The Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses (Studies in the History of Religions)

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THE RESURGENCE OF RELIGION

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NUMEN BOOK SERIES

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY

OF RELIGIONS

edited by W.J. HANEGRAAFF

advisory board P. Antes, M. Despland, RI.J. Hackett, M. Abumalham Mas, A.W. Geertz, G. ter Haar, G.L. Lease, M.N. Getui, I.S. Gilhus, P. Morris, J.K. Olupona, E. Thomassen, A. Tsukimoto, A.T. Wasim

VOLUME XCVI

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THE RESURGENCE

OF RELIGION

a comparative study of selected themes in christian and islamic fundamentalist discourses

BY

DAVID ZEIDAN

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2003

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zeidan, David.

The resurgence of religion : a comparative study of selected themes

in Christian and Islamic fundamentalist discourses / by David Zeidan.

p. cm. — (Studies in the history of religions, ISSN 0169-8834 ; v. 96) Based on the author’s thesis (PhD).

Includes bibliographical references (p. ).

ISBN 9004128778

1. Religious fundamentalism—Comparative studies. 2. Islam—Relations– –Christianity. 3. Christianity and other religions—Islam. I. Title. II. Studies in the history of religions ; 96 BL238 .Z45 2003 200’.9’051—dc21

2002028200

Bibliographic Information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche

Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on

the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de

ISSN 0169-8834 ISBN 90 04 12877 8 © Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements .......................................................................... Notes ................................................................................................ Abbreviations ...................................................................................

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Introduction ..................................................................................... Preliminary Notes ..................................................................... Main Thesis .............................................................................. Methods of Research ............................................................... Theoretical Considerations ...................................................... Importance of Fundamentalist Discourse ............................... Selection of Primary Sources .................................................. Literature Review ..................................................................... Summary of Chapters ..............................................................

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I

Historical Background to Protestant Christian and

Islamic Fundamentalisms ......................................................... Christian Fundamentalism ................................................... Introduction ...................................................................... Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism .............................. On the Fringes—The Hard Right or the Lunatic

Fringe ............................................................................ Historical Outline ............................................................. Some Characteristics of Contemporary Protestant

Fundamentalism ............................................................ Historical Background of Islamic Fundamentalism ........... Introduction ...................................................................... Some Causes Offered for Islamic Fundamentalism ...... History ..............................................................................

II The Phenomenon of Fundamentalism: Theoretical and

Methodological Considerations ........................................... Resurgence of Religion ........................................................ Is the Term “Fundamentalism” Usable across

Boundaries? ....................................................................... Definitions & Attributes ....................................................... Categorization of Fundamentalisms ................................ Are Comparisons Valid? .................................................

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III Anti-secularism as a Main Common Denominator ............. Introduction ......................................................................... Anti-Secularist Stance of Fundamentalisms .................. Views on the Historical Development of the

Secularist Paradigm .................................................... Appearance of Secularism in the Muslim World

and Reaction to it ...................................................... Fundamentalist Critique of Secularism ............................. Secularism is Antithetical to Religion ........................... Secularism is Based on Wrong Presuppositions ........... Secularism Privatizes Religion and Fragments

Culture ......................................................................... Secularism is Anthropocentric, Yet Devalues Man ..... Secularism Promotes the Myth of Progress and

Utopianism .................................................................. Secularism Corrupts Faith, Law and Morality ............ Secularism is the Source of Contemporary Evil

deologies ...................................................................... Secularism is Idolatry ..................................................... Conclusion ...........................................................................

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IV Sacred Scripture as God’s Revealed Standard and Law .... Introduction ......................................................................... Centrality of Scripture ........................................................ The Right Attitude to Scripture ....................................... Interpretation of Scripture ................................................. Scripture as Law ................................................................. Conclusion ...........................................................................

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Attitudes to Religion, Politics, and the State ....................... Introduction ......................................................................... Attitudes to Governments and to Political Participation ..... State Legal System ............................................................. Some Views on the Integration of State and Religion ... Who has the Right to Rule for God? .............................. Conclusion ...........................................................................

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VI The Past Golden Age and Contemporary Religious

Politics ...................................................................................... Looking Back to the Golden Age ..................................... The Goal of Religious Politics .......................................... Gradual Implementation by Stages ................................... Views on Democracy and Power Sharing ....................... Conclusion ...........................................................................

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VII The Contemporary Battle .................................................... Introduction ....................................................................... Various Aspects of the Battle ........................................... Fundamentalist Separatism ............................................... Impact of Eschatology ...................................................... Conspiracy Theories .......................................................... Legitimation of Resistance and Violence ........................ Conclusion ..........................................................................

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Conclusion ...................................................................................... Discussion of Findings .......................................................... Final Word ............................................................................

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Appendix: Biographies of Primary Source Authors ..................... Islamic .................................................................................... Christian .................................................................................

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Bibliography .................................................................................... Primary Sources .................................................................... Secondary Sources ................................................................ References .............................................................................. Scriptures ...............................................................................

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Index ................................................................................................

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was only made possible by the academic, moral and mate­ rial support of a number of people. First, I want to thank my tutor, Dr. Kate Zebiri of SOAS for guid­ ing my study and contributing valuable suggestions and advice which have kept me on the right path and prevented me from straying into tempting but unproductive byways and sidelines. Many thanks are also due to my good friend Gerhard Lichtenthaler who originally prompted me to undertake this endeavor and continued to encourage me to persevere right to the end. Finally, I must express my deep gratitude to Ronald and Laura Adeney of Oxford, who have made this study possible by their generous mate­ rial and moral help. Sadly, Ronald, who served many years in the Middle East, is no longer with us, and I would like to dedicate this thesis to his memory.

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NOTES 1. As most fundamentalists tend to use the masculine pronoun inclu­ sively to refer to both genders, I have followed their practice when deal­ ing with primary sources. In other parts of the thesis I have tried to accommodate the contemporary use of he/she, humanity, people, per­ sons, etc. (without making it too convoluted). 2. Most Arabic words (except for personal names) are written in Italics, with (") for the hamza, and (') for the 'ayn. In transliteration and diacritics I have followed the IJMES system. In quotes I have followed the exact text of the source, while in references I have used the translit­ eration offered by the sources.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used for the individual books contained in the anthology: Francis Schaeffer. 1982. The Complete Works of Francis Schaeffer: A Christian Worldview, in 4 volumes. ACM CBW DIC EFR GED GST GWT HSL MTC NFC NLP TCE WHR

A Christian Manifesto The Church Before the Watching World Death in the City Escape From Reason The Great Evangelical Disaster Genesis in Space and Time The God Who is There How Should We Then Live? The Mark of the Christian No Final Conflict No Little People The Church at the End of the 20th Century Whatever Happened to the Human Race?

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INTRODUCTION P N The resurgence of religions, especially in their fundamentalist forms, across many religious and civilizational boundaries is a characteristic of the latter part of the 20th century. While there are many studies of fundamentalism within each religious tradition, there is a dearth of farranging comparative studies of the phenomena across religious divides. For example, in the very comprehensive Chicago “Fundamentalism” project,1 Appleby and Marty and other scholars list general character­ istics of religious fundamentalists and discuss how these apply to fun­ damentalist movements in various religions including Islam and Christianity. However there are hardly any comparisons of specific concepts of the different groups across the religious divides. This reticence may be due to the post-modern fear of confusing the particularity of human phenomena coupled to the fear of reductionism. However, as Carter argues, such comparative studies are important and possible given the right methodology that balances the descriptive par­ ticularities with the explanatory generalities.2 The phenomenological study of religion emphasizes the avoidance of value judgments (epochè), the need for a positive empathy (Einfühlung),3 and the utility of non-judgmental comparisons, even though it might be impossible for the researcher, as a historically and culturally located human being, to attain to absolute objectivity. It is also important to attempt, as far as possible, not to misrepresent the object of the study. As Morgan points out, every religion ought to be understood from its own standpoint, for that is how it is understood by its adherents.4 This study carries no claim to being exhaustive or comprehensive. The field is so great that only selective themes and samples could be studied. There are many more themes to investigate, such as funda­ mentalist discourses on mission, on economics, and on social justice.

1 Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, eds., 1991–1995. The Fundamentalism Project, a 5 volume University of Chicago series. 2 Jeffrey R. Carter. “Description is Not Explanation: A Methodology of Com­ parison”, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998, pp. 133–148. 3 Frank Whaling. “Introduction”, in Whaling, ed., 1995. Theory and Method in Religious Studies: Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion, pp. 19–22, 32–33. 4 Peggy Morgan. 1996. “The Authority of Believers in the Study of Religions”, DISKUS, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1–10. Internet, .

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However, I trust that this study is broadly representative of the time scale and of the wide spectrum of movements and personalities in both fundamentalisms. M T This research thesis consists of a comparative study of some selected themes in Christian and Islamic fundamentalist discourses, undertaken because while there are many studies of the fundamentalist phenome­ non and of the separate fundamentalisms within each religion, there are very few comparative cross-religious studies. The main thesis is that such a wide-ranging cross-religious compari­ son of discourses of the two fundamentalisms is both valid and fruitful, and that it will reveal many significant and striking Wittgensteinian “family resemblances” as both are rooted in monotheistic, revelatory, prophetic religions, and both are reactions to modernism. It will also highlight important differences due to their differences in scriptures, his­ torical development, and regional environments. These resemblances and differences will increase our understanding of the complex matrix of fundamentalisms in Islam and Christianity and help identify the many movements and views involved in the resurgence of religions at the end of the 20th century, not only across the religious divide, but also within each religious camp. M  R According to some observers, “fundamentalism”, just like “Islam” and “Christianity” is a polythetic concept that encompasses so much vari­ ety and complexity as to be almost worthless for the sake of compara­ tive studies. There are many groups on each side of the divide, each with its own specific mixture of doctrines and concepts and with its own weighting of the different concepts it stresses. To avoid the prob­ lems of reification and essentialization, it is important to go beyond gen­ eralities and focus on discrete groups, persons and doctrines within the wide spectrum. This study was undertaken using a multidisciplinary approach, with insights from the fields of sociology, Middle East area studies, religious studies, ethnography, theology, and Islamic studies. In it I have tried to avoid describing one religion in terms and categories of the other, have aspired to think the believers’ thoughts after them, and have tried to let the voices of the believers come through clearly. Also, I have tried to maintain an empathy, a constructive sympathy, for the writers and movements being studied, without necessarily justifying their beliefs

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or actions. In order to maintain objectivity, I have looked not only at the believers’ descriptions and interpretations of their own faith and ide­ ology, but also at many studies by academic observers from various dis­ ciplines, realizing that there will always remain tensions between scholars and believers in interpreting religions. There are some basic problems inherent in a text-based approach: first the danger of not giving a fair representation to all the different groups and movements within the studied environment. Second, the danger of giving a wrong weighting to different groups, favoring some over others. Should the weighting be in proportion to the relative size of the group? To the stridency of its demands? The radicalism of its ideology? Third, while some small groups have produced a lot of rele­ vant and easily available texts, other very large groups have produced hardly any texts, or they are difficult to obtain. The Tabìghi Jamà'at springs to mind as an example: a movement comprising many millions of adherents, claimed by some to be the largest Islamic movement of our day, yet offering very few available texts for the scholar to study. It is thus automatically disadvantaged in a textually-based study such as this, and would benefit from a corrective field-work based study. This study concentrates on several selected underlying themes in fun­ damentalist Islamic and Christian discourses, analyzes and compares them to each other, noting both “family resemblances” and differences. The themes were selected after a wide reading of primary sources so as to reflect subjects prioritized by the discourse itself and common to fundamentalisms in both camps. There are many such themes, the main ones being their reaction to secularism; their theocentric worldview; their understandings of God, his uniqueness, sovereignty and his revelation in scripture; their views on the right interpretation of the holy texts; their stress on social and political activism; their attitudes to politics, state and democracy; their views on a past golden age, on eschatology and on utopia. Other subjects of interest include their dichotomic views of life as a battle, their concepts of separatism, and the conspiracy the­ ories advocated by some; the whole area of morality, family, sexual behavior and gender roles is also very important to fundamentalists of both persuasions; issues of social justice also seem imortant to contem­ porary fundamentalists; and finally the call to faith (mission) also has a prominent place in their discourse. To keep the book at a reasonable size, I had to limit myself to the first few themes I considerd axiomatic and basic to an understanding of the fundamentalist mindset. The ones selected seem to be founda­ tional to fundamentalist theology and worldview. Their attitudes to morals and the family, for instance, could not be understood without first comprehending their basic God-centred and scripture-centred antisecularist position. Had space allowed I would certainly have included chapters on the issues of morals and the family and on fundamentalist

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views on missionary outreach. The issues of fundamentalist attitudes to politics, state and democracy were included as they are at the center of the general public interest in fundamentalisms at this time in history. Discourses on these themes within a spectrum of Islamic and Christian fundamentalist writers and groups is described, concentrating—but not exclusively—on Egypt, Pakistan and Iran on the Muslim side (as these are the countries where fundamentalist movements are most fully devel­ oped and influential), and on North American and British groups on the Christian side. Of course, not every author writes on every theme selected, and this has meant a broadening of the base of selected writ­ ers to include sufficient relevant material on those themes in discourse that are of importance to fundamentalists. Some commentators have noted the similarities between modern fun­ damentalist Islam and the Protestant Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries, as in both cases an immense spiritual and intellectual ferment emerged coupled to a revolution in mass communications (the printing press in the 15th century, electronic media in the 20th), giving ordi­ nary believers unprecedented access to education and sources of knowl­ edge about their religion, causing them to question traditional carriers of religious authority, and to deliberately examine the fundamentals of their faith. These observers assert that the latter half of the 20th cen­ tury will evoke as profound a change in the Muslim World as the Reformation did in Christendom.5 This study deals with the similarities of contemporary fundamentalist Islam with the heirs of the Reformation, the Christian fundamentalists of the end of the 20th century. Other observers see similarities between fundamentalist Islam and contempo­ rary Christian Liberation Theology movements especially in Latin America, as both use original sacred texts to reconstruct contemporary societies in line with social justice models.6 Having decided on several well known main primary sources in each camp, I have also selected several other lesser known primary sources to widen and deepen the discussion. After dividing the wider thesis into main topics and subheadings, under which I looked at the sources, I then analyzed and compared the different writers both within and across 5 Dale F. Eickelman. “Inside the Islamic Reformation”, Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 80–89. Interestingly, 'Alì Sharì'atì, the ideologue of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, noted the similarity between Muslim societies of today and European society in the Reformation era, claiming that contemporary Islamic societies need a similar religious reformation that will shift them into an activist mode and unleash great energies for applying ideology to solve their problems. See 'Alì Sharì'atì. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam, p. 58; Sharì'atì. 1986. What Is to Be Done, p. 18; Sharì'atì. 1981. Man and Islam, pp. 103–105. 6 Kristin E. Wolff. “New New Orientalism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory”, in Ahmad S. Moussalli, ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities, Footnote 30, p. 68.

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the religious divide. While all oppose secularism, seen as a modern ide­ ology inherently hostile to religion and bent on excluding it from the public sphere, in each religion there is of course a spectrum of thought, spanning the field from the extreme radical (usually smaller) fringe groups, through the mainline moderate (usually larger) groups and onto the groups partly overlapping with the more liberal, non-fundamentalist, accommodationist coreligionists (traditionalist, reformist, modernist). T C The Phenomenon of Fundamentalism In order to gain a comprehensive view of this project, the thesis opens with a theoretical and methodological study of the phenomenon of fun­ damentalism. Clearly the resurgence of religion in the latter part of the 20th century has puzzled academic observers who had generally accepted secularization theory, and as convinced secularists were biased against any religious phenomena appearing in the public sphere. While some continued to battle for the old premises, others, like Esposito, accused them of unfounded bias because the degree of a scholar’s intellectual sophistication and objectivity was equated with a secular-liberal rela­ tivistic stand antithetical to religion.7 The fact is that religion in modern times has proven itself to be quite robust and capable of renewal and re-invention in ways most scholars would never have imagined possible. This is stressed by Hadden among others, who sees religion as one of the principal means by which cul­ tures are still being renewed. Hadden’s comments are made in the con­ text of the American Religious Right, and he accuses the intellectual and political establishments of viewing fundamentalist activism as an aberration because their own worldview is grounded in secularization theory.8 Some observers even accuse secularist scholars of tampering with the truth: Wills claims that for the USA at least the claimed decline of religion was more academic than real—anti-religious media and aca­ demic observers were unwilling to admit to proof of their theories being wrong, in spite of surveys showing a consistent large majority of Ameri­ cans as devoutly religious. He quotes a 1989 survey in which 40% of all Americans called themselves “born-again Christians”—meaning 7

John L. Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat, p. 200. Jeffrey K. Hadden, in University of Virginia Homepage of New Religious Movements, Internet, ; Hadden, 1990. “Conservative Christians, Televangelism, and Politics: Taking Stock a Decade after the Founding of the Moral Majority”, in Thomas Robbins & Dick Anthony, eds., 1990. In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America, pp. 463–471. 8

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evangelicals.9 Voll states that most social scientists accept the secular worldview and thus a “presumption of unbelief ” that colors their view of reality, forcing them to explain away religious beliefs as secondary phenomena, and falsely posit the causes of religious phenomena as sec­ ular aspects of human experience such as class interests and material gain.10 Roy adds that most observers are still prisoners of the old Enlightenment fallacy which assumed that the only form of progress is political modernity expressed in parliamentary democracy, economic development, moral permissiveness, and secularization.11 Many scholars note that the resurgence of religion has shaken the foundations of secularization theory, causing some to question its basic premise of the total marginalization of religion as well as to try to adapt it to the new realities. Cox argues that the contemporary resurgence of religion coupled to the weakening of the nation- state opens the way for a re-definition of the public sphere to include moral and religious values.12 This theme is echoed in numerous variations by a number of scholars including Greeley, Pannenberg, Voll, and Gellner.13 while some like John Keane even attack secularism as a conflict-producing ideology.14 Framework of Religious Resurgence Using Weber’s concept of the charismatic prophet, it can be posited that contemporary fundamentalisms arise out of a convergence of deeply alienating crises and dislocations (spiritual, social, political, and eco­ nomic) with the emergence of charismatic prophetic personalities who reformulate religious traditions in a way appropriate to modern con­ texts. This convergence is the catalyst for the tremendous forces being unleashed by fundamentalisms. Scholars arguing for this position include Hefner who shows how the relevance of Weber’s original theories on

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Gary Wills. 1990, Under God: Religion and American Politics, pp. 14–25. John O. Voll. “Foreword” in Richard P. Mitchell. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, new edition, pp. ix–xxii. 11 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam, p. 1. 12 Harvey Cox. “Citizens and Believers: Always Strangers?” in Robbins & Anthony, 1990, pp. 452–457. 13 Wolfhart Pannenberg. “How to Think About Secularism,” First Things, Vol. 64, June/July 1996, pp. 27–32; Cox. 1990. pp. 449–450; Andrew M. Greeley. 1973. The Persistence of Religion, pp. 15–16, 26; Voll. 1982. Islam: Continuity and Change, pp. 275–276; Ernest, Gellner. “Marxism and Islam: Failure and Success” in 'Azzàm Tamìmì, ed., 1993. Power Sharing Islam, p. 33. 14 John Keane. “Secularism”, a paper delivered at the Seminar on “Islamism, Pluralism and Civil Society”, Part I. “Secularism and the Modern State in the Muslim World”, organized by the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (Islam 21), April 23, 1999, MSANEWS, 20,5,99, Internet, . Keane sees secularism as undemocratic, because real democracy is based on insti­ tutionalized humility which leads to a respect for and a tolerance of others. 10

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the potential of religions and the importance of the charismatic prophet have been modified and upheld over time. Bainbridge claims that today “all around the world religious movements are energizing social change and shaping the transformation of entire societies”. Dekmejian, while not denying the socioeconomic aspects of the crisis, insists on a more comprehensive view that includes the crisis of the spirit—of identity and culture; and the crisis of legitimacy—the erosion of the moral basis of authority.15 Fundamentalism can also be seen as a paradigm shift introduced by specific individuals who view reality in qualitatively different ways from their contemporaries. These paradigm shifts are always accompanied by periods of struggle and conflict. Following Küng’s statement that “it is possible, important, and urgent to transfer the paradigm . . . from the sphere of the natural sciences to that of religion and theology . . .,” Küng and Bosch have adapted Kuhn’s paradigm theories from the nat­ ural sciences to the realms of religion, in the process somewhat modi­ fying Kuhn’s original term which was coined for the natural sciences. Küng, and following him Bosch, both posit six paradigms in the devel­ opment of Christianity: (1) Early Christian apocalyptic paradigm; (2) Early Church Hellenistic paradigm; (3) Medieval Roman Catholic par­ adigm; (4) Reformation Protestant paradigm; (5) Enlightenment modern paradigm; (6) Contemporary ecumenical post-modern paradigm. This is relevant to the Western Church, as it largely ignores the Eastern and Orthodox churches. I have not seen anything similar done for Islam.16 Validity of the Term “Fundamentalism” Across Boundaries Many scholars have reservations about the term “fundamentalism” and doubt its applicability to phenomena across religious boundaries as it originated in a Christian Protestant milieu. The negative stereotypes popularized by the mass media concerning fundamentalisms as mono­ lithic, fanatic and violent also seem to minimize the utility of the term. However, after discussing the various other available terms, most schol­

15 Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: World Building and the Rationality of Conversion”, in Hefner. ed., 1993. Conversion to Christianity, pp. 7–14, 28–31; Max Weber. 1963. The Sociology of Religion, pp. 46–59; Theodore Long, E. 1986. “Prophecy, Charisma, and Politics: Reinterpreting the Weberian Thesis”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., Prophetic Religions & Politics, pp. 3–17; Bainbridge. 1997. The Sociology of Religious Movements, p. 27; Hrair Dekmejian. 1985. Islam in Revolution, p. 8. 16 Hans Kung. 1995. Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Times, pp. 59–60; See also David Bosch. 1991, Transforming Missions. pp. 181–189, 315–319. On Kuhn’s paradigm theory, Marsden quotes Kuhn as stating: “the transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced,” George M. Marsden. 1980. Fundamentalism and Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870–1925, pp. 214–215.

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ars, while still uneasy with the term, find it the most useful one avail­ able to describe the complex cluster of movements and ideologies involved in the reaffirmation of religious fundamentals at the beginning of the 21st century. All other terms with similar connotations fail to convey some of the essential hallmarks of the various fundamentalisms around the world. These scholars, who while acknowledging the difficulties, yet accept the inevitability of using the term, include Küng who argues it needs a more concise definition,17 Caplan who claims it does help identify “family resemblances”,18 Walker who sees it as useful in describing the common resistance of all such movements to secular modernity,19 Voll who dislikes it yet agrees that it is useful for comparative studies,20 Sidahmed and Ehteshami who accept that it is here to stay but must be redefined as a concept and as a comparative category,21 Dekmejian who argues that Islamic fundamentalists often refer to themselves as aßliyìn, meaning fundamentalists, and thus the term Islamic fundamen­ talism is a most appropriate term for describing their movements,22 and Tibi who also finds it the most appropriate term for the Islamic revival.23 Even some leaders of Islamic movements are happy to accept the term: al-Turàbì seems quite happy to use the term “fundamentalist” for himself when speaking to foreign audiences,24 and Ghannùshì accepts it as denoting the profound devotion to the fundamentals of religion as a basis for reform.25

17

Kung. 1995. p. 635. Lionel Caplan, “Introduction”, in Caplan, ed., 1987. Studies in Religious Fundamentalisms, pp. 4–5. 19 Andrew Walker. 1987. “Fundamentalism and Modernity: The Restoration Movement in Britain”, in: Caplan. 1987. pp. 195–199. 20 Voll, 1969. p. xiv. See also Voll. 1991. “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, p. 347. 21 'Abdelsalàm Sìda˙med & Anushirvan Ehteshamì. “Introduction” in Sìda˙med & Ehteshamì, eds., Islamic Fundamentalism, 1996, pp. 2–5. 22 Dekmejian, 1985, p. 4. 23 Bassam Tibi, 1993, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993a. Fundamentalisms and Society, pp. 73–74. 24 Óasan al-ˇùràbì, “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sunna and Shi'a Worlds”, the text of a speech given by Dr. al-Turàbì in Madrid on the 2nd, August, 1994 to a mainly non-Muslim audience. Edited by Sean Gabb and published as an occa­ sional paper by the Sudan Foundation. 25 Rashid Ghannùshì. “Western Cultural Fundamentalism and its Blowbacks”, an MSANEWS IntraView 10, Feb. 1998, MSANEWS, Internet, . 18

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Finally, Shepard states that in spite of his reservations, the term is in such common use that it may be beyond the power of academics to reverse it.26 I  F D Discourse is important because it communicates ideas, evokes moods, and motivates to action by setting ideals, visions and agendas. Discourse appears in various media such as books, pamphlets, manifestos, sermons, talks, lectures, audio cassettes and films. In this study I have limited myself to the printed word and not investigated the audio-visual media. The types of literature studied include monographs, articles in jour­ nals, and publications on the Internet. While the first two genres are well established, Internet publications are a very recent development, and it is of interest to note the explosion in the amount of fundamen­ talist discourse published in this new medium as many opposition move­ ments, often limited in their own states of origin by the authorities, have shifted to the Internet to get their message freely across to a world­ wide audience. In this thesis, I have examined, analyzed, and compared fundamen­ talist discourses on the Christian and the Islamic side of the religious boundary. As Mirna Mahmoud points out in her comments on Islam, both religions comprise rich and complex cultural systems offering a vast symbolic network with considerable rhetorical power that can give meaning and provide a means of interpreting reality to both believers and others in societies still impacted by the historical and cultural force of religion.27 Fundamentalist discourses use this inherent residual poten­ tial of religious symbols within their societies to disseminate their views, radicalize their audience, gain recruits to their cause, and impact pub­ lic policy. These discourses also introduce well-known religious vocab­ ulary and symbolism into politics and appeal to the many disillusioned with present trends in society. Caplan claims that fundamentalist discourse is an attempt to estab­ lish a regime of absolute truth as against modernist concepts of truth as relative and contextual. Fundamentalist discourse is essentialist, aim­ ing at establishing a space of unchanging divinely based and objectively knowable truth.28 Some recent studies stress the importance of fundamentalist dis­ course and try to explain its popular appeal in various societies. These 26

Shephard, 1987. p. 368. Mirna Ma˙moud. 1998. “Causes for Fundamentalist Popularity in Egypt,” in Moussalli, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities, pp. 322–328. 28 Caplan in Caplan ed., 1987. p. 21. 27

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studies claim that fundamentalist rhetoric resonates with nascent themes and symbols of the traditional, authentic, and hegemonic culture— Islamic or Christian—that prepare the ground for its acceptance. Salwa Ismà'ìl in a study on discourse in contemporary Egypt, empha­ sizes the role of ideological discourse in the formation of social forces, ideology being a system of representation which sustains relations of power. Such discourse mobilizes potent symbols using discursive rules “that structure the production of meanings, their reproduction and their circulation.”29 According to Ismà'ìl, fundamentalist Islamist discourse has reconstituted the boundaries of political power relations in Egypt, mov­ ing into the vacuum left by the failure of nationalist, liberal and social­ ist regimes. Fundamentalist Islamist discourse is seen as rooted in orthodoxy, trying to recreate an ideal past, link society back to trust­ worthy traditional symbols of its history, and map out a good future congruent with these religious symbols. Islamist fundamentalists attempt in their discourse to reunite God’s sovereignty with a temporal human authority drawing its legitimacy from the divine source. Islamic funda­ mentalist discourse also reconstructs traditional Islamic notions of legit­ imate government while confronting official Islam and secular regimes, and seeking to disqualify their discourse and establish itself as the dom­ inant orthodoxy. It motivates the receivers to critically evaluate present conditions, judge them as lacking, and shift to an activist mode of oper­ ation in search of the prescribed ideal system. Among the radicals this critique of the present evil system leads to takfìr, the legal ruling that ruler and regime are infidels, and to the call for jihàd, the struggle against the evil system. Both terms are heavily loaded with traditional symbolic meanings that prepare the ground for their acceptance by many in society. Radical Islamist discourse has used other similar terms (hijra, jàhilìyya, ˙àkimìyya), giving them new ahistorical and timeless mean­ ings, and using them as political tools for changing the present. Ismà'ìl views radical Islamic discourse as re-establishing the traditional Islamic discourse of what is right and legitimate, by using traditional religious symbols in a modern ideological framework to articulate political goals relevant to contemporary contexts.30 In their study on American Christian Right discourse, Hopson and Smith argue that the themes and symbols used in this discourse offer a sense of stability to many people disturbed by the uncertainties of the post-modern age. They stress the importance of Christian Right dis­ course in placing fundamentalist movements on the sociopolitical map of America. The fundamentalist movements have become more sophis­

29 Salwa Ismà'ìl. 1992. “Discourse and Ideology in Contemporary Egypt”, unpub­ lished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Political Science, McGill University. pp. 1–2. 30 Ismà'ìl. 1992. pp. 89–92, 112–116.

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ticated in the effective use of language, realizing the importance of sym­ bols and political “buzzwords”, and selecting a number of scriptural themes to describe their vision of the desired public good. Hopson & Smith stress that “the taken-for granted presuppositions which underlie language are essential in understanding the effect of such language on public perceptions, preferences, and practices”. The rhetorical conven­ tions used by fundamentalists exploit deeply entrenched myths and sym­ bols inherent in the religion-based dominant conceptual categories that inform society’s words and practices. Symbolic catchwords and phrases are used to invoke unambiguous responses to highly complex social issues, some creating deep positive resonances within society while oth­ ers raise deep anxieties and fears. Comforting visions of the promised utopia are raised by terms such as “law and order”, “social justice”, “morality”, and “tradition”. Anxiety-arousing negative terms that con­ jure threatening repulsive images include the “breakdown of the tradi­ tional family”, “breakdown of law and order”, and “the rising tide of crime”. Hopson & Smith argue that fundamentalist discourse using sym­ bolic language helps reconstruct life into a manageable system of expla­ nations, beliefs and actions, allying itself to hegemonic cultural attitudes that demonize enemies and glorify the traditional insider.31 Williams in a study on American political culture notes a clear ten­ dency to transform moral and religious concepts into political issues, based on the extraordinary vibrancy of religion in American culture. Religious and moral issues dominate the political landscape, providing discourse and rhetoric for political campaigns. Williams notes that all over the world, religion offers potential cultural resources—symbols, meanings, ideologies, and legitimacy—that political movements can use. However, in America, these religiously-based cultural resources are espe­ cially potent, as most ideas about politics are still rooted in religion, and the political discourse based on religious motives resonates with persuasive power. Williams further claims that most political discourse in America revolves around the perceived common good and the social arrangements required to achieve it. Assumptions about what consti­ tutes the good society are rooted in religion and are consciously manip­ ulated by fundamentalist political rhetoric in order to persuade the public. Rhetorical appeals for change draw on accepted cultural resources in an innovative manner, in order to convince people that the new thing offered is based on old traditional notions of morality and reli­ gion. This persuasion is constrained within the parameters of the rec­ ognizable and connects to extant dominant religious themes in order

31 Ronald E. Hopson & Donald R. Smith. “Changing Fortunes: An Analysis of Christian Right Ascendance Within American Political Discourse”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 1999. pp. 1, 6–7.

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for the claims to be intelligible and legitimate. Religiously-based politi­ cal language helps construct a public image that transcends self-interest and realpolitik, and connects the movement with the community’s authentic identity based on religion and linked to altruistic concepts of community, service, sacrifice, and morality. These images and symbols engender group solidarity and mobilization, and foster identity and meaning.32 Williams posits three possible models within which political discourses and movements operate: the covenantal model, the contractual model, and the stewardship model. The covenantal model, which sees society as a moral community in a covenantal relationship with God, is the one most appropriate to fundamentalist discourse. In this model, polit­ ical reform is seen as a necessary part of moral reform to be enacted according to the divinely revealed law for the common good. Williams sees this model as fitting the New Christian Right in America and their politico-moral discourse. The inherent hallmark of the covenantal model is the reliance on a transcendent authority for moral guidelines in human affairs. Fundamentalist movements focus on the submission of individ­ ual interests and choices to the divine blueprint and to the common good, while evil influences, such as greed and sexual lust must be con­ trolled for the good of the community.33 According to Williams, the covenant model in America is based on the puritan ideals about the relationship between God, society, and the individual as held by the Founding Fathers. They viewed human nature as inherently depraved by original sin, and therefore not to be totally trusted, but needing outside guidance and control. They saw themselves as a biblical “chosen people” entering a new “promised land” and divinely called to build a “New Jerusalem”. The idea of the covenant between God and his chosen people still informs much of American political discourse in the popular themes of American exceptionalism and the American destiny to provide moral guidance to the world. Covenant was the organizing principle of puritan religion, a pact bind­ ing God and his people, giving society a transcendent purpose and pro­ viding the motivation for morals, justice and reform, furnishing concepts of egalitarianism, voluntarism, and communalism for the fundamental­ ist American political discourse.34 Williams’ model, though based on American Protestantism, is emi­ nently suitable to Muslim societies, where religion is still strongly en­ trenched in society, and where religious history offers very potent cultural

32 Rhys H. Williams. “Visions of the Good Society and the Religious Roots of American Political Culture”, Sociology of Religion, 1999, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 1–3. 33 Williams. 1999. pp. 4–5. 34 Ibid., pp. 7–9.

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resources for contemporary Islamic fundamentalists and their discourse. Based on these studies, it would seem that fundamentalists in both Christian and Muslim societies are effectively manipulating authentic religious symbols that appeal to large segments of their societies, thus gaining a hearing for their vision of the good society based on religious principles, and for the methods and tools needed to attain it. Fundamen­ talist discourse is thus a mobilizing factor of great importance, and its wide diffusion by effectively using modern technology is one key ele­ ment in the success of fundamentalist movements in both camps. Studying the writings of fundamentalist thinkers it is important to remember that they represent a wide spectrum of opinion within each fundamentalist paradigm. While there is some agreement on essentials, there are also important nuances, differences, and disagreements between the various constituent elements of each fundamentalism. Another impor­ tant fact to bear in mind is that fundamentalists use different discourses depending on the target audiences. What is intended for outsiders may sometimes be quite different to the discourse intended for insiders. S  P S This study is based mainly on primary texts. Secondary expositions and theoretical considerations are used mainly in the first theoretical chap­ ters and as a background for the discussion of the primary materials in the later chapters. There are many varieties of believers in the wide spectrum of fun­ damentalist groups and movements, and there is a very wide list of pos­ sible primary sources in the various fundamentalist tendencies. While it is important to try and let as many voices as possible be heard, allow­ ing them to represent themselves and their interests, not privileging some above the others without a good reason,35 limitations of space and time have forced me to limit the selection to manageable proportions and choose a sample which I hope is representative also of the many not included.36 On the Islamic side, I have selected writings by some of the founders of Sunnì Islamic fundamentalism such as Óasan al-Bannà", Sayyid Abu"l A'la Mawdùdì, Óasan 'Alì Nadwì and Sayyid Qu†b to represent the mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamà'at-i Islàmi. Their disciples within the main­ stream include figures such as Mu˙ammad Qu†b (Sayyid Qu†b’s brother), Yùsuf al-Qaradàwì, Tàhà Jàbir al-'Alwànì, Isràr A˙mad, Khurràm

35 36

Eickelman. 1989. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, pp. 376–378. For brief biographical sketches of the main fundamentalists selected, see Appendix.

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Muràd, Khurshid A˙mad, Ràshid Ghannùshì, and Óasan al-Turàbì. Of the radical interpreters of their message who gave rise to extremist revolutionary fringe groups, I have included Mu˙ammad Faràj of Tanzìm al-Jihàd, Shukri Mu߆afa of Takfìr wa"l Hijra, Sheikh 'Umar 'Abd alRa˙màn, Nà˙ah Ibràhim, 'Asim 'Abd al-Màjid, and 'Isàm al-Dìn Dàrbala, all spiritual guides to both the jihàd and the jamà'at groups, Taqi al-Dìn al-Nabhànì founder of Óizb al-Ta˙rìr, Mu˙ammad al-Mas'arì the Saudi dissident, 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad founder of al-Muhàjirùn, as well as Usàma bin-Làden of al-Qà'ida. Some of these still alive are in prison and some in exile in the West. Charismatic Shaykhs such as the popular Mu˙ammad Mitwalì al-Sha'ràwì and Óamìd Kishk of Egypt are included as they represent an important part of the Islamist dis­ course that tends to mobilize many into activism.37 On the Shì'a side I have included Ayàtollàh Rùhollàh Khomeinì, leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, 'Alì Sharì'atì (the main ideo­ logue of the Iranian Islamic revolution), and Ayàtollàhs 'Alì Khamene"i, present Supreme Guide of Iran, and Mu˙ammad Khatamì, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I have also included the well-known Iraqi Shì'ì scholar Ayàtollàh Mu˙ammad Bàqir al-Íadr, martyred by the Iraqi regime, and several other well-known Shì'ì scholars such as Ha"iri Shìràzì and Murtàzà Mu†ahharì. On the Christian fundamentalist side I have included J. Gresham Machen, Carl McIntire, and Cornelius Van Til to represent the earlier Reformed trend. Francis Schaeffer, widely accepted as the greatest fun­ damentalist thinker of this period, and several of his disciples, such as Os Guiness, who have continued this trend through the 1960s and 1970s into the 1990s. John Stott and James Packer are included as the most influential representatives of the Anglican Evangelicals, and Martyn Lloyd-Jones for the British Reformed wing. For the charismatic, free church and house church camps I have included Clifford Hill and Derek Prince. On the radical Reformed wing Roussas Rushdoony the founder of the Reconstructionist movement, as well as his disciples Gary North, Andrew Sandleen, and Greg Bahnsen. For the radical Baptist funda­ mentalist separatists Bob Jones II of Bob Jones University, Fred Moritz, David Cloud, John Cereghin and Steve Van Nattan. For the Dispensa­ tionalist camp I have included Tim LaHaye, William MacDonald, Norman Geisler, and Rene Pache. From the Holiness tradition A.W.

37 Some observers would deny that Sharì'atì, ˇùràbì, and Ghannùshì are Islamic fundamentalists, arguing that Sharì'atì sees many meanings to the Qur"àn instead of taking it literally, while all three seem to lean towards the Reformist-modernist wing of Islam in their views on politics, human rights and democracy. However, ˇùràbì and Ghannùshì both accept the term fundamentalist for themselves, while many other important scholars place all three in the fundamentalist camp because of their views on scripture and the necessity to return to the sources.

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Tozer. For the neo-Evangelicals, Billy Graham the greatest popular evangelist of our time, and some of the politically active leaders of the Christian Right in the 1980s and 1990s such as Jerry Falwell founder of the Moral Majority, Pat Robertson founder of the Christian Alliance and the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), and Charles Colson of Watergate fame. For those evangelicals concerned with family and moral­ ity I have included Alan Crippen from Focus on the Family. I have tried through this collection to represent the various streams in Christian fundamentalism such as the Independent Fundamentalist Bible Baptists, the Southern Baptists, Reformed churches, Dispensationalists, Bible Presbyterians, Reconstructionists, Christian Brethren, Pentecostals, Neo-Pentecostals and Charismatics, as well as newer politically involved movements such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition. While I have concentrated on the main writers selected, I have also looked at some others in each tradition in order to give a better view of the wider spectrum and of the many voices out there. Discourse is not limited to a few well-known writers but also includes the publica­ tions of the many groups and movements within each camp, including their manifestos, proclamations, leaflets, tracts, and other information often presented in their own internal journals and on their Websites. I have made use of some of this material in order to broaden the catch­ ment area of my thesis and represent something of this fast-growing sphere of fundamentalist discourse. L R Definition and Characteristics of Fundamentalisms Attempts at defining fundamentalisms generally come up with a cluster of main characteristics applicable to most such movements. Fundamen­ talsim thus can be seen as a syndrome evidencing a cluster of typical symptoms rather than a narrowly defined category. Marty and Appleby list a number of these attributes, many of which could also be attrib­ uted to secular political radical movements such as Marxism or Fascism— their relevancy to fundamentalisms arises only when coupled to fundamentalism’s essentially religious-scripturalist nature.38 A serviceable definition based on Ben-Dor’s discussion is that funda­ mentalism is a religious ideology that claims a divinely revealed inerrant scripture as its ultimate authority, is mainly literalist in its handling of scripture, radical in the application of scripture to contemporary 38 Marty & Appleby. “Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. pp. 814–842. Also Marty & Appleby 1991, “The Fundamentalisms Project: A User’s Guide”, pp. iv–vii, in the same volume.

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contexts, extremist in its methods, and exclusivist towards competing ideologies.39 Most observers see scripturalism, radicalism, extremism, exclusivism, and militancy as typical attributes of fundamentalisms. Other attributes noted by observers include the ideologization of truth, the creation of alternative societies, the stress on absolute authority, the focus on faith, family and the state, and the dichotomization of their world view. Scripturalism is the main attribute that defines fundamen­ talisms as religious—most other attributes equally fit radical secular ide­ ologies. On scripturalism, Bainbridge quotes a 1991 study in the USA in which 35% of a representative sample of all Americans agreed to the statement that “the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”, while an added 45% agreed that “the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.” He adds that Protestants are twice as likely as Catholics to say the Bible is the “actual word of God.”40 Hadden and Shupe stress that for fundamentalists, the sacred text is accepted as relevant to all modern areas of life.41 Gerami notes that while fun­ damentalists stress the necessity of a return to the original scriptures, some also stress the need to reinterpret them for contemporary situations,42 while Boone claims that while fundamentalists idealize an “only scripture” doctrine, in practice they often end up empowering their own interpreters rather than scripture itself.43 Some observers try to set off fundamentalism from conservative ortho­ doxy or traditionalism with which it is often confused. As Gerami notes, fundamentalism is not orthodoxy, because it is inherently modern and activist, while orthodoxy is neither. Also, fundamentalism is present and future oriented while orthodoxy is past oriented. Fundamentalism looks to the past only in order to reshape the present and the future. Another distinction is that fundamentalism is basically this-worldly while ortho­ doxy tends to other-worldliness.44 An often overlooked characteristic of some fundamentalist movements is millenarianism. Barr claims that although not all fundamentalists are millenarian, yet millenarianism plays an important part in the evolution of Christian fundamentalism.45 Nasr predicts that the wave of messian­ 39 Gabriel Ben-Dor. “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism”, in MaddyWeitzman & Inbar, eds., 1997. Islamic Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. 239– 240. 40 Bainbridge. 1997. pp. 16–20. 41 Hadden & Shupe, “Introduction”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions And Politics, p. xxi. 42 Shahin Gerami. 1996. Women and Fundamentalism: Islam and Christianity, p. 27. 43 Kathleen C. Boone, 1989. The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism, pp. 2–3. 44 Gerami. 1996. p. 26. 45 James Barr. 1977. Fundamentalism, p. xv.

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ism in Islam will increase as long as Muslims are frustrated with their lot and see themselves confronted by alien forces threatening their very existence.46 Taxonomy of Fundamentalisms Various methods of categorizing the vast spectrum of fundamentalisms are offered by different observers. A popular division, presented by Shepard and based mainly on politics, is that between stricter and broader types, the stricter movements being radical, sometimes violent, and isolationist, the broader types gradualist and willing to forge prag­ matic alliances with non-fundamentalists.47 This division however does not do justice to apolitical passive groups. Other observers, such as Hadden, divide fundamentalisms into four wider categories: theological, political, cultural, and global.48 Almond, Sivan and Appleby chose a more comprehensive fourfold division relating to the interaction of fun­ damentalisms with the outside world: the world conqueror type, aiming at taking control of all structures of society, if necessary by force; the world transformer type engaging in a gradual transformation of individuals and of institutions in society; the world creator type busy creating pure enclaves of alternative societies; and the world renouncer type stressing extreme sep­ aration from the polluted majority. These are ideal types, most move­ ments exhibiting several of these characteristics in various weightings.49 Validity of Comparative Studies of Fundamentalisms Across Religious Boundaries Of great importance to this comparative study are scholarly views on the validity of comparisons across religious boundaries. Simpson notes the absence of a comparative framework in the study of fundamen­ talisms, suggesting as a likely reason the abandonment of a focusing on problems in general sociological theory. He stresses the need for a re­ commitment to the “efficacy of comparative analysis” for the solution of problems.50 Some like Huntington claim that there is no common ground between Islamist and Western Christian ideologies, confronta­ tion between them is inevitable, so comparisons would not seem to be

46 Seyyed Hossein Vali Reza Nasr, 1987. Traditional Islam In The Modern World, pp. 302–303. 47 Shepard. 1987. pp. 358–359. 48 Steven Jones. 1998. “Fundamentalism”, in Hadden, ed., University of Virginia Sociology Department Internet Pages on New Religious Movements, Internet, . 49 Almond, Sivan & Appleby “Explaining Fundamentalisms”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 426–429. 50 John H. Simpson 1986. “Some Elementary Forms of Authority and Fundamen­ talist Politics”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. pp. 395–396.

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meaningful.51 Others deny the validity of comparisons because of the fear of reductionism and of confusing the particularities of human phe­ nomena, as well as the dangers of essentialization and reification. However, most scholars see such comparisons as valid and necessary in spite of various caveats: Carter points to the importance of such comparative studies when undertaken using the right methodology that balances descriptive particularities with the explanatory generalities. He stresses that all descriptions inherently contain comparisons.52 Cox argues that despite post-modernist critique, the study of religion is actually based on the creation of typologies which must balance broad generalizations for the sake of comparison with the accurate accounts of specific data.53 Ben-Dor notes that the essence of the social sciences is comparison, looking for similarities in what appears to be different and for differences in what appears to be similar.54 Lawrence stresses that the only way to understand world-wide fundamentalisms is by comparing the phenom­ ena in their various contexts.55 Shepard sees enough commonalties between Islamic and Christian fundamentalisms to justify comparisons.56 Smart refutes those who argue that widely differing contexts invalidate comparisons. He states that while each variant is unique, there are always a range of “alike-claims” and that discerned similarities yield important insights and raise fruitful questions. The danger of particu­ larizing everything is that there is no vocabulary left to describe cul­ tures. Smart also offers a sevenfold framework of religious dimensions as an aid to the comparative study of religions.57 Grew argues that com­ parative studies of fundamentalisms across religious boundaries discover common patterns in their development and environment. He makes sev­ eral suggestions as to various possible areas of fruitful comparisons.58 The comparative study reveals “family resemblances” in broad areas, with subtle differences in each area within each camp and across the religious divide. The resemblances are striking, and a recognition of these parallels helps us gain new insights into the complex world of contemporary fundamentalisms.

51 Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash Of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22–49. 52 Carter. 1998. pp. 133–148. 53 James L. Cox. “Religious Typologies and the Postmodern Critique”, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1998, pp. 244–261. 54 Ben-Dor, 1977. p. 241. 55 Cited by Jones. 1998. “Fundamentalism”. 56 Shepard. 1987. pp. 358–362. 57 Ninian Smart. 1996. Dimensions of the Sacred, pp. 2–6, 8–15. 58 Raymond Grew. “On Seeking the Cultural Context of Fundamentalism” in Marty & Appleby, eds, 1997. Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity, pp. 19–23.

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Shepard sees three levels for comparison: obvious similarities, differences, and a deeper level of mixed and subtle differences and similarities. Differences result from the fact that each fundamentalism tends to stress the distinctives of its own religious traditions. Similarities result from both “fundamentalisms” being a reaction to the crisis of modernism and its perceived attack on authentic values, as well as both belonging to religions that are monotheistic and based on divine revelation in a holy text. Both are supernaturalist in theology, absolutist in ethics, and selec­ tively modern in their methods.59 The overwhelming consensus of scholars seems to endorse compar­ isons across religious boundaries, and many, including Shepard, Hegland, Hallencreuz, Westerlund, Hefner, Ben-Dor, and Roy list striking resem­ blances as well as differences between Islamic and Christian funda­ mentalisms in various areas.60 S  C The first two chapters are introductory, helping place fundamentalisms in their historical and methodological frameworks. The first chapter gives a brief overview of the history of Christian and Islamic funda­ mentalisms aimed at providing a necessary minimum of background contextualization for readers familiar with only one of the two tradi­ tions, not with the other. The second introductory chapter, offers a methodological study of the phenomenon of religious resurgence, offering a theoretical framework in which to conceptualize fundamentalism. In the Weberian sense, the rise of charismatic prophetic individuals has coincided with deep social crises caused by modernity and secularization to produce the emergence of this new type of religious movement intent on competing with sec­ ularism for dominance in society and culture and for reshaping them in its image. Our age is characterized by this clash of paradigms and worldviews between secularism and fundamentalism. The utility of the term “fundamentalism” for comparative studies is investigated. In spite of the many caveats put forward by scholars as to its Christian Protestant origin and its complex polythetic quality, the consensus seems to be that it is still the most useful term for compar­ ative studies, as long as it is clearly defined and carefully used to help

59

Shepard. 1987. pp. 355–378. Shepard. 1987. pp. 359–367; Hegland in Antoun & Hegland, eds., 1987. Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism, pp. 248–249; Hallencreutz & Westerlund in Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 1–8; Hefner. 1993. pp. 3–4; Ben-Dor. 1997. pp. 242–245; Roy, 1994. pp. 65–67. 60

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describe the complex cluster of movements and ideologies involved in the re-affirmation of religious essentials, to identify “family resemblances” across religious divides, and to describe the common opposition of fun­ damentalisms to secularism. No other term seems to serve observers as well. There follows an attempt at defining fundamentalisms and their main characteristics, which include a literalist handling of scripture aligned to radicalism in its application to the contemporary world, extremism in methods, and exclusivism in attitudes to other worldviews. These attrib­ utes encourage efforts at separatism, the founding of pure communities, utopian and millenarian aspirations, and the realization that the world is a battlefield in which true believers are fighting for the forces of light against the forces of darkness. Comparisons across religious divides seem justified to most scholars, and the resulting differences and similarities yield meaningful insights into recurring patterns across religious divides, sharpening the distinc­ tives of each movement. The first chapter closes with a brief compar­ ison of some similarities and differences between the Islamic and Christian forms of fundamentalisms. Chapter three deals with the fundamentalist critique of secularism, a main common denominator of fundamentalisms across the religious divide. There is a clash of worldviews between secularism and funda­ mentalism as they compete for dominance in culture and society. Fundamentalisms are theocentric by definition, placing God and revealed scripture at the heart of the universe, and they accuse secularism of being anthropocentric, placing man at the center of the universe, view­ ing man as autonomous, and relying on unaided human reason as the basis of its philosophical and scientific view of the cosmos. Both fun­ damentalisms developed a markedly similar critique of secularism and of its impact on the modern world, opposing its anti-God tendencies, its separation of religion from public life, and its fragmentation of human society and identity. Fundamentalists see secularism as the ideological source of all evils including moral permissiveness, crime and the break­ down in the family. They further accuse secularism of being relativis­ tic, and of eliminating objective truth from worldview and science, leading to what they perceive as the intellectual despair current at the end of the twentieth century. Chapter four deals with the centrality of scripture and scriptural law. Accepting revealed scripture as God’s inspired and infallible revelation, fundamentalists have to grapple with its interpretation and application. While most prefer a literal interpretation of the text, their literalism does allow for some flexibility and an understanding that certain pas­ sages are symbolic and allegorical. The important thing is not theoret­ ical wrangling over scripture but an attitude of submissive humility towards its ultimate authority, coupled with the will to implement its

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demands in all areas of life. Scripture is viewed as the basis for all true knowledge, to which all areas of human life, including science, must be brought into conformity. Scripture is also seen as law, containing detailed regulations which serve as a framework within which to live out one’s life on earth. The argument is between those who see scripture as pro­ viding broad guidelines to be contextually implemented, and those who view it as a detailed legal system, which must be rigidly implemented. Finally scripture is viewed as a divine handbook for believers in all areas of life. Chapters five and six look at the relationships between fundamen­ talisms, politics and the state. A basic question is whether believers are expected to be involved in politics, and there are divergent views on this topic between the passive pietists and the active participators. Another question is whether scriptural revelation provides a detailed blueprint for an ideal religious political order, or only broad guidelines to be implemented flexibly in accordance to changing contexts. Fundamentalists also differ on the ways and means of implementing scripturally recom­ mended rules on politics and the state. Are democratic involvement and power-sharing permissible and effective in bringing change to legal sys­ tems and political institutions, or should the desired change be brought about by violent revolution? Are all regimes in power ordained by God and to be obeyed, or only those who implement the divine decrees? Where is the border line for civil disobedience or for a violent take­ over of power? These are some of the subjects discussed in fundamen­ talist discourses. Chapter seven investigates the fundamentalist view of life as a peren­ nial battle against the forces of evil, and the trickle-down effect of this view into the areas of personal life and communal activity. While a main area of conflict is within each individual in the moral struggle against sin and temptation, there is also an external struggle against identifiable foes. Another aspect of the battle is directed at demonic forces of evil. The terms used are symbolic, yet they can be manipu­ lated to legitimize violence in certain contexts. Believers are soldiers in God’s army who must be well trained and alert, ready to sacrifice all they have, including their lives, for God’s ultimate triumph. In such a cosmic struggle all must chose sides and there is no room for compromise and neutrality. Binary dichotomies of God versus Satan and light versus darkness, are used to describe the two camps into which humanity is divided. The concept of battle results in the fundamentalist trend to separatism, seen as a defensive setting of boundaries against the hostile world, a means of maintaining purity within the camp, and a positive witness to what the true community should look like. Muslim fundamentalisms also see separation as one stage in the struggle for implementing the Islamic system, modeled on Mu˙ammad’s Meccan period and the hijra to Medina.

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Fundamentalists tend to conspiracy theories in which enemies are identified. Radical fringe movements develop exaggerated conspiracy theories, but these are based on mainstream perceptions. Secularism, Freemasonry, Jews, and a “new world order” are identified as enemies conspiring to destroy true religion. Many Muslim fundamentalists believe in a perennial Christian-Jewish conspiracy to destroy Islam. A recycling of modern anti-Semitism seems common to radical fringe groups in both camps, creating some common ground for cooperation.

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CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PROTESTANT, CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISMS C F Introduction Christian Protestant fundamentalism1 is based on a history of cyclical religious awakenings and revivals reaching back to the Reformation. In the USA it was the Great Awakening of the 18th century and the revivals of the 19th that prepared the ground,2 but there were similar revivals in England and other Protestant European countries. This study focuses mainly on American fundamentalism as it is the largest and most influential of contemporary Christian fundamentalisms. American fundamentalism is the driving force of the world wide phenomenon, as it predominates in both numbers and resources. At the same time it impacts and lives in symbiosis with similar movements around the global Christian world.3 Roots of Contemporary Protestant Fundamentalism The roots of Protestant fundamentalism lie in the response of Conservative Protestants (Evangelicals) to the encroachments of the Enlightenment and of secularism on the Protestant churches at the end of the 19th century and during the early years of the 20th century. During this period modernist liberal theology penetrated the establishment of main­ line Protestant denominations, initiating doctrinal controversies and a struggle for the control of the churches and their institutions. Fundamen­ talism was the specific conservative Protestant reaction to the growing influence of modernism, perceived as denying the uniqueness and author­ ity of the Christian revelation. The movement sought to defend the essential doctrines (fundamentals) of Christianity against the attacks of 1 While this study concentrates on Protestant fundamentalism, it is important to note that there are movements in Catholicism and Orthodoxy which may be labeled fundamentalist too in spite of many differences to the Protestant variety. 2 William Martin. 1996. With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, pp. 3–5. 3 Steve Brouwer, Paul Gifford, & Susan D. Rose, eds., 1996. Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism, pp. 1–6. Also George M. Marsden. 1980. Fundamentalism and Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870–1925, pp. 221–222.

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modernistic thought.4 It was also a response to the alienating upheaval of accelerated industrialization and urbanization of that period.5 Fundamentalists claim that their belief in the essentials of the Christian faith, especially the verbal inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible, is the traditional and orthodox Christian view, prevalent in the early church and dominant until modern times—they are simply returning to tradi­ tional biblical orthodoxy.6 Contemporary American fundamentalists also claim to be inheritors of the worldview of the puritan Founding Fathers mediated through the Evangelical revivalism which dominated 18th and 19th century American culture with its emphasis on individual conver­ sion, piety and voluntarism.7 Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism Whilst some observers see Fundamentalism as a movement parallel to and separate from evangelicalism, it is better to view modern Fundamen­ talism as the conservative wing of Evangelicalism which in turn is the conservative wing of Protestantism.8 Pentecostalists and Charismatics form a distinctive group within Evangelicalism and its fundamentalist wing. They accept fundamental­ ist inerrancy views of scripture and tend to a premillennial view of eschatology. Their unique doctrinal contribution is their stress on an empowering baptism by the Spirit after conversion, and on the avail­ ability of charismatic gifts for all believers.9

4 George M. Marsden. 1991. Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, pp. 7–9; Frank J. Lechner. 1990. “Fundamentalism Revisited”, in Robbins & Anthony, eds. In Gods We Trust, p. 85; Wade, C. Roof. 1986. “The New Fundamentalism: Rebirth of Political Religion in America”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., Prophetic Religions and Politics, p. 19; David W. Cloud. 1995. “Fundamentalism, Modernism, and NewEvangelicalism”, in O Timothy, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1995, Oak Harbor, WA: Way of Life Literature. 5 Ninian Smart. 1987. “Three Forms of Religious Convergence”, in Antoun & Hegeland, eds., 1987. Religious Resurgence in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism”, pp. 224–225; Nancy T. Ammerman. 1991. “North American Protestant Fundamentalism”, in Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 12–13. 6 Hans Kung. 1995. Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Time, pp. 636–637. 7 Simon Coleman. 1996. “Conservative Protestantism, Politics and Civil Religion in the United States”, in David Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, p. 30; Marsden. 1980. pp. 223–225; Lechner. 1990. pp. 82–87. 8 Ammerman, 1991, pp. 2–3; Oliver Barclay. 1997. Evangelicalism in Britain 1935– 1995, pp. 12–14. Barclay distinguishes between Conservative (or Classical), and Libe­ ral Evangelicalism in Britain. Conservative Evangelicals are “those who maintain the doctrine of the reliability, sufficiency, and final authority of the Bible . . .” Liberal Evangelicals are “those who while they maintain some of the other typical Evangelical emphases, do not maintain, and often repudiate, the total reliability of the Bible . . .”; See also Harriet A. Harris. 1998. Fundamentalism and Evangelicals, pp. 1–4. 9 Ammerman. 1991. pp. 3–4.

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Most Black American churches belong doctrinally within the Evangelical and Fundamentalist camp. However due to their long history of segre­ gation and separate development they exhibit a distinct isolationist iden­ tity focused on African-American society and culture.10 Millenarian groups such as the Seventh Day Adventists also fall within the fundamentalist camp. Jehovah Witnesses technically belong to the apo­ litical margins of the same camp due to their militant faith in the author­ ity of the inerrant Bible. However, because of their views on the person of Christ they are regarded by most Fundamentalists as a non-Trinitarian cult. Mormons are seen as definitely outside the Christian camp because of their belief in a different scripture—the Book of Mormon—although they are fundamentalist in their attitudes towards it.11 Evangelicalism Evangelicalism is based on the Reformation doctrine of the Bible as the inerrant revealed Word of God and the ultimate sole authority in all matters of faith and practice. Other essential doctrines characteristic of Evangelicalism include the deity of Christ, his saving and atoning sub­ stitutionary death, the necessity of individual conversion and sanctification, and the importance of active involvement in evangelism.12 Evangelicalism is not a monolithic movement but contains a large variety of orientations. Fundamentalist and Evangelical are often used interchangeably by the media, ignoring the variety of beliefs and groups covered by these terms. In reality, Evangelicals form the larger inclu­ sive constituency, and used as an umbrella term, Evangelicalism includes groups in the older denominations, many independent churches, as well as Pentecostalists and Charismatics. Evangelicals comprise maybe a quar­ ter to a third of the total US population, with approximately one third of Evangelicals being Fundamentalists of various brands.13 10

Ammerman. 1991. p. 3. Ammerman. 1991. p. 4. 12 Alister, E. McGrath. 1997. An Introduction to Christianity, pp. 397–398; Barclay. 1997, pp. 10–14 offers a definition of Evangelicalism based on Bebbington and McGrath which lists five main distinctives: biblicism—seeking to be ruled in life and thought by the teaching of scripture (the final authority and sufficiency of the Bible); crucicentrism (Barclay prefers christocentrism)—salvation is by Christ’s sub­ stitutionary atonement alone; conversionism—the need to be born again spiritually, have a personal experience of God; activism—having a vision for evangelism—in the early 20th century conservatives majored in evangelistic activity almost to the exclusion of social activity. 13 Wade, C. Roof. 1986. “The New Fundamentalism: Rebirth of Political Religion in America”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 19–21, 30–33; See also University of Virginia Sociology Department Webpages on New Religions/Fundamentalism, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden, , which conservatively estimate 30 million Christian fundamentalists in the USA; Also Ammerman. 1991. p. 2. 11

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The variety within Evangelicalism is seen by the many streams feed­ ing into it: Pietism in European Establishment Churches (Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican-Episcopalian); Calvinist Reformed post-millennial theocratic traditions based on the puritan New England Founding Fathers and reaching beyond them to the original Reformers and puritans; pro­ ponents of the 19th century Princeton theological school; Baptist, non­ conformist, and Anabaptist independent and separatist traditions stressing the separation of Church and state and the autonomy of the local con­ gregations; revivalist traditions based on great preachers like the Wesleys, Whitefield, Edwards, Finney, Moody and Graham; the Methodist Holiness movement that developed into Pentecostal and Charismatic renewals; the Keswick Deeper Life movement linked to premillennialist dispensa­ tionalist interpretations of biblical prophecy as developed by J.N. Darby and the Plymouth Brethren; and finally Adventism and millenarianism. These various currents can be grouped into three main streams: the conservatives (mainly Reformed, Baptist and Brethren) who stress right doctrine; the holiness stream which emphasized perfectionism and strict personal ethics; and the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement which stresses the supernatural gifts of the Spirit.14 In spite of their variety, all are united in a common commitment to the essentials or fundamentals of the faith: the ultimate authority of the inerrant and inspired Bible for all matters of faith and practice; indi­ vidual conversion and salvation only by God’s grace through personal faith in Christ’s substitutionary atonement; belief in the literal Virgin birth, death and on the cross, resurrection, ascension and return of Christ; the importance of an upright moral lifestyle, and the duty to take the gospel to the world. Other shared beliefs include the sover­ eignty of god, the fall of men, regeneration through the work of the Holy Spirit, the priesthood of al believers, and good works as the evi­ dence of saving faith. Mainstream Evangelicals stress the positive aspects of Christianity and the essential unity of all believers exhibiting a nonjudgmental attitude to other Christians and interpreting the biblical injunction to be “salt and light” as a command to infiltrate society with the Good News, preserving the good in it, denouncing all its evils, and working for its reform. Contemporary Evangelicalism is in fact a vast and complex international and interdenominational movement with its own discourse, leaders, preachers and institutions.15

Southern Baptists may be the largest fundamentalist denomination, but other groups such as the fundamentalist Baptists accuse them of not being fundamental­ ists. The narrower streams of fundamentalism would exclude Pentecostalists and Charismatics from the fundamentalist fold as well as more moderate Baptists. Graham, Falwell, and Robertson are all attacked as apostates by the extreme wing of fundamentalism. 14 Roof. 1986. pp. 20–22; Ammerman. 1991. pp. 13–14. 15 Jon R. Stone. 1996. “Defining Protestant Orthodoxy: Religious Authentication

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Fundamentalism Fundamentalism, as a conservative Evangelical subgroup, is impacted by mainline Evangelical discourse and shares most mainline Evangelical doctrines. Fundamentalism draws from the same sources, but is marked by a greater intensity in attitudes, a stronger defense of biblical author­ ity and inerrancy, and a greater aggressiveness toward modernist reli­ gious and cultural trends. Fundamentalists share the Evangelical stress on conversion, personal piety and a life of inward experiential religion in contrast to external rituals and creeds.16 Fundamentalists are characterized by a militancy against liberal ten­ dencies, demanding separation from all moral and doctrinal evil and from heretical churches. The bible is seen as a comprehensive and sys­ tematic set of rules for detailed guidance in their personal and com­ munal lives. They stress the negatives of the Bible, and consider it their duty to judge all groups and institutions, identifying and exposing false teachers and teachings.17 In relation to politics there are two theological poles in Fundamentalism: a Reformed theocratic tradition that subordinates civil society to the Church (state law must be based on biblical law and morality), and a separatist pietist-anabaptist position supporting state-church separation and elevating individual conscience guided by scripture above civil author­ ity (God’s law above state law). This dichotomy causes sporadic shifts from a theocratic politically activist stance to a separatist withdrawal from public involvement.18 The Reformed theocratic trend stresses the puritan Pilgrims’ and Founding Fathers’ understanding of covenant as underlying the close and the “New” Evangelicalism, 1940–1960,” in: Bromley & Carter, eds., 1996. Religion and the Social Order, vol. 6. pp. 70–75; Ammerman. 1991. pp. 3–4; Marsden. 1991. p. 5. 16 Cloud. 1995. cites a definition of fundamentalism by the World Congress of Fundamentalists which has eight points: 1. A fundamentalist is a born-again believer in Christ; 2. Maintains an immovable allegiance to the inerrant, infallible, verbally inspired Bible; 3. Believes that whatever the Bible says is so; 4. Judges all things by the Bible, and is judged only by it; 5. Affirms the foundational truths of the historic Christian faith: the Trinity; the incarnation, virgin birth, substitutionary atonement, bodily resurrection, glorious ascension, and Second Coming of Jesus Christ; the new birth through regeneration by Spirit, the resurrection of saints to eternal life and of the ungodly to final judgment, the fellowship of saints as the body of Christ; 6. Is loyal to the faith and endeavors to preach it to every crea­ ture; 7. Exposes and separates from all ecclesiastical denial of the faith, compro­ mise with error, apostasy from the Truth; 8. Earnestly contends for the faith once delivered. 17 Ibid. Also Barclay. 1997. pp. 9–14. Barclay differentiates between American fundamentalists and British Conservative Evangelicals because of their different his­ tory and ethos, yet admits that they share a similar insistence on the key biblical doctrines 18 Roof. 1988. p. 21; Brouwer, Gifford, & Rose, eds., 1996. pp. 13–15; Coleman. 1996. pp. 27–28.

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relationship between church and state and of Americans as a chosen people. The separatist pole is emphasized by the Baptists and other Independents who insist on the strict separation of Church and state as the guarantee of religious freedom and of personal liberties. Dispen­ sationalism, which became dominant in early to mid-20th century fun­ damentalism, strengthened the separatist pole as it stressed the futility of trying to change the sinful human condition by social or legal reform, the only hope for the world being Christ’s Second Coming and his mil­ lennial reign. While some observers see premillennialism as a hallmark of fundamentalism, there have always been postmillennial tendencies within the Calvinist stream.19 Relationship between Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism The relationship between Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism is some­ what confusing and has been treated differently by various protagonists. Some, like Martin Lloyd-Jones (1899–1981) define all of Evangelicalism in fundamentalist terms, arguing that the term Evangelical is a limiting term that distinguishes Evangelicals from other Christians who are too vague and ecumenical on the central biblical doctrines. Evangelicals are defined by their submission to the Bible as the only authority, and they reject the authority of traditions that add to, or subtract from, scrip­ ture, distrusting reason that places human understanding above God’s revelation. Reason and scholarship in this view are good servants but bad masters. They must not be allowed to determine what Christians believe, but only how to believe. Other characteristics of true Evangeli­ calism, according to Lloyd-Jones, are an activism that puts belief into practice, a strict behavioral code, a rejection of dead orthodoxy, and an emphasis on regeneration and on a new life from God.20 Others like McGrath use the term Evangelicalism to differentiate between Evangelicals who are seen in a positive light as mainstream Christians, and fundamentalists who are viewed negatively as sectarian offshoots. They accept an overlap in the beliefs of both groups which however mask real differences in outlook. Evangelicalism is the broader trend which places particular emphasis on the place of scripture in the Christian life. Fundamentalism is a reaction of some Evangelicals to the rise of secularism, a counter-cultural movement with tight criteria of membership that uses “doctrinal affirmations to define cultural barri­ ers”. Evangelicalism on the other hand is a cultural movement with looser criteria of self-definition. Fundamentalism totally rejects biblical

19

Martin. 1996. pp. 1–2; Ammerman. 1991. p. 38. Martyn D. Lloyd-Jones. 1992, What is an Evangelical? pp. 16–26, 33–61; LloydJones also adds an interest in revival; primacy to preaching and concern for evan­ gelism as main characteristics of true Evangelicals. 20

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criticism and is committed to a literal interpretation of the Bible, while Evangelicalism accepts a limited and responsibly applied criticism of scripture. Finally, in this view, Fundamentalism is committed to a sys­ tem of doctrines which seem peripheral to mainstream Evangelicals.21 In reality, mainstream Evangelicalism has a slightly more flexible atti­ tude to the interpretation of scripture than its fundamentalist wing, and a more liberal wing of Evangelicalism is also emerging today. Evangelic­ alism is thus a multi-faceted movement, and the borderline between mainline Evangelical and Fundamentalist is vague, fluid and flexible, running not just between denominations, but within various denomina­ tions as well as within specific churches. Even individuals may have broader Evangelical views on some issues and narrower fundamentalist views on others.22 On the Fringes—the Hard Right or the Lunatic Fringe In the United States there have always been strong Christian-populist currents. William Jennings Bryan, presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, and prosecutor at the Scopes trial in 1926, embodied this move­ ment in the early 20th century. In the 1940s and 1950s the ultra-conservative and anti-communist fundamentalist-separatists like Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis continued this tradition. This current also fed on the exceptionalist belief in the special God-ordained status of the United States (manifest destiny), as proclaimed by the Calvinist Founding Fathers who believed that God had made a special covenant with them that guaranteed their supremacy over heathen Indians, African slaves, and Catholic settlers.23 In contemporary America, these currents are still present in ultra con­ servative political circles and in Christian fundamentalism. On the fringes of these currents operate a multitude of groups with a variety of ide­ ologies and agendas. These are fed by the populist heritage, apocalyp­ tic millennialism and conspiracy theories. The most extreme adopt white supremacism, racism, anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism. They include such groups as the John Birch Society, the Patriotic Militias, Christian Identity, Liberty Lobby, The Constitution Action Party, the Independent American Party, and many more. All these groups display overlapping areas of agreement with the mainstream Religious Right as well as areas of dis­ agreement. The streams flowing into this conglomeration of groups in­ clude militant gun-rights advocates, survivalists, anti-tax protesters, extreme

21

Alister E. McGrath. 1994. Christian Theology: An Introduction, pp. 111–113. Coleman. 1996. p. 43; Barclay. 1997. p. 12 defines liberal Evangelicalism as the insistence on Christian doctrines being re-defined so as to harmonize them with the spirit of the age. 23 Brouwer, Gifford & Rose, 1996. pp. 16–19. 22

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anti-abortionists, militant anti-environmentalists, the militant county move­ ment, the Tenth Amendment movement, states-sovereignty movements, and elements of racist, anti-Semitic, or Neo-Nazi movements. These have become prominent in the public eye in recent years due to the Weaver case, the Waco incident, and the Oklahoma City bombing.24 The links of Protestant fundamentalism to militant extremist groups are controversial, and most mainstream fundamentalists and Evangelicals reject the extreme groups as non-Christian. However, all these groups include some religious Christian fundamentalist views in their agenda, although for most it is obscured by prioritized nativist, populist, and authoritarian political goals.25 Also, there is a historic tradition of anti­ black, anti-Semitic, and anti-federal government sentiments within parts of fundamentalism that continue to feed the far-out periphery. While repudiated by most fundamentalists, many of these extremists see them­ selves as true inheritors of the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant heritage of America.26

24 Greg R. Broderick. 1996. “The Lunatic Fringes” published on the Internet in The Radical Religious Right Pages, ; Chip Bertlet & Matthew L Lyons. “Militia Nation” reprinted from the Progressive Magazine in The Public Eye, sponsored by Political Research Associates, ; In the 1992 Weaver case, US Marshals besieged the cabin of Christian Identity member Randy Weaver in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, when he missed a court appearance on a gun charge. In the ensu­ ing gun fight they killed his wife and his fourteen year-old son. At Waco in 1993 federal agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) besieged the apocalyptic Christian Branch Davidian group under their leader David Koresh. The siege ended in a fire that destroyed the compound and killed 126 members of the group. In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing the federal Arthur R. Murrah building was blown up by a self-made bomb, a blast that killed 347 people. It was planted by a right-wing militia activist, Timothy McVeigh. See Richard Abanes. 1996. American Militias, pp. 1, 43–62. 25 Abanes calls for a clear line of demarcation between responsible evangelicals and radical extremists. He deplores the fact that some mainline fundamentalist Christians foolishly endorse racist leaders because of some common ground on sin­ gle issues such as abortion and fear of big government. Abanes sees a blurring of distinctions especially in the militant pro-life movement. See Abanes. 1996. pp. 218–221. 26 Martin. 1996. pp. 16–22. Martin mentions Gerald Winrod and Gerald L.K. Smith as typical exponents of these trends. Both were active mainly in the 1920s and 1930s and espoused racist, anti-Semitic, anti-communist and pro-fascist stands intertwining them with their fundamentalist doctrines and patriotic American posi­ tions. They had large followings for a while. Smith especially had close links to Henry Ford who was an avowed anti-Semite.

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Historical Outline 1. Reformation and Pietist Background (15th–18th Century) The Reformation laid the foundation for fundamentalism by its insis­ tence on “sola scriptura” as against Catholic claims of equal authority to church tradition and doctrine. Reformation theology developed a systematic doctrine of the verbal inspiration, inerrancy and infallibility of Scripture.27 The term “Evangelical” was first used in the 16th century to distin­ guish Reformers from Roman Catholics, and was later applied to the pietistic movements that sought to revitalize a church paralyzed by ster­ ile orthodoxy. Pietists stressed an experiential personal living faith and individual Bible study in their efforts at reform.28 2. Evangelicalism in the 19th Century During most of the 19th century Evangelicalism dominated a consid­ erable segment of Protestantism in the United States and in Britain, although liberal theology was making significant inroads. In America especially, Evangelicalism dominated the religious, spiritual and cultural establishments that determined the norms of society. Many Protestant leaders saw America as a Christian civilization based on shared reli­ gious, cultural and moral principles that integrated society.29 Evangelical revivals renewed the social conscience of many Evangelicals who then adopted a variety of social causes such as the abolition of slavery, prison reform, child labor reform, temperance, and education for the poor, founding many philanthropic and charitable institutions such as mission hospitals, homes for unwed mothers, educational insti­ tutions for the blind and deaf, homes for the mentally handicapped and orphanages. Social concern was combined with evangelism, as they were convinced that social reform without personal regeneration had no last­ ing impact.30 In England notable Evangelicals like William Wilberforce, Lord Shaftesbury, and William E. Gladstone were very influential in politics,

27

Kung. 1995. pp. 537–638. McGrath. 1994. pp. 73–74; 110–11. Well known Pietist leaders included Philip Jakob Spener, August Francke, and Count Nikolaus von Zinzendorf in Germany; John Owen, John Wesley, George Whitefield, Howel Harris and the Haldane broth­ ers in Britain; and Cotton Mather, Jonathan Edwards, and Lyman Beeecher in America. 29 Marsden. 1991. p. 10. 30 John Stott. 1984. Issues Facing Christians Today: New Perspectives on Social & Moral Dilemmas, pp. 2–3; See also Martin. 1996. pp. 4–5 who claims that converts of the Finney and Moody revivals where very active in progressive social movements of that era, while a wealthy elite of radical Evangelical businessmen (The Association of Gentlemen) helped bankroll these ventures. 28

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espousing social causes like the abolition of slavery. At the same time nonconformist Evangelicals like the Baptists, Plymouth Brethren and the Salvation Army evangelized the middle and working classes. Similar movements took place on the European continent.31 Darby and the Brethren Movement John Nelson Darby (1800–1882) and the Brethren movement he founded in Britain provided contemporary fundamentalism with a model and a doctrinal basis for separatism. Darby was among the founders of premillennial dispensationalism which argued that the real hope of believers was not a progressively improving world, but the second coming of Christ. The world is getting progressively more evil as it nears the end times, while the institutional church in all its forms is in irreversible ruin and apostasy. It is the duty of all true believers to separate from all ties with official churches, meeting only with likeminded believers solely in the name of Christ in communities that have no denominational affiliation. These separated communities serve as the only true representatives of the true universal Church. Brethren teaching impacted Evangelicals in Britain, the United States and the Continent far beyond their own small numbers.32 Major Causes of Fundamentalist Backlash Liberal theology accepted sev­ eral concepts that precipitated the fundamentalist backlash among Evangelicals. The Darwinian theory of evolution was denounced by con­ servatives as a rejection of the Biblical account of creation and of tra­ ditional Christian understanding of human nature. Higher Biblical Criticism rejected the traditional authorship of Biblical books teaching they were a synthesis of various documents collected over an extended period of time and edited into one volume by later redactors. Conservatives rejected Biblical criticism as an attack on the inerrancy and authority of Scripture. Anti-supernaturalism rejected the miracles of the Bible as contradictory to scientific fact and to reason, while conservatives accepted all Scriptural miracle accounts literally.33 The upheavals caused by the industrial revolution and the ma­ ssive rural to urban migrations caused much misery and poverty in the 31 Barclay. 1997. p. 15; Roof. 1986. p. 21; Lloyd-Jones. 1992. pp. 14–15; The Blumhardts and Johann Heinrich Wichern were noted for their social involvement in Germany, while the Dutch Calvinist Abraham Kuyper founded the Free University in Amsterdam and became Prime Minister of Holland. 32 Max S. Weremchuk. 1992. John Nelson Darby: A Biography, pp. 60–64; 77–86; Darby himself left the Episcopal Church in Ireland in which he was an ordained minister. The Plymouth Brethren he co-founded later split into a strictly separatist “Exclusive” wing in which various groups kept on splitting from each other, and in the more Evangelical “Open Brethren” that deeply impacted the wider Evangelical sector in Britain and the United States. 33 Martin. 1996. pp. 6–7; Ammerman. 1991. pp. 9–11.

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overcrowded cities. Liberals responded with the social gospel theology which strove to reform society and its institutions solely by human efforts on the basis of Christian moral values in a process viewed as leading to the founding of God’s Kingdom on earth. In response, conservatives stressed the importance of individual conversion and transformation as the basis of social morality, and the return of Christ to set up his Kingdom as the only eschatological hope.34 By the end of the 19th century, most mainline denominations and their institutions had accepted the modernist stand, liberals gradually taking over most central institutions, so conflict between them and the conservatives was inevitable. Fundamentalism was the backlash of the threatened conservative Evangelicals who became preoccupied with defending the threatened fundamentals of the faith.35 3. Eearly 20th Century to Mid Century By the turn of the 20th century, conservatives were on the defensive, struggling to root out heresy and demanding public tests of orthodoxy for ministers and seminary staff. They finally lost control of the denom­ inations and began to separate from them to set up their own enclaves of separated churches and institutions.36 The liberal victory was some­ what hollow, denominations experiencing a major decline in their num­ bers as fundamentalist dissidents judged them unreformable, apostate, and corrupt, and separated out of them to gather into their own com­ munities of “true believers”. The publication and wide distribution of “The Fundamentals” (1910–1915), Edited by R.A. Torrey (1865–1928), was the catalyst for the emergence of modern fundamentalism. This was a collection of articles against modernism by a wide range of American and European conservatives defending five basic doctrines of Christianity: the inspiration and infal­ libility of scripture; the deity of Christ; the substitutionary atonement; the literal resurrection of Christ from the dead and his bodily ascen­ sion; and the literal return of Christ in his Second Coming. These five doctrines were identified as the essential “fundamentals” of the Christian faith, the criterion of true belief. The term “fundamentalism” was coined in 1920 by Curtis Lee Laws, a Baptist editor of the Watchman-Examiner. Gradually the term “fundamentalism” came to cover all conservative streams: independent, fundamentalist Baptist, scholarly theocratic Calvinist, premillennial-dispensationalist, and Pentecostal-Charismatic.37

34 Ammerman. 1991. pp. 12–14; Also Stott. 1984. pp. 6–7. Stott identifies Walter Rauschenbach as the leading exponent of the liberal “social gospel”. 35 Roof. 1986. p. 20; Stott. 1984. pp. 6–7. 36 Martin. 1996. pp. 15–17; Coleman. 1996. pp. 30–31; Also Stone. 1996. p. 71. 37 Hallencreutz & Westerlund, in David Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the

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The Interwar Period Following WWI many Evangelicals perceived Christian culture to be threatened by evolutionary philosophy; socialist and communist revolutionary conspiracies; and by permissive morals invading society especially in the movies and the media. The very future of Bible-based Christian civilization was at stake, and fundamentalists to defend it against these evil threats.38 The ravages of WWI confirmed fundamentalist convictions on the depravity of human nature and the inability of humans to help them­ selves. The pre-millennial dispensationalist teaching of J.N. Darby, spread by the popular Scofield Bible, seemed in harmony with the desperate situation of the post-war world. The evil world system seemed beyond redemption, and only the return of Christ to set up his kingdom could reverse this inevitable trend. Meanwhile believers had best concentrate on saving individual sinners rather than on a futile attempt to reform society in general. While fundamentalists, like most Americans, were apprehensive of communism and of perceived world-wide conspiracies, they eschewed politics and concentrated on winning souls, building schools, and expanding their ministries to believers, using dispensational premillennialism to legitimize their withdrawal from public life.39 The 1925 Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee, gave the final blow to fundamentalist activism in public life. This trial ended in public embar­ rassment for fundamentalists which convinced them to withdraw from the mainstream of American society and concentrate on building their own separatist enclaves. For instance, J. Gresham Machen of Princeton Theological Seminary, a leading conservative scholar in the Reformed tradition, resigned his post in Princeton Seminary in 1929 to found Westminster Theological Seminary, as a conservative Reformed theo­ logical stronghold.40

Secular State, Introduction, pp. 1–5; J.D. Douglas, ed., 1978. The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, pp. 396–397. 38 Roof. 1986. pp. 21–22; Martin. 1996. pp. 15–17. 39 Marsden. 1980. pp. 206–211; Stott. 1984. pp. 8; Roof. 1986. pp. 21–22; Dispensationalist premillenial eschatology was first preached by John Nelson Darby, an influential Anglo-Irish minister who left the established church and became one of the founders of the Plymouth Brethren. Darby widely toured both the European continent and the United States, and many from all denominations were influenced by his teachings which became a mark of the arising fundamentalist wave along­ side Princeton theology, Biblical literalism, and Holiness teaching. 40 Kung. 1995. p. 640; The so-called “Monkey Trial” at Dayton Tennessee in 1925 pitted the anti-evolutionist fundamentalists against the liberal secular-humanists of the time. A young high school science teacher, John T. Scopes was charged with teaching biological evolution theory, thus contravening a recently enacted state law. The trial became a sensational contest in which William Jennings Bryan, a famous Southern politician, championed the antievolutionist party against Clarence Darrow, a leading lawyer who defended Scopes and modern skepticism. Although Scopes was found guilty and fined, the publicity surrounding the trial, skillfully

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Fundamentalists turned inward during the 1930s and 1940s, con­ centrating on building and consolidating their own enclaves. These efforts included a massive increase in the founding of Bible colleges, seminar­ ies and other fundamentalist institutions. In the second quarter of the 20th century fundamentalism grew to become the most influential Evangelical movement, dominant in American missionary activity worldwide.41 4. Reaction against Insularity and Marginalization (1940s–1960s) Following a period of consolidation, fundamentalists by the 1940s were ready for a comeback. Many reacted against their cultural insularity and the bitter infighting in their enclaves. Harold Ockenga, Carl Henry and Edward Carnell, scholars on the staff of Fuller Seminary, stressed that in order to achieve revival believers had to emerge from their ivory towers and witness to the relevance of the Gospel to modern society. They called for a reappraisal of the fundamentalist stand on social issues which had deviated from Evangelical 19th century pattern of involve­ ment. This desire to impact American society as a whole and initiate a new revival could only be attained by all believers co-operating and pooling their resources. These “Neo-Evangelicals” founded the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in 1942 to counter the more sepa­ ratist American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) founded in 1941. They had a more irenic attitude to other Evangelicals and looked for new ways to meet the challenges posed by the accelerated changes in American society.42 Whilst both groups shared a similar fundamentalist doctrinal base, the moderates shifted to a more positive and accommodating attitude in order to broaden their constituency and impact wider society. They also returned to the older Evangelical interest in social activism. The stricter camp on the other hand, continued to stress the need of purg­ ing the churches from modernism and separating from other sinful churches and institutions. This trend was most visible in Carl McIntyre, leader of the separatist Bible Presbyterians, who saw it as the mission of the ACCC to expose apostasy within the denominations.43

manipulated by H.L. Mencken, (whose reports ridiculed fundamentalists as rural, backward, ignorant, illiterate, bigoted country bumpkins, totally out of touch with modern scientific progress), discredited fundamentalism in the public eye and initi­ ated its withdrawal from mainstream religious and cultural life; See also Marsden. 1980. pp. 184–189; McGrath. 1997. pp. 329–330. 41 Marsden. 1987. pp. 8–11; See also Martin. 1996. pp. 17–18. Martin claims that between 1930 and 1950 the number of these institutions jumped from 49 to 144. 42 Stone. 1996. pp. 70–75; Martin. 1996. pp. 22–23. 43 Stone. 1996. pp. 72–75.

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The Neo-evangelicals founded a number of youth movements that aimed at being culturally relevant while remaining faithful to biblical doctrine. Youth for Christ (in which Billy Graham had his first expe­ rience of evangelistic work) was established in 1945, and Campus Crusade (aimed at students on campuses) in 1951. Together with Inter-Varsity they have had a tremendous impact in nurturing a new generation of activist Evangelical youth, very effective in outreach to young people outside the Evangelical sphere, many of whom were converted and trained for leadership. These movements also experimented with mod­ ern organizational techniques and intensive one-to-one approaches.44 The tensions between various factions emerged in the 1950s in a con­ frontation over Billy Graham’s evangelistic campaigns. In 1957 Graham was invited by an independent committee of clergy and laity to hold a crusade in New York. Fundamentalist leaders, many of whom had pre­ viously supported Billy Graham, opposed any co-operation with liberal churches represented on the committee. They insisted that all co-operating clergy sign a fundamentalist doctrinal statement to which the lib­ eral clergy would not assent. By accepting the invitation of the committee Graham angered the separatist fundamentalists who denounced his “ecu­ menism”, while the New Evangelicals defended his decision.45 The fractures in national self-esteem engendered by the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, as well as the growing unease at the break­ down of the family and of public morals and the rise in crime resulted in the New Christian Right which was able to mobilize multitudes of conservatives through its various programs, gaining a recognizable profile in the media. Its rise is also partly due to the effective use of new media technologies to reach larger audiences.46 The growing threat of secular-humanism usurping total hegemony over American culture aroused many fundamentalists to become more active in the public sphere. Secularists seemed to have taken over not just culture in general, but all the power centers of American society, including government, education, and the judiciary, leaving fundamen­ talists with the feeling that they were aliens in their own land.47 It was 44 Martin. 1996. pp. 25–29. Other movements worth mentioning are The Navigators, Youth With A Mission, and Operation Mobilization. 45 Billy Graham. 1997. Just As I Am, pp. 297–324. Graham mentions that many of the fundamentalist leaders were his personal friends and supporters in the early years of his public ministry. Their criticism, especially their harshness, hurt him deeply, but he had to follow what he felt was God’s leading; Also Cully & Cully, eds., 1990. Harper’s encyclopedia of Religious Education, p. 264; Lloyd-Jones. 1992. pp. 22–23 shows that in Britain too the first Billy Graham campaigns in the 1950s cre­ ated similar tensions. Lloyd-Jones criticizes Graham for his willingness to be spon­ sored by people who in reality deny the message he is preaching. 46 Coleman, 1996. pp. 31–33. 47 Emmanual Sivan. 1995. “The Enclave Culture” in Marty & Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 13–14.

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the High Court’s banning of school prayers and of Bible reading in public schools (1962–3) that was a main catalyst in arousing fundamen­ talists. While some groups continued in their isolationist apolitical stand, many sought for new ways to impact society, politics and culture in a bid to stop the shift to permissive moral values. Many united in tenta­ tive organizational experiments on such issues as civil liberties, school prayers, and sex-education in schools. This experience bore fruit in the last three decades of the century as the religious right became more adept at lobbying and pressurizing state and federal legislatures and at mobilizing large numbers of conservative Christians in their networks. Differing Reactions to Hippie Era During the social upheavals and stu­ dent turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s separatist fundamental­ ists and Neo-Evangelicals reacted differently to the hippie movement. Separatists viewed it as evil and demanded separation from all expres­ sions of the new culture, whilst Neo-Evangelicalism was more sensitive to some of the revolution’s critique of the establishment.48 As a reac­ tion to the excesses of the hippie movement and the counter-culture, the Jesus movement arose in the 1960s, composed mainly of young con­ servative Evangelicals, the movement spread across North America and Europe in the 1970s. Its followers used the high-profile methods of the counter-culture such as car stickers, posters, balloons, T-shirts and var­ ious media outlets to proclaim the “Jesus Revolution” and its message of love. It fed into charismatic and other renewal movements in vari­ ous churches, gave a new impetus to modern missionary groups such as Youth With a Mission, Jews for Jesus, and Operation Mobilization, and also generated some new cults such as the Children of God.49 Neo-evangelicalism since the 1950s has regained intellectual and moral respectability in the wider society through the evangelistic crusades of Billy Graham, the founding of Christianity Today magazine, and the emer­ gence of high quality distinctively Evangelical seminaries. Separatist fun­ damentalists, however, are still disparaged as unreasonable and militant religious fanatics actively fighting moral decadence in society, seeking to enforce a puritan public morality on society at large.50 5. Resurgence of Activism (1970s & 1980s) Protestant fundamentalism was quietly active in the public sphere since the 1950s, but its visible and strident resurgence since the 1970s caught many by surprise. Most observers had assumed that it was in­ herently passive, separatist, and in decline, failing to note the changes

48 49 50

Cully & Cully, eds., 1990. p. 264.

Rosemary Goring, ed., 1995. The Wordsworth Dictionary of Beliefs and Religion, p. 262.

Stone. 1990. pp. 74–86; Also Ammerman. 1991. p. 37.

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developing within it.51 The ignorance of Evangelical terminology dis­ played by the media when Jimmy Carter appeared as a presidential candidate in 1976 demonstrates the supposed marginality of funda­ mentalism in the perceptions of opinion formers and the media.52 The fundamentalist resurgence was driven by the radical moral shifts in American society as expressed in new permissive attitudes to drugs, homosexuality, abortion, and crime. Fundamentalists saw these attitudes as threatening to destroy traditional Christian values, and a more activist and politicized fundamentalist stance emerged intent on challenging the secular-humanist forces pushing the new morality and of calling Ameri­ cans back to biblical Christian norms.53 The new activists entered the democratic process, seeking to transform society from below by organ­ izing Christians at the grassroots level, and from above by pushing for legislation in line with fundamentalist beliefs. This was enhanced by a theological shift from a dominant premillennialist to a dominant postmillennialist standpoint.54 This emerging “Neo-fundamentalism” was exemplified by Jerry Falwell who in the 1950s had proclaimed himself a separatist fundamentalist focused solely on soul winning.55 He became politicized in the late 1970s, founding the Moral Majority movement in 1979 which united with other similar movements to mobilize large segments of conservative Protestantism in political action against liberal secular humanism.56 By appropriating symbols of American civil religion they gained a high public profile and widespread cultural and political legitimation, impact­ ing senatorial and congressional contests and playing an important role in Reagan’s successful presidential bids in 1980 and 1984.57

51

Roof. 1986. pp. 19–20. Martin. 1996. pp. 148–149. 53 Roof. 1986. pp. 26–28; The Vietnam war and the hostage crisis activated deep-seated anxieties about the nation’s future, while High Court decisions legaliz­ ing abortion and forbidding school prayers, were seen as the work of liberal-secularists bent on breaking America’s cultural identity. 54 Coleman. 1996. pp. 32–33; Almond, Sivan & Appleby. 1995. “Examining the Cases” in Marty & Appleby. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 451–452. 55 Almond, Sivan & Appleby. 1995. p. 451. 56 Martin. 1996. p. 201 quotes Falwell’s goals for the Moral Majority as mobi­ lizing all grassroot ‘moral’ Americans to political activism; keeping them informed of what politicians and legislators are scheming to do; lobbying Congress and state legislatures to defeat immoral, left-wing secular-humanist bills; pushing for positive legislation in line with religious and moral values; and fighting immorality in all it forms in the public arena: pornography, homosexuality, and immorality in school text books. 57 D. Westerlund. 1996. in Westerlund, ed., pp. 11–15; See also Marsden. 1980. p. 228; Phyllis Schlafly estimated that the number of involved people in the con­ servative movement had risen from 27 million in 1964 (exemplified by those who voted for Barry Goldwater) to 54 million in 1984. Quoted in Martin. 1996. p. 88. 52

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Observers also note the extraordinary impact of Francis Schaeffer on the Evangelical world. A missionary, theologian and philosopher of Reformed background, his lectures and writings challenged believers to be ‘in the world though not of it’. Stressing that God is Lord of every realm in the universe, and that all truth is God’s truth he encouraged believers to study all of culture (including art, music, film, theatre, lit­ erature, science and politics), and reclaim it for God by being cultur­ ally relevant and involved. Schaeffer encouraged Evangelical leaders like Falwell to study the inside workings of government, the ways in which the political process can be influenced, and to mobilize grassroots Evangelicals as a lobbying force in the political sphere. He also encour­ aged Evangelicals to build alliances with groups they differed with the­ ologically but with whom they agreed on specific goals, such as pro-life (anti-abortion), pro-family, anti-gay, anti-ERA, and anti-governmental meddling in private schools (the concept of co-belligerency). This prag­ matism was crucial to the shift from pietistic separatism as many in var­ ious churches shifted to a political activism aimed at subduing the state and the economic and social institutions to God’s sovereignty.58 To counter the crisis of authority in the United States after Vietnam and the Watergate affair, fundamentalists drew on the immense resid­ ual prestige of the Bible in America, especially in the South which was becoming more affluent and politically important.59 Entering the polit­ ical arena as a means of taking over secular institutions for the Kingdom of God caused a shift in attitudes to material success and to progress which became more positive. The world’s resources such as money, pol­ itics, and art were now perceived not as inherently evil, but as morally “neutral”. They can be put to good or evil use, and believers were now challenged to claim all of them for God. A marker of this shift was the emergence of faith movements committed to prosperity theology and to a gospel of personal success. The televangelism of Falwell, the Bakkers, Swaggart, and Robertson all contributed to the rising impact of fundamentalism on American society. Fundamentalists re-discovered the efficient use of the mass media in the 1970s, the new televangelists combining religious themes, patri­ otism, symbols of civil religion and a call for national repentance to save the nation from its humiliations in Vietnam and in the Watergate

58

Martin. 1996. pp. 159–160, 196–197. William S. Bainbridge. 1997. The Sociology of Religious Movements, pp. 16–20. Bainbridge quotes a GSS (General Social Survey) study in the USA which claims that 80% of Americans regard the Bible as the inspired word of God. Of a rep­ resentative sample of all Americans, 35% agreed to the statement that “the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”, the other 45% agreed that “the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.” 59

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scandal. While teaching that God was punishing the nation for its back­ sliding, they stressed that restoration was possible by means of repen­ tance and renewal of the covenant with God.60 New fundamentalist organizations like the Moral Majority, the Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, Christian Freedom Foundation, Coalition for Traditional Values and the Christian Alliance became increasingly involved in electoral politics in an attempt to improve public morality. They adopted aggressive modern professional organizational tactics such as lobbies, bloc-vote organizing groups, targeted mailing lists, fund rais­ ing, and courting legislators. Other methods include computerized tar­ geting of audiences concerned about specific issues. and the issuing of report cards on the views of public officials and political candidates on specific moral issues. Another development is the proliferation of Evangelical think-tanks in the last decades, preparing position-papers on many issues and targeting Congressmen, Senators and others in high positions. Fundamentalist lobbies also effectively focused on one-issue politics such as opposition to abortion, support of an amendment to permit public school prayers, and teaching creationism in high schools, forging alliances with other groups that had similar concerns in order to maximize their impact on politics. Following a 1978 attempt of the Internal Revenue Service to revoke tax-exempt status from private schools a coalition that included Catholics and Jews in addition to Evangelicals was formed that opposed this plan and forced the IRS to rescind it. For many this was the beginning of a politically effective movement able to impact Congress.61 At the same time a significant minority of fundamentalists remained in a separatist and passivist stance. Premillennialists especially remained convinced that the world was doomed to inevitable moral decline until the Second Coming and that political activism was both useless and corrupting.62 6. More Political Involvement and the Building of Alliances (The 1990s) A second wave of fundamentalist activism was launched in the late 80s and early 90s by Pat Robertson and his Christian Coalition who suc­ cessfully mobilized a large constituency and a wide network of sup­ porters to become powerful players in American politics. Focusing on local politics they combined their ideology with an organizational frame­ work of extensive networking, efficient lobbying, and aggressive directmail campaigns which had an impact on state and federal power centers.63

60 61 62 63

Roof. 1986. pp. 26–27.

Roof. 1986. p. 24; Martin. 1996. pp. 172–173.

Coleman. 1996. pp. 31–33.

Coleman. 1996. pp. 37–39; Robertson ran for the Republican Presidential

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The contemporary fundamentalist movements target secular human­ ism as the main enemy, an ideology seen as the source of all the sins of the modern world, opposed to any faith in God, absolute moral val­ ues, the traditional family, and religious education. It is perceived as a coherent movement conspiring to tempt believers into immorality and unbelief in order to undermine America’s moral and spiritual foundations.64 As secularism is the main common enemy, some fundamental­ ists are now willing to build common-interest partnerships with groups previously viewed as adversaries such as Roman Catholics, Mormons, Jews, and to some extent Muslims, in order to create broad public sup­ port for specific moral agendas. A number of “New Christian Right” leaders are actually Catholic, Jewish or Mormon, in addition to the many Protestants.65 The anti-abortion and pro-life issues are important rallying points for this broader coalition, enabling believers of diverse faiths to unite around specific issues disregarding older controversies. Many fundamentalists are now willing to marginalize denominational and religious controversies in order to cooperate with members of other religious persuasions who share similar concerns. As the center of unity has shifted from doctrine to moral causes, there is a new willingness to create cross-denominational alliances, and this is a marker of the more moderate contemporary fundamentalist movements.66 Moving from their originally separatist position of Christianity against culture, some fundamentalists have in recent decades shifted their efforts to reform culture from within. This shift is expressed in the explosion in Christian publications on themes such as popular psychology, selfrealization, positive thinking, how-to-succeed guides, Christian sex man­ uals, and money guides as well as in the proliferation of Christian soap operas, posters, bumper stickers, and a host of advertising gimmicks. The “Electronic Church” is part of this trend, using polished, mediawise evangelists to present its religious messages, and utilizing the most sophisticated electronic equipment and production techniques. Popular programs like the PTL Club and the 700 Club utilize entertainment techniques borrowed from secular radio and television that focus on the felt personal concerns and immediate needs of viewers “in an atmos­ phere of spontaneity, surprise, sharing and smiling”.67

nomination in 1988. While his bid did not succeed, the support he garnered and the publicity surrounding his bid enhanced the self-image of Evangelicals and their conviction that they could impact the political process. 64 Martin. 1996. p. 196. 65 Richard Vaguerie and Phyllis Schafly are Catholics, Orrin Hatch is Mormon, Paul Weyrich is Eastern Rite Catholic, Howard Phillips is Jewish. 66 Roof. 1986. pp. 24–25. 67 Roof. 1986. p. 25.

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Clinton’s victory in the 1992 election galvanized the religious right to focus more on organizing grassroots activities. As a result, member­ ship in the Christian Coalition doubled during 1993, and in the 1994 Congressional elections the Religious Right gained many seats in both houses, enabling a partial implementation of Newt Gingrich’s “Contract With America”. In parallel, the Christian Coalition launched their Con­ tract with the American Family to advance Evangelical concerns in the areas of family, education and public morality.68 Dr. James Dobson and his Focus on the Family organization were another very powerful profamily political and cultural force impacting millions of Americans. The Promise Keepers emerged in 1990 as a Christian male move­ ment concerned with the erosion of the traditional family and the low self-esteem of men under the impact of extreme feminism. They claim that the decline of the American family is partly due to the feminiza­ tion of men neglecting the leadership role God has given them in the family. Promise Keepers want to restore the paradigm of the patriar­ chal biblical family, urging men to repent of their neglect of their Godgiven roles as husbands, fathers, and providers, and encouraging them to fulfill their position as spiritual leaders in their families.69 Some Characteristics of Contemporary Protestant Fundamentalism Use of Religious Education, Publishing & Media Fundamentalists have always used religious education based on the Sunday School as a primary vehicle for transmitting their faith. Starting in the 1970s thousands of private Christian primary and secondary schools were founded as a response to the perceived secularism, immoral­ ity, relativism and indiscipline rampant in the public school sector. Their curriculum stressed a Biblical approach to life including Biblical cre­ ationism, an emphasis on Christian values, and firm discipline.70 Home schooling has also burgeoned since the 1980s, with the aim of keeping children pure and protected from the immorality and violence rampant in public schools. Many new Evangelical-fundamentalist colleges, Bible Schools and some seminaries and universities were founded, many of which have become accredited. This vast educational network now offers a total educational system and is preparing the new generation of lead­ ers for fundamentalist Christianity.71 At the same time Evangelical and fundamentalist publishers, book distributors and bookstores expanded their networks and are have become important means of education and outreach. Fundamentalist incursions 68 69 70 71

Martin. Martin. Martin. Bloesch

1996. pp. 331, 341.

1996. pp. 349–353.

1996. pp. 168–169.

in Cully & Cully, eds., 1990. p. 236.

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into the mass media of radio and TV resulted in the founding of many local and national stations and networks, and the World Wide Web is now offering another efficient means for fundamentalist organizations and individuals to get their message across.72 Demographic Causes for Accommodationism Some observers claim that the new attitudes to culture are partly dri­ ven by economic and demographic changes among fundamentalists in America. The majority of fundamentalists were originally located in the deprived quarters of the large industrial cities of the North and in Southern small-town areas. In the last quarter of a century fundamen­ talists have experienced a significant upward shift in their socio-economic status as they benefited from expanding educational and job opportunities. Many have become affluent, respectable, middle class and suburban citizens, well-connected to business and social and political circles. Roof states that in the 1960s only 6% of Evangelicals had at­ tended college, but by the 1970s it was 23%. A significant shift in agestructure has also taken place as fundamentalist communities now have younger age groups and higher birth rates than liberals and secularists. As the traditional family and its values are a main concern for funda­ mentalists, the family has remained more intact among than in other religious communities. Contemporary fundamentalists are thus aggres­ sively pro-family partly because of the large number of younger fami­ lies in the fundamentalist constituency.73 Vigorous Expansion in World Mission Another marker especially since the early 1990s is the vigorous involve­ ment of fundamentalists in world missions. This is evident in the DAWN movement, the 2000 A.D. movement and the many consultations on mission held involving fundamentalist Christians from both the devel­ oped and the third world. There is a shift to triumphalism in missions compared to the more humble attitudes of the cold-war era. An increased numbers of missionaries are being sent out cross-culturally, with Korea becoming the second largest missionary sending country in the world. Latin America, where fundamentalist Evangelicals have experienced phenomenal growth since the 1960s, is also experiencing a new move­ ment of fundamentalists into missions, as well as into social work and politics.

72

Ammerman. 1991. pp. 33–34; Also Cully & Cully, eds., 1990. pp. 264–265. Roof. 1986. pp. 25–27; In spite of these shifts, liberals still entertain preju­ diced views of fundamentalists as “these unlettered, southern fundamentalists”, and castigate their leaders as “the ayatollahs of the Christian far right”. See Eric Margolis, “The Snub Heard Round The World”, 21, January, 1988, appearing in his “Inside 73

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There has also been a phenomenal growth of fundamentalist Christianity in Latin America (Central America, Chile and Brazil),74 and in Asia (Korea, China, Indonesia), and sub-Saharan Africa. In these countries fundamentalists are becoming active in politics as they have become a highly valued sector courted by political parties and governments.75 Conservative Protestants in Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru are form­ ing their own political parties.76 In Zambia in 1991 the newly elected President Chiluba, a born-again Christian, proclaimed Zambia a “Christian Nation”.77 The spread of Christian Fundamentalism in many ThirdWorld countries means that is no more unique to the West, but that it has become a truly global religious movement.78 Following the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe fundamentalists moved in to these areas (including the new Muslim republics of Central Asia) to spread their message and estab­ lish fundamentalist churches there. Experimentation with New Forms of Congregation and Worship Contemporary Fundamentalist Christianity is also experimenting with both the founding of huge churches (especially in South Korea and the United States), and a move to small cell groups in a search for revival and renewal. The shift to home fellowships seeks to regain the vigor of the early Church by a return to New Testament paradigm of the house church. The movement includes both independent house churches and traditional churches that have house groups meeting in private homes under the supervision of the central leadership. This movement has spread widely in China where the state forbids the public worship of officially not recognized religious bodies. In the West there are a vari­ ety of groups seeing themselves as restorers of the New Testament

Track On World News”, sent to subscribers via e-mail from <[email protected]>. Margolis is a Canadian liberal syndicated columnist and broadcaster, whose editorials also appear in the Toronto Sun. 74 Daniel H. Levine. 1995. “Protestants and Catholics in Latin America: A Family Portrait”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 155–156. 75 Paul Freston. 1998. “Evangelicals and Politics: A Comparison Between Africa and Latin America”, in Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 13, No. 1. 1998, pp. 37–49. Freston states that in Latin America the vast majority of Protestants are theologically conservative Evangelicals who “emphasize the authority of the Bible, and the importance of individual conversion and evangelism”. Freston also states that Brazil has the world’s second largest community of Evangelicals. 76 Lindy Scott. 1995. “The Political Significance of the Protestant Presence in Latin America: A Case Study from Mexico”, in Transformation, Vol. 12, No. 1, January/March 1995, pp. 28–32. Scott claims Evangelicals now constitute 10 to 20 percent of the Latin American population (much higher in some specific states). 77 Paul Freston. 1998. pp. 47–48. 78 Brouwer, Gifford, & Rose, eds., 1996. p. 1.

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Church model and the manifestation of the Kingdom of God in our times and they have impacted all fundamentalist and Evangelical groups.79 H B  I F Introduction Islamic fundamentalism is part of a wider religious resurgence sweep­ ing across the Muslim world and existing in a symbiotic relationship with other trends in Islam. The borderline between fundamentalism and the wider movements is blurred and flexible. Whilst contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon, it is rooted in the historical phenomena of cyclic revivals which provide models and symbols from early Islamic history, and it also interacts with modern cultural, social, political and religious contexts.80 “Islamic fundamentalism” is an umbrella term for a wide variety of movements and discourses committed to Islam as a total way of life and as a viable alternative to Western sec­ ular ideologies.81 Most are united in their goal of the Islamization of the total social and political system of their societies, states, and ulti­ mately of the whole Muslim world. Whilst stressing the unitarian and universalistic character of Islam, fundamentalism exhibits a great diver­ sity as it is also colored by the variety of local circumstances in which these movements emerged and in which they operate.82 Some observers see Islamic fundamentalism as part of a trend in con­ temporary Islam toward a more doctrinally homogeneous type of reli­ gion based on sacred texts which views local expressions of Islam as deviations from orthodoxy and seeks to suppress them. Modern means of communication have accelerated this process by opening up the peri­ phery to the penetration of the centralizing forces. In this view, funda­ mentalism is the more radical wing of a wider movement which also in­ cludes madrasa-based traditional groups and Íùfi-type reform movements.83 Some observers would restrict the term “fundamentalist” to the polit­ ically active movements that see Islam as a modern political ideology.84

79

Rosemary Goring, ed., 1995. Wordsworth Dictionary, p. 226. Hrair Dekmejian. 1985. Islam in Revolution, p. 9. 81 Mumtaz Ahmad. 1991. “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaati-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia” in Marty & Appleby, eds., Funda­ mentalisms Observed, p. 507. 82 John O. Voll. 1991. “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, p. 347; Also Sidahmed & Ehteshami in their Introduction to Sidahmed, Abdel Salam & Ehteshami, Anu­ shirvan, eds., 1996. Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 1. 83 Richard W. Bulliet. 1994. Islam: The View from the Edge, pp. 186–187. 84 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam, p. vii. 80

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However, while such groups form the vast majority of Islamic funda­ mentalist movements, there are a number of other groups, some like Tablìghì Jamà'at with a very large membership, that also fit the funda­ mentalist criteria without being politically activist. The goal of Islamic fundamentalists can be summarized as the re­ establishment of a revived “true” Islam and its implementation in all areas of life.85 Differences between the large variety of movements stem from arguments on how best to achieve this goal, and includes apolit­ ical individualist, political gradualist, and revolutionary approaches. Some are opposed to any cooperation with non-fundamentalists, whilst others are willing to co-operate on the tactical level. Finally some are elitist, whilst others are populist.86 For the pietistic apolitical groups, the widespread renewal of indi­ vidual Muslims as they imitate the pious example of the Prophet in their personal conduct will inevitably lead to the renewal of society and state without the revived members having to engage in the corrupting world of politics. For the politically activist groups, the restoration is to be achieved by legally purifying society from un-Islamic practices, by a politically binding reinstatement of Islam’s original divine sources (Qur"àn and Sunna) as the ultimate authority which as Sharì'a must be applied to modern contexts, and by the establishment of an ideal Islamic state modeled on that of the Prophet, the Rashidun, and the Companions. This threefold program demands political activism, and will inevitably result in the transformation of both individual Muslims and of society in a comprehensive Islamic system (nìzàm Islàmì ) adapted to the modern world, which will usher in a unified world-wide “Islamic state” (khilàfa) in which the Sharì'a is the basis and sole source of all legislation.87 Some Causes Offered for Islamic Fundamentalism Observers recognize the complexity and multiplicity of the causes that gave rise to contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, and offer a variety of weightings to the various factors.88 Most agree that colonialism, its Western cultural dominance and imposed modernization which mar­

85 Gabriel Ben-Dor. 1997. “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism”, In Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, eds., Islamic Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, p. 241. 86 William Shepard. 1987. “Fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic”, In Religion, 1987, 17. pp. 358–359. 87 Ben-Dor. 1997. p. 241; John L. Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, pp. 22–23. 88 Shireen T. Hunter. 1995. “The Rise of Islamist Movements and the Western Responses: Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Interests?” in Laura Guazzone, ed., 1995. The Islamist Dilemma, p. 319.

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ginalized Islam as a political ideology are major causes of the resurgence.89 In sharp contrast to the miserable present blamed on the West, fundamentalists recreate the memories of Islam’s past glorious golden age.90 These two themes of anti-Westernism and nostalgia for the glo­ rious past are characteristic of most contemporary Islamic fundamen­ talist movements.91 The failure of Western secular ideologies to deliver following independence strengthened the fundamentalist movements with their call for a return to Islam as an authentic alternative politi­ cal ideology.92 Islamic fundamentalists have a hostile attitude to continued Western secular influences, viewed as a continuation of colonialism by other means, and their perceived corruption of Islamic societies. A primary goal is to purify Islamic societies from pollution by the “perceived endemic Western evils of secularism, atheism, alcohol, drugs, sexual per­ missiveness, and family breakdown”.93 Western civilization is blamed for the corruption of all that is good in the world, Western values are seen as bankrupt and decadent and must be rejected because to be respon­ sible they lead to “moral anomie”.94 Islamic fundamentalism is also response to modern social, economic and cultural changes that seem to threaten Islamic identity.95 While the positive benefits of modernization have benefited a select few, the major­ ity have experienced its resultant evils of rural migration and rapid urbanization and the breakdown of the traditional family leading to dis­ illusionment and despair.96 These negative effects of modernization also include the population explosion, the breakdown of traditional religious and social values, high unemployment, and the sharp inequalities in wealth distribution. These overwhelmingly rapid changes resulted in an acute sense of dislocation, identity loss, alienation and anomie.97 The

89 Khurshid Ahmad. 1983. “The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence,” in John L. Esposito, ed., 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp. 218–219. 90 Francis Robinson. 1982. Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500, pp. 163–174. 91 Bassam Tibi. 1993. “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Funda­ mentalisms and Society, pp. 92–94. 92 Bassam Tibi. “The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East”, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1983, pp. 4–5, 7. 93 Seyyed Hossein Nasr. 1987. Traditional Islam in the Modern World, pp. 304–305. 94 Samuel C. Heilman. 1995. “Parallels Between Islam and Judaism” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 74–75. 95 John O. Voll. 1991. p. 347. 96 Esposito, ed., 1983. pp. 12–13. 97 Dekmejian. 1985. pp. 29–36. Dekmejian stresses that the most potent catalyst of the culture crisis is the disruptive impact of modernization, and adds five cata­ lysts contributing to the acute crisis: identity, legitimacy, elite misrule, class conflict, and military impotence.

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ruling Westernized political elites could not cope with the ruptures in society, and failed to achieve improvements in the social conditions of the masses.98 Another cause is the weak legitimacy of the concept of the nationstate as well as of the existing secular regimes. This crisis is evident in the pervasiveness of autocratic regimes and in the continuing segmen­ tation of society along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines.99 The political, social, and economic failures of the secular state are important con­ tributing factors to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a mass-based response demanding radical change.100 Fundamentalists tend to blame the modern secular nation-state and its Westernized elites for all the ills of society.101 History Movements of reform (islà˙) and renewal (tajdìd ) have been part of Islamic history since the early khawàrij and Shì'a rebellions. Revivals were often led by charismatic figures assuming the roles of renewer of the faith (mujaddid ) or of the messianic savior (mahdì ),102 who argued that the causes of political, military and economic weakness were the moral and spiritual decay resulting from the umma’s departure from the orig­ inal model of true Islam.103 Most observers see Islamic resurgence since the 17th century as going through three major phases: tajdìd (Islamic Renewal, 1744–1885), salafìyya (Return to Pious Forbears, Islamic Reformism 1839–1970), and sa˙wa (Awakening, Islamic Radicalism, 1970 and onward). These centered on the three major areas of the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent for Sunnì Islam and Iran for Shì'a Islam.104 Whilst the labels are open

98 These include the failures of Islamic liberalism in the 19th and 20th cen­ turies, as well as the failures of nationalism and socialism after independence. Tibi. 1983. p. 7. 99 Roy. 1994. pp. x–xi. Roy claims the crisis of the state is not limited to, nor typical of Muslim states exclusively, but rather is typical of all third world states who at this juncture in history all experience patrimonialism, segmentation, nonintegration of their societies into a state logic, and weak democratic demand. In p. 15 however, he does point out that lack of an autonomous political sphere lends itself to the seizure of the political realm (the state) by khaldunic 'assabiyya (solidar­ ity) groups, a clan or a minority, who seize control of the state apparatus and turn it into an instrument for the economic exploitation of society. 100 Kristin E. Wolff. 1998. “New New Orientalism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory”, in Moussali, Ahmad S. ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities, Footnote 30, p. 68. 101 Mirna Hammoud. 1998. “Causes for Fundamentalist Popularity in Egypt” in Moussalli, Ahmad S. ed., 1998. pp. 322–323. 102 These roles are elaborated in ˙adìth literature. Dekmejian. 1985. p. 12. 103 Esposito. 1991a. pp. 116–118. 104 Itzchak Weismann. 1997. “Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist

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to questioning, the exact delineation in time is somewhat arbitrary and the periods overlap to some extent, these three waves do represent real phases in the development of Islamic revivalism. Most fundamentalist thinkers combine elements from all three phases, the specific mix deter­ mined by their background and local circumstances. The First Stage: Pre-Modern Revivals (17th–19th Centuries) Revival movements in the Islamic world during the pre-modern era were a reaction to cultural, religious, political and economic decline in a period when most Muslim states were beginning to feel the pressure of Western Imperialism. Revivalists criticized establishment Islam’s depar­ ture from the original model, the widespread practices of taqlìd and superstitious folk practices which they saw as the reasons for the decline of the community. They argued that Islam could regain its original strength only by purging itself of un-Islamic innovations (bid'a) includ­ ing saint worship and magic, by returning to the fundamentals of Qur"àn and Sunna, by recreating the model of the first Muslim community, and by renewing the practice of ijtihàd (pious individual endeavor in inter­ preting Sharì'a). True Muslims must separate themselves from unbeliev­ ers so as to build a righteous society that can engage in the moral and military struggle ( jihàd ) to withstand Western aggression and to re-establish true Islam in society and state. These ideas strongly impacted all subsequent revivalist and reformist movements.105 On the Indian subcontinent renewal in the Naqshbandì Íùfì order and A˙mad Sìrhindì’s (1564–1624) teachings were the basis of a revival aimed at countering the universalistic tendencies of some Mughal rulers. Later, Sha˙ Walì-Allàh of Delhi (1702–1762) endeavored to unite Muslims around a reapplication of Sharì'a to present circumstances through ijti­ hàd, a return to pristine Islam, and a condemnation of blind imitation (taqlìd ). His aim was to rediscover the forgotten original precepts of ideal Islam preserved in Qur"àn and Sunna.106 In the Arabian Peninsula 'Abd al-Wahhàb (1703–1792) founded a puritanical and militant reform movement based on the Óanbalì madhhab and on ibn-Taymiyya’s teachings, and ensured its survival by his

Syria”, in Studia Islamica, 1997/1 (Fevrier) 85. p. 132; Youssef M. Choueiri. 1990. Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 181. 105 Esposito. 1991a. pp. 118–119; 126–127. 106 Esposito. 1991a. pp. 119, 123–127. Sayyid Ahmad Barelewi (1786–1831) took Shah Wali Allah’s reform teaching a step further by declaring India part of dàr al˙arb thus justifying military jihàd against the Sikhs and the British. After his victory over the Sikhs at Balakot (1826) he established a state based on Sharì'a and endeav­ oured to purify Islam by reforming Íùfism, denouncing un-Islamic practices and emphasizing monotheism (taw˙ìd ).

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alliance with the house of Sa'ùd. 'Abd al-Wahhàb saw traditional Islam as a degenerate version of pristine Islam corrupted by taqlìd, Shì'a ele­ vation of their Imàms to the role of mediators, and Íùfì popular folk religious practices, especially saint-worship, all of which he condemned as innovation (bid'a) and idolatry (shirk). He compared the Arabian soci­ ety of his time to the pre-Islamic jàhilìyya period, applying takfìr (declar­ ing Muslims to be apostates) to opponents whom he labeled as jàhilì (neo-pagan) to justify jihàd against them. 'Abd al-Wahhàb emphasized the doctrine of the transcendental unity of God (taw˙ìd ) as the basis of a political system legitimized by strictly enforcing the legal principles of Qur"àn and Sunna which alone were ultimately binding. Later traditions and decisions of medieval scholars were not authoritative.107 Following the encroachments of Western imperialism, Íùfì-led move­ ments of renewal calling for jihàd against the foreigners and for the purification and reform of Islam emerged in other peripheral areas such as the Sudan (mahdìsm 1882–1898), and Libya (Sanùssìyya 1837–1931), demanding and implementing independent Muslim states based on Sharì'a. These succeeded for a while until dismantled by superior British and Italian forces. Similar movements emerged also in the Maghrib against the French ('Abd al-Qàdir 1808–1883), in Sub-Saharan Africa ('Usman dan-Fodio 1754–1817; 'Umar Tal 1797–1864), and in the Caucasus against the Russians (Shamil 1796–1871).108 The Second Stage: Reformism & Salàfìyya (19th and Early 20th Centuries) The modern reform movement of the 19th and early 20th century coun­ tered Western colonialism and its political and cultural dominance by initiating radical reforms in Islam. Foreshadowed by Sir A˙mad Khàn (1817–1898) in India, it was initiated by Jamàl al-Din al-Afghànì (1839–1897) and Mu˙ammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), and it gave birth, among others, to the Salàfiyya movement founded by Rashìd Ri∂à (1865–1935) which led to contemporary fundamentalism.109

107 Voll. 1991. pp. 249–352; Also Esposito. 1991a. pp. 119–121; Whilst the Wahhàbis condemned all Íùfism and Shì'ism as bid'a and sought to extirpate them in their territories, other reformers differentiated between true Íùfism which was seen as Islamic, and its distortions which were condemned. Many Íùfis were involved in the reform movements, though the dominant discourse was perceived as anti-Íùfi. 108 Roy. 1994. pp. 31–32. Roy also mentions Shamil in the Caucasus, Mullah-i Lang in Afghanistan, the akhund of Swat in India, and 'Abd al-Karìm in Morocco as representatives of this peripheral Íùfi-led Islamic renewal and resistance to impe­ rialism. These leaders managed to unify the tribes against the Europeans by impos­ ing Sharì'a as against the tribal common laws ('adat, urf ) and tribal 'asabiyya. Arjomand, in “Islamic Fundamentalism” in Marty & Appleby eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Com­ prehended, pp. 180–181 also stresses that Íùfi revivalist movements have often been the means for unifying tribes and for the formation of states on the basis of Islam. 109 Shepard. 1987. p. 358.

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The reformers searched for an answer to the question of what had gone wrong with Muslim society. They offered an alternative both to conservative rejectionism and to secular adaptation, opposing the con­ servatives who advocated a rejection of the West, non co-operation with the new rulers, and an isolationist withdrawal into traditional religion, as well as the secularists who advocated the separation of religion from the state on the Western model. They initiated a process of internal self-criticism, of redefining Islam, and of proving its relevance to the new context by a synthesis of Islamic and modern concepts. They instilled in Muslims a pride in their past glory, reviving their shattered sense of identity. They also emphasized the progressive and rational character of Islam that enabled it to integrate modern culture and accommodate change.110 The reformers rejected common law ('adàt, 'urf ) and popular Íùfì practices. They also questioned the authority of the classical com­ pendiums of the 'ulamà" and the four legal schools (madhàhib).111 Al-Afghànì was a political activist dedicated to resisting imperialism and to reviving Islam’s lost glory by reforming a decadent and super­ stitious Islàm, utilizing Western science and philosophy, and forging a pan-Islamic unity. He tried to bridge the gap between modern secu­ larists and religious traditionalists, stressing that reason had been inte­ gral to early and classical Islam and that Islamic essentials are compatible with science. Islam is a comprehensive way of life encompassing the societal and political as well as the personal spheres. It is a dynamic and progressive religion of reason and science capable of responding to modern contexts. The stagnation ( jumùd ) of Islam must be rejected, and the gates of ijtihàd reopened so as to break the 'ulamà" monopoly on religion and to formulate new responses to changing circumstances.112 'Abduh, who became rector of al-Azhar and chief Sharì'a judge (muftì) of Egypt, advocated reform by a return to the pure sources. The causes of stagnation in Muslim society were un-Islamic practices and supersti­ tions, fatalism, rigid scholasticism (†aqlìd ), the corruption of the 'ulamà" and their subservience to the rulers, as well as their inability to distin­ guish between the unchanging core of Islam and its external layer which was open to change. He stressed the unity of God (taw˙ìd ) as the foun­ dation of Islam’s integrated worldview, saw no conflict between Islam and modernity, and stressed that religion and reason were not contra­ dictory, but complemented each other as two valid sources of Islam. 'Abduh’s reforms aimed at discovering the real intent behind Islam’s unchanging fundamentals and implementing them in educational and social reforms that selectively appropriated aspects of the West not

110 111 112

Esposito. 1991a. pp. 128–129; 147.

Roy. 1994. pp. 32–33.

Esposito. 1991a. pp. 130–132.

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contrary to Islam. Whilst regulations of worship ('ibadàt) were unchange­ able, precepts concerning social affairs (mu'ammalàt ) were open to re­ interpretation and change. 'Abduh also utilized the Màlikì principle of public welfare (maßla˙a) to issue legal decrees ( fatwàs) reforming polygamy, bank interest, and the status of women.113 Ri∂à carried on Afghàni’s and 'Abduh’s call for a reinterpretation of Islam and the development of a modern Islamic legal system. However he was influenced by Wahhàbism and more critical of the West and its growing cultural impact on Egypt. He too rejected blind imitation of medieval formulations of law, and aimed at regenerating Islam by return­ ing to Islam’s original sources and to the model of the pious ancestors (salaf )—Mu˙ammad, his Companions, and the ràshidùn Caliphs who he claimed had practiced a pure and rational Islam free from superstition in a just and prosperous Islamic society and state.114 This kind of Islam was self-sufficient and comprehensive and had no need to imitate the West. He stressed that full implementation of Islamic law required the existence of a truly Islamic government in the form of a restored Cali­ phate that would function through compulsory consultation (shùrà) between the ruler and the representatives of the community.115 Following Ri∂à, the Salafìyya movement sought to halt the internal decline and help gain independence from the West by rejecting †aqlìd and popular Íùfìsm, calling for a return to the example of the pious ancestors (salaf ). It saw Islam as the religion of reason, nature and sci­ ence, and sought to restore its initial vitality by freeing it from tradi­ tionalism. Salafìyya was influenced both by the reformist stress on reinterpreting the origins in order to face the modern world, and by a narrow Wahhàbì puritanism. It advocated educational and social reforms, establishing schools and welfare programs, publishing books and mag­ azines, and mobilizing the masses in support of the nationalist libera­ tion movements. It became very influential by shaping an activist fundamentalist ideology across the Muslim world.116 Out of the Salafì movement emerged the Muslim Brotherhood, the first activist grass-roots contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movement.

113 Donohue & Esposito, eds., 1982; Islam in Transition, p. 9; Esposito. 1991a. pp. 132–134. 114 For Afghani and 'Abduh, the salaf meant the first centuries of Islam. Rida restricted the term to meaning exclusively the first generation of Muslims—only they were to be emulated. See Esposito, 1991a. p. 136. 115 Hamid Enayat. 1982. Modern Islamic Political Thought, pp. 72–74. 116 Elie Kedourie. 1992. Politics In The Middle East, pp. 328–329; Also Esposito, 1991a. pp. 134–136; 147. Salafìs in the Maghrib included al-Fasi in Morocco and Ben-Badis in Algeria, both active in the nationalist liberation movements of their countries.

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Founded by Óasan al-Bannà" (1906–1949) in 1928, it combined a drive to reform Islam along Salafì lines with efforts to improve the condition of the deprived masses by mutual-aid and self-help.117 Bannà" demanded a return to the practice of the early Muslim community claiming that only the Qur"àn and the best attested ˙adìth should be accepted as sources of Sharì'a. Bannà" saw Islam as an integrated, self-sufficient, and com­ prehensive social and political system which must be implemented in an Islamic state—there could be no separation between state and reli­ gion. It was the implementation of Sharì'a that made a government truly Islamic—so this implementation was a primary goal of the movement. The constitution of the Islamic state would be the Qur "àn, its legal sys­ tem the sharì'a, and its government would operate through consultation (shùrà ). The Muslim Brotherhood concentrated at first mainly on establish­ ing educational and welfare programs, but following its rapid growth it became more politically activist and founded a secret military arm. It developed a tightly-knit organization with a network of branches sub­ divided into secret cell groups and a missionary network that spread into Syria, Palestine and the Sudan. Members received intensive ideo­ logical and physical training.118 Bannà" outlined a gradualist strategy in three stages: the preparatory propaganda stage aimed at educating the people; the recruiting, training and organizational stage; and finally the stage of public action to achieve hegemony in society and implement sharì'a in an Islamic state.119 On the Indian subcontinent Abu"l A'la Mawdùdì (1903–1979), influenced by Bannà", was the catalyst for a similar awakening. He founded the Jamà'at-i Islàmì in 1941 as an elitist vanguard organization aimed at establishing an Islamic order. Individual, society and politics must all be gradually transformed in line with Islamic ideology through the efforts of a highly motivated vanguard of enlightened Muslims act­ ing as catalysts of the revolution. A return to the pure original Islam is essential, as is a total obedience to Sharì'a. Mawdùdì saw political power as the main tool for establishing a pure Islamic society, hence it was essential that Muslims be involved in politics and aim at control of the state, establishing an Islamic Sharì'a state which he saw as the panacea to all the problems facing Muslims around the world. In

117

Kedourie, 1992. pp. 328–329. Abdel Azim Ramadan. 1993. “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 153–157; See also Esposito. 1984. Islam and Politics, pp. 130–133; 137–139. 119 Said Aly Abd al-Moneim & Manfred W. Wenner, 1982. “Modern Islamic Reform Movenents: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, 1982. 118

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Mawdùdì’s thought, Islam is a total ideological system aimed at dom­ inating the political structures of state and society.120 Mawdùdì’s Islamic state is based on God’s sovereignty (˙àkimìyya), as God is the only sovereign ruler and lawgiver. Man is God’s vice-regent (khalìfa), who must submit to God’s divine law (Sharì'a) as revealed in Qur"àn and Sunna as the only binding authority. Man cannot legislate— only interpret and apply God’s law which is both reasonable and in accordance with nature. Submission to man-made rules is polytheism (shirk) as it sets up man in God’s place. Anything that does not con­ form to Sharì'a is willful idolatrous ignorance—jàhilìyya. Mawdùdì criti­ cized the 'ulamà" for their blind imitation (†aqlìd ) of tradition, and attacked the West as degenerate for setting up man as the source of sovereignty thus usurping God’s place. At the same time he rejected violence and advocated a gradualist approach to achieving power.121 In Egypt, Nasser, after a brief honeymoon with the Brotherhood, imprisoned and tortured many of its leaders. Some Brotherhood mem­ bers, radicalized by Nasser’s terror formed the radical Islamic groups that advocated violent jihàd to achieve dominance in the state. Sayyid Qu†b, the main ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, was executed by Nasser in 1966, but his writings (especially Ma'àlim fi"l-ˇarìq, translated as “Signposts on the Road” or “Milestones”), became the main ideo­ logical source of contemporary radical Islamic movements, providing them with the criteria by which to judge contemporary regimes and societies. Qu†b was influenced by Mawdùdì’s writings,122 and constructed a rev­ olutionary ideology which stressed God’s sovereignty and rule (˙àkimìyya) and the unity of God (taw˙ìd ) as the foundation of an integrated and comprehensive Islamic system. Qu†b transformed the meaning of the Islamic term hijra (emigration) from a simple description of the Prophet’s historic migration from Mecca to Medinah to signifying a definite stage in the development of all true Muslim societies—hijra is the response of true Muslims to the state of jàhilìyya (pre-Islamic pagan ignorance) preva­ lent in society. They must withdraw from society in order to create a vanguard of committed activists able to take over society when the right time comes.123

120 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. 1994. The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'ati Islami of Pakistan, pp. 7–8. 121 On Mawdudi and Jamà'at-i Islami see Nasr. 1994. The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamà'at-i Islami of Pakistan. 122 Ramadan. 1993. pp. 156–157; Also Roy, 1994, pp. 35. Abu"l Óasan 'Ali Nadvi, a disciple of Mawdùdì, translated his master’s works into Arabic and also met Sayyid Qutb. 123 Voll. 1991. pp. 368–372. This re-interpretation of hijra was later put into prac­ tice by Takfìr wa"l-Hijra who physically withdrew from society into caves in Upper

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Qu†b’s central mobilizing concept was his reinterpretation of jàhilìyya, which changed from a historical description of pagan pre-Islamic soci­ ety to a description of the neo-pagan conditions prevalent not only in the modern non-Islamic world, but also in all contemporary Muslim societies, which were thus labelled un-Islamic (takf ìr is the term used for this ritual condemnation), thus becaming legitimate targets of violent jihàd by true Muslims. It is also the duty of true Muslims to revolt against any state proclaimed as kàfir. Most violent extreme groups of today like al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya, the various takfìr and jihàd groups, Óamas, the Islamic Liberation Front, the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) and many more, were born out of the Muslim Brotherhood as reinterpreted by Qu†b.124 Shì'ì fundamentalism whilst drawing from some common roots with Sunni revivalism, as in Afghànì’s activism, yet went its own specific way centered especially on Iran and tending to be more clerical and more leftist than its Sunni counterpart. It grew partly out of traditionalist oppo­ sition to Westernization led by the anti-constitutionalist 'ulamà" starting in the early 1920s. Many Iranians resented the secularization and Westernization tendencies of both Shahs. Some, like the Fedayan-i Islàm and the Mujahidìn-i Khalq developed a Marxist-Islamist ideological oppo­ sition to the Shah which included acts of terrorism against the state and prepared the ground for contemporary Shì'ì fundamentalism. The Third Stage: Sa˙wa (Awakening) and Radicalism (1980s–1990s) The contemporary Islamic revival emerged during the 1970s in oppo­ sition to the all-pervasive secularized state, replacing nationalism with Islam as the core identity of society. Disillusionment with post-independence authoritarian national-socialist military regimes was fuelled by the 1967 defeat in the war against Israel and the perceived bankruptcy of secular ideologies and contributed to the emergence of Islam as the only credible ideology. Another contributing factor was the resentment felt by many at the manipulation of establishment Islam by corrupt sec­ ular governments. In this environment fundamentalism gained a large popular following.125 In Egypt, following Nasser’s death, Sadat manipulated Islamic sym­ bols, and encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups to help crush the leftist Nasserist opposition. Islamic associations ( jama'àt

Egypt where they created a pure alternative society waiting for the time when they would be powerful enough to initiate the stage of conquest. 124 Weismann. 1997. pp. 131–132; Also Moussali. 1995. pp. 90–99. 125 As'ad Abu-Khalil. 1994. “The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century, in Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 677–680.

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Islàmìyya) penetrated student unions and professional associations. Violent organizations emerged such as Takfìr wa"l-Hijra, al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya, and Jamà'at al-Jihàd which, following the regime crackdown on Islamists, assassinated Sadat in 1981.126 Since then the regime has tried both to co-opt and to suppress the radical groups, but sporadic violence is endemic. In Iran, clerical opposition to the secularizing policies of the Shah combined with the activities of the Islamist-Marxist movements, the existentialist-Islamist ideology of 'Alì Sharì'atì (1933–1977), and finally the rise of Ayàtollàh Khomeinì (1902–1989) to dramatically change Shì'ism from its traditional passive mode to an activist revolutionary stance. Sharì'atì laid the intellectual groundwork for the revolution, whilst Khomeinì, seen in the traditional Shì'a role of the brave 'àlim opposing the illegitimate ruler,127 succeeded in rallying the masses with a mes­ sianic fervor that mobilized them against the Shah’s regime, millions joining the mass protests that finally brought it down in 1979.128 The new regime was different from the Sunnì version of an Islamic khilàfa, but in line with millenarian Shì 'ì expectations of the return of the Hidden Imàm.129 Khomeinì’s innovative ideology of the Islamic state, the wilàyat al-faqi˙ (governance by the jurist), demanded that the highest Shì'a cleric, as the representative of the Hidden Imàm, rule in his name until his return.130 Shì 'ì fundamentalism was much more 'ulamà"-controlled than the Sunnì version. The success of the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran had a great impact on all Shì'a centers around the Muslim world—Southern Lebanon, Southern Iraq, the Gulf, and the Indian Subcontinent. It was a great catalyst for world-wide Islamic fundamentalism, both Sunnì and Shì 'ì, as it was the first modern state in which Islamic fundamentalism succeeded in taking over power and setting up an Islamic state. An Islamic constitution was drawn up with appropriate institutions offering a model to fundamentalists struggling to attain power in other states.131 Following Khomeinì’s death the regime entered a consolidation phase, balancing its efforts at exporting the Islamic revolution with the neces­ sity of developing a stable governmental system. Much of its energies were directed at balancing the various pressure groups within the new ruling elite and at creating better international relations. The election

126

Robinson. 1982. pp. 163–174.

Mallat. 1993, pp. 5–6.

128 Robinson. 1982. pp. 163–174.

129 Robinson. 1982. pp. 163–174.

130 Ninian Smart. 1987. “Three Forms of Religious Convergence”, in Antoun &

Hegeland, Religious Resurgence in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism”, p. 228. 131 Mallat. 1993. pp. 4–5. 127

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of Khatamì as president in 1997 reveals a developing tendency to mod­ eration and pragmatism as Iran tries to consolidate the regime, assert its influence in its immediate neighborhood, and reach accommodation with rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the USA, while remaining the main backer of Shì'a fundamentalist groups around the Islamic world. Around the Muslim world, the effects of the contemporary Islamic awakening are evident in the increased participation of Muslims in reli­ gious rituals, the donning of Islamic garb by women, and the growing of beards by men. The growing desire to shape lives according to Sharì'a is also seen in the religious question and answer columns of newspa­ pers, in which 'ulamà" answer questions on ritual and practice raised by the public.132 Islamic literature production and distribution have mush­ roomed, many Islamic associations have been founded, and charismatic preachers have gained immense popularity as they utilized modern media (radio, cassettes and TV) to broadcast their message. As a result, both governments and opposition groups have been trying to strengthen their legitimacy by manipulating Islamic symbols and ideology in competi­ tion with the fundamentalists.133 During the 1980s and 1990s violent radicals expanded their activi­ ties in Muslim states while creating bases in the West and networking with each other. Groups like al-Jihàd, Óizbullàh, al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya and others attempted to destabilize kàfir regimes, seize power and estab­ lish Islamic states by force.134 For example, Egypt’s al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya attacked government security forces, well-known secularists, Coptic Christians and foreign tourists, and also engaged in international ter­ rorism as in the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New-York. Radicals also sent their members to help jihàd struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kossovo and other flashpoints. The Gulf war fur­ ther radicalized these groups, confirming their perception of the West as trying to re-colonize Muslim states, while the stationing of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia was seen as unacceptable pollution of the Muslim Holy Places. In contrast to the radicals, the moderate Islamic movements contin­ ued their efforts within the system, using preaching (da'wa) to convert and transform individuals and creating Islamic spaces in society (Islamic neighborhoods, schools, clinics, banks, and mutual-aid networks). Islamic

132 Abu-Khalil. 1994. pp. 691–692. He cites Shaykh al-Baz of Saudi Arabia who wrote a whole book on the evils of photography and videos, claiming that pho­ tographers will suffer in hell, as well as describing in great detail the manner in which Muslims are allowed to, or prohibited from, looking at or shaking hands with women, particularly non-Muslim women. 133 John O. Voll. 1982. Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, pp. 275–279. Also Esposito. 1992. pp. 10–12. 134 Esposito. 1992. pp. 206–207.

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political parties participated in the democratic process wherever allowed to do so. A new generation of modern educated Islamic elites emerged which has successfully promoted Islamic fundamentalism in all Muslim societies, resulting in the proliferation of free mosques (free that is of government control), the Islamic domination of professional associations and student unions, and the explosive growth of Islamic organizations active in welfare and education. Fundamentalists dominate the discourse in the media and in the public sphere, and they have successfully pro­ moted the adoption of Islamic dress, the segregation of the sexes, and the development of an Islamic economy and Islamic banks.135 The Islamization of daily life has now become routine in most Muslim countries,136 with many fundamentalist groups lobbying for the imple­ mentation of a total Islamic system. There is a growing interaction and networking between Islamist movements around the world, and many pan-Islamic international organizations have committed themselves to the fundamentalist vision of one umma undivided by artificial borders.137 Wahhàbi Saudi Arabia has been very active in supporting a wide vari­ ety of Islamist groups all over the world, using its oil wealth to support extremist Muslim groups in Egypt, Sudan, North Africa and Afghanistan, as well as in the Far East and the West. At the same time, internal dissent has resulted in fundamentalist opposition groups forming, accus­ ing the Saudi regime and royal family of corruption, and aiming at instituting an Islamic Republic in Saudi Arabia.138 A shift from moderate gradualism to activist radicalism was experi­ enced by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan (led by Dr. Óasan 'Abdallàh al-Turàbì since 1964). After Nimeiri’s downfall in 1985, Turàbì’s newly founded National Islamic Front (NIF), successor to the Muslim Brotherhood, became the third largest party in the 1986 elec­ tions, and participated in the coalition government led by al-Íàdiq alMahdì. It then shifted to a radical mode, supporting the military coup of June 1989 which overthrew the democratically elected government and replaced it with the military-Islamist regime under 'Umar Óasan al-Bashìr.139 Whilst Turàbì stresses consultation (shù`ra) as Islamic democ­ racy that guarantees pluralism within the bounds of Qur "àn and Sunna, the NIF controls the reins of power and saw to it that all its opponents got dismissed from state and public service. Turàbì sees the Islamic

135

Abu-Khalil. 1994. pp. 691–692; Also: Roy. 1994. pp. 78–82. Voll. 1991. p. 386. 137 Robinson. 1982. pp. 163–174; Also Esposito. 1992. p. 206. 138 Prof. Muhammad al-Mas'ari is the most famous oppositional fundamentalist, leading his activity against the Saudi regime from exile in the UK. 139 Gabriel Warburg. “The Sudan under Islamist Rule”, in Maddy-Weizman & Inbar, eds., 1997. Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. 25–29. 136

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State system in Sudan as a first step to the ultimate unity of the whole Muslim umma under one central Islamic government (khilàfa).140 The Afghan wars were a catalyst for radical movements all over the Muslim world who sent volunteers to help fight the Soviet occupying forces. A measure of co-operation was forged between the widely diver­ gent groups in spite of the many internal conflicts.141 The continued fighting after the Soviet withdrawal, and the emergence of the ˇalibàn movement are evidence of the complex local religious, cultural, ethnic and political elements involved. Many of the Afghan veterans returned to their home countries after the Soviet withdrawal, instigating a radi­ calization of Islamic groups and a marked increase in violent activities. Their influence was especially felt in Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria as an increase in the level of violence aimed at destabilizing the regimes. Others moved on to other flashpoints such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kossovo in a jihàd to defend threatened Muslim communities against the “Crusader” West.142 An interesting development in the last decades of the 20th century is the relocation of the centers of many extreme movements from their countries of origin to the West due to the repression of radical funda­ mentalism in Muslim states. Many leaders and activists were exiled or went into voluntary exile to Europe or to the USA and set up their bases there utilizing the relative freedom of operation granted them in the secular and democratic West. From there they oversee wide-flung networks of members around the world, link up with each other and propagate their doctrines back into their home countries by the mod­ ern means of the fax, e-mail and the internet. There has also been a shift in their perception of the main enemy of true Islam: apostate regimes in Muslim states have been replaced by the United States as the main enemy to be fought because it is trying to impose its infidel worldview and lifestyle on the whole world while bombing Muslims in Iraq, stationing troops in the Muslim Holy Land of Saudi Arabia, and supporting Israel in its occupation of Muslim lands. Usàma bin-Làden

140

Warburg. pp. 29–31. Differences were based on confessional Sunni-Shì'a lines, on ethnic and tribal backgrounds, as well as on ideological nuances, and on the backing of different Musim powers—Pakistan, Iran, Saudi-Arabia. 142 Richard Engel, “Inside Al-Qaeda: A Window into the World of Militant Islam and the Afghani Alumni”, Jane’s International Security News, (28 September, 2001), Internet: ; See also Simon Reeves, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism, (London: Andre Deutsch, 2000), pp. 172–189; Also Shaul Shay & Yoram Schweitzer, “The ‘Afghan Alumni’ Terrorism: Islamic Militants Against the Rest of the World”, The International Policy Institute for Counter Terror-ism, (6 November, 2000), Internet: http://www.ict.org.il/articledet.cfm?articleid=140. 141

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emerged in this period as the chief propagator of this new approach, developing a wide network of Islamist groups in his al-Qa'ida organiza­ tion. His activities culminated in the spectacular terrorist attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York on the 11th September 2001.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE PHENOMENON OF FUNDAMENTALISM: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS R  R Failure of Secularization Theory: Observations and Theories The global resurgence of religious movements since the 1970s, surprised many Western observers who had assumed that the process of secular­ ization,1 based on 19th century positivistic ideas of progress and mod­ ernization, was universal, unidirectional, and inevitable: all societies were moving inexorably to increasingly secular conditions in which religious institutions would be progressively marginalized and their hold on society diminished.2 The dominant linear view of secularization emphasized that this process will gradually force religion to retreat into ever shrinking areas, ultimately leaving the “public square” totally devoid of its presence.3

1

Secularism is understood as an ideology based on the Enlightenment view of man and reason at the center of the universe and as the basis of knowledge. Secularization as the process through which spheres of society dominated by reli­ gion gradually come under the control of secular institutions. Modernity designates all Western development since the Renaissance. Modernization is a value-free process utilizing science and technology which results in an increase in the productivity of human labor. Modernism is an ideology which views man’s increasing ability to control nature and develop technologically as inevitable moral progress. See Friedemann Buttner. 1997. “The Fundamentalist Impulse and the Challenge of Modernity”, Law and State, Vol. 55, 1997, pp. 72–73. 2 Rippin, Andrew. 1993. Muslims, Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, Vol. 2, pp. 11–14. Rippin sees secularization as the process of the emancipation of various areas of life from the dominance of traditional religious ideas. Secularization is but one facet of modernity, which as he quotes from Berger, also includes abstraction, futurity, individuation, and liberation. Rippin also quotes Cox who sees modernity as including: The emergence of the sovereign nation-state; Science-based technol­ ogy supplying images for life; Bureaucratic rationalism which produces alienated, powerless and apathetic people; The quest for profit maximization; Secularization and the trivialization of religion. 3 Harvey Cox. “Citizens and Believers: Always Strangers?” in Robbins & Anthony, eds., 1990. In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America, pp. 452– 457. Cox claims that the concept of the public realm as value free, excluding reli­ gion and open only to rational discourse, was a reaction of the emerging bour­ geoisie in the 18th and 19th centuries to previous centuries of Church domination.

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Secularization will circumscribe religion more and more even in the sphere of private faith and morality as modern and post-modern worldviews take over. Esposito summarized the received wisdom of these observers in the adage: “Every day in every way, things are getting more and more modern and secular.”4 However, in the light of contemporary religious revivals, there is now a growing skepticism about secularization theory and an adaptation of this theory to the new realities.5 Berger confesses that he was mistaken in his earlier views on secularization. The contemporary world is “mas­ sively religious”, with an interplay of secularizing and counter-secularizing forces. Powerful religious movements are sweeping across most of the world, with only Western Europe a seeming exception to this rule.6 Pannenberg argues that a thoroughly secularized social order is always counterproductive as it gives rise to a sense of meaninglessness that pre­ cipitates violent outbreaks of dissatisfaction, as well as a new search for values and meaning. This places modern secular society in a precari­ ous situation.7 Bainbridge posits a cyclical dialectical relationship between secularization and religious revival in which secularization stimulates a revival of religion, which in turn revives a new tide of secularism, and so on ad infinitum. Cox rejects the possibility of a universal theory of secularization, stressing that patterns of secularization and of religious revival must be studied in specific local settings.8 Greeley points out that the persistence of religion is based on humanity’s inherent and perma­ nent need for an ultimate system of meaning.9 Voll notes the paradox of contemporary religion exhibiting signs of great vitality in modern­ ized and seemingly secularized societies,10 while Gellner sees at least one

4

John Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat, p. 200. Hadden & Shupe, “Introduction”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. xi–xiv; See also Hadden, “University of Virginia Homepage of New Religious Movements”, Internet, ; Gary Wills. 1990, Under God: Religion and American Politics, pp. 14–25; George Jr. Gallup, “Religion In America: Will the Vitality of Churches be the Surprise of the Next Century”, The Public Perspective, 1995, quoted in USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1997. 6 Peter L. Berger. “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Perspective”, in Berger. 1999. ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, pp. 1–11. Berger actually claims that secularism is the unusual phenome­ non, not fundamentalism, and that secularism is the preserve of a tiny, but power­ ful elite, that controls politics, education, and the media in most states. 7 Wolfhart Pannenberg. 1996. “How to Think About Secularism,” First Things, Vol. 64, June/July 1996, pp. 27–32. 8 Cox. 1990. pp. 449–450. 9 Andrew M. Greeley. 1973. The Persistence of Religion, pp. 15–16, Greeley also states (p. 26) that directionality in social change is not in the event, but in the mind of the beholder. 10 John Voll. 1982. Islam: Continuity and Change, pp. 275–276. 5

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major exception to the secularization theory, namely that over the last century the hold of Islam over its adherents has not diminished, but has markedly increased.11 Bias of Secular Academics and of Western Cultural Elites The apparent dominance of secularism among Western elite groups is not necessarily a true indicator of the situation in society as a whole. Hadden claims that because a large proportion of opinion-makers— scholars, intellectuals, and journalists—are committed to “a liberalsecular social agenda” that includes secularization theory, their attitude as to what research findings are acceptable is biased: “Ideology serves as the criteria of acceptability.” Hadden notes that the resurgence of conservative religion as a political force produces so much “cognitive dissonance” that information confirming it is suppressed as unaccept­ able and unreliable, and is discredited by “the application of double standards and unfair personal slurs.” This leads to the dichotomy of treating religious resurgence in politics with ridicule as improbable, while simultaneously reacting to it with alarm as a dangerous threat.12 Shift in Intellectual and Academic Views of Secularism The resurgence of religion has also initiated a slow shift in intellectual and academic assessments of secularism, which while accepting modernity’s achievements in the fields of science and technology, raises ques­ tions about its materialistic core and its destructive results in the fields of spirituality, morality, global economic inequalities, international conflicts, and the breakdown of family and community. John Keane has redefined secularism as an inherently conflict-producing ideology based on the arrogant “titanic” assumption that man can control men, nature, and the universe. Keane sees three sources of conflict: first, greater secular­ ization leads to a growing nervousness among believers, who realizing religion is threatened respond by re-organizing and utilizing all possi­ ble means to resacralize society and politics; second, at the end of an extremely violent twentieth century there is a growing awareness of the

11 Ernest Gellner. “Marxism and Islam: Failure and Success” in Tamimi, Azzam, ed., 1993. Power Sharing Islam, p. 33. 12 Jeffrey K. Hadden. “Conservative Christians, Televangelism, and Politics: Taking Stock a Decade after the Founding of the Moral Majority”, in Robbins & Anthony, eds., 1990. pp. 463–471. Hadden’s comments are made in the context of the American Religious Right but are true of the general approach to religion by part of the intellectual and political establishment in the West; See also Hadden & Shupe. 1988. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier, pp. 200–215; Voll. “Foreword” in Ritchard P. Mitchell. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. ix–xxii. Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam, p. 1.

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inadequacy of science to ultimately explain our complex world, an accept­ ance of some sort of controlling power and authority in the universe, and a growing realization that “when there is no God presumed in the field of power politics the most monstrous crimes result”; third, secu­ larism has an inherent tendency to institutionalize some forms of destruc­ tion of life and the denial of civil liberties. Keane rejects secularism as undemocratic, notes the very different forms of secularism (French, English, American, Bolshevik), and postulates a view of modernity seen in terms of long cycles of the decline and resurgence of religion.13 Development of Weber’s Views on Religion as the Core of Social Cohesion and Change Some sociologists and anthropologists, including Weber, realized that “religion is at the core of the understanding of all social cohesion and much social change.”14 Though Weber predicted that the process of ration­ alization would lead to a growing “disenchantment” with the world, this did not necessarily mean increased secularization or the end of religion, but could be taken to mean the emergence of a more rational religious form.15 Later sociologists of religion, building on Weber’s theories, have also stressed the permanent salience of religions in society, and pointed out that prophetic world religions ( Judaism, Christianity and Islam) will always be capable of revolutionary, world-shattering, and world-building processes given the convergence of suitable circumstances: “World history bears evidence to the enormous strength of these religions in reformulating social, cultural and political relations and meanings,” as well as personal experience and faith.16 Abu-Rabi' argues that many anthropologists and sociologists of religion have stressed that religion is the basis for ultimate meaning in human society, and have assumed that as a result of modernization religion has not diminished in impor­ 13

John Keane. “Secularism”, a paper delivered at the Seminar on “Islamism, Pluralism and Civil Society”, Part I. “Secularism and the Modern State in the Muslim World”, organized by the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (Islam 21), April 23, 1999, MSANEWS, 20,5,99, Internet, . Keane sees secularism as undemocratic, because real democracy is based on institutionalized humility which leads to a respect for and a tolerance of others. 14 Donald G. MacRae. “Introduction” in Michael Hill. 1973. A Sociology of Religion, pp. vii–viii. 15 Fundamentalism is a more rational form of religion, based on revealed scrip­ tural facts, hostile to magic, superstition and mysticism, concerned with utilizing the most efficient modern means of propagating itself and establishing its dominance in society. 16 Robert W. Hefner. 1993. Conversion to Christianity, pp. 7–10; See also Robert N. Bellah. 1975. The Broken Covenant, p. 162, where Bellah argues that: “Culture is the key to revolution; religion is the key to culture.”

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tance, but has rather become more highly differentiated and functional, even flourishing in some secularized contexts.17 A key feature of world religions is their dualistic worldview which posits the existence of an ideal transcendental realm that “dualizes” believers’ cosmologies and drives them to recurrent salvation quests in which this world is evaluated in the light of the transcendental ideal and found wanting. Driven by their vision of the ideal, pressures are created for reform and revolution. Prophetic religions, although their potential impact may be latent for long periods of time, have thus the capacity to remake the world when new historical circumstances favor a revival in which their essence is reinterpreted and reapplied.18 According to Weber the charismatic prophet figure is essential to this process as only he possesses the gifts necessary to religious renewal. He can articulate a unified, integrated and meaningful view of the world, and express the deeply-felt plight and resentments of the oppressed com­ mon people against the existing religious and social-political status-quo, legitimizing their desire for change. He polarizes and challenges society by his radical, dramatic and symbolic words and acts. He formulates a renewed religious ideal able to effectively mobilize believers as they seek to bring their lives in line with the new integrated system of meanings and norms.19 The charismatic prophet is thus the catalyst for the redemp­ tive transformation of the world. Charismatic prophecy can create new religious movements and can radically transform individuals, groups, and institutions at different levels of cultural, social or political organization.20 Convergence of Crisis and Prophecy as the Catalyst for Contemporary Religious Revivals The convergence of a crisis, caused by spiritual, social, economic, national and ethnic dislocations affecting identity and self-worth, with the emer­ gence of charismatic prophetic personalities capable of reformulating religious truths, served as the catalyst for unleashing the tremendous forces of world religions and for the changes we are now experiencing across religious and cultural boundaries. The Western presence in Third World countries caused a crisis of identity and authenticity, whilst in the West itself it was the paradigm change to post-modernism that

17 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi'. “Beyond the Post-Modern Mind”, Review Article, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 20, 1990, pp. 235–256. 18 Hefner. 1993. pp. 12–14. 19 Max Weber. 1963. The Sociology of Religion, pp. 46–59; See also R. Scott Appleby. “Introduction” & “Conclusion”, in Appleby, ed., 1997. Spokesmen For the Despised, pp. 2, 398–399. 20 E. Theodore Long. “Prophecy, Charisma, and Politics: Reinterpreting the Weberian Thesis”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. pp. 3–17.

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caused a similar reaction. The resulting alienation dissolved boundaries and shattered traditional reference-groups that had served as anchors to people’s sense of self, thus preparing them for receiving the new prophetic message. As the structures of traditional society collapsed, religions responded by offering a revived, sometimes millenarian, world view in which scriptural truths and traditions were repackaged in a simplified system appropriate for propagation in the modern world of mass media, global communications, and mass consumption. Out of the convergence of crisis with the emergence of charismatic-prophetic lead­ ers a new kind of religious movement was born, creatively reinterpret­ ing tradition, uniquely adapted to the modern world, radical in its prophetic ideas, and possessing a powerful dynamic for mobilizing peo­ ple into committed activism and for reshaping beliefs, ethics, referencegroups and identity—indeed society itself.21 Most explanations of the causes for the emergence of fundamental­ ism tend to emphasize political, social and economic factors that can also be applied to the rise of other secular mass movements in the 20th century such as nationalism, fascism, and communism. These explana­ tions, while partly correct, fail to be cognizant of the specific religious nature of fundamentalist movements, and of the fact that the crises are not just social and economic but have moral and spiritual connotations.22 Grew rightly notes that religious beliefs have always been high motivating forces for struggle, sacrifice and martyrdom and this has not changed in the 20th century,23 while Moussalli in his references to fun­ damentalist Islam, argues that treating these movements as purely polit­ ical dilutes their metaphysical role and the fact that they deal with a diversity of issues and are “a way of life and a philosophy and a cri­ tique of existing ways of life and philosophies.”24 Some observers wrongly assumed that religious resurgence was confined to the lower classes, thus erecting theoretical barriers to the perception of strong middle-class involvement.25 However, these contemporary crises are not limited to the lowest classes (as is often implied), but threaten the identity of other classes in society, especially the middle classes.26 It 21 William S. Bainbridge. 1997. The Sociology of Religious Movements, p. 27; See also Hefner. 1993. pp. 28–31. 22 Hrair Dekmejian. 1985. Islam in Revolution, p. 8. 23 Raymond Grew. “On Seeking the Cultural Context of Fundamentalism” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1997. Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity, p. 20. 24 Ahmad S. Moussalli. “Introduction to Islamic Fundamentalism: Realities, Ideologies and International Politics” in Moussalli, ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities, pp. 3–4. 25 Voll. “Foreward” in Mitchell. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. xiii where he claims that modern educated professionals were actively involved in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt since the 1940s. 26 Lionel Caplan. “Introduction” in Caplan, ed., 1987 Studies in Religious Fundamentalism,

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is this convergence of interests between the classes that characterizes modern fundamentalist movements, as very often leaders with middle class background emerge able to provide intellectual guidance and mate­ rial resources. In Iran the bazàri class were fervent supporters of Khomeinì. In the USA some fundamentalist groups are definitely middle class, and the emergence of a well-educated wealthier evangelical milieu is well documented.27 This new type of religious movement is often labeled “fundamental­ ism” and is proof of the abiding capacity of world religions to impact and change the world rather than passively accept it as it is. Fundamen­ talism can thus be seen as one type of prophetic response of world reli­ gions when facing crises of relevance and authority. It occurs in all world religions, but the prophetic monotheistic religions are more prone to it than others.28 Fundamentalism can thus be squarely placed within this conceptual framework of the responses of world-religions to severe crises across the globe converging with the rise of charismatic prophetic figures able to reformulate religious worldviews to the needs of the modern world. In Islam it was figures like Rashìd Ri∂a, Óasan al-Bannà", Abu"l A'la Mawdùdì, Sayyid Qu†b, 'Alì Sharì'atì, Rùhollàh Khomeinì, and Óasan al-Turàbì; in Christianity people like J. Gresham Machen, Carl McIntyre, Bob Jones, C.S. Lewis,29 Francis Schaeffer, Billy Graham, Roussas John Rushdoony, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson, who were the catalysts.30 In fundamentalism, religion is getting its own back, reconquering space it had previously vacated under pressure of modernity.31 In the process, fundamentalism has absorbed and made its own many of modernism’s

pp. 8–9. See also Bellah. “Individualism and the Crisis of Civic Membership,” The Christian Century, March 20–27, 1996, pp. 260–265. where he states that American society in the 1990s faces a crisis of civic membership that causes a decline in its “social capital”, and this crisis is as characteristic of the middle class as of the poorer classes. 27 Wade Clark Roof. “The New Fundamentalism: Rebirth of Political Religion in America,” in Hadden & Shupe, eds. 1986. pp. 25–27. 28 Hans Küng. 1995. Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Times, p. 642. 29 C.S. Lewis was not a fundamentalist himself, but his apologetic writings have been immensely popular and have impacted many to return to Evangelical Christianity, and some of those have ended up in the fundamentalist end of the spectrum. On the Islamic side, Shariati and Iqbal do not strictly fit the fundamentalist mold, yet have had a great impact on Islamic fundamentalism. This is also true of others not mentioned here. 30 This is not a complete list, only a sample. In both fundamentalisms there are of course many more such personalities. 31 Caplan in Caplan, ed., 1987. p. 1. Caplan states of American fundamental­ ism that “it denotes an aggressive and confident religious movement which, in coali­ tion with conservative political forces, seeks to combat what is regarded as the liberal takeover of the state, family and church . . .”.

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own values and methodologies in epistemology, science and technology. Whilst some observers deny that fundamentalism is something new, claiming it is just a revival of traditional religion that irrationally resists cultural change, Caplan points out that it is inherently modern because it is a deliberate response to contemporary developments. It is not just a resurgence of the old, but a reaction to modern threats, and is there­ fore closely linked to modern developments in culture, politics, and rela­ tions of power.32 It is a radical reaction to the invasive encroachment of secularism which threatens to displace religion from its central place in culture and society.33 For fundamentalists the resurgence is no surprise—it is the liberals and the secularists who were taken by surprise at the unexpected vig­ orous response of religion. Traditional religion, threatened by secular­ ism, fought back by changing from a passivist to an activist fundamentalist mode that has aggressively targeted liberal and secular dominance in the social and political centers of power using modern tools and methods. Secular elites have responded with some paranoia to this unforeseen counterattack. Fundamentalism as a Reaction to Paradigm Shifts Basing his theory on Thomas Kuhn’s theory of “paradigm shifts” in the natural sciences, Küng has posited dominant paradigms in Christian theology and church history, characterized by sporadic shifts over time. Bosch expanded Küng’s paradigms to include the history of Christian missions.34 Whilst these paradigms are unconscious, implicit assumptions people make about the world—the complex of beliefs and values shared by a community, its frame of reference and perception of reality—the paradigmatic shifts are introduced by a few individuals who begin to perceive reality in ways qualitatively different from their contemporaries and search for new models of meaning, a new paradigm. Periods of shifts between paradigms tend to be times of struggle, conflict and great upheaval. Old and new paradigms are incompatible: the perspectives of their proponents are so different that though they live in the same phys­ ical world they react to it as if living in different worlds and facing different realities.35 32

Ibid., 1987. pp. 4–5. Almond, Sivan, & Appleby. “Fundamentalism: Genus and Species” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, p. 405. 34 Küng. 1995. pp. 59–60; See also David Bosch. 1991. Transforming Missions, pp. 181–189. On Kuhn’s paradigm theory see also George M. Marsden. 1980. Fundamen­ talism and Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870 –1925, pp. 214–215. Marsden quotes Kuhn as stating: “the transfer of allegiance from para­ digm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced”. 35 Bosch. 1991. pp. 184–185. 33

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Bosch sees Western Christian fundamentalism as a reaction of part of Protestantism to the Enlightenment paradigm,36 while other observers see Islamic fundamentalism as a response triggered by modern crisis milieus and as part of the cyclical revivals in which prophetic figures arise to save the umma from external threat and internal decay and restore its golden age.37 One problem with the Küng-Bosch theory of paradigm is its deter­ ministic tendency. It sees the new paradigm as inevitably taking over and becoming dominant in a specific historical period (although they accept that in theology at least, old paradigms can live on into the new era, and often exist in parallel with the new dominant paradigm). Thus the “ecumenical post-modern” paradigm we are entering into is seen as unstoppable. The essence of fundamentalism is of course its opposi­ tion to this paradigm and its efforts to enforce its own neo-traditional paradigm as dominant. It is the struggle between both that character­ izes this age.38 Whilst the paradigm theory deals mainly with mainstream Christianity, it might be useful to expand it to cover both Christianity and Islam and their “fundamentalist” expressions, and posit that in both religions various sub-groups live in paradigmatic matrices that differ both from their own dominant expressions and from that of groups in the other religion. Their actions, reactions, and worldviews differ as a result, yet are all held in a symbiotic relationship to the other religious paradigms, as well as to the secular philosophies prevalent in their societies. This view must inform all attempts at comparison, both within and across religious boundaries. Looked at from this perspective, we can find similarities of Islamic fundamentalisms to both modern day Protestant Christian fundamen­ talism and to Reformation-era Protestantism. This paradigm view also helps us understand the differences between the many fundamentalist groups across the Christian and Muslim worlds, both in the West and in Third World countries, as they were shaped by particular local his­ tories and developments. In the Islamist scene, the ˇalibàn of Afghanistan for instance live in a different theological and historical paradigm to the Shì 'a revolutionaries in Iran, and both differ from al-Turàbì’s Islam as applied in the Sudan, as well as from the Muslim Brotherhood type of

36

Ibid., 1991. pp. 315–319. Dekmejian. 1985. pp. 9–12; Also Syed Habibul Haq Nadwi. 1995. Islamic Fundamentalism: A Theology of Liberation and Renaissance, pp. 92–106 38 For a good refutation of Enlightenment and post-modern determinism, see Roger Scruton. “What Happened to Us after the Deluge”, a Book Review of John Gray. Enlightenment’s Wake, published in The Times, 16, 11, 1995, where he states that reason itself tells us that if we have followed a path into chaos, then it is wiser to retrace our steps rather than moan that “history has moved on”. 37

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fundamentalism in Egypt, or the Jamà'at-i Islàmi of Pakistan. While they all interact and impact each other as a result of existing in the same historical era where due to modern media and communication tech­ nology they are cognizant of each other and in touch with each other, yet they each have their own specific doctrines and practice evolved from their own specific local historical, cultural, and religious situation. I  T “F” U A B? Origin of Term In contemporary academic discourse and in the mass media, “funda­ mentalism” is the most popular term used to describe activist, radical, and militant religious movements anywhere in the world across all reli­ gious and cultural boundaries. However, fundamentalism originally emerged in the framework of the ‘Reformation Protestant’ paradigm, mainly within evangelicalism, when the Baptist C.C. Law coined the term “fundamentalists” to describe the representatives of the conserva­ tive movement that had produced a series of twelve volumes under the title “The Fundamentals” between 1910 and 1915. This term gradually became widely accepted both by conservative Protestants and by the secular media of the time. The various definitions given by observers to describe fundamentalisms across religious boundaries still owe much to the Protestant fundamentalist model.39 Media’s Derogatory Attitude to Fundamentalism The media in the secular West tends to malign extremism of any kind, and especially people holding to strong religious beliefs, by derogatorily labeling them “fundamentalists”, conveying the idea of “unreasonable, extremist, and obscurantist religious fanatics and bigots.”40 All belief in divinely revealed scriptures, as well as any literal interpretation and observance of religious law is pejoratively labeled “fundamentalist” whether in Christianity, Judaism, or Islam, and raises suspicions of being reactionary and politically aggressive.41 Religious liberals, like James Barr, also view the core of fundamentalism as “obscurantist, backward look­ ing, and extremist.”42 US presidential candidate Barry Goldwater at the

39

Küng. 1995. p. 636. Joseph P. Gudel. “Religious Radicalism Right or Wrong?” Christian Research Journal, Winter/Spring 1990, p. 16. 41 Esposito. 1992. p. 7. 42 James Barr. 1977. Fundamentalism, pp. xiv, xix–xx. Barr is a fierce liberal Christian critic of fundamentalism, who sees the whole body of fundamentalist ideology as unbiblical and erroneous. While his book was groundbreaking in its early effort at 40

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1964 Republican National Convention gave a fundamentalist response to such liberal prejudices by stating: “I would remind you that extrem­ ism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!”43 Attempts at Evaluating the Term “Fundamentalism” As Küng states, the more popular the term “fundamentalist” became and the more extended its use, the more vague became its meaning— in order to use it effectively we need a more concise definition.44 Caplan states that “Fundamentalism” is a polythetic category that encompasses so much variety and complexity as to make comparative studies almost unfeasible. While not being a unifying paradigm, it does help identify “family resemblances” among the wide spectrum of phe­ nomena it attempts to describe.45 Whilst there is much truth in that statement, polythetic concepts such as “Christianity, “Islam”, and “fun­ damentalism”, are nevertheless irreplaceable and need narrower definitions in order to be used profitably. There are many groups on each side of the Muslim/Christian fundamentalist divide, each with its own specific mixture of doctrines and concepts and with its own weighting of the different concepts it stresses. It is better therefore to go beyond gener­ alities and focus on discrete groups, persons and doctrines within the wide spectrum. Walker argues that it is difficult to disentangle the term from its Protestant origins, and that as a folk-term emerging from a specific sub­ culture it is inadequate as a unifying paradigm to cover the wide spec­ trum of phenomena attributed to it. He believes its main usefulness is in describing strategies of religious resistance to modernity.46 Fundamentalist religion however does not resist modernity per se, but rather its secu­ larist aspects, and the term “fundamentalism” is therefore useful in describing resistance to secularism in various religions and cultures. Voll remarks on the negative connotations given to the term “fun­ damentalist” in the analysis of religious movements by modern secular scholars, in whose worldview “fundamentalisms” are a peripheral and an anti-modern “other” blocking the spread of progressive modern ideas.

defining the Christian fundamentalist movement, his approach was hostile, with none of the scholarly detachment or the epochè (empathy) and value-free judgment expected of a scholar in comparative religions. 43 Quoted in William Martin. 1996. With God on our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, p. 84. 44 Küng. 1995. p. 635. 45 Caplan. 1987. pp. 4–5. 46 Andrew Walker. 1987. “Fundamentalism and Modernity: The Restoration Movement in Britain,” in Caplan. 1987. pp. 195–199.

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This approach limits the utility of the term, especially where funda­ mentalists actually represent a large segment of society, or even its main­ stream. Voll recognizes that some scholars have accepted the term as useful for comparative studies after carefully defining it as a general mode of religious expression divorced from the particularisms of its origin.47 In an Islamic context he defines fundamentalism as “the reaffirmation of foundational principles and the effort to reshape society in terms of these reaffirmed fundamentals.”48 Sidahmed and Ehteshami note the widespread academic use of the term “fundamentalism”, but argue that its employment as a label does not automatically justify it as a concept. Scholars find it difficult to use in Islamic contexts because of its negative exploitation by the media, giving rise to a mistaken impression of a monolithic extremist and fanat­ ical movement across the Muslim world. They claim that although the term is here to stay as a label, it must be redefined as a concept and as a comparative category in relation to Islamist movements.49 Moussalli accepts that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” has become an integral part of the literature on Islamic thought and is a descrip­ tive, if not an evaluative, term of those movements who in their efforts to establish an Islamic state in accordance with Sharì 'a transform polit­ ical concepts into religious ones. Moussalli prefers the term “Islamic Fundamentalism” to others such as “Political Islam” or “Islamism”, and argues that while it is not necessarily comparable to the term “Christian fundamentalism”, all fundamentalists “want to resurrect their religions in terms of their ‘fundamental’ sources or original ‘fundamentals’.”50 Other Terms and Labels on Offer —yet ‘Fundamentalism’ Remains the Label of Choice It is obvious that the term “fundamentalism” is controversial and is often not the first choice of scholars for describing some specific move­ ment in any one religion. Shepard prefers the term “radicalism” for the Islamic variety, and would describe it as an “ideological orientation” in addition to the “traditionalist”, “secularist”, and “modernist” orienta­ tions in the Muslim world.51 Esposito regards “fundamentalism” as too much weighted with Christian presuppositions and implying a threat

47

Voll. 1969. in Mitchell. 1969. p. xiv. Voll. “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, p. 347. 49 Abdelsalam Sidahmed & Anushirvan Ehteshami in their Introduction to Sidahmed & Ehteshami, eds., 1996. Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 2–5. 50 Moussalli, 1998. pp. 3–4. 51 William Shepard. “Fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic”. Religion, Vol. 17, 1987. p. 358. 48

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that does not exist. He finds “Islamic revivalism” and “Islamic activism” less value-laden and with roots in the Islamic tradition of political reform and social activism.52 Juergensmeyer finds the pejorative resonance of the term troubling, but recognizes that it is possible to use it academ­ ically in a non-judgmental way to label the cross-cultural phenomena of anti-secularist religious activism.53 Seyyed Hossein Nasr rejects the term fundamentalism because it is drawn from a Christian context where it describes movements very different from those in Islam. The differences between the Christian and the Islamic varieties are much greater than the similarities, though he does concede a few of those.54 Nasr and other scholars prefer “Integrisme” originating in a Catholic context as more appropriate to the integrated worldview of the studied groups, although it does confuse the differences between traditionalists and modern fun­ damentalists, many of whom are counter-traditionalists.55 Still others prefer “neo-fundamentalism” as they claim the 18th and 19th century Wahhàbi puritan movement in Arabia was the original fundamentalist movement in Islam. Islamic radicals prefer the term “Islamicists” (Islàmìyìn) to describe themselves and their exclusivist brand of Islam,56 but this term is obvi­ ously unusable across religious boundaries. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers have used ußùliyya (derived from Arabic ußùl meaning basics, essentials, roots) which has positive connotations to Muslims.57 For the advocates of the term, Tibi quotes the Islamic thinker Óasan Óanafi as stating that it is difficult to find a more appropriate term than “funda­ mentalism” to cover the meaning of the Islamic awakening or revival!58 Ràshid Ghannùshì, leader of the Tunisian al-Nah∂a movement, states that “If what is implied by fundamentalism is the authentic Islamic understanding which denotes in its general implication the profound attachment to the fundamentals of Islam and its principles as a basis for reform and renovation, then I would be honored to be such a man, and pray to God to make me worthy of such a description and to die

52

Esposito. 1992. p. 8.

Mark Juergensmeyer. “Antifundamentalism” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995.

Fundamentalisms Comprehended, p. 354 54 Sayyed Hossein Nasr. 1987. Traditional Islam in the Modern World, pp. 303–304. 55 Ibid., pp. 303–304. 56 Dekmejian. 1985. p. 4. 57 Bassam Tibi. 1993. “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993a. Fundamentalisms and Society, pp. 73–74; Abdel Azim, Ramadan. “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, p. 152. Ramadan states that ußùliyya is not generally used in Arabic sources, who often pre­ fer the term ‘radicals’. 58 Tibi. 1993. in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993a. p. 85. 53

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as one”. However he would not accept the term if it implied “the cling­ ing to rigid and extremist interpretations of religious texts, and the desire to impose them by force on others . . .”59 Some Christian radicals on the other hand, especially the Fundamen­ talist Baptist Churches in America, are quite happy to accept the label as an identity-specifying badge of honor,60 though others would prefer “Evangelicals”, or “Conservative Protestants”, or plain “Christians”, which all tend to describe wider constituencies.61 In spite of the controversies surrounding the term, there is a wide acceptance of the reality it represents, and many observers do find it useful as a term that is understood to refer to the complex cluster of movements, ideologies and groups involved in the reaffirmation of reli­ gious essentials at the end of the twentieth century.62 Many scholars go to great lengths to explain why they are uneasy with the term—yet end up using it anyway, as no other term seems able to serve observers as well in describing and communicating the intended phenomena across religious and cultural boundaries. Obviously, it is here to stay.63 Other words with similar connotations such as traditionalism, con­ servatism, orthodoxy, religious extremism and radicalism, all fail to con­ vey the basic hallmark of fundamentalism which is its acceptance of the divinely revealed and inerrant (infallible) Scriptures as the complete, sole, and final authority for the believing community,64 and its radical commitment to the contemporary application of Scriptural principles to all areas of life.65 As Barr rightly understood, fundamentalists take the

59 Rached Ghannouchi. “Western Cultural Fundamentalism and its Blowbacks”, MSANEWS, IntraView with Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, 10, Feb. 1998, Internet, (). 60 Carl McIntire. 1945. Twentieth Century Reformation, p. 4. “We are a fundamen­ talist. We are not ashamed of that word, and when people speak of us as a fun­ damentalist we own the word.” He would have preferred the term “Christian”, but as it was subverted by modernists (who are actually pagans), it must now be clarified by the term “fundamentalist” to identify the real Christians. McIntire was one of the early leaders of Reformed fundamentalist separatism in America. 61 Stott. 1988. In Edwards & Stott. Essentials, pp. 89–104. As an example, Stott complains about James Barr lumping fundamentalists and evangelicals together, and he repudiates the label fundamentalist for himself. However, he asserts that originally the term had an honorable connotation of adhering to true Christian fun­ damentals. This changed as it gradually became associated with extremes and extrav­ agances of some fundamentalists. However, both Evangelicals and fundamentalists accept some of the same fundamentals, including the inerrancy of scripture. 62 Voll, 1991. p. 347. 63 Robert Olson. “Islamic Fundamentalism: Threat and Challenge or Normalization and Opportunity?” International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1993, pp. 1–3; See also Shephard. 1987, p. 368. 64 James I. Packer. 1958. Fundamentalism and the Word of God, p. 73. 65 More moderate groups might theoretically accept fundamentalist beliefs on

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more generally accepted tradition of the authority of Scripture to its absolute logical extreme in the modern social and intellectual situation.66 Fundamentalists see scripture as having immediate relevance to con­ temporary issues and challenges, and as revealed to guide believers in today’s practical problems.67 Fundamentalisms also accepts that Scripture is self contained and self-interpreting, stressing a literalist interpretation and application of Scripture, usually bypassing centuries-old classical bodies of interpretation and commentary and the privileged classes of experts expounding them. Most other terms proposed can be used to describe religious move­ ments that are not committed to this essential characteristic. “Radical Religious Groups” would obviously constitute a wider category includ­ ing many other religious movements of today across all religions. It is clear that many groups termed fundamentalist by the popular press, especially with an eye to involvement in politics and violence, do not actually deserve the epithet “fundamentalist” even if they are extreme and radical, but should be covered by the wider “radical religious groups” term. Marty and Appleby in their comprehensive series on fundamentalisms whilst giving a narrow definition of fundamentalism derived from the Protestant model, go on to include radical groups in Buddhism, Hinduism, modern Japanese religions, etc. that do not fit the narrow definition given but rather the wider category of “radical religious groups.”68 On the other hand the strict scripturalist definition as derived from Protestant fundamentalism needs to be made somewhat more flexible in order to include the majority of Islamic groups who accept the author­ ity of the Sunna in addition to the Qur "àn,69 as well as the Catholic and Orthodox groups who accept the authority of the early Ecumenical Church Councils. This is also true regarding Judaism where the divine Scripture, but are in no hurry to take those beliefs to their logical end in imple­ menting them in modern society—they are quite comfortable with the status-quo. 66 Barr. 1977. pp. xx–xxi. 67 Ronald Nettler. 1994. “A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb’s Introduction to the Tafsir, Fi Zilal Al-Quran,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. 68 “The Fundamentalist Project” of the University of Chicago in five volumes edited by Appleby & Marty. 69 Of all the reviewed Islamic groups, Takfìr wa"l-Hijra in Egypt seems to be the only one that clearly rejects the four madhhabs and all traditional commentators. Most other groups pick and choose the ones that seem closest to their views. See Walid M. Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt, p. 197. As to ˙adìth, most groups accept only the most trustworthy as authentic, with big differences in these selections. However Qaddafi insisted on returning to the Qur"àn alone for guid­ ance, denying even the authority of the ˙adìths (as a result, a theological commis­ sion in Saudi Arabia accused him of apostasy), see Francis Robinson. 1982. Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500, p. 167.

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authority of the oral law is assumed by all orthodox groups termed fun­ damentalist. There is no clear cut-off point, and questions could be raised con­ cerning Shì'a groups which accept the ongoing authority of the ayàtol­ làhs as representatives of the Hidden Imàm, of Íùfì groups with their esoteric interpretations of scripture, or of Catholic groups accepting the infallibility of the Pope when speaking ex-Cathedra—there will always be some ambiguity and overlap. As Marty and Appleby point out in their discussion on assessing the application of the term fundamental­ ism: “The reality is often more complex and subtle than any ideal type will allow.”70 D  A Definition An attempt must be made at defining the term “fundamentalism” and at describing its main characteristics. Fundamentalism is a reaction to the destructive effects of secular modernity on religion, especially the growing cleavage between religion and the public sphere. Fundamentalism fights to bring religion back to the center of the public arena and to revive religious society.71 Fundamentalism calls society to take religion, its teaching and practice, seriously—to accept that religion literally means what it says.72 Building on the attempts of various scholars at defining fundamen­ talism, I propose the following definition: a cluster of religious move­ ments concerned about the contemporary marginalization of religion and its public role in society, claiming a divinely revealed inerrant scrip­ ture as their sole ultimate authority for all spheres of life, mainly liter­ alist in their handling of the source scriptures, radical and rigorous in terms of the contemporary application of these scriptures, extremist (though not necessarily violent) in terms of their methods, and exclu­ sivist in their views of competing ideologies.73

70 Marty & Appleby. “Introduction,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, p. 6. 71 Gabriel Ben-Dor. 1997. The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism”, in MaddyWeitzman & Inbar, ed., Islamic Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. 239–240; See also Marty & Appleby. 1995. pp. 6–7. 72 Gellner, in Tamimi, Azzam, ed., 1993. p. 40. Gellner posits this claim against both esotericism and liberalism in religions, both of which do not accept a firm interpretation of scripture. 73 Ben-Dor. 1997. pp. 239–240; see also: Almond, Sivan, & Appleby, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. p. 405.

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An inherent hallmark of fundamentalism is its reliance on a tran­ scendent authority for moral guidelines in all human affairs.74 Funda­ mentalism is not equivalent to orthodoxy as orthodoxy is oriented to the past and to tradition. While fundamentalism highlights the essen­ tials of revealed religion, it is modern and activist, oriented to the pre­ sent and the future. Gerami argues that fundamentalism is not fanatical or irrational, but rather rational and based on reason and only selec­ tively regressive. It is contemporary because it is an activist response to present day issues and it uses the past in order to correct the present. Gerami adds that fundamentalists develop behavioral in-group codes of behavior and tend to exclusivism.75 Scripturalism refers to a view of the scriptures as divinely inspired and revealed and thus perfect and inerrant (in Christianity this view is limited to fundamentalists and evangelicals,76 in Islam it is accepted by a far wider constituency), as well as to their alleged “naïve” or “sim­ plistic” literal interpretations. God’s commands are clear and demand obedience, not sophistry. The sacred text is accepted as relevant to con­ temporary issues, and is rigorously applied to both individual and pub­ lic areas of life.77 Fundamentalists are puritans, loyal to the core fundamentals of their scriptures and religion, whilst actively cleansing the faith from impurities, innovations and deviations accrued over the centuries. Believers must not only return to the original sources (with some flexibility as to what constitutes the original documents), but also re­ interpret them and re-apply them to contemporary situations, correct­ ing any deviation from the essential faith.78 Boone however argues that while fundamentalists claim to obey scripture only, downgrade the role of interpretation, and reject classical and traditional interpretations, they end up empowering their own contemporary interpreters of the sacred text and accepting a complex reciprocal relationship between text, preach­ ers, commentators and ordinary members.79 In fundamentalism, revealed truth is ideologized and presented as a monolithic, unified, integral and undifferentiated whole, absolute and objective. Some groups reject all hermeneutics as they hold literal ren­ derings of scripture as self-evident.80 This also explains the prevalent

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Rhys H. Williams. “Visions of the Good Society and the Religious Roots of American Political Culture”, Sociology of Religion, 1999, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 4–5. 75 Shahin Gerami. 1996. “Women and Fundamentalism: Islam and Christianity,” pp. 26–30. 76 Bainbridge. 1997. pp. 16–20. 77 Hadden & Shupe. 1986. p. xxi. 78 Gerami. 1996. p. 27. 79 Kathleen C. Boone. 1989. The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism, pp. 2–3. 80 Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, p. 818.

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tendency to eschatological messianism and millenarianism81 as they expect all scriptural descriptions and prophecies of the end times to be liter­ ally fulfilled. Messianism and millenarianism may be more prevalent in Christian fundamentalism, but is certainly present in the Shì 'a fold, and has appeared in at least two Sunnì groups: Takfìr wa"l-Hijra in Egypt and in Juhayman al-'Utaibì’s movement that seized the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.82 Many fundamentalists see themselves as active par­ ticipants in the dramatic convulsions of the last days, hastening the return of Christ, the Messiah, or the Mahdì, and the inauguration of God’s Kingdom—the time is short, and the urgency to prepare for the end fuels their missionary zeal and their militancy. The radicalism of fundamentalist movements is expressed in their commitment and effort to achieve a thorough reordering of society in order to bring it in line with their ideal vision of what scripture demands society to be like. Their extremism refers to their readiness for sacrifice and their willingness to engage in aggressive action (not necessarily vio­ lent) in pursuit of their goals. This may be achieved by saving indi­ viduals and adding them to alternative pure societies, by erecting walls of separation to protect the community from the pollution of the out­ side world, by entering the democratic process in order to influence society and majority culture so as to effect constitutional changes inline with their ideology, or by legitimizing violence in order to take over power in the state and impose reforms from above. Radicalism and extremism imply a degree of intensity, but do not necessarily refer to political activism and/or the legitimization of violence. There are pacifist apolitical fundamentalist groups, especially in the Christian sphere, but also in Islam,83 who reject involvement in the polluted world of pol­ itics, but are radical and extreme in their isolationist efforts (separation), their behavioral demands of their members (purity), their boundary set­ tings (protecting the faithful elect remnant), their refusal to accommo­ date to liberal interpretations of scripture and religion (no compromise with moral evil), etc. It is important to take a profound look at these differences in doctrine and methods as well as at differences and simi­ larities in goals and objectives.84 Another aspect of radicalism and extremism is their utility as a touch­ stone of the believer’s orthodoxy that acts to separate believers from outsiders who find it difficult to accept the radical criteria of the group. 81

Barr. 1977. p. xv. Nasr. 1987. pp. 302–303. Nasr predicts that Messianism in Islam is bound to increase. 83 Carl F. Hallencreutz & David Westerlund. “Introduction: Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion,” in Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, p. 7. Examples are the Mennonites in Christianity and the Tablìghì Jamà'atì in Islam. 84 Ben-Dor. 1997. p. 241. 82

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This is linked to what Marty and Appleby call the “consciously scan­ dalous” aspects of fundamentalism (such as the adoption of Islamic garb and beards, or the aggressive public evangelism in the West), which dis­ turb secularist sensibilities and are intended to draw a strict boundary line which keeps unbelievers out.85 Fundamentalists are also iconoclastic, engaged in smashing idols— both traditional and modern. They bitterly critique the deviations of traditional religion from the norms of its sources in both doctrine and practice, as well as opposing all contemporary secular substitutes to God, especially in political ideologies and philosophical frameworks. For exam­ ple, like the puritans of the Reformation, the Wahhàbis of 18th cen­ tury Arabia smashed Íùfì and Shì 'a shrines as idolatrous. This spirit continues to permeate Islamic fundamentalism, and is also found in Christian Protestant fundamentalism. Their exclusivism refers to their view of their own belief system as the exclusive representation of divine truth and their judgment of all other belief systems as false.86 They see themselves as exclusive and authoritative guardians of objective truth possessing God’s only valid revelation to humanity. Many deny the possibility of others possessing some truth, and actively engage in exposing and denouncing doctrinal and moral error.87 As keepers of the truth, they create strict boundaries around themselves with doctrinal statements and creeds as passwords to gain access to the enclave within these boundaries.88 They also tend to dichotomize the world into binary opposites and divide it into two camps: the one of true believers and the other of unbelievers (which includes nominal co-religionists). The contrasts between good and evil, light and darkness, God’s Kingdom and the Kingdom of Satan, are typical of this Manichean discourse. Their zeal to preserve their com­ munity pure from contamination by the sinful world outside is often expressed by a compulsion to identify the enemy and expose his strat­ agems, judge outsiders as heretics, and indulge in sometimes fanciful conspiracy theories.89 Fundamentalism must be seen as a syndrome with a large set of “symptoms” rather than a specific tightly defined category, and any move­ ment which is characterized by the foregoing minimum characteristics

85

Marty, & Appleby, eds., 1991. p. 818. Elliot Miller. “The 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions”, Christian Research Journal, Winter. 1994. p. 16. 87 Kung. 1995. p. 640. 88 Alister E. McGrath. 1990. An Introduction to Christianity, p. 329; In Islamic fun­ damentalism there is a marked trend to defining the movement’s 'aqìda—see Ibrahim, Abdul-Maajid & Darbaalah. 1997. In Pursuit of God’s Pleasure, pp. 17–36. 89 Marty & Appleby, ed., 1991. p. 821; For Christian fundamentalist conspiracy theories, see Marsden. 1980. pp. 209–211. 86

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can be labeled as “fundamentalist”, even if it exhibits marked differences to other so-called fundamentalisms or to the media–inspired image of fundamentalism in the public mind. The above characteristics would seem to be the bare minimum for defining a fundamentalist movement, a number of others will be outlined. Attributes and Characteristics Marty and Appleby list eleven characteristics of fundamentalist move­ ments, many of which may be attributes of any radical and extremist social and political movement such as Fascism, Marxism or Maoism. Their relevancy to fundamentalism arises only when coupled to fundamentalism’s essentially religious-scripturalist nature. There is a danger of supposing all such movements to be politically active and militant, but we must remember that their extremism and militancy are expressed in many different ways. With this caveat in mind we can look at some of these attributes.90 One result of the radicalism and extremism of fundamentalist groups is their militancy, a characteristic highlighted by most observers of the fundamentalist scene. This militancy is part of their defensive reaction to dominant trends in society perceived as an existential threat to their community, worldview, way of life, and core identity. As a result, “sec­ ularism” (and its tool the secularizing state) is perceived as the epitome of all evil forces because it encompasses atheism, relativism, and moral permissiveness and advocates the marginalization of religion.91 Sensing a vicious attack by hostile forces of secular-liberal-humanism, funda­ mentalists mobilize for a counterattack in order to zealously defend their community and worldview.92 Most fundamentalist groups view the world as a spiritual battlefield in which all of humanity is engaged in warfare whether people realize it or not. Those fighting for God are called out to a lifestyle congruent with the emergency situation they are in, and to the implementation of God’s pre-determined plan for this world. Militancy includes a selectivity in choosing their weapons as funda­ mentalists study their real or imagined past “golden age” to find in it specific doctrines and methods which they apply to modern situations. They reconstruct an idealized history of their faith which supplies the

90 Marty & Appleby, “Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family”, in Mart & Appleby, eds., 1991. pp. 814–842. 91 Marty & Appleby, “The Fundamentalisms Project: A User’s Guide”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. p. vii. Marty & Appleby state that while “modernity” is seen as the apex of evil, it is only the secularist part of modernity that is rejected, the scientific-technological part is gladly appropriated. 92 Shepard. 1987. p. 356; See also Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991, p. iv.

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community with an authentic identity and ideology rooted in the famil­ iar past paradigm. They focus their energies into defending a specific selection of core scriptural principles and practices that provide a cri­ teria of orthodoxy and identity-markers of belonging to the pure com­ munity. Some specific beliefs act as rallying points and mobilizing motivators (biblical inerrancy, pro-life anti-abortionism, imposition of Sharì'a, Islamic garb) to defend their positions and to attack secularism. Another attribute is their endeavor to create alternative societies in communities of true believers, protected from the pollution of the outside evil world, yet reaching out to effect change in that world. Within these communities members are offered a consistent, clear, and simple worldview as against the confusing outside world. Interpretation is mostly literal, doctrine is unambiguous, and sophisticated interpreta­ tions are regarded as heresy.93 Within these communities the converted, many of whom come from alienated and marginalized backgrounds, experience a dramatic increase in self-esteem, and a heightening of their self-consciousness and identity through enlightenment and empower­ ment. Sivan describes these alternative societies as enclave cultures. While the enclave community cannot forcibly prevent its members from yield­ ing to external temptations, it uses moral persuasion and emotional and behavioral boundaries to keep members in and outsiders out, thus cre­ ating a separate space in which strict behavioral patterns and a specific vocabulary are accepted as identity markers.94 Lawrence sees the stress on absolute and holistic religious author­ ity as a main characteristic of fundamentalists, which makes them intol­ erant of criticism and motivates them to demand that specific religious norms be publicly recognized and legally enforced as the moral basis of society.95 This is linked to the essentialist and universalist tendencies of fundamentalisms as they emphasize a number of selected core fun­ damentals of their respective religions, based on the original sources, and proclaimed as true for all times and places, while denigrating local­ ized and popular forms of religion which they term superstitious, syn­ cretistic, or semi-pagan. Gerami notes the tendency of fundamentalist discourse to focus on three overlapping subjects: faith, family and state. Faith in the scrip­ tural essentials is the ideological basis for all of life, the family is the basic building block of a godly society, while the state ought to be the manifestation of the divinely ordained political order. Implemented

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Kung. 1995. p. 641. Emmanuel Sivan. “The Enclave Culture” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. pp. 16–18; 27–29. Behavioral norms are voluntarily assumed by members and include rituals, outward appearance and dress, morals, vocabulary, etc. 95 Cited by Sivan. 1995. pp. 16–18; 27–29. 94

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according to the divine formula, these three create a holistic godly sys­ tem: “Faith provides the instruction, the state the tools, and the family the building foundation for a godly system.”96 Attitudes to Modernity and the Flexibility of Fundamentalisms Popular stereotypes of fundamentalisms see them as rigid and closed belief systems, yet they can be amazingly flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances. Some offer a variety of symbolic themes, others utilize a variety of interpretations, and many use modern technology and the communication media.97 Being a response to modernity, fun­ damentalisms do not reject all of it, but share some of its attributes and benefit from some of its products. They are part of the Enlightenment shift from the mythic dimension of religion to a more rational-doctrinal form98 which is well suited to the modern world of increased choices in all areas of life, including the religious, social and moral.99 In many ways fundamentalism is a child of modernity in its supermarket-like offer of choices. Fundamentalisms exist in a symbiotic relationship with moder­ nity, effectively utilizing its technology and mass media to create inno­ vative methods in missionary outreach, administration, advertising and education.100 Ràshid Ghannùshì, leader of the Tunisian al-Nah∂a move­ ment, defines the return to Islamic fundamentals as a necessary condi­ tion for an opening up of religion to “dialogue between itself, reason and reality, in the hope of generating a rejuvenated fiqh ( jurisprudence) apt to digest modern sciences and skills, to position Muslims back to the path of civilization.”101 On the Christian side, McIntire had already in 1945 stated that true Christian fundamentalists are progressive, forward-looking, and interested in modern technological and scientific inno­ vations, recognizing them as a gift from God.102 An example of this attitude is the trend in the late 1990s of both fundamentalisms to eagerly take to the Internet as a platform for stat­ ing their presence and propagating their views. This use of modern tools to reach a wider audience for recruitment and influence attenu­ ates the drive to separation and isolationism.

96

Gerami. 1996. pp. 30–31. Westerlund. 1996, Questioning the Secular State, pp. xiii–xiv; See also Roof. 1986. pp. 30–33. 98 Ninian Smart. 1996, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs, pp. 58–59, 60. 99 Grew. 1997. p. 25. 100 Marty & Appleby. 1991. p. vii. 101 Ghannùshì, Ràshed. 1998. “Western Cultural Fundamentalism and its Blowbacks”. 102 McIntire. 1945. p. 5 97

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C  F

Fundamentalisms in both Christianity and Islam encompass a vast spec­ trum of beliefs, practices, and movements. Instead of trying to force all of these into a narrowly defined straitjacket, it is better to describe the variety of voices, whether dominant or minor, loud or suppressed, whether of numerically large or of small fringe groups. In reality, rather than comprising a linear spectrum between moderate and extreme as often depicted, fundamentalisms are actually composed of a continu­ ously changing multi-dimensional matrix of beliefs and practices in which any one movement or individual embraces a wide variety of doctrines and positions that may represent moderation on one issue, extremism on another, orthodoxy on the one hand and innovation on the other. One way of categorizing fundamentalist movements is by dividing them into stricter and broader types, the stricter groups tend to be more radical and isolationist, condemning not only the outside world but also other fundamentalist groups, the broader ones more gradualist and will­ ing to forge tactical alliances with non-fundamentalists.103 Hadden divides fundamentalism into four categories: theological—concerned with defending Scripture and doctrinal fundamentals against modernist-secularist attacks; political—endeavoring to change legislation and society in line with their views of morality and the ideal civic order; cultural—trying to impact the wider culture that has strayed from its scriptural moral roots, by creating model alternative societies and by engaging in missionary activities; and global—the multi-religious world­ wide phenomena of fundamentalist movements existing today.104 Almond, Sivan and Appleby identify four types of fundamentalisms relating to their interaction with the outside world:105 first, the world conqueror type that is not satisfied with creating an alternative society in its own enclave, but aims at taking control of all structures of soci­ ety, if necessary by force, rather than gradually transform them (revo­ lutionary Shì'ìsm in Iran before the revolution, the radical Egyptian jama'àt and some fringe groups on the extreme Christian Right are examples of this mode); second, the world transformer type which engages in a gradual process of transforming individuals, institutions, laws, and society (the Muslim Brotherhood and the New Christian Right are good examples of this mode); third, the world creator type, which works at

103

Shepard. 1987. pp. 358–359. Steven Jones. “Fundamentalism”, in Hadden, ed., 1998. University of Virginia Sociology Department Internet Pages on New Religious Movements, Internet, . 105 Almond, Sivan, & Appleby. “Explaining Fundamentalisms,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. pp. 426–429. 104

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creating enclaves of pure alternative societies with their own particular structures and institutions and reaches out only to gain converts for their enclave (the Tablìghì Jamà'atì and some fundamentalist Baptist Churches that oppose political involvement are examples of this mode); and fourth, the world renouncer type, extreme separatists who forsake the outside world, and live within their own self-imposed boundaries oblivious to the rest of humanity ( Jamà'at al-Takfìr wa"l-Hijra in its pas­ sive stage was an example). Movements can move in historic stages from one type to another, or simultaneously manifest several types in their doctrine and practice.106 A C V? Of great importance to this comparative study are scholarly views on the validity of comparisons across religious boundaries. As social phe­ nomena differ greatly, it is imperative to compare between them. BenDor quotes the famous French sociologist Raymon Aron who said that “the essence of social science is to look for similarities in that which appears different, and also look for differences in that which appears similar.”107 Simpson notes the absence of a comparative framework in the study of fundamentalisms, suggesting as a likely reason the abandonment of a focusing on problems in general sociological theory. He stresses that in general sociological theory there must be a commitment to the “efficacy of comparative analysis” for the solution of problems.108 Some like Huntingdon claim that there is no common ground between Islamist and Western Christian ideologies, confrontation between them is inevitable, so comparisons would not seem to be meaningful.109 Others deny the validity of comparisons because of the fear of reductionism and of con­ fusing the particularities of human phenomena, as well as the dangers of essentialization and reification. However, most scholars see such com­ parisons as valid and necessary in spite of various caveats: Carter states that it is rare to find wide-ranging comparative studies of religion because of the fear of reductionism or of particularity. It is however imperative to perform such comparisons, while maintaining a balance between par­ ticularity and generality, and distinctions between description and expla­ nation. All descriptions and explanations inherently contain comparisons:

106

Almond, Sivan & Appleby. 1995. pp. 426–429. Ben-Dor. 1977. p. 241. 108 John H. Simpson. 1986. “Some Elementary Forms of Authority and Fundamen­ talist Politics”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., pp. 395–396. 109 Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash Of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1993, pp. 22–49. 107

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description differentiates the studied objects from their environment, while explanations assert the generalities, interconnections, and relations between observed facts. Theory is the organizing principle for mapping the descriptive facts into explanatory systems.110 Cox argues that in spite of post-modernist critique, the study of reli­ gion is based on the creation of typologies which serve to make the vast diversity of phenomena intelligible. These typologies must balance broad generalizations for purposes of comparison, with the accurate accounts of specific data.111 Smart refutes those who argue that widely differing contexts invali­ date comparisons. He states that while each variant is unique, there are always a range of “alike-claims” and that discerned similarities yield important insights and raise fruitful questions. The danger of particu­ larizing everything is that there is no vocabulary left to describe cul­ tures. Smart backs the claim that comparative studies of religions necessitate the use of informed empathy which creates the sensitivity to enter into the attitudes of other cultures, and the suspension of value judgments (epochè ) which precludes arrogant superiority and relations of power. Smart provides a sevenfold pattern of dimensions of religion as an aid to the study of specific religions and as a framework for comparisons between different religions. This model includes: (1) The ritual-practical; (2) The doctrinal-philosophical; (3) The mythic nar­ rative; (4) The experiential-emotional; (5) The ethical-legal; (6) The organizational-social; (7) The material-artistic.112 Grew argues that comparative studies of fundamentalisms across reli­ gious boundaries discover common patterns in their development and environment. He makes several suggestions as to various possible areas of fruitful comparisons.113 Finally, Lawrence states that the only way to understand the world-wide phenomena of fundamentalism is by com­ paring the phenomena in their various contexts.114 Enough ‘Family Resemblances’ to Justify Comparisons The overwhelming consensus of scholars seems to endorse comparisons across religious boundaries, and many, including Shepard, Hegland, Hallencreutz, Westerlund, Hefner, Ben-Dor, and Roy list striking resem­ blances as well as differences between Islamic and Christian fundamen­ talisms in various areas.115 110 Jeffrey R. Carter. “Description is Not Explanation: A Methodology of Com­ parison,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998, pp. 133–148. 111 James L. Cox. “Religious Typologies and the Postmodern Critique”, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1998, pp. 244–261. 112 Smart. 1996. pp. 2–6, 8–15. 113 Grew. 1997. pp. 19–23. 114 Cited by Jones in Hadden, ed., 1998. “Fundamentalism.” 115 Shepard. 1987. pp. 359–367; Mary E. Hegland. 1987. in Antoun & Hegland,

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Shepard argues that Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms have enough in common as “ideological orientations” to justify comparisons. He sees three levels for comparison: one of obvious similarities, the sec­ ond of differences, and the third a deeper level of mixed subtle differences and similarities. Differences exist because each fundamentalism stresses the distinctives of its own religious traditions, while similarities exist because both are a reaction to similar crises of modernism and its per­ ceived attack on religion, and both also belong to monotheistic religions based on divine revelations received in sacred texts. Both are “super­ naturalist in theology, absolutist in ethics,” as well as being selectively modern in their methods.116 Marty and Appleby claim that fundamentalists have more in com­ mon with each other across religious boundaries than with their own co-religionists, especially in the area of essential foundational truths that include revelation as the guide to human inquiry. They also adopt sim­ ilar attitudes towards anthropocentric concepts of progress and development.117 It is evident that fundamentalist movements do share certain “fam­ ily resemblances”, but they also differ from each other in substantial ways. Attempts to find one model that can explain everything have not been successful, as the picture is too large and too diverse to fit a sin­ gle unified theory. In the light of the huge regional differences in soci­ ety, history, culture, and geography, Ben-Dor suggests that it makes sense to reduce the level of analysis and look at each fundamentalism as a universal phenomenon to be understood in terms of the specific society, culture, and religious milieu in which it emerged. Comparisons between different fundamentalisms sharpen the distinctiveness of each, yield important insights into recurring patterns of belief and practice, while illuminating why a particular form appears in one place and not another and why some are more intense or more successful than others.118 Subjects for comparison may be categorized under Smart’s seven dimensions of worldview: They could include comparisons of significant doctrines, interpretations of scripture, views on morality, ethics, family, gender and education as well as behavioral modes. One could also look at histories of specific movements and their leaders, the reasons for their formation and their links to earlier traditions, as well as their passivity or activism, the emotional experiences of their members, methods of

eds. Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism, pp. 248–249; Hallencreutz & Westerlund in Westerlund, ed., 1996. pp. 1–8; Hefner. 1993. pp. 3–4; Ben-Dor. 1997. pp. 242–245; Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam, pp. 65–67. 116 Shepard. 1987. pp. 358–366. 117 Marty & Appleby. 1993. “Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, Defiant Society” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993a. p. 5. 118 Ben-Dor. 1997. pp. 239–241.

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operation in outreach and institution-building. Specific religious, social, economic, and political goals and the strategies and tactics for achiev­ ing them can be compared, as well as attitudes to mass media, gov­ ernments, constitutions, parties, and civil society. Another important comparison would be their views on power and violence.119 Grew argues that comparative studies of fundamentalist movements across religious boundaries will discover common patterns in their devel­ opment and in the environment in which they seem to thrive. Grew also advocates comparisons of the ways in which various fundamen­ talisms relate to the dominant religious tradition from which they emerged, the social ties they utilize, the identifying markers they use, and the tac­ tics they employ to achieve their goals. Finally Grew would compare fundamentalisms as to the specific social groups they target, the alliances they forge, and the accommodations they are willing to make in order to gain influence.120 It would thus seem that the overwhelming consensus of academic observers tends to the endorsement of comparisons between religious fundamentalisms within each camp and across the religious boundaries. Importance of Comparisons and of Close Scrutiny of Similarities and Differences It is common to perceive fundamentalist Islam as standing in direct opposition to Western Judaeo-Christian and liberal civilization. The mil­ itancy of the extreme activist Islamic groups (at the moment of writing Algeria is the example that springs to mind) have aroused a horror in the Western media that tends to equate the extreme minority with the whole of Islam and to justify old stereotypes of Islam as a “threat”. It is often claimed that there is no common ground between radical Islamic fundamentalism and Western ideologies, and that the confrontation between them seems to be inevitable.121 A closer look at fundamentalist Islamic discourse reveals similarities to fundamentalist Evangelical concepts, as well as to populist and rad­ ical revolutionary Western ideologies. A comparative study of the basic doctrines, concepts, and discourse of fundamentalist Islam and funda­ mentalist Christianity will reveal some striking similarities as well as many differences. These help us understand the complex matrix of fun­ damentalist groups in both camps.

119

Appleby & Marty. 1991, “The Fundamentalisms Project: A User’s Guide”,

p. xi. 120

Grew, Raymond. 1997. pp. 19–23. Huntington. 1993. pp. 22–49; See also Esposito. 1992. pp. 167–174. Esposito points to the negative memories Muslims have of their history of dealings with the West and to a process of “mutual satanization” in both camps. He warns of the dangers of creating imagined monolithic images of the “other”. 121

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  Some Similarities

An obvious similarity is the way both movements developed as a response to modernist-secularism and its attack on authentic values couched in religious idiom.122 Both see secularism as their main enemy—godless, atheistic, enforcing anti-God legislation under the pretense of the sep­ aration of Church and state, and committed to the removal of religion from the public arena.123 Both fundamentalisms rely on an early Enlightenment view of truth and reject modernism’s acceptance of reason rather than revelation as the source of all knowledge, its claim to a monopoly over science, its de-emphasizing of the supernatural, and its relativism in ethics and morality. They see a clear causal relationship between secularism and the crisis of values in contemporary societies. Both claim authenticity and stress distinctive aspects of their respective religions. Both are strongly supernaturalist in theology and absolutist in ethics.124 As oppositional movements, both Islamic and Christian fundamen­ talists consciously take unpopular “scandalous” positions, refusing to con­ form to current fads. Both argue that “true” believers are a minority in their societies, simultaneously asserting that many in their societies can be won over by the proper forms of persuasion, and that a large proportion of the population—“the silent majority”—agrees with their worldview and would support their programs in democratic elections. They are confident that this silent majority would happily consent to a fundamentalist take-over of the political institutions of power and would willingly live under a fundamentalist regime.125 Many observers see both fundamentalisms as a reaction to the crisis of anomie and alienation in contemporary societies caused by the over­ whelming pace of change in modernization, secularization, industrial­ ization, urbanization, and development. This crisis leads to feelings of powerlessness, humiliation, a sense of cosmic despair, and an existen­ tial loss of identity coupled to a deep disillusionment with the political and religious status-quo, resulting in a quest for the roots of one’s faith. In all societies, those marginalized, impoverished, and alienated by the inability of corrupt regimes to solve their basic problems respond with a deep-seated sense of grievance that may express itself in religious idiom.126 122

Buttner. 1997. pp. 72–73. Shepard. 1987. p. 360. 124 Ibid., pp. 366–367. 125 Ibid., pp. 360–362. 126 The Economist, August 6–12th, 1994, “The Fundamentalist Fear”, pp. 13–14; & The Economist, August 6–12th, 1994, “A Survey of Islam”, pp. 3–18. In many countries these frustrations first led to Marxist and Maoist movements e.g. “The Shining Path” of Peru, and the strong Tudeh communist party of Iran. 123

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Both fundamentalisms are rooted in religious traditions, but influenced by modern political theories. In both fundamentalisms many groups have developed an activist, political ideology that enables them to exert pressure on the political system or even take it over. Previously passive groups now actively struggle to assert their identity and to make their voices heard above the dominant elitist discourse.127 Some affinities can be seen as a result of both camps belonging to monotheistic revealed religions possessing holy scriptures. Fundamentalists stress not only the inerrancy of scripture coupled to a literalist inter­ pretation, but draw radical conclusions from it that they zealously seek to implement in the modern world (e.g. in Islam the branding of whole societies as jàhilì and kuffàr, thus legitimizing the violent overthrow of existing regimes; in Christianity the battle to include creationism in state school curricula).128 Both fundamentalisms aim at actively bringing contemporary society under God’s sovereignty, rule and law, as revealed in their respective scriptures. Both judge their respective societies as decidedly neo-pagan, immoral and corrupt, reject both secularism and liberal theologies, and call for an integrative total worldview and socio-political system based on absolute scriptural morality and ethics. Both Islamic and Christian fundamentalisms have developed a growing political awareness in recent decades and are actively working to strengthen the role of religion in political life and to change the attitudes of society and its institutions so they will accept public expressions of religion.129 Both Christian and Islamic fundamentalists are viewed by the out­ side world and by their opponents as being intolerant, extremist, fanatic, rigid, literalist, narrow-minded, reactionary, militant, and the like.130 Governments, media, the man in the street, all seem frightened and confused by the fundamentalist phenomenon and don’t quite know how to relate to it. For liberal observers fundamentalism is obviously a reac­ tionary and obscurantist response. Saiedi states that Islamic fundamen­ talism is “a paranoid reaction to present social contradictions, and seeks a solution by imposing a mechanical form of collective conscience on society.” For him, Islamist fundamentalism represents an extremist, mil­ itant, intolerant, and repressive alternative to Islamic liberalism.”131 Similar 127 Hegland, 1987. in Antoun & Hegland, eds., Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Chritianity and Judaism, pp. 248–249; The dominant elites can be the Westernized secularized elites ruling most Arab countries, or the liberal-secularhumanist elites who until recently dominated Western societies and especially the media and Academia. 128 Shepard. 1987. p. 366. 129 Hallencreutz & Westerlund, in Westerlund, ed., 1996. pp. 1, 6, 8. 130 Shepard. 1987. p. 359. 131 Nader Saiedi. “What is Fundamentalism?” in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. pp. 173–195.

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views are expressed in the Christian West towards Christian funda­ mentalism. Both camps have ideologized religion, claiming it should not only control personal morality and worship, but ought to be applied to all areas of life including politics. Even knowledge itself must be “reli­ gionized” to purify it from secular contamination. They present their vision as a social and political panacea which will solve all the evils of society and usher in utopia.132 Islam and Christianity are world religions that have shown great suc­ cess in propagating themselves over time and space.133 Their funda­ mentalisms are especially zealous and successful in missions—the widespread incidence of conversion to fundamentalist versions of Chris­ tianity and Islam suggests resemblances in outreach and appeal across cultures.134 Both are distinctively modern in some aspects, appealing to new strata of literate people with modern technical education. Adherents claim to be “true” Christians or Muslims, rediscovering and keeping the pure faith revealed in their religion’s Holy Scriptures as practiced by the first generation of believers. Facing vicious secularist attacks on their faith, they respond by selecting a limited number of endangered doctrines to serve as rallying points and as bases of counterattack against their enemies.135 Some Differences There are obvious differences between “fundamentalisms” in the Islamic and the Christian contexts, many of which can be ascribed to each fun­ damentalism emphasizing the distinctives of its own tradition. One difference relates to the processes of revelation and inspiration of scrip­ ture, where Muslim views cannot be easily compared to the Protestant Christian fundamentalist view as most do not isolate the Qur"àn from the Sunna.136 The Muslim view is nearer the Catholic and Orthodox conservative view, while the inerrancy of the Qur "àn is not an exclusive fundamentalist doctrine but is unquestionably accepted as a basic premise

132

Shepard. 1987. p. 361. Hefner. 1993. p. 4. 134 Ibid., pp. 3–4; Large scale conversion to fundamentalist Christianity is espe­ cially visible in Latin America and Korea. For Islamic fundamentalism the West seems especially fruitful—in Africa and Asia it is still the Íùf ì forms that seems more attractive to non-Muslims. The great success of fundamentalist Islam lies of course in attracting many professing Muslims to its ranks. 135 Shepard. 1987. p. 361. 136 Hallencreutz & Westerlund, in Westerlund, ed., 1996. pp. 4–5. In Christianity, not only fundamentalists, but also most evangelicals subscribe to the inerrancy doctrine. 133

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by most Muslims. Another difference is due to the fact that for Western Christianity modernism and secularism developed gradually within Western culture, while in the case of Islam they penetrated from without and were imposed by ruling elites endeavoring to modernize their countries on a Western model.137 While Islamic fundamentalists view modernism as culturally alien and representing a serious break in the cultural con­ tinuity of their societies, Christian fundamentalists tend to accept cer­ tain aspects of modernity including some separation of church and state and the acceptance of secular governments, as legitimate. Islamic fundamentalism developed in opposition to imperialism, and it sometimes uses the discourse of radical Third World liberation movements.138 Western Christian fundamentalisms on the other hand are part of the post-imperialist society, sharing many of the assumptions that underlie post-colonialism, including the view of Islam as the main ide­ ological enemy.139 Protestant fundamentalism tends to patriotism and nationalism, while Islamic fundamentalism tends to pan-Islamism and consciously rejects nationalism as a foreign ideology designed to divide the Muslim com­ munity. Fundamentalist Islamic groups support national liberation move­ ments merely as a step towards the ultimate goal of pan-Islamic unity.140 While many Islamic fundamentalists actively try to penetrate the polit­ ical systems of other Islamic countries in the name of the one umma, most Christian fundamentalists, in spite of the doctrine of the one uni­ versal church and despite some activities such as missionary work car­ ried out across national borders, do not have an ideological goal of penetrating the political fabric of other countries or of setting up one universal Christian state.141 Another difference noted by Ben-Dor is that Islamic fundamentalism is inherently more political than the Christian variety. It rejects all boundaries between church and state, and posits Sharì 'a as binding in all areas including personal status, economics and politics. Christian fundamentalisms, on the other hand, interpret the saying of Jesus: “Then give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s”142

137 Shepard. 1987. pp. 366–367; See also Kate Zebiri. 1998. “Muslim AntiSecularist Discourse in the Context of Muslim-Christian Relations”, Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1998, p. 1. 138 Hallencreutz & Westerlund, in Westerlund, ed., 1996. pp. 4–5. See also Shepard, 1987. p. 360: In Latin America, Liberation Theology adopted a similar revolutionary idiom. 139 This is on the whole true also of Christian fundamentalists in Third World countries. 140 Shepard. 1987. p. 360. 141 Ben-Dor 1997. pp. 242–243. 142 New Testament, Luke 20:25.

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as meaning the acceptance of at least some form of separation of state from church.143 While in the West secularism has gained the ascendancy in a long historical process, in the Muslim world religion is still dominant in the public square and in political discourse. Eickelman sees a parallel between the Christian Reformation in Europe and the present upheavals in the Muslim world where social unrest and innovations in mass media have combined to create a spiritual an intellectual ferment causing many to criticize traditional religion and demand a return to the sources and reforms in both establishment religion and the state. While in the West the marginalization of religion has supplanted religious justifications for violence with secular ideological justifications, the present ferment in the Muslim world has produced extremist movements using Islamic reli­ gious justifications to legitimize violence and acts of terror as accept­ able means to achieving their goals.144 Active martyrdom and jihàd are two other areas of significant differences. Traditional Islam allowed only competent 'ulamà" to declare jihàd after due deliberation. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalism has popularized jihàd as an effective mobilizational tool against all enemies in its strug­ gle for an Islamic state. Some, like Faràj of Islamic Jihàd turn it into a sixth pillar of Islam—the missing or forgotten obligation. Martyrdom, is actively encouraged and glorified and its rewards in the afterlife stressed so that many actively court it. This is especially true of Shì 'a fundamentalists,145 but has also impacted Sunnì groups, both encourag­ ing and organizing suicide missions and other forms of violent martyr­ dom. Though passive martyrdom was eagerly looked for and glorified in early Christianity, in modern Christian fundamentalism it is seen only as a last resort, and holy war (Crusade) is understood mainly in its spir­ itual and symbolic sense.146

143

Ben-Dor. 1997. p. 245. Dale F. Eickelman, “Inside the Islamic Reformation”, Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 80–89. 145 For a good introduction to contemporary Shì'a thought on martyrdom, see: Sharì'atì, 'Alì. 1981. Martyrdom: Arise and Witness, in which Sharì'atì stresses the importance of martyrdom as a revolutionary weapon. 146 Roy. 1994. pp. 65–67; Also: Ben-Dor. 1997. pp. 246–247; Shì 'a martyrdom has a long pedigree beginning with that of 'Alì and Hussein, which are annually commemorated in the 'Ashùra. Martyrdom as a political and military tool has been especially cultivated by Shì 'a groups in Iran (Fedayan-i-Islam) and Lebanon (Óiz­ bullàh), and the Palestinian Óamas and Islamic Jihàd groups, though it appears also in other arenas of Islamic struggle against perceived enemies as in Afghanistan, Chechnya, etc. 144

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CHAPTER THREE

ANTI-SECULARISM AS A MAIN COMMON DENOMINATOR I Anti-Secularist stance of fundamentalisms Opposition to secularism is one of the most striking common denomi­ nators fundamentalists share across religious and cultural barriers. Fundamentalists in both religions view secularism as a rebellion of man against God, the main enemy of true religion, and the main cause of the evils prevalent in modern societies. The term secularism, in funda­ mentalist discourse, is often used interchangeably with modernism, human­ ism, and liberalism, to represent the paradigmatic “other”. Berger argues that all fundamentalisms have a common critique of secularism, namely that a secular world bereft of transcendence would be an untenably shallow and impoverished world.1 Clemens rightly states that all fundamentalisms view secularism as devoid of spiritual qualities, anti-God, and promoting materialism, hedonism and atheism. He also argues that all fundamentalists reject the secular concept of ultimate, man-centered values based on non-religious sources. American Christian fundamentalists have coined the label “secular-humanism” to describe this arch-enemy of religion, a label that covers all manifestations of evil in the contemporary world, especially “the sexual permissiveness, the decline of the traditional family, the legalization of abortion, and the dramatic rise in crime.”2 Similarly, Abu-Rabi' argues that all Islamist thinkers reject “once and for all,” secularist nihilism, secularist rejection of God’s rule, and secularist affirmation of the centrality of man.3 Fundamentalists view secularism as a materialistic anthropocentric ide­ ology grounded in the Enlightenment, which replaced the then domi­ nant theocentric worldview with an anthropocentric paradigm, positing man, his reason, and his sensory observation of nature, at the center of the universe and as the highest criteria of truth and values. Replacing

1 Peter L. Berger. “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Berger. 1999. ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, p. 13. 2 Simon Clemen. “Conservative Protestantism, Politics, and Civil Religion in the United States”, in David Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 24–42. 3 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi'. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, pp. 263–264.

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the religious foundations of society, law, and culture with nature and reason resulted in new systems of natural law, natural morality, and natural theory of government, expressed in social contract theories.4 Having replaced God and his revelation by autonomous man and his reason, triumphant secularism attributed all positive results of the mod­ ernization and secularization processes to this new paradigm, whilst ignoring its negative impact. Islamic and Christian fundamentalists view secularism as militantly anti-religious and reject its main presupposition of human autonomy, its optimistic belief in the scientific method as the guarantor of limitless progress, its rejection of transcendence and its lack of a supernatural reference point, as well as its marginalization of reli­ gion. Fundamentalists replace this secular worldview with their own theocentric paradigm.5 Acknowledging the primacy of the fundamentalist anti-secularist stance across religious boundaries, Manzoor sees the real clash of our age not so much between Western and Islamic civilizations as between the sec­ ularist and fundamentalist camps, between the “transcendence negat­ ing” and the “transcendence affirming” worldviews within each civilization.6 This view is gradually replacing the “clash of civilizations” paradigm popularized by Huntingdon. Zebiri notes the emergence of a contemporary Islamist anti-secularist discourse, not confined to fundamentalists, which accuses secularism of being based on fallible human reason rather than on divine revelation, and of excluding morality from politics. Secularism is viewed as the cause of the moral breakdown in Western societies.7 Hallencreutz and Westerlund note the developing political awareness of both Islamic and Christian fundamentalisms striving to strengthen the role of religion

4 Wolfhart Pannenberg. “How to Think about Secularism”, First Things, Vol. 64, June– July 1996, Internet, . See also Andrew Rippin. 1993. Muslims, their Religious Beliefs and Practices, vol. 2. The Contemporary Period, p. 13. 5 Bernhard J. Trautner. 1999. “The Clash Within Civilisations: Islam and the Accom­ modation of Plurality,” p. 1. Internet, ; See also: Parvez Manzoor. “The Conflict Between the Transcendence Affirming and the Transcendence Negating World Views”, a lecture delivered at the Seminar on Islamism, Pluralism and Civil Society; Part I. Secularism and the Modern State in the Muslim World, London, 23, April, 1999, organized by the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster and the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (Islam 21). MSANEWS, 20, May, 1999, Internet, . 6 Manzoor. “The Conflict Between the Transcendence Affirming and the Tran­ scendence Negating World Views”. 7 Kate Zebiri. 1998. “Muslim Anti-Secularist Discourse in the Context of MuslimChristian Relations,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1998. pp. 47–50.

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in politics as well as to change attitudes and institutions in society in the direction of greater acceptance of religious expressions in the pub­ lic square.8 Fundamentalist anti-secularist discourse coupled to attempts at reviving the influence of religion in the public arena are thus a mark of the last decades of the twentieth century. On the fundamentalist side, Packer and Howard, well known and influential Evangelical academics, state that secular-humanism is the cor­ rect label for the secularist worldview that calls itself “humanism with­ out qualification.” Christianity is the real, sacred humanism, indeed, the only worldview worthy of the term “humanism”. Packer and Howard define secular-humanism as “an aggressive cultural ideology—that is, a set of ideas expressed in programs designed to change people’s lives.” They capture fundamentalist antipathy to secularism when they accuse secular-humanism of claiming that: There is no Creator to worship, no Redeemer to love, no image of God to recognize and honour in my neighbour, no future life to pre­ pare for, no heavenly glory to inherit: and you are not inwardly free till you admit this.9

Os Guinness, a disciple of Francis Schaeffer and director of Trinity Forum,10 sees not only the ideology of secularism as destructive to faith, but also the process of secularization itself, as it “provides the perfect set­ ting for secularism,” an environment in which secularism can flourish. Guinness defines secularization as “the process through which, starting from the centre and moving outwards, successive sectors of society and culture have been freed from the decisive influence of religious ideas and institutions.” It has displaced religion’s influence in the central areas of modern society and has made “religious ideas less meaningful and religious institutions more marginal.” While many consciously oppose the philosophy of secularism, they unconsciously accept secularization as inevitable because it is a silent and gradual process which brainwashes them into becoming subconscious secularists.11

8 Carl F. Hallencreutz & David Westerlund. “Introduction: Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion”, in Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 1–8. 9 James I. Packer & Thomas Howard. 1995. Christianity: The True Humanism, pp. 11–14. 10 Guinness was active in Francis Schaeffer’s “L’Abri Fellowship”. Trinity Forum helps senior executives and politicians relate contemporary issues and ideas to their faith. 11 Os Guinness. 1983, The Gravedigger File, pp. 51–54. In this book Guinness imi­ tates C.S. Lewis’ Screwtape Letters in having a director of the devil’s program to sub­ vert Christianity write to a subordinate with instructions which in reality express a critique of secularization and of the liberal version of Christianity.

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  Views on the Historical Development of the Secularist Paradigm

Most observers, academic as well as fundamentalist, see the Enlightenment as developing in two stages: early and modern. The early Enlightenment stage rejected God as the absolute reference point, but still searched for an absolute to replace him. The modern Enlightenment stage, moving into postmodernism, rejects any kind of absolute, replacing it with rel­ ativism, initiating an obsessive search for a new relativistic framework which according to fundamentalists is inherently unstable as it is replaced by ever newer relativistic relativisms . . . Pannenberg explains that in Christian Europe religion had been the unifying and validating principle of society and culture, but as the dom­ inant culture became increasingly anti-Christian, especially after the French Revolution, it was gradually eliminated from its position as the foundation of a unified social order, and consigned to the private sphere. Pannenberg sees that process as initiating modern secularism in the political sphere: In the absence of religious ways of legitimizing government, alterna­ tive theories had to be developed based on the autonomy of human nature and reason and of natural law.12

Marsden views the Enlightenment as developing in four aspects to which religion reacted in different ways: first, early Moderate Enlight­ enment associated with ideals of order, balance, and religious com­ promise as represented by Newton and Locke. Second, the skeptical anti-religious Enlightenment as represented by Voltaire and Hume. Third, the Revolutionary Enlightenment which emerged out of Rousseau’s search for utopia. Fourth, Scottish Common Sense philosophy which opposed skepticism and revolution but was committed to science, ratio­ nality, order, and Christian tradition. Many conservative Christian thinkers coexist happily with the first and fourth aspects, but vehemently oppose its skeptical and revolutionary aspects.13 Western secularism first imposed modernism on all societies, decon­ structing all old certainties in order to replace them with its own ratio­ nal truths. Modernism’s heir however, is contemporary postmodernism, which has rejected modernity (out of which it emerged) and its belief in “Big Ideas that give sense and direction to life”. Postmodernism claims that notions of truth and morality are mere social constructs, and there­ fore ultimately meaningless. In its embrace of total relativism postmod­ ernism has rejected science, religion, reason, and reality along with all

12

Pannenberg. 1996. “How to Think about Secularism”. George M. Marsden. 1991. Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, pp. 127–128. 13

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worldviews based on absolute truth-claims. Postmodernism blurs all dis­ tinctions between reality and image, creating a meaningless and nihilis­ tic world.14 Fundamentalists accept the earlier Enlightenment view of a rational universe, possessing order and purpose and governed by law. They claim that this view provides a firm foundation for science and knowledge in general. However, they accuse the Enlightenment of an anti-God bias that, especially in its second stage, has destroyed its own basis by deny­ ing absolute objective truth, thus negating the possibility of true knowl­ edge and science. This is the basis of their efforts at a “religionization” of knowledge. Christian Views on the Development of Secularism On the Christian side, Francis Schaeffer, a very well-known and influential Evangelical thinker from the Calvinist-Reformed wing who has had a great impact on all fundamentalist and Evangelical sectors, argues that early modern scientists shared the belief of biblical Christianity in “a reasonable God who had created a reasonable universe; and thus man, by use of his reason, could find out the universe’s form.” He claims that scientists such as Bacon, Galileo, Newton, and Kepler had based their scientific work on the premise of a universe created by a reason­ able God, a premise which implied that it was possible through reason to discover truths about the universe. The tremendous contributions of these scientists launched early modern science, a feat today’s scientists would be unable to replicate as they function outside these biblical assumptions. What Schaeffer calls “modern modern” science (the new relativistic science) developed when scientists accepted the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system as their dominant philosophy, leaving God and freedom no place in a cosmos transformed into one large allencompassing machine. This change was not a result of newly discov­ ered facts, “but of a shift in the presuppositions of modern scientists—a shift to the worldview of materialism or naturalism.” As a result, con­ temporary science is being transformed into mere technology and soci­ ological manipulation. According to Schaeffer, this humanist view of final reality penetrated the United States around the turn of the cen­ tury, and became dominant in culture, government, law, and the media since the 1940s, resulting in increased chaos and in arbitrary law.15

14 Ziauddin Sardar & Merryl W. Davies. “The Fire of Secularism” in Sardar & Davies. 1993. Distorted Imaginations: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair. See also Sardar. “Deconstructing Postmodernism”, Encounters, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, Internet, . 15 Francis Schaeffer. 1982. The Complete Works of Francis A. Schaeffer: A Christian Worldview, Volume One, EFR, pp. 225–231, 327–328; Volume Five, ACM, p. 495.

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Miroslav Volf, a Croatian evangelical professor at the Evangelical Theological Faculty, Osijek, Croatia, and at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, USA, stresses these two stages in the development of the enlightenment paradigm: in the first stage, more congenial to religion, truth was seen as based on axiomatic first principles and reason. This stage was committed to “one uniform set of principles and one ratio­ nal method leading to one objective and universal truth encompassing all of reality.” Scientific knowledge was viewed as “factual, value-free, and neutral, facts being independent of the observer and objectively true.” The second stage dominant today holds a relativistic epistemo­ logical position in which the correctness of judgments about matters of truth are dependent on the individuals who make the judgments: “epis­ temological absolutism was replaced by a stress on the ‘goodness of the fit’ of the various components of an explanation, not on their corre­ spondence to real ‘reality’ and objectively true facts.”16 This echoes Pannenberg’s argument that in the second stage of the Enlightenment the idea of objective truth, “truth that does not need my approval in order to be true,” has been rejected.17 Packer and Howard argue for a psychological understanding of sec­ ularism: it is a psychological “reaction of the scarred mind” to the fail­ ings of organized religion throughout history and to the emotional hurts and resentment inflicted by it. Secular-humanists reacted with outrage to perceived ills of nominal Christianity, becoming obsessively antiChristian and initiating a relentless campaign against Christianity aimed at its total destruction. Packer and Howard view contemporary secu­ larism as Christianity’s “prodigal child”, seeking for freedom and fulfillment away from home, driven by the rebel child’s passion to strike at his parents.18 Another aspect of secularism highlighted by Packer and Howard is the two-sided face of secularism: “Enlightenment humanism” and “Promethean humanism”. The first was a movement of refined secular intellectualism as expressed by “cool reasoners” like Kant and Voltaire, rooted in eighteen-century rationalism. The Promethean version on the other hand stems from Feuerbach, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, and is rooted in the nineteenth-century romantic movement that glorified heroic rebels and promoted revolution with a passionate urge to negate and destroy.19

16

Miroslav Volf. 1994. “The Unique Christ and the Challenge of Modernity”, in Bruce J. Nicholls, ed., 1994. The Unique Christ in our Pluralistic World, pp. 96–99. 17 Pannenberg. 1996. “How to Think about Secularism”. 18 Packer & Howard. 1995. pp. 15–17. 19 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

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Islamic views on the Development of Secularism While both fundamentalisms accept that secularism and modernity are based on the Enlightenment, Muslim fundamentalists highlight the for­ eign Western source of secularism as an additional reason for resent­ ing it and reject it with even greater vehemence than their Christian counterparts. Óasan al-Bannà", founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, views materialism as the main negative attribute of European secularism. Following the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, religion was manip­ ulated for political aims: “Europe retained its Christianity only as a his­ torical heirloom, as one factor among others for educating the simple minded and naive among the masses, and as a means for conquest, col­ onization, and the suppression of political aspirations.” According to al­ Bannà", this resulted in the rise of the strong state coupled to science encroaching on areas outside its legitimate domain. As a result, mod­ ern secular European culture rests on the elimination of religion from public life and on the enthronement of its materialistic outlook as the criterion for everything.20 Al-Bannà" gives a long list of other negative characteristics of European secularist culture which includes the denial of God’s existence, the denial of the soul and of the afterlife with its rewards and punishments, a hedonistic dedication to the pursuit of pleasure, the licentious gratification of every base lust “of the belly and of the genitals, the equipment of women with every technique of seduction and incitement”, individual selfishness and class selfishness leading to fragmentation of society and to wars between nations, the legalization of usury which corrupted European society and weakened its moral fiber, and the shattering of the integrity of the family and the home.21 Sayyid Qu†b, the main ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed by Nasser in 1966, actually argues that Europe was never really Christian—true Christianity has always been marginal to European society. He sees Imperial Roman principles of power politics—the util­ itarian use of force and a materialistic perception of life—as having dominated European culture. The Roman worldview prefigured secu­ larism as it did not allow the gods to interfere in the affairs of real life and “it was never expected that they would give moral laws to humans.” Modern secular Western civilization is essentially irreligious even though it tolerates religion and does not totally reject God. Basically, it ignores any absolute moral framework in favor of utilitarian pragmatism.22 The ordinary European, claims Qu†b, 20

Hasan Al-Banna. 1978. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), pp. 25–27.

Ibid., 1978. pp. 25–27.

22 Sayyid Qutb. “Social Justice in Islam” in Shepard, W. ed., 1996. Sayyid Qutb

and Islamic Activism, pp. 292–293. 21

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  Whether democrat or fascist or Bolshevik, worker or intellectual, knows only one positive religion and that is the worship of material prog­ ress, that is, the belief that there is no other goal in life than to make this one life itself more and more comfortable . . . The temples of this religion are the large factories, the cinemas, the chemical laboratories, the dance halls and the electrical power plants, while its priests are the bankers, the engineers, the movie stars, the leaders of industry and the heroes of aviation.

The inevitable result is a destructive power struggle for material resources between heavily armed nations, and “the creation of a human type whose ethical philosophy is limited to useful and practical matters and for whom the highest criterion of good and evil is material progress.”23 Abu’l Óasan 'Alì Nadwì, an influential Muslim scholar and early pio­ neer of fundamentalism, who was Rector of the prestigious seminary Nadwatul-'Ulamà", Chairman, Board of Trustees, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and founding member of the Muslim World League, claims that following the Renaissance, religious, spiritual, and moral values lost their hold on Western society. As a result of Wrong and monopolistic behavior by religious leaders, the economic pressures, the struggle for existence which the various European nations had gone through . . . in the West turned its attention from man him­ self to the external world, from man as a spiritual entity to man as a physical structure; it turned from his heart and soul to the body of nature, to the sciences of physics, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics and so on.24

This concentration on the natural world resulted in great strides in science and technology bringing great wealth to Western nations. However, it did not improve human nature and society, neither did it get rid of “fear, anxiety, warfare, enmity, poverty, disease”. In spite of acquiring the material means necessary for transforming the world into a par­ adise, peace and brotherhood were not established. Instead, the world was plunged into horrendous global wars, while society became increas­ ingly immoral as the family disintegrated and individuals became iso­ lated. Nadwì concludes that Western man’s morals, motives and attitudes have not kept pace with the progress of technology. Rather, he has lost the key of faith that enables moral regeneration under divine guidance.25

23

Ibid., p. 294. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi. 1983. Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission, pp. 34–36. 25 Nadwi. 1983. pp. 34–36. 24

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Appearance of Secularism in the Muslim World and Reaction to it In the West it was the deep frustrations caused by the wars of religion that were the catalyst for the Enlightenment and its concepts, which then developed in stages as a gradual organic process, so western fun­ damentalists can identify with at least some the Enlightenment postulates.26 In the Muslim world in contrast, the Enlightenment and its attendant secularism appeared as a violent and sudden cataclysm, force­ fully imported by imperialism and colonialism and causing massive dis­ ruptions whose effects are still felt today. As Western hegemony spread, so too did secularism, causing massive dislocations that impacted all of society but especially the poor who became the main victims of its atten­ dant industrialization and bureaucratization.27 Khurràm Muràd, former director general of the Islamic Foundation, Leicester, a member of the central executive of the Jamà'at-i Islàmì Pakistan 1963–77, amìr of its Dhaka branch 1963–71, and deputy amìr of Jamà'at-i Islàmi Pakistan since 1987, claims that as a result, Muslims, who did not share the Western experience of the gradual spread of the Enlightenment, were “plunged into a soul-rending conflict.”28 Most contemporary Islamists view secularism as a foreign ideology antithetical to Islam and imposed by rulers who aimed at modernizing their countries on the Western model. In their view secularism is a sin­ ister plot to undermine Islam, and Western cultural influences are termed an “intellectual invasion” (al-ghazw al-fikrì ) more dangerous than the for­ mer political and military dominance. This contemporary Islamist antisecularist discourse blames secularism for the breakdown of moral values evident in Western societies, and opposes secularism as a basis for soci­ ety and state. The only solid basis for society, state, and culture, accord­ ing to this discourse, is divine revelation.29 Many Muslim intellectuals, not only fundamentalists, view their opposition to secularism as essen­ tial in their efforts to preserve the authentic cultural identities of their various societies and ensure their survival in the face of the western sec­ ularist claims to cultural monopoly and trend to a shallow and global­ izing international culture.30 For Islamic fundamentalists, Western dominance and materialism are seen as an unmitigated disaster for the Muslim world. Materialism was the main corrupting trait Europe implanted in Muslim lands,31 while

26

Marsden. 1991. pp. 127–128; See also Pannenberg. 1996.

Rippin. 1993. pp. 14–15.

28 Khurram Murad, “Introduction”, in Mawdudi 1984. The Islamic Movement:

Dynamics of Values, Power And Change, pp. 25–26. 29 Zebiri. 1998. pp. 47–50. 30 Sardar. 1999. “Deconstructing Postmodernism”. 31 Al-Banna. 1978. pp. 25–27. 27

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Islam’s greatest disaster occurred when Europe conquered the Islamic world and injected the spirit of materialism into it.32 The encounter between the imperialist West and the Muslim countries it invaded resulted in “an attitude of surrender, of abject subservience before Western val­ ues and ideas” which robbed the Muslim peoples of their distinctive identity and self-respect.33 Taqi al-Dìn al-Nab˙ànì, founder of Óizb al-Tahrìr, states that when Islamic countries were first swamped by secular European culture, most Muslims did not realize that democracy and capitalism were systems of unbelief, nor that they were based on the separation of religion from the state. Many Muslims tried to prove that Western culture originated in Islam, thus justifying Western secular culture and trying to accom­ modate Islamic culture to Western concepts. They forgot that in Islam “Allah’s commands and prohibitions encompass all things as well as the prayer: they encompass buying and selling, renting (indeed all business transactions), the Judicial and education systems; simply everything, but the Muslims were no longer affected by these concepts.”34 F C  S Fundamentalists have a deep concern for God’s honor and sovereignty, and therefore actively oppose all secularist attempts at denigrating God and mocking those who have faith in him, as well as any attempts at blasphemy and sacrilege. These secularist tendencies are seen as evil, sinful, insensitive, and distasteful. Freedom of expression must have bounds that limit anti-religious and anti-God attacks.35 Fundamentalist critique of secularism focuses on several fronts: its anthropocentrism which they claim has contradictorily resulted in the devaluation of man; its separation of religion from politics and public life; its arrogant insistence on man’s autonomy and on placing human reason as the source of all knowledge; its rejection of God’s revelation as the ultimate criterion of truth, standard of behavior, and source of knowledge and values, and its soulless materialism. Fundamentalists also accuse secularism of infiltrating and subverting religion by creating a fifth column within the ranks of the believers—the modernist, liberal wing of religion. Also, under the guise of pluralism, secularism has imposed its own worldview as the one dominant value which must not

32

Qutb in Shepard, ed., 1996. p. 282. Nadwi. 1983. pp. 28–29. 34 Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, (nd). The Islamic State, pp. 194–196. 35 On the Islamic side, this attitude was well demonstrated in the Salman Rushdie affair. On the Christian side it was evident in reactions to the film “The Last temp­ tation of Christ”. 33

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be questioned, while all other paradigms, including religions, are open to doubt, skepticism and even ridicule. Secularism is Antithetical to Religion Various observers note that in spite of its claims to tolerance, secular­ ism views religion as antithetical to itself. Bosch argues that for secu­ larists the narrow believer, the “fundamentalist”, has become the real danger to a secular society which can tolerate everything except the absolutist claim: “Indiscriminateness was elevated to a moral imperative”.36 Sardar claims that secularism views both Christianity and Islam as its arch enemies, and directs its “venom, its ridicule and its abuse” against them, labeling them as medieval, reactionary, anti-progress and anti-rational.37 Fundamentalists on the other hand see secularism as the antithesis of all true religion, an open rebellion against God and a rejection of his authority and revelation. Secularism is thus the main enemy they fight against on all the various fronts of the contemporary world. Christian Views Christian fundamentalists stress man’s sin, pride and rebellion against God as the root cause of secularism, which is seen as a destructive ide­ ology, antithetical to God-revealed truth and to human nature and soci­ ety as God intended them to be. Schaeffer places the origin of secular-humanism in humanity’s origi­ nal revolt against God—it is a spirit of anti-law rebelling against God himself: It is characterized by man putting himself at the center of everything, making himself the standard of value. This is why we call this spirit of revolution humanism. It is Man with a capital M. It is man say­ ing, ‘I will only accept knowledge that I myself can generate out from myself.’ This is why we relate this spirit of revolution against God to the word rationalism.38

Because secular-humanism today controls the consensus in society and the media, Christians must be “inalterably opposed to the false and destructive humanism, which is false to the Bible and equally false to what Man is,” and which “presses in upon us, constantly challenging our very life-style”. The real battle, maintains Schaeffer, is ultimately

36

Bosch, David. 1996. Transforming Missions, pp. 266–267 Sardar, Ziauddin. 1999. “Deconstructing Postmodernism”. Sardar explains that secularism’s main attack is nowadays directed against Islam, as Christianity has already succumbed to its attack. 38 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Three, NLP, p. 53. 37

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about the “Truth of what the final reality is: is it impersonal material or is it the living God?”39 The moral erosion in Western culture is seen as a result of the fun­ damental shift from a world view that was at least vaguely Christian, towards a completely secular worldview “based upon the idea that the final reality is impersonal matter or energy shaped into its present form by impersonal chance.” These two world views are completely anti­ thetical, both in their understanding of the nature of reality and exist­ ence and in the totally different results they produce in society, government and law: “There is no way to mix these two total world views. They are separate entities that cannot be synthesized.” Schaeffer views human­ ism, as depicted in the Humanist Manifestos I and II, as an alterna­ tive religion which claims all of life. Christianity and humanism are incompatible competing total systems.40 Packer and Howard also claim that secular humanism in all its vari­ ants (Western liberal, Marxist, and existentialist) is antithetical to Christianity, a defiant revolt against the Creator born of human pride, arrogance and self-confidence. It abolishes God as “the transcendent ground and guardian of right and wrong” and is another link in a long chain of human bids for independence from the Creator and for human autonomy. It rejects any suggestion of submitting to God or of exchang­ ing intellectual and moral autonomy for theonomy (God’s rule). Its main goal is the destruction of Christianity.41 Pat Robertson, leader in the American charismatic movement, one­ time presidential candidate, and founder of the Christian Coalition and of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), sees a rejection of the Creator as underlying all crises in modern society: “God has been removed from the center of things, and man has taken His place. All things exist for man and his pleasure.”42 Others argue that secularism’s vaunted ethical pluralism simply means that “all moral views are valid except any moral view that does not believe that all moral views are valid ”. As a result, secularism sees the absolutist posi­ tion of Biblical Christianity as unacceptable.43 Islamic Views Islamic fundamentalists stress the hostility of European secularism specifically to Islam, as well as to all that is good in all religions. They

39 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Three, NLP, p. 50; Volume Four, ACM, pp. 427, 445–446. 40 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, ACM, pp. 423–425, 445–446. 41 Packer & Howard. 1995. pp. 11, 16–17; 22; 28–30. 42 Pat Robertson. 1982. The Secret Kingdom, pp. 31–32. 43 Gary North & Gary DeMar. 1991. Christian Reconstruction: What it is, What it isn’t, p. 184.

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also highlight the negative characteristics of secularism, especially its atheism and materialism. European secularism is viewed as the enemy of monotheistic religions. It demolished all the good that revealed reli­ gions had established over the centuries and was particularly hostile to true Islam.44 Nadwì sees the European Enlightenment as a decidedly anti-religious revolt against all things spiritual: Inevitably, Europe turned, and turned decidedly towards materialism. The enlightened sections among the Europeans developed a strong aversion to everything associated with the clerics, a definite intolerance of every kind of spiritual control. Their feelings of disgust and disdain were directed not against a particular religion, but against the whole concept of religious belief and worship. In its haste, the West decided that no progress could be made until religion was discouraged and bondage to the Church ended. Europe thus rose openly in revolt against the Church and set out on the journey of materialism, the mournful consequences of which everywhere stare us in the face. It is a long and mournful story.45

Nadwì argues that a stable and virtuous civilization can be built only on the foundation of a right concept of God and of a view of life which shows man his right place in the total scheme of life. This was totally strange to the European way of thinking and the Western secularist rebellion was totally opposed to all religion and morality.46 Sayyid Abu’l A'la Mawdùdì, the famous Pakistani fundamentalist thinker and founder of Jamà'at-i Islàmì, states that secularism destroys religion, and that it is impossible to live a full Muslim life in a society dominated by secularism: “Indeed, if the society is ruled by secularism and Kufr, then it will be impossible to live by Islam even in many aspects of your private life. The domination of the secular structure will squeeze Islam even out of your private life and reduce its writ to a nar­ rower and narrower territory.”47 Qu†b claims that all modern jàhilì philosophies and sciences are basi­ cally hostile to religion in general and to Islam in particular, their main fault being that they set up human reason as a god instead of the One True God. The sciences have exceeded their legitimate realm of deal­ ing with actual recorded facts and of experimentation, and have ven­ tured into philosophical speculations on the nature of scientific results and on human nature.48

44 45 46 47 48

Al-Banna. 1978. p. 26.

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 48–49.

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 48–49.

Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1996. Witnesses Unto Mankind, p. 46.

Qutb in Shepard, ed., 1996. pp. 302–303.

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Ràshid Ghannùshì, leader of the Tunisian al-Na˙da movement who lives in exile in London, states that modern Western civilization cast off the religious and moral constraints of the Church age when it totally rejected God and willingly “abdicated the divine presence”, thus trig­ gering a deep crisis from which it has never recovered. It has sacral­ ized man, deified his rational faculties, and transformed civilization into an arena of conflict in which “the will to power and extolling of national glory, of which the world wars are a clear testimony,” dominate.49 Secularism is Based on Wrong Presuppositions Fundamentalists see a causal link between the wrong presuppositions underlying secularist thinking and the evils of the modern world. Having rejected the premise of an absolute objective truth transcending time and culture, secularism adopted the false presupposition that science is more reliable than God’s revelation, resulting in a shift in the concept of truth toward a view of reality based on the subjective perception of the observer. This has spawned the plethora of false relativistic worldviews characteristic of modernity. Limiting knowledge to human per­ ceptions alone has pushed God out of the picture, has replaced objectivity with subjectivity, and has placed science on a shaky foundation, blur­ ring the distinction between fact and fantasy. Holy scripture is treated like any other human book, to be critically examined and deconstructed by secular textual experts, leaving no ultimate foundation for society and morals. Van Til, who was Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary and who had a marked influence on Francis Schaeffer, main­ tains that every thinker assumes an ultimate conceptual framework in constructing a sensible interpretation of reality: The issue between believers and non-believers in Christian theism can­ not be settled by a direct appeal to ‘facts’ or ‘laws’ whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate. The question is rather as to what is the final reference-point required to make the ‘facts’ and the ‘laws’ intelligible. The question is as to what the ‘facts’ and ‘laws’ really are. Are they what the non-Christian methodology assumes they are? Are they what the Christian theistic methodology presupposes they are?50

49 Rached Ghannouchi. “Western Cultural Fundamentalism and its Blowbacks”, MSANEWS IntraView with Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, 10, Feb. 1998, Internet, . 50 Cornelius Van Til. 1967. “Defense of the Faith”, Internet, .

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In order to make sense of any fact one must presuppose “the reality of the self-contained triune God and the self-attesting revelation of the Scriptures.” Sinful humans cannot be judges of ultimate reality, and sec­ ular presuppositions of a random and impersonal cosmos cannot account for the order and rationality seen in the universe. Life and reality only make sense on the basis of biblical Christian presuppositions.51 Secularists make the basic assumption of the autonomy of their own experience, and so are unable to accept any fact that challenges their self-sufficiency.”52 Schaeffer argues that the real difference between the religious and the secular worldviews concerns their basically different presuppositions. The right presuppositions are those which best fit the reality of “what is” and are supremely important. Sadly “many people catch their pre­ suppositions like some children catch childhood diseases—they have no idea where they come from.”53 Schaeffer blames secular-humanism and liberal theology for having generated the dominant monolithic consen­ sus and methodology which have resulted in a tremendous shift in the concept of truth. This shift took place around 1890 in Europe and about 1935 in America, and Schaeffer calls it “the line of despair”: before these dates most people, Christians and non-Christians, functioned on the basis of Christian presuppositions of absolutes in epistemology that implied the acceptance of antithesis—“they took it for granted that if anything was true, its opposite was false.” While this consensus held, it was possible to have true communication between the various camps: “however this consensus now no longer holds sway, and communica­ tion has become meaningless.”54 Christianity is true to total reality as it begins with the central real­ ity of the objective existence of the personal-infinite God:55 “for the greatest antithesis of all is that God exists as opposed to His not exist­ ing: He is the God who is there.” In contrast, says Schaeffer, the human­ ist worldview posits everything as beginning with matter, and everything since then as developing randomly within matter. This presupposition allows no understanding of why things exist, nor of how life began, and it leaves materialistic scientists with what Woody Allen described as “alienation, loneliness and emptiness verging on madness.” These sci­ entists manifest an arbitrary prejudice against religious answers to the basic questions of the universe, and are unwilling to consider a solu­ tion involving God—at the very mention of God their supposedly open

51

Van Til. 1967. “Defense of the Faith”. Van Til, Cornelius, (nd). Why I Believe in God, Philadelphia: Committee on Christian Education. 53 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, TCE, p. 20. 54 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume One, GWT, pp. 5–7. 55 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, ACM, p. 425. 52

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minds shut in a dogmatic rationalism. Ultimately, humanist explana­ tions are just as much a “faith answer” as any other.56 John Stott, a very influential Anglican evangelical leader, thinker and writer, claims that because God created humans as spiritual and moral beings “religion and ethics, godliness and goodness, are fundamental to authentic humanness.” The tragedy of secularism is its closed worldview which rejects God and replaces him with a spiritual vacuum. Stott quotes T.S. Eliot who called secularism a “waste land ” and Theodore Roszak who termed it a “desert of the spirit”. Without transcendence, adds Stott, “the human person shrinks—secularism not only dethrones God but simultaneously destroys human beings.”57 Packer and Howard argue that secularist presuppositions include the evolutionist belief in inevitable progress which results in an irrationally optimistic view of human nature and in the claim that personal wel­ fare is the ultimate value. However, while humanists start with opti­ mistic presuppositions, they always end up as pessimists on human nature, “optimistic only about their plans for changing it.” They become “social engineers devaluing all individuals who do not measure up to their ideal . . . justifying abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, and the ster­ ilizing and killing of the physically handicapped and mentally limited, as the Nazis did.” This is no coincidence, but a logical inevitable result of their presuppositions and of their impatience with people who obstruct the fulfillment of their permissive utopias.58 On the Muslim side, fundamentalists state that ultimately all human categories and practices are based on a central presupposed paradigm which defines the ultimate source of authority. All jàhilì thinking, phi­ losophy, ethics, science and arts are directly affected by the jàhilì pre­ suppositions, and as a result are hostile to religion even in their methodology.59 Qu†b sees the decline of the secular West as rooted in its adoption of false values, as “all man-made theories, both individu­ alistic and collective, have proved to be failures”.60 The wrong premises of Western secularism resulted in an aimlessness of the Western enlightenment project which lost its way in its unravel­ ing of the maze of nature. European sciences did discover important facts about nature, but failed to integrate and synthesize them into one “purposeful, life-giving whole. The new sciences achieved victory after victory in the field of knowledge, but left humanity in deeper moral darkness than they found it.” There was no congruent moral progress

56 57 58 59 60

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume One, GWT, p. 47; Volume Four, WHR, pp. 357–361.

John Stott. 1984. Issues Facing Christians Today, pp. 36–37.

Packer & Howard. 1995. pp. 19–20.

Qutb in Shepard, ed., 1996. pp. 302–303.

Qutb, 1990. Milestones, pp. 5–6.

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in man, and the new powers unleashed destructive forces fatal to civilization.61 Kalim Siddiqì, founder of The Muslim Institute, London, and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, argues that the “secular faith” that emerged from the European Enlightenment, was based on the false premise of the sovereignty of human reason as sole criterion of knowl­ edge. It resulted in “a brutal and parasitic, ‘value-free’ post-Christian civilization”, which spawned a multitude of false ideologies such as Dar­ winism, Fascism, and Nazism.62 Isràr A˙mad, leader of ˇanzìm-i-Islàmì in Pakistan, states that European philosophers over the past two hundred years developed an attitude that ignored transcendental concepts and espoused purely materialistic con­ cepts instead. Science replaced divine revelation, and a radical shift of emphasis from transcendental themes to material subjects occurred that was later imposed on the Muslim world.63 Ghannùshì argues that all Western values have experienced a deval­ uation with the shift to a relative view of truth and to the philosophies of the absurd and “of deconstruction and destruction which have no object but to clear existence of all values and meanings, in the interest of nihilism, emptiness and meaninglessness, as embodied in the philos­ ophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger his successor.”64 Secularism Privatizes Religion and Fragments Culture Both fundamentalisms see the separation of religion from the public sphere as a negative development that is contrary to God’s will and morally destructive as it releases culture from all moral restraints imposed on humanity by God. While some Christian groups in the Anabaptist separatist tradition would accept, and even promote, a degree of sepa­ ration as both Biblical and essential for the restraining of political power and the guarantee of religious freedom to all,65 all Islamist fundamen­ talists view the separation as one of the cardinal sins of the modern era. Schaeffer states that secular-humanism is an intolerant worldview which cannot tolerate any competing ideologies. It has succeeded in dominating the state and its power centers, in the process marginaliz­ ing religion and removing it from all areas of public life.66 Secularhumanism utilizes an existential methodology which accepts the “dichotomy 61

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 49–50, 102–104. Kalim Siddiqui. 1996a. Stages of Islamic Revolution, pp. 13–14. 63 Israr Ahmad. “Islamic Renaissance: The Real Task Ahead”, Internet, . 64 Ghannouchi. “Western Cultural Fundamentalism and its Blowbacks”. 65 “North America Owes its Religious Freedom to the Baptists”, paper not men­ tioning author, Internet, . 66 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, ACM, p. 480. 62

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of optimism about meaning and values separated from the area of rea­ son” which has managed to transform religion into an irrational optional worldview.67 Rene Padilla, a conservative evangelical editor, writer, youth worker, and pastor in Buenos Aires, Argentina, likewise accuses secularism of having banned religion from all important decision-making centers in society and of creating a fragmented culture split between the public and the private spheres. It has removed religion from the realm of objective facts to the realm of values and opinions, transforming it into a matter of personal preference and individual choice “irrelevant to the public sphere, separated from politics, and relegated to the private realm.” Padilla blames secular-modernity for producing the modern con­ sumer society in which people choose their religion like selecting a prod­ uct off a supermarket shelf, based on a neo-pagan concept of individual freedom interpreted as “everyone doing as he wills” and on a “utili­ tarian emphasis on the maximization of personal self-interest.” Secularism, he concludes, “has forced a pluralization, compartmentalization, and fragmentation of life-worlds, shattering the integrated wholeness” of reli­ gious man under God.68 For Christian fundamentalists, the process of secularization has frag­ mented the integrated lifestyle of previous generations in which every­ day life had a sacred and transcendent religious framework and in which the human world could shelter under the shade of divine truth. Secularization transformed ordinary reality into the only reality, chang­ ing human life from being “a house with windows open to other worlds into a house without windows at all . . . The scale of the present irrel­ evance of religion is unique in human history.” Guinness maintains that secularization has also destroyed the harmonious continuum between the public and the private spheres and has led to privatization: “The process by which modernization produces a cleavage between the pub­ lic and the private spheres of life and focuses the private sphere as the special arena for the expression of individual freedom and fulfillment.” The public sphere of government, business and the military-industrial complexes, forms an impersonal and anonymous world where individ­ uals stripped of identity play out their roles without understanding its inner workings. On the other side of the great chasm lies the unreal world, the private sphere of family, church, private associations, hob­ bies and leisure activities where the real self dwells. The public sphere maintains the private sphere as a “harmless play area” where every­ thing is allowed including religion, and where individuals find a safety

67

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, HSL, p. 253. Rene Padilla. “The Unique Christ in the Challenge of Modernity”, in Nicholls, ed., 1994. pp. 89–90, 96–97. 68

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valve for their frustrations in an amazing array of choices. However, in the “real world” of the public sphere personal preferences and choices have no place and individuals are but numbers and cogs in a vast machine: “in the normal working world, personal convictions, along with hats and coats, are to be left at the door.”69 A.W. Tozer, a popular Evangelical writer on the spiritual life,70 accuses secularism of introducing a cleavage into men’s lives by dividing life into sacred and secular areas considered incompatible and existing totally apart from each other. This creates an imbalance in the believer’s life, a shuffling between two worlds, which fragments life rather than uni­ fying it into one complete whole. As a result, people feel confused and trapped by the mundane claims of this world, trying to walk a tightrope between two kingdoms. This sacred-secular antithesis has no basis in scripture—“Jesus knew no divided life, but lived the total of his life on earth to God’s glory, without any distinction between the various areas of life.” Believers must view all of life as one unified whole dedicated to God and his service.71 On the Muslim side, al-Bannà" claimed that secularism had shattered the family and the home, as well as multiplying destructive ideologies and revolutions, and shaking the foundations of established economic, social and political institutions.72 Nadwì argues that with modern life becoming ever more complex its problems defy all secularist attempts at solution. Nadwì sees one of the greatest gifts of Islam to humanity in the integrative concept of “the unity of spirit and matter: the harmony of the sacred and the pro­ fane . . . The Qur"an does not recognize any division between the tem­ poral and the spiritual since man’s desire to propitiate God and follow His commands permeates every fiber of human activity.” All fields of human endeavor including government, war, economics, and marriage are sanctified. Islam teaches that good intentions turn even the most mundane act into a virtuous deed, bringing men nearer to God. The secularist dichotomy, however, forces man to chose between the world and religion, disengages the state from the church, and eliminates moral­ ity from the conduct of public affairs. According to Nadwì: This hideous schizophrenia not only divorced what was called worldly from the benefit of spiritual wisdom, but also gave birth to the faith­ lessness and agnosticism of modern Europe, which is now threatening,

69 Guinness. 1983. pp. 56–57, 75–80. Guinness also likens the private sphere to an Indian reservation or a Bantustan, a separate homeland constructed “by the architects of secular society’s apartheid system.” 70 Pastor of Southside Alliance Church in Chicago for 31 years. 71 A.W. Tozer. 1995. The Pursuit of God, pp. 185–187, 198. 72 Al-Banna. 1978. p. 27.

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  because of its political and cultural supremacy, to inundate the entire world. The present wave of gross materialism, loss of faith and moral debasement can be seen as a direct consequence of the division between spirit and matter . . .73

Qu†b saw the modern secular worldview as positing a false dichotomy between natural law and religion. This artificial separation is the basis of the modern jàhilìyya—the philosophy of relativistic, atheistic moder­ nity that fragmented the world and deposed Islam from its rightful posi­ tion as leader of humanity. This was the worst catastrophe in human history which enabled jàhilìyya to regain the leadership of the world that it had lost at the initial appearance of Islam.74 Modern jàhilìyya posits a successful material world devoid of religion in which human creativity is the result of the negation of religion viewed as a non-creative force: “Having separated human creativity from the Godly way, they forced man into their ungodly sphere.” This is a ter­ rible misconception as only the ‘Godly way’ can release real creativity and direct its proper use.75 Muràd argues that modern Western civilization is the only civiliza­ tion in history that has openly banished God from public life as irrel­ evant and redundant. Secularism, “the Western way of separating politics from religion, has divorced power and law from faith, and has carved out separate spheres for society and religion, resulting in a polarization of the two.”76 Khurshid A˙mad, who was Professor of Economics, University of Karachi, Vice president of the Jamà'at-i Islàmì Pakistan, and DirectorGeneral of the Islamic Foundation, UK, complains of the great suffering inflicted by secularism’s fragmented point of view: “materialistic ide­ ologies have totally ignored the spiritual and moral side of life and have dismissed it as fictitious and imaginary.” This inherent dichotomy of modern Western civilization, in both its variants of secular capitalistic democracy and Marxist socialism, has been an unmitigated disaster and is guilty of spiritually impoverishing humanity by confining religion to the private sphere. On the other hand: Islam does not admit any separation between ‘material’ and ‘moral’, ‘mundane’ and ‘spiritual’ life and enjoins man to devote all his ener­ gies to the reconstruction of life on healthy moral foundations. Islam

73

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 49–50, 102–104. Ronald Nettler. 1994. “A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb’s Introduction to the Tafsir, Fi Zilal Al-Qur’an,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1994. 75 Ibid. 76 Khurram Murad in Mawdudi, Sayyid Abul A'la. 1984. The Islamic Movement: Dynamics Of Values, Power And Change, pp. 25–26. 74

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is not confined to the private life of man, but is a complete way of life catering for all fields of human existence.77

Islam’s uniqueness is in spiritualizing all of life and in bringing all its spheres under the umbrella of religion, where all activities are con­ sciously undertaken according to God’s revealed pattern. The secular­ ist division of life into watertight compartments of sacred and secular is a deviation from the Right Path.78 Al-Khilàfah Magazine, the organ of Óizb al-Ta˙rìr, states that secular­ ism detaches religion from life, leaving it to be practiced only in the personal lives of believers.79 It laments the fact that secularism has become the accepted standard even in the Muslim world as many Muslims accept secular ideals. Secularism, however, is plagued by an inherent contradiction: while recognizing religion, it claims the right to limit its role. However, it is unable to decide on the proper measure of religion in the secular state: how much religion is “too much”, how much religion is “too little”? This results in a “see-saw dilemma”. Al­ Khilàfah Magazine sees conservatives in contemporary secular societies attempting to redress the balance by restoring religion to a more promi­ nent place in the public sphere, while liberals continue their efforts to expel religion out of every niche it still inhabits in the secular world. Conservatives argue that marginalizing religion leads to the loss of its unifying influence in society, as well as to the spiritual and moral vac­ uum prevalent in all Western societies, which secularism fills with the destructive influences of individualism and consumerism.80 Al-Khilàfah sees the root cause of secularism in the reaction of Western nations to the suffering inflicted by an excess of religion during the Middle Ages, when theocracy led to oppression and bloodshed. Muslims today are caught in the same web, because they have accepted the pre­ supposition of a secular society. Even in the so-called “Islamic Republics” of Iran and Pakistan Islam is not the real foundation of the state, but only a Western-style “state religion”, given certain limited functions by a parliament which freely legislates in all other areas. The very term “Republic” points to a secular state based on human sovereignty, and calling parliament majlis al-shùrà does not make it any more Islamic. Secularism is quite willing to give religion a specific limited area while excluding it from all other spheres. However, in true Islam, the

77 Khurshid Ahmad. “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics”, in K. Ahmad, ed., 1976. Islam: Its Meaning and Message, pp. 36–37. 78 Khurshid Ahmad. 1974. Family Life in Islam, pp. 11–12. 79 “The State of Religion” (author not mentioned), Al-Khilafah Magazine, July 1998, MSANEWS, 6 Jul 1998, Internet, . 80 Ibid.

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contradiction inherent in secularism does not exist as Islam cannot co­ exist with a secularist ideology which detaches religion from society: Allah’s () commands are applied universally, in political and ‘reli­ gious’ matters. Consequently there is complete harmony between the actions undertaken in this life and the ultimate objective of life itself, worship to Allah (). In this system, Islam is not a “state religion” but the very basis of society and state—there is no place for conflict between “spiritual leaders” and “political leaders”—political leaders must adhere to Islam alone.81

Secularism is Anthropocentric, Yet Devalues Man For fundamentalists, the cardinal sin of secularism is its anthropocen­ trism which has replaced the theocentric worldview of God at the cen­ ter of the universe. Secularism and modernity are viewed as being radically anthropocentric because they place man’s autonomous reason derived from the order of nature at the center of man’s understanding of the universe. They also elevate man above God as autonomous and independent, while simultaneously degrading him as no different in prin­ ciple from animals and plants, liable to manipulation and exploitation.82 Thus, in spite of placing man at the center of the universe, secularism concurrently devalues man and minimizes his dignity. Packer and Howard repeatedly stress that secular humanism always ends up devaluing humans in spite of claiming to safeguard their integrity, and it enslaves them to some communal benefit program which manipulates and discounts them.83 Schaeffer accuses liberals of deliberately confusing the public by seman­ tically equating humanism with humanitarianism and the humanities, and he denies that secularism with its material-energy-chance concept of reality can fathom what man really is: at the most it can only define what he is not. Secularism has no sufficient basis for its concept of man nor for its concepts of society and law. He defines humanism as the placing of man at the center of all things, making him the measure of everything. In this position man has no knowledge except what he him­ self can discover and no standards outside of himself.84 Schaeffer argues that secularism has reduced man to the status of a programmed computer, whose sole relationship is downward to the ani­ mal and to the machine. Because modern man has rejected the idea of being created in the image of God:

81

Ibid. Bosch. 1996. p. 266. Although Bosch belongs to the more liberal wing of Evangelicalism, these views on the Enlightenment are very much in line with fun­ damentalist critique of it. 83 Packer & Howard. 1995. pp. 20–21. 84 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, ACM, pp. 426–428. 82

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He has no clue as to who he is, and can find no real value for him­ self or for other men. Hence he downgrades the value of other men and produces the horrible thing we face today—a sick culture in which men treat men as less than human, as machines.85

Stott claims that through technology secularism has dehumanized per­ sons who now feel themselves merely as identification numbers “punched on a card that has been designed to travel through the entrails of a computer.” Secularist scientific reductionism argues that human beings are “nothing but”—nothing but an animal, nothing but a machine pro­ grammed to respond to external stimuli, thus reducing human beings to a level lower than the fully personal. Existential secularism which sees God and values as dead, deprives man of his intrinsic quest for meaning, leaving him no way to authenticate himself except by pre­ tending to have real significance in spite of the evidence against it, because “meaninglessness leads to boredom, alcoholism, juvenile delin­ quency and suicide.” Stott goes on to indict secularism, because: Where human beings are devalued, everything in society turns sour. Women are humiliated and children despised. The sick are regarded as a nuisance, and the elderly as a burden. Ethnic minorities are dis­ criminated against. The poor and oppressed are denied social justice. Capitalism displays its ugliest face. Labour is exploited in the mines and the factories. Criminals are brutalized in prison. Opposition opin­ ions are stifled. Belsen is invented by the extreme Right, and Gulag by the extreme Left. Unbelievers are left to live and die in their lostness. There is no freedom, no dignity, no carefree joy. Human life seems not worth living, because it is scarcely human any longer.86

Muslim fundamentalists state that secularism had pushed God out of the way, resulting in individual and communal human selfishness tak­ ing over and causing destructive dissension and wars.87 Under the Enlightenment and its attendant secularism, humanity became the mea­ sure of all things, disregarding God’s revelation and the cosmic unity of all creation. This process of critical inquiry and natural law replac­ ing God’s law inevitably leads to a catastrophe of personal and social anomie. Secularism and its “scientific jàhilìyya” focused solely on human characteristics common to those of animals, declaring that man is noth­ ing more than an animal or than inorganic matter. Islam, in contrast, stresses man’s God-given human qualities, nurtures them, and trans­ forms them into the dominant factor in human nature.88 85 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume One, EFR, pp. 219–224; Volume Four, MTC, pp. 184–185. 86 Stott, John. 1992, The Contemporary Christian, pp. 229–232. 87 Al-Banna. 1978. p. 27. 88 Nettler. 1994; Qutb. 1990. pp. 40–41.

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Mawdùdì attacked the West as morally degenerate because it rebelled against God’s sovereignty by setting up man as the locus of authority. This Western evil of secularism he labeled as jàhilì and shirk. Muràd, Mawdùdì’s editor and translator, claims that in modernism, proud and self-sufficient man has set himself up as the measure of all things, rais­ ing secular-liberal-humanism to a semi-divine position as the supreme object of loyalty and the ultimate criterion of moral right and wrong.89 Nadwì, commenting on the United States as the most developed of sec­ ular Western societies, claims that: As America has enslaved the world it has, itself, become the slave of its technologies. It is a prisoner of its way of life, of material progress, of factories and laboratories, of fancy goods and gadgets. One thing that I did not see here was ‘man’, a real man whose heart was alive and awake, and not the working part of a machine. Man, here, has become so thoroughly adapted to technology and an artificial envi­ ronment, that his ideas and emotions too have become mechanical. The properties of rock and iron have entered into his soul. He has become narrow, selfish, cold, unfeeling, impervious to the needs of humanity. There is no warmth in his heart; no moisture in his eyes.90

Secularism Promotes the Myth of progress and Utopianism Most Christian fundamentalists critique secularism’s utopianism and blind belief in inevitable evolutionary progress to ever higher intellectual and material levels. They accuse secularism of positivism, determinism, and arrogance in its view of knowledge as developing from medieval reli­ gious superstition into enlightened modernity, and in its assumptions that everything is predictable and explicable and that humans can inde­ pendently solve all problems given all relevant facts. Secularism elimi­ nated God from society’s validation structures and from science as an outdated and unnecessary presupposition. It also eliminated purpose from science by making direct causality, doubt, empiricism and ratio­ nalism into the dominant scientific approach, leading to a mechanistic epistemology and a deterministic belief in progress and development that stressed expediency and utility over morality. Finally it also ignores the terrible consequences of secularist utopias, which usually end by using force in order to impose the desired vision on society. In such secularist utopias as fascism and Marxism this has led to terror, mur­ der, and genocide91

89 90 91

Murad in Mawdudi. 1984. pp. 32–33.

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 79–80.

Bosch. 1996. pp. 262–267.

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Christian fundamentalists attack the “myth of unilinear progress” which claims that modernism is superior to everything that preceded it and that things are always getting better.92 They also argue that the Enlightenment had repudiated divine revelation, claiming that knowl­ edge arises only from within human experience, and that man’s poten­ tial for reasoning and doubt is the only key to unlocking nature’s secrets. Coinciding historically with modern technological achievements, it claimed them as its own, thus radiating a false aura of success, and claiming that a humanity which enjoys “real” progress and inevitable linear devel­ opment can safely leave God out of the equation.93 Schaeffer sees the utopian concept of the Perfectibility of Man as constituting the false theoretical foundation of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and of Marxist-Leninism. Wherever this concept has been acted on, it has led to a loss of liberty and of “humanness” because it is false to what Man really is.94 This Christian critique of the perfectibility of man contrasts with the Muslim view of man, endorsed by Islamic fundamentalists, that views man as perfectible in this life. Many accept that the perfectibility of man is a Qur"ànic truth: man is born a clean slate, and given the right environment (a Sharì 'a ruled society and state) he can fully develop all the potential for good inherent in him. At this point Islamic funda­ mentalists seem to concur with secularist ideas: they deny original sin, and claim that by a constant effort both individual and society are per­ fectible. Mu˙ammad Asad, an Austrian convert to Islam and well known scholar, states that “Islam is emphatic in the assertion that man can reach perfection in the earthly, individual life and by making full use of all the worldly possibilities of his life”. While this perfection is not absolute, it does signify the full development of all positive qualities and dormant powers inherent in man. The other corollary to the doctrine that man is originally good, is that redemption and damnation are indi­ vidual: “every Muslim is his own redeemer; he bears all possibilities of spiritual success and failure within his heart.”95 The Islamic critique of secularism focuses on its efforts to build human perfectibility in a Godless immoral environment which can only cor­ rupt man. However, an Islamic state in which a Sharì'a based Islamic system is functioning, does provide the right environment for the full development of human moral and cultural potential and perfectibility. However, some fundamentalists like the charismatic Egyptian Sheikh 'Abd al-Óamìd Kishk stress man’s inherent evil lower nature and its 92

Padilla in Nicholls, ed., 1994. pp. 89–90. Ranald MacAuley. “Inerrancy: the Larger Discussion”, Evangelicals Now, March 1997. 94 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, ACM, pp. 487–488. 95 Muhammad Asad in Ahmad, ed., 1976. pp. 50–53. 93

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carnal appetites that continuously tempt him to sin. Man must contin­ ually struggle against them and subdue them through pious living and strict moral discipline. Only Sharì'a with its strict rules and limits (˙udùd ) can serve as an “unassailable stockade” to curb the baser lusts of mankind and keep them from being fully unleashed.96 Secularism Corrupts Faith, Law and Morality Both fundamentalisms accuse secularism of rejecting God’s absolute moral code as revealed in scripture and of basing its own concept of morals and ethics on materialist, evolutionary and relativistic assump­ tions. As a result contemporary society finds itself in a deep moral cri­ sis which has affected not only behavioral mores but also the legal systems of society. All fundamentalists lament the rising crime rates, drug abuse, the permissiveness in sexual mores, the legalization of abor­ tion and homosexuality, the breakdown of the traditional family and its associated gender roles, and the flooding of the media with pornographic programs. Christian fundamentalists especially devote much space to this subject, revealing their deep concern at the moral crisis in Western societies. J. Gresham Machen, famed Presbyterian Reformed scholar, who in 1929 left Princeton in order to found Westminster Theological Seminary, claims that having discarded God’s holy law and the notion of sin, hav­ ing thrown off moral restraints and all standards, contemporary society is returning to barbarism and experiencing a swift disintegration. True liberty and justice are found only under God’s law: when that law is discarded, tyranny and decadence abound. Unless men possess a right relationship with God they will never have right relationships with each other. The way to gain a right relationship with God is by developing a true consciousness of sin as men are brought face to face with the law of God. As men are led to a humble repentance before a holy God, they accept God’s law as a tutor leading them to Christ in whom they are justified by faith.97 Schaeffer argues that modern man has polluted morality by reject­ ing all absolutes and by setting up arbitrary hedonistic and relativistic standards, leaving society with no real moral standards. He claims that the materialist-evolutionist view of man has no adequate basis for law, and that limiting law to man’s finite experience and to Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest concepts results in its being based on brute force. In contrast, the Reformation was based on the concept of the supremacy of God’s written law in scripture as the final authority with neither 96 'Abd al-Hamid Kishk. 1995. Dealing with Lust and Greed According to Islam, pp. 13, 21–23. 97 Gresham Machen. 1923. Christianity and Liberalism. pp. 189–195.

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church nor state above that Law, while the Judaeo-Christian worldview of man created in the image of God offers the right balance of “form and freedom”. Secular society however is based on “sociological law” that has no fixed absolutes, reflecting only what an elite group arbi­ trarily decides is best for society: “Sociological law is silent as to values—it cannot differentiate the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’.” The secular view of reality has inevitably produced totally wrong and inhuman results, affecting especially the executive and judiciary branches of government that are manipulated by the secularist elite in order to force this false view on all of society.98 Schaeffer also claims that the presupposition of the uniformity of nat­ ural causes in a closed system produces a view of the whole universe as a machine with inevitable results in culture and morals. As the Marquis de Sade realized, “if man’s behaviour is determined, than what is is right”: When you tell men long enough that they are machines, it soon begins to show in their actions . . . he theater of cruelty, the violence in the streets, and the death of man in art that had all followed naturally from the philosophic shifts . . . When nature is made autonomous, it soon ends up by devouring God, grace, freedom and eventually man.99

Robertson sees the accelerated moral degeneration since the 1980s as a result of the influence of secular-humanism, which he identifies as a spirit of antichrist. This process started when a significant and militant minority in society threw off all accepted restraints of moral standards and of God himself, with the majority gradually following its lead. As this rebellion gained momentum, the participants became more aggres­ sive and militant, openly indulging in practices that had been consid­ ered shameful in the past. With the fall of each societal standard, another comes under attack: the pressure is relentless and the process results in the destruction of established institutions. Ultimately the struggle that began as a cry for “freedom of expression” grows into all-out war against the rights of advocates of traditional morality. The latter are hated, reviled, isolated, and the persecuted. Moral values of honor, decency, honesty, self-control, sexual restraint, family values, and sacrifice are replaced by gluttony, sensuality, cruelty, dishonesty, delinquency, drunk­ enness, drug-addiction, fraud, and waste.100 Alan Crippen, Senior Fellow for Family and Social Policy Studies at Focus on the Family’s Institute for Family Studies, Colorado Springs, 98

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Three, NLP, p. 55; Volume Five, ACM, pp. 428–430, 437–443. Schaffer cites the Supreme Court treatment of the abortion question as evidence for this view. 99 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume One, EFR, pp. 230–233. 100 Robertson. 1982. pp. 28–29.

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USA, maintains that the last decades of the twentieth century have wit­ nessed the destructive social effects of Enlightenment-secularism and its attendant evils of “materialism, radical individualism, moral relativism, subjectivism, militant feminism, and homosexual activism”101—a state­ ment most fundamentalists would concur with. Crippen claims that Christian values began losing their influence with the rise of the Enlight­ enment, resulting in the destructive social effects of materialism, radical individualism, and moral relativism, which have caused the unraveling of the social order in Western societies. Crippen senses a change as the stranglehold of the cultural elites is being loosened as the public real­ izes the bankruptcy of their ideas. The deepening crisis provides an opportunity for Christians to take the lead in offering true answers to people’s questions.102 Another aspect of this attack on secularism is the claim that secu­ larism in any guise stifles the human spirit—“for without transcendence the person shrivels.” Secularism is blamed for the current epidemics of drug abuse and the proliferation of religious cults, that prove material­ ism cannot satisfy the human spirit’s search for transcendent reality.103 Clifford Hill, a conservative evangelical British sociologist and the­ ologian, is fairly representative of the fundamentalist view when he states that the world today faces two major destructive forces—materialism and secularism: “Materialism keeps us bound to the earth, and secu­ larism blinds us to spiritual reality and tells us that there is no God”. These two pose the greatest threat to the survival of humanity as they “undermine all attempts at stabilizing social situations, slowing down the rate of change, and promoting harmonious relationships.” The secularist-humanist philosophy liberates man from the binding forces of tradition and religion by breaking down traditional morality. However, no attempts at redefining morality can change God’s fundamental laws that govern human behavior and operate in the same way as God’s natural law that controls the order of creation. According to this divine law sin defiles man, separates him from God, and destroys his rela­ tionship with other human beings. It results in much hurt and in a lack of wholeness in individuals, families and communities.104 Hill further argues that in nations once rooted in the Bible, secular­ ism has “eliminated God from individual and communal life, and has eliminated his Divine authority that had served as the underlying basic legitimization of Law.” Secularism, has also redefined moral norms and

101

Alan Crippen. “Appendix A” in Crippen, ed., 1996. Reclaiming the Culture, p. 198. 102 Ibid., p. 198. 103 Stott. 1992. pp. 223–226. 104 Clifford Hill. 1986. A Prophetic People, pp. 66–68, 80–81.

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encouraged the gradual expansion of the parameters of decency: “Things that would have shocked the average person fifteen years ago are now accepted as normal everyday behaviour.” This rapid change in values is due to the impact of the mass media which promote the lowest com­ mon denominator as the norm. The impact of secularism on a once God-fearing society results not in a spiritual vacuum, but in the spread of superstition, occultism, immorality, and violence. Traditional moral­ ity is undermined, and the constraints that hold in check man’s baser drives are removed: “Once these forces are unleashed every area of life is affected . . . Where God’s revealed Word is rejected, people cast off all restraint and become driven by the basest forces in human nature.” Western society is reaping the harvest of what it has sown in the con­ temporary spread of genocide, nuclear weapons, guerrilla warfare, street riots, vandalism, abortion, and children hurt by divorce. Hill argues that while secular-humanism puts its faith entirely in man’s ability to solve all problems and to create a life of happiness, harmony and wholeness, “the evidence of modern secular society demonstrates that freedom from constraint is not true liberty, but rather libertarianism and license to pursue self-interest regardless of the cost to others.” Secularism’s basic error is that man can have untrammeled liberty without reference to absolute standards as revealed by God in his law. Man’s deliberate rebellion against God and his law inevitably unleashes destructive forces that prey on man’s sinful ambitions and greed, “Eating like a cancer into the heart of the nations.”105 Muslim fundamentalist writers concur with their Christian counter­ parts in bemoaning the dire moral disintegration of Western societies, but have much less to say on the subject of immorality in Islamic soci­ eties. On the whole they presume that due to the cohesive and moral force of Islam, societies in Muslim countries have a higher moral stan­ dard than their Western counterparts. Much less of Islamic fundamen­ talist discourse is focused on moral issues than in Christian fundamentalist discourse, as most of it is focused on political and social themes. However, having stated this, there is some criticism of Muslim societies on the moral agenda by a number of fundamentalist writers. Qu†b argues that in Western-influenced jàhilì societies morals have degenerated and sexual permissiveness, in which the relationship be­ tween the sexes is based on pure lust, has become the norm. Morality and ethics have been strictly limited to the economic sphere only, so that “whatever distinguishes man from the animal is considered beyond its sphere.” Instead of developing human character by controlling ani­ mal desires, this worldview encourages sexual depravity and rampant

105

Ibid., pp. 74–78, 80–82.

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immorality, thus severely limiting the real progress of human individu­ als and society.106 Nadwì claims that the consequences of Western secularist civilization include a failure of morality, the loosening of the social fabric, and the disintegration of the family. While secularism may have given human­ ity great physical resources, it caused an atrophy of man’s moral nature, an indifference to virtue and righteousness, and an increase in human unhappiness, selfishness and savagery.107 Other Islamic fundamentalists note that the Western secular worldview caused a shift from spiritual pursuits to sensual gratification.108 They deplore the fact that many Muslims are accepting values diametrically opposed to Islamic teachings in the name of modernization, and that the mass media are increasingly promoting obscene and vulgar mate­ rial with destructive effects on Muslim morality,109 resulting in a morally hypocritical society in which “lying, cheating, dishonesty and venality” have become widespread. The free intermixing of the sexes and the media propagation of vulgarity are also blamed for this deterioration.110 Westernization has resulted in a serious decadence of Muslim societies and states evidenced by the easy availability of explicit videos, novels, glossy magazines, and the increasingly daring policies of the electronic media which are tolerated and encouraged by the authorities. This liberalization of social norms constitutes a perfect recipe for social degeneration.111 Secularism is the Source of Contemporary Evil Ideologies Fundamentalists do not view “evil” ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism and Marxism as mere aberrations of Western secular-humanism, but rather as logical end-results of its basic paradigm and pre-suppositions. Christian fundamentalists argue that humanism lacks any final base for values or law, and inevitably leads to chaos, resulting in a totali­ tarianism that tries to suppress the chaos. Humanism has no concept of final reality, so it has no reason to be interested in individuals—it focuses instead on the collectives of state and society thus engendering totalitarian ideologies.112 All modern totalitarian ideologies result from

106

Qutb, 1990. pp. 82–84. Nadwi. 1983. pp. 35, 49–50, 87–88. 108 Israr Ahmad. “Qur’an: Our Weapon in the War of Ideas”, Tanzeem-e-Islami, Internet, . 109 Ibid. 110 Tanzeem-e-Islami press release, 15, January, 1999. MSANEWS, 19, Jauary, 1999, Internet, . 111 Ahmed Afzaal. “A Wake-Up Call: Reflections on Media, Freedom & Morality”, Hizb-e-Islami, Internet, . 112 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, ACM, p. 430. 107

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secularism combining with materialism to produce ideologies based on social Darwinism and advocating the utilitarian principle that the end justifies the means which inevitably leads to aggression and violence.113 Mangalwadi, a contemporary Indian Evangelical Christian thinker who studied under Schaeffer, sees the Enlightenment as the root of ide­ ological evils. The Enlightenment undermined a European society based on Christian concepts, and excluded God and the notion of sin: “man could not be a guilty sinner as he was not accountable to anyone but himself ”. In its attempts to get rid of theology and base itself on objec­ tive scientific explanations, secular-humanism manipulated Darwin’s the­ ory of evolution and developed racism as a worldview to explain differences through the prism of inferior and superior races. This racist ideology was extremely popular in the West during the 19th and early 20th cen­ turies, informing colonialism and imperialism, and leading to the Nazi holocaust. As an example, Mangalwadi argues that ‘scientific racist ide­ ology’ changed the British character permanently impacting Britain’s relations with India. The men who first reformed the British Raj believed in the sovereignty of God, in rulers as God’s trustees, and in the fall­ enness of man, universal values accepted just as true in India as in Britain. Secular-humanism however, replaced sin with race as the expla­ nation of backwardness, implying that the only “scientific” hope for India was being governed by the more evolved British race. Mangalwadi claims that it was this transition from Christianity to secular racism that turned colonialism nasty.114 On the Muslim side, materialistic secularism is accused of multiply­ ing false ideologies which engendered destructive revolutions and wars. Western social principles have failed because they were limited to tech­ nical knowledge and invention resulting in the flooding of markets with mechanical products incapable of offering man a “ray of hope or a grain of faith”. Man is not a machine—he is tired of the purely mate­ rialistic solutions offered by the secularist West, craves for spiritual com­ fort, and desires to break free and destroy the materialistic prison he is in. The collapse of the Western social order was especially evident between the two world wars, when the chaos of democracy resulted in the rise of Nazism, Fascism, and Communism, tyrannical ideologies bent on imposing their own rigid social, political, and cultural systems at home while engaging in aggressive wars abroad. The struggle between these opposing ideologies revealed to Muslims the bankruptcy of the West and led to a rediscovery of and a return to the perfect principles of Islam which are far better than anything discovered by Western social sciences and political ideologies. As Muslims compared their heritage to

113 114

Hill. 1986. pp. 66–68.

Vishal Mangalwadi. “A Passage from India”, Evangelicals Now, Dec. 1997. p. 14.

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Western ideas they realized the immense value of Islam and opted to follow its straight path as revealed by God.115 Qu†b argues that any society not exclusively dedicated to submission to Allah and his law is jàhilì, producing injustice and violence. As an example he points to the materialist communist societies that deny the existence of Allah and subordinate man to the party rather than to God, and reject God’s commandments as the only valid basis of law.116 Secularism is Idolatry The idea of secular society as a neo-pagan society in which secular man has returned to the age of immoral barbarian heathenism is prevalent among fundamentalists who claim that secularists have set up multiple false gods whom they worship instead of the one true God. Fundamen­ talisms have a definite iconoclastic streak about them as they seek to smash all idols in society. Qu†b states that the main cause of the world-wide crisis, bankruptcy, and loss of moral values which affects both Western Christian and all Muslim societies, is the return of humanity to paganism—jàhilìyya—and the dethroning of God from his rightful sovereignty and rule. This cri­ sis is a God-given opportunity for true Islam to step into the breach and lead humanity away from disaster towards a new golden age, as it alone offers all the missing ingredients for the necessary spiritual revival. Qu†b argues that any system in which ultimate and final authority belongs to human beings, is a jàhilì system which deifies men, and des­ ignates others than God as lords over men thus usurping God’s divine sovereignty.117 Van Til argues that humanists have actually set themselves up as gods by claiming that the “reach of their intellect” is the standard of the possible.118 Machen (writing in 1923) states that while seventy-five years ago, Western civilization was still predominantly Christian; to-day it is pre­ dominantly pagan . . . Paganism is characterized by its optimism regard­ ing unaided human nature—while its superstructure seemed glorious, its foundation was rotten. In contrast, Christianity is the religion of the broken heart.119

115 Al-Banna. 1978. p. 27; Al-Banna in John J. Donohue & John L. Esposito, ed., 1982. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, pp. 78–83. 116 Qutb. 1990. pp. 66–67. 117 Ibid., p. 47. 118 Van Til. “Why I Believe in God.” 119 Machen. 1923. p. 65.

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Derek Prince, a well known English fundamentalist Bible expositor and preacher, who had held a Fellowship in Philosophy at Cambridge (1940–1949), and was converted to evangelical Christianity during the Second World War, states that worst form of human disobedience is the breaking of the first two of the Ten Commandments by acknowl­ edging other gods besides the Lord, and by making artificial represen­ tations of God and offering them worship. Men must acknowledge that the Lord is the only true God and that there is no other besides him. Those who acknowledge and worship false gods deliberately reject the clear revelation of the true God available to them in creation and in scripture. Idolatry results in progressively debased morals.120 These views are very similar to those of Islamic fundamentalists on jàhilìyya. Both fundamentalisms accuse secularism of setting up a variety of false idols for man to worship instead of worshipping the one true God. One of these false gods is the   , which some sec­ ularist thinkers such as Hobbes had transformed into the absolute Lord of human life, eventually leading to Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Gulag.121 On the Muslim side, Muràd agrees that Hobbes and Hegel had elevated the autocratic state to the status of the Divine, placing loyalty to the state above all moral values as man’s ultimate duty.  too can be worshipped as gods in the personality cults of many mod­ ern states. In the Godless secular Western states, where God has been entirely rejected, false gods have proliferated as never before in history, and rulers have become “omnipotent, absolute, monstrous gods grasp­ ing that which rightfully belongs only to God.”122 These new gods include    which claim absolute monopoly over knowl­ edge and promise to supply all human needs. Ruling elites manipulate these new gods to claim totalitarian control over all areas of people’s lives, including beliefs, morals, customs, even health and education. The    are other such gods, and the nation-state is the ultimate alternative god for most secularists.123 Another secularist idol is    . Schaeffer states that in this age of autonomous freedom, “man has set himself up as God, in defiance of the knowledge and the spiritual truth which God had given.”124 Stott states Christianity’s most violent clash with secularism is in the area of human pride: Christianity insists on humility and is implacably hostility to pride. However, Western culture has imbibed more than it realizes of the power philosophy of Nietzsche with its model of the “superman”. In contrast, Jesus had placed a little child as the model 120 121 122 123 124

Derek Prince. 1990. Blessing or Curse: You can Chose, pp. 55–57, 68.

Bosch. 1996. p. 266.

Murad in Mawdudi. 1984. pp. 31–32.

Ibid., pp. 31–32.

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, GED, pp. 309–310.

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for his followers: “There is nothing so obscene as pride, nothing so attractive as humility.”125 On the Muslim side, Muràd too claims that proud and self-sufficient man has set himself up as the end and mea­ sure of all things, Nietzsche had elevated man, as the Will to Power endowed with energy, intellect, and noble birth, to the level of a Superman beyond good or evil.126 Society is also seen as a false god. Schaeffer states a profound rule: “if there are no absolutes by which to judge society, then society is absolute”.127 Nadwì sees modern technological culture as a source of contempo­ rary idolatry: “Today a theory is formulated, a law discovered, a power­ ful machine made; and, tomorrow, the whole nation becomes subservient to them. Bondsmen of the idols and images carved by their own hands!”128 C There is a remarkable field of resemblances in the Islamic and Christian fundamentalist discourses on secularism. Both types of fundamentalism agree to a large extent on their instinctive rejection of secularism’s claims and authority, using very similar arguments about secularism being a rebellion against God, ejecting him from his rightful place at the cen­ ter of the universe, and replacing him with man and his reason. This is seen as the root sin which has inevitably led to a deterioration in all areas of human society, both individual and communal, moral and social. Both fundamentalisms see secularism as an ideology inherently hostile to and intolerant of religion, starting with its main axiom which denies God’s existence and enthrones man and his reason in his place, and continuing in its methodology and in its attitudes to life. Secularism has led to a shift in the concept of truth, relativizing all absolutes, deny­ ing any objectivity, and causing a degeneration in moral values. Both fundamentalisms also accuse secularism of banishing religion from pub­ lic life, marginalizing and privatizing it, and creating a cleavage between religion and the public sphere which has fragmented human life. Both fundamentalisms also accuse secularism of devaluing man as it ignores his spiritual self and aspirations, and accuse it also of neo-paganism, of raising substitute idols instead of the one true God, and generally of a worldview that leads inevitably to a breakdown of law and order and to a rise in crime, to moral permissiveness and degeneracy, to racism

125 126 127 128

Stott. 1984. p. 37.

Murad in Mawdudi. 1984. pp. 31–32.

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Five, HSL. p. 224.

Nadwi. 1983. pp. 110–111.

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and imperialism and to evil totalitarian ideologies and regimes that have thrust the world into violent genocidal wars. Some differences are due to the historical lag in the experience of secularism. Western societies, where secularism first arose, are much fur­ ther down the road of implementing its concepts in behavioral mores and in their legal systems, and Western fundamentalists are greatly con­ cerned at what they perceive as the resulting deep moral crisis in their societies. Muslim societies were impacted much later by the secularist influences through imperialism and colonialism, and Muslim funda­ mentalists seem to devote less space than their Christian counterparts to the moral discourse, but because of the foreign origin of secularism and its sudden cataclysmic onslaught on Muslim societies, they tend to a more antagonistic view of secularism as part of their anti-Western discourse. Some Muslim fundamentalists state that it is impossible to live a full Muslim life in a secular society, while most Christian fundamentalists see no problem in living a full Christian life in most societies. While Christian fundamentalists critique the utopianism and perfectionism latent in secularism, Muslim fundamentalists tend to set up their own Islamic visions of the perfectibility of human nature under Islam.

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CHAPTER FOUR

SACRED SCRIPTURE AS GOD’S REVEALED STANDARD AND LAW I Scriptural Literalism as a Fundamentalist Marker Observers agree that scripture is at the heart of fundamentalism, and that scripturalism is a main marker of fundamentalist movements. All fundamentalisms legitimate their existence by reference to a corpus of sacred texts, accepted as inerrant and timeless.1 Fundamentalists demand that believers must return to the original sources, re-interpret and re­ apply them to contemporary situations, while correcting all later deviations.2 They actively oppose all philosophies and ideologies that are not ultimately rooted in divine revelation as their source and are not in harmony with it,3 while taking the accepted mainline tradition of the authority of Scripture to its absolute logical extreme in the modern social and intellectual context.4 Both fundamentalisms agree on viewing revealed scriptures as the pure Word of God, absolute and timeless, inspired, inerrant, authori­ tative and binding, necessitating responses of submission and imple­ mentation in individual life and in society. Both fundamentalisms are resolved to bring contemporary society under God’s rule as revealed in their respective scriptures. Both assert the right and the ability of indi­ vidual believers to read and interpret scripture without the need for professional experts,5 and both favor the plain sense of the text and

1 Lionel Caplan, in Caplan. ed., 1987. Studies in Religious Fundamentalisms, pp. 14–17. 2 Shahin Gerami. 1996. Women and Fundamentalism: Islam and Christianity, p. 27; Jeffrey K. Hadden, & Anson Shupe, “Introduction” in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, p. xxi. 3 Ahmad S. Moussalli. 1992. Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, pp. 77–78. 4 James Barr, 1977. Fundamentalism, pp. xx–xxi. 5 For instance, on the Muslim side, Nadwi states: “The Qur’an’s profundity of thought remains accessible to general human understanding without the aid of laboured interpretations”. A view echoed by many fundamentalist writers, both Muslim and Christian. See Abul Hasan Nadwi. 1983. Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission, p. 51. However, some fundamentalist Muslim writers, usually 'ulama" themselves, stress the need for expert righteous scholars, seen as the heirs of the prophets, in guiding and teaching the believers and in checking that their actions

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accept literally many elements in scripture that liberals would either reject or reinterpret. Some groups in both movements tend to an antiesoteric and others to an anti-hermeneutic stance. Fundamentalists of both religions are often pejoratively labeled as blind literalists by their opponents and by academia.6 Barr accuses Christian fundamentalists of hypocrisy, because while claiming to liter­ ally interpret scripture, their actual interpretations are controlled by a specific religious tradition, that of the Evangelical Revivals, rather than by scrip­ ture itself: “Fundamentalism is based on a particular kind of religious tradition, and uses the form, rather than the reality, of biblical author­ ity to provide a shield for this tradition.” According to Barr, funda­ mentalist interpretation actually shifts between the two modes of taking the Bible text literally and non-literally in an attempt to protect the real centerpiece of fundamentalism which is biblical inerrancy.7 However, other scholars acknowledge that there is a wide spectrum of honest flexibility in fundamentalist literalist readings of the text: Shepard notes that Christian fundamentalists interpret some biblical pas­ sages non-literally in order to defend inerrancy, and this is also true of Muslim fundamentalists defending certain doctrines, while Shì'a funda­ mentalism is quite open to allegorical and esoteric interpretations.8 Boone also evidences a more sympathetic attitude, seeing literalism as a reac­ tion against interpreters who manipulate the text to mean anything they want. She argues that literalist readings are in harmony with the lay reader’s common-sense preference for the plain and sensible sense of scripture. Most fundamentalists recognize poetic, symbolic and allegor­ ical styles of certain portions of scripture, yet insist on the primacy of the literal sense whenever at all possible. Agreement on the principle of literalist reading does not preclude variety of interpretations, espe­ cially of eschatological passages.9 In Islam, the inerrancy of the Qur"àn is not exclusive to fundamen­ talists but is the basic tenet of all practicing Muslims.10 Most Muslims

are in accordance with right scriptural interpretation. See Ibrahim, Abul-Maajid & Darbaalah. 1997. In Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, “Preface”. Qara∂àwì also represents this stance. 6 Gabriel Ben-Dor. “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman & Efraim Inbar, eds., 1997. Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. 239–240; See also Esposito, John. 1992. The Islamic Threat, p. 7; Hadden & Shupe. “Introduction”, in Hadden & Shupe eds., 1986. p. xxi. 7 Barr. 1977. pp. 11, 40–46. 8 William Shepard. “Fundamentalism’ Christian And Islamic”, Religion, Vol. 17, 1987, pp. 362–363. 9 Kathleen C. Boone. 1989. The Bible Tells Them so: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism, pp. 39–42. 10 Carl F. Hallencreutz & David Westerlund. “Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion,” in Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning The Secular State, p. 4–5.

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naturally accept the divine origin, perfection and inimitability of the Qur"àn as a matter of fact that needs no defense, so Islamic funda­ mentalist discourse does not give much space to discussing this subject. Christian fundamentalists on the other hand, sense themselves under fierce attack on the issue of scripture both by Christian liberals and sec­ ularists, so they rally to defend this particular point with great vigor, giving the discussion of this theme much space in their discourse. Christian fundamentalists stress the importance of having a “high view” of scrip­ ture and see the question of inerrancy as the contemporary acid test of true faith. Literalism Upsets Academics Literalism seems to be the one element of fundamentalism that most upsets secular and liberal academic observers. Shepard states that both Christian and Islamic fundamentalists are viewed as “intolerant, extrem­ ist, fanatic, rigid, narrow-minded, reactionary, militant, and the like” by their opponents, because of their literalist view of scripture.11 Küng accuses Islamic fundamentalists of being bound to a literalist view of the Qur "àn that does not permit reinterpretations for the challenges of the time: “The occasion, point of time, and situation of individual sùras and verses may not be investigated in order to establish where and for what period they are or have been valid.”12 Saiedi accuses Islamic fundamentalists of a scriptural literalism that uses authority references and rejects historicism and rationalism. Reason is accepted only in the framework of the fundamentalist literalist inter­ pretation of scripture, and the literal return to scripture is seen as the panacea to all problems in the world. For fundamentalists the validity and authority of scripture transcend the norms of “rational discourse, free choice, and personal belief.”13 In defense, most fundamentalists argue that their literalist return to scripture is the only valid way to treat God’s revelation, which in spite of variety in the specific contexts of revelation is in essence timeless and unitary, and that the literalist reading provides interpretations applica­ ble and binding to the modern world, is not bound by rigid traditional commentators, and evades the liberal tendency to find any and every meaning in scripture.

11

Shepard. 1987. pp. 359, 366

Hans Kung. 1995. Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Time, p. 643.

13 Nader Saiedi. “What is Islamic Fundamentalism?” in Hadden & Shupe, eds.,

1986., p. 191. 12

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There are amazing resemblances in the way Christian and Islamic fun­ damentalists describe and define their respective scriptures, both stress­ ing its necessity, its axiomatic authority, perfection, divine transmission, preservation, inspiration, inerrancy, infallibility, timelessness, and its role as the only true guide for humanity, and the ultimate criterion by which all else is judged. While the meaning of these terms may have some­ what different connotations in each tradition, it is impossible not to note the many family resemblances in their views on this subject. Nature and Necessity of Revelation Fundamentalists see revelation as axiomatically true and perfect in every sense, a witness to God’s ultimate reality and truth, and an exact of record of his revealed will for humanity, so all that is left for humans is to accept, submit and obey. God’s sovereign rule and perfect reve­ lation are the axiomatic bedrock of the fundamentalist worldview, the first principle from which all others flow. God has revealed himself in Scripture and in nature, so scripture is to be studied and obeyed as the supreme guide of human behavior, while nature, whose laws are as immutable as the God who decreed them, is to be studied as the Creator’s other book revealing God’s glory and wisdom. Both revela­ tions are clear, simple and easy for everyone to understand, accept and obey, thus assuring a life of harmony with God’s creative purposes. The necessity of the divine revelation in scripture follows from human finiteness and dependence on the creator. Human reason is seen as a useful tool, but as a bad master. It needs the framework of revelation within which to arrive at reasonable deductions and at true knowledge, as it cannot independently arrive at the true answers to life’s basic prob­ lems. Revelation is also needed because of the human propensity to evil which clouds people’s judgment. In a moral universe, finite humans endowed with free will but tempted by evil need absolute standards and moral guidance to help them make the right choices. While both fundamentalisms stress humanity’s finiteness and depen­ dence on God’s revelation for true knowledge, Christians tend to a greater stress on the fallenness of all human beings and their depraved nature which renders them helpless to redeem themselves. Humans are therefore totally dependent for their salvation on God’s initiative in rev­ elation. Muslims tend more to stress the human need for a perfect divine moral and legal framework so individuals and society can attain to their to full potential. Christian views on character and necessity of revelation Christian fundamentalists argue for the necessity of divine revelation in scripture because human reason is able to function properly only in the

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framework of revelation. The original Enlightenment thinkers are blamed for enthroning reason and rejecting the need for revelation. However, as unaided human reason is too limited to fully grasp the really impor­ tant questions of morality and knowledge, contemporary humanist thinkers eventually repudiated reason. While admitting that autonomous reason leads to a meaningless universe, they did not take the logical road to despair, but rather an irrational leap into hope, creating modern exis­ tentialism, a form of irrational nihilistic mysticism. God is dead and the existentialist does not know if there is anything out there, so he is left with a demand for an experience as experience: Forget your mind: just experience! This is the philosophy by which the majority of the people in the West are now living . . . This is a revolt against the mind, a passionate rejection of the Enlightenment ideal of reason.14

The Evangelical worldview necessitates revelation, because while affirming God’s image in man, it emphasizes his finiteness and fallenness. Without God’s initiative in making himself known, and his self-revelation in scrip­ ture, fallen man cannot know God, and humanity degenerates into idol­ atry with no criterion by which to distinguish between good and evil. Revelation protects humans from idolatry while imposing liberating lim­ its on their belief: “The truth sets us free from bondage to fad and fashion, folly and falsehood.”15 The necessity of revelation is located in God’s infinite transcendence and in human finiteness and the fall. Finite human beings desperately need a supernatural revelation in order to gain a true understanding of God and of reality. The fact that God desires to make himself known to humans and be loved by them, descending to their level of com­ prehension through revelation in nature and in scripture, is a miracle— revelation is of necessity a saving act of God to helpless fallen humanity. God has placed man on earth in a paradoxical situation: though endowed with intelligence and logic he finds himself surrounded by mysteries he cannot comprehend about his origin, suffering and death, and ultimate destination. The original fall broke communication between humans and God, corrupting human independent reason, so the revelation in nature is insufficient and humans desperately need God’s revelation through the scriptures to be able to live meaningfully and morally in this world and be saved for the next. In the light of human depravity, the com­ bination of conscience, nature, and reason is insufficient, and the only 14 Francis Schaeffer. 1982. The Complete Works of Francis A. Schaeffer: A Christian Worldview, Volume Four, WHR, pp. 373–374. 15 John Stott, in David L. Edwards & John Stott. 1988. Evangelical Essentials, pp. 335–336; Stott. “Theology: A Multidimensional Discipline”, in Lewis & McGrath, eds., 1996. Doing Theology, pp. 4–5.

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way to gain a true personal knowledge of the Creator is by God’s ini­ tiative in revelation, which includes scripture as God’s written word.16 Islamic Views on Character and Necessity of Revelation Islamic fundamentalists argue that God did not leave humanity to fol­ low its own natural impulses, but revealed to them clear signposts to point them to the right path, so they would not be led astray. The Qur"àn is the necessary guide and final authority for a humanity endowed with the gift of freedom of choice. It is the sublime Word of God, con­ tained on “a well-guarded tablet” (in Paradise), as well as being pre­ served and guarded on earth. It was necessary for the Qur "àn to be revealed at a specific point in history: the whole world had become so corrupted that there was no hope except in a new revelation.17 God’s revelation in the Qur "àn was also necessary because it presents the only way of life that can lead to salvation. Scripture is the only source of every good, given to humanity as the necessary blueprint for establishing God’s rule on earth.18 God’s revelation through the Prophet is the only provision for the spiritual regeneration of humanity and for the establishment of a perfect social and religious world order meeting the needs of all nations.19 It is the necessary remedy for a humanity continually afflicted with many social and spiritual evils. God’s word, the Qur"àn, is humanity’s universal and powerful means of deliverance.20 Scripture as God’s Inspired, Perfect, Preserved, Unchanging and Inerrant Revelation Both fundamentalisms represent the traditional orthodox views of their respective religions by agreeing on the divine source and inspiration of their respective scripture, its uniqueness and authority, and on the fact that the God who first revealed it has also preserved it, so it is com­ pletely trustworthy, uncorrupted and free from error, as well as being relevant and applicable to all times and places. The written revelation has been given in the most appropriate form to a humanity unable to attain to real truth without divine help. Scripture gives man true guid­ ance in all areas of life, offering him God’s absolute moral standards and requirements.

16

Rene Pache. 1969. The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture, pp. 11–14. 18, 20–24. Sayyid Qutb. 1979. In the Shade of the Qur’an, vol. 30, pp. 119, 188, 241. 18 Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1982. Let Us be Muslims, pp. 61–62; Mawdudi. 1980b. Towards Understanding Islam, pp. 62–65. 19 Nadwi. 1983. pp. 45–46. 20 Muhammad Mitwalli Al-Sha'rawi. (nd). The Miracles of the Quran, p. 24. Sheikh Muhammad Mitwalli al-Sha'rawi was a famous Egyptian charismatic preacher whose books and tapes are widespread in Egypt and the Arabic world. 17

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Both fundamentalisms see their doctrines of divine inspiration as the guarantee of the divine preservation of scripture and its total freedom from error. There are differences in their understandings of the process of revelation and inspiration, both tending to stick to the traditional orthodox definitions of their respective religions. Islamic fundamental­ ists stress the divine nature of the text of the Qur "àn, untouched by the human medium, inimitable and divinely preserved in its exact original form, while Christians tend to stress its dual nature, with the human factor as a necessary though secondary element in this process, and stress that total inerrancy is true only of the original manuscripts, admit­ ting that very minor and irrelevant copying and translation errors may have crept into existing texts—but these in no way compromise its authority in anything it affirms. Most Muslims extend the divine inspi­ ration, inerrancy and preservation of Scripture to include ˙adìth and sìra while differentiating between the modes of inspiration and preservation: The Qur "àn is preserved from error in every individual word, while the Sunna is preserved in its totality, so as to allow for weak and inauthentic ˙adìth. Christian Views on Inspiration and Inerrancy Christian fundamentalists stress that the Evangelical doctrine of biblical inspiration and authority is the traditional historic orthodox doctrine of the universal Church.21 According to this doctrine, all of scripture is “God-breathed . . . the Word of God spoken by God on the model of human speech . . . God speaking through human authors in a way which ensured that the words were simultaneously God’s and theirs . . . it is the Word of God through the words of human beings.” 22 Inspiration does not mean that God spoke audibly, nor that he himself wrote the documents, nor that he mechanically dictated the text. The individual human personality of the authors was not smothered by God speaking through them, and they spoke freely as men without distorting the truth God was revealing.23 Following the example of Jesus and his disciples, believers must regard scripture as without error in all that it affirms in any sphere. The modern distinction between theology and ethics ver­ sus history and science is arbitrary and wrong. All doctrines have their problems, but it would be silly to delay faith until all problems were solved: “The acceptance of inerrancy is more conducive to an attitude of reverent humility before God’s word, than a belief in limited inerrancy, let alone errancy.”24

21 22 23 24

Stott in Edwards & Stott. 1988. pp. 333–335.

Stott. 1992, The Contemporary Christian, pp. 167–169.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 167–169; Stott in Edwards & Stott. 1988. pp. 2–106.

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In this view, scripture has been transmitted miraculously through inspiration and is perfect both in its divine and human aspects. Humans were given the gift of communication because “the God of the Bible is a God who communicates and speaks.” The written revelation is indis­ pensable as it collects all original messages received over time, inde­ pendent of the authors. It is “universal, indestructible, accessible, almost omnipresent.”25 God’s inspiration of the writers was absolutely sover­ eign, comprehensive, and perfect, extending also to events and facts known to them without special revelation. Fundamentalists reject accu­ sations that they hold to a theory of mechanical dictation: the writers retained their natural lucidity, but the inspired message transcended their comprehension. Plenary inspiration of scripture is defined as “entire without restriction,” all scripture is the very Word of God, the revela­ tion is complete, and nothing may be added to it or subtracted from it.26 Divine inspiration is the guarantor of textual inerrancy: The determining influence exercised by the Holy Spirit on writers of the Old Testament and the New Testament in order that they might proclaim and set down in an exact and authentic way the message as received from God . . . This influence guided them even to the extent of their use of words, that they might be kept from all error and omis­ sion . . . every scripture and all scripture is inspired, and that it is the text itself which is inspired . . . the Holy Spirit guided the authors even in the choice of expressions without effacing their personalities.27

According to Machen, the Bible is God’s revealed guidance as to how sinful persons can attain communion with God. It is the infallible rule for faith and practice, unique, liberating, and enlightening: “The Bible is not a burdensome law, but the very Magna Charta of Christian lib­ erty.” Real Christianity must be solidly founded upon the Bible in all aspects of thought and life.28 The doctrine of plenary inspiration is not a mechanical dictation theory, as it does not deny the individuality of the Biblical authors, nor their use of ordinary means to acquire infor­ mation, nor the historical contexts in which the biblical books arose: “What it does deny is the presence of error in the Bible,” as the Holy Spirit kept the writers from errors that mar all other human books.29 Packer argues for the doctrine of the inspiration of scripture in light of the internal affirmations of scripture about itself. Evangelicals reject “the supposition that Scripture errs; for Scripture claims not to err . . . they reject all methods of Biblical criticism which assume about Scripture 25 26 27 28 29

Pache. 1969. pp. 12–14, 27, 32–34, 40.

Ibid., pp. 50–56, 66–71.

Ibid., pp. 45–49, 71.

Gresham Machen. 1923, Christianity and Liberalism, pp. 74–79.

Machen. 1923. pp. 74–75.

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something other than Scripture assumes about itself.” God himself is speaking in scripture which is God’s infallible utterance, revealing things about himself and about his will for humanity. Scripture is an inspired and “God-given organism” given to enable humans to know God in a personal way. Though the writers of scripture were fallible, God kept them from error while writing scripture, and God guarantees its verac­ ity, as scripture is “the written testimony of God, who can neither lie nor deceive.”30 Schaeffer affirms that “The Bible is true and without error in all it speaks including where it touches on history and the cosmos—it gives propositional truth all the way back to the first chapter of Genesis.” He criticizes some Evangelicals who have compromised their view of scrip­ ture, as well as neo-orthodoxy which asserts that the Bible contains seri­ ous mistakes, yet exploits it as a source of religious experiences. Schaeffer justifies the contemporary evangelical obsession with inerrancy by quot­ ing Luther’s statement that believers must defend God’s truth at the very point in which the devil and the world are attacking it. In our day the main point under attack is the authority and reliability of scrip­ ture, so holding to a strong view of scripture has become the real water­ shed of the Evangelical world: “Evangelicalism is not consistently evangelical unless there is a line drawn between those who take a full view of Scripture and those who do not.”31 Biblical inerrancy does not mean that the Bible is without error in things it does not affirm, or in the speculations of interpreters. Rather, it means that the Bible is without error in all it says about history, the cosmos, meaning and values. Schaeffer notes two reasons for holding to an uncompromising view of Scripture: this is the only way to be faithful to what Scripture teaches about itself, and without it Christians cannot survive the contemporary relativistic shifts in culture.32 On the Independent Baptist wing, Dean Robinson, assistant editor of the Plains Baptist Challenger, argues that verbal inspiration means God inspired not just the ideas and thoughts, but the very words of scrip­ ture. God providentially prepared the biblical authors for their task, guiding and controlling them, so that all they wrote was God’s pure and perfect word. The Bible is true from beginning to end, all its parts are fully and equally inspired, and no additional revelations are needed: “The Bible does not contain the Word of God, it is the Word of God.” In addition, God has preserved the Bible over the centuries. Inspiration and preservation are both essential truths: “The Bible rests itself on the

30 James I. Packer. 1958. Fundamentalism and the Word of God, p. 74; Packer. 1981. God’s Words, pp. 15–16, 18, 20, 35–39. 31 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Two, NFC, pp. 121–122; GST, pp. 121–122. 32 Schaeffer. 1982, Volume Two, NFC, pp. 143–147.

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sure foundation of inspiration and preservation. One without the other is useless.”33 An interesting aside is taken by Bert Craf who represents the extreme view of some Independent Fundamentalist Baptists that “the preserved Word of God in English is the King James Bible (1611),” because it alone was translated from the “Textus Receptus” manuscripts. Modern translations, which are based on other manuscripts, are altered and perverted.34 Islamic Views on Inspiration and Inerrancy On the Islamic side, fundamentalists stress that Qur "àn and Sunna in their pristine purity are the only true source of Islam. All other tradi­ tions are infected by human error. They also stress the divine origin and nature of the Qur "àn as God’s word, as well as its total preserva­ tion ever since given to the Prophet.35 Qu†b stresses the divine preservation and reliability of the Qur"àn. Though the Messenger is absent, he left the Qur "ànic message as a reli­ able guide for all of humanity in all its affairs “until the end of time.” The Qur"àn gives guidance on the most basic questions of human existence—the relationship between man and God, man’s position and rela­ tionship to the universe, and humanity’s ultimate goal. Believers are called to remain loyal to the pure sources, which are Qur "àn and ˙adìth. Everything else is polluted, Buried under the debris of manmade traditions . . . crushed under those false laws and customs that are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings . . . Allah has taken the responsibility for preserving the Noble Quran on Himself because He knows that Islam can be established and can benefit mankind even after the time of the Prophet, peace be on him . . . The Quran was the unique living source out of which the Companions drank, and this made them unique, for they went to no other source. Later generations got polluted with pagan cultures and evolving traditions and lost their initial purity . . . the Quran which enshrines this message is still in our hands, and the hadith of the Messenger of Allah, peace be on him, his guidance in practical affairs, and the history of his sacred life are also intact, as they were in the hands of the first Muslim community whose likes history could never again produce.36

33 Dean Robinson. “The Right Church,” Internet, . 34 Bert Craf. “WANTED! True Independent New Testament Baptists,” Internet, . 35 Ibrahim, Maajid, & Daarbalah. 1997. p. 30. 36 Qutb. 1990. pp. 7–19.

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The reliability and the comprehensiveness of scripture, as well as its preservation is also stressed by Mawdùdì. The Qur "àn is ‘the true Book of God’, and Qur "àn and Sunna together are the only reliable sources for ascertaining God’s complete will, the direct revelation by which God has imparted all the instructions he wished to communicate to human­ ity. The Qur"àn exists today exactly as it was revealed to the Prophet— not a word nor a syllable have been altered. It is the Word of God in the original text preserved for all time, perfectly true, demanding total obedience, addressed to all mankind, in all ages, as “the eternal code for human life.”37 Others highlight the unadulterated purity of the Qur "àn, which is “the only religious book free from human interpolation and alive in all its first purity.” It possesses tremendous spiritual wealth, and has the power to solve all problems facing the modern world, reviving all nations.38 The perfectly preserved and unadulterated revelation also includes ˙adìth and sìra, which record the life and sayings of the Prophet in their pris­ tine purity: “There has not been an iota of change in this unique his­ toric record . . . The sayings and the entire record of the life of the Holy Prophet have been handed down to us with unprecedented pre­ cision and authenticity in works of the Hadith and the Sirah.”39 Khurràm Muràd states that the Qur "àn was given as divine guidance to lead individuals and communities to become muttaqìn—pious, Godconscious, able to differentiate between right and wrong. The Qur "àn is God’s eternal word and guidance to humanity, as relevant today as it was when first given: “As you read the Qur"an, Allah speaks to you. To read the Qur"an is to hear Him, even to converse with him, and to walk in His ways. It is the encounter of life with the Life-giver.”40 Al-Sha'ràwì stresses the miraculous divine features of the Qur "àn: it is Allah’s speech “drawing its everlasting validity from the eternal attrib­ utes of Allah Himself,” it is unique and unsurpassed in its language, composition, and scientific accuracy: “Each letter and word has its place while the language is free from fault”. It is inimitable and unrivaled in its ability to touch human hearts, while its message contains layers of meanings relevant to all ages, able to accommodate advances in knowl­ edge and guide humanity in changing times and contexts. The Qur"àn’s textual authenticity has been preserved from any corruption by God.41 Mas'arì states the generally accepted axiom that the Qur "àn is preserved letter for letter, and like most Islamic fundamentalists he ex­ 37

Mawdudi. 1980. pp. 45, 62–65.

Nadwi. 1983. p. 51.

39 Khurshid Ahmad. 1996. “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics”, in

K. Ahmad, ed., 1996, Islam: Its Meaning and Message, pp. 31–32; 42–43. 40 Khurram Murad. 1996. Key to al-Baqarah, pp. 13–15; Murad. 1985. Way to the Qur’an, pp. 10, 15. 41 Al-Sha'rawi. (nd). pp. 5–39. 38

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tends the divine preservation to both Qur "àn and Sunna, which are the ultimate and only reference point for humanity. The inspiration and preservation of Sunna are different to that of the Qur "àn. He accepts that there are weak and even fabricated ˙adìth, however, since Allah permitted the Sunna to be communicated in this way, it is perfect in its totality, Allah providing the necessary correctives to all problems. We can be absolutely certain that not a single letter has been lost, there is no Quran outside the Mushaf. Some Quran has been abro­ gated verbally and excluded from Mushaf, as it should be, and as decided by Allah and none else. It cannot be otherwise—else the divine promise fails and the Quran cannot be from Allah, na'uthu–billah! . . . It is the fundamental belief of every Muslim that Qur’an and Sunnah are the ultimate and final reference—the ONLY reference. This truth is the core of tawheed: Allah is the ONLY God, Lord, Lawmaker, Sovereign, Master, Commander, and His Messenger is the ONLY infallible communicator and explainer. THAT IS THE THEORY! . . . This preservation of Sunnah can only be in its totality, not in every single Hadeeth, sentence or letter. It is thus impossible that a nongenuine hadeeth or part of it, will creep in either by a narrator’s mis­ take or intentional fabrication, without a corrective evidence in the same or in some other hadeeth. Allah has taken care of that. The preser­ vation of Sunnah also means that no authentic prophetic saying, prophetic act, prophetic approval, will be lost and never found till judgement day. It is also impossible that the abrogated (mansoukh), unre­ stricted (mutlaq), general (‘am) and the unexplained (mujmal ) will be pre­ served, while the abrogating (naasikh), the restricting (muqayyid ), the specifying (mukhassis), and the explanatory (mufassir) is lost forever! This can never, never, happen! Else Allah’s promise fails and is a lie (na’uthu billah). This means that we do not need any thing else or anybody else: no salaf, no khalaf.42

Dual Revelation in Nature and Scripture—Dual Interpretation in Science and Theology Christian fundamentalists argue that it is a mistake to contrast “science” with “scripture” as science is a human development while scripture is a divine revelation—the two are not comparable. Instead, “nature” must be compared with “scripture”, and “science” with “theology”. Theology is the systematic study of the biblical revelation, while science is the systematic study of the natural order. Nature and scripture are both divine revelations—the one general and natural, the other special and supernatural, and God is revealed both in the created world and in the biblical witness. On the other hand, science and theology are fallible

42 Muhammad al-Mas'ari. “The Devil’s Deception of Hizbut-Tahrir Reader’s Corner, 17,2,98, Internet, .

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human interpretations—the one of nature, the other of scripture. Both nature and scripture rely on given data which comes from God and cannot contradict itself. Any perceived contradictions are between sci­ ence and theology, that is “between different human interpretations of God’s double revelation.” Humanist attempts at replacing revelation by reason are misplaced: while reason is vitally important in understanding and applying revelation, it can never be a substitute for it—“without reve­ lation reason gropes in the dark.”43 The concept of God’s dual revelation in nature and in scripture is also echoed by some Islamic fundamentalist writers who argue that there is no discrepancy between Qur "àn and nature: the Qur "àn has layers of meaning and it regenerates its meanings in accordance to man’s evolv­ ing knowledge of the universe. While the main aim of the Qur"àn is to grant humanity divine guidance in matters of worship, its factual state­ ments on matters of nature and science are true, as both the Qur "àn and nature are divine revelations that cannot contradict each other. The created universe, in its perfection and harmony, is a witness, a sign and a portent to God’s unity, greatness and power and God encourages men to explore the universe and marvel at its harmony and perfection which mirror God’s Unity and supreme power.44 Ultimate Authority of Scripture Fundamentalists argue that as scripture is God’s inspired revelation, it is also the ultimate absolute authority for humans in all areas, includ­ ing morals and knowledge. It is the ultimate criterion between right and wrong, and the framework within which all human activities and thought ought to reside and by which they must be judged. Again, Christian fundamentalists dedicate more space in their discourse to this theme than do Islamists. Christian Views on Ultimate Authority For Christian fundamentalists, the Bible is the objective, absolute author­ ity for humanity—it is absolutely true in all areas it touches upon. Culture is to be continually judged by the Bible, not the other way round. This was what the early Church did in regard to Roman-Greek culture of its day. The Reformation did the same in relation to the culture at the end of the Middle Ages. All the great revivalists in church history followed this method concerning the surrounding cultures of their day.45 Schaeffer states that only God is autonomous in the area of final authority, and he upholds the Reformation’s rejection of man’s autonomous 43 44 45

Stott in Edwards & Stott, 1988. pp. 83–85, 333–335.

Al-Sha'rawi. (nd). pp. 64–67, 115–116.

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, TCE, pp. 104–105.

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intellect and of a natural theology independent of Scripture. The Reformation had accepted the biblical doctrine of a total fall which included man’s intellect and will, therefore “final and sufficient knowledge rested in the Bible” alone. He rejects views of final authority as being located in Scripture plus something else such as the Church or natural theology, and he criticizes the liberal location of final authority in “the revelation of God in Christ alone” as a modern shift in theology which rejects the Reformation view of “scripture only” and leaves man with no content for the word Christ.46 The ultimate difference between liberals and Evangelicals is located in their attitude to authority and salvation. The fundamental questions in every religion are the same: “By what authority do we believe and teach, and by what means can sinful men be reconciled to God?”47 Because scripture is ‘God’s Word written’, it has supreme authority over all human traditions, while the church must be continually reformed and renewed according to scripture.48 In addition to believing in the divine inspiration and utter trustwor­ thiness of scripture as originally given, and in its supreme authority in all matters of faith and doctrine, fundamentalists stress that it is the sole and only authority as a safeguard against the wrong conservative view of tradition as an equal source of authority, and of the equally wrong modern method of the drawing out and reinterpreting what was only implicit in scripture. Lloyd-Jones asserts that the Bible contains propo­ sitional truth in all it asserts about God, man, history, and any other subject, and he defends the supernatural element in scripture which includes ‘prophecy as foretelling’ and the literal truth of the miracles. There can be no dichotomy in the Bible’s authority, no division of truth into religious truth revealed in the Bible, and scientific truth discovered by science.49 Packer argues that the basic Evangelical contention about scripture is that it has complete and final authority over the Church as a selfcontained and self-interpreting revelation from God: “What Scripture says, God says; and what God says in Scripture is to be the rule of faith and life in His Church.” The real modern problem is that of ulti­ mate authority which Evangelicals, following the original orthodox Christian position, locate in scripture: The teaching of the written Scriptures is the Word that God spoke and speaks to his Church, and is finally authoritative for faith and life. To learn the mind of God, one must consult His written Word. What

46 47 48 49

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume One, EFR, pp. 217–219.

Stott in Edwards & Stott. 1988. pp. 333–335.

Stott. 1992. p. 182.

Martyn Lloyd-Jones. 1992. What is an Evangelical? pp. 69–82.

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  Scripture says, God says. The Bible is inspired in the sense of being word-for-word God given. It is a record and explanation of divine rev­ elation which is both complete (sufficient) and comprehensible (per­ spicuous); that is to say, it contains all that the Church needs to know in this world for its guidance in the way of salvation and service, and it contains the principles for its own interpretation within itself. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit, who caused it to be written, has been given to the church to cause believers to recognize it for the divine Word that it is . . . The Bible therefore does not need to be supple­ mented and interpreted by tradition, or revised and corrected by rea­ son. Instead, it demands to sit in judgment on the dictates of both; for the words of men must be tried by the Word of God.50

Packer attacks traditionalist ecclesiastical views of final authority resid­ ing in the official teaching of the institutional church. Whilst this view accepts the Bible as God-given and authoritative, it does not view it as self-contained or self-interpreting, supplementing it by the seemingly equally God-given tradition of the Church. Another wrong position is the subjective view that the final authority resides in the verdict of indi­ vidual reason, conscience, or religious sentiment, arising from an indi­ vidual examination of scripture by historical, philosophical, and scientific methods. In contrast to these positions, the Church must be ruled by scripture alone as God’s written Word, allowing it to fix and control the methods and presuppositions with which it is studied. Accepting the authority of Scripture includes the willingness to believe what it teaches, applying its teachings personally for correction and guidance. Church traditions and private theological speculations must never be identified with the spoken word of God.51 Billy Graham relates his personal struggle concerning the final author­ ity of scripture. After reading many books representing a variety of views on the subject, he turned to the New Testament and read 2 Tim 3:16.52 He then realized that while “there was an impenetrable mystery to that concept (the inspiration of scripture), as with all things pertaining to God, yet the basic meaning was clear: the Bible was more than just another human book.” Graham struggled a whole night with the issue, recalling that Jesus and the apostles had loved the scriptures, quoted from them, and verified the Genesis accounts of creation and the flood as well as the story of Noah. There was no doubt about the internal testimony of Scripture to its own inspiration and authenticity. Graham realized that he would either have to trust the Bible or quit public evangelism. Finally, after confessing to God that there were many things 50

Packer. 1958. pp. 41–51, 73. Ibid., pp. 49–50, 68–69. 52 2.Timothy 3:16 “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness”. 51

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he did not understand about the Bible, he experienced the assurance of faith: That night I believed with all my heart that the God who had saved my soul would never let go of me . . . at last the Holy Spirit freed me to say it: ‘Father, I am going to accept this as Thy Word by faith! I’m going to allow faith to go beyond my intellectual questions and doubts, and I will believe this to be Your inspired Word . . . Not all my ques­ tions had been answered, but a major bridge had been crossed . . . in my heart and mind I knew that a spiritual battle in my soul had been fought and won.53

Islamic Views on Ultimate Authority Islamic fundamentalists all uphold the ultimate authority of divine rev­ elation, arguing that a believer must live only under the authority of God’s book, renouncing all other authorities and judging all things by Qur"àn and Sunna: The moment you recite the kalimah you accept that the only law you recognize is God’s law, only God is your sovereign, only God is your ruler, you will obey only God, only the things written in God’s book and given by his Messenger. You renounce all other authority in favour of God’s authority, you judge everything in the light of Quran and Sunnah: accept what conforms to them, reject what contradicts them.54

They argue that it is the fundamental belief of every Muslim that Qur "àn and Sunna are the final and only reference point, the sole sufficient and ultimate authority. “The core of tawhid is that Allah is the only God, Lawmaker and Sovereign, and His messenger the only infallible com­ municator and explainer of His will.” This means that the message com­ municated, Quran and Sunna, are sufficient and in need of nothing outside of themselves.55 The Qur "àn, God’s word in human language, is the only true guidance and light for mankind, the only weapon against evil, the only way to salvation, and the only way to approach God.56 T R A  S Both fundamentalisms stress the necessity of an attitude to scripture that includes faith in its divine authority, and humble submission and prac­ tical obedience to its guidance. In both camps there is a sense that God

53 54 55 56

Billy Graham. 1997. Just As I Am, pp. 135–136.

Mawdudi. 1982. p. 66.

Al-Mas'ari. “The Devil’s Deception of . . .”.

Murad. 1985. pp. 19–21.

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has spoken clearly and finally in Scripture and that the real question is not one of “literalism” and interpretation, but of authority and atti­ tude, whether humans are willing to submit to God and obey His Word rather than follow their own desires.57 The really important thing is for humans to let scripture speak to them directly, transforming them from within as they integrate its message into their lives. Finally both stress the importance of obeying and implementing what the believer has understood of scripture. Christian Attitudes to Scripture Christian fundamentalists stress that the right attitude to the scriptures involves a willing, unconditional, and humble submission to their supreme authority and a readiness to obey their guidance in all spheres of life, within the framework of a personal relationship with God. A true believer accepts the Bible in faith, taking God at his word: “He accepts the Bible as the Word of God on the authority of God Himself.” While there are things in it he does not understand, he is willing to wait until God in his grace grants him more light on his word.58 At the heart of fundamentalism lies the willingness of believers to accept the supreme authority of scripture and to live by it: The crucial issue which underlies the ‘Fundamentalism’ controversy thus concerns the attitude in which Christians should approach Scripture, and the use they should make of it. Evangelicals . . . seek to think and live in accordance with its authoritative teaching . . . they reject views which they believe to be contrary to it. They reject for instance the supposition that Scripture errs; for Scripture claims not to err . . . they reject all methods of Biblical criticism which assume about Scripture something other than Scripture assumes about itself.59

Because it is God himself who speaks in the Bible, man’s attitude to scripture ought to be one of humilty, respect, and gratitude, coupled with the readiness to listen, learn, and change beliefs and actions in conformity to its teachings. This is the only way to really know God.60 Evangelicals and fundamentalists are defined as those who identify Scripture as God’s word and have an unconditional commitment to it, submitting to its authority in their lives, believing all it says, and obey­ ing its instructions. Obedience to scripture is a logical result of accept­ ing the sovereignty of God:

57 58 59 60

Shepard. 1987. pp. 362–363.

Carl McIntire. 1945. Twentieth Century Reformation, pp. 5–6.

Packer. 1958. p. 74.

Packer. 1995. Knowing Christianity, pp. 18–22: Packer. 1981. pp. 18, 29.

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The hallmark of Evangelicals is a submissive spirit, their a priori resolve to believe and obey whatever Scripture may be shown to teach. They are committed to Scripture in advance, whatever it may later be found to say. They claim no liberty to lay down their own terms for belief and behaviour. They see this humble and obedient stance as an essen­ tial implication of Christ’s lordship over them.61

Stott argues that the only hope for national renewal is in a re-instatement of the Word of God—it must be respected, widely read, and obeyed. He advocates a humble submission to Scripture as a sign of the believer’s submission and loyalty to Jesus, who subordinated himself to the author­ ity of the Old Testament Scriptures: “It stands written” was for him the conclusive argument. Evangelicals, says Stott, sit under Scripture and let it judge them: “Evangelicals find true freedom under the author­ ity of revealed truth, and combine a radical mind-set and lifestyle with a conservative commitment to Scripture.”62 The double authorship of scripture demands a two-fold approach: As the Word of God we read it as we read no other book—humbly and reverently on our knees, praying for illumination of the Spirit to give us understanding and obedience. As the words of human authors, we also read it like any other book using our minds to ponder, think, reflect, scrutinize its literary, cultural and linguistic characteristics. This combination of humble reverence and critical reflection is not only not impossible; it is indispensable.63

The right starting point for studying scripture is a personal experience of the Lordship of Christ and the power of the Spirit, coupled to a recognition that God has carefully preserved the text of the Bible. Based on the firm foundation of faith in the ultimate authority of God’s Word, scholarship can be undertaken without fear as it will not undermine faith, but lead to a greater revelation of truth. It is a false dichotomy to assume that a Christian must be either a true believer or a scholar, the real dichotomy is that between belief and unbelief.64 Unless one submits to the ultimate authority of the scriptures, one is drawn into accommodation. “First one starts questioning, based upon what the world about us is saying, then one looks at scripture, then theology, then scientific study—until finally what the scriptures teach is completely subjected to whatever view is currently accepted by the world.”65 61

Stott in Edwards & Stott, 1988. pp. 102–106. Stott. 1992, pp. 159–160, 184; Stott in Edwards & Stott, 1988. pp. 83–85, 102–106. 63 Stott. 1992, pp. 169–170. 64 Clifford Hill. 1986. A Prophetic People, p. 120. 65 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, GED, p. 398. 62

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For strict fundamentalists the only important question is: “What does the Bible say, and what does the Word of God command us to do?” They are not influenced by what others think of them, nor by fears for their reputation or position. A true fundamentalist “is a man who is so founded upon the Bible that he cannot in his doctrine or his practice deliberately disobey it.”66 As Jones warns: Any religion that does not put its emphasis upon the Book, the whole book, and nothing but the Book and the Christ of the Book will become corrupt and be turned to the destruction of souls.67

Fundamentalists are called to live a holistic and integrated life under the authority of the Word of God in all areas: in their personal lives and in their service to fellow men, in their social relationships and in their work for social justice. The Bible, says Graham, is the God-given map guiding believers in this world, following its directions benefits the inner man of those who are consistent in reading it and diligent in applying it to their lives.68 Islamic Attitudes to Scripture For Islamic fundamentalists the right approach to Scripture is likewise one of submission and application. Scripture is viewed as the motiva­ tor to action, the engine of revolutionary Islamic change. Humans must approach the Qur"àn humbly in order to derive from it their concepts and ideas, accepting its statements as final. It is wrong to approach the Qur "àn with preconceived ideas searching in it for their confirmation.69 Looking back to the “golden age” of Islam, Qu†b argues that the first generation of Muslims read the Qur"àn differently to mod­ ern Muslims who study it only for the sake of acquiring knowledge, or to find solutions to legal and scientific problems. In contrast, the unique first generation of the Prophet’s Companions studied scripture in order to immediately obey it and put its prescriptions into practice: They turned to the Quran to find out what God the Almighty Creator had prescribed for them. They approached it to act on it immediately. They understood that instruction is for acting, and this is what opened the doors to spiritual fulfillment. Had they read the Quran only for discussion, learning and information, the doors would have remained shut.70

66 67 68 69 70

Bob Jones. 1985. Cornbread and Caviar, pp. 167, 174.

Ibid., p. 184.

Graham. 1986. Unto the Hills: A Devotional Treasury, pp. 2–3, 231–232.

Ibid., p. 302.

Qutb. 1990. pp. 13–14.

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The Qur"àn “does not open its treasures except to the one who accepts it in this spirit, i.e. the spirit of knowing with the intention of acting upon it.” It was not revealed as a book of theory but as a way of life dedicated to Allah. It became integrated into the personalities of the first Muslims, transforming them into living examples of a faith that was not mere intellectual book-knowledge, but a dynamic powerful enough to change the world. The first Muslims lived in constant con­ sciousness of God, molding their lives according to God’s sacred pat­ tern in the Qur"àn: “The method of the first Muslims was instruction translated into action. Later generations sought instruction for acade­ mic discussion and enjoyment.”71 Studying scripture is not a matter of learning a theological system, but of translating scriptural beliefs into practice, implementing its message as a comprehensive method aimed at creating and safeguarding a living community.72 Mu˙ammad Qu†b (Sayyid Qu†b’s brother), argues that the Qur"àn can be rightly understood and have its dynamic effect on people only when they are actively engaged in the struggle for ‘no deity but Allah’. Reading the Qur"àn in a detached and passive manner means missing its main purpose, it must be read while actively participating in the struggle to establish God’s sole rule on earth, so “one’s heart will open to receive its meanings which one would otherwise have missed, and will draw inferences of which one was totally unaware.”73 All Islamic fundamentalists call for an attitude of humble faith in scripture and an unconditional willingness to apply its instructions. They criticize the hypocritical lip-service many Muslims give to the Qur"àn. True faith is expressed not just by verbal confession that it is the Word of God, but by a heartfelt devotion that binds minds and hearts under its spell. As physical food for the body derives from the earth, so spir­ itual food for the soul derives from the Qur "àn. Muslims therefore ought to study the Qur "àn by reading it slowly and thoughtfully many times over, digesting its contents, meditating on its message, and seeking its guidance for their lives. It is the obligation of believers to act upon its teachings in every sphere of life, both individually and collectively, as well as to propagate its message to every corner of the world.74 The right attitude of self-surrender to the Qur"àn and of practicing its instructions is repeatedly stressed. Only what is practiced is of any value. A true Muslim must center his life around the Qur "àn, devoting himself totally to the reading and understanding of scripture, abandon­ ing himself to its message without any trace of arrogance or self-sufficiency. 71

Ibid., pp. 13–14. Ibid., pp. 30–33. 73 Muhammad Qutb. “Introduction” in Qutb. 1979. pp. xvi–xvii. 74 Tanzeem-e-Islami, “The Obligations Muslims Owe to the Qur’an”, Internet, . 72

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This is the only way to please God, to discover one’s self, and to find dignity in this world. Without the Qur"àn, humanity will continue its inevitable slide into the abyss of self-destruction. The right approach to the Qur"àn is one of gratitude to God for giving it, faith in it as the word of God, purity of intention in accepting its teachings and guid­ ance, and a willingness to obey its injunctions and to change inwardly and outwardly according to its norms.75 I  S Both fundamentalisms argue for the right and duty of all believers to interpret scripture for themselves without the need for a class of pro­ fessional experts and mediators. Both also stress the priority of the clear common-sense literal meaning of the text, although willing to concede that some contexts demand allegorical, typological, and symbolic inter­ pretations. They also stress the importance of the method of interpret­ ing scripture by scripture, and counter seeming contradictions in the text by efforts at harmonization. Finally, both tend to reject the author­ ity of medieval and other interpreters, boldly reinterpreting scripture in new ways. There are exceptions to all these views, and there tend to be multiple spectrums from the more egalitarian to the more elitist, from the more literalist interpreters to the more multifaceted ones, from the simple lay common sense interpreters to the more sophisticated the­ ologically proficient ones, from the boldly independent interpreters to those still bound to traditional methods and views. Christian Interpretations Christian fundamentalist interpreters tend to stress the simple, natural, common sense and literal meaning of the text except where the con­ text demands differently. Scripture is seen as objectively true with a clear intended original meaning that can be objectively discovered by the serious reader. The text is to guide the interpreter, not vice versa. Among the dispensationalists and those from the Anabaptist tradition, are some groups with a definite anti-intellectual and anti-scholarship stance. On the extreme anti-intellectualist position are those who refuse to interpret scripture at all, preferring to quote only scriptural passages on any given theme or problem, assuming that scripture is sufficiently clear in itself, and thus there is no need for human interpretation.76 While all groups oppose the relativistic and subjective liberal inter­

75

Murad. 1985. pp. 10–12, 25–35. Personal experience in a very exclusivist-separatist Christian Brethren Church. This is not typical of the majority “open” stream of this movement. 76

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pretations, stress the importance of scripture interpreting scripture, and of the primary literal sense of the text, fundamentalists from the larger church traditions tend to give greater priority to the use of the interpreter’s mind and reasoning, as well as to the methodological and theological frameworks within which interpretation is conducted. The Re­ formed wing especially highlights the importance of right theology and some disparage their more ‘simple-minded’ dispensationalist brothers as gullible, illogical and naïve especially in matters of eschatology, as well as of espousing a “dictation theory” view of inspiration and a too lit­ eralistic interpretation which neglects the symbolic and metaphorical dimensions of scripture.77 There is thus a wide spectrum of interpreta­ tion ranging from anti-intellectual and anti-scholarship positions, to the highly sophisticated efforts of well known evangelical scholars such as Stott and Packer. Dispensationalists tend to place a special stress on the plain sense of scriptures and on an unaided lay approach to them. Tim LaHaye, senior pastor of Scott Memorial Baptist Church and Chancellor of Heritage College, both in San Diego, California, warns against speculation in areas where scripture is not specific. He quotes Dr. David L. Cooper, founder of the Biblical Research Society, as having taught him the “Golden Rule of Interpretation”: When the plain sense of Scripture makes common sense, seek no other sense, but take every word at its primary, literal meaning unless the facts of the immediate context clearly indicate otherwise.78

Bob Jones II, Chancellor of the separatist Baptist Bob Jones University, advocates the method of the Bible interpreting itself. He claims that “the Bible explains itself and you can only interpret an obscure passage honestly when you do so in the light of clear passages.” Bob Jones warns believers not to be dogmatic in insisting on extreme interpreta­ tions of scripture. Where good Bible believing interpreters hold contra­ dictory positions on the meaning of some scriptural passages, the truth generally lies in between. He warns of over-reliance on commentaries: The important thing is to read the Book, not books about the Book. Preaching should be soundly Biblical, not coldly and technically the­ ological. Men need the clear proclamation of the great Bible fundamentals—about which there can be no differences of interpretation, for these are positively and explicitly stated.79

77 Gary DeMar. “Introduction,” in North & DeMar. 1991. Christian Reconstruction: What it is, What it isn’t, pp. 3–6; see also Stott in Edwards & Stott. 1988. pp. 90–91. 78 Tim LaHaye. 1972. The Beginning of the End, “Dedication”, & p. 78. 79 Jones. 1985. p. 45.

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Stott, coming from an Anglican-Evangelical stand, stresses the impor­ tance of the mind in interpreting Scripture, while keeping scripture supreme. For liberals, the final court of appeal is rationality, and the final criterion of truth is “modern opinion,” so they are able to set aside biblical teachings on the cross, on miracles, and on homosexuality. For Evangelicals, on the other hand, authority is “Scripture as correctly interpreted,” the emphasis being not on the interpretation but on the Scripture which is being interpreted. Appeal must always be made from an interpretation of scripture to scripture itself, imitating the method Jesus used in his controversies with Jewish authorities: “Both accepted the supreme authority of Scripture: their disagreement was over its true interpretation.” Stott argues that the presupposition that “the Bible is God’s word through human words” means that God has not contradicted himself in scripture. The right approach to resolving seeming contra­ dictions is a patient attempt at harmonization, not artificial manipula­ tions or declarations of error. Problems once loudly proclaimed as biblical errors were later solved due to patient study and new insights.80 Packer, representing the mainline Reformed position, argues that as the Bible is a very complex unity, interpretation is necessary in order to relate specific texts to their broader contexts. He stresses the impor­ tance of a thematic approach, of gaining a good grasp of the central themes of scripture, in order to correctly understand the variety of details within its integral unity. Packer stresses two modes of interpretation: first, each text must be interpreted according to its natural intended sense, to the rules of grammar and discourse, as well as to its place in history. The intended literal sense is the real meaning of the text (this does not preclude the recognition of figures of speech where employed): “The literal sense is the spiritual sense, coming from God and leading to him.” This contrasts with medieval scholastic views of the literal sense of the text as unimportant, the deeper allegorical meanings being its true essence. The second basic principle is that of interpreting scripture by scripture. When one passage presents difficulties, it can best be under­ stood by searching for other passages which illuminate it. This involves seeking for unifying cross-references and topical links.81 Islamic Interpretations Islamic fundamentalists interpreters generally stress that Qur"àn and Sunna are a unified revelation containing the basic essentials of Islam which all Muslims can study and understand. The right method of

80 Stott. 1992, pp. 169–170. Stott in Edwards & Stott, 1988. pp. 102–106, 333–335. 81 Packer. 1958. pp. 102–106.

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interpretation is that of interpreting the Qur"àn by the Qur "àn, seeking to place the literal meaning in its historical context and then applying it to contemporary situations. All rules of faith and conduct must be derived directly from the original sources, and where directly relevant texts are not available, ijtihàd is recommended. The demand for ijtihàd is a marker of contemporary Islamic fundamentalists, who all oppose the traditional Sunnì view of the gates of ijtihàd being closed in the early centuries of Islam. However, there are differences in the way ijtihàd is perceived to work. Some see it as the right of every Muslim, others limit it to those competent in Islamic scholarship. Qu†b argues that the basic essential truths of Islam are defined in several specific, axiomatic, and self-evident Qur "ànic passages, the main truth being that sovereignty belongs to God alone. From these, right interpretation can deduct the many practical rules suitable to the vary­ ing contexts of the Islamic community. As to interpretation, it is wrong to quote Qur"ànic texts out of context or use them as isolated proof texts. All laws and rules must be derived from the Qur "àn, either by being based on authoritative texts, or by means of ijtihàd within the bounds of general interpretive principles where clear texts do not exist. Qu†b claims that all Muslims can equally interpret and apply Sharì'a—but qualifies this statement by adding the elitist limitation that this is pos­ sible only if they have adequately comprehended it. His own views are not a new interpretation, but simply “plain Islam” as it was first under­ stood by Mu˙ammad and his companions.82 Qu†b also says that the clear texts of the Qur"àn should determine how human reason interprets it and not the other way round. While reason is useful, it is limited and must be subordinated to the Qur "àn which is absolute by its divine nature.83 Mu˙ammad Qu†b claims that the Qur"àn must be interpreted along two axes: the first focuses on the basic moral principles that lead indi­ viduals and communities to the “highest degree of moral and spiritual nobility.” The second presents the divine practical code which must govern every area of life. According to Mu˙ammad Qu†b, his brother, Sayyid Qu†b, used this twofold method in his interpretation of the Qur "àn. He did not focus on individual words and expressions, but on whole passages, endeavoring to explain their meaning and relevance to either the essential moral principles or the divine practical code.84 Khurshid A˙mad argues for the right of every believer to inter­ pret scripture for himself: “Everyone may approach the Book of God directly and translate its dictates into practice.” However, interpreting 82 Qutb. “Social Justice in Islam” in Shepard, W. ed., 1996. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, pp. 9–12, 278–279, 307. 83 Qutb. 1979. p. 302. 84 Qutb, M. “Introduction” in Qutb. 1979. p. xiii.

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and understanding scripture is possible only to those who “use their God-given faculty of reason to acquire the appropriate knowledge.”85 Qur"àn and Sunna contain broad basic principles of individual and com­ munal social conduct which can be freely applied to contemporary prob­ lems by the use of ijtihàd. While the basic guidelines are permanent, their application can change in accordance to the peculiar needs of every generation: “That is why Islam always remains as fresh and mod­ ern as tomorrow’s morn.” Khurshid A˙mad states that revealed law, Sharì 'a, is given to help determine between right and wrong, permitted and forbidden (˙alàl & ˙aràm). Man is obligated to accept Sharì'a and implement it in all areas of life, indeed, conducting all human affairs in accord with Sharì'a is the ultimate test of acceptance by God.86 As to attitudes to later commentators and interpreters, there is some variety. Jamà'at al-Takfìr wa"l-Hijra in Egypt repudiated all interpreta­ tions after the Ràshidùn Caliphs, including the four madhhabs and all tra­ ditional commentators, as unnecessary because the Qur "àn was given in plain Arabic. The founding scholars of the madhhabs were puppets of rulers who used them to monopolize the Qur "ànic interpretation to their own advantage. They had closed the gates of ijtihàd and made them­ selves tawaghì† (idols), serving as mediators between God and believers.87 In contrast, the Egyptian Jamà'at al-Jihàd (responsible for Sadat’s assas­ sination), while calling for a return to Qur"àn and Sunna, accepted the four madhhabs, much of scholarly consensus, and some later commen­ tators such as Ibn-Taymiyya.88 Khurràm Muràd posits two categories of Qur "ànic study: first, tad­ hakkur, which aims at gaining guidance from the text in order to imple­ ment it. It does not need sophisticated scholarship and is open to every sincere believer. Second, tadabbur, which aims at finding the full mean­ ing of every word and verse of the text, including its metaphors and symbols, endeavoring to discover the underlying cohesion and unity of the Qur"àn. This study requires a good knowledge of the various fields of Qur"ànic scholarship. According to Muràd there are four steps to inter­ preting a Qur "ànic passage: first, understanding its simple literal mean­ ing; second, looking up what scholars have said about it; third, studying it at a deeper level to absorb its meaning; and fourth, obediently imple­ menting everything comprehended.89

85 Ahmad, K. “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics”, in Ahmad, K. ed., 1996. p. 34. 86 Ibid., p. 34. 87 Walid M. Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt, p. 197. 88 Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. “Al-Farida al-Gha"iba”, translated, in Johannes Jansen, J.G. 1986. The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, pp. 166–175. 89 Murad. 1985. pp. 77–80.

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For those possessing the ability, Muràd recommends a basic inter­ pretative methodology based on the search for the real meaning of the text, for “nothing in the Quran is without reason and purpose.” Muràd differentiates between the divine text and human understandings of it: believers must not assign divine status to their own understandings of the Qur"àn, as they are human understandings liable to error. He also lays down another principle of interpretation: no understanding is to be accepted that conflicts with the overall framework of the Qur"àn or with the continuing consensus (ijmà' ) of the umma, because the whole Qur"àn is a coherent unity, a single message with one worldview, in spite of the diverse forms in which it is communicated. This means that all pas­ sages are fully consistent with each other. Muràd stresses that the Qur "àn’s language is aimed at the common man, who can best comprehend it by interpreting one passage with the help of another—“understanding the Qur"an by the Qur"an . . . the best tafsir of the Qur"an is the Qur"an itself ”—a stand similar to that of some Christian fundamentalists who stress the interpretation of scripture by scripture. While the first task of the interpreter is to find the literal meaning of the text, it is also impor­ tant to search for the original meaning in the context it was given, and to translate both into the contemporary context.90 Al-Sha'ràwì argues that the Qur "àn has many layers of meaning that expand on the literalist significance of various passages. As man’s knowl­ edge of the universe grows and changes he realizes the hidden mean­ ings of the Qur"àn applicable to his time and context. This proves that the Qur"àn was given to all humanity for all times and places: “Providing knowledge for all generations . . . the Qur"an is constantly regenerating new meaning, providing a continual source of guidance.”91 Mas'arì states that God’s textual revelation in Qur"àn and Sunna deals mainly with basic laws that must be interpreted and applied to con­ crete situations in real life. Proper understanding of the texts and of the present situation is essential for extracting the divine ruling for each specific case, and this obligatory process of extraction is ijtihàd. Mas'arì argues that a divine ruling exists for every new situation Muslims may ever face, but it must be found by ijtihàd.92 There is no need for an ordained official clergy to make ijtihàd—every Muslim is responsible to Allah alone, and as such ijtihàd is his right if he possesses sufficient knowledge of the sources and of the present situation, and is able to argue for his opinions in the community. Ijtihàd however is a fallible human process and its results are not ‘The Revelation’ nor ‘The Sharì 'a’,

90

Murad. 1996. p. 8; Murad. 1985. pp. 91–95. Al-Sha'rawi. (nd). p. 18. 92 Al-Mas'ari. “Ruling by Kufr is Haram”, MSANEWS, 18, December, 1997, Internet, . 91

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but rather the mujtahid ’s understanding of the revelation or Sharì'a on the specific point in question. It is not Allah’s ruling, but the mujtahid ’s view and understanding of Allah’s ruling. Because many problems are not related to definitive (qati' ) textual evidence, while many ˙adìth are not well established as to their authenticity, there will be diverging views and believers face the problem of which one to follow. For individual Muslims this has been extensively studied by fiqh scholars who estab­ lished principles of †aqlìd (following the scholar), and ittibà' (following the argument). However, the scholars have not established clear guide­ lines for the public domain, stating only that the legitimate leader, the wàli al-"amr or khalìfa, has the right to adopt a position, and whatever ruling he adopts becomes law when duly enacted and published.93 'Azzàm Tamimi sees Islam as consisting of two circles, an inner reli­ gious core sphere (al-dìnì), and an outer political shell (al-siyàsì). While the inner core is unchangeable, ijtihàd on the outer shell is permissible and enables Islamic scholars throughout the ages to resolve problems arising in new contexts.94 Siddiqì argues that Islam must include within itself the “feedback learning processes capable of correcting divergences.” This includes the mechanism of ijtihàd which allows for learning from the results of choices made in the past. In the early centuries 'ulamà" made great use of ijti­ hàd, but having legitimized their respective divergences, they closed the gates of ijtihàd.95 Shì' ì interpreters tend to a less literalist interpretation of scripture, stressing the many layers of meaning and the impossibility of absolute truth in interpretation, which is viewed more as the domain of the ex­ perts, the Shì'ì 'ulamà". They are also generally more influenced by Islamic philosophy and Íùfì thought than their Sunnì brethren. Sharì'atì who is more eclectic than most other Islamic fundamental­ ists and more impacted by Twelver-Shì'ite and Íùfì mystical and philo­ sophical thought, differs from the majority of Sunni fundamentalist interpreters of scripture in stating that the Qur"àn is written in symbolic language which is the highest form of literature. The Qur"àn thus has a hidden bà†inì meaning as well as the direct and literal Ωàhir mean­ ing. These multiple levels of meaning contain all truth for all time.96 Sharì'atì agrees with all other Muslim interpreters that the Qur "àn is the key to authentic Islamic revival as the only text that has been divinely

93

Ibid. Azzam Tamimi. 1998. “Democracy: The Religious and the Political in Contemporary Islamic Debate” Encounters, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1998, MSA Scholars Base, Internet, . 95 Kalim Siddiqui. 1996a. Stages of Islamic Revolution, p. 101. 96 Ali Shariati. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam, p. 72; Shariati. 1981. Man and Islam, p. 2. 94

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preserved from changes. Like other fundamentalists interpreters, Sharì'atì bases his reinterpretations of Islam mainly on the text of the Qur "àn rather than on studies of later commentators.97 Khomeinì argues for a Shì'ì fundamentalist view of the Qur "àn as a multilayered revelation some aspects of which may be understood by some, others which may never be understood. The real exponents of the Qur"àn’s meaning were the infallible Shì'ì Imàms, and today it is the Shì 'ì 'ulamà" who have the necessary expertise to interpret it. Khomeinì berates contemporary leftist-leaning unqualified interpreters of the Qur"àn (Sharì 'atì?), who manipulate its interpretation to further their evil designs by passing un-Islamic doctrines under an Islamic guise. It is best for the young and those who do not possess enough Islamic knowledge to refrain from interpreting the Qur"àn and spreading their wrong views and private judgments. Even experts, including Khomeinì himself, can only give one possible interpretation among many—so no one is allowed to claim “that the Qur"àn says so.” He goes on to say that: “When I explain any verse of the Qur"an, I do not claim that the verse means only what I say. I do not say anything for certain. I am hinting at a possibility only.”98 Mu˙ammad Bàqir al-Íadr, the Iraqi Shì'ite leader executed by Saddam Hussein, advocates the thematic approach to Scripture (al-ittijàh almawdù'ì ) as preferrable to the analytical approach (al-ittijàh al-tajzì'ì ). While accepting the necessitity of the analytical method of expounding the meaning of the Qur"ànic text verse by verse, he asserts it is limited by its piecemeal accumulation of data “which are disconnected and piled up in such a motley manner that it is not possible for us to iden­ tify the link existing between them or discover their pattern of arrange­ ment.” Al-Íadr recommends the thematic approach which relates the text to present realities and needs of society. Rather than being a pas­ sive and mute listener to the Qur "àn, the exegete using the thematic approach does so: As one entering a dialogue. In an inquisitive and contemplative spirit, he questions the Qur"an, beginning with the Qur"anic texts concern­ ing the subjects of his study . . . the results of the thematic tafsir are in constant link with human experience . . . thematic tafsir operates as a dialogue with the Qur"an by seeking replies from it . . . It is an active approach with the purpose of discovering truth from among the great truths of life from the Qur"an . . . This approach begins with reality

97 Shariati. 1979. p. 72; Shariati. 1981. p. 2; Shariati. 1986a. What is to be Done? pp. 67–77. 98 Ruhollah Khomeini. “Interpretation of Surah Al-Hamd” in Mutahhari, Tabatabai, & Khumayni. (nd). Light Within Me, pp. 121–123.

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  and ends in the Qur"an, in its capacity as a true source for deter­ mining the sacred outlook regarding that particular reality.99

Al-Íadr wants to use this method to “discover the Islamic standpoint, affirmative or negative . . . (which) when determined would enable us to solve the problems in diverse fields of human existence”.100 This is a modern attitude which wants to utilize Qur "ànic interpretation to define doctrinal and ideological standpoints on contemporary issues and use these to mobilize and galvanize believers into action. S  L God’s will for humanity is revealed in holy scripture—this is a basic presupposition of both fundamentalisms. Both would agree that it is man’s duty to obey God’s will as revealed in scripture, seeking to please God in all his thoughts and deeds, in his worldview and his lifestyle. The main differences revolve around the question of whether to view scripture as a detailed legal code of law, or rather as a set of general guiding moral principles. Islamic Views on Qur"àn as Law and on Sharì'a The accepted Muslim view, followed by most Islamic fundamentalists, is that while the Qur"àn enunciates the essential fundamentals of Islam, Qur"àn and Sunna together do constitute a detailed legal code of law, to be followed specifically by believers in its moral and ritual details as expounded in Sharì'a. The divergences among Islamists relate to the parameters of the use of ijtihàd, which ˙adìth to accept as reliable, and how literally to follow the injunctions of Sharì 'a. This is well demon­ strated in the contemporary differences in application and interpreta­ tion of Sharì'a by the ˇalibàn of Afghanistan in contrast to the Iranian and Saudi models. Each model has its specific priorities of literalist versus allegorical and moralist applications, its specific mixture of traditional and regional legal custom unconsciously accepted as part of the original Sharì'a and coloring its interpretation and application. This is best seen in the very different emphases on the status and role of women in society, as well as in the prescribed dress patterns, and extent of segregation, by the different movements, but is also true in all other areas well. Zebiri states that fundamentalists, like most Muslims, view Sharì'a as God’s revealed law for humanity. This transcendent ideal was once fully 99 Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr. “Thematic Approach to Qur’anic Exegesis”, AlTawhid, Rajab-Ramadan 1409, Vol. vi, No. 3, pp. 18–28. 100 Ibid.

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implemented in the exemplary Muslim society of the “golden age”, and ought to be fully implemented in contemporary societies. Most accept the traditional distinction between Sharì'a the ideal, and fiqh ( jurispru­ dence) as its human interpretation, and vehemently oppose the restric­ tion of Sharì'a by contemporary secularized regimes, as well as the Western-influenced constitutions of most Muslim states. Sharì'a also serves as an important identity marker: while others might also believe in God and his prophets, only Muslims possess Sharì'a. Islamists view the com­ prehensiveness of Sharì'a as a powerful symbol of a truly integrated soci­ ety, which contrasts starkly to the fragmentation characteristic of modern Western societies.101 Abu-Khalìl, an anti-fundamentalist Arab academic, states that mem­ bers of fundamentalist movements are expected to follow the particu­ lar interpretations of Sharì'a endorsed by their specific leaders. These leaders label other Muslims who do not share their view of Sharì'a, or who favor secular regimes not based exclusively on Sharì'a, as apostates and infidels. For instance, the influential mainstream Egyptian Islamic thinker, Mu˙ammad al-Ghazàlì, stunned secularists when he endorsed the assassination of Faraj Foda, claiming in court that Foda’s secular­ ist views made him automatically a murtadd (apostate).102 Al-Bannà" sees Qur"ànic law as erecting a “protective fence” around believers within which they can safely inculcate its principles. He lists twelve essentials including the five pillars, jihàd, the commanding of good and the forbidding of evil, the obtaining of education, good deportment and high moral values, care of physical health, and social solidarity. All these according to al-Bannà" are obligatory “for they have all been specified in the Noble Qur"an, and have been illustrated unequivocally in the deeds of the Prophet (May God bless and save him!) and his Companions and those who followed them in doing good, with sim­ plicity and clarity.” Al-Bannà" demands that legislation in Muslim states “must be derived from the prescriptions of the Islamic Sacred Law, drawn from the Noble Qur"an.”103 Qu†b defines Sharì'a as a comprehensive total system of law for human­ ity covering all spheres of human life and gleaned from Qur"àn and Sunna: The Shari'ah of God means everything that God has prescribed to order human life. This takes the form of the fundamentals of belief,

101 Kate Zebiri. 1998. “Muslim Anti-Secularist Discourse in the Context of MuslimChristian Relations”, pp. 52–53. 102 As'ad Abu-Khalil. 1994. “The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1994, p. 679. 103 Al-Banna, Hasan. 1978. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), pp. 15–17, 89.

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  the fundamentals of government, the fundamentals of behavior and the fundamentals of knowledge. It takes the form of legislative deci­ sions and it takes the form of principles of ethics and behavior. It takes the form of values and standards that rule society and by which peo­ ple, things and events are evaluated. Then it takes the form of knowl­ edge in all its aspects and of all the fundamental principles of intellectual and artistic activities.104

The usurping of God’s sovereignty and legislative authority is the great­ est sin of the modern world, both Western and Muslim, as only God, the absolute ruler of the universe, has the exclusive right and author­ ity to legislate for humanity. Man has no authority to make laws, only to interpret and apply God’s law. As man is involuntarily subject to God’s laws in nature, so he must voluntarily submit himself to God’s moral laws in Sharì 'a: “Sharì 'a is best because it comes from Allah.” True Islam means unquestioningly accepting Sharì'a, not by a process of comparison with other legal systems, but because it is Allah’s revealed will. Qu†b claims that God has ordained Sharì'a to establish harmony and equilibrium not just in human society but in the whole cosmos as well. Any group, society, or regime that fails to implement Sharì'a is to be declared apostate, and jihàd by force is legitimate in annihilating it and replacing it with a true Islamic society on the model of Medina under the Prophet. This radical political message has been a major inspiration to many modern Islamic fundamentalist movements.105 Christian Views of Bible as Law The Christian view of God’s revelation as law is more complex than the Islamic one, as it is tempered by the doctrine of salvation by faith as opposed to salvation by obedience to a written law. Most Christian fundamentalists would describe the Bible as God’s guidance to man, rather than God’s law. The legal parts of the Old Testament are gen­ erally divided into the ritual parts fulfilled by Christ and therefore not binding on believers today, and the moral part which is a revelation of God’s righteous and holy character, and as such eternal. Most would agree with Stott in his view of Old Testament law as our “ ‘pedago­ gos’, condemning and imprisoning us in sin, in order to lead us to Christ who alone can rescue us.”106

104

Qutb in Shepard, ed., 1996. p. 298. Qutb. 1990. pp. 30, 67–69, 107–108; Ronald Nettler. 1994. “A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb’s Introduction to the Tafsir, Fi Zilal Al-Qur’an”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1994. 106 Stott in Edwards & Stott. 1992. p. 336. 105

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Christian fundamentalists fall into the traditional Protestant divisions of those who stress that believers in Christ are free from the law as they are under grace, and those who stress the continuous validity of biblical law, even though believers have been freed from the eternal punishment for breaking its precepts. Many would accept the traditional differentiation between the Old Testament moral law which is eternally valid, and the ceremonial law which was fulfilled in Christ and there­ fore does not now apply to believers. On the whole, all fundamental­ ist Christian groups stress a more rigid moral value and behavioral system than other Christians. Even those stressing the rule of grace over law, and the believer’s freedom from the law (as do most dispensa­ tionalists), have a fairly well developed unwritten, yet socially binding and detailed code of behavior for their members, which they would claim is based on God’s will as revealed in scripture. The other point of discussion is whether the Scriptural law accepted to any extent by each group, is valid and binding only for believers, or is also binding on society in general. This has deep political implica­ tions, and is the defining difference between the passivist groups stress­ ing separation from the evil world which is under Satan’s rule, and the activists who stress God’s overall rule over the whole world and the need for believers to be involved in all areas of life so as to reclaim them for God and redeem them for his glory. The Reformed camp is the most articulate Christian fundamentalist wing on the subject of law and the nearest to Islamic perceptions. At the heart of the Bible, says Machen, are two great and inseparable truths—the majesty of God’s law, and sin as an offense against that law. God’s comprehensive law is grounded in the infinite perfection of God’s being: “It is a holy law, as God himself is holy.” Seen against the holiness of God’s law, the terrible evil of sin is revealed as an offense against the infinite God. The outstanding characteristic of our age is “a disbelief in anything that can be called a law of God and in particu­ lar a disbelief in anything that can be called sin.” The result is “the throwing off of restraint, the abandonment of standards, the return to barbarism” and the accelerated disintegration of society. Machen states that the central theme of the Bible is that God is the lawgiver and man owes obedience to his law: “The law of God is the background of every­ thing that the Bible says regarding the relations between God and man.” He quotes the Shorter Chatecism’s definition of sin: “Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God” and concludes that the ideas of law and of sin go together. Machen explains that while believers are not under the law’s curse and punishment, as Christ bore the law’s penalty for them, they are not free from obedience to God’s holy law. Rather, they have received new divine power to enable them to obey God’s commands in a way they could never have obeyed before. Machen concludes by stating that the Bible presents a majestic unitive view of the law of God:

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  One law over all—valid for Christians, valid for non-Christians, valid now and valid to all eternity . . . How grandly that law is promulgated amid the thunderings of Sinai! How much more grandly still and more terribly it is set forth in the teaching of Jesus—in His teaching and in His example! . . . it is written in the constitution of the universe, search­ ing the innermost recesses of the soul, embracing every idle word and every action and every secret thought of the heart, inescapable, allinclusive, holy, terrible.107

Schaeffer refers back to Samuel Rutherford and his Rex Lex as an exam­ ple of the biblical Reformation view of law upon which government in the United States was originally built, and which in North-European Reformation countries had for a while guaranteed a balance of freedom and form. Real law is not based on sociological statistics, but on the solid foundation of God’s revelation. Rutherford had claimed that because God had spoken, there was a base upon which to build law. Locke had secularized Rutherford’s Rex Lex, and the American Constitution actually rested on Rex Lex toned down through Locke.108 Packer argues that the Bible, as the ultimate source and criterion of truth, contains clear guidance on the kind of behavior that pleases God. This is found in the Ten Commandments, the moral teachings of the prophets and apostles, and in the teachings of Christ. This scriptural law is both revealed and rational, in harmony with the natural law of the universe and human nature. All humans have some knowledge of God’s laws as they are built into human nature and the cosmos. Human sin is a result of a willful suppression and distortion of this God-given knowledge.109 This view is very close to the Islamic concept of fitra. The Christians closest to the Islamic concept of Sharia are the Reconstructionists. While most reformed groups accept that Biblical law is still valid as a rule of life, though not as the way to salvation, Reconstructionists go further in their theonomic view of scripture (theon­ omy means God’s Law), seeing all of life constrained by detailed bib­ lical law valid for contemporary society. This law, as found in the Bible, has never been abolished as God’s standard of righteousness, is a descrip­ tion of God’s holy and righteous character, and is unchangeable. Christians are obliged to keep every Old Testament law unless the New Testament specifically indicates otherwise.110 The purpose of divine law is to pro­ vide a universal standard of behavior and obedience, and to maintain order in society, restraining and arresting civil evil (reminiscent of the 107

Machen. 1923. pp. 184–191. Schaeffer 1982. Volume Four, TCE, pp. 19–20. 109 Packer. 1998. Serving the People of God: Collected Shorter Writings of J.I. Packer, Vol. 2, pp. 365–368. 110 Greg L. Bahnsen. 1985. By This Standard: The Authority of God’s Law Today, pp. 2–5. 108

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Quranic maxim of “ordaining good and prohibiting evil”). Not just basic moral principles and guidelines are valid and binding, but also scrip­ tural case-law and all social rules. Reconstructionists agree that the cer­ emonial law centered on the Temple is fulfilled in Christ and not binding today, but all other laws pertaining to criminal justice, economics, soci­ ety, and civil authorities are binding today and must be applied not just by believing communities, but by the state itself.111 Roussas John Rushdoony, founder of Reconstructionism, argues that “lawless Christianity is a contradiction in terms: it is anti-Christian.” Rushdoony blames the antinomianism rampant in many churches for the contemporary breakdown of law and order in society. The purpose of God’s grace in Christ is to enable man to keep the law—the New Testament does not attack law, only legalism and a wrong interpreta­ tion and application of the law. Biblical law is not a way of salvation— that is provided by grace—but it is the way of a holy life—“it is God’s means of sanctification.” According to Rushdoony, all law is religious and the source of law in a given society—reason, mind, or God—is the god of that society. Biblical law is a covenant between God and man by which all of man’s life ought to be ordered, a pattern for man’s dominion in creation under God. Its purpose is the restitution of God’s order in creation. The Ten Commandments serve as the basic law, the core that declares the essential broad principles of God’s law, while other legal passages consist of case law which illustrates and interprets the basic principles in terms of specific cases.112 Rushdoony further argues that in contrast to polytheism which serves many gods and many laws, monotheism means “one God, one law.” Arguing in a way reminiscent of Islamic concepts of taw˙ìd, he claims that because God is one, truth is one, and the unity of the Godhead manifests itself in the unity and coherence of the law: “The law of God is essentially one word, a unified whole . . . one absolute, unchanging law” that requires “lone, total, unchanging, and unqualified obedience.” To have two laws would be to recognize two gods—the Bible however recog­ nizes only one Law revealed by the One God “to the patriarchs and Moses, and expounded by prophets, Jesus Christ, and the apostles.”113 Reconstructionists believe that the whole Bible is the believer’s guide in every area of life—“from personal holiness to civil righteousness.” God’s law as found in the whole Bible is still valid today: Jesus satisfied the requirements of the law in the sinner’s place and only brought about a change in those laws that had specific reference

111 Sandlin. “The Creed of Christian Reconstructionism”, Chalcedon, Internet, . 112 John Roussas Rushdoony. 1973. The Institutes of Biblical Law, pp. 4–14, 302–307. 113 Ibid., pp. 18–20, 679.

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to the redemptive work of Christ and those institutions and ceremonies that were specifically designed to keep Israel a separate people and nation. The law as a blueprint for personal, familial, ecclesiastical, and civil righteousness was not abrogated by the work of Christ. This is the Calvinistic tradition . . .114

Biblical law is based on the whole Bible and is necessary to the build­ ing of a Christian world as it contains God’s permanent moral and institutional blueprint: “Biblical law is Christianity’s tool of dominion.” The civil laws of the Old Testament apply not just to historical Israel, but to all nations today. The coming of Jesus did not alter the applic­ ability of these laws, except for the few specifically abrogated by New Testament revelation.115 The New Testament serves as the interpreta­ tive guide in determining how to apply these abiding laws: The precepts of God’s law (prior to Moses, the Mosaic legislation, the wisdom literature, the prophets, the ministry of Christ in the gospels, and the remainder of the New Testament) are morally obligatory for all men in all ages to obey.116

C There are remarkable resemblances in the description and definitions of holy scriptures between the two fundamentalisms. Both stress the necessity of divine self-revelation in scripture to meet finite man’s need for true knowledge of God and for guidance in all areas of life. Both camps also agree on describing scriptures as inspired, perfect, infallible and unchanging, reliable, divinely preserved, and applicable for all times and places. Differences arise on the question of the human element in revelation. While most Christians attribute the divine inerrancy only to the original manuscripts, present-day copies and translations being reasonably reli­ able versions of the original, Islamists attribute absolute inerrancy and perfection to the copies of Qur"àn in their hands today. Islamic fundamen­ talists stress the traditional Muslim view of the Qur "àn as handed down from heaven as a perfect counterpart of the heavenly version. Another difference is that while Christian fundamentalists regard only the Bible as inspired scripture, most Islamists include ˙ad˙ and sìra with the Qur"àn in this category. However, they have a somewhat different stand on ˙adìth, arguing for a divine overruling over the human compilation of ˙adìth,

114 115 116

North. 1991. p. 151.

Ibid., pp. 43, 51, 160.

Ibid., p. 87.

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so that it is perfectly trustworthy in its totality. Christians stress in var­ ious degrees the overruling of divine inspiration over the human element of the scriptures, God using the human author’s personality, environ­ ment, and context, yet assuring the perfect inerrancy of what they wrote down. There is actually a similarity in the Christian views on the Bible with the Islamic views on ˙adìth, as both acknowledge a co-mingling of the human and the divine, and postulate a divine overruling of the process of compilation and an ongoing divine preservation. Fundamentalists in both camps agree that divinely revealed scripture is the ultimate absolute authority for all life and practice, the absolute moral standard, and the sole criterion of good and evil. For Christian fundamentalists, this acceptance of the final authority of scripture is what sets them apart from other Christians who include other sources of authority or deny any whatsoever. For Muslims again this is a stand that characterizes a much wider camp than fundamentalism. For most Muslims, not only fundamentalists, the Qur"àn is axiomati­ cally God’s Word, and there is no need for much discussion on the subject. Among Christian fundamentalists however, the question of scrip­ tural inerrancy has become a main watershed differentiating between true believers and all others as the reliability of scripture has been under consistent attack by liberal scholarship for over a century. Both camps stress the importance of the right attitude of faith, sub­ mission, and humility in man’s approach to scripture, coupled to a will­ ingness to implement truth as soon as it is understood. Both also stress the right of every believer to interpret scripture without the need for professional intermediaries. As to the interpretation of scripture, there is some agreement in stressing the importance of the literal meaning as against allegorical and mystical interpretations, and agreement too on the importance of the method of interpreting scripture by scripture. In both camps there are differences between strict literalists and those accepting a more flexible method of interpretation that takes into account literary forms such as allegory, simile, eschatology, and poetry. Finally there is some agreement on viewing scripture as containing God’s laws and moral precepts. Islamists strongly stress scriptural law, Shar ì 'a, as a total and complete system of law binding on individuals, society and the state in all its details. Christian fundamentalists tend to argue more among themselves as to the extent of scriptural law, some stressing grace and freedom as against law, viewing scripture mainly as a source of broad moral guidelines, others accepting the whole Bible as God’s law valid in many of its detailed instructions for the contem­ porary world.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ATTITUDES TO RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE STATE I The resurgence of religion in the political arena is a fact of the late 20th century, and as a result fundamentalisms and politics is the theme most widely dealt with in the academic world, generating a vast body of literature on this topic. Most observers stress the activism of fundamentalists in the political process. All over the contemporary world revolutionary sentiments tend to be cultivated mainly in religious communities, and radical religious movements are active in forging powerful links to resurgent national­ isms in many contemporary societies, thus maximizing their impact on politics.1 All fundamentalisms believe in attaining a partial redemption through this-worldly activism, harboring political as well as religious aims, seek­ ing to transform or replace existing political systems in order to bring them into conformity with their ideals.2 Fundamentalisms concentrate their attention and activity on two main areas: politics and the family, both of which they attempt to reformulate and reorganize.3 Some observers note that Islamic fundamentalism is more involved in politi­ cal activities than Christian fundamentalism.4 This however is more a question of differences in weighting, as both fundamentalisms include apolitical groups and a varied spectrum of political involvement. Fundamentalists view politics as based on several main themes related to their goal of a God-centered and God-guided community:

1 William R. Garret. “Religion and the Legitimation of Violence”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 109–112; See also Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, pp. 39–41. Juergensmeyer views religious fundamentalisms as inherently national­ ist, labeling them “religious nationalisms,” the polar opposite to “secular nation­ alisms”, ignoring the universalistic tendencies of fundamentalisms. 2 Mary Elaine Hegland. “Conclusion: Religious Resurgence in Today’s World” in Antoun & Hegland, eds., 1987. Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism, p. 248. 3 Shahin Gerami. 1996. Women and Fundamentalism: Islam and Christianity, p. 27. 4 William Shepard. “Fundamentalism’ Christian And Islamic”, Religion, Vol. 17, 1987, p. 364; Also Gabriel Ben-Dor. 1997. “The Uniquenss of Islamic Fundamen­ talism”, in Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, eds., Islamic Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, p. 245.

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The first theme is the recognition of an ultimate higher divine author­ ity and sovereignty to which all human institutions are accountable. Any human authority, whether personal or institutional, is a delegated author­ ity and therefore accountable to God, limited by him in its scope, and to be exercised within the specific parameters set out for it in revela­ tion. Delegated authority and sovereignty are not independent or auto­ nomous, but bound by the revealed principles for their operation and by the divine code of values and morals—the divine law, in contradic­ tion of which they may neither legislate nor act. Another basic theme is the fundamentalist understanding of what the sacred scriptures prescribe in terms of politics, state structures and insti­ tutions. Does scripture endorse the political activity of the believer and his involvement in government? There is a divergence between passivist and activist views. Mumtaz studies the interesting phenomenon of the apolitical Islamic Tablìghì Jamà'atì which seeks to Islamize society exclu­ sively through the education and reform of individuals.5 However polit­ ical passivity is much more widespread among Christian fundamentalist groups. Is there a divinely prescribed relationship between religion and state? If so, is there a divine blueprint for a specific legitimate form of state, government, constitution and state law, or are there rather basic pri­ mary principles that can be flexibly applied to modern contexts? Are the principles of modern secular democracy compatible with the fun­ damentalist political system as mandated by scripture, and if so, to what extent? There are many divergent views on these issues. All funda­ mentalists posit that human political authority must be rooted in God as the ultimate sovereign holder of all true authority, emanate from him, and be accountable to him in order to be legitimate. Fundamentalists assert that all power is God’s and that every holder of power is respon­ sible to God. While most Christian fundamentalists accept that all polit­ ical power is ordained of God and therefore believers must obey governments in all circumstances except when clearly commanded to disobey God’s will, Islamic fundamentalists tend to the view that any government that does not rule by God’s Sharì'a alone is illegitimate to some extent.6 Islamic fundamentalists, with very few exceptions, are on the whole also agreed that the sources prescribe the unity of state and religion, the setting up of an Islamic state, and the paramount importance of the believer’s political involvement, but are divided as to the form of 5 Mumtaz Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia”, in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 517–520. 6 Ann K.S. Lambton. 1989. “The Clash of Civilizations: Authority, Legitimacy and Perfectibility”, in Robert M. Burrel, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 36–37, 46–47.

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 

the Islamic state prescribed. Is it a khilàfa imitating the original model with huge powers given to the khalìfa, or is it a flexible reinterpretation of the original with some characteristics of a modern democratic system? Christians face the divergence between the Old Testament theocratic covenant model and the absence of any political recommendations in the New Testament. Some posit the Old Testament model as applica­ ble today to some extent while others hold that the apolitical New Testament stand supersedes the Old Testament model. As to the question of the legal system in the state, the debate is on whether scriptural law is to be applied to believers only or to all of society, whether it is fully binding today or only in its broad moral aspects, whether it is to be fully implemented in every detail, or whether the state legal system should be based on a flexible reinterpretation and reapplication of essential scriptural legal principles. Muslim fundamen­ talists mainly support the unequivocal implementation of Sharia while discussing what it really is, what its implementation really means, and the need for ongoing ijtihàd to adapt it to modern contexts. Christian fundamentalists diverge more from each other on the issue, as they face the dichotomy of freedom from the law by God’s grace while submit­ ting to the law of Christ, as well as the Old Testament system of laws applying to the state and the absence of any such laws in the New Testament. Their views on this subject range from the Reconstructionist theonomist aim of a total application of all Biblical (including Mosaic) law, through the more general aim of constituting Biblical moral law (i.e. the Ten Commandments) as the basis of the state legal system, to the separatist stand of total uninvolvement in state politics and legal systems. Another theme is the fundamentalist belief in a historical “Golden Age” that serves as a model for all times and is to be reconstructed, replicated, or at least have its basic principles reapplied today. Whilst not many believe in a literalist total imitation of the original political structure and system, most do want to reapply its basic principles and spirit to modern situations. This view of the ideal, God pleasing king­ dom on earth looks back to the original golden age or to several such ages in the past as well as looking forward to the eschatological fulfillment of God’s kingdom on earth in the future as foreseen by the religion’s scriptures. The juxtaposition of God’s ideal against the present evil real­ ity explains much of fundamentalism’s radicalism and revolutionary zeal. Muslims of course have an original Islamic state polity to look back to as set up by the Prophet himself in Medinah and further developed by the Ràshidùn Caliphs. For Christians the situation is more complex as Christ and the Apostles never assumed political power nor sought for it, so there is no original state model to look back to. Some look back to the Old Testament paradigm of God’s rule over his covenant people, others to the New Testament acknowledgment of Christ as King

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of Kings and Lord of Lords, with his kingdom both within us now and yet to come fully in the future. Also the Bible, especially in the Old Testament, has many texts implying God’s will for a just political and social system. This complexity is expressed in the great divergence between the Anabaptist apolitical separatist stand that endorses the sep­ aration of religion from state as in accordance with God’s will and as a guarantee of true religious freedom, and the Reformed stand that seeks a theocratic system in which religion imposes at least the consti­ tutional and legal systems on the political structure. Finally there is the search for the appropriate ways and means of implementing the vision. This includes the means for recruiting and mobilizing believers and getting them organized effectively to achieve the goals of the political vision. Here we find the perennial controversy between the top-down and the bottom-up theories: should a few con­ vinced believers, acting as a vanguard, first seize power in the state by force and impose their vision and structures on state and society, or should they first transform individuals in society, organize them into party-like structures, infiltrate civil society, and eventually take over gov­ ernment in a democratic way by sheer weight of numbers? A  G   P P One characteristic of most fundamentalist Christian thinking on gov­ ernment is that all civil government is ordained by God and therefore in principle is to be obeyed regardless of what form of government it is. This stand is nearer the traditional Sunni Muslim teaching than the Islamic fundamentalist one which views most contemporary governments, especially the secular ones, as corrupt and at least as potentially ille­ gitimate. Christian fundamentalists all agree that there is a line where civil disobedience is justified, but diverge on where to draw this line and on what form civil disobedience takes. On the Islamic side most fundamentalists agree that God has revealed the basis of the ideal Islamic state in Qur"àn and Sunna, and most agree that God’s sovereignty (˙àkimìyya), his Unity (taw˙ìd ), and man’s viceregency (khilàfa) are part of this God-given design. Governments that do not comply with this model are corrupt, but there are various views as to how to deal with them, ranging from pietist non-participation in politics, through active participation in the political process so as to gradually transform them from within and from below into the Godwilled pattern, to the position advocating their violent overthrow by a dedicated vanguard.

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  Separatist-Pietist Views

Separatist-pietists have a pessimistic view of the world as corrupted by sin, awaiting judgment, and irredeemable except for a future direct inter­ vention by God. The world is in fact enemy territory in which believ­ ers are pilgrims sent to save individuals and perfect themselves through suffering. Politics especially is suspect as the realm where human lust for power corrupts all who come near it. While God overrules man’s evil to consummate his plan for the world, human politics will never usher in utopia. The world situation is bound to get worse as the escha­ tological end of time approaches, and the signs of the time are clearly visible to those who can discern them. Believers ought not to interfere in politics, but to concentrate on converting sinners, purifying them­ selves, doing good, and building up God’s holy community. At the same time believers are called to be exemplary law abiding citizens. The separatist-pietist view is that religion and politics don’t mix. As Christ proclaimed that his kingdom is not of this world, believers must see themselves primarily as citizens of heaven and only pilgrims on this earth, their main concern in life being “not to improve the world, but to see man saved out of it.” Influencing society by means of legislation is not the responsibility of believers. Politics are corrupt “by their very nature,” so it is best for believers to separate themselves by not par­ ticipating in the political process in any way.7 At the same time, MacDonald states that all civil government is ordained by God to avert chaos and promote the common good of society. For this reason God has given governments the authority to judge criminal matters and punish offenders: In every orderly society there must be authority and submission to that authority. Otherwise you have a state of anarchy, and you can­ not survive indefinitely under anarchy. Any government is better than no government. So God has instituted human government, and no government exists apart from His will.8

God commands Christians to submit to the authority of the state, respect its offices, and never rebel against it. At the most, Christians can engage in passive resistance by disobeying state demands that clearly contra­ dict God’s commands, accompanied by the willingness to suffer the con­ sequences of their stand including martyrdom, following the example of the first-century Christians under the Roman Empire.9 This does not mean that God approves of all that rulers do as he opposes corruption, brutality, and tyranny. However, the fact remains 7 8 9

William MacDonald. 1990. Believer’s Bible Commentary: New Testament, pp. 958–959.

Ibid., pp. 416, 548–549.

Ibid., pp. 416, 548–549.

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that the authorities that exist are appointed by God and believers are to be loyal, law-abiding citizens who pay their taxes and honor those in rule. At the same time, believers are not to participate in the polit­ ical process and are not to take part in elections, as their call is to con­ centrate on propagating the gospel which is the real solution to man’s problems. MacDonald argues that “The only ideal government is a beneficent monarchy with the Lord Jesus Christ as King” which will only exist following the Second Coming of Christ. In the meantime, believers can live by biblical principles under any regime—democracy, monarchy, or dictatorship.10 In contrast to most other Islamic fundamentalist groups, and similar to the pietistic separatist Christian fundamentalists, Tablìghì Jamà'atì takes an apolitical stand claiming that true religion can only be exercised when free from political involvement. Politics is inherently corrupt and corrupting, and whoever gets involved in politics compromises his moral values. Tablìghì Jamà'atì sees its main goal as widely preaching the mes­ sage of Islam so as to reawaken the spiritual consciousness of Muslim individuals everywhere. True Islamization of society is achieved through the education and reform of individuals.11 Farid Esack, who was a member of Tablìghì Jamà'atì for ten years stresses that it is a revivalist movement that avoids all political involvement.12 Anìs Shivàni, a Tablìghì student leader in America, states that as the malaise of the umma is moral and spiritual deviancy, only a spir­ itual cure can help. Legal, social and political reforms are of no use unless preceded by true spiritual revival: The tablighi jama‘at feels that it is people’s hearts which must be won, and that the politics or the governance of different Islamic countries will take care of itself once enough people from the masses truly under­ stand and practise Islam with sincerity. The tablighi jama‘at, there­ fore, does not believe in forceful imposition of Islam from above, or taking over the leadership of Islamic countries in the short-term, as solutions to the problems of the ummah.13

Reluctant Participation in the Political Process This type of thinking is found mainly in the Christian fundamentalist camp. Here are found mainly the broader dispensationalist evangelical

10

Ibid., pp. 416, 548–549. Ahmad, M. in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1991. pp. 517–520. 12 Farid Esack. 1999. On Being a Muslim, p. 198, note 3. See also p. 148 where he states that he “loved his ten years in the Tablighi Jama'ah . . .”. 13 Anis Shivani. “Jama'at-e-Tabligh”, MSANEWS, 30,9,1997, Internet, . 11

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voices who prioritize church and gospel as the believer’s main field of service, but are willing to concede some space for political involvement in the hope of influencing government policies and legislation in the direction of biblical values. Norman L. Geisler represents this stand which accepts that believers should attempt to influence legislation by participating to some extent in the political process, especially in democratic societies. Geisler states that as government is not based on special biblical revelation, but on God’s general revelation to all men (which includes civil law based on natural moral law), civil governments are not obliged to follow bibli­ cally revealed law, but only natural law. This “natural law theory” assumes that man has an innate quality of reason which enables him to perceive and live by self-evident truths manifested in nature and conscience.14 Like other evangelicals, Geisler accepts that all Government is ordained of God and that civil government has God’s authority to rule with the right to use force to suppress evil. Although there were a variety of specific government forms in the Old Testament, the basic principle confirmed in the New Testament is that all government is of God who sovereignly gives it to whom he wills. It follows that “to dis­ obey government is to disobey God.”15 Independent Baptists restate the separatist New Testament view of believers as citizens of another world passing through enemy territory, and reiterate the generally accepted biblical position that all govern­ ment is instituted by God and that it is the duty of every Christian to obey it as a good citizen. The biblical code of conduct for believers in this world is to “live as obedient citizens paying taxes, willingly obey the laws of the land, and maintain a respectful spirit toward those in authority.”16 This stand can be summarized by three biblical principles governing the relationship of believers to government: (1) Human government is a divine institution derived from God, the source of all authority and power, appointed and constituted by him. The governed ought to submit to this God-given authority, and resis­ tance to governments is synonymous to rebellion against God. While the man in office cannot always be respected, the office itself is to be respected as ordained by God. However, there is one important caveat: When there is a conflict between the requirements of men and the commandments of God . . . if the civil power commands us to violate

14 Norman Geisler. “Dispensational Premillenial View of Law and Government” in Anderson J. Kerby, ed., 1990. Living Ethically in the 90s, p. 157. 15 Geisler. 1990. Christian Ethics, pp. 216–217. 16 Dean Robinson. “Christian Citizenship” in Topical Index of Baptist Doctrine, Internet, . Dean Robinson is assistant editor of the Plains Baptist Challenger.

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the law of God, we must always obey God before men. ‘We ought to obey God rather than men’ (Acts 5:29) . . . the Bible does not teach passive obedience or non-resistance when the Word of God is at stake. We must never allow the law to make us disobey God’s word.17

(2) Submission to government authority is God’s way of preserving society, so no one is exempt from submission or permitted to break the law. The biblical pattern is that all citizens obey their rulers, just as wives ought to obey their husbands, children their parents, employees their employers, and church members their spiritual leaders. God’s pur­ pose for government is that it protect and promote the good in soci­ ety while restraining and punishing evil. This is very close to the Islamic concept of “commanding good and restraining evil.” (3) Christians should be loyal citizens, obeying the government not out of fear of punishment, but because their conscience motivates them to submit to God’s will. It is the duty of all Christians to pay their taxes, support the needs of government, and vote in elections.18 Eager Participation in the Political Process This cluster of movements assumes that as God’s purpose for govern­ ments is that they function for the general welfare of society, believers must be politically engaged in implementing religious concepts of jus­ tice and compassion. Social activism and political involvement are Godgiven tools for dealing with the manifest ills of human society, and believers as good citizens must be involved in all aspects of government so as to ensure the implementation of the divine principle of reward­ ing good behavior and punishing evil. On the Christian side, Stott defines politics as “the art of living together in a community,” concerned with the whole of human life in society. He argues that the political and social involvement of Christians is vitally important despite the hostility in some Evangelical circles to political involvement. Stott realizes that many accept the necessity of social work but reject political activity, fearing the politicization of the church. As citizens, Christians should vote, inform themselves about contemporary issues, and share in the public debate. Christians inter­ ested in specific moral or social concerns should form groups, study the issues, and take appropriate action. Some Christians might be called by God to devote their lives to political service.19 Franky Schaeffer argues strongly against the view that there are areas of life such as politics in which believers should not be involved. Christians

17 18 19

Ibid.

Ibid.

John Stott. 1984. Issues Facing Christians Today, pp. 10–14.

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must act decisively in all areas, including politics, so as to change the status quo: The status quo, the reign of the devil, is what Christ came to redeem. To speak of a gospel that does not have political implications or a Bible whose laws do not apply to the modern world subverts the entire thrust of Christianity, which is to reclaim for God what has been lost through man’s disobedience.20

Jerry Falwell stresses that the moral crisis in America necessitates Christian involvement in politics, for: “Our very moral existence as a nation is at stake.” Christians must mobilize masses of concerned citi­ zens to reverse the politicization of immorality in society. Politics is sim­ ply the implementation of the social process, and it is wrong for Christians to divorce themselves from society and shut themselves in the isola­ tionism “that characterized the medieval hermits.” Even though he defines himself as “a fundamental, independent, separatist Baptist” who accepts the imperative of separation in the personal and ecclesi­ astical spheres, Falwell is convinced of the need for a coalition of Godfearing, moral Americans representing their convictions to government.21 On the Reconstructionist side, Rushdoony sees God’s government as mediated through human institutions such as family, church, school, and state. While marred by sin, these institutions still reflect God’s gov­ ernment of the world and rightly demand obedience. “The state is the state, created and destined to be a part of God’s Kingdom, called to magnify God by enforcing his law-order, and it therefore cannot be despised, however ungodly the rulers of it may be.” The state repre­ sents God’s ministry of justice, and its main duty is to further the King­ dom of God by recognizing God’s sovereignty and implementing revealed law. The state and everything in it ought to be Christian. The church has tragically surrendered the state to apostate rational humanism, imply­ ing that God is dead outside the church walls. Rushdoony argues that the essence of humanism is a system in which man is his own God, the state is not part of God’s Kingdom, and the concept of sin as an offense against God’s rule has vanished.22 Reconstructionists view the state as obliged to keep God’s biblically revealed law. While many Christian fundamentalists equate the Church with God’s Kingdom, Reconstructionists claim to go back to the Reformation definition of the institutional church as narrower than God’s world-encompassing kingdom. God is building both church and kingdom—but they are not identical. The kingdom is the “civilization of

20 21 22

Franky Schaeffer. 1982. A Time for Anger: The Myth of Neutrality, p. 137.

Jerry Falwell. 1980. Listen, America! pp. 255–257.

John Roussas Rushdoony. 1973. The Institutes of Biblical Law, pp. 238–241.

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God, the whole world of Christian service.” While the church is the community of believers. The church ought to be separate from the world, the kingdom is not. “Separating the kingdom from the world leads to the surrender of the world to Satan’s kingdom”. Satan’s king­ dom is illegitimate, and it is the duty of true Christians to roll it back in all areas including that of politics and the state.23 North sees politics as a legitimate sphere of activity for the believer: The civil magistrate brings God’s negative sanctions in history. In a democratic society, voters bring negative sanctions against civil mag­ istrates . . . Thus, politics begins with the individual citizen who is covenanted in a political order under God. He governs himself, and then he executes judgment through politics. Politics is the means of establishing and controlling civil government.24

Biblical law contains God’s permanent moral and institutional blueprint and it must be applied in government as well as in all other spheres of human life. God commands Christians to discipline the nations by reclaiming the political realm, assuming political responsibility, and imposing sanctions in terms of God’s Bible-revealed law. As Christ is “King of Kings and Lord of Lords” holding all authority, all political leaders are directly responsible to him and should “seek the direction of Scripture in framing their political positions and programs”. Obedience to God’s law also keeps rulers from becoming “proud, arrogant, and oppressive.”25 For Reconstructionists, lawful government is based on the biblical theme of covenant with its structure of conditional obligations and rights, and that covenant is the criterion by which to measure the state’s com­ pliance to God’s will. Central to the covenant model are the sovereignty and rule of God—“He is in charge; there are no other Gods before Him.” Man ought to worship, submit, and serve God alone, attitudes manifested by obeying his commandments, and rewarded by God’s bless­ ing and protection. Christians are called by God to exercise dominion in every area of life, taking possession of it in terms of God’s covenan­ tal principles. This is accomplished by first reconstructing their own lives, families, and churches and then leading society in a moral reconstruction.26 North’s views are quite similar to Qu†b’s concepts on God’s sovereign rule (˙àkimìyya and rabbànìyya), as well as his views on jàhilìyya and separation.

23 Gary North & Gary DeMar. 1991. Christian Reconstruction: What it is, What it isn’t, pp. 27–29. 24 Ibid., p. 44. 25 Ibid., pp. 51, 125–126. 26 Ibid., pp. 52, 56–59.

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Reconstructionists do make a distinction between religious and civil institutional authorities, each having its own office and sphere of legit­ imate authority, yet both under God and under obligation to proclaim and enforce his law. “The church is not under the State; neither is the State under the church. Both are under God”. The State is therefore not monolithic and monopolistic, but “only one legitimate government among many other governments.” This decentralized social order is the basis for a free and orderly society. Reconstructionists call for a mini­ malist state that does not get involved in education or welfare, but leaves these spheres and many others to other autonomous institutions such as the family and the church.27 In his plea for a minimalist state North looks back to Old Testament models of separate priesthood and Kingship as well as at the role of the prophets, and argues that: The Bible outlines a decentralized social order where power is diffused and the potential for corruption and tyranny are minimized. Freedom is enhanced because of the diluted strength of the one by the main­ tenance of the many. The biblical social order is utterly hostile to the pyramid society . . . It is made up of multiple Institutional arrange­ ments, each with its own legitimate, limited, and derivative sovereignty under God’s universal law. Second, each institution possesses a hier­ archical chain of command, but these chains of command are essen­ tially appeal courts—“bottom up” institutions—with the primary duty of responsible action placed on people occupying the lower rungs of authority. Third, no single institution has absolute and final authority in any instance; appeal can be made to other sovereign agents of godly judgment. Since no society can attain perfection, there will be instances of injustice, but the social goal is harmony under biblical law, in terms of an orthodox creed. God will judge all men perfectly. The State need not seek perfect justice, nor should citizens be taxed at the astro­ nomical rates necessary to sustain the quest for perfect justice.28

On the radical fringes of the Christian right, the claim is made that freedom can only be maintained by having state political institutions based on “faith in God and belief in the existence of moral law.” The constitution of the United States is seen as being written by men under the inspiration of God, guaranteeing men’s inalienable rights, express­ ing eternal moral laws, and limiting government claims on the individ­ ual. The goal of these movements is to use involvement in the political process to undo the harm done by the liberal ruling elites and return the United States back to its Christian origins.29 27

Ibid., pp. 59, 82, 92. North. 1985. Moses and Pharaoh: Dominion Religion Versus Power Religion, pp. 211–212. 29 Independent American Party, “Principles”, Internet, . 28

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On the Islamic Shì 'ì side, Khomeinì claims that the “Governance of the Jurisprudent” is axiomatic, “a clear scientific idea that requires no proof ”. The Islamic Government, based on God as sole ruler and leg­ islator and on his revelation is not despotic but constitutional, in that rulers are limited by conditions laid down in Qur"àn and Sunna. An Islamic state can be implemented in a parliamentary system, with the caveat that while in Western systems the people’s representatives cod­ ify and legislate, in the Islamic system “the power of legislation is confined to God,” so parliament, rather than legislating, supervises the executive branch of government including its various ministries and the services they offer the public.30 On the Sunni side Mawdùdì states that the Islamic political system is based on three principles: taw˙ìd (the unity of God), risàla (prophethood), and khilàfa (vice-regency). Taw˙ìd means that all sovereignty belongs to God alone and His commandments constitute the law of Islam and the state. Human beings have no legal or political sovereignty. Prophethood is the medium through which God’s law has been received, bequeath­ ing two authoritative sources: the Qur "àn, in which God laid down broad principles to govern human life, and the Sunna, based on the details Mu˙ammad’s life, as the authoritative model for interpreting Qur "ànic principles. The combination of these two sources is Sharì 'a. Man as God’s khalìfa (vice-regent) has certain limited specific powers delegated to him which constitute the framework of the political entity. Political power is a trust from God, and political leaders are accountable to Him. A state established in accordance with this political theory—accepting God’s sovereignty, governing according to God’s commandments, and keeping God’s prescribed limits—“will in fact be a caliphate under the sovereignty of God.”31 According to Mawdùdì, the Islamic state has three main character­ istics: (a) God’s sovereignty, meaning that all are subjects of the one sovereign God and no person or group have any sovereignty of their own. (b) God is the only lawgiver with the absolute right to legislate. Humans cannot modify God’s laws nor invent their own. (c) The Islamic state must be based on God’s Sharì 'a. A government can expect obe­ dience from its citizens only as long as it enforces God’s laws.32 Mawdùdì posits four sources for the “unwritten Islamic Constitution” of the Islamic state: Qur"àn, Sunna, the conventions of the Ràshidùn Caliphate, and the “rulings of the Great Jurists.” The first three are to be accepted

30

Ruhollah Khomeini. in Donohue & Esposito, eds., 1982. Islam in Transition, pp. 314–318. 31 Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1996. Human Rights in Islam, pp. 9–10. 32 Mawdudi. “Political Theory of Islam” in Khurshid Ahmad, ed., 1976. Islam: Its Meaning and Message, pp. 158–159.

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unconditionally, while the fourth source, though not conclusive, con­ tains the “best guidance for proper understanding of the spirit and prin­ ciples of Islamic Constitution.”33 Mawdùdì argues that God’s absolute de facto sovereignty is “inherent and manifest in the entire universe,” while his de jure sovereignty was physically manifested by the Prophet who acted as God’s mouthpiece. Human political leadership is legitimate only as representative of God’s sovereignty: Whatever human agency is constituted to enforce the political system of Islam in a state, will not possess real sovereignty in the legal or political sense of the term because not only that it does not possess de jure sovereignty but also that its powers are limited and circumscribed by a supreme law which it can neither alter not interfere with . . . The term used by the Qur"an, for this agency is ‘Khilafah’ which means that such an agency is not sovereign in itself but is the vice-regent of the de jure and de facto sovereign, viz, Allah Almighty.34

Vice-regency (khilàfa), is not to be equated with the tyrannical divine right of kings in European history. Rather, it is a democratic concept involving all people, the collective right of all those who accept Allah’s absolute sovereignty and adopt the Divine Code as the “law above all laws and regulations”. The Islamic khilàfa is the antithesis to the Theocratic, the Monarchical and the Papal forms of government.35 In this sense it is a real democracy in which government is limited both by the bound­ aries imposed by Sharì'a and by the fact that it can be changed by the will of the voters. Mawdùdì’s concept of the Islamic state has similarities to modern Western political systems with their separation of powers between the three organs of government. He interprets the model of the Ràshidùn Caliphate as an Islamic state with a supreme head of state who over­ sees the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The executive works directly under the Supreme Head carrying out the administration of the state. The legislature legislates within the limits imposed by Sharì'a, and is also the body which the Head must consult with in all important matters. The judiciary is responsible for applying Sharì'a equitably to all. This basic system is inviolable, although it may be amended in some details to suit contemporary situations.36 Mawdùdì uses the term “democracy” to describe the Islamic politi­ cal system, and he argues for the independence of the judiciary who

33 34 35 36

Mawdudi. 1994. The Islamic State, p. 5.

Ibid., pp. 13–14.

Ibid., pp. 14–15.

Ibid., pp. 19–20.

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are not under the control of the executive, and for certain limits to the authority of the Amìr.37 At the same time, Mawdùdì argues that the ideal model of the Ràshidùn is not identical to any modern form of gov­ ernment in spite of some similarities. In that model, the Amìr was the only one to whom loyalty was due, he attended the council, presided over all its meetings, and all council members were his party. This not so democratic model is the ideal Muslims should aspire to, but it can only be achieved when society has for some time been able to develop “in accordance with all the revolutionary teachings of Islam.”38 Qu†b bases the Islamic state on the principle that all authority belongs to God alone, who exercises his sovereignty (˙àkimìyya) by establishing a political system (manhaj ) based on Sharì'a. The Islamic system is fun­ damentally different from all human systems of government and it is forbidden to mix Islam with any human system: In the Islamic system, nobody is associated with God, neither in His will and determination nor in His Shari'ah and His program (manhaj ). Any other theory would be idolatry (shirk) and unbelief (kufr). Therefore, it is not possible for humans to set up systems of government with laws and ordinances on their own authority, for to do this is to reject the divinity of God and at the same time claim the characteristics of divinity for themselves, and this is clear unbelief (kufr).39

Qu†b claims that the Islamic system is based on two fundamental ideas, the unity of the human race, and Islam as the God-willed world-wide system of government. Islamic government is based “on justice on the part of the rulers, obedience on the part of the ruled, and consulta­ tion between rulers and ruled.” These broad principles characterize all institutions of Islamic government. The criteria for evaluating any government that claims to be Islamic are God’s sovereignty and the implementation of Sharì 'a. Any government that is not based on God’s sole sovereignty and that does not enforce Sharì'a is un-Islamic, even if it bears the name “Islamic”.40 Omar Bakri Mu˙ammad, leader of al-Muhàjirùn, views khilàfa as the leadership of the whole Muslim umma whose role is to establish Sharì'a and to spread Islam to all the world. The appointment of a khalìfa and the establishment of the khilàfa state is an obligation ( far∂ ) prescribed by God for all Muslims, and to refrain from its implementation is a great sin. Khilàfa is a contract between the khalìfa and all Muslims, cemented by the oath of allegiance (bay'a) given by the people to the 37

Mawdudi. 1986a. The Islamic Way of Life, pp. 31–35. Mawdudi. 1994. pp. 29–30. 39 Sayyid Qutb. “Social Justice in Islam” in Shepard, ed., 1996. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, pp. 111–112. 40 Ibid., pp. 109–115. 38

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leader. It is thus the people (all Muslims) who appoint him and give him his authority, and no one can be head of the Islamic state if not duly appointed by them. Mu˙ammad adds that the Islamic system is based on four principles: sovereignty belongs to the Sharì'a, not to the people; authority belongs to the people (umma); the appointment of a khalìfa is an obligation on all Muslims; and only the khalìfa has the right to enact the divine rules (à˙kàm) which are part of the state’s constitu­ tion and legal system.41 Isràr A˙mad of the Pakistani ˇanΩìm-i Islàmi argues that while all modern forms of government are permissible as long as they implement Sharì'a principles, the khilàfa model is the best and the modern system closest to it is the presidential one. A˙mad sees three basic principles as the criterion of a truly Islamic state: first, sovereignty belongs to God alone; second, it is constitutionally assured that no legislation is repug­ nant to Sharì'a; and third, full citizenship is for Muslims only. This model functions by Parliament seeking expert advice from Islamic scholars on all legislation, and bringing any dispute before the Supreme Court which will decide on its conformity to Qur"àn and Sunna.42 The Islamic system advocated by most writers seems to be a rather authoritarian and interventionist state. Ghannùshì however takes a different stand, nearer the Christian view of a minimalist state. The main function of the state according to Ghannùshì is to deter aggres­ sion against Muslims, and he claims that the Islamist project is con­ cerned primarily with the individual and society, not the political regime. The Islamic state has very limited functions and, as the community gets stronger, the need for the state diminishes.43 Al-Turàbì views the model of the first Islamic state as a modern pres­ idential federal democracy which guaranteed freedom of speech and human rights: The Prophet of Islam was effectively the President of a federal system of government in which there were entrenchments of human rights. He ruled not as an absolute monarch but as a leader of a free peo­ ple. That is the meaning of shura, or public consultation. In many cases, he had to give way before the expressed will of the people. People always had the right—directly, not just through intermediary

41 Omar Bakri Muhammad. “The Khilafah”, and “Constitution and Canon”, Internet, . 42 Israr Ahmad. “Legitimation in an Islamic State” in Tanzeem-e-Islami Pakistan, Press Release 2, August, 1998, MSANEWS, 17,8,1998, Internet, . 43 Rached Ghannouchi. in “A Government of God?” an interview by journalist Omayma Abdel-Latif in Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 409, 24–30 December, 1998.

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institutions—to express themselves freely and to vote on important issues.44

For al-Turàbì the establishment of an Islamic political system is the main priority of the Islamist movements. He recognizes the fact that Islamic thought in this field is still “rudimentary, speculative and theo­ retical,” and stresses the urgent need to develop Islamic concepts on “the relationship between the rulers and their subjects with regard to freedom, consultation, and commitment,” as well as on system checks and balances.45 Al-Turàbì also sees the Islamic government as limited in its functions under Sharì'a and leaving much space open to civil soci­ ety. While politics and religion are integrated, it is religion that is a whole way of life and politics is only one dimension of religion.46 Radical Views Promoting Violence In the Christian fundamentalist camp this stand is mainly represented by groups that are variously termed extreme right, hard right, or the lunatic fringe, and that actually represent a wide variety of ideologies and views from anti-communism ( John Birch Society), through antifederalism and anti-big government (militias), to racist anti-Semitic, antiBlack, and anti-Catholic (Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi Aryan and whitesupremacist) groups. These movements seem to flourish mainly among deprived Whites unhappy with the status-quo, fueled by economic pres­ sures, fears of immigrants, and suspicion of internationalism, as well as being motivated by ethnic, racial, religious, and class animosities. Another factor is a collective fear, rooted in biblical apocalyptic literature on the end times, of an impending evil social order imposed by the state. They stand for isolationism in foreign policy, and support for the simple, hard­ working American people and their traditional way of life. Some reli­ gious conservatives were disappointed in their expectations of achieving rapid radical changes in state and society as a result of the fundamen­ talist political involvement, and so responded by developing a height­ ened animosity to the secular state, becoming radicalized and open to the possibility of using force to achieve their aims.47

44 Hasan al-Turabi. “Reflections on the New Constitution for Sudan”, an inter­ view given to the Sudan Foundation in May 1998 and published as an occasional paper by the Sudan Foundation, London. 45 Turabi in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi. 1998. The Making of a Political Leader: Conversations With Hasan al-Turabi, p. 121. 46 Al-Turabi in WISE Roundtable with Dr Hassan Turabi: “Islam, Democracy, the State and the West”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1992. pp. 49–61. 47 Susan Ladd & Stan Swofford. “Discontent Feeds Movement, Observers Say”, in News & Record, June 25–27, Greensboro, N.C.; See also Joel Schalit & Charlie Bertsch. “Millennial Revelations: Religious Extremism and the Preparations for a

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Many mainline fundamentalists would reject the inclusion of such groups in their camp, claiming that they are not even Christian, and accusing them of being beyond the pale as heretical cults. Some of these fringe groups are more interested in non-religious political and economic issues such as the right to bear arms, empowerment of local states and communities, elimination of Federal government functions not outlined in the Constitution, the abolishment of income tax, the return of America to the gold and silver standard, the removal of the United States from membership in the United Nations, and the return of Federal lands to state ownership. However, most include Christian fundamentalist themes in their ideology and platforms even when they are secondary to their main focus. They also harbor conspiracy theories that percolate into the mainstream. Some common conspiracy theories include the secret efforts by a shadowy elite (secular intellectuals, Freemasons, wealthy bankers, Jews) to create a one-world government and a “New World Order” run by the United Nations. Historically many of these groups developed out of the populist movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries.48 Most of these groups do not aim at overthrowing the government, but rather at defending themselves, if necessary by the force of arms, from the intrusive central government and the forces of the New World Order that they feel are preparing to suppress them. The recent Waco and Weaver cases of federal agencies using lethal armed force are used as examples to back their suspicions.49 The coalescing of various streams of right-wing movements creates the potential for violence against per­ ceived scapegoats such as federal agencies, law-enforcement officers, abortion providers, immigrants, Blacks, and Jews.50 The overlap of the so-called Christian “lunatic fringe” with mainline Christian fundamentalism can be seen in the reason they offer for the crisis in American society, namely that Americans have forsaken the teachings of Christianity. It is also evident in the fact that the Patriot Movement (a militia group), for example, includes as one of its goals: “Restore America to a Christian nation by making the Bible part of the law of the land”. Most also support Christian education and home

Secular Apocalypse”, in DEOLOG, Internet, . 48 From “Patriot Aims/The Militias”, published in the News & Record, Greensboro, NC, June 25–27, 1995; See also Ladd & Swofford. “Discontent Feeds Movement, Observers Say”. 49 Ladd & Swofford. “The Law of the Land: Group Seeks Country Rule”, in News & Record, June 25–27, Greensboro, N.C. 50 Chip Berlet & Matthew N. Lyons. “Militia Nation” in The Public Eye, spon­ sored by Political Research Associates, reprinted from Progressive Magazine, Internet, .

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schooling.51 Another group, the Christian American Party, state in their manifesto as their first principle that “God is the source of all author­ ity. Those who seek to displace or ignore God in the public forum are working de facto against the interests of the nation.” This group is against reverse discrimination, and promotes family values, justice, parent-empowered education, and economic populism.52 In the Islamic camp movements advocating the use of force are com­ posed of those who have carried Qu†b’s radical reinterpretations of jàhilìyya, ˙àkimìyya, takf ìr and jihàd to their logical conclusion. These groups see themselves as the vanguard of true Islam in its struggle to establish a renewed universal umma under a true khalìfa that will fully implement Sharì'a. The necessary first step towards the ultimate goal is the violent take-over of power in individual Muslim states. Shukrì Mu߆afà, leader of the Egyptian Takf ìr wa"l Hijra movement stated that the Prophet’s mandate was to fight all people (al-nàs) until they all convert, pray and pay zakàt. This ultimate goal has never yet been achieved in history. Takfìr will first establish its rule over Egypt and then issue a call to all humanity to join Islam and submit to Sharì'a. Those who reject the call must be fought against to end all dissension, and the Islamic state will then be the third superpower gradually extend­ ing its dominion over the whole world. Mu߆afà also claimed that both the Egyptian regime and all of society were jàhilì and declared them as under takf ìr, so true Muslims must separate from them and join the only true Muslim jamà'a, Takfìr wa"l-Hijra. Both regime and society are the ‘near enemy’ to be dealt with first by active jihàd. External enemies such as Israel will be dealt with later. However, he also stated that Jamà'at al-Takf ìr was still in a state of weakness, so open jihàd must not be initiated until it reached its phase of strength when it would declare open war against the regime. In the meantime, its members must sep­ arate themselves from jàhilì society and disengage from all its symbols and institutions. Mu߆afà was radical in repudiating all Muslim com­ munities after the Ràshidùn Caliphs and rejecting the four madhhabs and all traditional commentators.53 51 From “Patriot Aims/The Militias”, published in the News & Record, Greensboro, NC, June 25–27, 1995. The militia members interviewed in this article state that basic American liberties are in danger as the Beast of Revelation takes form in the shape of the oppressive New World Order and the centralized federal state. They aim at local county supremacy and at a Christian common law county court as the highest court in the land. See also: Ladd & Swofford. “Discontent Feeds Movement, Observers Say”. 52 Christian American Party Manifesto, Internet, . 53 Walid M. Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement In Egypt, pp. 11, 197, 204–205. It is interesting to note that at the end of the 1990s some members of these extrem­ ist groups state that they are convinced that foreign enemies such as the USA and

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Mu˙ammad 'Abd al-Salàm Faràj, one of the leaders of the Egyptian Jamà'at al-Jihàd which assassinated Sadat, believed that it was the oblig­ ation of every Muslim to fight for the establishment of Sharì'a over the whole world, starting first with a specific state. This goal can only be achieved by active war against the infidel rulers of the various states.54 While accepting that society in Muslim states consists of a mixture of Muslims and jàhilìs, the rulers are all jàhilì as they legislate according to their own whim. Faràj declared that any neglect of fundamental reli­ gious duties is kufr. He declared violent jihàd as the sixth missing pillar of Islam which has been suppressed by the 'ulamà". Jihàd against unbe­ lievers, especially against the regime and its employees is the legal and imperative priority of all true Muslims, its goal being the seizure of political power and the establishment of an Islamic state. Faràj claimed that there was no excuse for postponing the mobilization of the masses for a violent confrontation with the regime. Killing true Muslims enlisted by the regime was justified by reference to the prophetic example. Faràj criticized mainline fundamentalist movements such as The Muslim Brotherhood for their gradualist strategy and involvement in infidel polit­ ical systems. After dealing with various excuses put forward for post­ poning jihàd, he concluded that they were all wrong, there was no need to prepare the ground and establish one’s strength beforehand, and active and immediate jihàd is the only strategy for achieving an Islamic state. The fall of the jàhilì regime will miraculously cure all ills, as God would grant success for establishing the new state imposing his Sharì'a.55 Ibrahìm, 'Abd al-Màjid, and Darbàlah, who are close to the Egyptian Jamà'àt, clearly state the condition for rebelling against a ruler in pro­ claiming their 'aqìda (creed): Whoever legislates different laws to those of Allah and replaces His Laws with others, has gone against Allah’s sovereignty. Such a person has made himself a partner and equal in jurisdiction with Allah, thus stepping outside the circle of Islam. If this person is a ruler, he should therefore be rebelled against and deposed.56

In the Shì'ì camp, Sharì'atì argued that as all Islamic societies suffer from internal and external oppression, revolution was the only alterna-

Israel are now the greater threat and should be fought against first, while the Egyptian regime has been transformed from an apostate to a Muslim system. See Rashwan Diaa. “Islamists Crash the Party”, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 447, September 16–22, 1999. 54 Abdelnasser. 1994. p. 235. 55 Muhammad Abdessalam Faraj. “Al-Farida al-Gha’iba”, translated into English, in Johannes J.G. Jansen, 1986. The Neglected Duty, pp. 170–175, 202–213. 56 Najeh Ibrahim, Asim Abdul-Maajid, & Esaam ud-Din Darbaalah. 1997. In Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, p. 29.

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tive left for effecting change. For Sharì'atì, the main tool for mobiliz­ ing Muslim societies is Islamic ideology which replaces the fatalistic “is” with the utopian “ought to be”, generating a dialectical tension that helps overthrow the unbearable present and establish utopia: “Ideology . . . is the thinker’s belief relative to the value of the external realities—their evaluation, what inconsistencies such realities contain, and how to trans­ form them into ideal forms.” Consciously chosen by the masses as a tool for changing their unbearable condition, Islamic ideology becomes a force that threatens corrupt regimes. Ideological methodology will help discover principles that are catalysts for change, and applying these prin­ ciples could result in a great leap forward for Muslim societies which could bypass centuries of “normal” development. Sharì'atì sees Islam as a revolutionary ideology because it had always sided with the oppressed and is biased towards the poor: “God is the God of the oppressed” and the “God of the deprived”. Islam as an ideology is the panacea for all problems of Muslim states and societies, as it encompasses a scientific and deterministic philosophy of history, a positive humanism, and a belief in the inevitable victory of the oppressed.57 These views offer sim­ ilarities to Christian liberation theology. S L S Fundamentalists claim that all law must be based on God’s revelation in scripture, which is the foundation of all legal systems. No state must be allowed to treat law and scripture as unrelated phenomena, and state law ought to encourage citizens to do God’s will and close off paths obviously leading to evil.58 However, for Christian fundamentalists of the more separatist camp, scriptural law and morality are viewed as mainly binding on believers and the church, not on unbelieving society as a whole. The state, though instituted by God, is supposed to operate by natural law as revealed by God in creation and conscience. Jerry Falwell advocates state laws based on scriptural principles. The Founding Fathers had established America’s laws on biblical principles such as the Ten Commandments, inculcating a profound respect for Bible-based law as the preserver of liberties and the moral guide to all of life: “Our Founding Fathers were not all Christians, but they were guided by biblical principles. They developed a nation predicated on

57

Ali Shariati. 1981a. Man and Islam, pp. 68, 75, 83; Shariati. 1986. What is to be Done, pp. 1, 52–54; Shariati. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam, pp. 39–42, 59–60; Shariati. 1981b. Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness, p. 78. 58 John H. Garvey. 1993. “Fundamentalism and American Law,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 34–39.

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Holy Writ.” The Founding Fathers also realized that state and gov­ ernment are merely instruments used by God to “help secure man’s God-endowed rights”, and that “man was created to serve God, not the state.” Falwell’s aim is to revive this consensus at all levels of American society.59 The Reformed camp sees biblical moral law as binding on all, includ­ ing the state. Packer argues for the universal applicability and author­ ity of biblical laws commanding or forbidding specific things. Those who claim that the concept of obeying God’s commandments is incon­ sistent with Christian liberty and spontaneity have a wrong understanding of scripture: God our Maker and Redeemer has revealed the unchanging pattern of response that he requires, and that humanity needs to be truly itself. The pattern is both an expression of God’s own moral character and an indication of what he approves and disapproves . . .60

Christian Reconstructionists have a theonomic view of biblical law as the objective transcendent standard of righteousness for all of life, includ­ ing the state and its political system, and as the foundation for gov­ ernment and law. “Holy Scriptures as God’s supreme objective revelation of righteousness . . . must serve as the blueprint of the righteousness demanded of human government and society, no less than of individ­ uals.” It is the duty of governments to submit to Biblical law and encour­ age society to willingly embrace it. Christians, when in power, ought to govern all spheres of life, including the state, in terms of the entire Bible. 61 Cornelius Van Til of Westminster Seminary developed the concept of “theonomy”, meaning total submission to God’s rule and a bringing of all areas of life under his dominion—there is no neutral, secular ground. This basic concept was further disseminated by Rushdoony and the Chalcedon ministries he founded. The modern state is seen as hav­ ing overstepped its God-given boundaries, is therefore tyrannical and idolatrous, and must be brought down by its subjects.62 Legitimate civil

59

Jerry Falwell. 1980. Listen America! pp. 29, 52–53. James I. Packer. 1998. Serving the People of God: Collected Shorter Writings of J.I. Packer, Vol. 2, pp. 390–391. 61 “Chalcedon Vision Statement”, inside front cover of Chalcedon Report, No. 400, November 1998; Also Andrew Sandlin. “A Critique of Christian Nontheonomic Conceptions of Civil Government”, a position paper of the Ohio Center of Policy Studies. Internet, . 62 Nancy T. Ammerman. 1991. “North American Protestant Fundamentalism” in Marty & Applebey, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 50–52. 60

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government must enforce God’s laws based on the Old and New Testaments. Rushdoony argues against ideas of natural law and of the common law of nations held by some Christians, as these reflect the sinfulness of man. Revealed law is the law of a truly Christian society—apart from it man is in rebellion against God, the only ultimate power and source of law. The state is an agency of law—not the sole agency, merely one among a group of such agencies that includes family and church. The state has a limited and specified area to administer under God. Sadly, the modern state is totalitarian and tyrannical, “a Moloch state”, which denies any limits to its powers and invades all human spheres: it taxes at will, it expropriates property, and it conscripts all men into warfare.63 On the Evangelical-charismatic side, Pat Robertson’s thesis is that the Kingdom of God is among us now in invisible form since the time of Christ (it will come in visible form at Christ’s return). We can be part of it if we submit to the King and his sovereignty and realize that the Kingdom has its own laws which are just as binding and real as the laws of nature. Those who keep these laws will experience God’s bless­ ing in the individual and communal sphere. Nations that integrate God’s laws into their legal system will be blessed as nations—if they reject God’s rule and laws they will be destroyed. For Robertson the laws of the Kingdom are based on the Sermon on the Mount as given by Jesus to his disciples.64 Islamic fundamentalists demand a state in which the rule of God’s law is paramount. The doctrine of God’s sovereignty demands that in such an Islamic state Sharì 'a is fully implemented and is the only source of all secondary legislation. This means in fact treating the Sharì 'a as the constitution of the state, the legislative being able only to enact laws that are congruent with this constitution. Most Islamists advocate ongoing ijtihàd, based on Qur"àn and Sunna only, as the tool for developing a legal system true to the sources and yet compatible with modern circumstances. Common to most is the view that Qur"àn and Sunna deal with broad essential rules that allow for a flexible interpretation and adaptation through ijtihàd. In that they differ sharply from traditionalists who either hold that the gates of ijti­ hàd are closed, or would base it on the accumulated traditions and inter­ pretations of the centuries.

63

John Roussas Rushdoony. 1973. The Institutes of Biblical Law, pp. 10, 34. Pat Robertson. 1982. The Secret Kingdom, pp. 35–45, 58–75, 103–210. Robertson lists eight such laws: 1. The law of Reciprocity (give and it shall be given); 2. The law of use; 3. The law of Perseverance; 4. The law of Responsibility; 5. The law of Greatness; 6. The law of Unity; 7. The law of Miracles; 8. The law of Dominion. 64

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There are differences of opinion on how much freedom is possible in secondary legislation, meaning legislation on issues where no clear text is found related to it in the sources. Bannà" demands that all legislation in the Islamic state be derived from the Qur"àn, and he stresses the importance of implementing the ˙add punishments in order to “deter the most hardened criminals and relieve governments of expensive experimentation in punitive criminol­ ogy and justice.”65 Mawdùdì states that the fundamental, basic legal code of the Islamic state is the unchangeable Sharì 'a which must constitute the source of any secondary legislation.66 All legislation in an Islamic state must be “within the limits prescribed by the Shari'ah. The injunctions of God and His Prophet are to be accepted and obeyed and no legislative body can alter or modify them or make any new laws which are contrary to their spirit.”67 However, Mawdùdì sees much scope for legislation in areas “not covered by any specific injunctions of the Shari'ah”—in such areas the legislature is free to legislate, and problems concerning the intent of commandments open to more than one interpretation should be deferred to a sub-committee of the shùrà staffed with experts in Islamic law.68 The Legislature according to Mawdùdì is “what in fiqh is called ahl al-hall wal-'aqd (those who resolve and prescribe).” The legislature can­ not “legislate in contravention to the teachings of Allah and His Prophet.” The functions of the legislature include the enactment of explicit teach­ ings of Sharì'a as viable laws in a contemporary format without alter­ ing their essence; determining the right interpretation in cases where the teachings of Qur"àn and Sunna are open to divergent interpretations; enactment of laws in keeping with the general spirit of Islam and based on the books of fiqh in cases which lack explicit provisions in Qur"àn or Sunna; and finally, where the sources lack even basic guidance, the unre­ stricted formulation of laws as in this case God has permitted the free­ dom to legislate “according to our best lights.” However, no legislation may contravene the spirit of Sharì'a in any way.69 According to Mawdùdì the judiciary is established to enforce Sharì'a and must base its decisions on “the Law of Allah as transmitted to them through the Prophet.”70 The judiciary is not under the control of the executive, but “derives its authority directly from the Shari'ah and is answerable to God.” Though the judges are appointed by government, 65 66 67 68 69 70

Hasan Al-Banna. 1978. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), p. 89.

Mawdudi. “Political Theory of Islam” in Ahmad, ed., 1976. pp. 164–165.

Mawdudi. 1986a. pp. 34–35.

Ibid., pp. 34–35.

Mawdudi. 1994. pp. 17–18.

Ibid., 1994. p. 19.

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once appointed they are to be independent and impartial in adminis­ tering justice according to God’s law. The judiciary oversees all: Organs and functionaries of the Government . . . even the highest exec­ utive authority of the Government will be liable to be called upon to appear in a court of law as a plaintiff or defendant. Rulers and ruled are subject to the same law and there can be no discrimination on the basis of position, power or privilege.71

Qu†b argues from the premise that Islam cannot exist solely as a creed or faith in people’s hearts, but by its very nature demands an outward expression in society and state—it must take shape in an actual political and social system that ensures that sovereignty (˙àkimìyya) is God’s alone and in which the Sharì 'a supervises people’s lives in all their details. In such a system there can be no divine right of the ruler as God alone is sovereign. Neither can the ruler legislate what God does not permit.72 The concept of “˙àkimìyya ”, sovereignty belonging to God alone, means that individuals and states must totally submit to God’s sovereign rule by fully implementing Sharì'a. All laws, rules, and judg­ ments, must be derived from revealed Sharì'a and from nothing else, either by being based on an authoritative text (nass), where one exists, or by means of ijtihàd within the bounds of general interpretative prin­ ciples when there is a lack of clear authoritative texts. Anything less is jàhilìyya (state of ignorance similar to pre-Islamic pagan Arabia). Imple­ mentation of the Sharì'a becomes the sole criterion of legitimacy. In the true Islamic system to be realized in an Islamic state and society, The divinity of God (S) must be realized on earth as this divinity is realized in heaven; it must be realized through submission to His Shari'ah and command just as it is realized through his foreordaining and determining of events.73

This is the source of the insistent demand for the full implementation of Sharì'a in many Islamic states and the pronouncement of present regimes as pagan (takf ìr ) and therefore liable to opposition by force ( jihàd ) by radicals. According to Omar Bakri Mu˙ammad, the constitution of the Islamic state is based exclusively on the Islamic creeed ('aqìda), Qur"àn and Sunna, the consensus of the Companions (ijmà' al-ßahàba), analogy (qiyàs), and when necessary on ijtihàd. Everything in the system’s structure and regime must have the Islamic creed as its source. All new rules must be based on Sharì'a or ijtihàd after careful consideration and must be prefaced

71 72 73

Mawdudi. 1986a. pp. 34–35.

Qutb in Shepard. 1996. pp. 277–278.

Ibid., pp. 278–281.

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with an explanation that shows the connection of the rule to the sources via a madhhab or correct ijtihàd. In the Islamic state, all citizens, whether Muslim or not, are treated equally without discrimination, and the state implements Sharì 'a law on all citizens whether Muslim or not, except that non-Muslims may follow their own religious laws in matters of belief, worship, and personal affairs. Omar Bakri Mu˙ammad adds that the language of the Islamic state must be Arabic!74 Khomeinì argues that the Islamic government is a government of God’s law, which it too must obey. God’s law is thus both constitution and judge in the state: “There is no place for opinions and whims in the government of Islam. The prophet, the Imams and the people obey God’s will and Sharì'a.”75 Dr. Isràr A˙mad, Amìr of the Pakistani ˇanzìm-i Islàmì argues that there is scope for much secondary law-making in a modern Islamic state, as long as “no legislation is repugnant to Qur"an and Sunnah.” A˙mad suggests a Supreme Court, aided by experts in the relevant fields and by Islamic scholars, as the institution that should decide on whether specific laws transgress the boundary of Sharì 'a.76 Mas'arì states that law-making in Islam is very complicated, needing elaborate developments to clarify the principle of Divine Sovereignty (˙àkimìyya), and its relation to human authority and responsibility. A sharp distinction must be made between God’s exclusive Sovereignty and Rule (˙àkimìyya, sìyàda), and the authority (sul†àn) given to the umma. Anyone “enacting essential laws transgresses against God’s Sovereignty and commits a crime of cosmic proportions—shirk and kufr. It is rebel­ lion and treason against the King of Kings.”77 S V   I  S  R Some scholars state that while most Islamic fundamentalists unques­ tionably accept and demand the total integration of religion, politics, and state, Christian fundamentalists are more ambiguous, possessing an inherent tendency to accept a minimal separation of spheres following the command of Jesus to “give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s”. So among Christian fundamentalists there is a wider spectrum of opinion, ranging from the Calvinist theocratic stand simi­

74

Muhammad, O.B. “Constitution and Canon”. Khomeini in Donohue & Esposito, 1982. pp. 317–318. 76 Israr Ahmad. “Legislation in an Islamic State” in a Tanzeem-e-Islami Press Release of Sunday, 2, August, 1998, MSANEWS, 17,8,98, Internet, . 77 Muhammad Al-Mas'ari. “Ruling by Kufr is Haram,” MSANEWS, 18,12,1997, Internet, . 75

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lar to the Islamic one, to the Anabaptist separatist strand which rejects state involvement in religion and vice versa.78 Most Christian fundamentalists agree that the primary sphere of a believer’s activity is in the church, which is not coterminous with the state. For extreme separatists the believer does not engage in politics at any level as he is a citizen of heaven, not of earth. More moderate sep­ aratists accept the need for believers to be active in politics to try and improve conditions in society, fulfilling their duty as “salt and light”. Both these tendencies however accept the division between church and state as God-given, with each institution autonomous in its own sphere. On the Reformed side of the discourse, Schaeffer argues that while in the Old Testament there was a theocracy commanded by God, there is no New Testament basis for linking church and state. The “Constantine mentality” of Christianity as the official state religion was a mistake which created “great confusion between loyalty to the state and loyalty to Christ, between patriotism and being a Christian . . . We must not confuse the Kingdom of God with our own country . . . We should not wrap Christianity in our own national flag.” However, he accepts that the USA was founded on a Christian consensus, and believers ought to advocate Judaeo-Christian principles for government.79 Other Reformed leaders posit a much closer relationship between church and state although they too accept a division between civil gov­ ernment and church government. Believers are to participate fully in the political sphere in order to try and base it on God’s biblical moral law as far as possible. In contrast, the generally accepted Islamic view is that Islam is a comprehensive system that encompasses all of life and there can thus be no separation between religion and politics in Islam—Islam is both religion and politics, an all-encompassing system. In this view govern­ ment is part of religion, not autonomous. However, in practice, some division does emerge whenever there are efforts at implementing an Islamic state. In Iran the religious element, as represented by the Supreme Guide, seems to be dominant, while in Saudi Arabia it is the political element represented by the King and the royal family that dominates the system. However in both systems there is a constant struggle between the two wings for hegemony. Islamists actually blame Christianity for not dealing with structural evils and being passive politically because of its privatization of reli­ gion and its excessive individualism. Islam on the other hand, is seen 78

John H. Simpson. “Some Elementary forms of Authority and Fundamentalist Politics”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. pp. 393–394; Also Gabriel Ben-Dor. “The Uniquenes of Islamic Fundamentalism”, in Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, eds., 1997. p. 245. 79 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, ACM, pp. 485–486.

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as politically active in its fight against structural evils. Islam is seen not just as a religion, but as culture, a civilization, and a legal code—with social, political, and economic ramifications.80 Many Christian fundamentalists resent the growth of big government as anti-biblical, as God has given government legitimate but limited functions—overreaching its limits results in oppression and tyranny. According to Schaeffer, the biblical Reformation worldview leads to increasing freedom, while the humanist worldview inevitably leads to statism because humanists, having no God, “must put something at the center, and that something is inevitably the state.” This is evident both in the former communist countries and in most Western states. As an example Schaeffer offers the US Federal government which is “contin­ ually taking over powers the original founders did their best to curtail and resist.” Only a reinstatement of the biblical basis can limit the expansion of state authority.81 North claims that God has ordained several autonomous spheres of government that include self-government, church government, and fam­ ily government in addition to state-government. The secularist monop­ olization of the concept of government by the centralized territorial state is the reason for most loss of liberty in this century. North states that this modern monopolistic concept of the state as the supreme locus of loyalty and power has made control of the state the greatest prize in modern power struggles: “this struggle for control over the state . . . is the equivalent of medieval man’s quest for salvation” and is thus basi­ cally a religious enterprise. Reconstructionists call for a “massive reduc­ tion in the power and activity of the state.”82 While a majority of Christian fundamentalists decry the modern sec­ ular interpretation of the separation of church and state claiming that God must rule in every area of life, there is a variety of approaches to the subject. The Calvinist-Reformed wing of fundamentalism is closest to Islamist ideas in advocating a theocracy in which the church lays down the principles of proper government, and civil law is based on Biblical law. On the other hand, Independent Baptists and others in the nonconformist-Anabaptist traditions view the separation of church from state as a guarantee of religious freedom, claiming that Baptists such as Roger Williams first introduced the concept. Baptists highlight their historical role in rejecting the state churches of the original colonies, where the puritans had established a theocracy in which their congre­

80

Kate Zebiri. “Muslim Anti-Secularist Discourse in the Context of MuslimChristian Relations”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1998. pp. 4–6. 81 Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, ACM, p. 482. 82 North. 1991. pp. 44–45, 126.

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gational state-churches persecuted all dissidents. However, unaided by political power, Baptist principles of religious freedom for all triumphed in the separation of church and state. The First Amendment is seen as the product of Baptist influence through James Madison. No constitu­ tional limitation was placed on the church: “Rather, limitations were imposed on the role of government”. The “wall of separation” was orig­ inally intended as a “wall that kept government out of the church— not church people out of government!”83 Falwell states that the separation of church and state functions in America was intended to avoid giving a favored position to one church over another, not to establish “a government devoid of God or of the guidance found in Scripture.” It was not intended to separate God from government nor to separate godliness from government.84 On the Islamic side, al-Bannà" advises his followers to reply to those who question them as to their message of a comprehensive unitary system: We are calling you to Islam, which was brought by Muhammad (May God bless and save him!): government is part of it, and freedom is one of its religious duties. If someone should say to you: This is pol­ itics!, say: This is Islam, and we do not recognize such divisions.85

Qu†b claims that according to the Islamic concept, religion and the political system are one and the same: ‘Religion’ (al-Din) in the Islamic understanding is synonymous with the word ‘system’ (nizam) in modern terminology, with the complete mean­ ing of a creed in the heart, ethical principles in behavior and Shari'ah in society . . . All of this is contained in the concept ‘religion’ in Islam. Therefore there cannot be a system that God accepts and Islam confirms unless it is this system derived from the doctrinal conception (tasawwur) of Islam and represented in administrative systems and acts of legis­ lation derived from the Islamic Shari'ah and from nothing else.86

Qu†b also claims, in a somewhat utopian vein, that the Islamic system is free from all imperfections characteristic of other human systems in which truth and error are intrinsically mixed. The divinely ordained Islam system is perfect and comprehensive, and free from any error. It

83 E. Wayne Thompson, & David L. Cummins. 1994. This Day in Baptist History, as quoted on the Tabernacle Baptist Church Internet Homepage. See also John Berggren, 1997. “The Baptist Heritage: The Baptist Struggle for Freedom of Religion”, Internet, . 84 Falwell. 1980. pp. 53–54. 85 Al-Banna. 1978. p. 36. 86 Qutb in Shepard. 1996. p. 110.

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is a complete method (manhaj ), a harmonious unity, and it is forbidden to introduce any foreign element into it.87 Al-Turàbì states that the Islamic movement wants to integrate politics and religion and opposes the separation of Church and State. Religion is the dominant and all-encompassing way of life and politics is “only one dimension of religion . . . politics has to be integrated into religion.”88 W   R  R  G? A result of the fundamentalist high view of God’s centrality and man’s vice-regency, is their doctrine that no one person or group can legiti­ mately rule other human beings except they be ordained by God. For Christians, all rule is legitimate as all rulers are ultimately ordained by God. For Islamists, all rule not according to the God-given Sharia is illegitimate and tyrannical. There are divergent views on who is to rule for God and what is the ideal God-given governmental system, as well as on how to appoint the ruler or rulers, what their functions and pow­ ers ought to be, and on whether democracy is compatible with the scriptural injunctions. Fundamentalists tend to stress the importance of the virtuous char­ acter of the ruler and of individuals involved in government for ensur­ ing a just society, assuming a necessary causal link between individual virtue and good governance. This stands in marked contrast to the sec­ ularist view of the dominant importance of law and institutions in estab­ lishing a just society, almost irrespective of the characters of those involved in the ruling system.89 For Christians the presidential or prime-ministerial role has no spe­ cial difficulties. For Islamists, the leader occupying the post of head of state is the khalìfa or amìr, God’s vice-regent on earth, and this role has deep theological and doctrinal implications. Much Islamic fundamen­ talist discourse focuses on the khal ìfa, his role and his personal quali­ ties. Some see him as a parallel to the powerful presidential model of the USA, others would give him much more authority, turning him in fact into a dictator. Reconstructionists stress that the majority of citizens in a state need first to be spiritually and morally transformed in order to have the

87

Ibid., p. 109. Al-Turabi. “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sunni and Shia World” a lecture delivered in Madrid, 2, August, 1994, Dr. Turabi’s Internet Web Page, . 89 Muqtedar Khan. “Good Governance: Requires Good Men or Good Laws?” IJTIHAD, Vol. 1. No. 3, 20, October, 1999, Internet, . 88

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benefit of a virtuous leadership—not the other way around. Government cannot be better than the people who create it, and a nation usually gets what it votes for. Governments cannot make people better. “Leadership, like water, rises to its own level, the righteousness of the people. The maintenance of good government is dependent on good people.” Falwell states that America today faces a tremendous vacuum in godly male leadership. Only men who are students of the Word of God are able to be effective leaders as they alone are guided by God’s wisdom as to how to direct the world. What is really needed are powerful, dynamic, and godly leaders who are willing and able to change the churches within the nation, the families as the basic units of society, and finally the nation itself.90 There is a similar stress on the virtue of the individual, both rulers and people, in some Islamic fundamentalist movements, where there is a conscious effort to reconstitute the original model of leadership as practiced in Mu˙ammad’s Medina and, for Sunnis, in the Ràshidùn Caliphate. This model posits a single virtuous leader (khalìfa, imàm, amìr) as head of state aided by a consultative body (shùrà) and a judiciary. There is much discussion and divergence on the characteristics of the leader and his aides and on the division of power between them as well as on the degree of their accountability to the people. In the Shì'ì camp, Khameneì claims that taw˙ìd rejects the right of anyone but God to supervise society and rule over humans. The only acceptable rule is that “entrusted to the ruler or the ruling party by a higher power . . . in religious ideology this higher power is Allah whose domination and knowledge has no bound.”91 Who are the men desig­ nated by God to have authority? Khamenei tries to answer this ques­ tion by the rather vague statement that: Rule over man, then, is God’s specific right which is realized by His appointees: those who most closely match criteria specified in divine ideology. It is through them that divine order is guarded and divine laws are executed.92

Khomeinì of course stated that the one given the divine prerogative to rule is the Hidden Imam, but in his occultation and until his return, a suitable faqìh rules in his name and as his representative (vilayet-efaqìh). This faqìh must have the qualities of “knowledge of the law and of justice”, and as most jurisprudents in this age possess these quali­ ties, it should be easy to find such a man and to set up an Islamic

90

Falwell. 1980. pp. 16–17. Sayyed Ali Khamenei. 1991. Essence of Tawhid: Denial of Servitude but to God, pp. 18–19. 92 Khamenei. 1991. pp. 20–21. 91

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government with this kind of jurisprudent at its head: “He will run the social affairs that the prophet used to run and it is the duty of the peo­ ple to listen to him and obey him.” He will be in charge of “justice and the settlement of disputes, the appointment of provincial rulers and officers, the collection of taxes, and the development of the country.” However, these powers do not mean that the ruler has the status of the Prophet or of the Imams, he is simply a trustee over the whole people as Sharì'a commands a trustee over minors. When no one suit­ able jurisprudent can be found, all jurisprudents can collectively assume this responsibility.93 On the Sunnì side, Mawdùdì claims that the head of the Islamic state is the supreme head of the three organs of the state: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. As at present no man has the same moral qualities enjoyed by the “Righteous Caliphs” his powers must be some­ what more limited and circumscribed than theirs in order to protect the people from dictatorial tendencies. The head of state must be elected by the general public, nobody has the right to impose himself forcibly on society, no clan or class has a monopoly on the office, and the elec­ tion must be free to all Muslims. The leader of the state must gain the confidence of the people—should he lose their confidence he must step down. This view posits the sovereignty of the people as subordinate to God’s sovereignty and exercised by the right to elect the khal ìfa as well as the right to depose him when he contravenes Sharì 'a.94 Mawdùdì posits the principle that the rulers in Islam must always be those endowed with the very best Islamic moral qualities in society. The Islamic movement aims at a revolution in leadership which will appoint those who are “God-conscious, righteous and committed to following Divine guidance.” Mawdùdì states that the administration of the gov­ ernment in an Islamic state is to be “entrusted to an Amir (leader) who may be likened to the President or the Prime Minister in a Western democratic state.” He does not rule on his own, but is obliged to be assisted and guided by “a Shura (consultative council), elected by the people.” Mawdùdì describes the basic quality of the leader as “his knowl­ edge and grasp of the spirit of Islam; he should possess the Islamic attribute of fear of God; he should be endowed with the quality of statesmanship. In short, he should be both able and virtuous.”95 Qu†b states that the ruler is not directly appointed by heaven, but becomes a ruler only when elected by the absolutely free choice of Muslims, and once in power his authority is derived from his enforce­ ment of Sharì'a: “So, if the Muslims do not accept him he has no author­

93 94 95

Khomeini in Donohue & Esposito. 1982. pp. 320–322.

Mawdudi. 1994. pp. 26, 19–20; Mawdudi. 1976. Human Rights in Islam, p. 10.

Mawdudi. 1984. pp. 71, 99–100; Mawdudi. 1986a. pp. 34–36.

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ity, and if they do accept him but then he abandons the Shari'ah of God, no obedience is due him.” Qu†b further states that the ruler must not oppress the people, nor touch their possessions. Neither he nor his family have any special privileges. The limit of his authority is the enforcement of the punishments and obligations of Sharì'a. Qu†b adds that “while Islam limits the authority of the leader (imàm) in matters concerning his person, it gives him the broadest possible powers in look­ ing after the welfare (maßàlih mursala) of the community in those mat­ ters concerning which there is no authoritative text (nass), and which develop with new time and conditions.” He has wide powers to enact decrees as he sees fit to deal with various problems, to impose taxes beyond zakàt when necessary, and to deter anything that causes harm to the community while encouraging everything that brings it benefit— as long as he does not violate any authoritative religious texts (nass).96 Qu†b enjoins Muslims to obey those in authority ('ulu-al-'amr) as this is their duty and “is derived from obedience to God and the Apostle.” This obedience is not absolute but has limits as the ruler Is not obeyed for his own sake, but is obeyed only because he sub­ mits to the authority of God and recognizes His sovereignty and then carries out the Shari‘ah of God and His Apostle, and it is from his recognition of God’s sole sovereignty and then his execution of this Shari‘ah that his right to obedience is derived. If he departs from either one, he is no longer entitled to obedience, and his orders need not be carried out.97

Muràd states that power and leadership are of utmost importance as societies move in the direction determined by those who control the centers of power. A society controlled by those who have turned away from God drifts towards rebellion against God. In an Islamic state it is essential to have leaders who in their personal lives have attained to the values of imàn, islàm, taqwa and ihsàn (faith, surrender, trust and piety), and are capable of changing the direction of society. Such lead­ ers are not content with being merely creatures of history, but have the potential to make and remake it.98 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad claims that the ruler’s most important char­ acteristics are “piety, kindness towards his citizens and a strong per­ sonality.” Mu˙ammad stresses the importance of the ruler’s strength of character: if he is weak he has no right to rule. The minimal obliga­ tory required characteristics of the khal ìfa are listed as being a Muslim, male, mature, sane, just, and free: any other requirements, such as that

96 97 98

Qutb in Shepard. 1996. pp. 114–119.

Ibid., pp. 113–114.

Murad in Mawdudi. 1984. p. 11.

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he be a mujtahid, are merely matters of preference. Suitable men may ask for the appointment and compete for the post. Once appointed there can be no other khalìfa until the first one dies or is duly removed from office. The khalìfa may not appoint his successor, a new khalìfa must be appointed by the majority of Muslims in the state. In Mu˙ammad’s view the khalìfa, once appointed, enjoys autocratic author­ ity within the limits of Sharì'a: “The Khaleefah is the State”, he estab­ lishes the divine rules and implements them, is responsible for the internal and external policies of the state, is in charge of the army and the secu­ rity forces, appoints and dismisses all main government officials, judges and the chief of staff—all these are responsible to the khalìfa and not to the majlis al-shùrà.99 Siddiqui has the most authoritarian and mechanistic view of the ruler and the lines of authority in an Islamic state. His metaphor for Islam is a country that has one single powerhouse supplying power to one inclusive national grid. All homes and institutions are connected to the grid, and appliances are connected to it by means of a standard plug inserted into the socket so power can flow into them. Analogous to the metaphor, the Prophet is the only direct human link with Allah, medi­ ating God’s power to the people through the contemporary ruler. The line of obedience is clearly defined: Obey Allah, obey Allah’s prophet, obey him from among you who is in charge of the affairs of the community. It is the last link, the one after the Prophet, that completes the circuit for the flow of divine power to the human condition. He is called khalifah or imam, more precisely khalifatul Rasool.100

The leader is the center of the Islamic state and its structure is built around him. “The entire structure of the Islamic state is an extension of the authority of the khalifah/imam, whose authority in turn is derived from the authority of Allah and his Prophet.” He is the essential con­ duit for the power and authority of God, the sole link between Allah and the umma, and it is his presence that legitimizes the political sys­ tem. Nothing can change the position, power and role of the khalìfa: “He is closest to Allah and His Prophet, and is the living manifestation of the Prophet’s power and authority.” He cannot be overruled, and even when mistaken, obedience to him is obligatory. The leader’s duty is to manage and guide change while keeping to the divine absolutes of Islam and to the principle that in Islam the collective good always

99 Muhammad, O.B. “The Islamic Verdict on the Status of Charity Organisations in Islam” Part 1. MSANEWS, 27, January, 1998, Internet, ; Muhammad, O.B. “The Khilafah”. 100 Siddiqui, Kalim 1996a. Stages of Islamic Revolution, pp. 92–93.

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take precedence over the personal or small-group interest. Without a single ruler who is a khilàfat al-Rasùl there is no khilàfa, no power or authority, no Islamic state. Because today there is no Prophet nor Imàm to appoint him, the community has the divine right to chose its own leader. Siddiqui argues that once a khalìfa is elected, obedience to him and his government is obligatory on all Muslims, being in fact obedience to Allah and his Prophet. The khalìfa must conduct the affairs of state by shùrà (consul­ tation), and this necessitates the creation of a majlis al-shùrà. The khalìfa also appoints his advisers as well as the president, prime minister, cab­ inet ministers, and governors.101 Siddiqui maintains that it is the khalìfa’s duty to ensure the widest possible recourse to consultation. However, there is no place in this process for “propaganda, vested interests, political parties, professional lobbies, or the media.” The khalìfa may base his decisions on advice given by centers of research and excellence such as universities. These centers can also propose new legislation and evaluate current policies. The majlis al-shùrà can be composed of both elected and of appointed individuals. In this ideal Islamic state under its khalìfa there will be “no secret deals, no party whip, no horse trading and arm twisting as in secular democracies.” Legislation will aim at the creation of a moral and just society as defined by Islam, in which the highest good is the moral correctness of the people.102 Siddiqui asks how Muslims can survive in the absence of an Islamic state and a visible khalìfa, and answers that it is possible because lead­ ership roles exist at lower levels of the community—e.g. the husband and father is leader of the family unit and his authority in family mat­ ters is as absolute as the khalìfa’s in the state, and the imàm leads Muslims in their public prayers—those behind him must follow his example even if he makes a mistake. Muslims in general must follow the leadership of those in legitimate leadership roles and await the emergence of a real khalìfa.103 Taqi al-Dìn al-Nab˙àni also has a very authoritarian view of khilàfa as the foundation of the Islamic state, without which it cannot exist. Defects in the state do not invalidate its Islamic status as long as the khalìfa is viable, and it is not permitted for Muslims to be without a khalìfa. The Islamic state is a Khaleefah implementing Islam and the office of Khilafah or Imamah is to have full disposal over the affairs of the Muslims . . . The appointment of the Khaleefah is an obligation upon 101 102 103

Ibid., pp. 93–95.

Ibid., pp. 95–96.

Ibid., pp. 97–98.

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  Muslims, they are forbidden from spending more than two nights with­ out giving bay‘ah to him. If the Muslims did not appoint a Khaleefah within three days they would all be sinful until they had appointed a Khaleefah.

Al-Nab˙ànì has a simple khàrijì-like stand on the necessary attributes of the khalìfa—any “Muslim male who is mature, sane and just is fit to be given the bay'ah by other Muslims in order to become their Khaleefah and no other conditions are needed nor should be laid down”.104 C In their attitudes to government and politics both fundamentalisms exhibit a remarkable complexity. Both have an apolitical separatist-pietist wing that views politics as inherently corrupt and corrupting and eschews any involvement of true believers in politics. True believers are called only to preach God’s message and convert individuals, integrating them into God’s pure community. This view is much more widely held among Christians than Muslim fundamentalists. Christian fundamentalists exhibit graded views in their advocacy of political involvement, some seeing it as a necessary evil, others advo­ cating eager participation and full involvement in politics, with the aim of achieving some degree of influence in directing society towards God’s moral precepts. Islamists on the other hand tend to be all in the fullinvolvement type camp, seeing politics as the main tool for implementing God’s will on earth. It would seem that there is some asymmetry between the two fun­ damentalist movements when it comes to politics despite some broad resemblances. On the whole Islamist fundamentalists are much more wholeheartedly politically engaged than Christian fundamentalists, mainly because of their ideology of no separation between religion and poli­ tics. Christians are on the whole more diffident in their approach to politics. It is the Reformed Calvinists who are the most enthusiastic sup­ porters of Christian involvement in politics, though they too realize the dichotomy of two autonomous spheres, although believing both to be under God and as such legitimate spheres for Christian involvement. Others eschew politics totally as inherently evil and corrupting, part of Satan’s world system and under his control as opposed to God’s sys­ tem realized in the Church and in God’s secret kingdom. Christians tend to view religion and politics as two autonomous, though interconnected spheres, some preferring total separation between the two in order to ensure religious freedom, others advocating some

104

An-Nabhani. (nd). pp. 224–228.

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degree of inter-penetration and mutual influence. Islamists on the other hand stress the unity of religion and politics and the responsibility of governments to be the protectors and enforcers of true Islam and of its Sharia. Islamists therefore aim at a take-over of political power in the state, either gradually from below by Islamizing society and utilizing the democratic process, or violently by coup d’état or revolution, imposing the Islamic system from above. On the Christian side however, there are some groups like the Reconstructionists, who tend to the mainline Islamic view of believers achieving total power in the state and impos­ ing God’s law on the total state system. While Christian fundamentalists are not overly concerned with the person of the ruler in the ideal state, Islamists devote much of their discourse on the type of leadership desired, and the personal qualities of the ruler (khal ìfa). While there are radical violent fringes in both fundamentalisms, the Islamic variety is much more ideologically coherent, basing itself on Qu†b’s reinterpretation of concepts such as jàhilìyya, ˙àkimìyya, hijra, mufàßala and the obligation of jihàd to demand treatment of other coreligionists, especially in government, as unbelievers worthy of death for their apostasy, and of a violent struggle with the aim of implementing a fully Islamic state system based on Sharì'a as state law. On the Christian side, the extremist violent fringes are a motley group with differing ide­ ologies ranging from anti-communism, anti-federalism, anti big govern­ ment, to racist anti-Semitic and anti-Black neo-Nazi white supremacist views. Some are also motivated by eschatological fears of impending doom under a hostile New World order.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE PAST GOLDEN AGE AND CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS POLITICS L B   G A Most fundamentalists look back to a perceived golden age to find an ideal model for contemporary applications of religion in all areas of life, including, for some, the political state order. Fundamentalists view his­ tory as a process of progressive decline from that original ideal state.1 Frustrated by the present weakness of their respective religions, Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms tend to assess modern developments by standards drawn from the golden age of their religion’s founding, a period often glorified as the era in which true faith and right doctrine were fully implemented. Believers of that era are viewed as having had an integrated lifestyle, the right approach to scripture, and a willing­ ness to practically apply scriptural teachings immediately on compre­ hending them. The golden age is viewed in utopian terms of a believing community exemplifying perfect separation, morality, and social justice, a model to be imitated and re-instituted. The nostalgia for the golden age often results in a re-writing of history in light of the presumed utopia. Christian Views Various Christian fundamentalist groups claim that their doctrines and church system faithfully represent the New Testament model as prac­ tised by Christians of the first century under the Apostles. Many view the apostolic period and the writings of the New Testament, especially the book of Acts and the Epistles, as containing the model for church life and organization in all ages. Clifford Hill states that the contem­ porary House Church movement had the radical goal of re-establishing the lost simplicity and purity of the Early New Testament church, and that it therefore subjected all dogma and practice to the scrutiny of the Bible.2 Gibbs, a Bible teacher and writer in the Christian Brethren

1

Lionel Caplan in Caplan, ed., 1987. Studies in Religious Fundamentalisms, pp. 18–19. Peter Fenwick. 1995. “The Roots of the Toronto Blessing” in Hill, Fenwick, et al. 1995. Blessing the Church? A Review of the History and Direction of the Charismatic Movement, pp. 49–50. 2

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movement, lists three tests for the validity of any Christian ordinance applicable today: Was it commanded by Christ in the gospels? Was it practised by the early church in the book of Acts? Is its spiritual significance clearly expounded in the Epistles?3 Selected New Testament doctrines are stressed that include the inde­ pendence of the local congregation, the priesthood of all believers and the abolition of an official clergy, the importance of individual conscious repentance and faith, the expectation of Christ’s return, and the imple­ mentation of the gifts of the Spirit. These are contrasted with contem­ porary church practice, revealing the great deviation from biblical fundamentals that has taken place over the centuries, the corruption of essential doctrines, and their syncretistic mingling with church traditions and pagan customs. The historical development of Christianity after the apostolic age is thus explained as a deviation from the faith’s original principles. The writings of the church fathers, church traditions, inno­ vations, and pagan accretions were allowed to replace the authority of scripture, in spite of clear biblical warnings against this development. Gibbs distinguishes between “Christendom”, a system of beliefs and tra­ ditions that embraces the total of those who profess to be Christians, “the sum total of all these religious systems and organizations that name the name of Christ, whether they be good, bad, or indifferent”—and a “true Christianity” which includes only true believers, is biblically based, and Christ centered.4 Gunn, another Christian Brethren writer, characterizes present day Christendom as perverted, paganized, and apostate. The true believer ought to separate himself from it and meet only with true Christians according to the New Testament model.5 MacDonald glorifies the first century church described in the book of Acts as the only model to emulate. Under guidance of the Apostles and the impact of God’s love and Spirit the first believers evidenced several important characteristics that Christians today should recapture: In an environment of hate and greed the disciples manifested love to all, repaying persecution with kindness. As material possessions were a stewardship from God given to fulfill human needs, they practised a communal lifestyle and distributed goods according to individual needs, thus engendering equality. These first believers were zealously loyal and obedient to God, fearless in preaching the gospel, and willing to suffer for Christ. They had one purpose only, the preaching the gospel, and would not be side-tracked from this priority by any subordinate matter such as politics. They saw man’s sinful nature as the cause of all

3

Alfred P. Gibbs. 1963. The Lord’s Supper, p. 12. Gibbs. (nd). Worship: The Christian’s Highest Occupation, p. 109; Gibbs. 1963. pp. 12–14, 51, 86, 92–96; See also James Gunn. (nd). I Will Build My Church, pp. 27–36. 5 Gunn. (nd). pp. 27–36. 4

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personal, social and political evils in the world, and realized that polit­ ical and social reforms treat merely the symptoms without affecting the core disease itself, as only the gospel can change man’s evil nature. Obeying the explicit commands of Christ, believers sold their goods, gave the proceeds to the poor, and left family and security to go out and preach the gospel. Though only a small group of poor disciples living in an obscure corner of the world, they were imbued with the vision of evangelizing the whole world and totally committed to this task. Their worldview was Christ-centered, their sole aim in life to be witnesses to Christ. In a world engaged in a mad struggle for survival, they formed a hard core of zealous disciples intent on advancing the Kingdom of God and subordinating all else to this goal.6 MacDonald argues that an important lesson contemporary Christians can learn from the New Testament church is that Christianity is a lay movement, not a hierarchical organization with a monopolistic profes­ sional class of priests and clergy. All believers were priests endowed with gifts which they freely practised, resulting in a flexibility and the absence of rigidity. MacDonald argues that the hierarchical clerical system was unknown in the New Testament—it was an innovation of the 2nd cen­ tury. The early church was integrated and color blind to skin or race, all being equal as brothers and sisters. People detected a reality in believ­ ers’ lives that backed up their public preaching, enhancing their impact. The early church was a living organism, not a highly complex organi­ zation, moving in constant obedience to the leading of God’s spirit. Early believers were also totally involved in the spiritual battle. Realizing that they were opposed by spiritual forces of evil, they fought back with the spiritual weapons of faith, prayer, and the word of God.7 LaHaye sees the first century as “the most fervent and evangelistic generation the nineteen centuries of church history have yet produced.” Early Christianity had such a powerful impact on the pagan world that by the third century it became the state religion of the Roman Empire. LaHaye contrasts this achievement with twentieth century Christianity and its evangelization program, which despite all its sophisticated resources including modern means of communication, has not succeeded in keep­ ing up with the population explosion around the world.8 However, while many find scriptural models for individual conduct and for church structure, few Christian fundamentalists find political blueprints in the New Testament age, nor do Protestant fundamental­ ists hark back to the era of Christianity as the state religion in the

6 William MacDonald. 1990. Believer’s Bible Commentary: New Testament, pp. 405–416, 421, 443, 481–482. 7 Ibid., pp. 426, 435, 442, 482–483. 8 Tim LaHaye. 1972. The Beginning of the End, p. 12.

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Roman and Byzantine Empires. Those who look for political scriptural blueprints in the Bible, like the Reconstructionists, turn back to the Mosaic law and to high points of Old Testament history, where just rulers imposed a God-pleasing social and political order, often after a stage of profound national repentance and revival. Such historic peri­ ods are those of Israel under Moses and Joshua, the Davidic and Solomonic reigns, and the reigns of certain godly kings such as Asa, Jehoshaphat, Josiah, and Hezekiah, as well as the post-exilic period under the leadership of Ezra and Nehemiah. Muslim Views In addition to the personal virtues of the first believers, Muslims look back to the model of a historic Islamic state founded by the Prophet and continued under his immediate successors, the ràshidùn. Bannà" sees the original Islamic state, based on the “excellent Qur"anic social organization”, as possessing perfect social and political unity under the first Caliphs The vast early conquests were due to “the strength of their faith and the solid fabric of the institutions they imposed . . .”9 Qu†b’s view of Islamic history is that of a short golden age under the Prophet and his Companions, including the period of the ràshidùn Caliphs: At one time this message created a generation without any parallel in the history of Islam, even in the entire history of man, the generation of the Companions of the Prophet (may Allah be pleased with them). After this, no other generation of this caliber was ever again to be found.10

The reason for their uniqueness was that they had been personally trained by the Prophet and exclusively taught by the revealed source of guidance—the Qur "àn. Later generations polluted and diluted the pure source by introducing elements foreign to God’s revelation—Greek philosophy, Persian culture, and Jewish traditions. As a result, no true Islamic society has existed for the last several centuries. He states that Islam decayed as it got buried under the rubbish of man-made tradi­ tions, interpretations, and superstitions, and that any radical renewal of Islam must emulate the model of the first community, returning to the pure sources of Qur "àn and ˙adìth, and discarding all accretions. This is a salafì view that contradicts traditionalist views of Islam as the total of Qur"àn, Sunna and all scholarly interpretation and consensus over the ages. Qu†b propounds a view similar to that of Christian fundamen­ talists such as Gibbs, Gunn, and others who reject most traditions and 9 10

Hasan Al-Banna. 1978. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), pp. 17–18. Sayyid Qutb. 1990. Milestones, p. 11.

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innovations following the model era of the early New Testament church and stress the importance of returning to the Bible as the sole author­ ity for life and practice.11 Qu†b argues that a mark of the authentic golden age was the full implementation of Sharì'a in an exemplary Islamic society integrating religion and politics, thus guaranteeing God’s blessing. Contemporary Muslims must rediscover this original principle and actively implement it in present society.12 Another distinguishing mark of the unique first generation was its commitment to obey and apply the revelation’s com­ mands in real life. Later generations approached the Qur"àn for theo­ retical academic knowledge, developing sophistry and scholasticism. The Companions, however, had “the understanding that instruction is for action . . . Instruction to be translated into action was the method of the first group of Muslims.” Qu†b claims that the golden age was pos­ sible because the first Muslims were initially personally transformed by the new message. Submitting to God they worshipped him alone and were liberated from their own desires as “la Ilaha illa Allah became imprinted on their hearts.” Once the Islamic system was established in their hearts, they could go on to establish an Islamic polity with an Islamic political system and laws in which Allàh’s justice was supreme and in which social justice was practiced in the name of taw˙ìd. With morals and hearts purified, conscience became the real law-enforcer. Pleasing Allàh, fear of his anger, and hope for his reward were their only motive, so there was no need for police to enforce the limits Allàh had prescribed. This first generation of Muslims lifted the social order and morals to a “zenith of perfection that had never been attained before and which cannot be attained afterward except through Islam.”13 Mu˙ammad Qu†b (Sayyid Qu†b’s brother) sees the first generation of Muslims as the only ones who had ever practised true Islam, per­ fectly fulfilling God’s description of them: ‘You are indeed the best nation that has ever been raised up for mankind: you enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong and believe in Allah’.” That first generation wrote An incomparable page in human history . . . They established truth and justice on earth and raised for mankind an inimitable civilisation which builds up its structure in the material and spiritual worlds at the same time. It is a civilisation which unites the two worlds and achieves harmony between body and soul, religion and politics, faith

11

Qutb. 1990. pp. 11–16, 29–35, 68–69. Qutb. “Social Justice in Islam” in William Shepard. 1996. Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, p. 9. 13 Qutb. 1990. pp. 13–14, 25. 12

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and science, the present life and the hereafter, the practical and the ideal.14

Nadwì looks back to the opening decades of the seventh century as the golden age when a tremendous spiritual force gushed forth from a remote valley in Arabia, spreading with a force and speed unprece­ dented in human history to reach the ends of the then known world, enriching all nations with new life. This very same power can be appro­ priated and used today, and it is capable of overcoming all the problems that confront our modern civil­ isation; it can inject into it fresh vigour and a new vitality by pro­ viding a new sense of purpose, by reorienting the instruments and institutions of science and technology. This alone can lead to the mak­ ing of a new society, the dawn of a new age.15

Two Golden Ages Shepard argues that in reality both fundamentalisms posit two relevant golden ages: the founding era of their religion and a relatively recent period of religious flourishing. In spite of their rhetoric, the real goal of most fundamentalists is not a return to the first “golden age”, but rather to the more recent ideal past, usually a period just before their respective religions deviated from the right path due to the pressures of modern secularism.16 Shepard states that for Muslim fundamentalists the later period is sometimes seen as the era of high cultural achievement under the 'Abbàsids (8th–11th centuries C.E.), but for most it is the period just before the onslaught of Western imperialism.17 In the Protestant case, Shepard sees the later era as is either that of the Reformation period, or for Americans, the period of the “Founding Fathers”, or the mid 19th century which many view as the time in which the ideal of a Christian society was most closely approached. Others turn to some period of great revival in their own nation or region.18 For example, on the Islamic side, Óizb al-Tahrìr compares the real­ ity of present day secular Turkey, described as a second rate satellite

14 Muhammad Qutb. “Introduction,” in Qutb, 1979. In the Shadow of the Qur "an, p. xii. 15 Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi. 1983. Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission, p. 37. 16 Shepard. “Fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic”, Religion, 1987, Vol. 17, pp. 363–364. 17 Ibid., p. 363. 18 Ibid., p. 363.

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of the West, with its glorious Ottoman Caliphate predecessor. The entire Ottoman Caliphate period, from its inception until its dissolution in 1924, is seen as an idealized Islamic golden age in which the khilàfa was the main superpower in the world, independent economically and militarily, uniting all Muslims as equal citizens in spite of the variety of ethnic origins. While it subdued many lands to the authority of Islam, it did not enslave their populations and plunder their resources as Western imperialists later did. It also practiced jihàd and carried Islam into Europe controlling much of it for over 500 years. It was an ideo­ logical state, a source of intellectual, cultural and scientific progress with many highly qualified scholars, intellectuals, and politicians.19 On the Christian side, Schaeffer indeed calls for a return to the Bible as the sole authority, but he repeatedly presents the Reformation era and its truths as the ideal and the apex of true Christianity. Much of his work is a call to a return to Reformation principles and practices rather than to first-century Christianity. Sir Fred Catherwood on the other hand, looks back to Europe in the late Middle Ages, which he sees as a unified Christian space with a common view of life tran­ scending the inherent tribalism, greed and ambition of the war-like preChristian pagan tribes. In spite of the many failures of the church in that era, the common Christian presuppositions and the deep impreg­ nation of society with the leaven of Christianity for centuries, released a dynamic energy that gave birth to modern science and to great cul­ tural achievements.20 T G  R P Most Christian fundamentalists who advocate participation in politics, do so as a complement to evangelism, with the aim at improving gov­ ernment, culture and society by placing government and law on a more biblically moral basis and helping to restrain evil. Politics are inevitably linked to morality as all legislation is a product of specific worldviews, and Christians ought to be involved in influencing legislation and deci­ sion making as much as possible. The true goal of Christian politics is seen by most as the implementation of justice in all public spheres21 (a goal stressed also by Islamic fundamentalists).

19 “Hizb ut-Tahrir to the Generals of the Turkish National Security Council and the Armed Forces”, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jordan, 21, January, 1998, MSANEWS, Internet, . 20 Fred Catherwood. “Europe: A House Swept Clean,” address given at the 1992 New Europe Forum in Brussels, Hope for Europe, Internet, . 21 Andre Rouvoet. “Politics, Democracy and Morality,” paper presented to the 1995 New Europe Forum, Hope for Europe, Internet, . Rouvoet is a Dutch MP for the Reformed Political Federation.

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Reconstructionists, however, have a more tangible aim: both evan­ gelism and politics are to be used as a means of progressively trans­ forming the world by the gospel, and of bringing whole nations one by one under Christ’s covenant, culminating in “a confederation of Christian nations welcoming newly converted nations into the commonwealth of redeemed mankind . . . an international kingdom of God.”22 Restoration­ ists also presume that the church will overwhelm the secular world and will dominate governments and all political and social institutions, not by force but by its example and by the involvement of believers in all spheres of life.23 These goals have similarities to those expressed by Islamic fundamentalists such as Mawdùdì and Qu†b. On the Islamic side, the ultimate goal of Islamic politics is “the res­ urrection of the Islamic empire as a unified state embracing the scat­ tered peoples of the Islamic world, raising the banner of Islam and bearing its message.” Muslims are guardians of humanity commissioned to instruct all people in God’s ways: The Noble Qur"an appoints the Muslims as guardians over humanity in its minority, and grants them the right of suzerainty and dominion over the world in order to carry out this sublime commission . . . it is our duty to establish sovereignty over the world and to guide all of humanity to the sound precepts of Islam and to its teachings, without which mankind cannot attain happiness.24

Another ultimate goal of Islam for fundamentalists is the abolition of all un-Islamic systems, states and governments opposed to its ideology, and the creation of a world-state based on the teachings of Islam in which all mankind is incorporated into one just cultural and political system with equal rights and opportunities for all, in which hostile com­ petition is replaced by friendly cooperation for the common good. This state not only fulfills the collective will of the people, but aims at a higher moral ideal of establishing a just political order based on divine guidance in which virtue can flourish and evil be suppressed. This can only be achieved by a state in which the law of God is the law of the land, and this is achieved by ensuring that collective power and lead­ ership are in the hands of righteous true believers.25 In this Islamic

22 Gary North. “Earthly Victory,” forerunner, Internet, . 23 Fenwick, in Hill, Fenwick, et al. 1995. pp. 44 –45. Restorationists and Reconstructionists hold to a positivist post-millennial eschatological position which presumes that the church will usher in the Kingdom before Christ’s return. The situation in the world is thus bound to improve as it progresses towards this goal. 24 Al-Banna. 1978. pp. 24, 71–72. 25 Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1976. Human Rights in Islam, p. 11; Mawdudi. 1984. The Islamic Movement, pp. 78–81.

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system people are freed from prejudice, national traditions, and racial pride to practice justice for humanity as a whole: A state on the basis of this ideology and programme of Islam . . . Islam requires the earth—not just a portion, but the entire planet—not because the sovereignty over the earth should be wrested from one nation or group of nations and vested in any one particular nation, but because the whole of mankind should benefit from Islam, and its ideology and welfare programme.26

The main object of this state is to implement Islam’s reform program for the betterment of mankind which includes the establishment of peace, the raising of the standard of living, the imposition of good Islamic practices, and the wiping out “with full force all those evils of which Islam aims to cleanse mankind of.” Another important goal of the Islamic state according to Mawdùdì is to be a visible witness to the world of a society actually functioning on the basis of God’s principles, translat­ ing them into public policies and programs, and demonstrating real equality and justice. This utopian society has a caring and efficient administration that ensures law and order as well as true social welfare, by the high standards of morality of its public servants. It practices virtue in internal policies and honesty in foreign policies. It conducts war in a civilized manner and exhibits integrity and loyalty in peace. It is thus a model and a living testimony for all humanity of Islam as the true guarantor of human well-being.27 Islam, as the only world-wide system ordained by God, has a pri­ mary goal “to remove jàhilìyya from the position of authority and to take the lead into its own hands in order to promulgate its own spe­ cial way of life that is a permanent feature of its system . . . to replace this jàhilìyya with Islamic ideas and traditions.”28 Qu†b calls for the estab­ lishment of an Islamic society governed by the Islamic creed, Sharì 'a, and the Islamic system (niΩàm Islàmì ).29 Islam is not a man-made, but a God-given ideology and system with its own “personality, concept, and mode.” It is revolutionary in its aim of totally replacing all other human systems. This is to be achieved through a step-by-step program of first inviting everyone to Islam, and then showing jàhilìyya its own corruption as compared to Islam.30 Among the more radical Islamic movements, the goal is clearly stated as being the re-establishment of the original world-wide Caliphate. For

26 Mawdudi in Donohue & Esposito 1982, Islam in Transition, pp. 94–97; Mawdudi. 1986b. Witnesses Unto Mankind, p. 32; Mawdudi. 1997b. Jihad fi Sabilillah, pp. 4, 12. 27 Mawdudi. 1994. The Islamic State, p. 23; Mawdudi. 1986b. pp. 32–33. 28 Qutb. 1990. pp. 113, 120. 29 Qutb. in Shepard. 1996. p. 277. 30 Qutb. 1990. pp. 114, 120.

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instance, the Conference of Islamic Revivalist Movements organized by the al-Muhàjirùn movement in London in November 1998, stated in its final declaration: “The Islamic Movements agree that the global prob­ lems we face are the direct result of the absence of the Islamic State (Al-Khilafah) and the need to co-operate and work together to fulfill the duty of its re-establishment.”31 Egypt’s al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya states that while their first goal is to bring all mankind into submission and worship of God, their second goal is the establishment of a khilàfa on the model of the Prophet.32 G I B S Both fundamentalisms tend to posit specific stages along the road to implementing their political goals. Islamic Implementation by Stages Whilst there are extreme movements active in violent revolutionary and terrorist activity, most Islamic fundamentalist movements argue for grad­ ualism (taddaruj ) in the implementation of their ultimate goal of a uni­ versal khilàfa. This is often based on the model of Mu˙ammad’s stages in setting up the first Islamic state in Medina. The advocated stages usually take the form of first reforming and transforming the individ­ ual in Muslim states and societies, then organizing mass grassroots move­ ments, followed by the establishment of Islam as a socio-political authority in a Muslim state, and finally the establishment of a universal khilàfa sometimes envisioned as a federation or union of Islamic states. Isràr A˙mad states that the Islamic revolution can be achieved by a non-violent popular movement able to affect change in the social, polit­ ical and economic domains. The right method is to study the stages by which the Prophet achieved his revolution and replicate them today. A˙mad sees seven stages in any revolution: (1) propagation of the rev­ olutionary ideology; (2) organization of all adherents into a highly dis­ ciplined political party; (3) training the members to activism and sacrifice; (4) passive resistance as a strategy to gain time for broadening the base of the party and winning the sympathy of the populace; (5) active resis­ tance when the revolutionary party becomes strong enough to challenge the status quo; (6) direct conflict which can be a violent or non-violent

31

“Declaration of The Conference of Islamic Revivalist Movements”, Friday 20th November 1998, MSANEWS, 24, 11, 1998, Internet, . 32 Jama'at creed, Azzam Publications website, Internet, .

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revolt; (7) the establishment of the Islamic order and its export abroad. A˙mad is at pains to show that these were actually the stages under­ taken by the Prophet. The Prophet did use armed conflict in the last stages, but this is not appropriate today, mainly for utilitarian reasons, as is evident from the failure of those Islamic movements who have resorted to violence, and it is better to bring about changes by popu­ lar pressure and non-violent civil disobedience as practised by Gandhi.33 Mawdùdì states that the goal of an Islamic state will be achieved by a process involving several stages. The first stage involves activating the consciousness of individual Muslims, making them aware of Islam’s demands in faith and action. The second stage involves the launching of an organized collective ( jamà'a) as the full requirements of Islam can only be fulfilled in a community. Activated Muslims must unite and organize themselves in order to accomplish the task as “organized cor­ porate life, that is jama'ah, has been made mandatory in Islam. That is why it is necessary to establish an organized jama'ah before embarking on Jihad”. As the contemporary Muslim world is in a state of disarray and disintegration there is no one jamà'a which can claim the loyalty of all Muslims, so in the initial stages of the Islamic movement it is inevitable that there will be a variety of organizations “working for the same ideal but following their own methods and plans.” However, they will eventually all unite into one Islamic organization that will establish institutions in which “the true spirit of Islam will prevail.” The final stage arrives when the united organization through its incessant strug­ gle manages to overthrow the Godless systems and replaces them with a just Islamic system,34 thus establishing an Islamic state or khilàfa in one specific country. Once Islamic governments are established in sev­ eral Muslim countries they will form a federation and elect a khalìfa for the whole world of Islam.35 Qu†b states that the goal of all true Muslims is the establishment of a true Islamic system using a step-by-step program based on the Prophetic model of the first community. The first stage is to re-Islamize the pop­ ulations of Muslim states, inviting all to Islam and presenting true Islam

33 Israr Ahmad. “Islamic Revolution can be Brought About by a Non-Violent Popular Movement”, Tanzeem-e-Islami press release, 19, October, 1997, MSANEWS, Internet, . Ahmad claims that the Prophet’s revolu­ tionary ideology of tawheed had threatening implications for the ruling elite in the areas of politics, society, and economics. The Prophet called all men to his ideol­ ogy, organized his followers, trained them, spent the Meccan period in passive resis­ tance, consolidated his strength in Medina, then entered into the stage of active conflict which ended with the victory of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and its export to the surrounding empires. 34 Mawdudi. 1986b. pp. 46–51. 35 Mawdudi. 1994. p. 38.

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as a comprehensive concept and system, “A paradigm of life and of the universe with its own unique characteristics.” The primary task of this da‘wa is to bring them out of jàhil ìyya back to Islam and make them Muslims all over again, replacing their jàhilì values with Islamic norms.36 The second stage is to openly display the corruption of jàhilìyya, so those who reject Islam are left without excuse. The third stage is to create an organized movement whose goal is the replacement of the existing jàhilì system with an Islamic system: “Islamic belief must take shape in living souls, in an active organization, and in a viable community.” Islam’s theoretical foundation must be actualized in an organized move­ ment with a strong leadership separated from jàhil ì society. It is the duty of all true Muslims to establish a true Muslim community ( jamà'a), the vanguard of renewal, governed by Sharì'a and engaged in spread­ ing Islam to the world. This process is gradual, modeled on the Prophet’s community: the true jamà'a will inexorably grow and reach the position of strength from which it can take over political power.37 The final stage is the establishment of the Islamic state, for according to Qu†b: Only one place on earth can be called the home of Islam (dar-al-Islam), and that is the place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari'ah is enforced and Allah’s limits are observed, and where all Muslims administer the affairs of the community with mutual consul­ tation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (dar-al-harb). A Muslim can have only two possible relations with dar-al-harb: peace with a contractual agreement, or war.38

Al-Turàbì also posits several stages in the development of Islamic move­ ments toward their ultimate goal of assuming the leadership of society. The initial stage is that of da 'wa, in which individuals experience “a spontaneous awareness of the Islamic identity and the need to express and promote it,” resulting in the emergence of small scattered groups in a hostile environment whose priority is Islamic apologetics. In the second stage the small groups coalesce into an organized group pro­ moting Islam and acting as an embryonic model of the Islamic society of the future. The third stage sees the development of a wider Islamic movement with a reformist role that has a tangible impact on society as it mobilizes positive social forces and brings pressures to bear on the political power center, becoming the main opposition force in the strug­ gle against evil in society. The final stage arrives when the Islamic move­ ment “assumes the mantle of political leadership of society and takes charge of public policy, putting into action its programmes aimed at

36 37 38

Qutb. 1990. pp. 21–35, 111, 120.

Ibid., pp. 29–39.

Ibid., p. 102.

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building a cleaner, freer, and better society and raising its religious and material living standards,” In this stage it also develops its international dimension toward other Muslim states and the wider international community.39 Óizb al-Ta˙rìr claims that the right route to establish khilàfa is polit­ ical activism that starts by winning over individuals and acculturating them into true Islam. The second stage is to generate in the masses a public awareness of Islamic ideology by engaging in an intellectual strug­ gle against the dominant kufr philosophies as well as a political strug­ gle against the kufr regimes. In this stage the organization is against the use of force and coercion, but it is also opposed to the democratic sys­ tem as a route for achieving khilàfa, as it is contrary to Mu˙ammad’s model, and because it is convinced that secular state elites will never allow Islamists to gain power and establish khilàfa—the examples of Algeria and Turkey are stressed. However, the rise of the khilàfa state is inexorable as it is God’s will, and it will be restored using the method­ ology of the Prophet, non-violent persuasion in the Meccan stage, and takeover of political power in the Medinan stage,40 completely replac­ ing the basis of state and society with the Islamic khilàfa. This means appointing a khalìfa to whom all Muslims give the oath of allegiance (bay'a) and whom they obey as long as he acts according to Qur"àn and Sunna. The khalìfa’s duty is to unite all Muslims within one khilàfa state to the exclusion of all others. Muslims are commanded to guide all of humanity and to run the world’s affairs according to Islam, so the khilàfa state will propagate Islam by da 'wa and jihàd to the whole world, until all its inhabitants either become Muslims, or submit to the laws of Islam and the authority of the khilàfa state.41 The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1989 election program of its political front, the Islamic Movement, stated that as God has con­ stituted all Muslims as one brotherhood and one nation, it is wrong for Muslims to be fragmented into various ethnic groups and states. The cure for all contemporary troubles is the unity of all Muslims under the banner of Islam, and the Brotherhood calls on all Muslims to work toward a comprehensive Muslim unity. It suggests a unified Arab home­ land as a first stage in the process leading to a “unified Islamic nation in a unified Islamic homeland able to face the giants of the East and

39 Al-Turabi, Hasan, in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi. 1998. The Making of an Islamic Political Leader, pp. 109–111. 40 Hizb ut-Tahrir. 1996. Hizb ut-Tahrir, pp. 18–27; Hussain Mushtaq of Hizb alTahrir, “Algeria—Massacres to Slaughter Islam and Muslims”, MSANEWS, 27,1,98, Internet, . 41 Mushtaq. “A Call from Hizb ut-Tahrir to the Generals of the Turkish National Security Council and the Armed Forces”, MSANEWS, Internet, .

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the West as equals.” Some suggested steps toward this goal are the pro­ motion of Islamic bonds among all Muslims, the encouragement of cul­ tural, commercial, technical and military exchanges between Muslim states, the facilitating of travel and movement throughout the Islamic world, supporting jihàd movements in the Islamic world, and deepen­ ing the commitment of Muslims around the world to the application of Shar ì 'a.42 The Bangor University Islamic Society claims that the Global Islamic movement is composed of all jama'àt sharing the aim of uniting all Muslims and recreating a borderless Islamic superstate. This will be achieved in stages, first by a gradualist (taddaruj ) reform of individuals and communities leading to the establishment of Islam as the political authority in Muslim states, then by the proliferation of da'wa on a global scale, and finally by the establishment of universal khilàfa. The society stresses the universality ('alamìyya) of Islam, as well as its pragmatism (waqi'ìyya) and balance (tawazzun) in achieving these goals.43 Some movements and leaders however, oppose gradualism. The spir­ itual guides of Jamà'at al-Jihàd (who assassinated President Sadat) dis­ agree with the stage by stage theory of implementing the Islamic system and state. This follows the teaching of Faràj in his book “The Hidden Obligation” (al-farì∂a al-ghà"iba) where he argues that Mu˙ammad’s func­ tioning in stages was a once for all God-ordained process that must not be emulated today. For Muslims after the Prophet, only the last stage, that of jihàd against unbelievers, is now in force. Jihàd also disagrees with those who while accepting jihàd as an obligation argue that Muslims are too weak at the moment to implement it, or who say that it can only be undertaken under the command of a khalìfa. These are simply excuses to cover their cowardice: “Jihad remains the exclusive concern of its people who know it is an obligation enjoined on them by Allah. It remains a necessity dictated by the nature of Islam, provoked by Jahiliyyah and narrated by history.”44 The ultimate goal of implement­ ing a truly Islamic system can only be achieved by this God-ordained method of immediate and violent jihàd, and Muslims today have no choice but to unite, prepare, and engage in the battle:

42 Sabah al-Said. 1995. Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 1989–1994, pp. 58–59. 43 “The Global Islamic Movement,” Bangor Islamic Society, Internet, . 44 Najeh Ibrahim, Asim Abdul-Maajid, & Esam ud-Din Darbaalah. 1997. In Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, pp. 122–136. This book, written by the three authors while in an Egyptian prison, was supervised by the blind Sheikh 'Umar Abdul-Rahman, the spiritual guide of al-jihàd, who is now in prison following his involvement in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.

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  Fighting is binding in order to remove disbelieving rulers who domi­ nate our countries, to retrain the groups of people who surround these rulers, support them and defend their man-made laws, to install a Caliph for all Muslims, to regain the lands which we have lost and to help release Muslim prisoners . . . We must prepare for a ceaseless war that will rage until all kufr begins to crumble, all Jahili laws are swept away, our Caliphate is re-established and all our lands are regained. Then we will go forth with the sword in one hand and the Qur"an in the other, calling all Mankind to Islam. It is true this will be a serious and hard task to carry out, but all our able men are now obliged to undertake it; otherwise we will all be guilty of neglecting all these obligations.45

'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad also opposes gradual implementation, stat­ ing like Faràj that since the Prophet has completed his mission, Muslims are now obliged to implement all revealed rulings simultaneously with­ out exceptions. Applying Islamic law today must be enforced in one swift stroke, and gradualism contradicts Islamic commands. All Allàh’s rules are of equal value and cannot be distinguished as to priority of implementation. The explanations of some that Muslims are not yet powerful enough to apply Islam and that the current circumstances do not allow it are unacceptable excuses.46 However, in a somewhat con­ tradictory manner, 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad views the life of the Prophet as the model to follow in implementing an Islamic society and state, acknowledging that the prophet changed society in stages by impacting individuals first, then the predominant ideas and the general public opin­ ion of the time, and finally the prevailing government system. He thus seems to acknowledge the need for at least a preparatory stage, as in many Muslim societies today the predominant discourse of the major­ ity is secularist and nationalistic, and these attitudes have to be changed first.47 The way to implement the true Islamic state is by Muslims in one country appointing a khalìfa and giving him their oath of allegiance. All Muslims in all countries of the world are then obliged to recognize this khalìfa and offer him their bay'a too, because establishing a khilàfa is a collective duty incumbent on all Muslims, and once implemented in the correct manner by some, it immediately becomes binding on all.48 This seems to be based on a rather utopian view of the nature of the Muslim world.

45

Ibid., pp. 125, 135. Omar Bakri Muhammad. “It is Prohibited to Implement Islam Gradually,” Internet, . 47 O.B. Muhammad. “Society”, Al-Muhajirun webpage, Internet, . 48 O.B. Muhammad. “The Khilafah”, Al-Muhajirun webpage, Internet, . 46

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Christian Fundamentalist Implementation by Stages Christian fundamentalists, especially in America, seek to mobilize grass­ roots political activism in order to implement desired changes in poli­ tics, government, the legal system, and society. In order to solve the crisis in the moral condition of America, Falwell suggests concerned Christians follow three stages: first, mobilize all con­ cerned Christians to become registered voters and exercise their right to vote in order to “change the tide of political influence on the social issues in our nation.”49 Second, “keep the public informed on the vital moral issues” as many Americans are unaware of the real issues. The Moral Majority was founded so as to “inform the moral majority of what is going on behind their backs in Washington and in state legis­ latures across the country.”50 Third, social and political activism. Falwell reminds Christians of the many instances in history where Christian involvement in politics produced important changes in social issues: the great revivals under Whitfield and Wesley, the abolition of slavery in the British empire, the impact of the Salvation Army, and the prohi­ bition of 1919. He berates Christian fundamentalists for evading social issues since the 1940s with the excuse that their “only obligation is to preach the gospel and prepare men for heaven,” and forgetting that they are still their brother’s keepers.51 Robertson makes the following suggestions to evangelicals desiring to make a difference: register new voters, study and discuss the political issues from a biblical standpoint, form alliances with other churches to get the issues and candidates before the Christian public, get involved at the grassroots precinct and primary level because a tiny minority working faithfully at that level determines the nation’s political platforms and party candidates. He feels sure that if this program is followed, than evangelicals could profoundly reshape the political life of the nation.52 Crippen suggests organization, voting and lobbying as the steps for furthering the cause of a reformation of American politics and culture. Organized activities by Christians on social and political issues are part of the drive to implement the wished for reformation. As voting is the most direct way to influence government, he suggests Christians con­ duct voter-registration drives in their churches, help distribute voter guides, join a local party committee, serve on a campaign, and finally run for office. Crippen also highlights lobbying, suggesting believers

49 50 51 52

Jerry Falwell. 1980. Listen, America! p. 258.

Ibid., pp. 258–260.

Ibid., pp. 261–263.

Pat Robertson. 1986. America’s Dates with Destiny, pp. 300–304.

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contact their elected representatives on specific issues, forcing them to exert pressure on governments into adopting Christian agendas.53 North believes in a “gradual, pervasive transformation of human insti­ tutions in the wake of worldwide conversion to orthodox Christianity. . . . civil government at the top will change when government at the bot­ tom changes; from self-government to civil government at all levels”. The political process becomes useful only when mass individual trans­ formation has take place. Reconstructionists do not believe in the pyra­ mid theory of changing the top first in order to have a trickle-down effect. They do not believe the pagan notion that it is sufficient to change the state in order to change society.54 North states that Reconstructionists are not revolutionary, he calls Christians who plan to advance the kingdom by revolution “romantic revolutionaries”. Reconstructionists possess a consistent biblical view which includes the belief that they have lots of time in which to patiently accomplish their goals. The way for Christians to achieve dominion “is by ethical service and work, not by revolution.” They follow the bibli­ cal examples of people like Joseph and Daniel who “exercised enor­ mous influence within the world’s greatest empires. But they attained their positions by hard work, perseverance in persecution and suffering and faithful obedience . . . We are not to attain positions of leadership by revolution or rebellion. Instead we are to work at our callings, and wait on the Lord to place us in positions of influence, in His time.” Only “Satanic Power religion” uses unethical violent means to attain power, Dominion Religion is ethical in its means and goals.55 V  D  P S Much academic discourse is dedicated to the issue of fundamentalism, democracy and power sharing. Some observers claim that there is an inherent incompatibility between fundamentalist religion and democracy. Others like Esposito and Voll argue that fundamentalism is not incom­ patible with democracy, as religions have a wide spectrum of potential resources for different forms of government. They state that religious resurgence and democratization are the two most significant trends in the last quarter of the twentieth century, expressing the wish of many in various cultures for greater identity and participation. These trends often coincide with and reinforce each other, though they accept that

53 Alan Crippen. “A Call to Action”, in Crippen, ed., 1996. Reclaiming the Culture, pp. 164–171. 54 Gary North & Gary DeMar. 1991. Christian Reconstruction: What it is, What it isn’t, pp. 92–93. 55 Ibid., pp. 140–142.

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in some areas these movements are locked in conflict.56 Juergensmeyer claims that most fundamentalists have willingly accepted the electoral process as a means of choosing leaders and making decisions compat­ ible with their religious convictions. In this respect they are as democ­ ratic as secular politicians, the basic difference being that fundamentalists are less concerned with the process and more with its ultimate purpose, which is to support a political system that ascertains that all human activity is consonant with the divine moral order.57 Both fundamentalisms devote some space in their discourse to the tensions between their theocentric views of God’s sovereignty in the political sphere and contemporary secular democratic systems. They differ from accepted secular-liberal democratic ideas in stipulating God’s sovereignty as absolute and above the sovereignty of the people. God’s revealed will in the scriptural sources acts as the constitutional frame­ work within which a quasi-democratic system may operate. While many Christians are happy for the legislative body to enact independent leg­ islation on any matter as long as it does not contradict divine biblical moral principles, Islamists tend to narrow it down to not legislating, but rather interpreting the details of God’s prescribed code of law. Only where the sources have no explicit directions whatsoever is the legisla­ tive council allowed to really legislate on its own accord with the stip­ ulation that these laws must in no way be reprehensible to Sharia. Democracy is thus played out in a more restricted field than in the western secular model of democracy. However, the institutions of government as described by fundamen­ talists are remarkably similar to those established by western secularliberal democratic states. Christians indeed claim some right to these institutions as being born of the Reformation spirit. Most fundamen­ talists are happy with the three-fold division of powers (executive, leg­ islative and judiciary), and most are happy with the executive being run by a presidential-style head of state. Christian Views In the Christian view all civil government is seen as ordained of God, no matter what form it takes. As such it is due the loyalty and obedience of all its subjects, whether it be a monarchy, democracy, or dictatorship.58

56

John Esposito & John O. Voll. 1996. Islam and Democracy, pp. 8–10. Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, p. 178. 58 MacDonald. 1990. pp. 416, 548–549. 57

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Democracy as the Lesser Evil As to the preferred political system, given man’s sinful nature, democ­ racy is seen by many as the lesser of all evils.59 Christians are to pray for those in authority and if possible be actively engaged in the politi­ cal process to lawfully install the best candidates who are committed to a biblical worldview and morality.60 In this view democracy is the preferred political system because it reflects the biblical paradox of man. It deals seriously with human dig­ nity, refusing to govern people without their consent, and encouraging their full participation in the decision-making process. Because it rec­ ognizes the consequences of the fall, it refuses to concentrate power in the hands of one person or of a limited elite, thus protecting men from their pride and folly. No political ideology has a monopoly on truth and goodness—“at best it can be but an approximation of the will and purpose of God.” Absolutism and anarchy are evil—“absolutism because it relies on rigid control, denies the dignity of man and leads to tyranny, and anarchy because it denies man’s depravity due to the fall and pro­ motes unrestricted freedom which leads to chaos, not utopia.” The only real alternative is democracy, “the political expression of persuasion by argument.” Modern democracy reflects the balanced biblical view of human beings as formulated by the Reformation, as it is realistic about human nature while involving the citizens in the legislative process. In a democracy Christians can make a positive contribution to society by engaging in the public debate, seeking to influence public opinion in the direction of a more God-pleasing legislation. However, like any other human institution, democracy can be manipulated by unscrupulous lead­ ers and fail to deliver. Also, as democracy is by definition the rule of a majority, there is an inherent danger of trampling on minorities.61 Republic Rather than Democracy Reconstructionists postulate a difference between democratic and repub­ lican forms of government. Democracy is a government of the masses because it places all power in the people, and when their whims and fancies change, the law changes. It is the dictatorship of the majority, offering no guarantees to minorities who end up being oppressed. “The will of the democratic majority must not be equated with the will of God.” Democracy can degenerate into exploitation as people discover that “they can vote themselves political and financial favors out of the public treasury. Those seeking power through majority rule always vote for the candidate promising the most benefits.” As a result, democra­

59 60 61

John Stott. 1984. Issues Facing Christians Today, pp. 40–41.

Norman Geisler. 1990. Christian Ethics, pp. 216–217.

Stott. 1984. pp. 40–41, 57–60.

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cies tend to collapse when the treasury is bankrupted, giving way to a dictatorship. On the other hand, a republic is a system in which law, not the majority, is supreme. The USA is a republic rather than a democracy—a system in which God’s law is the law of the land. This law “requires just treatment of both the citizen and the ‘stranger’, the majority and the minority, because God has given one law for the peo­ ple . . .”. Reconstructionists, however, do not aim at a revolution or at a top-down take-over in order to implement this ideal system, but rather affirm that God’s laws should be implemented through the democratic process (in spite of North’s earlier attacks on democracy) which God can use to extend his kingdom.62 Islamic Views Moussalli notes that moderate Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast to the radicals, are more democratic than the secular-nationalist regimes of many Middle Eastern states, believing that power is delegated by God to the people as a whole, accepting the division of power among the institutions of government (executive, legislative and judiciary), demanding basic human rights, and encouraging civil society.63 Islamic fundamentalists are divided on democracy, some stating that the Islamic system is in a unique category of its own having nothing to do with democracy, others claiming Islam as the only true and orig­ inal democracy, while yet others see democracy as adaptable to Islamic principles. Some of the Islamic debate on democracy can be attributed to semantics, as it does seem that many use it in a tactical utilitarian sense to imply that their proposed systems offer the positive benefits of Western democracy even as they repudiate those very systems. However, others seem sincerely dedicated to its inherent qualities of freedom and equality. Tamìmì reviews several leading fundamentalist thinkers and notes that some see democracy as Islamic or at least compatible with Islam, while others reject it altogether. Tamìmì sees Qu†b as the archrejectionist of democracy among fundamentalists, denouncing the very concept as alien and jàhilì. On the other hand Tamìmì sees Mawdùdì, Hudaybì, Ghannùshì, Óawwà" and Bennabi as gradually developing an acceptance of democracy as Islamic or as compatible with Islam.64 On the more rejectionist side, Qu†b is against comparing the Islamic system with any modern political system. The Islamic political system,

62

North & DeMar. 1991. pp. 120–122. Ahmad S. Moussalli. 1995. “Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy”, in August R. Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, p. 118. 64 Azzam Tamimi. “Democracy in Islamic Political Thought”, Encounters, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1997, pp. 21–44. 63

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created by God, stands in a category of its own as totally different to all other human-derived political systems with which it must not be mixed.65 Even if similarities exist, they are peripheral and superficial, not essential. “The very effort to find support for the Islamic systems in similarities to or agreements with other systems is a sign of a defeatist attitude . . .”. However, he grants some similarities and leaves an open door, within limits, to the adoption of modern western democratic systems. Qu†b states that consultation (shùrà) is one of the basic principles of the Islamic system for which “no particular system has been specified, its applica­ tion is left to existing circumstances and needs . . . There is ample space for various kinds of systems and methods which are not defined by Islam, as it is content to lay down the general principle.” One limit he lays down is that consultation may be practised only in matters where there is no direct revelation in scripture. Another limitation is that those to be consulted (ahl al-shùrà) must be “from among those with experi­ ence, prestige and good judgment.”66 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad definitely views Western democracy as anti­ thetical to Islamic belief in God’s sovereignty, and finds an inherent contradiction between the two systems. The Muslim umma must be healed from the “poison of freedom, democracy, capitalism, national­ ism, and secular thought which the fangs of the imperialist kafirs injected into our thinking.” He remarks with satisfaction on the new phenom­ enon of Muslims rejecting Western concepts in favor of comprehensive Islamic system, and opposes Muslim organizations trying to encourage cooperation and coexistence with kufr systems in the hope of gradually changing them.67 Mu˙ammad warns against comparing the Islamic state as prescribed by the original sources with Western democracy, or set­ ting up Western democracy as a standard against which to judge the Islamic system. The important thing is not its similarities to some form of Western democracy, but its compliance with the original divine model. The Islamic khilàfa model is based on Sharì'a, with religion, state and government integrated into one unit. It is therefore totally different to any other system of government. Mu˙ammad agrees that God has given authority to the whole Muslim umma, but this authority is implemented by the umma appointing a khalìfa and submitting to him. The khalìfa is accountable to the umma on the basis of Sharì'a, and the umma in turn judges his performance by God’s law:

65

Qutb. 1990. pp. 106–108. Qutb in Shepard. 1996. pp. 116–117. 67 Omar Bakri Muhammad. “Islam vs. Democracy”, Internet, . 66

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Though the Khilafah system may appear similar to the democratic system with regard to the freedom of elections, voting, and to voice some opinions, it is incorrect to consider the two systems as similar because in the democratic system, these matters result from the liber­ ties, whilst in Islam they result from the conditions of the Khilafah contract. . . . The difference between guaranteeing the freedom in elections and securing the consent and selection in the contract is that the freedom is the decision of the people . . . securing the consent and the selection is the rule of the contract not the law of the people. So if it was not achieved the contract would be illegal and not con­ cluded. Similarly, all the thoughts of Islam differ from the thoughts of democracy.68

Political parties established on the basis of Islam are legitimate in this view, their function being to hold the ruler accountable and to test his actions by Sharì'a. Should he infringe the divine rules, a special “Court for the Acts of Injustice” (ma˙kumàt al-maΩàlim) has the authority to dis­ miss him. The consultative council, majlis al-shùrà, is elected by the peo­ ple, but is a rather weak institution whose main role is to represent the Muslim citizens and their views to the khalìfa when consulted, to give him non-binding advice, to complain about erring government officials, and to determine the candidates for the post of khalìfa before an election.69 In spite of this, Mu˙ammad sees the rule of the people as guar­ anteed by the rule of Sharì'a—it “is not the rule of the ruler, rather the rule of the law, where the rule of the ruler is itself subject to the rule of the law.” The ruler is only a shepherd who cares for his people within the framework of Sharì 'a. As Muslims are motivated to keep the law by the fear of hell and by their desire to please God, the settling of disputes in the Islamic state will be easy.70 Mawdùdì is more open to the idea of democracy, and while he claims that the Islamic philosophy of government is totally different from that of Western democracy, in practice the system he suggests actually has many similarities to the democratic one. He argues that the Islamic state system is a “theo-democracy” ruled by the whole Muslim community: The entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. If I were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe this system of government as a ‘theo-democracy’, that is to say a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God.71

68 69 70 71

Omar Bakri Muhammad. “The Khilafah”, Internet, .

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mawdudi in Ahmad. 1976. pp. 160–161.

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For Mawdùdì, the Islamic concept of khilàfa means that all who sub­ mit to God’s sovereignty and law have collective political rights: “The authority of khilafa is bestowed on the whole of any community which is ready to fulfill the conditions of representation after subscribing to the principles of tawhid and risala.” This makes the Islamic khilàfa “a democracy, which in essence and fundamentals is the antithesis of the Theocratic, the Monarchical and the Papal forms of government, as also of the present-day Western Secular democracy.”72 The Islamic gov­ ernment is democratic because on questions lacking explicit injunctions in Sharì'a every Muslim is entitled to interpret the law of God, the final decision being settled by the consensus of all Muslims. It is theocratic because no one can alter explicit commands given in Sharì 'a and because it accepts all God-ordained limitations on human freedom, knowing that they are in the best interests of humanity.73 Mawdùdì does not pre­ scribe how the Muslim populace practically arrives at consensus, whether by referendums or representatives in the shùrà council. He is interested in the broad sweep of the ideology, not in the constitutional and bureau­ cratic details of how to implement it in practice.74 There are affinities between democracy and the Islamic political sys­ tem as both are against the tyranny of dynasties, individuals, or classes. As in a democracy, every individual in society enjoys equal rights, and government is constituted by gaining the agreement of the people, who delegate their authority to it for a limited time. The affairs of state should be run according to the Qur"ànic principle of consultation (shùrà) in which every Muslim has the right of a direct say or the right to have a representative chosen by him to participate in the running of the state.75 Mawdudi stresses that shùrà is compulsory: the head of state must consult with the consultative body which is the legislature. Though in the time of the ràshidùn Caliphate, the Caliph had the right to veto the majority opinion in the consultative council, Mawdùdì feels that in contemporary situations it is better “to limit and subordinate the exec­ utive to the majority decisions of the legislature.”76 According to Mawdùdì the difference between Islamic democracy and Western democracy is that Western democracy is based on absolute popular sovereignty while Islamic democracy is based on popular khilàfa, ultimate sovereignty belonging to God as revealed in Sharì 'a. In the West the people are sovereign, in Islam only God is sovereign while the people are His caliphs or representatives. In the West the people

72 73 74 75 76

Mawdudi. 1994. pp. 14–15.

Mawdudi. “Political Theory of Islam” in Ahmad. 1976. pp. 160–162.

Ibid., pp. 160–161.

Mawdudi. 1976. pp. 10, 34.

Mawdudi. 1994. pp. 20–22.

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make their own laws, in Islam they follow and obey God’s laws. In the West the government fulfills the will of the people, in Islam govern­ ment and people fulfill the will of God.77 For the legislative assembly (majlis al-shùrà) of the Islamic state, Mawdùdì lays down the following principles: The members of the assembly must be freely elected by the people, who through their representatives have the right to criticize government. Government must never suppress the facts when presenting the people with specific situations, so people can judge for themselves whether the government is acting properly; there must be a guarantee that only those who enjoy the support of the masses be allowed to rule, while those who lose this support should be removed from their position.78 Mawdùdì does not deal with the question of who interprets Sharì'a and makes sure that government and people do not deviate from it. This question has not been clearly dealt with in Islamic discourse. As Western democracies need some kind of constitutional court, Islamic systems need some kind of higher Shar ì'a authority, a spiritual-legal arbiter external to the government to keep it in check and to ensure it does not deviate from the divinely ordained paradigm.79 In the pro-democracy camp, al-Turàbì states clearly that “The Islamic model of government is based on, I might call it, democracy . . .”.80 He claims that Islam demands a limited government and opposes an allpowerful state as only God is omnipotent. “Government has no busi­ ness interfering in one’s religion or religious practices. This limitation resembles that of liberalism and the Marxist vision of a vanishing state . . . In the case of Sudan, government may have to play an important role to establish rules, but then it should withdraw”. In general, government should leave society alone and only step in when a societal function fails. Al-Turàbì sees shùrà and ijmà' (consultation and consensus) as equiv­ alent to democracy.81 Some Islamic fundamentalists accept the republican form of govern­ ment as consistent with Islamic principles, and see ijtihàd by a legisla­ tive assembly as the modern democratic form ijmà' takes on today. All Western ideas of democracy, including freedom, fair play, and human rights are acceptable as long as “they remain within the limits of Sharia

77

Mawdudi. 1976. p. 10. Ibid., p. 34. 79 Juergensmeyer. 1993. pp. 175–177. In the Islamic Republic of Iran this func­ tion is carried out by the office of the Supreme Guide initially filled by Ayatollah Khomeini, and after his death by Ayatollah Khamenei. 80 Al-Turabi, “Interview with Sudanese Leaders Al-Turabi and Al-Attabani” at the Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference held in Khartoum 8–10 October 1994. 81 Al-Turabi, WISE Roundtable with Dr Hassan Turabi: “Islam, Democracy, the State and the West”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1992. pp. 49–61. 78

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and do not transgress those limits”. Popular democracy on the other hand is unacceptable as it is diametrically opposed to the Islamic prin­ ciple of sovereignty belonging to Allàh alone. While it is not possible to establish today an exact replica of the ràshidùn Caliphate, it is pos­ sible to incorporate its principles of state and governance into Islamic political institutions. In a modern Islamic state political parties are allowed to function freely with the only restriction that their manifestos do not violate the injunctions of Sharì 'a. Again any dispute about this must be decided by the Supreme Court of the Islamic state.82 Dr 'Issam al-Erian, one of the founders of the Islamic Students Movement in Egypt in the seventies, and an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood, states that the Muslim Brotherhood had in prin­ ciple “always believed in the viability of the parliamentary system” as seen in the fact that Óasan al-Bannà" had twice nominated himself as candidate for parliament (1942 and 1945). Bannà" had expressed the wish that parliament should be the platform in which all the construc­ tive desires and aspirations of the entire nation be expressed. The Muslim Brotherhood had a declared commitment to “true and real democracy” as well as to pluralism and power sharing—it was the government that prevented it from participating in the democratic process, forcing it to target trade unions and syndicates to create platforms for its ideas and activities. The Brotherhood opposes radicalism, aggression, and violence of any kind, and blames the Egyptian government for much of the ter­ rorism which is a result of the repression and the frustrations caused by it.83 Ghannùshì claims that “Islamic rule is by nature democratic. Basically, because it derives its legitimacy from the people and, if the people with­ draw their support, it loses its right to remain in power.” Other ide­ ologies have a right to compete with Islamism.84 Ghannùshì rejects the stance of some Islamic fundamentalists that link democracy to foreign intervention and non-belief, stating that such negative attitudes actually hinder the implementation of an Islamic system. “Democracy is a set of mechanisms to guarantee freedom of thought and assembly and peace­ ful competition for governmental authority through ballot boxes.” As Muslims have no modern experience of Islamic systems that can replace democracy, they should concentrate on Islamizing democracy, as that

82 Ahmad, Israr. 1998. “Legitimation in an Islamic State” in Tanzeem-e-Islami Pakistan Press Release, 2nd, August, 1998, MSANEWS, 17, 8, 1998, Internet, . 83 Essam al-Erian. “The Future of Power-Sharing in Egypt” in Tamimi. 1993. Power Sharing Islam, p. 59. 84 Ghannouchi. “A Government of God?” an interview by journalist Omayma Abdel-Latif in Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 409, 24–30 December 1998.

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is the system closest to implementing shùrà (consultation),85 sees ˙àkimìyya as allowing ijtihàd in interpreting God’s guidelines. Differences of opin­ ion and disagreements in this process are to be tolerated as normal. Ghanùshì also posits spaces ( faraghàt ) left by Islam for humans to fill according to exigencies of time and place. He rejects the view of some Islamists that the sources contain direct solutions to every conceivable problem of past, present and future. While that might be true of the inner circle of Islam (al-dìnì ), for the outer circle (al-siyàsì ) the sources contain essential guidelines, from which Muslims are to develop answers suitable to modern exigencies.86 Power-Sharing—Can Islamists Co-operate with Non-Islamist Regimes and Non-Islamist Movements? There is an ongoing discussion of this subject in Islamic discourse. Mas'arì is against power sharing with un-Islamic regimes, arguing for a limited participation of Muslims in their administrative functions, but not in legislative and executive ones. The reason is that Western democ­ racy is based on human sovereignty, a suitable majority of the elected body having the right to enact any law it wants even if completely con­ trary to God’s revealed law. As an example he cites the legitimization of homosexuality in Britain which changed it into respectable expres­ sion of human behavior and a legally protected right—all following a simple majority vote in parliament that disregarded God’s higher Law.87 Mas'arì argues for clearly discerning between law making and admin­ istrative elected bodies. Muslims are allowed to participate as public ser­ vants and employees in administrative and procedural bodies belonging to kufr (disbelief ) and Ωulm (oppressive) regimes, although difficulties may arise when dealing with matters clearly forbidden by Shar ì 'a (such as regulating “red-light” districts, or raising interest on loans). Muslims however are not permitted to take part in the law-making bodies and processes of non-Islamic states, as law-making is the prerogative of Allah alone: “All scholars of Usul al-Fiqh agree that Allah is the Haakim (law­ maker), not humans nor reason . . . any belief to the contrary is Shirk and Kufr.”88

85 Ghannouchi. “Islamic Movements: Self Criticism and Reconsideration”, Middle East Affairs Journal, Winter 1997, MSANEWS, 14, April, 1999, Internet, . 86 Ghannouchi, interview with Azzam Tamimi, London, June 1997, as quoted by Tamimi in “Democracy: The Religious and the Political in Contemporary Islamic Debate”, 1, October, 1998, MSANEWS Scholars Base, Internet, . 87 Muhammad al-Mas‘ari. “Ruling by Kufr is Haram,” MSANEWS, 18, 12, 1997, Internet, . 88 Ibid.

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Mas'arì argues that God condemns all acts of ruling, governing, judg­ ing, and administering not sanctioned by Divine Law. He classifies these acts as criminal, kufr (disbelief ), Ωulm (oppression and injustice), and fißq (public rebellion and disobedience). In such systems, heads of state, cab­ inet ministers, and members of law-making bodies all transgress against the divine sovereignty. A judge in a kufr system applying kufr laws becomes a kàfir, Ωàlim, and fàßiq. Human beings were not created to exercise power or share in it, but to worship Allah alone, surrendering to none but Him, and establishing God’s rule and system of true jus­ tice on earth, based on Qur"àn and Sunna. Mas'arì states that “it is very difficult to live and work UNDER kufr and zulm regimes, but the difficulties escalate to a higher order of magnitude if you want to work WITH them,” and he opposes those like Tamìmì who talk about powersharing.89 Ghannùshì on the other hand advocates that Muslims willingly par­ ticipate in the establishment of secular democratic systems. While an Islamic regime is the ideal, “The secular democratic system is semiIslamic because justice is one of its basic components”. When circum­ stances are not agreeable to the implementation of Sharia, the second best is the establishment of a just democratic system based on “respect for human rights and justice . . . If that is achieved, even though not under Islam’s banner, than well and good.”90 Ghannùshì states that there are no really Islamic government in existence despite all the effort to establish one (in his view Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan are not really Islamic governments). However, the concept of an Islamic gov­ ernment does exist, and it is the religious duty of all Muslims to work for its establishment.91 In the meantime, Muslims should participate in the establishment of what Ibn-Khaldùn called a “rational government” due to their inability to establish a “government of legitimacy”. It is the duty of Muslims “to participate politically in establishing and admin­ istering government in order to serve the interests of the umma and pre­ vent evil. Failing to do so will undermine these interests and allow evil to dominate society.” Ghannùshì sees the real choice facing Muslims today as not that between an Islamic government and a non-Islamic one, but that of a dictatorship versus a democracy. In this situation power sharing is a means of working towards common goals “such as national solidarity, respect for human rights, civil liberties, cultural and social development and the deterrence of external threat.” Ghannùshì goes on to claim that

89

Ibid. Ghannouchi. “A Government of God?” 91 Ghannouchi, Rachid “The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Govern­ ment” in Tamimi. 1993. pp. 51–56. 90

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realism and flexibility are important features of Islamic methodology, and the extraordinary situation Muslims find themselves in dictates that Muslims ought to promote the interests of mankind in whatever way they can and make the best of a bad situation. The rule is that Muslims are obliged to do only what they can: So power-sharing in a Muslim or non-Muslim environment becomes a necessity in order to lay the foundations of the social order. This power-sharing may not necessarily be based on Islamic Shari‘ah law. However, it must be based on an important foundation of the Islamic government, namely Shura, or the authority of the ummah (commu­ nity), so as to prevent the evils of dictatorship, foreign domination, or local anarchy. Such a process of power-sharing may also aim to achieve a national or a humanistic interest such as independence, social soli­ darity, civil liberties, human rights, political pluralism, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, or liberty for mosques and Islamic activities.92

Ghannùshì permits participation of Islamists in all aspects of govern­ ment in democratic states. Indeed, he sees it as a religious duty of Mus­ lims, both individuals and communities, to participate in such a system.93 Ghannùshì advocates that in all countries where Muslims are a minor­ ity, they should enter into alliances with secular democratic groups to help establish a system of freedom and respect for individual rights which are Islamic goals. True democracies, even in non-Muslim states, are not to be seen as dàr al-˙arb. In Muslim majority states ruled by dictators, Islamic movements should ally themselves to secular democ­ ratic parties in order to struggle towards the toppling of the dictator­ ship and the establishment of a secular democracy that will respect human rights and liberties. The long-term objective of establishing an Islamic government should be postponed until circumstances permit it in a non-violent and democratic way. The main goal for Muslims is “to be actively engaged in an effort to implement the revealed laws of Allah, whether partially or in their totality, depending on the circum­ stances and resources. The essence of Allah’s laws, for which all divine messages were sent, is the establishment of justice for mankind.” The main contemporary task is “to combat despotism in favor of a genuine and true transition to democracy”, and to force incumbent regimes in Muslim states to allow Islamist movements to form political parties and join in the political discourse.94

92 93 94

Ibid., pp. 51–56.

Ibid., 1993. p. 56.

Ibid., 1993. pp. 62–63.

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There are resemblances in the way both fundamentalisms look back to the origins of their faith as to an idealized and perfect golden age which ought to be emulated and restored. Both tend to call for a return to the virtues, devotion, and single-mindedness of the first believers, and to the essential doctrines they promulgated and lived out. Both view present-day religion as corrupted and as a deviation from the first pure paradigm. Finally both posit secondary glorious eras as part of the per­ ceived golden age to be emulated today. As to the goal of their political involvement, most Christian groups have a rather limited aim of influencing the present system and improv­ ing society, culture and government, rather than totally transforming or replacing it.95 Most Islamists have an ultimate goal of resurrecting a universal Islamic state ( khilàfa) based on Sharì 'a which will replace all other jàhilì systems in the world. Islamic fundamentalists, except for the Tablìghì Jamà'at which eschews politics and focuses on individual spiri­ tual revival, seem united in wanting an Islamic state with a khal ìfa, Amìr or Imàm at its head and with the Sharì 'a as its constitution. Most see consultation (shùrà) as compulsory and as the Islamic equivalent to west­ ern democracy. Though they engage in much discussion on the theory of the Islamic system and the Islamic state, they do seem to be rather vague on the details of how this is to be set up and to function in prac­ tice. In the Christian camp, only the Reconstructionists seem to have an aim similar to that of Islamic fundamentalists of establishing a reli­ gious political order in the state and of bringing all nations into one superstate under Christ. Most groups in both fundamentalisms want to implement their goal by stages. Islamists recreate their own vision of Mu˙ammad’s stages in creating the first Islamic state, which usually includes a stage of weak­ ness in which the message is broadcast and society gradually Islamized, followed by a stage of separation (hijra, mufàßala) in which the Islamic community is consolidated and gains strength, and finally the stage of strength in which the Islamic community takes over the reins of power and establishes an Islamic state system. Discussions are mainly on whether to implement this process peacefully or violently, as well as on the definitions and parameters of the different stages. Christians have less doctrinaire and more pragmatic plans of impacting society and gov­ ernment by mobilizing true believers to inform themselves on the cur­ rent political and moral issues and where the various political players

95 Christian Reconstructionists differ from most other Christian groups by hav­ ing a similar goal of bringing all nations into one superstate under Christ.

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stand on them, organize themselves into pressure groups, participate in elections to get believers into political positions of power both in local and central government, and lobby on specific issues that concern Christians. Both fundamentalisms view government as operating firmly within the parameters of divine sovereignty and revelation, the will of the peo­ ple being subordinate to God’s law. For Christians this means efforts at repealing perceived immoral legislation and passing new laws based on biblical morality and ethics. Most Christians accept democracy as the lesser of all evils as far as systems of government are concerned, while many plead for a minimalist government which gives much space to other God-given autonomous spheres of government in family, church and school. Islamists argue on whether democracy is compatible with Islam. Some see the Islamic system as unique and having no relation to modern Western democracy. Others claim Islam is the true and original democ­ racy, while others yet adapt democracy to Islamic concepts and stress pluralism and human rights. Most describe possible Islamic systems remarkably similar to contemporary Western democratic systems with a division of powers between the three arms of government: the leg­ islative, judicial and executive. However, most Islamists tend to give large powers to the leader of the executive (khal ìfa), regarded as the main guarantor of the Islamic state system. Also most Islamists view the ideal state as actively interventionist in protecting and enforcing the divine order. There is also some confusion on the motives for ad­ vocating some degree of democracy and power sharing—some see it as tactical, others as an essential part of the Islamic ideology. Common to both fundamentalisms is the concept that God’s law is above human law and defines the limits of legislation. This is taken much further by Islamists than by most Christians, Islamists usually claiming that Sharì'a is the basic law of the state, as only God has the authority to legislate, so the legislative institution only interprets God’s laws, issues guidelines on how to implement them, and only when no clear rule is laid down in Sharì 'a, may exercise the right of ijtihàd to legislate by consensus on these matters. As Tàji-Farùki noted about al-Nabhànì, the founder of Óizb al-Ta˙rìr, there often seem to be contradictions and internal inconsistencies in the writings of various Islamic authors. This seems to happen especially in their comparisons of the Islamic system with Western democracy. Most seem eager to prove that the Islamic system has all the benefits of democracy, yet it is not clear whether this is only a tactical compro­ mise of using familiar idiom with positive connotations to the masses in order to gain a hearing, or if they really mean it in a literal sense. The other point to make is that a lot of the academic writing on specific Muslim authors seems to be biased by the author’s secularist­

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liberal premises. For instance Mawdùdì is accused of being very author­ itarian and anti-democratic in his proposed political system,96 yet Mawdùdì takes pains to stress the similarity of his views with democracy. It is true that he sometimes contradicts himself. In his essay “Political Theory of Islam” he does claim that Islam has no trace of Western democracy as it repudiates the idea of popular sovereignty. Yet in many other writ­ ings he does stress a semi-democratic system of government even if he does term it Islamic and totally different.97 It must also be noted that the founders of the Islamic movements tended to be charismatic prophetic figures, and their writings are char­ acterized more by prophetic passion focusing on a limited number of essential themes, rather than on academic attention to detail or legal constitutional mores. It is the second-generation leadership that fits bet­ ter into the Western academic mode as many of this second genera­ tion are academically trained, often in Western institutions.

96 See for instance Nazih Ayubi. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, pp. 127–130. 97 Mawdudi, in Ahmad, 1976. pp. 160–161. In the footnote to this statement, Ahmad argues that democracy as a philosophy and democracy as a system of gov­ ernment are two different concepts. While Islam repudiates democracy as a phi­ losophy, it has its own system of democracy in its form of organization.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLE I It is not too strong to say that we are at war, and there are no neu­ tral parties in the struggle. One either confesses that God is the final authority, or one confesses that Caesar is Lord.1

The concept of the world as a battlefield between the forces of good and evil, of believers constantly being assailed by the enemies of God, of a perennial battle going on everywhere and at all times, is common to both Islam and Christianity, but is especially characteristic of the fundamentalist groups within both religions. Fundamentalists view his­ tory as a cosmic struggle between good and evil using stark binary dichotomies to describe the opposing camps.2 This prominent rhetoric of warfare stresses that the battle is spiritual, but nonetheless real, being fought in the realms of personal spiritual and moral development, as well as in the sphere of ideas, worldviews and ideologies.3 However, the manipulation of the concept of warfare to mobilize followers into activism can easily blur the distinctions between terms such as Crusades, Holy War, and jihàd, symbolizing moral and spiritual battle, and their rein­ terpretation to legitimize violent struggle in certain contexts where the ends justify the means. Fundamentalists battle against many perceived foes: other ideologies and movements, erring believers within the camp, co-religionists who do not take their religion seriously, and the corrupt secularized elites and government systems of their countries. Fundamentalist discourse on the subject of battle serves to mobilize believers into a state of alert­ ness and readiness. Believers are warned against identified enemies, taught how to resist their attacks, and encouraged to train, organize, and actively participate in the battle. Fundamentalists respond to secularism either by withdrawing from society into isolationist separatism, or by engaging in socio-political affairs

1

Francis Schaeffer. 1982. A Christian Worldview, Vol. 4, ACM, p. 482. Lionel Caplan. in Caplan, ed., 1987. Studies in Religious Fundamentalisms, pp. 18–19. 3 Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, pp. 156–160. 2

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to transform society.4 Both responses are forms of battle—defensive against attacking forces of pollution and deception, or offensive to rout these forces and transform society. All fundamentalists practice some form of separatism, at least in the moral and behavioral aspects. But some demand total separation from the surrounding evil society and its institutions, as well as from fellow believers accused of wrong teachings and affiliations. V A   B Both fundamentalisms view history in dialectical terms as a permanent spiritual battle, part of a great cosmic and spiritual confrontation between God’s forces of good and Satan’s forces of evil. Every believer who takes a stand for truth is under attack and involved in the fight. It is therefore imperative to be forewarned and forearmed so as not to be taken by surprise. The seemingly mundane struggles of believers in this world are seen as reflections of higher struggles in the spiritual and heavenly realms. Reality of the Battle Qu†b posits a real battle taking place in this world between the forces of good and those of evil, between faith and jàhilìyya. Part of his dis­ course has marked similarities to New Testament concepts. True believ­ ers are to fight and suffer patiently, not for the reward, but because it is their duty toward God. This world is a battlefield, with angels look­ ing on to see how believers fight, and the struggle is not limited to this earth, but extends into all of space and time. In this world there are only partial defeats and victories, but the final victory of good is assured though reserved for the final judgment. While believers do not always win and often suffer defeat and martyrdom, there is no cause for despair as God comforts and encourages them. From God’s perspective this world and its affairs are tiny in comparison with the world to come, the real reality, and worldly success does not carry much weight in God’s scales: Real triumph is not limited to immediate victory . . . in Allah’s mar­ ket the only commodity in demand is the commodity of faith. The highest form of triumph is the victory of soul over matter, the victory of belief over pain, and the victory of faith over persecution.5

4 David C. Rapoport. 1993. “Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Groups,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 430–431. 5 Sayyid Qutb. 1990. Milestones, pp. 130–137. For NT references dealing with

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On the Christian side, Graham asserts that believers are involved in a spiritual battle between the forces of God and those of Satan in which men must chose sides.6 Colson sees history as a dialectic spiritual bat­ tle for the values by which man is to live,7 while Schaeffer exhorts his readers not to lose sight of the fact that the world is on fire, and that Christians risk losing the entire culture. A stand for truth always demands confrontation which results in struggle.8 Rushdoony views biblical law as the initiator of a perennial battle against evil aimed at destroying all idolatrous forms of worship, identi­ fying enemies of God’s law-order who must be brought to justice by force if necessary. The question is not whether God’s order will be attacked, but whether it is willing and ready to resist such inevitable attacks: “A law-order cannot escape warfare . . . A law-system is a form of warfare. The fact of warfare remains constant: the object of warfare can change.” [italics in original]9 Supernatural Aspect of the Battle Some fundamentalists stress the supernatural nature of the battle, assert­ ing that invisible evil powers, fighting to control individuals and whole cultures, have infiltrated all societies. Believers are arrayed against a “terrifying fact of a hostile world of evil and malicious spirits . . .”.10 While all Christian fundamentalists accept the reality of the demonic and the need for a spiritual struggle against it especially in prayer, some, especially charismatics, are preoccupied with what they term “spiritual warfare” and a lot of their discourse is devoted to this aspect of battle. According to Schaeffer the Bible clearly teaches that believers are “locked in a battle of cosmic proportions . . . a life and death struggle over the minds and souls of men for all eternity, but it is equally a life and death struggle over life on this earth.” Christians must take this battle seriously if they want to impact the world. While the primary battle is a spiritual one, “It is equally a battle here on earth in our own country, communities, schools, work and homes.” The spiritual invisi­ ble battle rages over space and time and is mirrored in the visible world in human history, in the minds of men, and in every area of human culture.11 the concept of battle, see 1.Cor. 9: 26–27, Ephesians, 6:10–18, 1.Timothy, 6:11–12, Hebrews, 12:1–4, as well as many passages in the book of Revelation. 6 Billy Graham. 1986. Unto the Hills: A Devotional Treasury, p. 247. 7 Charles Colson. 1986. The Struggle for Men’s Hearts and Minds: Christ and Caesar in the 20th Century Arena, pp. 9–10. 8 Schaeffer. 1982. Vol. 4. CBW, pp. 162–163; TCE, p. 110. 9 John Roussas Rushdoony. 1973. The Institutes of Biblical Law, pp. 93–95. 10 R. Arthur Matthews. 1978. Born for Battle, pp. 30–32. 11 Schaeffer. 1982. Vol. 4. GED, pp. 310–312.

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On the charismatic side, older notions and practices such as bless­ ings, cursings and exorcism have been revived, and controversial new concepts of spiritual warfare have been recently developed which include deliverance ministries, power encounters, territorial spirits, and spiritual mapping.12 These have been popularized by John Wimber of the Vineyard movement who emphasized “signs and wonders” and power evange­ lism, Peter Wagner, formerly of Fuller Theological Seminary, who stresses the importance of spiritual warfare in missions, and Frank Peretti whose popular novels on warfare against demonic powers captured the imag­ ination of many. The main contention of the advocates of spiritual war­ fare is that the Western church, under the influence of Enlightenment rationalism, has tended to ignore and suppress the reality of the spiri­ tual dimension. It now needs to re-learn, both from scripture and from other cultures, the prevalence of the demonic influences in life and the necessity of using appropriate techniques and spiritual authority to defeat these evil powers. The main controversy is on the appropriate stress to be placed on Satan and the demonic, i.e. the danger of a dualistic worldview where evil is (almost) as strong as God. The argument is about the relationship of the evil powers to God’s authority—how strong they really are and how much authority God allows them in this world, as well as how biblical are some of the more modern concepts and methodologies. While this theme is especially strong in Christian charismatic dis­ course, there are parallels in some parts of the Islamic discourse such as that of the charismatic preacher al-Sha'ràwì who states that in this world there are unseen forces which are a threat to man and from which he can only protect himself by seeking refuge in Allàh. These creatures include devils and jinns who have the power to influence man’s thoughts and actions by evil suggestions. That is why it is important to seek God’s help before every undertaking in life.13 The Battle in the Realm of Ideas, Worldviews and Ideologies Both fundamentalisms stress the importance of the battle in the realm of ideas. Two incompatible worldviews are struggling in a great war over the hearts and minds of people for the leadership of humanity: the fundamentalist paradigm is centered on God and his perfect reve­ lation, the secularist-humanist view is centered on man and his reason and passions. This conflict permeates every level of society. Christian fundamentalists argue that believers face a monolithic secular-humanist consensus armed with sophisticated modern technology

12 13

Patrick Johnstone. 1998. The Church is Bigger than You Think, pp. 270–273. Muhammad Mitwalli al-Sha'rawi. (nd). The Miracles of the Qur’an, pp. 226–227.

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whose goal is the destruction of the last vestiges of Western Christian civilization. This goal may soon be realized unless Christians are willing to stand up and fight.14 There is thus a clash between secular-humanism on the one hand, and biblical Christianity on the other, an “escalating confrontation between biblical Christianity and empire-building secu­ larism.” This is an ideological conflict between materialistic secularists motivated by pleasure, greed and power, and altruistic believers guided by the biblical value of love for their neighbor.15 In this view the two rival religions, Christianity and Humanism, based on two rival views of God, are locked in deadly combat on the battlefield of this earth. The battle is theological in nature, has political ramifications, and is waged on many fronts that include church, education, art, eco­ nomics, state, and politics. The central issue at stake is whether the God of the Bible owns and controls the world and is due man’s wor­ ship. In this battle there can be no neutrality: “Christianity must either be subdued by the humanists or else it will subdue them.”16 Christian fundamentalists argue that ideas have consequences—bad ideas have bad consequences, while good ideas have good consequences. Christianity has the most powerful and revolutionary ideas in the world: love, truth, justice, and forgiveness. The contemporary reality of bad ideas seemingly winning the battle is not due to the inherent weakness of the good ideas, but to the weakness of Christians in defending them. The Enlightenment started the process of Christian ideas losing their influence, resulting in the defeat of Christian values and in the mar­ ginalization of Christians in an increasingly anti-Christian culture. The destructive effects of materialism, radical individualism, moral relativism, feminism, and homosexuality are now evident in society, which is des­ perate for good ideas to stem the unraveling of the social order. The crises in society provide new opportunities for Christians to regain influence as they alone provide true answers to the deep questions being asked. Christians must actively fight to pick up the shattered pieces of Western culture and rebuild it with the Christian values that had orig­ inally produced Western civilization.17 On the Islamic side it is the battle against jàhilìyya—understood as any system not based on Qur"àn, Sunna and Shar ì 'a—that is emphasized. Qu†b sees a permanent conflict between the Islamic system and all jàhilì paradigms. The concepts of the two systems are totally incompatible, so there is no possibility of compromise or coexistence between them. 14

Franky Schaeffer. 1982. A Time for Anger: The Myth of Neutrality, p. 122. James I. Packer. 1998. Serving the People of God: Collected Shorter Writings of J.I. Packer, Vol. 2, pp. 273–274. 16 Gary North & Gary DeMar. 1991. Christian Reconstruction: What it is, What it isn’t, pp. 39–40. 17 Alan Crippen. 1996. Reclaiming the Culture, pp. 197–199. 15

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Truth is one and undivided: all that is not true is inevitably false, and the mixing of truth with falsehood is impossible. Islam means total sub­ mission to God and his law, while jàhilì systems are “a deviation from the worship of One God and the divinely ordained way of life.”18 For Islamic fundamentalists Islam is actively fighting false ideas on many fronts: (a) old-jàhilìyya—superstitious un-Islamic folk-religion; (b) new-jàhilìyya—a materialistic denial of God, the soul, and the after­ life); (c) doubt and lack of faith within Islam; (d) permissiveness and Westernization; (e) Sectarianism. In this battle the most powerful weapon is the Qur "àn, and the challenge is to cleanse the ideological realm from all atheistic elements, reconstructing Islamic thought in contemporary idiom. While the Qur "àn is the true guide and motivator, its teaching can only be effective when coupled to Islamic activism and dynamism.19 True Religion as Radical and Revolutionary Fundamentalist writers in both camps stress the revolutionary charac­ ter of their movements, viewed as a revolt against the status-quo and its corrupting influences, aiming at establishing a new social and polit­ ical order. The founders of the respective religions are pictured as rev­ olutionaries, and their message interpreted as a revolutionary ideology still potent to destroy evil and achieve drastic change in the modern world. Christian fundamentalists decry the conservative social and political positions of many Evangelical leaders. True believers are a revolution­ ary minority called to destroy the status quo, emulating Jesus who was a revolutionary leader struggling against a conservative establishment. The Christian revolution is based on the scriptural truth of a God of love and holiness ordaining absolute moral categories. Schaeffer exhorts the young that growing long hair and beards does not turn them into revolutionaries—they must become involved in the real revolution, fighting all who have turned away from God and his revelation, placing Christ as Lord over contemporary society and culture. As revolutionaries based on the absolutes of scripture, Christians cannot maintain permanent alliances with movements that are based on different conceptual foun­ dations. Only temporary tactical alliances on specific points might be permissible.20 Culture, society, government, and law are in a crisis “not because of a conspiracy, but because the church has forsaken its duty to be the salt of the culture.” In order to reverse the slide to authoritarianism, 18

Qu†b. 1990. pp. 111–113. Israr Ahmad. “Atheistic Ideologies can be defeated only through the Qur’an”, Tanzeem-e-Islami, Press Release, 26,9,97, MSANEWS, Internet, . 20 Schaeffer. 1982. Vol. 4. TCE, pp. 24–30. 19

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the church must be committed to total revolution along Reformation lines.21 Revolutionary Christianity must be strong and biblical, fighting any infiltration by relativistic thinking and insisting that truth does exist and that it is possible to know that truth—“not exhaustively but truly”.22 On the Islamic side, Islam is seen as a revolutionary ideology with the power to change contemporary society and culture just as it had transformed seventh century society.23 True Islam can never accept the status-quo but must always struggle to oppose and change it by stimu­ lating renewal. The purpose of the Islamic program (manhaj ) is to pro­ pel humanity toward greater freedom and creativity, while destroying all bondage and suffering.24 Mawdùdì pictures true Islam and its past and present leaders as a modern-style Revolutionary party: Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals. “Muslims” is the title of that “International Revolutionary Party” organized by Islam to carry out its revolutionary programme. “Jihad ” refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic Nation/Party brings into play in order to achieve this objec­ tive . . . There is no doubt that all the Prophets of Allah, without excep­ tion, were Revolutionary Leaders, and the illustrious Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) was the greatest Revolutionary Leader of all.25

Crisis Mentality—Believer as Soldier in a Permanent State of Emergency Christian fundamentalists especially tend to use the metaphor of believ­ ers as soldiers in God’s army engaged in real warfare who must be well-trained, disciplined, and committed.26 Satan is always on the attack to destroy the believer’s faith, so life is a continual battle. While that is not all what life is about, it is nevertheless always necessary to fight in order to maintain the faith.27 The logical conclusion of this emer­ gency situation is that churches should be put on a wartime footing of mobilization and austerity. Real warfare means soldiers fighting on the front-line, while in the rear all are vigilant and armed. Sadly, most

21

Schaeffer. 1982. Vol. 4. ACM, p. 447.

Schaeffer. 1982. Vol. 4. TCE, pp. 87–89.

23 Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi. 1983. Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission, p. 94.

24 Sayyid Qutb. “Social Justice in Islam” in Shepard, W. ed., 1996. Sayyid Qutb

and Islamic Activism, pp. 309–311. 25 Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1997b. Jihad fi Sabilillah, pp. 3, 8–9. 26 This is based on Paul’s use of this martial metaphor in his epistles in the New Testament. See Ephesians, 6:10–18; 2.Timothy, 2:3–4. 27 John Piper. “A Battle Call to Advance God’s Kingdom”, Mission Frontiers, March–April 1999, pp. 13–14. 22

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believers do not really believe, preferring the comforts and luxuries of a supposed peacetime: “No urgency, no watching, no vigilance. No stra­ tegic planning. Just easy peace and prosperity.” True followers of Christ facing severe conflict with evil must reject being drawn into secondary conflicts which divert them from the real battle.28 Bob Jones II argues that as Satan is increasingly active in this age, the battle is growing more vicious, and believers “can just expect to be in the fire all of the time.” Christians must be ready to sacrifice nor­ mal family and social ties, dedicating themselves fully to the battle, and speaking out against any attacks on the Bible. Jones adds that “a fun­ damentalist must be a fighter,” separating himself from all who deny the faith, from cults, from propagators of false religions, from ecumenical compromise, and from academic liberalism. He adds the advice: “Never retreat when you are under an attack,” but be battle-ready at all times: A constant fight is essential to keeping a Christian institution true to its calling and to the Word of God. All that is necessary for the devil to take it over is that its leadership refuse to fight . . . no man is a Fundamentalist unless he does fight for the Faith.29

Jones also notes that a spiritual man is an angry man, his teeth set on edge by all the evil which God hates. He defines a fundamentalist as a “militant defender of biblical authority and infallibility,” and argues that: When truth is attacked, those who love truth must come to its defense . . . If we are to contend for the Faith, we must attack the enemies of the Faith. We should attack them on the point of their involvement with error and concentrate our fire there and avoid any personal vindictiveness.30

Fundamentalist Baptists claim that there is “no such animal as a ‘non­ militant Fundamentalist’.” Fundamentalists are soldiers drafted into the Lord’s army whose sole purpose is to fight fearlessly against the “world, the flesh, and the devil”—no one respects “cowards, deserters and draftdodgers” in times of war. Fundamentalists must be motivated by con­ cern for God’s honor, grounded in the Bible and its principles, and characterized by a militant spirit and opposition to compromise: “The seriousness of the hour and the threat of the age must be met with a firm jaw and a determined heart.” Sin in the camp must be exposed, truth defended, and those who refuse to repent must be expelled from the true community. Battle fatigue may tempt some to compromise, a

28 29 30

Ibid.

Bob Jones. 1985. Cornbread and Caviar, pp. 84, 108, 167–172.

Ibid., pp. 163–165.

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grave sin that must be resisted at all costs. “It has always taken a back­ bone to serve God, regardless of the age. The fundamentalist must fight whether he wants to or not.”31 Binary Dichotomies Fundamentalists tend to use absolute Manichaean binary dichotomies such as God vs. Satan; truth vs. falsehood; light vs. darkness; and good vs. evil.32 They see humanity as divided into two opposing camps of believers and unbelievers with no neutrality possible for anyone. While all fundamentalist discourse is dominated by a cosmology of the battle of good against evil, extreme groups concentrate on conspiracy theo­ ries, eliciting a hatred for specific perceived enemies which can legit­ imize outbursts of violence. For example, Islamic radicals label everything in the modern West, as well as non-fundamentalist regimes and society in Muslim states, as satanic and evil, a legitimate target for violent attacks.33 Some Fundamentalists elaborate on the theme of no neutral ground being possible in the battle. If Christians refuse to sacrifice their lives and fortunes for God’s kingdom, then a new age of tyranny will inevitably descend upon the world. “There is no neutrality. We face these choices today: the kingdom of God on earth or the kingdom of Satan on earth.”34 Others elaborate on the “myth of neutrality” as propagated by secular-humanists, warning that Christians who accept this myth abdicate their God-given duty to be salt in the earth and preservers of culture.35 For Christian fundamentalists, the Bible teaches that man is caught in between tremendous spiritual forces in the struggle between good and evil. The world is a battleground in which man must chose sides— there is no neutral ground as the opposing forces are irreconcilable. On the one side are sin, the devil and hell, on the other God, righteous­ ness and heaven. Believers are engaged in a real battle against God’s enemies that will last until the eschatological end.36 On the Islamic side fundamentalists divides the world into two camps: God’s party versus Satan’s. Man faces a moral choice he cannot evade,

31 John Cereghin. 1994. “Developing a Separatist Mentality”, Swordsman, Fall 1994, quoted in O Timothy, Volume 12, No. 4, 1995. 32 William Shepard. 1987. “Fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic”, Religion, No. 17, p. 362. 33 Nader Saiedi. “What is Fundamentalism?” in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 173–195. 34 North. “Earthly Victory”, forerunner, Internet, . 35 Franky Schaeffer. 1982. pp. 22–23. 36 A. W. Tozer. 1980. God Tells the Man Who Cares, pp. 190–192.

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and he must voluntarily submit to God’s moral laws in Sharì 'a. There is only one God and one truth: all else is error; only one law, Sharì'a— all other law is mere human caprice; only one true system, Islam—all other systems are jàhilìyya. Qu†b lays much stress on the either/or nature of the conflict between Islam and jàhilìyya: Islam cannot accept any compromise with jahiliyya, either in its con­ cept or in its modes of living derived from this concept. Either Islam will remain, or jahiliyya; Islam cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam and half-jahiliyya. In this respect Islam’s stand is very clear. It says that truth is one and cannot be divided; if it is not the truth, than it must be falsehood. The mixing and coexistence of the truth and falsehood is impossible. Command belongs to Allah, or else to jahiliyya. The Shari 'ah of Allah will prevail, or else people’s desires.37

As Islam means submission to God, kufr means disobedience to God. God loves Muslims but dislikes kàfirs. Muslims find God’s forgiveness, kàfirs do not. Muslims will go to jannah (paradise), kàfirs to hell ( jahan­ num). Both camps consist of human beings, but Muslims recognize and obey their Lord, while kàfirs neither recognize him nor obey him. That is the basic difference.38 For Ghannùshi the real conflict in the contemporary world is not as that between civilizations or religions, but as the multidimensional conflict between Truth and Falsehood, between oppressed and oppressor. These conflicts are often packaged in appealing humanistic and religious slo­ gans so as to deceive the masses.39 The Moral Struggle in the Individual Self Both fundamentalisms stress individual responsibility and the importance of the internal battle within each believer against sin and temptation. Both highlight the ennobling results of this struggle as the believer over­ comes his lower nature and develops in purity, God-consciousness and devotion. As in traditional Islam, the concept of jihàd among Muslim funda­ mentalists is divided into two: the greater jihàd and the lesser jihàd. The greater jihàd is the moral struggle in the individual soul which is of paramount importance. This continuous struggle aims at subduing man’s baser nature and attuning him to God’s moral standards revealed in

37

Qutb. 1990. pp. 101–102, 112. Mawdudi. 1982, Let Us Be Muslims, pp. 53–54. 39 Rached Ghannouchi. “The Conflict Between the West and Islam: The Tunisian Case: Reality and Prospects”, a lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 9, May, 1995, pp. 2–3; 7. 38

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Sharì 'a. It is the basis for personal moral development and for philan­ thropic activism in society. The lesser jihàd is the one by the sword. While not all Muslim fundamentalists ascribe to the two-nature doc­ trine of man, the charismatic preachers and those influenced by Shì'a and Íùfì teachings, do. Qu†b states categorically that man possesses two natures. Every individual is obliged “to deny his lower self and its unlaw­ ful desires and to cleanse and purify it and carry it on the road to spir­ itual health and salvation; otherwise it will carry him to destruction.” The individual is responsible to watch his lower self, calling it to account when it errs.40 Khomeinì stresses that man’s worst enemy is the lower self within him, an idol that hinders him from developing in godliness. The only escape is by smashing the idol of the lower self and getting rid of selfishness which is the root cause of human depravity. The major jihàd is the fight against one’s lower self—it is useless to engage in other jihàds before succeeding in this one. Khomeinì highlights the early Muslims who fought first against their lower selves before going out in jihàd against unbelievers, and he calls contemporary believers to emulate them in fighting to the utmost against worldly desires within, trusting Allàh for success.41 Ha"iri Shiràzì, a Shì'a Iranian writer, argues that the Qur "àn teaches that man is a dual being containing within him two natures: tabì'a, man’s animal nature, and fi†ra, man’s human nature, and there is a perennial struggle between them. In the first stage of his being, tabì'a rules, but every person ought to strive to attain the second stage of being, in which fi†ra will gain the ascendancy.42 Kishk restates traditional themes when he pictures the believer in this world as surrounded on every side and at all times by “fearsome waves of materialism” from which only faith can save him. Everyone must persevere in this struggle against the world, the devil, and his lower self, trusting in God’s mercy and forgiveness: The struggle which we face in our lives is the touchstone of the tri­ als which Allah created us for, a task which the heavens and the earth were unable to bear! . . . So we must strive against our lower self which commands us to evil. It has the promise of the Garden and yet leads us to the fire. It loves the ornaments and adornments of this world and dislikes the places and hardships of good. It is not possible to be saved from its snares and rescued from its ruses except by clinging to the firm rope of Allah and His luminous path and traveling on the

40

Qutb in Shepard 1996. pp. 70–71. Ruhollah Khomeini. “Difference Between Bismillah of each Surah”, in Mutahhari, Tabatabai, & Khumayni. (nd). Light Within Me, pp. 139–44. 42 Muhiuddin Hairi Shirazi. 1997. Man’s Dual Inclinations, pp. 14–15. 41

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  path of the noble Qur"an and the Sunna of the Beloved Prophet. Millions have traveled this path spending their lives in the greater jihad, which is the jihad against the lower self, until they meet their Lord with their self at peace, pleasing and well pleased, free of bondage of the lower self and the abasement of enslavement to other than Allah— and what a despicable abasement that is!43

Kishk views man as a dichotomy of body and spirit, lower self and intellect. The spirit strives to elevate man to the sublime heights of fulfilling God’s requirements while the lower self distracts him from this lofty goal by tempting him to be preoccupied with lusts. The lower self was created in order to test men by constantly tempting them “from the path of good, love and duty.” However, Allàh who created man for this struggle against his lower self has also given him the inner strength to confront it. Kishk stresses that in order to escape hell-fire, attain freedom from enslavement to self, and receive Allàh’s peace and certainty, believers must continually struggle against the appetites of the lower self by disciplining it, giving up things it craves for, and learning to be content with just enough material things to “keep the body straight”. Self discipline, obedience to Sharì 'a, meditating on God, and affirming His greatness, are the means provided for overcoming evil. The greater jihàd is a continuous struggle aimed at subduing one’s baser nature and attuning oneself to God’s moral standards. It is the basis for personal moral development, creating pious and philanthropic activism, promot­ ing justice and prosperity in society, while combating ignorance, injus­ tice and oppression. As a result of this greater jihàd, says Kishk, Islam “heals those societies which follows its guidance and are built on con­ sciences which have been awakened and hearts which have been illu­ minated by the light of belief.”44 On the Christian side too the importance of the individual’s internal struggle for sanctification, or Christlikeness, is stressed and occupies much space in the discourse. Packer states that the process of the believer’s sanctification is a constant battle in which the believer always faces resistance from indwelling sin, and must continually advance against opposition.45

43 Sheikh 'Abd al-Hamid Kishk. 1995. Dealing With Lust and Greed According to Islam, pp. 143–145. This is very similar to the New Testament concept of fighting against the “world, the flesh, and the devil”. 44 Ibid., pp. 2–9, 133. 45 Packer. 1998. Vol. 2, pp. 323–324. Packer bases this conclusion on the verses in the New Testament, Galatians 5:17, that describe this battle: “For the sinful nature desires what is contrary to the Spirit, and the Spirit what is contrary to the sinful nature. They are in conflict with each other, so that you do not do what you want”.

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God’s holiness demands a specific response from man, the desire to be like Him and imitate His holiness. This means believers must fight the sinful lusts which ruled them before salvation. Following their spir­ itual rebirth a new nature is formed within them that is in harmony with God’s will. The Christian life is a struggle of renouncing the evil still infecting human nature, and destroying its power. It is a disciplin­ ing of the thought life and a rejection of all impurity, while develop­ ing the spiritual life and holiness until they control all thoughts, feelings and acts.46 God allows believers to be tempted and tested in order to help them know themselves better, learn to distrust their own selves, and trust only God for everything. In order to experience victory and revival in their personal life believers must be completely separated from all carnal desires, put themselves at God’s disposal, and willingly accept any suffering this entails—an experience similar to death by crucifixion that ends the dominion of self. God will have nothing to do with man’s selflife: “The Spirit of God deals with it by an intolerant and final destruc­ tion, saying, ‘This selfish I cannot live if God is to be glorified in this human life’.”47 This view is remarkably similar to the Sufi concept of fanà" billàh. F S While all fundamentalists are separatists in the sense of stressing the importance of personal moral separation from evil and of the struggle against it, most go further by setting visible boundaries and demanding some degree of separation from worldly society and its corrupting influences, evidenced by norms of conduct, dress and behavior. Some demand institutional separation not only from the world, but also from erring believers in order to ensure doctrinal and institutional purity. A few demand total separation from all aspects of evil society and the cor­ rupt state. While on the Christian side doctrinal and ecclesiastical sep­ aration are often stressed, on the Islamic side it is the degree of separation from jàhilì society that fuels the discourse. Christian Views on Separatism Christian fundamentalism displays a spectrum of thought on this theme from the strong separatism of the independent Baptists to the advoca­

46

Fred Moritz. 1994. Be Ye Holy: The Call to Christian Separation, pp. 23–36. Tozer. 1987. Chosen Classics From A.W. Tozer, “I Talk Back to the Devil”, pp. 98–99, 131–133. “Who Put Jesus on the Cross”, p. 124. 47

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tion of a wholehearted involvement in society and politics as advocated by some in the Reformed camp. Baptist Separatist Views On the Christian side the groups most representative of the early fun­ damentalist separatist inclination are the independent fundamentalist Baptist churches in the USA. They define separatism as the withdrawal from doctrinal and practical error, motivated by a love for the holiness of God. Personal separation means the avoidance of sin in the believer’s personal life. Ecclesiastical separation is the withdrawal from theologi­ cal systems, organizations or individuals who hold incorrect doctrines or practices. While separatists do not hate their Christian brothers, they do hate error: “We must never compromise a Biblical position so we may ‘build bridges.’ God will bomb our bridges if love toward the brethren is more important to us than our love toward God.” Separatists are not upset with people, but with the “world, the flesh, and the devil”. Finally, separatism must be implemented in a militant spirit.48 Bob Jones II stresses that ecclesiastical separation is an essential part of fundamentalism. No man is a fundamentalist unless he sepa­ rates himself from unbelief and compromise. Fundamentalists must sep­ arate from ecclesiastical tyranny and identify with Christ who stands “outside the camp”. As all large historic denominations have been tainted by apostasy, fundamentalist churches must be independent, local con­ gregations, that take a distinct biblical stand and refuse to be controlled by any central organization. Separation implies that: “Somebody has to hold the line. Somebody has to raise up the banners and mark out the frontiers.”49 However, Jones argues that separation from ecclesiastical evil does not mean non-involvement in politics. It is the duty of fundamentalists to condemn the sins of society and to promote civil righteousness. Historically fundamentalists were active in many political causes seek­ ing to be obedient to the Bible in the political sphere, while prioritiz­ ing the gospel: Biblical Fundamentalists recognize the importance of the voting booth . . . believe in taking vigorous action and speaking out on everything that concerns the welfare and freedom of America, but we major in the preaching of the gospel and the proclamation of God’s Word. We repudiate the idea that moral reform will produce revival but recog­ nize that sin, immorality, and crime will bring God’s judgment on our country.50

48 49 50

Cereghin. 1994. “Developing a Separatist Mentality”.

Jones. 1985. pp. 163–175.

Ibid., pp. 195–197.

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In this view, separatism has always been a distinctive of the funda­ mentalist movement because it is a biblical principle based on God’s holiness and plainly commanded in scripture. Separation is necessary because the spheres of God and Satan are totally opposed to each other as light is opposed to darkness. Separation is a stand for holiness and truth that inevitably attracts Satan’s attack. The separatist is character­ ized by a passion to imitate God’s holiness which results in personal and ecclesiastical separation from evil, and it is his duty to identify and expose false teachers and doctrines. Separatists should be characterized by an unwavering biblical militancy in the defense of God’s Word, in battling error, and in exposing false doctrine. The criterion for separa­ tion is not personal relationships but biblical principle. A believer must separate from anything that is tarnished with false doctrine, as well as from any lifestyle that is forbidden by scripture.51 Calvinist-Reformed Views Reformed fundamentalists argued that it was the liberal Christians who ought to separate themselves from the mainline churches as they now rejected the traditional plain creeds of these churches, while the con­ servatives were in full agreement with them. Had they been honest, lib­ erals would have withdrawn to set up their own associations, as the only way they could remain in the churches was by feigning agreement to principles they did not believe in. Machen makes an important dis­ tinction by stating that while involuntary associations must be tolerant, voluntary associations, such as evangelical churches, are based on agreed fundamentals and must be intolerant or else cease to exist. It is imper­ ative, concludes Machen, that there exist communities of separated true believers who gather together humbly in the name of Christ on the basis of biblical doctrines: “Such groups alone can satisfy the needs of the soul.” When no alternative is left, true believers must separate from churches in which liberals have gained complete control to found new separated communities outside of the existing churches.52 This attitude is very similar to that of J.N. Darby and the Christian Brethren of a previous generation. McIntire claims that God encourages separation in order to clearly reveal the differences between true faith and its liberal counterfeits. The purity of the church demands separation, for there can be no commu­ nion between light and darkness, belief and unbelief: “When unbelief becomes entrenched and established and it cannot be judged and put out, then in obedience to the blessed commands God’s people must separate, no matter what the cost, letting goods and kindred go.”53

51 52 53

Moritz. 1994. pp. 1–3, 42, 63–64, 90–91, 100–102.

Gresham Machen. 1923. Christianity and Liberalism, pp. 157–180.

Carl McIntire. 1945. Twentieth Century Reformation, pp. 67–68.

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Schaeffer laments the accommodation and worldliness that have pen­ etrated evangelicalism, its establishment no longer speaking with a clear biblical voice on the crucial issues of the day: “The evangelical accom­ modation to the world of our age represents the removal of the last barrier against the breakdown of our culture . . . To accommodate to the world spirit about us in our age is the most gross form of worldli­ ness in the proper definition of the word.” Accommodation inevitably leads to social chaos and the rise of authoritarianism in an effort to control it. Truth demands loving confrontation and it is imperative that some will have the courage to publicly draw the line and reject all error regardless of its labels. Christians must live in obedience to the full authority of the inerrant Bible in all contemporary doctrinal, moral, and social issues. Obedience to God’s Word is the watershed over which evangelicalism is already divided, and “the two halves will end up miles apart . . . a line must be drawn”. Schaeffer narrates that he used to shift uncomfortably when labeled a fundamentalist because of the negative connotations of the term. However he came to accept it when he real­ ized that anyone attacking unbiblical practices is immediately labeled “fundamentalist”. Schaeffer uses the “slippery slope” type of argument when claiming that: “Accommodation leads to accommodation—which leads to accommodation . . .”54 Calls for Engagement in Society Neo-fundamentalists in the United States and their counterparts in Britain argue against separatism and for a revival of the active Evangelical involvement in society characteristic of the 19th century. The early 20th century shift toward separation is understandable when one realizes the tremendous pressures that had forced fundamentalists into an isolation­ ist corner. However, since the 1960s the evangelical mainstream has gradually recovered its social dimension, Carl F.H. Henry (founding editor of Christianity Today), being the first to recall evangelicalism to its social responsibilities.55 This was followed by the 1966 “Wheaton Declaration” which combined the primacy of preaching the gospel with evangelical social action, calling evangelicals to take a firm public stand for racial equality, human freedom, and social justice. Another high point was the 1974 Lausanne International Congress on World Evan­ gelization whose Covenant included the declaration that “evangelism and socio-political involvement are both part of our Christian duty.”56 In this view there are only two possible attitudes Evangelicals can adopt toward the world: escape (separatism) or engagement. Escape 54

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, GED, pp. 401–405. Stott mentions Henry’s 1947 book The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism as the defining influence. 56 Stott. 1984. pp. 8–10. 55

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means rejecting the world and ignoring its desperate needs, engagement means a total Christian lifestyle that includes evangelism and social responsibility, “Exercising compassion and getting our hands dirty in service as we are driven by the love of God which cannot be con­ tained.” Too many Christians retreat into irresponsible escapism, occa­ sionally raiding enemy territory with the gospel, then “withdrawing back into their Christian castle”. Stott argues against this separatistescapist position which treats God as though he were powerless and outside of history, “An absentee landlord, who has lost control of his world and of human history”. Evangelicals must go out to a lost world in order to “live, and love, to witness and serve, like him and for him.”57 The church is viewed as having a double identity: a community of people called out of the world to God, and a community sent back into the world to witness and serve. Keeping the right balance between the two is vital: over-stressing holiness brings separation and insularity, while overemphasis on engagement leads to compromise and contamination by the world’s values. Jesus taught that his people are “in the world but not of it” and that they are to be “salt and light” in society. While the church is radically different from the world it must penetrate the world with God’s light to preserve it from decay: “The church can be neither totally world-affirming nor totally world-denying . . . While redemp­ tion is God’s saving work for the individual believer, reform is the church’s mission to society—reform it according to God’s law.” Stott also warns against utopianism: while it is right to campaign for social justice and endeavor to improve society, believers know that sin is ingrained in human nature and society, so they have no illusions about perfection.58 Graham argues that while the believer is primarily a citizen of another world and must be separated from the evils of this world, rejecting any compromise with sin, it is nevertheless his duty to infiltrate the world, live in it, witness to the gospel, and participate in civic and political affairs in order to positively impact it. Believers face the difficult task of developing loving relationships with unbelievers while resisting the world and keeping separate from its contaminating evil: “We are in the world, but the world is not to be in us”.59 Islamic Views on Separation—Development in Stages While for fundamentalist Christians separation is a doctrine of perma­ nent isolation from evil in all its manifestations in society, in doctrine, and in apostate institutions, for most fundamentalist Muslims it is a 57 58 59

Ibid., pp. 14–15.

Stott. 1992. pp. 24–25, 390–392.

Graham. 1986. pp. 180–181, 247.

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stage in the political quest for the establishment of the Islamic state modeled on Mu˙ammad’s practice. Qu†b started the contemporary Islamic debate on separation by his re-interpretation of separation (mufàßala) and migration (hijra). He argued that the first Muslim community developed in clearly defined stages which must be emulated today. First was the proclamation of the mes­ sage, then the separation (mufàßala) from unbelievers, and finally the fight to implement God’s new society on earth. Separation from jàhilì society is a necessary step for establishing boundaries and identity. It is not conceived of as total physical separation, but similar to the Christian engagement concept, as a spiritual separation whilst staying on in soci­ ety to proclaim and recruit. According to Qu†b, a characteristic of the Islamic golden age was that when a person became a Muslim he made a clean break with his past, separating himself totally from the jàhilì environment. He thus started a new life with the Qur"àn as his only guide: “This was a parting of the ways and the starting of a new jour­ ney free from pressures of the values, concepts, and traditions of the jahili society.” Qu†b concludes that this characteristic of the first unique generation is a necessary condition for any modern renewal: “In the early stages of the new Islamic movement, we must remove ourselves from all the influences of the jàhilìyyah in which we live and from which we derive our benefits.” The first step for true Muslims is separation from jàhilì society, transforming themselves by immersion in the Qur"àn, so as to radically change society as they follow in the footsteps of the first Muslims.60 In the process of replacing all other human systems with the Godgiven revolutionary ideology and system of Islam, total separation is however not possible—Qu†b here adopts a stand somewhat similar to the Christian principle of “in the world, but not of it”: This cannot come about by going along even a few steps with jahiliyyah, nor by severing relations with it and removing ourselves to a separate corner; never. The correct procedure is to mix with discretion, give and take with dignity; speak the truth with love, and show the superiority of the Faith with humility. But we must always bear in mind that we live in the midst of jahiliyyah, that our way of life is nobler than that of jahiliyya, and that the change from jahiliyyah to Islam is vast and far-reaching. The chasm between Islam and jahiliyyah is great, and a bridge is not to be built across it so that the people on the two sides may mix with each other, but only so that the people of jahiliyyah may come over to Islam, whether they reside in a so-called Islamic country and consider them­ selves Muslims or are outside the Muslim world so they may come out of darkness into light, get rid of their miserable conditions, and

60

Qutb. 1990. pp. 14–16.

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enjoy the blessings that we have tasted—we who have understood Islam and live in its atmosphere. If they do not respond to our call, then we shall say to them what Allah commanded His Messenger, peace on him, to say: ‘For you your way, for me mine’.61 [Italics in the original].

Physical Separation The Egyptian extremist movement Takfìr wa"l-Hijra developed Qu†b’s ideas on separation to mean that all true Muslims in all generations must emulate Mu˙ammad’s model of hijra from Mecca to Medina: there must be physical separation from unbelieving society, withdrawal to a new location to establish a new alternative society, and preparations for the stage of tamakkun (strength) and ultimate victory. Total separation (mufàßala kàmila) is a must in the temporary stage of weakness which ends when the alternative umma becomes strong enough to challenge the regime. Till then, passive separation, non-violence, and escape to safe areas to reduce contact with the apostate world were recommended. Takfìr was a millenarian movement in a stage of passive growth which could stretch indefinitely. It aimed to win over a large portion of the total population before it would deem itself strong enough for the final assault on jàhilì society. However, it did not reach its phase of power— it was still in its phase of weakness when it was destroyed. Separation was also interpreted as meaning that in case of war members must not fight in the ranks of the Egyptian Army, but flee to secure positions. Society members refused to be conscripted to the army and felt no alle­ giance to the state, rejecting anything that might serve its interests. They did not recognize state education, uniforms, marriage, or legal system— since all was jàhilì. They were not allowed to be state employees, and those who were changed jobs on entering the society.62 Spiritual Separation Another Egyptian radical Islamist group, al-Jihàd, rejected the notion of total separation from society, interpreting Qu†b’s concept of separation as purely spiritual and moral, with a duty laid on true believers to pen­ etrate jàhilì society and structures in order to bring about a radical change as soon as possible. Al-Jihàd tried to infiltrate the military, security services and government institutions so as to wage immediate jihàd.63

61

Ibid., pp. 113–114, 120. Nabeel T. Jabbour. 1993. The Rumbling Volcano: Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt, pp. 143–157; also Gilles Kepel. 1985. The Prophet and The Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, pp. 95–96, 150. 63 Hrair R. Dekmejian. 1985. Islam in Revolution, pp. 92–96, 101. 62

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I  E

Eschatology, messianism, and millenarianism play an important part in the worldview of most fundamentalists, encouraging separatism and jus­ tifying conspiracy theories and violence.64 Eschatological views impact the interpretation of the relations between God’s Kingdom, state and society, helping believers identify enemies and see themselves as engaged in the final battle of the end time. Eschatology plays an important part in the worldview of many Christian fundamentalists, coloring their conspiracy theories. Many interpret all biblical apocalyptic passages as referring to actual future events, and much fundamentalist discourse is given to the discussion of these themes. Dispensationalist premillennialists especially are prone to view all con­ temporary events in the light of biblical prophecy, developing elaborate schemes and speculating on the “signs of the times”, the increase of world-wide evil, the appearance of the Antichrist, the “mark of the beast”, the tribulation, Christ’s return, and the setting up of the millen­ nial Kingdom. The resurrection of the state of Israel plays an impor­ tant role in this view of prophetic fulfillment. Premillennialists tend to a negative view of human history and stress separatism. The whole world-system is the enemy of Christ doomed to destruction at his return. It is a many-headed beast manifesting itself both in secular-humanist worldviews and in political configurations such as the Communist bloc, the Islamic nations, or the European Union. Coupled to the ecumeni­ cal movement in nominal Christianity, they will end as a One World Government allied to an apostate One World Church.65 LaHaye stands in the mainstream of dispensational premillennial think­ ing, teaching that the study of eschatology by comparing recent history with Bible prophecy leads to the conviction that the end is near. The sheer amount of biblical evidence relating to the Second Coming is so vast, it inexorably leads to the conclusion that the Second coming is certain: “the most significant single truth in all biblical prophecy is the certainty of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. That event is the prophetic key that unlocks all other future events.” The Second Coming is not the end, but the beginning of a chain of events leading to the end of the world, as it “starts God’s prophetic clock of the future”, and he specifies fifteen events in the sequence leading to the end.66

64 David C. Rapoport. 1993. “Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Groups,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 447, 450. 65 These metaphors are taken from the biblical book of Revelation. 66 Tim LaHaye. 1972. The Beginning of the End, pp. 9, 46. In a similar vein, Billy Graham lists 12 biblically predicted “Signs of the End” (Graham. 1965. World Aflame, pp. 216–229). These include: the bewildered mental state of the world, the depraved

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Hal Lindsey, whose book “The Late Great Planet Earth” was a best seller for many years, selling over 20 million copies since first published, argues that Israel is God’s key to the prophetic puzzle, and that Israel’s rebirth is the trigger that sets off the end-time clock of prophecy.67 All premillennialists agree that the “signs of the end” are being seen today in world political developments, as well as in wars, famines, and nat­ ural disasters that seem to have multiplied in intensity on an unprece­ dented scale, a view echoed by a number of Islamic fundamentalists.68 On the other hand, postmillennialists believe Christ will return only after the millennial age is ushered in by the efforts of believers and the success of the gospel. They thus tend to stress the positivist and tri­ umphalist aspects of Christianity and argue for active involvement in society and politics parallel to spreading the gospel. Reconstructionists are postmillennial, and view the last days as denot­ ing the entire period between Christ’s ascension and his return. In this period, in which we now live, The gospel will be preached in full efficacy . . . the nations will bow to Christ’s authority . . . kings will protect Christ’s people . . . domes­ tic peace and harmony will pervade mankind . . . Biblical law will pre­ vail in society . . . and the righteous will reign as Christ’s representatives in the earth. The fact that we do not yet observe the fullness of Christ’s reign is no proof it is not to be expected.69

While eschatology seems to play a lesser part in fundamentalist Islamic discourse, most accept the traditional Sunnì or Shì'a eschatological teach­ ings on the signs of the end times: the appearance of the Antichrist (al­ dajjàl ), the coming of the mahdì or the return of the hidden Imàm to set up a righteous rule on earth.70 However, some groups are heavily influenced by Islamic eschatology and perceive their activities as part of the end-time scenario.

moral state of the world, a falling away from the true faith, an increase in law­ lessness, the coming of scoffers who mock God, widespread persecution of believ­ ers, growing disparities between rich and poor, wars becoming more prevalent and widespread, dramatic increases in knowledge and in travel, stress on peace confer­ ences, the coming of a world dictator, and finally, a dramatic increase in world­ wide evangelization. 67 Hal Lindsey. 1970. The Late Great Planet Earth, pp. 32–46. 68 Many thought the Soviet Union would be the enemy from the north that would attack Israel in the last days before Christ’s return. With the demise of the Soviet Union attention has now shifted to fundamentalist Islam as the possible fulfillment of this prophecy. Many also view the developing European Union as a fulfillment of the prophecies regarding a resurrected Roman Empire. 69 Andrew Sandlin. “Against Pessimism”, Chalcedon Website, Internet, . 70 Najeh Ibrahim, Asim Abdul-Maajid, & Esaam ud-Din Darbaalah. 1997. In

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The Egyptian Takf ìr wa "l-Hijra organization was a mahdist movement with an eschatological worldview similar to Christian premillennialism. The world was close to its end time as indicated by the signs of dis­ belief, oppression, immorality, famine, wars, earthquakes and hurricanes. Their leader, Shukrì Mu߆afà was seen as the promised mahdì who would found the new Muslim community, conquer the world, and usher in God’s final reign on earth.71 Faràj, the theorist of al-Jihàd, accepted the traditions of the mahdì who will reveal himself at the end of time and establish justice in the whole world. This however, should not lead to passivity, as in the mean­ time true Muslims should be active in fulfilling the original mandate of the worldwide spread of Islam before the end-time and the appearance of the mahdì—a view similar to Christian postmillennialism. Lack of messianic leadership is no excuse for postponing the struggle as lead­ ership is to be given to the best Muslim in the community.72 Juhayman al-'Utaybì led his failed revolt against the Saudi regime73 in the name of a proclaimed mahdì, Mu˙ammad ibn-'Abd Allàh al­ Qahtànì, a student at the Islamic University in Riyad, whose mahdì sta­ tus had been revealed in dreams to his wife and sister and coincided with the beginning of the 15th Islamic hijrì century. It was claimed that he fulfilled the ˙adìth that the mahdì would appear at the ka'ba at the turn of the Islamic century, as well as others stating he will have the same name as the Prophet and exhibit similar physical attributes. The movement’s ideology was rooted in the belief that after a long period of devi­ ation from true Islam the mahdì would appear to put an end to tyrannical kingship and set up a reign of justice and peace. The movement was convinced that once the mahd ì had revealed himself, all Muslims would pay him allegiance and defeat the forces of the corrupt regimes who would be swallowed up by the earth itself.74

Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, pp. 30–31. The authors, who are close to the Egyptian alJihad movement, include in their declaration of faith (aqeedah) the following items: “We have no doubt that the awaited Mahdee (or rightly-guided Imam) will come forth from among the Ummah of the Prophet at the end of time (on earth). We believe in the Signs of the Hour. The appearance of ad-Dajjal (false Messiah, or Antichrist). The descent from heaven of 'Isa, son of Mary. The sun rising from the West. The emergence of the Beast from the earth. And other signs mentioned in the Qur"an and the authentic Hadeeth of the Prophet”. 71 Walid M. Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt, p. 216. See also Derek Hopwood. 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society, p. 118. 72 Muhammad Abdessalam Faraj. Al-farida al-gha'iba, translated in Jansen, G.H. 1986. The Neglected Duty, pp. 163–164. See also Abdelnasser, W.M. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt, pp. 234–235. 73 Juhayman and his followers seized the Grand Mosque in 1979 and had to be dislodged by the security forces in a violent siege. 74 Ayman Al-Yassini. 1985. Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, pp. 124–129.

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In the Shì 'ì world, the rise of Khomeinì to power in the Islamic Revolution resonated with Shì 'ì eschatological symbols and inspired many Iranians to see him either as the promised “hidden Imàm” himself, or at least as some eschatological manifestation and representative of the hidden Imàm sent to prepare the way for the end times. C T While scapegoating thrives in many diverse social and political group­ ings that feel the need to blame external forces for their perceived intol­ erable situation, it is very typical of both fundamentalisms, with the more radical groups having a special affinity to harboring bizarre con­ spiracy theories. Each camp tends to see the fundamentalist camp in the other religion as a satanic force engaged in a perennial battle against the true faith. Some of the perceived hostile conspirators are common to both camps—secularism in all its forms seen as part of a worldwide evil plot to exterminate true religion, Freemasonry, and to some extent Judaism, Jews and Zionists. Christian Conspiracy Theories Many Christian fundamentalists see liberal-secular-humanism as the great enemy which since the Enlightenment has conspired against Christianity and its values. Atheism, socialism, liberalism, Marxism, and Freemasonry, are all seen as products of the Enlightenment. Secular-humanist and liberal elites are viewed as infiltrating all power centers in order to impose their godless ideologies on the unsuspecting public. For exam­ ple, in America in the early 1990s many evangelicals accused the sec­ ular public school administrations of trying to get the children into the school system at an early age in order to supplant the family and pa­ rental authority, and to brainwash the children with liberal ideologies. Whoever got the children won the next generation, and evangelicals saw this as a well-planned, premeditated strategy by liberal secularhumanist educators to dominate the future of America.75 McIntire sees the United Nations as the main agent in promoting an evil New World Order which will include “One World Worship”—an apostate worldwide religion linked to the liberal and ecumenical Christian World Council of Churches as well as to New Age and Earth Goddess (Gaia) movements. McIntire accuses those involved in these movements of a totalitarian antagonism to religious diversity, and of aiming at extin­ guishing all forms of traditional religions, especially fundamentalism,

75 William Martin. 1996. With God on our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, pp. 337–339.

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which is seen as a global menace, replacing them with a monolithic one world religious entity culminating in Satan worship which will brook no rivals.76 Pat Robertson harps on the vision of the New World Order propa­ gated by President Bush during the Gulf War. He sees it as an evil conspiracy by government, think tanks, financial elites, secret societies, and New Age groups aimed at creating a global super-state managed by an elitist central government exercising total control with the aid of international peace-keeping armed forces. This New World Order will eliminate all nation-states and replace them with a one-world govern­ ment, a world police force, world courts, world banking, and a world currency. Robertson claims that all US governments this century, regard­ less of who ruled in the White House, have been following this secret goal of one world government. He argues that the present events in world history are not accidents, but are planned with this overarching goal in mind by an elusive secret elite, all this in direct fulfillment of biblical prophecies. Extremists on the fringes of the religious right in America, have a view of reality that sees all opposing camps as part of an evil satanic Antichrist conspiracy. In the “lunatic fringe” this leads to the view that opponents are utterly evil and thus must be destroyed.78 The John Birch society saw godless communism as the main threat to Western Christian civilization, and accused secular liberals in the West of being commu­ nist agents encouraging socialism and internationalism, with the ulti­ mate goal of creating a one-world socialist government. The United Nations were seen as part of this conspiracy to build a New World Order. The John Birch Society posited a group of “Insiders” as the leaders of the conspiracy, and these were viewed as Illuminati-Freemasons having an unbroken link back to the French Revolution. These theo­ ries are coupled to anti-Semitic and anti-Black strands prevalent in Christian Identity, White Supremacist, and neo-Nazi ideologies.79 Following the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war, more attention is now directed to the United Nations, and to US involve­ ment in international conflicts such as the Gulf War, to justify fears of an imminent UN-backed New World Order. For many on the extreme

76 McIntire. 1995. “One World Worship”, The Christian News, New Haven, MO, Internet, . McIntire quotes Catholic liberal theologian Hans Küng as stating that “traditional religions have an ethical obligation to cease to exist”. 78 Richard Abanes. 1996. American Militias: Rebellion, Racism and Religion, pp. 210–211. 79 Greg R. Broderick. “The Lunatic Fringes”, The Radical Religious Right Pages, Internet, . See also “John Birch Society”, The Public Eye, Political Research Associates, Internet, .

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Christian right in the US, the enemy is becoming the federal govern­ ment and its manifold agencies, seen as selling out to a United Nations backed New World Order controlled by foreigners bent on weakening America and denying its citizens their constitutionally guaranteed lib­ erties and rights. The militias especially are organizing themselves and training in weapons so as to be able to fight these conspiratorial ene­ mies in due time.80 For some Christian fundamentalists, especially at the extreme end of the pro-Israel dispensationalist spectrum and the Christian-Zionist move­ ment, Islam is the main contemporary enemy, challenging true Christianity for control of the world. Some of the rhetoric of that camp suggests a shift of inherent racism, previously directed at Jews and Blacks, in the direction of Muslims. As an example, Dave Hunt, a well-known writer on prophecy, understands literally the Islamic use of terms such as holy war, ignoring Christian use of militant terms in a symbolic way, to imply that “Islam is fighting a holy war for control of the world!” The ultimate goal of Islam is the conquest of the whole world, and the rad­ ical Islamists are but one wing of its militant advance. While Hunt accepts that many Muslims insist Islam is a peaceful religion, he states that Muslim terrorists are not fringe extremists, but mainline funda­ mentalists true to the teachings of the Qur"àn. Hunt also argues that Christians and Muslims do not worship the same God. It is not that they have different views of the one God, but that Muslims worship another God linked to the pre-Islamic pagan moon god of the ka'ba.81 Islamic Conspiracy Theories Islamic conspiracy theories are rooted in the frustration arising out of several centuries of colonialism and dependency. Against the views held by traditionalists of Jews and Christians as protected “dhimmìs” and “peo­ ple of the Book”, fundamentalists link contemporary Western supremacy to the historic opposition of Jews and Christians to the rise of Islam in the 7th century, and to source texts in Qur"àn and ˙adìth with antiChristian and anti-Jewish implications. Based on these they develop a modern concept of uninterrupted Christian and Jewish hatred for Islam since the inception of Islam, expressed in continual efforts throughout history to divide, weaken, and if possible destroy, Islam and Muslim states and people. The Jews and Christians of the 7th century are seen as identical with the Jews and Christians of today, so the Christian Crusading West in its various contemporary post-colonialist forms, together

80 Brian M. Abshire. “Counter-Cultural Christianity: Militias!” The Chalcedon Report, No. 407, June 1999, Internet, . 81 Dave Hunt. 1995. A Cup of Trembling: Jerusalem and Bible Prophecy, pp. 78, 196–197, 235–237, 240–244.

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with the Jews, are deemed to be perennial enemies plotting the destruc­ tion of Islam. Secularism is the other favorite enemy of Islamic fundamentalists. Recent decades have seen the rise of a Muslim anti-secularist discourse which in addition to the usual anti-secularist apologetic also accuses sec­ ularism in its various forms of being part of a sinister plot to weaken and undermine Islam. Muslim secularists are viewed as being anti-Islamic and foreign agents. Qu†b sees hostility to Islam as inherited, inherent, and latent in the West since Crusader days. Orientalism transmitted the distorted versions of Islam absorbed during the Crusades, the Reconquista, the fall of Constantinople, and the Reformation. Secular Europe inher­ ited the contempt for all things Islamic from religious Europe, and in spite of its rationalism, these irrational prejudices survive, strengthened by Western Imperialism which saw Islam as the main obstacle to achiev­ ing world domination. This anti-Islamic spirit unites all Western states and cultures: This is the Crusader spirit that all Westerners carry in their blood and that lies hidden deep in their minds, to which is added imperialism’s fear of the Islamic spirit and the effort to destroy the strength of Islam, whereby the Westerners are all linked by a single feeling and a single interest in destroying it. This unites communist Russia and capitalist America. And let us not forget the role of worldwide Zionism in the plot against Islam and in uniting the forces against it both in the Cru­ saderist imperialist world and in the materialist communist world. It is the continuing role that the Jews have always played since the Hijrah of the Apostle to Medina and the founding of the Islamic state.82

The radical Egyptian Takfìr wa"l-Hijra stressed an international Jewish conspiracy and the need to fight it, accusing the Jews of seducing human­ ity to idol-worship and of spreading corruption and immorality all over the world. Another Egyptian radical group, al-Jihàd, viewed Christians as the first enemy to be dealt with and was heavily involved in antiCoptic activities. Al-Jihàd accused Muslim rulers of obeying Jews and Christians and opening up Muslim countries to exploitation. Its spiri­ tual leader, Sheikh 'Abd al-Ra˙màn, issued a fatwà legitimating the killing and robbing of Christians who were anti-Muslim.83 Taqì al-Dìn al-Nabhànì, founder of Óizb al-Tahrìr also sees the Western animosity to Islam as a constant ever since the Crusades. Contemporary Christian oppression, humiliation, colonization and exploitation of Muslims is an act of brutal revenge for the defeat experienced then. This hatred manifested itself in different garbs in different periods: in colonial times

82 83

Qutb. 1990. pp. 94–96; Qutb in Shepard. 1996. pp. 284–288.

Abdelnasser. 1994. pp. 226, 240–244, 254.

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Orientalism and missions, backed by Western states, where the two ways in which it revealed itself. This Crusader animosity to Islam is deeply rooted in Europe, especially in Britain, resulting in the military con­ quest of Arab lands during WWI. Modern Europe is engaged in a cul­ tural Crusade against Islam aiming at poisoning the minds of young Muslims by distorting Islamic history and values in the name of Orienta­ list scientific research. This cultural venom is far more dangerous than the Crusades, portraying Islam as a “bogey of humanity, or this demon which would destroy the progress of humanity.” Orientalists continue to support all anti-Islamic activities in the world, backed by the Christian clergy who have always conspired against Islam, slandered its history, and degraded Mu˙ammad and his Companions.84 Khomeinì has much to say about the conspiracies of Jews and Christians, against Islam: Since its inception, Islam was afflicted with the Jews who distorted the reputation of Islam by assaulting and slandering it, and this has con­ tinued to our present day. The Crusades made the Christian West realise that Islam with its laws and beliefs was the biggest obstacle to their control and domination of the world. That is why they harboured resentment and treated it unjustly. Then more than three centuries ago, came the evil colonists who found in the Muslim world their long sought object. To achieve their ambitions they laboured to create the conditions which would lead to the annihilation of Islam. Missionaries, Orientalists, the information media—all are in the service of the colo­ nialist countries and all are guilty of distorting Islam in a way that has caused many Muslims to steer away from it and not find their way back to it. Whilst Islam is the religion of struggle for right, jus­ tice, freedom and independence, those enemies have portrayed it in a distorted manner, even in the academic world, aiming at extinguish­ ing its flame and robbing it of its revolutionary character. They teach that Islam has no relevance to society and government and is only concerned with private rituals. These enemies have implanted their falsehoods in the minds of the Muslim people with the help of their agents, and have managed to eliminate Islam’s judiciary and political laws from the sphere of application, replacing them by European laws. The colonialists and their lackeys claim there is a separation between state and religion, so they can isolate Islam from the affairs of society and keep the ulama’ away from the people. When they have sepa­ rated and isolated us they can take away our resources and rule us.85

Ayatollah Khamene"ì, Khomeinì’s successor as Supreme Guardian of the Islamic republic of Iran, labels the USA and Israel as enemies of

84

Taqiuddib An-Nabhani. (nd). The Islamic State, p. 189. Ruhollah Khomeini. “Islamic Government,” in Donohue & Esposito. 1982, pp. 314–315. 85

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Iran and of Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the last bastion in which the superpower America has no influence, and “commands no value, credibility or respect”. Iran has demolished the American superpower’s myth of invincibility by standing up to its threats and not bow­ ing to its demands. America is afraid of Islamic Iran’s influence on the Muslims of the world, because following its example, Muslims all over have started fighting and expressing their Islamic feelings. Khamene"ì posits a struggle during the last twenty years between two competitive camps on the world political scene—the camp of arrogance led by America and the Islamic camp led by the Islamic Republic of Iran. During this period, the Islamic camp has advanced and gained victo­ ries as Islamic movements came to power in various states. America is trying to counter this advance by using rumors of negotiations to imply that Iran has changed its positions, that it is being forced to negotiate, that Islam has been defeated. Khamene"ì goes on to review the history of United States interference in Iran since it replaced Britain—a his­ tory of “America delivering blows to us, betraying us, stabbing us in the back by plotting coups d’etat . . .”. In the Iraq-Iran war, America supported Iraq against Iran. America has harmed Iran more than any­ one else, and it fully deserves the title “The Great Satan” because “it engages in evil, in treachery, in murder and because it is arrogant.” America is also “the greatest supporter of the Zionist regime which has thrown out an Islamic nation from its homeland.86 The World Islamic Front in its gathering in London on 23, February, 1998, which included among others Usàma bin-Làden (al-Qà'ida), Ayman al-¸awàhirì (al-Jihàd ), Abu-Yàsir ˇàhà (al-Jamà'a al-Islàmìyya), Mir Hamza ( Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan), and Fazlul Rahman ( Jihàd Movement Bangladesh), issued a statement: “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”, in which the United States was identified as the main enemy of Islam for occupying Islamic holy land in the Arabian Peninsula, and for fighting against the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples. In this endeavor the Americans have forged an alliance with the other great enemy of Islam, the Zionists and the Jews: “All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims.” The Front issued a fatwà declaring it an individual duty ( fard 'ayn) of all Muslims to kill the Americans and their allies wherever possible in order to liberate al-Aqßa in Jerusalem and the Holy Mosque in Mecca from their grip, and in order to drive out their armies from all Muslim lands.87 86 Ali Khamenei. “No Need for Iran-US Negotiations,” excerpts from a khutbah addressed to Tehran’s Friday worshippers on 16th January 1998. MSANEWS, 27, January, 1998. 87 World Islamic Front Statement, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Internet, . This fatwa was based on the Quranic verses: “And fight the pagans all together as they fight you all

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Antisemitism Christian Antisemitism Among Christian fundamentalists, especially as a result of the holocaust, anti-Jewish sentiments now characterize mainly marginal groups, viru­ lent anti-Semitism being restricted to the extreme “lunatic” fringes. On the other hand, some of the more mainline groups, especially the dis­ pensationalists, are positively pro-Jewish and pro-Zionist. On the margins of Christian fundamentalism, many identify the real enemy behind all contemporary destructive forces as a small cabal of international bankers, Freemasons and Illuminati88 who have planned all the catastrophes of this century, including communism and Nazism, in order to prepare the world for the implementation of their New World Order. These conspiracy theories result from apocalyptic fears and millennial expectations, while continuing well-documented strands of racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Freemason themes, prevalent in Christian Identity, White Supremacist, and neo-Nazi ideologies. The secretive, mani­ pulating, and deceitful enemy is seen as linked to demonic anti-Christian powers. From here it is but a small step to identify most of these con­ spirators as Jews, reverting to older Western anti-Semitic stereotypes, both religious and racist. Jews are seen as the seed of Satan, bent on destroy­ ing the pure Aryan race and on achieving total world domination.89 Islamic Anti-Semitism On the Muslim side anti-Semitism has become a marker of most fun­ damentalist movements who as a result of the Israel-Palestinian conflict have imbibed much of modern Western racist anti-Semitism in addi­ tion to the traditional anti-Jewish strand of Qur"àn and ˙ad ìth. AntiSemitism seems to have infected the mainstream, especially in the Arab world, as a result of Qu†b’s invective. Qu†b used racist stereotypes and forgeries of Western anti-Semitism such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (translated into Arabic and widely distributed in the Muslim world).90 As a result, Islamic fundamentalism today sees itself involved in a cosmic struggle against “the Jews” and has developed a compre­ hensive new doctrine of Muslim-Jewish relations.91

together”, and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” 88 The Illuminati were a 18th century Bavarian secret society linked to Freemasonry and banned by the authorities. Conspiracy theories involving the Illuminati were revived in 20th century America. 89 Abanes. 1996. pp. 143–168; See also Andrew Macdonald. 1996. The Turner Diaries, pp. 29, 34, 42, 64. 90 Qutb. 1990. pp. 94–96. 91 Ronald L. Nettler. 1987. Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews, Foreword & p. x.

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For Qu†b, modern-day Jews are identical to their ancient forefathers at the time of Mu˙ammad, who “confronted Islam with Enmity from the moment that the Islamic state was established in Medina. They plotted against the Muslim Community from the first day it became a Community”.92 Since then, all Jews have always been wicked enemies of Islam, and the contemporary Muslim umma continues to be attacked by the very same Jews and their: Machinations and double dealings which discomfited the Early Mus­ lims . . . The Jews continue—through their wickedness and doubledealing—to lead this (Muslim) community away from its religion and to alienate it from its Qur’an . . . Anyone who leads this Community away from its Religion and its Qur’an can only be a Jewish agent . . .93

Qu†b accuses the Jews of having conspired to poison the Islamic her­ itage, including Qur"ànic exegesis, by inserting falsehoods in the “Islamic Oral Heritage” in order to confuse Muslims and weaken their faith.94 Jews are inherently evil because all through the ages they have rebelled against God “in the most disgustingly aggressive manner . . .”. As a result, “From such creatures who kill, massacre and defame prophets one can only expect the spilling of human blood and dirty means which would further their machinations and evilness.” They are characterized by ingratitude, selfishness, fanaticism, isolationism, and hatred for all others, always fomenting dissension in their host societies, exploiting all disasters to profit from the misery of others. They utilize usury to accu­ mulate wealth, infiltrate societies, and dominate the whole world.95 Qu†b states that Jews have been behind every misfortune which befell the Muslims through the ages, using conspiracies and treachery to achieve their aims, Zionism being but the latest in the long line of Jewish plots against Islam. He identifies modern secular philosophy and culture as a trap laid by world-wide Judaism in order to destroy all barriers of creed, weaken society and government, and enable it to penetrate every country with its “satanic usurious activity” which will finally “deliver the proceeds of all human toil into the hands of the great usurious Jewish financial institutions”.96 He also claims that Orientalism has been infiltrated by Jews who poison Western academic studies of Islam. Jews have even infiltrated Muslim states in the guise of political leaders who lead their people astray: “Therefore the struggle between Islam and the Jews continues in force and will continue, because the Jews will be satisfied only with the destruction of this religion (Islam).”97 92 93 94 95 96 97

Qutb. “Our Struggle With the Jews”, in Nettler. 1987. p. 81.

Ibid., p. 72.

Qutb is here evidently referring to the Isra "iliyat.

Qutb in Nettler. 1987. Also Qutb. 1990. pp. 94–96.

Qutb in Shepard. 1996. p. 303.

Qutb in Nettler. 1987. pp. 75–85.

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The Internet displays several Islamic web pages that combine radi­ cal Islamic views on politics and power with blatant anti-Semitism of the modern Western racial sort. One example is the “al-Bayan” site whose chief editor is Jamàluddin al-Haidar. When dealing with Jews it combines references to Qur"ànic and ˙adìth sources derogatory of Jews with modern Western anti-Jewish discourse such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and articles obviously gleaned from the Christian neoNazi hard right fringe such as: “The Truth About the Talmud: An Expose on the Roots of Zionism” and “EXPOSED!: The AIPAC Tapes Revisited: Evidence of Zionist stranglehold over Clinton White House and US Congress”.98 In an article in which Haidar calls on Muslims of various convictions to drop their petty internal quarrels (the lesser kufr) in order to unite in fighting the “greater kufr ”, he names the Jews as the common enemy, stating: They [the Jews] are vampires, and vampires do not live on vampires. They cannot live only among themselves. They must subsist on Christians and other people not of their race. If you do not exclude them, in less than 200 years our descendants will be working in the fields to furnish them sustenance while they will be in the counting houses rub­ bing their hands. (i.e. Jewish dominated Wall Street in New York City).”99

Some academic observers are troubled by this new aspect of Islamic anti-Semitism. Kramer links this new type of anti-Semitism to modern European irrational ideologies such as Fascism and Nazism. Traditional Muslims did not see the Jews who had resisted Muhammad as arche­ types of Jews in all times and places. Kramer stresses the overall record of Islamic civilization’s tolerance of Jews over many centuries, especially as compared to that of European Christianity, seeing them as dhimmìs and as a legitimate community of the ‘people of the book’ (ahl al-kitàb). In contrast, argues Kramer, modern Islamic fundamentalist anti-Semitism, reacting to the creation of the state of Israel, sees Jews everywhere and at all times as involved in a sinister plot to destroy Islam. Selectively using the same sources of Qur"àn and ˙adìth as the traditionalists, it blurs the distinctions between anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Judaism, arriving at the view of all Jews as the enemies of God and as the peren­ nial arch-conspirators against Islam. Islamists have been infected by modern extremist Western racist anti-Semitism recycled as the authen­ tic ideological view of Islam, conveniently targeting all Jews as scape­ goats in order to excuse modern Muslim weakness. Fundamentalist Islam

98

Al-Bayan homepage, Internet, . Jamaaluddin al-Haidar. “Sufi-vs-Salafi: The Pot Calls the Kettle Black,” Internet, . 99

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has linked modern Western anti-Semitism to negative source texts and to the modern political context of the state of Israel, developing a vir­ ulent, extreme, and dangerous new form of anti-Semitism. Everything is now viewed through this ideological anti-Jewish prism.100 Tamìmì represents a more moderate Islamic fundamentalist viewpoint when he recognizes that during the first thirteen centuries of Islam the Muslim perception of Jews as protected people of the book alongside Christians never changed. They were accorded a safe haven in Muslim lands from Christian persecution and allowed to participate in the Islamic State. It was Christians, not Muslims, who regularly blamed Jews for every catastrophe and crisis. It was modern Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel that changed this perception, turning Jews into enemies of Arabs and Muslims. However, Tamìmì warns against the shift in Muslim perceptions, created by a re-reading of history and a re-interpretation of the sacred texts, which views all Jews everywhere as always corrupt and scheming against Islam. He recognizes the pri­ mary contribution of modern Western-Christian anti-Jewish writings including the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” to the emerging Islamist anti-Semitism which concludes that Jews have hatched a global con­ spiracy aiming at imposing their control over the whole world. Tamìmì also accepts that hostility to the Zionist project has blurred the tradi­ tional distinction between the Qur "ànic condemnation of some Jews for their bad conduct, and the Qur "ànic injunction to give Jews and Christians covenant rights, the violation of which is a grave sin.101 Tamìmì warns fellow Muslims against failing to make distinctions between Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews, and he calls for a revision and a re-interpretation of sources and an elimination of false concepts that do not distinguish between them. This revision calls for a restoration of the contextual interpretation of Qur"ànic texts which clearly distin­ guish between evil and righteous Jews, and will prepare the Muslim world for the post-Israel period when due to the retreat of the West coinciding with the Muslim political revival, the state of Israel will disappear—but Jews will remain.102 Islamic fundamentalists further away from the Middle East take a more moderate stand on the Jewish question. Khurràm Muràd of Jamà'at-i Islàmì argues that the primary purpose of Qur"ànic accounts of the fail­ ings of the Jews was not to condemn the Jews of the Prophet’s time,

100 Martin Kramer. “The Salience of Islamic Antisemitism”, October 1995, MSANEWS, 19, May, 1996, Internet, . 101 Azzam Tamimi. “Jews and Muslims in Post-Israel Middle East”, MSANEWS, 30, June, 1999, Internet, . 102 Ibid.

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but to provide a case study of what may go wrong with any individ­ ual believer or believing community. The Jews had been the “Muslim Ummah of their times” and the history of their deviation is given as a warning, a mirror placed before Muslims of all times to see a true reflection of themselves in their response to God’s revelation: “This ‘mir­ ror’ shows Muslims what can go wrong, where, and why, and the con­ sequences.” Muslims, says Muràd, “are no different . . . As the Prophet (bpuh) said: ‘You will follow the ways of Bani Israel, step by step’.” Muràd sees great similarities between the history of the Jews and the Muslim umma’s later deviation from Sharì'a, both leading to similar con­ sequences of subjugation by alien powers.103 Anti-Semitic Alliance? It is evident that on the anti-Semitic theme extreme radicals, Christian and Islamic, find common ground and are evolving an alliance of sorts. As an example, A˙mad Ràmì, a former lieutenant in the Moroccan army who fled to Sweden following his involvement with military coups in Morocco in the early 1970s, has set up a radio station called Radio Islam which broadcasts and publishes virulent ant-Semitic material, tar­ geting Zionism and the Jews as the “only one enemy” of Islam and of mankind, and including excerpts from the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and American extreme right wing racist and anti-Semitic suprema­ cist material. He has forged links with both American and Russian antiSemitic groups. He sees Jewish conspiracies behind all Western regimes and some Arab regimes like Morocco, which he terms “Judaeocracies”. He claims that a “Zionist Mafia” and Jewish intellectual terrorism have overpowered Western systems (as in Sweden), and that “the power over banks, mass media and commercial and industrial life is in the hands of a small group of ‘the chosen people’. All education in schools and universities is carried on in a way which is favorable to the ‘master race’.”104 A˙mad also publishes a letter to his station in which the writer urges that “it is time for Muslims and Christians to stop fighting each other and see the REAL enemy!”105 L  R  V Radical fundamentalists see their militancy as a defense against secu­ larizing tendencies threatening to destroy the sacred. Responding to the

103

Khurram Murad. 1996. Key to al-Baqarah, pp. 15–19. “Ahmad Rami’s Idealism”, Pravda interview with Ahmad Rami, Radio Islam, July 15, 1997, Internet, . 105 “Right On!” by Jessie, Radio Islam, Internet, . 104

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perceived threat they are willing to break state laws in the name of a higher sacred law.106 As bearers of a revolutionary ideology, fundamen­ talists are actively engaged in recruiting, mobilizing and organizing for the showdown with the hostile system. Herbrecht notes that all states, including secular ones, are essentially religious in enforcing conformity to their own worldview, and in their use of force against those attacking their particular paradigm. Secular states assume that the state is a neutral arbiter maintaining order among a pluralistic variety of racial, ethnic, and religious groups, and claim sole legitimization over the use of violence. The state labels groups that deny its legitimacy or use violence without its consent, as terrorist and criminal, ideological enemies against whom its own use of violence is legitimate.107 As many observers point out, the state is often as culpa­ ble as the fundamentalist groups in this vicious cycle of repression and violence.108 Both fundamentalisms tend to see contemporary modern and post­ modern society as essentially neo-pagan, reverting to the immorality and antinomianism of the pre-Christian and pre-Islamic polytheistic heathen civilizations. This reversion to paganism serves as a main legitimization for concepts of civil disobedience and resistance to immoral and evil government regulations. Fundamentalist views of civil disobedience are rooted in their reaction to situations where mere men command what God explicitly forbids in revealed scripture. While most fundamentalists have an affinity to the model of the conservative, law-abiding, good cit­ izen stereotype, moral conflicts imposed by secular authorities stir their conscience and shift them to passive civil disobedience that can move on to activist violent modes.109 The fundamentalist tendency to continually stress issues that evoke deep emotional resonance can eventually wear down psychological bar­ riers to violent action. While violence causes the destruction of some organizations, new radical groups always emerge to continue the fight.110 Rapoport argues that all religions display potential for violence parallel to their potential for peace and reconciliation. Religious wars seem to be more intense and ferocious than wars fought over other issues, mainly because religious issues evoke primordial concepts of identity and

106

Rapoport. 1993. pp. 429–430. William Herbrecht. 1996. “Religious Authenticity as a Function of State Power”, in Bromley & Carter, eds., 1996. Religion and the Social Order, pp. 20–21. 108 Ahmad S. Moussalli. “Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy”, in Augustus R. Norton, ed., 1995. Civil Society in the Middle East, pp. 16–17. 109 John H. Garvey. “Fundamentalism and American Law”, in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 35–36. 110 Rapoport. 1993. pp. 439–440. 107

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values. However, religions do not possess a higher propensity for vio­ lence than other ideologies. Rather, they are often manipulated by unscrupulous forces because of their utility. Religions actually tend to force their members to subject violence to a higher law which defines the legitimacy of their targets and methods.111 Christian Views Many Christian writers liken the situation today to that of pagan Rome and its “bread and circuses” mentality in its era of decadence. It wasn’t the external enemies that caused the downfall of the Roman empire, but the internal decadence and depravity which inexorably damaged its moral fiber from within. Packer states that: The Greco-Roman world that the early Church confronted was in the grip of a frenzied pleasure-seeking mentality . . . And it is supremely ironic that, after two millennia of Christian culture, the West should now be plunging back into a self-defeating hedonism that is horribly simi­ lar to the barbaric pagan life-style of the first century, and that it should be doing so in the belief that the Christian religion is basically anti­ human because it does not set up pleasing oneself as life’s highest value.112

As a result, the West, and especially America, is poised for cultural and social collapse. Society has become a cesspool of depravity and lust, while greed is the only emotion that drives the electoral process. People have become soft, businessmen cheat customers and the government, and many inner city areas have been turned into virtual war zones.113 Facing this catastrophic situation, Christian fundamentalists, with their high view of the God-given authority of all state regimes, grapple mainly with the problem of when and if resistance to state oppression by force is ever justified. William MacDonald represents the view that the only option for believers faced with non-biblical laws is passive non-violent disobedi­ ence, coupled with a willingness to bear the consequences. As all civil government is ordained by God, Christians are duty bound to submit to its authority and must never rebel against it. At the most, they may passively disobey its demands when they clearly contradict God’s com­ mands, while consciously willing to suffer the consequences of their stand and if necessary be martyred for their faith.114

111

Ibid., pp. 446–447. Packer. 1998. pp. 390–391. 113 Steve Van Nattan. “Practical Preparation for Financial, National, and Social Collapse”, Balaam’s Ass Speaks, Internet, . 114 William MacDonald. 1990. Believer’s Bible Commentary, New Testament, pp. 416, 548–549. 112

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Geisler offers the believer more options when faced with state tyranny, though he too accepts only the legitimacy of passive disobedience. These options include active moral and political campaigns to change offensive laws, migration to a safe haven, and passive disobedience. Just wars can only be fought by a legitimate government against other governments, not by individual citizens. He agrees that as all government is of God, “to disobey government is to disobey God.”115 However, there are times when Christians are forced to engage in civil disobedience. The ques­ tion is where to draw the line, and there are two Christian positions on this: One holds that governments should be disobeyed when they promulgate a law that is contrary to the Word of God. The other con­ tends that governments should be disobeyed only when they command Christians to do evil.116 Geisler accepts the second position as more bib­ lical. All biblical instances of legitimate disobedience share three char­ acteristics: a command issued by the authorities contrary to the Word of God; an act of disobedience to that command; and finally, divine approval of the refusal to obey the authorities. When civil authorities force all citizens, including believers, to disobey God’s word, then the bottom line has been reached: “This is oppressive and should be disobeyed.”117 While restating the basic principle that “the first and foremost respon­ sibility a Christian has to any government, just or unjust, democracy or monarchy, is to obey its laws” and to be an example to others as a law-abiding citizen, Geisler goes on to describe biblical ways in which to respond to a government that assumes God’s place. These include praying for a change in its unjust attitude, and working peacefully and legally to change it by political action such as participating in elections and voting for better candidates: “We should fight oppression in our government with the ballot, not the bullet. It should be resisted with good, not with guns . . .”. These biblical options also include disobey­ ing oppressive commands, fleeing to a place of freedom outside the government’s reach, and finally when flight is impossible, the willingness to suffer even unto martyrdom.118 Geisler accepts that the Bible approves of just wars waged by a law­ fully constituted government to protect its citizens from aggression, as God gave the sword to governments, but believes that it is forbidden for citizens to take up the sword against their own government: God never gave the sword to citizens to use on their government; he gave it to governments to use on rebellious citizens. Just wars are 115 116 117 118

Norman Geisler. 1990a. Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, pp. 216–217.

Ibid., Geisler. 1990b. p. 241.

Ibid., pp. 245–246, 253.

Ibid., pp. 251–255.

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waged against another nation that is aggressing against one’s own. Revolutions are against one’s own nation. They are, in fact, fatal fam­ ily feuds. In a revolution we are, as it were, killing off our own kin. In opposing the government God established, one is thereby opposing God, who established it (Rom. 13:2). Just wars, on the other hand, protect one’s country against aggression by another and are fought in self-defense.119

Van Nattan, in a paper against exaggerated conspiracy theories, claims that while most conspiracy theories are fantasies, there might come a time in America when the government would start terrorizing its sub­ jects. Therefore it is wise to prepare now for a future attack by finding friends who will be ready to help you escape. Running from battle is one strategy God endorses in the Bible. Think of where you could es­ cape to—and prepare.120 This is reminiscent of the Islamic hijra concept. The Reformed side goes beyond passive disobedience to define cases when rebellion against a wicked state is permitted. Christians must first exhaust all alternatives, campaigning against evil in all areas, including abortion and euthanasia, and taking all appropriate legal and political action. However, there must be bottom line, and the biblical bottom line is civil disobedience when the state has abrogated its authority. “We must recognize that there is a bottom line if we are to have real free­ dom of thought and action at the present time—even if, happily, we never reach that bottom line . . . If there is no place for civil disobedi­ ence, than the government has been made autonomous, and as such, it has been put in the place of the Living God.” Schaeffer for instance argues that: It is time we consciously recognize that when any office commands what is contrary to God’s Law it abrogates its authority . . . It is no longer our proper legal government, and at that point we have the right, and the duty, to disobey it. Our primary loyalty to God demands that we then make an appropriate response to the tyrannical usurp­ ing of power. This is relevant for our times, especially in such areas as abortion. We must not be satisfied with mere words, but must try to roll back the inhuman results of the false world-view.121

The American Declaration of Independence contains many elements of Reformation thinking, including the rights of citizens to oppose oppres­ sive civil government. While warning against resisting government for “light and transient causes”, it asserted the right and duty of citizens to throw off a government which practices a “long train of abuses and

119 120 121

Ibid., pp. 253–254.

Van Nattan. “Practical Preparation for Financial, National, and Social Collapse”.

Schaeffer 1982. Volume Four, ACM, pp. 489–495.

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usurpations designed to produce an oppressive, authoritarian state.” Citi­ zens who find their basic rights systematically abused by the state, have a duty to change the government, and failing that to abolish it. When all avenues to flight and protest have been closed, defensive force becomes appropriate.122 The use of force will always be necessary to some extent in a fallen world, and every government has the right to use force when its exis­ tence is threatened. Two principles must govern the use of force: it must have a legitimate cause and be legitimately exercised. Before using force, believers must attempt to correct society by all available peace­ ful means. However, once the bottom line is reached, the use of force is legitimate and justifiable. Schaeffer makes a clear distinction between legitimate force and violence—overreaction can easily turn to ugly vio­ lence. He quotes Samuel Rutherford, the 17th century Scottish Reformed theologian, as arguing that for believers there are three levels of resis­ tance to state abuse: legal protest, flight when possible, and finally the use of force for self defense. Franky Schaeffer argues against passive detachment and advocates active involvement in the struggle for a godly society that might lead to civil disobedience as “every person of true moral principle is on a collision course with the modern, inhuman, technological state and soci­ ety in which we live. Every person of true moral principle should be prepared to stand and fight against this ‘brave new world’.” Those within the Judaeo-Christian tradition have been far too passive when faced with state-sanctioned atrocities such as abortion and infanticide. Christians must become fully involved in every aspect of life including politics, fighting in their particular arenas without compromise and mounting a cultural counter-attack in order to save Western civilization from the “secularist, immoral bio-engineers and power-hungry ethicists.” Christians face a choice between “a secular Caesar, the bondage and death of an all-powerful state, with the most powerful techniques of control at its disposal, or the God of the Old and New Testaments.” Obedience to God means a willingness to disobey bureaucracies, courts, and the whims of humanistic culture. Those who accept the myth of neutrality have surrendered the battlefield to the enemy. Franky Schaeffer closes with the statement that “It is time that mighty deeds be done again. Truth equals confrontation.”123 Islamic Views: Jàhilìyya, Takfìr, Jihàd In traditional Islam the term jàhilìyya, understood as an historic condi­ tion of paganism and ignorance in pre-Islamic Arabia, has always had 122 123

Schaeffer. 1982. Volume Four, ACM, pp. 483–489.

Franky Schaeffer. 1982. pp. 150–154.

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a pejorative sense. In most Muslim societies ignorance of the jàhilìyya period still prevails, while studies of jàhilìyya that do not fit Islamic per­ spectives are branded anti-Islamic. Fundamentalists stress an ideological stigmatization of jàhilìyya a that discourages the study of the pre-Islamic era except to exaggerate its evils. For most Muslims, traditional and fundamentalist, real history began with Islam—anything before it is jàhilìyya and therefore of no value except as a foil to exalt Islam.124 Fundamentalists have however reinterpreted jàhilìyya, applying it to pre­ sent day societies, rulers, and regimes. Viewing only Sharì 'a-based regimes as really legitimate, some have reinterpreted the traditional concepts of jàhilìyya and takfìr in their attempts to justify the use of force against other Muslims and against state-regimes. Radical and mainline movements differ over the application of jàhilìyya to Muslim society and states. The central question for Islamists is the extent of jàhilìyya: does it apply to society as a whole or only to the regime? does it include the bureaucracy and the military? the 'ulamà" establishment? If the entire society, not just the government, is jàhilì, then this legitimizes attacks on civilians who are effectively apostates as there is no neutral ground.125 For extreme Muslim fundamentalists, jàhilìyya is the present condition of a society that by its non-implementation of full Sharì'a reveals its rebellion against God’s sovereignty. All Western society and the international organizations dominated by it are jàhilì as are all Muslim regimes. Since the early khàrijì rebellions, the 'ulamà" have recognized the dan­ gers of takf ìr (official labeling as apostate), ruling that it cannot be used against professing Muslims. The large mainline fundamentalist move­ ments such as the Muslim Brotherhood, although using the jàhilì con­ cept in their discourse, follow this tradition and will not pronounce takfìr on any Muslim, accepting claims of belonging to the faith at face value, while leaving the judgment of intentions to God. These movements are committed to participation in the democratic process in order to affect a gradual movement of regime, constitution and society toward an Islamic state based on Sharì'a. Qu†b states that the main cause of the crises and loss of moral val­ ues affecting Christian and Muslim societies is the return of humanity to paganism ( jàhilìyya) and the dethroning of God from His rightful sov­ ereignty and rule (˙àkimìyya). This crisis is a God-given opportunity for

124 As'ad Abu-Khalil, “The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, Autumn 1994. 125 Strawson, John. “Encountering Islamic Law,” Essay presented at the Cri­ tical Legal Conference, New College, Oxford, September 9 –12, 1993. “The World Wide Web Virtual Library: Islamic and Middle Eastern Law”, Internet, . p. 11.

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true Islam to step into the breach and lead humanity from the brink of disaster towards a new golden age, as it alone offers the missing ingredients for a spiritual revival. According to Qu†b, jàhilìyya a is not a pre-Islamic historical era of paganism—it is an ever present condi­ tion of denying God’s rule, usurping His authority, and living by manmade laws that enslave men to their rulers, engendering oppression. Qu†b identifies the enemy as all jàhilì societies, thus supplying a specific focus for revolutionary action. Jàhilìyya is always evil in whatever form it manifests itself, always seeking to crush true Islam. Jihàd by force (bi"l saif ) must be used to annihilate jàhilì regimes and replace them by true Muslim ones.126 Qu†b claimed that the first step towards Islamic renewal is to judge all societies, institutions, and regimes by the criteria of true taw˙ìd and ˙àkimìyya. All those that do not fulfill these criteria are to be proclaimed jàhilì. This is takfìr—the pronouncement of individuals and/or commu­ nities as apostate, making them legitimate targets for active jihàd. Qu†b’s reinterpretation of jàhilìyya and takfìr unsheathed a tempting weapon for radicals: the possibility of pronouncing all rival groups and individuals as kuffàr—thus paving the way for indiscriminate terror as practiced by al-Jamà'a al-Islàmiyya in Egypt, and by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria. All Western societies, Christian, Jewish, Communist, and all contemporary Muslim societies are denounced as jàhilì, and no truly Islamic state exists in the world today.127 Radical movements use the concepts of jàhilìyya and takfìr to legit­ imize their actions. They are willing to denounce as kuffàr whole soci­ eties (including Muslim ones) and regimes as well as individuals. According to the radicals, the failure to implement Sharì'a in any state makes that state a jàhilì state under takfìr, and all true Muslims are duty-bound to wage jihàd against its regime. Radical movements, such as al-Jamà'a al­ Islàmiyya and al-Jihàd in Egypt, claim that gradualist attempts at reform are un-Qur"ànic. They view most regimes in Muslim countries as cor­ rupt and in a state of jàhilìyya resembling the authorities in pre-Islamic times. However, for contemporary radicals modern jàhilìyya is far worse as it includes the rejection of the message of Islam—“it is not a jahiliyya of ignorance, but a jahiliyya of conscious rejection.”128 Shukrì Mu߆afà, leader of the Egyptian Takf ìr wa"l-Hijra declared both regime and society as in a state of jàhilìyya and under takfìr, and ordered true Muslims to separate from them all.129 He viewed all Islamic communities since Mu˙ammad and the Ràshidùn Caliphs as jàhilì. All

126 127 128 129

Qutb. 1990. pp. 5–10, 15–17, 45–50, 66–67, 101, 123.

Ibid., pp. 64–68, 91–92.

Strawson. 1993. p. 11.

Jabbour. 1993. pp. 194–212; See also Abdelnasser. 1994. pp. 204–205.

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traditions following Qur"àn and Sunna (including the four madhhabs) are mere traditions of men and therefore jàhilì. They are unnecessary as the Qur"àn was given in plain Arabic and is absolutely clear for every Muslim. The four Imàms had closed the door of ijtihàd and made them­ selves into tawaghì†, pagan idols, interposing themselves as mediators between God and the believer.130 Faràj, the founder of al-Jihàd, did not see all of society as jàhilì, nor did he reject the four madhhabs. Rather, each individual in society is to be treated according to whether he is a true Muslim or a jàhil. Faràj interpreted Ibn-Taymiyya as teaching that while the masses are composed of both Muslims and jàhilìs intermixed, the rulers are all jàhilì because while claiming to be Islamic they rule according to their own whims.131 Discourse on jihàd The other concept used to legitimize violence is jihàd. While accepting that the individual internal struggle is important, many Islamic funda­ mentalists see jihàd, striving in God’s way, as mainly a struggle against societal evil and as a strategy for spreading Islam so as to establish a true Islamic system based on Sharì 'a in all states. The political battle is inherent in this concept, the only question being whether the goal is to be achieved by a peaceful struggle or by a violent effort. Radicals go beyond the concept accepted by the mainline movements of a com­ munal struggle to improve society, and the use of force in defense against aggressors, to include aggressive violent action aimed at taking over power in the state. Some also justify attacks on other jàhilì states, Muslim and non-Muslim seen as dàr al-˙arb, in order to impose the Islamic sys­ tem and Sharì'a on the whole world by force. On the mainline side, al-Bannà" saw jihàd as a God-ordained defen­ sive strategy, stating that most Islamic scholars “agree unanimously that jihad is a communal defensive obligation imposed upon the Islamic ummah in order to broadcast the summons (to embrace Islam), and that it is an individual obligation to repulse the attack of unbelievers upon it.” However, as a result of unbelievers ruling Muslim lands and humbling Muslim honor, “It has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, on every Muslim to prepare his equipment, to make up his mind to engage in jihàd, and to get ready for it until the oppor­ tunity is ripe and God decrees a matter which is sure to be accomplished.”132 Al-Bannà" does not accept as sound the ˙adìth that claims the 130

Dekmejian. 1985. pp. 92–96. Faraj, in Jansen. 1986. pp. 169–175; See also Gilles Kepel. 1985. The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, pp. 191–222; Also Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? pp. 134–135. 132 Hasan al-Banna. 1978. Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), pp. 150–151. 131

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jihàd of the spirit is the greater jihàd, and the jihàd of the sword the lesser jihàd, and he glorifies active defensive jihàd: The supreme martyrdom is only conferred on those who slay or are slain in the way of God. As death is inevitable and can happen only once, partaking in jihad is profitable in this world and the next.”133

Ghannùshì promotes the defensive nature of jihàd. The Qur"àn “con­ demns aggression and oppression and recognizes the legitimate right of an oppressed to resist and even fight in order to deter oppression.” Ghannùshì points out that the Qur"àn accepts the fact of conflict as a natural feature of human development: as evil spreads so the fight against it must intensify. The Qur"àn calls for the establishment of truth and justice both by peaceful means and by jihàd.134 Dr. Isràr A˙mad, leader of the TanΩìm-i Islàmì movement of Pakistan, also views jihàd in a defensive light. He says that Muslims are facing attacks by atheistic and un-Islamic ideologies that can only be effectively resisted by a jihàd using the weapon of the Qur"àn. Jihàd implies the struggle in Allàh’s way against opposing forces. Qur"àn and Sunna describ­ ing six different ways in which this struggle operates: Jihàd with one’s self or life; with one’s material resources; with one’s hand in active resis­ tance against evil; with one’s heart by inculcating a strong abhorrence of evil; and finally with the sword (qitàl ). All available means of com­ munication should be used to wage jihàd against un-Islamic ideologies, and that the distribution of audio and video tapes and the publication of books and magazines is covered by the term “jihàd bi"l-lisàn” (of the tongue).135 Qu†b takes a middle position, viewing jihàd as both defensive and offensive. Qu†b states that jàhilìyya is always evil in whatever form it manifests itself and jihàd by force (bi"l saif ) must be used to annihilate jàhilì regimes, replacing them by Islamic systems. Jihàd bi"l-saif is not aimed at individuals—“there is no compulsion in religion” defines Islam’s attitude to individuals. However, to guarantee the free choice of accept­ ing true Islam, individuals must live in a Muslim environment where no impediment is placed on the implementation of Sharì 'a. The goal of jihàd is to free people from enslavement to other men so that they might serve God alone in such a society where all can see Islam operating as God intended: all are free, all are equally slaves to God, legal and social justice is practiced, greed and usury are eliminated.

133

Al-Banna. 1978. pp. 155–156. Ghannouchi. “The Conflict Between the West and Islam: The Tunisian Case: Reality and Prospects”. 135 Ahmad, Israr. “Atheistic Ideologies can be defeated only through the Qur’an”. 134

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When they have no such freedom, it becomes incumbent upon Muslims to launch a struggle, initiating an activist movement committed to restoring their freedom and destroying the regimes that deny people the freedom to listen to the message of Islam and force them to bow to their own sovereignty rather than to that of Allah. Having annihi­ lated the tyranny, Islam then establishes a new social, economic and political system, in which all men and women enjoy real freedom. The purpose of jihad bil-saif is to introduce true freedom for mankind and prepare the way for a free preaching of Islam to all humanity. This it accomplishes by using all resources practically available in any given human situation, and developing in definite stages, in each of which it utilizes appropriate new methods.136

Mawdùdì seems to go a step further, explaining jihàd as the revolu­ tionary struggle to establish God’s just order on earth, “To bring about a revolution and establish a new order in conformity with the ideology of Islam.” This struggle is undertaken not for selfish reasons, but to earn God’s pleasure, the aim being not to “replace Caesar with Caesar”, but to establish a “just and equitable social order among human beings”. In this struggle Muslims are to exert all their possessions including their lives in the fight against evil “so that evil and contumacy may be erad­ icated and Allah’s Law enforced on earth”. Mawdùdì explains that it is the duty of true believers to “wipe out oppression, wrongdoing, strife, immorality, arrogance and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. It is their objective to shatter the myth of the divinity of ‘demi­ gods’ and false deities, and to reinstate good in the place of evil.” Under an evil government evil systems takes root and flourish and no pious order can ever be established. This is why the Islamic party has no option but to wrest the authority of government from wicked hands and transfer it to the hands of true Muslims.137 The radicals view jihàd as both aggressive and imperative. Shukrì Mu߆afà claimed that as both society and regime in Egypt are under takfìr, both are the first enemy to be dealt with by jihàd. Israel, the enemy far away would come later. Open jihàd however is not to be ini­ tiated until Takfìr reaches its phase of strength.138 Faràj of al-Jihàd declared both regime and its employees as jàhilì and under takfìr, therefore jihàd against them is justified and imperative. Active jihàd was God’s solution to the problem of dealing with apostate rulers. Faràj taught that violent jihàd against all unbelievers is the sup­ pressed sixth pillar of Islam, the main religious duty of true Muslims, superior to all other forms of struggle, which must be given top priority.

136 137 138

Qutb, Sayyid. 1990. pp. 43–50.

Mawdudi. 1997. pp. 4–6, 10–11.

Jabbour. 1993. pp. 194–212; See also Abdelnasser. 1994. pp. 204–205.

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True Islam means immediate and continuous jihàd against Egypt’s athe­ ist ruler and state. Focusing on achieving political power, Faràj gave priority to an immediate coup against the regime, seizure of political power, and the assassination of the “evil prince”. The first target had to be the enemy at home—external enemies would be dealt with later. There was no excuse for postponing the confrontation which was to be waged by violence and the mobilization of the masses. Killing true Muslims enlisted by the regime was justified by reference to prophetic example and famous commentators. So was the infiltration of the enemy camp and the use of deception in overthrowing the regime. Faràj crit­ icized other groups for their gradualist strategy of involvement in the political system which only strengthened the regime. He dealt with var­ ious excuses put forward for postponing active jihàd or interpreting it as defensive or non-violent and concluded that they were all wrong and that active and immediate jihàd is the only strategy for achieving an Islamic state.139 Ibrahim, Abdul-Majid & Darbaalah, who are close to Jamà 'at al-Jihàd, criticize Muslims who believe that jihàd is only permitted in self-defence, or that jihàd should be postponed for various reasons. They state that jihàd is one of the three practices, da'wa, ˙isba, and jihàd, ordained by Islam for dealing with the world and applicable for all times and places.140 Jihàd is aimed at unbelievers against whom war must be waged at all times, and it is the means by which to establish khilàfa, after removing the disbelieving rulers who have usurped God’s position, and of estab­ lishing God’s law as supreme. Jihàd is also the only way by which to recover lost Muslim lands. Jihàd is an obligation on all Muslims and it is an unforgivable crime to abandon it. Faràj was right to label it “The Forgotten Obligation”. However, jihàd must be waged only in the frame­ work of a jamà'a based on Sharì 'a.141 C There are remarkable resemblances in the way both fundamentalisms view life as a constant battle between God’s powers of good ranged against Satanic evil powers. Both call on believers to fight and suffer patiently in God’s cause. Christians especially stress the militant attitude expected of believers in light of this emergency situation.

139 Faraj, in Jansen. 1986. pp. 159–179, 186–189, 192–193, 207–213; See also Hamid Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, 1984. pp. 136–137; also Esposito, 1992. pp. 134–135. 140 Da'wa is the missionary call to all people to submit to Islam, while hisba entails all the practical means of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong in society. 141 Ibrahim, Abdul-Maajid, & Darbaalah. 1997. pp. 48–51, 76–77, 115, 123.

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Both view history as a dialectical spiritual battle in which a stand for God’s truth will always involve confrontation. Both use binary dichotomies to describe the world, stressing that there can be no neutrality or com­ promise, and that the opponents of God are totally corrupt and evil. Both stress the supernatural aspects of this battle, though Christians seem to dwell more on this aspect, some of them developing elaborate doctrines of spiritual warfare against territorial spirits. Both fundamen­ talisms also view the battle as involving the realm of ideas, worldviews and ideologies, in which two diametrically opposed camps are battling for supremacy, the central issue being that of God’s authority and rule. Both state that their founders were radical revolutionaries initiating a new system that destroys the corrupt status quo. Interestingly, both camps dedicate some discourse to the issue of the personal moral struggle within the individual, stressing man’s dual nature and the importance of the struggle against temptation and evil in the development of godly character and what Christians term sanctification. Islamists especially use the metaphor of the lower evil self which has to be conquered and subdued in the greater jihàd. Both fundamentalisms advocate separatism to varying degrees. For Christians it is based on the concept of God’s holiness and expressed mainly as separation from personal evil and ecclesiastical false doctrines and systems, leading many to set up their own independent churches and institutions. Some however repudiate total separation and call for social and political involvement in order to be “salt and light” in soci­ ety while upholding personal moral separation from evil. For Islamic fundamentalists separation usually means emulating the Prophet’s hijra from Mecca to Medina interpreted as a temporary separation from jàhilì environment in order to consolidate the community’s strength and even­ tually return in power to destroy the evil system and establish God’s rule. While the personal aspect of this separation is stressed by some, most Islamic discourse is on its political expression, discussing whether it means total non-involvement with present regimes and societies, or only partial separation as true Muslims seek to impact individuals in society and the general culture. Another interesting parallel is the thriving of conspiracy theories among some wings of both camps. In both groups there is a tendency to iden­ tify perceived enemies and unmask secret conspirators. For Islamists, the perennial enemies of Islam are usually the Crusading Christians, the Jews, and secularism in its manifold manifestations. For Christians, liberal-secular-humanism is the great enemy, but some see Islam as the real contemporary enemy, while on the fringes there are perceived con­ spiracies by Freemasons, Jews, socialists, and bankers aimed at setting up a New World Order with apocalyptic motives. These forces are tak­ ing over central government and the United Nations and threaten human rights and freedoms based on the Bible.

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Anti-Semitism is evident to some extent in both movements. In con­ temporary Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Semitic rhetoric plays a domi­ nant role. Among Christian fundamentalists anti-Semitism was more prevalent before World War II, but due to the holocaust its operating space has shrunk to the extreme right-wing fringes, whose rhetoric bears many resemblances to Islamic anti-Semitic discourse. Both fundamentalisms view contemporary society as neo-Pagan in its repudiation of moral absolutes, sexual permissiveness, and secular-atheistic worldview. Both see the need to resist ungodly and evil dictates of such systems. Christians grapple with the question of if and when resis­ tance is justified and when it may go beyond passive resistance. While some advocate only passive non-violent disobedience without any involve­ ment in politics, others encourage active engagement in social and polit­ ical campaigns in order to change the situation. Biblical responses to illegal demands include fleeing to safer places, and peaceful activism against the offending regulations. Most Christians are against armed rebellion, arguing that only a law­ fully constituted government is permitted to bear the sword. Some how­ ever see a possibility of going beyond passive civil disobedience and using legitimately constituted force when the ultimate bottom line has been reached. On the Islamic side, mainline groups view the struggle mainly in ideo­ logical terms and advocate involvement in civil society, charitable work, and democratic politics to change the evil situation. Among radicals, jàhilìyya, takfìr, and jihàd, are the concepts used to justify terrorism, armed resistance and violent takeovers of government from corrupt and apos­ tate regimes. While some see all of contemporary society as apostate and legitimate targets of violence, others claim it is only the rulers, regimes and active helpers that may be targeted.

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CONCLUSION This comparative study has conclusively shown that there is much value in conducting broad-ranging, cross-boundary comparisons in the realm of religious fundamentalisms. It has shown that neither fundamentalism is monolithic, but that each variety encompasses a wide spectrum of ideas on each theme studied. It has also revealed remarkable and unex­ pected areas of “family resemblances” within which there are great differences and nuances both between the two camps and within each camp. The most marked areas of resemblance are those concerned with the anti-secularist discourse, the integrated theocentric world view, as well as the various conceptualizations of holy scripture. There are also broad resemblances complemented by many nuanced differences in other areas and themes of discourse, such as in the discourse on politics and the discourse on life as a moral and spiritual battlefield between the forces of good and those of evil. Strong divergences are most notice­ able in the fields of politics, government, and the state. Overall it seems that whenever there are strong convergences there are also subtle divergences, and vice versa, whenever there are strong divergences, there also exist subtle convergences. It is the detailed study of these thematic resemblances and differences that helps more clearly map out the contours of the ‘map’ of the Christian and Islamic fun­ damentalist discourses, and helps us find our way in this complex land­ scape of complementary and competing movements, groups, ideologies, and worldviews. The resemblances noted do not imply that there are no real differences between the fundamentalist versions of Islam and Christianity. Core differences would emerge strongly in any comparative studies of the basic doctrines of each camp, especially on such topics as the right view of the Godhead (unitarian vs. trinitarian), views of the person of Christ (deity vs. prophethood), salvation, redemption, and similar themes where the differences seem unbridgeable for fundamentalists. However, this study endeavors to show that based on a careful comparison, there are significant areas of resemblance within quite a number of selected themes, both in doctrinal and practical spheres. The search for common ground between both religions has so far in the main been confined to dialogue between the liberal branches of Christianity and Islam, and is based more on basic monotheistic con­ cepts, spirituality and ethics common to both.1 However, this study,

1

Leonard Swidler. “The Evolution of a Dialogue”, in Swidler, ed., 1992. Muslims

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while revealing the multifaceted variety of doctrine and practice within each fundamentalist camp has also shown that there are many resem­ blances between specific doctrines, concepts, and interpretations on both sides of the fundamentalist divide. While fundamentalists of all stripes tend to a universalistic and essentializing search for the original mean­ ing of their source scriptures in order to implement the discovered prin­ ciples in contemporary contexts, their interpretations represent a wide spectrum of views that are often reproduced with remarkable similarity on both sides of the religious divide. There is a marked “family resemblance” in the general consensus of both fundamentalisms against the secularist ideology of our time, but while most Christian fundamentalists can accommodate themselves to some aspects of this secularism and others even welcome its separation of state and religion as the guarantee of religious freedom, most Muslims seem to be totally antagonistic to it. There is also a marked family sim­ ilarity in the desire of both camps for a God-centered universe to replace the man-centered systems prevalent in the world today. Another “family resemblance” is in the attitudes to the original sacred scriptures seen as revealed by God, inerrant and to be literally obeyed. Yet there are marked differences in how to interpret them and on how to apply them both between the camps and within each camp. Attitudes to state and politics reveal some resemblances and many differences. While all critique the present systems of government for excluding religion from the public sphere and the real power centers, there are marked differences in the approach and method of achieving change. While most Christians approve of some political involvement of believers, they seek more to influence the present systems in the direc­ tion of a more biblically-oriented value-system and legal system, while some reject any involvement whatsoever in the political system, and only a few aim at taking over power in the state and setting up a Christian government. Muslims on the other hand are in general more committed to political involvement and most agree that it is necessary to set up an Islamic system of government, but have differences on how to achieve this—whether by joining the political system and influencing it from within until they achieve a majority and can set up their own regime by democratic means, or whether the only way to achieve their goal is by violence—coup or revolution—which will overthrow the old system. An interesting finding resulting from this study is the wide spectrum of thought within each religious camp, paralleled by a similar wide spec­ trum in the other camp. For instance, when looking at the subject of

In Dialogue, pp. iv–xviii; Dan Cohn-Sherbock. “Incarnation and Trialogue”, in CohnSherbok, ed., 1991. Islam In A world Of Diverse Faiths, pp. 18–32.

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involvement in politics, both camps have an apolitical wing: TablìghìJamà'at in the Islamic camp and some Anabaptist, pietist, and pre-millennial dispensationalists in the Christian camp. There are also many views among those advocating involvement in politics. Among the Islamic fundamentalists most advocate a full involvement, either as gradualists intent on joining the democratic political process in order to win power legally by sheer force of numbers, or radicals aiming at a violent take­ over of political power in the state in order to force their fundamen­ talist agenda on society. On the Christian side there is a more varied approach to involvement, as quite a few groups prefer a “reluctant involve­ ment” approach, advocating a limited involvement in politics in order to influence government and legislation on specific moral issues dear to them. Then there are the advocates of full involvement who see pol­ itics as a legitimate field of action and service for believers and hope to attain greater influence in order to implement their values and policies, while others like the Reconstructionists aim at attaining total power through the democratic process, hoping to completely change the system and place it on a biblical basis. Resemblances are also apparent in the attitude of both fundamen­ talisms to a past “Golden Age” as well as to the concept of life in this world as a constant battle between good and evil, creating stark binary dichotomies that carry over into the relationships with erring believers as well as with ideological opponents. While there are resemblances in the ways fundamentalists of both camps seek to justify civil disobedience and violence, in practice outright indiscriminate violence (terrorism) seems to be more prevalent in Islamic fundamentalist circles. This may have something to do with the fact that Western Christianity experienced its violent religious internecine wars following the Reformation, injecting a certain horror of religious violence (though not of political violence) that has lasted for several centuries. While some Christian fundamentalists find a theoretical underpinning for violence, in practice their civil dis­ obedience efforts have to date been fairly limited while outright vio­ lence has been minimal, limited to some shootings at abortion clinics.2 This view has been somewhat modified by the bombing of a federal building in Kansas City in which over 300 people were killed and which was traced to extreme right militia members who also have a Christian fundamentalist agenda as part of their wider worldview. The Christian fundamentalists closest to mainline Islamic fundamen­ talists are the Reconstructionists whose views on God’s sovereignty and rule are close to Qu†b’s concepts of ˙àkimiyya and rabbànìyya. Their view

2 John H. Garvey. 1993. “Fundamentalism and American Law”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993b. Fundamentalisms and the State, p. 46, note 35. This was obvi­ ously written before the Kansas City bombing.

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of all scripture as a system of law binding on contemporary society, and of governments as bound to implement the detailed scriptural law, have great family resemblances to the views of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamà'atì-i Islàmì on the implementation of Sharì'a in the constitution and legal system of the state. These resemblances also extend to their gradualist views of implementation of their ideals using a bottom-up democratic approach. A word must also be said about stylistic resemblances and differences. In both camps, there are some writers who exemplify the charismaticprophetic style. Their writing is highly emotionally charged and moti­ vational. Like Old Testament prophets, they thunder against the evils of contemporary society and challenge its norms, call the people to repentance and to total loyalty to God, castigate the religious and polit­ ical establishments, warn of coming doom, and herald a spiritual renewal. On the Muslim side, such prophetic characters include al-Bannà", Qu†b, Nadwì, Mawdùdì and Sharì'atì. On the Christian side, Lloyd-Jones, Schaeffer, Rushdoony, and Hill come to mind. Other writers have a much more intellectual and sophisticated dis­ course. They tend to be university educated intellectuals, striving to institutionalize the movement and routinize the charisma of the founder generation. On the Muslim side Ghannùshì, Mas'arì and al-Turàbì seem to represent this strand, while on the Christian side it is represented by Stott, Guiness, Colson, and Packer, among others. Another strand of style is composed of those writers who possess neither the emotive power of the founders nor the sophistication of the second generation intellectuals, but exemplify an uncompromising, combative, and radical stress on the binary dichotomies of fundamentalism, taking them to their logical extremes, often targeting not just unbelievers, but fellow-fundamentalists as enemies of the faith. On the Muslim side this strand is represented by al-Nabhànì, 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad, Faràj, and 'Umar 'Abd al-Ra˙màn. On the Christian side people like McIntire, Bob Jones, and Cloud come to mind. D  F Having studied Christian and Muslim fundamentalist discourses and their relationship and attitudes to modernism and secularism, it would seem that the real contemporary conflict many observers are concerned with is not the notorious “clash of civilizations”, nor is it primarily a political confrontation between West and East, or North and South. It is rather a kulturkampf, a competition between two cultural tendencies within each civilization, one based on religious values, the other on sec­ ularism and materialism. The real core questions for all participants lie in the realm of ultimate concepts and values and worldviews—of ulti­

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mate conceptual paradigms. For fundamentalists of both persuasions the real question is whether the universe and human society are ultimately based on absolute values, revealed by a transcendent power, that serve as criteria and testing stones for new ideas and developments and that demand application in all areas of human life including science, soci­ ology, politics, art and economics; or whether human society is ulti­ mately based on the post-modern uncertainty principle, which in the fundamentalist view inevitably leads to a tolerance of most things whether labeled good or bad, as everything is relative and it is impossible to know whose truth is more true. Both worldviews have consequences in the real lives of individuals, societies, states and civilizations, and the results of each can be seen working their way out in the history of various societies. This struggle between the religious and the secular worldviews is the mark of the last decade of the twentieth century and the dawn of the twenty-first, and in this apocalyptic struggle many strange tactical alliances will yet be formed and dissolved and many battles fought of which we cannot know the result. As this study has shown, most fundamentalists would agree with A˙mad’s statement that the choice can only be between the Divine Principle and a secular materialist culture. A˙mad calls all those con­ cerned over the spiritual and moral crisis of our times to welcome Islamic and Christian fundamentalist resurgence and not be scared by it.3 Islamic and Christian fundamentalists of all stripes, like the prophets of their respective religions, present the real questions facing humanity in dichotomic terms, calling on their co-religionists to decide, to take a stand, to mobilize for committed and organized action against the per­ ceived evil powers active at this stage in human society. This basic Manichaic premise is used to analyze scripture, critique tradition, his­ tory, society, politics, morals, and government, and to present solutions. Fundamentalist discourse is used to present the stark choices in each area and call for corrective action. Of course there remains a basic difference in that in the West the process of secularization has proceeded for several centuries, leading to the marginalization of Christianity in the political sphere. Christian fun­ damentalists therefore face an uphill battle in trying to convince their societies of the need for a stronger role of religion in the public sphere. In most Muslim countries and societies however, Islam is still very much a dominant force in the public square and in politics, giving funda­ mentalists much greater leverage in their quest for an Islamic state. Western modernism and its attendant secularism have given birth to both good and evil, to democracy, freedom, pluralism and tolerance, as

3 Khurshid A˙mad. 1983. “The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence” in Esposito, ed., 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp. 228–229.

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well as to Fascism, Nazism and Communism, runaway consumerism and unbridled greed, manipulation and exploitation. Islam and Christianity have provided a moral framework for millions, but have also been manipulated for political power struggles and have been used to legit­ imate violence and terrorism as well as extreme nationalism and xeno­ phobia. There are extremists and lunatic fringes in all camps. F W This study could only touch on a few selected themes. The chapters on history, antisecularism and scripture are more in the nature of an introduction to the following chapters on contemporary issues. It would be important if further similar comparative studies were undertaken on other themes such as morality and ethics, mission, eschatology, and social justice. Other issues worth looking into would include the religion­ ization of knowledge and economics. Textual studies are limited to the discourse of a few leading figures in each camp, and cannot reveal what the great mass of followers really think, nor whether the ideals and concepts expressed in the discourse are actually implemented in reality, and if so to what extent. Finding answers to these questions would necessitate undertaking field studies within the various movements in different regional locations.

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APPENDIX B  P S A1 Islamic 2

'Abd al-Ra˙màn, 'Umar (1938–) Blind Egyptian religious scholar and radical fundamentalist leader, grad­ uate of al-Azhar. 'Abd al-Ra˙màn taught as a mosque preacher in a poor rural area but returned to graduate studies in al-Azhar obtaining a Master’s degree in 1967 and a faculty appointment in 1968. He was connected to the mainline Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s, but grad­ ually moved to Qu†b’s radical interpretations. After completing a doc­ torate in 1972, he lectured at al-Azhar and later at the Azharì Institute in Asyut where he was sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood student organization. 'Abd al-Ra˙màn left Egypt in 1977 for four years in Saudi Arabia as Professor of Quranic Studies at Sa'ùd University. After his return he was arrested for his leadership role in TanΩìm al-Jihàd, the organization involved in the assassination of President Sadat. However he was acquit­ ted by the court and released in 1984. 'Abd al-Ra˙màn emerged in the 1980s as a leading figure in the radical Islamist movements in Egypt. His book Mì†hàq al-'àmil al-Islàmì (Charter of Islamic Action) expressed his affiliation with the radical groups aiming at the overthrow of the secular state. He became linked also to the Jamà'a al-Islàmìyya as their chief spiritual guide. In 1990 he emigrated to the United States and was arrested there in 1994 for his alleged link to the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. A˙mad, Isràr (1932–)3 Pakistani mainline fundamentalist preacher, writer, and leader of the Óizb-i Islàmì movement in Pakistan.

1 I have endeavored to provide dates of birth for all authors, as well as dates of publication for all books mentioned. Wherever they are missing, it means that I was not able to find the respective dates. 2 Information on 'Umar 'Abd al-Ra˙màn has been collected from various sources including: Biographical note in: 'Abd al-Ra˙màn. 1990. The Present Rulers and Islam: Are they Muslims or not? ; Esposito, J. ed., 1995. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: 'Abdel Rahman, Omar, Vol. 1, p. 10. 3 “Israr Ahmad’s Biographical Data”, Internet, .

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Dr. A˙mad graduated in medicine from the King Edward Medical College in Lahore in 1954, and later received an MA in Islamic stud­ ies from the University of Karachi in 1965. After practising medicine for 16 years, A˙mad devoted himself to the study and teaching of the Qur "àn. He was a leading member of Jamà'at-i Islàmì, but following some disagreements with Mawdùdì over Jamà'at-i Islàmì involvement in elec­ toral politics he resigned in 1957. In 1974 he founded his own Islamic movement, called TanΩìm-i Islàmì. Isràr A˙mad recognized the need to utilize the modern media, both print and electronic, which he has skillfully used to project the image of his movement as a worldwide organization. A˙mad, Khurshid (1932–) 4 Prominent intellectual and politician, scholar, economist, lecturer, con­ ference speaker, and one of the main leaders of the Jamà'at-i Islàmì in Pakistan. Khurshid A˙mad was born in Delhi, India, where his father was active in pre-Independence Muslim politics. A˙mad had a traditional Islamic education and attended the Anglo-Arab secondary school in Delhi. Following the partition in 1948, the family emigrated to Karachi, Pakistan, where A˙mad attended the Government College of Commerce and Economics. A˙mad holds a BA in Law and Jurisprudence, a Master’s degree in Economics and Islamic Studies, and an Honorary Ph.D. in Education. A˙mad joined Jamà'at-i Islàmì’s student organization, Islàmì Jami'at ˇalàba (IJT) in 1949, and was its President 1953–1955. Under his lead­ ership it became a well-organized efficient organization actively fighting for students’ rights, a center of campus politics. By the 1970s the IJT was winning 60 to 80 percent of the student elections. A˙mad served as Professor of Economics at the University of Karachi (1955–1968), Federal Minister of Planning and Development, Government of Pakistan (1978–79), and Member of Senate, Pakistan (1985–1997). He has also served as Vice President of the Jamà'at-i Islàmì Pakistan and was founder and Director-General of the Islamic Foundation, UK. Professor A˙mad was a research scholar at the University of Leicester, UK, and has held academic positions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as serving on many associations, committees, and advisory coun­ cils across the world.

4

Khurshid A˙mad. 1974. Family Life in Islam, back-cover; “The Leadership you can Trust . . . Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, Naib Ameer (Vice President),” JI: Leadership: Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, Internet, ; Esposito & Voll. “Khurshid Ahmad: Muslim Activist-Economist”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXX, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 24–36.

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Khurshid A˙mad combined teaching with writing and was editor of various Jamà'at publications, including Tarjumàn al-Qur "àn, the Jamà'at’s official mouthpiece. He has written, translated and edited over fifty books on Islam, economics, education and law, both in English and Urdu, including: Fanaticism, Intolerance and Islam (1957), The Prophet of Islam (1966), Islam: Its Meaning and Message (1976), Economic Development in an Islamic Framework (1979), and Family Life in Islam (1974). Khurshid A˙mad is a main contributor to the development of Islamic economics and to its creation as a contemporary academic discipline. He was elected first president of the International Association for Islamic Economics founded in 1986. Basing himself on Mawdùdì’s concept of Islam as a comprehensive system, A˙mad views Islamic economics as an integral part of the holistic Islamic system, value-oriented, and sub­ ject to God’s sovereignty and taw˙ìd. Al-Bannà", Óasan (1906–1949)5 Populist and charismatic Egyptian Islamic leader, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and a main early leader of the contemporary Islamic resurgence, an exceptional public speaker and a skillful organizer. Óasan al-Bannà" was born in the Egyptian Delta town of Ma˙mudiya, where he received an elementary religious education as well as attend­ ing state primary school. He was associated for a while with the Óasafìya Íùfì order. He attended the Damanhùr Teacher’s Training College, and then studied at the teacher’s training college Dàr al-'Ulùm in Cairo, from which he graduated in 1927. He was then appointed as an Arabic lan­ guage teacher at a primary school in Ismà'iliya. Al-Bannà" was disturbed by the rapid Westernization and seculariza­ tion of Egyptian society, and the serious social dislocations they engen­ dered. Muslim weakness was a result of a deviation from true Islam as defined by the original scriptures, blind imitation, and syncretistic super­ stitions. Following salafì teachings, he preached a return to the sources and a rejection of foreign currents, adding the necessity of political activism. Islam was a system that included personal piety, politics, and social justice. Al-Bannà" sought to re-Islamize the masses as a step towards the establishment of a comprehensive Muslim order in an Islamic state. Al-Bannà" founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in order to mobi­ lize the masses, purify Islam, combat colonial domination, and set up

5

Hasan al-Banna. 1995. Letter to a Muslim Student, pp. 7–8; David Commins. “Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949),” in 'Ali Rahneema, ed., 1994. Pioneers of Islamic Revi­ val, pp. 125–153; Nabeel T. Jabbour. 1993. The Rumbling Volcano: Islamic Fundamentalism In Egypt, pp. 71–109; The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Banna, Hasan al-, Vol. 1, pp. 195–199.

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an Islamic state based on Sharì 'a. He stressed the importance of organ­ ization and activism in achieving the goals of his movement. Under his leadership the Muslim Brotherhood became the best organized and largest grassroots political group in Egypt (membership was estimated at 1 million in the 1930s), with branches in most other Arab countries. With the growth of the Brotherhood, al-Bannà" became involved in national politics. In 1936 he sent a letter to King Farùk, the prime min­ ister, and other Arab leaders encouraging them to promote an Islamic order. After WWII the Brotherhood, especially its secret special mili­ tary arm (NiΩàm al-Khàs), took part in the violent campaign against the British occupation. Al-Bannà" was assassinated in 1949 by the govern­ ment secret police after the military arm of the brotherhood was impli­ cated in the assassination of the Egyptian prime minister al-Nuqràshi in 1948. Al-Bannà" wrote Majmu'at al-Rasà"il (Collection of Letters), and Mudhakiràt al-da'wa wal-da'ì (Memories of the Message and the Messenger). Bin-Làden, Usàma (1957–)6 Saudi multimillionaire dissident and anti-American radical Islamic activist who fought with the Afghan Mujàhidìn in the anti-Soviet war. Bin-Làden was born in Medìna, and studied management and eco­ nomics at King Abdul Aziz University, Jedda. He became involved in Islamist movements in 1973, and in 1979 he joined the Afghan Mujàhidìn in their fight against the Soviets, and played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting and training Arab volunteers to fight in Afghanistan. With 'Abd Allah 'Azzam he established the Office for Mujàhidìn Services in Peshawar to help the mujàhidìn war effort. Bin-Làden also partici­ pated in battles against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Returning to Saudi Arabia after the end of the Afghan war, his involvement with Islamist groups led to the Saudi government with­ drawing his citizenship in 1994 and freezing his assets, while his own family disowned him. He then moved to Sudan in 1991 but inter­ national pressure forced him to move back to Afghanistan. Bin-Làden maintains a broad network linked to most radical Islamic movements, providing them with training, safe havens, and financial support. He is a principal source of funding and direction for al-Qà'ida,

6

“Who is Usama Bin Laden?” Internet, ; “Bin Laden (Osama),” Internet, ; “Declaration of War—Expel the Infidel from the Arabian Peninsula, Usama Bin Laden, Introduction” Internet, ; FAS Intelligence Resource Program “al-Qa’ida (The Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK—Services Office) International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, Usama Ibn Ladin/Osama bin Laden,” Internet, .

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an international jihàd movement linking senior leaders in various radi­ cal organizations such as the Egyptian al-Jamà'a al-Islàmìyya and al-Jihàd. Al-Qà'ida seeks to radicalize existing Islamic groups and create radical Islamic groups where none exist. It recruits, supports, and trains fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, Kosovo, and other countries, and has been implicated in terrorist activities such as the bombing of US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-as-Salam. In 1996 bin-Làden issued a public statement which he termed “A Declaration of War” outlining his organization’s goal to drive the US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, overthrow the government of Saudi Arabia, and liberate Muslim Holy Sites in Palestine. The declaration was a call to Muslims worldwide to declare jihàd against the “JudaeoChristian Alliance” occupying the “holy land of the two holy places” and Palestine. It defined armed struggle as the only way to repel the attack on Islam by the “greater kufr” and unite the whole Muslim world. In 1998 he organized a new alliance of radical movements, the “International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders”, which included al-Jamà'a al-Islàmìyya, Islàmic Jihàd, Óarakàt al-Ansàr, and others. The Front declared its intention to attack Americans and their allies (including civilians) anywhere in the world. Bin-Làden’s activity reached its peak with the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September, 11, 2001. Faràj, 'Abd al-Salàm (1952–1982)7 Electrical engineer who worked at Cairo University, Faràj was a founder and the main ideologue of the radical Egyptian TanΩìm al-Jihàd move­ ment which assassinated President Sadat in 1981. Faràj was born into a devout Muslim family, and his father was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Faràj became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood himself, but was disillusioned by its passivity and gradualism, and so joined activist radical groups, finally founding al­ Jihàd in 1979 as a radical movement with a complex organizational structure and a coherent ideology. Faràj recruited for his organization mainly in ahlì (independent) mosques in the poor quarters of Cairo where he delivered Friday sermons. He also succeeded in recruiting members of the presidential guard, military intelligence, civil bureau­ cracy, as well as university students. Faràj wrote a book entitled Al-Farì∂a al-Ghà"iba (The Neglected Duty, 1980) in which he expounded his ideology of jihàd as a necessary sixth 7 Abd al-Salam Faraj. Al Farida al-Gha’iba, in Johannes J.G. Jansen. 1986. The Neglected Duty; Jabbour. 1993. The Rumbling Volcano, pp. 179–212; Hrair Dekmejian. 1985. Islam in Revolution, pp. 92–101; Gilles Kepel. 1985. Muslim Extremism in Egypt, pp. 191–206; Walid M. Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt, pp. 234–235.

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pillar of Islam, and the only way to establish an Islamic State. It had an immense impact on all radical Islamic movements. Following Sadat’s assassination, Faràj was arrested, condemned to death, and executed in 1982. Al-Ghannùshì, Ràshid (1941–) 8 Tunisia’s leading fundamentalist reformer, thinker, activist, writer, and leader of the moderate fundamentalist Óizb al-Nah∂a (Renaissance Party). Ghannùshì grew up in a religious peasant family, and received his early education in the traditional Zaytùna schools. Later he studied phi­ losophy at Damascus University, graduating in 1968, and then did post­ graduate studies for a year at the Sorbonne in Paris. On returning to Tunisia, he became a secondary school philosophy teacher. In 1979 Ghannùshì formed the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) which focused on the social, political, and economic plight of Tunisians and called for Islamic solutions. He sought a restructuring of society and of the econ­ omy based on Islamic principles, and sought to participate in the demo­ cratic political process rejecting violence as a means of change. Arrested by the government in 1981, he was sentenced to eleven years in prison, but was released in 1984. Rearrested in 1987, he was released following Ben 'Alì’s takeover of power from Bourgìba. Ghannùshì changed the organization’s name to al-Nah∂a (Renaissance) Movement. The government did not allow al-Nah∂a to participate in the 1989 elec­ tions, so members ran as independents and won 15% of the vote, Ghannùshì’s movement emerging as the strongest opposition in Tunisia. The government then initiated a massive crackdown on al-Nah∂a, and Ghannùshì had to leave Tunisia to escape arrest and finally settled in London, where he continues to lead the movement, lecture and write. Ghannùshì is a moderate fundamentalist activist and a prolific writer who consistently opposes violence and advocates Islamic participation in the democratic process. Ghannùshì was influenced by salafì thought, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Algerian thinker Malik Bennabì. Knowledgeable in both Islamic and Western philosophies, he attempts a reconciliation of the essentials of Islam with modernity, and espouses coexistence and dialog in the relationship between Islam and the West. While proclaiming the fun­ damentalist basics of God’s sovereignty and man’s position as God’s vice-regent on earth, as well as the primacy of Sharì'a, Ghannùshì accepts democracy and pluralism as compatible with Islam and advocates a gradualist position for political and social change.

8 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Ghannushi, Rashid al-, Vol. 2, pp. 60–61; Azzam Tamimi. “Review of Ph.D. Thesis: Islam and the Transition to Democracy.” Internet, .

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Khamene"ì, Sayyid 'Alì (1939–) 9 Hard-line yet pragmatic Iranian Shì 'a cleric (Ayatollah) and political leader, a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeinì. He is former President of Iran and Khomeinì’s successor to the post of Chief Guardian (supreme spir­ itual and political leader) of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1989. Khamene"ì was born into a family of Islamic scholars in Mashad, where he received a religious education. At the age of 18 he started advanced religious studies in the main Shì'a center of Najaf (Iraq) where he stayed for two years. In 1958 he moved to Qom where he studied for another six years, becoming a close disciple of Ayatollah Khomeinì. He returned to Mashad in 1964, where he taught and studied, receiv­ ing a license for Ijtihàd from Ayatollah Ha"irì in 1974. Responding to the call of Imàm Khomeinì in 1962, he joined other religious leaders in disseminating Khomeinì’s revolutionary ideas. Following the crushing of the 1963 anti-Shah protests he was arrested and spent three years in imprisonment followed by a year of internal exile in the Balùchi desert. Returning to Mashad, he helped establish the Mujàhidìn 'Ulamà" League which organized nationwide marches and demonstra­ tions in 1977–1978 as a prelude to the Shah’s overthrow and the return of Khomeinì. The League became the basis of the Islamic Republican Party founded after the Revolution of 1979. After the triumph of the revolution, Khamene"ì served in various high positions: he was a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, Khomeinì’s representative at the Supreme Council of Defense, and Tehran’s Leader of Friday prayers. Khamene"ì also was responsible for the ideological indoctrination of the military and the founding of the autonomous Revolutionary Guard. Khamene"ì was elected president of Iran in 1981 and served in this position until 1989, emerging as a pragmatist in foreign policy while advocating a stern puritanism internally. After Khomeinì’s death in 1989 he was appointed Supreme Guardian of the Islamic Republic. He is viewed as a hardliner in comparison to the present President Khatamì. Khatamì, Mohammad (1943–)10 Iranian Shì 'a Islamist cleric and scholar, reformist fifth President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khatamì was born in Ardakhan to a respected Ayatollah. He attended Qom Theology School in 1961, later received a BA in philosophy from

9

Ali Khamenei. 1991. Essence of Tawhid: Denial of Servitude but to God, pp. 5–6; “A Brief Biography of Ayatullah al-Udhma Sayyid Ali Khamenei,” Rahbar Biography, Internet, . 10 “Biography of Mohammad Khatami President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Internet, .

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Isfahàn University, and his MA from Tehran University in 1970, after which he returned to Qom for further philosophical and religious studies. Khatamì began his political involvement in the Association of Muslim Students at Isfahàn University and was involved in the anti-Shah cam­ paigns of the late 1970s. He worked closely with Khomeinì’s son Hojjatolislàm A˙mad Khomeinì and Ayatollah Montazerì in organiz­ ing religious and political debates. After the Revolution he served as Head of the Hamburg Islamic Centre in Germany, then became a Member of Parliament in the first Majlis in 1980 and was also head of the kayhan newspaper institute. Khatamì was appointed Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1982. During the Iraq-Iran war he also served as head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the war Propaganda Headquarters. In 1989 he was again appointed Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance by President Rafsanjanì, a position he resigned in 1992 when he became cultural advisor to the President and head of Iran’s National Library. In 1996 he was appointed a member of the High Council for the Cultural revolution. In May 1997 he was elected by an overwhelming majority as fifth President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeinì, Ruhollah Musavi (1902–1989)11 Iranian Shì'a cleric and scholar, charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeinì was born into a religious but poor family in Khomein where his father was chief cleric. He undertook Islamic studies in Arak and Qom, becoming an authority in theology and canon law, and began teaching philosophy, ethics, and law in Qom at the age of twenty seven. In his early years he practised an ascetic mysticism, writing Íùfì poetry, and following traditional Shì 'a quietism towards politics. The Pahlavi drive to modernize and secularize Iranian society gradually provoked a more hostile and activist response to the regime, and in 1963 he emerged as a political activist and a bitter critic of the Shah. Khomeinì was involved in the students’ demonstrations that were harshly suppressed by the Shah’s regime, and he was arrested and exiled in 1964 to Iraq where he lived for 15 years in Najaf, teaching and writing books. In 1978 Iraq gave in to Iranian pressure and forced Khomeinì to move to France. 11

Daniel Brumberg. “Khomeini’s Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice,” in R. Scott Appleby, ed., 1997. Spokesmen for the Despised, pp. 16–82; “Imam Khomeini”, The Office of Ayatullah al Udhma Khamenei/Qom, Internet, ; The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi, Vol. 2, pp. 427–430.

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Ayatollah Khomeinì taught that the only legitimate government is that which accepts the rule of God and implements Sharì 'a. The ulti­ mate person authorized to rule for God is the Hidden Imàm, but in his occultation the just juriconsult rules in his name and as his repre­ sentative (vilàyet-i faqìh). Khomeinì became a symbol and leader of the Iranian opposition and managed to build and maintain a powerful religiously-oriented revolu­ tionary alliance, adopting Islamist left-wing discourse of opposition to the oppression of the masses. In 1979 he returned to Iran where he received a tumultuous welcome by millions, many of whom saw his return as symbolic of the expected return of the Hidden Imàm. Khomeinì then established the Islamic Republic, a state with a pres­ idential republican form, a constitution (based on Sharì 'a), and a divi­ sion of powers, with himself as Supreme Guide assuming the role of the just jurisprudent. Khomeinì gradually managed to eliminate leftist and nationalist forces from politics. Most of his rule was overshadowed by the brutal Iraq-Iran war of 1980–1988. He was violently antiAmerican, viewing the united States as the “Great Satan” behind all anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian machinations in the world. Khomeinì pro­ voked international controversy in 1989 by issuing a fatwà ordering the killing of Salmàn Rushdie for publishing the book The Satanic Verses. In his last years Khomeinì gradually tried to institutionalize the rev­ olution by curbing the power of the Council of Guardians, increasing that of the Majlis, and by a utilitarian and pragmatist view of the pri­ macy of the Islamic state as the expression of God’s will even over Islamic law. He ruled Iran as Supreme Guide until his death from can­ cer in 1989. Khomeinì is a revered founding figure in Islamic Iran and hundreds of thousands visit his shrine every year especially on the anniversary of his death. Some of his books and collected lectures have been trans­ lated into English including Islamic Government (1979), Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeinì (1980), and Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations (1985). Kishk, Sheikh 'Abd al-Hamìd (1933–)12 Extremely popular Egyptian charismatic preacher, whose books and ser­ mons on cassette are widely distributed all over Egypt and the Arab world. Kishk was born in a village near Damanhur, attended primary school in Alexandria, and became blind at the age of twelve. After

12 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Kishk, 'Abd al-Hamid, Vol. 2, pp. 437–438; “Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Kishk”, Internet, ; Jansen. 1986. The Neglected Duty, pp. 91–119.

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graduating from al-Azhar in 1962, he worked for some time for the awqàf ministry as a mosque preacher and imàm. From 1964 to 1981 he was an independent preacher in the 'Ayn al-Óayàh Mosque known as the Masjid al-Malik in Cairo, where his charismatic personality and emo­ tional preaching made him enormously popular. Under Nasser, Kishk refused to issue a fatwà approving the execu­ tion of Sayyid Qu†b in 1966. He also avoided answering questions as to the compatibility of Arab socialism with Islam, and was imprisoned as a dissident for three years. Under Sadat in the 1970s cassettes of his sermons were widely distributed all over Egypt and to the wider Arabic World. Kishk was imprisoned again in 1981 in Sadat’s crackdown on all opposition, but was soon released after Sadat’s assassination, though he was banned from preaching. He turned to writing Islamic books. Kishk attacked the social and moral ills of Egyptian society, empha­ sized personal piety, and preached on eschatology, miracles, metaphysics of the soul, and on death. Al-Mas'arì, Mu˙ammad 13 Saudi physics professor (holds a Ph.D. from Berkeley) and dissident who founded the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in Saudi Arabia in 1993, demanding more Islamization in domestic and international affairs. The Saudi government cracked down on the movement and Mas'arì had to leave Saudi Arabia in 1994 and set up office in London, from where he leads the Committee that organizes Islamic opposition to the Saudi regime and royal family. Mas'arì condemns the corruption of the royal family, espouses Sharì'a law and a democratic Islamic state. By exploiting modern communications technology he rapidly emerged as a major political force. His office faxed some 800 copies per week of a newsletter to Saudi Arabia where it was widely distributed. An e-mail service and Internet homepage widened his audience. By 1995/6 Mas'arì’s influence had become so great that his presence in London threatened Saudi/UK relations. The UK failed in its attempted to deport him, but by 1997 a combination of internal rivalries, financial problems, and intense Saudi and British government pressure caused the CDLR to lose momentum.

13 Peter Theroux. “Why Dissident Makes Riyadh Flinch—A Poster Boy for Fledging Saudi Intelligentsia,” Jinn, Internet, ; “Islamist Psychological Operations,” Internet, .

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Mawdùdì, Abu"l A'la (1903–1979)14 One of the greatest founding figures, thinkers, writers, and political lead­ ers of the contemporary Islamic revival, a systematic teacher of the Qur"àn, considered by many to be the most outstanding Islamic thinker and writer of our time, who has influenced many of the main con­ temporary Islamic leaders. Mawdùdì was born in Aurangabad in South India and grew up in a traditionally religious family. He studied traditional Islam as a young man, then acquired a Western modern education on his own. Mawdùdì began his public career as a journalist at the age of 17, in which he was involved for many years. He left journalism in 1927 for literary and historical pursuits. In 1933 he assumed editorship of Tarjumàn alQur"àn which became a vehicle for the propagation of his thought. He was involved in the Khilàfat movement for the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate between 1921–1924. Mawdùdì believed that a revival of true Islam was the sole answer to the Muslim communal problem in India, and he opposed the secularist-nationalist Muslim League led by Jinnah. However, when Pakistan was founded he emigrated there, hoping to initiate a shift from being merely a state for Muslims to becoming an Islamic State. His political involvement and criticism of government policies, as well as his anti-A˙madiyya agitation, led to his imprisonment in 1953, but the death sentence passed was never car­ ried out. Mawdùdì was influenced by Óasan al-Bannà" and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and he in turn impacted most contemporary Islamist move­ ments. He founded the Jamà'at-i Islàmi in 1941 as an extremely wellorganized movement committed to the establishment of an Islamic world-order which has had an important role in the politics of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and other South-East Asian countries. Rather than a grassroots movement like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamà'at was an elite vanguard of the Islamic revival and revolution, stressing disci­ pline, propagation (da'wa), and working for a gradual appropriation of power in the state. In Pakistan it became a fundamentalist political party with a major impact on national politics. Mawdùdì saw Islam as threatened by Westernization, and he rallied to its defense endeavoring to mobilize believers into political action. He criticized the West and the Westernized Muslim elites as degenerate, and he called for a renewal and purification of Islam by a return to the essential sources of the faith. He conceived of true Islam as a divinely revealed total comprehensive system and ideology, incorporating society, 14 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. “Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism,” in Rahneema, ed., 1994. pp. 98–123; Abul A'la Mawdudi. 1982. Let Us be Muslims, Backcover; Charles J. Adams. “Mawdudi and the Islamic State” in Esposito, ed., 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp. 99–133.

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politics and the state. Mawdùdì differentiated sharply between jàhilìyya, which included most contemporary Muslim societies, and true Islam. His goal was an ideological Islamic state based on God’s sovereignty (˙àkimìyya) and unity (taw˙ìd ) and on Sharì 'a. However he did not advo­ cate a violent revolution, but gradual Islamization of all aspects of life by involving the jamà'a in the political process of Pakistan. Mawdùdì was a prolific writer whose books have been translated into many languages. They include a six-volume Tafhìmul Qur"àn (Understand­ ing the Qur"àn), published in 1972, which impacted Muslims all over the world, as well as Muslims and the Present Day Political Struggle, Towards Understanding Islam, Let Us be Muslims, Way to the Qur"àn, The Islamic Movement, The Islamic Way of Life, and many booklets and tracts. Mu˙ammad, Sheikh 'Umar Bakrì (1958–)15 Radical fundamentalist leader and writer living in London, he is the self-appointed judge of the Sharì'a court for the UK, lecturer at the London School of Sharì 'a and founding leader of the al-Muhàjirùn movement. 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad was born in Aleppo, Syria and brought up in an orthodox Muslim home. He studied Islamic sciences and received his BA in Sharì'a and fiqh from the Sharì'a University in Damascus, and an MA in fiqh from the University of al-Imam al-U"zaie in Beirut. Originally a member of the Muslim Brothers, he later joined Óizb alTa˙rìr and was the founder of their UK branch. Mu˙ammad left Óizb al-Ta˙rìr and founded al-Muhàjirùn in 1983. 'Umar Bakrì Mu˙ammad has written many booklets and articles, and has organized many conferences and demonstrations supporting Islamist causes around the world. Muràd, Khurram (1932–1996)16 A highly respected Pakistani scholar, teacher writer, and activist Islamist, a leader in the mainline Jamà'at-i Islàmì of Pakistan, who lived many years in the West where he was involved in Islamic da'wa and inter­ faith dialogue. Muràd was born in Bhopal, India, and migrated to Pakistan in 1948. He graduated as a civil engineer from Karachi University in 1952, then left for America where he received a Master’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Minnesota in 1958. He then returned to Pakistan and worked as a leading consulting engineer in Karachi and Dhaka, as 15 “The Biography of Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad”, Internet, . 16 Khurram Murad. 1997. Way to the Qur"an, Backcover; Khurshid Ahmed. “Obituary of Khurram Murad,” Internet, ; “Khurram Murad,” Internet, .

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well as in Tehran and Riyadh. He was involved in the extension pro­ ject of the Masjid al-Óaràm in Mecca, 1975–1976. An Islamist activist, Muràd joined Jamà'at-e-ˇalàba ( Jamà'at-i Islàmì’s student movement) in 1948, serving as its president 1951–1952. He later became a member of the Central Executive of Jamà'at-i Islàmì Pakistan (1963–77), and Amìr of its Dhaka Branch (1963–71). Muràd was detained in prison without trial in Dhaka for three months in 1964 for his Islamic activities, and after the fall of Dhaka in 1971 he was a prisoner of war in India for almost three years. Muràd was Deputy Amìr (vice-president) of Jamà'at-i Islàmì Pakistan 1987–1996. In 1992 he was appointed editor of Tarjumàn al-Qur "àn, the movement’s mouthpiece. He was also a Trustee and former Director General of the Islamic Foundation, Leicester. Muràd translated and edited several of Mawdùdì’s books into English, and is considered a major interpreter of Mawdùdì’s works. He also wrote over thirty books himself, in Urdu and English, including Sharì 'ah: the Way of Justice (1981), Way to the Qur"àn (1985), Islamic Movement in the West, and Key to al-Baqarah (1996). Muràd also edited Abu"l Óasan 'Alì Nadwì’s book Muslims in the West: Message and Mission (1983), and wrote books for children as well as contributing scholarly articles to various journals. Mu߆afà, Shukrì (1942–1978)17 Charismatic founder and leader of the radical Takfìr wa"l-Hijra move­ ment in Egypt, a mahd ìst movement with an eschatological worldview. Mu߆afà was born in a village near Asyut, of which his father was mayor ('umda). He studied agronomy at Asyut University, where he was active in the Muslim Brotherhood and as a result was imprisoned in 1965 by the Nasserist regime, spending several years in solitary con­ finement. While in prison he joined the radical group of disciples of Sayyid Qu†b. On his release in 1971 he finished his University studies and simultaneously founded the Society of Muslims, commonly known as Takfìr wa"l-Hijra. Mu߆afà recruited members mainly in Upper Egypt among students and graduates. Following the kidnapping and murder of an ex-government minister, al-Dhahabì, he was arrested and exe­ cuted in 1978. Mu߆afà was an autocratic leader who expected total obedience from his followers. He was a charismatic personality, described as having 17 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Takfir Wa Al-Hijra, Jama'at Al-. Vol. 4, pp. 179–180; Esposito. 1988. Islam, The Straight Path, pp. 136–137; Farzana Shaikh, ed., 1992. Islam and Islamic Groups, p. 70; Abdelnasser. 1994. pp. 111, 197, 204–205, 216; Jabbour, The Rumbling Volcano, pp. 143–157; Dekmejian. 1985. pp. 92–96; David Sagiv. 1995. Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973–1993, pp. 45–50.

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piercing eyes and always dressed in black. His followers accepted him as the promised Mahdì. He ran Takfìr as a highly disciplined organiza­ tion, centrally controlled by himself, constructed of basic cells and of missionary and catering units. Mu߆afà viewed all of contemporary society as infidel ( jàhilì ) and under takfìr, and advocated total separation (mufàßala kàmila) and migra­ tion (hijra) from it. However as Takfìr was still in its phase of weakness open jihàd must be postponed until the movement reached a state of strength when jihàd will be waged until Sharì 'a is imposed on the whole world. Mu߆afà set up a separated alternative community, whose mem­ bers left their jobs and families and lived together in caves in Upper Egypt or in rented flats in Cairo. Mu߆afà wrote two booklets which circulated clandestinely among his disciples: Kitàb al-Khilàfa (The Book of the Caliphate), and Tawassumàt (Revelations). Al-Nabhànì, Sheikh Taqì al-Dìn (1909–1977)18

Founder and first leader of the radical and rejectionist Óizb al-Ta˙rìr,

an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine in 1953.

Al-Nabhànì was born in the village of Ighzim, Palestine (near Haifa) into a family with a tradition of Islamic scholarship. He graduated from al-Azhar, Cairo, in 1932, then returned to Palestine as a teacher of reli­ gion. Later he was appointed qadì in the Islamic court of law in Ramleh. During this time he became a leading figure in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the Israel-Arab war of 1948, Al­ Nabhànì fled to Syria, then returned to the West Bank (which had come under Jordanian control), where he was an official of the Sharì'a Appeal Court in Jerusalem. An-Nabhànì was an Islamist, but also influenced by Syrian revolu­ tionary Ba'thist ideology, and he attempted to create a modern revolu­ tionary political party with Islam as its ideology whose final goal was the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate in a single revived Islamic state. He saw the establishment of an Islamic political party aiming at assuming power, involvement in politics, and the ultimate establishment of the Islamic state (khilàfa), as absolute religious imperatives. The fun­ damental cause of Muslim decline was a faulty understanding of Islam, and the West was the perennial enemy of Islam. His overall strategy for the revival of the Islamic umma was modeled closely and literally on 18 Taqi al-Din Al-Nabhani. (nd). The Islamic State; Suha Taji-Farouki. “Islamic Discourse and Modern Political Methods: An Analysis of al-Nabhani’s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources of Islam”, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall 1994; David Commins. “Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and the Islamic Liberation Party,” The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXI, Nos. 3–4, 1991; “HizbutTahrir”, Impact International, September, 1994.

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his interpretation of the different stages in the Prophet’s sìra which he reapplied to contemporary politics as the party’s political program. Al-Nabhànì wrote a number of books, including Saving Palestine (Inqàdh Filastìn), The Islamic State, and The System of Islam (NiΩàm al-Islàm). Nadwì, Syed Abu"l Óasan 'Alì (1914 –1999)19 One of the greatest fundamentalist Muslim scholars of our time, a prolific writer, lecturer, and speaker, who occupies a unique position in the his­ tory of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Nadwì was Rector of the prestigious seminary Nadwatul 'Ulamà" in Pakistan; Chairman, Board of Trustees, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies; and Founding Member of the Muslim World League. He was awarded the King Faisal Award in 1980 for his outstanding services to Islam. He has also been linked to Jamà'at al-Tablìgh. Nadwì believed that Muslim decline had started right after the reign of the Ràshidùn caliphs. The 'ulamà" classes had let themselves be manipulated by the rulers and allowed revealed law to become mixed with man-made laws. This resulted in intellectual sterility and a static culture. In the modern age Muslims became dazzled by Western achievements and imitated Western social and economic institutions regardless of the consequences. The contemporary Muslim world is in a state of jàhilìyya which has per­ vaded every area of its life. Nadwì advocated a radical intellectual revolution and Islamic revival to be achieved by a return to the pure sources of Islam, which will revitalize the Muslim world and help achieve scientific and technolog­ ical parity with the West, without losing its authentic cultural and intel­ lectual base, and without sacrificing its spirituality to Western materialism. Nadwì impacted both Mawdùdì and Qu†b in their thought. He has pioneered da'wa, educational, and academic activities throughout the Muslim world, and has authored more than fifty books, written mainly in Arabic, covering a wide range of Islamic studies. These include: Islam and the World (1961), Western Civilization: Islam and Muslims (1974), Muslims in India (1976), Muslims in the West: The Message and Mission (1983), and Mu˙ammad: The Last Prophet (1993). Al-Qara∂àwì, Yùsuf 20 (1926–) Prominent Egyptian Islamist scholar and poet, affiliated to the mainline Muslim Brotherhood. 19 Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi. 1983. Muslims in the West: The Messsage and Mission, Backcover; Ibrahim Abu Rabi". 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, pp. 18–21. 20 “Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” Internet, .

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Al-Qara∂àwì was born into a devout peasant family in Gharbiyya province, and had memorized the Qur"àn by the age of ten. He stud­ ied at the institute of Religious Studies in Tanta, then moved to alAzhar University, Cairo, where he studied 'usul al-dìn and from which he graduated in 1953, but continued his studies there until 1960. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood during his studies in Tanta, and was arrested and imprisoned several times under Nasser for his activities in the Brotherhood. Al-Qara∂àwì was appointed chairman of the Academic Council of the University of al-Amìr 'Abd al-Qàdir for Islamic Sciences in Constantine, Algeria, and also served as an advisor on Islamic affairs to the Algerian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. In 1962 al-Qara∂àwì was sent by al-Azhar to Qatar as chairman of the Qatari Institute of Religious Studies, Doha, where in 1977 he laid the foundations for the Faculty of Islamic Sharì'a and became Dean of the Sharì'a College. Al-Qara∂àwì is the author of over forty books, including The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (English 1994), and Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism (1987). He has also published numerous articles and research papers. Qu†b, Sayyid (1906–1966)21 One of the greatest Islamic scholars, reformers, and radical Islamic think­ ers of the twentieth century, the main ideologue of the Muslim Brother­ hood in Egypt, and one of the most widely read Islamic writers. Qu†b was born in the village of Musha near Asyut in Upper Egypt, into a family of rural notables, where his father was a delegate of Mu߆afà Kàmil’s National Party. Qu†b attended the state school in the village and had memorized the Qur"àn by the age of ten. In 1921 Qu†b moved to Cairo, where in 1933 he graduated from Dàr al-'Ulum teacher training college with a BA in Arts of Education. Qu†b was then employed as a teacher by the Ministry of Public Instruction, starting his career in the provinces, and was later transferred to Helwan, a suburb of Cairo. From 1940 to 1948 he served as an inspector for the Ministry. During that time Qu†b had a liberal worldview influenced by 'Abbàs Ma˙mùd al-'Aqqàd and ˇàhà Óusein, and wrote literary criticism as well as poetry, short stories, and articles for newspapers and journals. Following a visit to the USA (1948–1951), he reacted against the per­ ceived materialism, immorality, and injustice of Western society, and turned to fundamentalist Islam, joining the Muslim Brotherhood. Qu†b was soon elected to the brotherhood’s leadership council, becoming its

21 Kepel. 1985. pp. 36–43; Ahmad S. Moussalli. 1992. Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb; Yvonne Haddad. “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival” in Esposito. ed., 1983. pp. 67–98.

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chief spokesman in the 1950s and 1960s. During the short honeymoon between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood, Qu†b served as the only civilian on the Revolutionary Council. In 1954 he became editor of the Brotherhood’s newspaper, al-Ikhwàn al-Muslimùn, which was closed down by Nàßir two months later. With the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood following the 1954 assassination attempt on Nàßir, Qu†b was arrested and spent ten years in prison. He was freed in 1964, but re-arrested in 1965, tortured, and executed in 1966. While in prison he wrote his greatest work, an eightvolume tafsìr of the Qur"àn, Fi ¸ilàl al-Qur"àn (In the Shade of the Qur"àn). Radicalized through his imprisonment, he wrote Milestones (Ma'àlim fi"lˇarìq) which became the manifesto of the radical and revolutionary Islamic groups. Qu†b’s books provided Islamic fundamentalism with its most impor­ tant intellectual base. His most important contributions were his rein­ terpretation of traditional concepts such as ˙àkimìyya, jàhilìyya, and takfìr, turning them into contemporary revolutionary concepts in his Islamic ideological system. His writings and martyrdom have had a major influence on Islamic revivalism and have motivated many of those involved in the Islamic resurgence of the last part of the twentieth cen­ tury, including the more militant groups such as al-Jihàd that assassi­ nated President Sadat, and Takfìr wa"l-Hijra, as well as 'Alì Sharì'atì, the main ideologue of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Some of his other books include: Social Justice in Islam (1953), Islam and Universal Peace (1977), This Religion of Islam (1982), and The Islamic Concept and its Characteristics (1992). Al-Íadr, Mu˙ammad Bàqir (1933–1980)22 Islamist Iraqi Shì 'a cleric, scholar, writer, religious leader, and activist, founder of the Iraqi Shì'ì party, Óizb al-Dawla al-Islàmiyya (also called Óizb-Allàh), opposed to the ruling Ba'th system and executed by the Ba'th in 1980 together with his sister, Bint al-Huda. Al-Íadr was born in Kazimain into an old and well-known religious family that had produced a number of Shì 'ì scholars. He received a traditional Shì'ì religious education in Najaf, the Shì'a center in Iraq, where he then taught ußùl al-fiqh, and was declared a mujtahid at the age of thirty. Al-Íadr viewed politics as part of Islam, and was one of the first Isla­ mists to write on Islamic economics. He opposed dialectic materialism

22 Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr. (nd). Our Philosophy, “Translator’s Introduction,” pp. vi–xiii; T.M. Aziz. “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shi'a Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980”, Internet, .

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then popular in Ba'thist Iraq. Al-Íadr viewed his movement as a cen­ tralized Islamic party working for social change. He called on Muslims to detach themselves from inauthentic foreign influences such as capi­ talism and Marxism, and return to the rich legacy of Islam. His political convictions and condemnation of the Ba'ath regime led to his first arrest. He was released, but was then rearrested in 1979. His sister Bint al-Huda, herself a scholar of Islamic theology organized a protest against his arrest and he was released again, but kept under house arrest. Al-Íadr issued a fatwà stating that it was unlawful (˙aràm) for a Muslim to join the Ba'th party. This led to his final arrest in 1980 and his execution together with his sister on April 8, 1980. Al-Íadr made many contributions to papers and journals and wrote a number of books on economics, sociology, theology and philosophy, including The Clear Fatwà, The Path of the Righteous, Our Economy, The Ultimate Thought in Usùl, Introduction to Islamic Political System (1982), Sources of Power in the Islamic State, and Our Philosophy. Al-Sha'ràwì, Sheikh Mu˙ammad Mitwallì (1911–1999)23 Very popular Egyptian charismatic preacher, who has held several impor­ tant positions, including President of al-Azhar, Head of Graduate Studies at King 'Abd al-'Azìz University, Mecca, and Minister of awqàf (reli­ gious endowments) in Egypt (1976–1978). Al-Sha'ràwì was born in the Nile Delta village of Dakadous to a devout family. He first attended the village Kuttàb, then for his sec­ ondary education attended the Zaqaziq Institute of Religious Education. In 1936 he enrolled at al-Azhar in the faculty of Arabic Language from which he graduated in 1941. He obtained the specialization (takhassus) degree from al-Azhar in 1943, and then started teaching at the Institute for Religious Studies in Tanta, and later in Zaqaziq and in Alexandria. In 1950 he went to Saudi Arabia to teach at the King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Mecca. He returned to Egypt in the early sixties and became director of the Office of the Rector of al-Azhar. In 1966 he was sent by al-Azhar as head of a delegation to Algeria with the aim of help­ ing in the re-Arabization program of that country and stayed there for six years. He then returned to teach at King 'Abd al-'Azìz University in Mecca, and finally returned to Egypt in 1975. In 1973 he started participating in the weekly television program Nùr 'alà Nùr, and in 1980 he started his famous Friday lessons on Egyptian television in which he interpreted the Qur"àn to a live audience. His radio and TV broadcasts were extremely popular, and his preaching style, aimed at the masses

23 Jansen. 1986. The Neglected Duty, pp. 121–149; “Shaykh Muhammad Metwalli al-Sha'rawi,” Internet, .

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and utilizing colloquial Egyptian, attracted large audiences. His mes­ sages were also widely distributed by books, cassettes and videos. Al-Sha'ràwì wrote several books, including: Interpretation of the Holy Quran, The Great Fatwas, How Allah Provides (English 1994), The Miracles of the Quran, and Fate and Predestination (English 1994). Sharì'atì, 'Alì (1933–1977)24 Important radical Iranian Islamic social and political activist and thinker, the main ideologue of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Sharì'atì was born in the village of Mazinan, near Mashad, into a family of religious scholars. His father was a reform minded scholar dedicated to Islamic revival and social reform. After attending govern­ ment elementary and high schools, he started studies at the Teacher’s Training College in Mashad in 1949. He then taught in a village school 1951–1952, and was involved politically in supporting the National Front and the National Resistance Movement, for which activities he was jailed for several months. He graduated from Mashad University with a BA in French and Persian literature in 1960 and then left for France where he studied in Paris at the Sorbonne earning a doctorate in soci­ ology in 1964. While in France he was influenced by Sartre, Camus, and Fanon, but rejected their anti-religious stance. He was also influenced by Massignon’s mysticism. Sharì'atì was active in the anti-Shah student movement in France and for a while was the editor of its newspaper Iràn-i Azad (Free Iran). On his return to Iran in 1964 he was arrested and jailed for six months for political activism abroad. Released in 1965 he began teach­ ing at Mashad University, using an innovative sociological approach to Islam. He was very popular with his students, his lectures attracting many from outside the university. The government engineered his dis­ missal, and he moved to Teheran where he lectured at the Óusayniyah-i Irshad for six years, again drawing large crowds of young people eager to learn his new interpretations of Islam and its role in society. Sharì'atì’s thought is innovative, offering fresh insights into Islam, which he reinterpreted in modern sociological categories, while recast­ ing Western political and sociological thought in Islamic idiom. He sought to apply Islam to the contemporary context making it relevant to modern times, and transforming it into a mass ideological and rev­ olutionary movement. His thought impacted multitudes of Iranian youth paving the way for the revolution. He opposed both the Western­ izing secularism of the Shah, and the traditional Shì'ìsm of the clergy. His thought was a complex mix of Shì'a Islam, mystical Íùfìsm, Western

24 Rahnema. 1998. An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati; The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World: Shariati, 'Ali, Vol. 4, pp. 46–49.

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existentialism, and dialectical Marxism. He sought to restore an imag­ ined pristine, anti-clerical, and revolutionary 'Alawì Shì 'ì Islam as an ideology that would emancipate the masses from oppression. Taw˙ìd was the central integrative principle of Islam, and all oppression, depen­ dence, and injustice were a rebellion against the God-given harmony of the universe, dignity of men, and dialectic of history. In light of the severe oppression afflicting Muslim societies, revolution was the only alternative left for effecting change, and enlightened thinkers (raushan­ fekràn) were the main agents of revolution. The Shah’s regime saw him as a dangerous radical, and in 1973 he was arrested and detained for eighteen months. Popular pressure and international protests secured his release in 1975, but he remained under close security observation. In 1977 he was allowed to leave Iran for Britain where he died, presumably of a heart attack, shortly after his arrival. Many allege that SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, had assas­ sinated him. Sharì'atì’s many lectures were compiled into books, some of which appeared in English, including Marxism and Other Western Fallacies (1979), On the Sociology of Islam (1979), Haj (1980), Man and Islam (1981), Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness (1981), and What is to Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance (1986). Íiddìqì, Kàlim ( ? –1996)25 Pro-Iranian fundamentalist leader, activist, and scholar, former journal­ ist for the Guardian newspaper, founding Director of the London-based Muslim Institute (1973), and founder of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. Íiddìqì lived in the UK since 1954. Believing that the West was implacably hostile to Islam, he was concerned at the lack of power of Muslim minorities in the West, and rejected integration as leading to assimilation and the loss of identity. The solution was to organize the total Muslim community in a Western state as one unit dealing collec­ tively rather than individually with the state. Following the Rushdie affair he established the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain in 1992 as a separate communal minority political system which he hoped would represent all Muslims in Britain and which would evolve into a unified non-territorial autonomous Muslim unit. The Manifesto of the Muslim Parliament, published under his name in 1990, declares: “The option of integration and assimilation that is on offer as official policy in Britain must be firmly resisted and rejected,” and it calls for “a no-go area where the exercise of freedom of speech against Islam will not be tol­

25 “The Thought of Kalim Siddiqui”, Internet, .

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erated.” The Parliament however was not a success and it subsequently fell into decline. Íiddìqì was a firm supporter of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran which he claims have reinvigorated the Muslim umma. In addition to his many speeches and articles, he wrote several books that include: Towards a New Destiny (1973), Issues in the Islamic Movement (1982), In Pursuit of the Power of Islam (1996), and Stages of Islamic Revolution (1966). Al-ˇùràbì, Óasan (1932–) 26 Sophisticated Islamist intellectual, politician, theorist and activist, long­ time leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, leader of the Sudanese National Islamic Front party, and general secretary of its successor rul­ ing party, the National Congress, leader of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress, and Speaker of the Parliament in Sudan since 1996. ˇùràbì was born into a religious family in Kassala, Eastern Sudan. His grandfather was head of a Íùfì movement, and his father an expert in Islamic law and a Sharì'a judge. ˇùràbì received a traditional Islamic schooling at home while receiving his elementary education in Kordofan, his intermediate education in Medani and Dorfar in central Sudan, and his secondary education at a prestigious English-speaking school in Medani. He studied law in Khartoum University graduating in 1955, received a Masters degree in law from London University in 1957, and a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne in 1964. Returning to Sudan, ˇùràbì was acknowledged as one of the leading experts on Islamic law, and became lecturer in the Faculty of Law of Khartoum University, eventually becom­ ing its dean. ˇùràbì was involved in Islamic activities since his student days in the early 1950s. In 1964 he was appointed secretary of the Muslim Brother­ hood front Jabhat al-Mithàq in Sudan, and after the 1965 elections served as a member of parliament. ˇùràbì reorganized the Brotherhood as a political party in 1969, strengthening his position against the hard lin­ ers who saw the party as an elite vanguard of the Islamic revolution. ˇùràbì argued for a broad coalition of all forces sympathetic to Islamic goals and advocated participation in government to gain political expe­ rience and contacts, while simultaneously pressuring the government to adopt an Islamic constitution.

26 Abdelwahab El-Affendi. 1991. Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan; Mohammed, E. Hamdi. 1998. The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations With Hasan Al-Turabi; Judith Miller. “Global Islamic Awakening or Sudanese Nightmare? The Curious Case of Hassan Turabi,” in Appleby. ed., 1997. pp. 182–224; Gregory Sanders. “Dr. Hasan Al-Turabi: His Political Philosophy in Context of Religion and Progress”, Internet, .

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Al-Tùràbì was arrested three times in the 1970s by the Numeiri regime, but was released and became reconciled with Nimeirì, serving as attorney-general from 1979 to 1982, and as presidential adviser on legal and foreign affairs until 1985, positions that enabled him to plant Brotherhood members in key posts in the government, army and security forces. Al­ Tùràbì approved of Nimeirì’s decision to impose the Islamic penal law in 1983 as a step towards implementing Sharì 'a. After Nimeirì’s down­ fall he formed the National Islamic Front and ran unsuccessfully in pres­ idential elections. He was a member of various coalition governments and served as Attorney General, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister. Al-Tùràbì supported General 'Umar al-Bashìr’s overthrow of the demo­ cratically elected government of Íàdiq al-Mahdì in 1989, and is thought to be the gray eminence and ideological mentor behind the present Sudanese government. He was elected Speaker of Parliament in 1996 and again in 1998. Of late there has been some rivalry between the two, Bashìr trying to sideline al-Tùràbì. Al-Tùràbì is a pragmatist whose goal is an Islamic state based on Sharì 'a. He opposes Western secularism and the secularist nationalist elites in the Muslim world, and advocates a pan-Islamic worldwide umma, while acknowledging that political realities necessitate its implementation first in specific nation-states. Al-Tùràbì advocates revival and reform by sweep­ ing away accrued traditions and returning directly to the textual sources of Islam. However, his interpretation of the sources tends to be more liberal than that of most other fundamentalist leaders, especially on mat­ ters relating to the role of women in Islam and to Islam and democracy. Observers note the dichotomy between his professed liberal views and the harsh realities of the Sudanese regime. Some claim that he is behind the repressive actions of the government, and that his liberal stand is a semantic fig leaf for the outside world, while others think his power is not sufficient to rein in extremist factions in his party and government. Al-Tùràbì has given numerous interviews and has written a number of works on contemporary Islam including: Tajdìd al-fikr al-Islàmi (Renewal of Islamic Thought, 1987), Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi (May 10, 1992), Hiwaràt Fi Al-Islàm, AlDimuqratiyah, Al-Dawlah, Al-Gharb (Dialog in Islam: Democracy, the State, and the West, 1995), and Qadàya Al-Tajdìd: Nahwa Manhaj Usùli (Principles of renewal: Toward an Authentic System, 1999). Christian Bynum, E.L.27 Expository preacher, writer, editor, and pastor of the separatist fundamen­ talist Tabernacle Baptist Church in Lubbock, Texas for over 43 years. 27

“E.L. Bynum, Pastor”, Internet, .

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After serving in the US Air Force he decided to become a preacher and graduated from the Bible Baptist Seminary in Fort Worth, Texas. Bynum takes a strong stand on the inspiration and preservation of the Bible, advocates the superiority of the King James Version of the Bible, and preaches both personal and ecclesiastical separation. He opposes modernism, liberalism, ecumenicalism and all compromise. Bynum has conducted revivals, Bible and Missions conferences, and is the editor of the Plains Baptist Challenger magazine. Has also written a number of books and booklets including: King James Fans, The Independency of the Local Church, 26 Outlines on Confession of Faith & Church Covenant, and Rightly Dividing Genesis. Cereghin, John 28 Fundamentalist independent and separatist Baptist pastor and Bible School teacher. Cereghin attended high school in North East, Maryland, 1979–1983, then graduated in physical sciences from the University of Maryland in 1985. In 1986 he shifted to Biblical studies at Maryland Baptist Bible College and received a Bachelor degree in Biblical Studies in 1988. Cereghin received a Masters degree of Divinity from Foundations Theological Seminary in Dunn, North Carolina in 1994, then went on to earn a Ph.D. in Biblical Studies from Maryland Baptist Theological Seminary in Elkton, Maryland. Cereghin has had a mixed career of pastoring and teaching. He was instructor at Maryland Baptist Bible College 1988–1989, Pastor of a Baptist Church in Centreville, Maryland 1989–1990, again Instructor at Maryland Baptist Bible College 1990–1993, pastor of Charity Baptist Church in Mebane, North Carolina 1993–1994, Instructor at Maranatha Baptist Church Academy, Elkton, Maryland 1994–1998, Academic Dean of Maryland Baptist Bible College and Theological Seminary 1996–1998, and since 1998 is Pastor of Grace Baptist Church in Smyrna, Delaware. Cereghin is a firm advocate of Baptist Fundamentalist Separatism and an advocate of the superiority of the English King James Authorized Version of the Bible. Cereghin has written many articles as well as sev­ eral books including; Commentary on the Song of Solomon, In Defense of Erasmus, and Nettleton Versus Finney: The Shift in American Evangelicalism 1820–1830. Cloud, David W.29 Independent separatist Baptist fundamentalist Pastor of Bible Baptist Church, Oak Harbor, WA. Director of Way of Life Literature. Editor of O Timothy magazine. 28 “Ministerial resume of Dr. John Cereghin”, Internet, ; “Pilgrim Way Ministries”, Internet, . 29 “What is Way of Life Literature?” Internet, .

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Cloud grew up in a devout Christian family. He attended a business college in Jacksonville, Florida, then was drafted into the army and spent a year and a half in Vietnam. On discharge he rebelled against the Christian faith and joined the hippie trail, but was converted to fundamentalist Christianity in 1973 after spending three days discussing the Bible with a believer. He then graduated from Tennessee Temple Bible School in Chattanooga in 1977. Cloud spent ten years as a missionary in Nepal (1979–1989) where he pioneered the planting of fundamentalist Baptist churches. On return to the USA he founded Way of Life Literature organization with the aim of communicating biblical truth to a wider audience, urging believ­ ers to stand for truth, and resist error, compromise, and apostasy. Cloud has written many articles and some books including: Way of Life Encyclopedia of the Bible & Christianity, and Things Hard to be Understood. Colson, Charles Wendell (1931–)30 Former politician, now a highly regarded mainline evangelical author, speaker and columnist, a leading authority on the causes and responses to crime. Colson was born in Boston, Massachusetts, and educated at Brown University (BA 1953) and George Washington University ( J.D. 1959). After serving in the Marine Corps (1953–1955), where he reached the rank of Captain, he worked in a law firm until joining President Nixon’s White House staff in 1969. Colson was Special Assistant to President Nixon and deeply involved in the Watergate Affair and its “dirty tricks” campaign, for which he was sentenced to prison and served a seven month term from July, 1974 to January, 1975. Colson was converted to Christianity in 1973 after reading CS Lewis’s book Mere Christianity given to him by his friend Tom Philips, then President of Raytheon Company. His account of that experience is told in his book Born Again (1976). After release from prison he became increasingly involved in helping prison inmates and founded the Prison Fellowship Ministries which developed to become one of the largest vol­ unteer organizations in the world, engaged in visiting prisons and help­ ing their inmates. Colson is also interested in reforming the criminal justice system and he founded Justice Fellowship as an organization ded­ icated to working with legislators and policy makers to further restora­ tive justice principles. In recognition of his prison work he received the prestigious Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion in 1993. 30 “Charles W. Colson”, Internet, ; “Biography, Charles Wendell Colson”, Internet, .

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Colson has written several books including Life Sentence (1979), Who Speaks for God? (1985), Kingdoms in Conflict (1987), The Body (1991), and Burden of Truth (1997). Crippen, Alan II 31 Mainline fundamentalist leader, scholar, and educator, involved in the revival of the family and culture, Director of Academic Programs and Senior Fellow for Religion and Political Studies at the Family Research Council, Washington, D.C. Crippen received his BS in biblical studies from Philadelphia College of Bible, and an MA from Westminster Theological Seminary. He also served with the US army in Europe. He was a founding member and Senior Fellow for Family and Social Policy Studies at Focus on the Family’s Institute for Family Studies. Crippen aims at preparing future Christian leaders so they can address society’s most pressing needs from a Christian perspective. He studies the secularization of American culture, and the social relationships of family, church and state, and promotes the revival of the religious and moral foundations of democracy. Crippen has written several articles for various magazines and has edited a book: Reclaiming the Culture: How You Can Protect Your Family’s Future (1966). Falwell, Jerry (1933–)32 American televangelist, Bible Baptist preacher, pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church, Lynchburg, Virginia, and founder of a Christian uni­ versity and of the politically activist “Moral Majority” movement. Falwell was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, where he attended public schools and then entered Lynchburg College in 1950. He experienced a conversion to Christ in 1952 and transferred to the Baptist Bible College in Springfield, Missouri. He was ordained a minister in 1956, and founded the Thomas Road Baptist Church in his home town with 35 members, of which he is still pastor. By the late 1990s the congre­ gation had grown to a membership of over 20,000 people. Falwell added a school (Lynchburg Christian Academy), and a rehabilitation center for alcoholics to the church ministries, as well as involving it in mis­ sionary and relief work. Falwell was a pioneer in religious broadcasting, launching radio and television broadcasts in 1956. His “Old Time Gospel Hour” gradually

31

“Alan R. Crippen II,” Internet, . John W. Kennedy. “Jerry Falwell’s Uncertain Legacy” Christianity Today, December 9, 1996; “Jerry Falwell Profile”, Thomas Road Baptist Church Biography of Dr. Falwell, Internet, . 32

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grew to reach an audience of millions. He also founded Liberty Baptist College in 1971 which later developed into Liberty University. Originally a separatist fundamentalist, he became convinced of the need for Christian activism in politics to halt the moral downward trend of American soci­ ety, and he is best known for founding the “Moral Majority” move­ ment in 1979 as a rallying point for conservative opinion and as a force for social and political reform. Its aim was to politically mobilize evan­ gelicals to register as voters and participate in the elections, in order to reverse the politics of immorality in American society. This was the birth of the New Christian Right, which successfully mobilized thou­ sands of churches and registered millions of voters. Falwell was also heavily involved in the 1980 and 1984 presidential election campaigns promoting Reagan. In 1988 Falwell closed down the Moral Majority, leaving others, like Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed to carry on the political activism through the newly formed Christian Alliance, while he retreated to carry on the work and ministry of his own church and university. He wrote Listen, America! (1980), The Fundamentalist Phenomenon (1981), Wisdom for Living (1984), and The New American Family (1992). Geisler, Norman L.33 Well known dispensationalist evangelical theologian, ethicist, speaker, lecturer and writer. Geisler holds a BA and an MA from Wheaton College, a Th.D. from William Tyndale College, and a Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago. Geisler was Professor of Systematic Theology at Dallas Theological Seminary, professor of Philosophy of Religion and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy of Religion at Trinity Evangelical School, Deerfield, IL., and Dean of Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte NC. At present he is dean of the Liberty Center for Christian Scholarship at Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia. He is convinced of the need for Christians to analyze the ethical problems of today within a bibli­ cal framework. Geisler is author of more than 40 books including: Ethics: Alterna­ tives and Issues (1971), Is Man the Measure? (1983), Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (1990), Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Pers­ pective, and Civil Disobedience: When is it Right? (1990). Graham, Billy (1918–)34 Internationally acclaimed popular American Baptist evangelist, widely regarded as fundamentalism’s chief spokesman, who has specialized in

33 34

“Norman Geisler”, Internet, . Billy Graham. 1997. Just as I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham; Christopher

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very large scale evangelistic events across the world extensively using the modern mass-media. Graham was born in North Carolina to a prosperous dairy farmer. He made a “decision for Christ” at the age of 16 and subsequently studied at Bob Jones University and Florida Bible Institute near Tampa from which he graduated in 1939. In 1940 he was ordained a minis­ ter of the Southern Baptist Church. After a brief pastorate in Western Springs, Illinois, he entered Wheaton College, Illinois from which he graduated with a BA degree in Anthropology in 1943. He then served for a while as the first evangelist of the newly founded Youth for Christ organization, becoming vice-president of the movement from 1945 to 1948. In 1949, while president of Northwestern College, Minneapolis (1947–1952), he acquired national fame through his high-profile preach­ ing Crusade in Los Angeles. He then founded the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, and has since conducted crusades on all con­ tinents, in which he preached a simple gospel of the sinfulness of men and their need to repent and turn to Christ in faith for forgiveness and salvation. His cultural sensitivity helped him gain popularity in many Third World countries. He also preached in the Soviet Union and sev­ eral other east European countries in the 1980s, encouraging local believ­ ers still suffering oppression under the communist regimes. It is claimed that millions have been won to Christianity through his crusades and subsidiary ministries of broadcasting, films, and literature. Graham promoted racial reconciliation and integration at his crusades in the South in the 1950s and 1960s when segregation was still the norm in many churches. A charismatic figure, Graham appealed to the masses by his sincer­ ity, honesty, and simplicity, while also being friend and counselor to many in high places including several presidents. He was especially friendly with president Nixon, but after Watergate realized the dangers of political involvement and ceased to identify himself with political lead­ ers and interests. Graham’s impact on Evangelicalism was greatly enhanced by his ini­ tiative in convening several international evangelical conferences such as the Berlin World Congress on Evangelism in 1966 and the Amsterdam Congress for Itinerant Evangelists in 1984. The most important was the Lausanne Congress in 1974, arguably the most influential Christian gathering since WWII. These conferences dealt with contemporary issues facing evangelical Christianity, stressing the supremacy of evangelism

Catherwood. 1994. Five Evangelical Leaders, pp. 220–284; J.D. Douglas. ed., 1974. The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, p. 427; “Graham, Billy” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Internet, .

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and the importance of social action, and recognizing and encouraging the growth of Christianity in the Third World. Graham was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal in 1996. His many books include: Peace With God (1952), World Aflame (1965), Angels: God’s Secret Agents (1975), Till Armageddon (1981), and his autobiography Just as I Am (1997). Graham was a cofounder of the evangelical magazine Christianity Today, and founder of the monthly magazine Decision. Guinness, Os 35 Evangelical scholar of the reformed persuasion, disciple of Francis Schaeffer and active for a while in Schaeffer’s L’Abri Fellowship. Born in China and educated in England, he took an advanced degree from Oxford University. Guinness moved to the USA in 1984, where he was the executive director of the Williamsburg Charter Foundation from 1986 to 1989. He is now Director of the Trinity Forum in America, a seminar-style forum for senior executives and politicians that helps relate contemporary issues and ideas to their faith. Guinness is convinced that biblical Christianity had a decisive impact on Western civilization and still offers real solutions to the problems of the modern world. He is author of several books including The Dust of Death: A Critique of the Establishment and the Counter Culture—and a Proposal for a Third Way (1973), The Gravedigger File (1983), and The Call: Finding and Fulfilling the Central Purpose of Your Life (1983). Hill, Clifford 36 Mainline charismatic sociologist, theologian and internationally known prophetic preacher, lecturer, writer and broadcaster, Hill is an ordained Anglican minister serving at St. Mark’s, Kennington. Hill is director of the Centre for Contemporary Ministry. He spent most of his ministry in the Inner City areas of London. Hill directed the Parliamentary Group Video Enquiry and has been used by the Police and the Prison Service as a consultant on Inner City affairs. Hill is editor of Prophecy Today magazine that aims at defending the faith in a pluralist age, enunciating a Christian perspective based on biblical prophecy to current world events, and applying unchanging scriptural principles to a changing world.

35 Michael Cromartie. “No Calling Without a Caller”, Christianity Magazine Online, Internet, . 36 Clifford Hill.1986. A Prophetic People, Inside cover; Editorial statement, Prophecy Today, Internet, ; Homepage, Prophecy Today, Internet, .

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Hill has written a number of books including: A Prophetic People (1986), Shaking the Nations, Prophecy Past and Present, and Rich Christians, Poor Christians. Jones, Bob, Jr. (1911–1997)37 American fundamentalist-separatist preacher and educator, former Chan­ cellor of Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina. Jones was born in Montgomery, Alabama. After attending a military high school he went on to study at Bob Jones College which had been founded as a separatist fundamentalist institution by his father. Jones later did graduate studies at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Chicago. Jones was board chairman and chancellor of Bob Jones University for many years. He gained public attention in the 1970s when the uni­ versity opted to lose its federal tax-exempt status rather than allow inter­ racial dating among its students. Bob Jones University enforced strict dress and behavioral codes for its students and gained recognition for excellence in some academic areas. He wrote a number of books includ­ ing the autobiographical Cornbread and Caviar (1985). His son Bob Jones III succeeded him as president. Lloyd-Jones, David Martyn (1899–1981)38 Great Welsh Reformed evangelical minister, expository preacher, and writer, considered by some to be the greatest British preacher of the twentieth century. Lloyd-Jones was born in Cardiff and attended the County Intermediate School in the small Welsh town of Tregaron. When the family moved to London he attended St Marylebone Grammar School there, then went on to study medicine at the St Bartholomew Hospital medical school, from which he received his MD in 1921. After practicing med­ icine for several years he felt called to the ministry, and in 1926 he became minister of a small church in Aberavon, Wales. For 30 years he was minister at Westminster Chapel, London, which under him became a center of British Evangelicalism and Nonconformity. He was also co-founder of London Theological Seminary, and former president of the Inter-Varsity Fellowship of Christian students. Lloyd-Jones never had any formal theological training. He believed a minister was primarily a preacher and pastor rather than an acade­ mic scholar skilled in Biblical languages. Preachers were born, not made, possessing a gift from God and being called by God to exercise it. His

37 “Year in Review 1997: Obituary” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Internet, . 38 Catherwood. 1994. pp. 57–118.

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preaching emphasized the authority of the Bible and the importance of using the mind in interpreting it and applying it to contemporary con­ texts, and it impacted thousands who flocked to hear him. He preferred an expository approach in the context of Reformed theology to the domi­ nant thematic approach of most preachers of his time, and would take his audience through a whole Bible book verse by verse over many weeks. Lloyd-Jones saw Christian unity as based on doctrine and cooperated with evangelicals across denominational lines especially in the student work of Inter Varsity and later IFES. However, in 1966, worried about the increasing dominance of liberalism in various denominations, he took a separatist stand at a National Assembly of Evangelicals in London, arguing for evangelicals to separate from theologically defective denom­ inations. While many followed his call, leading Anglican evangelicals such as Stott and Packer opposed it, and this opened a rift between Anglican and nonconformist evangelicals. Lloyd-Jones’ many sermons on Bible exposition and apologetics were collected into books, some posthumously, including: From Fear to Faith (1953), Authority (1958), Spiritual Depression (1965), Life in the Spirit (1975), Studies in the Sermon on the Mount (1984), Joy Unspeakable (1985), Revival (1987), What is an Evangelical? (1992), and Unity in Truth (1993). Machen, J. Gresham (1881–1937)39 Famed conservative and separatist Presbyterian Reformed scholar, the­ ologian, apologist, and prolific author. Machen was one of the most articulate defenders of orthodox Christian theology against the liberalizing trends of the early twentieth century. Machen grew up in Baltimore and studied at John Hopkins University and Princeton Theological Seminary, after which he spent a year in Germany at the University of Tubingen. He taught at Princeton Semi­ nary, but distressed by its move to theological liberalism he protested by leaving Princeton in 1929 together with Van Til and others to found Westminster Theological Seminary where he was Professor of New Testa­ ment until 1937. Suspended from ministry by the Presbyterian Church for insubordi­ nation, he founded the Presbyterian Church of America in 1935, later renamed the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, and served as its first mod­ erator. Machen argued for the essentials of the Christian faith against the inroads of liberal theology. He also argued against the increasing encroachment of the state in the lives of American citizens. His books

39 “In The Liberal Tradition: J. Gresham Machen”, Acton Institute, Internet, ; “John Gresham Machen (1881–1937): Non-fundamentalist Fundamentalist”, Christian History, Issue 55, Internet, .

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include Christianity and Liberalism (1923), God Transcendent (1937), and The Christian View of Man (1937). Mangalwadi, Vishal 40 The foremost evangelical Indian intellectual of our day, journalist, writer, speaker, evangelist, social reformer and political activist. Educated at Allahabad University, Mangalwadi served in the national headquarters of India’s Janata Dal party, overseeing agricultural reform. Through reading Francis Schaeffer’s book Escape from Reason he became a convinced Christian. He studied for six months in Switzerland under Schaeffer in 1973, then investigated Hindu gurus for his book When the New Age Gets Old. Mangalwadi lectures and broadcasts widely in India as well as in the US and Britain. Mangalwadi recognizes the positive influence of the British evangel­ ical revival of the 19th century on colonial India while not ignoring the evils of the Raj, especially when dominated by a secular-liberal racist worldview. His books include The World of Gurus (1995), Truth and Social Reform (1996), Missionary Conspiracy: Letters to a Post-Modern Hindu (1996), and India: The Grand Experiment (1997). McIntire, Carl (1906–) 41 One of the main leaders of the Reformed separatist fundamentalist camp since the 1930s. McIntire studied in Princeton under Machen. Following disagreements with Gresham Machen, he founded the Bible Presbyterian Church in 1937 after seceding from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church he had helped found. Later he was involved in church splits in 1956 and 1984. McIntire founded Faith Theological Seminary and Shelton College. He also founded the American Council of Christian Churches in 1941 to oppose the National Council of Churches, and the International Council of Churches in 1948 to oppose the World Council of churches. McIntire took separation to the extreme by repeatedly separating from churches and organizations he helped found. He was strongly anti-liberal and anti-Communist, and unusually, a pre-millenialist Presbyterian. He edited the Christian Beacon magazine which was popular in the 1960s and his radio program, 20th Century Reformation, was broadcast on 600 stations. McIntire wrote several books including: Twentieth Century Reformation: Fundamentalism in American Religion (1945), Modern Tower of Babel (1949), and Servants of Apostasy (1955).

40

“A Different Kind of Guru” Christianity Today, January 12, 1998. “Carl McIntire Meeting in His Home”, Banner of Truth, Internet, . 41

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Moritz, Fred 42 Independent separatist Baptist pastor, evangelist, and teacher. Moritz was brought up in a strict fundamentalist home and church. He received a BA from Pillsbury Baptist College, an MD from Central Baptist Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Bob Jones University. Moritz served as pastor in Indiana and Illinois and taught at Indiana Baptist College and Calvary Baptist Seminary. Currently he serves as executive direc­ tor of Baptist World Mission in Decatur, Alabama. Moritz is dedicated to a “sane, kind, militant, unwavering commit­ ment to biblical separatism as a complement to biblical evangelism,” and has an unwavering commitment to the truth revealed in the scrip­ tures, standing firmly against ecclesiastical and theological compromise. His book “Be Ye Holy”: The Call to Christian Separation (1994), sets forth his theology of biblical separation which is representative of the Independent Bible Fundamentalist Baptist strand of American fundamentalism. Packer, James I. (1926–) 43 Anglican evangelical-reformed minister, theologian, and writer, widely regarded as one of the most influential thinkers and apologists of evan­ gelical Christianity in the twentieth century. Born in Gloucestershire, England, Packer studied theology at Oxford where he was converted to evangelical Christianity and where he earned a D.Phil. in 1954. In 1947 he decided to seek ordination in the Church of England in order to challenge liberal influences in the church, and was ordained in 1952. Fascinated with the Puritans, and encouraged by Martyn Lloyd-Jones, he launched the Puritan Studies Conference in 1950 which served as a nucleus for a new and emerging constituency within British evangelicalism. Packer served as a curate in Birmingham for two years, as well as serving nine years at Latimer House, Oxford. He then held the position of associate principal at Trinity College, Bristol from 1972–1979. From 1979 onwards Packer has held the position of Board of Gover­ nors’ Professor of Historical and Systematic Theology at Regent College, Vancouver, Canada. He is in great demand as a lecturer, conference

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Fred Moritz. 1994. Be Ye Holy: The Call to Christian Separation. Alister McGrath. 1998. J.I. Packer: A Biography; Catherwood. 1994. pp. 177–219; McGrath, Allister. “A Peacemaker in the Battle for the Bible”, Christianity Today Online, Internet, ; Mark A. Noll. “Last Puritan”, Christianity Today Online, Internet, ; Wendy Murray Zoba. “Knowing Packer: The Lonely Journey of a Passionate Puritan” Christianity Today, April 6, 1998. 43

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speaker and visiting professor in many countries. His work is popular because of its clarity, vigor, and insight, as he deals with profound matters in a practical and highly readable way. He also contributes to the evangelical magazine Christianity Today. Like Stott, Packer operates within the Anglican Church hoping to encourage renewal from within. He opposed Martyn Lloyd-Jones’ call in the late 1960s for evangelicals to leave their liberal-leaning churches and form a separate evangelical denomination. Concerned for biblical authority and inspiration, he was a founding member of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy in 1977 and helped formulate its key ex­ positions, championing a stand that fully embraced infallibility and iner­ rancy without sacrificing common sense or adopting an ultra-literalistic approach. Packer has written many books including Fundamentalism and the Word of God (1958), Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God (1961), Knowing God (1973), and Among God’s Giants (1991). Prince, Derek (1915–) 44 English evangelical-Pentecostal pastor, Bible expositor, preacher, lecturer and counselor. Prince was born in India and educated in England at Eton and at Kings College, Cambridge. He held a Fellowship in ancient and mod­ ern Philosophy at Cambridge University 1938–1949. During the Second World War while serving in the Medical Corps he experienced a con­ version to Christ. While in the Army he served in Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Palestine. Following WWII he was involved in Christian ministry in Palestine living in Jerusalem during Israel’s War of Independence. In late 1948 he returned to England determined to devote his life to studying and teaching the Bible. In 1949 he resigned his fellowship at Cambridge to become pastor of a small Pentecostal church in London where he served for the next eight years. In 1957 he went to East Africa to head a teacher training college in Kenya. In 1963 he emigrated to America and pastored a small church in Seattle. He then launched his ministry of Bible teach­ ing, deliverance, and intercession (including a radio ministry) which made him famous worldwide. He is recognized today as a leading Bible expositor and is in great demand as a conference speaker. Prince has written many books and correspondence courses, includ­ ing: The Last Word on the Middle East (1982), God Is a Matchmaker (1986), Blessing or Curse: You can Choose! (1990), and Spiritual Warfare (1993).

44

“Derek Prince: His Life, His Work”, Internet, .

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Robertson, Pat 45 (1930–) Internationally renowned religious broadcaster and TV evangelist of Baptist-Charismatic persuasion, leader in the American fundamentalist scene, and a significant figure in American politics, Robertson was a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1988. Robertson was born in Lexington, Virginia. His father served 24 years in the United States Congress. After graduating from a military prep school, Pat Robertson entered Washington and Lee University in 1946 graduating in 1950. He was then called to active duty in the US Marine Corps and saw combat in Korea. On returning to civilian life Robertson entered Yale University Law School in 1955 and on graduation worked for a while in business. In 1956 he had a conversion experience and decided to pursue theological studies. He entered New York Theological Seminary and graduated with a Master’s degree in 1959. He was ordained a Southern Baptist minister in Norfolk, Virginia in 1961. Robertson then became involved in Christian broadcasting, buying a small TV studio in Virginia Beach, Virginia and developing it into one of the largest broadcasting and cable networks in the United States, the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) and the CBN Cable Network (which has 31 million subscribers). He is host of CBN’s popular 700 Club program, and has founded The American Family Legal Foundation, and Regent University in Virginia Beach, VA. Robertson was convinced of the need for evangelicals to become actively involved in the political process, in order to produce changes in the direction of Christian values. He himself ran (unsuccessfully) for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1988, and in 1989 he founded the Christian coalition that became the follower of Falwell’s Moral Majority, a political cross-denominational alliance of evangelical activists seeking to re-establish a foothold in government. Robertson wrote several books, the best known being The Secret Kingdom (1986), The New World Order (1991), The Turning Tide (1993), and The End of the Age (1998). Rushdoony, Roussas John (1916–) 46 Reformed scholar, theologian, and founder of the radical Reconstructionist movement that expounds a strict theonomic worldview, Chairman of the board of Chalcedon Foundation. Rushdoony was born in 1916 in the USA, son of Armenian immi­ grants. He was ordained as minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian

45 “Pat Robertson”, Internet, . 46 Joseph McAuliffe. “An Interview with R.J. Rushdoony”, Internet, .

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Church, and served as a missionary on American Indian reservations. His 1963 book The Messianic Character of American Education was a major influence on the fledgling home school movement of the time, and Rushdoony was involved as an expert in court cases on home school­ ing as a legitimate alternative to public education. Rushdoony was influenced by Van Til’s presuppositional apologetics and aimed at restoring the doctrines of Postmillennialism and Dominion. In his famous book Institutes of Biblical Law (1973) Rushdoony attempted to build a biblical “theonomic” social philosophy that uncompromis­ ingly affirmed the validity of biblical law, and aimed at rebuilding soci­ ety according to a biblical blueprint Rushdoony wrote numerous works on the application of Biblical law to society, including: By What Standard? (1958), Foundations of Social Order (1968), Politics of Guilt and Pity (1970), The Politics of Pornography (1974), Christianity and the State (1986), and The Roots of Reconstruction (1991). Schaeffer, Francis (1912–1984) 47 Very influential Evangelical Reformed philosopher, lecturer, apologist, and writer, Schaeffer was one of the main intellectual and spiritual lead­ ers of evangelical Christianity in the sixties and seventies, arguing against the secularizing and dehumanizing trends of modern culture. Schaeffer was born in Pennsylvania to a working class family. Initially he started studies in engineering, but feeling called to the ministry he transferred to an arts college and later became a graduate student at Westminster Theological Seminary where he studied under Machen and Van Til. In 1937 he helped set up Faith Theological Seminary and in 1938 was ordained as the first minister of the newly founded Bible Presbyterian Church, pastoring a church in Grove City Pennsylvania for 9 years. In 1948 the Independent Board of Foreign Missions sent the Schaeffers to Europe as long-term missionaries. After engaging in various mis­ sionary activities, Francis Schaeffer and his wife Edith founded the L’Abri Fellowship In 1955, a Christian student commune in the Swiss Alps where students from all over the world came for various periods of time, living in an atmosphere that stimulated philosophical and religious discussion. This ministry developed and now has branches in the USA, UK, The Netherlands and Sweden. In 1965 they returned to America where Schaeffer lectured widely and wrote his books. Schaeffer identified with the issues that concerned the student gen­ eration of the 1960s and 1970s, and was considered as the apostle to the hippie generation. He had a profound impact on the Jesus Revolution

47 Catherwood. 1994. pp. 119–176; Michael S. Hamilton. “The Dissatisfaction of Francis Schaeffer” Christianity Today, March 3, 1997.

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appealing to many students with countercultural leanings. Schaeffer resisted American postwar materialism and extreme individualism, preached against racism, urged respect for nature, and sympathized with drug users and dropouts. He thundered against the middle-class sins of the evangelical churches, challenging them to adopt a revolutionary mindset and a community attitude. Schaeffer has been compared to C.S. Lewis in his profound impact on evangelical thinking. He was an expert at presenting academic sub­ jects in a coherent but popularized and accessible framework for the non-specialist. Schaeffer was convinced that the real battle was in the realm of ideas, and he was worried by the decline of Western society and culture, arguing that all of modern art and culture was based on the assumption that humans were a chance product of an impersonal universe. He was convinced that biblical Christianity offered the true alternative to this nihilistic worldview, but that Christians needed to school themselves in the language of modern philosophy and culture in order to communicate with the world around them. Schaeffer argued for divine revelation as God’s absolute truth, defending the doctrine of biblical inerrancy which he felt was the most important issue facing contemporary evangelicals. He encouraged evangelicals to come out of their cultural ghetto, and inspired many students to become serious scholars. He also mentored some leaders of the New Christian Right such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, encouraging their anti-abortion stance and advocating the idea of co-belligerence (the concept of evan­ gelicals forming alliances across religious boundaries on specific issues). Schaeffer’s many books have been translated into more than 25 lan­ guages with over 3 million in print. They include: The God Who is There (1967), Escape from Reason (1968), Genesis in Space and Time (1972), True Spirituality (1972), Art and the Bible (1973), He is There and He is Not Silent (1980), A Christian Manifesto (1981), How Should we then Live: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture (1983), and Whatever Happened to the Human Race (1983). Stott, John R.W. (1921–) 48 English Anglican minister and writer, one of the most prominent evan­ gelical leaders, apologists, theologians, and thinkers of our time, acknowl­ edged as the leading spokesman for Anglican Evangelicals, Stott had a large role in the remarkable growth of evangelicalism since WWII. Stott was born in London, the only son of a leading Harley Street physician.

48 Timothy Dudley-Smith. 1999. John Stott: The Making of a Leader: A Biography: The Early Years; Catherwood. 1994. pp. 13–56; David Wells. “Guardian of God’s Word” Christianity Today Online, Internet, .

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He was educated at Rugby, were he came to a personal Christian faith at the age of seventeen. Stott went up to Trinity college, Cambridge, in 1939 where he initially studied modern languages and was involved in the Christian Union. He later transferred to reading theology, grad­ uating from Cambridge and being ordained in 1945. Stott had a remarkable career at All Souls Church, Langham Place, London, first as curate and later as rector (1945–1975). Together with Martyn Lloyd-Jones he was simultaneously involved in presenting a “scholarly Evangelicalism” to students around the universities of Britain, demonstrating that it was possible to be both an intellectual and a com­ mitted Christian. He also has an effective ministry worldwide as a con­ ference speaker especially among students, as a speaker at seminars for pastors, and in the Third World. In 1982 he founded the London Institute for Contemporary Christianity to stimulate Christians to think biblically about the contemporary world. Stott was deeply concerned over social issues, calling for a partner­ ship between evangelism and social responsibility. He was heavily involved in the Lausanne movement, helping to formulate its Covenant which calls evangelicals to be both conservative on the nature of scripture, accepting its authority and inerrancy, and radical in working out its truth in culture. Stott served as Chaplain to the Queen (1959–1991). He wrote many books (over 40) on Bible exposition and Christian apologetics includ­ ing: Basic Christianity (1958), Fundamentalism and Evangelism (1959), Issues Facing Christians Today (1984), The Contemporary Christian (1995), and Human Rights and Wrongs (1999). Van Til, Cornelius (1895–1987) 49 Separatist-Reformed theologian, Van Til was Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, from its founding in 1929 until his retirement in 1975. Van Til was born in the Netherlands, but his family emigrated to the United States when he was ten years old. He graduated from Calvin College in 1922, Princeton Theological Seminary (Th.B.) in 1924, and Princeton University (Ph.D.) in 1927. He was ordained in 1927 and served as pastor of the Christian Reformed Church in Spring Lake, MI, from 1927 to 1928, then became Instructor of Apologetics at Princeton Theological Seminary. Van Til, together with J. Gresham Machen and others resigned from Princeton Seminary in 1929 after Princeton took

49 “Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987)”, Internet, ; “Obituary: Dr. Cornelius Van Til”, Internet, .

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a decidedly liberal turn, and founded Westminster Theological semi­ nary where he taught apologetics. He is best known for a fresh approach in Christian apologetics, pre­ suppositionalism, which focuses on the role of presuppositions, the points of contact between believers and unbelievers, and the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian worldviews. He insists on an ultimate cat­ egory of thought, a conceptual framework, which must be assumed in order to make a sensible interpretation of reality. An appeal to facts or laws is not sufficient, the question being the final reference point required to make these facts and laws intelligible. Van Til wrote several books on apologetics including The New Modernism, (1946), The Defense of the Faith (1955), and Christianity and Barthianism (1962). Volf, Miroslav 50 Mainline evangelical theologian and writer, Dr. Volf has taught theol­ ogy at the Evangelical Theological Faculty, Osijek, Croatia and at Fuller Seminary, Pasadena, California, and is now Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School. Volf grew up in a Christian family in communist Yugoslavia, where his father was a pastor of a Pentecostal Church. He studied at Osijek Evangelical Theological Faculty and also studied Philosophy at Zagreb University. He later went to the USA to study at Fuller Theological Seminary, then studied under Moltmann in the University of Tubingen, Germany. Volf is a committed evangelical thinker for whom the Christian faith makes sense in a world of failed modernity. Volf has written several books, including: Exclusion and Embrace: The Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (1996), and After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (1998).

50 “Miroslav Volf: Speaking the Truth to the World”, Christianity Today, February 8, 1998; Kevin D. Miller. “The Clumsy Embrace”, Christianity Today, October 26, 1998.

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Dailey, Timothy J. 1992. The Gathering Storm, Tarrytown, NY: Fleming H. Revell Company. Darby, John Nelson, 1971. The Collected Writings of John Nelson Darby, Edited by William Kelly, 34 vols. and index, Oak Park, IL: Bible Truth Publishers. Davidson, Lawrence, 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism, Westport, CN. & London: Greenwood Press. Davis, John Jefferson, 1984. Foundations for Evangelical Theology, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. ——— 1985. Let the Bible Teach you Christian Doctrine, Carlisle: Paternoster. DeMar, Gary. 1988. The Debate Over Christian Reconstruction, Fort Worth, TX: Dominion. ——— 1994. Last Days Madness, Atlanta: American Vision. Dixon, Meyer, & Torrey, eds., 1910–1915. The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, 12 vols. Reprinted in four volumes, with introduction by George Marsden, 1988. Fundamentalism in American Religion Series, New York: Garland Pub. Dobson, James & Gary L. Bauer. 1990. Children at Risk, Dallas: Word. Dollar, George W. 1973. A History of Fundamentalism in America, Greenville, SC: Bob Jones University Press. Edwards, David L. & John Stott. 1988. Evangelical Essentials, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Einwechter, William O. & Anthoney Cowley, eds., 1997. Explicitly Christian Politics, Pittsburgh, PA: National Reform Association. El-'Awa, Mu˙ammad S. 1980. On the Political System of the Islamic State, Indianapolis: American Trust Publications. Falwell, Jerry. Exec. ed., 1978. Liberty Commentary on the New Testament, Lynchburg, VA: Liberty Press. ——— 1980. Listen America! Garden City, NY: Doubleday. ——— 1981. With Ed Dobson and Ed Hinson. The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity, Garden City, NY: Galilee-Doubleday. ——— 1987. Strength for the Journey, New York: Simon & Schuster. ——— 1992. The New American Family, Dallas: Word Publishing. ——— 1997. Falwell: An Autobiography, Billings, MT: Liberty House Press. Faraj, Mu˙ammad Abdessalam. (nd). Al Farida Al Ghaiba (The Missing Duty), English translation in Jansen, Johannes J.G. 1986. The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan. Farooqi, Misbahul Islam. 1991. The Jewish Conspiracy and the Muslim World, Kuala Lumpur: Thinker’s Library. (A reprint of a 1967 Pakistani edition). Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji. 1983. Tawhid: Its Relevance for Thought and Life, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Students. ——— 1979. Islam, Niles, IL: Argus Communications. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji & Lois L. Al-Faruqi. 1986a. The Cultural Atlas of Islam, New York: Macmillan. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji. 1986b. The Path of Da'wah in the West, London: UK Islamic Mission. ——— 1983. Humanism and the Law: The Case of the Shariah, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. ——— ed., 1988. Trialogue of Abrahamic Faiths, Herndon, VA: IIIT. Al-Faruqi, I.R. & A.O. Naseef. eds., 1981. Social and Natural Sciences: The Islamic Perspective, London: Hodder & Stoughton and Jeddah: King Abdulaziz University. Al-Faruqi, I.R. & A.H. Abu Sulayman. eds., 1981. Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Workplan, Herndon, VA: IIIT. Forster, Roger & John Richards. 1995. Churches that Obey: Taking the Great Commission Seriously, Carlisle: OM Publishing.

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Geisler, Norman L. ed., 1980. Inerrancy, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. ——— 1983. Is Man the Measure? Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. ——— 1988. Christian Apologetics, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. ——— 1990a. Christian Ethics: Options and Issues, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. ——— 1990b. Civil Disobedience: When is it Right? Lynchburg, VA: Quest Productions. Gentry, K.L. 1993. God’s Law in the Modern World, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian And Reformed. Gibbs, Alfred P. (nd). Worship: The Christian’s Highest Occupation, Kansas City: Walterick Publishers. ——— 1963. The Lord’s Supper, Kansas City: Walterick Publishers. Goldingay, John. 1995. Models for Interpretation of Scripture, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing. Graham, Billy. 1954. Peace With God, reprinted 1984, Bromley: STL. ——— 1960. Answers to Life’s Problems, Milton Keynes: Word (UK). ——— 1965. World Aflame, New York: Doubleday & Company. ——— 1981. Till Armageddon: A Perspective on Suffering, London: Hodder & Stoughton. ——— 1986. Unto the Hills: A Devotional Treasury, Milton Keynes: Word (UK). ——— 1997. Just as I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham, London: Harper Collins Publishers. Grenz, Stanley J. & Roger E. Olson. 1992. 20th Century Theology: God & the World in a Transitional Age, Carlisle: The Paternoster Press. Guinness, Os, 1973. The Dust of Death: The Sixties Counterculture and How it Changed America Forever, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. ——— 1983. The Gravedigger File, Sevenoaks, Kent: Hodder and Stoughton. ——— 1989. The Devil’s Gauntlet, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. ——— 1993. The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning, New York: Macmillan/The Free Press. ——— 1995. Fit Bodies, Fat Minds: Why Evangelicals Don’t think and What to Do about It, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Guinness, Os & John Seel. eds., 1992. No God But God: Breaking With the Idols of Our Age, Chicago: Moody Press. Gunn, James. (nd). I Will Build My Church, Kansas City: Walterick Publishers. Hargis, Billy James. 1974. Why I Fight for Christian America, Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson. Hawwa, Sa'eed. 1983. The Muslim Brotherhood: Objectives, Stages, Method, trans. Abdul Karim Shaikh, Delhi: Hindustan Publications. Henry, Carl F.H. 1947. The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. ——— 1967. Evangelicals at the Brink of Crisis, Waco, TX: Word Books. ——— 1979. God, Revelation and Authority, Vol. 4. Waco, TX: Word Books. ——— 1983. After Fundamentalism, San Francisco: Harper & Row. ——— 1988. Twighlight of a Great Civilization: The Drift Toward Neo-Paganism, Westchester, IL: Crossway Books. Hill, Clifford. 1986. A Prophetic People, London: Fount. ——— 1995. Shaking the Nations: A Future and a Hope, Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications. Hill, Fenwick, et al. 1995. Blessing the Church? A Review of the History and Direction of the Charismatic Movement, Guildford, Surrey: Eagle. Hizb ut-Tahrir. 1996. (no author mentioned), Hizb ut-Tahrir, London: Al-Khilafa Publications. Hunt, Dave. 1995. A Cup of Trembling: Jerusalem and Bible Prophecy, Eugene, OR: Harvest House. Hunter, James Davidson. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, New York: Basic Books.

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Important Chapters in Edited Books Adams, Charles J. “Mawdudi and the Islamic State” in Esposito, ed., 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp. 99–133. A˙mad, Mumtaz. “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 457–530. Almond, Gabriel A., Emmanuel Sivan, R. Scott Appleby. “Fundamentalism: Genus and Species”, in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1995. Fundamentalisms Compared, pp. 399–424. Ammerman, Nancy T. “North American Protestant Fundamentalism”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 1–65. Arjomand, Said Amir. “Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 179–198. Ben-Dor, Gabriel. “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism”, in Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, eds., 1997. Islamic Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. 239–252. Berger, Peter L. “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Perspective”, in Berger. 1999. ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, pp. 1–11. Bromley, David G. & Anson Shupe. “Rebottling the Elixir: The Gospel of Prosperity in America’s Religioeconomic Corporations”, in Robbins & Anthony, eds., 1990. In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America, pp. 233–253. Brumberg, Daniel. “Khomeini’s Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice,” in R. Scott Appleby, ed., 1997. Spokesmen for the Despised, pp. 16–82. Bruce, Steve. “Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and Enclave”, in Marty & Appleby, eds.,

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 1993. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, the Economy, and Militancy, pp. 50–67.

Clemen, Simon. “Conservative Protestantism, Politics, and Civil Religion in the United States”, in David Westerlund, ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 24–42. Cohn-Sherbock, Dan. “Incarnation and Trialogue”, in Cohn-Sherbok, ed., 1991. Islam in a World of Diverse Faiths, pp. 18–32. Coleman, Simon. “Conservative Protestantism, Politics and Civil Religion in the United States”, in Westerlund, D. ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 24–47. Commins, David. “Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949),” in 'Alì Rahneema, ed., 1994. Pioneers of Islamic Revival, pp. 125–153. Eisenstadt, S.N. “Fundamentalism, Phenomenology, and Comparative Dimensions”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 259–276. al-Erian, Essam. “The Future of Power-Sharing in Egypt” in Azzam Tamimi. 1993. Power Sharing Islam. Garret, William R. “Religion and the Legitimation of Violence”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 103–361. Garvey, John H. “Fundamentalism and American Law”, in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1993. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, the Economy, and Militancy, pp. 28–49. Gellner, Ernest. “Marxism and Islam: Failure and Success” in Tamimi, Azzam, ed., 1993. Power Sharing Islam. Glazer, Nathan. “Multiculturalism, Religious Conservatism, and American Diversity”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1997. Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-identity: Nations in Turmoil, pp. 125–141. Grew, Raymond. “On Seeking the Cultural Context of Fundamentalism” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1997. Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity, pp. 19–34. Haddad, Yvonne. “Sayyìd Qu†b: Ideologue of Islamic Revival” in Esposito, ed., 1983. Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp. 67–98. Hadden, Jeffrey K. “Conservative Christians, Televangelism, and Politics: Taking Stock a Decade After the Founding of the Moral Majority”, in Robbins & Anthony, eds., 1990. In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of religious Pluralism in America, pp. 463–471. Hallencreutz, Carl F. & David Westerlund. “Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion”, in Westerlund, D., ed., 1996. Questioning the Secular State, pp. 1–8. Hammoud, Mirna. 1998. “Causes for Fundamentalist Popularity in Egypt” in Moussalli, A˙mad S., ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities, pp. 308–336. Hegland, Mary Elaine. “Conclusion: Religious Resurgence in Today’s World” in Antoun & Hegland, eds., 1987. Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Heilman, Samuel C. 1995. “The Vision from the Madrasa and Bes Medrash: Some Parallels between Islam and Judaism”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 71–95. Hunter, Shireen T. 1995. “The Rise of Islamist Movements and the Western Responses: Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Interests?” in Laura Guazzone, ed., 1995. The Islamist Dilemma. Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Egypt’s Islamic Militancy Revisited”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 353–361. Jansen, J.J.G. “The Significance of Modern Muslim Radicalism”, in C. van Dijk & A.H. de Groot, eds., 1995. State and Islam, pp. 115–123.

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Juergensmeyer, Mark. “Antifundamentalism”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 353–366. Lambton, Ann K.S. 1989. “The Clash of Civilizations: Authority, Legitimacy and Perfectibility”, in Robert M. Burrel, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 36–47. Lechner, Frank J. “Fundamentalism Revisited”, in Robbins & Anthony, eds. 1990. In Gods We Trust, pp. 77–97. Long, Theodore E. “Prophecy, Charisma, and Politics: Reinterpreting the Weberian Thesis”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds. 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 3–17. Marty, Martin E. & R. Scott Appleby. “Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 814–842. ——— “Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, Defiant Society”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education, pp. 1–19. ——— “Conclusion: Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics and Militancy, pp. 620–643. Miller, Judith. “Global Islamic Awakening or Sudanese Nightmare? The Curious Case of Hassan Turabi,” in Appleby, ed., 1997. Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East, pp. 182–224. Moussali, A˙mad S. “Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy,” in Norton, ed., 1995. Civil Society in the Middle East, pp. 88–116. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. “Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism,” in Rahneema, ed., 1994. Pioneers of Islamic Revival, pp. 98–123. Ramadan, Abdel Aziz. “Fundamentalis Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, the Economy, and Militancy, pp. 152–183. Rapoport, David C. “Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, pp. 429–461. Roof, Wade Clark. “The New Fundamentalism: Rebirth of Political Religion in America”, in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 18–34. Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. “Activist Shi'ism in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 403–456. Saiedi, Nader. “What is Islamic Fundamentalism?” in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 173–195. Salvatore, Armando. “Discursive Contentions in Islamic Terms: Fundamentalism versus Liberalism” in Moussalli, A˙mad S. ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities, pp. 75–102. Simpson, John H. “Some Elementary forms of Authority and Fundamentalist Politics” in Hadden & Shupe, eds., 1986. Prophetic Religions and Politics, pp. 393–394. Sivan, Emmanuel. “The Enclave Culture”, in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1995. Funda­ mentalisms Comprehended, pp. 11–70. Smart, Ninian. “Three Forms of Religious Convergence”, in Antoun & Hegland, eds., 1987. Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Stone, Jon R. “Defining Protestant Orthodoxy: Religious Authentication and the ‘New’ Evangelicalism, 19940–1960”, in Bromley & Carter, eds., 1996. Religion and the Social Order, vol. 6, 1996: The Issue of Authenticity in the Study of Religions.

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Swidler, Leonard. “The Evolution of a Dialogue”, in Swidler, ed., 1992. Muslims In Dialogue, pp. iv–xviii. Tibi, Bassam. 1993. “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” in Marty & Appleby, eds., 1993. Fundamentalisms and Society. Voll, John O. “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan”, in Marty & Appleby, eds. 1991. Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 345–402. Warburg, Gabriel. “The Sudan under Islamist Rule”, in Maddy-Weizman & Inbar, eds., 1997. Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, pp. Wolff, Kristin E. 1998. “New New Orientalism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory”, in Moussali, A˙mad S. ed., 1998. Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities.

R Barrett, David B. ed., 1982. World Christian Encyclopedia, New York: Oxford University Press. Borgatta, Edgar F. & Marie Borgatta. eds., 1992. Encyclopedia of Sociology, New York: Macmillan Publishing. Bosworth, et al., eds., 1986–1996. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden: Brill. Cully & Cully, eds., 1990. Harper’s Encyclopedia of Religious Education, San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers. Douglas, J.D., ed., 1974. The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Eliade, Mircea, ed., 1987. Encyclopedia of Religion, 16 vols, London: Collier Macmillan/ New York: Macmillan. Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience, 1988. New York: Scribners. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1997. 15th ed. [rev]. Chicago & London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Esposito, J., ed., 1995. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols. New York: Oxford University Press. Fahlbusch, E. et al., eds., 1999. The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol. 1, A-D. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, & Leiden: Brill. Faruqi, Khalid Kemal, 1995. Islamic Fundamentalism—An Annotated Bibliography of Sources in English, New Delhi: CBS Publishers Goring, Rosemary, ed., 1995. The Wordsworth Dictionary of Beliefs and Religons, Ware: Wordsworth Editions. Gresch, A. & D. Vidal. 2000. The New A-Z of the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. ed., 1998. The Islamic Revival Since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, London: Greenwood. Hinnells, John R. 1995. Penguin Dictionary of Religion, New Expanded Edition, London: Penguin Books. Holt, Lambton, Lewis, eds., 1977. The Cambridge History of Islam, in 4 Volumes, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press. Hussain, Asaf, 1983. Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran: An Annotated Bibliography, London: Mansell Press Lippy, C.H. & P.W. Williams. eds., 1988. Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience: Studies of Traditions and Movements, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. MacDonald, William. 1990. Believer’s Bible Commentary, New Testament, Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1990 Queen, Edward L. et al. 1996. The Encyclopedia of American Religious History, New York: Facts on File, 2 vols.

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S The Holy Bible, New International Version, Colorado Springs: International Bible Society, First Edition 1979, this edition 1980, entirely reset 1984, Nineteenth Impression April 1992. The Holy Quran, Text, Translation and Commentary by A. Yusuf Alì, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

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INDEX

'Abbasids 205 'Abd al-Majid, 'Asim 14, 182 'Abd al-Qader 50 'Abd al-Rahman, 'Umar 14, 255, 280, 283 'Abd al-Wahhab 49, 50 'Abduh, Muhammad 50, 51, 52 abolition (slaves) 31 abortion 38, 40 Abu Khalil, As'ad 157 Abu Rabi', Ibrahim M. 64, 93 accommodationism 43 activism, activist 34, 46, 54 political 40 social 3 'adat 51 Adventism (Seventh Day) 26 Afghanistan 57, 58, 69, 156 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 50, 51, 52, 55 Afghan Wars 58 Africa Sub-Saharan 43, 50 African-American 25 slaves 29 ahkam 178 ahl al-hall-wal 'aqd 186 ahl al-kitab 261 Ahmad, Israr 13, 109, 188, 209, 210, 272, 283–284 Ahmad, Khurshid 112, 151–152, 281, 284–285 Ahmad, Mumtaz 165 'alamiyya 213 Algeria 59, 87 alienation 47, 66, 88 aliens 36 alike-claims 84 'alim 56 Allah 102, 114, 124, 137–139, 154, 158, 186, 196, 204, 214, 224, 226, 234, 242 alliances 39, 40, 236 Almond 17, 83 alternative societies 81, 83 al-'Alwani, Taha Jabir 13 America 30, 31, 35, 39, 116, 180, 191, 215

American, Americans 5, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 64 Christian Right 10, 12 Constitution 160 Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) 35

destiny 12

politics 215

society 36, 38, 184

soldiers 57

amir 101, 228 Anabaptist(s) 26, 109, 148, 167, 177, 188, 193, 194, 279 apolitical separatists 167, 189 non-conformist views on churchstate 190 Anglican-Episcopalian 26 anomie 47, 88, 115 anthropocentric, anthropocentrism 20, 93, 102 anti-abortion(ists) 30, 39, 41, 81 anti-black 30, 199, 254 anti-Coptic 255 antichrist 119, 250, 251 anti-environmentalists 30 anti-ERA 39 anti-federal 30 anti-gay 39 anti-God 20, 93, 102 anti-intellectual 148–149 anti-law 103 antinomianism 161 anti-religious 102 anti-scholarship 148–149 anti-secularism 93–95 anti-Semitism 22, 29, 30, 199, 254, 259–263, 276

Christian 259

Islamic 259–263

anti-supernaturalism 32 anti-Westernism 47 apolitical (movements) 17, 37, 45, 78

Christian separatist 168

Tabligji Jama'at 169

Apostates, apostasy 32, 33, 35, 157–158 Apostles 166, 200, 201

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

Appleby, R. Scott 1, 15, 17, 83 'aqida 182, 187 al-Aqsa 258 Arabia, Arabian Peninsula 49, 73, 188, 258 Arabic 188 army (God’s) 21, 237 Aron, Raymon 84 Asa (King) 203 Asad, Muhammad 117 ascension 26, 33 Asia 43 "asliyin 8 atheism 47, 93 atonement (Christ’s) 26 substitutionary 33 Auschwitz 125 authentic, authenticity 47, 81, 88 autonomy, human 94 Awakening 23, 48, 55 Great 23 Ayatollah 14, 76 al-Azhar 51 backsliding 40 Bacon, Roger 97 Bahnsen, Greg 14 Bainbridge, W.S. 7, 62 Al-Banna", Hasan 13, 53, 67, 99, 111, 157, 185, 191, 203, 224, 280, 285–286 Baptists, Baptists 26, 28, 32, 33, 190 Fundamentalist Independent Bible 14, 15, 33, 74, 136, 170, 172, 190, 238, 244 Southern 15 views on separation 244 Barr, James 16, 70, 74, 129 Al-Bashir, 'Umar Hasan 58 batini 154 battle contemporary 231–274 life as 3, 21 spiritual 202, 231 various aspects 232–243 battlefield 20, 80, 232 bay'a 177, 214 al-bayan 261 bazaris 67 believers 9, 20, 63 thoughts of 2

description of faith 3

variety of 13

Ben-Dor, Gabriel 15, 18, 19, 84, 85, 86, 91 Bennabi 219 Berger, Peter 62, 93 Bible 16, 27, 28, 32, 39, 103, 120, 129, 135, 141, 150, 159, 167, 174, 238 absolute, objective authority 140 absolutely true 142 colleges 34 God-given 142 God’s guidance 158 inerrancy of 25, 26 inspiration of 25, 26, 136 judges culture 140 King James 137 as law 158–162 preserved by God 136 Schools 42 Scofield 34 sole authority for life & practice 204, 206 as Word of God 25, 136 Biblical account of creation 32 approach to life 42 authority 27 books 32 creationism 42 criticism 32, 135 doctrine 36 inerrancy 27, 32, 81 law 27, 159, 160, 162, 172, 173 morality 27 presuppositions 107 Biblical Research Society 149 bid'a 49 bin-Laden, 'Usama 14, 59, 258, 286–287 Blacks 180 blasphemy 102 Bob Jones University 14, 149, 311 Bolshevik 64, 100 Boone, Kathleen C. 16, 77, 129 born-again, Christians 5, 43 Bosch, David 7, 69 Bosnia 57, 59 boundary, boundaries 21, 70, 78, 79, 81 Brazil 44 Brethren, Plymouth, Christian 15, 26, 32, 200, 201, 245 Britain 31, 32, 123, 225 British 4, 50

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 British Empire 215 British Raj 123 Bryan, William Jennings 29 Buddhism 75 Buenos Aires 110 Bynum, E.L. 304–305 Byzantine Empire 203 Caesar 91, 188, 231 Caliphate 52, 176, 224 re-establishment of 208 Caliphs 52, 181, 203 Righteous 193 Calvinist 8, 33, 188 Founding Fathers 29 Reformed 26, 97, 190, 245 theocratic stand 188 Campus Crusade 36 capitalism 102 Caplan, Lionel 8, 9, 68, 71 Carnell, Edward 35 Carter, Jeffrey R. 1, 18, 84 Carter, Jimmy 37 catalyst 6, 53, 56, 59, 65 101 Catherwood, Sir Frank 206 Catholic 16, 28, 29, 31, 40, 73, 75, 90 Caucasus 50 cell groups 44, 53 Central America 43 Central Asia 44 Cereghin, John 14, 305 Chalcedon Ministries 184 Charismatic 15, 24, 25, 26, 37, 48 charismatic gifts 24

movement 104

prophet 65, 67

preachers 57

sheikhs 117

Chechnya 57, 59 Children of God 37 Chile 44 Chiluba (Zambian President) 44 China 43, 44 Christ 25, 32, 118, 141, 158, 159, 160, 162, 167, 185, 201, 202 his ascension 33 his deity 25, 33 his Lordship 145, 236 his resurrection 33 his return 33, 250 his Kingdom 168 King of Kings, Lord of Lords 167, 173

375

Christendom 201 Christian, Christians 38 Alliance 15, 40 Civilization 30 Coalition 15, 40, 42, 104 Conservative 37 culture 34 fundamentals 33 Identity 29 missions 68 Nation 44 revolution 236 Right 15, 83 Right, radical extreme fringes 174, 179 Voice 40 Christian American Party 181 Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) 15, 104 Christian Identity 254, 259 Christian Zionist 255 Christianity 42, 64, 71, 202 biblical 97, 104

Fundamentalist 42

nominal 98

revolutionary 237

Christianity Today 37, 246 church, churches 105, 189 and state 28, 91 Black American 24 as community of believers 172 double ministry 247 Establishment 26 heretical 27 House 200 not identical to state 189 institutional 32, 172 as living organism 202 Orthodox 7 overcomes world 207 ruled by scripture alone 142 true universal 32 vs. state 174 western 7 civil disobedience 21, 167, 267 civil government 168, 217 civil liberties 37, 64 civil religion 38, 39 civilization Christian 31, 34

Judeo-Christian 87

liberal 87

Western 47, 106, 235

civil society 27

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

clash of civilizations 94, 280 clash of worldviews 20 classes (in society) 66, 67 Clemens, Simon 93 Clinton, Bill 41 Cloud, David W. 14, 305–306 Coalition for Traditional Values 40 co-belligerency 39 cold-war era 43 colleges, evangelical-fundamentalist 42 Colombia 44 colonialism 46, 47, 50, 101, 123 Colorado Springs 119 Colson, Charles W. 15, 280, 306–307 common denominator 20, 93 good 11 ground 87, 277 communism 34, 43, 66 Companions (Muhammad’s) 46, 52, 146, 203, 204, 256 comparative studies 72 of fundamentalisms 1, 17, 18, cross-religious 2, 17, 18, 19, 20, 84, 85–88 Conference of Islamic Revivalist Movements 209 Conflict, inner moral 21 Congress, Congressional 40, 42 conscience 27, 31 conspiracy theories 3, 21, 29, 34, 79, 253–258

Christian 180, 253–255

Islamic 255–258

Constantinople 255 constituency 40, 43 constitution, American 174, 180 Constitution Action Party 29 Continent (Europe) 32 Contract With America 42 conversion 24, 25, 26, 27, 33 Cooper, David L. 149 Copts 57 counter-culture 37 covenant 12, 27, 29, 40, 173 core identity 55 cosmologies 65, 239 cosmos 136 covenant biblical law as 161 Christ’s 207 Cox, Harvey 6, 62 Cox, James L. 18, 84

Craf, Bert 137 creation 32 creationism 40 Crippen, Alan 15, 119, 215, 307 crisis 48, 65, 67 criteria, criterion 33, 54, 63, 81 Croatia(n) 98 cross 26, 150 cross-denominational 41 Crusader, Crusades 59, 231, 255, 258 cultural elites 63 dominance, western 46

monopoly 101

systems 9

culture 37, 39, 41, 94 American 11, 36 European secular 99 fragmented 110 international 101 relativistic shifts in 136 Roman-Greek 140 al-dajjal 251 dan Fodio, 'Usman 50 Daniel 216 dar al-harb 211, 227, 271 dar al-Islam 211 Darbala, 'Isam al-Din 14, 182 Darby, John Newton 26, 32, 34, 245 Darwin, Darwinism, Darwinian 32, 109, 118, 123 DAWN movement 43 David, King 203 da'wa 57, 211, 212, 213, 274 Dayton, Tennessee 34 Death, Christ’s atoning 25 Dekmejian, Hrair 7, 8 democracy, democratic 64, 176, 178, 229 as lesser evil 218 attitudes to 3, 4 fundamentalist views on 216–230 involvement 21 Islamist views on 219–225 republic better 218 system of unbelief 102 theo-democracy 221 Democratic Party 29 demographic 43 demonic 11, 21, 233, 234 despair 47, 88 determinism 116

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 devil 136 Dhaka 101 dichotomy, dichotomies, dichotomize 27, 63, 79, 112, 239, 242 differences 18, 19, 20, 84, 90–92, 277 dhimmis 255, 261 al-dini 154, 225 discourse 9 Christian 9, 26

fundamentalist 9–12

radical Islamist 10

disenchantment 64 Dispensationalism, dispensationalist 28, 148, 149

camp 14

interpretations 26

Premillennial 32, 250

Dobson, Dr James 42 doctrines, essential 23, 25 dominion 161, 173, 216 drugs 38, 47 Eastern Europe 44 Ecumenical Church Councils 75 ecumenical movement 250 education 36, 42 Edwards, Jonathan 26 Ehteshami, Anoushirvan 8 Eickelman, Dale F. 92 Einfühlung 1 Egypt 4, 10, 14, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 69, 78, 83, 182, 224, 249, 272, 274 Ehteshami, Anushirvan 72 elites, elitist 46, 48, 53, 56, 59, 63, 68, 89, 90, 174, 253 Eliot, T.S. 108 emigration 54 empathy 2, 85 enclaves 17, 34, 35, 81 enemy, enemies 21, 40, 79, 88 England 23, 40 English 64 Enlightenment 6, 23, 69, 82, 88, 96, 101, 105, 115, 120, 123, 235 epochè 1, 85 Epistles (NT) 201 Al-Erian, 'Issam 224 Esack, Farid 169 eschatology 24 impact on fundamentalisms 249–253 Esposito, John L. 62, 72, 216

377

essentials 19, 24, 26, 74, 150 ethics 26 Europe, European 33, 37, 96, 99, 206 European Union 250 Evangelicals 6, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 43, 45, 74, 140, 141, 145, 246, 247

Anglican 14, 318

charismatic 185

conservative 33, 34

neo- 15

revivals 31

terminology 38

Evangelicalism 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 70 Evangelism, evangelization 25, 31, 202 evangelists 41 evolution 32 evolutionary philosophy 29 ex-Cathedra 76 exceptionalism (American) 12 exceptionalist belief 29 exclusivism 77, 79 extremism, extremist 78, 89 Ezra 203 faith 26, 62, 81 Fall (original fall of man) 26, 141 Falwell, Jerry 15, 38, 39, 67, 172, 183, 184, 191, 193, 215, 307–308 family, families 3, 42, 43, 81 breakdown, disintegration 47, 63, 122 family resemblances 2, 3, 18, 20, 71, 85–86, 278 fana " billah 243 faqih 193 Far East 58 Faraj, Muhammad 'Abdelsalam 14, 92, 182, 214, 252, 271, 273, 274, 280, 287–288 faraghat 225 al-farida al-gha"iba 213 Fascism 15, 65, 80, 109, 122 Fatwa, fatwas 52, 255 Fedayan-i Islam 55 federal 37 feminism 42 Feuerbach 98 fight, fighting 80 film 39 Finney, Charles 26

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fiqh 82, 157, 186 First Amendment 191 fisq, fasiq 226 fitra 160, 241 Focus on the Family 15, 42, 119 Foda, Faraj 157 form and freedom 119 Founding Fathers 12, 24, 26, 27, 29, 183, 184, 205 Freemasons, Freemasonry 22, 180, 253, 259 French 50, 64 French Revolution 96, 117, 254 Freud 98 fringe groups 180, 254 Fuller Theological Seminary 35, 98, 234, 320 fundamentals 4, 7, 23, 26, 33, 51, 72 fundamentalisms 2, 21, 33, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 278

American 23

apolitical 17

categorization of 83, 84

Christian 28, 29, 69

cultural 17

definitions, attributes 15, 20, 70–84

forces unleashed 6

global 17

gradualist 17

hallmark of 77

isolationist 17

Islamic 45, 48, 56, 69

Islamic Sunni 13

militant 238

phenomenon of 5, 61

political 17

radical 17

taxonomy 17

theological 17

term 7

violent 17

world conqueror 17, 83

world creator 17, 83

world renouncer 17, 83

world transformer 17, 83

fundamentalisms and politics 164–199 attitudes to political participation 167–183

political aims, activism 164

view of politics 164

views on state and religion

188–199 fundamentalisms and cosmic battle 231–240

fundamentalist Christian 2, 4, 14, 30 Christian Protestant 23, 45 Islamic 4, 47, 49, 57, 58, 66, 101 militancy 80 separatism 243–249 Galileo 97 Gandhi 210 Genesis 136 Geisler, Norman L. 14, 170, 265, 308 Gellner, Ernest 6, 62 genocide 116 Gerami, Shahin 16, 77, 81 Ghannushi, Rashid 8, 14, 73, 82, 106, 109, 178, 219, 224, 226, 240, 280, 288 Al-Ghazali, Muhammad 157 al-ghazw al-fikri 101 GIA (Armed Islamic Group) 55 Gibbs, Alfred P. 200 Gifts, charismatic 24 Gingrich, Newt 42 Gladstone, William E. 31 glory 51 God 3, 39, 40, 41, 54, 64, 91, 232, 268 banished from public life 112 at center of universe 114, 192 as (reasonable) Creator 95, 97, 104 who communicates 135 as final reality 104 his holiness 243, 244 his honor 102, 238 his Kingdom 33, 78, 79, 172, 250 his law 54, 118, 188 as Lawgiver 159, 175 out of the equation 117 personal infinite 107 of poor & oppressed 183 power, greatness 140 his revelation 3, 79, 130 his rule 128 right concept of 105 his sovereignty 3, 26, 39, 54, 102, 124, 131, 158, 175, 176, 217, 228 his Truth 39 his uniqueness 3 his Unity 50, 54, 140 God’s Party 239 golden age 47, 69, 80, 146, 157, 166, 200–206, 279

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 Christian views of 200–203 Islamic views of 203–206, 248 looking back to 200 two golden ages 206 Goldwater, Barry 70 Good News 26 gospel 26, 35, 202 government 36, 39, 43, 193 autonomous spheres of 190 based on general revelation 170 based on covenant 173 centralized locus of power 190 a divine institution 170 Islamic 175 must suppress evil 170 ordained by God 170 resentment at big 190 to be obeyed 170 Governance of the Jurisprudent 175 grace 26, 159 Graham, Billy 15, 26, 36, 37, 67, 142, 146, 233, 247, 308–310 grassroots 38, 39, 52 Great Mosque 78 Greek philosophy 200 Greeley, Andrew M. 6, 62 Grew, Raymond 18, 66, 84, 87 Guiness, Os 14, 95, 110, 280, 310 Gulag 125 Gulf War 57, 254 Gunn, James 201 hadd, hudud 118, 186 Hadden, Jeffrey K. 5, 16, 17, 63, 83 hadith 53, 134, 137–139, 154, 157, 162, 163, 203, 252, 255 al-Haidar, Jamaluddin 261 hakimiyya 10, 54, 167, 173, 177, 181, 187, 188, 199, 225, 269 halal 152 Hallencreutz, Carl F. 19, 85, 94 Hamas 55 Hamza, Mir 258 Hanafi, Hasan 73 Hanbali 49 haram 152 Hargis, Billy James 29 Hawwa", Said 219 Hefner, Robert W. 6, 19, 85 Hegel 125 hegemony 36, 53, 101 Hegland, Mary E. 19, 85 Heidegger 109 Henry, Carl F.H. 35, 246

379

Herbrecht, William 264 Heritage College 149 hermeneutics 77 anti-hermeneutic 129 Hezekiah (King) 203 Hidden Imam 56, 76, 251 only legitimate ruler 193 High Court 37 Higher Biblical Criticism 32 hijra 10, 21, 54, 199, 228, 248 Hill, Clifford 14, 120, 200, 280, 310–311 Hinduism 75 Hiroshima 125 hisba 274 history 48 fundamentalist view of 200 Christian fundamentalism 23–44 Islamic fundamentalism 45–60 Hizb al-Tahrir 14, 102, 113, 205, 212, 229, 255 Hizbullah 57 Hobbes 125 holiness 26 Holiness Tradition 14 holocaust 259 Holy Mosque 258 Holy Spirit 26, 135, 143 Holy War 231 homosexuality 38, 150, 225 Hopson, Ronald E. 10, 11 house church 44 house groups 44 Howard, Thomas 95, 98, 104 Hudaybi 219 human, humans as cogs in a machine 111 autonomy 104 depravity of nature 34, 132 devaluation of 114 pride, arrogance 104 reason as alternative god 105 spiritual and moral beings 107 humanism 93, 95, 122 as an alternative religion 104 Enlightenment 98 Promethean 98 Humanist Manifesto 104 humanity, humanity’s 21 original revolt against God 103 Hume 96 Hunt, Dave 255 Huntingdon, Samuel P. 17, 84, 94 Hussein, Saddam

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'ibadat 52 Ibn-Khaldun 226 ibn-Taymiyya 49, 152, 271 Ibrahim, 'Abd al-Majid & Darbalah 182, 274 Ibrahim, Nahah 14, 182 iconoclastic 79, 124 ideologies, ideology 10, 40, 45, 47, 54, 63, 123

destructive 111

Islamic 183, 207

materialistic 112

totalitarian, tyrannical 122, 123

ideologization 77, 90 idols 79, 124, 125 ihsan 195 ijma' 153, 223 ijtihad 49, 51, 151–156, 166, 185, 187, 188, 223, 225 Illuminati-Freemasons 254, 259 imam 195, 228 imam, Shi'ite 155, 193, 253 hidden 56, 253 iman 195 Imperial Roman 99 imperialism 49, 51, 90, 101, 205, 206 Independent American Party 29 India 50, 123 Indians American 29 subcontinent 48, 49, 53, 56 Indonesia 43 inequalities 47 infidels 157 inspiration, verbal 31 Institute for Family Studies 119 institutes 26, 27 blind and deaf 31

charitable 31

fundamentalist 34

Integrisme 73 interdenominational 26 Internal Revenue Service 40 Internet 9, 82, 261 interpretations of scripture 29, 75, 144, 148–156

allegorical, esoteric 129, 148

Christian 148–150

common sense 148

golden rule of 149

harmonization 148

Islamic 150–156

literal 77, 129

Qur"an by Qur"an 151 scripture by scripture 148–149 thematic approach 155 typological 148 variety of 129 Inter-Varsity 36, 312 Iran 4, 14, 48, 55, 56, 57, 67, 69, 83, 113, 156, 189, 226, 257 Iraq 14, 56, 59 islah 48 islam 195 Islam 45, 55, 63, 64, 71 as civilization, culture 190 pan-Islam 51 Sunni 48 as Revolutionary Party 237 true 46 Islamic associations 55, 57 awakening 57 banks 58 constitution 56 dress 58 economy 58 fundamentalism 45, 58 garb 57, 79, 81 government 52, 53, 59 groups 59 history 45 identity 47 ideology 53, 57 law 52 liberalism 89 movements 58 order 53 radical groups 54 Radicalism 48 Reformism 48 Republics 58, 113 Revivalism 49, 55, 73 society 52, 53 state 52, 53, 54, 56, 59, 72, 117, 165, 175, 185, 196, 197, 203 symbols 55, 57 system 21, 46, 54, 58, 191, 204, 224 Islamic Foundation 101, 112 Islamicists 73 Islamic Liberation Front 55 Islamic Republic of Iran 14, 56, 257, 258 Islamic University, Riyad 252 Islamisms, Islamist, Islamists 55, 56, 58, 59

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 Islamist-Marxist 56 Islamiyin 73 Islamization 45, 58 Isma'il, Salwa 10 Israel 55, 59, 162, 203, 251, 273 ittiba' 154 al-ittijah al-mawdu'i 155 al-ittijah al-tajzi'i 155 jahanam 240 jahiliyya, jahili 10, 50, 54, 55, 89, 105, 112, 115, 116, 124, 173, 181, 182, 187, 199, 208, 211, 214, 228, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 248, 249, 268, 269, 270 jama'a, jama'at 14, 55, 83, 181, 182, 210, 211, 274 al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya 55, 56, 57, 258, 270 Jama'at al-Jihad 56, 57, 92, 152, 213, 249, 252, 255, 258, 270, 274 Jama'at-i Islami 13, 53, 70, 101, 105, 112, 280 Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan 258 jannah 240 Japanese religions 75 Jehoshaphat (King) 203 Jehovah Witnesses 25 Jerusalem 258 Jerusalem, New 12 Jesus 90, 111, 125, 134, 142, 150, 161, 185, 188, 236, 246, 250 Jesus Revolution 37 Jewish traditions 203 Jews 22, 40, 41, 180, 253, 255, 258, 260, 262 Jews for Jesus 37 jihad 10, 14, 49, 50, 54, 55, 57, 59, 92, 157, 158, 181, 185, 188, 213, 231, 240, 242, 268, 269, 270, 271–274 jinns 234 John Birch Society 29, 179, 254 Jones, Bob Jr. (II) 14, 67, 146, 149, 211, 238, 244 Joseph 216 Joshua 203 Josiah (King) 203 Judaism 64, 70, 75 Judeo-Christian principles 189 judge 27 judiciary, judicial system 36, 102, 186 Juergensmeyer, Mark 217 jumud 51

381

Jurisprudent, represents Hidden Imam 193 jurist 56 justice, social 4, 11 ka'ba 252, 255 kafir, kuffar, kufr 57, 89, 105, 177, 182, 188, 212, 214, 220, 225, 226, 240, 270 kalima 143 Kansas City 279 Kant, Imanuel 98 Keane, John 6, 63, 64 Kepler 97 Keswick Deeper Life Movement 26 Khamene"i, 'Ali 14, 193, 257, 258, 289 Khan, Ahmad 50 Khatami, Muhammad 14, 57, 289–290 khalaf 139, 195 khalifa, khilafa 46, 54, 56, 59, 166, 167, 177, 178, 181, 193, 194, 196, 197, 206, 209, 213, 220, 221, 222, 228 establishing 210, 212 head of Islamic state 192 is the state 196 role in Islamic state 191–198 khalifat al-rasul 197 khariji, khawarij 48, 198, 269 al-Khilafa (magazine) 113 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi 14, 56, 67, 155, 175, 188, 193, 241, 253, 256, 290–291 Khurshid, Ahmad 14 Kishk, 'Abd al-Hamid 4, 117, 241, 242, 291–292 King, Kingdom, Kingship 33, 34, 166, 174, 185, 189 Kingdom of God 39, 45, 185, 189, 202, 239 King James Bible 137 King of Kings 167, 173, 188 Korea, South 44 Kossovo 57, 59 Kramer, Martin 261 Kuhn, Thomas 7, 68 Ku Klux Klan 179 Kulturkampf 280 Küng-Bosch (theory of paradigm shifts) 69 Küng, Hans 7, 8, 71, 130 LaHaye, Tim 14, 149, 202, 250 Late Great Planet Earth 251

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Latin America 44 Lausanne International Congress on World Evangelization 246 Lausanne Movement 319 law, laws Bible based civil law 183, 190

ceremonial OT 161

of Christ 166

common 51

freedom from 159

of the Kingdom 185

Mosaic 203

natural 185

scripture as law 156–162

Law Curtis Lee 33, 70 Lawrence, Bruce, B. 81, 85 leader, leadership importance of virtuous qualities

193–195

lack of godly male 193 Lebanon 56 Legislate, legislation, legislators, legislature 37, 38, 40, 54, 186 legitimacy, legitimation 38, 48 Leicester 101 Lewis, C.S. 67, 318 liberal(s) 33, 43, 63, 67, 150 liberalism 93, 144 liberation movements 90 Liberty Lobby 29 Liberty University 308 Libya 50 Lindsey, Hal 251 literature review 15–18 Lloyd-Jones, Martyn 14, 28, 141, 280, 311–312 lobbies, lobbying 37, 39, 40, 215 Locke 96, 160 London 258 London Institute for Contemporary Christianity 319 lunatic fringe (Christian Right) 179, 180, 254 Luther, Lutheran 26, 136 Ma'alim fi"l Tariq 54 MacDonald, William 14, 168, 169, 201, 202, 265 Machen, J. Gresham 14, 34, 67, 118, 124, 135, 159, 245, 312–313 madhhab, madhhahib 49, 152, 181, 188, 271 Madison, James 191 madrasa 45

magic 49 Maghrib 50 mahdi 48, 78, 251, 252 al-Mahdi, al-Sadiq 58 mahdism 50 mahkumat al-madhalim 221 Mahmoud, Mirna 9 mailing lists 40 majlis al-shura 113, 196, 197, 221, 223 Maliki 52 man, man’s 103 autonomous 114 created in God’s image 119, 132 duty to worship God 173 Islamic view of 117 inherent evil nature 117, 217 as locus of authority 116 as machine 115 devaluation of 102 as measure of everything 114, 116 pride, rebellion 103 paradoxical condition 132, 217 his sin 103, 201 his vice-regency 192 Mangalwadi, Vishal 123, 313 manhaj 177, 191, 237 mansukh 139 Manzoor, Parvez 94 Maoism 80 Marsden, George M. 96 Marty & Appleby 75, 76, 79, 80, 86 Marty, Martin 1, 15 martyrdom 66, 92, 232 Marx, Karl 98 Marxism, Marxist 15, 55, 80, 116, 122, 223 Marxism-Leninism 117 masalih mursala 195 al-Mas'ari, Muhammad 14, 138, 153, 225, 226, 280, 292 maslaha 52 materialism 101, 102, 107, 120 materialism-energy-chance concept 114 Mawdudi, Sayyid Abu"l A'la 13, 53, 54, 67, 69, 105, 116, 175, 176, 177, 186, 194, 207, 208, 210, 219, 221, 222, 229, 237, 273, 280, 295–296 McGrath. Alister E. 29 McIntire, Carl 14, 29, 35, 67, 82, 245, 253, 313 Mecca, Meccan 21, 54, 258 media 9, 25, 36, 38, 42, 57, 82

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 anti-religious 5, 70

electronic 4, 36

mass 7, 42, 65

mediators 148 Medina 21, 54, 78, 158, 166, 193 Messenger (Muhammad) 137, 143 Messiah 78 messianic 48 messianism 16, 78, 250 Methodist Holiness 26 Middle Ages 140, 206 Middle East 48 migration 47 Milestones 54 militancy 27, 78, 80, 87 militant, extremist groups 30 military 53, 55 militias, patriotic 24, 279 millennial reign, millennial kingdom 28, 250 millenarian, millenarianism 16, 20, 25, 26, 56, 65, 78, 250 miracles 32, 150 mission, missions 43, 90, 256 missionary 34, 37, 38, 53, 78 mobilize, mobilizing 37, 39, 40, 172 model, models 12 “modern modern science” 97 modernism 2, 18, 23, 67, 72, 88, 91, 96 modernization 61, 64, 94 modernized, modernizing 35, 62, 101 modernity 19, 63, 64, 67, 82 modernization 46, 47 monotheism 161 Moody, Dwight L. 26 Moral Majority 15, 38, 40, 215, 307 morality 3, 40, 62, 63 Morgan, Peggy 1 Moritz, Fred 14, 314 Mormon, Book of 25 Mormons 25, 41 Morocco 263 Mosaic law 203 Moses 161 Moussalli, Ahmad S. 66, 72, 219 Movements, radical fringe 22 mu'ammalat 52 mufasala 199, 228, 248, 249 mufassir 139 mufti 51 Mughals 49 al-Muhajirun 14, 177, 209

383

Muhamamad (Prophet) 52, 151, 193, 212, 228, 256, 260 Muhammad, 'Umar Bakri 14, 177, 178, 187, 188, 195, 214, 220, 280, 294–295 mujadid 48 Mujahidin-i Khalq 55 mujmal 139 mujtahid 154, 196 muqayyid 139 Murad, Khurram 14, 101, 112, 116, 125, 126, 138, 152, 153, 195, 262 murtadd 157 mushaf 139 music 38 Muslim(s) 41, 46, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 101

Holy Places 59

Holy Places 57

morality 122

Muslim Brotherhood 13, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 69, 83, 99, 182, 212, 224, 280 The Muslim Institute 109 Muslim Parliament 109 Muslim World League 100 Mustafa, Shukri 14, 181, 252, 270, 273, 295–296 Mutahhari, Murtaza 14 mutlaq 139 muttaqin 138 al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din 14, 102, 197, 229, 255, 280, 296–297 Nadwatul-'Ulama" 100 Nadwi, Abu"l Hasan 'Ali 13, 100, 105, 111, 116, 122, 205, 280, 297 Al-Nahda 73, 82 Naqshbandi Sufi order 49 al-nas 181 nasikh 139 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein Veli Reza 16, 73 nass 187, 195 Nasser, Gamal Abdul 54, 55, 99 nation-state 48 National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) 35 National Islamic Front (NIF) 58 nationalism 55, 66, 90 national liberation movements 91 national-socialist 55 nature 52, 54, 63, 94 nature & scripture: dual

revelation 139

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

Natural Law Theory 170 Nazism, neo-Nazism 29, 30, 109, 122, 179, 199, 254, 259 Nehemiah 203 neo-Evangelicals 35, 36, 37 neo-Fundamentalism 38, 73, 246 New Age 253 New Christian Right 36, 41, 83, 318 New England 26 New Evangelicals 36 New Jerusalem 12 newspapers 57 New Testament 44, 135, 142, 160, 161, 162, 166, 170, 185, 189, 200, 201, 202, 203, 232, 268 church model 44, 203 Newton 96, 97 New World Order 22, 180, 199, 253, 254, 255, 259 New York 36, 57, 60 Nietsche 98, 109, 125, 126 nizam Islami 46, 208 non-conformist 26, 32 non-Trinitarian 25 norms 38 nostalgia 47 North Africa 58 North America 4, 37 North, Gary 14, 173, 174, 190, 216, 219 Objective-subjective debate 106–107 Ockenga, Harold 35 Oklahoma City 30 Old Testament 135, 145, 157, 1159, 162, 166, 167, 170, 174, 185, 189, 203, 268 Old Testament Prophets 280 One World Church 250 One World Government 250 Operation Mobilization 37 Orientalism 255, 256, 260 Orthodox (Church) 75, 90 orthodox Christian view 24 position on scripture 141 orthodoxy, neo-orthodoxy 16, 31, 33, 74, 77, 136 Osijek, Croatia 98, 320 Ottoman Caliphate 206 Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies 100 Pache, Rene 14 Packer, James I. 14, 95, 98, 104,

108, 135, 141, 142, 150, 160, 184, 242, 265, 280, 314–315 Packer & Howard 98, 104, 108, 114 Padilla, Rene 110 pagan, paganism 54, 55, 124 neo- 55, 110, 124, 264 Pakistan 4, 69, 101, 113 Palestine 53 pan-Islamism 91 panacea 53, 90 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 5, 62, 96 paradigm, New Testament 44 paradigm shift 7, 42, 67 Paradise 133 patriotic militias 29 patriotism 39, 90 Pentecostals 15, 24, 25, 26 Charismatic 33 neo-Pentecostals 15 “People of the Book” 255 perfectibility of man 117 perfectionism 26 Peretti, Frank 234 Peru 43 phenomenological studies 1 philosophy 51 pietism piety, pious 24, 26, 27, 31, 46 pietists 21, 27 pietistic movements 31, 46 Pious Forbears, Ancestors 48, 52 Plains Baptist Challenger 136 Plymouth Brethren 26 politics, political 21, 27, 37, 39, 42, 45, 53, 63 activist 51, 73 attitudes to 4, 167–183 Christian Reformed stand 167 corrupt by nature 168, 169 eager participation in 171–179 integration with religion 191, 192 one-issue 40 order, ideal 21 parties 43 radical views 179–183 reform 73 religious goal of 206–209 stages of implementation 209–216 pollution 81 polygamy 52 polytheism 54, 161 polythetic 2, 71 Pope 76

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 population explosion 47 populism, populist 29, 30, 46 positivism 116 post-colonial 90 post-modernism 62, 96 postmillennial, postmillenialists 26, 28, 38, 251 power 53, 54 power centers 36, 40 power sharing 21, 225–230 power, takeover 21 preachers 26, 57 pre-millennial dispensationalism 33, 34, 250 premillenialism 24, 26, 28, 38, 40 Presbyterians, Bible 15, 313 presuppositions 107 Prince, Derek 14, 124, 315 Princeton Theological Seminary 26, 34, 312, 319 privatization of religion 109 pro-family 39, 43 progress, evolutionary, unilinear 116, 117 pro-life 41, 81 Promise Keepers 42 promised land 12 Prophet (Muhammad) 46, 54, 146, 157, 158, 176, 186, 203, 210, 212, 214, 252 prophets, prophecy 26, 193 prophet, charismatic 6, 19, 65 Protestant, Protestants, Protestantism 7, 12, 16, 19, 23, 24, 31, 38, 41, 69, 159 Conservative 23, 74 mainline 23 Reformation, Reformation-era 4, 69 Protocols of the Elders of Zion 259, 262 Public Square 61, 92 Pure, purity 78, 81 purifying 46 puritans 77, 79 Al-Qahtani, Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah 252 al-Qa'ida 13, 60, 258 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf 13, 297–298 qati' 154 qital 272 qiyas 187 Qur"an, Qur"anic 49–50, 52, 54, 58,

385

75, 90, 111, 129–130, 137–140, 143, 146–148, 150–156, 167, 175, 185–188, 203–204, 207, 212, 222, 236, 248, 255, 260, 271, 226 Allah’s speech 138 as law 156–157 as guidance 133, 137 divinely preserved 137–138 as protective fence 157 Word of God 133, 137–138, 163 Qutb, Muhammad 13, 147, 151, 173, 204 Qutb, Sayyid 13, 54, 55, 67, 99, 105, 108, 112, 121, 124, 137, 146, 151, 157, 177, 181, 186, 191, 194, 195, 204, 207, 208, 210, 219, 220, 232, 233, 235, 240, 241, 248, 255, 259, 260, 269, 270, 272, 280, 298–299 Qutb’s radical interpretations 181, 248 view of history 203 rabbaniyya 173, 279 racism, racist 29, 30 radical, radicals 5, 38, 57 Christian 74 Islamic groups 54 radicalism 55, 72, 74, 78 Radical Religious Groups 75 radio 43, 57 Rahman, Fazlur 258 Rami, Ahmad 263 Rashidun 46, 52, 152, 166, 175–177, 181, 193–194, 203, 222, 224 Rationality, rationalization 64, 149 Reagan, Ronald 38 realpolitik 12 reason 28, 32, 51, 52, 94, 97, 102, 131 Reconstructionists 14, 15, 160, 166, 184, 172, 174, 192, 203, 207, 216, 228, 251 on political involvement 172–174 view of biblical law 160–161 view on democracy 218–219 Redeemer 95 reform child labor 31 culture 41 Islamic 48 prison 31 social 31, 51 Reformation 4, 5, 25, 31, 92, 118, 140, 160, 205, 206

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Reformed 26, 34, 38, 184, 189 British 14 Churches 15 radical 14 theocratic 27 Reformers 26, 31 Reformism, reformist 50, 52 Regent College, Vancouver 315 regeneration 26, 31 regime, regimes 21, 54 autocratic 48

corrupt 88

religion, religions 5, 6, 23, 31, 35, 44, 45, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 77, 179, 236 attitudes to politics and state 164–199

monotheistic 67

prophetic religions 65

traditional 68

world religions 65

religionization of knowledge 90, 97 religious 5, 61, 62 absolute, holistic authority 81 extremism 74 freedom 28, 190 Religious Right 5, 10, 29, 37, 42, 254 Religious Roundtable 40 Renaissance 99, 100 renewal 37, 44, 46, 48 repentance 39, 40 Republican National Convention 71 research methods 2–4 restoration 40 Restorationists 207 resurgence 37, 38, 47, 63, 164 Islamic 48 of religions 1, 2, 5, 6, 19, 61–69 resurrection 26, 33 return (of Christ) 26, 33, 34, 78, 201 return (of Hidden Imam) 56 revelation 19, 101, 131–133, 153 in nature 131 its nature and necessity 131, 132, 133 human element in 162 revive, revival, revivals, revivalist 49, 51, 62, 65

Christian 23, 31, 35, 44

cyclical 69

Evangelical 129

Islamic 8, 44, 48

movements 49

pre-modern 49

revivalism, evangelical 24 revolution, revolutionary 4, 21, 53, 54, 64, 209 Revolution, Islamic, Iran 14, 56 Rex Lex 160 rhetoric 10, 11 Rida, Rashid 50, 52, 67 risala 175, 222 ritual(s) 27 Riyad 252 Robertson, Pat 15, 40, 67, 104, 119, 185, 215, 254, 316 Robinson, Dean 136 Roman Catholics 31, 44 Rome, Roman Empire 168, 202, 203, 264 Roof, Wade Clark 43 Rousseau 96 Roszak, Theodore 108 Roy, Olivier 6, 19, 85 ruler, rulers for God 192–199 mechanistic view of 196 faqih as 193 ordained by God 192 Russians 50 Rushdoony, Roussas 14, 67, 161, 172, 184, 185, 192, 203, 207, 233, 280, 316–317 Rutherford, Samuel 160, 268 sacrifice 21, 66, 78 sacrilege 102 al-Sadat, Anwar 55, 56 de-Sade, Marquis 119 al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir 14, 155, 156, 299–300 sahwa 48, 55 Saiedi, Nader 89, 130 saint worship 49, 50 salaf, sasalfi, salafiyya 48, 50, 52, 53, 203 salvation 26 by faith 158 Salvation Army 32, 215 Sandeen, Andrew 14 San Diego 149 Sanussiyya 50 Sardar, Ziauddin 103 Satan 21, 79, 159, 173, 233, 234, 237, 238 The Great Satan 258 Sa'ud 50 Saudi Arabia, Saudi 57, 58, 156, 189, 226

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 savior 48 scandalous behavior 79, 88 Schaeffer, Francis 14, 38, 67, 95, 97, 103, 106, 114, 117, 118, 125, 136, 140, 160, 189, 190, 206, 233, 236, 246, 268, 280, 317–318 Schaeffer, Franky 171, 268 schools 42, 52 school prayers 37, 41 science, scientific 39, 51, 52, 63, 64, 82

European 108

relativistic 97

vs. scripture 139

vs. theology 140

Scofield Bible 34 Scopes Trial 29, 34 Scottish Common Sense Philosophy 96 scriptural principles 74 scriptural literalism 128, 130 scripturalism 15, 16, 77 scripture, scriptures 16, 121, 28, 31, 32, 74, 77, 128, 130–31, 133–135, 141, 146 attitudes to 143–148 authority of 75, 130, 131, 140–143 centrality of 131 common-sense meaning of 148 as law 21, 128, 156–162 as revelation 20, 21, 70, 74, 77, 128 centrality of 20 inerrancy of 24, 74, 77, 128, 131, 135–136 infallibility of 33, 74 inspired permanent revelation 33, 77, 128, 131, 133–139, 141 interpretation of 20, 29, 75, 148–156 miracles of 32 as only guide 131 its perfection 131 its preservation 131, 134 submission to 143–144 as Word of God 128, 132, 141 Second Coming (Christ’s) 28, 32, 33, 40, 169, 250 secular, secularists 61, 62, 72 academics 63 ideologies 55 scientific reductionism 115 racism 123

387

regimes 48 society 62 secularism 20, 21, 23, 41, 42, 47, 63, 64, 67, 80, 91, 231, 255 antithetical to religion 103–106 anthropocentric 114 critique of 20, 102–126 as a destructive ideology 103 development of 99–100 a foreign ideology 101 its hostility to Islam 104, 105 is idolatry 124 impact on society 121 as main enemy of religion 88, 93, 103, 105 in Muslim world 101–102 and myth of progress 116 opposition to 4, 19, 20 philosophies 69 its presuppositions 106–108 reaction to 3, 67 as rebellion against God 103 as source of all evil 122 secular (liberal) humanism 36, 38, 40, 93, 95, 98, 103, 104, 116, 235

vs. biblical Christianity 235

greatest enemy 253

secularization 6, 19, 62, 64, 88, 94 process of 95 theory 5, 61, 62, 63 secularizing 62 segregation (of sexes) 58 seminaries 34, 37, 42 Senators 40 separation 78 as staged development (Islamic) 247–248 from evil world 159, 244 physical 248 sacred-secular 111 spiritual 248–249 state-religion 27, 88, 92, 102, 167, 190–192 religion-politics 103 religion-public sphere 109 separatism, separatists 3, 20, 21, 27, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 232, 243–249, 315 extreme 189 views on politics 168–169 Sermon on the Mount 185 Seven Hundred (700) Club 41, 316 Seventh Day Adventists 25 sex, education, behavior 3, 37, 47, 121

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

Shah 55, 56 Shamil 50 Shaftesbury, Lord 31 al-Sha'rawi, Muhammad Metwalli 14, 138, 234, 300–301 Shari'a 49, 50, 53, 54, 57, 72, 117, 151–154, 156–158, 163, 165–166, 175, 177–179, 181–182, 185–188, 192–194, 199, 204, 211, 213, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 228, 241, 271 comprehensive total system 157

God’s revealed law 156, 158

as identity marker 157

imposition of 81

judge 51

sources of 53

Shari'ati, 'Ali 14, 56, 67, 154, 155, 182, 183, 280, 301–302 shaykhs, charismatic 14 Shepard, William E. 9, 17, 72, 85, 129, 130, 205 Shi'a, Shi'i, Shi'ites, Shi'ism 14, 48, 50, 56, 57, 78, 83, 154, 175, 241

eschatology 253

fundamentalism 55, 129

Imams 50

revolutionaries 69

Shirazi, Ha"iri 14, 241 shirk 50, 54, 116, 177, 188, 225 Shivani, Anis 169 Shupe, Anson D. 16 shura 52, 53, 58, 186, 193, 197, 220, 222, 223, 225, 228 ahl al-shura 220 Sidahmed, Abdelsalam 8, 72 Siddiqi, Kalim 109, 154, 196, 302–303 “signs of the times”, “signs of the end” 250, 251, 252 Signposts on the Road 54 silent majority 88 similarities 4, 18, 19, 20, 84, 88–90 Simpson, John H. 17, 84 sin 12, 21, 118, 120 sira 134, 138, 162 Sirhindi, Ahmad 49 Sivan, Emanuel 17, 83 siyada 188 al-siyasi 154, 225 sixth pillar 92 slaves 29 Smart, Ninian 18, 84, 86 Smith, Donald R. 10, 11 Spirit (Holy) 26, 145, 201

social activism 35, 170, 171 change 64 cohesion 64 concern 31 engineering 108 gospel 33 order 62 reform 31 work 43 society, societies 37, 38, 48, 53, 54, 61, 63, 64 modern consumer 110 disintegration of 121 sociological law 119 sola scriptura 30 soldiers 21, 57, 237 Solomon (King) 203 sources original 52 primary 3, 4, 13 sovereignty 26, 54 Soviet, Soviet Union 44, 59 spiritual battle 201 forces of evil 202 weapons 202 spirituality 63 stages 53, 228 implementation by 209–216 state, states 37, 46, 81, 82 as khilafa 177 attitudes to 4 Islamic state system 167, 176 its duties 172 law & legal system 27, 166, 183–192 minimalist 174, 178 Muslim 49, 50 religion 113, 202 replaces God 190 secular 48 states-sovereignty movements 30 stereotypes 82, 87 Stott, John 14, 108, 115, 125, 145, 149, 158, 171, 289, 318–319 student unions 55, 58 struggle 49 cosmic 21, 231 external 21 for control of churches 23 internal moral 240–243 stages of 21 substitutionary atonement 26

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 Sudan 53, 58, 59, 69, 223, 226 Sufi, Sufism 45, 50, 51, 52, 76, 79, 154, 241 sultan 188 Sunday School 42 Sunna 49, 50, 54, 75, 90, 134, 137–139, 143, 150, 152–153, 156, 167, 175, 185–188, 194, 203, 226, 272 Sunni 48, 55, 56, 58, 78, 167 superman 125, 126 superstition 52 supremacism (white) 29 Supreme Court 178, 188 Supreme Guide (Iran) 14, 189, 256 Sweden 263 symbols 20, 21 cultural 10, 11, 12 religious 9, 45 syndrome 15, 79 Syria 53 systems 53, 54, 104 tabi'a 241 Tablighi Jama'at 3, 46, 84, 169, 228 tadabbur 152 taddaruj 209 tadhakkur 152 tafsir 153 taghut, tawaghit 271 Taha, abu-Yasir 258 tajdid 48 Taji-Faruki, Suha 229 takfir 10, 50, 54, 181, 187, 268, 269, 270 al-Takfir wal-Hijra 14, 56, 78, 84, 152, 181, 249, 252, 255, 270 Tal, 'Umar 50 Taliban 59, 69, 156 tamakkun 249 Tamimi, 'Azzam 154, 219, 226, 262 Tanzim al-Jihad 14 Tanzim-i Islami 109, 188, 272 taqlid 49, 50, 51, 54, 154 taqwa 195 tawwazun 213 tawhid 50, 51, 54, 139, 143, 161, 167, 175, 193, 222, 270 technology 63, 82, 100 televangelists 39 Temperance 31 temptation 21 Ten Commandments 124, 160, 161, 166, 183

389

Tenth Amendment movement 20 Terror, terrorism 54, 55, 57 texts holy 3

interpretations 20

primary 12

real meaning of 153

sacred 4, 45, 77, 128

text-based approach 3

The Electronic Church 41 The Fundamentals 33, 70 theocentric 20, 27, 94 theo-democracy 221 theology 139 liberation 4 fundamentalist 3 liberal, modernist 23, 32 social gospel 33 theonomy 104, 160, 166, 184 theoretical considerations 5–8 thesis, main 2 Third World 44, 65, 90 Tibi, Bassam 8, 73 Torrey, Reuben A. 33 touchstone (of orthodoxy) 78 Tozer, A.W. 15, 111 Traditions 28, 54 traditionalism 16, 47, 52, 74 tribal 48 Trinity College, Cambridge 319 Trinity Forum 95 triumph, God’s ultimate 21 triumphalism 43 truth 98, 236, 246 absolute objective 97, 98 concept of 107 divine 79 revealed 77 Tunisia 73 al-Turabi, Hasan Abdallah 8, 14, 58, 67, 69, 178, 179, 191, 211, 223, 280, 303–304 Turkey 205 TV 43, 57, 316 Twin Towers 59 2000 AD movement 43 typologies 18

'ulama" 182, umma 188, United United

50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 92, 158, 269 48, 58, 59, 91, 169, 177, 181, 196, 220, 226 Nations 254, 255 States, USA 1, 16, 23, 25,

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29, 31, 32, 39, 44, 57, 67, 97, 116, 174, 180, 189, 218, 254, 255 unity of all human spheres 111 universal 61, 62 universe 39, 63, 64 harmony of 140

as machine 119

rational 97

University of Karachi 112 urbanization 47 'urf 50 Usul al-fiqh 225 "usuliyya 73 al-'Utaibi, Juhayman 78, 252 utilitarian, utilitarianism 99 utopia, utopianism 20, 90, 96, 116 values 38, 47, 62 change in, decline 121 vanguard 53, 54 Van Nattan, Steve 14, 266 Van Til, Cornelius 14, 106, 124, 184, 319–320 Venezuela 44 vice-regent, vice-regency 54, 176, 192 Vietnam 36, 39 vilayet-i faqih 193 Vineyard movement 234 violence, violent 42, 54, 55, 59, 62, 63 legitimation of 21, 78, 89, 92, 179–183, 231, 263–276 Virgin Birth 26 Volf, Miroslav 98, 320 Voll, John O. 6, 8, 62, 71, 72, 216 Voltaire 96, 98 voluntarism 24 Waco 30, 180 Wagner, Peter 234 Wahhabi, Wahhabism 52, 58, 73, 79 Wali-Allah, Shah 49 Walker, Andrew 8, 71 waqi'iyya 213 warfare, wars 80, 100, 233, 234, 233, 237, 266 Washington 215 Watchmen-Examiner 33 Watergate 15 Weaver (case) 30, 180 Weber, Max 6, 19, 64, 65 welfare 52, 53 Wesleys 26, 215

Westerlund, David 19, 85, 94 West, western 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 100 Western Europe 62 westernization 55, 236 Westminster Theological Seminary 34, 106, 118, 184, 319 Wheaton Declaration 246 Wheaton College 309 Whitefield, George 26, 225 White House 254 white supremacist 179, 199, 254, 259 wilayat al-faqih 56 Wilberforce, William 31 Will to Power 126 Williams, Rhys H. 11 Williams, Roger 190 Wimber, John 234 Wittgenstein 2 women’s status 52 world 21, 62, 64 a battleground 239 Christian 162 corrupted, irredeemable 168 religions 64, 67 World Council of Churches 253 World Islamic Front 258 World Trade Center 60 worldview, worldviews 69, 234 anthropocentric 114 biblical reformation 190 dualistic 234 evangelical 132 Christian 104 Judeo-Christian 119 secular, humanist 6, 104, 190 theocentric 3, 114, 202 World Trade Center 57 worship 43, 44, 51 WWI 34 Yale Divinity School 320 youth, evangelical 36 Youth for Christ 36 Youth With A Mission 37 zahir 154 zakat 181, 195 Zambia 44 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 258 Zebiri, Kate 94, 156 Zionism 253, 258, 260, 262, 263 zulm, zalim 225, 226

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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

NUMEN BOOK SERIES

8 K.W. Bolle. The Persistence of Religion. An Essay on Tantrism and Sri Aurobindo’s Philosophy. Repr. 1971. ISBN 90 04 03307 6 17 Liber Amicorum. Studies in honour of Professor Dr. C.J. Bleeker. Published on the occasion of his retirement from the Chair of the History of Religions and the Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Amsterdam. 1969. ISBN 90 04 03092 1 19 U. Bianchi, C.J. Bleeker & A. Bausani (eds.). Problems and Methods of the History of Religions. Proceedings of the Study Conference organized by the Italian Society for the History of Religions on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Death of Raffaele Pettazzoni, Rome 6th to 8th December 1969. Papers and discussions. 1972. ISBN 90 04 02640 1 31 C.J. Bleeker, G. Widengren & E.J. Sharpe (eds.). Proceedings of the 12th In­ ternational Congress, Stockholm 1970. 1975. ISBN 90 04 04318 7 34 V.L. Oliver, Caodai Spiritism. A Study of Religion in Vietnamese Society. With a preface by P. Rondot. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04547 3 41 B. Layton (ed.). The Rediscovery of Gnosticism. Proceedings of the Interna­ tional Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Conn., March 28-31, 1978. Two vols. 1.The School of Valentinus. 1980. ISBN 90 04 06177 0 Out of print 2. Sethian Gnosticism. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06178 9 43 M. Heerma van Voss, D.J. Hoens, G. Mussies, D. van der Plas & H. te Velde (eds.). Studies in Egyptian Religion, dedicated to Professor Jan Zandee. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06728 0 44 P.J. Awn. Satan’s Tragedy and Redemption. IblÊs in Sufi Psychology. With a fore­ word by A. Schimmel. 1983. ISBN 90 04 06906 2 45 R. Kloppenborg (ed.). Selected Studies on Ritual in the Indian Religions. Essays to D.J. Hoens. 1983. ISBN 90 04 07129 6 50 S. Shaked, D. Shulman & G.G. Stroumsa (eds.). Gilgul. Essays on Trans­ formation, Revolution and Permanence in the History of Religions, dedicated to R.J. Zwi Werblowsky. 1987. ISBN 90 04 08509 2 52 J.G. Griffiths. The Divine Verdict. A Study of Divine Judgement in the Ancient Religions. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09231 5 53 K. Rudolph. Geschichte und Probleme der Religionswissenschaft. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09503 9 54 A.N. Balslev & J.N. Mohanty (eds.). Religion and Time. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09583 7 55 E. Jacobson. The Deer Goddess of Ancient Siberia. A Study in the Ecology of Belief. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09628 0 56 B. Saler. Conceptualizing Religion. Immanent Anthropologists, Transcendent Natives, and Unbounded Categories. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09585 3 57 C. Knox. Changing Christian Paradigms. And their Implications for Modern Thought. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09670 1

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58 J. Cohen. The Origins and Evolution of the Moses Nativity Story. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09652 3 59 S. Benko. The Virgin Goddess. Studies in the Pagan and Christian Roots of Mariology. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09747 3 60 Z.P. Thundy. Buddha and Christ. Nativity Stories and Indian Traditions. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09741 4 61 S. Hjelde. Die Religionswissenschaft und das Christentum. Eine historische Untersuchung über das Verhältnis von Religionswissenschaft und Theolo­ gie. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09922 0 62 Th.A. Idinopulos & E.A. Yonan (eds.). Religion and Reductionism. Essays on Eliade, Segal, and the Challenge of the Social Sciences for the Study of Religion. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09870 4 63 S. Khalil Samir & J.S. Nielsen (eds.). Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period (750-1258). 1994. ISBN 90 04 09568 3 64 S.N. Balagangadhara. ‘The Heathen in His Blindness...’ Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09943 3 65 H.G. Kippenberg & G.G. Stroumsa (eds.). Secrecy and Concealment. Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10235 3 66 R. Kloppenborg & W.J. Hanegraaff (eds.). Female Stereotypes in Religious Traditions. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10290 6 67 J. Platvoet & K. van der Toorn (eds.). Pluralism and Identity. Studies on Ritual Behaviour. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10373 2 68 G. Jonker. The Topography of Remembrance. The Dead, Tradition and Col­ lective Memory in Mesopotamia. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10162 4 69 S. Biderman. Scripture and Knowledge. An Essay on Religious Epistemology. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10154 3 70 G.G. Stroumsa. Hidden Wisdom. Esoteric Traditions and the Roots of Chris­ tian Mysticism. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10504 2 71 J.G. Katz. Dreams, Sufism and Sainthood. The Visionary Career of Muham­ mad al-Zawâwî. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10599 9 72 W.J. Hanegraaff. New Age Religion and Western Culture. Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10695 2 73 T.A. Idinopulos & E.A. Yonan (eds.). The Sacred and its Scholars. Comparative Methodologies for the Study of Primary Religious Data. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10623 5 74 K. Evans. Epic Narratives in the HoysaÏa Temples. The R§m§yaÖa, Mah§bh§rata and Bh§gavata Pur§Öa in HaÏebÊd, Belår and AmÜtapura. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10575 1 75 P. Schäfer & H.G. Kippenberg (eds.). Envisioning Magic. A Princeton Seminar and Symposium. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10777 0 77 P. Schäfer & M.R. Cohen (eds.). Toward the Millennium. Messianic Expecta­ tions from the Bible to Waco. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11037 2 78 A.I. Baumgarten, with J. Assmann & G.G. Stroumsa (eds.). Self, Soul and Body in Religious Experience. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10943 9

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79 M. Houseman & C. Severi. Naven or the Other Self. A Relational Approach to Ritual Action. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11220 0 80 A.L. Molendijk & P. Pels (eds.). Religion in the Making. The Emergence of the Sciences of Religion. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11239 1 81 Th.A. Idinopulos & B.C. Wilson (eds.). What is Religion? Origins, Defini­ tions, & Explanations. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11022 4 82 A. van der Kooij & K. van der Toorn (eds.). Canonization & Decanonization. Papers presented to the International Conference of the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (lisor) held at Leiden 9-10 January 1997. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11246 4 83 J. Assmann & G.G. Stroumsa (eds.). Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11356 8 84 J.G. Platvoet & A.L. Molendijk (eds.). The Pragmatics of Defining Religion. Contexts, Concepts & Contests. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11544 7 85 B.J. Malkovsky (ed.). New Perspectives on Advaita Ved§nta. Essays in Com­ memoration of Professor Richard De Smet, sj. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11666 4 86 A.I. Baumgarten (ed.). Apocalyptic Time. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11879 9 87 S. Hjelde (ed.). Man, Meaning, and Mystery. Hundred Years of History of Religions in Norway. The Heritage of W. Brede Kristensen. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11497 1 88 A. Korte (ed.). Women and Miracle Stories. A Multidisciplinary Exploration. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11681 8 89 J. Assmann & A.I. Baumgarten (eds.). Representation in Religion. Studies in Honor of Moshe Barasch. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11939 6 90 O. Hammer. Claiming Knowledge. Strategies of Epistemology from Theos­ ophy to the New Age. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12016 5 91 B.J. Malkovsky. The Role of Divine Grace in the Soteriology of “aÒkar§c§rya. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12044 0 92 T.A. Idinopulos & B.C. Wilson (eds.). Reappraising Durkheim for the Study and Teaching of Religion Today. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12339 3. 93 A.I. Baumgarten (eds.). Sacrifice in Religious Experience. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12483 7 94 L.P. van den Bosch. F.M. Müller. A Life Devoted to the Humanities. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12505 1 95 G. Wiegers. Modern Societies & the Science of Religions. Studies in Honour of Lammert Leertouwer. 2002. ISBN 90 04 11665 6 96 D. Zeidan. The Resurgence of Religion. A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12877 8

ISSN 0169-8834