THE PRIVATE SPHERE
Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture VOLUME 15 Series Editor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.,...
54 downloads
1240 Views
817KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
THE PRIVATE SPHERE
Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture VOLUME 15 Series Editor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Department of Philosophy, Rice University, and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas Associate Editor Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., Department of Philosophy and Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Assistant Editor Lisa Rasmussen, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, USA Editorial Board Stanley Hauerwas, Duke University, Durham, N.C. Maureen Kelley, University of Alabama, Birmingham Terry Pinkard, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois Griffin Trotter, Saint Louis University, Missouri
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
THE PRIVATE SPHERE An Emotional Territory And Its Agent
Mats G. Hansson Uppsala University, Sweden
Author Mats G. Hansson Uppsala University Sweden
ISBN: 978-1-4020-6651-1
e-ISBN: 978-1-4020-6652-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007938403 c
2008 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
Printed on acid-free paper. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
Foreword
The present work has emerged as the result of several years’ involvement in various multidisciplinary research projects which have been carried out within the Research Programme in Biomedical Ethics at Uppsala University, now the Centre for Bioethics at Karolinska Institutet and Uppsala University. I am grateful to various colleagues who have taken part, whether briefly or at length, in discussions of the concepts of privacy and integrity. Hearty thanks must go to Gert Helgesson, Ulrik von Essen, Pär Segerdahl and Richard Wessman who have read the initial version of the book and provided useful comments. I am particularly indebted to Pär for taking the trouble to read the whole manuscript a second time. Arne Öhman and his research group at the Psychology Section in the Department of Clinical Neurosciences at Karolinska Institutet read an earlier version of Chapters 3 and 4. This provided a constructive and rewarding discussion which was of particular value to me since psychology did not form part of my own professional training. Sven Danielsson and the members of his research seminar in practical philosophy at Uppsala University read Chapters 5 and 6 and offered constructive criticism. Their critical views helped me to try to express more clearly the aim of these chapters within the framework of the book as a whole. All the readers of the book or parts of it can certainly have reason to wish for further revisions or indeed for a different presentation of the problem of understanding the role of the agent in the private sphere. I alone am responsible for the final version with whatever residual defects it may still possess. I am also grateful to various bodies who have provided the economic support allowing me to carry out a multidisciplinary research project on questions relating to integrity. They are: Knut and Alice Wallenberg’s Foundation (the National Biobank Program within Wallenberg Consortium North and SweGene, the Swedish Council for Social Research, now the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research), the Foundation for Strategic Research, the Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Genome and Gene Technology Research (ELSA) Programme and the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems, VINNOVA).
v
vi
Foreword
Translation The manuscript has been translated by Dr. Craig McKay. Besides his language expertise I have benefitted greatly from his philosophical insights and his personal interest in questions related to privacy and integrity. I have really enjoyed our conversations this spring and I am grateful to him for the skill, time and effort he has brought to the project at this final stage. Uppsala, 3 August 2007 Mats G. Hansson
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A New Approach to Understanding the Concepts of Privacy and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Four Literary Contributions as an Introduction to Understanding the Concept of Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juhani Aho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carl-Erik af Geijerstam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sven Barthel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective . . . . . . The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory – A Psychological and Evolutionary Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integrity as Something Which is Morally Worth Protecting . . . . . . . . . Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority – Integrity from a Philosophical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . Balancing Seclusion and Participation – Integrity from the Perspective of Moral Philosophy, Jurisprudence and the Law Integrity as a Quality Worthy of Esteem and Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Relationship Between Privacy and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective . . . . . . . 1.1 In the Supposed Seclusion of the Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 What Will the Neighbours Say? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Power Over Spiritual Life and Thought – The Private Sphere from a Religious Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 To Retire with a Book – The Private Sphere from a Literary Perspective 1.5 To Participate in Drawing a Line Between What Is Public and What Is Private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory – A Psychological and Evolutionary Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Emotions Which Are Constitutive for a Person’s Private Sphere . . . . . 2.2 The Emotional Territory’s Significance in Evolutionary Development 2.3 Integrity – A Composite Property of the Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 3 3 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 13 14 15 16 22 25 29 32 33 33 38 42 vii
viii
Contents
2.4 Three Candidates: Fear, Embarrassment and Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.5 The Role of the Emotions in the Establishment of Social Order – Dominance and Submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.6 The Experience of Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 A Teleological Perspective with Regard to Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Moral Value of Protection Originating in the Individual’s Capacity for Sentient Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Moral Value of Protection from the Viewpoint of the Individual’s Capacity for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority – Integrity from a Philosophical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Individual Freedom Meaningful First in a Social Context . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Individual Freedom Exhibited at Different Social Levels . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 A New Approach to Self-Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Social Recognition: From Separation to Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Respect for Integrity as Social Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority . . . . . . 4.7 Participating with Knowledge, Insight and Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53 54 56 59 63 71 73 76 78 80 82 86 88
5 Balancing Seclusion and Participation – Integrity from the Perspective of Moral Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.1 Is the Protection of Private Life Adequately Covered by Other Rights? 94 5.2 Social Conventions Shift the Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.3 The Basic Interest in Avoiding Certain Types of Insight and Invasion 98 5.4 The Value of a Differentiated Social Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5.5 Non-interference Does Not Solve the Dilemma of Balancing Interests 101 5.6 Basis for Balancing Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 6 Legal Protection – Privacy and Integrity from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 6.1 The Declarations Set the Basic Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 6.2 The Significance of the Private Sphere for Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 6.3 The Right to Protect What Is One’s Own . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 6.4 Legislation Arrives at the Same Result but in Different Ways . . . . . . . 116 6.5 Focussing on a Careful Legal Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 6.6 The Limitations of the Consent Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 6.7 Respect for Private Life as a Complement to the Consent . . . . . . . . . . 125 7 Integrity as a Quality Worthy of Esteem and Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 7.1 The Continuity of the Concept of Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 7.2 Being True to Oneself and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Contents
ix
7.3 Integrity as Both a Personal and Social Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 7.4 In Contact with the Internal Goal of an Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 7.5 The Moral Substance Psychologically Grounded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 8 Conclusions and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 8.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 8.1.1 What Is Integrity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 8.1.2 Why Ought One to Respect an Individual’s Integrity? . . . . . . . 152 8.1.3 How Should the Interest of Integrity be Weighed Against Other Interests? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 8.2 Ethical Considerations Involved in Balancing Interests in Biobank Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 8.2.1 Biosamples Taken for Different Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 8.2.2 Genetics as Hyperbole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 8.2.3 To Be Left in Peace but at the Same Time to Participate . . . . . 158 8.2.4 To Participate in the Development of Medical Knowledge . . . 160 8.2.5 The Integrity of the Researcher and Persons in Authority . . . . 161 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Introduction
A New Approach to Understanding the Concepts of Privacy and Integrity The word privacy carries with it a positive valuation. It is frequently used, both in political and legal contexts, and it is taken for granted that it is important to respect the individual’s or family’s private spheres. It can be the case of persons who have the right to a private sphere also when they are in hospital as a patient. In one legal case, the complaint was made that the defendants had accessed computerized patient records of a well-known person without proper authority. The latter’s private sphere had been invaded, even although no direct physical or mental damage had occurred. The requirement in such a situation that a person’s privacy should be respected can be thought to be justified by the circumstance that every human being has the right to determine who is allowed to have an insight into personal matters or to have access to information relating to that person as a private individual. From a psychological viewpoint, the scope of the private sphere, which a person wishes to define in this way, will be found to vary greatly. Whereas one person may be very unwilling to provide private information, another will freely expose themselves, both physically and with regard to their inner tendencies and thoughts. Some people look upon the fact that they can be observed through a window by a stranger as invasive, whereas others accept it without difficulty as part of the price to be paid for living in a town. Many people would undoubtedly react with a feeling of distress when their home is broken into by unwelcome guests. To discover that their homes have been searched, their personal effects turned over, and items of great personal value stolen or damaged, can in certain cases have severe repercussions on those who experience such a violation. It takes a long time for people to recover from the incident. Certain other people scarcely react, apart from registering a feeling of irritation because the police and the insurance company have to be contacted. Different individuals impose different limits upon other people’s insight into their personal lives and this would seem to vary greatly, both within a particular culture and between cultures. Even within the family, members view the private sphere differently. In ethical and legal studies it is common to define privacy in terms of seclusion. The individual is taken to have a strong interest in being left in peace from outside insight and interference in what is regarded as the individual’s own personal affairs. This has been the dominant approach in theorizing both about the concept M.G. Hansson, The Private Sphere, C Springer 2008
1
2
Introduction
of privacy and in connection with discussions of a supposed right to a protected private life. The private sphere is a zone of non-interference, which is separate from others, a protected zone specially set aside for the individual or the family. The non-interference perspective is common when theorizing about the protection of the private life of individuals and their families. In my view, however, this accepted way of looking at things, leads our thoughts astray. It fails to do justice to the interest of the individual and family, both in being allowed to be left in peace but at the same time participating in a community together with other people. To be washed up on a desert island gives unlimited seclusion from others but most people would regard it, at least after some time, as a case of undesirable isolation. Individuals seek an opportunity for a private sphere, which is part of a larger social space in which they participate in various types of social relationships together with other individuals. Within the family, individuals wish people to respect that certain matters are deeply personal, but at the same time they wish to participate in the inner life of the family. So too in the case of friendship. There is a desire both for privacy and for participation. Life at work and the daily life of a neighbourhood draw further lines between the desire of the individual for privacy and the same person’s desire to participate in opportunities which community with others offers. This dual interest occurs also at a more general, overarching social level. New methods of communications interception (“bugging”, tapping of public lines etc.), video and even satellite surveillance allow insight and an entry into personal matters, but they can be also be used to satisfy people’s need for protection, safety and security in public places. Genetic research has provided insight into the individual’s genetic material in a way which was previously impossible, thereby allowing new possibilities for the diagnosis and treatment of hereditary illnesses. Individuals have an interest in non-interference but also an interest in profiting from the results, which such interference can give. A theory about respect for the individual’s right to a private sphere and its protection ought therefore to incorporate both these interests. One could, indeed, define respect for privacy as a respect for the individual’s own private space and those matters concerning the individual which can be looked upon as being private and personal in character, in keeping with the non-interference perspective. In weighing up the ethical and legal pros and cons, we have to balance this interest against other interests, namely of family, friends, colleagues, neighbours and ultimately that of society as a whole. Such an approach, however, involves what would appear to be an erroneous assumption about certain irreconcilabilities: the individual as opposed to others; private as opposed to public and so forth. In fact, the individual wishes simultaneously to enjoy a private sphere protected from insight but also to participate, both to be left in peace and to be a member of a family, a friend, colleague, neighbour and member of society. In the present work, I shall propose an alternative approach which differs from that which is currently dominant. I shall start with the assumption that the individual wishes both to enjoy privacy and equally to be able to participate. According to this way of looking at things, individuals find themselves constantly torn between these fundamental interests. They are interests, which every social organism possesses to some extent, even if individual and cultural variations can be considerable.
Four Literary Contributions as an Introduction to Understanding the Concept of Integrity
3
All social organisms have a basic interest in finding their own role in a socially complex context in terms of collaboration, tolerance or competition. In practice their private and public spheres are interwoven to form a complex, social tapestry. However, each individual wishes to exert influence on where and how the distinction is to be made between the private and the public spheres. In this book I shall suggest that an emotional territory, which forms the individual’s own sphere of action and experience, has developed in the course of evolution in pace with the changes in the individual’s conditions of life, brought about by challenges in the natural and social environment. This emotional territory allows a readiness to act along different lines and to maintain a multiplicity of different social relations. In order to capture the fundamental notion of agency involved in an individual’s efforts to expand, defend and, sometimes, give up the private sphere I shall use the term integrity. Respect for integrity focuses on the agency of an individual trying to relate the private sphere to an active participation in social and public life. My starting point is the insight that the behaviour of human beings with respect to their privacy and integrity reflects in fundamental way patterns of behaviour among social animals. Furthermore, this pattern has been established at an early point of evolutionary history. In comparison with integrity I regard privacy as a narrower concept where the emphasis is laid on the protection of the private sphere, without acknowledging the double interest of seclusion and participation. Respect for integrity, in my view, includes respect for privacy. The traditional view of privacy is expanded through an emphasis on the role of the agent in the private sphere and that agent’s strivings to be socially recognised. I will still use and discuss the concept privacy, primarily in the chapters dealing with the legal and the moral philosophical discussion of the interests related to our private spheres.
Four Literary Contributions as an Introduction to Understanding the Concept of Integrity Without laying claim to a deeper textual analysis, I would like to begin by developing the meaning of the concept of integrity by citing four literary works. In slightly different ways, they succeed in capturing important aspects of the meaning of the concept and remind us of certain central features of human life. They are intended to give a hint, both about the central importance of the concept and the rich variation, which occurs in interpreting it. Starting with two excerpts from the Finnish writer Juhani Aho followed by a poem of the Swedish poet and author Carl-Erik af Geijerstam we end with the description of an experience by the Swedish writer, Sven Barthel who is well known for his works about the Stockholm archipelago.
Juhani Aho Certainly one is still allowed, thank God, to hunt rather freely in the deserted areas of Finland. But that is not the same as to hunt in woods where I alone have the right to do so.
4
Introduction For it is precisely in this that the pleasure lies. I believe that there is in the very blood of those of us who are hunters, an inheritance from our forefathers, which made them enjoy in solitude, so to speak in secret, creeping through the forest with their dog early in the morning when everyone was still fast asleep. Moreover they were very concerned to ensure that no one else would force their way into their area. Even today, there is nothing likely to anger an old hunter so much as the bark of a strange dog or a shot from another gun. And this is not simply envy, born of the pursuit of quarry, so that he thinks: now another person has shot the game which I just as well could have bagged: I know that from my own experience. The cause is something deeper. It is the atmosphere, this feeling of solitude and secretiveness, which attracted us and which we set out to enjoy, which is destroyed. Here I go, all by myself, in the empty countryside – this is what I think when I go on my lonely wanderings in the silent forest. No one knows where I am; I am completely cut off from the rest of the world, alone with nature in all its might, in order to find out its secrets, and tease out its qualities. And my dog is nowhere to be seen – he is on the hunt after something and no sound can be heard from him – now I hear his bark. It is a queer feeling. . . But then suddenly another man’s dog rushes past me and barks; there is the report of another man’s rifle. . . . Farewell to the atmosphere. The magic is gone and I hurry home as though ashamed of something. But if I had had my own hunting grounds, this would not have happened: I would not then have needed to fear being disturbed. That is the real cause. (From Aho, Juhani, Fridlysta jaktmarker, in the collection Hafvet i lugn. Spånor V. Authorized translation from Finnish to Swedish of Ellen Snellman, published by Björck and Börjesson, Stockholm, printed in Helsingfors 1912. AB Lilius and Hertzberg, pp. 71–72).
Even those who have not had personal experience of living in the wild, recognize the need for seclusion, to be able to be on one’s own without others’ insight and knowledge. This is expressed in different ways in different times and cultures, but somewhere there is the desire to retire to one’s own world, free from others’ insight. At least, there must a possibility of doing so. In many similar scenes from Finnish Karelia, Juhani Aho has described the human search for seclusion from the rest of the world. It is not simply a question of having the resources to survive and reproduce. Whoever has learned in the course of many wanderings in the forest where the paths lead, has followed the trail to the fox’s lair, has crept in on the blackcock’s ‘lekking’ behaviour, and witnessed how the boreal owl flits swiftly between the tops of the trees at dusk, experiences a deep sense of belonging and peace. This is a feeling, which fits in well with the joy of arriving home with game from the forest. There is a feeling of presence and belonging in the solitude and seclusion. A feeling, which is destroyed when an intruder appears on the scene. The secret attraction of having a hunting territory of his own is also rooted in the hunter’s own mind and attitude. When a stranger suddenly appears, the mood is broken, and ashamed for having been exposed and having his innermost self held up to another’s close gaze, the hunter returns home as though his own inner territory has been threatened. In “Vildmarkens hämnd”, Aho describes the vulnerability of this inner territory. A skier has stopped in the middle of a mountain slope at an open spot where he can look over the forest landscape beneath, where marsh and lake, stream and sound, alternate with one another. At the foot of the mountain slope, he spies the roof of his hut between two stretches of water, gleaming in the sunlight.
Four Literary Contributions as an Introduction to Understanding the Concept of Integrity He is a hunter, the sole inhabitant of these lonely woods, which stretch as far as the eye can see from the top of this mountain. He has devoted himself to the area around these stretches of water because there was no one else who could take possession of it. No sign of a human foot has been seen since the year of the great war when some people fled westwards, while others were carried off forcibly to foreign lands. He drinks in the mild air and the fresh smells of the woods, gazing contentedly with a kindly expression from under the mop of hair, which covers his forehead. A sense of joy fills his being, a feeling that the reign of winter is coming to an end and that its iron grip has loosened. Not even this winter has brought what he had feared. Soon one will no longer be able to ski; soon the snowdrifts will begin to sink, and no hunter from the populated regions has shown up here. The unknown danger, which he had always anticipated, sensed, without knowing where it would come from, has remained far away. – May it come some time so that he could be quit of it! – But he always felt pleased about Spring when its presence had been delayed during winter. In the summertime, people would no longer be able to find their way here [. . .] The log cabin there on the bank of the rapids is now already full of animal hides, the fruit of the winter’s hunting. Tomorrow he will load them onto a sledge and putting on his skis, he would drag it to the market. There, the merchants would revel in the skins and remark that you couldn’t buy any better, not even from the king’s huntsman himself. But where they came from, was a mystery. Ahra, they would say, was not a person to speak about his business or where he lived. He always led trackers and spies on false trails, and brought his goods to market without leaving a trail behind him. . . He is just in the process of setting out when he hears a bark. The bark of an angry dog reaches him from the foot of the mountain. Alarmed he gives a start, because this is not the usual cry of a dog, neither the lively but at the same time peaceful sound when he barks at a squirrel on a tree, nor the forced and eager call of a dog in pursuit of fleeing quarry. Because now one can hear that it concerns some large animal which the dog hates and fears simultaneously, and dares not attack, because this call sounds more cautious, uncertain, but at the same time, angry. Ahra whistles to the dog whose bark has turned into a howl “A wolf!” – he guesses and skis down the steep slope. “Yes, a wolf!” he inwardly decides with still greater certainty, when the dog with his tail between his legs comes towards him halfway up the mountain slope. The gleam in the man’s eye darkens; the contented smile on his lips disappears. He bends his strongly muscled frame and his face takes on an expression of tense curiosity while he spurs himself on anew to hunt his quarry [. . .] Ahra skis on, failing to stop at the place where the dog turned in among the trees, but at the same moment he goes over the track, he suddenly notices that it is not the track of a wolf, but of skis. He immediately stops, hops down in the snow and stands a good while with the snowdrift up to his knees, stunned as if lightning had flashed before his eyes. Then he slowly gets up on his skis and approaches the alien ski track, bent and sly. Yes, these are genuine tracks of skis. They belong to someone who has come from the direction of the lake, skied up here to the wood and somewhat further on has approached the shore in the direction of Ahra’s hut. Where has this skier come from? Where is he heading? Who is he? [At this point there is a long hunt in which Ahra follows the track left by the skis of the intruder – apparently a Lapp to judge from the trail left behind – in twists and turns, over lakes and mountains. When it gets dark, the intruder gives himself away by lighting a fire on an islet in a mountain lake] Ahra took a hold of his spear, mounted his skis and glided forward towards the fire. The Lapp was sleeping close to the log fire and did not notice the approach of his ambusher. Already on the shore of the islet, Ahra had taken off his skis and now crept with hunched back ever closer.
5
6
Introduction The person asleep was a young boy in a peski edged in red. He reclined on his back at the foot of a fir tree, quiet and secure, with his hands under his head, while the light of the log fire lit up his childish, innocent features [. . .] The point of the spear poised for immediate attack, was already lowered, and Ahra took a step back so as not to be observed. Suddenly a twig snapped under his foot, the sleeping boy woke up, sat up with a quick movement and rubbed the sleep from his eyes. At the same moment, Ahra raised his spear and thrust it so violently into the boy’s chest that the weapon passed through his body and transfixed the young man to the spot where he was lying [. . .] But when Ahra wanted to withdraw his spear which had been thrust deep into the earth, he began to feel a quiver run first through his body, then his hands, and then in the spear itself and the victim’s body, a fit of shivering which was so violent and uncontrollable as though it wished to strip the clothes from his body. He was unable to tear free his hands from the shaft of the spear; the more he tried, the more violently they shook, and he felt himself shaken ever more wildly, as if bewitched [. . .] Ahra skied home without ski sticks following his previous track. But not even in his home was he released from the curse of the dead. Whatever weapon or tool he took up, be it spear, ski stick, bow, axe, steering-oar or trident, he was gripped by the selfsame terrible shaking. Thus he was forced to leave the wilderness, so dear to him, and go to places where people lived. He was compelled to abandon his hut and his shed, which raised itself on piles close to the rapids; to leave the game, the forest and glades and all his store of materials, that paradise he had owned, to someone who, once upon a time, had chanced to find his way there in order to build a dwelling and take hold of everything. When Ahra came to new pastures, strangers put a pick and spade in the hands of this former free and daring hunter from the wilds. These tools stayed firmly in his hands; no shaking loosened them from him. The thoughts, which came and went in Ahra’s mind, were neither great nor deep. But it was clear to him that if he had not attacked Tapio’s son, he would not now be striking a pick into the stony earth. The wilderness had wreaked vengeance for its son and driven out the one who had broken its peace. (From Aho, Juhani, Vildmarkens hämnd, in the collection Spånor, Fourth Collection, Published by Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, printed in Tavstehus by AB Hämäläinens Press 1899, 212–234).
Ahro’s peace of mind was shattered, not through the intrusion which the stranger was guilty of, but through his own incapacity to protect seclusion as part of a greater participation. The protected place, the hut and store remained there, and the terrible deed would probably never have been discovered in these inaccessible places, but Ahra’s security and freedom were banished forever due to his fear and shame.
Carl-Erik af Geijerstam Being Observed I have been given binoculars as a present and from my window I can point them at the trees in the cemetery. You come in close to the naked tops of the trees and almost immediately I catch sight of the body of a bird which is sitting completely still and peaceful, pressed up against the trunk of a tree. It is a woodpecker with its beautiful white-red-black plumage. I would never have been able to see it with my naked eye and now
Four Literary Contributions as an Introduction to Understanding the Concept of Integrity
7
I can follow the smallest movement it makes. It is new and sensational, but simultaneously somehow indecent with this peering, these bulging eyes which peek among the secrets of the tree. What right have I to expose this bird to the close scrutiny of my gaze and my groping curiosity about its feathered dress? Not a turn of the head, or adjustment of its body escapes me. Should not all creatures, as something self-evident, have a special area where they can be left in peace from such all-seeing eyes? A place where they can disappear, vanish away to quiet non-existence. (From Geijerstam, Carl-Erik af, Strimmor av vanlighet, Författarförlaget, Uddevalla 1985, p. 51).
Perhaps animals, or at least those which have more socially complex patterns of life, have social needs for territory of their own, but these lines of Geijerstam underline the common experience of the search for anonymity and quietness, of finding a balance between seclusion and participation in social intercourse. To be left in peace from such all-seeing eyes and still be a participant in social life. It is a difficult balancing act, not least because human curiosity would seem to be as least as strong as people’s need to protect their integrity. Probably curiosity too has an evolutionary origin, in the sense that it is thus individuals learn new tricks and insights in the art of survival, not to mention also learning of others’ capers and mistakes.
Sven Barthel . . . Bugleweed is the Spring night’s word. Blueness is alive tonight, inhumanly alive but felt from the skin to the very core of one’s being. Thrusting ever closer and ever more vertiginously deep. A grape-blue satiation and a raw, bottomless suck. Something happens behind my head, which forces me to look there. It is the moon in the East, behind the pines, wet with gold, remorselessly climbing. A disquiet runs through my nerves, the agony of helplessness. The rock I am standing on, the forest, the water, give no support. Earth’s gravitational pull has loosened its grip. I am losing my centre of gravity. The blue night has taken its prey. I still have the door to shut behind me, the blind to pull down, to seek sleep. A light sleep, a nerve-torn numbness which slowly deepens towards morning, sinks into a stream of unattainably fleeing dreams dissolving one’s identity. A drowsiness, which is heavy to lift oneself out of. And when I am awake much later in the morning and pull up the blind, there is a trace of rain on the window. When I step out on the hillside, it hits me. It is not a rain, which is a substitute for snow; it is the first rain of the summer season. A soft, gentle spray, at the moment abating and disappearing with showers that are thinning out. The last drops glitter in the sun, which has broken through. A starling is sitting in the tall poplar. Gleaming like metal, it tramps, shakes its wings, makes a clicking sound and pipes in a harsh discordant voice, with a sudden transition into mature rejoicing. Down on the jetty, on the furthest pile of the bridge, there sits a male wagtail. He says nothing, simply peeps. And then he launches himself, weaving through the air to the stony shore, where new seaweed is lying, already spread out, shimmering. I see it with exaggerated clearness; I see the hazel blossom gleaming in gold at the edge of the wood. I take some steps and see the colt’s foot, which was still closed yesterday, shining at the edge of the ditch. I see – at least I believe that it is I who see. I scarcely know.
8
Introduction I stand here helplessly surprised by my senses, dizzy, upset, deprived of my integrity. Irresistibly opened by the breath of Spring, by the softness of the air and the gleam of the sea, of the pungent smell of the earth delivered from the frost. The vapours of the earth are released like some primal discharge. It surges inside me, seasoning my blood, rank and acid and sweet, caressingly raw, ruttish. I move about in the countryside and I am still a human being, still conscious, but my consciousness is powerless. I am seduced and I know it: now the only to do is to comply, in sweet despair. (From Barthel, Sven, Skärgård, 1952. Printed in Strandhugg by Sven Barthel with illustrations/photographs of Roland Svensson, Bokförlaget Max Ström, Stockholm 2000, pp. 47–48).
Barthel’s text is the most politically explosive of the texts I have chosen. It certainly recalls the human search for a greater unity and balance in the context of nature, which we find described in research into views of life. We do not need to be sailors or lovers of the archipelago to recognize the emotional reaction. The Norwegian ecosophical movement of the 1970s, represented by thinkers such as Arne Naess, speak in similar tones (Naess 1974). The insight about the need in certain situations to surrender our privacy reminds us also of Hegel’s political philosophy and his concept of Aufhebung. By the sublation of the contrary relationship between themselves and the Other, individuals are able to achieve social recognition and respect. Integrity has two aspects. The desire for seclusion, but also the need to surrender our protected zone – our private sphere – in order to participate in something greater. It is only when we as individuals can sublate the contrary relationship between ourselves and the Other that we ourselves can become part of a larger community.
The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective Let me now briefly sketch the various chapters of the book. The view that the individual has a dual desire both to be left alone in peace and simultaneously to participate emerges clearly in the historical account presented in Chapter 1 of the views of private life which were held at different times and places and in various cultures. The picture of the private and the public is presented as a complex social web. The attempts by human beings to create a sphere of their own, has taken place simultaneously with the search for participation in a larger social context. The search for seclusion has gone hand in hand with the struggle for social recognition in a more or less socially complex world. Individuals wish to protect their freedom, but it is a freedom, which seems empty and devoid of meaning if it cannot be attained in a social context. The decisive struggle has been about the freedom to decide for ourselves where the line should be drawn between what is the individual’s own private sphere and the spheres of community and participation which form part of our life as social beings: to take part in a community on our own terms, and at the same time be socially recognized and respected.
The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory – A Psychological and Evolutionary Perspective
9
The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory – A Psychological and Evolutionary Perspective The concept of the private sphere is related to the individual’s status as a psychological and social being. In dynamic interaction with the world around, the individual’s self image is influenced as well as the surrounding world’s view of the individual. Individuals are affected emotionally by things, which happen in their surroundings and react with different kinds of behaviour. Someone steals a bicycle. Someone makes a fool of parents or a close friend. Someone criticizes a party or church to which they belong. Suddenly we become aware that someone is looking at us from a distance through a pair of binoculars. A journalist describes the details of our pension scheme and the family’s personal financial affairs. Someone becomes a little too intimate in everyday conversation and the other person takes a step back. A physician writes to a person and says that he has genetic information about them. We find ourselves acting emotionally. A whole series of purely physiological processes are set in motion. Our pulse increases, as does the activity of our sweat glands and we blush. The boundaries defining the private sphere vary from individual to individual. Some of this is probably genetically conditioned, but it also depends on upbringing, learning and the influence of culture. All individuals with a basic capacity for social relations develop a larger or smaller sphere, where things that happen, have a pronounced concern and influence upon themselves. In this way, all social beings can be considered to possess a self, which is able to interact with its surroundings, and which makes its presence known via various types of emotional reaction. An entry into this sphere need not necessarily mean a violation. Anyone who has made great efforts to attract the attention of a potential male or female partner responds with feelings of joy rather than disgust, if the object of their attention suddenly reacts with reciprocal curiosity. In considering the emotional reactions, which would seem to be linked to various kinds of entry into the individual’s private sphere, it is reasonable to begin our conceptual investigation by examining the psychological aspects of integrity concerns. I propose that we look upon integrity psychologically speaking as an emotional territory which all individuals dispose over and which they seek to expand, defend and in certain situations are prepared to partially surrender. In Chapter 2, taking as my starting point various studies of emotions, I shall describe integrity as just such an emotional territory. By starting with emotions, which play a primary role in the relation of individuals to their surrounding and their communication with it, we acquire a concept of integrity, which is applicable to both human beings and animals. There is a conceptual continuity between the various animals – including human beings – which live in societies, even if the variation between the various individuals can be extremely large, above all due to differences in the natural and social environment with which the individuals have to relate. In Chapter 3, I shall try to answer the following fundamental questions: what is integrity? Why do individuals seek to protect their private sphere? And how can we explain the variations in reactions of different individuals to the violation of their private sphere?
10
Introduction
If integrity is something possessed by animals adapted to social life, evolutionary biology ought to be in a position to give us part of the explanation for this phenomenon. Such an explanation turns out to be not so farfetched, and can allow us to understand the individual variations which are conditioned by the various challenges which different individuals have to meet in their environment and social surroundings. By defining integrity as an emotional territory, an alternative view to the dominant perspective based in non-interference of privacy emerges. The emotional territory is primarily a result of and an instrument for communicating with the surrounding natural and social environment. This emotional territory has been shaped under a long period of evolutionary history, as a result of individuals’ attempts to master the challenges which arise in a partly hostile environment in order to win advantages for themselves in competition with others, but also to be able to develop various forms of social co-operation and to enjoy the fruits which participation with others offer. The emotional territory answers to a need to relate, in various ways, to various individuals, thereby maintaining various kinds of social relationship. Integrity, psychologically considered, has primarily a social function. It originates, not from a purely negative interest in being left in peace, but in a dual interest in both being allowed to live in seclusion and, at the same time, to participate. If we start from a definition of integrity as an emotional territory of a rather stable character, it is tempting to look upon it as a property of individuals. This property can be expected to have certain advantages for survival, as a part of the individual’s social mechanisms. A certain stability in the individual’s response pattern facilitates social co-operation between various individuals and enables the group to deal collectively with different challenges. The way in which animal and human beings play, offers potentially interesting behavioural patterns for study, bearing in mind the notion of integrity as an individual quality where individuals seek their own roles in interplay with others. In play, certain social rules and conventions are followed, and it is expected of individuals taking part in the game, that they know the difference between playing and acting seriously. Through various emotional reactions, it is possible for those participating in the game to determine if someone goes beyond the accepted boundary. The game seems to give rise to a form of social expectation with regard to the individual. This expectation presupposes partly that individuals can interpret the emotions and behaviour of other individuals, and partly that the latter behave in a somewhat predictable way. Individuals, who go beyond the boundary between play and real, ‘no-pretending’ behaviour, are often subject to some form of sanction. The game is an exercise in drawing boundaries, where the individual’s integrity is formed through interaction with other individuals. By means of the game, individuals acquire an understanding of their own property of integrity but simultaneously they learn to respect the integrity and the private spheres of others. By a swift submissive reaction to the wronged player’s aggressive reaction, individuals show an insight that they have gone too far. A social expectation arises through social relations, and the expanded possibilities of predicting a response from the others involved can very well give evolutionary advantages, which results in socially more advanced groups winning. It is also
Integrity as Something Which is Morally Worth Protecting
11
possible to think that this social expectation creates a feeling for what constitutes a reasonable and just response from the other party, an idea which Marc Bekoff has developed, and which is presented in more detail in Chapter 3. Bekoff has analysed the significance of play in various animal species, for the development of such an expectation and feeling for what is socially appropriate behaviour. The realization that one’s opposite number – in Hegelian terms, the Other – is acting according to social convention or etiquette gives a feeling of being socially recognized. The Other has felt respect for one’s integrity. If we start with the proposed definition of integrity as an emotional territory, we then have the possibility of explaining what the concept of “moral integrity” might mean. It is then a quality associated with individuals, corresponding to the social expectation, which is established and becomes evolutionally significant in a group of individuals. The moral integrity, which is associated with persons who abide by their word and do not accept bribes, as far as its psychological basis is concerned, can be thought to be related to the qualities, which are to be found in individuals with quite different mental and social requirements in the course of evolution. The behaviour of individuals possessing that quality of character called moral integrity corresponds to the social expectation, which is established in a culture. Moral integrity could thereby be looked upon as a basic psychological quality which gradually with the help of increasingly more advanced cognitive capabilities in individuals, and later in development, with the help of social conventions, ideology and moral views has come to represent a complex property, which is socially sufficiently well-founded to serve as a guide in complex social relations. I shall return to the question of moral integrity in Chapters 3 and 7.
Integrity as Something Which is Morally Worth Protecting Integrity can be considered as something which has a special moral value, something which elicits from other individuals respect and consideration. In Chapter 3, I shall also discuss three alternative ways of describing integrity as something worthy of moral protection. In the case of animal integrity, some people have advocated a teleological approach where one supposes that every species incorporates a sense of purposiveness, which is particularly worthy of protection. An alternative to this is to focus attention on the individual’s own experiences in analogy to how respect and moral consideration have been linked to the individual’s capacity to feel pain or experience happiness. This alternative is more in keeping with my own approach, which takes as its starting point the notion of integrity as an emotional territory. A third alternative focuses on the individual’s capacity to act as a morally important quality and therefore particularly worthy of protection. It is inter alia in the Kantian moral tradition that emphasis has been laid on respect for the individual as agent, but with the focus confined to human beings. Morality regulates the intercourse between different individuals and groups. In the history of human kind, a number of moral principles have emerged to guide the social interaction between human beings and to deal with various conflicts of interest. According to the Kantian moral tradition,
12
Introduction
the members of a moral community impose upon themselves a basic requirement in their thought and actions to refrain from whatever is based on violence, compulsion or deception. This presupposes on the part of individuals a capacity to impose on themselves this kind of basic requirement. In so doing, we find a break in continuity between human kind and other animals, even although the latter can share many capacities and the intrinsic experience of a violation of integrity, as regards its basic components, follows universal psychological principles.
Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority – Integrity from a Philosophical Perspective The occurrence of integrity as a property in the individual elicits attention and moral consideration. Confronted with someone else’s private sphere, one halts, irrespective of the species or group to which this individual belongs. There is also a common link between all social beings as regards moral integrity. Integrity as a more developed moral concept, however, forms part of a rational project where one attempts with rational principles to find an explanation of its significance. With the support of Kantian ethics, I develop in Chapter 4 the idea of respect for an individual’s integrity in terms of respect for human beings’ dignity as moral agents. The foundation stone of Kantian ethics is the postulate about the individual’s freedom to think and act in accordance with universally valid principles. Hegel shared in large measure the same view of the individual’s moral autonomy, but went one step further than Kant. Just as evolutionary psychologists have described how the development of various emotions can only be understood against the background of the individual’s attempts to deal with a hostile environment, so we may look upon Hegel’s approach, which is new relative to Kant, as a revolutionary change of perspective. For Hegel, human freedom and independence are continually under threat. Human life is a continual struggle for respect and social recognition. In the philosophical perspective on integrity, the book’s central idea of the individual’s dual interest in both living in secluded freedom and at the same time in participation with others is reiterated. Neither Kant nor Hegel makes use of the concept of integrity, but Hegel describes human ethical relations in various social contexts in a way, which his expositors have described as a theory of social recognition. One of these, Axel Honneth has described how the individual’s self-image is formed in a struggle for social recognition and it is in terms of social recognition that human integrity is respected. Honneth’s theory is not immune to criticism, but it gives us an important view of integrity as a moral and political concept. In more recent years, Honneth has sought inspiration in psychodynamic theories for his sociopsychological model in order to explain integrity, but he would probably have much to learn from evolutionary biology as well. The link to Hegel is, however, no longer feasible in my opinion. For Hegel, respect for integrity was a question of a moral and political project, which focuses on how society’s institutions ought to be organized within the framework of a constitutional state.
Integrity as a Quality Worthy of Esteem and Respect
13
Balancing Seclusion and Participation – Integrity from the Perspective of Moral Philosophy, Jurisprudence and the Law In a political context, respect for the individual’s right to a private sphere is considered fundamental, even if in certain situations, this right must be restricted to take into account the interests of other people. A person suspected on good grounds of being guilty of criminal activity must accept close scrutiny. In practice, protection of privacy and other interests have to be counterbalanced. In a number of countries, for example, one is restrictive in allowing telephone interception or the video surveillance of people in public spaces. On the other hand, one permits close scrutiny of people’s economic affairs and where they choose to have their principal place of residence. The regularly recurring population and housing censuses take place nowadays without arousing any great concern, although in the days of King David, they were viewed as a serious violation and a rebellion against God. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to an account and critical analysis of various moral philosophical, jurisprudential and legal conceptions of privacy where the main issue is to decide how to balance the protection of privacy against other interests. In my approach, integrity is given a wider meaning than the concept of privacy. To respect someone’s integrity does not simply mean that we halt, before entering a sphere that is personal and private. It also implies social recognition and a declaration of people’s moral and political authority in their striving to satisfy collectively the dual interest of seclusion and participation.
Integrity as a Quality Worthy of Esteem and Respect In English the concept of integrity is understood as a quality, which influences how individuals act in a social context and how others look upon them. The possession of integrity is looked upon as something worthy of respect: a quality of character, which elicits admiration and respect from others. In the English-speaking world, one has distinguished privacy as something that can be violated and integrity as a quality of character, which one can possess. Theories about the sanctity of private life and integrity as honourable and something worthy of respect thereby never meet. By contrast, if one accepts my theoretical approach, these two senses of what is at stake come together. By focusing on the agent of the private sphere there is a connection between the privacy which can be violated, and the integrity which is expressed in admirable behaviour, a thesis that I shall develop in Chapter 7. This connection can be exhibited by noting that in both cases it is a question of an individual or personal attribute with a strongly charged emotional background. In the concluding chapter, the insights gained in earlier chapters will be applied to the specific issues involving respect for individuals’ integrity, which arise in the case of genetic research and research making use of human biological material.
14
Introduction
The Relationship Between Privacy and Integrity As described in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6 privacy and integrity are sometimes used as interchangeable concepts and sometimes without any clear definition at all. In my view privacy and integrity should be distinguished as two separate concepts rendering different meanings to “respect for privacy” and “respect for integrity”. With “privacy” I mean a condition where individuals enjoy a secluded sphere of their own. It can be a physical space that is isolated and free from insight or intrusion by others, or it can refer to certain information of a personal nature that is not accessible to others. “Respect for privacy” means then that one should not, without good reasons and only on certain conditions (e.g. consent or protection of other vital interests), enter into an individual’s private sphere. With “integrity” I mean a property of a social agent navigating the intersection of the private sphere and the public spheres. A social agent has an interest in enjoying a secret sphere that is barred to others but also to participate with others in a social life. The enjoyment of a private sphere enables the individual to engage in a complex social life with different kinds of relationships to other individuals and groups. “Respect for integrity” means a social recognition of the individual agent trying to master his/her relationship between the private and the social life. “Respect for integrity” is focused on the agent of a socialization process and I will show that the same concept is applicable to animals participating in social play as well as to human beings claiming recognition as moral and political citizens in modern societies. In the latter, more developed, instance the agent has won recognition as a person with insight into and the possibility of influencing the principles and rules which steer life in community with others, including how one should draw the line between the private and the public spheres in a society. I will suggest that evolution has equipped social beings with such a property that enables them to navigate between the private and the social. The basic element of this property is an emotional territory including an individual’s cognitive appraisal of different emotional reactions when facing environmental – natural and social – threats and challenges. Such a property is of great social significance and has an adaptive function in analogy to how other properties (e.g. being fast, tall, small, strong, courageous, sensitive, emphatic) are essential for seeking food, mating, escaping a prey bird or socializing. Implicit in the idea of an emotional territory is the recognition of the individual agent whose territory it is and who uses this territory as his/her sphere of action and social engagement.
Chapter 1
The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
In legal discussions of human integrity, it is the protection of the sanctity of private life which is central (see Strömholm 1967, Westregård 2002). This is consistent with general linguistic usage. The private sphere is the one which other people have no right to infringe. When this occurs, it is looked upon under certain conditions as a violation of someone’s integrity (Collste 1997). Normally what is intended is the right of individuals to protection of their private sphere but at the same time the family is considered to have the right to protect itself against external insight. What is private is marked off from what is generally accessible to all, just as a private piece of land is marked off from a city park which is open to all. What is private is also distinguished from things which are the objects of public insight and the exercise of power. Under certain circumstances, the state has the right of access to private data relating to housing, financial matters and family relations. How far-reaching these rights are, varies from state to state. As Amitai Etzioni has pointed out, it is not only the state’s interest which is counter posed to that of individuals (Etzioni 1999). Private corporations such as insurance companies are sometimes given the right to have access to detailed information about individuals. Various forms of confidentiality laws have been designed to protect the private life of individuals and families from unwelcome intrusion. Respect for people’s privacy has been taken to mean that certain personal and sensitive information must be protected from public insight. As a legal concept respect for privacy is intended as a protection of what is or ought to be private and the personal matter of the individual concerned. The basic idea underlying both the legal discussion of privacy and general language usage is that what is private must be able to be fenced off from what is publicly available. A historical survey, however, shows that this view of what is private is highly simplistic. During different periods and in different cultures, what is private and what is public have been interwoven by the fact that individuals always exist and participate in a socially complex tapestry. What is private and what is publicly available has continuously altered in different social situations. The way the line has been drawn between them has been influenced by such things as architecture, town planning, economic conditions, religion and political ideologies. Even in one and the same society during a given period, the seclusion of the private sphere can be found to vary significantly, depending on the social status of individuals and their economic resources. In part, Western history has been an ideological and political M.G. Hansson, The Private Sphere, C Springer 2008
15
16
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
struggle about counterbalancing the interests of society in general with the right to have a private sphere. The need for both seclusion and participation would seem to follow human beings wherever they live. In a five-volume work, Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby assisted by a large number of historians, have presented a history of private life from Roman times to the modern era (Ariès and Duby 1987–1991). The main emphasis is on European history, and much of the material covering the Middle Ages and the subsequent historical development, deals with France, Germany and England. The material which is collected in this monumental work on the private life of human beings in Western Europe is enormously rich. In the present context, there are two observations which it is especially important to note. The historical development of the concept of what is private has not been a continuous one (Thébert 1987, 320). Radical redefinitions of the concept take place for a host of social developmental reasons. This is linked to the insight that what ultimately is viewed as private is intimately bound up with the relationship that exists between public and private. The fundamental theory which emerges in reading the history of private life is that the private sphere has never been completely separate from that which is accessible to others. The private and public spheres are interwoven to form a complex, social tapestry. In all times, however, it has been considered important to define and defend a territory which is the preserve of individuals, if only in the form of freedom and independence of thought. This spiritual freedom has naturally been influenced by the currents of the time and cultural features which are shared and formed by many others. What can be considered as experiences of the violation of privacy varies greatly from one time to another, as well as between different cultures. Privacy is largely a social construction, even if a continuity exists between the emotional reactions to this form of violation and certain behavioural patterns which have been formed much earlier in evolutionary history. To support the thesis that the private and public spheres are interwoven, I shall give some examples relating to the individual’s place in family, home and society in Western history.
1.1 In the Supposed Seclusion of the Home The home is considered a protected zone for the individual and family, where the curiosity of outsiders can be excluded, and family matters can be dealt with in secret, secluded from the outer world. The individual’s opportunities to have a private life within the walls of the home are naturally limited and have varied widely throughout history. In Roman times, public assignments were a completely private affair. The Romans made no clear distinction between the public assignments of the rulers and their role as private individuals, nor between public revenues and personal wealth. Rome’s greatness was a collective asset for the ruling class and the group of affluent senators (Veyne 1987, 95ff.). Public assignments were looked upon as private sources of income obtained through private contacts. Paul Veyne compares ruling and influential people in the Roman Empire with a Mafia “Godfather”. One built
1.1 In the Supposed Seclusion of the Home
17
up a private fortune with the help of public assignments, and family ties determined how the power was exercised and distributed (ibid.). Ruling over a Roman province was akin to a private family business. A consul was expected to pay out of his own pocket for public, often expensive spectacles, such as chariot racing in the Circus Maximus and gladiatorial combat at the Coliseum. All of this was done to please Roman citizens. The aristocracy were then forced to despatch their officials to the provinces to replenish the state coffers. Living privately at home but charged with public assignments made demands on organization and architecture. The private home formed an important part of public life. The home was so organized that there was room both for a life in luxury which resulted from public assignments and the need to fulfil official duties. The aristocracy had a large number of rooms for different activities and the colonnade, so characteristic of the time, played a key role in separating the realm of public duty from more private affairs (Thébert 1987). It was here that subjects and delegations were received, while an ingenious system of corridors and vestibules were employed to convey visitors to the appointed place, depending how intimate their relations were with the family. “After passing through the main entrance, the visitor finds himself in the vestibule. This transitional space, although part of the house proper, is one in which the visitor is still subject to scrutiny. His view of the house is limited, and the vestibule is under the watchful eye of the guard. . .” (ibid., 355). The same need for transitional rooms leading from the public sphere to the private sphere is to be found in the architecture of later ages, although the form it took varied depending on economic possibilities and the extent to which those at home used it for public duties or services for others. The home became increasingly independent of public facilities. The famous Roman baths were public establishments to which both high and low had recourse, to attend to their personal hygiene. Arising first in the ranks of the aristocracy, this function was later incorporated in private homes. The possibilities for seclusion have in all ages been influenced by the family’s economic circumstances. Charles de la Roncière has described the renaissance architecture of Florence, when those with sufficient wealth built magnificent urban palaces, completely separated from the street by powerful doors and windows which were placed high on the facade to prevent people peeping in (Roncière 1988, 176ff.). Within the walls, there were beautiful gardens and an abundance of rooms for different needs. In the homes of the poor, one room sufficed for everything, while the more affluent were able to extend the room with an additional one. The principal room was used as a kitchen and living room, while the chamber behind it served as a bedroom. In the chamber were kept the most valuable family possessions and documents (ibid., 217). It was here that the secrets of the family and its forebears could be preserved. Economic circumstances have played a major role throughout history in determining the form of private life. Michelle Perrot has described the living conditions of the urban poor from the mid-1800s to the beginning of the 20th century (Perrot 1990, 349ff.). Crammed together in dirty, overcrowded hovels, where there was no room for any personal secrets, people developed their private lives by taking over the neighbourhood streets in a variety of ways. Forced to live a
18
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
major part of their lives in the street, the workers commandeered semi-private areas of the neighbourhood for their activities, and made use of the public establishments which existed. The alleys became the preserve of different groups, and private affairs were settled there. People helped one another and showed newcomers how to find their feet in the urban culture. It was one where the family’s possibilities of protecting the privacy of its individual members was severely limited for reasons of space. There were many whose private lives were shaped by such conditions. Antoine Prost relates that in 1894, 20% of the population in the town of Saint-Etienne, 19% of the population of Nantes and 16% of the population of Lille, Angers and Limoges lived in one-room flats (Prost 1991, 53). Jean Guéhenno’s description of life there is typical. “We had only one room. There we worked, ate, and on some nights even entertained friends. Along the walls we had to find space for two beds, a table, two armoires, a buffet, and a gas stove, as well as room to hang pots, photos of the family and pictures of the czar and the president of the Republic . . . Lines stretching from one corner of the room to the other always held the most recent laundry . . . . Beneath [a high window] we installed the ‘workshop’, my mother’s sewing machine, my father’s bench, and a large bucket of water in which arches and soles were always kept soaking” (ibid., 54). It was not only the family members who had to agree about this area. The home was visited by people wanting to have their shoes repaired. This description illustrates nevertheless a relatively spacious and modern working class home, when judged by the norms of the time. Many had significantly fewer possibilities for rest, socialization and a life of their own. To have one’s own home as workplace can seem to be a modern luxury. At the beginning of the industrial age, it was not however something that was voluntarily chosen but a necessity in order to survive under poor material conditions. It meant that the tradesman’s customers, as well as his family, were part of the domestic scene. Prost estimates that more than half, and up to as much as two thirds, of the French working population worked at home in 1900 (ibid., 9). Either one was self-employed or took work home to carry out for one’s employer. Both men and women worked at home with weaving, the making of clothes, shoes and gloves as well as the production of spectacles and jewellery on behalf of some manufacturer. Sometimes the manufacturer would deliver the material or semi-manufactured goods to the tradesmen, and payment for the work carried out was paid by piece, as the work was completed. Since the work was carried out at home, the home became inevitably open to the comings and goings of outsiders. The seamstress had to receive her customers and the weaver had to open his doors to the manufacturer and his agents. The combined homeworkplace environment on occasions became the scene of conflict. One witness tells of parents who made shoes from lasts they bought by the dozen (ibid., 13). During a strike in the shoe industry, the father’s savings ran out and he went off to get a hold of lasts with which to make shoes. When the workers on strike learned of this, they forced their way into his home and accused him of strikebreaking. Public conflicts took place in private rooms. Eventually social development and town planning brought about the growth of special industrial areas,
1.1 In the Supposed Seclusion of the Home
19
and the development of wage labour entailed that working life became separated from the home. In the countryside, the home had always served as a workplace, and the poor family often shared one and the same room as kitchen and bedroom. The rural conditions for private life were shared by many. In France, 69% of the population lived in the countryside in 1872. In 1911, the figure was 55.5%. Those who grew up on a farm at the beginning of the 20th century will recognize the picture which Perrot draws of the French countryside during this period (ibid., 347–348). The home was of a robust, but simple, construction and often overcrowded. In it, were to be found both human beings and animals, while all sorts of activities which formed part of the work on the farm, were carried out in the room which served simultaneously as kitchen, living room and bedroom. Every person found themselves exposed to everyone else. To conceal a pregnancy or even more a birth required considerable ingenuity and the co-operation of other women in the village. The barn, the ditch which surrounded the nearby fields or a patch of woodland became meeting places for love-trysts or the personal care of one’s own body (ibid., 348). Roger-Henri Guerrand quotes the lively description by the engineer Victor Considérant of his travels in the poor parts of rural France. “You find rooms that serve as kitchen, dining room, and bedroom for the whole family: father, mother, and children. They also serve as cellar and attic and sometimes as stable and barnyard as well. Light is admitted through low, narrow openings. Drafts enter by way of ill-fitting doors and windows. The wind whistles through blackened, broken panes – if there are panes, for there exist whole provinces in which glass is virtually unknown. Occasionally a smoky oil lamp is used for light, but usually the only light comes from the fire. The floor is of rough, damp earth, with puddles here and there. One steps in them. And young children wade in the mud. I myself have seen ducks scour these puddles for food” (Guerrand 1990, 386–387). Preserving one’s private sphere under such living conditions was no easy task. The better-off, both in the countryside and the towns, had more space to move about in at home, and possessed more rooms which could be used for different purposes. But also in these homes, other people besides the family’s own members formed part of the scene. The servants of the house sometimes assisted with the personal hygiene of master and mistress, and were well informed about most of what went on inside the family. They saw and heard everything, but had an obvious duty to say nothing about what went on in the home to outsiders. There was scarcely room for any private life on the part of the servants. A domestic servant was normally unmarried, and was assumed to live without a lover, husband or child (Perrot 1990, 232ff.). Those among the rich who had the means, could also retain the services of a family physician who dogged the footsteps of the family, and carefully attended to the intimate circumstances relating to the health of family members. Medical knowledge hastened the development which allowed, even among the working class, greater scope for the individual in the bosom of the family. The French cholera epidemic of 1832 clearly illustrated the injurious effects of crammed housing, where several family members shared both rooms and beds (Corbin 1990, 479–480). Stimulated by Lavoisier’s new medical discoveries about breathing and
20
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
the utility of a good supply of oxygen, the doctors declared war on overcrowded housing and gradually there was a trend towards the goal of one bed per person. A side effect of this was to enable individuals to be increasingly their own masters, and thus preserve their own private lives within the confines of the home. The bonds of marriage, family and kinship hold together the individual’s private sphere, but the ties of friendship and the relationships which members of the family are able to form outside the family, are important for their private lives. Throughout the whole of Western history, since Roman times, the opportunities for such relations have been unequally distributed between the sexes. Men have wielded power in the home. The opportunity to expand private life by cultivating relations outside the home has, for long periods, been reserved for men. The large European households of the Middle Ages were steered firmly by the master of the house. Legally speaking, the household, according to a definition of 1282, constituted his “own maisnie residing in his house (ostel), that is, composed of those who perform his private tasks at his expense” (Duby 1988, 63). It was the master of the house who provided those who lived there, with food and protection from intruders. This then gave him the right, when necessary, to administer various forms of punishment. The master of the house kept those under him alive, and thus ruled the house in accordance with his own desires. Georges Duby compares his role with that of an abbot in a monastery who was responsible for the material and spiritual needs of the monks (ibid., 68). The image of a single man in charge was based on contemporary theological symbolism with God the Father as sole ruler in heaven. The role of women was similarly inspired by the biblical stories. Woman was the weaker sex, and was seen as a threat to the patriarchal order in the home because of her sinfulness. The first duty of the master of the house was therefore to keep the women folk of the household in order, and carefully watch over wife, sisters, daughters and widows who made it up. The so-called chambre des dames was not, according to Duby, as one might be led to believe, a place for womanly distraction and seduction, but a form of prison where women were in captivity, because men feared them (ibid., 77). In the Middle Ages, and in certain circles up to modern times, the family was seen as a reflection of the Holy Family. The family formed the corner stone of the spiritual development of Christian society. The moral sermons of the Church were but vanity, if Christian families did not prepare the earth so that the seeds of this teaching took proper root in human souls. Charles de La Roncière describes the family during the period from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, as the spring from which religious vocation and a life of piety would flow (Roncière 1988, 302ff.). One effect of this way of looking at things was that the guardians of spirituality also seized the right to control the life style of the family. Both Dominicans and Franciscans visited homes frequently to guide the members of the family and assist in their moral education. These church brethren often became close friends of the family, but contributed in practice to the church’s control of private life (ibid., 305). Christian theology’s influence on the private sphere, whether in drawing the line between private and public or as regards insight into private life, in the unequal distribution of opportunities with respect to the sexes in moving between the private and the public spheres, has been considerable. During certain periods, religious
1.1 In the Supposed Seclusion of the Home
21
representatives have introduced substantial programmes of reform, which to a large degree defined the social and private roles of men and women. The evangelical reform movement within the Anglican church at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century is an obvious example of a strict gender division between the home and the outside world, which exerted influence on social life for a long time thereafter. Catherine Hall draws attention to the evangelical writer Hannah More who was particularly influential in advocating Christian family ethics which assigned clear and different roles to men and women (Hall 1990, 55ff.). In tracts and pamphlets, her message to the poor was that they should submit to authorities, and cultivate their spiritual life in preparation for the heavenly joy to come. Her most popular books were aimed, however, at the middle classes. The novel Coelebs in Search of a Wife which was published in 1807, was much read in families of shopkeepers, merchants, lawyers and doctors. It was also such families which formed the backbone of evangelical congregations. A recurring theme of her writings was the view of man as a person responsible for public duties, while woman was responsible for the spiritual and moral education of the family. Hannah More’s spiritual outlook played an important role in moulding middle-class homes, and in framing the rules of private life in 19th century England. “The religious commitment to establish a new way of life that would make possible a constant attention to spiritual experience and which demanded a religious household had found material form in the gradual separation and demarcation of men’s and women’s work” (ibid., 73–74). Men devoted themselves to the unceasing, new challenges in the expanding world of business and trade. They increasingly identified themselves in terms of their professional roles and public duties. Women withdrew from this world to take upon themselves the role of mother who was responsible for the concerns of the home. Manliness was defined by the male’s capacity to provide for his family. Womanliness in his wife and daughters was based on their roles as dependent individuals with needs. A religious way of thought had a decisive influence on the various opportunities available to members of the family to move between the private and public spheres. The independence and freedom of action associated with the private sphere was reserved for men, a fact which was also reflected in legislation. Married women had no legal right to make a contract, to sue someone or be sued, or to enter into any form of partnership. Their married status implied that, in the eyes of the law, they were the man’s responsibility. They had no independent legal status (ibid., 67). The possibilities for insight into the internal affairs of the family are strongly influenced by various ties of kinship and by how the members of the family relate to one another, and by whether they live together. Several generations often shared the living quarters of the private household, but if economic circumstances permitted, efforts were made to give adults their own rooms. In the countryside, the older generation retired to a cottage on their land and the new generation took over the farmhouse and the running of the farm. Throughout history, children have seldom had a right to a private life of their own, although ways were gradually discovered of how to preserve secrets, and maintain independence in their intercourse with other children. Marriage was always a family matter and the parents had great influence, particularly when considerable fortunes were at stake. To have a room of one’s own
22
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
which parents respect, is a very recent phenomenon, and has, indeed, not really entirely caught on, even in modern times. The power exercised by parents over their children has always been great. Antoine Prost mentions a French survey in a mass circulation newspaper in 1938, which revealed that 30% of the readership considered that it was the parents who should choose their children’s career, and prepare them for it from an early age (Prost 1991, 69). In recent times, the increase in the number of divorces and the building of new families where both children and parents gain new family ties has meant an increase in the number of individuals with insight into the private affairs of the family. Now possibilities for assisted reproduction also implies that the individual’s genetic and social family ties increase in number. According to Swedish legislation with regard to confidentiality, information about a person’s health is considered sensitive. New knowledge about genetic links has led to an increase in the circle of people who are affected by this type of information about individuals. With the help of family history and sometimes with a test to establish if a person is a bearer of a certain disposition, it is possible, for example, to identify individuals with an increased risk of cancer due to hereditary factors. Several genes for inherited forms of tumour have been localized and characterized. In many cases, it is a question of polygenic illnesses, where a mutation in a single gene is only responsible for a limited part of the risk of illness to which the individual is exposed. Other inherited dispositions, varying penetrance and several environmental factors influence the overall risk the individual runs. When a family member is identified as a genetic bearer the dynamic of the family is affected. Individuals who are not genetic bearers can sometimes experience what has been called “survivor’s guilt” (Hopwood 1997). A child’s identification with a parent can be affected when a genetic similarity or difference can be demonstrated (Grosfeld et al. 1997). Clinical experience shows that one branch of a family can accuse another branch of bringing “a bad inheritance” into the family. In a case study, Theresa Marteau (1996) described the complex reactions within a family when one of its members chooses to undergo a test, whereas other members would prefer not to know anything about the situation of the family. Croyle .et al. (1997) examines phenomena such as the stigmatization of a family as a “cancer family” or a “high risk family”.
1.2 What Will the Neighbours Say? The opportunities for individuals and families to maintain a private sphere within the confines of the home have fluctuated throughout Western history. Neighbours have always had a certain measure of insight and sometimes the boundaries between the household sphere and the surrounding neighbourhood have fluctuated. The Venetian Franciscan, Fra Paolina, expressed the social role of human beings in the words Fagli mestiere a vivere con molti (make it your concern to live together with many other people) (Roncière 1988, 157). This duty extended beyond the family and included neighbours as well. People who daily spent their lives in the company of
1.2 What Will the Neighbours Say?
23
others, shared also, according to Paolino, a special form of solidarity. People were expected to support one another, and family events such as marriages and births involved those living close by. There was very little that could be kept secret from the neighbours, and sometimes close friendships developed. Charles de la Roncière tells of the patrician Geri Spini in Florence, who treated his neighbour, the baker Cisti, as a friend after Cisti had offered him a glass of wine (ibid., 164). Neighbours were sometimes chosen as the godparents to a newborn child, and in this role were invited to enter the bosom of the family. “They could come and go and converse with servants or with the lady of the house without occasioning gossip among the neighbors. They were part of the family’s private life” (ibid.). Arlette Farge describes the neighbourhood in French cities of the 18th century as something more than just a particular part of the town (Farge 1989, 578ff.). It formed a society of its own within the city, with its own laws and rules, where each citizen was subject to the scrutiny of the others. The lieutenant-general of police and his subordinates, together with the priest and his deacons, were given the task of keeping an eye on people’s way of life. These officials were the guardians of the moral order. They were well informed and were asked for official help in various connections. The constable could turn to the priest to get information about a person living in the neighbourhood who was suspected of some impropriety and their services were used for various purposes. The police archives contain a great number of certificates concerning individuals with “unblemished ways of life”, issued by the parish priest. “The constables were the eyes and ears of the neighborhood, and the lieutenant general of police made sure that they did their job, that they went everywhere and knew everything. The slightest incident brought them running. Constables and informers kept them apprised of rumours and plots discussed in the streets, inns and cabarets and around the fountains” (ibid., 578–579). Protecting the family’s honour is a task which calls for discretion in a society where private life cannot be kept within the confines of the home. In the middle of the 18th century, there was a special legal instrument in France – the so called lettre de cachet (ibid., 588ff.) – to assist a family wishing to restore its honour, besmirched by one of its members. It was a special document issued by the King which could be used to examine and imprison a citizen without recourse to the courts, and thus outside the normal processes of public law. The aim was to maintain the moral order, while ensuring that family’s secrets were preserved. At the close of the 18th century, the system was increasingly criticized for its arbitrariness, and the question was raised whether it was the responsibility of the police to intervene and pass judgement in disputes between husband and wife, or between parents and children. The neighbourhood rules for families and individuals were determined by their economic opportunities and town planning. Antoine Prost cites Jean Paul Sartre’s lively description of the conditions of private life, during a meander through the poor quarter of Naples in the middle of the 20th century: “The ground floor of every building contains a host of tiny rooms that open directly onto the street, and each of these tiny rooms contains a family. . . In these rooms people sleep, eat and work their trades. But. . . people are drawn into the street. They go outside for reasons of thrift, so that they won’t have to light a lamp, or to enjoy the fresh air, and also,
24
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
I suspect, out of fellow feeling, a desire to rub shoulders with everyone else. They drag tables and chairs out into the street or leave them on the threshold, half outside, half inside, and in this intermediate environment they perform the principal acts of their lives. Since there is no longer any outside or inside and the street is an extension of their living quarters, they fill it with their private smells and objects, as well as with their history. . . Outside is organically linked to inside. . . Yesterday I saw a mother and father dining outdoors, while their baby slept in a crib next to the parents’ bed and an older daughter did her homework at another table by the light of a kerosene lantern. . . If a woman falls ill and stays in bed all day, it’s open knowledge and everyone can look in on her” (Prost 1991, 4–7). These people lived their lives on the threshold between the private and the public spheres, torn between seclusion and participation. Neighbours know about the lives of one another, but they also participated together in various forms of social activities. “Anyone willing to pay the price can enjoy the benefits of living in a neighbourhood: smiles, hellos, friendly greetings, an exchange of pleasantries – things that make a person feel alive, known, recognized, appreciated and respected” (ibid., 104). People round about know who you are, where you live and a great number of other things pertaining to your private sphere. Clothes have their own story to tell, and neighbours see what is everyday apparel and what is unusual. Family disputes make themselves known through open windows, and new purchases are immediately noted. Prost cites Pierre Mayol who relates that the other apartment occupants could be expected to put up with a bottle of wine bought from the local wine dealer for dinner on Sunday, but the first bottles of whisky which were drunk in his own neighbourhood of Croix-Rousse in Lyons had been bought in Carrefour, the retail chain, where the anonymity of a larger wine and spirit merchant’s establishment allowed the buyer to avoid being noticed (ibid., 106). The neighbourhood is a public place where no one can avoid exposing their private life. The shopkeeper, the baker and the butcher were the eyes and ears of the neighbourhood. The church was a place where one could observe one’s neighbours, noting how often they attended mass, took communion or the time taken by young girls at their confession. Women were specially watched over and “when their faces swelled and their hips took on a rounder look and then suddenly became slimmer again, tongues began to wag” (Perrot 1990, 228). For the men in French towns, there was always the neighbourhood café where they could exchange experiences with one another in relaxed conversation which provided both a certain distance to the home, and yet at the same time, an opportunity for airing more personal matters. At the outbreak of the Second World War, there were 500,000 cafés in France with a licence to sell alcoholic drink. This meant more than one “bistro” per hundred inhabitants. Even the smallest village had a café and in larger towns, there were innumerable such places. In Roubaix, for example, at the end of the 19th century, there was one café per fifty inhabitants (ibid., 108). In towns, the role of public watchdog, with the task of keeping an eye on what people got up to in private, was transferred from the police to the caretaker in the house, – invariably a woman – la concierge. She was feared by all because of her position, poised between the private and the public spheres, between the tenants and
1.3 Power Over Spiritual Life and Thought – Private Sphere from a Religious Perspective
25
the landlords and sometimes in close contact with the police, who turned to her to make use of her services as a spy (ibid.). The insight and influence of a caretaker in a Stockholm apartment block in the 1940s was not essentially different from this earlier French equivalent, although their task was mainly concerned with clearing away the snow, and deciding when the heating in the house was to be switched on or turned off. The large apartment blocks of the modern town provide a greater degree of anonymity and seclusion, but there is a lack of participation and that social recognition which a living neighbourhood can offer. Infiltration of the modern private sphere takes place in a more subtle way. New fashion trends, radio, television, internet and music reach beyond the closed doors of the apartment. It must be left to each and everyone to decide, according to their wishes, whether to switch off what is on offer, but in practice public life makes itself felt both in the private spheres of the living room and bedroom.
1.3 Power Over Spiritual Life and Thought – The Private Sphere from a Religious Perspective The study of the past shows that the family hearth and home have seldom been a zone which is protected from the outside world. Instead, there emerges a picture of the private and public as intimately intertwined spheres, both for good and ill. Individuals and families have tried to overcome material and spatial limitations in order to achieve seclusion and independence. In order to win respect, social recognition and friendship, some form of participation in social life is needed, and the veil around the private sphere must be pulled back. Different ideologies and systems of thought have influenced and shaped the lives and attitudes of individuals and families to the surrounding world. Individualism as an ideology and political programme is a relatively recent phenomenon, and first gained momentum in the 19th century. Throughout the whole of Western history we can, however, follow the individual’s struggle for spiritual independence and freedom of thought. Individuals themselves have not always experienced it as a struggle, but when we look at matters retrospectively from the outside, there are many people who have participated in the spiritual struggle, and have sought to control the inner life of human beings. Christianity has played a decisive role both in protecting, illuminating and shaping the inner spaces of the private sphere. As Michel Rouche has pointed out, Christianity emphasized the relations between God and the individual (Rouche 1987, 519). The evangelists describe it as the central thesis in their stories about the life and activities of Jesus. Criticizing the Pharisees and those well versed in the sacred texts, who according to the gospels devote far too much time to displaying their righteousness so that others can clearly see it, emphasis is placed on the hidden life of faith and the importance of examining our own hearts. The Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthew’s Gospel lays great emphasis on the involvement of belief in a life hidden from other people. “Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them. . . . That thine alms may be
26
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly. . . And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corner of the streets where they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly” (Matthew Chapter 5, verses 1–6). The Christian message initially focussed on human character and dispositions: “Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement: but I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgement. . . . Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart” (Matthew Chapter 5, verses 21–28). It was a type of character which made far-reaching ethical demands on loving one’s enemies and praying for one’s persecutors. The inner life and the relationship to God took on, however, an external aspect, partly in the form of Christian ethics, but also in the form of the congregation which lived and acted in various places. Jesus takes farewell of his apostles with the following words: “And I say unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church. . .” (Matthew Chapter 16, verse 18). Christianity developed within this tension between what is internal and what is external. The gospel stories about the time following the death of Jesus describe a little group of Christians in a hostile world. The Jews tried, for religious reasons, to put a stop to the budding sect and the Roman army of occupation had reason to keep a close check on potential rebels. Intermittently in this period, the persecution was harsh. In his description of these times, Peter Brown describes how a hostile environment welds together the small band of people (Brown 1987, 253ff.). For the group under threat, it was necessary to mobilize a far-reaching solidarity among its members. It demanded a wholehearted and uncompromising dedication from one and all. The external threat during the first centuries of Christianity brought about a need to control spiritual life, the innermost spaces of the private sphere. “What was most private in the individual, his or her most hidden feelings and motivations, those springs of action that remained impenetrable to the group, ‘the thoughts of the hearth’, were looked to with particular attention as the possible source of the tensions that threatened to cause fissures in the ideal solidarity of the religious community” (ibid., 254). At an early stage the foundation was laid for a tension between the hidden life with God and the group’s need to exercise an extensive control over human inner drives and dispositions, a tension which has followed Christianity throughout Western history. The need for control has continued, in more or less accentuated forms, until modern times, long after the church had become a power factor of its own in society, and continuing after its legal powers had become blunted. Brown points out the role of the concept of scapegoat in holding the group together and defining its limits in relation to the world around (ibid., 276–277). Matters such as sexual morality or specific doctrinal beliefs which were deeply personal for the individual, furnished grounds for the priesthood to exclude a church member
1.3 Power Over Spiritual Life and Thought – Private Sphere from a Religious Perspective
27
publicly and openly. When the power of the Roman Catholic Church was at its height, the Inquisition furnished the most striking example of how the defenders of the Christian faith believed themselves to have the right to investigate and control people’s spiritual life. The home was looked upon virtually as a place of heresy, as a place where heretics hid their intentions, until the time was ripe. Thus the Inquisitor investigated carefully every nook and cranny of a person’s private life. Some of the most detailed descriptions of peasant homes during the Middle Ages come from the careful reports of the Inquisition (Contamine 1988, 456). George Duby holds that the church’s decision, requiring that all Christians should go to confession and confess their sins at least once a year, was, in part, a repressive measure of an Inquisitorial kind: “its purpose was to unearth insubordination and heresy lurking in individual consciences” (Duby 1988, 532). The same pattern with a focus on the inner spiritual life and the heart’s belief which became an object for external rules and extensive checking recurs throughout ecclesiastical history. Both the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reformation laid emphasis upon inner piety and the individual’s hidden life with God in reaction to a church which had become too wedded to political and temporal power. Luther preached Justification through Faith in a polemic against the selling of indulgences and drew attention to the believer’s own responsibility for reading and interpreting the Bible. Francois Lebrun points out how collective Catholic piety, where salvation is sought through a comprehensive liturgy and a multitude of sacraments administered by the priesthood, was replaced, as a result of the Lutheran Reformation, by the way of belief, where individuals were left to seek their own salvation (Lebrun 1989, 100–101). Individuals were not, however, left completely abandoned to their search for salvation. The cornerstones of the Lutheran church’s support for the individual were baptism, Bible-reading and participation in Sunday prayers. Individuals were expected to read and interpret for themselves, but the Holy Scriptures were not available to laymen and the need for instruction, both concerning the Bible and how to live a moral life was judged to be great. Catechetical instruction, a form of dialogue between priests and congregation where the priest asked questions about the Bible, the teaching of the church and the life of faith, and the congregation members answered, often took place in the home. It, like church service, formed part of the discipline which the inner spiritual life was considered to need. It was a way of publicly checking and correcting people’s knowledge and their commitment to their beliefs. The same state of affairs is also to be found in Catherine Hall’s description of the Evangelical Movement within the Anglican Church during the 19th century (Hall 1990, 50ff.). The inner spiritual life was itself at the very heart of the Evangelical worldview, and it was through such a life dedicated to root out our own sins, that the morals of society would also be improved. There was a Christian meaning to every thought and action which led every believer to carefully review their own motives and habits. In the evangelical congregation, the private and public spheres were closely intertwined. It was a faith which demanded much of its practitioners. “. . . it aimed at the transformation of the individual self, the becoming of a new person in Christ. This required powerful supports – an internal system of checks, already
28
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
used by the Puritans and represented by the diaries and journals of the seriously religious, and also external supports from clergy and others among the faithful who could assist in the ceaseless struggle to live as a new soul. . . God was watching and listening, and all those all-seeing and all-hearing eyes and ears had to become the internal conscience. It was necessary to scrutinize every aspect of human behavior” (ibid., 52). The heart must bend itself in obedience and the will must be trained to submit. The individual prayer, the heart’s conversation with God, has played a prominent role in all religious communities and has probably had a useful function in safeguarding a last private sphere in the world of belief. The prayer offered a sanctuary, a protected zone for thought, but it was also a kind of religious life which others were able to influence. One prayed with words taken from well-known psalms, with prayers formulated by the church fathers which were reproduced in countless handwritten and printed copies. There were prayers for all the daily contingencies of life, which were written down and collected in anthologies. Philippe Braunstein describes how there was even a fashion in prayers where the formulation and choice of words varied between generations and between different regions (Braunstein 1988, 624ff.). The common “free prayer” which played an important role in Protestant evangelical movements which arose in the middle and the close of the 19th century and which still forms part of the practice of many churches, would appear to have been one of the more potent instruments for obtaining insight into and control over the individual’s private life. The free life of faith has gone hand in hand with the fear of being inadequate, and of not fitting in, a fear which has pursued the exponents of the Christian faith in all ages. The threat of excommunication, at certain periods, has been all too real for the members of church groups. In the Swedish Free Churches far into the 20th century, careful track was kept of which persons had the right to be included among those celebrating communion together. Views in doctrinal matters, as well as how one conducted one’s private life, could at any time become a topic for public discussion at a meeting of the congregation, and many people who, for one reason or another, failed to live up to the requirements, were excluded. During the 1920s, 30s and 40s, congregational discipline was used as a powerful instrument within the free churches for controlling the life style and doctrinal beliefs of the members. In certain congregations, fifty out of a hundred of those baptised were excluded for such reasons (Kennerberg 1996). What goes on in the bedroom and with whom, is for many churches still a stumbling block and a reason for being excluded from the offices and duties of the church. In the church’s attempts to mould the inner convictions of its members, reading of the Holy Scripture and other writings has been of major importance. Michel Rouche draws attention to the Benedictine Order as an example of how lack of occupation and idleness were regarded as the soul’s worst enemies (Rouche 1987, 539). In order to keep the enemy at bay, it was proposed that a certain number of hours each day should be devoted to physical labour and the reading of ecclesiastical texts. Communal reading took place at mealtime and sometimes also during work in the kitchen or during other activities. Benedict of Nursia provided clear rules about the amount of
1.4 To Retire with a Book – The Private Sphere from a Literary Perspective
29
time that should be spent on private reading; two hours every morning in the period from Easter to the first of November and three hours during the winter half of the year. During Lent, the Sundays were devoted to private reading and at the beginning of Lent the “brothers took ‘a book from the library that all would read in turn.’ There were more than twenty hours of private reading each week. This discipline was so difficult to maintain that two senior monks were assigned to keep watch during reading hours, looking for chatterers, idlers, and others who succumbed to otium or acedia (spiritual torpor)” (ibid., 539–540). One aim of private reading was to promote silence which was intended to help individuals to gather their thoughts and cultivate their inner lives. During the time of the Inquisition, it became clear that this period devoted to personal reading and reflection was also the seed to subversion and heresy and as a result, unsuitable literature was burned or placed under lock and key where it was accessible only to the censors of the time.
1.4 To Retire with a Book – The Private Sphere from a Literary Perspective The possibility of retiring with a book and reading in silence has played a major role in the creation of a private sphere. “Reading puts real-life experience in perspective; the self-absorption it implies can easily stir fantasies and spur the imagination” (Régnier-Bohler 1988, 375). Books act as a stimulus, causing our thoughts to seek new paths and also awakening our intimate feelings and very being. Philippe Braunstein cites Dante as an example of the importance of reading for thought and feeling (Braunstein 1988, 543). Dante begins his poetic autobiography Vita nuova with a methodological remark in which he emphasizes private reading’s intellectual atmosphere and great importance. The very composition of the words he writes, steers the intensity of the emotions which are awakened in reading. “Writing orders the past and thus keeps the sources of memory alive; it is a liturgy that sustains love, a cult of memory that constitutes and renews the writer’s pained consciousness” (ibid., 544). The text provides the reader with the keys for enjoying and developing the secrets of private life. Philippe Ariès emphasizes that literacy and the possibility for people to retire and indulge in their own private reading formed one of the most important factors in the development of the individual’s private sphere from the late middle ages onwards (Ariès 1989, 2ff.). The art of printing books and the circulation of literature decisively altered the boundary between what was private and what was public, but it had been preceded by a new outlook on private reading. The written word gave the opportunity to evade the attention of those around and the public life of society outside the private sphere. It was also possible to evade attention by retiring to a bench in a public park and there become absorbed in a book with thoughts of one’s own, even if it was plain to everyone what one was up to, and perhaps also, what one was reading. The private sphere made available by the written word and printed book, was not, however, open to everyone in society. Literacy was unequally distributed
30
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
in society, and far from everyone who could read, could also write. Historians treat the occurrence of personal signatures on various types of document as a rough measure of the level of literacy in society (Chartier 1989, 111ff.). There were those who could read, but who, nevertheless, were unable to write their signatures, and mastery of the art of writing could not be inferred from the fact that a person was able to sign a document. The figures tended to exaggerate the level of literacy and to underestimate reading abilities. Having said that, they nonetheless give a relatively accurate picture of the number of people in Europe and the American colonies who had access to this form of private life (ibid., 112). There was a dramatic increase in literacy in the years between 1500 and 1800. Chartier present figures for three countries where the statistical evidence is sufficiently broad to allow one to draw general conclusions (ibid., 112ff.). In Scotland, in the 1640s, literacy was around 25% for the male population. A hundred years later, this figure had risen to 65% for men and 15% for women. In England, there was a corresponding development, with male literacy rising from 30% to 60% at the close of the 18th century. Among English women, literacy was around 40% in 1790. In France, there was also a major increase although the development was behind that of both Scotland and England. In 1690, only 29% of men and 14% of women could write their own signatures in the parish register when they were married. In 1790, the corresponding figures were 48% and 27%. Private reading rapidly caught on in various parts of Europe. Literacy in Sweden would seem to have been exceptionally high as a result of the ecclesiastical law of 1686 in which the State undertook to support the Church in ensuring that the country’s citizens were able to read the Bible, and see with their own eyes what God had promised and offered in the Holy Scriptures. It was the priest who was responsible for teaching people to read and for the teaching of the catechism. Chartier says that at the middle of the 18th century, there were few Swedes who could write, but on the other hand some 80% could read (ibid., 118). In Italian cities, both the abilities to read and write were prominent. As early as the 14th century, there were many, including those from the lower classes, who could read and write. In Florence, between 45% and 60% of all children between 6 and 13 attended elementary school. In the case of boys, the proportion of those able to read must have been even higher since there was marked sexual inequality (ibid., 121). Reading took various forms, but the most sweeping change noted by Philippe Ariès is the growth of private reading in a secluded and silent place where the reader was able to reflect about the text in peace and quiet. “This ‘privatisation’ of reading is undoubtedly one of the greatest cultural changes in the early modern epoch” (ibid., 125). Chartier notes that the art of printing books was certainly a technical revolution of major importance which significantly contributed to intellectual development and to change the conditions of private life. However, the mental change had already taken place through the development of silent readings in rooms set apart, irrespective of whether the text being read was handwritten or printed (ibid., 126). The mental revolution was already under way when Gutenberg developed his method of mechanically producing multiple copies of texts in Mainz in the 1450s.
1.4 To Retire with a Book – The Private Sphere from a Literary Perspective
31
Reading in turn brought about private libraries – at least for those who could afford them – with the opportunity they offered of seclusion, study and meditation. The library became a retreat where people’s private thoughts had room to breathe and develop in dialogue with all sorts of texts. In 1570, Michel de Montaigne retired from parliamentary and public duties and spent his time in his castle where he wrote his essays. In them (III:3), Montaigne stresses the role of the library as a place of retreat for escaping the gaze of the general public. At home I betake me somewhat the oftner to my library, whence all at once I command and survey all my household. It is seated in the chief entry of my house, thence I behold under me my garden, my base court, my yard, and look even into most rooms of my house. There without order, without method, and by piece-males I turn over and ransack, now one book and now another. Sometimes I muse and rave; and walking up and down I endight and enregister these my humours, these my conceits. It is placed on the third store of a tower. The lowermost is my Chapell; the second a chamber with other lodgings, where I often lie, because I would be alone. Above it is a great ward-robe. It was in times past the most unprofitable place of all my house. There I pass the greatest part of my lives days, and wear out most hours of the day. The form of it is round, and hath no flat side, but what serve for my table and chair: In which bending or circling manner, at one look it offer me the full sight of all my books, set round about upon shelves or desks, five rancks one upon another. It hath three bay-windowes of a far-extending, rich and unresisted prospect, and is in diameter sixteen paces void. In winter I am less continually there: for my house (as the name of it importeth) is pearched upon an over-pearing hillocke; and hath no part more subject to all wethers then this: which pleaseth me the more, both because the access unto it is somewhat troublesome and remote, and for the benefit of the exercise which is to be respected; and that I may the better seclude my self from companies and keep incroachers from me: There is my seat, that is my throne. I endevour to make my rule therein absolute, and to sequester that only corner from the communities of wife, of children and of acquaintance. Else-where I have but a verbal authority, of confused essence. Miserable in my mind is he who in his own home hath no place where to be to himself; where he may particularly court, and at his pleasure hide or with-draw self. [E-text at www.uoregon.edu/∼rbear/montaigne]
The possibility of private retreat to the world of books was reserved for those who could read, and had the money and interest to do so. Private access to books, however, rapidly developed during the 16th century. Chartier refers to the survey of inventory lists in Valencia from this time (Chartier 1989, 128ff.). In the period from the end of the 15th century to the second quarter of the 16th century, the average physician’s collection of books had expanded from 26 to 62, the lawyer’s from 25 to 55 and the shopkeeper’s from 4 to 10. Tradesmen in the textile branch who normally only owned one book, increased their “libraries” in this period to a figure of 4, on average. The number of books increased rapidly in this period, but it was the higher social classes which were responsible for the majority of book purchases, and reading as a way of creating one’s own sphere of intimacy, seclusion and reflection was not available to everyone. Reading was not something that one indulged in merely for oneself. It was also a way of exchanging thoughts with other people and thus of discovering that one’s private opinions were shared by friends and colleagues. Before official academies of science had been established, groups of scholars and friends gathered to discuss books which they circulated among themselves. In 1600,
32
1 The Private Sphere from a Historical and Cultural Perspective
a petite academie was founded in Lyons where seven scholarly colleagues and friends met at the home of one of the academy members. “The place where we hold our meetings is the study of one of our academicians. There we gather amid five or six thousand volumes which constitute a library as choice as it is large. That alone provides ready and agreeable assistance to our scholarly conferences” (letter from Brosette, one of the founders and an advocate at the court known as the présidial, to Boileau, 16 July 1700) (ibid., 149). Reading and the associated conversation in special private groups is described by many artists in the 17th and 18th centuries and this period witnessed the appearance of various forms of literary societies and clubs. In the case of reading too, the distinction between private and public was not a strict division into two separate spheres. In the self-selected group, there was scope for expanding the private sphere and yet of exercising a certain control over personal concerns and independence. In other groups, the pressure to participate was an external one and the aim was instead the desire for insight and control over the individual’s thoughts and secrets. Reading offered the possibility of extending the sphere of private life, while at the same time literature in various ways mirrors contemporary society. At certain periods, certain literature has been forbidden for religious or political reasons, but even under governments who defend the freedom of the press, the individual’s reading is determined both by access to books and by what the author chooses to write. The private sphere arises as the result of an inner pressure, but it is also a social construction.
1.5 To Participate in Drawing a Line Between What Is Public and What Is Private Unlimited command over one’s own private sphere has seldom been possible. Not even the individual’s thoughts or religious beliefs have been safe from other people’s aspirations to power and need for control. The more affluent, like Montaigne, could find a place in their own house where they could be themselves, devoting themselves to their own interests and hiding themselves from the outside world. The search for seclusion, however, would seem to be common for both high and low, even if economic and material conditions imposed limitations. In every age, people have tried to find a place of their own, from which they can view and react to the world about them, a protected zone to which they can escape to lick their wounds of embarrassment and recover their courage, find time for their own creativity, confide in their closest friends or clandestinely plan some action or attack. Ideological or religious convictions have been used to justify the invasion of the hidden life of faith, long after the real threat from the surrounding world has disappeared. The church has also played a major role in influencing people’s possibilities of moving between the private and public spheres. The participation of women in public life is a recent phenomenon and their chances of being able to play a part in social life on their own terms is still severely limited. For good or ill, children are still dependent upon the morality of the family.
Chapter 2
The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory – A Psychological and Evolutionary Perspective
2.1 Emotions Which Are Constitutive for a Person’s Private Sphere The fundamental questions which I try to answer in this chapter are the following: what is integrity and how do we explain variations in reactions on the part of different individuals when their private sphere is invaded? In formulating answers to these questions, one ought to begin by noting the fact that an intrusion in the private sphere is usually followed by an emotional reaction. Psychological research has long been interested in emotions such as fear, dejection, joy, rage and loathing. In more recent times, there has been new interest in those emotions, which apparently presuppose self-awareness and which would seem to be largely social in origin (Tangney and Fischer 1995). Typical examples of these latter emotions are shame, guilt, pride and embarrassment (Lewis 2000b). Emotions, both those which involve self-awareness and others, are more than mere feelings. An emotion such as shame can be divided into three components where the individual’s behaviour includes (i) certain physical features – lowering one’s gaze, hiding the face, sometimes blushing and falling silent, the swelling of veins or wringing one’s hands (ii) the emotional experience – feeling oneself ashamed, heavy, small, exposed and vulnerable and (iii) certain tendencies to act in a certain way – hiding oneself, fleeing or trying to shift the blame for what has happened onto someone else. Emotions embrace all three components. Psychological research into emotions is a relatively recent phenomenon, but its links to cognitive research, research into personal characteristics, social relations and questions about human mental health have engaged the attention of an increasing number of scientists (Lewis and Haviland-Jones 2000). June Price Tangney and Kurt Fischer have summarized part of this psychological research concerning emotions, and have put forward four basic assumptions in order to define what emotions are (Tangney and Fischer 1995, 6). (i) Emotions are fundamentally adaptive and functional. They tend to support human functions, rather than acting as a destabilizing factor. (ii) Emotional reactions are thoroughly permeated by previous responses in processing various events and situations. This processing activity is taking place all the time individuals are observing and regulating their emotional reactions. (iii) Every emotion can be described with the help of a pattern, consisting of cognitive M.G. Hansson, The Private Sphere, C Springer 2008
33
34
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
elements, affective experiences, motivations and the resulting behaviour, which is characteristic for the emotion. This pattern has been formed by earlier events and the reactions to these events. (iv) Emotions can be classified in families according to their affective similarity. As far as is known, privacy has not been treated by researchers examining the emotions, but the reactions to a violation of privacy would seem to fall very naturally within the proposed framework. A violation is linked with those basic defensive reactions which arise when someone is scared. Individuals try to escape or hide themselves. A violation of privacy is also associated with physical signs which are reminiscent of those which have been registered in connection with studies of shame and embarrassment. Inter alia embarrassment is associated with a desire to avoid meeting another person’s gaze, blushing and palpitation of the heart, or in feeling exposed. It is followed by a behaviour pattern where the person affected runs their hands through their hair, clothes or other parts of the body (see Lewis 1995). A form of social coping in an effort to regain social admiration and re-establish the social relation which has been disturbed (Miller 1995) has also been observed. A violation of privacy is also reflected in the individual by certain emotional experiences akin to shame and embarrassment, of feeling placed in a vulnerable position, of being exposed or revealed or robbed of something which up till then had been considered as one’s own secret or personal matter. Things are somewhat more complex when it comes to the tendencies to act in a certain way following a violation of privacy or a threat of violation. On the one hand, we would expect the same tendencies as those which apply in the case of embarrassment or shame, when people’s self-image or some social relationship has been disturbed and there is an attempt to hide away or flee. However, embarrassment is linked with a sensation of failing to live up to certain expectations, and of personal inadequacy in matching the expected norm. This is not so in the case of intrusions into the private sphere. In the latter case, we expect instead, the strong presence of aggression and defence, where persons who are exposed to an intrusion will try to defend themselves and mark off the boundaries of their own territory from others. Perhaps we should seek instead among those behavioural responses which are associated with an emotion such as pride, where individuals lift up their heads, stretch themselves and try to inspire respect in those around them (Stipek 1995). People whose privacy has been violated, fix their eye on the violator and try to show that they are ready and capable of attacking. When the drama takes place in the public domain, it would often seem to consist in ridiculing or discrediting the violator in order to protect their private sphere and preserve certain secrets for themselves. From the emotional reaction perspective, the three emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride qualify as the primary candidates defining the emotional territory which constitutes an individual’s private sphere. As will be shown, there are also evolutionary reasons for this choice. Acknowledging the basic element of agency involved in this sphere of action and experience I will here on use the term integrity for denoting this emotional territory. A violation of integrity is an unjustified intrusion into this emotional territory. The emotional reactions which take place as the result of a violation of integrity are similar to other emotional
2.1 Emotions Which Are Constitutive for a Person’s Private Sphere
35
reactions. Probably several emotions are involved and, as has been pointed out, there is considerable variation between individuals. The question is whether this yields a better understanding of the concept of integrity. To say that a violation is associated with emotional reactions can provide a certain amount of information, and it can be meaningful to study different patterns of reaction exhibited by different individuals by means of research in the psychology of emotions. However, what is still lacking is a coherent theory about the nature of integrity which would explain why individuals react as they do and why one finds major differences in the way in which people react to similar stimuli. Apart from its explanatory value, such a theory could also, at a more general level, serve as a foundation for empirical enquiries. I suggest that an important stepping stone towards formulating a theory of integrity would be to test the idea that emotions do not simply follow in the wake of a violation of integrity, but are constituent elements of it, defining what an individual’s integrity is. A certain combination of emotions defines the scope of the individual’s private sphere. Emotional territory is based on emotions. A theory of integrity, therefore, presupposes a theory of emotions. Richard Lazarus has emphasized the relational element in his theory of emotions and their role in the way in which individuals respond to various challenges in their environment (Lazarus 1991). The underlying idea is that individuals are in a station of continuous interaction with the surrounding environment. Various events in this environment limit or promote the abilities of individuals in achieving their goals. When such an event occurs individuals try to estimate the probable effect on their own welfare and well-being. This appraisal is central to several theories of emotion, and implies that individuals try to determine the emotional importance of what takes place. Appraisal. . . . Is an evaluation of the significance of what is happening in the personenvironment relationship for personal well-being, and which is influenced by both environmental and personality variables. . . (ibid., 87).
In the appraisal process, individuals take note of what is happening in their immediate surroundings, but attention is also paid to previous experiences. The environmental variables include such things as available resources, whether a challenge is immediate, or possible uncertainty in interpreting what is happening or in the estimation of the probability that something will occur. Another example of the kind of thing that has to be evaluated is whether the effect is of a more enduring kind or whether it is of a more temporary kind. Personal variables are made up of such things as motives and views about reality which the individual has previously made use of in his or her life. If the individual stands to lose or win this process of appraisal provokes an emotional response. If the outcome is not consistent with the individual’s goal this gives rise to negative emotions such as fear, embarrassment, shame and envy. On the other hand, if the outcome is in accordance with the individual’s goal, this gives rise to positive emotions such as joy, pride and relief. A basic premise in Lazarus’ theory of emotions is that all mammals must be biologically so constituted that they are able to carry out an appraisal of those changes and challenges in their environment which are linked to their own welfare.
36
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
Without such a biological capacity, the individual – and sometimes not even the species – would be able to survive the evolutionary pressure of selection. For these reasons emotions can be assumed to play a central role in evolution. Individuals who are incapable of deciding relatively rapidly if a challenge restricts or promotes the possibilities of their own welfare and well-being do not survive and flourish. As a result their genes will not be able to be replicated in coming generations. This appraisal process must sometimes take place rapidly, and in some sense, automatically. Lazarus puts forward the idea that there is a fundamental psycho-biological principle according to which individuals react to events in their environment by indulging in certain predetermined behavioural patterns. If individuals evaluate their relation to their environment in a certain way this is always followed by a characteristic emotion which is linked to just this evaluation. Lazarus maintains that with the help of such a principle we can explain the fact that many emotions have certain basic features in common, irrespective of the developmental level of the individual involved and of the social context. There is a universal feature which is present in emotional reactions. A well know example is Paul Ekman’s studies of how, given a certain type of emotional evaluation, facial expressions share similar features, irrespective of the individual’s cultural background (Ekman 1973, 1998). Leda Cosmides and John Tooby set the emotions in the context of the development of the brain and of the structure of the mental processes which have been necessary to allow individuals, in the course of evolution, to solve various problems of adaptation, such as acquiring food, recognizing a face, choosing a partner, regulating cardiac activity, dealing with the need for sleep, and developing a capacity to keeping an eye out for predators (Cosmides and Tooby 2000). According to their theory, emotions function as a kind of superior mental program for organizing impressions and choosing an adequate response. They must be able to switch off a sleep program, when a program designed to avoid a predator has been activated by stimuli, or to combine programs for regulating cardiac activity and for sharpening hearing. Some emotions have been established early in evolutionary history and survive as a form of inherited memory, despite the fact that they are no longer functionally required, and despite the fact that individuals try to control their reactions with various kinds of mental tricks. In his book on emotions Charles Darwin describes a visit to a zoological park where he positioned himself to study a puff adder which lay coiled up behind a thick plate of glass (Darwin 1872/1998, 43). He was thoroughly determined not to jump back if the snake went to attack, but his determination was to no avail. When the snake launched an attack, Darwin jumped back a couple of metres with surprising alacrity. “My will and reason were powerless against the imagination of a danger which had never been experienced” (ibid.). Psychologists have subsequently discovered that both human beings and other primates are biologically equipped to react with fear when confronted with objects resembling snakes (Mineka et al. 1984). According to Comides and Tooby there are numerous mental programs which are activated by an emotion such as fear when some menacing intruder creeps close or one finds oneself in an ambush (ibid., 93–94). (i) A change occurs in perception and attention. Hearing is sharpened in order to make out more clearly what is happening.
2.1 Emotions Which Are Constitutive for a Person’s Private Sphere
37
The threshold values of various signals change, so that the individual no longer requires convincing proof of imminent danger. (ii) The individual’s goals change and motives are reversed. Security is assigned high priority, whereas hunger, thirst, sexual desire and pain are suppressed. (iii) The search for information is redirected. Where is my child? Where are others who can protect me? Can I move to a place where I have a better view of what is going on? (iv) Conceptual frameworks are shifted to focus on what is respectively dangerous or safe. Following a well-known path can now be experienced as a threat whereas places which we would normally not visit, such as a fork in a tree beside the path, are considered as safe hiding places. (v) Memory is employed to find old hiding places or to decide whether the approaching face looks just as it did on the previous encounter. (vi) Communication processes change so that a person either sounds the alarm with a note of warning, or is struck dumb in the face of imminent danger. (vii) Various interpretational processes go into operation to try to make out if the advancing lion has caught sight of us, or to decide if the leopard has just eaten, and is therefore no longer dangerous. (viii) Various learning systems are activated so that the threat which is experienced can produce life-long effects. (ix) There are physiological changes so that adrenaline increases, cardiac activity changes, the supply of blood to the peripheral vessels increases and the muscles receive their instructions. (x) There are various types of behavioural reaction, depending on the nature of the potential threat: seeking to hide, flee, defend oneself or on occasions completely freezing. Some of these various responses linked to the emotion of fear are automatic and uninfluenced by the will. When considered altogether, evolution has provided animals, including human beings, with a welldeveloped repertoire involving a complicated mental architecture, although it is not always of great help in solving new types of problems of adaptation. Of central importance for the emotion of fear and common to all the programmatic responses is the focus on the individual’s ability to act in a dynamic environment which is changing all the time, and very often in a hostile or threatening manner. Many reactions are common to different species and individuals, but there is also room for individual variations. In order to explain individual variations in the emotional processes, Lazarus suggests that different individuals can interpret the same events in the environment in different ways, depending upon social and cultural factors in the learning process. There is a central core in emotional reactions so that a person who is in love or is betrayed can always be recognized, whereas what constitutes an act of love or a betrayal is something we learn in the culture in which we grow up. According to Lazarus, the universal components are basically biological in character, whereas the individual differences can be explained as socially conditioned patterns of reaction. However, it is an open question as to what is actually biological in character, and what is the result of social construction. Because Lazarus lays great emphasis on cognitive components in his theory of emotions the part played by automatic behavioural reactions is limited. For Lazarus the cognitive capacities which are associated with the individual’s interpretation of threat or possibilities in the environment form a necessary requirement for the occurrence of an emotion, even if these capacities are basic and are discharged to some extent automatically by the individual. The research carried out by June Price Tangney and
38
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
Kurt Fischer also assumes that at least emotions which are self-conscious have a strong social background. These researchers, however, would seem to be uninterested in the question of whether such emotions also have a biological component at least and could thus be partially explained on the basis of evolution.
2.2 The Emotional Territory’s Significance in Evolutionary Development Research into emotions from the standpoint of evolutionary biology provides evidence for the hypothesis that emotional reactions are at least in part steered by primitive basic functions, which evolved long before any higher functions associated with consciousness, came into play. Arne Öhman and Susan Mineka have studied how individuals deal with fear and various phobias (Öhman and Mineka 2001). They proceed from a basic premise similar to that of Lazarus, namely that mammals must have learned early in their evolutionary development to deal with dangers and sudden events in their environment, such as falling trees, bolts of lightning, and sudden lack of oxygen. Appropriate evolutionary strategies include fleeing or avoiding danger, but Öhman and Mineka suggest that this does not occur in accordance with a simple two-part stimulus-response model. Instead, between these two poles there has evolved a central motivational structure which can be activated both by external and internal stimuli. Thus there is a basic capacity which provides a more flexible guide for the individual about what is the appropriate reaction or action. Depending on circumstances, animals, which are threatened by imminent danger, can react, as has been stated, by standing completely still (freezing), fleeing or going to attack. Öhman and Mineka identify the central driving force behind these reactions as fear. In actual fact, the appraisal process is extremely complex, since all the while advantages which promote survival can be won by individuals who learn at an early stage to recognize certain sounds, smells and sensory impressions, before being actually confronted by the danger. It is to be expected that there were obvious evolutionary advantages in assigning parts of fear’s complex motivational structure to basal parts of the brain in order to develop rapid responses which do not presuppose cognitive capacities or conscious consideration. The basal parts of the motivational structure ought to incorporate a certain degree of complexity in order to permit a favourable flexibility in the patterns of response. Certain scents are recognizable and a sound can be so well-known that individuals will at most prick up their ears, or perhaps raise their heads. Öhman and Mineka have developed a theory about what they call the “fear module” and have described it in a way, which makes it empirically testable (ibid.). Starting from the evidence of various investigations into various phobias in human beings and apes, they suggest that the fear module is characterized by four central properties. (i) The module is activated in a strange or threatening situation by stimuli which are relevant to fear from an evolutionary perspective. (ii) The activation by these stimuli occurs automatically and (iii) it is relatively immune to attempts to control it cognitively. (iv) The activation of the module can be associated with a particular
2.2 The Emotional Territory’s Significance in Evolutionary Development
39
dedicated neural path, which is located in the amygdala (corpus amygdaloideum) on the front of the hippocampus. Other parts of the brain are probably involved, but the amygdala is conceived by many as a kind of co-ordinating, emotional computing centre within this system (see LeDoux 1999, LeDoux and Phelps 2000, Panksepp 2000). The automaticity of fear reactions suggests that the fear module has an evolutionary origin, even if repeated training can give the same degree of automaticity in various mental functions. Öhman and Mineka have shown how response to biological stimuli such as pictures of spiders, snakes or angry faces, occurs virtually automatically, in the sense that it is independent of consciousness. Anders Flykt’s research suggests that the same thing holds for certain cultural stimuli such as a pistol pointed at the experimental subject (Flykt 1999). The main evidence for the role of evolutionary development comes, however, from the localization of the basal functions of the fear module in a part of the brain where the cerebral cortex is not at all involved. It must therefore be a question of functions which were established at an early stage of evolution, before the cognitive capacities were able to function freely due to the development of the cerebral cortex. Jaak Panksepp gives an account of studies where it has been shown that injuries to the cerebral cortex only influence the degree of an emotional sequence of events, not the basal emotional reactions as such (Panksepp 2000, 152). The cerebral cortex is not a necessary prerequisite for emotions, but its development has made it possible for individuals to regulate their emotions in various sophisticated ways: prolonging or shortening a reaction, concentrating on the emotional resources by learning or analysing the emotional concepts in a new way. The cognitive components have a prominent role in Lazarus’ theory of emotions. For Lazarus, cognitive capacity has a central function in activating emotional reaction. The appraisal process with respect to how a stimulus in the environment can be thought to influence one’s own well-being is a necessary condition for whether an emotion will occur at all. According to Öhman and Mineka there is a part of the fear module which is relatively independent and reacts freely to various stimuli without involving cognition. Basic reactions are directly determined by certain stimuli, if they are relevant to fear from an evolutionary perspective. It is certainly possible to imagine that the evolutionary development has allowed basic parts of the emotional structure to develop in order to deal with rather complex decisions by pure conditioning. It is, however, first with the development of cognitive capacities that the possibility of social learning arises, and that we can expect cultural variations in emotional reactions. A probable role for cognitive ability is connected with the rationalization of an emotion (Öhman and Mineka 2001, 508). The basic emotional reaction undergoes further processing, the complexity of which becomes increasingly complex, the more developed the cognitive capacity becomes. It is a question of a rationalization phase where the individual, in some sense or other, chooses to adopt a certain attitude to the emotion, or to take command over it. The individual can, for example, believe that the immediate threat in the neighbourhood implies, in the short term, unpleasantness, but in the long run certain advantages. In a similar way, embarrassment can be the price that people consider worth paying to attain a certain value.
40
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
Cognitive capabilities can play an important role in the individual’s ability to anticipate danger and take the necessary measures. In part it is still a question of biology but it is the higher levels of the brain which are involved and the fear module develops relatively late in evolution. Michael Lewis has drawn attention to the distinction between emotions as mental states and emotional experiences as the point of departure for a discussion about the cognitive capacities’ relation to emotions (Lewis 2000a). Memory is a necessary cognitive prerequisite for the existence of emotional experiences. A child, who has experienced pain in connection with a visit to the doctor, may react with fear in encountering a person in a white coat. The capacity to categorize various types of stimuli like the capacity for rational thought and morally evaluating what is involved in certain actions, also influences emotional reactions. In research on emotions there would seem to be an emerging consensus about how one looks upon the connection between emotions and cognitive capacities. Arne Öhman holds that in the light of recent research, it is no longer meaningful to ask oneself whether cognitive capacities are necessary conditions for the emergence of emotional reactions such as fear (Öhman 2000). He holds that it is now more meaningful instead to seek an answer to how the interaction between the emotional and the cognitive takes place. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have in fact defined the concepts so that one completely circumvents this issue (Cosmides and Tooby 2000). For them, cognitive processes are simply another name for all the mental processes which take place in the brain and cover everything that in the everyday sense constitutes ‘thinking’ and ‘consciousness’ as well as basic emotional states which cannot be influenced by will or thought. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology emotions form only a part of a set of different information processes which take place in various parts of the brain in order for individuals to succeed in communicating and socially interacting with the world around them. The capacity for thinking is dissected and consists of a set of co-operating mental programs. Cosmides and Tooby’s terminology, however, changes nothing of substance. It is still meaningful and important partly to understand how various programs have been developed at different occasions in the course of evolution, depending on environmental and social challenges, and partly to understand how the complexity of various programs provide a basis for explaining variations between individuals at the same stage of development. In a fruitful pedagogic image Öhman and Mineka have described how one can look upon the evolutionary development of various behavioural modules in analogy with how one has seen that various organs have developed a high degree of complexity in order for individuals to be able to master their relationship to their surroundings. From this research into emotions it is not possible to draw the conclusion that biology is responsible for the universal features in an emotion and that individual variations can be explained by reference to social and cultural differences. Lazarus’ premises are too simplistic. For one thing, it is reasonable to imagine that there is a variation also in the basic motivational module, which depends both on environmental variations and random biological processes. Biological chance has relatively speaking played a greater role when it comes to properties which develop after the individual’s reproductive phase (Finch and Kirkwood 2000). The individual has
2.2 The Emotional Territory’s Significance in Evolutionary Development
41
everything to win from a genetic program which offers greater flexibility already at the automated stage. For another thing, the higher cognitive capacities which deal with learning and influence the individual’s capacity for strategic choice are subject to evolutionary selection mechanisms. It is therefore to be expected that a certain social encoding is incorporated in the emotional modules. There are also good reasons for paying heed to that part of research in the emotions which describes and explains how social and cultural influences affect the individual’s emotions, and it would be risky to rule out these variables if we want to explain the behavioural variations which arise between individuals and between different cultures. In a study of how bonobo apes learn a language, Pär Segerdahl, William Fields and Sue Savage Rumbaugh have made an important distinction regarding the concept of culture and culture’s evolutionary importance (Segerdahl et al. 2005). The dominant view of the concept of culture in biology is that it is a question of information which is transmitted from one individual to another, and from the elder to the younger generation by means of learning. Cultural influence can therefore be assumed to be greatest among animals with long life histories, something that I shall return to in the next chapter. After observing how the young bonobo ape Kanzi and his siblings acquire their language skills, Segerdahl, Fields and Savage-Rumbaugh draw attention to an evolutionary more important aspect of cultural influence. Kanzi learned to communicate with human beings by participating in everyday activities rather like when children acquire a language in the surroundings they grow up in. Individuals in a group are influenced by a common culture: “a shared way of living containing characteristic activities, tools, environments, communication means, social relations, personalities, games, gestures and so on” (ibid., 8). Culture is a part of the environment which influences individuals, and just as challenges in the natural environment exert a selective pressure, so too cultural changes which are sufficiently long lasting can be expected to influence evolutionary development in a certain direction. The conclusion drawn by Segerdahl et al. is that the primary understanding of language which is transmitted culturally, takes precedence to the language based on grammatical skills. Individuals are born with some kind of social sensitivity, which is highly relevant for their abilities to acquire language skills. Similarly, it is reasonable to consider that the individual’s emotional capacity is shaped by the challenges from the natural and cultural environment. The individual’s emotional motive for behaving in one way or another can be explained in evolutionary terms and is based partly on emotional modules, which are not in any simple way accessible to cognitive processes or the influence of consciousness. Öhman and Mineka have studied the fear module but there is not reason to suppose that the same ideas could not be applied and empirically tested in the case of other emotions such as shame, envy, embarrassment, pride and empathy. Different parts of the brain, however, would appear to be involved in different ways, depending on how much the cognitive capacities are involved, and it is to be expected that there will be variations which depend on the effect of various environmental factors, and also with respect to the cultural parts of the natural life environment of the individual and group (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Durham 1992). I shall return in the next chapter to consider questions about evolutionary selection at group level.
42
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
2.3 Integrity – A Composite Property of the Individual An emotion describes an individual’s way of reacting to certain internal or external stimuli. The interpretation of how a change in the internal or external environment can be thought to influence one’s own well-being can occur more or less automatically and involves different levels of consciousness in the brain. The emotional reaction can be recognized from various physiological processes and normally also from special behaviour, even if the behavioural tendency associated with the emotion is not always expressed in actions. Lazarus distinguishes between emotions where the individual reacts in a certain way, given certain stimuli, and properties which have an emotional basis, but where the reaction pattern exhibits a higher degree of stability, even when the circumstances change. A sad person can experience considerable joy when the sun appears in a grey sky, while a cheerful person is able also to recognize certain shades of silver in the grey clouds. The same would seem to be the case with integrity. There is a certain stability in the reaction pattern when circumstances change. The emotional territory is therefore specific for a certain individual and for human beings it should be designated as more stable individual characteristic rather than a short-term emotion. I have suggested that integrity can be described as an emotional territory. Integrity is not in itself an emotion but a characteristic with an emotional basis. This emotional basis is probably very complex and my suggestion is that we define it as a complex characteristic consisting of a number of different behavioural modules. Some of the emotions can certainly be linked to basal parts of the brain, while other components determining behaviour presuppose more advanced cognitive abilities. It is not difficult to imagine that behaviour which sets out to protect from and relate a private sphere to others can be valuable from an evolutionary perspective. Within biology, it is well known that various types of territorial behaviour is meaningful, given individuals’ need to secure their supply of food, protect themselves from their enemies or to have time to decide whether an intruder has good or bad intentions. Individuals can have reason for hiding their intentions so that their strategy about what they intend to do simply cannot be predicted by their opposite number. This provides greater flexibility in being able to deal with new situations and to be in command of the social game. By being in control of one’s private sphere, one gains social distance which can be advantageous in certain situations. Different techniques have been developed to shape and protect our territory. Robert Murphy has described how the Tuaregs make use of their dress to achieve this (Murphy 1984). In French, they are called “les hommes bleu” because of their long indigo coloured garments which more or less completely cover their bodies. A veil hides the region of the mouth from the tip of the nose downwards. The parts of the body which are visible are painted in the same blue colour. By means of the veil Tuaregs are able to distance themselves from other individuals. In negotiating a deal, in resolving a conflict or in the arriving at a settlement in the case of a marriage, the veiled individual can prevent their opposite number from noting important stimuli, thus giving themselves greater freedom to make their own strategic choices and minimise their own vulnerability. From an evolutionary point of view it is sometimes of great
2.4 Three Candidates: Fear, Embarrassment and Pride
43
use to transmit information, but on other occasions it can be directly harmful to reveal oneself. For that reason we would expect that all developed communicational systems between individuals in a social context would involve a capacity to regulate the exchange of information. In choosing between seclusion and participation, the boundaries between the private and public are continually being shifted depending on what best promotes reproduction, freedom of action, or in a human context also ideological and moral beliefs. As a property, integrity ought to have had, and has an evolutionary function in dealing with how we draw the line between the need to protect our own interests and simultaneously interact with the world around us in an effective manner, in a way which favours reproduction and the transmission of our own genes to succeeding generations. This is an important problem for individuals, all of who find themselves torn between seclusion and participation. Awareness of this, and the capacity to manoeuvre and to develop the emotional territory which bridges the gap between these two poles varies within the tree of evolution. As cognitive abilities develop in the course of evolution, complexity increases and in human species one can note great variations within the species.
2.4 Three Candidates: Fear, Embarrassment and Pride Integrity is a composite property consisting of several behavioural modules with different emotional backgrounds. Among conceivable candidates, fear ought to be a basic module. According to Lazarus (ibid., 234ff.) fear is directed at the imminent threat of concrete physical injury. There is a factor of uncertainty or ambiguity because the injury has not occurred but lies in the future, although this future can be very soon. If it is possible rapidly to avoid or flee from the impending danger, fear disappears or becomes less acute. Fear as a motivational structure and behavioural module could be considered as the first necessary component in an individual’s seizure of command over a social space. For certain species in the tree of evolution, cognitive abilities such as memory and imagination make the response pattern more flexible. A rat which in a certain situation is subjected to a painful stimulus will react with the same behaviour on a later occasion when the same conditions are repeated, but where it is not subjected to pain. The rat has a memory capacity, albeit of a relatively primitive kind. There are memory capacities with varying degrees of automatisation. In the case of animals which live longer we can, as has been stated, expect learning possibilities and cultural influence to play a large role. Embarrassment is another conceivable candidate in the emotional territory. Darwin described the phenomenon of blushing as the most human of all emotional expressions, but he linked this phenomenon to several self-conscious emotions and drew in fact no distinction between embarrassment and shame (Darwin 1872/1998, 310ff.). He looked upon the tendency to blush as hereditary, and described in detail the various physiological reactions which are associated with blushing. He also made suggestions about how an emotional reaction like embarrassment
44
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
can be measured. For Darwin, embarrassment is linked to how individuals think they appear to others. Attention is paid to their conduct in a social context. Several researchers have recently drawn attention to self-preoccupation when a person blushes. Embarrassment thus presupposes some form of mental capacity to make an evaluative comparison between us and other people. However for Darwin and later researchers, it is not a question of a moral evaluation, but is about a person’s social appearance. Michael Lewis has in a descriptive summary of the various theories of emotion concerning embarrassment drawn attention to the fact that they all speak of embarrassment as an unpleasant feeling which arises when our own self-image is discredited either as the result of the loss of self-esteem or of the esteem of others (Lewis 1995). Embarrassment and shame are two emotions which can be expected to be closely connected both as regards what prompts them and how they are exhibited in various patterns of behaviour. They are both linked to the individual’s self-image, and both can be thought to form part of an emotional territory such as integrity. The emotion of shame, however, presupposes a more complex cognitive capacity and reflection about how we as individuals satisfy certain social and moral rules and conventions. The capacity to feel shame is dependent on cultural influence and learning. It is thus a question of an emotion where it is difficult to find a continuity in the evolutionary history of development, even if all species whose social life is based on various types of social convention ought to have room for an emotion of this kind. According to emotions research embarrassment would seem to be of a more primitive type, in the sense that it does not presuppose that the individual has knowledge of social expectations of various kinds, but is more directly focussed on self-exposure. Shame is the result of a negative outcome in evaluating ourselves. Embarrassment can arise not only in connection with censure, but also when people receive a positive reception from other people. Speakers who are introduced with appreciative words can react by blushing, looking down at their lecture notes for a minute and somewhat nervously fiddling with their clothes or running their hands through their hair. Michael Lewis points inter alia to the level of intensity as an important differentiating factor (Lewis 2000b, 631). The experience of shame would seem to be intensive and heart-rending. It involves a number of higher cognitive capacities for a long time. The individual is intensely concerned with his or her own insufficiency which is experienced as the basic factor giving rise to the emotion. Experiences of embarrassment are not nearly so intensive and all consuming for the individual. The body language is also different. The behaviour of people who feel shame includes a desire to hide oneself, disappear or die. In the case of embarrassment it is instead an ambivalent attitude in the person concerned, who is torn between simultaneously wishing to come closer and desiring to flee. The individual looks one in the eyes and then looks away, in a repetitive behaviour which is followed by a smiling facial expression (ibid.). This behaviour with the smiling face is never associated with shame. Studies have been carried out of embarrassment in children (Griffin 1995) but the theoretical development would still seem to be relatively incomplete. It is clear, however, that it is not simply a question of a private emotional reaction to some event in the world around us. A spectator will immediately recognize the
2.4 Three Candidates: Fear, Embarrassment and Pride
45
signs of embarrassment and the emotion should be considered as a form of social communication which has considerable importance for the development of a course of events (Miller 1995). Michael Lewis allows the possibility of a continuity between shame and embarrassment, so that the difference between them is merely in terms of the emotion’s intensity. He also includes two types of emotion in the embarrassment group. On the one hand, there is embarrassment as exposure; on the other, there is embarrassment as a form of shame involving a higher degree of intensity. Not least from the perspective of evolutionary psychology but also with regard to the ambivalence which is present in embarrassment but not in shame, it would seem more appropriate to differentiate them. Ambivalence expresses a social function in the emotion of embarrassment which ought to be present in species long before some more advanced capacity to relate to social rules and moral expectations had evolved. Embarrassment can be considered to have played an important role in the course of evolution for the individual’s capacity to relate to other individuals and find a place in the social arena. The ambivalent attitude suggests an evaluative component in the emotional capacity, which has the function of deciding if one is liked, treated with suspicion or exposed to hostile attention. This plays an important role in defining the individual’s social space. Embarrassment as an emotion would seem to be a promising candidate for inclusion in the emotional territory which causes individuals to react to invasions of their integrity. To be embarrassed is something unpleasant, even if it is the consequence of praise and approval. This feeling makes individuals try, by means of various patterns of behaviour, to protect themselves, or to take command of situations where the emotion is stimulated. Those who are affected try in various ways to avoid exposure and escape attention. In the case of violations of integrity there is also an element of repudiation or rejection, where the person who has been violated holds their head high to mark the impropriety of the intrusion, and counterattacks. The violation is not in itself a pleasant experience, but the emotional response would seem also to include a trace of pride. Emotion researchers have found a similarity between children’s joy in discovering a causal connection when playing with building blocks, and the type of pride which children display when they discover their own role in this causal nexus. The majority, however, would seem to hold that there are important differences between experiences of joy over simple causal connections and the pride which older children feel when they achieve something which result in some kind of social recognition (Stipek 1995). Hume made a clear distinction between experiences of joy and experiences of pride (Hume 1740/2002). He associates pride not only with a positive and uplifting feeling, but also with a feeling of self-importance, a confidence in the form of a feeling of personal capability and power. That which inspires pride must be related in some positive way to one’s own person. People can feel happiness over a beautiful house but a further necessary condition for experiencing pride is that it is their own house, or that they have been involved in designing it or building it (Taylor 1980). In the case of children who experience joy when the tower of building blocks remains standing after an additional block has been placed on the pile, it would seem that their joy is associated with an insight into their own
46
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
contribution. There are studies where one has identified various physiological signs and behaviour as indicators that individuals feel that they have succeeded or failed with something. None of them, however, would appear to be unique for pride (Stipek 1995). From the perspective of evolutionary biology it is quite possible to imagine that there is a continuity between basic reactions of joy prompted by causal processes where individuals themselves are involved in an increasingly more advanced self-assessment based on complex cognitive abilities and which is influenced by various social systems of reward where the individual’s attainments become the object of others people’s appreciation. People whose integrity has been violated react with fear and embarrassment, but are also able to put forward a defence on the basis of the image they have of themselves as being valuable and capable people. The emotions of pride and embarrassment are both associated with social status, something that in evolutionary terms has formed an important focus for selection. To lose face can be thought to increase the motivation to make use of the next opportunity offering an increased chance of social advancement. Like other positive emotions pride can also be thought to function in such a way that it expands individuals’ awareness when it comes to new impressions and new opportunities (cf. Cosmides and Tooby 2000, 104). Embarrassment and pride are linked to functions such as social weakness and social strength, which are important from an evolutionary standpoint. Embarrassment tends to be given the task via social exposure of performing a somewhat ambivalent investigation of one’s own personal status, examining where one is more vulnerable and runs the risk of social isolation, and where one’s strengths lie and where social warmth and solidarity can be rediscovered. Studies of experimental animals have led to a growing knowledge about neural paths in the brain which supply social emotions of this type in mammals (Panksepp 2000, 138). Pride is directly related to a form of social status which is important for individuals, if they are to be successful in their intentions and actions. Social emotions of this kind have great evolutionary significance. As Arne Öhman has pointed out: “Human history is replete with examples of how social conflicts that have escalated out of control provide a potentially deadly danger, not to speak of the social threat in terms of defeat and humiliation they may involve” (Öhman 2000, 575). The evaluation, both automatic and conscious, of one’s behaviour in terms of social success or social failure would probably be an important part of the individual’s framing of new goals and plans of action. Given that individuals in the course of evolution have been compelled to deal with increasingly challenging social situations, the conditions for fear as an emotion have also altered. People still react to some extent automatically at the sight of dangers in nature such as snakes and other reptiles. In studies of selfreported fear, the social fears emerge clearly (ibid., 575). The informants describe fears, which are connected with relations to other people, fear of social criticism, fear of rejection and fear of conflict. Öhman and his co-workers have proposed that these fears are part of fundamental behavioural modules which have been formed in the course of evolution and which derive from a dominance -submission system, the adaptive function of which has been to promote a social order through various hierarchies for dominance (ibid., 576).
2.5 The Role of the Emotions in the Establishment of Social Order
47
2.5 The Role of the Emotions in the Establishment of Social Order – Dominance and Submission Animals which live in groups are often described in terms of dominance and submission, where the internal relation between the members of the group is hierarchically ordered (see Creel and Sands 2003, Drea and Frank 2003). These types of behaviour would seem partly to be related to fear but they are also important as independent components in the social life of the group. The hierarchical position of individuals determines their role and place in the group’s collective search for protection and in the struggle for food. Susan Perry has described how South American ringtail monkeys (Cebus capucina) form strong coalitions where a group of low ranked males and females are prevented from taking part in the search for food in a tree, despite the fact that there is plenty room for them (Perry 2003). Who co-operates with whom is determined by one’s place in the hierarchy, and individuals that do not belong to the coalition are met with aggressiveness. If there is an external threat to the group new constellations can arise in order to defend the group. Being able to find a productive balance between co-operation and competition within a social group is a necessary condition for being able to orientate oneself and react in an advantageous way in encountering predators, prey and hostile groups (de Waal and Tyack 2003, 87ff.). In times of external threat and lack of food, it is to be expected that there will be selective pressure to develop cognitive abilities which favour cooperation, a form of intelligent social life which can be seen in the case of the spotted hyena and some primates (Boesch 2003, Drea and Frank 2003). The basis for co-operation is the social order in the group where dominance and submission form the basic behavioural modules. Often the dominance-submission game takes a symbolic form, where one of the parties tries in various ways to impress the other with his or her strength and courage. There are, however, examples of behaviour where the social order and assignment of roles entails submission for one of the parties, which from an evolutionary perspective is very obvious. The spotted hyenas sometimes spend periods by themselves or in small groups and when they are reunited in the burrow they share, they perform a kind of greeting ritual in which the hierarchical order is once more determined (Drea and Frank 2003, 134). Two hyenas place themselves beside each other and the one which is submissive turns its rear quarters towards the head of the dominant individual, simultaneously lifting its leg and allowing the other to come close and inspects its genitals. The behaviour is then repeated with the roles reversed. The submissive individual must first lift its leg, “exposing their entire reproductive future to the bone-crushing teeth and powerful jaws of a higher-ranking animal” (ibid.). Such behaviour would probably not have survived the evolutionary pressure of selection, if the social order with dominance and submission had not had its own decisive advantages for the species. Arne Öhman has described the characteristic behaviour which characterizes dominance and submission in primates (Öhman 1986, 129). In primates, facial expression plays a crucial role. A dominant chimpanzee male demonstrates his superior social status by an erect gait and the bristling of his hair. “The opponent is
48
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
fixated with wide open, staring eyes under frowning brows. The mouth is shut with tense lips and somewhat lowered corners” (ibid.). After a battle, the loser exhibits clear signs of submission. “The submissive expression often includes gaze aversion, and fear-grimaces in the form of a silent bare-teeth display, with the eyes wide open, the brows relaxed or up, and corners of the mouth drawn back, exposing the teeth and sometimes the gums” (ibid.). It is especially interesting to note in this connection that the behavioural patterns which are linked to dominance and submission are very like those associated with the emotions of pride and embarrassment. Proud individuals draw themselves up, raise their heads and gaze, while embarrassed persons sink their eyes and give an ambiguous smile. The human role game does not have perhaps the same crucial importance for the survival of the species, but it would seem that there is a continuity in behaviour between, on the one hand, pride and dominance and, on the other, between embarrassment and submission. The individual’s role as dominant or submissive would seem to play an important part in human social interaction. Pride and embarrassment carry with them evolutionary memories that are associated with the struggle for survival among the hyenas in Africa’s savannahs and primates in their forests. Integrity as an emotional territory which includes the emotions of fear, pride and embarrassment would really seem to have a long evolutionary history which is of fundamental importance for the individual’s social life. Perhaps it should also be pointed out that there is a whole array of positive emotions such as joy, contentedness, enthusiasm and love, which stimulate the individual to be actively attached to a group. However, the focus in the present context is on defensive types of emotion, connected with invasions of a person’s integrity. Both types of emotion have social functions. When integrity is violated, the individual reacts with fear, embarrassment and pride. It is a case of a composite emotional response. Several emotions can be considered relevant, but these three would seem to be central, and at an initial stage in theorising, it can be appropriate to begin with a limited set of emotions. It is a question of a minimalist theory about what constitutes a violation of integrity, seen from the viewpoint of the individual who is affected. I shall hand over to people researching into emotions, ethologists and people investigating the brain, to further develop and empirically test these three behavioural modules, which together make up an individual’s integrity. As Öhman and Mineka have stated in the case of fear, an expanded emotional theory about integrity ought to satisfy four theoretic demands (Öhman and Mineka 2000, 484). (i) It must be clear that the specific behaviour forms a meaningful functional unit from an evolutionary perspective, something that has been demonstrated for all three emotions which make up integrity. (ii) Characteristic features must be specified for each type of behaviour (e.g. how the system is activated, the type of response and the degree of automaticity involved). (iii) The theory must be able to generate hypotheses about what influences the various types of behaviour and how different behavioural patterns associated with the various emotions in the territory, are causally related to one another. (iv) The empirical evaluation must be based on strict tests, whereby competing explanations can successively be discarded. When it comes to measuring the effects of an invasion of integrity, we can imagine using physiological measures, but it would seem to be very difficult to
2.6 The Experience of Self
49
define in an unambiguous and clear way, those measures which allow us to distinguish what emotions are involved. Reading an individual’s behaviour would seem to be a more viable approach. In the case of primates, there were, for example, clear differences in the way of smiling which allowed one to distinguish embarrassment from pride. In this matter, my sole claim is that by providing a new approach to understanding the concept of integrity, I have shown the possibility of reaping a reward from such a theoretical development.
2.6 The Experience of Self As has been shown, an emotion is a behavioural module consisting of three components. The emotional response has certain physical signs, it includes an emotional experience and it is associated with a tendency to act in a certain way. The emotion refers to all three aspects. Already in this basic definition there is a link to the individual as an acting being, notwithstanding that the behaviour in certain cases is very primitive, even if it also in the case of a fundamental emotion such as fear, is a question of a more composite property than a simple condition. By assigning the three emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride to the common shared property of integrity, one arrives at a combined emotional territory where the tendency to act has relatively speaking a complex background. For certain individuals, the cognitive processing can be of an extremely simple kind, but whoever has the capacity to be afraid, embarrassed, and feel a sense of pride, ought, on the basis of the behavioural tendencies which are associated with these emotions, to be able to be designated as acting individuals or actors. In every emotion, there is also a certain involvement of the subject’s self – ego-involvement – something which also characterizes acting individuals, including human beings (Lazarus 100). In the emotions of pride and embarrassment, the relationship to ego-involvement is particularly prominent. Both these emotions are in a fundamental sense linked to the standing one has in the eyes of other people. As the cognitive abilities evolve and cultural factors play a greater role, the expressions for the emotion pride are more related to the image that individuals have of themselves (Isenberg 1980). The same thing ought to hold for the motion of embarrassment. Beginning with the central role that he assigns to the capacity for concept formation and language, Richard Rorty has claimed that an attribute like embarrassment is exclusively human in character. Humiliation is a special kind of pain experience which animals are incapable of (Rorty 1989, 88ff.). According to Rorty, this would presuppose in part a whole number of cognitive capacities which animals are incapable of dealing with, in part an advanced social culture of the kind which human beings have created. However, already Darwin made observations which refute this restrictive division, as far as an emotion like embarrassment is concerned. Darwin’s major work on emotions, which contains observations systematically collected and described with the help of numerous anthropologists, ethologists and people living in other cultures, shows partly that many of the emotions which have been chiefly
50
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
studied in the case of human beings are also present in other animals, and partly that many emotions have universal features (Darwin 1872/1998). Paul Ekman has, inter alia in a discussion with the social anthropologist Margaret Mead given an account of how later research into emotions has been able to verify Darwin’s observations (Ekman 1998). The expressions of emotions have strong universal features associated with their value to individuals, as a tool for being able to communicate with the world around them. The hair bristling on the body, the increase in blood circulation to the arms when danger threatens, the hands coming out in a cold sweat and the increase of blood circulation in the legs brought about by fear, blushing and the averting of the eyes brought about by embarrassment, drawing oneself erect and raising one’s head – all these phenomena are universal expressions of emotions. They are to be found in all cultures and more or less in all species of animals. Naturally biology cannot provide the complete answer. Exactly what it is that prompts these expressions can vary between cultures, just as individuals for moral, cultural or religious reasons vary in their reactions to challenges in the world around them and in their way of processing emotional reactions. Darwin noted that young people blush more often than their elders and he mentions two observations where two little girls, between the ages of 2 and 3, blushed when they were reprimanded for something they had done. This is well before an age when one can believe that they had acquired the language skills which Rorty presupposes are involved in drawing his line of demarcation. Given the theory of language learning which Segerdahl, Fields and Savage-Rumbaugh have put forward (Segerdahl et al. 2005) it is not at all difficult to look upon these children as primarily language-gifted in the sense that they are in possession of an emotional equipment for social communication, where the capacity for embarrassment is only one of several components in a fundamentally natural feeling for social relations. Darwin also cites Dr Burgess’ work The Physiology or Mechanism of Blushing from 1839 in which Burgess shows in several cases that the tendency to blush is hereditary. Different families blush to a different extent and the extent to which blushing expands from the face, ears and neck further down the body, varies for individuals from different families. The emotional territory which constitutes the individual’s integrity has developed in the course of evolution in pace with how challenges in the environment have altered the individual’s conditions of life, through several emotions being able to act together in response to these changes and through more advanced cognitive capacities allowing individuals to act together with other individuals in a socially complex context. The property of integrity has considerable survival value since individuals in their own territory have a breathing space before reacting. There is time for interaction between several stimuli, a readiness for flexibility in the individual’s response, and a capacity to interpret and orientate oneself in the social interaction with other individuals. In the course of evolution a state of readiness to act along different lines and to maintain a multiplicity of different relations has developed. For individuals with a complex territory it is possible to imagine that in certain situations they find it more appropriate to surrender parts of that territory in order to gain some other advantage.
2.6 The Experience of Self
51
Integrity develops by individuals trying to deal with various challenges in their environment. Changes in the environment and encounters with other individuals within and outside their own social group who are competing for space, food and sexual exchanges, help to shape the emotional territory which forms the individual’s own sphere of action and experience. The territory is a result of the attempts of individuals to relate to the world around them from the viewpoint of their own interests. These interests can be more or less conscious and certain emotional reactions are determined at such a basic biological level that individuals cannot influence them, even if, at a more general, higher level, they can learn to relate to them with the help of various cognitive capacities (cf. Darwin’s encounter with the snake). The individual’s emotional territory develops in interaction with the surrounding world. It is thus basically a social property, even if it is determined, to a larger or smaller degree, by fundamental neurological and genetic components, and the evolutionary inheritance behind different individuals’ reactions can go back far in time. This is consistent with how psychologists describe emotion as a psychological category which is moulded in the interaction between physiological and social factors (Frijda 1986). Integrity would seem to be a rather robust property in the individual with both an individual variation and the occurrence of characteristic features which are shared between species, by the same species and by individuals in the same social group. With an increased cognitive capacity and increasing demands to deal with complex social information, individual variation increases. In human beings, it is probably not only influenced by different material and social conditions, but also by wider social conventions, religious ideas and moral views. The history of private life, which was described in the foregoing chapter, bears witness to a constant struggle to protect one own private sphere and also to be allowed to participate and develop different types of relation with other human beings. This has never been a simple task. It is easy for personal ambitions to spill over into other people’s territory, and without the co-operation of other people, personal goals cannot be attained. The constant moral and political task has been to accommodate people’s differences, to weigh particular needs against the usefulness of interacting with others in the family or neighbourhood, or among colleagues at work and as a citizen. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with the question of what moral principles should guide us in organizing society, bearing in mind individuals’ dual interest in seclusion and participation. What moral principles should guide the organization of our lives together, both so as to protect peoples privacy and at the same time, respecting them as beings with moral authority, who are themselves capable of having insight into and of participating in the shaping of social institutions. The basic insight to be derived from the historical survey, is that every individual wishes to personally exert influence on how the distinction is to be made between the private and the public spheres. The struggle for social recognition has its roots in the development of the emotional territory, but biology as a discipline makes no normative claims and evolution is not directed towards some predetermined goal. Can one identify rational principles which allow scope for human differences and at the same time form a basis for reaching a reasonable balance among the various interests? Respect for integrity can
52
2 The Private Sphere as an Emotional Territory
be traced back to its social value and biological inheritance, but it looks forward to respect for another person as a being possessing moral and political authority. The question remains if it is sufficient to shape social institutions in accordance with these principles, or if it also presupposes people who possess integrity, not only as a property which other people can violate, but also as a feature of their character which actively guides their attempts to reconcile different interests. What makes a person of whom we can say, that he or she possesses integrity, a quality worthy of respect? In the next chapter, we will first of all discuss why integrity as an emotional territory is something morally worth protecting.
Chapter 3
Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
In this chapter, I shall discuss three alternative ways of describing integrity as something which is morally worth protecting. (i) In the case of the integrity of animals, some people have proposed a teleological view where we start from the premise that every species is carrying an intrinsic purpose and that this purposiveness is something which should be specially protected. (ii) An alternative to (i) is to focus on the individual’s own experiences in analogy with how respect and moral consideration have been linked to the individual’s capacity to experience pain or happiness. This alternative corresponds better to my own theoretical perspective, which takes as its starting point integrity as an emotional territory. An advantage of using this approach as a basis for moral consideration, is that we are able, with the help of physiological measurements and the study of behaviour, to determine objectively if, and to what degree, individuals are subject to territorial intrusion. Another advantage with a theory of integrity as something related to the individual’s capacity to experience things and social orientation, is that it can be applied to both animals and human beings. The behavioural modules can appear somewhat different for different species, depending both on how different environments have necessitated different strategies of adaptation and how different cognitive abilities are integrated in a response. According to this line of argument, all creatures that are able to feel have a special right to moral protection. As a creature capable of feeling, the individual who possesses the property of integrity is entitled to be assigned a special moral status just as beings with the capacity to feel pain are assigned such a status. Confronted with beings that are capable of sensory feelings, we halt in the sense that we should neither inflict pain on such a being, nor violate their integrity without good reason. (iii) A third approach to moral consideration fixes on the individual’s capacity to act as something morally important, and therefore particularly worthy of moral protection. It is inter alia the Kantian moral tradition which has emphasized respect for the individual as a moral agent, although focussing exclusively on human beings. Morality regulates the intercourse between different individuals and groups. In human history, a number of moral principles have evolved in order to guide the social interaction between people and to cope with different conflicts of interest. According to the Kantian moral tradition, the members of a moral community impose on themselves the fundamental requirement that in their thoughts and actions they must refrain from everything that is based on violence, compulsion or deception.
M.G. Hansson, The Private Sphere, C Springer 2008
53
54
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
Ultimately it is a question of respecting another individual’s moral authority. This presupposes a capacity in the individual to be able to impose on themselves this form of basic requirement. It is here that there is a break in continuity with the rest of the animal kingdom, even if human beings share many capacities with the other animals and the actual experience of a violation of integrity in its basic essentials follows universal psychological principles.
3.1 A Teleological Perspective with Regard to Integrity The concept of integrity has in recent years begun to figure in discussions of animal ethics. In this context, however, one usually interprets the concept on the basis of a teleological perspective and not from the individual’s own experience or capacity to act. The capacity to feel pain has been widely accepted as a reason for assigning to animals a moral value which must be respected by human beings in keeping animals or using them in research experiments. Arthur Caplan has in addition proposed an animal’s purposiveness as a basis for moral status (Caplan 1993). If an organism tries to attain certain natural ends, such as drinking water, seeking out its habitat, or resting, then other things being equal, it is wrong to frustrate these desires and ends. According to Caplan, the capacity for feeling and purposiveness constitute two properties which intrinsically provide sufficient ground for ascribing to an organism a moral value which we should not violate without good reason. With regard to these properties, human beings and animals are similar, even if there are often relevant differences concerning the complexity involved which can constitute a legitimate ground for treating different beings differently. The capacity to feel pain is complex inasmuch as it can involve one or more of the following three components: namely a sensory one, an affective one and a cognitive one. A purely sensory pain reaction which can be observed in animals is by no means necessarily experienced by the animal as something painful. The nociceptive message never passes parts of the brain which cause the animal to feel pain. It is first when the affective and cognitive components are activated that it is meaningful to speak of suffering. If an animal has cognitive capacities which, for example, entail that an experience of pain can be anticipated or remembered, the prerequisites exist for mental suffering. The more advanced the capacities for experiencing pain that an animal possesses, the stricter the moral protection should be. In an analogous way, we can imagine that the property of being purposive varies in degree of complexity and can therefore constitute a ground for different treatment, even if all individuals with these properties have a right to moral consideration. Caplan never speaks of integrity in this connection but contents himself by giving purposiveness as a ground for a moral value. Bart Rutgers and Robert Heeger, however, take this purposiveness as a reason for assigning integrity to animals (Rutgers and Heeger 1999). According to their proposal, an animal’s integrity is a property which is composed of three components: the wholeness and completeness of the animal and the species-specific balance of the creature, as well as the animal’s
3.1 A Teleological Perspective with Regard to Integrity
55
capacity to maintain itself independently in an environment suitable for the species. All these components must be present in order that the animal is assigned a right to respect on the basis of its integrity. The concept of integrity can be applied both to the individual and the species. The individual animal is a well defined biological being with a special disposition. The proposal of Rutgers and Heeger forms part of a classical teleological tradition deriving from Aristotle who emphasized that all the parts of an animal, when taken together, form a complete or organic whole which is adapted to its end, that is to say purposive, and where the species has a disposition by virtue of this purposiveness to interact with other purposive parts in its natural environment. Here the concept of integrity is not at all related to the animal’s wellbeing or welfare. As a result, one includes more individuals than those capable of feeling pain in the category of moral subject worthy of our respect; at the same time, one allows more factors than pain and suffering to be counted as morally relevant. The aim is admirable but one overlooks several problems with this teleological way of describing things. It was Aristotle who first promulgated the idea that every species was determined by a specific idea. The species incorporated an inner purposiveness which also formed the basis for its interaction with other species. According to Aristotle, every species has thus an essential structure which must not be altered. The ideas of Rutgers, Heeger and Caplan of species as something biologically intact or whole and therefore worthy of protection is inspired by Aristotle’s concept of species. This essentialist notion is, however, antiquated. Since the triumph of the theory of evolution, this concept of species has been replaced by one which is in practice purely statistical. The old Aristotelian idea of variations as a deviation from a natural type which had been cherished by biologists, was replaced after the work of Darwin, Galton and Mendel by a focus on statistical variations between populations (Sober 1994, Chapter 11). A species is the sum of an arbitrarily chosen number of specific properties, among higher forms of life also determined by the capacity for sexual reproduction. The species does not embody any inner purposiveness but is the statistical description of variations within a population of individuals, put forward by a biologist from the viewpoint of a biological or practical end. If there are limits which should be respected between different species such as those at present described, this depends on such things as concern for the consequences for ecosystems, or the desire for a certain degree of biodiversity in nature. The idea of “the species” as a given, unchangeable entity is no longer compatible with the insights which have been attained through research in evolutionary biology. Species are not sacrosanct or inviolable. Moreover the very idea of purposiveness being latent or expressed in nature, and that this purposiveness or wholeness or disposition forms the basis for assigning a special moral value, is problematic. From the viewpoint of evolutionary biology there are no natural types which bear some form of inner, predetermined purpose. What is purposive depends upon how the individual is able to interact and deal with different stimuli or stressors in their environment. How well the individual succeeds, depends both on its inner and social qualities and on what happens in the world around. Thoughts about the natural type, the purposive or the biologically intact which is especially worthy of protection recurs here and there in the discussion about animal ethics. In the
56
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
Swedish legislation on the protection of animals, one finds the Aristotelian ontology as a requirement that the animal must be able to indulge in its natural behaviour. In practice, however, there is no such ‘natural behaviour’ and ideas about the purposive or the biologically intact as a ground for ascribing to animals the protective value of integrity give little in the way of moral guidance. There are numerous different breeds of domesticated pigs which are derived from pigs in the wild after a long process of domestication. No pig-breeder would think of treating domesticated pigs like their relatives in the wild. There are instead many variations in behaviour between different breeds which one has to know about, in order to decide if the animal is happy and content. That one of these variants is more natural or original is uninteresting from a moral standpoint. What is crucial is instead to identify, on the basis of the animal’s behaviour, its preferences and how its welfare is affected by such things as its accommodation, how it is handled, its social situation, how its transport is organized etc. (Meyerson 2003, 49). Does the animal show signs of anxiety, apprehension or evasiveness? It is not the place itself, nor the access to rest and water which is morally crucial, but how the animal reacts to this or that. A sheep which has been genetically modified by having a human gene for a coagulation factor hooked onto a gene for its own milk protein, is no longer biologically intact and the operation, on the basis of the definition put forward by Rutgers and Heeger can be viewed as a crime against the animal’s integrity. However in the course of evolution, many genes have been hooked on and off, or switched on or off, and the small behavioural variations which can be distinguished between different breeds, have also in part a genetic background. What ought to be crucial for ethical judgement, are the consequences of the operation for the animal’s health, well-being and integrity as an experiential phenomenon.
3.2 The Moral Value of Protection Originating in the Individual’s Capacity for Sentient Experience The teleological approach to defining the concept of integrity seems to be a deadend. It does not accord with what one knows from the biology of evolution about the development of the species and individual’s attempts to master their environment. It also does not fit in with basic moral intuitions that it is more important to take account of individuals’ own preferences, their health and well-being, than of what is supposed to be ‘natural’. Using the definition of integrity indicated in the previous chapter, we focus on the animal’s own sentient experience. A violation of the animal’s integrity means an intrusion into its emotional territory. The experience of an intrusion into its territory can be inferred from the animal’s behaviour and in several cases, there are clear physiological measurements, which can be used to measure the degree of this intrusion. Like the capacity to feel pain, such a violation of integrity can be read off by means of sensory measurements. Integrity is to be found in rats, as well as in human beings. In the case of humans we can expect a more complex picture since the cognitive capacity is more advanced, and a special behaviour can
3.2 The Moral Value Originating in the Capacity for Sentient Experience
57
be influenced by how the individual deals with such things as linguistic narratives, special views about reality and prudential or moral values. In the case of imagination, human beings differ from other creatures. Human beings would seem to possess a special capacity for imagining things which cannot yet be observed. It is possible to object that it is risky to transfer human linguistic images and concepts, which have a clear meaning in terms of human experiences, to animal experiences. However, some of this is already done when, in the case of children, we look for expressions of emotions such as fear, embarrassment or pride. The objection also presupposes that there is no continuity in the development of various emotions, from beings with simple cognitive capacities to socially advanced beings with rich cognitive capacities for dealing with their emotions rationally. Research in evolutionary psychology has presented clear evidence that some of the emotional response exhibited by human beings are also processed by mental structures which developed very early in the history of evolution, and which can be found to be present in many animals. The development of advanced capacities for a rich social life does not imply that that we are not partly steered by the same system of dominance and submission like other social animals. It remains for ethologists to develop and define the exact meaning of emotional territory in the case of different kinds of animals, on the basis of the emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride, but here there is then a theoretical approach which seems more promising than the teleological way of looking at things. What is required is that one can discover a basis other than the teleological one, to give integrity a moral protective value; in other words, something which one ought to respect and should not violate without good reason. The difficulties involved, however, do not appear insuperable. Here are at least two conceivable alternatives, both of which have the advantage of being compatible with the insights of evolutionary biology concerning a continuity between human beings and the rest of the animal kingdom. The first alternative has been formulated within the framework of classical utilitarianism and in preference utilitarianism. There is substantial agreement that the capacity to experience pain or pleasure constitutes sufficient ground for attributing a moral protective value to those individuals who possess such a capacity, even if the reasons given can vary. There is also broad unanimity, given the capacity of individuals to have their life plans and preferences frustrated, about assigning a moral protective value to individuals who possess such an ability to some degree. These are properties which are morally relevant and should be noted. In both cases, it is a question of sufficient reasons: they are not necessary for assigning a moral protective value. The capacities noted constitute a minimalist ground. It is possible, with the help of further criteria, to specify the distinctions which make it meaningful to distinguish between different individuals with respect to the degree to which they possess these capacities. Thus, as has been mentioned, pain can be divided into three components, a sensory component, an affective component and a cognitive component (Hansson 1996). Via the nociceptive system, pain stimuli are transmitted to the basal parts of the brain, which brings about a pain reaction, but the individual concerned feels no pain. For pain to be felt, the affective capacities must be involved. Depending on the development of the
58
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
frontal cortex, the preconditions for experiencing pain vary both qualitatively and quantitatively between and among different developmental levels/groups of animals. In addition to the sensory and affective components, pain also has a cognitive aspect. Depending on cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination and language, individuals can experience pain in different ways and choose different strategies to control it, depending on how this pain interacts with other stress factors. In this, human beings form part of a developmental chain and share many capacities with other animals, but also differ in regard to certain points just as the different types of animals used in meat production and animal experiments differ from one another. The questions of whether, and to what degree, these differences between different individuals and different types of animal are morally relevant e.g. whether there are reasons for assigning a higher protective value to a human being than to a chimpanzee or a higher protective value to a rat than to a squid, are not of interest for the moment. Here we are concerned with the more fundamental question of whether capacities can be thought to constitute reasons for giving an individual a moral protective value. Other things being equal, it is morally reprehensible to expose another individual to pain or to frustrate his or her preferences. Good arguments are required if this is to be justified. Such an argument might be, for example, that the pain that is caused is an unavoidable part of the medical treatment. Similarly a dog must learn to obey its master and mistress if it is to function as a pet, and as a result its own preferences must be curbed. Taking as one’s starting point its definition as an emotional territory, integrity as a property morally worth protecting can be assigned to the group of experiencerelated properties. To enter uninvited an individual’s emotional territory is to violate that integrity and as in the cases of inflicting pain and frustrating preferences, there has to be good reasons for doing so. With regard to integrity, the seriousness of the violation can be thought to vary depending upon the complexity of the territory which the individual seeks to defend, just as analogously one distinguishes between pains which only involve nociception and pains which also engage the affective and cognitive levels of the individual. According to this line of argument, the property of integrity is a property worth protecting which is analogous to the capacity to experience pain and the capacity to entertain preferences which can be frustrated. Integrity is thus a property by virtue of which an individual should be included in a moral community. An alternative would be on non-moral grounds to assume that integrity has an intrinsic value as a part of a good life for the individual. The idea here is that what is good in itself is something worth striving after. Such an approach, however, seems to be only partly applicable in the case of integrity. Certain components in the emotional territory such as the possibility of retreating to a secluded place, could be thought to have an intrinsic value, but an important point underlying my definition of integrity as an emotional territory, is that individuals depending on their inner qualities and challenges in the surrounding environment, choose to respond differently to such a supposed intrinsic value. In order to achieve a certain measure of participation in social relations, individuals presumably wish to curtail their opportunities for seclusion. This does not fit in at all with the idea of an intrinsic value. James Griffin’s theory of how a
3.3 Moral Value of Protection from the Viewpoint of the Individual’s Capacity for Action
59
number of prudential values form components in an individual’s well-being, would seem to do more justice to the dynamic of the emotional territory (Griffin 1986, 1996). Griffin puts forward values such as the possibility of some form of control over one’s own life (and thus not simply being a victim of circumstances and the decisions of others), of experiencing some measure of deeper personal relations, of enjoying life and achieving something of substance and significance in one’s life. These values can be thought to be important components as parts of a good life for all human beings, but people assign different weights to them. Someone is willing to surrender a certain degree of autonomy in order to alleviate pain. Some people are prepared to abstain from certain relations with others in order to have more control over their own lives. According to Griffin there is a continuity between the experience of these components as valuable, and the experience of other fundamental interests of a more physical kind (Griffin 1996, 52ff.). Just as one can experience the absence of food as a deficiency, which finds its expression in various physical and psychological symptoms, so one can experience the absence of control, or the absence of personal relations as a deficiency. The experience of these prudential values is a part of human nature in an analogous way to other human properties. Griffin does not deal with the question of animals’ well-being, but there is nothing which contradicts a continuity with other animals where the limiting factor for being able to experience the lack of a basic value as a deficiency, is the individual’s cognitive and emotional capacity. There would seem to be an obvious affinity between Griffin’s theory of value and my presentation of integrity as a property which is valuable to the individual. The focus is on the functions which are protected by the emotional territory, for example the opportunity for seclusion or the opportunities for relations with other individuals and social influence. In Griffin’s opinion, it is these functions which are valuable. Cognitively advanced individuals can choose to relate in different ways to these valuable functions, and in some sense give up part of their territory in order to win something else which is significant. Integrity as an intrinsic property cannot, however, be regarded as such a value, but rather forms a necessary condition for the ability to experience these values. It is a question of a mental property which is to be found in all social beings without which social relations, even in a very primitive sense, are impossible.
3.3 The Moral Value of Protection from the Viewpoint of the Individual’s Capacity for Action Given individuals’ capacity to experience an intrusion into their emotional territory as a violation, there are thus moral reasons for other people to halt outside. An alternative, if one wishes to argue for integrity as morally worthy of protection, is to link this property to the individual’s capacity to act. People who have the capacity to be afraid, to be embarrassed and to feel pride, given the tendencies to action which are linked to these emotions, and the state of readiness for certain actions
60
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
which emotional territory supplies, ought to be able to be designated as agents or actors. Already by means of the interplay and balance which develops between the three emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride in the brain, there exist possibilities for looking upon the individual as an independent agent. In every emotion there is a degree of ego-involvement, something that is characteristic for agents. Starting from the co-operation between the three specified emotions, a relatively complex self-image is developed. In the social interaction the subject’s self-image is reinforced by role-taking in terms of submission and dominance. To be able to have integrity violated is thus a sufficient condition for enjoying the respect which belongs to an agent. Even if one does not achieve a more advanced level as a moral actor, it should be sufficient to include individuals with this property within a moral community of such individuals. It is reasonable to look upon individuals who are able in certain situations to swallow their pride, refrain from exploiting their superior position and making use of another person’s embarrassment, as moral subjects. As shall be shown later, various forms of play offer a pedagogical framework for moral education which helps gradually to give an individual a sense of fair play. The necessary precondition for this moral development is to be found in the basic interaction between the emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride. The emotions form a substrate for the individual’s developmental possibilities, or to put it another way, function as organs which are developed in dynamic interaction with the environment just as other organs such as lungs, skin, nervous system have equipped individuals to deal with challenges in their environment. Interplay between the emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride constitutes a necessary condition for a life as a socially and morally acting being. Psychopaths who display an incapacity to respect other peoples’ integrity can be considered as pathological examples of cases where the condition is missing. The psychopath is continually on the move, and never manages to establish long lasting, secure emotional relations with other individuals. It is especially in the Kantian tradition of ethics that emphasis has been placed on respect for the individual as an agent, however, only with respect to human beings. In several works, Onora O’Neill has drawn attention to this particular feature of Kant’s moral philosophy (O’Neill 1989, 2002). Morality regulates the intercourse between different individuals and groups. In the course of human history a number of moral principles have emerged to guide the social interaction between human beings and to deal with the various conflicts of interest which arise. Kant’s idea is that we must only choose those principles for our actions which we would wish to see universalized (Kant 1785/1965). We must imagine ourselves in a situation where the principles we ourselves subscribe to are also applied by other agents to all others, including ourselves. Nobody would then approve of principles which are based on force, deception or violence, as universally valid moral maxims. In certain situations an action which is based on compulsion can be accepted, but then only as an exception to protect freedom of action. Individuals can, in certain specified circumstances, be forcibly treated against their will in order that they cannot performs actions which are against their own interests or which threaten other people. Thus the aim is always to support, as far as possible, the confidence of individuals in their own capacity so that they can, without the use of compulsion, take charge of their
3.3 Moral Value of Protection from the Viewpoint of the Individual’s Capacity for Action
61
own lives and those of other people. O’Neill has developed a system of ethics based on such principles in order to deal constructively with a series of bioethical issues, but this lies outside our present focus (O’Neill 2002). According to the Kantian moral tradition the members of a moral community impose a fundamental requirement on their thoughts and actions to abstain from whatever is based on violence, compulsion or deception. The moral responsibility extends only to those with sufficient capacity to follow another person’s reasons and arguments for acting. There are more individuals involved in the moral community who are worthy of protection (see Kant’s concept of Schützgenossen, Kant 1793/1982, 46), but there is a clear limitation in Kant’s thinking when it comes to those who can conceivably be included on the basis of their cognitive capacities. Animals certainly do not belong, although there are moral reasons for being concerned with their well-being (Hansson 1991). Nor did Kant accept feelings as a basis for moral action, even if he presupposed a fundamental moral feeling associated with the will to be moral. Emotions have no place in his structure for moral thinking and acting. They cannot help the individual to decide what is right or wrong (I shall return to the question of the function of emotions when I deal with acting morally in Chapter 8). On the other hand, respect for the agent is of fundamental importance. The moral principles which are applied must not be allowed to completely eliminate an individual’s scope for action. In this way, one has an indirect protection of those properties which are needed for an individual to react to challenges in the world around and to other individuals. In the Kantian tradition, the individual’s communicative properties are morally valuable, an aspect of Kantian ethics which has been developed inter alia by Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib (Benhabib and Dallmayr 1990, Habermas 1968/1987, 1985/1991). Integrity defined as an emotional territory which includes a disposition to action and where individuals relate to the world around them in a structured way is therefore something which is morally worth protecting. As in the understanding of other morally important properties, it is possible to conceive of a continuity from very basic capacities which are present in some animals to a very complex communicative capacity which involves various cognitive capacities in human beings. Margaret Archer has developed a theory of human action in which she rejects, on the one hand, biological simplifications which explain human action in terms of their biological constitution, while, on the other hand, attacking what she calls the sociological fundamentalism of many postmodernists, who claim that advanced linguistic and cultural capacities form a necessary condition for human action (Archer 2000). Human properties and possibilities are neither predetermined nor exclusively social in character, but arise as a result of practical attempts to relate to the surrounding world. Archer deals with questions about human action from a sociological perspective and shows that there is a continuity between children’s mastery of challenges in their environment and adults’ socially complex actions. She does not discuss the question of the evolutionary genesis of these properties, or whether human action is continuous with the types of behaviour which can be observed in other animals. Her theory, however, fits in well with the results of evolutionary biology and neurobiology. Jaak Panksepp emphasizes, for example, that the demonstration of basic
62
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
emotional structures in the brain does not lessen the need for a complementary perspective, in order to explain, for example, how human beings deal with emotional challenges in real life (Panksepp 2000, 140). Kim Sterelny who starts from the empirically reasonable premise that the environment which tests individuals in the course of evolution is neither thoroughly friendly nor neutral, has suggested that there are different survival advantages at stake. These can be attained partly by cognitively dealing with several different stimuli simultaneously with a certain robustness, and partly by developing a broad multiple response to these stimuli (Sterelny 2001). Cosmides and Tooby have for example described the capacity to prioritize between different emotional impressions, as an important control function of great adaptive value (Cosmides and Tooby 2000, 103). This capacity to prioritize helps the individual to decide which functions are compatible, as for example hunger and boredom, and which exclude one another, such as searching for food and fleeing from a predator. Individuals’ life possibilities are strengthened to the extent that they can anticipate behaviour among their social counterparts. Because the environment is not completely transparent and is sometimes threatening, the pressure to develop the communicative capacities is increased. In primates, one has observed advanced capacities to read various behavioural patterns in a competitor. These capacities, when taken together, help individuals to make decisions about mental states, such as fear (de Waal 1982). Animals in general do not sit around and wait passively on information from the world around them. Sometimes the events in their environment are signals they read as a direct result of their own investigations. Parrots and other birds which hunt tree-boring insects make use of sound which they themselves produce to locate their prey. African wild dogs test a possible quarry by means of behaviour designed to reveal vulnerability (Sterelny 2002, 271–272). Animals interpret not only their environment but also the changes which they themselves can bring about in it. Through the capacity to combine several different types of stimuli in a robust way and apply a broad spectrum of responses, preferences have evolved which make the animal better fitted to dealing with new factors in the environment which have been caused by the changes the animal itself initiates. There is some argument about the extent to which the animal itself can, and needs to, bear in mind how a certain action leads to a certain result, just as there is about where in the tree of evolution we find this intentional type of behaviour. Sterelny’s point is that there is a continuity in the development of preferences and these presuppose the capacity to deal with several stimuli simultaneously in a robust but flexible way. Animals can learn what they need, not only how to satisfy their needs, and with their capacity to deal with their preferences individuals can postpone gratification to a later occasion, something which is important for planned behaviour. From a moral point of view it can be necessary to make a distinction between an individual’s different capacities for preference-steered actions. In this connection it is interesting to see that there is a continuity between different kinds of animal. Basically one ought to encounter those properties which are associated with dealing with fear and the development of a personal identity, initially not as self-consciousness in some more advanced sense, but as an emotional territory which is characterized
3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity
63
by a certain stability and gives a sufficient flexibility in the pattern of responses and preferences. Derek Parfit has, as a basis for ascribing an identity, referred to the psychological continuity of a number of mental states over a period of time (Parfit 1984/1992). He rejects the view that an individual possesses a unique identity in some other sense. Given the discoveries of evolutionary biologists, there is, however, reason to search for individual differences on the basis that every individual has special patterns of responses and preferences. All individuals can be thought to have a more or less unique arrangement of preferences which are partly based on the form of their particular emotional territory and partly on how, given this territory, they relate to the world around. Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones and Patricia Kahlbaugh have described the significance of the emotions for the development of identity in a way which is compatible with Parfit’s theory. When individuals are confronted with a new situation, they recognize the emotional signals on the basis of earlier experiences, and different experiences can be compared with the help of the emotional processes. In their terminology, emotions are the glue which binds experiences together and gives them an identity of their own (Haviland-Jones and Kahlbaugh 2000, 294).
3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity The development of integrity as a socially significant property is dependent on individuals’ emotional territory, which they possess partly as an inheritance from their parents. The brain is packed with basic emotions which steer social interaction. Fear can be seen as a mental program which influences the individual’s choice with respect to social functions such as flight, fight, tolerance and co-operation. In a corresponding way, embarrassment and pride form the basis for individuals’ social role-taking in terms of submission and dominance. The size of the brain has long been thought to be directly correlated with the cognitive capacity of individuals and indirectly thereby to their capacity for social interaction. The individual’s life history has also been found to be highly significant (van Schaik and Deaner 2003). Natural selection is expected to favour more rapid life-cycles because the genotypes which are reproduced more rapidly will end up by replacing others in the population. There must, therefore, be considerable advantages with a longer life-cycle for each generation. Such an advantage might be the capacity for cognitive adaptation and the possibility of mastering social challenges. These advantages constitute a form of delayed profits which have shown themselves so important that they counterbalance the cost of development in the form of diminished reproduction (ibid., 19). The individual benefits from an emotional territory of a certain complexity in order to be able to make use of a socially complex life. An important function is connected with the capacity for social learning. A longer life provides a possibility for the growing individual to profit from the experience of older members of the group. The adult elephant has a social memory which helps it
64
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
to keep track of other individuals and decide which individuals should be avoided (Payne 2003, 58). An individual is recognized even if it is many years since it has been encountered and, in the meantime, its social status has altered. Katy Payne describes a great individual variation among elephants when it applies to their social capacity, which gives rise to a rich and complex tapestry of social relations. Through smell, taste, the interpretation of sound, visual impressions and tactual sensations, the social ties between individuals are reinforced and expressed in emotionally charged greeting ceremonies (ibid., 59). “With the brain primed for social learning, sources of social complexity multiply during the long lifetimes of individual elephants. New status, new alliances and new rivalries develop, adding to and altering existing ones as the result of hormonal changes and increasing experience. Old females become repositories of ecological as well as social information and take on different roles from those of younger relatives” (ibid., 85). Social competence is crucial for the capacity to anticipate or manipulate the behaviour of conspecifics and in order to survive the stress factor presented by a partly hostile world. There is a selective pressure behind the development of cognitive capacities, because of the advantages which accrue from mastering a socially complex world, and thus also an emotional driving force which explain the development of the ever more refined and varied repertoire of emotional responses which make up the individual’s emotional territory. The capacity to recognize other individuals in the group would seem to be an important factor in the development of socially complex societies. From studies of bats, one has discovered that this capacity does not always presuppose learning. Twenty million bats (Tadarida brasiliensis) can inhabit the same cave where a female must be able to pick out its own young among the thousand of other bats congregating in a space of a square meter (Tyack 2003, 345). Bats solve this problem by means of individually distinct, auditory signals which the young transmit and which the mother recognizes. It has been shown that the majority of these individual characteristic auditory signals are hereditary (ibid.). Dolphins also make use of individually distinct signals in order to keep track of the various individual relations with conspecifics (Tyack 2003, 361). For this and other species it would seem that the individual capacity for recognition is developed via a complex social interaction which presupposes a good memory and a good feeling for hierarchies of submission and dominance. The spotted hyena is an example of such a socially advanced species. It would seem to recognize other individuals at a distance of several hundred metres, a capacity that is of great importance for an animal which during certain periods, lives in solitary isolation and is therefore compelled to develop methods for the transition from a solitary life to a social community (Drea and Frank 2003, 135) (cf. the greeting ceremony which is interesting from the evolutionary standpoint, when two individuals meet, as described in the previous chapter). The spotted hyena lives with marked territorial frontiers and central areas which it defends against intruders. There is no (or very little) shared responsibility for looking after the young. Their foremost protection is more to do with the hole where they spend their infancy, than with the near proximity of the mother hyena (ibid., 127). Like other species which live in holes or lairs, home is the safe and
3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity
65
secure place for the growing generation. The various individuals display a broad behavioural repertoire for friendly relations, which strengthens social ties, allows integration and co-operation or contributes to the solution of conflicts. Games have an important function in developing reciprocity and confidence in addition to tuning motor skills. As Christine Drea and Laurence Frank point out, playing behaviour offers a counterbalance to the otherwise prevailing aggressive distribution of roles on the basis of dominance and submission (ibid., 134). Altogether one has a picture of complex emotions and social skills in different species which can be thought to constitute the evolutionary foundation stones of a system of morals. Socially advanced animals such as the spotted hyena, primates, dolphins and elephants which have all been cited here as examples, rely on a form of social expectations when they are involved in different kinds of social relations. Because of this, Marc Bekoff has proposed that they also have a view about what is just (fair) (Bekoff 2001, 2004). Whoever breaks the social code with regard to rank in the hierarchy and behaviour is reprehensible and can be considered to be looked upon in this way. Bekoff’s thesis on the occurrence of a moral system among animals derives from studies of play in various species of animals. When animals play they make use of behaviour similar to that used in other connections when they meet predators, when they seek food and when they mate, but they adapt the behaviour to the rules of the game and use the opportunity to swap roles. What is interesting with play, is that there would seem to be a clear understanding about what for the moment counts as play and what is for real. An agreement to play is communicated with the aid of various signals and presupposes a capacity in both parties to read their opposite number’s intentions. Among other things it involves rapid exchanges of eye contact during play, in order to ensure that it is still a matter of play and has not become a serious matter (ibid., 84). Whoever cheats or transcends the boundaries and injures the other, becomes an undesirable member of the play group (ibid., 83). Bekoff holds that social play has an important function in allowing the individual to learn the rules of the group, and to resolve various conflicts within the group. Play can seem to be a costly activity from an evolutionary perspective, but the energy invested in it pays in the long run, precisely because of its significance for the development of social competence, where the individual who corresponds to social expectations gains advantages in the group. The selective pressure seems to lie on the group, which through co-operation based on a social morality of this kind, has better chances of surviving than other groups. However, as Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson have pointed out, as soon as a social norm of this kind develops it is also advantageous for the individual in the group to keep to this moral system and act fairly (reviewed in Bekoff 2001, 86; see also Sober and Wilson 1998, 135–137). Christopher Boehm has also shown that behaviours may become evolutionary stable if they are beneficial at a group level, even if they diminish the relative fitness of individuals in the group (Boehm 1997). Darwin explained the development of morality with a reference to selection among various properties which occurs at group level. “It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number
66
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
of well-endowed men and advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another” (Darwin 1871, 166). Darwin’s idea forms the starting point for a theory presented by Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson about a selection of morally important functions, such as altruism, through a natural selection which occurs at several different levels: at the gene level within an individual organism, among individuals and among groups (ibid.). The idea of selection through natural selection at the group level has been, and is still to some extent controversial among biologists. Sober and Wilson describe their theory in the light of a detailed critique of those who have only looked upon the individual or the gene as raw material for natural selection. There is no reason here to repeat what they have to say in detail, and the focus of interest in the present work is not on how altruistic behaviour can be explained in evolutionary or in psychological terms. Their explanation of how socially important behaviour can be selected on the basis of social norms, which with the assistance of rewards and punishments, can reinforce a fundamentally social behaviour, does throw, however, some light on questions about the significance of emotions for social and moral development. I shall begin by briefly summarizing the basic argument put forward by Sober and Wilson (ibid). Natural selection presupposes (i) that there is a variation between different phenotypes, (ii) that these phenotypes are inheritable and (iii) that there are differences with regard to survival and reproduction that corresponds to the different phenotypes. There is no genetic determinism whereby a genetic change corresponds to one phenotypic consequence, but rather small changes in the genome can give rise to large phenotypic variations. First of all there is a dynamic at cell and organism level because a gene codes for many different proteins and secondly, small genetic differences between different groups of individuals give rise to large differences, because of different social and ecological challenges. As far as behaviour is concerned it should be noted that many of the qualities involved are continuous and cannot be discretely defined. There can be advantages to be won by competitively defeating another group also through small variations in a certain kind of behaviour. Differences in phenotype must show a heritability in order that natural selection will be able to bring about an evolutionary change, but it is important to recognize that the concept of heritability is not limited to genetic mechanisms. Sober and Wilson maintain (with the support of Boyd and Richerson 1985) that “cultural processes can also cause offspring to resemble their parents, and this kind of heritable variation can also serve as the raw material for natural selection” (cited in Sober and Wilson 1998, 107). Cultural differences between different groups of individuals are not always stable over several generations, but some of them are transmitted faithfully from generation to generation in the course of several generations. The idea is already to be found in Darwin who defined inheritance as the tendency of offspring to be like their parents. The focus is on the phenotypic variation of different properties. It is only this variation which natural selection “sees”, but in actual fact, it is of no importance whether the cause of this variation is genetic or cultural as long as the property exhibits heritability and advantages with regard to survival and reproduction. “In most human social groups, cultural transmission is guided by a set of norms that identify what counts as acceptable behavior” (ibid., 150). Individuals who follow a norm are rewarded, while those who break it are punished or excluded
3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity
67
from the community. This transmission can certainly take place with the help of various mechanisms, and does not need at all to be stable, hereditary, or provide advantages of adaptation with regard to survival and reproduction, but it can also take place through natural selection at group level. Sober and Wilson carried out an empirical investigation to test the hypothesis that phenotypic differences between groups can sometimes have a greater heritability effect than differences between individuals. Their investigation provides evidence in support of not rejecting selection at group level, which favours social norms leading to other, functionally better-adapted groups, alongside selection at gene and organism level. The empirical material consisted of a random sample of ethnographical material representing 25 different cultures, from a large database, the so-called Human Relations Area File (HRAF) compiled by anthropologists in the course of many years. It requires a larger empirical basis in order to be able to falsify the hypothesis, but such an investigation is planned and there are detailed anthropological studies which strengthen the hypothesis. As an illustration, Sober and Wilson point to the interaction between two African neighbouring tribes, the Nuer and Dinka, which was first studied by the British anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard (ibid., 186ff.). Forty years of anthropological research on these tribes has been summarized by Raymond Kelly (1985) and it is Kelly’s account which is referred to by Sober and Wilson. The main features of the interaction between the two cultures, the Nuer and the Dinka, shall be presented here (ibid.).The Nuer emerged as an offshoot of the Dinka, but having soon acquired special features, they were looked upon as a tribe of their own. The Nuer expanded rapidly at the Dinkas’ expense, something which can be explained by a social organization which was able to deal better with the needs of the larger group. Both tribes lived by tending cattle and growing of millet. The driving force to territorial expansion was primarily the acquisition of more land for grazing and cultivation. They both had reasons to seize cattle and land from each other, but the driving force was greater in the case of the Nuer because of their unusual social organization. Both tribes practised a dowry system where cattle were transferred between families in conjunction with marriage. For the Nuer, however, the dowry was larger which entailed that there was a greater need for cattle and because of this, their lands more rapidly suffered from overgrazing. This gave rise to the desire to launch an invasion and take possession of the land of the Dinka tribe. Both of the tribes had more or less the same military strategy, but the Nuer were able to assemble larger and better organized forces for their attacks. What seems to have been crucial, however, was that the Dinka, immediately after a successful battle, began to enjoy the fruits of victory. Raymond Kelly has drawn attention to this specific feature (cited in Sober and Wilson 1998, 188): “a large [Raik Dinka] raiding party surprised a Nuer village and, Dinka-like, sat down to a happy day of wrangling over the spoils. It was their last, for meanwhile the Nuer surrounded them, and in the ensuing panic slaughtered them to the last man.” In contrast to the Dinka, the Nuer always postponed sharing out the spoils until the danger of a counterattack was over, and there was a special regulation about how the booty was to be divided among the group. In the case of the Nuer, family ties also played a more prominent role in keeping together different groups within the tribe. A small Dinka unit was made up of a group which cultivated and made use of a certain common area. Access
68
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
to land limited the group’s possibilities for development. The Nuer’s social system was based on family ties with the result that access to land did not impose the same limitation on the group’s opportunities. The group was held together socially, albeit not always geographically. In spite of the fact that many individuals in course of time flitted between the different tribes, the social behaviour and cultural differences remained stable. Raymond Kelly sums up as follows (cited in Sober and Wilson, 190): “the key features of Nuer social and economic organization that were instrumental to territorial expansion remained unaltered by the massive assimilation of Dinka and Anuka tribesmen”. This bears out the hypothesis that the phenotypic differences between different groups can exhibit greater heritability than the difference in phenotype in the case of individuals, “The Nuer social system was not perfectly adapted but merely more competitive than the system it replaced” (ibid., 190). This shows in itself only that social groups can adapt to new challenges, that variations between groups, given different social norms, may remain stable and that these variations can be shown to have certain advantages for survival and reproduction so that one group competitively drives out another. It says nothing, however, about the psychological mechanisms or motivational structures which form the basis for the establishment and maintenance of social norms. Access to the system of reward or punishment can, as Sober and Wilson point out, be thought to constitute a direct requirement for the development of various kinds of social behaviour (ibid., 151ff.). Both psychological egoism and altruistic motives can, as Sober and Wilson show, function as mechanisms for the occurrence of social and moral behaviour which is important for the groups’ functional adaptation. In the case of human beings, it is possible to conceive of ideological, religious and moral principles leading the way. Probably affective motivational structures play a major role in allowing social development and diversified social responses to various challenges in the natural and cultural environment. The risk of being exposed to general ridicule or of being publicly humiliated has been demonstrated to be a powerful stimulus in encouraging socially accepted behaviour in many cultures (see Amhara in Sober and Wilson, ibid., 182). The occurrence of a more or less complex emotional territory, with elements of both embarrassment and pride, should rationally have served as an important factor in explaining the mechanisms behind both social competition and social co-operation. Social expectation can be thought to emerge only in individuals with sufficient emotional capacity to feel themselves violated. This social expectation in the individual has a more or less complex social room for manoeuvre, depending on the challenges which groups with many individuals encounter in the world around them. Frans de Waal has pointed out three fundamental types of priorities which concern individuals in the interaction between competition and co-operation which they help to shape: Exploiting others: obtaining services, making friends in the right places, getting the most out of profitable partnerships; Making relationships worthwhile: maintaining and fostering the bonds of friendships by engaging in mutualism, reciprocity, and social tolerance; Coexisting peacefully: getting along and protecting valued partnerships, despite the competition that is inevitable when interests collide (de Waal 2003, 233).
3.4 Integrity as a Socially Significant Property – The Starting Point for Moral Integrity
69
Individuals use their emotional capacities to assist in being able to decide which interests are at risk and to be able to communicate their interests in a larger or smaller multiplicity of relations. Jan van Hooff and Signe Preuschoft have observed how chimpanzees used smiling in different ways, often as an expression of fear, but also as an expression of confidence and social security that an individual can experience in meeting and living with another individual (van Hooff and Preuschoft 2003, 284ff.). In an overview of a large number of studies, Lisa Parr has described how the emotional capacity to communicate is of central importance for chimpanzees in particular (Parr 2003, 288ff.). She reviews a host of primary data confirming that these animals possess a basic capacity for deciding the emotional value expressed in a conspecific’s face – is it negative or positive information? – and they can also use this information to meaningfully categorize different social events. Referring inter alia to Paul Ekman’s studies of common features in facial expressions in different cultures, Parr draws the reasonable conclusion that “these data confirm that chimpanzees have a basic understanding of the emotional valence, positive or negative, that is communicated by their facial expressions, and are able to use this information to categorize emotionally meaningful social and non-social scenes. Additionally, these data support the claim that emotional facial expressions in humans and nonhuman primates share a biological, as opposed to cultural, continuity” (ibid., 290–291). These data and conclusions are certainly compatible with a theory of integrity as an emotional territory with a strong biological basis. However, after going through Sober and Wilson, there is no reason to counter pose that to a possible cultural continuity, as Parr does. Among chimpanzees, as among other cognitively advanced animals – including human beings – with a long life history, we ought to expect that social learning also influences the emotional responses and expressions. In order to account for individual variations we must avail ourselves of several explanatory models, both biological and cultural, especially when the individual lives a long time in complex social contexts. Nevertheless, we must remember that culture also forms part of an individual’s sense of identity. A lasting culture such as the group’s way of living constitutes a part of the selective pressure both directly upon the group and indirectly on the individual. The social expectations possessed by individuals ought to be linked to the form taken by their internal mental programs with respect to the basic emotional modules. Starting from the definition of integrity as an emotional territory of a somewhat stable character, it is tempting to look upon it as a characteristic feature of the individual, a property that is advantageous to survival and reproduction, as part of the individual’s social equipment. A social expectation presupposes partly that an individual can recognize emotions and behaviour in another individual, something which – as we have seen – primates at least can do, and partly that this individual behaves in a somewhat predictable fashion. With the proposed definition of integrity as an emotional territory a possible starting point is thereby offered for explaining what the concept of “moral integrity” can be thought to be. It is a matter of a property of the individual which corresponds to the social expectation which has been established and has become significant from the viewpoint of evolution in a
70
3 Integrity as Something Worthy of Moral Protection
group of individuals. There is certainly a good bit left to explain what one means by “incorruptibility”, the legal term which is sometimes used to translate ‘moral integrity’. It is, however, an important point to see also in the case of this associated concept that there is a continuity between human beings and other animals. The moral integrity which is associated with a person who keeps his word and does not accept bribes, is related, as regards its psychological basis, to the properties which one finds in individuals with quite other mental and social presuppositions during the course of evolution. Moral integrity can be understood as a basic psychological property which gradually with the help of increasingly advanced cognitive capacities in the individual, and later in the development, with the assistance of social conventions, ideological contributions and moral views, has come to represent a complex property, sufficiently anchored in society for it also to serve as a guide for social life. Like other similarly established social norms which regulate co-operation, tolerance and reconciliation, moral integrity is a character property which is important for the group’s interaction. The focus is on the group which is welded together because social expectation is matched by a predictability in the other party’s behaviour. It is the group which derives an advantage, but as a result the individuals who are members of the group also benefit. Different groups can have different social norms which regulate conduct in life and the degree of exclusivity can vary. If one wishes to seek a basis for moral criticism of the group norms, one must look for support in other moral sources. A group can have a strong moral integrity internally, but its goals and behaviour may be either good or bad, when seen in a wider perspective. It can also be necessary for a society to break up group loyalties so that other interests can work together. Among the questions I shall later return to, are the following: what basis should serve to shape social morality? What characterizes a “person with moral integrity”? And what does respect for integrity at this level means? Integrity is a morally significant property like the capacity to experience pain and to have one’s preferences gratified or frustrated. The individuals who possess this property in some form can be said to constitute a moral community, a community of individuals with the capacities of feeling and acting beings. Faced with such a morally valuable property, there is reason for halting and not entering without good reason. The reasons for violating someone’s integrity must be good ones.
Chapter 4
Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority – Integrity from a Philosophical Perspective
In accordance with the presentation thus far, integrity can be looked upon as a property which has been developed by individuals living in a society, taking as our starting point the interplay between the three emotions of fear, embarrassment and pride. This emotional territory takes somewhat different forms depending on the challenges individuals and groups of individuals encounter in their natural and social environment. Respect for the individual’s integrity emerges in an interaction with other individuals as a social recognition through different forms of role taking, primarily in terms of dominance and submission. The individuals in the group learn to respond to their own territory and can in certain situations surrender parts of it in order to win advantages together with other individuals. In different cultures it is also reasonable to imagine that different social conventions are established with respect to how individuals view what belongs to the personal and private spheres, and what respect for another individual’s integrity entails. Balancing seclusion and participation is in human culture, as we have seen, strongly dependent upon religious views, moral and political ideals, as well as on practical and economic circumstances. The question to be discussed in this chapter concerns how society ought to respond to the needs of its citizens to defend and protect their private spheres, while simultaneously satisfying their interest in participation. The privacy interest varies from individual to individual. What one individual experiences as a serious violation, can be shrugged off by another individual. Both these individuals ought to be accorded respect for their integrity. The task of finding a balance between the interest of different people in both enjoying seclusion for themselves and participating with others is a moral and political one. A reasonable point of departure is that the individual is to be given insight and the possibility of influencing how the line between the private and public spheres is to be drawn. This accords well with the view of integrity which I have presented. Integrity is something which individuals themselves take care of, an emotional territory which in certain circumstances is fiercely defended and in others is surrendered in order to be able to participate. In a political context there can be reason to regulate when one may and when one may not interfere in the private affairs of citizens. As has already been mentioned, there are also reasons for respecting those who do not have a political voice and to halt outside another individual’s private sphere. The fundamental moral and political M.G. Hansson, The Private Sphere, C Springer 2008
71
72
4 Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority
task implies, however, a need to pay attention to individuals’ desires and capacities to dispose over their private sphere, and to participate themselves in deciding how the line between different interests is to be drawn. Individuals with adequate emotional and cognitive capacity ought to be qualified to participate in drawing the line and in balancing between different interests. The focus in this chapter is on individuals’ interest in personally taking charge of their own emotional territory. Respect for integrity implies for individuals with adequate emotional and cognitive capacity a respect for their moral and political authority. Different countries specify differing age limits for when an individual has the right to political influence. In Sweden, the right to vote in a general election is given to people who have reached the age of eighteen. For other situations, a judgement is made of the individual’s emotional and cognitive level of maturity. In Sweden, for example, a 15-year-old has the right to decide on an abortion without the parents having to be informed. Where exactly the boundaries are to be drawn can vary depending upon how social conventions develop and upon various technical advances. However, the procedures adopted in drawing the line and the way in which the individual is involved are of central importance. The view taken of citizens and their right to determine over their own private sphere and to participate in balancing the interests which are at stake in society, are crucial. As shown in Chapter 2, human efforts to create their own emotional territory for private life and simultaneously to participate in the social life outside the private sphere, are interwoven and form a colourful and complex tapestry throughout Western history. The striving for seclusion has gone hand in hand with a struggle for participation and social recognition. Individuals seek to protect their freedom, but it is a freedom which would seem to be empty and meaningless if it cannot be achieved within a social context. The crucial struggle is about the freedom to decide for oneself where the line should be drawn between the individual’s own private sphere and the spheres of community and participation which are a part of the life of the individual as a social being. It has concerned the right to participate in a community on one’s own terms and at the same time be recognized and respected. During the Enlightenment, emphasis was placed on this struggle for freedom, inspired by the writings of Kant and Hegel on individual freedom. They defend both the citizen’s right to participate in drawing up general guidelines and laws in order to decide for themselves and to decide together with others. The aim here is not to provide a historical description of how the respective philosophies of Kant and Hegel developed, nor to give a description of how a respect for human integrity as a respect for their moral standing and a social recognition can be thought to be compatible with their respective philosophical systems as a whole. My intention is much more modest, namely to present with the help of key concepts and lines of thought in Kant and Hegel, a picture of a fundamental perspective which suggests how the interests of citizens can be satisfied, and a description of what respect for integrity can be thought to imply morally and politically. The fundamental idea of the individual’s dual interest in seclusion and participation which has earlier been described from a historical, psychological and evolutionary biological perspective, reappears in this chapter as the object of a philosophical examination. Although the term seclusion seldom occurs in political philosophy,
4.1 Individual Freedom Meaningful First in a Social Context
73
one does encounter the idea of the individual’s interest in a protected sphere, free from interference, where people are free to develop their lives according to their own capacities and ambitions. From a fundamental perspective of non-interference, political philosophers have discussed how individual freedom ought to be weighed against the interests of other individuals, or against public interest. Individuals and the society of which they are part, find themselves in opposition, and according to the dominant viewpoint, respect for individual integrity implies granting individuals a protected zone which is out of bounds to other individuals or authorities, unless they have special legal means. It is a sphere where the individual has the exclusive right of decision. With the help of Kant’s view of autonomy as moral autonomy and starting from Hegel’s view that individual freedom presupposes overcoming seclusion to achieve a relationship with the Other where both recognize each other in a social context, I shall present an alternative view of what respect for integrity implies. Respect for the integrity of the individual means to recognize the dual interest of both being allowed to live one’s life, free from scrutiny and interference and at the same time to participate as a citizen with moral and political authority in a society and make use of the fruits which one together with others is able to create.
4.1 Individual Freedom Meaningful First in a Social Context Kant showed how respect for a human being’s dignity as moral actor is a necessary requirement for dealing with and solving moral conflicts, in a way which takes note of the interests of the different parties involved. To respect a human being is to respect the person as morally responsible and accountable. For Kant this required a capacity for rational consideration which he did not ascribe to animals. The continuity with moral action which has been demonstrated in socially advanced animals by evolutionary psychologists and primatologists was not available to Kant. He sought a system of ethics which can go beyond various group interests and promote that which impartially takes account of all the parties who are morally affected. The precondition for such a system is the existence of agents with moral authority who are able to wish to reason and act according to rational principles, which can serve as guiding principles for everyone. There may still be a continuity between this morality and the development of a private zone for the readiness to act and the capacity to empathize with the interests of other parties in a social context. The universal demand in Kantian morals presupposes, however, an advanced emotional and cognitive capacity for insightful feeling and reflection. The foundation of such a system of ethics is a postulate concerning the individual’s freedom to think and act in accordance with universally valid principles. Hegel largely took the Kantian approach to moral autonomy for granted, but held that the conclusions of a morality founded on the reflections of pure reason are vacuous concepts and provide no guidance in the concrete political and social issues of everyday life. Hegel’s criticism of Kant is not altogether fair. Certainly it is an advance if we can get rid off maxims which in principle presuppose violence,
74
4 Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority
compulsion or misleading or deceiving other actors. No one would want to choose fraud or deception as a basis for their actions and life, since we cannot will this to be guiding principles which are applicable to everyone. The individual would become an easy target of his own morality. The demand for openness and transparency which follows from Kant’s universalist claims is fundamental for creating the trust which is necessary to bridge the information gap between different actors in modern society. Onora O’Neill has given a clear example by applying Kant’s principles to the biomedical sphere, where a conspicuous feature is the fact that the information which is available to different actors regarding the scientific starting points of various applications and their consequences, differs (O’Neill 2002). It is, however, clear that Hegel goes a step further than Kant. For Hegel, the individual’s freedom and dignity is under attack the whole time. Just as the description of the development of different emotions offered by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby can be understood against the background of the individual’s attempt to deal with a hostile environment, so Hegel’s new approach relative to Kant, can be seen as a revolutionary change of perspective. Hegel’s starting point is not the individual’s independence, but the fact that this independence has been constantly questioned and attacked. History provides many examples of this. Individuals seek to participate in areas outside their own private sphere and attain self-recognition through meeting other people. Human life is a constant struggle for respect and social recognition. Axel Honneth and several others have described this recurring theory in Hegel about a struggle for recognition (Kampf um Anerkennung), even if as we shall see in Honneth, it is a very limited account of Hegel’s theory (Honneth 1992/1996, Williams 1997). In Hegel it is ultimately a struggle for the status of a participant with moral authority in a social context, as a citizen in a society. The communal life of citizens requires in Kant a limitation on individual freedom. In Hegel, on the other hand, freedom as such is only possible in a substantial, embodied and historically situated relationship with other individuals. Hegel constructs a theory about the individual’s freedom so that it presupposes the individual’s sublation (Aufhebung) of this freedom in a relation to the Other in social life (Hegel 1821/1991), hereafter referred to as PR). Human seclusion and independence are in practice worth very little if they are not respected by others and form part of a social community. Human beings cannot be free without realizing goals which are greater than their own and other people’s private needs and goals. In Hegel as in Kant the origin of freedom is to be found in the will, but there is always something that one wills – “I do not merely will – I will something” (PR § 6). There is always something definite which is the content and object of the will. “The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves which have never been green”, says Hegel (PR § 124). In Hegel, the good is freedom which has been achieved (PR § 129) in contrast to Kant where it is at most a question about a limitation of the good which is not consistent with the demand for universality. Certainly Kant suggests that the good which one wills, must be consistent not only with respect for other actors, but that one should also will our own ends as parts of a conceivable unity of ends, that which he calls the kingdom of ends. Hegel, however, approaches things from another angle when he supposes that freedom forms part of a social relationship.
4.1 Individual Freedom Meaningful First in a Social Context
75
In Hegel’s concept of freedom, the Other does not constitute an impediment but rather a prerequisite for achieving freedom (Theunissen 1982, 319). The social context shapes individuals with its continual questioning and individuals participate in the moulding of their freedom by seeking to participate. In a struggle for recognition, individuals strive to win their freedom in what is concrete and substantial (Foreword to PR, 22). The individual’s freedom is therefore always something real and social, embodied and situated in meaningful social environments: freedom is actualized in history (PR § 6). This theory of individual freedom Hegel expounds as a theory of social ethics by showing how freedom is achieved according to the same fundamental idea but in different ways in different social contexts: family/marriage, civil society with guilds and corporations, and, ultimately, in the state (PR § 256). In all these social contexts individuals win respect and maintain themselves by sublating their private sphere. Hegel’s example of the artist is familiar. The worse the artist, the more we perceive him in all his arbitrary, transitory, particularity. There is nothing which lifts thought beyond the particular in the individual. Greatness in art comes about when the artist through a close depiction of the individual manages to lift our thoughts from what is particular and private (PR § 124). Hegel was assuredly a philosopher of his time and influenced the conception of the family, civil society and the state as they appeared at the beginning of the 19th century when, for example, women were entirely excluded from public life. In a similar way, Kant was greatly influenced by his pietistic inheritance – but Hegel’s theory of the individual as a person placed in society and integrated with others extends beyond these temporal horizons. Hegel’s view of the state is indubitably complex and the conclusions drawn in the secondary literature are very mixed. The Hegel interpretation, however, has developed from the view of Hegel as a supporter of the Prussian state to Hegel as a possible defender of the modern constitutional state, a liberal democracy in the modern sense (see D’Hondt 1988). There are without doubt certain passages in Hegel which point in quite another direction. In PR § 100, he states that in certain circumstances the state can demand that its citizens should be sacrificed on its behalf. In contrast to what holds in civil society, it is not the state’s duty to protect unconditionally the life and property of its citizenry. But he was critical of the liberalism which merely contented itself with conserving individual freedom of conscience and dignity, individual freedom and rights. If liberalism does not go beyond this, according to Hegel, one incorporates a potential destruction of the values which one seeks to defend. A central idea, which Hegel develops in the philosophy of right, is that within state, one must sublate what is limited and particular, and incorporate the view of individual freedom in a larger vision where also other individuals and their freedom, goals and relationships form part (PR § 23). Simultaneously every individual must be able to see and be aware of how the institutions of society also take into account the individual’s own needs. Freedom is only possible in a society whose institutions can be recognized as rational by every individual and can provide room for one self. Furthermore individuals must be able to see and to be aware of how social institutions also embrace their own needs. It follows as in Kant that transparency and openness are prerequisites for the trust of the citizenry. The strength of the state
76
4 Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority
is determined by the constitution, but in real terms it is determined by the degree to which this constitution can form the starting point for individuals’ rights and duties as individuals with particular needs. If the state does not allow particular differences it becomes totalitarian.
4.2 Individual Freedom Exhibited at Different Social Levels Freedom as a personal right is an empty abstraction. If we stand aside from communal life, we are soon bereft of all that is of significance to us. The study of history shows how the human striving for seclusion and simultaneously for participation in society, has taken various forms. The lives of human beings are intimately interwoven, sometimes more than they guess and often without their having a choice in the matter, something which is illustrated rather well by modern genetic research. Individuals achieve freedom only by overcoming themselves in relation to the Other. This is the foundation of Hegel’s conception of freedom and he takes the example of love and friendship to illustrate what he means. In these types of relationship, individuals voluntarily impose limits upon themselves out of concern for the other person involved in the relationship, but are consciously aware that they remain themselves in this relationship (PR § 7). Individual freedom is achieved according to the same fundamental idea but in different ways in the social categories for this freedom: the family, civil society and the state (PR § 256). Within the family, individuals have sublated (aufgehoben) their isolation and view themselves as part of a whole which is bound together by love. Within the framework of the family unit the individual has rights, protection and economic security (PR § 159–160). The immediately defining concepts are according to Hegel marriage where free consent between two individuals forms the legal basis. Children and relatives are brought together in this community without consent. Initially the family represents the highest form of natural morality based on the solidarity which the ties of blood confer, but this community is limited and in Hegel’s account is full of disputes and conflicts over possessions. For Hegel, the new ethical family – based on free consent which is legally guaranteed – is of more importance for the individual’s economic and legal situation than ties of blood (PR § 172). The classical emphasis on a common biological origin is misleading because it does not allow room for a mutual recognition between two parties. Thus according to Roman law, the woman had no share in her husband’s inheritance but legally still belonged to the family she came from (PR § 180). This constitutes a more primitive form of legal system. For Hegel, it is very clear that it is the family as ethical idea, constituted by a marriage based on mutuality and consent, which is the fundamental principle and which ought to be preserved, not kinship or house or family property. For Hegel the significance of the family of origin declines, because the children form new families based on voluntary agreements (PR § 177). This dissolution of families and the forming of new families which relate to one another as external entities constitutes in Hegel the transition from the family to civil society (PR § 181, 238).
4.2 Individual Freedom Exhibited at Different Social Levels
77
Civil society forms the next stage for the individual’s social recognition. It is steered by particular interests of various groups in society and by an increasing need to regulate that, but it is a crude and primitive form of ethical institution designed to satisfy and optimize certain needs, those needs which the system and the prevailing community of values has use of (Williams 1997, 227ff.). At the basic level there are the needs of individuals and protection of property by just legal rules. The protection of particular interests is at this level a common interest which is administered by the public authorities, as well as by the corporations. In Hegel’s system of thought, corporations play the role of a second family (PR § 252). Civil society consists of three components: (i) a system to satisfy the personal needs of individuals and at the same time satisfy the satisfaction of the needs of others, (ii) a protection for the property of individuals by a just legal and political administration and (iii) a concern for the particular as a common interest which is defended by means of the institutions of the welfare state, other public authorities and the corporations (PR § 188). The individual’s abstract needs become meaningful, social needs through social recognition in civil society (PR § 192). The corporation, the guild (esprit de corps) constitutes the transmitting link in order to deal with the unfortunate consequences arising from civil society’s dependence upon self-interest (Williams 1997, 250). By being part of an occupational corps, a trading association, an academy or some other form of corporate body, the individual’s vocation is widened to become something greater than merely a personal sphere of interest. It is the corporation’s welfare which becomes the goal. It is through the corporation’s concern for the particular that the ethical element returns to civil society. Those whose interests and concerns focussed on the particular are no longer exclusively focussed on themselves as individuals. The co-operative corporation forms the second level of ethical life (PR § 255). Civil society, however, according to Hegel’s description acts like a blind wild animal that must be tamed. There is need for an institution to raise the perspective and guarantee welfare for the whole of society. In Hegel, the state is that ethical institution which goes beyond civil society’s limitations. The state must supervise the corporations, for it (civil society) would otherwise become ossified and set in its ways, and decline into a miserable guild system (PR § 255). The family undergoes fragmentation and its members act more and more in their search for mutual social recognition from one another, as if they were self-sufficient individuals, who finally are only held together by the band of mutual utility. Thus they are transposed to the socio-ethical level which characterizes civil society, a level which is illustrated most clearly by the guilds, associations and organizations which are formed on the basis of a common, controlling interest. Given a common interest and mutual utility, the individual’s freedom can be attained but it is, nevertheless, a question of a limited freedom. Certain of the individual’s particular interests are not included and those which do not fulfil the criteria for membership, remain outside. In Hegel’s theory, complete freedom is only attainable at the third socio-ethical level, that of the state. For Hegel the state is not an aggregate of atomistic individuals with particular demands where every individual is isolated, only negatively related to one another, and where different interests are regulated by social contract. For Hegel, it is a
78
4 Respect for the Individual as a Person with Moral and Political Authority
question of a transformation to something greater. Family, corporation and civil society are always limited to their concept of freedom’s empirical coincidences. The strength of the state is determined by the constitution, but in reality also by the degree to which this constitution can form the starting point for individuals’ rights and duties as individuals with particular needs (PR § 258, 261, 265). If the state does not permit the particular differences, it becomes totalitarian (PR § 270). Hegel’s idea of the state entails a constitutional protection against fanaticism and against the totalitarian state where one organization takes over all other relationships. The citizens’ trust also rests on such a constitution which is really realised in the different institutions of the state (PR § 258). The state can change over time and adapt to social conditions and new knowledge, but its fundamental principles remain the same (Winfield 1983, 189). It is first via the state that freedom receives its most concrete and simultaneously universal form. This takes place through a constitution which makes it possible for individuals to look after their own interests, and simultaneously concretely participate in a community where both individuals themselves and all other others have won recognition. The key is mutual recognition (PR § 33). Individual’s are free first when they have won recognition as persons with political authority with insight into and the possibility of influencing the principles and rules which steer life in community with others. It is against this background that we should see the central significance of such freedoms as free speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association. It is also against this background that we shall learn to value the importance of insight in political processes, the implementation of laws and the exercise of authority. It is these freedoms and this openness which the state constitution must defend. For individuals, it is more about sublating what is their own, the particular, we should say the private perspective, rather like the superior artist. There is always a risk that human beings in their efforts to improve the world and in spite of their good intentions become oppressors, because their perspective is far too limited. Hegel launches an attack on orthodox liberalism in order to defend its ideas against itself and make it real.
4.3 A New Approach to Self-Determination Respect for people’s right to self-determination has become something of a decorative slogan in modern times. It is