The Primal Eye

The Primal Eye Steve Nichols

Dedicated to Zachary. Copyright 2006 by Steve Nichols ISBN: 978-1-874603-08-5 Email: [email protected] All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission by the author.

Table of Contents Introduction.......................................................................................................1 1979-80 Phantom Eye.......................................................................................5 1992 - 1994 M.V.T. ........................................................................................17 Weak and Strong expressions of MVT...........................................................27 1994 Mind as a Gap........................................................................................31 The Structure of Nothingness .........................................................................43 1994 Light-hearted Metaphor .........................................................................47 MA Dreaming: Contents & Introduction........................................................51 MA Dreaming 1: Background ........................................................................57 MA Dreaming 2: Is Dreaming Functional? ...................................................67 MA Dreaming 3: Types of P-Dream ..............................................................73 MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience ........................................................81 MA Dreaming 5: Levels of Organisation .......................................................95 MA Dreaming 6: Finite to Infinite-State ........................................................99 MA Dreaming: Conclusions .........................................................................105 MA Dreaming: Appendixes & Bibliography................................................111 Evolutionary Evidence..................................................................................115 PhD Upgrade (Philosophy)...........................................................................151 Phasic Transients during E2 to E1................................................................173 Photoperiodism .............................................................................................176 PhD References ............................................................................................179 Descartes & Nychtheremal time ...................................................................195 Descartes: Introduction.................................................................................199 Descartes and Astrology ...............................................................................201 Descartes: Crypto-Maths & Natural Magic ..................................................207 Descartes: Costa ben Luca's worm ...............................................................215 Descartes: Sunspots and the Soul. ................................................................221

The Athena Fallacy .......................................................................................225 Eyes - 2nd and 3rd Pineal Glands? ...............................................................227 Marr and Theories of Vision.........................................................................231 Thermal Physiology ......................................................................................243 The Melatonin Hypothesis............................................................................253 Rapid Eye Movements (R.E.M.)...................................................................255 Phantom phenomena.....................................................................................261 Historical notes on Pineal .............................................................................275 Parietal Ontogeny..........................................................................................277 More on E0, E1 & E2 ...................................................................................279 Morphology of the Pineal Eye ......................................................................281 The Real-Time Hypothesis ...........................................................................283 Synaesthesia..................................................................................................285 Hypnosis .......................................................................................................287 MVT and Machine Consciousness ...............................................................289 MVT and Animals other than Humans .........................................................295 Experimental Difficulties for MVT ..............................................................303 Speculations ..................................................................................................305 Concluding Notes..........................................................................................309

Introduction To be inclusive of all my Phantom Eye, M.V.T. and Primal writings over the years, I have edited out relatively little from this 1997 account. If there are any repetitions or iterations of the same points, my apologies. Steve Nichols 09/10/2006 Introduction (1997) Firstly - in case you haven’t met recently - please let me introduce you to yourself. To be specific, allow me to draw attention to the conscious processes that are involved while you are reading this passage. Your eyes are reading visual symbols on this page (or screen), and at, seemingly, the same time you are ‘hearing’ a narration, probably approximating your auditory, vocal, voice reading these words. Or possibly you are imagining my (the author’s) voice speaking these words. This blurring of sense modalities - when we hear written words as sounds rather than just seeing them as visual squiggles - is a good example of synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is possible since the brain transforms all types of sensory input (visual, smell, auditory) into neural information. By their nature, neural signals must be different from light patterns, scent vapour, or sound waves - since they are travelling through the brain and not through the air. The processes whereby the animal transforms optical, olfactory or auditory data, received by sense organs such as eyes and ears, into chemico-electrical signals carried by the nervous system to the brain, have been basically understood since the time of Descartes. Very few people today seriously believe that rays of light are zapping around people’s brains, or that a little voice or actual sounds are echoing around inside the skull.

Introduction The matter that has not been satisfactorily explained by science, or by philosophers such as Descartes, is how this ‘neural information’ becomes (or reaches) a person’s conscious or aware experience. The light and sound signals are codified and compressed by the eyes and ears, and spun along optic nerves etc into the brain, but where, or how, are they recombined or made sense out of? How does the consciousness work? I am able to imagine myself as a ghost inhabiting my body. This ghost hears sounds that do not exist in the outside world. It can close its eyelids, yet still experience images - moving or still, monochrome or in colour - that have no external source. Perhaps you too can close your eyes and see a phantom object, for example the front door to your house or room. The physical scientist has trouble in dealing with this simple thoughtexperiment since the results are not observable. Only the reports of the experience can be made objective and shared. Because I am able describe verbally, in great detail, and perhaps even to sketch on paper what I ‘see’ of the familiar door or other phantom object, a reasonable person would tend to accept the fact that I probably am visualising. So dream experiences, hallucinations, and phantom objects such as my visualisation of a front door, do occur. As we shall see, the reason such things are able to be perceived is that the mammalian brain consists of a ‘phantom’ sense-organ combined with all the flesh and blood components. What is more - this phantom sense-organ is an organ of unitary synaesthesic sense - allowing all the modalities to be bound together seamlessly in consciousness. The physical model for the phantom sense organ is, as I have alluded, the pineal light-sensitive organ that predates our stereoscopic lateral eyes, and which also predates the hearing sense modality. It provides the very grounds of our awareness, the blank screen and a means of all our mental reflection. Everybody has heard of ‘phantom limbs’ that are universally experienced after the traumatic loss of an arm, leg or hand? And phantom organs of sense, such as ‘phantom vision’ or phantom hearing (tinnitus) are well established medical facts. The ‘sense,’ ‘reasoning’ or ‘plot’ of the words on this page serve to convey something of my (the author’s) beliefs and conscious (awake) experience. 2

The Primal Eye You should have no trouble hearing these words … unless perhaps you are very young and new to reading, or have difficulties with the medium. I am trying to keep them very simple rather than trying to impress with obscure terminology. Perhaps you able to distinguish between what I (the author) am saying, and what you (the reader) are ‘thinking’ about my words. I do not expect that you will necessarily follow my narrative sequence, and invite you to dip in and out of the text as you please. Some of the technical matters I feel to be important to a thorough understanding are dealt with only in outline, or by reference. I recommend you to my CD Rom version which includes all the material in this book plus fuller details, illustrations and so on. I prefer to write for electronic media since it gives hypertext, animation and interactive colour illustrations not possible in paper-format. The information contained in this book is not simply of academic interest but might actually be of some use! Feel free to utilise the ideas and theories in this volume as you will, and apply them any aspects of your life or studies. What I propose is no less than a solution to the mind-body problem. The explanation for all manner of consciousness - dreaming, trance and hypnotic states, and waking consciousness and ‘subconsciousness’. The aim of a unified theory of mind has been the Holy Grail both of philosophy and psychology. In the western mystery or hermetic tradition the same essential questions are couched in alchemical language. However I am careful not to associate my ideas with supernaturalist or superstitious theological theories. As a cognitive scientist, my ideas should best be seen as being a form of radical connectionism. The brain is a massive parallel system that performs huge numbers of simultaneous computations that give rise to behaviours and mentation. What connectionism has not been able to explain satisfactorily until now is how the brain produces self-referential consciousness. An important question is “how did dreaming originate?” Median Vision Theory gives a clear early evolutionary account of this, and in doing so also answers the question of philosopher Owen Flanagan, “what is dreaming for?” Any theory of consciousness should perhaps start with tackling the

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Introduction quest of dreams, since they are the best example of “consciousness” in a pure state -unsullied by waking sensory input. Dreams are self-generated and self-contained, and therefore throw much light on the nature of the “self.” The answer to the problem of consciousness is to be found by observing the natural world, and in particular the evolutionary transition of the brain from the old system that was hooked up to a ‘primal,’ ‘primary,’ ‘pineal,’ ‘old’ or ‘median’ eye - and the modern mammalian and avian brain which no longer has the sensory pineal eye. We are lucky indeed that a few ‘walking fossils’ and throwbacks to an earlier epoch still survive on this planet. One such is the Tuatara or Sphenodon, a reptile living on a few islands off the coast of New Zealand, which retains (in young animals) a functioning pineal eye. Results of experiments on the third eye of the Sphenodon verify the backbone of my argument. This evidence is not in scientific dispute, and dates back over a period of more than 100 years. The main application Median Vision Theory might lie in the insubstantial world of dreams, imagination, religion and trance. In recognition of the importance of culturally transmitted beliefs and ideas, in the second of this series, I detail third eye international legends and mythology. Everything in nature must be undifferentiated and continuous - yet we become conscious of different things. Newton, I argue using a form of ‘triangulation’ to show convergence of evidence from seemingly diverse fields of knowledge. If more co-ordinates are used it is easier to pinpoint a location by mathematics. And the more additional bits of evidence, or scientific perspectives, that are used to help prove a theory, the better. This accounts my inter-disciplinary and wide-ranging approach in this book.

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1979-80 Phantom Eye The theory which I am about to explain relies mainly on scientific and physiological experimental evidence and valid observations of nature, and to much lesser extent upon philosophical a priori inference and by thought experiments (speculations). The story of Phantom Eye Theory begins with a group of scientists in the last century visited New Zealand and became interested in a type of lizard called the Sphenodon. This creature is remarkable in that it resembles animals of a distant age, older than the first dinosaurs. It is amongst the few species of living land vertebrates which still retain a functioning Pineal eye alongside the normal two ‘lateral’ eyes of the type that we humanoids possess. Evidence from fossils indicates that the pineal eye is a predecessor of modern ‘lateral’ vision, and that at one time this type of sense organ was the property of virtually all animals, including our pre-human ancestors. OUTLINE OF PHANTOM EYE THEORY (1979 B.Sc. Dissertation). A) THE PINEAL APPARATUS 1. It is generally accepted that at an earlier stage of their evolutionary development, living vertebrates (including our direct though distant ancestors) possessed a functioning pineal eye (light sensitive organ) on the top of their skull. 2. The possibility that twin pineal eyes (pineal and parapineal) were the general case amongst early land-vertebrates is touched upon later in this work. Evidence from studies of the Tuatara reptile suggest the single pineal to be normal, but primitive fish species, of which a good example is the Lamprey, exhibit a pair of eyes - the pineal and parapineal.

1979-80 Phantom Eye 3. This eye was not constructed in the same way as modern lateral eyes, since it had no muscles to control direction, no eyelid allowing it to be closed, and no iris for focusing. 4. This pineal organ seems to have been a fore-runner of lateral eyes, and would have been the primary light-sensitive organ. Perhaps the skin was also light sensitive in the infra-red spectrum. 5. Creatures that have been found with functioning pineal eyes in present times have invariably been cold-blooded, for instance fish and reptiles. It is likely that modern lateral eyes had replaced the pineal as the main lightsensitive organ by the time of the first mammals and warm-blooded creatures. It is important to bear in mind that sunlight has more direct impact on the life-functions of cold-blooded animals than on warmblooded, which carry around an inbuilt heat generating chemical factory. 6. This pineal organ, being the light-sensitive part of the creature's body, was probably the main collector and distributor of sense-information concerning events in the outside world (such as transition from day to night, seasonally cycles from winter to summer, and immediate concerns like the proximity of predators, etc.). 7. For reasons that will become clear, this “proto-eye” can be considered as the main sensory site for gathering of information needed to govern the creature's behaviour in response to changes in the environment. I argue that it is likely to have been the place (interface) in which any `awareness' that the creature had of things outside itself would reside. You could perhaps describe it as a “spotlight of consciousness”. 8. The era I am looking back to is from the Mesozoic age 310 million years ago to the Jurassic age, 180 million years past. Phantom Eye theory does assume the basic soundness of neo-Darwinian evolution as a theory. From that premise, I assume that we as primates and mammals have a common descent from Cotylosauria (stem-reptiles) shared with many other animals such as birds, crocodilia and so on. 9 Our lizard-like ancestors were cold-blooded and so would move about only during the day when there was sufficient heat to supply the body with energy. The colour of the animal's skin may also possibly have changed according to conditions of the prevailing light. 6

The Primal Eye 10. We know that the pineal eye helped the creatures to determine the presence of predators, because of scientific studies carried out on the walking fossil, Tuatara (Sphaenodon Punctatus) which involved covering the functioning pineal eye of young animals with metal foil, and noting changes from its normal habits and behaviour. 11. The pineal eye has also been shown to assist the creature in knowing when to move away from excessive sunlight into the shade, and when to seek greater exposure to sunlight. 12. The sexual behaviour and breeding patterns of these primitive animals were also in accordance with the yearly cycle. Changes in the seasons were also detected by noting the variations in radiation emitted by the sun. 13. More generalised and pervasive functions such as storage and use of any body energy, together with timing of body movement, seem to have been monitored and regulated by this ever-open `eye'. Reptiles only become active and begin to run about after they have warmed up their bodies sufficiently by basking or by exposure to warm surfaces on the ground. 14. Their pineal eye told them when and where to find heat, and since there was some elementary visual field, it could perhaps detect sudden movements or shifts of light within their view that informed of any impending danger. 15. There can have been no point of separation between wake and sleep in these early ancestors. Their attention was constantly fixed by this pineal eye (more often than not upwards) which it was impossible to close. Selfvolition about when and where to move would have been fairly restricted, and would have varied according to the state of light that they were registering. 16. The central role played by this pineal sense-organ seems to me very suggestive of the role of “mind” in humans. Our conscious activity decides and determines timing and execution of various functions and motoractivity of the body, whereas the pineal apparatus affected these responses in early reptiles by glandular and electro-chemical reactions in response to the chemical photo-stimulus of the environment.

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1979-80 Phantom Eye 17. Phantom Eye theory argues that the early pineal apparatus acted as a physical mind' governing the behaviour of early vertebrates. The pineal apparatus clearly had a role in the co-ordination of perception and subsequent reaction to this information. I will develop the argument that the abstract processes that typify human mental life are modelled on processes once carried out by the physical cellular pineal sense-organ. 18. It is worth pointing out that the precise functions of the pineal eye remain something of an enigma to modern science. "In fact", according to Bellairs, "there is hardly another organ in the body which has so stubbornly resisted researches to elucidate its significance." * The Life of Reptiles Vol. II, A. Bellairs. 19. Evolutionary ophthalmics is a notoriously difficult area of science, since soft tissues such as nerve material rarely survive in fossil evidence, and the details we have of early ophthalmic structures are necessarily sketchy. The evidence concerning Tuatara has been vital to me in constructing this theory. 20. The pineal eye as sole and central provider of light-information and sense-data became gradually superseded by the more sophisticated `lateral' eyes, which as well as having stereoscopic advantage, also had facility for muscular control and a protective lid. 21. My conjecture is that the pineal eye, although still present and operative, over the course of millennia, lost its functions as main provider of light-information to the new lateral sense-organs. As its purposes became lost, the light-sensitive tip of the pineal or epiphyseal complex (gland, stalk and eye) either sank back through the skull-opening to form part of the gland, or alternatively, atrophied and withered away over many generations. 22. As the physical pineal lost functionality and its role over the ages, I suggest that its functions were assumed by mental or abstract skills and capacities. 23. It is likely that the focusing of light wave band by the iris allowed far greater spatial awareness, and a clear visual field. Warm-blooded animals would certainly have not needed a pineal eye of the nature I have de-

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The Primal Eye scribed, and its disappearance can be seen as part of a wider process allowing self-volitional warm-blooded life forms to come into existence. 24. Early mammals were nocturnal. The fact that they could function independently of environmental warmth and light increased their survival chances. Unlike reptiles, they helped to protect their young. 25. It is worth in this paragraph briefly examining the known psychological and physiological functions of the pineal gland as studied in human subjects. Psychological correlates of the hormonal activities of the gland are thought to be associated with light sensitivity, the timing of the oestrus and menstrual cycles, circadian rhythms, sleep patterns, imagination, the onset of the processes of puberty, and perhaps other phenomena. 26. It is the wide-ranging nature of the effects of pineal secretions that I wish to draw attention to. Further details can be found in the regular reports of Professor Axelrod's Symposium of Pineology, and from standard physiological texts. 27. Returning to the experiments conducted by covering or removing the pineal eye of young Tuataras ( since Victorian times when most of the scientific data was collected, Sphenodon has become one of the most joined to or contiguous with the phantom eye. Even if the pineal gland is surgically removed, the phantom ‘mind-organ’ still retains all its properties as the conscious focus within the body system. 28. When the primal eyes of young Tuatara were removed, sex glands were found to mature earlier, (Dendy, 1898). There is parallel medical evidence to suggest that in cases of pineal tumours or calcification in humans, a condition known as precocious puberty occurs. 29. It is worth noting that the pineal eyes of young Tuataras are functioning, but they seem to lose function in older Tuataras. This supports the idea of evolutionary atrophying, and incidentally lends some weight to Haekel's Theory of Recapitulation, which we will touch upon later in this section. Tuataras, incidentally, have fully functioning lateral eyes alongside their primal eye. 30. This accumulation of evidence helps to confirm my view that at an even earlier time than the 200 million odd years that Tuatara have survived, 9

1979-80 Phantom Eye the pineal (median/ parietal/ old/ primal or primary) eye had a central and a very generalised role, in fact almost an all-pervasive role, admitting the flow of light-data that governed many different aspects of animals' behaviour. 31. What is also remarkable (from modern studies of the pineal gland) is that despite having influence over such a variety of different effects and processes, the pineal gland is joined to the rest of the brain directly by only one neural tract, which connects it to the peripheral autonomic nervous system. B) THE BIG PICTURE I wish to turn now from this anatomical discussion, back to the key idea of Phantom Eye theory, and try to explain how it can be that a non-physical sense organ can exist. 32. In one sense it matters not if we conceive of the ‘phantom eye’ as the ‘thinking self' or in Descartes' language, as the Sens Commun, where all the information from our senses is bound together and perceived. It is permissible to consider the phantom of the primal eye as being a kind of trick or illusion of nature, or as a trace memory, reconstructed from primeval structures embedded deep within the brain. 33. The pineal apparatus grew up with the brain, since the earliest times. It cannot have been just a one-way process, not just ‘looking out’ or ‘looking in’. A two-way interaction must have been the case, with the information fed into the brain shaping the development of the physical lobes of that organ over millions of years, and the need for greater sophistication of processing of light information eventually giving rise to the more powerful and flexible lateral eyes. 34. In other words, for a long time the brain developed in close conjunction with its main supply/supplier of sense information. The fact that the vestigial pineal body is still with us gives proof to the durability of the association. 35. The story or pattern seems to be of an evolution from direct physical chemical-response behaviour, towards abstract, volitional, or self-control of behaviour. 10

The Primal Eye 36. I would argue that abstract perception (such as being able to close your eyes, and imagine a picture, for example the image of a person) without there being any direct physical stimuli in front of you, or any actual sensedata, is not possible unless you have an organ (part of your body) which is itself abstract, and has no spatial properties or boundaries. 37. An organ which once existed as part of the greater whole, and was central to the way most sensory information was gathered and coordinated, is the obvious (and seemingly the only) candidate for this role. C) THIRD PARTY INVISIBLE A rider to Descartes' Argument from Illusion. 38. It is helpful to return to the writings of Descartes: "And there were countless other cases like these, in which I found the external senses to be deceived in their judgement; and not only the external sense, but the internal senses as well. What (experience) can be more intimate than pain? Yet I sometimes heard, from people who had a leg or arm cut off, that they still seemed now and then to feel pain in the part of the body that they lacked; so it seemed in my own case not to be certain that a limb was in pain, even if I felt pain in it." 39. The above passage [taken from Descartes' Sixth Meditation on the Essence of Material things: the Real distinction between Mind and Body] contains the basic theme of what has come to be known as the Argument from Illusion. He also cites the example of a stick that seems to bend when dipped into water, because of a visual trick played by light and the eyes. 40. Descartes' main intention is to show that because of the occurrence of various illusions, the senses cannot be relied upon to provide true representations of the world. Furthermore, the 'Argument from Illusion' suggests that perception cannot be a direct awareness of the real properties of physical objects, but only of appearances. 41. Attempts have been made, by Austin amongst others, to try to dismiss the evidence from illusions by trying to reduce all such reports to terms of physical distortion of perception. For instance, it does seem to be true that

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1979-80 Phantom Eye most hallucinations occur only in certain circumstances, such as when the recipient's metabolism has been disturbed by drug action or a lack of sleep. 42. As response to Austin is to be found in the words of Edwards (* Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p133.) "Phantom limbs do not seem to be covered by any of these points; one can hardly say that the pains and sensations are `the images of genuine ones' ... they are genuine enough. Nor are the victims suffering from drugs or delirium. The usual physiological explanation is that the nerves from the toes remain in the untouched part of the limb and, being imitated at the stump, send impulses to the brain similar to those they would send if the toes were being crushed or as if the receptors located in the missing leg were being otherwise stimulated." 43. Even if we were to accept these various mechanistic accounts of illusion, Descartes' case remains undamaged. The feeling of pain in the toe is an actual experience, and is essentially the same as if the toe had been present. It is ludicrous to say that a pain is felt in the brain since brain tissue itself is insensitive (a pin stuck into the brain would not be felt). 44. It is equally absurd to claim that any pain is being felt in the nerve endings of the stump, since this is not where the pain is being reported. There may be some causal relationship with stump nerve-endings, but the location of the feelings (in the phantom toe) is quite specific. 45. It is useful here to give a summary of the medical facts. Most amputees report feelings “in” the amputated limb following an operation, and the effect is considered perfectly normal by doctors. 46. Occasionally a painless phantom sensation can become painful and bedevil a patient's life. A cause is seldom found and attempts to treat the condition by physical treatments, such as by trying to divide the paincarrying sensory tracts, are usually to no avail and are not justified. Attempts to ameliorate the underlying psychological problems are usually more important than the local treatment to the stump itself. 47. Reaction to amputation varies according to the personality of the individual. Only three percent of patients develop long-term painful phantom limbs. These are generally active adults over thirty-five who have lost their limbs as a result of a trauma at work or in war.

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The Primal Eye Such an amputee may: “feels a personal loss, not only of a valued functional part, but also of body completeness.” * Companion to Medical Studies Vol. 3/2, R. Passmore, 53.12. 48. This evidence is a useful analogy to my own argument, in that if a motor-organ can be felt to be present although not there, then similarly an organ of perception can still be felt to be present. 49. A sighted man who loses the use of his eyes is still able to `perceive' visual images, although they are in fact mental reconstruction or memories of perception that was once the property of his eyes. 50. The apparent difference between these examples and my theory is that the pineal eye is not a functioning part of our body that has been lost or amputated. However, Haekel’s Theory of Recapitulation shows that the trace of a pineal eye might be more than a property of our distant ancestor, and that we actually develop and then lose a parietal skull-opening whilst in the womb. It has been both grown and lost during the course of our current lifespan (therefore can exist as a phantom). 51. Once again, I wish to make it clear that I resist any identification between the location of attention (soul/mind/I) and the pineal gland itself. I consider the gland to be only one point of the human matrix that highly protected species on Earth) as well as being oblivious to possible predators, the subject animals displayed behaviour noticed to be generally more aimless. 52. The significance of the pineal gland can be likened to the stump of the leg, and shares the same type of role in the production of the phantom eye effect as the stump plays in producing a phantom arm or leg. If the leg had been severed at a higher point, the sensations and feelings from the phantom limb would still be present, and presumably not substantially changed. 53. A possible explanation for the pineal organ's starting to develop and then atrophying during our embryonic stage of life is given by G. de Beer in his book Embryos and Ancestors. The Theory of Recapitulation argues that to a great extent, the stages of embryonic development retrace the history of the evolution of the species.

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1979-80 Phantom Eye 54. During intrauterine development we pass through stages that seem to be fish-like, reptilian and non-primate mammal, before we reach a recognizably human state. Human embryos have gill-slits at one point, which disappear as they move out of the fish-stage of evolution. We also, each one of us, develop and then lose a tail! 55. It also seems the case that the embryos of different species are indistinguishable at certain stages of formation. 56. The parietal opening or foramen, however, is not lost whilst we are in the womb and takes about a year to close up after our birth. 57. Ernst Haeckel was a nineteenth-century German anatomist whose doctrine of Recapitulation (or Biogenetic Law) has gone in and out of scholarly fashion. Parts of his work are unsound. But even if only partly sound, his theory does seem a useful model as to how Natural Selection operates on individuals. Darwin himself refers to Haeckel’s work. 58. My comparison between phantom limbs and the phantom eye is to some extent analogous, since there are clear differences. Similarly, the Theory of Recapitulation can be taken as corroborative evidence, but my account of mind does not rely just on the validity of Haeckel's theory. I wish to establish by the phantom limb example that it is indeed possible to experience sensations from parts of the body that do not constitute of in any part physical (either organic or inorganic) substance. 59. Another way of looking at the phantom eye is that this non-material organ of unitary sense is contained in the genetic pattern or matrix alongside all the other aspects of the body-system. The brain expects or assumes it to be present, since for so long the pineal sense-organ was actually present. 60. You might even say that the brain imagines it still to be there, but it is not an imagination that takes any effort, for it arises naturally out of the (reptilian) deep structures of the brain and of its biological organisation. 61. There also is a cultural and linguistic input to the equation. Common memory of time when the pineal eye existed is so remote that it has long been replaced by "I", the conscious identity of a self.

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The Primal Eye 62. I assert that abstract and non-physical structures have taken over from (replaced / arisen out of) an earlier physical organ of conscious attention.

My contention was in 1979, and is now, that ‘mind’ or ‘self-referential consciousness’ evolved in direct inverse proportion to the regression and disappearance of the pineal eye. Another way to phrase this is to say that the brain of living vertebrates was intrinsically geared to receiving information from the primitive eye via the stalk attached pineal gland, and although it stopped receiving direct physical stimulus and input from the pineal sense-organ, it was still able to regulate body-decisions, and enable the organism to behave in an appropriate way in response to its surrounding environment. In short, abstract modelling or reflective thinking had arrived on the evolutionary scene.

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1992 - 1994 M.V.T. MEDIAN VISION (aka Phantom Eye) THEORY Solution to the Mind-Body Problem? This is an article for Philosophy Now (June 1993). Conditions of the magazine restricted the length, and also required that no references were listed, so are included in the body text. Much of the scientific information comes from "A cold look at warm-blooded dinosaurs", Ed. RDK Thomas & EC Olson, Am. As. AD. of Sci., Westview Press 1981, especially sections on implications for endothermy, and the parietal-pineal complex. I intend to look at aspects of recapitulation and evolutionary ophthalmics, as well as expand on some topics raised in this section. In this chapter I hope to show that "Consciousness is a trick of nature", rather than just a trick of language, as Gilbert Ryle might contend. I hope to show how the ability to have mental representations first occurred in early evolution, and how this basic trick becomes more refined as the ages pass. A delineation of this 'trick' or 'mechanism', I contend, clears up a whole cluster of related questions which Schopenhauer called "the world-knot". The terms "Pineal/ Parietal/ Old/ Median / Primal or Primary" are interchangeable alternatives when describing the ancient 'eye' or 'sense-organ'. "Third eye" is sometimes used although this is a misnomer since the pinealeye pre-dates our two 'lateral eyes'. The intracranial pineal body (glandular structure) can also be called the epipyphis or epiphyseal complex when it includes the median eye. I use the notation 'E-2' indicating the presence of both pineal body and median eye ... a primitive condition.

1992 - 1994 M.V.T. 'E-1' when just the pineal body (or impression in fossil skulls) remains. ‘E-0’ indicates a complete absence of any pineal apparatus. By "consciousness" I refer to the fundamental ability to have any mental representations that are self-referential. Other words (sentience, attentionality, etc.) might equally suffice in some contexts. It is important to establish some scientific ground. The slight foramen (skull opening) in which once house the median eye is a common feature of vertebrate skull morphology. Most living vertebrates belong to type (E-1). An (E-O) condition exists among certain dinosaurs who appear to have lost their entire epiphyseal complex; along with modern members of crocodilia. The more primitive (E-2) categories, retaining median eyes, are relatively uncommon among living animals. Experiments were made directly on the physical median eyes of certain families of lizards (Gundy et al, 1975), and importantly by Dendy on living Sphenodon (1899, 1911) before these creatures became highly protected and intrusive experiments banned. Interestingly, the pineal eye atrophies during the lifetime of the Sphenodon, and older Sphenodon lose sensitivity of the organ. The Lamprey, a primitive, parasitic fish, and the Stirnogen, plus a few families of anuran amphibians and some spiny-tailed lizards, more or less complete the catalogue of (E-2) animals having median eye-like photoreceptors amongst living vertebrates. Loss of the median eye seems to have occurred gradually among mammallike reptiles, and quite suddenly among ancestral dinosaurs (thecodonts). Fossil skulls suggest that ancient pineal systems included a median eye in reptiles directly ancestral to birds and mammals, as well as among protoamphibians and fishes. The long history of this sensory organ, from the Ordovician fishes to present day lizards, attests to its importance as an adaptation. The organ is (normally) unpaired and connected by a stalk to the pineal body that lies central in the brain. It has no muscles to control direction, no eyelid allowing it to be closed, and no iris allowing it to focus.

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The Primal Eye The eye varies in complexity from a simple sac-like vesicle to the welldeveloped structures found in Sphenodon and certain lacertilians, with a lens, retina, rods and cones, a fluid-filled space corresponding to the humours of lateral eyes, and a nerve that transmits impulses to the brain.... in fact all the components of lateral eyes except an iris sphincter and orbital musculature. Experiments on young Sphenodon (E-2) covering their median eyes have confirmed that the organ has a wide range of functions. The pineal eye seems necessary to detect the presence of predators. It assists in temperature regulation, and informing when to bask in the sun and when to move to shade. It has a role in changing the skin colour according to prevailing conditions of light, particularly by exuding melatonin like substances that affect pigmentation variation occurring between day and night. Changes in the season are detected by noting variations in radiation emitted by the sun. Such information is particularly important to determine breeding time. As the main collector and communicator of sense-information from the external environment, and having existed millions of years before auditory and lateral-visual systems, the median eye was seemingly the 'interface' and receptacle in which any 'awareness' that primitive creatures had of things and events outside of its body. It could be described as a spotlight of consciousness, or as I would contend, a "physical site of mind". The refinement of sensory systems and accompanying perception of environmental stimuli has been a major theme in over 400m years of vertebrate evolution. The later and more adapted lateral eyes usurped median apparatus as the sole supplier of light-information and seemingly made the old eye redundant because of their greater optical sophistication, muscular control, and stereoscopic advantages. In our cold-blooded ancestors, regulations of the storage and use of bodyheat was critical to survival. Metabolic activity was dependent on sufficient availability of solar-energy and we can observe that present day reptiles only become active once they have warmed up their bodies sufficiently by basking or by exposure to warm surfaces on the ground. Thermo-regulation and the role of the pineal in transition from coldblooded (exothermic or ectothermic) too warm-blooded (endothermic) is an important theme, to which I shall return. 19

1992 - 1994 M.V.T. RECAPITULATION is a necessary explanatory component within the Darwinian evolutionary paradigm. Haeckel's theory puts the case that the stages of embryonic development retrace the whole evolution of that species. It is the case that embryos of different vertebrate species are indistinguishable at early stages of formation. Also, human embryos during intrauterine development pass through stages from fish-like to reptilian, and then via non-primate mammalian to human primate. We have gill-slits at one embryonic stage, and develop and lose a tail during our life in the intrauterine sea. The parietal foramen develops as though a median eye is to form; and interestingly this opening is not completely lost during embryonic life but in humans takes about a year to close after birth. This is roughly the same time before a baby develops the idea of self, i.e. the baby can recognise its own reflection in a mirror. There is some current debate regards the extent to which recapitulation takes place ...but also a general agreement that it is necessary in some measure to explain Darwinian selection. Darwin himself believed that the theory was important. All I wish to establish for now is that the parietal opening has existed in each of us, during our early life, and that a physiological 'memory' of this stage of development might exist. There are disadvantages for a cold-blooded animal with a 'physical mind'. If behaviour is governed entirely by the quality of sunlight and the availability of body warmth, then damage to the exposed sense-organ could lead to behavioural incapacitation. Emerging warm-blooded animals are free to move about at night and attack the sluggish ectotherms and their eggs. In the analysis of fossil material, possession of an (E-2) entire complex indicates an ectothermic physiology, while absence of the median eye (E-1) may suggest either endothermic animals or ectotherms. A transitional evolutionary phase is possible if the pineal body is retained, whereas an (E0) fossil indicates that such vertebrates utilised some other means of temperature control.

Conservation of body warmth, and allocation of energy to different parts of the body, is of central importance, and an inverse relationship has been 20

The Primal Eye shown to exist between dependence on environmental sources of heat and the complexity of the epiphyseal complex. An evolutionary reduction of the (E-2) complex occurred in most vertebrates under the gradual warming and less seasonal climates the early Mesozoic. Loss of the median eye in mammal-like reptiles as they crossed the reptilian-mammalian boundary. Incidentally, small size is important in the emergence of competent endotherm since metabolic rate increases as size decreases irrespective of thermoregulatory strategy, and small size in warm-blooded reptiles may have been an important adaptation in warming climates, since a greater surface-to-volume ratio facilitates heat loss. When first formulated back in 1979/1980, the title "Phantom Eye" came from the close analogy between the phantom effect that invariably occurs after losing a limb and the 'experiential trace' that similarly follows from the loss of an organ of sense. First to clear up a common misconception: Humans don’t have any structures in our brains that other mammals don’t have. The only real difference between our brain and that of a cat is an enlarged neo-cortex. This is a biological theory (empirically falsifiable) not an ad hoc philosophical or semantic theory. Consciousness is what you lose when hit hard on the head! Some molluscs have a pair of eyes on stalks - pineal and parapineal. Third eye is an often used misnomer - the pineal eye pre-dates lateral eyes, hence is primary or primal eye. Recently I have been examining evidence from "Phantom Vision" cases, where strong and persistent images occur after total loss of eyesight. Blind patients facing an empty field have described a house (which is not there) in incredible detail. In the case of phantom legs, no amount of treatment to the stump can dispel the feelings of pain whose location is reported in the leg that is absent. In both these examples there is no physical stimuli present, although sensation is as strong to the subject as if there were. The notion of a gap in the organisational structure of the brain by means of which we can 'view' perhaps solves some inane 'physical Vs non-physical' arguments and distinctions in academic philosophical debate. It seems to me that in many ways a lump of lead or stone is more 'physical' than a

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1992 - 1994 M.V.T. cloud of gas. Its mass and density are greater and its spatial location is more precise. When trying to place various sub-atomic particles on a postulated "scale of physicality" we meet with greater difficulty since some of these 'particles' can only be inferred and cannot be precisely located or quantified. Obviously in the non-physical region of the scale are fictional characters, probably including the medieval legions of gods and devils. Placing Napoleon Bonaparte on our scale presents yet another problem. If it was the nineteenth century and he was still alive then he would fall safely into the 'physical camp'. Although he is no longer alive, bits of Napoleon’s atomic structure are still whizzing around the material universe. Furthermore it does seem fair that he counts as being 'more physical' than a character such as "the Wizard of Oz", who as far as we know has never lived or existed. The 'trace' or 'imprint' of Napoleon on the world is well established ... we have portraits of him, documentation, and possess items known to have been his. It also seems reasonable to claim that a sense-organ which once existed, and with which we still have a 'trace memory' or physiological imprint, is more 'physical' than a sense-organ that is purely fictional. However is clearly lower down the 'physicality scale' than our lateral eyes. If you should take a piece of paper and tear a piece out the middle, you have created a 'hole'. This 'hole' has a definite location and spatial boundaries, but is not composed of any physical stuff or form of energy and cannot be detected except by reference to the paper that borders it. A materialist philosopher would presumably deny the existence of the 'hole', although this is clearly absurd since we can all recognise the 'hole' to be present. I consider the 'mind' to be the 'hole' left by the disappearance of the median eye. We cannot see a 'hole' itself but may see through it. I would argue that 'reflective or 'abstract' thought, imagination and visualisation are only possible because there is a 'hole' in our physical structure through which to peer. We may mistake this hole for the 'background' and procession of events and perceptions seen through it. We are free to populate this abstracted sense-organ with anything that we care to imagine. The less the physical restraint (and the further we are away 22

The Primal Eye from the loss of a physical mind) the greater become our powers of abstract thought. I contend that our capacity to close our eyelids yet still 'see' dreampictures or mental visualizations that clearly have no optic path to the outside environment or any ontological correlate, is only possible by virtue of this sense-organ that forms part of our 'matrix', yet is itself just a phantom. Like can only interact with like (Leibniz); hence the problems with Descartes' notion that the physical pineal gland was the 'seat of consciousness. The pineal gland bears much the same relationship to 'soul' as the legstump bears to the phantom limb. If the leg was severed higher up the stump, the phantom sensation would still be present (and perhaps even stronger). When a pineal gland is calcified or surgically removed, a disruption such as the condition of precocious puberty might occur, but mental life is substantially unaffected. Our brains still expect or assume the ancient organ of 'unitary sense' to be present. You might even say that the brain 'imagines' it still there ... but not an imagination or memory that requires effort ....for it arises naturally out of the deep structure and organisation of the brain. The phantom eye forms a part of the genetic whole-body matrix or 'gestalten' that also gives rise to the ontogeny of the neuronal brain along with the rest of the foetus. ONGOING ABSTRACTION - FROM PHYSICAL MIND TO A CONSCIOUSNESS ENGRAM OR TRACE I propose that the pattern of evolution of mental representations has been away from direct physico-chemical responses (such as exhibited by a simple organism like the amoeba whose behaviour can be predicted by chemical attraction towards food and aversion to harmful light radiation and toxins) and towards increasing levels of self-volition and control of behaviour. Increased powers of abstraction, as shown by the human abilities to manipulate symbols (language, maths etc.) have evolved as the median eye (physical spotlight of 'consciousness) becomes more historically remote and its areas of control are eroded. For example, the invention of electric light has allowed greater 'mental' or 'self' control (choice) over circadian rhythms. I claim that levels of 'con23

1992 - 1994 M.V.T. sciousness and self-volition have occurred in direct proportion to the atrophy of the median eye. Abstract, or non-physical structures (holes, gaps, minds or conceptual 'structures') have 'replaced/emerged from' the earlier physical structure of mind or attentionality. MEDIAN VISION and MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS Consider these experiential properties of awareness and compare them with some known properties of median vision: (1) WHOLENESS OF FIELD ... we do not experience several 'points of view' concurrently, but experience the world from a single vantage point. It is not common to receive two or more sets of sensory impressions at once, or to believe that we are more than one person at the same time. (2) MULTI-MODALITY.... In the sense that we can both hear, see, smell and feel simultaneously. We effortlessly make 'sense' out of all the various types of data received from our special senses. Any candidate organ as prototype for this multi-sensory ability would itself have been multisensory and would have existed before these subsequent specialised sensegatherers. (3) NON-TRANSFERABILITY ...we do not 'experience' the direct mental representations from any being other than ourselves. Likewise we cannot project our focus of attention or mental field outside our own sensory realm and thus experience mental events from the viewpoint of any other person or being. Likewise an ancient animal relying on median vision, would not have been able to 'exchange' its physical median eye with that belonging to another animal. (4) NO ON/OFF CONTROL... Although we may become oblivious through concussion, drug effect or external means, we have no direct choice whether to 'think and perceive'. When asleep, we cannot decide to dream purely by self-volition. This is an inheritance from the median eye which cannot be shut off by muscular impulse or covered with an eyelid. (5) LOCATION There is no identifiable place in our brain or head where awareness is "situated". Since our range of vision and hearing is limited in range and converges at a central 'focus' within our skull; our sensory experience is naturally concentrated about this pivotal location. The parietal 24

The Primal Eye gland occupies a suitably median position in the skull to approximate the experiential loci of perception. Galen put forward the notion that the pineal gland, because it lies unpaired and central within the brain. He suggests its function as a 'valve' regulating the flow of thought, filtering out masses of unwanted information. This is not quite the point I wish to make ... but rather suggest a possible role for the median eye as a 'range-finder' for subsequent sensory organs .... giving us a 'location' within the sensory world because of delineating the useful parameters. As Kuhlenbeck states, ".. consciousness is not located in the (perceptual brain), but contrarily, that body as well as external world, are located in consciousness." (6) INNER AND OUTER PERSPECTIVE. 'Consciousness' is not just a one-way process of 'looking out' or of 'looking in, but combines both. The direction of attentionality can change, for example when we cut our hand and feel pain, there is more awareness directed to this peripheral limb than under normal circumstances. I would argue that the median eye and pineal gland (E-2) system has this same capacity at once to monitor both the external environment and internal kinaesthetic events. The nature of brain evolution is that as adaptations take place and new sensory capacities develop, new parts are added to the brain from the core outwards. The prefrontal lobes in humans are amongst the very latest stages of evolutionary development. However, the brain stem and old reptilian parts of the brain are retained and continue to function. Without becoming embroiled in details of the neuroscience, I would like to offer an analogy explaining how the 'phantom eye' might interact with the substrate of neurones and glial cells, synaptic connections, and the electrochemical process that compose the brain. Given that the brain is a kind of neural computer or connectionist machine, and that patterns of electrochemical events represent the information that it is carrying then the 'phantom eye' is a 'virtual computer screen' to which attention messages are passed. The "trick of nature" involves the fact that there is no longer a physical screen (sense-organ) to which output is directed, and from which input is received. 25

1992 - 1994 M.V.T. Pathways to the expected device have been so established over evolutionary history that the brain can 'reconstruct' how this organ once acted, and 'internalise' its functions. The virtual screen decodes information conveyed by complex neuronal firings in much the same way that a computermonitor redraws electron impulses as patterns of coloured pixels that are 'meaningful' to a viewer. Decisions concerning behaviour are then based on this 'meaningful' level of representation rather than low-level messages. Behavioural choices previously determined by light information as it affected the median eye are now taken by the computational brain and its abstract 'sense appendage'.... no longer a slave to direct environmental impressions.

DREAMING If what I claim is correct, then we would expect the theory to explain many aspects of mental life and perception, including dreams. Consider our distant ancestor, a land based ectothermic vertebrate with a median eye on top of its skull. During the day there is sun to warm its body and it moves around seeking food and avoiding predators. At night when it has become cooler the animal is unable to move around and becomes stationary. The median eye cannot be closed and continues to survey the feint measures of illumination received from the moon and stars. Despite hugely reduced metabolic activity, occasional 'twitches' might occur, triggered by fluctuations in moonlight caused by passing clouds. The creature would have experienced a reduced intensity 'simulation' of daytime activity, the twitching being a scaled down day-time muscular reaction to shifts in light. It is worth noting that whilst modern mammals (and to a lesser extent, birds) do seem to dream, their common ancestor the reptile does not. When humans dream, I suggest the 'mind' that cannot be switched off continues to register a 'shadow' or 'phantasy life' which resembles or simulates waking life, but with locomotive and sensory systems 'disengaged' allowing greater freedom for subjective consciousness. This phenomenon is highly comparable with the night-time 'median vision' of our ectothermic progenitor ... the difference being that our dreaming is 'symbolic' in content … whereas the median vision of the stem-reptile was 'direct'. 26

Weak and Strong expressions of MVT There was a period during the mid 1990’s when I wished to differentiate more clearly between the early Phantom Eye concept and the more recent Median Vision material. I still held to the claims of the earlier work personally, but realised that the Phantom Eye claims go beyond what is scientifically indisputable. WEAK (EVOLUTIONARY NARRATIVE) VERSION: This restricted account MVT can be held without entailing acceptance of the stronger claims of the ‘Phantom Eye’ hypothesis. Propositions include only those that are uncontroversial and are held generally amongst the scientific community. Instead of drawing conclusions from the data that may be difficult to substantiate, MVT avoids speculation and use of analogy and tries only to give a narrative account of the early evolution of ‘consciousness’, in the narrow sense of decision-making capacity. 1) That direct ancestors of humans owned a pineal eye. [ We are unarguably E-1 animals] 2) That this pineal eye pre-dates the evolution of lateral eyes. [See Pap’s, Evolutionary Ophthalmics] 3) That this pineal eye had a wide range of functions. 4) That a main function of the pineal apparatus was linked to thermoregulatory control in cold-blooded animals, and that the pineal atrophied in species at the point at which they evolved to become warm-blooded.[See E2 to E1]

Weak and Strong expressions of MVT 5) That some of these functions concerned decision-making that governed aspects of behaviour. Early vertebrates with a fully functioning pineal eye and gland (supported by studies on modern-day walking fossils such as Sphenodon and Yellowtailed lizards) exhibited behaviour conditioned by light from the environment acting on their pineal eye, and were unable to control major aspects of their behaviour independently from control exerted by the pineal eye. 6) That some animals have mental representations, and other organisms (such as amoebae and plants) exhibit behaviour that is strictly explainable in terms of chemical interaction with their environment. 7) That decision-making functions that were governed in early animals by chemical actions initiated by the pineal eye (mechanism of central control) and became ‘internalised’ in their descendants once the pineal eye had become non-functional. STRONG VERSION: This more speculative version of the theory makes claims beyond those made in the restricted theory, and makes use of parallels between ‘mind’ and the phantom experience of a pineal eye. All propositions from MVT are assumed. 1) That the brain is ‘fooled’ into assuming that it is still receiving environmental cues from the pineal eye. 2) That Recapitulation at least partially occurs. 3) That congenitally arising ‘phantom’ limbs and senses are possible, and indeed happen. 4) That emergence of ‘personal identity’ in humans is linked to the ontogeny of their pineal apparatus before birth and the closing of the parietal foramen after birth. 5) That as the pineal eye atrophied, no physical anatomical replacement for it developed.

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The Primal Eye 6) That this ‘anatomical gap’ left a residual congenitally arising ‘phantom’ organ of unitary sense. I make distinctions between these three broad (and perhaps overlapping) categories of organism : The first group of simple bacteria and plants with very basic behavioural repertoire that is entirely chemically or physically based and can be accounted for by reference to physical and biological laws. These organisms have no ‘mind’ or internal (self) control of behaviour. A second intermediate group, E-2 fishes and cold-blooded land vertebrates, with a more complex behavioural repertoire governed by mediation of environmental information by the pineal apparatus, cannot form mental or ‘abstract’ representations, but have a similar range of activities to more developed vertebrates (they hunt and avoid being hunted, seek and avoid sources of body-warmth, etc.). These organisms have behavioural choices to make, but their decisions are hard-wired, and under direct response of light information that they receive from the environment. Thus my shorthand description as having ‘physical’ or chemical protominds. The third group contains E-1 & E-0 animals who may experience mental events when no outside (environmental) stimulus is present. The capacity to REM dream (or to close lateral eyes yet still visualize internally) is indicative of this category of animal. This group of animals with ‘abstract minds’ includes primates, mammals, and probably birds and E-1 reptiles whose pineal eye has completely atrophied. Further anthropological support exists in mythological and literature of diverse and unrelated human cultures and religions that point to race memories of an earlier state of consciousness linked to a ‘third’ or better, ‘primal’ (more accurate since the pineal precedes the lateral eyes, so is FIRST not THIRD) or all-conscious non-physical eye.

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1994 Mind as a Gap MlND .... THE GAP Steve Nichols, 19th April 1994 A Few Words About Language I wish to make clear from the outset that my primary concern is with the phenomena of consciousness rather than with the language used to describe the phenomena. However there are certain difficulties that arise because this essay is itself (largely) a textual or linguistic account. A literary description can never wholly convey experiential content. I shall employ a graphical demonstration and illustrations, since these can be more suggestive of experiential phenomena. A direct way to express what it is to have an aspect of "consciousness" would be to communicate by telepathy. One obvious Rylean point is that whilst in everyday language we talk about "the Mind" or "the Will", such constructs are a grammatical misappropriation. We can "mind out" (for the gap on tube station platforms), and be "mindful" in the sense of being attentive. My thesaurus gives the following synonyms for "mind"; intellect (noun), brain (noun), sanity (noun), inclination (noun), intent (noun), heed (verb), tend (verb) and voice objection (verb). Levels of description provide us with one example of linguistic confusion. For example, reductionist and materialist accounts of "mind" tend to give a description of consciousness that, whilst appropriate at one level of description, does not give the whole picture. If asked to describe how a chef prepares a meal, the materialist description would run something like: "Organic, carbon-based preparations are placed in a vessel containing hydrogen dioxide. Heat being

1994 Mind as a Gap applied, the process of' Brownian motion then causes the particles to become excited and their properties change in the following ways.... Etc.” Such a description in the context of a cellular and neuronal level analysis of consciousness, whilst it might be consistent with certain facts, nevertheless fails as a comprehensive explanation. What we also want to know is what the meal consists of, which specific vegetables or animals are being cooked, together with some indication of how it might look, smell and taste. Contextual information about the kitchen environment, perhaps details of whether the ingredients were picked fresh by the chef or purchased at a market and so on might also assist our fullest understanding of "meal preparation". Conscious experience spans a wide range of topics such as dreams, emotional feelings, rational and analytical thought, visual and sensory experiences, learning, languages, self-generated mental visualisations, hallucinations et al. How and whether, such phenomena are linked - and what gives causes them - are questions that should be answered by any exhaustive explanation of consciousness. Definitions provide another linguistic problem. It seems to be that a complete description of what (something) is can be provided by exhaustive details of what it excludes or what-it-is-not. This is easier to illustrate with Set Theory. A particular set can be defined as the group of ALL SETS excepting every item that is not Of that particular Set. When I come to examine the related ideas of "gap" and "hole", and talk about "gaps" in the context of debates in the mind-body problem, some interesting properties of language will be seen. A linguistic paradox seems to be that the hole or gap exists only because of its absence. A hole is most definitely not "matter". It is ambiguous whether we can properly say that a hole "is there" or "exists". Although any given hole clearly has a size (measurable in at least one dimension) and a marked spatial location, these properties are measurable only against its substrate. Dualism, Monism, And Beyond

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The Primal Eye In this claim, the notion of a "hole" or "gap" is important, since a gap is both present and not present. that a gap is present is evident to any observer whenever the structure (I will discuss material and functional types of structure later) in question is incomplete gaps at the extremities or edges are perhaps less obvious than gaps in the centre of a body (when the gap tends to be a hole). One important point is that although it seems that it is possible to observe a hole, this is never the case. What you see is the some other object(s) through the hole. The attached card (viewed casually, since my draughtsmanship is not great) appears to be a white sheet with a yellow triangle drawn on it. Despite appearances this is not so. A triangular hole in the sheet causes this small triangle to be visible, whilst if the top sheet is removed what is seen behind it is another sheet with a large yellow circle. If the background sheet was moved an inch or two. then a continual white field would be seen, causing the triangle to disappear. If the background sheet was removed, then (in principle) anything whatsoever could be seen within the triangular hole. If you held up the white sheet in Paris, the Eiffel tower might appear "on" the sheet. What might seem a trivial demonstration illustrates some important concepts. If the sheet has no hole, then the Eiffel tower cannot be seen at all. If you hold it up, yet this hardly implies either that (1) you have gone blind or (2) that the tower has ceased to exist. Some key points are contained here, and some further unpacking of the concept of a "gap" are needed. What grounds do we have for saying that an object has an ovalshaped hole, rather than it is a naturally donut-shaped object? The grounds must be that at an earlier stage the object was integral, and that it has lost some of its structure subsequently. If it started out as a donut and has always remained so, then its surface has not be violated, and the "gap" or hole is only a supposition. the history of the object, and sequence of events in its life, need to be known.

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1994 Mind as a Gap To apply this line of thought to the composition of the brain, then if the brain was "solid matter", flawless and hermetically sealed from the environment, then it would be hard for the changeable mass of environmental data to enter and be represented by the impervious brain. Comparing the "mind" to a gap, then it follows that the "mental representations" or events that seem to "fill" or take place in view of the subjective witness are seen through a gap. The gap (mind) itself does not "exist" and so is not visible in its "pure state". since its pure state is void or absence. In early. evolution the primitive animal brain could only "sense" or "see" the external world through a gap. This might be the translucent part of the cell wall in single-celled animals, or the "eye-pit" of slightly more evolved species. If the gap were somehow general rather than specific. no focus or separation could be made between the inside and outside of the animal (or object). We have met the concept of pure disembodied consciousness earlier when projecting the future evolution of computers, but in the natural world I somehow doubt whether this is ever possible, since no distinction would exist between the disembodied consciousness and its surroundings. It might be feasible that energy (which according to physics is interchangeable with matter, and perhaps therefore best thought of as a finer kind of matter) could house intelligence or consciousness within its structure, and indeed this possibility is essential and must be proved before a114~ materialist hypothesis could ever be correct. The human (or animal) brain has been shown to manifest electrical charges or various natures, and this measure of "brain activity" differentiates brain-death from a living brain. Given that matter and energy are interchangeable and therefore both "materially manifest" and measurable by physical science: it remains the case that "consciousness" has abstract properties that are neither material, nor, as that philosophical magpie, Dennett, would have it, fictional or "heterophenomenological". I instinctively dislike counter-intuitive accounts of human consciousness, since it must be the case to a large extent that "what you see is what you get 34

The Primal Eye (WYSIWYG)". Since consciousness is whatever subjective experience is. to deny the experiential fact about consciousness is to be disingenuous and dishonest. The fact that people experience events happening in sequential time and from the standpoint of a subjective (unified) observer or witness, and are not, as Dennett suggests, aware of multiple editorial probes combining to give an illusion of a "virtual von Neuman computer", is crucial. I grant that all the low-level neuronal activity of the brain as described by neuro-physiologists may be necessary, indeed essential , to support the "experiential edifice" (as can be shown b~ medical cases of various agnosias and amnesic syndromes when mental experience is disrupted by organic traumas within the brain). However, as mentioned at the start of this essay, the neuro-physiological account of thought processes is just one level of description, and is inadequate as an account for all the phenomena. Functional And Organisational Gaps The discussion to this point has largely concerned gaps or holes in physical objects. I wish to broaden the concept of a "gap" to include functional gaps, when a property rather than material substance is absent. An example might be when some data is missing from a computer memory bank. No physical indication may be seen, yet the once complete data-set is now incomplete, which fact might have repercussions for the proper functioning of the computer. Signals, and not substance, has gone; but a gap is left nonetheless. Sometimes it can be seen that a gap has both functional and physical elements. For example, when a person dies they no longer (after cremation or decay) occupy the same physical space, and further to this, their previous activities are no longer carried out, which leaves a functional gap. If the deceased person played in a football team, the team would subsequently be a player short. Another interesting example, considered by Descartes and others, is the gap left by the traumatic loss or amputation of a limb. such as an arm or leg. The gap left in the matrix of the "whole person" is difficult to fill, having both physical and functional aspects. To continue our missing footballer analogy, it is possible that the team has coached and played over the years with a particular 4-4-2 formation. Old habits persist, and the left-winger instinctively crosses to the far 35

1994 Mind as a Gap post where his ex-team mate used to take position, even though he is no longer their and the pass is wasted. The team eventually comes to replace the missing player and can re-train, but medical observations have demonstrated that the loss of a motor-organ is never fully overcome, and that in every case of amputation the patient has persistent mental representations that seem to come from the ghostly organ. Dennett's heterophenomenological approach would seem to treat reports of pain in a phantom limb as being just as admissible as reports of pain being felt in a physically present organ. Most of us might like to make a distinction between the two reports? Median Vision Theory M.V.T. postulates an "abstract" organ of unifying sense (primary sense in the specific case of the pineal eye, since it pre-dates the specialised senses) which because of its absence (non-material nature) may allow us to sense or experience "abstract" entities. The gap we have in our skulls (the parietal foramen) is still evident, but we cannot actually "look through" this physical gap, since, unlike the tuatara and yellow-tailed lizard, we no longer have the physical pineal sense organ. Furthermore the skull opening has long since become covered over with skin. The gap left by the historical atrophy of the pineal sense-organ is functional or organisational as well as physical. Its original functions and operations were concerned with monitoring changes in the external world (everything other than the set defined as being the organism). Actions were direct, in the sense that a chemical change initiated by a change in solar radiation on the surface of the pineal eye resulted in the chemical messages passing along the eye-stalk (or sheath) connecting it to the centre of the brain. Secretions coming from the organ affected other chemical circuits inside the organism thereby modifying its constitution and behaviour. For example, production of a particular chemical (melatonin) was stimulated by the change of strength of photo activity at the end of the day (dusk), which in turn had a direct effect on the skin pigmentation of the animal causing it to change colour to its night-time camouflage. A more gradual and persistent chemical effect was caused by seasonal shifts in solar strength and spectral consistency, which had the 36

The Primal Eye effect of modifying the reproductive glandular activity of the animal. The incrementally increasing amount of radiation between winter and spring caused the switching on of sexual activity. Such behavioural decisions (e.g. to become sexual active) were not "made" by the animal using conscious processes, or by self reference. These chemical modifications were initiated by the external environment. I have mentioned only two areas, but the most crucial and central message mediated by the primal eye concern thermo-regulation, and the storage and use (by motor-activity) of available body warmth. Options such as to continue feeding, to bask in the sun or to seek shade, are mediated by thermoregulatory needs in cold-blooded animals. Warm-blooded evolution allowed a crucial transfer of thermoregulation to internal chemical generators, so the animal could become independent of direct external control. Awareness of the strength of heat from the sun and detection of the time of day and season came to be carried out (over the period of time of the cold to warm-blooded takeover) internally. (MISSING PAGE from my notes) As much as Fred hated to admit it, the new generation of specialists were better at dealing with information-gathering and discrimination than he was. Nonetheless, he was the senior employee, and as a reward for having helped set up the company, he felt justified in sitting back and taking it a little easier. He kept his secretary with her unique central office at the hub of the building. From his vantage point on the top floor, he kept an experienced eye on the world outside, and on the progress of the recruits to his sensory department. Life became even more relaxed for Fred as he lost responsibilities for passing data and orders downstairs to various internal departments. The frontal lobe areas were expanding, and the internal monitoring, supervision and communications were more and more being taken away from his sensory department. The number of voting members on the board increased, and Fred's power as a decision maker became subsequently diluted. His department, although becoming more

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1994 Mind as a Gap peripheral to decision making, was more efficient than ever at information gathering. However, Fred could read the signs. It was time to think about retirement. He couldn't leave immediately since certain crucial key functions were still only able to be performed by him. Furthermore, some of the older and less intelligent shop-floor workers would only take orders from him or Ms, Pin-gland acting on his authority. Fred decided, having taking a sounding from the board, to phase himself out, and he took a part-time consultancy. Fred carried out some key tasks that none of the new employees could master: whilst waiting for a time when he could hand over the rest of his responsibilities. As the years passed by, Fred was at work less and less often. Several employees were used to aspects of Fred's functions, and if Fred wasn't going to be around to give advice, they would have to cover for him. Fred's role within the company became more and more ceremonial. He kept his important titles and his office space, but his work activities became token. After a time. Fred retired completely. Those who could remember Fred and now found that they had to cover for him would ask themselves "what would Fred do" when they needed to carry out aspects of Fred's workload. The procedures of the company continued much as before. .Automatic decisions were rubber-stamped by Ms. Pin-gland with the words "authorised by Fred". and the lowly blue-collars executed the orders marked from Fred unquestioningly as they had always done. It was not necessary for many employees to be informed that Fred was gone. His name remained on his office. Reports and memos were still sent addressed to Fred. although were dealt with now by his secretary (in fact by her replacement, Ms. Pin-gland jr.) who stamped replies as "Fred". His name was still on top of the list of circulars, and copies of most internal memos still passed routinely to his desk. Fred was not replaced on the board, although his pivotal role was missed. "What would Fred have done, what would Fred have said?", remaining board members asked each other as they adjusted to Fred's absence. It was convenient to keep up the appearances of continuity, and certain advantages were gained by the pretence that Fred was 38

The Primal Eye still in his old job. If the new board got something wrong, "Fred" could be blamed. It was handy to retain Fred as a figure-head, a kind of corporate-identity. a nominal chairman who could mediate between rival claims of board members much as he had before, even though he was no longer there! The illusion that Fred was still making and authorising decisions kept the work-force happy and so the arrangement suited everyone. Over time, all Fred's original colleagues retired although most of them were replaced, and did their role or function within the company continued. Nobody working at the firm today knew the original Fred. All of them accept authorisation that seems to come from the incumbent of Fred's office, and since missives bear Fred's mark it is widely assumed that Fred (or some Fred jr. who is doing his job) still works in the sensory department. No one deals with Fred himself, since if they need anything from him they ask his secretary or a member of the board. Yet everything still carries on, decisions are made, there is no reason to question whether Fred is actually there. Other companies and organisation recognise communications from the organisation. The board puts out statements that purport to come from Chairmen Fred. Messages from the outside organisations which are addressed to Fred. sensory co-ordinator or chairman of the Metaphoric organisation are duly received (by way of the Lateral twins Jr. Jr. or somebody else in Fred's department) and interpreted b~ internal executives individually. or in conference. A reply. written from the standpoint of Fred, and signed by him, is delivered to the outside company in due course. The organisation continues to thrive, and the patterns of communication, objectives and corporate activity that was set on course by the original Fred and his early colleagues continue to be carried out. New board members learn the rhetorical trick of asking "What would Fred have done?". Some of the reasons for various behaviours have been lost, and some procedures may have a ritual or habitual component. The name on the door to Fred's office remains. There is no "Fred" behind that door. but the experience of Fred persists throughout the organisation, and Fred's retirement has not interfered with the smooth 39

1994 Mind as a Gap continuance of the organisation. Indeed, as far as the outside world and other organisations are concerned, Fred is (might as well) still be at the helm. day (whether day or night) remained important, but was no so fundamental. Subsidiary specialist functions (the hungriness gauge and related food-searching Fodor-type modules, for example) could operate more freely now not directly governed by a solar-override. The interpretation of signals from the environment becomes abstract, or symbolic rather than direct. By this, I mean that the chemical prompts from the pineal eye can be ignored or contradicted, and are now "information bearing" signals rather than direct commands. The shift from "command" to "message" means that status has changed from "creates a change or effect" to "suggests a possible change". My claim is that this shift marks the emergence of the symbolic. Symbols are "abstractions", taken from or originating in the physical environment. A symbol stands for something else. If it is the thing that it stands for, then it cannot be a "symbol". To phrase this differently: abstractions allow transformations or manipulations without any alteration to the external world or physical state of things. Experiments showing how the light images on the retina are psychologically “inverted” so that we experience the world "the right way up" provide such a demonstration. Conclusion Dennett concludes Consciousness Explained by saying that, "It's just a war of metaphors, you say - but metaphors are not "just" metaphors; metaphors are the tools of thought. No one can think about consciousness without them, so it is important to equip your self with the best set of tools available." If he had wanted to avoid mixing his metaphors "weapons of thought" might have been better, but not to worry, let us join the fray. REFERENCES and BIBLIOGRAPHY (A) Consciousness Explained, Daniel C1, Dennett (Little, Brown, 1Y91) (B) The Rediscovery of the Mind, John Searle (MIT

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The Primal Eye Press, 1993) (C) The Self-Aware Universe, Amit Goswami (Simon & Schuster, 1993) (D) No Ghost in the Machine, Rodney Cotterill (Heinemann, 1989) (E) The Making of Memory, Steven Rose (Bantam Press, 1992) (F) A History of the Mind, Nicholas Humphrey (Chatto & Windus, 1992) (G) The Mind Wins, Thomas Nagel (The New York Review, 4 March 19Y3) (H) Review of Even Odder Perception by Richard Gregory. Richard Carey (Sunday Times, 3 April 19~4).

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The Structure of Nothingness This chapter was written around 1992 as an attempt to elaborate on the idea that only through absence of environmental restraint and physical matter is the complete freedom to imagine and extrapolate possible. In broad terms, I see the evolution of consciousness as a process of increasing in-telling and subjective or self-control, in direct proportion to receding external or environmental behavioural constraints. This chapter is deliberately non-technical, and reflects my plenumist (as opposed to atomist) sentiments. Sorry for any repetition. ENGRAMS, HOLES AND GHOSTS The notion of a hole or gap in the organizational structure of the brain by means of which we can ‘view’ perhaps helps to clear up some inane ‘physical Vs non-physical’ arguments and distinctions found in philosophical debate. It seems to me that in many ways a lump of lead or stone is more ‘physical’ than a cloud of gas. Its mass and density are greater and its spatial location is more precise. When trying to place various sub-atomic particles on a postulated “scale of physicality” we meet with greater difficulty since some of these ‘particles’ can only be inferred and cannot be precisely located or quantified. Obviously in the non-physical region of the scale are fictional characters, probably including the medieval legions of gods and devils. Placing Napoleon Bonaparte on our scale presents yet another problem. If it was the nineteenth century and he was still alive then he would fall safely into the ‘physical camp’. Although he is no longer alive bits of his atomic structure are still whizzing around the material universe. Furthermore it does seem fair that he counts as being ‘more physical’ than a character such as “the Wizard of Oz”, who as far as we

The Structure of Nothingness know has never lived or existed. The ‘trace’ or ‘imprint’ of Napoleon on the world is well established ... we have portraits of him, documentation, and possess items known to have been his. It also seems reasonable to claim that a sense-organ which once existed, and with which we still have a ‘trace memory’ or physiological imprint, is more ‘physical’ than a sense-organ that is purely fictional. However is clearly lower down the ‘physicality scale’ than our lateral eyes. FIGURE and GROUND If you take a piece of paper and tear a piece out the middle, you have created a ‘hole’. This ‘hole’ has a definite location and spatial boundaries, but is not composed of any physical stuff or form of energy and cannot be detected except by reference to the paper that borders it. A materialist philosopher would presumably deny the existence of the ‘hole’, although this is clearly absurd since we can all recognise the ‘hole’ to be present. I consider the ‘mind’ to be a ‘hole’ in the gestalt organism left by the disappearance of the median eye. We cannot see a ‘hole’ by itself but can see through it. I would argue that ‘reflective or ‘abstract’ thought, imagination and visualisation are only possible because there is a ‘hole’ in our sensory structure. We may mistake this hole for the ‘background’ and procession of events and percepts seen through it. FREEDOM from External (Physical) Constraints We are free to populate this abstracted sense-organ with anything that we care to imagine. The less the physical restraint (and the further we are away from the loss of a physical mind) the greater become our powers of abstract thought. I contend that our capacity to close our eyelids yet still ‘see’ dream-pictures or mental visualizations that clearly have no optic origin from the outside environment or any ontological correlate, is only possible by virtue of the primal senseorgan that forms part of our ‘matrix’, yet is itself just a phantom. As Leibnitz pointed out, like can only interact with like, and hence arise the various problems with Descartes’ account that the physical pineal gland was the ‘seat of consciousness’. The pineal gland bears much the same relationship to ‘soul’ as the leg-stump bears to the phantom limb. If the leg was severed higher up the stump, the phantom 44

The Primal Eye sensation would still be present (perhaps even greater). When a pineal gland is calcified or surgically removed, a disruption such as the condition of precocious puberty might occur, but mental life is substantially unaffected. Our brains still expect or assume the ancient organ of ‘unitary sense’ to be present. You might even say that the brain ‘imagines’ it still there ... but not an imagination or memory that requires effort ....for it arises naturally out of the deep structure and organisation of the brain. The phantom eye forms a part of the genetic whole-body matrix or ‘gestalten’ that also gives rise to the ontogeny of the neuronal brain along with the rest of the foetus. ONGOING ABSTRACTION - Dematerialization of the PHYSICAL MIND I propose that the pattern of evolution of mental representations has been away from direct ‘physico-chemical responses’ (such as exhibited by a simple organism like the amoebae whose behaviour can be predicted by chemical attraction towards food and aversion to harmful light radiation and toxins) and towards increasing levels of self-volition and control of behaviour. Increased powers of abstraction, as shown by the human abilities to manipulate symbols (language, math’s etc.) have evolved as the median eye (physical spotlight of ‘consciousness) becomes more historically remote and its areas of control are eroded. For example, the invention of electric light has allowed greater ‘mental’ or ‘self’ control (choice) over circadian rhythms. In this volume I shall show that a long evolutionary process of internalization of control of much behaviour has occurred in E-1 animals. I claim that levels of ‘consciousness and self-volition have occurred in direct proportion to the atrophy of the median eye. Abstract, or non-physical structures (holes, gaps, minds or conceptual ‘structures’) have ‘replaced/emerged from’ the earlier physical structure of attentionality. Abstract (immaterial) thought can be independent of external sensory. For example, dreams are entirely self-luminous and internally generated. This is possible only because of the atrophy (and dematerialisation) of the Primal Eye during early evolutionary history.

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The Structure of Nothingness The nature of brain evolution is that as adaptations take place and new sensory capacities develop, new parts are added to the brain from the core outwards. The prefrontal lobes in humans are amongst the very latest stages of evolutionary development. However, the brain stem and old reptilian parts of the brain are retained and continue to function. Without becoming embroiled in details of the neuroscience, I would like to offer an analogy explaining how the ‘phantom eye’ might interact with the substrate of neurones and glial cells, connections, and electrochemical events that compose the brain. Given that the brain functions as a kind of neuro-computer or connectionist machine, and that patterns of electrochemical events represent the information that it is carrying then the ‘phantom eye’ is a ‘virtual screen’ to which attentional messages are passed. The “trick of nature” involves the fact that there is no longer a physical screen (sense-organ) to which output is directed, and from which input is received. Pathways to the expected device have been so established over evolutionary history that the brain can ‘reconstruct’ how this organ once acted, and ‘internalise’ its functions. The virtual screen decodes information conveyed by complex neuronal firings in much the same way that a computer-monitor redraws electron impulses as patterns of coloured pixels that are ‘meaningful’ to a viewer. Decisions concerning behaviour are then based on this ‘meaningful’ level of representation rather than low-level messages. Behavioural choices previously determined by light information as it affected the median eye are now taken by the computational brain and its abstract ‘sense appendage,’ no longer a slave to direct environmental impressions. The Symbolic World of Dreams When humans dream, I suggest the ‘mind’ that cannot be switched off continues to register a ‘shadow’ or ‘phantasy life’ which resembles or simulates waking life, but with locomotive and sensory systems ‘disengaged’ allowing greater freedom for subjective consciousness. This phenomenon is highly comparable with the night-time ‘median vision’ of our ectothermic progenitor ... the difference being that our dreaming is ‘symbolic’ in content whereas the median vision of the stem-reptile was ‘direct’.

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1994 Light-hearted Metaphor LIGHT-HEARTED NARRATIVE METAPHOR This metaphor is between an animal species over the course of its early evolution; and an organisation, let's say a business. Like most business enterprises it starts on a small scale with just a few employees. Moreover, because there are so few people employed in the fledging business, everybody has to carry out more than one task. Exclusive specialisation is a luxury at this stage, and each worker must cover a number of areas. Most employees, like Harry Hippocampus and Peter Pituitary, are "backroom boys". Fred PinealEye was one of the key associates in those early days, and unlike Harry, took up a front-line position in the reception room. Most tasks involving mediation between the company and the outside world were his responsibilities; market research, competitor analysis and the search for new business contacts and opportunities. In tandem with his secretary, Ms Pin-gland, Fred would collect all the incoming mail (and phone messages after the phone was invented), and forward it to appropriate internal departments. Some of the mail never got further than the litter-bin, and some of it was executed by Fred and Ms Pin-gland without any need to refer it on to anybody else. As you can judge, Fred had quite a busy department. When the company started it was small, and channels of communication were straightforward. Routine matters, for instance daily observations such as when it got dark and was time to tell various employees stop work, were dealt with by Fred as a matter of course. Important matters required consultation and co-operation between several departments, and a board-meeting was sometimes called. Such occasions sometimes involved a crisis that threatened vital matters (such as the very existence and solvency of the organisation) and extra effort and co-

1994 Light-hearted Metaphor operation was needed at these times. Wrong behaviour taken at these times could be disastrous and everyone had to be on their toes. Fred, who was a board-member, Ms Pin-gland and everybody else in the brain offices were senior to the blue-collar operatives who occupied positions lower down the company structure. Motoroperatives carried out orders they received from Fred Ms Pin-gland and other executives. It was not necessary to give these operatives accesses to the full data behind decisions, or to explain any board-room politics or disputes to them. They did what they were told, took their wages home at the end of the week, and didn't worry about where the company was heading or about the minutiae of the balance sheet. Things were fairly informal in those days; Fred and his mates on the board established a company regime that suited their various personalities and expertise. You might say that the "culture" of the company was established, its logo or company motto. Long term objectives, brand identity and product range were decided upon, as well as the general roles of each department. The command structure firmed up with use, and the organisation not only survived, but it prospered and set out on a course of expansion. Fred was the only employee with an angle on both internal and external events. Being central to communications structure within the organisation, Fred was an important decision maker. No one had a better overview of the whole picture. Fred carried on with his various activities, which had a very wide-ranging effect across the organisation. Sometimes it seemed that Fred was becoming overstretched. The amount of data he needed to monitor increased, and the repertoire of external events, and appropriate responses needed from the organisation like multiplied. New startup organisations were growing in the global marketplace and to survive a company needed to be faster on its feet than ever before. The board decided to recruit some new graduate employees to share some of Fred's load. The Lateral twins brought new-fangled tricks and jargon with them, such as "focusing", "visual direction", and "stereo-depth perception". The absence, far from weakening Fred's role, has given his function greater scope than he had when he retired, outdated and 48

The Primal Eye superseded in many ways, by the new specialist senses. Any new problems or data can be solved by a "non-actual" or virtual Fred, since the current workforce can reinvent him appropriate to current demands, and issue a statement signed "Fred" that concerns types of data and knowledge of which the original Fred could never have guessed. Although Fred has gone, and there is not a ghost in sight, the functional gap has been bridged. My analogy hopefully shows how "Fred identity" or "consciousness" has superseded the physical Fred.

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MA Dreaming: Contents & Introduction MA Dissertation, University of Leeds. 1996. CONTENTS Chapter One is a long Chapter which covers much ground and gives an overall philosophical perspective on dreams. It follows, in part, discussion of Flanagan’s first three questions about dreams. Chapter Two looks at Flanagan’s main question (4) Is dreaming Functional? Chapter Three examines phenomenal p-dreaming and looks at some allied phenomena such as somnambulism and hypnosis. Studies of lucid REM dreaming looked at in this chapter offer material of potentially great importance for philosophers, particularly those involved in the scepticism debate. Chapter Four looks briefly at some fundamentals, issues, and disputes within neuroscience. Chapter Five considers some further issues of synaptic and psychological organisation, and the origins of attentional mechanisms in dreaming. Chapter Six includes a new proposal how Median Vision Theory (MVT) can explain both synaptic re-organisation of the brain and self-organisation of mentation in terms of an evolutionary shift from finite-state to infinite-state systems.

MA Dreaming: Contents & Introduction The Conclusion ties up a few loose ends and put forwards some answers to Flanagan’s questions about dreaming. Some material here is of a more speculative nature than the in foregoing chapters. Appendix One outlines Median Vision Theory in general. Appendix Two briefly outlines MVT as an explanation of dreaming. Appendix Three details the history and physiology of the pineal gland. Appendix Four gives references for experiments and data on the pineal (median) eye. Appendix Five touches upon links between phantom sensations of all kinds, synaesthesia, and a neurological and perceptual theory of self that accounts for these diverse phenomena. Appendix Six briefly examines some competing views held by leading neuroscientists. Appendix Seven looks at some competing views in the philosophy of mind. INTRODUCTION There are a number of reasons why dreaming has been, and remains, an important area to philosophy. Dreams are ‘pure’ experiential phenomena not (seemingly) requiring input from the outside world via the special senses. As Aristotle puts it, “If all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we perceive a dream”. 1 A major part of this dissertation is concerned with issues raised in Owen Flanagan’s (1995) article, Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep.2 Western philosophy has concentrated on a few main areas. Perhaps the longest argumentative strand is connected with

1

Aristotle, On Dreams 1.1, circa 350 BC, trans. J.I. Beare, World Philosophy CDROM vol.1, Ed. S. Nichols, Actual Reality Publications, Leeds, 1996 2 Owen Flanagan, Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, Journal of Philosophy, XC11, Vol.1, January 1995, p.5

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The Primal Eye the problems of scepticism. Plato3, Cicero4 and (chiefly) Descartes, have all been concerned with the question “How can I be sure I am not always dreaming?”5 Flanagan numbers this problem (1). The second problem (2) is identified by Flanagan as Augustine’s question, “Can I be immoral in dreams?” In his lengthy tract Confessions, Augustine argues that dreams are happenings (involuntary) rather than actions (voluntary). By this reckoning, having a sinful dream does not imply that the dreamer has sinned. Flanagan’s third problem (3) arose with Norman Malcolm’s Dreaming (1959)6 out of verificationist ideas then current in philosophy. This question, “(3) Are dreams experiences?” was rejoined by Daniel Dennett7 and others. Flanagan sides with Dennett against Malcolm in believing that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep. He agrees with worries shared by both Malcolm and Dennett that evidence from dream reports and recollections are “putrid.” Flanagan cites the need for a valid neuroscientific account to shore up the phenomenological uncertainty made obvious by the whole debate initiated by Malcolm.8 Flanagan believes that such a solid neuroscientific account now exists: and that this account is the one given in his Towards a Unified Theory of Consciousness, or What Dreams are Made of (forthcoming) and in Hobson’s The Dreaming Brain (1988)9 and Sleep (1989). Flanagan’s fourth, and main, dream problem, “(4) Is dreaming func-

3

Plato, Theaetetus, 158b-c, World Philosophy CD-ROM vol.1, Ed. S. Nichols, Actual Reality Publications, Leeds, 1996 4 Cicero, Academica, 2.27.88 5 Owen Flanagan, Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, Journal of Philosophy, XC11, Vol.1, January 1995 p.5 6 N. Malcolm, Dreaming, Routledge, New York, 1959 7 D.C. Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, Philosophical Review, LXXII, 1976, pp.151-171 8 Owen Flanagan, Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, Journal of Philosophy, XC11, Vol.1, January 1995, footnote p.6 9 Hobson, The Dreaming Brain, Basic, New York, 1988

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MA Dreaming: Contents & Introduction tional?” therefore relies heavily on “various sorts of empirical evidence.” Flanagan begins the discussion of (4) by giving us his answer to it “up-front.” Flanagan introduces us to his “epiphenomenalist suspicion about dreams” and makes a distinction between subjective “pdreams” and their neural realisation which he calls “b-aspects.”10 His answer to (4) is that while sleep “and the phases of the sleep cycle” have biological and evolutionary “adaptationist” credibility: the phenomenal mentation that occurs during sleep, p-dreams, do not. Unlike b-aspects, p-dreams for Flanagan are “a spandrel, and exaptation.”11 My own scope is broader than Flanagan’s fourth question Is dreaming functional? I shall briefly deal with some matters raised by Aristotle, such as dreaming in animals other than man. I shall try to answer the question of How do Dreams Occur? relating this specific question to the wider context of consciousness generally. Whilst trying to keep technical issues to a minimum, it is important that they are discussed, since this evidence forms the basis of Flanagan’s philosophical speculation about dreaming. I shall take issue with some of Flanagan’s neuroscientific assumptions while agreeing with others as this dissertation unfolds. I shall briefly indicate the scale and depth of some disputes within neuroscience concerning empirical issues cited by Flanagan. Tim Shallice writes that “the modular model of the mind that is suggested by cognitive neuropsychology research contains a conceptual lacuna.” (Lacuna means: a hole, pit, f. lacus lake n.4 Cf. 1. In a manuscript, an inscription, the text of an author: A hiatus, blank, missing portion.)12 Shallice goes on to comment that the existence of “many special-purpose processing systems, each of which can operate autonomously, would not seem sufficient to produce coherent and

10

Flanagan, 1995, p.7 Flanagan, 1995, p.7 12 Oxford English Dictionary, CD-rom edition 11

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The Primal Eye effective operation for the whole system.”13 I shall introduce, by means of Appendices, my Median Vision Theory of dreaming (1980) and (1993) and will try to show how Shallice’s lacuna is median vision shaped. My conclusion outlines an alternative set of answers to Flanagan’s fourth question.

13

Tim Shallice, From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure, Cambridge University Press, 1991,p.307

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MA Dreaming 1: Background CHAPTER ONE: Philosophical Background Pre-written Scripts, Prophecy, Creative Dialogue, or Pure Nonsense? It has long been believed that dreams can uniquely reveal hidden aspects of our destiny and behaviour. Dreams do seem to have some narrative features which can be interpreted either using the traditional biblical language of dreams as prophecy, or using twentieth century phraseology in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis. Our motivations and desires are often expressed in terms of in a related 'wishfulfillment' sense of the word "dream,” such as in the phrase "the American Dream". Puns and riddles have been commonly observed within the dream narrative-form from earliest records to the present day. To Freud, the dream-act of 'chopping a piece of wood' might be symbolised by a repressed wish to 'kill your mother-in-law'. There might furthermore be a pun linking your mother-in-law's name (perhaps Mrs Forest) to the dream-object. Narrative features of dreaming is a topic important to this dissertation. Flanagan in Deconstructing Dreams (1995), to be my main point of reference in this dissertation, argues that dreams are products of the cerebral cortex trying to interpret 'system noise' originating in the brainstem in "terms of narrative structures, scripts and self-models." I do not intend to consider much material on prophecy and dreams that can be found in Aristotle, Plato, and elsewhere. However, Dennett makes an interesting point, suggesting that an implied cost of

MA Dreaming: Chapter One holding the received view (which he has just outlined) on dreams: is precognition. If terminal events in dreams are "strongly prepared for" by the previous narrative (without absurd juxtaposed turns, for example a goat that suddenly turns into a phone and starts to ring): then the composition process must have been directed by something having "knowledge of the future." Precognition is too high a price to pay in Dennett's opinion. However, planning and imagining future scenarios happens constantly during waking hours (I think I'll make a cup of tea) and it is not surprising to me that dreams should deal largely with possible or 'future' events.

Alan Hobson, who is Flanagan's favoured neuroscientists, differentiates between "logically preservative tenure dreams, worries about tomorrow's agenda, that the car needs gas first thing in the morning, and the like, on the side of conscious but nondreaming mentation" associated with NREM sleep. Flanagan thinks this is a helpful "definitional maneuver," that allows vivid REM dreams to be treated as "real," whilst duller but more persistent NREM mentation can be conveniently ignored as "nondreams." I maintain that this distinction is false and an unwarranted sleight of hand, and that NREM p-dreams run into REM dreams seamlessly (see Chapter Three, somnambulism and night terrors). A personal example. Just before waking up this morning I dreamt that my grandfather had died, (he is currently ill in hospital) and I 'rehearsed' my feelings centered around this event (except that during the dream I believed he was dead, and so was not consciously rehearsing). I wish to make the point that although this dream seems precognitive in the sense that events in the dream have not yet happened, this is hardly a difficult or unlikely outcome to predict, and the 'knowledge' that my grandfather might soon die was already well known to me, if ‘at the back of my mind’. What dreaming does seems to allow is the chance to experience events, even unpleasant ones, without the repercussions and survival overheads of actually going through with them. I shall return to the idea 58

The Primal Eye that dreams might provide a means for emotional (p-) information or (b-) content (messages or basal-activation) to adopt a narrative that gives them shape. I trust my own 'experiences', even those had when dreaming because of the proviso that I wake up knowing myself to have been lying down and asleep and am thus able to verify that my recent 'experiences' were dreams rather than waking experiences - and so have I no great trouble with Malcolm's Verificationist line. Hume, On Miracles, makes the point that if a religious experience or miracle happens to you, although you might be correct to believe it yourself, it is wrong you should proselytize and try to convince others of its verity. I know that I had the dream about my Grandfather this morning, and you just have to take my word for it, but this does not weaken my general account. My account not only conflicts with Flanagan, but also goes beyond the abreaction account of dreams (see Chapter Five). I suppose the fact that events can occur in dreams that have not yet happened in life does make them weakly pre-cognitive, but I do not claim this gives dreams any more predictive power than daytime speculation about future outcomes and scenarios. MVT belief is closer to abreaction since I think an animal while dreaming may be "stockpiling" "cassettes" (to borrow Dennett's phrase) of future possible behavioural responses to (the next day's) events. CRYPTic dreams? Heraclitus uses a cryptic philosophical style to combine issues of cosmology and anthropology into a single harmonious vision of life and death. Schofield identifies a superficial riddle-solving level of Heraclitus's passage where the author employs the [A] metaphor of lamp-lighting to describe dreaming. The dreamer creates an effect of illumination although his eyes are closed. The ancient Greeks believed that the deceased [B] could present themselves to us in dreams to issue advice or warnings. [B] and [C] together, at this superficial reading, suggest that a man even when awake is linked to his sleeping self and thereby to the dead. 59

MA Dreaming: Chapter One [A] A man in the night kindles (haptetai) a light for himself when his vision is extinguished; [B] living he is in contact (haptetai) with the dead, when asleep, [C] and in contact (haptetai) with the sleeper, when awake. At a second level, Heraclitus can be seen to unify opposites living/ dead, and awake/ sleeping, by the use of hapetetai, translated "kindle" in [A], and "is in contact with" in [B] and [C]. Although dead to the world[B], the subject by kindling the light of his dream[A] kindles the sleeping self, since dreams can be construed as a type of waking sleep[C]. A circle is completed since [B] [C] amount to the same as described in [A]; a dream is a state exhibiting simultaneously life and death, sleep and wakefulness. In ancient Egyptian ritual and belief, the soul (Ka) symbolically dies each night, and dreams are often depicted as stages in a journey past pylons and guardians of the night, in a landscape ruled by deities of the afterworld. Each day the sun is reborn: likewise a person is symbolically reborn as they awake. This claim that we are in contact with the dead might not be as absurd as it first seems. MacLean (1955) first put forward the notion that we have a reptilian brain, an ancient paleomammalian (limbic or visceral) brain, and a neomammalian brain (sspecifically the neocortex). The modern brain consists of these three overlapping basic braintypes combined as one triune brain. The interesting claim for this tiered structure is that each 'brain' has its own motor system, subjectivity, sense of space and time, and own particular intelligence. Each differs immensely in neurochemical and microscopic structure, and there is even some suggestion that (up to a point) they can operate independently of each other (MacLean 1976). Perhaps our ancient forebears do communicate with us during dreams - in one sense we are partly them - that sense being that there has been a continuous passing of living material (DNA) from their time to us. Your initial tissue and cellular instructions came to you from your parents' living bodies, and part of their initial tissues from a living parcel via their parents, and so on. The modern brain has not removed 60

The Primal Eye any structures from the reptilian brain (hypothalamus, amygdala etc.) with one important exception - that the peripheral pineal eye has disappeared over evolutionary time. I shall try to show how, and why, the external (time) regulating mechanism - the median eye - had to be removed or disconnected from the brain before self-organisation (and therefore consciousness, and an abstract 'self') could occur (see Chapter Six). This is perhaps the most crucial new point in this dissertation. LATENT and MANIFEST CONTENT It is worth briefly touching upon Harvey Mullane's article (1983) and Freud's models of explanations of dreams. Pierre Janet (1859-1947) was the first C19th psychologist to write about the "subconscious" mind - as he referred to it. Jung, Adler, and Freud in particular, were to borrow Janet's idea and rename it the 'unconscious'. Freud's book On the interpretation of dreams was to have the most impact on our understanding of dreams since Descartes. Freud thought dreams to be a 'momentous psychic act' concerned with solving problems in life, and that each dream was a 'disguised fulfilment of a suppressed wish.' Furthermore, he thought that sexual factors were always to be found in dreams. "Ladies and Gentlemen" - wrote Freud in his fifth Introductory Lecture on Psychoanalysis - "It happened in the course of the treatment that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion arose that the dreams too had a sense." 'Symptom formation' and 'dream work,' according to Freud, occur unconsciously. However, as Mullane points out, there is an explanatory gap, since if nonconscious occurrences have a 'sense,' it would seem to imply unconscious intelligences that carry out these functions. Freud's notion of latent and manifest content in dreams is interesting. Manifest content is that part of the dream that is obvious, and easy to remember. If a visit to a football match was the 'manifest content' this might be thought of as the sole purpose or narrative of the dream. Latent content though is considered by Freud to be an underlying and hidden meaning to the dream. This might be entirely unrelated 61

MA Dreaming: Chapter One to the manifest content, and for instance the football match could represent emotional feelings of 'love and belonging', if that is what is wished for through the dream. Flanagan's view, using his own words, leaves "plenty of room for dream symbolism and even for something like the manifest and latent content distinction." He thinks we have learned to utilise the "serendipitous mentation" interpreted by the cortex from system noise to further "the project of self-knowledge and identity location." (See APPENDIX FIVE discussion of neuromatrix theory of self). SCEPTICISM, WAKEFULNESS and DREAMING Flanagan (1995) describes the question "(1) How can I be sure I am not always dreaming?" as Descartes's problem. Descartes, speaking as Eudoxus, the hero of The Search for Truth, writes; "....How can you be certain that your life is not a continuous dream, and that everything you think you learn though your senses are not false now, just as much as when you are asleep?" In modern times we tend to find Descartes' arguments for doubt more compelling than his arguments for knowledge. But Descartes was using the skeptical method merely to prepare us for his later arguments: and was not himself finally a skeptic. J.F.M. Hunter points out that it is very hard to counter the allied philosophical problem to skepticism - solipsism - if the claim is upheld that dreams can be indistinguishable from waking experiences. Indeed solipsism is sometimes presented as the claim that "we are dreaming all the time". I shall cursorily examine some recent contributions by Barry Stroud, John Nelson, Hunter and others on the difference between dreaming and being awake and related issues of philosophical skepticism. Barry Stroud (1984) thinks that there are fundamental aspects of 'human knowledge itself' that might be uncovered by further exploring Descartes' dream argument "[that we be able to show that we are not dreaming if we are to know an external world]." A significant aspect of Descartes' dream skepticism that Stroud thinks he has exposed is that 62

The Primal Eye for the Cartesian position to hold, it relies upon a received philosophical assumption that there exists a real external world observable from a detached "external" viewpoint. He thinks the effectiveness of Descartes' argument rests on an untenable foundation, and rejects it on these grounds. This is not to say that he thinks the skeptical argument is easy to overcome, and Nelson (1993) indeed concludes that Stroud's program is not fully realized. PERSONAL IDENTITY or INCOGNITO? Another main area of concern in western philosophy, and Flanagan's problem (2), is the question of whether we are responsible for 'sins' committed in dreams. This seems to have first been raised by Plato in Book IX of the Republic. Nowadays this question seems rather trite, with the obvious answer being "no.” However, in one tribal society in Papua New Guinea, a person can be tried, and even executed, for 'crimes' committed only in their dreams. Saint Augustine seems to concede the thrust of the skeptical dream argument that, so far as he knows, he might be asleep. There is a real and practical basis to Augustine's concern about Flanagan's 'second' dream problem. It seems he was worried about any observable behaviour of his genitals during sleep, and about wet dreams in particular. Although the actual experience of the dream is subjective and private, these physical repercussions could prove embarrassing or worse for a monk. His preoccupation with sex agrees in some part with Freud, although their concerns very different. Augustine raises questions about personal identity in dreams, "Surely it cannot be that when I am asleep I am not myself, O Lord my God? And yet the moment when I pass from wakefulness to sleep, or return again from sleep to wakefulness, marks a great difference in me." He also touches upon differences in quality of experience of dreams and waking life, "During sleep where is my reason which, when I am awake, resists such suggestions and remains firm and undismayed even in the face of the realities themselves?" In the same passage he also attempts to justify his acquiescence in dreams to actions that would 63

MA Dreaming: Chapter One not engage in during waking life. He claims the difference between the two states is so great, "...I return to a clear conscience when I wake and realize that, because of this difference, I was not responsible for the act, although I am sorry that by some means or other it happened in me." I shall occasionally touch upon recent contributions centered on Augustine's debate, but am not primarily concerned with the questions that revolve around theological and moral issues that are beyond scientific objectification. It is worth mentioning that 'free-will' and having choice in dreams is an area important to Rosicrucianism. Various forms of 'astral projection' are techniques of remaining 'in control' and guiding your actions whilst dreaming or in an induced trance. The method is to stop yourself at the very point that you are falling asleep and to reassert the 'will' - similar to scientific methods used to induce lucid dreaming (see Chapter Three). ARE DREAMS EXPERIENCES? "Further, in addition to these questions, we must also inquire what the dream is, and from what cause sleepers sometimes dream, and sometimes do not; or whether the truth is that sleepers always dream but do not always remember (their dream); and if this occurs, what the explanation is." Aristotle. However, a third philosophical problem about dreams (following Flanagan's schema in Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, 1995) arose earlier in this century in reaction to Verificationist ideas. This question is "are dreams experiences?" or are they just reports of experiences which we think we had while sleeping but which in fact are constituted only by the experience of giving the report itself or by waking thoughts about the so-called "dream". I shall look briefly at the debate between Malcolm, Dennett and others collected in Dunlop's 1977 book, Philosophical Essays on Dreaming. If Norman Malcolm is to be believed, then dreams are not experiences that take place during sleep at all. His criterion for one's having dreamt is that one sincerely tells a dream story. Yet it is hard to construe how a story can be 'sincere' unless it has been some part of 64

The Primal Eye experience. An eyewitness account is normally more believable than a purely fictitious one. In addition, what point is there in making up such stories? Dennett allows the possibility that dreams are experiences, and that the mind composes and records dream narratives. He is not certain whether this composing and recording occurs during REM sleep, because he thinks that on becoming awake the subject selects any of the narrative "cassettes" that have been recorded during sleep, not necessarily the most recent. Both these philosophers place the emphasis on the account rather than on the experience of dreaming (which Malcolm denies altogether). More recent work on lucid dreams seems to give affirmation not only for the connection of dreams to REM, but also indicates that they are 'conscious' experiences. Flanagan summarily dismisses the whole Malcolm and Dennett et al debate by deciding that Malcolm is wrong, and that "dreams are experiences that take place during sleep.” WHAT ARE DREAMS? Aristotle's explanation of dreams, comparing them to afterimages, is interesting but ultimately inadequate since they do not occur immediately after the causal sensory event. Aristotle also thinks that the same mechanisms that cause illusion and hallucination during illness are responsible for dreams. He also makes an interesting point that very small sensory impressions that would not come to attention during the day seem loud at night by virtue of the absence of competing (daytime) noise. In a dream, a few minutes before writing these words, I was awoken when my toe physically twitched (it actually scraped a post at the bottom of the futon and woke me up). In my dream it was the whole of my foot moving as I was putting on a shoe that 'caused' (or at least was in conjunction with) my toe-twitch. It is hard to be certain whether a dream action precedes, is concurrent with, or follows an associated event in dreaming. What I wish to establish with this example is the 65

MA Dreaming: Chapter One different point that the p-dreamt event is larger-scale (involving a whole foot) than the associated physical event (just a toe). The dreamaction is a microcosm, as it were, of the waking motor-action. How this point fits with Median Vision Theory will, I hope, become more clear (see account of in APPENDIX TWO and phantom limb experiences in APPENDIX FIVE). Aristotle makes a similar point that dream experiences are often exaggerations of daytime ones: "From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, present themselves not only when persons are awake, but also then, when this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness. For by day, while the senses and the intellect are working together, they (i.e. such movements) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as a smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into notice. But by night [i.e. in sleep] owing to the inaction of the particular senses, and their powerlessness to realize themselves, which arises from the reflux of the hot from the exterior parts to the interior, they [i.e. the above 'movements'] are borne in to the head quarters of sense-perception, and there display themselves as the disturbance (of waking life) subsides." Aristotle, ON DREAMS, 3.1

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MA Dreaming 2: Functional?

Is Dreaming

CHAPTER TWO: Is Dreaming Functional? Owen Flanagan's main (fourth) question, "Is dreaming functional?” bears some relation to Aristotle's concerns. His account largely agrees with Aristotle's answer that the purpose of sleep is restorative: "But it is equally impossible also that either of these two affections should perpetually attach itself to the same animal, e.g. that some species of animal should be always asleep or always awake, without intermission; for all organs which have a natural function must lose power when they work beyond the natural time-limit of their working period; for instance, the eyes [must lose power] from [too long continued] seeing, and must give it up; and so it is with the hand and every other member which has a function." The clearest exposition of Flanagan's overall position that I have found is that in Consciousness Reconsidered (1992). Flanagan tries to explain dreams in terms of his larger proposals given in Consciousness Reconsidered and in the (unpublished) "Towards a Unified Theory of Consciousness, or What Dreams are Made of". Flanagan (1995) introduces two guiding assumptions that underlie his previous work on consciousness: 1) that consciousness has depth, hidden functions and structure, possible multiplicity, and hidden "natural and cultural history", and 2) that consciousness is heterogeneous in kind. Dennet's view in Consciousness Explained is similar to that of Patricia S Churchland (author of Neurophilosophy), and also to Flanagan's opinion, set out in Consciousness Reconsidered, 1992. From the title, it is apparent that Flanagan's book is written partly in reaction to Dennett. Dennett's multiple-draft variant of constructive naturalism

MA Dreaming 2: Is Dreaming Functional? shares many components with Flanagan's view that knowledge of consciousness can be acquired by triangulation. "That is," Flanagan remarks, "by combining neural and psychological data from experiments on humans and animals with subjective reports from humans." I concur with Flanagan's dislike of philosophers such as Colin McGinn, and to a lesser extent David Chalmers, who adopt an "anticonstructive" naturalism as opposed to Flanagan's more optimistic brand of constructive naturalism. Colin McGinn, a philosopher at Rutgers University, in his 1991 book, The Problems of Consciousness, argues that because our brains are the products of evolution, they have cognitive limitations. Just as monkeys or snails cannot even conceive of calculus, so humans may be prohibited from understanding certain aspects of existence, such as consciousness. Not only is an understanding of this phenomenon currently beyond us, but, according to McGinn, it will remain forever beyond human understanding. David Chalmers holds a similar view to this in that he believes philosophers can and must construct a higher-level theory to bridge the 'explanatory gap' between the physical and subjective realms. He proposes that a theory of consciousness must assume the existence of a new fundamental property, which he calls "information", that has aspects that are both physical and "phenomenal" or subjective. Flanagan has coined the term "Mysterians" to refer to philosophers such as McGinn and Chalmers. Where I find McGinn's argument weakest is that he neglects the rather obviously possibility that humans have evolved so far - and thus could in the future evolve yet further. Current limits on understanding might be overcome by, for example, the addition of a new structure on top of our current brains. My view could be described as 'constructive naturalism' since I reject any supernatural explanatory components and am optimistic as opposed to anti-constructive, regarding the way I view prospects for success in applying neuroscience. However, I take dispute with Flanagan that "mind and brain are the same thing seen from two different perspectives", and also disagree with him that "the gap between the subjective and the objective is an epistemic gap, and not an ontological gap." The mereologically super68

The Primal Eye venient concept of parts fusing into a gestalt whole is my preferred abstract model. I feel that Flanagan's account of (1) that part of the "hidden structure of conscious mental states involves their neural realisation" is problematic and does not sit well with his insistence that there is no difference between mental and physical. If one causes the other, then I fail to see how they can be identical. I accept (1) in the sense that the phenomena is extremely complex and multifaceted, but am not sure that consciousness can 'be' anything other than the presenting experience, so you cannot be 'conscious' of undeclared or "hidden" contents. I find Flanagan's supposition (2) that there are "different kinds of consciousness" slightly at odds with his claim for a 'Unified Theory.' This surely assumes there is some sort of unified phenomenon to have a theory about, otherwise we would need a different theory for each separate 'kind' of consciousness, and a further 'overtheory' to unite all of these phenomena. FLANAGAN'S FLANNEL Owen Flanagan is clear from the outset of his 1995 article that he believes dreams to be mere "spandrels," a "by-product of what the system was designed to do during sleep," mere "noise." But "stochastic noise" as has been shown by research by Thompson, Harvey and Husbands (December 1995), "can actually be advantageous to the evolutionary process. Such noise alters the behaviour of the hardware, as compared to its behaviour in some idealised, non-noisy world: hence it alters the fitness of this hardware [read brain] on which the task is being evaluated." I am not sure to what extent Flanagan intends "automatic sequela" to convey the impression that dreams are some kind of malady, but his choice of charged terms like "putrid" when referring to dream reports compound the impression that Flanagan finds p-dreaming a 'fly' in his philosophic ointment. To establish his central claim that dreams are 'nonfunctional', although 'beautiful accompaniments' to sleep, he must first satisfy us that none of the "credible adaptationist accounts for sleep" are valid. I 69

MA Dreaming 2: Is Dreaming Functional? do not think his article establishes this. In fact after reading his various accounts of possible functions for dreams, I think in his own mind this premise is weakened by the end of the article, when his choice of adjectives about p-dreams become more favourable. EPIPHENOMENA? Freud clearly believes that dreams have an important function in 'revealing' to us useful fragments from our 'unconscious' life/self/process. Flanagan thinks that p-dreaming was "probably not selected for" by nature, and despite being genuine experience, it has no significant biological or evolutionary proper function. P-dreams are, evolutionarily, a side effect. His claim is that p-dreams (and probably rapid eye movements themselves once the ontogeny of the visual system is complete) are "likely candidates of epiphenomena." (Blushing of the cheeks in humans is considered by some physiologists as another candidate). Nevertheless, Flanagan thinks that humans can and have created or invented functions for these spandrels. Flanagan is keen to distance waking consciousness from pdreaming and to avoid the conclusion that all consciousness is epiphenomenal. The key point in Flanagan's case is this: that although the cerebral cortex is "designed" to make sense from stimuli during waking life, it is not "designed" to do this for sleep stimuli. Attempts to put sleep stimuli into "narrative structures already in place" are only half successful. There are no "costs" entailed by having this 'sense-making' facility always switched on, ready to do its job. P-dreams are system noise - chaotic neuronal firings and their bizarre epiphenomena - that occur while the brain is carrying out its proper functions. Given these provisos, Flanagan thinks that p-dreaming might give us some self-knowledge about our mental life, well-being and identity. "Your dreams are expressions of the way you uniquely cast noise that someone else would cast differently." In a footnote, Flanagan admits that "using dreaming for gaining self-knowledge, creative projects, and the like" probably has no effect on b-dreaming, it may well have enhanced the capacity for persons to "remember or even to control dream plot and content." 70

The Primal Eye The MVT account of consciousness gives p-dreaming a more central explanatory role and I shall argue that p-dreams are not epiphenomena in the way Flanagan claims. An important omission from Flanagan's account is any discussion of important dreaming-related phenomena. Lucid dreaming (involving awareness that one is dreaming) has been widely observed throughout history, and its effects have been well-studied. I shall look at lucid dreaming, hypnosis and other phenomena in the following chapter.

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MA Dreaming 3: Types of P-Dream CHAPTER THREE: Types of p-dreams and related phenomena Flanagan asserts that p-aspects supervene on b-aspects or brain states, and holds a type of double-aspect theory. He thinks that brain states are “essential aspects or constituents” of some overall “conscious states” which also entail p-aspects.14 Further on, Flanagan points out that “pdreaming” is not a sufficiently fine-grained term since he wants to distinguish between REM (rapid eye movement) sleep and Non-REM sleep. The later occurs about 75% of the time and is (see Chapter Four) divided into four phases. Flanagan makes the point that mentation is not exclusive to REM sleep, and mentation (which occurs “in all stages of REM and NREM sleep”)15 in either state is reported as “dreaming.” REM dreams are often of more vivid, bizarre, image-rich proportions; whereas NREM dreams are of a more mundane, repetitive, “conscious but non-dreaming mentation” variety according to Flanagan.16 Dement and Kleitman (1962) suggested that dreaming is exclusively associated with REM, but later experiments by Foulkes (1962) and others subsequently have found that dream recall is reported in around 74% of cases of subjects during NREM sleep, but only by using a crucially different concept of dreaming. Dement and Kleitman allowed only “coherent, fairly detailed” reports of dream consciousness, and disregarded

14

Flanagan, 1995, p.7 Flanagan, 1995, p.14 16 Flanagan, 1995, p.13 15

MA Dreaming Chapter 3: Types of P-Dream dream-reports that were “without recall of content, or vague,” or were just “fragmentary impressions of content.”17 Foulkes allowed “reports with some substantive content”, including “any occurrences with visual, auditory, or kinaesthetic imagery.” Reports lacking such imagery, “but in which the subject either assumed another identity or felt that he was thinking in a physical setting other than that (laboratory) in which he actually was” were also classified as dreams.18 LUCID DREAMS Lucid dreaming implies there could be consciousness during sleep, a claim many psychologists have denied for more than 50 years. Orthodox sleep researchers argue that lucid dreams could not possibly be real dreams. If the accounts of lucid dreams are valid, then the experiences must have occurred during brief moments of wakefulness or in the transition between waking and sleeping, not in the kind of deep sleep in which rapid eye movements (REMs) and ordinary dreams usually occur. Lucid dreamers wanted to convince people that they really were awake in their dreams. But when you are deep asleep and dreaming you cannot shout, "Hey! Listen to me. I'm dreaming right now." All the muscles of the body are paralysed. All, that is, except for the eyes. Lucid dreaming (a term coined by Dutch psychiatrist Frederik van Eeden in 1913) is something of a misnomer since it means something quite different from just clear or vivid dreaming. Van Eeden explained that in this sort of dream "the re-integration of the psychic functions is so complete that the sleeper reaches a state of perfect awareness and is able to direct his attention, and to attempt different acts of free volition. Yet the sleep, as I am able confidently to state, is undisturbed, deep, and refreshing." Flanagan (as we shall see) puts the restorative properties of sleep at the heart of his argument that dream mentation is a mere spandrel.

17

W.C. Dement & N.A. Kleitman, The Relation of Eye Movements during Sleep to Dream Activity, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53, 1957, pp.339-346 18 W. D. Foulkes, Dream Reports From Different Stages of Sleep, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65, 1962, pp.14-25

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The Primal Eye An interesting spin on the skeptical idea we might be dreaming all the time comes from recent work on training (while awake) to be able to experience lucid dreams (while asleep). Experiments with trained lucid dreamers have shaken some aspects of the ‘received view,’ incidentally casting further doubt on Norman Malcolm’s Verificationist objections. This notion seems to me informative to many of the philosophical debates raised earlier: particularly Augustine’s free-will and morality debate. It also raises an issue about what kinds of dreams might exist, taking up Flanagan’s point about heterogeneity. Early experimental work suggests that high levels of physical and emotional daytime activity tend to precede lucidity at night. Lucid dream research seems to have an underlying realist agenda regarding dreamexperiences, and would expect the opposite outcome to Malcolm. Waking during the night and carrying out some kind of activity before falling asleep again can also encourage a lucid dream during the next REM period and is the basis of some induction techniques. 19 One of the best known is LaBerge's MILD (Mnemonic Induction of Lucid Dreaming). This is done on waking in the early morning from a dream. You should wake up fully, engage in some activity like reading or walking about, and then lie down to go to sleep again. Then you must imagine yourself asleep and dreaming, rehearse the dream from which you woke, and remind yourself, "Next time I dream this I want to remember I'm dreaming." A second approach involves constantly reminding yourself to become lucid throughout the day rather than the night. This is based on the idea that we spend most of our time in a kind of waking daze. If we could be more lucid in waking life, perhaps we could be more lucid while dreaming. Psychologist Paul Tholey suggests asking yourself many times every day, "Am I dreaming or not?" This sounds easy but is not. It takes a lot of determination and persistence not to forget all about it. For those who do forget, French researcher Clerc suggests writing a large "C" on your

19

Methods that have been developed include (Gackenbach and Bosveld 1989; Tart 1988; Price and Cohen 1988).

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MA Dreaming Chapter 3: Types of P-Dream hand (for "conscious") to remind you (Tholey 1983; Gackenbach and Bosveld 1989).20 Keith Hearne (1978), University of Hull, first designed experiments to exploit the fact that it seems not all the muscles of the body are paralysed. In REM sleep the eyes move so potentially a lucid dreamer could signal by moving their eyes following a prearranged pattern. Lucid dreamer, Alan Worsley, first managed this in Hearne's laboratory. He decided to move his eyes left and right eight times in succession whenever he became lucid. Using a polygraph, Hearne could watch the eye movements for sign of the special signal. He found it in the midst of REM sleep.21

The reporting of TIME and p-dreaming I will have more to say on physiological aspects of dreaming, particularly regarding brain phase and biological clocks in respect of selforganisation of circuitry. This seems a good juncture at which to diverge

20

Susan Blackmore, Lucid Dreaming: Awake in Your Sleep?, The Sceptical Inquirer, Vol. 15, 1991

21

Further research showed that Worsley's lucid dreams most often occurred in the early morning, around

6:30 A.M., nearly half an hour into a REM period and toward the end of a burst of rapid eye movements. They usually lasted for two to five minutes. Later research showed that they occur at times of particularly high arousal during REM sleep (Hearne 1978). It is sometimes said that discoveries in science happen when the time is right for them. It was one of those odd things that at just the same time, but unbeknown to Hearne, Stephen LaBerge, at Stanford University in California, was trying the same experiment. He too succeeded, but resistance to the idea was very strong. In 1980, both Science and Nature rejected his first paper on the discovery (LaBerge 1985). It was only later that it became clear what an important step this had been. S. Blackmore, Lucid Dreaming: Awake in Your Sleep?, The Sceptical Inquirer, Vol. 15, 1991

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The Primal Eye and look at what has been said about the temporal aspects and psychological time measurement of p-dreaming. Groups of experimenters have looked at the question of psychological time during REM sleep. LaBerge asked his subjects to signal when they became lucid and then count a ten-second period and signal again. Their average interval was 13 seconds, the same as they gave when awake. Lucid dreamers, like Alan Worsley, have also been able to give accurate estimates of the length of whole dreams or dream segments (Schatzman, Worsley, and Fenwick 1988). These findings stand in contradiction of Dennett and Malcolm insofar as they deny dream-experience, and indicate support but also some trouble, for the “received view” of dreaming as “explicitly endorsed by Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Russell, Moore, and Freud.”22 The new trouble for the sceptics is that trained lucid dreamers CAN know whether they are awake or asleep. HYPNOSIS Whilst mentioning day dreams (as being phenomenally closer to the folk-psychological wish-fulfilment model than either REM or NREM mentation), Flanagan does not explore the parallels between dreaming and hypnotic phenomena, but there are worthwhile comparisons to be made. Hypnosis seems to work by subjugating all conscious attention and focusing attention solely on the voice of the hypnotist. For example, light hypnotic trance is physiologically (EEG) similar to day-dreaming, whereas deep hypnotic trance produces levels of metabolism very similar to those exhibited during sleepwalking.23 Why I feel the evidence from hypnotic experiments is strong is because the subjects can report their experiences at the time, and also in the case of hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion, the impact of instructions given by the hypnotist is clearly demonstrable (even if the p-state of the subject isn’t).

22

D.C. Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, in Ed. Dunlop, p.227. Ullyett et al, Quantitative EEG analysis during hypnosis, 1974, in D.L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994

23

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MA Dreaming Chapter 3: Types of P-Dream

Dualism, in the modern era (contrasted with the ancient Greek concept of two minds - ηετερωξ αυτϖξ - literally the other self) can be traced to Anton Mesmer, who in the 1730’s demonstrated a behaviour pattern using hypnosis which was clearly different from that of the same individual in their waking state24. Freud’s theory was pure dualism,25 and more recently Sperry’s work seems to lend weight to Wigan’s (1844) 26 notion that the two hemispheres can act as two separate brains, one subordinate to the other, and both capable of acting independently of each other. One of the effects of Sperry’s Nobel Prize-winning work on hemispheric lateralisation was that it had an important impact on the way hypnosis was conceptualised. Akin to dreams, the history of hypnosis has been one of many observations of phenomena, with little agreement on theory since the time of Mesmer’s animal magnetism. From Sperry’s experiments, trance and dream-like states could clearly be associated with the drive-driven non-verbal right-brain mentation, while logical and verbal left-brain thinking is ‘simply’ normal waking consciousness. An important corollary to this is that clinical hypnotists had previously generally accepted the law of dominant effect, that when the will (Sperry’s left-brain) and imagination (Sperry’s right-brain) are in conflict, the imagination (right-brain) will dominate. Bicameral theory therefore interprets manifest and latent content in dreams in terms of left and right hemispheres.27 SOMNABULISM and NIGHT TERRORS Flanagan agrees with Allan Hobson (1994)28 that NREM sleep is associated with conscious but nondreaming mentation. He admits this

24

David L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.20 David L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.24 26 The Duality of Mind, Dr A.L. Wigan, 1844, cited in Pedersen, p.22 27 D. M. Ewin, Foreword, in D.L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.xi 28 A. Hobson & R. Stickgold, Dreaming: A Neurocognitive Approach, Consciousness and Cognition, III (1994), pp.1-15 25

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The Primal Eye ‘definitional manoeuvre’ (as I discussed earlier) struggles to deal with NREM states such as night terrors that as well as (probably) involving strong and bizarre imagery, also often cause (the child) to seem totally awake, eyes open, even running about talking nonsense. Sleepwalking (somnambulism), sleep talking and teeth-grinding are all NREM phenomena, and Flanagan thinks it uncertain whether such subjects are p-conscious or not.29 One reason, according to Flanagan, for this difficulty is that the terms have their origins in folk-psychology . On one hand Flanagan wants night terrors to be classed as “nondreams,” according to Hobson’s physiological criteria: even though, like REM ‘dreams,’ they contain strong and bizarre imagery. Though sometimes valuable, Flanagan claims, folk psychological language was not designed “to specify scientific or natural kinds.” Flanagan, and I herein approve, cautiously does not admit to there being any such natural or kinds in the science of mind: a caution that does not fit well with his earlier insistence on heterogeneity.

29

Flanagan, 1995, p.12

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience CHAPTER FOUR: Issues in Neuroscience Philosophical speculation (or to use Dennett’s words “armchair conceptual analysis”) is unable to reach firm conclusions about the nature and purposes of dreaming: and we must look towards “the saliencies that emerge from empirical investigation”.30 Neuropsychology is no longer at odds with the notion of ‘consciousness’ nor does it now dispute the need to explain it. My aim is to be problem driven rather than try to be a disciplinary purist. Several preliminary and technical issues raised by Flanagan need to be looked at before his case can be discussed in detail. However, Shallice identifies a number of ‘competing hypothesis’ that indicate no obvious progress has been made towards agreement. These include Shallice’s own (1972) ‘action or thought schema’ and variants such as Posner and Klein’s (1973) view that consciousness corresponds to a limited-capacity processing system, and Johnson-Laird’s (1983) suggestion that it corresponds to the operating system of a computer. A different set of proposals based around the idea of a system analogous to the Supervisory System originated with MacKay (1966) has spawned theories by Luria (1969), Marshall and Morton (1978), and Mandler (1975, 1985). That consciousness corresponds to the contents of a short-term memory store has been proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971). Dennett (1969) likens it to the input to a speech system. Baars, whom I have briefly discussed, compares consciousness to the contents of a globally distributed data-base

30

Daniel C. Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, in Dunlop (Ed.), p.250

MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience (1983). Marcel (1983) talks about the recovery of synthesised percepts, and O’Keefe (1985) identifies consciousness with the functions carried out by the hippocampus.31 Median vision theory offers yet a different account. Flanagan is selective in his choice of neuropsychological model. Flanagan thinks there may be many modes of consciousness; our awareness of an odour, for example, not only stems from a different set of neurons but also is in some sense qualitatively different from our visual awareness. Flanagan resists the temptation to look for any single neurological mechanism - such as Koch’s 40-hertz brain oscillations, Walter Freeman’s chaotic neural behaviour, or Benjamin Libet’s time-delay factor that accounts for consciousness. He holds consciousness to be a common biological phenomenon occurring not only in humans but in many other animals, certainly including the higher primates.32 It is not clear to which ‘lower’ species Flanagan attributes consciousness. Flanagan does not address hemispheric lateralisation in either his book (1992) or article (1995), but it is less clear whether he goes along with any parts of the triune brain idea. The bicameral approach purports to give a consistent and complete neurological account, as does Flanagan’s own neuropsychological account which emphasises Crick, Koch et al, and Hobson. Neural Darwinism and Gerald Edelman’s theories are looked at in Flanagan’s book (1992 Chapter Three) but not with respect to p-dreams. 33 Deconstructing Flanagan’s account of Dreaming Flanagan identifies three essential questions that “any good theory” of dreams needs to explain. “(1) Why (and how), despite involving vivid experiences, do p-dreams involve shut-downs of attentional, motor and memory systems and (relative) insensitivity to disturbance to external stimuli?

31

Tim Shallice, From neuropsychology to mental structure, CUP, 1988 (1992), p.401 O. Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, MIT Press, 1992, pp.2-3 33 I have covered some aspects of the Crick-Edelman debate in APPENDIX SIX. The jury still remains out on the various competing theories of consciousness within neuroscience. 32

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The Primal Eye (2) Why do the phenomenology of NREM and REM sleep differ in the ways they do? (3) What function (s) does sleep serve, and how do the clocklike cycling of NREM and REM sleep contribute to these functions?”34 To (1) and (2) he gives a short answer: that “sleeping in general is controlled by a clock in the suprachiasmatic nucleus of the hypothalmus” (an important area for hormone production and thermoregulation), and this clock gets us into NREM sleep, “a hypometabolic form of sleep”, and through its four stages.35 A second clock in the pons (pontine brainstem) starts up rapid eye movements and their accompanying mental phenomena. The reason people do not normally get up and start to sleepwalk and suchlike is because the bulbar reticular formation neurons on the brainstem send hyperpolarizing signals to the spinal cord which block external sensory input and motor output. He gives an unreferenced example of a patient with brainstem lesions who gets up in the middle of the night and plays “linebacker to their dresser - presumably imagined to be an oncoming full-back.”36 REM and NREM dreaming Aserinsky and Kleitman (1953) discovered that rapid, synchronous, eye movements occurred in bursts of about twenty minutes, recurring several times during the night. This has been repeatedly observed, and seems beyond dispute. 37 Subjects awakened at REM times generally reported having a dream, while subjects woken at other times did not. EEG (electroencephalograph) studies have shown four distinct phases of sleep, although whether these represent progressively “deeper” levels is arguable. REM sleep clearly follows EEG stage 1 sleep (which signals the onset of

34

Flanagan, 1995, p.14 Flanagan, 1995, p.14 36 Flanagan, 1995, p.17 37 C. Dunlop, Introduction, Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, Charles E.M Dunlop, 1977, p.46 35

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience sleep), and has also been correlated with respiratory quickening38, lowering of blood pressure, penile erections, loss of muscle tone and increased neuronal activity in the visual cortex.39 During REM sleep the visual brain is stimulated by (what EEG records as) PGO waves: so named because they originate in the pons, and the signals are conducted both to the lateral geniculate (G) body in the thalamus and to the occipital cortex (O). Since “PGO noise”40 visits lots of locations in the brain, and goes in all directions, Flanagan thinks it accounts for rich multimodal p-dreams during REM, since these waves are dominant in REM and ‘quiescent’ during NREM . Flanagan thinks this is why the “vivid, bizarre and multimodal imagery” associated with REM sleep does not happen during the periods of “dull” mentation during NREM, even though the normal mentation of NREM sleep carries on. NREM sleep by itself may be overlooked and not get reported since it is dull by comparison.41 BRAIN PHASE, BIOLOGICAL ‘CLOCKS’ and THERMOREGULATION Hence it is plain from what has been said that sleep is a sort of concentration, or natural recoil, of the hot matter inwards [towards its centre], due to the cause above mentioned. Hence restless movement is a marked feature in the case of a person when drowsy. But where it [the heat in the upper and outer parts] begins to fail, he grows cool, and owing to this cooling process his eye-lids droop. Accordingly [in sleep] the upper and outward parts are cool, but the inward and lower, i.e. the parts at the feet and in the interior of the body, are hot. (Aristotle, On Sleep & Sleeplessness) Flanagan makes some interesting observations distilled from “a list of over fifty functions” attributed to sleep and dreams. NREM sleep is the oldest form of sleep, and indeed is the only type experienced by ancient

38

W.J. Baldridge, Discusion paper, in Dream Psychology and the New Biology of Dreaming, Ed. Milton Kramer, Springfield, 1969 39 Dunlop, 1977, p.47 40 Flanagan, 1995, p.15 41 Flanagan, 1995, p.16

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The Primal Eye types of reptiles (such as Tuatara). Fish and amphibians rest but do not ‘sleep’ at all. Birds and more recently evolved reptiles have “robust NREM sleep and some REM sleep.” All mammals (save for the single exception of the strange egg-laying marsupial echidna) have both types of sleep.42 I have briefly mentioned Flanagan’s point that “sleeping in general is controlled by a clock”. I now wish to look at this topic more closely.43 Llinas and Ribary (1993), following work by F. Crick and C. Koch (1990)44, put forward a unitary hypothesis that “40 Hz activity (in the thalamo-cortical loop) provides the temporal binding of contentful states that involve 40 Hz oscillations in the areas devoted to particular modalities”. They write, “It is the dialogue between the thalamus and the cortex that generates subjectivity”.45 It this largely this speculation that leads Flanagan to his conclusions in Deconstructing Dreams. Yet this ‘dialogue’ (Flanagan’s PGO waves) is measurable electrically and chemically, whilst any “subjective” states or subjective p-dreams are not describable by using these methods. You might be able to tell the presence of p-dreams, but not their content. I agree with many of Flanagan’s points concerning the “restorative and /or energy conservation and/or body building functions” of NREM sleep. It is clear that the endocrine system re-adjusts all its levels during this time, and that new cell growth occurs for instance to repair the skin. Protein synthesis in the neocortex and the retina is faster during sleep than while awake. Naturally less food is needed for survival, the body having a lower metabolic rate while still and asleep. Research (see APPENDIX THREE, part two) on hibernation and sleep cycles is important here. As Flanagan points out, the biggest change between waking and NREM and REM sleep has to do with the different ratios of cholinergic

42

Flanagan, 1995, p.17 Flanagan, 1995, p.14 44 F. Crick & C. Koch, Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Seminars in the Neurosciences, II 1990, pp.263-75 45 Llinas and Ribrary, Coherent 40Hz Oscillation Characterises Dream State in Humans, Proc. Nat. Academy of Science, xc (1993), pp.2078-91 43

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience and aminergic neurochemicals. During REM, neurons known to release serotonin and norepinephrine (noradrenalin) stop producing, while neurons secreting acetycholine are on. “In particular, in waking, serotonin is working hard, as are dopamine and norepinephrine.”46 Flanagan links these observations to Posner and Petersens’ theory of attention which stresses the role of norepinephrine in activating both frontal and posterior cortical sub-systems, and further implicates both serotonin and norepinephrine in thermoregulation, as well as in cognitive learning, attention and memory.47 So Flanagan’s favoured hypothesis is that a major function of REM sleep is the “stockpiling” of serotonin and other neurotransmitters that the brain will require for the next day’s activities. Because of the massive reduction in firing, neurons involved with the production of neurotransmitters directly involved with attention become more quiet during NREM and rest completely during REM. This seems highly plausible. However, where I disagree with Flanagan is that “NREM and REM sleep were selected for and are maintained by selective pressures,” and count as bone fide biological adaptations - whilst the mental aspects (NREM mentation and REM dreams including lucid dreams) are “probably epiphenomena.”48 I would like to suggest that consciousness is still evolving (as of course there is ongoing bodily evolution) and that REM is a more advanced form of consciousness since the capacity to have it only appears recently in ‘higher’ animals. (I include all (E-1) animals in this ‘higher’ category, see APPENDIX ONE). If the REM sleep period fulfils the neurochemical needs of the brain and body and readies the body for the next day’s physical activity: why should not any REM mentation, in the same way by throwing up new permutations and mental variety, feed the conscious activity of the forthcoming day? The abreaction that occurs in p-dreams and under hypnosis may be associated with the “trash disposal” and consolidation processes mentioned by Flanagan.49

46

Flanagan, 1995, p.20 M.I. Posner & S.E. Petersen, The Attention System of the Human Brain, Annual Review of Neuroscience, XIII (1990), pp.25-42 48 Flannagan, 1995, p.21 49 Flanagan, 1995, p.23 47

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The Primal Eye

Flanagan (having previously declared that chemistry causes mentation and that this process is not reciprocal) naturally concludes that there is no reason, “as far as I can see, to think that the mentation caused by PGO waves is causally relevant to these processes.” I am not prepared rule out the pluralist possibility that “Soul and body, I suggest, react sympathetically upon each other: a change in state of the soul produces a change in the shape of the body, and conversely: a change in the shape of the body produces a change in the state of the soul.”50 I cannot think of any scientific test that could decide between these two propositions, and am not satisfied by Flanagan’s footnote remark that people deprived of sleep die because their immune systems break down. I do not dispute the physiological importance of sleep, and indeed am prepared to accept the priority of physiological processes above mental processes (no mentation can occur at all if the subject is dead). Flanagan goes on to concede that “awake mentation and NREM sleep mentation differ more in degree than kind,” and therefore that the cortex is able to make sense out of this information. Flanagan cannot dismiss NREM mentation as a spandrel without allowing all of consciousness to go the same way, and so he has to argue that REM mentation “differs in kind,” and even that it is closer to “psychosis” than it is to other types of mental states. Yet my rehearsal suggestion for the function of p-dreams gives a possible reason why even experiencing extreme and psychotic states might be useful for survival. By learning in REM dreams to differentiate between normal and extreme experience, an animal might be better prepared to deal with hallucinations caused by ingestion of poisons or from illness during waking life. The barriers of imagination are stretched and behavioural scope for the animal is widened. Flanagan includes a chapter on Conscious Inessentialism and the Epiphenomenalist Suspicion in his 1992 book which postulates the view

50

Aristotle, Physiognomics, Chapter 4, in CD-Rom Library of World Philosophy, 1996.

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience that “consciousness did not have to evolve”, and that the claim that “consciousness is not essential to highly evolved intelligent life”51 is true and important. This view is reined back as the chapter proceeds and Flanagan concludes that “subjective awareness plays a role in our mental lives,” but he is unsure to what extent it has importance. After weighing various experimental results and his commitment to a picture of massive neural connectivity, Flanagan thinks that “multifarious” causal roles might be attributed to phenomenal consciousness. “It is extremely implausible,” writes Flanagan, “that widely distributed conscious activity plays no significant causal role.”52 Flanagan recognises that evolutionary biology is a “crucial player”, and that “embedding the story of consciousness into theories of evolution (biological and cultural)” is important, alongside “amateurs,” he remarks, “let folk wisdom be put on the table along with everything else.”53 Much of what he says about evolution is interesting. I take issue though with his definition of what constitutes an “evolutionary proper function.”54 STRUCTURE and Consciousness At this point, a little more about median vision. The functional (and physical) gap left by the median eye supervenes on the brain similarly to the way the round hole supervenes on a donut. This I take to be supervenience of the mereological variety, in terms of whole-part-fusion. The hole is clearly different and distinct from the donut though the two are inseparable: the donut and hole are not dual-aspects of the same thing as Flanagan might claim. The “hole” must be a mental construct, since only the donut itself is physical. Presence of the hole depends on an observer, it is a conjecture, albeit a powerful and useful conjecture. The hole is completely dependent on, and takes its shape and existence from, the donut (substrate). To prove this, try to give a physical volume/quantity/mass to the hole. With the donut

51

Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, 1992, p.129 Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, 1992, p.151 53 Flannagan, 1995, p.8 54 Flannagan, 1995, p.10 52

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The Primal Eye you just need to weigh it, measure it and so forth. The hole however cannot be isolated and measured in such ways, and yet is still has a spatial location (given in terms of the substrate) and a temporal (it was there until I ate the donut) location or address (see APPENDIX ONE. 55). I will briefly relate this to the global workspace notion of Bernard Baars. Although similar to Dennett and Kinsbourne's 'multiple drafts' concept, the Baars theory originates more directly out of neurophysiological and functional analysis. In fact, we can go a step further than Baars and look at what the global workspace must contain. The answer is -- nothing! It is a virtual workspace, a neurological metaphor. The modules talk directly with one another, and the decision about which dominates is made by mutual inhibition. No machinery has to decide where the message goes, because it goes everywhere. Baars uses the metaphor of broadcasting rather than telephone-like links for this process. Each module is under local control and responds only to its immediate inputs.56 Thus my idea 57 is at once both naturalistic and non-physicalist. It rejects (the existence of, not necessarily the emotional needs of) any supernatural entities, deities or components, or Cartesian ‘ghosts’ in the machine. But, to use the final words from the Brainspotting TV (August 1996) series, “Even if the mind is nothing, its a real kind of magical nothing.” 58

55

56

S. Nichols, Mind the Gap, Post-human Publications, 1994

Bruce Bridgeman , What We Really Know About Consciousness:

Review of A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness by Bernard Baars, Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness 2(30), July 1996. 57

S. Nichols, Phantom Eye Theory, Post-human Publications, UK, 1980 (1992 edition). 58 Ken Cambell, Brainspotting, C4 TV, Sunday 25th August, 1996

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience Colin McGinn (and to some extent David Chalmers) agree that consciousness (including dreams) is a natural phenomenon, but think it is of a fundamentally non-interpretable nature. Flanagan, and I agree with him, is constructive in that he thinks if we could see the whole picture, we could understand in more specific terms what is happening with the particulars of consciousness. Shallice makes the point that Darwin was at a loss to explain similarities between flora of South America, Africa and Australia which should, according to evolution, have meant that the three regions were close geographically. This phenomenon only became comprehensible after the discovery of the theory of continental drift. 59 McGinn’s ‘program’ leads (if it leads anywhere) to defeat. Part of the whole picture, missed by Flanagan, is that a lack of spatial and temporal constraint is necessary for self-organisation to occur in the brain. REM states, which followed on the disappearance of the median eye in evolution, allowed self-organisation within the brain on a far greater scale that had previously been the case. In Chapter Six I shall look at this notion more fully. TYPES of VISION Plants go into flower according to measurement of daylight. Even out of ‘season’ they will start to flower if exposure time to light is artificially adjusted - this seems to be an involuntary, non-conscious response on behalf of the plant. Like animals: a plant’s behaviour switches during the night. Phototropism must be about the earliest example of light sensitive behaviour, and could be claimed as a rudimentary form of vision (“light detection and tracking”). Some experts claim that thirty-week old foetuses go through phases of REM-ing (I am careful not to say REM sleep) twenty-four hours a day. Flanagan makes a connection (which I think might be a good one) between the larger percentage of REM sleep that occurs during the development of young in mammals than occurs in adult mammals - and the idea that this

59

Tim Shallice, From neuropsychology to mental structure, CUP, 1988, footnote, p.381

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The Primal Eye might be important in building and strengthening cortical connections, particularly in the visual system, that had not finished developing during the foetal stages. 60 I wish to suggest a possible function for rapid eye movements based on Menaker’s (1985) 61 paper, Eyes, the second (and third) pineal glands? My conjecture is that REM in lateral eyes plays a part in the new duties of melatonin production (linked to photoperiodism) that lateral eyes had to play after the pineal eye had disappeared. Accompanying REM mentation might well simulate the previous mental states that would have accompanied night time experience during (E-2) earlier evolutionary stages (see APPENDIX FOUR). I am working towards a position, in stark contrast to Flanagan’s epiphenomenalism, that you may be more essentially you in a dream than when you are awake. Foetal stages, and early post-natal life, are largely spent in REM state. The waking ‘conscious self’ has to be constructed out of this foundation, in the sense that infants need to learn to see in 3-D (images on the retina have only two dimensions) and to locate themselves, their bodies, limbs and hand-eye co-ordination, in the external world. It is the same ‘self’ or conscious identity that was dreaming that opens its eyes to be bombarded with stimuli from the environment which the motor systems and so on must address. There are other people and agents to react to, and consciousness is restrained and constrained by the increased environmental demands, whereas when asleep abstract thought is relatively untrammelled. 62 Somehow we must retain enough vigilance to wake, either in an emergency, or in the normal course of events when it is dawn. Flanagan points out that John Locke 63 recognised deep sleep to be a problem, since he wanted to differentiate between the Cartesian idea that consciousness constitutes essence and his favoured notion that consciousness “grounds”

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Flanagan, 1995, p.20 M. Menaker, Eyes, the second (and third) pineal glands?, CIBA Symposium Proceedings, March 1985, pp.78-93 62 I shall develop this case further in the conclusion. 63 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, CD-rom of World Philosophy 61

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MA dreaming 4: Issues in Neuroscience the sense of identity.64 It is universally agreed that the brain does not shut down altogether. Locke’s, and Flanagan’s, postulation is that consciousness is absent during deep sleep, and so consciousness cannot be the essence of an entity (as Descartes might have it) since the entity would cease to be if the essence (consciousness) ceased to be.65 My view (see APPENDIX TWO) is that phenomenal consciousness might slow down drastically when asleep, but since the ancient median eye could not be closed, consciousness always remains at some level if the being is alive (and not brain-dead). If dreams are a leftover from the reptilian median-vision night experience, then they are also the flip-side of conscious waking experience. During daylight, the lateral eyes bridge the gap of stimuli previously provided by the pineal eye. Animals can now tell it is dusk by using lateral vision in conjunction with the new cortical structures, perhaps confirming this by sensing (through the skin) an accompanying drop in air temperature. These various clues are collated together to provide the animal with an accurate picture of the external world, whereas in previous generations the hormonal commands, for example for skin pigmentation to change to night-camouflage, would have come directly and unmediated by ‘consciousness’ (or abstract modelling or sensory collation) directly from sunlight acting chemically on the pineal eye. It seems the plant’s behaviour pattern is not amenable to selfregulation, or self-organisation by the individual organism. Humans (as we have seen from St. Augustine and his problem with penile erections) are not entirely in charge of their bodily processes: but they do have much more capacity for self-organisation of their behaviour than do plants or indeed primitive reptiles. Neuroscience seems correct to look for correlations between (local and general) neuronal activity and shifts in perception and in behaviour. Our brains can rewire themselves (plasticity is particularly high during formative years) as they develop problem-solving methods and survival strategies in response to demands of the environment. The brain also self-organises information,66 by using neural circuits with lateral

64

Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, p.157 Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, p.157 66 For some purposes this might be considered the same as the ‘paths’ for the signals, since the paths are not differentiated from one another before the signal exists: 65

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The Primal Eye inhibition, reinforcement learning, interactive activation and competition (IAC)67, and by other local mechanisms. The reason for rapid eye movements themselves presents a problem for Flanagan. He thinks they also might be epiphenomena, a useless leftover from evolution, in the same way he regards p-dreams. However, his earlier argument that rest was the main reason for sleep is true, and it is hard to see how the eyes are ‘resting’ during REM. There is some evidence that movement of the eyes corresponds with what is being looked at in pdreams. Dennett refers to an example from Foulkes (1966) where a person whose REM patterns during a given experiment were predominantly vertical, on being woken up reported a dream of picking basketballs up off the floor and throwing them into baskets. A subject with predominantly horizontal REM on waking reported a dream of watching two people throwing tomatoes at each other.68 Other experiments have linked eye movements with hypnosis. 69

distribution of neurons is global, or at least wide-spread. Frequency of use might identify one ‘path’ from another. 67 S. Nichols, Interactive Activation and Competition Networks in Game Playing, MSc Dissertation, CCCN, University of Stirling, 1993. 68 David Foulkes, The Psychology of Sleep, NY, 1966, in Dunlop (Ed.), p.229 69 Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, 1994, p.58-9

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MA Dreaming 5: Levels of Organisation CHAPTER FIVE: Levels ff Organisation The key question, as I see it, of normal waking conscious phenomena, as well as of p-dreaming, is how is the brain able to self-organise intelligently? Dennett is correct in pointing out that much is (apparent) nonsense in dreams and seems ‘unedited’ or incomplete in some way. Flanagan is right to identify some likenesses between dreams and ‘system noise.’ And I go along with Flanagan’s connection between REM sleep and the decreased output of ‘attentional’ neurotransmitters. The lack of conscious (attentional, memory and learning) powers seems consistent with Dennett’s observations of ruptured and absurd (internal/subjective) narratives.70 The ability to organise thoughts is lessened, but has not completely disappeared, either in NREM or REM sleep. Flanagan’s biological support for his notion of p-dreams being a spandrel is summarised by his point that “the brain stem is designed 71 to activate the visual system to finish building it during the first year of life. Once the system is built, the continuation of the activation of the visual system serves no obvious further developmental function.” 72 He goes on to say the “visual, auditory, propositional and sensorymotor mentation that occurs [during REM] is mostly noise.” Some of this

70

Dennet, Are Dreams Experiences, in Dunlop, p.235 My italics here 72 Flanagan, 1995, p.23 71

MA Dreaming 5: Levels of Organisation noise is useful material and not weird, which Flanagan calls “the so-called residue” …“that makes occasional appearances.”73 He thinks, and I agree, that “the [organism when asleep] is designed to be relatively insensitive to outside noise, but it would be a pathetic survival design if it were completely oblivious to outside noise. “ Dripping taps and passing cars are noticed only in a degraded way, and might present themselves in dreams as “a growling predator at your campsite.”74 However, a genuinely frightening dream will cause you to wake up. If the ‘growling predator’ suddenly leaps at you in your dream, it might be wise (for survival in the dream) to wake up. On waking up75 you might realise that there is a police-siren, or that traffic noise is too great and so you walk over to close the window. Just because dreams use seemingly nonsensical (once we have woken up and re-examined them) symbols does not mean they carry no emotional message. Phenomenal dreams may, as Flanagan freely admits, “get you thinking in a certain way upon waking,” 76 and are useful for self-knowledge. The background or capacity for having mental representations remains with us all the time, and waking experience is the addition of input from the senses. This background capacity, or ground, is the legacy of our having lost our earliest physical sensory input channel. Fish and amphibians, whose pineal apparatus would have been intact, experience only a single kind of brain state (probably with only a single type of attentional or mental state). Primitive reptiles, whose pineal eye is in a state of atrophy, but where it has not fully disappeared and continues to function particularly in the young, experience normal brain-states, together with NREM, presumably with NREM mentations. It is only in animals (including birds

73

Flanagan, 1995, p.24 Flanagan, 1995, p.24 75 “up” - seems to me a folk psychological term which associates waking with “rising.” Sleep (and hence dreams?) are identified with a prone position, and so labels like “deep sleep” and “sub-conscious.” This metaphor stretches to ideas of thoughts ‘rising’ from brain-stem to cortex (as in the Triune brain theory) and of lower and higher ‘levels’ of consciousness (or development, societal position, and so on). 76 Flanagan, 1995, p.26 74

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The Primal Eye and modern reptiles) that have completely lost the median eye that REM sleep, and any accompanying mentation, occurs. My idea is that the REM state, and any accompanying dream mentation, might represent an adaptation or a new stage in the evolution of consciousness. This idea is not found anywhere in Flanagan (or elsewhere to my knowledge) and if shown to be the case would refute his proposed ‘solution’ to his fourth question. At night there is an absence of lateral vision (our eyes are closed) although I suggest there might be some stimulation of the retina by pressure (against the eyelids) during REM, and indeed NREM sleep from which ‘noise’ might arise. Since there is no external visual (or auditory) input, any such phenomena must be ‘self’ or ‘intrinsically’ generated. Yet it is not claimed, even by Flanagan, that pdreams are entirely random. Dennett points out there is a “third process,” what he terms the composition of what is presented and recorded. “In various ways, this process exhibits intelligence: dream stories are usually coherent and realistic ... and are often gripping, complex, and of course loaded with symbolism. Dream composition utilises the dreamer’s general and particular knowledge ... recent and distant experience, and is guided in familiar ways by fears and desires, covert and overt.” 77 Bi-cameral theory considers dreams to be a symbolic manifestation of a learning and consolidation process and interchange between logical and emotional ideas of behaviour, left and right hemispheres. The purpose of the dreaming process is “resolution of any discrepancies between these ideas which would otherwise prevent their symbiosis.” 78 This idea cannot be proven, but victims of the WW1 phenomena of shell-shock (PTSD) undeniably respond well to abreaction79 treatment under hypnosis.

77

Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, in Dunlop, p.233 Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, 1994, p.87 79 Joseph Breuer in 1882 discovered that by encouraging patients in deep hypnosis to re-tell their problems, many symptoms would disappear or be relieved. He called this method “cathartic”, involving ‘the re-direction of accumulated affect, which had been stuck on the wrong [narrative] lines, on to a normal path along which it could obtain discharge or abreaction.’ From S. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, in Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, 1994 78

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MA Dreaming 5: Levels of Organisation Dreams, in Pedersen’s view, are “a re-run of past events in which the events are relived in symbolic form by the right hemisphere.” By this process, emotional right-brain feelings are abreacted, and become reassociated with the more ‘rational’ left hemisphere.80 This view of dream mentation seems to fit with Dennett’s picture better than Flanagan’s, since it is the phenomenal or presenting experience of being able to ‘re-run’ (or in my view, abstractly model, which incorporates both rehearsal and abreaction) life events that allows us a narrative structure. Flanagan stresses that “mentation caused by the PGO waves” is not “causally implicated in the neurochemical stockpiling of amines (serotonin, norepinephrine, etc.)” and that p-dreaming or mentation does not (obviously) help select “the right circuits” in the brain to be worked on. But Flanagan has stated previously in the same paragraph that the mentation “is caused by” the PGO waves, and so cannot the mentation cannot be “causally relevant to these [physiological] processes,” 81 without logical contradiction. If a mentally vivid and disturbing dream can cause the recipient to wake up, then at the very least this shows the mentation has a veto over Flanagan’s restorative stockpiling processes. In my opinion, a veto power over a process counts as causative. We have seen how serotonin-melatonin (see APPENDIX THREE) is a main binding agent involved in the processes of attention. In modern animals it is produced from signals originating internally. In the distant evolutionary past (and today, in a few rare walking fossils), it was produced by external environmental and solar signals from the median eye. The next chapter expands on this point by trying to show the prerequisites for any circuit (either mechanical-electronic or bio-electrical varieties) to be able to self-organise in response to demands from the environment.

80 81

Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, 1994, p.101 Flanagan, 1995, p.23

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MA Dreaming 6: Finite to InfiniteState CHAPTER SIX: From Finite to Infinite-state Machines In the course of writing this dissertation I have been in correspondence with Adrian Thompson, of COGS at University of Sussex. His paper Silicon Evolution (1996) reinforces some thoughts I have about the inverse proportionate relationship between the absence of the pineal eye and a corresponding increase in mental capabilities, or mental self-organisation (see APPENDIX ONE). It is clear that the findings regards hardware evolution using genetic algorithms can only give a pointer to how the brain evolved in evolution. Nevertheless, some underlying principles seem to apply in both instances. New types of reconfigurable integrated circuits (notably the XC6200 family from Xilinx Inc., 1995 82) have made it possible to produce evolution intrinsically using a real physical substrate to produce new electronic circuits evaluated in the real world. This intrinsic hardware evolution is in contrast to ‘extrinsic’ examples, where a simulation model is used, with “only the final configuration being downloaded onto the chip.”83 Thompson makes the valid point that “evolution uses no model-

82

@INCOLLECTION xili:96, Xilinx Inc., BOOKTITLE The Programmable Logic Data Book, TITLE XC6200 Advanced Product Specification V1.0 1996 83 A. Thompson, Silicon Evolution, Proc. of Genetic Programming, MIT press, 1996, p.445

MA Dreaming 6: Finte to Infinite-State ing, abstraction or analysis”, and unlike human designers allows “only physical behaviour.”84 Most real physical electronic circuits are continuous-time dynamical systems. These are finite-state machines. They calculate answers to problems, but do not properly evolve and reconfigure themselves in this process. Although aiming for unconstrained spatial and temporal structures, care has to be taken to prevent “transients” from affecting the system’s overall behaviour. This is done by making sure that “one part of the system does not influence the rest until any transient dynamics have died down.” 85 The Thompson type of electronic system design reconsiders both the “spatial structure (modularity)86 and the temporal structure (synchronisation and the role of phase in general). The new reconfigurable hardware is a continuous-time, analogue, dynamical electronic system: “a primordial soup of resources to be exploited.”87 This results in an infinite-state computer, more like a human brain. In the new hardware the “phase of the system does not have to be advanced in lock-step by a global clock, nor even the local phasecontrolling mechanisms of asynchronous digital design methodologies.”88 Transients occur in circuits designed “at the abstraction level of digital boolean logic” by humans who must use a clock or “some other means of enforced phase control.” Thompson writes to me 89 “In my technique, there aren’t any transients because all of the dynamics are potentially part of the useful behaviour of the system in performing the

84

Adrian Thomson, Abstract -Silicon Evolution, Proc. of Genetic Programming, MIT press, 1996. 85 A. Thompson, I. Harvey, & P. Husbands, Unconstrained Evolution and Hard Consequences, December 1995, to appear in Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1996, p.14 86 Tim Shallice, p.307 87 Adrian Thompson, Silicon Evolution, Proc. of Genetic Programming, MIT Press, 1996, pp.444-452 88 A. Thompson, I. Harvey, & P. Husbands, Unconstrained Evolution and Hard Consequences, December 1995, p.16 89 E/mail, 2nd Sept 1996

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The Primal Eye desired task.” Thomspon’s experiments seem to demonstrate that once “unessential dynamical constraints have been removed,” evolution alone can sculpt the dynamics of the system so that “the overall behaviour is appropriate.”90 Having noted possible dangers of pursuing computational analogies, I wish to make a few observations following Thompson’s experiments. Firsly I want to cast some doubt on Flanagan’s claim that a constantly dynamic evolutionary system would retain an entirely useless epiphenomena (p-dreams) over millions of successive generations. Thompson makes the important observation that “any kind of modularity that is appropriate to evolution could be very different to that arising in design by humans. Conventional notions of modularity should not be imposed upon an evolving circuit; although human and evolutionary decomposition may sometimes coincide.”91 The fact that Flanagan has failed to identify any specific function for REM p-dreams does not mean they are pretty, but pointless, epiphenomena. It can been seen (APPENDIX ONE) that the median eye largely governed thermoregulatory behaviour of early (ectothermic)animals. It is obviously necessary that ectothermic thermoregulatory control had to go, or loosen, before warm-bloodedness could evolve, although there almost certainly was a cross-over period. This example seems analogous to the experimental cases where constraints need to be removed (or designed out in the first place) to allow the system to exhibit greater self-organisation. Gradual or even relatively sudden freedom from external synchronisation (see APPENDIX ONE &THREE) loosened the restraints on the (primitive) organism from direct and involuntary ‘lock-step’ control by environmental or external time and gives a ‘workspace’ for p-time, psychological, perceptual or phenomenal time. We do not have to wait until spring, or some particular solar or lunar phase to be able to breed. We can

90

Adrian Thomson, Silicon Evolution, Proc. of Genetic Programming, MIT press, 1996, 3.2 91 Thompson, Silicon evolution, 3.1

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MA Dreaming 6: Finte to Infinite-State choose for ourselves when to breed, as do other mammals.92 Both external objective and psychological time can be measured (there have been many experiments taking measures of psychological time): both are real. I agree with Flanagan that something like Crick and Koch’s 40hz unifying hypothesis might be correct. 93 This activity in the non-specific thalamo-cortical loop is claimed to provide temporal binding of contentful states (involving this oscillation) in areas devoted to particular modalities. Resonating activity provides “the temporal binding of such content into a single cognitive experience evoked either by external stimuli, or, intrinsically during dreaming.”94 Thompson’s experiments with reconfigurable hardware do seem to imply “a certain degree of regularity in the oscillation.”95 A major claim in this dissertation is that the brain of most species of animals, since the Mesozoic age, has been in transition from a finitestate machine to an infinite-state machine, to gain advantages from the capacity for self-organisation and intelligent reconfiguration. In conjunction with jettisoning the heat-sensitive and thermoregulatory functions of the median eye: the light-sensitive, day and season length measuring, brain phase regulating functions of the median eye were also lost. Selforganisation might only have occurred by losing the spatial and temporal constraints imposed by the median eye. Which of these parallel events was biological adaptation, and which if any mere serendipitous side-effect, is open to question. What seems interesting to me is that REM states might occur only in species

92

Albeit this does not deny that some preponderance to breed more in certain phases of the year might still persist. Certain of our bodily processes and responses are ‘vegetative’ or ‘pre-conscious’. 93 F. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Seminars in the neurosciences, II, 1990, pp.263-275 94 Llinas & Ribrary, Coherent 40hz oscillation characterizes dream state in humans, Proc. Nat. Acad. Of Science, XC, 1993, p.2081 95 Thompson’s experiments demonstrate that the population (of G.A.s) “quickly converges on the desired frequency,” and that the population is “not just converging upon an individual which was already in the initial population: the maximum fitness in the population, as well as the mean, increases over time.” Silicon evolution, 5 experiment 2.

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The Primal Eye which have had, and lost, a median eye.96 I need to spend some time researching whether this is actually the case. Flanagan admits that the “incredible prospect” that living human beings “might always be in some experiential state or other,” might be true. But median vision theory would reckon it likely rather than not that “we are never wholly unconscious - if that is, 40hz patterns are sufficient for experience.”97

96

In tuatara, young animals retain median eye functions, which are later lost during adulthood. In human ontogeny, REM takes place more of the time in embryos and infants than it does in adults. 97 Flanagan , 1995, footnote p.10. There is further interesting discussion about whether REM conforms to the 40hz oscillation pattern, and some details about experience of sleepwalkers to be found here.

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MA Dreaming: Conclusions CONCLUSION There is much interesting material on computational analogies, including the observations of random off-line firings of neural networks that Crick and others have likened to dreaming, which I do not have space to examine in this dissertation. Flanagan (1995) touches upon the hypothesised function of REM sleep involvement in “disk maintenance, compression, trash disposal and memory consolidation.”98 The idea of creating backups of data, or “saves” linked to the idea that waking memory reactivation requires reactivation of neural networks whose weightings or structures have been changed,99 is also touched upon, but not developed by Flanagan. In this section I wish to draw together some strands of thought from my earlier suggestions that REM subjective phenomena has a much more primal and central role that Flanagan recognises. Night-time is spent dealing with things you can’t properly see. Ancient reptiles would have retained the capacity to detect movements (of predators or prey) and shifts in light because their median eye always remained open. P-dreams, for us, also contain uncertainty, things we can’t quite figure out or make clear sense from, glimpses of ‘latent’ painful events we are trying to hide or lost pleasant memories we are trying to find, fleeting mental shadows and cryptic plots. The unknown gives rise naturally to speculation: and in thisconclusion I intend to be more speculative than in preceding chapters.

98 99

F. Crick & G. Mitchison, The Function of Dream Sleep, Nature CCCIV, 1983 Flanagan, p.21

MA Dreaming: Conclusions

First to revisit St. Augustine. It is not disputed (by Augustine, Dennett, or Flanagan) that p-dreams allow more freedom than does waking consciousness. In a dream we can jump from being in China to being in Leeds, fly through the sky on a camel, or have sex with a supermodel. I have outlined the case that this is because consciousness is untrammelled by demands to respond to waking stimuli. This greater scope and freedom is also possible because subjective thoughts are not constrained by what is ‘forbidden’ or disapproved of by peers, other minds, or society. In dreams you are free to think forbidden thoughts ... forbidden during conscious waking experience ... and this greater freedom, by my reading of it, implies a more unconstrained ‘self’ and less external mask (or learned, conditioned or social behaviour). Galen believed the function of the mind to be to filter out the flood of largely irrelevant information bombarding us, leaving what is useful to know (see APPENDIX THREE, section one). One could speculate that REM pdreams are the result of a flood of information without, or with weakened, self-censorship. Flanagan might well be wrong about dreams being spandrels: if only because mental stimulation is a useful, even an essential, function fulfilled by p-dreams. Learning studies (when awake) have shown that human or mammal, infants or adults, will thrive on a rich diet of mental stimulation, and will become ineffective or retarded given no stimulation. Dreams might help keep our sleeping metabolism ‘in tone’ by the simple virtue of not allowing the sleeper to become bored. The effectiveness of sleep learning reinforces the connection and unity between sleeping and waking consciousness. One technique utilised in sleep learning is thinking of the subject we are trying to learn during the moments leading up to sleep. This prior to sleeping technique has had greater success than listening to tape-recording when fully asleep (as rightly disparaged by Dennett) 100.

100

Dennett, p.239 briefly discusses, and disputes the effectiveness of, taped recordings of textbooks played to sleeping students.

106

The Primal Eye To some extent, NREM mentation is a continuation of waking thought, and even REM p-dreaming may be determined partly by the deliberate conscious processes during the lead-up to sleep. Would Flanagan suggest that ‘play’ is also a spandrel, since like pdreams, play in childhood has no immediate survival pay-back? Because he can find no short-term, obvious function, Flanagan concludes that REM pdreams are pointless. However, just as play gives infants a chance to rehearse behaviours and mental roles that might be useful later in life, so pdreaming might furnish the individual with a wider and richer mental repertoire. If Flanagan is right that p-dreaming was not a biological adaptation but an accidental secondary effect: then consciousness likewise might be explainable as a serendipitous side-effect of the evolutionary process of losing the median eye, which could have been for other survival reasons entirely. Consciousness might by this account be a side effect of the evolutionarily useful new ability to be able to self-regulate body temperature and thus to move about during the night when ectothermic predators were docile and immobilised. I do not agree with Flanagan that you can buy the epiphenomenalist suspicion just for p-dreaming and not for the rest of consciousness phenomena. Even granting Flanagan that p-dreaming (and perhaps selfawareness) might have started out as epiphenomena: this does not entail they necessarily must remain so for all time. Even if we have invented (or if have come about according to Flanagan’s account of non-biological functional adaptiveness 101) extra uses for p-dreaming: then these new devices after a period, might come to count as a (biological) adaptation. Flanagan offers no clear time-scale, or a definition which is satisfactory to me between what counts as a biological adaptation, and what he counts as non-biological adaptation.

101

Flanagan, p.22

107

MA Dreaming: Conclusions Another problem for Flanagan, I believe, is his concession that “phenomenal dreams make a difference” because they “may get you thinking in a certain way upon waking.”102 As a result of my ‘grandfather dream’ I have spent more time than usual today thinking about death (of my grandfather, and in general). In other words, my conscious thought has been shaped or influenced by my pdreaming experiences. If p-dreams prime and influence waking behaviour in the ways that Flanagan admits, then I think serious doubt is cast on his central claim that p-dreams are irrelevant epiphenomena. I think that Flanagan is by-and-large correct in his analysis of the restorative properties of sleep, but I wish to put forward a further notion that p-dreaming might be useful for calibration. The infant has to build a model of the external world103, and intelligence seems a measure of how accurate our various psychological models are tested against reality. If I believe that a sharp metal axe, when struck against a tree, will result in the tree being toppled - and I carry out the action and am proven correct - then my psychological or abstract supposition has been successfully tested. In some critical situations we might not have the luxury of a trial run and might have to go with our best abstract conceptual model untested. It is important for survival then that our abstract conceptualisation matches real-world outcomes as closely as possible, and dreams seem to be part of this reality-testing. We in particular cannot test our long term emotional strategies in relationships in the world without risk of upsetting or destroying these relationships. The MVT model does not require any radical departure in neuropsychology, but does stress the study of the evolutionary effects following the disappearance of the pineal eye within the general neuroscientific program. REM might have been a new state made possible in the brain of the new species of reptiles and paleomammals because of the evolutionary process of the replacement of median vision by self-organisation. That

102

Flanagan, p.26 For example, 3-D vision is a psychological process, and limb-coordination in 3-D space has to be ‘learnt’.

103

108

The Primal Eye could have allowed fantasy, creative modelling and weird embellishments,104 It may have been a biological adaptation or an accidental sideeffect. Unfortunately we cannot re-run evolution to test my account of the origins of dreaming against Flanagan’s or any other model, but work such as with infinite-state reconfigurable circuits can offer us a huge clue. Steve

Nichols,

Leeds,

4th

104

September,

1996

I agree with Flanagan’s remark that p-dreams (spandrels) are not “nonfunctional”, but do not share his emphasis. He claims they can be “worked into all sorts of creative and fun things we have learned to do in our lives,” and that although the phenomenal side of (waking) vision can be ascribed an adaptionist account, this does not follow for p-dreaming. Flanagan (1995) p.24

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MA Dreaming: Appendixes & Bibliography APPENDIXES: Note – I have lost the original format of appendixes, but have added them at the very end of the book in a modified and expanded format. Appendix One outlines Median Vision Theory in general. Appendix Two briefly outlines MVT as an explanation of dreaming. Appendix Three details the history and physiology of the pineal gland. Appendix Four gives references for experiments and data on the pineal (median) eye. Appendix Five touches upon links between phantom sensations of all kinds, synaesthesia, and a neurological and perceptual theory of self that accounts for these diverse phenomena. Appendix Six briefly examines some competing views held by leading neuroscientists. Appendix Seven looks at some competing views in the philosophy of mind.

Bibliography (BOOKS) David L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994 Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1992

MA Dreaming Appendixes & Bibliography Charles E.M. Dunlop (Ed.), Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, Cornell University Press, 1977 William G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and Cognition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (1995 edition) P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, H.W. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy X, University Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1986 Stephen Everson (Ed.), Psychology: Companions to Ancient Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1991 M. Davies & G.W. Humphreys (Eds.), Consciousness, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993 Tim Shallice, From neuropsychology to mental structure, Cambridge University Press, 1988 Harry Jerison, Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence, Academic Press, 1973 E.A. Wallis-Budge, Osiris & the Egyptian Resurrection, Vol II, Dover Publications, 1911 Classic Library of World Philosophy CD-ROM vol.1, Ed. S. Nichols, Actual Reality Publications, Leeds, 1996

Bibliography (Articles) John O. Nelson, Stroud's Dream Argument Critique, Philosophy 68, 1993, 473-482 Gareth B. Matthews, On Being Immoral in a Dream, Philosophy 56, 1981, 47-54 Owen Flanagan, Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, Journal of Philosophy, XC11, Vol.1, January 1995, 5-27 William E. Mann, Dreams of Immorality, Philosophy 58, 1983, pp.378-385 112

The Primal Eye Harvey Mullane, Defence, Dreams and Rationality, Synthese 57, 1983, 187-203 J. F. M. Hunter, The Difference between Dreaming and Being Awake, Mind, Vol. XCII, 1983, 80-93 Adrian Thompson, Silicon Evolution, Proc. of Genetic Programming, MIT press, 1996 S. Nichols, Interactive Activation and Competition Networks in Game Playing, MSc Dissertation, CCCN, University of Stirling, 1993. [also see my article GENETICALGORITHMS and GAME THEORY] M. Menaker, Eyes, the second (and third) pineal glands?, CIBA Symposium Proceedings, March 1985 Susan Blackmore, Lucid Dreaming: Awake in Your Sleep?, The Sceptical Inquirer, Vol. 15, 1991 A. Thompson, I. Harvey & P. Husbands, Unconstrained Evolution and Hard Consequences, December 1995, to appear in Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1996 Thomas Nagel, The Mind Wins, New York Review, March 4, 1993

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Evolutionary Evidence E-1 and E-2 Physiology (PhD DRAFT) INTRODUCTION Median Vision (AKA Phantom Eye) Theory provides a simple and unitary account for the origins of phenomenal consciousness and selforganizing behavioural capacity in vertebrates. Along with many competing theories in this field it has suffered from the difficulty of lack of any way of testing its claims experimentally. Events and conditions that occurred 400m years ago are not easily replicated, and fossil evidence regarding soft-tissue structures (brain tissue and pineal eyes) is relatively thin on the ground. This area of research has only expanded in very recent times, the key to modern median eye theory being Edinger's (1955) successful rejection of the widespread scientific opinion that the fossil record could not reveal the condition of even the presence of parietal (median) eyes. MVT arises from experimental evidence from studies on the median eyes of living reptiles [see Median Vision Experiments] as well as from nonexperimental observations of natural phenomena. It is an evolutionary biological theory, and therefore is open, in all or part, to verification or refutation. In common with competing views such as Jerison's Recency Theory, there are inherent difficulties in designing experiments to test events that largely occurred millions of years ago. However, it seems indisputable that the E-2 complex in living vertebrates is derived from brain structures dating back to jawless fishes of the Ordovician.

Evolutionary Evidence A priority of effort has been to identify any promising avenue of experimental research that might support or refute the main predictions and implications of MVT. I propose two such possible avenues. First of all, recent results using new types of reconfigurable hardware [such as the XC6200 family from Xilinx Inc., 1995] have allowed evolutionary processes to be 'sculpted' directly rather than 'modelled' or simulated. Adrian Thompson writes that "The nice thing about my circuits is that I impose no constraints on them at all - just those inherent in the medium. So they don't have to look like anything we're used to. Maybe they're more like the brain than models of the brain are! Or maybe not." The main testable claim arising from MVT in relation to the [Silicon Evolution] and [Unconstrained Evolution and Hard Consequences] findings is that the brain's of E-2 animals experiment (I suggest, using Californian yellow-tailed E-2 lizards and E-1 controls) will have more properties more akin to a finite-state, phase-controlled system than those of similar E-1 animals. The second avenue for concerns comparison of the REM properties exhibited by similar species E-2 and E-1 animals. This could be explored relatively by looking across a range of different species, and correlating degrees of absence of parietal eye-tissue with amount of time (if any) in REM states. MVT would expect that E-2 animals exhibited less or no observable REM compared with E-1 species. As well as comparison between species I am interested in comparing young and adult animals of the same E-2 species, where the young animal has a functioning parietal eye, and where the eye has become covered by skin or dysfunctional in the adult animal. The evidence from [Silicon Evolution] does not demonstrate consciousness (after all, RGA circuits are not conscious), but the presence of REM - with all of its rich accompanying mentation and dream fantasy - probably is indicative of 'consciousness' in an animal. REM is such a powerful, rich and varied source of mentation that I suggest [see MA dissertation] REM is a good indicator of “consciousness” being possessed by species that exhibit [REM states]. Some researchers think that during certain foetal stages REM in humans can occur up to 24 hours a day, and the importance of REM to ontogeny might lend some support to [Globus’ REAL-TIME hypothesis]. My linking of this idea with [MENAKER] indicates that melatonin production may have largely 116

The Primal Eye transferred from pineal eye to lateral eyes after E-2 to E-1 transition during the reptile-paleomammalian interface of the Mesozoic. REM was a new adaptation, and represents a new stage in the evolution of [CONSCIOUSNESS]. Combined with the findings from [Thompson] that show that external clocks prevent (or mightily inhibit) circuits from self-organising, a consequence of the loss of the median eye in most vertebrates [see climatic reasons for loss], there is a clear case to be made that the loss of the pineal eye was either (1) essential for consciousness to occur, [WEAK Median Vision Theory] or (2) led directly to consciousness [STRONG Phantom Eye hypothesis]. LOSS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PINEAL EYE: Anomalies, possibilities and disputes All vertebrates, surviving and extinct, respond to their environments according to the perception and integration of stimuli by sensory organs. The pineal body and median eye, together referred to as the epiphyseal complex, functions as an environmental sensor, and its importance as an evolutionary adaptation is demonstrated by its continued existence, in all or part, in both modern and fossil vertebrates. <(a) p. 189> The median eye owes its name to its midline location between two parietal bones. A foramen in the skull leads from the eye to the pineal gland (epiphysis cerebri), which in turn is connected to the habenula in the diencephalon. <(b) p. 90> The existence of the parietal foramen in fossils indicates the presence of the median eye, whilst the pineal body is indicated by the sculpturing of the intracranial roof. The presence of both eye and body is described as an E-2 condition, their absence as an E-O condition, and a pineal body (in living species) or an intracranial impression only in fossils represents an E-1 condition. <(a) p. 189> The E-1 condition is found in most modern bony fish, birds, mammals (including all primates), and in lizards living near the equator (primarily geckos and teiids). Maclean identifies five key questions involved the physiological and behavioural evolutionary transition from therapsids to true mammals. The first and perhaps fundamental question is:

117

Evolutionary Evidence (1) Were the therapsids warm- or cold-blooded? Other questions are (2) Were they capable of communicative displays? (3) Was there evidence of egg laying or parental care? (4) Were the therapsids able to hear and to vocalise? And (5) What was the size and form of the brain? <(b) p.89> No unique function has been identified for the pineal body or median eye. I shall look at these further key questions in relation to evidence that, like the pituitary, the pineal may have many functions (Hamasaki and Eder, 1977). Steyn (1961) and Brink (1963) have explored aspects of pineal function in fossil vertebrates. Olson (1976) has made important comparisons , specifically that the initial evolution of a large median eye, inferred from foramina, appears to be an important adaptation to terrestrial life among certain large, slow-moving herbivorous animals. Research on mammals (Reiter 1977), birds (Binkley et al, 1971; Ralph 1975) and reptiles (Levey 1973; Stebbins 1970; Underwood 1977) "has consistently demonstrated an involvement of the pineal in reproduction and in the control of circadian rhythms." <(a) p. 191> Paleoclimates and the Aquatatic-Terrestrial Thermal Barrier (from Roth & Roth) The existence of broad patterns of Climatic Change over geologic time have been established on the basis of the distributions of climatically limited faunas and floras, from evidence of glaciations, and from isotopically determined paleotemperatures. Estimates of pre-Permian isotopic temperatures are not available, due to the general lack of suitably preserved materials. However, widespread cool climates are indicated for the late Paleozoic by the evidence of extensive southern hemisphere glaciations. Few data are available for the Triassic, but there is general agreement, based on faunal, floral, and isotopic data that Jurassic climates were much more equable than those that preceded them. More extensive cooler climates became established in the Cretaceous, initiating a broad decline in equability that would continue up until the Pleistocene glaciation. The values for most isotopic paleotemperatures are based on marine fossils and sediments, but a similar broad pattern for terrestrial environments is shown for ancient lakes (Fig. 4) by Keith and Weber (1964). 118

The Primal Eye In any discussion dealing with the evolution of thermal physiology, it is important to emphasize that the mechanisms of body temperature regulation are flexible. The adaptive thermal repertoire of any species has evolved in response to natural selection exerted by particular, gradually changing thermal conditions of the environment. Under such conditions, both ectothermy and endothermy are successful body temperature regulating strategies, which meet the specific demands of each species' unique circumstances. It is probable that vertebrates were faced by variable thermal conditions during their first emergence onto the land. Windley (1977) has noted that the relative, plate tectonic movements of continents have affected the evolution of life by changing ecologically determinative factors, such as: (i) ocean circulation (ii) nutrient supply (iii) climatic changes (iv) habitat exploitability (v)

submergence

and

emergence

of

land

masses

All of these, in concert, can be regarded as environmental regulators of evolution and its fossil record. I; a change of latitude results from continental drift, a fauna may be transported from a stable climate to one with fluctuating thermal environments. Tolerance of temperature variation is probably as important a factor in vertebrate evolution as food supply (Windley 1977). Table 1: Core temperature and pineal size appear to be correlated in that animals without pineals have verge low or heterothermic body temperatures, while large pineals occur in animals with body temperatures near or above the mammalian average (37°C). Mammals with small pineals tend to have low body temperatures, but may be heterothermic or near the average mean. A system for accurately quantifying pineal size has not been developed; consequently, it is only possible to recognize the presence or absence of lineal bodies and broad size categories. Small or average size 119

Evolutionary Evidence categories depend to some extent on the subjective interpretation of size differences. The number of +'s to the right of centre in each box indicates a relatively larger pineal; the number of -'s to the left of centre indicates a relatively smaller pineal; - indicates that the pineal body is absent. Body temperature information from (1) Block (1974); (2) Altman and Dittmer (1973); (3) Meritt (1974); (4) Ralph (1975); (5) Augee (1976); (6) Crompton, et al. (1978); and (7) Swan (1974). It is very likely that primitive fishes, amphibians, and reptiles were exposed to thermal variability in their environments and some may have developed precise behavioural thermal control. Emergence from aquatic habitats and invasion of terrestrial ecosystems occurred throughout the upper Devonian, Carboniferous and Permian as the vertebrates expanded from marshy areas into extensive terrestrial plant communities (Romer 1966; Young 1962). In these environments the atmosphere may have been warm and humid; consequently, it is often assumed that the transition from an aquatic to a terrestrial existence involved gradual change from one thermally stable environment to another (Eaton 1960). Although many Paleozoic aquatic and amphibious vertebrates appear to have lived under warm climates, thermal stresses were certainly rigorous at higher latitudes. Bowen (1966) has presented data suggesting that oceanic temperatures during the late Paleozoic were warmer than those of the present day, but that terrestrial temperatures were quite variable. Vertebrates attempting to invade terrestrial environments required and employed precise behavioural temperature control in response to these variable temperatures. This is not to imply that early reptiles, amphibians and fishes had efficient endogenous temperature control, but rather that they behaviourally selected optimal thermal surroundings in response to daily and seasonal changes in temperature, much as do modern ectotherms. Temperature regulation may even have been a prerequisite for invasion of shallow bodies of water. As in the present day large, deep bodies of water were more thermally stable than smaller, shallower waters, during the late Paleozoic. The magnitude or thermal differences may not have been as great as at present, but a thermal spectrum must nave existed. Today, the annual range in oceanic temperature is no more than 10 C in any locality. Rivers are more thermally stable (11 C range) than lakes, which may have a temperature range from 4 -20 C (Wilber 1964). Small, shallow bodies of water may have a thermal range of 0 -42 C (Young and Zimmerman 1956), while the range in terrestrial environments may be as great as 60°-70°C. 120

The Primal Eye

In the course of their evolution, the ancestors of terrestrial vertebrates migrated from the oceans to rivers and thence to lakes and marshes. Behavioural, physiological and morphological adaptations to environmental temperatures must have been pronounced as vertebrates responded to thermal pressures. The transition from an aquatic to a terrestrial existence implies adequate thermoregulatory abilities prior to total emergence. Precise behavioural thermoregulation was undoubtedly perfected as fossil vertebrates evolved through the hierarchy of aquatic thermal barriers discussed above. Behavioural adaptations first developed in aquatic environments ensured adequate thermoregulatory survival in more complex and variable terrestrial thermal situations. An appreciation of the thermoregulatory function of the epiphyseal complex is important for understanding the evolution of precise behavioural temperature regulation. It is possible to predict that the occurrence of the E-2 complex is frequent in lineage's evolving through the aquatic thermal hierarchy and increasingly frequent in groups that were just crossing the aquatic-terrestrial thermal barrier. Discussion Although parts of the preceding discussion are admittedly speculative, it is hoped that this attempt to link and interpret the variety of vertebrate adaptations and the somewhat fragmentary evidence provided by the fossil record will contribute to a better understanding of the evolutionary process. The argument developed here is that the parietal eye and pineal body have played an important role in the evolutionary success of vertebrates, as they occupied and adapted to thermally variable terrestrial environments. This conclusion is based on studies which have been collated in this paper to suggest that: 1. Morphological variation in epiphyseal systems is assigned to three categories, E-0, E-1, and E-2. 2. The most primitive epiphyseal system, including both a Parietal eye and a pineal organ, is the E-2 complex.

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Evolutionary Evidence 3. The antiquity of the E-2 complex, in concert with the almost ubiquitous presence of the lineal body among living vertebrates, indicates that these structures must have played an important part in vertebrate evolution. 4. The Parietal eye and the pineal body are central nervous system components involved in both ectothermic behavioural thermoregulation and endothermic temperature control. 5. An inverse relationship exists between dependence on environmental sources of heat and the complexity of the epiphyseal system. E-0 systems are confined to animals which maintain lower core body temperatures than related E-1 or E-2 animals. E-2 systems are found exclusively among ectotherms. E-1 systems are found among both ectotherms and endotherms; however, secretory E-1 systems occur primarily among endotherms and are largest in polar animals. 6. An evolutionary reduction of the E-2 complex occurred in most vertebrates, except for many small reptiles, under the gradually warming and less seasonal climates of the early Mesozoic. 7. The third eye was lost (E-1) in therapsid reptiles only in taxa which were in the process of acquiring mammalian morphological and presumably also physiological characteristics. 8. Both the parietal eye and the pineal body were lost (E-0) in the early Mesozoic evolution of the dinosaurs. 9. These considerations lead us to conclude that E-2 systems represent ectothermic animals in the fossil record, and that E-1 systems represent endothermic animals if the E-1 system evolved from an E-2 system, where other morphological evidence supports the acquisition of an endothermic physiology (some therapsids). E-0 systems are not diagnostic of either ectothermy or endotherm they are characteristic of animals with low or labile body temperatures. In this context, we have examined the occurrence of the Parietal eye and the pineal body among fossil vertebrates of the Permian and Triassic periods. It is possible to document three major vertebrate sequences in which the extracranial Parietal eye has been progressively lost. 122

The Primal Eye The first sequence occurred in the Devonian fish assemblage, the second in the Permo-Triassic reptilian assemblage, and the third is continuing today among extant lizards. The Permo-Triassic events are most interesting, for it is during this time that loss of the parietal eye occurred among the mammal-Like reptiles and early thecodonts (ancestral to dinosaurs). All mammal-like reptiles have a third eye except for bauriamorphs, some advanced cynodonts, and one dicynodont. In contrast, only a few early thecodonts and none of the dinosaurs retained third eyes. The pineal body is present in all cynodonts, but except for one small coelurosaur, cranial impressions of lineal bodies are not evident among dinosaurs. If lineal bodies were present among dinosaurs, they were undoubtedly small. Loss of the parietal eye, but retention of the pineal body among some advanced mammal-like reptiles, in contrast with what appears to be loss of the entire epiphyseal complex in dinosaurs, probably reflects different thermoregulatory adaptations. It is reasonable to conclude that the adaptation of advances mammal-like cynodonts (ictidosaurs and tritylodonts) to seasonal climates included incipient or competent endotherm facilitated by small size, and marked by internalization of temperature regulation by the pineal body as the parietal eye was lost. In contrast to the mammal-like reptiles of the Permian, late Triassic dinosaurs were faced with warmer, not cooler climates. In a warm environment, large ectotherms maintain body temperatures comparable to those of large endotherms. Consequently, both may be homeothermic, the ectotherms as a result of the environment and their size, the endotherms as a result of internal regulation and size. Homeothermy, however it is maintained, makes it very difficult to infer thermoregulatory adaptations (ectothermy and endothermy) using temperature dependent activities or morphology. Based upon the evidence provided here, the tentative conclusion is presented that some mammal-like reptiles lost the Parietal eye and retained the lineal as precise endothermy was perfected in response to cool environmental temperatures. In contrast, loss of the entire E-2 complex among dinosaurs in response to gradually warming climates indicates that these 123

Evolutionary Evidence reptiles probably retained the ectothermic strategy of ancestral thecodonts, becoming large-size specialists in environmental homeothermy. Some small dinosaurs (certain coelurosaurs) apparently retained the pineal, as have their avian descendants; these small dinosaurs may have been endothermic. Finally, small size may be important in the evolution of competent endotherm since metabolic rate increases as size decreases, irrespective of thermoregulatory strategy. Thus, endothermy may be facilitated in part, if the size of a lineage decreases over time. Small size may also be an important endothermic adaptation in warm Climates since a greater surface-tovolume ratio facilitates heat loss. Apparently, adult Mesozoic dinosaurs weighing as little as five kilograms were rare; a few of them weighed less than one hundred kilograms. If most dinosaurs were active endotherm as has been proposed, the lack of any significant radiation of dinosaurs into small size categories is very surprising, particularly since successful small size specialists have evolved among all extant endotherm. It has become clear that the variety of thermoregulatory adaptations employed by vertebrates is such that a group of animals can no longer be satisfactorily defined as being ectothermic, homeothermic or endothermic. Although it is generally agreed that mammals and birds generate their own heat from within, both groups have representatives which may regulate body heat behaviourally, or have body temperatures which drift with environmental temperature (torpidity). Both of these features are characteristic of ectothermic vertebrates. On the other hand, many ectotherms which do not generate or conserve enough body heat to be competent endotherms, can control body temperature behaviourally, often with enough precision to be considered homeothermic when they are actively regulating. Some ectotherms can, in fact, produce body heat during activity or by muscular contraction, such that they may be considered transient endotherms. Should we wonder then, that a controversy exists over the possibility of internal temperature regulation in an extinct group of vertebrates, the dinosaurs? The controversy is perhaps more volatile because dinosaurs are reptiles, and in all living reptiles, thermal homeostasis is maintained primarily by ectothermic regulation. The dinosaurs were unique vertebrates, separated from living reptiles not only by time and morphology, but 124

The Primal Eye also quite probably by their physiologies. They undoubtedly employed varied thermoregulatory strategies among their members, large and small, as do living birds and mammals. In other words, dinosaurs may have been ectothermic or endothermic in varying degrees. Some species may have employed behavioural thermoregulation during some periods and purely physiological responses on other occasions. To define dinosaurs as endothermic or as ectothermic is as difficult as assigning any living vertebrate to one of these categories. Vertebrates, and especially reptiles, cannot be easily placed in one thermal category or another; rather, each species represents a particular adaptation to the thermal requirements of its environment. In this context, both ectothermic and endothermic responses may be highly----successful adaptations to the dictates of different environmental conditions and individual physiological requirements. The parietal eye and pineal body appear to have functioned as sensory systems for monitoring environmental thermal extremes. The sensory capacity of the parietal eye and pineal body may have guided the taxis responses of early ectothermic vertebrates to appropriate environmental temperatures. With the involution of photoreceptive cells and development of secretorary capacity, pineal bodies assumed a more dominant role in thermoregulation as endothermy became established and the parietal eye was lost. Loss of the parietal eye in mammal-like reptiles occurred as they crossed the reptilian-mammalian boundary; it is likely that endothermy was established in synchrony with these events. The presence of all or parts of the epiphyseal complex in modern vertebrates underscores the contribution of this system to successful adaptation by almost all vertebrates, in the course of their evolution. <(a)> (1) THERMOREGULATION Reptiles are said to be "cold-blooded" because if they stay in one place without moving, their body temperature approaches that of the external environment. Animals with this (poikilothermic) condition must engage in behavioural thermoregulation, moving between warm and cool places in order to gain or lose heat. The question whether animals are ectothermic or endorthermic is of critical importance,

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Evolutionary Evidence "because of the primary role of thermoregulation in metabolic processes underlying all aspects of an animal's biological functions and activities." <(b) p.89> The fact that most living E-1 lizards (7 of the 18 modern families are E-8; 11 of 18 are E-2) live in equatorial regions strikes me as no accident. Fossils of some advanced mammal-like reptiles have been discovered at high latitudes where they were quite possibly at risk of cold conditions, even during the Mesozoic. Some paleontologists have argued that these therapsids may have been protected by a coat of fur. . Skull markings which indicate foramina around the nasal orifice and mouth suggest, according to Brink, that therapsids may have had sweat glands and vibrissae, and if so, such features would suggest a general hairy integument. Fossil evidence of nasal turbinate bones found in high regions also indicate endothermy, since theses structures would either warm or cool inspired air. <(b) p.89>. The pineal body in fossil reptiles (E-1) was usually retained after parietal eye loss, and evidence from modern vertebrates indicates that it developed a secretory capacity in ancestors of mammals and birds. Loss of the parietal eye seems to have occurred quite suddenly among ancestral dinosaurs (thecodonts), but much more gradually among mammal-like reptiles. <(a) p. 189> The question as to why most dinosaurs appear to have lost the entire epiphyseal complex whilst other species retained the pineal body is an interesting one, to which I shall return. To some extent MVT has generalised when talking about attributes amongst E-0, E-1 and E-2 categories. I have alluded previously to some strange exceptions to the more general trend, and wish in this section to look at some particular exceptions that might be problematic or throw up interesting new possibilities. I also wish to indicate areas of current dispute amongst scientists working in this field. [Maclean's "haversian" objection to Roth & Roth] The argument from several authors in the symposium "A Cold Look at Warm-Blooded Dinosaurs," according to Maclean, claims that dinosaurs might have been endothermic for two main reasons. The first is because the pattern of haversian canals seen in cross sections of their bones is similar to that of birds and mammals. This argument, according to Maclean, remains inconclusive since there is a high degree of variation of 126

The Primal Eye vascularization in bones of reptiles, birds and mammals, and many species do not have haversian replacement. . What we propose may not appear to be entirely consistent with Ricqles' (1974) demonstration that herbivorous anomodonts (dinocephalians, dicynodonts) and some carnivorous theriodonts (bauriamorphs, cynodonts), which retain parietal eyes, exhibit a fibro-lamellar bone pattern that is associated with endothermy in mammals. However, it seems reasonable that there would have been no abrupt transition from ectothermy to endothermy, but rather that parietal eye loss and sophistication of the endocrine and neural apparatus controlling the pineal occurred gradually as an endothermic physiology became established. Endothermic bone patterns could have preceded parietal eye loss among theriodonts. Endothermy among anomodonts is not consistent with the presence of large E-2 systems in all genera except Kombuisia. In fact, this group would appear to be ectothermic. Bouvier (1977) contested the idea that there are distinctive, exclusive bone types characteristic of ectothermic or endothermic physiology. Instead, there is an array of vertebrate histological patterns, such that ectotherms and endotherms exhibit very similar Haversian patterns and lamellar systems. Ricqles (1974) notes this potential histologic variability among ectotherms living in homeostatic thermal environments and in endotherms which experience periods of torpidity or which undergo annual bouts of hibernation. Consequently, Haversian bone and secondary Haversian resubstitution may not accurately reflect metabolic activity for all animals. Advanced anomodonts may simply be ectotherms (as indicated by retention of a complete well-developed E-2 system) which were homeothermic as a consequence of precise behavioural temperature regulation, controlled by the parietal eye and pineal body. [ Maclean's Sarcopterygians (surviving E-1 ectotherms) objection to Roth & Roth] The other evidence that advanced mammal-like reptiles may have become endothermic centres on Roth & Roth's findings involving the function of the median eye in lizards. This second strand of evidence has direct bearing on MVT. Roth and Roth suggest that the E-0 condition existed in dinosaurs. 127

Evolutionary Evidence "among modern vertebrates, an E-2 complex occurs exclusively among ectotherms. The E-1 and E-0 conditions occur among both ectotherms and endotherms. These correlation's lead us to suggest that fossil reptiles with E-2 pineal systems were probably ectothermic. Transitional stages toward retention of the pineal body alone (E-1) may represent animals evolving toward endothermy (coelurosaurs and mammal-like therapsids). Body temperature and metabolic rate are low among modern E-0 vertebrates, especially in heterothermic edentates. We speculate that Mesozoic E-0 reptiles (most dinosaurs) must have employed a similar means of temperature regulation. Like modern E-0 vertebrates, dinosaurs may have had homeothermy under the equable climates of the Mesozoic." <(a) pp. 189190> The E-2 condition does apply to early sarcopterygians (fleshy fins) which include the crossopterygians and the closely related dipnoans (lung fish), amphibians, and to 11 of 18 families of lizards. The crossopterygians are thought to be the ancestors of labyrinthodonts (amphibians with "labyrinthine" structure of individual teeth), which in turn gave rise to the stem reptiles (cotylosaurs), hence ultimately to mammals. In the most mammal-like reptiles, as we have seen, the parietal foramen disappeared. <(b) p.90> Temperature regulation has been suggested as a function of the epiphyseal complex by several workers (Stebbins & Eakin; 1958, Stebbins 1960; Ralph, Firth & Turner 1979), but the subtlety of thermopineal effects and a lack of comparative experiments have precluded widespread acceptance of such a role. Roth & Roth believe that some recent and ongoing studies are sufficient for acceptance of such a thermoregulatory role <(a) p.193> . Maclean agrees that experiments on E-2 lizards show that destruction of the median eye resets the thermostat for temperature regulation about two degrees higher, and further accepts that these findings do suggest that the epiphyseal complex is implicated in the thermoregulation of ectotherms. However, he is reticent to allow that "the disappearance of the parietal eye in mammal-like reptiles may have reflected changes toward an endothermic condition. "This argument, however," claims Maclean, "is somewhat tempered by the recognition that there has been a loss of the parietal eye in many ectotherms that have survived into present 128

The Primal Eye times, including sarcopterygians."<(b) p.90> A closer reading of Roth and Roth though does seem to deal with this point, and to overcome Maclean's objection. All workers, including Maclean, agree that possession of the entire E-2 complex indicates an ectothermic physiology. There are no known exceptions to this. Roth and Roth allow that: " a secretory pineal body alone (E-1) occurs in both ectotherms and endotherms." They go on to explain "In E-1 pineal systems associated with endothermy , secretory pinealocytes are present, whereas in those associated with ectothermy, photoreceptors with complete outer segments occur. It is not possible to determine cellular characteristics from fossil material. However, we suggest that fossil vertebrates with E-1 pineal systems whose descendents are endothermic were transitional at the time when the parietal eye was being lost. Those vertebrates whose descendents are ectothermic are presumed to have had pineal photoreceptors and to have remained ectothermic after the parietal eye was lost. Although snakes and turtles may have secretory pineals and are ectothermic, some species are capable of maintaining body temperature above ambient by means of activity or [body size]." <(a) p.193> [ Extinct E-0 dinosaurs and Surviving E-0 species - Crocodilians, Sea Cows (dugongs), Manatees (sirenians)] Important ground to establish first of all is that the E-O conditions in some dinosaurs and modern members of the subclass Archosauria (Crocodilia), along with Sea Cows and Manatees, is due to their ancestors appearing to have lost the entire epiphyseal complex. <(a) p .189> Loss of both the parietal eye and pineal body (E-0) indicates that these vertebrates must have used some alternative means of temperature control. Modern E0 vertebrates are characterised by "low metabolic rates, torpor and low or labile body temperatures." <(a) p.193> Thermal Physiology 129

Evolutionary Evidence Definitions which once adequately described the thermoregulatory mechanisms employed by animals (Adolph 1951; Cowles and Bogert 1944) have been largely outdated by recent research. Templeton (1970), Bligh (1973), Heath (1968, 1970) and Swan (1974) have recently reviewed the ethology and physiology of thermoregulation among reptiles, mammals and other vertebrates. Greenberg (this volume) reviews behavioural thermoregulation among reptiles and presents a discussion of thermoregulatory definitions; Whittow (1966) and Cowles (1962) also define those terms most popular in current usage. Taken together, these reviews point up an important deficit. Categorical definitions of thermoregulation may depict extremes but they do not adequately describe the range of thermoregulatory mechanisms exploited by vertebrates. For instance, most students of thermoregulation readily separate ectotherms from endotherms based upon the source of heat utilized to raise or lower body temperature. Unfortunately, distinct suites of physiological and behavioural responses are often assumed to be linked firmly to ectothermic or endothermic patterns of temperature regulation when, in fact, both ectotherms and endotherms use common physiological and behavioural strategies to maintain thermal homeostasis. Behavioural and physiological thermoregulation are not finite ends of a categorical spectrum ranging from ectotherms to endotherm Ectotherms employ endothermic strategies during daily bouts of activity, or become transient endotherms seasonally during incubation periods (Hutchison et al. l966). Conversely, endotherms depend on behavioural strategies utilized by ectotherms to avoid environmental temperature extremes. Mammals and birds, which generate heat internally and regulate its dissipation through the peripheral integument, often compromise thermal homeostasis during periods of torpor, allowing body temperature to approximate ambient conditions (Bligh 1973; Withers 1977). The behavioural regulation of heat transfer between the organism and its environment may be more important, moment to moment, even among endotherm than is generally realized. Endotherms may control thermal homeostasis behaviourally during most activities (Hafez 1964), only resorting to autonomic controls (sweating panting, hair-erection, gular flutter) when thermal homeostasis is challenged (Bligh 1973). In fact, if temperature control centers in the hypothalamus (pre-optic area) are lesioned (Lipton 1968; Carlisle 1969), body temperature remains normal in cold challenged rats since behavioural regulation compensates for physiological failure; Van 130

The Primal Eye Zoeren and Stricker (1977) contend that the degree of behavioural and physiological deficits in thermoregulatory ability depends on the location of hypothalamic lesions. Reptiles which regulate body temperature by precise exposure to appropriate environmental temperatures primarily do so behaviourally (Templeton 1970; Bogert 1959). Most reptiles lose or gain heat across a thermal gradient by movement, changes in posture and orientation, conduction, convection, and radiation (Schmidt-Nielsen 1964; Bosert 1959), thereby maintaining body temperatures within a range characteristic of each species (Brattstrom 1965). Body temperature regulation in active lizards is precise (Dewitt 1967; Schall 1977) and may be narrow enough to be comparable to endothermic regulation around a single set-point (Templeton 1970). In addition, reptiles do not lack the ability to alter their body temperatures by physiologic or autonomic processes. Like mammals and birds, reptiles respond pnysiologically to changes in temperature. For example, they show different rates of heating and cooling (Bartholomew and Tucker 1963); utilize vascular shunts which serve to regulate headbody temperature differences tHeath 1964); alter heart rate in response to ambient temperature (Heath 1966); pant when stressed with high temperature (Richards 1970; Heatwole et al. 1973; Dawson and Bartholomew 1958); and flush the body periphery (shell) with blood during periods of heat transfer between the animal and the environment (Weathers and Morgareidge 1971; Weathers 1970; Schall 1977). Metabolic heat production may also play an integral part in thermoregulation among reptiles, but its contribution to thermal homeostasis is still unclear (Bennett and Dawson 1976; Bennett and Licht 1972). Some reptiles, such as turtles (Frair et al. 1972; Mrosovsky and Pritchard 1971) and varanids (McNab and Auffenberg 1976) maintain fairly constant, above ambient body temperatures because of their large size or activity. All these observations clearly support Heath's (1968) suggestion that "among higher taxa there are no purely poikilostatic or homeostatic animals". The inability of reptiles to remain homeothermic when challenged by cold is perhaps the most distinctive feature separating modern endotherms from ectotherms (McNab 1978). of course, as Hotton (this volume) and others have suggested, even this difference could be eliminated in sufficiently large reptiles, as long as they did not experience extreme, long-term changes in environmental temperature. 131

Evolutionary Evidence The mean body temperature within the range selected by active animals is known as the preferred (laboratory) or eccritic (free-living) temperature characteristic of a species (Licht et al. 1966). The selection of appropriate species-specific eccritic temperatures among reptiles (Brattstrom 1965) and the maintenance of a constant body temperature around a specific set-point in birds and mammals require precise temperature sense and control. Lizards may regulate body temperature within a range containing many eccritic temperatures that are characteristic of different activities (Regal 1966; Kitchell 1969; Schall 1977). Lizards generally leave warm or cool places when body temperature approaches an upper or lower limit. Barbour and Crawford (1977) suggest that lizards may allow body temperature to fluctuate at random within their thermal ranges, regulating activity only at the upper and lower limits, to avoid some of the energetic costs of thermoregulation (Huey and Slatkin 1976). Although these limits may be several degrees apart in lizards and virtually at a single point in mammals, the mechanisms of body temperature control in ectotherms and endotherms may be related. The hypothalamus, located above the pituitary and below the third ventricle, is currently believed to be the major thermoregulatory control centre in mammals. The regulation of body temperature near a set-point is apparently controlled primarily by the hypothalamus, and secondarily by other cerebral structures (Cooper 1966; Jurgens 1974; South et al. 1972; Satinoff l974). While the reviews just cited primarily deal with endotherm Rodbard et al. (1950), Heath et al.(1968), and Hammel et al. (1967) have recognized areas in the reptilian hypothalamus containing neurons sensitive to heat and cold, comparable to those found in mammals. They suggest that a behavioural hypothalamic thermostat in reptiles may have been an evolutionary precursor of the endothermic thermostat. The regulation of body temperature in reptiles, birds and mammals shows many striking similarities (Hammed et al. 1967). This has led to the suggestion that certain reptiles (e.g. Crotaphytus Collards) have "developed the early analogue of the posterior thermoregulatory centre. If this could be demonstrated by electrical studies or bioamine responses of the midbrain, the collared lizard could be considered as lacking only an insulating coat to be able to achieve homeothermy" (Swan 1974) . In view of the many common thermoregulatory mechanisms and behaviours utilized by 132

The Primal Eye both ectotherms and endotherm Satinoff (1978) suggests that "ectotherms can be considered as endothermic systems in transition". Analytical determinations of hypothalamic temperature control in reptiles are still needed; however, studies illustrating the influence of other central nervous system structures upon reptilian thermoregulation may have an important bearing on any discussion concerning the evolution of a behavioural thermostat. Current studies in which both ectotherms and endotherms are subjected to thermal challenge clearly indicate that both the parietal eye and the pineal body influence precise temperature regulation, by controlling the high and low limits within which a species regulates its body temperature. Imprecise discrimination of high or low hypothalamic setpoints results in an alteration of the mean eccritic temperature, which usually shifts to higher levels in response to surgical manipulation of the parietal-pineal complex. Thus, the involvement of this complex in thermoregulation among modern ectotherrns and endotherm together with the antiquity of the complex among fossil vertebrates, suggests that these neural structures may provide a model that will shed light on the evolution of thermoregulation among the vertebrates. The Parietal-Pineal Complex and Evidence for Its Role in Ectotherm Temperature Regulation Although primal eyes were first described nearly 150 years ago (Brandt, Edwards and Duges 1829, cited in Gundy and Wurst 1976b) as "special glandular" spots on the heads of certain reptiles, their function was not apparent until Stebbins (1958, 1960, 1970, 1973) initiated a series of fundamental studies. Eakin (1973) reviews this and other information which clearly links parietal eye and pineal function with photoreceptivity and temperature regulation among reptiles. A similar thermoregulatory function for the pineal among birds and mammals suggests that the evolution of endothermy may have involved sequential improvements in the basic behavioural thermoregulatory machinery of ectotherms. By examining the response behaviour of free-living, but surgically parietalectomized western fence lizards (Sceloporus occidentalis), Stebbins and Eakin (1958) suggested the possibility that third eyes serve to regulate exposure to environmental light, and thus temperature. The authors com133

Evolutionary Evidence pared the behaviour and physiology of sham-operated and parietalectomized lizards, demonstrating an accentuation of exposure to full sunlight, an increase in locomotor movement, a change in activity with time of day, and an increase in thyroid epithelial cell height with a corresponding reduction in follicular colloid among parietal-eyeless animals. Subsequent studies have recorded more active thyroids in both sexes of S. occidentalis (Stebbins and Cohen 1973). Some of the effects cited above (i.e., (i) changes in activity or its intensity; (ii) alterations in reproductive cycles; and (iii) greater exposure to bright light) have also been recorded in Xantusiaf vigilis (G-laser 1958; LaPolnte 1966; Stebbins 1970), Sceloporus virqatus (Stebbins 1963) and Callisaurus draconoides (Packard and Packard 1972). Stebbins proposed that all the responses to parietal eye removal noted above amounted to actions taken by the lizards to remain thermally homeostatic when active, or were secondary effects produced by imperfect behavioural temperature selection. However, only doubtfully significant differences in body temperature between parietal-eyeless and control animals were observed in early experiments (Stebbins 19601, an outcome probably attributable to limitations of the method of recording temperature using manual fast-reading thermometers. Since temperature is an intrinsic characteristic of environmental light, the increase in photic exposure observed in studies of several species of lizards might be expected to bring about statistically demonstrable alterations in body temperature. Hutchison and Kosh (1974), using multipoint temperature recorders, measured body temperature in female Anolis carolinensis housed within thermal gradients. They reported that parietalectomized animals maintained-----body temperatures 2-5 C higher than control animals, throughout the day and night except for the period 0800-0900 hrs. The importance of these results is twofold: (i) they provide a dramatic demonstration of an effect on body temperature after parietal eye removal, confirming Stebbins' and Eakin's predictions; (ii) these data suggest that the parietal eye controls thermal behavior at night even in the absence of light. The latter response implies that, in ectotherms, environmental light may serve only as a taxis stimulus that is correlated with environmental temperature.

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The Primal Eye Roth and Ralph (1976b) further explored the effects of thermal and photic stimuli upon the behaviour of surgically parietalectomized A. carolinensis. Although dark thermal stimuli were moderately more attractive to parietalectomized animals than to controls, both groups avoided a light source without heat. The latter effect was significantly more pronounced among parietalectomized animals. Initial attraction of all experimental groups to a cool light source, followed by gradual and finally complete avoidance of that light source, supports the suggestion that environmental light may serve as a taxis stimulus in lizards exploiting the thermal characteristics of light. Because photothermal gradients with fixed heat/light sources are steep and narrow, they encourage permanent occupation of thermal locations by dominant animals, forcing subordinate animals to accept suboptimal positions. Roth and Ralph 11976a) provided a unique environmental photothermal chamber with a moving heat/light source in which to test the thermal responses of surgically parietalectomized female A. carolinensis. Body temperature was measured continuously over a four day preoperative and four-day postoperative period, a procedure that generated 3,264 data points for each parietalectomized, shamparietalectomized, and intact animal. The results confirmed those of Hutchison and Kosh (1974); Parietal eye removal initiates hyperthermic behavior in animals freely selecting appropriate temperatures in a thermally variable environment and significantly increases body temperature. Suspecting that the parietal eye might be a fine tuning thermostat and that the pineal body proper might serve as a coarse tuning thermostat influencing set-points of the hypothalamus, Roth and Ralph (unpublished) pinealectomized female A. carolinensis and recorded body temperatures under conditions already described. Pinealectomy also resulted in an immediate hyperthermic response (1.75 C increase in body temperature) comparable to that observed after parietalectomy. Subsequent studies indicate that injection of the pineal hormone melatonin in pinealectomized S. undulatus just before the dark phase of a photoperiod (14L:lOD), tends to reverse hyperthermic behavior, and animals select cool nighttime refuges with temperatures statistically identical to those of intact controls. Temperature Regulation and the Pineal in Endotherms Some elegant studies and a variety of anecdotal observations combine to suggest that pineal bodies may play a role in temperature 135

Evolutionary Evidence regulation in endotherms as well as ectotherms. However, the paucity of data bearing on the relationship between the pineal gland and body temperature control among endotherms leaves much to be desired. <(a)> Gaston and Menaker (1968) have reported that the circadian rhythm of activity was lost in sparrows after pinealectomy, an effect similar to activity changes recorded among lizards (Stebbins 1963; Glaser 1958). Likewise, Binkley et al. (1971) have reported a loss of the circadian rhythm in the temperature regulation of pinealectomized sparrows in continuous darkness. Body temperature did not drop to the normal daily minimum characteristic of control birds, and pinealectomy raised the temperature.---These results suggest that a hyperthermic nighttime response comparable to that of parietalectomized lizards (Hutchison and Kosh 1974) also occurs in birds. More recently, John et al. (1978) have shown that the circadian rhythm of body temperature is not abolished by pinealectomy in pigeons, but that compared with intact and sham-operated birds this operation does initiate higher body temperatures during both light and dark phases. In addition, subcutaneous implantation of melatonin pellets nullifies or reverses the hyperthermic effect of pinealectomy. Binkley (1974) observed that melatonin injected into sparrows results in a lowering of cloacal temperature. Cogburn eft al. (1976) nave recently reported dark chase thermoregulatory dysfunction in pinealectomized chickens. Among mammals, melatonin may affect mechanisms that lower body temperature in mice (Arutyunyun et al. 1964), and may promote the deposition of brown fat (a readily accessible source of metabolic heat used during periods of rapid arousal) in hibernating mammals (Girardier 19775. Experimentally, nothing more is known of thermopineal effects among mammals. Mammals with atrophic or small----pineals (e.g. elephants, hyrax, sirens, rhinoceros) and certain vertebrates lacking pineal bodies altogether (crocodilians, edentates, dugongs) tend to inhabit warm or tropical regions These groups of vertebrates may represent natural experiments. Stebbins and Eakin (1958), Stebbins (1963) and Roth and Ralph (1976a) have suggested that one function of the lineal in all vertebrates may be to prevent metabolic excess. If the lineal acts as a brake, then it might be predicted that endotherms in cold environments would possess large pineals, func136

The Primal Eye tioning to prevent metallic machinery from producing heat at a pace which would debilitate energy reserves. In contrast to animals inhabiting lower latitudes, sea lions, seals, and walruses have the largest pineals known in mammals (Tilney and barren 1919; Aello and Mezzani 1969). flings also have large and temperature-sensitive pineal bodies (Quay 1978). As another natural precedent, we can compare body temperatures between mammals with and without pineal bodies. The naturally occurring evolutionary loss of lineal bodies Sung vertebrates appears to coincide with lover body temperatures or reduced metabolic rates, compared with animals with well-developed pineal bodies .This trend appears to be Contradictory to the results of surgical pinealectomy, which generally leads to loss of temperature rhythms and hyperthermia. PHASIC TRANSIENTS and the EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION from E-2 to E-1 I wish to look further at the transitional evolutionary phase between ectothermy and endothermy which is possible if the pineal body is retained, <(a) p.193> and will suggest link with Thompson's experimental findings concerning transients. My intention, in evolving MVT, is to try to complete conceptual patterns from the welter of observations - - natural and from experimental data - - and to link together valid and pertinent knowledge from whatever source. It is difficult to organise the evidence for involvement of the median apparatus in the early evolution of consciousness in a strictly hierarchical fashion. For example, there are contingent issues of definition for what is meant by "consciousness" that stem from particular areas of philosophical or psychological literature, yet may have a bearing on the way that experimental data can be interpreted. To this ends I am employing HYPERTEXT LINKS to organise and cross-reference information. Some of the biological data also cuts across categories - - for example, RMG Wells, V Tetens & T. Brittain 's article, Absence of cooperative haemoglobin-oxygen binding in Sphenodon, <(g)Nature, vol.306, 1dec 1983>, has some relevance to the discussion on thermoregulatory properties of the pineal, to the discussion of environmental and geoclimatic reasons for the disappearance of the median eye, and also impacts on any discussion of behavioural and survival amongst E-2 animals, which feeds 137

Evolutionary Evidence discussion feeds into the topics of the origins, nature and purposes (if any) of consciousness. The findings from this paper are relevant to the evolutionary ideas of M.L. Coates (Journal of Molecular Evolution 6, 1975, pp.285-307) which suggests that low cooperativity and diminished Bohr effects in primitive vertebrates, with the advent of terrestrial life and increased metabolism in an oxygen-rich environment, permitted exploitation of cooperative oxygen binding "and substantial Bohr shifts." This low-level metabolic attribute has the implication for behaviour that Sphenodon is capable of fast movements over short distances, and subsequently adopts a 'freezing' posture if it has not reached its normal resting place in a burrow. Behavioural and physiological thermoregulation are not the finite ends of a categorical spectrum ranging from ectotherms to endotherms. Ectotherms deploy endothermic strategies during daily bouts of activity, or become transient endotherms seasonally during incubation periods (Hutchinson et al, 1966). An example cited by Hutchinson is of pythons who approach endothermy when incubating their eggs by muscular contractions that can keep body temperature above ambient level. They are transient endotherms only since body temperatures will eventually fall with continued exposure to cool environments. Further examples of ectothermic-endothermic transients include Bartholomew & Tucker's 1963 work on utilisation of vascular shunts to regulate head-body temperature differences, and Dewitt 1967; Schall 1977; on how body temperature regulation in active lizards may be in a narrow enough range to compare with endothermic regulation around a single setpoint. <(a) p. 199> Similarly endotherms depend on behavioural strategies utilised by ectotherms to avoid temperature extremes in their environment. For example, mammals and birds who generate heat internally and regulate its dissipation through "the peripheral integument, often compromise thermal homeostasis during periods of torpor, allowing body temperature to approximate ambient conditions “(Bligh 1973; Withers 1977). The behavioural regulation of heat transfer between the organism and its environment 138

The Primal Eye may be more important, moment to moment, even among endotherms, than is generally realised." <(a) pp.198> Hafaz (1974) suggests that endotherms may control thermal homeostasis behaviourally (poikilothermically) during most activities and only resort to autonomic (specifically endothermic) controls such as sweating, panting, hair-erection and gular flutter, when thermal homeostasis is challenged (Bligh 1973). Lipton 1968 and Carlisle 1969 show that body temperature remains normal in cold-challenged rats since behavioural regulation compensates for physiological failure. Van Zoeren and Stricker 1977 argue that the degree of behavioural and physiological deficits in thermoregulatory ability depends on the location of hypothalmic lesions. <(a) p. 199> The Morphology of the Parietal-Pineal Complex This subject in detail is not as clear and straightforward a division between the convenient E-0, E-1 and E-2 categories as I have suggested hitherto. On one level, the brain can be seen as the site of integration for behavioural and physiological functions in animals. Particular structures in the brain exhibit relative hypertrophy depending on requirements of individual adaptations (e.g. large optic lobes are necessary in flying vertebrates). The CNS structures of subavian vertebrates are arranged more linearly than in birds and mammals. The epiphyseal structure in subavian vertebrates forms as an evagination from the roof of the diencephalon, "usually with a superficial exposure above the level of the cerebrum and cerebellum" whereas in the pineal gland in primates is a deep brain structure as a result of neocortical expansion. There is a tendency to take the primate pineal as being the morphological norm, which is unfortunate since in fact it is highly untypical amongst E-1 vertebrate groups.” <(a) p.194> Morphology of The Pineal Gland The pineal system of most sub-mammalian vertebrates varies in complexity and may occur with accessory structures derived embryologically from it or functionally linked to it. In living vertebrates, the pineal system in its most complete form may be regarded as a series of evaginations of the forebrain, in sequence, the paraphysis, dorsal sac, parapineal, 139

Evolutionary Evidence and pineal bodies (Stebbins and Eakin 1958). The pineal complexes of ectothermic 1 am preys, fishes, amphibians and certain reptiles contain photoreceptive cells. Somet imes the complex includes, on the dorsal surface of the head, an extracranial parietal eye, which is a highly complex photoreceptor with a lens, retina and nerve (Eakin 1973). In most fishes and amphibians, as well as in some reptiles, there is no parietal eye, but since the intracranial pineal structures may also contain rod-like photoreceptor cells (Collin 1971), the pineal complex may yet have a photoreceptive capacity. In some form s that do not possess an extracranial photoreceptor, the pineal is located directly under a translucent area of the cranial roof (Reiter 1977) or under a thin sheet of cartilage which may serve to transmit light (Gundy and Wurst 1976a). In other forms, the pineal may have a forward extension which maximizes exposure of photoreceptive cells to vertical light sources (Gundy and Wurst l976b; our observations). Comparative morphology of pineal photosensory cells shows changes that reflect an evolutionary reduction in direct photosensitive capacity. Histological studies (Reiter 1977) have shown that the neurosensory elements of photoreceptive lineal cells are structurally similar to the neuroepithelial sensory cells of ehe retinas of lateral eyes. In more advanced forms, the photoreceptor cells lose their outer segments and become more secretory in appearance (Reiter 1977). The pineal bodies of snakes, perhaps turtles, birds, and mammals are primarily secretory rather than directly photosensitive. Morphology of the Parietal Eye The third or parietal eye varies in complexity from a simple saclike vesicle to a structure with all the components of lateral eyes except an iris sphincter and orbital musculature. The well developed parietal eye (as in Sphenodon and certain lacertilians) contains a lens, a retina with rods and cones, a fluid-filled space corresponding to the humors of the lateral eyes, and a nerve that transmits impulses to the brain (Eakin 1973; Engbertson and Lent 1976). The skin immediately overlying the parietal eye is clear and devoid of pigment, thus resembling a cornea. In some individuals of the genus Sceloporus, the parietal eye has failed to become extracranial and the skin over the entire cranium is uniformly pigmented (Stebbins and Eakin 1958; Roth and Roth, unpublished). 140

The Primal Eye The parietal eye is derived embryologically from a dorsal evagination of the diencephalic roof of the brain, or as a bud from the tip of the pineal primordium (Eakin 1973). Controversy exists over the origins of the pineal and Parietal anlagen. The general conclusion based on findings of Eakin (1964) is that the origin of the parietal eye is species dependent, arising in many reptiles from a separate anterior diencephalic diverticulum (Gladstone and Wakeley 1940), by constriction from the pineal anlage (SceloPorus, Eakin 1964), or from a bilaterally paired diverticulum that may or may not fuse (the left usually giving rise to the parietal eye, Dendy 1911). Studies of modern forms [Lacertilia]

[Serpentes]

[Rhynchocephalia]

Studies of fossil forms (missing) Anapsida: [1. Cotylosauria] [2. Chelonia] Synapsida: Mammal-like Reptiles [1.Pelycosauria and Therapsida] Archosauria:

[Thecodontia]

Ontogeny of the Parietal Foramen Recently (1981) the ontogeny of the parietal eye and foramen in the lizard Anolis carolinensis has been studied by Roth & Roth. As it develops, the parietal eye primordium migrates anteriorly and assumes a position in the cranial roof. In adult lizards, the parietal eye rests in a foramen, which is usually located in the frontal-parietal structure. The foramen in hatchling lizards of the genus Anolis is more properly termed a fontanelle, because nearly the entire parietal and a portion of the frontal bones are unossified. Bone deposition is rapid during the first year of life and the fontanelle gradually decreases in size, finally assuming a small triangular shape as the animal reaches reproductive maturity (44-45 mm Snout-Vent Length, SVL). Bone deposition continues as the animal grows until the shape of the Parietal foramen closely approximates the shape of the parietal eye (>50 141

Evolutionary Evidence mm SVL). The foramen may close entirely in some species (Edinger 1955); in A. carolinensis closure can occur in individuals which are larger (>55 mm SVL) and presumably old (our observations). Although Parietal foramen closure is not rare in large lizard species such as Iguana iquana (Edinger 1955; Roth’s observations) it is observed infrequently among small lizards. This may be because small species never, or only rarely, reach old age--a stage of life during which complete ossification most commonly occurs. The early pattern of foramen ossification in Anolis appears to be typical for small lizard species, but may not be representative of all extant parietal-eyed lacertilians. For example, the foramen in Clrotaphytus collaris, Iguana iguana, and some varanids may enclose the parietal eye earlier in life. Also, buttressing by bone around the foramen and eye may form a small cone which is more prominent in large and presumably older individuals. The morphology of parietal foramina shows many similarities in form between living reptiles and fossil vertebrates. In fossils, cranial impressions and parietal foramina indicate that pineal structures existed in many early vertebrates. A pineal groove may be Observed on the ventral surface of the cranial vault in well preserved skulls, particularly those skulls of forms with parietal eyes (Roth’s observations; Camp 1942). Arthrodires, ostracoderms, amphibians, and primitive reptiles all possessed parietal foramina; they may have been paired in Devonian fishes (Edinger 1956). In a number of primitive reptiles the parietal foramen was much larger in relation to the size of the brain than in any extant form (Edinger 1955). The structure of the parietal foramen in fossil forms such as mammal-like reptiles varies from a simple opening in advances theriodonts to an elaborate bony ramification approaching a cone in the dicynodont Aulacocephalodon. The significance of this buttressing is uncertain. It may have served to protect the parietal eye or it may have functioned to enhance the exposure of the eye. At any rate, it is certain that this buttressing raised the parietal eye above the plane of the parietal table. EYES- the second (and third) pineal glands? Roth and Roth (1980) point out that comparative morphology of pineal photosensory cells show changes reflecting an evolutionary reduction in their direct photosensitive capacity. Histological studies (Reiter 1977) have shown specifically that the neurosensory elements of photore142

The Primal Eye ceptive pineal cells are structurally similar to the neuroepithelial sensory cells of the retinas of lateral eyes. Reiter goes on to show that in more advanced forms, these photoreceptor cells lose their outer segments and become more secretory and less photosensitive. This occurs in the pineal bodies of snakes, turtles and birds as well as mammals. <(a) p.195> In my MA dissertation (1996) I introduced the notion that REM states might have arisen as part of the evolutionary process of transfer of certain functions away from earlier pineal structures, and 'taken over' by lateral eyes. Michael Menaker in his 1985 paper 'Eyes - the second (and third) pineal glands?' argues against the prevailing view that melatonin produced in the pineal gland "is unique in some important way." Comparative behavioural and physiological studies of both bird and lizard species seem to show that retinas and pineal glands fulfill similar endocrine roles. <(c) p.78> Both hydroxyindole O-methyltransferase (HIOMT; Cardinali and Rosner 1971) and serotonin N-acetyltransferase (NAT; Miler et al 1980) have been detected in the mammalian retina. Attempts to maintain the distinction between retina and pineal by arguing that while the pineal glands of all vertebrates synthesize melatonin, the retinas of only some species do so, are criticised by [Menaker]. Although the pineal glands and retinas of vertebrates is indistinguishable as a whole, each of these organs varies greatly among species, even of the same family. Pinealectomy of some birds and lizards abolishes circadian locomotor rhythmicity, while in other species of both classes pinealectomy has minimal effect (Menaker 1982, Underwood 1984). He discusses evidence from iguanid lizards that either the retina, or pineal glands, but not both in the same species, have important regulatory circadian effects. The genetics of melatonin synthesis in mice is discussed, and Menaker seeks to show that the ability of the mouse pineal to synthesise melatonin can be rapidly abolished by selection. These experiments are claimed to bolster the suggestion from the iguanid experiments that it should be relatively easy to influence the melatonin-forming ability of a tissue by natural selection. <(c) p.78> Such examples do not exhaust the possible ways in which selection, either natural or artificial, might modify melatonin output in a species. They do suggest, according to Menaker, that if new and different patterns of melatonin synthesis become adaptive, they can quickly be realised. The circadian and reproductive responses of 143

Evolutionary Evidence organisms to particular photic environments in which they live can directly affect their fitness. <(c) p.86> The first intracellular recordings from photoreceptors were made in an invertebrate horseshoe crab in the 1950s (Hartline, Wagner and MacNichol, Cold Spring Harb. Symp. Quant.Biol. 17, 125-141, 1952). They showed that light depolarises the membrane, and so it was a surprise when Tomita in 1965 convincingly showed that the light response of fish cone photoreceptors is hyperpolarising. Tomita's results were confirmed in numerous subsequent intracellular recordings, and by the 1970's the surprise had become the rule - "vertebrate photoreceptors hyperpolarise." Solessio and Engbretson (1993) report the first exception to this rule - recording from morphologically typical vertebrate receptors of the lizard pineal eye - they find a primary light response that is depolarising. These same photoreceptors also have a hyperpolarising light response which is spectrally distinct from the primary response, and is only exhibited at high intensities. <(f) p.389> Solessio and Engbretson's findings confirm that the parietal eye of lizards "is a simple yet highly structured photoreceptive organ that projects to non-visual areas in the mid-brain," which interacts in an antagonistic chromatic fashion at this level; "that is, the photreceptors depolarise in response to a green light and hyperpolarise in response to a superimposed blue stimulus." <(e) p.442> Photoreceptors are the first in the chain of neurons that process visual information. Lateral eyes of vertebrates operate by the action of light hyperpolarising rod and cone photoreceptors that synapse onto bipolar and horizontal cells in the first synaptic layer of the retina. This results in chromatically dependent depolarizing and hyperpolarising responses in response to visual stimuli. This visual information is next conveyed to the second synaptic layer for encoding and transmission to the brain by ganglion cells. As I have previously illustrated [structure of pineal eye] the pineal eye has no muscles of control, eyelids, or method of focus. The parietal eye of lizards does not contain bipolar cells or other interneurons, and "photoreceptors synapse directly onto ganglion cells." Yet, even in the absence of interneurons, antagonistic chromatic mechanisms modulate the ganglion 144

The Primal Eye cell responses. The findings of Solessio and Engbretson show that "chromatic antagonism in the 'third eye' originates in the chromatically dependent hyperpolarising and depolarizing response of the photorecptors to light." They further suggest that these photoresponses may provide lizards with a mechanism for enhanced detection of dawn and dusk. <(e) p.442 abstract> These "remarkable findings" raise many questions. "If the pigment is bistable, then the bright lights that produce hyperpolarisation might do so by simply converting active photoproduct back to rhodopsin, as is the case in invertebrates. Such back conversion could reduce the level of activation. Alternatively the hyperpolarisation might be mediated by a distinct molecular pathway, perhaps the conventional vertebrate cascade. However things turn out, photoreceptors of the lizard parietal eye are going to break more of the established 'rules' of vertebrate phototransduction." <(f) p.390>

PHOTOPERIODISM, MELATONIN, and EXTERNAL CLOCK SYSTEMS I wish to link some of Thompson's findings regarding finite and infinite state systems to 'clock systems' in animals. First of all I shall indicate how melatonin production (whether from the pineal eye, gland or lateral eyes) governs circadian rhythms in vertebrates. There is a huge amount of material in the literature relating to this, and I shall begin by briefly looking at Follet, Foster and Nicholl's 1985 paper 'Photoperiodism in birds'. Birds are E-1 and have a well developed pineal gland, which, ass in mammals, secretes melatonin in a rhythmic fashion. This secretion, both synthesis and release, is normally confined to hours of darkness. Melatonin secretion is governed by circadian rhythm and is under control of at least two clock systems. "One lies in the suprachiasmatic nuclei and regulates the pineal via the usual multisynaptic pathway through the superior cervicular ganglion; the other lies within the pineal itself and , whilst present in other vertebrates, is absent from mammals." I have already indicated from [Roth & Roth] that the pineal gland in mammals is not typical of most species owing to its deeper location in the brain 145

Evolutionary Evidence owing to the enlarged neocortex. “When the avian pineal gland is isolated from all its neural inputs either in vivo or in vitrio it is still perfectly capable of secreting melatonin rhythmically under a light-dark cycle. The relative importance of these two clock systems in most birds is still unresolved." <(d) p.93> Diurnal cycles affecting behaviour exist even in humans (see (j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Chronobiology of performance, Paul Naitoh, p.50 (Diurnality), pp.51-53 (basic model of applied chronopsychology). Also “within-a-day cycles”, Kripke p.313-314, REAl-time hypothesis of stage REM, (Globus 1966) p.314-321 CONSCIOUSNESS and REM That there are strong links between serotonin/melatonin production and REM sleep has been known for some time. For a while it was thought that the many projections of the serotonin-containing neurons of the raphe nuclei in the brain stem regulated REM sleep. Destruction of these neurons with toxic drugs yielded animals that did not sleep much and showed no REM sleep at first, but given sufficient time REM sleep returned, even though the serotonin system in the brain was largely destroyed. The serotonin sytstem has something to do with REM sleep “but exactly what continues to elude researchers.” <(i)The Brain, an introduction to Neuroscience, R.F. Thomson, Freeman & Co., NY, 1985 p.285> In 1977 Allan Hobson and Robert McCarley proposed their “activation-synthesis” theory of dreams. This theory, that dreams are byproducts of the REM process, which is driven by the lower parts of the brain, was largely adopted by philosopher Owen Flanagan (Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep, Journal of Philosophy, XC11, Vol.1, January 1995). However, as I alluded in my MA dissertation (1996), although activation-synthesis theory might be a provocative new “bottomup” perspective on dreams, it falls short in explaining dream experiences. Hobson, disagreeing with Freud, thinks that the meanings of dreams are transparent (and largely random), not symbolic. In my dissertation I agreed with Stephen Laberge against Hobson-Flanagan that dreams can convey more meaning than an ink-blot, and are more like “artworks, revealing something of the structure of the artist’s mind, as individual as the life of 146

The Primal Eye the dreamer.” <(h)Evolution of consciousness, Robert Ornstein, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1991, p.197> As I pointed out in the MA dissertaion, newborn babies spend a large portion of their sleep (50%) in REM (Sterman 1972). Hobson makes an interesting point (of which I was previously unaware, but which agrees with my conclusion in the MA dissertation) that it is important for reproduction for us to “practice sex,” and he suggests that natural selection ensured that we experience “a powerful sex drive during every REM period” to facilitate this rehearsal. This might provide some vindication for Freud’s prime processor. <(h) Evolution of consciousness, Robert Ornstein, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1991, p.197> Many biologists and physiologically-oriented psychologists prefer to side-step large questions about “consciousness”, and treat it as a product of the evolution of the brain, and in particular the cerebral cortex. Despite this, many of these same scientists would agree that “Consciousness seems clearly to have adaptive value. The multitude of sensory inputs, internal cues and motivating processes are somehow integrated together with past knowledge into an apparently unitary awareness, which ‘decides’ to act in adaptive ways.” R.F. Thompson, 1985, p.317 The neuronal basis for consciousness remains largely unknown and an area of controversy. The result of a questionnaire of the opinions of biologists and neuro-scientists asked to rank a list of animals in terms of degree of consciousness, as might be expected, radiated downwards though animals most like humans (primates, and possibly sea-mammals), then carnivores, rodents and so on. Serious doubts were expressed about consciousness in flies and worms. Interestingly, the opinion corresponded “rather closely with the evolution of the forebrain and cerebral cortex.” R.F. Thompson, 1985, p.317 Distribution of REM-experiencing animals correlates reasonably well with the questionnaire of biologists. REM seems to be the property of E-1 animals, all mammals, birds to a lesser extent, and maybe some reptiles. However, a general impression is that the REM and nonREM rhythm may only “achieve good stability in the highest mammals.” <(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Ultradian Rhythms in behaviour and physiology, Daniel Kripke, p.321> 147

Evolutionary Evidence

Globus extended Kleitman’s original REM studies by offering radical “Real-time” hypothesis (1966) that “the neurophysiological process which underlies the D-state recurs on a cyclic basis in real-time throughout the 24 hour day irrespective of whether the subject is asleep.” <(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, pp.314-5, p.657> REM or “D” brain state might be best recognised when the subject was asleep, but present when awake. He mentions daydreams, psychotic phenomena, and ego-weakness as possible waking manifestations of this state. This idea was challenged by Berger (1969), “although the argument was more semantical than experimental.” There is much more detailed work to explore in this area including an important modification to “real-time” (Schulz, Dirlich & Zulley, 1975, 1976), Globus discussion of STAGE REM and BRAC (basic rest-activity cycle) Globus 1970a, and Kripke discussion of latest data on this whole topic.<(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Ultradian Rhythms in behaviour and physiology, Daniel Kripke, p.318-343> It is clear from the work of several authors that REM sleep (in rodents) is influenced by light-dark transmissions. Non-REM -REM cycle rate may be positively correlated with metabolic rate, the higher the metabolic rate the faster the cycle. A more detailed analysis (Zepelin & Rechtschaffen, 1974) concludes that cycle length was highly correlated with brain weight, metabolic rate (inverse), and life-span. Others argue that encephalisation is more crucial that the body weight (Dallaire, Toutain, & Ruckesbusch, 1974). <(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Ultradian Rhythms in behaviour and physiology, Daniel Kripke, p.318, 321> REFERENCES <(a) The Parietal-Pineal Complex - Evidence for Temperature Regulation, Jan.J Roth & E.Carol Roth, A Cold Look at Warm Blooded Dinosaurs, Ed. R.D.K. Thomas & C. Olson, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Westview Press, 1980>.

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The Primal Eye <(b) The Triune Brain in Evolution, P.D. Maclean, Plenum Press, London & NY, 1990> <(c) Eyes - the second (and third) pineal glands? M. Menaker, in Photoperiodism, melatonin and the pineal, CIBA foundation symposium 117, 1985> <(d) Photoperiodism in birds, B.K. Follett, R.G. Foster & T.J. Nicholls, in Photoperiodism, melatonin and the pineal, CIBA foundation symposium 117,1985> <(e)Antagonistic Chromatic mechanisms in photoreceptors of the parietal eye of lizards, E. Solessio & G.A. Engbretson, Nature vol. 364, 29th July 1993> <(f) Strange case of the third eye, Edward N. Pugh, John Lisman & Richard Payne, Nature, vol. 364, 29 July 1993> <(g) Absence of cooperative haemoglobin-oxygen binding in Sphenodon, RMG Wells, V Tetens & T. Brittain, Nature, vol.306, 1dec 1983> <(h)Evolution of consciousness, Robert Ornstein, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1991, p.197> <(i)The Brain, an introduction to Neuroscience, R.F. Thomson, Freeman & Co., NY, 1985 p.285> <(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Ultradian Rhythms in behaviour and physiology, Daniel Kripke, p.318>

149

PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) Median Vision Theory He who conceives of nature freely grasps this Spirit and he who strives for material things is left with only the shell. Spirit and matter are both one in their origin, yet different in appearance. This unity is a mystery - truly the mystery of all mysteries, the gate to all spirituality. Tao Te Ching

PRELIMINARY The Physiology of MVT can be split into two (overlapping) arguments. The first outlines the case from early evolution, and explains how 'self-organisation', and by default 'self-consciousness', is not (and cannot be!) achieved by primitive E-2 animals, and how the atrophy of the median eye is a prerequisite for 'modern consciousness' to occur. I detail this new stage of modern consciousness marked by the introduction of REM states, taking it further than Finite to Infinite-state Capability argument that I introduced September 1996. The second general physiological argument details the further point that mental experience, of both humans and similar E-1 animals, is largely shaped by the evolutionary transition from ectothermic to endorthermic, and that the E-1 brain simulates a VIRTUAL SENSE-ORGAN derived and constructed from the preserved DNA genetic record of the ancient median eye. The Philosophical section will sometimes make reference to a (factual) point, and I will assume a rudimentary grasp of the thrust of the position outlined in the Physiology section. I shall endeavour to present my case in such simple terms that even philosophy folk who admit their failure

PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) to follow the arguments in my MA dissertation might be able to understand. I give examples from connectionist neuroscience (see appendices SPEECH and VISUAL SYSTEMS) which show the connectionist approach to be more appropriate than the traditional algorithmic computational model to which most philosophers still fruitlessly adhere.105 In the course of the Philosophical Discussion I shall indicate how competing “conceptual analytic” theories of consciousness are either reduced to (if correct) or eliminated by (if false) MVT. My argument for reduction closely follows Patricia and Paul Churchland’s analysis, but overcomes ‘subjectivity’ objections that have been made against their versions of eliminative materialism.106 Another point of departure from Paul Churchland’s line of attack is that I do not accept that “folk psychology” is a unified theory … your grandmother might disagree with my grandmother.107 Also, following exhaustive research into ‘third eye’ references throughout history, I consider that folk psychology, in many different cultures, supports the notion of a “mind’s eye” very similar to what MVT proposes. I would agree with Paul Churchland’s108 reasoning in rejecting the belief-desire thesis, but wish to maintain that this is only one aspect of wider folk psychology. This distinction is important, since unlike the Churchland’s eliminativism which Lycan describes as a “radically uncommonsensical view”: 109 MVT, I contend, is much less counter-intuitive, and even positively intuitive for many people.

105

See William Bechtel, Connectionism and the philsopophy of Mind, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, supplement, in W. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition, 1990, Blackwell, particularly pp. 256-261. Also PS Churchland and TJ Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation in W. Lycan (Ed.) 1990, pp.231-234 106 Fodor & Pylyshyn, Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis, Cognition, 1988, 28, 3-71 107 John Searle often refers to ‘folk psychology’ as “grandmother psychology.” 108 PM Churchland, Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitude, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), in WG Lycan (Ed.) 1990. 109 WG Lycan, Introduction to Eliminativism and Neurophilosophy, Mind and Cognition , 1990, p.201

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The Primal Eye This new 1997 compact explanation departs from my earlier (1980) "phantom eye" concept. My new 1997 formulation is a significantly more powerful since it does not rely on any 'analogy'. A phantom limb or sense organ (see physiological references) are a good examples of “virtual” or “simulated” body parts. But since phantom organs usually (except for the important cases of congenitally arising phantoms) arise as a result of loss of the physical organ I have previously only been able to draw comparisons between phantom organ experiences and the ‘phantom’ experience of the (median) organ of unitary sense. I no longer need to say that ‘consciousness’ is having a “phantom-like” (median) sense-organ experience, but now say that it IS the experience of a virtual (median) sensor. My conclusion is that MVT is a comprehensive and self-consistent explanation, and is the most correct model for consciousness in E-1 animals. ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction to MVT Mundane Hallucinations, Real Virtuality and Chalmer’s “Hard” Problem [page 7] Natural and Connectionist LANGUAGE: and MVT (sketch only) [page 10] MVT and inter-theoretic Reduction of philosophy of mind (sketch only) [page 11] Physicalism and Costa ben Luca’s worm (sketch) [page 11] Does MVT solve the mind-body problem? Are there ‘kinds’ of consciousness? Etc. [page 14] (PHILOSOPHY) INTRODUCTION to MVT Relations between the mental and physical have been much explored by philosophers without resolution, and I would agree with Prof. Young that, even though “knowledge of the brain is imperfect,” biological

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) knowledge is what is needed to help bridge our explanatory gap110, rather than “the philosopher’s classical methods for reporting his own and other people’s mental activities” in which “it is now clear that there are serious deficiencies.”111 A good example of philosophy’s problem about (A- and P-) “consciousness” can be found in a recent debate initiated by Ned Block’s article, On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995) 112 The truth or otherwise of MVT is largely an empirical matter. ‘Conventionalist’113 philosophers, those under the influence of Austin, Quine and Davidson, might want to make a distinction between ‘meaning’ which is allowed to be discussed by analytic philosophy, and empirical ‘facts’ which are not. This division places much of MVT outside the scope of the “philosopher’s debate”.114 Thus I am forced to adopt Jerry Fodor’s manoeuvre, and pretend that MVT is correct and its empirical status is

110

A phrase used by John Searle in Minds, Brains and Science, Harvard Univ. Press, 1984, p.209, and more recently by Chalmers in Explaining consciousness: “The hard Problem”, Journal of consciousness studies, Vol 2 No 3, Autumn 1995. 111 JZ Young, Philosophy and the Brain, OUP 1987, p.2 112 Ned Block, Behavioural and Brain Sciences (1995) 18, 227-287, which elicited dozens of responses including such comments as from Richard Warren in his reply published in the same journal, Should we continue to study consciousness? Warren remarks that “Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the tern ‘consciousness’ by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears further to becloud the mtopic, however. Perhaps consciousness should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.” Roger Shepard, replying to Block in What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent? is unsure even after reading Block’s (lengthy) paper “Who, or what exactly are the entities or agents to which Block would attribute P-consciousness?” Daniel Dennett in The Path Not To Be Taken rejects Block’s whole distinction and thinks his “A/P distinction should really be seen as a continuum, a continuum in richness of content and degree of influence.” DM Armstrong on the other hand, in Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness? thinks that “Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness is accepted”, but unlike Block equates p-consciousness with “perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, non-verbal sort about the subject’s body and environment.” Access consciousness, according to Armstrong, “is good old-fashioned introspection.” 113 To borrow Ronald Dworkin’s phrase used during his assault on positivism, from Taking Rights Seriously, 1977. Of course, I do not intend conventionalism to imply anti-positivism: just that it is current dogma. 114 Perhaps MVT is FALSE - but this can only be empirically tested and demonstrated - and cannot be refuted by analytic philosophy alone. Alternatively, MVT is in whole or in part TRUE ( or possibly true). I will argue that MVT overcomes many objections that philosophers have raised against previous theories in philosophy of mind and does represent a cohesive and exhaustive account for mental phenomena. If one accepts that MVT is potentially true - even in part - then its likely importance to a number of fields, theoretical and applied, is hard to deny.

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The Primal Eye given. So, “Let’s pretend. Let’s pretend that (Median Vision Theory) is true.”115 I will try to keep formulation of MVT as simple as possible for the benefit of non scientifically-trained philosophers. Median Vision Theory can be summarised by two main claims: A. that the E-1116 brain (neural network) instantiates a virtual generic sense-organ, and B. that the template for this virtual generic sensor is the 'old,' 'primal' or 'median eye'. The virtual sense-organ unscrambles (decodes) the sensory data-stream being processed by other parts or modules of the brain (neural network). The type of sense-organ simulated is rather like a lens which can adjust its filter strengths and its focal length.

115

J.A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, in Lycan (Ed.) p. 312

116

The intracranial pineal body (glandular structure) can also be called the epipyphis or epiphyseal

complex when it includes the median eye. When talking about vertebrates, I shall sometimes use the notation (E-2) indicating the presence of both pineal body and median eye ... the most primitive condition and (E-1) when just the pineal body (or impression in fossil skulls) remains, as for all mammals and birds. (E-0) indicates a complete absence of any pineal apparatus. An (E-0) condition exists among certain dinosaurs who appear to have lost their entire epiphyseal complex; along with modern members of crocodilia. There are also a few (E-0) snakes who may have evolved largely subterranean species. The parietal foramen (skull opening) which once housed the median eye is a common feature of vertebrate skull morphology Most living vertebrates belong to type (E-1), including all mammals and birds. The more primitive (E-2) categories, retaining median eyes are relatively uncommon among living vertebrates. The best example of median eyes are found in walking fossil, Tuatara (Sphaenodon). Experiments have been made on the median eyes of certain families of lizards (Gundy et al, 1975). Lampreys, a primitive, parasitic fish, and the Stirnogen, observed in three families of anuran amphibians, apparently complete the distribution of (E-2) median eye-like photoreceptors among modern vertebrates.

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) In E-2 animals the median eye is DIRECTLY in contact with light and the external world. In E-1 animals this “median eye-like” experience is achieved indirectly, by SIMULATION, rather than by E-2 direct and unmediated “feel” of the world. In both dreams and waking mentation, we E-1 humans experience only a model of our environment, a neural construction and reconstruction. Our experience of life is always subjective and never objective. This is because our conscious “component”, “agent” or “sensing facility” is itself a simulation, a model of a biological senseorgan, but virtual and not cellular. What do I mean by GENERIC sense-data? Sensory processing in the brain is essentially "generic.” Rather than in streams of separate special sense-data for each sense, sight, hearing and so on… the primary sensory signals (light radiation, sound waves etc.) are translated into forms of signal that the brain can process neuronally. The strongest evidence perhaps comes from work on synaesthesia 117 (see Physiology), although no one seriously disputes this claim. There are no beams of real light or actual sounds reverberating around inside the brain just transformed signals (generic neural sense-information).

117

Synesthesia (Greek, syn = together + aisthesis = perception) is the involuntary physical experi-

ence of a cross-modal association. That is, the stimulation of one sensory modality reliably causes a perception in one or more different senses. Its phenomenology clearly distinguishes it from metaphor, literary tropes, sound symbolism, and deliberate artistic contrivances that sometimes employ the term "synesthesia" to describe their multisensory joinings. An unexpected demographic and cognitive constellation co-occurs with synesthesia: females and non-right-handers predominate, the trait is familial, and memory is superior while math and spatial navigation suffer. Synesthesia appears to be a left-hemisphere function that is not cortical in the conventional sense. The hippocampus is critical for its experience. Five clinical features comprise its diagnosis. Synesthesia is "abnormal" only in being statistically rare. It is, in fact, a normal brain process that is prematurely displayed to consciousness in a minority of individuals. Richard E. Cytowic, Synesthesia: Phenomenology And Neuropsychology A review of current knowledge, PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness 2(10), July 1995.

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The Primal Eye Because the virtual sensor (sense-organ or discriminatory filter) through which the sense-data is interpreted (sensed/decoded/filtered) is itself constructed by this same type of neuronal information processing, some traditional philosophical difficulties (originating with Descartes pineal gland theory) are overcome. Principally, these are the difficulties related to Leibniz’ Law118, that like can only interact with like ….. or that to be “identical” a thing must be “fully interchangeable.” Since the sensor and the ‘sensed’ information are constructed on the same system utilising the same neuronal processes, the problem of how the subjective (internal) and interact with external (environmental, objective) cues is eliminated. The case for the median eye as the template for this virtual sensor is made in the physiology section. To a large degree this claim is of secondary interest to philosophers: however the terminology of the median eye as “template” for the virtual sensor is of some importance. Since we are looking at the origins of ‘modern E-1 consciousness’ that occurred long ago in early evolutionary history, it would be surprising if ‘modern E-1 consciousness’ had remain unchanged from earliest times, and I accept that “human culture and language” and other factors have shaped part of our current human mental experience. These are changes in degree, but not changes in the basic processing of cognition. Modern (endothermic E-1) consciousness takes its shape from, and expands upon or adapts, the original pineal eye template. This may be particularly true in the case of hearing, the most recent119 of the special senses to evolve, and the most removed in time from the original physical median eye experience of our E-2 ancestors. In the Physiology section (previous chapter) I give an account of the origins of REM (rapid eye movements) and indicate how the appearance of this new phenomenon (not exhibited by ectothermic E-2 animals) is linked to the retinal production of melatonin, which is no longer supplied to the brain by the atrophied or atrophying median eye. REM is most often associated with the phase of vivid dreaming during mammalian sleep, but quite a strong argument is put forward by Globus (in his real-time hypothesis), which in brief is that REM occurs throughout both waking and

118 119

See S. Nichols, Phantom Eye Theory, 1980 See H.A. Jerison, Recency Theory

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) sleeping cycles, but is harder to detect during the day. Daytime REM is associated with periods of day-dreaming … disassociated imagination. It is indisputable that human embryos and new-born infants spend a very high proportion of their life in REM, up to 24-hours a day during a particular embryonic stage according to some researchers. So far in this section I have tried to account for the processes of awareness of ‘externally originating’ sense-information. Yet much of what we are conscious of experiencing originates internally. Dreams, and also the more mundane and waking “silent” auditory voice (or voices) that we call thought, have no basis in external stimulus (see Mundane Hallucinations and Real Virtuality120). Yet these “mundane hallucinations” are experienced similarly to if we were awake and not dreaming, or were talking and hearing our voice properly instead of ‘imagining it.’ The persistent ‘self’ or “narrative centre of gravity”121 to use Dennett’s phrase, is the same for waking and dreaming situations, and for experiencing either out-loud conversation or an internally generated “thought voice.” This observation is consistent with both internal and externally originating sensory content being experienced by the same virtual sensor.

120

I have borrowed the phrase “real Virtuality” from an article about Sonoluminescence - a phenomenon from physics, first noticed in 1934, whereby sound produces light. As a sound wave travels through a liquid bubbles tend to form and expand. An experimenter can make the bubble get large and more violent until it collapses, producing a high-pitched (inaudible to humans) sound and a pale blue flash of light at each colapse. Dr Eberlein thinks that “empty” outer space is packed with this transient and imperceptible particles, and uses the phrase “real virtuality” in this respect .. although my usage describing consciousness differs.

121

From Dennett’s controversial book, Consciousness Explained, 1991, in which he is relentlessly reductionist to an absurd degree, claiming that the whole body consists of selfrepairing and replicating “macromolecules” to which he tries to apply his metaphor of “intentionality.” Each macromolecule, even in a plant, is an “intentional agent” seeking its own path through life. A confusing elaboration is that Dennett also wishes to distinguish between simple robotic molecules, and less and more crudely intentional systems comprising them.

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The Primal Eye In the dream case the visual cortex or some other brain area is manufacturing 122 sensory information or signals that resemble actual, externally originating, visual. The virtual sensor can interpret these (electrochemical) signals equally as well, or nearly as well, as if the signals originated from the external environment. Similarly in the case of the “auditory hallucination” of the internal voice. The virtual sensor can unscramble internally generated “sounds” similarly to if the sounds came from an external voice. Questions remain to be tackled. I explain (in physiology section) how a sense-organ might be simulated by the E-1 brain in general terms, and specifically related to the median sense-organ. If the E-1 neural net is capable of simulating a sense-organ and of transforming and processing sensory information, then it should (and is) also capable of simulating sensory information (as in dreams and generating an internal voice). It is not necessary at this stage to decide if the decoding mechanism/virtual sensor is modular and associated with a local neuronal circuit - - or whether the generic sense-organ is simulated on a widely-distributed basis across the E-1 brain - - since this matter does not affect the fitness of MVT when dealing with philosophical problems. What the internally generated voice is saying, its intended content or meaning if you like, depends on ‘background’ processing elsewhere in the widely distributed E-1 neural network. (See appendix Aspects of Connectionist Speech Processing and Natural Language, attached as appendix). Different, though overlapping or otherwise co-ordinated modules or neuronal sub-systems are associated with learning (see examples), memory, pattern recognition, emotions and so on. The key difference between E-2 (physical median eye) and E-1 (lost median eye) systems is that “internally originating” sense-data can be experienced in the E-2 neural system in addition to externally originating sensory information (which is accessible to both types of system). An intelligent robot, insect, or primitive E-2 reptile, might survive perfectly well and behave in much the same way as an E-1 human which is self-

122

or perhaps merely exhibiting system noise as Dave Hobson’s activation-synthesis theory of dreams would have it: deliberate manufacture or accidental production, it does not matter to my argument at this point

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) conscious, but without any conscious experience of this behaviour. ‘Self’ 123 consciousness and the private, experiential distinction between individuals and their environments is an evolutionary novel feature. Another term for this is “centrally evoked.” This might be either the result of a happy evolutionary accident, a by-product associated with the loss of the median eye because of global climatic changes and resulting thermoregulatory adaptations; OR selfconsciousness, REM and the rest of conscious experience might have been an adaptation positively selected for. This question can only be resolved by empirical science and evolutionary biology, and not by “armchair conceptual analysis.”124 2. Mundane Hallucinations, Real Virtuality and Chalmer’s “Hard” Problem Materialists and Identity theorists (I include both Churchland’s here) founder on their claim that mental states are brain states. I mentioned that true “identity” requires full interchangeability, and if two states can only be described differently - brains states by the language of science and mental states by the language of folk psychology or subjective report - then they are not fully identical. Physical theories might explain how specific mental functions - memory, vision, attention, intention - are correlated to specific physical processes in the brain. Yet why (and how) is the performance of these functions accompanied by subjective experience? “The hard problem” to use Chalmer’s words, “is the question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. This puzzle involves the inner aspect of thought and perception: the way things feel for the subject. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations, such as that of vivid blue.”125

123

‘Self’ organisation is only possible in principle (a priori) in the absence of direct, externally enforced control (see Physiology section for explanation of MVT account specific evolutionary absence of physical median eye and its accompanying constraints). 124 DC Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, in CEM Dunlop (Ed.) Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, Cornell University Press, 1977, p.250 125 DJ Chalmers, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, Scientific American, Dec 1995, p.63

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The Primal Eye In order to tackle this hard problem 126 (impossible problem according to Colin McGinn 127) I need to spell out what I mean by “mundane hallucinations” and “real virtuality.” The distinction I made earlier between internally generated sense-information and externally originating sensory data from the environment via the special sense-organs, leads me to the following perceptual taxonomy.128 There are two sources of origin for sensory neural signals or messages, internally generated, or provided by the special senses from the environment. Internal signals give rise to “mundane hallucinations” when reintegrated by the brain’s virtual sensor. By “Real virtuality” - I mean the experience (by the virtual sensor) of externally originating information received via the special (cellular) sense-organs; visual, auditory and so on. “Mundane hallucinations” comprise normal dreams (not extreme night terrors) and the ‘auditory hallucination of an internal voice’ - speaking to yourself without opening your mouth - and are distinct from what can be termed “disruption hallucinations” (phantom vision, tinnitus, schizophrenia, LSD and so on) that result from mental illness, physical trauma or brain chemistry imbalance. The only perceptual differences between the two types might be variations in signal strength … even if we are trained meditators and can visualise an object quite well with our lateral eyes closed … it is unlikely to be as detailed and strong a perception as opening our eyes and looking at an external object.

126

David Chalmers, in The Conscious Mind, OUP, 1990, suggests that those who think consciousness can be explained by looking at the nuts and bolts of the brain are only tackling an “easy problem.” It is “hard problem” of explaining how the brain acts as “experiencer” that I believe is satisfied by MVT. 127 Colin McGinn, in The Problems of Consciousness, 1991, argues that because our brains are products of evolution they have cognitive limitations. He thinks that monkeys or rats cannot even conceive of quantum mechanics … a view I do not share …. and similarly humans may be forever prohibited from understanding certain aspects of existence, such as ‘consciousness’, and the relation between mind and matter. 128 I deliberately avoid trying to equate these terms with over-analysed and contentious philosophical jargon such as a-consciousness and p-consciousness. Much has been written about such terminology but little agreement has been reached.

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) Since, as we have seen, neuronal signals are generic, there is overlapping of the two perceptual types: we can be looking at a page of an (external) book whilst internally generating a “mundane hallucination” of a narrator reading the words. My model for the virtual sensor depends on its generation on a massively parallel ‘computational network’ rather than by a traditional von Neuman computer129 (serial Turing machine) that runs programs and “rules based programs” such as predicate sentence-logic. 130 According to my schema, the virtual sensor is a construction used (and created) by the E-1 brain for perceiving. It is the same entity used to perceive ‘mundane hallucinations’ and to perceive ‘real virtual’ representations of the external world. I see no particular difference between “perceive” and terms I have used earlier such as “unscramble” or “decode,” or some statement like “read and interpret neuronal signals.” The physiological or physical process of decoding IS the ‘mental’ process of consciousness (subjectivity, private awareness) which is experienced by E-1 humans, and presumably other E-1 animals. A TV set is a receiver and translator of air-borne signals. What results on the screen is a representation of a virtual moving picture - in fact created by translation of the original air borne signals into patterns of individual pixels, from which our brains extrapolate moving images. There is only one process carried out by the virtual (simulated) sensor, and there is no “physical spatio-temporal location” perhaps in the hippocampus or some parts of the cortex - since the virtual sense-organ (although it is definitely a part of our body matrix. “Real virtual” perception of signals from the special senses from the outside are ‘less unreal’ than “mundane hallucinations” deliberately

129

This is a KEY POINT in Patricia Churchland’s argument for connectionism which she sees as a “radical departure from the a priori, introspection-based strategy that has characterised most previous work in epistemology.” PS Churchland and TJ Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, in Lycan (Ed.), p.224 130 Patricia Churchland discusses how connectionist modelling frees us from intuitive conceptions of representations as language-like and computation as logic-like, thus freeing us from “what Hofstadter (1982) called the Boolean Dream, where all cognition is symbol-manipulation according to the rules of logic.” Paul Churchland and William Bechtel also discuss this topic in depth. PS Churchland and TJ Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, in Lycan (Ed.), p.248

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The Primal Eye created by parts of the brain and recognised as self-originating, which in turn might be said to be less “unreal” than random and freakish “pure hallucinations” caused by system damage. All perception is subjective, simulated, and virtual or hallucinatory to some degree or other…. and the “self” - virtual organ of unitary sense -which experiences it all is also a deep ‘hallucination’ or simulation by the brain All the brain and computational processes involved are ‘physical’ and there is no spooky stuff of dualism in this account. The virtual sensor is nothing other than neuronal electrochemical effervescence or firings, as likewise the sensory information being decoded is neuronal electrochemical effervescence or firings. Intrusive surgery of the brain would not reveal a screen or “Cartesian Theatre,” a homunculus or Costa ben Luca’s worm.131 I have tried to make this introduction to MVT as straightforward as possible, but need to point out that I agree with Pat Churchland that “the idea that there is essentially one single implementational level is an oversimplification. Depending on the fineness of grain, research techniques reveal structural organisational many strata: the biochemical level; then the levels of the membrane, the single cell, and the circuit; and perhaps yet other levels such as brain subsystems, brain systems, brain maps, and the whole central nervous system.” 132 No amount of observation or scientific scanning will reveal a PHANTOM limb or phantom sense organ, since these are virtual rather than cellular entities. I do not wish to retreat into analogy at this stage, I just wish to establish that phantom limbs are accepted facts of science, as well as extremely real perceptual facts to their owners. Since the simulated sense-organ is itself “real virtuality,” a phantom or ‘hallucination’ created by the brain that it has a physically real cellular (median) organ.’ 133

131 132

See The Occult Philosophy of Descartes, from Third Eye CDRom, Steve Nichols 1996.

I might even allow extension of this beyond the single brain to ‘groups of brains united as a community or organisation of individuals’ to allow the possibility for cultural or linguistically transmitted cross-individual functioning.

133 The transition stage (which lasted for millions of years, and is still ongoing in Tuatara after 200m years) of having a functioning E-2 median eye as a youngster gave these reptile’s brains a very powerful “memory” of

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) The virtual sensor I have described is nothing over and above WHAT IT DOES and the distributed neural processes that give rise to it. It binds together sensory modalities, acting as an OUTPUT for neuronal streams processing (internally and externally originating sensory information) producing unified perception. Since the virtual sensor is itself manifested by local neuronal circuits, changes in the state of these circuits can result from stimulation or input VIA the subjective sensor. The virtual lens is an end-point or INPUT for some neural generic signals, and an OUTPUT, or end-result, for the modules that are generating it. This OUTPUT variance may be indirect, for example, if the eyelids close or it becomes dark in the environment, the amount or level of (real virtual) sensory data being processed by the virtual sensor drops, the energy needed to manifest the less-overloaded or less busy virtual organ drops, and a chemical is released elsewhere in the endocrine system by the new threshold conditions. The E-1 animal as a result may fall asleep. 134 Neural processing is going on all the time, much of it unconsciously. When the generic information passes through the virtual lenses, this is the point (and real-time) when it comes to awareness (conscious manifestation 135). The interface between one system (the sensing system) and other (data processing) streams or systems is distributed, and there is not necessarily any single grandmother cell which activates a memory of a person’s grandmother or the colour red. The nature of the sensor, its (simulated) focal length or filtering strength, alters in response to the data that it encounters: and it is this reaction that I term an “infinite state feedback loop.”

having sensations from this organ in later life (after the subsequent loss of the median eye in the adult reptiles). This earliest example of a virtual median eye must have been persistent and enduring, as are phantom limb experiences in humans. The “life experience” and learnt behaviors of the adult reptile no doubt compensated for the loss of primary sensory input and environmental information that had been fed by the median eye. 134

A look at the functions of the median eye from experiments on E-2 living reptiles are important here (see Physiology). If replicating a median eye, the model would carry out its physiological functions, regulating awareness of predators, finding its way around the environment and particularly in locating its burrow, etc.

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The Primal Eye To conclude this chapter, I reiterate my claim that MVT solves Chalmer’s “hard problem”, and overcomes the problem that other materialist accounts have with subjectivity. The E-1 brain differentiates itself, by purely natural processes that I have described, into a conscious subject - its virtual median sensor, and subject-matter - mundane and extreme hallucinations; and real virtual perception of external objects. (In addition there are a multitude of automatic muscular and brain activities that do not enter into the consciousness “feedback loop”, and do not register consciously). Rights retained, Steve Nichols, Leeds, January 1997

Natural and Connectionist LANGUAGE: and MVT (sketch) When the philosopher examines thoughts he uses “mentalistic words, often of common speech.” Because of privacy and the diversity of the subject matter it is very difficult to agree about the use of these words. Scientific discourse on the other hand depends upon words “that describe observations that can be confirmed and agreed by all appropriately trained humans.”136 As a result, “only in science” (although granted not always) “do we ever seem to reach an intellectual consensus” .137

I agree with the agenda of Patricia Churchland and others to dispose of the idea that “cognition is to be modelled largely on language and logical reasoning:” and that “having a thought is, functionally speaking, having a sentence in the head, and thinking is, functionally speaking, doing logic, or at least running on procedures very like logic.” 138

136

JZ Young, Philosophy and the Brain, OUP 1987, p.1 DA Armstrong, The Causal Theory of Mind,1981 138 Neural Representation and Neural Computation, in Lycan (Ed.) p.231 137

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) However, her example in the same article of NETtalk (Sejnowski and Rosenburg 1987, 1988)139 is rather dated, and I offer my 1993 update of work in this field which presents much more promising connectionist implementations than NETtalk, and compares connectionist natural language processing with the best algorithmic implementations available (see attached appendix). I am interested in exploring hybrid models which integrate rulesbased models and connectionist systems140 My approach to language, stated baldly, is that PATTERN COMPLETION is prior to language acquisition, and underlies all linguistic processes. The time structure that GIVES a narrative (sequential) form to speech comes from the median eye template. 141 Pattern recognition or completion is a major theme in connectionism, and my discussion would centre on philosophical importance of this concept as discussed by William Bechtel (in Mind and Cognition, William Lycan) under such headings as “How important a cognitive task is pattern recognition?” (page 262).

MVT and inter-theoretic Reduction of philosophy of mind (sketch) I agree with Pat Churchland’s desire, as a reductionist, to “strive for an integration of psychological and neurobiological theory” in opposition to theory dualists.142 Reductions can be seen as explanations of phenomena described by one theory in terms of the phenomena described by a more basic theory. Conceptual and semantic theories are second order in comparison with a natural theory that accounts for the same phenomena.

139

TJ Sejnowski and CR Rosenburg, Parallel networks that learn to pronounce English text (1987) and Learning and representation in connectionist models (1988) 140 William Bechtel, Connectionism and the philosophy of Mind, in Lycan (ed.) p.264 141

See The pineal, a gland that measures time, Josephine Arendt, New Scientist, 25 July 1985 and voluminous literature elsewhere. My thesis is that psychological time is derived from E-2 median biophysical regulation. 142 In Lycan (Ed.) p.229

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Very pure philosophers who cannot bring themselves to call perfectly respectable domain -relative explanations “reductions” are really just digging in on who gets to use the word. I propose to explore this debate further, with particular reference to the debate about reduction of Folk Psychology, which I touched upon in my introduction. Physicalism and Costa ben Luca’s worm I must admit to previously having always wavered on the question of ‘physicalism’ and whether or not MVT (in its previous guise as phantom eye hypothesis) fitted into an entirely physical or material schema. I have always maintained that MVT was a wholly natural theory (and antisupernatural theory) of mental life, and as such did not fit any dualist account. ‘New naturalism’143 in philosophy is related to the physicalist program in that it departs from the previous a priori philosophical tradition, and stresses that “epistemology itself must be informed by the psychological and neurobiological data that bear upon how in fact we represent and model the world.” 144 My dislike of categorisation and philosophical jargon has caused me to avoid commitment to any single linguistic descriptive formula, and I still have reservations whether universal catch-all headings such as “materialism” fully make sense or actually convey any content. However, in order to make my position more intelligible and clear, I shall shelve the objections I have made in the past against the physical/non-physical distinction, and make try to make MVT easier for philosophers to comprehend. I have previously (1996) indicated that MVT is close to Kim’s category of “mereological supervenience” which points it strongly towards the physicalist camp.

143

First introduced in an explicit and developed form by Willard Quine, Word and Object, MIT press, 1960 144 P.S. Churchland & T.J. Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, MIT, 1989 in W. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader, 1990 (revised 1995), p.225

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) My current “virtual sensor manifested on an E-1 neural network” formulation clearly pushes MVT into the physicalist camp, and furthermore (typically of many late converts) I now feel compelled to advocate a radical and eliminativist form of physicalism. I retain my strong dislike of a priori theorising. Truths for “all times” are by their nature ‘conservative,’ thus antagonistic or anti-optimistic towards the idea of scientific progress.145 Physicalism (materialism) and Cartesian substance dualism are normally portrayed as antagonistic polar opposites in philosophy. I am reluctant to use universal ‘catch-all’ terms, although if forced would classify MVT as essentially physicalist. There are several reasons for this, not least being that I see no reason in principle (although some in practice) why a manufactured neural computer should not be able to manifest a “virtual sensory centre” and thus have self-awareness. This awareness would likely have more of a metallic and machine-like quality than our corporeal flesh and blood type of perception. I reject philosophical dualism since my analysis of ‘consciousness’ is as a natural bodily process. However, I am intrigued by Costa ben Luca’s notion of the pineal gland as a “worm” although still part of the brain. This is a more subtle and interesting notion that Descarte’s (unattributed) adaption of ben Luca’s which involved the pineal gland, prompted by thought stuff, to actually move within the brain. The notion of a ‘worm’ implies a living thing with an identity separate to the rest of the brain although still attached. Not quite an independent homunculus, and not very bright, but nevertheless a module of the brain that might be aware of other modules within the same system.

145

Pat Churchland outlines two anti-naturalist positions that are coloured by rejection of empirical science. Mandt (1986, p.274) puts forward an existentialist criticism that science is a “neurosis” which is “plunging civilisation into a nihilistic abyss.” Another response is that neuroscience is fascinating but “irrelevant” to answering important questions about higher cognitive functions, consciousness and so forth ….. although psychology and linguistics it is conceded might be of some use. P.S. Churchland & T.J. Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, MIT, 1989 in W. Lycan (ed.), p.226

168

The Primal Eye MVT is not a dualist or homunculus theory, since both sensor and sense-information are part of the same distributed neural network (E-1 brain). Part of the system is aware of other parts of the system, but this “virtual sensor” is itself the product of synaptic firings and neuronal processes, and is not of a different ‘stuff’ to the rest of the neural network. There is no worm, with a separate intentional agenda to the rest of the system, just a virtual lens-like sensor, which is integrated with other motor and sensory neuronal systems. Identifying a single location in the brain where “a red flash of light experienced by the person” can be seen, since the neuronal modules involved in manifesting the virtual sensor are distributed and parallel. To count as a proper solution to the mind-body problem, a theory should address the nature of dependence that characterises the mind-body relationship, whether or not we agree with the explanation. For the epiphenomenalist there is causal dependence - physical states cause mental ones although the mental does not cause anything. In logical behaviourism we shall see that dependence is claimed as either ‘definability’ or ‘meaning dependence.’ Type-type identity theories advocate dependence of ‘macro’ or mental directly on properties of the physical micro-structure. Parallelism claims that there is no direct dependence relation between mind and body, in either direction, but that any observed covariance between the mental and physical depends on a third factor or ‘common cause’ (in the case of Malebranche this was identified as divine intervention).146 I am not an idealist, since I think that the physical world comes before the ‘modern E-1 conscious realm’, which is a fairly recent in evolutionary terms. If the body dies, consciousness stops. The physical processes are required for conscious life, although the converse is not true. Materialism, or physicalism, is the view that the fundamental properties of matter and energy, as described by physics, are the only existent properties. Early examples of this view are the Indian philosophy of Charvaka (‘dust’), and the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who said that ‘only atoms and the void are real’, and believed that ‘soul atoms’ were

146

Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience, in (ed.) Sam Guttenplan, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, p.582

169

PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) made of fire - the finest material substance. This literal materialism is clearly nonsense. Type physicalism claims that every type or kind of entity is physical, whereas token physicalism claims that every particular is physical. Type physicalism implies token physicalism since every token is of some type: but token physicalism does not imply type physicalism. Following from Herbert Feigl’s147 claim that mental states are brain states, U.T. Place (1956) and J.J.C. Smart(1959)148 originated the strong (type-type) identity theory to overcome problems that behaviourism had in accommodating inner and episodic life. David Lewis and the Australian, D.M. Armstrong (1968),149 modified the original identity theory by claiming mental terms were defined causally, for example “pain” means a state brought about by physical damage and typically causes withdrawal, screaming and so on. There is a danger of circularity here, depending on what counts as “physical”. Donald Davidson in Mental events (1970) and Jaegwon Kim150 (1969)151 developed a “so-called token(-token) identity theory”.152 Their posture implies token physicalism but denies type physicalism, as well as denying that mental types are reducible to physical ones. The position that Davidson has termed anomalous monism is similar in many respects to a view held earlier by Kant. Davidson also acknowledges that “something like my position” 153 is postulated by Thomas Nagel (1965)154 and P.F.

147 Feigl, H., The mental and the physical, Minnesota studies in Phil. Of Science, 2, 1958, pp.370497 148 Smart, J.J.C., Sensations and brain processes, Philosophical Review 68, 1959, pp.141-156 149 Armstrong, D.M, A materialist theory of mind, Routledge, London, 1968 150 Kim no longer holds this view, called “Nomological monism”, now preferring a version of supervenience for reason I shall touch upon later. 151 Kim, J., On the psycho-physical identity theory, in J. O’Connor (ed.), Modern Materialism, Harcourt, New York, 1969pp.195-211 152 Cynthia MacDonald, Mind-brain identity theories, Routledge, London, 1989, p.vii 153 Davidson, D., Mental events,1970, in Actions & Events, footnote to p.214 154 Thomas Nagel, Physicalism, Philosophical review 74, 1965, pp.339-356

170

The Primal Eye Strawson (1963)155. I would hope that MVT as a natural theory would allow reduction of these rather contorted positions. Patricia Churchland identifies some historical thinkers; Plato, Descartes and Kant - who together with contemporary figures such as Strawson (1960), Davidson (1974), and McGinn (1982) - have pursued “reflective understanding and pure reason” and who consider empirical observations made by psychologists and neurobiologists as “irrelevant, or at least incapable of effecting any significant correction of the a priori conclusions.” 156 According to Churchland, and I agree with her, the a priori insights of philosophers should be seen as “articulations of assumptions that live deep in our collective conception of ourselves” rather than as “The Absolute Truth.” 157 KINDS of CONCIOUSNESS. The two hybrid kinds of consciousness, p-consciousness and aconsciousness described by Ned Block are both encompassed by the processes of sensory processing and perception described by MVT…. and my model actually helps clears up the confusion surrounding these terms, and other inadequate linguistic formulation. However, there is a real issue about describing conscious phenomena, either in terms of variation of strength and quality, or whether conceived as ‘natural kinds.’ MVT - The Heretical Philosophy If I remain on this philosophy & physiology double PhD at Leeds University, areas I might look at include questions of imagery (in Lycan, pp.549 to 627).

155

Strawson, P.F., Contribution to a symposium on ‘determinism’, in Freedom & Will, Ed. D.F. Pears,St. Matin’s Press, London, 1963, pp.48-68 156 P.S. Churchland & T.J. Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, MIT, 1989 in W. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader, 1990 (revised 1995), p.225 157 P.S. Churchland & T.J. Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation, MIT, 1989 in W. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader, 1990 (revised 1995), p.225

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PhD Upgrade (Philosophy) I make no apologies for my uncompromising stance. I believe that the purpose of reasoning and conceptual analysis should be discriminatory, and that bad or outworn approaches should be reduced (or rejected) rather than perpetuated. My views on MVT are evolving, and are not a personal religion. To illustrate what is wrong with the conventionalist 'philosopher's game' let us consider another game - soccer. As a (scientifically-oriented) philosopher my main emphasis would be on watching the game itself. This is the most practical course to follow. Vision, as a parallel input system, conveys more and faster information than the serial auditory input channel. Of course, sound from the players and crowd adds an extra valuable informational dimension. To benefit from expert opinion and perhaps to fill in my missing background knowledge, news of injured players etc., I might also tune in to the radio to listen to the commentary of the game (with the proviso that this added to, rather than detracted from, my primary information source: watching the game on the pitch). A conventionalist philosopher tries to follow the game using only the secondary (linguistic descriptive) source - by listening to the commentary. He might argue that the interpretation he is absorbing is as good as watching the game himself, since the expert commentator understands aspects of the game better than he himself, and is able to convey some of this interpreted knowledge. Philosophical debate mirrors listening to the radio commentary, especially the panel of experts at half-time, and from this limited and second-hand experience claiming that you have a full appreciation of the game itself. What I have described as conventionalist academic philosophy is an hermeneutic discipline - engaged in the interpretation of scripture. Steve Nichols (Note: Not to surprisingly I parted company with my Department and Supervisor shortly after submitting this paper, originally entitled “MVT The Heretical Philosophy”.

172

Phasic Transients during E2 to E1 PHASIC TRANSIENTS TRANSITION E-2 to E-1

and

the

EVOLUTIONARY

I wish to look further at the transitional evolutionary phase between ectothermy and endothermy which is possible if the pineal body is retained, <(a) p.193> and will suggest link with Thompson’s experimental findings concerning transients. My intention, in evolving MVT, is to try to complete conceptual patterns from the welter of observations - - natural and from experimental data - - and to link together valid and pertinent knowledge from whatever source. It is difficult to organise the evidence for involvement of the median apparatus in the early evolution of consciousness in a strictly hierarchical fashion. For example, there are contingent issues of definition for what is meant by “consciousness” that stem from particular areas of philosophical or psychological literature, yet may have a bearing on the way that experimental data can be interpreted. Some of the biological data also cuts across categories - - for example, RMG Wells, V Tetens & T. Brittain ‘s article, Absence of cooperative haemoglobin-oxygen binding in Sphenodon, <(g)Nature, vol.306, 1dec 1983>, has some relevance to the discussion on thermoregulatory properties of the pineal, to the discussion of environmental and geoclimatic reasons for the disappearance of the median eye, and also impacts on any discussion of behavioural and survival amongst E2 animals, which feeds discussion feeds into the topics of the origins, nature and purposes (if any) of consciousness. The findings from this paper are relevant to the evolutionary ideas of M.L. Coates (Journal of Molecular Evolution 6, 1975, pp.285307) which suggests that low cooperatively and diminished Bohr effects in primitive vertebrates, with the advent of terrestrial life and

Phasic Transients during E2 to E-1 increased metabolism in an oxygen-rich environment, permitted exploitation of cooperative oxygen binding “and substantial Bohr shifts.” This low-level metabolic attribute has the implication for behaviour that Sphenodon is capable of fast movements over short distances, and subsequently adopts a ‘freezing’ posture if it has not reached its normal resting place in a burrow. Behavioural and physiological thermoregulation are not the finite ends of a categorical spectrum ranging from ectotherms to endotherms. Ectotherms deploy endothermic strategies during daily bouts of activity, or become transient endotherms seasonally during incubation periods (Hutchinson et al, 1966). An example cited by Hutchinson is of pythons who approach endothermy when incubating their eggs by muscular contractions that can keep body temperature above ambient level. They are transient endotherms only since body temperatures will eventually fall with continued exposure to cool environments. Further examples of ectothermic-endothermic transients include Bartholomew & Tucker’s 1963 work on utilization of vascular shunts to regulate head-body temperature differences, and Dewitt 1967; Schall 1977; on how body temperature regulation in active lizards may be in a narrow enough range to compare with endothermic regulation around a single set-point. <(a) p. 199> Similarly endotherms depend on behavioural strategies utilized by ectotherms to avoid temperature extremes in their environment. For example, mammals and birds who generate heat internally and regulate its dissipation through “the peripheral integument, often compromise thermal homeostasis during periods of torpor, allowing body temperature to approximate ambient conditions (Bligh 1973; Withers 1977). The behavioural regulation of heat transfer between the organism and its environment may be more important, moment to moment, even among endotherms, than is generally realised.” <(a) pp.198> Hafaz (1974) suggests that endotherms may control thermal homeostasis behaviourally (poikilothermically) during most activities and only resort to autonomic (specifically endothermic) controls such 174

The Primal Eye as sweating, panting, hair-erection and gular flutter, when thermal homeostasis is challenged (Bligh 1973). Lipton 1968 and Carlisle 1969 show that body temperature remains normal in cold-challenged rats since behavioural regulation compensates for physiological failure. Van Zoeren and Stricker 1977 argue that the degree of behavioural and physiological deficits in thermoregulatory ability depends on the location of hypothalmic lesions. <(a) p. 199>

175

Photoperiodism PHOTOPERIODISM, MELATONIN, and EXTERNAL CLOCK SYSTEMS I wish to link some of Thompson’s findings regarding finite and infinite state systems to ‘clock systems’ in animals. First of all I shall indicate how melatonin production (whether from the pineal eye, gland or lateral eyes) governs circadian rhythms in vertebrates. There is a huge amount of material in the literature relating to this, and I shall begin by briefly looking at Follet, Foster and Nicholl’s 1985 paper ‘Photoperiodism in birds’. Birds are E-1 and have a well developed pineal gland, which, ass in mammals, secretes melatonin in a rhythmic fashion. This secretion, both synthesis and release, is normally confined to hours of darkness. Melatonin secretion is governed by circadian rhythm and is under control of at least two clock systems. “One lies in the suprachiasmatic nuclei and regulates the pineal via the usual multisynaptic pathway through the superior cervicular ganglion; the other lies within the pineal itself and, whilst present in other vertebrates, is absent from mammals.” I have already indicated from [Roth & Roth] that the pineal gland in mammals is not typical of most species owing to its deeper location in the brain owing to the enlarged neocortex. When the avian pineal gland is isolated from all its neural inputs either in vivo or in vitrio it is still perfectly capable of secreting melatonin rhythmically under a light-dark cycle. The relative importance of these two clock systems in most birds is still unresolved.” <(d) p.93> Diurnal cycles affecting behaviour exist even in humans (see (j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Chronobiology of performance, Paul Naitoh, p.50 (Diurnality),

The Primal Eye pp.51-53 (basic model of applied chronopsychology). Also “within-aday cycles”, Kripke p.313-314, REAl-time hypothesis of stage REM, (Globus 1966) p.314-321

177

PhD References a121 The Anthropic Universe. Martin Rees, New Scientist 6 Aug 1987. (Matter and awareness). a141 Yoga of the Third Eye, Richard Matthews. Yoga Today, April 1981. a27/ Flying in the Face of God ~Life & intelligence in the Universe), Martin Rowan-Robertson, Guardian Science, Oct 28 1993. a361 Evolution on the Bookshelf, Michael Kenwood. New Scientist 23 May 1992. (Reviews of Darwin by A. Desmond & J Moore, Fossils by Niles Eldridge, The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee by Jared Diamond, Dawn of the Millennium by Eric Haith, Last Animals at the Zoo by Colin Tudge, Natural History of the Universe by Colin A Ronan). a381 Is the Soul Simply Grey Matter.? Francis Crick, Times Dullon Lecture, May 4 1994. a391 Is the Brain not built to do Physics'? Sharon Begley. Newsweek Nov29 1993. a41/ Mind-Body Link? Editorial, Bryn Mawr Alunini Bulletin, Winter 1991. a42/ Genomes to Dreams. Paul Grobstein. Br'yn Mawr Alunrini Bulletin, Winter 1991. a431 The Human Brain: Soulless. (Review of The Astonishing Hypothesis by Francis Crick). Author unknown.

PhD References a48/ The Holographic Hypothesis of Memory Structure in Brain Function and Perception. Karl H Pribram, Marc Nuwer & Robert J Baron. Cont. Devs. in Mathematical Psychology, Vol II, Measurement, Psychophysics, and Neural Information Processing, WH Freeman & Co, San Francisco 1975. a49/ A Grand Tour of the Head. (Reviews of Bright Air, Brilliant Fire by Gerald Edelman, and Facts of Life: Shattering the Myth of Darwinism by Richard Milton). Roy Porter and Julia Neuberger. Science Books, Sunday Times, 30 Aug 1992. a50/ Strange Birth of a Brainwave.(Quantum theory of mind, Prof Chris Clarke, Applied Maths at Southampton Uni, and Dr Peter Fenwick, Inst. of Psychiatry) Jerome Bume, Sunday Telegraph, 6 Nov 1994. a51 Sur~ival of the Quickest (Review of The Nature of Knowledge by Henry Plotlkn) Epistemology,next to Fuzzy' logic article Bart Kosco. Sunday Times, 27 Feb 1994. a52 Or Maybe Not'? Review of Searle's Chinese-room argument. The Economist, Jan 27 1990. a55I The Edge of Chaos. (Complexity work at Sante Fe Institute). Elizabeth Coorcoran, Scientific American, Oct 1992. a56/ Illusory Fall brings Visual Commotion, Erlend Clouston, Guardian 1993 (day before Edinburgh Conscious Symposium mentioned). (Confirmation of Aristotle’s mention of visual phenomenon in Book of Dreams etc. by Richard van Wezel, Univ Utrecht). a57/ Forging Childhood Memories, Sharon Begley, Newsweek April 26 1993. (Review of Katherine Nelson C.Col. Ny, narrative 2nd hand framework). a58/ The Frontier of the Brain, Dogen Haunali. (Interview with Dr Joseph Martin, Univ Californai, on Mapping the human brain project). Newsweek April 26 1993

180

The Primal Eye a60/ God and Darwin. Rupert Sheldrake. (Guardian '? No into). a6 1/ The Anatomy of Memory. Mortimer Mishlan & Tim Appenzeller. Scientific American (Supplement'?) a62/ Art, Illusion & the Visual System. Margaret S. Livirigstone, Scientific American (date unknown). (Form, colour and spatial into processing along three independent patrhways explaming some visual effects). a63/ Probably the oldest story in the world. (Review of The Language of the Genes by Steve Jones, Harper Collins, also Sexual Brain by Simon Le Vay, MIT Press). a38/ Is the Soul Simply Grey Matter'? Francis Crick, Times Dullon Lecture, May 4 1994. a40/ Dinosaurs: National Geographic Double Supplement special issue, Vol 183, Jan 1993. a42/ Genomes to Dreams. Paul Grobstein. Bry'ri Mawr Alumini Bulletin, Winter 1991. a44/ The Sixth Sense of Monotremes. Robin McKie, 23 June 1991, Obserr'er. a451 A Brain At War with Itself C[be Triune Brain... reptile(survival) , limbic (feeling & long-term memory), The Neocortex (rational & special) and pre-frontal (empathetic) cortex... work by Dr Paul Maclean, head of Lab of Brain Evolution of Nat Inst. for Mental Health), article by Caroline Fenderson, LT Times, June 10 1992. a46/ Australia's Polar Dinosaurs (night vision & apparent warm bloodedness) by Patricia Vickers-Rich & Thomas Hewitt-Rich, Scientific American, July 1993. a47/ The Soul of the Matter? (Review of Dr Charles McCreery, Oxford Uni ). The Economist, Aug 7th 1993. 181

PhD References a48/ The Holographic Hypothesis of Memory Structure in Brain Function and Perception. Karl H Pribram, Marc Nuwer & Robert J Baron. Cont. Devs. in Mathematical Psychology, Vol II, Measurement, Psychophysics, and Neural Information Processing, WH Freeman & Co, San Francisco 1975. n a5O/ Strange Birin of a Brainwave.(Quantum theory of mind, Prof Chris Clarke, Applied Maths at Southampton Uni, and Dr Peter Fenwick, Inst. of Psychiatry) Jerome Burne, Sunday Telegraph, 6 Nov 1994. a51/ Daydrearning: Experinients reveal link between memory and sleep. Jobri Horgan, Scientific American, Oct 1994. a52/ SLEEP. Physiology and dreaming).Michael E Long. National Geographic, Dec 1987. a58/ The Frontier of the Brain, Dogen Hannah. (Interview with Dr Joseph Martin, Univ California, on Mapping the human brain project). Newsweek April 26 1993 a591 The Light of Spring. John Illinan, April 6 1993. (Seasonal Aflective Disorder SAD, Review SAD, who gets it'? Angela Smythe, Unwin) a611/ The Anatomy of Memory. Mortimer Mishkin & Tim Appenzeller. Scientific American (Supplement'?) a621 Art, Illusion & the Visual System. Margaret S. Livirigstone, (Form, colour and spatial info processing along three independent patrhways explaining some visual effects). a631 Probably the oldest story in the world. (Review of The Language of the Genes by Steve Jones, Harper Collins, also Sexual Brain by Simon Le Vay, MET Press). Steve Connor, Science books, Sunday Times?

182

The Primal Eye a64/ Features & Objects in Visual Processing. Anne Treisman, Scientific American, date unknown. (REFERENCES background only) The Tuatara, Why is it a lone survivor? Charles M Bogert, Scientific Monthly, Vol. 76 (1953) ppl-163-70 The Timeless Tuatara, James A Oliver, Animal Kingdom Vol 56 (1953) pp2-8, 31. References to the Tuatara in the Stephen Island Letter Book, Karl P Schmidt, Fieldiana, Zoology, Vol 34, 1952, ppl -10 a8/ Homeobox Genes and the Vertebrate Body Plan. Eddy Dc Robertis, GinlIermo Oliver and Christopher Wright, Scientific American, July 1990. (Head to tail axis, median lines etc). a 13/ Dizzy Dinosaur Days (review of the Dinosaur Heresies by Robert Barker, longman) Beverley Hal stead, New Scientist, 6 August 1987. (Warm blooded dinosaurs). also Third Eye leads a Lizard Home, National Geographic, Oct 1993. (Report of Barbara Ellis, Quinn and Carol A Simon (New York City CoHege) surgically implanted transmitters on Spiny Lizards, some with pineal eye covered, some not. Covered group failed to locate burrows and wandered aimlessly). a16/ MIND and BRAIN (Special Issue). Sept 1992. The Problem of Consciousness, Francis Crick and Christof Koch. a/17 a/I 8 a 19/

The Visual Image in Mind and Brain, Semir Zeki Mind and Brain (evolution), Gerald D Fischbach Working Memory and the Mind, Patricia Goldi-

nan-Rakic a20/ Short-term Visual Memory, Bill Phillips. Phil Trans. R. Soc. Lond 1983 a2 1/ Neuropsychological Studies of the Frontal Lobes. Donald T Stuss & D Frank Benson ~/copy Unknown source). 183

PhD References a221 PHANTOM LIMBS, Ronald Melzack, Scientific American April 1992. a23/ Program from Royal Society of Edinburgh's Symposium on Consciousness, 25th Nov 1992. a24/ New Evidence Proves coloured lexicon' exists. (Synaesthasia), Steve Connor, The Independent 31 May 1993. (Geneticist Francis Galton C 19th work and recent work by Simon Baron-Cohen, Institute of Psychiatry). a25/ The Sleep of Reason From Mesmer to Freud by Adam Crabtree), 1994. a26/ Perspective Special... Evolution and the Human Sciences report, The Times higher, June 25 1993. a28/ Orgaitisation of Neocortex in Mammals (Implications for Theories of Brain Function). Jon H Kaas, Ann. Rev. Psychol. 1987, 38;129-51 a291 The Pineal Complex, Aggressive Behaviour and Thermoregulation in Curly Tailed Lizards, Lelocephalus carinatus, JA Phillips & KA Howes. Jul Physiology & Behaviour, 1988 Vol 42 pt 1 pp 103-8 (Aggressive behaviour in male lizards monitored after shielding pineal eyes).* a30/ ST'RANGE CASE OF THIE THIRD EYE Edward Pugh, John Lisman, Richard Payne Editor NATURE, vol 364, 29 July 1993 .(Phototransduction). * a3 1/ Antagonistic Chiomatic Mechanisms in Photoreceptors of the Parietal eye of lizards, Eduardo Solessio & Gustav Engbretson, Nature, Vol 364 29 July 1993. a32/ THE GLAND THAT MEASURES TIME, New Scientist “pineal' issue, 25 July 1985. The Pineal - a gland that measures time? Josephine Arendt, pp360 Biological clock). 184

The Primal Eye a331 A Gland for all Seasons, Andrew Loudon, New Scientist 25 July 1985. (Influence on many things from appetite to sexual behaviour in mammals by pineal gland). a34/ Messages in Evolution, Andrew Scott. New Scientist, 25 July 1985. Communications of primeval cells. a35/ Absence of cooperative haemoglobin oxygen binding in Sphenodon, a reptilian relic from the Triassic. RMG Wells, V Tertens & T Brittain, NATURE, 306, 1 Dec 1983. a36/ Evolution on the Bookshelf, Michael Kenwood. New Scientist 23 May 1992. (Reviews of Darwin by A. Desmond & J Moore, Fossils by Niles Eldridge, The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee by Jared Diamond, Dawn of the Millennium by Eric Harth, Last Animals at the Zoo by Colin Tudge, Natural History of the Universe by Colin A Ronan). a37/ Triumph of the Embryo, Mark Ridley. Nature Vol 357, 21 May 1992. (Review of The Meaning of Evolution by Robert J Richards). 15/ FOSSILS AND THE LIFE OF THE PAST. Eric Thenius (Trans B. M. Crook). 1973, English Universities Press. (Chap I Introduction to Palaeontology, Chap 6 Fossils and Evolution, Chap 10 Living Fossils ...including Sphenodon). n 16/ The RUNAWAY BRAIN. Christopher Wills. 1994, Harper Collins, London. (The evolution of human uniqueness - a theory). 17/ ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR - Its Development, Ecology and Evolution. Robert A Wallace. 1979, Goodyear, California. p.193 Pineal eye experiments on sightless frogs, Adler's 1976 experiments of pineal detection of polarized light in overhead sky and orientation of salamanders and frogs).a

185

PhD References 18/ BIOLOGY OF SEROTONERGIC TAANSMISSION, Osbourne (ed). 1982, John Wiley & Sons ltd. (Andersonian 612.822B10) (P.86). 19/ THIE Vertebrate BRAIN. Pearson (Andersonian D.596.0188PEA). (ref p.323 Bertini 5 experiments, 1958). 20/The Biology of Lampreys. MW Hardisty & IC Potter (Eds). Academic Press, NY 1972. (Chapter 12 The Pineal Complex. STRUCTURE (a) General Morphology, (b) Cell types, FUNCTION (a) Colour change in the ammocoete, (0) Metamorphosis, (c) Reproduction, References).n 21/The Pineal Gland & Its Endocrine Role. (Ed. J Axekod). F Fraschini & GP Velo, 1983. Plenum Press. (Aspects of evolution of the pineal organ ppl7~l9). 22/The Pineal Gland: CIIBA Foundation Symposium. GEW Wolstenholme & J Knight (ed), 1971, Churchill Livingston ISBN 07000-1502-7. (a) The Pineal Organ: An Introduction, J Arens Kappers pinea1 organ in Anamtriotes, pineal and animal colour change, light sensitivity, decay of pineal in adults; Pineal organ in Reptiles, decay of organ in adults etc; Pineal organ in Birds, effects light on reproduction, circadian rhythm & photoperiods Oksche & Kirschstein (1969), Pineal organ in Mammals, Functional Evolution of the Pineal, "The mammalian pinealocyte is phylogenetically derived from the neurosensory photoreceptor present in the pineal of anatiotes. It is not a modified nerve cell. "Indirectly photosensitive by a circuitous route via the retinas and complicated neural pathway. Photorecptive capacity gradually lost and becomes preponderantly secretorary with some photoreceptivity. "Alongside the gradual loss of the pinealo-fugal sensory innervation pattern there is an increasing development of an autonomic pinealo-petal motor innervation pattern.” Regulation of reproductive processes. Nature of Stimulus to the Pineal. Mode of Secretion of Pineal Products. References.) 186

The Primal Eye 23/ The Pineal, PINEAL ANATOMY 24/ A Cold Look at the Warm-Blooded Dinosaurs. Roger DK Thomas & Everett C Olson (eds), AAAS Selected Symposia Series, 1981(?), Westview Press, Colorado. (Chap 7 The Parietal-Pineal Complex Among Paleovertebrates, Jan J Roth & E Carol Roth, plus Chaps 3, 6, 9, 10 Relative Brain Size and implications for Dinosaurian Endothermy).Stirling Uni Library 25/ Living Reptiles of the World, Karl Schmidt & Robert Inger. 1957, Hamish Hamilton. pp 4147 The Tuatara). Physiology (Articles) al/ Can Science Explain Consciousness'? John Horgan, Scientific American, July 1994. a2/ We Have Ways of Keeping You Awake. Martin MooreEde, New Scientist, 13 Nov 1993. a3/ The Evolutionary Future of Man. Richard Dawkins, 150 Economist (Magazine) Special, pp 103-110 a4/ A Simple Matter of Complexity. Evolution and complexity) Roger Lewin, New Scientist, 5 Feb 1994. a5/ Visual Dominance in Conscious Awareness: A Neuroanatomical-Evolutionary Approach. Dr Peter Grossenbacher (Poster Presentation at Conf. on Evolution and the Human Sciences, London 24-26 June, 1993 ... also see email personal correspondence re. median vision theory). a7/ Visualizing the Mind. Marcus E Raichle, Scientific American, April 1994. The role of Median Vision in the Early Evolution of Mental Representations 187

PhD References

WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY & some notes 1/ THE CONSCIOUS BRAIN. Prof. Stephen Rose, 1973. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. (Chapters 2 to 13).a 2/ NEURONAL MAN: IIIE BIOLOGY OF MIND. Prof. JeanPierrre Changeux, 1985 (trans. Dr L. Garey). Pantheon Boooks, NY * (Preface. Chap 2 The Component Parts of the Brain, Chap 3 Animal Spirits, Chap 6 The Power of Genes, Chap 7 Epigenesis, Chap 8 Anthropogenesis). 3/ THE BRAIN. AN INTRODUCTION TO NEUROSCIENCE. Prof Richard Thompson, 1985 Freeman & Co. USA. (Chap 1 Brain and Neuron, Chap 5 Neurotransmitters and Chemical Circuits in the Brain, Chap 9 The Life Cycle of the Brain, Chap 10 Brain & Behaviour).a 4/ BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Philip M. Groves & Kurt Schlesinger, 19822nd Ed. Wm. C. Brown Co., USA. (Chap 1 Historical Concepts in the Study of Brain and Behaviour, Chap 2 Behavioral Genetics and Evolution, Chap 11 Hormones & Behaviour, Chap 12 Emotions, Aggression & Reward, Chap 13 Sleep, Dreaming & Arousal). a 5/ PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY. Reflections of a Biologist. Prof G. Adam, 1980. Plenum Press, NY. (Part 1 Perception - Information Uptake of the Mind, Part 2 Energetics of Mental Processes: Walling State, Sleep, Attention & Consciousness, Part 3 Experience of the Mind: Learning & Memory).a 6/ SENSORY PROCESSIING, PERCEPTION, AND BEHAVIOUR. Prof. Robert Livingston, MD. 1978, Raven Press, NY. (Chap 1 Behaviour and Evolution, Chap 2 Perception, Chap 3 Sensory Processing, Chap 4 Sensation).a 188

The Primal Eye 7/ EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN AND INTELLIENCE. Harry J Jerison, 1973. Academic Press, NY (Part I The Approach, Part II The Basic Vertebrate Radiation, Part III Brain Enlargement, Part IV Progressive Evolution of the Brain, ). 8/ MECHANICS OF THE MIND Colin Blakemore, BBC Reith Lectures 1976, Cambridge Univ. Press. (General)a 9/ THE PINEAL. Prof's. Richard Wuranan, Julius Axekod & Douglas Kelly. 1968 Academic Press, NY. (Chap I Pineal Anatomy, Chap 2 Biochemistry of the Pineal Gland, Chap 3 Pharmacology of the Pineal Gland, Chap 4 Light, The Pineal & Biological Rhythms, Chap 5 Physiology of thepineal, Chap 6 The Human Pineal & its Diseases). 1. Origin and Organisation, Evolution, Vascularization, Innervation. 2. Microscopic Anatomy of Saccular Pineal Systems - Pineal Photoreception. (NOTE: pages missing 9 through 128.) (Chap 4 Light, The Pineal and Biological Rhythms.. Vi. Species variation in Pineal responses to light vii. Other effects of Continuous illumination on Pineal metabolism, viii. Pineal biochemical rhythms and their control by light, ppl 54-155 Role of Pineal in Gonad responses to light., pplSS-158 Pineal and the Thyroid huiction. pplS8-9 Pineal & biological rhythms, experiments on circadian effects, Neurochemical & Neurophysiological Effects of Melatonin, Other Actions of Mammalian Pineal, Pigmentation).a* 10/ FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY TO MENTAL STRUCTURE. Tim Shallice, 1988, Cam. Univ.Press. (General, evidence from Human abnormalities). 11/ THE SYNAPTIC ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN. 3rd Ed. Prof Gordon M. Shepherd (ed), 1990, Oxford Univ Press. (General). n

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PhD References 12/ COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY. Andrew W Ellis & Andrew W Young. 1991ed, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, UK. (Chap 3 Visual & Spatial Abilities (Blind sight etc)). n 14/ THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE MIND Richard Gregory (Ed). 1987, Ox Uni Press. (General). n descriptions are of the same event, there is no a priori way of telling which of the subjects is the minimal one.59 MVT PhD CONCLUSION For the reasons above, I find non-reductive materialism, specifically anomalous monism, and most varieties of supervenience, unconvincing on criteria (1) and (3). There is even some doubt whether Davidson's view satisfies (2) or whether it is a dual-aspect theory. Mereological Supervenience is most resonant with my views 60 and seems the most plausible of the materialist contenders looked according to my three criteria. However to say that it is adequate is not to say that it is fully acceptable or true. Unfortunately there is not space here to properly detail this position. Finally I wish to point out that this discussion has been restricted to selected materialist theories and ignores many other positions entirely.61 4297 words BIBLIOGRAPHY Actions and Events.' Perspectives on the Philosophy ofDonald Davidson, (Eds.) Ernest LePore & Brain P. McLaughlin, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985 Essays on Actions and Events, Donald Davidson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980 (1989 edition) The Unity of the Mind, D.H.M. Brooks, St. Martin's Press, Scots Philosophical Club, 1994 Mind-Body Identity Theories, Cynthia MacDonald, Routledge, London 1989 (1992 edition) Mind and Cognition: A Reader, (ed.) William G. Lycan, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (1995 190

The Primal Eye edition) Organic Evolution, R.S. Lull, Macmillan, London, 1921 Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Steve Edwards, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994 The Synaptic Organisation of the Brain, 3rd Edition, (Ed.) Gordon M. Shepherd, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990 Median Vision Theory, Steve Nichols, Post-human publications, Lowestoft, 1993 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Ed.) Ted Honderich, Oxford University Press, 1995 Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, (Ed.) Sam Guttenplan, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994 Physiognomics, Aristotle, in CD-Rom Library of World Philosophy, Actual Reality, 1996 Weak Externalism and Mind-Body Identity, Cynthia MacDonald, Mind, Vol.99, July 1990 Cynthia MacDonald, Mind-brain identity theories, Routledge, London, 1989, p.182 60 Nichols, S., Median Vision Theory, Posthuman publications, England, 1993 61 For example the views of Searle, McGinn, Dennett and Fodor. 1.1.5 Lecture 11 Friday, 14th May) Topic: Naturalism and Physicalism Reading: McDowell (1994), Chaps. x-xv Sellars (1956) Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations References Davidson, Donald (1980), Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hempel, C. G. (1%2), "Rational action", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, pp.5-24. Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. with an introduction, comparative table of contents and analytical index by L. A. 191

PhD References Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition, with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition, with text revised and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. LePore, Ernest and McLaughlin, Brian P., eds. (1985), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell. Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham, eds. (1995), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Oxford: Blackwell. McDowell, John (1994), Mind and World, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Sellars, Wilfrid (1956), "Empiricism and the philosophy of mind" in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sdence, vol.1, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.253-329. Stroud, Barry (1977), Hume, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G.E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edition, Oxford: Blackwell SOURCES Articles (1) Connected-digit Speaker-dependent Speech Recognition using a Neural Network with Time Delayed Connections, IEEE trans.on signal proc., 39;3 March 1991. KP Unnikrishnan, John Hopfield, David Tank (2) Models of Reading Aloud: Dual route & Connectionist Approaches. Sept 1991 (unpublished). Max Coitheart, Brent Curtis, Paul Atkins. 192

The Primal Eye (3) The Process of Lexical Decision. Journal of Exp. Psychology, vol 18;4. 1992. Paul Fera, Derek Besner. (4) Generalisation with Componential Attractors: Word & Nonword Reading in an Attractor Network. Proc. 15th Ann. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc., 1993. David C Plaut, James L McClelland. (5) A Method for Designing Neural Networks using Nonlinear Multivariate Analysis: Application to SpeakerIndependent Vowel Recognition.Neural Computation vol 2;3. Fall 1990. Toshio Irino, Hideki Kawahara. (6) A Practical Approach for Representing Context and for Performing Word-Sense Disambiguation using Neural Nets. Neural Computation 3;3. Fall 1991. Stephen A Gallant. (7) Recognising Hand-Printed Letters and Digits Using Backpropagation Learning. Neural Computation 3;2. Summer 1991. Gale L Martin, James A Pittman. (8) Speaker-Independent Digit Recognition Using a Neural Network with Time-Delayed Connections. Neural Computation 4, 1992. KP Unnikrishnan, JJ Hopfield, DW Tank. (9) Modular Neural Networks for Learning ContextDependent Game Strategies. MPil Thesis, Carnb. Uni., Aug 1992. Justin A Boyan. (10) Speaker Normalisation and Adaption using SecondOrder Connectionist Networks. IEEE trans. neural nets., vol 4;1. Jan 1993. Raymond L Watrous. (11) Glove-Talk: A Neural Network Interface between a Data-Glove and a Speech Synthesizer. IEEE trans. neural nets., vol 4;1. Jan 1993.S Sidney Fels, Geoffrey E Hinton. (12) Connectionist Models of Utterance Production. Lect.Notes in Al, 565.1989. HJ Eikmeyer. (13) Distributed Semantic Representations of Word Meanings. Lect.Notes in Al, 565, 1989. BB Reiger. (14) Review of Neural Networks for Speech Recognition. Neural Computation, 1;1, 1989. RP Lippmann. (15) Continuous Speech Recognition with the Connectionist Viterbi training Procedure: A Summary. Lect.Notes in Comp.Sci. 540, 1991. M Franzini, A Waibel, KF Lee.

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PhD References (16) An Approach to Isolated Word Recognition. Lect.Notes in Comp.Sci. 540, July 1991. MJ Castro, F Casacuberta. (17) Recurrent Neural Networks for Speech Recognition. Lect.Notes in Comp.Sci. 540, July 1991. JE Diaz Verdejo et al. (18) A Speech Recognition System that Integrates Neural Nets and H.M.M. Lect.Notes in Comp.Sci. 540, July 1991. E Monte, JB Manno. (19) Comparison of Neural Networks and Conventional Techniques for Automatic Recognition of a Multilingual Speech Database. Lect.Notes in Comp.Sci. 540, July 1991. D Maravall et al. Books (20) Neural Networks for Vision, Speech and Natural Language. Chapman & Hall, 1992. (Ed. R Linggard, DJ Myers, C Nightingale). (21) From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure. CUP, 1988. Tim Shallice. (22) Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol 2. Bradford, 1986. James McClelland, David Rumelhart et al. (23) Psycholinguistics. Longman 1982. Danny Steinberg. (24) Semantic Networks. Pitman, 1988. Lokendra Shastri. (25) Connectionism in Psychology. Harvester, 1991. Philip Quinlan. (26) Speech Understanding Systems: Final report of a study group. North-Holland, 1973. (26a) Neural Networks and Speech Processing. Kluwer Academic, 1991. David P Morgan, Christopher L Scofield. (27) Implementing Semantic Networks in Parallel Hardware. Erlbaum, 1981. Ed GE Hinton (& JA Anderson).

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Descartes & Nychtheremal time Baltazar Barrera-Mera, a Chronobiologist at Departamento de Neurosciences, Instituto de Fisiologia Celular, UNAM, Mexico, published a review of “The Cartesian Model of Pineal Function” (Salud Mental, 1987 v.10(3) 22-26) in which he argues that Descartes’ understanding of pineal gland function was more profound that is commonly assumed. I quote from this article at length, with apologies for the translation (the brackets are my own): “In Europe, Rene Descartes postulated at that time a unique and encephalic model to coordinate the nychthemeral activity of the human being. Descartes suggested that the animal corpor(e)al components constituted a machine automatically controlled by a structure, which like a clock, tells time by means of an immaterial substance. Besides its contributions to the knowledge of the basic operations of the nervous system, in its proposal related with the neural coordination (of) the corporeal activity, Descartes considered a form of integrative control which he attributed to the pineal gland. He attributed a strategic role to this structure when he considered it as the anatomic site of the soul. The effects of the alteration of this structure on the aberrant behaviour of psychiatric patients (I shall consider a whole raft of papers detailing pineal misfunction associated with a range of mental disorder, see new Bibliography), as well as those due to its experimental removal, and in many aspects of the metabolic and hormonal control, causes the Cartesian proposal regarding the acquisition of that complex photosensible and neuroendocrine organ to acquire a significant actuality.

Descartes & Nychtheremal time The Cartesian metaphoric conception of the functioning of that small epiphysiary (pineal complex) portion of the nervous system as that of a clock is proof of his particular intuition. Descartes attributes a cardinal role, (like) that of a control tower, to the pineal gland, which would receive the peripheric neural information to coordinate the corporal activation. According to Descartes, the cerebral cyclic activity is modified according to the nychthemeral time, by means of which the number of small encephalic tubules and the cranial peripheric activated nerves prove the value of his powerful mind to explain the rythmic and motivational behavioural control from the central areas of the nervous system. By illuminating the region of the pineal gland, by removing it or successfully reimplanting it, the coordinating role of that gland in the mysterious processes regulating the specific cyclic control is proved, as shown in the case of nychthemeral locomotive activity. The periodic secretion of melatonin and the peptidic neurosecretions also demonstrate that the pineal, a photosensible and neuroendocrine transductor organ, is a very important gland in the organisation of the mechanism of a circadic cycle clock mechanism by means of the control of the rest of the neuroendocrine system. Ultrastructural morphological, histochemical, and citochemical studies show that the pineal catalyses, moderates, and synchronises a great variety of important functional processes by means of its own intense synthetic hormonal activity. Breathing and hemodinamia, ingestion, sleep and vigil, the control of endocrine and cellular metabolism and of other homeostatic functions of the corporal activity, depend on a complex but harmonic neuronal activation with periodic recurrence, also regulated by the pineal gland. Other cyclic functions, such as the adaptation to our environment, the (enhancement) of longevity, and the preservation of the various animal species which depend (on) the pineal functioning emerge as a proof of the glorious traces of Cartesian thought, which with its brilliant propositions has inspired several generations of famous investigators in the field of exact, physical and natural sciences, 196

The Primal Eye in which reference is now made to the theoretic conception of one of the nychthemeral control mechanisms in the field of modern Chronobiology. I intend to look at the evidence for not only most of these claims, but even for a few further ones, such as Dawson, Crowne and Richardson’s view of the pineal gland as yielding “both visual and auditory evoked responses” (Electrophysiological evidence of photic, acoustic, and central input to the pineal body and hypothalamus, N Dafny, Exp. Neurol., 1977, 55 449-457) and also “regulat(ing) neuroendocrine responses to visual and auditory stress (Neuroendocrine function in long-term pinealectomized male rats following visual and audiogenic stress, Klein, Siegel et al, Jn. Neural Transm., 1979 46 113122). The pineal gland may well modulate bilateral sensory attention in the visual and auditory modalities.” Experiments in the Victorian age on a newly discovered ‘walking fossil’, Sphaenodon Punctatus, which retained a developed and functioning pineal eye have been followed in this century. It has been shown that a whole range of different behaviours are governed by the pineal eye, and that when covered or removed, the vertebrate becomes fairly aimless and unaware (see Pineal eye references). In the first half of this century, the pineal gland was thought of as a calcified vestige and dismissed as the rudimentary ‘third eye’ of the lower vertebrates (The Pineal Organ, Wurtman & Moskowitz, The New England Journal of Medicine, 296, 1977 pp.1329-1333). “Quite likely, scientific discussions about the pineal systems have overutilised the term “vestigial” more than any other single adjective. If such descriptions were to prove accurate, then these organs would rate as among the most prevalent of all vestiges! In all present day vertebrates, excepting only the hagfish Myxine, crocodilians, edentates, and perhaps dugongs; distinct pineal organs are present (Adams, 1957; reviewed by Krabbe, 1961; Arens-Kappers, 1965; Oksche, 1965). And even in some of those species, there is reason to suspect that diffuse regions of pineal tissue exist along the diencephalic roof (Hulsemann, 1967; Machado, 1963; Di Dio, 1963). “

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Descartes & Nychtheremal time “Far from appearing evolutionarily regressive, pineal organs are and have been about as common in vertebrate brain as pituitary glands.” (The Pineal, Wurtman, Axelrod, DE Kelly, 1968 Academic Press, pl).

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Descartes: Introduction The Occult Philosophy of Rene Descartes But no one ventured to order all natural science on new principles except René Descartes, who started in relation as if no one had treated physics before - Paschius It is apparent that Descartes often presented theories as his own work that were actually based on his reading of prior authors, and it can be inferred that Descartes omission of such acknowledgements was deliberate. I will cite a variety of such instances, and particularly his pineal gland theory, which I will demonstrate as being derived from the earlier theory of Costa ben Luca, though unacknowledged by Descartes. I shall also show that Descartes was widely regarded amongst his contemporaries as being an occultist, and will look in some detail at astrological and esoteric aspects of his writings. In my forthcoming book or CDROM of ‘World Third Eye Mythologies’ I shall contrast MVT with the traditional, 'received' occult philosophy of the "third" eye. This received view encapsulates the ideas of Ancient Egypt, Galen, Costa ben Luca, Descartes, and in more recent times by Blavatsky and the Theosophists. It appears that Descartes wished to decide all questions of physics and metaphysics without much caring if he was right - Huygens to Leibniz, 11 July 1692.

Descartes and Astrology CARTESIAN ASTROLOGY Several astrologers sought support and justification from Cartesianism. I follow largely the text from Prof. Lynn Thorndike’s History of Magic and Experimental Sciences, Columbia University Press, NY, 1923. KIRCHMAIER Kirchmaier, in a work printed in 1680, says that twenty-one years ago the Cartesian, John Placentinus, professor at Frankfurt-onthe-Oder and mathematicus (which probably means astrologer) to the Elector of Brandenburg, held that the principle and origin of human life was a most subtle celestial matter, analogous to the element of the sun and fixed stars, and that the natural motion of the limbs proceeded from that celestial matter. Further Placentinus cited a Jean de Raey, Professor at Lyon and author of two dissertations on this subtle matter, as affirming that, after the child is born, it continually fills its lungs with the subtlest particles of this celestial matter. Kirchmaier, however, objects that the nature of celestial matter is as yet unknown, and that the first element of Descartes can be explained far otherwise than as a matter analogous to the sun and fixed stars. GADROYS A Discourse on the Influence of the Stars according to the Principles of Descartes, composed by Claude Gadroys, first appeared in 1671 and then was reprinted in 1674 without change except that to the title was added, "where it is shown that there goes out Continually from

Descartes and Astrology the stars a matter by means of which may be explained the things which the ancients have attributed to occult influences." This matter is of course Descartes’ first element. After chapters on the nature of the stars, of the sun and fixed stars, and of the planets, Gadroys tells how the matter from the stars gets here, and then discusses conjunctions, oppositions and aspects. He not only ascribes to the stars effect on weather and health, but goes on to broach the theme of talismans or astrological images. Gadroys goes on, however, to explain how the stars incline, although they do not compel, us to this or that action. It is through their effect upon the animal spirits, for difference in the animal spirits can produce diversity of inclinations. Descartes says that spirits can differ in four ways as they are more or less abundant, their parts more or less gross, more or less agitated, and more or less equal or equable. Their abundance excites love, goodness and liberality. If they are strong and gross, they make for confidence and boldness; if equally agitated, for tranquillity; if unequally agitated for desire, promptitude and diligence. If deprived of all these qualities, they engender malignity, fear, inconstancy and disquietude. Sanguine humor is compounded of promptitude and tranquillity of mind, and perfected by goodness and confidence. Melancholy humor is compounded of sloth and disquietude, and augmented by malignity and fear. Choleric humor is a compound of promptitude and disquietude, fortified by malignity and defiance. It is important to note the positions of the planets at the moment of birth, because immediately thereafter the parts of the brain set themselves and conserve all through the course of life the first impressions which they have received. The force of a star's impressions depends upon its finding in the child dispositions conforming to its quality. Each planet causes certain inclinations in men according to its distance from the sun and consequent solidity. Saturn, being far from the center of its tourbillon, that is to say, from the sun, is very solid and coarse. The planets are solid bodies which are governed by certain laws 202

The Primal Eye to which liquid bodies such as the sun and stars are not subject. But then Gadroys immediately begins to back water again, stating that the Greeks added a hundred superstitions to astrology, and proceeding to criticize astrologers himself, leading to the conclusion that "it is a criminal temerity to pretend to pierce the thick darkness of the future." One should judge only in general concerning health or sickness, the fortune or misfortune of the newborn babe, and whether he will be amiable and gentle or otherwise. He holds further, however, that even some of our particular actions can be conjectured from the stars. When they recur in the same disposition as at the first moment of our life, they make us act in a way which we would not do, if we were not extraordinarily agitated. Gadroys then concludes with the statement that he is content to have laid the foundations of a new astrology of which he leaves it to others to rear the edifice. He doubts not that they will succeed in rendering this science very considerable, if they will concentrate upon the nature of each star in particular and upon observing the time of its domination. In his book of 1675 on The System of the World only three short pages are devoted to the influence of the stars and Gadroys_ attitude is more non-committal. He says that this question has long been discussed, and that he believes that it will continue to be debated for a long time to come. He would not assert positively the existence of such influence, neither would he deny it, for there are many things of which the causes also not seem terrestrial. Three years ago he discussed the question at length and so will not dwell on it further now. MAGERLINUS About 1679 Petrus Magerlinus, who seems to have been a lawyer by profession composed a Cartesian Astrology or Demonstration of the principles of astrology from the philosophy of Rene Descartes, with an Epilogue in which certain tenets of Descartes were refuted. This shows that Magerlinus regarded himself as something of a philosopher, and he speaks of thirty-seven years experience in testing the truth of

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Descartes and Astrology astrology. Magerlinus is possibly to be identified with Peter Megerlin (1623-1686) who in 1674 became professor of mathematics at Basel and wrote greatly on astrology and comets. The underlying idea of Magerlinus’ work is that the matter of Descartes' first element, which exists in the sun, planets and fixed stars and also is dispersed between the particles of the second and third elements, furnishes a basis for a mechanical explanation of astrology. The attempts of men like Abdias Trew in Germany and J. B. Morin in France to base astrology upon the philosophy of Aristotle involve occult qualities and "cabalistical relationships" which do not impress Magerlinus. But in Kepler's harmony of the soul of the universe and soul "at the center of the earth," and mutual sympathy of superiors and inferiors he finds a close resemblance to Descartes, although it may seem to the modern reader that the one was animistic and the other mechanistic. Magerlinus is not so insane as to swallow all the nugae and superstition of astrologers, but his own experience and observation over many years convince him that many mysteries of nature are contained in the wrappings of astrology, "and have come down to us through so many centuries not without singular divine providence." He still retains astrological houses and the triplicities of the signs, aspects and antiscii, exaltations of planets and houses, critical days, directions and revolutions, and prediction of the weather and public events. Magerlinus criticizes Descartes for setting aside the Word of God and only scrutinizing His works, for holding that the world is infinite, and with regard to the matter of his first element, vortices, comets, clouds and thunder. But it makes no difference to his astrology whether comets are eternal bodies, as Seneca held, or generated from 204

The Primal Eye the fixed stars lay incrustation and destruction of their vortices, as Descartes held, although Magerlinus personally would attribute their generation rather to mutual adhesion of particles of the first element. DANCKWARTEN Another who maintained that the Cartesian philosophy was not unfavorable to astrology was Christian Gottfrietl Danckwarten, M.D., of Hamburg, in 1684, in a work written in German but with so many quotations in Latin that it almost seems to be in that language.

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Descartes: Crypto-Maths & Natural Magic CRYPTIC MATHEMATICS Descartes was an accomplished mathematician who made several improvements in algebraic notation and followed analytical geometry by relating curves to equations. But he retained some of the secrecy of sixteenth century mathematicians, writing purposely in an obscure style, although most of his other works are models of French clarity, omitting large portions of the analysis, and not stating all that followed from his conclusion, "so as to leave to posterity the pleasure" of further discovery.35 Gilson makes a good case that Cartesian philosophy was in the most part a clear explanation of facts which do not exist. But for Descartes they did exist, and experiments were still associated with, if not synonymous with, “marvelous secrets, with far-off wonders of India, and with the fabulous phoenix.” His purpose was to deal with centuries old problems rather than to explore entirely new channels of inquiry, but he wanted to solve the problems by appeal to natural reason rather than by scholastic methods and authorities. Descartes continued to deny the existence of a vacuum, he believed in animal spirits, and tried to answer such questions as why children and old people weep easily. Descartes was widely regarded amongst his contemporaries as being an occultist, and I will look in some detail at esoteric aspects of his writings ( also see Descartes & Astrology). Of particular interest is Descartes’ relationship with Isaac Beeckman (1570-1637) who was head of a Latin school in Dordrecht.

Descartes: Crypto-Maths & Natural Magic DESCARTES & BEECKMAN Beeckman’s doctoral dissertation (on intermittent tertian fever) was his only work published during his lifetime, although his Mathematico-physicae meditationes were printed posthumously, Utrecht, in 1644. He kept a journal which has survived in the provincial library of Middelburg in Zeeland. This shows that he was interested in the law of inertia during 1611 and 1612, and from 1613 held the atomic theory that water did not change to air He shared general interests in mathematics, physics and astronomy with Descartes, and they met in November 1618 at Breda. They exchanged views on problems such as the indivisibility of a point, and Beeckman told Descartes that he had proved experimentally that ice occupies more space than water, and proposed to him the “hydrostatic paradox” that a bucket of water can weigh as much as all the water in the ocean. After this they corresponded frequently and met again at Dordrecht in October 1628. They felt they were the only two men in the world who thought alike.<Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman, ed. Cde Waard, La Haye, 4. Vols., 1939, I, 244, II, 94-95> Beeckman strongly believed in astrological influences and celestial virtue. To the planetary aspects trine, quartile and sextile he added a quintus aspect. <Journal, I. Beeckman, I, 97,99, II, 139, III, 47, 140, 207-8> From past history he noted a prediction who would become pope, and he suggested that, if astrological images were true, the best way to make them would be by a glass converging the rays of the desired star on one point. It is clear from such accounts as under the caption “How incubi tormented me” <Journal, I, 281-2> that Beeckman was firmly attached to medieval and superstitious beliefs. There is no direct evidence of Beckman having influenced Descartes in his conception of the particles of his first element. I shall have more to say about the first element ideas of Descartes.

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The Primal Eye DESCARTES as a Natural Magician Despite Descartes’ exaltation of natural reason and his promise of an easy method by which any man could find in himself knowledge essential in directing his life, “his contemporaries thought of him as a magician who controlled Nature’s secrets and had evoked a rational and mechanical explanation of the universe and its origin, nay of many worlds, to replace alike the single universe and incorruptible heavens of Aristotle, and the divine creation of one world out of nothing of Christian theology.” MARVELS, SUPERSTITION and NATURAL MAGIC Descartes had more faith in reason and in mathematics than he did in experimentation. On December 23, 1630 he wrote to Mersenne that, in the case of the more particular experiments, it was impossible not to perform many superfluous and even false ones, unless one knew the truth before making them.41 Towards the close of his life, however, he wrote to Henry More: “I am not sure that I will ever bring to light the rest of my philosophy, since it depends on numerous experiments for the accomplishment of which I know not if I shall be granted the opportunity”.42 Indeed, at the time when he wrote the Discours de la cathode his conception of experimental science was more like that of Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century than it was like that of Robert Boyle later in the seventeenth century. But we must remember that Galileo's work on New Sciences did not appear until the following year. Descartes says that it will be impossible for him to treat in detail of the sciences which are deduced "from rare and well thought out experiments . . ." “for we should first of all have to examine all the herbs and stones brought to us from the Indies: we should have to have beheld the phoenix, and in a word to be ignorant of none of the marvellous secrets of nature.” 43

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Descartes: Crypto-Maths & Natural Magic Thus for Descartes experiments were still associated with, if not synonymous with, marvellous secrets, with far-off wonders of India, and with the fabulous phoenix. He professed to have wiped the slate of his mind clean, to have razed the previous edifice of knowledge to the ground. Yet he retained such beliefs as these, presumably because he classed them not as erroneous opinions or matters of doubt, but as established facts. Similarly the aim of his new method in philosophy was not to discover new facts but rather a better explanation of the old facts, a more certain ground for accepted beliefs. Wilson has well said that the Cartesian philosophy was in large part a clear explanation of facts which do not exist. But for Descartes they did exist. Nor did he attempt a new classification of knowledge, or to direct the human mind into new channels of inquiry. His purpose was rather to deal with the century-old problems which had long engaged human thoughts but to solve them by an appeal to natural reason rather than by scholastic methods and authorities. He still denied the existence of a vacuum. He still tried to answer such questions as why children and old people weep easily. He still believed in animal spirits. He repeated, without acknowledgement Costa ben Luca's tenth century explanation of thought as centring in the movement of the pineal glands. Why the sea was not increased by the rivers flowing into it by supposing the return of its water through underground passages to the tops of mountains, although Jacques Besson in the previous century had maintained that evaporation and rainfall sufficed to supply all springs and streams.45 Descartes still discussed bitumen, earthquakes and volcanoes and comets, and other natural phenomena which had been the staple topics of scientific treatises for centuries. He suggested a possible explanation for the reputedly inextinguishable lamps which burnt hundreds of years without addition of fuel. In general, he was concerned with the same problems, subjects and notions as had occupied the minds of philosophers and scientists for ages past. But he offered a new explanation of these by his new method, and by his new hypotheses of vortices, of comets, of animals as auto210

The Primal Eye mata, only of three elements, common to heavens and earth, as against the four terrestrial elements and fifth celestial essence of antiquity and middle age, or the three principles of Paracelsus. Fontellelle said that the Cartesian philosophy shed a new light on the whole thrilling world, and that books written since had been better arranged and more precisely expressed it. The hypothesis of vortices was for a time generally applauded, and that of three elements was very influential. Most of all, he emboldened others to think for themselves, to forge their own explanations and classifications of natural phenomena, and to base these upon recent mathematical analysis and experimental or observational discovery rather than upon the most ancient authorities. If, however, we ask ourselves whether the Cartesian attitude of doubt and of discarding authority, and his mechanistic interpretation of the natural universe, were directed against the belief in the influence of the stars and in natural marvels, and whether he was responsible for the abandonment of such views or of superstition in general, the answer will have to be in the negative. Descartes was so confident in his ability to explain anything and everything by his principles, that he was apt to employ them in justifying such dubious beliefs as that in inexhaustible lamps, or in the bleeding of the corpse of the victim in the presence of the murderer, as well as in expounding genuine natural phenomena. His sharp separation of the spheres of mind and body, and his insistence upon clear and distinct ideas, were incompatible with the animism of Kepler, the mysticism of the alchemists, and the spiritual science and occult medicine of van Helmont. In the long run they would work against the association of magic with experimental science. But for the moment he inclined to preserve many traditional marvels in the persuasiveness of his argument and clarity of his thought, like flies in amber. For the time being he sought an alliance with natural magic in his attack upon scholastic philosophy. Already in August, 1629 Descartes had written to Mersenne that there was a part of mathematics which he called the science of miracles 211

Descartes: Crypto-Maths & Natural Magic because by use of air and light it could produce all the illusions that they say magicians cause to appear by the aid of demons. "This science has never been practiced that I know of.” 48 If, however, he had in mind optical illusions, use of mirrors and the magic lantern, his science of miracles was of course much older than he imagined. In October of the same year he wrote that he judged from the title of Gaffarel’s recent Curiosites inoulyes stir la sculpture des Persans, horoscope des patriarches et lecture des estoilles that it would contain only chimeras.49 Thus he already drew a sharp line between natural or mathematical magic, which could be effected or explained mechanically, and an immaterial magic based on the power of words, pictures and diagrams. But there was one close resemblance between him and Gaffarel. The later offered only tourbillons. But, as we have seen, everything was in movement. Descartes piously made God the first cause of motion, but since an equal amount of it was always conserved in the universe, this intervention was no longer necessary or, for that matter, possible. No more action was needed for motion than for rest, all moving bodies continued to move until stopped by some other body, and all tended to move in a straight line. Thus in the tourbillons we have centrifugal force, and it explains why the bodies of the sun and stars are round. Descartes not merely attempted a purely mechanical explanation of the material universe and of inanimate nature, but held that animals were mere automata and that the sole principles of physiology were motion and heat. "There is nothing in us that we ought to attribute to our soul excepting our thoughts."33 This meant that he rejected the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul of Aristotle and retained only the rational and immortal soul. For the other two he substituted the animal spirits which we have already often seen such a favorite resort of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He defined them as "nothing but material bodies... of extreme minuteness," which were formed in the cavities of the brain from the most animated and subtle parts of the blood which heat had rarefied 212

The Primal Eye in the heart. They were never at rest but moved with great speed and caused the movement of the muscles. Presently a chapter is entitled, "How all the members (of the body) may be moved by the objects of the senses without the aid of the soul" 34

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Descartes: Costa ben Luca's worm Costa ben Luca’s Worm and Descartes’ Ghost It is apparent that Descartes often presented theories as his own work that were actually based on his reading of prior authors, and it can be inferred that Descartes omission of such acknowledgments was deliberate. I will cite a variety of such instances, looking particularly at Descartes strained relationship with Galileo. One example concerns Cartesian physics. “The golden rule of mechanics,” that work needed to raise different weights to different heights remains the same if the product of the weight and the height are the same, which Descartes is once said to have originated, has been traced back to the middle ages. Isaac Voss in 1662 charged Descartes with having derived his law of the refraction of light from Snellius of Leyden (1581-1626). Duhem confirms that Descartes’ presentation of the theory of simple machines in 1637 clearly depends on Galileo and Stevin, although Descartes denied ever having read Galileo in a letter to Mersenne of October 11, 1638. Galileo was angry with Descartes for making no mention of him in Dioptrics. I am particularly interested in his pineal gland theory, which I will demonstrate as being copied from the earlier theory of 9th century arabic occult philosopher, Costa ben Luca, unacknowledged by Descartes. Whether this lack of acknowledgment was in oversight or

Descartes: Costa ben Luca's worm deliberate will be further discussed. I shall examine the history of Costa ben Luca’s pineal gland theory of the soul. Most interestingly for MVT, Descartes repeated, without acknowledgment, Cost ben Luca’s explanation of thought as centring in the movement of the pineal gland. Descartes not merely attempted a purely mechanical explanation of the material universe and of inanimate nature, but held that animals were mere automata and that the sole principles of physiology were motion and heat. “There is nothing in us that we ought to attribute to our soul excepting our thoughts.” This meant that he rejected the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul of Aristotle and retained only the rational and immortal soul. For the other two he substituted the animal spirits which we have already often seen such a favorite resort of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He defined them as “nothing but material bodies... of extreme minuteness,” which were formed in the cavities of the brain from the most animated and subtle parts of the blood which heat had rarefied in the heart. They were never at rest but moved with great speed and caused the movement of the muscles. Presently a chapter is entitled, “How all the members (of the body) may be moved by the objects of the senses without the aid of the soul” < The search after truth, caps.xxi, xvi> Costa ben Luca, or Qusta ibn Luqu of Baalbeck Costa ben Luca is most well-known for his Arabic version of the lost Greek text Mechanica by Hero of Alexandria, translated for the caliph al-Musta during 862-866 AD. The works originated by Costa ben Lucas were often misascribed to Constantinus, and herein could lie one reason for Descartes’ failure to attribute. Among his influential occult works is his Epistle concerning Incantations, Adjurations, and Suspensions from the Neck, which has been reproduced in error as a work of Galen, Constantinus Africanus, and in a volume of Cornelius Agrippa (appended as The letter of an unknown author).
The Primal Eye ed. Basel 1536, pp.317-21; Occult Philosophy, H.C. Agrippa, Lyons, 1600 pp.637-40> Albertus Magnus in the mid C13th cites this treatise both in Vegetables and plants where he names “the books of incantations of Hermes and of Costa ben Luca the philosopher, and the book of physical ligatures.” The treatise is in the form of a reply by Costa ben Luca to a person addressed as “dearest son” who has inquired what validity there is in incantations, adjurations and suspensions from the neck (amulets). Costa first affirms that all the ancients have agreed that the virtue of the mind affects the state of the body. Galen in particular is cited. Costa concludes that amulets worn around the neck are potent, but not by their occult properties, but rather because of the comforting effect they have on the mind. His treatise, On the Difference between Soul and Spirit, was translated into Latin by John of Spain for Archbishop Raymond of Toledo in the C12th. . It is subsequently found in many manuscripts, often together with the works of Aristotle . Costa believes in the existence of spiritus, which is not spirit in one of our senses of that word, but “a subtle body”, unlike the soul which is incorporeal. This subtle spiritus perishes when separated from the body and it operates most of the vital processes of the body such as breathing, the pulse, sensation and movement. The first two of these processes are operated by spiritus “arising from the heart and bourne in the pulsating veins to vivify the body.” The latter two processes are caused by spiritus which arises from the brain and operates through the nerves. Thus spiritus is the cause of life in the body and leaves with our dying gasp. The clearer and more subtle the spiritus is, the more readily it lends itself to mental processes. The more perfect the human body, the more perfect the spiritus and the human mind. Costa argues that the 217

Descartes: Costa ben Luca's worm intellectual powers of children and women are inferior, and the same is true of races subjected to excessive heat or cold, for example the Ethiopians or Slavs. These are repeats of much the same views found in the Epistle concerning incantation. The spiritus in the brain becomes more subtle and able to receive the virtues of the soul by its passage from one cavity of the brain to another. The less subtle spiritus is used by the brain for the five senses. Costa speaks of “hollow nerves” from the brain to the eye through which the spiritus passes for the purposes of vision. The most subtle spiritus is deployed in higher mental processes like imagination, memory and reason. Costa ben Luca gives the following explanation how processes occur in the brain. The opening between the anterior and posterior ventricles of the brain is closed by a sort of valve (following Galen’s identification of the pineal) which he describes as “a particle of the body of the brain similar to a worm.” During the act of recalling something to memory the valve opens and the spiritus passes from the anterior to the posterior cavity. As well as the relative subtlety of the spiritus contributing to relative intelligence in individuals, the speed with which the valve works or responds in different brains also differs, explaining why some men are slow thinkers and others can answer a question sooner. Costa, rather amusingly, claims that the habit of inclining the head when deep in thought is also to be explained by assistance in opening of the valve. Other medieval writers varies from Costa as to the nature of spiritus and the number and type of cavities in the brain. Constantinus Africanus in On Melancholy states that the spiritus of the brain is called the rational soul, which is inconsistent with the distinction drawn between soul and spirit in Costa’s treatise. Writing of Arabian medicine and Avicenna, as well as of Galen, E.G. Browne, (1921, p.123) says, “Corresponding with the five external senses, taste, touch, hearing, smelling, and seeing, are the five internal senses, of which the first and second, the compound sense (or ‘sensus communis’) and the imagination, are located in the anterior 218

The Primal Eye ventricle of the brain; the third and fourth, the coordinating and emotional faculties, in the mid-brain; and the fifth, the memory, in the hind-brain.” To relate Costa ben Luca (Qusta ibn Luqa of Baalbeck) to MVT – it is plain that he was wrong that the pineal gland was a worm; but it might be considered ‘worm-like’ if it had a rudimentary sensory function that caused it to move or act. Luca’s ideas are interesting, but much more similar to Descartes pineal gland idea that to the MVT/ phantom pineal eye claims.

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Descartes: Sunspots and the Soul. The discovery of sun-spots by Galileo formed the basis for the theories of Descartes as to the formation of comets and planets and the stratification of the earth's crust. It was this basing his hypotheses upon or conforming them to recent discoveries, which were a matter of common report and knowledge, that made them so readily and generally acceptable to his time. Sun-spots were hard to explain on an Aristotelian or Ptolemaic basis. Descartes not only explained them but made them examples of almost everything else. And that, perhaps, was where his magic came in. The remote cause of some of Descartes' ideas may have been something he had read or heard about and then forgotten more often than he admitted or even realized. To him their immediate cause was either subconscious cerebration in dreams or conscious thought as he lay in bed after waking in the morning. In this there was something bordering upon magic: divination from dreams or the insight of the mind or soul when free from the distractions of the body. Descartes, it is true, felt that he was above being deceived by the promises of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, the artifices or the empty boastings of any of those who make a profession of knowing that of which they are ignorant. Yet he was credulous as to the wounds of a Corpse bleeding at the approach of the millenium and as to instant warnings, in dreams or waking, of the afflictions, danger or death of distant friends and kindred. In The Search after Truth, Epistemon is especially curious concerning the Secrets of the human arts, apparitions, illusions: in a word, all the wonderful effects attributed to magic. For I believe it to be

Descartes: Sunspots and the Soul. useful to know all these things, not in order to make use of the knowledge, but in order not to allow one's judgment to be beguiled into admiration of the unknowns. Again in his Principles Descartes affirmed that there were no qualities so occult, no effects of sympathy or of antipathy so marvellous or strange, but that his principles would explain them, provided they proceeded from a purely material cause. His chief suggested explanation was that the long, restless, string-like particles of the first element, which existed in the intervals or interstices of terrestrial bodies, might be the cause, not only of the attraction exerted by the magnet and amber, but of an infinity of other marvellous effects. "For those that form in each body have something particular in their figure that makes them different from all those that form in other bodies,"52 and they may pass to very distant places before they encounter matter which is disposed to receive their action. According to Barchusen, the Cartesian hypothesis of which medicine had especially made use, was his much-vaunted first element and its passage through pores, "the chief cause of extraordinary effects."51 Since Descartes was so confident of his ability to think up a rational and mechanical explanation for all such seemingly occult phenomena, he was likely, for a time at least, to encourage rather than discourage the belief ill theme furthermore, his tendency to advertise the results of his method as marvellous as well as easy of attainment savoured more of magic than of science. Another who maintained that the Cartesian philosophy was not unfavourable to astrology was Christian Gottfrietl Danckwarten, M.L)., of Hamburg, in 1684, in a work written in German 69 but with so many quotations from authorities in Latin that it almost seems to be in that language. The biblical account of creation was interpreted in Cartesian terms in a book entitled Cartesius Mosaisans and again in 1685.

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The Primal Eye After Descartes' characterization of brute animals as automata, Cureau de la Chambre composed a Treatise of the Knowledge of Animals, in 1648, - new editions in 1662 and 1664, which also meanwhile appeared in English translation at London in 1657. La Chambre turned to another theme about animals, which had long been of perennial interest and also bordered more closely upon magic, namely, the sympathy and antipathy existent theme. In the later years of the century, however, many writers followed Descartes is in conclusion that animals other than man were mere automata. Thus the Jesuit mathematician Pardies (1636—1673), in a treatise on the knowledge of beasts,74 held that they were machines moved by the spirits which formed in the brain and spread to all the muscles. He further contended that Aristotle had often represented beasts as automatic machines, while Augustine mentioned one of which the parts kept moving after it had been cut to pieces. Descartes was important in the development of scientific medicine. Anthony Le Grand's book on the Lack of Sense and Cognition in Brutes was printed at London and Leyden in 1675 and at Nurnberg in 1679. Daniel Duncan's book on The New and Mechanical Explanation of Animal Actions, printed in 1678, are also notable Cartesian works. Theodore Craanen (? my notes unreadable) was a Cartesian in the field of medicine and contended that, to explain most of the bodily functions, it was unnecessary to resort to the soul as mover. He compared the human body to a clock.78 As late as 1694, N. Froment published a medical work in which he professed to explain everything by "the principles of the celebrated Descartes and the experience of the best practitioners." 79

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The Athena Fallacy Most of academic Philosophy assumes what I call Athena Fallacy. This is from the Greek myth of Athena or Minerva being born, fully grown and fully armed, from out of the top of the head of Zeus or Jove. The assumption is that the human brain was born fully evolved, and that language itself is of prime interest. MVT starts bottom-up from the biological and evolutionary evidence, rather than downwards from the a priori of reasoning and language. My aim in recent times has been to strip away as much ‘philosophy’ away from M.V.T. as possible, since the pertinent evidence is largely empirical. The smaller the conceptual leaps I have to make the better. Philosophical ‘problems’ - on my historical reading of them - do not seem to go away and are reformulated in new philosophers jargon rather than resolved. The mind viewed as a phantom sense-organ with no locatable physical presence (like a phantom limb) but with definite experiential location, as with the patient who cannot help but feel his invisible limb, can help to explain a whole number of different mental effects. MVT/ Phantom Eye theory allows us to overcome traditional problems in Philosophy regarding the nature of the world of objects, the mechanisms of perception, and the internal/external relationship. My theory gives a sufficient account of mind without needing to resort to the bankrupt philosophical debates concerning realism and idealism, dualism and materialism, and so on. I do not feel such labels to be of much use, and claim Phantom Eye Theory to be a new paradigm. Total avoidance of such terminology is not possible if I am to engage in discourse with philosophers steeped in such a linguistic mindset.

Eyes - 2nd and 3rd Pineal Glands?

Michael Menaker: EYES- the second & third pineal glands? Roth and Roth (1980) point out that comparative morphology of pineal photosensory cells show changes reflecting an evolutionary reduction in their direct photosensitive capacity. Histological studies (Reiter 1977) have shown specifically that the neurosensory elements of photoreceptive pineal cells are structurally similar to the neuroepithelial sensory cells of the retinas of lateral eyes. Reiter goes on to show that in more advanced forms, these photoreceptor cells lose their outer segments and become more secretory and less photosensitive. This occurs in the pineal bodies of snakes, turtles and birds as well as mammals. <(a) p.195> In my MA dissertation (1996) I introduced the notion that REM states might have arisen as part of the evolutionary process of transfer of certain functions away from earlier pineal structures, and ‘taken over’ by lateral eyes. Michael Menaker in his 1985 paper ‘Eyes - the second (and third) pineal glands?’ argues against the prevailing view that melatonin produced in the pineal gland “is unique in some important way.” Comparative behavioural and physiological studies of both bird and lizard species seem to show that retinas and pineal glands fulfill similar endocrine roles. Both hydroxyindole O-methyltransferase (HIOMT; Cardinali and Rosner 1971) and serotonin Nacetyltransferase (NAT; Miler et al 1980) have been detected in the mammalian retina.

Eyes - 2nd and 3rd Pineal Glands? Attempts to maintain the distinction between retina and pineal by arguing that while the pineal glands of all vertebrates synthesize melatonin, the retinas of only some species do so, are criticized by [Menaker]. Although the pineal glands and retinas of vertebrates is indistinguishable as a whole, each of these organs varies greatly among species, even of the same family. Pinealectomy of some birds and lizards abolishes circadian locomotor rhythmicity, while in other species of both classes pinealectomy has minimal effect (Menaker 1982, Underwood 1984). He discusses evidence from iguanid lizards that either the retina, or pineal glands, but not both in the same species, have important regulatory circadian effects. The genetics of melatonin synthesis in mice is discussed, and Menaker seeks to show that the ability of the mouse pineal to synthesize melatonin can be rapidly abolished by selection. These experiments are claimed to bolster the suggestion from the iguanid experiments that it should be relatively easy to influence the melatoninforming ability of a tissue by natural selection. Such examples do not exhaust the possible ways in which selection, either natural or artificial, might modify melatonin output in a species. They do suggest, according to Menaker, that if new and different patterns of melatonin synthesis become adaptive, they can quickly be realised. The circadian and reproductive responses of organisms to particular photic environments in which they live can directly affect their fitness. The first intracellular recordings from photoreceptors were made in an invertebrate horseshoe crab in the 1950s (Hartline, Wagner and MacNichol, Cold Spring Harb. Symp. Quant.Biol. 17, 125-141, 1952). They showed that light depolarises the membrane, and so it was a surprise when Tomita in 1965 convincingly showed that the light response of fish cone photoreceptors is hyperpolarising. Tomita’s results were confirmed in numerous subsequent intracellular recordings, and by the 1970’s the surprise had become the rule - “vertebrate photoreceptors hyperpolarise.” Solessio and Engbretson (1993) report the first exception to this rule - recording from morphologically typical vertebrate receptors of the lizard pineal eye - they find a primary light response that is depolarising. These same photoreceptors also have a hyperpolarising light 228

The Primal Eye response which is spectrally distinct from the primary response, and is only exhibited at high intensities. <(f) p.389> Solessio and Engbretson’s findings confirm that the parietal eye of lizards “is a simple yet highly structured photoreceptive organ that projects to non-visual areas in the mid-brain,” which interacts in an antagonistic chromatic fashion at this level; “that is, the photoreceptors depolarise in response to a green light and hyperpolarise in response to a superimposed blue stimulus.” <(e) p.442> Photoreceptors are the first in the chain of neurons that process visual information. Lateral eyes of vertebrates operate by the action of light hyperpolarising rod and cone photoreceptors that synapse onto bipolar and horizontal cells in the first synaptic layer of the retina. This results in chromatically dependent depolarizing and hyperpolarising responses in response to visual stimuli. This visual information is next conveyed to the second synaptic layer for encoding and transmission to the brain by ganglion cells. As I have previously illustrated [structure of pineal eye] the pineal eye has no muscles of control, eyelids, or method of focus. The parietal eye of lizards does not contain bipolar cells or other interneurons, and “photoreceptors synapse directly onto ganglion cells.” Yet, even in the absence of interneurons, antagonistic chromatic mechanisms modulate the ganglion cell responses. The findings of Solessio and Engbretson show that “chromatic antagonism in the ‘third eye’ originates in the chromatically dependent hyperpolarising and depolarizing response of the photoreceptors to light.” They further suggest that these photoresponses may provide lizards with a mechanism for enhanced detection of dawn and dusk. <(e) p.442 abstract> These “remarkable findings” raise many questions. “If the pigment is bistable, then the bright lights that produce hyperpolarisation might do so by simply converting active photoproduct back to rhodopsin, as is the case in invertebrates. Such back conversion could reduce the level of activation. Alternatively the hyperpolarisation might be mediated by a distinct molecular pathway, perhaps the conventional vertebrate cascade. However things turn out, photoreceptors of the lizard parietal eye are going to break more of the established ‘rules’ of vertebrate phototransduction.” <(f) p.390>

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Marr and Theories of Vision VISION, EVOLUTIONARY OPHALMICS, and MVT. OUTLINE: I intend to look at evidence concerning several different aspects of visual processing in humans and animals, and of several different types of vision and related phenomena. Early visual evolution is also of relevence. I shall look at distinctions between visual systems and visual perception. (Pineal vision is the subject of a separate chapter). A major part of this outline compares the general theories of vision of Gibson, David Marr and Roger Watt of Stirling University. All organisms adapt to their environments to survive and reproduce. Plants will grow towards the strongest source of sunlight. Most animals move around their environment to find food or coffee...... Although LIGHT is perhaps the most commonly used source of information about the environment, it is by no means the only type of energy that can be detected by special senses of animals. Subterranean (blind) animals might detect changes in their environment through mechanical energy, assessing pressures on the body surface. A robotic vision system can be designed without the flexibility and complications of animal systems. Perhaps a video camera might scan apples travelling along a conveyor-belt at constant speed, and an ‘’arm’’ GRAB any object identified as “”non-apple””. A machine vision system might alternatively be designed to help a missile to FLY. Obviously a greater knowledge of the environment would be required than the GRAB system......knowledge of the

Marr and Theories of Vision orientation, speed, altitude and location of the missile itself, and the coordinates of the target. The visual system of a bird has to assist with grasping of twigs to build a nest as well as coordinating flight. It might also need to estimate the flight-path of its prey or predators. LIGHT-RECEPTION AND MANIPULATION In animals, photoreceptor cells specialise in detection of light. Photoreceptor cells might be distributed over the body-surface, or gathered into ‘eyespot’ patches, such as those along the mantle edge of some bi-valve molluscs. An animal with single receptor cells or patches of cells in ‘eye-spots’ cannot detect spatial patterns, since they sample only the total light from all directions. It can detect changes in total intensity over time. Many invertebrates possess ‘eye-cups’, which are patches of receptor cells sunk into the skin. Some are open to the water while others are filled with a gelatinous ‘lens’. Each receptor cell is clearly responsive to light from a narrower angle than cells on the skin surface, and a lens further helps reject light at a large angle from the axis. This ‘directionality’ allows finer spatial pattern to be extracted from the optic array, and some molluscs with regularly spaced eye-cups along the body (eg. the marine gastropod Corolla) are potentially able to detect nearby moving objects through successive dimming of light along their series of cups. A true ‘eye’ forms an image on a layer of photo-receptor cells, and the image is localised at this one point on the body, not like Corolla who must use their whole body surface to ‘see’. There are two main types ... COMPOUND EYES of insects, and the SINGLE-CHAMBERED EYE. Compound eyes are tightly grouped clusters of eye-cups, each one with a crystalline cone at the tip, and light-sensitive rhabdom below. Single-chambered eyes have evolved by enlargement and modification of a single eye-cup rather than by massing of eye-cups to232

The Primal Eye gether. The most successful type uses a convex lens (similar to a camera). Mammalian eyes are of this single-chambered type. Vertebrate photo-receptors are ciliary rather than rhabdomeric. There are two main types, rods and cones, which have differently shaped outer segments. Light transduction in rods and cones begins with the same effect (on rhodopsin) as in the retinula cells of insects. Chemical changes in the molecules of the cell are coupled to changes in membrane structure which reduce the sodium conductance of the membrane and cause hyperpolarisation (as opposed to the depolarisation of a rhabdomeric receptor). Extraction of pattern begins with the retina itself. Information about the light is transmitted along the optic nerve, not a stream of pictures to the brain. Input into robotic vision systems might be via arrays of photoelectric cells, or via cameras. Complex robot ships designed for spaceflight and moon-landings may have several different types of receptors (eg. infra-red detectors, and videos with different filters). Vision systems contrasted and compared. Vision systems exist for particular needs. A hawk can spot a mouse hundreds of feet below, while jellyfish only detects total dimming of light reaching to avoid predators. Hunting species, such as the hawk, need to make the image at the retina larger to increase acuity. Their eyes are thus deeper than ground-dwelling birds. A dragonfly has compound eyes that wrap around the head allowing panoramic vision without moving. Vertebrates that need to be aware of predators have sideways-placed eyes. Often there is a trade-off for visual specializations. Machinevision examples include telephoto lenses, when increased magnification is achieved at the expense of diminished field of view. A diurnal specialist (having a higher cone-to-rod ratio than nocturnal animals) is unable to detect an object in sparse light conditions.

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Marr and Theories of Vision Forward-looking primates sacrifice panoramic vision for binocular over-lap, which allows greater perception of depth. Humans, with their unique dexterity and opposable thumbs, have been able to capitalise on enhanced depth-focussing to intricately manipulate objects (e.g. mugs). However, to pilot an airplane, humans cannot rely on sight alone and need altitude detectors and other instruments. Animals with compound eyes cannot focus on nearby objects using ‘accommodation’. Fish and amphibians achieve this by moving the lens backwards and forwards. Birds and most mammals alter the power of the lens by changing its shape. Primates achieve greater accommodation by using cilliary muscles to thicken the lens, increasing curvature and power. Grasping a Mug Most animals drink by lowering their heads into some water. More sophisticated visual and cognitive control is required to cup your hands and scooping water up to your mouth. Identifying an suitable vessel and manipulating this to your mouth in order to drink requires yet more precision. Damasio & Damasio explain how “Concepts” are stored in the brain as ‘dormant records’. When these records are reactivated they create the varied sensations and actions associated with a particular entity or group. “A cofee mug can evoke visual and tactile representations of its shape, colour, texture and warmth, along with the smell and taste of the cofee or the path that the hand or the path that the hand and arm take to bring the cup from the table to the lips.” {Sci.Am. Sept 1992 *2} These representations are recreated in separate neural regions, but their reconstruction occurs fairly simultaneously. “The difference between grasping and touching.... (is that it is) sensible to talk about touching a point; (but) grasping will only succeed if it takes into account the extent of the object.” {Watts, p.135} Vision helps select a location (by supplying information about the shape the mug where sufficient friction can be exerted by the hand to clamp it). It is important that a good centre of gravity is selected, so 234

The Primal Eye that the mug is not tipped in transit. You might observe the level of liquid to estimate tolerance of tilt (and if the liquid surface was level with the brim you might decide to slide it along the (table) rather than lift it). From the visual surface (and past experience of the properties of objects with similar textual appearance), the density/weight of the mug can be estimated for lifting. Adhesion (slipperiness) of the mug can also be predicted by qualities such as the sheen (or dryness) of the surface, from a property of textures (liquid surfaces are flat thus reflect more light). Vision can provide clues (presence of steam) that might prevent your hand being burned. Flying through the Air During World War II, JJ Gibson studied the training of pilots, and the problem of discriminating potentially successful from unsuccessful pilots prior to training. To land a plane, you must know where you are relative to the air strip, the angle, and the correct speed of approach. Good depth perception was thought prerequisite for good flying, but Gibson found that tests based on pictorial cues to depth had little benefit. His theory (1950) replaced “depth” or “space” perception with emphasis on “surfaces” in the “environment”. The ground across which an animal moves or above which a bird flies, consists of surfaces at different distances and slants. Pebbles, or even trees from altitude, possess a statistical regularity, and textures are made up of such elements. Gibson puts forward a “direct” theory of perception, rejecting the claim for retinal image as starting point for visual processing, and stressing the effect of the total array of light beams reaching the observer. These light beams have been structured by surfaces and objects in the world. When an observer moves, the entire optic array is transformed, and Gibson suggests that it is misleading to consider the observer as ever being static. He believes that movement is essential for seeing.

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Marr and Theories of Vision Animals which move about at speed through air (or water) will be able to draw upon variables in the optic flow field which are not available to intermittently moving land-based species. Stability of flight in insects is achieved not just by beating of the wings. The abdomen acts as a rudder and also gives pendulum stability against roll. Such inherent stability is augmented by “active reflexes” ... nervous feedback from receptors which detect information specifying rotation around an axis... so that wings, limbs or abdomen move to correct imbalance. This air-flow information is misleading since the insect flies through gusts and eddies, and the insect also relies on less ambiguous information about its environment. Otherwise they would not be able to fly sufficient distances to reach food. Locusts maintain stability in the rolling plane by detecting both the direction from which diffuse light intensity is the greatest, and the angle of horizon relative to the body axis {Goodman 1965 *BG}. Several experiments on flies have used cylinders with unidirectional stripes inside. The insects were often tethered by a rod glued to their back inside the drum, and responses noted as the cylinder was rotated. A fruitfly responds to a striped pattern moving sideways with a yawing turn made by increasing the difference between amplitudes of the two wing beats, sideways deflection of abdomen and hind legs, and “hitch” inhibitions of the wingbeat amplitudes which occur spontaneously and independently on the two sides of the body during normal flight {Gotz, Hengstenberg & Biesinger, 1979 *BG}. Gotz has suggested that fruitflies will fly in a straight line by default in an empty environment, with frequent turns in patches of vegetation, with the result that the fly spends more time in food-rich areas. Collett {1980} however has argued against this assumption, and has provided evidence that it does not hold in the case of the hoverfly, which is a superb natural aeronaut. Part of Collett’s model of hoverfly flight control is detection of of optic flow over the part of the eye appropriate for the direction of flight (forward flight in the front part of eye, sideways flight at the side).

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The Primal Eye (a) Grabbing a mug, and (b) Flying through the air... compared Most animals need to carry out navigatory and locomotive activity such as flight, and also be able to manipulate objects in space at close range. As we would expect, a large part of the visual system and vision information is used for both flying and grasping. Animals with binocularly overlapping vision have stereoscopic information available from the two retina. The amount of disparity between the two images, at close range, is information from which the brain can compute precisely the relative distance of objects in the world. We have already discussed accommodation of the lens. Another type of “primary” or “physiological” cue available to humans is the movement of the eyeballs at different angles of inclination to converge. The eyes swing inwards to focus on a near object, and outwards to converge at distances. This angle also assists the brain in computation of relative distance of objects. Pictorial cues to depth are features from the ‘flat’ retinal picture; including shadow, and the geometry (consequences of lines and curvatures) which allow the brain to compute perspective. Relative size of known objects allows gradient computations of relative distance. The movement of an observer (or of details in the range of vision) provide information of relative distance by motion parallax. If the eyes stay still and two objects move in the world at a constant speed, then the image of the nearer one would appear to move further across the retina than the object at greater distance. Conversely, the moving eyes can provide information about two still objects in the environment, since the nearer one moves further across the retinal view. These are examples of dynamic cues. If your head remains still, and you extend your arm towards the structure identified as a “mug”, the relative position of the two objects in space can be computed by use of motion parallax. There is some value in a Gestalt (figure/ground) explanation in differentiating the textured surfaces of the “mug” from the background of the room.

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Marr and Theories of Vision Human and animal observers typically sample their visual worlds by a series of discrete fixations. Information can be integrated from these successive “snapshots” to produce stable visual perception. There is a short-lived iconic memory, first fully investigated by Sperling (1960), but strong argument rages whether this could be a basis of the integrative function. Marr has proposed an “indirect” theory of vision to explain many features of the vision system of mammals. He proposes that cells in the retina and visual cortex function to locate ‘zero-crossings’ from the retinal image. These provide a first step in deducing information about edges in the world, and represent intensity over a huge array of different locations. Comparisons of zero-crossings by sets of cells with different receptive field sizes allow a set of “features” to be extracted, which Marr calls the raw primal sketch. The primitives in this raw primal sketch are edges, bars, blobs and terminations ..... which are associated with properties of orientation, contrast, length, width and position. The next stage in early visual processing involves assignment of place tokens to small structures or clusters, grouped together for detection of larger structures ... boundaries and regions. This description level is known as the full primal sketch. Although many contours and textures within the image have been captured, the goal is to relate this description in context of the viewer. This goal is obtained by analysis of depth, motion and shading, together with the other features from the primal sketch. Marr calls this the 2.5-D Sketch, and having a point of vantage, it is sufficient for any action such as simple eye movements or locomotion. However, to recognise a “mug (of coffee)”, a higher associative level is needed, which is centred on individual ‘objects’, and is able to draw on a stored set of attributes known to belong to that object. This process of “recognition” draws upon other sensory modalities. Marr calls it the 3-D model representation.

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The Primal Eye Although Gibson’s ‘direct’ theory has thrown up some interesting experiments and results, and helped the theory of vision disentangle itself from philosophical obsession with sense-data; it is inadequate as a general explanation of mammalian vision systems. That vision is not a ‘direct’ process is demonstrated by experiments using “upside-down spectacles” {Dolozeal}. Ullman (1980) argues that there are not two distinct levels of explanation, the ecological and the physiological, and agrees with Marr that an “algorithmic theory” must come between the two to organise physiological knowledge. IMAGE DESCRIPTIONS In Understanding Vision, Roger Watts puts forward an essentially algorithmic account. He describes how three types of visual processing can co-exist in one visual system. A simple type is where the outcome of visual processing is just a movement in the given direction based on image properties. Certain structures might be deduced from the image and used to control behaviour. Another more sophisticated operation is when the threedimensional layout of the scene is computed from the image, enabling the animal to plan and perform more complex behaviour. “Understanding Vision” examines formal descriptions of information necessary for an action. No strong claim is made for identification of these formalisations with processes in actual visual processes, but this approach obviously has particular use in robotic applications, and might reveal something of underlying neural computations. Watt is interested in “systems that do not have visually intelligent operators, but that must do everything themselves”. The first stage of image processing is from raw input to an Image Summary. Value statistics describe the range of intensity values, and I-mean tells us whether an image has become brighter of dimmer

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Marr and Theories of Vision and by what magnitude. Location values are multiplied, and the mean of these gives us the Centroid (centre of gravity of the image). This is not sufficient to determine direction. If a moth can see two equal lights, the centroid lies between them. SEGMENTATION is needed when image-wide statistics are not appropriate. Fixed segmentation is simple geometric partitioning. This might succeed in our moth example, but the problem with this technique is its insensitivity to contents of the image. A content-sensitive method of segmentation is to start by transforming an image by a series of desired algebraic operations. From this set of mean values, we select those values that interest us, for example all values greater than the mean, discarding values less than this. Each cluster of intensity has its own centroid and associated standard deviation of location. Our proposed action can be in the direction of a choosen centroid. VISUAL DESCRIPTIONS From our numerical Image Description (‘unstructured’ set of sentences each representing a particular region or property) we can initiate simple actions. BLOB sentences can be converted into an equivalent TOUCH sentence (direction; distance; ACTIVE) fairly automatically by choosing relevant parameters from the former. Reformulating this to an action description for GRASP requires (direction; distance; width; ACTIVE). The new parameter, WIDTH expresses amount the fingers should open. GRASPING requires isolation of a set of sentences from neighbouring parts of an image to control size of grip (neighbouring sentences). LIFTING requires additional identification of various connect parts of the object, and a second process of clustering similar sentences. If the (organism/device) is going to perambulate (or fly) towards an object, we have seen there a number of further complications. Movement of eye/ optoreceptor changes what is present in the scene. Image algebra can help to differentiate and analyse the various levels involved in vision and motor systems designed for both 240

The Primal Eye GRASPING and FLYING. Great descriptive detailed can be revealed by such an approach, which I regret there is not space to fully expound in this essay. Several components of vision systems are common to both processes. Image Algebra or Sketch primitives are clearly prior to any motor-action from visual information. It is easy to imagine a pilot grasping a mug of coffee and simultaneously guiding a plane. Other vision systems, like the hover-fly, are specially evolved for one task. Steve Nichols, MSc. essay, Centre for Cognitive & Computational Neuroscience, Univ. of Stirling.

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Thermal Physiology THERMOREGULATION and Origin of Warm-blooded Animals Thermal Physiology Definitions which once adequately described the thermoregulatory mechanisms employed by animals (Adolph 1951; Cowles and Bogert 1944) have been largely outdated by recent research. Templeton (1970), Bligh (1973), Heath (1968, 1970) and Swan (1974) have recently reviewed the ethology and physiology of thermoregulation among reptiles, mammals and other vertebrates. Greenberg (this volume) reviews behavioral thermoregulation among reptiles and presents a discussion of thermoregulatory definitions; Whittow (1966) and Cowles (1962) also define those terms most popular in current usage. Taken together, these reviews point up an important deficit. Categorical definitions of thermoregulation may depict extremes but they do not adequately describe the range of thermoregulatory mechanisms exploited by vertebrates. For instance, most students of thermoregulation readily separate ectotherms from endotherms based upon the source of heat utilized to raise or lower body temperature. Unfortunately, distinct suites of physiological and behavioral responses are often assumed to be linked firmly to ectothermic or endothermic patterns of temperature regulation when, in fact, both ectotherms and endotherms use common physiological and behavioral strategies to maintain thermal homeostasis. Behavioral and physiological thermoregulation are not finite ends of a categorical spectrum ranging from ectotherms to endotherm Ectotherms employ endothermic strategies during daily bouts of activity, or become transient endotherms seasonally during incubation periods (Hutchison et al. l966). Conversely, endotherm depend on

Thermal Physiology behavioral strategies utilized by ectotherms to avoid environmental temperature extremes. Mammals and birds, which generate heat internally and regulate its dissipation through the peripheral integument, often compromise thermal homeostasis during periods of torpor, allowing body temperature to approximate ambient conditions (Bligh 1973; Withers 1977). The behavioral regulation of heat transfer between the organism and its environment may be more important, moment to moment, even among endotherm than is generally realized. Endotherms may control thermal homeostasis behaviorally during most activities (Hafez 1964), only resorting to autonomic controls (sweating panting, hair-erection, gular flutter) when thermal homeostasis is challenged (Bligh 1973). In fact, if temperature control centers in the hypothalamus (pre-optic area) are lesioned (Lipton 1968; Carlisle 1969), body temperature remains normal in cold challenged rats since behavioral regulation compensates for physiological failure; Van Zoeren and Stricker (1977) contend that the degree of behavioral and physiological deficits in thermoregulatory ability depends on the location of hypothalamic lesions. Reptiles which regulate body temperature by precise exposure to appropriate environmental temperatures primarily do so behaviorally (Templeton 1970; Bogert 1959). Most reptiles lose or gain heat across a thermal gradient by movement, changes in posture and orientation, conduction, convection, and radiation (Schmidt-Nielsen 1964; Bosert 1959), thereby maintaining body temperatures within a range characteristic of each species (Brattstrom 1965). Body temperature regulation in active lizards is precise (Dewitt 1967; Schall 1977) and may be narrow enough to be comparable to endothermic regulation around a single setpoint (Templeton 1970). In addition, reptiles do not lack the ability to alter their body temperatures by physiologic or autonomic processes. Like mammals and birds, reptiles respond pnysiologically to changes in temperature. For example, they show different rates of heating and cooling (Bartholomew and Tucker 1963); utilize vascular shunts which serve to regulate head-body temperature differences tHeath 1964); alter heart rate in response to ambient temperature (Heath 1966); pant when stressed with high temperature (Richards 1970; Heatwole et al. 1973; Dawson and Bartholomew 1958); and flush the body periphery (shell) with blood during periods of heat transfer between the animal and the environment (Weathers and Morgareidge 1971; Weathers 1970; Schall 244

The Primal Eye 1977). Metabolic heat production may also play an integral part in thermoregulation among reptiles, but its contribution to thermal homeostasis is still unclear (Bennett and Dawson 1976; Bennett and Licht 1972). Some reptiles, such as turtles (Frair et al. 1972; Mrosovsky and Pritchard 1971) and varanids (McNab and Auffenberg 1976) maintain fairly constant, above ambient body temperatures because of their large size or activity. All these observations clearly support Heath’s (1968) suggestion that “among higher taxa there are no purely poikilostatic or homeostatic animals”. The inability of reptiles to remain homeothermic when challenged by cold is perhaps the most distinctive feature separating modern endotherms from ectotherms (McNab 1978). of course, as Hotton and others have suggested, even this difference could be eliminated in sufficiently large reptiles, as long as they did not experience extreme, long-term changes in environmental temperature. The mean body temperature within the range selected by active animals is known as the preferred (laboratory) or eccritic (free-living) temperature characteristic of a species (Licht et al. 1966). The selection of appropriate species-specific eccritic temperatures among reptiles (Brattstrom 1965) and the maintenance of a constant body temperature around a specific set-point in birds and mammals require precise temperature sense and control. Lizards may regulate body temperature within a range containing many eccritic temperatures that are characteristic of different activities (Regal 1966; Kitchell 1969; Schall 1977). Lizards generally leave warm or cool places when body temperature approaches an upper or lower limit. Barbour and Crawford (1977) suggest that lizards may allow body temperature to fluctuate at random within their thermal ranges, regulating activity only at the upper and lower limits, to avoid some of the energetic costs of thermoregulation (Huey and Slatkin 1976). Although these limits may be several degrees apart in lizards and virtually at a single point in mammals, the mechanisms of body temperature control in ectotherms and endotherms may be related. The hypothalamus, located above the pituitary and below the third ventricle, is currently believed to be the major thermoregulatory control center in mammals. The regulation of body temperature near a 245

Thermal Physiology set-point is apparently controlled primarily by the hypothalamus, and secondarily by other cerebral structures (Cooper 1966; Jurgens 1974; South et al. 1972; Satinoff l974). While the reviews just cited primarily deal with endotherm Rodbard et al. (1950), Heath et al. (1968), and Hammel et al. (1967) have recognized areas in the reptilian hypothalamus containing neurons sensitive to heat and cold, comparable to those found in mammals. They suggest that a behavioral hypothalamic thermostat in reptiles may have been an evolutionary precursor of the endothermic thermostat. The regulation of body temperature in reptiles, birds and mammals shows many striking similarities (Hammed et al. 1967) . This has led to the suggestion that certain reptiles (e.g. Crotaphytus Collards) have “developed the early analogue of the posterior thermoregulatory center. If this could be demonstrated by electrical studies or bioamine responses of the midbrain, the collared lizard could be considered as lacking only an insulating coat to be able to achieve homeothermy” (Swan 1974) . In view of the many common thermoregulatory mechanisms and behaviors utilized by both ectotherms and endotherm Satinoff (1978) suggests that “ectotherms can be considered as endothermic systems in transition”. Analytical determinations of hypothalamic temperature control in reptiles are still needed; however, studies illustrating the influence of other central nervous system structures upon reptilian thermoregulation may have an important bearing on any discussion concerning the evolution of a behavioral thermostat. Current studies in which both ectotherms and endotherms are subjected to thermal challenge clearly indicate that both the parietal eye and the pineal body influence precise temperature regulation, by controlling the high and low limits within which a species regulates its body temperature. Imprecise discrimination of high or low hypothalamic setpoints results in an alteration of the mean eccritic temperature, which usually shifts to higher levels in response to surgical manipulation of the parietal-pineal complex. Thus, the involvement of this complex in thermoregulation among modern ectotherrns and endotherm together with the antiquity of the complex among fossil vertebrates, suggests that these neural structures may provide a model that will shed light on the evolution of thermoregulation among the vertebrates. 246

The Primal Eye The Parietal-Pineal Complex and Evidence for Its Role in Ectotherm Temperature Regulation Although third eyes were first described nearly 150 years ago (Brandt, Edwards and Duges 1829, cited in Gundy and Wurst 1976b) as “special glandular” spots on the heads of certain reptiles, their function was not apparent until Stebbins (1958, 1960, 1970, 1973) initiated a series of fundamental studies. Eakin (1973) reviews this and other information which clearly links parietal eye and pineal function with photoreceptivity and temperature regulation among reptiles. A similar thermoregulatory function for the pineal among birds and mammals suggests that the evolution of endothermy may have involved sequential improvements in the basic behavioral thermoregulatory machinery of ectotherms. By examining the response behavior of free-living, but surgically parietalectomized western fence lizards (Sceloporus occidentalis), Stebbins and Eakin (1958) suggested the possibility that third eyes serve to regulate exposure to environmental light, and thus temperature. The authors compared the behavior and physiology of sham-operated and parietalectomized lizards, demonstrating an accentuation of exposure to full sunlight, an increase in locomotor movement, a change in activity with time of day, and an increase in thyroid epithelial cell height with a corresponding reduction in follicular colloid among parietal-eyeless animals. Subsequent studies have recorded more active thyroids in both sexes of S. occidentalis (Stebbins and Cohen 1973). Some of the effects cited above (i.e., (i) changes in activity or its intensity; (ii) alterations in reproductive cycles; and (iii) greater exposure to bright light) have also been recorded in Xantusiaf vigilis (Glaser 1958; LaPolnte 1966; Stebbins 1970), Sceloporus virqatus (Stebbins 1963) and Callisaurus draconoides (Packard and Packard 1972). Stebbins proposed that all the responses to parietal eye removal noted above amounted to actions taken by the lizards to remain thermally homeostatic when active, or were secondary effects produced by imperfect behavioral temperature selection. However, only doubtfully significant differences in body temperature between parietal-eyeless and control animals were observed in early experiments (Stebbins 247

Thermal Physiology 19601, an outcome probably attributable to limitations of the method of recording temperature using manual fast-reading thermometers. Since temperature is an intrinsic characteristic of environmental light, the increase in photic exposure observed in studies of several species of lizards might be expected to bring about statistically demonstrable alterations in body temperature. Hutchison and Kosh (1974), using multipoint temperature recorders, measured body temperature in female Anolis carolinensis housed within thermal gradients. They reported that parietalectomized animals maintained-----body temperatures 2-5 C higher than control animals, throughout the day and night except for the period 0800-0900 hrs. The importance of these results is twofold: (i) they provide a dramatic demonstration of an effect on body temperature after parietal eye removal, confirming Stebbins’ and Eakin’s predictions; (ii) these data suggest that the parietal eye controls thermal behavior at night even in the absence of light. The latter response implies that, in ectotherms, environmental light may serve only as a taxis stimulus that is correlated with environmental temperature. Roth and Ralph (1976b) further explored the effects of thermal and photic stimuli upon the behavior of surgically parietalectomized A. carolinensis. Although dark thermal stimuli were moderately more attractive to parietalectomized animals than to controls, both groups avoided a light source without heat. The latter effect was significantly more pronounced among parietalectomized animals. Initial attraction of all experimental groups to a cool light source, followed by gradual and finally complete avoidance of that light source, supports the suggestion that environmental light may serve as a taxis stimulus in lizards exploiting the thermal characteristics of light. Because photothermal gradients with fixed heat/light sources are steep and narrow, they encourage permanent occupation of thermal locations by dominant animals, forcing subordinate animals to accept suboptimal positions. Roth and Ralph 11976a) provided a unique environmental photothermal chamber with a moving heat/light source in which to test the thermal responses of surgically parietalectomized female A. carolinensis. Body temperature was measured continuously over a four day preoperative and fourday postoperative period, a procedure that generated 3,264 data points for each parietalectomized, sham-parietalectomized, and intact animal. 248

The Primal Eye The results confirmed those of Hutchison and Kosh (1974); Parietal eye removal initiates hyperthermic behavior in animals freely selecting appropriate temperatures in a thermally variable environment and significantly increases body temperature. Suspecting that the parietal eye might be a fine tuning thermostat and that the pineal body proper might serve as a coarse tuning thermostat influencing set-points of the hypothalamus, Roth and Ralph (unpublished) pinealectomized female A. carolinensis and recorded body temperatures under conditions already described. Pinealectomy also resulted in an immediate hyperthermic response (1.75 C increase in body temperature) comparable to that observed after parietalectomy. Subsequent studies indicate that injection of the pineal hormone melatonin in pinealectomized S. undulatus just before the dark phase of a photoperiod (14L:lOD), tends to reverse hyperthermic behavior, and animals select cool night time refuges with temperatures statistically identical to those of intact controls. (1) THERMOREGULATION Reptiles are said to be “cold-blooded” because if they stay in one place without moving, their body temperature approaches that of the external environment. Animals with this (poikilothermic) condition must engage in behavioural thermoregulation, moving between warm and cool places in order to gain or lose heat. The question whether animals are ectothermic or endothermic is of critical importance, “because of the primary role of thermoregulation in metabolic processes underlying all aspects of an animal’s biological functions and activities.” <(b) p.89> The fact that most living E-1 lizards (7 of the 18 modern families are E-8; 11 of 18 are E-2) live in equatorial regions strikes me as no accident. Fossils of some advanced mammal-like reptiles have been discovered at high latitudes where they were quite possibly at risk of cold conditions, even during the Mesozoic. Some paleontologists have argued that these therapsids may have been protected by a coat of fur. Skull markings which indicate foramina around the nasal orifice and mouth suggest, according to Brink, that therapsids may have had sweat glands and vibrissae, and if so, such features would suggest a 249

Thermal Physiology general hairy integument. Fossil evidence of nasal turbinate bones found in high regions also indicate endothermy, since theses structures would either warm or cool inspired air. <(b) p.89>. The pineal body in fossil reptiles (E-1) was usually retained after parietal eye loss, and evidence from modern vertebrates indicates that it developed a secretory capacity in ancestors of mammals and birds. Loss of the parietal eye seems to have occurred quite suddenly among ancestral dinosaurs (thecodonts), but much more gradually among mammal-like reptiles. <(a) p. 189> The question as to why most dinosaurs appear to have lost the entire epiphyseal complex whilst other species retained the pineal body is an interesting one, to which I shall return. To some extent MVT has generalised when talking about attributes amongst E-0, E-1 and E-2 categories. I have alluded previously to some strange exceptions to the more general trend, and wish in this section to look at some particular exceptions that might be problematic or throw up interesting new possibilities. I also wish to indicate areas of current dispute amongst scientists working in this field. Temperature Regulation and the Pineal in Endotherms Some elegant studies and a variety of anecdotal observations combine to suggest that pineal bodies may play a role in temperature regulation in endotherms as well as ectotherms. However, the paucity of data bearing on the relationship between the pineal gland and body temperature control among endotherms leaves much to be desired. <(a)> Gaston and Menaker (1968) have reported that the circadian rhythm of activity was lost in sparrows after pinealectomy, an effect similar to activity changes recorded among lizards (Stebbins 1963; Glaser 1958). Likewise, Binkley et al. (1971) have reported a loss of the circadian rhythm in the temperature regulation of pinealectomized sparrows in continuous darkness. Body temperature did not drop to the normal daily minimum characteristic of control birds, and pinealectomy raised the temperature.---- These results suggest that a hyperthermic nighttime response comparable to that of parietalectomized lizards (Hutchison and Kosh 1974) also occurs in birds. More recently, John et 250

The Primal Eye al. (1978) have shown that the circadian rhythm of body temperature is not abolished by pinealectomy in pigeons, but that compared with intact and sham-operated birds this operation does initiate higher body temperatures during both light and dark phases. In addition, subcutaneous implantation of melatonin pellets nullifies or reverses the hyperthermic effect of pinealectomy. Binkley (1974) observed that melatonin injected into sparrows results in a lowering of cloacal temperature. Cogburn eft al. (1976) nave recently reported dark chase thermoregulatory dysfunction in pinealectomized chickens. Among mammals, melatonin may affect mechanisms that lower body temperature in mice (Arutyunyun et al. 1964), and may promote the deposition of brown fat (a readily accessible source of metabolic heat used during periods of rapid arousal) in hibernating mammals (Girardier 19775. Experimentally, nothing more is known of thermopineal effects among mammals. Mammals with atrophic or small----pineals (e.g. elephants, hyrax, sirens, rhinoceros) and certain vertebrates lacking pineal bodies altogether (crocodilians, edentates, dugongs) tend to inhabit warm or tropical regions These groups of vertebrates may represent natural experiments. Stebbins and Eakin (1958), Stebbins (1963) and RDth and Ralph (1976a) have suggested that one function of the lineal in all vertebrates may be to prevent metabolic excess. If the lineal acts as a brake, then it might be predicted that endotherms in cold environments would possess large pineals, functioning to prevent metallic machinery from producing heat at a pace which would debilitate energy reserves. In contrast to animals inhabiting lower latitudes, sea lions, seals, and walruses have the largest pineals known in mammals (Tilney and barren 1919; Aello and Mezzani 1969). flings also have large and temperature-sensitive pineal bodies (Quay 1978). As another natural precedent, we can compare body temperatures between mammals with and without pineal bodies. The naturally occurring evolutionary loss of lineal bodies Sung vertebrates appears to coincide with lover body temperatures or reduced metabolic rates, compared with animals with well-developed pineal bodies .This trend

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Thermal Physiology appears to be Contradictory to the results of surgical pinealectomy, which generally leads to loss of temperature rhythms and hyperthermia.

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The Melatonin Hypothesis Previous scientific viewpoints became modified in the 1960’s with the formulation of the “melatonin hypothesis” by Wurtman and Axelrod (The Pineal Gland, RJ Wurtman & J Axelrod, Sci.Am 1965, 213, 50-60). According to Wurtman and Axelrod, melatonin is synthesised exclusively within the pineal cells. The chief cellular components of the pineal glands are the pinealocytes which are modified photoreceptor cells. The sequence of the synthesis of melatonin is: tryptophan - 5 hydroxytryptohpan - serotonin - acytylserotonin melatonin. Once formed, melatonin is not stored within the pineal, but is released into the blood directly. The melatonin hypothesis heralded a number of studies on the role of the pineal gland in a variety of physiological processes. An important finding relating to melatonin is its relation to the circadian rhythms (Neural regulation of circadian rythms, Rusak & Zucker, Physiology Review, 1979, 59, 449-526). The light-dark cycles of the environment and the melatonin levels in the blood have been found to be related (Wurtman & Moskowitz, 1977). While the melatonin level is low during the day it reaches a peak about six hours after the onset of darkness (Wurtman & Axelrod, 1965; Wurtman and Moskowitz, 1977). Developmental studies indicate that melatonin levels are higher in prepubescent children than other age groups (Waldhauser, Steger & Vorkapic, 1986). Its concentration also appears to be very high during infancy and pregnancy (Mathews, 1981). Studies have also implicated the pineal and melatonin in the regulation of sleep and dream cycles (Lernor & Nordlund, 1975); in human sexuality (Kennaway, Gillmore & Seamark, 1982); and in

The Melatonin Hypothesis certain behavioural disorders, particularly depression (Watterberg, 1986 etc). Pineal secretion also seems to be affected by variations in geomagnetic fields (Reiter et al, 1988, and see new Bibliography. I intend to look in the future at some new findings in light of “lateral lines” in primitive animals which might have been a precursor to the pineal eye, and at the special sense in some animals related to geomagnetic orientation. (See Robert McKie’s report on the sixth sense on montremes - platypus and echidna Observer Zoology, 23 June 1991).

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Rapid Eye Movements (R.E.M.) The main testable claim arising from MVT in relation to the [Silicon Evolution] and [Unconstrained Evolution and Hard Consequences] findings is that the brain’s of E-2 animals experiment (I suggest, using Californian yellow-tailed E-2 lizards and E-1 controls) will have more properties more akin to a finite-state, phase-controlled system than those of similar E-1 animals. The second avenue for concerns comparison of the REM properties exhibited by similar species E-2 and E-1 animals. This could be explored relatively by looking across a range of different species, and correlating degrees of absence of parietal eye-tissue with amount of time (if any) in REM states. MVT would expect that E-2 animals exhibited less or no observable REM compared with E-1 species. As well as comparison between species I am interested in comparing young and adult animals of the same E-2 species, where the young animal has a functioning parietal eye, and where the eye has become covered by skin or dysfunctional in the adult animal. The evidence from [Silicon Evolution] does not demonstrate consciousness (after all, RGA circuits are not conscious), but the presence of REM with all of its rich accompanying mentation and dream fantasy probably is indicative of ‘consciousness’ in an animal. REM is such a powerful, rich and varied source of mentation that I suggest [see MA dissertation] REM is a good indicator of “consciousness” being possessed by species that exhibit [REM states]. Some researchers think that during certain foetal stages REM in humans can occur up to 24 hours a day, and the importance of REM to ontogeny might lend some support to [Globus’ REAL-TIME hypothesis]. My linking of this idea with [MENAKER] indicates that melatonin production may have largely transferred from pineal eye to lateral eyes

Rapid Eye Movements (R.E.M.) after E-2 to E-1 transition during the reptilian-paleomammalian interface of the Mesozoic. REM was a new adaptation, and represents a new stage in the evolution of [CONSCIOUSNESS]. Combined with the findings from [Thompson] that show that external clocks prevent (or mightily inhibit) circuits from selforganising, a consequence of the loss of the median eye in most vertebrates [see climatic reasons for loss], there is a clear case to be made that the loss of the pineal eye was either (1) essential for consciousness to occur, [see WEAK Median Vision Theory] or (2) led directly to consciousness [see STRONG Phantom Eye hypothesis]. REM and TYPES of VISION Plants go into flower according to measurement of daylight. Even out of ‘season’ they will start to flower if exposure time to light is artificially adjusted - this seems to be an involuntary, non-conscious response on behalf of the plant. Like animals: a plant’s behaviour switches during the night. Phototropism must be about the earliest example of light sensitive behaviour, and could be claimed as a rudimentary form of vision (“light detection and tracking”). Some experts claim that thirty-week old foetuses go through phases of REM activity (I am careful not to say REM sleep) twentyfour hours a day. Flanagan makes a connection (which I think might be a good one) between the larger percentage of REM sleep that occurs during the development of young in mammals than occurs in adult mammals - and the idea that this might be important in building and strengthening cortical connections, particularly in the visual system, that had not finished developing during the foetal stages. 158 Menaker, REM & Melatonin

158 Flanagan, 1995, p.20

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The Primal Eye I wish to suggest a possible function for rapid eye movements based on Menaker’s (1985)159 paper, Eyes, the second (and third) pineal glands? My conjecture is that REM in lateral eyes plays a part in the new duties of melatonin production (linked to photoperiodism) that lateral eyes had to play after the pineal eye had disappeared. Accompanying REM mentation might well simulate the previous mental states that would have accompanied night time experience during (E-2) earlier evolutionary stages. I am working towards a position, in stark contrast to Flanagan’s epiphenomenalism, that you may be more essentially you in a dream than when you are awake. Foetal stages, and early post-natal life, are largely spent in REM state. The waking ‘conscious self’ has to be constructed out of this foundation, in the sense that infants need to learn to see in 3-D (images on the retina have only two dimensions) and to locate themselves, their bodies, limbs and hand-eye co-ordination, in the external world. It is the same ‘self’ or conscious identity that was dreaming that opens its eyes to be bombarded with stimuli from the environment which the motor systems and so on must address. There are other people and agents to react to, and consciousness is restrained and constrained by the increased environmental demands, whereas when asleep abstract thought is relatively untrammelled. 160 Somehow we must retain enough vigilance to wake, either in an emergency, or in the normal course of events when it is dawn. Flanagan points out that John Locke161 recognised deep sleep to be a problem, since he wanted to differentiate between the Cartesian idea that consciousness constitutes essence and his favoured notion that consciousness “grounds” the sense of identity.162 It is universally agreed that the

159 M. Menaker, Eyes, the second (and third) pineal glands?, CIBA Symposium Proceedings, March 1985, pp.78-93 160 I shall develop this case further in the conclusion. 161 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, CD-rom of World Philosophy 162 Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, p.157

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Rapid Eye Movements (R.E.M.) brain does not shut down altogether. Locke’s, and Flanagan’s, postulation is that consciousness is absent during deep sleep, and so consciousness cannot be the essence of an entity (as Descartes might have it) since the entity would cease to be if the essence (consciousness) ceased to be.163 My view is that phenomenal consciousness might slow down drastically when asleep, but since the ancient median eye could not be closed, consciousness always remains at some level if the being is alive (and not brain-dead). If dreams are a leftover from the reptilian medianvision night experience, then they are also the flip-side of conscious waking experience. During daylight, the lateral eyes bridge the gap of stimuli previously provided by the pineal eye. Animals can now tell it is dusk by using lateral vision in conjunction with the new cortical structures, perhaps confirming this by sensing (through the skin) an accompanying drop in air temperature. These various clues are collated together to provide the animal with an accurate picture of the external world, whereas in previous generations the hormonal commands, for example for skin pigmentation to change to night-camouflage, would have come directly and unmediated by ‘consciousness’ (or abstract modeling or sensory collation) directly from sunlight acting chemically on the pineal eye. It seems the plant’s behaviour pattern is not amenable to selfregulation, or self-organisation by the individual organism. Humans (as we have seen from St. Augustine and his problem with penile erections) are not entirely in charge of their bodily processes: but they do have much more capacity for self-organisation of their behaviour than do plants or indeed primitive reptiles. Neuroscience seems correct to look for correlation’s between (local and general) neuronal activity and shifts in perception and in behaviour. Our brains can rewire themselves (plasticity is particularly high during formative years) as they develop problem-solving methods and survival strategies in response to demands of the environment. The brain also self-organizes informa-

163 Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, p.157

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The Primal Eye tion,164 by using neural circuits with lateral inhibition, reinforcement learning, interactive activation and competition (IAC)165, and by other local mechanisms. The reason for rapid eye movements themselves presents a problem for Flanagan. He thinks they also might be epiphenomena, useless remnants from evolution, in the same way he regards p-dreams. However, his earlier argument that rest was the main reason for sleep is true, and it is hard to see how the eyes are ‘resting’ during REM. There is some evidence that movement of the eyes corresponds with what is being looked at in p-dreams. Dennett refers to an example from Foulkes (1966) where a person whose REM patterns during a given experiment were predominantly vertical, on being woken up reported a dream of picking basketballs up off the floor and throwing them into baskets. A subject with predominantly horizontal REM on waking reported a dream of watching two people throwing tomatoes at each other.166 Other experiments have linked eye movements with hypnosis. 167 CONSCIOUSNESS, Melatonin and REM That there are strong links between serotonin/melatonin production and REM sleep has been known for some time. For a while it was thought that the many projections of the serotonin-containing neurons of the raphe nuclei in the brain stem regulated REM sleep. Destruction of these neurons with toxic drugs yielded animals that did not sleep

164 For some purposes this might be considered the same as the ‘paths’ for the signals, since the paths are not differentiated from one another before the signal exists: distribution of neurons is global, or at least wide-spread. Frequency of use might identify one ‘path’ from another. 165 S. Nichols, Interactive Activation and Competition Networks in Game Playing, MSc Dissertation, CCCN, University of Stirling, 1993. 166 David Foulkes, The Psychology of Sleep, NY, 1966, in Dunlop (Ed.), p.229 167 Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, 1994, p.58-9

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Rapid Eye Movements (R.E.M.) much and showed no REM sleep at first, but given sufficient time REM sleep returned, even though the serotonin system in the brain was largely destroyed. The serotonin system has something to do with REM sleep “but exactly what continues to elude researchers.” <(i)The Brain, an introduction to Neuroscience, R.F. Thomson, Freeman & Co., NY, 1985 p.285>

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Phantom phenomena The FACTS about PHANTOMS OUTLINE: My initial exposition of MVT was called "Phantom Eye Theory" and relied heavily on analogies between features of imagination and consciousness, and aspects of the phantom limb phenomena as known to medical science. Descartes uses phantom limbs to illustrate how our senses may be fooled. I use the 'Median Vision’ analogy (which draws attention to similarities between conscious experience and the postulated original median vision sensory experience) simply because it is wider, and an analysis of 'phantom fields' remains essential to my central argument. In brief, my claim is that a 'phantom' median eye develops, along with development of the physical constituency of the brain, and that we identify the persistent experience of/from this phantom sense organ with our conscious self. This identification is 'transparent' -as a lateral eyeball cannot see itself- and becomes no less transparent even should we think or introspect harder (*see Nothingness). This phantom eye is a "non-material organ of 'unitary sense"', contained within the "genetic pattern or 'matrix' alongside all the other aspects of the body system. The brain 'expects' or 'assumes' it to be present, since for so long the pineal sense-organ was actually present." (S. Nichols, Phantom Eye Theory, 6.60, 1992). You might say that the brain 'imagines' it still to be there, but it this not an imagination that takes any deliberate effort since the phantom emerges naturally from the deep structures of the (limbic) brain and as a result of the evolutionary and current biological state of the individual animal or human.

Phantom phenomena Several important misconceptions remain concerning phantoms. These arise, I would claim, because of an instinctive rejection by many scientists and philosophers of facts that do not sit well with their mechanistic presumptions about the nature of the brain and perception. The strength of feeling against phantoms was such in 1866 that S.Weir Mitchell, the foremost American neurologist of his time, published his first account of phantom limbs, not in a scientific journal, but as an anonymously written short story in the Atlantic Monthly. Some historians believe that Mitchell wished to test the reaction of his peers, who he feared would not believe that amputated arms and legs could be felt after the limbs were gone, even though the experience of phantom limbs is so common, and the pain and sensations felt in these invisible appendages can be so great (R. Melzack, Sci Am, Apr 1992, p.90). The phenomenon of phantom limbs challenges some fundamental assumptions in psychology and medical science, one such being that sensations are produced only by stimuli and those perceptions in the absence of stimuli are psychologically abnormal. Phantom limbs, as well as phantom seeing and hearing, indicate that the brain does more "than detect and analyze inputs; it generates perceptual experience even when no external inputs occur. We do not need a body to feel a body." (R.Melzack, Scientific American, p.96 April 1992). Recent advances in the study of phantoms corroborates previously held observations, and also gives us some powerful new insights. Ronald Melzack, a foremost authority on phantoms who also authored, with Patrick D. Wall, the famous "gate control" theory of pain in 1965, gives a concise account of phantoms in his 1992 Scientific American article. In this chapter I intend to look at Melzack's "Phantom limbs and the concept of a neuromatrix", Trends in Neurosciences; 1990 Mar Vol.13 (3) pp.88-92, and "Phantom limbs, the self and the brain (the D.O. Hebb Memorial Lecture)", Canadian Psychology, 1989, Jan Vol. 30(1) 1-16). The possibility for innate emerging phantoms (rather than caused by traumatic loss) is important to Phantom Eye Theory, and I shall discuss congenitally occurring phantoms. Although Phantom Eye theory is concerned with a phantom organ of sense rather than with a

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The Primal Eye motor-organ, the underlying mechanisms that give rise to phantoms may have elements in common. Evidence from phantom seeing and hearing are perhaps more important for my theory than studies of phantom limbs. Experimental tests for phantom vision are harder to design than those for, say, "blindsight"; and despite phantom visions having been known of for a long time, it is only in the last few years that serious attention has been paid to them. Towards the end of this outline I shall briefly examine the work of James McGarry (Hypnotic interventions, Mar 1993); Walter Needham and Robert Taylor (Benign visual hallucinations, or "phantom vision", Jun 1992); David Levine (Unawareness of visual and sensorimotor defects: A hypothesis, Jul 1990); and Bernd Frank & Erich Lorenzon's survey of sleep and dreams in limb amputees (Experiences of phantom limb sensations in dreams, Jul-Aug 1989). FACTS ABOUT PHANTOM LIMBS: This section is based largely on Ronald Melzack's work. * The most extraordinary feature of phantoms is their reality to the person. * Their vivid sensory qualities - and precise location in space make them seem so real that a patient may try to step out of bed onto a phantom foot, or grasp at a mug with a phantom hand. * The reality of the phantom is reinforced because they are experienced as part of oneself; that is, as integral parts of the body. A phantom foot is reported as not just being real, but as unquestionably belonging to the person. Even though a foot is felt to be dangling in the air several inches below the stump and unconnected to the leg, it is still experienced as part of one's body and moves appropriately with the other limbs. * The phantom may even feel more substantial than a real limb, especially if it hurts. * The reality of the phantom is enhanced by wearing an artificial arm or leg, and the phantom usually fills the prosthesis as a hand fits a glove. * The sense of reality is strengthened by the wide range of sensations in a phantom. Pressure, warmth, cold and different varieties of pain are common. A phantom can feel wet (as when an artificial leg is

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Phantom phenomena seen stepping in a puddle), or may be felt as being ticklish, sweaty or itchy. * Amputation (or traumatic loss) is not essential. Sometimes if a shoulder is wrenched forward so all the nerves of the arm are ripped from the spinal cord (brachial plexus avulsion) a resulting phantom occupies the now useless true arm and is co-ordinated with it. "Regrettably, removal of the true arm by surgery has no effect on the phantom or the pain" (Melzack p91). * Congenital phantoms occur. (See "Phantom representations of congenitally absent limbs.", Paul Scatena, Univ. Rochester, NY, US, in perceptual and Motor Skills, 1990 Jun Vol 70 (3, pt 2) pp.1227-1232). * Supernumerary phantom limbs can occur (See "Three Arms: A case study of supernumerary phantom limbs after right hemisphere stroke.", P.W. Halligan, J.C. Marshall, D.T. Wade, Rivermead Rehab. Centre, Oxford, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry; 1993 Feb Vol 56 (2), pp.159-166) such as the 65 yr old man who reported a persistent third arm whose subjective reality was not ameliorated by his attempts to rationalize its existence. Although deeply confused by the phantom, the patient was otherwise fully oriented, with a high verbal IQ and normal cognition. Immediately after an accident the phantom leg may be dissociated from the body, a leg might be raised over the chest or head, even when the person can see that the missing limb is stretched out on the road. Later, though, the phantoms move in coordination with the body (at least when the patient has their eyes open). In most cases, a phantom arm hangs down by the side when the person sits or stands, but behaves like a normal limb when walking, i.e. moves in perfect coordination with other limbs. Sometimes, however, the limb remains stuck in an unusual position. One man whose arm was bent behind him could sleep only on his abdomen or on his side (Melzack, p.90). * As many as 70% of amputees suffer from persistent phantoms. * Children who lose a limb as young as one or two years old can have phantom limbs, and Melzack and Renee Lacroix encountered children who have painful phantoms lost before the age of two.

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The Primal Eye * Phantom limbs often persist for many years, and do not usually disappear for ever, even though they might go away for many decades at a time. EXPLANATIONS FOR PHANTOM LIMBS The oldest explanation for phantom limbs is that remaining nerves in the stump grow at the cut end into nodules called 'neuromas' which continue to generate impulses. These flow via the spinal cord and relays in the thalamus to the somatosensory areas of the cortex, the presumed centres for sensation in classical concepts of the nervous system. Attempts to treat the pain based on this theory, cutting nerves from the stump usually just above the neuroma, may provide pain relief for months or even years, but the pain usually returns. Importantly, none of these procedures abolishes the phantom limb experience, hence neuroma activity by itself does not provide an explanation. A related 1960's theory moves the source of the phantom to the spinal cord and suggests that phantoms arise from excessive, spontaneous, firing of the spinal cord neurons. However, some paraplegics who have suffered a complete break of spinal cord high in the body may feel severe pain in the legs and groin, although the spinal neurons that carry messages from those areas of the brain originate well below the level of the break. A recent proposal is that phantom limbs arise still higher in the CNS in the brain itself. Frederick A. Lenz (Univ. Toronto) observed abnormally high levels of activity and a bursting pattern in thalamus cells of a paraplegic patient who had a full break of the neck yet felt pain in the lower half of his body. The overactive cells also responded to touches of the head and neck, even though cells were in that part of the thalamus that normally responds only to stimulus of the body below the level of the cut This finding suggested that neural inhibition was lifted on the flow of signals across existing but previously unused synapses in sensory neurons projecting from the thalamus from head and neck. (See "Thumb in cheek? Sensory reorganisation and perceptual plasticity after limb amputation"; P.W. Halligan, J.C. Marshall, D.T. Wade, Jane Davey et al, Neuroreport, 1993 Mar vol 4(3) pp.233-236). 265

Phantom phenomena (See also "Perceptual correlates of massive cortical reorganisation", V.S. Ramachandran, M. Stewart, & D.C. Rogers-Ramachandran; Neuroreport, 1992 Jul vol 3(7) pp.583-586, which found that several complete somatotropic representations of the phantom limb were found, on the face, chest, and axilla, indicating the emergence of such maps in regions remote from the stump). Nevertheless, alterations in this system cannot by themselves account for phantoms and their pain, since removal of the affected parts of the somatosensory cortex or thalamus does not solve both problems. Any explanation must account for the "rich variety of sensations a person can feel, the intense reality of the phantom and the conviction that even free-floating phantoms belong to the self." (Melzack, p.92) MELZACK'S NEUROMATRIX THEORY Melzack concludes that the source of phantom limbs is more complex than any of these theories would allow. He agrees with Lenz that, to a great extent, phantom limbs originate in the brain, but thinks that much more of the cerebrum than the somatosensory system is involved. He claims that the brain contains a network of neurons, or 'neuromatrix', that as well as responding to sensory stimulation, continuously generates a characteristic pattern of impulses that indicate the body to be intact and unequivocally one's own. In the absence of sensory inputs from the periphery of the body, it creates the impression of having a limb even when that limb has been removed. In order to produce all of the properties that can belong to phantoms, the matrix would have to be quite extensive, and include at least three major neural circuits. One of these must be the classical sensory pathway through the thalamus to the somatosensory cortex. The second must pass through the reticular formation of the brain stem to the limbic system, critical for emotion and motivation. One reason to include this system is that paraplegics who suffer a complete spinal break high in the upper body continue to experience 266

The Primal Eye themselves as still being in their old body, and they describe the feelings in the denervated areas with the same kinds of affective terms as they did before they were injured, such as "painful," "pleasurable," or "exhausting." (Melzack, p.93) A final system consists of cortical regions important to recognition of the self and to the evaluation of sensory signals. A major part of this system is the parietal lobe, which has been shown to be essential to the sense of self (Melzack, p.93). Blakemore writes that "not just the surface of the skin is sensed within the cortex. The very existence of the body is registered there as well. Injuries behind the touch area, in the parietal lob, produce a most extraordinary disturbance of the relationship between body and mind” (Mechanics of the Mind, CUP, 1977 p.82). Neuromatrix theory claims that sensory signals form the periphery or elsewhere pass though each of these systems in parallel, and as the signals are analysed, information about them is shared by the three and converted into an integrated output. This integrated output is sent on to other parts of the brain. "Somewhere in the brain the output is transformed into a conscious perception, although no one knows exactly where the transformation that leads to awareness takes place." As the matrix analyses sensory information, it imprints a characteristic neurosignature on the output. Melzack believes that the "specific neurosignature of an individual would be determined by the pattern of connectivity among neurons in the matrix". (Melzack, p.93) CONGENITAL PHANTOMS Another entrenched assumption is that perception of the body results from sensory inputs that leave a memory in the brain (cite Changeux in 'Neuronal Man'), and that the sum of these signals becomes the body image. However, the existence of phantoms in people who have never had a limb or who lost one at an early age "suggests that the neural networks for perceiving the body and its parts are built into the brain" (p.96), and that "the neuromatrix (is) an assembly whose connections are primarily determined not by experience but by the genes" (p.94). Melzack's work with cases such as an eight-year old body born with a right arm that ends at the elbow yet when he fits his 267

Phantom phenomena elbow into a cup with a lever has phantom fingers "like everyone else's fingers" that emerge from his elbow to manipulate a lever have led him to depart from Donald Hebb's claim that synapses between brain cells form stronger connections because of sensory input activates the two cells simultaneously (p.94). Paul Scatena (in "Phantom representations of congenitally absent limbs.” Univ. Rochester, NY, US, in Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1990) reviews cases of congenital and acquired amputees, and shows that phantoms of aplasics can be both vivid and dexterous. Scatena explores reasons for infrequency of reports, and looks at implications for understanding of the body-schema. He concludes that phantoms of congenitally absent limbs indicate that the neurological substrate of the phantom is at least partly innate. These innate structures may suffice for phantom sensations, and early experience may further reinforce those mechanisms. PHANTOM SEEING, PHANTOM HEARING and SENSORY HALLUCINATIONS Following Melzack's excellent April 1992 summary: "Phantom seeing and hearing, like phantom limbs, are also generated by the brain in the absence of sensory input. People whose vision has been impaired by cataracts or by the loss of a portion of the visual processing system in the brain sometimes report highly detailed visual experiences. This syndrome was first described in 1769, when the philosopher Charles Bonnet wrote an article on the remarkable visual experiences of his grandfather, Charles Lullin, who had lost most of his vision because of cataracts but otherwise was in good physical and psychological health. Since then, many mentally sound individuals have reported similarly vivid phantom visual experiences. Phantom seeing often coexists with a limited amount of normal vision. The person experiencing the phantom has no difficulty in differentiating between the two kinds of vision. Phantom visual episodes appear suddenly and unexpectedly when the eyes are open. People usually describe the visual phantoms as seeming real despite the obvious impossibility of their existence. Common phantom images 268

The Primal Eye include people and large buildings. Rarer perceptions include miniature people and small animals. Phantom sights ARE NOT MERE MEMORIES OF EARLIER EXPERIENCES; they often contain events, places or people that have never before been encountered. First appearances of phantom images can be quite startling. A woman in one of our studies who had lost much of her vision because of retinal degeneration reported being shocked when she looked out of a window and saw a tall building in what she knew to be a wooded field. Even though she realised that the building was a phantom, it seemed so real that she could count its steps and describe its other details. The building soon disappeared only to return several hours later. This phantom vision still continues to come and go unexpectedly. As with congenitally phantom limbs, phantom vision often goes unreported. This may be because some people avoid discussing phantom vision for fear of being labelled as psychologically disturbed. Nevertheless, about 15% of all people who lose all or part of their vision report phantom visual experiences. Naturally a high proportion of these people are elderly since vision deteriorates with age. Phantom sounds are also extremely common, although few people recognize them for what they are. People who lose their hearing commonly report noises in their heads. These noises, called tinnitus, are said to sound like whistling, clanging, screeching or the roaring of a train. They can be so loud and unpleasant that the victim needs help to cope with the distress. Some people with tinnitus report hearing "formed sounds", such as music or voices. A woman who had been as musician before losing her hearing reports that she "hears" piano concerts and sonatas. The impression is so real that at first she thought the sounds were coming from a neighbour's radio. The woman reports that she cannot turn off the music and that it often gets louder at night when she wants to go to sleep. Another woman who had lost much of her sight and hearing, experienced both phantom sight and sound. In one instance, she delightedly described seeing a circus and hearing the music that accompanied the acts.

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Phantom phenomena Phantom sights and sounds, like phantom limbs, occur when the brain loses its normal input from a sensory system. In the absence of input, cells in CNS become more active. The brain's intrinsic mechanisms transform that neuronal activity into meaningful experiences. I shall discuss auditory and visual hallucinations further in the Chapter which relates to the functioning of the human PINEAL GLAND. There seems to be a correlation between hallucinations suffered by schizophrenics, who (like Joan of Arc) often hear "voices" that seem to originate from outside of themselves. Such auditory and visual hallucinations in schizophrenics, and also in cases of LSD ingestion, seem to be strongly affected by levels of serotonin and melatonin. If Melzack's 'neuromatrix' provides a binding mechanism for low level sensory signals, I would speculate that the unified signal is transformed in perception by melatonin secreted by the pineal gland (see "Melatonin: a link between the environment and behaviour", Alan Frazer and Richard Brown, and further discussions, Integrative Psychiatry, Mar 1987, vol 5(1), pp.3-27) and sometimes melatonin secreted by the retina itself (see "Asymmetric distribution of melatonin recptors in the brain of the lizard Anolis Carolinensis,Alan Wiechmann & Celeste Wirsig-Wiechmann, Brain Research, Oct 1992, vol 593(2) pp.281-286). David Levine in "Unawareness of visual and sensorimotor defects; A hypothesis", Brain and Cognition, Jul vol 13(2), pp.233-281, proposes a theory to explain unawareness of neurological defects, based on the hypothesis that sensory loss must be discovered by observation and inference. The theory explains (1) why unawareness of blindness occurs only in a setting of severe intellectual loss, (2) why patients unaware of blindness confabulate visual percepts, and (3) why unawareness of hemianopsia does not require intellectual impairment and is associated with perceptual completion. The theory predicts a clinical setting for unawareness of hemiplegia, explains why this is more common after damage to the non-dominant hemisphere, and accounts for phantom limbs after amputation. His neural basis assumes that the brain consists of parallel distributed processing systems. This

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The Primal Eye theory is extended to cognitive deficits and is compared, in the article, with recent theories of unawareness. Needham and Roberts in "Benign hallucinations, or 'Phantom Vision' in visually impaired and blind persons", Journal of visual impairment and blindness, 1992 Jun vol 86(6) pp.245-248, examined visual hallucinations in 443 veterans in two studies. A substantial minority reported phantom visions. They conclude that visual hallucinations correspond to aspects of the phantom limb experience of amputees, and may be conceptualized as instances of "phantom vision". James McGarry in "Hypnotic interventions in psychological and physiological aspects of amputation", 1993 Mar vol 14(1) pp.7-12, discusses the traumatic effects of amputation, including modification of the sense of self, the sense of loss, awareness of mortality, loss of confidence, disfigurement, loss of balance, guilt, and phantom limb sensations. A case history of a man who lost part of his left index finger in a woodworking accident is presented to illustrate the role of hypnosis in overcoming these effects. Hypnosis was used to (1) ensure that the wound remained painfree, (2) maximise white blood cells to that area to prevent infection and promote healing, (3) release the sense of loss and sadness, (4) place into perspective the idea that part of the body had died, and (5) build a new subconscious blueprint. A mind mirror technique was used to relearn the shape of the body, to overcome the fear of power tools, and to overcome phantom limb sensations. Inzelberg, Vishnieyskaya and Orczyn from Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Centre in "Transient musical hallucinations", Journal of neurology, neurosurgery and psychiatry, 1993 Jul vol 56(7), report the case of transient hallucinosis in a 75 yr old right-handed woman which occurred following the sudden development of right hemiparensis and oysphasia. It is suggested that the hallucinations may represent a beafferentation phenomena, reminiscent of visual hallucinations in the blind, thalamic pains, or phantom limb. Frank and Lorenzon in "Experiences of phantom limb sensations in dreams", Psychopathology, 1989 Jul-Aug vol 22(4) pp.182271

Phantom phenomena 187, surveyed 84 males aged 56-78 years, who had had a limb amputated following trauma suffered during WW2. They were concerned to discover instances of phantom limb sensations in dreams. 77 subjects reported phantom limb sensations in the waking state and 70 subjects reported phantom limb sensations in dreams. Phantom limbs were characterised as either complete, reduced, intermittent, or nonexistent. 40 subjects had the same type of phantom limb while awake and while dreaming. 44 had a different type in dreams. Phantom limb sensations in dreams were sometimes so intense that the subjects awakened and realised their amputation with astonishment. While all subjects suffered from a painful phantom limb while awake, phantom limb sensations in dreams were never painful. Case examples from five of the subjects are included in this article. PHANTOM PINEAL EYE To conclude this section, having established that phantom body parts can emerge congenitally and without amputation, and that organs of sense can manifest as phantoms as well as motor-organs; my contention is that the pineal gland is a 'stump' to a phantom pineal eye. Although loss of the functioning pineal eye seems to have occurred at the time of arrival of the first warm-blooded animals, mammals and dinosaurs, during Mesozoic times (see Chapter on Evolution the section on Recapitulation), it is true that a rudimentary epiphysis starts to develop even in humans during intrauterine development, and that the skull opening for the pineal eye does not fully close until about a year after birth. If phantom sensations (limbs and vision) have uniform properties, such as perceptual 'reality', and strong identification as being part of oneself; then there is every reason to believe that phantom sensations of pineal 'vision' would share these properties. It is interesting to note that phantom sensations are to an extent dependent on the (lateral) eyes remaining open. An example cited by Melzack was the artificial leg being seen to be wet, and an accompanying 'wetness' felt in the phantom. The close links, evolutionary and biologically, between lateral and pineal vision, would seem to support the notion that 'phantom median vision’ (what I would claim to be consciousness) and co-ordination of 'internal 272

The Primal Eye mental experiences' and environmental sensory input are synchronised when the eyes are open and the person is fully awake. I would argue that phantoms fulfil the condition of having subjective 'reality' without having any objective 'reality' measurable in the world. This is also the property of our mental representations. The pineal eye, as the most primitive organ of sense, arising congenitally, is the only candidate for role of the body-part that can combine all sensory modalities into an experiential phantom.

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Historical notes on Pineal THE PINEAL: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The Egyptian anatomist, Herophilos, proposed over 2,000 years ago that the pineal body controls the flow of thoughts (Some answers to a 2,000 year-old question: role of the pineal gland, SD Wainwright, Revs. Pure Appl. Pharmac. Sc., 1982 3, 185-262). By the third century b.c., The time of Herophilus and Erasistratus, Alexandria had taken over from Athens as the centre of world learning. Knowledge of the brain advanced rapidly as these two anatomists abandoned the analogies with animals so dear to Aristotle, and became the first to systematically dissect the human body. At that time, even touching a corpse was taboo, yet they were supplied with criminals whom, as Celsus wrote, “the kings removed from the prisons to give to them, and they examined them while they were still breathing.” Herophilus is reported to have dissected thousands of bodies. (Neuronal Man, Changeux, p.5-6) Not only was a distinction made between the cerebellum and the brain and spinal cord, but they also showed that the brain contained cavities (or ventricles); that its surface, or cortex, was folded into convolutions; and that the nerves were distinct from blood vessels. They showed that the nerves originated in the brain or spinal cord and not in the heart, and also distinguished between nerves concerned with “movement” and those with “feeling”. Alcmaeon of Croton, a Pythagorean thinker, seems to have been the first Greek to locate sensation and thought in the brain. However, such was the grip of Aristotle’s legacy that it was almost five hundred years after the Alexandrian school before Galen of Bergema succeeded

Historical notes on Pineal in introducing a new experimental method, established brain physiology as a science, and finally ended Aristotle’s cardiocentric thesis. Following up the work of Herophilus and Erasistratus, he distinguished three ventricles: one at the front of the brain, divided into two; one in the centre; and one at the rear. Galen demonstrated the brain’s central role in controlling bodily and mental activity - although Aristotle’s erroneous opinions survived until the eighteenth century because they were backed up by many theological and philosophical works, and perpetuated by medieval scholars. Galen’s concept of the pineal gland was as a valve or filter, whose purpose was essentially to stop the brain being overloaded with raw experience or knowledge of the environment. Descartes wastundoubtedlty aware that Galen, following the tradition set by Herophilus, attributed a central role to the pineal gland as the “organ of the soul”. Descartes argument that the soul joins the body at the pineal, which has the virtue of being unpaired, because ‘the other parts of of our brain are double, and we can only think about one thing at one one time’, is rather simplistic and inadequate. Critics, from Benedict de Spinoza onwards, have almost with one voice, ridiculed Descartes’ pineal gland hypothesis. My feelings are that Descartes pineal gland view is presently deserves a reassessment and in the light of modern scientific findings. It has long been suspected (in Western and Eastern mystical traditions of thought) that the pineal gland is, or was connected to, the ‘third eye’ of mythology.

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Parietal Ontogeny

Ontogeny of the Parietal Foramen Recently (1981) the ontogeny of the parietal eye and foramen in the lizard Anolis carolinensis has been studied by Roth & Roth. As it develops, the parietal eye primordium migrates anteriorly and assumes a position in the cranial roof. In adult lizards, the parietal eye rests in a foramen, which is usually located in the frontal-parietal structure. The foramen in hatchling lizards of the genus Anolis is more properly termed a fontanelle, because nearly the entire parietal and a portion of the frontal bones are unossified. Bone deposition is rapid during the first year of life and the fontanelle gradually decreases in size, finally assuming a small triangular shape as the animal reaches reproductive maturity (44-45 mm Snout-Vent Length, SVL). Bone deposition continues as the animal grows until the shape of the Parietal foramen closely approximates the shape of the parietal eye (>50 mm SVL). The foramen may close entirely in some species (Edinger 1955); in A. carolinensis closure can occur in individuals which are larger (>55 mm SVL) and presumably old (our observations). Although Parietal foramen closure is not rare in large lizard species such as Iguana Iguana (Edinger 1955; Roth’s observations) it is observed infrequently among small lizards. This may be because small species never, or only rarely, reach old age—a stage of life during which complete ossification most commonly occurs. The early pattern of foramen ossification in Anolis appears to be typical for small lizard species, but may not be representative of all extant parietal-eyed lacertilians. For example, the foramen in Clrotaphytus collaris, Iguana

Parietal Ontogeny iguana, and some varanids may enclose the parietal eye earlier in life. Also, buttressing by bone around the foramen and eye may form a small cone which is more prominent in large and presumably older individuals. The morphology of parietal foramina shows many similarities in form between living reptiles and fossil vertebrates. In fossils, cranial impressions and parietal foramina indicate that pineal structures existed in many early vertebrates. A pineal groove may be Observed on the ventral surface of the cranial vault in well preserved skulls, particularly those skulls of forms with parietal eyes (Roth’s observations; Camp 1942). Arthrodires, ostracoderms, amphibians, and primitive reptiles all possessed parietal foramina; they may have been paired in Devonian fishes (Edinger 1956). In a number of primitive reptiles the parietal foramen was much larger in relation to the size of the brain than in any extant form (Edinger 1955). The structure of the parietal foramen in fossil forms such as mammal-like reptiles varies from a simple opening in advances theriodonts to an elaborate bony ramification approaching a cone in the dicynodont Aulacocephalodon. The significance of this buttressing is uncertain. It may have served to protect the parietal eye or it may have functioned to enhance the exposure of the eye. At any rate, it is certain that this buttressing raised the parietal eye above the plane of the parietal table.

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More on E0, E1 & E2 EPIPHYSEAL (E-0, E-1 & E-2 brains) In this chapter I intend to examine closely some of the issues met in the MVT outline, in particular the origin and development of the pineal eye in primitive species; the circumstances of its simultaneous disappearance across a range of species during the time of the first warm-blooded dinosaurs; and the relationship between the origins of lateral vision and the disappearance of the pineal eye. A large part of this chapter will concern reports on experiments on the pineal eye of living vertebrates. All vertebrates, surviving and extinct, respond to their environments according to the perception and integration of stimuli by sensory organs. The pineal body and median eye, together referred to as the epiphyseal complex, functions as an environmental sensor, and its importance as an evolutionary adaptation is demonstrated by its continued existence, in all or part, in both modern and fossil vertebrates. <(a) p. 189> The median eye owes its name to its midline location between two parietal bones. A foramen in the skull leads from the eye to the pineal gland (epiphysis cerebri), which in turn is connected to the habenula in the diencephalon. <(b) p. 90> The existence of the parietal foramen in fossils indicates the presence of the median eye, whilst the pineal body is indicated by the sculpturing of the intracranial roof. The presence of both eye and body is described as an E-2 condition, their absence as an E-O condition, and a pineal body (in living species) or an intracranial impression only in fossils represents an E-1 condition. <(a) p. 189> The E-1 condition is found in most modern bony fish, birds, mammals (including all primates), and in lizards living near the equator (primarily geckos).

More on E0, E1 & E2 The Morphology of the Parietal-Pineal Complex This subject in detail is not as clear and straightforward a division between the convenient E-0, E-1 and E-2 categories as I have suggested hitherto. On one level, the brain can be seen as the site of integration for behavioral and physiological functions in animals. Particular structures in the brain exhibit relative hypertrophy depending on requirements of individual adaptations (e.g. large optic lobes are necessary in flying vertebrates). The CNS structures of subavian vertebrates are arranged more linearly than in birds and mammals. The epiphyseal structure in subavian vertebrates forms as an evagination from the roof of the diencephalon, “usually with a superficial exposure above the level of the cerebrum and cerebellum” whereas in the pineal gland in primates is a deep brain structure as a result of neocortical expansion. There is a tendency to take the primate pineal as being the morphological norm, which is unfortunate since in fact it is highly untypical amongst E-1 vertebrate groups. <(a) p.194>

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Morphology of the Pineal Eye Morphology of the Parietal Eye The third or parietal eye varies in complexity from a simple saclike vesicle to a structure with all the components of lateral eyes except an iris sphincter and orbital musculature. The well developed parietal eye (as in Sphenodon and certain lacertilians) contains a lens, a retina with rods and cones, a fluid-filled space corresponding to the humors of the lateral eyes, and a nerve that transmits impulses to the brain (Eakin 1973; Engbertson and Lent 1976). The skin immediately overlying the parietal eye is clear and devoid of pigment, thus resembling a cornea. In some individuals of the genus Sceloporus, the parietal eye has failed to become extracranial and the skin over the entire cranium is uniformly pigmented (Stebbins and Eakin 1958; Roth and Roth, unpublished). The parietal eye is derived embryologically from a dorsal evagination of the diencephalic roof of the brain, or as a bud from the tip of the pineal primordium (Eakin 1973). Controversy exists over the origins of the pineal and Parietal anlagen. The general conclusion based on findings of Eakin (1964) is that the origin of the parietal eye is species dependent, arising in many reptiles from a separate anterior diencephalic diverticulum (Gladstone and Wakeley 1940), by constriction from the pineal anlage (SceloPorus, Eakin 1964), or from a bilaterally paired diverticulum that may or may not fuse (the left usually giving rise to the parietal eye, Dendy 1911). RECENT EXPERIMENTS ON THE PINEAL EYES OF VERTEBRATES (REFS: The pineal complex, aggressive behaviour and thermoregulation in Curly-tailed Lizards, Leicophelus carinatus, JA Phillips & KA Howes, Physiology and Behaviour, 1988, vol 42 pp.103-108;

Morphology of the Pineal Eye Ayssmetric distribution of melatonin receptors in the brain of the lizard, Anolis carolinensis, AF Weichmann & CR WirsigWiechmann, Brain Research, 1992, 593 pp.281-286; The role of the pineal in the regulation of some aspects of circadian rhythmicity in the Catfish, Heteropneustes fossilis, SK Garg & BI Sundararaj (Dept. Zoo, Uni Delhi), Chronobiologia, 1986 v.13 (1) pp.1-11; Antagonistic chromatic mechanisms in photreceptors of the parietal eye of lizards, Eduardo Solessio & Gustav A Engbretson, Nature, 29 July 1993, v.364, pp.442-445; The Pineal Complex, The Biology of the Lampreys, JMP Eddy, 1972 Academic Press pp.91-103; Third eye leads a lizard home, B EllisQuinn & CA Simon, Nat. Geogr. OCt 1993; Absence of cooperative haemoglobin-oxygen binding in Sphaenodon, a retilian relic from the Triassic, RMG Wells, V Tetens, T Brittain, Nature, 1 Dec 1983, pp.500-502.

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The Real-Time Hypothesis Globus’ REAL-TIME HYPOTHESIS REM is most often associated with the phase of vivid dreaming during mammalian sleep, but a strong argument is put forward by Globus (in his real-time hypothesis), which in brief is that REM occurs throughout both waking and sleeping cycles, but is harder to detect during the day. Daytime REM in humans is associated with periods of day-dreaming, disassociated imagination. It is indisputable that human embryos and new-born infants spend a very high proportion of their life in REM, up to 24-hours a day during a particular embryonic stage according to some researchers. Globus extended Kleitman’s original REM studies by offering radical “Real-time” hypothesis (1966) that “the neurophysiological process which underlies the D-state recurs on a cyclic basis in realtime throughout the 24 hour day irrespective of whether the subject is asleep.” <(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M. Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, pp.314-5, p.657> REM or “D” brain state might be best recognized when the subject was asleep, but present when awake. He mentions daydreams, psychotic phenomena, and ego-weakness as possible waking manifestations of this state. This idea was challenged by Berger (1969), “although the argument was more semantical than experimental.” There is much more detailed work to explore in this area including an important modification to “real-time” (Schulz, Dirlich & Zulley, 1975, 1976), Globus discussion of STAGE REM and BRAC (basic rest-activity cycle) Globus 1970a, and Kripke discussion of latest data on this whole topic.<(j)Rhythmic Aspects of behaviour, Ed. F.M.

The Real-Time Hypothesis Brown & R.C. Graeber, 1982, Ultradian Rhythms in behaviour and physiology, Daniel Kripke, p.318-343>

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Synaesthesia SYNAESTHESIA & THE BINDING MECHANISM It does seem to be the case, as Alan Watts points out, that all of the five senses are differing forms of the same fundamental ‘sense’. Visual sensations are simply light waves being touched by a highly sensitive and specialist part of the body (the retina). Hearing is the mechanical touch or feel of vibrating air by sensitive skin inside the ears. Smell is the result of sensitive olfactory hairs being able to feel minute particles in the air and taste is a similar ‘touching’ carried out by sensitive skin on the tongue. What I propose is that reflective ‘thinking’ is a sense which operates similarly to the others except that it deals with abstract rather than physical materials. When things strike us as being rational, we say that they make sense. We see reasons for things and feel things to be true. Also, when we concentrate on something it is as if we focus our mind as if we were looking hard at an idea, or introspecting. This is all indicative of an abstract sensory facility which underlies our mental perceptions and the whole of experience. SYNAESTHESIA New insight has also recently been gained concerning multimodal sensory experiences or synaesthesia. A sensation from the world, such as sound, may manifest itself in perception as a colour, or perhaps a smell might present itself to consciousness as a musical note. The geneticist Francis Galton wrote about people who associated colours with certain sounds over one hundred years ago, and several composers, such as Liszt and Scriabin, were said to have seen colour with certain musical notes. Until recently, modern psychology has not taken the phenomenon too seriously because of lack of scien-

Synaesthesia tific evidence. The recent case of 82 year old Elizabeth Pulford, an artist from Wales, has convinced researchers at the Institute of Psychiatry in London that synaesthesia was a genuine psychological condition by her prowess in being able to paint or describe in colours the words she saw (The Independent, 31 May 1993). Simon Baron-Cohen and his team at the Institute have tested several 100 synaesthists, mainly women, since 1987, and subjected six to brain scans at the Medical Research Council's Cyclotron unit. These six were compared to six others without the condition, and it was found that the regions of the brain normally used in visual perception became active in all six synaesthesia women, but remained inactive in the others, upon presentation of the same verbal stimuli.

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Hypnosis Whilst mentioning day dreams (as being phenomenally closer to the folk-psychological wish-fulfilment model than either REM or NREM mentation), Flanagan does not explore the parallels between dreaming and hypnotic phenomena, but there are worthwhile comparisons to be made. Hypnosis seems to work by subjugating all conscious attention and focusing attention solely on the voice of the hypnotist. For example, light hypnotic trance is physiologically (EEG) similar to day-dreaming, whereas deep hypnotic trance produces levels of metabolism very similar to those exhibited during sleepwalking.168 Why I feel the evidence from hypnotic experiments is strong is because the subjects can report their experiences at the time, and also in the case of hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion, the impact of instructions given by the hypnotist is clearly demonstrable (even if the p-state of the subject isn’t). Dualism, in the modern era (contrasted with the ancient Greek concept of two minds - ηετερωξ αυτϖξ - literally the other self) can be traced to Anton Mesmer, who in the 1730’s demonstrated a behaviour pattern using hypnosis which was clearly different from that of the same individual in their waking state169. Freud’s theory was pure dualism,170 and more recently Sperry’s work seems to lend weight to Wigan’s (1844)

168 Ullyett et al, Quantitative EEG analysis during hypnosis, 1974, in D.L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994 169David L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.20 170David L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.24

Hypnosis 171 notion that the two hemispheres can act as two separate brains, one subordinate to the other, and both capable of acting independently of each other. One of the effects of Sperry’s Nobel Prize-winning work on hemispheric lateralisation was that it had an important impact on the way hypnosis was conceptualised. Akin to dreams, the history of hypnosis has been one of many observations of phenomena, with little agreement on theory since the time of Mesmer’s animal magnetism. From Sperry’s experiments, trance and dream-like states could clearly be associated with the drive-driven non-verbal right-brain mentation, while logical and verbal left-brain thinking is ‘simply’ normal waking consciousness. An important corollary to this is that clinical hypnotists had previously generally accepted the law of dominant effect, that when the will (Sperry’s left-brain) and imagination (Sperry’s right-brain) are in conflict, the imagination (right-brain) will dominate. Bicameral theory therefore interprets manifest and latent content in dreams in terms of left and right hemispheres.172

171 The Duality of Mind, Dr A.L. Wigan, 1844, cited in Pedersen, p.22 172 D. M. Ewin, Foreword, in D.L. Pedersen, Cameral Analysis, Routledge, London, 1994, p.xi

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MVT and Machine Consciousness MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS OUTLINE I am keen to find some practical applications for MVT, and the field of AI & Machine Consciousness is an obvious area to explore. The following introduction is not at all exhaustive, and I hope to consider the work of Aaron Sloman, Marvin Minsky and others. At this stage I have only jotted down possible conceptual linkages between MVT, natural systems and ‘intelligence machines’ “Unfortunately, the physical structure and mechanisms of operation in the brain are so unlike those of any piece of machinery made by man that analogies are usually weak.” (Mechanics of Mind, Blakemore 1976, pl05) Psychologists in particular have always liked to use an analogy between the human “mind” and the latest whiz-bang piece of technology if they seem to exhibit any least kind of similar properties. During the 1920’s and 1930’s the current vogue was to create models of brain function in terms of a Telephone exchange or switch-board. Incoming calls were supposedly sent around the brain via a series of relays and switches, resulting from which the correct output channels were selected either by a homunculus operator or by some automatic device. Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s the fashion was to use analogies with Turing’s theoretical computer, and von Neumann’s functioning implementations. The attraction of using the von Neumann model was largely because the method of constructing task-lists or programs was based on the way people (by internal dialogue) would normally try to solve the problem, eliciting and representing the operations with a flowchart or by critical path analysis. Artificial Intelligence (AI) languages such as PROLOG were virtually identical with predi-

MVT and Machine Consciousness cate logic, which in turn had arisen or been formulated as a system of representation because it revealed something of the nature and ordering of the logos (mind). Serial computer software therefore had something in common with human thought processes. But the architecture of the hardware and the way that such computers worked had absolutely nothing in common with the brain. No specialized banks of memory cells, or equivalent to the central processor is to be found in the brain. Rosenblatt’s perceptron architecture was modeled closely on brain neurons (a perceptron, in silicon, represented a single neuron complete with synapses) with multiple arrays of perceptrons operating similarly although on a vastly reduced scale to actual neuronal local circuits. As massively parallel processing finally started to achieve success in the 1980’s the usual bandwagon of psychologists (swiftly followed by philosophers) adopted connectionism as a new paradigm to explain all mental life. Naturally there are many similarities between neural networks and brains, since the former are computer implementations based on (aspects of) the latter. However a divergence occurred within the neural computing community, with those interested in making the networks work more efficiently at solving real-world problems veering off towards an approach based less on the biology of the brain, and being more concerned with theoretical physics and analogies with “spin glasses” rather than synapses. Those whose primary interest is in modeling and studying the brain have largely ignored new non-biological designs of the engineers and mathematicians. The strong analogy between neural computers and brains does not work for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly the brain neurons are alive. The former are designed systems whilst the latter have evolved biologically. Whereas brain neurons have to establish their initial connections (by ontogeny) designed circuits have a predetermined pattern. Brain neurons have life-support needs (excretion, immune reactions, etceteras) whilst silicon neurons are only concerned with their mathematical function. Living material is, I suggest, capable of experiencing events in a way that inert (non-organic) matter can not. 290

The Primal Eye To bring the discussion back towards the notion of the “gap," I wish to mention the property of graceful degradation, which is shared by both silicon and organic neural network systems, but is not exhibited by traditional computers. This property allows processing to carry on and an answer be arrived at: even when part of the circuitry is malfunctioning or missing altogether. The output will not be quite as reliable or precise, but it will be the best approximation possible given the capability of the remaining working units. If a traditional expert-system Prolog-type program is missing just one line of code, or has a coma out of place, the whole structure might either crash or give an incorrect answer. Neural processing relies on the underlying models of probability and statistical mechanics, and will perforce give an output, based on best weightings of probability. Human brain cells are continually dying, and it just would not do if access to a whole range of response was impaired because one critical neuron had misfired. A network can “ignore” a gap in its circuitry, since all the parallel units are effectively identically, and memory and processing are distributed throughout the net. There will usually be an alternative route to the correct answer given a wide enough bandwidth. Another important property of networks is that of generalisation, and the related ability to interpolate. A net can cope with novel inputs which it has never come across before -- by matching them with the most approximate model that it does recognize from experience. A von Neumann machine cannot identify inputs that are outside its database or specific programming. A net does have parameters within which range it can interpolate, meaning it can accept novel inputs that are outside its experience but within its tolerance. Humans can extrapolate, and make imaginative leaps that are outside any range of parameters, since human limits and mental parameters (goals, objectives' etceteras) are internally adjustable and not set by an external operator. It is true that silicon nets can switch between modes or levels of operation using only ‘connectionist glue’ (intermediate groups of neurons) and can make novel recombination’s of output that might appear to be “imaginative”, but this is not the same 291

MVT and Machine Consciousness thing as claiming that they can imagine, and express (output) more or less any statement or activity. John Searle in The Rediscovery of Mind (ref.B) makes a strong assault on widely held “computational” comparisons that claim, for instance, the mind is to the brain what a program is to a computer; and in so doing, he attacks the underlying materialist assumption that somehow mental phenomena can be described entirely in engineering, non-mental terms. One strand of Searle’s concern is phrased within context of the theory of meaning and the “intentionality” of mental states. Several researchers into ‘emergent properties of complex systems’ believe ‘complexity’ of itself to have some rather magical role in the formation of consciousness. Terence Sejnowski, and some of the neural net scientists working at Sante Fe Institute, seem to adopt this view, which perhaps stems from mathematical chaos theory when, after a certain threshold is reached, systems become ‘unstable’ in the sense that they are impossible to predict. Another reason why ‘complexity’ has come into vogue might also be that current neural nets have an order of connections that are of a magnitude less than the huge number of synaptic connections known to exist in the human brain. Theorists who are keen to equate brains with PDP machines postulate that although current massively parallel processors do not exhibit consciousness; perhaps they would if only they had as many billions of connections as exist in brains. It is not a matter of difference of type that denies consciousness to neural nets, but is simply a case of the desired complexity not yet having been reached. By extension of their argument, its fallacy can be seen. A Pentium (586) computer, according to the complexity argument, is more ‘conscious’ than a humble 286 computer. If it is not at present fully conscious, then, it is claimed, eventually it might become so, perhaps with the arrival of a new 2086 or maybe the 3086 processor. An interesting question is whether it is a matter of ‘having more or fewer amounts of consciousness,' or just of ‘having it, or not having it’?

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The Primal Eye Rather perversely, I tend towards that view that, where consciousness is concerned, less means more! The absence of the physical sense organ frees that part of the whole body (neuronal) matrix to be filled by a phantom representation of the sense organ. Removing a part from the material world adds, rather than lessens the overall capability of the system. ‘Intelligence’ seems to indicate a different property from ‘selfawareness’ or ‘abstract volition,' which are necessarily at a remove from the external environment. Karl Lashley in “persistent problems in the evolution of mind,” 1949, neatly sidesteps the whole issue, when discussing relative intelligence across different species, by using the term “behavioural capacity” rather than “mind” or “intelligence”. This virtue of being able to side-step tricky definitional problems yet still being able to usefully discuss issues including the origins of intelligence was, I would contend, the single most important ‘utility’ that led to a widespread adoption of the ‘behaviourist’ paradigm. Eventually the metaconceptual defects in behaviourism became a drawback that outweighed the utility of a streamlined method of description. To continue with the computational analogy, I would suggest that “less is more” also holds true. For example, a mainframe that fills a room might be exactly computationally equivalent to a small desk-top computer. In one sense the two machines are equally ‘intelligent,' but in other sense we might consider the smaller machine to be ‘smarter’ since it does the same operations requiring less circuitry and using less power. Let me stretch this analogy still further by postulating that computer design becomes yet more advanced, and using ingenious software the computer holds full information about its design, circuitry and operation. This machine might then be able to bypass some of its circuitry and continue to function in exactly the same way. In the case of mathematical proofs, it is the case that the shorter proof is more efficient, therefore “better” than a different proof that takes longer or requires more terms for expression. In the mammalian brain, before and immediately after birth the human or other mammal continues to generate more neural and synap293

MVT and Machine Consciousness tic connection. As the creature learns and moderates its behaviour in response to demands of its survival situation in the environment, Donald Hebb and others have shown that these neuronal connections are pruned back, only those that are reinforced by use and activity become strengthened, whilst connections that are not useful are not retained. he borderline between genius and madness in humans is quite fine, probably because the genius has successfully pared synaptic circuitry to its minimum level to fully function .... less being more since fewer pathways give more direct communication ... whilst the brain that trims away slightly too may connections and loses useful circuits experiences mental malfunction. To conclude this computational diversion, and returning to our intelligent machine that has learnt to bypass parts of its own circuitry; I wish to consider the possible case in which the computer could lose its dependency on the material processor unit almost completely, and, whilst retaining its power source and slave circuits, manages to become pure ‘information’. The machine can carry out its functions as before, but with its CPU or with a vision co-processor completely removed. I would speculate that, at this advanced and as yet unrealised stage in computer design, when a crucial component can be ‘dispensed with’ in the sense that its physical presence is not needed, and the key component has become a disembodied or ‘phantom’ component, then it might be true to claim that the machine has a capacity for ‘consciousness.' Naturally this would not be an organic form of consciousness of the type that we and other animals enjoy, and the computer would have an entirely alien ancestral legacy and intentional range of properties to our own. In principle though I do not see why a silicon-based structure should not experience ‘itself’ as a conscious event.

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MVT and Animals other than Humans MEDIAN VISION THEORY AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANIMAL AND HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS When shown a table of vertebrate radiation, or an evolutionary chart, and asked to indicate at what point “consciousness” first occurred, some scientists draw the line at man, some with just primates and dolphins, some with all mammals, and fewer with all warmblooded creatures, or with alit species after fish. Some people would like to use “purposefulness” as an indication of intelligence, but some plants seem to show purposeful behaviour, and most people (Prince Charles excepted) do not wish to attribute consciousness to plants. Certain animist religions however believe that everything in the world is ‘conscious’, including inanimate objects such as stones and rocks. At the other extreme, some Behaviourists wish to deny consciousness and mental experience as even occurring in humans. Several Greek philosophers seem to support the notion that animals are conscious. A careful reading of Plato’s Republic reveals that his ideal world would be vegetarian. In Europe, the dominance of Christianity swept away residual sympathy for consciousness in animals, although Pierre Gassendi, early in the seventeenth century, revived the ideas of the Greek atomists and Lucretius. He announced to the College de France that animals have a memory and that they can reason. He claimed that not only could they reason, but possessed other psychological characteristics in common with man, and therefore, they must also have a soul. A lively debate developed concerning the soul of animals, but the outcome was not a humanising of animals, but an animalisation of

MVT and Animals other than Humans man. Guillame Lamy, the disciple of Gassendi, wrote: “I use the words soul and animal spirits without differentiation. There should be no confusion because they are the same thing” (Neuronal Man, JeanPierre Changeux, Pantheon 1985, p.13). Goal-seeking behaviour is a function of all organisms, including bacteria and plants. The evolution of mobile, multicellular organisms necessitated the development of rapid means of communication between different body regions - the nervous system. Brains, together with a major system of neurons running the length of the organism, first appeared with the advent of bi-directionality with a defined head and tail end. As long ago as the ancient Greek thinkers, Herophilus and Eristratus, it was emphasized that the greater development of the cerebral hemispheres constitutes the major difference between man and various animal species. Although many ‘human supremacists” make great play of “corticalisation”, this is not restricted to primates, and certainly not to man. The neocortex has existed since the beginning of evolution of mammals and proportionately there is at least as spectacular a divergence from platypus to the shrew as from chimpanzee to man. In modern times, not a single transmitter, receptor or ion channel has been found that is specific to mankind. Karl von Baer in 1828, and later Ernst Haeckel, drew attention to the striking similarities between first foetal stages of humans and species as remote as the tortoise. The major differences appear only in the final stages of development. This led to the hypothesis hat, since the initial stages were in common and persisted for so long, that there was a “recapitulation” of the evolution of the species during embryonic development. Thus a mammalian embryo would pass through “fish” and “reptile” stages (see Evolution section). The major problem when trying to show that seeming intentional actions in animals involve ‘cognition’ or mental representations is that we cannot ask them. The lack of human language, or as some would argue, and type of capacity for language, is the major reason that many academics deny conscious properties to animals.

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The Primal Eye Professors Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney have been engaged in research involving monkeys and apes in Botswana and elsewhere. Their results are detailed in “How Monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species”, University of Chicago Press 1990, “Truth and deception in animal communication” in Cognitive Ethnology: The minds of other animals, edited by C.A. Ristau, Lawrence Erlbaum 1991, and “Meaning and mind in monkeys”, Scientific American, Dec 1992. An important conclusion that they reach is that non-human primates, such as vervet monkeys, do seem to communicate in ways that resemble aspects of human speech. What their studies do not show however is firm evidence that the monkeys are able to recognize mental states in others. However, such negative results do not permit us to distinguish between an inability to “attribute a state of mind to others and a failure to make use of such an ability. It is certainly possible that monkeys do recognize the difference between their own knowledge and that of others, but this awareness has no behavioural effect.” Sci Am, Dec 1992 p.83. Other research on chimpanzees suggests that these apes, unlike monkeys, may possess a rudimentary theory of mind. Premack and Guy Woodruff’s 1978 experiments showed videotapes to a chimp named Sarah of trainers trying to solve a variety of problems. After each videotape the researchers gave Sarah several photographs, one of which depicted the solution to the problem. She consistently choose the correct photograph, and Premack and Woodruff interpreted this as evidence that she recognized the videotapes as representing a problem and inferred purpose to the human trainers. Interestingly, when tested with videotapes of a favourite and a less favoured trainer, Sarah choose correct solutions for the favourite trainer but incorrect ones for the other trainer. More recent results from Daniel Povinelli, now at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, obtained comparable results in experiments requiring chimps to distinguish between a knowledgeable and an ignorant human condition. Some fascinating work by Stephen Gould concerns cases in the animal world that are seeming exceptions to the norms of recapitula297

MVT and Animals other than Humans tion; when evolution seems to go in the opposite direction. The evolution of the skull and the face in higher primates and humans seems to be one of these exceptions. The head of a young child and a young chimpanzee seem to be similar, yet the adult human face and skull retains this similarity to a young chimp, whilst the adult chimp goes on to develop simian features as it grows older. Several questions are raised by this. Has the chimp undergone a final addition of a monkeylike face to its more humanlike common ancestor? Does the chimp descend from man? Or, on the contrary, has there been a final deletion in the human, leading to the persistence of fetal features for some evolutionary reason? Fossil evidence from man’s direct ancestor such as Australopithecus or Homo habilis suggests that the adult simian features gradually disappeared. Man is “neotenic” in that he resembles a fetal chimpanzee suddenly become adult. A reason postulated for this is that the cranial capacity of the chimp increases by about 60 percent after birth, whilst in humans it can increase fourfold. However, some further interesting factors are involved. Gestures and expressions of young chimps are astonishingly similar to those in the human infant. The chimp manifests the same six stages of sensori-motor development described by Jean Piaget in children. However, chimps do not progress in their play with construction objects of different shapes and colours any further than a comparable child of two to four years, whilst humans continue to elaborate patterns of reasoning, initially concrete, and then progressively more and more abstract and universal. Young chimpanzees are naturally compliant and “law abiding”, and their behaviour is easily moderated by the interventions of their elders. One suggestion is that human adults never reach true simian mental adulthood, and that our behaviour, as well as the structure of our skull, is comparable to that of immature chimps. A more frightening theory is that, although intra-species battles between present-day monkeys such as baboons, are usually inoffensive play, it might have been that Australopithecus and the first Homo deliberately misdirected aggressiveness from their limbic systems 298

The Primal Eye towards their fellows when they realised they could kill them. Those able to outwit the strategies of their enemies had the greater chance of survival, and the “genetic evolution of the human brain may be a consequence of the ability to murder one’s fellows.” (Neuronal Man, Changeaux, p.271) Whereas a good case can be made that human ‘linguistic consciousness’ is more advanced than other species, it is also the case that we deceive ourselves if we think that our visual perceptual world is complete. A rabbit can see movement as slow as that of the sun across the sky, and some animals can detect the plane of polarisation of light or the direction of a magnetic field (Mechanics of Mind, Colin Blakemore, CUP BBC Reith Lectures 1976, p.90). Several physiological indicators have been used in the absence of self reports. For example, REM or Paradoxical Sleep, which is accompanied by dreaming in humans, is exhibited by other mammals, to a certain extent in birds, but not in reptiles. One advantage of Median Vision Theory is that it gives a fairly clear delineation of the emergence of consciousness in evolution. To be more precise, it describes the origin of the type of mental mechanisms that we possess, and probably share in common with other animals whose ancestors once had a pineal sense-organ which has now longsince disappeared. Certain species that come from a subterranean ancestry that have no pineal apparatus, and insects and many invertebrates, have had a separate evolutionary course from our own, and cannot (according to MVT) have ‘conscious attributes’ in the same way that we - and I would argue most vertebrate species - experience. Very early types of animal and ‘primitive’ (in evolutionary terms) walking fossils such as the Tuatara, have a physically functional pineal eye which mediates the behaviour of the animal with its environment. I describe such Q animals as having a ‘physical mind’, whereas those animals that have lost | their pineal eye r would claim have the capacity for mental representations, ‘abstracted’ from their environment. You might say that such animals have a ‘phantom’ mind and are able to internalise aspects of control over their physiological processing (such as thermoregulation in warm-blooded animals). 299

MVT and Animals other than Humans I would extend this claim to capacity for self-referential consciousness to certain fish. A commonly studied fossil fish is Chirodipterus wildungenis, whose nearest living relative is Neoceratodus, the Australian lungfish. Dipnoi are useful to study since its forebrain is rather tightly packed into the braincase, whereas more typically a fish brain might be only 10% the volume of the endocast. Stensio (1963) presents a careful reconstruction of the endocast of Chirodipterus wildungensis within an outline of its head, together with other versions of the endocast of the living Australian lungfish. “There is a remarkable similarity in the shapes of the endocranial cavities of these fish, despite the great difference in their sizes. The major difference in shape of the brain, a difference emphasizing the primitiveness of Chirodipterus, is the presence of an opening for the pineal eye in the Devonian fossil. If the brain of Chirodipterus fits tightly into its braincase, there is some suggestion of enlargement of its forebrain.” (Evolution of the brain and intelligence, pp.121-122. Harry Jerison, Academic Press, 1973). There are many demonstrations of seemingly conscious or deliberate behaviour carried out by all manner of animals. Animals constantly trick their foes in nature. For example, when a predator approaches the nest of a piping plover, the mother bird fakes a broken wing to tempt the enemy away. What is difficult to be certain of is that such behaviors are anything more than ‘instinctive’ or genetically inherited repertoires. Since there is no test that fully confirms subjective experience in our own species, how much harder it is to design an experiment that would confirm conscious events in other species. “Animal consciousness is still taboo,” asserts ethologist Donald Griffin of Harvard University’s Museum of Comparative Zoology in his 1992 book, “Animal Minds”. Griffin claims that many science journals refuse to publish papers on the possibility of animal consciousness. Researchers whose field observations imply that animals are capable of forming intent - by screaming warnings, deceiving their foes, use tools and plan their activities - are complicit by still insisting that it’s all just basic instinct. “If you are a young and insecure scientist trying to get a job or tenure, you would be ill advised to get into this. It 300

The Primal Eye is no coincidence that I did not get into it until I was not only tenured but almost retired.” Griffin claims that part of the taboo stems from a strong pressure, even today, to make a distinction between us and the rest of the animal kingdom. The position argued by Descartes - that animals were completely mechanistic and possessed no “soul”; whilst only the bodies and nervous structures in humans are mechanistic and that we alone have possession of a “soul” and rationality, looks increasingly shaky in the light of modern research. Descartes had theological and biblical considerations to weigh, but nevertheless on a personal and ethical level, he had no reservations about conducting tortuous experiments on live cats. Some scientists to this day continue their work on live animals with this attitude that animals are simply animated lumps of meat, and do not have any mental experiences of the type or quality we experience as humans. A politico-economic reason for the endurance of this unreasonable stance on animal consciousness might be that if you allow that other mammals, who have exactly the same components in their brains as humans, are ‘conscious’; then you can further argue that they have ‘rights’ as sentient beings. If animals feelings have to be respected, then the economic use of animals for food or as beasts of burden needs to be revised. Obviously this could be expensive for the human livestock farmers and consumers.

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Experimental Difficulties for MVT Experimental Difficulties for MVT Median Vision (AKA Phantom Eye) Theory provides a simple and unitary account for the origins of phenomenal consciousness and self-organizing behavioural capacity in vertebrates. Along with many competing theories in this field it has suffered from the difficulty of lack of any way of testing its claims experimentally. Events and conditions that occurred 400m years ago are not easily replicated, and fossil evidence regarding soft-tissue structures (brain tissue and pineal eyes) is relatively thin on the ground. This area of research has only expanded in very recent times, the key to modern median eye theory being Edinger’s (1955) successful rejection of the widespread scientific opinion that the fossil record could not reveal the condition of even the presence of parietal (median) eyes. MVT arises from experimental evidence from studies on the median eyes of living reptiles [see Median Vision Experiments] as well as from non-experimental observations of natural phenomena. It is an evolutionary biological theory, and therefore is open, in all or part, to verification or refutation. In common with competing views such as Jerison’s Recency Theory, there are inherent difficulties in designing experiments to test events that largely occurred millions of years ago. However, it seems indisputable that the E-2 complex of living vertebrates is derived from brain structures dating back to jawless fishes of the Ordovician. A priority of my efforts has been to identify any promising avenue of experimental research that might support or refute the main predictions and implications of MVT. In this paper I propose two such possible avenues. First of all, recent results using new types of recon-

Experimental Difficulties for MVT figurable hardware [such as the XC6200 family from Xilinx Inc., 1995] have allowed evolutionary processes to be ‘sculpted’ directly rather than ‘modelled’ or simulated. Adrian Thompson writes that “The nice thing about my circuits is that I impose no constraints on them at all just those inherent in the medium. So they don’t have to look like anything we’re used to. Maybe they’re more like the brain than models of the brain are! Or maybe not.”

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Speculations Phantom Eye Theory (or MVT) attempts to provide a unified theory of mind accounting for diverse facets of mental life, for example ‘dreaming’ and abnormal states, as well as normal waking states. The aim is not only to overcome philosophical objections that have been made against previous theories, but also to reconcile physiological observations and evidence with perceptual and personal experience, within an evolutionary narrative. I must admit to being attracted to Richard Dawkin’s notion of ‘anti-Darwinian’ evolution. The after-human possibility arises because our knowledge of natural selection allows the deliberate flouting of it. Each of us has had, and lost, a rudimentary tail and gills during our embryonic lifetime. As children we are immersed in and live out the “human” phase of our evolution: absorbing the linguistic and culturally transmitted knowledge and traditions of our human ancestors. A Post-human interpretation of the fact that, before and since birth, we have lived through previous stages of existence is that recognition of this wider pattern permits us insight into future changes not possible for previous generations. http://posthuman.org Recent advances allow a more pro-active and directed approach to personal evolution than was the case. Auto-suggestion plays a role in reinforcement of attitudinal stance and we have at least some input or ‘self determination’ in fashioning our individual personas and psychological make-up. Social conditioning and systems of cultural belief also play a part in forming our psychological matrix. So for example the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt and ‘Divine’ Monarchs of Europe in the Middle Ages and their subjects did take seriously their magnified and

Speculations deified identities, although today we tend to reject claims to supernatural status. The belief that we are “humans” is similarly just a longestablished cultural identity and the result of social conditioning reinforced by auto-suggestion. The notion of “human” had great utility when it ushered in a new era of development, but has now been around for so long that it acts as a drag on progress rather than as a spur to further advance. It is no more necessarily true that we are “humans” than it is true that the Pharaoh was a living solar deity, although both assumptions of identity go unchallenged and unremarked during their times. It might be said that the adoption of another self-label such as Post Human could become just as restraining or pre-determining as belief that one is human. Certainly there are dangers in Nietzsche’s idea of ‘super-man’, and the adoption of a neutral ‘non-label’ that states just that the next step in evolution is “after” and embodies no value judgements must be preferable. The ultimate authority on matters of personal identity seems to rest with the individual rather than with outside observers, and in this specific question of self we ‘are what we think (and are convinced) we are’. My claim to be “post human” is irrefutable, since I know my mind and identity better than any outside commentator. The longer and more strongly that I continue to make this claim, the more persuasive it becomes, both to myself and to others. The claim is subjective in essence. No doubt we continually engage in a loop with others that reinforces or modifies our thinking about ourselves, and share many subidentities that relate to activities or locations (I can be a Cornishman, a coal miner or both). That one is a coal miner by trade is fairly easy to establish. If you are normally a candle-stick maker but happen to be mining coal at a particular time, then it is true to say that you are a “coal miner” only when carrying out that exceptional activity. Your basic belief remains that you are a candle-stick maker who happens at that moment to be digging for coal.

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The Primal Eye As there were countless phases such as Neanderthal eras and so on before the advent of ‘Homo Sapiens’, naturally there will be subsequent phases of evolution. It is important to choose or guide evolutionary progress considering new and fullest knowledge, most importantly that revealed by Darwin in the previous century. Just as knowledge of circadian and season cycles finds new areas of application, slower cycles and patterns of evolution likewise can reveal clues to assist current and future choices. If there is a purpose to life, this purpose seems to have been to evolve. Long enduring habits of thought and tradition are hard to break and the transitional phase from human to whatever is to follow may take a long time. It could turn out to be no more than a useful perspective that allows us to step outside the boundaries of our past, and makes appear more pathetic and absurd the superstitious beliefs, pollution, racism, militarism, gender discrimination and disregard for other species that seems ingrained in the traditional human ethos. Sphenodon has been able to survive, in a more slowly evolving form, than any other land vertebrate (albeit aided by geological accident of isolation). If Darwinian “survival of the fittest” holds true, then Sphenodon is one of the longest-surviving and thus fittest animals on this planet. Co-operation with other species, for example it shares its burrow with a sea-bird, and with nature seems the mark of Sphenodon’s long and harmonious survival. RELIGION Depending upon whether the speaker is of religious, scientific or psychological persuasion, he might use terms such as ‘selfconsciousness’, ‘soul’, ‘ego’, ‘life-force’, ‘mental behaviour’ or even ‘spirit’ to describe more or less the same thing. However, there is considerable difference of opinion when it comes to explaining the mechanics of sentience, ranging from a pure physicalist explanation in terms of neurological processes, to theological talk of Gods and supernatural agencies. Of course to be realistic, a theory should correspond as closely as is possible to things as they are in the natural world and therefore

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Speculations must be liable to falsification if contrary scientific and empirical evidence can be found. The great weakness of Theological and most Philosophical positions are that they rely on subjective belief of one type or another, whose nature can never be proven or refuted by examining objective criterion. The disadvantage with logical positivist or pure-science approach is that it is impossible to even start to study things which have no physical direct existence, and are subjective rather than objective in essence. Neurological impulses can be detected and quantified, but the quality and nature of a person’s thoughts and perceptions cannot, and cannot therefore be said to be identical and one and the same as the measurable brainwaves. In fact it can be seen that mental events do not really have space/time locatable existence at all, and are to some extent ‘non-physical’ whilst some species of subjective experiences such as hallucinations and dreams almost are non-physical (although not non-existent) by their definition. CHAKRA Theory Further support for this view comes from the traditional Yogic system of Indian Philosophy. According to Chakra theory, the master Chakra (consciousness centre) called the Sahasrara Chakra, is identified as the sensory correlate of the pineal gland and third eye. This centre is the highest in important, is said to be located two inches above the head, and is the place where “Supreme Shiva resides”.

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Concluding Notes I realize that not every reader is conversant with academic terminology, and to make what is in essence a very straightforward theory more digestible, I have made a 53 minute documentary about The Primal Eye, which is available in DVD format (Europe PAL and USA NTSC). It includes video footage of living animals (such as the Sphaenodon) with functional pineal eyes, and has interviews with Prof. Richard Gregory, Dr Rupert Sheldrake, and a Zoo-keeper in charge of some reptiles that we filmed. Please email [email protected] for availability, or check the http://steve-nichols.com website. Comments and reviews of this book are welcome. Steve Nichols, England, October 2006.

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