and dialogue efforts. Public diplomacy professionals in both countries must keep in mind that the audiences they seek to reach have considerable pride that affects their view of the United States. For example, South Koreans may understand rationally that America provides their country with security, but many who are vocal do not like U.S. troops on their soil. In Egypt, many fear, especially after the Bush era, that Americans do not respect Arabs and Muslims, although President Obama has addressed that. There are similarities in the U.S. broadcasting situation as well. There is no “Egyptian” broadcasting by the United States just as there is no “South Korean” broadcasting, although people in both countries are part of a broader audience, and U.S. broadcasting still manages to have an impact. Using the new media in South Korea and Egypt requires considerable effort to keep up with technology. But it also requires a systematic effort to keep track of what people will use to gather information about the United States. Both embassies maintain websites, but the Embassy Seoul website appears to be better designed with better usability than Embassy Cairo’s. South Korea is much more technologically advanced than Egypt, but each program has found unique ways to take advantage of the technological and new media situation that exists: SMS in Egypt and the Embassy Youth Forum for South Korea. Bob Holden at the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs,

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whose job it is to test out new media and its utility with foreign audiences, says: “It’s a matter of engagement and dialogue; is it working or is it just giving people a chance to yell? . . . you picked up maybe 2000 Facebook users, but now what? Do you have a way to stay in touch?” 76 There has been a rush in recent years to just use social media tools. Social media such as Twitter and Facebook are maximized when they are used to facilitate conversation. If postings are made by users, and even if they all can be read by embassy personnel, the value is very limited if there is no response or indication that the ambassador or someone else is actually being reached.77 The differences between the two countries in terms of conducting public diplomacy highlight the limits of what any program can do. South Korea is a much more receptive environment not because of new media tools or their use, but because of years of positive cooperation and attitudes. And in Egypt, as one analyst stresses for the Arab world, no matter how savvy a public diplomacy program is, it will be ineffective in changing Arab public opinion if that public is dissatisfied with U.S. policies on the ground.78 As one poster on Embassy Cairo’s YouTube education page wrote: “I can’t understand you! You are killing our people in Iraq, stealing our treasures in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the gulf generally, you treat us like animals here in Cairo, and you arrest our guys at your ‘stupid country.’ If you hate us . . . then why do you attract us? What is your problem with us? WHEN WILL YOU LEAVE US ALONE? :) Just innocent question.” 79 A mindset like this can’t be overcome through a public diplomacy program by itself. But at least, the public diplomacy staff should try to show the audience respect, and dignify such questions with answers.

Notes 1. Carin Zissis and Youkyung Lee, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance—Council on Foreign Relations,” April 14, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11459/. 2. Personal interview with U.S. diplomat no. 1, a current State Department official, November 6, 2009. 3. Response from Americans in PAO section of U.S. Embassy Seoul to questions forwarded, received via e-mail, October 30, 2009. 4. Telephone interview with U.S. diplomat no. 2, an FSO who served in Seoul, 1996–2000, October 30, 2009. 5. Ibid. 6. Blaine Harden, “S. Koreans Have New Regard For U.S. Beef,” The Washington Post, December 10, 2008.

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7. “US Enhanced MAD Cow Feed Ban Won’t Affect Korean Beef Imports,” Asia Pulse, April 23, 2009. 8. Harden, “S. Koreans Have New Regard For U.S. Beef.” 9. “Seoul Tells U.S. Envoy to Watch Mouths,” The Korea Herald, June 6, 2008; and “Yonhap, Editorial from the JoongAng Daily,” December 1, 2008. 10. Harden, “S. Koreans Have New Regard For U.S. Beef.” 11. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 1, cited. 12. Telephone interview with Sol Schindler, former FSO who served in Seoul in the 1970s, November 2, 2009; interview with Mort Smith, former minister-counselor for public affairs (PAO) in Korea. He served a total of eight years in Korea in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 13. Ibid. 14. Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, “South Korean Survey Shows Teenagers Trust Nontraditional Media News Sources” (English), October 22, 2008. 15. Response from Americans in PAO section of U.S. Embassy Seoul to questions forwarded, received via e-mail, October 30, 2009. 16. “Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea—Home,” http://seoul.usembassy.gov/. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 1, cited. 20. Patrick Linehan, minister-counselor for public diplomacy, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, in a web video posted on the U.S. Embassy Seoul website, http://stream.state.gov/streamvol/ libmedia/korea/49271/EYF8/01EYF1YearAnniversary320x240.wmv. 21. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 1, cited. 22. Hannah Bae, “Students and Diplomats Square Off—INSIDE JoongAng Daily,” May 19, 2009, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2904981. 23. “Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea—Home.” 24. Ibid. 25. Personal interview with Dong Hyuk Lee, chief of the East Asia and Pacific Division, Korean Service, Voice of America, November 6, 2009. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. CIA, East & Southeast Asia: Korea, South, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ks.html. 31. Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, “South Korean Survey Shows Teenagers Trust Nontraditional Media News Sources.” 32. “Asia Internet Usage Stats and Population Statistics,” http://www.internetworldstats.com/ stats3.htm. 33. CIA, East & Southeast Asia: Korea, South, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ks.html. 34. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 2, cited. 35. Linehan, in a web video posted on the U.S. Embassy Seoul website. 36. “Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea—Home.” 37. “US Embassy Seoul (UsembassySeoul) on Twitter,” http://twitter.com/usembassyseoul; “U.S. Embassy Seoul | Facebook,” http://www.facebook.com/usembassyseoul. 38. “Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea—Home.” 39. “AmCham Egypt—Business Studies and Analysis Center—Egypt-U.S. Economic Relations,” http://www.amcham.org.eg/BSAC/ustrade/USTrade_Relations.asp. 40. Telephone interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, a currently serving U.S. diplomat who has served most of his career in the Middle East, October 29, 2009.

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41. Ibid.; “Hassan Abou Taleb, Bilateral and Regional Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations, June 2009—Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” http://www.carnegieendowment. org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23278. 42. Shibley Telhami, “Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland with Zogby International, 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey.” 43. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 44. Ibid. 45. Lee Keith, “After Years of Bush, Arabs See Hope in Obama,” Associated Press Worldstream, November 7, 2008. 46. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 47. “Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV: Performance Update. 27 October 2009, Broadcasting Board of Governors.” 48. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 49. Ibid 50. Ibid. 51. Telephone interview with Larissa Aoun, correspondent/producer for Alhurra, November 20, 2009; telephone interview with Chams Eddin, communications specialist for Alhurra, November 20, 2009. 52. “U.S. Embassy Cairo Main Page,” http://cairo.usembassy.gov/. 53. “U.S. Embassy Cairo News and Information,” http://www.facebook.com/USEmbassy Cairo. 54. “YouTube—USEmbassyCairo’s Channel,” http://www.youtube.com/user/USEmbassyCairo. 55. “US Embassy Cairo (USEmbassyCairo) on Twitter.” 56. U.S. Embassy Cairo Main Page.” 57. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 58. “Clickatell SMS-Powered ‘Mobile Town Hall Without Borders’ A Big Success—Text Messaging Connects Thousands Around the World During Live Obama Cairo Speech | Newsroom | Clickatell,” http://www.clickatell.com/press/press_article.php/132. 59. For a summary of the establishment of Radio Sawa and al Hurra Television, see Mohammed el-Nawawy, “U.S. Public Diplomacy and the News Credibility of Radio Sawa and Television al Hurra in the Arab World,” Philip Seib, ed., New Media and the New Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 119–138; for a comment on broadcasting to Egypt, see Hussein Amin, “The View from Egypt,” pp. 111–113, in the same book. 60. Interview with Eddin, cited; interview with Aoun, cited. 61. interview with Aoun, cited.. 62. Interview with Eddin, cited. 63. Ibid. 64. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 65. Ibid 66. University of California Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, “An Evaluation of Alhurra Television Programming,” July 31, 2008; William A. Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy,” Arab Media and Society, February 2009; and “Broadcasting and American Public Diplomacy,” Transnational Broadcasting Studies, Spring 2005; Shawn Powers and Ahmed El Gody, “The Lessons of al Hurra Television,” in Philip Seib, Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 49–66. 67. Interview with Aoun, cited. 68. Interview with Eddin, cited. 69. William Rugh, “Urgent Reform For Our Arabic Broadcasting (unpublished essay),” June 6, 2009. 70. “Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV: Performance Update. 27 October 2009, Broadcasting Board of Governors.”

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71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. “U.S. Embassy Cairo News and Information”; “Study USA-Egypt | Facebook,” http:// www.facebook.com/StudyUSAEgypt. 74. Interview with U.S. diplomat no. 3, cited. 75. Africa: Egypt (CIA), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ eg.html. 76. Personal interview with Robert Holden, director, Office of East-Asia Pacific Affairs, Bureau of International Information Programs, State Department, November 6, 2009. 77. Joshua Fouts, “Social Media, Virtual Worlds and Public Diplomacy,” World Politics Review, October 13, 2009. 78. Mohammed el-Nawawy, “US Public Diplomacy in the Arab World: The News Credibility of Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra in Five Countries,” Global Media and Communication, Vol. 2, No. 2 (August 2006), 183–203. 79. “YouTube—USEmbassyCairo’s Channel.”

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CH A P T E R

12

Finding the Right Media Formula—from the Soviet Union to Russia E l i se S. C rane

Never was public diplomacy more important—or more challenging— than during the Cold War. Virtually airtight to outside inf luence, Soviet authorities created their own image of the world and relentlessly distributed these distortions to their citizens, elevating U.S. public diplomacy to vital importance. In an information-hostile environment, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) confronted a critical need for programs that countered Soviet propaganda and presented factual information about America. American broadcasting, such as Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Liberty, is the public diplomacy instrument most often credited with catalyzing the Soviet Union’s collapse1 but there is much more to the story. With its unique reciprocal distribution arrangement, the Russian-language magazine Amerika, published monthly from 1944 to 1994, successfully eluded Soviet censorship to provide Russians with a critical window on the West. Amerika is testament to the power of print media—often overlooked in studies of Cold War–era public diplomacy—in presenting America’s best face to cloistered publics. While broadcasting by the VOA and Radio Liberty played a significant role in changing hearts and minds and affecting perceptions about the West, Russian reverence for the written word arguably made Amerika more powerful than radio and enshrines it as a case study in the unsung role of print media in felling

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the Soviet empire. Amerika functioned in a hostile political environment and conquered steep challenges to serve as the ideal public diplomacy instrument for its place and time. Amerika’s Exceptionality As a U.S. diplomat in Moscow said in 1959, “With the exception of personal contacts, Amerika magazine has made the greatest contribution to better understanding of America by the Soviets and to provision of accurate information about the U.S., thus counteracting to some degree anti-American propaganda.”2 In this study, I examine the essence of Amerika, its deployment during the Cold War, and its potency compared to USIA broadcasting. I then turn to current public diplomacy toward Russia and suggest ways in which Amerika’s success can be translated into contemporary programming, including new media initiatives. The Right Fit for Its Place and Time From the Soviet era to the modern day, Russian society has presented unique challenges and opportunities for public diplomacy programming. Most importantly, education and intelligence have always carried a high value and literacy has been nearly universal. Dick Baker worked on Amerika for many years and viewed Russian literacy rates as a “non-issue.”3 This was surely a rare luxury for public diplomacy professionals, given illiteracy rates in many parts of the world, and allowed them to use print media to effectively target not just elite opinion makers, but also the mass public. In a society that adulates the written word, print publications are king; knowing its audience, USIA officials had to develop an excellent print product that appealed to the Russian intellect while providing images of daily American life. Amerika hit the target. Despite practically universal literacy, Amerika relied as much on images as on words. According to Baker, most Russians were aware that the Soviet government fed them lies. By extension, they expected that the U.S. government would lie to them as well. However, as former USIA official Howard Cincotta said, “they trusted pictures more than words.”4 One image of a fully stocked American supermarket provided an infinitely more credible and powerful image of life in the

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West than could a five-thousand-word article about capitalism and consumer goods. Of all public diplomacy programs aimed at the Soviet Union, including broadcasting and other print publications, Amerika responded most successfully to the popular appetite for information about the West. Starved for knowledge about a land that must have seemed worlds away, Russians developed an obsessive interest in Western ways of life. Former USIA officials describe this obsession as integral to Amerika’s success. George Clack, Amerika’s last editor, emphasized its ability to tap into an enormous hunger for information about the West in a country notoriously scarce on information.5 Cincotta described his time at Amerika as “probably the only time in my editorial career when I was positive that our stuff was reaching a large, appreciative audience.” This opinion was substantiated by the booming black market for “unsold” issues and Soviet attempts to obviate the distribution agreement. As Yale Richmond aptly put it, “nothing attracts like forbidden fruit.”6 For many behind the Iron Curtain, Amerika was that forbidden fruit. The Reciprocal Distribution Agreement Under the first Soviet-U.S. cultural agreement, signed in 1945, Amerika was published by the Office of War Information and lacked a Soviet counterpart. Realizing its impact on the mass public in early 1950, Soviet authorities began to manipulate circulation numbers and to claim that Russian readers had “lost interest in Amerika,” returning twenty-five thousand supposedly unsold copies to the U.S. Embassy each month.7 This led USIA officials to discontinue Amerika in 1952 and to redouble efforts in broadcasting. Then-editor Marion Sanders fought valiantly to save the magazine, citing its centrality in reaching a broad and educated audience. A New York Times editorial supported her fight, claiming “the suspension of Amerika is regrettable because it was the last direct means of giving the Russian people a glimpse of American life and American aims in refutation of Soviet lies.”8 Stalin’s death led to a renewed Soviet-American cultural agreement in October 1956 and the inception of a reciprocal distribution scheme, with Amerika distributed by the Soyuzpechat agency. Amerika’s relaunch was a huge success and led to renewed Soviet attempts to restrict its circulation in violation of the cultural agreement terms.9 These terms stipulated that each magazine could sell up to fifty thousand copies in its respective market. The Soviet magazine distributed in the United

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States, originally called USSR but later changed to Soviet Life, sold for twenty cents and was by many accounts a burdensome product. Soviet Life articles were “heavy with freight” and dripping with overt ideology that failed to resonate with U.S. readers.10 Unlike Amerika, which enjoyed the status of being virtually the only visual window on America in the USSR, Soviet Life competed with a range of U.S. magazines reporting on foreign affairs.11 As a minor and secondary effort to the official Soyuzpechat distribution system, American public diplomacy officials sent roughly two thousand copies of Amerika to inf luential elites, targeted by Moscow embassy staff, along with clippings from the Wireless File.12 This list, significantly, included the young Mikhail Gorbachev; although the magazine was just one piece in forming Gorbachev’s views on the West, it speaks to Amerika’s long-term contribution to toppling communism from within.13 Soft Persuasion with the Vivid American Dream Amerika’s greatest strength was its powerful images, factual presentation of the American way of life, and subtle approach to swaying hearts and minds. Modeled after Life and other popular U.S. magazines, Amerika featured an oversized format with vibrant color photos and thick, glossy paper. In contrast to bleak Soviet publications, Amerika had sensory appeal and wowed Russians with its detail and workmanship. “It was everything that the USSR wasn’t,” said McKinney Russell, a former USIA official who worked in the Moscow embassy in the late 1960s. “It was glossy, colorful, varied, and well-edited.”14 By relying on factual content, Amerika epitomized Creighton Peet’s definition of good public diplomacy: “never to tell other people what we think is wrong with them or how much better we are—but merely to show them what kind of people we are, how we live and work, and, indirectly, ask for their understanding and support.”15 Amerika eschewed political propaganda, focusing instead on rosy presentations of U.S. daily life.16 Images of happy families relaxing on beaches, taking airplane rides, and picnicking in parks were tantalizing to Russians entrenched in the daily grind of subsistence living. Images of new technology, such as “The Automobile—Inside and Outside,” and photo essays on New York’s skyscrapers must have seemed artifacts of an alien world for Russians accustomed to a single car model and drab Soviet architecture.17

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Cincotta underlined Amerika’s strength in f launting a prosperous U.S. lifestyle. We would do a story on people who fix their own homes, running a full-page picture of an entire wall of toilet seats in Home Depot. The story and the caption didn’t really matter; what riveted Soviet readers was the unbelievable idea that you could choose from 20 or more toilet seats. As a society built on the scarcity of consumer goods, the contrast was striking. John Brown, another former Moscow diplomat who worked with Amerika, underlined its ability to gently present another way of life: “it did not take much imagination on their part to conclude that this [U.S.] way of life was a better and freer one. [Amerika] also ‘looked’ far better than local publications—another way of telling readers that the USA, although not perfect, was a fine place to be.”18 Clack described Amerika’s dual mission to demonstrate the superiority of America’s twin pillars of democracy and capitalism and to quench Russian curiosity by showing how Americans lived. Amerika included reprints from such popular magazines as Life and Look, as well as USIA-solicited articles with titles such as “The Role of the President” and “Labor and Management: a Partnership.” Solicited articles more directly promoted capitalism and democracy, but Amerika editors sensed their readers would respond better to human-interest stories and relied on reprints as “Best Dressed College Girls” and “America’s 1956 Automobiles to satiate Russian interest while conveying subtle political messages.”19 A Keepsake Production Perhaps Amerika’s greatest legacy, and evidence of its profound impact on the Soviet psyche, is its attainment of keepsake status. Baker described Russians’ obsession with collecting the full set (454 issues in total) of the “classic production,” while Clack highlighted the pass-along rate and resultant “multiplier effect” that is a unique benefit of print publications. Because copies were so limited and kiosks often sold out, citizens would often share the same tattered issue with several people,20 leading Amerika’s editors to invest in heavy-duty paper and thick staples. Fitzhugh Green remarked, “each new issue disappears faster than rain in the desert.”21 A 1949 Time article estimated that the fifty thousand

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sanctioned copies “get thumbed by about 1,000,000 Soviet citizens”22; small wonder that Green cited Amerika as USIA’s “most notable” magazine and a model for other USIA publications.23 Gauging Its Impact Given strict Soviet control, USIA could not rely on traditional means such as focus groups or reader surveys to gauge Amerika’s popular reception. Baker remembered only two audience surveys during his fourteen years with Amerika. Embassy staff relied on Amerika’s obvious popularity with both the public and the elite, evidenced by constant scarcity problems and the f lourishing black market, to measure its success. According to a 1946 Time article, in the black market Amerika could command one hundred times its cover price of ten rubles from Russians eager “for a look at the Amerika most of them will never see except in pictures.”24 Amerika was seen as “the thing to have on your coffee table” to show you were “in the know,” said Clack, which effectively transformed the magazine into an elite prestige symbol. Even if Soviet officials were hostile to America, “they still wanted Amerika,” said Baker. Amerika’s impact was also evident by tracking Soviet distribution crackdowns and propaganda counterblasts. According to Robert Cattell, a former USIA official who worked on Amerika from DC headquarters, “when the Soviets got difficult about distribution it was a sign that our editors were doing something right.” Propaganda blasts in such Soviet dailies as Pravda and Izvestia typically centered on U.S. race relations, vehemently rejecting Amerika features on Abraham Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation as false and spewing accusations of widespread U.S. Ku Klux Klan activity.25 Although Amerika shied away from responding overtly to such histrionic claims, it featured unadorned reports such as “The Negro Today,” which aimed to present facts and figures of African American successes as anecdotes to allegations of entrenched racism.26 Glasnost and the End of Amerika As with all good public diplomacy efforts, Amerika’s focus and content evolved to meet its audience’s changing demands and the mutating political context in which it operated. Amerika took a marked turn toward more serious material when the USSR began opening to the

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outside world in the late 1980s. The content shift was particularly striking after glasnost allowed foreign commercial media into the once infoscarce Soviet market and Amerika suddenly had to compete for readers in an info-rich and often cacophonous media environment,27 resulting in a sharp drop in sales after 1989. But despite the “whole new ballgame” of glasnost, Clack said Amerika was still selling around one hundred thousand copies per month in 1994. Competing with Hollywood is no small feat; Amerika fought admirably for five years after glasnost and may well have continued if USIA director Joseph Duffy hadn’t eliminated the agency’s entire magazine division in 1994. Broadcasting and Other USIA Initiatives: Amerika’s Edge Amerika’s success compared to other USIA efforts, both print and broadcasting, merits brief examination. USIA produced several other print publications aimed at the Soviet sphere, most notably Problems of Communism (PoC) and Dialog USA, but each was founded with a distinctly different purpose and audience and neither rivaled Amerika’s reach or mass appeal. Abraham Brumberg launched PoC in 1952 as a bimonthly journal for international elites. Its audience and goals were hugely different than Amerika’s; PoC’s circulation of twenty thousand targeted intellectuals at the physical periphery of communist control and strived to thwart Soviet efforts at indoctrination beyond its borders by exposing the essential shortcomings of communism.28 PoC did not operate under a distribution agreement; since it was distributed only in English, Soviet authorities seemed to view it as less threatening to the general populace. Appealing directly to the public, in its own language and with vivid pictures and descriptions of life on the other side, was a tremendously powerful tactic to encourage Russians to question communism’s relative merits. Dialog USA, a quarterly publication whose Russian version launched in 1969, also targeted intellectuals and aimed to create global dialogue on ideas and social problems, avoiding “facile popularization” such as glossy images.29 Through 1988, the U.S. embassy in Moscow and the consulate general in Leningrad distributed approximately five thousand copies per quarter. Although it may have had significant impact on the Russian intelligentsia, Dialog USA’s rejection of image appeal kept it from attaining Amerika’s keepsake status or from changing perceptions of America on a societal level.

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The VOA was undeniably inf luential on generations of Russians eager for news about the West. Willis Conover’s Jazz Hour attracted massive audiences and remains an indelible memory for many Russian immigrants recounting their first exposure to America. However, Amerika’s relative merit over VOA was threefold. First, VOA’s audience may have been broader but was arguably less inf luential. Like VOA, Amerika inf luenced hearts and minds in the mass public but also among intellectuals and elites, who may have viewed VOA as more entertainmentfocused and found value in the authority of the written word. Second, Amerika was impervious to jamming; as a 1956 Time article stated, “the Russians can often jam out the Voice, but they have never been able to down Amerika.”30 Former editor Sanders hypothesized that the Soviets generally let Amerika trickle through because “We never preach, brag, quarrel, or draw invidious comparison. Ours is not a frontal attack; it is a long-range campaign.”31 Third, VOA lacked Amerika’s strong visual appeal. An image is infinitely more potent than a sound bite; Amerika’s keystone was its compelling images. Other broadcast efforts, such as USIA director Charles Wick’s push toward television in the 1980s, also failed to rival Amerika in inf luencing hearts and minds. With its classic Cold Warrior rhetoric, Wick’s programming was heavy-handed and, more importantly, failed to appeal to a significant audience.32 Amerika not only had excellent content that vividly depicted the American Dream but also drew an eager audience. For its place and time, it was public diplomacy at its finest.

Russia’s Marginalization in Contemporary Public Diplomacy Since 1994, and particularly after the 1999 USIA-State Department merger, public diplomacy efforts in Russia and Eastern Europe have been minimal at best. Joseph Duffy’s 1994 budget cuts eliminated the entire regional magazine division and the book program. The Cold War was over, jubilant Americans declared, and communism’s demise clearly demonstrated Russian commitment to capitalism and democracy. While alluring, this philosophy was naïve. Former USIA official Richard Virden said, “it was a bit like our loss of interest in Afghanistan when the Soviets were forced to leave after ‘Charlie Wilson’s War.’ ”33 Although Afghanistan and Russia present very distinct challenges, the

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comparison is worth acknowledging. Just as Afghanistan never ceased to be a problem, significant barriers to mutual understanding between Americans and Russians persisted after the fall of the Berlin Wall and, arguably, are only growing in strength and virulence today. Public Diplomacy Programs toward Russia in the Early 1990s In the heady post–Cold War era, after the magazine division was eradicated, “the idea was that electronic materials would replace outmoded, Cold War-era publications,” said Clack. The reality, he continued, was that the Internet was still quite new, especially in Russia, and it was very difficult to get content online. Moreover, most Russians lacked direct Internet access; even if content had been transferred online, who would have seen it? In light of continued Russian disinformation, the Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission highlighted the sustained demand “constant vigilance and prompt exposure.”34 The Advisory Commission called for issue-specific pamphlets in both its 1991 and 1992 reports, emphasizing the printed word as “basic to the work of public diplomacy.”35 The Regional Products Office (RPO) in Vienna took up this task with vigor, producing a litany of targeted pamphlets to meet Russian demand for practical information on capitalism and business start-ups. As a former RPO officer said, these efforts “supplemented those used after Moscow lost control of its empire” but, unlike such efforts as Amerika, aimed for rapid knowledge transfer more than long-term attitude change. On the whole, Russia-specific public diplomacy campaigns, and particularly print publications, were largely abandoned after the fall of communism. Evolution of Public Diplomacy Efforts toward Russia The long-view of public diplomacy that worked so well with Amerika seems to have been discarded in the aftermath of the Cold War. Contemporary public diplomacy often resembles what Clack describes as crisis response rather than preventative medicine. By Virden’s estimation, “politicians often tend to want to use public diplomacy as a quick fix for burning problems. A sound public diplomacy program would not neglect Eastern Europe—or Africa or South America—because of the fires burning elsewhere.”36 Clack described a world polarized by threats stemming largely from the Middle East, which he calls “the angriest child crying.”

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The larger problem may indeed be financial—Cincotta cites the “distortion of resources for the military versus State and USAID” as an imbalance that even Secretary of Defense Gates has acknowledged. Despite financial constraints, it would be a mistake to overlook a region still plagued by authoritarianism residue. Reaching out to Russia’s populace must be a priority, lest Russians be misled by rhetoric that, however implicitly, encourages anti-Americanism and threatens a return to Cold War politics. As Boris Kagarlitsky said in a Moscow News editorial, “today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union, and ideologically it’s in the same camp as the United States. But a half-conscious memory of the Soviet past remains part of the national psyche.”37 This fragile national psyche allows Russian leaders opportunities to manipulate perceived differences from the United States. A June 2007 Pew Global Survey showed that 76 percent of Russians see the spread of the U.S. way of life as a bad thing; this is a startling contrast to the Cold War, when despite vast differences in governance and official ideology, the Russian public at large seemed eager to embrace Amerika and all it represented. Recent public opinion data from Russia’s VTsIOM ref lects a worrisome downward trend in U.S. approval ratings, with only 22 percent of Russians citing positive feelings toward the United States in September 2008. This figure is disturbingly lower than its 1991 level, when 83 percent of Russians reported positivity toward America.38 Indeed, such polls show that anti-American sentiment has “reached a level not seen since the days of the Cold War.”39 The raw numbers present a compelling case for increased commitment toward dialogue with the Russian population and for active promotion of American ideals, values, and institutions as a matter of national security. Current Public Diplomacy Efforts toward Russia The State Department’s primary platform for International Information Programs (IIP) has moved from print to online, primarily represented by www.America.gov. America.gov’s content began with rudimentary versions of the daily Wireless File but its eJournal now includes five thematic categories of articles including Economics, Global Issues, and American Life.40 The eJournal lacks specific regional focus, and only some of its “books,” which are primarily in PDF format but also available in print by special order, are translated into Russian. America.gov features a Russian-language blog but its global conception dilutes its targeted appeal—an area where Amerika excelled.

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In a more aggressive effort, State’s Digital Outreach Team’s (DOT) has expanded onto Russian blogs and chat rooms. Unlike America.gov, which relies on user-driven traffic, DOT meets “people where they are, with tools they use.”41 Former under-secretary James Glassman described the DOT’s mission as working to improve the U.S. image and to fight extremist propaganda and correct disinformation. DOT has sparked criticism from Russian newspapers that claim the initiative represents a throwback to Cold War–style engagement. Such criticism was not helped by Glassman’s reference to DOT as engaging in a “war of ideas.”42 The State Department quickly backtracked on this rhetoric but the damage was done, prompting a harsh response from Segodnya newspaper: “Apparently, despite the financial crisis, the United States will not abandon its approach of ‘weakening the enemy from within.’ ”43 The introduction of the word “enemy” should present sufficient evidence that current public diplomacy efforts toward Russia have fallen short or, more worrisome, have perhaps been counterproductive. Moscow Embassy Initiatives The U.S. ambassador to Russia John Beyrle speaks excellent Russian and is familiar with new media, allowing him much more direct communication with the Russian public. Ambassador Beyrle’s skills and drive have helped the Moscow embassy blaze a more effective path toward new public diplomacy. The website www.openamerica.ru represents one of the most promising directions. It includes diverse multimedia clips including an interview with Anna Kournikova and a link to Ambassador Beyrle’s Russian-language blog, which is also linked to several mainstream Russian news sites and to www.rutube.ru, representing significant efforts to reach a young, increasingly digitalized audience.44 Though Moscow Embassy press attaché David Sief kin describes openamerica.ru as a “side project” for the time being, he is optimistic about its future. “I think interest in the U.S. about Russia is growing again,” he said. “Our polls show that younger people are slightly more favorable toward the U.S. than older Russians, and that positive views of the U.S. are going up again, and now are a little ahead of negative views.”45 Access Issues and the Continued Demand for Print Material Despite the promise of such targeted embassy initiatives, two distinct problems remain: barriers to access and, more broadly, the relative

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impact of electronic to print media. A December 2008 study showed that only 27.1 percent of Russians had Internet access46; with this kind of gap in participation, how can we justify focusing all public diplomacy resources on Web 2.0 and neglecting the audience that perhaps most acutely needs our attention? Although individual embassies have the option of ordering print materials from IIP headquarters, increasingly constrained budgets are a key obstacle.47 Further, rudimentary electronic publications fail to project the tactile appeal that made Amerika so successful. As Cincotta said, “print publications can be outdated and irrelevant—or a powerful combination of argument, images and documentation” that have an enduring shelf life and exude authority.48 The few remaining American centers and American corners in Russia provide free public Internet access but this arrangement relies on the public coming to the State Department, rather than the State Department meeting the public where they are. A current U.S. public diplomacy official describes the Freedom Support Act as an example of attempts to expand Internet access and capability in the former USSR, but until this f ledging effort truly takes wing, we may be alienating those who lack access and who perhaps most urgently need to hear our message. Matt Keller, the director of One Laptop Per Child, concurs: “It’s crazy to cut out billions of the world’s people. Those are the people you need to be talking to.”49 While print publications certainly do not guarantee universal access, it seems rational to continue with modest print efforts until Internet penetration approaches universality. The Fight for Relevance, Accessibility, and Appeal: Applying Amerika’s Strengths to Web 2.0 Though access issues will continue to pose problems, opportunities for public diplomacy engagement online are myriad yet must be approached strategically. Key is to employ the central aspects of public diplomacy that Amerika exemplified. As IIP director Duncan MacInnes recently said, appropriate content is critical when using a new medium for communication: “What we don’t want to do is the worst form of new media where you take a blog and put a press release on it, and you think you’ve blogged, which I’ve seen done. Where you do, ‘Oh, I want to do a viral video,’ and you do . . . five minutes with the Secretary of State. It’s not going to go viral.”50

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Cincotta cites increased complexity as a key obstacle in dealing with today’s Eastern Europe and Russia. “In the Amerika era, things were much simpler: Soviet Union, Soviet bloc in East Europe, and that was it. Today, when you say Eastern Europe, you also have to look at resources and programs for Central Asia; each has its own complex set of circumstances and issues. But yes, we need more staff and resources there.” A key IIP official emphasized the importance of learning to engage audiences on the platforms they actually use; underdeveloped platforms for new media in Central and Eastern Europe and underrepresented language versions of electronic materials continue to complicate new media engagement.51 Another complication is the struggle to be heard in a crowded information marketplace. While Amerika essentially served as Russians’ only substantial view on the West, the United States now competes in a distended market. As a recent CSIS report warned, “as the noise becomes louder than the message, sound-bites will smother dialogue. To avoid this state, the government is obliged to remain active in the marketplace of ideas by providing easy access to information. The key is to use new media artfully and to continue to use traditional media in societies where information is denied to citizens.”52 Indeed, a key challenge for modern public diplomacy is in promoting dialogue over one-way projection of information. Under-Secretary Judith McHale has highlighted the potential of new media and stressed the importance of two-way communication and sustained engagement.53 Although Amerika arguably lacked a true dialogue function, it was responsive to Russian demand for information and generated buzz about America’s finer side. As Clack says, the key is in “finding connections between the old and new ways of doing public diplomacy while maintaining the same basic principles.” Clack sees potential in new media’s multiplier effect, echoing in much greater volume Amerika’s pass-along element, and highlights new media’s ability to invite questions, encourage dialogue, and, ultimately, produce a genuine online community.54 The Road Ahead Since the end of the Cold War and particularly in the wake of the StateUSIA merger, overarching public diplomacy efforts have been severely curtained in Russia and Eastern Europe to allow more resources to f low to global hot spots. Though modern Russia may not register as a top priority, it should remain a high one. The Cold War may be over

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but misunderstandings persist; if we fail to represent our best side, we tacitly invite others to popularize our worst. Although we should seek to use the best public diplomacy instruments for today’s unique circumstances, we should not lose sight of successful programs from the past. Cincotta argues that proper usage of technology in public diplomacy focuses on the four Rs: “right content, right audience, right format—right now.”55 If new media can be employed in a way that draws on successful lessons of the past—appealing content, soft persuasion, targeted impact, and increased opportunities for dialogue—and can highlight user-generated content, it will hugely strengthen modern public diplomacy and allow us to do more with less resources. The culmination of this effort, according to the Diplopundit blog, “will be a virtual presence that is engaged in a global dialogue, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in all corners of the world.”56 Although Amerika in its traditional format is outdated, public diplomacy professionals would be well advised to draw on its success in presenting an alternative way of life and to employ these elements in revitalizing targeted public diplomacy efforts in Russia. The Internet provides a cost-effective delivery platform, but given persistent access issues and potentially diluted delivery, print publications should not be entirely abandoned. In all efforts—new media or traditional—we should strive to engage the Russian public in open dialogue to further mutual understanding and create a true partnership. Centering that conversation on the softer side of the United States, as Amerika did so well, could make all the difference. Notes 1. For example, Victoria V. Orlova, “The View from Russia,” in Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 69–71; and McKinney Russell, PAO in Moscow during the Cold War, “A Voice for Change,” in Local Voices, Global Perspectives, ed. Alan L. Heil, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Public Diplomacy Council, 2008), 14. 2. Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 118. 3. Dick Baker, former USIA official, telephone interview by author, October 16, 2009, Somerville, MA. 4. Howard Cincotta, IIP official, e-mail interview by author, October 24, 2009, Somerville, MA. 5. George Clack, former Amerika editor and USIA official, telephone interview by author, October 20, 2009, Somerville, MA.

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6. Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain ( University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 6. 7. Creighton Peet, “Russian ‘Amerika,’ a Magazine about U.S. for Soviet Citizens,” College Art Journal, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1951), 19. 8. “The Press: The Death of Amerika,” Time, July 28, 1952, 51. 9. Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 117. 10. Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, 72. 11. Ibid. 12. Robert E. McCarthy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, February 4, 2003. Copyright 2004 ADST. 13. Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, 102. 14. McKinney Russell, former PAO Moscow, telephone interview by author, October 5, 2009, Somerville, MA. 15. Peet, “Russian ‘Amerika,’ ” 20. 16. Thomas C. Sorenson, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 87. 17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_(magazine); accessed November 22, 2009). 18. John Brown, former USIA official, e-mail interview by author, October 13, 2009, Somerville, MA. 19. Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 118. 20. Estimates of the pass-along rate vary between five and twelve per copy. 21. Fitzhugh Green, American Propaganda Abroad (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc, 1988), 63. 22. “The Press: The Voice of Amerika,” Time, June 6, 1949, 45. 23. Green, American Propaganda Abroad, 63. 24. “The Press: ‘Amerika for the Russians,’ ” Time, March 4, 1946, 69. 25. Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 118. 26. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_(magazine); accessed November 22, 2009). 27. Clack, interview. 28. Russell, interview. 29. Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, 152. 30. “The Press: On Again,” Time, July 30, 1956, 50. 31. “The Press: The Voice of Amerika,” Time, June 6, 1949, 44. 32. Mark Shapiro, “Is Anyone Out There Watching? Charlie Wick’s Latest Flop,” Washington Monthly, October 17, 1985, 51–53. 33. Richard Virden, former USIA official in press and publications, e-mail interview by author, October 26, 2009, Somerville, MA. 34. Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission Report 1989, 20. 35. Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission Report 1992, 35. 36. Virden, interview. 37. Boris Kagarlitsky, “Roots of Anti-Americanism,” The Moscow Times, April 9, 2002. 38. Public Opinion data from VTsIOM, July 3, 2009, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/ tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/12077.html?no_cache=1&cHash=59f83704be (accessed October 20, 2009). 39. Kagarlitsky, “Roots of Anti-Americanism.” 40. Cincotta, interview. 41. Current U.S. public diplomacy official, telephone interview by author, October 29, 2009, Somerville, MA. 42. “America Defends Itself on the Internet,” Kommersant, October 30, 2008, available at http://www.kommersant.com/p1049447/r_527/Internet_government_activity/ (accessed October 25, 2009).

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43. Andrey Kuzminov, “The U.S. is Willing to Pay for Russia’s Collapse,” Segodnya, August 3, 2009, available at http://watchingamerica.com/News/32683/the-us-is-willing-to-payfor-russias-collapse/ (accessed October 25, 2009). 44. David Sief kin, Moscow embassy press attaché, e-mail interview by author, October 29, 2009, Somerville, MA. 45. Ibid. 46. Internet World Stats report, December 2008, available at http://www.internetworldstats. com/europa2.htm (accessed November 4, 2009). 47. Howard Cincotta, “Wireless File to Web: State Department’s Print and Electronic Media in the Arab World,” in Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds Through Public Diplomacy, ed. William A. Rugh. (New York: Public Diplomacy Council, 2004), 148. 48. Ibid., 151. 49. David Herbert, “Digital Divide Thwarts Online Diplomatic Efforts,” National Journal Online, April 23, 2009, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20090415_4481. php (accessed October 24, 2009). 50. Duncan MacInnes, “State Department Public Diplomacy Initiatives,” iDiplomacy blog, November 10, 2009, available at http://idiplomacy.org/2009/11/10/duncan-macinnes-onstate-department-public-diplomacy-initiatives/ (accessed November 14, 2009). 51. Current public diplomacy desk officer for three Eastern European countries, telephone interview by author, October 29, 2009, Somerville, MA. 52. CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), 3. 53. Joshua Fouts, “Social Media, Virtual Worlds and Public Diplomacy,” World Politics Review, October 13, 2009, 2, available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4440 (accessed October 31, 2009). 54. George Clack, “How Does State Use Web 2.0 Technologies?” [PowerPoint slides] (accessed October 20, 2009). 55. Cincotta, “Wireless File to Web,” 151. 56. Diplopundit blog, June 5, 2009, available at http://diplopundit.blogspot.com/ (October 25, 2009).

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PA RT

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New Thinking about Public Diplomacy

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CH A P T E R

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Should Public Diplomacy Be Privatized? N i cole G ab ri e l le K rave c

Some argue that public diplomacy is not as strong and effective as it could be. Many of these critics argue that public diplomacy should be privatized. Others defend the current public diplomacy structure and results. The main question that this essay addresses is: “Should public diplomacy be privatized?—and what does that mean?” Furthermore, what should the relationship between the public and private sector be, with respect to public diplomacy? This essay explores the importance of the privatization debate, and why public diplomacy is currently under such criticism; then it examines arguments from both sides of the privatization debate, and draws some conclusions.1 Relevance and Importance of the Privatization Debate Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is clear that the United States has an image problem abroad,2 so there has been a debate in the United States over the role of public diplomacy that has challenged the long-standing definition of public diplomacy as being solely a function of the federal government. This has led to proposals for some kind of privatization of public diplomacy. There are four broad causal factors behind this development. First, since the 9/11 attacks, public diplomacy has attracted increased attention from both practitioners and scholars from many parts of the world.3 The second factor has been

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conceptual developments in other fields such as marketing and public relations notions such as branding that have been incorporated into public diplomacy theory. Third, the concept of “soft power”—defined by Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”—has made it clear that public diplomacy is a mechanism that seeks to leverage soft power resources.4 Fourth, scholars coined the term “new public diplomacy” to include both public and private activities, in a system that is no longer statecentric but composed of multiple actors and networks, operating in a f luid global environment of new issues and contexts.5 Some, like Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, argue, “Citizen diplomacy programs should be expanded.” The debate is taking on a multidisciplinary character, with no single discipline determining public diplomacy’s intellectual agenda. Privatized Public Diplomacy Privatization can mean different things, including: (a) creating a new private sector institution completely separate from the U.S. government, (b) creating a new private institution linked to the U.S. government, (c) enhancing the existing private partnerships, or (d) giving all of public diplomacy to the private sector (which at the time of writing, no one was arguing). Selected Pro-Privatization Proposals Many privatization arguments and plans exist, but four proposals in particular have captured the most attention within the public diplomacy field. Business for Diplomatic Action Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA) is an organization composed of companies whose mission is to improve the United States’ relationships and image abroad.6 Its members believe it is more profitable to do business abroad if America is understood and liked there. BDA’s goal is “to see the day when America is once again admired as a global leader and respected as a courier of progress and prosperity for all people.”7

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The BDA does not recommend any particular organizational structure creation. It is noteworthy that although it represents business interests, it has offered no detailed business plan to back up its proposals. Yet BDA remains remain active in the field by ongoing listening and research efforts, engaging Americans, and by engaging in relevant public policy issues.8 BDA’s mission is “to enlist the U.S. business community in actions to improve the standing and reputation of America in the world.”9 It strives to: familiarize and sensitize Americans to antiAmericanism today and its implications; transform American attitudes and behaviors; build on the many positive perceptions of America that still exist; and build “new bridges of cooperation, respect, and mutual understanding across cultures and borders through business-led initiatives.”10 According to Cari Guittard, BDA’s executive director, “the spirit behind BDA is partnership, to help guide companies—not about reinventing the wheel. The private sector in many instances has more touch points than embassies; it’s all about establishing trust and developing relationships for the long-term. The more entities we have engaging, the better off we’ll be.”11 Corporation for Public Diplomacy Peter Peterson, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and chair of the Council’s Public Diplomacy Task Force, favors producing content and helping distribute U.S. public diplomacy programs through television, books, magazines, public speakers, and the Internet.12 He has proposed a not-for-profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD), similar to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting founded by Congress in 1967, which could receive private-sector grants but is intended for an international audience.13 Peterson argues that the CPD will be better able to raise funds while looking less like propaganda. The CPD does not yet exist. Foundation for International Understanding The Foundation for International Understanding (FIU) is an offspring of the CPD, and is still conceptual in nature.14 David Abshire, who proposed for the creation of the FIU, supported the CPD idea, but found that Congress didn’t like the term “corporation” because it seemed to imply less transparency than a governmental institution would have.15 The Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC)

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developed the FIU concept from a proposal put forward by the Council on Foreign Relations, to create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. CSPC and the Meridian International Center are now leading efforts to create and capitalize the FIU.16 The FIU concept is supported by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, and was supposed to come into being in 2009, although no explicit plans for implementation exist.17 The FIU would fundamentally be a grant-making organization. Leaders in international broadcasting and public diplomacy would develop a business plan to “marshal the talent and creativity of the private sector to combat antagonism and mistrust between America and other societies.” The FIU would provide grants to facilitate the production and international distribution of high-quality media programming to combat anti-Americanism.18 The FIU’s strategy is to “support the use of media productions and interactive digital technologies to engage and connect people around the world.”19 It would purportedly use a combination of public and private funding to “marshal talent and innovation from media providers, content developers, and social entrepreneurs around the world.” Furthermore, the FIU would also act as a resource multiplier by using matching grants and cofunding partnerships to leverage financial participation from corporations, foundations, and other donors worldwide.20 USA-World Trust Kristin Lord, author of a major study of public diplomacy by the Brookings Institution, argues that to be most inf luential, American public diplomacy should tap into and mobilize technology, media, and other private sector actors as much as possible, but within current official structures. She argues that the United States should find new ways to engage private actors and employ technology, media, and private sector expertise.21 Lord calls for the creation of the USA-World Trust, a “nimble and entrepreneurial new non-profit organization,” to complement and support U.S. government efforts. The USA-World Trust will draw on the enormous goodwill, creativity, knowledge, and talent of the American people and like-minded partners overseas.22 Specifically, the USA-World Trust would engage in five activities:23 1. Research and analysis, drawing on the knowledge of experts and conveyed in a form useful to public diplomacy practitioners.

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2. Tap the vast potential of the private sector and engage companies, nongovernmental organizations, universities, and others to work on innovative new initiatives. 3. Provide grants and venture capital to endeavors that advance the USA-World Trust’s objectives. 4. Identify, cultivate, and experiment with new technologies and media products that support U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. 5. Bring together practitioners from the U.S. government, scholars, and talented visitors from the private and nonprofit sectors to address public diplomacy and strategic communication challenges. The Brookings report recommends that the Congress provide the USA-World Trust with a fifty-million-dollar annual budget, guaranteed for two years at a time, to facilitate planning and good use of funds. Government contracts, foundation grants, private gifts, or other fee-for-service projects would be expected to supplement the budget. As a 501(c)(3) organization, the Trust should be able to accept charitable donations. If the Trust is successful, additional sources of revenue including private donors are likely to exceed this core-operating budget many times over. (Proponents of the Trust, however, have yet to define exactly what they mean by success.) Federal contracts, especially from the Departments of State and Defense, may be substantial if the Trust earns a reputation for good work.24 Lord argues that from all these efforts, the Trust will engage new voices and talent, serve as a resource to government and private groups that wish to improve America’s image, strengthen America’s relations with foreign populations, and combat anti-American ideologies.25 What are the major arguments in favor of a greater private sector role, and what are the responses to those arguments from the practitioners of public diplomacy? The following sections summarize both points of view.26 Arguments for Public Diplomacy Privatization Many of the ideas raised earlier, with regard to current criticisms of public diplomacy, contain arguments for privatization of some sort. To sum up, the promise of America’s public diplomacy, in our view, has not been realized due to the lack of will, the absence of

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an overall strategy, a deficit of trained officials, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings, and a scarcity of resources. Money alone is not going to solve this problem. Strong leadership, imaginative thinking, planning and coordination are critical.27 BDA says it will show more activity in “bringing business solutions to the challenges of public diplomacy,” according to its president, Keith Reinhard.28 Reinhard argues that many multinational firms are doing good things around the world, like corporate social responsibility efforts29; but the problem is that their efforts are just not being noticed. “CEOs we’ve talked to say they have never wanted to publicize their corporate social responsibility efforts for fear of being seen as grandstanding,” Reinhard said. “It would be different, we think, if BDA were telling these stories to the foreign press as a neutral third party.”30 Reinhard believes that the role of the private sector is much broader than public relations. He focused his remarks on the challenges the United States faces in winning hearts and minds among young Muslims and BDA’s efforts to “out-recruit bin Laden.” “Business could offer alternatives to the mullahs’ brand with free, high-quality English language training,” Reinhard said. He added that people-to-people exchanges through employment would lessen mutual misperceptions between Americans and people around the world. “Bring interns into American companies in the United States, and Americans into companies in other countries—‘the Fulbright of the private sector,’ if you will,” Reinhard added.31 Another privatization proponent adds that: Not only is business more admired and trusted, in many ways it is more relevant than national governments . . . Multinational corporations are also more culturally sensitive . . . Business is more skilled . . . at building strong brands that generate good will, trust and loyalty. Business should inf luence the government . . . support public diplomacy reforms . . . [and] lend expertise to the federal government.32 Yet another adds that “The best way to practice public diplomacy is through ordinary people. In many cases, only private actors have the credibility to make a difference.”33 Critics of the current public diplomacy structure, such as Peter Peterson through his idea of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD),

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or through Kristin Lord’s notion of a USA-World Trust,34 or through David Abshire’s Foundation for International Understanding,35 point to several primary reasons to increase the role of the private sector work with the U.S. government regarding public diplomacy work.36 Context/Credibility Some argue that businesses have achieved strong reputations around the world, and that a privatized public diplomacy organization would accomplish the same feat. People, individuals, have far more access to information and far more of what we might call soft power to inf luence global affairs directly, indirectly, and through their governments. A multitude of factors have explained that: globalization, the increased speed with which information is transmitted and received and processed, 24-7 television programming, global news media, CNN and related entities, growing internet penetration, and smart mobile phones.37 While some point out that “the global image of the U.S. has significantly deteriorated . . . anti-Americanism is on the rise,”38 others note that the U.S. government needs an aggressive public diplomacy approach and could rely on private sector research “to win the hearts and minds of the Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other key strategic areas.”39 Fluidity BDA has made the argument that officials need speeches to be cleared, which can add considerable time to communication. Some privatization supporters believe that independent messengers could be more f luid in their ability to target and engage and persuade various audiences.40 This seems to be an oversimplification. “Heat Shield” Some say that involving private sector participation adds to some extent a heat shield that can be useful when tackling controversial issues that might have negative political or diplomatic repercussions.41 Some believe that it is important to demonstrate America’s belief in democratic and open debate; the give and take of a culture that thrives

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on legitimate critiques admits weaknesses and uses truth as the most powerful arm of public diplomacy. Private messengers can engage in this kind of debate more often than officials could, for fear of political backlash.42 Involve “Experts” Another argument is that the U.S. government is unlikely to attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals who could utilize the most cutting edge media and communications technology.43 Media or entertainment spokespeople may be more likely to cooperate with private sources, such as NGOs, than with an effort directly funded by the government. For example: “Arab and American fire fighters and police fighters, victims, particularly women and children, including Arab and Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans who are thriving in America, and we see nothing wrong with using sports figures, Muhammad Ali, if we could recruit him, business leaders, scientists, health care leaders and so forth.”44 Proponents of privatization call for effective utilization of public opinion and market research: “Simply put, the American government is very poor at listening to foreign publics. It is far behind the private sector in its understanding and use of sophisticated techniques at the global level. Global public opinion research is an area that needs to be expanded and developed in concert with the much more experienced business community.”45 Critics also call for the effective use of marketing, advertising, and public relations to reach the largest audiences effectively.46 Increased Funding and Resources Peter Peterson argues for a Corporation for Public Diplomacy, saying: “Unlike public programs, the CPD could accept private donations and raises more than half its income from private sources. A vital problem affecting public diplomacy is the serious funding shortfall which, if left in government hands, seems unlikely to change soon.”47 Many proponents of privatization assert that nongovernment organizations succeed in public diplomacy-type actions. One said: “The recent establishment of a branch of Weill-Cornell Medical College in Doha, Qatar, for example, will do much to advance American interests and values. Teaching and medical care are profound acts of public diplomacy that can’t be matched by government messages.”48

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Arguments against Public Diplomacy Privatization A basic contrary view is that privatization will not necessarily fix public diplomacy’s current problems.49 Credibility One argument challenges the credibility rationale as exaggerated, especially with the international support given to President Barack Obama. Moreover, it is uncertain that a nongovernmental American organization, and employing many Americans, would be perceived as being different enough to somehow be more credible.50 Restructuring Costs Critics of privatization say that it would require a great deal of time, resources, and restructuring. The published proposals by privatization advocates do not include timelines, but when interviewed, the advocates explained that the shifts would be major and timely.51 This large-scale change could potentially exacerbate current challenges. A complete restructuring of the current public diplomacy system (which is already underfunded),52 would require considerable transition time and an inherent distraction from actual public diplomacy work; and public diplomacy results could therefore suffer in the short term during a transition. Another complete reorganization would cause needless anxiety and waste. Furthermore, the improvements already achieved would be lost.53 Conflict of Interests The critique of privatization also argues that the risk of dovetailing interests and the agendas of multiple actors would be a challenge under a new privatized system. Business historically depends on a bottom line of profit. Marketing, public relations, and other business-related aspects that can be connected to public diplomacy all present a one-sided positive view—which differs greatly from public diplomacy’s goal of representing all Americans and honest views (even if they are negative).54 Some corporations support public diplomacy to build relationships and foster communication between cultures; most understand it just makes good business sense.55 While there may be less politics involved in business, politics is still very much a factor.

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Nicole Gabrielle Kravec Uncertainty of Details—Faulty Assumptions, Knowledge Gaps

Critics of privatization proposals point to what they regard as a glaring assumption: privatizing public diplomacy presumes that adequate institutions exist for corporate governance in the private sector, without which privatization will simply mean trading the problem of publicsector public diplomacy for inefficiencies elsewhere.56 One privatization proponent, for example, says: “In projecting America’s messages, Washington must be mindful of something every good salesman understands: if you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message.”57 However, critics of privatization respond that if the American government were not trusted abroad, why would an American company suddenly be trustworthy? They add that many tactical issues remain:58 ● ● ●

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Where would it be housed? What would the scope capacity be? What would happen to Public Diplomacy Cone and officers? Would American government workers be unemployed? Balanced and comprehensive? Whose interests would it really serve? How would it interact with the U.S. government? How would it be monitored and evaluated and improved? Who would oversee it? What would happen to the current public diplomacy officers? Where would the budget come from (Kristin Lord specifies the budget)? Would it operate in countries that are not commercially interesting? Would it maintain offices abroad and if so how would they look? Is there agreement among critiques of the current public diplomacy system (those who support privatization) for one solution? Guarantee of resources for the future? Problems Would Not Necessarily Be Fixed by Privatization

Finally, the critics of privatized public diplomacy express a general concern that a lack of consensus exists. Many “dogmas” of privatization in existence appear as rational arguments, but, upon further investigation, often lack the detail and credibility to be applicable.

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For example, Peter Peterson, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations in 2002, stated that: I think it’s fair to say that historically, U.S. public policy has been communicated largely in a push-down method, which lacks sufficient reach and explanation to foreign media. The policy is created, speeches are given, press releases are written, press conferences are held, with a lot of focus at least on addressing the U.S. media. Many of our messages are delivered by a rather limited number of official messengers, with a primary foreign audience of foreign governments and international organizations, not foreign publics.59 Critics of privatization say marketing, advertising, and public relations will not solve public diplomacy problems. According to Shaun Riordan, an expert in this field, “It is . . . highly questionable whether a national brand can be created, and whether efforts to do so are credible.”60 Some, like Martin Herz, criticize the use of advertising in public diplomacy.61 The RAND Corporation notes, “it is fanciful to believe that redeploying American ‘marketing talent,’ even when supplemented by the $62 million appropriated to launch a new Middle East television network, would significantly diminish the prevalence of anti-Americanism.”62 Applying the same public relations tactics to issues of war, national sovereignty, and global economic development risks increasing international resentment of the United States.63 Should the Private Sector Serve as a Supplement or Replacement to Public Diplomacy? Theoretically, there are two major privatization options that could be considered. One is wholesale replacement of the current governmentmanaged system by a completely private one. For all of the reasons explained earlier, privatization should not serve as a replacement, and no one is suggesting that. There is too much value in the current system, and too much would be at risk by completely replacing an existing system. The other option is that the private sector should supplement government-run public diplomacy. The problems with public diplomacy, as it exists currently—lack of resources, bureaucratic constraints, and changing international

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context—lead to arguments that it should be supplemented by the private sector. But the private sector already for years has supplemented government-run public diplomacy. One example of this partnership is the National Council on International Visitors (NCIV). The NCIV was founded in 1961 as a 510(c)(3) nonprofit organization whose mission is to promote excellence in citizen diplomacy. It serves participants in the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program and other exchanges.64 Other partnerships exist between the U.S. Department of State and the NGOs AMIDEAST and the Institute for International Education (IIE), two private, nonprofit organizations. When the U.S. Department of State puts out a Request For Proposal (RFP), AMIDEAST, IIE, and others compete for the contract. One partnership is in the Tomorrow’s Leaders program, which has been in existence for three years.65 While the U.S. Department of State pays for “almost the whole thing,” AMIDEAST or IIE handle the recruitment of students.66 The private sector should not displace traditional state-to-state diplomacy as practiced by foreign ministries, but it will impact the way those ministries do business.67 Conclusion Increasingly, foreign ministries and diplomats will need to go beyond bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and to construct and conduct relations with new global actors.68 But the current problems with public diplomacy will not be fixed by major privatization measures. It is no panacea. As one former State Department official explained, “There are weaknesses in public diplomacy in terms of research and technical development, but the government is capable of improving those areas with increased funding—not by diverting funding elsewhere.”69 Public diplomacy should remain a government function. The private sector may serve as a complement to, but not a substitute for, public diplomacy. One scholar who has examined this question agrees, saying in effect that public diplomacy is a type of diplomacy, but to be successful, it should take advantage of the efforts of private parties working in international communications.70 That is a sensible formula. The term “private public diplomacy” is, in a sense, an oxymoron. Can public diplomacy still be public if it is run privately? Whose interests would be prioritized? There are other recommendations; some

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urge the creation of a “New USIA,” 71 while others argue for the creation of a public diplomacy coordination system similar to the National Security Council.72 The public sector currently plays an important role in public diplomacy—although many people may not be aware. Recommendations “I feel very strongly about Public Diplomacy being a vital part of the United States State Department responsibility. I feel equally strongly that the private sector and NGO activity from people to people, city to city, and business to business are virtually adjunct and should be encouraged.” 73 Three recommendations result from the findings of this essay, a “blend” of strengthening the existing public diplomacy structure, while also strengthening relationships with the private sector. Strengthen the Existing Structure First, strengthen State Department public diplomacy by providing adequate authority and resources. BDA supports this notion in part, as they recommended more infrastructure support for public diplomacy, both in funding and human resources.74 The Obama administration and Congress should take efforts to improve the existing public diplomacy structure. Specifically, public diplomacy needs a clear chain of command as well as adequate personnel and financial resources. It is essential to re-streamline public diplomacy channels75 by enhancing public diplomacy career training, increasing the number of experienced foreign service personnel in State Department public affairs, and strengthening interagency coordination. Increase Domestic Awareness and Understanding Domestic access limits on public diplomacy products contained in legislation dating from the 1940s (Smith-Mundt Act) should be abolished. In the Internet age, almost anyone with a computer can access public diplomacy materials, and almost every U.S. government entity outside of the State Department engages in self-advocacy. Elements of the Act needlessly complicate the job of government communicators by blocking the cross-f low of products and services from public diplomacy and

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public affairs units, slowing the production of public relations materials, and ensuring duplicated efforts and expense because agencies outside of State Department public diplomacy must create similar products, such as pamphlets and press releases, from scratch.76 Many problems stem from the lack of understanding by Americans of public diplomacy. Some are unaware that it already involves “building relationships in spheres of everyday life.” 77 Others are unaware that it has often used private sports figures: “Even sports can have a remarkable ability to provide common ground. Think of the pingpong matches of the early 1970’s that helped thaw relations with China, the American wrestlers who competed against Iranians in the 1990’s or the Baltimore Orioles playing in Havana.”78 There appears to be a serious disconnect between what public diplomacy actually is and does, versus how it is perceived.79 Kathleen Fitzpatrick surveyed former USIA officers, and found that: Personal contact between U.S. representatives and people abroad emerged as the most important element of effective public diplomacy. When asked to rate the overall effectiveness of various public diplomacy activities, respondents rated most highly exchange programs, face-to-face interactions with local publics, international visitors programs, and dialogue with political elites.80 She continued that: “In addition to the activities listed in the questionnaire, USIA alumni cited the importance of representation, binational centers, non-paid media placements, book programs, English training and other educational programs, performing and fine arts tours, sports events, and support of local communities through small grants and other programs.”81 There is a need to raise awareness about the existing partnership of public diplomacy with the private sector.82 Strengthen the Existing Partnerships between Public Diplomacy and the Private Sector The existing partnerships should be strengthened. But challenges include “where to draw the line” between the U.S. government’s control over public diplomacy and the increasing role of the private sector.83 Perhaps cooperation can occur with the private group Foundation for

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International Understanding (assuming it officially takes shape), which would fund media projects for overseas consumption, providing grants from private sources for television, radio, and Internet media productions “that promote mutual understanding.”84 Notes 1. The primary forms of data collection for this essay were interviews and secondary data review. This report seeks to go beyond the excellent essay by a respected scholar that has asked the important questions and laid out the basic issues: Kathleen R. Fitzpatrick, “Privatized Public Diplomacy,” in ed. Philip Seib, Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 155. 2. Pew Poll of Foreign Publics’ Opinion of the United States, 2002–2004; “Public Diplomacy: How To Think About and Improve It,” RAND Corporation, 2004. 3. USC Center for Public Diplomacy, “What is PD?” available at http://uscpublicdiplomacy. org/index.php/about/what_is_pd (accessed November 4, 2009). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Business for Diplomatic Action website, available at http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/who/index.html (accessed October 3, 2009). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. “Who We Are.” Business for Diplomatic Action website, available at http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/who/index.html (accessed November 17, 2009). 10. Ibid. 11. Cari Guittard, telephone interview, February 9, 2010. 12. Peter Peterson, “Privatising U.S. Public Diplomacy,” January 21, 2004, available at http:// www.cfr.org/publication/6697/privatising_us_public_diplomacy.html (accessed November 17, 2009). 13. “Perceptions on U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at http:// www.cfr.org/publication/8934/perceptions_of_us_public_diplomacy.html (accessed November 1, 2009). 14. The Foundation for International Understanding, “Encouraging Innovation in Public Diplomacy” (Audio), Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/ publication/14613/foundation_for_international_understanding.html (accessed October 28, 2009). 15. Ibid. 16. Foundation for International Understanding Power Point Presentation, available at www.cspresidency.org/.../Foundation_for_International_Understanding_Overview.ppt (accessed November 18, 2009). 17. Ibid. 18. Foundation for International Understanding, USC Center for Public Diplomacy website, available at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/projects/fiu (accessed November 1, 2009). 19. Foundation for International Understanding Power Point. 20. Ibid. 21. “The USA-World Trust: Bringing the Power of Networks to U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Brookings Institution, available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/winter_ public_diplomacy_lord.aspx (accessed November 7, 2009).

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22. Kristin Lord, “Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century,” Brookings Institutions, available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/11_public_diplomacy_ lord.aspx (accessed October 25, 2009). 23. Ibid. 24. Kristin Lord, “The USA-World Trust: Bringing the Power of Networks to US Public Diplomacy,” Public Diplomacy Magazine, available at http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/ memos-to-obama/the-usa-world-trust/ (accessed November 10, 2009). 25. Lord, “Voices of America.” 26. Fitzpatrick, “Privatized Public Diplomacy,” pp. 161–168, also describes pros and cons. 27. Peter Peterson, Council on Foreign Relations Speech, July 30, 2002, transcript obtained September 13, 2009, from http://www.cfr.org/publication/4697/public_diplomacy.html. 28. Business for Diplomatic Action, “America’s Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy,” October 2007, available at www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/ . . . / bdawhitepaper_oct07final.pdf (accessed September 22, 2009). 29. “The Impact of the Private Sector on Public Diplomacy,” Pacific Council on International Policy, available at http://www.pacificcouncil.org/interior.aspx?pageID=News&subID=4 1&itemID=23 (accessed November 18, 2009). 30. Pacific Council website, available at http://www.pacificcouncil.org/interior.aspx?pageID= News&subID=41&itemID=23 (accessed November 17, 2009). 31. Business for Diplomatic Action, “America’s Role in the World.” 32. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 198–199. 33. Michael Holtzman, “Privatize Public Diplomacy,” The New York Times, August 8, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/08/opinion/08HOLT.html (accessed September 12, 2009). 34. Lord, “Voices of America.” 35. Kristin Lord, telephone interview, November 5, 2009. 36. Peterson, “Privatizing Public Diplomacy.” 37. Peterson speech, July 30, 2002. 38. Business for Diplomatic Action, “America’s Role in the World.” 39. Ed Fuelner, “Public Diplomacy or Propaganda?” The Layalina Review, Vol. VI, No. 1 ( January 1–14, 2010), available at http://www.layalina.tv/Publications/Review/PR_VI.1/ article2.html (accessed January 15, 2010). 40. Peterson speech, July 30, 2002. 41. Ibid. 42. S. Johnson, and H. Dale, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy,” available at http:// www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1645.cfm (accessed October 3, 2009). 43. David E. Morey, testimony delivered to the Subcommittee on National Security, “Emerging Threats and International Relations U.S. Congress,” February 10, 2004, available at www. au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ . . . /public_diplomacy_morey_feb04.pdf (accessed November 17, 2009). 44. Peterson speech July 30, 2002. 45. Business for Diplomatic Action, “America’s Role in the World.” 46. Ibid. 47. Peterson, “Privatizing Public Diplomacy.” 48. Holtzman, “Privatize Public Diplomacy.” 49. Fred Coffey et al., “Making Public Diplomacy Effective,” January 2009, available at www. publicdiplomacy.org/17.htm (accessed November 1st, 2009). 50. Retired FSO with longtime public diplomacy experience abroad, interview, November 2009. 51. Lord interview, November 5, 2009.

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52. Katherine T. Ron, U.S. State Department, Office of Innovative Engagement, telephone interview, January 29, 2010. 53. Johnson and Dale, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy.” 54. William Rugh, lecture, “United States Public Diplomacy.” The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy. October 6, 2009. 55. Alvin Snyder, “Private Public Diplomacy,” available at http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index. php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/private_public_diplomacy1/ (accessed October 3rd, 2009). 56. A.W. Goudie and David Stasavage, “A Framework for the Analysis of Corruption,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 29 (1998), pp. 113–127 and 131–134. 57. Peterson, “Privatizing Public Diplomacy.” 58. Former State Department senior official and senior fellow on communication, leadership and policy at the University of Southern California, interview, January 19, 2010. 59. Peterson speech, July 30, 2002. 60. Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007) p. 188. 61. Article in Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1949), pp. 471–486, quoted in Anthony Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conf licts,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds. Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, cited, p. 115. 62. “Public Diplomacy: How To Think About and Improve It,” RAND Corporation, 2004. 63. PRWatch, “Onward, Free Market Soldiers: Privatizing Public Diplomacy,” available at http://www.prwatch.org/node/5967 (accessed September 28, 2009). 64. NCIV website, available at http://www.nciv.org/about_07.asp (accessed October 1, 2009). 65. Quincy Dermody, program coordinator for AMIDEAST, Telephone interview, November 17, 2009. 66. Ibid. 67. USC, “What is PD?” 68. Ibid. 69. Former State Department official, interview, January 19, 2010. 70. Fitzpatrick, “Privatized Public Diplomacy,” pp. 168–169. 71. William Kiehl, “Humpty Dumpty Redux: Saving Public Diplomacy,” available at http:// www.publicdiplomacy.org/98.htm (accessed September 29, 2009). 72. Business for Diplomatic Action, “America’s Role in the World.” 73. Bruce Gelb, former USIA director, e-mail interview, November 6, 2009. 74. Snow and Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. 75. Johnson and Dale, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy.” 76. S. Johnson, H. Dale, and P. Cronin, “Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination, and Strategy,” available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/ PublicDiplomacy/bg1875.cfm (accessed October 16, 2009). 77. Holtzman, “Privatize Public Diplomacy.” 78. Ibid. 79. One retired FSO with considerable public diplomacy experience says that while government officials and several private sector institutions know all about partnerships with the State Department on public diplomacy projects, otherwise the American public seems unaware of them. Interview, November 2009. 80. Kathleen Fitzpatrick, “The Collapse of American Public Diplomacy: What Diplomatic experts Say About Rebuilding Around the World—A View From the Trenches,” available at http:// www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/7/7/pages251779/ p251779-5.php (accessed October 5, 2009). 81. Ibid. 82. Ron, interview. 83. Lord, interview. 84. Snyder, “Private Public Diplomacy.”

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CH A P T E R

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Do Peace Corps Volunteers Do Public Diplomacy? M i nta M ade ley

This study compares the Peace Corps and public diplomacy: their stated goals, their actual functions, and how the practitioners view themselves and each other. It uses case studies from the two countries in the Arab world that today have both Peace Corps and public diplomacy programs, namely, Jordan and Morocco. Public diplomacy is crucial in the Arab world, but what is the function of Peace Corps Jordan and Morocco from a public diplomacy perspective? Using the U.S. State Department’s public diplomacy efforts, both in general and in Jordan and Morocco specifically, as a baseline for comparison, this essay argues that Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) do engage in public diplomacy: PCVs are employed by the U.S. government, two of their overarching goals parallel those of the Public Diplomacy Cone of the U.S. State Department, and their activities in Jordan and Morocco complement U.S. public diplomacy aims in those countries. However, Peace Corps Volunteers are not primarily public diplomacy actors, for two reasons. The first is that their goals include development goals. The second is that their power and credibility in public diplomacy ironically comes from their separation from the policies of the U.S. government and their focus on activities other than specifically public diplomacy projects. This essay presents some recommendations that would help Volunteers walk such a thin line.

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Many of the issues that public diplomacy officials deal with in Jordan and Morocco are the same as those being handled by U.S. public diplomacy officials all over the world, including democracy, freedom, and the environment.1 Public Affairs sections also support the goals of the local mission, such as economic, social, and political reform, counterterrorism, and public outreach in Morocco.2 One of the biggest issues that Public Affairs officers confront in Jordan and Morocco is opposition to American foreign policy, particularly policy toward the region. A particular challenge is the large amount of high-quality, highly effective media available in those countries. American foreign policy is a hot topic and is discussed frequently on the most popular broadcasting stations, on the most popular shows. There may be twenty-five hours a week of popular news and discussion shows where U.S. policy is discussed with three or more guests each, and it is unrealistic for the U.S. Embassy to provide representation on every one. The embassy might be represented in one or two shows per week, but guests on other shows are almost exclusively anti-U.S. policy.3 Some public diplomacy officers seek to affect the media directly by appearing on popular shows, others indirectly inf luence local people who may appear on television and have positive things to say about America, or otherwise help educate target populations. Public Diplomacy Instruments in Jordan and Morocco Public diplomacy sections use several instruments, such as the America. gov website, in addition to contacts with print and television media staffers. In Morocco, embassies provide media and journalism training and maintain an information resource center.4 The Access program, in which local teachers teach the English language to youth, is ongoing and very successful in both countries, providing American cultural information along with English lessons. State Department officials agree that the most effective public diplomacy programs are those that involve dialogue and exchange of ideas. For example, in Morocco, one official felt that “we were really proud of our website, but it was just the beginning.” One program that he found effective was simple. The ambassador would regularly meet with journalists informally over breakfast, off the record. This

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had “huge appeal” because unlike a press conference, it was a dialogue in which the journalists’ views were also heard.5 In Jordan, every year the embassy sends a writer to a creative writing workshop in Iowa for three–four weeks. Sending writers who are critical of the United States has brought great success; while participants often remain critical, they have an excellent experience and return with a more nuanced understanding of the United States.6 Two of the most important and well-known exchange programs are the Fulbright Program and the International Visitor Leader Program (IVLP), which provide exchanges between Jordan and Morocco (among other nations) and the United States, promoting dialogue and mutual understanding. The Fulbright Program allows foreign scholars to come to the United States to study or teach, and for Americans to do research or study abroad. The IVLP program usually includes a visit to Washington, D.C. where participants learn about the U.S. system of government, and supports meetings with professionals in their field and visits to other U.S. cities. For example, a recent program on the U.S. political process included a visit to D.C. and several states, meetings with academics, politicians, and journalists, and observation of a political primary.7 One of the most important aspects of the IVLP program is the involvement of private Americans as “citizen diplomats” who engage in a mutual exchange of ideas, cultures, and opinions. These Americans interact with the visitors, hosting them in their homes for a meal or meeting them in a professional setting, introducing them to what “real Americans” are like, while the visitors share stories about their own country, family, career, and beliefs. Visitors gain a network of connections that they can maintain when they return home, and they also develop a deeper knowledge of American culture.8 Perhaps the credibility of these “real Americans,” who are not employed or trained by the government, makes them so effective. The issue of credibility will be addressed later in this essay. The primary target population for these public diplomacy efforts is educated people. Some technological information programs, such as America.gov, are obviously geared toward those with Internet access, who are literate and tech-savvy. While many programs strive to recruit diverse participants, particularly from underrepresented populations in the region and in the United States, the Fulbright Program is more narrowly intended for scholars, which indicates an educated sector. Likewise, the IVLP targets “current or emerging leaders in . . . key fields.”9 By targeting people who have long inf luential careers ahead of

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them, the embassy ensures that its efforts have a ripple, or “multiplier,” effect well into the future. What Is the Peace Corps? The Peace Corps is a U.S. government agency that was created in 1961 to promote world peace and friendship. It has three goals: 1. Helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women. 2. Helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served. 3. Helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.10 These goals are constantly reiterated to Volunteers throughout their service, constituting the essence of a Volunteer’s experience. The first is a development-oriented goal that Peace Corps Volunteers fulfill by transferring skills, conducting training sessions, teaching and working on projects with people from their host country. The other two goals, however, do have a clear public diplomacy angle. Volunteers achieve them by living in their communities for two years, talking to people, and helping their host community members get to know them as Americans. They take their experiences home by contacting U.S. family and friends while they are away and by educating their home communities once they complete their service. Organizationally, there is tension between the public diplomacy and development goals, which is not always mutually reinforcing. The Peace Corps is noted as being crucial to the United States’ image abroad, by strengthening relationships between the United States and other countries, increasing cross-cultural understanding, and serving as a source of soft power. In fact, the Peace Corps in practice contributes directly to U.S. national security by improving relations with the rest of the world, serving as “the face of America that is welcomed most enthusiastically in the rest of the world.”11 In 2002, President Bush announced the creation of a “Freedom Corps” of which Peace Corps would be a part. One objective of the Peace Corps under his initiative was to operate more in Islamic countries, including in Afghanistan under the Crisis Corps program. In addition, Congress has been interested in inf luencing Peace Corps’ geographic

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scope, based on a strategic perspective.12 These changes ref lect the fact that Islamic countries have had a generally negative view of the United States, and Peace Corps does a good job of changing people’s minds, albeit one-by-one. As Joseph Nye put it, “the Arab street” does not believe government-generated messages, and it is everyday people who retain credibility. Therefore, programs like the Peace Corps need to be used as a public diplomacy tool for communication with the Arab public.13 In other words, “Peace Corps is an agency of public diplomacy as much as it is a development organization, and personal interaction and demonstration of U.S. values is as important as providing technical expertise.”14 One Peace Corps rule, however, contrasts it from public diplomacy precepts that always include national strategic goals. The Peace Corps’ development mission requires that it pull out of countries that have “graduated” and no longer need the technical expertise that it provides, so theoretically, it would leave even a strategically important country once the development goals have been reached. Public diplomacy operations, in contrast, are continued everywhere possible, regardless of development concerns. To this end, Peace Corps is currently attempting to bolster its technical expertise by recruiting older Volunteers and those with specific skills needed in certain countries.15 In the past, young idealistic Volunteers were recruited to teach English and fulfill other generalist functions, and in that capacity they may have been better suited for the public diplomacy function of the Peace Corps. Thus, policymakers demonstrate a lack of unanimity about whether Peace Corps’ primary role should be in development or public diplomacy. The disagreement expressed by policymakers affects the way that the Volunteers view themselves and their experiences abroad. How Does the Peace Corps Fit into the Public Diplomacy Paradigm? State Department officials agree that the Peace Corps is a beneficial program to their own objectives, but most deny that there is or should be any cooperation between themselves and the Peace Corps. One public diplomacy official, for example, says: “Peace Corps is a parallel but almost entirely separate activity,” which cannot be too closely identified with the embassy in order to maintain Volunteers’ credibility with their host communities.16 Because of the independence of Peace Corps from the embassy, PD officials cannot direct or inf luence Volunteers’

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activities or words, which means that Volunteers are not a direct public diplomacy tool.17 Every year, the secretary of state issues a memo that stresses the necessity of Peace Corps remaining separate from the embassy’s activities, to maintain its credibility. While the degree to which the embassy adheres to this policy varies by country and context, there is a definite boundary between the Peace Corps and other U.S. agencies abroad. For example, the annual strategy report on the goals and objectives for all U.S. agencies in a particular country does not include Peace Corps’ goals or activities, nor is the Peace Corps required to align its goals to the mission strategy, because of its special status as separate from the embassy.18 The Peace Corps’ separate status allows PC Volunteers to wield a great deal of credibility, even though they are employed by the U.S. government and in practice perform public diplomacy functions. This is aided by the fact that they stay for a relatively long time and become intimately involved in their communities. As independent actors, like the host Americans who volunteer to host foreign visitors coming for the IVLP program, they are not told what to say or encouraged to present U.S. policies in a positive light, which makes what they say credible and believable. To call a PCV an instrument of public diplomacy would strip them of their independence, and thus their credibility, and ironically, it would destroy their effectiveness as an instrument of public diplomacy. An online survey of former or “Returned” Peace Corps Volunteers (RPCVs) conducted in November 200919 indicates that most Volunteers perceive that no cooperation takes place between the embassy and Peace Corps in their country. Only 11.7 percent of respondents responded “yes” to the question, “Did Peace Corps Volunteers work with the Public Diplomacy section of the U.S. embassy in your country of service?” Of those, most referred to public diplomacy training for Volunteers or provision of resources to Volunteers, but not to coordinating projects together. Some Volunteers felt that they did not have a close enough relationship with the embassy, others felt that they had a good working relationship with the embassy, and still others experienced a welcome independence from the embassy. Interestingly, however, both the Amman and Rabat embassies do in fact conduct programs in cooperation with Peace Corps Volunteers, indicating a lack of clarity or communication about these programs. In Jordan, an English language camp called American Village English Access Microscholarship Summer Camp (AVEA) is a joint

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project between the Aqaba Education Directorate ( Jordan), the U.S. Embassy through the Regional English Language office, the American NGO AMIDEAST, and the Peace Corps, supported by a USAID initiative.20 Many of the counselors at this program are Peace Corps Volunteers who help out for a couple of weeks during their summer. In addition, the State Department’s Regional English Language Officer (RELO) has tried to link Peace Corps Volunteers with Access teachers in their communities nearby, and distributed books to Jordanian teachers and children through Peace Corps Volunteers.21 The fact that only one Volunteer from Jordan of those surveyed identified these programs as cooperation between the embassy and the Peace Corps could indicate either that the Volunteers did not view them as a part of their Peace Corps experience, or that they did not realize who organized the events. Either way, this demonstrates a misunderstanding about the nature of the relationship between Peace Corps Volunteers, public diplomacy, and the embassy (see later). Don Hesse, a former Volunteer (RPCV) who had served in Jordan, worked with the Department of State’s Regional English Language Officer (RELO) on implementing the AVEA camp and discussed other projects with the RELO during his service. Don noted that even though Peace Corps is not meant to be part of the embassy, it was never suggested that the embassy and Peace Corps should not work together. The AVEA camp was a success because the Volunteers did not have the resources to put together such an undertaking, while the embassy could not have found about ten or twelve Volunteer counselors to take care of the attendees without Peace Corps. Using the Volunteers to help distribute books meant that more people in hard-to-reach areas were able to own and read their own books, both in English and in Arabic, making both the embassy and the Volunteers more successful. Don added, “I think I could have been a much more effective Volunteer if I had had more contact with [the RELO]’s program from the beginning. He had much more experience teaching English in that setting than almost anyone else.”22 This points to the expertise and resources that the embassy could provide if there were more interaction between the Peace Corps and the embassy. This type of cooperation does not compromise the independence of the Peace Corps, and makes both the embassy and the Peace Corps more effective. Similarly, in Morocco, Peace Corps Volunteers teach at English language immersion summer camps, organized by the Moroccan Ministry of Youth and Sports but with many students’ fees paid for by the U.S. Embassy in Rabat.23 Of the twelve respondents to the RPCV survey

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mentioned earlier who served in Morocco, every one answered “no” to the question, “Did Peace Corps Volunteers work with the Public Diplomacy section of the U.S. embassy in your country of service?” and only one added, “I put no but I am not entirely sure.” Again, this underscores the misunderstanding that Peace Corps Volunteers are not fully aware of their relationship to the embassy. Currently serving State Department officials and Peace Corps staff seem to agree at first that Peace Corps Volunteers do not actually do public diplomacy, but a survey of sixty returned Volunteers (RPCVs) who had served in different countries, when asked, “Would you say that your job included public diplomacy?” showed that only two said “not at all.” Thirteen (22 percent) said “a little,” forty (67 percent ) said “yes definitely,” and six (10 percent) said “my job was public diplomacy.”24 At the same time, these RPCVs indicated that they had had a sense of independence from official U.S. government positions and programs. Common survey responses were: “I wasn’t consciously promoting any kind of U.S. interest,” and “ I should say that [when] ‘explaining U.S. foreign policy to foreign publics’ a lot of the time I was saying things along the lines of ‘I don’t understand it (or agree with it) myself,’ and in some cases I think that was the most powerful thing I could have said.” In this sense, PCVs are similar to certain tools used by public diplomacy officials, such as speakers, who are brought from the United States to have discussions with foreign publics. These speakers are free to state their own opinions, and their purpose is to help those publics learn more about various aspects of American life and culture. However, Volunteers certainly do not perform all of the functions of public diplomacy. Some important work that public diplomacy programs perform includes educating people in other countries about the American system of government, promoting professional networking and high-level education. PCVs are not specifically engaged in any of these, nor should they be. They do the opposite: they learn about the country where they serve, receive hospitality there, and get the chance to compare their own culture with that of their hosts. They also work at the grassroots level, with people who may not have a great inf luence on others—the “multiplier effect” of a PCV is smaller than that of an embassy program specifically aimed at having the widest possible impact. PCV contributions to public diplomacy efforts are centered on personal exchange and small-scale development projects. One public diplomacy official explained the relations between Peace Corps goals and the public diplomacy goals she promotes. She said they were actually the same at some levels, but different at others, and

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often resulted in very similar projects for very different reasons. At the institutional level, Peace Corps goals do include public diplomacy, but their country-level goals do not. For example, in one country, Peace Corps country goals may center on health, youth development, environment, and microfinance. As she put it, health Volunteers “wake up and they’re thinking about health, they go to sleep and they’re thinking about health,” while public diplomacy officials think explicitly about public diplomacy. However, both, for their own reasons, do projects that are needed in that country. As a result, a youth development Volunteer might do a youth basketball camp that looks exactly like a youth basketball camp organized by a public affairs officer. The activity is exactly the same, but the two come at it from different angles, with different purposes in mind.25 The Peace Corps in Jordan and Morocco The Peace Corps today has programs in only two Arab countries— Jordan and Morocco—because of security considerations and because other Arab governments have not requested them. In this troubled region, both countries stand as stable kingdoms enjoying good relations with the United States. Their development needs are not as extreme as those of some other countries in the world where Peace Corps operates. For example, unlike the situation in some other countries, Volunteers in Jordan live in homes with running water, relatively reliable electricity, cell phones, and often Internet. Most Volunteers do not offer a great deal of expertise that does not exist to some degree in-country. This suggests that these countries were chosen for their strategic importance, a notion not lost on the Volunteers themselves. When frustrated by their lack of impact, many of them find renewed purpose by aiming at public diplomacy as their objective, rather than on the Peace Corps’ first, development-oriented, goal. In the survey of returned PCVs mentioned earlier, the sixty respondents included eleven who had served in Jordan and twelve in Morocco, and these two groups were more likely than the total group to say that they do perform a public diplomacy function, indicating that Volunteers in Jordan and Morocco tend to be more concerned than other Volunteers about their public diplomacy role. However, Peace Corps Volunteers in Jordan and Morocco are not a direct tool of public diplomacy used by the State Department, although they do fulfill some of the objectives of public diplomacy programs in those countries. For

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example, one public diplomacy goal for Morocco is to promote a more comprehensive and positive image of the United States. Peace Corps Volunteers present a face of America every day and are constantly available to people of the communities where they live. When returned Volunteers are asked about the most impactful thing they did during Peace Corps, their answers tend to be about the long-term relationships they made, the conference they organized that showed participants “what a Western conference is,” or spending time with children who will always have that “positive experience with an American.”26 The audience that PCVs reach out to is different from the public diplomacy sections’ target audience. Peace Corps works exclusively on a personal level, while public diplomacy attempts to reach a wider “public.”27 Both work toward the same goal, however. For example, Peace Corps Volunteers support the public diplomacy section’s efforts to promote civic engagement through projects that encourage participants to be more active in their societies, or to be good citizens. A conference about program management for possible future NGO managers in Morocco is as useful coming from a Peace Corps Volunteer as it is coming from the U.S. Embassy. A village clean-up project in Jordan promotes civic values at a lower level than the embassy operates at, but supports the embassy’s efforts nonetheless. Tensions and Misunderstandings Peace Corps Volunteers seem to understand what public diplomacy is and that public diplomacy goals are included in their job, even if not specified as such, but their role within the public diplomacy spectrum appears unclear to them. In 2003, the General Accountability Office defined the mission of public diplomacy thus: To inform, engage, and inf luence global audiences . . . to reach out beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics and sustained access and inf luence in important sectors of foreign societies. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast and electronic media, and other means.28 Surveyed Peace Corps Volunteers defined public diplomacy in a variety of ways. Some said they thought it was “one of those BS terms

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people in development throw around to make it sound like they’re actually doing something,” others said it was “presenting the nuances of America,” or “serving as a diplomat (ambassador) towards the public rather than the government.” They also differ on whether they engaged in public diplomacy themselves. Interestingly, the RPCV who commented that public diplomacy was a development term stated that his or her job consisted of “a little” public diplomacy. When given the earlier mentioned definition, this person had second thoughts, stating that their job “definitely” included public diplomacy. On the other hand, the person who said that public diplomacy was “serving as a diplomat (ambassador)” said that the Peace Corps job “was public diplomacy” both before and after reading definitions of public diplomacy. Very few respondents changed their minds about the extent to which their job included public diplomacy in the time between defining public diplomacy themselves and seeing standard definitions of it, indicating that most of them already understood the term. In other words, returned PCVs in general had a correct understanding of public diplomacy, and those tended to consider at least part of their job as a PCV to be public diplomacy. As demonstrated earlier, PCVs do engage in activities that promote the goals of public diplomacy in general and also the goals of public diplomacy in their specific countries, and survey responses indicate that they are aware of this. A selection of their responses demonstrates a reasonable assessment of tasks that do indeed fall under public diplomacy outreach: Explained US foreign policy (and elections) . . . I made a conscious decision that I was going to engage with every person I met . . . It meant a lot of tea drinking . . . Going to meetings, parties and events . . . Presenting a positive vision of Americans . . . Conversation in a public setting . . . 29 The Peace Corps Volunteers’ role within the public diplomacy paradigm is less clear: there is some confusion amongst Peace Corps Volunteers about where their own opinions end, and where their job as U.S. government employees begins. Peace Corps Volunteers are not hired to speak for the government, and they are not public diplomacy officers. Yet many returned PCVs who were surveyed referred to themselves as “ambassadors” of the United States and noted that they had been employed by the U.S. government. Some noted that they felt pressured

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to explain U.S. policies, which they may not have fully understood or agreed with. Their liberal use of the word “ambassador” is likely metaphorical, but they clearly see their jobs as consisting of undefined public diplomacy tasks. One parallel that might make the situation clearer for Volunteers is that of speakers who are brought from America to talk about their areas of expertise, because they “do public diplomacy” by representing their own views, not those of the government. Finally, there is the tension between the three Peace Corps goals. Most Volunteers initially believe that they will make a difference through providing developmental assistance. Through training, which focuses on technical skills, Volunteers learn that development is the most important objective. Meanwhile, Volunteers in Morocco and Jordan also get the sense from their country and program directors that cultural exchange is most important. Depending on the situation in their communities, they may focus more on one than the other; public diplomacy may become the “fallback” if the Volunteer is not having success in their technical work, so that “at least I’m making connections and learning about the culture.”30 This can especially be the case when there is a perceived lack of support or resources for their project from the country office—a common complaint. In the best case scenario, the interaction between the three goals plays a role in Volunteers’ success. One returned PCV who served in Jordan noted that “when I was implementing a project, the fact that word was getting around that I was doing something, it sparked more interest, it opened opportunities for public diplomacy.”31 Another who had served in Morocco mentioned that “cultural diplomacy was probably more credible when I was actually working.” At the same time, there are plenty of development organizations working in Morocco, but “the value added of Peace Corps is the greater understanding.” Because a Volunteer knows the people in their community and their needs, when he or she implements a project, the reaction is not: “Who is this crazy person? How does she think she can do [a development project]? She doesn’t even know us!”32 The combination of a deep knowledge of their community plus access to development resources is potent, even if it is at a grassroots level. Recommendations These tensions should be and can be addressed without damaging the credibility, independence, or integrity of the Peace Corps as distinct

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from the U.S. Embassy in the host country. First, the PC Volunteers’ role should be made clear. They should be specifically told that their role is not to represent the government, but rather the people of America, and that they are not expected to play the role of an ambassador. Along those lines, their relationship with the embassy should be clarified. Official policy states that the U.S. Mission should not inf luence the activities of the Peace Corps Volunteers, and Volunteers should be aware of this. They should also be aware that the embassy can and does support their projects in addition to cooperating with them on activities that both are interested in, such as English language summer camps. The extent of cooperation should be made explicit, as this will also help to ensure that policy is enforced and that Peace Corps Volunteers are able to knowledgeably maintain their credibility and independence from the embassy. Third, Peace Corps Volunteers should receive training in the essentials of public diplomacy. Two-thirds of the Peace Corps’ mission runs along public diplomacy lines, and yet nearly all training is geared toward the technical proficiency they will use to transfer knowledge and skills to their host communities, instead of on public diplomacy-related skills. Possibly a public diplomacy official from the embassy, or other expert, could give a one-time workshop during training that addresses the types of questions Volunteers are likely to receive, and ways to answer or def lect those questions. Many Volunteers do receive some training in this, but in Jordan, this training comes from host country nationals who arguably do not have the same perspective or skill as a trained U.S. diplomat. Training of this sort need not compromise Peace Corps Volunteers’ independence from the embassy; however, it would give Volunteers some of the knowledge and skills necessary to avoid major blunders that might put the Volunteer in a service-ending conversation or situation. Finally, Peace Corps Volunteers should have access, either directly or indirectly, to Public Affairs Officers at their embassy. This line of communication would allow PC Volunteers, who are sensitive to the pulse of local populations, to inform the embassy of developments in a timely manner, and to get information they need to respond to the expressed sentiments of their host community. A direct line would be more efficient while an indirect line, for example, through someone at the Peace Corps office in country, would maintain the distance from the embassy that may be essential for the Volunteers’ credibility. For example, one issue that seemed to escape the embassy’s radar in December 2006 was the talk of every village in northern Jordan for days. Saddam Hussein’s

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execution on the first day of Eid al-Adha made him a martyr to many locals, even those with moderate political beliefs.33 While the United States was not responsible for the execution, criticism spilled over on to the American government. Thus there was a public diplomacy void at a time when any statement on that topic to the Arab media would have been better than none. A line of communication from the Peace Corps to the embassy would have been critical in making that happen. Conclusion Public diplomacy in Jordan and Morocco is crucial to the United States at a time when the Arab world’s opinion of the United States has been so low. From a public diplomacy perspective, Peace Corps Volunteers do engage in public diplomacy work, but not directly or through official means. Although the Peace Corps explicitly promotes mutual understanding as two of its three goals, Volunteers are not trained to fulfill those goals in the most effective manner possible and they are left with an unclear idea of what is expected of them in that respect. Through increased training and definition of boundaries, Volunteers can be more effective, benefiting the embassy’s goals without compromising Volunteers’ credibility or independence from the embassy. Notes 1. State Department public diplomacy official in the Information Policy (IIP) office who works on Middle Eastern affairs, telephone interview, November 10, 2009. 2. “Background Note: Morocco,” U.S. Department of State, updated January 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm (accessed February 15, 2010). 3. Phil Frayne, embassy spokesman, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, November 20, 2009, telephone interview. 4. Matt Lussenhop, former information officer, U.S. Department of State, telephone interview, November 4, 2009. 5. Ibid. 6. Frayne, interview. 7. “International Visitor Leadership Program,” International Visitor Corps of Jacksonville Inc., available at http://www.ivcjax.com/html/body_ivlp_snapshot.html (accessed February 16, 2010). 8. “Article on the Power of Citizen Diplomacy,” National Council for International Visitors, http://www.nciv.org/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=9:libra ry&download=32:article-on-the-power-of-citizen-diplomacy&Itemid=93 (accessed February 16, 2010); “Impact of the USIA International Visitors Program: Success Stories Volume II,” ed. Sherry Mueller and Nicole Cavallerano, available at http://www.nciv.org/index. php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=9:library&download=81:successstories-volume-2&Itemid=93 (accessed February 16, 2010).

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9. “International Visitor Leadership Program,” U.S. Department of State, http://exchanges. state.gov/ivlp/ivlp.html (accessed February 15, 2010). 10. “Mission,” U.S. Peace Corps, available to http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn. whatispc.mission (accessed December 10, 2009). 11. Lex Rieffel and Sarah Zalud, “Policy Brief #155: International Volunteering: Smart Power,” The Brookings Institution, June 2006. 12. Curt Tarnoff, “The Peace Corps: USA Freedom Corps Initiative,” Congressional Research Service, 2002. 13. Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 2 (2004), 267. 14. Ibid. 15. Mike Buff, Peace Corps recruiter, telephone interview by author, December 1, 2009. 16. State Department IIP official, interview 17. Lussenhop, interview. 18. Tom Gerhardt, Peace Corps program officer, Jordan, speaking in a personal capacity, e-mail interview, November 3, 2009. 19. The survey was conducted by the author in the fall of 2009 using a questionnaire, which was hosted on surveymonkey.com at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X6WQZCW. Data based on sixty responses only. 20. “American Ambassador Highlights U.S. Support for Economic, Educational Development Efforts,” Jordan Times, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.jordantimes.com/index. php?news=8729 (accessed January 28, 2010). 21. Don Hesse, RPCV Jordan, telephone interview January 25, 2010. 22. Ibid. 23. A knowledgeable source, e-mail interview, November 17, 2009. 24. This is the same survey mentioned earlier. 25. Knowledgeable U.S. official, interview by Skype, November 19, 2009. 26. Mandy Gardner and Adam Welti, RPCVs Morocco; Adam Gardner, RPCV Jordan; interviews, December 8 and 9, 2009. 27. Gerhardt, interview. 28. U.S. General Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges,” Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., September 2003. 29. Selected responses to the question, “What did you do as a PCV that was public diplomacy?” 30. Adam Welti, RPCV Morocco, interview, December 9, 2009. 31. Adam Gardner, RPCV Jordan, interview by Skype, December 9, 2009. 32. Mandy Gardner, RPCV Morocco, interview, December 8, 2009. 33. Author’s experience, December 30, 2006.

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CH A P T E R

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Conclusion: Field Experiences and Best Practices Wi l l i am A . Ru g h

This book analyzes the practice of contemporary public diplomacy by presenting in-depth case studies of American public diplomacy programs in vastly different countries from Europe and Africa to the Middle East and Asia. By confining these studies to the same time frame, it is possible to make comparisons to determine which programs are unique and which have common threads. Further, by scrutinizing field operations through interviews with current and former public diplomacy professionals, the studies point to the best emerging practices and examine programs that have not worked so well. In this way, the book attempts to add empirical evidence to the study of public diplomacy, and it offers suggestions about the directions successful public diplomacy should take. The studies shed light on major issues and questions that have been raised in public diplomacy discussions and literature. What follows is a summary of those issues and some insights this book offers. New Media One of the important questions for public diplomacy today concerns the extent to which new media are utilized in practice. Several chapters in this book examine new media in practice, and four chapters focus specifically and in depth on this question.1

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It is generally accepted that public diplomacy should capitalize on new communication technologies. The Internet provides tremendous opportunities including such social media as blogs, Facebook, and Twitter. Increased cell phone usage allows public diplomacy through instant messaging and photographs, and satellite television presents promising avenues of its own. These developments have been touted as opportunities that must be seized, and quickly. In 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted.”2 But some scholars question the U.S. government’s ability to adapt the new technology to public diplomacy and suggest this might require institutional change.3 The studies in this book show that the new media are in fact being utilized very creatively. American public affairs officers are especially drawn to SMS (short message service) as a public diplomacy tool. But these studies also show clearly that the new techniques work better in some countries than in others. Success depends on such factors as the level of local infrastructure (the lack of connectivity and even of electricity, e.g., in Africa and Afghanistan are a deterrent), local government restrictions (as in Iran), and the context of the political situation in the country and the region. The U.S. ambassador in Kenya uses Twitter extensively, even to criticize the Kenyan government, a tactic that is not possible in every country. Moreover, these studies have discovered systemic drawbacks when the new communication methods are tested. For example, when a U.S. Embassy tries to open a Facebook discussion, local participants sometimes receive no response to their comments. This can lead to frustration, angry discussion among themselves, and even the exchange of misinformation.4 Experimentation is still under way, and creative new uses have been discovered and employed, but the essays in this book help point the way to a more effective use of the new technologies. Russia is an interesting case. Conventional wisdom holds that broadcasting, namely, by VOA and Radio Liberty, was the one public diplomacy instrument that helped bring down the Soviet Union.5 But this book includes a new study that argues print media played a major role in felling the Soviet empire. As the author points out, the public diplomacy challenge in reaching the Russian audience has changed. Print media no longer function in Russia today as they did in the past, but that does not mean we need to embrace new media too hastily at the expense of traditional publications. Only about one-quarter of the Russian public has Internet access today. Moreover, the author found

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that the public diplomacy professionals at the State Department recognize that new media usage alone doesn’t produce effective communication with Russians or anyone else. She argues that some of the most compelling assets of print media, such as carefully selected visuals, could be effectively adapted for public diplomacy usage today. Personal Contact Despite the new technology’s attractiveness, practitioners with field experience agree that personal contact between American officials and overseas publics remains the most important element in public diplomacy. Surveys of practitioners show that “technology is a tool, not a panacea,” and that “face-to-face personal contact still matters”; they consider personal contact a very effective public diplomacy tool.6 Public diplomacy professionals, including all of the American staff at a U.S. diplomatic mission, plus the locally hired Foreign Service National staff, are expected to spend much of their time out of the office engaging with key members of the local society. This has become even more important since many embassies have implemented strict security measures that discourage visitors. This is also a primary reason for the professionals’ desire to restore the American centers and libraries; in the past, they were convenient venues in which to meet contacts, as Congress has recently acknowledged.7 The importance of face-to-face personal contact is rarely given sufficient attention in the public diplomacy literature. This is because it does not apply in Washington nearly as much as at field posts. But, as nearly all of the studies demonstrate, it is one of the most important factors behind success in the field. Exchange Programs A similar rationale applies to exchange programs, by which foreign students and professionals come to the United States and Americans go abroad. Such programs involve another form of face-to-face encounter between foreigners and Americans. Field officers regard exchange programs, along with personal contact, as the most effective of all their public diplomacy programs.8 Several studies in this book validate that conclusion. But the studies contained here also probe deeper into the exchange process, and find that some field offices have failed to capitalize fully on exchange programs.9 For example, the chapter on Sierra

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Leone points out that although exchanges are seen as the best public diplomacy tool, the embassy fails to make full use of them by neglecting to follow up with returnees. Monologue or Dialogue? One key issue in public diplomacy theory is whether public diplomacy should be a monologue or a dialogue. In proposing reform, proponents of a “new public diplomacy” argue that practitioners have used monologue in the past but now they should turn to dialogue.10 Scholar Jan Melissen says “new” public diplomacy is “persuasion by means of dialogue that is based on a liberal notion of communication with foreign publics . . . [it] listens to what people have to say . . . The new public diplomacy that is gradually developing . . . is not one-way messaging.”11 Shaun Riorden posits that successful public diplomacy “must be based not on the assertion of values but on a genuine dialogue . . . Public diplomacy must engage in a broad range of players in foreign societies. This requires a more open, and perhaps humble, approach, which recognizes that no one has a monopoly of truth or virtue, and that other ideas may be valid.”12 As another scholar put it, the new public diplomacy “must be more than delivering messages to target audiences.”13 Practitioners would agree with these arguments, but the assumption that dialogue is a new idea is incorrect, since they have been using the dialogue technique for decades. It is true that public diplomacy is a complex undertaking, sometimes employing monologue (unilateral message delivery), for example, in a public statement by an American official, but more often it employs dialogue, for example, in a conversation between an embassy official and a local newspaper editor. At field posts, in fact, almost all public diplomacy involves dialogue; even an ambassadorial speech to a foreign audience typically includes a Q&A period. The studies in this book give abundant practical examples of the dialogue function at field posts. Public diplomacy personnel everywhere know that dialogue is a key tool. This is true not only in Africa, where new media are limited, but even in a wired society such as South Korea. The PAO in Seoul has created a new website, the Embassy Youth Forum, that uses this new medium while preserving the traditional dialogue technique.14 In Washington, however, most public diplomacy tends to unfold by monologue—for example, in the form of speeches by senior officials. This may have given rise to the misunderstanding in the literature that public diplomacy is practiced as a monologue. Spokesmen at the State

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and Defense departments and the White House routinely hold “noon briefing” for the press, which are a form of dialogue. Yet the reporters are mostly Americans asking questions from an American perspective, not questions foreigners would ask, so there is little public diplomacy involved. The State Department operates Foreign Press Centers in Washington and New York for foreign journalists, but the American public is largely unaware of the centers because American media do not cover them. While dialogue prevails at field posts, Americans are not aware of this and therefore they may assume that monologue is the primary means of public diplomacy. Melissen and Riorden are therefore correct that dialogue is an effective approach, but they seem to be unaware that it has been practiced widely by American diplomats for decades. In fact, Riorden is right that they should practice humility and concede when their interlocutor has a point. American diplomats have always followed this rule. These factors suggest also that perhaps Washington could improve its public diplomacy by adopting some practices employed by field posts, by listening more to foreign opinion. Do U.S. Officials Lack Credibility and Access ? Some writers argue that American diplomats are not as successful in doing public diplomacy as private citizens because they lack credibility and access to people in the countries where they serve.15 But as studies in this book show, American diplomats do in fact have credibility and access. It is true that in some countries there are a few hardened ideologues who may, as a matter of principle, refuse to have any personal contact with American officials, but they may also avoid nonofficial U.S. citizens because of their entrenched mistrust of all Americans. However, if approached in the right way, most critics of American foreign policy or other aspects of the United States are likely to agree to speak with American officials at an embassy or consulate. Since the United States is the world’s only superpower and its actions often affect myriad lives abroad, most people have an interest in knowing more about our country and its policies. While they may not take the initiative to reach out to U.S. officials, critics may welcome contact in order to express their opinion about America directly to an official, hoping that they will have an impact on policy. Because of this, they may be quite willing to speak with U.S. officials, and contact with officials may serve their interest more than contact with nonofficials.16

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Some writers such as Shaun Riorden have argued that American diplomats should proactively engage with foreign media such as al Jazeera, which have carried criticism of U.S. policy.17 In reality, public diplomacy field officers already place high priority on gaining access to foreign media representatives, even unfriendly ones, whenever possible; they cultivate a variety of media officials and seek opportunities to be interviewed on radio, television, or in the print media. Al Jazeera is a somewhat special case. In the first years after 9/11, the Bush administration banned U.S. officials from appearing on al Jazeera. In response, al Jazeera reached out to American civilians for their views. Former Undersecretary for public diplomacy Karen Hughes eventually lifted that ban and urged officials to appear on al Jazeera. As a result, al Jazeera invited fewer nonofficials to their programs, seeing them as less authoritative.18 The lesson is clear: editors and producers of foreign media, including al Jazeera—which has been critical of U.S. policy— want to have American officials on their programs, often preferring them to nonofficials. So Riorden’s suggestion that public diplomacy officials should participate in foreign media is valid, but in fact, as some essays in this book demonstrate, this has already been a practice for a long time. In fact, practitioners know that gaining access to local media is often more effective than using our own channels, such as al Hurra Television.

Measuring Effectiveness Can we measure the effect of public diplomacy, which one study group called “moving the needle”?19 The public diplomacy literature gives considerable attention to evaluation issues. Most writers lament the fact that we have not been able to measure success well,20 and they are correct, but there are many reasons for this shortcoming. Foreign public opinion is formed out of the interplay of diverse factors, including local culture and the many pressures and communications coming both from home and abroad. Because of this, field officers know that that it is virtually impossible to identify what impact an American public diplomacy effort has had on public opinion. State Department officials in Washington, who must justify public diplomacy budgets before Congressional committees, are under pressure to identify so-called

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evidence of effectiveness to prove that the money is being put to good use. But because the field office cannot supply hard evidence, and hard statistics simply do not exist in public diplomacy, Washington, D.C. officials usually resort to anecdotal evidence. Field officers know that accurate measurement is impossible and believe that Edward R. Murrow was right when he said, “No cash register rings when minds change.”21 But field personnel nonetheless make constant assessments of their progress, based on their regular contacts with locals, and the contact that their Foreign Service National staff has with locals every day. Field officers may see an occasional opinion poll, but these are too infrequent and usually too general to suffice as hard evidence.22 As ref lected by some essays in this book, ongoing informal evaluation processes through regular local contacts is the only way to keep a finger on the pulse. Different Components Public diplomacy consists of several different components. One scholar has usefully identified five—listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting—but he believes it is difficult for the government “to administer all its public diplomacy under a single bureaucracy.”23 That concern may apply to Washington, but field staff finds that they are most effective when they utilize all of the different instruments together in a coordinated fashion. Many of the essays in this book provide examples of how public diplomacy officials working in specific countries have successfully used several of the instruments in concert. Public diplomacy history shows relative constancy in field office responsibilities despite frequent changes in Washington’s allocation of responsibilities and functions. In Washington in 1953, USIA assumed all functions except the cultural and education function, which was kept at the State Department until 1979 but always handled by PAOs in the field. When USIA was abolished in 1999, its functions were divided among several bureaus at headquarters in the State Department, plus the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). In the field, however, all functions remained under the public diplomacy section. While field officers have had minimal inf luence over broadcasting in the past, and almost zero since 1999, they coordinate all other aspects of public diplomacy and this arrangement works very well.

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Since Barack Obama’s election, people have speculated about his role in the American public diplomacy effort. Clearly, the American image abroad suffered under President George W. Bush and Obama’s arrival has ushered in a new style and tone that has raised America’s approval ratings substantially.24 Compared to their predecessors, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made more public speeches designed to appeal to foreign audiences and they have met more foreign groups in town hall meetings. These efforts have attracted media attention and, as several studies in this book show, have contributed significantly to a renewed public diplomacy effort. Obama’s and Clinton’s visits to Africa and Turkey boosted local public diplomacy programs but a broader impact is needed, and the impact has been uneven. Obama’s speech in Cairo was helpful, but the Arab public is still highly critical of our Mideast policy.25 In the United Kingdom, conversely, the public was so critical of President Bush as an individual that the change in administration by itself has helped. In any case, public diplomacy cannot be implemented by senior officials alone; as this book shows, the 24/7 work of public diplomacy professionals at our diplomatic missions abroad is just as important as the high level performances that monopolize media attention. Only those field officers can address local concerns directly, and interpret American policy, society, and culture in ways that are best understood by the local population. New Thinking The last two chapters in this book challenge prevailing assumptions about public diplomacy. The chapter on the Peace Corps and its role in public diplomacy questions traditional belief about their respective roles. The chapter on privatization questions assumptions about the usefulness of the private sector’s role in public diplomacy. Different Agencies The analysis of Peace Corps and public diplomacy programs as they actually function in the only two Arab countries points out for the first time that there is considerable overlap between the actions of two separate groups of U.S. government employees, despite official Peace Corps doctrine that says they are completely separate. Moreover, based on interviews with Peace Corps personnel and others working in these

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countries, the author documents her conclusion that the Peace Corps is doing public diplomacy, despite the confusion about what public diplomacy is. These conclusions are new and warrant attention Shaun Riorden argues that public diplomacy should include nation building.26 The Peace Corps study, however, shows that in practice the distinction is already blurred. Further, the study of Sierra Leone contained in this book shows the overlap of the two functions, even though public diplomacy is not usually thought to have a development or a nation-building function. Moreover, public diplomacy programs everywhere include educational exchanges that arguably have nationbuilding purposes. In many places, public diplomacy includes direct English teaching, which also constitutes a nation-building skill. One issue addressed in this study is whether U.S. government agencies are sufficiently coordinated. Similarly, coordination between the State Department and the Pentagon may be lacking in Washington, but in the field, representatives of the two agencies work in parallel and not at cross-purposes.27 The Private Sector Most of the thirty-plus reform proposals presented by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in recent years have argued that the private sector should play a much bigger role in public diplomacy. Scholars have also made this argument.28 A study in this book undertakes a more in-depth examination and analysis than has been done before, scrutinizing various proposals to increase the private sector role in public diplomacy. It finds that public diplomacy practitioners with field experience have long cooperated with private sector partners in ways that boost their programs’ success. Other studies in this book provide similar examples of such partnerships. When a foreign student or professional is sent to the United States on a U.S. government exchange grant, a private American NGO handles some of the recruitment (including testing) and most of the stateside arrangements, including university placement and even home stays. Among these NGOs are the National Council for International Visitors, the Institute of International Education, AMIDEAST, and Meridian House. These partnerships save the government money and staff time, and provide the foreign visitor with an appreciation of American volunteerism and freedom of expression that they experience in many unstructured encounters with private American citizens. Another example of

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a government-private partnership is the State Department’s recruitment of independent experts from university campuses and other private institutions as speakers. The State Department sends these experts abroad to lecture to foreign audiences, not telling them what to say or censuring their remarks. The privatization study also addresses nation branding. Wally Olins says that public diplomacy should focus on improving the U.S. “brand,”29 while Shaun Riorden argues that there is an overlap between nation branding and public diplomacy,30 and Peter van Ham says that place branding and public diplomacy are the “keys . . . to reinvigorating America’s soft power.”31 Gyorgyi Szondi argues that applying nation branding to public diplomacy would make it more creative and results oriented.32 Even former Secretary of State Colin Powell said that he had hired Charlotte Beers as his Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy because she was so good at marketing. Of public diplomacy, he said, “We’re selling a product. That product we are selling is democracy. It’s the free enterprise system, the American value system.”33 But both Olins and Riorden highlight serious problems with the branding argument. Riorden says it is “highly questionable whether a ‘national brand’ can be created and whether efforts to do so are credible,” while Olins argues there are many unanswered questions, such as who pays for nation branding and how the activities are coordinated.34 The analysis in this book essentially confirms the skepticism expressed by such theoretical analysis. In fact, public diplomacy has a much wider mandate than branding, broadly serving the American national interest, both long- and short-term. The Local Perspective The studies in this book demonstrate the important role that public diplomacy professionals play when they are assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. They provide an invaluable local perspective that officials sitting in Washington cannot know as well. Field officers devote a great deal of time and energy to engaging in discussion with a broad spectrum of local contacts in order to understand local attitudes on issues of importance to the United States, and to discuss those issues in ways that best deal with local priorities. They depend also on the Foreign Service National employees who work in the public diplomacy section to help keep abreast of current public opinion and the best ways to communicate across cultures.

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They must understand and deal with local concerns, to the extent that they relate to or affect the United States. This book highlights a spectrum of specific issues that are considered of highest priority by the public locally. For example, in Turkey, the Armenian genocide and Cyprus are key concerns; in Serbia, it is the 1999 NATO bombing and the 2008 Kosovo independence; in Afghanistan and Pakistan, governance and security; in Egypt, the Palestinians; in Sierra Leone, security and democracy; in Japan, the trade imbalance; and in South Korea, the American military presence and beef imports. The conditions under which the American public diplomacy professional works also vary widely from country to country. In Iran, the government is openly hostile and the United States lacks a presence, whereas in the United Kingdom we confront an open society and the friendliest of governments, but a public critical of U.S. policies. South Korea and Japan boast highly sophisticated modern communication media, whereas in Sierra Leone people lack television and even electricity. U.S. government employees take guidance from Washington on policy matters. They know they cannot simply parrot an official line as enunciated by senior officials, but they must help explain it in local terms, and often in the local language. They are in a better position than those in Washington to decide which communication instruments are most suitable for the country they are in, and how far they can go to test restrictions on embassy officials that may be imposed by the host government. In short, those field officers stationed at our diplomatic missions abroad, who are observant, sensitive to cultural clues, and empathetic, yet mindful of their main purpose to support American interests when they engage foreign audiences, are an absolutely crucial part of any successful public diplomacy effort. Public diplomacy is not just a Washington function. This is a basic fact that must be kept in mind. The world looks much more uniform from Washington’s perspective than it does to an American public diplomacy professional stationed abroad. He or she faces a unique set of public perceptions about America and an equally unique set of operational conditions. Each practitioner must select the programming tools that are most appropriate under the circumstances. While Washington provides basic policy guidance and can be supportive, individual practitioners on the ground best know the local scene and must determine the best approach to discussing policy and other aspects of America. All of the studies in this book illustrate this proposition. Finally, we can ask: Do practitioners of public diplomacy serving abroad operate on the basis of some kind of “theory”? Each practitioner

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is somewhat unique, but traditionally they have all tended to share a number of principles that might be called a general theory although they do not refer to it as such. They simply keep in mind those principles as guidelines in deciding, for example, what target audiences to select, what issues to focus on, and what program instruments to use. Many of these principles are ref lected in the case studies in this book and can be summarized here.35 The starting principle that U.S. government public diplomacy officers work under is that their overall responsibility is to present an accurate picture of the United States in all respects, and to try to correct misinformation and distortions of fact relating to the United States. They are quite aware that the foreign publics they are trying to reach have access to a very large variety of information sources relating to American interests. Today the U.S. government’s PD practitioners face much more competition in the global marketplace of ideas than ever before because of the explosion of satellite television, and use of the Internet and cell phones. Some of this steady 24/7 f low of information and opinion can be helpful to the task of the PD practitioner, for example, if a foreign journalist reports accurately from the United States, but much of it can be unhelpful, if it is based on ignorance or is deliberately hostile to the United States.36 The growth of international communication includes American nongovernmental actors. Public diplomacy officials tend to regard some of this as helpful—for example, they partner with some U.S. organizations in exchange programs—and some as harmful, as when private Americans make hostile or bigoted comments about foreigners and their comments are assumed to represent broad American opinion. The first operational rule of the practitioners is to start their public diplomacy planning by analyzing local attitudes and opinions, local political constraints and opportunities that affect that programming, and local means of communication. Their operational decisions can be inf luenced by policymakers in Washington, who, for example, have at times mandated a more elite target audience but recently have insisted that youth be given priority. But as the case studies in this book have shown, local conditions significantly affect these choices. An equally important operational principle is that personal contact is an essential tool for planning, implementation, and evaluation of programs. It is the best way to assess local opinion toward the United States because opinion polling and monitoring the local press are insufficient tools to understand nuances and real attitudes. Personal contact is also one of the best ways to convey information and to persuade. And when

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practitioners want to assess their success or failure they tend to depend heavily on informal assessments gathered from personal interactions. This anecdotal evidence does not always satisfy Washington’s requests for “metrics,” but field officers believe it is often the best they can do. Practitioners believe in Murrow’s famous dictum “it’s the last three feet that count,” because they know that persuasion and mutual understanding are best achieved in face-to-face personal encounters. Therefore, they usually make a special effort to develop a broad range of personal contacts and encourage their local-hire staffs to do the same. They are proactive in reaching out to anyone who will talk to them, even to America’s strongest critics. Respect for the power of personal contact is also a reason why they are enthusiastic about educational exchange programs that allow foreign students and professionals to visit the United States and interact with a variety of Americans in unstructured meetings. In carrying out the public diplomacy function to discuss American foreign policy, practitioners keep in mind that as U.S. government officials, they are expected to explain and defend the policies of the U.S. government, whatever administration is in office. But at the same time, they have an obligation to acknowledge and discuss dissenting opinion as it is expressed in the United States because they must represent the American public as a whole. They also know that public diplomacy can help explain foreign policy but it cannot always overcome strong opposition to policy positions. Public diplomacy professionals are communicators who seek to persuade, and they believe the dictum of Edward R. Murrow that in public diplomacy it is essential to be truthful because truthfulness is required for credibility. They also believe that the technique of dialogue is more effective than monologue, because it engages others in issues they are concerned about, and shows respect for their opinions, enhancing receptivity to ours. Finally, public diplomacy field officers are program managers, and they seek to mobilize all available communication tools that are effective in their local circumstances. They seek to orchestrate a multifaceted program, drawing on resources provided by Washington or developed locally, to achieve their objectives. In the process, they are also alert to programs and activities of other agencies (such as USAID) that they can help publicize, and to capabilities of private sector institutions willing to partner with them. These are some of the operational principles that most field officers believe should be followed. They have developed principles and

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a knowledge of best practices largely from their experiences working abroad, in embassies like the ones analyzed in the case studies in this book. The mindset of experienced field officers naturally is somewhat at variance with the view of Washington-based policymakers. Field officers hope that their approach is understood and appreciated, and they believe that a complete understanding of public diplomacy should include the field perspective as well as the Washington one. Case studies like the ones in this book are intended to help fill out that picture. Notes 1. The study of African programs by Okunubi, the comparative study of South Korea and Egypt by Rahaghi, and the comparative study of Japan and China by Yamamoto. 2. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2006. 3. Monroe E. Price, Susan Haas, and Drew Margolin, “New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Ref lections on Adaptations and Transformations,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008), pp. 150–170. 4. See chapters by Yamomoto, Okuubi, and Ntiru, but these problems apply elsewhere as well. 5. Alan L. Heil, Jr., Local Voices, Global Perspectives: Challenges Ahead for U.S. International Media (Washington, D.C.: Public Diplomacy Council, 2008), pp. 14 and 57; Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency (New York: Cambridge, 2008), p. 494; and Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 211. 6. USIA Alumni Study, reported in Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Future of Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate (Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 147, 235–237. 7. The Senate on May 19, 2009, passed S.Res.49 calling on the secretary of state to consider reestablishing publicly accessible American Centers worldwide. See United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Public Diplomacy—Time to Get Back in the Game,” A Report to Members, February 13, 2009, Washington, D.C., p. 11. 8. Fitzpatrick, The Future of Public Diplomacy, pp. 148 and 235–236, reporting on a survey of 213 former public diplomacy officers. 9. Studies of Serbia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea single out exchanges as their best programs. 10. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations report “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy,” 2003, pp. 43–44, said public diplomacy used the “push down” method rather than discussion. 11. Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 18. 12. Shaun Riorden, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm?,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy , p. 189. 13. Fitzpatrick, The Future of Public Diplomacy, p. 119. 14. See chapters by Huh and Rahaghi on South Korea, and Okunubi, Elisa, and Ntiru on Africa. 15. Riorden, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy, pp. 182, 190–191.

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16. In my experience as an FSO for thirty-one years, American officials almost always had better access than any private citizens. 17. Ibid., p. 184. 18. For example, I was invited many times in the months after 9/11 to appear on al Jazeera, in Arabic and English, because no U.S. officials were willing to appear, but after Hughes lifted the ban on officials, nonofficials were less in demand. On the Hughes policy change, see William A. Rugh, “Quiet Progress in Public Diplomacy,” oped, The Baltimore Sun, July 31, 2007. 19. “Changing Minds, Winning Peace,” Report of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for the Muslim World, Edward Djerijian, Chair, p. 66. 20. For example, Fitzpatrick, The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, p. 75. 21. Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 5. 22. Marc Lynch, “Public Opinion Survey Research and Public Diplomacy,” in Joshua S. Fouts, ed. Public Diplomacy, Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion (Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, and Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2006), p. 42. 23. Ibid., p. 36. 24. Pew Research Center, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,” Washington, D.C., July 23, 2009. 25. Testimony of Pew Research Center president Andrew Kohut before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2010, http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail. aspx?id=57624. 26. Riorden, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy, p. 185. 27. See the analysis of South Korea by Yamamoto, and of Afghanistan and Pakistan by Smith. 28. One example is Council on Foreign Relations report, “Finding America’s Voice,” pp. 37–38; see the Kravec chapter for other references. 29. Wally Olins, “Making a National Brand,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy, pp. 169–179. 30. Riorden, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy, p. 188. 31. Peter van Ham, “Place Branding: The State of the Art,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008), p. 139. 32. Gyorgy Szondi, “Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual and Practical Differences,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009), p. 19. 33. Remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell, NetDiplomacy 2001 conference, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2001. 34. Riorden, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy,” in Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy, p. 188, and Olins, “Making a National Brand,” in the same book, p. 178. 35. The principles described in the following paragraphs are based on my thirty-one years of personal experience in public diplomacy and on many conversations over the years with other practitioners. 36. Although scholars debate whether more information promotes democracy or not, what concerns PD practitioners is whether a specific communication helps or hinders an accurate understanding of America.

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I N DE X

Afghanistan, 43, 55–68 American centers and libraries, 12–13, 28, 32, 100–3, 114, 129–30, 184, 245, 256 see also American corners, information resource centers, libraries American corners, 12–13, 32, 84, 100–3 see also information resource centers, libraries American speakers, 27–8, 48, 120, 124, 129, 131–2, 134, 211, 234, 238, 252 broadcasting, 249 in Afghanistan, 65, 67 in Egypt, 183–4, 186 in Iran, 38, 40–1, 44 in Japan, 126 in Kenya, 85 in Pakistan, 65–7 in Russia and the USSR, 191–3, 197–8, 244 in Serbia, 9–10 in Sierra Leone, 99 in South Korea, 178–9, 186 see also VOA and RFE/RL Bush, President George, 22, 39, 43–4, 46–51, 53–4, 61, 81, 93, 114, 120, 127–8, 153, 161–2, 181, 186, 202, 248, 250

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cell phones, see mobile phones Clinton, Hillary, 29, 57, 59, 61, 64, 159, 162, 165–6, 250 Cold War, 199–201, 203 cultural programs in Afghanistan, 58, 62–4, 67 in Egypt, 182 in Iran, 40, 43 in Japan, 129–30, 135 in Kenya, 84–6 in Pakistan, 58, 60, 67 in Serbia, 7, 12–13 in Sierra Leone, 95, 100 in South Korea, 111, 114, 180 in Turkey, 26–7, 30–1 in United Kingdom, 43, 48–51 democracy, 4, 8, 10, 16, 21, 38, 43, 60, 75–8, 86, 109, 115, 119, 124, 183, 195, 198, 228, 252–3, 257 Department of Defense, 49, 200, 213, 244, 247 dialogue, technique of, 187, 222, 228, 246–7, 255 in Afghanistan, 58 in Africa, 160, 166, 168, 171 in Egypt, 175, 182, 186 in Iran, 42, 44 in Japan, 135 in Jordan, 229 in Morocco, 229

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dialogue, technique of—Continued in Pakistan, 58, 61 in Russia and the USSR, 197, 200, 203–4 in Serbia, 9 in South Korea, 175, 178, 180, 186 in Turkey, 27–9 in United Kingdom, 48, 50 effectiveness, x, 51, 55, 99, 137, 160, 162, 170, 222, 248–9, 254–5 Egypt, 175, 180–7, 253 English language teaching, 58, 214, 222, 228, 231, 239, 251 in Afghanistan, 58, 62 in Japan, 149–50, 153 in Kenya, 83 in Pakistan, 58, 65 in Serbia, 13 in Sierra Leone, 99 in South Korea, 113, 185 in Turkey, 30–2 exchanges of persons, 67, 214, 220, 222, 234, 244–6, 249, 251, 254–5 in Afghanistan, 51, 62, 63, 67 in Egypt, 182, 184 in Iran, 40, 43 in Japan, 130–1, 135–6 in Jordan, 229, 238 in Kenya, 80, 84–5 in Morocco, 229, 238 in Pakistan, 51, 62, 65, 67 in Serbia, 6–8, 12–16 in Sierra Leone, 98, 104 in South Korea, 112–13, 178 in Turkey, 25, 30–1 in United Kingdom, 48–51 see also Fulbright exchange programs exhibits, 7, 12, 48 Facebook, 144–6, 150–1, 153, 161–2, 164–7, 187, 244 in Africa, 168, 170 in China, 148 in Egypt, 182–5

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in Iran, 41 in Japan, 132, 149–50, 153 in Kenya, 79–80 in Pakistan, 151 in Serbia, 11 in Sierra Leone, 97–8 in South Korea, 178 in Turkey, 27 face-to-face, see personal contact Fulbright exchange programs, 214 in Afghanistan, 63 in Japan, 131–2 in Jordan, 229 in Kenya, 84–5 in Morocco, 229 in Pakistan, 65 in Serbia, 7, 13–14 in Sierra Leone, 98–9, 101, 103 in Turkey, 30–1 in United Kingdom, 48 information Resource Centers (IRCs), 63, 101, 118, 129–30, 178, 180, 182, 228 see also American centers and libraries, American corners International Visitor Leader Program (IVLP), 48, 131, 224, 232, 240 see also exchanges of persons Iran, 37–44, 47–8, 50–1, 244 Japan, 125–37 Kenya, 75–88, 92, 98, 164, 169, 244 libraries, viii, 10, 12–13, 28, 32, 84, 100–2, 130, 184, 245 see also American centers and libraries mobile phones, 79, 86, 88, 97, 144, 156, 167, 169–70, 185, 215, 235, 254 new media, x, 78, 143–55, 159–72, 175, 187, 202, 243–6 in Africa, 98, 159–63, 166–72

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Index in China, 147 in Egypt, 175, 182, 186 in Iran, 41, 44 in Japan, 132, 152 in Pakistan, 151 in Russia and the USSR, 192, 201–4 in Serbia, 8, 11–12, 14–16 in South Korea, 116–17, 121, 175, 177, 180, 186–7 see also Facebook, mobile phones, short message service, Twitter, websites, YouTube Obama, President Barack, 217, 221, 250 in Afghanistan, 55–6, 60, 62 in Africa, 147, 159–65, 168 in China, 147–8 in Egypt, 181, 186 in Iran, 38, 40, 44 in Kenya, 75, 78–9, 86, 88 in Pakistan, 55–6, 60, 64 in Sierra Leone, 91, 94, 96–7, 102, 104 in South Korea, 114, 120, 176 in Turkey, 22, 24, 28–9, 32 in United Kingdom, 46–8, 50–1 Pakistan, 3, 55–68 Peace Corps, 227–41, 250–51 personal contact, 150, 164, 172, 222, 245, 247, 254–5 in Africa, 159–60 in Egypt, 184 in Iran, 38, 44 in Japan, 129 in Serbia, 9, 14 in Sierra Leone, 98, 104 in South Korea, 109, 121, 180 in Turkey, 27–8, 32–3 in United Kingdom, 48–9 press relations, 168, 202, 214, 219, 222, 229, 247, 254 in Afghanistan, 63, 65 in Africa, 163–4, 168–9 in Iran, 42 in Japan, 129, 134–7

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in Kenya, 84–5 in Pakistan, 51 in Serbia, 8, 11 in Sierra Leone, 99–100 in South Korea, 178 in Turkey, 28 in United Kingdom, 48–50 see also print media print media, 67, 175, 228, 236 in Afghanistan, 63 in Africa, 160 in Egypt, 182 in Iran, 46 in Japan, 130 in Russia and the USSR, 191–3, 195, 197, 199–202, 244–5, 248 in Serbia, 10–11 in Turkey, 28, 32 in United Kingdom, 48–9 see also press relations private sector, vii, 48, 163, 170, 182, 209–23, 229, 247–52, 255 public diplomacy 2.0, see social networking media public diplomacy defined, vii, 3, 58, 103, 116, 210, 236, 246, 251, 253 public opinion, x, 216, 248–9, 252, 254 in Afghanistan, 59, 68 in Egypt, 180–1, 187 in Iran, 37–40, 43–4 in Japan, 126, 129 in Kenya, 77, 82, 86–7 in Pakistan, 59–61, 68 in Russia and the USSR, 192–3, 200 in Serbia, 3, 5–8, 15 in Sierra Leone, 92, 95 in South Korea, 110–14, 116, 176 in Turkey, 21–4, 26, 29, 32–4 in United Kingdom, 45–6, 48–51 radio, see broadcasting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 9–10, 18 n.48, 41–2, 52 n.24, 66, 71 n.74, 191, 244 see also broadcasting

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Russia and the USSR, 191–204, 244, 251, 253 Serbia, 3–16, 253 short message service (SMS), 41–2, 86, 97–8, 145, 147, 155, 162–5, 168, 170–1, 175, 182–3, 186, 244 Sierra Leone, 91–104, 251, 253 social networking media, 152, 156 n.14, 161, 163, 165, 170–1, 178, 183, 185, 187, 190 n.77, 206 n.53, 244 see also new media South Korea, 109–21, 175–80, 186–7 Soviet Union, see Russia and the USSR strategic communications, 62, 128, 161, 213 target audiences, 236, 254 in Africa, 162 in Iran, 41 in Japan, 133, 135 in Kenya, 81, 86 in Serbia, 6–8, 15 in Sierra Leone, 95, 101–2 in South Korea, 117, 119 in Turkey, 26–8, 31 television, 215, 219, 228, 248 in Africa, 160, 169 in China, 152 in Egypt, 181–4 in Iran, 41–2 in Japan, 133 in Russia and the USSR, 198 in Serbia, 10, 12, 14 in Sierra Leone, 96, 253 in South Korea, 177 Turkey, 21–34, 253 Twitter, 144–5, 147–8, 161, 244 in Africa, 162–3, 165–8 in Egypt, 182–3 in Iran, 41 in Kenya, 79–80, 88 in Sierra Leone, 97–8, 170

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in South Korea, 178 see also social networking media U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 3, 7–8, 10–11, 87, 191–8, 221–2, 249 United Kingdom, 37, 45–51, 250, 253 visits, official, 29, 31, 40, 82, 84, 100, 118, 134–5, 162, 166, 250 Voice of America (VOA), 9–10, 18 n.49, 33 n.33, 40–2, 51, 52 n.8, 53 n.26, 66, 70 n.70, 85–6, 89 n.30, 99, 163, 178–9, 188 n.25, 191, 198, 244 see also broadcasting websites, 146, 148, 228 in Africa, 161, 166 in Egypt, 182–3, 185–6 in Iran, 41–2 in Japan, 130, 132, 149, 153 in Kenya, 79 in Morocco, 228 in Russia and the USSR, 201 in Serbia, 12, 14 in South Korea, 118, 177–80, 186, 188 in Turkey, 27, 32 youth programs, 228, 235, 254 in Afghanistan, 66 in Africa, 162, 165 in Egypt, 181 in Iran, 40–1 in Japan, 146 in Kenya, 86 in Morocco, 233 in Serbia, 7–8, 12, 14, 16 in Sierra Leone, 95 in South Korea, 119, 178, 180, 186, 246 in Turkey, 26, 30–1 in United Kingdom, 47 YouTube, 11, 50, 144–5, 148–9, 161–2, 167, 178, 182–3, 185, 187 Yugoslavia, 4, 7–9, 12–13

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