The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700

THE RESILIENCE OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY 1665–1700

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700 CHRISTOPHER STORRS

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3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Christopher Storrs 2006 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 0–19–924637–8

978–0–19–924637–3

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

For those who have taught me, and for my students, past and present

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Acknowledgements One of the pleasantest things about completing a book is the opportunity to thank friends, mentors and others who have each in their way helped to bring it about. Some of these obligations date from way back. I should like to begin by thanking all those teachers who stimulated, encouraged and helped develop my understanding and love of history, and ability to ‘do it’, from Miss Tetley at The Elms and Mr. Hallett (‘Batman’) at Forest Fields Grammar School, both in Nottingham, to Dr. (now Professor) Peter Dickson and Dr. (now Professor) George Holmes, both of St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, and finally—once again—to Dr. Derek McKay, formerly of the London School of Economics. Derek deserves a medal for continuing to write references (often at short notice) in support of funding applications, without which much of the research abroad which has been so crucial to this book would have been impossible. Others who merit thanks for backing applications of one sort or another are Professor Jeremy Black, Professor Tony Thompson and Dr. Alistair Malcolm. On funding, I must thank the Arts and Humanities Research Board (or AHRB), now the Arts and Humanities Research Council (or AHRC) for funding research leave without which there is a very strong possibility that this book might not have been completed at all. I am also grateful to the Department of History of the University of Dundee, and to the University, for allowing me research leave and for purchasing microfilm of relevant material from the Archivo de Indias in Seville. Other bodies which funded research whose results are incorporated in this book include the Wellcome Trust and—above all—the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, whose remarkable generosity to Scottish academics deserves greater recognition. This book would not have been completed either without the assistance of the staff at various archives and libraries. I should particularly like to thank Isabel Aguirre and the staff of the unique Archivo General de Simancas, Julia Montalvillo García, at the Archivo Municipal of Cuéllar (which also houses the archive of the Dukes of Alburquerque) and Milagros Moratinos Palomero and her colleagues at the Archivo Municipal de Burgos. Research at Simancas, and the early morning bus from Valladolid—now, alas, no more—to that splendid castle—archive was made more enjoyable—and this work improved, I think—by the companionship, and interest in my work, of a number of other historians of early modern Spain, many of whom were also residents at the postgraduate residence, The Reyes Catolicos, in Valladolid. It would be impossible to mention all of these friends from Simancas and/or the Reyes, but I would like to acknowledge the enthusiastic interest in my work—and generous gifts of offprints and even books—from Luis Ribot García (formerly of the University of Valladolid, now of the UNED), Davide Maffi (University of Pavia),

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Acknowledgements

Julio Muñoz Rodríguez (University of Murcia), Antonio José Rodríguez Hernández (University of Valladolid) and Antonio Espino López (Universidad Autónoma, Barcelona) and, once again, Tony Thompson. Others who have supplied invaluable copies or offprints include Tomasso Astarita and Rafaella Pilo; I apologise if I have not made better use of what they supplied. Apologies, to any others who have provided me with xeroxes, offprints and more but who are not acknowledged here. Researching abroad—and even in London—is not always easy for an academic in provincial Scotland. Besides the grants referred to above, the existence of an ERASMUS partnership between the universities of Burgos and Dundee enabled me to visit that lovely town—and its rich municipal archive—on a number of occasions, visits facilitated in large part by Cristina Borreguero (University of Burgos). I should also like to thank Lorraine Goodhew and Nick McGill for their very generous hospitality over many years in London and Turin—and apologies for not acknowledging this in my first book. In that first publication, I gave thanks to my mother and Anne-Marie. Here I should just like to take the opportunity to amplify my sense of gratitude to my mother, who sacrificed a great deal so that I should succeed. As for Anne-Marie, it would be difficult to improve upon what I wrote on that earlier occasion, so I just repeat the thanks and acknowledge the obligation, which can never be adequately repaid. On this occasion, as so often in the past, Anne-Marie has proved an excellent copy-editor and proof-reader (and indexer). In this connection, I should like to record my gratitude to all at Oxford University Press who have helped bring this project to fruition, including Ruth Parr, Anne Gelling, Samantha Lyle Skyrme and, above all, Matthew Cotton, who helped arrange the splendid cover illustration. Finally, I should like to thank my colleagues at Dundee, for contributing to an atmosphere conducive to research and writing, and my students in recent years—particularly those taking my Honours course on early modern Spain—for helping me to think about some of the issues which are at the heart of this book.

Contents List of Abbreviations Maps Introduction

xi xiii–xv 1

1 Spain’s Armies

17

2 Spanish Naval Power

63

3 Spanish Finance

106

4 Spanish Politics and Government

151

5 Centre and Periphery in the Spanish Monarchy

191

Conclusion Bibliography Index

231 235 263

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Abbreviations ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIES AGS AHC AHMV AMB AHN ARH AST ASV BL BNM KHA PRO

Archivo General, Simancas Archivo Histórico, Cuellar Archivo Histórico Municipal, Valladolid Archivo Municipal, Burgos Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid Algemeen Rijks Archief, Hague Archivio di Stato, Turin Archivio di Stato, Venice British Library, London Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid Koninklijk HuisArchief, Hague Public Records Office, London SPANISH ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

CA CC CI CMC CS CW JAA JDC JDF JL JLG JM JMTP JP JRM

Council of Aragon [CCA: Consulta of Council of Aragon] Council of Castile [CCC: Consulta of Council of Castile] Council of Italy [CCI: Consulta of Council of Italy] Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas Council of State [CCS: Consulta of Council of State] Council of War [CCW: Consulta of Council of War] Junta de Apresto de Armadas [CJAA: Consulta of Junta de Apresto de Armadas] Junta de las Dependencias de la Campana (Futura) [CJDC: Consulta of Junta de las Dependencias de la Campana (Futura) ] Junta de las Dependencias de Flandes [CJDF: Consulta of Junta de las Dependencias de Flandes] Junta de Levas [CJL: Consulta of Junta de Levas] Junta of Lieutenants General [CJLG: Consulta of Junta of Lieutenants General] Junta de Milicias [CJM: Consulta of Junta de Milicias] Junta de Milicias y Tercios Provinciales [CJMTP: Consulta of Junta de Milicias y Tercios Provinciales] Junta de Presidios [CJP: Consulta of Junta de Presidios] Junta de Restablecimiento de Milicias [CJRM: Consulta of Junta de Restablecimiento de Milicias] INDIVIDUALS

CII DLT ST VA

Carlos II of Spain count de la Tour marquis of Saint-Thomas Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy

xii AEA AHC AHDE AHES AHR AIEM ASMC BH BRAH CIH CHE CHM CHMC CLAHR CN CODOIN CSPD CSPV EcHR EHQ EHR ETF HAHR HDE HJ HPE IH JEH JEEH JLAS JMH MCV Millars PER P&P RDM RHE RHM RHMC RI RSI SHHM SSPHS THM

Abbreviations Anuario de Estudios Americanos Anuario de Historia Contemporanea Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español Anuario de Historia Económica y Social American Historical Review Anales del Instituto de Estudios Madrileños Annali di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea Bulletin Hispanique Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica Cuadernos de Historia de España Cuadernos de Historia Moderna Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporanea Colonial Latin American Historical Review Chronica Nova Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España Calendar of State Papers Domestic Calendar of State Papers Venetian Economic History Review European History Quarterly English Historical Review Espacio, Tiempo y Forma Hispanic American Historical Review Historia del Derecho Español Historical Journal Hacienda Pública Española Investigaciones Históricas Journal of Economic History Journal of European Economic History Journal of Latin American Studies Journal of Modern History Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez Millars. Espà i Historia Parliaments, Estates, and Representation Past and Present Revista de Derecho Mercantil Revista de Historia Económica Revista de Historia Militar Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine Revista de Indias Rivista Storica Italiana Studia Histórica. Historia Moderna newsletter of Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies Temas de Historia Militar

GUIPÚZCOA Santander Bilbao ÁLAVA

OLD CASTILE Simancas Toro

Burgos Palencia Soria Valladolid

R. Tagus Cáceres Lisbon

Toledo

NC Cuenca

Córdoba

r uivi Jaén dalq

Cape St Vincent

ua Seville R. G Granada ANDALUSIA Sanlúcar de Jerez Barrameda Málaga Cádiz

Gibraltar

Map 1: Spain in the Reign of Carlos II

Rosas

Monzón Palamós Zaragoza CATALONIA Barcelona R. Ebro Tarragona ARAGON Menorca Mallorca

Valencia Gandía

NEW CASTILE

Badajoz

Gerona

IA

Tordesillas Zamora Segovia ero Salamanca R. Du Ávila Guadalajara PORTUGAL Madrid

Huesca

LE

León Vigo

NAVARRE ROUSSILLON

Laredo

Oviedo

VA

La Coruña

VIZCAYA

Murcia Cartagena

Ibiza

Balearic Islands

FINLAND

1 = Finale 2 = Tuscan Presidios

Edinburgh

5 = Ceuta

ENGLAND

IRELAND Dublin

6 = Melilla 7 = Oran

London

Bre

FRANCE

SAVOY

AVIGNON (PAPAL)

Lisbon

GERMAN STATES OF THE EMPIRE

4

6

SAXONY ILE

SIA

V ENE V en PARMA ic a MODENA e no

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1

Ge TUSCANY PAPAL STATES

CORSICA (TO GENOA)

CRIMEA

TI A

Milan

PIED MONT

Azov

Budapest

SWITZ

SARDINIA

3

PRUSSIA

HABSBURG EMPIRE HUNGARY BAVARIA Vienna

S P A I N

5

Moscow COURLAND

BRANDENBURG P O L A N D Berlin Warsaw S

FRANCHE COMTÉ

Barcelona

IA

POMERAN

n

DUTCH REPUBLIC

Paris

Madrid

Copenhagen

me

SPANISH NETHERLANDS

PORTUGAL

ic

4 = Larache

R U S S I A

Stockholm lt

SCOTLAND

Ba

3 = La Mamora

D NO ANISH RW KIN EGIA GD OM N

SWEDEN

2

Rome

Naples

7

Map 2: The Spanish Monarchy in Europe in the Reign of Carlos II

Constantinople

NA

PL

ES

SICILY

Black Sea

St Augustine

Zacatecas Guadalajara Vera Mexico Cruz

Havana

Santo Domingo

Pa na m

a

VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN

Bogotá Quito

Lima

YAL RU F PE TY O Map 3: Spanish America in the Reign of Carlos II

BR

ERO

AZ

VIC

IL

Guayaquil

Cuzco La Plata Potoslí

Santiago Buenos Aires

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Introduction Many think it a miracle that the Monarchy is still in existence Venetian ambassador, 1681–2¹ the present state of Spain; which how wretched soever it may seem to others, they are in their own conceit very happy, believing themselves still the greatest nation in the world; and are now as proud and haughty as in the days of Charles the Fifth English envoy in Madrid, 1699²

THE DECLINE OF SPAIN In 1665 the 4-year-old Carlos II succeeded his father, Philip IV, as king of Spain, and head of the Spanish Monarchy, or the worldwide Spanish empire. Philip had concluded (1659) the Peace of the Pyrenees with Louis XIV of France, ending a long conflict, but was still attempting to reimpose by force of arms his dominion over the Portuguese (in revolt since 1640). However, the war was not going well and in 1668 Carlos II—or rather his mother, Mariana of Austria, ruling as Regent—reluctantly acknowledged Portugal’s independence.³ Of the Portuguese dominions acquired nearly a century earlier by Philip II, Carlos retained only the outpost of Ceuta in north Africa,⁴ while Portugal remained a security problem for the rest of the century. Additional pressure to end the Portuguese war came with the renewal of war with France. In 1667 Louis XIV launched his so-called ‘War of Devolution’, asserting a claim to Spanish Flanders (on behalf of his wife, Carlos II’s half-sister), by exploiting the so-called law of devolution (in breach of her renunciation of any claim on the Spanish succession as part of her marriage settlement in 1659). The war, fought out in Catalonia, Flanders, and Franche Comté, was a disaster for Spain. The forces of Louis XIV carried all before them.⁵ Spain’s ability to fend off the French monarch’s assault was not eased by the fact ¹ G. Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1943; 1990), 17. ² Alexander Stanhope to marquis of Normanby, 6 Jan. 1699, in Lord Makon, Spain under Charles the Second, 2nd edn. (London, 1844), 152. ³ R. Stradling, ‘A Spanish Statesman of Appeasement: Medina de las Torres and Spanish policy, 1639–70’, HJ, 19 (1976), 1–31. ⁴ R. Pérez-Bustamante, El Gobierno del Imperio Español (Madrid, 2000), 324 ⁵ On 27 July the town of Lille—whose inhabitants had declared their loyalty to Carlos II— surrendered after a siege of just two weeks and in the presence of 4,200 (Spanish) troops, Maura, Carlos II y su Corte, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1911), i. 320; and G. Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege. Old

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

that, at the same time, the prince of Algiers attacked another of Spain’s north African outposts, Melilla.⁶ Spain was prevented from complete collapse—in the Low Countries, at least—by the intervention of the Triple Alliance of concerned neighbours: the Dutch Republic, England, and Sweden. Nevertheless, Madrid was obliged to abandon hope of recovering Lille and other towns conquered by Louis XIV’s forces in the Low Countries.⁷ Overseas, in the Indies, the Spanish empire faced additional threats and losses. In 1668 English buccaneers operating from Jamaica (seized from Spain in 1655) and led by Henry Morgan, briefly occupied Portobello, one of the nerve centres of Spanish America, and in 1670 expelled the Spaniards from the island of Old Providence, or Santa Catalina, before occupying Panama in 1671.⁸ In the meantime, the French had seized Santo Domingo (Hispaniola) in 1669.⁹ In 1670 Carlos II’s mother was obliged to acknowledge the loss of Jamaica as the price of a mutual Anglo-Spanish guarantee of their overseas territories.¹⁰ The setbacks of the later 1660s were only the prelude to the disastrous decade that was the 1670s. In 1673 the Monarchy went to the aid of the United Provinces in Louis XIV’s ‘Dutch War’, hoping to recover the territories recently lost to the French monarch, prompting the latter to declare war.¹¹ Unfortunately, the outcome was not that intended. In 1674 French forces conquered Franche Comté for a second time (having taken and returned it in 1667–8), effectively eliminating the so-called ‘Spanish Road’ road along which Spanish Flanders had been supplied from Spanish Italy for more than a century.¹² In succeeding years, the Spanish position in Flanders crumbled as Louis XIV’s forces captured a succession of strategic towns. These included Condé and Bouchain in 1676;¹³ Valenciennes (reputedly one of the strongest places in the region), St Omer and Cambrai in 1677;¹⁴ and in 1678 Ghent (isolating the coastal towns from the rest of Flanders, and opening regime and revolution in Lille (Cambridge, 1991), 1. The Venetian ambassador thought Spain would lose Flanders, A. von Kalnein, Juan José de Austria en la España de Carlos II (Lleida, 2001), 115. For a brief account of the war, see J. A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (Harlow, 1999), 106–8. ⁶ Pérez-Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 324. ⁷ For Spanish territorial losses in Flanders in and after 1668, cf. the map in A. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence. The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe (London, 1991), 85. ⁸ J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Harmondsworth, 1973), 265 ff.; Cf. C. Ward, Imperial Panama. Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 1550–1800 (Albuquerque, 1993), 171 ff.; L. García Fuentes, El Comercio español en América 1650–1700 (Sevilla, 1980), 174. D. Rowland, ‘Spanish Occupation of the Island of Old Providence or Santa Catalina, 1641–70’, HAHR, 15 (1935), 298 ff. ⁹ S. Sim (ed.), The Concise Pepys (Ware, 1997), 800, entry for 17 May 1669. ¹⁰ Piero Mocenigo to Doge and Senate, 3 May 1669, CSPV: 1669–70, 47–8. ¹¹ Kalnein, Juan José, 302. ¹² Cf. A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La crise intérieure de la Monarchie des Habsburgs espagnols sous Carlos II’, in J. A. H. Bots and A. G. Weiler (eds.), The Peace of Nijmegen 1676–78/79. La Paix de Nimègue (Amsterdam, 1980), 158; G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659 (Cambridge, 1974; 2004). ¹³ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 145–6; G. Satterfield, Princes, Posts and Partisans. The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678) (Leiden, 2003), 275. ¹⁴ Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 295 ff.

Introduction

3

the way to Antwerp and even Brussels, the fall of which—declared a jittery governor of Flanders—would mean the collapse of Spanish dominion in the Low Countries),¹⁵ and Ypres.¹⁶ By the autumn of 1678 the terms of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which had concluded the War of Devolution, and which had been regarded at the time as humiliating, appeared positively attractive.¹⁷ Spain’s ability to resist the French in Flanders had been undermined (as in 1667–8) by difficulties elsewhere. Louis XIV had exploited a revolt in Messina (1674–8) which Carlos II’s forces failed to nip in the bud, and which seriously threatened the Spanish position in Sicily, Italy, and the Mediterranean.¹⁸ Typically, in the spring of 1677 news reached Madrid simultaneously of the siege of its garrison at Porto Longone (on the Tuscan coast), the loss of yet another town in Sicily, and the defeat of the allies in Flanders (and the fall of Cambrai and St Omer).¹⁹ Worse still, in the summer of 1677, a Moorish attack on Oran in north Africa necessitated the diversion there of troops intended for Sicily.²⁰ Louis XIV’s forces also made inroads into Catalonia.²¹ In 1678 the viceroy of Catalonia, the count of Monterrey, failed to prevent Puigcerdá, the key to the Cerdagne, from falling to the French, opening the road to Zaragoza (Aragon) and perhaps into Castile.²² Spain’s difficulties were compounded by—and in turn fuelled— political instability at home, where Carlos II had reached his majority in 1675, and where his illegitimate half-brother, Don Juan of Austria, seized power and ousted (1676–7) the de facto prime minister, the marques de Valenzuela, and the latter’s patron, Mariana of Austria, and her supporters. While Spain was losing ground to Louis XIV, other states sought to exploit its difficulties. The grand duke of Tuscany, for example, sought to buy part of the Spanish garrison complex in central Italy, the so-called presidios (which included Porto Longone).²³ Carlos II avoided this cession, and also defeated the Messina revolt, but was less successful in Flanders, where the Peace of Nijmegen concluded the ‘Dutch War’. Carlos II recovered Ath, Charleroi, Courtrai, Ghent, Limbourg, and Oudenarde, but was obliged to accept the loss of Cambrai, St Omer, ¹⁵ Duke of Villahermosa to CII, 16 and 30 Mar. and 25 May 1678, H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier, and J. Lefèvre (eds.), Correspondence de la Cour d’Espagne sur les Affaires des Pays Bas, Vol. V: Charles II (1665–1700) (Brussels, 1935), 289, 301. ¹⁶ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 155–6. ¹⁷ Don Manuel de Lira to CII, 14 Sept. 1678, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 273–4. ¹⁸ Cf. L. Ribot García, La Revuelta Antiespañola de Mesina. Causas y antecedentes (1591–1674) and La Monarquía de España y la guerra de Mesina (1674–1678) (Madrid, 2002). The revolt and escalating French presence threatened supplies of grain carried by sea from Puglia to the city of Naples, with potentially serious consequences for Spanish control of that turbulent city, and the realm of Naples, Monarquía, 51–3. ¹⁹ De Gubernatis to marquis of Saint-Thomas [ST], 29 April 1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 192. ²⁰ Avvisi, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 217. ²¹ In 1675 the diversion of troops to Sicily facilitated a French invasion of Catalonia, P. Sanz Camañes, Política, Hacienda y Milicia en el Aragón de los últimos Austrias entre 1640 y 1680 (Zaragoza, 1997), 285; for the disaster in Catalonia in 1677–8, ibid., 287. ²² De Gubernatis to ST, 25 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 333. ²³ J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Razón de Estado y Geostrategia en la Política Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677–81)’, BRAH, CLXXIII (1976), 297–358.

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Valenciennes, Ypres, and Franche Comté;²⁴ in consequence of the latter, the French king and his negotiators subsequently questioned Carlos’s right to title himself duke of Burgundy (and king of Navarre).²⁵ Between 1667 and 1678 the Spanish king had been obliged to cede to Louis XIV nearly double the 14,000 square kilometres ceded by his father between 1629 and 1659.²⁶ After 1678 Louis XIV’s policy of reunions, obtaining territory by means of arguable legal decisions backed by military might,²⁷ chipped away at the Duchy of Luxembourg,²⁸ and in 1683–4 its strategically important capital fell to a French siege in open war—indicative, according to one modern historian, of ‘the final breakdown of the Spanish system’²⁹—a loss acknowledged by Carlos II in the Truce of Ratisbon (1684).³⁰ In Italy, Spanish Milan was threatened by Louis XIV’s de facto acquisition from the duke of Mantua of the fortress of Casale in neighbouring Monferrato.³¹ Subsequently, the bombardment of Genoa by the vessels of Louis XIV and the subsequent humiliating submission of the republic to the French monarch, also threatened Spain’s interests in Italy.³² On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, in north Africa, Spain lost Mamora in 1681.³³ The 1680s were also difficult overseas. In 1680 the Portuguese established themselves at Sacramento, opposite Buenos Aires, in South America.³⁴ That same year, the Spaniards lost control of New Mexico for more than a decade following the so-called Pueblo revolt.³⁵ In 1680, too, English pirates invaded the Pacific, which had hitherto largely escaped piracy on the scale experienced in the Caribbean,³⁶ and between 1684 and 1687 there was a major onslaught on the Spanish Pacific.³⁷ In ²⁴ Cf. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, 84 ff. (and map); and Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 177. D. Pedro Ronquillo, one of the Spanish negotiating team at Nijmegen, was reportedly happy at being replaced there, thus avoiding putting his own own name to—signing—a shameful peace, A. Serrano de Haro, ‘España y la Paz de Nimega’, Hispania, 52 (1992), 584. ²⁵ Duke of Jovenazzo, 11 Feb. 1680, Lonchay, Correspondence, vi. 802–3. ²⁶ Alcalá Zamora, ‘Razón de Estado’, 352. ²⁷ Cf. D. McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815 (London, 1983), 36 ff. After 1668 Louis had exploited the opportunities offered by his gains in the war of 1667–8, J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘Las relaciones internacionales de la Monarquía Hispánica durante la regencia de doña Mariana de Austria’, SHHM, v. 20 (1999), 155. ²⁸ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 163 ²⁹ R. Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish System, 1580–1720, (London, 1981), 176. ³⁰ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 167–9. ³¹ Ibid., 164. For the French negotiations for Casale, cf. G. Symcox, War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618–1763 (London, 1974), 81–101. ³² D. Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century (Harlow, 1997), 14. It is not the case, as Sella declares, that ‘Spain did not lift a finger to help’ the Genoese. I hope to discuss this elsewhere. ³³ J. M. Marqués, La Santa Sede y la España de Carlos II (Rome, 1981–2), 57. ³⁴ Cf. V. Magalhães Godinho, ‘Portugal and her Empire, 1680–1730’, in J. S. Bromley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1715/25 (Cambridge, 1971), 529–30. ³⁵ D. J. Weber (ed.), What Caused the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 (New York, 1999). ³⁶ K. E. Lane, ‘Buccaneers and Coastal Defense in Late-Seventeenth Century Quito: The Case of Barbacoas’, CLAHR (1997), 145. ³⁷ Céspedes del Castillo, G., ‘La Defensa militar del istmo de Panamá a fines del siglo XVII y comienzos del XVIII’, AEA, 9 (1952), 242–3; J. Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, II: Spain and America 1598–1700 (2nd edn., Oxford, 1981), 198–9.

Introduction

5

1685 Campeche (New Spain)³⁸ and in 1687 Guayaquil (Peru) fell, the latter having to be rebuilt on a new site.³⁹ Spain’s ability to fend off its enemies at sea was also exposed in Europe. In 1680 Carlos II had been humiliated by the seizure of Spanish vessels in Ostend harbour by ships of the elector of Brandenburg;⁴⁰ and in 1686, French ships blockaded Cadiz to force payment of 500,000 crowns—the value of a cargo confiscated from a French merchant for trading illegally with the Indies; in a further humiliation, the Spanish fleet was forced to salute the French flag.⁴¹ Spain continued to suffer setbacks thereafter, not least during the so-called Nine Years War or War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97). In 1689 Spain— which had signed up to the League of Augsburg (of princes of the Holy Roman Empire) in 1686,⁴² joined the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. Thereafter, Spanish troops were active on most fronts. They were not always successful. They suffered defeat in Italy in 1690 and again in 1693, when the French fleet also launched an abortive attack on Naples. In 1696 Milan itself was threatened by a Franco-Savoyard invasion which helped to bring the war in Italy to an early close. Carlos II’s forces also suffered defeat in Flanders—for example at Fleurus in 1690⁴³—and the loss of Mons in 1691,⁴⁴ Namur in 1692,⁴⁵ and Charleroi in 1693;⁴⁶ and in 1695 Louis XIV’s forces bombarded Brussels.⁴⁷ Carlos II’s forces also suffered severe setbacks in Catalonia, above all that sustained at the battle of the Ter (1694).⁴⁸ Substantial parts of the principality were occupied by Louis XIV’s forces. In many respects the last year of the war was an annus horribilis for Carlos II and his subjects. In 1697 Barcelona, which had been bombarded from the sea by the French in 1691,⁴⁹ was besieged and taken,⁵⁰ fuelling renewed fears of a French assault on Aragon. At the same time as the French laid siege to Barcelona, the Moors—who had long been besieging Ceuta—launched a major

³⁸ Cánovas de Castillo, Historia de la Decadencia de España desde Felipe III hasta Carlos II (Madrid, 1854; 2nd edn., Madrid, 1910), 676. ³⁹ L. A. Clayton, ‘Local Initiative and Finance in Defence of the Viceroyalty of Peru: The Development of Self-reliance’, HAHR, 54 (1974), 297 ff. ⁴⁰ D. McKay, The Great Elector (Harlow, 2001), 188–9. ⁴¹ J. Dunlop, Memoirs of Spain in Reigns of Philip IV and Charles II, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1834), ii. 240–1. ⁴² C. Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies? The Spanish Monarchy and Germany in the Reign of the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, 1665–1700’, in C. Kent, T. K., Wolber and C. M. K., Hewitt (eds.), The Lion and the Eagle. Interdisciplinary Essays on German-Spanish Relations over the Centuries (Oxford and New York, 2000). ⁴³ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 206–9. ⁴⁴ Ibid., 216–18; S. Baxter, William III (London, 1966), 293–4. The fall of Mons (1691) prompted the flight of numerous Belgian nobles to Brussels, CCC, 12 May 1691, AGS/F/3844. ⁴⁵ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 223–6; Baxter, William III, 302–3. ⁴⁶ Max Emmanuel to CII, 23 Oct. 1693; Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 597. ⁴⁷ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 248–9. ⁴⁸ J. L. Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación económica y militar de la ciudad de Granada a las Guerras del Reinado de Carlos II’, CN, 6 (1971), 72. ⁴⁹ A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el Reinado de Carlos II. Política y guerra en la frontera catalana, 1679–1697 (Barcelona, 1999), 119–20. ⁵⁰ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 259–61.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

assault on Melilla.⁵¹ Overseas, in 1697, a French expeditionary force briefly occupied and sacked Cartagena de Indias.⁵² The conclusion of the Nine Years War that year meant peace thereafter in Europe, but the Spanish Monarchy continued to face challenges elsewhere. These included a renewed Moorish attack on Ceuta and a serious Scottish challenge at Darien in central America.⁵³ However, these challenges were overcome and Spanish dominion survived. Indeed, despite the foregoing, we should not ignore the extent to which empire was maintained and even extended, inside and outside Europe. In Europe, a defeated Louis XIV had been obliged to make concessions at the end of the Nine Years War (1697) in the Low Countries (where Carlos II and his allies had recaptured Namur in 1695),⁵⁴ restoring Luxembourg to Carlos, and in Italy (where Spanish and other allied forces successfully besieged Casale in 1695)⁵⁵ returning Pinerolo to the duke of Savoy. In the meantime, Spanish forces had briefly occupied the island of Ponza (a fief of the duke of Parma) near Naples. The same picture of resilience, even expansion, is evident outside Europe. In south America, Antonio Sánchez de Orellana extended Spanish dominion in the Amazon region east of Quito in the 1690s.⁵⁶ In central America Spanish forces had begun the conquest of ‘the last Maya kingdom’.⁵⁷ Further north, the Spaniards had reconquered New Mexico (between 1693 and 1697), having suppressed the Pueblo revolt;⁵⁸ and established more presidios on that frontier.⁵⁹ Carlos II’s forces had also entrenched themselves in Florida, at Pensacola (1698)⁶⁰

⁵¹ Operti to ST, 30 May 1697, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ⁵² W. T. Morgan, ‘The Expedition of Baron de Pointis against Cartagena’, AHR, 37 (1932), 237–54. The attack netted loot totalling over 9,000,000 pesos. ⁵³ C. Storrs, ‘Disaster at Darien (1698–1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs’, EHQ, 29 (1999), 5 ff. In 1699 the Genoese and French envoys in London told Carlos II’s minister there, the marquis of Canales, that if Spain did not act, their nations would remove the Scots, consulta of [Council of ] Indies, 9 May 1699, AGI/ Panamá/160, f. 99 ff. The effective exploitation of Darien by the Spaniards had only been ordered the previous year, ibid., f. 107. ⁵⁴ Lynn, Wars of Louis, 248–9; Baxter, William III, 327–30. Lynn’s interpretation of the loss of Namur understates the seriousness for Louis of this setback. ⁵⁵ G. Symcox, Victor Amadeus II. Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675–1730 (London, 1983), 115–16. Spinola had failed in an earlier attempt (1629–30) to take Casale, Stradling, Europe and the Decline, 89–90. ⁵⁶ T. Herzog, ‘La Empresa Administrativa y el Capital Social: los Sánchez de Orellana (Quito, siglo XVIII), in J. L. Castellano (ed.), Sociedad, Administración y Poder en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Granada, 1996), 383–4. ⁵⁷ G. D. Jones, The Conquest of the Last Maya Kingdom (Stanford, 1998). ⁵⁸ J. M. Espinosa, ‘The Recapture of Santa Fe, New Mexico, by the Spaniards, December 29–30 1693’, HAHR, 19 (1939), 443 ff; H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire. The Making of a World Power 1492–1763 (London, 2002), 424. ⁵⁹ T. H. Naylor and C. W. Polzer, The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain. A Documentary History, 1: 1570–1700 (Tucson, 1986), as reviewed, HAHR, 68 (1988), 118–19. ⁶⁰ R. S. Weddle,Wilderness Manhunt. The Spanish Search for La Salle (Austin, 1973), considers Spanish expansion in the Gulf of Mexico in the later 1680s and 1690s (largely as a reaction to the activities of the French); Kamen, Spain’s Road, 254, 427.

Introduction

7

and were venturing into Texas.⁶¹ Indirectly, the Spanish king resumed Spanish penetration of the Californias (also known as the Carolinas) from 1697.⁶² In the Caribbean, in 1688 the Spaniards considered the reconquest of Santa Catalina, but since it was uninhabited (by any foreign power)—and thus no threat—decided against it.⁶³ Beyond the Americas, the 1690s had also seen the continued expansion of Spanish dominion in the Pacific, where the Marianas (1668) and Carolinas (1686) had been claimed for the Crown earlier in Carlos II’s reign.⁶⁴ Despite some losses therefore, the Monarchy inherited by Carlos II in 1665 remained largely intact on his death in 1700, was still the largest of the European overseas empires, and was even growing. The loss of empire—and above all of its European components, i.e., Spanish Flanders and the Italian realms—was primarily a consequence of the (unavoidable) participation in the subsequent War of the Spanish Succession of Carlos’s successor, the first Bourbon king of Spain, Philip V.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECLINE In view of the difficulties and defeats of the Spanish Monarchy in later seventeenthcentury Europe, it is hardly surprising that Spain is absent from most accounts of international relations in the ‘age of Louis XIV’,⁶⁵ and that the reign of Carlos II is one of the least studied in early modern Spanish history. Later seventeenthcentury Spain has long seemed an uninspiring subject, certainly by contrast with the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, Carlos I (the Holy Roman emperor Charles V), Philip II, and even Carlos II’s own father, Philip IV, who nearly shipwrecked Spain and its empire in the course of the Thirty Years War. Indeed, for many historians, Spain—exhausted by its efforts in the Thirty Years War, in the war against France which continued until 1659, and in the unsuccessful attempt to reimpose Habsburg rule in Portugal—retreated into obscurity for the rest of the seventeenth century.⁶⁶ In an age whose diplomacy centred in part on the Spanish Succession, i.e., the question of who was to succeed to the inheritance of the ⁶¹ W. E. Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678–1702: The Beginnings of Texas and Pensacola (Austin, 1917); L. Gómez Canedo (ed.), Primeras exploraciones y poblamiento de Texas (1686–94) (Monterrey, 1968); Kamen, Spain’s Road, 427. ⁶² F. J. Weber, ‘The Pious Fund of the Californias’, HAHR, 43 (1963), 78 ff. Carlos II insisted that, although the colonization of California was to be financed by the Jesuits, possession must be in the name of the Spanish Crown. ⁶³ Rowland, ‘Spanish Occupation’, 298 ff. ⁶⁴ Pérez-Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 393; Kamen, Spain’s Road, 419–21. ⁶⁵ A. Lossky, review of J. B. Wolf, Louis XIV, in JMH, 42 (1970), 103. R. M. Hatton has noted the need for more work on the French king’s main opponents, the Austrian Habsburgs, but omits Carlos II, Hatton, ‘Louis XIV and his Fellow Monarchs’, in Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe (London, 1976), 29. ⁶⁶ According to R. Valladares, La Rebelión de Portugal 1640–1680. Guerra, conflicto y poderes en la monarquía hispánica (Valladolid, 1998), 294–5, the loss of Portugal was crucial to Spain’s loss of reputation and hegemony.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

ailing, impotent, and childless Carlos II, what seemed to matter were the policies of the powers preying on a declining Spain, not those of Spain itself. Not surprisingly, historians have been more interested in explaining Spain’s decline as an imperial and great power after 1640 than in its survival; or in questioning the meaning and appropriateness of the term ‘decline’.⁶⁷ Some contemporaries, both Spaniards and non-Spaniards, certainly depicted a Spain in difficulty. The Spanish arbitristas, who sought to identify solutions to Spain’s problems, perhaps inevitably emphasized the Monarchy’s difficulties.⁶⁸ Historians have perhaps paid too much attention to their jeremiads, and not enough to the views of other contemporaries,⁶⁹ but some of the latter shared—at least implicitly—a vision of Spain’s present which contrasted it unfavourably with a former ‘golden age’. Contemporary Spanish writers rarely called Carlos II—as they did his father—the most powerful monarch in world.⁷⁰ For their part, foreign observers, including Spain’s allies, were often more damning about Spain’s weakness, their criticisms supplying later historians with ample ammunition for their devastating critiques of the reign. Foreign diplomats deplored both the state of Spain and the want of vigour of those responsible for its government.⁷¹ Most foreign commentators also contrasted Spain’s weakness and the arrogant pride of Carlos II’s ministers.⁷² Perhaps inevitably, Spanish attitudes and policy in this period are frequently characterized as unrealistic, or ‘quixotic’.⁷³ This negative perception of the reign of Carlos II was further elaborated by the Bourbon historiography of the eighteenth century which presented Philip V as reviving a moribund Spain.⁷⁴ Not all shared this vision of later Habsburg Spain,⁷⁵ but most writers contrasted the supposedly decadent Spain of the later Habsburgs with the supposedly resurgent Spain of the ‘modernizing’, Enlightenment-inspired ⁶⁷ Cf. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), 41 ff. ⁶⁸ J. H. Elliott, ‘Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth Century Spain’, P&P, 74 (1977), 41–61. ⁶⁹ Cf. García Fuentes’s efforts to understand the thinking of the Indies merchants of Seville, Comercio Español, 68 ff. ⁷⁰ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 421. ⁷¹ Typical is the correspondence during the Nine years War of Alexander Stanhope, in Lord Mahon, Spain under Charles, passim. ⁷² Cf. A. de Saint-Léger and P. Sagnac, La Préponderance Française: Louis XIV 1661–1715 (Paris, 1935), 240. ⁷³ According to J. R. Jones, Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1966), 77, Spanish pride prevented Louis XIV from ending promptly the war of 1667–8. ⁷⁴ Cf. V. Bacallar y Sanna, marquis of San Felipe, Comentarios de la Guerra de España e historia de su Rey Felipe V, el Animoso, ed. C. Seco (Madrid, 1957), 25, cited by H. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700–1715 (London, 1969), 58. Cf. also R. García Cárcel, Felipe V y los Españoles (Madrid, 2002), 173 ff. (Campomanes, Viera y Clavijo et al.), and 245 (Cadalso); and P. Fernández Albaladejo, ‘Dinastía y Comunidad Política’, in idem, (ed.), Los Borbones. Dinastía y Memoria de Nación en la España del Siglo XVIII (Madrid, 2002), 488, 594 (Jovellanos). ⁷⁵ T. Egido López, Prensa Clandestina Española del Siglo XVIII: ‘El Duende Crítico’ (Valladolid 1968, 2002), 137–9; Bethencourt Massieu, prologue to T. Egido López, Opinión Pública y Oposición al Poder en la España del Siglo XVIII (1713–1759) (Valladolid 1971; 2002), 21.

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9

Bourbons.⁷⁶ By the reign of Carlos III the supposed degradation of Spain at the end of reign of Carlos II was a commonplace: Galvez’s blueprint for the reform of Spain’s imperial government, Plan for the Intendant System (1768), compared the then deplorable state of Mexican government with that of Spain itself in 1700.⁷⁷ Subsequently, Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor’s Semanario Erudito (1787–) published documents from the reign of Carlos II, not only demonstrating Spain’s dire condition in that period but also suggesting that the failure of reform—for example, the attempts of Don Juan of Austria in the 1670s—was due to the absence of the necessary ‘revolution’ which followed the advent of the Bourbons and the War of the Spanish Succession.⁷⁸ This critical, Enlightenment, tradition was continued by nineteenth-century historians.⁷⁹ These included the politician-historian Cánovas del Castillo, for whom the physical wreck, Carlos II, became the embodiment of Spain’s decline,⁸⁰ and the son of another politician, the duke of Maura, whose work has had an enduring impact on modern perceptions of later seventeenth-century Spain.⁸¹ In seeking to explain Spain’s apparent difficulties in the reign of Carlos II, many contemporaries were inclined to point to a lack of direction at the top.⁸² This easily fitted with the image of a decrepit monarch which has persisted and been distorted.⁸³ But historians have also sought to identify more ‘structural’ explanations for Spain’s difficulties in this period.⁸⁴ For J. H. Elliott, the failure of Olivares’s projects, which might have sustained Spain’s imperial pretensions in a changing world, effectively paralysed the will to reform, leading to stagnation.⁸⁵ For some others, Spain was simply retreating to a more appropriate position with the revival of France, whose extraordinary weakness between 1560 and 1630 ⁷⁶ P. Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo,’ in J. M. Jover Zamora (ed.), Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, Vol. 28, ed. P. Molas Ribalta, La Transición del Siglo XVII al XVIII. Entre la Decadencia y la Reconstrucción (2nd edn., Madrid, 1994), 12–13. ⁷⁷ Review of M. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, From impotence to authority. The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808 (Columbia, Miss., 1977), JLAS, 10 (1979), 363. ⁷⁸ Kalnein, Juan José, 93. ⁷⁹ García Cárcel, Felipe V, 244 ff.; Cf. B. Pellistrandi, ‘Los Borbones entre historia y opinión’, in Fernández Albaladejo, Los Borbones, 628 ff. ⁸⁰ Cánovas del Castillo, Historia de la Decadencia, 617 ff.; idem, Bosquejo histórico de la Casa de Austria en España (Madrid, 1869; 2nd edn., Madrid, 1911). On the link between Cánovas’s history and his politics, cf. Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, 2. ⁸¹ Duke of Maura, Carlos II y su Corte, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1911–15), a third volume was intended but not published; idem, Vida y reinado de Carlos II, (Madrid, 1940; 1990). Maura was prompted to publish the latter by the publication of L. Pfandl, Karl II (Berlin, 1940). ⁸² Marqués, Santa Sede, 57 (the Pope, 1681, following the loss of Mamora). ⁸³ Typically, C. H. Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (London and Oxford, 1918), 243, refers to ‘the imbecile Charles II’. For one historian of Spanish America, under the ‘semi-imbecile Carlos II’, ‘Spain had reached the nadir of its fortunes’, I. A. Leonard, ‘On the Mexican Book Trade, 1683’, HAHR, 27 (1947), 403. For M. Rodríguez Salgado, ‘The Problems of Empire: The Spanish Monarchy in the Early Modern Period’, HJ, 31 (1988), 441, Carlos II was ‘insane’. ⁸⁴ Cf. the survey of ‘decline’ literature from the eighteenth century in E. García Hernán, Milicia General en la Edad Moderna. El Batallón de Don Rafael de la Barreda y Figueroa (Madrid, 2003), 43 ff. ⁸⁵ J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven and London, 1986), 676; idem, Imperial Spain, 379.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

explained Spain’s unusual European primacy in that era.⁸⁶ Spain, it has been suggested, did not have the resources for ‘great power’ status and empire, especially in the difficult conditions of the seventeenth century, when Castile, in particular, experienced serious population loss, economic downturn, and urban decline.⁸⁷ Most historians emphasize the role of the seventeenth-century crisis, but Henry Kamen has gone further, arguing that Spain was never prepared for the challenges of empire; in effect, Spain did not suffer decline because it never ‘rose’, never ‘conquered’ an empire, and, in effect, depended from the very start on a vast array of (foreign) collaborators to achieve and maintain imperial dominion.⁸⁸ But for many historians, Kaman’s insistence that the decline of Spain was a ‘myth’ goes too far.⁸⁹ For many of those who believe Spain did decline, Spain and its empire survived only on sufferance, because other states benefited from the massive fraud which went on within the supposedly monopolistic imperial trade structure; inevitably, those states preferred to leave Spain in possession (rather than a more effective foreign prince, for example Louis XIV) to bear the burden or cost of empire, while they supplied the goods and reaped most of the profit.⁹⁰ This applied to Spain’s European empire as much as the Indies.⁹¹ While Spain found foreign allies against Louis XIV in its hour of need, the Sun King—it is sometimes argued—in fact deliberately refrained from delivering the knock-out blow, hoping in this way to secure the Spanish Succession.⁹²

REVISIONIST HISTORIOGRAPHY The Spain of Carlos II continues to suffer by contrast with that of the sixteenthand early seventeenth-century ‘golden age’,⁹³ but it is no longer quite so neglected. On the one hand, the established view of the late seventeenth century was always too dark;⁹⁴ on the other hand, that view rested on too positive a ⁸⁶ G. Parker, ‘The Decline of Spain’, History Today, 34 (1984), 44; P. Williams, Philip II (Basingstoke, 2001), 32. ⁸⁷ Garzón Pareja, M., La Hacienda de Carlos II (Madrid, 1981), 74 ff.; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 161 (Burgos, Segovia, Toledo). ⁸⁸ H. Kamen, Spain 1469–1714. A Society of Conflict (2nd edn., Harlow, 1991), p. xv.; and idem, Spain’s Road, pp. xxi ff., et passim. ⁸⁹ H. Kamen, ‘The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth’, P&P, 81 (1978), 24–50; J. I. Israel, ‘The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth’, P&P, 81 (1978), 170–80. ⁹⁰ García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 54. Cf. Kamen, Spain’s Road, 412 ff. ⁹¹ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 118–19, for English interest in Sicily. ⁹² Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, 274. ⁹³ In 1998 and 2000 there were extensive celebrations in Spain of, respectively, the 400th anniversary of the death of Philip II, and the 500th anniversary of the birth of Charles V. Any celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the death of Carlos II, were muted. This was used by Luis Ribot as a springboard for a general reflection on the reign of Carlos II in a special issue of the journal Studia Historica. Historia Moderna: ‘Carlos II: el centenario olvidado’, SHHM, 20 (1999), Informe: La Epoca de Carlos II, 19 ff. ⁹⁴ C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), 150, observed that the reign of Carlos II was responsible for some good colonial legislation and policies.

Introduction

11

perception of the preceding and subsequent eras.⁹⁵ Increasingly, historians have recognized the need to transcend Bourbon propaganda, and the ingrained image of a Spain in terminal decline between 1660 and 1700.⁹⁶ In some respects, this is part of a much larger reinterpretation of Habsburg Spain, which seeks to revise an understanding dominated by what has been called the ‘Black Legend’, and more recently—in a reference to the influence on American historians of Spain of the work of W. H. Prescott—‘Prescott’s Paradigm’.⁹⁷ Revisionist historians have begun to celebrate the reign of a monarch who was regarded by the contemporary Catalan publicist Narcis Feliú de la Penya as the best king Spain had ever had.⁹⁸ Revisionists emphasize both the real achievements of Spain under Carlos II, particularly after 1680, and the way the reign laid the foundations of the achievements of the Bourbons after 1700. Demographic historians have suggested that population decline in the seventeenth century (i.e., c. 1591–c. 1717) was less, and that Spain’s population was greater in 1700 than used to be thought.⁹⁹ It has even been suggested that there was some population growth in the last third of the century, though this was by no means even across Spain.¹⁰⁰ Spain’s economy has also been positively reassessed,¹⁰¹ as have the benefits accruing from the Americas. Partly as a consequence of this revision, the extent of ‘decline’ has been revisited. Thus, while some parts of Spain, notably the interior, Castile, were suffering, others were thriving, particularly the periphery.¹⁰² For some this underpinned important shifts within Spain and the larger imperial structure: thus Castile was less able to impose itself on the non-Castilian territories in Spain, while Lynch has suggested that the seventeenth century witnessed not so much the decline of the empire or Monarchy as a whole, but the decline of Spain within it and a degree of ‘Americanization’.¹⁰³ Spain’s cultural and intellectual life has also been reassessed: the loss of patronage by a weak Crown,¹⁰⁴ it has been suggested, allowed cultural and spiritual renewal, paving the way for the Enlightenment.¹⁰⁵ ⁹⁵ Menéndez Pelayo observed that Carlos II retained an empire much of which was lost by his Bourbon successor, García Cárcel, Felipe V, 247–8. ⁹⁶ H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century (Harlow, 1980), 115. The ‘Black Legend’ was not always, or everywhere, a Bourbon construct; for the creation in Austrian Habsburg (former Spanish) Italy of an anti-Spanish mythology in the early eighteenth century, cf. F. F. Gallo, ‘Italia entre Los Habsburgo y los Borbones’, in Fernández Albaladejo, Los Borbones, 152 ff. ⁹⁷ R. L., Kagan, ‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain’, AHR, 101 (1996), 423–46. ⁹⁸ N. Feliú de la Penya, Anales de Catalunya (Barcelona, 1709), iii. 458–9, cited by A. S. Tarrés, prologue to Espino López, Catalunya durante el Reinado, 14. ⁹⁹ Molas Ribalta, ‘ Prólogo’, 36–8. ¹⁰⁰ This is usefully summarised in B. Yun Casalilla, ‘Del Centro a la Periferia: La Economía Española en la Epoca de Carlos II’, SHHM, 20 (1999), 51 ff. For the experiences of different towns c.1591–1700, cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 42–3, 154. ¹⁰¹ Again, a useful synthesis is Yun Casalilla, ‘Del Centro a la Periferia’, 51 ff. Cf. also A. Marcos Martín, España en los Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII (Barcelona, 2000), 454 ff. ¹⁰² García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 4. ¹⁰³ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii, 13, 117, 122, 283 (et passim). ¹⁰⁴ Kamen, Spain in Later, 315, 325. ¹⁰⁵ Kamen, Spain in Later, 314. Cf. E. Velasco Moreno, La Real Academia de la Historia en el siglo XVIII. Una Institución de sociabilidad (Madrid, 2000), 30–1.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

In contrast to those who emphasize the importance of the framework or structure, i.e., population and economy, and with those who see the Crown as losing control, others have emphasized the role of decisive government action in the direction of reform. It has been argued, for example, that the political instability of the reign was due largely to the reformist impulse of ministers, and the implications of this for the traditional system of conciliar government.¹⁰⁶ Reform, it is claimed, was a feature of Carlos II’s reign. It ranged from fiscal reform—the authorities acknowledging the excessive fiscal burden and its damaging impact on the economy¹⁰⁷—to attempts to get rid of traditional dress, including, for example, the golilla.¹⁰⁸ Individual ministers have been reassessed. Oropesa, for example, is regarded as one of many who sought to rein in the power of the Church.¹⁰⁹ Above all, historians have praised the king and his ministers for grasping the nettle of currency reform, resolving the problems created by the manipulations of his father and grandfather. By doing so, Carlos II brought stability and laid the foundations for the future; the Spain inherited by Philip V, it has been claimed, was already on the way to recovery after the currency reforms of 1680 and 1686.¹¹⁰

THE ARGUMENT OF THE PRESENT WORK Such revisionist work, which has suggested the idea—now widely accepted—of a new watershed in Spanish history, c.1680, the start of a new, more positive phase or conjuncture,¹¹¹ is welcome, although some are now in danger of exaggerating rather than of underplaying, the positive elements in Carlos II’s Spain. Thus, the efforts of Carlos and his ministers to stimulate population growth pale besides those of Carlos III in the eighteenth century,¹¹² while those who see signs of intellectual progress may underestimate the strength of older attitudes.¹¹³ The preoccupation with Spain’s domestic experience has meant a neglect of some other important issues, including Spain’s survival as an imperial power. For many ¹⁰⁶ B. Cárceles de Gea, ‘Juicio y debate del régimen polisinodial en las campañas políticas del reinado de Carlos II’, Pedralbes, 7 (1987), 105 (et passim). ¹⁰⁷ A. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio sobre la Decadencia de Castilla. La ciudad de Valladolid en el siglo XVII, (Valladolid, 1989), 373. ¹⁰⁸ AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 151. Cf. also ‘Avvisi’, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 180. ¹⁰⁹ Marqués, Santa Sede, 139. Cf. for the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias (1680), Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 175, 295. ¹¹⁰ Cf. J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘Arbitrismo y reforma monetaria en tiempos de Carlos II’, ETF, ser. IV, Historia Moderna, t. V (1992), 173 ff.; García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 4; H. Kamen, ‘The decline of Castile: The Last Crisis’, EcHR, 17 (1964), 76; Kamen, War of Succession, 371. ¹¹¹ This view is so widely held among modern historians that it would be invidious to single out individuals. ¹¹² J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La política repobladora del reinado de Carlos II’, ETF, ser. IV, Historia Moderna, t. 3 (1990), 232–3. ¹¹³ J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘El gusto por lo sobrenatural en el reinado de Carlos II’, CHMC, 3 (1982), 7 ff. However, Sánchez Belén contests Bennassar’s view that this reign saw the triumph of superstition.

Introduction

13

historians this is deliberate, since the abandonment of any pretensions to great power status removes the need to study this issue,¹¹⁴ which ensured (at the time) the primacy of domestic issues, and cleared the way for reform, hitherto blocked by the primacy of foreign policy.¹¹⁵ This has meant, unfortunately, a failure to recognize the continued importance of war in the reign.¹¹⁶ For his part, one of the few Spanish historians still interested in the Monarchy, Luis Ribot García, has painted a bleak picture of Madrid’s capacity for war in the 1670s, reaffirming an older vision of an imperial structure in dire straits.¹¹⁷ Reflecting their preoccupation with domestic rather than imperial themes—in part also a reaction against the historical agenda of the Franco era¹¹⁸—the revisionists have left considerable gaps. Despite the work of Luis Ribot and others, as Jan Glete has observed, we still know little about Spain’s armies and fleets after 1640. Most modern accounts of the politics of Carlos II’s reign still depend enormously on the narrative and interpretation, particularly of the politics of the reign, provided by Maura nearly a century ago. There is still no broad study of the imperial system, of viceroys and governors.¹¹⁹ As Felipe Ruiz Martín has remarked, our continued ignorance of the (later) seventeenth century underpins the persistence of the established image, and chronology, of decline.¹²⁰ Thus, there remains a widespread inclination on the part of historians of Habsburg Spain to see 1665 as closing a period, and to ignore the subsequent generation.¹²¹ Revisionism is also too ‘progressive’ in its emphasis and interpretation. This is a problem because—and this is the central argument of the present study—the achievement of Carlos II was essentially a ‘conservative’ one, in conserving largely intact the empire he inherited.¹²² Contrary to what is often claimed or suggested, ¹¹⁴ A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Juros y censos en la Castilla del Seiscientos’, in A. M. Bernal (ed.), Dinero, moneda y crédito en la Monarquía Hispánica (Madrid, 2000), 803, describes the (foreign) policy of this reign as ‘pacifista y, en cierto modo, abandonista’. ¹¹⁵ For Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century (London, 1980), p. vii, the disintegration of the empire in the late seventeenth century conserved (scarce) resources. Cf. also M. Hernández, A la sombra de la Corona. Poder local y oligarquía urbana (Madrid, 1606–1808) (Madrid, 1995), 285. ¹¹⁶ J. L. Castellano, Las Cortes de Castilla y su Diputación (1621–1789). Entre Pactismo y Absolutismo (Madrid, 1990), 85–112, an otherwise admirable study of the Castilian Cortes after 1665, largely ignores the extent to which relations between the Diputación of the Cortes and the Crown under Carlos II were shaped by war and war finance, preferring instead to see a more timeless clash between royal (aspirations to) absolutism and rival conceptions of government. ¹¹⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, passim. ¹¹⁸ Itself reacting against recent historical trends, and with a clear ideological and political purpose, Franco’s regime sought to redirect historical studies in Spain after the Civil War towards the country’s catholic imperial past. Cf. B. W. Diffie, ‘The Ideology of Hispanidad’, HAHR, 23 (1943), 457 ff. ¹¹⁹ R. Pérez Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, is useful but perhaps the best way to understand the imperial system is by means of a detailed and more narrowly focused monograph study, such as L. Ribot García, Revuelta Antiespañola de Mesina. ¹²⁰ ‘Hacienda y grupos de presión en el siglo XVII’, in B. Bennassar et al., Estado, Hacienda y Sociedad en la Historia de España (Valladolid, 1989), 97. ¹²¹ Cf. the otherwise excellent D. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 1589–1665. Reconstruction and Defeat (Cambridge, 1997). ¹²² On this cf. P. Fernández Albaladejo, ‘“Soldados del Rey, soldados de Dios”. Ethos militar y militarismo en la España del siglo XVIII’, in La Espada y la Pluma. II mondo militare nella Lombardia

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

Carlos II and his ministers were committed to the defence of the Monarchy; to upholding the exclusion of foreigners from the Indies and the Indies trade;¹²³ and to the maintenance of great power status. For some, the determination to retain Flanders is explicable only in terms of dynasticism.¹²⁴ However, while this was of some importance, the Low Countries also acted as a brake on France,¹²⁵ because of the threat it posed.¹²⁶ Some Spaniards hoped to recover previous losses.¹²⁷ This commitment to empire influenced Spanish policy throughout the reign,¹²⁸ and ensured that Spain played a crucial role in putting together the anti-French coalitions which finally restrained Louis XIV.¹²⁹ One of the reasons why Carlos II was able both to find allies and to retain his own territories was that he had substantial forces (armies and fleets) at his disposal. For these reasons, Spanish ministers expected their king and his wishes to be taken seriously in, for example, allied peace negotiations.¹³⁰ Nor did they take lightly, or regard as inevitable, imperial setbacks: the shocking loss of Cartagena de Indias in 1697 prompted a major investigation in order to explain this disaster.¹³¹ The demands imposed by the almost constant wars fought by Carlos II cannot be compared with the demands facing Spain in the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, they were substantial. Carlos II’s subjects therefore continued to be asked to supply men and money in a way that is only now beginning to be fully aknowledged by historians. During the Nine Years War, for example, the city of Granada faced a great flood of demands.¹³² These demands, in turn, put pressure on Spain’s political system. Unfortunately, most historians, because they have underestimated the extent of Spain’s commitment and contribution, have also failed to acknowledge the extent to which Spanish politics and society were shaped by war in the last third of the seventeeth century. This failure to take into account the imperial struggle and the larger Monarchy is apparent in the spagnola cinquecentescha. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Pavia 16, 17, 18 ottobre 1997 (Lucca, 2000), 90–1. ¹²³ Belegno to Doge and Senate, 1 May 1669, CSPV, 1669–70 (London, 1937), 46. ¹²⁴ Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La crise intérieure’, 158–9. ¹²⁵ Consulta of [1691], P. Gan Giménez, ‘Corpus documental del arzobispo-presidente-virrey Ibañez de la Riba’, CN, 11 (1980), 129. ¹²⁶ C. Ekberg, ‘From Dutch to European War: Louis XIV and Louvois are Tested’, French Historical Studies, 10 (1974), 399. ¹²⁷ M. Herrero Sánchez, El Acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés (1648–1678) (Madrid, 2000), 87 ff. The Spaniards took the opportunity to insist on the recovery of Maastricht in their alliance with the Dutch—although they did not secure it. ¹²⁸ According to the English envoy in Madrid, in early 1694 French peace proposals, communicated to the Spanish Court by the king of Denmark, were considered by a committee of the Councils of State and War in Carlos II’s presence and rejected, Stanhope to Trenchard, 3 Feb. 1694, SP 94/73 f. 246. ¹²⁹ Baxter, William III, 90–2. ¹³⁰ Marquis of Borgomanero to count Kinsky, 8 Jan. 1695, Vienna, Koninklijk Huisarchief (Hague), XI/g/53. ¹³¹ McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, 24 ff. This seems at odds with McFarlane’s later assertion, 27, that government in Madrid drifted in the last decade of the hapless Carlos II. ¹³² Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación’, 54.

Introduction

15

otherwise ground-breaking revisionist history of the reign published by Henry Kamen in 1980. It is also apparent in much of the historical work published in Spain since the death of Franco and the establishment of the system of autonomous regions—encouraging research and publication on local subjects which, for the most part, ignore the larger picture.¹³³

SOURCES Spain may no longer have enjoyed hegemony in the later seventeenth century, but that did not mean it was inactive or unsuccessful on the European or global stage. On the contrary, it was surprisingly successful. The succeeding chapters explore the foundations of the resilience of Spain and its empire in the later seventeenth century. Chapter 1 considers Spain’s armies, their composition, recruitment, supply, function, and so on. Chapter 2 does the same for Spain’s navies. Chapter 3 looks at Spain’s efforts to finance its military and naval effort in these decades. Chapter 4 considers politics and government; and Chapter 5, the relationship between centre and periphery.¹³⁴ Too often, evidence for the state of Spain in the later seventeenth century is drawn from hostile, or otherwise very negative, foreign observers, including the despatches from Madrid of William III’s very critical English envoy, Alexander Stanhope.¹³⁵ The observations of foreigners—including, during the Nine Years War, those of the French agent, the Marquise de Gudanes—are important.¹³⁶ But we need to make greater use of the Spanish materials for Spain’s history in this period. The sources available for such a study are vast, even overwhelming, and still largely untapped. Foremost among these are the state papers (records of the Council of State) held in the Archivo General at Simancas and (in much smaller volume) in the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid; and the records of other government agencies, notably the Councils of Castile, Finance, Italy, and War, located in those two archives, and which remain abundant despite substantial destruction during the Napoleonic and Spanish civil wars.¹³⁷ Some use has also been made of the archives of the council of the Indies, located in Seville. In addition to these official records, resort was had to the archives of a number of town councils in Castile (Burgos and Valladolid) and to some private correspondence ¹³³ Cf. the closing remarks of I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Patronato Real e Integración Política en las Ciudades Castellanas bajo los Austrias’, in J. I. Fortea Pérez (ed.), Imágenes de la Diversidad. El mundo urbano en la Corona de Castilla (S. XVI–XVIII) (Santander, 1997), 496. ¹³⁴ Initially, this study included a chapter on Spanish diplomacy between 1665 and 1700. Unfortunately, that chapter had to be dropped for lack of space. I hope to publish that material elsewhere. ¹³⁵ Lord Mahon (ed.), Spain under Charles, passim. ¹³⁶ Martin, A., ‘Letters de la Marquise de Gudanes 1693–1695’, Revue Hispanique, 47 (1919), 383–541. ¹³⁷ Cf. Kalnein, Juan José, 299, on war-related destruction at Zaragoza (1809) and Huesca (1937–8).

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

both published and unpublished, and now in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, including that of the duke of Villahermosa, governor-general of Flanders, and viceroy of Catalonia. Outside Spain, use has also been made of the reports of foreign envoys, particularly those in the Archivio di Stato in Turin from the representatives of the duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II. In the Nine Years War the duke looked to Spain for assistance of all kinds, and his representatives in Madrid and Naples (and elsewhere) were necessarily alert to developments in Spain and could be more positive than, say, Stanhope. The survival of Spain as empire and ‘great power’ in the later seventeenth century is an enormous subject and it is as well to state at the outset the limits of the present study. Too often, Spanish history (and that of Spain in Europe) and that of Spanish America in the early modern period are considered separately.¹³⁸ This book seeks to include both, but focuses primarily on Europe. There are good reasons for this. Above all, apart from the problem of the buccaneers in the 1680s, the major threat to the Monarchy occurred in Europe, and it was there that Carlos II and his ministers made their greatest efforts, since foreign powers did not—for the most part—attempt major assaults on the Spanish overseas empire.¹³⁹ Before continuing, however, we need to define terms. The term Spain, while generally used, is perhaps too loose, and does not allow us to distinguish the contribution and roles of Castile (Old and New Castile and Andalusia) and Aragon (to say nothing of various other territories in Spain, including Asturias, Navarre, and Vizcaya); many who find the word Spain inadequate prefer to refer to ‘Hispania’ and things ‘hispanic’.¹⁴⁰ Similar problems arise in seeking to describe the larger ‘empire’. Simplest, no doubt, would be to call it the Spanish empire. However, this was not the contemporary usage, which preferred the Catholic Monarchy—a reference less to religious attitudes than to the title bestowed by Alexander VI on Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, the Catholic kings, at the end of the fifteenth century.¹⁴¹ In what follows, the terms used will be what seem most appropriate in the context. Throughout, the Spanish monarch is referred to as Carlos II, not least in order to avoid any confusion with his contemporary, Charles II of England and Scotland.

¹³⁸ Cf. the pertinent observations of J. H. Elliott, Spain and its World 1500–1700 (New Haven, 1989), 3; and Lane, ‘Buccaneers and Coastal Defense’, 145. ¹³⁹ P. Bakewell, A History of Latin America (Oxford, 1997), 215. ¹⁴⁰ J. Vicens Vives, Aproximación a la Historia de España (Barcelona, 1960), as noted by F. X. Tapia, in review of the English translation, HAHR, 49 (1969), 126. ¹⁴¹ A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Gobernadores, agentes y corporaciones: la Corte de Madrid y el estado de Milán (1669–1675)’, in G. Signorotto (ed.), L’Italia degli Austrias: Monarchia cattolica e domini italiani nei secoli XVI e XVII, special issue of Cheiron, anno IX, 17–18, trimester 1992 (Mantua, 1993), 183, 254.

1 Spain’s Armies Bedloe . . . said further that 10,000 Spaniards were to land . . . which was very improbable, Spain not having men at this time to supply and defend their territories, either at home or abrode, which gave France soe great advantage against it. Sir John Reresby, 18 Nov. 1678¹

INTRODUCTION In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the celebrated and distinctive tercios—moulded in the wars of the Catholic kings and Carlos I (Charles V)²— underpinned Spain’s rise to apparent European hegemony. However, the defeat of those forces at Rocroi in Flanders in 1643 appeared to mark the start of Spain’s military decline.³ Decline took various forms. For one thing, Spain’s armed forces, which had risen to a peak of perhaps 200,000 in the 1630s, shrank thereafter, to maybe 70,000 in the 1670s,⁴ when Carlos II struggled to assemble in Sicily 15,000 men against the Messina rebels and their French allies,⁵ and thereafter effectively withered away.⁶ To all appearances, by 1700 Spain’s armies had virtually ceased to exist.⁷ This was the more striking because the armies of other states were ¹ Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, ed. A. Browning, 2nd edn., ed. M. K. Geiter and W. A. Speck. (London, 1991), 159–60. ² J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain (London, 1961), 133–4; R. Quatrefages, ‘The Military System of the Spanish Habsburgs’, in R. Bañón Martinez and T. M. Barker (eds.), Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present (Boulder, Col., 1988), 1 ff. ³ G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 2004), 260–1. ⁴ G. Parker, ‘The “Military Revolution 1560–1660”— a Myth?’, JMH, 48, (1976), 195–214 repr. in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder and Oxford, 1995), 44; J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven and London, 1986), 509; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Domestic Resource Mobilization and the Downing Thesis. War and the State in Spain in the mid-17th century’, in E. Martínez Ruiz and M. de Pazzis Pi Corrales (eds.), Spain and Sweden in the Baroque Era (1600–1660) (nd, np), 284. ⁵ L. Ribot García, La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina (1674–1678) (Madrid, 2002), 194 ff. ⁶ Glete, War and the State, 95, claims that the army of Flanders ‘was left to wither away’ after 1659. ⁷ A. Espino López, ‘El Declinar Militar Hispánico durante el Reinado de Carlos II’, SHHM, 20 (1999), 198; R. García Cárcel, Felipe V y los Españoles (Barcelona, 2002), 170.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

expanding: at the height of the Nine Years War, for example, Louis XIV’s forces totalled well over 400,000 men on paper.⁸ But this was not all. While the armies of other states improved their organization and weaponry, that of Spain—which had pioneered many of the improvements in the way armies operated in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries⁹—apparently stagnated under Carlos II.¹⁰ Finally, and inevitably, the Spanish armies sustained repeated defeat: in Flanders, in Italy, in Africa, and—in Spain itself—in Catalonia. The decline of Spanish military might struck Spaniards and non-Spaniards alike. Foreigners who had once admired and feared the king of Spain’s forces, now scorned them. Successive Venetian ambassadors to Madrid, and exasperated foreign allies, lamented Spain’s military unpreparedness,¹¹ as did Carlos’s own subjects.¹² In part, it is this apparent collapse which necessitated Philip V’s military reforms after 1700: these included the abandonment of outmoded weapons (arquebus, musket, and pike) and tactics in favour of more up-to-date ones; and the replacement of such emblematic institutions as the tercio, abolished in 1704 in favour of the regiment. In effect, the Bourbon regime was implementing the modernization which, in this crucial sector of state activity, had been neglected by Carlos II.¹³ A belief that the reigns of Philip IV and Philip V were of greater importance in implementing military reform; that imperial defence was, in this as in the financial sphere (Chapter 3), less burdensome; and that Spain’s armies were insignificant after Rocroi helps explain why, in contrast with the period before 1665, Spain’s forces thereafter have been neglected by historians.¹⁴ The armies deployed by Carlos II were certainly less impressive in many respects than those of some of his predecessors and of some—by no means all—of his contemporaries; and, in part because of this, the Monarchy relied, as it had not done before, on the military ⁸ J. Lynn, ‘Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siècle, 1610–1715’, in Rogers, Military Revolution, 128, 131. ⁹ Parker, Army of Flanders, 133 ff.; D. Maffi, ‘L’Amministrazione della Finanza Militare nella Lombardia Spagnola: I Veedores e i Contadores dell’Esercito (1536–1700)’, Storia Economica, 5 (2002), 105. ¹⁰ L. Ribot García, ‘Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain’, in P. Contamine (ed.), War and Competition between States (Oxford, 2000)’, 63. Inevitably, the exemplar of ‘progress’ is the army of Louis XIV, cf. G. Satterfield, Princes, Posts and Partisans. The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678) (Leiden, 2003), 30. Spain is an almost constant exception to general improvement identified in F. Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern Europe (London, 1992), 9, 12. ¹¹ H. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700–1715 (London, 1969), 57. ¹² In 1695 Orihuela (Alicante) claimed that its fortifications wanted repair and artillery, E. G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (Madison, 1983), 42. ¹³ Kamen, War of Succession, 61–2; F. Andújar Castillo, Los militares en la España del siglo XVIII. Un estudio social (Granada, 1991), 33 ff.; and C. de Castro, A la sombra de Felipe V. José de Grimaldo, ministro responsable (1703–1726) (Madrid, 2004), 79 ff., 173 ff. Carlos II’s reign saw no major military ordinances comparable to those of 1632 or 1768. ¹⁴ Most accounts of the wars of the later seventeenth century either ignore or dismiss Spain’s input. Typically, S. Baxter, William III (London, 1966), omits the Spanish contribution at the battle of Fleurus (1690), 267, and to the 1693 campaign in Flanders, 312 ff. The excellent A. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio sobre la Decadencia de Castilla. La ciudad de Valladolid en el siglo XVII (Valladolid, 1989), discusses the impact of levies to 1660, but ignores those thereafter.

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19

support of allies, exemplified by the presence of Dutch garrisons in the so-called Barrier Fortresses of Spanish Flanders at the end of the reign.¹⁵ However, the Monarchy continued to maintain a sizeable military establishment (below), one which demands investigation, to clarify Spain’s contribution to the struggle against Louis XIV, to explain Spain’s survival as an imperial power, and to restore a missing dimension to Spain’s ‘domestic’ history in the period. This chapter seeks to identify the size of Carlos II’s army, or armies, the means used to recruit men, and the Monarchy’s general capacity to wage war on land, drawing primarily on the records of the Councils of State and War at Simancas. Unfortunately, these are extremely rich but not easy to use;¹⁶ none the less they are the foundation of any serious study of Carlos II’s armies.

COMMITMENTS AND ARMIES A scattered empire needed a ‘grand strategy’, if only to ensure the best use of scarce military resources.¹⁷ In Carlos II’s reign an essentially conservative strategy centred on the defence of territories from which Carlos derived resources and prestige, and which provided external bulwarks whose ultimate purpose was the preservation of Spain itself. Thus, French troops tied down in Flanders could not be deployed in the peninsula.¹⁸ The Italian territories played a similar role: if Naples, Sicily, the so-called Tuscan presidios (Orbitello, Piombino, and Porto Longone),¹⁹ and the garrison at Finale, in Liguria, ‘the only door Your Majesty has to enter the Milanese from Spain’,²⁰ were lost then Milan was threatened; and if Milan fell, then Louis XIV’s forces in the south could be concentrated on the ¹⁵ R. De Schrijver, ‘De Eerste Staatse Barriere in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (1697–1701)’, Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 18 (1963–4), 65 ff. ¹⁶ The difficulty is twofold: the sheer volume of material and the lack of adequate catalogues. Typically, the number of legajos, or bundles of consultas (advice papers) generated by the sección de Tierra (responsible for the land forces) of the Council of War averaged about 30 a year for most of Carlos II’s reign, fewer than between 1635 and 1668 but still considerable. Each legajo contains between 50 and 100 individual consultas (with associated papers) on different matters. Unfortunately, the absence of detailed catalogues makes these abundant materials difficult to use. The probability of chance discoveries is high but that of being able to pursue a given issue for a number of years is low. ¹⁷ Cf. G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, 1998); and P. C. Allen, Philip II and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621. The Failure of Grand Strategy (New Haven and London, 2000), pp. ix, 1–2. ¹⁸ In 1668 Carlos II’s mother urged on the Dutch the importance to them of the Spanish Low Countries, to ensure they supported Spain’s continued presence there, Mariana to Gamarra, 25 Mar. 1668, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 50–2. Cf. J. I. Israel, ‘Olivares, the Cardinal-Infante and Spain’s strategy in the Low Countries (1635–1643): The Road to Rocroi’, in R.L. Kagan and G. Parker (eds.), Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World. Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott (Cambridge, 1995), 267 ff. ¹⁹ J. Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, ‘Razón de Estado y Geostrategia en la Política Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677–81)’, BR AH, CLXXIII (1976), 352. ²⁰ CCS, 25 Sept. 1691, AGS/E/3415/74. Cf. C. Storrs, ‘The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665–1700) (Part II)’, War in History, 5/1 (1998), 14–15.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

Pyrenean border with Spain itself. In Spain, Catalonia must be defended because its loss might be followed by that of Aragon, and even of Castile and Andalusia. As for Spain’s north African outposts: as long as they were held, the Moroccan threat was kept at bay across the Straits of Gibraltar; if they fell, the Reconquista completed in 1492 might be overturned. Outside Europe, Spain’s position in the Americas must be maintained because of its contribution to the Monarchy’s finances (Chapter 3). However, the Americas took second place to Europe, where the major threat to Spanish dominion (in terms of forces deployed) occurred. Priority was therefore given to Catalonia, Flanders, and Milan, although opinions sometimes differed about which of these must come first.²¹ Prestige, or reputación, and a desire to be able to decide strategic questions in terms of Spanish interests, rather than being dictated to by allies, also required Carlos II to have his own armies: in 1675, the duke of Infantado declared that Spain could insist on nothing in an allied army in Flanders to which it contributed so little. ²² The armies of Carlos II were smaller than those of some earlier Spanish monarchs and than those of some of his contemporaries, but we should not exaggerate their reduced size. Unfortunately, determining precisely how many troops the king had at his disposal is extremely difficult, because there was often a significant gap between the number of men officially in his pay and the number of what contemporaries called ‘effectives’. In the autumn of 1668, for example, the army of Flanders was said to include nearly 53,000 infantry, only 42,000 of whom were effectives.²³ Discovering the exact number of men (and combating the fraud which, in part, lay behind the discrepancy) was largely the responsibility of the inspector-general, or veedor general, and pay office, of each army; their main weapon was the regular review, or muestra, usually carried out at the beginning and end of the campaign season.²⁴ Following one such review, in February 1677 the duke of Villahermosa, governor of Flanders, declared that only 7,484 officers and men could be regarded as effective in the 11 Spanish tercios in the army of Flanders, and that—since this figure included many boys, sick, and old men— only 5,000 were fit for service.²⁵ This system of control was by no means perfect.²⁶ Nevertheless, the official figures, provided they are used with caution, reveal much about the size and composition of Carlos II’s armed forces.²⁷ ²¹ In 1674–5 the admiral [of Castile] and the duke of Alburquerque urged giving priority to Sicily rather than Catalonia, Ribot, Monarquía, 259; Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part II)’, 6–7. ²² CCS, 22 July 1675, AGS/E/2129. Cf. CJDF, 24 Dec. 1691, AGS/E/3885, Quirós to CII, 15 May 1699, and same to cardinal Portocarrero, 3 Feb. 1700, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 696–7, 728–9; and CCS, 1 July 1699, AGS/E/3894. ²³ Constable [of Castile] to Mariana, 10 Oct. 1668, AGS/E/2108. ²⁴ Maffi, ‘L’Amministrazione Militare’, 56–7, 62–4. ²⁵ Villahermosa to CII, 17 Feb. 1677, and Resumen de la muestra general, ASGS/E/2133. ²⁶ In 1691 the king ordered the dismissal of army officers and officials of the pay office involved in fraud, CII to Gastañaga, 26 July 1691, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 532; Botello to Leganés, 6 Sept. 1691, AGS/E/3415/136. ²⁷ At least one Spanish minister thought the musters of the forces of Carlos II more rigorous than those of the armies of Louis XIV, CCS [Feb. 1681], AGS/E/3866.

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21

On Carlos’s accession, Spain’s major defence commitment was the war against the renascent Portuguese state, a struggle abandoned in 1668, after which Portugal was a lesser concern. Thereafter, Carlos maintained three major armies and various other, smaller, fighting forces, reflecting the commitments and strategic vision outlined above. The most important army remained that of Flanders, created with the duke of Alba’s dispatch to Flanders by Philip II in 1567 to suppress the ‘Dutch Revolt’, and which had peaked at nearly 90,000 men in 1640. Reduced following the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, according to Parker the army of Flanders had dwindled to a permanent peacetime footing, or planta, of just 11,000 men by the end of Philip IV’s reign.²⁸ While broadly true, this overlooks what Mariana of Austria, Carlos II, and their ministers both aimed at and achieved in Flanders in wartime after 1665. Following Louis XIV’s invasion of the Low Countries in 1667, the number of troops in Flanders rose to almost 53,000 early in 1668, and to almost 63,000 later that year.²⁹ Peace in 1668 was followed by the usual post-war ‘reform’, but Spain’s participation in the Dutch War saw the army of Flanders again expand, peaking at over 53,000 men in 1675.³⁰ However, the resources of the Spanish system were already being diverted to the reconquest of Messina; not surprisingly the army of Flanders shrank between 1675 and 1678. There were proposals following the end of the Dutch War for a peacetime establishment in the Spanish Low Countries of 29,000–40,000 men, but these proved abortive.³¹ The need to expand the army of Flanders acquired greater urgency following the outbreak of the Nine Years War, with plans in 1691–2 for a planta of 45,000 men (32,600 infantry and 13,200 cavalry/dragoons),³² but this proved too ambitious.³³ The end of that conflict in 1697 was followed by ‘reform’: in December 1698 Carlos II ordered the implementation of a reduction to just under 20,000 men.³⁴ In 1699, comprising less than 8,000 of the king’s own troops (plus a nominal 10,500 troops of the elector of Bavaria), the army of Flanders was certainly much smaller than c.1640. However, it should be noted that Spain was at peace in Europe in 1699, that other states also reduced their forces in peacetime,³⁵ and that the army of Flanders remained one of the most ²⁸ All figures to 1664 from Parker, Army of Flanders, 231. Of Carlos II’s three main armies, that of Flanders is the most neglected, but cf. E. Rooms, ‘Bezoldiging, bevoorrading en inkwartiering van de koninklijke troepen in de Spaanse Nederlanden (1567–1700)’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen Gescheidenis van Nederland, 118 (2003), 519–44. ²⁹ Constable to Mariana, 30 Jan., and 1 and 13 Feb. 1669, AGS/E/2109; D. Maffi, ‘Il Potere delle Armi. La Monarchia spagnola e: suoi eserciti (1635–1700: una rivisitazione del mito della decadenza’, in RSI, cxviii (2006), 388–439, Table II. ³⁰ Summary of reviews held Feb.–Mar. 1675, 3 Apr. 1675, AGS/E/2128. The infantry totalled 36,716 infantry (officers and men) and the horse 11,427 (officers, men, and ‘refomed’). Another 2,600 infantry were being raised. ³¹ CCS, Jan. 1680, AGS/E/3865. ³² CJDF, 24 Dec. 1691, AGS/E/3885, and 24 April 1693, AGS/E/3887, and Extracto de diferentes cartas, AGS/E/3885. Originally, the Council of State proposed 40,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. ³³ However, Espino, Catalunya, 211, may underestimate (18,000 in 1695) the size of that force. ³⁴ Balanze, and copy of royal order of 5 Dec. 1698, Add. 22,503 ff. 267–8 and 269–70. ³⁵ J. Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689–1702 (Manchester, 1987), 189 ff.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

imposing forces about the Lower Rhine: it underpinned Carlos II’s military role as head of the Circle of Burgundy in the imperial defence system,³⁶ and remained a potential support—and threat—to neighbouring princes and states.³⁷ Carlos II’s second main fighting force was the army of Lombardy, or Milan, which effectively dated from Emperor Charles V’s acquisition of that duchy in 1535, and which had peaked at 35,000 in 1640, declining thereafter to 15,000–20,000 for most of the 1640s and 1650s.³⁸ The Peace of the Pyrenees was followed by ‘reform’.³⁹ In 1661 the army of Lombardy was fixed at 6,000 men (4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry), and it has been suggested that—like the army of Flanders—the army of Lombardy totalled little more than 10,000 men throughout the reign of Carlos II.⁴⁰ However, the army of Lombardy continued to fluctuate in size, according to whether Spain was at war, or anticipating it.⁴¹ It never fell below 10,000 men, and on occasion (1684, 1693, 1694–6), totalled more than twice that figure.⁴² In the winter of 1690–1 the governor of Milan, the count of Fuensalida, proposed that the army of Lombardy be increased to more than 30,000 (25,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 2,000 dragons), a level not achieved since 1635.⁴³ This proved too ambitious, but numbers may have reached 25,000 in 1696.⁴⁴ The end of the war was followed by the reduction of the army of Lombardy, in part in response to pressure from the Milanese.⁴⁵ It was therefore much reduced on Carlos II’s death in peacetime in 1700; but, like its counterpart in Flanders, remained the largest and best fighting force in the region,⁴⁶ underpinning Spanish dominion and influence there, and capable of expansion if necessary in time of war. Spain’s third main fighting force was the army of Catalonia, the only one of the three located in the Iberian peninsula and effectively dating from the opening of war against France in 1635.⁴⁷ The fluctuations in its size broadly mirrored those ³⁶ Cf. C. Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies? The Spanish Monarchy and Germany in the Reign of the Last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, 1665–1700’, in C. Kent, T. K. Wolber, and C. M. K. Hewitt (eds.), The Lion and the Eagle. Interdisciplinary Essays on German–Spanish Relations over the Centuries (New York and Oxford, 2000), 110. In 1697 Carlos II was asked for 4,000 troops in this guise, CII to Max Emmanuel, 5 Jul. 1697, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 657. ³⁷ In 1685 Carlos II’s ambassador in London suggested offering James II 4,000 men of the army of Flanders, to crush Monmouth’s rebellion, CCS, 3 Aug. 1685, AGS/E/4134. ³⁸ L. Ribot García, ‘Milán, Plaza de Armas de la Monarquía’, IH, 10 (1990), 203 ff.; M. Rizzo, ‘Centro spagnolo e periferia Lombarda nell’impero asburgico tra Cinque e Settecento’, RSI, CIV (1992), 325 ff. ³⁹ Ribot, ‘Milan’, 221–2. ⁴⁰ Rizzo, ‘Centro’, 328. ⁴¹ Cf. memoria of reformed units since 1659 [1693], AGS/E/3418/69. ⁴² Cf. D. Maffi, ‘Nobilta e Carriera delle Armi nela Milano di Carlo II (1665–1700)’ (in press), 8. ⁴³ CCS, 9 Jan. 1691, on Fuensalida’s proposal, AGS/E/3414/17–19. ⁴⁴ Espino, ‘Declinar’, 181. ⁴⁵ Operti to ST, 16 May 1697, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ⁴⁶ In 1685 the forces of the Genoese republic were put at just 3,500 (although 10,000 men were needed to garrison the capital alone in time of need), memoir, AGS/E/3621/13. ⁴⁷ A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el reinado de Carlos II. Política y Guerra en la frontera catalana 1679–1697 (Barcelona, 1999), 33. The army of Catalonia was put on a new footing in the principality following its return to Habsburg allegiance in 1652, ibid., 45.

Spain’s Armies

23

of the two armies discussed above;⁴⁸ however, in contrast with the army of Flanders and the army of Lombardy, 1697—the year of the siege of Barcelona— was one of expansion, men being diverted from both the Low Countries and the Milanese to Catalonia.⁴⁹ As elsewhere, peace offered the opportunity to reduce the burden: the viceroy of Catalonia, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, proposed an establishment of 25,000 men at the end of 1697, but the army of Catalonia was substantially reduced at the death of Carlos II.⁵⁰ These three ‘core’ armies were not Spain’s only military forces. In Spain itself, troops were also needed along the extended coastline, to defend Barcelona, Cartagena, Gibraltar, Malaga, and other places which were increasingly vulnerable to French seapower.⁵¹ At the western end of the Pyrenees, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and the kingdom of Navarre—whose capital, Pamplona, was described in 1672 as the antemural of Spain, on whose defence depended the entire Monarchy⁵²—must also be defended. The role of these three territories in Spain’s early modern wars has understandably been overshadowed by that of Catalonia at the eastern, Mediterranean, end of the Pyrenees, and for good reason: the war in the west was generally a muted affair, although Navarre was briefly invaded in 1684. Some of Carlos II’s ministers would have liked to escalate the war in Navarre. They included the admiral of Castile, who, in 1689, argued that Spain’s mistake in the war against Portugal had been to not wage war on all fronts, and who urged a vigorous effort in the western Pyrenees. The marquis of Mancera agreed, but believed that until Carlos II had 3,000–4,000 veteran infantrymen and 1,500 cavalry there it would be wrong to carry the war from Navarre into France.⁵³ Equally gloomy assessments characterized discussion in December 1691—and again a year later—of William III’s proposal of a joint expedition across the Pyrenees into Guienne. As before, Spanish ministers recognized the advantages of the project but feared the consequences of defeat; they vetoed the proposals.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya must be defended.⁵⁵ In the west, Carlos and his ministers also needed to man the frontier with Portugal. Peace with Portugal meant that Spain no longer needed a large army of Estremadura, which had totalled 15,000 in 1661.⁵⁶ The five Castilian provincial tercios (of Valladolid and Burgos, Madrid, Cordoba, Toledo, and Seville), which had been raised in 1637 but ‘fixed’ or made ⁴⁸ In 1690 the marquis of la Granja, Comisario General de Infantería, proposed a planta of just over 23,000 men, Espino, Catalunya, 239. ⁴⁹ Ibid., 210. ⁵⁰ Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt to [?], 14 Dec. 1697, AGS/E/4182. ⁵¹ In 1677 the establishment of Gibraltar was 500 infantry and 50 horse, AGS/E/1947/213. In 1693, a muster revealed 412 troops there: duke of Sessa to [?], 31 May 1693, AGS/GA/2913. ⁵² CCamara, 7 May 1672, AHN/Consejos/4445/79. ⁵³ CCS, June 1689, AGS/E/4137. ⁵⁴ CJDF, 17 Dec 1691, AGS/E/3885, and 10 Oct. 1692, AGS/E/3886. The duke of Montalto observed that opening operations there in 1638 had led to the loss of Catalonia and Portugal. ⁵⁵ In 1672 the peacetime establishment of the fortress of Pamplona comprised 100 plazas, or men, and 8 artillerymen, CCamara, 7 May 1672, AHN/Consejos/4445/79; and in 1677 the combined establishment of San Sebastián and Fuenterrabía was put at 900 plazas, and that of Navarre at 500, AGS/E/1947/213. Cf. CCW, 2 and 11 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2913. ⁵⁶ White, ‘Los tercios en España: el combate’, SHHM, 19 (1998), 162.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

permanent only from 1664, and which were stationed on that border, were therefore withdrawn to Castille in 1669 (in part to forestall a coup attempt by Don Juan of Austria, Chapter 4)⁵⁷—rather than being suppressed as might otherwise have occurred—and henceforth provided the core of Carlos II’s forces in Castile and the peninsula.⁵⁸ However, anxieties about Portugal persisted in Madrid, and the king still had to maintain some troops on that border.⁵⁹ Outside Spain, Carlos II and his ministers also had to provide for the African garrisons: Ceuta, Oran, La Mamora, Larache, and Melilla. In 1677 it was calculated that the garrisons of Spain and Africa together totalled 10,323 men,⁶⁰ and in early 1695 there were said to be 4,000 men in garrison in the besieged Ceuta alone.⁶¹ Carlos II also had to garrison the Tuscan presidios,⁶² together with Naples and Sicily, which, since the late sixteenth century, had each had a resident Spanish tercio of 3,000 infantry.⁶³ Again, in wartime, the establishment could be greatly enlarged, as occurred in Naples and Sicily during and after the Messina War.⁶⁴ Sardinia, too, had to be provided for.⁶⁵ Last, but by no means least, the fleet needed troops: in 1677 the armada off Messina carried more than 2,000 infantry.⁶⁶ Outside Europe, Carlos II also needed to look to the defence of Spanish America. The Indies were increasingly obliged to defend themselves in the seventeenth century. In 1668–70, following Morgan’s attacks on the isthmus of Panama, the viceroy of Peru dispatched reinforcements there;⁶⁷ and between 1697 and 1700 the viceroys of Peru and New Spain sent men to Cartagena to oust the French, and to Darien to expel the Scots.⁶⁸ Accordingly, measures were ⁵⁷ Maura, Vida, 124. Subsequently, Valenzuela may also have hoped to use these troops against Don Juan, A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes y clientelas: el mito de Sobrarbe, Juan José de Austria y el Reino paccionado de Aragón (1669–1678)’, Pedralbes, 12 (1992), 288. ⁵⁸ J. Contreras Gay, ‘La reorganización militar en la época de la decadencia española’, Millars. Espa i Història, 26 (2003), 148–9. Cf. CJM, 20 Nov. 1691, AGS/GA/2858. ⁵⁹ Rudio to Doge and Senate of Venice, 2 Nov. 1672, CSPV: 1671–2, 307–8; CCS, 22 Apr. 1681, AGS/E/3666; 11 Jan. 1690 AGS/E/3884; and 31 Oct. 1690, AGS/E/4037. ⁶⁰ AGS/E/1947/212, 213. Oran’s garrison was put at 1,700 plazas, that of Cadiz at 1,409, and that of Ceuta at 943. ⁶¹ Operti to ST, 21 Apr. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m.41; cf. J. Montes Ramos, El Ejército de Carlos II y Felipe V 1694–1727. El Sitio de Ceuta (Madrid, nd). ⁶² There were about 1,300 men in ‘Tuscany’ in May 1678, AGS/E/3302/202, and 3,000 in these garrisons in 1696, Leganés to duke of Medinaceli, 18 Apr. 1696, Casa Pilatos, Seville. ⁶³ Ribot, Monarquía, 123 ff. In 1696 there were just under 4,000 Spanish troops in the kingdom, T. Astarita, Aspetti dell’organizzazione militare nel Regno di Napoli alla fine del Viceregno Spagnuolo, tesi di laurea, Storia Moderna, Facolta di Lettere e Filosofia, Universita degli Studi di Napoli, anno academico 1982–83, 56. ⁶⁴ Ribot, ‘Provincias’, 107–9, and idem, Monarquía, 194 ff. ⁶⁵ In 1676 Carlos ordered the levy of 357 men, to accompany the new viceroy, the count of Santisteban, to Sardinia, to increase the Spanish tercio there to 500 [CII] to Gabriel Bernaldo De Quirós, 11 Feb. 1676, AGS/GA/2364. ⁶⁶ AGS/E/1947/239. ⁶⁷ G. Céspedes del Castillo, ‘La Defensa militar del istmo de Panamá a fines del siglo XVII y comienzos del XVIII’, AEA, 9 (1952), 260. ⁶⁸ Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 244–5, 261; C. Storrs, ‘Disaster at Darien (1698–1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs’, EHC, 29 (1999), 10 ff.

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taken to increase and improve local forces in the Indies.⁶⁹ However, before the establishment of a standing ‘army of America’ by Carlos III in the second half of the eighteenth century, those forces were rarely adequate to deal unaided with a serious threat.⁷⁰ Carlos II was therefore obliged to send troops to the Indies, particularly following serious incursions there. In 1671 the Council of State urged that 3,000 men be sent to the Americas following the loss of Panama;⁷¹ in 1676, men were levied in Andalusia for Florida (100 men), Cartagena (200), and Chile (200);⁷² in 1677, 1,000 men were sent to the Caribbean;⁷³ and in 1680, Carlos II ordered the captain-general of the Canaries to levy 1,000 men for the Indies.⁷⁴ Men and munitions continued to be dispatched from Spain thereafter, including 400 men in 1683,⁷⁵ at least 500 infantry sent to Cartagena in 1697,⁷⁶ and the expeditionary force sent to Darien in 1700.⁷⁷ Finally, large numbers of troops were often either awaiting transport to America, Flanders, Italy, and Catalonia from Spain’s Atlantic and Mediterranean ports (and vice versa), or in fact sailing—or marching—to the theatre or front where they were to serve. In March 1678, for example, 1,000 men were at Cadiz waiting to sail to Sicily;⁷⁸ that same year—and throughout Carlos II’s reign—men marched up and down the road which linked Milan with Finale and the rest of the Monarchy.⁷⁹ Carlos II’s various forces, the bulk of which were stationed outside the peninsula—suggesting that comments about the defenceless state of the peninsula in 1700 need to be regarded with caution—added up to a sizeable total. Between 1668 and 1697 Carlos may have had in his pay between 80,000 and 100,000 men from one year to the next.⁸⁰ In 1675 the king may have had under arms 100,000 men, almost as many as the Dutch Republic and Louis XIV, and far more than Charles II of England and Karl XI of Sweden;⁸¹ and in 1690 Carlos II’s ⁶⁹ Cf. list of garrisons, etc. [1699], AGI/Panamá/162 f. 53 ff.; and (for Mexico City, 1690s), L. N. McAlister, ‘The Reorganisation of the Army of New Spain, 1763–1766’, HAHR, 33 (1953), 4, 6. ⁷⁰ Cf. J. Marchena Fernández, ‘Las Levas de Soldados a Indias en la Baja Andalusía. Siglo XVII’, in Andalucía y America en el siglo XVII (Seville, 1984), 93 ff. Apparently, it was deliberate policy not to recruit in the Indies. ⁷¹ Contarini to Doge and Senate, 1 July and 26 Aug. 1671, CSPV: 1671–2, 81–2, 100. These men were to be drawn from the garrisons of Andalusia and Estremadura, to obtain veterans. ⁷² CII to President of the Casa de Contratación, 1 Feb. 1676, AGS/GA/2360. Cf. Z. Moutoukias, ‘Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires’, HAHR, 68 (1988), 781, for the dispatch of arms and troops to Buenos Aires and Chile. ⁷³ H. G. Bensusan, ‘The Spanish Struggle against Foreign Encroachment in the Caribbean,’ unpublished Ph. D. thesis,UCLA, 1970, 87. ⁷⁴ CCW, 28 Jan. 1681, AGS/GA/2608. ⁷⁵ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 98. ⁷⁶ Extracto de las Providencias, AGI/Panamá/161, f. 895 ff. ⁷⁷ Storrs, ‘Disaster’, 14 ff. Marchena Fernández, ‘Las Levas’, omits this levy. ⁷⁸ De Gubernatis to ST, 6 March 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 303. In 1692 1,400 men spent most of the campaign awaiting embarcation for Italy, Operti to ST, 11 Sept. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38 ⁷⁹ Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy’ (1998), 15–16. ⁸⁰ Maffi, ‘Nobiltà e Carriera’ 3. ⁸¹ The English peacetime army in the 1670s totalled less than 9,000 men and still stood at only 25,000 in 1678, J. Childs, ‘Monmouth and the Army in Flanders’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, (1974), 3 ff.

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representative at The Hague expected his master to maintain almost 80,000 men in Catalonia, Flanders, and Lombardy alone.⁸² While far fewer than the 170,000 maintained by Philip IV c.1635 and less impressive than the forces of some other princes and states, Carlos II’s armies were not insignificant. Carlos found allies not just because Spain was thought to be weak. It was, in part, because the last Spanish Habsburg had various armies at his disposal that he was—and was regarded as— an invaluable addition to any anti-French coalition, helping to frustrate Louis XIV’s anticipated conquest of the Dutch Republic in 1672–3.⁸³ The king and his ministers sometimes failed to fulfil their promises to their allies, or to achieve their own targets, but they still aimed to maintain large numbers of men under arms— and sometimes did so—such that Spain’s contribution to the struggle against Louis XIV was by no means, or always, inferior to that of its allies.⁸⁴

LOSS OF MILITARY MANPOWER Keeping these forces up to strength was a major challenge, given the significant wastage of men. Attrition resulted from three main causes: death or capture in action; ill health; and desertion. That Carlos II’s armies lost considerable numbers in combat is indicated in Table 1. Besides these losses in major engagements, men were also lost in numerous lesser operations.⁸⁵ Carlos II’s forces were also vulnerable to capture in transit: in 1677, 300 men sailing from Galicia to Flanders were taken prisoner.⁸⁶ Prisonersof-war were often recovered by exchange agreements, or cartels, including that concluded in 1691 for the exchange of those lost at Larache in 1689,⁸⁷ and that agreed in Catalonia in 1695.⁸⁸ Exchange did not always work smoothly. In 1677 the French initially refused to return the 300 Spanish troops captured en route to Flanders (above), although a cartel had been agreed; it was claimed that the governor of Spanish Flanders had wrongly detained a French officer; in fact, ⁸² Account of session of Hague congress of 20 Mar. 1690, AGS/E/3989. This was almost identical to the Dutch contribution. In 1695 the armies of Catalonia, Flanders, and Lombardy alone still totalled 50,000, Espino, ‘Declinar’, 180–2. This figure omits, among other troops, the 7,600 men—on paper—in garrisons in the Caribbean, Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 151–2. ⁸³ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 192; Notes by Williamson [Aug.–Sept. 1677] on Spain’s deployment of its troops in defence of the Dutch Republic in 1672–3, CSPD: 1677–8, 540–2. Cf. Baxter, William III, 90, for the anxiety of Louis XIV about Spain in 1672. ⁸⁴ In 1692 the army of Lombardy contributed 7,000 of the almost 27,000 allied troops which invaded Dauphiné, more than 25% of the total, cf. Estat, [1692], SP8/13/94; in 1695 the army of Lombardy contributed two-thirds of the allied force which besieged Casale, Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy (Part I), 382. ⁸⁵ Up to 100 men may have been killed, and 80 captured in an encounter near Ghent in 1675, Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 162. ⁸⁶ Duke of Villahermosa to [Carlos II ?], 5 March 1677, AGS/E/2133. ⁸⁷ Stanhope to earl of Nottingham, 13 Sept. 1690 and 10 Jan. 1691, Spain under Charles, 8, 11. Soldiers were to be exchanged man for man, and 1 Spanish officer for 10 Moors. ⁸⁸ Stanhope to Galway, 19 May 1695, Kent RO/U1590/015/4.

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Spain’s Armies Table 1. Troops lost in action 1665–1700 Year

Action

Losses

1677

surrender of fortresses of Valenciennes, Cambrai, and St Omer, Flanders

13,000 men taken prisoner

1689

siege and loss of Larache, Africa

1,500 dead and 1,500 taken prisoner

1691

siege and loss of Seu d’Urgel, Catalonia

700 men taken prisoner

1693

battle of Neerwinden, Flanders

loss up to 8,000 men

1693

battle of Marsaglia, Piedmont

army of Lombardy lost over 3,300 men

1694

battle of the Ter, Catalonia

2,200 infantry and 200 horse

1697

siege of Barcelona

4,500 men of garrison died and another 800 wounded

Sources: CCS, 6 May 1677, AGS/E/2133; Friedman, Spanish Captives, 48, 94, and 101; Operti to VA, 21 June 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 72; Max Emmanuel to CII, 14 Aug. 1693, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 592; Relacíón, AGS/E/3656/3; Operti to VA, 17 June 1694, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40/127; A. Espino López, ‘Las tropas italianas en la defensa de Cataluña 1665–1698’, IH, 18 (1998), 74.

Louis XIV may also have hoped to exploit Carlos II’s difficulties in replacing his depleted forces in the Low Countries by not returning prisoners.⁸⁹ In general, however, the exchange system worked reasonably well, and often meant the recovery of prized veteran troops. Illness, too, was a serious drain of men. Indeed, more men were lost in this way than in action in Catalonia, accounting for between 17.8 and 56.7 per cent of all losses among various units serving there between 1673 and 1695.⁹⁰ But the problem was not confined to Catalonia. Ill health was the result of many different factors. In 1695, for example, Portuguese units serving at Ceuta fell sick and had to be replaced. Some blamed the outbreak on the fact that the men had eaten inferior and mouldy bizcocho rather than the standard issue bread given to the Spanish troops (below); others believed the men were simply worn out by the tough conditions of service in the African garrisons. Some fell ill—and died—on what could be an arduous sea voyage between Galicia and Flanders. Generally speaking, men fell ill in Carlos II’s armies for the same reasons as those in other forces, although some features of the Spanish logistical system may have put more pressure on the men: delays in finding transports undoubtedly exacerbated some of these problems. Those who fell ill enjoyed medical services developed from the later sixteenth century. But the authorities also sought to prevent the men falling ill in the first ⁸⁹ Villahermosa to [CII ?], 5 March 1677, AGS/E/2133. ⁹⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 219, 221. For this and the following paragraph, see C. Storrs, ‘Health, Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces, c.1665–1700’, Medical History, 50 (2006), 325–50.

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place. This might mean little more than ensuring a regular supply of bread (below), but might also involve adopting improvements pioneered elsewhere. The admiral of Castile claimed to have introduced the use of field tents in the army of Lombardy when governor of Milan (1678–86), to protect the men against summer heat and spring and autumn cold and wet, and in 1693 he urged their use in Catalonia. The Junta of the Lieutenants-General (Chapter 4) recommended that Carlos II order the manufacture of 2,500 tents for the 12,500 infantry— i.e., one tent for five men—and 1,200 tents for the cavalry of the army of Catalonia for 1694; that the linen for their manufacture should be obtained within Spain (from Galicia, where it abounded), thus keeping costs down; and that one tent should be brought to Madrid for evaluation. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this suggestion, which reveals some Spanish ministers at least to be open to new ideas about improving military effectiveness, was adopted: Carlos’s response was to seek information about the costs and to know the junta’s verdict on the tent they saw before continuing. The most serious threat to Spain’s military manpower, however, was another long-standing threat to all armies, desertion.⁹¹ In the army of Catalonia, in various units between 1673 and 1695, desertion accounted for between 30.5 and 74.6 per cent of all losses, by far the single greatest cause of wastage.⁹² Desertion also undermined the army of Flanders, and that of Lombardy.⁹³ There was a steady trickle of deserters, too, from the desolate African garrisons.⁹⁴ Some deserted en route from Castile to the coast where they were to embark;⁹⁵ others while awaiting embarcation.⁹⁶ The problem of desertion was exacerbated by the fact that deserters from Carlos II’s forces often enlisted in those of Louis XIV,⁹⁷ the inspector-general of the army of Flanders declaring in 1694 that, as a result, the ‘flower’ of Spain was, in fact, serving in Louis XIV’s armies.⁹⁸ There was no single explanation for desertion. It was sometimes a form of protest by men who now used this means of resolving their grievances—poor conditions: arrears of pay, lack of food and other supplies, and so on—rather than, as in the past, organized mutiny.⁹⁹ Some men deserted because they were being kept in the ranks beyond the period for which they had enlisted.¹⁰⁰ Raw recruits, or bisoños, unused to the privations of the soldier’s life, and perhaps the horrors of ⁹¹ Cf. R. Mackay, The Limits of Royal Authority. Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile (Cambridge, 1999), 146 ff., 161 ff.; L. White, ‘The Experience of Spain’s Early Modern Studies: Combat, Welfare, and Violence’, War in History, 9 (2002), 4 ff.; and Parker, Army of Flanders, 177 ff.; and for other states, Childs, British Army, 121 ff.; and Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 406–14. ⁹² Espino, Catalunya, 221. ⁹³ CCS, 6 June 1684, AGS/E/3874; Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I)’, 394. ⁹⁴ Friedman, Spanish Captives, 46–7. ⁹⁵ CCW, 4 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. ⁹⁶ Representation by Reino de Galicia, 1679, M. Garzón Pareja, Hacienda de Carlos II, (Madrid, 1980), 190–1. ⁹⁷ Stanhope to Hopkins, 14 Jul. 1694, Spain under Charles, 65–6; Espino, Catalunya, 109. ⁹⁸ Veedor general to [Carlos II?], 4 June 1694, AGS/E/3888. ⁹⁹ G. Parker, ‘Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1572–1607’, P&P, 58, (1973), 38–52. ¹⁰⁰ Cf CJLG, 7 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2913.

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war, were regarded as particularly likely to flee.¹⁰¹ Those serving in their own or friendly country were also more likely to desert than those serving in more distant theatres.¹⁰² Spanish commanders and officials sought to prevent desertion in various ways. These included harsh deterrents: in December 1671 the governor of the Low Countries, the count of Monterrey, following a spate of desertions, secured the approval of the regent for the exemplary execution by firing squad of five offenders.¹⁰³ Bounties were sometimes offered for the capture of deserters.¹⁰⁴ In order to facilitate the identification of deserters, the age, place of origin, and distinctive physical features of new recruits were increasingly recorded.¹⁰⁵ However, as elsewhere, necessity frequently obliged the authorities to be lenient: in 1691, and again in 1692, Carlos II—desperate to find recruits for the forthcoming campaign—issued new orders against deserters, but also pardoned those who returned to the ranks.¹⁰⁶ Preventive steps included treating recruits as little more than prisoners: in 1694 a locksmith of Oviedo made 66 pairs of handcuffs for men (many, no doubt, unwilling recruits) raised in Asturias.¹⁰⁷ More positive measures included orders to commanding officers to treat their men less harshly.¹⁰⁸ One characteristic of the Spanish system, the use of troops away from their home territory, also helped to prevent desertion.¹⁰⁹ So, too, did bonuses of pay and other rewards, including a ‘long-service medal’.¹¹⁰ The greater likelihood of desertion among raw recruits was one very good reason why Spanish commanders, like senior officers in other armies, valued experienced soldiers.¹¹¹ Besides their combat value,¹¹² veterans were less likely to desert. Great efforts were therefore made to inure new recruits to the military life, and to integrate old and new hands. In 1692 some of the more recently raised Spanish tercios in Flanders were ¹⁰¹ In 1674, during recruiting in Leon, one man deserted after just a week, AGS/CMC/3/4. ¹⁰² This was a commonplace among senior commanders: cf. Parker, Army of Flanders, 27. ¹⁰³ CCS, 1 Jan. 1672, AGS/E/2117. ¹⁰⁴ In January 1692 Carlos II offered a doubloon for a deserter, Add. MSS 25,448 f. 25. Cf. also Espino, Catalunya, 215 ¹⁰⁵ J. Contreras Gay, ‘Aportación al estudio de los sistemas de reclutamiento en la España moderna’, AHC, 8 (1981), 16 ff., notes the value of these records as a source of information about, for example, the extent of plague (scars). ¹⁰⁶ AMB/HI-3476; Add. 25,448, f. 25. In 1676 Villahermosa offered pardons to deserters from the army of Flanders, Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 284. ¹⁰⁷ AGS/CMC/3a/2437/14. Some of those levied for the Darien expedition in 1699–1700 were handcuffed, Leva y Recluta, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 433. ¹⁰⁸ Cf. J. J. Giménez Ferrer, ‘El Ejército de Carlos II’, in E. Balaguer and E. Giménez (eds.), Ejército, Ciencia y Sociedad en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Alicante, 1995), 76, for a royal directive of 1691. ¹⁰⁹ In 1690–1 it was observed that Galicians traditionally served in Flanders, not least because it was difficult for them to desert (from) there, AHN/Consejos/4462/112. ¹¹⁰ In 1676 Carlos Francisco Cobaren, who had risen, over 20 years, from soldier to lieutenantcolonel, successfully requested this medal, CCW [1676], AGS/GA/2348. ¹¹¹ Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 244, and idem, ‘Las tropas’, 69. ¹¹² The count of Frigiliana claimed that it was unprecedented to use new recruits in the desembarco (the most dangerous type of operation) intended at Darien, CCS, 6 June 1699, AGS/E/4183.

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Table 2. Troops needed, levied, or dispatched 1665–1700 Year

Number needed

End 1667

Number being raised

Number raised, waiting to go, or dispatched

10,000 men for Flanders being raised in Castile, Galicia, Asturias, Vizcaya

1668

1500–2000 Spaniards a year needed to recruit Spanish tercios

9,000 Spaniards recently sent to Flanders

1672

4,000–5,000 men needed to recruit armies of Flanders and Lombardy

500 men, of levy of Juan de Miranda, waiting (spring 1672) at San Sebastián to go to Flanders

1676

13,000⫹ men for Catalonia, Flanders, and Italy for 1676 campaign

5,310 men actually raised in Castile and Andalusia

1682

Arrival in Flanders (autumn 1682) of tercio of count of Grajal and 600 men

1683

Departure of 542 men from Galicia and Laredo for Flanders

1684

12,650 needed to recruit army of Flanders alone

1689

14,000 men for army of Flanders

1692

600 men for Milan (in Old Castile?) and 2,000 men (500–600 in Andalusia to remount cavalry and 1,400 infantry) for Lombardy

Start 1693

End 1693–4

800–1200 Spaniards for Lombardy

1,800 men (in Old Castile and parts of Andalusia) for Flanders 14,000–15,000 men for Catalonia, Milan, and frontiers of Spain

31

Spain’s Armies Table 2. (Contd.) Year

Number needed

Feb. 1695

1700

Number being raised

Number raised, waiting to go, or dispatched

5,000 newly raised Spaniards for Catalonia 13,000 men ordered to be levied for army of Catalonia

Sources: Consulta of Don Juan of Austria, 18 Nov. 1667, BL/Egerton/347, f. 536; CCS, 1 Nov. 1668, AGS/E/2108; Mariana to estates of various provinces, 7 Aug. 1668, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 59; CCS, 23 Oct. 1672, AGS/E/2119; CCS, 22 Apr. 1672, AGS/E/2117; CJL, 10 Jan. 1676, AGS/GA/2353; Relación del Numero, 26 Nov. 1676, AGS/GA/2346; CCW, 12 Jan. 1676, AGS/GA/2353; CCS, 19 Nov. 1682, AGS/E/3873; Account of men raised in Galicia and Burgos, 10 Dec. 1683, AGS/E/3873; Planta de la Gente de Guerra [early 1684], AGE/E/3876; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda de Carlos, ii. 201–3; Instrucción . . . .26 Jan. 1693, AGS/GA/2916; Operti to VA, 22 Nov. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38; Operti to VA, 13 Mar. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38; CJLG, 5 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916; Stanhope to Galway, 14–24 Feb. 1695, Kent RO/U1590/015/4; Castro, A la sombra, 35, 50–1.

disbanded and the men distributed among other units in order to recruit the latter and strengthen the influence of the veterans on the newer men.¹¹³ However, most commentators agreed that, to prevent desertion, Carlos II must ensure regular payment and supply of his troops.¹¹⁴ The continual loss of men meant a constant need for new recruits. In the later sixteenth century, the Council of War had sought to raise about 9,000 men annually.¹¹⁵ The annual average a century later is unclear. However, and particularly in years of peak military activity (1667–8, 1673–8, 1683–4, 1689–97) the demand was considerable, as Table 2 shows. RECRUITMENT IN SPAIN (CASTILE) The armies of Carlos II were, as Table 3 shows, remarkably cosmopolitan, like those of his predecessors, and were never filled only or even primarily by the king’s Spanish subjects, i.e., men from Castile and, to a lesser extent, from Aragon.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, the king’s Spanish subjects were frequently the largest single national group in those forces. Those serving in Spain’s African outposts and in the Americas were overwhelmingly Spaniards. ¹¹³ CCS, 29 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3886. ¹¹⁴ Veedor-general to [CII?], 4 June 1694, AGS/E/3888. ¹¹⁵ I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620 (London, 1976), 103. ¹¹⁶ Cf. Parker, Army of Flanders, Appendix A; Ribot, ‘Milan’, 209 ff.; R. A. Stradling, ‘Filling the Ranks: Spanish Mercenary Recruitment and the Crisis of the 1640s’, in idem, Spain’s Struggle for Europe 1598–1668 (London, 1994), 257; and H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 80, 152, 385–6.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

Table 3. The national composition of Carlos II’s armies (infantry) Spaniards (mainly Castilians)

Army of Flanders July 1670 August 1672

11,019 10,065

Walloons

Germans (in Carlos II’s service)

Italians

Others

730 British (English, Irish, & Scots) 663 British 616 British

5,129

8,328

2,265

2,374 3,046

Total Infantry (includes other groups)

26,993 32,949

Nov. 1672 Apr. 1675 Mar. 1684 End 1691

9,926 9,574 5,448 4,294

6,399 6,256

8,214 12,716

1,584

1,987

Feb. 1692

3,913

2,541

1,422

Army of Catalonia Sept. 1691 Nov. 1696 Oct. 1697

5,942 8,357 4,794

1,321 936

655 566 551

537 968 2,623

7,212 15,516 11,346

Army of Lombardy Oct. 1668 Mar. 1670 Oct. 1680 Feb. 1686 Mar. 1690 Sept. 1699

3,223 3,327 6,922 6,460 5,125 3,571

3,140 2,092 2,280 2,482 2,918 1,864

1,238 692 2,213 3,248 5,344 1,793

8,098 8,395 13,876 14,411 15,789 9,386

1,274 226 British and Burgundian 1,214

30,718 36,716 17,431 10,218 9,090

Sources: CCS, 12 June 1672 on accompanying documents, AGS/E/2119; Refacciónes a las provincias, AGS/E/2119; Relación, 21 Nov. 1672, AGS/E/2121; Relaciónes of infantry and cavalry, 3 Apr. 1675, AGS/E/2128; Grana to CII, 21 Mar. 1684, AGS/E/3874; Relación de los oficiales . . . [end 1691], AGS/E/3885; Relation sommaire, Add. 22,503 f. 223–4; Espino, Catalunya, 211 ff.; Ribot García, ‘Milan, Plaza’, 223 ff.

Spaniards were highly prized for their supposed capacity to endure the hardships of army life, their valour,¹¹⁷ and their reliability.¹¹⁸ The belief that Spaniards were particularly loyal helps to explain why they were regarded, and not ¹¹⁷ Spanish military writers continued to cite Rocroi (1643) as an example of the powers of resistance of Spanish troops: cf. D. Orejon, Politica y mecánica militar para sargentos mayores de tercio (Brussels, 1684), in R. A. Stradling, ‘Catastrophe and Recovery: The Defeat of Spain, 1639–43’, History, 64 (1979), 209. ¹¹⁸ In 1677 German troops in Sicily refused to fight unless paid, but not the Spaniards, which one commander attributed to their ‘Spanish’ identity and devotion to their king, Ribot, Monarquía, 493.

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only by Spanish commanders, as the core or ‘nerve’ of Carlos II’s forces eveywhere. This view, which was articulated by numerous commanders and policymakers,¹¹⁹ had important implications. ‘Spanish’ units were not always composed entirely of Spaniards, despite royal orders to this effect,¹²⁰ but large numbers of troops had to be raised in Spain itself. As in the past, most of these would be raised in Castile (including Andalusia and Galicia), although the non-Castilian realms (above all the territories of the Crown of Aragon) contributed more in this than in previous reigns (Chapter 5). Securing those men involved a sometimes bewildering number of initiatives,¹²¹ and of different types of recruitment, most of them tried and tested. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Carlos II’s predecessors had secured most of the men they needed by a generally effective combination of central, state organization—Spain’s military structure was probably the best in Europe c.1580¹²²—and voluntary enlistment, what has been called ‘administrative’ or ‘direct’ recruitment, effected by a captain with a royal commission, with the king bearing the costs. This method of recruiting was less effective after 1630,¹²³ but its continued importance in the reign of Carlos II should not be ignored. It was sometimes explicitly stated that recruits must be voluntary;¹²⁴ and volunteers there were, although fewer than before. All recruitment was overseen by the Council of War, whose jurisdiction was restricted to Castile but which effectively co-ordinated the Monarchy’s global war effort;¹²⁵ by the council’s many executive committees, or juntas;¹²⁶ and by the comisario general de infantería, who advised where and how men might be raised.¹²⁷ In 1675–6 the comisario general, the marquis of Ontiveros, prepared a recruitment ‘map’ of Spain for the levy of 13,300 men for Flanders, Italy, and Catalonia, which was used again in 1693–4, with modifications, as the basis of a levy of 15,000 men.¹²⁸ The commissary-general ¹¹⁹ Castel Rodrigo to Mariana, 20 Oct. 1667, AGS/E/2106; Farnese to CII, 24 Jan. 1681, AGS/E/3866; marquis of los Balbases, CCS, Oct. 1690, AGS/E/3413/47; and Max Emmanuel to CII, 10 Sept. 1692, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 567–8. ¹²⁰ In 1695 Sebastian Nipho was allowed to join a Spanish tercio, although he was not a Spaniard, CCI, 20 June 1695AGS/SP/Napoles/63. ¹²¹ This emerges clearly from A. Hernández Rodríguez, ‘El Reclutamiento de españoles para el Ejército de Flandes durante la Segunda mitad del Siglo XVII’, in D. Maffi (ed.), Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Política, Estrategia y Cultura en la Europa Moderna (Madrid, 2006), passim. ¹²² Tallett, War and Society, 73. ¹²³ J. Contreras Gay, ‘El Servicio Militar en España durante el Siglo XVII’, CN, 21 (1993–4), 105; Mackay, Limits, 9, 135. ¹²⁴ Cf. Mariana to city of Burgos, 3 Oct. 1675, AMB/Actas/1675, f. 438. Volunteers were believed to be better of quality and less likely to desert, CCW, 16 Oct. 1677, AGS/E/1947/141. ¹²⁵ Thompson, War and Government, 38 ff.; J. C. Domínguez Nafria, Real y Supremo Consejo de Guerra (siglos XVI y XVIII) (Madrid, 2001). ¹²⁶ These included the committee overseeing preparations for the next campaign, the junta de la disposiciones generales para la futura campaña [JDG], that responsible for garrisons (the junta des presidios), the Junta de levas (responsible for recruiting) and the junta de tercios. Carlos II’s order for the establishment of the JDG, 2 Oct. 1677, is in AGS/E/4152. ¹²⁷ This post, created in 1587, was suppressed in 1715, Thompson, War and Government, 115; F. Andújar Castillo, Consejo y Consejeros de Guerra en el Siglo XVIII (Granada, 1996), 49. ¹²⁸ CJLG, 5 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

also considered proposals to recruit in Spain. In 1683 the comisario-general, the Council of War, the Council of State, and Carlos II approved the proposal of the governor of the Low Countries to recruit men for the army of Flanders by sending 4–6 captains (with their junior officers, alferezes, and sergeants) from each of the Spanish tercios in Flanders to Galicia, Cantabria, and Guipúzcoa, where they were to base themselves in the most populous cities, towns, and villages, and if this failed to produce enough recruits, to head into Castile.¹²⁹ This central oversight ensured that recruiting efforts were directed to where men were likely to be found, that too many recruiting captains were not operating in any one district at one time and competing for the same men,¹³⁰ and that men were recruited close to where they must embark or serve.¹³¹ Co-ordination was not always successful,¹³² but this long-established procedure was more effective than is usually acknowledged, and continued to be a preferred means for recruiting the army of Flanders and the army of Lombardy.¹³³ Without the king’s commission a captain might have great difficulty. ¹³⁴ It ensured the co-operation of the local authorities where recruiting took place.¹³⁵ The assistance of the more important cities and towns was often secured by the local corregidor, the king’s representative, who sometimes himself played an active role in local recruiting: between mid-March and mid-April 1676, for example, the corregidor of Leon dispatched 700 men to Catalonia;¹³⁶ and in December 1676 the corregidor of Segovia was ordered to levy 200 men for Catalonia in Segovia and surrounding towns.¹³⁷ In this work, the corregidores were often superintended by the presidents of the chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada, the courts of appeal of, respectively, Castile and Andalusia, which also

¹²⁹ CCS, 24 Feb. 1683, AGS/E/3872. ¹³⁰ In 1676 the president of the Casa de Contratación, who sometimes oversaw the levy of men in Andalusia for the Indies, was ordered to raise 200 men for Cartagena in the vicinity of Puerto de Santa María, Puerto Real, and San Lúcar, in order not to clash with recruiting elsewhere in the realm of Seville, CII to president, 1 Feb. 1676, AGS/GA/2360. ¹³¹ Broadly speaking, Castile, Galicia, and northern Spain acted as a recruiting ground for Flanders, Navarra, and Guipúzcoa, Andalusia for Italy, and Murcia for Oran and Italy. ¹³² In 1676 the corregidor of Burgos, ordered to raise 600 men for the army of Catalonia, identified various difficulties, including the presence in Burgos of a captain recruiting for the Guards, CCW, 23 Dec. 1676, AGS/GA/2346. Cf. CCW, 24 Dec. 1691, AGS/GA/2858 (Segovia). ¹³³ Cf. Instructions, January 1693, AGS/GA/2916, for recruiting 1,800 men (18 companies of 100 men each) for Flanders in Andalusia and Castile, 10 companies in Old Castile (including 4 in Valladolid and 1 in Burgos), and 8 in Andalusia. ¹³⁴ J. D. Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus ut Des. Los servicios de la ciudad de Murcia a la Corona a finales del siglo XVII (Murcia, 2003), 115–16. Some captains carried a commission from a viceroy or captain general, ibid., 176. ¹³⁵ CCS, 11 Feb. 1693, AGS/E/3887. ¹³⁶ Memoria de la gente [May–June 1676], AGS/GA/2364. ¹³⁷ AHC/Acuerdos/13, session of 2 Jan. 1677. This function of the corregidores is ignored by B. González Alonso, El Corregidor Castellano (1348–1808) (Madrid, 1970). I take a more positive view of the corregidor than does I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Aspects of Spanish Military and Naval Organization during the Ministry of Olivares’, in idem, War and Society in Habsburg Spain (Aldershot, 1992), 5.

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35

had important administrative-governmental functions.¹³⁸ In 1676 the president of the chancillería of Valladolid co-ordinated recruiting across Old Castile for Catalonia, and again in 1693.¹³⁹ Mobilizing corregidores and chancillerías also required the co-operation of the Council of Castille, the established channel of communication with these institutions,¹⁴⁰ and for territories in the jurisdiction of the military orders that of the Council of Orders.¹⁴¹ It was also advisable to secure the support of influential local nobles and others, including, for example, the duke of Medinaceli in Andalusia, and the admiral and constable of Castile in Old Castile. Successful recruiting also required liaison with the Council of Finance to secure essential funds. It is almost impossible to be precise about the type of men who enlisted,¹⁴² or, in the case of volunteers, why they joined up.¹⁴³ Military service was apparently held in much less regard in later seventeenth-century Spain than before, in large part because of the way some men were (forcibly) raised, and the type of man recruited as a result (see below), such that the gentleman volunteer of an earlier period was no longer found in the ranks.¹⁴⁴ Some recruits were, no doubt, influenced by comrades; some clearly had no idea what they were getting themselves into (and soon deserted);¹⁴⁵ some probably just wanted to get away from their towns and villages and hoped for better prospects.¹⁴⁶ Some were no doubt attracted by enlistment money, although the lure of this one-off payment no doubt varied with local employment and other opportunities.¹⁴⁷ The same may well be true of army pay, 3 reales a day from 1632.¹⁴⁸ The soldiers’ basic pay was inferior to that of Castilian labourers, and recruiting may have suffered accordingly;¹⁴⁹ but many soldiers also received bonuses of one sort or another.¹⁵⁰ The troops’ pay was often ¹³⁸ Cf. R. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500–1700 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981), J. Fayard, Les Membres du conseil de Castille à l’époque moderne (1621–1746) (Geneva, 1979), 73 ff., and Mackay, Limits, 32 ff. ¹³⁹ CJL, 20 Dec. 1676, AGS/GA/2347; Instructions, Jan. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. For the role of the president of the chancillería of Granada in supervising levies, cf. Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación’, 42, 75. ¹⁴⁰ Fayard, Membres, 11 ff. ¹⁴¹ CJLG, 27 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. ¹⁴² Cf. for an earlier period, I. A. A. Thompson, ‘El soldado del imperio: una aproximación al perfil del recluta español en el Siglo de Oro’, Manuscrits, 21 (2003), 38 et passim. ¹⁴³ The relaciones de meritos, career summaries, submitted by petitioners for royal mercedes, or favours, chart the progress of some individuals, from soldier to senior officer but say nothing about motives. ¹⁴⁴ Castro, A la sombra, 174. ¹⁴⁵ Cf. the comments of one recruiting captain, CCW, 4 Sept. 1693, AGS/GA/2923. ¹⁴⁶ One future bandit, Joseph Vicent, unable to earn enough to keep his mill going, sold up and enlisted, H. Kamen, ‘Public Authority and Popular Crime’, JEEH, 3 (1974), 685. ¹⁴⁷ In Madrid in 1693 it proved difficult to find recruits despite raising enlistment money from one real to one doubloon, CCS, 10 Oct. 1693, AGS/E/4141; CJLG, 5 Feb. 1694, AGS/GA/2917. ¹⁴⁸ Thompson, ‘El soldado’, 34. ¹⁴⁹ Thompson, War and Government, 106–7; idem, ‘ “Money, Money, and Yet More Money!”. Finance, the Fiscal-State and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500–1650’, in Rogers, Military Revolution, 282–3. For wage rates in Valladolid, cf. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 170 ff. ¹⁵⁰ Salvador Serrano claimed to have served 20 years (including at Oran, and in Catalonia) without getting further than soldado abentajado (on a monthly ventaja, or bonus, of 6 escudos); the Council of War suggested, and Carlos II agreed, that he receive another 2 escudos a month, CCW, 11 Mar. 1676. Cf. Parker, Army of Flanders, p. xxvi.

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in substantial arrears for long periods at a time, the men receiving socorros—a fraction of their pay; but in hard times, the army at least seemed to offer bread.¹⁵¹ Some theatres were easier to recruit for than were others.¹⁵² Most men probably did not serve for an ideal. However, we cannot ignore the possibility that some recruits were affected by less material arguments, and that they may have wished to serve their king,¹⁵³ to defend their country, or region—more obviously threatened than before 1665, by the Moors across the Straits and by Louis XIV across the Pyrenees—or to fight for their Catholic faith, or indeed all three.¹⁵⁴ But the royal commission system had never supplied all the recruits needed, so that Carlos II needed to find the men he needed in other ways as well. As in the past, the king continued to strike agreements with private individuals who offered to raise men. This method was particularly favoured when voluntary recruiting by the king’s own agents proved slow, and in time of war: inevitably, the Dutch War and the Nine Years War saw a number of agreements of this sort. Essentially, an individual would offer to raise a given number of men, some or all of them at his own cost, in return for a merced, or reward of some sort. Some of those making offers were junior and/or ‘reformed’ army officers looking for promotion and/or a permanent post; others were seeking an hábito of one of the military orders. Not all these offers were accepted; sometimes the conditions attached were regarded as excessive and the offer rejected, or accepted only after negotiation, as in the case of Don Nuño de Espinosa. In 1676, recently returned to his native Galicia after serving in the army of Flanders, as soldier, captain, and sargento mayor, Espinosa offered to raise 1,500 men in Galicia; in return he asked for the rank of maestre de campo general for himself, a promise that his tercio would not be reformed, and a clutch of hábitos. The Council of War, which was concerned at the slow progress of recruiting for the impending campaign, recommended acceptance of this proposal, but it did not meet with the approval of Carlos II.¹⁵⁵ The reasons for the king’s reluctance to agree in this case are unclear, but not in that of Don Francisco Monrroy, sargento mayor, in 1692. Monrroy offered to raise a tercio of 500 men in 9 companies for the Low Countries; he would levy the men in Old Castile and the Rioja and deliver them at San Sebastian (for transfer to Flanders) by the end of March 1693. His terms were that he appointed the officers, that the comisariogeneral (i.e., the king) be responsible for the men’s clothing, that he receive 3,000 ecus, and a promise that his tercio would not be reformed. Once again, the comisario urged acceptance and the junta de disposiciones de campaña agreed However, Carlos II believed that, since captains were coming from the Low ¹⁵¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 447 ff. ¹⁵² In 1695 those recruiting in Spain for Lombardy were said to have greater success than those recruiting for Catalonia, Operti to ST, 24 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ¹⁵³ Espino, Guerra y cultura, 537. ¹⁵⁴ White, ‘The Experience’, discusses these matters (to 1668). ¹⁵⁵ CCW, 13 March 1676, AGS/GA/2347. The outcome of this episode is unclear. Cf. also Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I)’, 397.

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Countries to recruit for the army of Flanders, this offer, too, should be rejected.¹⁵⁶ Despite these difficulties, deals of this sort—typical of that bargaining between sovereign and subject which was an essential feature of Spain’s mercedes-based social and political system¹⁵⁷—remained an important supplement to voluntary state recruiting. Carlos II also passed on the burden and cost of recruiting—to territories, corporations, social groups, and individuals.¹⁵⁸ In Galicia, for example, the Reino, or community of the realm and individual clerics and ecclesiastical institutions agreed to levy men in 1667–8,¹⁵⁹ in the 1670s and in the 1690s: in 1691–2, for example, various archbishops, bishops, cathedral chapters, monasteries, and religious orders responded to the king’s request that they contribute to a levy of 800 men to recruit the Galician tercios in Flanders.¹⁶⁰ Ecclestiastics elsewhere also served, the archbishop of Seville and the bishop of Cordoba each offering 100 men for Flanders in 1667–8.¹⁶¹ As for the titled nobles, or títulos, Carlos II also called on them for men, as had his father, during whose reign some were expected to raise entire tercios.¹⁶² At the end of 1676 the king ordered the levy of 2,500 men in Andalusia for Naples and Sicily, 600 of which were to be found by the dukes of Alcalá, Arcos, and Osuna (200 men each) and 360 by the marquises of Comares and Priego and the duke de Sessa (120 each).¹⁶³ The following year, 1677, it was suggested that the dukes of Arcos, Medinaceli, Osuna, and Sessa, and the marquis of Priego each raise 100 men—a total of 500—or just over 20 per cent of the total of 2,400 it was hoped to raise in Andalusia for Naples.¹⁶⁴ This was by no means the end of efforts of this sort. During the Nine Years War, in the summer of 1693, the grandees were asked for up to six mounted men each for Catalonia;¹⁶⁵ and in 1694 a number of titled nobles raised troops at their own cost.¹⁶⁶ Some títulos responded positively to these demands. However, the impression remains that, individually and as a group, títulos and grandees were not put under the same pressure as they were in the 1630s, and that they did not make the same efforts as in that earlier period, perhaps reflecting the greater power of the aristocracy (Chapter 4).

¹⁵⁶ CJDC, 27 Dec. 1692, AGS/GA/ 2914. It was suggested that Monrroy might levy men instead for Catalonia, but again the outcome is unclear. ¹⁵⁷ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 152 ff. and Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, passim. ¹⁵⁸ Memoria de la gente, [May–June 1676], AGS/GA/2364. ¹⁵⁹ CCW, 11 and 13 Jan. 1668, AGS/GA/2161. ¹⁶⁰ Cf. draft letter to Fr. Antonio de Arroyo, 27 Oct. 1691, AGS/E/4171; Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 216. ¹⁶¹ CCW, 16 Jan. 1668, AGS/GA/2161. ¹⁶² Thompson, War and Government, 146 ff; Mackay, Limits, 168. ¹⁶³ Ribot, Monarquía, 170. In 1676 the duke of Medina Sidonia had levied (200) men in Andalusia, for Catalonia, undated list [end 1676?], AGS/GA/2364. ¹⁶⁴ CCW, 16 Oct. 1677, AGS/E/1947/141. The comments [of the regent] on this consulta suggest that the attempt to obtain men from the títulos in 1676 was not a success. ¹⁶⁵ Gudannes, 24 June 1693, Martín, ‘Lettres’, 413; Stanhope to Nottingham, 17 June 1693, Spain under Charles, 52. ¹⁶⁶ Gudannes, 9 July 1694, Martin, ‘Lettres’, 468.

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The need for military manpower stimulated efforts to revive older military institutions and obligations, including those of the members of the three military orders of Castile: Alcántara, Calatrava, and Santiago. These institutions, which had played an important role in the medieval Reconquista, had subsequently been largely divested of their military role and transformed into largely honorific bodies.¹⁶⁷ However, Philip IV had called on them to provide a battalion c.1640;¹⁶⁸ and his son also sought to revive their military role. There were two aspects to this. First, the king reserved hábitos to those who had given military service to the Crown.¹⁶⁹ This policy was not rigidly adhered to, hábitos being granted to those without a military background,¹⁷⁰ but the fact that military services performed by members of the urban elites were frequently rewarded with hábitos meant that the military orders were in some respects ‘re-militarized’.¹⁷¹ Second, Carlos could demand military service from existing holders of hábitos. In 1677 caballeros of the orders were summoned to serve the king, or to supply three substitutes, although most refused—claiming that they were obliged only to fight the Moors—or supplied poor quality replacements.¹⁷² Despite this, in 1694, in view of the position in Catalonia, Carlos II called on the caballeros of all three orders to serve;¹⁷³ and in 1695, the military orders were asked for 1,000 men.¹⁷⁴ In 1691–2 Carlos ordered the re-establishment of another Reconquista institution which had waned in the sixteenth century, i.e., the obligation of the caballeros cuantiosos of Andalusia,¹⁷⁵ to provide unpaid military service in return for various privileges.¹⁷⁶ Just how successful this was is unclear, but a regiment of caballeros cuantiosos existed as late as 1697.¹⁷⁷ Carlos II and his ministers also sought to revitalize the (Castilian) militia. This medieval institution, or obligation, had been revived at the end of the sixteenth century, in the wake of English attacks, and again—when it was also extended geographically—in 1625 and in 1636, and subsequently underpinned the tercios ¹⁶⁷ L. P. Wright, ‘The Military Orders in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spanish Society. The Institutional Embodiment of a Historical Tradition’, P&P, 43 (1969), 34 ff.; E. Postigo Castellanos, Honor y privilegio en la Corona de Castilla. El Consejo de Ordenes y los Caballeros de Hábito en el Siglo XVII (Valladolid, 1988), 118. ¹⁶⁸ Wright, ‘Military Orders’, 59. ¹⁶⁹ For an initiative of this sort in 1692, cf. Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 205; and J. Sánchez Bélen, ‘Colonos y Militares: dos alternativas de promoción social’, in J. N. Alcalá-Zamora (ed.), La vida cotidiana en la España de Velázquez (Madrid, 1989), 299. ¹⁷⁰ CCS, 11 Nov. 1684, AGS/E/4033. ¹⁷¹ Cf. J. D. Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Consenso e Imposición en la Conservación de la Monarquía. La Práctica Política en un Territorio de la periferia Castellana: el Reino de Murcia (1682–1700)’, Hispania, 63 (2003), 985. ¹⁷² Dunlop, Memoirs, ii. 117. ¹⁷³ Royal order, 20 June 1694, AHN/Consejos/libros/1474/42. ¹⁷⁴ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 296. ¹⁷⁵ Cf. J. Hellwege, Zur Geschichte der spanischen Reitermilizien. Die Caballeria de Cuantia unter Philipp II. und Philipp III (1562–1619) (Wiesbaden, 1972). ¹⁷⁶ CCW, 25 May 1694, AGS/E/4141. For the privileges claimed by the caballeros cuantiosos, cf. CCW, 10 Dec. 1691, AGS/GA/2858. ¹⁷⁷ Soto de Clonard, Historia Orgánica de las Armas de Infantería y Caballería Españolas, 16 vols. (Madrid, 1851–9), iv. 473.

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provinciales, the core henceforth of Philip IV’s armies in Spain.¹⁷⁸ However, from early on, communities were allowed—even encouraged—by the Crown to give money instead of men by means of the so-called composición de milicias, a process largely complete by Carlos II’s accession.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, local—urban and parish—militias continued to function, at least along vulnerable coasts and frontiers: on twelve occasions between 1685 and 1700, for example, the militia(s) of Murcia were deployed in defence of Oran.¹⁸⁰ But there was also a growing pressure to reactivate the militia throughout Castile. In 1675–6, when ministers were hard pressed to find all the troops they needed by voluntary means, the duke of San Germán urged resort to the militia.¹⁸¹ It was the Nine Years War, however, when the external threat was at least as great as those which had prompted militia reform earlier in the century, which provided the decisive impulse to the reactivation of the militia in Castile, for home defence (rather than to recruit the armies of Catalonia, Lombardy, and Flanders).¹⁸² The process of reform began in July 1691 and was overseen by a special committee, the Junta de restablecimiento de milicias.¹⁸³ A royal order was circulated to the principal cities of Castile. It painted a depressing picture of Spain’s defenceless condition, short of men and of arms, on all fronts. It was, therefore, necessary to train men in the use of arms. The king ordered the compilation of lists of all males (aged 18–60) capable of bearing arms, without excepting nobles or clergy, and of all muskets, arquebuses, pikes, and other weapons. The king would use these lists to devise a new militia structure, and would appoint militia captains, who, it was hoped—since no salary would be paid—would consider the honour and merit of serving king, patria, and religion sufficient reward. Anticipating anxieties that the militia might be used to recruit the overseas fighting units, this was clearly ruled out.¹⁸⁴ In Valladolid, where the committee set up by the regidores compiled the lists on the basis of information about the number of male communicants supplied by parish priests, the registers were ready within little more than two weeks.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the order for the re-establishment of the militia was not finally issued until August 1693, against the background of continuing French pressure.¹⁸⁶ The militia was to comprise 10 per cent of all adult ¹⁷⁸ Thompson, War and Government, 20 ff., 126 ff.; Mackay, Limits, 80 ff. Additional tercios provinciales were established in 1664, Clonard, Historia Orgánica, v. 5 ff. ¹⁷⁹ L. Ribot García, ‘El reclutamiento militar en España a mediados del siglo XVII. La composición de las milicias de Castilla’, CIH, 9 (1986), 63 ff. ¹⁸⁰ Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 163. ¹⁸¹ CJL, 24 Jan. 1676, AGS/GA/2364. ¹⁸² Cf. J. Contreras Gay, ‘Las milicias en el antiguo régimen. Modelos, características generales y significado histórico’, CN, 20 (1992), 79–80. ¹⁸³ Giménez Ferrer, ‘Ejército’, 83 ff. ¹⁸⁴ President of CC and CII to all corregidores, 17 July 1691, AMB/Actas/ 1691, f. 206 ff. Cf. Navarro Pérez, Aportación’, 70; and Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 154. ¹⁸⁵ AHMV/Actas/70, f. 896, 898–9, 901–2, 903, 910. ¹⁸⁶ Cf. royal decree, 21 Aug. 1693, NLS/Astorga/G.33.c.34. Earlier, the governor of Malaga was said to have summoned 10,000 militiamen on reports of the French advancing there, Stanhope to Nottingham, 22 July 1693, SP/94 f. 180, while the militias of Seville went to the relief of Gibraltar following the arrival there of the French fleet, Add. 21, 439 f. 81.

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males aged 25–50; if there were insufficient volunteers, militiamen would be chosen by lot, or sorteo. The militia was to be organized in units based in the principal cities of Castile and Andalusia. To ensure there were enough weapons, more than 23,000 arms were to be distributed among those cities and towns.¹⁸⁷ To make militia service attractive, Carlos confirmed the privileges attached to it.¹⁸⁸ The reformed militias attracted some. Members of local elites, for example, sought—as was intended—a leading role in the new structure: in Burgos, Don Diego de Salamanca, of one of the families which had long dominated the ayuntamiento, sought a captaincy in the militia in 1696.¹⁸⁹ However, volunteers to fill the ranks were fewer. Many of those eligible fled to avoid serving, some after the community had resorted to the lottery as the only means to find militiamen.¹⁹⁰ This was not the only difficulty. In the winter of 1693–4 the corregidor and ayuntamiento of Jaen suspended the militias there on the grounds that the captains were expected to pay the media anata tax on their patents, and that many could not afford this.¹⁹¹ To resolve many of these issues, and others, Carlos II re-issued the order for the re-establishment of the militias, with some modifications, in February 1696.¹⁹² The reform of the Castilian militia was not a complete success.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, it paved the way for the Bourbon achievement after 1700 of a militia which was more clearly integrated into the frontline forces and also more obviously a royal instrument.¹⁹⁴ We should, therefore, be wary of regarding the re-establishment of the militia between 1693 and 1696 as typical of a larger devolution of royal authority, of a failure of absolutism in Spain; it could equally be seen as the opposite, as the Crown’s imposition or revival of a broader military obligation, one which might also be used—despite earlier promises not to do this—outside the realm.¹⁹⁵ Militia reform in 1693 was swiftly followed by another development, one which also represented an intensification of the royal demands for military services from the Castilian cities: a succession of imposed levies in 1694, 1695, 1696, and 1697.¹⁹⁶ In the autumn of 1693, according to the English envoy in ¹⁸⁷ Giménez Ferrer, ‘Ejército’, 83. Arms were to be distributed as follows: Burgos (2,000 arms), Toledo (2,000), Seville (3,000), Cordoba (2,000), Granada (2,000), Jaen (2,000), Jerez (2,000), Murcia (1,200), Segovia (1,700), Valladolid (200), Molina de Aragon (1,000), and Madrid (4,000). ¹⁸⁸ AHN/Consejos/1474/37bis. In 1694 the king ordered investigation of the arrest of a militiaman for debt in breach of privilege, CII to Governor of CC, 24 Nov. 1694, AHN/Consejos/7207. ¹⁸⁹ AMB/Actas/1696, f. 78 ¹⁹⁰ CJRM, 24 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. ¹⁹¹ CJLG, 3 Feb. 1694, ASG/GA/2917. ¹⁹² Cf. copy of king’s order, 18 Feb. 1696, AMB/Actas/1696, ff. 61–9 and C. Borreguero Beltrán, El reclutamiento militar por Quintas en la España del siglo XVIII (Valladolid, 1989), 45. ¹⁹³ J. Contreras Gay, Las milicias provinciales en el siglo XVIII. Estudio sobre los regimientos de Andalucía (Almeria, 1993), 20, 23, notes some defects of the schemes of 1693 and 1696. ¹⁹⁴ Contreras, ‘Las Milicias’, 75 ff.; Borreguero Beltrán, El reclutamiento militar. ¹⁹⁵ In 1696 the corregidor of Valladolid communicated a royal order that if the king had to use the militias outside the realm, militia captains would receive the same pay as those in the royal army, AHMV/Actas/72, f. 348. ¹⁹⁶ Clonard, Historia Orgánica, v. 13–23; Espino, ‘Declinar’, 192. Contreras, ‘Aportación’, 29–31, and ‘Servicio Militar’, 121, discuss the levy of 1696.

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Madrid, it was decided to levy 43,000 men to reinforce Carlos II’s armies, and ‘quintear el Reyno . . . that is oblige every fifth man to serve’, to obtain them.¹⁹⁷ The imposition of such quotas in wartime was not new.¹⁹⁸ In November 1693 the chief cities of the realm were asked to send to Madrid population returns, or vecindarios, for their provinces.¹⁹⁹ The reliability of the returns has been questioned,²⁰⁰ but they formed the basis for determining quotas.²⁰¹ Perhaps because of what the returns revealed about Castile’s reduced population, it was decided to raise just 10 new regiments, each of 1,000 men, for the army of Catalonia, by levying 2 men for every 100 vecinos, or households, i.e., a 2 per cent levy rather than the 20 per cent implied by quintear.²⁰² The governor of the council of Castille anticipated difficulties, not least because the levy occurred at the same time as the king was re-establishing the militia and seeking a donativo (Chapter 3);²⁰³ but he acknowledged that 2 per cent was reasonable and might be favourably received if the opportunity were taken to rid the localities of vagabonds and other undesirables. His suggestion that the consent of the Cortes-voting towns be sought was ignored.²⁰⁴ On 20 January 1694 Carlos II ordered the levy, which would produce 10 new provincial tercios.²⁰⁵ The order was circulated to the corregidores and others responsible for its execution.²⁰⁶ Some towns resented the apparent infringement of their privileges, or fueros, implied by a quota; the regidores of Toledo declared as much, but offered more men than it was asked for, if their contribution was acknowledged as voluntary.²⁰⁷ For its part, Ciudad Rodrigo sought exemption on the grounds of its role as garrison on the Portuguese frontier and of its depopulation, following a recent epidemic.²⁰⁸ For whatever reason, some communities failed to send their quota to the assembly points: in June 1694, the corregidor of Agreda reported having sent 32 men to Burgos, towards the quota, but claimed that most of the towns of his ¹⁹⁷ Stanhope to Nottingham, 14 Oct. and 4 Nov. 1693, Spain under Charles, 55. ¹⁹⁸ Cf. J. E. Gelabert, Castilla convulsa (1631–1652) (Madrid, 2001), 172–3; and Mackay, Limits, 75–80, 113, 121 ff., 154. In 1692 Carlos II expressed disappointment at Galicia’s response to a request for men, not least because the king had the right to quintear the realm in wartime, M. M. De Artaza, Rey, Reino y Representación. La Junta General del Reino de Galicia (Madrid, 1998), 281. ¹⁹⁹ AHMV/Actas/71, f. 496. ²⁰⁰ M. Martín Galán, ‘Fuentes y métodos para el estudio de la demografía histórica castellana durante la Edad Moderna’, Hispania, 148 (1981), 247. ²⁰¹ The number of vecinos of the province of Valladolid was put at 12,051. This included Valladolid itself (3,637) and the dependent town of Simancas (252); the quota of the former was set at 73 men, that of the latter at just 5, AGS/GA/2934. ²⁰² CJLG, 20 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2921. For one foreign observer in Madrid this was an impressive indicator of commitment to the war, Operti to VA, 28 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40, 23–4. ²⁰³ CJLG, 24 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2921. ²⁰⁴ Don Manuel Arias to Don Juan Angulo, 19 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/12499/3. ²⁰⁵ CJLG, 13 Jan. 1694, AGS/GA/2950. The 10 tercios were: Burgos, Cuenca, Gibraltar, Jaen, Leon, Murcia, Segovia, Seville, Toledo, Valladolid. ²⁰⁶ Cf. AMB/Actas/1694, f. 33 ff., and AHMV/Actas/71, f. 538. For the communication by the corregidor of Segovia to the ayuntamiento of Cuéllar of its quota, cf. AHC/Acuerdos/14. ²⁰⁷ Arias to Angulo, 29 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/12499/3. ²⁰⁸ Petition [after 1693], AGS/GA/3060. Cf. CJLG, 14 Feb. 1694, AGS/GA/2917.

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district refused to contribute.²⁰⁹ Where efforts were made to fulfil quotas, drastic measures were sometimes used, the corregidor of Cordoba seizing men as they left the theatre.²¹⁰ Inevitably, there were complaints of wrongful detention: the Portuguese envoy in Madrid protested that some of his master’s subjects had been forcibly levied.²¹¹ Not surprisingly, perhaps, the governor of the Council of Castile subsequently claimed that many of those levied had deserted.²¹² These difficulties should not, however, obscure the success of the 2 per cent levy. The regidores of Valladolid made no objection to the imposition;²¹³ and by April 1694 1,000 men were on their way to Catalonia from Toledo, according to the corregidor,²¹⁴ who was subsequently asked for more men.²¹⁵ Burgos and Cuenca both raised their 1,000 quota.²¹⁶ Some of those involved sought rewards for their contribution to the scheme’s success, as did Don Alonso Pacheco, corregidor of Valladolid, for executing the levy in his province, and for arranging the manufacture of outfits for the 3,000 men of the new tercios of Valladolid, Burgos, and Leon.²¹⁷ Testimony, perhaps, to the success of the imposition, was the king’s attempt to repeat it in the summer of 1694. In July Carlos II ordered the marquis of Tavara to try to obtain from the province of Valladolid another 2 per cent of its vecindario, more than 400 men.²¹⁸ Following the conclusion of the 1694 campaign, when most of the new levies served in Catalonia, the junta of the lieutenants-general decided to reform two of the new provincial tercios, because of their depleted state, and to levy just 1 soldier per 100 vecinos (on the same basis as the 2 per cent levy) in order to recruit the remaining eight tercios; it was hoped that this would be less burdensome, and provoke less resistance.²¹⁹ In 1696, in contrast, it was decided to increase the quota, to 1 man in 75, in order to raise 7,000 men in Castile.²²⁰ The quota remained at this level in 1697.²²¹ However, following a debate in the Council of State about whether to impose a levy (of men generally regarded as of poor quality), or whether to allow the cities to give money instead, providing funds ²⁰⁹ CJLG, 2 May. 1694, AGS/GA/2947. ²¹⁰ Sánchez Belén, ‘Colonos’, 295. ²¹¹ CCS, 6 Apr. 1694, AGS/E/4040. ²¹² CJLG, 16 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/2949. ²¹³ Preferring to seek volunteers rather than to press men, they agreed to offer 1 real enlistment money, to give 1 real on the day the men left Valladolid and to pay 3 reales a day until the troops entered the king’s pay, session of 4 Feb. 1694, AHMV/Actas/71, f. 544. ²¹⁴ CJLG, 6 Apr. 1694, AGS/GA/2947. ²¹⁵ CJLG, 22 Jun. 1694, AGS/GA/2948. ²¹⁶ Cf. formal account of men raised, dispatched, by corregidor, AGS/GA/2948. ²¹⁷ CJLG, 12 May 1694, AGS/GA/2951. ²¹⁸ AHMV/Actas/71, f. 633, 636, 645, 647. Whether the king sought to impose the additional 2% throughout Castile (and Andalusia) is unclear. ²¹⁹ Carnero to Arias, 14 Nov. 1694, AHN/Consejos/10123; CJLG, 16 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/2949. ²²⁰ Cf. CII to the governor of the CC, 15 Mar. 1696, AHN/Consejos/ 7209/12, for Toledo’s quotas. Burgos had supplied 19 men for the 1% levy, AMB/Actas/1695, f. 10–11, and must now give 23 men, AMB/Actas/1696, f. 75. Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 167; and Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 254. ²²¹ Cf. AMB/Actas/1697, f. 29. The ayuntamiento of Cuellar received a (printed) copy of the king’s order from the corregidor of Segovia. Only bachelors aged 20–50 should be levied, giving priority to vagabonds and such like—who must be able to bear arms. Where there were fewer than 75 vecinos, communities should be grouped to provide a soldier.

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which could be used to raise good quality volunteers, Carlos II suggested to the cities that they compound for their quotas at 30 reales a man. The change of policy was justified on the grounds of the king’s desire to avoid the dissension provoked by the imposition of quotas and the use of sorteos (to find the men when volunteers were lacking) and to relieve his subjects.²²² Apparently, the majority of towns opted to compound, but a minority, including Murcia, welcomed the opportunity to get rid of local vagabonds.²²³ Valladolid, which had had no difficulty filling its quota in earlier years, and which had already recruited a number of men to fill that for 1697, initially voted not to compound but reversed its policy following royal pressure.²²⁴ The quotas imposed between 1694 and 1697 were not a complete success, provoking some resistance and yielding troops of often doubtful quality.²²⁵ However, they did raise a number of new regiments for service in Spain and north Africa.²²⁶ As with the reform of the militia, Carlos II was laying the foundations for Philip V, who used the vecindarios compiled in 1693–4 when imposing his own 1 per cent levy in 1703.²²⁷ The quotas succeeded in part because they solved the problem for many local communities of the many adult males living on the margins of society. The forcible levy of such men was not new but seems to have become more regularized and entrenched in the reign of Carlos II and was resorted to whenever recruits were in short supply. In 1675 the comisario general suggested forcibly recruiting the idle and dissolute, removing them from the localities and giving them employment in the king’s service,²²⁸ a proposal which appears to have been implemented in some parts.²²⁹ Vagabonds and others were also targeted during the Nine Years War.²³⁰ As with the militia and the quotas imposed between 1694 and 1697, there were abuses: in 1692 the corregidor of Toledo protested that some of those seized were victims of the malice of the local justices.²³¹ However, this method of recruitment had proved its value and continued to be used.²³² ²²² AHMV/Actas/72, f. 414; AMB/Actas/1697, f. 41. Murcia had used sorteos, Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 181. ²²³ Espino, Catalunya, 177. ²²⁴ AHMV/Actas/72, f. 414, 422, 429, 430. Valladolid having already ordered the production of 750 vestidos and swords, these were sent to Gibraltar, for Ceuta, cf. accounts (1700), AGS/CMC/ 3a/2982/18. In March 1697 Cuellar sent its (cash) contribution to Segovia, AHC/Acuerdos, session of 9 Mar. 1697. ²²⁵ They also had other consequences, including an increase in marriage (to benefit from the exemption of married men), Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Consenso e Imposición’, 984. ²²⁶ Clonard, Historia Orgánica, x. 182 ff. provides brief histories of some of the new tercios. Most served in Catalonia and subsequently at Ceuta between 1694 and 1700. ²²⁷ Castro, A la sombra, 62 ff. ²²⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 168. ²²⁹ For the dispatch to the army of undesirables from Segovia, 1676–7, cf. R. Cueto, La Vida a través de la muerte: voces segovianos del siglo XVII (Valladolid, 2004), 400–1. ²³⁰ In 1694, informed of delays in recruiting for Catalonia in Madrid, the junta of the lieutenants general cited Carlos II’s decision in similar circumstances in 1692, that the corregidor of Madrid and the police magistrates there, the alcaldes de corte, threaten vagabonds with the African presidios if they did not enlist, CJLG, 2 Feb. 1694, AGS/GA/2917. ²³¹ H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700 (Harlow, 1980), 173. ²³² In 1698–9 vagabonds and others were targeted when men were needed against the Moors at Ceuta and the Scots at Darien, CII to President of CC, 31 Aug. and 18 Dec. 1699, AHN/Consejos/7212.

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Related to this forced levy of those on the margins of society was the way the courts supplied soldiers directly, again an established practice.²³³ In 1675 the Comisario General suggested forcibly recruiting those held in local prisons for light offences;²³⁴ the outcome is unclear, but in 1677 Carlos II ordered that, in view of the lack of men in the African garrisons, orders should be sent to the chancillerías, Audiencias, corregidores, and other magistrates to send to those garrisons all those whose offences carried this penalty, a measure which would at the same time ‘cleanse’ the villages of the idle.²³⁵ Some of those condemned to the African presidios and to other penalties were allowed to commute their sentences to service in Carlos II’s armies elsewhere.²³⁶ The demand for Castilians to defend the Monarchy clearly persisted after 1659. But were the men there? Some Spanish policy-makers and commanders certainly appear to have believed that the manpower available in Spain was reduced.²³⁷ Spain’s population had increased markedly in the sixteenth century, from 4,698,000 inhabitants in 1530 to 6,632,000 in 1591, with the rate of growth greatest in Castile.²³⁸ Thereafter, a succession of plagues (1597–1602, 1647–52, and 1676–84) and other disasters had reversed that trend.²³⁹ Social changes, including the growing numbers of clergy, may have further reduced the pool of potential soldiers.²⁴⁰ Indicative of Spain’s difficulties, and of the fact that Carlos II and his ministers may have been scraping the barrel to fill the ranks, was that many recruits were said to be little more than children. In October 1675 officials in Sicily rejected almost one-third of a recently arrived Mallorcan tercio on the grounds that they were boys of between 10 and 12 years.²⁴¹ In France, on the ²³³ Cf. Contreras, ‘Aportación’, 21. ²³⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 168. ²³⁵ AHN/Consejo de Castilla/Sala de Alcaldes/Libros de Govierno/1262 (1677), f. 146. Unfortunately, the absence of criminal (as opposed to civil) court records makes this a difficult subject to explore. For Madrid, cf. J. M. López García (ed.), El impacto de la Corte en Castilla. Madrid y su territorio en la época moderna (Madrid, 1998), 473; and Kamen, Spain in Later, 168 ff. ²³⁶ In 1691 Don Juan de Villamar, condemned to eight years’ garrison duty at Oran, had this commuted to eight campaigns in Catalonia, CII to governor of Council of Castile, Madrid, 22 Feb. 1691, AHN/Consejos/7204. In the Indies convicted criminals who agreed to serve as soldiers in Chile or Guayaquil were often pardoned, T. Herzog, Upholding Justice. Society, State and the Penal System in Quito (1650–1750) (Ann Arbor, 2004), 54. ²³⁷ Cf. pragmática of 1674 (reissued in 1677) against the excessive number of liveried servants, AHN/Castilla/Sala de Alcaldes/Libros de Gobierno, 1262 (1677), f. 107 ff.; and CCS, 15 Dec. 1691, AGS/E/3416/14. ²³⁸ A. Marcos Martín, España en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII. Economía y Sociedad (Barcelona, 2000), 321–3. ²³⁹ According to C. R. Phillips, Ciudad Real 1500–1700 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 17, Spain lost about 1.5 million people between 1580 and 1650, most of them in Castile. In 1693 the population of Seville was one-third less than in 1597, Lovett, ‘From Prosperity’, 204, as was that of Avila, Kamen, Spain in Later, 154. The population of Cuenca had fallen by almost 75%; that of Leon by more than one-third. ²⁴⁰ Cf. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 99 ff. ²⁴¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 169. In December 1693 Leganés complained that many of the 1,200 troops recently arrived from Naples and Catalonia were muchachos, and bisoños, Leganés to CII, 27 Dec. 1693, AGS/E/3419/28. Cf. also CCS, 26 Jun. 1694, AGS/E/3888, on recruits from the Canaries, Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 168, and Espino, Catalunya, 262–3.

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other hand, a population twice that of Spain enabled Louis XIV to field larger armies and to enjoy greater military success.²⁴² However, we must not exaggerate Spain’s population decline, or its impact. The worse period of population loss occurred c.1580–1630, followed by a less severe demographic crisis c.1680,²⁴³ such that Carlos II’s recruiting efforts may have benefited from a stabilization—even an increase—in population, both in Spain as a whole,²⁴⁴ and in individual towns of Castile and Andalusia.²⁴⁵ Old Castile had certainly suffered substantial population loss, but Madrid was recovering by 1670, benefiting from immigration from all parts of Spain which swelled the ranks of the idle, vagabond poor, who were most likely to be levied.²⁴⁶ Some other areas on the periphery—Galicia and the Basque country in the north, Catalonia and Valencia in the east, Murcia in the south—were also faring much better demographically.²⁴⁷ These developments had important implications for recruitment. Andalusia remained a good recruiting ground, as did Galicia. In December 1690, in a discussion in the Council of State about whether to reform the Galician tercios in Flanders, the marquis of los Balbases urged on the contrary that new recruits should be ordered because Galicia was a populous realm.²⁴⁸ In addition, the migration of Galician labourers to Castile may have helped to sustain recruiting in the latter.²⁴⁹ Madrid, too, was a major source of recruits, and recognized as such: in 1677 it was expected to supply 1,000 men—more than one-third—of the 2,700 demanded of Castile for Catalonia, whereas Medina del Campo and Burgos were each to give just 100 men.²⁵⁰ But we should not be too determinist about the relationship between population size and recruitment: the former was not the only factor influencing the latter.²⁵¹ The growing number of servants and of the poor may have increased the pool of those most likely to join up or be forcibly levied.²⁵² Similarly, the collapse of ²⁴² Cf. P. R. Campbell, Louis XIV (Harlow, 1993), 4–5. ²⁴³ Cf. J. J. Vidal, ‘The Population of the Spanish Monarchy During the Baroque Period’, in Martínez Ruiz and De Pazzis Pi Corales (eds.), Spain and Sweden in the Baroque Era (1600–1660) (n.p., n.d.); 443–71; Marcos Martín, España en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, 454 ff.; Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. p. x ff.; and Kamen, ‘Decline of Castile’, 64. ²⁴⁴ Cf. Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, p. xii ff. ²⁴⁵ Lovett, ‘Golden Age’, 742; Kamen, Spain in Later, 43–4, 154; M. Weisser, ‘The Agrarian Depression in Seventeenth-century Spain’, JEH, 42 (1982), 151; and Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 93 ff., who, however, is wary of emphasizing recovery. ²⁴⁶ J. M. López García (ed.), El impacto de la Corte, 153 ff.; C. Larquié, ‘Un estudio cuantitativo de la pobreza: Los madrileños y la muerte en el siglo XVII’, Hispania, 40, (1980), 577 ff. ²⁴⁷ Cf. the regional essays in R. Fernández (ed.), España en el Siglo XVIII. Homenaje a Pierre Vilar (Barcelona, 1985); and V. Pérez Moreda and D. S. Reher, ‘La Población Urbana Española entre los Siglos XVI y XVIII. Una Perspectiva Demográfica’, in J. I. Fortea Pérez (ed.), Imágenes de la Diversidad. El Mundo Urbano en la Corona de Castilla (S. XVI-XVIII) (Santander, 1997), 129 ff. ²⁴⁸ CCS, 11 Jan. 1691, AGS/E/3884. Apparently, there were more than 800 men listed for the militia in Galicia. ²⁴⁹ Cf. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 86 ff. Some recruited in Granada were from other parts of Spain, Contreras, ‘Aportación’, 17. ²⁵⁰ CCW, 16 Oct. 1677, AGS/E/1947/141. ²⁵¹ Cf. Glete, War and the State, 94. ²⁵² Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 117–18, 121–2.

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industry in old manufacturing centres—including Cordoba and Segovia²⁵³— may have produced more volunteers. On the other hand, personal experience or second-hand information about the hardships of army life may have dissuaded likely recruits in otherwise potentially rich recruiting grounds: in 1693 the constable of Castile observed that while there were fewer people in Spain there were even fewer who wished to join up, and that although there were many men in Galicia, their experience (of army service) made them shy of enlisting.²⁵⁴ Whatever the reason—demographic exhaustion or reluctance to serve— Carlos II and his ministers needed to look beyond Castile to fill the ranks. Like his father, the king could turn to the other territories in Spain, including the Crown of Aragon and its constituent parts, and the non-Spanish territories of the Monarchy. In 1699, during discussion in the Council of State about how to expel the Scots from Darien, the count of Frigiliana declared that Spain’s depopulation risked the loss of the Indies; it must therefore turn to the king’s subjects elsewhere, in Italy and Flanders.²⁵⁵ Carlos II’s non-Castilian subjects did make a greater contribution to its defence than before (Chapter 5), but he could also supplement his forces by recruiting outside the Monarchy. Spanish military thinkers certainly assumed that Carlos II’s commanders would be in charge of men of varied nationality, including some who were not their master’s subjects.²⁵⁶ So, too, did Carlos himself, who expected to bring to Spain 17,000 foreign troops (including Irish, Swiss, and Germans) for the 1695 campaign.²⁵⁷ It must be emphasized that this was not new, or peculiar to Spain, or necessarily a sign of ‘decline’: the forces of Carlos II’s allies and enemies also included many foreign troops.²⁵⁸

FOREIGN TROOPS Germans (i.e., those in Carlos II’s service rather than those contracted from other princes or made available by allies) continued to contribute substantially to Carlos II’s infantry in all theatres (Table 3). One reason for the greater German presence in the Low Countries was their proximity, facilitating speedy recruitment in time of crisis. In the winter of 1671–2, for example, as the international situation appeared to deteriorate, the count of Monterrey ordered the levy of 2,000 ²⁵³ Cf. J. I. Fortea Pérez, ‘The Textile Industry in the Economy of Cordoba at the End of the Seventeenth and the Start of the Eighteenth Centuries: A Frustrated Recovery’, in I. A. A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilla (eds.), The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (1994), 136 ff. ²⁵⁴ CCS, 10 Oct. 1693, AGS/E/4141. ²⁵⁵ CCS, 6 June 1699, AGS/E/4183. ²⁵⁶ F. Pozuelo y Espinosa, Compendio de los esquadrones modernos (Madrid, 1690), 105, discussing the deployment of troops took the example of a Spanish commander forming a squadron with 350 Spanish pikes, 340 Italians, and 280 Germans. The example is suggestive. ²⁵⁷ Operti to ST, 29 July 1694, same to VA, 26 Aug. AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40. ²⁵⁸ For William III’s army in Ireland in 1690, cf. G. Clark, ‘The Nine Years War, 1688–1697’, in J. S. Bromley (ed.), The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1725 (Cambridge, 1970), 238.

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Germans.²⁵⁹ As for the Swiss, they had a long-established reputation both as soldiers and as mercenaries, and were also well placed geographically to supply men for Flanders, Milan, and Franche Comté.²⁶⁰ Despite the conclusion in 1663 of a treaty between the cantons and Louis XIV, the Swiss continued to supply Carlos II with troops. Indeed, the expansion of the army of Lombardy in 1683–4 was due almost entirely to the levy of nearly 2,000 Swiss.²⁶¹ The Grisons were another valuable source of recruits. In order to maintain good relations with them (and to keep open to the Habsburgs the passes between Italy and Germany), Philip IV had agreed to maintain 600 Grisons troops in the Milanese.²⁶² In 1692 this was doubled to 1,200 men.²⁶³ Another traditional recruiting ground, particularly for the army of Flanders, was Britain.²⁶⁴ Charles II permitted a levy of 4,000 troops in 1667,²⁶⁵ although only half of these were, in fact, raised, and many soon deserted, not having been paid.²⁶⁶ There were plans c.1680 to expand the British component in the army of Flanders,²⁶⁷ but they were not implemented. Perhaps the most important of the British contingents were the Irish, who had a long history of Spanish service and who also served in Catalonia and Lombardy.²⁶⁸ During the Nine Years War, when numerous Irish exiles fought for Louis XIV, there were largely unsuccessful attempts to encourage desertion to the Spanish service.²⁶⁹ Carlos II even hoped, in 1694–5, that William III might allow recruiting in Ireland.²⁷⁰ Broadly speaking, however, Britons serving in Carlos II’s own forces represented a very small proportion of his fighting strength—in part, no doubt, because the Spanish king’s English ally was recruiting more of them for his own military effort in defence of Flanders, particularly during the Nine Years War. Many other foreign troops also served Carlos II, including 1,700 Swedes and Courlanders, levied in 1683–4.²⁷¹ Peace with Portugal after 1668, and a shared fear of the African powers, meant the availability of Portuguese troops: the king of Portugal gave 1,000 men for the defence of Ceuta at the end of 1694.²⁷² However, anxious to remain neutral in ²⁵⁹ CCS, 22 Jan. 1672, AGS/E/2117. Farnese levied 3,000–4,000 Germans in similar circumstances in 1681–2, CCS, 22 April and 21 June 1681, AGS/E/3866. ²⁶⁰ CCS, 18 May 1669, AGS/E/2109. ²⁶¹ Ribot, ‘Milán’, 226–27. For the Nine Years War, cf. Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I), 396. ²⁶² Ribot García, ‘Milán’, 224 ff. For Spanish perceptions of the Grisons, cf. Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 277. ²⁶³ CCS, 4 March 1698, AGS/E/3426/12. The Grisons troops were reduced in 1698 to 800. ²⁶⁴ Parker, Army of Flanders, 24 ff.; Stradling, ‘Filling’, 265–6. ²⁶⁵ Belegno to Doge and Senate, 19 Jan. 1667, CSPV, 1666–1668 (London, 1935), 175–6. ²⁶⁶ Mocenigo to Doge and Senate of Venice, 10 Aug. 1668, CSPV, 1666–1668, 240–1. ²⁶⁷ CII to Alessandro Farnese, 24 Jan. 1681, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 353–4. It was intended to include 1,000 Scots and 1,000 Irish—and 6,000 Spaniards—in an infantry total of 20,000. ²⁶⁸ Stradling, ‘Filling’, passim; Ribot, ‘Milan’, 225–6 (1678–9). ²⁶⁹ Stanhope to Nottingham, 11 Nov. 1693, and Stanhope to Trenchard, 3 Mar. 1694, SP 94/73, f. 234, 261. Cf CJLG, 23 Mar. and 2 and 23 May 1694, AGS/GA/2950, and Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy’ . . . (Part I), 396. ²⁷⁰ William III to Heinsius, 23 Nov. 1694, Add. 34,504 f. 158. ²⁷¹ Grana to CII, 21 Mar. and 15 Apr. 1684, AGS/E/3874. ²⁷² Operti to ST, 2 Dec. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40, and same to VA, 24 Mar. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41.

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the European war, the Portuguese monarch disappointed Spanish hopes of 6,000 of his troops for the defence of Catalonia for 1697.²⁷³ Foreign troops in Spanish pay, as opposed to those whose princes received subsidies from Carlos II but remained in command of their troops, were obtained in various ways. These included unsolicited offers similar to those made by Carlos’s own subjects.²⁷⁴ Alternatively, foreign officers already in the king’s service might be commissioned to recruit in the country concerned, although success might depend on the co-operation of the authorities in the latter. Political instability in Britain sometimes made recruiting there difficult: in 1682, in view of this, it was decided to find 300 men for the Irish tercio in Catalonia from among the Irish community in Spain.²⁷⁵ Identifying and negotiating for available troops for Carlos II was one of the tasks of his diplomats abroad. A foreign prince might offer,²⁷⁶ or be asked for, a large body of troops in return for payment. Agreements of this sort—capitulations—were concluded with numerous German princes in these decades.²⁷⁷ In September 1690, for example, a capitulation was agreed between the governor of Milan and the duke administrator of Württemberg for three regiments to serve in Milan, for a fixed period, an agreement periodically renewed theafter;²⁷⁸ and in May 1691, the governor of the Spanish Low Countries, the marquis of Gastañaga, concluded an agreement whereby the approximately 5,000 Brandenburg troops then serving Carlos II in Flanders were increased to almost 7,500.²⁷⁹ The capitulation negotiated with Max Emmanuel of Bavaria in 1694 by the Spanish minister at The Hague, Don Francisco Bernaldo de Quirós, was typical. It was to run for two years, from 1 April 1694 to 1 April 1696 and specified the number of troops to be provided— 3,500 infantry, 960 dragoons, and 1,600 cavalry, just over 6,000 men in total—and their senior officers, Max Emmanuel promising to maintain them at this strength. For his part, Carlos agreed to pay Max Emmanuel for the maintenance of these troops—including bread and forage—500,000 pattagons (or 100,000 Brabant florins) and guaranteed payment. The Bavarian troops would enjoy the same winter quarters as Carlos’s own troops.²⁸⁰ Using foreign troops, whether they were under the direct control or not of the Spanish king and his commanders, had various advantages for Carlos II. The king did not have to find—recruit—the men, or concern himself with their subsequent ²⁷³ Gudannes, 23 Dec. 1694, Martin, ‘Lettres’, 496; Operti to ST, 13 Dec. 1696, m. 43; Espino, Catalunya, 177. ²⁷⁴ In 1669 the former ambassador of the Catholic cantons offered 5,000 Swiss (or Germans), CCS, 18 May 1669, AGS/E/2109. ²⁷⁵ CCS, 12 Feb. 1682, AGS/E/3869. For this community, cf. E. García Hernán, Irlanda y el Rey Prudente (Madrid, 2000). ²⁷⁶ In 1693, following the loss of Rosas, Max Emmanuel of Bavaria offered Carlos II two Bavarian regiments then in Piedmont, Operti to VA, 13 Aug. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38 ²⁷⁷ Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies?, 113–15. ²⁷⁸ P. H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 (Cambridge, 1995), 114–15. ²⁷⁹ Cf. copy of articles in SP/8/9/56 and summary of subsequent agreement of 1693 in Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 589. ²⁸⁰ CCS, 24 Dec. 1693, AGS/E/3891.

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demobilization. However, foreign troops also had their disadvantages. Some were regarded as unreliable.²⁸¹ In addition, many of the foreign troops who were available were Protestant, prompting complaints from the Catholic hierarchy about the lodging of ‘heretics’ in monasteries in Flanders.²⁸² This difficuly was not insuperable,²⁸³ but the fact that Max Emmanuel of Bavaria was a Catholic was one reason to prefer his men in the Low Countries to the Protestant troops of the elector of Brandenburg.²⁸⁴ As for treaty troops, they were not always deployed as Carlos II or his commanders were promised they would be, or wished them to be: in the winter of 1691–2 the commander of the Brandenburg troops in Carlos II’s pay in Flanders refused to put them in garrison at Ostend and Nieupoort, where an enemy assault was feared. ²⁸⁵ Those troops were also likely to be withdrawn by their prince if not paid or treated as promised—a real problem for the cashstrapped Carlos II.²⁸⁶ This difficulty exacerbated two others. For one thing, the first loyalty of these troops was to another prince; for another, foreign hire troops were generally far more expensive than those raised by Carlos II’s own captains. Not surprisingly, some Spanish ministers believed that Carlos II should apply the sums paid to various German princes for their troops to ensuring that he had more of his own in, for example, Flanders.²⁸⁷

THE SPANISH WAY OF WAR The strategic vision outlined earlier, and the desire not to waste troops who might be hard to replace, shaped the way Carlos II’s forces were deployed. In peacetime they were relatively inactive, although the army of Flanders and the army of Lombardy might execute small-scale policing operations, often in support of local princes, reinforcing the local sense of the superiority of Spanish arms, and thus Spanish influence.²⁸⁸ But such operations were rare and, broadly speaking, Carlos II’s armies were restrained, even cautious, in peace and war.²⁸⁹ In 1676, typically, the duke of Villahermosa, governor-general of the Low Countries, fearing that defeat of the allied army might entail the collapse of the Spanish position in Flanders, restrained its commander, William of Orange, from risking battle to save ²⁸¹ For the Swiss, cf. Stanhope to Galway, 14 July 1695, Spain under Charles, 81–2. ²⁸² CII to Gastañaga, 31 May 1690, AGS/E/3913, van Durme, Archives, ii. 713–14. ²⁸³ CII to ME, 6 Feb. 1698, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 670. ²⁸⁴ Voto of duke of Infantado and Pastrana, Nov 1691, AGS/E/3885. ²⁸⁵ Gastañaga to CII, 2 Jan. 1692, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 542. ²⁸⁶ Cf. Villahermosa to CII, 20 July 1678, AGS/E/2136, replying to a complaint that he had failed to provide for the Brandenburg troops. For the withdrawal of Hanoverian troops in the Nine Years War, cf. CII to Gastañaga, 21 Feb. 1691, AGS/E/3913. ²⁸⁷ CCS, 22 July 1675, AGS/E/2129. ²⁸⁸ Cf. Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I), 384–5, for operations of this sort in north Italy after 1697. ²⁸⁹ Cf. Thompson, ‘Domestic Resource’, 304, for the greater suitability of defensive warfare to the military and political structure which had emerged under Philip IV.

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Bouchain.²⁹⁰ There were exceptions to this reluctance to take the offensive. In 1684 the viceroy of Catalonia was criticized in the Council of War in Madrid for not going onto the offensive against the retreating French after their failure to take Girona.²⁹¹ Bold, aggressive action was sometimes taken, for example in Italy during the Nine Years War, men of the army of Lombardy participating in the only successful allied incursion into France of the war, in 1692.²⁹² However, the Spanish commander was clearly reluctant to invade France on this occasion, and to have his troops winter there, far from the Milanese.²⁹³ Defeat in Piedmont in 1693 (and the loss of valuable troops, to say nothing of the possible French threat to Milan) prompted criticism of Leganés in Madrid for allowing himself to be drawn into battle.²⁹⁴ Defeat thus reinforced the view that the best strategy for the Monarchy was a defensive one. The caution of Spanish commanders—which Carlos II’s allies sometimes criticized²⁹⁵ but which was not uniquely Spanish²⁹⁶—expressed itself in a strategy centred on the defence of great fortified towns or complexes. These offered a base for the low-level engagements, raiding or partisan fighting, or ‘little war’, which were more common than major battles.²⁹⁷ More important, however, and despite the apparent speed with which Louis XIV’s forces took fortified towns in the Low Countries in 1667, the effort required to master the many fortified towns there allowed time for the reinforcement of the army of Flanders, the formation of the Triple Alliance, and the preservation, with relatively minor losses, of the Spanish Low Countries.²⁹⁸ As Vauban noted, a French victory in this theatre was rarely decisive because the many fortresses provided a haven for the defeated and acted as a brake on the victors.²⁹⁹ For Carlos II and his ministers, however, fortresses were costly to maintain and tied down large numbers of men in garrison. In 1676 the governor of Flanders claimed that although Carlos had more than 45,000 men in the Low Countries, another 15,000 were necessary to supply sufficient garrisons.³⁰⁰ This ensured that only a relatively small fraction of ²⁹⁰ Dunlop, Memoirs, ii. 101–2. ²⁹¹ Espino, Catalunya, 57. In 1692 the constable urged the offensive in Catalonia and Italy, ibid, 124. ²⁹² Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I)’, 388 ff. ²⁹³ Leganés to CII, 15 Jun., 21 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3417/16, 95, 97. Leganés preferred to besiege the French-held fortress of Pinerolo, expelling Louis XIV from Italy. Many in the Council of State concurred, CCS, 26 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3417/94. ²⁹⁴ Operti to VA, 17 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/111, 115. In fact, the Spanish commanders had been reluctant to fight, Bazán to CII, 22 Oct. 1693, AGS/E/3655/88. ²⁹⁵ In 1690 the duke of Savoy blamed the reluctance to commit his forces of the Spanish commander, Louvigny, for the allied defeat in Piedmont, VA to DLT, 28 Aug. 1690, AST/LM/ Olanda, m. 1. ²⁹⁶ Cf. DLT to VA [Nov. 1693], AST/LM/Olanda, m. 2 for William III’s criticisms of the duke of Savoy’s eagerness for battle—with its attendant risks. ²⁹⁷ Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 211 ff. ²⁹⁸ Feuquières criticized Louis XIV’s siege strategy for this reason, Dunlop, Memoirs, ii. 16. ²⁹⁹ Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 3–4. ³⁰⁰ Villahermosa to CII, 18 Mar. 1676, AGS/E/2131. In the 1620s it was calculated that the number of men needed to garrison the fortresses of Flanders was 35,000, and that a field army of

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Carlos II’s total forces was available to go on campaign each year,³⁰¹ and helps to explain why Spain’s contribution to the allied field army in Flanders was often so risible.³⁰² The state of the Monarchy’s fortifications was a constant preoccupation in Madrid. In 1676 Carlos II asked the camara of Castile to identify experienced engineers who might inspect all the garrisons of the realm.³⁰³ If defences were found wanting, new works might be necessary. In 1691 those of Cartagena, home of the Spanish galleys, were discovered to be in a poor state and repairs ordered;³⁰⁴ and from late 1695 the fortifications of the recently recovered Namur were repaired and strengthened—according to plans prepared by the great Dutch military engineer, Coehoorn.³⁰⁵ The conclusion of a war offered both an opportunity and an incentive—not least because Louis XIV often deliberately destroyed the fortifications in Spanish territory that he occupied³⁰⁶—to implement essential repairs. In 1668 the duke of Alburquerque urged that the cessions of territory in the recent peace necessitated new works in Flanders;³⁰⁷ the recovery of Messina in 1678 was followed by an extensive building programme throughout Sicily;³⁰⁸ and in 1696, following the end of the war in Italy, Leganés planned to repair and extend Milan’s defences.³⁰⁹ Overseas, too, attacks by pirates and others prompted the removal of vulnerable coastal populations to more defensible inland sites, and the foundation of new towns,³¹⁰ but also an impressive programme of new or improved fortifications at places like Cartagena and Panama—and indeed throughout the Indies.³¹¹ In the sixteenth century Spain’s armies had been at the forefront of new military technology, but apparently failed to keep abreast of developments in the seventeenth century,³¹² with obvious implications for the Monarchy’s ability to 24,000 was sufficient, A. Esteban Estríngana, ‘Guerra y redistribución de las cargas defensivas’, CHM, 27 (2002), 77. Cf. Parker, Army of Flanders, 9. ³⁰¹ The proportion of the army of Catalonia able to take the field during the Nine Years War rose from 63.3% (1689) to 80.3% (1697) in large part due to the loss of fortresses in the intervening years, Espino, Catalunya, 207–8. Cf. Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part I)’, 388. ³⁰² Carlos II was expected to contribute just 10,000 men (the Dutch 50,000 and William III 40,000) to the field army of 100,000 the Grand Alliance hoped to field in Flanders in 1693, DLT to VA, 24 Apr. 1693, AST/LM/Olanda, m. 12. ³⁰³ CCamara [1676], AHN/Consejos/4449/136. ³⁰⁴ Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 145. ³⁰⁵ CCS, 31 Jan 1696, on Max Emmanuel to CII, 13/1/1696, AGS/E/3894. ³⁰⁶ Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 52 (1670s) and 194 (1690s). This is one reason why many of Spain’s fortresses were in a bad state in 1700, cf. Kamen, War of Succession, 57. ³⁰⁷ Alburquerque to Mariana, 4 Aug. 1668, AGS/E/2109. ³⁰⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 619 ff. ³⁰⁹ Albert van der Meer to Fagel, 30 Nov. 1696, Milan, ARAH/SG/8644/325. ³¹⁰ Cf. F. Castillo Meléndez, ‘Población y defensa de la isla de Cuba (1650–1700)’, AEA, XLIV (1987), 1 ff. ³¹¹ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 92 ff., 159; Céspedes de Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 253 ff.; C. Ward, Imperial Panama. Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 1550–1800 (Alburquerque, 1993), 161 ff.; and, for Mérida (Yucatán, New Spain), J. Victoria Ojeda, ‘Piratas en tierra adentro. Estrategia defensiva de una ciudad novohispana. Siglos XVI al XVIII’, Millars. 26 (2003), 47 ff. ³¹² Espino, Catalunya, 244.

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meet the challenge of its more innovative rivals. Some Spanish military thinkers continued to champion older practices and weapons. In a work published in 1669, and reissued at least once again before 1700, one writer declared that pikes were still the principal force of a squadron, citing Rocroi, twenty-six years earlier.³¹³ Not surprisingly, perhaps, the traditional Spanish tactical formation, the square or squadron, was still used when other armies were abandoning it for a linear formation.³¹⁴ However, we should not exaggerate the contrast between a ‘backward’—and therefore failing—Spain and its more progressive—and therefore successful— competitors. French armies continued to use pikes into the War of the Spanish Succession.³¹⁵ More important, Spanish commanders were by no means hostile to innovation,³¹⁶ and there was ‘modernization’. The number and proportion of pikemen fell and that of musketeers increased in Carlos II’s armies,³¹⁷ and new grenadier units were created.³¹⁸ Similarly, in 1673 Carlos ordered the count of Monterrey to form a company of arquebus-carrying dragoons, which were a novelty in the army of Flanders; the new unit distinguished itself that year, the king ordering the creation of a tercio of such troops, a second being established in 1676; in 1677 a new tercio of dragoons was ordered in Catalonia.³¹⁹ We should not overstate the ‘modernization’ of Carlos II’s armies, but nor should we ignore the extent to which they were developing along the same lines as other forces. ORGANIZ ATION AND SERVICES For Carlos II’s troops to be effective, they must be properly supplied. This had been recognized by earlier Spanish monarchs, who had elaborated supply services, providing arms, food, clothing, shelter, hospitals, transports, and horses for the cavalry. But were these effective in the later seventeenth century? Spanish military organization did not conform to the French model: in Spain many of the functions which in France were the responsibility of distinctive military intendants were handled by a wide(r) range of agents, with all the attendant possibilities for confusion and delay.³²⁰ Some foreign observers certainly saw room for ³¹³ Dávila Orejón Gaston, Pólitica y mecánica militar, 97, in Stradling, ‘Catastrophe’, 209. It was a commonplace among Spanish writers that at Rocroi a Spanish square had resisted until the French deployed artillery, Pozuelo y Espinosa, Compendio de los esquadrones, 8 ff. ³¹⁴ Tallett, War and Society, 27. ³¹⁵ G. Symcox, ‘Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years War’, in R. M. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe (London, 1976), 167–8. ³¹⁶ Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 53, for Bournonville’s positive response to the proposal to create more grenadier units; and CCS, 21 Aug. 1685, AGS/E/4134, on Leganés’s views on the creation of units of miners and dragoons. ³¹⁷ Thompson, ‘Money’, 281. The Council of War proposed that in 1693 the infantry of the army of Catalonia be armed with 75% firearms (44% arquebuses and 31% muskets) and just 25% pikes, Espino, Catalunya, 243–4. ³¹⁸ Giménez Ferrer, ‘Ejército’, 72–3. Espino, ‘Declinar’, 186. ³¹⁹ Clonard, Historia Orgánica, iv. 477–8. ³²⁰ Cf. Mackay, Limits, 9.

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improvement.³²¹ Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the achievement of the centralized structure identified earlier and of the officials with the army—the veedor general and others—in overseeing the provision of an array of services to Carlos II’s troops. Those who offered to recruit men at their own cost generally clothed them as well;³²² but for the most part this was the responsibility of the Council of War. Large numbers of uniforms were required each year, including for example 14,000 in 1694.³²³ To meet this need, the king’s ministers relied on private contractors.³²⁴ The manufacture of uniforms in wartime may have stimulated the Castilian economy: the tailors of Valladolid, for example, were busy making uniforms in 1694.³²⁵ The quality of the uniforms manufactured in Castile is not clear, but in 1671, 300 vestidos for recruits of the provincial tercio of Toledo (going to Catalonia) were prepared in Barcelona on the grounds of cost and quality,³²⁶ and uniforms supplied from the Low Countries were said in 1692 to be of better quality than those arriving from Spain.³²⁷ More serious, perhaps, were the financial and organizational difficulties which meant that the troops did not always receive the outfits intended for them, although just how extensive or frequent these were— and their implications for the troops’ effectiveness—is not clear. The king’s troops were also supplied with bread, or pan de munición. This represented a major challenge. In 1677 it was calculated that the 10,323 men in garrison in Spain and Africa (above) required 562,465 rations of bread and 28,889 fanegas of barley a year.³²⁸ In addition Carlos was often obliged to supply bread to the foreign troops in his pay and those of his allies.³²⁹ Bread had long been supplied by private contractors on a yearly basis.³³⁰ However, in 1680 this practice ended in the army of Catalonia;³³¹ and in 1681, the governor of the Low Countries, Alessandro Farnese, proposed that, following the expiry of the existing annual contract (in March of that year), the men of the army of Flanders should ³²¹ In 1690 the Savoyard envoy in Madrid believed that the effectiveness of the army of Lombardy would be improved if an intendant were appointed, Operti to VA, 16 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³²² CJLG, 15 Aug. 1694, AGS/GA/2950. ³²³ Operti to VA, 28 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40. Special operations required extraordinary efforts: in 1692, Leganés ordered 5,000 pairs of shoes for the invasion of mountainous Dauphiné, Leganés to CII, 8 Aug. 1692, AGS/E/3417/175. ³²⁴ Cf., for the army of Catalonia, Espino, Catalunya, 323. ³²⁵ AGS/CMC/3a/2982/18. ³²⁶ CJMTP, 20 May 1671, AGS/GA/2245. ³²⁷ CCS, 29 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3886. No details are given. ³²⁸ AGS/E/1947/213. The contract concluded in April 1694 by Carlos II’s minister in London for the transport from the Downs to Flanders of troops from the Canaries specified their rations, CCS, 23 May 1694, AGS/E/3888. The 1.5 lbs. of bread a day per man was the same as that laid down in the War of the Spanish Succession, Castro, A la sombra, 20. ³²⁹ Relación de las raciones de pan, [1677–78] AGS/E/2136. ³³⁰ Cf. Parker, Army of Flanders, 136–7; and A. Esteban Estríngana, ‘La Ejecución del Gasto Militar y la Gestión de los Suministros. El abastecimiento de pan de munición en el ejército de Flandes durante la primera mitad del siglo XVII’, in M. Rizzo et al. (eds.), Le Forze del Principe. Recursos, Instrumentos y Limites en la Práctica del Poder Soberano en los Territorios de la Monarquía Hispánica, 2 vols. (Murcia, 2003), i. 409 ff. In the 1670s suppliers included the firm of Machado and Pereira, Childs, Army of William III, 250. ³³¹ Espino, Catalunya, 43, 49.

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be given money to buy their own bread; this, he claimed, would cut costs and prevent fraud (by the suppliers).³³² Farnese’s proposal, which he declared imitated the practice of the Dutch and others who understood ‘military economy’, was rejected by the Council of State, on the grounds that it would be difficult to ensure regular payment, that the troops would gamble away the money given them, and that it would be difficult for them to buy bread in the field, such that more men would be lost if the plan went ahead.³³³ However, the change was implemented, and some savings were made,³³⁴ but by the Nine Years War the use of private contractors was again the norm in Carlos II’s armies.³³⁵ Without weapons the troops were obviously of little use. In the late sixteenth century Spain, besides being in the forefront of arms technology, also led the way in supplying weapons to its troops.³³⁶ The continued military effort in the later seventeenth century meant that there was still a substantial demand for arms and munitions—to arm new recruits and replace weapons lost in action and so on—in Spain itself (for new levies destined for other theatres, above all for Catalonia),³³⁷ in Italy, and in Flanders, as in Table 4. Local arsenals and arms industries existed throughout the Monarchy,³³⁸ but Carlos II’s armies everywhere looked to Spain for weapons. This meant, primarily, the arms manufactories at Eugui (Navarre), Liérganes, and La Cavada (Cantabria), at Plasencia and Tolosa (Guipúzcoa), and the gunpowder factories of Granada, Murcia, Orihuela, and Pamplona.³³⁹ Arms production at Liérganes, may have declined in the later seventeenth century,³⁴⁰ and new recruits in the reign of Carlos II occasionally reached Catalonia, Flanders, and Milan without arms.³⁴¹ Such shortages could have serious consequences: in 1694, after his defeat at the Ter, Escalona claimed that his forces had lacked ³³² For accusations, c.1680, that an earlier veedor-general of the army of Lombardy had fraudulently profited from the bread contract, cf. Maffi, ‘L’Amministrazione Militare’, 102. ³³³ CCS on Farnese to CII, 29 Jan. 1681, AGS/E/3666. ³³⁴ Farnese to CII, 10 Sept. 1681, enclosing relación of cost of bread, AGS/E3867. ³³⁵ Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part II)’, 392 ff.; Espino, Catalunya, 319. From 1685 the marquis of Valdeolmos supplied the garrisons of Navarra and Guipúzcoa with grain (and barley for the horse), Ma. C. Hernández Escayola, Negocio y servicio: Finanzas públicas y hombres de negocios en Navarra en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII (Pamplona, 2004), 215–16. ³³⁶ Tallett, War and Society, 119. ³³⁷ Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 280–2, for arms needed in Catalonia 1690–4. ³³⁸ Cf. K. E. Lane, ‘Buccaneers and Coastal Defense in Late-Seventeenth Century Quito: The Case of Barbacoas’, CLAHR (1997), 157. ³³⁹ Cf. Thompson, War and Government, 254; Castro, A la sombra, 184 ff; J. Calvo Poyato, ‘La industria militar española durante la Guerra de Sucesión’, RHM, 66 (1989), 514; J. Vigón, Historia de la Artillería Española, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1947); and, for Eugui, Hernández Escayola, Negocio y servicio, 248–9. ³⁴⁰ Cf. J. Alcalá-Zamora, Historia de una Empresa Siderúrgica Española: Los Altos Hornos de Liérganes y La Cavada, 1622–1834 (Santander, 1974), 91, 93. Alcalá-Zamora attributes this to Spain’s abandonment of its international responsibilities. ³⁴¹ According to a report of 1683, of 200 recruits recently dispatched to Flanders from Galicia and 346 from Burgos and Santo Domingo de la Calzada, only 36 of the latter were armed, the order for arms for the former having arrived too late, Account, 10 Dec. 1683, AGS/E/3873.

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Spain’s Armies Table 4. Arms requested and sent from Spain, 1665–1700 Date

Destination

Arms requested and/or ordered

1667

Flanders

1671

Milan

1672

Flanders

1674

Catalonia

1674–5

Sicily

4,000–5,000 muskets and arquebuses

1681–2

Flanders

3,000 canones de Vizcaya

1683

Flanders

2,000 muskets

1690

Milan

Unspecified number of (Basque-manufactured) muskets

1692

Milan

(Basque-manufactured) 8,000 muskets

1694

Milan

3,000 muskets and 2,000 pikes from Aragon

1699

Indies

Arms sent 500 muskets

1,000 firearms manufactured in Guipúzcoa 3,000–4,000 muskets 3,000 arms 2,000 arquebuses and 1,000 muskets

500 muskets, 1,000 quintals of powder, 200 grenades, 1,000 ‘bombs’, and 6 mortars

Sources: CCS, 22 Apr. 1672, AGS/E/2117; CCW, 11 May 1671, AGS/GA/2245; CCS, 22 Apr. 1672, AGS/E/2117; Godolphin to Arlington, 4 July 1674, Hispania Illustrata, 219–22; Ribot, Monarquía, 416; CCS, 9 Nov. 1681, AGS/E/3867; CCS, 1 June 1683, AGS/E/3872, and 31 July 1683, AGS/E/3873; Fuensalida to CII, 7 Sept. and 4 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/3416/51, 54; CCS, 28 Jan. 1692, AGS/E/3416; CCS, 2 Jan. 1694, AGS/E/3419/1; Storrs, ‘Disaster’, 14.

essential firearms.³⁴² Clearly, there were problems with manufacture: in 1676 it was claimed that production at the powder factory at Granada was hindered by interruptions of the water supply.³⁴³ However, this and other problems were not peculiar to Spain.³⁴⁴ More important, some Spanish commanders thought highly of Spanish arms.³⁴⁵ Arms production in Spain did sometimes increase in response to the greater demand in wartime, for example at Liérganes,³⁴⁶ which helped to ensure that Spain remained self-sufficient in cast-iron guns throughout ³⁴² Espino, Catalunya, 137. ³⁴³ [?] to Zarate, 14 Nov. 1676, AGS/GA/2364. ³⁴⁴ Cf. Childs, Army of William, 15–17, 171–2. ³⁴⁵ In 1690 and 1692 successive governors of Milan requested Basque muskets, claiming that these were superior (better suited to the local terrain) to the Italian ones their Spanish troops had, Fuensalida to CII, 7 Sept. and 4 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/3416/51, 54. ³⁴⁶ Alcalá-Zamora, Historia de una Empresa, Appendix 1A (graph of output 1630–1715).

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this period.³⁴⁷ In 1694, with 1,094 bronze and 1,343 iron cannon in its forts, Spain had double what it had in 1656.³⁴⁸ We should not exaggerate the positive elements. In 1693, when Carlos II sought to revive the militia, it was discovered that the urban arsenals had been emptied during the war against Portugal and not made good since.³⁴⁹ Some of those arsenals were re-stocked thereafter, at the initiative (and expense) of those towns most vulnerable to attack. Unfortunately, just how widespread and successful this was, and where the arms were obtained, is unclear.³⁵⁰ Nevertheless, efforts were under way to make good earlier neglect and to expand Spain’s munitions industry: in 1692, for example, the manufacture of cuerda mecha, or fuses, began at Sigüenza.³⁵¹ The single greatest obstacle to efforts of this sort was, not surprisingly, the lack of funding.³⁵² So far, the focus has been largely on the infantry, which made up the bulk of Carlos II’s troops. However, the number and proportion of cavalry was increasing in the armies of Spain,³⁵³ as in those of other states,³⁵⁴ and this necessitated a constant supply of horses³⁵⁵ to replace those lost in action or seized by the enemy,³⁵⁶ those taken by deserters, and those sold. Counter-measures to prevent some of this wastage included cutting off one of the ears of army horses to facilitate their identification; since, however, those who illegally obtained these animals often cut off the remaining ear, in 1692 Carlos II ordered the seizure of all horses missing one or both ears.³⁵⁷ But the king still needed large numbers of additional horses each year. He could buy those he needed,³⁵⁸ or requisition them as Philip IV had done: ³⁵⁹ in the summer of 1693, in the crisis which followed the loss of Rosas, almost 1,000 requisitioned horses were stationed in the grounds of the Retiro palace in Madrid.³⁶⁰ The king could also prohibit the export of horses, that of horses to French-occupied Catalonia being banned in 1677 and 1694.³⁶¹ ³⁴⁷ Thompson, ‘Aspects’, 5. ³⁴⁸ J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘La fábrica de hierro colado de Corduente, en Molina de Aragón (1642–1672)’, in idem, Altos hornos y poder naval en la España Moderna (Madrid, 1999), 209. ³⁴⁹ Governor of CC to CII, 7 Aug. 1693, AHN/Consejos/10120. ³⁵⁰ In 1694 swords for the 2% levy in Old Castile were purchased in Valladolid, but their precise origin is unclear, AGS/CMC/2982/18. ³⁵¹ Larruga, Memorias Políticas, xvi. 217. ³⁵² For sums owed various arms manufacturers, cf. CCS, 27 Apr. 1672, AGS/E/2117, and [?] to López de Zarate, 14 Nov. 1676, AGS/GA/2364. ³⁵³ Cf. Thompson, ‘Money’, 281. In the army of Catalonia in the Nine Years War, the cavalry fluctuated between just under 20% and 33% of the total, Espino, Catalunya, 205; in the army of Flanders, the cavalry represented just over 25% of the total in 1675, but between 1689 and 1695 rose to almost 50%, ibid., 211; and in the army of Lombardy in the same period the cavalry were almost constant at about 20% of the total, ibid., 210. Maffi, ‘Nobiltà e Carriera’, 11, reveals a rather different pattern over the period as a whole. ³⁵⁴ Cf. J. Chagniot, Guerre et société a l’époque moderne (Paris, 2001), 286 ff. ³⁵⁵ Cf. R. A. Stradling, ‘Spain’s Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600–1660’, History, 69 (1984), 208 ff. ³⁵⁶ In 1676, Louis XIV’s forces captured 100 horses in a raid near Mons, Satterfield, Princes, 293. ³⁵⁷ Royal order, or cedula, 20 Nov. 1692, AHN/Consejos/libros/1474/36. ³⁵⁸ In 1692 Leganés bought 900 horses for the army of Lombardy, for 48,000 escudos, AGS/E/ 3417/24. ³⁵⁹ Clonard, Historia Orgánica, iv. 465; Kamen, ‘Decline’, 70. ³⁶⁰ Stanhope to Nottingham, 17 June 1693, SP94/73 f. 168. ³⁶¹ M. Artola, La Monarquía de España (Madrid, 1999), 244.

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During the Nine Years War Carlos II enacted a measure which aimed to ensure not only a constant supply of cavalry mounts in the long term but also the availability of horses for other purposes. In 1695 the king re-issued an order of 1671 for the registration of all mares and for what might be called a co-ordinated stud programme across Castile; unfortunately, we do not know enough about the implementation of this measure, which had important implications not only for the country’s military capacity but also for its livestock and agriculture.³⁶²

QUALIT Y OF THE SPANISH FORCES Carlos II may have had fewer troops than his father, but some contemporary Spanish military writers believed that military success depended not so much on superior numbers or weaponry as on able leadership, examples of which were to be found in Spain’s own past: the ‘grand captain’, Gonzalo de Cordoba, who had conquered Naples (1495–7, 1501–4), the duke of Alba, victor at Tunis (1535) and Muhlberg (1547), and Hernán Cortés, the conqueror of Mexico.³⁶³ Not everybody agreed with this view, however. Manuel de Lira, an experienced diplomat and administrator, thought that even these great commanders could not have succeeded in the conditions prevailing in late seventeenth-century Spain. His seemed the prevailing opinion. For most contemporary commentators, Spaniards had lost the military ‘spirit’ which had underpinned earlier successes.³⁶⁴ This seemed to be justified by the reluctance of many Spaniards to serve and the poor quality of most of those who did. However, Carlos II’s troops could still win the esteem of their opponents for their fighting qualities. In 1690 the commander of Louis XIV’s forces at Fleurus, said of the Spanish troops opposing him that those at Rocroi had not been braver;³⁶⁵ and in 1693 Leganés described his men as standing firm at Marsaglia when others gave way.³⁶⁶ There was widespread praise, too, for the Spanish cavalry.³⁶⁷ Where discipline broke down, or Spanish forces suffered a setback, it was often attributed to their not having been properly supplied.³⁶⁸ If the troops were not at fault, perhaps the problem lay in those who led them. It was a constant complaint that there were too many officers in Carlos II’s armies.³⁶⁹ In addition to their excessive number, too many officers seemed to be ³⁶² AMB/Actas/1695, f. 225–33. For an earlier measure of this sort (1570), cf. Thompson, War and Government, 22. ³⁶³ Espino, Guerra y cultura, 514. 1684 saw the publication of Solis’s Historia de la Conquista de México, much of which—and particularly the historical commentary—could be regarded as a tract for the Monarchy’s difficult times. ³⁶⁴ Cf. the Venetian ambassador in Madrid, in 1678, in H. Kamen, ‘The Decline of Castile: The last Crisis’, EcHR, 2nd ser., (1964–5), 64. ³⁶⁵ Espino, Catalunya, 56. ³⁶⁶ Leganés to CII, 8 Oct. 1693, SP8/14/76 ³⁶⁷ Espino, ‘Declinar’, 183. ³⁶⁸ CCS, 13 (10) Aug. 1691, AGS/E/3885, on the army of Flanders. ³⁶⁹ Constable to Mariana, 10 Oct. 1668, AGS/E/2108; CCS, 28 Aug. 1680, AGS/E/3865. Some tercios and companies were more top-heavy than others, individual units varying enormously in size and in the proportion of officers to soldiers. The problem was not confined to the army of Flanders.

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more concerned with lining their pockets at the expense of their men and their king, and to the detriment of the effectiveness of the king’s forces.³⁷⁰ Ensuring a capable officer corps was not helped by the fact that some officers were appointed not because of their ability but because of ‘inherited’ merit or their connections.³⁷¹ These problems also apparently extended to the high command.³⁷² Individual commanders were certainly found wanting. They included the count of Monterrey, who was criticized for his poor performance at the battle of Seneffe (1674),³⁷³ and later blamed for defeat in Catalonia (1677);³⁷⁴ the duke of Medina Sidonia, replaced as viceroy of Catalonia in 1694 after a lacklustre performance;³⁷⁵ and Medina Sidonia’s successor, Escalona, defeated at the Ter. In Sicily the marquis of Villafranca, viceroy at the outbreak of the Messina revolt, was accused of incapacity—and worse.³⁷⁶ These difficulties, which also extended to the army of Lombardy,³⁷⁷ were not new: Olivares had complained that Spain suffered from a lack of leaders, and that Spain’s military difficulties in this period were in part at least due to the deficiencies of its ruling class.³⁷⁸ As with the junior officers, men were often promoted for reasons other than their ability,³⁷⁹ contrary to Philip IV’s ordinances of 1632.³⁸⁰ Such appointments almost inevitably meant that the faction struggle in Madrid (Chapter 4) spilled over into the armed forces, to ill effect.³⁸¹ However, these rivalries also mean that contemporary criticism of individual commanders cannot always be taken at face value. The king and his ministers were not always content to tolerate abuses. In 1669 the Council of State urged replacing two maestres de campo who showed little inclination to leave Madrid and join their ³⁷⁰ Contreras, ‘Servicio Militar’, 104. ³⁷¹ In 1696 the marquis of Valfuentes, eldest son of the duke of Abrantes and a close confident of the all-powerful admiral, was given two companies of horse in the army of Lombardy, Operti to ST, 8 Mar. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ³⁷² Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 125, regarding the Nine Years War in Catalonia, and Ribot, Monarquía, 296 ff, on the Messina War. For an earlier comparison, cf. F. González de Léon, ‘The Road to Rocroi: The Duke of Alba, the Count–duke of Olivares, and the High command of the Spanish Army of Flanders in the Eighty Years War, 1567–1659’, Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1991. ³⁷³ Alberti to Doge and Senate, 25 Jan. 1675, CSPV: 1673–5, 343–4. ³⁷⁴ De Gubernatis to ST, 28 July 1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 229. ³⁷⁵ Espino, Catalunya, 128–34, 138. Yet the Council of War approved Escalona’s dispositions after the fall of Palamós that year to defend Gerona and Barcelona. ³⁷⁶ Ribot, Monarquía, 95 ff. ³⁷⁷ Maffi, ‘Nobiltà e Carriera’, 12 ff. ³⁷⁸ Thompson, ‘Aspects’, 1. Cf. cardinal Portocarrero’s memoire (1703) for Philip V, H. Kamen, War of Succession, 83–4. ³⁷⁹ Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 94. In 1697 Carlos II agreed to the demand of the prince of Nassau (who had suffered great losses as a result of the war being fought in the Spanish Low Countries) that his son receive the first vacant cavalry regiment in the army of Flanders, CII to Max Emmanuel, 5 July 1697, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 657. In effect, the appointment was a means of rewarding—and confirming—the loyalty of the prince and his family. ³⁸⁰ Clonard, Historia Orgánica, iv. 399 ff. ³⁸¹ In 1677–8, Don Juan replaced key military figures in Catalonia with his own creatures, ‘Diario de Noticias de 1677 a 1678’, CODOIN, LXVII (1877), 108. In 1696 a clash between the viceroy of Catalonia and the prince of Hesse Darmstadt (the queen’s cousin) was said to be dividing the officers of the army of Catalonia, reducing its effectiveness, Operti to VA, 5 Apr. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43.

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tercios in Flanders.³⁸² Efforts were also made to end unmerited promotions,³⁸³ although these were not completely eradicated,³⁸⁴ and to impress upon army officers their obligations. Thus, commanders of besieged fortresses who were regarded as having surrendered too readily were sometimes detained, and investigated by the judicial arm of the army, i.e., the superintendente de justicia militar, with a view to prosecution by court-martial. The rapid fall of a number of fortresses in Catalonia and Flanders prompted measures of this sort during the Dutch War,³⁸⁵ and the Nine Years War. Don Gabriel de Quiñones, for example, arrested along with other officers of the garrison following the fall of Rosas in 1693, was sentenced to ten years’ presidio service, although he successfully appealed.³⁸⁶ In fact, most of these investigations exonerated those investigated; they were generally held to have done their duty in very difficult circumstances.³⁸⁷ Indeed, we should not be too harsh on the officer class in Carlos II’s armies. The nobility remained in some respects a military class, many seeking relief from the lanzas tax (levied on the titled nobility in lieu of military service) on the grounds that they did, in fact, serve in Carlos II’s armies;³⁸⁸ many lesser nobles and younger sons of noble families looked to the king’s forces to provide them with employment and rank; and there are many examples of junior and senior officers who were able. The views expressed by the constable of Castile in numerous consultas of the Council of State reveal a man with a good grasp of military issues, as befitted somebody who had held the senior military and political command in Flanders.³⁸⁹ The marquis of Leganés, a man of wide military experience, for his part, was highly esteemed by other allied commanders in Italy in the Nine Years War.³⁹⁰ Other able, energetic, successful senior commanders included the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, briefly viceroy of Sicily during the Messina war.³⁹¹ Among the junior officers, too, there were many able nobles, some of whom died fighting in the king’s sevice. Among the casualties at the battle of Marsaglia in 1693 were the marquis of Solera, eldest son and heir of the count of Santisteban del Puerto (viceroy of Naples) and relatives of both the admiral and the constable ³⁸² CCS, 21 May 1669, AGS/E/2109. ³⁸³ In 1677 Carlos II ordered the Council of War not to propose for commands candidates without military experience [Godolphin] to Mr Yard, 25 Aug. 1677, Hispania Illustrata, 323–4. ³⁸⁴ Giménez Ferrer, ‘Ejército’, 74–5. ³⁸⁵ Cf. Constable to Villahermosa, 14 Aug. 1675, BNM, MS. 2408 f. 147, on the fall of Bellegarde; and CCS, 2 May 1678, on report of Don Juan de Layseca, superintendente of military justice (in Flanders), AGS/E/2136, following his investigation of the loss of Ghent, Ypres, and Fuerte Rojo. ³⁸⁶ Maura,Vida, 413–14. Military justice in Spain’s armies has barely been studied, but cf. F. González de Léon, ‘La Administración del Conde Duque de Olivares y la justicia militar en el Ejército de Flandes, 1567–1643’, IH, 13 (1993), 107 ff. ³⁸⁷ Cf. C. Storrs, ‘The Problem of Civilian and Military Justice in Early Modern Europe’, in C. Donati (ed.), Civilians and the Military in Early Modern Europe (in press), for the investigation (and exoneration) of the prince de Barbançon, after the loss of Namur in 1692. ³⁸⁸ For the count of Montijo, cf. paper [Nov.–Dec. 1676], AGS/GA/2364. ³⁸⁹ Cf. CCS, 9 Feb. 1677, AGS/E/2133. ³⁹⁰ Cf. Max Emmanuel to William III, 19 Oct. 1693, SP 8/14. ³⁹¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 98 ff.

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of Castile.³⁹² Last, but by no means least, many of those who played a leading role in the military successes of Philip V were products of—and promoted in—the armies of Carlos II. They included the marquis of Bedmar (b. 1652), who began his military career in the Milanese, but spent most of it in Flanders, where he held numerous senior posts, being appointed head of the Council of War in Madrid by Philip V; and Juan Francisco de Bete y Croy, marquis of Lede (b. 1668), the future conqueror of Sardinia (1717), Sicily (1718), and Ceuta (1720).³⁹³

CONCLUSION The reign of Carlos II is widely regarded as one in which Spain abandoned the international struggle; in which the military structure developed in earlier reigns atrophied, Spain’s armed forces being both outnumbered and ‘out-organized’ by those of France (and by those of some other states); and in which the military effort required of the king’s subjects was substantially reduced. Spain, it is argued, survived only because other states were willing to support a power which could not even make a reasonable contribution to the anti-French coalitions. However, this bleak picture caricatures Spain’s military experience in the last decades of the seventeenth century: there is a core of truth, but it is not the whole picture. Carlos II and his ministers remained firmly committed to defending the Monarchy. This meant that they had to continue to maintain substantial forces inside and outside Spain in Europe—in Flanders, Lombardy, Catalonia—and beyond. These forces were smaller and less obviously dominant than in the past; but they cannot simply be written off. Since Spaniards—in effect, Castilians—were still widely held in Spain to be the best troops, this defence commitment meant that Spain—above all Castile—was asked to provide thousands of men. Many of these, and particularly those serving outside Spain, were obtained by an established system of voluntary recruitment by the king’s captains. Voluntary recruiting was less productive than before, however, despite efforts to enhance the prestige and attractiveness of the military.³⁹⁴ This necessitated a resort to forced levies of various types, including the imposition of annual quotas between 1694 and 1697 and the refurbishment of the Castilian militia. These experiments were not entirely successful, but anticipated developments in the reign of Philip V, who, in some respects, responded to the same problems that faced Carlos II with the same solutions. Equally important, in view of claims that the military system of the reign of Carlos II represented ³⁹² Albert Van der Meer to Fagel, 10 Oct. 1693, ARAH/SG/8644/78; Operti to VA, 5 Nov. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³⁹³ Cf. potted biographies in Andújar Castillo, Consejo y Consejeros de Guerra, 197–8, 176–7. ³⁹⁴ In 1683 Carlos II inaugurated a sort of ‘Remembrance Day’, cf. L. Hanke, and C. Rodríguez, Los Virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria, 12 vols. (Madrid, 1978–80), vi, 253; and Grana to CII, 11 Aug. 1683, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 403.

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a surrender of effective central authority, the king’s ability to impose these new obligations suggests that, on the contrary, Carlos enjoyed significant real power. Measuring the military burden in this, or any other, reign is not easy, not least because of the diversity of recruitment, such that we can seldom be sure that we have identified all those recruited in any one year. Nevertheless, the number of men recruited in specific localities could be substantial. Between 1660 and 1700 the number of soldiers levied in Jaen was less than half that raised between 1641 and 1659, the peak of Spain’s military activity in the seventeenth century, but much the same as in 1623–39.³⁹⁵ For those affected by the continued demand for troops, the burden of war remained substantial, even if for some it offered opportunities.³⁹⁶ However, Castile, which had never been the sole source of troops, was less able than before to provide soldiers, not least because of its demographic difficulties. Carlos II therefore looked, as had his predecessors, to the manpower resources of the larger Monarchy. Last, but by no means least, the king could, again like his predecessors, use foreigners, and also mobilize—a greater novelty this—allies. There were never enough men to meet all commitments, Carlos and his ministers having constantly to juggle scarce resources: in 1677 reinforcements originally destined for Sicily were diverted to Oran following (false) reports of a Moorish siege of the latter.³⁹⁷ Nevertheless, and however inadequately, the machinery still functioned, there were men to be juggled with, even if, as in previous (and subsequent) reigns, much depended upon improvisation.³⁹⁸ It was one thing to put men into the field; their effectiveness once there was another matter. This depended upon a number of things, including the success of supply systems and the quality of the high command. Here, too, there were real deficiencies, structural and individual, with damaging consequences. However, while acknowledging that the troops sometimes went unpaid and that crucial supplies were too often late or inadequate, we must also recognize that large numbers of men were raised, armed, clothed, transported, and fed. The quality of Carlos II’s troops, too, was sometimes poor, although our knowledge of the army of Catalonia—the only one of his three major armies hitherto studied in any detail, but perhaps the least impressive of them—distorts our perception. Alongside the many unwilling conscripts, there were able, willing men at all levels of the military hierarchy. In addition, those at the top were by no means resistant ³⁹⁵ Cf. Thompson, ‘Domestic Resource’, 286, where Granada is said to be have been providing 800 men a year into the 1690s. Between 1685 and 1698 38 recruiting officials appeared in Murcia alone, Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Consenso’, 983. Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 247 ff., Appendix VI, lists levies in Murcia between 1685 and 1700. ³⁹⁶ Cf. D. Vassberg, The Village and the Outside World in Golden Age Castile. Mobility and migration in everyday rural life (Cambridge, 1996), 110 ff. Unfortunately, this excellent study is less full on the reign of Carlos II than on those of his predecessors. ³⁹⁷ Avvisi [July 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 227. In the winter of 1680–1 Alexander Farnese was promised 2,000 men (1,000 Neapolitans and 1,000 Lombards) for Flanders but all were diverted, to Catalonia and the Armada, CCS, 12 Apr. 1681, AGS/E/3666. ³⁹⁸ Cf. Mackay, Limits, 12.

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to change. Indeed, military reform was in the air in the reign of Carlos II.³⁹⁹ Innovations were not always successful, and did—could—not always resolve what was perhaps the single most important failing of Spain’s military system in this reign, the want of funds. Indeed, it is arguable that Spanish troops were not inferior in quality to their enemy, but that they were just not funded/supplied sufficiently to enable them to do the job.⁴⁰⁰ These difficulties, it must be stressed, were by no means peculiar to Carlos II’s Spain.⁴⁰¹ Given the difficulties they encountered, we should be the more impressed by Spain’s military success and survival in the late seventeenth century. This owed something to the constraints of contemporary warfare. When the army of Catalonia was defeated, for example, in 1694, the supply difficulties which handicapped Louis XIV’s commander—competing with the Sun King’s forces elsewhere for resources which were increasingly scarce in France itself—helped to prevent what was a serious setback for Carlos II from proving a ‘decisive’ disaster.⁴⁰² In addition, the fact that Spain was fighting on so many different fronts—it was the only member of the anti-French coalition fighting on all fronts, in Flanders and on the Lower Rhine, in Italy, and in Catalonia in the Nine Years War—which might be thought of as a source of weakness, stretching Spain’s resources too thinly, in fact enabled the Spanish monarch and his ministers to ease the pressure on one front by making greater efforts on another. In the summer of 1693 Louis XIV’s troops, having taken Rosas, were withdrawn from Catalonia, relieving the pressure there, to counter the intention of the allies in Piedmont (whose forces included the expeditionary force of the army of Lombardy) to besiege the fortress of Pinerolo (and threatening another invasion of Dauphiné).⁴⁰³ The performance of Carlos II’s armies was sometimes disappointing, but they tied down large numbers of enemy troops for long periods. In addition, Spain’s contribution to the allied (field) armies may have been relatively small, but without it—and the facilities available in, for example, Spanish Flanders—those armies would have been weaker and less successful. We should not ignore the contribution of Carlos II’s own military organization to the fact that on his death, his successor inherited a Monarchy which was still largely intact, inside and outside Europe.

³⁹⁹ Kalnein, Juan José, 190; Giménez Ferrer, ‘Ejército’, 81. ⁴⁰⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 61–2. ⁴⁰¹ The failure of the Dutch provinces to pay the forage contractors of his army created difficulties for William III in Flanders, William to Heinsius, 2 Jan. 1693, Add. 34,504 f. 109. ⁴⁰² Cf. J. Ostwald, ‘The “Decisive” Battle of Ramillies, 1706: The Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare’, Journal of Military History, 64 (2000), 649–77. ⁴⁰³ Stanhope to [?], 1 July 1693, SP 94/73 f. 169; Operti to ST, 21 and 27 Aug., and 10 Sept. 1693; same to VA, 27 Aug. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38; Espino, Catalunya, 133.

2 Spanish Naval Power . . . at sea we are lost unless we agree with the Dutch for . . . 20 or 30 ships viceroy of Sicily, February 1675¹ As for the Mediterranean squadron . . . the English claim ‘absolute’ command, which the Spaniards would be reluctant to concede, because their weakness has not lessened their pride Savoyard envoy at The Hague, December 1691²

INTRODUCTION The Spanish Monarchy was united—or divided—by the seas, as commentators had long recognized;³ consequently, the persistence of Spanish imperial dominion depended not merely on its armies but also on its navy, or navies. Unfortunately, these have suffered the same neglect on the part of historians as Carlos II’s armies, and for much the same reason: Spanish seapower appeared to have collapsed and recovery must await the new broom of the Bourbons.⁴ Spain had become a significant naval power in the Mediterranean in the later sixteenth century.⁵ However, Spain’s bid to become a force in northern waters had faltered in 1588, when the Armada against England failed.⁶ This was not the end of efforts to ensure that Spain remained a major maritime power,⁷ but the setback of 1588 was confirmed

¹ Marquis of Villafranca to Mariana, 15 Feb. 1675, in L. Ribot García, La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina (1674–1678) (Madrid, 2002), 68. ² Count de la Tour [DLT] to duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy [VA], 28 Dec. 1691, AST/LM/ GB, m. 8. ³ Cf. the observations of Botero, in his Reason of State (1589), D. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 1589–1665. Reconstruction and Defeat (Cambridge, 1997), 9–10. ⁴ According to H. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700–1715 (London, 1967), 58–9, by 1700 ‘the Spanish crown had ceased to exist as a naval power’. For Philip V’s measures to revive the Spanish navy, cf. ibid., 140. ⁵ P. Williams, Philip II (Basingstoke, 2001), 99; I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560–1620 (London, 1976), 168, 300. ⁶ Cf. G. Parker and C. Martin, The Spanish Armada (Manchester, 1999). ⁷ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 14 ff.

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by defeat at The Downs in 1639.⁸ Thereafter, Spain was doomed to second- even third-class naval power status, with inevitable consequences for its imperial pretensions.⁹ Spain’s weakness at sea was the more serious because its neighbours and rivals—above all the Dutch Republic, England, and France—were expanding their own fleets: all three had larger navies than did Carlos II.¹⁰ In addition, Spain was being left behind in the second half of the seventeenth century by advances in the design, size, tonnage, and armament of warships, i.e., by the naval variant of the ‘Military Revolution’.¹¹ Carlos II’s Spain could certainly reveal remarkable weakness at sea. In Europe the Spanish blockading fleet not only failed in January 1675 to prevent the entry of a French relief expedition into rebel Messina, which was about to surrender, but defeat at sea off Palermo in June 1676 allowed Louis XIV’s forces to extend their hold along much of Sicily’s eastern shore, further threatening Carlos’s hold on the island realm—and on the adjacent kingdom of Naples—and undermining the entire ‘Spanish system’ in Italy.¹² Thereafter, in 1683–4, the Spanish monarch’s forces were unable to check Louis XIV’s naval bombardment of Genoa; traditionally an ally of the king of Spain, the republic was forced to adopt a more neutral stance between Louis XIV and Carlos II, with damaging implications for Spain’s ability to use its facilities.¹³ In the Atlantic, in 1686, Cadiz was blockaded by French ships which only departed on being promised 500,000 crowns, the value of goods confiscated from French merchants trading illegally with Spanish America.¹⁴ Spain’s impotence at sea was again exposed during the Nine Years War. In 1691 the French fleet bombarded Barcelona and Alicante.¹⁵ Worse was to come. In the summer of 1693 the Spanish fleet fled to the shelter of Port Mahon (Menorca), while a superior French force threatened Spain’s entire Mediterranean coastline from Cadiz to Barcelona, prompting fears for the latter, for Gibraltar, and for ⁸ R. A. Stradling, ‘Catastrophe and Recovery: The Defeat of Spain, 1639–43’, History, 64 (1979), 205–19; C. R. Phillips, Six Galleons for the King of Spain. Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, 1986), 215 ff. ⁹ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 254; R. Valladares, ‘La dimensión marítima de la Empresa de Portugal. Limitación de recursos y estrategia naval en el declive de la Monarquía Hispánica (1640–1668)’, Revista de Historia Naval, 51 (1995), 19–31. ¹⁰ J. R. Bruijn, ‘States and their Navies from the Late Sixteenth to the End of the Eighteenth Centuries’, in P. Contamine (ed.), War and Competition between States (Oxford, 2000), 71; J. S. Bromley and A. N. Ryan, ‘Navies’, in J. S. Bromley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1725 (Cambridge, 1970), 790 ff. ¹¹ J. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal–Military States, 1500–1660 (London, 2002), 38, 95. Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 213, 417. Further proof of Spain’s backwardness at sea is found by some in its continued use of the galley, cf. (the sceptical) M. Herrero Sánchez, El Acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés (1648–1678), (Madrid, 2002), 247. ¹² Ribot, Monarquía, 60 ff. According to one Spanish commander, the French entered Messina as easily as if the blockading Spanish vessels were in the Indies. ¹³ For the importance of Genoa’s shipyards to Spain, cf. Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 312. After 1684 the Tursi galleys (below) wintered at Gaeta (Naples), AGS/E/3633/206. ¹⁴ C. Fernández Duro, C., La Armada Española, desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y de Aragón, 9 vols. (Madrid, 1895–1903), v. 210. ¹⁵ A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el reinado de Carlos II (Barcelona, 1999), 302.

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control of the Straits.¹⁶ It was not only Louis XIV who posed a threat in Europe: throughout Carlos II’s reign, north African and Turkish ships continued to attack the coasts of Spain and the other territories of the Monarchy.¹⁷ Outside Europe, too, the Monarchy was vulnerable. It was virtually impossible, for example, to prevent illegal foreign interloping in the Indies.¹⁸ More seriously, in the 1670s and 1680s Spanish America was rocked by the attacks of the buccaneers,¹⁹ who occasionally threatened the organized fleets which passed between Spain and the Indies. The loss of Cartagena in 1697²⁰ and the Scots’ colonization of Darien from 1699 both owed something to Spain’s vulnerability at sea in the Caribbean. Apparently, Spain was saved at sea—as on land—by its allies, above all by the Dutch Republic and England. From the start of Carlos II’s reign, Spain was a beneficiary of Dutch operations against the Barbary corsairs in the Mediterranean.²¹ This was overshadowed, however, by Dutch support during the ‘Dutch War ‘. In August 1674, following Carlos II’s decision to concentrate his strength in Italian waters against Messina, a Dutch fleet went to the defence of the otherwise exposed Catalonia, forestalling a French attempt on Rosas.²² The following year, admiral de Ruyter led to Sicily a powerful squadron, including 18 warships, to assist Spanish efforts to restore Carlos II’s authority in Messina.²³ De Ruyter’s squadron returned home in 1676, but in 1678 another Dutch squadron, again including 18 warships, under admiral Evertsen, left for Spain, where it learned that Louis XIV’s forces had evacuated Sicily and soon returned home.²⁴ The Monarchy also benefited, inside and outside Europe, from the operations of Dutch privateers, arranged during the Dutch War by Carlos II’s envoy at The Hague, Don Manuel de Lira.²⁵ Dutch seapower continued to shore up the Monarchy in the Nine Years War, when England also came to Spain’s aid. In 1692 fears for Rosas following the appearance of French naval forces in strength off Catalonia prompted a request for English naval support;²⁶ and in 1694, informed that the Brest fleet had entered the Mediterranean to join that of Toulon (and fearing that Spain’s coasts would be ¹⁶ Stanhope to Nottingham, 17 June, 8, 22, and 29 July, 12, 19, and 26 Aug. 1693, SP 94/73, ff. 168, 171, 180, 182, 188, 192. ¹⁷ Cf. B. Garcés Ferra, ‘Propuesta de Armada contra los Piratas Berberiscos entre Holanda y España a mediados del Siglo XVII. Noticias de Mallorca y Argel’, Hispania, 8 (1948), 403–33, passim for the situation c.1661; and CJAA, 17 Dec. 1696, AGS/GA/3877. ¹⁸ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 88–9. ¹⁹ J. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 199. ²⁰ J. A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (Harlow, 1999), 261; H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire. The Making of a World Power 1492–1763 (London, 2002), 419. ²¹ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 383. ²² Ibid., 386–7. ²³ Ribot, Monarquía, 84, 233 ff.; Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 387–8. De Ruyter died of wounds received in action off Catania in April 1676 and was posthumously awarded a noble title by Carlos II, for which cf. A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, A., ‘De la Conservación a la Desmembración. Las Provincias Italianas y la Monarquía de España (1665–1713)’, SHHM, 26 (2004), 207. ²⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 244–5. The Dutch squadron mounted 1,300 guns. ²⁵ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 96, 253, 369; Ribot, Monarquía, 122. ²⁶ Stanhope to Nottingham, 11 July 1692, Spain under Charles, 32–3.

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targeted as in 1693), Carlos II again pressed for English and Dutch help.²⁷ The Spanish king also looked to London to protect the fleets returning from the Indies: in 1693, following a request by Carlos’s minister in London for an escort for the New Spain fleet,²⁸ Queen Mary ordered a squadron of warships to Cadiz.²⁹ In addition, the English collaborated with the Spaniards in the Caribbean: in 1695 William III contributed the bulk of the naval contingent to an AngloSpanish expedition against the French colony of Santo Domingo (Hispaniola).³⁰ Not surprisingly, the reiterated demands of the Spaniards exasperated William, who complained to Carlos II’s representative in London in 1694 that they contributed little themselves to the common war effort at sea.³¹ Spain’s contribution to the maritime struggle certainly appeared inferior to that of its partners in the Nine Years War: according to one report, the allied fleet in Cadiz in July 1694 included 75 major vessels, of which 41 were English, 24 Dutch, and just 10 Spanish.³² In fact, however, Spain remained—necessarily—a sea power between 1665 and 1700, seapower contributing enormously to the survival of the Monarchy, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate. The most important sources for such an analysis are much the same as those which supply the materials for the investigation of Spain’s armies in the reign of Carlos II: the Estado and Guerra (sección de Mar, or marine secretariat) series at Simancas, supplemented by other series in the same archive (notably the records of the Council of the Cruzada, which had some responsibility for the galleys) and those of the Archive of the Indies at Seville. Although it is often difficult to achieve a complete picture, enough can be discovered to give a fuller, more realistic, and thus more satisfactory, picture of Spanish naval power, its purpose and achievement in the reign of Carlos II.

SPANISH AT TITUDES TO SEAPOWER AND THE WAR AT SEA Spain’s difficulties at sea in this period were not the result of wilful neglect, or of a failure to appreciate the significance of seapower. On the contrary, all those interested in the survival of the Monarchy could not but be aware of its importance, which had clearly impressed Carlos II’s father and the latter’s chief minister, the count-duke of Olivares.³³ Indeed, by 1640—if not before—it was a commonplace ²⁷ CCS [May 1694], on Canales to CII, 20 Apr. 1694, AGS/E/3969. ²⁸ Hermitage to States, 25 Sept. 1693, Add. 17677 f. 250. ²⁹ Nottingham to Stanhope, 6 Oct. 1693, SP 104/196 f. 72. In 1696 William III was anxious that the Mediterranen squadron depart in time for the return of the galleons, Blathwayt to Shrewsbury, 11 Sept. 1696, Add. 37,992 f. 128. ³⁰ H. G. Bensusan, ‘The Spanish Struggle against Foreign Encroachment in the Caribbean, 1675–1697’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, UCLA, 1970, 210 ff. ³¹ Canales to CII, 30 Mar. 1694, AGS/E/3969. ³² J. C. De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, 6 vols. (Haarlem, 1860), iii. 425. ³³ J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge, 1984), 72–3.

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among Spanish ministers that their empire depended on its fleets.³⁴ Many of those who wrote on such matters in the reign of Carlos II shared this view, including Juan de Lancina, an official with wide experience in Italy, who articulated it in his Commentaries on Tacitus (1687), which was dedicated to the count of Oropesa.³⁵ Inevitably, most of these writers lamented, and sought to remedy, Spain’s weakness at sea. The historian and publicist Luis Salazar y Castro, for example, urged that Spain should have a strong fleet of its own, applying to this end the money used to subsidize the Emperor’s struggle against the Turks.³⁶ Certain sectors of Spanish society, including the Seville and Cadiz merchants who constituted the Indies ‘trade’, were particularly aware of the Monarchy’s weaknesses at sea.³⁷ These concerns were often articulated within governing circles. In January 1676, following receipt of a report from Carlos II’s envoy in Genoa on French naval preparations at Marseilles and Toulon, the Council of State urged the need for greater effectiveness at sea, and for an increase in the size of the fleet, if the king was to retain his Italian dominions.³⁸ Such views continued to be aired in that body, and others, thereafter.³⁹ Carlos II was not deaf to these arguments, articulating them himself. In December 1676 the king declared that powerful maritime forces had been crucial to the Monarchy’s success in the past and that contemporary events—probably a reference to events in Sicily—demonstrated the disastrous consequences of their want.⁴⁰ These concerns gave rise to plans for the strengthening of Spain’s naval forces from the later 1670s. Mariana’s favourite and chief minister, Valenzuela, sought to strengthen the navy by buying, or having built, a number of ships.⁴¹ For his part, Carlos II’s articulation of the importance of maritime strength in 1676 preceded an order to his ministers to advise him on the naval establishment necessary for the future.⁴² At the same time the king ordered the Simancas archives to dispatch all papers relating to the earlier naval squadrons of Galicia and Cantabria to Madrid, for consideration by the naval secretariat.⁴³ These plans survived the fall ³⁴ Cf. the diplomat Diego Saavedra Fajardo, cited by A. Pagden, ‘Europe and the Wider World’, in J. Bergin (ed.), The Seventeenth Century: Europe 1598–1715 (Oxford, 2001), 199. ³⁵ A. Espino López, Guerra y Cultura en la Epoca Moderna (Madrid, 2001), 289–90. ³⁶ L. Salazar y Castro, Discurso político sobre la flaqueza de la Monarquía Española en el reynado de D. Carlos II, y valimiento del conde de Oropesa. Ano 1687, in Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 443 ff. ³⁷ In 1691 Carlos II agreed an indulto of 500,000 pesos with the Cadiz trade, which insisted that it be spent on the fleet, Operti to VA, 14 Jan. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35 f. 269. ³⁸ CCS, 6 Jan. 1676, AGS/E/3614/16. ³⁹ CCS, 28 Nov. 1690, AGS/E/4138; CJA, 14 Dec. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. ⁴⁰ CII to Bernaldo de Quirós, 18 Dec. 1676, AGS/GA/3592. ⁴¹ Don Bernardino Navarro, Memorias inéditas, in Maura, Carlos II y su Corte, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1915), ii. 361. ⁴² CII to Bernaldo de Quirós, 18 Dec. 1676, AGS/GA/3592. ⁴³ CCamara, 12 Dec. 1676, AHN/Consejos/4449/154; CII to duke of Veragua, governor and captain-general of Galicia, 6 Dec. 1677, AGS/GA/Registros, libro 342. The Cantabrian and Galician squadrons were created as part of a major overhaul of the fleet between 1617 and 1623, Thompson, War and Government, 198–9.

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of Valenzuela.⁴⁴ In February 1677 orders were issued for the building of ships and recruitment of seamen in Vizcaya, ‘to restore our navy to the flourishing state it once enjoyed’,⁴⁵ and a donativo request that year was justified by the need for a large navy.⁴⁶ The outcome of this project, like that of so many others, is unclear,⁴⁷ but the strengthening of the fleet in the Caribbean (below) may have owed something to it. This was not the end of plans for naval reform. The loss of the facilities provided by Genoa prompted renewed discussion of some older schemes. These included the exchange of Orbitello (part of the Tuscan presidios complex) for Portoferraio (on the island of Elba, held by the Grand Duke of Tuscany but frequently used by French privateers), and the establishment of the latter as a new galley base, and the development of the port facilities of Finale in Liguria.⁴⁸ During the Nine Years War, setbacks at sea stimulated further proposals. From the summer of 1694 there were abortive efforts to improve Spain’s naval strength by means of a naval ‘Union of Arms’, with the different parts of the Monarchy assigned individual quotas of ships they must provide for the Atlantic fleet;⁴⁹ and in the spring of 1696 the admiral of Castile was given charge of naval affairs, following a decision to re-establish an Armada of 24 ships to guard the Straits, defend the flota expected from the Indies, and meet the other defence needs of the Monarchy.⁵⁰ These efforts to restore the independent naval strength of the Monarchy were also influenced by the fact that reliance on allies brought problems in its train. Sensitivities about status, reflected in the problem of naval salutes (below), might hinder joint operations. In addition, Spain’s allies often had to be provided for in Spain’s ports, as were the Anglo-Dutch squadrons which spent the winters of 1694–5 and 1695–6 at Cadiz,⁵¹ putting great pressure on local facilities, while the local Catholic clergy protested at the presence of Protestants from the English and Dutch ships.⁵² In addition, in coming to the aid of Carlos II, the English and Dutch were pursuing their own interests—for example, protecting their Levant and Spanish trades—and also often demanded a price for their aid. In 1685 an ⁴⁴ ‘Diario de Noticias de 1677 a 1678’, CODOIN, 67 (1877), 75 (28 Jan. 1678). ⁴⁵ Stradling, Armada, 236. ⁴⁶ J. L. Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportacón economica y militar de la ciudad de Granada a las Guerras del Reinado de Carlos II’, CN, 6 (1971), 47–9. ⁴⁷ L. A. Clayton, ‘Ships and Empire: The Case of Spain’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 62 (1974), 248. ⁴⁸ CCS, 3 May 1685, on Bazán to CII, 29 Mar. 1685, AGS/E/3621/32, 33, 34. Councillors acknowledged Portoferraio’s value but feared the cession of Orbitello would weaken the presidios. Cf. J. Alcalá-Zamora y J. Queipo de Llano ‘Razón de Estado y Géostrategia en la Política Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677–81)’, BRAH, de la Historia, CLXXIII (1976), 297–358 (343 ff.). ⁴⁹ CII to Max Emmanuel, 3 Sept. 1694, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 617; CII to Crispin González Botello, 5 Sept. 1694 and consulta of (Flemish) Council of State, 11 Oct. 1694, AGS/E/3888. ⁵⁰ Operti to VA, 22 Mar 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ⁵¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 87; Bromley and Ryan, ‘Navies’, 807–8. ⁵² Stanhope to Vernon, 26 Oct. and 28 Dec. 1695, SP 94/74 f. 15, 68; same to Sir George Rooke, 6 Dec. 1695, Spain under Charles, 85. The administrators of the naval hospital at Cadiz initially refused to treat the sick of the English fleet on the grounds of lack of funds.

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offer of English help against pirates in the Caribbean was rejected because the English sought in return the lucrative contract to supply African slaves to the Spanish colonists in the Indies, the asiento de negros.⁵³ For their part, the Dutch in the 1670s, and both they and the English in the Nine Years War, exacted promises of Spanish subsidies towards the cost of their help at sea (Chapter 3), although during the latter conflict some of Carlos II’s ministers felt the demands unjustified, since Spain was not the sole beneficiary of allied operations in the Mediterranean.⁵⁴ Inevitably, failure to pay the promised sums created tensions,⁵⁵ and led to threats to withdraw the English and Dutch ships.⁵⁶ The allies’ support was by no means certain, or a guarantee of success. De Ruyter’s Dutch fleet did not reach Sicily until October 1675 and returned home in the autumn of 1676,⁵⁷ without having markedly improved the situation in Sicily.⁵⁸ As for the English fleet, one of the reasons why William III’s suggestion of a combined land and sea operation against south-west France in 1691 was rejected (Chapter 1) was that the English fleet could not be relied upon.⁵⁹ This problem dogged attempts at co-operation at sea and embittered relations. In 1693 the news that the French fleet had returned to threaten Rosas caused widespread anger in Madrid because the long-promised English fleet had still not appeared.⁶⁰ It is not entirely surprising that disappointment with Spain’s allies—particularly when the latter seemed so contemptuous of the Monarchy’s own efforts at sea— should boil over, as it did in the expulsion of William III’s Dutch agent in Madrid, Schonenberg, in 1695. William’s English minister there, Stanhope, sought to prevent Schonenberg’s banishment by threatening that, if it went ahead, the Anglo-Dutch fleet would not aid Carlos II. The threat may have backfired: some, at least, of the Spanish king’s ministers appear to have responded by articulating the view that the Monarchy was too dependent on its allies at sea, and that it would do better to use the subsidies promised the English fleet to restore that of Spain itself.⁶¹ NAVAL COMMITMENTS AND FORCES Spain needed considerable naval resources because of its extensive world empire and the multiple threats to it. Inside and outside Europe, communications must be maintained, troops supplied and transported, and ports and territories defended against other sovereigns, and their subjects. ⁵³ Céspedes del Castillo, ‘La Defensa Militar del Istmo de Panamá a fines del Siglo XVII y comienzos del XVIII’, AEA, 9 (1952), 243. ⁵⁴ Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 21 Sept. 1695, SP 94/74 f. 13. ⁵⁵ Lira to Mariana, 29 May 1675, AGS/E/2129. ⁵⁶ DLT to VA, 9 Aug. and 22 Sept., and 13 and 25 Oct. 1695, AST/LM/Olanda, m. 4. ⁵⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 95, 162. ⁵⁸ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 389. ⁵⁹ CJDF, 17 Dec 1691, AGS/E/3885. ⁶⁰ Stanhope to Blathwayt, 28 May 1693, Add. 21,489 f. 13; Canales to Nottingham, 24 Aug. 1693, SP 100/55. ⁶¹ Gudannes, 24 Nov. 1695; Martin, ‘Lettres’, 537.

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To meet these many commitments, Spain had not one but a number of fleets in different seas, supervised by the naval secretariat of the Council of War, operating through various specialized committees or juntas. These included the Junta de Armadas, broadly responsible for the fleets; the Junta de Guerra de Indias, whose responsibilities were confined to the Indies; the Junta de Apresto de Armadas, responsible for the fitting out of the fleet(s); and the Junta de Galeras, responsible for the galleys, and other ad hoc bodies.⁶² Other agencies which played a part in co-ordinating Spain’s fleets in the Atlantic and the Americas included the Casa de la Contratación, at Seville.⁶³ Perhaps the most important—and largest—of Spain’s fleets was the Armada del Mar Océano, variously known as the Atlantic, or High Seas Fleet, or Main Armada.⁶⁴ This had been created by Philip II following the defeat of the Armada of 1588, in order to ensure effective defence in Spain’s Atlantic waters. Devastated at The Downs in 1639, as late as 1663 the Armada totalled 28 vessels.⁶⁵ In late 1667, during the ‘War of Devolution’, budgeting for the following year was on the basis of a fleet of 25 ships,⁶⁶ but this force, which effectively constituted the Monarchy’s battle fleet in European waters, rarely exceeded 20 vessels in Carlos II’s reign. In 1673 the Armada comprised 21 ships,⁶⁷ and in October 1674 24 vessels (20 ships, plus 2 fireships and 2 pataches) arrived in Sicilian waters from Catalonia.⁶⁸ Thereafter campaigning inevitably took its toll. In November 1677 the Armada was said to total 15 warships, most of them in Sicily, plus 5 fireships and 1 patache;⁶⁹ and in 1678 it comprised just 13 vessels, including 2 of the Flanders squadron (below).⁷⁰ The end of the war, in 1678, provided an opportunity to make good recent losses. In November 1685, according to the Junta de Armadas, which sought the king’s order on how many ships must put to sea the following year, 23 warships and 5 fireships were available.⁷¹ During the Nine Years War, the Armada totalled between 15 and 20 vessels.⁷² ⁶² Cf. J. F. Baltar Rodríguez, Las Juntas de Gobierno en la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI–XVII) (Madrid, 1998), 352 ff., 431–2. In 1685, following the sack of Campeche, a Junta for the Defence of America advised on naval dispositions in the Indies; Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 101–2. ⁶³ L. García Fuentes, El Comercio Español con America, 1650–1700 (Seville, 1980), 23 ff. ⁶⁴ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, passim; Thompson, War and Government, 185 ff.; Stradling, Armada of Flanders. Henceforth, to avoid confusion, the term Armada used without qualification will refer only to this fleet. ⁶⁵ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 276. ⁶⁶ Consulta of Don Lope de los Ríos, President of Council of Finance, 28 Nov. 1667, BNM/1322, f. 60. Apparently, this number was recommended by the Junta de Armadas. ⁶⁷ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 250. These totalled 11,819 tons and carried 874 guns and 6,411 men. ⁶⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 209. For the number of ships (and men aboard) in Catalan waters in August 1674, ibid., 224. ⁶⁹ CJDG, 1 Nov. 1677, AGS/E/1947/183. ⁷⁰ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 250. Of these 13 ships, only the capitana (the flagship, carrying the commander of the fleet) was more than 1,000 tons. ⁷¹ CCS, 10 Nov. 1685, AGS/E/4134. These ships totalled 17,539 tons and were said to be capable of mounting 1,334 guns. ⁷² Cf. Operti to [VA] [summer 1691], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, for 17 vessels and 3 fireships. A list of the vessels of the Armada being fitted out at Naples in 1693 gave a total of 15 (8 galleons, 3 frigates, 2 fireships, 1 pingue, and 1 saetia), Relación del porte y artillería . . . [1693], AGS/E/4017. So, too, did a report of 1694, CCW, 5 Mar. 1694, AGS/GA/2947.

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In the Mediterranean Carlos II had at his disposal a galley fleet, which totalled 27 vessels in late 1675,⁷³ and 29 in 1677,⁷⁴ a figure which remained fairly constant for the rest of the reign.⁷⁵ This was far fewer than the nearly 150 galleys in Philip II’s service in 1574,⁷⁶ and inferior to the galley fleet of Louis XIV, but was otherwise unrivalled among the European powers.⁷⁷ This ‘Spanish’ galley fleet in fact comprised 5 different squadrons, the largest being the Neapolitan squadron, with 8 galleys;⁷⁸ the other squadrons were that supplied (by contract) by the Genoese duke of Tursi (7 galleys),⁷⁹ the squadron of Spain (6), that of Sicily (5), and the Sardinian squadron (2). These squadrons hardly varied in size throughout Carlos II’s reign.⁸⁰ In northern Europe Carlos II inherited the Flanders squadron, or Armada de Flandes. Originally intended, as its name suggested, to defend Flemish waters, this unit was effectively incorporated in the Armada when it was ordered to Spain, for good, in 1669.⁸¹ In 1685 it comprised 4 galleons, 9 frigates, and 2 pataches.⁸² In 1693 6 vessels of the Flanders squadron (2 galleons, 3 frigates, and 1 fireship) were being fitted out at Naples,⁸³ and the same number were at Cadiz with the Armada in early 1694.⁸⁴ Back in Flanders, the count of Monterrey had urged the restoration of an independent Flanders squadron,⁸⁵ but the place of the original squadron in northern waters was filled by the so-called Ostend convoy, which had been established (1665) by Monterrey’s predecessor, the marquis of Castel Rodrigo. During his governorship, the duke of Villahermosa added a third vessel, the Charles II.⁸⁶ On occasion, for example in 1672, the Ostend convoy also briefly served with the Armada.⁸⁷ Naval defence across the Atlantic and in the Americas was the responsibility of various units, including the vessels which escorted the flota and the galeones to New Spain and Tierra Firme, the so-called Armada de la Guardia,⁸⁸ or carrera de ⁷³ Ribot, Monarquía, 214. ⁷⁴ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 251. ⁷⁵ Cf. Kamen, War of Succession, 58, for the size and composition of the galley fleet in 1700. ⁷⁶ Cf. Thompson, War and Government, 300–1. ⁷⁷ The Republic of Genoa had just 6 galleys, in 1685, AGS/E/3621/13, and 1693, AGS/E/3633/ 206. The grand duke of Tuscany had only 4 in 1695, Lambert Blackwell to duke of Shrewsbury, 27 June 1695, SP 98/18. ⁷⁸ Cf. R. Mantelli, Il pubblico impiego nell’economia del Regno di Napoli: retribuzioni, reclutamento e ricambio sociale nell’epoca spagnuola (secc. XVI–XVII) (Naples, 1986), 146. ⁷⁹ Cf. lists of convicted oarsmen released 1694–7, AGS/E/3628/108. ⁸⁰ Cf. CII to governor of the CC, 4 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/7207/1. ⁸¹ Stradling, Armada, 237–8. ⁸² Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 13. In 1690, when 2 frigates of this squadron were in Spain and their return to Flanders was urged (following the arrival at Dunkirk of 6 French frigates), it was hoped to increase the squadron by 1 vessel each year, CCS, 4 Apr. 1690, AGS/E/4138. ⁸³ Relación del porte y artillería . . . [1693], AGS/E/4017. ⁸⁴ CCW, 5 Mar. 1694, AGS/GA/2947. ⁸⁵ CCS, 8 Feb. 1670, AGS/E/2111. ⁸⁶ Grana to CII, 16 June 1683, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 398; Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 234. The Charles II was seized by ships authorized by the elector of Brandenburg in 1680 (Chapter 3). ⁸⁷ Mariana to Monterrey, 29 Feb. 1672, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 127. ⁸⁸ Phillips, Six Galleons, 14; C. Ward, Imperial Panama. Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian Panama 1550–1800 (Alburquerque, 1993), 21. The New Spain flota usually had an escort of 2 galleons, the galeones 1 of 8, García Fuentes, Comercio, 163–4.

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Indias.⁸⁹ For the defence of the Pacific coast of Peru, a less vulnerable area before 1680,⁹⁰ Carlos II had at his disposal the Armada del Mar del Sur (or South Seas Fleet), based at Callao,⁹¹ which comprised 3 vessels (c.1686),⁹² and from 1693, 5.⁹³ The most important of the locally based fighting forces, however, was the Armada de Barlovento, or Barlovento or Windward fleet, whose remit was the defence of the Caribbean.⁹⁴ This had been proposed as early as the 1590s, but not made effective until the 1630s. Almost immediately it was diverted to European waters, being incorporated into the Armada until 1667 when a revamped Barlovento fleet, just 5 vessels, was dispatched to the Caribbean.⁹⁵ Two of these were soon diverted elsewhere and the remaining 3 destroyed (1670) by English pirates, in an episode which demonstrated the need for an effective locally based force. In 1671 Mariana of Austria agreed, at the suggestion of the Council of the Indies, to re-establish the Barlovento fleet, but was thereafter obliged to give priority to naval defence in Europe.⁹⁶ However, in 1677, following further representations from the Council of the Indies, Carlos II gave 5 frigates, authorized the conversion of 2 confiscated merchant ships, and promised 3 other ships then under construction in the Dutch Republic to the re-established Barlovento fleet; in 1680 it apparently comprised 10 vessels, superior to the English, Dutch, and French forces—and to the buccaneers—in the Caribbean.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, the Barolovento fleet did not maintain this strength thereafter, totalling just 4 vessels in 1685,⁹⁸ and 5 in 1693.⁹⁹ However, in 1697, following the loss of Cartagena, Carlos II ordered the dispatch to the Caribbean of 3 more vessels, initially to cover the rebuilding of Cartagena’s defences, and subsequently to clear the area of ‘pirates’.¹⁰⁰ In 1699 (following the arrival of the Scots at Darien) the king ordered that the Barlovento fleet be increased to 8 vessels.¹⁰¹ Besides the Barlovento fleet, ⁸⁹ In 1699–1700 ships built for the carrera were deployed on the Darien expedition, CII to Council of San Sebastian del Pasage, Sept. 1699, AGI/Panamá/162, f. 728. ⁹⁰ Clayton, ‘Local Initiative’, 284. ⁹¹ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 196 ff.; Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 4. ⁹² Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 15; Clayton, ‘Trade and Navigation’, 2. ⁹³ Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 17. They carried a total of 1,238 men and 144 guns. ⁹⁴ This paragraph follows C. H. Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs (London and Oxford, 1918), 253 ff. and J. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 192–4. Cf. also J. de Veitia Linaje, Norte de la Contratación de las Indias Occidentales (Seville, 1672), 88–100. ⁹⁵ Apparently, after the peace of 1668 it was decided to maintain 10 ships to defend the Caribbean but this was not implemented, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 17 June 1671, CSPV, 1671–72, 76–7. ⁹⁶ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 27–8. The Seville consulado criticized the way the Barlovento fleet had been neglected and diverted from its main task, García Fuentes, Comercio, 176. ⁹⁷ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 88 ff. These vessels totalled 3,060 tons, and carried 380 guns and 2,165 men. ⁹⁸ Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa’, 247. ⁹⁹ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 155. ¹⁰⁰ Extracto de las Providencias, AGI/Panamá/161, f. 895 ff. Cf. Don Andrés de Pez to Canillas, 16 Jan. 1699, AGI/Panama/160, f. 11 ff. for the number of ships, their guns and crew. ¹⁰¹ CCS, 6 Feb. 1700, AGS/E/4183. Apparently, Carlos had ordered an increase to 8 vessels in 1690, to no effect, Apuntamiento de los Navíos [1699?], AGI/Panamá/161 f. 839.

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Carlos II had at his disposal in the Caribbean coastguard vessels, which sometimes totalled a considerable number,¹⁰² and operated to some effect against interlopers;¹⁰³ other isolated vessels;¹⁰⁴ and small local forces established on an ad hoc basis by the viceroys.¹⁰⁵ On occasion, these different units acted together, or vessels were detached from them on specific missions, making it difficult to speak with certainty about their size and composition. In 1671, for example, the squadron—10 larger and 4 smaller ships—prepared for the Caribbean following Morgan’s attack on Panama included vessels drawn from a variety of sources,¹⁰⁶ as was the squadron sent against the Scots at Darien in 1700.¹⁰⁷ In addition, since the number of vessels which were fitted out each year depended on various factors, including the perceived threat and need, we cannot be sure (and should not assume) that those at sea represented all the ships at Carlos II’s disposal.¹⁰⁸ Spain’s naval resources were not limited to ships and galleys. They also included harbours and support services. Cadiz, for example, an Atlantic port close to the entrance to, and exit from, the Mediterranean through the Straits, and the home base of the Armada del Mar Océano,¹⁰⁹ enjoyed excellent facilities, and could accommodate large numbers of ships and their crews. In the Mediterranean, a string of islands—the Baleares (Ibiza, Majorca, Menorca) and Sardinia—provided a series of staging posts for Carlos II’s ships between the Iberian peninsula and Italy.¹¹⁰ In central Italy the Tuscan presidios provided a haven for Spanish vessels passing between Naples and Sicily and Liguria. The fact that these facilities were denied to Louis XIV’s galleys made it much harder for the French monarch to make effective his naval superiority,¹¹¹ and allows us to regard the western Mediterranean as a ‘Spanish lake’.¹¹² At the end of 1692 the Spanish fleet escaped the French—and possible annihilation—by taking refuge at Naples, and in 1693 by fleeing to Port Mahon. These facilities were immensely valuable to Carlos II’s ¹⁰² In 1693 Spanish coastguard vessels in the Caribbean comprised 10 frigates, at least 36 sloops, and more than 31 galleys and demi-galleys, Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 155. ¹⁰³ N. Zahadieh, ‘The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 43 (1986), 585–7; Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 144, 159. ¹⁰⁴ Cf. certification by accountants of Council of Indies, 8 June 1695, AGI/Panamá/159, f. 523 ff. ¹⁰⁵ In 1686 the viceroy of Peru put together such a force to escort a ship from Callao to Tierra Firme following the appearance of English ships, Certificate of expenditure, 10 Oct. 1687, AGI/ Panamá/159, f. 131 ff. ¹⁰⁶ García Fuentes, Comercio, 176–7. ¹⁰⁷ Resumen de lo que esta resuelto, AGI/Panamá, 161 f. 364 ff. ¹⁰⁸ In 1685 Carlos II ordered that, since no major threat was expected at sea that year, only 12 warships and 2 fireships should go to the Straits, CCS, 2 June 1685, AGS/E/4134. In 1692 Carlos II had to agree to send out just 8, CCS, 15 June 1692, AGS/E/3626/56. ¹⁰⁹ Cf. CCS, 14 Oct. 1693, AGS/E/3418/171. ¹¹⁰ In 1674 the Armada del Mar Océano, en route from Catalonia to Sicily, put into Cagliari to escape a storm, Ribot, Monarquía, 53–4. ¹¹¹ One French commander argued that his galleys needed to put in regularly to friendly ports and that alienating Spain (over salutes at sea) put this at risk, A. Zysberg, Les galériens. Vies et destins de 60,000 forçats sur les galères de France 1680–1748 (Paris, 1987), 298–9. ¹¹² Cf. H. Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Cambridge, 1953), 60–1.

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allies, and were among the chief attractions of the Spanish alliance.¹¹³ This was clearly demonstrated in 1694–5 when the English and Dutch fleets wintered at Cadiz, enabling them to enter the Mediterranean early in 1695 and to engage French ships leaving Toulon for the Channel.¹¹⁴ English and Dutch privateers in the Mediterranean were also able to take their prizes to Spanish ports.¹¹⁵ Outside Europe, Carlos II’s fleets enjoyed the advantage of numerous havens in the Americas and, in particular, the dockyard and other facilities available at Havana, Cartagena, and elsewhere.¹¹⁶ We should not, therefore, exaggerate Spain’s decline as a naval power under Carlos II. Almost uniquely, the Monarchy commanded a variety of fleets, in many different seas, and which could be combined to some effect. In addition, while those various fleets, even combined, could not always compare with those of the other—very few—first-rank naval powers, Spain’s battle fleet, 22 ships and 25 galleys in the autumn of 1683,¹¹⁷ and which perhaps totalled 50–60 fighting vessels, was valued by others,¹¹⁸ and could not be ignored. The French king himself acknowledged as much. In 1688 Louis was reluctant to send naval help to James II (as a Dutch invasion loomed, before the ‘Glorious Revolution’) in part because this would surrender naval superiority in the Mediterranean to Carlos II.¹¹⁹ In addition, Spain’s fleets were still greater than those of many of its smaller neighbours and could influence their decisions in the international struggle. In 1690 one of the attractions of the anti-French coalition for the duke of Savoy was the prospect of Carlos II’s naval forces defending the county of Nice against those of Louis XIV, something which the virtually non-existent navy of the duke could not do.¹²⁰ In the Nine Years War the combined English, Dutch, and Spanish forces were expected to make the Grand Alliance supreme in the Mediterranean.¹²¹ Nor was Spain’s anticipated contribution to a joint allied naval force minor: in October 1692 an agreement for Anglo-Dutch-Spanish naval operations in the Mediterranean in 1693 stipulated a Spanish contribution of 16 warships and ¹¹³ Stanhope to Nottingham, 6 Jun. 1693, Spain under Charles, 51. Earlier that year, following the Lagos disaster, 1693, English and Dutch ships sheltered in Spanish ports. ¹¹⁴ J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III (Cambridge, 1953), 526 ff. The Spanish Court would have preferred its allies to use Port Mahon, Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, 25 Sept. 1694, HMC Buccleuch MSS, II/1, 140. ¹¹⁵ In 1672 Dutch ships carried prizes to Cadiz, Rudio to Doge and Senate, 22 Sept. 1672, CSPV, 1671–72, 284. In the Nine Years War, Zeeland privateers took prizes to Palermo, Albert van der Meer to Fagel, 31 Jan., 14 Feb., and 4 Mar. 1695, ARH/SG/8644/167, 171, 179. ¹¹⁶ Phillips, Six Galleons, 12–13. ¹¹⁷ Instructions for Bazán, 24 Sept. 1683, AGS/E/3633/29. In 1686 the fleet comprised 17 warships, with 1,424 cannon and 8,900 men, plus 9 ships of the flota, with 450 men, 6 fireships, and 80 long boats according to one report, Sánchez Belén, Hacienda Real, 78. ¹¹⁸ Successive Popes and the republic of Venice sought the participation of Carlos II’s galleys in the war against the Turks, marquis of Villagarcía to CII, 5 May 1685, AHN/E/libro 206. ¹¹⁹ J. P. Kenyon, Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1641–1702 (London, 1956), 211. ¹²⁰ Cf. Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge, 1999), 59–60. ¹²¹ Ronquillo to CII, 11 Apr. 1690, Maura, Correspondencia, ii. 200.

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25 galleys.¹²² Indeed, before 1694 Spain’s naval forces constituted the only substantial naval presence in the Mediterranean of the anti-French coalition. In September 1692 the Spanish fleet (17 warships, 19 galleys, and 3 fireships) reached Genoa, the only allied naval force in a position to co-operate with the allied land forces in exploiting the incursion into Dauphiné.¹²³ In fact, it was too late for this, but the Spanish vessels might put pressure on the Genoese to pay the ‘contributions’ demanded by Carlos II’s cousin and ally, the emperor Leopold, to fund his war effort in Italy.¹²⁴ Spain’s capacity at sea was not negligible in these decades either in its size or its significance.¹²⁵

FUNCTION AND STRATEGY Carlos II’s ships and galleys had three main functions: combat, escort, and transport; the defence of both authority and dominion; and the maintenance of reputation. Combat sometimes meant battle at sea; for example, that fought off Palermo in 1676. Failure to engage the enemy could prompt criticism of a commander. In 1692 the marquis of Villafranca expressed surprise that Don Pedro Corbete, commander of the Armada, whose fleet totalled 21 vessels, had headed for Naples without engaging the French fleet, which—although superior (with 23 vessels)— did not enjoy an overwhelming advantage.¹²⁶ On occasion the fleet acted jointly with Carlos II’s land forces in offensive operations. In 1692 the Armada co-operated with the army of Catalonia,¹²⁷ and was expected to join the allied forces which had invaded Dauphiné for a combined assault on Nice.¹²⁸ In wartime the fleet might also aid rebels in enemy territory: in 1675, following receipt of reports of discontent at Marseilles, the dispatch there of a naval expedition was considered with a view to forcing Louis XIV to withdraw his own support from the Messina rebels.¹²⁹ Sometimes the mere presence of the fleet was sufficient to achieve its objective, making combat unnecessary. In 1691, for example, Carlos II ordered the Armada (23 ships and 5 galleys), to Catalonia after the French bombardment of Barcelona and Alicante, to oblige Louis XIV’s forces to desist, which it did.¹³⁰ ¹²² De Jonge, Geschiedenis, iii. 343–4; J. Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, 8 vols. (Hague, 1726–31), vii. 2, 320. Cf. the list of (16 plus) Spanish ships which would join those of England and the Dutch in 1693, May 1693, SP8/14/5. ¹²³ CCS, 31 Oct. 1692, AGS/E/3417/105. ¹²⁴ Kirk to Blathwayt, 28 Sept. 1692, Add. 21,486 f. 27. ¹²⁵ Kamen, War of Succession, 58–9, is too critical of the size and capacity of Spain’s naval forces in 1700. ¹²⁶ CCS, 31 Oct. 1692, AGS/E/3417/105. ¹²⁷ Stanhope to Nottingham, 27 Aug. 1692, SP 94/73 f. 78. In 1694 the viceroy of Catalonia, Gastañaga, requested ships to break enemy supply lines there, Espino, Catalunya, 283. ¹²⁸ Stanhope to Blathwayt, 4 Sept. 1692, Add. 21,489 f. 5. ¹²⁹ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 257–8. ¹³⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 120; declarations of expenditure of two galleys of the Doria brothers (the Tursis squadron), 1690–1, AGS/Cruzada/365; Zysberg, Les galériens, 315.

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Combat also frequently meant attacking enemy merchant shipping. In 1690 the allies agreed that Carlos II’s ships should harry French shipping between the Straits of Gibraltar and Cape St Vincent. Nor should we ignore the constant ‘little war’ at sea, above all against the Barbary states.¹³¹ In the Americas the Barlovento fleet sometimes fought the buccaneers,¹³² and in 1695 participated in the joint expedition against Santo Domingo.¹³³ It was in part to ensure that the Spanish king’s vessels could fight that ships and galleys carried their own complement of soldiers.¹³⁴ However, combat often came second to convoy or transport duty and the maintenance of communications, although the distinction might sometimes be difficult to make. This meant the transport of individuals—viceroys, commanders, and ambassadors,¹³⁵ but above all that of troops, money, munitions, and provisions. This was not a new role. Before the development of the overland ‘Spanish Road’ between north Italy and Flanders many troops had reached Flanders from Spain by sea.¹³⁶ Thereafter, between 1567 and 1659 the journey via the Channel was less favoured.¹³⁷ However, the dismantling of the Spanish Road meant that the sea route between the Iberian peninsula and the Low Countries again flourished in Carlos II’s reign. In 1667–8,¹³⁸ between 1672 and 1678,¹³⁹ and again in 1683–4,¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ E. G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (Madison, 1983), p. xviii. ¹³² Cf. Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 157, for one engagement of this sort in 1686. ¹³³ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 145 ff. ¹³⁴ In 1677 the fleet then in Italian waters was said to have more than 2,000 infantry aboard, AGS/E/1947/239. The garrison of the capitana of the Genoa or Tursis squadron ranged between 111 and 50 from May 1690 to August 1691, Declarations of expenditure, 1690–1, AGS/Comisaría de Cruzada/365. In 1699 the squadron of ships intended for Darien was thought to need 2,600 infantry (besides 2,600 seamen and 2,300 infantry to be put ashore), Resumen de lo que está Resuelto [1699], AGI/Panamá/161, f. 374. ¹³⁵ In 1691, 2 galleys of the Tursis squadron, then off Catalonia and about to return to Genoa, were ordered to carry with them the marquis of Leganés, the newly appointed governor of Milan, Operti to VA, 17 March 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/29. ¹³⁶ One-fifth of the 35,000 Spanish infantry which fought at St Quentin (1557) had reached the Low Countries by sea, Williams, Philip II, 28 ¹³⁷ J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Velas y cañones en la política septentrional de Felipe II’, in ibid., Altos hornos y poder naval en la España de la Edad Moderna (Madrid, 1999), 95–6. ¹³⁸ Constable to Mariana, 14 Sept. and 24 Oct. 1668, AGS/E/2108, and count of Monterrey to same, 14 Dec. 1672, AGS/E/2121. Many of these transports put into English harbours en route. Cf. CSPD: 1667–1668 (London, 1893), 186 (report from Plymouth, 24 Jan. 1668, of a Spanish manof-war, carrying 300 soldiers for Ostend, with five other ships carrying 1,500 men, and a further 1,200 ready to embark), 304 (a report from HMS Monmouth, 24 Mar. 1668 of 2 ships, 1 a man-of war of 24 guns, taking 600 men from San Sebastian to Ostend), 388 (report from Portsmouth, 12 May 1668 of a Spanish man-of-war, transporting 400 men from Vigo in Galicia for Flanders, having put in for water, after being separated in a storm from another ship carrying another 400 men), 407 (report from Falmouth, 25 May 1668 of the arrival of an Ostend ship carrying 300 men to Flanders), and 509 (report from Plymouth, 28 July 1668, of the arrival of a Spanish man-of-war with an unstated number of men for Ostend). ¹³⁹ Cf count of Monterrey to Mariana, 24 Aug. 1672, AGS/E/2119. ¹⁴⁰ Cf. Grana to CII, 8 Sept. and 3 Nov. 1683, and 31 May 1684, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 406, 413, 450.

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and between 1689 and 1697,¹⁴¹ troops were carried from Spain to Flanders by sea in wartime, as they were in peacetime.¹⁴² Communications between the various Spanish territories in southern Europe had never been eclipsed by an alternative overland route, and Carlos II’s galleys and ships continued to ferry men throughout the western Mediterranean. During the Messina war they transported resources from other parts of the Monarchy to Naples and Sicily;¹⁴³ but the restoration of Carlos II’s authority in Messina in 1678 was followed by that of the more usual pattern of distribution of men and munitions in the opposite direction. During the Nine Years War men and munitions were transported by sea to Catalonia from Italy,¹⁴⁴ and from other parts of Spain itself.¹⁴⁵ Men and munitions were also ferried to Liguria, for the army of Lombardy,¹⁴⁶ and for Carlos II’s ally, the duke of Savoy.¹⁴⁷ The Tuscan presidios were also supplied by sea,¹⁴⁸ as were those in Africa: in September 1679, 10 galleys reached Melilla with men and munitions;¹⁴⁹ and in May 1684, 2 of the galleys of the Spanish squadron, the Almudena and Santa Ana, left Cartagena for Oran, with essential supplies.¹⁵⁰ Inevitably, reinforcements of men and materiel for Carlos II’s territories in the Indies also went by sea. The fleet also frequently escorted to Cadiz the returning Indies fleets, whose cargo of silver remained crucial to Spain’s finances (Chapter 3). In November 1667, 17 ships left Cadiz to forestall a Franco-Portuguese attack on the returning galeones;¹⁵¹ and in February 1673, following the appearance off Cadiz of English and French ships, which were thought to be lying in wait for another galeones fleet, the prince of Montesarchio was ordered out with ¹⁴¹ For the carriage of men from Galicia on the Ostend convoy, cf CCS, 18 June 1689, AGS/E/ 4137, and Max Emmanuel to CII, 13 Aug. 1692, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 565. Cf. also Sir John Trenchard to Lord Sydney and to Lords of Admiralty, 19 Apr. 1694, CSPD: 1694–1695 (London, 1938), 104–5, for that of 500 new levies from Galicia in 1694. ¹⁴² In the autumn of 1686 450 Neapolitans and 40 men levied in the Canaries reached Ostend by sea, CII to Gastañaga, 7 Nov. 1686, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 482. ¹⁴³ Ribot, Monarquía, 104–5, 111; Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 281. ¹⁴⁴ In October 1682, 800 men embarked at Naples for Catalonia, A. Espino López, ‘Las tropas italianas en la defensa de Cataluna, 1665–1698’, IH, 18 (1998), 65. In July 1689, 18 galleys reached Barcelona with more than 1,000 troops aboard; ibid., 66. ¹⁴⁵ In 1691, 4 Spanish warships embarked troops at Malaga for Catalonia, Stanhope to Nottingham, 9 May 1691, SP 94/73 f. 31. In 1693 4 galleys of the squadron of Spain carried troops from Alicante to Catalonia, rejoining the Armada at Cartagena, CCW, 27 June 1693, AGS/GA/ 2913. In 1694 some of the new tercios raised by the 2% levy of that year (Chapter 1) reached Catalonia by sea, CJLG, 2 Feb. 1694, AGS/GA/2917. In 1695 the fleet carried men from Granada to Barcelona, Stanhope to Hopkins, 11 and 18 May 1695, SP 94/74, ff. 30, 33. For 1697, cf. Manuel de Silva to CII, 16 July 1697, AGS/E/3509. ¹⁴⁶ Operti to VA, 13 Sept. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35 f. 87; CCS, 19 Dec. 1693, AGS/E/ 3419/4, and 2 Jan. 1694, AGS/E/3419/1; and CCS, July 1696, AGS/E/3629/28. In 1690 it was assumed the governor of Milan would also take some of the soldiers on the Neapolitan and Sicilian galleys. Cf. Kirk to Blathwayt, 28 Sept. 1692 and 10 May, 1693, Add 21,486, f. 27, 32. ¹⁴⁷ Duke of Tursis to CII, 28 July 1694, AGS/E/3628/17, 18. ¹⁴⁸ CCS, 25 Aug. 1691, AGS/E/3322. ¹⁴⁹ Madrid Gazette, 14 Nov. 1679. ¹⁵⁰ CCW, 22 May 1684, AGS/GA/2608. ¹⁵¹ Sandwich to Arlington, 30 Nov. 1667; Godolphin, Hispania Illustrata, 87–9.

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26 ships.¹⁵² Defence of the Indies fleets in home waters continued to occupy the Armada for the rest of Carlos II’s reign: in 1691, 13 vessels of the Armada were ordered to escort home the returning galeones, delaying the junction of the former with the other allied naval forces.¹⁵³ Defending the king’s authority and reputation meant two things. First, the fleets might be sent wherever Carlos II’s rule was questioned by internal upheaval. The most striking example of this sort of operation was the Armada’s role in the reduction of Messina,¹⁵⁴ but it was not unique. In 1669, for example, the (12) galleys of Naples and Sicily, which were intended for the war against the Ottomans in Candia, with 1,500 men, were diverted to Sardinia following the assassination of the viceroy, the marquis of Camarasa.¹⁵⁵ But the king’s ships were also expected to maintain his status in the matter of salutes at sea, i.e., the matter of salvos and the raising and lowering of flags.¹⁵⁶ This issue had a ‘domestic’ aspect.¹⁵⁷ However, in terms of Spain’s international position, the more important dimension was the ‘foreign’ one, that of the salutes given and received in encounters with the ships of other sovereigns.¹⁵⁸ This was a matter of great importance to all sovereigns,¹⁵⁹ Carlos II’s mother issuing new orders on it in 1671,¹⁶⁰ and Spanish commanders reported the fact when they obliged other vessels to give salutes.¹⁶¹ Ominously, Louis XIV’s development of a navy was accompanied by a determination to insist on salutes from the vessels of Carlos II; indeed, the Sun King’s navy was as valuable to him as a means of forcing acknowledgement of this ceremonial superiority as it was for purely strategic purposes. Louis therefore ordered his vessels to seek out those of Carlos II in order to insist upon their giving salutes. For Carlos, on the other hand, to give way to Louis’s demands would be to acknowledge inferiority, which the Spanish king was reluctant to do. One solution to this problem was to avoid confrontation, but this was not always possible. In 1688 admiral Don Honorato Bonifacio Papachino, one of the naval heroes of the reign, was forced, ¹⁵² Rudio to Doge and Senate, 22 Feb. 1673, CSPV, 1673–75, 15. ¹⁵³ Memoir given to Stanhope, 29 May 1691, SP 94/73 f. 35. Cf. the list of the ships sent by the English consul, SP94/73, f. 39. ¹⁵⁴ In 1677 Corbete expressed the view that his ships should all assemble at Palermo, to ensure that the Sicilian capital remained loyal, Ribot, Monarquía, 442. ¹⁵⁵ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 276. On Sardinia, cf. Maura, Carlos II, I, 360–1; and B. Anatra, ‘Casi una Crisis: La Cerdeña del Siglo XVII’, in A. S. Tarrés et al., 1640: La Monarquía Hispánica en Crisis (Barcelona, 1992), 200 ff. ¹⁵⁶ Cf. Zysberg, Les galériens, 295 ff. ¹⁵⁷ Salutes were given and received by Carlos II’s commanders when they entered his own ports and when they encountered other royal vessels. In 1691 the king ordered the reprimand of the governor of Palamós who had endangered 2 of the galleys of the Tursis squadron by his unreasonable attitude over salutes, CII to duke of Medina Sidonia, 30 April 1691, Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 113–14. ¹⁵⁸ Cf. the discussion of the instructions of Carlos II’s envoy (Bazán) to the Republic of Genoa, CCS, 2 Sept. 1683, AGS/E/3633/28. Agreement on salutes was regarded by Bazán as one of his successes, cf. his end of mission report, 1693, AGS/E/3633/206. ¹⁵⁹ For Genoa, cf. T. Kirk, Genoa and the Sea. Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic 1559–1684 (Baltimore, 2005), 77 ff; and Madrid Gazette, 21 Feb. 1679. ¹⁶⁰ AGS/Galeras/17 f. 1. Cf. Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 88–97. ¹⁶¹ Cf. marquis of Villafiel to CII, 27 Sept. 1682; Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 105–6.

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after a long fight off Alicante, to give way; his resistance won him praise while a captain who was thought to have supported him inadequately was courtmartialled.¹⁶² It was not only relations with France which were complicated by this issue: agreement on salutes was a necessary prelude to successful collaboration with the English and Dutch.¹⁶³ These different—sometimes competing—functions, and the burdens they imposed, prompted persistent debate among policy-makers about the most effective disposition of the king’s ships and galleys. In 1676 the Council of State urged the king to send the galleons of the carrera de Indias, then at Cadiz (and other ships careening at Cartagena) to reinforce the fleet off Sicily—against the advice of the dukes of Alba and Osuna, who thought this too risky.¹⁶⁴ This difference of opinion in Madrid echoed one in Italy itself, where commanders disagreed about whether their vessels should be dispersed on various tasks, or whether they should be kept together, in a single—strong—bloc.¹⁶⁵ This dilemma continued to exercise and divide those responsible for grand strategy in the Nine Years War. In the Council of State in May 1690,¹⁶⁶ for example, the constable of Castile observed that he had always urged that half the Italian galleys should be stationed in Italy and half in Spain, and proposed that the Neapolitan, Sicilian, and Sardinian squadrons (and 3 galleys of the Genoese squadron) should remain in Italy, thus ensuring sufficient vessels for transport purposes and the defence of Finale. Against this view, the admiral of Castile argued that the galleys were needed in Catalonia. A month later, following the departure of the Toulon fleet for the Channel, the constable agreed that the galleys were no longer needed in Italy, but the count of Chinchón thought that the galleys of Naples and Sicily should remain in Liguria because Louis XIV was making his main effort in the Mediterranean against Piedmont so that there was now no threat to Catalonia. For his part, the marquis of Los Vélez urged that all the galleys should remain in Spanish waters, given reports that French galleys were fitting out at Marseilles; it seemed foolish to him to oppose them with two small, weak squadrons. This problem, which stemmed from the fact that they had insufficient resources to cope with perhaps the most extensive defence commitment in contemporary Europe, continued to test Carlos II and his ministers.¹⁶⁷ This difficulty imposed an often inglorious strategy, one which has underpinned the erroneous impression given of the complete eclipse of Spanish naval power in this period. Between 1676 and 1678 the Spanish battle fleet, following its defeat at Palermo, effectively remained in harbour, the fleet’s commanders ¹⁶² Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 159–60. CODOIN, 79, 458–9. ¹⁶³ Agreements of this sort were concluded at The Hague in April 1691, and October 1692 for the Mediterranean, and were subsequently ordered by Carlos II to be followed in the Caribbean, Mancera to Stanhope, 15 Dec. 1692, SP 94/73 f. 86. ¹⁶⁴ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 389. ¹⁶⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 70 ff. ¹⁶⁶ Storrs, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . (Part II)’, 12–13. ¹⁶⁷ In 1695 Leganés complained that the ferrying of troops from Lombardy to Catalonia would weaken the galleys in Italian waters, Leganés to CII, 25 Jan. 1695, AGS/E/3657/19.

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believing that it was just not strong enough to engage the enemy. This was not a view shared by ministers in Madrid, where it was felt that engaging the enemy was better policy—and propaganda.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, there was a powerful strand in Spanish thinking about the war at sea which prized the preservation of the fleet above battle. In 1691, following the bombardment of Spain’s Levant coast by the French fleet, and with pressure from Carlos II’s Aragonese realms to counter this, some in Madrid opposed sending the fleet against the French for fear that it would suffer great losses.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, in the autumn of 1692, reports of the approach of the French admiral d’Estrées, with a superior force, prompted the departure of the Armada from Genoa to Naples.¹⁷⁰ The flight in the summer of 1693 of Carlos II’s entire Mediterranean fleet to Port Mahon may have abandoned the initiative, but at that point in the war only the fleet stood between Spain and defeat, and with it—as some feared—the Monarchy’s exit from the war.¹⁷¹ By evading action, and with it the risk of destruction, the Spanish king’s vessels could continue to fulfil their most important—their essential—function, holding the Monarchy together. In the Council of State in the autumn of 1693, in an anxious atmosphere following the second allied defeat in Piedmont, the constable suggested that, once it was confirmed that the French fleet had either headed for the Atlantic or returned to Toulon, the galleys should be ordered to Catalonia to carry reinforcements for the Milanese.¹⁷² This aspect of the role of Carlos II’s naval forces was fully understood by Louis XIV. Instructing his own galley commanders, in 1696, to seek out and destroy the Spanish galleys, he observed that Spain had always regarded the latter as a bond between its scattered Mediterranean possessions: it was for this reason that they must be destroyed.¹⁷³ In 1696, however, the Spaniards again thought discretion the better part of valour in the struggle at sea, and again frustrated Louis XIV.¹⁷⁴ Powerful French naval forces certainly threatened this Spanish system, and to some extent shaped its operations.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, although they rarely had the initiative, Carlos II’s ¹⁶⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 104 ff., 441–2. ¹⁶⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 118. Eventually, the fleet did head for Catalonia but arrived too late, ibid., 120. ¹⁷⁰ CCS [1692], AGS/E/3626/116. However, the retreat was cloaked in a desire to accede to Genoese wishes that the fleet should leave Genoa and respect the republic’s neutrality. ¹⁷¹ Stanhope to Nottingham, 5 Aug. 1693, SP 94/73 f. 184. Cf. Stanhope to Blathwayt, 12 Aug. 1693, Add. 21489 f. 21, for Spanish fears for Barcelona and the fleet itself. ¹⁷² CCS, 26 Sept. 1693, AGS/E/3655/55. ¹⁷³ P. W. Bamford, ‘The Knights of Malta and the King of France, 1665–1700’, French Historical Studies, 3 (1964), 434; idem, Fighting Ships and Prisons, 43. ¹⁷⁴ Stanhope to Vernon, 6 Sept. 1696, SP 94/74 f. 104; Operti to ST, 1 Sept. 1696, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 43. ¹⁷⁵ In 1693, following requests from the Savoyard envoy at Naples that the Spanish fleet either carry munitions to Liguria for his master, or give a convoy ship for the same mission, Pappachino was discouraging: the fleet, he said, acted according to report and circumstance. It might not, therefore, be able to put into port, and it was inadvisable to detach individual vessels, Operti to VA, 3 Feb. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. In 1696, following the departure of the Toulon fleet from the Mediterranean, Leganés requested troops from Naples on the grounds that there was no threat to Italy that year, Leganés to Medinaceli, 1 and 26 Feb., 21 Mar. and 18 Apr. 1696, Casa Pilatos.

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ships and galleys continued to carry men, munitions, and money—assuming they were available—to where they were needed. The issues which influenced the deployment of Spanish naval forces in the Mediterranean also applied in the Americas.¹⁷⁶ The re-establishment of the Barlovento fleet from 1677 was followed by instructions to its commander in 1680 which freed it from simply protecting the commercial fleets, and enjoined it to carry out patrols throughout the West Indies and to hunt down the buccaneers. However, in 1683, following the buccaneers’ capture of Vera Cruz while the Barlovento fleet was absent, that fleet was broken up into smaller units, each with its own smaller district to patrol, but with orders to maintain contact with the rest of the fleet in order to be able to regroup in force against an aggressor if need be; the gaps this strategy threatened to create would be plugged by expanding the number and role of the local coastguard. Following the sack of Campeche (1685) a further dispersal of the Barlovento fleet to protect vulnerable outlying ports was decided. Inevitably, while extending the protective cover given by the fleet more widely, that coverage was diluted, enabling the Scots, for example, to slip through to reach Darien. However, the general effectiveness of these dispositions is suggested by the fact that the fleet played its part in the efforts which eventually expelled the Scottish colonists. SHIPBUILDING Just as Carlos II needed to make good losses in his land-based forces, so he had to replace lost ships. Few of the king’s ships were destroyed in action, although at least 4 ships and 2 galleys were lost in the engagement off Palermo in 1676.¹⁷⁷ Some other vessels fell into enemy hands. In 1682 1 of the ships of the Barlovento fleet was seized off Cuba by buccaneers,¹⁷⁸ and in 1692 the San Juan, a warship of 66 guns, was captured by French vessels on its way from Vizcaya to Cadiz.¹⁷⁹ The great threat, however, was not the enemy but the weather. In 1675 five ships (and 1 smaller vessel) of the Armada—almost one-third of the entire force—were lost in a storm off Messina;¹⁸⁰ in 1684 the capitana, or flagship, of the Armada sank in similar circumstances off Ceuta;¹⁸¹ and in December 1693 2 of the 7 Tursis galleys went down in a storm off Corsica, with the loss of 156 soldiers, 14 seamen, and 222 oarsmen.¹⁸² An impregnable harbour was no guarantee against bad ¹⁷⁶ This paragraph largely follows Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 95 ff. ¹⁷⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 93. Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 390. ¹⁷⁸ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 141. ¹⁷⁹ Stanhope to Nottingham, 27 Aug. 1692, SP 94/73, f. 78; CCW, 17 Apr. 1693, AGS/GA/ 3837. In 1675 the Nuestra Señora del Pópulo had been (briefly) lost in this way off Sicily, Ribot, Monarquía, 65, 210–11. The Nuestra Señora de Atocha also fell into enemy hands during the Nine Years War, CCW, 30 Oct. 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ¹⁸⁰ Ribot, Monarquía, 210; the following year the patrona of the Sicilian galley squadron sank in a storm between Naples and Sicily with the loss of 500 men, ibid., 189–90, 437. ¹⁸¹ CCW, 19 Apr. 1684, AGS/GA/2608. ¹⁸² CCS, 27 Jan. 1694, AGS/E/3627/90.

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weather: in 1693 the warship the San Francisco de Asis, with more than 350 men on board, sank in strong winds as it guarded the entrance to Port Mahon.¹⁸³ Other vessels might be lost by accident, carelessness, or sabotage. In 1677, for example, the frigate Nuestra Señora de la Concepción was destroyed by fire in port, at Palermo,¹⁸⁴ and in 1697 the Neapolitan vessel the San Carlo, of 80 guns, went down off Cadiz, for which the pilot was blamed.¹⁸⁵ The cause of some other losses is unclear.¹⁸⁶ Whatever the explanation, such losses required investigation; for example, that by a councillor of Castile into the sinking in 1696 in a storm off the Portuguese coast of the flagship of the Armada, the 76-gun Carlos II.¹⁸⁷ Those thought to have been at fault were often punished.¹⁸⁸ Many of these losses were replaced, the fact that the king’s naval forces did not vary greatly in number masking a considerable achievement in this respect. According to the marquis of Los Vélez, viceroy of Naples between 1675 and 1682, the number of galleys in that realm’s squadron at the end of his period of office was just one more (8) than at the start; nevertheless, he claimed that he had overseen the construction of 5 new galleys for that squadron, and another 4 for Carlos II’s other galley squadrons.¹⁸⁹ The fact that the same name was given to a succession of different vessels in the royal fleets may also mask the extent to which new ships and galleys were acquired.¹⁹⁰ When wishing to replace losses, or to increase the number of his vessels, Carlos II had various options. He might simply apply captured enemy ships, as in 1684 when he ordered that a French vessel of 50 tons, and carrying 6 guns, recently seized in Galicia, be incorporated into the Armada.¹⁹¹ Since privateers operating under Carlos II’s patent (below) captured substantial numbers of enemy ships, this was a valuable source.¹⁹² Alternatively, the king could have built, or purchase, or hire, or embargo ships in Spain. Or Carlos could obtain ships abroad. Whether he opted for one method or another depended on how soon the ships were needed, their availability, suitability, and price. During the Messina War, when there was pressure to increase the number of vessels at the king’s disposal as rapidly ¹⁸³ Stanhope to Nottingham, 26 Aug. 1693, SP 94/73 f. 192. Carlos II ordered masses for the 200 dead and paid a pension to at least one widow, CCW, 27 Aug. and 21 and 30 Oct. 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ¹⁸⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 601. ¹⁸⁵ Operti to ST, 9 Jan. 1698, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. Of the 800 men aboard, 60 were saved. ¹⁸⁶ Cf. AGS/E/1947/132 for the loss of the galleon, Nuestra Señora del Rosario y San Gabriel, at Havana, in 1670. ¹⁸⁷ J. Fayard, Les Membres du conseil de Castille à l’époque moderne (Geneva, 1979), 77. Operti to ST, 27 Dec. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. All but 6 of those on board drowned. ¹⁸⁸ In 1693 Don Alonso Fernández de Córdoba was condemned following the loss of the San Juan, but successfully appealed, and in 1699 aspired to the captaincy of the Almudena, CJGI, 17 Sept. 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 1054. ¹⁸⁹ Relación de las Galeras, 18 Dec. 1682, RAH/9/700, f. 128 ff. ¹⁹⁰ Between 1696 and 1701 there were 3 vessels in the Barlovento Fleet called Nuestra Señora del Rosario. The first was built in 1696, the second was bought in 1699, and a third was one of two constructed at Campeche from 1699 (and sank in 1705). I wish to thank Dr Wayne Childers, of the University of West Florida, for this information. ¹⁹¹ CJA, 23 March 1684, AGS/GA/3709. ¹⁹² Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 100.

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as possible, there was great interest in ships for purchase in Italy: in 1676 Carlos II’s envoy to the republic of Genoa, the marquis of Villagarcía, was ordered to report on four ships available at Genoa and which might be suitable for the Armada.¹⁹³ More than twenty years later, when ministers were hastily preparing the expedition to Darien, 1 ship newly built in Cantabria for a Seville owner, for the Indies trade, was embargoed or seized,¹⁹⁴ and 2 frigates purchased: the Nuestra Señora del Carmen, bought at Pasajes for 19,000 pesos; and the San Antonio, a French vessel, bought at Cadiz for 25,500 pesos.¹⁹⁵ The purchase of foreign ships might seem conclusive proof of the dire state of Spain’s shipbuilding industry in the reign of Carlos II. In the sixteenth century Spanish shipbuilding and associated activity had thrived, both in the north, in Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Cantabria; and in the south, at Seville and other ports associated with the Indies trade, and at Gibraltar.¹⁹⁶ But Spanish shipbuilding was in a far less flourishing condition in the seventeenth century, apparently exemplifying the larger economic recession.¹⁹⁷ In 1668 Vizcaya claimed that shipbuilding there had stopped and that the Crown must act to revive it.¹⁹⁸ In addition, some contemporaries, who clearly had some knowledge of the subject, sought to address perceived weaknesses in Spanish shipbuilding. In 1691 Don Francisco Antonio Garrote, who had extensive experience of navigation in the Atlantic and Caribbean, dedicated to Carlos II a treatise on improved shipbuilding techniques for application in Spain, the Recopilación para la nueva fábrica de baxeles españoles;¹⁹⁹ and in 1693 he prepared a memoir urging the establishment of a yard for the construction of warships in the river Guadalquivir, using wood from the nearby forested woodlands, or montes of Gibraltar.²⁰⁰ That the Spanish shipbuilding industry faced some challenges is undeniable. These included ensuring a proper supply of timber, particularly in view of the deforestation of parts of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²⁰¹ Some wood, including Prussian pine, was imported,²⁰² but as far as possible the authorities used local timber.²⁰³ However, ensuring a good supply required ¹⁹³ CCS, 3 Oct. 1676, AGS/E/3614. The outcome is not known. ¹⁹⁴ Cf. petition of Don Manuel Esteban de Zarauz, of Seville [no date], AGI/Panamá/163, f. 365. ¹⁹⁵ Relazión del caudal, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 1065 ff. In 1700 the purchase of more ships for the Darien expedition was under discussion, [?] to [?], 12 Feb. 1700, AGI/Panamá/163 f. 215–16. ¹⁹⁶ J. H. Elliott, ‘Spain and its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in idem, Spain and its World 1500–1700 (New Haven, 1989), 21. ¹⁹⁷ Clayton, ‘Ships and Empire’, 241 ff.; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 85–6; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 163–5. ¹⁹⁸ Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, v. 99–100. ¹⁹⁹ Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, v. 110 ff. ²⁰⁰ CJLG, 10 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2913. ²⁰¹ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 68 ff. ²⁰² Cf. J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘The Trade of Scandinavian Merchandise in the Spanish Monarchy at the End of the 17th Century’, in E. Martínez Ruiz and M. De Pazzis Pi Corales (eds.), Spain and Sweden in the Baroque Era (1600–1660) (nd, np), 612 ff. ²⁰³ In 1675–6 negotiations were ongoing with Doña Gracia de Atocha, who cut trees in the Pyrenees for the fleet, reducing the need for costly imports, CCamara, 2 Nov. 1675, AHN/Consejos/ 4448/132; Mariana to president of CC, 1 Mar. 1676, AHN/Consejos/7186.

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vigilance. Spain’s montes were the subject of special legislation, and of controls which included occasional visits of inspection, visitas, to discover how effectively these were enforced (and to punish those who illegally felled trees),²⁰⁴ special permission being needed for cutting.²⁰⁵ Since the reign of Philip II various localities were obliged to plant new trees, to maintain levels of forestation, not least for the fleet, although these obligations were not always fulfilled. In 1691, for example, Don José de Garro, an official at Gibraltar, was fined 4,000 maravedis for failing, throughout his period of office there, to order the planting of trees.²⁰⁶ At Gibraltar, as elsewhere, the needs of the navy competed with those of the local population for construction materials, fuel, and grazing for animals.²⁰⁷ In December 1692 Carlos II, referring to the need to conserve the montes of Gibraltar because of the excellent wood it supplied for the building of ships and galleys, banned the burning of charcoal, the governor being threatened with dismissal if he permitted this.²⁰⁸ Unfortunately, the regulatory structure did not work as well as it might, not least because of the clash of jurisdictions between the Council of War, and its juntas, and that of Castile. In 1694, according to the Junta de Armadas, which was concerned about the montes of Cantabria, it had sought a report from the superintendente de montes y plantíos, the official responsible for overseeing the plantation regime there; the superintendente claimed that in 1688 the Council of Castile had deprived the juezes de montes y plantío, who enforced the system, of their responsibilities, which were transferred to the ordinary local magistrates, who (claimed the superintendente) were less concerned to preserve the montes.²⁰⁹ In fact, the decline of Spanish shipbuilding has been exaggerated.²¹⁰ New vessels continued to be built at Barcelona, Gibraltar,²¹¹ Pasajes, and Colindres in this reign. These included some constructed in and after 1676, for example, one being built by Don Pedro de Aquero in Ibiza c.1677,²¹² and suggesting that ²⁰⁴ Cf. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 68 ff., for the period before 1665; and O. Rey Castelao, Montes y Política Forestal en la Galicia del Antiguo Régimen (Santiago de Compostela, 1995), 170 ff. ²⁰⁵ In 1674 the Council of Castille ordered the felling of trees in the montes of Gibraltar (and elsewhere) to careen the capitana and the almiranta of the galeones, Mariana to president of CC, 2 May 1674, AHN/Consejos/7184. ²⁰⁶ Residencia tomada a las autoridades militares de Gibraltar, AHN/Consejos/41501/1. ²⁰⁷ D. E. Vassberg, Land and Society in Golden Age Castile (Cambridge, 1984), 36 ff., and 70 ff., an otherwise very useful discussion of the montes, ignores the naval dimension. ²⁰⁸ CII to governor of CC, 5 Dec. 1692, AHN/Consejos/7204. ²⁰⁹ CII to governor of CC, 30 Oct. 1694, AHN/Consejos/10123. The junta was also, of course, defending its own jurisdiction. These conflicts persisted after 1700, F. Andújar Castillo, Consejo y Consejeros de Guerra en el Siglo XVIII (Granada, 1996), 109. ²¹⁰ Cf. H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700 (Harlow, 1980), 115. ²¹¹ However, a proposal of 1677—perhaps connected with the (abortive) naval construction programme of that year—to establish a major shipbuilding yard at Gibraltar did not succeed, F. Serrano Mangas, ‘Proyecto de astilleros en Gibraltar (1677–79)’, AEA, 39 (1982), 437 ff. Serrano Mangas attributes the failure to the opposition of the shipyards of the Cantabrian coast and their customers in the Seville-Cadiz complex. ²¹² Cf. AGS/E/1947/239. Some, however, antedated this initiative, cf. royal patent, 8 Mar. 1675, appointing Juan Cordero de la Madriz (captain of the galleon Nuestra Señora del Pilar, capitana real of the Armada), captain of the galleon Santiago recently completed in Guipúzcoa, AGS/GA/Registro 328, f. 186.

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Carlos II’s desire to rebuild Spain’s fleets (above) had some effect;²¹³ at a later date, the galleon San Francisco, built to replace the vessel of the same name lost the previous year, was nearing completion in the summer of 1694.²¹⁴ It is clear, too, that Carlos II and his ministers continued to rely at least in part on Spain’s own shipbuilding industry to supply new warships, not least because some believed it best to spend the money in the king’s own dominions and that the ships built there were of better quality than those obtained elsewhere.²¹⁵ In 1673 the king ordered the resumption of payments—20,000 ducats a year, from the Cruzada— to the shipyards at Barcelona, the most important centre for galley construction in Spain itself,²¹⁶ because of the need for such a facility there and because of the quality and low cost of its work.²¹⁷ Two new galleys were said to be under construction at Barcelona in 1692.²¹⁸ Not surprisingly, the 1670s and the 1690s saw a peak in government initiatives, in offers to build ships—not all of which were accepted,²¹⁹ in part because of lack of funds²²⁰—and in construction. In 1697 a government contract was given for the building of a number of large ships in the Basque shipyards,²²¹ and in the spring of 1699 4 vessels were being built for the Armada in Cantabria, and 2 ships, the capitana and the almiranta (rear flagship), for the carrera de Indias.²²² Don Francisco Garrote (above), put his own advice into practice and was responsible for constructing a number of good quality, up-to-date ships.²²³ Most of the ships built for the fleet in Spain were constructed by independent contractors, rather than by the Crown itself—i.e., by asiento rather than by administración.²²⁴ In April 1673 Don Miguel de Oquendo, of San Sebastián, caballero of the Order of Santiago, agreed to build 2 vessels, of 500 tons, which would serve (under the command of his sons) with the Armada.²²⁵ In December 1674 Don Joseph de Iriarte signed a contract to build 4 ships and 1 patache, which were to serve with the Armada as the squadron of Guipúzcoa, for six years; ²¹³ For contracts to build ships for the Indies trade, 1675–79/81, cf. García Fuentes, Comercio, 196–7. ²¹⁴ CCW, 25 Aug. and 9 Sep. 1694, AGS/GA/3850; Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, v. 99 ff., 235, and 390 ff. ²¹⁵ CJA, 14 Dec. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. ²¹⁶ Construction had resumed c.1660, Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 131 ff. During the Catalan revolt (and for some time after Barcelona returned to Habsburg allegiance in 1652), Philip IV secured from Genoa the galleys he would normally have obtained in Barcelona. ²¹⁷ CII to Don Antonio de Benavides, 24 March 1673, AGS/Cruzada/517. ²¹⁸ Consulta of governor of CC, 27 May 1692. ²¹⁹ In 1694 Gisberto Mels, who had long been making bids, offered to build 28 ships, totalling almost 14,000 toneladas, for the Armada, 14 to be built in Amsterdam for the 1695 campaign, and 14 in Gibraltar for that of 1696. His offer was rejected as unrealistic, CJA, 25 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. ²²⁰ CJA, 6 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. The Crown sometimes accepted offers to build ships for the Indies trade in return for mercedes, but this did not prove very successful, the main difficulty being the Crown’s inability to supply the funds it must still contribute, García Fuentes, Comercio, 198–9. ²²¹ Kamen, Spain in Later, 115. ²²² CCIndies, 9 May 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 99 ff. ²²³ García Fuentes, Comercio, 201–2. ²²⁴ For the debate (c.1560–1620) about these two methods, cf. Thompson, War and Government, 256 ff., et passim. ²²⁵ AGS/E/1947/236. Don Miguel’s father had commanded the Spanish fleet at the Downs in 1639, Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 240.

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Iriarte’s ships were to be built in the shipyards of the ria of Laredo, and to be of 650, 600, 550, 500, and 250 tons; he was to be paid 30 ducats a ton (part in silver, part in vellon); they were to be of frigate design; and the asiento was to last for six years, after which those vessels still afloat would belong to the Crown.²²⁶ Ministers preferred asiento to administración²²⁷ for various reasons: the former was less costly, and work would not stop if money was not received, as too often happened.²²⁸ Generally, the asiento system worked well, the contractors being monitored by local royal officials.²²⁹ But asiento was not always an option; in 1694 Don Pablo de Guzmán, of the Junta de Armadas, approached a Cantabrian shipbuilder regarding the construction of 2 vessels of 800 tons, by asiento; the shipbuilder refused, saying too much was owed on previous ships, in effect declaring that the vessels must be built by administración.²³⁰ Carlos II could also secure new vessels within the larger Monarchy, where, as has already been observed of Naples, shipbuilders supplied vessels for the native galley squadron and others.²³¹ Two new galleys were under construction there in early 1693.²³² As for Sicily, in 1677 the viceroy, the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, declared his intention to made good the two galleys lost by the Sicilian squadron in the Messina War, although this was only achieved by his successor, the count of Santisteban.²³³ During the Nine Years War, in 1694, Carlos II resolved that the viceroys of both Naples and Sicily should each have 2 ships built for the Armada. Unfortunately, the then viceroy of Naples, Santisteban, declared that he could only construct 1 vessel, since Naples was already building a galley for the squadron of Sardinia.²³⁴ Outside Europe, Carlos II’s American territories, and above all Cuba, Peru, and the Philippines, were invaluable in this respect, not least because good quality wood was abundant, and costs lower.²³⁵ The shipbuilding industry ²²⁶ AGS/E/1947/235. Clause 5 provided for Iriarte’s obtaining wood in the montes. Cf. also CJDG, 16 Nov. 1677, AGS/E/1947/209, and accounts of sums paid the two men, AGS/E/1947/ 230, 245. For the later history of these vessels, cf. CJA, 8 Sept. 1684, AGS/GA/3709. ²²⁷ Cf. the contract, 29 June 1680, with Don Thomas Pérez de Dunslague and others, for 8 ships for the Armada, totalling 6,800 toneladas, to be delivered by April 1681, AGS/CMC/3/2125/13. ²²⁸ Cf. CJA, 24 Nov. and 8 and 31 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ²²⁹ Cf. CJDG, 16 Nov. 1677, AGS/E/1947/209, for a report by the corregidor of the Cuatro Villas of Cantabria on the progress of Iriarte’s vessels. ²³⁰ CJA, 14 Dec. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. The issue provoked renewed discussion of the merits of the two systems. The outcome is unclear. ²³¹ Cf. Madrid Gazette, 27 June 1679, for a new galley of the Naples squadron. ²³² Operti to ST, 3 Feb. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²³³ Ribot, Monarquía, 214–15. ²³⁴ CJA, 11 July 1696, AGS/GA/3876. Santisteban also claimed that he lacked wood, since the war had reduced traffic from northern Europe, and hoped to obtain supplies from Naples and Spain, CCS, 20 Jan. and 11 Nov. 1695, AGS/E/3326/14, 64. Another response to this disruption of supply was to use wood from Calabria, Relazione del cavaliere G. B. Operti, 1697, in C. Morandi (ed.), Relazioni di ambasciatori sabaudi, genovesi e veneti durante il periodo della grande alleanza e della successione di Spagna (1693–1713) (Bologna, 1935), 12. The viceroy of Sicily also found it difficult to fulfil the king’s order. ²³⁵ Cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 115; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 208; and Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 255.

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of Havana supplied many of the vessels which served in the Atlantic, while Guayaquil (Peru) built many of those which defended the Spanish Pacific.²³⁶ The need to counter the buccaneering threat in the 1680s stimulated local shipbuilding intiatives throughout the Spanish Caribbean.²³⁷ If Carlos II could not build or buy ships (and essential naval supplies)²³⁸ within the Monarchy, he might, like his predecessors and his successor,²³⁹ obtain what he needed abroad. The most important foreign source was the Dutch Republic. In 1665 the Spanish envoy at The Hague, Gamarra, requested permission for the departure from Middelburg (Zeeland) of 2 vessels carrying to Vizcaya cables and other supplies needed in the construction of ships for the Indies trade.²⁴⁰ Nearly thirty years later, in 1692–3, Spain was still buying essential naval supplies in the Dutch Republic.²⁴¹ It was not only naval stores which were purchased in Holland. In 1664 the two asentistas, Lomelin and Grillo, had taken charge of the construction in Holland of 4 ships for Philip IV;²⁴² twenty years later, in 1684, Carlos II approved a contract for the construction in Holland of 4 frigates.²⁴³ The Dutch were not the only source. The Republic of Genoa was also an important supplier. In 1684 the count of Frigiliana was ordered to report on a Genoese ship, the Loreto, then on its way from Lisbon via Cadiz to Genoa; he thought it good but expensive, at 55,000 pesos; the junta, in view of the hard-pressed royal finances, advised against purchase and the king agreed.²⁴⁴ Too great a reliance on foreign sources might be risky, however. Measures were therefore taken to ensure that Spain could supply some, at least, of the essential naval supplies it needed.²⁴⁵ In 1675 two immigrants from the Low Countries, Adrian de Roo and Baltasar Kiel, established, at Sada (Galicia), a factory manufacturing rope (for rigging) and canvas (for sailcloth) for the Armada;²⁴⁶ in 1678 there were plans for the increased supply in Spain of ships masts;²⁴⁷ and in 1682 another contract with Roo and Kiel aimed at self-sufficiency in the supply of ²³⁶ Clayton, ‘Ships and Empires’, 246; Clayton, ‘Trade and Navigation’, JLAS, 7 (1975), 18. ²³⁷ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 100–1, 177. ²³⁸ In 1674 Iriarte was allowed to import essential materials not available in Spain to build ships, AGS/E/1947/235 (cl. 6). ²³⁹ Phillips, Six Galleons, 193; Kamen, Philip V, 50–1. ²⁴⁰ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 329. ²⁴¹ CJA, 19 Feb. 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ²⁴² C. Sanz Ayán, Los Banqueros de Carlos II (Valladolid, 1988), 188. ²⁴³ CJA, 30 Jan. and 6 Apr. 1684, AGS/GA/3709. ²⁴⁴ CJA, 16 May 1684, AGS/GA/3709. ²⁴⁵ There were problems but these were not insuperable. Steps were taken, for example, to reduce fraud in the construction of ships for the carrera de Indias, and to create a system for supplying timber and masts, Mangas, Las galeones de la carrera de Indias, 1650–1700, as reviewed, HAHR, 67 (1987), 154–5. ²⁴⁶ M. M. De Artaza, Rey, Reino y Representación. La Junta General del Reino de Galicia (Madrid, 1998), 434–5; M. L. Sánchez, ‘The Attempts at Reform in the Reign of Charles II: A Revisionist View of the decline of Castile, 1665–1700’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1976, 90–1. Artaza identifies Roo and Riel as from Flanders. However, C. Sanz Ayán, ‘El Abastecimiento de Pertrechos Navales a la Monarquía Hispánica durante el Siglo XVII’, in idem, Estado, Monarquía y finanzas. Estudios de Historia financiera en tiempos de los Austrias (Madrid, 2004), 97–8, declares them to be Dutch. ²⁴⁷ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 140.

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hemp for the fleet.²⁴⁸ Just how successful these efforts were is not clear. Roo and Kiel’s Galician manufactory at Coruña was still in operation in 1688,²⁴⁹ but in 1692, cables and other equipment needed to fit out the fleet then wintering at Naples in 1693 could only be found at Cadiz, at very high prices; it was therefore decided to purchase these in Holland.²⁵⁰ But this was clearly an exceptional situation. In less demanding circumstances, Naples was expected to supply others: in October 1691 the viceroy was ordered to provide the Spanish galleys with 1,000 oars.²⁵¹ At a time when the other naval powers were building ships of larger tonnage, capable of carrying the guns needed for the artillery duels between ships of the line which increasingly characterized major engagements at sea,²⁵² Carlos II had fewer of these big warships. Some of his ministers urged the need for such vessels. In January 1684, for example, the Junta de Armadas, considering a suggestion that an English vessel recently seized in Sardinia would make a good fireship, urged that the Armada should be acquiring bigger ships.²⁵³ However, ministers continued to commission²⁵⁴ and to send to sea a variety of types of vessel. The Spanish battle fleet in Sicilian waters in 1675,²⁵⁵ and in 1677, combined larger, heavier galleons and the new lighter, longer frigates;²⁵⁶ so, too, did the fleet in Italy in 1692–3;²⁵⁷ and in 1700 the squadron sent to Darien included 2 galleons, both over 900 tons; 3 frigates, of 600, 550, and 470 tons; and a number of smaller vessels.²⁵⁸ Generally speaking, Carlos II’s ships had fewer guns, which were of bronze rather than of iron, and of smaller calibre than those of the other naval powers,²⁵⁹ ²⁴⁸ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 144; Sanz Ayán, ‘El Abastecimiento’, 97. ²⁴⁹ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 135. ²⁵⁰ [?] to Bernaldo de Quirós, 12 Nov. 1692, AGS/E/4017. ²⁵¹ CII to [viceroy of Naples], 29 Oct. 1691, AGS/E/3322/178. ²⁵² On changing naval design in the seventeenth century, cf. G. Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge, 1988), 102–3. However, Parker’s survey suggests that we need to be wary of thinking in terms of one simple, ‘ideal’ path for navies to follow in the seventeenth century. Cf. J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Evolución del tonelaje de la flota de vela española durante los siglos modernos’, Estudios, 1 (1975), 177 ff. ²⁵³ CJA, 13 Jan. 1684, on count of Frigiliana to [?], 22 Oct. 1683, AGS/GA/3709. Junta and king agreed, however, that if the vessel could be had cheaply it should be acquired for the purpose suggested. ²⁵⁴ Cf. Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, v. 390 ff. ²⁵⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 210. The largest vessel was the galleon Santiago, of 1,250 toneladas. Other vessels included the almirante, the Santa Ana, a galleon of 934 tons, and the Nuestra Señora de la Almudena, another galleon, of 823 tons, both built in 1668, Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 273, ²⁵⁶ AGS/E/1947/239. My calculations differ slightly from those of Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 250. ²⁵⁷ See appendix. ²⁵⁸ Relación del numero [1700], AGI/Panamá/161, f. 611. The largest vessel was the galleon, Nuestra Señora de Tezanos (937 tons). Another list of July 1699 included the galleon Santissima Trinidad (1,600 tons) and the capitana real (1,500 tons), Tripulación, AGI/Panamá/162, f. 338. The two ships being built for the carrera de Indias in 1699 (above) were both of 1,100 tons, CCIndies, 9 May 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 99 ff. [f. 111]. According to the king’s orders to the governor of Cuba, before the departure of the Darien expedition, the latter comprised 10 vessels ‘of the line’, CII to Governor of Cuba [1700], AGI/Panamá/163, f. 337. ²⁵⁹ In April 1676 the French fleet in the engagement off Catania had 1,726 guns against the 1,450 of the Dutch–Spanish fleet, Ribot, Monarquía, 89. In 1692–3 the 21 ships of the Armada, then at Naples, a total of 13,890 tons, had just 1,040 guns, between one-half and one-third of the artillery of the fleets of France, the Dutch Republic, and England, Ribot, Monarquía, 419–20.

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suggesting another reason for the failure of Carlos II’s ships to engage the enemy more frequently. Insufficient guns was a frequent problem. In late 1677, for example, the marquis of Villafiel declared that he needed 166 bronze cannon of different calibres (70 ⫻ 25 pounders and 96 ⫻ 18 pounders) for just 6 ships of the Armada.²⁶⁰ The Junta de Armadas proposed giving Villafiel half of the guns he asked for, to be obtained both in Spain and (purchased) abroad, in England and Holland. It was also suggested that guns might be cast in Naples. However, in view of the fact that the 4 new ships—of Aguero, Iriarte, and Oquendo (above)— were said to need 40 bronze pieces each, it was pointed out that it was better for these to be cast in Spain, which should be self-sufficient in artillery, not least in order to avoid additional expenditure. The junta blamed Spain’s lack of self-sufficiency in this respect on neglect. On the other hand, the supply of ship’s guns—the number of which was not always itself decisive²⁶¹—could be supplemented from other sources. They could be recovered from sunken vessels,²⁶² while the guns of ships which were no longer fit for action were removed to others which were.²⁶³ In addition, artillery could also be obtained from fortresses.²⁶⁴ Last, but by no means least, captured enemy vessels were a windfall source of guns.²⁶⁵ Not surprisingly, Carlos II’s ministers resented suggestions in the spring of 1693 that the ships they were to contribute to a joint Anglo-Dutch-Spanish squadron in the Mediterranean had fewer guns than had been agreed: in fact, they mounted more.²⁶⁶

CREWS Another major headache was the crewing of ships and galleys. Crew size—including the number of both sailors, gente or plazas de mar or marinería,²⁶⁷ and infantry (gente de mar y guerra)—was calculated according to the status and tonnage of the ²⁶⁰ Cf CJDG, 21 Nov. and [end] 1677, AGS/E/1947/214, 215. ²⁶¹ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 89 on the poor quality of the powder of the artillery-superior French fleet in an engagement with the Spanish and Dutch forces off Catania in 1676. ²⁶² In 1677 56 cannon (30 of iron and 26 of bronze) were recovered from the galleon Santa Ana, almirante of the Armada, and the patache, San Gabriel, which had gone down off the Tuscan coast in 1676 carrying troops from Finale, Ribot, Monarquía, 212. In 1700 it was suggested that 7 bronze artillery pieces from the San Carlos (which had sunk off Andalusia) and which had been incorporated into the defences of Cadiz, be used on the Darien expedition, CJGI, 26 Feb. 1700, AGI/Panamá/163 f. 167 ²⁶³ Ribot, Monarquía, 212. ²⁶⁴ In 1689 the new capitana of the Armada was armed with cannon from the African presidios, CCS, 15 Jan 1689, AGS/E/4137. ²⁶⁵ In 1692 75 cannon were salvaged from a French vessel which sank off Ceuta; another vessel was refloated and put into service, Operti to VA, 8 May 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ²⁶⁶ Copy of paper given to Schonenberg, 5 May 1693, SP8/14/5, and enclosed Relación del Porte y Artilleria [May 1693]. Cf. also Relación de la Gente [1693?], Add. 21,553 f. 31.The 16 vessels should have carried 960 guns (according to their tonnage), but apparently had 1,040. ²⁶⁷ The broad category marinería comprised seamen, gunners, apprentices or grumetes, and ship’s boys. Cf. the review of the fleet, January 1678, tabulated in Ribot, Monarquía, 225.

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vessel, as laid down in earlier royal orders of 1621 for the galleys,²⁶⁸ and of 1633 for the Armada.²⁶⁹ On the basis of these establishments, the number of men aboard Carlos II’s 28 galleys should have totalled more than 8,000 men (oarsmen, seamen, and officials).²⁷⁰ As for the Armada, in the summer of 1674 the 21 ships of the fleet then off Catalonia carried more than 6,500 men (2,539 plazas de mar and 3,983 infantry);²⁷¹ in 1692–3 the 21 ships which were to join the English and Dutch in the Mediterranean had on board over 4,000 seamen (and over 4,000 infantry);²⁷² and in 1696 the number of sailors needed for the fleet was put at 2,776.²⁷³ These figures do not compare with those of, for example, the Dutch,²⁷⁴ but the number of men aboard Carlos II’s fleets was substantial. As with Carlos’s armies, there was a constant drain of manpower. The duke of Veragua, commander of the Spanish galleys, put the number of oarsmen wanting in his squadron in March 1691 at 239, equivalent to the entire complement for one galley, such that he feared that only 5 of the squadron’s 6 galleys could put to sea in the imminent campaign.²⁷⁵ As in the king’s armies, sickness was a major problem. In January 1684, for example, there were said to be more than 400 sick aboard the Armada.²⁷⁶ Some men were taken prisoners, including, for example, the crew of the San Juan, in 1693.²⁷⁷ Men were also lost when galleys and ships went down: in 1693 the sinking of the San Francisco de Asis meant the loss of 200 men.²⁷⁸ Desertion was less of a problem at sea, but the Nuestra Señora del Pilar lost more than 100 men (seamen and soldiers) who jumped ship in Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Cartagena, as it made its way to Sicily in 1674.²⁷⁹ The galleys suffered losses related to their reliance on convicts, or forzados. Each year numbers of men were released on completion of their sentences²⁸⁰—although some agreed to stay on, as ²⁶⁸ R. Pike, Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain (Madison, Wis, 1983), 11. ²⁶⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 227. Ordinary vessels were to have 16 mariners (and 26 soldiers) per 100 tons, with more on the capitana and almirante. Iriarte’s contract (1674) fitted in with this. ²⁷⁰ In 1668 the total number of oarsmen on the seven galleys of the Spanish squadron alone was 2,080, Pike, Penal Servitude, 13. The largest complement was that of the capitana (379), the smallest that of the San Pedro (262). In October 1687, at the end of the campaign, there were aboard the 7 galleys of the Tursi squadron, 1,828 oarsmen—86 short of its establishment—and 386 officers, or cabos, Relación de la gente, 17 Oct. 1687, AGS/E/3633/59. The capitana had the largest establishment, 330 oarsmen, nearly 100 more than the galley with the smallest. Cf. Zysberg, Les Galériens, 429, for Louis XIV’s galleys. ²⁷¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 224. The number of troops aboard was unusually high. ²⁷² Relación de la Gente, [1693], Add. 21,553. ²⁷³ CII to Governor of CC, 28 April 1696, and enclosed repartimiento, AHN/Consejos/7209/21. ²⁷⁴ The Dutch fleet was expected to need 24,000 men for 1694, Blathwayt to Trenchard, 20 Oct. 1693, BL/Add. 37992 f. 49. ²⁷⁵ Relación de el estado . . . de las Galeras [1690] AGS/E/3654/39. The Neapolitan galleys were reportedly lacking 900 men in 1695, Operti to ST, 15 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁷⁶ CJA, 28 Jan. 1684, AGS/GA/2608. In 1680 more than 250 oarsmen were said to be ill at Cartagena, Pike, Penal Servitude, 22. ²⁷⁷ CCW, July 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ²⁷⁸ CCW, 27 Aug., 21 Oct., and 4 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/3837. ²⁷⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 220. Paid oarsmen (below) were likely to desert if not paid, Ribot, Monarquía, 232 (1678). For fears of desertion while the Armada was at Genoa, in 1692, cf. CCS [1692], AGS/E/3626/116. ²⁸⁰ At the start of 1693, 300 convicts—equal to the complement of 1 galley—were released on completion of sentence in Naples, Operti to ST, 16 Jan. and 13 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5.

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paid men, or buenas boyas—or because they were simply too old or infirm to man the oars,²⁸¹ some men were pardoned,²⁸² and Moorish slaves were sometimes exchanged for Christian prisoners.²⁸³ Measures at least to reduce the rate of loss included the provision of medical services, at the naval hospital at Cadiz,²⁸⁴ and in the galley hospitals at Cartagena and Puerto de Santa María.²⁸⁵ Nevertheless, those losses continued, and had to be made good if Carlos II’s galleys and ships were to be able to put to sea. Generally, the men needed for the Armada were recruited voluntarily. Many were found in Spain itself, in the seafaring regions of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, Cantabria, Galicia, and Andalusia.²⁸⁶ On occasion, however, they might be recruited elsewhere in the Monarchy. In 1677–8, for example, the viceroy of Naples was expected to find 350 seamen for the Armada, which was then in Italian waters.²⁸⁷ Seamen were also recruited outside Carlos II’s territories, in territories as far apart as Ragusa and England: in 1676 the crew of the frigate El Rosario included English and Dutch subjects.²⁸⁸ Indeed, when the Darien expedition was being prepared, it was noted that it would be difficult to ensure that the ships were crewed only by Spaniards: ministers therefore sought to ensure that the majority were Spaniards, or levantiscos (from eastern Spain), and that—above all—they were good Catholics.²⁸⁹ The difficulties facing voluntary recruitment might be overcome by offering more enlistment money, but not always.²⁹⁰ Carlos might also bargain, particularly with the so-called foral territories (Chapter 5). In 1665, for example, the juntas generales of Alava agreed to a royal request for 200 seamen, in return for a reduction of the duties levied on wool from Navarre and Aragon.²⁹¹ If all else failed, the king might have to insist that his own needs take priority, and even—imitating his predecessors²⁹²—to press men. In 1692 the Junta de Armadas urged that a San Sebastian privateer not be allowed to set sail before the levy of sailors for 2 vessels ²⁸¹ Cf. CCS, 3 July 1688, AGS/E/3628/11, on the release of a number of aged and infirm on the Tursi galleys; and [?] to the duke of Tursi, 20 June 1692, listing 20 forzados then in hospital: these included one Carlos Campana, aged 78, condemned to the galleys for life in 1651. One reason for releasing these men was the expense of their maintenance. ²⁸² Cf. CII to viceroy of Valencia, 7 Oct. 1694, BSC, MS 126 f. 280, pardoning Agustín Hager, who had been sentenced to the galleys for ten years for murder. ²⁸³ CCW, 30 March 1696, AGS/GA/3876. ²⁸⁴ Stanhope to Rooke, 6 Dec. 1695, Spain under Charles, 85. ²⁸⁵ Pike, Penal Servitude, 23. ²⁸⁶ Cf CCS, 3 Mar. 1685, AGS/E/4134, and 15 June 1692, AGS/E/3626/56. ²⁸⁷ AGS/E/1947/239. Much the same happened in 1692–3. ²⁸⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 490. ²⁸⁹ [JGI?] to Navarrete, 12 and 19 Feb. 1700, AGI/Panamá/163 ff. 215–16, 231–2. ²⁹⁰ In 1684 it was difficult to find men for the fleet, then detained by contrary winds at Cartagena, even offering 2 doubloons, CJA, 6 Apr. 1684, AGS/GA/3709. ²⁹¹ X. Alberdi Lonbide and A. Aragón Ruano, ‘La resistencia frente a la política de las autoridades de Marina en Guipúzcoa durante el período borbónico’, in R. Porres Marijuán (ed.), Poder, Resistencia y Conflicto en las Provincias Vascas (Siglos XVI–XVIII) (Bilbao, 2001), 368. ²⁹² Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 196.

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preparing at Pasaje (Guipúzcoa) was complete;²⁹³ subsequently, the English envoy, Stanhope, reported the view in Madrid that an order to the recently departed flota to return to port had been ignored because of fears that the crews would be pressed into service on the Armada.²⁹⁴ Philip III had introduced, and Philip IV had attempted to enforce, a registration scheme which should ensure a supply of sailors for the royal fleets.²⁹⁵ It is tempting to see this as an anticipation of both the French maritime classes established by Louis XIV,²⁹⁶ and the matrícula de mar introduced into Spain by Louis’s grandson, Philip V;²⁹⁷ unfortunately, the success of the earlier Spanish scheme and its status after 1625 remains unclear. Nevertheless, Carlos II and his ministers did sometimes resort to the imposition of quotas in coastal areas. In 1667 a quota was imposed on Guipúzcoa.²⁹⁸ But such impositions were perhaps easier to implement in non-foral Andalusia. In 1694 Corbete suggested that, in view of the lack of crews for 4 ships ordered to carry troops from Malaga to Catalonia, the king should order the local magistrates and royal officials of Cadiz, Puerto de Santa María, Gibraltar, San Lúcar, Ayamonte, and Seville to get those seamen who had not served in previous campaigns to enlist, according to their obligation.²⁹⁹ In 1696, too, Carlos II ordered a repartimiento along the coast of Andalusia (including 300 each from Malaga and Cadiz) in order to raise 1,850 of the 2,776 men needed by the Armada.³⁰⁰ In the spring of 1700, with the recruitment of sailors for the expedition to Darien faltering, and after consideration in the Junta de Guerra de Indias,³⁰¹ Carlos ordered yet another repartimiento in Andalusia, to be executed by the local magistrates under the direction of the captain-general of the Ocean Coasts, the captain-general of the Granada Coasts, the governor of Malaga, and the asistente of Seville.³⁰² The king stressed that this should only be resorted to when all voluntary methods had failed, and sought to make it more palatable by saying that single men should be taken first and that no more men should be taken up than were needed. In addition, those taken must be paid in advance, so that ²⁹³ Consulta of Governor of CC, 22 July 1692, AHN/Consejos/10119. ²⁹⁴ Stanhope to Nottingham, 20–30 July 1692, SP 94/73 f. 76. ²⁹⁵ Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 192 ff.; Phillips, Six Galleons, 141. ²⁹⁶ E. Asher, The Resistance to the Maritime Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert (Berkeley, Calif., 1960). ²⁹⁷ J. R. McNeill, Atlantic Empires of France and Spain (Chapel Hill, 1985), 72–3; A. González Enciso, ed., G. Desdevises Du Dezert, La España del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid, 1989), 551 ff. ²⁹⁸ Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa, 19, 153. On this occasion, officials in Guipúzcoa said they could not fulfil the quota because so many seamen had been seized by the north African corsairs; this prompted a royal order to ‘redeem’ these men. ²⁹⁹ CJA, 7 Mar. 1694, AGS/GA/3851. The junta agreed, since time was pressing. Whether by ‘obligation’ something general or more specific was meant is unclear. ³⁰⁰ CII to governor of CC, 28 April 1696, and enclosing order for repartimiento, AHN/Consejos/ 7209/21. Cf. consulta of JAA, 11 July 1696, AGS/GA/3876. ³⁰¹ It was observed that forced levy was not violence in this case but public necessity, CJGI, 22 Mar. 1700, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 811. Navarrete had reported on 16 Mar. that only 1,390 had so far signed up of the 2,500 seamen required. ³⁰² [CII] to Don Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, April 1700, AGI/Panamá/182, f. 542–3; same to duke of Alburquerque, 14 May 1700, AGI/Panamá/163, f. 733.

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they could provide for their families. Subsequently, Navarrete was authorized to seize seamen who had already signed up for merchant ships, since ‘the public necessity must come first’ and anyway the men could be replaced.³⁰³ Such measures were not entirely satisfactory. Inevitably, they were unpopular, and prompted requests for exemption.³⁰⁴ Many simply fled. Nor were naval officials always happy with the yield: in 1694 Corbete urged that the officials executing the repartimiento select able men, and not useless country people as usually happened. Besides these ad hoc measures, some thought was given to the longer term. In 1674 Iriarte was expected to have serving in his squadron (above) a number of Basque noble entretenidos, because the Crown wished them to be skilled in naval matters.³⁰⁵ Some years later, in 1681, the newly established Junta de Comercio established the colegio of San Telmo (Seville) to train youths as sailors for the royal and merchant fleets.³⁰⁶ Other schemes included sending male orphans to sea. In January 1694 it was suggested that 350 boys in the Madrid colegio de desamparados (a home for orphans and others) serve as apprentices with the Armada, in imitation of English practice; apparently the Spanish king had already sent 50 of these boys to the fleet and Corbete had been very pleased with them.³⁰⁷ Oarsmen for the galleys were recruited rather differently. Some were convicts, or forzados, others were ex-convicts who agreed to serve on (or were effectively detained against their will), or buenas boyas, and others were slaves. The proportion of each of these groups varied from squadron to squadron and according to need.³⁰⁸ Convicts may have been of diminishing importance in the seventeenth century:³⁰⁹ on the Tursi galleys in October 1687 they supplied just 299 of the 1828 oarsmen, far fewer than the slaves (479) or buenas boyas.³¹⁰ Nevertheless, convicted criminals remained important, espercially when buenas boyas and slaves were in short supply. The supply of convicts depended on the courts, the needs of the galleys resulting in more crimes being made punishable by a term in the galleys in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain.³¹¹ In Castile, those condemned to the galleys were ³⁰³ [CII] to Don Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, 27 April 1700, AGI/Panamá/163, f. 651–2. ³⁰⁴ Cf. [?] to [?], 24 Apr. 1700, on a request from Cadiz that its shipowners be exempt from the repartimiento for the Darien expedition, AGI/Panamá/182, f. 634. ³⁰⁵ AGS/E/1947/235 (cl. 45). ³⁰⁶ Sánchez, ‘Attempts at Reform’, 192; Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iv. 249 ff. ³⁰⁷ Consulta of governor of CC, 16 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/12499/1. Cf. Kamen, ‘Spain in Later, 280; and AGS/CMC/3/2230 (1680). ³⁰⁸ In 1694 the shortage of convicts in Naples necessitated greater recourse to free men, Operti to VA, 30 Mar. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³⁰⁹ Pike, Penal Servitude, 13. Cf. certificate by D. Francisco de Castillo y Mercader, of the Spanish embassy in Genoa (and inspector and accountant of the galleys), AGS/Galeras/17, f. 59. For the proportions on the French galleys, cf. Zysberg, Les galériens, 69. ³¹⁰ Relación de la gente de cavo, 17 Oct. 1687, AGS/E/3633/59. ³¹¹ Surviving lists of forzados can provide invaluable information on crime and criminals in contemporary Spain: cf. [?] to duke of Tursis, 20 June 1692, listing 20 forzados, AGS/E/3628/10; list of 12 forzados, 7 July 1694, AGS/E/3628/21; and memoir of those released from the Tursis galleys 1694–7, AGS/E/3630/108. Cf. also Kamen, Spain in Later, 173 (1693, Madrid), 174 (1672–5,

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collected at Toledo (and elsewhere), from where chaingangs of forzados were periodically dispatched to the galley ports.³¹² Carlos II continued to impose the galleys as a penalty for convicted offenders,³¹³ and when the galleys were particularly short of men instructed the Council of Castile to order local justices and the criminal courts (above all, the chancillerías of Granada and Valladolid) to speed up their activities and to dispatch their convicts to Toledo to join the chaingang. This happened in 1683–4,³¹⁴ in early 1691,³¹⁵ in 1691–2,³¹⁶ in 1693–4,³¹⁷ in 1696,³¹⁸ and again in 1697–8.³¹⁹ It is arguable that the needs of the galleys thus influenced the prosecution and punishment of crime and criminals under Carlos II. Some of those responsible for the administrative of justice certainly feared that it was less of a priority than were defence needs. The Council of Castile, for example, opposed the practice whereby convicted criminals condemned to the galleys obtained their release by offering a slave in their place; it pointed out that men were not sent to the galleys purely for the benefit of the latter.³²⁰ Castile was not the only source of convicts for the galleys, who were also obtained from Carlos II’s other territories. The forzados of the kingdom of Valencia supplied the galleys of Sardinia;³²¹ without them, it was claimed in 1694, the latter would have no oarsmen.³²² In Italy, each realm supplied its own convicts.³²³ Naples not only sent its convicts to its own galleys³²⁴ but also Madrid). Some of those who appeared at the great auto de fe held in Madrid in 1680 went to the galleys, Dunlop, Memoirs, ii. 203. ³¹² Cf. Pike, Penal Servitude, 18–19 (with map of chaingang route to the coast). ³¹³ Heras Santos, Justicia Penal, 159, 262, 301–2, 304 ff. In 1692 two Portuguese were condemned to a whipping and the galleys, a sentence reduced on appeal by the chancillería of Valladolid to just the galleys, CCS, May 1692, on complaint of Portuguese envoy, and report of corregidor of Salamanca, 27 May 1692, AGS/E/4039. ³¹⁴ CII to governor of CC, 9 Dec. 1683, AHN/Consejos/7195/7. ³¹⁵ Cf. CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, and attached Relación of state of galleys of Spain, AGS/E/3654/34, 39. ³¹⁶ CII to president of chancillería of Valladolid, 19 Nov. 1691, ARCV/Libros de Acuerdo/14, f. 407; same to governor of CC, 17 March. 1692, AHN/Consejos/7205. ³¹⁷ CII to governor of CC, 4 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/7207/1. The king’s order pointed out that, in view of the fact that the Spanish galleys had been obliged to remain in port during the 1693 campaign, with negative consequences for Spain’s war effort, a general order was to be issued to speed up as far as possible the trials of criminals who deserved to be sent to the galleys (i.e., whose offences carried this penalty). In addition, the audiencia of Galicia should devote one day per week to criminal causes because of the considerable backlog. ³¹⁸ CJAA, 9 April 1696, AGS/GA/3876 (and another copy in AGS/GA/3877). ³¹⁹ CII to president of CC, 1 April 1698, AHN/Consejos/7211/10. ³²⁰ Cf CCC, 18 May 1672, AHN/Consejos/7182/12. ³²¹ Many of those involved in the Valencian revolt of 1693 were condemned to the galleys, Kamen, Spain in Later, 221. ³²² CII to viceroy of Valencia, 30 Apr. 1694, BSC, MS 126 f. 265. In 1681, however, the viceroy had been ordered to send his forzados to Cartagena, for the Spanish galley squadron (rather than that of Sardinia), same to same, 25 July 1681, BSC, MS. 123 f. 199. ³²³ In Sicily, the convictions following the subsistence riots in various towns in 1671–2 provided a number of men for the galleys, Ribot García, La Revuelta Antiespañola de Mesina (1591–1674) (Valladolid, 1982), 184. ³²⁴ Cf. Operti to ST, 22 Apr. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4 for the sentence of Neapolitan coiners to the galleys for life.

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supplied them to other squadrons.³²⁵ For its part, the Milanese supplied the Tursi (and other) galleys, sending its convicts along the military road between Milan and Finale.³²⁶ Pirates and others captured in the Caribbean were also frequently condemned to the galleys.³²⁷ Other states and feudatories in Italy, particularly if they had no galleys of their own, also supplied Carlos II with convicts,³²⁸ as did Carlos’s cousin, the emperor, who sent convicted Hungarian Protestants to Naples.³²⁹ The need for convicts often depended on the availability, or cost,³³⁰ of buenas boyas and slaves.³³¹ Unfortunately, the former are the least well documented of the groups who manned the oars.³³² They may have been the most troublesome. In 1691, volunteers on the Neapolitan galleys refused to embark without an advance of pay and took refuge in a local church when this was denied, delaying the squadron’s departure.³³³ Many of the slaves—mostly Moors—were captured in the frequent minor operations on land and at sea in the western Mediterranean, including those around Ceuta and Oran.³³⁴ Alternatively, Carlos II, or rather the commissary of the Cruzada, could purchase slaves. He or his ministers could buy them in Spain,³³⁵ or abroad—at Leghorn and other Mediterranean slave marts³³⁶—although the competition, including that from other galley fleets, ³²⁵ In 1694 the viceroy of Naples was ordered to supply the Tursi galleys with 30 forzados, but was unable to do so, duke of Tursis to CII, 15 Apr. 1694, AGS/E/3627/121. ³²⁶ In June 1666 the governor of Milan dispatched 92 forzados to the galleys, CCS, 8 June 1666, AGS/E/3612. In 1695 Leganés had ready another chaingang of 89 forzados [?] to [CII], 28 May 1695, AGS/E/3628/92. On this occasion (as in 1686), the Genoese made difficulties about allowing the men across their territory, cf. Bazán’s report, 1693, AGS/E/3633/206. ³²⁷ Godolphin to Arlington, 15 Aug.1674, Hispania Illustrata, 219–22. In 1685 all captured pirates in Peru were to be sent to Spain for the galleys, K. E. Lane, ‘Buccaneers and Coastal Defense in Late Seventeenth-century Quito: The Case of Barbacoas’, CLAHR (1997), 154. ³²⁸ Cf. list, 23 July 1696, AGS/Varios/Galeras/122, of those condemned to the galleys by the Republic of Lucca and supplied to the Tursi galleys. The fact that the prince of Masserano gave his convicts to Carlos II’s galleys was one reason to protect his interests, cf. Leganés to CII, 31 May 1694, AGS/E/3419/164. ³²⁹ R. M. Hatton, ‘Louis XIV and his Fellow Monarchs’, in idem (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe, (London, 1976), 26; C. W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815 (Cambridge, 1994), 70–1. ³³⁰ ln 1693 volunteers for the Neapolitan galleys were offered 40 scudi, Operti to ST, 31 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³³¹ Cf. duke of Tursis to CII, 18 Mar. 1694, AGS/E/3627/113. ³³² According to Bazán’s report, 1693, AGS/E/3633/206, buenas boyas were collected in the Tursi squadron’s hospital galley at Genoa, along with forzados. ³³³ Operti to VA, 27 Mar. 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³³⁴ CJAA, 17 Dec. 1696, AGS/GA/3877. On this occasion 166 Moors were captured, although not all were fit for the oars. ³³⁵ Cf. the purchase, for 100 ducats, of a Moor from the hospital of San Juan de Dios, Madrid, for the galleys of Spain, Relación de gastos, 1696–1702, AGS/Cruzada/300. The Moor was examined by a surgeon who declared his fitness for the galleys. In the spring of 1691 the viceroy of Mallorca was ordered to purchase slaves from the corsairs (below), CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, AGS/E/3654/341. ³³⁶ In 1694 the duke of Tursi purchased at Leghorn (and elsewhere) slaves for his galleys, duke of Tursis to CII, 15 Apr. 1694, AGS/E/3627/121.

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could make this an expensive option.³³⁷ Occasionally, the king seized privately owned slaves for the duration of a campaign.³³⁸ Carlos II’s ships and galleys were often seriously short of men. In October 1677, for example, the fleet in Sicily lacked more than 800 seamen.³³⁹ The lack of mariners and oarsmen, and of skilled men, including pilots,³⁴⁰ could seriously delay the departure of ships and galleys, hindering operations.³⁴¹ However, this problem was by no means peculiar to the Spain of Carlos II.³⁴² Nor was it insoluble. Despite the temporary difficulties, and the fact that on occasion a galley or ship— sometimes a number of vessels—were temporarily unable to put to sea,³⁴³ Carlos II’s fleets were rarely, if ever, completely paralysed by a shortage of manpower.³⁴⁴ SUPPLY AND FUNDING Equally challenging was the issue of supply. The Armada needed a vast quantity of provisions: in 1678, for example, the Junta de Armadas wished to provide the fleet in Sicily with 1,000,000 rations.³⁴⁵ Meeting these needs was not easy, in part due to the dependence on contractors—asentistas—and factors.³⁴⁶ In 1677 the financier Francisco Báez Eminente had supplied the fleet in Sicily with 500,000 rations and the Junta de Armadas hoped that he would take on the supply of twice ³³⁷ P. W. Bamford, ‘The Procurement of Oarsmen for the French Galleys 1660–1748’, 65 (1960), 34, 35. ³³⁸ CII to governor of CC, 4 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/7207/1. ³³⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 224. ³⁴⁰ In 1689, in view of the lack of pilots and other skilled men on the galleys of Spain, the duke of Tursis was asked to supply these, [Carlos II?] to Council of the Cruzada, 20 April 1689, AGS/Cruzada/518. Cf. D. Goodman, Power and Penury. Government, Technology and Science in Philip II’s Spain (Cambridge, 1988), 72 ff., for the situation in the later sixteenth century and Zysberg, Les galériens, 60, 63, for that on the French galleys. ³⁴¹ In 1675 the departure of the fleet to Sicily was delayed by the want of crews, Godolphin to Coventry, 7 June 1675, Hispania Illustrata, 233–6. In 1691 sailors were hard to find for ships waiting to carry men for the army of the Catalonia, Stanhope to Nottingham, 2–22 May 1691, SP 94/73, f. 32. ³⁴² Cf. D. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965), 147 ff., for manning problems in the British navy in the eighteenth century. ³⁴³ In 1693, when the Armada left Naples accompanied by the galleys, 2 of the latter were left behind for want of oarsmen, Operti to ST, 7 July 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. In 1698 the viceroy of Naples declared that for want of means to buy slaves he could only crew 6 of the realm’s 8 galleys, Medinaceli to CII, 13 April 1698, AGS/E/3630/67. ³⁴⁴ On occasion, galleys and ships appear to have carried more than their establishment of seamen or infantry or of both, Pike, Penal Servitude, 11; and Ribot, Monarquía, 227. ³⁴⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 427. In 1677 it was calculated that 50,000 rations would be needed by the 375 men (sailors and soldiers) aboard 2 ships built in Holland for Carlos II, AGS/E/1947/239. Cf. what was calculated as necessary for 4,724 men aboard 8 ships going to Darien, 1699, AGI/ Panamá/162, f. 338. ³⁴⁶ On the factor system, cf. Sanz Ayán, ‘El Abastecimiento’, 79 ff., explains the difference between asiento and factoring, and lists the factors of the galleys of Spain 1637–96/1700 and the asientistas of the Armada del Mar Océano, 1642–99/1700.

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that quantity in 1678. However, Báez Eminente was reluctant to renew the contract, having suffered a loss when grain was scarce and prices rose in 1677, and it took some time before the Junta was able to strike a deal with another supplier.³⁴⁷ The conclusion of a contract was not always the end of these problems. In 1699 Francisco Báez Eminente’s son, Juan Francisco Eminente, who had succeeded his father in 1691 and renewed the navy supply contract in 1698 for three years,³⁴⁸ raised difficulties regarding the supply of the Darien expedition. Nevertheless, the Junta de Guerra de Indias insisted that he must provide the stores as part of his contract for 1,100,000 raciones for the Armada for the year.³⁴⁹ The galleys of Spain—which were factored separately from the fleet—and those of the other squadrons faced similar difficulties;³⁵⁰ for much of the reign, naval contracts and factoring were in the hands of foreigners or men of foreign origin. The fundamental problem, however, was money (Chapter 3). The Armada was perhaps the single most expensive item in Spain’s defence establishment. Building ships, cleaning (or careening) them, fitting them out, recruiting men, paying them, supplying guns and provisions for a voyage or campaign was very costly: in 1677, a fleet of 30 warships was budgeted to cost each year about 2,000,000 escudos.³⁵¹ The king’s navy, and the galleys (funded from the Cruzada), did not always receive what was needed or promised, with inevitable consequences in terms of their operational effectiveness. In 1676–7 one of the reasons given for the fleet’s inactivity in Sicilian waters was the lack of careening—an operation essential to their seaworthiness, manœuvrability, and speed—a consequence of the want of funds.³⁵² Lack of money lay behind other problems, including the failure to attract men. In the winter of 1691 the marquis of los Vélez identified as the only reasons why the Armada might not be able to sail with 19 warships, 4 fireships, and 2 pataches the want of 150,000 reales to pay the seamen already recruited and the want of additional mariners.³⁵³ Failure to pay or provision the crew could create serious problems: in December 1674 the crew of the capitana of the Flanders squadron, then in Italian waters, refused to set sail until provisioned; in 1675 a number of those aboard two galleys of the Spanish squadron took refuge in a Palermo church and refused to depart unless paid; and in 1677 some serving in the Armada in Sicily, having received no pay throughout 1676, refused to sail or fight.³⁵⁴ We should not exaggerate the extent to which Carlos II’s naval forces were hobbled by shortage of money, but the failure to ensure prompt, regular, and ³⁴⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 427–8. A contract for 1,000,000 rations was not concluded until after the end of the Messina War, although the contractor did supply provisions in the meantime. In 1679 Báez Eminente resumed his contract as factor of the Armada. ³⁴⁸ Cf. Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 350–1. ³⁴⁹ CJGI, 25 July 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 201 ff. ³⁵⁰ Ribot, Monarquía, 430; Sanz Ayán, ‘El Abastecimiento’, 89–90. ³⁵¹ Budget for 1678, AGS/E/1947/139; account of money needed by fleet, end 1677, AGS/E/ 1947/233. ³⁵² Ribot, Monarquía, 444. In 1681 the prince de Vaudemont complained that want of funds to prepare his vessels meant that he could not leave port, CCS, 23 Oct. 1681, AGS/E/3868. ³⁵³ CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, AGS/E/3654/34. ³⁵⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 488 ff.

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reliable funding was probably the single greatest obstacle to the effective functioning of Carlos II’s forces at sea as it was of those on land.³⁵⁵

HIGH COMMAND The quality of the high command of Carlos II’s fleets may have undermined Spain’s performance at sea.³⁵⁶ Some contemporaries certainly thought so. It is easy to see why. Apparently, senior officers were often chosen with little regard to their experience or suitability, were often reluctant to fight, and squabbled with those (viceroys and others) with whom they should have co-operated. In the Messina War, naval commanders—notably the prinice of Montesarchio—consistently disobeyed orders to engage an enemy fleet which they believed to be superior;³⁵⁷ during the Nine Years War, the count of Fernan Nuñez, soldier and diplomat, may have owed his appointment as commander of the Armada (1695–6) to his agreeing to the marriage of his heiress daughter to one of Mariana of Neuburg’s German entourage.³⁵⁸ These problems were complicated by the fact that the command structure—and the relationship between the commanders of the different units, and that between naval commanders and viceroys—was unclear, and that these clashes, which soon became personal, were also often conflicts between men with rival political connections in Madrid.³⁵⁹ One consequence of these difficulties, and of the resulting failures at sea, was that some commanders were dismissed and even ordered to be court-martialled. During the Messina War these included those—the marquis del Viso, commander of the galleys of Spain, and Don Melchor de la Cueva (later duke of Alburquerque)—who were blamed for allowing the French relief expedition to enter Messina in 1675.³⁶⁰ In the Nine Years War, too, captains who were thought to have failed in their duty were punished.³⁶¹ However, the fact that some of these men were replaced and investigated suggests expectations of higher standards.³⁶² More important, there were a number of experienced and able commanders in Carlos II’s fleet. These included Don Diego de Ibarra, who replaced Montesarchio as commander of the Armada ³⁵⁵ In July 1678, although careening was completed, the lack of crews (and of money to pay them) prevented the departure of the fleet, Ribot, Monarquía, 438. ³⁵⁶ Ribot, Monarquía, 295 ff. ³⁵⁷ Cf. ibid., 109, for the clash between the more aggressive marquis of Villafiel and the marquis of Orani, commander of the Sardinian galleys. Villafiel, who was an associate of Don Juan of Austria, was appointed gobernador of the fleet in March 1677, following the death of Don Diego de Ibarra. ³⁵⁸ Gudannes, 29 April 1695, Martin, ‘Lettres’, 514; Stanhope to Rooke, 14 Feb. 1696, Spain under Charles, 89–90. Typically, Stanhope was critical. Fernan Nuñez was the original choice to lead the flotilla going to Darien, Navarrete to CII, 9/11/1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 694. ³⁵⁹ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 283 ff. ³⁶⁰ Ibid., 288. Viso was later (1693), however, promoted to the Council of War, Espino, Catalunya, 303. ³⁶¹ In 1692 a number of captains who were blamed for the loss of a ship in action against the French were arrested, Operti to ST, 28 Aug. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³⁶² Cf. CII to Villafranca, 9 Jan. 1676, Ribot, Monarquía, 289.

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in 1676, and who was killed in the battle off Palermo that year;³⁶³ Fernando Carrillo, marquis of Villafiel, commander of the Armada from the summer of 1677;³⁶⁴ Corbete, who was appointed governor of the Armada in January 1692 to general approval,³⁶⁵ and who was congratulated by the city of Naples for having so disposed the fleet there in 1693 that the French were unable to launch their intended assault on both fleet and city;³⁶⁶ and Papachino, who rose to the command of the Flanders squadron in 1679 and that of the Armada del Mar Océano in 1694.³⁶⁷ CORSAIRS AND PRIVATEERS So far, attention has focused almost exclusively on the royal fleets. However, we cannot overlook the contribution to Spain’s naval power in this period of corsairs and privateers. These men received a royal patent, from Carlos II or from one of his viceroys, allowing them to attack enemy shipping—distinguishing them from pirates who had no such legal cover—and their prizes were dealt with in royal courts, but they were otherwise largely independent.³⁶⁸ Resort to this type of warfare might be regarded as a sign of the weakness or decline of royal or state instutions, in this case the fleet, as a consequence of which the Crown was obliged to take into partnership the ‘private’ sector.³⁶⁹ Spain has traditionally been regarded primarily as the victim of powers which used corsairs and pirates, and not as a privateering power itself.³⁷⁰ Spain certainly suffered at the hands of corsairs.³⁷¹ But that should not be allowed to obscure the extent to which corsairs from all parts of the Spanish Monarchy, including Naples,³⁷² Sicily,³⁷³ Sardinia,³⁷⁴ Finale,³⁷⁵ and Flanders contributed in their own way to the war at sea in the reign of Carlos II.³⁷⁶ ³⁶³ Ribot, Monarquía, 93, 109. Montesarchio was an experienced naval officer. ³⁶⁴ Ibid., 296. Details of his career are in Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 151–60. One of Villafiel’s exploits was the subject of a printed Relación. ³⁶⁵ Operti to VA, 17 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³⁶⁶ Operti to VA, 27 and 31 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³⁶⁷ For Papachino’s career to 1697, cf. Fernández Duro, Disquisiciones, iii. 151–60. In 1684 Papachino had seized Dutch and French ships carrying munitions to Toulon, a success much publicized in Spain, Espino, Catalunya, 351. ³⁶⁸ The legal framework was laid down by Philip IV, whose orders, of 1621, 1623 and 1624, are in G. López Nadal, El corsarisme mallorquí a la Mediterrania occidental 1652–1698. Un comerç forçat (Barcelona, 1986), 485–9. ³⁶⁹ G. Symcox, The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688–97 (The Hague, 1974), 143 ff. ³⁷⁰ Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, ii. 170. ³⁷¹ In 1693 a French corsair seized allied ships in the heart of the Tuscan presidios, Blackwell to Nottingham, 13 July 1693, SP 98/17. ³⁷² Operti to VA, 26 Oct. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³⁷³ Cf. Albert van der Meer to Fagel, 21 May 1694, ARAH/SG/8644/125. ³⁷⁴ Cf. the king’s order of 23 Dec. 1691, AST/Sardegna/Materie Marittime, m. 4/7, reducing the royal share of prizes. ³⁷⁵ Cf. Bazán’s report, 1693, AGS/E/3633/206. ³⁷⁶ For privateering before and during this reign, cf. R. A. Stradling, ‘The Spanish Dunkirkers, 1621–48: A Record of Plunder and Destruction’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 93 (1980), 541–58;

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During her regency, Mariana of Austria resorted to privateers in reponse to an English presence in the Straits and the threat from the Barbary coast,³⁷⁷ while the War of Devolution saw an upsurge of privateer activity.³⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, the ‘Dutch War’ saw a more sustained and wide-ranging resort to this type of warfare. In February 1674, following years of pressure from viceroys and others in the Indies to be allowed to resort to privateering in their own defence until the Barlovento fleet should be reinstated, the Regent at last gave way.³⁷⁹ In European waters Madrid also encouraged the privateers of Mallorca³⁸⁰ and Vizcaya;³⁸¹ and in December 1677 the viceroy of Sicily authorized anybody who wished to do so, to arm privateers against the French and the Messina rebels.³⁸² That same year Carlos II’s minister at The Hague concluded an agreement with a Dutch corsair squadron.³⁸³ The end of the war in Europe in 1678 did not mean the end of corsair activity in the Mediterranean.³⁸⁴ During the war of 1683–4 the viceroy of Valencia was authorized to issue corsair patents,³⁸⁵ and it was suggested that the governor of Milan might also grant them.³⁸⁶ As for the Americas, in 1685 a junta ordered by Carlos II to consider the defence of the Caribbean against piracy included among its recommendations the use of corsairs, a deal being struck in 1685–6 with an organization of privateers from Guipúzcoa for this purpose.³⁸⁷ In Europe the Nine Years War again saw the king resorting to privateers. In November 1691 Carlos agreed, following a consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, to an offer by Arturo Obruyn to fit out and maintain at his own cost a squadron of 5 vessels, both to locate sunken vessels and corsear in the Americas.³⁸⁸ A few months later, in January 1692, Carlos II issued a decree allowing any of E. Otero Lana, Los Corsarios españoles durante la decadencia de los Austrias. El corso español del Atlántico peninsular en el siglo XVII (1621–97) (Madrid, 1992); and G. López Nadal, El corsarisme mallorquí. ³⁷⁷ J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘Relaciones Internacionales’, 151; Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 383–4. ³⁷⁸ Cf. prizes of Flemish privateers, 1621–1668, Stradling, Armada, 256. ³⁷⁹ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 363; Haring, Trade and Navigation, 256–7. In Jan. 1674 the corsairs of Mallorca sought new privileges in return for reconstituting their own organization, López Nadal, Corsarisme Mallorquí, 523–4. ³⁸⁰ P. Sanz Camañes, Política, Hacienda y Milicia en el Aragón de los últimos Austrias entre 1640 y 1680 (Zaragoza, 1997), 286. Cf. the agreement concluded at the end of 1674 between Pedro Vázquez Torrero, veedor and proveedor of the army of Catalonia, and a squadron of Mallorcan corsairs, the latter agreeing to serve in Sicily for six months, in return for 42,000 pesos de oro, Ribot, Monarquía, 245, and the patent granted (August 1675) to Pedro Roca, López Nadal, Corsarisme Mallorquí, 529–31. ³⁸¹ In 1671 the Council of State decided not to mobilize the corsairs of Vizcaya against the English at Panama, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 1 July 1671, CSPV: 1671–72, 81–2. But in 1676 Juan de Echarcoaga, of San Sebastian, received a patent, AGS/GA/Registro 328 f. 398; so, too, in 1677, did Francisco de Aguirre, of Fuenterrabía, AGS/E/3620/111. ³⁸² Ribot, Monarquía, 114. ³⁸³ Lira to marquis of los Vélez, 1677, BN/MSS 10695 f. 6. ³⁸⁴ Cf. Madrid Gazette, 25 July 1679, for the capture of a Turkish merchant ship by one Mallorcan corsair. ³⁸⁵ CII to count of Cifuentes, 10 May and 21 Aug. 1684, BSCMS 124 f. 95, 123. ³⁸⁶ CCS, 11 Aug. 1684, AGS/E/3620/114.; [?] to Lira, 28 Sept. 1684, AGS/E/3620/110, enclosing a copy of a patent issued by Carlos II in 1677, AGS/E/3620/111, which might be copied by Melgar. ³⁸⁷ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 106–7. The Guipúzcoans put out a squadron of 8 ships totalling 770 tons, carrying 104 guns and 500 men. ³⁸⁸ CII to governor of CC, 29 Nov. 1691, AHN/Consejos/7204.

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his subjects to arm ships for corsair operations in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic;³⁸⁹ he also sought to encourage Basque privateers by allowing their appeals in prize cases to go to the chancillería of Valladolid rather than to the Council of War, to the chagrin of the latter.³⁹⁰ The king’s efforts seem to have been successful, prompting a number of requests for privateering patents.³⁹¹ Corsairs were not the only example of what we might call the ‘privatization’ of the war at sea. In 1674 Don Carlos Espero offered to serve with a squadron of 6 vessels, at his own cost, for sixteen years, in return for the lucrative estanco of white paper in Castile and Leon and the Indies.³⁹² Sometimes, however, too high a price was demanded for this help: in 1677, following a consulta of the Council of State, Carlos II rejected one offer of 8 frigates to serve with the Armada in the Mediterranean after which the privately owned ships should be allowed to go to the Americas in breach of the monopoly.³⁹³ However, independent vessels of one sort and another continued to supplement the royal navy: licensed so-called register ships, for example, sometimes carried men and munitions across the Atlantic.³⁹⁴ Privateers and the like contributed to the war at sea in various ways. Occasionally, as in the case of the Mallorcan corsairs contracted in 1674, they were effectively incorporated into the Armada.³⁹⁵ More commonly, they seized enemy (and neutral) ships carrying supplies. In the Messina War, Mallorcan corsairs seized French and other merchant ships,³⁹⁶ including some carrying provisions to the rebel city. Indeed in 1677 the French intendant in Sicily lamented the damage inflicted by Mallorcan (and other) corsairs, which helped to make life difficult in the besieged Messina,³⁹⁷ and no doubt contributed to its defeat. In the Nine Years War, too, privateers operating from Carlos II’s territories attacked French shipping. In 1689 Neapolitian corsairs captured several French ships on the coasts of Tuscany and Sicily,³⁹⁸ setting a pattern for the rest of the war. Privateering attacks on neutral trade could put political pressure on a government, including, for example, that of Charles II of England, during the Dutch War, to intervene on behalf of the Monarchy. Finally, privateers were also sometimes used, particularly when the main fleet could not, as transports: in November 1667, for example, the Council of State suggested that, since the Armada was not able to carry the troops ³⁸⁹ Newsletter, Madrid, 16 Jan. 1692, BL/Add. 25,448, f. 25. ³⁹⁰ Consulta of governor of CC, 22 July 1692, on CJA, AHN/Consejos/10119; royal order, 28 July 1692, ARCV/Cédulas y Pragmáticas, caja 8/70. For the role of the Council of War in prize cases, cf. Stanhope to Nottingham, 4 June 1692 (an English merchant ship had taken a French prize to Cartagena, whose governor then seized it), 13 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1692 (the case of the Orange Flower, seized by the galleys of Sardinia and taken as a prize to Naples), SP 94/73 f. 73, 77, 80. ³⁹¹ Pedro Fernández de la Atalaya, of Asturias, successfully requested a patente de corso in 1696, CCW, 24 March 1696, AGS/GA/3876. ³⁹² Mariana to president of CC, 26 Jan. 1674, AHN/Consejos/7184. ³⁹³ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 363. ³⁹⁴ Z. Moutoukias, ‘Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-century Buenos Aires’, HAHR, 68 (1988), 780 ff., 801. ³⁹⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 245. ³⁹⁶ In 1677, 2 Mallorcan privateers captured a French vessel valued at 200,000 dollars [Godolphin to ?], Hispania Illustrata, 315 ff. ³⁹⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 91–2, 118. ³⁹⁸ London Gazette, no. 2399, ‘Naples’, 1 Oct. 1689.

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and supplies that the governor of Flanders was desperately requesting, the regent should discover whether other vessels—including those of the corsairs—might embark them.³⁹⁹ Privateers and others could be very effective, for example against English shipping in the Caribbean in the 1670s.⁴⁰⁰ For this reason, Carlos II might have to accommodate their concerns. In 1691, for example, Carlos acted to redress a grievance among the privateers of Ostend which had, in effect, brought them to ‘strike’.⁴⁰¹ However, we should not exaggerate the contribution of the privateers, who often competed with the royal ships for seamen.⁴⁰² More important, the privateers’ main concern was to profit from prizes. This sometimes meant that rather than take on well-armed enemy ships they made captures, particularly of neutral and even allied vessels, which seriously embarrassed Carlos II. Those who suffered in this way in the 1670s included the English and the Dutch.⁴⁰³ In 1677, in reprisal, the English effectively blockaded the Flemish coast, obstructing Spanish efforts to supply Flanders by sea.⁴⁰⁴ Not surprisingly, Carlos II was sometimes obliged to rein in the corsairs.⁴⁰⁵ The preoccupation with profit also meant that the privateers concentrated where rich merchant shipping was plenty, ignoring other areas.⁴⁰⁶ Many of these problems resurfaced in the Nine Years War.⁴⁰⁷ In September 1692 the Portuguese envoy in Madrid complained at the continued detention of a Portuguese ship and its crew, taken by a Spanish corsair to San Sebastian four months earlier.⁴⁰⁸ Portuguese shipping continued to suffer.⁴⁰⁹ So did Danish shipping. In 1700 the Danish envoy in Madrid was still seeking redress for seizures of Danish ships by the corsairs of both Flanders and Vizcaya during the recent conflict.⁴¹⁰ Put simply, the corsairs had their own agenda, making it difficult to control them, or to ensure their co-operation in a co-ordinated royal naval strategy. In the summer of 1675, for example, the Basque ³⁹⁹ CCS, 11 Nov. 1667, AGS/E/2106. ⁴⁰⁰ Cf. petition of West India merchants, 1678, G. P. Insh., ‘The Carolina Merchant: Advice of Arrival’, Scottish Historical Review, 25 (1927–8), 107; Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 35. ⁴⁰¹ CCS, 19 May 1691, AGS/E/3884. The appointment by the governor-general of Flanders, the marquis of Gastañaga, of the postmaster of Ostend as depositario general of prizes had effectively halted the operations of the corsairs of Ostend and Nieuwpoort; Carlos II ordered the governor to revoke the appointment, CII to Gastañaga, 13 Dec. 1691, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 539. ⁴⁰² CCW, 11 Feb. 1674, AGS/GA/2698; CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, AGS/E/3654/34. ⁴⁰³ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 120. ⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Borgomanero to Coventry, 5–15 and 19 Aug. 1677, and Coventry to Borgomanero, 6 Aug. 1677, BL/Harleian 1516, ff. 80–1. ⁴⁰⁵ In 1676 the Ostend corsairs complained at not being allowed to prey on the vessels of Carlos II’s Dutch allies, Villahermosa to CII, 22 Jun. 1678, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 309. ⁴⁰⁶ Bensusan, ‘Spanish Struggle’, 19. ⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Bazán’s end of mission report, 1693, AGS/E/3633/206. ⁴⁰⁸ CCS, Sept. 1692, AGS/E/4039. The matter was referred to the Council of War. ⁴⁰⁹ Cf CCW, 25 Sep. 1694, AGS/GA/3850, on 2 vessels seized by the privateers of San Sebastian; and CII to ME, 23 July 1694, Madrid, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 615, on the seizure by the Ostend privateers of a Portuguese ship. ⁴¹⁰ CII to ME, 12 Mar. 1700, Madrid, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 734.

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corsairs effectively refused Madrid’s request to operate in Catalan waters, where ministers feared a French attempt on Palamós and Rosas.⁴¹¹ CONCLUSION Spanish seapower in the last third of the seventeenth century was less impressive than it had been a generation or two earlier. Fewer ships, of poorer quality than those of the Monarchy’s main competitors,⁴¹² generally slow to put to sea (thus losing the initiative) and apparently attempting little,⁴¹³ and commanded by less capable men—Spain’s ineffectiveness at sea in this period was evident. Symptomatic, perhaps, were projects to destroy the French fleet by sabotage rather than confrontation at sea,⁴¹⁴ and the decision to put the emphasis in the Caribbean on fixed fortifications rather than mobile ships.⁴¹⁵ Spain, it might be argued, was saved less by its own efforts than by the inaccessibility of much of its overseas empire,⁴¹⁶ by the weather—what might be called ‘Catholic winds’⁴¹⁷—and by allies whose firmer line against those of their own subjects engaged in piracy in the Caribbean, for example, helped to reduce that particular threat after 1685.⁴¹⁸ But we should not exaggerate Spain’s weakness at sea, or the novelty of this: many of the difficulties encountered by Carlos II and his ministers also frustrated their predecessors.⁴¹⁹ Nor should we underestimate the desire of king and ministers to improve matters. On the contrary, they acknowledged the seriousness of the French naval threat in Europe, and that of the buccaneers in the Caribbean, and recognized the need to strengthen Spain’s navy. This resulted in some significant, though not always completely successful, or sustained, efforts to rebuild Spanish seapower. More important, Spain remained a significant naval power. In the Mediterranean Carlos II was Louis XIV’s only real competitor as ⁴¹¹ Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles, 323. In 1676 the Council of Aragon had to disappoint the king’s hopes that between 4 and 6 Mallorcan corsair frigates might patrol the coast between Gibraltar and Catalonia: the privateers would carry out only operations they thought profitable, Sanz Camañes, Política, 286. ⁴¹² Cf. Stanhope to Trenchard, 16 Mar. 1694, SP 94/73 f. 267, deprecating the size and quality of any Spanish contribution to an allied fleet in the Mediterranean. But Stanhope was inclined to be very critical of Spain’s performance. ⁴¹³ CCS, 15 June 1692, AGS/E/3626/56. ⁴¹⁴ In 1678 the Spanish minister in Turin, Jovenazo, organized an arson attempt on the French dockyards; in 1695 a group of Spaniards was said to be plotting to burn those galleys in port at Marseilles, Zysberg, Les galériens, 140–1. ⁴¹⁵ Cf. Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa Militar’, 253 ff. ⁴¹⁶ Cf. ibid., 236 for Spanish awareness of this. ⁴¹⁷ In 1677 d’Estrées appeared in the Caribbean, but half his fleet ran aground off Curaçao, CSP: Colonial, America and West Indies, 1677–80 (London, 1896), 100. In 1678 the French galleys were ordered to patrol the Catalan coast but were frustrated by the weather, Bamford, Fighting Ships, 35–6. In 1696 a French incursion into the Spanish Pacific was prevented by bad weather from rounding Cape Horn: Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa Militar’, 10. ⁴¹⁸ Cf. K. E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire. Piracy in the Americas 1500–1750 (New York and London, 1998), reviewed by Wadsworth for H-War [1999], and published on H-LatAm. ⁴¹⁹ Cf. Goodman, Power and Penury, 72 ff., 88 ff., 109 ff., 123 ff., for Philip II; and Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, passim.

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a galley power,⁴²⁰ and for most of the reign Spain remained the strongest European naval power in the Caribbean. Above all, Spain’s fleets maintained the empire, fighting off challengers, contributing to the recovery of territories temporarily lost, and carrying men, money, and munitions to where they were needed. Many of the elements of this achievement may have been less dramatic and heroic—and in some respects less visible—than victory at sea in battle, but they were arguably more important to imperial resilience over the reign as a whole.⁴²¹ As for the contribution of Spain’s allies, they could not always be counted on, not least because they were hobbled by many of the obstacles which affected Carlos II’s fleets. The same was true of Louis XIV. The latter’s vessels were affected by the weather (above), by sickness,⁴²² by competing demands for scarce funds in wartime, and by shortage of crews. During the Dutch War, despite his apparent naval superiority, the French king was unable to turn this to decisive account in the Mediterranean, and in March 1678 his forces abandoned Messina. In the Nine Years War the strain of a great royal navy ultimately proved too much for Louis; it was effectively mothballed, in favour of a privateering war.⁴²³ As with Spain’s armies so with its naval forces, the impression is conveyed of scarce resources being juggled constantly and not without success.⁴²⁴ Indeed, it is arguable that, over the reign as a whole, Carlos II was more successful at sea than was Louis XIV, and that Spain’s naval resources were used more effectively than were those of its chief opponent. APPENDIX: THE SPANISH FLEET IN ITALY, 1692–3 ⁴²⁵ Name

Type of ship

Tonnage

Guns

Gente de mar (crew)

Infantry

Nuestra Se~nora de la Concepción y las Animas, capitana real,

galleon

1550

92

550

460

La Esperanza, almiranta real,

galleon

900

70

315

295

Santa Rosa,

galleon

840

64

210

308

San Diego de Alcalá

galleon

900

70

260

373

⁴²⁰ According to Bamford, ‘Procurement’, 46, the accession of the Philip V eliminated the only other significant galley power, thus contributing to the decline of the French galley fleet. ⁴²¹ The French fleet intercepted none of the transports carrying Spanish troops to Sicily 1674–8, Ribot, Monarquía, 189–90. ⁴²² Zysberg, Les galériens, 294. ⁴²³ Symcox, Crisis, passim. ⁴²⁴ Cf. Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa Militar’, 248–9. ⁴²⁵ Relación de la Gente, Add. 21,553 f. 31. This does not include any galleys.

105

Spanish Naval Power Appendix (Contd.) Name

Type of Ship

Los Tres Reyes

galleon

Tonnage 900

Guns 70

Gente de mar (crew) 274

Infantry 368

San Ignacio

galleon

600

50

172

211

Santa Theresa de [?]

galleon

800

62

261

280

San Carlos

galleon

900

66

308

314

San Francisco

galleon

600

50

202

141

San Lorenzo

frigate

600

50

202

201

San Thomas de Aquino

frigate

600

50

198

240

San Agustin

pink

400

24

41

50

San Paulo

frigate

400

16

45

—

Santa Clara

saetia

—

—

24

21

Santa Theresa

fireship

300

46

38

—

San Carlos, capitana of Flanders squadron

galleon

900

72

244

180

San Pedro de Alcántara, almirante of Flanders squadron

galleon

800

62

251

195

San Herónimo

frigate

700

58

183

216

San Domingo

frigate

550

52

144

206

El Sacramento

frigate

350

34

84

65

Castile

fireship

300

12

20

—

Totals

21 vessels

4,073

4,124

13,890

3 Spanish Finance Nobody ever supported armies, or maintained kingdoms with paper fantasies (Duke of Osuna, in Council of State, August 1688)¹ The present exigencies of this monarchy are inconceivable, . . . upon no branch of it can be found a credit for 100,000 crowns, be the occasion ever so urgent (English envoy in Madrid, January 1693)²

INTRODUCTION Philip IV’s reign had seen the king’s subjects make herculean efforts to fund the Monarchy’s wars.³ Carlos II’s reign, on the other hand, saw substantial alleviation of the fiscal pressure⁴—part of a larger secular trend⁵—which has been attributed to a deliberate policy of fiscal reform, in part in response to Spain’s demographic and economic difficulties;⁶ to the abandonment of the international struggle;⁷ and to the breakdown of a structure which had earlier justified Spain’s claim to be the first ‘fiscal-military state’.⁸ Whatever the explanation, it appears that Carlos ¹ A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el Reinado de Carlos II. Política y Guerra en la frontera catalana, 1679–1697 (Barcelona, 1999), 83. ² Alexander Stanhope to earl of Nottingham, January 1693, Spain under Charles, 42. ³ A. Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV (2nd edn., Madrid, 1983), passim. ⁴ M. Garzón Pareja, La Hacienda de Carlos II (Madrid, 1981), 225; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘ “Money, Money, and Yet More Money!”. Finance, the Fiscal-State and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500–1650’, in C. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder, Col., and Oxford, 1995), 287; L. Ribot García, La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina (1674–1678) (Madrid, 2002), 629 ff. ⁵ According to A. García Sanz, ‘Repercusiones de la fiscalidad sobre la economía castellana en los siglos XVI y XVII’, Historia de la Hacienda en España (siglos XVI–XX: Homenaje a Don Felipe Ruiz Martín) (Madrid, 1991), 15 ff., the tax burden rose from 5% (c.1500) to 15% (c.1600–50), but fell to 5% in the eighteenth century. ⁶ J.A. Sánchez Belén, La política fiscal en Castilla durante el reinado de Carlos II (Madrid, 1996). ⁷ M. Herrero Sánchez, El Acercamiento Hispánico–Neerlandés (1648–1678) (Madrid, 2000), 255; J. I. Andrés Ucendo, La Fiscalidad en Castilla en el Siglo XVII: Los Servicios de Millones, 1601–1700 (Bilbao, 1999), 29, 89; C. Sanz Ayán, ‘Arrendadores de rentas en la segunda mitad del Seiscientos. La renta de las lanas’, in idem, Estado, monarquía y finanzas.Estudios de Historia financiera en tiempos de los Austrias (Madrid, 2004), 148–9. ⁸ J. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660 (London, 2002), 136–8.

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II’s reign not only saw no new taxes⁹ but also the removal of some of those introduced by his father,¹⁰ and reform of the system of collection.¹¹ The resulting improvement in the finances by the end of the reign¹² suggests that the last decades of the seventeenth century anticipated the overhaul of Spanish public finance by the Bourbons.¹³ Defence spending certainly did not match that of Philip IV’s reign,¹⁴ and some taxes were either abolished or reduced. In December 1668 following the conclusion of peace with France and Portugal—and under pressure from Don Juan of Austria (Chapter 4)—the regent ordered the suppression of the quiebra de millones (a supplement to the millones, below), which was estimated to yield 1,300,000 ducats a year (equivalent to 12 per cent of the ordinary revenues) and the abandonment of efforts to recover arrears amounting to 6,000,000 ducats.¹⁵ The following year saw the establishment of the so-called Junta de alivios, which sought to relieve further the fiscal burden,¹⁶ and a reduction of the servicio de milicias, which funded Castile’s provincial tercios (Chapter 1).¹⁷ Later reductions included, in 1686, the halving of the four percentage supplements to the alcabala tax (which were imposed in 1639, 1642, 1656, 1663), the so-called cuatro unos por cientos.¹⁸ Changes in the way tax was collected or paid, for example the move towards encabezamiento, or compounding, of the alcabalas, cientos, and millones between 1680 and 1683, also lightened the load.¹⁹ Other reforms in the running of the finances included the appointment of an all-powerful Superintendente General of finance (1687), in part modelled on the position enjoyed by Colbert in France;²⁰ the introduction (1691) of provincial superintendentes of finance;²¹ and ⁹ H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century (Harlow, 1980), 360. ¹⁰ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism and Liberty’, in P. Hoffmann and K. Norberg (eds.), Fiscal Crisis, Liberty and Representative Government (Stanford, 1994), 348 (n. 89). ¹¹ Kamen, Spain in Later, 360. ¹² Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 342; Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 84–5. ¹³ G. Muto, ‘The Spanish System: Centre and Periphery’, in R. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford, 1995), 259. C. Sanz Ayán, ‘Límites y Objetivos de las Reformas de la Hacienda Real Castellana a Fines del Siglo XVII’, in idem, Estado, monarquía, 123–5, sees an ‘absolutist’ agenda behind the fiscal reforms of Carlos II’s reign. ¹⁴ By the 1680s remittances to Flanders consumed under 20% of total spending, I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Public Expenditure and Political Unity: Spanish Monarchy and European Union’, in A. M. Bernal (ed.), Dinero moneda y crédito en la Monarquía Hispánica (Madrid, 2000), 882–3. For Thompson, this represents a decline, but I would urge the extent to which Madrid was still making substantial provision for Flanders. ¹⁵ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 204–5. In a number of towns, including Valladolid and Madrid (which had been assigned the revenues of the quiebra de millones in return for loans), the local taxes which funded the quiebra continued, A. Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio sobre la Decadencia de Castilla. La Ciudad de Valladolid en el Siglo XVII (Valladolid, 1989), 369. ¹⁶ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 213 ff; Maura, Carlos II, ii, 47–8. ¹⁷ J. Contreras Gay, ‘La reorganización militar en la época de la decadencia española’, Millars. Espa i Historia, 26 (2003), 152. ¹⁸ Cf. Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 235 ff. ¹⁹ In the 17 provinces of Castile where agreement had been reached by the spring of 1684, the average reduction in tax levels was 15%, Kamen, Spain in Later, 366; Andrés Ucendo, Fiscalidad, 28–29, 85 ff. ²⁰ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 16. ²¹ Artola, Hacienda, 219; J. L. Bermejo Cabrero, ‘Superintendencias en la Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen’, AHDE, 54 (1984), 409 ff.; J. I. Ruiz Rodríguez, ‘Estructura y recaudación del servicio de

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

the reduction (1677, 1691) of the supposedly bloated central bureaucracy.²² In 1694 with the incorporation of the Diputación del Reino into the Council of Finance, the latter achieved sole responsibility for the administration of taxes in Castile.²³ Other measures of a reforming nature included the revaluation of the coinage (1680, 1686),²⁴ and the attempt in 1688 to balance income and obligations by decreeing that, henceforth, 4,000,000 escudos would be reserved annually from the revenues for the ‘causa pública’, satisfying the Crown’s creditors and other obligations from what remained.²⁵ It was even suggested in the 1680s that the millones, the mainstay of the fiscal system but a regressive imposition, be abolished, but this was a reform too many.²⁶ Nonetheless, the yield of the millones fell by half between 1665 and 1700, to just 730,194,241 maravedis.²⁷ However, if the financial burden was less than before 1665, it remained substantial. This chapter seeks to show that war continued to drive spending, which remained high; and that the reign was necessarily fertile in fiscal expedients.²⁸ It does so using the records of the Council of Finance and associated (including, for example, accounting) agencies and those of the other Councils (of War and State), whose own discussions were frequently shaped by issues of cost. Unfortunately, reconstructing the financial history of Carlos II ‘s reign is not easy, not least because of the destruction or loss of key source materials.²⁹ Budgets survive,³⁰ but interpreting them is not easy, in part because they are generally incomplete. As for actual spending, there was no single treasury or accounting system,³¹ and most retrospective attempts to identify expenditure were incomplete. In 1693, for example, the Council of Finance sought to identify military spending since the outbreak of the Nine Years War in 1689, which totalled 2,083,774,834 maravedis (or 6,128,749 vellon escudos). However, this summary not only millones 1590–1691’, Hispania, 52, (1992), 1080. Provincial superintendentes had been briefly appointed in 1682. ²² Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii, 295. ²³ H. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700–15 (London, 1969), 200. ²⁴ H. Kamen, Spain 1469–1716: A Society in Conflict (2nd edn., Harlow, 1991), 260–1; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 431–42. ²⁵ Kamen, Spain in Later, 367–9; Artola, Hacienda, 216–19; J-P. Dedieu, ‘El arca de rentas reales de Villanueva de los Infantes a finales del siglo XVII. La cuenta de Tomás Marco Ortega (1685–1690)’, CHM, 21 (1998), 120. The decree is in J. de la Ripia, Práctica de la Administración y Cobranza de las Rentas Reales (5th edn., Madrid, 1736), 290–3. ²⁶ Andrés Ucendo, Fiscalidad, 89. ²⁷ Ibid., 246–7. ²⁸ Spain is omitted by P. G. M. Dickson and J. Sperling, ‘War Finance, 1689–1714’, in J. S. Bromley (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History, VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1725 (Cambridge, 1970). ²⁹ Many of the records of the accounting department, or Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, were destroyed during the Napoleonic Wars, L. Ribot García, ‘El Reclutamiento Militar en España a mediados del Siglo XVII. La “Composición” de las Milicias de Castilla’, CIH, 9 (1986), 89. ³⁰ C. Sanz Ayán, Los Banqueros de Carlos II (Valladolid, 1988), 211 (1667); J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La Hacienda Real de Carlos II’, in Actas de las Juntas del Reino de Galicia, Vol. XI: 1690–1697 ( Junta de Galicia, 2002), 59–60 (1674); Provisiones generales para el año de 1678, AGS/E/1947/135, 136; Kamen, Spain in Later, 361–2 (1680), 368 (1690); and Resumen gen.l de la Real Haz.da, AGS/E/4182 (1697). ³¹ Dedieu, ‘El arca’, 109.

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ignored sums made available from other parts of the Monarchy (Chapter 5) but also some provided from Spain itself, and did not identify all spending.³² We may never know exactly how much Carlos II received, or how much he spent—in total—in (and on) war, or indeed in peacetime. Understanding the financial records of Carlos II’s reign is further complicated by the variety of coins and units of account—ducats, escudos, maravedis, reales de plata, reales de vellon, patacones, pesos, doblones, and so on—and their fluctuating value, following the manipulations of the coinage since 1599.³³ One further consequence of the latter was that Castile’s was by 1665 an essentially copper, or vellón coinage, whereas many of the payments Carlos II had to make were in areas—some in Spain itself—where only silver, plata, was accepted. Where silver was required, it was necessary to pay a premium, more vellon, to bridge the gap.³⁴ Hence a hunt for silver,³⁵ and the deflation of 1680—followed by the reflation of 1686—which had important implications for both values and attempts to compare revenue and expenditure before and after those dates.³⁶ ORDINARY REVENUES AND ADMINISTRATION c.1 6 6 5 There was no single body which formally oversaw the finances of the whole Monarchy, but the Council of Finance, or Hacienda, in Madrid, which was responsible for the finances of Castile,³⁷ came nearest to fulfilling such a role, not least because Castile contributed the bulk of the revenues.³⁸ The Council of Finance comprised various departments, or salas and the Tribunal de la Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, responsible for accounting. Various permanent and ad hoc juntas supplemented the work of this, as of other councils.³⁹ The president of the ³² Resumen general, 20 Aug. 1693, and accompanying documents, AGS/E/3993. ³³ The ducado was equivalent to 375 maravedis, the escudo to 340, the real to 34, the real de a ocho or peso to 272, and the real de a cuatro to 136, C. Álvarez Nogal, El Crédito de la Monarquía Hispánica en el Reinado de Felipe IV (Valladolid, 1997), 9–11. Calculation is further complicated by the different coins and units of account used outside Castile, in Spain, in Flanders, and in Spanish Italy. Some budgets or statements of expenditure give equivalents. ³⁴ E. J. Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain, 1651–1800 (Harvard, 1943), 9–35. Spending in 1678 was expected to total 4,455,500 escudos de plata plus 5,348,576 escudos de vellon; the premium of 212.5% meant a grand total of 19,272,013 escudos de vellon. Cf. Andrés Ucendo, Fiscalidad, 30, graph showing nominal and silver value of the millones. ³⁵ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 389. ³⁶ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 285–90; Sanz Ayán, ‘Limites’, 123, The impact of monetary reform is debated, cf. J. Bravo Alonso, ‘La devaluación de 1680. Propuesta de análisis’, Hispania, 53 (1993); and J. de Santiago Fernández, Política Monetaria en Castilla durante el siglo XVII (Valladolid, 2000), 195 ff. J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘Arbitrismo y reforma monetaria en tiempos de Carlos II’, ETF, ser. IV, Historia Moderna, 5 (1992), includes conversion tables for 1665 and 1686. ³⁷ T. García-Cuenca Ariati, ‘El Consejo de Hacienda (1476–1803)’, in M. Artola (ed.), La economía española al final del Antiguo Régimen, IV: Instituciones (Madrid, 1982), 403 ff. ³⁸ In 1674, of total revenues of almost 36 million ducats, just over 23 million were supplied by Castile, Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 59. ³⁹ Cf. J. F. Baltar Rodríguez, Las Juntas de Gobierno en la Monarquía Hispánica (Siglos XVI–XVII) (Madrid, 1998 ), 207 ff.

110

The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

council (and from 1687 the superintendente general ) was inevitably among Carlos II’s most important ministers.⁴⁰ The fiscal system overseen by the Council of Finance was complex, developed over centuries, and included regalías, or regalian revenues, received or imposed by the king in virtue of his royal authority. Among these were some older taxes now enjoyed in perpetuity, including the alcabala, or sales tax. Originally 10 per cent, it was supplemented by four 1 per cent increases in the reign of Philip IV (above).⁴¹ The alcabala, much of which had in effect been alienated (below), produced about 20 per cent of ordinary royal revenues. The regalian revenues also included the customs duties, aduanas, which yielded about 10 per cent of total ordinary income; the media anata (1631), equivalent to half of the first year’s salary of any public office (and also imposed on the inheritance of titles); the stamped paper tax (1636); the royal tobacco monopoly (1636), the most important revenue source in Castile after the alcabala and millones; the profits of justice; various taxes on wool; the salt monopoly; occasional coining, which yielded substantial profits between 1599 and 1665; and various other sources.⁴² Clearly distinguished from regalian revenues in contemporary Spanish thinking was taxation, i.e., the servicios voted by the realm assembled in the Castilian Cortes.⁴³ From the 1590s a growing proportion of the Crown’s revenues derived from this source.⁴⁴ Impositions included the old servicio ordinario y extraordinario, by now a fixed sum. Far more important by 1665 was the millones, introduced following the failure of the Armada of 1588. Levied on essential foodstuffs, it comprised a number of grants, voted on different occasions: according to the budget of 1674,⁴⁵ these yielded about 5,600,000. The millones, a major component of royal income, required renewal every six years by the Cortes (Chapter 4). The clergy paid the millones, but were generally exempt from secular taxation. However, the king enjoyed the so-called Gracias apostólicas, ecclesiastical taxes originally granted by the Papacy to Philip II primarily to finance the galley fleet(s) in the struggle against the Ottoman Turks and their allies in the Mediterranean, and the ransom of Christians there,⁴⁶ although there were complaints that the money raised was diverted elsewhere.⁴⁷ These impositions were the subsidio, an annual tax on property, and the most valuable, being fixed at 420,000 ducats ⁴⁰ Presidents of the Council of Finance included: Don Miguel de Salamanca, the count of Villaumbrosa, Don Lope de los Ríos, Juan Lucas Doria, Don Diego de Zapata, Don Gonzalo de Córdoba, the count of Humanes, Don Antonio de Monsalve, the marquis Los Vélez, and the count of Adanero. ⁴¹ J. Canga Argüelles, Diccionario de Hacienda, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1833–4), ii. 206. ⁴² Artola, Hacienda, 34. ⁴³ Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 258–9, Artola, Hacienda, 32 ff. ⁴⁴ J. L. Castellano, Las Cortes de Castilla y su Diputación (1621–1789). Entre pactismo y absolutismo (Madrid, 1990), 47. ⁴⁵ This erroneosly included the abolished quiebra de millones. ⁴⁶ Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 229 ff.; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 252–3; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 389–90. ⁴⁷ Cf. the complaints (1670) of the nuncio, J. M. Marqués, La Santa Sede y la España de Carlos II. La negociación del nuncio Millini 1675–1685 (Roma, 1981–2), 55, and of the clergy of Toledo, 1690, Egerton 2055, f. 263 ff.

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a year (or 2,100,000 over five years); the excusado, a sort of tithe, yielding 250,000 ducats a year; the tercias reales, equivalent to two-ninths of the income from tithes; and the cruzada, producing 800,000 silver ducats a year in Spain.⁴⁸ These levies yielded substantial sums to the Crown, over 650,000,000 maravedis a year c.1660,⁴⁹ and were supplemented by, for example, the right to receive the revenues of vacant sees.⁵⁰ However, these ecclesiastical revenues left some sectors of the Church, including convents and certain orders, largely untouched.⁵¹ They were granted for specific purposes and administered by a comisario-general and the Council of the Cruzada.⁵² They also required renewal, every five years, by means of negotiation with the clergy, and above all with a Papacy not always sympathetic to the Monarchy’s needs.⁵³ Finally, and ignoring the contributions of the non-Castilian territories of the Monarchy (Chapter 5), there were the revenues from the Indies.⁵⁴ Carlos II’s predecessors had introduced various impositions in the Americas and on the Indies trade, including the royal fifth of silver production and other dues (for example, the alcabala).⁵⁵ Although classified here as ordinary revenues, the income from the Indies depended upon the arrival of the treasure fleets and the size of their cargo, and fluctuated greatly. Nevertheless, the revenues derived from the Indies remained important, because of their contribution to the total and their nature: the silver underpinned the asientos, contracts or loans which oiled the machinery of imperial defence.⁵⁶ The Council of Finance oversaw these and various other impositions—including, for example, the lanzas, paid by titled nobles and grandees in lieu of military service⁵⁷—but rarely directly administered them. Carlos II inherited a system characterized not by collection by royal officials, administración,⁵⁸ but by the ⁴⁸ In 1692 those revenues were said to yield 3,000,000 pieces of eight a year, Operti to ST, 14 Aug. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ⁴⁹ Artola, Hacienda, 106 ff. According to one (ecclesiastical) source, c.1662 clerical revenues totalled over 10,000,000 ducats, of which the Crown received more than 5 million Marqués, Santa Sede, 50. Cf. Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 54. ⁵⁰ Mariana to president of CC, 25 Oct. 1672, AHN/Consejos/7182. ⁵¹ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 383, 385. The excusado was not paid in Aragon. ⁵² Comisario general and council played an important role in the operations of the galleys, CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, AGS/E/3654/34, and CCW, 26 June 1693, AGS/GA/2913. ⁵³ In 1665 Carlos II inherited the five-yearly subsidio agreement negotiated by his father (which terminated in 1667). ⁵⁴ A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Los caudales de Indias y la política exterior de Felipe IV’, and ‘Las remesas de metales preciosos de Indias en 1621–1665’, in idem, Estudios Americanos (Madrid, 1998). ⁵⁵ Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 266; C. H. Haring, ‘Ledgers of the Royal Treasurers in Spanish America in the Sixteenth Century’, HAHR, 2 (1919), 174 ff. 179 ff.; D. A. Brading and H. E. Cross, ‘Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru’, HAHR, 52 (1972), 560 ff.; R. S. Smith, ‘Sales Taxes in New Spain, 1575–1770’, HAHR, 28 (1948); Álvarez Nogal, Crédito, 30. ⁵⁶ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 182–3; Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 266. Cf. consulta of marquis of los Vélez, 4 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/4138. ⁵⁷ Artola, Hacienda, 103. In 1699 the count of Grajal paid 3,600 reales—almost 10% of his total annual spending—to the servicio de lanzas, L. M. Rubio Pérez, Jurisdicción y Solar. Poder, Rentas y Patrimonio de la Casa de Grajal en la Edad Moderna’, SHHM, 25 (2003), 212. ⁵⁸ For what follows, cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 357, and C. Sanz Ayán, ‘Arrendadores de rentas en la segunda mitad del seiscientos. La Renta de las Lanas,’ in idem, Estado, monarquía y finanzas, 129–49.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700

contracting out, or farming, to individuals or companies, of the right to collect many of its revenues, sparing the Crown the expense. Tax-farming, or arrendamiento, meant that the Crown enjoyed guaranteed revenues, and an invaluable advance from the farmer of a portion of the yield of the revenue for the contracted period, at the start of his farm. An alternative to farming revenues was compounding for them, or encabezamiento, by local authorities, who promised to pay a certain sum and themselves raised the money, not always as originally envisaged. Carlos II was the beneficiary of a substantial long-term increase in Crown income. In 1667 the royal revenues overseen by the Council of Finance totalled 12,769,326 ducats, and those administered by other agencies—including the council of the Cruzada—may have increased this to as much as 20,000,000 ducats.⁵⁹ But Carlos also inherited a substantial debt. The single largest call on the royal income were the annuities, juros, which were, in effect, repayments for earlier advances.⁶⁰ These were ‘situated’ on the various royal revenues and absorbed a growing proportion of the king’s income. In 1667, of the 12,769,326 ducats just mentioned, an astonishing 9,147,341—or 72 per cent—was earmarked for the juristas, the owners of these annuities, a wide spectrum of individuals and institutions throughout Castile.⁶¹ In fact, the debt burden was such that Philip IV had began to appropriate part of what was due to these rentiers.⁶² In addition, some Castilian towns, above all the capital, Madrid, were important sources, or guarantors, of loans to the Crown, their advances secured by handing over to them Crown revenues, exemplifying the apparent privatization, or breakdown, of royal or state structures in Castile in the seventeenth century.⁶³

WAR EXPENDITURE 1665/8–1700 Expenditure—and the revenue needed to cover it—fluctuated enormously, such that normal, ordinary, and average are perhaps misleading terms, but Carlos II’s reign could see very high levels of spending, particularly in wartime.⁶⁴ Budgeted spending for 1678 totalled almost 20,000,000 ducats, nearly three times Philip II’s spending in the late 1570s, and little short of the 24,000,000 that Philip IV ⁵⁹ Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 180. ⁶⁰ Cf. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 206–7; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, i. 60–1; Kamen, Spain 1469–1716, 89–90; A. Castillo Pintado, ‘Los juros de Castilla. Apogeo y fin de un instrumento de crédito’, Hispania, 23 (1963), 43 ff.; and Artola, Hacienda, 143 ff. ⁶¹ Kamen, Spain in Later, 360; Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 180. Ecclesiastical institutions were substantial holders of juros, ibid., 306. ⁶² Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 299 ff. ⁶³ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘The Government of Spain in the Reign of Philip IV’, in idem, Crown and Cortes. Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern Castile (Aldershot, 1993), 80–1. ⁶⁴ In view of what has been said about the difficulties of discovering full details of revenue and spending, the figures that follow must be used with caution.

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was spending in 1665 (the highest level in Habsburg Spain).⁶⁵ The vast majority of this expenditure was defence-related: just 2,400,022 vellon escudos of the anticipated expenditure for 1678 was non-military, about one-eighth of the total. Non-military spending included that on the royal Court, i.e., the households of Carlos II and his mother, and later those of his wives.⁶⁶ Spending on the Court in this reign reached a new high,⁶⁷ but could not compete with that on war. Military costs in Spain itself included the substantial expenditure involved in recruiting, equipping, and transporting troops. In 1667 the levy in Castile of an unspecified number of men for Flanders was put at 1,000,000 vellon escudos;⁶⁸ in 1676 the levy of 5,310 men in Castile and Andalusia was said to have cost 2,660,022 reales (or 266,002 escudos);⁶⁹ and in 1693 the levy of 1,800 men in Castile and Andalusia for Flanders was expected to cost 100,000 escudos.⁷⁰ Actual expenditure—on all items—generally exceeded that budgeted. In 1693, according to the governor of Cadiz, 13,440 escudos were allocated to pay for transporting 896 men (of the 1,800 going to the Low Countries, above) from Cadiz, i.e., 15 per man; but he had been obliged to agree to pay 20 escudos a man for the carriage of men from Galicia to Flanders.⁷¹ According to the budget for 1678, the ‘garrisons and frontiers’ of Spain were assigned 136,808 escudos de plata and 687,266 escudos de vellon. That same budget included provision for the army of Catalonia, where payment in silver was necessary: it was estimated that 1,000,000 escudos de plata were needed.⁷² Madrid continued to remit substantial sums for the Army of Catalonia thereafter, including over 16,000,000 reales de plata between 1680 and 1688.⁷³ The cost of the army of Catalonia was much greater during the Nine Years War. In 1690 the budget for that force totalled 4,336,840 reales de plata, and, although in 1693 the army’s paymaster put the annual cost at 3,517.096 reales de plata, between May 1688 and December 1697 Carlos supplied over 45,000,000 reales, which still did not meet all the needs of the army of Catalonia. Outside Spain, the army of Flanders had long depended on remittances from Madrid,⁷⁴ and continued to do so. In 1665 that force was said to require 80,000 ⁶⁵ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile: Polity, Fiscality and Fiscal Crisis’, in Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, 157. ⁶⁶ In 1674 the households of the king and his mother and their excursions (to the palaces of the Escorial and Aranjuez) cost over 2 million ducats, Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 60. ⁶⁷ A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Los Gastos de Corte en la España del Siglo XVII’, in idem, Crisis y Decadencia de la España de los Austrias (Barcelona, 1969), 75 ff.; Maura, Carlos II, ii. 205 ff. ⁶⁸ Consulta of Lope de los Ríos, 16 Dec. 1667, BNM, Ms. 1322 f. 68. ⁶⁹ Relación del Numero, 26 Nov. 1676, AGS/GA/2346. ⁷⁰ CJDF, 11 Feb. 1693, AGS/E/3887; Presupuesto, AGS/GA/2916. ⁷¹ Don Francisco de Velasco to count of Montijo, 8 Nov. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. ⁷² This comprised twelve monthly payments of 40,000 escudos and 600,000 for the contracts for grains and the artillery train. The cost of the bread and barley contracts depended upon availability. ⁷³ For this and the following figures, cf. Espino, Catalunya, 310–15. ⁷⁴ Parker, Army of Flanders, 195 ff.; A. Esteban Estríngana, ‘Guerra y redistribución de las cargas defensivas. La Unión de Armas en los Países Bajos católicos’, CHM, 27 (2002), 53.

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escudos a month (almost 1,000,000 a year),⁷⁵ and between January 1665 and June 1671 Madrid remitted 2,376,826 escudos to Flanders, almost half the total receipts of the military treasury there.⁷⁶ War, inevitably, meant a substantial increase in spending.⁷⁷ Between March 1675 and June 1677 of 3,692,683 escudos received (and spent) by the paymaster of the army of Flanders, 2,321,272—just under 63% of the total—was remitted from Spain (or paid in accordance with letters of change sent from there),⁷⁸ and the budget for 1678 included the provision of 1,500,000 escudos (twelve monthly payments, or mesadas of 125,000 each) for Flanders, as did that for 1680.⁷⁹ The brief war for Luxembourg meant further calls on Spain’s resources. At the end of 1683 500,000 patacones (or reales de ocho) were carried from Spain by the veedor general of the army of Flanders—and promptly spent. The constable of Castile was horrified that the governor had spent the entire sum with a net increase of just 2,500 troops; at that rate, he declared, there was not enough money in the entire Monarchy to sustain the army of Flanders.⁸⁰ That force continued to require large sums in the Nine Years War, and subsidy from Spain.⁸¹ In 1693 the governor, Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, claimed to need 1,400,000 escudos a year to pay the troops and 1,655,400 for recruits, the purchase of horses and the artillery train—a total of more than 3,000,000 escudos—for an army of Flanders totalling just 40,000 men.⁸² As for sums remitted from Spain, in July 1693 it was calculated that in the 16 months of Max Emmanuel’s governorship, he had received 976,270,030 escudos, or an average of 61,017 a month;⁸³ and in the summer of 1693 it was calculated that, of more than 31,000,000 silver reales made available for the war by the Council of Finance since the start of the war in 1689, almost 8,000,000— over 25 per cent of the total—were sent to Flanders.⁸⁴ In Italy, during the ‘Dutch War’, Madrid subsidized the reconquest of Messina. It has been calculated that between 1674 and 1678 between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 escudos were remitted from Spain to Naples and Sicily (and Milan) for that conflict.⁸⁵ According to the budget for 1678, it had not been necessary to ⁷⁵ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 51. ⁷⁶ Parker, Army of Flanders, 295. ⁷⁷ E. Rooms, ‘Bezoldiging, bevoorrading en inkwartiering van de koninklijke troepen in de Spaanse Nederlanden (1567–1700)’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederland en, 118 (2003), 523. ⁷⁸ Accounts of the paymaster general of the army of Flanders, AGS/CMC/3/1982/3. Between 1674 and 1676 asientos for Flanders totalled almost 5 million escudos, Kamen, Spain in Later, 364. ⁷⁹ Provisiones generales, AGS/E/1947/135; Kamen, Spain in Later, 361. ⁸⁰ CCS, 29 Apr. 1684. Almost half of the total had been spent repaying advances to or for the army of Flanders. ⁸¹ Cf. Espino, Catalunya, 311, for the relative contributions of Flanders (two-thirds) and Madrid (one-third) in 1692, and for ministers’ articulation of why they must make such efforts. ⁸² CJDF, 24 April 1693, AGS/E/3887. In 1690 the pay of the infantry totalled 1,280,144 florins (more than 3 million escudos) a year and that of the cavalry, 1,677,704 florins (more than 4 million escudos), Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 208. ⁸³ Tanteo de todo [July 1693], AGS/E/3887. ⁸⁴ Espino, Catalunya, 311. ⁸⁵ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 324 ff. Certainty is impossible. Some payments have probably been omitted, while some letters of change were ‘protested’ (below). Cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 363.

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fund the army of Lombardy (which was normally subsidized from Naples) in recent years, when there was no fighting in north Italy.⁸⁶ Things were rather different in the Nine Years War. In the autumn of 1690 the army of Lombardy’s monthly expenditure was put at more than 88,990 escudos, or just over 1,000,000 escudos a year;⁸⁷ between January and March 1692 the governor of Milan spent just over 1,300,000 Milanese lire preparing for the campaign,⁸⁸ which in 1693 was calculated to cost 7,000,000 reales de plata, much the same as in 1696.⁸⁹ In these circumstances, Madrid also had to subsidize the army of Lombardy. In 1691 the newly appointed governor, the marquis of Leganés, left Spain for Milan with 300,000 escudos;⁹⁰ and a year later, 600,000 of the indulto (levy) on the recently arrived Indies fleet (below), were earmarked for Milan.⁹¹ Overall, between the spring of 1689 and the summer of 1693 over 4,000,000 reales de plata were remitted to Lombardy, a further 3,864,576 reales de plata between January and August 1694,⁹² and additional sums thereafter.⁹³ Carlos II’s navy, however, was the largest single item of defence expenditure.⁹⁴ According to the budget for 1678, the cost of the Armada—i.e., a battle fleet of 30 vessels—was usually calculated at 2,000,000 escudos; but since the fleet would be operating in 1678 in Naples and Sicily, where payments must be made in silver, the cost was put at 500,000 escudos de plata and 1,500,000 escudos de vellon.⁹⁵ Substantial sums were, in fact, spent on the fleet in this conflict and in the Nine Years War, in Spain,⁹⁶ and elsewhere in Europe, when the fleet wintered at Naples.⁹⁷ Outside Europe, too, defence at sea required substantial expenditure. In 1685 the cost of preparing and dispatching to the Caribbean just 8 vessels was put at 2,401,245 pesos.⁹⁸ ⁸⁶ Provisiones generales, AGS/E/1947/135. ⁸⁷ CCS, 20 Nov. 1690, AGS/E/3413. In October 1690 the count of Fuensalida ordered a socorro (a portion of the pay due) to the entire army, for 15 days, which totalled just over 17,783 escudos. ⁸⁸ Account of sums received and issued Jan–Mar. 1692, AGS/E/3417/172. At 6 Milanese lire to the escudo, this was equivalent to almost 220,000 escudos. ⁸⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 311–12. ⁹⁰ CCS, 9 July 1691, AGS/E/3415/16. ⁹¹ London Gazette 2735 (Madrid, 9 Jan. 1692). 1 million would go to Flanders and 400,000 to Catalonia. ⁹² Espino, Catalunya, 311–12. ⁹³ In early 1696 the asentista Grillo agreed to remit 300,000 pieces of eight to Milan, Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 29 Feb. 1696, SP 94/74, f. 73. ⁹⁴ Cf. details of war spending, AGS/E/3993 and budget for 1697, AGS/E/4182. ⁹⁵ There was no provision for the galleys (the responsibility of the Cruzada, in Spain, and of the other realms). ⁹⁶ In 1691 up to 600,000 pieces of eight, or piastre, were said to have been spent at Cadiz fitting out the Armada and 700,000 (of Cruzada revenue) on the galleys of Spain, Operti to VA, 11 June 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 60. Operti, who had managed the galleys of the Knights of Malta, claimed that this sum would have funded 18 galleys of his order. ⁹⁷ In 1692–3, large sums were sent to Naples for this reason, Stanhope to Nottingham, 25 Feb. 1693, SP 94/73 f. 103. ⁹⁸ Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa Militar’, 14. In 1695 annual assignments for the fleets and isolated vessels combating piracy in the Indies amounted to 1,996,252 pesos, certification, AGI/Panamá/159, f. 523 ff.

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Carlos II also paid considerable sums to other princes and states in wartime, for the hire of their troops (Chapter 1) or as subsidies. During the Dutch War, Carlos II was paying subsidies to his Austrian Habsburg cousin, the Holy Roman Emperor,⁹⁹ the king of Denmark, the Dutch Republic,¹⁰⁰ the dukes of Celle and Wolfenbuttel, the duke of Neuburg, the elector of Trier, the bishop of Osnabruck, and the elector of Brandenburg. Carlos II’s annual subsidy commitment to these allies was said to total just over 2,000,000 escudos in 1677.¹⁰¹ Carlos again paid subsidies during the brief conflict of 1683–4,¹⁰² and during the Nine Years War. In the later struggle the king committed himself to subsidizing the costs incurred by the English and Dutch ships which wintered at Cadiz (1694–5),¹⁰³ to paying various German princes for their troops,¹⁰⁴ and—after a series of ad hoc payments from the summer of 1690 (some paid from Naples and Sicily, Chapter 5)— to a regular monthly subsidy of 30,000 escudos to the duke of Savoy from 1692.¹⁰⁵ Carlos II and his ministers concluded asientos for remittances inside and outside Spain—virtually all of them defence-related—totalling about 30,000,000 escudos de plata and about 4,000,000 escudos de vellon.¹⁰⁶ That the Spanish military and naval machine continued to function during the reign therefore owed a great deal to the fact that there were still financiers, asentistas, ready to advance money to, and on behalf of, the king.¹⁰⁷ The history of the Spanish Habsburgs’ dealings with financiers was characterized by the rise and fall of different groups, the Genoese largely being replaced by the Portuguese after 1627.¹⁰⁸ In Carlos II’s reign Spanish asentistas were more prominent.¹⁰⁹ But we should not exaggerate their role, or ignore the continued reliance on Italians and Portuguese. The former included the firm of Grillo, which remitted substantial sums throughout the Monarchy during the Dutch War and the Nine Years War.¹¹⁰ In 1691 Francisco Grillo agreed an asiento of 1,400,000 pesos, half of which was allocated to Flanders (and some of the remainder to Milan, above);¹¹¹ and in March 1693 ⁹⁹ Cf. Godolphin to Arlington, 10 Apr. 1674, Hispania Illustrata, 189 ff. ¹⁰⁰ Carlos II agreed to pay the Dutch 88,000 pesos, or reales a ocho (or 23,936,000 maravedis) a month, or 1,056,000 pesos (a year) for the co-operation of their fleet in the Mediterranean, AGS/E/ 1947/231. ¹⁰¹ AGS/E/1947/201. ¹⁰² Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies’, 114. ¹⁰³ Blathwayt to Stanhope, 2 Nov. 1694, Hague, Add. 37,992 f. 90; Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 21 Sept. 1695, SP 94/74 f. 13; William III to Heinsius, 5 Oct. 1695, Add. 34,504, f. 187. ¹⁰⁴ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 208–10; Operti to VA, 8 and 22 Mar. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ¹⁰⁵ Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 103–4. ¹⁰⁶ Calculated from tables in Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 491, 494. ¹⁰⁷ For letters of change supplied by various financiers, cf. the accounts from Mar. 1675 to Jun. 1677 of the paymaster general of the army of Flanders, AGS/CMC/3/1982/3. ¹⁰⁸ J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven, 1986), 299 ff. ¹⁰⁹ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 377 ff., and ‘Reformismo y prácticas de negocio de un “natural” a fines del siglo XVII’, in idem, Estado, monarquía, 241 ff.; and Kamen, Spain in Later, 362–4, 369–72. ¹¹⁰ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 319–20. ¹¹¹ Operti to VA, 2 Mar. and 3 Apr. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38 f. 2, 21.

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another, for 1,000,000 silver escudos for Flanders.¹¹² Asentistas of Portuguese descent included the Cortizos.¹¹³ Agreeing the details of an asiento—what was to be paid, where, and when, and how the asentista was to be repaid—could take time, for example that negotiated in 1667–8 with Sebastián Cortizos by the then president of the Council of Finance, Don Lope de los Ríos, for 1,500,000 escudos for Flanders.¹¹⁴ Once an asiento was concluded, things did not always go smoothly.¹¹⁵ The letters of change whereby remittances were made were sometimes ‘protested’, not paid. In 1692 the marquis of Tamarit agreed to remit 1,000,000 escudos to Flanders in ten ‘monthly’ payments, from March, but the letters for 400,000 of this sum were ‘protested’, and only 600,000 received by the army of Flanders.¹¹⁶ These difficulties were caused in the main by the Crown’s failure to pay the sums promised to the financiers. The relationship between Crown and financiers was thus not always easy. On occasion, ministers sought to put pressure on financiers, and to obtain funds, by demanding that they settle their often long overdue accounts.¹¹⁷ However, without the asentistas the Monarchy could not have survived as it did under Carlos II: their importance was reflected in the rewards they sought and secured, including entry into the Council of Finance, other offices, and noble titles.¹¹⁸ These commitments involved Carlos II in considerable expenditure. In 1693–4 it was calculated that, since 1689, the Council of Finance had provided for the war 14,563,134 escudos de plata and 12,735,925 escudos de vellon, which some ministers believed seriously understated what had been spent.¹¹⁹ Military and naval expenditure was a constant burden,¹²⁰ but war—inside and outside Europe—meant the charge was greater.¹²¹ The outbreak of war often meant frantic efforts to raise money. In 1667–8, following Louis XIV’s invasion of Flanders, Mariana and her ministers gathered for Don Juan, who was ordered to the Low Countries 1 million pesos de plata in cash and 780,000 pesos in letters of ¹¹² CJDF, 24 Apr. 1693, AGS/E/3887. ¹¹³ Cf. Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 336 ff., and idem, ‘Los Cortizos. Un clan financiero de origen judeoconverso’, in idem, Estado, monarquía, 185 ff., 241 ff.; and Kamen, Spain in Later, 362–4, 369–72. In 1673 Manuel José Cortizos concluded asientos for Flanders and Germany totalling over 1 million escudos de plata, Sanz Ayán, ‘Arrendadores’, 146. ¹¹⁴ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 52. ¹¹⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 324 ff. ¹¹⁶ Tanteo de todo [July 1693], AGS/E/3887. In 1695 Stanhope attributed the delay of troops coming to Spain from Flanders on the fact that the bills sent for their transport had twice been ‘protested’, Stanhope to Lexington, 4–14 Apr. 1695, U1590/025/2. ¹¹⁷ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 101 (1675). In 1693 sums assigned Grillo from the Cruzada were suspended until he supplied accounts, Operti to VA, 15 Jan. and 12 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ¹¹⁸ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 65. ¹¹⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 311. ¹²⁰ The budgets for 1678 (a year of war) and of 1680 (one of peace) were remarkably similar. ¹²¹ A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘De la Conservación a la Desmembración. Las Provincias Italianas y la Monarquía de España (1665–1713)’, SHHM, 26 (2004), 203, sees no link between the extension of venality throughout the Monarchy in 1687–91, 1693–5 and 1699–1700 and its European wars, but the first two coincide with the Nine Years War and the last with both the renewal of the Moorish threat in north Africa and that of the Scots in central America.

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payment.¹²² As this episode shows, the appointment of a viceroy or governor also often necessitated a desperate search for large sums of ready money and for guaranteed regular future remittances; otherwise the appointee might refuse to take up his post. In 1691 Leganés would not go to Milan without large sums and the assurance of future payments.¹²³ How did Carlos II and his ministers find the necessary sums?

CUT TING NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURE The king could seek to balance the gulf between income and expenditure in wartime by reining in the latter, particularly non-military spending. The court, whose costs attracted fierce criticism in the winter of 1694–5,¹²⁴ was pruned in this way.¹²⁵ Carlos and his ministers also sought to reduce his outgoings in wartime by leaving posts vacant,¹²⁶ by ‘reforming’—reducing—the number of salaried officials (Chapter 4), and by simply appropriating the salaries of officials. This might involve merely taking a portion of what was due: in 1694, for example, Carlos appropriated one-third of the salaries of the ministers of his councils and tribunals.¹²⁷ But he might take the entire amount, as in 1691, 1693, and 1700.¹²⁸ Some worried about the consequences: in 1684, the president of the Council of Castile told the king that the salary arrears of the alcaldes de corte, who oversaw the policing of Madrid, might undermine the administration of justice there.¹²⁹ However, criticism by the Council of Aragon of another appropriation, or valimiento, in 1695 received the blunt reply that defence made the measure necessary.¹³⁰ Some of those affected sought to cut their losses by trading their arrears against other obligations. In 1691, for example, Carlos II’s representative in London, Don Pedro Ronquillo, asked to be allowed to offset what he owed for the media anata, payable on his succession to the title of count of Gramedo on the death of his brother, against his arrears.¹³¹ Another form of valimiento was that of pensions and other favours, or mercedes. Mercedes were an important instrument of royal patronage and authority, attracting service and cementing loyaty. But they also absorbed large sums and inevitably ¹²² Maura, Carlos II, i. 322; Kalnein, Juan José, 64. ¹²³ Stanhope to Nottingham, 21 Mar. 1691, SP 94/73 f. 27.For Velasco, appointed viceroy of Catalonia in 1696, cf. Stanhope to Vernon, 4 Jul. 1696, SP 94/74f. 96. ¹²⁴ Operti to ST, 10 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ¹²⁵ In 1696 the households of the king, the queen, and the king’s dead mother were ‘reformed’, to supply the army of Catalonia, Operti to ST, 27 Dec. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ¹²⁶ CCámara, [1677], AHN/Consejos/4450/38. ¹²⁷ Don Juan de Angulo to Don Manuel Arias, Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/12499/2. ¹²⁸ J. Fayard, Les membres du Conseil de Castille à l’Époque Moderne (1621–1746) (Geneva, 1979), 109. ¹²⁹ President of CC to CII, 18 Sept. 1684, AHN/Consejos/10113. ¹³⁰ Arrieta Alberdi, Consejo Supremo de Aragon, 260–1. ¹³¹ CCF, 6 Sept 1691, AGS/Hacienda/1590.

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attracted attention when the king needed money for other purposes. In January 1676, at the height of the Dutch War, Carlos II stopped all mercedes for that year,¹³² and again in 1677,¹³³ Don Juan seeking both to find money for the war and to punish his political enemies.¹³⁴ Mercedes, from which the pensions of old soldiers, widows, and orphans were generally exempted,¹³⁵ were also appropriated in 1683–4,¹³⁶ and during the Nine Years War: in 1690–1,¹³⁷ 1693,¹³⁸ 1694,¹³⁹ 1695,¹⁴⁰ 1696,¹⁴¹ and 1697, when Carlos II suspended all mercedes above 5 reales a day, the money saved being assigned to the war.¹⁴² In 1700 this means was again used, to fund the defence of Ceuta.¹⁴³ The suspension of mercedes, like so many of the measures under discussion, was often applied throughout the Monarchy.¹⁴⁴

MAXIMIZING THE ORDINARY REVENUES In 1686 the Council of Castile declared that if the king could prevent fraud, his revenues would cover his needs.¹⁴⁵ Not surprisingly, therefore, efforts were made—particularly in wartime—to combat the widespread tax evasion. These included periodic investigations of the illegal export of silver from Cadiz by foreign merchants (1674),¹⁴⁶ and the establishment of bodies specifically targeting fraud: the so-called fraud committee, or Junta de Fraudes (1682),¹⁴⁷ the committee for the tobacco revenues, or Junta de Tabaco (1683),¹⁴⁸ and the committee for the protection of the revenues, or Junta de Resguardo de las Rentas (December 1692).¹⁴⁹ The last was part of a serious and wide-ranging crackdown, one which ¹³² Kalnein, Juan José, 374, 429 ff.; Maura, Carlos II, ii. 252. Some ministers secured exemptions, CCW, 1676, AGS/GA/2348. ¹³³ Typically, Don José Antonio de la Serna, promoted from the Audiencia of Seville to the Council of Finance, was denied the usual one-off payment, or ayuda de costa, to fund his move to Madrid, CCámara, 1677, AHN/Consejos/4450/126. ¹³⁴ Sánchez, Attempts, 107–8. ¹³⁵ Sánchez Belén, ‘Colonos’, 298 (1693); CCWar [1676], AGS/GA/2348. ¹³⁶ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 262–3; Sánchez, Attempts, 108. ¹³⁷ Operti to VA, 7 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35. ¹³⁸ Operti to VA, 23 Oct. 1692, and to ST, 1 Jan. and 4 June 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ¹³⁹ Duke of Montalto, to Don Diego José Dormer, 14 Nov. 1693, BN MS 918, f. 19; Stanhope, 18 Nov. 1693, Madrid, SP 94/73 f. 236. ¹⁴⁰ Operti to ST, 10 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ¹⁴¹ Cf. CCCruzada, 12 July 1696, AGS/Cruzada/518/1696. ¹⁴² Royal order, 22 Dec. 1696, AGS/E/3891; Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 246. ¹⁴³ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 277. ¹⁴⁴ Cf., for Flanders, CII to Max Emmanuel, 3 March 1695, 22 Dec. 1696, and 13 Aug. 1700, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 622, 653, and 743. ¹⁴⁵ Sánchez, Attempts, 166. On fraud, cf. B. Cárceles de Gea, Fraude y Desobediencia Fiscal en la Corona de Castilla 1621–1700 (Valladolid, 2000). ¹⁴⁶ Godolphin to Arlington, 4 July 1674, Hispania Illustrata, 219–22. ¹⁴⁷ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 160 ff. Initially limited to Seville, in 1683 the remit of the junta was extended to the whole realm, Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism’, 349–50. ¹⁴⁸ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 177 ff. ¹⁴⁹ Unless otherwise indicated, what follows draws on Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 177 ff.

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would not have regard to the status of offenders.¹⁵⁰ One expression of this tough approach was the use of mounted troops from the army of Catalonia in place of the civilian guards hitherto employed by the farmers at the entrances into Madrid, to form a military-style cordon.¹⁵¹ The initial success of junta and cordon is suggested by the resentment of many of those affected, including some foreign diplomats,¹⁵² Castilian titled nobles,¹⁵³ and other administrative bodies, jealous of the junta’s jurisdiction. Within little more than a year the junta had been reined in, although the cordon survived until 1695, when the troops manning it were sent to the besieged Ceuta.¹⁵⁴ Thereafter, responsibility for combating fraud reverted to the Council of Finance and other established agencies.¹⁵⁵ Monarch and ministers also sought to improve the yields of existing revenues by simply increasing the rate at which they were levied. In 1674 the servicio de milicias, which was levied at so much per soldier, was increased from 20 to 30 ducats per man, an increase which underlined the fiscal advantages of allowing composition.¹⁵⁶ The king could also seek to boost revenues by changes in the way they were administered or collected. At the start of the reign the customs of Seville were taken into administración (1665–7); however the anticipated increase in yield did not materialize and the customs were soon farmed again.¹⁵⁷ Tax-farming clearly had advantages, and could be made to yield higher revenues by inviting competitive bids.¹⁵⁸ During the Messina War, the Crown exploited rivalry for the farm of the salinas of Castile, to obtain both a large initial payment and an increase in the total yield over the period of the contract.¹⁵⁹ In the Nine Years War the king and his ministers were able to increase the millones revenues in this way: within ¹⁵⁰ The English merchants’ privilege (guaranteed by treaty, but conducive to fraud) of having their civil and criminal cases heard by a special magistrate, the juez conservador, was to be curtailed, Stanhope to Nottingham, Jan. 1693, Spain under Charles, 41–3. ¹⁵¹ Mancera to Operti, 5 Feb. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. The tax-farmers would pay the 700,000 ducats a year that the troops were expected to cost. ¹⁵² The English envoy’s dispatches describe his clashes with the guards, cf. Stanhope to Nottingham, 11 and 28 Feb. 1693, Spain under Charles, 43–5; same to same, 26 Aug., 9 Sept. and 7 and 14 Oct. 1693, SP 94/73 ff. 192, 198, 223, 225, Stanhope to [?], 16 June 1694, SP 94/73 f. 287. It is ironic that Stanhope, a fierce critic of the weakness of Spain’s government, did not welcome this greater vigour; the Savoyard envoy lauded the firm hand, Operti to ST, 26 Feb. 1693, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 38. ¹⁵³ The arrest of the count of Lemos reportedly outraged his relations and the grandees in general, Stanhope to Nottingham, 11 Mar. 1693, SP 94/73, f. 133. ¹⁵⁴ Stanhope to Hopkins, 13 April 1695, Spain under Charles, 76–7. There were claims that the cordon had reduced revenues, Stanhope to Trenchard, 24 and 31 Mar. 1694, SP 94/73 f. 269, 277. For their part, the farmers were reluctant to pay for the troops employed on the cordon, Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 198 ff. ¹⁵⁵ Cf. Fayard, Les membres, 77, for a magistrate of the Seville audiencia investigating fraud there, 1697. ¹⁵⁶ J. Contreras Gay, ‘La reorganización militar’, Millars, 26 (2003), 152–3. ¹⁵⁷ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 347–8; B. H. Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade and War (Baltimore, 2000), 67 ff. In Mexico City, similarly, the sales tax was taken into ‘administration’ from 1677 but farmed from 1694, Smith, ‘Sales Taxes’, 6, 11. ¹⁵⁸ Cf. Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 61–3, for increases in farms, 1669–80. ¹⁵⁹ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 253. Cf. also Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 370.

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just a few years, between 1694 and 1696, the yield of the farm of the millones of much of Andalusia increased by nearly 75 per cent.¹⁶⁰ There was a danger that farmers might be led to promise too much, and fail to deliver.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, since some of the farmed revenues which grew most spectacularly over the reign as a whole—including, for example, those from tobacco, whose yield more than trebled to over 9,000,000 reales annually—tax-farming clearly had advantages; Carlos II continued to rely on farming until the end of his reign.¹⁶² But farming had its disadvantages, and in the Nine Years War there were further changes in fiscal management, this time in favour of direct administration. In the summer of 1691 Carlos II ordered that the alcabalas, medios por cientos, servicios, and millones should, henceforth, be brought into administración; where these revenues were farmed—in Burgos, for example—this should be done once the farm expired.¹⁶³ In addition, each partido, or province, should have a central treasury, or treasuries, for the different impositions. These treasuries were to be overseen by a provincial superintendente general. The superintendente was required to send regular reports to the Council of Finance, detailing revenues received. He was also to press the payment of arrears, and to seek as far as possible to revive decayed industries in his province. The superintendente—an innovation briefly foreshadowed in 1682–4, but not universally welcomed (and subject to some modification after 1691)—was to be the agent of a tighter, more centralized, ‘state’ structure, one which anticipated the provincial intendentes of the Bourbons. In a number of provinces, including Burgos and Valladolid, the corregidor of the province was appointed superintendente.¹⁶⁴ The superintendentes received no remuneration but were to be paid by results.¹⁶⁵ Arrears of existing taxes were, clearly, a resource of sorts. Arrears were common, and to some extent reflected the fact that taxpayers were allowed some latitude in payment.¹⁶⁶ They also reflected real inability to pay on the part of communities hit by natural disasters, war, and population loss.¹⁶⁷ In doing a deal over arrears the king relieved his subjects of part of that burden, but he also insisted on payment of some of those arrears. A co-ordinated and wide-ranging pursuit of ¹⁶⁰ Andrés Ucendo, Fiscalidad, 80. ¹⁶¹ In 1675 Jacinto Romerate secured the farm of the wool duties, promising more than twice the annual revenues offered by the previous farmer, and a lump sum of 200,000 vellon escudos, but was in difficulties by 1677, Sanz Ayán, ‘Arrendadores’, 132 ff. 148. ¹⁶² B. Yun Casalilla, ‘Del Centro a la Periferia: La economía española bajo Carlos II’, SHHM, 20 (1999), 60; Artola, Hacienda, 221. In 1682 the tobacco farm was renewed in return for a servicio of 120,000 reales de plata for Flanders, Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 262. Cf. also, Sanz Ayán, ‘Limites’, 118 ff. ¹⁶³ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 37 ff., 53–4; Dedieu, ‘El arca’, 110, 112, 124–5; Artola, Hacienda, 219–20, 250–1. ¹⁶⁴ AMB/Actas/1691, f. 293; AMV/Actas/70, f. 975. Carlos later ordered the Superintendente general of the servicio de milicias to appoint the corregidores his agents (Chapter 5). ¹⁶⁵ Royal order, or cédula, 27 Sept. 1691, AMB/Actas/1691, f. 293 ff. ¹⁶⁶ Dedieu, ‘El arca’, 115–16. ¹⁶⁷ J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La política repobladora del reinado de Carlos II’, ETF, ser. IV, Historia Moderna, 3 (1990), 222 ff.

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arrears was launched in 1677, at the height of the ‘Dutch War’, when the president of the Council of Finance, the count of Humanes, was ordered to compound with cities and villages for the often substantial sums they owed.¹⁶⁸ Indicative of the sort of deal sought by the Crown was that struck with the town of Hita. Of arrears totalling 85,000 maravedis, the king remitted 21,250, or 25 per cent; the town must still pay 63,750 maravedis.¹⁶⁹ The king again resorted to this policy in the Nine Years War, in 1692 and again in 1696.¹⁷⁰ Carlos II and his ministers were by no means resigned to the loss of arrears, but ready to bargain to secure something. Just how much was received is not clear, but clearly something was promised— perhaps enabling the king to obtain credit on the strength of what was agreed—and something no doubt paid.

EXTRAORDINARY REVENUES (EXCLUDING DONATIVOS) Carlos II secured the consent of the Castilian Cortes-voting towns to the renewal or prorogation of the millones in 1667, 1673, 1679, 1685, 1691, and 1697, but the king’s failure to summon the Cortes (Chapter 5) limited his ability to impose new taxation. Not surprisingly, therefore, the reign, and wartime in particular, witnessed a variety of alternative money-raising projects.¹⁷¹ Some of these were the brainchild of the king’s councils;¹⁷² others of a succession of ad hoc committees of means, or Juntas de medios, whose members often included ecclesiastics because of the ethical-political dimension of any measures decided on.¹⁷³ Such committees functioned in 1674,¹⁷⁴ 1692,¹⁷⁵ 1693,¹⁷⁶ 1694,¹⁷⁷ and the winter of 1696–7.¹⁷⁸ Established expedients included the sale of office, which had been exploited by the Crown since the fifteenth century.¹⁷⁹ Venality took two forms: the sale of ¹⁶⁸ CII and president of CF to city of Burgos, 28 July 1677, AMB/Actas/1677, ff. 419–20; Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 219–21. ¹⁶⁹ Cf. CCámara, [1678], AHN/Consejos/4451/82. ¹⁷⁰ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 251–2. Cf. also CII to count of Santa Cruz de los Manueles, corregidor of Burgos, 26 June 1696, AMB/Actas/1696, f. 251. ¹⁷¹ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 331–3; Canga Argüelles, Diccionario de Hacienda, i. 256. ¹⁷² In 1676, in view of the want of funds for the war, the king circularized the central organs of government, seeking proposals, CCámara, 28 Nov. 1676, AHN/Consejos/4449/172. ¹⁷³ A Junta de medios para la guerra con Francia (1693) included the king’s confessor and a parish priest, Maura, Vida, 414. C. Jago, ‘Taxation and Political Culture in Castile 1590–1640’, in R. L. Kagan and G. Parker (eds.), Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World (Cambridge, 1995), 48 ff., is relevant. ¹⁷⁴ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 249–50. ¹⁷⁵ Stanhope to Nottingham, 27 August 1692, SP94/73 f. 78. ¹⁷⁶ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 275; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 292–3. ¹⁷⁷ Copy of royal order, 27 July 1694, and of CII to count of Adanero, 30 July 1694, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 40. The junta was to identify, in eight days, how to raise 4 million pesos for the defence of Catalonia during the winter and the levy of foreign troops. ¹⁷⁸ Operti to VA, 13 Dec. 1696, to ST, 10 Jan. 1697, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ¹⁷⁹ A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La venta de cargos y oficios públicos en Castilla y sus consecuencias económicas y sociales’, in ibid., Instituciones y sociedad en la España de los Austrias (Barcelona, 1985), 146 ff.; F. Tomás y Valiente, ‘Ventas de oficios públicos en Castilla durante los siglos XVI y XVII’, in

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an office, sometimes created simply to be sold; and the sale of the right to pass on or inherit one. Philip IV’s extensive resort to the latter had contributed to, or confirmed, the domination of the towns of Castile by an oligarchy of increasingly hereditary councillors, or regidores.¹⁸⁰ But sales were not popular and Carlos II’s minority reign saw a reaction against them. In 1669 Mariana ordered the abolition of perpetual municipal offices with voting rights sold since 1630, promising compensation to those affected, although implementation of the decree seems to have been patchy, not least because the Crown could not pay the compensation promised.¹⁸¹ To all intents and purposes, this was the end of new sales by the Crown of municipal regimientos, but not of venality. In 1673 the Council of Finance expressed its concern about the sale of revenue-collecting offices, only to be told that this was a prerogative matter.¹⁸² In 1675 a Junta de medios proposed, and the Cámara of Castile (which advised on appointments in the King’s gift) approved, sale of the office of escribanía of the cuatro unos por cientos.¹⁸³ But sales extended higher up the administration, financiers buying their way into the Council of Finance. In 1676 the marquis of Castromonte purchased the post of councillor and grand chancellor of the Council of Finance, and permission to include the latter in his entail, for 200,000 escudos.¹⁸⁴ Sale of office was not limited to Castile, but was extended to other parts of the Monarchy.¹⁸⁵ The extent of venality during the Dutch War provoked some concern about its legality and morality,¹⁸⁶ contributing to the unpopularity of Valenzuela’s regime; following Valenzuela’s fall, his enemy and successor, Don Juan of Austria, implemented a moral–fiscal reform programme whose targets included the sale of office.¹⁸⁷ Carlos II appeared to be determined to avoid selling offices after Don Juan’s death,¹⁸⁸ but, in 1691, he ordered the Cámara to discover all those offices sold in perpetuity over the last ten years whose purchasers had still not paid up: if they did not pay the balance, they would forfeit the office.¹⁸⁹ As this example suggests, the sums to be gained from venality again attracted ministers during the Nine Years idem, Gobierno e Instituciones en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid, 1982), 151 ff.; J. H. Parry, The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies Under the Habsburgs (Berkeley, 1953). ¹⁸⁰ Cf. for Madrid, M. Hernández, A la sombra de la Corona. Poder local y oligarquía urbana (Madrid, 1606–1808) (Madrid, 1995), 11; and for Valladolid, Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 301 ff. ¹⁸¹ Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Venta’, 168–9. Some of those affected successfully appealed, cf. CCámara on appeals (1675) of Antonio García (former) regidor of Brunete, and of the widow of a (former) regidor of Zafra, AHN/Consejos/4448/56, 74. ¹⁸² AHN/Consejos/4446/62, 75. ¹⁸³ CCámara, 27 Apr. 1675, AHN/Consejos/4448/42. ¹⁸⁴ J. L. Castellano, ‘La Carrera burocrática en la España del siglo XVIII’, in Castellano (ed.), Sociedad, Administración y Poder en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Granada, 1996), 36. ¹⁸⁵ Cf. Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 333–4, and R. W. Patch, ‘Imperial Politics and Local Economy in Colonial Central America, 1670–1770’, P&P, 143 (1994), 77 ff.; and A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvarino, ‘La venalidad de magistraturas en el Estado de Milán en el reinado de Carlos II’, Archivio Storico Lombardo, ser. 12, 6 (2000), 131. ¹⁸⁶ CCámara, June 1675, AHN/Consejos/4448/60. ¹⁸⁷ Kalnein, Juan José, 334, 429 ff. This exposed the patchy implementation of the decree of May 1669, Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Venta’, 168–9. ¹⁸⁸ Sánchez, Attempts, 122. ¹⁸⁹ Operti to ST, 8 Nov. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. It was anticipated that this measure would produce 400,000 pesos from the Council of the Cruzada alone.

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War. In 1696 a Junta de medios suggested the creation for sale in every town of the post of notary.¹⁹⁰ It is not clear whether this proposal was implemented, but extant offices were certainly sold. In 1696 the lucrative governorship of Cadiz went for 20,000 pistoles.¹⁹¹ As for the Indies, in 1689 Carlos II had ordered that no office connected either to the administration of justice or the royal revenues should be sold, but in 1692 effectively countermanded this, and was unmoved by representations from the Council of the Indies against sweeping sales.¹⁹² In 1695–6 the offices of viceroy of both Mexico and Peru were sold.¹⁹³ The offer of the count of Montezuma for the viceroyalty of Mexico was accepted, despite the reservations of the Council of State.¹⁹⁴ Unfortunately, as with so many expedients, it is almost impossible to discover the total yield of venality in Carlos II’s reign, inside or outside Spain.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, and despite the potential threat it posed both to royal authority and (long-term) revenues,¹⁹⁶ sale of office remained an attractive option in time of need. Noble status, from mere hidalguía to titles and the rank of grandee, was also sold,¹⁹⁷ Carlos II’s reign witnessing an unprecedented sale of titles. Significantly, the number of annual creations peaked at 38 in 1693, the crisis year of the Nine Years War.¹⁹⁸ Not all of these new titles were sold; many of the new titles granted by Carlos II were, on the contrary, rewards to military men,¹⁹⁹ administrators,²⁰⁰ and even munitions manufacturers or contractors for services which contributed to ¹⁹⁰ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 298. ¹⁹¹ Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 20 Jun. 1696, SP 94/74 f. 94. ¹⁹² Burkholder and Chandler, ‘Creole Appointments’, 189–90; K. J. Andrien, ‘The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700’, HAHR, 62 (1982), 57. For venality in late seventeenth-century Peru, cf. T. Herzog, Upholding Justice. Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650–1750) (Ann Arbor, 2004). ¹⁹³ In 1695 the count of Cañete offered 250,000 pesos for the viceroyalty of Mexico, Operti to ST, 16 June 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41, and secured it according to Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 249. However, according to Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 298, Cañete paid 200,000 for the viceroyalty of Peru. Stanhope to Vernon, 3 Apr. 1697, Spain under Charles, 109–10, suggests one explanation for this apparent confusion. ¹⁹⁴ Operti to ST, 15 Dec. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. Montezuma had offered 130,000 ready cash and 70,000 pezze on the return of the flota. The money was immediately used to supply Flanders, Ceuta (besieged by the Moors) and Catalonia, where the bread contract of the army of Catalonia was about to end. The Council of the Indies was concerned because Montezuma’s wife was a descendant of ‘the great Montezuma’, and the count might become a pretender to the crown of New Spain, Stanhope to marquis of Normanby, 9 Jan. 1697, Spain under Charles, 106–7. ¹⁹⁵ But, for Quito, cf. A. Sanz Tapia, ‘La Venta de Oficios de Hacienda en la Audiencia de Quito (1650–1700)’, RI, 63 (2003), 633–48. ¹⁹⁶ Cf. Andrien, ‘Sale of Fiscal’, 67–71. ¹⁹⁷ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘The Purchase of Nobility in Castile 1552–1700’, JEEH, 8 (1979), 313 ff. Thompson may underestimate the sales of mere nobility, J. S. Amelang, ‘The Purchase of Nobility in Castile 1552–1700: A Comment’, JEEH, 11 (1982), 219 ff. ¹⁹⁸ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 210. ¹⁹⁹ Cf. the marquisate of Gastañaga granted (1686) to Don Francisco Antonio de Agurto y Salcedo, who held a number of senior military posts, and the grandeza given the count of Santisteban del Puerto following the death of his son (Chapter 1). ²⁰⁰ Juan Antonio López de Zarate, marquis (1686) of Villanueva de la Sagra, was secretary of state for Italy to 1697 and thereafter secretary of the despacho universal (Chapter 5).

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the continued functioning and preservation of the Monarchy.²⁰¹ But some titles were sold, even if indirectly and/or as part of a larger deal. In the winter of 1667–8 one of the sticking points in Lope de los Ríos’s negotiations with the financier Sebastian Cortizos, for an asiento of 1,500,000 escudos for Flanders (above), was Cortizos’s demand for a title for his nephew, who was finally declared viscount of Valfuentes.²⁰² Such sales were alluded to in a consulta of the Council of State in December 1690, when the purchase of grandeza by Domingo Grillo, marquis of Clarafuente (1682), brother of the financier Francisco Grillo, was under consideration. Apart from the admiral of Castile, those present—all títulos or grandees, or members of such families—accepted the need to sell the honour, although the duke of Osuna thought it was being depreciated, claiming that titles had been sold for as little as 20,000 pesos. However, the sale was approved,²⁰³ in time for the marquis of Leganés to be supplied by Grillo before departing for Milan in 1691.²⁰⁴ The following year an attempt was made to extract more from those who had already purchased titles. In August 1692 a royal order demanded the balance from all who had purchased titles since 1 January 1680 for less than 30,000 ducats; the titles of those who paid the additional amount would be declared hereditary, the titles of those who did not would die with them.²⁰⁵ Discovering just how much was raised from these sales is not easy, not least because sums promised were not always paid promptly or in full. In 1683 the marquis of Tamarit, whose supply contracts and remittances of money were vital to the army of Catalonia, and who had been assigned 20,000 pesos offered by Don Luis de Alcázar for a title, was still owed 6,000 pesos; he requested that Don Luis be denied the privileges of a titled nobleman until the money was paid.²⁰⁶ Clearly, however, the measure generated some funds, tapping the aspirations of some of Carlos II’s wealthier subjects. Among the beneficiaries were the financiers, without whom the military and naval machine might not have functioned at all. In this respect, Carlos II’s wars ensured some social mobility as the moneyed men entered the ranks of the nobility via their fiscal services;²⁰⁷ for many of these ²⁰¹ The title of viscount of the royal armoury was granted in 1694 to José Aldaz, who received the Eugui manufactory in 1689 in return for a donativo and who contracted to supply various munitions to the Crown during the Nine Years War, M. C. Hernández Escayola, Negocio y servicio: Finanzas públicas y hombres de negocios en Navarra en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII (Pamplona, 2004), 248. ²⁰² Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 51–2; Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 358. ²⁰³ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 220; and Kamen, Spain in later, 250–1. According to Kamen, Grillo gave 300,000 pesos for the grandeza, but the Savoyard minister in Madrid, who detailed how that sum was to be distributed (between Catalonia, Flanders, and Milan) and of how Grillo was to be repaid, gave the purchase price as 150,000, Operti to VA, 24 Feb. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35. Some councillors insisted that the new grandee ‘buy roots’ in Castile, i.e., revenues there to the value of 10,000–12,000 ducats (a year). ²⁰⁴ Stanhope to Nottingham, 21 Mar. 1691, Spain under Charles, 13. ²⁰⁵ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, I, 213–14. ²⁰⁶ CII to governor of Council of Castille, 23 Nov. 1683, AHN/Consejos/7195/86. ²⁰⁷ Cf. the trajectory of the Aguerri family, who secured the marquisate of Valdeolmos in 1687, Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 378–81.

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men, the grant or purchase of a title was merely one stage in a process which included the acquisition of landed property, a lordship or señorío, an hábito in one of the military orders, a regimiento in a town council, and administrative and/or court office.²⁰⁸ The king also imitated his predecessors in alienating—selling—jurisdictions and vassals.²⁰⁹ In 1668 the village of Aguaio (Burgos) was sold out of royal jurisdiction;²¹⁰ and in 1674 the regent agreed to exempt the village of Vergassa from the jurisdiction of the town of Arnedo, despite the latter’s efforts to prevent this and the opposition of the Cámara,²¹¹ which feared the loss of Crown revenues.²¹² Opposition might succeed. In 1693, in view of his want of funds to provide for the defence of the Monarchy, Carlos II agreed to the sale of the town of Lebrija (Seville) to the marquis of los Alamos.²¹³ Seville’s opposition to this dismemberment of its own jurisdiction—offering 9,628,800 maravedis to prevent it—was supported by the Council of Castile, which claimed that the sale would harm trade and encourage fraud.²¹⁴ This seems to have thwarted los Alamos, but in 1697 the king—now desperate for funds for the defence of Barcelona—sold Lebrija to the viscount of Santa Cruz del Valle.²¹⁵ One consequence of these policies was the continued dismemberment of some of the once extensive territorial jurisdictions of some of Castile’s towns, including Avila, which, in 1668, protested, to no avail, against the sale of the village of los Patos to a member of the Council of Finance.²¹⁶ Carlos II’s predecessors had alienated revenues for short-term cash gain, and he did the same,²¹⁷ raising at least 84,000,000 maravedis in the course of the ²⁰⁸ Cf. C. Sanz Ayán, ‘ “Blasones son Escudos”. El Ascenso económico y social de un asentista del rey en el siglo XVII: Bentura Donis’, in idem, Estado, monarquía, 236; and idem, Banqueros, 451 ff. Some who gained titles soon abandoned finance, ibid., 460 ff. ²⁰⁹ Cf. H. Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain. The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516–1700 (Baltimore, 1990). ²¹⁰ Kamen, Spain in Later, 160–1. Price was calculated according to the number of inhabitants; in the case of Aguaio, the purchaser was expected to pay 15,000 maravedis for each of the 92 vecinos, or householders. ²¹¹ CCámara, 3 Nov. 1674, AHN/Consejos/4447/162. ²¹² CCámara, [?] 1678, AHN/Consejos/4451/34, on petition of the count of Regalados to be granted the jurisdiction of the town of Utiel; the latter was a cabeza de partido or administrative centre, and a corregimiento, and alienation would also be a breach of the millones contract. ²¹³ CII to governor of CC, 14 March 1693, AHN/Consejos/7206. ²¹⁴ Consulta of president of CC, 28 Aug. 1693, AHN/Consejos/10120. ²¹⁵ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 377–8. ²¹⁶ Kamen, Spain in Later, 160. Avila may just have been too poor to outbid those eroding its jurisdiction. ²¹⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, what follows draws on J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La incorporación de rentas reales enajenadas en el reinado de Carlos II’, in E. Sarasa Sánchez and E. Serrano Martín (eds.), Señorío y Feudalismo en la Península Ibérica (Zaragoza, 1993), 286–8, and idem, Política fiscal, 99 ff. For the provinces of Cuenca, Granada, Gudalajara, and Toro, cf. C. Sanz Ayán, ‘Poderosos y privilegiados’, in J. N. Alcalá Zamora (ed.), La vida cotidiana en la España de Velázquez 2nd edn. (Madrid, 1999), 153; for that of Soria, cf. J. M. Alcalde Jiménez, El Poder del Señorío. Señorío y poderes locales en Soria entre el Antiguo Régimen y el Liberalismo (Valladolid, 1997), 84; and for Madrid (1678), Hernández, A la sombra, 230.

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reign.²¹⁸ However, there were far fewer sales than in previous reigns.²¹⁹ Indeed, Carlos and his ministers sought to recover for the Crown earlier alienations, or to oblige buyers (or their descendants) to pay that part of the original purchase price still due. In pressing ‘reincorporation’ of regalian revenues and rights, the last Habsburg again anticipated the first Bourbon.²²⁰ In 1674 the Council of Castile was ordered to investigate alienated or usurped revenues, but with disappointing results. Nevertheless, the idea was resurrected in the Nine Years War, in 1691 by the Council of Castile, which saw resumption as a solution to the problem of funding the war, and in 1692 by the Junta de Negocios de Hacienda. But a firm policy was not adopted until 1693, when a Junta de Incorporaciones was established by the president of the Council of Finance. A number of jurisdictions and revenues were recovered, but it is likely that the real concern was less the long-term resumption of resources for the Crown than cash, or the promise of it, in the short term. King and ministers were clearly prepared to compromise to secure the latter. In 1697 agreement was reached with the count of Siruela, who had been illegally receiving the alcabalas of the town of Siruela: he was allowed to continue to collect these in return for 3,500 doubloons. The crown was not hostile to alienation, or privilege, whose sale was recognized to be a source of funds. In 1671, to finance the dispatch of a relief force to Panama, the duke of Medinaceli was authorized to sell various privileges to those cities and towns willing to purchase them.²²¹ In Madrid Carlos II’s reign also saw the establishment of privileged new guilds, and the confirmation (and extension) of their privileges to existing ones, again particularly in wartime. In 1677, at the request of the guild of ribbon-makers (established in 1600), Carlos approved new regulations which, among other things, limited the role of women;²²² and in 1693 he approved the establishment of a guild of fan-makers,²²³ and also confirmed the privileges of the so-called cinco gremios, or five guilds, (of jewellers, mercers, drapers, linen merchants, and silk merchants), founded with royal approval in 1686 and the biggest corporate taxpayers in Madrid, whose loans were increasingly valuable to the Crown.²²⁴ These measures also enabled Carlos to create bodies better able to deliver his revenues: the fan-makers asserted as much when petitioning to be allowed to form a guild. Other wartime beneficiaries included the guilds of ²¹⁸ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 369 ff. ²¹⁹ Cf. Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism’, 221. ²²⁰ Cf. Kamen, War of Succession, 216–17; and I. M. Vicent López, ‘La Junta de Incorporación: lealtad y propiedad en la monarquía borbónica’, in P. Fernández Albaladejo and M. Ortega López (eds.), Antiguo Régimen y liberalismo. Homenaje a Miguel Artola, 3: Política y Cultura (Madrid, 1995), 365 ff. ²²¹ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 177. ²²² E. Larruga, Memorias políticas y económicas sobre los frutos, fábricas, comercio y minas de España, 45 vols., (Madrid, 1785–1800), i. 103. ²²³ M. J. Pastor Cerezo, ‘Apuntes sobre el abanico en España hasta el siglo XIX’, in C. Rodrigo Zarzosa (ed.), Colección de Abanicos del Museo Nacional de Cerámica (Madrid, 2000), 27. ²²⁴ Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, XXVIII, 51.; Kamen, Spain in Later, 273; Larruga, Memorias políticas, i. 109 ff.; M. Capella and A. Matilla Tascón, Los Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid (Madrid, 1957).

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rope-makers (1673), glove-makers (1674), tanners (1695), and guitar-makers (1695).²²⁵ Such measures were not confined to Spain: in 1694 Carlos approved the establishment in the Indies of the merchant guild or consulado of Santa Fe de Bogotá, not least to guarantee New Granada’s contribution to the avería, which funded the escorts for the silver fleets.²²⁶ It is not entirely true that Carlos II’s reign saw no new burdens. A number of limited impositions of brief duration were introduced in wartime. In 1668, for example, the king imposed a levy on (foreign) property in Cadiz, but accepted 200,000 ducats in lieu levied on all residents;²²⁷ and in 1676 a 4 per cent levy was imposed on the yield of medios and arbitrios (below) imposed by local councils.²²⁸ However, the most striking example of the extent to which war led to new impositions was the king’s exploitation of the Crown’s salt monopoly (dating from 1564) to impose, in 1695, 4 reales on every fanega of salt.²²⁹ This was a bold move. Philip IV’s abortive attempt to substitute a salt tax for the millones had provoked serious disorder in 1631–2.²³⁰ Not surprisingly, it was also widely felt that the king’s exploitation of this regalian right in fact bordered on new taxation, which required the consent of the realm in the Cortes (Chapter 4).²³¹ The king and his ministers were aware of the risk they were taking, but pressed on. Carlos simply informed the Cortes-voting towns, resorting to the argument of necessity—i.e., war—which, he declared, did not allow for fuller consultation; he promised to levy the surcharge only as long as the war lasted,²³² in accordance with contemporary thinking on ‘just’ taxation.²³³ Collection was initially entrusted to the provincial superintendentes.²³⁴ Contrary to his promise of 1695, Carlos did not suppress the price increase following the conclusion of the Nine Years War; initially, its continuation was justified on the grounds that the defences of the realm (including the fleet and those of Catalonia) needed strengthening; prorogation in 1700, when the imposition was reduced by half, was justified by the need to ²²⁵ Larruga, Memorias políticas, i. 200, iii. 24 (1674), iii. 2 and 24, and iv. 221. In 1693 the Madrid guild of innkeepers paid 500 doblones to limit the number of taverns in the capital to just 400, AHN/Consejos/libros/1278, f. 44 ff. ²²⁶ R. S. Smith, ‘The Consulado in Santa Fe de Bogotá’, HAHR, 45 (1965), 442 ff. ²²⁷ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 142–3, 227. ²²⁸ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 253. ²²⁹ In 1693 the price of salt in Galicia had been increased by 1 real to fund a donativo, Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 360. A fanega was equivalent to just over 1.5 bushels. ²³⁰ Elliott, Count-Duke, 425–6, 432–4, 438–9, 447–51; J. E. Gelabert, Castilla convulsa (1631–1652), (Madrid, 2001), 17–66. ²³¹ In 1693 Carlos II increased the price of cocoa and chocolate, prompting protests that this breached ecclesiastical immunities, Portocarrero to CII [?] August 1694, ACDA/3852/12. ²³² CII to the ayuntamiento of Burgos, 9 April 1695, and attached royal order of 6 April 1695, AMB/Acuerdos/1695, f. 104 ff; Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 130; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 334; Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 283–6. ²³³ J. Fortea Pérez, ‘Los Donativos en la Política fiscal de los Austrias (1625–1637): Servicio o Beneficio?’, in L. Ribot García and L. De Rosa (eds.), Pensamiento y política económica en la Epoca Moderna (Madrid, 2000), 32–3; Jago, ‘Taxation’, 48 ff.; Castellano, Cortes, 41, 44, 49. ²³⁴ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 283–6; Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 79–80.

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defend Ceuta and to dislodge the Scots from Darien. Carlos II had, on the back of war and imperial defence, established a permanent new tax, one not dependent on the approval of the Castilian Cortes.²³⁵ Some expedients were avoided. Among measures under consideration at the end of 1695 was a capitation, or head, tax, as recently implemented in France, but it was not introduced, apparently because it would take too long.²³⁶ Unlike his predecessors, Carlos II did not manipulate the coinage for profit in wartime.²³⁷ It was considered: at the end of 1692 a recoinage (calling in all gold and silver coin and re-stamping it at a higher face value), from which the king was expected to make a profit of 20 per cent, was discussed by a Junta de medios.²³⁸ But manipulation had already been dismissed in 1690 by the superintendente general of finances, los Vélez, who thought it would be a disaster,²³⁹ and it was avoided despite the obvious temptations. Another device not exploited was the sale of territory to foreign sovereigns, although bids were received, from the grand duke of Tuscany for the Tuscan presidios during the Messina War,²⁴⁰ and apparently from the Republic of Genoa during the Nine Years War.²⁴¹ Neither attempt succeeded; further evidence perhaps of the determination of king and ministers to maintain the Monarchy.

DONATIVOS One of the most striking fiscal devices of the reign of Carlos II was the so-called ‘free gift’, or donativo. Like most of the fiscal expedients resorted to between 1665 and 1700, donativos, which—at least initially—clearly differed from taxes, servicios and (interest bearing) loans, were not new, having been resorted to by Philip II, Philip III, and, more frequently, by Philip IV.²⁴² In 1667, faced with Louis XIV’s invasion of Flanders and other parts of the Monarchy, Mariana of Austria resorted to a variety of revenue-raising measures including a donativo.²⁴³ In subsequent years the regent and her son would frequently fall back on this device inside and outside Spain. The donativos of Carlos II’s reign were not all for the same amount. Whereas Philip IV’s last donativo (1664) had sought to raise 2,000,000 reales (or 68,000,000 ²³⁵ Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus, 130–2; Sanz Ayán, ‘Límites’, 123–4. ²³⁶ Operti to ST, 15 Dec. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ²³⁷ Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism . . . ’, 343 (n. 50). ²³⁸ Stanhope to Nottingham, 3 Dec. 1692, Spain under Charles, 38–9. ²³⁹ CCS, 4 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/4138. Los Vélez said no more, but any ‘reform’ of the coinage would increase the government’s spending commitments and might be politically risky. ²⁴⁰ J. Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, J., ‘Razón de Estado y Geostrategia en la Política Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677–81)’, BRAH, Historia, 173 (1976), 326 ff. ²⁴¹ Operti to ST, 30 June 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ²⁴² Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 279 ff; Fayard, Les Membres, 76, lists the donativos of Philip IV’s reign but not those of Carlos II. Many of the conclusions of Fortea Pérez, ‘Los donativos’ apply to Carlos II’s donativos. ²⁴³ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 52; Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 209.

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maravedis), those of 1667, 1671, 1674, and 1676 were all set at 1,000,000 ducats (or 375,000,000 maravedis), although the period over which different donativos were paid also varied (up to two, and even three years).²⁴⁴ Some were precisely targeted. In 1684, for example, donativos were required of office-holders and owners of coaches;²⁴⁵ in 1692 nobles and public officials were the target group;²⁴⁶ office-holders were again asked to contribute in 1693, as were titled nobles in 1694; and in the desperate circumstances of 1697, on the recommendation of the Junta de medios and the Council of State, Carlos again sought a donativo from the grandees.²⁴⁷ In some respects, therefore, donativos sought to overcome some of the inadequacies of the existing fiscal system, and to tap the resources of Carlos II’s wealthier subjects, although this was not always the outcome (see below). Despite their name, donativos were rarely truly voluntary. Most were, in fact, imposed or requested by the Crown, and negotiated locally by royal agents, including corregidores,²⁴⁸ presidents (and other officials) of the chancillerías of Granada and Valladolid, and councillors of Castile,²⁴⁹ many of whom justified requests for favours by referring to their role in securing donativos.²⁵⁰ Their operations were often co-ordinated centrally by an ad hoc committee, or Junta de donativos.²⁵¹ In addition, although the decision about how much to give might be left to the donor, fixed sums were often demanded. In 1689 printed instructions were issued with a contribution scale ranging from 4 to 15 ducats.²⁵² Alternatively, a sum paid towards an earlier donativo might set a precedent for later ones. In 1674 the town of Villadiego (Burgos) requested exemption from a contribution of 20,000 reales towards the donativo of that year, which had been allocated it by the corregidor of Burgos on the ground that this is what Villadiego had given towards the donativo of 1664 when it reflected the town’s share of the alcabala and ²⁴⁴ Cf. AHN/Consejos/4451/84. In 1676, Carlos II sought 1 million [reales] payable over two years (1676 and 1677), CII to city of Burgos, 31 Jan. 1676, AMB/Actas/1676, f. 101–2. ²⁴⁵ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 199; M. Escalona Jiménez, ‘Los donativos de la ciudad de Sevilla durante el reinado de Carlos II’, ETF, ser. IV, Historia Moderna, 11 (1998), 287. ²⁴⁶ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 80. ²⁴⁷ CCC, 12 and 15 Jan. 1697, AHN/Consejos/7188; Stanhope to Vernon, 22 Jan. 1697, Spain under Charles, 108. ²⁴⁸ The disappointing yield of the donativo of 1667 was attributed to the fact that it had been administered by the local justices, Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 39. All donativos requested of Burgos in these decades were communicated to the ayuntamiento by its corregidores. ²⁴⁹ In 1693–4 Don Diego Flores, councillor of Castile, was given a list of men he should visit in Madrid, including Don Pedro de la Varrera, whose offer of 100 ducats he rejected as inadequate in view of Varrera’s wealth, CCC, 25 Jan. 1694, AHN/Consejos/12499/3. ²⁵⁰ In 1674 Don Juan Francisco Zapata Palafox y Beteta, corregidor of Trujillo, buttressed his request for an hábito by referring to his role in securing contributions to the donativos of 1671 and 1672, AHN/Consejos/4447/58. ²⁵¹ In 1672 Seville’s request to be allowed to raise the donativo it had offered of 75,000 ducats by means of various arbitrios was referred to the Junta de donativos, CCámara, AHN/Consejos/ 4445/8. ²⁵² AHN/Consejos/libros/1474/24. Another printed scale of 1693 ranged from 8 to 15 ducats, corregidores in Cortes-voting towns paying the maximum (as in 1689), CII to [?], 8 July 1693, enclosing printed instruction, AGS/Cruzada/518.

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the cuatro unos por cientos taxes.²⁵³ For their part, in 1671, 1674, and 1676 the regidores of Valladolid agreed to give 10,250 ducats, as they had in 1667.²⁵⁴ Within a relatively short period, therefore, contributions to a donativo of 1,000,000 had become customary, or fixed. Among the attractions for the Crown of donativos was the fact that they did not require the consent of the Cortes.²⁵⁵ However, like all extraordinary impositions, they needed justification of some sort, and this was invariably the defence of the Monarchy, most donativos being imposed in wartime. In 1667, typically, the regent’s circular letter requesting a donativo of 1,000,0000 reales referred to the need to strengthen Spain’s land and sea forces in order to defend the Indies and Flanders.²⁵⁶ In 1671 the two donativos requested that year were for Flanders and Catalonia, and for the fitting out of the Armada.²⁵⁷ In 1673 the regent’s circular letter requesting a donativo spoke not only of the need to provide garrisons and the fleet for war but also of a desire to avoid imposing new taxes on the king’s subjects.²⁵⁸ In 1676 Carlos II’s letter to the city of Burgos, informing the regidores of his decision to levy a donativo, referred to his many commitments, and the lack of money in the royal treasury; he was therefore obliged to appropriate whatever could be applied to ‘the security and defence of my Monarchy, so threatened’.²⁵⁹ The following year, 1677, a donativo was initiated in order to fund an ambitious programme to rebuild the fleet (Chapter 2).²⁶⁰ In 1678 the reason given for requesting a donativo from the councils and various professional groups—lawyers, doctors, surgeons—was the need both to fit out the fleet and to pay the subsidy arrears owed to the Dutch (see below).²⁶¹ Donativos imposed in the Americas were justified in much the same way as those in Spain. In 1697 the donativo which Carlos II ordered in the Indies was founded on the need to improve the fleets and defences there following the sack of Cartagena.²⁶² On this occasion, other arguments frequently used to justify donativos were also used: a reluctance to burden the royal treasury and to impose new taxation.²⁶³ ²⁵³ AHN/Consejos/4447/63. The town claimed it now had fewer vecinos, who were poorer. ²⁵⁴ AHMV/Actas/62 f. 495 ff; AHMV/Actas/64 f. 423 ff; and AHMV/Actas/65 f. 269 ff. Granada offered just under 9,500,000 maravedis in 1676, as in 1674, Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación económica’, 46–7. ²⁵⁵ For Fortea Pérez, ‘Las ciudades, las Cortes y el problema de la representación política en la Castilla moderna’, in idem (ed.), Imágenes de la Diversidad. El mundo urbano en la Corona de Castilla (S. XVI–XVIII) (Santander, 1997), 440–1, the resort to donativos was a reversion to an earlier revenue-raising device following the failure of the Cortes (millones) experiment. ²⁵⁶ Mariana to city of Burgos, 20 July 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, ff. 177–8. ²⁵⁷ Escalona Jiménez, ‘Donativos’, 287. ²⁵⁸ Mariana to city of Burgos, 8 Dec. 1673, AMB/Actas, 1674, ff. 36–7. ²⁵⁹ CII to city of Burgos, 31 Jan. 1676, AMB/Actas/1676, ff. 101–2. ²⁶⁰ CII to city of Burgos, 25 Jan. 1677, AMB/Actas/1677 ff. 135–6. The king’s letter to the city of Granada is in Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación’, 47 ff. Apparently, the yield of the donativo was diverted to funding the dispatch of relief forces to the besieged Oran. ²⁶¹ De Gubernatis to S, 12 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 329. ²⁶² Copy of royal order, addressed to governor and captain general of Tierra Firme, 28 Dec. 1697, AGI/Panamá/164 f. 154–7. ²⁶³ Cf. Mariana to city of Valladolid, 16 Feb. 1671, AHMV/Actas/62 f. 480 ff.

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It was one thing to demand a donativo, another thing to receive anything. Many of those individuals who were expected to give instead sought to evade payment. Some sought formal exemption. In 1684 the Council of Orders unsuccessfully requested exemption from the donativo on coaches for the caballeros of the Orders, since the latter were religious. Individual titled nobles and grandees, lacking corporate representation, petitioned on their own behalf. In 1694, for example, the marquise of Lapilla requested a reduction of the donativo demanded of her, to 200 ducats, on the ground that she had given a donativo in 1693 and had also paid 1,500 ducats (i.e., the media anata tax) on succeeding to her title; her petition was rejected, as were so many, on the ground that to allow it would set a bad precedent.²⁶⁴ Some petitioners did succeed. The count of Orgaz gained exemption from payment of the 500 ducats requested of him in 1694, on the grounds that his house enjoyed no mercedes; that the king had appropriated his juro revenues; that his estates were sequestrated to pay his creditors; and that he only enjoyed an allowance from them of 2,000 ducats a year.²⁶⁵ Those who did not secure formal exemption might offer something in lieu or declare their inability to pay.²⁶⁶ Some did pay, including the councillors of state in the summer of 1693.²⁶⁷ Those who contributed sought to extract maximum advantage for themselves and their families for their generosity: in 1675 the bishop of Calahorra, petitioning for an hábito for a nephew, successfully urged his own services, including contributions to different donativos.²⁶⁸ Obtaining donativos from the cities of Castile was not always easy either. In 1674 the regidores of Burgos agreed to give 3,000 ducats over two years (1674 and 1675) towards the donativo of 1,000,000 sought by the Crown.²⁶⁹ In 1676 the city was approached again. In the council session of 16 April 1676, one of the regidores, Don Miguel de Salamanca, who had led earlier opposition to such grants, proposed—after outlining Burgos’s own financial difficulties—to grant just 2,000 ducats (over the following two years). Most of the other regidores agreed with him, although Don Andrés de Melgosa suggested giving 3,000 ducats as in 1674, The corregidor was obliged to close the session without agreement having been reached.²⁷⁰ Only on 5 May did the councillors finally decide, again following Don Miguel’s lead, to give 3,000 ducats, but over 3 years (1676, 1677, and 1678), an offer which the corregidor accepted on behalf of the monarch.²⁷¹ ²⁶⁴ CCámara, 13 Mar. 1694, AHN/Consejos/4465/19. ²⁶⁵ CCámara, 18 Dec. 1694, AHN/Consejos/4465/150. ²⁶⁶ De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 12 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 327. ²⁶⁷ Stanhope to Nottingham, 17 June 1693, Spain under Charles, 52. ²⁶⁸ CCámara, [1675], AHN/Consejos/4448/47. Cf. CCámara on petition of Don Joseph de Sancha y Ayala, regidor of Cuenca, [1691], AHN/Consejos/4462/39. ²⁶⁹ AMB/Actas/1675, f. 226 ff. That same year one regidor of Valladolid proposed offering only 8,000 ducats, another thought that in view of the city’s difficulties Mariana should be asked not to request a donativo, AHMV/Actas/64 f. 423 ff. ²⁷⁰ AMB/Actas/1676, f. 107–9. Don Miguel had been reluctant to agree all that the Crown had requested in 1674, AMB/Actas/1674, f. 38 ff. For truculence in Seville in 1676 and 1677, cf. Martínez Ruiz, Finanzas Municipales, 275, and 283–8. ²⁷¹ AMB/Actas/1676, f. 158 ff. Don Andrés de Melgosa had proposed payment over just two years (as requested in the king’s letter).

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Donativos, clearly, were rarely truly voluntary. In addition, those whose wealth it was hoped to tap passed the burden on wherever possible. In the cities, most donativos were, in fact, funded by arbitrios, mostly indirect local impositions, or quotas, levied by virtue of royal licences, or facultades.²⁷² These attracted some criticism on the ground that they merely added to the burden carried by the king’s subjects,²⁷³ and in requesting the donativo of 1674 it appears that the regent sought to avoid resort to these means. However, the town councils thwarted her intentions: in August 1674 the Cámara protested that, contrary to the regent’s express wish that the donativo requested in the summer of 1673 should be voluntary rather than raised by repartimientos or quotas, the Junta de medios was granting facultades allowing the raising of money by way of quotas imposed on local residents.²⁷⁴ Thereafter, the grant of facultades continued to be bound up with the payment of donativos. In 1676 the corregidor of Burgos, when accepting the council’s offer of 3,000 ducats, also approved its appropriation, to pay that donativo, of various arbitrios, pending arrival of a royal facultad allowing the council to impose a new duty;²⁷⁵ in 1678, when the town of Medellín requested permission to sell the acorns from its commons in order to pay its milicias obligations, it was objected that such facultades were only usually granted in connection with donativos.²⁷⁶ It is, unfortunately, difficult to obtain any precise idea of what Carlos II received in donativos, from which corregidores,²⁷⁷ and collectors took a (tiny) cut.²⁷⁸ The results of the donativos of both 1667 and 1678 were said to be poor,²⁷⁹ while those of 1671 and 1673 apparently yielded only half of what was anticipated.²⁸⁰ These results were disappointing for the Crown, not least because donativos were often earmarked for the payment of the financiers supplying the armies and fleets. Seville’s donativo of 1667, for example, was used to pay Juan Andrea Espinola, factor of the Armada del Mar Océano, and Francisco Centani, who had agreed to remit 300,000 escudos to Flanders.²⁸¹ Not surprisingly, ²⁷² Mariana to city of Burgos, 20 July 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, ff. 177–8. ²⁷³ The Junta de encabezamientos (1682–3) opposed arbitrios for this reason, J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘Absolutismo y fiscalidad en Castilla a finales del siglo XVII: el encabezamiento general del Reino (1682–85)’, ETF, ser. IV 2 (1989), 185–6. ²⁷⁴ CCámara, 25 Aug. 1674, AHN/Consejos/4447/98. Already, on 12 Mar. 1674, Mariana had issued a facultad allowing Burgos’s regidores to impose duties on wine, to raise 2,000 of the 3,000 donativo they had agreed, AMB/Actas/1674, f. 136 ff. ²⁷⁵ AMB/Actas/1676, f. 158 ff. In 1677 Gibraltar offered 800 ducats towards the donativo for rebuilding the fleet in return for a prorogation of its existing arbitrios for four years, CCámara, 4 Aug. 1677, AHN/Consejos/4450/155. ²⁷⁶ CCámara, [1678], AHN/Consejos/4451/88. ²⁷⁷ J. M. de Bernardo Ares, ‘Fiscal pressure and the city of Cordoba’s communal assets in the early seventeenth century’, in Thompson and Yun Casalilla, Castilian Crisis, 210–11. ²⁷⁸ Mateo de San Martín, vecino of Aranda de Duero, and collector of the donativos there in 1674–5 and 1676–7 was allowed 1%, AGS/CMC/3/2909/10. ²⁷⁹ Diario de Noticias, CODOIN, 67 (1877), 103. ²⁸⁰ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 57. ²⁸¹ Martínez Ruiz, Finanzas Municipales, 272–3. In 1676 the corregidor of Aranda was ordered to pay 2,800,000 maravedis of the donativo of that town (for 1676–7) to Don Manuel José Cortizos de Villasanta, marquis of Villaflores, for his remittances to Flanders and Catalonia, CII to Don Juan Buelta de Velasco, 24 Mar. 1676, AGS/CMC/3/2909/10. (Unfortunately, the donativo yielded

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Burgos’s failure in 1676 to agree speedily a donativo, and to pay over two years, vexed ministers: the corregidor was told that, if not paid promptly, the city’s donativo would be of little use.²⁸² In fact, and understandably, given the frequency of donativos, donors were slow to pay and arrears mounted: in 1693 Carlos II ordered recovery of sums outstanding from the donativo of 1689.²⁸³ For all their defects, however, donativos—which provide a crude index of the wealth of Carlos II’s Spain²⁸⁴—contributed yet another element to the complicated fiscal structure that sustained the Spanish Monarchy in these decades.²⁸⁵

OFFLOADING THE BURDEN Donativos were just one of many ways in which Carlos II was able to offload the burden of imperial defence. Among those expected to take up that charge were the titled nobles and grandees, who were asked to recruit troops for the king: the duke of Osuna, for example, claimed that troops raised at his own cost in Andalusia in the 1680s cost him 200,000 ducats.²⁸⁶ While nobles could perhaps have contributed more, it has to be borne in mind that the patrimonies of some of the greatest houses were still suffering from the general economic downturn and the consequences of earlier services to the Crown;²⁸⁷ that some offices open to nobles, including prestigious embassies, often left them out of pocket;²⁸⁸ and that while some escaped the worst consequences of the appropriation of both pensions and juros (below), many did not. Carlos II also called on the Church to fund the defence of the Catholic Monarchy, particularly against its Protestant and non-Christian enemies overseas. Besides securing Papal consent to the renewal of the apostolic or ecclesiastical ‘graces’, Carlos sought other grants. The outcome of an attempt to secure Papal approval for an extraordinary levy on the clergy of the Indies from 1671 to fund the recovery of Panama is unclear.²⁸⁹ However, in September 1677 Innocent XI granted Carlos a levy of one-tenth (i.e., 800,000 ducats) on ecclesiastical incomes nearly 500,000 maravedis less than this.) In 1691 sums pencilled in to repay Grillo’s asiento of 1,400,000 pesos (above) included 100,000 expected by way of a donativo from Madrid, Operti to VA, 2 Mar. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 2. ²⁸² Don Benito Trellez to corregidor of Burgos, 23 May 1676, AMB/Actas/1676, f. 195. ²⁸³ CII to governor of Castile, 22 Feb. 1693, AHN/Consejos/10120. ²⁸⁴ Seville, whose donativos were perhaps the largest (apart from those of Madrid) paid nearly 500,000 ducats in donativos between 1671 and 1684, Escalona Jiménez, ‘Donativos’, 290. Valladolid’s contribution to the donativo of 1674, 1% of the total, was three times that of Burgos. ²⁸⁵ Cf. figures in Martínez Ruiz, Finanzas Municipales, 275. ²⁸⁶ Kamen, ‘España en la Europa’, 259. ²⁸⁷ On the economic plight of various grandees and títulos, cf. Kamen, Spain in later, 237 ff.; and for the duke(s) of Osuna, L. J. Gladstone, ‘Aristocratic Landholding and Finances in Seventeenthcentury Castile: The Case of Gaspar Téllez Girón, duke of Osuna (1656–1694)’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia (1977). ²⁸⁸ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 247–8. ²⁸⁹ Cf. memoria, AGI/Panamá/159, f. 463 ff.

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in Castile, for the defence of the African garrisons,²⁹⁰ although Don Juan reduced this to a demand for 490,000 ducats over four years following protests from the Castilian clergy.²⁹¹ In 1693 Innocent XII granted the king a levy of one-tenth on ecclesiastical incomes in the Indies to fund their defence against (heretical) pirates.²⁹² Execution was delayed by difficulties regarding its administration,²⁹³ but the tenth—or a subsidy of 1 million ducats—was re-granted in 1699 to fund the expulsion of the Scots from Darien.²⁹⁴ Earlier, in 1697, Carlos II authorized the Jesuits to colonize California, a task which had largely defeated the Crown hitherto, on condition that possession was taken in the name of Spain and that the royal treasury did not have to supply funds; in this way the king effectively delegated (the cost of) the further integration into the Monarchy of that territory.²⁹⁵ Carlos II also asked individual ecclesiastics and institutions to fund appropriate military activities or organizations in less obviously religious wars in Europe. In Galicia, where the Church was especially wealthy and powerful, ecclesiastical bodies were frequently asked to recruit troops for Flanders (Chapter 1). For their part, in 1683, the Catalan bishops contributed to the costs of fortifying various places threatened by the French.²⁹⁶ During the Nine Years War, Castilian bishops, archbishops, cathedral chapters, and other religious bodies were asked to help pay for the field hospital of the army of Catalonia;²⁹⁷ and in 1694 the prelates of the ten Castilian cities in which new regiments were to be raised from the 2 per cent levy were asked to fund their portable (or field) chapels, or capillas.²⁹⁸ The response to these requests was not entirely satisfactory. In 1693 when Carlos II asked the Congregation of Valladolid for a subsidy for the war, he was given short shrift;²⁹⁹ and in 1694, whereas the cardinal archbishop of Toledo and the bishops of Valladolid and Cordoba agreed to fund regimental chapels, the bishops of Cuenca and Jaen refused.³⁰⁰ Even when a contribution was agreed, it was not always paid promptly: in 1696 the archbishops of Santiago and Seville both owed arrears on annual payments due to the naval hospital at Cadiz.³⁰¹ On other ²⁹⁰ Carpintero Aguado, ‘Las décimas eclesiásticas en el siglo XVII: un subsidio extraordinario’, in P. Fernández Albaladejo (ed.), Monarchía, Imperio y Pueblos en la España Moderna Actas de la IV Reunión Cientifica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna (Alicante, 1997), 755. ²⁹¹ Marqués, Santa Sede, 51–4; Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 65. ²⁹² Cf. Marquis of Cogolludo to CII, 2 Aug. 1693, AGI/Panama/159, ff. 436–7, enclosing copy of Papal brief. ²⁹³ Cf. CCIndies, 1 Feb. 1695, AGI/Panamá/159, f. 549–71. The council objected to allowing the nuncio to administer the levy, claiming that this would breach the royal monopoly of ecclesiastical patronage in the Indies. ²⁹⁴ CCIndies, 20 June 1699, AGI/Panamá/162, ff. 160–70; CII to archbishop of Lima, 27 Mar. 1700, AGI/Panamá/164, f. 435. ²⁹⁵ F. J. Weber, ‘The Pious Fund of the Californias’, HAHR, 43 (1963), 78 ff. ²⁹⁶ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 208. ²⁹⁷ Cf. BNM Ms 2995, f. 227 for requests of this sort to the monastery of San Jerónimo, Cordoba, in 1691 and 1692; and CII to governor of CC, 6 Sept. 1694, AHN/Consejos/10123. ²⁹⁸ CJLG, 24 Feb. 1694, AGS/GA/2917. ²⁹⁹ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 89. ³⁰⁰ CJLG, 23 and 26 Mar., 6 Apr. and 26 May 1694, AGS/GA/2947. ³⁰¹ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 209.

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occasions, the clergy were sensitive about threats to their fiscal immunities.³⁰² Not surprisingly, some ministers would have liked more from a wealthy corporation, prompting occasional discussion (particularly in wartime), of the appropriation of clerical property, or desamortización, and of ways to halt the increase in clerical numbers.³⁰³ These discussions may have led nowhere, but some other initiatives provided other ways to tap clerical wealth.³⁰⁴ Among those on whom the cost of war was off-loaded were the cities of Castile (and Andalusia), which, besides contributing to donativos, also raised men for the king at their own expense. Burgos exemplifies the burden shouldered by those cities in ‘serving’ with recruits during the Nine Years War. Between 1690 and 1694, the city supplied 216 men and 25 horses at a cost of 110,500 reales.³⁰⁵ These ‘services’ prevented Burgos from fulfilling its annual servicio de milicias obligation of 8,000 reales between 1691 and 1694, such that arrears of 32,000 accumulated. The king agreed to write off 16,000 and to allow the council to impose another arbitrio; none the less by 1696 the arrears had risen to 24,000 reales, necessitating the prorogation of the earlier arbitrio.³⁰⁶ The money for these ‘services’ was raised by loans which were repaid by various indirect impositions on the inhabitants of Burgos, usually in the form of duties on foodstuffs. In February 1690 Carlos II allowed the ayuntamiento to impose a duty on wine to pay for the company it offered;³⁰⁷ in 1691 (and subsequent years) the king prorogued the imposition—8 maravedis on a pitcher of over 16 litres of red wine and 16 on one of white—so that the city could recruit that company;³⁰⁸ in 1693 the mounted men provided by the city were paid for by a loan which was repaid out of a duty of 2 maravedis on each pound of beef and sheep which passed through Burgos’s butcher shops or slaughterhouses.³⁰⁹ These ‘services’ were typical of those provided by all the cities of Castile and Andalusia in the reign.³¹⁰ ³⁰² Cardinal Portocarrero expressed concern about the salt price increase in 1695, to little effect, Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 285–6. ³⁰³ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 13, 152. ³⁰⁴ In 1677 the charterhouse of El Paular, a wealthy sheepowner, purchased territory detached from the jurisdiction of Segovia, for 8,000 ducats, Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 94. ³⁰⁵ AMB/Actas/1695, f. 51. When objecting to the new imposition on salt the regidores of Burgos claimed that they had paid over 100,000 ducats in levies since 1690, AMB/Actas/1695, f. 112. ³⁰⁶ Cf. copies of royal facultades, 8 Mar. and 7 Sept. 1696, AMB/Actas/1696, ff. 83–4, 289–90. ³⁰⁷ Copy of royal facultad in AMB/HI-4308. ³⁰⁸ Copies of royal facultades, 10 Jan. 1691, 5 Jan. 1692, and 12 Feb. 1693, AMB/HI-4309, 4310, 4311, and (that of 1691) in AMB/Actas/1691, ff. 24–5. A list of the town’s taxes, AMB/Actas/1691 f. 60 ff., notes that it was introduced (and indicates the yield of this excise, allowing comparison with those of other impositions). ³⁰⁹ Copy of royal facultad, 1 July 1694, AMB/HI-4312. ³¹⁰ For those of Medina del Campo, cf. B. Yun Casalilla, Sobre la Transición al Capitalismo en Castilla. Economía y Sociedad en Tierra de Campos (1500–1830) (Valladolid, 1987) cuadro 64; of Malaga, cf. F. J. Quintana Toret, ‘Endeudamiento municipal, mercado financiero y tesoros en Andalucía. Los censualistas del concejo malagüeño (siglos XVI–XVII)’, CN, 17 (1989), 289; and of Valladolid, cf. J. Ruiz de Celada, Estado de la Bolsa de Valladolid. Examen de sus Tributos, Cargas y Medios de su Extinción. De su Gobierno y Reforma (Valladolid, 1777), ed. by B. Yun Casalilla (Valladolid, 1990), 117, 137, 145 ff.; A. Gutiérrez Alonso, ‘Un aspecto poco conocido de la crisis del siglo XVII: el endeudamiento municipal. El ejemplo de Valladolid’, IH, 6 (1987), 9 ff., and HMV/Actas/70 f. 422, 443, 458 ff.

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The urban oligarchs received hábitos and other mercedes from a king grateful for their co-operation, but their services to the Crown meant that long-term municipal debt increased everywhere,³¹¹ and with it the burden of the arbitrios introduced to fund it.³¹² In the eighteenth century this debt was seen by those wishing to revive the decayed cities of Castile as among the greatest burdens those communities carried.³¹³ In effect, the facultades granted by Carlos II meant that the king was ‘permitting’ new taxation, by-passing the Cortes, and might be thought to demonstrate the real authority enjoyed by the monarch, who generally obtained what he wanted, within the bounds set by the resources of the cities concerned. Some, at least, of Carlos II’s subjects were concerned at what was happening and sought a solution—i.e., the assembly of the Cortes (Chapter 5).

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INDIES For many, the rise of Habsburg Spain depended on the wealth it derived from the Americas, Spain itself being too poor to support unaided the cost of empire.³¹⁴ Not surprisingly, therefore, the apparent collapse of revenues from the Indies after 1600, and especially after 1660,³¹⁵ might seem to be decisive. Various developments contributed to this failure. For one thing, less silver was being mined in Peru and New Spain (Mexico), due, in part, to a shortage of the necessary labour and of the quicksilver needed to process the silver ore.³¹⁶ In addition, a growing proportion of the Crown’s Indies revenues were spent locally, on defence,³¹⁷ used to make payments assigned there by the king and his ministers,³¹⁸ or sent to the Philippines.³¹⁹ ³¹¹ Hernández, A la sombra, 40–1, 86–7, 226–7, 285; J. M. Navalpotro y Sánchez Peinado, ‘La Formación de la Junta de Rentas de Madrid de 1680’, Cuadernos de Historia del Derecho, 3 (1996), 207 ff.; J. I. Martínez Ruiz, ‘Crédito público y deudas municipales en España (siglos XV–XVIII)’, in Bernal, Dinero, 863 ff.; Gutiérrez Alonso, ‘Un aspecto’, 9 ff., and idem, Estudio, 387. ³¹² Gutiérrez Alonso, Estudio, 373–4, 393–4. ³¹³ Cf. Ruiz de Celada, Estado, passim; F. Ruiz Martín, ‘Credit Procedures for the Collection of Taxes in the Cities of Castile during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: The Case of Valladolid’, in Thompson and Yun Casalilla, Castilian Crisis, 169 ff., and C. de la Hoz García, ‘Las Reformas de la Hacienda Madrileña en la Epoca de Carlos III’, in Equipo Madrid, Carlos III, Madrid y la Ilustración (Madrid, 1988), 99–100. Carlos II had sought to ‘reform’ the town’s finances as early as 1680, Navalpotro y Sánchez Peinado, ‘Formación’. ³¹⁴ C. Martínez Shaw, ‘Estudio Preliminar’, in A. García-Baquero González, Andalucía y la Carrera de Indias 1492–1824 (facs. edn., Granada, 2002), 10. ³¹⁵ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 182; Kamen, Spain in Later, 135. ³¹⁶ Brading and Cross, ‘Colonial Silver Mining’, 568 ff.; M. F. Lang, ‘New Spain’s Mining Depression and the Supply of Quicksilver from Peru 1600–1700’, HAHR, 48 (1968), 631. ³¹⁷ Cf. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 218 (Mexico) and 243 ff. (Peru); and H. Tovar Pinzon, ‘Remesas, situados y Real Hacienda en el Siglo XVII’, in Bernal, Dinero, 241 ff. ³¹⁸ Cf. Resumen . . . y contribución del Comercio en las cinco últimas ocasiones de Galeones, [1677], AGS/E/1947/130 and Resumen y contribución del Comercio en las cinco últimas flotas, [1677], AGS/E/1947/131. ³¹⁹ According to the Council of State (1680), Mexico remitted cash and provisions worth 700,000 pesos to the Philippines each year, Marqués, Santa Sede, 56.

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During the count of Galve’s viceroyalty of New Spain (1688–96), for example, only one-sixteenth (926,000 pesos) of the entire receipts (14,750,000 pesos) of the royal treasury there were remitted to Spain.³²⁰ Nor can we ignore the breakdown of the monopoly system established in the sixteenth century—based first at Seville, and from 1680 at Cadiz—which was intended to ensure that the Indies trade benefited Castile and its king.³²¹ Not only did the organized fleets—the flota and galeones that were the hub of that system—sail less frequently and regularly between Spain and the Americas in Carlos II’s reign,³²² in part because of the greater threat posed by enemies at sea,³²³ but foreigners were increasingly providing the goods carried by those fleets.³²⁴ Those who were not supplying the Spanish colonists via Seville and Cadiz, using Spanish front-men, were often doing so from their own territories in the Caribbean, including, for example, the English in Jamaica.³²⁵ As Spanish participation in the trade declined, so too did the revenues the Crown obtained from it.³²⁶ Some, at least, of Carlos II’s subjects believed the Indies no longer sustained imperial Spain.³²⁷ However, if a larger proportion of local resources was being used to repel foreign attacks in the Americas, those resources were simply being deployed where they were needed and maintaining Carlos II’s empire.³²⁸ Payments made in the Indies also enhanced the larger defence capability of the Monarchy.³²⁹ More important, the sombre picture outlined above is overdrawn. For one thing, king and ministers were not passive in the face of the problems they faced. From the late 1660s there were efforts to revive the mita system of forced native labour for Potosí’s silver mines; these proved largely abortive but they suggest that in this sphere, too, Bourbon reformism was anticipated in the reign of Carlos II.³³⁰ For another, silver production was by no means as depressed as was once thought: Peru was in long-term decline as a source of silver after 1660, but a really serious fall in output was only apparent from c.1680, and some at least of the shortfall was ³²⁰ Haring, ‘Ledgers’, 178. Cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 136 (money from Peru, 1682). ³²¹ A. García-Baquero González, ‘Andalusia and the Crisis of the Indies Trade, 1610–1720’, in Thompson and Yun Casalilla, Castilian Crisis, 115 ff. That system was outlined in J. Veitia y Linaje, Norte de la Contratación de las Indias Occidentales (Seville, 1672). ³²² Cf. the list of flotas and galeones, 1669–1700, in Kamen, Spain in Later, 133. ³²³ Fear of French attack kept the silver fleet in Havana in 1693, Operti to ST, 5 Nov. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³²⁴ Kamen, Spain in Later, 182 ff. ³²⁵ C. Nettels, ‘England and the Spanish American Trade (1680–1715)’, JMH, 3 (1931), 1–32. ³²⁶ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 209. ³²⁷ Cf. Álvarez Osorio (1687), cited by C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (London and Oxford, 1918), 56. ³²⁸ In 1699–1700, orders were sent to viceroys and others in the Indies to supply the expedition being sent to Darien, Storrs, ‘Disaster at Darien . . . ?’, 24. ³²⁹ In 1676 Carlos ordered that Valentin Pérez de Dunslague be paid in Panama for 2 vessels being built for the king in Holland, Relación, 16 Sept. 1677, AGS/E/1947/134. ³³⁰ J. A. Cole, ‘An Abolitionism Born of Frustration. The Count of Lemos and the Potosí Mita, 1667–73’, HAHR, 63 (1983), 307 ff.; J. Lynch, review of Cole, The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labour in the Andes (Stanford, 1985), JLAS, 18 (1986), 444–5; and I. González Casasnovas, Las dudas de la Corona. La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosí (1680–1732) (Madrid, 2000).

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being made good from New Spain, which was recovering—particularly in the 1690s—from its own earlier recession.³³¹ In fact, the Indies trade remained buoyant in the late seventeenth century,³³² and silver continued to pour into Spain. According to Jan Everaert five-yearly totals in the period 1671–1700 oscillated between 35 million and 66 million pesos, exceeding those in what used to be thought of as the peak years, the 1590s.³³³ For his part, Michel Morineau puts imports of precious metals in the five-year period between 1676 and 1680 at 84,500,000 pesos, the second highest quinquennial total throughout the seventeenth century.³³⁴ Individual treasure fleets, in some respects more important than five-yearly averages,³³⁵ were among the richest ever reaching Spain: the galeones of 1691 carried 40 million pesos and the flota of 1697 30 million.³³⁶ The exact amount of silver returned to Spain, and its significance, remains a matter of debate,³³⁷ but the view that little or no silver reached Spain under Carlos II is no longer tenable. But what was Carlos II’s share of that wealth? The sums brought for the king were, generally speaking, smaller than private cargoes,³³⁸ while much of the latter in fact profited the non-Spaniards operating through Cadiz and Seville.³³⁹ However, private silver was vulnerable to appropriation by the king, above all in an emergency, i.e., in wartime. In 1677, the Governor of the Low Countries urged that the cargoes aboard the galeones and flota were the salvation of the Monarchy, and that seizing them would harm the king’s enemy, because of the foreign—in this instance French—presence in the Indies trade.³⁴⁰ From the perspective of royal needs, therefore, exactly who owned the silver was of little importance; indeed, ³³¹ H. S. Klein, ‘The Great Shift: The Rise of Mexico and the Decline of Peru in the Spanish American Colonial Empire, 1680–1809’, Revista de Historia Económica, 13 (1995), 35 ff.; P. J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas 1546–1700 (Cambridge, 1971), 195; Brading and Cross, ‘Colonial Silver’, 568 ff. ³³² Cf. L. García Fuentes, El Comercio Español con America 1650–1700 (Seville, 1980), 412; and J. Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700–1808 (Oxford, 1989), 16. ³³³ J. Everaert, De internationale en koloniale Handel der Vlaamse Firma’s te Cadiz 1670–1700 (Bruges, 1973), 902, in Kamen, Spain in Later, 135–6. ³³⁴ M. Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleaux métaux. Les retours des trésors américains d’après les gazettes hollandaises (XVIIème et XVIIème siècles) (Paris, 1985), 83, 250 ff. ³³⁵ Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Las remesas’, 168; Álvarez Nogal, Crédito, 17. ³³⁶ Everaert, De internationale, in Kamen, Spain in Later, 136. ³³⁷ García-Baquero González, ‘Andalusia and the crisis’, 115 ff.; J. M. Oliva Melgar, ‘Realidad y Ficción en el Monopolio de Indias: una reflexión sobre el sistema imperial español en el siglo XVII’, Manuscrits, 14 (1996), 329 ff.; F. Pease and H. O. Noejovich, ‘La cuestión de la plata en los siglos XVI–XVII’, Histórica, 24 (2000), 365 ff.; D. Weiland, review of Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, HAHR, 82 (2002), 339–44. ³³⁸ For the galleons of 1667, cf. Sandwich to Arlington, 21 Dec. 1667, Hispania Illustrata, 87–9. For 1676, 1679, 1682, and 1686, Kamen, Spain in Later, 137; only in 1679 was the king’s share greater. For the flota of 1693, cf. duke of Montalto, to Don Diego José Dormer, 12 Dec. 1693, BN/Ms 918, f. 27. ³³⁹ Kamen, Spain in Later, 138–9. According to the Venetian secretary in Madrid, the flota expected from the Indies in 1672–73 was worth more than 20,000,000 pieces of eight, most of it for the French and English, Rudio to Doge and Senate, 11 Jan. 1673, CSPV 1673–75, 3. ³⁴⁰ Villahermosa to CII, 6 Aug. 1677, AGS/E/2134. Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 384, for similar calls.

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the fact that Louis XIV’s subjects were prominent among the foreigners who had penetrated the Spanish economy and the Indies trade made justification of such seizures easier and more attractive in wartime; since the French presence in the trade was believed to help Louis XIV to fund his own war effort, some Spanish ministers saw strict application of the laws on participation in the Indies trade as a weapon in the war against the Sun King.³⁴¹ In fact, the threat of seizure was often merely the opening move in a negotiation between the king’s ministers and the trade, leading eventually to the imposition of an agreed fine or pardon (for breach of the regulations governing trade with the Indies), or indulto. In the summer of 1667, a threatened seizure of French effects was bought off by an indulto of 212,000 pesos,³⁴² and another in 1676 by one of 100,000 pieces of eight.³⁴³ Typical was the indulto levied on the galeones which returned to Cadiz in November 1691, with just 250,000 pesos of the king.³⁴⁴ That same month, Carlos II sent a commissioner to Cadiz to seize the effects (bullion and merchandise) of French merchants, to the value of 6 million pesos; if these could not be identified, he must seize those of ‘the [entire] trade’ (i.e., the Spanish merchants). The trade subsequently offered 2 million pesos, the king moderating his own demand to 4 million. Negotiations continued, conducted by a special junta appointed by the king, and agreement was reached in late December. (In the meantime, pending the conclusion of this bargaining, all other negotiations—of asientos—were effectively suspended.) The trade agreed to give 2 million pesos in cash, to have the Armada careened, and to fund it for six months (adding 3 vessels), to pay the crews, and to fit out the galeones for their return journey—all of which was said to total 4 million pesos.³⁴⁵ For the Savoyard envoy in Madrid—who was informed that the trade would have paid up to 8 million if pressed, and who believed that besides 44 million pesos officially registered the galeones had carried another 14 million contraband which Carlos II could have confiscated if his officials had acted swiftly—this was disappointing. He was told that the king had settled for less for fear of ruining the trade, and provoking unrest in Andalusia: 4 merchant ships had been lost in the Indies when the galeones left and 8 million–9 million pesos had gone down when a galleon sank; it would also be impossible to identify French effects without the co-operation of the trade. For these reasons, and the fact that the king and his ministers needed to know as soon as possible what funds were available to them, in ³⁴¹ Godolphin to Arlington, 20 June [1675], Hispania Illustrata, 236–9. ³⁴² Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 271. ³⁴³ Godolphin to Richards, 9 Apr. 1676, Hispania Illustrata, 264–5. ³⁴⁴ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 48. 400,000 pesos were already assigned to Grillo, for his asiento of 1,400,000 (above), Operti to VA, 5 Mar. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38 f. 2. ³⁴⁵ Operti to VA, 22 Nov., and 20 and 22 Dec. 1691, 28 Feb., and 13 March 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. Cf. also Stanhope to Nottingham, 9 Jan. 1692, SP 94/73 f. 51; Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 17; and García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 136, simply state that the consulado offered an indulto (1692) of 2,500,000 pesos.

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order to agree the asientos essential to preparations for the impending campaign, Carlos preferred to compromise.³⁴⁶ Besides those already mentioned, indultos of this sort were imposed in 1677, 1678, 1682, 1684, 1689, 1691, 1693, and 1697.³⁴⁷ They were also demanded (again for carrying illegal cargoes) from departing fleets, 500,000 pesos being levied on the flota of 1690,³⁴⁸ and on that of 1695.³⁴⁹ Indultos were also offered by the consulado, for example in 1676, to ensure that a flota did not go.³⁵⁰ One final type of fine, or rather licence, was that imposed on the navíos de registro, which sailed outside the flotas and galeones and were an important part of the military and naval lifeline of empire (Chapter 2), but which also engaged in (otherwise illegal) trading; Crown revenue from this source peaked in the 1670s and 1690s.³⁵¹ It is tempting to see the extent and level of indultos imposed in this reign as reflecting the real prosperity of the Indies trade under Carlos II.³⁵² That may well be so, but most indultos were negotiated at a time when the king was desperate to find funds for war, such that they are as much a measure of the needs of the Monarchy as of the wealth of the trade. The king also obtained servicios of one sort or another from the Indies trade, although the distinction between these and indultos (and other types of levy) was—and is—not always clear. Mariana secured a servicio from the consulado in 1671 for the Panama expedition.³⁵³ Subsequently, the trade ‘served’ Carlos II with 600,000 vellon reales in 1687, 2 million in 1688, 3,500,000 in 1689;³⁵⁴ advanced 60,000 pesos in 1697 towards the relief expedition sent to Cartagena;³⁵⁵ and in 1699 with 300,000 pesos to fund the expedition to dislodge the Scots from Darien, whose presence in the Indies clearly threatened the trade’s own interests.³⁵⁶ ³⁴⁶ Carlos II and his ministers promptly agreed the disposition of the 2 million pesos, Operti to VA, 17 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³⁴⁷ Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, 85; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 194; and Oliva Melgar, ‘Realidad y Ficción’, 342. In 1692 [–3] Carlos threatened a full inspection of the returning fleet, prompting the consulado to offer 2,700,000 escudos, which were accepted. In 1689, apparently, the consulado paid an indulto and gave a donativo (below), the two amounting to over 500,000 pesos, Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 80. M. E. Rodríguez Vicente, ‘Los Cargadores a Indias y su Contribución a los Gastos de la Monarquía 1555–1750’, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 34 (1977), 211 ff., omits indultos. ³⁴⁸ Marcos Martín, España en los Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, 549. ³⁴⁹ [Carlos II ?] to governor of CC, 13 and 14 May 1695, AHN/Consejos, 7208/14. According to Operti to ST, 16 June 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41, this was the largest item of a total of over 1 million pesos recently raised by the king’s ministers. ³⁵⁰ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 271. ³⁵¹ Z. Moutoukias, ‘Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires’, HAHR, 68 (1988), 780 ff., 801. ³⁵² Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 17. ³⁵³ García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 111–12. ³⁵⁴ Maura, Vida, 322. ³⁵⁵ CCIndies, 9 May 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, f. 99 ff. Apparently, the trade (i.e., the consulado of Seville) had not only given 1 million on the return of the last flota and galeones [1698], but had advanced the 60,000 for the Cartagena expedition, and contributed another 60,000 pesos to the fitting out of the next flota and a further 50,000 for the 2 ships of the carrera de Indris being built. ³⁵⁶ CCIndies, 21 Aug. 1699, AGI/Panamá/164, ff. 1–12, regarding the offer and conditions.

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Another possibility was to seek gifts, or donativos (below). In 1686 the consulado of Seville gave a donativo of 800,000 pesos; and at the end of 1693, following the arrival of the flota, the Seville trade ‘served’ the king with another, of 550,000 pesos.³⁵⁷ Although called a donativo by the king, part at least of this sum was a loan,³⁵⁸ which was the last resort of Carlos and his ministers. In 1679 the flota returned with a cargo estimated at 30 million pesos, but just 1,500,000 for the king, whereupon the president of the Council of Castile intimated to those who had received money on the flota (and the earlier galeones) that they must lend to the king.³⁵⁹ In 1686, too, the Cadiz trade ‘anticipated’ (advanced) 100,000 pesos for the Armada;³⁶⁰ and in the summer of 1693 Seville’s merchant community lent Carlos II 500,000 crowns, with the promise of repayment on the return of the flota.³⁶¹ As with indultos, these other grants or impositions generally required negotiation and concessions on the part of the Crown. In 1679, for example, following a gift from Cadiz of 80,000 crowns, the tribunal known as theJuzgado de Indias, which had been abolished at the instance of the Casa de Contratación in 1666, was restored and in 1680 the trade effectively moved to Cadiz.³⁶² The 500,000 pesos (donativo and loan) granted by the consulado in 1693 was given in return for a promise that Carlos II would no longer grant, (i.e., sell) patents of naturalization (which enabled foreigners to participate in the Indies trade without resort to Spanish agents).³⁶³ In 1699 the consulado sought various concessions—not all of which were made—in return for its advance for the Darien expedition.³⁶⁴ Silver from the Indies therefore continued to underpin the Monarchy. The budget for 1674 showed flotas and galeones contributing 3,500,000 ducats, almost 12 per cent of income/expenditure;³⁶⁵ and that for 1680 anticipated that they would contribute 376,797 silver escudos, or 13.6 per cent of total needs.³⁶⁶ Between 1670 and 1700 the Indies trade supplied Carlos II, in special impositions alone, with 9,000,000 pesos—more than 50 per cent of which was received in the 1690s.³⁶⁷ In addition, Carlos II’s share of silver brought back on the flota and galeones between 1666 and 1686 alone may have totalled just under 14 million ³⁵⁷ Cf. CII to president of the Casa de Contratación, 5 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40, f. 3, ordering him to pay the duke of Savoy’s envoy 100,000 pesos out of that donativo. In February 1694 the arrival of the annual fleet from Buenos Aires, with 6,000,000 pesos for private individuals but nothing for the king, prompted hopes of obtaining something comparable to that given by the trade, Operti to ST, 11 Feb. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40. ³⁵⁸ Rodríguez Vicente, ‘Cargadores’, 220; and Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 274, both describe the money as a loan. ³⁵⁹ ‘Nove’, Madrid, 31 Aug. 1679, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 461. ³⁶⁰ Sánchez Belén, ‘Arbitrismo’, 168. ³⁶¹ Stanhope to Nottigham, 27 May 1693, SP 94/73, f. 164; same to Blathwayt, 28 May 1693, Madrid, Add. 21,489 f. 13. ³⁶² Haring, Trade and Navigation, 14. ³⁶³ A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La concesión de “naturalezas para comerciar en Indias” durante el siglo XVII’, in idem, Estudios Americanistas (Madrid, 1998), 131–3. ³⁶⁴ CCIndies, 21 Aug. 1699, AGI/Panama/164, ff. 1–12; Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 81. ³⁶⁵ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 59–60. ³⁶⁶ Kamen, Spain in Later, 361–2. ³⁶⁷ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 270 ff. Sánchez Belén’s calculations are only of special impositions. Vicente Rodríguez, ‘Cargadores’, is also incomplete. In 1692 the Seville consulado accused the Crown of imposing great costs on the trade, García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 70.

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pesos.³⁶⁸ This means that Carlos may have received—or benefited by, or was able to apply³⁶⁹—at least 23 million pesos over the reign as a whole, to which should be added the trade’s uncosted services.³⁷⁰ War funding depended on, and followed the rhythm of, the fleets. The conclusion of asientos for a total of 1,600,000 pesos, for Italy, Flanders, and Germany, in December 1676, followed close on the arrival in November of the flota;³⁷¹ twenty years later the disappointing yield of another flota (and the refusal of farmers to advance money) created enormous difficulties for the president of the Council of Finance.³⁷² This helps to explain the continued importance attached to the Indies and its resources,³⁷³ and why the protection of the returning flotas and galeones not only continued to preoccupy the trade,³⁷⁴ the king and his ministers, and Spain’s allies but also to influence the deployment of Spain’s fleet(s) (Chapter 2). On the other hand, it is perhaps surprising that more radical attempts were not made to maximize the revenue potential of the Indies, as some of the king’s allies urged him to do. There were proposals to make more effective Spain’s monopoly. Don Luis Cerdeño, of the Council of the Indies (and member of the Junta de comercio), was the author of one of many schemes for a Spanish monopoly trading company, modelled on those of the English and Dutch, which would more effectively exploit the Americas for the exclusive benefit of Carlos and his subjects.³⁷⁵ But these fell on deaf ears. There were good reasons for Carlos II’s approach, including the existence of powerful vested interests, notably the consulado in Seville,³⁷⁶ and the king’s ability to secure something, not least in wartime. A more determined and capable monarch—Louis XIV, William III, or Victor Amadeus II of Savoy—might have extracted more. But we should not exaggerate their likely success or Carlos II’s failure to take steps to tap the wealth of the Indies. Its importance explains why, in 1687 and again in 1695, the then president of the Council of the Indies was appointed superintendente general.³⁷⁷ ³⁶⁸ This figure is based upon Kamen, Spain in Later, 137. ³⁶⁹ In December 1693 the duke of Savoy was assigned 20,000 (later increased to 25,000) doppie from the returning flota, Operti to VA, 31 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/116. ³⁷⁰ In 1670 Mariana thanked the consulado for having supplied 5 ships at its own cost to prevent a Turkish attack and to escort ships carrying infantry to Sardinia, Rodríguez Vicente, ‘Cargadores’, 15. ³⁷¹ Avvisi, Madrid, 11 Dec. 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 102. Of course, this was the appropriate time to be providing for the next campaign. ³⁷² Stanhope to Vernon, 12 Dec. 1696, Spain under Charles, 105. ³⁷³ Cf. DLT to VA, 26 Aug. 1691, AST/LM/Olanda m. 1; Stanhope to Nottingham, 4 Nov. 1693, SP94/73 f. 233. ³⁷⁴ In 1690–1, the ‘trade’ gave 600,000 reales for the preparation of the fleet (which would meet the returning galeones), cf. CCS, 31 Mar. 1691, AGS/E/3654/34. ³⁷⁵ R. D. Hussey, ‘Antecedents of the Spanish Monopolistic Overseas Trading Companies (1624– 1728)’, HAHR, 9 (1929), 1–30; M. Sánchez-Apellaniz y Valderrama, ‘El Proyecto de Compañía de Comercio con Indias aprobado por la Junta de Comercio en 1683’, RDM, 33 (1962), 95 ff. ³⁷⁶ They occasionally (1667, 1692–3) refused to agree to the dispatch of the flota or galeones, García Fuentes, Comercio Español, 162–3, and frequently criticized Crown policy on all matters relating to the trade. ³⁷⁷ J. L. Bermejo Cabrero, ‘Superintendencias en la Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen’, AHDE, 54 (1984), 431.

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The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700 CREDIT

Credit was crucial to the functioning of imperial Spain, as it was to that of other states.³⁷⁸ Philip IV’s reign ended with the Crown owing 21,616,037 ducats to asentistas alone.³⁷⁹ Carlos II’s difficulties in securing credit frequently undermined the effectiveness of the Monarchy’s war effort.³⁸⁰ Nevertheless, borrowing was another resource, especially in wartime.³⁸¹ But credit was a complex matter, including short- and long-term debt and credit made available willingly and unwillingly. It also involved both the king’s own subjects and others who were not. The king could ‘anticipate’ future revenues, i.e., borrow in advance from collectors and farmers. During the Dutch War, revenues anticipated in this way included the yield of the media anata,³⁸² and that derived from tobacco,³⁸³ while in 1684, at the height of the Luxembourg War, the king asked the town of Madrid to ‘anticipate’ a servicio of 30,000 escudos offered by the guild of tavern-keepers.³⁸⁴ The importance of this type of borrowing is indicated by the fact that in the winter of 1695–6 the refusal of farmers and collectors to advance money, together with the disappointing flota, was said to have created great difficulties for the president of the Council of Finance.³⁸⁵ Another form of borrowing was simply to leave salaries and wages unpaid (above), issuing officials instead with interest-bearing government bonds, or juros, ‘situated’ on (i.e., to be paid from the receipts of ) specific revenues.³⁸⁶ Carlos and his ministers frequently saw juros as the solution to the problem of securing funds in the short term. In 1676, for example, a Junta de medios proposed seizing the cash balances of the cities of Castile in return for juros.³⁸⁷ Similarly, in 1689, the sale of 1 million ducats of juros at 5 per cent was ordered in the viceroyalty of Peru. Take-up was disappointing on this occasion, due perhaps to the impact of the Lima earthquake of 1687, but in 1696 desperate royal ministers tried again, adding the inducement of the suspension of all treasury payments in the viceroyalty except of juro obligations.³⁸⁸ However, king and ministers were also concerned about the extent to which interest payments absorbed revenues which—particularly in wartime—might be urgently needed elsewhere. In seeking to do something about this, they largely ³⁷⁸ Elliott, Imperial Spain, 205–6. ³⁷⁹ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 155. ³⁸⁰ Ribot, Monarquía, 632. Cf. also, Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Consenso e Imposición’, 985, and references. ³⁸¹ J. Gelabert, ‘Castile, 1505–1808’, in R. Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200–1808 (Oxford, 1999), 224–5. ³⁸² Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 217. ³⁸³ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 205 ff. ³⁸⁴ Royal order, 11 April 1684, AHN/Consejos/10112. ³⁸⁵ Stanhope to Vernon, 12 Dec. 1696, Spain under Charles, 105. ³⁸⁶ Dedieu, ‘El arca’, 117–19. ³⁸⁷ Mariana to president of CC, 14 May 1676, AHN/Consejos/7186. ³⁸⁸ K. J. Andrien, ‘The Sale of Juros and the Politics of Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1608–1695’, JLAS, 13 (1981), 17.

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imitated Philip IV, who had developed a practice of appropriation, or valimiento, which, in effect, involved imposing the media anata on the annual interest due to juristas, the holders of juros. Reflecting the extent of the interest (and the debt), this soon became a major revenue stream. Under Carlos II, most years between 1665 and 1700 saw the discounting of juros in one way or another, with appropriation peaking in years of war.³⁸⁹ Particularly striking was the ‘reform’ effected in 1677, at the height of the Dutch War.³⁹⁰ This annulled 50 per cent of the value of all juros but also distinguished between old (pre-1635) and new or modern (post-1635) juros; the remaining 50 per cent of the former became subject to the media anata and a tax (or discount) of 5 per cent and the remaining 50 per cent of the latter subject to the media anata and a tax (or discount) of 15 per cent.³⁹¹ These deductions caused hardship and resentment, which the Crown sought to head off by ‘reserving’ (i.e., not discounting) each year the juros of a number of religious bodies (including the Council of the Inquisition and the Society of Jesus), and those of various individual juristas (generally those with small annuities and the neediest).³⁹² In 1673 reserved juros were said to have totalled 1 million ducats, which, it was said, could not be repeated in 1674.³⁹³ Inevitably, juristas petitioned to have their juros ‘reserved’: these ranged from individuals— including royal officials,³⁹⁴ and urban oligarchs³⁹⁵—to ecclesiastical institutions not exempted.³⁹⁶ Some petitioners were successful, but most were not. The media anata de juros and valimiento in general were too valuable to ministers to surrender, not least because payments to asentistas were often assigned on them.³⁹⁷ In 1674 the Cámara of Castile opposed a request for the exemption of mercedes from the media anata de juros on precisely these grounds.³⁹⁸ Some juristas sought to make the best of a bad job, selling their juros to, for example, ecclesiastical institutions.³⁹⁹ But in the difficult conditions of the later 1670s these measures, which reduced the incomes of the élite,⁴⁰⁰ provoking protests,⁴⁰¹ no doubt increased political tensions (Chapter 5). ³⁸⁹ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 209, 211, 218; P. Toboso Sánchez, La Deuda Públíca Castellana durante el Antiguo Régimen (Juros) y su liquidación en el siglo XIX (Madrid, 1987), 178. Ripia, Práctica, 208 ff., lists all valimientos and discounts in the reign. ³⁹⁰ Castillo Pintado, ‘Los juros’, 64 ff. For many historians this measure was the first step towards the amortization of the juro debt. ³⁹¹ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 299. ³⁹² Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 88; Sanz Ayán, ‘La Evolución de las suspensiones de pagos en el siglo XVII. Concepto y utilidad’, in idem, Estado, monarquía, 62–4. ³⁹³ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 249. ³⁹⁴ In 1674 Don Francisco Merino de Arévalo, recently appointed corregidor of Ronda and Marbella, petitioned for payment of some of the 1,559,606 maravedis ‘discounted’ on juros he held (worth 228,250 mrs a year) and ‘situated’ on the almojarifazgo mayor of Seville, in the shape of an ayuda de costa to cover his removal expenses, AHN/Consejos/4447/59. ³⁹⁵ In 1678 Don Luis Antonio de Solís, regidor of Guadalajara, sought payment of 700 ducats of his juro revenues, saying that he was owed a total of 80,000, AHN/Consejos/4451/85. ³⁹⁶ In 1674 the Scots College in Madrid received just over half of the yield of a juro worth almost 18,000 vellon reales a year, the king appropriating the rest, Risposte [1674], Scottish Catholic Archives (Edinburgh), CA4/23/17. ³⁹⁷ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 87. ³⁹⁸ AHN/Consejos/4447/43. ³⁹⁹ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 65. ⁴⁰⁰ Friedman, Spanish Captives, 117. ⁴⁰¹ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 64.

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The king could also reduce rates of interest, diminishing the obligations of various institutions to their creditors, in order to secure for himself the sum saved by way of a servicio. In 1678, for example, Carlos II’s ministers obtained a donativo from Madrid by reducing the rate of interest it paid to its annuity holders, from 7 per cent to 5 per cent for three years, which was said to be worth 500,000 ducats.⁴⁰² In 1688 it was suggested that interest rates on censos be reduced (and the difference applied to the needs of the Crown), a measure dismissed as a breach of the conditions of the millones and difficult to implement.⁴⁰³ Like many of the other revenue-raising devices, the manipulation of interest rates hit, and was unpopular with, rentiers.⁴⁰⁴ Among those bodies best placed to lend to the Crown in Spain was the town of Madrid. In 1667 the ayuntamiento agreed a servicio of 500,000 escudos;⁴⁰⁵ and in 1674 the corregidor arranged a loan of 400,000 ducats, at 8 per cent, secured on various excises.⁴⁰⁶ Marid’s role as lender reflected the town’s size and wealth, and the fact that its inhabitants included many of those who were most at risk of appropriation (of salaries and juro income), and of requests for donativos, and for whom this a more lucrative way of lending to the king; it was also often more creditworthy than the Crown.⁴⁰⁷ Occasionally, the Crown sought to access the town’s wealth more directly. In the winter of 1690–1, for example, the appropriation of the sums which Madrid paid its own creditors (for earlier advances to the Crown) was considered by ministers, although the outcome is unclear.⁴⁰⁸ Others from whom the king borrowed included the consulado of Seville. In 1699 the consulado stipulated that the 300,000 pesos it advanced for the Darien expedition (above) should be regarded as a loan, repayable at 8 per cent; among the conditions it sought—without success—to attach to its advance was favoured treatment with respect to the repayment of 1,200,000 escudos owed it by the Crown for earlier advances.⁴⁰⁹ The king could also borrow abroad, both directly, or willingly, and indirectly, or unwillingly. Unwilling lending to the king took the form of subsidy arrears. By allowing arrears to accumulate, foreign princes and states were, paradoxically, subsidizing Spain’s war effort. At the end of 1677, during the Dutch War, it was calculated that Carlos II owed in subsidy arrears 2,770,289 reales.⁴¹⁰ The elector of Brandenburg was a creditor both then and during the Nine Years War: in 1691 ⁴⁰² De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 6 March 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 298. ⁴⁰³ Canga Argüelles, Diccionario de Hacienda, i. 271. ⁴⁰⁴ Cf. J. A. Álvarez Vázquez, ‘El Memorial del estamento eclesiástico en 1691 sobre la baja de la tasa de interés en fueros y censos’, Hispania, 139 (1978), 405–35. ⁴⁰⁵ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 52, ⁴⁰⁶ J. Fayard, ‘Credit public en Espagne au XVIIe siècle: les emprunts sur la ville de Madrid’, in La documentación notarial y la historia. Actas del II Coloquio de Metodología Histórica Aplicada (Santiago de Compostela, 1984), ii. 253 ff. ⁴⁰⁷ Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism’, 343. ⁴⁰⁸ Consulta of los Vélez, 4 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/4138. ⁴⁰⁹ CCIndies, 21 Aug. 1699, AGI/Panamá/164, ff. 1–12, on report of president of Casa de Contratación, regarding the offer. ⁴¹⁰ Relación de lo que importan los subsidios [end 1676?], AGS/E/2133.

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he sent a minister to Madrid, to seek arrears of 200,000 pesos, owed for troops serving in Flanders,⁴¹¹ and by 1698 he was owed the equivalent of 6,500,000 florins.⁴¹² Other creditors among the German princes included Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, who claimed in the summer of 1695 to be owed 900,000 escudos for his 6,000 troops in Spanish service in Flanders (since 1694, Chapter 1);⁴¹³ and the duke of Württemberg, whose troops served in Milan.⁴¹⁴ In Italy, the duke of Savoy was also owed large sums.⁴¹⁵ The accumulating arrears soured relations between the Spanish court and its allies. In the spring of 1676 the Dutch threatened to withdraw their fleet from Italy if their arrears—now totalling perhaps 700,000 escudos—were not paid,⁴¹⁶ and in 1678 declared that if their debt was not settled their ships would not leave Cadiz.⁴¹⁷ Only following the remittance to Cadiz of 100,000 pieces of eight did the Dutch agree to carry Carlos II’s troops to Catalonia.⁴¹⁸ Given the difficulties in securing the sums owed, creditors sought to turn their arrears to advantage in other ways. In 1677, having failed to secure his arrears,⁴¹⁹ the Danish king requested the cession of German territory, belonging to Carlos II as duke of Burgundy.⁴²⁰ The following year, the Brandenburg envoy, after more than two years of fruitless efforts to recover his master’s arrears, sought permission to send ships to the Indies, but without success.⁴²¹ In 1695 the duke of Savoy sent an envoy to Madrid, seeking—again to little effect—the cession of north Italian fiefs held by Carlos II, and even the governorship of Milan.⁴²² In view of Madrid’s failure to come to terms, some adopted tougher measures. In 1680 the vessel Charles II was seized at Ostend by ships flying the flag of the great elector, to the great embarrassment of Spanish ministers.⁴²³ Nevertheless, in many cases these arrears were not settled until after Carlos II’s death.⁴²⁴ ⁴¹¹ Operti to ST, 22 Nov. 1691, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ⁴¹² Count of Frigiliana to CII, 1 April 1693, AGS/E/3893. ⁴¹³ CCS, 24 Oct. 1695, AGS/E/3889; Operti to ST, 15 Dec. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. Max Emmanuel was said to be threatening to withdraw his troops and to put them into the service of the Dutch Republic. ⁴¹⁴ CCS, 4 Aug. 1692, AGS/E/3417/59. ⁴¹⁵ Cf. Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 114. Carlos II’s ministers contested the total owed, Operti to VA, 29 Dec. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41/162. ⁴¹⁶ Ribot Monarquía, 234 ff., 240 ff. Lira suggested allowing the Dutch to export salt from the Indies, not least because this would satisfy the debts owed them, but without success, Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 122–3. ⁴¹⁷ De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 12 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 328. ⁴¹⁸ De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 25 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 330; Avvisi, f. 336. ⁴¹⁹ De Gubernatis to ST, 2 April 1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 172. ⁴²⁰ CII to Villahermosa, 25 Nov. 1677; Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 280. ⁴²¹ Avvisi sent with de Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 4 Feb 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 287. ⁴²² Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 116; idem, ‘Army of Lombardy . . . Part II’, 17. ⁴²³ Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies’, 113–14; Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 261. ⁴²⁴ In 1700 the Danish king was still seeking his arrears, Carlos II to Max Emmanuel, 8 Oct. 1700, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 744. In 1710 the king of Prussia was promised Orange and part of Franche Comté, in settlement of debts owed by the Spanish Crown from the reign of Carlos II, H. Snyder (ed.), Marlborough–Godolphin Correspondence, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1975), i. 1419.

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Carlos II could also borrow from his allies in a more formal manner, above all from the Dutch. In 1667, following Louis XIV’s invasion of Flanders, it was proposed temporarily to cede part of the Spanish Low Countries to the Dutch, as security for a loan of 2 million escudos to fund defence measures;⁴²⁵ and in 1678 Don Juan proposed that the Dutch (and English) advance the funds needed to maintain the army of Flanders, promising repayment from the bullion carried by the flota and galeones.⁴²⁶ During the Nine Years War, Carlos II was allowed to raise loans in the Dutch Republic to a total equivalent to £317,000 (almost one-third of the total of about £1 million raised there by members of the Grand Alliance), charged on the revenues of the Spanish Low Countries, and geared to the defence and preservation of Flanders.⁴²⁷ For all their inventiveness, and the occasional windfall,⁴²⁸ Carlos II and his ministers sometimes had to admit defeat, declaring bankruptcy, i.e., suspending payments to all but those supplying the army and navy, and issuing new juros to the Crown’s other creditors, as had his predecessors.⁴²⁹ The regent seems to have intended a suspension in 1665–6, and again in 1675, although on neither occasion was one realized.⁴³⁰ One was declared, however, at the end of 1678, reflecting the pressures of the Dutch War.⁴³¹ Similar strains produced similar results in the Nine Years War. In January 1692, for example, bankruptcy was declared, releasing 8 million escudos.⁴³² Further operations of this sort occurred in November 1692,⁴³³ in March and December 1693, in January 1695,⁴³⁴ and in January and November 1696.⁴³⁵ Suspensions of payments, which hit asentistas hardest, may have been ⁴²⁵ Herrero Sánchez, Acercamiento, 129–30, 169, 190. Whether the money was actually given is unclear. The proposal was opposed by a Junta de teologos and—although this opposition was ignored by the Council of State and an agreement concluded in April 1668—was overtaken by events, i.e., the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. According to De Schrijver, ‘De Eerste Barriere’, 66, the Dutch did lend 2,000,000 pond. ⁴²⁶ Don Juan’s Paper to Godolphin, 6 Apr. 1678, Hispania Illustrata, 370–3. For Godolphin, who noted that Carlos received relatively little of the remittances from the Indies—£400,000 p.a. on average in the last twelve years—better terms must be offered, Godolphin to Coventry, 15 May 1678, Hispania Illustrata, 388–405. ⁴²⁷ Dickson and Sperling, ‘War Finance’, 296; and B. E. De Muinck, Een Regenthuishouding omstreeks 1700; gegevens uit de privé-boekhouding Van Mr. Cornelis de Jonge Van Ellemeet, outvangergeneraal der Verenigde-Nederlanden (1646–1721) (Hague, 1965), 86–9. In 1695 Carlos II borrowed 400,000 florins at 4% to repair the defences of the recently recovered Namur. Earlier, in 1693, the fort of Santa María on the Scheldt was pledged to the Dutch in return for 700,000 florins, for the army of Flanders, Tarino to VA, 3 Apr. 1693, AST/LM/Baviera, m. 12. ⁴²⁸ In 1696 Carlos II obtained 470,000 ducats a month on the death of his mother, whose provision as widow of Philip IV reverted to the Crown. This facilitated the provision of sums for Catalonia, Operti to VA, 12 July 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ⁴²⁹ Sanz Ayán, ‘Evolución’, 39 ff. In Philip IV’s reign alone suspensions had been declared in 1627, 1647, 1652, 1660 and 1662. ⁴³⁰ Cf. Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 97 ff. ⁴³¹ Kamen, Spain in Later, 367; Sanz Ayán, ‘Evolución’, 61. ⁴³² Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 292; Sanz Ayán, ‘Evolucion’, 63. ⁴³³ Unless otherwise stated, the following list is from Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 274–5, 341, and idem, ‘Evolución’, 63. ⁴³⁴ Operti to ST, 10 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ⁴³⁵ In November 1696 it was decreed that all who had advanced the king money on the 4,000,000 ducats reserved for public needs (following the budget reform of 1688) must wait four years for payment, at 5% interest, Operti to ST, 28 Nov. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43.

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overtaken as a financial instrument by the appropriation of juro annuities;⁴³⁶ nevertheless, suspensions remained an option for Carlos II and his ministers.

CONCLUSION It is a commonplace that in the reign of Carlos II Spain abandoned the international struggle, relieving Carlos’s subjects of the cost of empire. This was not entirely true. Carlos (and his mother before 1677) remained committed to the preservation of the Monarchy and, in consequence, his subjects continued to support a substantial fiscal burden, because armies, navies, and so on were costly. To meet these demands, Carlos sought to maximize his ordinary revenues, not least by efforts to improve administration, efforts which should be regarded as examples of defence-driven ‘fiscalism’ rather than of a more fundamental ‘reform’ of defective institutions.⁴³⁷ Imperial defence remained the priority, and could effectively block attempts to tackle deep-seated deficiencies of Castile’s tax system, most obviously in the case of los Vélez’s efforts to replace the millones with a more progressive tax (1687–8), which failed because the millones underpinned defence spending and could not be sacrificed.⁴³⁸ Carlos II also resorted to a range of extraordinary measures, above all in Castile, which continued to bear most of the cost of defending the Monarchy, supplemented by the resources of the Indies and of Carlos II’s other territories. Few of the revenue-raising measures resorted to in the reign were new. However, and again contrary to a widely held view, Carlos did impose what was, in effect, new taxation, during the Nine Years War. The reign also saw important changes in financial administration. Castile’s ability to carry the burden was limited by the generally weak economic environment,⁴³⁹ and by natural calamities, but we should beware of crude economic determinism.⁴⁴⁰ Some foreign observers, particularly those from smaller, poorer states, perceived Spain to be rich,⁴⁴¹ and believed that what was lacking was the will to impose rather than the wealth to be tapped.⁴⁴² In fact, large sums were raised, a testimony to the resources still to be found in Castile, to the capacity of a succession of finance ministers—including Don Lope de los Ríos,⁴⁴³ and the marquis of los ⁴³⁶ Sanz Ayán, ‘Evolución’, 64. ⁴³⁷ For these concepts, cf. A. García Sanz, ‘Castile 1580–1650: economic crisis and the policy of ‘reform’, in Thompson and Yun Casalilla, Castilian Crisis, 28–9. ⁴³⁸ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 298. ⁴³⁹ Cf. A. Marcos Martín, España en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII. Economía y Sociedad (Barcelona, 2000), 454 ff. ⁴⁴⁰ Cf. H. Kamen, ‘The Seventeenth-century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?’, P&P, 97 (1981), 144–5. ⁴⁴¹ Operti to VA, 7 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ⁴⁴² In 1678, according to the marquis of Astorga, the Junta de medios had identified sources of funds but its recommendations had not been implemented, for want of vigour, De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 12 May 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 327. For Carlos II, cf. Chapter 4. ⁴⁴³ For his career to 1667, cf. Fayard, Les Membres, 77.

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Vélez—and to the ability of the king to impose on his subjects.⁴⁴⁴ The continued cost of empire contributed to the decayed state of some at least of Castile’s towns. Unfortunately for those preoccupied with imperial defence, despite a resort to extraordinary measures of all sorts, borrowing inside and outside Spain, and to much improvisation and juggling of resources,⁴⁴⁵ the funds mobilized were often insufficient to meet the Monarchy’s enormous wartime needs. Carlos II’s armies and navies—and Spain’s overall war effort—suffered in consequence (Chapters 1 and 2). However, Spain was not alone in finding it difficult to fund war in this period: all the participants in both the Dutch War and the Nine Years War were hard pressed.⁴⁴⁶ More important, despite Spain’s difficulties, its armies and navies continued to function and to contribute to the survival of the Monarchy and be supported by allies, some of whom were attracted by the promise of subsidies. ⁴⁴⁴ Some foreigners acknowledged the effort that was being made, Operti to VA, 14 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ⁴⁴⁵ In 1686, for example, sums intended for the defence of the Americas against the buccaneers were suddenly switched to Spain itself, to meet pressing needs there, Céspedes del Castillo, ‘Defensa Militar’, 248–9. In 1694 the Savoyard envoy complained that his master’s subsidy from Naples had been diverted in 1691 to the Tuscan garrisons, in 1692 to fitting out the galleys and in 1693 to that of the Armada, Operti to VA, 3 June 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40/126. ⁴⁴⁶ For subsidies owed the duke of Savoy by William III, cf. Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 113–14.

4 Spanish Politics and Government . . . what account are we to give to God, the king, and his vassals of such a misgoverned minority? Don Manuel de Lira, May 1676¹ . . . our greatest toil is the flexibility of the king, and with the helmsman missing from this ship we cannot expect it but to capsize Duke of Montalto, 1686² I do not know whether the change at the Spanish Court will be good for us. The Count of Oropesa and D. Emanuel de Lira have retired, and seven new councillors of state are appointed, but that is not the way to restore affairs, too many ministers ruin states . . . Savoyard envoy at The Hague, July 1691³

INTRODUCTION The capacity of the Spanish Monarchy to weather the challenges it faced in the later seventeenth century was all the more impressive given that it experienced a sustained domestic political crisis.⁴ The most obvious cause of this difficulty was the apparent inadequacy of Carlos II in a system of government which depended on the monarch for its vigour. Carlos, born in 1661, succeeded as a minor. Throughout early modern Europe, minorities were disastrous for royal authority and strong government; that of Carlos II, which was complicated by the ambitions ¹ Lira to Pedro Coloma, 26 May 1676, BNM, Ms 10876, f. 220. ² Duke of Montalto to Pedro Ronquillo, 4 July 1686, CODOIN, LXVII, 357. ³ Count de la Tour [DLT] to marquis de Saint Thomas [ST], 13 July 1691, Hague, AST/LM/ Olanda, m. 1. ⁴ According to I. A. A. Thompson, ‘ “Money, Money, and Yet More Money!”. Finance, the FiscalState and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500–1650’, in C. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder, Col., and Oxford, 1995), 287, Carlos II’s reign saw ‘the collapse of internal authority, a tax freeze, and the retreat from hegemonic conflict. The three were closely related’. A. Carrasco Martínez, ‘Los grandes, el poder y la cultura política de la nobleza en el reinado de Carlos II’, SHHM, 20 (1999), 130, speaks of a ‘collapse of the state’. Cf. also A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘La crise intérieure de la monarchie des Habsbourgs espagnols sous Charles II’, in J. A. H. Bots and A. G. Weiler (eds.), The Peace of Nijmegen 1676–1678/79 La Paix de Nimègue (Amsterdam, 1980), 166.

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of Carlos’s illegitimate half-brother, Don Juan of Austria, was no exception. Carlos’s attainment of his majority in November 1675 ought to have put an end to this difficulty but did not, because he appeared unable to give firm direction of the sort provided by his predecessors.⁵ This difficulty, which was compounded by Carlos’s poor health and frequent illnesses,⁶ was bad enough. But the king also failed to father an heir, creating uncertainty at home—and abroad—regarding the succession.⁷ These difficulties inevitably affected the efforts of Carlos II and his ministers to defend the Monarchy.⁸ However, while acknowledging the impact of domestic developments upon the fate of the empire, we should not ignore the degree to which the Monarchy’s wars in turn shaped its internal politics. It is surely no coincidence that three of the political crises of the reign, those of 1676–7, 1691, and 1694–5, occurred against the background of war,⁹ and that that of 1668–9 followed the Monarchy’s first disastrous conflict wth Louis XIV and the conclusion of two treaties (with Louis and with the king of Portugal) in 1668 which represented a loss of territory and prestige. We cannot link every political problem or crisis of Carlos II’s reign to defence and foreign policy: that of 1699 which triggered Oropesa’s second fall from power did not fall into this category.¹⁰ Nevertheless, foreign or imperial issues continued to influence domestic politics long after 1659.¹¹ This was not least because of the efforts, outlined in earlier chapters, of Mariana, Carlos II, and their ministers to mobilize men and money for war— efforts which suggest that the monarch and his collaborators still enjoyed real authority or power, and which contributed to the process of ‘state formation’ in Spain.¹² ⁵ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 249, is damning. Stradling, with typical hyperbole, calls Carlos II an ‘ersatz king’, Europe and the Decline of Spain, 162. ⁶ Cf. Mariana of Neuburg to Elector Palatine, 16 Apr. 1693, in Adalbert of Bavaria and Maura Gamazo (eds.), Documentos inéditos referentes a las postrimerías de la Casa de Austria en España (Madrid, 1927–355; repr. in 2 vols., Madrid, 2004), i. 323. ⁷ The episode towards the end of the reign of Carlos’s exorcism—the origin of the label commonly applied to him of el hechizado, or ‘the bewitched’—is indicative of the importance of the succession and the lengths to which some were prepared to go to resolve (and exploit) the general concern, Kamen, Spain in Later, 390–1. Unfortunately, the affair has distorted perceptions of the king and his reign. ⁸ In 1690 the newly arrived Savoyard minister attributed apparent Spanish lethargy in the war to Carlos II’s lack of an heir, in consequence of which all were looking out for themselves, ignoring the common good, Operti to VA, 7 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35, f. 184. ⁹ News of the loss of Taormina, and a worsening of the Spanish position in Sicily, reached Madrid in November 1676, Avvisi sent with de Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 26 Nov. 1676, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 32, f. 96. Don Juan launched his coup the following month. ¹⁰ T. Egido, ‘El motín madrileño de 1699’, IH, 2 (1980), 253 ff. ¹¹ J. H. Elliott, ‘Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain 1598–1659’, in idem, Spain and its World 1500–1700 (London, 1989), 134. ¹² Cf. Andrés Ucendo, J. I., La fiscalidad en Castilla en el siglo XVII: los servicios de millones, 1621–1700 (Bilbao, 1999), 9 ff. B. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton, 1992), largely ignores Spain in its construction of political models regarding the impact of war in early modern Europe.

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This chapter seeks to clarify the link between Spanish politics and government and the survival of Carlos II’s Monarchy. It attempts to show that: (1) the politics of the reign centred on issues, notably the fate of the Monarchy, as well as office;¹³ (2) that existing structures of government, while sometimes slow moving, particularly in a crisis,¹⁴ broadly proved their worth;¹⁵ but (3) that where they were found wanting, particularly to meet the demands of war, there was change and improvement,¹⁶ suggesting that the administrative system could broadly cope with a less than vigorous monarch; (4) that, in fact, despite the apparent surrender of real power by the Crown, Carlos II was of greater importance, and the king (or rather the Monarchy, or developing state) perhaps more ‘absolute’ than some modern historians have allowed; and (5) that, nevertheless, the demands of war contributed to growing calls by the end of the reign for the assembly of the (Castilian) Cortes.

SPANISH POLITICS Any collapse of royal authority in the years immediately after 1665 was largely the result of Carlos II’s minority. Philip IV’s will provided that his widow, Mariana of Austria, should rule as regent until her son attained his majority (when he reached the age of 14, in November 1675), with the help of a five-man regency council, or Junta de gobierno.¹⁷ However, Mariana, with little experience of government,¹⁸ preferred to rely on her confessor, Father Nithard, who became the latest in a ¹³ The ‘new administrative history’ of early modern Spain which has emerged in recent decades is admirable, but focuses on prosopography and profit rather than on policy and principle: cf. J. L. Castellano, ‘Prólogo, in idem (ed.), Sociedad, Administración y Poder en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Granada, 1996), 7–9; and other studies in that volume. ¹⁴ W. Godolphin, Hispania Illustrata, ‘Preface’. ¹⁵ L. Ribot García, La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina (1674–1678) (Madrid, 2002), 63. ¹⁶ A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Sacralización de la dinastía y arte del buon gobierno. El púlpito en la Capilla Real en tiempos de Carlos II’, ASMC, 9 (2003), 175–6, identifies a succession of ‘models’ of government in the reign of Carlos II. ¹⁷ Maura, Carlos II, i. 137 ff. and H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665–1700 (London, 1980), 328–9, give biographical details. The members of the regency council were (1) the count of Castrillo, president of the council of Castile; (2) Don Cristóbal Crespi de Valldaura, president of the council of (or vice-chancellor of ) Aragon; (3) the count of Peñaranda, an experienced diplomat; (4) the marquis of Aytona, a grandee with military experience; and (5) the cardinal of Aragon (and inquisitor general, and still serving as viceroy of Naples). The archbishop of Toledo (primate of Castile) was designated (ex officio) member of the junta but died before taking up his post. Don Blasco de Loyola, secretary of the Despacho Universal (below) acted as secretary. Leading figures excluded from the junta included the duke of Medina de las Torres. For the changing composition of the junta, cf. Ribot García, ‘La España de Carlos II’, in Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, (Madrid, 1993), 28 (1993), 78 ff. Only two of the original junta remained in November 1675, when the junta comprised (1) the president of the council of Castile, the count of Villaumbrosa; (2) the vice-chancellor of Aragon, Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull; (3) the primate, Pascual de Aragon; (4) the inquisitor general, Sarmiento de Valladares; (5) Peñaranda; and (6) the constable of Castile, Kalnein, Juan José, 360. ¹⁸ Mariana’s capacity is invariably questioned, cf. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 258. However, she was committed to the defence of the Monarchy (her son’s inheritance) and hardworking: in July

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succession of favourite-ministers, or validos.¹⁹ Philip IV’s will had excluded foreigners from the regency council; therefore Mariana engineered the Jesuit’s naturalization, and his appointment (1666) as inquisitor-general and ex officio member of the regency council.²⁰ Nithard’s influence was resented by those hostile to him as a Jesuit, as a man of relatively humble origin, as a foreigner, and (like Mariana herself ) as an advocate and symbol of the Austrian Habsburg connection, which failed Carlos II in his time of need during the war of 1667–8 (below). Mariana’s difficulties were substantial enough, as a woman,²¹ but were increased by the ambition of the late king’s adult illegitimate son, Don Juan José of Austria (1629–79). Don Juan, who had extensive military experience in Italy, Catalonia, and Portugal, had been excluded from the regency by his father, but sought a role in government.²² Don Juan was admitted to the Council of State in 1667 following the outbreak of war with Louis XIV,²³ but that conflict also gave the regent an opportunity to remove Carlos II’s ambitious half-brother from Spain by appointing him governor-general of the Spanish Low Countries.²⁴ Following Don Juan’s failure to go to Flanders—after being denied additional powers, he excused himself on health grounds²⁵—he was banished from Madrid; he subsequently fled to the kingdom of Aragon, and the protection afforded by its distinctive laws (Chapter 5) following the issue of an order for his arrest for plotting Nithard’s death. Don Juan continued the political struggle from Aragon, seeking to mobilize a broad range of opinion inside and outside the élite (below) against Mariana’s confessor; his efforts generated real fears for the impact of these domestic divisions on Spain’s international position on the part of some within that élite.²⁶ Finally, in February 1669, Don Juan marched on Madrid with about 1,000 armed men, demanding 1671 she attended a session of the Council of State which considered the issue of Panama, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 1 July 1671, CSPV, 1671–2, 81–2. ¹⁹ F. Tomás y Valiente, Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII, 2nd edn. (Barcelona, 1982), 70 ff. ²⁰ Maura, Carlos II, i. 197 ff., Kamen, Spain in Later, 331. Mariana had to secure the consent of the Cortes-voting towns for the naturalization, that of the Pope for a Jesuit to hold high state office, and also had to manœuvre Don Pascual de Aragón out of his post of inquisitor general into the (vacant) archbishopric of Toledo (and primacy of Castile). ²¹ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 281. On the other hand, for J. M. Campbell, ‘Women and Factionalism in the Court of Charles II of Spain’, in M. S. Sánchez and A. Saint-Saens (eds.), Spanish Women in the Golden Age. Images and Realities (Westport and London, 1996), 122, Carlos II’s reign saw the ‘appropriation of power by those [i.e., women] who would not normally have access to it’. ²² The Venetian ambassador thought (1667) Don Juan might seize the throne, Kalnein, Juan José, 113. ²³ Ribot, ‘España de Carlos II’, 87. ²⁴ Maura, Carlos II, i. 321 ff.; Kalnein, Juan José, 64 ff. ²⁵ Maura, Carlos II, i. 317 ff. The sticking-point appears to have been Don Juan’s request to be able to mortgage part of Flanders to the Dutch, to raise funds for the army of Flanders. While the Council of State broadly approved, this was rejected by a Junta de teólogos, the only favourable vote being that of Don Juan’s own confessor. Don Juan also resented the execution—on Nithard’s authority and in breach of due process—of one of his retinue, on the ground of involvement in a plot to murder Nithard in which Don Juan was implicated. ²⁶ Kalnein, Juan José, 130.

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Nithard’s dismissal.²⁷ With civil conflict threatening,²⁸ Mariana’s fellow regents obliged her to give way. Following an agreement brokered by the archbishop of Toledo, Don Pascual de Aragón, and the papal nuncio, Nithard went into gilded exile as Carlos II’s ambassador in Rome.²⁹ In addition, as urged by Don Juan, a committee, or Junta de Alivios, was established to consider the reforms needed to alleviate Castile’s fiscal burden, and to ‘restore’ the Monarchy.³⁰ Don Juan returned to Aragon as vicar-general of that realm, an essentially political appointment which was nevertheless a notable administrative innovation.³¹ The removal of both Nithard and Don Juan, peace with France from 1668, and the creation of a royal guards unit, the so-called Chamberga regiment, to prevent a repeat of the intimidation seen in 1669,³² only partially defused the political crisis. The Junta de Alivios soon ran out of steam.³³ In addition, there was hostility to the Chamberga regiment in Madrid, where the soldiers were disorderly; the creation of the regiment also offended those who saw Spain’s Monarchy as one founded on the rule of justice and law, and not on force (below).³⁴ Finally, Don Juan remained excluded from power in Madrid. Increasingly, his continued antagonism towards Mariana focused on the man who had emerged by 1675 as the new valido: Fernando de Valenzuela, a man of relatively obscure background, whose wife served in Mariana’s household. In 1675, anticipating Carlos II’s majority in November of that year, and fearing that the king would summon his half-brother to assist him in government, Mariana and Valenzuela sought to remove Don Juan altogether by dispatching him once again to a beleaguered part of the Monarchy. This time, he was to go as supreme commander, or vicargeneral, to Italy, where the squabbles between viceroys, admirals, and generals were hampering the reconquest of Messina.³⁵ However, as in 1668–9, Don Juan ²⁷ Ibid.,155 ff. ²⁸ The admiral raised troops and urged resistance, but was ignored, Kamen, Spain in Later, 335. ²⁹ This episode highlights the enhanced role of the clergy in the politics of the reign, and above all of the primate of Castile, the archbishop of Toledo. For most of the reign this meant cardinal Portocarrero, for whom cf. A. R. Peña Izquierdo, La Casa de Palma. La familia Portocarrero en el gobierno de la Monarquía Hispánica (1665–1700) (Cordoba, 2004), 145 ff. ³⁰ J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La Junta de Alivios de 1669 y las primeras reformas de la Regencia’, ETF, 4 (1989), 658 ff.; Kalnein, Juan José, 188 ff. ³¹ Kalnein, Juan José, 302, argues that Don Juan proved a loyal and effective ruler of Aragon, not least in his efforts to strengthen the realm’s military defences. ³² Ibid., 203 ff.; C. Gómez-Centurión Jiménez, ‘La Guardia Chamberga, Don Juan José de Austria y la Opinión Pública Madrileña’, THM, 1 (1986), 250–62. The regiment’s name derived from the fact that the men, recruited from among those who had been fighting in Portugal, wore uniforms similar to those of the troops of the opposing commander, Shomberg. At the same time, the 5 provincial tercios on the frontier with Portugal were removed to Castile, 2 of them to cities close to Madrid (Segovia and Toledo), Ribot, ‘España de Carlos II’, 94. ³³ Kalnein, Juan José, 198 ff., attributes the junta’s failure to Mariana’s hostility to a reform process imposed on her by Don Juan. ³⁴ Ribot, ‘España de Carlos II’, 94. Apparently, in 1671 the Council of State considered sending the regiment to Panama, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 1 July 1671, CSPV: 1671–2, 81–2. ³⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 288. One of those commanders, the prince of Montesarchio, subsequently joined Don Juan’s march on Madrid in 1677 (see below).

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expressed concern about the rank and powers he would enjoy and delayed his departure.³⁶ Don Juan’s supporters at Court encouraged Carlos to summon his half-brother to Madrid in November 1675; but the bastard’s assumption of power was frustrated by Mariana, who still exercised considerable influence over her son; the regency was extended for two years and Don Juan ordered to Italy.³⁷ But the opposition to Valenzuela continued. It was fuelled by the suspension (September 1676) and dissolution (November 1676) of the regency council, leaving power in the hands of Mariana and her favourite;³⁸ by the elevation of the latter as marquis of Villasierra with grandeza (October 1676);³⁹ and by his appointment by Carlos II as prime minister (November 1676)—the first use of this title in Spain.⁴⁰ The deepening political crisis, which some feared would explode into civil war,⁴¹ was resolved by Don Juan’s ‘coup’ of December 1676–January 1677: he marched on Madrid from Aragon with about 10,000 armed men supplied primarily by his supporters among the titled nobility,⁴² overthrew Valenzuela (who was sent to the Philippines)⁴³ and Mariana (who was effectively banished to Toledo),⁴⁴ and effected the most wide-ranging and violent purge of Carlos II’s reign⁴⁵ in an attempt to expunge all trace of the fallen minister and ministry and to settle old scores. Supporters of Mariana and Valenzuela were dismissed and/or exiled, and those loyal to Don Juan replaced them at Court,⁴⁶ in ³⁶ The English minister in Madrid expressed surprise at the powers allowed Don Juan in the troubled Sicily, but observed that Mariana and her friends thought no price too high to get rid of him, Godolphin to Coventry, 20 Nov. 1675, Hispania Illustrata, 242–51. ³⁷ Kamen, Spain in Later, 337–8; Kalnein, Juan José, 340 ff. Valenzuela was banished from Madrid along with Don Juan, but was back at Court by the spring of 1676. ³⁸ Ribot, ‘España de Carlos II’, 94. According to De Gubernatis to ST, 1 Oct. 1676, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 32, ff. 76–7, the junta was suppressed after a consulta on a draft royal order to Don Juan, to withdraw from Aragon to Castile (to prevent Carlos meeting his half-brother on the intended journey to Zaragoza) which the junta advised against. ³⁹ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 293 ff. ⁴⁰ Kalnein, Juan José, 338. ⁴¹ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 302. In December 1676 it was suggested that the favourite raise his standard at Segovia, ibid., 306. Cf. ‘Avvisi’ sent with de Gubernatis to ST and to Madama Reale [MR], 6 Jan. 1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, ff. 113–14, describing the advance of Don Juan’s force on Madrid while Mariana’s supporters sought to reinforce the Chambera guards. ⁴² Maura, Carlos II, i. 327–8, lists those who gave Don Juan armed men. ⁴³ J. A. Escudero, ‘El destierro de un primer ministro: notas sobre la expulsión de Valenzuela a Filipinas’, in Administración y Estado en la España Moderna (Valladolid, 1999). Mariana made various abortive efforts between then and Valenzuela’s death (1692) to secure his restoration, A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘El favor real: liberalidad del príncipe y jerarquía de la república (1665–1700)’, in C. Continisio and C. Mozzarelli (eds.), Repubblica e Virtú. Pensiero politico e Monarchia Cattolica fra XVI e XVII secolo (Rome, 1995), 430–1. ⁴⁴ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 353 ff; Godolphin to Arlington, Hispania Illustrata, 291–5. ⁴⁵ Valenzuela was arrested and tortured. Since he was seized within the monastery of the Escorial, the incident created difficulties with Pope Innocent XI, Marqués, Santa Sede, 110–17. ⁴⁶ The king’s confessor, fray Gabriel Ramírez de Arellano, was banished, Maura, Vida, 196; the admiral of Castile, the king’s caballerizo mayor, and ally of Mariana and Valenzuela, was exiled to his estates at Medina de Rioseco, ibid., 207; and some of Mariana’s ladies-in-waiting were dispatched to the convent of las Huelgas (Burgos), F. J. Lorenzo Pinar, and L. Casallo Toranzo (eds.), Diario de Antonio Moreno de la Torre. Zamora 1673–79. Vida cotidiana en una ciudad española durante el siglo XVII (Zamora, 1990), 137–8, under Saturday 6 Feb. 1677.

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the central councils,⁴⁷ among the viceroys,⁴⁸ and among the military and naval high command.⁴⁹ The Pope sought to moderate the vindictiveness of the new regime, not least to prevent Spain’s further weakening abroad,⁵⁰ but few of Valenzuela’s and Mariana’s collaborators survived. The Chamberga regiment, the only likely source of organized resistance, was dispatched to Sicily, to strengthen the forces seeking to reduce Messina.⁵¹ Don Juan’s achievement of power, which has been described as Spain’s first military coup,⁵² was welcomed by many who anticipated greater vigour at home and abroad,⁵³ and ended the most bitter period of domestic political conflict of the reign. But Carlos II’s half-brother soon himself became the focus of discontent,⁵⁴ on the part both of those ousted in 1677 and of some of those who had taken part in his coup; indeed, it was widely believed that if Don Juan had not died in September 1679 he would soon have been dismissed by Carlos.⁵⁵ The death of the king’s half-brother facilitated the re-knitting of a political élite which had been seriously fractured since 1665.⁵⁶ However, other developments prevented this, above all the apparent weakness of Carlos II, which encouraged a prolongation of the sort of power struggles which had characterized his minority. Among those who sought to fill the vacuum were the king’s two wives, Marie Louise of Orleans (from 1679) and, following her death in 1689, Mariana of Neuburg (from 1690). Both women sought to wield influence, as did Carlos II’s mother, who re-emerged ⁴⁷ Don Pascual de Aragón replaced Don Melchor de Navarra as president of the Council of Aragon, Don Juan de la Puente Guevara replaced Villaumbrosa as president of that of Castile, and Don Gonzalo de Córdoba replaced Don Lope de los Ríos as president of that of Finance, the duke of Alba becoming president of the Council of Italy, Kalnein, Juan José, 421 ff. ⁴⁸ The count of Aranda, who as viceroy of Aragon had opposed Don Juan, was dismissed as viceroy of Galicia; Don Juan’s ally, the count of Monterrey, replaced Alessandro Farnese, prince of Parma as viceroy of Catalonia, Kalnein, Juan José, 423–4. ⁴⁹ Don Melchor de Portocarrero, a long-time ally of Don Juan, was appointed comisario general of Spain’s armies, Kalnein, Juan José, 424. In addition, the illegitimate son of the constable of Castile (a supporter of Mariana) was dismissed as general of Artillery in Catalonia, which was given to Don Giuseppe Pinos, who had contributed 500 horse to the march on Madrid; the duke of Alburquerque was dismissed from his command of the Armada; and a ‘familiar’ of Don Juan received the tercio of Sicily, Avvisi [May 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 203. ⁵⁰ Cf. P. J. Rietbergen, ‘Papal Diplomacy and Mediation at the Peace of Nijmegen’, Bots and Weiler, Peace of Nijmegen, 56. ⁵¹ Maura, Vida, 124–5; A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes y clientelas: el mito de Sobrarbe, Juan José de Austria y el Reino paccionado de Aragón (1669–1678)’, Pedralbes, 12 (1992), 243. ⁵² H. Kamen, Vocabulario Básico de la Historia Moderna. España y America 1450–1750 (Barcelona, 1986), 74. However, the army did not constitute a distinctive, self-conscious, political actor in the way such a description suggests. ⁵³ Godolphin to Coventry, 24 Feb. 1677, Hispania Illustrata, 285 ff. ⁵⁴ In the summer of 1678 the Savoyard envoy in Madrid believed that Don Juan hoped for peace with Louis XIV in order to reduce domestic opposition, De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 18 Aug. 1678, AST/ LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 356. He also observed the build-up of troops in Madrid. ⁵⁵ Carrasco, ‘Los Grandes’, 107 ff; Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Sacralización’, 171. In 1679 Don Juan was apparently hoping for a reconciliation with his former enemy, Mariana, ‘Nove’, Madrid, 31 Aug. 1679, AST/LM/ Spagna,m. 32 f. 459. ⁵⁶ Typically, the Jesuits exiled by Don Juan returned to Madrid after his death, ‘Nove’, Madrid, 29 Sept. 1679, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 468.

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as a figure of some influence from 1679 until her death in 1696.⁵⁷ These developments inevitably impacted upon political life, which again reached crisis point during the Nine Years War. In the summer of 1691, against a backdrop of military setbacks in Flanders and Catalonia, Carlos II’s chief minister (since 1685), the count of Oropesa, was forced from office,⁵⁸ and there was apparently some criticism of the king himself;⁵⁹ thereafter Mariana of Neuburg’s German entourage attracted widespread hostility, culminating in 1694–5 in a call for their expulsion, which the king was unable to resist.⁶⁰ One of the reasons why Marie Louise and Mariana of Neuburg enjoyed such influence was the fact that they were expected to produce the child who would secure the succession.⁶¹ Carlos’s failure to father a son thus contributed to the persistence of political tensions after 1675. The struggle for office and influence centred on the king’s Court, i.e., on appointments to the household of the king—including successive royal confessors who may have played a greater political role in this reign⁶²—and to those of Carlos II’s mother and wives.⁶³ But many contemporary observers believed that, in the absence of an effective king, real power lay in the hands of the upper ranks of the nobility, i.e., the more than 500 titled nobles, or títulos, and grandees, or grandes ⁶⁴ and that Spain was, in effect, an aristocracy, or aristocratic republic.⁶⁵ There is clearly some justification for this view. In 1676, for example, a number of títulos and grandes played a crucial role in toppling Valenzuela: they issued a ⁵⁷ Carrasco ‘Los Grandes’, 117, speaks of a ‘polycentric’ political system under Carlos II. ⁵⁸ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 271–2, 275–6; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 273; Operti to VA, 28 April and 5 July 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 41, 75. Cf. Papel anónimo contra el conde de Oropesa, Egerton 330, ff. 34–74, for criticism of Oropesa’s handling of the Monarchy’s effort in the Nine Years War. Oropesa’s stock has risen in recent decades, but he may have been more effective a minister in peace than in war. Gudannes, 3 Feb. 1693, Martin, ‘Lettres’, 390, gives a different version of Oropesa’s fall. ⁵⁹ Operti to ST, 25 May 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 52. ⁶⁰ C. Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies? The Spanish Monarchy and Germany in the Reign of the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, 1665–1700’, in C. Kent, T. K. Wolber, and C. M. K., Hewitt (eds.), The Lion and the Eagle. Interdisciplinary Essays on German–Spanish Relations over the Centuries (Oxford and New York, 2000), 121 ff. ⁶¹ Should any child succeed as a minor, the queen mother would also enjoy significant authority, as Mariana (Carlos II’s own mother) had done. ⁶² J. M. de Bernardo Ares, ‘The aristocratic assemblies under the Spanish monarchy (1680–1700)’, PER, 21 (2001),131. ⁶³ Unfortunately, little (analytical) work has been done on the Court of Carlos II, although Maura’s work in effect centres on it, but cf. A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Los Gastos de Corte en la España del Siglo XVII’, in idem, Crisis y Decadencia de la España de los Austrias (Barcelona, 1969), 75 ff.; and T. Zapata, La entrada en la Corte de María Luisa de Orleans. Arte y Fiesta en el Madrid de Carlos II (Madrid, 2000). More generally, cf. J. H. Elliott, ‘The Court of the Spanish Habsburgs: A Peculiar Institution’, in idem, Spain and its World, 142 ff.; G. Redworth and F. Checa, ‘The Courts of the Spanish Habsburgs 1500–1700’, in J. Adamson (ed.), The Princely Courts of Europe 1500–1750 (London, 1999), 43–65; and M. A. Gómez Centurión, ‘Etiqueta y ceremonial palatino durante el reinado de Felipe V: el reglamento de entradas de 1709 y el acceso a la persona del rey’, Hispania, 56 (1996), 965–1005. ⁶⁴ For the hierarchy, cf. I. A. A. Thompson, ‘The Nobility in Spain 1600–1800’, in H. M. Scott (ed.), The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1: Western Europe (Harlow, 1995), 188 ff. There were about 100 grandees. ⁶⁵ Stanhope to Nottingham, 22 May 1691, Spain under Charles, 18.

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manifesto against the favourite,⁶⁶ and supplied Don Juan with the armed men who made his coup possible. Thereafter, they dominated the king’s government: the duke of Medinaceli, the foremost grandee (and master of the horse, or caballerizo mayor, in Carlos II’s household from 1680), achieved the position of the king’s chief minister (1679–85); so, too, did Oropesa (1685–91), whose dismissal in 1691 apparently followed concerted representations to Carlos II by a group of títulos and grandes.⁶⁷ The titled nobility’s influence derived, in part, from their estates and señoríos, large tracts of Spain being under the direct or immediate control not of the king but of a feudal lord.⁶⁸ It is not surprising, then, that títulos and grandes were able to form clienteles and to mobilize men.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, the noble élite appeared determined to use its influence in an entirely selfish way. The hostility of the grandes to Valenzuela sprang, in large part, from resentment of his relatively modest origins.⁷⁰ In addition, many títulos were in financial difficulties and sought power merely for the material rewards;⁷¹ many also evaded contributing to the defence of the Monarchy, in the form, for example, of donativos (Chapter 3). Last, but by no means least, their hostility to the king’s appointment of a chief minister to co-ordinate and direct more effectively the affairs of the Monarchy was widely regarded as undermining the defence of the latter.⁷² However, this image of the upper nobility borders on caricature. For one thing, feudal señores were not independent but implemented the king’s law, and decisions in the senorial courts could be appealed against in the royal audiencias, chancillerías, and the Council of Castile.⁷³ In addition, not all titled nobles joined in Don Juan’s coup, which, in some respects, was the work of the disgruntled and ⁶⁶ The text (and list of signatories) is in A. Carrasco Martínez, Sangre, honor y privilegio. La nobleza española bajo los Austrias (Barcelona, 2000), 178–80. ⁶⁷ Stanhope to Nottingham, 17–27 June 1691, SP 94/73 f. 42. According to Stanhope, the duke of Aveiro (or Arcos) had presented a memorial to the king in the name of most of the grandees, and returned to the point when nothing was done. ⁶⁸ Cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 226 ff.; A. Carrasco Martínez, Control y Responsabilidad en la Administración Señorial. Los juicios de residencia en las tierras del Infantado (1650–1788) (Valladolid, 1991), 7 ff.; B. Yun Casalilla, ‘The Castilian Aristocracy in the Seventeenth-century: Crisis, Refeudalization, or Political Offensive?’, in I. A. A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilla (eds.), The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1994), 277 ff. ⁶⁹ Cf. Carrasco Martínez, Sangre, honor, 57 ff. For a specific example, the marquises of Los Vélez in Murcia, cf. F. J. Guillamón Álvarez, ‘Monarquía, aristocracia y poderes locales en la Corona de Castilla (ss. XVI–XVIII). Una interpretación del clientelismo político a propósito de la casa Fajardo’; and J. D. Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Servir a los Fajardo. Una geografía del poder clientelar en el reino de Murcia (ss. XVI–XVIII)’, in Gli Eroi Fassardi/Los Héroes Fajardos. Movilización social y memoria política en el Reino de Murcia (ss. XVI al XVIII) (Murcia, 2005), 11 ff. and 33 ff. ⁷⁰ Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘El Favor Real’, 393 ff. Don Juan’s own pretensions alienated many of his former grandee supporters, Carrasco, ‘Los Grandes’, 107. ⁷¹ Kamen Spain in Later, 226 ff.; C. Jago, ‘The “Crisis of the Aristocracy” in Seventeenth-century Spain’, P&P, 84 (1979), 60 ff.; Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, i. 223 ff.; Carrasco Martínez, Sangre, honor, 43 ff. ⁷² Operti to VA, 3 Nov [Dec.] 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/114. ⁷³ Cf. M. Artola, ‘Prólogo’, I. Atienza Hernández, Aristocracia, poder y riqueza en la España moderna. La Casa de Osuna siglos XV–XIX (Madrid, 1987), p. xiii.

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disgraced,⁷⁴ while many remained loyal to the regent and her favourite—and suffered in consequence—or were neutral. More important, perhaps, many títulos and grandees and their families were able and gave good service in the imperial administration and armed forces, including, for example, the count of Santisteban, who served as viceroy of Sardinia and Sicily and whose eldest son (and heir) was killed serving in the army of Lombardy in Piedmont in 1693 (Chapter 1). Furthermore, much noble debt was the consequence of services to the Crown in defence of the Monarchy in this and previous reigns.⁷⁵ Last, but by no means least, if grandees and títulos were motivated by selfish concerns, then—since many had estates in, and drew revenues of all sorts from, the Monarchy—it was in their interest to preserve the empire.⁷⁶ This unflattering picture of the nobility is closely bound up with an equally negative image of the politics of the reign, which became a byword inside and outside Spain at the time,⁷⁷ and subsequently,⁷⁸ for a selfish factionalism inimical to the best interests of Spain and the Monarchy. Men sometimes refused to serve if their demands for rewards, or mercedes were not met.⁷⁹ Key appointments seemed to depend less on ability or merit than on connection and patronage. Those in power might make appointments simply to gain the support of a key figure or faction.⁸⁰ Invariably those seeking to appreciate the significance of new appointments identified the kin and patrons of appointees rather than any ideology or programme.⁸¹ Struggles for place between these groupings could intrude into the work of the policy-making councils. In 1690 the Savoyard envoy in Madrid reported a session of the Council of State on the subject of replacing the count of Fuensalida as governor of Milan, in which the admiral exchanged sharp words with the constable, Fuensalida’s relation and protector.⁸² Competition for office ⁷⁴ Among those who joined Don Juan’s march on Madrid at the end of 1676 was the banished former governor of Flanders, Monterrey, Maura, Carlos II, ii. 328. ⁷⁵ C. Jago, ‘The Influence of Debt on the Relations between Crown and Aristocracy in Seventeenth-century Castile’, ECHR, 26 (1973), 218 ff. ⁷⁶ In 1681 the marquis of Leganés drew 9% of his income from his estates in Italy, Kamen, Spain in Later, 230–1. It is not therefore surprising that Leganés was a vigorous governor of Milan between 1691 and 1698. ⁷⁷ Godolphin to Coventry, 20 Nov. 1675, Hispania Illustrata, 242–51. In identifying and explaining the composition of Mariana’s ‘party’, Godolphin emphasized interest not principle. ⁷⁸ In 1723–4, when Philip V abdicated in favour of Luis I, Isabella Farnese advised the latter not to allow the emergence of two parties, of the king and of the queen, as she declared had happened under Carlos II, M. A. Pérez Samper, Isabel de Farnesio (Madrid, 2002), 180. ⁷⁹ In 1671 Montesarchio refused to go to Panama unless given the presidency of (the audiencia of ) Guatemala, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 22 Aug. 1671, CSPV 1671–2, 100. ⁸⁰ In 1675 Mariana—desperate to prevent the defection of key figures to Don Juan—gave the viceroyalty of Sardinia to the marquis of las Navas in order to gain his brother-in-law, the constable, according to Godolphin to Coventry, 20 Nov. 1675, Hispania Illustrata, 251. ⁸¹ In 1676 the newly appointed Eguiá and Lope de los Ríos were described as creatures of Valenzuela, de Gubernatis to ST, 17 Sept. and 15 Oct. 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, ff. 70, 81. On Leganés’s appointment as governor of Milan in 1691, Operti carefully related his career and connections: he was close to the constable and to the marquis of los Balbases, Operti to VA, Madrid, 2 Feb. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35, f. 293. ⁸² Operti to VA, 12 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35/8, 9.

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could also undermine the effective working of the administrative and military machine by holding up important appointments: in 1691 the struggle of the various factions to secure for one of their own the governorship of Milan (and with it the command of the army of Lombardy)—Mariana of Neuburg pressing the candidacy of count Mansfeld—delayed the appointment of Fuensalida’s successor, Leganés, to that crucial post.⁸³ Factional loyalties, which extended beyond the Court to town councils, cathedral chapters, and so on—with sometimes fatal consequences⁸⁴—could also undermine working relationships which were crucial to effective co-operation in defence of the Monarchy.⁸⁵ However, we must beware of exaggerating the negative aspects of clientage and of the struggle for office, and of seeing these as peculiar to Carlos II’s Spain. Patronage, and the struggle to control it, had long existed, and was an integral part of the political process in early modern Spain,⁸⁶ and Europe.⁸⁷ Those in power needed to have their own men—‘creatures’ as they were called, and as they often described themselves—in office if their policies were to be executed. It is not surprising, then, that Don Juan’s coup was followed by a purge of those appointed by Valenzuela. This system clearly carried with it the potential for the appointment of less able figures: the incompetence of those who replaced Don Lope de los Ríos, dismissed from the presidency of the council of Finance by Don Juan, obliged the latter to ask the very capable Don Lope to resume office.⁸⁸ However, as this example shows, inadequate kin or creatures could not always be maintained in office indefinitely.⁸⁹ In addition, many of those who succeeded under this system were able. Fuensalida’s successor, the marquis of Leganés, was undoubtedly ambitious and factious, but he was also an experienced and able soldier and a highly regarded governor of Milan. Much the same could be said of many others who attained high political and military office in Carlos II’s Monarchy.⁹⁰ ⁸³ Operti to VA, 1 and 4 Jan. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35/21, 22. ⁸⁴ In 1675 Don Cristóbal Alvaro de Toledo was condemned to death for the murder of Don Miguel Muñoz, regidor of Cuenca. Don Cristóbal had gone to Cuenca to secure election as regidor as a protégé of the prince of Astillano, the son of the duke of Medina de las Torres. He had originally secured a promise of the votes of Don Miguel and his brother, but Don Miguel later declared he would vote against because of enmity between his own house and that of Medina de las Torres, cf. (unsuccessful) petition for pardon, 1675, AHN/Consejos/4448/143. ⁸⁵ The difficulties in Sicily between Villafranca and Montesarchio may have had something to do with the fact that the first was a partisan of Mariana, the second of Don Juan, Ribot, Monarquía, 286. ⁸⁶ J. Martínez Millán, ‘La investigación sobre patronazgo y clientelismo en la administración de la Monarquía Hispánica durante la Edad Moderna’, SHHM, 15 (1996), 83 ff.; A. Carrasco Martínez, ‘Un modelo para el estudio de las formas de sociabilidad en la edad moderna: las clientelas señoriales’, MCV, 30 (1994). ⁸⁷ Cf. S. Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-century France (Oxford, 1986). ⁸⁸ Maura, Vida, 207. ⁸⁹ In 1675 all the efforts of his family and connections could not prevent Monterrey’s dismissal following a poor performance in 1674, constable to Villahermosa, 2 Jan. 1675, BN/Ms 2408 ff. 31–2. In 1691 the constable did eventually abandon Fuensalida. ⁹⁰ Cf., for example, his nephew, the count of Palma, and other members of the Portocarrero ‘clan’, Peña Izquierdo, Casa de Palma, passim.

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These groupings might also be held together by more than just the desire for office. They did sometimes have a programme of sorts, or at least believed that affairs were mishandled and that an alternative was both possible and necessary. Despite claims to the contrary,⁹¹ political division in Carlos II’s reign—whether within bodies such as the Council of State, or taking in a larger section of Spanish society—frequently centred on issues and policy.⁹² These were both ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ in nature. Don Juan’s main charge against Nithard was that the confessor behaved as a tyrant,⁹³ while Valenzuela was accused of ‘imprisoning’ the young Carlos II.⁹⁴ Valenzuela was also vulnerable to accusations of corruption, the main criticism levelled by his critics.⁹⁵ Of course, these were, in some respects, simply effective rhetorical sticks with which to beat political opponents. However, Don Juan’s pursuit of the fallen minister was accompanied by a reform programme with moral overtones which echoed that of Olivares and Zuñiga sixty years earlier,⁹⁶ and which was also expected to contribute to the preservation of the Monarchy. Throughout Carlos II’s reign, imperial defence was both a powerful political discourse and a real political issue: in 1691, for example, one foreign envoy in Madrid explained the fall of Oropesa as the consequence of representations to Carlos II by those who, following the loss of Mons and Urgel, blamed the count for the apparently disastrous state of the Monarchy.⁹⁷ We therefore need to be wary of exaggerating the degree to which Carlos II’s subjects were growing weary of the burden of empire,⁹⁸ an attitude apparently voiced by Don Juan.⁹⁹ Unfortunately, the existence of such views is difficult to assess, given the paucity of evidence and the problems involved in its interpretation.¹⁰⁰ Some individuals certainly appeared willing, or at least prepared, to abandon some imperial commitments. In 1673, for example, the count of Peñaranda, hitherto a champion of the integrity of Flanders, seemed ready to surrender the Spanish Low Countries if a satisfactory deal could be done;¹⁰¹ and ⁹¹ Cf. Kalnein, Juan José , 383, on the lack of ideological content in the opposition to Valenzuela. ⁹² In 1674 the Council of State was divided on policy vis-à-vis England and the Dutch Republic, Godolphin to Arlington, 30 Jan. 1674, Hispania Illustrata, 185–6. ⁹³ Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes y clientelas: el Mito de Sobrarbe Juan José de Austria y el Reinó paccionado de Aragon (1669–1678)’, Pedralbes, 12 (1992), 282. ⁹⁴ Carlos II’s order of 27 Jan. 1677, stripping Valenzuela of his titles, justified the measure on the ground that the grant(s) were not made freely, Tomás y Valiente, Los validos, 179. ⁹⁵ Cf. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Sacralización’, 181. ⁹⁶ Cf. Carlos II’s order, 10 Feb. 1677, BL/Egerton 347, f. 474, and CII to Duke of Villahermosa, 21 Mar. 1677, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 261. Don Juan established a junta to ‘reform’ public morals, Kalnein, Juan José, 436. For the earlier episode, cf. J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven, 1986), 85 ff. ⁹⁷ Stanhope to Nottingham, 17–27 June 1691, SP 94/73 f. 42. ⁹⁸ Kamen, War of Succession, 26. ⁹⁹ Cf. Campbell, ‘Women and Factionalism’, 118. ¹⁰⁰ J. H. Elliott, ‘Spain and its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in idem, Spain and its World, 25–6, cites Olivares (1631) as articulating this ‘anti-imperialist’ thesis (one in sharp contrast with the more self-confident imperialist view articulated in the days of Charles V) but is rightly cautious about its significance. ¹⁰¹ J. Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Razón de Estado y Geostrategia en la Política Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677–81)’, BRAH, 173 (1976), 352.

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in 1677, when a disastrous peace was anticipated for Spain, Don Gerónimo Eguía, secretary of the Despacho Universal (below), told the Savoyard envoy in Madrid that as long as Italy was secure the loss of Flanders mattered little to the Spanish Crown, the Low Countries having been its ruin.¹⁰² For their part, English and Dutch ministers suspected that Spanish policy-makers wished to hand over the defence of the Monarchy, or of key territories (notably Flanders) to them— something which was discussed in Madrid in 1691 but rejected, apparently on religious grounds.¹⁰³ In fact, anti-imperial views were as old as the Monarchy itself,¹⁰⁴ and need to be set beside the views of the many who expressed distress at the disintegration of Carlos II’s imperial inheritance.¹⁰⁵ King and ministers were reluctant to cede territory in Italy,¹⁰⁶ or in Flanders. In January 1678 Don Juan, reporting French peace proposals which implied the loss of the Low Countries, declared to the English minister in Madrid that ‘if we had but one Foot of Ground remaining in Flanders, it should never be yielded up by my consent’.¹⁰⁷ Don Juan explained that the retention of Flanders was enjoined in his father’s will. Since his descent from Philip IV underpinned Don Juan’s political ambitions¹⁰⁸ this was one powerful reason not to abandon the imperial legacy,¹⁰⁹ but there were more fundamental strategic reasons, notably the fact that Flanders, the Italian territories, and the African garrisons prevented Spain’s enemies from intervention in the peninsula itself (Chapter 1). Nevertheless, there was debate about how best to preserve the Monarchy. Among the matters at issue was the question of allies. The Austrian and Spanish branches of the Habsburgs were traditionally very close, but not all policy-makers in Madrid were convinced of the continued value of the Viennese connection. Peñaranda led an anti-Austrian and pro-French faction against the count of Castrillo in the first years of Mariana’s regency.¹¹⁰ In some respects, the opposition to Nithard and his Austrian Habsburg patron, Mariana, was fuelled by the failure of the emperor, who faced his own difficulties in Hungary and the Balkans, and ¹⁰² De Gubernatis to ST, 29 April 1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, ff. 190. Subsequently, the Dutch minister in Madrid reported ‘the usual threats’ to abandon the Low Countries, although he feared that this might become a reality in view of Spain’s financial difficulties and if the campaign went badly, Dutch minister to [?], 15 July 1677, BL Harleian 1516 f. 59. ¹⁰³ Stanhope to Nottingham, 9 May 1691, SP 94/73 f. 31. ¹⁰⁴ Cf. J. A. Maravall, La oposición política bajo los Austrias (Barcelona, 1962); I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile, Spain and the Monarchy: The Political Community from Patria Natural to Patria Nacional’, in G. Parker and R. Kagan (eds.), Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World (Cambridge, 1995), 125 ff. ¹⁰⁵ Cf. P. Portocarrero y Guzmán, Teatro Monárquico de España , ed. C. Sanz Ayán (Madrid, 1998), passim. ¹⁰⁶ Alcalá Zamora, ‘Razón’, 348. ¹⁰⁷ Godolphin to Coventry, 12 Jan. 1678, Hispania Illustrata, 340–3. ¹⁰⁸ Cf. Kalnein, Juan José, 51, for the way Philip IV’s will became a focus of the political struggle from 1665; and, for Don Juan’s programme of ‘restoration’ and the cult of Philip IV, Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Sacralización’, 157, 166–7. ¹⁰⁹ Later that year, Don Juan opposed the cession to king Charles II of England, as a cautionary town, of Ostend, the only port in the Low Countries still in Spanish hands, Don Juan’s Answer, Hispania Illustrata, 360 ff. ¹¹⁰ Kalnein, Juan José, 162.

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who concluded a secret treaty of partition of the Monarchy with Louis XIV in early 1668, to come to Carlos II’s aid during the ‘War of Devolution’.¹¹¹ The ousting of Mariana by Don Juan further complicated relations with the Imperial Court, and was followed by efforts to improve Spain’s own contribution to its defence, in an attempt to reduce its reliance on allies who were regarded as self-seeking and unreliable.¹¹² Relations with the Imperial Court improved after Don Juan’s death,¹¹³ but such attitudes—and the Monarchy’s losses—might even suggest the advisability of abandoning those allies altogether and withdrawing from the war by means of an advantageous separate peace. In late 1677 Don Juan was making great efforts to increase Spain’s armed forces, but was also said to be thinking of trying to save his regime by making peace,¹¹⁴ although this was not, in fact, what happened. How best to conserve the Monarchy continued to divide the king’s ministers thereafter. As in most states at war, there was a constant debate within the policymaking élite. Just as in the Dutch War, the Monarchy’s dismal performance in the Nine Years War inevitably stimulated those who thought that participation in the conflict was a mistake, and that the Monarchy should abandon the war. This view was articulated in the Council of State in the autumn of 1693;¹¹⁵ and the corregidor of Madrid, Don Francisco Ronquillo, who was regarded as a member of a peace faction headed by the duke of Montalto,¹¹⁶ reportedly told Carlos II that Spain should not involve itself in the quarrels of other states to its own loss.¹¹⁷ Montalto again urged that peace be made, in February 1695, when the Council of State discussed the Monarchy’s response to the revelation that the king’s allies had been conducting secret peace negotiations with the French Court.¹¹⁸ Those opposed to peace, or rather to a separate peace, prevailed over those who preferred to settle, not least because they doubted Spain’s ability both to secure and make effective a separate settlement with Louis XIV.¹¹⁹ But the question of war and peace—and how to maintain Carlos II’s inheritance—was clearly a contentious one. ¹¹¹ Kalnein, Juan José, 68. ¹¹² Cf. Don Juan’s harsh words to the imperial ambassador, ‘Avvisi’ [mid-late Feb. 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 143. In an episode suggesting the mingling of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ issues, the ambassador intervened on behalf of Mariana, urging the efforts made on Spain’s behalf by its allies, and the need not to endanger these. ¹¹³ The Ratisbon settlement of 1684 was concluded by imperial diplomats on behalf of Carlos II. ¹¹⁴ Cornaro to [Doge and Senate?], 26 Nov. 1677, AS/Venezia/Dispacci Ambasciatori/ Spagna, filza 117. ¹¹⁵ Stradling, Europe and the Decline, 188; Operti to VA, 31 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/116. ¹¹⁶ Stradling calls Ronquillo the leader of the peace lobby known as the ‘Company of the Seven Just Men’, a position he owed in part to his enlightened government of the capital, which was of growing political importance, such that he was becoming a ‘popular tribune’, Stradling, Europe and the Decline, 189. Stradling gives no reference, but cf. Gudannes, 5 Aug. and 3 Sept. 1693; Martín, ‘Lettres’, 423, 431–2. ¹¹⁷ Gudannes, 3 Feb. 1693; Martín, ‘Lettres’, 388–90. ¹¹⁸ CCS, 14 Feb. 1695, AGS/E/3900. The constable, followed by cardinal Portocarrero and the marquis of Mancera, advised against seeking a separate peace; the admiral, who had held this view earlier, now favoured such a peace, as did Montalto. The council had previously discussed the issue in August 1694. ¹¹⁹ In an audience of 23 Dec. 1693, Carlos told the Savoyard envoy he would never agree to a peace which was not approved by his allies, Operti to VA, 31 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38.

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Such divisions existed in most states at war, but may have been allowed to become more serious because of the role, or rather the inactivity, of Carlos II. Some of his subjects certainly saw Carlos as a lightweight. In 1676 Don Pedro de Aragón was reported to have said, in the Council of State, ‘We have no king’.¹²⁰ In addition, the use of a stamp to impress the king’s signature on routine official papers continued after Carlos came of age.¹²¹ However, the use of such a stamp was as much an indication of the volume of papers requiring the royal signature as of the king’s incapacity or lack of commitment to business;¹²² and the maturing king (aged 39 when he died, in 1700) may have played a greater role than has been allowed. In his many audiences with foreign ministers during the Nine Years War, Carlos II could be quite animated.¹²³ In the summer of 1691 Carlos was said to be actively involved in efforts to reform the finances.¹²⁴ On occasion, too, councils and juntas met in the king’s presence.¹²⁵ For the most part, Carlos II simply ordered implementation of the advice of his councils, but not always.¹²⁶ Carlos sometimes ignored recommendations for office, for example, and—like his predecessors—made some appointments without a consulta.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, we cannot always be clear about the influences on the king, or why he made specific decisions, or whether a decision was really his. Nevertheless, he cannot simply be dismissed. Indeed, Carlos’s central role explains that of the secretary of the Despacho Universal, who prepared documents for the king’s signature and liaised between Carlos and his councils.¹²⁸ The secretary was clearly believed to have influence over the king,¹²⁹ such that Carlos’s chief ministers sought to ensure that the post was occupied by a man they trusted.¹³⁰ ¹²⁰ De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 8 July 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 40; the duke of Alba was said to have made a similar remark, same to same, 2 Sept. 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 56. ¹²¹ C. Sanz Ayán, Banqueros de Carlos II (Valladolid, 1988), 58, gives no reference, and does not indicate whether this practice continued until 1700. ¹²² Most consultas reaching the king received the standard ‘como parece’, indicating royal assent, such that a stamp of this sort was of enormous value whatever the capacity or inclination of the monarch. Philip IV had used one, R. Stradling, Philip IV (Cambridge, 1988), 279. ¹²³ Cf., for example, the Savoyard envoy’s account of his audiences of Carlos on 8 and 12 Jan. 1694, Operti to VA, 14 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40/117. ¹²⁴ Operti to VA, 5 July 1691, 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/39, f. 76; and 2 Aug. 1691, m. 38/42. ¹²⁵ Operti to VA, 25 Oct. 1691, 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/51; Stanhope to Trenchard, 19 May 1694, Spain under Charles, 61; Montalto to Dormer, 5 June and 18 Dec. 1694, BN, MS 918, f. 63, 112. ¹²⁶ In February 1693, for example, Carlos broadly agreed with a consulta of the Junta de disposiciones de Flanders on the reform of the army of Flanders proposed by Max Emmanuel, but sided with the constable on specific points where opinion differed, CJDF, 23 Feb. 21693, AGS/E/3887. ¹²⁷ R. Gómez Rivero, ‘Consejeros de Ordenes. Procedimientos de designación (1598–1700)’, Hispania, 214 (2003), 657 ff.; Kamen, Spain in Later, 22–5. Kamen, however, distinguishes between occasional independence and initiative and rule ‘in any real sense’, 22. ¹²⁸ Tomás y Valiente, Los validos, 114–15; Kamen, Spain in Later, 26–9; Castro, A la sombra, 37–8, 71 ff.; Bernardo Ares, ‘Aristocratic assemblies’, 135. ¹²⁹ In 1696 the Savoyard envoy urged the secretary of the Despacho Universal to have Carlos II sign the treaty of Vigevano (and consent to the neutrality of Italy), Operti to VA, 14 Nov. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ¹³⁰ The 10 secretaries of the Despacho in this reign were Blasco de Loyola (1665–9), Pedro Fernández del Campo Angulo, marquis (1673) of Mejorada (1669–75); Jeronimo de Eguía

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Even where Carlos was less directly active, his concerns dominated policy, as the bishop of Solsona observed in 1695.¹³¹ Carlos II’s interventions were, in part, determined by his own understanding of the Monarchy and his responsibility for it. Carlos, like his half-brother, was constrained by Philip IV’s will, and his education had also instilled in him a sense of obligation to conserve the Monarchy.¹³² The king’s subsequent conduct revealed his preoccupation with the fate of his inheritance. In 1693, for example, Carlos was said to have expressed anger at efforts to palliate the seriousness of the allied defeat in Italy that year,¹³³ and in 1694 Don Juan de Angulo, secretary of the Despacho Universal, was said to have died—presumably of mortification—after being hit with his hat by his master, after Carlos had been informed by the admiral (an enemy of the secretary) of the ‘protest’ of a letter of change arranged for the army of Lombardy by Angulo.¹³⁴ It was not that the king lacked zeal: during the Nine Years War, the Savoyard envoy in Madrid thought Carlos was committed to the war.¹³⁵ However, Carlos failed to impose his will. Typically, in 1697, the king expressed his intention of leaving for Catalonia to direct the war effort, but did not, in fact, go before the war concluded.¹³⁶ But, for all his defects, Carlos II wished to preserve his inheritance, which helped to ensure that this remained a priority of his government.¹³⁷ OPINION AND ITS CONCERNS Spain may have been regarded as an ‘aristocratic republic’, but contemporary observers frequently noted that Spanish political life was influenced in Carlos II’s reign by those outside what might be thought of as the élite. During the crisis of November 1675, for example, the English minister in Madrid, Godolphin, (1675–82); José de Veitia y Linaje (1682–5); Manuel de Lira (1685–1691); Juan de Angulo (1691–4); Alonso Carnero (1694–5); Juan de Larrea (1695–7); Juan Antonio López de Zarate, marquis of Villanueva (1697–8); and Antonio de Ubilla, marquis (1698) of Rivas (1698–). For Valenzuela’s replacement of Mejorada, cf. Maura, Vida, 178. ¹³¹ Cf. Representaciones que hizo a SM el Obispo de Solsona en 15 de octubre de 1699, para remediar los daños de su Monarquía, in B. Cárceles de Gea, ‘Juicio y Debate del Régimen Polisinodial en las Campañas Políticas del Reinado de Carlos II’, Pedralbes, 7 (1987), 121. ¹³² Cf. Maura, Carlos II, ii. 73 ff., for the instructions given Carlos’s tutor. The tutor (from 1667), the jurist Don Francisco Ramos del Manzano, had held office in Italy and Madrid, and in 1667 wrote a tract defending the Spanish monarch’s possession of the territories in Flanders claimed by Louis XIV, Maura, Carlos II, i. 300–2. The tutor was among those who, against the background of the apparent disintegration of the Monarchy (Flanders, Sicily) in 1675, urged Carlos II to summon Don Juan to share in government. ¹³³ Gudannes, 16 Oct. 1693, Martín, ‘Lettres’, 436–9. Apparently, Carlos asked if he would always be treated like a child. ¹³⁴ Gudannes, 18 Mar. 1694, Martín, ‘Lettres’, 456. ¹³⁵ Operti to VA, 13 Mar. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ¹³⁶ A. Espino López, ‘El Esfuerzo de Guerra de la Corona de Aragón durante el Reinado de Carlos II, 1665–1700. Los Servicios de Tropas’, Revista de Historia Moderna, 22 (2004), 234. ¹³⁷ The royal decree of 19 Jan. 1677, justifying the recent coup and the new regime, referred (implicitly) to the king’s need to devote himself to the problems of the wider Monarchy as one reason for the change, Maura, Carlos II, ii. 337.

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observed that, while Don Juan depended primarily on the grandees, he also had on his side ‘that great Monster the People’.¹³⁸ During the Nine Years War, too, foreign envoys commented on the freedom with which political issues, the élite, and even Carlos II himself were discussed in Madrid.¹³⁹ This phenomenon was not entirely new,¹⁴⁰ or without successors,¹⁴¹ nor was it limited in Spain to Castile,¹⁴² or in the Monarchy—or Europe—to Spain.¹⁴³ However, the phenomenon appeared, to some at least, to reach new heights in Castile and Spain in this reign,¹⁴⁴ and has left a trail of pamphlet and other literature in archives worldwide.¹⁴⁵ The material, or media, which either stimulated or expressed that opinion included ‘open’ letters, for example that from Don Juan to Mariana published in Madrid following his flight to Aragon in 1668;¹⁴⁶ consultas, such as that of Nithard in reply to Don Juan’s open letter;¹⁴⁷ manifestos, including that of the grandees of December 1676; almanacs;¹⁴⁸ sermons (many of which were published);¹⁴⁹ verses or rhymes;¹⁵⁰ short pamphlets and longer treatises;¹⁵¹ and posters.¹⁵² Most of these circulated in print, but many were also passed round in ¹³⁸ Godolphin to Coventry, 20 Nov. 1675, Hispania Illustrata, 242–51. Cf. ‘Avvisi, o Relatione dello stato presente della Corte di Spagna’ [Jan. 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 124. ¹³⁹ In 1693 the minister of the Elector Palatine observed that half of what was permitted in the Spanish capital would not be allowed by any German prince, Storrs, ‘Germany’s Indies’, 129. ¹⁴⁰ Cf. T. Egido López, Sátiras políticas de la España Moderna, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1973), i. passim . ¹⁴¹ Cf. T. Egido López, Opinión Pública y Oposición al Poder en la España del Siglo XVIII (1713–1759), (Valladolid, 1971; repr. 2002), whose analysis and interpretation of the contemporary expressions of ‘opinion’ are broadly applicable to the reign of Carlos II. ¹⁴² Cf. J. Gascón Pérez (ed.), La Rebelión de las Palabras. Sátiras y Oposición Política en Aragón (1590–1626) (Zaragoza, 2003). ¹⁴³ Cf. L. Ribot García, Revuelta Antiespañola, 199, for satires in Sicily; and M. Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678–1681 (Cambridge, 1994) for contemporary England. ¹⁴⁴ P. Sanz Camañes, Política, Hacienda y milicia en el Aragón de los últimos Austrias entre 1640 y 1680 (Zaragoza, 1997), 241. Cf. also C. Gómez Centurión Jiménez, ‘La sátira política durante el reinado de Carlos II’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, 4 (1983), 11, 13. According to Egido, Sátiras políticas, 34, the pamphlet, denigration, and satire were the true means used by Don Juan to obtain power, not the intervention of the periphery (Chapter 5). ¹⁴⁵ Cf. Maura, Carlos II, ii. 461, on the surviving editions of fray Manuel Guerra’s pamplet, Visita de la Esperanza y el Tiempo. Foreign diplomats in Madrid frequently sent copies home, to give an idea of the state of Spain’s government. ¹⁴⁶ Don Juan to Mariana, 21 Oct. 1668, in A. Valladares y Sotomayor, Seminario Erudito, x (Madrid, 1788), 27–9; and Kalnein, Juan José, 118–19. ¹⁴⁷ Maura, Carlos II, i. 371. Indicative are the numerous surviving published copies. Kalnein, Juan José, 80, notes the growing publication of individual consultas in this era. ¹⁴⁸ In 1676 an almanac appeared forecasting civil war, ‘Avvisi’ sent with de Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 11 Dec. 1676, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 101. ¹⁴⁹ Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes’, 250; idem, ‘Sacralización’, 179 ff. ¹⁵⁰ Cf. ‘Mudanzas de casa, por San Juan de 1691’, BNM, MS. 10,422 f. 232; in Adalberto and Maura Gamazo, Documentos inéditos, i. 232. ¹⁵¹ These included the Libro nuevo de la pérdida de España (1676), whose authorship and content (including its anti-Machiavellian stance) are discussed by Kalnein, Juan José, 391 ff. ¹⁵² On 25 December 1676 posters appeared throughout Madrid offering 25,000 pesos for Valenzuela’s head, De Gubernatis to ST, 25 Dec. 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 110.

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manuscript;¹⁵³ this ensured evasion of the censorship (of the Council of Castile, and of the Inquisition),¹⁵⁴ although the authorities may have been more indulgent in 1675–7 of Valenzuela’s critics.¹⁵⁵ Some of the attitudes expressed in the published and manuscript media also found oral or vocal expression. The disastrous 1694 campaign in Catalonia, for example, prompted the posting of lampoons on the gates of the royal palace, and cries in the street(s) to the effect that the constable and the duke of Montalto had betrayed Spain.¹⁵⁶ The style of these productions varied, depending upon medium, audience, and argument. Picture posters, for example, tended to be simple and direct, even crude. Among the most accessible forms were the glosses and parodies of the ‘Ave Maria’ and ‘Our Father’ and other familiar religious texts.¹⁵⁷ These productions were not popular in the sense of emanating from the people. Where the authors of these productions are known, they were, not surprisingly, drawn largely from the ranks of the educated, including many churchmen. Among the latter, for example, was Juan Cortés Osorio, a fierce critic of Don Juan.¹⁵⁸ The satires and so on were ‘popular’ only in the sense that their audience included the population of Madrid, although newsletters produced there could inform a provincial audience of developments and opinions on them in the capital, assuming that the audience was interested.¹⁵⁹ It might be thought that low levels of literacy would limit the audience for much of this printed matter. However, literacy was increasing in early modern Castile.¹⁶⁰ In any case, the literate could communicate the content of written texts to the illiterate, who could also appreciate and respond to the visual and oral material. Some characteristics of Madrid’s population may also have played a part. For one thing, the capital depended upon constant immigration to maintain its numbers, such that its population was ‘floating’.¹⁶¹ Many of those immigrants had been forced by circumstance to move and might have resentments to express. ¹⁵³ One of the bitterest satires against Don Juan, Cortés Osorio’s Desvergüenzas de la Plaza, en el senado de los pícaros, presidiendo la Barrabasera survives in print and in numerous manuscript versions, suggesting extensive copying, Sanz Camañes, Política, 250. On the continued importance of manuscript transmission in early modern Spain, cf. F. Bouza, Corre manuscrito. Una historia cultural del Siglo de Oro (Madrid, 2001). ¹⁵⁴ In 1672 the authorities had suppressed the published manifesto of England against Holland which Godolphin had had printed, Contarini to Doge and Senate, 18 May 1672, CSPV, 1671–2, 211. The Carta Verdadera de las Novedades de España, 1665–60 (1669) was seized by the Inquisition on publication but manuscript copies survive, cf. BL Add. 17,518. ¹⁵⁵ Kalnein, Juan José, 389. ¹⁵⁶ Maura, Vida, 426–7. In 1695 the satires were reportedly ‘recited’ everwhere, Operti to ST, 10 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ¹⁵⁷ Cf. Décimas a los sucesos de don Fernando de Valenzuela. Glosa del Ave María’, in Egido, Sátiras políticos, i. 182. ¹⁵⁸ Sanz Camañes, Política, 249–50. ¹⁵⁹ For an awareness in Zamora of political developments in Madrid, and references to gazettes (below) and to some of the satires circulating there, cf. Lorenzo Pinar and Vasallo Toranzo Diario de Antonio Moreno de la Torre. 135, 138, 139. ¹⁶⁰ S. T. Nalle, ‘Literacy and Culture in Early Modern Castile’, P&P, 125 (1989), 76. ¹⁶¹ M. F. Carbajo Isla, La población de la villa de Madrid. Desde finales del siglo XVI hasta mediados del siglo XIX (Madrid, 1987), passim; Kalnein, Juan José, 149 ff.

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Once in Madrid, the conditions of many of these incomers remained difficult, not least because of the high cost of housing and the gap between wages and the cost of living,¹⁶² a differential which would be accentuated in times of dearth, for example during the Castilian crisis of 1676–83. Despite the existence of a system of bread supply and price control, the authorities could not always satisfy a vulnerable and volatile urban population.¹⁶³ Finally, the layout of Madrid, the proximity of the royal palace, the seat of government, to the town, and the presence of the houses of ministers in the latter may have encouraged demonstrations of popular feeling, and increased their impact.¹⁶⁴ In order to connect with popular sentiment, satires and other productions needed to address its concerns. Don Juan and other opponents of Nithard and Mariana successfully exploited this in 1667–8, and no doubt benefited from a widespread discontent among those affected by the appropriation of salaries, juro income, and pensions—a crucial component of the income/wealth of nobles, members of the urban élites, and ecclesiastical and other institutions—between 1673 and 1677 (Chapter 3). Significantly, immediately after seizing power in 1677, Carlos II’s halfbrother and his fellow plotters gave out that Valenzuela had been discovered with jewels and other valuables, and instigated a search for his supposedly ill-gotten wealth.¹⁶⁵ Once in power, however, Don Juan found himself in the same position as his ousted rival. As early as the spring of 1677 the failure of the new regime to reduce the fiscal burden was said to be fuelling discontent in Madrid.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Don Juan soon imitated Valenzuela, appropriating juro annuities, pensions, and salaries.¹⁶⁷ In 1678 it was said that Don Juan had raised large sums but that their destination was unknown,¹⁶⁸ echoing charges brought earlier against Valenzuela. Similar concerns were expressed during the Nine Years War. In 1692 the newly appointed Junta de medios (Chapter 3) inspired new satires;¹⁶⁹ and in 1694–5 the political assault on Mariana of Neuburg and her German entourage was underpinned by the fact that Carlos II’s subjects were being asked to pay more for the war, at a time when the queen’s favourites were securing lucrative mercedes.¹⁷⁰ But it was not just the cost of war which was at issue. Events abroad, above all defeat, were exploited by the rivals for power in Madrid, who blamed their ¹⁶² J. M. López García (ed.), El impacto de la Corte en Castilla. Madrid y su territorio en la época moderna (Madrid, 1998), 272–4. ¹⁶³ C. de Castro, El pan de Madrid. El abasto de las ciudades españolas del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid, 1987), 185 ff. ¹⁶⁴ Cf. map of Madrid (1656) in J. Brown and J. H. Elliott, A Palace for a King (New Haven and London, 1980); and J. Fayard, Les Membres du Conseil de Castille à l’époque moderne (Geneva, 1979), 443 ff. During the 1699 bread riots, Oropesa’s house in Madrid was attacked. ¹⁶⁵ Cf. ‘Avvisi’, Madrid, 4 Feb. [1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 134; and Lorenzo Pinar and Vasallo Toranzo, Diario de Antonio Moren de la Torre, 136 ff., entry for Saturday 23 Jan. 1677. ¹⁶⁶ De Gubernatis to ST, 19 Mar.1677, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 163 and 2 April 1677, f. 170. ¹⁶⁷ Cf. Avvisi [July 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 222. ¹⁶⁸ De Gubernatis to ST, 26 April 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 316. ¹⁶⁹ Cf. the verses enclosed with Baumgarten to Prielmayer, 17 Sept. 1692, Adalberto and Maura Gamazo, Documentos Inéditos, i. 301–2. ¹⁷⁰ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 295–6.

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opponents for the disasters of the Monarchy. In 1668 the defence of Flanders was one of the focuses of the struggle between Don Juan and Nithard. Don Juan’s open letter to the regent of October 1668 sought to explain his apparent dereliction of duty in not going as ordered to the defence of Flanders; he suggested that he was being sent ill-equipped and that Nithard was, in fact, prepared to lose Flanders if this was the price of removing his chief critic. Nithard defended himself against these claims, and against the numerous pamphlets issued by supporters of Don Juan (many of whom spelt out the way the Monarchy’s defences had been neglected),¹⁷¹ by urging that Don Juan and Flanders had been properly provided for.¹⁷² For his part, Don Juan further claimed that it was only when he discovered how poorly provided he was that he excused himself from going to the Low Countries.¹⁷³ In a subsequent letter to Mariana, intended (like the others) for a wider audence, the king’s half-brother expressed his indignation at the recent peace treaties with Portugal and France; he claimed to be unable to understand that Mariana found it so easy to let go the greater part of the Low Countries—a reference to the territory recently ceded to Louis XIV—but not her confessor.¹⁷⁴ This was clever politics: according to the Venetian envoy in Madrid, the peace of 1668 ‘agitated the blood of the Castilians’.¹⁷⁵ Defeat, and the loss of both reputation and territory, again, and inevitably, became major political issues issues following Spain’s entry into the Dutch War. Once again, Mariana and her minister were accused of neglecting the Monarchy’s defences and presiding over a disastrous war effort.¹⁷⁶ In 1676 the Savoyard minister commented on the impact of the news of defeat in Sicily on the ‘popolo’ of Madrid and the fact that the latter blamed ‘the disgraces’ of the Monarchy on the government;¹⁷⁷ one critical publication, the Libro nuevo de la pérdida de España revealed concern about the commitment to Flanders;¹⁷⁸ and in December of that year Carlos II gave the needs of the Monarchy as one of the reasons for summoning his half-brother to his side in Madrid,¹⁷⁹ in a situation in which Valenzuela and his associates were blamed for the recent setbacks of Spanish arms on all fronts.¹⁸⁰ ¹⁷¹ Cf. ‘Política Censura’, Semanario Erudito, Vol. IV (Madrid, 1787), 40 ff. ¹⁷² Nithard’s consulta, 25 Oct. 1668, in reply to Don Juan, Semanario Erudito, iv. 47–80. ¹⁷³ DJA to the city of Barcelona, 14 Dec. 1668, Semanario Erudito, iv. 118–23. In an earlier letter to the city of Burgos, 20 Nov. 1668, AMB/Actas/1669, f. 9, Don Juan explained his flight to Aragon as intended to conserve the king’s realms and protect his own person and honour. ¹⁷⁴ DJA to Mariana, 22 Feb. 1669, Semanario Erudito, iv. 147–52; Maura, Carlos II, 430; Ribot, ‘España de Carlos II’, 91 . ¹⁷⁵ Kalnein, Juan José, 62. ¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 365, 367, 390 ff. ¹⁷⁷ De Gubernatis to MR, Madrid, 8 July 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 40, and same to ST, 23 July 1676, f. 46. The impact of this news may have been greater because earlier reports spoke of Spanish success: same to same, 27 May 1676, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32 f. 17. According to Bergeyck to Villahermosa, 23 Sept. 1676, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 251, the raising of the siege of Maastricht and the loss of Ypres created a bad impression in Madrid, where Monterrey was blamed for involving the Monarchy in the war. ¹⁷⁸ Kalnein, Juan José, 392. ¹⁷⁹ CII to DJA, 27 Dec. 1676, Maura, Carlos II, ii. 323. ¹⁸⁰ ‘Avvisi, o sia Relatione dello stato presente della Corte di Spagna’ [mid-late Jan. 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 119 ff. (at f. 124).

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The grandees’ manifesto of December 1676 also made much of the travails of the Monarchy.¹⁸¹ On achieving power, Don Juan’s team sought to blacken further Valenzuela’s reputation, claiming to have discovered a secret correspondence between the ousted minister and Louis XIV,¹⁸² perhaps implying that Spain’s defeats owed something to treason at the top. The advent of Don Juan encouraged many to believe that Carlos II’s forces would, henceforth, enjoy greater success against France,¹⁸³ reflecting a ‘messianic’ strain in Spanish politics which the supporters of the king’s half-brother readily exploited.¹⁸⁴ Don Juan, however, could not satisfy the hopes placed in him. Messina was recovered, but the Spanish collapse in Flanders in 1677–8 clearly upset opinion in Madrid. In April 1678, following the loss of Ghent and the present to Carlos II of a giant by the grand duke of Tuscany, there appeared throughout Madrid a ‘libel’ playing on the similarity between the name ‘Ghent’ and the word ‘giant’ which was intended as a criticism of the regime’s loss of another major town in Flanders.¹⁸⁵ In the summer of 1678 among memorials handed to Carlos II as he went to chapel was one representing Spain’s losses since the king’s half-brother had assumed power;¹⁸⁶ and later that same year, the dukes of Alba and Osuna and the marquis of Astorga (allies of Don Juan in 1676–7) declared their opposition to the peace of Nijmegen.¹⁸⁷ Following the conclusion of that peace, some councillors of state were said to be openly declaring it the most fatal and ignominious peace ever concluded by Spain, including that with Portugal of 1668.¹⁸⁸ The growing disillusionment found expression in mounting criticism of the sort earlier directed against Valenzuela. A swelling critical literature pointed out that under Don Juan taxes were no lower than before, but nor had the defences and security of the Monarchy improved.¹⁸⁹ Ministers could seek to counter this criticism in various ways. For one thing, they could punish those commanders in the field deemed responsible for disaster. In 1675, for example, following the French breach of the blockade of Messina, the ¹⁸¹ Godolphin to Arlington, 27 Jan. 1677, Hispania Illustrata, 272–83. ¹⁸² ‘Avvisi’, Madrid, 4 Feb. [1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 133. ¹⁸³ Kalnein, Juan José, 440. ¹⁸⁴ Don Juan sought to justify the coup to Innocent XI by referring to God’s having punished Spain in recent years, Maura, Carlos II, ii. 326. For contemporary ‘messianism’, cf. Kalnein, Juan José, 363; and A. de Bethencourt Massieu, prologue, Egido López, Opinión Pública, 20. ¹⁸⁵ De Gubernatis to ST, 1 April 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 312. Cf. Letter of Advice to Mr Richards, 22 Mar. 1678, Hispania Illustrata, 351 ff. ¹⁸⁶ De Gubernatis to ST, 9 June 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 339. ¹⁸⁷ De Gubernatis to ST, 17 Oct. 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 383. The previous year the Venetian ambassador observed that some of Don Juan’s opponents were happy to see things going badly, Cornaro to [Doge and Senate], 11 Nov. 1677, ASV/Dispacci degli Ambasciatori/Spagna, f. 117. ¹⁸⁸ De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 18 June 1679, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 401. Talk of reform at this time was regarded by some as an attempt to distract the public from recent tax increases and the losses in the war, ‘Nove correnti’, Madrid 12 Jan. 1679, sent with de Gubernatis to [?], 12 Jan. 1679, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 402. ¹⁸⁹ Kalnein, Juan José, 493, 499; Maura, Carlos II, ii. 463; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 268; Sanz Camañes, Política, 272.

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outcry in Madrid was such that the authorities ordered the arrest and investigation, or visita, of those responsible.¹⁹⁰ For another, Carlos II and his ministers could make much of good news. Following the recovery of Messina, in the spring of 1678, Carlos interrupted his stay at Aranjuez and returned to Madrid to give public thanks at the monastery of Nuestra Señora de Atocha,¹⁹¹ where all major public and royal events—births and marriages, the king’s recovery after illnesses, victory and peace, and so on—were celebrated.¹⁹² As for the critics, they could be persecuted. In 1676 Don Pedro Fernández del Campo, secretary of the Despacho Universal, ordered a search of the cell of one of the royal preachers, Antonio de Vergara, and the seizure of any satires against the government found there; Vergara, and other preachers of sermons hostile to the regime, were subsequently banished from Court.¹⁹³ As for Don Juan, in 1678 he was said to have repented of allowing satires, now that they criticized him;¹⁹⁴ instead, he now sought to discover and punish their authors.¹⁹⁵ But Don Juan also sought to mould opinion as he had in seeking to gain power. His secretary, Fabro Bremundan, who had between 1661 and 1663 collaborated with his master to produce a Madrid gazette, which often trumpeted Don Juan’s success, and who used similar means to project his master during the latter’s residence in Zaragoza between 1669 and 1676,¹⁹⁶ secured the privilege to publish another in Madrid following the coup of 1676–7.¹⁹⁷ Bremundan’s gazette depicted a regime which was hard-working, in the interest of the public and the Monarchy, and successful.¹⁹⁸ On the conduct of the war, the issue of the gazette dated 31 January 1678, typically, painted a positive picture of the situation in Italy. On the one hand, the French were said to be in retreat, their fleets returning ¹⁹⁰ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 219; Ribot, Monarquía, 316. After lengthy proceedings most were acquitted of the charges against them. ¹⁹¹ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 416, 453; Castellano, Cortes, 52. Later that year the king ordered public prayers of thanksgiving following the reduction of Messina and the wreck of the enemy fleet in the Indies. ¹⁹² In 1679 Carlos gave thanks at Atocha following the conclusion of the negotiations for his first marriage, Maura, Carlos II, ii. 471. ¹⁹³ Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Sacralización’, 180. According to Fernández del Campo, Vergara had not only gone too far in a recent sermon, but was a known associate of the malcontents, and had contacts with a servant of Don Juan. ¹⁹⁴ De Gubernatis to ST, 28 April 1678, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 323. ¹⁹⁵ In 1678 Don Juan was seeking to discover the author of a critical ‘comedy’, De Gubernatis to Madama Reale, 4 Aug. 1678, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 353. In March 1679 the marquis of Mancera, a leading figure in the household of the banished Mariana of Austria, was fined 100,000 ducats and banished for a paper hostile to Don Juan, Nove correnti, Madrid 15 March 1679, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 418. This may explain why fewer satires survive for 1677–9 than from 1668–9 and 1675–7, Kalnein, Juan José, 443. ¹⁹⁶ Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes,’ 249. ¹⁹⁷ E. Varela Hervias, La Gazeta Nueva (1661–1663). Notas sobre la historia del periodismo español en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII (Madrid, 1960); M. D. Sáiz, Historia del periodismo en España, 1. Los orígenes. El siglo XVIII, 2nd edn., (Madrid, 1990), 48 ff. ¹⁹⁸ Cf. the issue of the Madrid (or ordinary) gazette, dated 5 July 1677, reporting the return of Carlos II to Madrid after a successful journey to Aragon (Chapter 6), and the efforts of the king and Don Juan on behalf of the Monarchy, Sanz Camañes, Política, 304.

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to port and their forces reduced by illness and desertion; on the other hand, levies of troops in Spain’s Italian realms for the coming campaign were declared to be going well—reflecting the loyalty of those territories—while Carlos II’s army in Italy was to be reformed in order to ensure a more disciplined and effective force.¹⁹⁹ Certainly, the French would within a few months abandon Sicily, leaving Messina to the mercy of Carlos II. Nevertheless this report put a very positive gloss, or ‘spin’, on what remained a testing a situation for the king, his halfbrother, and ministers. The gazette did not survive Don Juan’s death, being supressed in 1680, but was revived within a few years, not least because of the continued demand for news of the sort it reported.²⁰⁰ Events abroad, and particularly those involving the Monarchy, continued to impact on Spanish politics after 1679. In 1684, for example, the truce of Ratisbon was celebrated in Spain, not least because it prevented worse disaster, but was followed by the fall of Don Juan’s successor as chief minister, the duke of Medinaceli, whose administration was (held) responsible for the condition of Spain and another defeat, and with it the loss of Luxembourg.²⁰¹ In many respects the Nine Years War seemed to represent a return to the 1670s. Ministers could use the press to appeal to ‘opinion’ on foreign policy to explain the decision to enter the conflict (1690).²⁰² However, defeat abroad had political consequences at home. In 1691 the loss of Mons in Flanders and of Urgel in Catalonia probably contributed to the fall of Oropesa (above), and in 1692 the loss of Namur was said to have provoked despair and ‘murmurings’ in Madrid.²⁰³ In the summer of 1693 many in Madrid feared for Cadiz, Andalusia, and Catalonia following reports of the advance of the French fleet,²⁰⁴ anxieties realized with the fall of Rosas; indeed, it was said that the captain general of Catalonia was ordered not to send to Madrid so many expresses with news of this sort, for fear of provoking popular disorder in the capital.²⁰⁵ Much of the criticism on this occasion was directed against Spain’s allies who had not fulfilled their promises of support: it was said that the English envoy, Stanhope, did not dare to leave his house for fear of being insulted in the street.²⁰⁶ Later that same year, following the arrival in Madrid of news of the allied defeat in Piedmont, and the casualties suffered by Carlos II’s troops, there was some criticism of the duke of Savoy (for giving battle) by those of the ‘middling sort’, relatives of some of the junior officers among the casualties.²⁰⁷ In 1694 disaster in Catalonia ¹⁹⁹ La Gazeta General que vino de Madrid, Lunes 31 de Enero de 1678, NLS/G.25.e.1 (7). ²⁰⁰ Sanz Camañes, Política, 251; Sáiz, Historia del periodismo, 53–5. ²⁰¹ Dunlop, Memoirs, ii. 236–7. ²⁰² Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, xxviii. 26. ²⁰³ Stanhope to Nottingham, 30 July 1692, SP 94/73, f. 76. Cf. also los Vélez to Baltasar de Fuenmayor, 6 Aug. 1692, Madrid, Lonchay, Correspondence,v. 563. ²⁰⁴ Operti to VA, 18 June 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/99. ²⁰⁵ Stanhope to Warre, 24 June 1693, Spain under Charles, 52–3. ²⁰⁶ Gudannes, 9 July 1693, ‘Lettres’, 417–20. I have not seen this confirmed in Stanhope’s own correspondence. ²⁰⁷ Operti to VA, 5 Nov. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38.

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and the apparent lack of solutions to the Monarchy’s problems of the king’s ministers inspired widespread discontent,²⁰⁸ which some observers thought was only halted by the appearance of the Anglo-Dutch fleet,²⁰⁹ although apparently a Te Deum was celebrated at Atocha that summer following English successes against the Breton and Norman coasts.²¹⁰ Some of the foreign envoys were clearly concerned by the ‘licence’ of the satires circulating in Madrid in the winter of 1694–5.²¹¹ However, when the English admiral Russell complained about a report in the Madrid gazette of 24 December 1694, some of Carlos II’s ministers defended the licence of that organ, suggesting that they may have regarded it as a safety valve, preventing something worse.²¹² In 1695, fortunately, the Madrid gazette was able to report better fortunes in Catalonia,²¹³ Italy,²¹⁴ and Flanders, prompting victory celebrations in Madrid of a sort not seen for many years,²¹⁵ and some more upbeat publications.²¹⁶ However, the setbacks suffered in 1696 and 1697 provoked further discontent,²¹⁷ before the conclusion of the Treaty of Rijswijk allowed the king’s subjects to celebrate the end of a long conflict,²¹⁸ one which had stimulated opinion in a way not seen since Don Juan’s seizure of power in similar circumstances during the Dutch War.

²⁰⁸ Typical was the satire La gran Comedia de la Torre de Vabel y Confusa Vabilonia que se representa en Madrid . . . , Egerton 330, f. 174. This praised the queen mother, was highly critical of Mariana of Neuburg and her German entourage, and closed with the words ‘the Monarchy is over and the comedy too’. ²⁰⁹ Stanhope to Hopkins, 14 July 1694, Spain under Charles, 65–6; Operti to VA, 15 July 1694, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40/128, 177. ²¹⁰ Gudannes, 20 Aug. 1694, Martin, ‘Lettres’, 474–5. The French agent clearly saw this as propaganda and claimed that a councillor [of State] had told her that he did not doubt a Te Deum would be sung in Madrid even if the French captured Barcelona. ²¹¹ Operti to VA, 13 Jan. 1695, and same to ST, 10 Feb. (enclosing a copy of such a satire), AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41/137 and m. 41, 42. Clearly, if the political situation in Spain deteriorated, this would undermine Carlos II’s contribution to the struggle against Louis XIV. ²¹² Portocarrero and Frigiliana argued that the gazettes were harmless, and that to ban or censor them would be counter-productive, CCS, 11 Jan. 1695, AGS/E/4143. ²¹³ Stanhope to [?], 24 Aug. 1695, SP 94/74 f. 3. ²¹⁴ Stanhope to Vernon, 3 Aug. 1695, SP94/74 f. 45, same to Lexington, 4 Aug. 1695, Add. 46,540 f. 19, and same to Galway, 11 Aug. 1695, Kent RO/U1590/0154/4, reporting a Te Deum celebration in the king’s chapel and three days and nights of celebrations following the surrender of Casale. ²¹⁵ Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 28 Sept.1695, SP 94/74, f. 11, described the three days of celebrations in Madrid of the capture of Namur as the ‘greatest demonstrations I have known here on any occasion’. ²¹⁶ The author of the Diario de el sitio y de la toma de el castillo de Namur (Madrid, 1695) declared that the fortress had fallen in less time than in 1692 and that its recovery heralded the reverse of the French coin. ²¹⁷ In 1696 Stanhope reported that the ‘rabble’ were stirred up against the ruling élite by printed libels depicting the mismanagement of the latter, which were sold in the streets, Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 14 Nov. 1696, Spain under Charles, 104. ²¹⁸ For the joy of king and subjects, and celebrations, cf. Geleen to Elector Palatine, 10 Oct. 1697, and countess Berlips to same, 11 Oct. 1697, in Adalbert of Bavaria and Maura Gamazo, Documentos Inéditos, i. 679, 680.

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THE CASTILIAN CORTES If satires and other forms of political criticism flourished in the reign of Carlos II this may have been due to the lack of other outlets, including that provided by the Cortes of Castile. The Cortes had been summoned by Philip IV to meet in October 1665, to swear allegiance to his heir, Carlos. However, Mariana was reluctant to assemble the Cortes, fearing that her political opponents would use it to attack her regime; she therefore authorized the cities to vote servicios without the formal assembly of their representatives,²¹⁹ setting a precedent which was followed by Don Juan and Carlos II, who both failed to summon the Castilian Cortes, i.e., the representatives of the 21 towns with a vote in it.²²⁰ Some of the representative assemblies of the other territories of Spain (and the Monarchy) were assembled, including the junta general of Galicia,²²¹ the Cortes of Aragon,²²² and the Cortes of Navarra,²²³ but this only highlights the contrast with Castile.²²⁴ This is the more striking because the Cortes of Castile had become an established feature of constitutional and political life since at least 1590, on the basis of its role in granting and confirming taxation, most notably the millones.²²⁵ For some contemporary opinion, particularly that critical of Mariana, the disappearance of Castile’s main representative institution was the triumph of ‘absolutism’,²²⁶ a view echoed by many later commentators.²²⁷ For others, however, the failure to call the Cortes was a sign not so much of royal power as of its impotence vis-à-vis the oligarchies which dominated the Castilian towns and had refused before 1665 to bow to the demand of the king and his ministers that they give full powers to their deputies to the Cortes, whom the king would then oblige to agree to further taxation.²²⁸ According to this view, just as the Crown surrendered to the aristocracy, so it also yielded to the Castilian urban élites. This was the more serious because ²¹⁹ Castellano, Cortes, 72, 75 ff., 180–1; Artola, Hacienda, 209; Maura, Carlos II, i. 139. Mariana may have been dissuaded from summoning the Cortes by the (regency) council, R. Valladares, La Rebelión de Portugal 1640–80. Guerra, conflicto y poderes en la monarquía hispánica (Valladolid, 1998), 193. ²²⁰ The 21 towns were: Avila, Burgos, Cordoba, Cuenca, those (collectively) of Estremadura (since 1655), those (collectively) of Galicia (since 1623), Granada, Guadalajara, Jaen, Leon, Madrid, Murcia, Palencia, (since 1660), Salamanca, Segovia, Soria, Seville, Toledo, Toro, Valladolid, Zamora, A. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Concesiones de votos en Cortes a ciudades castellanas en el siglo XVII’, in idem, Crisis y Decadencia de la España de los Austrias (Barcelona, 1969), 97 ff. ²²¹ Manuel M. de Artaza, Rey, Reino y Representación. La Junta General de Galicia (1599–1834) (Madrid, 1998), 26. ²²² Sanz Camañes, Política, Hacienda, 301 ff.; Kamen, Spain in Later, 345–50. ²²³ Artaza, Rey, Reino, 25. ²²⁴ In addition, 1694 saw the suppression of the Diputación de Alcabalas—or of the Reino— effectively all that remained of the Cortes of Castile, Castellano, Cortes, 107 ff. ²²⁵ Cf. C. Jago, ‘Philip II and the Cortes of Castile: The Case of the Cortes of 1576’, P&P, 109 (1985), 24 ff. ²²⁶ Kalnein, Juan José, 52 ff. ²²⁷ Cf. C. Jago, ‘Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile’, AHR, 86 (1981), 326. ²²⁸ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘The End of the Cortes of Castile’, PER, 4 (1984); repr. in idem, Crown and Cortes. Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern Castile (Aldershot, 1993).

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the failure to summon the Cortes in effect froze the tax structure at a time when funds were needed for a succession of costly wars (Chapter 3). In fact, and despite not formally assembling, the Cortes continued to have influence. Thus the conditions laid down—in the formal agreements, or contracts, or escrituras—for earlier millones grants—and which included a ban on sales of nobility, on grants of naturalization, and on the foundation of new religious houses²²⁹—remained in force. Those hoping to establish monasteries and convents, and those seeking naturalization therefore had to obtain the approval of the Cortes, i.e., of the voting towns (or rather of the regidores who dominated those towns).²³⁰ More important, the Crown still needed the consent of the Cortes every six years to the continuation of the millones. Thus, although there was no formal assembly of the representatives of the Cortes after 1665, the voting towns were frequently consulted, and their consent sought, but individually, making concerted action, and resistance to the demands of the Crown, more difficult. In 1667,²³¹ 1673,²³² 1679,²³³ 1684,²³⁴ 1691,²³⁵and 1697²³⁶ Mariana and/or her son successfully requested the consent of the voting towns to the prorogation of the millones. But this was not the limit of the Crown’s consultation of those towns. In 1669 Mariana asked them to submit their views to the recently established Junta de Alivios.²³⁷ In addition, the extra burdens made necessary by war required—in accordance with contemporary thinking about the need for the realm, or reino, to consent to new impositions—that the (Castilian) Cortes-voting towns be consulted. In the winter of 1693–4 it was suggested that the intended 2 per cent levy to raise soldiers for the 1694 campaign was most likely to succeed if the king first secured the consent of the Cortes-voting towns (Chapter 1), although this was ignored; and in 1694–5 Carlos II sought the consent of those towns to the new imposition on salt (Chapter 3)—or rather informed them of it. Political opponents also sought to make use of, or secure the support of, the Cortes towns. In 1668–9, for example, Don Juan wrote to all the Cortes-voting towns, seeking their support against Mariana and Nithard,²³⁸ and in December 1676 the manifesto in which various grandees and other nobles declared their intention to ²²⁹ ‘Over time the contract acquired well over a hundred conditions and regulated practically every aspect of Castilian public life’, C. Jago, ‘Crown and Cortes in Early Modern Spain’, PER, 12 (1992), 180. ²³⁰ In 1669 the duke of Maqueda secured the support of the regidores of Burgos for the naturalization of his nephew, the illegitimate son of the duke of Aveiro: AMB/Actas/1669, f. 200. In 1675 the city of Granada obtained their consent to the foundation of a new religious house, AMB/Actas/1675, ff. 492–3. ²³¹ Cf. Mariana to Burgos, 25 July 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, ff. 174–5. ²³² Burgos agreed to prorogue the millones on 5 June 1673, AMB/Actas/1679, ff. 175–6. ²³³ CII to city of Burgos, 24 Apr. 1679, AMB/Actas/1679, f. 165. ²³⁴ CII to city of Burgos, 31 Dec. 1684, AMB/Actas/1685, f. 65. The letter sent to Toledo was dated the same day, cf. Larruga, Memorias Políticas y Económicas, vi. 300. ²³⁵ CII to city of Burgos, 5 Feb. 1691, AMB/Actas/1691, f. 57. ²³⁶ CII to city of Burgos, 19 Feb. 1697, AMB/Actas/1697, f. 62. ²³⁷ Kalnein, Juan José, 191. Mariana’s letter to Burgos, 24 Mar. 1669, is in AMB/Actas/1669, f. 93; Burgos’s reply, 8 Apr. 1669, ibid., ff. 111–13. ²³⁸ Maura, Vida, 109. Most did not open the letter, or reply to it, forwarding it to Madrid, unopened Maura, Carlos II, i. 380–2, 389–91, 420.

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oust Valenzuela and Mariana claimed the support of a majority of those towns.²³⁹ Whether Don Juan and his fellow plotters really wished to see the Cortes of Castile assemble in such a tense political juncture must be doubted: following his coup, the Cortes of Aragon was summoned, but not that of Castile, as Don Juan’s critics pointed out. In fact, resistance of a sort remained a possibility, and a reality. In 1666 the regent’s efforts to secure the naturalization of Nithard, without which he could not hold the office of inquisitor general (above) was opposed by Avila, Cordoba, and Granada;²⁴⁰ and in 1667 Guadalajara refused to agree to the renewal of the millones.²⁴¹ On this occasion (as on others) the opposition was ignored as being in a minority. Occasionally, however, the voting towns might attempt to co-ordinate resistance. In 1675 Cuenca, claiming that the Council of Finance was administering the millones in breach of the escrituras, protested to Mariana, and sought to mobilize the other voting towns.²⁴² Regidores often split over royal demands, some individuals opposing the latter on a number of occasions, such that we can sometimes speak of opposed ‘royal’ and ‘municipal’ parties or factions.²⁴³ Resistance might also, finally, be effective. In 1693–4, for example, the self-interested opposition of various of the Cortes-voting towns forced some modification of the proposed abolition of the Diputación before it was finally accepted.²⁴⁴ Opposition was limited in extent and was generally overcome, but it could not be ignored. The Crown, therefore, needed to manage the regidores of the Cortes-voting towns, just as it would have had to manage an assembly. There were various well-established ways of doing this. One was to present a compelling case of urgent need, which the realm, or its representatives simply could not ignore. In 1667, on the same day that the regidores of Burgos were presented with Mariana’s request that they renew the millones for a further six years, they also received her letter informing them of the invasion of Flanders by Louis XIV’s troops in breach of the peace of 1659.²⁴⁵ Whether this was decisive is not clear; nevertheless, when the regidores agreed the prorogation of the millones on 19 August, the view expressed by the count of Villariezo, that the millones should be renewed to ²³⁹ ‘Avvisi, o sia Relatione dello stato presente della Corte di Spagna’ [mid-late Jan. 1677], AST/ LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 119 ff. (at f. 124). This claim needs investigation. ²⁴⁰ Maura, Vida, 78–9; Castellano, Cortes, 72; Kalnein, Juan José, 86, 139 ff. ²⁴¹ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Patronato Real e Integración Política en las Ciudades Castellanas bajo los Austrias’, in J. I. Fortea Pérez (ed.), Imágenes de la Diversidad. El mundo urbano en la Corona de Castilla (S. XVI–XVIII) (Santander, 1997), 494. According to a letter sent from Madrid on 22 Oct. 1667 by the deputies of Burgos, the cities of Avila, Guadalajara, and Segovia still had not agreed to prorogation, session of 27 Oct. 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, f. 260. ²⁴² Cf. letter to the regidores of Burgos, 6 Nov. 1675, session of 14 Nov. 1675, AMB/Actas/1675, f. 450. Burgos declined to act, since in Burgos there was no such infraction. ²⁴³ Cf. Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Tantas Cortes como ciudades: negociación, beneficio y fidelidad en la Corona de Castilla (1667–1712)’, in F. J. Guillamón Álvarez et al. (eds.), Entre Clio y Casandra. Poder y sociedad e la monarquía hispánica durante la Edad Moderna (Murcia, 2005), 277–301; and available online at http://www.tiemposmodernos.org/floridablanca/ textomunoz.htm for Murcia, 1667–97. ²⁴⁴ Castellano, Cortes, 108 ff. ²⁴⁵ Mariana to city of Burgos, 26 July 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, f. 176.

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provide for the defence and security of the Monarchy was that of the majority and the millones were prorogued at the regent’s first attempt to do this without assembling the Cortes.²⁴⁶ Similarly, in October 1667, when asking the city of Burgos to raise a company of 100 men at its own cost (towards a tercio to be raised in Cantabria) for Flanders, the regent urged that Louis XIV had launched an unjust war and expressed the hope that the city would come to the aid of her young son and herself, a widow;²⁴⁷ following Burgos’s delay in complying with this request, Mariana informed the regidores that the defence of Castile, and thus the peace she desired for her subjects, depended upon that of the Low Countries.²⁴⁸ On subsequent occasions, too, the Crown exploited the argument that defence needs—the dangerous situation of Christendom, of the Monarchy and of Castile itself—persisted, and to good effect, for example in 1684²⁴⁹ and 1695. On the latter occasion, the regidores of Burgos expressed a number of objections to the new imposition on salt, but put these aside in face of the king’s articulation of the urgent defence needs which impelled him to it.²⁵⁰ While he could rely on his subjects’ loyalty, the king also needed to show, or at least to claim, that such decisions were not taken lightly. In January 1694 Carlos’s letter imposing the 2 per cent levy not only referred to the need to find men for the army of Catalonia, the bulwark of Castile, it also made clear that the decision to impose a quota in this way was taken only after wide consultation—in accordance with a widely held view that the king must seek counsel²⁵¹—and that this measure seemed the least onerous for the king’s subjects.²⁵² Such arguments were effectively unanswerable. Those Burgos town councillors who voted to grant the servicios requested by the Crown themselves frequently articulated the need to defend empire (often specifically, Flanders), while those opposing them only referred to the exhaustion and poverty of their town and its province. Of course, it is possible that this latter was a more politically acceptable cover for anti-imperial sentiments, but, on the face of it, the regidores of Burgos, and those of the other Cortesvoting towns, remained committed to the Monarchy. In 1698 the majority of ²⁴⁶ Castellano, Cortes, 72–3. Guadalajara opposed renewal. ²⁴⁷ Mariana to city of Burgos, 24 and 25 Oct. 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, ff. 266–7. ²⁴⁸ Mariana to city of Burgos, 10 Dec. 1667, AMB/Actas/1667, f. 295. However, the argument that the provincial tercios must be kept up after the conclusion of peace in 1668, to keep that peace, did not convince the regidores of Burgos, Mariana to city of Burgos, 15 June and 8 Aug. 1668, AMB/Actas/1668, f. 289. ²⁴⁹ Cf the city of Toledo to Carlos II [Feb. 1685?], Larruga, Memorias Políticas y Económicas, vi. 300 ff.; and CII to the city of Burgos, 19 Feb. 1697, AMB/Actas/1697, ff. 63–5. ²⁵⁰ CII to regidores of Burgos, 6 Apr. 1695, AMB/Actas/1695, ff. 106–8. The urgency, of course, implicitly justified the failure to consult, or by assembly. The council identified objections to the tax in replying to Carlos, but accepted that the defence of the Monarchy (mentioned by the king), overrode all their other concerns, AMB/Actos/1695 f. 110 ff. Earlier, in June 1694, the royal order suppressing the Diputación del Reino explained the latter in part by reference to the need to apply the funds it consumed to defence, Castellano, Cortes, 106. ²⁵¹ Cf. M. D. Sánchez González, El deber del consejo en el estado moderno: las juntas ad hoc en España (1471–1665) (Madrid, 1993). ²⁵² Carlos II to regidores of Burgos, 20 Jan. 1694, AMB/Actas/1694, f. 34.

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Cortes-voting towns agreed to the prorogation of the salt imposition, which was justified by the king on the grounds of the need to rebuild the defences of Catalonia and the Armada;²⁵³ and again in 1700 (when the imposition was reduced by half ), the king claiming that it was necessary to fund the defence of Ceuta against the Moors and the expulsion of the Scots from Darien.²⁵⁴ A leading role in managing the Cortes-voting towns in these situations was played by the corregidores,²⁵⁵ who received the royal letters requesting various servicios, and effectively oversaw the council sessions in which the regidores discussed them. On occasion, a corregidor might intervene to halt voting where it was clearly going against the Crown: in 1668, for example, the corregidor of Burgos suspended voting on the regent’s request for the prorogation of the provincial tercio, after the regidores represented that the town and its province were in no state to give what was asked, that the town had already prorogued the millones in 1667 and granted a donativo, and that the war (against Portugal) was over, reducing the need (or justification) for the tercio.²⁵⁶ The Crown could also offer various rewards, including hábitos of the military orders for regidores and their relations, and appointments as corregidor to those who co-operated (i.e., granted what the Crown sought): in 1691, for example, Don Joseph de Sancha y Ayala, regidor of Cuenca, requested (and obtained) an habito, in view of his many services, which included agreeing to prorogation of the millones in 1667, 1673, 1679, and 1685.²⁵⁷ Thus, the disappearance of the Cortes as a functioning assembly simply consolidated the local power of the urban oligarchies and their social status within the noble hierarchy,²⁵⁸ although this would, no doubt, also have been the outcome if the Cortes had assembled. Mercedes did not guarantee future support: Don Miguel de Salamanca, the most consistent and forceful opponent of royal demands among the regidores of Burgos for most of this period (Chapter 3), was a caballero of Santiago.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the prospect of rewards led many regidores ²⁵³ Cf. list of cities and towns which approved prorogation, and corregidor of Salamanca to [president of CC], 12 Mar. 1698, AHN/Consejos/4468/40. Salamanca opposed prorogation. ²⁵⁴ CCamara, 30 Apr. 1700, AHN/Consejos/4470/36. On this occasion, Leon, Toledo, and Vallaolid were said to have refused their consent. ²⁵⁵ B. González Alonso, El corregidor castellano (1348–1808) (Madrid, 1970), is disappointing in this respect. J. I. Fortea Pérez, ‘Les Villes de la couronne de Castille sous l’ancien regime: une histoire inachevée’, RHMC, 41 (1994), 306, notes the lack of studies revealing just what the corregidores did. ²⁵⁶ The corregidor suspended votes on 26 and 28 Jan., 11, 16, 27, and 29 Feb., and 25 June 1668, AMB/Actos/1668, ff. 49 ff., 59, 60, 65, 76, 216 ff. ²⁵⁷ AHN/Consejos/4462/39. Of 139 regidores rewarded after renewal of the millones in 1679, 30 were appointed corregidor, Thompson, ‘Patronato Real’, 492. The regidores of Murcia alone received 12 hábitos, 3 corregimientos, and 1 encomienda, after agreeing the prorogation of the millones in 1685 and 12 hábitos, 1 corregimiento, and 1 regiduría after that of 1697, Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Tantas Cortes’. For Guadalajara, cf. F. Salgado Olmeda, ‘Tipologia social de una oligarquía urbana: los regidores de Guadalajara en el siglo XVIII. ¿Elite nobiliaria o burguesía funcionaria?’ Hispania, 62 (2002), 706. ²⁵⁸ Kalnein, Juan José, 52 ff. ²⁵⁹ On the other hand, Muñoz Rodríguez, Damus ut Des, 70, identifies a royalist ‘party’ among the regidores of Murcia, favourable to the requests of the Crown, who were part of the clientele of the marquis of los Vélez.

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to seize their opportunities to demonstrate loyalty to the Crown,²⁶⁰ something made easier by the fact that the oligarchs were, on the whole, conservative, and inclined towards collaboration not confrontation.²⁶¹ Many regidores also recognized that by agreeing to prorogation of the millones they might ensure payment of the juro annuities assigned on that revenue. Last, but by no means least, the dispatch of a deputy or formal letter to Madrid, informing the regent or king of a city’s agreement to prorogation of the millones, or to another servicio, offered an opportunity to make representations to the king on matters of concern, much as a formal assembly might have done.²⁶² But the Castilian Cortes represented a limited sector even of Castilian society and its wealth. It did not speak for the clergy, which had its own representative body, or congregación, although that did not assemble in this reign either, the Crown preferring to consult cathedral chapters and so on individually.²⁶³ This created some difficulties, particularly when Carlos II introduced measures which the clergy believed were taxes, imposed without their agreement or that of Rome.²⁶⁴ Nor did the Cortes speak for the nobility. It also represented only some of the towns and cities of Castile (including Andalusia), omitting such pockets of wealth as Cadiz and Malaga. Mariana and Carlos II therefore found, as had their predecessors, other means to obtain ‘services’ from these groups, negotiating through the consulado of Seville and the Casa de Contratación for example, with Cadiz (and Seville) and the Indies trade,²⁶⁵ and with individual towns for servicios of troops and money (Chapter 3). Indeed, it is striking the extent to which the cities of Castile and Andalusia, besides co-operating with captains raising men voluntarily with the king’s commission in their towns and districts, themselves ‘served’ Carlos by recruiting men, primarily for the provincial tercios. In Old Castile, Valladolid’s ‘services’ included 200 men in 1676, 1677, and 1684; a company of 100 men in 1690, 50 men to recruit that company (1691, 1692, and 1693); and a further 50 men in the summer of 1693.²⁶⁶ Most of the other Castilian cities served with men, and—like ²⁶⁰ Regidores cited their voting records in support of petitions for titles of nobility (and other mercedes), I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Neo-noble Nobility: Concepts of Hidalguía in Early Modern Castile’, EHQ, 15 (1985), 387; Thompson, ‘Patronato Real’, 496, cites the example of the marquis of Velamazán, regidor of Soria on the occasion of the renewal of the millones in 1679 and 1685. ²⁶¹ Ruiz Martín, ‘Hacienda y grupos de presión’, 104. ²⁶² Cf. the letter/representation by Toledo [Feb. 1685], above. ²⁶³ Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii.15; Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism’, 207. ²⁶⁴ Cf. Portocarrero to Carlos II [?] August 1694, ACDA/3852/12, arguing that this was a breach of ecclesiastical fiscal immunities, and same to same, 28 June 1695, ACDA/3852/12, arguing the same for the increase of the price of salt in March 1695. ²⁶⁵ L. García Fuentes, El Comercio Español con America 1650–1700 (Seville, 1980), 23 ff., 53–4, 110 ff. ²⁶⁶ Cf. petition of Valladolid [1676–77], AHN/Consejos/4450/144; sessions of ayuntamiento, 10 Jan. 31 May and 8 Nov. 1690, of 15 Jan., 16 Feb., 30 Mar., and 16 Nov. 1691, AHMV/Actas/70, ff. 422, 522, ff. 648, 714, 742, 780, 988; and of 21 Mar., 20 June, and 1 July 1693, AHMV/Actas/71, ff. 351, 408, and 422.

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Valladolid—did so on more than one occasion.²⁶⁷ In Andalusia, the cities which gave soldiers included Cordoba,²⁶⁸ Granada,²⁶⁹ and Seville.²⁷⁰ These contributions were, not surprisingly, dwarfed by that of the capital, Madrid, reflecting its greater population.²⁷¹ While voluntary, these services were agreed at royal request, and if a city was reluctant or slow to respond it could come under sustained pressure.²⁷² None the less, some bargaining was necessary: Carlos made concessions, for example, over the appointment of officers, and the ‘reform’ of such units.²⁷³ These and other ‘services’ offered by the regidores of Andalusia and Castile had important consequences for their communities: while the urban oligarchs received hábitos and other mercedes from a grateful sovereign, the cost increased the municipal debt and tax burden (Chapter 3). The fact that there was no formal assembly of the Cortes was not therefore necessarily a sign of absolutism. However, and whatever the channel, the Crown—not least because its agents controlled the mechanism of consultation (and could therefore, for example, declare majority approval)—generally obtained most of what it was seeking. In consequence, some among the urban élite worried increasingly about what was happening and there were growing calls for the Cortes to assemble as a body. The regidores of Cordoba had agreed renewal of the millones in 1667, 1673, 1679, but in 1685 requested that the Cortes be summoned, to remedy the broadly perceived problems facing the Monarchy. Such calls became more frequent from Cordoba following Spain’s entry into the Nine Years War: there were renewed demands for the Cortes in 1691; and in 1697, when the ayuntamiento apparently refused to agree renewal if there were no Cortes.²⁷⁴ It was not only the regidores of Cordoba who were concerned. ²⁶⁷ According to CJDC, 7 Apr. 1691, AGS/GA/2828, the following cities gave men for the provincial tercios: Zamora, 30 and Toro, 25 for that of Seville; Toledo, 50 and Segovia, 52 for that of Toledo; Burgos, 33 and Palencia, 50 for that of Cordoba; Salamanca and Toledo, 50 each for that of Madrid; and Valladolid, 50 (above) and Avila, 103 for that of Valladolid and Burgos. Soria was said to have offered to serve with 80 men. These services were of infantry; Caceres served with 22 horses to recruit the cavalry of the army of Catalonia, but declared its inability to supply riders. ²⁶⁸ J. Calvo Poyato, ‘Medio siglo de levas, reclutas y movilizaciones en el Reino de Córdoba: 1657–1712’, Actas II Jornadas de Historia de Andalucía. Andalucía Moderna, (Cordoba, 1983), ii. 25–41. ²⁶⁹ Cf. Navarro Pérez, ‘Aportación’, 9–15 and passim. ²⁷⁰ Seville ‘served’ with two mounted companies (1690, 1691, 1692, and 1693), and more than 300 men in 1694 during the Nine Years War alone, J. I. Martínez Ruiz, Finanzas Municipales y Crédito Público en la España Moderna . . . Sevilla 1528–1768 (Seville, 1992), 282–3. ²⁷¹ In 1693 Madrid offered a tercio of 1,000 men, AHMV/Actas/71, f. 408; and in 1694, following the loss of Rosas, levied another, Espino, Catalunya, 244. ²⁷² In December 1691, 8 cities in Andalusia and Castile were said to have offered just 295 men so far for 1692: Burgos (25), Carmona (40), Ecija (30), Ronda (25), Salamanca (50), Segovia (50), Toro (25), and Valladolid (50). Leon offered to ‘serve’ by ransoming the men it had provided for Catalonia in 1691, who had been taken prisoner on the fall of Seu d’Urgel. Various other cities were said to be eager to serve, but declared their lack of means, including Avila and Toledo. It was agreed that the latter should be written to very forcefully, CJDC, 27 Dec. 1691, AGS/GA/2855. ²⁷³ Cf. CCS, 8 June 1694, AGS/E/3887, on reform of the tercio of the Canaries. ²⁷⁴ Artola, Hacienda, 209–10. In 1691, having agreed the renewal of the millones, plans for a meeting at which to petition Carlos to remedy various ills were frustrated by the corregidor. In 1697

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In February 1691 Don José de la Serna, regidor of Salamanca, declared that the levy of troops on behalf of the king had cost his city almost 200,000 reales in recent years; he believed that this was, in effect, new taxation and needed the consent of the assembly of the realm, i.e., in the Cortes.²⁷⁵ That same year Don Rafael Sanguineto, regidor decano of Madrid, called for the king to summon the Cortes—to overhaul the fiscal system (in part to ensure effective provision for defence) and proposed prorogation of the millones for just one year to secure this.²⁷⁶ At least one of the governing councils supported these calls: in the charged political atmosphere of December 1694, the Council of Castile proposed that the Cortes be assembled.²⁷⁷ Carlos II failed to respond,²⁷⁸ but in the 1690s the pressures of war—and the succession²⁷⁹—encouraged some in Castile to believe that the realm, i.e., the Cortes, should again play a greater role in its political life. ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT Effective government, and defence, depended in part on the quality of the administrative structure. Unfortunately, that of Carlos II’s Spain suffered some real defects.²⁸⁰ The government of Habsburg Spain was a ‘polysynody’, based upon a number of councils with thematic and regional responsibilities,²⁸¹ whose functions and jurisdiction were not always sufficiently clearly delineated to prevent conflicts over competence.²⁸² The councils were also, in some respects, the mouthpiece of lobby groups. The Council of Finance, for example, pressed the interests of the financiers and others it depended upon to fund the Monarchy’s armies and navies;²⁸³ while the Council of the Indies was, to some extent, the mouthpiece of the Indies trade and those connected with it.²⁸⁴ As royal agencies, the corregidor secured favourable theological opinions in a move reminiscent of the Crown’s resort to Juntas de teólogos. ²⁷⁵ Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism’, 355–6. Subsequently, in 1693 Salamanca offered 200 men in return for a facultad de arbitrios to cover the costs and other concessions, CCW, 26 June 1693, AGS/GA/2913. In 1698, when the regidores of Salamanca voted against prorogation of the imposition on salt, Don Jose was among the minority who favoured agreeing to it, because of fears that otherwise the kingdom would be vulnerable to the Moors. ²⁷⁶ Voto of Don Rafael Sanguineto, regidor decano of Madrid, 1691, Egerton, ff. 298–302. ²⁷⁷ Stanhope to Galway, 16 Dec. 1694, Spain under Charles, 71. In 1695 even the Junta de medios urged calling the Cortes. ²⁷⁸ Garzón Pareja, Hacienda, 295. One of the arguments against calling the Cortes (to consider the succession) in 1697 was the fear that overburdened subjects would attempt to reduce royal authority, Operti to VA, 7 Feb. 1697, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. ²⁷⁹ Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 8 May 1696, Spain under Charles, 93; Stanhope to Vernon, 16 May 1696, SP94/74 f. 93; Maura, Vida, 403, 419, 501, 544, 661. ²⁸⁰ For Elliott, Imperial Spain, 379, whereas much of Europe witnessed rapid intellectual and administrative progress after 1650, Spain stagnated politically and intellectually. ²⁸¹ P. Molas Ribalta, La Monarquía Española (siglos XVI–XVIII) (Madrid, 1990), 115 ff.; C. de Castro, A la sombra de Felipe V. José de Grimaldo, ministro responsable (1703–1726), (Madrid, 2004), 11 and passim. ²⁸² Fayard, Membres, 1. ²⁸³ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 39–41. ²⁸⁴ Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 13 ff.

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the manner of operation of the councils—notably the lengthy advice paper, or consulta, and the frequent reference to other agencies—made for delay, which for many was the fundamental weakness of Spain’s administrative structure.²⁸⁵ There were also wanting individuals or offices responsible for ensuring the implementation of royal decisions on the consultas of the councils.²⁸⁶ The political difficulties of the reign of Carlos II exacerbated some of these difficulties. For one thing, the councils were sometimes unwilling to take a firm stand in the struggles for power, for example between Nithard and Don Juan;²⁸⁷ for another, having to deal with these confrontations distracted policy-makers from some of the other pressing problems facing the Monarchy. Last, but by no means least, capable men were too often purged by victorious factions and less able men installed instead (above). Some councils, including the Council of Castile were more important than others. As the body effectively overseeing the government of Castile, the core of the Monarchy, it had extensive responsibilities and authority,²⁸⁸ and was widely regarded as a premier body. Hence, the importance of the presidency of the Council of Castile, and Don Juan’s replacement of the existing president by one of his own creatures in 1677.²⁸⁹ The continued pressure of war in Carlos II’s reign emphasized certain aspects of its role. For one thing, the Council of Castile was the means whereby the Crown communicated with audiencias, chancillerías, corregidores, and regidores, and through them with the cities of Castile and their satellite territories,²⁹⁰ and was the channel whereby those cities and territories were asked by the Council of War for men, for example. On occasion, members of the Council of Castile were themselves dispatched to towns and individuals to request services of all types, including donativos.²⁹¹ All the evidence suggests that the council continued to keep the Monarchy’s war machine (in Castile) going. But the councils were not merely administrative bodies; they were also courts in a political culture in which the provision of justice was regarded as perhaps the chief duty of the king,²⁹² and in which courts such as the audiencias, chancillerías, and the Casa de Contratación (Seville) had an administrative ²⁸⁵ Stanhope to Nottingham, 18 Nov. 1693, Spain under Charles, 56. ²⁸⁶ Castro, A la sombra, 18 and passim. ²⁸⁷ Kamen, Spain in Later, 332. The reluctance of the Council of Castile (and of that of State) to act against Don Juan may imply some sympathy with the latter. ²⁸⁸ The council of Castile’s responsibilities are indicated by Fayard, Membres, 14–18. ²⁸⁹ Fayard, Membres, 154–5. Oropesa was a councillor of Castile from 1680. ²⁹⁰ In 1677 the corregidor of Logroño was ordered to Vitoria by the Council of Castile, following irregular elections there, R. Porres Marijuán, ‘De los bandos a las “parzialidades”. La resistencia popular al poder de la oligarquía en Vitoria (siglos XVI–XVIII)’, in idem (ed.), Poder, Resistencia y Conflict en las Provincias Vascas (Siglos XV–XVIII) (Bilbao, 2001), 266 ff. ²⁹¹ In 1673 Mariana ordered the council to commission one of its members, Don Antonio Monsalve, responsible for supplying the tercios provinciales, to seek an account from Granada (which owed substantial arrears for the composición de milicias, which funded them), Mariana to president of Council of Castile, 18 July 1673, AHN/Consejos/7183. ²⁹² Cf. P. Volpini, Lo spazio politico del ‘letrado’. Juan Bruetista Lerrea Magistrato e giurista nella Monarchia di Filippo IV (Bologna, 2004), 147 ff., Fayard, Membres, 2 ff., 11 ff.; and T. Herzog, Upholding Justice. Society, State and the Penal System in Quito (1650–1750) (Ann Arbor, 2004), 5.

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function.²⁹³ The importance of this judicial role helps to explain not only the importance of lawyers and letrados in Spain’s conciliar system but also the fact that all councils were expected to protect the king’s subjects—even to oppose and resist the king on occasion—as well as to act as the instruments of the monarch.²⁹⁴ In the case of the Council of Castile, in the absence of the Cortes, it assumed the role of defender of what we might call the (Castilian) constitution, reminding the king of the conditions of the millones contracts agreed between monarch and realm, reino, in the Cortes: in 1669, for example, the Council of Castile pointed out to Mariana the limitations on her authority implied by those agreements.²⁹⁵ The existence of these safeguards may have helped to ensure that some discontents in Castile did not give rise to more serious disturbances.²⁹⁶ The pressures of war, not surprisingly, provided further opportunities for the Council of Castile to act as protector of the king’s subjects.²⁹⁷ In July 1667, when frantic efforts were being made to raise men for Flanders following the French invasion, the council opposed a proposal to make grandees responsible for levies, and allowing them to apply some of the funds owed to their creditors, as unjustifiable since it was unfair to the latter.²⁹⁸ In the Nine Years War the Council of Castile sought to assert itself articulating more clearly a constitutional role for itself. In December 1693 the council formulated various objections to the 2 per cent levy proposed throughout Castile (Chapter 1), arguing among other things that it must send out the order for the levy to the towns, because it was widely regarded as a substitute for the Cortes;²⁹⁹ subsequently the council claimed that the failure to follow its advice had undermined the success of the levy, provoking resistance.³⁰⁰ More striking, perhaps, in December 1694, at the height of the anti-German crisis (above), the Council of Castile presented itself as representative and spokesman of the king’s subjects, criticizing his government and calling for the assembly of the Cortes.³⁰¹ In 1695 the president of the Council of Castile, writing to the Cortes-voting towns with the royal order for the increase in the price of salt (Chapter 3), declared that the council had ‘consulted’ the king on this measure in accordance with its obligation to protect the interests and rights of the reino.³⁰² This role was not new in 1665 and, although what we might call its its constitutional role and stance may have been less attractive to Philip V,³⁰³ the Council of ²⁹³ Cf. Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies, 39 ff. ²⁹⁴ Cf. J. Bravo Lozano, ‘La Devaluación de 1680. Propuesta de Análisis’, Hispania, 183, (1983), 145–6. ²⁹⁵ Thompson, ‘Crown and Cortes’, 35. In 1695 the Council of Castile urged the need to consult the realm (i.e., the voting towns) on new monastic foundations, Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad Española, ii. 77. ²⁹⁶ Mackay, Limits, 99. ²⁹⁷ Cf. the observations on the political role of the Spanish judiciary of I. A. A. Thompson, ‘The Rule of Law in Early Modern Castile’, EHQ, 14 (1984), 231–2. ²⁹⁸ CCC, 1 July 1667, AHN/Consejos/7177/26. ²⁹⁹ CJLG, 24 Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2921. ³⁰⁰ CJLG, 16 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/2949. ³⁰¹ Sanz Ayán, Banqueros, 275; Garzón Pareja, Hacienda de Carlos II, 294–5. ³⁰² President of CC to city of Burgos, 9 April 1695, AMB/Actas/1695, ff. 105–6. ³⁰³ Kamen, War of Succession, 111.

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Castile continued to defend the king’s subjects and established law against royal absolutism after 1700.³⁰⁴ The prominence of the Council of Castile should not, however, mislead us into thinking that the other councils—above all those of State and War—were thereby eclipsed.³⁰⁵ For one thing, the various councils simply had different functions: those of the Council of Italy for example included mobilizing the resources of the Italian territories (Chapter 5). In fact, and more important, the Council of State remained the premier council,³⁰⁶ reflected in the range of experience, social rank, and political standing of the men who sat on it, and the fact that (like the Council of War) its sessions were at least nominally presided over by the king himself. This was not least because, unlike the Council of Castile and most other councils, the Council of State took a truly global view of the Monarchy’s concerns, policy, and strategy; because of the crucial importance of the issues transacted there; and because its advice (for war, for example) would affect the other councils. It was, in part, because of the importance of its recommendations that the Council of State could appear to be, and sometimes was, so slow in preparing a consulta for Carlos II. Nor was the Council of Castile able to extend its sphere of operation at the expense of the Council of War. In late 1694 the Council of Castile made a bid to oversee the quota first imposed in Castile earlier that year.³⁰⁷ But the Council of Castile was held to lack the necessary expertise, and oversight remained with the Council of War and the Junta of the Lieutenants-General.³⁰⁸ Some important modifications were made, however, to the conciliar structure between 1665 and 1700. For one thing, efforts were made to reduce the size of that establishment, the first (1669) being made by the Junta de Alivios.³⁰⁹ In 1676 the number of councillors of finance was halved to just 8,³¹⁰ and later that year Valenzuela was said to be working on a reform of offices (and other measures), which was expected to yield 4,000,000 ducats a year, all to be applied to the war.³¹¹ Resentment of these cutbacks may have fuelled hostility towards Valenzuela (Chapter 5) but his fall did not put an end to them. In 1677, at the height of the ‘Dutch War’, a reduction of the number of councillors of the Indies, finance, and war was ordered,³¹² and the Cámara of the Indies was abolished completely,³¹³ ³⁰⁴ C. de Castro, Campomanes, Estado y reforma ilustrado (Madrid, 1996), 242 ff. ³⁰⁵ Kalnein, Juan José, 75; J. A. Escudero, ‘Consultas al Consejo de Estado: trámites irregulares en el reinado de Carlos II’, in J. M. Cuenca Toribo (ed.), Homenaje al Dr Juan Regla Campistol, 2 vols. (Valencia, 1975), i. 661–4. ³⁰⁶ Ribot, Monarquía, 249. ³⁰⁷ JLG, 16 and 24 Nov. 1694, AGS/GA/2949. ³⁰⁸ CJLG, 4 and 31 Dec. 1694, AGS/GA/2949. ³⁰⁹ J. A. Sánchez Belén, ‘La Junta de Alivios de 1669 y las primeras reformas de la Regencia’, ETF, 4 (1989), 659 ff. The Junta de galeras, for example, was reduced to the establishment laid down in 1610. ³¹⁰ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 282. ³¹¹ De Gubernatis to MR, 29 Oct. 1676, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 84. ³¹² The number of councillors and officials in the Council of the Indies was reduced to 19, copy of royal order, Hispania Illustrata, 313–14. ³¹³ Avvisi, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 222. The abolition was expected to yield 155,000 pieces of eight. Avvisi, [July 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 172. The Camara had been established by

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although those affected by these measures were cushioned against the loss of emoluments.³¹⁴ The most extensive reform of this sort occurred during the Nine Years War. In July 1691 Carlos ordered a reduction of the number of councillors and other officials in the Councils of Aragon, Castile (including the Cámara and the alcaldes de Corte), Finance, War, the Indies, Italy, and the (Military) Orders, to the levels established by Philip III.³¹⁵ Just how effective was this ‘reform’—which allowed those affected to retain half their salary—is unclear,³¹⁶ but it was expected to save large sums,³¹⁷ which could be spent on the war: in 1694 Carlos ordered that money saved from the reform of the Councils of the Indies and the orders be applied to the army of Catalonia.³¹⁸ This was not the end of such cost-cutting measures: in 1694 the king decreed the abolition of the Diputación del Reino, on the grounds of the financial situation, defence needs, and his reluctance to impose new taxes.³¹⁹ On the other hand, the reign of Carlos II also saw the creation of various new bodies, above all small committees or juntas—rather than full-blown councils— which could be a means of dealing with more specialized issues, of speeding up business, and of ensuring greater political control.³²⁰ Carlos II inherited a number of such juntas, including those reponsible for the fleets, galleys, and garrisons (Chapters 1 and 2).³²¹ Among the new juntas established in the reign were the Junta de gobierno, or regency council, which functioned between 1665 and 1676 (above); the Junta de comercio, or trade committee, which was first founded in 1679;³²² and the Junta de fraudes (Chapter 3), one of many established by the Philip IV. There was also talk in 1677 of merging the Councils of Italy and Aragon, Kalnein, Juan José, 245, and ‘Avvisi’ [mid-late Feb. 1677], AST/LM/Spagna, m. 32, f. 141 ff. ³¹⁴ Sánchez, ‘Attempts at Reform,’ 124–5. ³¹⁵ J. Arrieta Alberdi, El Consejo Supremo de Aragón (1494–1707) (Zaragoza, 1994), 260; J. Fayard, Membres, 128; J. L. de las Heras Santos, La Justicia Penal de los Austrias en la Corona de Castilla (Salamanca, 1991), 84; García-Cuenca Ariati, ‘Consejo de Hacienda’, 449–50; Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 18–20; F. Andújar Castillo, Consejo y Consejeros de Guerra en el siglo XVIII (Granada, 1996), 32–3, 36; E. Shäfer, El Consejo real y supremo de Indias, 2 vols. (Seville, 1935–47), i. 268; cf. Giardina, ‘Consiglio Supremo d’Italia’, Atti della Regia Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Belle Arti di Palermo (1934), 102. ³¹⁶ The number of councillors of Finance (and officials) had risen again by 1695, Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 19–20. ³¹⁷ Operti to VA, 19 July 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³¹⁸ CJLG, 16 Mar. 1694, AGS/GA/2947. ³¹⁹ CII to city of Burgos, 18 June 1694, AMB/Actas/1694, ff. 159–60; Castellano, Cortes, 108 ff. ³²⁰ J. H. Elliott, Count-Duke of Olivares, 295–7; Artola, Monarquía, 333. For the juntas as an expression, or instrument, of royal absolutism, cf. J. Martínez Millan, La Corte de Felipe II (Madrid, 1994), 33. ³²¹ C. Espejo de Hinojosa, ‘Enumeración y atribuciones de algunas juntas de la administración española desde el siglo XVI hasta el ano 1800’, Revista de la Biblioteca, Archivo y Museo de Madrid, 32 (1931), 325 ff.; and J. F. Baltar Rodríguez, Las Juntas de Gobierno en la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI–XVII) (Madrid, 1998) provide a useful—but incomplete—guide to, and list of, early modern Spanish juntas. ³²² Larruga, Memorias Políticas, (Madrid, 1787), iv. 225 ff; W. J. Callahan, ‘A Note on the Real y General Junta de Comercio 1679–1814’, EcHR (1968), 519 ff.; Kamen, Spain in Later, 75–86; Molas Ribalta, ‘ Prólogo’, Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, xxviii. 17.

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duke of Medinaceli during his period as Carlos II’s chief minister. But there were many more, most of them ad hoc bodies of brief duration; many of them in connection with the Monarchy’s defence.³²³ Perhaps the most important junta in terms of the defence of the Monarchy was the so-called Junta de Tenientes Generales, or the Lieutenants-General, which operated between 1693 and 1695. Apparently, as early as 1679 a junta of 4–5 ministers was proposed, to avoid the (factional) problems provoked by the domination of one chief minister.³²⁴ However, such a scheme was not implemented until the Nine Years War. There was a proposal for a 3-man junta in 1691³²⁵ and rumours regarding the establishment of a directing triumvirate (Portocarrero, Montalto, Monterrey), in the summer of 1693, with responsibilities for matters of church, state, and war.³²⁶ In fact the 3-man body which was established by Carlos II in October 1693 (after the disasters which exposed the need for more effective direction of the war effort) involved different people with different, i.e., geographic, responsibilities: the constable of Castile assumed responsibility for Old Castile (including Leon), Navarra, Galicia, Asturias, Alava, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa; the admiral for Granada, Toledo, Seville, Cordoba, Jaen, Gibraltar, Murcia, Estremadura, the Canaries, and the African garrisons; and the duke of Montalto for the territories of the Crown of Aragon.³²⁷ This junta has not enjoyed a good reputation.³²⁸ However, it represented an interesting experiment in wartime co-ordination, operating, in effect, as a war cabinet.³²⁹ Inevitably, it faced difficulties, including the hostility of other bodies and individuals; there was even some concern that the junta was acting without reference to the king.³³⁰ Nevertheless, the new body had some impact. It initiated and oversaw, for example, the (2 per cent) vecindario levy in Castile of 1694 (Chapter 1). The fact that the junta was effectively abolished by Carlos II in February 1695 suggests that

³²³ They included that established in 1696 to consider the position of the Inquisition, after clashes between the the latter and the viceroy of Catalonia, Stanhope to Galway, 12 Jan. 1696, Spain under Charles, 88–9. ³²⁴ ‘Nove’, Madrid, 15 Sept. 1679, AST/LM/Spagna,m. 32, f. 463, 464. ³²⁵ Operti to VA, 5 July 1691, Madrid, 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. [?]/39, f. 75. ³²⁶ Stanhope to Nottingham, 22 July 1693, SP 94/73, f. 180. In 1693 it was rumoured that cardinal Portocarrero was to form part of a four-man war directorate, with specific responsibility for the fleets and galleys because of the clergy’s role in funding these, Operti to ST, 13 Aug. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³²⁷ Royal decree, ordering formation of JLG, 5 Oct. 1693, Egerton 2055, f. 291 ff, including patent for constable of Castile as lieutenant-general with responsibility for Old Castile (including Asturias and Vizcaya); [CJLG?] on establishment of JLG, 9 Oct. 1693, AGS/GA/2914; CII to viceroy of Valencia, 26 Oct. 1693, BSC, MS126, f. 257; Molas Ribalta, ‘Prologo’, xxviii, 18. ³²⁸ Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 273–4; The junta is ignored by Artola, Monarquía, 333; and by Espejo de Hinojosa, ‘Enumeración’, 325 ff. Baltar Rodríguez, Juntas, has just one passing reference, 431. ³²⁹ The lieutenants-general were to attend the Councils of State and War, to inform these of the state of [the war] when necessary, CII to [constable], [Oct. 1693], Add. 21,439 f. 84. ³³⁰ Operti to VA, 17 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/115.

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it ‘failed’.³³¹ Nevertheless, while it lasted, the junta did much to galvanize Spain’s—and the Monarchy’s—war effort. The Junta of the Lieutenants-General also exemplified a trend under Carlos II towards a more executive style of government, at the expense of the conciliar system.³³² This development expressed itself in other ways, which included by-passing the councils by simply failing to refer a matter for consulta. In 1693, for example, following representations from the Savoyard minister about the need of his master for money, Carlos II directed that he be assigned money from the returning Indies fleet and that no conciliar consulta was necessary.³³³ This was by no means an isolated example. In addition, the ‘system’ of validos, which has been widely interpreted as a product of ineffective monarchs in seventeenth-century Spain,³³⁴ was giving way to that of a prime minister, the reign of Carlos II apparently seeing the final triumph of the valido, and (in the person of Valenzuela) the valido’s transformation into prime minister, an office subsequently held by Medinaceli and Oropesa. During the Nine Years War, some of Carlos II’s allies hoped for the appointment of such a minister to provide firmer direction and frequently reported rumours of an impending declaration of this sort by the king.³³⁵ No chief minister was appointed, but we can see the emergence in the central administration of figures who, in some respects, anticipated the secretaries of state who characterized the administration of Bourbon Spain. Carlos II appointed a number of superintendentes, who could overcome some of the problems created by the existing administrative structure and provide more effective co-ordination.³³⁶ The creation of a financial supremo, superior to the president of the Council of Finance, was urged by the admiral in 1674, to ensure the proper funding of the war for Messina.³³⁷ Such a figure was not then appointed,³³⁸ but 1687 saw the appointment of a Superintendente General of finance (Chapter 3).³³⁹ The first incumbent, the marquis of los Vélez, was clear proof—if any were needed—that some titled nobles and grandees at least were able and effective administrators.³⁴⁰ The utility to the Monarchy of combining the chief financial offices—and uniting with them that of the presidency of the Council of Castile—was subsequently ³³¹ Operti to ST, 10 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 41. ³³² Cf. Cárceles de Gea, ‘Juicio’, 103 ff. on the crisis of conciliar government in this reign. ³³³ Operti to VA, 31 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/116. ³³⁴ Tomás y Valiente, Los validos, 31 ff; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, 2, 26, 73. ³³⁵ Stanhope to Galway, 6 May 1694, to Halifax, 31 May 1694 (Montalto), and to Hopkins, 16 Feb. 1695 (Oropesa), Spain under Charles, 59, 62, 75; Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 7 Sept. 1695, SP 94/74 f. 4. ³³⁶ J. L. Bermejo Cabrero, ‘Superintendencias en la Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen’, AHDE, 54 (1984), 409–47. ³³⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 255. ³³⁸ However, Don Antonio de Monsalve, responsible for the servicio de tercios provinciales y milicias, was described in 1675 as superintendente general, AMB/Actos/1675, f. 203. ³³⁹ Sánchez Belén, Política fiscal, 16. In 1691 the president of the Casa de la Contratación was addressed as superintendente of the same, los Vélez to count Miranda y della Calzada, 16 Nov. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ³⁴⁰ At the same time, the reign saw a number of untitled administrators acquiring titles, contributing to—or confirming—the emergence of what we might call a service nobility.

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(1695) urged on Carlos II in favour of the capable count of Adanero by the admiral of Castile.³⁴¹ At provincial level, the most striking development was the transformation of an older institution, the corregimiento, whose role in Castile’s cities and towns had been laid down by the Catholic kings at the end of the fifteenth century.³⁴² For some, then and later, the corregidores were too close to the urban oligarchs they were supposed to monitor. In 1691 the Junta de milicias blamed the indulgence of their corregidores for allowing Ubeda and Baeza—and other cities—to accumulate arrears on the servicio de milicias, and urged the king to repeat an order of July 1690 that no corregidor would be appointed to a new post until he had satisfied the relevant accounting body, the contaduría de milicias.³⁴³ However, such criticism reflected the fact that the king and his ministers continued to depend enormously on the corregidores (above) to manage the Cortes-voting towns and secure grants of money and men.³⁴⁴ In fact, the corregidores’ responsibilities were extending as we have seen (Chapter 3) to revenue-collecting. In 1691 they became responsible for the collection of the rentas reales and the millones in Castile, and in 1693 the king ordered that the superintendente general de milicias designate the corregidores as his agents.³⁴⁵ It would be wrong to suggest that Spain lacked a proper administrative structure on the accession of Carlos II in 1665. That structure continued to function, recruiting men, for example (Chapter 1), and thus contributed to the success of the Monarchy between then and 1700. However, by the end of the reign Carlos and his ministers had gone some way towards creating a more effective network of provinces and provincial officials,³⁴⁶ one more clearly the instrument of a more executive style of central government. Thus developments in Spain before 1700—in large part driven by defence needs—anticipated the intendants and the provincial administrative structure usually associated with the advent of French administrative practice under Philip V.³⁴⁷ ³⁴¹ Cf. consultas of admiral, 30 and 31 Oct. and 19 Nov. 1695, AHN/E/libro 875, f. 4, 29 ff., 41. The consultas in this volume suggest that the admiral was more able than historians have allowed. ³⁴² Kamen, Spain 1469–1716. A Society of Conflict, 2nd edn. (Harlow, 1991), 25–6; González Alonso, El corregidor, 1 ff. ³⁴³ CJM, 21 Sept. 1691, AGS/GA/2856. The king agreed. Corregidores did sometimes petition ministers for relief for their city from some burden. ³⁴⁴ In 1678 government efforts to discover the state of the Spanish economy were largely directed at the corregidores, Sánchez, ‘Attempts at Reform’, 64 ff. ³⁴⁵ CJM, 10 Jan. 1693, AGS/GA/2916. Cf. the instructions issued to the new corregidor of Burgos, the count of Santa Cruz de los Manueles, by the superintendente general of the servicio de milicias, June 1696, AMB/Actos/1696, 256–62 ff. ³⁴⁶ The arrangements of 1691 were the first step in the creation of the province of La Mancha, J. M. Donézar Díez de Ulzurrun, Riqueza y Propiedad en la Castilla del Antiguo Régimen. La provincia de Toledo en el siglo XVIII (Madrid, 1984), 20. ³⁴⁷ For J. D. Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Consenso e Imposición en la Conservación de la Monarquía. La Práctica Política en un Territorio de la periferia Castellana: el Reino de Murcia (1682–1700)’, Hispania, 63/3, 215 (2003), 969–94, these developments suggest the importance of non-French (i.e., Spanish) influences on those after 1700.

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Spanish political life in the reign of Carlos II was sharply divided, although that was not entirely new: the reigns of Philip II and Philip IV had also witnessed bitter political struggles. In part, under Carlos II these divisions were about office. But they also centred on issues, including that of the fate of the Monarchy, which was one of the strands in, for example, the abundant ephemeral literature of the 1670s and 1690s. The (Castilian) Cortes did not meet, but the notion that government was a pact between Crown and realm persisted,³⁴⁸ while the combined pressures of war and the succession meant that in the 1690s there was a growing—though by no means irresistible—demand for the Cortes to assemble. Carlos II’s ability to resist that pressure suggests that he may have been more ‘absolute’ than has—until recently—been acknowledged.³⁴⁹ If, on the other hand, by this term we mean personal direction of the type associated with Philip II, Louis XIV, or Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, then sceptics may be right to doubt whether Carlos II’s rule merits the term. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge his own personal commitment to the Monarchy and the influence this had on individual appointments and decisions, and on broad policy: this is one reason to doubt whether Spain was really an ‘aristocratic republic’ in this period.³⁵⁰ If, however, Carlos was personally unable to provide consistent and determined direction then we ought to be impressed by the relative success in meeting the challenge of war of the existing, tried, and tested machinery of government, even if sometimes cumbersome and slow, and of the élite which made it work. Where the administrative structure inherited by Carlos II was defective, the reign saw developments which suggest a greater ability to respond to challenges, and a flexibility which, to some extent, laid the foundations for some of the achievements of the Bourbons after 1700.³⁵¹ Carlos II’s success was testimony not only to the real reserves of authority available to the Crown but also to the readiness of his subjects to respond, above all to the claim, and the reality, that the realm and larger Monarchy were in danger.

³⁴⁸ Cf. Bernardo Ares, ‘Aristocratic assemblies’, 142. ³⁴⁹ Cf. Thompson, prologue to Sanz Camañes, Política, 11–17; and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez, ‘Una propuesta de análisis de la Administración en el Antiguo Régimen: la Constitución Implicita Factual’, IUS FUGIT. Revista interdisciplinar de estudios históricos-juridicos, 3–4 (1994–5), 169 ff., for the rupture in mid-century of a traditional ‘constitution’, a development which benefited the Crown/ state thereafter over the long term. ³⁵⁰ Cf. Bernardo Ares, ‘Aristocratic assemblies’, 133. ³⁵¹ Cf. J. D. Muñoz Rodríguez, ‘Cuando el rey se hace presente. El Superintendente coms elemento racionalizador en la recaudación fiscal akstellana (1682–1700)’, in F. J. Aranda Pérez (ed.), La Declinación de la Monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII (Cueneca, 2004), 377–90.

5 Centre and Periphery in the Spanish Monarchy Naples is the co-ordinator and source of funds for our efforts in Sicily. Don Manuel de Lira, 1677¹

INTRODUCTION The Monarchy of the Spanish Habsburgs was a typical ‘composite’ polity,² vulnerable to the tensions in relations between the component territories and between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’. Spain’s (or the Monarchy’s) mid-seventeenth-century crisis owed a great deal to the fact that Philip IV was fighting a major war abroad at the same time as he had to confront revolt in various territories of the Monarchy, in Naples, Sicily, Catalonia, and Portugal. These revolts were, in large part, provoked by the efforts of Philip and his ministers to integrate the non-Castilian territories of the Monarchy more fully into its defensive structure by means of his ‘Union of Arms’, and/or to mobilize more men and money there for war, apparently at the expense of their distinctive laws, or constitutions, or fueros.³ In this context, it is arguable that the resilience of the Spanish empire under Carlos II owed something at least to the very different relations between the ‘centre’ of the Monarchy and the ‘periphery’, the non-Castilian territories, apparent after 1660.⁴ For one thing, the king and his ministers were less distracted, even undermined, when confronting ¹ Lira to Don Juan of Austria, 26 July 1677, BN/MSS 10695 f. 5. ² J. H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies’, P&P, 137 (1992), 48–71; J. Fernández Sebastián, ‘España, monarquía y nación. Cuatro concepciones de la comunidad política española entre el Antiguo Régimen y la Revolución liberal’, Studia Histórica-Historia Contemporánea, 12 (1994), 52. ³ J. H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain 1598–1640 (Cambridge, 1963); J. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 103 ff. Cf. H. Kamen, Vocabulario Básico de la Historia Moderna. España y América 1450–1750 (Barcelona, 1986), 101 ff.: ‘Fueros’. ⁴ H. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century (Harlow, 1980), 10. For Elliott, the key to Spain’s survival as a great power after the erosion of Castile’s economic and demographic base was the ‘balance between centre and periphery’, R. Kagan and G. Parker, ‘Introduction: The Centre and the Periphery’, in idem (eds.), Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World. Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott (Cambridge, 1995), 15, 24.

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their enemies abroad, by rebellion at home; for another, the non-Castilian realms which had contributed little to imperial defence before 1660 gave far more thereafter.⁵ Indeed, according to this ‘neoforalist’ interpretation,⁶ in contrast with both Olivares’s earlier attempt to impose his blueprint for co-ordinated imperial defence on the various parts of the Monarchy, and with Philip V’s later suppression of the Aragonese fueros, Carlos II’s reign was a golden age of provincial autonomy.⁷ The king and his ministers respected the distinctive ‘foral’ regimes of the nonCastilian realms, above all those of the three main component territories (Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) of the Crown of Aragon. Not only that, but Don Juan of Austria’s career between 1669 and 1677 (Chapter 4) saw the Aragonese realms intervene dramatically in the politics of Castile.⁸ Not surprisingly, the nonCastilian periphery did not want to secede in the reign of Carlos II,⁹ who was eulogized by the Catalan publicist Narcis Feliú de la Penya, in his Anales de Catalunya (1709), as the best king Spain had ever had.¹⁰ For some, this integration of centre and periphery—facilitated, in part, by the weakening of antagonistic national sentiment in the various territories—meant that a common identity was being created, such that in this sphere, too, the reign of Carlos II anticipated what is regarded as one of the achievements of the Bourbons after 1700: the creation of ‘Spain’ and a Spanish national identity.¹¹ The neoforalist thesis is not without its difficulties. Thus, the real commitment of Carlos II and his ministers to Aragonese constitutional liberties is unclear; they ⁵ For the (greater) contributions of Aragon, Navarre, and Vizcaya c.1660–5, cf. Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 50. Some have suggested that the Monarchy was moving towards a ‘federal’ structure, a development cut short by the death of Don Juan of Austria (and the War of the Spanish Succession), J. Pérez, ‘Prólogo’, A von Kalnein, Juan José de Austria en la España de Carlos II (Lleida, 2001), 12. ⁶ Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, xxviii. 12–13, citing Juan Reglá, who most fully developed this interpretation. Cf. the recent (critical) formulation by X. Gil Pujol, ‘La Corona de Aragón a finales del siglo XVII: a vueltas con el neoforalismo’, in P. Fernández Albaladejo (ed.), Los Borbones. Dinastía y Memoria de Nación en la España del Siglo XVIII (Madrid, 2002), 99. ⁷ This attitude was articulated by Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Juicio interior y secreto de la Monarquía para mí sólo (Madrid, 1665), cf. Fernández Sebastián, ‘España, monarquía’, 52–3. The author was a native of the foral realm of Navarre, and had served as viceroy of New Spain. ⁸ P. Sanz Camañes, Política, 239; Kalnein, Juan José, 406 ff. In 1691 the fall of Oropesa was attributed by some to the intervention of the Councils of Castile and Aragon, and of the Diputació of Catalonia, after the loss of Urgel, Operti to VA, 5 July 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 75. Neoforalism was one aspect of a larger (political) crisis in Carlos II’s Spain for A. Domínguez Ortíz, ‘La Crise intérieure de la Monarchie des Habsburgs espagnols sous Charles II’, in J. A. H. Bots (ed.), The Peace of Nijmegen 1676–78/79. La Paix de Nimègue (Amsterdam, 1980), 161 ff. ⁹ For Stradling, Europe and the Decline, 176, the Truce of Ratisbon (1684) meant that Catalonia, Flanders, and Italy achieved (by default) ‘independence’ (with the final breakdown of the Spanish system). This goes too far. ¹⁰ H. Kamen, ‘A Forgotten Insurrection of the Seventeenth Century: The Catalan Peasant Rising of 1688’, JMH, 49 (1977), 211. Carlos II also remained popular in Naples long after his death, A. Domínguez Ortíz, ‘Los gastos de Corte en la España del siglo XVII’, in idem, Crisis y decadencia de la España de los Austrias (Barcelona, 1971), 96. ¹¹ I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile, Spain, and the Monarchy: The Political Community from Patria Natural to Patria Nacional’, in Parker and Kagan, Spain, Europe, 125 ff.

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may simply have wished to exploit Aragon’s resources following the decline of an exhausted Castile within Spain, resources which could not simply be extracted by force.¹² In fact, bodies like the Council of Aragon, the agency responsible for overseeing in Madrid the affairs of the Crown of Aragon, often expressed ‘absolutist’ attitudes.¹³ We also need to avoid exaggerating the role of the non-Castilian territories in the Iberian peninsula,¹⁴ and underestimating the continued primacy of Castile. On the other hand, ‘neoforalism’ focuses almost exclusively on Spain (in fact on Aragon) and largely ignores the non-Spanish periphery, including the Italian territories,¹⁵ and the Americas, although there are suggestions of a shift of the balance of power within the Spanish world in favour of the transatlantic territories, and that here, too, the centre was relaxing its grip.¹⁶ Further work on the various realms within the Monarchy and their relationship with Madrid may suggest a more complex pattern than the label ‘neoforalism’ suggests, and that a simple explanatory framework, one reflecting a single vision or design, on the part of those in Madrid or of those on the periphery is untenable. We also need to beware of viewing the peripheral territories as monoliths: attitudes and interests there could also vary, and even conflict.¹⁷ Above all, perhaps, we need to distinguish between foralism and a complete abandonment of initiative and policy formulation and implementation (in pursuit of the conservation of the Monarchy). In fact, it is increasingly clear that although Madrid may have had to bargain—and have been handicapped by the difficulty of operating over great distances—it continued to be, and was determined to remain, the sole source of authority in the Monarchy.¹⁸ Finally, the long-term success of neoforalism is by no means clear,¹⁹ not least because of a reluctance on all sides, including Castile,

¹² J. H. Eliott, ‘The Decline of Spain’, in idem, Spain and its World 1500–1700 (New Haven and London, 1989), 222; J. Fontana, ‘Sobre el Comercio Exterior de Barcelona’, 199–219; C. Martínez Shaw, ‘La Cataluña del siglo XVIII bajo el signo de la expansión’, in R. Fernández (ed.), España en el siglo XVIII. Homenaje a Pierre Vilar (Barcelona, 1985), 55 ff.; B. Yun Casalilla, ‘Del centro a la periferia’, 51 ff. ¹³ Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, 19–20. For the Council of Aragon, cf. J. M. Batista i Roca, ‘Foreword’, in H. G. Koenigsberger, The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain (London, 1951), 20–1; and J. Arrieta Alberdi, El Consejo Supremo de Aragón (1494–1707), (Zaragoza, 1994). ¹⁴ Cf. T. Egido López, Sátiras políticas de la España Moderna (Madrid, 1973), 34. ¹⁵ However, Elliott, ‘Europe of Composite’, 53, accepts that Naples and Sicily were, in effect, neoforal territories within the Monarchy. ¹⁶ J. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 212 ff.; idem, ‘The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America’, JLAS, 24 (1992), 69 ff. Cf. also the observations of L. B. Simpson, ‘Thirty Years of the Hispanic American Historical Review’, HAHR, 29 (1949), 189–90; and J. L.Phelan, ‘Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureucracy’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 (1960), 7 ff. ¹⁷ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 276 (for Sicily). ¹⁸ Some historians doubt whether there was a neoforalist period at all, A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el reinado de Carlos II (Barcelona, 1999), 389–90. ¹⁹ For Ricardo García Cárcel, Felipe V y los españoles. Una visión periférica del problema de España (Barcelona, 2002), 39 ff., the experiment with a ‘third Spain’—neither ‘Olivarist’ centralization nor aggressive (or truculent) foralism of the sort evident before 1660—had clearly failed by 1700, well before the War of the Spanish Succession.

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to lose their distinctive institutions and identities in a single Spain and the Monarchy.²⁰ This chapter explores these issues.²¹ The main objective is to discover to what extent, how, and why, Carlos II and his ministers succeeded in integrating more effectively the territories of the Monarchy into a common defence structure. In order to answer these questions, it focuses on the contributions of (1) the territories which made up the Crown of Aragon; and (2) the Italian territories (the duchy of Milan, the kingdom of Naples, and the kingdom of Sicily). Very brief reference will also be made to the role of the Americas. On the other hand, no attempt will be made to include the contribution of peoples and territories which were not formally subject to Carlos II.²² NON-CASTILIAN SPAIN: THE CROWN OF ARAGON

The Principality of Catalonia In 1640 Catalonia had revolted against the efforts of Philip IV and Olivares to oblige the principality to participate more fully in the war against France.²³ Only after a long struggle did Catalonia, which had, in the meantime, put itself under the sovereignty of Louis XIII, return in 1652 to the obedience of Philip IV, in return for a promise that Madrid would, henceforth, respect its distinctive political institutions: the Diputació or Generalitat; the committee of the Corts of Catalonia (which did not meet between 1599 and 1702), which effectively acted as watchdog of the principality’s liberties; and Barcelona’s Consell de Cent.²⁴ Different attitudes in both Madrid²⁵ and the principality promised a more successful relationship between the two than in the recent past. Catalonia, which was one of the main theatres of war throughout Carlos II’s reign, did not again renounce its allegiance to the Habsburgs. More important, Catalonia participated far more in the defence of the Monarchy in this reign than ever before. Between 1667 and 1697 the principality contributed perhaps 25,000 men to its own defence.²⁶ Indeed, by 1697 the ²⁰ Thompson, ‘Castile, Spain, and the Monarchy’, 125 ff.; and idem, ‘Public Expenditure and Political Unity: Spanish Monarchy and European Union’, in A. M. Bernal (ed.), Dinero, moneda y crédito en la Monarquía Hispánica (Madrid, 2000), 879 ff. ²¹ Since numerous towns and corporations in Castile enjoyed privileges of one sort and another, it is arguable that Castile was itself foral, cf. J. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (London, 1966), 184–5. ²² As does Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, passim. ²³ Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans. ²⁴ Elliott, Imperial Spain, 341–54; Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 110–17. The other major institution of government was the royal Audiencia of Barcelona. ²⁵ Elliott, ‘Europe of Composite’, 65, suggests that many of those who succeeded Olivares saw the recognition of (political/territorial) diversity as God-given and necessary. ²⁶ This total is based upon figures in A. Espino López, ‘El Esfuerzo de Guerra de la Corona de Aragón durante el Reinado de Carlos II, 1665–1700. Los Servicios de Tropas’, RHM, 22 (2004), 215–16, i.e., the tercios of the Consell de Cent (10,000), those of the Generalitat (4,000), and the

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services (since 1652) of Barcelona alone were put at almost 6,400,000 libras, more than twice what Catalonia had contributed in the previous century and a half.²⁷ These services were not always simply gifts. In 1690, for example, Barcelona gave the king 60,000 libras (or 348,000 reales) in return for the grant to its consellers of the privilege (enjoyed by grandees) of wearing their hats in the king’s presence, which they had lost in 1632.²⁸ Nevertheless, this overall contribution, which may not include donativos,²⁹ was the more impressive, given that in 1659 those parts of the principality lying north of the Pyrenees, Roussillon and part of Cerdanya, had been ceded to Louis XIV, reducing Catalonia’s territory and population by a fifth.³⁰ Madrid was thus securing a larger proportion of a reduced resource base than ever before, and at times—of war—when much of the principality was either devastated or occupied by enemy forces.³¹ Catalonia continued to depend on the supply of men and money from Castile³² and other parts of the Monarchy,³³ but was none the less playing a far more significant role than before in its own defence. The king and his ministers, however, could not take success for granted and were constantly aware—and fearful—of the danger of a repeat of the events of 1640–52.³⁴ As early as 1666, for example, the viceroy informed the regent that if he was not properly supplied, the lodging and supply of his troops might provoke resistance and a repeat of 1640.³⁵ For the same reason, securing a contribution to their own defence from Barcelona and/or Catalonia generally required careful negotiations, involving the king and the Council of Aragon in Madrid—where the Diputació usually had an agent³⁶—and in Barcelona, the king’s viceroy.³⁷ In provincial tercios (11,000). For Barcelona’s contribution to 1684, cf. also F. Anglada, ‘Els terços de la ciutat de Barcelona: participació de la ciutat en la defensa de la Monarquía durant les Guerres de Devolució, d’Holanda i de les Unions (1667–1684)’, Pedralbes, 13 (1993), 573–80. ²⁷ Manifestación en que se publican muchos y relevantes servicios y nobles hechos con que ha servido a sus reyes la excelentísima ciudad de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1697). ²⁸ Kamen, ‘Forgotten Insurrection’, 228; Espino, Catalunya, 110. Cf. also CII to comisario general de la Cruzada, 2 Aug. 1694, AGS/Cruzada/518/1694. ²⁹ In 1691 the brazo militar (noble estate) of Catalonia offered a donativo to secure the release of those taken prisoner on the fall of Urgel, CCA, 13 July 1691, AGS/GJ/libro 329. ³⁰ This traumatic loss helped to shape (anti-French) feeling in the principality thereafter, J. Albareda, ‘Catalunya y Felipe V: Razones de una Apuesta’; Fernández Albaladejo, Borbones, 303 ff. ³¹ Espino, Catalunya, 324. ³² For the presence of units from Aragon (Aragon and Valencia), Andalucia, and Castile (including Madrid and Toledo) in Catalonia, cf. Espino, Catalunya, 52–3, 55, 58–9, 66–7, 75. ³³ Cf. A. Espino López, ‘Las tropas italianas en la defensa de Cataluña 1665–1698’, IH, 18 (1998), 51–74. ³⁴ In 1682 the king sought an explanation for the public use of suspect symbols (which had been deployed in 1640), Serra i Puig,’Catalunya despres’, 204. ³⁵ Espino, Catalunya, 46–7. ³⁶ Ibid., 57–8, 71, 151. ³⁷ Viceroys in this period were: Vicente de Gonzaga y Doria (1664–7); the duke of Osuna (1667–9); the duke of Sessa (1669–73); the duke of San Germán (1673–5); the marquis of Cerralbo (1675–6); Alessandro Farnese, prince of Parma (1676–7); the count of Monterrey (1677–8); the marquis of Leganés (1678, 1684–8); the duke of Bournonville (1678–84); the count of Melgar, later admiral of Castile (1688); the duke of Villahermosa (1688–90); the duke of Medina Sidonia (1690–3); the duke of Escalona (1693–4); the marquis of Gastañaga (1694–6); Don Francisco de

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the absence of the Corts, the viceroy negotiated with the Diputació and the consell de Cent.³⁸ Carlos II’s bargaining position was immensely strengthened by the fact that the king enjoyed greater control over appointments to these bodies following Catalonia’s reincorporation into the Monarchy, Philip IV acquiring in 1652 important powers (of veto) in the process of insaculación, i.e., the selection by lot of the members of the Diputació and Consell.³⁹ Carlos used his veto to exclude critics and other trouble-makers,⁴⁰ and resisted Catalan efforts to recover complete freedom of election.⁴¹ In 1698, following the recovery of Barcelona from the French, and despite the support for the Catalan position of the viceroy, the king refused to surrender this invaluable means of controlling the rulers of principality and city.⁴² Thus, even those distinctive institutions which continued to work, and through which the king and his ministers mobilized Catalonia’s resources, were not entirely independent. Nevertheless, Catalonia was not entirely trouble-free under Carlos II. On the contrary, the presence of the army of Catalonia, and the issue of the funding of its quarters, created real tensions.⁴³ A satisfactory distribution of the burden had not been worked out and dogged relations between Court and principality after 1652.⁴⁴ Inevitably, years of hardship—including poor harvests and a plague of locusts Velasco (1696–7); the count of Corzana (1697–8); prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (1698–1702). Cf. R. Peréz Bustamante, El Gobierno del Imperio Español. Los Austrias (1516–1700) (Madrid, 2000), 85 ff., 414 ff.; J. Reglá, Els Virreis de Catalunya (Barcelona, 1987), 136 ff. ³⁸ Cf. J. L. Palos, ‘The Habsburg Monarchy and the Catalan Cortes: The Failure of a Relationship’, PER, 13 (1993), 139 ff. According to Amelang, ‘Barristers and Judges in Early Modern Barcelona: The Rise of a Legal Elite’, AHR, 89 (1984), 1282, the Audiencia filled the vacuum left by the Corts. Amelang notes the enhanced role in this period of judicial interpretation, compilations of Audiencia decisions being regularly updated in the reign of Carlos II. Apparently, the most significant expansion of barristers in Barcelona occurred in the neoforal period, ibid., 1267. ³⁹ Serra i Puig, ‘Catalunya despres’, 199–200. Most (English language) textbook accounts of the re-incorporation omit this important gain by the Crown, giving an unduly ‘foral’ impression of the nature of that settlement. ⁴⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 174 (1696). In 1687 three diputats who complained of the burden of quartering the army of Catalonia were punished in this way, Kamen, ‘Forgotten Insurrection’, 213. ⁴¹ It is worth remarking that Don Juan, whose neoforal credentials largely rest on his Aragonese links, neither called the Catalan Corts nor abandoned the royal veto between 1677 and 1679. ⁴² J. M. Torras Ribé, ‘El control polític de les insaculacions del Consell de Cent de Barcelona (1652–1700)’, Pedralbes, 13 (1993), 457–68; J. Ragón i Cardoner, ‘Las relaciones entre Barcelona y el poder central tras su reincorporación a la Monarquía Hispánica en 1697’, in Homenaje a Antonio Domínguez Ortiz (Madrid, 1981), 627–35. Cf. Kamen, Spain in Later, 268. Carlos refused as late as 1700 to surender this power, which the Council of Aragon decared a ‘regalía’, C. de Castro, A la sombra de Felipe V. José de Grimaldo, ministro responsible (1703–1726) (Madrid, 2004), 48 ff. On the ciutans, cf. J. Amelang, Honoured Citizens of Barcelona. Patrician Culture and Class Relations 1490–1714 (Princeton, 1986). ⁴³ Espino, Catalunya, 40 ff.; Serra i Puig, ‘Catalunya despres’, 203–4. ⁴⁴ The difficulties were made worse by abuses, by the fact that from 1679 the troops were in quarters all year, and by the granting of numerous exemptions, Espino, Catalunya, 48, 65. In 1678 the Audiencia urged the restriction of these privileges, but the outcome is unclear. The division between privileged and non-privileged is one indication that ‘Catalonia’ comprised various interests which were not always in harmony.

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from 1685—ensured that reluctance to pay grew. In the spring of 1687 the viceroy, the marquis of Leganés, accused three of the diputats of encouraging refusal to pay, and pressed Carlos to use his power to exclude them from the selection process;⁴⁵ for its part, the Diputació claimed that Leganés was breaching the constitutions,⁴⁶ and, following the exclusion of the diputats, it called on the king to travel to Catalonia to swear to defend its constitutions, as he ought to have done on his accession (or on reaching his majority). This developing constitutional spat, which belies any simple ‘foral’ notion of cosy relations between Court and principality,⁴⁷ was soon overshadowed by a popular uprising. In October 1687 troops sent to the town of Centellas to enforce payment of the levy for their maintenance provoked rioting which promptly escalated into revolt across Catalonia, thousands of insurgents marching on Barcelona in the spring of 1688.⁴⁸ The agitation was calmed by a good harvest, but exploded again in 1689 following the efforts of a new viceroy, the duke of Villahermosa, to collect a donativo. The latter was intended to solve the problem of the funding of the troops’ quarters, but was regarded as a breach of the constitutions of Catalonia, since only the Corts could agree to special impositions.⁴⁹ As in 1640, revolt was followed by negotiations between the rebels and the French king. However, on this occasion Louis XIV failed to make the most of his opportunity, whereas towards the end of 1689, and following a second peasant march on Barcelona, Villahermosa deployed his regular troops—whose numbers increased in the wake of the outbreak of war against France in the spring—against the insurgents, obliging them to abandon their siege of Barcelona at the end of that year.⁵⁰ Despite continuing low level disorder thereafter, which the French monarch now belatedly sought to exploit,⁵¹ the revolt was over. Echoing what had happened in 1652, some individuals and institutions (including the Audiencia of Barcelona) pressed for a programme of repression and the further extension of royal authority in the principality.⁵² Indeed, a memorial prepared for Carlos II by Villahermosa in 1690 represented one of the harshest anti-Catalan programmes ever suggested in Habsburg Spain.⁵³ However, ⁴⁵ The king thus ignored the more moderate advice of the Council of Aragon, which, in turn, was acting on a report from the Audiencia. The episode reveals that ‘centre’ or ‘Court’ are too sweeping terms for a complex of (often clashing) attitudes and interests. ⁴⁶ Leganés was (also) accused of breaching the fueros of Catalonia by stopping the posts to Madrid, Espino, Catalunya, 69–70, apparently to prevent complaints from reaching the Court. ⁴⁷ At the same time the alignment of forces was complex. Hardliners in the principality found support among hardliners in Madrid, whereas those in Catalonia critical of the confrontational stance of the viceroy, Leganés, found support in the Council of Aragon, Espino, Catalunya, 74. ⁴⁸ For what follows, cf. Espino, Catalunya, 63 ff.; and Kamen, ‘Forgotten Insurrection’. ⁴⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 85. In Madrid, these tensions—at a time of war with France—provided further arguments against calling the Corts. ⁵⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 90 ff. Villahermosa articulated very clearly the anti-Catalan attitude of many of the Castilian élite. ⁵¹ Ibid., 95. ⁵² Ibid., 92. For Espino this confirms that the reign was not ‘neoforalist’. ⁵³ X. Gil Pujol, ‘Corona de Aragón’, 108.

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although Carlos sanctioned severe treatment of the ringleaders of the revolt, he preferred the more moderate advice of the Council of Aragon.⁵⁴ The problem created by the issue of quarters was solved in part when the Diputació took responsibility for collection of the levy to fund these,⁵⁵ although difficulties continued. This was not least because of the expansion of the army of Catalonia after 1689 at the same time as the loss of territory to the French reduced the capacity of the principality to accommodate Carlos’s troops.⁵⁶ The revolt of 1687 had made clear the need to wage effective war on other fronts, notably Flanders and north Italy, in order to relieve the pressure on Catalonia,⁵⁷ and, hence, the close relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ issues. It had also highlighted the need for a large army of Catalonia, to maintain the king’s authority in the principality. Carlos II’s Catalan subjects were by no means hostile to the presence of a large royal army. Indeed, increasingly the great fear in Catalonia was less the threat to the fueros posed by the king’s army than that represented by its weakness and inability to defend them. Throughout the Nine Years War some in Catalonia suspected that the principality was being abandoned, prompting efforts to ensure that Madrid did not denude the principality of troops for other fronts,⁵⁸ further complicating strategic planning in Madrid. The Diputació argued that the principality was the antemural of Spain, in an attempt to secure greater efforts there.⁵⁹ Failure to give the desired aid could undermine relations with the Court. The setbacks suffered by Carlos II’s forces in Catalonia early in the Nine Years War were said to have prompted criticism, and anti-Castilian feeling in the summer of 1691.⁶⁰ According to the English envoy, Stanhope, in August 1693 the Catalans, who ‘are generally malcontented, are now highly disposed to . . . revolution’—i.e., to welcome the French fleet.⁶¹ The following summer, one of the most difficult of the war in Catalonia, the consell of Barcelona also feared revolt.⁶² This may explain why at this time Carlos II restored some of the privileges lost by Catalonia during the reign of Philip IV.⁶³ In October 1694, following the disaster at the Ter, the occupation by Louis XIV’s forces of much of the principality,⁶⁴ and the depradations suffered by much of the population ⁵⁴ Espino, Catalunya, 91. ⁵⁵ Sánchez Belén, ‘Hacienda Real’, 82. ⁵⁶ Espino, Catalunya, 163. The consellers, not least because of their fear of popular resistance to the quartering of troops, complained to their agent in Madrid at the failure of the allied leaders to exploit their advantage in Catalonia in 1695, to recover territory which could provide additional quarters. ⁵⁷ Espino, Catalunya, 94. ⁵⁸ Cf. ibid., 114 (1689–90). ⁵⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 126, citing a letter from the Diputació to the viceroy (May 1692). ⁶⁰ Espino, Catalunya, 121. In 1692, too, a failure to effect anything prompted criticism, ibid., 124 ff. ⁶¹ Stanhope to [?], 12 Aug. and 18 Nov. 1693, SP 94/73, ff. 186, 236. It was suggested that Carlos go to Catalonia to inspire the effort there, Espino, Catalunya, 131, 135. He did not go then, or when this was proposed during another crisis, in 1697, ibid., 191–2. ⁶² Espino, Catalunya, 144–5. ⁶³ Operti to ST, 1 July 1694, Madrid, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 40. Operti gives no details. ⁶⁴ Espino, Catalunya, 124. The abandonment of the attempted recovery of Hostalric was regarded by some in Catalonia as ‘treason’ but won praise in Madrid, Espino, Catalunya, 147.

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of Catalonia at the hands of the Carlos’s own ill-supplied troops,⁶⁵ the consell ordered its agent in Madrid to press for either peace or for the dispatch of enough veteran troops and funds to ensure an effective war effort in Catalonia.⁶⁶ In July 1697, with Barcelona threatened, the marquis of Villafranca urged the need to send more troops, to convince the consellers and diputats that their city would be defended.⁶⁷ The inability of the king, i.e., of the army of Catalonia, to defend the principality undermined relations between centre and periphery.⁶⁸ Unfortunately, while recognizing the need for effective measures in Catalonia, ministers in Madrid continued to fear a repeat of the events of 1640. Indicative of the unsympathetic attitude of policy-makers in Madrid to Catalonia’s fueros was the constable of Castile’s response in June 1694 to Barcelona’s suggestion that it assume full responsibility for its own defence, allowing the 11,000 regular troops in garrison there to relieve the besieged Girona. The constable feared that Barcelona simply wanted to be freer to act as it wished.⁶⁹ This fundamental mutual distrust between the Court and Catalonia⁷⁰ ensured that offers from the principality to resort to the Catalan somaten, or general levy, were also regarded with suspicion. In June 1696 the constable spoke of the natural incilination of the Catalans to criticize, and of their wish that others shed their blood (in Catalonia’s defence); but he was unwilling to call out the somaten, claiming that this had always been the signal for revolt in the principality.⁷¹ Therefore, such calls were rejected—for example, in the summer of 1694 and the spring of 1697⁷²—until there was no alternative, in the summer of 1697.⁷³ Royal ministers preferred to rely on the king’s own forces, i.e., the army of Catalonia.⁷⁴ Yet, despite the difficulties and tensions, the events of 1687–9 were a far cry from 1640. Louis XIV found limited support in Catalonia between 1689 and 1697. The crucial contrast was in the conduct of the élite, whose loyalty was clear in 1689,⁷⁵ ⁶⁵ Ibid., 143, 147 (summer 1694). For Espino López one of the explanations for the poor performance on the Catalan front in the Nine Years War was the poor relationship between the army of Catalonia and the principality, Catalunya, 125. ⁶⁶ Espino, Catalunya, 151. ⁶⁷ Ibid., 186. This followed the dispatch to Madrid of a deputation urging the strengthening of the realm’s defences Cf. copy of letter sent to CII by deputy of Catalonia, 9 Aug. 1697, AST/LM/ Spagna, m. 43. ⁶⁸ Espino, Catalunya, 124–5, 128, 179–80, 198, 200. For Espino, this helps to explain the decision of Catalonia to abandon Philip V and to support instead the Austrian Habsburg, ‘Carlos III’. ⁶⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 141. According to Espino López, the constable’s view was inspired by the reports sent by the viceroy. ⁷⁰ Ibid., 200. In 1684 the viceroy, Bournonville, observed that the Catalans were naturally inclined to obstruct the royal service, ibid., 51–2. ⁷¹ Ibid., 171. ⁷² Ibid., 142 and 179–80. On the latter occasion, the viceroy noted that the standard of Santa Eulalia (patron of Barcelona), usually flown when the somaten was called out, had been raised during the revolt of 1640. ⁷³ Ibid., 181. George of Hesse-Darmstadt favoured the use of the somaten, one reason for his popularity in Catalonia, ibid., 183–4. ⁷⁴ In 1675 Carlos II—following a consulta of the Council of Aragon—vetoed the proposal of the viceroy to withdraw from Catalonia half of his cavalry in order to alleviate the principality’s burden, the council urging that troops were needed to control Catalonia, Espino, Catalunya, 47. ⁷⁵ Kamen, ‘Forgotten insurrection’, 210 ff.; Espino, Catalunya, 90.

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and which—although the élite was no monolithic bloc—clearly felt closer to Madrid than had been the case in 1640. There were various reasons for this. For one thing, while reluctant to call the Corts, the king’s ministers acknowledged the need to retain the goodwill of the Catalans,⁷⁶ and to pay some attention to their representations, for example about successive viceroys. This contributed to the remarkable turnover of viceroys, who also had their detractors in Madrid. The criticisms from Barcelona and Catalonia in 1694 contributed to the replacement of Escalona by Gastañaga,⁷⁷ who, in 1696, was replaced by a bastard son of the constable and former governor of Cadiz;⁷⁸ for his part, Velasco, too, soon lost favour with the Catalans.⁷⁹ In addition, more members of the Catalan élite than before were making careers in royal service, in the military, law, and administration.⁸⁰ Wherever they served, their loyalty was underpinned by the prospect and grant of mercedes,⁸¹ including titles of nobility.⁸² A number of Catalan financiers profited from supplying the army of Catalonia, including Feliú de la Penya and Joan Lapeira, conseller of Barcelona in 1691.⁸³ Indeed, one of the foundations of the neoforal relationship between Catalonia and Castile in these decades was the developing prosperity of the former, symbolized by de la Penya’s Fénix de Cataluna (1683), and whose business leaders sought to expand their operations beyond the principality.⁸⁴ In 1674 it was asserted from Barcelona that Catalonia was part of Spain, and that Catalans were therefore Spaniards. This was a self-interested argument: Catalan merchants trading at Cadiz did not wish to be represented there (as were other foreigners) by a consul, who would levy an imposition on their operations. Nevertheless, that a leading Catalan foral institution could articulate such a view said much about attitudes, and possible integration in Spain under Carlos II.⁸⁵ ⁷⁶ In 1695 los Balbases urged that the viceroy retain the goodwill of ‘aquellos naturales’, Espino, Catalunya, 162 ⁷⁷ Ibid., 147, 150–1. ⁷⁸ In 1696 the consell and the brac militar complained—unfairly in view of the size of his forces and his orders—of Gastañaga ’s inaction, praising, in contrast, the prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, Espino, Catalunya, 168 ff. Velasco’s appointment may have been intended to gain his father for the queen’s faction, ibid., 188. ⁷⁹ In 1697 Velasco was criticized for failing to attack the French forces besieging Barcelona, Espino, Catalunya, 190. ⁸⁰ For some administrative and legal careers in Catalonia in Carlos II’s reign, cf. M. A. Martínez Rodríguez, ‘Los magistrados en la Cataluña del Antiguo Régimen: estado actual de la investigación’, in J. L. Castellano (ed.), Sociedad, Administración y Poder en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Granada, 1996), 335 ff. ⁸¹ Serra i Puig, ‘Catalunya despres’, 202. ⁸² A. Espino López, ‘Oficiales catalanes en el ejército de los Austrias 1635–1700’, CHM, 24 (2000), 31–54. Pere Rubi de Sabater, son of a magistrate in the Audiencia, and brother-in-law of a conseller of Barcelona, enjoyed a distinguished military career between 1667 and his death (following the loss of his arm during the siege of Rosas) in 1693; Carlos II granted him the title of marquis of Rubi shortly before he died. ⁸³ Espino, Catalunya, 315 ff. Lapeira claimed in 1690 to have mobilized his friends and relations to ensure that a tercio granted by Barcelona was increased from 300 to 500 men, and helped the viceroy in his efforts to borrow money in 1689. ⁸⁴ Cf. the work of Pierre Vilar, cited by Espino, Catalunya, 16; Martínez Shaw, Cataluña en la carrera de Indias, 72 ff.; and ibid., ‘Cataluña del siglo XVIII’, 57 ff. ⁸⁵ Kamen, Spain in Later, 9; García Cárcel, Felipe V, 45–6.

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Integration was underpinned by the fact that any lingering sympathy for France and its monarch—the only viable alternative to the Spanish Habsburgs in 1640—had long evaporated among most of the population of Catalonia. Some who were disaffected continued to look to Louis XIV, but most Catalans were increasingly anti-French, a sentiment strengthened by the excesses committed by Louis’s troops in the principality after 1665.⁸⁶ Catalans were, therefore, less responsive to the French propaganda distributed in the principality during the Nine Years War,⁸⁷ and did not take the opportunity to throw off rule from Madrid, despite the great difficulties which accompanied the Nine Years War. Catalonia was clearly more effectively integrated into the Monarchy under Carlos II. It contributed more than before to the Monarchy’s defensive needs and was less of an internal problem, although the seriousness of the events of 1687–9 cannot be ignored simply because they did not result in a repeat of 1640. Whether the better relations that prevailed between centre and periphery in this period reflect ‘neoforalism’ is not entirely clear. Carlos II and his ministers broadly acknowledged the need to work within the ‘constitutional’ framework (one that had been shifted in favour of the Crown in 1652) and with the Catalan élite, which increasingly found it advantageous to co-operate with Madrid. But views on how to deal with Catalonia differed in Madrid, where some were suspicious of Catalan loyalty and eager to further extend royal authority in the principality.⁸⁸ If the army of Catalonia had been more effective, this might have been achieved, but it was not. As for the creation of a new, common, Spanish identity, there was some acknowledgement of the need to work together against the common enemy, Louis XIV’s France. However, not least because of the ineffectiveness of the army of Catalonia, there was no real meeting of minds. Castilians and Catalans remained mutually suspicious, anticipating their divergent political choices in the War of the Spanish Succession.⁸⁹

The Kingdom of Aragon The Crown of Aragon was itself composite, and the territories which it comprised enjoyed different patterns of relations with the king and Madrid. The kingdom of Aragon proper, with its capital, Zaragoza,⁹⁰ had not revolted in 1640. Royal authority there had been extended following the earlier ‘revolt’ of 1592,⁹¹ at the expense of the realm’s foral institutions—including the Corts and Diputación,⁹² ⁸⁶ Espino, Catalunya, 137–9, 145. ⁸⁷ Ibid., 98. ⁸⁸ Carlos II did not swear to maintain the privileges of Catalonia in the Corts, Kamen, ‘Forgotten Insurrection’, 212. ⁸⁹ Espino, Catalunya, 63. ⁹⁰ For an overview, cf. Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, 39–46; and E. Fernández Clemente and G. Pérez Sarrión, ‘El siglo XVIII en Aragón’, in Fernández, España en el Siglo XVIII, 565 ff. ⁹¹ Elliott, Imperial Spain, 277 ff.; A. W. Lovett, ‘Philip II, Antonio Peréz and the Kingdom of Aragon’, EHQ, 18 (1988), 131 ff.; J. Gascón Pérez, La Rebelión de las Palabras. Sátiras y Oposición Política en Aragón (1590–1626) (Zaragoza, 2003), p. lxvi ff. ⁹² Control of the militia passed from the Diputación to the president of the Audiencia, Sanz Camañes, Política, 64.

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and the Justicia, the official who was expected to ensure that the realm’s fueros were not breached; nevertheless those institutions had survived,⁹³ along with a distinctive political ideology founded on the so-called ‘myth of Sobrarbe’.⁹⁴ It was from Aragon, his base since 1669, that Don Juan launched his coup in 1676, after which—and following frequent calls for this since 1665 (and particularly from 1675, below)—Carlos II convened the Aragonese Corts in 1677 at Zaragoza (swearing to respect the realm’s fueros), and again in 1684.⁹⁵ Like Catalonia, Aragon contributed more substantially to the defence of the Monarchy in the reign of Carlos II. Between 1665 and 1697 the number of troops with which the kingdom of Aragon offered to serve totalled more than 12,000 men,⁹⁶ although making good these offers was not easy.⁹⁷ The costs of these ‘services’ were frequently shared with the Crown, but to fund the two tercios given by the Corts in 1677–8 it was necessary to increase the tax burden in Aragon.⁹⁸ As in Castile, these ‘services’ increased municipal indebtedness.⁹⁹ In addition, these services—or the problem of their funding—enabled the Crown to increase its own long-term revenues in Aragon. In 1671 the regent failed in her attempt to introduce a tobacco monopoly, because of the fueros; however, in 1684, because of the inadequacy of the measures to fund the tercios agreed in 1677, and against the background of the war for Luxembourg, Carlos II succeeded.¹⁰⁰ Of the various contingents with which Aragon served, only the 1,500 men given (for 20 years) in 1677 were negotiated through the Corts. Generally speaking, the need to act quickly meant that the monarch preferred to negotiate— via the Council of Aragon and successive viceroys¹⁰¹—with the Diputación and ⁹³ Elliott, Imperial Spain, 282–3, believes that Philip II did not exploit his opportunity to extend royal authority in Aragon more fully. ⁹⁴ R. E. Giesey, If not, not. The Oath of the Aragonese and the Legendary Laws of Sobrarbe (Princeron, 1968), 31 ff.; A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Fueros, cortes y clientelas: el mito de Sobrarbe, Juan José de Austria y el Reino paccionado de Aragón (1669–1678)’, Pedralbes, 12 (1992), 276 ff.; X. Gil Pujol, ‘Aragonese Constitutionalism and Habsburg Rule: The Varying Meanings of Liberty’, in Kagan and Parker, Spain, Europe, 160 ff. ⁹⁵ Kalnein, Juan José, 439 ff.; Sanz Camañes, Política, 301 ff.; Kamen, Spain in Later, 345 ff. The Aragonese Corts comprised four estates: clergy, nobles, The gentry, and towns. ⁹⁶ Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 219. Of a total of 12,388 men, the realm gave 9,538 and Zaragoza 2,850 men. It is not clear whether these figures include the services of other towns such as Borja, Daroca, Huesca, Jaca, and Tarazona which also gave men (and/or money), Sanz Camañes, Política, 295–8. In 1676 Borja gave 200 libras and Huesca 600 for the war in Catalonia. ⁹⁷ It soon became clear that the two tercios (1,500 men) promised in 1677–8 (below) was too ambitious, at a time when Aragon was serving (1678) in Sicily with a tercio of 600 men: in 1680 Carlos II—following a petition from the junta and a consulta of the Council of Aragon—ordered the two tercios to be merged into one of just 700 men, Sanz Camañes, Política, 343 ff. ⁹⁸ Sanz Camañes, Política, 340–1; Artola, Hacienda, 169. According to reports from Madrid, there was resistance to the new taxes, Avvisi [Mar. 1678] AST/LM/Spagna, m 32, f. 307. ⁹⁹ Álvarez Ossorio, ‘Fueros’, 252 ff.; Sanz Camañes, Política, 62–3, 345. ¹⁰⁰ Sanz Camañes, Política, 58–9, 280, 346–7. ¹⁰¹ Viceroys of Aragon in this reign were: duke of Ciudad Real (1664–7); duke of Terranova (1667); count of Aranda (1668); Don Juan of Austria (1669–77) [and vicario general of the Realm] Lorenzo Colonna, constable of Naples (1678–81); duke of Hijar (1671–87); duke of Seminara (1688–91); count of Castro (1692, 1693–9); archbishop of Zaragoza (1693); marquis of Villena (1693); duke of Inverazzo (1693), Peréz Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 413.

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with the ruling bodies of individual towns.¹⁰² Most of the Crown’s requests enjoyed some success, although in 1669 the diputados pleaded their fueros regarding the funds to be applied.¹⁰³ The Crown’s success was due, in part, to its deployment of the defence argument, inside and outside the Corts.¹⁰⁴ The speech from the throne at the opening of the Corts in 1677 referred to the need to provide for the conservation of the Monarchy.¹⁰⁵ This argument was compelling, not least because, as a frontier realm, Aragon was vulnerable to the forces of Louis XIV, both directly, across the Pyrenees, and, more probably, through Catalonia. Aragon’s positive response to the Crown’s demands thus owed much to the fact that Catalonia was regarded as the antemural of Aragon.¹⁰⁶ In addition, there was growing anti-French feeling in Aragon rooted in French economic competition.¹⁰⁷ Finally, however, while the realm and individual cities were ready to serve, the terms could not be imposed. In 1677 the Corts made clear its right to appoint the officers of its tercios and—reflecting a strong sense of a distinctive identity— expected its troops to wear uniforms which should distinguish them from others in the royal army.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the Corts of 1677–8 took the opportunity to impose a ban on textile imports (from France and ‘Spain’). Even when the Crown avoided the Corts, it must negotiate, make concessions,¹⁰⁹ and grant mercedes by way of thanks. Those granted during and after the Corts of 1677–8 included hábitos and titles of nobility.¹¹⁰ However, and emphasizing the fact that the foral realms were complex entities, comprising bodies with divergent interests, not all were fully satisfied. In 1675, for example, Zaragoza ‘served with 500 men in Catalonia, and sought the grant of a mint, but without success; the concession was ¹⁰² In the summer of 1667 Mariana directed the Council of Aragon to order the levy of two tercios in Aragon—a total of 1600 men—for Catalonia. The outcome is unclear, Sanz Camañes, Política, 228. Cf. consulta of Don Juan, 18 Nov. 1667, with ‘map’ of levies for Flanders, Catalonia, and Milan, BL/Egerton 347, f. 536. The outgoing viceroy of Aragon, the duke of Ciudad Real, thought this would be difficult to achieve (for which reason his term was not renewed, although Zaragoza desired this). The appointment of a new viceroy delayed the levies. In 1691 the count of Guara brokered an agreement for a tercio (for 1692) between the king and the condado of Ribagorza, consulta of CA, 14 Nov. 1691, AGS/GJ/libro 329. ¹⁰³ Sanz Camañes, Política, 278. ¹⁰⁴ The two tercios granted in 1677–8 were agreed following a request from the viceroy, whose key argument was that of imperial defence, Sanz Camañes, Política, 311, 339. ¹⁰⁵ Maura, Carlos II, ii. 379. ¹⁰⁶ Sanz Camañes, Política, 346, 349. In 1695 there were fears for Aragon if the French king’s forces took Lleida (Catalonia), Espino, Catalunya, 158. Cf. also Álvarez Ossorio, ‘Fueros’, 254. ¹⁰⁷ Sanz Camañes, Política, 233–4, 324. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 340. ¹⁰⁹ These included in 1678 the right to import horses from Castile. Cf. (a) CJDG, 10 Nov. 1691, on (b) CCC, 3 Nov. 1691, on (c) CCA, 24 Sept. 1691, on (d) request of diputats of Aragon that the order of 1678 granting the right to export horses from Castile to Aragon in the king’s service be implemented, claiming that this fuero was very important in the present war. The Council of Castile was reluctant to allow a general licence, in part because of a supposed lack of horses in Castile, but agreed to their export for the duration of the war if all horses were registered and the appropriate duties paid. The junta suspected that Aragon was a conduit for exports to France, but agreed to the export of 1–2 horses at a time for the duration of the war, AGS/GA/285858. This issue resurfaced in 1691, when the king noted that export accorded with the (Aragonese) fuero of 1678, but breached the fueros of Castile; because of the needs of the war, Carlos agreed controlled export of small batches at a time, CCA, 24 Sept. 1691, SGS/GJ/libro 329. ¹¹⁰ Kalnein, Juan José, 468–70.

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opposed by the Diputación.’¹¹¹ Nevertheless, the horizons of the Aragonese élite were expanding and its members—or many of them—were being drawn into membership of a larger, Spanish or even ‘Monarchy’ élite.¹¹² The Corts of 1677–8 also followed what was, at least on the surface, the most serious ‘constitutional’ clash of the reign, Don Juan and his supporters in the realm expounding the view that Carlos II, having achieved his majority in 1675, must come to swear to observe the fueros; otherwise, he could not exercise royal authority there.¹¹³ However, it is difficult to see this episode as anything other than an attempt to use the fueros for narrow political advantage. In this sense, the Corts of 1677–8 represented the triumph of a faction, rather than of a constitutional movement. More important, perhaps, is the fact that there were differing views in the realm about what the fueros were and how best to protect them. Indeed, in a development dating from the 1590s, Aragonese liberty was being redefined in favour of co-operation with (rather than resistance to) the Crown, which was regarded as the protector of that liberty against the threat to it posed by the king of France. The thrust of the foral tradition was changing accordingly: it was seen more and more as compatible with royal authority.¹¹⁴

The Kingdom of Valencia Least problematic of the realms of the Crown of Aragon was Valencia, which had earlier proved remarkably co-operative regarding the so-called Union of Arms.¹¹⁵ The Corts of 1645 had agreed to fund a tercio for a number of years and, henceforth, the Crown need only seek (via the realm’s Junta de Levas rather than the Corts) the renewal of this servicio.¹¹⁶ The fueros, or furs,¹¹⁷ which were effectively defended by the standing commission of the Corts, the Diputació, and the city council of Valencia, and the prevalence of feudal jurisdictions, hampered the efforts of successive viceroys,¹¹⁸ for example, to eradicate ¹¹¹ Sanz Camañes, Política, 256. ¹¹² The marquis of Osera, a follower of Don Juan whose career had stalled during the regency, was rewarded after the coup of 1677 with membership of the Council of Aragon and the viceroyalty of Sardinia, J. Gil Pujol, ‘La proyección extrarregional de la clase dirigente aragonesa en el siglo XVII’, in P. Molas Ribalta (ed.), Historia social de la administración española, (Barcelona, 1980), 21 ff. ¹¹³ Álvarez Ossorio, ‘Fueros’, 239 ff. ¹¹⁴ X. Gil, ‘ “Conservación” y “Defensa” como factores de estabilidad en época de crisis. Aragón y Valencia en la década de 1640’, in A. Simón Tarrés et al. (eds.), 1640. La Monarquía Hispánica en crisis (Barcelona, 1992), 44 ff.; idem, ‘Aragonese Constitutionalism and Habsburg Rule: The Varying Meanings of Liberty’, in Kagan and Parker, Spain, Europe, 183, 185. ¹¹⁵ J. Casey, The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1979), 223–46, calls Valencia the ‘loyal kingdom’. ¹¹⁶ Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 234–5. ¹¹⁷ Cf. J. Casey, ‘Patriotism in Early Modern Valencia’, in Kagan and Parker, Spain, Europe, 197. ¹¹⁸ The viceroys of Valencia in the reign of Carlos II were: marquis of Astorga (1664–6); marquis of Leganés (1666–7); marquis of Leganés, son of the foregoing (1667–9); count of Paredes (1669–75); duke of Ciudad Real (1675–8); archbishop of Valencia (1678–9); duke of Veragua (1679–80); count of Aguilar and Frigiliana (1680–3); Juan Tomas Rocaberti (1683); count of Cifuentes (1683–7); count of Altamira (1688–90); marquis of Castel Rodrigo (1691–5, two terms); Alfonso Peréz de Guzmán,

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banditry.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, Valencia made important contributions to the defence of Catalonia under Carlos II. Each year the realm served with between 400 and 500 men, and sometimes (for example, in 1690 and between 1694 and 1697) with many more, while the city of Valencia occasionally supplemented the contribution of the realm; in all a total of just over 10,000 men between 1665 and 1697.¹²⁰ Like the kingdom of Aragon, Valencia feared that a French conquest of Catalonia would be followed by its own subjection: for this reason, Valencia needed Madrid to be stronger and more effective.¹²¹ These contributions were not granted—as they should have been—by the Corts of the realm—but (as in Castile) following approaches to those concerned by the king, via the viceroy (and the Council of Aragon). The realm’s representatives asserted their commitment to the furs,¹²² and wanted the king to visit Valencia (and to summon its Corts)— following Carlos II’s visit to Aragon. However, the kingdom was disappointed: Carlos did not visit and the Corts did not assemble. Despite this disappointment, the realm continued to serve, its contribution only restricted by its limited resources. In 1678, after four years of ‘services’, Valencia declined to ‘serve’ because of the threat of plague and the cost of the necessary preventive measures.¹²³ Once these difficulties were overcome, the realm was prepared to serve its monarch again, and did so in the Nine Years War, when it clearly worried about the French threat. In the summer of 1691 the city of Valencia wrote to the king, expressing concern at the loss of Seu d’Urgel (in Catalonia).¹²⁴ The bombardment of Alicante that same year by Louis XIV’s fleet fanned anti-French feeling in Valencia;¹²⁵ it also ensured that Valencia continued to contribute to the war effort and to the reform/creation of a new militia (of 6,000 infantry and 1,300 horse).¹²⁶ The realm was still sensitive to breaches of its laws, to the point of threatening recruiting. In 1691, for example, the viceroy declared that because one captain did not bring the usual accompanying letter, or sobrecarta of the Council of Aragon, to levy the 70 men he was to raise before the conclusion of the levy of 500 men offered by the realm, the viceroy could not allow him to raise his standard.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, the realm was broadly co-operative for much the same reasons as were the other realms of the Crown of Aragon, whose élite was brother of duke of Medina Sidonia (1696–1700); marquis of Villagarcía (1700–5), Peréz Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 418–19. ¹¹⁹ H. Kamen, ‘Public Authority and Popular Crime: Banditry in Valencia 1660–1714’, JEEH, 3 (1974), 654 ff. Banditry effectively disappeared only with the fueros after 1707. ¹²⁰ Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 235–6; C. M. Fernández Nadal and M. V. Candela Marco, ‘La guerra en movimiento. Los Valencianos en Italia durante el reinado de Carlos II’, Millars, 26 (2003), 208 ff. ¹²¹ S. García Martínez, Els Fondáments del Pais Valencia Modern (Valencia, 1960), 103–25. ¹²² C.1690 the Valencians informed Carlos II that he would find their furs printed ‘on our hearts no less than in books’, Casey, Kingdom, 225. ¹²³ Sanz Camañes, Política, 287. ¹²⁴ CII to city of Valencia, July 1691, BSCV, Ms. 125, f. 374; Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 238. ¹²⁵ Operti to VA, 2 Aug. 1691, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38, f. 95. ¹²⁶ Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 238. ¹²⁷ CCW, 26 Sept. 1691, AGS/GA/2856. On the sobrecarta, cf. Arrieta Alberdi, Consejo Supremo, 470 ff.

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being increasingly tied to the Court and preparing the way for the loss of its furs in 1707.¹²⁸ In addition to the men provided or funded by the realm, Valencia was an important recruiting ground for the Spanish forces in Naples, Sicily, and Milan, whether the men were recruited by captains with the king’s or viceroy’s commission, or who were raising men at their own cost (Chapter 1).¹²⁹ For their part, Carlos II and his ministers in Madrid were concerned about the defences of Valencia—above all the three fortified places of Alicante, Denia, and Peñíscola— and made some efforts to strengthen (and in the case of Alicante after 1691) to rebuild them.¹³⁰ When, in 1694, the English envoy in Madrid pressed a ban on trade between Valencia and France on the Spanish Court, he was told that this was impossible because Carlos II had only the name of king in the Crown of Aragon.¹³¹ In fact, Carlos’s authority—or effective power—there was greater than this implied, such that both Castilian and Aragonese (or Catalan ‘nationalist’) historians may have exaggerated the ‘absolutist’ rupture effected in 1714.¹³² This helped to ensure that the reign of Carlos II saw the territories of the Crown of Aragon—including the Balearic islands¹³³—making a greater contribution to the common defence than hitherto. In the summer of 1684 the mainland territories of the Crown of Aragon were said to have at least 5,370 troops in their pay;¹³⁴ and in the summer of 1693 3,370 men with another 2,600 anticipated.¹³⁵ The Crown, by no means enamoured of foralist institutions, was pressing—successfully—for greater efforts, and those institutions were not always a very effective brake on the king. The foral realms were sensitive about their fueros, and sometimes cited them as an excuse not to give more,¹³⁶ however the Crown generally obtained what it sought.¹³⁷ But was this an Aragonese contribution? Broadly speaking, the Aragonese territories remained smaller, less populated, and poorer in resources than Castile, and rarely raised all the men they had promised (above). The defence of the Crown of Aragon thus still depended enormously upon the contributions of Castile (and other parts of the Monarchy) to the army of Catalonia,¹³⁸ such that we perhaps ¹²⁸ Cf. Casey, ‘Valencian Patriotism’, 208. ¹²⁹ Fernández Nadal and Candela Marco, ‘La guerra en Movimiento’, 219–23. ¹³⁰ C. M. Fernández Nadal and M. V. Candela Marco, ‘Arquitectura de la guerra en el Reino de Valencia: La defensa de la costa en época de Carlos II’, Millars, 26 (2003), 165 ff. ¹³¹ Stanhope to Russell [1694], Kent RO/U1590/043/2. ¹³² Dedieu, ‘Dinastía y Elites de Poder’, in Fernández Albaladejo, Los Borbones, 397. ¹³³ The island kingdom of Mallorca also made greater efforts under Carlos II, cf. Espino ‘Esfuerzo’, 241–8; and J. J. Vidal, ‘Contribución de Mallorca a la Monarquía en el siglo XVII’, in Homenaje a A. Domínguez Ortiz (Madrid, 1981), 595 ff. In 1691, when the army of Catalonia was short of artilleros, it was suggested that 20 of these be requested from the viceroy of Mallorca, CCA, 6 Oct. 1691, AGS/GJ/libro 329. ¹³⁴ Espino, Catalunya, 58. ¹³⁵ Ibid., 132, 146. These figures do not include the men raised by private individuals, cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 172, and CCA, 1 Dec. 1691, AGS/GJ/libro 329, on tercio offered by Felipe Bardaxi. ¹³⁶ Espino ‘Esfuerzo’, 222 (Aragon, 1678). ¹³⁷ In 1669 a royal request that Aragon use certain revenues to fund the tercio sought was initially opposed as a breach of the fueros but later allowed, Sanz Camañes, Política, 278. ¹³⁸ Espino, Catalunya, 136.

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need to question that part of the neoforalist vision which emphasizes the way that more prosperous Aragonese territories came to the rescue of Castile.¹³⁹ Many of the troops levied by Aragon were, in fact, recruited in Castile;¹⁴⁰ and when there were fewer recruits available in Castile (from 1694), Aragon found it harder to fulfil what it had promised.¹⁴¹ Perhaps the greatest contribution of the neoforal relationship was that it meant that Carlos II and his ministers were not undermined by domestic upheaval and were thus better able to focus on the foreign struggle. This clearly needs qualification in view of events in Aragon between 1675 and 1677, and Catalonia between 1687 and 1689. However, Barcelona’s apparent welcome of the French fleet in the summer of 1693 may have looked like a repeat of the 1640s, although the reality was far different. One reason for Carlos II’s success was, no doubt, the fact that the territories of the Crown of Aragon were internally divided, and unable to present a common front in Madrid.¹⁴² But the latter, too, could be at odds. The Council of Aragon, which tended to defend the distinctive identity and privileges of the territories of Aragon, sometimes in consequence quarrelled with the other councils (occasionally because of the demands of Madrid),¹⁴³ although, as the king’s instrument, the council could also take a hard line with those territories.¹⁴⁴ Perhaps the most important factor in Carlos II’s success, however, was the fact that Louis XIV was perceived as a greater threat to their liberties by the Aragonese élites. To some extent a common experience, ideology (focused on loyalty to the king and dynasty) and purpose allows us to speak of the de facto integration of Castile and Aragon into ‘Spain’. Indeed, a larger political identity, loyalty, and entity may have been emerging, not least because of the weakness of alternative (Castilian and Aragonese) identities.¹⁴⁵ But we should not exaggerate. In 1675–6 Aragon and Castile failed to make common cause, suggesting the absence of any sense of common identity, interest, or purpose.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the common experience of the Aragonese realms, and disappointment with the (military) aid ¹³⁹ Cf. Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, ii. 276–8. ¹⁴⁰ Many of the 1,500 men offered by the Corts of Aragon in 1677–8 were levied in the neighbouring Castilian provinces of Cuenca and Soria, and in Navarre, Espino ‘Esfuerzo’, 221. ¹⁴¹ S. García Martínez, Valencia bajo Carlos II 2nd edn. (Villena, 1991), 305. ¹⁴² The realm of Aragon claimed to be the head of the Crown; and fear for its primacy may have undermined efforts to present a common ‘Aragonese’ front in Madrid, Espino ‘Esfuerzo’, 227. ¹⁴³ Espino, Catalunya, 72 (Council of War, 1687); Sanz Camañes, Política, 278–9, 286 (re 2,000 troops for Catalonia). ¹⁴⁴ In 1679 the Council of Aragon argued against the summoning of the Corts of Catalonia—at which Carlos would swear to respect the fueros—on the ground that the Catalans would seek their lost privileges, Kamen, Spain in Later, 343. Sánchez Marcos, using records of the Council of Aragon, says the latter did not express neoforal attitudes, but rather ‘absolutist’ ones, Molas Ribalta, ‘Prólogo’, 19–20. ¹⁴⁵ Cf. Thompson, Prólogo’ to Sanz Camañes, Política, 11 ff. In 1669 Don Juan was appointed vicar general of Aragon; but there is no indication that this political expedient, intended to remove him from Madrid (Chapter 5), meant either intervention in Catalonia and Valencia or greater coherence, or a greater sense of a distinctive Aragonese identity, Kalnein, Juan José, 245. ¹⁴⁶ Cf. Kalnein, Juan José, 323–4.

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received from Madrid, may have encouraged them to take the opportunity to throw off their allegiance to it, in the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁴⁷

SPANISH ITALY Focusing on the contribution of Carlos II’s Castilian and non-Castilian Spanish territories risks forgetting that the Monarchy comprised more than just Spain, and ignoring the role of the Italian realm. In fact, policy-makers in Madrid were fully committed to retaining the Italian territories. Indeed, it is possible to identify a reinvigoration of ‘imperial’ government—and an echo of that recovery from c.1680 identified elsewhere—in the visitas initiated in the Italian territories by Don Juan and the royal ‘absolutism’ established in Sicily from 1678 (below), and in the widely admired regime of the marquis of Carpio in Naples (1683–7).¹⁴⁸ It is also possible that the weakness of the Monarchy in the second half of the seventeenth century prompted efforts to mobilize more effectively the resources of Spanish Italy and to strengthen the links between those territories.¹⁴⁹

The Duchy of Milan Apart from the Dutch War, when it was effectively turned on its head, Spanish Italy largely centred on the defence of the duchy of Milan,¹⁵⁰ the home of the army of Lombardy (Chapter 1). In sharp contrast with the 30 years before 1659,¹⁵¹ the succeeding 30 years were ones of peace for the Milanese, although war with France was anticipated during the Dutch War, when Milan supplied the war against Messina,¹⁵² and in 1683–4. From 1689 the Milanese was again at war, both indirectly—units of the army of Lombardy campaigning in neighbouring Piedmont and Monferrato¹⁵³—and directly, following the Franco-Savoyard invasion of Milan in 1696.¹⁵⁴ ¹⁴⁷ Espino, ‘Esfuerzo’, 248–9. ¹⁴⁸ G. Galasso, ‘Ceti e classi alla fine del secolo XVII’, in idem, Alla periferia dell’impero. II Regno di Napoli nel periodo spagnolo (secoli XVI–XVII) (Turin, 1994), 279 ff. ¹⁴⁹ G. Galasso, ‘Milano spagnola nella prospettiva napoletana’, Alla periferia, 327. ¹⁵⁰ P. Fernández Albaladejo, ‘De “llave de Italia” a “corazón de la Monarquía”: Milan y la Monarquía Católica en el Reinado de Felipe III’, in idem, Fragmentos de Monarquía (Madrid, 1992), 185 ff.; M. Rizzo, ‘Centro Spagnolo e Periferia Lombarda nell’Impero Asburgico tra Cinque e Seicento’, RSI, 104 (1992), 315 ff. ¹⁵¹ Cf. D. Maffi, ‘Potere, carriere e onore nell’esercito di Lombardia 1630–1660’, in La Espada y la Pluma. Il mondo militare nella Lombardia spagnola cinquecentescha. (Lucca, 2000), 195 ff; and D. Maffi, ‘Milano in Guerra. La Mobilitazione delle risorse in una provincia della Monarchia, 1640–1659’, in Rizzo, Ruiz Ibañez, and Sabatini, Le Forze del Principe, 345 ff. ¹⁵² Ribot, Monarquía, 120, 160, 163–4, 165, 173, 185–6, 203–4, and 361–2. ¹⁵³ In 1695 magazines were established at Pavia and Valenza in preparation for the siege of Casale in 1695, Albert van der Meer [VDM] to Fagel, 4 Mar. 1695, ARH/8644/179. ¹⁵⁴ D. Sella, ‘Sotto il Dominio della Spagna’, in D. Sella and C. Capra, Il Ducato di Milano dal 1535 al 1796 (Turin, 1984), 3 ff. largely ignores the impact of war between 1659 and 1700.

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The army of Lombardy was costly, above all in wartime (Chapter 3). The governors of the Milanese¹⁵⁵ had various means to cover its cost.¹⁵⁶ Extraordinary measures included the sale of office, which was resorted to during the Dutch War,¹⁵⁷ and the Nine Years War,¹⁵⁸ and anticipation of future revenues. In 1692, for example, in order to fund his preparations for the invasion of Dauphiné, Leganés anticipated 6,000 escudos of the revenues of the salt farm of the Milanese;¹⁵⁹ the following year he anticipated 300,000 lire of the revenues for 1695, in order to fund the rebuilding of the army of Lombardy after its mauling in Piedmont.¹⁶⁰ Money was also raised by the sale of fiefs and jurisdiction,¹⁶¹ or the threat of this. In 1693 the community of Casalmaggiore offered 300,000 lire (50,000 reales) to prevent its alienation.¹⁶² That same year, Leganés sought Papal permission to tax ecclesiastical property in the Milanese;¹⁶³ the following year, 1694, he concluded a long-running dispute with the republic of Genoa over its right to buy salt at Finale, which was granted in return for a one-off payment equivalent to 220,000 rixdollars.¹⁶⁴ However, the population of the Milanese also bore a substantial part of the burden of the army of Lombardy more directly in the form of the annual quota, or repartimiento generale, fixed at so many thousand Milanese lire a day.¹⁶⁵ This quota inevitably rose sharply in wartime. During the Dutch War, in 1676, the Milanese claimed that the repartimiento had risen from 6,000 lire a day c.1660 to 12,000 in 1674, and 19,000 in 1676, and requested that the army (and with it the repartimiento) be reduced to the earlier level.¹⁶⁶ This ¹⁵⁵ Governors of the Milanese in this reign were: Luis Guzmán Ponce de León (1662–8); marquis of los Balbases (1668–70); marquis of Mortara (1668); duke of Osuna (1670–4); prince of Ligne (1674–8); count of Melgar (1678–86); count of Fuensalida (1686–91); marquis of Leganés (1691–98); prince of Vaudemont (1698–1706), Peréz Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio Español, 436. ¹⁵⁶ Many are identified in Operti to VA, 3 Nov. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/114. ¹⁵⁷ A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘La venalidad de magistraturas en el Estado de Milán en el reinado de Carlos II’, Archivio Storico Lombardo, ser. 12, 6 (2000), 131. Cf. D. Maffi, ‘L’Amministrazione delle Finanze Militare nella Lombardia Spagnola: I Veedores e I Contadores dell’ Esercito (1536–1700), Storia Economica, 5 (2002), 96. ¹⁵⁸ For the sale of the office of correo mayor of the Milanese (1693), cf. CII to Leganés, 14 Nov. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38; and king’s confirmation of deal, 1693, AHN/E/libro 430. ¹⁵⁹ CCS, 25 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3417/126. He also resorted to this in 1693, Leganés to CII, Milan, 9 Mar. 1693, AGS/E/3418/76. ¹⁶⁰ CCS, 30 Nov. 1693, on CCI on letter of ordinary magistrates of Milan, AGS/E/3418/169. ¹⁶¹ K. Visconti, ‘Feudo e societa nel contado milanese tra sei e settecento’, ASMC, moderna e contemporanea, 9 (2003), 193–263. ¹⁶² Operti to ST, 18 June 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38; Relación . . . [1693], AGS/E/3993. ¹⁶³ CCS, 4 May and 4 Aug. 1693, on accompanying papers, AGS/E/3418/96, 124–31. ¹⁶⁴ Albert Van der Meer to Fagel, 29 Oct. 1694, ARH/SG/8644/153. ¹⁶⁵ This followed Don Luis Ponce de León’s agreement with the Congregazione in 1662 for the introduction of the so-called remplazo, whereby the communities of the Milanese would pay an agreed sum for the army each year, and would not be obliged to give any more, thus putting an end to the frequent ad hoc demands typical of the period to 1659, Maffi, ‘Nobiltá e carriera’, 21. ¹⁶⁶ Representación q hizo el Estado de Milan a Su Magestad [1676], BL/Add. 14,009, ff. 211–14. Grievances of this sort were not made any more bearable by the fact that some Spanish governors, for example the duke of Osuna, seemed to wish to burden the military establishment of Lombardy with their own creatures.

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burden did subsequently fall, to 18,000 lire a day in 1682,¹⁶⁷ but rose again during the Nine Years War, peaking in July 1693 at 23,000 lire a day,¹⁶⁸ after which it fell to 21,300 lire a day.¹⁶⁹ Less was certainly being demanded of the Milanese after 1659 than in the decades before,¹⁷⁰ but the Duchy was being pressed—and its population certainly felt pressed—during the Dutch War and the Nine Years War. Inevitably, there were protests, to the governor, in Milan,¹⁷¹ and to the Council of Italy and the king in Madrid, (through the duchy’s agent there, and others).¹⁷² There were two distinctive—but closely connected—complaints. First, governors frequently ordered the local bodies responsible for the administration of the ordinary and extraordinary revenues of the duchy, the magistrato ordinario and the magistrato extraordinario,¹⁷³ to make payments which exceeded the governor’s powers, breaching what we might think of as the distinctive rules and practices of the Milanese—its fueros—and established rules on financial management.¹⁷⁴ Second, governors tended to create posts in the army of Lombardy for their creatures and dependants, and to ignore abuses, again exceeding their powers and adding to the army’s cost. War, inevitably, exacerbated conflict over these issues (and over governors’ other measures to raise money), and the Nine Years War was no exception.¹⁷⁵ Leganés’s fiscal devices soon prompted complaints,¹⁷⁶ and calls to reduce the burden of the army,¹⁷⁷ by rooting out fraud but also by ‘reforming’ (i.e., reducing) its size. The governor—and the king and his ministers—could respond to these concerns in various ways. In 1678, as part of his wide-ranging reaction against the overthrown Valenzuela regime (Chapter 4), Don Juan instigated a visita of Milan, an investigation designed to expose abuses, which was aimed primarily at those who had recently purchased offices.¹⁷⁸ In some respects, this revival of an older policy of visitation, one pursued in other parts of Italy by Don Juan’s regime, ¹⁶⁷ Cf. Airoldi’s memoir to CII [1694], AGS/E/3420/40. ¹⁶⁸ Leganés to CII, 3 July 1693, AGS/E/3418/121. ¹⁶⁹ Cf. memorial of marques Airoldi [1694], AGS/E/3420/40; Espino, Catalunya, 312 (1696). ¹⁷⁰ D. Sella, Crisis and Continuity. The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); D. Maffi, ‘Milano in guerra’, 401–3. ¹⁷¹ In September 1696 a delegation urged on Leganés the impossibility of the Milanese supporting his (and the allies’) troops if Milan became the seat of war, VDM to Fagel, 16 Sept. 1696, ARH/SG/8644/305. ¹⁷² A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, A., ‘Pervenire alle orecchie della Maesta: el agente lombardo en la corte madrileña’, ASMC, 3 (1997), 173 ff.; and idem, ‘Ceremonial de palacio y constitución de monarquía: las embajadas de las provincias en la corte de Carlos II’, ASMC, 6 (2000), 227–358. ¹⁷³ For the magistrato ordinario cf. A. Visconti, La pubblica amministrazione nello Stato di Milano durante il predominio straniere (1541–1796) (Rome, 1913), 217–59. ¹⁷⁴ Cf. CCS, 12 Oct. 1690, on CCI on representations from the magistrato about the contract for the supply of bread to the army of Lombardy, AGS/E/3413/27. ¹⁷⁵ Cf. lists of Fuensalida’s ‘counter-orders’ (for payments) for 1686–90 and 1690–1, AGS/E/ 3417/72, 73. ¹⁷⁶ Cf. CCS, 8 Dec. 1691, on CCI, on letters from the magistrates of Milan, AGS/E/3415/120. ¹⁷⁷ CCS, 4 Oct. 1693, on CCI and memoria from estado of Milan, AGS/E/3417/158, 159, 160. ¹⁷⁸ Cf. A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales: la visita del Estado de Milán (1678–1680)’, ASMC, 5 (1999), 123–241.

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reflected a distinctly non-foral approach to Spanish Italy, although it proved difficult to reverse fully the tide of venality; but it also reflected a desire to satisfy those in the Milanese élite who felt that venality had damaged their own interests. For his part, Leganés urged in 1691 that the needs of the army of Lombardy must take priority over established procedures,¹⁷⁹ an attitude which was appreciated by many of the king’s ministers in Madrid who themselves had experience as viceroys or governors in various parts of the Monarchy.¹⁸⁰ In fact, Leganés was not immune to the pressure from the Milanese, and carried out a ‘reform’ of the army of Lombardy in the spring of 1693.¹⁸¹ This did not put an end to the complaints. In October 1693, following successive representations to Carlos II from Milan, a junta was established to investigate the grievances of the Milanese,¹⁸² and a ‘reform’ of excess officials subsequently ordered, although implementation was apparently slow.¹⁸³ The need to relieve the Milanese, the relative inacitivity of the allies in Italy in 1694—and the pressing needs of Catalonia—explain the order to switch troops to Catalonia for 1695; and in 1696, following the end of the war in Italy, orders from Madrid were being awaited in Milan for another reform of the army and the dispatch of troops to Catalonia, which should relieve the hard-pressed finances of Milan.¹⁸⁴ Milan did not seek to throw off Spanish rule despite the burden. Indeed, it was one of the least troubled territories of the Monarchy.¹⁸⁵ The loyalty of the Milanese can be attributed to various factors, including the possibility of complaint, to Carlos II in Madrid, and the likelihood of some redress. Equally important, the Milanese élite were effectively co-opted into power.¹⁸⁶ They were not only asked to raise men for Carlos II, using their local influence on his behalf, but also obtained lucrative military office, sometimes at the highest level. Indeed, the use of the army of Lombardy to reward Milanese nobles sometimes threatened ¹⁷⁹ CCS, 8 Aug. 1691, on CCI on Leganés to [CII], 26 June 1692, AGS/E/3417/174. ¹⁸⁰ Cf. the constable, in CCS, 4 Oct. 1693, AGS/E/3418/158, on another petition from the Milanese for relief from the burden of the army of Lombardy. ¹⁸¹ CCS, 4 Apr. 1693 on Leganés to CII, 8 Feb. 1693 and memoir of reform of tercios of Spanish infantry in army of Lombardy since 1659, AGS/E/3418/66, 67, 69. Cf. also CCS, 9 May 1693, on Leganés to CII, 5 Apr. 1693, AGS/E/3418/95, 96. ¹⁸² Cf. order [1693] to establish junta (of the constable, the admiral and the marquis of Villafranca) to investigate the complaints of the Milanese, AGS/E/3418/209. ¹⁸³ CCS, 3 Sept. 1694, on count Airoldi (the Milanese agent in Madrid) to CII [1694], seeking execution at the end of the campaign of the king’s orders regarding the reform of excess officials, AGS/E/3420/39, 40. According to Airoldi, the artillery train (five-ninths of the cost of which was borne by the Cámara and the rest by the Milanese) totalled 610 lire a day (by contrast with 198 in 1632) for pay alone; he also protested at various innovations, some of which represented a transfer to the Milanese of payments which were the responsibility of the Cámara. ¹⁸⁴ VDM to Fagel, 17 Dec. 1696, ARH/SG/8644/326. Leganés ordered reform of 2 companies per regiment in 1697, VDM to Fagel, 15 Jan. 1697, ARH/SG/8644/331. ¹⁸⁵ Historians have commented on the fact that Castile and Valencia were relatively trouble-free in Spain’s crisis years after 1640 and 1660, but Milan’s quiescence has passed largely unnoticed. ¹⁸⁶ Cf. A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘De la Conservación a la Desmembración. Las Provincias Italianas y la Monarquía de España (1665–1713)’, SHHM, 26 (2004), 191–223, esp. 198 ff.

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its effectiveness, but attached that élite to the Monarchy.¹⁸⁷ Some of Milan’s grandest families served Carlos II on a wider stage: Carlo Borromeo Arese, of one of the most distinguished families of Lombardy, held various senior commands in the army of Lombardy, briefly (1686) represented Carlos II in Rome, and was appointed governor of Novara.¹⁸⁸ Not surprisingly, as in the Crown of Aragon, the alternatives to rule from Madrid were far less attractive. During the Nine Years War members of the Milanese élite articulated their anxiety about the designs on Milan of the duke of Savoy, whose rule was expected to be far harsher than that of Carlos II.¹⁸⁹ The end of the conflict in Italy in 1696 also relieved an exhausted Milan of most of the burden of which it complained,¹⁹⁰ reducing much of the tension built up in the Nine Years War.¹⁹¹ Last, but by no means least, and whatever the Milanese might believe, the army of Lombardy was effectively subsidised by the other parts of the Monarchy, including not only Castile but, in Italy, the kingdom of Naples.¹⁹²

The Kingdom of Naples In the early seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy rested on three pillars: Castile; the Indies; and the kingdom of Naples. However, the disastrous plague of 1656¹⁹³ undermined Naples’s ability to continue to act as a major recruiting ground for the Monarchy.¹⁹⁴ Successive viceroys¹⁹⁵ complained that they could not supply what was demanded of them, and feared the disturbances provoked in Naples by forcible levies for service outside the kingdom. However, these complaints were not entirely new, and should not be taken at face value. Fewer men were probably ‘exported’ from Naples to the Monarchy as a whole between 1665 and 1700 than between 1618 and 1648/1659, not least because the scale of ¹⁸⁷ This subject is discussed by Maffi, ‘Nobiltá e carriera’, 11 and 16 ff. ¹⁸⁸ G. Lutz, ‘Carlo Borromeo Arese’, DBI, 13 (1970), 81–4. Francisco Gattinara, marquis of San Martino, served thirty years in Milan, Extremadura, and Galicia, was promoted (1674) to the Council of War, served as maestre de campo general in Catalonia (1675), and was given the command of the army of Sicily in 1677, Ribot, Monarquía, 280. ¹⁸⁹ G. De Caro, ‘Vitaliano Borromeo’, DBI, 13 (1970), 76–8. ¹⁹⁰ According to VDM to Fagel, 19 Oct. 1696, ARH/SG/8644/315, the Milanese treasury was empty. ¹⁹¹ In 1698, however, the Congregazione was still complaining of breaches of the remplazo, CCS, 29 Mar. 1698, AGS/E/3426/26. ¹⁹² Cf. account of sums received and spent, Jan. to Mar. 1692, AGS/E/3417/168, and CCS, 11 Dec. 1692, on CCI and report of magistrato ordinario of Milan of sums received (including remittances from Spain, Naples, and Sicily) and spent, AGS/E/3417/134. ¹⁹³ I. Fusco, ‘Il Vicere di Napoli, conte di Castrillo, e l’epidemia di peste del 1656’, in Le Forze del Principe, i. 169–70; L. De Rosa, ‘Immobility and Change in Public Finance in the Kingdom of Naples, 1649–1806’, JEEH, 27 (1998), 17. ¹⁹⁴ G. Coniglio, Il Viceregno di Napoli nel secolo XVII (Rome, 1955), 23–4. For the Neapolitan military establishment in the seventeenth century, cf. Ribot García, ‘Las provincias’, 105 ff. ¹⁹⁵ Viceroys of Naples under Carlos II were: the cardinal of Aragon (1665–6); Don Pedro of Aragon (1666–71); marquis of Villafranca (1671); marquis of Astorga (1672–5); marquis of Los Vélez (1675–83); marquis of Carpio (1683–7); marquis of Santisteban (1687–96); Duke of Medinaceli (1696–1700), Peréz Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 429.

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warfare was not the same, and also because of a concern not to provoke a repeat of the so-called Masaniello revolt of 1647–8.¹⁹⁶ This is one reason, perhaps, why historians have shown more interest in the new cultural, intellectual, political, and social currents in the kingdom in the late seventeenth century than its contribution to the military functioning—and survival—of the Monarchy.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, throughout the reign of Carlos II Naples remained an important recruiting, and training, ground.¹⁹⁸ When men were needed in north Italy—and elsewhere— the king and his ministers invariably looked to Naples (and Sicily, below) to provide them: in 1674, for example, Mariana ordered the levy in Naples of almost 5,000 men towards a force of 16,500 intended to quell the Messina revolt in neighbouring Sicily.¹⁹⁹ Close to home, the kingdom was responsible for the Tuscan garrisons, or presidios, dispatching a steady stream of men to relieve troops already there and to reinforce them if an attack was anticipated. In the first months of the Messina revolt the marquis of Astorga sent to the presidios from Naples 4,600 infantry and 1,200 cavalry; in May 1677, los Vélez sent 300 men to the garrison of Puerto Longone; and during the 1693 campaign, the presence of the French fleet prompted the diversion to the presidios of troops intended for Catalonia.²⁰⁰ Further afield, the army of Lombardy depended upon the supply of men from Naples for its effectiveness.²⁰¹ There was a constant flow of men to the Milanese for this purpose, which peaked in the Nine Years War. In June 1690 the Neapolitan galleys, supported by those of Sicily and the duke of Tursi, carried 2,135 Spanish and Neapolitan troops north for Milan;²⁰² in May 1693 5 Spanish galleys reached Liguria from Naples with 500 troops;²⁰³ and in November 1693, after the heavy losses at Marsaglia, more than 3,000 Neapolitan troops were en route to, or waiting to embark for, Milan.²⁰⁴ Detachments dispatched between the end of 1693 and the conclusion of the war in Italy in 1696 included 2,000 troops who left Naples for the north in ¹⁹⁶ R. Villari, ‘Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations’, P&P, 108 (1985), 117 ff. ¹⁹⁷ Cf. C. F. Black, Early Modern Italy. A Social History (London, 2001), 146. ¹⁹⁸ CCS, 8 Feb. 1696, AGS/E/3423/13. ¹⁹⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 160. Initially, more than 50% of the men in the ‘army of Messina’ came from Naples, ibid., 202. ²⁰⁰ Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Razón de Estado’, 319, 332; Operti to ST, 30 Sept. 1693, and to VA, 8 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁰¹ Fuensalida’s plans to expand the army of Lombardy to over 30,000 men for 1691 assumed an increase of the Neapolitan infantry tercios from 2 to 8, and a total of 6,400 men, and the cavalry companies from 8 to 10, to a total of 1,000, such that the Neapolitan contingent would contribute 25% of the entire (projected) army, Fuensalida to CII, 11 Dec. 1690, and accompanying planta, AGS/E/3414/18, 19. ²⁰² CCS, 11 July 1690, on letters from Fuensalida, AGS/E/3412/15–18. In 1691 the viceroy of Naples claimed to have sent to Milan in 1690 2,442 men, infantry and desmontados, Relación de lo que consta en la Secretaria de Nápoles, 28 July 1693, AGS/E/3993. ²⁰³ Kirk to Blathwayt, 10 May 1693, BL/Add. 21,486 f. 30. ²⁰⁴ By December 1693 2,000 troops had reached north Italy from Naples [?] to Medinaceli, 5 Dec. 1693, Turin, AGS/E/3085.

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the spring of 1694.²⁰⁵ Naples was also a recruiting ground for Catalonia. At the end of 1692, for example, 1,000 men were being levied in Naples for Catalonia;²⁰⁶ in the spring of 1694 1,000 left Naples for Catalonia;²⁰⁷ and in June 1695 the Neapolitan galleys were expected in Genoa, en route to Catalonia, with 1,000 men.²⁰⁸ Last, but by no means least, Naples supplied the Atlantic fleet when it wintered in the kingdom in 1692–3: 1,000 men were being levied to serve with the fleet in October 1692.²⁰⁹ This list of troops dispatched to the other parts of the Monarchy is not complete,²¹⁰ and omits the levy of troops in Naples for other states.²¹¹ Nevertheless, it demonstrates Naples’s continued importance as a source of fighting men in most European theatres in which the Monarchy fought. Occasionally, this constant drainage of military manpower prompted fears for Naples itself. In the autumn of 1691, for example, the Council of State was anxious about further denuding the kingdom;²¹² and in the spring of 1692, fearing a French attack and disorder in Naples, the viceroy requested troops from Milan.²¹³ In the autumn of 1693 the dispatch of so many Spanish troops from the capital to reinforce the army of Lombardy after the recent defeat in Piedmont worried the Savoyard minister there, Operti, who declared that on the city of Naples depended the conservation of the whole realm.²¹⁴ Many of the men dispatched from Naples were Spaniards, In July 1690, for example, 1,000 of the 1,500 men who reached Milan from Naples were Spaniards;²¹⁵ and in 1693, of 1,000 men about to leave for Milan 500 were Basques and 500 Neapolitans.²¹⁶ Spaniards were to be found in the fixed tercio of the realm, which totalled a notional 6,000 men;²¹⁷ and on occasion, the viceroy ²⁰⁵ C. Morandi, ‘Torino e Napoli durante la guerra della Grande Alleanza nel carteggio diplomatico di G-B. Operti (1690–97)’, Archivio per le provincie napoletane (Naples, 1935), 349. Some of these men were bound for Catalonia. Cf. also Bazán to CII, 22 June 1696, AGS/E/ 3423/74. ²⁰⁶ Operti to VA, 28 Dec. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. For the dispatch of an unspecified number of troops to Catalonia in the spring of 1692, cf. Relación . . . en la Sec.ria de Nápoles, 28 July 1693, AGS/E/3993. Cf. Espino López, ‘Las tropas italianas’, 51 ff. ²⁰⁷ Operti to VA, 24 Apr. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. Each was said to have cost 11 ducats. ²⁰⁸ Don Francisco Moles to CII, 9 June 1695, AGS/E/3628/100. ²⁰⁹ Operti to ST, 28 Oct. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²¹⁰ According to Galasso, ‘Milano spagnola nella prospettiva napoletana’, in idem, Alla periferia, 325, during the viceroyalty of the count of Santisteban alone (1687–96), Naples dispatched well over 2,000 troops to Milan. This seems too low. ²¹¹ In 1686 Carlos II allowed the Venetian republic to levy 1,000 men in Naples, cf. minute of Villagarcía to CII, 1 Dec. 1686, AHN/E/libro 206. ²¹² CCS, 3 Sept. 1691, AGS/E/3415/89. ²¹³ CCS, 7 April 1692, AGS/E/3416/120. The threat also prompted the formation of an emergency force of 360 horse, Operti to ST, 17 June 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²¹⁴ Operti to ST, 23 Oct. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. In February 1695 there were said to be very few Spaniards (and Italians) in Naples, so many having been sent to Catalonia, Operti to VA, 11 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²¹⁵ CCS, 16 Aug. 1690, AGS/E/3412/73. ²¹⁶ Operti to ST, 13 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²¹⁷ Ribot, Monarquía, 187.

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would recruit in Spain.²¹⁸ However, there were simply not enough Spanish forces in Naples to meet all the demands,²¹⁹ and there was a reluctance to denude the realm of reliable Spanish troops.²²⁰ Many of those sent to Milan and elsewhere were, therefore, Neapolitans, as were at least 1,604 of the 2,442 men sent to Milan in 1690.²²¹ It was necessary to recruit among the population of Naples itself, for example, during the Dutch War.²²² In 1678, with the Messina revolt over, a newly raised regiment left Naples for Finale, and Catalonia; and in 1680 a Neapolitan tercio was formed for service in Milan, remaining there throughout the 1690s. The levy of new units was almost constant in the Nine Years War: in 1690,²²³ 1692,²²⁴ 1693,²²⁵ 1694,²²⁶ and 1695.²²⁷ The Savoyard envoy in Naples was impressed with the kingdom’s potential in terms of military manpower²²⁸ but, for whatever reason, recruiting was sometimes slow.²²⁹ Inevitably, when volunteers were scarce the authorities looked—as in Spain— forcibly to recruit the rootless and unemployed, although such men were likely to desert.²³⁰ The viceroy also looked to the feudal barons, whose power had grown in the seventeenth century,²³¹ to raise men, for example after the defeat in Piedmont in 1693, with some success.²³² In 1674 the viceroy dispatched men from the militia of the realm, the battaglione, to Sicily;²³³ and during the Nine Years War another viceroy hoped to use it to recruit his troops.²³⁴ The viceroy could also seek ²¹⁸ In 1693–4 the viceroy gave money to recruiting officers to go to Spain, Operti to ST, 1 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. In March 1695 320 men arrived in Naples from Malaga, Operti to ST, 11 Mar. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²¹⁹ In 1694, following a request from the duke of Savoy for troops, the viceroy of Naples, who declared there were insufficient Spaniards in Naples, ordered the dispatch of 200 men from the Tuscan garrisons, Operti to VA, 27 July 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²²⁰ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 189–90, for thinking during the Messina War. ²²¹ Relación . . . en la Sec.ria de Nápoles, 28 July 1693, AGS/E/3993. ²²² Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 173–4. ²²³ Consul Kirk to Nottingham, 16 Sept. 1690, PRO/SP 79 f. 173. ²²⁴ Operti to ST, 8 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²²⁵ Operti to ST, 12 May and 31 July 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²²⁶ Operti to ST, 12 Oct. 1694, and to VA, 4 Jan. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²²⁷ CCS, 17 Apr. 1695, AGS/SP/Napoles/63; Operti to ST, 17 June 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5 ²²⁸ Operti to ST, 12 Sept. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²²⁹ Operti to VA, 7 May 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²³⁰ Operti to ST, 24 Apr. and 8 May 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4; Operti to ST, 8 Apr. 1695, and to VA, 12 Apr. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²³¹ Cf. T. Astarita, The Continuity of Feudal Power. The Carracciolo di Brienza in Spanish Naples (Cambridge, 1991), 214. ²³² Operti to ST, 26 Oct. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. The barons were asked to levy/recruit 1 man per 100 hearths, and subsequently 2,000 men were sent to Milan, besides 11 companies of Spanish and Italian troops, G. Galasso, Napoli spagnola, 90; in 1694 the prince of Macchia left Naples for Catalonia, leading his own tercio of 1,000 infantry, ibid., 100. For Galasso, this demonstrates the continued loyalty to the Spanish Habsburgs of the Neapolitan nobility. ²³³ Ribot, Monarquía, 200. ²³⁴ In 1693 the viceroy rejected the suggestion of the Savoyard envoy that he summon the battaglione and use it to find troops, on the grounds that this would fill the country with bandits (i.e., those unwilling to serve), Operti to ST, 18 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4, but in 1694 mustered the battaglione of Terra di Lavoro, hoping to find men for the Neapolitan tercios in Catalonia and Milan, Operti to ST, 19 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5.

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to enrol bandits, thus also removing one of the realm’s great scourges. During the Messina War, for example, los Vélez agreed (1675) with almost 1,000 bandits that they should serve the king.²³⁵ Besides men, the realm also supplied munitions and provisions to the presidios,²³⁶ Carlos II’s allies,²³⁷ Catalonia,²³⁸ the other galley squadrons,²³⁹ the fleet,²⁴⁰ and Milan. When a major enterprise was planned by the army of Lombardy, it invariably looked to Naples for what it needed. In 1695 the governor of Milan was supplied from there with 2,000 bombs and other munitions for the siege of Casale.²⁴¹ Naples was also a source of grain. In 1691 the viceroy allowed the export to Milan of 30,000 tomoli of grain.²⁴² Naples’s importance in this respect grew due to a succession of poor harvests across Europe in the mid-1690s. In 1695, following a request from the duke of Savoy to be allowed to export grain from Naples, Carlos II ordered the viceroy of Naples to allow him as much as possible, the duke of Savoy himself requesting 100,000 tomoli. At the same time the governor of Milan sought 40,000 tomoli for the bread contractor of the army of Lombardy, while the dukes of Modena and Parma also hoped to be allowed grain from Naples. However, when the viceroy put these requests to the Collateral Council,²⁴³ they were refused. The council feared that the poor harvests would increase prices in Naples itself, and that if the exports became public knowledge, disorder might follow.²⁴⁴ Subsequently, however, informed that the grain requested by the duke of Savoy was for the allied army in Piedmont, he was allowed to export 50,000 tomoli (and Leganés the 40,000 he sought).²⁴⁵ Besides its contribution to the war on land, Naples contributed the largest non-Spanish squadron to Carlos II’s Mediterranean galley fleet (Chapter 2): at 8 vessels, it equalled that of Spain itself. In addition, Naples, for long the Spanish paymaster in Italy, to the detriment of its own finances,²⁴⁶ continued to be regarded as a source of funds, as another ²³⁵ I. Pasquale, ‘Il governo napoletano e la ribellione antiespagnola di Messina (1675–78)’, Archivo Storico per le provincie napoletane (1968), 56–7. Failure to pay the sums promised rendered this abortive. ²³⁶ Operti to ST, 19 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²³⁷ In 1692 the viceroy of Naples supplied the duke of Savoy with munitions in lieu of his subsidy, Operti to ST, 14 Aug. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. ²³⁸ Relación . . . en la Sec.ria de Nápoles, 28 July 1693, and additional note 4 Aug. 1693, AGS/ E/3993. ²³⁹ Ibid. ²⁴⁰ Cf. consulta of junta preparing for next campaign, 11 Nov. 1677, AGS/E/1947/244, on CJA for munitions supplied to the Armada. ²⁴¹ Operti to VA, 1 July 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5; Moles to CII, 6 Aug. 1695, AGS/E/ 3628/126. ²⁴² Operti to ST, 8 Sept. 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁴³ For the government of Naples, cf. R. Villari, La Rivolta antispagnola a Napoli: Le Origini 1585–1647 (Bari, 1976), 19 ff. The parliament of the realm had last met in 1642, ibid., 40. ²⁴⁴ CCS, 16 Jan. 1696, on Santisteban to CII, 1 Nov. 1695, AGS/E/3658/22, 23. Cf. also Operti to VA, 25 Oct. 1695, and to ST, 22 Nov. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁴⁵ Santisteban to CII, 13 Jan. 1696, AGS/E/3658/59. In 1696 Santisteban’s successor, Medinaceli, was ordered to allow the duke of Savoy to export a further 52,000 tomoli, CCS, 30 Aug. 1696, AGS/E/3658/109. ²⁴⁶ For Naples’s contribution to Spanish imperial finance between the middle of the sixteenth and that of the seventeenth centuries, cf. A. Calabria, The Cost of Empire. The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule (Cambridge, 1991), which (despite its title) ignores the last sixty years of Spanish dominion.

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‘Peru’.²⁴⁷ Besides supporting its own military and naval establishment, Naples subsidized Spain’s diplomatic network in Italy,²⁴⁸ the Tuscan presidios,²⁴⁹ the army of Lombardy,²⁵⁰ and, on occasion, the army of Catalonia.²⁵¹ Between 1669 and 1671 it has been calculated that the kingdom’s external obligations totalled over half a million ducats a year, equivalent to almost 25 per cent of total revenues.²⁵² Naples shouldered a much greater financial burden between 1674 and 1678, when it relieved Madrid of much of the cost of the Messina War.²⁵³ Spending on levies in Naples and abroad for Sicily, remittances to Sicily for the Neapolitan and other troops there and payments for the Spanish and Dutch fleets,²⁵⁴ amounted to a considerable sum.²⁵⁵ Calculating the realm’s (total) contribution to the Messina War is not easy. However, it probably spent at least 5 million ducats,²⁵⁶ at a time when the revolt (and the French presence) threatened the security, trade, prosperity, and resources, of the kingdom of Naples itself.²⁵⁷ Inevitably, renewed warfare in north Italy and the Mediterranean from 1689 meant new burdens for the realm.²⁵⁸ Following the defeats in Piedmont in 1690 and 1693, Naples was called upon to fund the rebuilding of the army of Lombardy;²⁵⁹ and, in 1695, the viceroy, Santisteban, ‘anticipated’ revenues totalling 20,000 reales to fund the dispatch of 3,000 imperial troops from Italy to Catalonia.²⁶⁰ Other charges included a share of Carlos II’s ad hoc payments and ²⁴⁷ D. Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century (Harlow, 1997), 28; I. Zilli, ‘Note sul ruolo dell’ informazione statistica nella strategia economica del regno di Napoli nella seconda meta del sec. XVII’, in A. M. Bernal et al. (eds.), El gobierno de la economia en el imperio español. Información estadística, política económica y fiscalidad (Seville and Naples, 2000), 274 ff. ²⁴⁸ For obligations to Spanish diplomats in Italy between 1675 and 1682, cf. the relaciones prepared by the marquis of los Vélez at the end of his viceroyalty, RAH/9/700. ²⁴⁹ In 1677 los Vélez was providing 10,000 reales a month, Alcalá-Zamora, ‘Razón de Estado’, 332. In December 1688 13,000 ducats were remitted for the fortifications of Piombino alone, Galasso, Napoli spagnola dopo Masaniello, 100. ²⁵⁰ Throughout Carlos II’s reign, the kingdom was obliged to remit 10,000 ducats a month to the contractors supplying the army of Lombardy’s pan de municíón. The payments were ‘assigned’ on the dogana (customs) of Foggia, CCS, 13 Nov. 1691, AGS/E/3415/104. This was by no means the limit to Naples’s ‘ordinary’ obligations to the army, Ribot, Monarquía, 342. ²⁵¹ Relazión de las cantidades que se han librado y pagado, 23 July 1693, AGS/SP/Nápoles/66. ²⁵² Ribot, Monarquía, 342. ²⁵³ Ibid., 338; Pasquale, ‘Il governo’, 29–64. ²⁵⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 241 ff.; G. Sabatini, ‘El Nápoles del marqués de los Vélez y la obra de don Bonaventura Tondi’, in Gli Eroi Fassardi / Los Heroes Fajardos. Movilización social y memoria política en el Reino de Murcia (ss. XVI al XVIII) (Murcia, 2005), 85 ff. ²⁵⁵ A snapshot of Neapolitan commitments/spending on the Messina War between July and November 1674 is offered by Ribot, Monarquía, 349–50. It totalled almost 250,000 ducats. ²⁵⁶ Ibid., 359. Galasso puts the realm’s contribution at 7,000,000 ducats (of a total of 15,000,000 ducats), Napoli spagnola, 215 ff. Cf. account of sums assigned on (paid from) Naples (1677), Relación de las cantidades . . . [1677], AGS/E/1947/221. ²⁵⁷ Cf. T. Astarita, Village Justice. Community, Family and Popular Culture in Early Modern Italy (Baltimore and London, 1999), 16, for the impact on Calabria Ultra. ²⁵⁸ Cf. Relación de lo que consta en la Secretaria de Nápoles se ha gastado de aquel Reyno desde 13 de Mayo de 1689, 28 July 1693, AGS/SP/Napoles/66. ²⁵⁹ Cf. Fuensalida to CII, 11 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/3412/23, for the receipt of (letters from Naples for) 50,000 escudos. ²⁶⁰ CCI, 28 June 1695, AGS/SP/Nápoles/63.

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subsidy to the duke of Savoy.²⁶¹ Other extraordinary costs in this conflict included those incurred in accommodating and later fitting out the Armada, which wintered at Naples in 1692–3 (Chapter 2); 95,000 ducats were remitted from Madrid to Naples in the autumn of 1692 to cover some of those costs,²⁶² but the presence of the fleet was said to have cost the realm 262,349 ducats.²⁶³ Naples also bore the expense in 1693 of the extraordinary preparations for the impending arrival of an Anglo-Dutch fleet,²⁶⁴ which failed to appear. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume that by the end of the 1680s the kingdom was exhausted and unable to contribute to the defence of the Monarchy.²⁶⁵ According to the wide-ranging survey, carried out in the spring of 1693, of the Monarchy’s war effort since 1689, Naples’s contribution totalled at least 2,872,394 ducats,²⁶⁶ to which should be added the realm’s spending between the summer of 1693²⁶⁷ and that of 1696.²⁶⁸ The continued importance of Naples and its contribution helps to explain both French designs on the kingdom and Spanish and Neapolitan fears of a French assault, for example in 1692 and 1693. If an attack had materialized, let alone succeeded, the Spanish war effort would, at the least, have been seriously hampered. Fearing a repeat of the revolt of 1647, ministers sought, as far as possible, to avoid new taxation.²⁶⁹ Carlos II’s ministers preferred to use other means, none of them new and most of them echoing expedients resorted to in Madrid.²⁷⁰ These included reducing mercedes, pensions, and salaries—and applying the sums involved to the war—and even cutting posts. In 1676 Naples suffered the Monarchy-wide cut in mercedes ordered by Carlos II,²⁷¹ and in 1691, on orders from the king, the number of ‘regents’ and other officials was reduced and some official salaries halved as part of the contemporary reform of the Council of Italy and other councils in Madrid.²⁷² The viceroy sometimes also suspended payment ²⁶¹ In 1690 the viceroy of Naples was ordered (like the viceroy of Sicily) to send the duke of Savoy 100,000 scudi, Operti to VA, 7 and 14 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38. It was for this reason that the duke sent a resident minister (Operti, brother of his envoy in Madrid) to Naples in 1691; Operti remained there until the end of the war, his letters providing an invaluable insight into Naples’s contribution to Spain’s war effort. Cf. Operti’s account of all his master received from Naples, AST/Negoz/Napoli, mazzo 1, doc. 2, and Operti to VA, 31 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38/60, with details of the revenues on which his master’s subsidy was assigned in Naples and Sicily. ²⁶² Operti to ST, 12 Nov. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. Other sums followed, cf. Operti to duke of Savoy, 28 Dec. 1692, and 10 and 24 Apr. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²⁶³ Cf. Relación, 28 July 1693, and additional note, 4 Aug. 1693, AGS/E/3993. ²⁶⁴ Operti to ST, 24 Ap. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁶⁵ G. Coniglio, Il Viceregno, 321–2. ²⁶⁶ See n. 209 above. ²⁶⁷ Cf. R. M. Filamondo, Il Genio Bellicoso di Napoli (Naples, 1694), for fears of attack in 1692. Artillery from other parts of the kingdom was dispatched to the capital, whither engineers were sent from Livorno and Milan, while bombproof vaults were designed (as powder magazines) in the Castel dell’Uovo, Operti to ST, 22 and 28 Mar. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²⁶⁸ For spending on the realm’s defences (including fortifications), cf. Relación . . . en la Sec.ria de Nápoles, 28 July 1693, AGS/E/3993. ²⁶⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 356. ²⁷⁰ Cf. Relación de los efectos destinados en Nápoles para asistir al Sr. Duq. De Saboya y remeseas hechas a Milán . . ., 11 July 1692, AGS/SP/Nápoles/66. ²⁷¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 386. ²⁷² Operti to ST, 1 Sept. 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. The funds released were later assigned to the payment of the duke of Savoy’s subsidy, same to VA, 8 Apr. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4,

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of sums assigned on the realm’s tax farms, for example on those on salt and tobacco in 1692,²⁷³ obliged the tax-farmers to advance money, as for example in 1678,²⁷⁴ and/or imposed (as in 1693–4) a percentage levy on those farms.²⁷⁵ Another traditional expedient was the sale of vacant (escheated) fiefs. In the winter of 1690–1 it was agreed that 300,000 scudi received for the fiefs of the prince of Stigliano should be used for the war.²⁷⁶ Turning fiefs into cash was not always straightforward.²⁷⁷ Nevertheless, they continued to be sold and interested parties were alert to the death, without heirs, of fief-holders.²⁷⁸ Between 1689 and 1691 the viceroy resorted to ‘reform’ of the coinage, which lost about 30 per cent of its value in these years.²⁷⁹ Another device was to ask the public banks for money. In 1676 los Vélez asked the banks to advance 100,000 ducats demanded by the Dutch admiral de Ruyter;²⁸⁰ in 1693, to fund measures to fend off the French, the viceroy sought 80,000 ducats;²⁸¹ and in 1695, on an order from Carlos II to send 10,000 doppie di Spagna to the duke of Savoy and another 10,000 to the governor of Milan, the viceroy obtained this money from the banks, assigning them the salt and customs revenues.²⁸² Voluntary donativos were sometimes requested from the barons: during the Messina War, a measure of this sort was regarded as preferable to summoning the parliament of the realm.²⁸³ The city of Naples was also called on in this way.²⁸⁴ Occasionally, however, the costs of war might necessitate additional taxation. In the autumn of 1692, to cover the costs of the fleet, a hearth tax was imposed, other levies being suspended to facilitate this, to the prejudice of those assigned revenues from these;²⁸⁵ and following the defeat in Piedmont in 1693, there was (another) levy—in effect a Castilian-style donativo—on officials and ministers, the barons were expected to contribute money and men, and new 26 Oct. 1693, and 28 Sept. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 5. In 1693 the viceroy suspended all payments, prompting widespread complaints, Operti to ST, 14 Aug. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁷³ Operti to ST, 19 Jan. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²⁷⁴ De Rosa, ‘Immobility and Change’, 18. ²⁷⁵ Operti to ST, 18 Dec. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. The money raised funded the completion of the fortifications of the Tuscan presidios, recruiting in Spain and providing for the troops going to Catalonia, Operti to VA, 16 Mar. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁷⁶ Operti to VA, Madrid, 23 Nov.and 14 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35, ff. 167–8. In the summer of 1691 some of those funds were diverted to Puerto Longone, Operti to VA, 1 Sept. 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²⁷⁷ As late as 1694 Operti was claiming that difficulties in liquidating the Stigliano states were delaying his master’s subsidy, Operti to VA, 15 Jan. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁷⁸ In 1691 the fief of Traiello was sold for 102,000 scudi, Operti to VA, 5 May 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. Operti was promised 20,000 of the proceeds. At the end of 1691, reporting the death of the holder of another fief, Operti declared his intention of suggesting to the viceroy that he sell it, Operti to VA, 8 Dec. 1691, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4. ²⁷⁹ De Rosa, ‘Immobility and Change’, 19. ²⁸⁰ Pasquale, ‘Il governo’, 38–9. ²⁸¹ Operti to VA, 27 Mar. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁸² Operti to ST, 23 Sept. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁸³ Pasquale, ‘Il governo’, 38, 51. ²⁸⁴ Cf. Ribot, Monarquía, 358, for a donativo offered by the city of Naples in 1676, payment of which was, however, slow. In 1692 the city offered 12,000 ducats, Operti to VA, 27 Mar. 1692, AST/ LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁸⁵ Operti to ST, 14 Oct. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicile, m. 4.

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taxes were expected, to fund the dispatch of men and provisions to Milan.²⁸⁶ The viceroyalty of Naples clearly provided excellent training in the identification and mobilization of funds for war: los Vélez’s occupation of that office during and after the ‘Dutch War’ therefore represented a useful preparation for his later direction in Madrid of the finances of Castile and the larger Monarchy (Chapter 3). Carlos II’s wars, and the alienation of revenues to fund them,²⁸⁷ increased the Neapolitan tax and debt burden.²⁸⁸ Not surprisingly, officials in Naples²⁸⁹ and Madrid worried about the long-term impact on the Neapolitan finances of shortterm measures to raise money during the Messina revolt and the Nine Years War. Following the conclusion of the war, in 1678, Carlos II ordered ‘reform’ (and the recovery of alienated revenues), but just how successful this was must be doubted. In 1690 the Council of Italy expressed concern at earlier alienations, fearing that the resort to this during the Messina War had permanently harmed the royal finances.²⁹⁰ The recovery of revenues alienated during the Messina War remained a matter of concern in the eighteenth century.²⁹¹ Unfortunately for all those dependent on remittances from Naples, the realm found it difficult to meet its many competing obligations. Those who suffered in consequence included Carlos II’s diplomats,²⁹² and his allies. That portion of the duke of Savoy’s subsidy paid from Naples was effectively applied to the fitting out of the galleys in 1692, 1693, and 1694;²⁹³ in 1694 Operti hoped to obtain some of the 30,000 ducats obtained from the sale of the fief of Capracotta, but was told that this had been assigned to the military treasury, or cassa militare;²⁹⁴ and in 1695 the viceroy claimed to be unable to pay the subsidy because he was trying to find money for the chinea, the annual payment to the Pope in recognition of his suzerainty over the kingdom.²⁹⁵ These difficulties prompted efforts to identify alternatives to the cash subsidy due to Victor Amadeus.²⁹⁶ The Neapolitan galleys, despite taking priority over the Duke of Savoy, also suffered: in 1694, the lack of ²⁸⁶ Operti to VA, 23 Oct. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁸⁷ Cf. Facultades concedidas para ennagenaciones en Nap.s [after 28 Aug. 1693], AGS/SP/ Nápoles/66. ²⁸⁸ De Rosa, ‘Immobility and change’, 27. The Consiglio Collaterale was said to have put the annual deficit at 50,000 ducats in 1693, Operti to VA, 7 July 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ²⁸⁹ Pasquale, ‘Il governo’, 50 and passim. ²⁹⁰ CCS, 8 July 1690, AGS/E/3412/6. ²⁹¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 359–60. ²⁹² Cf. Memoria of what was owed to the embassy in Vienna [1680], AGS/E/3865. In 1692 Bazán (in Genoa) claimed that he was owed 60,000 reales and that this prevented him from taking up his appointment as Carlos II’s representative in Turin, CCS, 3 Apr. 1692, AGS/E/3416/139. ²⁹³ Operti to VA, 18 March 1692 and 31 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4., and same to same, 16 Mar. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁹⁴ Operti to VA, 17 Aug. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. For the cassa militare, cf. Calabria, Cost of Empire, 102. ²⁹⁵ Operti to VA, 21 June 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁹⁶ In 1693 some thought was given in Turin to receiving the duke’s Neapolitan subsidy in the form of wool (from Puglia) which could be turned into uniforms for the duke’s expanding army, Operti to ST, 3 March and 13. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. Unfortunately, what was due was paid in cash—not wool—and the money was already assigned to other purposes. Operti subsequently suggested that his master seek the principality of Salerno in lieu of his arrears, Operti to VA, 16 July 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5.

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40,000 ducats for the pay of the galleys, delayed their departure for Spain.²⁹⁷ As for the Army of Lombardy, in November 1684 the marquis del Carpio refused to send an additional 50,000 scudi to Milan (besides the ordinary monthly contribution), because of the state of Naples’ finances.²⁹⁸ More seriously, the regular remittances for the Army of Lombardy fell behind during the Nine Years War. In December 1691 Leganés complained that negotiation of the bread contract for 1692 were hampered by the failure to ensure the monthly payments from Naples to the contractor, who he claimed was owed 140,000 escudos.²⁹⁹ These difficulties persisted after the conclusion of the Nine Years War.³⁰⁰ Nevertheless, these difficulties should not obscure the fact that the kingdom was still relieving Madrid (and Castile) of some of the burden of defence, that without its contribution the Monarchy might have fared less well under Carlos II, and that Spanish rule continued to impose burdens on the realm. The Messina revolt reinforced ministers’ fears of trouble in Naples. In the 1680s, the viceroy, Carpio, justified a fierce drive against banditry, which alienated some of the barons,³⁰¹ in part on the grounds that French agents might incite the bandits to revolt (at a time, 1683–84, when Louis XIV would welcome any distraction of this sort).³⁰² But bandits and barons were not the only problem. There was little love lost between Spaniards and Neapolitans. In 1677, serious clashes between the two in the camp at Milazzo ended in fatalities.³⁰³ The presence of the fleet in 1692–93 sharpened many of these tensions.³⁰⁴ In the spring of 1694 Operti reported the appearance in Naples of posters threatening the viceroy, and in the summer claimed that the Neapolitans were tired of Spanish government.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, Operti was impressed by the loyalty shown in the crisis provoked by the appearance of the French fleet in 1693 and denied that there was any likelihood of a rising in 1694.³⁰⁶ He was correct in his assessment. There was no Neapolitan revolt to embarrass the Monarchy in the reign of Carlos II—although if the French had succeeded in effecting a landing, things might have been very different. ²⁹⁷ Operti to VA, 11 May 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ²⁹⁸ G. Sabatini, ‘La trasmissione delle informazioni dal Regno di Napoli agli organismi centrali della corona: le relazioni delle autoritá vicereali, le memorie delle magistrature, le suppliche delle comunitá’, in A. M. Bernal et al., El Gobierno de la Economía (Seville; Naples, 2000), 224–5. ²⁹⁹ CCS, 1 Jan. 1692, on Leganés to CII, 1 Dec. 1691, AGS/E/3416/1, 2. In the spring of 1692 the contractor was said to have received no payment from Naples for eight months and to be owed at least 110,000 ducats, CCS, 3 May 1692, on Leganés to CII, 6 Apr. 1692, AGS/E/3416/141,142. The viceroy had applied 47,000 ducats of the money due to the contractor to the fitting out of the galley squadron. ³⁰⁰ In 1698 the duke of Medinaceli claimed that he could not obey Carlos II’s order to send 3 of the Neapolitan galleys to Cartagena, to join the galleys of Spain in clearing the Turks from the coasts of Andalusia, because he intended to send 6 galleys against the Turks who infested Naples’s own waters, and because his want of funds to buy slaves rendered his other galleys inoperable, Medinaceli to CII, 13 April 1698, AGS/E/3630/67. ³⁰¹ Sella, Italy in Seventeenth, 62. ³⁰² Sabatini, ‘La trasmissione’, 222–3. ³⁰³ Ribot, Monarquía, 306. ³⁰⁴ In 1693 the Savoyard envoy observed that the (sometimes fatal) clashes between the men of the fleet and the local population exacerbated the ‘natural’ hostility between the two nations, Operti to VA, 24 April 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. Cf. also same to same, 16 June 1693, AST/LM/ Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³⁰⁵ Operti to VA, 16 July 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³⁰⁶ Operti to ST, 12 Mar. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5.

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The Neapolitans certainly appeared loyal to the dynasty, and to Carlos II.³⁰⁷ In 1692 there were celebrations in Naples following the birth of a son to the elector of Bavaria, regarded in Naples (by some at least) as their future king in the event of the death without heirs of Carlos II;³⁰⁸ and in 1693 celebrations on the recovery of Carlos following one of his many illnesses.³⁰⁹ The king’s birthday was celebrated annually, on 6 November, here as elsewhere in the Monarchy. When seeking to explain Naples’s apparent loyalty, or inertia, we must acknowledge that the king and his ministers deliberately sought, in the wake of the disorders of 1647, not to press too hard. Efforts were also made to propagate the image of a benevolent Spanish government,³¹⁰ and to encourage a sense of being part of a larger Monarchy. In 1695, for example, the viceroy celebrated the recovery of Namur in Flanders.³¹¹ The Spaniards also exploited—or at least benefited from—the cult of the kingdom’s patron saint: in the spring of 1693, the liquefaction of San Genaro’s blood was said to have removed lingering fears of attack by the French fleet.³¹² Nor can we ignore the fact that some in Naples benefited from the Monarchy’s needs: the prosperity of the Calabrian iron industry after 1647 depended, in part, on supplying the Spanish navy.³¹³ But the king also depended on the local élite, whose loyalty and co-operation was won (as in Milan, especially after 1680) by applying a lighter touch,³¹⁴ and by offering mercedes, i.e., deploying patronage.³¹⁵ While administrators, financiers, and suppliers essential to the functioning of the realm’s fiscal-military structure secured entry into the nobility, those already secure within it gained other rewards: in 1694, for example, Carlos II gave the prestigious Golden Fleece to the prince of Avellino.³¹⁶ Some of the king’s Neapolitan subjects also held senior posts in the Monarchy, including the prince of Montesarchio, a high-ranking naval commander over many years,³¹⁷ although the most sensitive offices were reserved for Spaniards.³¹⁸ ³⁰⁷ Operti to ST, 5 Nov. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³⁰⁸ Operti to VA, 19 Dec. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4 ³⁰⁹ Operti to ST, 5 June 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³¹⁰ Domenico Antonio Parrino’s Teatro eroico e politico de’ governi de’ vicere del Regno di Napoli (Naples, 1692–4) was commissioned by Santisteban to this end, A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, Milán y el legado de Felipe II. Gobernadores y corte provincial en la Lombardía de los Austrias (Madrid, 2001), 19. ³¹¹ Operti to Buttigliera, 26 Aug. 1695, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³¹² Operti to ST, 8 May 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. Indicative perhaps of Naples’s importance is the fact that, in 1702, Philip V, declared the Neapolitan patron saint, Gennaro, one of the patrons, or protectors of the Monarchy Cf. W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, 5 vols., 2nd edn. (London, 1815), i. 196 ff. ³¹³ Sella, Italy in Seventeenth Century, 44. ³¹⁴ A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘De la Conservación’, 191–223. ³¹⁵ Elliott, ‘Europe of Composite’, 56. ³¹⁶ Operti to VA, 23 Nov. 1694, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 5. ³¹⁷ G. De Caro, ‘Avalos, Andrea d’, DBI, 4 (Rome, 1962), 617 ff. In 1683 Montesarchio was appointed to the Council of War. Since Montesarchio joined Don Juan’s coup, in 1676–7 (Chapter 4), the latter should not simply be regarded as an ‘Aragonese’ episode. ³¹⁸ In the Nine Years War the brother of the duke of Medina Sidonia was general of the Neapolitan galleys, Operti to ST, 13 Mar. 1692, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4.

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The Kingdoms of Sicily and Sardinia The island of Sicily had been part of the Aragonese/Spanish polity since the voluntary submission of the realm to the king of Aragon following the Sicilian Vespers (1282). Under the Habsburgs, besides maintaining its own military establishment, a tercio of about 3,000 men and 6 galleys,³¹⁹ Sicily shared some of the costs of Monarchy—though contributing less than the larger, more populated and wealthier Naples³²⁰—and continued to do so in the 1660s, supplying, among others, the army of Flanders³²¹ and the army of Catalonia.³²² In part because it had been acquired voluntarily rather than by conquest, and in many respects echoing the situation in the crown of Aragon, the island enjoyed various privileges, and its parliament continued to meet and to make grants, or donativos.³²³ Successive monarchs sought to work within this quasi-foral framework through the Council of Italy and the viceroy,³²⁴ resident in Palermo. Unfortunately, this was increasingly difficult, not least because of the near impossibility of accommodating the pretensions of the city of Messina, which had remained loyal when Palermo revolted in 1647,³²⁵ and which was perhaps the most privileged city within the entire Spanish Monarchy: Messina could (like the foral realms of the Crown of Aragon) declare any measure a ‘counter-privilege’ and any individual an enemy of the city; these were powerful weapons and not infrequently used.³²⁶ Messina’s assertion of its claims represented a multifaceted threat to the Monarchy: in 1670 the senate demanded that the captain of one of the realm’s galleys surrender a Messinese buena boya, on the ground that for a Messinese to serve in this way was a breach of the city’s privileges, and, on the captain’s refusal, seized some of his crew; this had worrying implications for the effectiveness of Sicily’s, and thus the Monarchy’s, galley strength.³²⁷ The situation was a complex one because Messina was opposed within Sicily by Palermo, which resented Messina’s privileges and its economic and political rivalry; and by the feudal barons, the other great social and political force in Sicily. ³¹⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 123 ff.; L. Ribot García, ‘La Hacienda real de Sicilia en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII. (Notas para un estudio de los balances del Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid)’, CIH, 2 (1978), 425 ff. ³²⁰ For Sicily’s contributions to 1665, cf. R. Giuffrida, ‘La politica finanziaria spagnola in Sicilia da Filippo II a Filippo IV (1556–1665), RSI, 88 (1976), 310 ff. ³²¹ Ribot, Monarquía, 381. ³²² Sanz Camañes, Política, 279. ³²³ Cf. L. A. Ribot García, La Revuelta Antiespañola de Mesina. Causas y antecedentes (1591–1674) (Valladolid, 1982), 38 ff. for the government and institutions of Sicily. ³²⁴ Viceroys in this period were: duke of Sermoneta (1663–7), duke of Alburquerque (1667–70); prince of Ligne (1670–4); Francisco Bazán de Benavides (1674); marquis of Villafranca (1674–6); marquis of Castel Rodrigo (1676); marquis of San Martino (1676); cardinal Portocarrero (1677–8); duke of Guastalla (1678); count of Santisteban (1678–87); duke of Uceda (1687–96); duke of Veragua (1696–1701), Peréz Bustamante, Gobierno del Imperio, 431–2. ³²⁵ H. G. Koenigsberger, ‘The Revolt of Palermo in 1647’, Cambridge Historical Journal, 8 (1946), 129 ff.; and idem, Estates and Revolutions (Ithaca and London, 1971), 253 ff. ³²⁶ Ribot, Revuelta, 57 ff. In 1667 the senate and ordinary council of Messina declared a ‘counterprivilege’ the levy of certain taxes on their trade, ibid., 107–10. ³²⁷ Ribot, Revuelta, 123.

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During Carlos II’s minority ministers in Madrid were increasingly convinced that force must be used to resolve the problem of Messina, but implementation of this policy was prevented by fears that Louis XIV might exploit the situation.³²⁸ Indeed, between 1667 and 1674 (as between 1674 and 1678), Spanish policy in Messina cannot be isolated from the international situation, emphasizing the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ issues and policy. However, relations between Madrid and Messina continued to deteriorate, and in July 1674 the ordinary council of Messina formally declared the present and former estraticos of the city (a royal agent equivalent to the Castilian corregidor), and members of the royal faction in Messina, the merli, to be enemies of the city, and seized control of the city and its defences, thereby initiating the Messina revolt,³²⁹ perhaps the most serious internal threat to the Monarchy’s survival in the reign of Carlos II, and comparable with the Catalan and Portuguese revolts of 1640. The absence of the Sicilian galleys supporting Carlos II’s forces in Catalonia, prevented the viceroy from promptly crushing the rebels,³³⁰ and for the next four years ministers were distracted by an internal revolt, which— particularly following the intervention of Louis XIV—necessitated the diversion to Sicily of men, money,³³¹ and other resources which might have ensured greater success for Carlos II’s forces in Catalonia and Flanders.³³² From 1678, following the withdrawal of Louis XIV’s forces, Messina was once again under Carlos II’s control. He and his ministers sought to prevent a repeat of the revolt, exploiting their success to enhance royal authority and real power, and mounting what we might call a propaganda campaign which included the exploitation of the Sicilian Vespers episode (with its anti-French and pro-Spanish implications) to cement loyalty to Carlos, the dynasty, and Spain.³³³ The senate of Messina was replaced by a Spanish-style ayuntamiento, and its members appointed by the viceroy; its meetings would, henceforth, take place in the royal palace, in the presence of the governor; the tribunal of the estratico became a royal audiencia; all those local offices hitherto appointed by the senate would, henceforth, be nominated by the viceroy (or governor); the town also lost its fiscal privileges and most of its revenues; the charter of the city’s privileges, housed in Messina cathedral, ³²⁸ Ribot, Revuelta, 120–5. ³²⁹ Ribot, Monarquía, 21; in September 1674 the portrait of Carlos II was removed from the senate, ibid., 38. ³³⁰ Ibid., 27. ³³¹ For the importance of remittances to Sicily, cf. Ribot, ‘Hacienda Real’, 410 ff. ³³² Sicily’s own auxiliary military forces proved largely ineffective, Ribot, Monarquía, 127 ff. The feudal host, between 1600 and 1900 horse, was less valuable as a military force than as a source of funds (via composition); the inadequacy of the militia inspired plans for its reform but the war ended before these were implemented. ³³³ L. Ribot García, ‘ “La Clemenza Reale” de Francesco Strada, una Exaltación Absolutista de la Monarquía de España en la Sicilia de 1682’, in M. H. da Cruz Coelho et al., Pueblos, Naciones y Estados en la Historia (Salamanca, 1994), 86. The count of Santisteban, viceroy of Sicily between 1678 and 1687, embellished the royal palace in Palermo with a picture of the coronation of Peter of Aragon, the first Aragonese monarch of Sicily, and portraits of the viceroys (and others) who had governed the island since 1488, thus linking the Aragonese and Habsburg regimes, A. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, Milán y el legado, 19–20.

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was confiscated; the palace of the senate and the great bell of the cathedral—used to signal a supposed breach of the city’s privileges—were both destroyed (the bell was melted down and the bronze used to cast a statue depicting Carlos II crushing the hydra of rebellion, which was erected on the site of the former palace of the senate); and finally a citadel was constructed (1680–83) in Messina to prevent any future revolt.³³⁴ This ‘absolutist’ policy was not limited to Messina: cities such as Catania and Siracusa with a tradition of municipal autonomy also had their privileges curtailed or suppressed.³³⁵ The earthquake of 1693 again reduced Sicily’s ability to meet its imperial obligations;³³⁶ and, occasionally, the island still needed help from outside, for example in, 1693 to fund new fortifications at Augusta and Siracusa.³³⁷ Broadly speaking, however, the realm was again a contributor to the Monarchy’s defence needs after 1678. In the summer of 1690 the Sicilian galleys carried 500 Spanish troops north from the island for service in Lombardy, the viceroy, the count of Uceda, arranging the remittance of sums to Milan to fund them.³³⁸ The island could also contribute financially, the resources available to Carlos II swelled by the confiscation of the property of the Messina rebels.³³⁹ During the Nine Years War, Sicily was again funding the army of Lombardy, paid part of the duke of Savoy’s subsidy,³⁴⁰ and contributed to the costs of the army of Catalonia.³⁴¹ In general, the fund-raising measures implemented in Sicily echoed those applied elsewhere, apart perhaps from parliamentary grants. In January 1691 the Council of State in Madrid, lamenting Sicily’s inability to supply more, suggested that Carlos II approach the Sicilian barons for a donativo;³⁴² and in 1694 the Council of Italy suggested that one-third of salaries in Sicily be applied to the army of Milan.³⁴³ Like Naples, Sicily was an important source of grain. In November 1695 over 1,000 salmas of grain reached Finale from Sicily for the army of Lombardy, its purchase funded by the sequestration of Genoese effects in the realm;³⁴⁴ and the duke of Savoy was allowed, in 1695–6, to receive part of his subsidy arrears in the ³³⁴ Ribot, Monarquía, 625–6; H. Hills, ‘Mapping the Early Modern City’, Urban History, 23 (1996), 145 ff. No attempt appears to have been made to explore the impact of (or response to) these ‘antiforal’ measures (initiated by Don Juan’s regime) in contemporary Aragon. ³³⁵ Ribot, Monarquía, 29. ³³⁶ The viceroy of Sicily attributed the failure to pay that part of the duke of Savoy’s subsidy paid from the island by reference to the earthquake, Memoria from Operti, 19 May 1693, AGS/E/3655/43. Cf. duke of Uceda to Bazán, 21 Jan. 1694, AGS/E/3656/33. Cf. Operti to VA, 28 Apr. 1693, AST/LM/ Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³³⁷ Operti to [?], 26 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³³⁸ CCS, 16 and 29 Aug. 1690, AGS/E/3412/73, 89. In August 1690 the recently voted Sicilian donativo was directed to be sent to the governor of Milan, who was subsequently ordered to send 100,000 ducats to the duke of Savoy. ³³⁹ Ribot, ‘Hacienda Real’, 408 ff. In 1693 this source yielded just over 28% of the revenues of the realm. Many of the confiscated properties were subsequently sold, mostly to the barons, thus strengthening the position of the latter in Sicily, Ribot, Monarquía, 29. ³⁴⁰ Between 1682 and 1700 the realm remitted over 400,000 ducats to Milan, and between 1691 and 1693 over 140,000 ducats, Ribot, ‘Hacienda Real, 430–1. ³⁴¹ Cf. Relazión de las cantidades que se han librado, 23 July 1693, AGS/SP/Nápoles/66. ³⁴² CCS, 11 Jan. 1691, AGS/E/3414, 22. ³⁴³ CCS, 8 Mar. 1694, AGS/E/3419/52. ³⁴⁴ Leganés to CII, 30 Nov. 1695, AGS/E/3421/3.

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form of Sicilian grain.³⁴⁵ As in Naples, competing priorities and inadequate resources meant some went unpaid: in the spring of 1693 the duke of Savoy’s subsidy was not a priority.³⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in total, Sicily remitted at least 250,000 ducats to Milan, and 130,000 ducats to Turin between 1688 and 1696.³⁴⁷ As with the kingdom of Naples, these sums do not compare with those remitted from Sicily earlier in the seventeenth century, but none the less they contributed to the Monarchy’s survival. Finally, in Spanish Italy, there was the smaller, poorer island realm of Sardinia. The murder of the viceroy in 1668 briefly threatened Spain’s hold,³⁴⁸ but this was overcome and the island, small though it was, played a part in the imperial defence system.³⁴⁹ In 1674, for example, los Vélez, then viceroy of Sardinia, raised a tercio for service in Sicily against Messina. The Italian leg of the Spanish ‘system’ continued in the last decades of Habsburg Spain to contribute to the defence of the Monarchy as a whole, supplying men for the armies of Lombardy,³⁵⁰ Catalonia,³⁵¹ and Flanders.³⁵² In some respects, Spanish Italy was also more integrated. One indicator of this is the way individuals—including the marquis of los Vélez and the count of Santisteban— progressed from the lesser viceroyalty of Sardinia to those of Sicily and Naples. For some, the greater degree of co-operation evident between Spain’s Italian territories in the later seventeenth century reflected Spain’s weakness, even decline.³⁵³ But what is striking is the way Madrid was able to ensure those territories ‘worked’, largely under the direction of the viceroy of Naples.³⁵⁴ Don Juan’s appointment as vicar general of Italy, with the expectation that he would lead to Sicily the expeditionary force being prepared in Spain, and effectively act as ‘super-viceroy’ of Spanish Italy, was innovative, but was rendered abortive by his failure to go there.³⁵⁵ The role of the viceroy of Naples thus remained pivotal, founded on the ³⁴⁵ Count of Santisteban to CII, 1 Nov. 1695 and 13 Jan. 1696; and CCS, 30 Aug. 1696, AGS/E/3658/23, 59, 109. ³⁴⁶ Operti to [?], 26 Mar. 1693, AST/LM/Due Sicilie, m. 4. ³⁴⁷ Ribot, ‘Hacienda Real’, 401–2, and passim. ³⁴⁸ B. Anatra, ‘Casi una crisis: la Cerdeña del Siglo XVII’, in Tarrés et al., 1640: La Monarquía Hispánica en Crisis, 200 ff. Ministers feared that the events of 1668 in Sardinia might find an echo in Milan, A. Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, Milán y el legado, 208. ³⁴⁹ Apparently, Carlos II sought to substitute a Spanish for the Aragonese title on Sardinian coins but reverted to the latter in 1674, F. Mateu y Lopis, ‘Rex Sardiniae (Cerdeña en la intitulación diplomática de los reyes de Aragón)’, Studi in onore di F. Loddo Canepa (Florence, 1959), i. 147 ff. ³⁵⁰ In 1668 Italians (Lombards) made up just over 15% (1238 men) of the infantry of the army of Lombardy, over 33% in 1684, and almost 20% in 1699, Ribot, ‘Milán, Plaza de Armas’, 224 ff. ³⁵¹ In September 1684 Italians made up just over 6% of the infantry of the army of Catalonia, but contributed over 23% of that total in October 1697, Espino, ‘Las tropas italianas’, 53. ³⁵² In April 1675 Italians contributed almost 8% of the infantry of the army of Flanders, relación, AGS/E/2128; and in 1691 a proposed new establishment suggested an Italian contingent equivalent to 7.5% of the infantry, CJDF, 24 Dec. 1691, AGS/E/3885. ³⁵³ Galasso, ‘Milano spagnolo nella prospettiva napoletana’, 326–37. ³⁵⁴ For Ribot, Monarquía, 273–4, 338–40, the continued functioning of the Italian arm indicates an administrative maturity which contributed to the Monarchy’s resilience. ³⁵⁵ Kalnein, Juan José, 349–52; Ribot, Monarquía, 256 ff.

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greater resources made available from the kingdom. Explaining why the Italian branch of the Monarchy ‘worked’ is not easy. Within the élites, it seems clear that many continued to find the military career attractive, and to find niches in the military machine of the Monarchy,³⁵⁶ which thus supplemented the pool of mercedes whereby Carlos II was able to attach the nobility of Spanish, and nonSpanish Italy, to him.³⁵⁷ We also need to be wary of an older tradition of negative, Risorgimento-inspired historiography regarding the Spanish presence in Italy, one which preferred to ignore the loyalty to Spain and its king of the native population.³⁵⁸ Most of the inhabitants of Sicily were loyal during the Messina War, the Diputación of Sicily articulating a vision of imperial cohesion and obligation which compared with that of Olivares.³⁵⁹ It was one thing, of course, to be positively in favour of Carlos II and the Monarchy. Nevertheless, that there was an enduring Spanish identity or loyalty of sorts in much of former Spanish Italy is suggested by the problems encountered by the duke of Savoy in Sicily between 1713 and 1720, and in Sardinia thereafter.³⁶⁰

THE AMERICAS The American territories—essentially the viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain (or Mexico)—were not foral in the way that the Aragonese and Italian realms were: they had no autonomous organs of government and their laws were made in Spain.³⁶¹ Indeed, Carlos II’s reign saw the issue of a major code of colonial law, the Recopilación de Indias (1680).³⁶² However, some historians have observed a weakening of central control—from Madrid—in the seventeenth century. There were various aspects to this. For one thing, more of the wealth of the Americas was consumed locally, rather than remitted to Spain (Chapter 3). For another, the Crown increasingly sold (local) offices,³⁶³ and—for the same fiscal reasons— surrendered its control of the municipalities: in 1699 Carlos II agreed to the request of Quito (Peru)—accompanied by the promise of cash—that it recover the right (lost in 1539) to elect its ordinary municipal judges.³⁶⁴ These developments ³⁵⁶ Cf. Maffi, ‘Nobiltá e Carriera’, passim. ³⁵⁷ A. Spagnoletti, Principi Italiani e Spagna nell’etá barocca (Milan, 1996), 51 ff. ³⁵⁸ Ribot, Monarquía, 9–10, 29. ³⁵⁹ When seeking aid from Madrid in September 1675 the Diputación of Sicily argued (in a very ‘interested’ way) that Sicily’s past contributions to the defence of the Monarchy meant that it deserved help in turn against Messina, Ribot, Monarquía, 384. Ribot makes the comparison. ³⁶⁰ Cf. Storrs, War, Diplomacy, 311. ³⁶¹ Kamen, Spain’s Road, 141–2. ³⁶² Cf. T. Herzog, ‘The Recopilación de Indias and its Discourse: The Spanish Monarchy, the Indies, and the Seventeenth Century’, Ius Commune, 20 (1993), 143 ff. ³⁶³ K. J. Andrien, ‘The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700’, HAHR, 62 (1982), passim; A. Sanz Tapia, ‘La Venta de Oficios de Hacienda en la Audiencia de Quito (1650–1700)’, RI, 63 (2003), 633–48. ³⁶⁴ T. Herzog, Upholding Justice. Society, State and the Penal System in Quito (1650–1750) (Michigan, 2004), 106–7.

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both encouraged and confirmed the emergence of local, creole élites, or oligarchies.³⁶⁵ These élites and other powerful local groups could block reforms initated by the Crown and/or its agents, for example the count of Lemos’s efforts, as viceroy of Peru, to abolish the mita tribute, which was opposed by the (silver) mine and mill owners—azogueros—of Potosí, and by the local corregidor whom they clearly intimidated.³⁶⁶ In the more distant territories, the authorities might fail to enforce royal legislation intended to protect the Indian population from exploitation by encomenderos.³⁶⁷ On occasion, the king’s own officials frustrated royal initiatives: the military governor of Cartagena, for example, obstructed— arrested and deported—Carlos Alcedo y Sotomayor, who had been sent to Nueva Granada in 1695 to conduct a major investigation, or visita.³⁶⁸ On the other hand, the Crown could achieve its objectives, including imperial defence, only by working with these emerging élites,³⁶⁹ whose developing attitudes may have increasingly distanced them from Spain.³⁷⁰ This development, which has been labelled a process of ‘Americanization’, goes some way towards explaining relations between Madrid and Spanish America under Carlos II. However, it does not accurately convey the essentials of that relationship. More of America’s resources were certainly deployed locally, in the Indies, in this period. But decisions about that deployment—power—still clearly lay in Madrid with the king and his ministers,³⁷¹ whose priorities shaped the policies pursued by successive viceroys,³⁷² and to whom colonial élites continued ³⁶⁵ P. Bakewell, ‘Conquest After the Conquest: The Rise of Spanish Domination in America’, in Kagan and Parker (eds.), Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World, 314–15; and idem, A History of Latin America (Oxford, 1997), 214 ff. For one of these elites, cf. A. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence. Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon rule (Cambridge, 1993), 239. ³⁶⁶ J. A. Cole, ‘An Abolitionism Born of Frustration: The Conde de Lemos and the Potosí Mita, 1667–73’, HAHR, 63 (1983), 307 ff. Cole attributes the corregidor’s ability to frustrate the reform to the structural weaknesses of Habsburg administration in Upper Peru and the power of the azogueros. Cf. also I. González Casasnovas, Las Dudas de la Corona. La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosí (1680–1732) (Madrid, 2000), 108 ff. ³⁶⁷ Cf. Bakewell, History of Latin America, 238–40. ³⁶⁸ McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, 25 ff. ³⁶⁹ Z. Moutoukias, ‘Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires’, HAHR, 68 (1988), 771 ff. ³⁷⁰ P. Pérez Herrero, La America Colonial (1492–1763). Política y sociedad (Madrid, 2002), 311 ff. ³⁷¹ Kagan, review of Lynch, Spain under Habsburgs, Vol. II, HAHR, 50, (1970), 359–60. Lynch, the main exponent of the thesis of seventeenth-century ‘Americanization’, has himself acknowledged in a formulation which might be applicable elsewhere in the Monarchy of Carlos II, that the late Habsburg colonial state was characterized by the ‘dilution’ (of royal absolutism) but not by devolution of decision-making, ‘The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America’, JLAS, 24 (1992), 73. ³⁷² In 1675 the Crown and the Council of Indies ordered the shelving of the mita reform initiated by the count of Lemos, Cole, ‘Abolitionism’, 331. It is difficult to separate this from the need for silver for the wars (and associated expenditure) the Monarchy was at that time fighting in Europe. J. I. Israel, ‘The Seventeenth-century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?’, P&P, 97 (1981), 150 ff., believes that the diversion of funds from Mexico and Peru to imperial defence in the Caribbean undermines the ‘Lynch thesis’ that the two viceroyalties were appropriating—retaining— more of their own wealth in the seventeenth century.

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to look for honours and ‘validation’.³⁷³ There was dissent, even resistance, the most serious being the Pueblo revolt (1680) which forced the Spaniards from that part of New Mexico; however, it was a popular revolt—not an élite movement— and its success proved transient.³⁷⁴ CONCLUSION It has not been possible to discuss all the territories of Carlos II’s Monarchy, notable omissions including Asturias, Navarre and the Basque territories in Spain itself ³⁷⁵ and Spanish Flanders outside.³⁷⁶ Nevertheless, some broad conclusions can be drawn. Carlos II’s reign was not on the face of it one in which Madrid sought to intervene, to impose, in the manner of Olivares with his Union of Arms. This subtler, ‘neoforal’, approach had its reward, The peripheral territories of the Monarchy were content to remain part of the latter, and to contribute to the common defence, while in territories lost (to Louis XIV) there was a residual loyalty to the Spanish king and Monarchy.³⁷⁷ The efforts of an apparently exhausted Castile were thus supplemented in a new way by those of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, and Madrid was distracted by fewer provincial revolts than in the decades after 1640. The co-operation in a common struggle against Louis XIV may also have encouraged the growth of a sense of Spain, and of Spanish identity,³⁷⁸ and the breakdown of narrowly Castilian and Aragonese attitudes,³⁷⁹ loyalty and integration being cemented—as they had always been—by loyalty to the dynasty, by royal patronage,³⁸⁰ and by economic ties between the Monarchy’s component parts.³⁸¹ ³⁷³ The term is used by Bakewell, History of Latin America, 221. According to Bakewell, the creole élites were aware, consciously or not, that their own position depended upon Spain’s (continued) imperial presence in America. ³⁷⁴ D. J. Weber (ed.), What Caused the Pueblo Revolt? (Boston, Mass., 1999). ³⁷⁵ Asturias, Navarre, and the basque lands (Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alava) certainly could not contribute to the defence needs of the Monarchy as did Castile, or even Aragon, but were being pressed to do something. Unfortunately, space does not permit a proper discussion of this, or of the various responses of these territories, but cf. M. A. Faya Díaz, ‘Gobierno municipal y venta de oficios en las Asturias de los siglos XVI y XVII’, Hispania, 63/1, 213 (2003), 75–136; M. Garcia-Zuñiga, ‘Taxation in the Kingdom of Navarra (XVIth–XVIIth Centuries), JEEH, 31 (2002), 531–58; and M. I. Ostolaza Elizonado, ‘Administración del Reino de Navarra en la Etapa de los Asturias’, Hispania, 60 (2000), 563–96. ³⁷⁶ Fortunately, Herrero Sánchez, El Acercamiento, passim, although it does not continue beyond 1678, provides an impressive analysis of relation between Madrid and the Spanish Low Countries which is also broadly applicable to the rest of Carlos II’s reign. Cf. also M. F. van Kalken, La fin du régime espagnol aux Pays-Bas. Etude historique politique, économique et sociale (Brussels, 1907). ³⁷⁷ Cf. A. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence. The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe (London, 1991), 84 ff. ³⁷⁸ Cf. Thompson, ‘Castile, Spain and the monarchy’, 125 ff. ³⁷⁹ Gil Pujol, ‘Corona de Aragón’, 114–15. ³⁸⁰ This included making appointments to the royal households from across the Monarchy. Ribot, ‘La España de Carlos II’, 113, observes, of the Flemish and Italian appointments to the new queen’s household, c.1677–9, that they point to more than the traditional Castiian-centred vision. ³⁸¹ M. A. Echevarría Bacigalupe, ‘Relaciones Económicas y Fiscales en la Monarquía Hispánica, Siglos XVI y XVII’, Hispania, 179 (1991), 933–64.

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However, this neoforal vision needs to be tempered. We should not exaggerate the prosperity and contribution of the larger periphery,³⁸² or ignore those of what we might call the Castilian periphery, notably Murcia and Galicia.³⁸³ In addition, there were political difficulties, even revolt—above all, but not only, in Sicily. Nor were attitudes necessarily neoforal. Ministers were anxious not to provoke revolt,³⁸⁴ but were suspicious of provincial loyalty and seized opportunities where they were offered to increase central, royal authority. We also need to remember that this was a supranational Monarchy, and that the supposed creation of a Spanish national state after 1700, even if we believe this to have occurred, was as much a retreat from, as the achievement of, a larger identity. The War of the Spanish Succession, besides meaning the loss of Italian territories which had contributed a great deal to the Monarchy’s war-making capacity, may have cut short or reversed the shaping of a multinational national identity which was developing before 1700 and was based upon the fuller integration into the Monarchy of peoples and territories from the Pacific to Naples. For the most part, the neoforalist interpretation too narrowly focuses on relations between Castile and Aragon (i.e., on the territories within modern or contemporary ‘Spain’) in what was a much larger and more diverse political structure; one in which war was a crucial determinant of relations between ‘centre’ and periphery, but in which—it is arguable— there was no single model of those relations. War might lead Carlos II to confirm existing privileges or to grant new ones in order to cement loyalty and secure resources.³⁸⁵ But this did not mean that the king and his ministers were, therefore, prepared to relax their grip, that the various territories of the Monarchy were effectively autonomous,³⁸⁶ or that the non-Castilian or non-Spanish territories were imposing on Spain, on Castile, and on the Court. While Spain’s (Castile’s) position within the larger Monarchy was perhaps less dominant than hitherto, local élites—in Aragon, Italy, or America—did not instruct Carlos II in policy.³⁸⁷ Throughout Carlos’s empire, policy was still decided in, and imposed from, Spain, or rather from the royal Court in Madrid—and that policy was aimed at the preservation of the Monarchy.

³⁸² Cf. Gil Pujol, ‘Corona de Aragón’, 104. ³⁸³ Cf. G. Lemeunier, ‘El reino de Murcia en el siglo XVIII . . .’ in R. Fernández (ed.), España en el Siglo XVIII. Homenaje a Pierre Vilar (Barcelona, 1985), 289 ff. ³⁸⁴ In 1692, when the question of how to deal with the prince of Barbançon (held responsible for the loss of Namur) was discussed in the Council of State, the count of Montalto recalled the consequences of the prosecution and execution of the Flemish nobles Egmont and Horn by Philip II at the start of the Dutch Revolt, CCS, 3 Dec 1692, AGS/E/3886. The prince was subsequently exonerated (on military grounds, Chapter 1). ³⁸⁵ As happened, for example, in the case of Luxembourg, in 1684, Grana to CII, 12 Jan. 1684, Lonchay, Correspondence, v. 421. ³⁸⁶ For Álvarez Ossorio Alvariño, ‘De la Conservación’, 191 ff., de facto autonomy made the change of dynasty from 1700 superficial. ³⁸⁷ I adapt here the comments of P. J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas 1546–1700 (Cambridge, 1971), 235–6.

Conclusion . . . a Spanish minister told an English peer that to persevere in the war was not obstinacy but the usual result of the prudent and profound statesmanship of Spain. . . . The vast Spanish monarchy was not affected by small accidents nor was it influenced by other powers, like many inferior crowns which made war and peace from day to day Venetian secretary in London, Jan. 1675¹ The King passed to the Spaniards, saying their conduct in Italy did not surprise him, they had behaved the same with him for eighteen years. However, they must save the Spaniards despite themselves, because the loss of the Spaniards would be that of the rest Savoyard diplomat, 1690²

Spain was no longer a hegemonic power in Europe in the age of Carlos II, and suffered some major setbacks and territorial losses, in Europe—above all in the Low Countries—and abroad in the Indies. However, we must not exaggerate. For one thing, the contrast with the past may be overdone. One hundred years before, at a time when Spain is often thought to have enjoyed hegemony, in the wake of the defeat of the Armada there was some criticism of the regime of Philip II.³ In addition, many of the losses sustained under Carlos II—notably Namur and Luxembourg—were not permanent. Besides, what was lost represented a very small proportion of a Monarchy which was enormous and which, in fact, continued to expand, particularly overseas, in Carlos’s reign. In addition, in reacting to the threat posed by other powers, the Spaniards explored and settled territories which they had hitherto claimed but not effectively occupied (for example, Darien) making a greater reality of empire.⁴ The last Habsburg thus handed his successor an empire which was far from the expiring thing of legend and textbook. When seeking to explain the survival of the Spanish Monarchy in this period, historians have tended to emphasize the collapse of Spain’s own military (and naval) institutions, and to put the emphasis on the importance of foreign aid and the intervention of former enemies—above all the English and Dutch—now concerned to defend a weak Spain against the predatatory Louis XIV. However, ¹ ² ³ ⁴

Alberti to Doge and Senate of Venice, 25 Jan. 1675, CSPV, 1673–5, 343–4. DLT to VA, 24 Nov. 1690, AST/LM/Olanda, m.1. R. Kagan, Lucrecia’s Dreams. Politics and Prophecy in Sixteenth-century Spain (Baltimore, 1990), 90 ff. Cf. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 426–7.

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this explanation largely ignores the fact that Carlos II deployed substantial armies and navies, which did not sustain defeats comparable to those suffered at sea in 1588 and 1639, or on land in 1643, which contributed to the defence of the territories of the Monarchy, and which played—and were expected to play—a key role in the containment of Louis XIV.⁵ Those historians who damn the entire reign on the basis of a snapshot of its armed forces in 1700, a year of peace in Europe, commit a major error, and underestimate the effort the Monarchy had made in its wars since 1665 and might make again. It is certainly wrong to claim—as some have done—that Carlos II had neither an army nor a navy. Of course, it would be wrongheaded completely to deny the contribution of foreign allies. However, that support could not be taken for granted, and depended, in part, upon a diplomatic network built up over previous reigns and upon a small number of very able individual diplomats, whose achievement it was to mobilize those allies.⁶ But it must also be acknowledged that Spain’s allies were sometimes found wanting. In 1674, for example, a number of Carlos II’s councillors of state expressed the view that the Dutch had not fulfilled the promises made to Spain which had helped bring the latter into the war.⁷ Much the same occurred during the Nine Years War: in May 1694 the duke of Montalto acknowledged that the English and Dutch were trying to fulfil their promise to enter the Mediterranean in force with the Spaniards, but was distrustful because of his experience.⁸ Historians have been critical of the failings of Carlos II’s Spain, but have failed to acknowledge those of his allies. For this reason, we should not exaggerate the role of foreign aid: Spain saw off most of its enemies, above all in the Caribbean and north Africa, without outside help. If Carlos II’s allies had difficulties, so, too, did his main opponent, Louis XIV of France. During the Nine Years War, the French king’s forces in Catalonia were increasingly ill-supplied, affecting both their military operations and (because of their ill-treatment of the civilian population) the possibility of inspiring a Catalan revolt.⁹ Sometimes, too, the French war machine had too many demands placed upon it, preventing Louis from maximizing his advantages. In the summer of 1693, for example, the French army in Catalonia and the fleet in the Mediterranean—after great successes—were reportedly inactive because of sickness (in the summer heat) and the want of provisions.¹⁰ Louis XIV’s difficulties were, in part, the consequence of the many fronts on which he was engaged, and the ⁵ In 1690 William III discussed with the Savoyard and Spanish ministers in London a combined land and sea assault by the allies on Provence, with a view to inciting a Huguenot revolt in southern France: he hoped that Spain would put 3,000 troops on its galleys as its contribution to this (as it proved, abortive) allied project, DLT to VA, 15 Dec. 1690, AST/LM/GB, m. 8. De la Tour believed Carlos II could easily find the 3,000 men from among the troops he had in Naples and Sicily. ⁶ As indicated earlier, I hope to publish elsewhere a study of Carlos II’s diplomats and their achievement. ⁷ CCS, 9 Oct. 1674, AGS/E/2126. ⁸ Duke of Montalto, to Don Diego José Dormer, 22 May 1694, BN MS 918, f. 61. ⁹ A. Espino López, Catalunya durante el Reinado de Carlos II (Barcelona, 1999), 145–6, 148–9. ¹⁰ Operti to ST, 9 Aug. 1693, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 38.

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nature of contemporary warfare. Carlos II was able to confront the French king on so many fronts that the latter was rarely able to enjoy a decisive success—one which should knock Spain (or, in the Nine Years War, the duke of Savoy) out of the war. In the summer of 1690 Louis withdrew as many as 5,000 troops from Catalonia in order to reinforce his forces in Piedmont, reducing the pressure on the former;¹¹ following Catinat’s victory in Piedmont in August, the Spanish ‘system’ swung into action, reinforcing the army of Lombardy and reassuring the duke of Savoy.¹² In 1692 Louis made great efforts in Flanders, but at the cost of reduced strength in Piedmont and Catalonia.¹³ The indecisive nature of contemporary warfare, despite the advances associated with what some call the ‘Military Revolution’, also contributed to the success of Carlos II’s Spain.¹⁴ Crucial in the survival of Spain’s empire was the determination of the king and his ministers to hang onto the Monarchy. For this reason, they pressed Spain to supply the men and money necessary. Contrary, therefore, to a well-established view, the king’s Spanish subjects were expected to contribute substantially to ensure there were armies and navies, and many—including nobles—continued to ‘trail a pike’ in Flanders,¹⁵ and elsewhere. In a Spain which was less prosperous than before, these demands contributed to the turbulence of the politics of the reign. To some extent, reform and innovation helped to mobilize otherwise scarce resources, although we should not underestimate the success of established institutions and practices. Equally important was the fact that, in large part because of the greater threat represented by Louis XIV, the non-Castilian territories of Spain contributed more than before to the Monarchy’s military effort. To some extent, Carlos II was obliged to compromise with these territories to ensure this contribution, but both inside and outside Castile in Spain royal authority seems to have been increasing, such that a more integrated—Spanish—polity was in gestation. But Castile and Aragon—Spain—were only part of a much larger Monarchy. This, too, was at least as well articulated and integrated as hitherto. It has been suggested that the Spaniards failed to develop a theory of empire which should generate enthusiasm and/or loyalty in, for example, Italy.¹⁶ However, as the Messina revolt revealed—when, despite Spanish fears, there was no general revolt against Spanish rule in Sicily¹⁷—most of the constituent parts of the Monarchy were loyal to Carlos II. Many, inside and outside the Monarchy, preferred the ‘softer’ Spanish rule to that of the alternatives. If Carlos II and his ministers were unwilling to surrender territory, local élites were unwilling to be subject to ¹¹ Operti to VA, 1 Aug. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35 f. 15. ¹² Operti to VA, 13 Sept. 1690, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 35 f. 87 ff. ¹³ Espino, Catalunya, 124. ¹⁴ Cf. J. Chagniot, Guerre et société a l’époque moderne (Paris, 2004), 309; Satterfield, Princes, Posts, 5. ¹⁵ Cueto, La Vida a través de la Muerte, 296–7. ¹⁶ H. G. Koenigsberger, The Government of Sicily under Philip II (London and New York, 1950), 55–9. ¹⁷ Ribot, Monarquía de España, 524.

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another prince, for example the duke of Savoy.¹⁸ Indeed, pro-Spanish feeling in the territories lost to France in this period offered opportunities to Carlos II for, for example, sabotage.¹⁹ Outside Europe, it might be thought that Spain’s dispersed empire created difficulties. It did not; or, rather, it also defeated attacks. In addition, substantial sums were poured into local defence, not least in the form of extensive fortifications. For some, the fact that this consumed funds that might otherwise have gone to Spain undermined the Monarchy. The opposite was, in fact, the case. By 1700 (and indeed throughout Carlos II’s reign) what has been described as ‘the Spanish System’ continued to function: the resources of the various parts of the Monarchy were deployed as and when needed, and the consequence was that Philip V inherited a Monarchy which—if one believed all that has been written about Carlos II’s reign—would defy belief. The war(s) waged by Carlos II and his subjects had, in the meantime, shaped Castile, Spain, and the Monarchy for yet another generation. ¹⁸ Cf. Operti to VA, 9 Feb. 1696, AST/LM/Spagna, m. 43. In 1699 the governor of Finale was approached by the inhabitants of the village of Pereto, who requested that they be brought under the jurisdiction of the king of Spain, claiming to be oppressed by the duke of Mantua and being unwilling to be subjects of the duke of Savoy, CCS, 27 Oct. 1699, AGS/E/3427, 116. ¹⁹ Cf. A. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence. The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe (London, 1991), 89 ff.

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Given the great number of sources consulted, particularly in Spain, specific references to which are given in the endnotes, only the number of individual bundles (or legajos, or cajas) and volumes is given here. Italy Turin Archivio di Stato Lettere Ministri: Spagna, m. 32, 38–43 Lettere Ministri: Due Sicilie, m. 4–5 Negoziazioni Venice Archivio di Stato Dispacci degli ambasciatori: Spagna, f. 117 Netherlands Algemeen Rijks Archief, Hague Verbaal of Albert van der Meer Spain Archivo General, Simancas Consejo de Cruzada: legajos 300, 330, 339, 365, 517–18. Consejo de Estado: legajos 1947, 2104–37, 2203, 2276, 2346–8, 2353, 2360, 2552–3, 2698, 2813, 2916, 2920, 3083–8, 3091, 3181, 3214, 3302–5, 3322, 3326, 3338, 3411–27, 3494, 3497–8, 3509, 3518, 3522–4, 3571–2, 3612–33, 3654–60, 3684, 3688, 3690, 3692, 3852, 3855, 3858, 3860–1, 3865–9, 3872–5, 3882–95, 3900, 3903, 3931–9, 3956, 3969–71, 3980, 3988, 3990, 4014–19, 4024–5, 4027–41, 4137–43, 4171, 4183, 5041 Consejo de Guerra (or Guerra Antigua or Guerra y Marina), secciones de Tierra, and Mar: legajos 2161, 2245, 2608–10, 2913–25, 2946–51, 3011–13, 3060, 3592, 3653, 3709, 3837, 3848–51, 3876–7; registros/libros 328, 341–2 Consejo and Juntas de Hacienda: legajos 1581, 1586, 1590, 1593, 1926 Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3o época: legajos 1982, 2125, 2256, 2263, 2310, 2437, 2773, 2909, 2982, 3042, 3297

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Index Italic numbers denote reference to tables Adanero, count of 188–9 administrative structure main weaknesses of 183 new committees created 186 proposals to revise 188 trend towards executive-style government 188 Agreda 41 Alba, duke of 21, 57, 79 Albuquerque, duke of 51 Alcedo y Sotomayor, Carlos, visitador of Nueva Grande 228 Alicante 64 allies attracted by Spanish harbour facilities 73–4 criticisms of Spanish commanders 50 criticized for not fulfilling promises 173 dealing with piracy 103 Spanish contribution to 20 Spanish dependence on 18–19 Spanish efforts to reduce dependence on 164 Spanish problems with allied fleets 68–9 viewed as self-seeking 164 Americas 19, 25; see also New Spain (Mexico), Panama, Peru deployment of resources 228 further expansion in 6–7 local elites 228–9 Pueblo revolt 229 Recopilación de Indias (1680) 227 role of Madrid 227, 228 Andalusia 19, 33, 34, 35, 37, 40, 45, 91–2, 136, 140 Angulo, don Juan de, Secretario del Despacho Universal 166 Apresto de Armadas, Junta de 70 Aquero, don Pedro de, shipbuilder 84 Aragon, Council of absolutist attitudes 193 advice to Carlos II 198 criticises proposed expenditure cuts 118 quarrels with other bodies 207 role 193, 195 Aragón, don Pascual de, Archbishop of Toledo 153 n, 155 Aragón, don Pedro de 165 Aragon, kingdom of 19, 31, 33 attitude to France 203, 204 foral institutions 201–2

constitutional clash over fueros 204 contribution to defence of Monarchy 202, 206 Corts convened 175, 202 identity 203 introduction of tobacco monopoly 202 relations with Crown 202–3, 204 relations within 203–4 Aranjuez 172, 174 Aristocracy, see Nobility, Spanish Armada de Barlovento 72, 76, 81 Armada de Flandes 71 Armada de la Guardia 71 Armada del Mar del Sur 72 Armada del Mar Océano 70, 73, 133 Armadas, Junta de 70, 84 criticisms 89 policy advice 88 supply problems 96–7 arms industry, Spanish 54–6 army, Spanish cavalry 56–7 conditions 28–9 desertion 28–9, 31, 42, 47 garrison troops 50 leadership 57–8, 59–60 losses 26, 27 medical services 27 militia 38–40 nationality 31, 32, 46–7 numbers 17, 20, 25, 26, 30–1, 31 praised by opponents 57 prisoners, use of 44 reasons for enlisting 35–6 recruitment 31–46, 48 religion 49 strategy 49–50 supplies 53–4 tactical formation 52 vagabonds, use of 41, 43 volunteers 33, 35 weapons 52, 54–6, 55, 57 asiento de negros 68 Astorga, marquis of 213 Asturias 229 Avellino, prince of 222 Avila 126 n, 177, 181 n Báez Eminente, Francisco, financier 96–7 Balbases, marquis of los 45

264

Index

Baleares 73; see also Ibiza, Mallorca, Menorca Barcelona 53, 64, 84, 85 siege of (1697) 5, 27 Basque country 23, 45; see also Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya Bedmar, marquis of 60 Bernaldo de Quirós, don Francisco 48 Bete y Croy, Juan Francisco de, marquis of Lede 60 Borromeo Arese, Carlo 212 Bouchain 50 Brandenburg, elector of 49, 146–7 Bremundan, Fabro (secretary to Don Juan) 172 buccaneers 65, 81; see also pirates Burgos troop contributions 40, 41, 42, 45 donativos 129–34 other financial contributions 136–7 as Cortes-voting town 176–8 caballeros cuantiosos 38 Cáceres 181 n Cadiz 23, 64, 66, 73, 140 Cantabria 34, 54, 85, 86 Carlos II 29, ?31 administrative reforms 188–9 appropriation of private treasure 139 army policy 19, 36, 50–1, 52, 56–7 attitude of subjects 165, 192, 233 attitude to Monarchy 163, 166, 233 by-passing Cortes 129, 131, 137 California 135 Catalan bodies, powers in appointing to 196, 197 fear of Catalan revolt 195, 198 church funding for wars 135–6 compared with predecessors 112 contemporary and historical reputation 18, 232 convenes Aragonese Corts 202 corregidores 189 counter-criticism 171–2 criticism of 158 Crown of Aragon 206 decision-making 28, 36–7, 165–6 dependence on allies 65–6, 69 donativos 130, 131 Don Juan of Austria 170 failure to consult 176, 187 failure to produce heir 158 failure to summon representative bodies 122, 128, 175, 180, 182 financial measures 118–19, 121–2, 127 fiscal management 107 foreign troops 46–9 guilds 127–8

Imperial Court, relations with 163–4 imposition of levy 40–5 Indies trading 140–1, 143 kingdom of Naples 222 naval policy 67, 72, 92–3, 94–6 policies anticipating Bourbon developments 40, 43, 60, 107, 121, 127, 138, 188, 189, 192, 234 privateers 100–1, 102 provincial autonomy 188, 191, 192 reform of militia 38–40 regidores 178, 179, 181 respect for foral regimes 192 revival of military orders 38 sale of titles 125 salt monopoly 128–9, 176 shipbuilding policy 84, 85, 86, 87 value to allies 26 venality 123–4, 125 Carpio, marquis del 221 Cartagena (Indies) 6, 24, 51, 65, 131 Cartagena (Murcia) 23, 51 Casa de Contratación, Seville 34, 183 Groups represented by 180 Casale (Monferrato) 6, 208 n Castel Rodrigo, marquis of 59, 71, 86 Castile 19, 23, 28, 31, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42 population growth 44, 45 Castile, admiral of 20 n, 23, 68, 156 n, 189 Castile, constable of 59, 60, 160, 161, 187 Castile, council of 35, 41, 42 conflict with Council of War 84, 185 criticizes government 184 opposition to policy proposals 94, 118, 123, 126, 184 proposes assembling Cortes 182, 184 role and importance 183, 184 Castrillo, count of 163 Castromonte, marquis of 123 Catalonia 19, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 65 attitudes to Louis XIV 199–200, 201 concerns about defence 198, 199 Diputació 195, 196, 197, 198 fears of revolt in 195, 199 identity 200 political institutions 194 participation in defence of monarchy 194–5 popular uprising 197 relations with Madrid 199–201 restoration of privilege 195, 198 turnover of viceroys 200 Catalonia, army of 22–3, 28, 32, 41, 53, 186 contribution to combating tax evasion 120 costs of 113 support from Catalan financiers 200

Index tensions caused by presence and costs 196, 197, 198 Catalonia, viceroys of 50, 195 n celebrations Treaty of Rijswijk 174 truce of Ratisbon 173 victory 174 Centani, Francisco, financier 133 Ceuta 24, 27, 43 n, 47, 60, 81, 89 n Chamberga regiment created 155 dispatched to Sicily 157 hostility towards 155 Charles II, king of England 25, 47, 163 n Charles V, emperor 22 chinea (tribute paid to Pope as Suzerain of Naples) 220 Church, Catholic contribution to military activities and organisations 37, 39, 135–6 papal grants and levies 134–5 protests at Protestant presence 68 Ciudad Rodrigo 41 Comisario general de infantería 33, 36, 43, 44, 157 n composición de milicias 39, 136 Consulado of Seville 137–43 groups represented by 180 Coehorn, Dutch military engineer 51 Corbete, don Pedro (commander of the Armada) 75, 92, 93, 99 Cordoba 42, 46, 133 n, 135, 177, 181 Córdoba, Gonzalo de 57 Cortés, Hernán 57 Cortes of Castile approval required 176 calls for assembly of 181–2 commitment to Monarchy 178 composition 175 n. 220 Diputación del Reino abolished 186 influence 176 failure to summon 175, 179, 181 regidores of voting towns 177, 179–80, 181 response to consultation 177–9 role in taxation 175, 176 Cortizo, Sebastian (financier) 117, 125 corregidores criticized by Junta de milicias 189 depended on by Carlos II 189 role in managing Cortes voting towns 189 role in recruitment 34 role in securing donativos 130, 132, 133 Councils factionalism 183 judicial role 183–4 reduction in size of 185, 186

265

criminal justice policy, effect of naval needs on 93–4 Cruzada, Council of 66, 111 Cuba 86 Cuéllar 42 n, 43 n Cuenca 42, 177, 207 n Darien, expedition to 24, 46, 65, 73, 81 composition of squadron 88 papal levy to fund 135 policy on naval crew 91 preparations 83 servicio from consulado of Seville 141, 146 supply difficulties 97 Denmark, king of 147 Devolution, war of 70, 100 diplomacy role in raising troops 48 secret peace negotiations with French court 164 disposiciones de campaña, Junta de 36 donativos 41; see also finance, loans, millones, revenue, silver, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation amounts raised 130, 133–4 exception and evasion 132 from the Indies trade 142 level of contributions 130–1 resulting increase in municipal debt 136–7 target groups 130 Don Juan of Austria In Aragon 154, 155 appointment to Flanders 154 appointment to Italy 155–6, 226 attitude to Monarchy 163, 164 Council of State 154 criticized 169, 171 criticizes Mariana 170 criticizes Nithard and Valenzuela 162 death 157 efforts to increase armed forces 164 exploitation of popular sentiment 169 failure to summon Cortes 175 focus of discontent 157 marches on Madrid (1669) 154–5, (1676–7) 156 open letter to Mariana of Austria 167 papal levy 135 propaganda against Valenzuela 169, 171 purge of court 156–7 reform programme 162 satires 172 seeks support of Cortes-voting towns 176 self-promoting 172–3 urges reforms 155 venality 123 visita of Milan 210

266

Index

Dutch Republic failings as ally 232 support for Carlos II 65 Dutch war 21, 36, 59, 65 financing 114, 116, 119, 122, 209 venality during 123 Eguía, don Gerónimo 163 England, support for Carlos II 65, 66, 68–9 Escalona, duke of, viceroy of Catalonia 54, 58, 196 n Espero, don Carlos, offers ships 101 Espinola, Juan Andrea, factor of Armada 133 Espinosa, don Nuño de, offers troops 36 Evertsen, Dutch admiral 65 factionalism at court 160–1 Farnese, Alessandro (governor of Low Countries) 53–4 Fernández del Campo, don Pedro (Secretario del Despacho Universal) 172 Finale (Liguria) 19, 68, 77, 99, 213 finance, see also donativos, loans. millones, revenue, silver, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation accounting system, weaknesses of 108–9 borrowing, forms of 144 coinage, manipulation of 108–9 compounding (encabezamiento) 112 court expenditure 113, 118 dependence on foreign financiers 116 expenditure cuts 118–19 fiscal management, changes in indultos on the fleet 141 interest payments addressed 145 interest rates, manipulation of 146 jurisdictions, sale of 126–7 juros 112, 144, 145 levies 128 media anata 144 mercedes 118–19 military expenditure 113–16, 117–18 noble status and titles, sale of 124–5 privatisation 112 relations between Crown and financiers 117 reserve established 108 servicio de milicias 120 servicios 141 suspension of payments 148 venality 122–4 Finance, Council of 35, 108, 109, 110, 111, 123, 182, 186 composition of 109 criticises sale of office 123 difficulties encountered 143, 144 role 111, 112, 121, 122, 182

Flanders 19, 33, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 59 Flanders, army of 21–2, 23, 28, 32, 34, 37, 47, 50, 52, 53 costs 113–4 criticism of costs 114 in peacetime 49 Florida, expansion in 6 foreigners, attitude to Spain 18 foreign troops 31, 32, 46–9 forestation 84 fortifications and garrisons 50–1 Franche-Comté 1, 4, 47 Frigiliana, count of 46, 87 Fuensalida, count of 160, 209 n, 210 n Galeras, Junta de 70 Galicia 33, 34, 36, 37, 45, 87–8, 91, 175 Galve, count of, viceroy of New Spain 138 Garrote, don Francisco Antonio, advice on shipbuilding 83, 85 Gastañaga, marquis of (governor of Spanish Low Countries) 48, 124 n Genoa 64, 68, 75, 83, 87 Gibraltar 23, 43 n, 64, 84, 90, 133 n Girona 50, 199 Granada 54, 55, 61 n, 131 n, 177 Grandees, see Nobility, Spanish Grillo, Francisco (financier) 116, 117, 125, 134 n Guadalajara 177 Guerra de Indias, Junta de 70, 97 guilds establishment 127–8 extension of privileges 127–8 Guipúzcoa 34, 54 Habsburgs, Austrian, attitudes towards 163–4 Hesse Darmstadt, George, prince of, viceroy of Catalonia 58 n, 196 n horses, means to ensure supply of (for cavalry) 56–7 Humanes, count of (president of Council of Finance) 122 Ibiza 84 identity of interests between Castile and Aragon 207, 208 Spanish, growing sense of 207, 229 Indies, defence of, from Spain 24 Indies, Council of 72 Camara of, abolished 185 and Barlovento fleet 72 proposal to raise revenues 143 role 182 significance of trade 143 venality 124

Index Inquisition 187 n Ireland, recruiting in for Spain 47 Iriarte, don Joseph de, shipbuilder 85 Italy, Council of 185, 186, 208–27 and Milan 208–12 and Naples 212–22 and Sicily 223, 225 Jaen 40, 61 Jesuits, and colonisation of California 135 Junta de Alivios 107, 155, 185 Karl XI, king of Sweden 25 Lancina, Juan de 67 lanzas 59 Lapilla, marquise of 312 Larache 27 Leganés, marquis of 51, 57, 59 ability 161 and Army of Lombardy 115, 209, 211 appointment to Milan 118, 125 complains about payment delays 221 conflict with Diputació 197 criticism of 50, 210 Lemos, count of (viceroy of Peru) 228 Leon 181 n Leopold, emperor 163–4 Lieutenants-General (or Tenientes-Generales), Junta of abolished 187–8 composition 187 concerns about 187 established 185, 187 responsibilities187 Lira, don Manuel de, diplomat and secretary of the Despacho Universal 57, 65, 166 n literacy 168 loans, see also donativos, finance, millones, revenue, silver, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation from institutions in Madrid and Seville 146 from Indies trade 142 foreign 146–8 negotiations for 146 Lombardy, army of 22, 23, 28, 32, 34, 47 dependence on Naples 213, 216 financing of 114–15, 209–10, 212 in peacetime 49, 50, 58 Milanese contribution to 209 reform 211 Louis XIV, king of France 27, 45, 50, 51, 64 attitude to Spanish fleets 74, 80 fails to exploit revolt in Catalonia (1689) 197 French army 18, 25, 52, 62, 232 French navy 73

267

salutes from Spanish vessels 78 Spanish deserters in army of 28 Low Countries (Flanders) 36, 46, 50, 53 Luxembourg, war for, loss and recovery 4, 6, 144, 173 Madrid 45, 56, 134 n, 146, 168–9 Mahon (Menorca) 64, [80] Malaga 23, 136 n Mallorca 100 Mancera, marquis of 23 Mariana of Austria 21 abolishes venal municipal offices with voting rights 123 attempts to remove Don Juan 154, 155 banished to Toledo 156 Barlovento fleet 72 Chamberga regiment 155 continued influence 157–8 criticized 170 donativos 129, 131, 133 establishes Junta de Alivios 155 levy in Naples for Messina, orders 213 management of regidores 177–8 plots with Valenzuela 155 regency council 155 reluctant to assemble Cortes 175 secures servicio from Consulado in Seville (1671) 141 use of privateers 100 venality 123 Mariana of Neuberg 157, 158, 161, 169 Marie-Louise of Orléans 157 Marsaglia, battle of 59 Mary, queen of England 66 Max Emanuel of Bavaria 48, 49, 114, 147 Medinaceli, duke of 37, 127, 159, 173, 186–7, 188 Medina del Campo 45, 136 n Medina Sidonia, duke of, viceroy of Catalonia 58, 195 n Melgosa, don Andrés de, regidor of Burgos 132 Melilla 24 Messina destruction of palace and cathedral bell 225 loss of fiscal and other privileges 224–5 powers of 223 problems for Monarchy 223 relations with feudal barons 223 relations with Palermo 223 Spanish policy in 224; following revolt 224–5 Messina, revolt or war (1674–8) 17, 21 acquiring vessels for 82–3 attitudes in Sicily during 227 confiscation of property following 225 contribution of Naples to 217 difficulties with high command 98

268

Index

Messina, revolt or war (cont.) Dutch naval support in 64–5 finance 114, 120 implications for Monarchy 224 origins of 220 restructuring following 224–5 Mexico see New Spain Milan, duchy of 19, 25, 48, 51, 54 elite 211–12 fear of Savoyard rule 212 financial burden 209, 211, 212 fueros 210 junta to hear complaints 211 loyalty to Carlos II 211, 212 role 208 venality 210–11 military orders of Castile 38 as source of troops 38 hábitos of as reward for services 36, 38, 132, 137, 181 millones, see also donativos, finance, loans, revenue, silver, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation importance of and yield 110 proposal to abolish 108 renewal of by Cortes 122 abolition of quiebra de millones 107 Monarchy attitudes towards 162–3 defence needs 23 definition 16 policy debate on preservation 163–4 relations between centre and periphery 230 Monrroy, don Francisco, offer of troops for Flanders 36 Mons, loss of (1691) 5, 173 Montalto, duke of 164, 187, 232 Monterrey, count of 29, 46, 52, 58, 71, 187 Montesarchio, prince of 77, 222 Murcia 39, 43, 45, 54 Namur 5, 6, 51 Naples, kingdom of 19, 24, 37, 64 bandits 216, 221 concerns about defence of 214, 217, 218, 221 contribution to defence of Monarchy 212–13, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218 contribution to Messina war 216, 217 elite 219–20, 222 fear of revolt in 221 loyalty to Carlos II 221–2 relations between Spanish and Neapolitans 221 role 212, 216–17 royal finances 220–21 San Genaro, Spanish exploitation of 222 source of grain 216

taxation policy 218–20 viceroys of 212 n Navarre, kingdom of 23, 54, 229 Cortes 175 Pamplona 54 recruitment in 207 n navy, Spanish composition of Atlantic fleets 73 asiento vs administración 85–6 combat 76 comparison with other states 64 convicts, use of 93–5 corsairs and privateers 99, 100, 101, 102–3 costs 97–8 crews 89–91 shipbuilding industry 83, 84, 86–7 escort duty 76–7 expenditure 115 fleet 70–5, 88, 104–5 foreign views of fleets 74 funding shortages 97–8 harbours 73–4 high command 98–9 joint working with land forces 75 loss of vessels 81–2 Mediterranean galley fleet 71 naval reform plans 68 non-engagement policy 79–80 strategic debate on disposition of fleet 79 recruitment policy 91–6 reliance on foreign supplies 87,88 replacing vessels 82, 85, 87–8 salutes at sea 78–9 slaves, use of 95–6 supply difficulties 96–7 weaknesses 64 weapons 88–9 neoforalist interpretation of reign of Carlos II, and weakness of 191–3, 229–30 New Spain (Mexico), viceroyalty of 4, 6, 57, 138, 139, 229 Nieupoort 49 Nijmegen, peace of 3 opposition to 171 Nine Years’ War (or War of the League of Augsburg) 5–6, 36, 37, 68–9 as return to 1670s 173 contribution of Burgos to 136 contribution of Naples to 213, 214, 215 contribution of Sicily 225 declaration of bankruptcy during 148 ecclesiastical support towards costs 135 expenditure 113, 114, 115, 116, 119 financing and supply of Army of Lombardy during 209, 210, 213 high command, weaknesses in 98 ministers’ use of press during 173

Index naval strategy during 79 punishment of defeated commanders 59 reform of Councils 186 reform of militia 39 revenue-raising measures 120–1, 122, 128, 148 shipbuilding 86 Spain’s army in 21 venality during 123–4 weakness at sea 64–6 Nithard, Father 153 consulta responding to Don Juan 167 defence against critics 170 exiled 155 role in regency council 154 Nobility, Spanish as military class still 59–60 depiction of 159–60 loyalty to regent 160 opposition to Valenzuela 158–9; and Oropesa 159 power 158 role in recruitment 37 sale of noble status & role in social mobility 124–5 source of influence 159 support for Don Juan 159–60 North Africa see also Ceuta, Larache, Melilla, Oran desertion 28 numbers of troops 24 destination of convicted criminals 44 Nuestra Señora de Atocha, monastery of, celebrations at 172 Oquendo, don Miguel de, Basque shipbuilder 85 Olivares, count-duke of 58, 66, 227 Ontiveros, marquis of, comisario-general de infantería 33 Operti G-B, Savoyard envoy in Naples in Nine Years’ War 214, 220, 221 Oran 24, 39; 61, 77 Orders, Council of 35 donativos 132 reform of (1691) 186 Orgaz, count of 132 Oropesa, count of 158, 159, 162, 173, 188 Osorio, Juan Cortés, critic of Don Juan 168 Ostend 5, 49, 102, 147 Osuna, duke of 37, 79, 125, 134 Pacheco, don Alonso, corregidor of Valladolid 42 Palencia 181 n Panama 2, 24, 51, 141 Papachino, don Honorato Bonifacio, naval commander 78

269

Pedro II, king of Portugal 47–8 Peñaranda, count of 162, 163 Peru 24, 86, 137–9, 227–8 Philip II, king of Spain 21 Philip III, king of Spain 92 Philip IV, king of Spain 18, 26, 38, 47, 56, 58 financial measures 145 juros 112 level of debt 144 naval recruitment policy 92 additional powers in Catalonia after 1652 196 summons Cortes 175 venality 123 war finance 106 will and succession 153, 154 Philip V as depicted in Bourbon historiography 8 development of Carlos II’s reforms 40, 43, 60 military reforms 18 pirates, threat posed in Caribbean 4, 51, 69, 72 political life, Spanish influence of non-elite 166–7 Ponza, island of, seized 6 public opinion and the press 166–74; see also satires demonstrations 168–9 evading censorship 167–8 explanation of 168–9, 170 forms 167–8, 174 freedom of discussion 167 of allies 173 of political leadership 169, 170, 171, 174 oral 168 Portocarrero, cardinal archbishop of Toledo and family 160 n, 187 Portugal 21, 23–4 role of Portuguese financiers 116 prisoners of war 26–7 Quiñones, don Gabriel de, punished following loss of Rosas 59 regency council established 153 fears civil conflict 155 dissolved 156 revenue, see also donativos, finance, loans, millones, silver, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation, anticipating revenues 144 Indies 111, 137, 138, 142–3 licences to trade with Indies 141 measures to increase 120, 122–3 measures rejected 129 regalian 110 Rijswijk, peace treaty of 174

270

Index

Ríos, don Lope de los, president of Council of Finance 117, 125, 149, 161 Rocroi, battle of 52, 57 Ronquillo, don Francisco, corregidor of Madrid 164 Ronquillo, don Pedro, Spanish ambassador in London 118 Rosas 56, 59, 65, 69 Russell, English admiral 174 Ruyter, de, Dutch admiral 65 Salamanca, don Miguel de, regidor of Burgos 132, 179 Salazar y Castro, Luís, historian 67 Sancha y Ayala, don Joseph de, regidor of Cuenca 179 San Germán, duke of, Comiasrio General de Infanteria 39 San Sebastian 91 Sanguineto, don Rafael regidor of Madrid 182 Santa Cruz del Valle, marquis of, purchase of Lebrija 126 Santo Domingo (Hispaniola) 66 Sardinia, kingdom of 24 contribution to Messina war 226 elite 227 murder of viceroy 226 role of viceroy 226–7 Santisteban del Puerto, count of, viceroy of Sicily and Naples 59, 86, 160, 217, 226 satires, see also popular criticism foreign concern at licence 174 ministerial defence of 174 seen as “safety valve” 174 Schonenberg, agent in Madrid of William of Orange 69 Scotland, recuiting in for Army of Flanders 47 Segovia 34, 46, 181n. Seneffe, battle of 58 Serna, don José de la, regidor of Salamanca 182 Seville 132n, 133, 134n, 181n Sicily, kingdom of [19, 24, 25, 37, 44, 58, 61, 64, 65] contribution to Monarchy 223, 225, 226 loyalty to Spain 227 parliament 223 programme of fortifications after 1678 Sicilian vespers 224 source of grain 225 support from Monarchy 225 silver, see also donativos, finance, loans, millones, revenue, subsidies to foreign princes, taxation Crown appropriation 139 decline in production 138

efforts to revive production 138 negotiations with Indies trade to obtain 140 opinion of Savoyard envoy on negotiations 140–1 remitted to Spain 139, 142–3 weapon against Louis XIV 140 Soria 181n, 207n Spanish Road, from Italy to Flanders 76 Spanish Succession, war of 7, 52 Stanhope, Alexander, English envoy to Spain 41, 69 afraid to leave house 173 critic of Spain 15, 120n observations on Catalans (1693) 198 State, Council of 42, 46, 54, 58, 67 defence of Naples 214 divisions within 79, 160, 162 policy proposals 79, 80, 164, 225 premier Council 185 subsidies to foreign princes see also donativos, finance, loans, millones, revenue, silver, taxation arrears 146–7, 225–6 in wartime 116 Superintendente de justicia militar, role of 59 Tavara, marquis of 42 taxation 110; see also donativos, finance, loans, millones, revenue, silver, subsidies to foreign princes arrears 121–2 changes 107 combating evasion 119–20 ecclesiastical 110–11 salt 128–9 tax-farming 112, 120–1 Te Deum celebrations, including of Spanish and allied successes 174 Ter, defeat at battle of 27, 54, 58 tercios 29, 34, 42, 44, 59 abolished 18 Castilian 23 new 52 provincial 38–9 Títulos, see Nobility, Spanish Toledo 41, 42, 43, 53, 181n Toro 181n Triple Alliance, formation of during War of Devolution 50 Tuscan presidios 19, 24, 68, 73, 213, 216, 217 Vagabonds forcible levy of 43 Valencia, kingdom of attitude to French 205, 207 contribution to defence of Monarchy 205, 206, 207 cooperation with Crown 204, 205

Index difficulties faced by viceroys 204 elite 206 internal divisions 207 neoforal relationship 206–7 population 45 principal administrative organs 204 Valenzuela, Fernando de, marquis of Villasierra 67 and reform of offices 185 and venality 123 appointment as prime minister 156 banishment following Don Juan’s ‘coup’ 156 elevation 156 emergence as valido 155 opposition to 155, 156, 162, 170 plots with Mariana 155 valido, system of 188 Valladolid 34–5, 39, 42, 43 Vauban, French military engineer 50 Vélez, marquis of los 79, 97 as viceroy of Naples 213, 216, 219, 220 as viceroy of Sardinia 226 as Superintendente General of Finance 129, 149, 188 career progression 226

271

Vergara, Antonio de, preacher in royal chapel 172 Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy attitude to Spanish fleets 74 creditor 147 criticized 173 king of Sicily and Sardinia 227 subsidies 225 Villafiel, marquis of 89 Villafranca, marquis of 58, 75 Villagarcía, marquis of 83, 199 Villahermosa, duke of (governor-general of Low Countries) 49, 71, 197 Vizcaya (see also Basque Country) 23, 68, 83, 100 war, attitudes to Spanish participation in 164 War, Council of 33, 36, 50, 53, 185, 186 conflict with Council of Castile 84, 185 William III, king of England 47, 49, 66, 69 Württemberg, duchy of, troops in Spanish service 48, 147 Zamora 181n