The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy
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Christopher J. Kukucha
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The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy
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Christopher J. Kukucha
The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy
© UBC Press 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the publisher, or, in Canada, in the case of photocopying or other reprographic copying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency), www.accesscopyright.ca. 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08
54321
Printed in Canada with vegetable-based inks on FSC-certified ancient-forest-free paper (100% post-consumer recycled) that is processed chlorine- and acid-free. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Kukucha, Christopher John The provinces and Canadian foreign trade policy / by Christopher J. Kukucha. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7748-1584-0 (bound); 978-0-7748-1585-7 (pbk.) 1. Canada – Foreign economic relations. 2. Canada – Commerce. 3. Canada – Commercial policy. 4. Foreign trade promotion – Canada – Provinces. I. Title. HF1455.K83 2008
382’.30971
C2008-903397-3
UBC Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support for our publishing program of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP), and of the Canada Council for the Arts, and the British Columbia Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Printed and bound in Canada by Friesens Set in Stone by Artegraphica Design Co. Ltd. Copy editor: Matthew Kudelka Proofreader: Sarah Munro UBC Press The University of British Columbia 2029 West Mall Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2 604-822-5959 / Fax: 604-822-6083 www.ubcpress.ca
To James
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Contents
Preface / ix List of Abbreviations / xi Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism 1 The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy / 3 2 International Pressures and Canadian Federalism / 12 3 The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade / 43 Part 2: Considerations of Process and Outcome 4 The Political Executive in Provincial Foreign Trade Policy / 61 5 Bureaucratic and Legislative Pressures / 81 6 Issues of Implementation, Negotiation, and Consultation / 98 7 Is Anybody Listening? Evaluating Societal Considerations / 120 8 Dominant Ideas, Ideology, and Intrusive Neoliberalism / 139 Part 3: Evaluating Regimes and Change 9 Non-Central Governments’ Cross-Border Functional Relations / 157 10 Emerging Regional Environment and Labour Regimes / 175 Conclusion / 193 Notes / 200 Selected Bibliography / 226 Index / 231
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Preface
I first started thinking about the provinces and Canadian foreign trade policy when I was a doctoral student at the University of Alberta. It was during negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of GATT, and several exceptional academics, including Douglas Brown, Earl Fry, Brian Hocking, and Hans Michelmann, were looking specifically at the role played by subfederal governments in international relations. Desperately seeking a thesis topic, I was inspired by their work. After graduation I was hired to teach at Douglas College in my hometown of New Westminster, British Columbia. Though I enjoyed my experience in the trenches of BC’s community college system, it allowed me little time for research. Only after my arrival at the University of Lethbridge in 2001 was I able to return to this topic. Over the next five years I interviewed bureaucrats and other officials in Ottawa and all ten provinces. During this period I also struggled to develop an appropriate analytical framework to engage the provinces’ international activities. This book is the outcome of that process. When something takes this long to write, there are numerous people to thank. There will also be inevitable omissions, and for this I apologize. Regardless, I was fortunate to have excellent feedback from Paul Gecelovsky, Anil Hira, Tom Keating, and Kim Nossal, who read all or parts of the first draft. Several of the chapters started out as conference papers; regarding those, I benefited from the insights of Bruce Doern, Geoffrey Hale, Harold Jansen, André Lecours, Stephen McBride, Alex Michalos, Nelson Michaud, Heather Smith, Elizabeth Smythe, Claire Turenne Sjolander, and Patrick Wilson. In addition, I thank Shauna Langemann for compiling the statistical data in Chapter 2 and Gerald Baier and Sujit Choudhry for stressing the benefit of brevity. And I am indebted to Peter Meekison and Ian Urquhart, who tutored me – a student of international relations – on the merits of federalism during my time at the University of Alberta. Finally, a number of people in government and industry reviewed specific chapters and corrected a number of mistakes. Any remaining errors are my sole responsibility.
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Preface
As a first-time author, my experience with UBC Press was extremely positive. Senior editor Emily Andrew was patient and supportive throughout the writing and editing processes and offered excellent suggestions for revising the first chapter. Matthew Kudelka, Ann Macklem, Megan Brand, Melissa Pitts, and Jason Congdon provided further assistance related to the editing and marketing of the book. The manuscript’s anonymous reviewers also offered advice that greatly improved the final result. The University of Lethbridge Research Fund and a University of Lethbridge Chinook Research Summer Award helped fund this project. Over the past several years the Forum of Federations has generously facilitated my participation in several round tables and meetings, during which I had an opportunity to broaden my understanding of federalism. An invitation by the Privy Council Office (Intergovernmental Affairs) to participate in the Fourth International Conference on Federalism in New Delhi, India, added to this experience. The final revisions for this book were completed while I was a William J. Fulbright Research Chair in Canadian Studies at the State University of New York (Plattsburgh). I thank Chris Kirkey and everyone at the Centre for Canadian Studies for providing a relaxed and intellectually vibrant work environment. On a personal level, I want to acknowledge my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge for their dedication to teaching and research excellence. As always, my family and friends in Vancouver, Lethbridge, and elsewhere in Canada, continue to provide the wisdom and encouragement that I value so greatly. My wife Renee and son James, however, remain my main source of love and support.
Abbreviations
ACOA AEF AFPA AGO AHST AIT APEC BC-ACTS BNA BSE CAP CAPP CCA CCF CCME CCPA CCTN CEC CEDC CEPA CFFO CFTA CGLG CHST CIA CIFFC CLSC CME CNAFTN COFI
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Atlantic Economic Forum Alberta Forest Products Association Attorney General’s Office Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Agreement on Internal Trade Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation BC Agri-Food Council on Trade and Subsidies British North America Act bovine spongiform encephalopathy Canada Assistance Plan Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers Consultative Committee on Agriculture Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Canadian Coordinator for Trade Negotiations Commission for Environmental Cooperation Community and Economic Development Committee Canadian Environmental Protection Act Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario Committee for the Free Trade Agreement Council of Great Lakes Governors Canada Health and Social Transfer Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre Centre Locale de Services Sociaux et Communautaires Committee of Manufacturers and Exporters Committee for North American Free Trade Negotiations Council of Forest Industries
xii Abbreviations
COGP CSG-West CSL CSN CTTC CUPE DFAIT DFO DIIR DIST DREE DRIE EC ECE ECO EPF EU FAC FEDNOR FIRA FPCD FPU FRBC FTA FTAA FTQ GATS GATT GDA GPA IGAS IGR IJC ILO IMTC IPE ISWG ITAC ITCan ITS IWA JCPC JUVIS
Committee on Government Productivity Council of State Governments-West Consultations and Liaison Division Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux Canadian Trade and Tariffs Committee Canadian Union of Public Employees Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Fisheries and Oceans Department of Intergovernmental and International Relations Department of Industry, Science, and Technology Department of Regional Economic Expansion Department of Regional Industrial Expansion European Community Evaluation Committee of Experts Executive Council Office [of New Brunswick] Established Programs Financing European Union Foreign Affairs Canada Federal Economic Development for Northern Ontario Foreign Investment Review Agency Federal Provincial Coordination Division Fishermen’s Protective Union Forest Renewal BC Canada-US Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area of the Americas Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade general development agreement Government Procurement Agreement Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat International Joint Commission International Labour Organization International Mobility and Trade Corridor international political economy International Strategy Working Group International Trade Advisory Committee International Trade Canada Intelligent Transportation Systems Industrial, Wood, and Allied Workers Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Joint Use Vehicle Inspection Stations
Abbreviations xiii
MABAC MAI MEDT MERD MFN MIA MIIR MIR MLB MLC MOU MRA NAAEC NAALC NAC NAFTA NAO NDP NEC NEGC NEP NFFAWU NFU NIFC NTB OAS OFA OFEC OPEC OSCIA PACE PCO PLQ PNWER POGG PPC PPCB PQ PRI PSAG SAGIT SCM SGI
Montana Alberta Bilateral Advisory Council Multilateral Agreement on Investment Ministry of Economic Development and Trade Ministry of Economic and Regional Development most favoured nation Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations Ministry of International Relations Maritime Lumber Bureau Midwestern Legislative Conference Memorandum of Understanding mutual recognition agreement North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation National Advisory Committee North American Free Trade Agreement National Administrative Office New Democratic Party New England Council New England Governors’ Conference National Energy Program Newfoundland Fish, Food, and Allied Workers’ Union National Farmers Union National Interagency Fire Centre non-tariff barrier Organization of American States Ontario Federation of Agriculture Ontario Farm Environmental Coalition Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association Peace Arch Crossing Entry program Privy Council Office Parti Libéral du Québec Pacific Northwest Economic Region peace, order, and good government [Newfoundland] Planning and Priorities Committee Priorities, Policy, and Communications Board Parti Québécois Policy Research Institute Provinces-States Advisory Group Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Saskatchewan Government Insurance
xiv Abbreviations
SLA SPC STEP SUFA SWEEP TCB TILMA TNO TPCLD UFA UN UNESCO UNFCC UPA USTR VQA WCER WD WGA WPC WTO
Softwood Lumber Agreement Standing Policy Committee Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership Social Union Framework Agreement Soil and Water Environmental Enhancement Program Trade and Competitiveness Branch Alberta-BC Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement Trade Negotiations Office Trade Policy Consultations and Liaison Division United Farmers of Alberta United Nations UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Union des Producteurs Agricoles US Trade Representative Vintners Quality Alliance Western Centre for Economic Research Western Diversification Western Governors Association Western Premiers Conference World Trade Organization
Part 1 Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
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1 The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy
Canadian provinces have long pursued a wide range of international objectives. They have sought trade and investment opportunities, opened foreign offices, and Quebec, specifically, has pursued nationalist goals related to language and culture. Recently, though, these activities have increased. In 2006, Quebec negotiated a “formal” role for itself in the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Then in 2007, British Columbia signed a climate change agreement with California. That same year the Government of Alberta opened an office in Washington, DC, to lobby the White House and members of Congress directly. There are two different opinions on these subfederal initiatives. Some, such as Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s former UN ambassador, suggest that this activity – especially in the context of Quebec – represents a continuation of past ad hoc provincial efforts. Others, such as Andrew Coyne, have argued that the foreign presence of Canadian provinces “blurs our international identity” and duplicates the activities of federal officials at considerable expense to taxpayers.1 This book engages these arguments in the context of provincial foreign trade policy. It begins with an examination of the increasing intrusiveness of international trade commitments into domestic policy space and the impact of these changes on Canadian federalism. Canada’s membership in international trade regimes, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), expanded rapidly in the decades following the Second World War. Initially, these commitments did not directly include Canadian provinces. However, as issues of provincial jurisdiction were added to the international agenda – issues such as agriculture, alcohol, government procurement, energy, labour, the environment, and national health and safety standards – Ottawa became increasingly aware of the need to secure the provinces’ compliance when negotiating and implementing these agreements.
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Thus was created a new dynamic in Canada’s federal-provincial relations. The federal government expanded consultative linkages with the provinces through a series of federal-provincial committees, now known as CTrade; and to formalize ties with business it established the International Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) and the Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade (SAGITs). Ottawa also began to engage non-governmental players through parliamentary committees, foreign policy reviews, and other forums. For all these changes, however, there is nothing to suggest that the federal government suffered a significant loss of autonomy owing to international pressures. Changes in the global political economy modified Ottawa’s approach to formulating trade policy, but federal officials maintained considerable independence, despite a proliferation of new and legitimate actors. Part 1 of this book focuses on these developments in relation to provincial autonomy. First, subfederal trade patterns were not significantly altered in the aftermath of GATT, NAFTA or WTO. The United States remained the dominant trading partner for most provinces and there was no transformation of Canada’s fragmented and highly specialized political economy. Historic conflicts related to fiscal policy, regional development programs, and natural resources, also reflected decentralizing trends in federal-provincial economic relations that were well established prior to these agreements. The decision to implement CTrade and previous consultative committees further demonstrated Ottawa’s trust in traditional models of “executive federalism” to manage intergovernmental relations. All of this suggests that Ottawa and the provinces relied on customary practices of Canadian federalism to counter challenges associated with the intrusiveness of foreign trade commitments. Part 2 explores the question of subfederal autonomy in terms of the provincial policy process and its capacity to directly affect outcomes related to Canada’s foreign trade relations and international norms and standards. It argues that the provinces’ trade policy choices are shaped by institutional, sectoral, societal, and ideational considerations. Institutional factors are dominated by constitutional and bureaucratic realities. Provincial executives occasionally involve themselves in trade issues, but this is limited to crisis situations, trade promotion, and specific trade disputes. Provincial legislatures have only a minimal impact in this policy area. Sectoral factors are important, though the business sector’s relevance tends to fluctuate as a function of its economic strength and ties to government. Societal factors are less relevant, typically because of “consultation fatigue” and limited resources. Ideational considerations, which are more important than sectoral ones, include dominant ideologies, the priorities of specific regional economies, and attitudes toward participatory government. Any evaluation of outcomes, however, must also address questions of change. Part 3 of this book focuses on emerging cross-border cooperative regimes
The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy 5
and the NAFTA “Side Deals” on labour and the environment. The provinces have enjoyed success in cross-border forums in terms of setting agendas, negotiating bilateral agreements with American states, and developing personal relationships with senior officials; however, there is no evidence that these ties are fostering deeper continental integration. The fact that these regimes continue to focus on functional issues, and rarely challenge existing regulatory practices and judicial precedent, also suggests they will not serve as catalysts for “significant” change in North American trade relations. The resilience of federal institutions in response to these developments also challenges broader assumptions regarding the “decline” of the nation-state in the contemporary international system. International Political Economy and Provincial Trade Policy An exploration of the provinces’ role in Canadian foreign trade policy is worthwhile for four main reasons. First, it will serve as a source of information for federal and provincial officials in this policy area. Also, non-Canadian practitioners will find it useful when it comes to understanding the provinces’ increasing relevance in matters of international trade. Second, this analysis will draw attention to the intrusiveness of international developments for other states in the global political economy. Ottawa faces specific constitutional realities vis-à-vis the provinces that many other federal states do not; that said, most governments find themselves confronting pressure from a range of non-central actors as trade agreements enter domestic policy space.2 Third, this study will cast light on important distinctions between issues of promotion, negotiation, and implementation. As already noted, the provinces play an active role in trade promotion, and most such endeavours are now considered a legitimate aspect of provincial economic development. Trade policy, on the other hand, is linked to provincial development, but it is also a distinctly separate matter that involves negotiating and implementing international trade agreements. Most importantly, however, this book will address the limited and institutional nature of the international political economy (IPE) literature. Specifically, there is a lack of IPE scholarship relating to the global trade relations of subfederal actors. Realist and mercantilist frameworks are state centred, focus on power relations, and tend to ignore distinctions between international and domestic levels of analysis.3 Similarly, orthodox or laissez-faire liberal models have long limited their discussion to the promotion of free markets.4 As liberalism evolved, discussions of market intervention concentrated on how to rebuild war-torn economies, which culminated in Keynesian economics and the Bretton Woods system.5 In the four decades that followed Bretton Woods, liberalism was dominated by questions of autonomy, cooperation, and emerging structures of international governance.6
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Liberalism’s interest in governance and cooperation contributed to the emergence of various regime theories in the 1980s and 1990s. Regime theory does not focus on domestic actors such as provinces; it does, though, provide insight into this book’s assertion that emerging cross-border regimes may reflect a substantial reorganization of North American economic relations. Regime-based frameworks can be power-, interest-, or knowledge-based.7 Realist (“power-based”) approaches focus on balance of power and hegemonic dominance (rather than institutionalized cooperation) as the basis of international stability.8 Neoliberal (“interest-based”) approaches represent the more mainstream assumptions regarding international regimes. Neoliberal institutionalists, for example, embrace a number of realist principles, including rationality, state sovereignty, and the relevance of anarchy. The difference is that interest-based theories portray regimes as both effective and resilient.9 Finally, there are “knowledge-based” theories of regimes, which focus on how interests originate in the policy process and on the impact of regimes in terms of the identities of international actors. These contributions fall outside the more traditional realist-liberal debate and suggest that significant change is possible.10 A small number of liberal scholars have specifically addressed the relevance of domestic actors; examples include Peter Gourevitch’s “second-image reversed” approach and Robert Putnam’s discussion of “two-level games.”11 Though it is possible to include subfederal interests in these two frameworks, neither fully engages with questions of provincial autonomy and broader issues of change. Gourevitch’s approach is essentially a statist analysis of domestic interests. Though he recognizes the impact of the bureaucracy and the importance of transnational actors, in the end he relies on a “strong state” (limited domestic influence) versus “weak state” (strong domestic influence) argument. Putnam focuses on domestic “win sets” and on the opportunities and constraints these impose on international negotiators. Some critics suggest that in doing so he has simply restated an argument commonly made by liberal scholars: that state preferences in international bargaining reflect international and domestic considerations.12 Much like Gourevitch, Putnam also tends to focus on developments taking place within states.13 Karl Polanyi folded international and domestic factors into his “double movement” theory, albeit in a much broader manner than Putnam and Gourevitch. Specifically, he critiqued orthodox liberalism and its commitment to open markets.14 For him it was imperative to consider the impact of societal factors on market forces. He argued that “society” would protect itself if faced with a market-driven crisis such as the Great Depression. John Gerard Ruggie took this argument a step further by suggesting that liberal principles are embedded in domestic societies, as are basic concepts such as security and stability. Hence the compromise of “embedded liberalism”
The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy 7
allowed for measures to protect domestic economies as long as these efforts did not dramatically interfere with the expansion of international trade.15 Ultimately, both Polanyi and Ruggie examined the importance of numerous domestic institutional, sectoral, and societal actors; and they did so in a way that is consistent with this book’s analysis of provincial autonomy. But unlike other contributions such as that of Putnam, Polanyi and Ruggie made no attempt to examine causal links between specific domestic and international actors. Other liberal studies have focused on the international activities of federal states.16 One early effort centred on “trans-sovereign” linkages and “perforated sovereignty.”17 These themes were subsequently explored by other scholars under the rubric of “paradiplomacy.”18 While these contributions highlighted the global role of non-central governments, they suffered from specific weaknesses. Studies of perforated sovereignty, for example, failed to adopt any explicit theoretical framework. Studies of paradiplomacy claimed that state-centred views of global politics were a “gross distortion of reality,” yet in the end they concluded that subfederal activities were limited to areas of “low politics.” Also, studies of perforated sovereignty and paradiplomacy restricted discussion to institutional factors, though John Kincaid did highlight pluralist domestic forces in his analysis of “constituent diplomacy.” Recent discussions of perforated sovereignty and paradiplomacy have embraced, albeit selectively, several of the themes that are central to this book. Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating have acknowledged that paradiplomacy extends beyond domestic institutional variables such as sectoral issues, institution building, and civil society. Aldecoa and Keating have offered a more holistic approach but have failed to disaggregate the policy process except to note that other domestic actors are relevant.19 André Lecours has challenged the lack of theoretical substance in the paradiplomacy literature and has argued for the adoption of an analytical framework that focuses on structure and agency. For him the key is to examine how subfederal governments are legitimized as international agents and how they pursue their objectives through “opportunity structures.”20 Ultimately, this book’s theoretical framework builds on the domestic and international insights of Aldecoa, Keating, and Lecours. It is Brian Hocking who has done the best job of integrating state and non-governmental actors into studies of international and domestic trade policy. For example, he has dismissed realist, state-centred models as inadequate but is just as critical of generalized studies of globalization that posit the death of the nation-state. He argues instead for a multiperspectival approach with the goal of understanding “the impact of influences at the systemic, state and sub-state levels.”21 Initially, he engaged this challenge by focusing on “multilayered diplomacy” and the role of non-central governments in Canada, Australia, and the United States.22 Later he isolated
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Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
environments, agendas, and processes in an effort to better understand the nuances of trade policy at the domestic and international levels of analysis.23 This book will share many of his conclusions. However, its focus will be on distinct process factors and their impact on international norms and standards. A Review of the Canadian Literature According to Maureen Appel Molot, most studies of Canada’s foreign relations are largely descriptive.24 They generally rely on traditional approaches; they focus on Canada’s status as a principal, middle, or dependent power; and they have only implicit ties to neorealist, neoliberal, and regime-based models.25 Subsequent observers, such as David Black and Heather Smith, challenged these conclusions but acknowledged that the literature has been “marked by significant inadequacies and lacunae,” especially in terms of integrating “both domestic and international influences on the state.”26 Kim Nossal has suggested that after an initial reliance on realist models, over the past decade efforts have been made to engage broader theoretical frameworks.27 These include feminist, post-positivist, and constructivist approaches.28 Canadian scholars of trade policy have engaged liberal IPE theory to some extent. Gilbert Winham has explored the historic tension between market forces and regulatory mechanisms, arguing that the present-day complexities of international trade require better “multilateral management.”29 In his study of GATT, Frank Stone notes that this forum represents “one of the most successful efforts in international cooperation of the post-war period.”30 Other authors highlight the issue of state autonomy within these evolving governance structures. According to Sylvia Ostry, smaller states have the power to challenge economic hegemons; moreover, the success or failure of multilateral frameworks can be directly tied to domestic politics.31 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Nossal also have noted the relevance of middlepower leadership.32 But it is Robert Wolfe who has applied theory most explicitly, in his analysis of the political economy of agriculture.33 Much like Ostry, he focuses on the relevance of international and domestic factors while adopting Polanyi’s “double movement” framework to emphasize the impact of societal pressures on market forces. Studies focusing on NAFTA, the globalization of public policy, and North American integration tend to be more theoretically developed, especially in terms of domestic factors and the adoption of regime-based frameworks. Unfortunately, most such studies tend to take a state-centred and institutional approach.34 Furthermore, it is clear that “alternative” models relating to ideas, democratization, and gender have the most explicit ties to IPE theory. At this stage, however, only minimal critical attention has been directed at Canada’s external trade relations.35
The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy 9
The literature on the provinces and Canada’s global trade relations is also limited. These contributions generally focus on provincial actors, questions of centralization/decentralization, and Canadian trade policy’s institutional frameworks. In one early study, Douglas Brown and Earl Fry suggested that central governments could better manage the foreign policy initiatives of provinces, states, and cantons through decentralization.36 Making a somewhat similar argument, Nossal suggested that Ottawa remained firmly in control of Canada’s global trade relations.37 Grace Skogstad, on the other hand, concluded that Ottawa and the provinces had developed a mutual dependency in terms of negotiating and implementing international trade agreements.38 Finally, Michael Hart, G. Bruce Doern, and Brian Tomlin have cited the relevance of the provinces and executive federalism in the negotiation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA).39 Other studies have examined a broader range of subfederal activities. Stephen de Boer has explored the potential for a greater provincial role in North American integration. Ian Robinson has suggested that neoliberal agreements such as NAFTA have exposed the vulnerability of provinces in terms of regional development programs, worker rights, environmental programs, and health regulations.40 A number of economic studies have reviewed provincial trade patterns, especially in terms of North American regional economies and the provinces’ global exports.41 These observations are important, yet no one has addressed the potential long-term impact of other non-governmental interests at the domestic and international levels. Scholars in this field tend to focus instead on institutional, bureaucratic, and constitutional factors; their studies’ links with broader debates over sovereignty and state autonomy are at best inconsistent. The literature on Quebec’s international relations is well developed but somewhat eclectic.42 There is an obvious emphasis on Quebec’s history of international activity and its linkages with France and la Francophonie.43 Other contributions have reviewed Quebec’s foreign activities in the context of autonomy and provincial representation in Canadian federalism.44 There are also numerous studies examining Quebec’s international trade policy. Ivan Bernier and André Binette, for example, completed an analysis of provincial trade policy in the aftermath of the FTA.45 In 1993, Louis Balthazar, Louis Bélanger, and Gordon Mace conducted an empirical review of Quebec’s foreign policy that included several chapters on international and regional trade.46 Others, such as Mace, Bernier, Jean-Phillipe Thérien, and Guy Gosselin, have compared Quebec’s commercial and cultural relations with those of other subfederal governments in Canada, Europe, and Latin America.47 Balthazar and Bélanger have written extensively on Quebec’s relations with the United States.48 Finally, Stéphane Paquin has reviewed the province’s decision to ratify and review international treaties in the Quebec National Assembly.49 By contrast, little or no attention has been directed at the foreign
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trade relations of other provincial governments, with the possible exception of Ontario during the NAFTA negotiations.50 Evaluating Process, Outcome, and Change This book aims to complement already existing liberal IPE frameworks by focusing more directly on issues of process, outcome, and change. In terms of international factors, the assumption made here is that Canada formulates its trade policy in a neoliberal global economy that is increasingly competitive with ongoing pressures to deregulate, privatize, and pursue further trade liberalization. At the same time, it accepts (a) that cooperation is possible in an anarchic economic system and (b) that states, including Canada, maintain the capacity to pursue autonomous decisions in international institutions and regimes. By including a review of non-governmental actors, this analysis also accepts liberal efforts to engage civil society and improve democratization.51 In terms of process, this book focuses on a weakness of liberal IPE – namely, the need to expand discussion of domestic considerations beyond institutional variables. In his review of North American integration, George Hoberg accounted for non-institutional factors with a typology that explored international-domestic linkages related to economics, politics, and culture.52 This study replaces Hoberg’s model with more comprehensive categories – institutional, sectoral, societal, and ideational – within which economic, political, and cultural considerations are relevant. In the case of Canadian foreign trade policy, domestic institutional issues include constitutional and judicial realities, the role of the executive at both levels of government, federal and provincial legislatures, bureaucratic interests, and intergovernmental relations linked to international affairs. Sectoral factors include industry associations, specific corporations, individual executives, and advisory groups, as well as their consultative links with federal and provincial departments and officials. Societal factors, which are typically treated as secondary, incorporate organized labour, environmental groups, First Nations, civil society, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations. Finally, ideational factors focus on how dominant ideas are transferred or entrenched. Dominant ideas relating to ideology, sectoral priorities in regional economies, and attitudes toward participatory government exist in every province and are relevant to a better understanding of provincial trade policy. But simply creating new categories is not enough to fully comprehend process-related issues. It is also important to recognize that domestic actors, even at the provincial level, can shape policy outcomes in both Canada and the international system. For example, the institutional policies of central and non-central governments developed by executive, legislative, and bureaucratic interests are often transferred among levels of analysis as states consult, negotiate, and implement global trade commitments. Also, many
The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy 11
business interests and industry associations have a presence in the global political economy that is distinct from that of the nation-state. And societal groups have sometimes developed cross-border partnerships relating to organized labour, the environment, and civil society. In other words, when evaluating the provinces’ role in Canada’s global trade relations, it is important to realize that causal relationships are “top down,” “transnational,” and “bottom up.” Wolfe has pointed out that change does not happen if institutional or nonstate actors support policy positions that the government already advocates.53 So when evaluating provincial influence, it is important to compare the provinces’ positions to that of Ottawa. The key is to seek examples of provincial pressure actually altering federal policy (as opposed to simply reflecting that policy). A core argument of this book, however, is that the emergence of multilevel governance structures is a potential indicator of change. Powerand interest-based regimes at the international level do not always require significant commitments of sovereignty; conversely, knowledge-driven approaches represent different levels of cooperation.54 Hence the existence or creation of new regimes – especially knowledge-based ones – could represent “significant” change. Finally, it is important to consider the role of social issues. Given that change can be positive or negative, it is possible that higher standards of living, subfederal governance, and the greater recognition of human rights could be replaced by weakened social, economic, and environmental standards. This book argues that states and provinces still have the capacity to formulate independent policy. Unfortunately, the policy processes of most governments, including that of Canada, often fail to place a high priority on these normative issues. By addressing a wide range of international and domestic factors, this book hopes to draw greater attention to questions of political and economic marginalization as they relate to Canada’s global trade relations.
2 International Pressures and Canadian Federalism
This chapter makes two main arguments. First, there is little evidence that intrusive international trade commitments have altered the provinces’ foreign trade relations. Indeed, trade statistics confirm the ongoing dominance of the United States as a trading partner and point to a lack of provincial export diversification. In practical terms, this encourages Ottawa to protect provinces’ interests when negotiating and implementing international trade agreements, which in turn reinforces the specialization and fragmentation of Canada’s economy. Second, the same can be said of federal-provincial economic relations in Canada. A review of fiscal policy, regional development strategies, and past conflicts over natural resources makes it apparent that decentralizing trends in Canadian federalism predate recent international trade commitments. These economic realities also contribute to the emergence of provincial dominant ideas (see Chapter 8). Evaluating Provincial Political Economies A number of different perspectives are available regarding Canada’s role in the North American economy. Some scholars, such as Stephen Clarkson, have argued for greater economic nationalism to counter threats to Canada’s economic and political sovereignty.1 In contrast, Thomas Courchene has supported a common North American currency and suggested that some provinces, notably Ontario, are now part of larger cross-border economies.2 Others, including Michael Hart, William Dymond, Daniel Schwanen, and Geoffrey Hale, have called for an incremental approach to continental integration.3 This chapter, however, supports Richard Simeon’s argument that provincial economies and the institutions of Canadian federalism are not significantly influenced by international economic pressures.4 Simeon does not propose that developments in the global political economy are irrelevant; he does, though, question the inevitability of North American integration and the erosion of the Canadian state. George Hoberg and Grace Skogstad,
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 13
who point to the ongoing support for domestic economic interests, also support Simeon’s conclusions.5 Economic studies questioning the inevitability of integration reinforce Simeon’s argument. Of specific interest are contributions evaluating the relevance of borders to international trade. John McCallum, for example, has suggested that the Canada-US border has had a “decisive impact” on North American trade.6 John Helliwell has reached a similar conclusion, noting that Quebec trades substantially more with other Canadian provinces than with US states of similar size and distance.7 Though provocative, there are two major weaknesses with these studies. The first, which McCallum himself has acknowledged, is that both used small data samples of one to three years. Second, conclusions regarding North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were based on dated figures from only the first years of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Other studies focusing on provincial trade and specific exports also point to significant subfederal autonomy. In his analysis of Alberta and British Columbia, Edward Chambers observes that both provinces rely on natural resource exports.8 Not surprisingly, these exports include energy and agriculture for Alberta and forestry and mining for BC. W. Mark Brown, on the other hand, argues that the relevance of national borders varies from sector to sector and that these variances are a result of “government imposed barriers to trade.”9 Notably, he finds that “political” considerations are “strong” in terms of food products and textiles but are absent for other sectors such as transportation equipment. Both Chambers and Brown make it clear that governments maintain the capacity to protect certain industries that the result is often missed market opportunities in the global economy. This chapter attempts to improve on past studies by examining trade data for all provinces over a thirteen-year period (1993 to 2005). These statistics, however, have specific limitations. The first relates to reliability. Provincial trade statistics are compiled by Industry Canada, and these figures combine data collected by Statistics Canada with data collected by the Census Bureau of the US Department of Commerce. The two agencies use similar methods, but there are slight differences. This is not an issue when examining aggregate trade; but when data are broken down to four-digit product codes – as they are in this chapter – inconsistencies arise in terms of collection and categorization. Another peril of comparative statistical analysis on a yearly basis is that trade relations do not march in step with twelve-month cycles. Fluctuations, therefore, often reflect statistical anomalies rather than actual changes in trade patterns. An important reality is that trade is influenced by exchange rates, inflation, and investment and production cycles, which are difficult to account for with the raw data these agencies collect. One possible solution is to review data in sets of three- to five-year averages, which would lessen
14
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
the impact of these factors. Unfortunately for this study, provincial trade statistics have only been available for slightly more than a decade, which makes long-term trends difficult to identify. Reliability issues are exacerbated when international imports are added, given that these goods are not always shipped directly from the country of origin. Trade from Mexico, for example, often first travels through the United States, which makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of national borders on trade. In addition, parts from Place A are often shipped to Place B where they are added to a product that is subsequently shipped to Place C, the final destination. Similar problems exist in tracking goods once they enter Canada. Available data suggest that Nova Scotia and BC are major importers of foreign automobiles when in fact both provinces are simply the main points of entry for vehicles from Asia and Scandinavia. Moreover, oil and natural gas pipelines can distort provincial trade statistics. Washington State, for example, is a major importer of Alberta energy, but this is due to Terasen’s Trans Mountain pipeline, which carries crude oil from Edmonton to BC. Terasen’s Express System, meanwhile, moves heavy oil from the Alberta tar sands to refineries in the US Rockies and the Midwest. A similar problem arises when examining BC’s energy exports to California; these, too, are recorded as trade with Washington State. Yet another issue is the impact of individual trade contracts on various sectors. In the 1990s, for example, one Mexican company, Avantel, purchased $178 million worth of telecommunications equipment from Northern Telecom (Nortel). Not surprisingly, Alberta’s trade with Mexico collapsed in this sector when Nortel encountered financial difficulties.10 Another example: Manitoba imported approximately $1.2 billion in airplanes in 2002 as the result of a contract that Air Canada had signed to purchase new jets. The planes were dispersed across the country, yet the sale was listed as a provincial import because Air Canada’s head offices are in Winnipeg.11 Contracts can have an even greater impact on smaller provincial economies. In Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, Iraq became the province’s primary source of imports in the late 1990s. This was due to the UN’s Oil for Food program and the province’s sale of a troubled refinery at Come By Chance. The refinery was purchased by the Swiss-based oil trader Vitol SA in 1994. Vitol held a number of permits allowing it to purchase Iraqi oil through the UN. It was interested in the refinery because oil-trading firms are only eligible to purchase crude oil from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) if they own refineries. The Come By Chance refinery was available and affordable.12 Another factor is that wheat-producing provinces face extremely volatile export markets. Thus in Saskatchewan and Alberta, wheat exports to China and other Asian countries collapsed in the mid to late 1990s. This was due to China’s improved transportation system, which meant it no longer had
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 15
to rely on foreign shipments into southern Chinese ports. Indeed, China became an exporter of wheat during this period as a result of increased domestic production. Remember, though, that provincial producers do not export wheat. Canadian wheat is sold by the Canadian Wheat Board, which pursues a wide range of international markets that vary in terms of availability. This can result in sudden statistical increases, such as Saskatchewan’s emerging trade relationship with Algeria. It also accounts for historic exports to Eastern Europe and Russia, which were important markets for Canadian wheat during the Cold War. Finally, this chapter is unable to offer detailed data on provincial trade in services. Arguably, shifts in the services sector are a more accurate signifier of changes related to neoliberal international pressures. Several provinces emphasize services-based trade, including call centres and tourism. The main difficulty here is the shortage of data for provincial trade in services, especially over extended periods.13 Ontario Ontario has long dominated Canada’s export economy with shipments approaching $200 billion annually. The next largest province, Quebec, exports approximately $60 billion. Ontario’s top three export partners are the United States, the United Kingdom, and Mexico. Sales to the US peaked at approximately $193 billion in 2002. In contrast, UK and Mexican exports totalled $4.5 billion and $1.6 billion in 2005. For the most part the province’s export profile has remained stable over the past three decades. Though Ontario’s main exports are passenger vehicles and automobile parts, the province also ships large quantities of nickel mattes and nickel oxide to both the UK and Norway. Trade with the United States dominates provincial imports, with China, Japan, and Mexico consistently ranking in the top four. Other states enjoying similar import growth, albeit on a smaller scale, are Germany, the UK, Taiwan, South Korea, and Italy, whose total exports to Canada are all in the $2 billion range.14 The integration of the North American automobile industry in the 1960s created a regional economy dominated by manufacturing. As Table 1 indicates, Ontario’s motor vehicle exports represented 25 percent of the province’s total exports to the United States in 2004, with sales in excess of $46 billion. Trucks and motor vehicle parts competed for second place, at levels of $12 to $14.5 billion. In terms of imports, the province’s top three sectors between 1993 and 2003 were motor vehicle parts ($15 to $20 billion), passenger vehicles ($1.3 to $5 billion), and spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion engines ($2 to $6 billion). Ontario’s scale of trade with Mexico has increased in the post-NAFTA era but has not significantly diversified the province’s export profile. In fact, the only sector that has enjoyed consistently high exports to Mexico since 1993
Table 1 Ontario exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Automobiles
8703
24.0
24.7
26.4
25.1
24.5
24.6
24.5
25.7
24.4
24.2
Vehicle parts
8708
7.0
6.9
7.1
6.9
6.8
7.6
8.3
7.8
7.7
7.1
Trucks
8704
7.2
5.4
7.2
6.8
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.0
6.0
5.1
Engines
8407
2.0
2.2
2.3
2.1
1.8
1.8
2.0
2.1
1.9
1.6
Tractors
8701
1.6
1.6
1.5
0.9
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.7
1.1
1.5
Medicaments
3004
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.5
Telephone sets
8517
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.7
1.1
1.4
Furniture
9403
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.3
Non-crude petroleum
2710
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.0
0.7
1.0
1.2
Gold
7108
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.3
1.1
1.0
0.9
1.2
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 17
is auto parts, which increased between 1999 and 2001 from approximately $250 million to more than $400 million. Other areas of trade that already existed prior to NAFTA include transmission shafts, engine parts, moulding boxes, milk, and synthetic rubber. Sectors enjoying moderate expansion include seats, motor vehicles (since 1999), and computers. Imports from Mexico are more diversified, albeit at less significant levels, peaking at $2.5 billion in 2002. The biggest import from Mexico is motor vehicle parts, which reached a high of almost $450 million in 2001. Ontario’s trade with specific US states further strengthens Simeon’s argument. The province’s number one export destination in the United States is Michigan, which received over $59 billion in Ontario exports in 2003. This level of trade is not surprising, for two reasons. First, in almost all provinces, neighbouring US states are the primary export markets. This is due to the location of border crossings and the presence of regional transportation corridors. The second reason relates to the dominance of the automotive sector. In 2003 more than $29 billion of Ontario’s exports to Michigan were motor vehicles. The remaining top five exports were also related to the automotive industry; they included trucks and other vehicles, motor vehicle and engine parts, and seats. In the past four years, California has replaced New York as Ontario’s second major export market. Trade in motor vehicles also dominates this relationship, with close to $12 billion in exports in 2003. Quebec The United States dominates Quebec’s export profile. In 1993 that province exported $27 billion to the US, and in 2005 trade exceeded $57 billion. Quebec’s second largest trading partner is the UK, with exports peaking at $2 billion in 2000. The UK is the second largest exporter to Quebec, whose imports from Norway, Germany, Italy, France, Algeria, and China have also increased since 1992. Generally, Quebec relies on imports of crude petroleum, which is the number one shipment to that province from the UK, Mexico, Algeria, and Norway. Quebec tends to export goods in a number of areas in which it also has high imports. One example is imports of airplane and helicopter parts from the UK, which total close to $500 million. Other overlapping sectors include turbojets and turbopropellers, passenger vehicles, and circuit boards. In terms of exports to the US (Table 2), Quebec has two sectors regularly over $3 billion: helicopters and airplanes ($6 billion), and unwrought aluminum ($3 billion). Sectors in the $1 to $2 billion range include lumber, newsprint, uncoated paper and paperboard, turbojets and turbopropellers, and circuit boards. Two sectors with trade over $1 billion – electronic integrated circuits and turbojets and turbopropellers – dominate Quebec’s imports from the United States. As with its exports, Quebec’s imports have remained relatively consistent over most sectors. The only area of significant decline
Table 2 Quebec exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Aluminum
7601
7.6
6.4
5.7
5.1
6.4
6.1
6.8
6.8
7.4
9.9
Airplanes
8802
4.3
5.7
6.1
6.3
9.7
10.2
13.3
9.4
9.5
6.4
Newsprint in rolls
4801
5.6
5.1
4.3
3.9
4.0
3.7
3.7
3.2
3.0
3.1
Uncoated paper
4802
2.4
2.6
2.3
2.2
2.6
2.7
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.9
Turbojets
8411
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.0
2.5
2.5
2.1
2.5
2.4
2.7
Lumber > 6MM
4407
4.8
4.4
4.4
3.2
3.3
3.0
2.6
3.2
2.7
2.2
Copper wire
7408
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.9
1.2
2.1
Circuits
8542
8.5
6.8
5.1
4.3
3.9
2.5
2.4
2.5
3.2
2.0
Copper
7403
1.2
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.9
1.9
Non-crude petroleum
2710
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.6
1.7
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 19
was a reduction of approximately $1 billion in circuit boards in 2001. As with Ontario, these changes do not represent a long-term shift in the province’s political economy. There is no evidence that NAFTA significantly altered Quebec’s export profile. Mexico is not ranked as one of Quebec’s top ten export or import destinations. In fact, only two exports are close to $60 million – unwrought aluminum and mixed alkylbenzenes. Before NAFTA, the one sector with any presence in Mexico was asbestos, but trade in this commodity reached a low of $4.3 million in 2002, down from a high of $19.7 million in 1994. Regarding imports, Quebec has diversified its trade profile, but purchases in most sectors are well below $50 million. One exception is shipments of Mexican crude petroleum. In recent decades this sector experienced a low of approximately $102 million in 1995 and a high of $950 million in 2006. New York is the main destination for Quebec exports to the United States, with sales ranging from approximately $5 billion in 1994 to almost $8 billion in 2006. Quebec has expanded its trade with a number of other states over the past decade. These include Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Texas. Vermont remains the third highest importer of Quebec goods, but trade figures with that state have declined consistently from a high of $4.7 billion in 2000. Exports of aluminum have dominated Quebec’s trade with New York since 1993, reaching more than $1.2 billion in 2006. Other key sectors include copper wire, electrical energy, and newsprint. Trade with Pennsylvania and Ohio is driven by aluminum, whereas the primary export to Vermont is circuit boards, which, however, declined from $2.6 billion in 1997 to $1 billion in 2006. The dominant export to Texas, which totalled $1.2 billion in 2001, is helicopters, airplanes, and spacecraft. Alberta Alberta’s international trade is also dominated by the United States, reaching a high of $81.2 billion in 2005. Alberta’s second largest export market is Japan, though provincial sales exceed over $150 million in only three sectors: rape or colza seed, meat of swine, and chemical wood pulp. Alberta’s trade with China has also increased due to exports of sulphur and acyclic alcohol. Exports to South Korea are dominated by one sector, chemical wood pulp, which totalled over $180 million in 2002. The province’s primary sources of imports have also remained stable, except in China’s case. In 1993 Alberta’s imports from China totalled under $34 million. By 1997 this had expanded to $81.5 million, and in 2005 trade levels reached $1 billion. France, Germany, and the UK have also steadily increased trade. Imports from Japan, on the other hand, have remained relatively stable, with only slight increases since 1992. Alberta’s exports to the US reflect the province’s long-term reliance on crude petroleum and liquefied petroleum. As Table 3 suggests, Alberta
Table 3 Alberta exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Crude petroleum
2709
31.3
26.3
26.1
30.2
24.7
29.1
30.7
34.2
33.8
42.3
Liquefied petroleum
2711
36.1
33.8
34.5
37.7
45.2
39.2
45.8
42.2
44.7
34.9
Ethylene
3901
1.7
1.3
1.4
1.1
1.9
2.0
2.7
3.2
3.3
3.8
Live bovine animals
0102
2.4
2.7
1.5
1.0
1.3
1.4
0.3
–
0.3
0.9
Non-crude petroleum
2710
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.3
0.9
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.7
0.9
Fresh bovine meat
0201
2.0
3.0
3.3
2.0
2.3
2.7
1.6
1.9
1.5
0.9
Wood pulp
4703
1.4
1.9
1.7
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.8
Acyclic hydrocarbons
2901
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.7
Particle board
4410
0.6
1.2
1.5
0.7
0.6
0.8
1.1
1.6
1.0
0.6
Cyclic hydrocarbons
2902
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.9
0.9
1.1
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 21
exported roughly equivalent amounts of each product to the US until 2000; then, in 2001, sales of liquefied petroleum increased significantly. By 2006, shipments of crude petroleum had surpassed those of liquefied petroleum, totalling more than 42 percent of Alberta’s American exports. Other products, such as ethylene, have enjoyed steady growth over the past decade, reaching a high of 3.8 percent of US exports in 2006. Imports from the US are dominated by five sectors. The most consistent import is computers, with shipments above $300 million since 1998. Passenger vehicles have remained stable at approximately $200 to $300 million since 1992, notwithstanding reductions to below $100 million in 1997 and 1998. Helicopters, airplanes, and spacecraft topped $900 million in 2005. Unlike Ontario and Quebec, Alberta has increased its scale of trade with Mexico, though it is limited to a small number of sectors. Indeed, since 2000 one product group, meat of bovine animals, has dominated Alberta’s exports to Mexico. This sector has grown from less than $10 million in 1998 to more than $260 million in 2004. There are only three other sectors with exports to Mexico in the $60 to $130 million range: wheat, polymers of ethylene, and rape or colza seed. In terms of imports, Mexico is now the second leading exporter to Alberta, though it is dominated by one sector. Since 2000 Alberta has imported close to $140 million annually of “electrical apparatus” for telephones. This is significant because trade in this sector was at or below $20 million between 1992 and 1999. No other import from Mexico exceeds $40 million. Not surprisingly, Alberta’s trade with specific US states focuses on energy. In fact, more than thirty-six states import more than $100 million from the province, and thirteen of them exceed the $1 billion mark. The top three export destinations – Illinois, Washington State, and New York – are consistently at or above $6 billion. These figures are driven by imports of liquefied petroleum or hydrocarbon gases and/or crude petroleum oils. The only state near the top ten not historically dominated by oil and gas is California. Ranked eleventh, the state’s major purchases from Alberta are wood particleboard, which increased from approximately $100 million in 1999 to more than $330 million in 2004; and meat of bovine animals, with levels between $140 million and $260 million since 1997. British Columbia British Columbia has long been the least dependent province in terms of trade with the United States. Sales to the US, however, have grown considerably since 1999. In 1995, provincial exports to the US totalled approximately $14.5 billion; by 2005, however, annual trade had levelled off at about $23 billion. Exports to Japan peaked in 1995 at just over $6.8 billion before declining to $4.2 billion in 2005. Despite these reductions, Japan continues to be BC’s second largest trading partner. Another consistent provincial
22
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
export market is South Korea, with trade meeting or exceeding $900 million since 2004. In recent years South Korea has been surpassed by China, with BC increasing its exports there from about $500 million in 1994-95 to more than $1.3 billion in 2005. BC imports are dominated by the United States, with levels reaching $14.1 billion in 2005. The second major exporter to BC is Japan, with sales of about $7.1 billion in 2002. The third ranked exporter is China, which had raised its share of the provincial import market to approximately $7.5 billion by 2005. As Table 4 makes clear, a handful of natural resources dominate BC’s trade with the United States. Not surprisingly, the most important export is lumber, with trade ranging between $3 and $5 billion since 1993. The other significant export, liquefied petroleum, peaked at $3.9 billion in 2005. The most consistent import from the US dating back to 1993 is passenger vehicles, with yearly sales ranging between $200 and $500 million. Another import with steady growth since 1999 has been non-crude petroleum. Three other US imports exceeding sales of $300 million in 2005 were electrical energy, trucks, and tractors. There is little evidence that NAFTA has greatly altered BC’s trade relationship with Mexico. Mexico is currently the province’s eleventh-ranked export market, with only three sectors above $50 million: molybdenum ore, coal, and uncoated kraft paper. Mexico is BC’s fifth-ranked source of imports, though these remain at low levels. Before NAFTA, BC’s major import is motor vehicles, with shipments reaching about $80 million in 2001 before returning to $60 million in 2005. The other major import sector for BC is television receivers. Trade in this sector was around $10 million in 1993 but had expanded significantly to more than $180 million by 2005. BC’s number one export market in the United States is Washington State. Not surprisingly, trade with Washington continued to increase after BC’s sales to Japan declined. BC exports to Washington are dominated by energy and lumber. The province consistently ships roughly $2 billion in liquefied petroleum; sales of lumber range between $400 million and $650 million annually. California is the province’s second-ranked American market, accounting for close to 6 percent of provincial exports. Primary exports to California include newsprint, wood particleboard, fresh and chilled fish, lumber, and uncoated paper and paperboard, with sales between $100 and $200 million in 2005. Manitoba Manitoba’s traditional export market is the United States. Indeed, the percentage of Manitoba’s exports that went to the US increased from 62.8 to 76.3 percent between 1992 and 2003. During the same period, Japan was Manitoba’s second-ranked trading partner, fluctuating between 5 and 7 percent of overall provincial exports. The province’s primary sales to Japan
Table 4 BC exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Lumber > 6MM
4407
33.1
27.2
26.0
19.6
20.9
22.5
19.0
24.4
21.1
20.4
Liquefied petroleum
2711
4.8
5.9
6.3
11.0
11.9
9.2
14.6
12.0
17.1
14.3
Wood pulp
4703
5.0
3.1
3.6
3.5
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.3
Particle board
4410
1.5
1.7
2.0
1.6
1.5
1.7
3.0
3.3
2.4
2.3
Windows and doors
4418
3.0
3.7
3.9
2.3
2.5
2.6
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.3
Uncoated paper
4802
1.7
2.1
1.9
1.7
2.1
2.5
2.3
2.1
2.0
2.2
Zinc/alloys
7901
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.4
0.7
1.1
1.2
1.3
0.9
1.8
Fresh/chilled fish
0302
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.2
1.4
1.8
1.7
1.3
1.3
1.7
Newsprint in rolls
4801
3.1
2.9
2.5
2.1
2.1
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.5
1.5
Electricity
2716
1.4
1.8
2.2
8.4
9.0
1.3
1.9
1.3
2.9
1.5
24
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
are rape or colza seed ($100 to $200 million) and meat of swine (around $200 million in 2005). Manitoba consistently purchases over 85 percent of its imports from the US. China is Manitoba’s second major source of imports. Other importers to the province include Germany and Mexico. Of all Canadian provinces, Manitoba has the most diverse export profile vis-à-vis the United States (Table 5), largely because it serves as a gateway to the industrialized US Midwest. Manitoba’s top-ranked exports are crude petroleum and electrical energy, with sales of over $500 million in 2005. Other exports in the $200 to $400 million annual range include medicaments, buses, helicopter and airplane parts, motor vehicle bodies, unrefined copper, and live swine. Manitoba’s imports are equally diversified but at lower levels. The number one import is passenger vehicles, with totals between $300 and $450 million since 1992. Motor vehicle parts are also typically between $200 and $300 million. Though Manitoba’s trade with Mexico has steadily increased in the postNAFTA period, it has not dramatically altered the province’s export/import profile. Mexico is now the province’s fifth-ranked export destination, with totals climbing from 0.9 percent of overall sales in 1992 to a high of 2.6 percent in 2004. Exports are dominated by three commodities: wheat, meat of swine, and rape or colza seed. Imports also increased following NAFTA so that Mexico is now the province’s fourth-ranked importer, behind the United States, China, and Germany. Even so, the goods Mexico exports to Manitoba amount to less than $20 million annually. They include bananas, women’s and girls suits, engine parts, electric motors and generators, motor vehicle parts, furniture, and insulated wire and cable. Geography dictates that the top four US states for Manitoba exports are Minnesota, North Dakota, Michigan, and Illinois. The number one export to Minnesota is electricity, with sales peaking at $583 million in 2006. Exports of motor vehicle bodies to that state have ranged from $150 million to $250 million since 2000, up from approximately $110,000 in 1994. Motor vehicle body exports also dominate trade with North Dakota, whereas Michigan’s biggest import is unrefined copper. Manitoba’s main source of imports, across a wide range of sectors, is Illinois; in 2005 imports from that state totalled roughly $1.2 billion. Perhaps surprisingly, Manitoba imported more than $200 million in 2003 from fifteen other US states. Trade with Minnesota mainly involves passenger vehicles. Saskatchewan Saskatchewan also trades less with the United States than most other provinces. In fact, the province’s exports to the US (as a percentage of total trade) were as low as 42.5 percent in 1992, though this had increased to 65.5 percent by 2006. Historically, China has been the second-ranked destination for Saskatchewan exports, with a high of 12.4 percent in 1992. As the province’s
Table 5 Manitoba exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Crude petroleum
2709
8.0
5.0
7.6
7.4
8.7
9.8
6.8
5.5
7.2
8.9
Electricity
2716
5.7
5.8
5.2
5.5
7.0
5.0
3.7
5.2
7.5
7.3
Medicaments
3004
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.5
1.1
1.8
1.5
6.3
Copper
7402
3.9
5.9
5.1
2.8
4.7
5.0
4.8
3.9
3.9
4.8
Live swine
0103
3.0
2.5
2.5
2.6
3.2
3.1
3.8
4.8
5.5
4.3
Buses/transport
8702
2.7
3.0
2.4
0.03
0.02
0.1
2.0
3.4
3.1
3.1
Airplane parts
1514
4.7
7.4
7.6
4.6
5.0
3.4
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.8
Potatoes/frozen vegetables
2004
1.6
2.2
2.1
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.8
3.3
3.1
2.7
Bodies/vehicles
8707
2.9
3.1
4.0
4.7
5.6
4.1
3.3
2.6
3.0
2.6
Furniture
9403
3.0
2.9
3.0
2.9
3.5
3.7
3.6
3.4
3.1
2.4
26
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
exports to the US have increased, however, trade with China has diminished, sinking to a low of 3.1 percent in 2006. Wheat long dominated Saskatchewan’s exports to China, though sales in this sector have decreased substantially since 1996. Purchases of mineral and chemical fertilizer, on the other hand, remain high – between $300 and $435 million per year since 2000. Japan has a more stable trade relationship with Saskatchewan, importing wheat, rape or colza seed, and mineral and chemical fertilizers. When it comes to imports, however, the US dominates; close to 90 percent of Saskatchewan’s imports come from there. Table 6 makes it clear that Saskatchewan has a resource-based economy. Specifically, the province’s trade relationship with the US is based on two commodities. Exports of crude petroleum peaked at $5.8 billion in 2006. Shipments of mineral or chemical fertilizer – also a key export to China and Japan – have remained stable at approximately $1 billion since 1998. Over the past decade Saskatchewan’s third- and fourth-ranked exports to the US have been bovine animals and wheat; both, however, have declined sharply since 2003. Saskatchewan’s imports from the United States encompass a diverse range of goods; that said, the dominant products are passenger vehicles, tractors, harvesting and threshing equipment, self-propelled bulldozers, and retail pesticides. NAFTA has not significantly altered Saskatchewan’s overall trade with Mexico. In 1992 Mexico was Saskatchewan’s seventh-ranked export destination behind the US, Japan, China, Brazil, India, and South Korea. Over the following decade Mexico remained positioned between sixth and eighth, though it did climb as high as fourth in 2003. Wheat and rape or colza seed are Saskatchewan’s principal exports to Mexico, with sales in those sectors totalling more than $200 million in 2005. Saskatchewan imports a number of products from Mexico, but only three exceeded $3 million in 2005: tractors, electrical transformers, and iron and steel tubing and pipe fittings. Montana, Wyoming, and Illinois are the top three US states for Saskatchewan exports. In Montana and Wyoming export trade is tied to crude petroleum, with sales between $1 and $1.5 billion in 2005. Regarding Illinois, crude petroleum is Saskatchewan’s number one export, though mineral and chemical fertilizers run a close second, both at approximately $350 million. Minnesota is ranked fourth, with sales of crude petroleum and mineral and chemical fertilizers dominating trade. The province’s number one source for US imports is Illinois, with annual shipments between $500 and $750 million, consisting of bulldozers, threshing and harvesting equipment, and trucks. Other key exporters are Texas (more than $300 million in 2003) and Wisconsin and Iowa (around $200 million each). New Brunswick New Brunswick has significantly expanded its bilateral trade with the United
Table 6 Saskatchewan exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Crude petroleum
2709
34.1
26.1
29.0
41.8
36.9
36.7
46.3
48.1
49.8
55.9
Fertilizers/potash
3104
15.6
20.6
19.9
14.5
15.2
15.7
16.2
13.7
15.9
13.4
Tubes and pipes
7305
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.9
1.1
1.1
0.6
1.9
1.1
1.9
Particle board
4410
0.3
0.7
0.8
0.4
0.1
0.6
1.7
3.2
3.4
1.8
Uranium
2844
2.3
1.4
0.8
0.8
1.8
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.6
Fertilizers nitrogenous
3102
1.4
1.9
2.5
1.1
1.5
2.0
1.3
1.5
1.6
1.7
Canola and colza
1514
1.1
1.5
1.7
1.3
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.3
1.1
1.5
Live bovine animals
0102
3.7
3.0
2.3
1.3
2.8
5.4
1.1
–
1.8
1.5
Wheat
1001
4.9
4.2
4.1
2.3
3.2
3.0
0.2
0.8
0.6
1.4
Oats
1004
2.7
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.6
1.4
1.0
0.8
0.9
1.2
28
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
States over the past fifteen years. In 1992 it shipped 64.3 percent of its total exports to the US market. By 2006 this bilateral relationship had increased to 90 percent. During this period Japan was New Brunswick’s second-ranked export market, reaching a high of 7.4 percent of total exports in 1995. By 2006, however, that amount had fallen to 0.5 percent, placing Japan on par with Brazil, India, Poland, and Belgium. Trade with the United Kingdom also suffered a significant decline, from a high of 6.3 percent of total trade in 1992 to less than 1 percent in 2006. New Brunswick’s exports to the United States (Table 7) are dominated by non-crude petroleum, which totalled more than $5.6 billion in 2005. No other export regularly exceeds $550 million. Trade with Japan is on a much smaller scale, with sales of crustaceans (live or chilled) averaging between $40 and $80 million annually. Exports to the UK include chemical wood-pulp soda and newsprint. New Brunswick’s imports are more diversified relative to other Canadian provinces. US imports, for example, reached a high of 50.9 percent of total imports in 1999 before dropping to a low of 27.3 percent in 2006. Norway and Saudi Arabia have long been the province’s second- and third-ranked sources of imports, though Norway has now replaced the US in first place. The main import from the United States is live and fresh crustaceans, with sales of approximately $230 million in 2002. New Brunswick’s other bilateral relationships are dominated by crude petroleum. Imports of crude from Norway have maintained levels between $1.4 and $2.1 billion since 2000. Imports from Saudi Arabia are also now consistently in the $1.5 billion range. In 2003 Equatorial Guinea became the province’s fourth-ranked source of imports, accounting for 5.7 percent of total imports – again, this was crude petroleum. Before 2002 New Brunswick had no trade relationship with that country. Angola also became an oil exporter to New Brunswick in 2005, with sales exceeding $190 million. New Brunswick and Mexico have always had a marginal trade relationship. Indeed, Mexico does not rank consistently in the province’s top ten for either exports or imports. The two most important US states for New Brunswick exports are Maine and Massachusetts. In 2003 Maine imported $3.1 billion worth of goods from the province; $2.1 billion of this was non-crude petroleum. Exports in this sector, however, had declined to $2.4 million by 2006. Electricity, lumber, and chemical wood pulp are consistently the province’s other three main exports to Maine, with sales between $130 and $160 million. Trade with Massachusetts is also dominated by non-crude petroleum: shipments of that commodity totalled more than $560 million in 2006, with sales of crustaceans coming second at about $220 million. In terms of imports, Maine is the number one source of goods to New Brunswick, with trade ranging between $450 and $500 million; about $200 million of that consists of crustaceans. Texas is ranked second, with sales dominated by ether and ether alcohol.
Table 7 New Brunswick exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Non-crude petroleum
2710
29.9
19.8
22.2
30.5
41.5
41.5
47.2
48.9
58.4
57.7
Lumber > 6MM
4407
12.7
13.4
15.0
10.4
8.0
7.1
5.7
6.8
5.1
4.0
Crustaceans
0306
3.2
3.1
4.0
4.3
4.0
4.1
4.4
3.8
3.3
3.4
Coated paper
4810
8.8
11.4
9.5
8.6
4.3
4.4
4.9
4.0
0.6
2.9
Uncoated paper
4802
1.5
2.0
1.4
1.4
2.7
2.8
2.0
2.3
3.1
2.7
Liquefied petroleum
2711
0.1
0.1
0.09
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.9
2.1
Windows and doors
4418
0.3
0.6
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.6
2.2
1.9
1.8
Petroleum coke
2713
1.3
1.0
0.6
0.9
0.9
0.8
1.2
1.6
1.0
1.6
Chemical wood pulp
4704
1.8
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.8
1.4
1.7
1.4
1.2
1.4
Crustaceans/prepared
1605
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.4
1.4
30
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
Nova Scotia Nova Scotia has shipped between 75 and 80 percent of its total exports to the United States since 1999. Until recently, Japan was the second-ranked export destination with shipments consistently falling between 2.3 and 4.5 percent. In 2006, Japan gave way in second place to the United Kingdom, which accounted for 3.1 percent of total sales. Rounding out the top five export destinations for Nova Scotia are China, France, and India. Exports to the US are dominated by liquefied petroleum, with sales between $0.8 and $1.3 billion since 2000 (see Table 8). Interestingly, there was almost no bilateral trade in this sector before 1999. The second major export to the US is pneumatic tires, at $650 to $700 million. Historically, the UK’s imports from Nova Scotia have included chemical wood-pulp soda. Chemical woodpulp soda and molluscs dominate exports to France. Imports to Nova Scotia, as with New Brunswick, reflect a lack of reliance on the United States. In fact, Germany is the number one source of provincial imports, with totals ranging between 25 and 30 percent since 1999. The UK, which has consistently shipped between 13 and 15 percent of Nova Scotia’s overall imports, ranks second. Norway, Sweden, and Cuba follow, accounting for between 4.9 and 8.1 percent of Nova Scotia’s imports in 2006. The US is now ranked ninth, with levels dropping to 4.1 percent in 2006. Imports from Germany and Sweden are overwhelmingly dominated by passenger vehicles and automobile parts. These statistics are somewhat misleading, however, given that Nova Scotia is the point of entry for European producers such as Mercedes Benz, Saab, and Volvo. Imports from the US are more diverse, including non-crude petroleum, passenger vehicles, and machinery. NAFTA has not increased Nova Scotia’s trade with Mexico. Exports to Mexico have ranged between 0.1 and 0.9 percent of overall exports since 1998. Mexico is also not one of the top ten importers to the province. Nova Scotia’s number one export destination in the United States is Massachusetts, with trade exceeding $1.8 billion in 2005. The two sectors that dominate this relationship are liquefied petroleum and crustaceans, with sales of approximately $1.3 billion and $500 million respectively in 2005. The only other US state with provincial exports over $200 million is South Carolina, which imported more than $355 million from Nova Scotia in 2005, consisting primarily of tires. Other top export destinations include Michigan (tires), Texas (crude petroleum), and Maine (crustaceans). Given the less than dominant import relationship with the United States, Nova Scotia has an eclectic range of US trading partners, including Texas, Louisiana, Connecticut, California, and Ohio. Imports from all of these states, however, do not exceed $100 million in any sector.
Table 8 Nova Scotia exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Liquefied petroleum
2711
0.03
–
–
18.1
24.9
16.9
25.3
23.1
28.7
22.0
New tires of rubber
4011
22.5
21.6
21.2
17.8
14.7
16.9
14.4
15.1
14.5
17.9
Crustaceans
0306
5.7
6.3
7.1
6.8
7.6
8.8
8.8
8.2
7.1
8.0
Lumber > 6MM
4407
3.6
5.6
7.9
5.6
4.2
4.8
3.6
5.0
4.5
4.8
Non-crude petroleum
2710
0.5
1.4
0.9
0.9
2.0
1.1
1.5
3.1
1.0
3.0
Chemical wood pulp
4703
1.5
1.1
1.8
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.0
2.9
Gypsum
2520
2.6
2.5
2.7
2.2
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.2
Vehicle parts
8708
0.1
0.3
0.7
1.1
1.5
1.8
1.8
1.9
1.8
2.1
Fresh/chilled fish
0302
2.5
2.6
2.3
2.3
2.0
2.2
1.9
1.7
1.7
2.0
Molluscs
0307
3.9
3.8
3.5
3.4
2.3
2.7
2.2
2.1
1.6
1.9
32
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
Prince Edward Island The most significant difference between PEI and other Canadian provinces is its small scale of trade. The United States dominates the island’s exports. PEI’s bilateral relationship with the US has increased significantly since 1992, when trade totalled less than 60 percent of PEI’s exports. Since 2000, sales to the US have reached levels close to 90 percent, reducing all other markets to 1.5 percent or less. As with other provinces in Atlantic Canada, Mexico is not ranked in the top ten. PEI’s exports to the US are dominated by frozen potatoes, which account for $150 to $200 million in sales, and live crustaceans, which account for $50 to $100 million (Table 9). Fresh potatoes and molluscs were between $35 and $45 million in 2005. PEI has also developed an export market in turbojets and turbopropellers, though this declined to $18 million in 2005 from a peak of $30 million in 2001. In terms of US states, PEI exports most of its goods to Massachusetts and Maine. Once again, potatoes and crustaceans dominate that trade. In terms of overall imports, PEI relies on the United States, though sales are tied to a diverse range of goods. In 2005 the province imported $21 million in electric generating sets. Trade in that sector did not exist prior to 2004. The other primary import in 2005 was fertilizer ($8 million). Other sectors below $1 million included seeds, fruits and spores, liqueurs and spirits, parts for machinery, harvesting and threshing equipment, and transmission shafts. Only two countries accounted for more than 1 percent of PEI’s total imports in 2003. France was the source of 1.3 percent of PEI’s imports, mainly exported grape wines, with some additional trade in spirits and liqueurs. Mexico is a top ten exporter to PEI; however, the raw figures are low – only $480,000 in 2005. The two dominant imports from Mexico are beer, and spirits and liqueurs. Florida is consistently the number one US importer to PEI, with totals of almost $10 million in 2004. This trade consists almost entirely of fertilizer. In 2006 Maine was the only other state to sell more than $1 million of goods to the province. Newfoundland and Labrador Newfoundland and Labrador also relies on trade with the US market, though not as much as other provinces. In 1992, Newfoundland shipped 50.7 percent of its total exports to the United States. In 2002 bilateral trade with the US peaked at 74.2 percent before declining to 55 percent in 2006. In the early 1990s Japan and the United Kingdom were the second-ranked destinations for the province’s exports; they were later replaced by China and Germany. Shipments to the US are dominated by crude and non-crude oil, with annual sales of over $1 billion (Table 10). Crustaceans (live, fresh, chilled, or frozen) and newsprint are the other two major US imports from Newfoundland, with trade between $200 and $400 million. Exports to the UK were once dominated by iron ore and newsprint; now they are dominated by
Table 9 Prince Edward Island exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Potatoes/frozen vegetables
2004
28.1
28.2
28.8
29.2
35.8
28.3
30.7
Crustaceans
0306
11.5
13.3
17.4
16.0
14.4
20.1
Potatoes/fresh
0701
7.8
9.7
7.2
4.0
2.3
Textured protein
2106
–
–
2005
2006
30.7
26.1
27.8
16.9
13.7
13.5
12.4
4.8
5.8
3.5
5.2
7.1
–
–
–
–
0.02
3.7
6.6
Crustaceans prepared
1605
8.1
8.6
8.9
9.0
6.4
8.1
6.4
6.9
7.2
5.9
Turbojets
8411
4.9
5.4
3.9
7.1
5.0
4.0
4.1
2.4
2.8
4.7
Molluscs
0307
5.0
5.2
4.3
4.8
5.1
5.0
5.1
4.6
4.7
4.0
Parts of rail vehicles
8607
–
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.1
0.8
1.4
3.2
2.8
2.2
Diagnostic/lab reagents
3822
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.1
0.8
1.1
1.4
2.1
2.0
2.2
Lumber > 6MM
4407
3.2
4.4
4.1
2.4
2.0
2.1
2.0
2.9
2.4
1.3
0.01
2004
34
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
non-crude petroleum. China has become the province’s second-ranked export market; in 2005 it purchased $215 million of iron ore and $125 million of crustaceans. Germany has long imported Newfoundland’s newsprint; since 2000, however, it has been importing more iron ore – about $364 million worth in 2005. Mexico is not ranked in the top ten for provincial exports. Newfoundland’s import profile is unique among Canadian provinces in that the United States has never accounted for more than 20 percent of its imports; in 2005 that figure fell as low as 7.9 percent. Other governments have dominated imports on a cyclical basis. For example, Russia increased its trade from virtually zero in 1992 to over 20 percent of provincial imports the following year. In 2005 Russia was the province’s second-ranked importer, accounting for 13.4 percent of trade; however, this declined to 2.9 percent by 2006. Since 2000 the number one importer to Newfoundland has been Iraq, which in 2006 accounted for 57.6 percent of the province’s imports – exceeding $1.6 billion. A close examination of Newfoundland’s imports makes two things clear: they are dominated by crude petroleum from the US, Russia, and Iraq; and contracts and individual firms have a strong impact on this small provincial economy. As with the other Atlantic provinces, Mexico was not ranked in the top ten for provincial imports. Regional Economies, Provincial Priorities, and Canadian Trade Policy The above discussion makes it clear that definitive provincial economies exist within Canadian federalism. The question is whether the provinces’ economic priorities have shifted dramatically in response to rising pressures from international markets. It would be a mistake, for example, to argue that global economic developments have had no influence on provincial trade and investment strategies. To do so would be to ignore the fact that Canadian provinces are integrated in different ways into continental and global political economies. This became evident during the 1970s, when the OPEC oil crisis made it obvious that Canada lacked a national economic strategy. These tensions and divergent priorities are equally important today. Some observers have argued that these differences have heightened competition among the provinces as they pursue trade and investment goals; usually in the form of tax concessions, “soft” loans, and other incentives. It has also been pointed out that cross-border regional economies, such as Cascadia (i.e., the Pacific Northwest) and the Great Lakes Basin, reinforce diversified subfederal economic interests.15 The preceding review of provincial trade statistics, however, challenges the assumption that external pressures define subfederal trade relations. First and most important, divergent provincial and regional economic interests have long been an element of Canadian federalism. These cleavages predate
Table 10 Newfoundland and Labrador exports to the United States – total trade (percent) Product
HS4 code
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Non-crude petroleum
2710
46.2
28.3
35.5
39.6
44.6
27.3
Newsprint in rolls
4801
18.1
17.9
15.0
12.5
15.3
Crustaceans
0306
3.3
7.2
12.8
9.3
Crustaceans prepared
1605
1.3
2.7
2.8
Crude petroleum
2709
–
13.2
Iron ores
2601
19.4
Fish fillets
0304
Fresh/chilled fish
2003
2004
2005
2006
44.1
54.6
71.6
74.2
9.2
6.3
6.9
6.1
7.6
12.6
7.6
10.8
11.2
7.6
5.5
2.2
2.6
1.5
1.0
1.5
3.0
1.9
15.1
21.6
10.0
46.8
28.7
14.2
–
1.6
17.0
6.3
5.0
3.7
0.8
0.9
1.8
1.7
1.2
3.8
5.2
4.8
3.2
3.7
2.1
2.5
2.4
2.0
0.8
0302
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.8
Fish/caviar
1604
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.7
0.5
0.6
1.2
1.1
0.6
Molluscs
0307
1.5
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.07
0.02
0.1
0.1
0.2
36
Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism
recent international developments and reflect subfederal political economies entrenched over several generations. In the case of BC, North America is increasingly replacing the Pacific Rim as an influence on that province’s trade relations; however, there is no evidence that this has dramatically altered sectoral priorities. For example, BC has succeeded in developing new “niche” markets in the technology sector, but these industries are not reflected in provincial trade statistics, which continue to be dominated by softwood lumber and liquefied petroleum. Alberta has consistently relied on energy and agriculture, with international trade dependent on access to the North American market. The province has also attempted to increase trade with the Pacific Rim, albeit with limited success.16 Ontario has long depended on the US market, but it also has a more diversified economy than either BC or Alberta. Besides sectoral trade in automobiles, transportation equipment, and telecommunications, Ontario has an extensive export profile that reflects its strong manufacturing base. Quebec’s economy is not as diversified, but it, too, has escaped reliance on one or two primary sectors. The province exports energy and pulp-and-paper products (including newsprint, coated and uncoated papers, chemical pulp, specialty papers, and softwood lumber). Quebec is also home to a number of transportation and aeronautics corporations, software services, industrial equipment manufacturers, and specialty food producers, as well as consulting engineering firms and other professional services. At the same time, however, Quebec faces greater liberalization in previously protected areas, such as textiles and the dairy and poultry sectors. Some observers question just how different Canada’s provincial and regional economies are from one another; the point here is that each of Canada’s provinces has long had its own distinct economic priorities. Not surprisingly, the fragmented nature of Canada’s economy has had a direct impact on Canadian foreign trade policy. It follows that provincial sectoral interests can provide us with insight into this country’s inconsistent position on liberalization. Energy providers in Alberta want greater market access to the US as well as increased trade liberalization. Ontario’s automotive sector desires freer trade, but only under strict rules of origin as set down in the Auto Pact and NAFTA. The aeronautics industry in Quebec demands protectionism – an approach that is already being challenged by other states, such as Brazil. Canada’s softwood lumber exports are so contentious that they are purposely omitted from foreign trade agreements, leaving the issue to be resolved through federal-provincial consultation, Canada-US negotiations, and international dispute settlement mechanisms. Finally, there is the reality that regional sectoral interests are not monolithic; different producers in a given sector often have divergent goals. The result is a complicated policy process in which multiple state and non-governmental actors compete for influence.
International Pressures and Canadian Federalism 37
The Economic Decentralization of Canadian Federalism Questions of economic centralization and decentralization have arisen in the Canadian federalism literature for generations.17 More recently this debate has shifted to include international considerations. Ian Robinson has suggested that intrusive international pressures have the potential to centralize Canadian federalism as Ottawa seeks to guarantee provincial compliance with international trade commitments.18 Courchene has pointed to the benefits of North American integration. Others, such as Garth Stevenson, have noted the relevance of provincial jurisdiction in international negotiations.19 The rest of this chapter briefly explores these questions in relation to fiscal policy, regional and industrial development strategies, and natural resources. In doing so, it supports the argument that provincial economic autonomy was established prior to recent intrusive neoliberal pressures. The Relevance of Fiscal Policy Regarding taxation, Ottawa historically controlled a highly centralized system, one that allowed for redistributive transfers to the provinces. In 1957 a series of “tax rental” agreements were negotiated that introduced a taxsharing arrangement based on taxes collected within specific provinces. In 1962 the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act replaced the previous tax rental arrangement. Under the new system, Ottawa transferred personal income taxation to the provinces. Since then, fiscal relations in Canada have been based increasingly on the transfer of “tax room” to the provinces.20 Additional tax points were transferred in 1967 in lieu of previous cash transfers for post-secondary education. In 1977 this process culminated in the establishment of Established Programs Financing (EPF), which granted further tax room to the provinces. Besides new tax-collection agreements, Ottawa initiated an increasingly decentralized approach to federal-provincial shared-cost programs. After the Second World War the federal government offered a series of conditional grants to persuade the provinces to establish programs for public health services, welfare assistance, and health care. “Cost matching” ensured that Ottawa would reimburse the provinces 50 cents for every dollar spent provided that federal standards were met. In the 1960s new programs for medical care and welfare assistance were introduced; once again, these were funded by conditional grants. This time, however, owing to the provinces’ demands for flexibility, the conditions attached to these funds, under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), were less rigorous. In 1977 the EPF granted further tax points to the provinces but also established a series of “block grants” for health care that came with even fewer conditions for provinces. The existing CAP program was not altered by the EPF.21 The 1981 federal budget initiated a reduction in EPF funding. This reduction would remain in place for the next fifteen years. As well, CAP suffered
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a significant reduction in federal contributions during the 1990s. In 1996, as part of a consolidation effort, health, education, and social assistance were combined in a new block-funding arrangement known as the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). The CHST put an end to the EPF and CAP. Under the new regime, the provinces were given flexibility for program delivery; also, most funding was replaced with expanded tax room, which meant that the provinces would be paying for services by occupying departed federal tax space. Almost immediately, there erupted a series of federalprovincial disputes over social programs. One of the most controversial involved Alberta premier Ralph Klein’s decision to offer his province’s welfare recipients one-way bus tickets to BC. The BC government responded by imposing residency requirements, which Ottawa then prohibited. In response to this and other developments, in 1999 funding for the CHST was changed to a per capita basis.22 Health care remained a significant issue after the CHST was implemented. Ottawa insisted on national standards as outlined by the Canada Health Act (it did not insist on this for social assistance programs). Not surprisingly, the provinces were less than enthusiastic about this, especially given that public discontent over health care was often directed at provincial governments. The ensuing controversy led to the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), signed in February 1999. This agreement did not allow provinces to opt out of programs; however, it did lead to a federal-provincial health accord, signed in September 2000, that committed Ottawa to $15.5 billion in increased spending in 2000, $18.3 billion in 2001, and a total of $21 billion by 2005. A subsequent health deal negotiated in February 2003 increased that figure to $27 billion.23 Despite these changes, Alberta, BC, and Ontario imposed individual health-care premiums tied to income; these were designed to pressure Ottawa for greater funding.24 In February 2006 the Liberal government of Quebec announced that it would pay for certain private surgeries (namely, cataracts and joint replacements) if the public system could not provide adequate service within six months. This program was in response to an earlier 2005 Supreme Court ruling, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), that endorsed the funding of medical procedures by private health insurance after reasonable wait periods had passed.25 Opponents of the plan contended that it violated the Canada Health Act, but there was limited opposition from the new Conservative government of Stephen Harper.26 A month later, Alberta announced further health-care reforms that even Klein conceded might violate the Canada Health Act.27 Under Alberta’s proposals, doctors would be required to work in both the public and private sectors and patients would be able to pay for faster access to health care. This time, Harper questioned Alberta’s proposals, suggesting that Quebec had the better model.28 Ed Stelmach, Klein’s replacement, has yet to announce specific plans related to health care in Alberta.
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Regional and Industrial Development Strategies Regional and industrial development strategies strongly suggest a long-term trend toward the decentralization of Canadian federalism. Since the early postwar years, provinces and other local governments have attempted to attract business and investment by offering economic incentives. These incentives include loans, tax holidays, guarantees for corporate borrowing in the private sector, and direct financial participation by provincial governments. Critics have suggested that these programs have increased the fragmentation of the Canadian economy, besides limiting local governments’ ability to provide taxpayer services. Regardless, these provincial and municipal programs grew in popularity during the 1950s and 1960s.29 In 1968, when Ottawa established the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), this issue became a focus of federal-provincial relations. DREE’s main task was to coordinate regional infrastructure programs and develop incentives for industrial expansion and relocation. DREE was also responsible for maintaining already existing agricultural and rural development initiatives. After the 1972 federal election, industrial incentives were de-emphasized in favour of coordinated federal-provincial trade and investment strategies. General development agreements (GDAs), which called for the implementation of jointly funded and coordinated regional development programs, were negotiated with every province except Prince Edward Island (which had a pre-existing arrangement with Ottawa). In 1984, DREE was replaced by the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE), which took over much of the former Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce. Several new agreements, which replaced the old GDAs, were negotiated between Ottawa and the provinces.30 Despite these initiatives, Ottawa failed to establish a harmonized national industrial strategy. In 1984, after a Conservative government was elected, the agencies responsible for regional development underwent another period of transition. By the end of the decade, the Atlantic provinces and Western Canada were complaining that DRIE was biased in favour of Central Canada. Ontario’s strong economic performance during those years only strengthened these complaints. In response, the Mulroney government established the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) and a new department responsible for Western Diversification (WD). To address concerns in Central Canada, Ottawa also established Federal Economic Development for Northern Ontario (FEDNOR) and the Department of Industry, Science, and Technology (DIST), which focused on Ontario and Quebec. A subsequent $820 million accord was signed with Quebec; this amount was increased by $283 million in 1989. Jean Chrétien’s election as prime minister resulted in a review of many of these programs as part of the government’s fiscal restraint efforts. As a result of that review, ACOA suffered cuts to program spending of approximately 40 percent. Then in 2000 much of ACOA’s funding was
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restored in advance of the upcoming federal election.31 The current Harper government has maintained a regional approach to running these programs. ACOA is the responsibility of Peter MacKay, the Minister of both National Defence and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency. Rona Ambrose, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Western Economic Diversification controls WD, and FEDNOR is under the mandate of Industry Canada. Natural Resources and Federal-Provincial Conflict Natural resources have had a decentralizing influence on Canadian federalism. Provincial control in this policy area was established by Section 109 of the British North America (BNA) Act, which granted lands, mines, and minerals to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec. Other provinces were extended similar control on entering Confederation. The Prairie provinces, however, were not granted this jurisdictional authority until 1930, and only after political and populist pressure from that region. Ownership of natural resources guaranteed a source of revenue for provincial governments; in early years it also contributed to provinces’ economic diversification. As Donald Savoie has pointed out, “since resources are, in practice, very unevenly distributed, section 109 made a major contribution to the much-discussed phenomenon of regional disparities.”32 Ontario was one of the first provinces to benefit from resource control. By the nineteenth century the provincial government had placed considerable restrictions on the harvesting of timber on Crown lands. In later years, most provinces shifted their attention to the production of hydro-electric power. Concerned about competition from Quebec and the United States, the Ontario government pioneered the use of hydroelectricity as an affordable source of power for the manufacturing sector. Around the same time, other provinces – Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Quebec, BC – developed local power supplies. Not surprisingly, the export of hydro and thermal electricity quickly became a symbol of provincial control over energy resources. But when it comes to the decentralizing impact of energy policy, there is no better example than the oil-and-gas sector. Crude oil production in Canada began with the opening of the Leduc oil field near Edmonton in February 1947. Ever since, Alberta has produced as much as 80 percent of Canada’s oil and gas. Relations between Ottawa and Alberta were generally cordial in the early years of production. Though imported oil was less expensive, the federal government actively developed markets for the province’s petroleum products.33 During the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s, however, world prices soared. For Alberta the oil crisis represented an opportunity to raise domestic prices to increase profits for local companies (and royalties for the Progressive Conservative government). Ottawa, however, declared that the domestic price of oil would be kept below international levels to
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ensure that the Canadian market had guaranteed access to affordable energy. These guidelines were institutionalized by Parliament in 1975 with legislation granting the federal cabinet the right to set prices for oil transported across provincial borders.34 Pierre Trudeau’s re-election in 1980 and his Liberal government’s decision to implement the National Energy Program (NEP) further damaged relations between Ottawa and Alberta. The NEP allowed for a gradual increase in domestic prices; however, it limited Alberta’s ability to raise prices to international levels. The NEP also implemented a series of federal taxes on profits in the oil-and-gas industry and provided financial incentives for the exploration of alternative oil supplies in northern and offshore locations.35 Not surprisingly, Alberta condemned the NEP and threatened to reduce its supplies of oil and gas to drive up domestic prices. Western separatist movements also gained support within the province. At the same time, the US government attacked the NEP as a protectionist subsidy that violated existing trade laws. Owing to these pressures, Ottawa negotiated a new agreement with Alberta in September 1981 that raised domestic oil prices and promised a number of energy-related megaprojects, including the extraction of synthetic oil from the province’s tar sands. In 1985 Mulroney sponsored the Western Accord, which eliminated the NEP. As Donald Smiley suggested at the time, “perhaps never in the history of Confederation has the economic dominance of the centre been so effectively challenged by the peripheries.”36 From the preceding discussion, two general conclusions can be reached regarding the economic decentralization of Canadian federalism. First, domestic considerations – often in conjunction with international developments – continue to affect federal-provincial relations in Canada. Second, and perhaps more important, Ottawa has a limited capacity to develop independent initiatives aimed at controlling Canada’s economy. This does not mean that Ottawa has lost all ability to coordinate economic initiatives. Here many critics point to the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) and SUFA as examples of renewed federal-provincial cooperation. Overall, though, a review of the long-standing tensions related to fiscal policy, regional development, and natural resources makes it difficult to deny that over the decades, the Canadian federation has become decentralized in economic terms. So when examining the impact of international pressures on Canadian federalism, it must be remembered that decentralizing trends are not solely attributable to external developments; they are also related to a number of long-term domestic ones. Conclusion An analysis of subfederal trade patterns underscores the fact that Canada has specialized provincial political economies and that the provinces have specific sectoral interests. Also, the statistics provided confirm that the
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provinces’ economic interests predate increasingly intrusive international trade commitments. This is not to suggest that global developments are irrelevant to Canadian provinces; rather, it highlights a level of provincial autonomy that some observers questioned in the aftermath of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). It follows that provincial economic interests have implications for Ottawa when it comes to negotiating and implementing international trade agreements. Specifically, the provinces pressure Ottawa to represent the priorities of non-central governments. Given that some sectors benefit from greater market access, while others want to maintain protectionist barriers, Canada often articulates a contradictory position on liberalization. Yet there is also evidence that the ongoing decentralization of Canadian federalism is more closely tied to domestic economic developments than to neoliberal pressures in the global economy. A review of Canada’s fiscal policy and regional development programs and of provincial control over natural resources reinforces the fact that Canada’s political economy evolved over several decades and is not tied directly to international pressures. As subsequent chapters suggest, these realities are so entrenched in Canada that they contribute to dominant ideas reinforcing Canada’s fragmented and specialized economy. BC’s lumber, Alberta’s oil, Ontario’s manufacturing, and Atlantic Canada’s fisheries are more than economic realities; they are also tied to concepts of identity within provincial political cultures.
3 The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade
The federal-provincial committee system on international trade evolved in response to (a) constitutional ambiguity regarding the role of the provinces in Canadian foreign policy and (b) the increasing relevance of non-central governments in this policy area. Ottawa has for decades resorted to committees, or “executive federalism,” to address issues of federal-provincial relations. The committee system that has evolved since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), however, is a more permanent forum of consultation than past mechanisms established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This raises a number of important questions regarding the “internationalization” of executive federalism. Will an institutionalized brokerage mechanism for international trade lead to full provincial participation in future negotiations? As the role of the provinces expands, will executive federalism gain legitimacy as a means for managing a broad range of Canadian foreign policy issues? What implications will these committees have for both federal and provincial autonomy? At this point it is clear that Ottawa and the provinces have developed an elite-based system of consultation in this policy area. In matters of international trade, however, these linkages include not only a formalized committee system, but also ad hoc sectoral discussions related to specific negotiations or disputes, as well as selective mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). This chapter argues that with the federal government facing pressure from a number of international and domestic sources, the institutions of Canadian federalism have responded successfully to these developments. It is also clear, however, that executive federalism suffers from problems of transparency and accountability, though these deficits have yet to come under increased scrutiny from relevant sectoral and societal interests. International Law and Canadian Federalism Before evaluating Supreme Court decisions regarding the foreign activities of Canadian provinces, this issue must be reviewed in the context of international
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law. For example, international law declares that regardless of internal jurisdiction, it is central governments that are responsible for fulfilling treaty commitments. This is most clearly outlined in Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that a party to the convention must not use domestic law as justification for violating international treaty obligations. Even before the convention was signed, these principles were recognized by domestic courts, especially in Switzerland and Belgium; they were later codified in the national constitutions of France and the Netherlands.1 The Vienna Convention also makes it clear that specific treaties do not have to be legitimized by legislation or executive order in order to be applicable.2 In the case of Canada, this is somewhat irrelevant, given Ottawa’s ratification of the Vienna Convention in October 1970. The treaty entered into force on 27 January 1980. Central authority is reinforced by specific provisions in international trade agreements. In signing GATT in 1947, Canada bound itself to that agreement’s “federal state clause.” GATT Article XXIV:12, which was later incorporated into the WTO, states that “Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.”3 There is, however, some debate about the intrusiveness of Article XXIV:12. Some member states interpret “reasonable” as a pledge by central governments to use all available constitutional powers to guarantee subfederal compliance. Canada and other federal countries, on the other hand, believe that this clause is open to interpretation.4 The FTA included a similar “federal-state clause.” Article 103 of the FTA stipulated that the “parties to this agreement shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to its provisions ... by state, provincial and local governments.”5 Admittedly, the FTA did not dictate what a party must do to meet these obligations; however, according to Ian Robinson, “it was widely agreed that this reference was stronger than the GATT’s ‘reasonableness’ standard.”6 Article 105 of NAFTA incorporates the same “all necessary measures” language as the FTA. Provincial International Legitimacy and Canadian Judicial Review Canada is one of the few federal states without clearly defined constitutional parameters regarding the international activities of non-central governments. In fact, the only reference to international relations in the 1867 BNA Act is Section 132, which grants the Dominion the authority to implement treaties negotiated by Great Britain. Over time, Ottawa gained increasing autonomy in its foreign affairs, sometimes with direct implications for the provinces. As these issues were opened to judicial interpretation, three sections of the BNA Act became increasingly important: the treaty-making power, the trade
The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade 45
and commerce power, and the peace, order, and good government (POGG) clause. In terms of the treaty-making power, the 1937 Labour Conventions decision by Britain’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) established the precedent that Ottawa has the power to negotiate international treaties but does not have the right to implement agreements in areas of provincial jurisdiction. Despite initial concerns that this ruling would limit federal autonomy, the Supreme Court of Canada did not later use the Labour Conventions precedent in favour of either level of government, preferring instead to maintain a balance between federal and provincial authority regarding this issue.7 Judicial review of the trade and commerce power followed a similar pattern. Section 91(2) of the BNA Act had given Parliament exclusive control over the regulation of trade and commerce. The difficulty was that the provinces had been granted jurisdiction over property and civil rights, including the regulation of contracts through which international trade is conducted. Though Citizens Insurance Company v. Parsons (1891) appeared to confirm Ottawa’s control over international trade, questions were later raised regarding the regulation of products that were both consumed locally and traded internationally. As with Labour Conventions, however, the Supreme Court did not use trade and commerce to entrench federal or provincial power. Instead it reaffirmed that “there was no federal power to regulate a single trade or business. And, it indicated that issues ... must be determined on a careful case-by-case basis.”8 A third approach to interpreting federal authority is the POGG clause. Compared to trade and commerce and the treaty making power, judicial interpretation of POGG is less defined, especially in terms of economic and environmental issues. For the provinces the most relevant Supreme Court decision is Crown Zellerbach (1988). Here the forest company was accused of dumping wood waste into the Pacific Ocean. Though existing federal legislation defined “sea” as an extension of provincial internal waters, the Court ruled that POGG allowed Ottawa to extend its control when these issues were deemed to be matters of “national concern.”9 Even so, Crown Zellerbach has not served as a precedent for centralized control.10 Later cases, such as Friends of the Oldman River Society (1992) and Canada v. Hydro Quebec (1997), have reinforced this federal-provincial balance.11 Expanding the International Agenda With the exception of Quebec, most Canadian provinces did not have early international aspirations.12 As Quebec’s foreign activities expanded, however, other provincial governments began to show an interest in pursuing independent global and regional initiatives. According to Kim Nossal, it was not
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difficult to distinguish between Quebec’s goals and those of other provinces. Specifically, most provincial governments were concerned about defending and expanding areas of domestic jurisdiction, even in matters of foreign affairs. Usually these initiatives were limited to resource development, health, and education. Geography and the need to coordinate functional matters – such as law enforcement, waterways management, firefighting, and road, highway, and bridge services – also propelled the provinces into international activities.13 In the decades following the Second World War, several provinces developed an interest in foreign trade policy. In most cases this was a result of pressure from the United States as provincial subsidies and protectionist practices in a wide range of sectors (fish products, pork, softwood lumber, automobile production, Michelin tires) came under increasing scrutiny. Also during this period the US sent several diplomatic notes to Ottawa in response to the nationalization of American-owned potash firms by the Saskatchewan government in 1975-76. Washington expressed similar concerns relating to Canadian investment practices during Quebec’s takeover of Asbestos Corporation in 1979-81. Not surprisingly, the provinces were extremely critical of these attacks on domestic interests. Several governments even condemned President Richard Nixon’s move to initiate an import surcharge in 1971, with Manitoba and Ontario taking the extra step of developing relief programs to supplement federal compensation packages. The 1970s also marked an increase in provincial activism in specific sectors of the economy. Ultimately it was energy that did the most to increase federal-provincial tensions. Several premiers, including Peter Lougheed of Alberta and Edward Schreyer of Manitoba, took the then unusual step of visiting Washington to articulate provincial concerns. While the controversy over oil and gas created impressive headlines, Ottawa and the provinces continued to cooperate in a number of other areas. The two levels of government worked closely together on the aforementioned US countervail duties against Michelin tires and during Saskatchewan’s decision to intervene in the potash industry. There was also collaboration during negotiations on pipelines, location subsidies for automotive plants, and fisheries issues.14 In response to these pressures Ottawa at first attempted to institutionalize the provinces’ interests within the federal bureaucracy. At one level, federal officials hoped to develop a team approach by reorganizing External Affairs to include a new Federal Provincial Coordination Division (FPCD).15 This department was created to monitor the activities of Quebec, but it soon became responsible for keeping the provinces informed of all relevant Canadian international initiatives. It was also expected to coordinate subfederal activities and assist provincial foreign missions.16 As the Department of External Affairs became more comfortable with this activity, however, the political
The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade 47
need to monitor the provinces diminished. As a result, the Privy Council Office (PCO) took control of most FPCD responsibilities. Though External Affairs continued to maintain a federal-provincial office, it was, in the words of one official, “little more than a man and a boy.”17 Executive Federalism and International Trade: The Provinces and GATT As early as the 1960s, Donald Smiley labelled this form of federal-provincial interaction “executive federalism.” Specifically, he described this process as “the relations between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in federal-provincial interactions and among the executives of the provinces in interprovincial interactions.”18 Within Smiley’s definition was a prominent supportive role for bureaucratic actors. At first, federalprovincial meetings were related to the framing of constitutional proposals and the negotiation and implementation of fiscal and other financial agreements. They were also viewed as a natural outgrowth of an executive-driven domestic policy process in which both levels of government attempted to maximize their autonomy and jurisdiction.19 Executive federalism further thrived owing to the lack of effective brokerage mechanisms for provincial representation in federal institutions.20 The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations contributed to the internationalization of executive federalism, and its extension to the bureaucratic level in matters of trade policy. During the Kennedy Round, for example, some provinces submitted formal reports on tariff policy to the federal government and called for greater involvement in the negotiations. Ottawa’s response was tentative, however, and there was little indication that it would consider an expanded provincial role. Specifically, federal officials believed that clear constitutional guidelines existed regarding the negotiation of international tariffs. As one member of the Canadian delegation suggested at the time, the provinces received no preferential treatment and “got told [about international economic policy] when everybody else got told.”21 By the time the Tokyo Round began in 1973, however, GATT’s focus had shifted to the difficult issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Negotiations on visible tariffs were replaced by discussions of subsidies, government procurement, and other technical barriers. Sectoral negotiations on fisheries, resource-based products, and agriculture also involved areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is why the provinces demanded direct consultation with Ottawa. The federal government understood that, given the scope of the issues involved, it would need the support of the provinces in order to negotiate a binding international agreement under GATT’s federal state clause. At the beginning of the Tokyo Round the only formal mechanism for provincial input was the Canadian Trade and Tariffs Committee (CTTC). That committee, chaired by a federal deputy minister, gathered briefs from
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business, unions, consumer groups, the provinces, and all other interested parties. To better represent regional interests, a more direct forum for the provinces was established in 1975: an ad hoc federal-provincial committee of deputy ministers. In August 1977 a Canadian Coordinator for Trade Negotiations (CCTN) was appointed with the mandate to coordinate relevant information from the provinces, the federal bureaucracy, industry, and other non-governmental organizations. The CCTN’s chair, Jake Warren, who at the time was Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, was credited with increasing provincial bureaucrats’ involvement in the negotiations. According to Douglas Brown, the “provinces saw this as an improvement over the CTTC which was not perceived as having any determining influence over the Canadian negotiating position.”22 Despite these changes, British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec continued to push for a greater role during the Tokyo Round. These provinces sent delegates to Geneva; Quebec’s stayed for the entire round of negotiations. However, Ottawa refused to allow the provinces formal representation in the Canadian delegation. Even so, relations between the two levels of government were for the most part cordial during the GATT negotiations. Ottawa kept provincial officials informed, and most of the provinces provided the negotiating team with useful analyses. The federal government also benefited from access to detailed positions on domestic jurisdictional issues such as procurement and provincial liquor boards. As a result, despite a number of ongoing concerns relating to provincial empowerment, the Tokyo Round created a positive working environment between federal and provincial officials. In fact, the Macdonald Commission “recommended the use of the ‘successful’ procedure ... in future trade negotiations, in particular for the bilateral trade negotiations with the United States.”23 Not surprisingly, federal-provincial consultative mechanisms became more institutionalized following the Tokyo Round. Senior officials met regularly on newly created federal-provincial committees, and ministers responsible for trade took steps to improve existing channels of communication. Also, Ottawa and the provinces worked closely on sectoral disputes such as those involving softwood lumber and transborder trucking. This was also the time, however, when federal officials began wondering how willing the provinces actually were to comply with difficult economic commitments. In 1985, for example, Ontario refused to follow provisions regarding liquor and wine distribution, thus exposing Canada to a GATT challenge by the European Community (EC). Ottawa argued that the Canadian constitution prevented the federal government from forcing Ontario to adhere to GATT rules. The dispute panel disagreed, noting in 1988 that “the measures taken by the Government of Canada were clearly not all the reasonable measures as might be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of the General
The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade 49
Agreement by the provincial liquor boards, as provided in Article XXIV:12.”24 The dispute followed Ottawa’s refusal to include provincial representatives on Canada’s delegation to the GATT ministerial meeting in 1982.25 As Michael Hart noted, the increasing potential for petty politics in this policy area was “immense – and ... very destructive.”26 The Provinces and the FTA Despite these tensions, the provinces continued to push for greater participation in the Canada-US free trade negotiations. As G. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin have pointed out, much of this pressure came from the West, especially Alberta. Alberta premier Peter Lougheed and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney shared similar views on free trade; moreover, the western provinces wanted to ensure that future negotiations were not dominated by Ontario and Quebec. In the spring of 1985 the premiers of BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba declared their support for bilateral free trade; but they also requested “full provincial participation” in upcoming negotiations. Some, but not all, of the other provinces expressed a similar position. Ontario was cautiously supportive of a comprehensive trade agreement with the US; but it, too, supported the principle of full participation. Quebec supported both. The Atlantic provinces endorsed negotiations but “were neutral on the question of full provincial participation.”27 Provincial aspirations for the FTA were highlighted at the Annual First Ministers’ Conference, convened in Halifax on 28 November 1985. During this meeting the provinces pressed for a full role in the upcoming trade negotiations. Mulroney had initial concerns, but he was in a difficult political situation, given that during the 1984 federal campaign he had promised a more conciliatory relationship with the provinces. To make matters worse, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark put forward the deliberately undefined principle of “full provincial participation” in order to satisfy the provinces and end the conference on a high note.28 It was clear that despite the potential conflict over the provincial role, both Clark and Simon Reisman – who had been appointed chief federal negotiator and head of the Trade Negotiations Office (TNO) only a month earlier – wanted the provinces onside going into the negotiations, given the areas of domestic jurisdiction on the table.29 The question of provincial participation was finally settled when Don Getty, Alberta’s newly elected premier, put a compromise position forward in March 1986. Getty proposed on behalf of the provinces “a set of modalities for participation that included, among other things: the establishment by all first ministers of a joint mandate and joint control over Canada’s chief negotiator; full provincial representation on the Canadian negotiating team, including the option of ‘being in the room’ with the Americans; full participation in the negotiating strategy; and full information sharing in
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confidence with the federal negotiators.”30 Ottawa was reluctant to accept all of these recommendations; however, federal officials understood that a defined provincial role was essential if the trade deal was to be struck. Finally, in June 1986 the provinces accepted a compromise that included the following criteria: 1 The first ministers would meet once every three months for the duration of the negotiations, to review their progress. The first such meeting was set for 17 September 1986. 2 Designated ministers would meet as required, chaired by the new federal Minister for International Trade, Pat Carney. 3 There would only be one Chief Negotiator for Canada, Simon Reisman, who would be fully responsible to the federal cabinet for the conduct of the negotiations. The Trade Negotiations Office would be completely under the Chief Negotiator’s supervision. There would be no provincial representatives in the TNO or in negotiating sessions with the United States. 4 The Chief Negotiator’s mandate would be established by the federal government, in consultation with the first ministers and the designated ministers. 5 There would be close ongoing consultation through the CCTN, with Simon Reisman as Chairman. The CCTN, which had met once a month since January 1986, would continue to meet as often as required. Its function would be to provide liaison and advice. 6 The federal government would formally seek the views of all provinces prior to endorsing any agreement. There was no agreement on the issue of the role of provinces in the ratification or implementation of the agreement.31
In sum, the federal government gave the provinces enough power to satisfy some demands without losing control of the process. Provincial representatives would not physically be part of the negotiation team, but the provinces seemed to have more potential input than in any other previous arrangement.32 With consultative mechanisms now in place, Canada entered into bilateral trade negotiations with the United States. First, a consensus was reached on specific sectoral issues. When Canadian officials pressed for “a binding mechanism” that would circumvent US trade remedies, Washington demanded commitments from Canada limiting the use of subsidies. This impasse resulted in a breakdown of talks in September 1987.33 To this point, Ottawa’s consultation with the provinces had focused on the technical substance of the negotiations. The CCTN was the main forum of discussion,
The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade 51
but various subcommittee, ministerial, and quarterly first ministers’ meetings supplemented its work, as set out in the federal-provincial agreement. Despite concerns regarding openness and information sharing by both levels of government, most participants thought the consultations were fairly successful. Though they were not part of the formal federal delegation, the provinces did have an impact on the direction and substance of the talks. As Brown has noted, the degree of input from the provinces exceeded “that of most other domestic actors, including the private sector, other federal departments and [P]arliament. Only the TNO itself, the Prime Minister’s Office and the special subcommittee of the federal cabinet on trade appeared to have greater access to the negotiating process.”34 The last stage of negotiations, which followed the Canadian walkout in September, lasted until 4 October 1987. Though not completely satisfied with the American proposal, the Canadian delegation eventually accepted the tabled amendments. Provincial participation during the last month was extremely limited. In fact, in the lead-up to the 3 October deadline imposed by US Congress’ “fast track” legislation, there was no formal consultation with the provinces. There were also no meetings with the provinces in the period leading up to the release of the agreement’s final text.35 As a result, there were aspects of the final deal of which the provinces were unaware, especially regarding the new trade dispute process.36 Despite this lack of consultation, the FTA’s content produced relatively few surprises for the provinces. Provisions dealing with the Auto Pact, energy, and cultural initiatives had all been discussed thoroughly during earlier negotiations. Other items, including agriculture, wines and spirits, exceptions, national treatment, and services and investment, had also received a great deal of attention in earlier federal-provincial meetings. NAFTA and the Evolution of the Federal Provincial Committee System The increased participation of the provinces during the FTA negotiations fuelled further demands for provincial involvement in matters of trade policy. Shortly after the FTA was implemented, the CCTN became the Committee for the Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), on which each province had one official representative. Ottawa also established a series of consultative committees with various provincial departments to address sectoral concerns and ongoing trade irritants. Similar sectoral committees were set up for the stalled Uruguay Round. These developments, however, did not represent a departure from the federal-provincial relationship that existed prior to the FTA. The provinces were receiving more information but still played no formalized role in the formulation of Canadian foreign trade policy. After the 1988 First Ministers’ Conference, Ottawa agreed to enter into negotiations with the provinces to institutionalize federal-provincial ties in
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this policy area. Though the provinces continued to push for a more inclusive role, there was no consensus on the form and content of these proposed linkages. Quebec, for example, tabled an initiative in 1990 calling for the creation of a “hierarchy” of provincial participation that would allow access for a select number of provinces based on specific areas of jurisdiction. A number of officials, especially from the smaller provinces, worried that the proposal would create a consultative system dominated by BC, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. In addition, BC criticized the plan because it “essentially gave Quebec and Ontario a veto that was not extended to other provinces.”37 Finally, Ottawa suggested that these changes would likely involve constitutional reforms, which were not an option for the federal government. By the end of 1990 it was obvious that these differences were irreconcilable, and discussions aimed at formalizing a role for the provinces came to a standstill. Even so, in the early stages of the NAFTA negotiations there was considerable cooperation between Ottawa and the provinces. Even while the two sides debated what “full” participation meant, they were able to reach an agreement on changes to the existing federal-provincial committee system on international trade. The CFTA would remain in place to deal with ongoing issues of federal-provincial concern, such as trade disputes; but in addition, Ottawa and the provinces would establish the Committee for North American Free Trade Negotiations (CNAFTN). Cooperation between the two levels of government was evident throughout the CNAFTN process, especially in terms of information sharing. Specifically, the provinces received copies of every draft proposal tabled by the US and Mexico as well as information on a number of specific sectoral issues. On several occasions the provinces even had access to materials not yet reviewed by the cabinet. According to one provincial representative, the “CNAFTN process involved the federal government tabling draft proposals and the provinces taking these documents and pushing for changes at future CNAFTN meetings. Most provincial governments also had groups consisting of different government departments depending on the sectors being discussed.”38 Even federal officials conceded that linkages between Ottawa and the provinces were now extremely formalized. In the words of one representative, “we got to a point where a CNAFTN meeting could be held within a couple of hours using a conference call.”39 Though CNAFTN appeared to represent an important step in the evolution of formal consultations between Ottawa and the provinces, a number of provincial officials had ongoing concerns.40 In fact, some participants perceived the institutionalization of these ties as an attempt to co-opt the provinces in the policy process. Specifically, several officials suggested that Ottawa’s commitment to information sharing was really an effort to limit the input of provincial governments. Ottawa was overwhelming the provinces
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with detailed information; as a result, several delegations were unable to keep pace with the federal agenda and ended up with only limited influence in specific policy areas. Yet other provincial trade representatives considered CNAFTN an important improvement in consultation.41 For example, officials in several provinces rejected the notion that Ottawa was attempting to coopt provincial interests. These officials suggested that the main challenge facing the provinces was a lack of bureaucratic resources and expertise to cover all areas of the negotiations. They also endorsed the ongoing use of a formalized committee system for international trade following the NAFTA negotiations. Ongoing Consultation: CTrade As federal and provincial officials predicted, the CNAFTN process evolved into what is now known as the CTrade committee system for international trade. Initially, however, there was some resistance within the foreign policy bureaucracy regarding further institutionalization of the CNAFTN system. According to one federal bureaucrat, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) “was suffering from a lack of resources” and was hoping to avoid any growth in this policy area.42 Ottawa eventually endorsed the creation of CTrade for pragmatic reasons. For the better part of a decade, Canada had been involved in free trade negotiations at the global and regional levels. Now, the newly created WTO would encompass areas of provincial jurisdiction that required coordination between Ottawa and the provinces. Bureaucratic survival for both levels of government was also an issue. Past negotiations had forced Ottawa and the provinces to commit greater resources to international trade policy. As a result, there was pressure from the bureaucracy to maintain or expand the institutional infrastructure that already existed. The current CTrade process involves four-times-yearly meetings between Ottawa and the provinces. All provinces attend these discussions. In recent years one CTrade meeting per year has been held outside Ottawa: in 2002, trade officials travelled to Iqaluit; and in 2003, discussions were held in Charlottetown. Though CTrade always focuses on topical trade issues, local matters are also included in meetings held outside Ottawa. In Charlottetown, for example, representatives from Atlantic Canada provided an overview of regional trade concerns, including automobile insurance, softwood lumber, shipbuilding, call centres, potatoes, blueberries, mussels, and lobsters. Also, Ottawa and the provinces often exploit the fact that officials are in one location by scheduling other meetings around CTrade consultations. On its face, CTrade represents a significant commitment to involve the provinces in matters of international trade. However, this evaluation is not unanimously shared. Some provincial governments are concerned that
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CTrade is more a forum for information sharing than a mechanism for consultation. Indeed, most CTrade meetings are primarily opportunities for federal officials to update and brief the provinces on current international trade issues, as opposed to engaging in detailed intergovernmental discussions. Provincial trade officials have also complained about the late arrival of federal documents and the fact that CTrade agendas often have not been available until days before the actual meetings, preventing any significant policy planning.43 Most provincial officials, though, have only minor concerns regarding the CTrade process. They generally recognize that Ottawa has recently made it a priority to provide the provinces with better information. CTrade now has a secure website, and considerable e-mail flows between officials at both levels of government. Also, draft documents are made available when Ottawa enters negotiations in areas of provincial jurisdiction. The provinces are encouraged to provide feedback and guidance on these proposals, and federal negotiators are sensitive to the economic interests of the provinces. One provincial official pointed out that “the CTrade forum is only one avenue of information gathering for the provinces.” There are many other sources available, and “it is the responsibility of everyone at the provincial level to ensure they have enough information to do the job effectively.”44 Besides CTrade, three other forms of consultation take place between federal and provincial governments. First, there is almost always more than one department at the provincial level in contact with Ottawa on international trade matters. Many of the larger provinces have specific departments to coordinate CTrade and other foreign trade policy considerations. And even where these coordinating mechanisms exist, most provinces have other officials responsible for trade policy in a wide range of departments. Ministries of environment, agriculture, finance, and forestry all have interests related to international economic policy that need to be protected. CTrade, for example, does not usually include issues related to agriculture, which are dealt with in a separate federal-provincial committee. Ad hoc sectoral committees related to specific international issues or trade disputes are another form of consultation between Ottawa and the provinces. These committees can be in place for extended periods of time. In BC, for example, federal-provincial consultation on the pinewood nematode dispute has been ongoing for more than a decade.45 For the most part, this consultation occurs at the desk officer level or senior adviser level, with occasional involvement from other officials. But contacts of this sort are sporadic, with issues becoming important at different times. According to some provincial officials, the federal government tends to be more inclusive when it comes to “defensive” trade policy positions. Specifically, Ottawa is more likely to rely on “provincial expertise and resources when other states launch trade challenges against Canada.”46 It is rare for provinces to be involved in “offensive”
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cases, but there are exceptions. In the aircraft dispute involving Brazil (Embraer) and Canada (Bombardier) there were federal-provincial discussions with specific provinces. A final example of federal-provincial consultation involves MRAs. MRAs are “mutual recognition agreements” negotiated between countries to harmonize standards relating to specific products. These agreements typically fall outside the purview of the WTO and NAFTA. Essentially, they are “standalone” agreements relating to highly specific sectoral considerations. Many of the products harmonized by MRAs are matters of provincial jurisdiction, especially in terms of how those products enter subfederal markets. Provincial involvement in the negotiation of MRAs is not guaranteed – indeed, a number of provinces have minimal experience in this policy area. Ottawa views MRAs as a federal responsibility; usually, it includes a province in MRA negotiations if there are concerns about compliance or if the province’s expertise is needed. Sometimes, MRA negotiations involve minimal conflict between Ottawa and the provinces. In the negotiations for the New World Wine Accord, which was intended to harmonize standards for European and Canadian wine products, the federal government circulated drafts of proposed guidelines to the provinces. Other times, disagreements arise between the interested parties that lead to the abandonment of a proposed MRA. One such case involved an attempt by the federal government to add an electrical safety annex to an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement. Industry Canada entered into negotiations on the annex without consulting other relevant federal and provincial departments. As a result, the provinces refused to accept the annex as negotiated and the issue was abandoned.47 MRAs constitute only a small part of provincial policy output. Occasionally an MRA will emerge on the agenda of CTrade, but according to one official “it is unlikely that a formal institutionalized process for Ottawa and the provinces will ever evolve in this issue area.”48 The Administration of Provincial Trade Policy: Co-operative Federalism? As CTrade evolves, some provinces continue to push for a more formal role in the policy process. According to Grace Skogstad, Quebec has cited the example of the European Union (EU), which allows member states to participate directly on EU negotiating teams. In addition, some Quebec officials have called for the right to intervene directly during negotiations on matters they consider important to their province’s interests. In September 2005 the Liberal government of Jean Charest clarified that Quebec’s position on international relations would continue to be consistent with the 1965 GérinLajoie doctrine. Quebec’s Minister of International Relations Monique Gagnon-Tremblay outlined the following five-point proposal:
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1 Quebec must have access to all information and must be involved in helping plan the Canadian position before any negotiations. 2 Quebec must be a full member of Canadian delegations and must be solely responsible for appointing its own representatives. 3 Quebec must have the right to speak for itself at international forums when topics under its jurisdiction are being discussed. 4 Quebec’s right to give its consent before Canada signs or declares that it is bound by a treaty or agreement must be recognized. 5 Quebec must have the right to present its positions at appearances by Canada before the arbitration bodies of international organizations when Quebec or its interests are at stake.49 Though not explicitly tied to foreign trade, these conditions could have implications for other Canadian provinces. For example, Quebec’s recent success in obtaining a “formal” role in UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) seems to fulfill many of these objectives. At this time, however, it is unclear whether these demands will facilitate an expanded presence for provincial officials in global and regional forums, further contributing to the “internationalization” of executive federalism. Alberta, too, has proposed an institutionalized role for the provinces with regard to trade policy. Most recently it has argued for this under the umbrella of the Council of the Federation, created in July 2003. Any new mechanisms would not replace CTrade; it would, however, more clearly outline criteria for the provinces’ expanded international involvement. There is some evidence that during the later stages of Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government, Ottawa was seriously considering Alberta’s proposal. One senior provincial bureaucrat noted, however, that it was not Chrétien but Pierre Pettigrew, the trade minister, who was “the driving force behind involving the provinces as much as possible.”50 Indeed it was Pettigrew, with the support of Paul Martin, who called for a Canada-US subcommittee as part of the Council of the Federation.51 Ottawa, however, has consistently shown little interest in proposals that might reduce federal autonomy in international trade negotiations. Its specific concern is that an internal decision-making process for trade policy might restrict Ottawa’s ability to protect Canadian interests, especially if it was similar to the formal “7-50” criteria for constitutional amendments. According to Skogstad, this explains why the federal government has traditionally rejected these requests, “arguing there is no need for formalization since current mechanisms to ensure provincial participation are working well.”52 It would also appear that the provinces vary in their enthusiasm for a more formalized structure. In this regard, Ontario and BC have expressed a preference for the informal, flexible structure that already exists. One Ontario official suggested that the province “has concerns about a consensus-
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based model and, frankly, having to dedicate resources to issues we don’t really care about.”53 James Peterson, who replaced Pettigrew as federal trade minister, did little during his tenure to advance the agendas of Quebec and Alberta.54 It would appear, then, that substantial change to the existing CTrade system is unlikely. The same can be said for a formal and expanded role for provincial governments in international institutions and negotiations. CTrade and Executive Federalism: An Evaluation Despite its apparent success, CTrade does raise important questions regarding the role of executive federalism in Canada’s trade policy. Specifically, there is evidence that consultative linkages between Ottawa and the provinces could further limit federal autonomy. With international economic agreements encompassing increasingly more areas of provincial jurisdiction, demands for consultation are not going to diminish. This has implications for the federal government’s policy flexibility, both domestic and international. The following chapters will show that in the international arena, Ottawa has adjusted its positions because of concerns about provincial jurisdiction. At the domestic level, ongoing pressure from the provinces, both in CTrade and in other federal-provincial forums, has compelled Ottawa to re-evaluate its policy options in specific issue areas. In the past, the federal government ceded autonomy to international sources when signing these agreements. Today, Ottawa faces pressure from both inside and outside the country. The closed nature of CTrade also raises concerns about the legitimacy of this consultative process. That said, Canadians are unlikely to mobilize to challenge CTrade’s relative lack of transparency. After all, Ottawa’s resort to executive federalism in this case did not mark a profound departure from past models of elite accommodation.55 As Smiley first pointed out, personalities have always had a strong impact on executive federalism. For example, the provinces have benefited from the long tenures of officials working in this policy area. Personal relationships at this level, for example, have facilitated provincial cooperation. According to a number of officials, the last two chairs of CTrade also welcomed provincial input because of the sheer complexity of present-day negotiations, especially in areas such as services.56 In another example, several provincial trade representatives praised the federal leadership of Jonathan Fried, who later became Martin’s senior foreign policy adviser in the PCO.57 As one provincial official pointed out, this is a “small community of officials and it would be a mistake to think that personalities don’t have an impact on relations between Ottawa and the provinces, as well as between provincial governments.”58 Perhaps the most significant aspect of CTrade is its impact overall on intergovernmental relations in Canada. Over the past three decades, consultative
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mechanisms for matters related to international trade have expanded dramatically. This “internationalization” of executive federalism has set a potential precedent for other policy areas, such as labour and the environment. The key will be to evaluate these consultative linkages as they develop. Of specific interest will be the potential impact of these ties on federal autonomy. Questions of legitimacy and transparency will also be relevant. On its own, CTrade and its predecessors have successfully involved the provinces in matters of international trade without destabilizing traditional practices of Canadian federalism. If similar linkages begin to develop in other volatile policy areas, however, there is a risk that federal-provincial relations could experience a more dramatic institutional transformation. Conclusion As international trade agreements intrude into areas of provincial jurisdiction, non-central governments have increased their demands for a greater role in negotiating and implementing those agreements. In response, Ottawa has adopted a committee system similar to those in other issue areas in Canadian politics. Over the past two decades, trade-related committees have evolved into permanent forums for federal-provincial contact. This institutionalization reflects the capacity of Canadian federalism to respond to developments in the global political economy. In addition to CTrade, Ottawa engages provincial line departments on an ad hoc sectoral basis. MRAs are another forum for federal-provincial interaction. All of these developments, however, raise questions about executive federalism. At the domestic level, these relationships have reinforced past observations about the importance of executives and bureaucracies in constitutional negotiations. In terms of international trade, subfederal representatives are increasing their engagement when issues have implications for areas of provincial jurisdiction. The internationalization of executive federalism, however, raises ongoing questions about transparency and access; yet non-governmental interests have yet to challenge these practices. Meanwhile, efforts to further institutionalize the provinces’ role in Canadian foreign trade, such as those endorsed by Alberta and Quebec, face resistance from both Ottawa and other provincial governments. This could ultimately limit the further expansion of executive federalism in this policy area.
Part 2 Considerations of Process and Outcome
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4 The Political Executive in Provincial Foreign Trade Policy
This chapter focuses on the political executive and provincial foreign trade policy. Specifically, it evaluates centralizing subfederal institutional reforms and the interest and engagement of provincial executives in this policy area. For the most part, provincial executives have pursued institutionalized cabinet structures, although some provinces have turned toward post-institutional, premier-dominated models. The centralization of executive power has implications for provincial trade officials, though most of these representatives continue to exercise considerable autonomy. In fact, most provincial premiers and senior members of cabinet have only a peripheral interest in global trade issues, only becoming involved when high-profile meetings are held such as First Ministers’ and Premiers’ Conferences, or when crises develop such as the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Also, members of political executives tend to be active in the late stages of international negotiations or during trade disputes. Another area of executive involvement is federal and provincial trade promotion, such as Jean Chrétien’s Team Canada trade missions. At other times, however, senior cabinet members attempt to represent specific sectoral interests, as evident in Ralph Klein’s meetings with Vice President Dick Cheney regarding a continental energy strategy and a US-Alaska oil pipeline. Otherwise, direct engagement in complex issues of trade policy remains rare. Though there was evidence of executive involvement in Ontario and British Columbia during the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, this did not significantly alter Canadian trade policy or the evolution of international norms and standards. Studying Executives: Questions of Institutional Change Canada has experienced several stages of cabinet organization, including the traditional cabinet, the departmentalized cabinet, and the institutionalized cabinet. The traditional cabinet focused on local issues and was driven by patronage. The departmentalized cabinet had limited standing committees as well as bureaucratic departments with considerable autonomy.
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Contemporary institutionalized cabinet structures are notable for their formal committees, sharply defined central agencies, and budget-related controls. In such a cabinet the prime minister or premier is the organization’s “architect,” central departments and agencies provide policy input to cabinet, and decision making becomes more centralized; this in turn creates tension between the political executive and the various bureaucratic departments.1 Donald Savoie has also noted the development of a “post-institutional or premier-centered cabinet.” He suggests that the institutionalized cabinet’s collective and relatively collegial processes have added to the authority of the premier or prime minister.2 At the federal level, the process of formulating foreign trade policy reflects an institutionalized cabinet structure. The trade minister submits a Memorandum to Cabinet outlining the costs and benefits of various policy initiatives. Representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) facilitate this process, consulting with line departments and agencies before these matters are formally reviewed at the cabinet level. According to Dan Ciuriak, interdepartmental linkages are vital as trade officials seek to obtain the necessary support for cabinet approval.3 Once the policy initiative reaches cabinet, the PCO considers broader political and economic factors. Generally speaking, the process is collegial and is driven by the understanding that these officials will need support on other issues in the future. Christopher Dunn has posited that a more complex institutional relationship exists in provincial governments.4 He notes an increasingly decentralized cabinet process, one in which complex committee systems require coordination by central agencies.5 How are these decision-making structures to be evaluated in the context of the provinces’ foreign trade policies? Has institutional centralization dramatically altered the role of provincial trade officials? Remember, however, that organizational factors are not the only relevant ones when the role of provincial executives is being evaluated. In terms of trade policy it is also necessary to examine the influence and interests of provincial executives. Direct engagement may be limited, but at times the executive does intervene, as it did in BC and Ontario during the NAFTA negotiations. Atlantic Canada The Atlantic province with the most executive involvement is New Brunswick. In part this is because the premier has always been such a key figure in New Brunswick politics. Over the past four decades, four premiers have controlled the province (though others were in office for shorter terms). Louis Robichaud was elected premier in 1960 and served in that capacity for a decade. Richard Hatfield was premier from 1970 to 1987, followed by Frank McKenna (1987 to 1997), who was replaced by Bernard Lord (1999 to
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2006). All four leaders were Progressive Conservative or Liberal; however, Stewart Hyson has suggested that personalities and “orientation to the job” have always had a greater impact than partisan factors. This “personal” approach was evident during efforts to centralize control in the political executives of Robichaud and Hatfield. McKenna brought a greater focus on fiscal policy, emphasizing trade promotion, investment, and cooperative federalism. Lord also embraced many of the same priorities, but he also emphasized tax cuts, as opposed to McKenna’s “interventionism.”6 These historic realities have contributed to the current role of the political executive in New Brunswick’s foreign trade policy. In previous decades there was limited involvement by the executive in this policy area. Traditionally, Liberal and Conservative governments supported free trade and the political executive allowed the bureaucracy to operate without interference.7 The election of Lord and the Conservatives altered this working relationship. One senior provincial civil servant candidly admitted that “there was considerable distrust of the bureaucracy when the Conservatives first entered office.”8 The Conservatives launched a review of the province’s organizational structure; the result was Greater Opportunity: New Brunswick’s Prosperity Plan.9 At the core of these proposed changes was a greater role for the political executive in the formulation of government policy. According to Raj Venugopal, the Executive Council Office (ECO), as the “department of the premier,” would now “establish the policy direction of the government and manage the overall execution of the policy plan.”10 The premier, as “Minister of ECO” and also of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) until mid-2003, highlighted international relations as a priority for the new government. As part of this executive review, the Conservatives evaluated the international activities of various departments. According to James Kershaw, the deputy education minister, the scope of New Brunswick’s “global activities surprised a lot of people”; however, these initiatives lacked planning and coordination.11 The premier responded by adopting a “corporate” and centralized approach to the province’s international affairs. The reorganization led to Prospering in a Global Community: New Brunswick’s International Strategy, published in the spring of 2003.12 This report targeted fifty-seven specific “action priorities” ranging from cooperative federalism to identifying target markets for investment and trade. It was clear that IGA would continue to centralize activities in this policy area and serve as a “conduit” to the premier. According to one provincial official, “the initial distrust took a year or two to diminish,” but the “corporate model” was eventually “considered a success, at least by IGA.”13 Yet in matters of trade policy, it is important not to overestimate the impact of the New Brunswick’s political executive. Lord’s involvement on most trade matters was limited to issues of significant political importance, such as international education. As the same official pointed out, “most of the
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day-to-day activity on these issues remains with bureaucratic officials.” When interaction does exist, it is “very collegial.”14 In the words of another civil servant, the involvement of the New Brunswick executive in international affairs “remains mainly ad hoc and reactionary,” with decisions “driven primarily by trade policy officials and other relevant line departments.”15 In Nova Scotia, provincial executives have always been small, with limited mechanisms for cabinet coordination. According to David Johnson, however, the executive system in Nova Scotia has become more institutionalized over the past three decades, though these changes “must be qualified as limited.”16 Not until the 1990s was there significant reform in Nova Scotia. During the two years the Conservative government of Donald Cameron was in office (1991-93), it challenged traditional patronage practices in the provincial public service. The Liberals under John Savage continued these changes and adopted a number of new public management (NPM) principles; for example, it downsized and reorganized the bureaucracy. The Conservative government of John Hamm, elected in 1999, furthered these reforms and created five core central agencies to assist the premier and cabinet. Also, a Department of Intergovernmental Affairs was established to coordinate federal-provincial and international activities, with a specific emphasis on equalization benefits and royalty payments for offshore resources. Hamm resigned and was replaced by a new Conservative leader, Rodney MacDonald, in February 2006. There are no current plans to drastically alter the structure and role of the political executive in Nova Scotia. In terms of international trade, however, there is limited involvement by the political executive. In fact, the province’s representative for international trade has “never encountered any pressure from the executive.” In his view, “ministers and politicians don’t want to get involved in the arcane details of international trade.” Occasionally this official is “expected to provide briefing notes or some general guidance, but that’s about it.”17 Though the new IGA was expected to increase executive oversight in this policy area, the department has focused primarily on equalization and offshore royalties. Therefore, given the informal nature of the trade policy process, and its entrenchment over time, it is highly unlikely that the role of the political executive will change significantly in the future. “This will never be like Quebec,” said the same representative. “This province has a system that works and we’ve never been required to run back and forth to cabinet for approval on trade issues.” Unless international trade threatens the economic stability of Nova Scotia, “further involvement from the executive is unlikely.”18 In contrast to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the political executive on Prince Edward Island is not driven by institutional considerations. According to Peter Buker, socio-political factors such as small geographic size and population, a reliance on Ottawa for financial support, and a conservative PEI political culture provide a better context for understanding executive
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input into the policy process.19 In addition, the province has a premier-driven system of governance. Buker suggests that for these reasons, most cabinet ministers “owe” their electoral success to the premier. The result is unified governments and an often compliant public. Moreover, “off island” government activities continue to be controlled by the premier. The constitutional negotiations of the 1980s and 1990s reinforced this reality, as has participation in forums such as the Council of Maritime Premiers and the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers. Yet it would be a mistake to characterize PEI’s political process as entirely dominated by elites. As Buker puts it, provincial premiers “have always operated in a constrained, broader political environment lying outside of cabinet and the Legislative Assembly; it is these broader factors that circumscribe the scope of their power, if not their power per se.”20 Many of these observations are relevant to understanding the executive’s influence on the foreign trade policy of PEI. Relations between the political executive and the province’s international trade representative are for the most part collegial. Intergovernmental Affairs is responsible for provincial foreign relations, but involvement by the political executive on matters of trade policy is on an ad hoc basis. According to one senior bureaucrat, foreign trade was historically “handled by one official in IGA but they have a very small shop and now focus primarily on domestic social issues.”21 The recent “potato wart” crisis offers a good example of this relationship. There was no division within cabinet regarding the need to challenge US protectionist measures, and the “provincial executive’s role was not about policy per se, but rather about management and political extra-provincial lobbying.”22 In contrast to New Brunswick, executive involvement in PEI has not shifted based on the political party in power. At the same time, though, it is important to understand the unique nature of political and institutional relationships on Prince Edward Island. Relative to other provinces, there is little separation between the legislative and administrative branches of government. PEI politics is based on grassroots relationships, and politicians and ministers have very close ties with the public. The same official noted that problems tend to be identified quickly and that “ministers provide clear direction to the bureaucracy on a wide range of issues, including trade policy.” For example, blueberry producers in Maine recently lobbied the US government to take action against exports of PEI bush blueberries. In response, PEI’s local blueberry association approached the province’s agriculture minister directly, and he responded by writing letters to both his federal counterpart and the federal trade minister. As PEI’s trade official pointed out, “this is often the nature of PEI politics ... Members of the executive can selectively play a direct role in this policy area compared to other provinces.” At the same time, however, the institutional relationship is also a “two-way street and IGA is certainly responsive to issues I bring
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forward based on developing trade disputes or ongoing international negotiations.”23 Generally speaking, Newfoundland and Labrador has not deviated from its executive model over the past three decades. In the early 1970s several developments occurred that shifted the province toward an institutionalized executive system. One catalyst was the 1972 Report of the Committee on Government Administration and Productivity, which criticized the existing cabinet process, highlighting its heavy workloads, lack of policy planning, and reactionary approach to Canadian federalism. In response to the report, a new Planning and Priorities Committee (PPC) was established and policy committees were created that focused on resources, government services, and social policy. After Brian Peckford’s government was elected in 1979, focus shifted to economic development and intergovernmental relations. Also around this time the PPC became more involved in resource development issues such as the bankrupt Come By Chance refinery. The election of Clyde Wells and the Liberals in 1989 introduced further innovations. Wells prioritized fiscal control but also maintained continuity at the central agency level, with the Treasury Board maintaining tight control. The subsequent governments of Brian Tobin (1996-2000) and Roger Grimes (2001-03) both adopted decentralized institutional models. The election of Danny Williams and the Conservatives in 2003 did little to alter the organization of the political executive, except that cabinet was downsized.24 Officially, Newfoundland’s international relations are the responsibility of the Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat (IGAS), which is part of the province’s Executive Council. The Executive Council serves as the Newfoundland government’s central office. IGAS focuses mainly on federalprovincial relations, but its mandate includes contacts with other foreign governments and participation in the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers. Responsibility for international trade, however, is located in the Trade and Investment Division of the Department of Innovation, Trade, and Rural Development. That department is sometimes contacted by IGAS on technical issues, but this is typically on an ad hoc basis. Unlike previous premiers, Williams has a strong interest in trade and economic policy, especially as it relates to key sectors of the provincial economy. One bureaucrat noted that when it comes to the fisheries or oil and gas, for example, the premier “wants to know what’s going on, although this interest has a tendency to be issue dependent.” When Trade and Investment needs to clarify the government’s position on an issue, it typically prepares a cabinet paper for review.25 Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta Saskatchewan’s early commitment to social welfare programs contributed to a level of planning and rationalization not seen in other provinces for
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several decades. The result was the early demise of the patronage-driven civil service owing to a need for expertise in service delivery. In the modern era, successive New Democratic Party (NDP) governments maintained a commitment to state planning, especially in terms of economic policy. In the 1970s, for example, Saskatchewan took ownership of and control over a number of natural resources, including potash, natural gas, uranium, oil, and other minerals, in an attempt to establish a viable provincial economic base. Conservative governments during the 1980s attempted to privatize Crown-owned utilities, but this came to an end when Roy Romanow of the NDP was elected premier in 1991. It was Romanow who created the Crown Investments Corporation, which controlled a number of Crown corporations, including SaskTel, SaskEnergy, SaskPower, and SGI (Saskatchewan Government Insurance). New public-private enterprises, such as the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership (STEP), also assumed important roles in the provincial economy. Lorne Calvert, a former Romanow cabinet minister, maintained most of the province’s institutional framework when he became premier in 2001.26 At this time, newly elected premier Brad Wall has not taken steps to dismantle existing public-private relationships. Based on these historic realities, it is not surprising that Saskatchewan’s political executive has played a more active role than most others in trade policy. Despite the long tenure of the NDP, the province’s political executive did not oppose liberalized trade on ideological grounds. During the NAFTA negotiations, for example, NDP governments in other provinces “encouraged” Saskatchewan to coordinate its policy positions with their own. Romanow, however, was a pragmatist; in the words of one long-time Saskatchewan official, “he always promoted policies that served Saskatchewan’s economic interests, especially agriculture.”27 For the most part, Calvert continued this approach to foreign trade, though he did not involve himself directly in the policy process. There were some exceptions to this. For example, he had an interest in agricultural subsidies and was active in policy decisions related to these practices. He was also engaged during the BSE crisis. Yet this ministerial involvement should not be overestimated. As with other provinces, most technical issues are directly “handled by specialists within specific bureaucratic departments.”28 Manitoba’s political executive has undergone several periods of centralization and decentralization. Edward Schreyer’s NDP government (1967-77), for example, adopted central planning, reflecting the past influence of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). During his four years as Conservative premier (1977-81), Sterling Lyon attempted to dismantle most of Schreyer’s institutional reforms. Howard Pawley, the NDP premier between 1981 and 1988, returned the province to a Schreyer-style approach by centralizing policy processes and downsizing cabinet. This continued after Gary Filmon, a Conservative, was elected premier in 1988. When Gary Doer and
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the NDP replaced Filmon in 1999, reforms were initiated that had implications for provincial foreign trade policy. First, the ministries of Rural Development and Urban Affairs were replaced with the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, which subsequently became the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade. In addition, the NDP established a new Community and Economic Development Committee (CEDC) to coordinate economic policy.29 According to Joan Grace, this new design reflected Doer’s desire to centralize executive decision making and facilitate “the concentration of power at the centre.”30 Manitoba’s political executive involves itself in foreign trade much like Saskatchewan’s does – that is, it tends to limit itself to a narrow range of politicized issues. “In most cases we share a similar philosophy with Saskatchewan,” said one Manitoba official. “External trade is simply far too important for us so we tend to be very pragmatic and let the policy experts represent provincial interests.”31 When trade issues do go to cabinet they are processed by the CEDC, but this usually involves coordinating policy and developing specific “project teams.” A senior representative made it clear that “there is executive interest in trade policy but it is oversight and not direct involvement in the nuts and bolts of actual policy.” So it is only within a “narrow range of issues that we need to seek direction, and that’s not common.” Also, cabinet is organized in such a way that responsibility for foreign trade policy is located in Industry, Economic Development, and Mines rather than in Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade. This is owing to a focus on trade promotion in Intergovernmental Affairs and to the fact that the official responsible for trade policy in Industry, Economic Development, and Mines is also responsible for a broad range of issues, including economic development. This is not to suggest that Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade has no engagement on trade policy; rather, “linkages are informal and not formal.”32 “Premier-centred” executives long dominated provincial politics in Alberta. When Peter Lougheed and the Conservatives assumed control in 1971, however, reforms were adopted to “rationalize” relations between the political executive and the bureaucracy. Given the province’s increasing reliance on oil revenue, Lougheed wanted economic policies to be generated by a professional bureaucracy with significant guidance from the premier and cabinet. Don Getty, who replaced Lougheed as Conservative premier, adopted a similar organizational structure. When Ralph Klein became premier in 1991 he initiated sweeping changes designed to open up the government’s policymaking processes. Ultimately, however, his reforms transferred greater control and oversight to the premier. First, Klein politicized the provincial executive’s staff by assigning communications officers to the office of every government minister. In an attempt to streamline policy processes he also “blended” cabinet and caucus committees to reflect a hybrid of American and British
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traditions. Cabinet committees were replaced by Standing Policy Committees (SPCs), which were restructured following the 1997, 1999, and 2001 provincial elections. The Agenda and Priorities Committee served as a coordinating mechanism for these committees.33 For the most part, though, ministerial involvement in Alberta’s foreign trade policy is consistent with other provinces. In Alberta, public support for liberalized trade is such that there is very little debate within cabinet on foreign trade policy. Indeed, the government’s own polls have found that over the past three decades, Albertans’ support for “free trade” has run at 70 to 75 percent.34 “We obviously take ministerial direction and advice into consideration,” noted one provincial bureaucrat, “but the lack of politicization within the province related to trade policy is such that most bureaucratic departments are very autonomous.” This is not to suggest that there are no disagreements on policy issues, but “for the most part the executive and the bureaucracy both see the wisdom in pursuing open markets for Alberta, especially in terms of energy, grains, and red meat.”35 Direct involvement by the political executive tends to be limited to highly politicized issues, such as Alberta’s efforts to reopen American borders following the BSE crisis. In that situation, ministerial involvement was more significant, but not to the point that executive priorities conflicted with bureaucratic concerns related to long-term planning and policy implementation. Quebec Following the Quiet Revolution, and the traditional cabinets of Maurice Duplessis, Quebec modernized its government institutions. The Liberals under Jean Lesage initiated bureaucratic reforms and sponsored large public enterprises, including Hydro-Québec, first founded by the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) government of Adélard Godbout in 1944, and the Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund. According to Luc Bernier, these initiatives – which were not always well planned – were meant to encourage province building and to transfer power and economic resources to the state.36 Though the Liberals under Robert Bourassa continued to pursue similar economic objectives, the power of the cabinet and premier did not significantly increase during the 1970s. It was René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois (PQ) that built on the earlier centralized framework developed by Lesage. For much of the next decade, constitutional issues dominated the Liberal governments of Bourassa and Daniel Johnson. The subsequent election of Jacques Parizeau and the PQ focused government attention on the 1995 referendum. Under the current Liberal government of Jean Charest, however, economic issues have again become the focus of the political executive. Responsibilities for these initiatives are divided among the ministers of Finance, Treasury Board, Labour, Tourism, and Economic and Regional Development, which has replaced Industry and Commerce. In the tradition of Quebec politics, there
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are also separate ministers for Intergovernmental and Aboriginal Affairs, Culture, and International Relations.37 Despite these reforms, Quebec’s foreign economic policy continues to be guided by three long-standing principles. First, the political executive has always stressed economic and sectoral priorities when negotiating and implementing international trade commitments. Second, the provincial government consistently calls for increased consultation and direct provincial involvement when Ottawa is formulating foreign policy. Third, both the Liberals and the PQ have pursued greater autonomy for Quebec in foreign relations. These priorities were clear during the FTA and NAFTA negotiations. During NAFTA discussions, for example, Quebec’s cabinet strived to maintain the gains made under the FTA while excluding areas, such as publishing and language rights, considered vital to the province’s economy and culture. The province was also interested in opening the Mexican market to Quebec goods and ensuring that it remained an attractive location for investment. Quebec has supported trade liberalization for various reasons. Bourassa, for example, was an economist by training who understood the virtues of freer trade with the United States. He also saw the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a means to bolster the province’s status in Canadian federalism. Opposition to the FTA by David Peterson’s Liberal government in Ontario enabled Quebec to play a leadership role during negotiations. Indeed, according to one observer it was Quebec that often spoke for the “provinces on matters of general concern while searching for enough common ground with the federal government to preserve forward movement.”38 Quebec’s prominence was bolstered further by the hiring of Jake Warren, Canada’s former chief negotiator during the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).39 The province’s role as a federalprovincial facilitator continued into the NAFTA negotiations, especially when it came to the Side Deals on labour and the environment. A senior official from another province noted at the time that “Quebec is the key. They are the province that continues to gain control and influence in key international policy areas, and if they back out [of the Side Deal compliance negotiations] others will likely follow.”40 The PQ under Bernard Landry, which held power in Quebec until April 2003, also emphasized the economy. For example, it pursued stronger economic ties with the United States, opening trade offices in Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and Boston.41 Yet Landry also highlighted the province’s shifting status in Canadian federalism by resisting efforts to coordinate international initiatives with the federal government. Similar tensions were evident during the lead-up to the Summit of the Americas and its focus on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in 2001. As one Quebec official pointed out, there was “considerable disagreement between Ottawa and the province on Quebec’s role during trade talks for the FTAA prior to the 2001
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meetings in Quebec City.” The same representative made it clear, though, that federal-provincial differences were not limited to trade policy. In fact, those differences were similar to ones “across a wide range of issues, including education and health.”42 The political executive, however, was not the only architect of Quebec’s new role in Canadian federalism during the PQ era. The PQ has an International Relations Committee that provides strategic direction to the party. This committee often encouraged Landry to challenge Ottawa on foreign affairs. Daniel Turp, a recent chair of that committee, used the forum to argue for Quebec’s direct participation in those international organizations that focus on provincial areas of jurisdiction.43 Pressure from the committee also contributed to legislation in 2002 requiring National Assembly approval of all international agreements negotiated by the province or the federal government.44 At the same time, however, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the committee significantly altered the PQ’s already ambivalent position toward Canadian federalism. As Nelson Michaud points out, the PQ’s response to further coordination with Ottawa on foreign affairs was “unanimously negative, running from a critique of their effectiveness (by the party), to an implicit rejection (by the minister) all the way to an explicit rejection (by the government).”45 Not surprisingly, these positions were also consistent with the party’s broader goal of independence. Charest’s Liberal government, however, renewed Quebec’s interest in federal-provincial relations, though not at the expense of provincial autonomy. The Liberals’ position was outlined in a policy document drafted by Benoit Pelletier in 2001 while the party was in opposition. In A Project for Quebec: Affirmation, Autonomy, and Leadership, the Liberals called for a reevaluation of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine and noted a need to protect Quebec’s interests within the limitations of the Canadian constitution.46 These themes were again emphasized after the Charest government was elected. In a speech given in Quebec City in September 2004, Quebec’s Minister of International Relations, Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, stressed that Quebec’s “relations with Ottawa ... [existed] in a climate of cooperation.” She also highlighted commonalities between both levels of government on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and cultural diversity. Finally, she expressed Quebec’s desire to return to its former role as an advocate of provincial rights within federalism. Besides the Council of the Federation, she noted Quebec’s efforts to improve linkages with other provinces that “shared the desire to play a greater role on the international scene.”47 In the month following Gagnon-Tremblay’s speech, the Quebec government announced its intention to participate with France in a trade mission to Mexico. This mission involved Charest and the French prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and included a meeting with the Mexican president, Vincente Fox. It received considerable attention in the media, yet it did not
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draw heavy criticism from Ottawa. In fact, Paul Martin pointed out that the trip was consistent with past commercial missions. An earlier state visit to France, when the premier met the French president, Jacques Chirac, without Canada’s ambassador to France, had drawn a similar response. Indeed, Pierre Pettigrew, at the time Ottawa’s foreign affairs minister, defended the visit, citing new federal guidelines for provincial international activity created in 1999.48 The Liberal provincial government continued to pursue a number of initiatives consistent with those of previous PQ governments. Though the Liberals adopted an approach more conducive to cooperative federalism, political executives in Quebec continued to emphasize provincial autonomy, international status, and a strong role in federal-provincial relations in matters of international trade. Ontario The introduction of an institutionalized cabinet system in Ontario began in 1969 with the Committee on Government Productivity (COGP) commissioned by Conservative premier John Robarts. Remarkably, most of that committee’s recommendations, ultimately adopted by Premier Bill Davis, remained in place for almost three decades. The arrival of Mike Harris’ Conservative government in 1995 represented a return to a premier-dominated cabinet. Within a year the Harris government, as part of its “Common Sense Revolution,” had made significant cuts to the public service, reduced social assistance by 20 percent, and amended provincial labour laws. In 1999 it introduced further reforms, which included the establishment of a comprehensive Priorities, Policy, and Communications Board (PPCB) and several new policy committees. A Statutory Business Committee was also created, and “Superbuild” was initiated to coordinate public-private partnerships for infrastructure and investment. Though Harris suspended most policy committees as he neared retirement, his successor, Ernie Eves, resumed many of the same institutional practices. When Dalton McGuinty assumed office in 2003, the Liberals made a commitment to integrate caucus with cabinet – an issue that Eves, too, had taken steps toward during his brief period as premier.49 Ontario’s political executive was somewhat unique in that it did play a direct role in the province’s decision to oppose both the FTA and NAFTA. In 1988 David Peterson’s Liberal government had announced that it would oppose the proposed FTA. According to G. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin, Peterson’s decision damaged Ontario’s credibility with Ottawa and the other provinces during the FTA negotiations. While Ontario attended meetings and briefings, it refused to participate in any meaningful context. Only during the last stages of negotiations, when Peterson realized that a deal was inevitable, did Ontario begin to increase its interest. As Doern and Tomlin suggest, Peterson’s strategy erred badly “first in assuming Ontario could stop
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the negotiations, then in betting there would be no agreement and, most important, in deciding to play the role of a spoiler only, rather than attempting to shape the Canadian negotiating position.”50 Fortunately for Ontario, its key export industry, automotive vehicles and parts, already had guaranteed access to the US market through the Auto Pact. Donald Abelson and Michael Lusztig, however, doubt whether Peterson was really interested in stopping the FTA. The Liberals, for example, did not carry through on their original threat to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of the proposed agreement. In addition, the Peterson government did not proclaim legislation it had passed regarding energy and water exports. For Abelson and Lusztig this was the most telling indication of Peterson’s true intentions, for the Liberals had the support of the NDP opposition to pass that legislation. Abelson and Lusztig argue that ultimately, Ontario’s position was tied to the strength of organized labour in the province and to the political and economic costs associated with failing inefficient businesses.51 Thus Peterson was motivated by the desire to ensure that the FTA was perceived as an “imposed” agreement, reluctantly accepted by Ontario. Ministerial interest in foreign trade continued with the subsequent election of the NDP. Early on, Bob Rae’s government fully engaged itself with the NAFTA process, despite its preference for ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations. There was also strong support for liberalized trade within various branches of the Ontario bureaucracy. In fact, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) supported greater liberalization; this was evident in the appointment of Robert Johnstone, a former federal trade negotiator and deputy minister, as Ontario’s chief NAFTA negotiator.52 At the same time, though, there were increasing signs that Rae and senior members of the Premier’s Office were beginning to question NAFTA. Conservative advisers in Ottawa, for example, were overheard in a taped telephone conversation in September 1992 referring to Rae’s hardening position as typical of “that old left-wing, crypto-communist, anti-free trade, NDP-Liberal con group.”53 During that conversation, James Ramsay, the chief of staff for the Minister of International Trade, Michael Wilson, also suggested that Rae’s opposition would force the “coalition which has been sitting on their hands over the past two or three years” to get “out behind us again.”54 Ontario’s concerns were further entrenched in January 1993 when Rae transferred responsibility for the negotiations away from MEDT and to the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs (MIA). Several officials in MIA were especially critical of MEDT, believing that its “pro-business” orientation prevented it from protecting provincial interests. Rae also announced the creation of an Ontario cabinet committee to study NAFTA. Some provincial bureaucrats, however, were critical of Elmer Buchanan, the chair of the hearings, for not “facilitating any real dialogue on the issue.” In fact, the
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agriculture minister “always made it clear in his opening statement that Ontario was opposed to NAFTA.”55 There was also the perception within government that “the Ontario Cabinet Committee was simply a symbolic gesture designed to appease the Maude Barlows in the crowd.”56 Not surprisingly, the Final Report of the Cabinet Committee on the North American Free Trade Agreement, published in June 1993, cited problems with Ottawa’s positions on energy, water and forest resources, social policy, and the environment. As a result, the committee recommended that “the Government of Ontario assess the legal, legislative, and policy actions it can take to protect the interests of the people ... in the face of the NAFTA.”57 In the wake of these recommendations, Frances Lankin, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, outlined Ontario’s revised NAFTA strategy in a speech on 28 July 1993. Specifically, she announced that the province would retain legal counsel to challenge the federal government’s constitutional authority to implement NAFTA. In addition, Ontario was going to re-examine water export legislation first introduced by the Liberals with the unproclaimed Water Transfer Control Act of 1988. Lankin also pledged funding for a research project on “social dumping” that would address inadequate labour and environmental protections.58 These points were further developed in a subsequent news release that highlighted the need for an exemption on bulk water exports and other large-scale water diversion projects. The energy proportionality provisions of NAFTA, which guaranteed access to Canadian energy for American consumers even in times of shortage, were also cited as a concern. Other issues included the pursuit of a social dumping complaint regarding Mexican subsidies and the need to prioritize Ontario’s green technology initiatives. According to Abelson and Lusztig, though “little documentation exists, sources within MEDT and MIA suggest that Ontario’s policy shift created significant disruption of the NAFTA process.”59 At the core of Ontario’s opposition was the constitutional challenge. Specifically, officials in MIA hoped that the legal action would convince Washington that NAFTA faced serious difficulties in Canada. The only problem was that, in the words of one observer, “the Americans barely burped.”60 In addition to this, the Ontario Attorney General’s Office (AGO) pointed to existing judicial precedents and cautioned against further action. “It was not hard to figure out what was going on,” said the same representative, but even if MIA “saw the rats leaving a sinking ship it was not prepared to give up its quest to ruin the NAFTA.” The response to the legal challenge in the rest of Canada was also limited. A federal official called the plan “laughable”; another provincial counterpart said it “was difficult to support something that had no link to reality.”61 At the same time, however, there was some concern in other provinces that Ontario might actually move forward with the challenge. As one official suggested, there was “too much at stake ... to sit on the sidelines and let
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Ontario finish this thing on their own. People tend to lose sight about what this case is all about. It really has nothing whatsoever to do with the NAFTA. It is really about provincial rights and the division of powers in Canada.”62 Ultimately, all of these efforts had only a minimal impact on NAFTA’s implementation. Sensing potential problems, Mulroney ratified the agreement by passing legislation in the House of Commons without requesting direct legitimization from provincial legislatures. By December 1994, a year after the defeat of the federal Conservatives and the arrival of Chrétien’s Liberal majority, the Ontario government was hinting that it might withdraw its judicial challenge. Indeed, Laurie Stephens, a spokesperson for the Rae government, publicly speculated that “Ontario would likely lose ... [its] legal challenge since it could not prove it had suffered any damage by a federal intrusion into its jurisdiction with the implementation of NAFTA.”63 In the end, the province did not pursue either the reference case or proposed legislation on water protection. Within two years of NAFTA’s ratification the Rae government had been voted out of office. This is not to suggest that the subsequent Harris government represented an era of cooperation between Ottawa and Queen’s Park. In fact, Harris often clashed with the federal government on a wide range of issues. In matters of international trade, however, Harris ensured that Ontario’s relationship with Ottawa was channelled through MEDT. He did not want Ontario’s trade priorities damaged as a result of other federal-provincial conflicts.64 He also had a tendency to focus on export promotion rather than trade policy. One example of this selected interest was Ontario’s leading role in Canada’s position on the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Given the province’s significant services sector, Ontario was asked for direct input for Canada’s original and revised GATS offers. In response, MEDT prepared a formal proposal and worked closely with numerous ministries to ensure that the political executive would approve it. Despite these efforts, MEDT was repeatedly told that the cabinet agenda was full; ultimately, the proposal was not reviewed within the formal executive process. Instead, MEDT worked with the Cabinet Office, and eventually several recommendations were sent directly to the premier. Yet even at that point, MEDT officials “had to use the fact that the minister was going to an international trade meeting ... to gain access.”65 For the most part, the election of Dalton McGuinty’s Liberal Party did not represent a significant shift in the role of Ontario’s political executive. Though the province’s contribution to Canada’s revised GATS position still required cabinet approval, MEDT made no attempt to engage the formal process. This time, MEDT consulted directly with officials in other ministries and isolated specific areas of concern. Once this informal approach had created a consensus, a meeting with the premier was requested. Once again, however, there was no urgency to address this issue within the political
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executive. According to the same representative, “a similar tactic was needed to gain access to McGuinty.” In the end, MEDT had to highlight an upcoming trade ministers’ meeting and the need for Ontario “to clarify its position.” This demonstrates “cabinet’s minimal interest in matters of international trade.”66 British Columbia The political executive in British Columbia was long isolated from other federal and provincial officials in Canada, especially during the Social Credit era of W.A.C. Bennett. In later years, however, BC fluctuated between centralized and decentralized systems of decision making. The election of the NDP and Dave Barrett in 1972 established an activist cabinet model with an empowered political executive and considerable departmental autonomy. The return of Social Credit under Bill Bennett in 1975 shifted power to a central staff located in the government’s Intergovernmental Relations Office and the Premier’s Office. In contrast, according to Norman Ruff, the Mike Harcourt era was the “premier in a plexiglass bubble” period owing to Harcourt’s isolation from the policy process. The “colleague-intimidating, proactive, get-things-done political style of his successor” Glen Clark resulted in a premier-dominated model. Finally, the election of Gordon Campbell’s Liberals in 2001 further isolated power in the centre, with the Premier’s Office absorbing the Public Affairs Bureau, the Crown Agencies Secretariat, and the Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Secretariat. In Ruff’s opinion, the transfer of power to Intergovernmental Relations reflected the priority that Campbell placed on both interprovincial and international relations.67 Generally speaking, these institutional reforms had only a minor impact on BC’s foreign trade policy. The exception to this, ironically, was during Harcourt’s time as premier. Harcourt was not an intrusive participant in the policy process, but he did play an active role in the province’s opposition to NAFTA. According to one provincial bureaucrat, Harcourt’s NDP government had been elected with support from numerous groups “seeking influence” as a reward for long-time support.68 Indeed, BC’s powerful labour lobby was cited as the catalyst for the NDP’s decision to question its role in the NAFTA negotiations. Given the late stage of the talks, and the fact that there were issues on the table of vital interest to the province, the NDP decided to remain in the NAFTA consultative process – but only as a reluctant and vocal critic. Trade Minister David Zirnhelt announced that BC would attend federal-provincial briefings on NAFTA but that it would no longer “actively” participate in them – a strategy that was immediately praised by Ken Georgetti, the leader of the BC Federation of Labour.69 This decision to attend the meetings as an observer perplexed Ottawa as well as a number of the other provinces. One Vancouver Sun columnist noted that the “BC government’s statement on the North American free trade talks ... [was]
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strategically and tactically so foolish that one ... [had to look] for political reasons for it.”70 The same commentator suggested that organized labour’s hostility to NAFTA was at the core of NDP provincial trade policy. Some observers also suggested that besides organized labour, specific individuals in the provincial government had significant influence in this area of policy. Clark, for example, whom Harcourt had named Minister of Finance and Corporate Relations as well as Chair of the Treasury Board, was often singled out as a source of opposition to liberalization. This had potential implications for trade policy when Clark became the Minister of Employment and Investment in 1993. That ministry, which included the Trade Policy Branch, was important given its role in determining BC’s negotiating position for both the Agreement on Internal Trade and NAFTA. According to G. Bruce Doern and Mark MacDonald, Clark’s position on these agreements should not be surprising. After all, he had entered politics with a history of union activity and “was predisposed to be skeptical, even obstinate, about the process that was underway.”71 Also, Clark had entered cabinet somewhat distrustful of the existing bureaucracy. As one representative suggested, “this was especially the case with Trade Policy. He came in and saw the department filled with lawyers, economists, and MBAs and assumed it was a pro-business forum.” It was clear that other ministries “such as Agriculture and Forestry were not becoming politicized but [Trade Policy] was, because Clark was the minister in charge – and it got even worse after he became premier.”72 Some observers, though, argue that this is not a fair or accurate assessment of Clark’s position on trade policy. One senior official suggested that Clark was often labelled an ideologue without justification. First, though “Clark was on the left he was definitely pro-growth.” Also, he focused more “on trade promotion and the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) than international trade and ultimately, his position on NAFTA was a political decision designed to appease a divided cabinet and caucus.” In fact, “there was surprisingly little political discussion of NAFTA at that level and most of it centred on whether or not BC should support Ontario’s proposed constitutional challenge of the agreement.” What “needs to be remembered,” he continued, “is that once Clark became premier he had to balance a number of policy issues and he was not going to place NAFTA ahead of export growth and internal trade.” Ultimately, “people forget that Clark was first and foremost a provincial rights advocate and not an anti-NAFTA crusader.”73 Clark’s position on liberalized trade was perhaps misrepresented; even so, critics did argue that he influenced executive and bureaucratic appointments in this policy area. Vaughn Palmer, for example, has contended that Clark, along with Adrian Dix, his chief political adviser, arranged for the appointment of Tim Gallagher, now a senior policy analyst for Environment Canada, to a number of important positions, including in Trade Policy.74 That said,
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a former official with close ties to Clark has argued that any focus on Gallagher is “absolutely ridiculous.”75 Specifically, “Gallagher’s role, responsibilities, partisanship, and supposed connection to the premier was negligible.” And another high-ranking member of Clark’s executive has suggested that “Palmer’s insight makes for good political commentary, but it is unfair to Gallagher and other Trade Policy appointments, who were all highly knowledgeable.” In fact, “Clark made a point of ensuring that qualified officials were in place given the anti-NAFTA position of some members of caucus.” Furthermore, “he also maintained a large number of former Social Credit appointments, that served ... [the] government very well.” In sum, suggestions of “rampant NDP politicization of Trade Policy are hardly accurate.”76 Ultimately, only one appointment to Trade Policy was the result of direct intervention from Clark. This occurred when Clark requested a discussion paper outlining provincial options in a non-free trade scenario. The subsequent report, which Clark jokingly referred to as the “Albanian recommendation,” was viewed as an exercise within Trade Policy to challenge its image as a biased supporter of liberalization. In the words of one senior bureaucrat, “Clark saw the document as an almost Stalinist critique designed to appease him, and that’s when he decided to make changes, notably by recruiting ... a new director of Trade Policy.”77 Another former official, however, made it clear that this appointment was “hardly political.” Though the new director had previous ties with the BC Federation of Labour, he did not enter the department advocating an antiglobalization perspective. In fact, prior to being appointed to Trade Policy, he had served as a special adviser to the ministry on economic development issues.78 According to a representative from Atlantic Canada, the new director actively defended BC’s interests, though at times he was somewhat “quixotic” about his opposition to certain issues. Regardless, “just because he challenged positions readily accepted by others did not make him a ‘political’ apologist for the NDP.”79 Clearly, then, executive appointments to Trade Policy were not as politicized as Palmer has suggested. At the same time, it is important to note that some members of the bureaucracy did question their role and influence. “Look, I have no problem with political appointments,” said another senior representative. “These are orders-in-council and government has the right to appoint whoever they want. What Clark was doing was nothing new. Even Bill Vander Zalm hired people from outside of the bureaucracy to serve as deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers.”80 The difference, however, was that Clark and Harcourt established the precedent of appointing these individuals as low in the bureaucratic hierarchy as the policy adviser level. This, according to another official, raised questions regarding the integrity of the policy process, especially given Clark’s supposed stance on international trade. “It got to the point where you really had to be careful about what you said.”81
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Notwithstanding these concerns, there is evidence that new perspectives in the department had an impact on BC’s foreign policy. Specifically (see Chapter 6), Trade Policy became a vocal advocate of the need for a clear definition of social services in both NAFTA and the WTO. In terms of NAFTA, several officials were critical of Canada’s approach to the agreement’s Annex II, “Reservations for Future Measures.” Trade Policy encouraged the cabinet to include the need for stronger implementing language in BC’s negotiating position. This pressure resulted in “public education, public training, health, and child care” being explicitly included in provisions related to cross-border services and investment.82 The province also argued for a broader exemption related to Articles I:3(b) and (c) of GATS. In this case, however, federal and other provincial officials believed that the existing language of Article I:3(c), which allowed for the protection of services “supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service providers,” was sufficient to protect social services at both levels of government.83 Thus, with GATS, pressure from the department influenced BC’s negotiating position, but unlike in the case of NAFTA, that pressure did not significantly alter Canada’s trade policy or the development of international norms and standards. In the months following the defeat of the NDP in May 2001, the Liberal government of Gordon Campbell quickly dismissed several NDP appointments, including the director of Trade Policy. Not long after this, the Liberals adopted the same informal appointment process as had been followed by the Socreds and the NDP. Though these placements left Trade Policy largely untouched, there are several examples throughout government – especially in communications – where a selected number of ministerial assistants have been promoted to director positions.84 As the following chapter makes clear, however, any real or alleged executive influence over Trade Policy (now the Trade and Competitiveness Branch of the Ministry of Economic Development) is not the sole determining factor in BC’s foreign trade policy. Several line departments play significant roles, such as the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries. Also, current institutional restructuring by the Liberals is such that other ministries, including the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat (IGR), have been integrated into the foreign policy process.85 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to answer three questions: First, has the evolution of an institutionalized cabinet system had an impact on provincial foreign trade policy? Second, does executive interest and engagement vary among provinces in this issue area? And third, if it does, what implications does this have for Canada’s global trade relations and for the evolution of international norms and standards?
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In terms of organization, most provinces have shifted from traditional cabinets to institutionalized systems based on rational organizational principles designed to increase centralization. These reforms, however, have not dramatically altered the influence of provincial trade officials. Even when provincial executives have taken a direct interest in trade policy, such as in Ontario and BC during the NAFTA negotiations, there is no evidence this has had a significant impact on Canada’s trade policy or its negotiating position. Overall, the political executive tends to limit involvement to crisis situations, trade promotion, and politically relevant trade disputes. In extreme cases, some provinces – such as Alberta – have directly approached high-ranking members of foreign executives, though this activity is not common. Generally, then, provincial political executives in Canada play a surprisingly minor role in the detailed realities of foreign trade policy, especially relative to other issues in Canadian federalism. Also, it is not apparent that any direct engagement by the political executive has had an impact on emerging or existing international trade regimes.
5 Bureaucratic and Legislative Pressures
In order to evaluate the role of the bureaucracy and the legislature in the formulation of provincial foreign trade policy, it is necessary to examine issues of capacity, coordination, and influence. Provincial bureaucrats have exercised considerable autonomy in this policy area. This is owing to the small number of officials specializing in trade policy in most provinces. In the past these experts were usually located in separate departments within larger economic development ministries. Today, many of these representatives have been moved into centralized offices of intergovernmental affairs. This bureaucratic restructuring has not diminished the influence of these officials. At the same time, however, most provincial governments continue to face budget and staffing challenges related to trade policy. These workload issues, and the need to develop technical expertise within specific sectors, have resulted in the development of an international capacity in several line departments as well. In some provinces, such as Alberta, Quebec, and New Brunswick, there are institutional mechanisms to coordinate this activity. In other provinces this interaction is ad hoc. In addition, the legalization of trade policy and the prominent role played by outside legal counsel have placed additional financial strains on provinces and raised normative questions of accountability and transparency. Finally, provincial legislatures play a minor role in trade policy. This is due to party discipline, a lack of legislative activity in this policy area, the high turnover of elected officials, and the failure of most voters to identify with international trade at the constituency level. The Bureaucracy: Issues of Organization and Capacity Kim Nossal’s observations regarding the influence of bureaucratic actors at the federal level are also applicable to Canadian provinces. In terms of the bureaucracy, he notes that in theory it has the least influence over the policy agenda as these objectives are the responsibility of the political executive
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and the state’s elected leaders. Nossal, however, does suggest that the bureaucracy has a distinct advantage over the executive, especially in terms of expertise and the control of information.1 Federal bureaucrats have functioned in an evolving policy process over the past three decades. As Donald Savoie has noted, “two policy-making processes” have emerged in Ottawa. The prime minister and his inner circle of advisers have centralized policy by removing ministers, central agencies, departments, and career officials from specific policy decisions. In the aftermath, government officials have been left to “pick up the pieces” in a secondary policy process. What has emerged is a federal bureaucracy that is more “horizontal, consultative, and porous.”2 According to Marcel Massé, a former senior cabinet member, this new “postmodern government” requires politicians and bureaucrats to consult, explain, and understand policy issues with a wide range of actors.3 Not surprisingly, provincial governments have also struggled with these “postmodern” challenges, especially in matters of trade policy. Ontario and Quebec The two provinces with the most developed bureaucratic commitment to international trade are Ontario and Quebec. In Ontario, the responsibility for negotiating and implementing foreign trade agreements rests with the Trade and International Policy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT). That ministry has a number of divisions with varying responsibilities. Specific tasks include export development, investment, small and medium business, science and technology, and various agencies, boards, and commissions. The Trade and International Branch is located within MEDT’s Employment and Business Development Division. As the name implies, this division focuses largely on trade and investment promotion; negotiation and compliance are also key issues. As with other provincial bureaucracies, the Trade and International Branch has changed its role over time. Some sectors, such as automobiles, have long been excluded from its mandate. Ongoing WTO service negotiations, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 considerations, and international trade disputes are all current priorities in the department. The Trade and International Branch sometimes has intermittent input on specific files. In 2002, for example, one department official worked with the Ministry of Natural Resources on the issue of softwood lumber. By 2004, however, the Trade and International Branch was no longer involved, owing to philosophical differences related to ongoing WTO and NAFTA disputes.4 Ontario has faced staffing and budget challenges in this policy area. At one time the Trade and International Policy Branch consistently employed twelve or thirteen policy advisers. During the NAFTA negotiations and the Uruguay Round, extra staff was added. By 2005, however, the department had been reduced to nine, with one official on leave with the federal
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government and another on a one-year professional sabbatical. In both cases there was no money available to replace these representatives, even temporarily. This placed additional pressure on the department; however, one member noted that this was mitigated by the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), stalled WTO negotiations, and the MEDT’s reduced responsibility for softwood lumber.5 Quebec has devoted significant bureaucratic resources to provincial foreign policy over the past three decades. To coordinate this activity, the province has its own Ministry of International Relations (MIR), established by the Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1985. Since that year, under both Liberal and PQ governments, the department has seen its mandate shifted, with international trade and immigration being moved in and out of MIR. In 2001 the PQ highlighted Quebec’s international objectives with a new MIR strategic plan. That document covered a wide range of issues but prioritized the United States in relation to Quebec’s economic interests. France, however, remained the province’s main focus in terms of political and cultural affairs.6 As the previous chapter suggested, the Quebec Liberal Party has not adjusted the province’s foreign policy in any significant way, though it has placed more emphasis on federal-provincial coordination in the pursuit of Quebec’s international autonomy. It is interesting that international trade policy is not a primary focus of the Ministry of International Relations. During the NAFTA era, the province had a separate department for international trade. These responsibilities were then transferred into MIR; still later, they came under the control of Industry and then the Ministry of Finance. By 2003 foreign trade policy was located in the Ministry of Economic and Regional Development (MERD), which subsequently became the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation, and Export Trade. This department has a staff of approximately one hundred. In reality, only twelve or so work specifically on trade policy, given that the department’s primary commitment is to trade promotion. During the Uruguay and NAFTA negotiations, however, staffing levels were close to thirty.7 As in other provinces, line departments also have officials working on matters of trade policy. Responsibility for internal trade is located in the Premier’s Office. Western Canada When the New Democratic Party (NDP) came to power in British Columbia in 1991 it gained control of a bureaucracy that had already negotiated the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and was completing discussions regarding NAFTA. Its bureaucracy had a reputation for participating somewhat reluctantly in the continental free trade process. Indeed, when NAFTA was first announced, BC warned that the agreement had the potential to create a “fortress US” approach to economic policy that was damaging to Canadian
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interests. This position was not ideological, given that most policy officials had worked under previous Social Credit governments. Rather, concern about a broader hemispheric agreement reflected the fact that BC already enjoyed access to the then thriving Asia-Pacific market and had strong economic ties with several American states in the region. By then, the province’s softwood lumber industry had also been the focus of a number of US trade complaints for more than forty years. Declining bureaucratic resources presented a challenge for BC trade officials. The province had once been a leader in promoting provincial rights within Canadian federalism, but for economic and political reasons it no longer played that role. According to one official, the province lacked both the money and the staff to lobby on most matters of international trade. As much as BC wanted to build closer relations with the federal government, it “couldn’t afford to keep travelling back and forth to Ottawa or attending conferences in Geneva.”8 Also, the political reality was such that some departments – namely, Tax and Finance – were already heavily involved in disputes with the federal government. Thus provincial trade officials made a pragmatic decision to avoid confrontation as much as possible. Regardless, in selective cases, Socred governments continued to spare no expense in protecting provincial interests. This was most apparent with softwood lumber, especially regarding the exclusion of log export controls during NAFTA negotiations. Prior to the summer of 2005, responsibility for international trade was located in the Trade Policy Branch of the Ministry of Small Business and Economic Development. Following two reorganizations, the department was renamed the Trade and Competitiveness Branch (TCB) and moved into the new Ministry of Business and Development. Though the department’s mandate now included film industry policy and other general issues related to economic competitiveness, about 50 percent of TCB’s responsibilities remained internal and external trade.9 Despite these new tasks the department continued to struggle with staffing reductions. During the NDP era Trade Policy comprised as many as six people. As of 2003 the department had three officials, a new director, and two other representatives, one each for internal and external trade. A senior provincial bureaucrat suggested that in this new environment, “something was eventually going to fall through the cracks.”10 Other provincial officials, however, were reluctant to look at these developments as setbacks. A different representative noted that BC simply became “more strategic in the issues it pursued.” Now “we only focus on problems that are specific to BC or are being neglected by the federal government.”11 In Alberta, responsibility for international trade is located in the Trade Policy Branch of the Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations (MIIR). This department is responsible for negotiating and implementing
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international trade agreements, disputes, services, investment, and the AIT. Responsibilities within Trade Policy are generally divided up on a functional basis. The senior Alberta trade representative, who recently retired, was a long-serving provincial official with extensive experience in this policy area. The department also has a director of internal trade, whose caseload includes the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), the Council of the Federation, the Alberta-BC Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA), and provincial stakeholder negotiations. The associate director of trade and economic analysis coordinates market access issues, statistical research, alcohol, NAFTA, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the EC. In addition, the department has two international trade counsels. The first provides analysis related to dispute settlement, trade remedies, and technical barriers in a wide range of sectors. The second is responsible for services, investment, the environment, e-commerce, and Canada’s bilateral trade agreements with Chile and Costa Rica. Three to four trade policy officers support these senior bureaucrats, though some of these positions are sporadically vacant or filled by non-permanent staff.12 Given its broad mandate, Trade Policy could benefit from additional bureaucratic resources. According to one trade representative, the department “could easily handle three other research support staff.” To compensate for this, Trade Policy has a relationship with the Western Centre for Economic Research (WCER), located at the University of Alberta. The WCER is used on a contract basis to provide statistical analyses and reports, though these activities are limited by the availability of faculty.13 Despite these problems, Alberta is often considered a leader among the provinces on matters of foreign trade policy, owing to the expertise of its officials, which allows the department to provide services comparable to those of larger provinces such as Ontario and Quebec. Generally, Alberta is regarded as a highly professional if somewhat “intense” participant in domestic policy processes. As one observer suggested, “if you’re prepared and know what you’re talking about Alberta can be an extremely productive province to do business with. It’s only when you come to the table without doing your homework that you ... [can be] dismissed as irrelevant.”14 These characteristics have made Alberta a strong advocate for provincial rights in the formulation of Canadian foreign trade policy. Saskatchewan and Manitoba have less bureaucratic capacity devoted to international trade than Alberta and BC. In Manitoba these issues are mainly the responsibility of one official: the Director of Policy, Planning, and Coordination in the Administration and Finance Division of the Department of Industry, Economic Development, and Mines. Line departments, such as agriculture, also devote significant resources to international trade. Provincial representation on forums such as CTrade, however, remains the responsibility of Industry. Though the director has occasional support from other officials,
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staffing is also a challenge for Manitoba. One senior bureaucrat pointed out that Industry would “love to have six people working on international trade,” but because of limited resources, the department is “forced to pick its spots.” This is not to suggest that Manitoba did not play an important role in negotiations for NAFTA and during the Uruguay Round. In such situations, Industry relies on input from line departments and, in some cases, other provinces. “There were times,” said the same official, “that we’ve relied on the research capacity of Alberta and Quebec.” When the funding is lacking, “we get the information wherever we can.”15 The election of Gary Doer’s NDP government sparked a review of Manitoba’s international trade. Doer had an interest in Canada-US relations and sought to centralize control of this policy area. As a result, a number of traderelated issues were moved into Intergovernmental Affairs, which had its own Canada-US and International Relations department. Initially, the intent was to shift all policy responsibilities out of Industry and into Intergovernmental Affairs; this plan was eventually abandoned because, according to another official, “it became too difficult.”16 The director of policy planning and coordination remained in Industry and a formal written document was drafted outlining specific responsibilities. The director now reports to the ministers of Industry and Intergovernmental Affairs. This may seem confusing, but it has worked in Manitoba because Intergovernmental Affairs focuses mainly on trade development and promotion rather than policy.17 In Saskatchewan, Trade Policy is currently located in the Trade and International Relations Department of the Ministry of Government Relations, which until recently was the Ministry of Government Relations and Aboriginal Affairs. Compared to Manitoba, Saskatchewan has a greater bureaucratic commitment to international trade. Trade Policy has three senior trade analysts and a director. Even though the department has more staff, Saskatchewan, too, focuses on specific policy initiatives. “We typically step back and see what the universe looks like and then pick our spots,” said one high-ranking bureaucrat. The real difficulty, he continued, is “with negotiations and disputes.” Given the province’s “minimal resources, it’s difficult to adopt a strategic policy approach and as a result we tend to suffer at times from a lack of long-term policy development.” The result is a slightly “reactive” approach to foreign trade policy. However, it is important here to differentiate between sectors. Obviously, he noted, “if it’s related to agriculture, it becomes a high priority. Although we would like to target numerous international working groups, it’s just not possible.”18 Atlantic Canada Foreign trade policy became a higher priority in New Brunswick following the election of Bernard Lord’s Conservative government. At that time, Trade Policy was located in Business New Brunswick. Though line departments
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were involved in the policy process, they were limited mainly to technical issues. Their advice was then forwarded to the Director of Trade Policy, who coordinated the information and represented New Brunswick in its dealings with the federal government during the FTA, NAFTA, and Uruguay Round negotiations. Initially, the director was the sole bureaucrat responsible for those negotiations. As the agenda grew more complex, however, the department expanded to include two to three additional policy advisers, though not all of them were permanent and full-time. Today, Trade Policy consists of a senior policy adviser and an additional policy adviser. Also, Trade Policy’s ties with line departments have increased regarding matters related to international and internal trade.19 As noted in the previous chapter, the Conservatives’ emphasis on international relations resulted in a White Paper, Prospering in a Global Economy: New Brunswick’s International Strategy. A second and related change was Bill 55, An Act to Amend the Executive Council Act. This legislation replaced the previous Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs with the Department of Intergovernmental and International Relations (DIIR).20 The new department was meant to centralize executive control over New Brunswick’s international activities. Though the reorganization was motivated by Lord’s preference for an overarching bureaucratic framework and a more “corporate” approach to policy, it was also linked to budget and efficiency issues. According to a senior member of IGA, a number of departments were taking foreign trips but “nobody had a clear idea of what was being accomplished.”21 Though Trade Policy initially remained in Business New Brunswick, DIIR did begin to develop bureaucratic capacity, creating a US desk to monitor cross-border relations. Then in 2004, Trade Policy was moved out of Business New Brunswick and into DIIR. For the most part this was a collegial process, though it met with resistance from some members of the provincial bureaucracy. Nova Scotia, too, has developed a centralized foreign trade policy. In November 2002, responsibility for international trade was moved out of the Department of Economic Development and into the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. This shift, which was part of a broader bureaucratic reorganization, reflected the expanded mandate of Economic Development, which now focused on technology, investment, and trade promotion rather than on general economic policy. These changes had direct implications for Nova Scotia’s trade representative. That position had been created in the 1980s in the wake of the FTA negotiations. The Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and the AIT added to its responsibilities.22 Before the reorganization, the job description of the provincial trade representative was modified to give it a more defined federal-provincial role, which provided some justification for the move into IGA. This policy area now employs one additional policy adviser, a former contract employee, in addition to the province’s trade representative. Again, as with New Brunswick, the reorganization was for the
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most part collegial. As part of the move into IGA, these officials have at times taken on additional, unexpected responsibilities. One senior bureaucrat suggested that “we don’t want to be writing briefing papers on the trade policy of Belgium. As with any significant change, it’s going to take some time to fully clarify our key functions.”23 In Newfoundland and Labrador, responsibility for international trade is in the Trade and Investment Division of the Department of Innovation, Trade, and Rural Development, which was formerly the Trade Policy Branch of the Department of Industry, Trade, and Rural Development. The recent reorganization under the Conservative government of Danny Williams has added a Strategic Industries Division and a Rural Secretariat to the department; however, despite a new focus on technology, its responsibilities for foreign trade have not been significantly altered. Newfoundland, much like Nova Scotia, traditionally had one official responsible for international trade. In 2004, however, a second policy analyst was added. As in other provinces, the department would benefit from additional resources. It receives a number of ad hoc requests from other line departments seeking briefing notes on existing trade commitments or ongoing negotiations.24 In comparison to other provinces in Atlantic Canada, Prince Edward Island has the least developed bureaucratic capacity. Historically, PEI had minimal expertise within its bureaucracy on matters of international trade. During the FTA and NAFTA negotiations, Intergovernmental Affairs, line departments, or specialists, often working on a contract basis, handled provincial interests in an ad hoc manner. Between 1999 and 2002 the government had no employees focusing on international trade. Recently, however, the Department of Development and Technology hired a part-time trade adviser. This official is a former Saskatchewan trade representative who retired to PEI and whom the government recruited for their expertise. Obviously, given PEI’s size and location, its institutional bureaucratic structure is not as specialized as that of other provinces. Development and Technology, for example, has a very broad mandate and is responsible for economic policy in a number of sectors (which, however, do not include agriculture, fisheries, and to some degree forestry).25 Bureaucratic Coordination and Cooperation It is clear from the above discussion that every province has more than one department working on foreign trade policy. Typically, several ministries (often including finance, agriculture, forestry, justice, and the environment) have officials working on some aspect of international trade. Not surprisingly, three provinces have established standing committees to oversee these bureaucratic interests. In Alberta there are two structures that coordinate foreign policy. The first is the Trade Policy Committee, which is a forum for communication and
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information sharing and which distributes relevant documentation. Also, several Alberta departments besides MIIR have international policy capacity. Forestry, for example, has six officials dedicated to the softwood lumber dispute. Energy has its own department responsible for external relations, though it works mainly on market access and advocacy in the United States. It is MIIR, however, that is responsible for coordinating trade policy within the Alberta government. The Trade Policy Committee, then, serves as a formal source of expertise for MIIR on specific policy issues. Alberta also has a committee of assistant deputy ministers on international issues; however, it is not driven by trade policy. This committee provides the premier with information related to a diverse range of international initiatives such as those involving culture, education, science, and research.26 Quebec, too, has taken steps to coordinate its trade policy. Beyond MIR, numerous line departments – such as Agriculture and Natural Resources – have developed the expertise to negotiate and implement international trade agreements. Also, an interdepartmental committee has been created involving eighteen separate departments and agencies; it meets every two to three months. To ensure more frequent dialogue, a number of subcommittees have also been established. As in every province, ad hoc daily meetings and regular phone conversations are common during trade disputes and the crucial phases of negotiations. Quebec also has a Secretariat for Interprovincial Relations, which is responsible for both political and economic issues. This body focuses solely on internal trade, though there is inevitable overlap with Quebec’s foreign trade relations.27 New Brunswick also has institutional mechanisms to coordinate provincial international activities. In terms of general consultation, an interdepartmental International Strategy Working Group (ISWG) has been created to facilitate communication and information sharing. This forum, coordinated by DIIR, is designed to promote cooperation in the early phases of policy making. As noted earlier, this activity was historically ad hoc. Usually, technical positions were developed in line departments; this information was then forwarded to the Director of Trade Policy.28 According to Raj Venugopal, the recent reforms were not designed to give DIIR oversight and control over the activities of line departments. Rather, this “pooling and sharing of information was designed with two objectives in mind: to provide corporate memory of all government-related international activities; and to communicate government officials’ international work plan itineraries to senior managers prior to date of travel.”29 The other provinces do not have formalized committee systems. Instead, policy positions are established through ad hoc information sharing among the relevant ministries. Ontario lacks an overarching framework, though attempts to institutionalize coordination in specific sectors have been made in the past. One example is softwood lumber, where MEDT and Natural
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Resources attempted to formalize their communication and coordination processes. Before long, however, it was clear that the two departments differed on how to end the dispute. According to one senior official, “MEDT decided to terminate the arrangement and Natural Resources gained control of the file.”30 It is hard to say whether formal coordination might have prevented this tension; it is also important to point out that MEDT has a collegial working relationship with most departments in the Ontario government. Generally speaking, duplication is not inevitable. Another bureaucrat pointed out that “most of these policy areas are so broad and complex that there is rarely an overlap of interests.”31 In BC, Trade Policy is not the only department responsible for the province’s global trade. Indeed, Trade Policy relies on information from several other bureaucratic divisions. Not surprisingly, these departments are tied to the more prominent sectors of the provincial economy, which also tend to be the most contentious. For example, Trade Policy relies on information from the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries. Most interactions within the provincial bureaucracy involve trade disputes or briefings related to ongoing international negotiations. For the most part this is an extremely cooperative arrangement, and members from all three departments have praised the working relationship that they have developed.32 Unlike other provinces, such as Alberta, there is no formal mechanism or committee that oversees all aspects of BC’s international trade. To this point, however, this has not impeded policy making. One official suggested that the process “might not look coordinated, but it works.”33 Expertise and Influence In recent years, DFAIT has reorganized its bureaucracy to better accommodate the provinces’ demands in this policy area. Previously, it had a small department responsible for coordinating the provinces’ international interests, be they trade promotion, negotiations, or dispute settlement. As the issues grew more complex, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) established the Trade Policy Consultations and Liaison Division (TPCLD), responsible for coordinating CTrade and other provincial trade interests. When the TPCLD was formed in 1999, it consisted of a director, a deputy director, and around ten other officials. The office was not high in the DFAIT hierarchy, however. Rather, it was a division within the Trade Policy II Branch (the Services, Investment, and Intellectual Property Bureau), which reported to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Trade, Economic, and Environmental Policy. During the Paul Martin era, after DFAIT was divided into Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and International Trade Canada (ITCan), the same organizational hierarchy existed for TPCLD. The new title for the assistant deputy minister, however, was the ADM for Trade, Economic, and
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Environmental Policy and Chief Trade Negotiator for the WTO. This person reported to the Deputy Minister of International Trade. Stephen Harper’s Conservative government slightly altered responsibility for CTrade and provincial coordination. In 2006 TPCLD was eliminated and replaced with the Consultations and Liaison Division (CSL). This new division, which was part of Harper’s reintegration of ITCan and FAC, employs about ten officials, which at one point included a federal-provincial territorial liaison officer. The responsibilities of TPCLD and CSL are quite similar. Like the TPCLD, the CSL is relatively low in the government’s hierarchy. It is part of the Strategic Policy Division, which is located in the Investment, Innovation, and Sectors Branch of the Ministry of International Trade. That branch, which reports directly to the deputy trade minister, has a broad mandate. Also, the Strategic Policy Division shares bureaucratic resources with the Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative, Olympic Games 2010, Innovation and Partnership, Invest in Canada, Investment Marketing, Science and Technology, and the Strategic Trade Planning and Performance Management Division. Trade Policy and Negotiations and the Trade Law Bureau are also the responsibility of the deputy minister. The bureau, not surprisingly, is the federal government’s source of legal advice on trade matters. For its part, Trade Policy and Negotiations focuses on multilateral, regional, and North American trade. The various divisions of Trade Policy and Negotiations are responsible for trade issues such as technical barriers, services, intellectual property, and softwood lumber.34 Most officials in TPCLD (now CSL) have less experience than provincial representatives. As one bureaucrat pointed out, the provinces’ trade policy departments tend to be “staffed with knowledgeable members who have held these positions for very long periods of time.” At the federal level there is less continuity, given the “junior” status of TPCLD and CSL. These departments are “usually viewed as a career step for federal officials”; thus there “tend to be regular changes from year to year.”35 Again, though, it is important to emphasize that provincial consultation on trade issues is not limited to CSL: provincial officials are in regular direct contact with officials in specific ministries, such as DFAIT’s former Trade Policy I and II Branches. According to several provincial bureaucrats, these are often very senior members who are well versed on the intricacies of foreign trade. In cases such as these there is not a similar advantage for the provinces. Recent and pending retirements at the provincial level have the potential to alter this area of federalprovincial relations. Provincial representatives’ continuity allows them to build ongoing relationships with their counterparts in other provinces. Though it would be a mistake to suggest that the provinces often form alliances, data and workloads are quite often shared. In Ontario, for example, MEDT makes a point of copying most departmental memos to other provinces and the federal
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government in order to avoid duplication. Ontario went so far as to draft an internal Guide for Trade Agreements, outlining obligations for provincial departments, and distributed this manual to other provinces.36 At times, provincial cooperation is based more on sectoral considerations and mutual interests. For example, Alberta works closely with BC and Saskatchewan on softwood lumber. It also shares a working relationship with Saskatchewan on wheat and with Quebec on more general questions of jurisdiction.37 Quebec and Alberta also worked together during the final stages of the Uruguay Round in Geneva.38 Trade officials in Atlantic Canada have forged ties as well. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, for example, have long been in almost daily contact, especially on more contentious files such as softwood lumber and shipbuilding.39 One senior official in the region described this working relationship as a “job share” – that is, as a response to the lack of available resources and to complimentary strengths and weaknesses.40 In addition, “virtual committees” have been established in Atlantic Canada for information sharing on issues such as softwood lumber, services, and the AIT. Yet at the same time, it is important not to overemphasize this cooperation. In the words of one provincial bureaucrat, “provinces have competing interests, and it does not always make sense to share information.” “What people forget,” he continued, “is that in some cases we’re actually directly competing with other provinces and trying to anticipate their positions so we can have a better argument.”41 Several officials in Ontario complained that not all provinces were willing to share information and resources. One representative suggested that Ontario was a “bit of a boy scout and brownnoser when it comes to this stuff. Ultimately, we need to stop doing all the heavy lifting for other provinces.”42 Larger provinces have been known to depend on the bureaucracies of smaller provinces to protect specific interests. In the case of shipbuilding disputes with Europe, the Central Canadian provinces relied on representatives from Atlantic Canada “because we knew it was important to them and they would do the work.”43 Generally, then, cooperation among provinces is sporadic and depends heavily on the personalities involved. In the words of one official, “cooperation between provinces will only occur if it does not create a great deal of work for those involved. If it doesn’t come easily, it’s not likely to happen.”44 The Legalization of Trade Policy? The increasing complexities of international trade have contributed to a growing reliance on legal representation for both Ottawa and the provinces. Lawyers generally provide three specific services. First, they offer advice when international trade agreements are being negotiated. Second, they provide crucial legal representation when NAFTA and WTO tribunals hear
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trade disputes. Third and more recently, federal and provincial governments have been hiring Washington law firms to lobby Congress on specific sectoral concerns. Provincial trade representatives can no longer ignore the “legalization” of trade policy. “If I was putting together a trade shop ten years ago I would have hired a bunch of economists,” noted a senior bureaucrat from BC. “Now I need a roomful of lawyers.”45 Another representative, from Manitoba, suggested that historically “the role of provincial trade officials was similar to an editorial writer. We were asked to monitor developments and comment on possible implications for the province.” As negotiations began to include issues such as government procurement, services, and other intrusive areas of policy, “our job began to change.” Suddenly the province needed to focus on the implementation of these agreements. “I’m not a lawyer, but I need one, so this expertise has to come from outside of government.”46 An Ontario official was more blunt: “We now have to send everything to lawyers to review in order to ensure we have an informed legal opinion.” The difficulty, however, “is that once it leaves our hands it becomes less of a policy issue and more of legal matter, which prevents us from fully monitoring the process.”47 Not surprisingly, sectors involved in international trade disputes are also the ones most dependent on legal representation. An obvious example is softwood lumber. In the words of one former bureaucrat, “it was always the ‘A’ team of provincial and federal officials and Washington lawyers when it came to softwood lumber.” The “stakes were simply too high to have it any other way.”48 The costs for this representation are significant. In some provinces, decisions to hire specific firms for these lucrative contracts are based at least in part on political factors. For example, during Lumber II, which ended in 1991 with the termination of the Canada-US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on softwood lumber, most legal contracts in BC were with firms that had ties to the Mulroney government. Then after the 1993 election, the BC Council of Forest Industries (COFI) – at that time the main industry association in the sector – hired a prominent Vancouver law firm with close ties to Jean Chrétien and Eddie Goldenberg, his long-time adviser. At first this relationship was mainly political, and there were indications that it was succeeding as Chrétien began making softwood lumber the focus of several BC speeches. Over time, however, the firm also began providing extensive legal advice to COFI on the lumber file.49 Despite the growing influence of lawyers and the apparent practice of hiring firms with ties to the federal government, some observers have their doubts that foreign trade policy is becoming more “legalized.” According to one legal representative, the process remains highly “politicized” in that most legal firms – especially American firms – are hired on the basis of their access to Congress. Dewey-Ballantine, for example, is an American firm that
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represents US industry not just in lumber but in a wide range of other sectors, including steel.50 Regardless, these developments raise questions related to provincial budget considerations, as well as relevant issues of transparency and accountability. Put simply, trade policy is already a Byzantine process that draws extensive criticism related to access and legitimacy. These problems have the potential to become more serious when governments turn even more responsibility over to non-accountable lawyers, some of them with political ties to parties in both Ottawa and Washington. The Legislature There are two general opinions regarding the role of Parliament in formulating foreign policy. David Leyton-Brown and R.B. Byers have concluded that Parliament has historically lacked involvement on this issue.51 In addition, Nossal has argued that elected members rarely gain the support of local constituents on the basis of foreign policy, especially international trade.52 Activity is also limited by strict party discipline and by the legislature’s responsibility for a diverse range of issues. On the other hand, John English has suggested that the role of parliamentarians has increased over the past two decades. Specifically, he argues that especially in ethnic communities, voter support is being linked more and more to foreign policy. English also points out that elected members today enjoy expanded opportunities to serve on parliamentary committees and cross-border legislative associations.53 The key, then, is to evaluate these arguments in the context of provincial legislatures. To do so, it is necessary to examine the ratification and implementation of international treaties, the role of legislative committees focusing on foreign affairs, and the external legislative linkages of Quebec. In Canada, by tradition, the legislative branch of government is not involved in the ratification of foreign trade agreements. As Peter Hogg points out, the signing and ratification of treaties is the prerogative of the Crown and/or the executive. In other words, Canada’s Westminster model does not extend formal jurisdiction over foreign relations to elected legislatures (the US Congress, by contrast, does have this jurisdiction). Hogg does note, however, that the federal government has always sought parliamentary approval for significant agreements before official ratification. This legislative review is not statutory and is not granted royal assent. Between 1946 and 1966 roughly one-quarter of Canada’s treaties were submitted to Parliament. More recently it has become less common to require formal ratification for international commitments.54 Despite these limitations, in 2002 Quebec passed the Act to Amend the Act Respecting the Ministère des Relations Internationales. According to Stéphane Paquin, this “forces ratification by Quebec’s National Assembly of any federal treaty that concerns Quebec’s areas of jurisdiction.”55 In his opinion, this has created a potential problem within Canadian federalism that could prevent the ratification of future
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international agreements. Based on Hogg’s analysis, however, it is clear that the Quebec legislature will be limited to passing legislation based on the right to “review” international treaties in areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is not an insignificant development, but it falls short of creating a constitutional crisis over the issue of ratification. On the other hand, treaty implementation does often require legislative change to ensure that domestic law is consistent with international obligations. In terms of the provinces, this was the case with both the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC).56 Provincial legislatures have also initiated bureaucratic reorganizations and legitimized other institutional reforms. In 2002, for example, Quebec voted to establish the Observatoire Québécois sur la Mondialisation, a mechanism designed to advise the province on matters of “globalization.”57 Following NAFTA, Alberta also adopted a formal implementation process for trade policy. Most of these activities are carried out through executive orders-in-council, but some technical changes to areas of provincial legislation still require legislative authorization. Another area of potential involvement is legislative review. At the federal level over the past two decades there has been evidence of an enhanced role for Parliament in this capacity. Starting with the Mulroney government, a number of parliamentary committees and reports have examined Canadian multilateral and regional trade relations. Generally, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and its Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investment have coordinated public hearings on these issues. Since 2001 the federal government has published several studies linked to these efforts.58 All of this is in addition to parliamentary committees studying non-trade–related aspects of Canada’s external relations. Finally, parliamentarians engage industry and societal interests in multistakeholder negotiations and serve as panellists and speakers at a wide range of public forums. Finally, reports outlining Canadian economic priorities, Canada’s State of Trade and Canada’s International Market Access Priorities are tabled annually in Parliament. Conversely, provincial legislative committees on international trade are rare. Recently some provinces have attempted to formalize involvement on this issue for elected representatives. Saskatchewan, for example, has proposed a legislative review process.59 Alberta has a Standing Policy Committee to evaluate the work of various departments, but that committee does not usually focus on international trade, except at times in relation to softwood lumber and energy.60 However, Alberta’s MIIR is accountable to the legislature’s Business Plan (Budget) Annual Review. Most provincial committees on international trade are ad hoc. Where they exist, as in Ontario during NAFTA, they have the potential to be politically motivated.
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In BC during the 1990s, for example, NDP governments established legislative committees to study both NAFTA and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The first of these committees, the Select Standing Committee on Economic Development, Science, Labour, Training, and Technology, was created in January 1993 to discuss NAFTA with business, labour, NGOs, civil society, and academia. In its interim report, which was tabled in the provincial legislature in May 1993, the committee addressed NAFTA’s impact on environmental controls, agricultural support mechanisms, and water. However, the NDP chair of the committee, Mike Farnworth, emphasized the risk that NAFTA presented to provincial trade with Asia. In his opinion, BC “was unique among provinces in that we have convinced ourselves that our future lies in Pacific trade.”61 The BC legislature’s MAI committee, on the other hand, began its deliberations in the summer of 1998. The MAI was not explicitly linked to trade; even so, the committee, chaired by the NDP’s Joan Smallwood, expressed concerns regarding its impact on the province’s freedom to regulate economic and social development. From the outset, the NDP faced questions about the committee’s purpose. For one thing, it was formed during a six-month suspension of negotiations for the MAI following the expiry of an April 1998 deadline. For another, the committee faced a crisis when its Liberal opposition members walked out in October 1998.62 Despite these developments, in January 1999 the legislative committee tabled an initial report condemning the MAI; thereafter it continued to hold public meetings throughout the province.63 Though the committee lacked Liberal representation, and though the deadline for the MAI had passed, the NDP contended that the process was still necessary in case these issues arose during WTO negotiations scheduled for Seattle later that year.64 Ultimately, the committee ended without a consensus on the MAI; the process did, however, influence BC’s eventual decision to oppose investment provisions being considered for both the WTO and the FTAA. A final legislative issue to consider is the foreign relations of provincial legislatures. According to Louise Harel, Quebec has been the most active provincial government in establishing these linkages, in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. Specifically, Quebec has working relationships with the “Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophonie, [l’] Association Parlementaire du Commonwealth, [la] Confédération Parlementaire des Amériques, [le] Council of State Governments, [et le] National Conference of State Legislatures.” On a bilateral basis, Quebec has ties with “France (Assemblée Nationale et Sénat), la Bavière, le Parlement Centraméricain, la Communauté Française de Belgique, le Brésil, la Catalogne, la Californie, le Niger, l’Ontario, [et] la Région Wallonne.” In 1997 the province hosted the first Parliamentary Conference of the Americas, which subsequently became the Confédération
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Parlementaire des Amériques. Harel suggests that as a result of this experience, Quebec can serve as an example for other provinces considering an expanded presence in the international arena.65 Conclusion To understand the role of provincial bureaucracies in foreign trade policy, it is necessary to examine issues of capacity, influence, and cooperation. Provincial officials have considerable autonomy in this policy area; at the same time, they face budget and staffing challenges. Also, recent efforts to centralize policy within ministries of intergovernmental affairs and the ongoing development of line department capacity have generated tensions within some provinces. Regardless, subfederal bureaucratic coordination is effective, with Alberta, Quebec, and New Brunswick creating specific institutional mechanisms for this purpose. The strong influence of provincial bureaucrats, especially compared to their federal counterparts, is a result of the long tenures of these officials and the relationships they have developed with other provincial trade representatives. The expanding influence of legal experts, however, has added to provincial budget pressures and raised questions of accountability and transparency. It is clear that provincial legislatures play a less significant role in trade policy. Legislatures are sometimes asked to pass legislation related to international agreements, and to legitimize bureaucratic reorganizations and other institutional reforms, but generally their impact is limited. The only exception to this is arguably Quebec, which now has provisions for elected officials to review and debate all international agreements that have relevance to provincial jurisdiction.
6 Issues of Implementation, Negotiation, and Consultation
Besides institutional pressures, provinces must also balance sectoral factors when implementing and negotiating international trade commitments. Provincial business interests have influenced not only Canadian foreign trade policy but also the development of international norms and standards. Specific examples include the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA’s) service provisions, and recent agreements on wine and labelling. Note, however, that the impact of these actors varies among and often within specific sectors. Also, provincial industries are vulnerable to market forces and decisions by international dispute settlement panels. This is demonstrated by the emergence of “preventative” regulatory regimes related to NAFTA’s Chapter 11. As well, an examination of consultative linkages makes it clear that ties between provincial governments and the business community are informal and are limited to sectoral disputes or international negotiations. And within provinces, the development and maintenance of these links shifts from sector to sector and in some cases even within industries. Finally, there is evidence that dominant ideas related to the liberalization or protectionism of specific sectors influence government-industry relations in Canadian provinces. Furthermore, these attitudes are fragmenting and often contradictory, which contributes to an increasingly complex policy process that places restrictions on Canadian negotiators as they seek specific outcomes at the international level. Compliance and Implementation: Wine, Insurance, and Preventative Regulatory Regimes Before evaluating the provinces’ influence in specific sectors it is necessary to define implementation, negotiation, and consultation. For this discussion, “implementation” refers to putting into practice specific international trade obligations. Here, province-industry linkages are tied to Canada’s formal
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obligations outlined in NAFTA and the WTO, obligations that often require adjustments to domestic laws, policies, and regulations. “Negotiation” is a much broader and more inclusive term, one that touches on relationships among government officials as they represent Canada’s global, regional, or sector-specific interests. Finally, “consultation” refers to more general sectoral ties as provinces pursue formal and informal relationships with business and societal interests in order to gain information related to policy change. Clearly, these definitions are not mutually exclusive; there is some overlap. As noted in Chapter 3, alcohol was the first sector to highlight problems related to the provinces’ implementation of international trade agreements. Historically, Canadian provinces have maintained monopolies or near monopolies on the sale of alcoholic beverages, similar to restrictions in other sectors such as agriculture and government procurement. In an effort to raise revenues, provincial liquor control boards have carefully regulated the sale and importation of all alcohol – wine and beer in particular. Specifically, beer imports from other countries have been subject to high tariffs; similar restrictions were previously extended to domestic producers, requiring them to operate breweries in individual provinces. Several provincial governments have discriminated in favour of local wine makers by imposing extremely high prices on other Canadian products. Some liquor control boards have gone as far as to forbid the sale of wines made in other countries and provinces. According to Douglas Brown, the dispute between Canada and the EC centred on a 1979 Statement of Intent signed by Canadian provinces that explicitly limited the capacity of provincial liquour boards to regulate sales of alcohol. In the years following the agreement a number of European countries began to question the willingness of provincial governments to follow these guidelines. Specifically, Ontario’s marketing and distribution practices, and its policy of protecting local wineries through differential markups, were viewed as violations of the Statement of Intent. The matter was submitted to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute panel, which reported its findings in October 1987. The key here was GATT’s “federal state clause.” After hearing the case, the panel ruled in favour of the EC. Canada and Europe reached an agreement on 20 December 1988 that focused mainly on wine. Existing price differences for beer were frozen, and the principle of national treatment was extended to listing practices. Provincial beer distribution was not addressed.1 The EC/GATT dispute revealed significant differences among the provinces on the issue of alcohol. Grape growers and wineries in Ontario and BC defended provincial practices by citing European agricultural subsidies. Several other provinces, however, especially those with limited wine production and exports, wanted to settle the GATT challenge because it threatened to
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disrupt beer sales. In an effort to represent these conflicting interests, Ottawa invited the provinces to three separate EC negotiating sessions following the 1987 GATT ruling. Though the provinces did not attend as full participants, Brown believes that the final 1988 agreement “was made with the knowledge and tacit consent of the majority of the provinces, although Ontario apparently reserved its support until a final settlement was reached on wine adjustment measures in March 1989.”2 Following the 1988 agreement there were few official complaints from Europe related to wine and Canadian provinces. In the late 1990s, however, the EC called for a further review of provincial liquor distribution practices. In December 2000 it initiated a dialogue with Ottawa; several months later the federal government contacted the main wine-producing provinces – Ontario, Quebec, and BC – regarding participation in these discussions. As one official pointed out, “this was the first time in over a decade the provinces were directly involved in the EC wine dispute.”3 Federal officials attended these meetings, but only as observers. This model was based on earlier provincial involvement in 1990s discussions with the United States regarding market access. Those meetings, however, had been with American commercial groups rather than US government representatives.4 Another example of provincial engagement was Canada’s successful participation in the negotiation of the New World Wine Accord, signed by the United States, Australia, Chile, and New Zealand in December 2001.5 This pact was a mutual recognition agreement dealing with technical oenological (winemaking) practices that built on earlier multilateral discussions in the World Wine Trade Group, which was established in 1998. The mutual recognition agreement (MRA) was meant to allow greater access for wine exports with consistent production practices. In the past, production methods had been used to justify trade barriers in the defence of health and safety standards. The agreement also called for ongoing consultations and the creation of a sectoral dispute settlement mechanism (which would not supersede the WTO). The MRA demonstrated the federal government’s willingness to cooperate with the provinces in this sector. Over a three-year period, Ottawa circulated draft copies of the proposed agreement and made certain that any new international norms and standards would reflect provincial interests. Yet it is important to distinguish MRAs from more comprehensive trade agreements. As one bureaucrat noted, “MRAs are not nearly as contentious and the wine accord was a surprisingly easy deal to negotiate.”6 A subsequent wine-related development was the 2003 agreement between Canada and the EU regarding labelling and market access. Under this deal, to be phased in over ten years, Canadian producers were no longer allowed to label products using the terms sherry, champagne, port, or chianti, which the EU argued were exclusive geographic regions in Europe. Overall, this agreement had a negligible impact on Canadian provinces. Indeed, the
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Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA), which establishes standards in Ontario that are also voluntarily followed in BC, had already prohibited the use of these terms. The accord also allowed domestic wineries in BC and Ontario to exclusively sell Canadian wines in private retail outlets. Finally, label protection was extended to Canadian products such as ice wine and whisky. Once again, the 2003 agreement represents an example of provincial interests shaping foreign trade negotiations.7 Alcoholic beverages are not the only compliance issue affecting Canadian provinces. A somewhat unexpected outcome of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has been the emergence of “preventative” regulatory regimes. Under Chapter 11, private corporate interests are permitted to pursue claims against governments for lost investment opportunities. Though the number of Chapter 11 challenges has dropped significantly in recent years, Canada did lose earlier cases. For example, a loss to Ethyl Corporation resulted in a payment of $19 million to that US-based company. These cases have raised awareness at both levels of government regarding the relevance of Chapter 11 in various sectors. During the 2003 provincial election in New Brunswick, for example, the high cost of automobile insurance was a prominent campaign issue and there was pressure on all parties to endorse a “public” government insurance program similar to those in Manitoba and BC. The Conservative government of Bernard Lord seriously considered the idea but abandoned it because it might expose the province to a Chapter 11 suit.8 Automobile insurance was also an issue in Ontario, but again, the government decided not to pursue a public insurance program, in part because of Chapter 11. For similar reasons, Ontario also backed away from legislation calling for blank cigarette packaging.9 If a preventative regulatory regime has in fact emerged, it is another example of the intrusiveness of international trade commitments. Yet not all observers are convinced that Chapter 11 has had a significant impact. A senior federal official, for example, contends that Canada faces only a minimal long-term threat from Chapter 11. “I deal with these files every day,” he noted, “and the temperature has really gone down on this issue in both Ottawa and the provinces.” The number of Canadian cases has not increased significantly, and “both levels [of] government continue to pass legislation in potentially sensitive areas.” According to this representative, the best test case was the Kyoto Protocol. Given initial concerns, any Canadian “environmental legislation potentially limiting investment opportunities in Canada should have been targeted,” but this did not happen.10 Julie Soloway has also argued that Chapter 11 does not limit the government’s ability to regulate environmental issues.11 Negotiations: Provincial Interests and Market Pressures – Agriculture Provincial protectionism remains a reality in Canadian agriculture, especially in the dairy supply management system. Dairy production in Canada is de-
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termined by a combination of import tariffs, pricing programs, and production quotas. This system has benefited producers; even so, farmers must still pay provincial marketing boards a levy based on production levels. These fees are then used to maintain supply management systems and to lobby government. As Kathy Baylis and Hartley Furtan have pointed out, provincial legislation may require mandatory membership in marketing boards, but it is Ottawa that determines the actual quantity of national milk production. This has opened the door for tensions among provinces with different interests in relation to these quotas.12 A distinction must be made here between “fluid” milk, the quota for which is determined strictly on the basis of provincial population, and quotas for “industrial” milk, which are based on provincial production levels at the time of the 1973 Milk Supply Management Agreement. As things now stand, “industrial” quotas heavily favour Ontario and Quebec. In addition to production restrictions, pricing adjustments are made to ensure that fluid milk prices are higher than those for industrial milk, even though dairy prices for processing remain higher than international averages.13 In addition, the United States has challenged the Canadian Wheat Board as an unfair trading mechanism. The Wheat Board is a Crown corporation that sets prices for Western producers’ wheat exports; however, these prices are dependent on successfully acquiring foreign markets. Generally, this system provides price benefits for Canadian producers owing to Canada’s comparative advantage in this sector, which reinforces Canada’s argument that the Wheat Board is not a market-distorting mechanism. The Americans, however, point out that once costs are set and the Wheat Board purchases the grain, payments are guaranteed to Canadian farmers even if markets are not ultimately secured. Ted Cohn argues that these realities help explain the “consistent support [of the prairie provinces] for an effective agricultural trade regime” that includes the Canadian Wheat Board.14 Yet not all Canadian producers support the Wheat Board. In fact, many of them have argued that prices would rise for Canadian exports if wheat were sold directly to American consumers. Alberta is now strongly advocating market-based reforms. In support of its position, it released four separate reports on the Canadian Wheat Board in June 2006. Two of those studies recommended changing the board’s business model to make it better represent “goals of marketing choice.” The third report focused specifically on Australia and its single-desk marketing system. The final study discussed the elimination of federal supports and the future of the Wheat Board. According to Doug Horner, Alberta’s former Minister of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Development, the Canadian Wheat Board must be transformed owing to inevitable reductions in global agricultural trade barriers. As he noted at the time, Alberta has the capacity “to build ... [its] grain marketing system under ... [its] own terms.”15
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Though agriculture was a contentious issue during the NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, both agreements had only a modest impact on Canadian trade policy. According to Grace Skogstad, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture was notable for its lack of intrusiveness. The earlier quota system for dairy, poultry, and eggs was replaced with tariffs, but these were set at higher average rates than previous import quotas. In addition, Canada had already reduced domestic aggregate supports by the amounts stipulated in the agreement and was already reforming the grains sector in relation to income safety nets. As part of its deficit reduction strategy, Ottawa had also eliminated export grain subsidies in its 1995 federal budget, in this way exceeding the 36 percent target set by the WTO. Even in the sensitive supply-managed sectors, the Canadian government met and in some cases surpassed WTO targets. Finally, compared to Europe and the United States, Canada now had one of the lowest transfers as a percentage of total value of production, especially in terms of wheat.16 As Éric Montpetit has argued, agricultural protection remains but is not going to return to previous levels, despite pressure from lobby groups such as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Canada can simply not afford US and European levels of subsidization and is now focusing its international efforts on “price-depressing and trade-distorting agricultural aids.”17 Agriculture remains a key sector in the ongoing Doha Round of negotiations. Not surprisingly, there are regional differences within Canada between export-oriented sectors and import-sensitive sectors. According to Skogstad, organizations such as the Canadian Alliance of Agri-Food Exporters, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Manitoba’s Agricore are encouraging Ottawa to reduce tariffs and eliminate in-quota duties.18 The supply-managed sectors, by contrast, argue that past reforms have already gone well beyond those of other states and that attention should now focus on issues such as food safety. Skogstad notes here that American protectionist pressures related to sugar, peanuts, citrus, and cotton make it difficult to challenge Canadian supply management programs. The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement also has implications for agriculture. The final text of that agreement serves as another example of the provinces’ impact on the Uruguay Round talks. There was considerable American pressure to alter Article 2.2 of the SCM, which states that “the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.”19 During the negotiations, Washington made it clear that it wanted to remove or dilute this clause in order to end state subsidies, a practice that generates considerable competition among subfederal governments in the American market. Canada rejected this because it posed a threat to regional subsidy programs. As one official pointed out, “the US proposal would have made provincial programs countervailable
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and all provinces, not simply Ontario and Quebec, opposed it.” The other important factor, he suggested, was that “regional subsidies in the US are primarily state-driven programs, whereas in Canada the provinces rely almost exclusively on funding from the federal government.”20 Regional subsidy programs, however, were not the only SCM issue related to Canadian provinces. During the Uruguay Round some provinces lobbied for a stronger process for launching and investigating subsidy complaints, as outlined in Article 11 of the SCM. Alberta, for example, proposed a “net subsidy” approach wherein “countervailing duties could only be imposed on imported products to the extent that they received subsidies greater than the subsidies received by the industry that started the case.”21 This idea was ultimately dropped from the Uruguay Round’s agenda; even so, Alberta continues to support it. Another provincial concern during the Doha Round is potential changes to SCM Article 8.2, dealing with “green light” subsidies. This “traffic light” system, which was supported by provincial governments during the Uruguay Round, provides a means to identify various forms of subsidies.22 “Red light” subsidies include those for which government action is not allowed. “Green light” subsidies are the opposite. In the current negotiations, the Canadian provinces want to protect the regional development exemption outlined in Article 8.2(b). Finally, Article 1.1’s definition of “financial contributions” as subsidies is problematic, especially in relation to specific WTO panel decisions on softwood lumber, which have suggested that provincial programs could meet these criteria.23 Services Another specific interest for Canadian provinces is services. During the NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, several provinces did not have well-developed positions for this policy area. In fact, both levels of government were uncertain about the extent to which services would be included in any final agreement. Also, limited bureaucratic resources made it difficult for some provinces to develop negotiating positions, especially when other issues had higher economic priority. In other cases there was open disagreement among provincial governments. In terms of health and education services, some provinces supported the idea of further liberalization, due to a perceived comparative advantage, while others advocated greater protectionism. The movement of service-based professionals added another dynamic to these discussions. In terms of NAFTA, provincial interests were directly reflected in Annex I and Annex II of the agreement. Annex I excluded all provincial health measures in existence prior to 1 January 1994 as they related to national treatment, most-favoured-nation (MFN) status, and local presence requirements. As Mark Crawford has noted, this reservation seems to exclude most health services, given that basic provincial schemes have not been dramatically
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altered since 1994. The difficulty arises when provinces (such as Alberta) threaten to pursue a system that would provide greater access to privately funded services. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to strike down Quebec’s prohibition of private health insurance, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), has the potential to further legitimize the increased privatization of provincial health care programs. Based on the language of Annex I, this could open health services to the NAFTA dispute process.24 However, NAFTA’s Social Service Reservation, outlined in Annex II, could allow for ongoing protection of provincial practices. Specifically, Annex II excludes social services provided for public purposes. Canadian officials have argued that this provision includes “private delivery” of “publicly funded” services. Ultimately, it was BC that became the leading advocate for a clear definition of social services in NAFTA. As noted in Chapter 4, the BC government was critical of Ottawa’s approach to the Annex II negotiations. It argued for public education, public training, health, and child care to be specifically noted in the final agreement.25 BC also argued for changes to Article I.3 of the WTO’s GATS, which at the time excluded services provided by regional and local governments.26 As Crawford notes, BC was the only province to dispute what it believed was the narrow definition of the exemption. To bolster this argument, provincial officials pointed to successful challenges of Article 55 of the EC Treaty, which was designed to allow similar service exclusions in Europe. Other federal and provincial officials, however, believed that the existing language of Article I.3 could be “interpreted broadly” and argued that the recognition of the “right to regulate” and “due respect for national policy objectives” in the GATS preamble protected provincial interests.27 So in this particular case a province did not alter Canadian trade policy or international norms and standards. To date, no state has launched a WTO challenge applicable to this section of GATS. According to Anthony J. VanDuzer, however, Canada’s vulnerability is potentially exposed in Article I.3(c), which states that competition must be “economically rational as well as legally and practically possible.” In other words, a degree of consumer choice must be maintained consistent with previous GATT criteria related to trade in goods. At the same time, however, VanDuzer makes it clear that “the language of Article I.3(c) suggests that competition could have a ‘one-way’ meaning.” In this case, the criteria for evaluating the exclusion of a service under Article I.3(c) are based on whether a supplier is offering “services to all” and is not trying to “increase its revenues by attracting more consumers.” If so, these services “would be within the exclusion.” VanDuzer is relatively confident that under this interpretation Canada’s health and education services would remain protected; but he also points to the difficulty in predicting the outcomes of WTO dispute panels.28 In the decade following GATS, most provinces developed clearer priorities related to service-based industries. Provincial officials reviewed existing laws
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and regulations and are now aware that future GATS negotiations will have direct implications for areas of subfederal jurisdiction. In this regard, most provincial governments distinguish between “defensive” and “offensive” interests. Defensive interests require ongoing support for government regulatory capacity, especially in the areas of health and education. Offensive interests, by contrast, are services that might well benefit from a reduction of market barriers. An example is GATS Mode IV, which allows temporary access for professionals providing services in another country. Not surprisingly, most provinces have prioritized defensive interests. As already noted, however, divisions can develop even within “defensive” service sectors. A prime example is health and education, with some groups viewing GATS as a threat to Canada’s education system and others viewing it as an export opportunity.29 Several provinces have now developed specific GATS priorities. Ontario, for example, has initiated a comprehensive review of potential GATS liabilities. During this process a number of issues were highlighted. First, though the province is sensitive to defensive concerns related to education, there is support for greater liberalization of Mode IV provisions, especially in relation to professional services such as architecture, engineering, management, and accounting. Owing to issues of municipal jurisdiction, the province has also prioritized tour guide services as well as fishing, hunting, and other licence requirements. The distribution practices of provincial liquor boards remain a potential target, and general exceptions outlined in GATS may be less comprehensive than first believed. In addition, Ontario trade officials believe that GATS’ Article 1 provisions on “measures affecting trade in services” are unclear. Finally, there is evidence that provincial policy documents and public statements can now be used by the Appellate Body to clarify unclear practices under review.30 Ontario has also attempted to evaluate the exposure of services under NAFTA’s Chapter 11. In the area of private for-profit operations – for example, child care – the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) raised concerns during provincial labour negotiations that government funding could be targeted under Chapter 11. Though it was the Ministry of Children and Youth Services that was bargaining with the union, Ontario’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was eventually asked to evaluate a CUPE legal opinion on the issue. In drafting the rationale for the government’s position, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) consulted with Ottawa and other provinces; in the end, it was satisfied that its funding mechanisms, barring any unlikely government expropriation initiatives, were consistent with both NAFTA and GATS. According to one provincial official, “child care was not part of some conscious strategy but it seemed to indirectly reinforce provincial autonomy.” It also reflected “the uncertainties associated with provincial service based interests.”31
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The complexities of achieving provincial consensus on services are also evident in the positions of New Brunswick and Alberta. In its recently published international strategy, Prospering in a Global Community, New Brunswick specifies education and health as important export opportunities.32 Service exports related to knowledge and technology-based industries are also highlighted. Alberta, for its part, has identified the need to improve Mode IV access for engineers, who are still required to obtain certification in individual US states. Environmental service providers in Alberta have also been pushing for Mode IV improvements provided that access is not based solely on qualifications.33 Regardless, it is clear that Canada’s position on services is motivated by a multitude of often conflicting regional pressures. The result has been various degrees of influence on Canada’s foreign trade policy. Note well that success or failure in establishing norms and standards is tied to many pressures and that this further diminishes the impact of provincial interests at the international level. For example, the WTO Negotiating Group on the Movement of Natural Persons has successfully negotiated twenty schedules. Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki suggest that these commitments, which include Mode IV temporary access provisions, “[do] not go significantly beyond the status quo.”34 Often these negotiations are driven by the concerns of developing states (such as India), which are reluctant to dramatically open their service sectors. Having said that, Hoekman and Kostecki add that temporary access for service providers has the potential for incremental liberalization.35 This is not to suggest that the movement of persons is not a priority for Canada and the provinces. Rather, it indicates that several areas of these agreements do not reflect significant Canadian influence. Financial Services and Government Procurement In evaluating the provinces’ impact on NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, it is helpful to briefly examine provincial exclusions related to financial services and government procurement. NAFTA includes various provisions allowing provinces to maintain existing measures: Annex I (Reservations for Existing Measures and Liberalization Commitments); Annex V (Quantitative Restrictions – Chapter 12); and Annex VII (Reservations, Specific Commitments, and Other Items – Chapter 14). Generally, provincial service providers enjoy considerable autonomy when establishing financial institutions and new financial services, when building data processing capabilities, and when appointing senior managers and boards of directors. The financial services sector also allows for “prudential exceptions” – a term ambiguous enough to exempt a significant amount of activity in this sector.36 Negotiations for financial services during the Uruguay Round were contentious and threatened to delay the agreement. In the end it was agreed
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that discussions related to financial services (as well as basic telecommunications and maritime transport) would continue after the WTO was created. Negotiations for financial services were not concluded until December 1997. The end result comprised fifty-six schedules involving seventy member-states, which were annexed to GATS. The final financial services agreement was similar in many ways to related NAFTA provisions. Most important, it contained a “so-called ‘prudential carve-out’ for domestic regulation on financial services,” which provided considerable flexibility for signatories, just as in NAFTA.37 Once again, however, Canadian interests did not play a significant role in this part of the agreement. Instead, the final legal text reflected the interests of developing countries, which feared the impact of liberalization on the regulation and management of domestic financial services. In this sense, the provinces benefited from a form of “autonomy by proxy,” which allowed provincial bureaucrats to devote their limited time and resources to other issues. In both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, the provinces were also able to protect specific interests related to government procurement. The CanadaUS Free Trade Agreement (FTA) had restricted itself to federal procurement. NAFTA extended this to include the procurement of goods, services, and construction services. Canada, however, succeeded in exempting research and development, health and social services, utilities, communications, education and training, and financial services. Activities related to the delegation of government services to private corporations were also excluded from NAFTA.38 Participation in the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) was limited mainly to developed countries. Unlike other signatories, however, Canada did not grant foreign parties equal status with domestic suppliers when it came to bids for government procurement contracts. Also, Ottawa was able to exempt provincial, municipal, and regional governments from the GPA. Thus, Canada is not able to bid on government contracts in the jurisdictions of other signatories. Canadian provinces, however, can gain access to procurement contracts in US states.39 Consultation: Provincial Sectoral Linkages The provinces’ consultative exercises with sectoral interests take no standard form. At the federal level, two different sets of consultative linkages were established for the FTA negotiations: the International Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) and the fifteen Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade (SAGITs). There are no equivalent mechanisms at the provincial level. Where contacts exist, they often shift from sector to sector and within industries. Several branches of provincial bureaucracies tend to be involved, including trade policy offices and line departments. As a result of all this, consultative ties are difficult to evaluate in terms of domestic and international outcomes. Moreover, it is not always clear whether provincial decisions are a direct result
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of ties with business. The following section argues that consultative efforts have only a limited impact outside a small number of key sectors and that most such consultations are tied to specific international negotiations or disputes. Central Canada As noted in Chapter 4, Ontario did establish consultative mechanisms with business and non-governmental interests during the NAFTA negotiations. More recently, Ontario’s MEDT has engaged business interests in a wide range of sectors. During the softwood lumber dispute, for example, there was initial contact between MEDT and producers and remanufacturers. Sectoral interests also met with officials from the Ministry of Natural Resources, the provincial department responsible for forestry. Regarding MEDT, contact was limited to a small committee of five or so officials and industry lawyers. Membership on the committee was decided within the sector, but for the most part it was the larger companies that were represented. The problem Ontario faced was that producers and remanufacturers had divergent interests. Also, tension between MEDT and Natural Resources prevented the development of a unified provincial position on the dispute. Ultimately, as one bureaucrat noted, the province decided to side more with the manufacturing interests, “as it was more consistent with Ontario policy.”40 In other sectors, MEDT takes an active but informal approach in its attempts to engage industry, especially in terms of ongoing WTO negotiations. In relation to services the department has developed a contact list of relevant firms, though it is often difficult to generate interest from sectoral groups. On issues related to investment protection, MEDT has enjoyed more success, though in this sector contact has been limited to corporate lawyers (as opposed to industry representatives). In matters related to automobiles, MEDT is not involved. This sector – by far Ontario’s largest source of both exports and imports – is handled directly by the Premier’s Office, which attempts to strike a balance between North American producers (GM, Ford, Chrysler) and Japanese ones. The result, says one official, is “extremely ‘neutral’ policy statements” in this sector.41 At the same time, there is a consensus in some Ontario government departments that commercial interests have minimal impact on trade policy. A senior bureaucrat suggested that with the exception of specific disputes, such as softwood lumber, the “business lobby in Ontario is not very effective.” The Ontario Chamber of Commerce, for example, does not have the capacity to engage government on trade policy; other potential players, such as the Ontario Board of Trade, do have that capacity but “choose not to bother.” In addition, other sectoral groups fail to contact the provincial government “because they think we don’t matter.” In these situations, “industry attention is instead focused on Ottawa.”42 Another trade representative
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noted that sectoral interests “like to complain, but they rarely have any tangible alternative policy options to offer.”43 Having said that, the previous official did suggest that an absence of linkages is not necessarily a negative thing, especially given the government’s limited resources. Staffing is an issue, and furthermore, “there are no political reasons to pursue this. We simply don’t need the legitimacy.”44 Similar patterns of industry engagement are present in Quebec. There, as in Ontario, sectoral consultations are dispersed, but most contact is with line departments. This is especially the case with agriculture and forestry, where consultation with sectoral interests has played an important role in the development of Quebec’s international policy.45 Indeed, during international disputes Ottawa has relied on these linkages for information and expertise. Recent examples include Europe’s challenge of the Canadian asbestos industry and Brazil’s complaints about unfair subsidies to the aeronautics sector (most notably Bombardier). Quebec differs significantly from other provinces, however, in its corporatist tradition. Stephen Brooks and Andrew Stritch have defined that tradition as “a tripartite political structure in which the business elite and the tradeunion elite have jointly incorporated with the state elite into a centralized system of authority dominating the policy making process in capitalist societies.”46 Various models of corporatism emphasize different roles for the state. In “state” corporatism, government exercises significant control over business and labour. In “liberal” or “societal” corporatism, a more equal relationship exists in which labour and business have the capacity to influence the government’s agenda. Marxists, such as Leo Panitch, argue that corporatism is a means to co-opt labour into an alliance with state and business in order to maintain a stable economy, thereby limiting the possibility of organized opposition to capitalism.47 Several observers doubt whether corporatism is relevant to Canadian politics, owing to the fragmentation of industry, labour, and government. William Coleman, for example, has concluded – reluctantly – that these divergent interests have prevented coordinated industrial policy in Canada.48 Even Panitch acknowledges the absence of a corporatist “structure” in Canada, though he does concede that corporatist “ideas” have had occasional relevance.49 Wallace Clement, on the other hand, stresses “kinship ties” between economic and state elites, which have contributed to government restrictions on foreign ownership in the banking, insurance, utility, and transportation sectors.50 Despite these challenges, there is evidence of a corporatist tradition in Quebec dating back to the 1960s. After the Quiet Revolution the province hired significant numbers of personnel from Quebec’s business and nongovernmental communities in order to fill its expanding bureaucracy.51 According to Montpetit, this “certainly prompted the emergence of state-directed
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or state corporatist networks,” though these differed from sector to sector.52 Over the following decade the labour movement challenged government policies, which contributed to the election of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1976. The PQ promised to institutionalize a neocorporatist relationship involving the state, trade unions, and business. One specific example was the PQ’s creation of the Conseil du Patronat du Québec (the Council of Employers) as a consultative mechanism. In this forum members of the executive and the bureaucracy met with specific sectoral interests on an informal basis, usually two or three times a year. Membership on the council (which still exists) included the provincial Chamber of Commerce, major industry and labour leaders, and representatives from most industry associations in Quebec.53 Though some observers, such as Brian Tanguay, question the success of the PQ in this process, it is generally accepted that even with the return of Robert Bourassa and the Liberals in the 1980s, Quebec maintained elements of corporatist politics.54 In the 1990s, corporatist networks continued to expand to include a wide range of groups with differing levels of influence. The 1982 Conférence au Sommet de Québec, a facet of the corporatist process, included traditional participants such as trade unions, the Council of Employers, and consumer associations. By 1996 these meetings were also being attended by community groups, individual entrepreneurs, and “para-public” sector organizations such as the Centres Locaux de Services Sociaux et Communautaires (CLSCs). Montpetit suggests that the proliferation of participants was the result of an increasingly post-materialist agenda in which new issues, such as the environment, became focal points of government activity. Another contributing factor was budget cuts in the 1980s, which led to the emergence of community groups seeking access to the policy process. Montpetit notes that challenges to Quebec’s corporatist tradition have been developing over the past two decades. There is increasing distrust of that tradition among groups not included in the decision-making hierarchy. A more significant development is that pressures are building related to international market forces and the threat of an increasingly intrusive and expansionist federal government. For Montpetit, these developments have the potential to weaken corporatist ties in the province.55 The FTA exposed early divisions in Quebec’s corporatist framework. There was significant support for the FTA within the business community; however, opposition to it emerged among the larger provincial unions. Complaints from labour are not unique in Quebec; in this case, they focused on potential threats to employment. Groups opposed to the FTA also pointed to its impact on government subsidies, social programs, and cultural issues. These disagreements were highly visible during the 1988 federal election, during which business interests organized the Regroupement pour le Libre-Éxchange (Free Trade Support Network), which financed an extensive media campaign
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to challenge labour’s opposition.56 In the aftermath of the FTA and NAFTA, however, corporatist ties were restored. During public consultations by the Quebec National Assembly in September and October 2000, two major labour groups, the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) and the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), supported the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), albeit with calls for social issues to be a priority in any negotiations.57 Skogstad has examined corporatist relations in Quebec’s agricultural sector. Specifically, she has observed traditional province-based corporatist networks as well as interests seeking “national corporatist decision-making” structures. The “first face” of Quebec agriculture supports the “disengagement” of Quebec from the federal agricultural system. Ongoing support for this position is a result of the province’s expansionist agricultural policy, Ottawa’s decreased spending, and a decline in the number of farmers benefiting from federal supply management programs. For those advocating this position, the increasing intrusiveness of international market pressures is secondary to “provincial state-building and federal fiscal constraints.”58 The Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA) serves as Quebec’s corporatist farm union. Indeed, Bourassa recognized the UPA as a monopoly union in 1972, granting it the right to collect membership fees from all provincial farmers. The UPA also has a close working relationship with the province’s agricultural bureaucracy, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAPAQ). This has translated into significant policy influence at the provincial level.59 The “second face” of Quebec agriculture supports pan-Canadian corporatist networks. These interests are mainly in the dairy and poultry sectors and view international developments – especially in terms of Canada-US relations – as economic incentives to support Canadian federalism. This attitude is understandable, given Ottawa’s proven ability to protect Canada’s supply management systems under both NAFTA and the FTA and to resist strong pressure to dismantle these programs. The same pan-Canadian network, however, later promoted GATT-induced liberalization and fostered a 1995 agreement among six provinces, including Quebec, to harmonize dairy policy. The broiler industry in Quebec has accepted the possibility of provincial self-sufficiency; the province’s dairy and poultry producers have benefited from “political cooperation and concessions across provinces.” It is these “trust ties” that foster national corporatist networks focusing on supply management. Western Canada In Manitoba, sectoral consultation is the responsibility mainly of line departments; also involved, though, is the Director of Policy, Planning, and Coordination in the Administration and Finance Division of the Department of Industry, Economic Development, and Mines. For the most part, linkages
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are ad hoc and are driven by disputes or problems within sectors, though on broader negotiations the province has actively sought the views of specific industry associations. A senior official pointed out that one of the difficulties in Manitoba is the diversified nature of the provincial economy. “There is a well-established Chamber of Commerce in Manitoba, but each sector is represented with varying capacities. In the apparel sector there are numerous companies and agriculture is not solely farming, but also includes food and beverage processing. Steel, on the other hand, is one main producer.” Not surprisingly, he suggested that “it is difficult to maintain close contact with all of these varying interests on a regular basis.”60 Sectoral consultation in Saskatchewan is often limited to line departments, though there are some attempts to coordinate activities within the province’s Trade Policy Branch. Most such ties are related to agriculture as well as transportation and environmental services. Generally, linkages within government are collegial. “Agriculture is a good example of this,” suggested one bureaucrat. “Saskatchewan is able to avoid problems faced by other provinces due to the unified voice that exists in this sector.” The province’s small population and dependence on trade promotes cooperation between business and government. “For us the issue is simple,” said the same official. “We are now the second most trade-oriented province in Canada.” Put simply, “trade is our lifeblood here.”61 Alberta maintains consultative linkages with many sectoral interests. The province long made a point of maintaining a list of provincial participants on federal SAGITs in order to share information and consult with these groups. According to Alberta officials, however, this became more difficult owing to a lack of updated lists of provincial SAGIT members. Regardless, the province’s commitment to consultation is evident in several sectors. In terms of energy, the main industry association is the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). CAPP has an office in Calgary, and according to one senior representative it has “expertise related to a number of crossborder energy issues.” The difficulty is that CAPP is “a national organization [with] a wide mandate.”62 Contact with energy interests, however, sometimes does not take place in specific associations. In 2004, for example, the Alberta government sent a delegation to the Global Petroleum Conference in Calgary. At this forum the province focused mainly on oil-and-gas field equipment as well as environmental services (such as waste disposal). Alberta has also developed industry linkages with the forestry sector, largely in response to the softwood lumber dispute. Here the Alberta Forest Products Association (AFPA) represents a full range of sectoral interests, including pulp and paper, remanufacturing, and primary harvesters. A subgroup within the AFPA is the Softwood Lumber Trade Council, which comprises approximately fifteen corporate representatives. Though there are obvious divisions within the AFPA, the association operates on the understanding that individual
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companies can pose questions and concerns directly to government. A provincial bureaucrat considered this important, given the varying size and interests of AFPA members. “If government is going to articulate these positions,” he suggested, “we need a forum where we can get this information.” Unlike other provinces, “many of these firms can’t afford legal counsel and lobbyists in Washington.” For the most part, however, this contact is with the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Development, though Trade Policy is also involved on a selective basis.63 In the services sector, Alberta has launched consultation efforts, economic studies, roundtables, and surveys in order to evaluate specific priorities. The province prides itself on having one of the most developed negotiating positions on services in Canada. It has also worked collegially with other officials at both levels of government to develop negotiation strategies, especially in relation to GATS.64 At the same time, however, Alberta has encountered problems when it comes to facilitating dialogue with the wide range of actors with potential interests related to services. Under economic pressure, industry associations and corporations have reduced staff and capacity, including trade specialists. As a result, the expertise to deal with complicated service issues no longer exists, and this has created a need for independent consultants – something that many firms and industry associations cannot afford. The technical nature of this sector has also created an additional barrier to direct participation.65 BC’s Trade and Competitiveness Branch (TCB) has selected contact with sectoral interests. During the 1990s there was a shift in the way the New Democratic Party (NDP) government’s bureaucracy dealt with industry. Specifically, meetings with corporate interests became less frequent. As one provincial bureaucrat noted, the new government saw its support coming from labour and environmentalists and made it a priority to engage such groups.66 By 1999, however, the NDP had decided to expand dialogue, and the Ministry of Employment and Investment established an open-access Web-based initiative focusing on the ongoing WTO and FTAA negotiations. In particular, the ministry made available background papers covering a range of topics, including competition policy, technical barriers to trade, investment, services, the environment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, dispute settlement, e-commerce, and labour and human rights.67 In almost every case, BC’s position on these issues was not presented, except for some commentary on investment, services, and government procurement.68 A separate survey for small and medium-sized businesses was also included in this program. Sectoral linkages also existed during the NDP era with line departments outside Trade Policy. In March 1999, for example, the BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food launched its own consultative linkages in an attempt to establish a province-wide position on agriculture for the WTO and FTAA.
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The ministry created the BC Agri-Food Council on Trade and Subsidies (BC-ACTS) for this purpose. The panel comprised twenty-five members representing the interests of major commodity producers, processors, retailers, provincial marketing boards, consumers, and labour. Unlike Trade Policy’s initiative, BC-ACTS was not Web-based. Instead, it invited interested parties to mail, phone, or fax in comments and suggestions. Following the defeat of the NDP, the new Liberal Minister of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries, John van Dongen, established the BC Agri-Food Trade Council, which is similar to BC-ACTS. This forum meets three times a year; attendees include the heads of industry associations and the presidents/CEOs of agri-food businesses.69 Labour leaders are noticeably absent. Following the return to power of the Liberals, Trade Policy was encouraged to expand its consultative efforts. For the most part, however, it has not done so; instead it has focused on negotiation and implementation.70 One example is the ongoing dispute between Canada and Europe regarding the pine nematode. Though this is a forestry issue, one official in TCB handles the file. There is no direct contact with individual business interests; however, close ties are maintained with one of the key lumber industry associations in the province, the Council of Forest Industries.71 The Ministry of Forests is responsible for all other consultations with the forestry sector. This is a wellestablished relationship that at times has become almost “symbiotic.”72 Atlantic Canada There are varying levels of contact between government and industry in Atlantic Canada. In Nova Scotia, the Committee of Manufacturers and Exporters (CME) represents a wide range of international and domestic trade sectors. It meets once a month, with government officials usually in attendance. Similar ties exist, on a less regular basis, with the Atlantic Chamber of Commerce and the Maritime Lumber Bureau (MLB). There are also ad hoc consultations among industry, line departments, and Nova Scotia’s Trade Policy Branch.73 In New Brunswick, most industry contact is also with line departments, especially in terms of agriculture and fisheries. Trade Policy becomes involved when specific issues are related to disputes or to the negotiation and implementation of international agreements. According to a recently retired New Brunswick bureaucrat, the province often used information from sectoral interests to pressure Ottawa on trade issues. When US companies were dumping candy into the Canadian market, for example, New Brunswick adopted the advice of Ganong Candy, a local confectionary company established in 1873, and “pushed the federal government to ensure labelling was bilingual.” He also noted that during the FTA negotiations, it was New Brunswick that warned Simon Reisman, Canada’s chief negotiator, to “back off on agriculture because provincial farmers would never accept an agreement.”74
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Though Prince Edward Island only recently appointed an official to monitor foreign trade, the government has made some attempt to develop stronger ties with industry. Historically, PEI had no sectoral diversity, and its agricultural exports usually were not processed. The closing of the Canadian Forces Base (CFB) at Summerside, however, forced the province to develop new export sectors. Shipbuilding, for example, developed a market in Central America after subsidies were provided to one shipyard specializing in tugboats. Also, the former CFB became a manufacturing centre for large aircraft engines and interiors for Bombardier. Overall, however, the province continues to be dominated by agriculture; thus consultative linkages are most developed with the sector’s main industry associations – the PEI Potato Board and PEI Dairy Producers. Lobbying efforts by these groups are usually directed at the minister and deputy minister, given the grassroots nature of PEI politics. This was most evident during a recent dispute between Maine blueberry producers and PEI. The provincial minister was contacted quickly; PEI’s part-time consultant on foreign trade wrote a letter on the issue, which was then sent to the federal minister of agriculture.75 Sectoral consultations in Newfoundland and Labrador are similar to those in other Atlantic Canadian provinces. Stakeholder consultations are on an as-needed basis, and when they are held it is often in conjunction with federal initiatives. Typically, this contact is strongly issue-driven. In some cases divisions within specific industries can create challenges for the province. Recently, for example, the provincial government attempted to impose a processing system on the crab fishery that challenged traditional methods of distribution. Historically, large processors would offer incentives to bigboat fishers to gain access to their holdings of crab. Provincial legislation ended this practice, and new provisions allocating specific levels of crab to individual processors were welcomed by smaller owners and fish co-ops. Companies that benefited from the previous system organized a protest that closed the Confederation Building in 2005. The legislation is now under review, and “although there was no consultation prior to the original decision, there is now considerable input from industry.”76 Sectoral Protectionism, Liberalization, and Consultation: The Role of Dominant Ideas Based on the above discussion, it is clear that dominant ideas related to sectoral liberalization and protectionism exist in Canadian provinces. To influence outcomes, subfederal ideas must be sponsored by institutional elites. An example is alcohol, where there are long-standing protectionist policies related to provincial liquor boards. Government support for protectionism in this sector shifted somewhat after the 1987 GATT dispute panel; but dominant protectionist ideas have remained, as has official backing for
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these concerns. Though the subsequent New World Wine Accord was driven by the pursuit of expanded export markets, dominant protectionist ideas have ensured that the agreement has had only a negligible impact on Canadian provinces. Agriculture is another sector with embedded ideas related to liberalization and protectionism. Indeed, Canada has a long record of support for supply management and other methods of agricultural assistance. Historically, these policies have been tied to dominant protectionist ideas in Canadian provinces. In Quebec, for example, officials in provincial institutions sponsored protectionism, which contributed to government programs and regulatory frameworks designed to assist the province’s dairy and poultry industries. Protectionism in this sector has, however, diminished in recent years. As noted earlier, in the 1990s the federal government reduced protectionism as part of its deficit reduction project. Also, some provinces are much more protectionist than others in this sector. Some provincial officials, for example, have embraced principles of liberalization. Not surprisingly, conflicting subfederal ideas make it difficult for the federal government to develop a consistent international position on agriculture. Provincial ideas regarding services are relatively new and further highlight inconsistencies related to liberalization and protectionism. BC, for example, succeeded in obtaining federal and provincial sponsorship for specific exclusions in NAFTA’s Annex II. Conversely, Ottawa’s failure to endorse similar language in the WTO’s GATS provisions reflected an absence of elite support. Provincial ideas in this sector have been developed as well during the current Doha Round of negotiations. For example, Ontario supports the liberalization of professional services but also seeks the protection of education, licensing, distribution practices, and other selected social programs. New Brunswick has expressed a desire to pursue global markets for health and education services but not at the expense of compromising provincial practices. Alberta, on the other hand, is promoting the liberalization of environmental and engineering services, as well as Mode IV access issues. Once again, these conflicting dominant ideas contribute to an increasingly complex policy process in Canada. Given the relatively recent attention devoted to negotiations on services, it is difficult to evaluate these ideas in relation to long-term international outcomes. Dominant ideas of liberalization and protectionism, then, are sector and often province specific. Furthermore, those ideas are not monolithic, which means that differing opinions exist within industry and government. Whatever those inconsistencies, there is evidence that Canada has been able to protect specific sectoral concerns and, in the process, has succeeded in influencing international outcomes. It is important, though, not to overstate the impact of provincial dominant ideas beyond domestic process issues.
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No doubt, those ideas are taken seriously, but not all are endorsed by federal and provincial officials whose hard task it is to achieve consensus and broker compromises among growing numbers of participants. Even when institutional support exists, subfederal objectives can be consistent with the positions of other states, and this raises questions regarding what actually drives international outcomes. Finally, there is the reality that dominant sectoral ideas are often better reflected in bilateral and trilateral agreements (as opposed to multilateral ones). Canadian provinces do not have embedded ideas regarding sectoral consultation. Most consultative linkages between government and industry at the provincial level are informal and sector specific. Not surprisingly, corporate interests whose dominant ideas are related to liberalization or protectionism tend to have the most contact with government. Those sectoral interests often seek government support, which, however, does not guarantee success in terms of international outcomes. The exception to this is Quebec’s corporatist tradition. Quebec has long avoided the fragmentation of ideas that exists in other provinces regarding consultation. Challenges to corporatist ties emerged during the FTA negotiations, but these pressures have weakened over the past decade in relation to the now stagnant FTAA negotiations. Yet as Skogstad points out, agriculture is one sector that transcends the traditional corporatist argument in Quebec. Internal provincial linkages exist, but in her view the success of dairy and poultry interests with regard to supply management is tied more directly to a pan-Canadian corporatist network. Conclusion Provincial sectoral interests have influenced both Canadian foreign trade policy and the development of international norms and standards. In the case of agriculture and the WTO, Canada’s decision to reject US proposals related to Article 2.2 of the SCM was directly linked to subfederal subsidy programs. Canadian provinces also influenced Canada’s negotiating position on Article 8.2 (exemptions for regional development programs). In terms of NAFTA, specific provinces ensured that health care measures in existence prior to 1994 were excluded from Annex I of the agreement. Also, BC was instrumental in protecting NAFTA’s Social Service Reservation, though similar efforts for WTO exemptions did not succeed. Finally, subfederal interests were well represented in the New World Wine Accord and in agreements between Canada and the EU on labelling and marketing. Yet it is important to note that the positions of subfederal governments are not driven solely by industry. Obviously, Canadian provinces protect sectors that are vital to economic growth and stability, yet there are surprisingly few ties between business and government at the provincial level. Few provinces have formalized their linkages with industry groups; instead, such contacts are tied to specific international negotiations and trade disputes.
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Also, there are no regular consultation forums comparable to the federal ITAC and SAGIT systems. Government-industry consultations that do exist are held across a wide range of bureaucratic actors, including trade policy branches and line departments. Finally, there is evidence of provincial vulnerability in terms of NAFTA Chapter 11’s evolving role as a preventative regulatory regime. New Brunswick’s rejection of public auto insurance owing to potential Chapter 11 exposure demonstrates the often limited capacity of provinces and subfederal business interests to withstand international pressure or to shape outcomes in the global political economy. So, while the significance of business in the formulation of provincial trade policy is hard to deny, process factors vary among industries and often within specific sectors.
7 Is Anybody Listening? Evaluating Societal Considerations
Ottawa has attempted to engage societal actors in matters of foreign trade policy. The provinces, much less so. In Ontario, environmental issues related to agriculture are driven by industry; in the forestry sector, Aboriginal groups have had some impact. In Quebec, institutionalized consultative mechanisms were established under the Parti Québécois, and the province has a long corporatist tradition; however, the current Liberal government relies on other, arguably less inclusive forums. Alberta has a limited history of non-governmental activism with existing linkages dominated by business. In BC, interaction with societal interests increased during the New Democratic Party (NDP) governments of the 1990s; however, the influence of labour and environmentalists (though not of First Nations) has diminished over the past decade. Despite all the differences, it is possible to identify a number of commonalities in the provinces’ government-societal relations. First, contact, when it happens, typically involves specific ministries rather than trade policy departments. Also, some provinces with limited bureaucratic resources tend to engage societal interests mainly during federal consultations. Governmentsocietal relations are further marginalized owing to the generally held view within governments that societal groups are uninformed on trade issues. Moreover, many societal interests in this policy area suffer from similar limitations of funding and resources. Finally, besides normative concerns related to transparency and access, there is the difficulty of evaluating societal “influence,” especially when non-governmental goals are consistent with existing provincial policy preferences. Regardless, at this time it does not appear that domestic societal pressures contribute in any strong way to provincial foreign trade policy or to the evolution of international norms and standards. Attitudes regarding the legitimacy of non-governmental actors, however, do influence dominant ideas related to participatory democracy – ideas that contribute to provincial political cultures.
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The Role of Societal Factors In studies examining the political economy of international trade there are conflicting views on the relevance of societal considerations. Some observers are critical of transnational market forces and endorse the principle of cosmopolitan democracy, which calls for the democratization of international institutions and the development of a form of citizenship that extends beyond the nation-state.1 Traditional Marxist and dependency interpretations emphasize the exploitive nature of the global economy and look to class-based forces as a means of change.2 More recent “social movement” approaches focus on identity and culture as mobilizing influences, especially in terms of Latin America and Mexico.3 In contrast, communitarian or state-centred perspectives treat societal forces as secondary variables.4 The role of societal interests is also addressed in the Canadian literature, especially in terms of interest groups and social movements. Interest groups, for example, vary in organization and focus but are generally viewed as having formal structures and the capacity to articulate positions with the goal of altering policy preferences, albeit without assuming elected office.5 As an extension, studies examining “policy communities” and “networks” focus on formal and informal interactions between interest groups and the state.6 Social movements, for their part, tend to lack formal organization; with membership including a broad range of societal actors.7 Recent contributions have also argued that neoliberalism has altered the nature of political institutions and democracy in Canada.8 The role of societal considerations has also been evaluated in studies examining the democratization of Canadian foreign policy. Institutional perspectives have called for a wide range of reforms, including a greater role for the House of Commons, improved access to parliamentary committees, and stronger efforts to educate citizens at the constituency level.9 Other observers have argued for a greater role for non-governmental actors, including “ordinary Canadians,” in the policy process.10 Studies examining international trade, on the other hand, point to the impact of the MAI and the Seattle meetings of the WTO – both of which failed – on Ottawa’s decision to increase linkages with civil society.11 Another empirical analysis of public attitudes toward international trade has identified a “permissive consensus” in Canada based on the perception that foreign trade agreements increase prosperity without undermining the welfare state.12 Those opposing this view critique the apparent exclusion of non-corporate interests and suggest that the co-optation of these actors creates “long-term implications for social cohesion and democracy.”13 Specific attention to these conclusions is most apparent in studies examining Canada’s antiglobalization movement.14 Recent attention, therefore, has been directed toward the relevance of societal factors for international relations, for Canadian politics, and for
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Canadian foreign policy, but few studies have considered similar questions at the provincial level. For the most part, the role of societal actors in Canadian provinces is not significant, with some sector-specific exceptions such as agriculture, services, forestry, and the environment. Quebec’s corporatist tradition challenges this assumption, though the impact of that province’s societal groups on specific matters of