The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism (Routledgecurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 22)

The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism

This book examines the development of Thailand from the integration of Siam into the European world economy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, up to the emergence of Thailand as a modern nation state in the twentieth century. It concentrates in particular on the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), during which period the state was modernised, the power of the great nobles was subordinated to the state, and a modern bureaucracy and education system were created. Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead teaches at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. Her present academic interests lie in the transformations of Southeast Asian political and economic systems. Her current research focuses on the transformation of Thailand under Pax Americana.

RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia

1 The Police in Occupation Japan Control, corruption and resistance to reform Christopher Aldous 2 Chinese Workers A new history Jackie Sheehan 3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 The Australia–Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present Alan Rix 5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy Japan’s economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi 6 The Triads as Business Yiu Kong Chu 7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism A-chin Hsiau 8 Religion and Nationalism in India The case of the Punjab Harnik Deol 9 Japanese Industrialisation Historical and cultural perspectives Ian Inkster 10 War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945 Hans J. van de Ven

11 Hong Kong in Transition One country, two systems Edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter 12 Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962 Noriko Yokoi 13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975 Beatrice Trefalt 14 Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese Communists’ perspective Ang Cheng Guan 15 The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession Adopting and adapting western influences Aya Takahashi 16 Women’s Suffrage in Asia Gender, nationalism and democracy Edited by Louise Edwards and Mina Roces 17 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 Phillips Payson O’Brien 18 The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969 From curiosity to confrontation Kenton Clymer 19 Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim Ravi Arvind Palat 20 The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship Kenton Clymer 21 British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957–1970 ‘Neo-colonialism’ or ‘disengagement’? Nicholas J. White 22 The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead

The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism

Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-64430-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67508-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–29725–5 (Print Edition)

To my mother, who is strongly committed to giving her daughter the best education

Contents

Acknowledgements Explanatory notes Introduction 1

x xii 1

The Siamese state, society and the world-economies before absolutism

10

2

The first stage of state-building

38

3

Creating a modern bureaucracy through education

66

4

Contradictions within the bureaucracy

93

5

The defence of absolutism

126

6

The 1912 revolt: the first great challenge to absolutism

154

Conclusion

179

Notes Selected bibliography Index

184 210 222

Acknowledgements

This book is adapted from my PhD dissertation on the emergence and decline of the Thai absolutist state. I must pay tribute to the contributions made by earlier Thai and Western scholars which helped me reach an initial understanding of this very important turning point in Thai history. Although I have reached different conclusions, their work and commitment set standards without which this book could not have been written. My doctoral research was first supported by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, to whom I owe great thanks. The failure to find satisfactory answers to my initial questions led me to the second round of lengthy archival research and I was generously assisted in making copies by friends and students. Without the patient guidance of Dr Ruth McVey, my first supervisor at SOAS, I would not have been able to make sense of half of them. Ruth continued to give me help after her retirement, for which I am most grateful. Dr Robert Taylor then took on the role of supervisor, and gave me his full support. During the final stages, Dr John Sidel acted as supervisor and Dr Charles Tripp arranged for my doctoral examination in SOAS. My special thanks go to Dr Rajeswary Brown who supplied me with library materials unavailable in Thailand. Professors Ian Brown and Duncan McCargo read and commented on parts of my dissertation, for which I am grateful. Among my Thai colleagues, I particularly value the support and comments given by Dr Dhiya Saraya, Dr Sunait Chutintranond, Dr Chaiwat Chamchoo, Dr Thanet Charoenmuang, Choltis Tangcharoen, Pitch Phongsawat and Supamit Pittipat. The final stages of writing the dissertation were undertaken in Thailand. I was assisted by Jennifer Gampell, Natchapat Ountrongchit, Porpot Changyawa, Sutinee Sakulthep, Nisa Chamsuwan, Tanukom Bamrungpon, Thamthai Dilokvidhyarat, Tachanun Girivat, Marut Lichanporn, Pannate Rangsinturat, Natthapol Na Songkhla and Sopaporn Sae Ng. Juree and Damrongsak Amatyakul greatly relieved my burden by generously lending me the use of their heavenly seaside retreat. My special thanks go to Suwitchai Arunrattanamani and Chaiyaprut Sasayanond who have done a wonderful job in restoring my health. Arinee

Acknowledgements xi Methasate, Denchard Vongkomolshet and Thasanee Sriphaiphun are friends whose unfailing support is most valued. In London, I am grateful for the interest and support given by the editorial staff at RoutledgeCurzon, in particular Peter Sowden, who has led this project into publication. The copy editors have done a thorough job and remaining errors reflect my shortcomings rather than theirs. The last two people whom I thank deeply are my husband and son. Dr Richard Mead has accompanied me through this unexpectedly long journey, laboriously editing the early drafts and supporting me in every way. Paron Mead has been philosophical about having a mother who always had work to do, and his loving nature has sustained me through this difficult task.

Explanatory notes

Usage During much of its history, Thailand was called Siam. I have used both names, basing usage on context.

Transliteration Transcription had been based on the Royal Institute system. However, proper names in Roman characters are spelt according to common usage; Vajiravudh is, therefore, used instead of Wachirawut.

Chronology A variety of chronological systems have been used in Thailand. For clarity in this presentation, I have transposed all dates into the Gregorian calendar with the exception of the year given in the details of publication.

Abbreviations B FO KT M N NA NK NL O RKNS S SB SP SWA T

Ministry of the City Public Records Office, UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (bound documents) Ministry of the Interior Ministry of the City National Archives, Thailand Correspondence (bound Documents) National Library, Thailand Royal Scribes’ Department Royal Gazette Ministry of Public Instruction Personal Files Special Files (bound documents) Siam Weekly Advertiser, Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Introduction

This book studies the Thai state from the early nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. During this period the Thai elite worked to transform Siam from a patrimonial, pre-modern society state to a modern, absolutist state. The term absolutism is treated here as a historical process in which the pre-modern state was undermined and centralised government was created. In Western Europe, this process occurred over a long period, beginning with the revival of commerce and towns in the eleventh century. In the Thai case, it only started in the late nineteenth century. When a group of government officials took power in 1932, the state-building process was far from finished and patrimonial loyalties were still influential. The main argument of this book is that, like other states “peripheral” to the hegemonic political-economic centres in the world economy, the Thai state was transformed by economic opportunities and pressures, not as a result of war, as argued by Tilly.1 A comparative model of state transformation in developing countries is offered in support and the validity of Tilly’s argument is tested. Thailand was one of very few Asian states to escape colonial rule. According to conventional wisdom, this was due largely to the efforts of two modernising monarchs, King Mongkut (1850–1868) and his son, King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910). The first king accepted the British demand for free trade and started the process of modernisation, which was carried on with greater gusto by King Chulalongkorn who steered the country away from the threat of imperialism.2 Histories of nineteenth-century Thailand have tended to give heavy emphasis to the maintenance of independence.3 Instead, this book explains Thai development in terms of changes in the wider Southeast Asian context. It adapts Anderson’s suggestion in his seminal work on Thai Studies,4 that, in common, Southeast Asian states centralised in order to serve the expansion of the capitalist system. Here it is argued that modern, centralised states arose in the area which already had contacts with the world economy either via the colonial powers or their own ruling elites. The modern state differed from the pre-modern

2

Introduction

patrimonial one in that a centralised modern bureaucracy was staffed by educated, salaried officials. They needed to be trained. Thus its formation was a long-term process. In European-ruled countries, the new form of administration was colonial. In Thailand, it was absolutist, and the term “absolutist state” used herein refers to a specific form of state, which shared certain characteristics with that which emerged in the West from the sixteenth century onwards, and which gradually replaced the feudal state. The transformation of the Thai state differed from developments in the colonised Southeast Asian states in that the king struggled to wrest political power from the great nobles. A similar situation had occurred in European states. The question then arises as to how far the transformation of the Thai state from pre-modern to absolute rules follows the European pattern. The existing literature on state transformation is restricted to the western experience, and hence offers no comparisons. State transformation in Asia has been generally seen to differ from that in Europe in two respects. First, only Japan experienced a feudal period as in European states. All other Asian states had developed their own forms of premodern governments, whether patrimonial or sultanate. Second, until the threat of European imperialism, they were perceived as static agricultural backwaters, only transformed during the second half of the nineteenth century by imperialism or the threat of imperialism. Thus it is not surprising that one of the most influential theories of state transformation, that propagated by Charles Tilly, is based solely on the experience of Western European states. He argues that war makes states. Western European state rulers waged wars “in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus enjoyed the advantage of power within a secure or expanding territory”.5 According to this logic, a state’s main purpose in raising revenue is to finance war. Hence, the drive to prevail over one’s rivals is the key to state formation. In general, this does not correspond with the history of the modern Thai state. As we shall see, wresting control over the growing revenues from the great nobles was the main feature of state-building in the second half of the nineteenth century. In overcoming the great nobles, King Chulalongkorn used means other than wars. Although the conflicts with the French in the late 1880s, leading to the humiliating Siamese defeat in 1893, appear to fit Tilly’s theory, this episode had little influence on statebuilding in Siam, which had started a few decades earlier. Some Southeast Asian states, such as Burma, were subjugated by force. But, in general, war-making cannot be causally linked to state-building in the region. In another respect, Asian experiences differed from Tilly’s theory. Perlin studied the Mughal state before it was taken over by the British. He identified an economic context of “commercial resolution” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which led to centralisation under the Mughal.6 This example supports the link between the world economy and

Introduction 3 state formation and also shows that state-building might be driven by the indigenous elite – as in the case in Siam. At this juncture two theoretical issues present themselves for discussion. First, patterns of state formation in Europe and Asia seem to differ radically; but analysis of that proposition threatens to trap us in the Orientalist straitjacket, which divides the West from the exotic East. Second, we might re-evaluate Tilly’s theory – that war makes states. This book pursues the second path. It argues that the experience of Thailand and of other major Southeast Asian societies shows that pressures and opportunities from the world economy, rather than war, makes the state. From the late nineteenth century, the major states in the region were transformed into modern centralised states by colonial powers and the indigenous elite. These states had in common the process by which they were incorporated into the world economy. The histories of state-making in Western Europe and Southeast Asia share one common feature, in that they occurred during a period of capitalist expansion. This book argues that the expansion of a worldeconomy provides the backdrop for state-making. A world-economy generates extra resources well above those derived from agricultural production. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a Thai king seized the opportunity presented by an expansion of resources to build an administrative apparatus in the form of the modern bureaucracy. One needs to go back to the second half of the feudal period to observe the beginning of state-building in Europe. Long-distance trade linking the Baltic and Western Europe with Venice and other Italian cities revived the money economy. This was also a time when monarchical power was consolidated by the collection of revenue and of the replacement of the feudal system by a developing state judicial system.7 Increasing revenues allowed the European kings to wage wars against the great nobles and each other, and thus to centralise their powers and seize further territories. In answer to the questions of why the European states made war against each other and why wars contributed so much to their statebuilding, Tilly, who is interested in the role of violence in societies through time, puts the emphasis on explaining the use of military power rather than the reason behind it. Thus he assumes that it was purely for selfaggrandisement. That certainly contributed, but we need to ask why warmaking became possible and widely used. I argue that war-making in Europe was a reflection of European capitalist development. Economic expansion meant that any king who could control new forms of economic resource was in the position to consolidate his power over the great nobles as well as other kings. Tilly did see the importance of capital when he argued: “To make effective war, they (the kings)attempted to locate more capital.”8 According to this perception, the availability of capital was to serve the war-hungry monarchs and was not the force behind state formation. A different perspective offered in this book is that a world-economy

4

Introduction

makes states. Wars could be an integral part of state-making in some areas, but not so important in others. Thus, it is argued here that state-formation must be seen in relation to the world economy. War-making was an essential component of capitalist development in the core areas for two reasons. First, it was argued by Tilly himself that the formation of state institutions provided protection to the bourgeoisie, who increasingly needed to establish property rights.9 The role of the bourgeoisie, a missing element in the Southeast Asian states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was crucial in European state-making. Because the king could provide them with law and order, they supported his efforts to subdue the great nobles. Second, because Western Europe was core to the European worldeconomy, wars among these states were fought for hegemony, and often involved key economic regions.10 Wars fought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflected the competition among major states for hegemonic position in the European world-economy.11 States were prepared to incur debts in war-making because this investment promised to provide potential economic returns. Hence the difference in the process of state formation in Europe and Asia can be explained by their functions in relation to the world economy. A number of writers offer theoretical supports for the above argument. Braudel provides a useful analytical tool for an understanding of the difference in state formation. He invented the theory of a world-economy12 whose parameters include areas which interact economically through longdistance trade. Within a particular world-economy, there exist power relationships between the centre, the core areas and the periphery, each of which has different economic functions. At a particular time in history there might exist more than one world-economy. These capitalist worldeconomies have acted as the driving force behind major civilisations from time immemorial. Eventually, the various world-economies were dominated by the European world-economy, which ultimately transformed itself into the only world economy in the nineteenth century and was dominated by London.13 Braudel’s model can be applied to the development of states in Western Europe and Southeast Asia. The basis of the feudal states in Europe was economic self-sufficiency. Under such conditions, the king and great nobles maintained their rule by distributing land, the most valuable resource, to the ruling class. Hence economic development was localised and depended on land. In contrast, during a similar period, Southeast Asia developed state forms of Hindu–Buddhist empires such as Burmese Pagan, Khmer Angkor and Malay Sri Vijaya.14 They were connected to a world-economy or world-economies by maritime and over-land trade. Power was based on a self-sufficient economy and long-distance trade. Manpower rather than land was the most valuable resource, and was distributed to the ruling

Introduction 5 class. Those rulers who benefited from long-distance trade were able to establish royal courts and bureaucracies based on the Hindu model. Thus trade generated a surplus which facilitated the development of centralised state machinery. However, the region’s trade was mainly limited to trading forest products and the nature of the state was not drastically changed until the nineteenth century when the impact of a world-economy transformed its economic functions. In contrast, the early European involvement with a world-economy encouraged not only commercial capitalism, but also industrial and financial capitalism. These new forms of economic activities had the effect of diversifying state activities and eventually led to the collapse of the feudal system. These different cases illustrate how involvement with a world-economy influenced state development. Thus different forms of states evolved at different times in history depending on the timing and the nature of their contacts with world economies. Wallerstein’s controversial work on the world system also helps to explain the relationship between the world economy and state development. The first of his three volumes briefly discusses the link between the emergence of the world system from the sixteenth century and the rise of absolutism. His focus on the development of states around the centre of the world system15 does not explain what happens to a country at the periphery, such as the Thai state when it came to be directly incorporated into the western world economy in the middle of the nineteenth century. Yet his theory, as we shall see, proves to be applicable. Cox picks up from where Braudel left off, looking at the hegemonic world orders under Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. Both world orders were based on economic and military power, and so both provided economic and military dominance. State structures were transformed so that they fitted into the new configuration of world order. Cox calls this process the internationalisation of state, in which the state’s structure and role were reorganised. There emerged a distinctive form of state derived from a configuration of social forces upon which the state power ultimately rested. The state exercised power and choice in the organisation and development of production and classes within the context of the existing world order.16 As we shall see, Cox’s theory of the impact of Pax Britannica and the role of social forces in the internationalisation of state helps explain the Thai case. A recent study by Trocki offers the most comprehensive picture of the development of Pax Britannica in Asia, the regional order in which the Thai state developed. In the late seventeenth century, after being driven out of the spice trade in Southeast Asia, Britain established Indian trading bases in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The East India Company also went to China and set up a factory in Canton and engaged in the highly profitable tea trade, a commodity which gained popularity in Britain. This

6

Introduction

gave the British East India Company an edge over the Dutch VOC and, in the second half of the eighteenth century, it replaced the Dutch trading empire throughout Asia. The Indian bases allowed the British to move into the power vacuum left by the weakened Mughal empire, where they took control over the production and sale of opium. The export of opium enabled the British to turn around the trade imbalance that had arisen due to the growing demand of tea in Britain. Once the British authorities understood that it was more profitable to control opium production and distribution than to engage directly in shipping, British private traders played an increasing role. The colonial government allowed the country traders to bid for opium and carry the trade to China. The Dutch saw this practice as a sign of weakness, but it allowed greater flexibility than VOC practices and gave the British a further advantage.17 The new British practices concerning opium in the late eighteenth century involved a shift from mercantilism, whereby the state was directly involved in trade and production, to liberalism, whereby these activities were left to private entrepreneurs. It stopped the practice of earning revenue from trade. The main function of the state was now one of extracting surplus from economic activities by taxation. This influenced the theory and development of the hegemonic state. As we shall see, the Siamese kings and elite also learned this lesson. Thus Pax Britannica benefited the British authorities with increasing tax revenue and furthered the interests of British private traders who became the main source of capital accumulation, by far more important than that which occurred in Europe. Trocki points out that the opium trade led to a huge capital accumulation. Other economic activities were also developed in the region; for example, the establishment of British merchant houses, banks and insurance companies. Although opium formed a very important basis for Pax Britannica as argued by Trocki, there were other commodities, such as sugar and rice, which propelled the expansion of capitalism in Southeast Asia. These newly developed goods involved indigenous capitalist groups in India, Southeast Asia and China.18 Of particular significance were Chinese entrepreneurs who initially benefited from the western demand for tea. They were engaged in the expansion of economic activities and the growing division of labour not only in China and also in Southeast Asia. In the latter case they produced goods that were of great demand in both the West and in Southeast Asia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, they produced sugar in Java, Luzon and Negros in the Philippines and central Siam. In certain places, such as in the Philippines, they became business partners of the British. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, British entrepreneurs, armed with capital accumulations from India–China trade and a new trading philosophy, began to integrate large areas of Southeast Asia into

Introduction 7 the world economy. The development of British capital did not necessarily depend on British colonisation. The Philippines, a Spanish colony, provides an example. Economic downturns had forced Spain in the late nineteenth century to abandon its mercantilist policy of the late eighteenth century and open the Filipino economy to outsiders. Anglo-Chinese capital reaped the most advantage and turned the Philippines into “an Anglo-Chinese colony flying the Spanish flag”.19 Foreign capital flooded into all modern sectors and turned the Philippines into the most advanced capitalist economy in the region at the beginning of the Second World War. British dominance over the Mughal Empire also meant that rice became an important export item. At first Indian rice was exported to Britain; later, in the second half of the eighteenth century, rice was increasingly exported to many European countries where it was consumed by the upper and middle classes and used in such industries as paper, animal feed, liqueur and brewing. British trade also benefited from the fact that competing rice producers in the United States and Italy were impeded from exporting to Europe by the American Revolution and Napoleonic wars, respectively. The British then turned to Southeast Asia as a new source of rice supplies. In its occupation of Java between 1811–1816, Britain tried to introduce social and economic reforms so that rice could be produced for export. Although Java significantly exported rice to Europe in the early nineteenth century, domestic demand from an expanding population made it an unreliable exporter.20 The British occupation of Lower Burma in 1826 led to the development of the area as the greatest rice exporter in the region. In the meantime, rice from unoccupied areas in Burma was sold in Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia. Thus Britain did not introduce the rice trade to Burma after the final occupation of 1862. Rather, it encouraged the trade and production of rice by providing the context for its extraordinary growth. Burma became the first area in the region to be integrated into the world rice market.21 The resistance of the Burmese elite to the British further commercial influence shows that the British experienced greater problems in selling their new policy of liberalism in other societies. The resistance, from Siam, for example, became an increasing source of dissatisfaction among country traders in Singapore. Singapore had been established as an entrepôt for this network of regional trade and was a free port. The new practices meant that regional traders bringing goods to Singapore enjoyed the free tax status whereas British traders going into Southeast Asian ports were subject to discriminating tariffs. This perception of unfairness drove British demands for lower tariffs in Siam. The British authorities also appealed to free trade as a reason for liberalising the opium trade. At first, many Southeast Asian elites prohibited the import of Indian opium for ethical reasons. Once it was accepted,

8

Introduction

revenues from opium sales became the main source of revenue, and an important basis for state formation in Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Initially Siam had been outside the main thrust of British political and economic expansion. By the first half of the nineteenth century, Chinese entrepreneurs had developed the sugar industry and the country had become increasingly integrated into the Chinese world-economy. Burmese rice was sufficient to satisfy demands on the world market. Nevertheless, British trade interests began to grow when sugar exported by the Thai elite and Chinese traders started to arrive in Singapore. At first they accepted the discriminating tariff rate. However, during the 1840s they became agitated when the Siamese authorities shifted its earlier policy of free trade to monopoly in sugar. Britons based in Singapore began to pressure their government to demand free trade and to accommodate the import of opium and the export of rice. These demands were met soon after King Mongkut (1850–1868) ascended the throne. The Bowring Treaty in 1855 concentrated on the tariff issue and effectively integrated Siam into the world rice market, some time later than was the case with Burma. This book aims first to show how Siam became part of Pax Britannica. Second, it seeks to account for the subsequent state transformation of Siam. It is intended to be read not only as a history of a particular country but also as a contribution to an understanding of state transformation. Events in Siam did not precisely replicate those of Western Europe, but both regions shared some experiences in engaging with the world economy. Prior to the sixteenth century, the Siamese state contributed mainly to the Chinese world-economy. The Chinese limited the demands made upon its trading partners to engagement through the tributary system, and thus did not disrupt the social order. The Europeans, on the other hand, tended to press for greater accommodation. In the seventeenth century, Siam had suffered a range of trade restrictions imposed by their partners, the Dutch; yet, under Pax Britannica, far greater demands were made for both economic and ideological adjustments. In economic terms, demands from Pax Britannica that Siam transform itself into a major rice exporter came relatively late, at a time when the country had already lost its comparative advantage in sugar production to Java and Luzon. This shift to rice carried the economic advantage of involving the Thai peasantry as a labour force, whereas sugar production had been monopolised by Chinese labour. The ideological demands made by Pax Britannica on the Thai elite were more onerous and became the main cause of social disruption. The expected standards of civilised western behaviour divided the Thai elite; some accepted and aspired to achieve them and others completely rejected them. For those who accepted, their natural impulse was to confirm Siam’s

Introduction 9 superiority to other countries in the region.22 But more importantly, the quest for civilisation was claimed by various groups among the elite to attain their political objectives, and led to conflict. The faction of the elite who advocated participation in Pax Britannica wanted to modernise Siam in order to produce for the world market more efficiently. This put them in conflict with the official class who perceived modernisation as a threat to their livelihood. The monarch, on the other hand, agreed with the need to serve world markets more effectively, but his priority was to use modernisation as a tool to consolidate his political power. This led him to going further in adopting the institutions of the western state. Among the newly created official class, demands for Siam to move along with the civilised world proliferated. Political demands for a representative system of government also served their interests. Thus the quest for civilisation assumed a central place in the political space. In the process, the economic aspects got lost in the elite consciousness. In this book I will look at the impacts of both western economic and ideological influences on Thai history. I am interested in the form of rule and state ideology, which necessarily means that I am concentrating on the top of the society – the ruling elite. I will touch on details of the debates that went on among the elite and the way in which ideology and practice intertwined to show that the whole process was not automatic. I will also show that the kind of modernity Siam experienced was not just the product of the economic transformation but also arose from the decisions of the elite. Thus I by no means argue that Thai history constituted a unilinear march towards modernity. Instead I see it as a complex process of interactions among various social forces, and the denouement of this history was far from inevitable. Also, the history told here does not mean that I do not show interest in other levels of Thai society. I fully realise that any society consists of different levels of different strengths. Undergoing some form of change from the centre would be different from the periphery. Agitation by young army officers, attacking the monarchy for being backward, was quite different from the millennium movements in the northeast or the south, where people were incorporated into a modern state, making onerous demands on their livelihoods. But at this stage I choose to present the picture of a narrow group of people. This was due to available materials. A more comprehensive study of Thai history awaits further research.

1

The Siamese state, society and the world-economies before absolutism

Introduction The absolutist state, which evolved from the pre-modern state in nineteenth-century Siam, involved radical changes in structure while also displaying many characteristics of its predecessor. Hence, the pre-modern Thai state must be understood in order to make sense of what followed. Most studies have labelled the pre-modern system as the sakdina1 state, the meaning of which is still subject to debate among historians. But most of them maintained that its major elements persisted until the nineteenth century. Some even suggested that they survived the 1932 revolution and continued well into the 1970s.2 This chapter argues, however, that the Siamese state during the Ayudhyan period was far from being static and its development was influenced by various world-economies. Moreover, in the early Bangkok period, the Siamese state’s contacts with the Chinese world-economy and the European world-economy brought about a long process of state transformation into absolutism. The Thai absolutist state acted as a transition between the pre-modern state and the nation-state which succeeded the fall of absolutism in 1932. There were many significant developments during the early Bangkok period which marked a departure from the Ayudhyan state. However, we will consider both systems as pre-modern as opposed to the modern state which arose from Siamese absolutism during the second half of the nineteen century. Its modern characteristics include modern bureaucracy and the centralisation of power, elements obviously lacking in the pre-modern state. The chapter has the following sections: the Ayudhyan state; Siam and the Chinese world-economy; changes in the fiscal structure of the early Bangkok state; Siam and the European world-economy; and the impact of the Bowring Treaty on the early Bangkok state.

The Ayudhyan state The emergence of the Ayudhyan state, in the lower river basins of Siam during the mid-fourteenth century, coincided with the resurgence of mar-

State, society and the world-economies 11 itime trade in the region. Earlier, Ayudhya had been the regional gateway to the Chinese market, and during the fourteenth century there was also increase in trade from India, the Middle East and Europe. This expansion was caused partly by the growing demand of the West for spices and partly by China’s increasing commercial involvement in the region.3 From a Braudelian perspective, this meant that the European worldeconomy centred in Venice began to interact with other world-economies elsewhere: the Middle East, India and China.4 During this period, state formation was occurring in many parts of Southeast Asia. Ayudhya was particularly affected as it was strategically located, commanding a vast rice-growing area as well as being an entrepôt for forest products. Ayudhya’s strategic position as a city port also explains its dominance over other inland centres such as Suphanburi and Lopburi in the lower Chao Phraya basin. Uthong (1351–1369), the first king of Ayudhya, was in effect the king of local lords (chao muang), and Ayudhya had the status of city (krung) as against a town (muang),5 the appellation of other local centres surrounding it. Under the Ayudhyan system (as with western feudalism) the king had great difficulty in maintaining a steady flow of resources and keeping control over powerful lords and outlying centres. Initially, the king entrusted members of the royal family with the task of controlling these centres, and the Ayudhyan state at this stage was merely a cluster of power centres linked by personal relationships among the rulers. Soon enough, however, the decentralising process started and these centres posed a challenge to Ayudhya. The Ayudhyan kings relied upon redistribution and other devices such as ideology, state ceremonies, intermarriage with leading muang families, the appointment of royal kin to leading positions in outlying regions and warfare to keep the empire together. In spite of these measures, the history of the first hundred years of Ayudhya was plagued with revolts and warfare between the central and peripheral powers. It was not until the middle of the fifteenth century, after Ayudhya had consolidated power over other centres, especially Sukhothai, another northern centre of power (krung) which lay on the overland trade route linking Pagan with the northern part of the Chao Phraya basin, northern Laos and Cambodia,6 that the formal structure of the Ayudhyan state emerged under the design of King Trilokkanat (1448–1488). Under the new structure, the centres of the lower river basins such as Suphanburi and Lopburi formed the core area of the Ayudhyan state. They maintained their muang status but were incorporated into a central bureaucracy. Beyond the core area, outer muang (hua muang chan nok) were mostly ruled by local elite who became Ayudhyan nobles. The exception was Phitsanulok which was ruled by a royal prince who was an heir apparent and called heir apparent muang (muang luk luang).7 Each muang as well as Phitsanulok had its own bureaucracy and Phitsanulok was

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allowed to extract resources from its own muang and pass them on to Ayudhya in the form of tax in kind (suai). The core area and these centres constituted the territory of the Ayudhyan state (phra ratchaanakhet). At the periphery were the small tributary or suzerain states (prathetsarat). They maintained their autonomy, provided a buffer zone between Ayudhya and other kingdoms, and were responsible for paying tribute every three years.8 This tribute took the traditional form of silver and gold trees. This state structure was designed to consolidate manpower for three major activities; production, trade and warfare. The central administration created by King Trilokkanat reflects an attempt to create a highly centralised and hierarchical bureaucracy. Immediately below him were two chief ministers: the minister responsible for civilian affairs (Samuhanayok), and the minister responsible for military affairs (Samuhakalahom). Four lesser ministers also reported to the king; they were those responsible for Treasury and Foreign Affairs (Khlang), the palace (Wang), the City (Muang), and the Land (Na). Further down in the hierarchy were nobles responsible for administrative units (krom) and sub-units (kong). Some of these units had specialised functions whereas most were simply manpower units.9 In the Ayudhyan state, the primary role of manpower in the river basins was for production and warfare, and the state also allocated manpower to the ruling class as a means of support. In the outlying areas, manpower provided the state with goods for internal consumption as well as foreign trade. They could also be called up for military service. The achievement of King Trilokkanat’s system was to formalise the social arrangements between leaders and their peasant followers that had existed before the development of the Ayudhyan state, and transform these loose clientships into rigidly enforced ones. All males were incorporated into a single social hierarchy called the sakdina system, with each man, except the king, given a place in the pecking order (sakdina) starting from a high-ranking prince with 100,000 sakdina to a that (slave) with five sakdina. The state dictated that all male members of the peasant class or commoners (phrai) who had a sakdina mark of twenty-five must register under a master (nai) who was a noble and had a sakdina mark of 400 or higher.10 Every phrai subjected to this corvée system had to spend six months a year serving his nai, who was supposed to look after the welfare of his phrai. Each nai was given a number of phrai as private property, called phrai som, and as manpower belonging to an administrative unit (krom) or office (kong) called phrai luang. Those who submitted tax in kind were called phrai suai. The last group of manpower was slaves (that), who achieved this status either through debt bondage or as prisoners of war. They had a sakdina mark of five. A that was considered the private property of his nai and had to work full time for his master.11

State, society and the world-economies 13 Bonds between the king and the nobles were also based on patron–client relationships which had existed between leaders and followers long before the formation of the state itself. These relationships fulfilled the needs for protection on the part of the followers and for power on the part of the warrior-leaders. The tie between the king and his aspirant noble client was established by an act of homage (thawai tua), whereby the son of a noble was presented to the king in order to be trained in the affairs of state, usually in the capacity of a royal page. Once proved capable, he would be appointed to the bureaucracy as a noble in his own right. In his role as patron, the king was the source of a noble’s livelihood, and he performed this function, first, by granting his client manpower and when his client already had manpower, guaranteeing it. Second, he granted symbols of power, such as a gold tray on a pedestal or foreign brocaded silk. In return, the client noble was expected to contribute his resources for the king’s use. In time of war, he was expected to supply the king with fighting men under the noble’s command. During peace, his men might serve the king in the military or in other state services. Corvée might be substituted for monetary payment, in which case the noble nai was responsible for forwarding their corvée payment to the state.12 Furthermore, the noble client was expected to demonstrate his gratitude to his royal patron by taking an oath of allegiance in ceremonies held twice a year. Anyone absent from the rite was severely punished. That such punishments had to be levied shows how tenuous was the relationship between the king and the nobility in the Ayudhyan state. Although theoretically absolute, the actual extent of the king’s power depended on (and was demonstrated by his nobles’ willingness to supply him) with manpower. Thus, in practice, the Ayudhyan kings faced similar problems to the European feudal monarchs: the fragmented nature of the state, the fact that the central administration received resources only after lesser lords had taken their cut, dependence on the co-operation of great families who controlled manpower and strategic territories, etc. After all, the two primary means of accumulating power and resources were through warfare and agriculture. The former was a risky and intermittent business; the latter, given the technology and administrative resources of the day (accentuated by the existing constraints of the supposedly highly centralised state), relied on a trickle-up system that minimised royal take. One way of overcoming the centre’s weakness was by ideological means; emphasising the glory and sacredness of the monarch and the need to obey his will. The Ayudhyan kings relied on two sources of legitimacy: the Devaraja cult and Buddhism. The Devaraja cult, versions of which were exploited widely in the region by states that benefited from maritime trade, justified the king’s claim that he was a reincarnation of the Hindu god, Vishnu, and hence could claim absolute power. It was important that the notion of reincarnation be acknowledged by the ruling class who were

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always ready to challenge his power, and this was reinforced throughout the year in elaborate state ceremonies.13 Buddhist ideology, the other component of legitimacy, was highly compatible with Thai social organisation based on patron–client relationships. One’s place in the social hierarchy was determined by the merit accumulated in this and previous incarnations (bun). The ten most important virtues that the Buddha practised before reaching enlightenment are called barami. The notion of barami encompassed the concept of bun but included an additional meaning of accumulated merit; it was the privilege of those at the higher echelons of society, close to the king. Barami also acquired the social meaning of the ability to bestow patronage.14 The king, who was portrayed as a reincarnation of the Bhodisattavara (the Buddha’s previous incarnation), supposedly possessed the highest degrees of bun and barami. Accordingly, the king was considered the supreme patron of everyone in his kingdom and also of the Buddhist sangha. Buddhism provided a stronger basis for legitimacy than the Devaraja cult because it functioned in social interactions between patron and client. The extent of the individual’s bun and barami was reflected in the number of his or her entourage. But this strength was also its weakness. Any individual who had high enough social status to bestow patronage was perceived to have bun and barami. Such an individual posed a threat to the king. Thus, an ideological claim to legitimacy was not always sufficient; sometimes the king had to resort to playing politics with the great lords. This was particularly prevalent from the sixteenth century onwards, when the growth in maritime trade greatly increased the stake brought about by the arrival of the Europeans. As we shall see, the king’s need to play politics with the great lords meant he had to resort to drastic measures. This reduced the credibility of his ideological claim to the throne and caused him to lose control over resources and, at times, over his throne. By this time the Ayudhyan state has demonstrated the characteristic of the patrimonial state, with a complex administrative staff and conscripted subjects under the personal control of the king. In this system the king made a full claim of his personal authority in spite of the decentralisation of authority.15 With the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the Siamese state developed further. During the sixteenth century the European world-economy greatly expanded its boundaries to encompass both America and Asia. This was another period of great economic expansion in the region which saw the emergence of Burma16 as a strong state. A fierce rivalry began between the two states over who controlled the sources and outlets of forest products for the newly expanded maritime trade.17 The attempt by Ayudhya to gain domination over ports in the Indian Ocean, a major factor in the ongoing conflicts between Siam and Burma for over half a century, ultimately resulted in Burma’s domination over Ayudhya in 1569.

State, society and the world-economies 15 Internally, the beginning of the sixteenth century was a period of great political instability. The earlier incorporation of the northern centres into the Ayudhyan kingdom in the fifteenth century proved fatal, as it created a very powerful domestic challenger to the throne. Northern aristocrats provided a usurper to the throne, a collaborator with Burma, that resulted in the fall of Ayudhya mentioned above. However, the northern dynasty also provided a courageous king, Naresuan (1590–1605), who declared independence from Burma. The Ayudhyan state that emerged in the seventeenth century had a more centralised bureaucracy than earlier. The position of the heir apparent from the town (muang luk luang) of Phitsanulok was abolished. The territorial administration became unified and all muang were ruled either by local elite who were absorbed into the centre’s bureaucracy or by nobles sent from Ayudhya. But outer muang still maintained their own bureaucracy, replicating that at the centre.18 At the same time, the noble class from the north were moved to Ayudhya to serve in the central administration. A massive relocation of manpower from the north also occurred during the seventeenth century. Its initial purpose was for reasons of security, but it also served an economic purpose once Siam began producing rice for export.19 As a result of the adjustment in the territorial administration and the manpower mobilisation, the central bureaucracy became more extensive and complex. However, the Siamese state was not an absolutist state because it had yet to develop salaried officials who acted in the king’s interests. In the midst of economic expansion, it was essentially a patrimonial state. Once political power was consolidated, political conflicts shifted from local centres to the royal court with the growing power of the nobles. With the growth in trade, high-ranking nobles were permitted to engage in foreign trade which made them richer and more powerful and, consequently, dangerous to the monarchy. Only capable and warrior kings such as King Ekathotsarot (1605–1620) could successfully hold the nobles at bay. In general, the nobles’ powerful position and the uncertainty over succession combined to create political instability.20 With a growing number of foreign traders, princes and nobles tended to form factions with support from foreign communities. King Ekthotsarot was very conscious of fostering foreign trade as well as curbing the nobles’ power. He sent the first diplomatic mission to the court of Prince Qrange in 1608. He passed a law that allowed the crown to take one-third of a noble’s possessions when he passed away. He tightened control over the phrai, and took direct control of those found unreported. However, these measures did not prevent a powerful Kalahom (an abbreviation for Samuhakalahom, mentioned earlier), in 1629, from seizing control of the throne from the northern dynasty and becoming King Prasatthong (1629–1656).21 As the head of a new dynasty, King Prasatthong introduced measures that further enhanced the king’s power

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and reduced that of the nobles. He extended the monopoly role of the Royal Warehouse Department (Phra Khlang Sinkha) in both internal and external trade to such an extent that only small private traders were still able to do business. Many powerful nobles were executed and those who survived were constantly moved around. As in earlier reigns, one-third of the noble’s estate went to the Treasury upon his death. The governors of important muang were carefully watched at the court.22 Consequently, the noble class grew vis-à-vis the king’s oppressive measures.23 King Narai (1656–1688), King Prasatthong’s successor, reigned at the height of Siam’s participation in foreign trade. His reign also witnessed a struggle between Holland, France and China for regional power. Political development at the Siamese court also reflects this shift in foreign trade. In the early part of the reign, the most prominent court official, a Persian, co-operated closely with Chinese allies in obstructing the Dutch trade in Ayudhya. In 1664 the Dutch imposed a treaty which allowed them to monopolise the trade in deer skins, which were in much demand in Japan, where Siam got copper to buy goods from the Chinese market. Siam was also prohibited from using Chinese crews in their junks, which initially destroyed its shipping. However, the treaty did not significantly damage Siamese trade; the crown’s trade monopoly was still in place and the Dutch brought in much-needed bullion in the form of silver. Phaulkon, a Greek adventurer, became an influential trade officer in the early 1680s. He tried to circumvent Dutch power by attracting the French to provide military assistance to Ayudhya. He lead the French government to believe that King Narai might embrace Christianity and allow the citizens to convert, while also employing Europeans as crown officials, traders and seamen. His influence provoked a conspiracy by Phra Phetracha, the most powerful noble (whose power was based on manpower and support from the majority of the noble class), some Chinese and Japanese traders, to be rid of Phaulkon and depose King Narai in 1688 in a palace coup. The background of this political development was the Dutch decline and China’s ascendancy under the Qing after the end of its civil war (1673–1681). Upon his ascension to the throne, King Phetracha (1688–1703) of the new Banphuluang dynasty rewarded his Chinese supporters with properties and positions in the Phrakhlang and allowed his favourite Chinese to dominate foreign trade in Ayudhya.24 Contrary to what most people believe, King Phetracha was not anti-western; he only acted according to a new power structure in which the Chinese worldeconomy predominated. In the year he came to the throne, he also confirmed the earlier trade treaty and agreement with the VOC. After all, they were useful in bringing in silver and Indian textiles.25 The rise of the Chinese world-economy during the eighteenth century in Ayudhya is testified by the appointment of a Chinese as Phrakhlang under King Traisa (1709–1733) and the great number of Chinese immigrants as officials and traders until the fall of Ayudhya to Burma in 1767.

State, society and the world-economies 17 Thus, seen from the perspective of the world-economy, the reign of King Phetracha signaled a major turning point in Siamese history. The Chinese world-economy provided the structure in which the Thai political economy operated. This is the next topic we turn to.

Siam and the Chinese world-economy From the sixteenth century, China, which constituted a world-economy in its own right, became involved with the European world-economy. Since it provided the western market with the desirable key produce of tea and silk, it had started to gain access to bullion from America.26 It prospered even further from trade with the western world-economy led by Britain from the second half of the eighteenth century, after Britain dominated over the Mughal Empire. The wealth increased its trade volume with Southeast Asia for the traditional imports such as spices and forest produce. Furthermore, this new wealth had a significant impact on China’s political economy. China started to produce more cash crops such as sugar cane and cotton for its industry and began to import rice from Siam. It substituted sugar cane for rice and Ayudhya became one of the areas in the mainland Southeast Asia to export rice to China.27 The picture above does not correspond to Reid’s depiction of Southeast Asia entering the period of crisis in the late seventeenth century and the breakdown of absolutism developed from the fifteenth century. According to him, this resulted from the retreat of the West.28 However, he was oblivious to the growing importance of the Chinese worldeconomy. Liebermann who sees greater trade relations in the eighteenth century between China and Southeast Asian mainland states, observes significant economic and political transformations in the latter. Economically, they included new crops, the expansion of internal markets and urban complexes. In political terms, one sees in the major states of Burma, Siam and Vietnam, territorial expansions and the emergence of three major imperial systems. According to Liebermann, between the eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, these states were engaged in many reforms such as taxation, military organisation, and provincial and tributary relations.29 It is true that, under the Banphuluang, Ayudhya was part of this process, and strains resulting from commercial growth helped to destabilise the dynasty, as argued by Liebermann. As Siam produced for the Chinese market, the struggle for control over the phrai among the ruling class intensified since they were producers for the market, and this generally weakened the monarchy.30 There also emerged many centres engaging in foreign trade, such as Pattani and Nakonsrithammarat, which tried to gain independence from Ayudhya.31 These are internal factors, apart from the fact that Burma had been at the peak of its cycle of power, which contributed to the fall of Ayudhya in the late eighteenth century.

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Seen from the perspective of the world-economy, the political crisis does not matter too much since King Taksin (1767–1782) of Thonburi relied upon trade with China as a basis for the state revival. However, the fall of Ayudhya terminated Siam’s role as the rice producer for the Chinese market. Although the involvement of the Thonburi and Bangkok states in trade was, in one sense, a continuation of the trend started during the Ayudhyan period, it was even more the consequence of the centre’s loss of control over manpower that resulted in the fall of Ayudhya. The new dynasty was not in a position to exert command over manpower because King Taksin of Thonburi could not command the allegiance of most of the populace since his sources of leadership had dissipated after the sacking of Ayudhya. Additionally, the former Ayudhyan noble class was much better placed to attract allegiance than the new king, who had come from a wealthy Chinese tax farming family and was previously a governor of an unimportant town.32 He tried to solve the manpower shortage by encouraging labour migration from China.33 Although this measure only partly relieved the problem, it helped set the trend of the Chinese influx into Siam which would have many far reaching consequences. King Taksin also imposed an all-year corvée on those phrai under his control, a measure which partly undermined his legitimacy.34 Being unable to control manpower, King Taksin was forced to depend upon trade in order to establish his power base and revive the Siamese state. He actively rebuilt trade links with China, internally by gathering forest products and then securing external sources by waging wars with neighbouring countries.35 The wars of expansion during this reign and later in the early Bangkok period have usually been treated in purely political terms – as a product of the drive to dominate and extend royal prestige; clearly, there were also tangible economic reasons. As a result, trade assumed major significance from the very birth of the new state. The choice of Thonburi, a small village located at the mouth of the Chaophraya river, as the capital facilitated the junk trade of forest products. However, revenue from selling exported goods and monopolising imports during this period “was inadequate which led the king to behave wrongly and eventually to face a rebellion”.36 King Taksin was removed by his commander-in-chief, Somdet Chaophraya Barommahakasatsuk, a leader able to call upon traditional patron-client ties in the old Ayudhan ruling class. The new ruler took the title of King Rama I (1782–1809) of the Chakri dynasty. He revived a major element of the traditional Ayudhya power base by demanding that all phrai become phrai luang, (king’s men) who owed six months of labour to the state every year.37 Nonetheless, the Bangkok state failed to exert sufficient control over manpower, and many phrai remained unattached. King Rama II (1809–1824) tried to solve this problem first by allowing any nai who could encourage masterless men to come under his protection to

State, society and the world-economies 19 register them as phrai som (and thus liable for only two months of labour). Second, for every ten phrai som under his control, a nai was allowed to keep one man as a servant in his own retinue who was of higher status than phrai som.38 This encouraged the majority of the nai class to concentrate on gaining control of a large number of phrai som which they treated as their private property. Hardly any state dues paid by such phrai were passed on to the centre. This situation made the nai increasingly dependent on control of manpower, while the state had to rely principally upon trade as its major source of income. This came at a time when world trade patterns were shifting, driving Siam into greater involvement first with the Chinese and then with the European world-economies. As we shall see, this expanding commerce strengthened royal power vis-à-vis the nai class but also decreased the state’s role relative to the private enterprises owned by the royal princes and great families in alliance with Chinese entrepreneurs. From these commercial alliances a common interest emerged, the country’s economic development and the curbing of royal control of the economy. Since the fall of King Taksin was partly due to inadequate sources of revenue, Rama I was forced to find new ones. His attempts to squeeze revenues from the current practice of royal monopoly on imports and exports turned Chinese traders away. The king therefore became more actively engaged in the junk trade. According to King Mongkut, King Rama I sent out men to look for wood to build up junks and to gather sapan and red wood as well as other forest products to load these junks. He did so by forming a joint venture with Chinese junk traders, making profit from the junk trade to cover year to year expenditure.39 The royal junk trade was highly profitable because high-value goods such as ivory, were monopolised.40 King Mongkut also told us that another major import was Chinese immigrants.41 There was a continuing influx of lower-class Chinese immigrants during the 1790s and 1800s because of harsh conditions in China and encouragement from the traders who realised the need for manpower to build the new capital at Bangkok. They would soon take advantage of new opportunities offered by the European world-economy. During this reign, the practice of securing forest products from Siam’s neighbouring countries continued. Bangkok became an entrepôt of forest products for the Chinese market. Reportedly, the purpose of Siamese coastal trade with Cambodia, Vietnam and the Peninsular Malay states was to collect produce for the Chinese market.42 Likewise, produce from Laos travelled by river to Bangkok en route to the same destination.43 A major turning point in the Siamese economy came towards the end of the reign when the Kingdom suddenly started growing new products such

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as sugar cane, pepper and tobacco, ostensibly for the Chinese market.44 No convincing explanation has been given as to why China suddenly increased its demand, or why Siam so willingly obliged. A close look at China’s economic relations with the western world shows that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, British country traders previously engaged in trade in the Middle East had arrived in China. Because the East India Company already enjoyed a monopoly of luxury goods such as tea and silk, they had to settle for dealing in bulk products, especially sugar, which Siam was able to supply.45 These new items required large-scale production, often by Chinese entrepreneurs and labour. It is noteworthy that the Teochiu Chinese based in King Taksin’s homeland, who were pioneers in long-distance trade, originally came from sugar-growing regions of China.46 The king and the Siamese elite had a fair share of investment in new products, especially sugar. However, it should be noted that the important development of the Siamese economy during the early Bangkok period was due largely to the entrepreneurship and hard labour of the Chinese. The implications of their contribution to the economy will be explored later in the chapter. However, one must keep in mind that the demands of the European world-economy were the main force behind this development. By meeting the needs of the European world-economy arising in China, Siam played two roles: as producers for the world market, and as traders co-operating with the Chinese to monopolise the very significant trade route between Siam and China. In the first capacity, sugar was the most important item and, in the early nineteenth century, Siam became one of the centres, albeit as a late-comer, in Southeast Asia producing sugar for the world market. An eyewitness report mentions how sugar mills sprung up along major rivers in the central plain.47

Changes in the fiscal structure of the early Bangkok state The way in which the Siamese state became deeply involved with the Chinese world-economy, and indirectly with the European one, had many important consequences for its fiscal and political structures. One was the establishment of the Privy Purse (Phra Khlang Kang Thi). When King Rama I started earning additional income from his junk trade, he set it aside in a chest next to his bed, hence the Siamese name “the treasury by the bedside”.48 The Privy Purse was used to pay annual stipends (bia wat) to the ruling class. Although the amount was fairly small, it helped consolidate the patron–client relationships between the first king of the new dynasty and the ruling class.49 When the king refused to increase his Wang Na’s bia wat, the latter refused to see the king throughout his life.50 The Privy Purse was originally considered a convenient new-found source of wealth which was put at the king’s disposal, and which could be

State, society and the world-economies 21 disbursed according to his discretion. The annual stipend was the main expenditure item: others included those for religious purposes and buildings. Other smaller conventional sources of revenue continued to go in to the Treasury. The separation of the Privy Purse and Treasury should therefore not be read as evidence that the king’s finances were distinguished from those of the state; royal household and government were still intimately related. Nevertheless, this did mark the first step in a very long process by which the royal household and the state separated, as discussed on pages 23–24. The expansion of production significantly increased shipping business to the advantage of the private local and international traders. Under King Rama II (1809–1824) the royal junk trade was at a disadvantage, according to King Mongkut, because: the junk could be wrecked which caused great loss of royal revenue. Besides, those responsible for furbishing the junk used all sort of tricks to embezzle until there was no profit but only loss.51 The royal trade could not compete with the expansion of private enterprises and they increasingly threatened the state’s ability to raise revenues. As a consequence, the annual stipend was reduced by two-thirds or even half. Towards the end of the reign, white fabric was used in lieu of incomplete payment.52 The state’s failure to benefit fully from the new sources of income indicated to King Rama III (1824–1850) (the former Krommun Jetsadabodin who, under King Rama II, supervised royal trade and monopolies and was thus an extremely powerful political figure)53 the need to reform the financial structure of Siamese state. The king noted that, in China and neighbouring western colonies, the main source of state revenue was derived from tax farming. King Mongkut reflected back on his predecessor’s actions: under King Rama II the royal junk was not as profitable as formerly. This is because the junk trade was greatly expanded and there were many private traders. The royal junk trade was at a disadvantage for many reasons. But if he [King Rama III] were to issue discriminate measures, it would have been beneath the dignity of a great king. Once compared with the practice in China, he came to the conclusion that neither China nor other important countries earned their revenue from junk trade but from taxation in order to develop the country, to pay annual stipend, and to support the army. King Rama III then consulted the ministers about establishing tax farms on goods, abolishing the Royal Warehouse monopoly and allowing goods to be freely bought and sold. He received their full support.54

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According to Burney, the British envoy who came to negotiate a trade treaty in 1825, King Rama III signalled a change in the financial structure on the day he ascended the throne. He announced he would not be a kingmerchant and maintain monopolies; rather he would permit free trade which meant an abolition of the monopolistic role of the Royal Warehouse.55 Thus economic imperatives made the king embrace the new principle of liberalism of the time. It should be noted that this change in trade policy was not imposed upon Siam as claimed by many Thai historians. However, he maintained discriminations against western traders, a point to be discussed later. Since King Rama III was the son of a concubine and not the heir apparent, he needed all the support he could muster to succeed his father and to have these changes accepted. Because of his influence due to his involvement in trade and production, he had the support of the great nobles and managed to bypass the heir, Prince Mongkut, a twenty-year-old prince who chose not to press his claim and instead went into the monkhood for the rest of the reign. King Rama III turned to the ruling classes who staffed the state administration and who, while indirectly benefiting from the expansion of trade by selling surplus and commutation of corvée, had suffered from the reduction in bia wat brought about by decline of royal trade. The nobles assumed the bia wat had been cut by King Rama II in order to pay the costs of his numerous building projects. King Rama III assured them that he was determined to spend less than a quarter of his father’s expenditure,56 implying that the bia wat would be paid in full. King Rama III renounced royal court spending in order to win the support of the ruling classes, and generally projected himself as an austere monarch who, seeking nothing for personal pleasure, indulged only in building monasteries, making merit and giving alms to the poor.57 The announcement revolutionised fiscal structures. From then on, state revenue was transferred from external activities, i.e. trade, to internal taxation.58 Under the reign of King Rama III, thirty-eight new tax farms were established which reflected not only new economic activities but also the general expansion of the money economy due to the contributions of Chinese labourers and the involvement of some of the Siamese peasantry.59 The new tax farms can be divided into three categories. The first represented all newly produced export goods such as sugar, pepper, tobacco and cotton which were farmed, taxed from producers and also subjected to export taxes. The second included six items from the former export monopolies such as ivory, sapan wood, red wood, etc. The inefficient revenue-collecting mechanism employed by the Royal Warehouse through the monopoly system was replaced by the enterprising Chinese tax farmers who realised that assiduous collection was in their own interest. The third category of tax farm arose from the massive influx of Chinese immigrants, of which the majority worked in new forms of production.

State, society and the world-economies 23 The migration produced a huge labour force which stood outside the traditional system of production. Concentrated in the central plains and eastern provinces, it created a big market for food, consumer goods and services. Chinese labourers, having disposable wages, spent considerable sums on gambling and lotteries. The Siamese state, like the western colonial governments, found vice to be a major source of revenue. The Chinese immigrants also presented a potential tax farm for opium which was in great demand. However, this was resisted by King Rama III who projected himself as a model Buddhist king who could not possibly sanction such a blatant vice. As a result, some great nobles benefited personally from the opium smuggling.60 Additionally, Chinese labourers were significant consumers of food and many other goods such as cooking woks and Chinese sweets, which also became tax farms. One of the most important consequences of Chinese immigration related to the rice growing economy. Chinese labour’s presence in the central area drew the neighbouring Siamese peasantry into the market economy by selling food surpluses, a situation similar to the revival of European towns after the tenth century. By 1837, the involvement of the money economy in rice production allowed the state to commute the land tax to be paid in money rather than, as earlier, in kind (rice). King Rama III was pleasantly surprised to have found a new source of money revenue of 300 catties even after covering all the state’s rice needs. The revenue further contributed to the annual stipend payment, and after the embezzlement in the land tax collection was rectified, the revenue increased to 900 catties annually.61 Apart from the Chinese immigrants, those Siamese peasants who were drawn into the market economy also provided a basis for tax farms on Siamese consumer goods such as dried meat and fish. Channelled through the Treasury, the new tax system guaranteed the king a steady revenue. During this reign, the annual stipend was paid wholly from the Treasury and no longer from the Privy Purse. King Rama III no longer needed to depend on commerce although, in fact, he continued the junk trade, but in his role as a private entrepreneur rather than as a monarch. He frequently bought farmed goods in the market and paid the same taxes as other merchants.62 His profits were paid to the Privy Purse, which became well endowed because, according to King Rama V, “he took keen interest in (his trading activities) since he had long experience in the royal junk trade”.63 At the end of his reign, King Rama III had 4,000 catties in the Privy Purse, most of which he passed on to King Mongkut who kept it separate from his own Privy Purse. (Most of the money was used to pay the French following the Paknam Incident in 1893.) King Rama III had an interest in enforcing the distinction between the Treasury and the Privy Purse and in restricting outside demands upon the Privy Purse. There is no indication that he was aware of how he was furthering the process of separating royal household finances from state

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funds. He acted to give himself room to manoeuvre, and he probably would have reintegrated the fiscal system if this had been expedient. With the increased revenues from taxation, the state was less dependent on the traditional manpower system. Corvée began to be replaced with more flexible and easily mobilised waged labour. Building materials were obtained more efficiently by purchase than by suai (tax in kind), because the state could now afford to pay for them.64 The commutation of the land tax, mentioned earlier, indicates the extent of the money economy. A monarch’s ability to tax has been recognised as an important step to state-building in Europe. But Thai scholars have not adequately addressed this development in Siam. Nithi has perceived, quite rightly, that economic developments during the early Bangkok period contributed towards the modernisation that occurred during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, but he never pinpointed the causal process linking the two periods.65 As we shall see, this connecting factor was the influence of the European worldeconomy, dominated by London. The new fiscal system also caused a shift in the balance of power between the king and the great nobles. Under King Rama II, Phra Khlang (Dit Bunnag)66 and Krommun Jetsadabodin formed a close alliance to reap personal benefit from the royal junk trade and exercise their prerogatives in buying from and selling to western traders. This alliance led to Krommun Jetsadabodin’s accession to the throne. As King Rama III, he could not afford an all-powerful great nobility, especially during a time of great economic expansion. To check their concentration of power, King Rama III allocated all-new tax farms to the head of the Royal Warehouse Department, arguing that separating this new source of revenue from the Treasury would make it easier to track how much it contributed to state income.67 The head of the Royal Warehouse Department, Phraya Sriphiphat (That Bunnag) was a younger brother of the Phra Khlang; the king counted on the well-known jealousy and animosity between the Bunnags68 to prevent the tendency of powerful nobles to challenge the monarch’s power. At the same time, blood and commercial interests put the brothers on the king’s side against those whose power base rested upon the control of manpower. This group was led by Chaophraya Chakri who gained a powerful position during the previous reign by winning a war against Cambodia which brought him political prominence and control of booty. The king felt uncomfortable with the powerful ministers he inherited and relied more on the Bunnags and certain high-ranking princes.69 This divide-and-rule policy allowed King Rama III to partially contain the centrifugal forces inherent in the pre-modern state. Moreover, he was able to use his increased revenue to stop the nobles from uniting against him (for example, by employing Chinese labour instead of insisting the nai class fill its quota of corvée labourer). This kept the nai class content and enabled him to strike a political balance between the two factions of nobles – those

State, society and the world-economies 25 whose power depended on trade and those whose power depended on manpower. Simultaneously the exercise of divide-and-rule among the Bunnags turned Phraya Sriphiphat and his clients – Chinese merchants and tax farmers – into a powerful group with vested interests in retaining the existing economic system. They resisted the demand of the European worldeconomy to change Siam’s trading practices and taxation.

Siam and the European world-economy Although the direct participation of Siam in the European world-economy was sealed by British pressure imposed by the Bowring Treaty of 1855, we have seen that Siam had already started meeting the demands of the European world-economy from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, since the establishment of Singapore in 1819, Siam had been trading with the West and had not wanted to surrender its increasingly advantageous position in that economy. Siam had quickly become an important trading partner of Singapore, and offered goods both for re-export and for consumption within Singapore and the peninsula. Soon after its establishment, Singapore became the second largest importer of Siamese products. Both factors greatly spurred the development of the Siamese shipping business. Junks from Siam began arriving in Singapore in 1821, and soon thereafter they exceeded the number of junks coming from Cambodia and Cochin-China.70 Siamese shippers enjoyed a distinct trade advantage: they could sell or buy cheaply in the free port of Singapore, whereas British traders operating from Singapore who wanted to import to or export from Siam were subject to a warehouse monopoly and to various fees and restrictions. What most infuriated the British merchants was that Chinese traders were subject to none of these restrictions. The Chinese were thus favoured because of the mutual benefit developed far back in history. In 1821 the British made their first attempt to gain a better trade arrangement by sending John Crawfurd to negotiate. He failed to accomplish his mission, in part because he refused to sell firearms and in part because he was not empowered to confirm Siamese rights over Kedah. But most important, the Siamese authorities did not want to change the ongoing situation with respect to their arrangements with the Chinese and were highly suspicious of the British intentions.71 The second British attempt to negotiate a better trade arrangement in 1825 by Henry Burney occurred under different circumstances. The British Empire was moving closer to Siam’s western and southern borders, and was willing to make significant concessions to Siam.72 At the same time Siam, impressed by the defeat of the Burmese by the British, was motivated to settle its political differences with England. Besides, the former monopoly by the Royal Warehouse Department had been abolished a year earlier; thus the cause of complaint no longer existed. In the

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Burney Treaty, the Siamese government agreed that the British merchants could “buy and sell without the intervention of other persons” and that the import duty would be 1,700 ticals for each Siamese fathom.73 Under this agreement, Siamese traders continued to benefit hugely from trading with Singapore –partly because of the high import duty against the British and particularly because the British were forbidden to export Siamese rice, the product which became increasingly in demand in the world market. By the 1840s the international situation had changed: the Chinese world-economy was challenged and later subdued by the European worldeconomy through the Opium War and the Nanking Treaty (1842). This had a direct impact on Sino-Siamese trade and Siam’s declining economic position was reflected in new restrictions aimed at safeguarding state revenues and shipping. In 1842 sugar was subjected to partial monopoly and in 1844 the monopoly became a new tax farm.74 Although this promised to guarantee the government a fixed income even in hard times, when producers rather than government would carry the cost of taxation, in 1846 the production of sugar was reduced (from a level of 256,000 piculs in 1840) to 150,000 piculs.75 The monopoly pushed the price up, making Thai sugar less competitive in world markets, and it provoked a new confrontation with the British. The sugar monopoly highlighted an ongoing problem between British traders and tax farmers of export goods established by King Rama III. In practice, these tax farmers became monopolists in buying and selling the goods they farmed. This was a new form of monopoly which differed from that earlier imposed by the Royal Warehouse Department.76 However, if the rate imposed by tax farmers was not too high, western traders were willing to accept the situation. This was attested by the number of vessels modelled in the Western square-rigged style. In 1842 these amounted to fifty-five.77 In any case, in the 1840s this issue was not seen by the British authority to be an infringement of the Burney Treaty but, as we shall see, it would become the central point of contention in 1855. After China was defeated, British traders in Singapore and India lost patience and those in Singapore lobbied their government via the International Society in London.78 The Foreign Office then decided that a new mission would represent the Queen rather than the Governor General as in the case of the previous missions. In 1850, Sir James Brooke was instructed to negotiate a new trade treaty according to those made with other “imperfectly civilised states”, and demanded the right of residence and worship. Not ranking Siam as their top priority, the British authorities did not expect the mission to be successful and the envoy was instructed not to worsen the existing relationships.79 However, the Chamber of Commerce in Singapore felt that force should be exercised to make the Siamese accept British demands.80 The Siamese authorities were unaware of the conciliatory attitude of the British government and assumed its demand to reduce custom duties

State, society and the world-economies 27 would be drastic, and this dictated their negative posture toward the British envoy.81 However, the attitude of the Siamese elite towards the British was divided. This conflict reflects divergences in their economic, cultural and familial interests. It also represents the emergence of some of the forces that would later give rise to Siamese absolutism. Two younger members of the Bunnag family – Chuang and Kham Bunnag – their father, Chao Phraya Phra Khlang, and Prince Mongkut favoured an accommodation with the British. The opposition was dominated by King Rama III and Phraya Sriphiphat, head of the Royal Warehouse Department. Members of Prince Mongkut’s party were considered the first westernised members of the elite.82 Brooke had written in his journal that “the parties may be divided into a King’s party and the Princes’ party, and it may be generally taken for granted that the Princes themselves and the party adhering to their cause, are favourable to Europeans, whilst the king and the opposite party are opposed to them.”83 In so doing, he implied that the king’s supporters were backward and uncivilised. However sharp their cultural differences appeared, the conflict between the two groups was determined above all by their perception of Siamese (and their own) interests. King Rama III and Phraya Sriphiphat opposed a treaty because they were aware of the British traders’ displeasure of the tax farmers’ practice of monopoly and wanted to keep the tax farming system intact. They also thought the British intended to dominate the lucrative trade between Siam and Singapore. For example, by 1847 the Siamese nobility was making up to 300 per cent profit by collaborating with Chinese residents in transporting rice to Singapore.84 British merchants had only restricted access to Siam’s rice, and according to the Burney Treaty, the Thais had imposed a high custom duty which reduced the profits from importing bulky goods. Those opposing the treaty were supported by Siamese nobles and Chinese merchants who benefited from trade with Singapore and who were also tax farmers. According to a western observer: It is very well known that China merchants residing in Bangkok have for many years enjoyed an extensive and profitable trade with different parts of China, Hainan, Cochin China, Singapore and the Malay Coast; and they have always been very jealous of the English encroaching too much on this very valuable part of their trade, and these crafty people take great pleasure in doing us all the mischief they can by false and malicious representations to the King and ministers to prejudice them against us, to induce them to keep us out of the country.85 These Chinese merchants successfully persuaded most of the Thai elite that China had not succumb to the British and had concluded the Nanking

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Treaty merely out of irritation.86 Indeed, merchants were so upset to learn of the arrival of Sir James Brooke that they contemplated raising a 100,000 baht to fight the British. The description of Bangkok – “The city was in a state of panic, full of men in red uniforms and many boats along the river where the chain barring the river was raised”87 – shows that the treaty opponents realised their position was untenable. Those welcoming the treaty were a mixed bunch with mixed motives. The core member was the Phra Khlang whose official power was curbed by the control his younger brother, Phraya Sriphiphat, exercised over new tax farms introduced under the reign of King Rama III. However, the Phra Khlang prospered in his private capacity as a Siamese who built western-styled square rigged vessels of greater capacity than the traditional junk. These were better protected against the elements, required less of a crew and hence were cheaper to operate. He and his sons continued their trading activities with China and Singapore in the 1840s.88 It was an open secret that Phra Khlang imported opium, a contraband under King Rama III, from Singapore and resold it to the Chinese merchants in Siam at a great profit.89 Thus he had first-hand experience of how one could benefit from the European world-economy. Furthermore, in the Phra Khlang’s capacity, he did his best to obstruct British freedom of trade; this was an activity in which he and his brother, Phraya Sriphiphat, acted in unison.90 However, he acquired modern technology and, lacking vested interests in the tax farming system, the Phra Khlang could be persuaded by his sons to a drastic shift in the direction of the Siamese economy. King Mongkut later described how the Phra Khlang was reprimanded by King Rama III for being receptive to Brooke’s argument that the new treaty would be signed by the Queen.91 The seemingly disadvantaged position imposed by King Rama III on the senior branch of the Bunnags and the acquisition of western technology probably spurred the younger generation of Bunnags (Chuang and Kham) to re-orient themselves towards the western world. They believed that the West, especially Britain, was the force to be reckoned with.92 They were convinced that, although a trade treaty with Britain would require them to compete with the British on a more equal footing, that should not be an insurmountable problem having had adjusted themselves earlier on. A treaty would also mean a much bigger market for Siamese products. They accepted the British argument that the treaty would spur production and consequently create a wider base for taxation.93 According to them, the economic basis of the state and the elite would depend significantly on expanding internal production according to the British demand while allowing efficient Thais to have a share in the shipping business. The young Bunnags’ most important ally was Prince Mongkut. Although he had chosen to join the monkhood after being passed over for the throne, his political star was rising. King Rama III had failed to produce an acceptable heir, whereas Prince Mongkut had built up

State, society and the world-economies 29 barami94 as a monk and leader of the more puritan sect in the Buddhist church.95 The Bunnags considered him a suitable future king for, like them, he encouraged relations with the West. According to Prince Damrong, after deciding on Prince Mongkut, the two brothers cultivated his friendship by establishing a temple for the prince’s Thammayut sect.96 Judging from his keen interest in western languages and technology, Prince Mongkut was probably sympathetic to opening the country to the West, and given that he spent nearly three decades as a monk, he did not have much bargaining power vis-à-vis the Bunnags. However, Prince Mongkut was chiefly interested in succeeding to the throne and had no particular commitment to the economic arguments involved. Once king, he confessed to having been perplexed by the concept of free trade, wondering how it would benefit the Siamese authority. He admitted he could see the benefit for Siamese consumers and British exporters, but abolishing the measurement tax would certainly hurt Siamese authority, and creation of the inland revenue would oppress the Siamese peasantry.97 In any case, Brooke perceived Prince Mongkut as the head of a faction who communicated with the mission “in a private and guarded manner”.98 Since the king’s party prevailed, Brooke found himself stepping out of the official line and began to make many specific demands. He accused the Siamese government of violating the Burney Treaty by exercising monopolies.99 His proposed treaty aimed at giving the British merchants free access to rice, significantly reducing the measurement fees, and decreasing the number of the monopoly to seven items; which meant that British merchants could at least compete more satisfactorily with the local merchants, if not actually dominate the trade.100 Only Phra Khlang and Prince Mongkut among the senior elite supported the treaty; the rest of the Siamese establishment saw its interests better served by protecting the status quo. The commercial proposal was rejected on the grounds that it meant “to destroy, to change the fixed rules and customs of a great country which has been established for many hundred years, and to bring them all into confusion and ruin”.101 The king preferred not to make the decision himself, but to push it onto those nobles who were most involved. His side won easily, but he knew well that he was only buying time and that a new treaty was inevitable.102 Within a few years the balance between the two groups shifted dramatically. In 1850, King Rama III died and was succeeded by Prince Mongkut, who owed his succession above all to the support of the Bunnag family.103 The two senior Bunnags were raised to the title of Somdet Chaophraya: Phra Khlang (Dit) became superintendent of the whole country and was referred to as Ong Yai; Phraya Sriphiphat (That) became superintendent of Bangkok and was referred to as Ong Noi. Chuang became Chaophraya Srisuriyawong, the acting Kalahom; Kham became Chaophraya Thiphakonrawong, the new Phra Khlang. Thus the faction supporting the

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treaty was now the majority, with Chaophraya Srisuriyawong as the leader of the group that welcomed the new mission. For example, he wrote to Brooke in 1851, informing him that “the new King fully understands the relations of Foreign Nations . . . any intercourse of consultation may hereafter be conducted in an easier manner than before”.104 Chaophraya Srisuriyawong was most likely behind the measures taken to pave the way for the trade treaty: those included the reduction of measurement duties to 1,000 baht, the establishment of the opium tax farm and the granting of permission to export rice with certain limitations. As king, Mongkut could no longer present himself as a leader of the faction that favoured the trade treaty. He needed to represent all parties concerned. He also adopted his own agenda in ensuring that the treaty would enhance his political position. Hence he was willing to wait until Sir John Bowring had dealt with troubles in China rather than accepting an envoy of a lower rank.105 Moreover, he wanted to see Vietnam conclude a similar treaty with Britain so Siam would not be seen as succumbing to British influence which might affect its position vis-à-vis Laos and Cambodia.106 He also adopted a different attitude from the young Bunnags in believing that Siam should accept the British demands in order to negotiate for some concessions from the British.107 Those opposing the treaty had lost their most powerful leader, King Rama III, and also found their junk trade with China seriously damaged by the situation in that country.108 Trade with Singapore and tax farms were their main source of income. Hence Ong Noi (That), who supervised most of the tax farms, became the leader of the group, and he fought hard to safeguard the interests of his faction. The Kalahom’s faction tried to placate him by letting him supervise the most lucrative new tax farm, opium, when it was allowed in 1851, yet he refused to give in so easily. Thus, in 1855, the thorniest issue between Sir John Bowring and the Siamese government concerned the abolition of tax farms on export goods. Although King Mongkut appointed a five-man commission consisting of Ong Yai, Ong Noi, Kalahom, Phra Khlang and Prince Wongsa who represented the royal family, it turned into a fight between Chaophraya Srisuriyawong (the Kalahom) and Ong Noi. This time, Ong Yai also joined his brother in opposing the treaty, probably because he was not altogether convinced of the benefit of free trade. After all, he belonged to the generation which opposed the treaty. The conflict forced Chaophraya Srisuriyawong to formulate his argument in terms of the interests of the people and Siam, denouncing the tax farms for being oppressive. He assured Bowring that if the envoy really had the benefit of the Siamese people at heart, he should exert his influence on the king “to bring about that radical and necessary change which cannot otherwise be accomplished”.109 This led Bowring to wonder whether Chaophraya Srisuriyawong was a true nationalist or a hypocrite.110

State, society and the world-economies 31 Ong Noi fiercely defended his interests by rallying tax farmers to present their cases at the treaty negotiation.111 He also raised objections about the export of rice on the grounds that Siamese rice production depended upon rain and forest water which was beyond anyone’s control.112 The agreement on the abolition of certain tax farms only came after hard work on the part of Chaophraya Srisuriyawong and threats by Bowring. Srisuriyawong came into direct conflict with the senior Bunnag over the matter, and tried his best to gather information on the tax farming system for the British mission.113 Bowring, upon “observing the opposition on the part of Somdet Ong Noi stated distinctively to the Commissioners that a change in the present system was indispensable . . . and the he (sic) who opposed the desired arrangement . . . would incur the weight of the serious responsibilities connected with the observance of the old stipulations.”114 Other points of contention between Bowring and the Commissioners included the appointment of a consul which, according to the Siamese elite, might lead other western powers to follow this example. The existence of many representatives of western powers was seen as a threat to internal stability. Chaophraya Srisuriyawong was also concerned about this. The matter was resolved by an agreement that a consul would not be appointed until ten British ships had visited Bangkok after the treaty. The Siamese elite did not consider the extraterritorial right an issue because so few British subjects resided there at the time.115 As for the king’s concern, Bowring promised to extend his mission to Vietnam. Replacing the measurement tax with tariffs also went smoothly. An import tax of 3 per cent was agreed upon, while the export duties were to be levied internally or as an export tax. Monopolies were abolished except for those on firearms and opium which could only be sold to the government and non-Thais respectively. The Bowring Treaty has been generally seen as the way British imperialism imposed its will on a weak, defenceless Siam, and King Mongkut was doing his best to preserve the nation’s independence. As we have seen, this was King Mongkut’s position which was publicised by Prince Damrong.116 There was an element of threat and, unlike the Brooke mission, the British authority was more willing to resort to force.117 Before his arrival, Bowring had informed the Siamese government that although the British had a large fleet at sea he intended to bring only a few ships to Bangkok.118 However, those in the Siamese elite who saw the potential benefits from the trade treaty welcomed the British demands. Their perception and hard work brought about the conclusion of the treaty. The expansion of trade and production provided the basis for the establishment of the absolutist state under King Chulalongkorn. The Bowring Treaty was instrumental in linking the Siamese economy to the European world-economy. The comparative advantage criteria

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decided that Siamese geography was very suitable for producing rice to meet the increased demand from the world market, involving massive labour migration in Southeast Asia. Sugar production, which the Siamese elite expected to piggyback on rice, was not competitive with production from the Philippines and Java, and soon declined. The Bowring Treaty also brought Siam into the international division of labour. By becoming a rice-growing country, a position which it held until the 1960s, Siam lost its position of a sugar manufacturer and was given the role of the primary product producer. The principle of division of labour also worked internally: the central plains were fully drawn into the European world-economy, whereas the northeast, which had flourished under the Chinese world-economy by supplying forest products, went into decline because it could not serve the demands of the European worldeconomy.119

The impact of the Bowring Treaty on the Thai state We now turn to the nature of the Thai state after the Bowring Treaty. At its heart lies the issue of the relationship between the king and the great nobles after the treaty. The Bunnags’ support for King Mongkut’s accession to the throne has been noted, along with his lack of power base during his monkhood. The power of the great nobles grew even stronger, after the treaty, created by linking Siam with the world economy. That the king was a creation of the Bunnags means he had little control over increasing resources of the kingdom. And as we shall see, he remained a client of the great nobles throughout his reign. Thus, we have a situation by which forces of the pre-modern state still existed at a time when the Thai state was initially linked with the world capitalist system, and that link further undermined the power of the king. King Mongkut’s position is clearly shown by a proclamation issued in 1854 giving full authority to Ong Yai, Ong Noi, Chaophraya Nikon, the Mahadthai and Chaophraya Srisuriyawong. They had power to issue any order without seeking the king’s approval, and he would appreciate being informed of any important decision so that he could act accordingly.120 After the Bowring Treaty was signed, a new political arrangement among the Siamese elite was reached, and this is seen in the allocation of the tax farms, the country’s most important source of revenue. As we have seen, tax farms under King Rama III were controlled by the Treasury and the Royal Warehouse Department; now they were also meted out to other departments controlled by the great nobles (the Mahadthai, the Kalahom, the Krom Tha and the Krom Muang). Under this arrangement, the Treasury had two separate functions: as one of the departments which controlled a certain amount of tax farms, and in its role as the budding Ministry of Finance, collector of all state revenues. Judging from King Chulalongkorn’s account, the tax farms under the Treasury remained

State, society and the world-economies 33 within the royal domain; the rest was distributed among the great nobles.121 The Bunnags, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong, the Kalahom and Chaophraya Thiphakonrawong, his brother (Kham), the Krom Tha, enjoyed control over the most lucrative tax farms; they were allocated control over the opium farm (after the death of Ong Noi), the spirit farm of Bangkok, and import and export taxes. King Mongkut’s clients, Krom Luang Wongsa, and Chaophraya Phonlathep of the Land Department shared control over sources of the revenue. Krom Luang Wongsa, the king’s half-brother, enjoyed a substantial share in the Royal Warehouse Department tax farms, the major earner after the Kalahom,122 whereas Chaophraya Phonlathep oversaw the land tax, an increasingly important tax since Siam started producing rice for the world market. Thus, the powerful elite were satisfied with the increasing resources and the Bunnags’ power was checked to a certain extent. We have already seen that there existed a process of the separation between the king as an institution and as a person. The Privy Purse under King Rama III was considered his personal domain to an extent that King Mongkut did not make a claim on it. Then arose a question of how he should earn his personal income since he lacked King Rama III’s aptitude in trade. King Mongkut started his reign with the personal endowment of 100 catties which he tried to augment with private enterprises. When this became difficult under the Bowring Treaty, he turned to the great nobles for help and it was agreed by the elite that the Privy Purse would receive 5 per cent of the tax farm revenue, but this was honoured largely in the breach. King Mongkut relied mainly upon his grateful client Chaophraya Phonlathep of Krom Na who held his position through support from the king, and who went above the 5 per cent agreement by forwarding the flat rate of 2,000 catties annually to the Privy Purse. The remaining contribution to the Privy Purse was another 2,000 catties, and when the Krom Na was replaced by Phraya Ahanborirak, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong’s nephew and client, the king also lost the 2,000 catties contribution.123 The great nobles apparently considered the tax farms under their control as their own property and used every opportunity to limit their payments to the Treasury. They deemed it right to pay only a fixed amount of revenue to the Treasury regardless of the fact that bidding for the farms had increased over the years. Even Kromluang Wongsa, the king’s half-brother who was given the Royal Warehouse Department, did not act any differently from the other great nobles.124 This probably explains why King Mongkut prohibited any of Wongsa’s offspring to be ordained in his Thammayut sect.125 As a result, both the Privy Purse and the Treasury suffered at a time when the Siamese economy was expanding. According to King Chulalongkorn, during the last years of the reign, the annual stipend was barely covered. When King Mongkut died, he was not aware of his personal

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fortune and instructed that his cremation should be paid from the Privy Purse. This caused the Privy Purse to owe a huge sum to the Treasury, which it took over ten years to repay.126 Thus, it is safe to conclude that the great nobles benefited the most from the economic expansion. One reason the resources were controlled by the great nobles arose from the fact that, from the very beginning, the king was forced into being a client of the great nobles rather than their patron. Evidence suggests that soon after 1855 King Mongkut might have attempted to check the power of Chaophraya Srisuriyawong. The Kalahom claimed to a British envoy that he had been out of royal favour because of the fall in revenues and the terms of the treaty which were inferior to those which the Japanese had succeeded in obtaining from Britain.127 The king thus inadvertently alienated the man who would become the most powerful person in his reign, for although the treaty did destroy Siam’s independent trade and subordinated it to the West, it also brought a great number of productive forces into contact with the European worldeconomy. These ultimately contributed far more revenue to the state than it had in the past; already under King Mongkut the revenue from excise taxes expanded and the number and size of tax farms on consumer goods and services increased.128 These changes laid the groundwork for the transformation of the Thai state from a pre-modern to an absolutist state. In the meantime, the great nobles and their tax farmer clients simply enjoyed their privileges at the expense of the state. Under King Rama III, the revenue for the Privy Purse came largely from his private enterprise and was kept separately from Treasury revenue for his own benefit. The precedent of having the royal expenses come only from the Privy Purse and not from the Treasury was re-emphasised under the strained financial circumstances of the reign of King Mongkut, who took great care to point out that the money spent on his family and on making merit came from the Privy Purse and not from the Treasury.129 This helped to lay the foundation of private property in Thai society.130 Furthermore, once the monarch had no claim on the Treasury, his person was well on its way to becoming separated from that of the state. During King Mongkut’s reign, the form and financing of the state resembled the old, even as they increasingly took on the characteristics of the new. The king’s style and ideology reflected this ambivalence as well as the problems he faced in dealing with traditional and modernising forces from a position of weakness. Although King Mongkut’s administrative proclamations give the impression that he was active in state matters, the fact that the great nobles did not regularly attend the daily royal audience suggests that he was not at the centre of administrative power.131 The king’s writings indicate that he was the centre of neither symbolic nor administrative power. State and royal ceremonies, which supposedly functioned to reinforce the link and hierarchy between the monarch and

State, society and the world-economies 35 the nobility, became demonstrations of royal weakness because the great nobles did not attend.132 The king responded by de-emphasising the importance of such rites. Thus, when holding a tonsure ceremony for Prince Chulalongkorn, his son, he assured the nobles that he did not expect them to make contributions, but if they chose to do so he would return the favour in due time.133 By emphasising reciprocity, he was no longer acting out the traditional monarchical role of supreme patron. He openly conceded his role as the client of the nobles responsible for putting him on the throne, to whom he felt a deep sense of gratitude. As such he greatly needed their support. When his coat of arms was insulted because it was said to belong to an old and powerless king, he begged them to rally around him and attend the ceremony of tham khwan (calling back the guardian spirit).134 King Mongkut’s efforts to assert royal authority in his relationships with the nobility were largely limited to emphasising face-to-face contacts. Thus he ordered that members of the ruling class come to receive the annual stipend from him personally instead of sending representatives. He presided over the ceremony of drinking water of allegiance and took an initiation to make a vow to be true to the ruling class.135 He personally signed and presented the documents certifying the promotion of royal princes at their own palaces. He encouraged the lesser nobles to inform him of any ceremonies they arranged, so that he might make a contribution with a view to future reciprocity.136 But his patronage resources were limited, as can be seen by his offer to the nobles of the services of the royal masseuses.137 King Mongkut also attempted to strengthen the royal image among the general population by emphasising the role of the monarch as the source of justice and the people’s well being. He took up the role of crusader for justice – understandable, given that his real power had been stripped away by the great nobles, and that by attacking abuses of state power he effectively attacked them. In trying to include orders and proclamations “so that nobody would claim arbitrarily”, he issued a proclamation prohibiting those who aspired to be town governors from attempting to win office by bribery. He reasoned that once they had achieved their ambitions they would use their positions to seek benefits that greatly exceeded the value of what they had paid out, and would thus oppress the people. The language of the proclamation was harsh; those who resorted to bribery were compared to a vampire who sucks the people’s blood.138 The people were encouraged to present petitions to him directly, and details on how this could be carried out were elaborated. They were even promised money to cover their expenses.139 The king also addressed himself to tax farming, another source of popular oppression and hardship. As a monk, Prince Mongkut had travelled extensively and understood how much the people hated tax farmers; his expressions of sympathy with their plight had made him a very popular

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candidate for the throne – at least from his point of view.140 The problems he faced as monarch forced him to approve even more tax farms as the Thai state moved to a total reliance upon internal sources of revenue, but he found a way to reduce the potential for abusing the system. Tax rates were published in the Royal Gazette so the people could know the limits of their tax obligations, and, should the tax farmers become oppressive, the people were told what steps they could take to complain. They could go so far as the king himself, should the ministers fail to take action.141 By stressing the image of the monarch as a fighter for justice and the well-being of the common people, King Mongkut brought about an important development in state ideology. The dialogue between monarch and the ruling class gave way to a dialogue between the king and the lower strata of society – at least those who were literate and who lived close enough to the centre of power. The references to the happiness of and justice for the people remind one of the European Enlightenment. This change laid the foundations for the major shift in legitimising principles that occurred in the next reign. Western influences were largely responsible for this drive to ideological change. Since the collapse of China and Siam’s subordination to the western world order symbolised by the Bowing Treaty, the Siamese elite could not escape the ideological challenge posted by the West. Suddenly Siam felt itself to be measured against a “civilised” order – “civilised” meaning complying with western ideas. Thai social organisation, culture and worldview were scrutinised, with polygamy and slavery becoming sources of particular embarrassment.142 The Bunnags also faced up to the challenge posed by western thought and produced a scientific explanation for the most important Buddhist treatise, the Tri Phum Phra Ruang.143 This perception of the world order was reflected in the new term, siwilai (being civilised). The concept of “being civilised” was defined in different ways as we shall see, but when it first appeared it was closely related to the worldeconomy. King Mongkut described Siam as “half civilised, half barbarian”, noting that whereas the noble class of more backward neighbours such as Laos and Cambodia depended entirely upon the manpower system, the nobility of Siam were also sustained by the bia wat.144 Since the bia wat derived from trade and taxation, it seems likely that by the middle of the nineteenth century the Thai elite understood “being civilised” to mean that control over labour was no longer the basis of power. The elite began to perceive the manpower system as something backward and barbarian. The conception of “being civilised” co-existed well with the westerninspired notion that a free peasantry would become more effective producers for the world. It is therefore not surprising that King Mongkut started contemplating the abolition of slavery.145 As in previous Bangkok reigns, the corvée system no longer effectively served the state: the noble class controlled most of the unfree labour, and work obligations were

State, society and the world-economies 37 extensively commuted for cash. The main difficulty for the monarchy was finding money to pay labour costs and compensating the noble class; this could only be possible when the economy was better entrenched in the European world-economy and revenue from taxation could be used. It was left to King Mongkut’s son, King Chulalongkorn, to take on the task of changing the basis of power in the Thai state. He could do so because the Thai state had come a long way since the fall of Ayudhya, in terms of both structure and ideology. Even the post-Bowring changes, which would seem to impel the country away from the modern order – the return to reliance on domestic sources of surplus and the loss of the royal power to the nobles – were a spur to change rather than regression. Siam had become too involved in a market economy and a world of thought dominated by the West to remain a patrimonial state based on command of labour. New solutions had to be found, and in the next reign they would result in the establishment of royal absolutism.

2

The first stage of state-building

Introduction In 1868 King Mongkut died of a jungle fever, having caught the disease during a trip to an infested area where he had been taken in order to prove to the Siamese elite and foreign visitors that he could accurately forecast a solar eclipse. Even when he was on his death-bed, the question of succession was unsettled. He had followed the third reign’s practice of asking the great nobles to choose their own candidate, hoping that his son, Prince Chulalongkorn, would succeed him, but he was afraid for the young prince’s safety since there had been many examples in the past of the assassination of a young king.1 Phraya Surawongwaiyawat (Won Bunnag) informed King Mongkut that his father, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) and the elite had agreed that Prince Chulalongkorn should succeed his father. The king ensured his son’s succession by giving out valuable presents to the two Bunnags.2 When the old king’s death was announced, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong called a meeting of the high-ranking princes, nobles and monks, and his nomination of Prince Chulalongkorn was unanimously accepted. Chaophraya Srisuriyawong then proceeded to name the successor to the late Wang Na (Front Palace) who had died in 1865. The Wang Na, or Kromphraratchawangbowonsathanmongkon, was the second most important official in terms of control over manpower, and because he was appointed by the king was generally considered the heir apparent.3 Under King Mongkut, his brother Prince Pinklao was appointed not to this office, but raised to the status of the second king. The relationship between King Mongkut and the second king had been strained, and Chaophraya Srisuriyawong’s choice of Prince Wichaichan or Phraongchao Yodyingyod (known as George, after George Washington, the first president of the United States), King Pinklao’s son, as Wang Na was probably calculated to play him off against the new king. The new Wang Na, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong’s client, would inherit not only all his father’s men and ammunition, which would surpass those

The first stage of state-building 39 of the king, but also the title of second king. In spite of an objection from Krommun Worachak, the acting Phra Khlang (Minister for Trade and Foreign Affairs) that this appointment should be the prerogative of the new king, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong’s wish prevailed.4 With the new Wang Na as his client and with control over trade and taxation, Chaophraya Srisuriyawong seemed almost unassailable. In addition, he was appointed Regent but refused the title of Somdet Chaophraya on the grounds that it was higher than of his father at the same age. (He became Somdet Chaophraya in 1873.) In comparison, King Chulalongkorn carried very little political weight. He later reminisced about this difficult period: At that time I was fifteen years and ten days old, without a mother. None of my relatives on the maternal side were particularly able. As for paternal relatives, namely the high princes, they were all under the influence of Somet Chaophraya and had to look after their personal safety and well-being rather than support me. Some of them just took no interest in affairs of state. As for the officials, some, it is true, were devoted to me, but these were mostly junior. My own brothers and sisters, being minors, could be of no help. As for myself, at that age, I knew nothing of statecraft and was so seriously ill that but few people thought I would survive. At the time of my father’s death, therefore, I was like a human trunk, the head of which had just been cut off. I was propped up merely to serve as a figurehead. . . . The crown weighed heavily upon my head.5 The quotation reflects the difficult early years of the king’s reign. But it does not do full justice to the magnitude of the conflict boiling up between the various political groups, which led to one of the most serious political crises in modern Thai history. This chapter examines the first few years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign which marks the beginning of the state transformation process from a pre-modern to an absolutist state. It argues that these conflicts arose principally from the king’s efforts to create an absolutist state. The chapter includes the following topics: political groups within the elite; Old, Conservative and Young Siam; the initiation of the absolutist state that involved early fiscal reforms; the inauguration of the Council of State; the actions mounted against the Bunnags; and the Wang Na Crisis.

Political groups within the elite King Chulalongkorn initially had little power vis-à-vis the great families. One result of this was that questions of royal as against noble power were relatively insignificant to the debate over the course of the Siamese state, in which the king participated as a leader of one faction. This debate has

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The first stage of state-building

usually been presented as a cultural–political one between progressive modernisers versus reactionary traditionalists and cautious conservatives.6 The approach taken here is somewhat different. Old Siam, the reactionary faction, consisted of a majority of the noble families. Conservative Siam was a small group of the elite, centred on the Bunnags and their supporters. Young Siam consisted of King Chulalongkorn and his supporters, both in the nobility and the royalty. These labels were used contemporaneously, first by Dr Smith, an American missionary then residing in Siam, and have since been perpetuated by Wyatt and many other scholars.7 They accurately reflect the differences of opinion current among the elite, but it must be borne in mind that they also reflect conflicts of interest and a struggle for power which ultimately created a new identity for the monarchy. The struggle was for the control of resources, made more intense by Siam’s involvement in the capitalist world economy. As we have seen, this involvement placed an increasing emphasis on money, taxation and trade, as opposed to agriculture and control over manpower as sources of wealth and power. In the early stages of the conflict, the main split was between Young and Conservative Siams on the one hand and the Old Siam on the other. The former pairing believed that its interests lay in expanding Siam’s involvement in the world economy and trade, and thus in modernising. On the other hand, Old Siam saw its interests protected by maintaining manpower and the old value systems as the basis of political and economic power. At the same time, Conservative and Young Siams were divided by their interests in the extent of change towards modernisation, and their differences on this matter soon became acute. The previous chapter noted that King Mongkut initiated an ideological shift by emphasising the rights of the people; and also that he gave power to the Bunnag family and acted as their client. Because of their status as his patron and their earlier control over trade, the Bunnags stood in a very good position to reap the benefits from the increase in trade after the Bowring Treaty, and they did so at the expense of the Treasury. The Bunnags thus had a distinct interest in increasing Siam’s involvement in the world economy. Their immediate strength lay in control over taxation rather than in control over manpower. Nevertheless, they stood to command more money if labour was freed to became full-fledged producers for the world economy, and the bonds between phrai and nai were broken. They perceived that the old system of manpower primarily benefited Old Siam and those nobles’ interests, which obstructed the state’s direct access to the phrai. Thus Conservative Siam was interested in freeing labour, and in this respect its interests coincided with those of Young Siam, which wanted to see the state develop more efficient controls over manpower. But because much of its revenue was derived from tax farming profits, and because it feared giving up its capacity as patrons to the state (which would happen if

The first stage of state-building 41 a fully modern administrative system was implemented), its interests in change were distinctly limited. This was especially true when proposals for change affected state centralisation and fiscal reform. The king’s interests lay not only in developing the economy but also in applying modernising changes to the state administration. This was because a modern centralised state (of the royal absolutist model) would concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the monarch. A modern administration and tax system would strip wealth and power from the great families and remove the noble class as the mediator between the king and people. King Chulalongkorn and his allies therefore pressed for more thoroughgoing modernisation. In order to legitimise his moves to accumulate power in his hands and to gain support against these vested interests, the king stressed the importance of initiating the same reforms that had made the West strong. He emphasised the need for efficiency and economic development, the importance of social justice and the monarch’s role as representative of the nation and the people. Similar arguments had been advanced in the West by monarchs creating royal absolutist systems in order to harness bourgeois and popular support against feudal interests. In Siam’s case, bourgeois support was not important in this early period, but the need to adapt to the western challenge and to make Siam more prosperous made a powerful argument. Moreover, a modernising argument gave the royal faction influential support from western nations. But the king’s interest in modernising change was also limited. He did not want to see power pass to the nation-state, as had happened in Europe when absolutism had broken up. Any move in this direction would push the king into relative conservatism, and away from the more radical members of Young Siam. But like the European monarchs, he unwittingly set in train a process which could not be stopped: royal absolutism in Siam would also act as midwife to capitalist society and the nation-state, born from the dynastic state. The main body of the old ruling class – the nai – did not perceive that modernising change would serve their interests at all. However, they benefited from the change to a cash economy and an increase in trade in two ways. They could sell surplus rice produced by the phrai and that working for them. They collected payments from phrai who went to work in the developing urban sector, for instance as craftsmen, and from phrai working full time on estate lands and opening up new farming areas. When required by the government to supply workers for corvée, they provided their that rather than the money-producing phrai. But these benefits existed only because the nai could legitimately command a source of labour. If labour were freed, they could not see how they could raise the capital to employ labour in the household and in production, at least not in the manner to which they were accustomed.

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Replacing the labour-service system with a direct taxation system would free them from the obligation to provide the state with the labour of their phrai, but it would also render them redundant as organisers of labour. Consequently, they were opposed to all changes which implied a move away from the old system of hierarchy and labour control. They bitterly opposed reforms ending slavery and the marking of the phrai which sustained that institution. This question of manpower control was the main issue which ignited political conflict among the three groups. It had been a recurring problem in the pre-modern Thai state. It was now immensely complicated by Siam’s entry to the European world-economy, which shifted the major source of state revenue from the Chinese labourers, who had been the major force behind Siam’s involvement with the Chinese world-economy, to the Siamese producers. Those concerned with trade and taxation were beset with questions of whether the present manpower organisation served the new economic order best, and of how the so-called “modern” taxation system, aimed primarily at tapping resources from the Chinese community, should be adjusted. Chapter 1 made clear that during the early Bangkok period, control exercised over manpower had shifted more and more towards the nai at the expense of the king. And the number of phrai som was growing. When corvée was commuted to money payment, revenues tended to be monopolised by the chao mu (head of the manpower unit) and did not pass to the state in spite of many efforts to reform the system. During the reign of King Rama III, the service fees paid by the phrai som and for the that (by their nai) were commuted to three, and one-and-a-half bahts respectively. When this failed to guarantee state revenue, a new formula was implemented. This formula calculated fees according to the time of service each person owed the government. Thus phrai luang, who had to perform three months’ corvée, had the option of paying eighteen baht; phrai som who owed one month paid six baht; khun mun (petty officials) paid four baht for twenty days’ corvée, whereas that could pay one-and-a-half baht in lieu of eight days’ corvée.8 Early in King’s Mongkut’s reign, arguments for abolishing the systems of corvée and hired labour were discussed by the king and Chaophraya Srisuriyawong. They noted that the state did not benefit financially, and there were not enough phrai luang to perform royal service.9 But Siam had just joined the European world-economy, and the question of paying officials’ salaries as an alternative to allocating manpower was premature since the economy had yet to generate adequate money revenue. The problem was temporarily solved by writing off the nai’s arrears in paying their service fees. A plan to reduce the phrai luang’s obligation to the same level as that of the phrai som (that is, serving a month in a year) was also deemed impractical because the state needed the service of the phrai luang on a more continuing basis.10

The first stage of state-building 43 There was also a tendency for the phrai to enter slavery. In negotiating the terms of servitude they could strike a bargain with the nai that was to the advantage of both parties. Second, the nai systematically turned members of the phrai’s family to slavery by refusing to acknowledge the phrai’s death or illness and demanding that the family pay for his absence either with their property or their freedom.11 Third, the phrai fell into debt by succumbing to vices such as gambling and drinking, and these constituted a substantial source of state revenue. Thus, King Mongkut was unable to implement reforms in the organisation of manpower, while the nai class reaped greater benefits than ever from the status quo. The state might be able to derive income from the labour of the phrai once they were freed from their obligations to the nai and, as free producers, were liable to pay the head tax. However, this was not possible until the nai class was salaried and hence able to draw revenue from an alternative source. The first step in breaking the vicious circle was to end slavery, a measure which Conservative Siam eventually ventured to implement, setting off a major political conflict among the three political groups. In the early years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, the state’s situation deteriorated as the economy expanded and the nai saw their phrai as their cash earners. Apart from exacting higher payment than the official rate, the nai kept most of the service fees paid by their phrai to themselves.12 Eventually the new king would realise that the question of labour reorganisation could not be solved unless the state structure was also transformed. He would see how he could use the issue both to develop the economy and to centralise power in royal hands. Keeping in mind this background to the three groups’ interests and the problems associated with the manpower system, let us look in greater detail at these factions and the ideological positions they assumed. This will be done against the backdrop of the events between the first coronation and May 1873, when the king made his first move to establish the absolutist state.

Old Siam Old Siam believed that it could best protect its interests by keeping the old order as intact as possible. Its members stressed the maintenance of traditional customs, values and structures. Thus, they felt threatened by plans to reform the manpower system. Since the proponents of Young Siam openly identified themselves with westernisation and later publicly discussed plans for change (in their magazine, Darunowat) Old Siam saw them, and not Conservative Siam, as its arch-enemy. Since Old Siam represented the bulk of the official class through which the king needed to rule until the system was changed, it was potentially in a very powerful position. Its members appeared to have the support of the

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The first stage of state-building

sangha (the Buddhist order), which had been estranged from the monarchy by King Mongkut’s establishment of a new religious sect, the Thammayuttinikay, and which shared Old Siam’s apprehension over westernisation. Old Siam’s main weakness was that it had no real leadership of its own. The Old Siam group tended to centre around the current Wang Na, who controlled the resources necessary to seriously challenge the king. He had inherited from his father the title of second king, modern ammunition, and a large number of men, and was in an unusually powerful position. King Mongkut had calculated that his cousin controlled between 2,600 and 2,700 soldiers, 2,000 of whom were newly recruited; King Mongkut had been able to count on only 1,500 soldiers.13 His revenue, mainly derived from tax farms, amounted to, in principle, 5 per cent of state revenue. Given these resources, Somdet Chaophraya’s support, and his popularity among the official class, the Wang Na’s position was formidable. He was also well received by the diplomatic community, especially by Thomas Knox, the British Consul, who had been recruited by his father to teach modern military practice. The community knew him as the son of one of the most westernised members of the elite, and on King Mongkut’s death had presumably preferred this mature candidate to the throne over the young and unfamiliar Prince Chulalongkorn. These factors, rather than the depth of his conviction, made the Wang Na the natural leader of Old Siam. King Chulalongkorn found himself in a very delicate position when dealing with Old Siam; he did not want to alienate its members, yet he was being pushed by Conservative Siam to endorse policies that attacked the interests of Old Siam. This is illustrated by the events surrounding a proclamation read during the second coronation in 1873. The proclamation abolished the practice of prostration, and for the first time the audience stood up and bowed to the king. But it had far wider implications than merely regulating court etiquette. It also applied to relationships between the nai and the phrai. The proclamation was worded ambiguously; the king stated that he wanted to abolish oppression of the people, and prostration was oppressive because the inferior had to suffer the fatigue of prostration in order to honour the superior.14 Rather than calling directly for the abolition of the phrai and that system, he focused on the symbolic action which underlined their relationship. This can be seen as a cautious first step towards abolition, which would satisfy Conservative Siam, but was couched in terms that were not sufficiently specific as to antagonise Old Siam. The king also took positive measures. He emphasised the symbiotic relationships between the royal and the noble families. On the same occasion, he announced the creation of the Family Order, designed to reward those noble families who had loyally served kings of the Bangkok dynasty.15 The move borrowed a western practice and was intended to

The first stage of state-building 45 guarantee the adherents of Old Siam a place for themselves and their descendants in the westernisation process. Thus the old families were shown that there would be places for them in the reformed state. However, it is uncertain how far Old Siam was moved by the appeal. The king did not always calculate well in this respect, and when he tried to keep Old Siam ideologically off-balance by appealing to traditional sources of authority, he faced a serious rebuff. When he attempted to secure the sangha’s endorsement of the anti-prostration decree, thirty senior monks responded that they considered that the abolition of prostration would be incongruous (save in monasteries), and that the king should give more thought to what he was doing.16 Old Siam’s major weapon was to limit the participation in their relationships with the king, at its most drastic doing so publicly, and thus demonstrating the king’s lack of authority. This occurred most notably when only a small minority of the nobles attended a reception that the king gave for the Spanish ambassador. King Chulalongkorn was incensed and issued a proclamation pointing out that it was in the interests of all the families (royal and noble) to foster good relations with foreign countries; they brought progress to the country and protection to the families (implying that bad relations might damage Siamese independence and consequently endanger the families). He concluded that a future breach of discipline such as this would bring expulsion from the service.17 Thus, the king used both carrot and stick in dealing with Old Siam. The traditionalist nobles sometimes behaved badly, as in the case of the Spanish ambassador; but we will see that when Siam’s integrity and independence were seriously threatened they closed ranks and gave the king their support. Conservative Siam The driving force behind this small yet powerful group was the Bunnag clan, first of whom was Somdet Chaophraya Barommaha Srisuriyawong, the former Chaophraya Srisuriyawong who had done so much to conclude the Bowring Treaty. Other important members were Chaophraya Suriyawongwaiyawat, the Kalahom and Somdet Chaophraya’s son, and Phraya Ahanborirak, the Minister of the Krom Na (Ministry of Land) and Somdet Chaophraya’s nephew. One minister who would have seemed typical of Conservative Siam had he not defected to join Young Siam was Chaophraya Phanuwong, the Minister of Krom Tha. Other lesser members came from the Bunnag clan and served in those ministries that the family controlled. There are also indications that some of King Mongkut’s sons forged a close relationship with Somdet Chaophraya Borommaha Srisuriyawong.18 The strength of Conservative Siam lay in its members’ involvement in trade and taxation. With their ministry portfolios, the Bunnags exercised

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control over major tax farms such as opium, spirits and the import and export tariffs. Land tax also brought in considerable revenue. In their official capacity and in accordance with the practice known as sib lod (taking a tenth), they earned 10 per cent from these taxes. As we saw in the previous chapter, they used their politically powerful positions in the reign of King Mongkut to hand over to the Treasury a constant revenue irrespective of the expansion of the tax base, and to reserve the excess for their own purposes. They enjoyed not only direct wealth, they also controlled patronage. Chinese tax farmers paid large sums to a few high-ranking nobles and their relatives (such as the Bunnags) who were in a position to grant them concessions to tax farms.19 Members of Conservative Siam controlled vast capital resources which they exploited for their commercial activities or lent at interest to tax farmers.20 Because nobles and tax farmers between them controlled about 30 per cent of Siamese foreign trade, the British were antagonistic to such close relationships between “the Siamese government” and the Chinese tax farmers.21 Conservative Siam would soon find that it had to pay a high price for unpopularity in the British community. British disfavour hardly seemed likely from the outset. Somdet Chaophraya belonged to the first generation of the Siamese elite to perceive advantages in belonging to the European world-economy, and he greatly benefited from his prescience. It was therefore logical that he should wish to see westernised reforms, which would enhance British commercial interests and activate more trade and, hence, taxation. Indeed, a generation before, he had played the leading role in a group known as Young Siam in opposing to King Rama III and his supporters who, in those days, were labelled as Old Siam.22 He had brought about many changes inspired by western practice, such as building steamships and roads, and developing a police force for Bangkok. Members of the Bunnag family were regularly sent to study in England well before the royal family started the same practice.23 Members of Conservative Siam wished to introduce such reforms, as they would help Siam reap increased benefits from its participation in the European world-economy. The main task was to reform the manpower system, which they considered detrimental to production. They perceived that the state benefitted very little either from corvée or from the commutation of corvée to labour dues, which was in the interest of Old Siam. By abolishing the phrai and the that system, an efficient and productive labour market could be created, and Conservative Siam could benefit from the expansion of trade and taxation.24 Its advocates argued that the state should be given a slice of the economic pie, replacing corvée by household registration and a head tax. Arguing for the interests of the state, Conservative Siam pressed its own interests; but the two would not always coincide.

The first stage of state-building 47 In line with this approach, manpower reform was the main item on Somdet Chaophraya’s agenda. Right at the beginning of the reign, he appointed as head of Krom Suratsawadi (the office responsible for phrai registration) a noble of a commoner background named Phraya Burut (Pheng Penkun). He had been a client of King Mongkut, whom he had faithfully served during his monkhood and later as a senior official in the Royal Pages Department, achieving the title of Phraya Ratchasuphawadi.25 Somdet Chaophraya’s choice of this loyal but humble servant reflected his concern to appoint somebody who did not share the traditional ruling class’s vested interest in preserving the old manpower system. During the brief regency interregnum (1868–1873), Somdet Chaophraya initiated moves toward the abolition of slavery by proposing a law that would have forced the nai to pay the sum of two baht per month for each that’s service, and would have effectively abolished slavery within five years. Such a drastic measure incurred the opposition of Old Siam, and was roundly defeated.26 As a result of this setback, the Conservative Siam leaders drew back from open innovation and let Young Siam take the lead in introducing reforms. We do not know all the initiatives that were discussed at the time, but it seems likely that one of the reforms proposed by Young Siam was the abolition of gambling, the tax farm which had been in the king’s hands since 1870. This proposal closely fitted with Conservative Siam’s campaign, because gambling was considered a major cause of debt and slavery.27 Young Siam could be relied upon to urge change, and its vanguard role gave Conservative Siam the freedom to ally with Old Siam if the changes proposed ran counter to conservative interests in the manpower and financial reform desired by Conservative Siam. As we shall see, Conservative Siam’s early relationship with Young Siam had not always run smoothly; the conservatives, and particularly Somdet Chaophraya, were loath to approve efforts, favoured by young Siam, which might overmuch enhance the king’s position.28 But some time after the second coronation, the two groups appear to have forged a marriage of convenience, one offspring of which was co-operation on the gambling issue. In addition, members of Young Siam had publicly shown their commitment to the manpower and financial reform desired by Conservative Siam. As we have seen, the king, who was identified initially with Young Siam, attacked the traditional labour system through the law abolishing prostration. He also opposed the rounding up of unmarked phrai, arguing that this would seriously interrupt a great number of producers in their planting, would further prolong the stagnation of commerce and would mean a serious loss of revenue to the government.29 He introduced many revenueearning financial reforms, as we shall see, making royal income from the gambling tax dispensable. These initiatives met the needs of Conservative Siam, and it was not surprising that, in return, it consented to Young

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Siam’s efforts to establish such western-styled bodies as the Council of State and the Privy Council. Young Siam The Young Siam Society consisted originally of the king’s party: halfbrothers, followers and fellow-westernisers, most of them very young.30 The two most prominent and probably most outspoken members were Phraya Phatsakorawong and Phraya Krasapkitkoson, both of whom were very active in the Council of State. Phraya Phatsakorawong was Somdet Chaophraya’s much younger halfbrother (the age difference was forty years); he had been sent to study in England for a few years and had returned at the end of King Mongkut’s reign. He had held a position in the Royal Pages Department, and later served as the Royal Secretary to the young king and an officer in the Bodyguard. In spite of his Bunnag connections, he was a very active and able member of Young Siam and an enthusiastic westerniser. He was responsible for the translation of the French Second Empire Constitution and may also have been involved in other translations of constitutional models, including the Indian administrative structure and the oath taken by the British Privy Council.31 Phraya Phatsakorawong was also a prolific and controversial writer for the journal Darunowat, an occupation which later landed him in trouble. Phraya Krasapkitkoson belonged to a noble Ayudhyan family, the Amatyakul, one of the few noble clans that identified fully with Young Siam’s cause. He was joined by his brother, Phraya Charoenratchamaitri, who also served in the Council of State, and his son, Phra Prichakonlakan, who helped his father develop gold mines, the king’s pet project. Phraya Krasap was one of the first members of the Thai elite to study western science, and this earned him the post of head of the Royal Mint Department.32 In the Council of State, Phraya Krasap was responsible for drafting a section of the new legislation concerning opium farms, a delicate task because the farms were an important financial resource under the control of Somdet Chaophraya.33 His active role would eventually make his family the target of political attack and bring it into disgrace. Lastly, we come to the most ambiguous member, Chaophraya Phanuwong (Thuam Bunnag). He was president of the Young Siam Society when it was officially established in 1875, but as the head of Krom Tha and a member of the Bunnag family, he enjoyed control over some tax farms and thus shared in some of the interests of Conservative Siam. He was half-brother to Somdet Chaophraya, and it is likely that Somdet Chaophraya gave his blessing to his association with Young Siam in order to guarantee protection for Bunnag interests.34 Nonetheless, the Bunnag brothers did not always see eye-to-eye, for Chaophraya Phanuwong wished to pursue his own economic interests.

The first stage of state-building 49 This gave the king room to manoeuvre on behalf of Young Siam, and to lure Bunnag family members into joining his faction. In line with this, in 1870 the king transferred export taxes under royal jurisdiction to the Krom Tha, which already administered the rice export tax. This move gave Krom Tha control over all export taxes;35 it was administratively rational, but perhaps more importantly, it served to convince Chaophraya Phanuwong that if the king’s reforms were successful he might be in a position to gain a greater share of the pie than if he unswervingly supported the Bunnag interests. In the final analysis, it is likely that Chaophraya Phanuwong shared some of Young Siam’s ideals and wanted to be seen as a modern man. He belonged to a small group of the Thai elite who had visited Europe under King Mongkut, and in his capacity of the Phra Khlang he accompanied King Chulalongkorn to Singapore and Java in 1871. When Somdet Chaophraya opposed the king’s plans to visit Europe, Chaophraya Phanuwong approached Thomas Knox, the British Consul, and asked him to negotiate with the Regent so that the king might be allowed to visit India, on which trip he also went. King Chulalongkorn appears to have made Chaophraya Phanuwong the President of the Young Siam Society in 1875, precisely because of his conservative connections, for, as we will see in the next section, King Chulalongkorn’s policy was to avoid alienating the great families by bringing their members into organisations which he controlled. But this did not guarantee Chaophraya Phanuwong’s loyalty in all situations: during the Wang Na crisis he acted very much in concert with other Bunnags against Young Siam. The king then found it necessary to remind him that, as a member of Young Siam, his loyalty should be to the king’s position.36 Young Siam had some valuable foreign allies, two of whom were longterm expatriates in Siam. Mr Henry Alabaster entered the king’s service after resigning from his post as British Vice Consul in Bangkok under King Mongkut’s reign because of a conflict with Somdet Chaophraya. It is likely that he proved ideologically useful to Young Siam, expounding liberalism and giving the faction full support for its reform efforts. His advocacy considerably helped to raise the group’s stature among the western community in Siam. He also acted as a link between Young Siam and Dr Smith, an American missionary who ran an English and later a Thai newspaper.37 Some of Dr Smith’s writings were translated and published in the Young Siam magazine, Darunowat. Another source of foreign support for Young Siam came from the British Governor of the Straits Settlement, Sir Andrew Clarke. He was most impressed with the abolition of prostration during the second coronation ceremony, described to him by his representative. To quote this report: One incident of the coronation was remarkable. The chief ceremony took place in the hall of audience, the foreigners standing in the

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The first stage of state-building background and the Regent – about to yield the authority he had exercised since the death of King Mongkut in 1868 – and all the courtiers kneeling or lying prostate on the ground before the golden curtain. At a given signal the curtain was raised disclosing the King sitting on his throne, magnificently dressed wearing the crown and the royal jewels; but striking as was this picture, a more sensational incident was reserved a denouement. The King delivered an address and at the end of it he announced the abolition of the practice at his Court of kowtowing and lying down in the royal presence. As the words passed his lips the recumbent figures rose, and the effect was described by those present as most impressive. To change a practice of abject servility into one of reasonable and dignified Court etiquette was not a bad commencement for a reign of progress and reform. It was at least an occurrence that inclined the mind to give sympathetic consideration to any proposal or request emanating from the then young King of Siam. Fifteen months later the occasion arrived.38

The king was well aware that British representatives in Siam were not well disposed towards him, and he used the coronation as an opportunity to build a relationship with British authorities in the Straits Settlements. After the coronation, he wrote to Sir Andrew Clarke expressing the hope that goodwill would long continue between Siam and the British Colony, and offering him the order of the White Elephant of Siam. He wrote a second more formal letter thanking him for sending a mission to attend the ceremony and referring to Siam’s position concerning future reforms, and making the point that means for achieving these reforms were limited: in making changes for the development of its resources we can only proceed step-by-step according to our strength, and we cannot make very rapid changes. Only by the support of a powerful country can a weak one be rapidly developed, and therefore we beg that Your Excellency, appointed by H.M. Queen Victoria to govern a British Colony which is very close to Siam, will suggest and advise us as to whatever is likely rapidly and largely to develop our resources.39 Thus the king sent the representative of the British Government a signal that his future reforms would suit British interests because they would bring more trade. His plans for reform went further than those proposed by Conservative Siam in that he called not only for the abolition of slavery, as we have seen, but also fiscal reforms. Because Conservative Siam was unwilling to identify itself with further change, the Governor perceived the king and Young Siam to be the sole agents of reform, and the king was later able to reap the political benefits.40 Young Siam reached a peak of influence with the establishment of the Council of State and the Privy Council in 1874, and its mouthpiece,

The first stage of state-building 51 Darunowat. This journal was designed to orchestrate reforms and to speak out against the established powers.41 The first edition was published just ten days before the establishment of the Council of State, the king’s instrument for spearheading his reforms. Its tactic was to bring home to the ruling class how the great nobles abused their power and, therefore, how Young Siam’s cause should be supported.42 The Young Siam Society was not officially formed until 1875, when the drive for reform led to political crisis. Its formalisation probably reflected the king’s determination to forge ahead despite the opposition. Young Siam was closely identified with the king at this time, and he was most likely involved in the Darunowat project. We can take the Young Siam attitude as generally reflecting his own, although he tended to be more cautious in dealings with Old Siam and Conservative Siam, and at a later stage it seemed to him that Young Siam was going too far. Young Siam’s spokesmen argued along two lines. First, they stressed the need to improve the people’s prosperity through economic development, especially through trade and commerce. This extended the line of thought pursued by King Mongkut, and in this context, ideas of progress, justice and happiness were discussed. The second argument stressed the central role of the state in achieving progress; the idea of thamnu bamrung banmuang hai charoen (developing the country). This was understood as changing Siam’s social, economic and political structure in order to stimulate progress. It set the state against the old institutions, in particular the nai/phrai (manpower) system, which was perceived to discourage industriousness and the pursuit of happiness, and the administrative system which gave officials the opportunity to use their offices for personal profit and benefit. It also meant that the state should take responsibility for developing trade, promoting justice, providing security and education and abolishing bad habits such as gambling.43 The emphasis placed by Young Siam on a close relationship between the interests of the state and the interest of the people laid the ground for the development of the idea of the Thai nation-state, the state as the embodiment of the community of the people. More immediately, it served King Chulalongkorn’s intention to build an absolutist state. His efforts at state reform had two goals: the first was to strengthen his immediate position against the power of the noble class and the great families; the second was to permanently strengthen the central state and royal power.

The launching of the absolutist state In 1869, during the Regency and well before the first major reforms were implemented in 1874, the king showed an early inclination towards absolutism by instigating a survey of how modern states raised and distributed their resources. He had the constitutions of Britain, British India and the

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Second Empire France analysed, and out of these it appears that of France seemed the most appropriate.44 The French Consul reported that the king asked to borrow a copy of the “Code Napoleon”.45 The translation, made at the royal behest, told the king how an absolutist state with full control over its resources and territories functioned. It then went on to explain how power in the absolutist state was concentrated at the centre and how the centre controlled the periphery; the centre was to have full control over the collection and distribution of resources.46 This section deals with the steps which King Chulalongkorn took to achieve this goal. The early fiscal reforms The king’s first step in the campaign to create an absolutist state was to initiate fiscal reforms. These were designed to strengthen the state and to create the pre-conditions for other reforms such as reform of the labour and taxation system. As early as 1869, the king had started asking all those departments responsible for tax revenues to prepare financial statements. The Bunnags did not bother to respond, but other department heads who were formally responsible for tax revenues submitted reports. The reports made dismal reading; tax revenues were meagre, and many tax farmers were in arrears.47 The king responded by tightening his control over tax farms. In 1870, those under the Royal Warehouse Department and supervised by Prince Wongsa were transferred to the king upon the prince’s death.48 They consisted of many important revenue earners such as gambling and lotteries, spirits in Bangkok and the timber farm.49 The king then rearranged those tax farms under his control so as to increase their revenue. For example, he turned the gambling tax into two separate farms of gambling and lotteries, which doubled their revenue to the state.50 At this early stage, King Chulalongkorn had already begun to adopt western methods in his fiscal reform. In 1870 he established an audit office to oversee the revenue and expenditure of the tax farms under royal control. According to the official figures, in 1872 the revenue from the Treasury and the Royal Warehouse Department amounted to more than 50 per cent of total revenue from taxation.51 A further important step in westernising the fiscal system was taken in 1873 when a Finance Office known as Ho Ratsadakonphiphat, was established modelled on westernstyled ministries of finances. Staffed by salaried officials who were expected to keep office hours, it centralised the administration of taxes, which had previously been the prerogative of the tax manager (chao chamnuan) who approved the bidding of tax farms. This person was delegated power by “the great noble” who supervised the tax farms. The edict establishing the Ho Ratsadakonphiphat required that bidding for tax farms

The first stage of state-building 53 be carried out in its office and that tax farmers make monthly payments, thus further limiting the possibility of personal accommodation between tax farmers and the tax controller.52 The king justified this new institution on the grounds that there were so many tax arrears, most of which dated back to the previous reign. This, he argued, was because the tax farmers tended to keep the tax revenue for their commercial purposes. Once they were pressed to hand it in, they had to draw money from their trading enterprises, which affected their trade and brought accusations that the government was responsible for the decline in commerce. This was an effective argument, acceptable to the Bunnags so long as the new tax office did not affect their interests. It seemed unlikely that it would, for the wording of the edict was ambiguous as to the extent of the Ho Ratsadakonphiphat’s power,53 and the Bunnags were not directly involved in tax farmers’ arrears. In any event, the Bunnags were so well entrenched in their privileged positions that any move to dislodge them probably seemed unimaginable. This early fiscal reform paved the way for more drastic measures in two ways. First, the Ho Ratsadakonphiphat set the model for the Ministry of Finance, which would later be developed by the Council of State to regulate all state revenues. Second, the consolidation of royal control over state revenue helped the king to win more supporters for his reforms. He strengthened the role of Phraya Sriphiphat and Phraya Phiphitphokhai, respectively the head of the Royal Warehouse and the Treasury, both of whom were previously impotent because they did not have actual power in controlling tax farms. They were also members of the Council. They would now actually control the tax farms within their jurisdictions. The king also transferred the timber tax to the Mahadthai (Ministry of the North) under the control of Phraya Ratchawaranukun, the Under-secretary of the Ministry. This was a rational step because teak forests were concentrated in the north, but it also won for the king’s party the support of Phraya Ratchawaranukun, whom the king later appointed to the Council of State. The Bangkok spirits tax, another lucrative source of income, was transferred, and by so doing he expanded his political backing beyond Young Siam and those who had been loyal to his father. Those nobles who supervised tax farms were rewarded with 5 per cent of the tax revenues; some were also made members of the Council of State, a body whose importance we will discuss later. This drove home the lesson that, by serving the state under King Chulalongkorn’s leadership, a noble could enhance his own economic position. Having thus consolidated his fiscal position, the king felt strong enough to attempt to take control of all other resources. This effectively meant changing the rules of the political game. In order to secure acquiescence, and especially to prevent a combination between Old Siam and Conservative Siam against him, King Chulalongkorn did two things.

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First, he presented arguments in terms of increasing economic progress, an approach to which Conservative Siam would agree. He argued: The city these days is quite different from that in the past when the Kingdom did not earn revenue from trade. Formerly, trade was restricted to the Chinese, and there was little flow of imports and exports. Since trade with the West began there have been a heavy traffic of ships, and many more exports. Money flows into the city, and consequently the Kingdom enjoys progress and wealth. Since King Mongkut allowed exports, the country has prospered, and this is clear to everyone. [But] little has been done to promote more trade, and it cannot expand further, consequently the country cannot achieve progress rapidly. It is necessary to promote more trade because when more revenue flows into the city the Kingdom will definitely prosper. Trade can be promoted by digging canals which will increase the flow of goods and provide irrigation so that water will be available in time of drought. There are many other things which require promotion. When trade is busier than now a telegram service between ports will become necessary so that [ships] can be quickly dispatched to carry goods. In order that all these things are done, a large amount of investment must be found.54 Second, King Chulalongkorn introduced structural reforms aimed at involving others in changing the rules of the political game, so that they found themselves engaged in serving his purposes. We shall see this approach in the strategy he followed in developing the Council of State. The Council of State On 8 May 1874, King Chulalongkorn established a Council of State, later given the Thai name of Sapha thipruksa ratchakan phandin, but generally referred to as ‘Council’. Its members consisted of twelve nobles of phraya rank. Its function, stated vaguely, was to help the king to introduce reforms which would bring Siam into line with those modernised countries that he had visited.55 In fact, it was meant to be a legislative and administrative vehicle by which King Chulalongkorn would establish an absolutist state.56 The fact that the French system of government was studied suggests that the king borrowed the idea from the French Conseil d’État, whose functions were similar. The Conseil d’État had been created by Napoleon Bonaparte to draft and interpret laws and regulations and resolve administrative difficulties.57 The king won Somdet Chaophraya’s acceptance of this project by agreeing to place the abolition of both the phrai-that system and gambling, the main culprit for slavery on the Council’s agenda. Next, he persuaded Somdet Chaophraya to endorse the financial reforms as the prerequisite to

The first stage of state-building 55 labour and tax structure reforms. The king’s letter to Somdet Chaophraya later explained how he pulled off this coup: Formerly I considered that the state’s revenue was so crucial that it needed to be administered properly as a prerequisite. Thus I invited Your Excellency for a private consultation. Once it was agreed . . . [torn document] the Council of State’s meeting was called in order that the statement was read. And I had claimed that I had already consulted Your Excellency so that it appeared that there was a consensus in developing the country.58 Somdet Chaophraya’s lack of suspicion regarding the potential of this instrument for aggrandisement of the monarch’s power can also be explained by the king’s choice of the twelve members of the Council. Its composition appeared to guarantee Bunnag interests, for all members but one came from the old noble families, including three Bunnags.59 The only exception was Phraya Ratchasuphawadi, who, as we have seen, had been appointed by Somdet Chaophraya himself and, having responsibility for manpower, held a key position in Conservative Siam’s vision of reform. Phraya Ratchasuphawadi was given an unenviable job of “dismantling the manpower system as commanded by Somdet Chaophraya”.60 However, all these councillors had their own reasons for accepting reforms that would restrict the Bunnag power. This is exemplified by the three Bunnag representatives. We have already seen that one, Phraya Phatsakorawong, was naturally a progressive and committed to the king’s reforms. The other two, Phraya Sriphiphat and Phraya Kalahomratchasena, were the sons of the Phraya Sriphiphat, whose role under Rama III we discussed in Chapter 1. After his death, his control over tax farms had passed not to his sons, but to Prince Wongsa, most probably with the connivance of Somdet Chaophraya himself. It is, therefore, not surprising that the sons did not see Somdet Chaophraya’s interest as their own. The core Council members included supporters of the king’s westernisation policy. Others were senior officials and departmental heads who controlled resources, but whose powers, limited under the old dispensation, would be greatly augmented by the king’s proposed reforms. For instance, Phraya Phiphitphoka’s power certainly increased when fiscal reforms turned his department, the Treasury (Krom Phraklangmahasombat), into the powerful Ministry of Finance. Other senior officials, including those from the Wang Na, lent credence to the king’s initiative and were swayed by his early successes in strengthening the Treasury. King Chulalongkorn described how he developed this power base: Once the number of the people who shared rightful thinking increased we started to expand our power by sticking to the right cause and

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The first stage of state-building fighting against the wrong. When we won once or twice those who remained neutral became uncertain and turned to give us support. Our popularity increased so much that even our enemies had to become our friends, save for those who were determined and could not turn around and had to go ahead. But it was apparent that they were weakening all the time.61

The king bestowed personal financial rewards and honours upon the councillors as incentives to join this revolutionary project. They were promised an annual income of between forty and fifty catties, a sum which might be increased, depending upon the positions they occupied within the bureaucracy. Thus we learn from the obituary of Chaophraya Sriphiphat that he earned as much as seventy catties a year.62 They were also entitled to a life pension if they served the council for five years or longer.63 The political rewards were also substantial: councillors were subordinate only to ministers (senabodi). The king later issued a proclamation ordering that they should be addressed in the same manner as ministers. They were also awarded the Family Order, the initials of which, for a time, it became the practice to set behind one’s honorific name, in imitation of British custom.64 Having established the Council of State, King Chulalongkorn moved very rapidly to persuade the councillors to support his fiscal reforms. He had targeted these as the key to shifting the strategic balance between himself and the great families. At the first meeting on 8 May 1874, attended by councillors and ministers, King Chulalongkorn argued for economic progress and presented the fiscal reforms as if they were making only technical changes. He pointed out that there were backlogs in forwarding state revenues to the Treasury, and the fact that tax farmers were allowed to deduct their expenses or be reimbursed in kind made account-keeping confusing. Thus, there was no way of totalling state revenue, which greatly hindered the Treasury’s attempts to budget. And there were inadequate funds to pay for economic development. The king then presented principles for draft legislation which would centralise state revenues and expenditure at the Treasury.65 It is uncertain whether Somdet Chaophraya realised at this stage how his power was about to be curbed.66 Fiscal reforms were necessary if the king was to give up the gambling tax farm which, in 1872, produced 13 per cent of all revenue derived from taxation.67 But when the draft legislation concerning taxation was presented, he knew that he had been tricked into accepting a policy of reform which would significantly reduce his family’s autonomy. This was evident because the draft legislation proposed that the Treasury control not only revenue and expenditure, but also the granting of tax farms, the main source of power over tax revenue.68 This meant the transfer of tax farms distributed among various departments to the Treasury, and the end of the great nobles’ control of state resources. It also meant the end of the trickle-up system in which nobles were allowed

The first stage of state-building 57 to take their cuts before passing on the resources to the king. Somdet Chaophraya showed his displeasure by offering to return the management of the opium tax back to the king; and, arguing that the measures to be effected by the fiscal reform were impractical, he refused to let officials from the Ho Ratsadakonphiphat vet tax farm managers on the grounds that he lacked confidence in their judgement.69 At this point the king decided to place all his cards on the table. He confessed to the great families that he did mean to centralise state finance, but argued that their interests would be secured by their being paid an agreed percentage of the revenue. Ideologically, King Chulalongkorn shifted ground from the “technical” argument to the larger one of the state’s interest, Siam’s survival and prosperity, thus implying that opponents to his reforms were placing their family fortunes above the interests of Siam. Behind closed doors, the king bargained for the passing of the fiscal bill by assuring Somdet Chaophraya that he would be allowed to manage the opium tax in his own way despite the legislation.70 In spite of the compromise offered, the fiscal reform still meant the destruction of Conservative Siam’s power. Worse, the proposed reform of the labour system and abolition of gambling did not go as far as Somdet Chaophraya had wanted – and had been led by Young Siam to believe would be enacted. The king’s strategy for reforming the manpower system was to abolish slavery slowly, initiating measures that would take effect only in the next generation. The law eventually passed on 21 August 1874 abolished slavery for anyone born after 1868, and set new regulations for freeing existing slaves from bondage at the age of twenty-one.71 It was later said that because of the long-term effect of the measure, no one seemed to have shown either approval or objection to it.72 As to the question of corvée, indexes to Council minutes refer to deliberations on the abolition of marking the phrai and on the introduction of a poll tax. Unfortunately, the minutes have been destroyed by fire and we do not know the precise reason for the failure to promulgate this legislation. A document indicates that the king wanted to see the standardisation of the people’s obligations to the state.73 If we accept that King Chulalongkorn’s tactic was to introduce manpower reforms slowly, then the Council would not have introduced any drastic change in the phrai system. A supporter of Conservative Siam who wrote an article in Singapore’s Straits Times clearly stated that Young Siam had failed to carry out its promised manpower reforms, which suggests that the original intention was to go further than was effected.74 The wording of the Royal Gazette on slavery also gives the impression that the king was in no hurry to change the labour system radically. It stressed rather that the law was intended to stop commoner children from falling into slavery, and to give freedom to all at the age of twenty-one, which would allow ex-slaves the opportunity to join the wage labour market. As wage labour became more popular, it was argued, the use of slaves would decrease. At the same time, a school

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was planned to be established so that freed young slaves could be educated and join the clerical class.75 The failure to abolish gambling was another source of disappointment for Somdet Chaophraya’s priorities and Young Siam ideals. Although evidence suggests that the king gave the problem serious thought, and Darunowat remarked that the personal interests of a member (or members) of the Council (most probably referring to Phraya Sriphiphat, since he supervised the tax) posed an obstacle, it is unlikely that the king would easily give up a source of revenue which brought in more than 11,000 catties annually without finding a substantial compensation. Such compensation had to come from the centralisation of revenue, an issue delayed by resistance from Conservative Siam. Finally, the king made a gesture in this respect by prohibiting gambling within monasteries, so that the gambling spirit was not inculcated in the children who spent their spare time there.76 But it was far from what Somdet Chaophraya had wanted to see. In spite of these compromises, the draft legislation on fiscal reform made Old Siam suspicious and Conservative Siam acutely angry; and so criticisms of Young Siam and the reforms were rife. The king’s strategy was to separate the two groups of his opponents and to win noble class support through arguments expressed in the Royal Gazette. There he argued that the happiness and progress of the people, who were the blood of the state, guaranteed the progress of the country and benefit of the ruling class. Such a satisfactory situation could only be achieved, however, if the king had the financial resources to develop the economy. Only those who had previously misappropriated state revenues would be negatively affected by the proposed reforms. In effect, he persuaded Old Siam that members of Conservative Siam – in particular the Bunnags – placed their own interests above these of the state.77 Moving against the Bunnags The king’s strategy for discrediting the Conservative grouping was to publicise how its members had abused their positions. He began by targeting Phraya Ahanborirak (Nut), the Minister of Krom Na (Ministry of Land), who had extensive responsibilities for collecting the land tax, one of the main sources of state revenue since the Bowring Treaty. It was not coincidental to the king’s purpose that Phraya Ahanborirak was also Somdet Chaophraya’s nephew. In addition, the king picked the land tax as a test case because the revenue it raised could easily be checked by calculating internal consumption of rice and the quantities exported.78 When the deliberations on fiscal reforms started in May 1874, Phraya Ahanborirak was asked, along with other ministers, by the Council of State to comment on the draft legislation pertaining to the land tax. And, like the others, he responded negatively. He pointed out the impracticali-

The first stage of state-building 59 ties of the proposed changes, and argued that they would incur losses in revenue. Faced with this reaction, the king asked to see the accounts of the Krom Na. When they were presented, it was evident that Phraya Ahanborirak’s accounts of revenue received and the actual sums passed on to the Treasury failed to correspond significantly. The king then put Phraya Ahanborirak on trial, thus publicly establishing that a great noble had abused his power without directly confronting the two senior Bunnags. He intended that the great nobles should be frightened into accepting his reforms while those members of the noble class who had no direct interest in state revenue would sympathise with his effort to end abuse. The king set up a committee consisting of nine of the twelve members of the Council of State to try Phraya Ahanborirak and two assistants for suspected corruption in the Krom Na.79 Confronted by the massive amounts of paper constituting the Krom Na’s accounts, the committee was augmented by six further members, all privy councillors. The committee elected Phraya Krasap, one of the most active councillors of state, as chairman. The trial exposed embezzlement80 of state and Privy Purse revenues, involving not only Phraya Ahanborirak but also his clients and his patron Somdet Chaophraya. They had helped themselves to loans from tax revenue to pursue their personal trading enterprises, and it was an open question as to how much they had repaid.81 For example, it was established that Phraya Ahanborirak, even before he became the Minister of the Krom Na, had annually taken from 300 to 400 catties from the land tax revenue for his enterprises, and indeed had once borrowed a lump sum of 2,000 catties.82 Chaophraya Phonlathep had borrowed from 500 to 700 catties annually to buy foreign currency for imports.83 A Chinese client who had obtained the export tax farm (including rice) had been allowed to use the land tax from a particular town to finance his business.84 It was also disclosed that Phraya Ahanborirak had taken liberties in distributing the state’s rice to his family and to his patron, Somdet Chaophraya.85 When it came to examining the account of Krom Na receipts, the committee encountered further corruption. The only accounts that came to light were those made by officials responsible for collecting the land tax, and there was no authentication from the town governors. Many of these accounts were found to have been deleted, so that the sums delivered to the Treasury were less than those received by the officials, the difference being diverted to Phraya Ahanborirak and his assistants.86 The account of money paid into the Privy Purse was also found to have been forged, making Privy Purse accounts appear healthier than they actually were.87 But the most embarrassing aspect of this trial from the Bunnags’ point of view was the committee’s discovery of how Phraya Ahanborirak, in his role as manager of the Bunnags’ opium tax since 1871, had abused the responsibilities delegated to him. It was established during the trial that he had bought and sold larger quantities of opium than the official record

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showed.88 This caused the Bunnags to lose face because Somdet Chaophraya had earlier argued that he could not accept the king’s suggested reform on the grounds that his overall responsibility for the opium tax farm was so weighty that he could not afford to be hamstrung by finance office regulations. The final verdict was delivered in November 1874. Phraya Ahanborirak and his two assistants were found guilty of abusing their positions in the Krom Na. He was removed from his position, and his property was confiscated. But the king did not wish to rub salt in the Bunnag’s wounds. The question of corrupt dealing in the opium tax farm was treated as the Bunnags’ personal affair, to be resolved by them. Upon Somdet Chaophraya’s request for pardon, the king placed the deposed Phraya Ahanborirak and his two assistants under the care of the Kalahom without further punishment. They were required to pledge not to leave the country, to earn their living honestly, and not to co-operate with anyone in any enterprise that might run contrary to the law and to the interests of the state.89 This relatively light verdict demonstrated the king’s desire for reconciliation, for it was not yet time for all-out confrontation with the Bunnags. A month later, however, matters came to a head.

The Wang Na crisis and its aftermath At this time Siam, had no law of succession. As we noted earlier, the Wang Na, or second king, who occupied the Front Palace, was commonly seen as the leading claimant, but he had no assured right to the throne. Tradition had dictated that the succession and the appointment of the Wang Na were matters for the king and the great nobles to agree on. But the current Wang Na had not been appointed by the king, and there was no tradition that his status as the former Wang Na’s son gave him the right to succeed. He was, furthermore, Somdet Chaophraya’s own creation, having been elevated to this post in 1868 largely as a result of the Bunnags’ effort. Bent on consolidating royal power, King Chulalongkorn had used the Privy Council, another western organisation set up to consolidate royal power, to deprive the Wang Na of any claim to the throne. In their speeches at the inauguration of the Privy Council in 1874, and no doubt at the king’s instigation, the forty-eight Privy councillors pledged their loyalty to the king and to his son, who was deemed to be his successor.90 The Wang Na was the only person who could seriously challenge King Chulalongkorn, for he controlled a large number of men and weapons, and apparently he had the support of Old Siam and the British Consul in Siam. Moreover, the Wang Na not only felt threatened by the question of succession, but also by the financial reforms, which were bound to affect his share of state revenues. Already his revenue had declined (though, as

The first stage of state-building 61 we shall see, less because of the reforms than because of a failure to pass on the revenue due to him). The Wang Na’s sense of grievance provided Somdet Chaophraya with an excellent opportunity to redress the balance between himself and the king. The crisis was sparked by an anonymous letter sent to the Wang Na, which seemingly threatened his life.91 In early December 1874, nearly a month before the crisis actually started and evidently before the letter was received, Somdet Chaophraya had asked the British Consul what position the British government would take in the likelihood of a conflict between the king and the Wang Na. This suggests that Somdet Chaophraya seriously anticipated a conflict, and that he may have inspired the letter. He stood to gain if conflict between the king and the Wang Na generated a political crisis, for this would require a man of his stature to resolve it. A successful resolution would increase his authority, and hence present him with the opportunity to put an end to the king’s reforms.92 In response to the anonymous letter, the Wang Na mobilised up to 600 of his men in his palace. To allay the king’s suspicions, he used an upcoming religious ceremony as a pretext for this. Nonetheless, the move underlined the disquieting fact that the Wang Na had more palace guards and better weaponry than the king; and King Chulalongkorn also began to mobilise his guards. Then, on the night of 28 December 1874, a mysterious fire broke out in the Royal Palace (the Middle Palace). The Wang Na’s guards, stationed in the Front Palace, as dictated by custom, went to help extinguish it; but because it was thought the fire might have been set to provide them an excuse for entry, they were turned away. The Wang Na himself chose to remain in his palace, rather than enter the Royal Palace with his men. Giving the excuse that tradition required the Wang Na to take an active role whenever a crisis threatened any part of the royal compound, the king ordered his guards to place the Front Palace under siege. Once the conflict had started, the king and his ministers agreed that Somdet Chaophraya, absent for the moment, was the only person who could effectively handle the matter. The king sent for him at Ratburi, the Bunnags’ stronghold, commenting privately that he was forced to “swim to the crocodile”.93 Somdet Chaophraya’s first message to King Chulalongkorn advised him that since the king was unhappy with the Wang Na, he should either reduce the Wang Na’s current titular status from second king to his traditional one of Kromphraratchawangbowonsamongkon, the title of the Wang Na before the office of the second king was invented by King Mongkut, or confiscate his men and weapons, or execute him. King Chulalongkorn recounted later that these proposals were more than he had hoped for. He apparently asked the ministers to inform Somdet Chaophraya that all he had wanted was to curb the Wang Na’s control over men and weapons.94 Somdet Chaophraya told him this delicate

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matter would take time to resolve. He did not say what price should be paid in return, but he did hint at his displeasure with the Council of State and the Privy Council.95 Thus, Somdet Chaophraya was able to determine both the issues in dispute and the timing, and could turn the conflict to his advantage. Meanwhile, the acting British Consul (the British Consul having returned to the United Kingdom) was informed by Somdet Chaophraya of the alternatives being considered by the king with regard to the Wang Na, implying that the situation was so bad that the British should send a gunboat to protect British lives and property.96 This was unusual. The Siamese leaders generally took care not to involve foreign powers in Siam’s internal affairs. But the situation was also unusual: the king was still not capable of openly challenging the great nobles (as he needed to if he were to satisfy an important condition for the emergence of a modern state; the ability of the monarch to prevail over the nobility). But he had managed to outwit them, to the extent that Somdet Chaophraya attempted to improve his position by involving the British and the French. Mutually jealous of the other’s influence in Siam, each of these foreign powers would balance the other. From Somdet Chaophraya’s point of view, the British were not ideal allies, for they thought him a serious impediment to their commercial interests. However, the British Consul, Thomas Knox, had considered that both the former and the present Wang Na were more suitable candidates for the throne than either King Mongkut or King Chulalongkorn; the first attracted by virtue of his outgoing personality and savoir-faire, and the second both because he was King Pinklao’s son and because of his own maturity. Somdet Chaophraya hoped to portray the Wang Na as stronger than he really was, in order that the king would accept his own advice. At the same time, he hinted to the Wang Na that the king might be wanting the second king’s execution, which was calculated to render the Wang Na amenable to his influence. Thus, he attempted to create a situation in which, by becoming an essential mediator, he could demand an end to those reforms of which he disapproved. However, he misjudged the Wang Na’s character, for the second king became so alarmed that, in the early hours of 2 January 1875, he fled to seek protection from the British Consulate. This unexpected turn of events meant that Somdet Chaophraya could no longer use the Wang Na as a bargaining pawn in his political struggle with King Chulalongkorn. His efforts to persuade the Wang Na to return to his palace failed, and the western consuls expressed their support for the Wang Na’s action in seeking refuge. Somdet Chaophraya was then forced to request certain high-ranking officials (ministers, councillors and those phraya entitled to use the golden tray as their insignia) to deliberate on the Wang Na’s action.

The first stage of state-building 63 The language in the memorandum which Somdet Chaophraya prepared for these worthies was harsh. Presumably it was calculated to swing sympathy away from the Wang Na and to isolate him so that he would be forced to rely upon the good graces of Somdet Chaophraya. The Wang Na was accused of using a foreign power to enforce his wishes to the detriment of royal authority.97 At a meeting between Somdet Chaophraya and the officials, an indictment of the Wang Na was drawn up. King Chulalongkorn then intervened and suggested that instead they should try inviting the Wang Na to return to the palace. The invitation was, however, declined by the Wang Na, whose refusal to accept reconciliation helped to improve the king’s position.98 Documents suggest that at this point Somdet Chaophraya requested the French Consul to approach the king over the question of the Council of State and the Privy Council and their authority. This was intended to put the king under pressure; but the king indicated strongly that he would not abolish the Councils but would be willing to expel any member proved to be unworthy.99 It is likely that the French Consul dropped the question of the Councils in his discussions with the king and concentrated instead on working for an agreement between the king and the Wang Na that could be guaranteed. The agreement eventually drafted by the ministers respected the Wang Na’s status generally, but reduced his title from that of the second king to the traditional Kromphraratchawangbowonsathanmongkon.100 This proved to be unsatisfactory to the Wang Na, however, since the question of his manpower and tax revenue allocations had not been resolved. In his counter-proposal, he asked for reassurance that he could keep his men and that he would be entitled to the tax revenues that he enjoyed in the past. But his most important demand was that the British and French Consuls should act as guarantors.101 King Chulalongkorn was under pressure from the ministers to compromise with the Wang Na, but he was saved the embarrassment of acceding to this demand by a vote of the high-ranking nobles and princes against the requirement that the consuls act as guarantors, lest it be interpreted by them as licence to meddle in the affairs of the Siamese state.102 The crisis dragged on, mainly because the warm support expressed by the acting British Consul persuaded the Wang Na that the British government was on his side. He thus waited for British intervention, and rejected point-blank the note offering reconciliation. Once it appeared that stalemate had been reached, the acting British Consul was advised by Somdet Chaophraya that he should seek the assistance of an influential person; and, in response, the acting Consul invited Sir Andrew Clarke, the British Governor in Singapore, to come to Bangkok, presumably to mediate.103 However, King Chulalongkorn himself had earlier contacted Clarke, who was very sympathetic to the king’s reforms, and presented his version of the crisis in an effort to rally foreign support for his cause.104 Clarke was

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anxious to come and advise the young king, but it took London a long time to make the decision. Once it did, the king was certain that he had the upper hand. In Bangkok, Sir Andrew Clarke allowed King Chulalongkorn to dictate his terms of agreement and forced the humiliated Wang Na to accept them.105 It was now agreed that the Wang Na could not pretend to the status of second king. He was allowed to keep 200 guards with small guns; they were confined to the Front Palace and were at the king’s disposal. The king was to enjoy a monopoly on all ships, arms and ammunition. In return, King Chulalongkorn pledged to look after the Wang Na’s financial rights and interests once he had “placed the Finances of Our Kingdom on a more secure and firmer basis, so as to lighten the burden of our people, and prevent the waste of our resources”.106 In effect, the agreement gave the king a significant political victory over both Old Siam and Conservative Siam. The Wang Na was no longer in a position to challenge the king, and Old Siam had lost its leader. The provision of the clause assuring the Wang Na’s financial security gives the impression that it was intended as a message to Conservative Siam that the king did not intend to backtrack on his intention to pursue financial reforms until he gained full control over resources. That Somdet Chaophraya saw the outcome of the crisis as a defeat is witnessed by his continuing attempts to reinterpret the agreement concerning arms and ammunitions allotted to the Wang Na; eventually the king had to employ the good offices of Clarke to gain the Bunnag’s acquiescence.107 Yet, within a year of this signal victory, King Chulalongkorn wrote to Sir Andrew Clarke that he had decided: “to defer the prosecution of further plans of reform until I shall find some demand for them among the leaders of my people. I have not relinquished them, but act according to my opportunities.”108 It would appear that after the crisis it became obvious to the king that, in order to carry out such a grand reform, he needed more allies than he had at the time. Furthermore, he came to realise that he could not rely entirely on those who had hitherto been his political allies. When he had appointed two council members, Phraya Sriphiphat and Phraya Ratchasuphawadi, to the ranks of Chaophraya Sriphiphat and Chaophraya Mahintharasakthamrong respectively, he had been unpleasantly surprised by an article in Darunowat which suggested that the latter had only been promoted out of favour to his daughter, the king’s concubine.109 The author of the offending piece was the young Phraya Patsakorawong, a member of Young Siam who presumably objected because these two nobles represented the more conservative elements in the Young Siam faction. In fact, there were already signs that the more radical members of Young Siam had gone too far in pressing for changes and in alienating the conservative elements. In Darunowat they openly ridiculed Somdet

The first stage of state-building 65 Chaophraya, whereas the king’s strategy was to avoid direct conflict. They criticised senior monks in the sangha for not doing a proper job,110 which aroused unnecessary resentments. Like radical supporters of reforming rulers elsewhere, they grew impatient of their leader’s compromises and were quite unrealistic in their expectations. Thus members of Young Siam argued that in the five years following the abolition of the gambling tax farms the increase in other taxes would adequately cover the loss. Young Siam’s enthusiasms could become dangerous if they caused a split in the king’s faction, or if they obliged him to move more rapidly than was wise. Another potentially dangerous political ally was the influential missionary Dr Smith, who had hitherto supported the king’s reforms. Unlike the king, whose reforming vision was largely limited to strengthening the monarchy, his ultimate aim was to have Siam completely transformed into a western-type society. There was a danger in encouraging Dr Smith to assume that the process of change would go as far as he wished; the more so because the missionary equated the condition of being civilised with Christianity. The king was well aware that giving too free a hand to proselytising westerners would arouse Buddhist resentments. Thus the king may have found it useful to use the recent political crisis as a reason for pausing in the pursuit of fiscal reforms. The king and Dr Smith soon parted company, and the latter’s publications actively crusaded for those reforms which he felt the king had failed to deliver. He championed the plight of the phrai, criticised the Thai ruling class for polygamy, and pointed out that it was only during the reign of King Chulalongkorn that opium smoking had become widespread. All of this proved a considerable embarrassment to the king.111 Another reason for checking the pace of fiscal reform was that the king came to realise that he did not need to go much further. By consolidating his authority over those resources which he already controlled, in particular tax farms under the supervision of the Treasury, the Warehouse and the Mahadthai he would have sufficient power to lay the foundations of an absolutist state. In 1875 he promulgated a law on the Ministry of Finance which westernised and rationalised the Treasury. Although its jurisdiction was limited to those tax farms, it meant that the Treasury could now raise sufficient revenue to allow the king to carry on reforms in non-controversial areas such as education, defence and communications. In the meantime, the Bunnags retained their power in the Kalahom, Krom Tha and the southern provinces; it would be another decade before the king could destroy the Bunnag Empire. But end it he did: after Somdet Chaophraya’s death, the Treasury confiscated his house on grounds of tax arrears.

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Creating a modern bureaucracy through education

Introduction We have seen in Chapter 2 how King Chulalongkorn worked to gain control of political and fiscal power in order to establish an absolutist state. To the same end, he built up a modern bureaucracy and promoted nationalism. His efforts strengthened monarchical rule in the immediate future but also planted the seeds of its undoing. Even before his reign ended, the introduction of western-style education and state nationalism led to conflicts within the absolutist state. The king intended to build up a modern bureaucracy and inculcate a royally centred nationalism without substantially changing Siam’s social order.1 This concept was flawed, for although the royalty and nobility enjoyed greater access to the new educational institutions than did the commoners, the latter showed themselves much more highly motivated to take advantage of the new opportunities and to acquire knowledge. Thus the non-elite classes penetrated all levels of the bureaucracy, and the attempt to maintain the old social structure was ultimately unsuccessful. Attempts made by the king and his ministers to block this process were half-hearted, for four main reasons. First, the modernisers’ desire to preserve the social order was at odds with the need to defend Siam and increase the king’s power by creating a modern bureaucratic apparatus. Second, they were influenced by the meritocratic ideas that were part and parcel of western education. Third, the elite classes remained aloof from the new approach. Traditional ideas and institutions discouraged royal and noble participation in a meritocratic system, and powerful nobles and princes saw educational opportunities only as useful patronage gifts for their lower-class clients. Fourth, as modern education replaced presentation at court as the essential qualification for entry to the bureaucracy, it was harder for officials to believe in the king’s favour as the source of their position and livelihood. The creation of the nation in the minds of the officials ultimately raised the question of whether king and nation were identical, and if not, where their loyalties lay.

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From the king’s point of view, the most radical priority was to create modern bureaucrats from idle royals. Only a few high-ranking members of royalty had played an active part in the traditional bureaucracy; the remainder enjoyed social prestige but were a financial burden upon the Privy Purse. At a time of bureaucratic expansion, they appeared to the king to constitute an appropriate source of bureaucratic talent; they belonged to the old ruling class, and if they could be induced to enter salaried employment, the king’s burden of supporting them would be relieved. King Chulalongkorn was so determined to incorporate royalty into the bureaucracy that he actively discouraged their participation in commercial pursuits. When one prince sought permission from the king to go to the north to trade timber, he was told that as a member of the royalty he should try to obtain training to enter government service rather than to involve himself in trade, which was not sufficiently profitable to satisfy a prince’s honour.2 Thus, the early education policy concentrated on turning royalty and nobility into modern bureaucrats. Quite a number of royal princes and sons of the nobles were sent to study abroad.3 In the modern bureaucracy, high-ranking princes would come to occupy the top-level posts, lowranking royalty and nobility would staff the middle level, and, as in the traditional system, literate commoners would staff the lowest levels. It was assumed that this class composition of the modern bureaucracy would guarantee social stability. In the traditional state, the criterion for recruitment into the bureaucracy had been family. King Chulalongkorn told Prince Damrong how recruitment to the bureaucracy had been managed in the past: Formerly, sons of phu di [the ruling class] who were to enter the royal service of the king, presented themselves as clients to the king [thawai tua] and became pages at a tender age. While pages were around the court, the king got to know them. Some had positions serving in the Department of Royal Pages before they served as nobles in other ministries.4 Thus, the traditional system emphasised the king’s personal relationship with the nobles, a relationship based upon the notion that the king was the sole source of their status, prestige and well-being. As such they should feel gratitude to him. This relationship of obligation was the main pillar of the old system. Only the sons of the nobles were allowed to be presented to the king as pages. There were two types of royal pages. Those who actively served were called “pages on duty” (mahadlek wen). Usually, they came from families with a tradition of serving in this capacity. Second, there were those who were presented to the monarch and were then appointed to

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various departments; these were called “special pages” (mahadlek wiset). Only the latter had the right to attend the king’s daily audiences where top-level business was conducted, and this is how they learned the art of government.5 Their serving as royal pages also gave the king the opportunity to become personally acquainted with his future officials; this personal contact was the basis of the trust relationship between king and officials. Some families gave their own training to their offspring, and a young man was trained as an apprentice in his father’s department either before or after being presented to the court. This form of training was also given to the sons of the lesser nobles whose status did not justify their being presented to the king. Literate commoners could also seek ministerial patronage to enter the bureaucracy as clerks. Most government business was conducted verbally. At the daily royal audiences, reports were read out to the king, and he gave oral instructions. Written communications were kept to a minimum, and those received by the king were commonly petitions and accounts.6 Literacy was not considered important by the nobles, who left pen-pushing to clerks. Although birth was the most important criterion for recruitment to the traditional bureaucracy, and sons tended to be appointed to their father’s position, merit played some part. A page’s ability to deliver oral reports well was recognised by the king and influenced future appointments. The creation of the absolutist state with its modern bureaucracy fundamentally changed the way official business was conducted, as literate skills were now indispensable. The king’s daily audiences became perfunctory, and the most significant business was carried out in various ministries generating streams of paperwork. Literate officials were needed from the outset in 1872, when the king established a corps of salaried officials who were to keep office hours and carry out their business in offices. Thus, education became the criterion for entry to the new bureaucracy, and King Chulalongkorn’s fundamental and most immediate need was to train literate officials. There was also a need for foreign-language skills, for both the king and Young Siam recognised that if Siam was going to be westernised, its future leaders should be able to use English. This skill was also needed in administrative areas such as foreign affairs, customs, postal and telegraphic services. It was necessary that the future elite had the English-language skills to grasp the meaning of such concepts as “finance” and “budget”, let alone those concepts for which Thai culture had no equivalents, such as “government” and “nation”. In the king’s words: the administration needs to rely upon the models set by westerners who have acted upon them hundreds of times. We need people with a knowledge of Western administration [reflecting the newness of the concept he used the Thai transliteration of the word “office”] to set a model for us.7

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In the rest of this chapter we will consider the ways in which this ambition was pursued, and the problems that it created. The chapter includes the following topics: education and social mobility, professional education, social mobility and the question of loyalty, and implanting nationalism through education.

Education and social mobility This section deals with attempts, made at different stages in the reign, to develop bureaucrats through education. Three forces militated against King Chulalongkorn’s efforts to educate the ruling class. First was resistance from Old Siam, whose members harboured deep resentments against the king’s reforms and refused to accept that modern education should be necessary for entering the bureaucracy. The American Consul wrote in 1880: There is . . . [a] strong party of the old regime who do not approve of education in any form, in foreign languages and studies, who believe implicitly in the wisdom of their ancestors, and obstinately oppose themselves to any attempt at removing the ancient landmarks wherever posted.8 Second, literacy had hitherto been taught in such a way as to dissuade students from continuing to study beyond a basic grasp of consonants and simple vowels.9 Such traditional teaching was generally responsible for the low level of literacy in Thai society; it generated a pessimistic attitude towards education in society as a whole, so that the prospect for widespread literacy seemed grim. The idea of education itself posed a psychological block. Third, members of the commoner classes recognised the career opportunities to enter the bureaucracy and earn salaries offered by modern education. The commoners consisted of the growing and increasingly prosperous mercantile community (mostly immigrant Chinese in origin), poor urban dwellers as peasantry in outlying provinces.10 These families had relatively more to gain from educating their children than had ruling-class families, and by the time the latter began to take a serious interest, they found themselves in a poor position to compete. These problems are discussed in greater detail below (pp. 73–74). Socialising the elite in the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment The first move by King Chulalongkorn towards setting up the modern bureaucracy was to establish the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment in 1870.11 The regiment was established in order to give younger members of the elite who were close to the king some modern military training and

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other types of education befitting their future roles as directors of a modern state. It operated as an alternative to the traditional means of entry through apprenticeship in the Royal Pages Department. In its first year of existence, the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment included the king’s half-brothers and some of his former personal pages who had been recruited into a small bodyguard corps; together they formed the core of the king’s lieutenants. Other members were sons of the nobility who had served as pages or were about to join the Royal Pages Department, but instead had been persuaded to join the new organisation.12 In 1872 the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment expanded to six companies, drawing recruits from royal, noble and some well-to-do commoner families. Because it included large numbers of both royalty and nobility, the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment was highly prestigious. The king himself commanded it, with the title of colonel. Bodyguard cadets were paid high salaries, issued uniforms and modern weaponry, and given full board within the palace – where the cuisine was excellent.13 In many respects, the regiment clearly and consciously copied the practice followed by the ruling class in some European countries – for instance Prussia, where sons of the junkers joined guards regiments before embarking on their bureaucratic careers. The king may or may not have been aware of the precedent; his reason for following this course of action was that, traditionally, royal pages also functioned as the king’s bodyguards.14 The attempt to teach literacy to the cadets was carefully planned. A new set of textbooks emphasising learning drills, the Munlabotbanphakit, was commissioned,15 and a Thai medium school was set up for them in 1871. The school, which would include not only cadets but also other pages in the Royal Page Department and noble sons not yet presented to the court, aimed at initiating a new style of learning which pupils would find less painful than in the past. In his proclamation canvassing support for the school, the king guaranteed that its scholars would be taught in a proper manner and neither caned nor scolded with foul language. Like the cadets, other candidates were also offered uniforms and per diem expenses.16 The proclamation promised that literacy was the key to other knowledge, government customs and practices, and that “once they have acquired a literate education, goodness, beauty and prosperity will be with them to the end of their days”. Read in the context of the king’s attempt to build up the modern bureaucracy, the proclamation transmitted a very important message to the ruling class: henceforth education was to be a key criterion in recruiting for government service, allowing one to attain a better life than that under the old system.17 Another important move in educating the elite occurred in 1871 when the king sent twenty princes of mom chao18 to study in Singapore. However, only three of them were sent to further their education in Europe, The rest returned to attend an English medium school in 1872 after a qualified teacher was found. This school was established for the

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king’s half-brothers and the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment. The history of this short-lived school – in existence for only three years – shows that only a few the high-ranking princes benefited most. Prince Damrong, who studied there, wrote that the morning session was reserved for the royal princes, whereas the other students studied in Thai and practised military drills in the mornings, and only attended the afternoon sessions. The latter gradually dropped out of the English school altogether. Prince Damrong’s explanation was that they possibly found this timetable too strenuous;19 A further factor may have been the unwillingness of the ruling class to be pushed further into an educational system of uncertain value. Thus the king’s policy of educating in English was unsuccessful. Only a small number of the king’s brothers shared his zeal for westernisation, and pursued the study of English with sufficient stamina to stand them in good stead when they went on to make their careers. These included the two most powerful ministers in King Chulalongkorn’s reign, Prince Damrong and Prince Dewavongse. Almost all of King Chulalongkorn’s half-brothers who went to the English school were responsible for helping him set up various modern organisations, and after 1892 they served as ministers in the western-style cabinet. Thus, in this first phase of King Chulalongkorn’s establishment of the modern bureaucracy, the royal princes clearly emerged as the future elite who would dominate its top levels. Many members of the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment left the regiment in the early years of the reign and became senior officials in various ministries.20 Thus, the palace school and the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment acted as a nursery for the civil and military services. Yet King Chulalongkorn’s early efforts to educate the ruling class for a leading role in the bureaucracy were not entirely successful. There were three main reasons for this. First, as mentioned earlier, the unwillingness of the old noble class to support the king’s reform efforts posed a major obstacle in the first period. Second, cultural inhibitions still relevant at this point meant that “pen-pushing” was not considered a proper occupation for the upper strata of society. Those of its members who did attend school tended to leave after completing only four of the six textbooks comprising the Munlabotbanphakit, partly because they found it too difficult, and partly because the demand for even low levels of literacy was so high that they could always find employment in the ministries.21 Third, the government failed to restrict student recruitment to candidates with an appropriate social background. Already in the late 1870s, the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment had been infiltrated by people of common stock. In 1880 Prince Damrong was to complain of the social background of many of these new recruits; “they are pages on duty (mahadlek wen) or come from bourgeois families.”22 Thus, in the first decade of modern education, the commoners captured places in this prestigious institution because there were insufficient

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applicants from the ruling class. In the 1880s, changes in the class composition of the elite schools became even more evident. Now the Old Siam generation was dying out, and the royal and noble families were coming round to accepting that modern education was essential for their children’s future. At the same time, commoner families were increasingly motivated to secure employment within the bureaucracy, and the evolving modern bureaucratic elite included representatives of both the traditional ruling class and the commoner class. One result of this was the extension of modern schooling outside the court. To examine this, we move forward to 1879. The Suan Anan and Suan Kulap schools The Suan Anan school was established in 1879 because of a need to provide English and Thai education at the secondary level to the sons of royalty and the nobility. When Dr McFarland, the American missionary, expressed his wish to see an institution similar to Robert College in Constantinople, he was invited to take charge of setting up the new school. The king’s intention was clear from the outset – to train the ruling class to serve in the modern bureaucracy. The king laid down the guidelines: the school was to offer sufficient training in reading and writing for clerks, but should also provide such subjects as mathematics, arts and sciences, which might be useful to the country. The teaching of Christianity was strictly prohibited. It was to be run as both a boarding and a day school. Initially, Suan Anan school had 100 pupils from royalty and the nobility. It quickly achieved high educational standards. It was well received by the ruling class and, at first, had more applications than it could accommodate. But after five years, we find the school facing a fate similar to the palace school: participation from the ruling class declined and the school admitted a growing number of commoners. In this case it was the prosperous Chinese mercantile community and some poorer Thai families living near the school. By 1883, it was reported that only seven of the original fifty noble pupils had passed the first level (prayok). Wyatt suggests that the school’s inconvenient location (on the Thonburi side of the river) and its overly advanced syllabus were the reasons for the school’s failure to attract the ruling class. Most important, he points out, was the competition from another recently established elite school, Suan Kulap. This second school drew away elite participation, and had the effect of diverting government financial support from Suan Anan to Suan Kulap.23 The Suan Kulap school had been established in 1880. It was designed to educate the royalty, who were in general responding poorly to the new curriculum, and to give them a head-start over the commoners. It taught at primary and secondary levels, and in 1881 introduced English to the curriculum. The king was open about the school’s objectives: on the occasion of a prize-giving ceremony he explained that he had established the Suan

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Kulap school in order to educate the low-ranking members of the royalty (at mom chao and mom ratchawong ranks)24 who were then numerous and traditionally not part of the bureaucracy. The king argued that this was particularly unfortunate because many of them were intelligent, and that entering the school was equivalent to presenting oneself at the court. He also announced that he planned to educate his own sons there in the future.25 He thus used both traditional and modern arguments to justify his promotion of the school. In its first year, the Suan Kulap school recruited only royalty of mom chao rank. Even when it did begin to recruit from the nobility, members of royalty were given special treatment.26 The stress on royalty and the drive to make the school an elitist institution guaranteeing a bureaucratic career were soon successful, and places were in great demand. In 1881 the number of students exceeded the number of officer appointments in the Royal Bodyguard Regiment that could be made available to graduates, and the king decided to abandon his original strategy of depending solely upon the regiment to train recruits to the bureaucracy. Henceforth military training was no longer a prerequisite for entry to the middle and higher levels of the bureaucracy, and graduates of Suan Kulap were able to move directly into the administration.27 Under the guidance of Prince Damrong, Suan Kulap remained an elite school serving the ruling class, but there were changes in terms of class composition. In the first four graduating years (1885–1886, –1887, –1888, –1889 ) all but two of the nineteen graduates to pass through both the primary and secondary levels (prayok one and two) came from the royal family. But in the next six years, less than 15 per cent of all graduates (ten from a total of eighty) were royal.28 The family names of some – and the fact that others did not have family names at this time – suggest that many graduates came from commoner backgrounds.29 Although we do not have the full list of all students, the available data suggest that the Suan Kulap school was not entirely immune to the effects of the desire for social mobility. For example, among those pupils who received awards in 1890, we find many from families of lesser officials, commoners and of Chinese background.30 A more detailed picture is provided by the class composition of the graduates at the primary level in 1896. Of twenty graduates, only one was royal. Four were sons of high-ranking nobles (from luang upward) and five from lesser noble parents. Eight were commoners and a further two were Chinese.31 The school was even less able to restrict entry at the secondary level. In order to meet the demand for educated officials, it had to increase its intake of secondary-level students, and this forced it to recruit from classes other than royalty and the nobility. Some came from much lower social levels. For example, Nai Bun came from Supanburi, over 80 kilometres from Bangkok, and was of a peasant family which also engaged in the rice trade. He came first in the primary-level examination taken in Bangkok,

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and his family then decided to send him to stay in the capital with a guardian who was known to his parents. There, an acquaintance of this guardian introduced him to the school.32 There is further supporting evidence that the elite feared an invasion of the school by commoners. In 1889 a school fee of twenty baht per annum was introduced in order to prevent khon leo (people of a low, common stock) from gaining entry to the school.33 Seen in the context of the current school class composition, this was a reaction to the ongoing situation rather than a pre-emptive measure. By the end of the reign, the school appeared to have lost its elitist status. By then, Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, the director of the Education Department, was of the opinion that the students’ quality was much lower than when the school was first established because of the differences in family background: “Then, the students were selected from the royalty and the nobility. Now it can be seen where they come from.”34 Parallel with the establishment of homegrown institutions was the policy of sending members of royal and noble families abroad, reflecting the consistent policy of giving priority to the ruling elite in joining the modern bureaucracy. The outcome of this expensive policy was as dismal as the internal efforts. By 1892 many Thai students under the royal support were sent home due to their poor performance. The reason for this failure was obvious, these young men were sent abroad thanks to their family background and personal qualifications were not taken into consideration whatsoever. This policy also attracted heavy lobbying for the royal sponsorship, and this was blamed for the high rate of failure in educating the Thai elite abroad.35 Mass education The development of an absolutist state demanded not only the education of the elite; it also required an army of clerks to staff the bureaucracy. King Chulalongkorn chose to use the traditional centre of learning, the wat (temple), to carry out the task. The government involved itself by supporting the production of new textbooks and paying salaries to both monk and lay teachers. The effort began in 1875 when King Chulalongkorn issued a proclamation encouraging those monks who ran temple schools to be conscientious in giving education and not to shrink from forcing lazy students to study. He suggested that all temples under royal patronage should aim at having at least five monks or lay teachers to teach reading, writing and traditional arithmetic. Teachers who attracted students would be paid a salary of six baht per month and supplied with textbooks. The king explained that he was ready to invest in this education because it was beneficial to the Buddhist religion, the country and the children themselves.36 The establishment of schools in the monasteries was a logical choice for

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the Siamese elite since monasteries had traditionally been the centre of education. Furthermore, monasteries had buildings called sala (pavilions) which could be used as schools, thus saving the government the cost of purchasing land and buildings. Prince Damrong also reasoned that setting up schools outside the monasteries might have one or two negative effects. Either the government schools would become so popular that the monastery schools would lose their support from the lay community, or parents would continue sending their sons to monastery schools at the expense of the government schools.37 However, it was easier to proclaim policy than implement it. A wide gulf separated traditional practice and the methods called for by the proclamation. At that time, the traditional system tended to discourage all but a minority of their students from achieving the level of literacy desired by the modern bureaucracy. Outside the religious sphere, education had offered few “career prospects”, and most commoners had little understanding of the new priorities. After the proclamation, there was no further government intervention until 1884, when the king instructed Prince Damrong to implement policy along the lines laid out in 1875. According to the plan, monasteries were encouraged to develop new schools; the government paid teachers’ salaries and provided textbooks, while the administration of these monastery schools was given to the monks.38 But only a few abbots and high-ranking monks could be persuaded to join the government scheme.39 This reflected the deep resentment by the sangha of King Chulalongkorn’s reforms. In common with other members of Old Siam, the senior monks realised that their position would grow increasingly marginalised if the king’s reforming zeal persisted. At first, commoner families were also reserved in their support, fearing that enrolment in government-supported monastery schools would render their sons liable to military service. The abbot of Wat Mahan, the first monastery to accept Prince Damrong’s scheme, found that on the first day after conversion to a state school almost all the pupils enrolled in his temple school had disappeared.40 Their families realised that the government’s involvement in monastery education would, for the first time, give it access to a reliable source of information on the phrai because all pupils had to submit vital information concerning their age, parentage and domicile; and this might mean that they would be summoned to service.41 The government issued a proclamation denying any connection between education and military service, and the panic subsided. Within a month, pupils at the Wat Mahan school had returned.42 By this time literacy was clearly seen as the ladder to a better life for commoners. The minimal literacy of prayok nung (primary education) offered an entirely new route to recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy. It had also become obvious to many noble families that the traditional system of elite socialisation by becoming royal pages would no

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longer be the key to success in the modern bureaucracy, and so more and more children of noble families enrolled in schools. However, the education given did not entirely satisfy the needs of the state. The demand for clerks was now so great that any literate man could get a position in any department he chose. This led to a problem: the individual had no cause to prolong his education beyond this basic level. The king summed up the situation: These days there are many positions in various departments which need to be filled by salary-paid clerks. These departments cry out for qualified school leavers. But there are not enough people to meet the demand and the departments compete for them with salaries. At the moment, clerks are scarce. They were very valuable and in very great demand.43 In an attempt to encourage higher education among commoners, the king issued a proclamation (1885) stating that an annual examination would be held and that those who passed the test on the six textbooks satisfactorily would be given a certificate which guaranteed the level of literacy they had achieved and qualified them for organised, government secondary education. Those commoners who graduated from secondary school would lose their phrai status.44 This applied not only to the school graduates in question, but also to their offspring. It was a popular move. A contemporary observed that for many people, the incentive to rid themselves of phrai status was greater than the urge to work for a salary.45 Not surprisingly, many more people now reached greater levels of literacy by prolonging their education. We now look at the broad picture of social participation in the education system. In 1896, 115 primary school pupils sat their graduation examination at the Suan Kulap examination centre (which was apparently the only such centre in the country). Their family backgrounds were as follows: royalty high-ranking nobility lesser nobility commoners Chinese Tributary states

2 13 14 66 18 246

These figures indicate that the children of commoner and Chinese families constituted the two largest groups in school. The next largest group came from low-ranking noble families, and the high-ranking noble and royal families made up a small minority. The commoners responded to the inducement of education to such an extent that in 1901 the regulations on exemption from the phrai status to school graduates were tightened.47

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It is thus evident that the primary and secondary schools which developed during the first half of King Chulalongkorn’s reign served as a vehicle for social mobility. We now turn to see how the two most important education objectives set during the second half of the reign were fulfilled. They were the creation of professional schools and the dissemination of education throughout society so that “the people are knowledgeable and are of better behaviour”.48

Professional education Professional education was set up in the second half of the reign, after the administrative reorganisation in 1892, in order to train future bureaucrats with specialised skills in addition to literacy. During this period King Chulalongkorn also started to send his own sons who had come of age to Europe to staff the top of the bureaucracy. Among the first four princes sent to Europe, two of them, Prince Nakhonchaisri and Prince Chanthaburi assumed the leading role in the army and the Ministry of Finance whereas the other two, Prince Ratburi and Prince Chumphon were responsible for establishing the Law School and the Naval Academy.49 In this area of professional education too, we find that the official attitude towards social background remained ambivalent. Although attempts were made to restrict professional education to the high-born, in practice increasing numbers of commoners were able to take advantage of this opportunity for social advancement, and the government was forced to pay elite students as an inducement to attend.50 We can see this in the situation at three professional schools: the Training School of the Civil Service (later, the Royal Pages School), the Law School and the Military Officers’ Academy. To call professional education during the reign of King Chulalongkorn “tertiary education” would be misleading because these specialised schools, run by the ministries concerned, offered only very basic training. For example, the first group of law students needed little more than a year of part-time study to graduate as a barrister-at-law.51 Besides, all except the Law School found that they needed to provide secondary education to ensure that students were sufficiently literate. Soon after the Training School of the Civil Service (henceforth, the Training School) was established, it abandoned its original plan of teaching academic subjects and concentrated instead on practical, work-related training. Its syllabus was divided into three levels. The lowest level taught sufficient general education, the intermediate level dealt with subjects necessary for work (such as writing reports) and the highest level provided field training.52 When the Military Officers’ Academy was established in 1887, only a minimal level of literacy was required for this least popular of professions, and the curriculum lasted four years (in 1906 it was extended to six years).

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These three key professional schools attempted to prevent commoners from gaining admission. The regulations of the Law School, formally established in 1896, stated that candidates needed to have approval from the Minister of Justice or some person delegated by him.53 The most ambitious school in this respect was the Military Officers’ Academy, which stated clearly that candidates must be high-born, either members of the royalty or sons of nobles.54 Such exclusiveness was not unquestioned, however. Early idealistic schemes for bureaucratic training disregarded birth. Chaophraya Phatsakorawong was most extreme and proposed that the civil service training school should accept anyone who expressed an interest to join, regardless of qualification and birth.55 Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, the ambassador to the Court of St James and the guardian of King Chulalongkorn’s sons, proposed that recruitment should be strictly on merit, with no one allowed in by the patronage system.56 After initially refusing, Prince Damrong decided to take responsibility for setting up the Training School himself. It was to be managed by the meritocratic Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, who ruled that candidates must be as well qualified as those who in the past had been presented to the court as royal pages.57 From the tone of his letter to the king, we can infer that Prince Damrong became impatient with such liberal ideas and felt that without his intervention which was urgently needed, the school would either not be established or would set off in an undesirable direction.58 In the first two years after the Training School was established in 1899, 252 students were recruited.59 The high number of secondary-school graduates suggests that they were recruited regardless of their social background. In 1905, the director of the Training School proudly announced that it had started to attract more high-born young men than previously.60 This point is substantiated by a letter from the Director of the school in 1906, making plain that originally the school did not discriminate against those of commoner birth.61 This letter was written as a comment on a request made by Phraya Suriyanuwat, the Minister of Communications, asking that a quantity of those students who were high-born be trained for supervising railway and other government construction works. The Director was querying how he could supply as many as requested, given that the school did not make any requirements of elite birth. The relative absence of discrimination is confirmed by the fact that poor students were paid a stipend of thirty baht per month. And when it was suggested that all students wear the royal pages’ uniforms, in line with the re-designation of the Training School as the Royal Pages School (a point taken up later in this chapter), it was proposed that the school buy them for those students who could not themselves afford to pay.62 While seeking to introduce bureaucratic values, the school also demonstrated attempts to maintain traditional norms. Thus, as in the other professional centres, some school places were awarded on a patronage basis. Yet this practice, too, was made for the promotion of commoners,

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who sought placement through favouritism in an institution which welcomed elite recruits. Indeed, it seems that even King Chulalongkorn gave places in the Royal Pages School as patronage to commoner clients.63 So although the Training School of the Civil Service succeeded more than the other professional schools, the birth restrictions proposed by Prince Damrong were not enforced. Indeed, only a few years after its establishment, the school lowered the educational requirements demanded from sons of the elite and insisted only on primary-school qualifications, in order to ensure that commoner entrants did not swamp the Training School.64 Other factors beside these relaxed qualifications attracted members of the elite to the Royal Pages School, as the Training School was retitled in 1902. Prince Damrong was active in encouraging likely upper-class candidates to enroll, and the kind of training offered was very likely to be appreciated by the old ruling class. Students were trained not only as modern administrators but also as royal pages according to the traditional system, and thus this training enjoyed prestige. Also, a career in the ministry did not suffer from cultural stigmatisation as did a legal career, which was frowned upon by devout Buddhists who considered it sinful to put people in prison, or as did a military career which was generally identified with conscription for war (the notion of a professional army being novel) and thought to be sinful because it involved killing.65 And when nationalist unrest began to bedevil the bureaucracy, graduates of the Royal Page School appeared largely immune. The success in recruiting from the elite, the traditional nature of the training given, and the good opportunities for career advancement in the Ministry of the Interior indicated that the school’s graduates were relatively content bureaucrats. The legal profession, too, offered very promising career prospects. For example, upon graduation as barrister-at-law, Laoo Khrairoek (later Chaophraya Mahithon) was immediately promoted to the position of Judge of the Criminal Court, on a salary of 280 baht a month (at that time a clerk’s salary averaged twenty baht). One year later he was appointed Head of the Civil Court and earned 400 baht.66 Prospects in the legal profession were so good that one student turned down a king’s scholarship to study in the West in order to enroll into the Law School (a decision which he did not regret because he was later sent to England to study law). The Law School attracted bright young men regardless of social background. The training followed the British and Indian systems of jurisprudence and required considerable intelligence and perseverance; thus talent became a far more important qualification than social background. It also inculcated social values and ideas of the state which were sharply at variance with those expressed in the traditional system, and so laid the basis for alienation from the royal principle. A survey of the lists of Law School students and graduates shows that students of commoner background usually outnumbered those from noble

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families. The ranks of commoners included a few Chinese. For example, in 1907, students who passed the first legal examination consisted of six from noble parents, one from the lesser nobility, six commoners and one Chinese.67 Similarly in 1910, students passing at the same level consisted of three seniors and two of lesser nobility, eight commoners and two Chinese.68 Of the nineteen second-class barristers-at-law in 1913, six had noble parents, one was from the lesser nobility, twelve of commoner parents and two of Chinese parents.69 Yet their participation in a common profession made them more or less equal in a new and distinct social category. Thus the legal profession demonstrates the early development of a new social class which consisted of both upwardly mobile commoners and the descendants of traditional office-holders. Of the three professions, the army was the least successful in fending off commoners. The phrai system had given the military profession the social stigma of belonging to society’s least fortunate, those who were pressed into service. Thus, the Military Officers’ Academy found itself attracting only children of the lesser nobles or low-ranking army personnel.70 The commoner class, for that matter, only slowly understood the opportunities offered by the army for career advancement. It seems that the prejudice against the army was so strong that the promised stipend of twelve baht (a considerable sum of money in 1880s) and sakdina of 400 on entry to the Academy by the cadet was insufficiently lucrative. King Chulalongkorn and the new army leadership (headed principally by Prince Chira, King Chulalongkorn’s son who graduated from Denmark in 1897) found the disinterest worrying, especially in view of their hopes for a large, modern conscript army. In 1897 arrangements were made for the Military Officers’ Academy to recruit as many lesser royalty as possible. Four high-ranking young princes were attached to it in 1899 in the hope that, if royalty was seen to enter into a military career, the common prejudice against soldiering would diminish and more of the higher-born would be encouraged to enlist.71 As a result of the strong royal support and the growing popular awareness of a military career as a potential source of upward mobility, the army did indeed begin to gain popularity. In 1901, the number of graduates rose from around ten a year in the previous decade to twenty-two. In that year, the king deemed it possible to make public the plan for replacing the corvée system with conscription to a modern army. The edict on conscription promulgated in 1905 was assured by the figure of the 1904 Military Officers’ Academy graduates which was as high as forty-eight. These military graduates, coming from both the commoner and ruling classes, would become leaders of those conscripts under the new system. With the growing popularity of the military profession, we see efforts to restrict entry to the Military Officers’ Academy. In 1906 the regulations were changed to the effect that applicants had to be sponsored and guaranteed by a commissioned government official (that is, someone of noble

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rank). They had to be children of reputable parents and to pass an examination set by the committee of the Academy. In 1909 the admission regulations were changed to the effect that only members of royalty and of a few related families (for instance, the Bunnags) and of officer families could enroll in the three lower years at the Academy (which offered a sixyear curriculum). Others could join in the fourth year. Moreover, a special junior class was created for young princes and the sons of high-ranking officers “to instil a preference for the military”.72 The real objective of these measures was to ensure that the army was dominated by the aristocrats and the military establishment. At the same time, the army offered the highest opportunities for social mobility, and as a result, the officer corps had the most mixed class composition of all the professional elites. This trend had the long-term effect of turning the army into a hotbed of nationalist unrest – as we shall see in future chapters. Thus, the bureaucracy developed in such a way that it increasingly went against the principles of social hierarchy on which the regime rested. In the next section we deal with King Chulalongkorn’s response to this problem.

Social mobility and the question of loyalty It was obvious not only that the advancing tide of commoner officials posed a threat to the king’s plans, but also that the modernisation of the bureaucracy was undermining his relations with the ruling class. Traditionally, the king needed to retain his status as patron of the new bureaucrats in order to retain his authority over them. But a bureaucrat who moved into and up in the bureaucracy because he had earned educational qualifications instead of being the king’s client was unlikely to feel the gratitude that tradition demanded. Thus the basis of noble loyalty to the monarch was seriously undermined. The king responded by emphasising his role as the protector of the nai class against the rising tide of commoners trying to push into the nobility. First, as we have seen, the king tried his best to ensure that the noble class was able to participate fully in the modern bureaucracy, overcoming both the attitudes and the educational disabilities that had marked Old Siam’s negative response. In 1885, five years after the Suan Kulap school first opened its doors to the ruling class, he felt sufficiently secure to announce that, in the future, anyone who was not educated to specified levels would not become a noble.73 These announcements served notice to young nobles who were wondering whether or not to be trained for a career. He then turned his attention to the old institution of presenting the nobles’ sons to the court. This announcement placed in difficulty many royal pages who had dropped out of modern schooling before gaining any formal qualifications. In 1887 the king attempted to harness such talent by issuing a proclamation instructing those pages who had passed the age of

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sixteen to prepare themselves for an examination within three months. This would test such skills as spelling, handwriting, precis from memory, arithmetic and knowledge of the (traditional) bureaucratic system.74 These measures screened pages for the modern bureaucracy and also hammered home the message to the ruling class that the old world had eventually died away. The conduct of bureaucratic business had consequently changed. The king would no longer listen to oral reports at daily audiences, where their delivery had previously decided bureaucratic promotion. Now promotion was to be won with literacy skills. This was easier said than done. The examination was postponed for over a year, the official explanation being that the pages were engaged in too many ceremonies to respond to the new regulation. In the second proclamation on the subject, the king said that he had a premonition that the extra time had not been taken advantage of, and that the pages might feel that if the majority of them failed the examination, then individuals would not be too humiliated. He reminded them that being high-born and wealthy was not enough to be qualified to maintain the family’s name and its high social stature; by doing well in the examination they would not only perform their duty as nobles, but would also show gratitude to their families.75 There is, however, no evidence that the examination was actually held. Judging from the general atmosphere, it seems probable that the pages still found it difficult to come to terms with the strict requirement to acquire educational qualifications. The king thus continued to face the dilemma of wanting to preserve the old ruling class while having to appoint commoners to join its ranks because of the need to staff the modern bureaucracy. In 1890 he issued a proclamation expressing his perceptions of the problem; his difficulty was obvious: It has come to His Majesty’s knowledge that these days young men who are sons of nobles tend not to get training in the office but hang about doing nothing and enjoying themselves in activities which are not beneficial. Those who work in offices are often ordinary people who are poor and want to earn salaries by working as clerks. After some time they become more acquainted with the work, and it is natural that their head of departments should value their worth. When there is a vacancy it is imperative to promote those who can do the work. Sons of officials who have done nothing are always at a disadvantage compared with those who have shown their worth. His Majesty is worried that as the situation stands he does not know how sons of officials whose families have been in the nobility for generations can continue to serve in similar positions. Some groups or individuals might think that he does not want to chup liang [give a position in the bureaucracy] to the descendants of officials but prefers to promote those with no family to serve in official positions. The old official families might be aggrieved. So he commands that a proclama-

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tion be issued to remind all officials who have sons and nephews who should be in the service that it is His Majesty’s great desire to have sons of officials who belong to noble families serving in those departments in which their fathers have served, or even in greater capacity, and he prefers them above those who have no family. But if those with family have neither knowledge nor capacity and are promoted to serve in senior positions then the service will be jeopardised or even fail. His Majesty cannot allow the service to be jeopardised. He must give priority to the service and chup liang those who are low-born but knowledgeable in the service according to their merit [khun wicha].76 The rest of the proclamation shows how the king hoped to solve the situation. He urged sons of the nobles not to dismiss the idea of starting their careers as clerks in government offices by joining any government office and learning from the job, as in the past.77 What he did not mention was the new requirement that they needed to be literate, and this omission implies that he would not reject sons of nobles who might not be fully literate but were prepared to start their careers on the lowest echelon. This was a concession to the noble families; it gave an alternative to those who had failed to send their sons to schools after the Royal Pages Department had ceased to operate as the route into the administrative establishment. He would offer them no other privileges, and they had to be content with a clerical salary. (One royal prince chose this route into the bureaucracy because ill-health prevented him from pursuing his study. His nanny was incensed and curtly reminded his father that the salary barely covered the young prince’s medical bill.)78 The king said he realised that his suggestion might not bring results in spite of his full commitment to the young nobles’ cause. Even so, they were assured that birth would still count after they were established in their careers. When a member of the noble class and a commoner started their careers at the same time and they were equally proficient, the former would be promoted first.79 This proclamation reflected the problem which would become increasingly serious in time. All secondary-school graduates would start their careers in the bureaucracy at the same level, and once they reached the middle level they could join the nobility. The king was willing to promote able commoners to noble status provided that they never constituted more than a minority of the nobility. Already, by the end of the 1880s, those commoners who had proved themselves in the various ministries were being appointed to the khunnang class. The bureaucratic heads who were primarily concerned that their organisations should run efficiently often promoted talented subordinates regardless of their social origins. Indeed, Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior, promoted talent so zealously that the king complained that he did not personally know these newly appointed young Khunnang.80

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The unease which the ruling elite felt towards the penetration of commoners into their class was reflected in the ambivalence of even the most ardent modernisers. On the surface they demonstrated snobbery, an extreme form of which was expressed by Prince Damrong when he denounced the company of commoners. Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, who had earlier argued that recruitment to the Training School of the Civil Service should be made purely on merit, complained by the end of the reign about the difficulty of teaching the commoners because they lacked certain social skills which were ingrained in their superiors.81 It was also argued that these newcomers were inept at court etiquette. The king once remarked that, from his experience, it seemed impossible to find an official serving in the upcountry who was not ill at ease in a royal audience.82 Their awkwardness undermined the sanctity of the monarchy, the pivotal characteristic of pre-modern kingship, which the king wanted to maintain in the absolute monarchy. But most importantly, the new system of recruitment destroyed the system of personal relationships upon which traditional loyalties between the king and officials depended. The king’s complaint that he did not know the new nobles personally reflected his worry as to how the recruitment system affected the relationship between the monarch and the nobles. He was worried about the lack of trust between himself and the nobles, and the feeling that the nobles’ loyalty was not as strong as in the traditional system. Prince Damrong, who felt personally responsible for appointing more commoners into noble ranks than any other cabinet minister because he headed the Ministry of the Interior, the fastest-growing sector of the bureaucracy, came up with an ingenious plan to quell the king’s anxieties in dealing with the nobles sprung from commoner stock. In 1896 he proposed that: in order to solve the problem a school should be established in the Royal Pages Department. Students would be presented to the King and have a chance to be in his audience, which would provide him with the opportunity to get to know them. Moreover, they would study court etiquette along with basic knowledge of administration.83 He believed that this would restore the symbiotic relationship between the king and the nobles; the king would be able to trust the nobles, and the nobles would feel loyalty to the king. Initially, students of the Civil Service Training School were presented to the king between completing their classroom study and receiving field training. As this practice did not give the students enough time in the king’s audience, the presentation was moved back to between the first and second levels. The king gleefully approved the revised plan and remarked that “this will consolidate trust between the king and the officials”.84 And

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since so much emphasis had been placed on adding training appropriate to royal pages, Prince Damrong suggested that the school be renamed “The Royal Page School”. King Chulalongkorn also welcomed the second suggestion with equal enthusiasm, claiming that he had considered this kind of name before, but had been worried that it might sound out of tune with the times.85 After presentation, the civil service students would wear the uniforms of the royal pages, but with less elaborate decoration. Prince Damrong reported the success of his project thus: Whenever the King travelled to the provinces he had these pages mixed with his personal pages. King Chulalongkorn showed kindness to them by greeting them, asking them to run errands for him, and also by examining them about their work.86 Thus the Royal Page School provided the king with the means to establish personal contacts with his future officials. Adorned with the aura of glorified royal servants, they appeared to have been socialised rather successfully into the old cultural mould of clients to the supreme patron, the king. As we noted earlier, graduates from the Royal Pages School were not among those who rose to challenge the absolute monarchy in 1912. Class and individual patronage were not the only means King Chulalongkorn used to maintain loyalty among the newly created officials. Education was used in order to inculcate an awareness of the nation – the invention of the European absolutist state which long out-lived its creator. We shall see that by establishing the nation-state as the centre of loyalty, the Thai absolute monarchs, like their European predecessors, eventually faced the fatal question of whether royalty was better suited to the role of spokesman for this newly created political entity.

Implanting nationalism through education The new breed of bureaucrats generated by education reforms began to coalesce into a new social group which will be called here the “modern bureaucrats”. Its members differed distinctly from the old noble class in that they identified their interests and values with the institution of the modern bureaucracy rather than with the throne. This phenomenon would eventually lead to the demise of the absolute monarchy, the legitimacy of which was challenged by the new class in the name of the nation. Ironically enough, when we trace the development of the new concept, we find that it was implanted by the king’s new education system. Nationalism was promoted not only by King Chulalongkorn, but also by other prominent members of the ruling class. They had three goals in mind. First, nationalism aimed at creating acceptance and encouragement of positive participation in a changing world environment. This motive was

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shared by the king, Young Siam and, to a certain extent, by Conservative Siam. Second, nationalism was useful for centralising royal power and legitimising absolutism, a motive specific to the king. Third, it contributed a moral imperative for social stability, a motive shared by the king and both Young Siam and Old Siam.87 We shall illustrate the way in which nationalist ideas were inculcated by using a leading textbook series called Thammachariya, a title which conveyed the idea of moral education. In order to understand its importance, we need first to consider the role of these textbooks in the emerging modern educational system. Ministry of Education officials responsible for compiling textbooks consisted mainly of two groups of people. The first were those who had left the sangha and, as in the traditional system, found themselves most useful in the service of the Department of Religion, which now became the Ministry of Education. The second, a very small group, consisted of westerneducated officials, of whom a young educationist, later known by the name Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, was the leading light. As King Chulalongkorn was convinced of the inadequacy of Buddhist scholars in dealing with subjects outside religious studies,88 it is not surprising that textbooks directed towards such an important goal as inculcating state values would come from the second group and especially from Thammasakmontri.89 Thammasakmontri was born into an old noble family. His father had died when he was very young, and as the son of a minor wife his career path was more typical of a commoner than a member of the ruling class. He attended a monastery school at the primary level. However, he was given an opportunity to join the Suan Kulap school at the secondary level and later moved to the Teachers’ Training School, where he won a scholarship to study in England for two years between 1896–1898.90 Upon his return, he was made responsible for producing textbooks in the Ministry of Education, and in the same year he was sent to inspect the education system in India. He was then called to supervise production of the six volumes of moral studies in the Thammachariya series. Four volumes were written during King Chulalongkorn’s reign; the analysis that follows deals with these initial volumes (one, four, five and six). Authors for the succeeding two could not be found until later.91 The series reflected the new ideas coming into Siam, especially through the foreign-educated elite. These ideas offered vehicles to bring European enlightenment to the Siamese people and to make them “modern” and prosperous. Analysis of the textbooks suggests that their main purpose was to encourage active participation in the world economy. This corresponded with the attitude of the ruling elite, especially prominent during the last part of King Chulalongkorn’s reign when the need to train bureaucrats was nearly satisfied at the lower levels, that modern education should foster more effective economic production.92 Thammachariya suggested that the location of the individual was in an

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economic rather an ethical universe. The concept of interdependency in the capitalist world economy was explained. It was pointed out that an individual’s existence was impossible without the support of the material and social worlds.93 The material and social worlds were interconnected, and their relationship provided a clue to the stage of development that a society had reached. Negroes were offered as an example of uncivilised people who lived in a pre-agricultural society. The main reason for their “backwardness”, it was claimed, was that they lacked contact with the outside world. In other words, their material world was determined by the scope of their social world.94 One distinguishing characteristic of the “civilised world” was the existence of the division of labour. This led to the exchange of goods both internally and externally, and thus to a “civilised” way of living.95 Thus, in Thammachariya, the term siwilai had a specific meaning that was closely related to the notion of an economic system which engaged in international trade. Sometimes siwilai was interchangeable with “progressive” (charoen). In this context, being civilised or progressive referred to the degree to which the society had moved from a closed economic system into the money economy and the capitalist world economy. And how far the society moved into the money economy depended upon its productive system. Thammasakmontri developed from this a description of the role that the state expected the individual to perform that would benefit not only himself, but the state in general. The author argued that, before an individual could fully contribute to economic progress, one needed to develop both spiritual and technical qualities: What if the people are uneducated, or are educated but behave in a foolhardy manner like rogues ? How then can they earn a living righteously? Because the country is determined to generate production, an individual must have knowledge and be trained in technology so that he is capable of working and of earning his livelihood.96 Apart from teaching about the new economic order, Thammasakmontri also wished to inculcate a new set of core values which corresponded to the order’s needs. The topics discussed in Thammachariya VI included cleanliness, perseverance, proper manners, discipline, punctuality, truthfulness, frugality, preservation of public property, gratitude, kindness, etc.97 These core values were not presented in terms of a universal ethical system, but instead were related specifically to the world economy. For example, tolerance was presented in terms of willingness to trade with countries professing different religions. The writer pointed out that this marked a departure from past practice, when unauthorised involvement of Siamese with foreigners, either in trade or religion, had elicited severe punishment. Lack of tolerance was detrimental to trade, and consequently to progress.98 Thus, morality was shifted from an ethical system to a matter of utility.

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Thammasakmontri explained state formation within the context of economic development. The earliest formation of the Thai state was the tribal system, which was the extension of the kinship system, and its economic system was pre-agricultural. Once strong leaders had managed to control them, these groups of people began to settle down, and hence the economic system developed on an agricultural basis. The leaders were not only military commanders but also the regulators of agricultural production.99 The author explained that, when the state became powerful and spread over a wider territory, it was formed into a country called Siam, and its leader became king. But the state failed to progress because it spent so much time fighting with its neighbours in order to gain more territory and to round up more manpower. This early Thai state, which spent most of its energies in waging wars and paid little attention to trade, was still in the dark ages. The beginning of trade with European powers was the turning point when Siam stepped out of the dark age of barbarianism and entered civilisation.100 And this new beginning took place during King Chulalongkorn’s reign. Thammasakmontri went on to argue that trade with Europe changed the characteristics of Siam’s international relations. The state began to enjoy peaceful relations with other states, and could now afford to concentrate on maintaining internal peace and order, and to develop the country so that people were sufficiently intelligent and educated to contribute to its progress. This abstention from fighting wars gave the Thai government the opportunity to organise a sound administration and to achieve rapid progress. The Thammachariya series did refer to the threat from the colonial powers, but only as a danger which was already past, thanks to King Chulalongkorn’s great ability in developing the country.101 The state was the vessel for a cultural community – the nation – which furnished the fundamental identity of those living within its jurisdiction. As a unit of the labour force, the individual was seen as the most important component of the state. Thus, the role of the individual as a member of the cultural community coincided with that of the producer in the economic order and subject of the state. The new stress on the nation-state involved developing a new vocabulary. Originally the word chat meant birth, and its use in the sense of “nation” was an innovation that seems to have originated in the middle of the nineteenth century when Siam was concluding trade treaties with Britain.102 In Thammachariya, this idea was popularised; the individual was told that he belonged to a cultural community called chat Thai, and that the whole community lived in a country (muang Thai), which was their fatherland. Remember that muang Thai is our fatherland [ban kird muang non] and we have to love it very much. We have to love it more than the school where we study. Moreover, we have to love our fellow Thais, in

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other words our nation. This is because we are born Thai and belong to the same group of people. We are of the same nation and speak the same language, so how can we not love each other more than we love other people who belong to other nations and speak other languages? If someone speaks untruly and criticises muang Thai by saying that it is not good in such and such a way, we cannot bear to listen because it hurts as though somebody stabs our heart with a sharp knife.103 And in order to add a further distinction between “us” and “them” and to create pride in the fatherland, the word Thai was used in the sense of freedom: “We are Thais because we are nobody’s servants.”104 But these notions did not have general usage; in 1883, students of the Englishlanguage course at Suan Anan school found it impossible to translate the word “nation” from English into Thai.105 Students were called upon to demonstrate a sense of duty and to sacrifice their lives to the nation in the same way that past generations had sacrificed themselves for the fatherland: The sacrifice of one’s life to the country has always been respected by the people both in the past and now in the present. And this is the greatest honour for the sacrificers, for although one might be dead one’s name will live on forever.106 The author attempted to make national boundaries coincide with those of the cultural community by defining the community’s components. The first component was language: We are of the same nation and speak the same language, so how can we not love each other more than we love other people who belong to other nations and speak other languages?107 This suggested that the Thai nation would necessarily exclude those living on Thai soil but speaking other tongues. The author tended to gloss over the logical complications arising from this definition. Two fundamental issues were involved: the distinction between Thai and non-Thai languages separated the culturally Thai from the culturally non-Thai; and the distinction between “proper” (cultivated) Thai as opposed to Thai dialects separated high Thai culture from low. With the first, the question arose as to whether assimilation into the national community, through language conversion, was possible or desirable; the question was ignored. With the second, people were positively encouraged to move upward to high Thai culture by spreading (indeed, insisting on) the “standard” version of the language.108 Religion was the second component of the cultural community. Here, one sees a sharp distinction between textbooks produced by the ministry’s Buddhist scholars and the ones by those who were westernised. Previous

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textbooks written by other Ministry of Education officials had employed Buddhist principles as an exclusive basis for teaching moral education, but in his sections on moral education, Thammasakmontri abjured such an obvious framework. He was more selective in making reference to Buddhism, and the topics in the moral reading series were chosen to teach the lessons not only of Buddhism but also of the state. He used a variety of sources for this. For example, the topic of honesty in Thammachariya III was illustrated with selections from the Jataka tales, a poem from Wachirayan magazine, English and Thai history, King Chulalongkorn’s writings and a quotation from Plato.109 Thus, the concept was based on Buddhist ideas but widened by references from elsewhere. The new educational system treated Buddhism as an element of national identity and did not explicitly propagate the values of Buddhist philosophy. For example, the writer of Phutthachariya (Buddhist Ethics) gave little attention to explaining religious principles, but instead concentrated on showing their importance in Thai culture. He discussed the role of the sangha, the monasteries, religious ceremonies and monuments, and how all these elements involved people in their everyday lives.110 Thus, the teaching materials on morality taught that language and Buddhism formed integral parts of the Thai nation. The general material on history and geography further helped to create the sense of national identity, and of Siam as a cultural community. Thammachariya identified families as the basic units of the nation-state. Home was a very important unit for modelling the individual’s relationship with the state and the world. A happy, loving, kind, just and responsible family produced human beings who were capable of seeking happiness, and of contributing to the benefit of the world. Thammasakmontri argued that love and involvement within the family would lead to love and involvement at school, and that these qualities would eventually be transmitted to the nation and the state.111 Thus the inculcation of love within various social units led to nationalism. Other important qualities of family relationships were obedience and respect, which reflected the unequal relationship between parents and children, or between superiors and inferiors. Parents had the responsibility of looking after their children and of teaching them well. The children’s basic responsibility towards their parents was to obey their instruction willingly and promptly because the superiors knew very well that obedience will also be beneficial to other people. This is the reason why they must give instruction to children.112 Children must totally trust that their superiors will not teach anything that is wrong and not good for them because the superiors know better than the children what is right and what is wrong. Besides being the guardians of the children they probably do not want the children to turn into rascals.113

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The need for children to be obedient towards their superiors was as strictly upheld as that for soldiers towards their officers.114 When obedience was enforced within the family, the individual member was trained to submit himself to the command of his rulers.115 This was because the government rules over the country in the same manner as parents rule over the family.116 Students were told to submit themselves without question to the command of all authorities, including the ruler, because these authorities enforced the rules that guided the community; one had no choice but to comply, since one could not make these rules oneself.117 There were two reasons for obeying the government. First, those who were in authority were knowledgeable and sufficiently intelligent to rule and enforce their command. Second, the government was the source of all justice in the country. If the government was bad and did not observe justice, and granted privileges to one class rather than to others, then disturbances and unrest were inevitable. Thus obedience to the government was not intended to be blind, and only a good government deserved good citizens.118 The last core value expected to be inculcated in the national family was gratitude. The students were reminded that they owed gratitude to their parents, who had brought them up from birth and had protected them from all kinds of danger. Students should always remember their parents’ virtues and should try to repay the debt of gratitude whenever the occasion arose.119 They could make this repayment by being honest, caring for their parents and paying them respect.120 This sense of gratitude should also determine relations with teachers, and, one step on, with the monarch. The people should feel gratitude to the monarch because his rule brought peace and happiness to the country.121 Thus we can see, at this stage of absolutism, the relationship between monarch and people was still portrayed in terms of the traditional ideology; the monarch contributed to the happiness and well-being of the country and its people, and at the same time, the people should feel gratitude and be loyal to him in return. However, the monarch was not closely identified with the nation. The continuing validity of older concepts can be seen during the Paknam Incident of 1893, when officials and people volunteered to fight the French in the name of their gratitude to the king, and the word “nation” was not mentioned. At that time, only handful of western-educated Thais expressed animosity towards the French in terms of nationalism.122 Moreover, when the legitimacy of the monarch was mentioned, it was still the legitimacy of the monarch as a person rather than as an institution. The activities of each king might affect the country differently: “Whether the country will be good or bad depends significantly upon the king . . . A good king will be of great benefit to the people.”123 Students were told to be grateful to King Chulalongkorn because he “has contributed to the utmost benefit of the country”.124

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This apparently reflects the traditional notion of the relationship between monarchy and people. It was written during King Chulalongkorn’s reign, when he commanded respect for his achievements; whether or not the monarchy should be separated from the state was not yet a conscious issue. But in the next reign, when the personality and policies of the monarch were controversial, the negative implications were much more apparent, and questions of separating monarchical and state powers were debated. We have seen that the Thammachariya series treated nationalism as the means first to mobilise the Siamese to serve the world economy, and second, to serve royal centralisation of power. Thus, Thammasakmontri claimed that there were two ways one could express nationalism: One has to devote oneself to the nation in spite of hardship and even sacrifice one’s life for the nation. The other way is to earn one’s living according to one’s ability and skill, and to try to progress in one’s own activity. This, on the whole, would contribute to the country.125 Thai nationalism of this time was optimistic and oriented towards change; we have to wait until the next reign for the defensive and reactionary “official nationalism” proclaimed by state ideologues,126 and in particular the king, in order to preserve royal power. In the meantime we should bear in mind that many of the arguments advanced in the Thammachariya series could be turned to undermine the claim of the absolute monarchy. The introduction of the concept of the nation-state was itself very dangerous, as it had been in Europe, because it raised the question of whether royal or national interests had priority. However, these ideas only became explosive when there existed significant groups of people who were looking for ideological justification for bringing about changes. Such groups were being created by the educational and structural reforms of King Chulalongkorn’s modernisation effort. We have seen that the state failed to reserve the new professions for the old ruling class. At the same time, there began to emerge something that could be considered a bureaucratic elite, with its own consciousness of interest. It grew from the sprawl of royal ministers and their followers of office holders – some from traditional aristocracy, some commoners – that characterised the first decade of reform. The stage was being set for challenges to the system both from upwardly mobile commoners, and from office holders who identified their interests and values with the institutions of the modern bureaucracy rather than with the throne. In the next chapter, we examine the conflicts which turned nationalism into a weapon against the throne.

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Contradictions within the bureaucracy

Introduction King Chulalongkorn could only establish absolutism when he could exercise control over an efficient bureaucracy. This bureaucracy had to be capable of implementing policy and of transmitting information to and from the king. If absolutism was to endure, it must widen its span of control over all aspects of national life. This demanded the participation of increased numbers of bureaucrats. Hence, the need for absolute control led inexorably to growing dependence upon a government machine. At first he relied upon a small group of fellow reformers and old-style officials. This gave rise to a number of contradictions, which we examine in this chapter. We first examine the process by which the king attempted to consolidate monarchical power from the aftermath of the Wang Na crisis to the early 1890s. The monarchical system appeared to be growing more secure. Education played an increasing part in determining employment and promotion, and old-style patronage relationships were formally superseded. Yet they persisted partly because they enabled senior bureaucrats to build private and informal empires within the system. Besides, the king himself did not want to relinquish the practice when it suited him. This, plus the persistence of traditional attitudes and habits became a source of conflict between the king and his modern allies. During this period, the king also learnt a very painful lesson; modern bureaucracy could turn into a powerful challenge to his monarchical power. The second part of this chapter deals with the contradictions that developed during the second half of King Chulalongkorn’s reign as the elite and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie began to emerge as new social groups. The analysis exemplified the ambiguities inherent in Thai absolutism, and set the stage for the struggles that followed in King Vajiravudh’s reign. The chapter is thus divided into two parts. The first part covers the period from after the Wang Na crisis to the end of the century and has the following sections: consolidation contradictions in the absolutist state;

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early criticisms of absolutism; the king’s relationships with his bureaucrats. The second part deals with the emergence of the modern bureaucratic elite, and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which posed challenges to the king from the beginning of the century to the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign. For clarity, three main categories are identified within the bureaucracy developed by King Chulalongkorn and bequeathed to his successor: •

•

•

the bureaucratic elite, consisting of departmental heads. They belonged to the highest social rank, and in general were highly educated. the middle-level bureaucrats or the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”,1 signifying a new social class which went through the modern education system and acquired noble status. the clerical levels consisting of officials who had less than 400 sakdina.

Consolidation and contradictions In his birthday speech in 1885, the year of the Wang Na’s death, King Chulalongkorn proudly announced that he had succeeded in his efforts to extend royal authority to cover all the muang in the realm (phra ratcha anakhet).2 Events appeared to justify this claim. Conservative Siam seemed to have lost its stomach for the fight. The last major political battle between King Chulalongkorn and Somdet Chaophraya had occurred in 1880 when the king tried to consolidate his political power by modernising the First Foot Guard (thahan na), a regiment founded by King Mongkut.3 This constituted the first attempt to replace the corvée system with the standing army, the basis of the absolute monarch’s political power in the West. The soldiers were to be recruited on a voluntary basis from “white wristed” men (non-tattooed men who had escaped their obligations to the state and who were, in many cases, seeking protection from a nai). They were to be salaried and to serve for five years, after which they would become reserves, being finally released at the age of fifty. They were promised exemptions from taxes and compulsory labour service. Volunteers were recruited throughout the townships of the inner provinces. Many recruits came from Ratburi and Phetburi, the Bunnags’ stronghold. This created a dual problem: the king was seen to be intruding into the Bunnags’ territory, and it was common knowledge that the First Foot Guard was being modernised in order to serve the interests of the king against those of the Bunnags. A crisis flared, and Somdet Chaophraya wrote to Chaophraya Suriwong (his son and also the Kalahom) inciting a rebellion. It was rumoured that the Wang Na was to be brought forward as the nominal head of a rebellion.4

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 95 There are three reasons that explain how King Chulalongkorn once again emerged victorious from the conflict with Conservative Siam. First, Chaophraya Suriwong passed his father’s letter to the king in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Thus, he showed that he was not prepared to defy the king in his effort to consolidate the monarchy. Second, the king had a legitimate cause in arguing that he was justified in enlisting unregistered phrai. Third, he acceded to Somdet Chaophraya’s request to enlist the phrai at Ratburi, and, thus saved the latter’s face.5 Although victorious, King Chulalongkorn was yet again reminded that the possibilities of insurrection were not entirely extinguished. In 1881, he created a secret League from a group of trusted officials with the purpose of defending the king, and of ensuring that his still-youthful first son from a high-ranking queen should succeed him. The members of the League swore before the Emerald Buddha (the Buddha image most closely identified with the Chakri dynasty) eternal friendship and brotherhood, and promised that they would neither serve any other nai nor seek any personal benefit in carrying out their duties.6 In so doing, the king identified his political allies. The king achieved absolute control over the centre by, first, ensuring the succession. The Wang Na died in 1885 (two years after his one-time patron, Somdet Chaophraya). The king immediately abolished the office of Wang Na and, in 1887, installed his son, Prince Vajirunhis, as Phra borom orotsathirat or Heir Apparent. This ancient title dated back to the fourteenth-century palatine law of King Uthong. By reaffirming it, the king brought Siam in line with the “civilised monarchies of Europe and plucked the succession away from princely grasping, ministerial manipulation and foreign intervention”.7 The king justified the change in Siamese succession by claiming both the traditional justification of palatine law and the modern practice of investing an heir apparent.8 When Prince Vajirunhis died in 1893, he was succeeded as Heir Apparent by Prince Vajiravudh, the son of another queen. Second, the king took control of the revenues from the Bunnags. Chaophraya Phanuwong, the Phra Khlang, retired in 1887 and Chaophraya Suriwong, the Kalahom, in 1888. Thus, all tax revenues passed into the king’s hands. His confidence in his new fiscal power is demonstrated by the regulation that all state revenues should be directly sent to the Treasury and the office of Privy Purse, which received a share of 15 per cent of all state revenues for the maintenance of the royal household and royal family.9 Third, the king centralised his political power. In 1892, he replaced the Council of Ministers with the cabinet system. This marked the terminal decline of Old Siam and Conservative Siam, and the rise of royal princes prepared to take active roles in the bureaucracy. The cabinet included nine royal princes, all of whom were the king’s brothers.10 Of the three

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nobles in the cabinet, only one (Chaophraya Rattanthibet) belonged to Old Siam. The Privy Council was reconstituted and membership was increasingly used to reward members of the bureaucracy. The Ratthamontri sapha was given legislative responsibilities and superseded the inactive Council of State. These consultative institutions represented the king’s effort to share responsibilities and blame, to stabilise the system by creating institutions that would set the direction of reform, to increase sources of information, and to encourage more participation by trusted aides. Fourth, the king actively encouraged ideological unity among his officials. For instance, he encouraged the establishment of a library and literary club called the Wachirayan Library (Ho phrasamut wachirayan). The first stated objective of the library was to be: A meeting place which fosters unity among the royalty and high and low ranking officials so that they can be called true official friends and so together they will contribute to things which are beneficial.11 Thus, it would provide a forum in which officials could both socialise and internalise shared values. These values would also be transmitted by means of the library’s magazine, Wachirayan wiset. This deliberate encouragement of conformity among officials was an important task in an age of westernisation, when traditional values and practices were forced to co-exist with western ones. Members were asked to contribute answers to troublesome problems, and many of these revolved around the issue of deciding which set of values was applicable to a particular situation. For example, they were asked how a new graduate from the West who had committed a blunder by shaking hands with a friend’s wife should assuage the wrath of the couple.12 Wachirayan wiset also serialised literary works, the most important of which was Phraratchaphithi sibsong duan (the Twelve-Month Ceremonies), a most extensive and scholarly study of state ceremonies written by King Chulalongkorn. Thus, Wachirayan wiset was used as a vehicle for recapturing the past in order to manipulate it. His work on state ceremonies was partly intended to establish the king as an authority on the past, and thus as an interpreter of it; and this role was much in evidence in his drive to centralise the system. It was also intended to reinforce a Thai sense of identity over and against western influences. This became increasingly necessary as the pace of modernisation accelerated, and the feeling developed among the educated that all things western constituted a desirable model, and all things Thai were out of date.13 On occasion, the king was forced into explicit denunciations of western things. When the western New Year was celebrated in 1890, the king commented that this borrowed tradition had nothing to recommend it to Thais, but since it was for fun and only once a year, no significant harm

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 97 could be done. He then went on to say that there were many good aspects to western tradition, and that the Thais should take care to select only those that were beneficial. Anything which was potentially harmful should be avoided, and only good and beneficial customs should be adopted.14 Contradictions stemmed from a range of factors, and the new practices and institutions of the absolute monarchy themselves worked to undermine monarchical power. Take, for example, the separation of the Privy Purse from the Treasury. On the one hand, this allowed the king more freedom over a sizeable chunk of state revenue, and in times of economic expansion, the Privy Purse stood in a strategic position to reap the benefits. For instance, it developed entrepreneurial interests in real estate, rice mills, financial speculation, public utilities and in industry.15 But on the other hand, this separation also restricted the king’s access to the Treasury’s fund and helped to quicken the process by which the monarchical and state powers became separated – a process which was eventually to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchy. Like other absolutist monarchs, King Chulalongkorn faced a major problem in financing the administrative machine – which was intended to enhance royal power. The French monarchy of the “ancient regime” had sold offices to the bourgeoisie and, consequently, weakened its own authority; the nobless de la robe had used their offices to earn returns from their investment, and the monarchy could not afford to dismiss them.16 The enlightened King of Prussia, Frederic William, built his modern bureaucracy from the Junker noble class, and then allowed them to seek profit from their position in the modern army. The end result was similar to the French experience: the Prussian bureaucracy became very powerful at the expense of the monarch’s authority.17 Determined to turn the old ruling class into bureaucratic bourgeoisie, King Chulalongkorn chose a path similar to that followed in Prussia. During the transitional period before 1892, the old system of resource distribution co-existed with the modern payment of salaries. The old ruling class was allowed to continue conscription and the poll tax replaced the corvée system. During this period, the king was also forced to continue his reliance upon the tax farming system, which ran contrary to the spirit of his early reforms. State revenue was still mainly raised from such taxes, and those imposed on opium, gambling and spirits. Not until the first decade of the twentieth century was there evidence of a shift from indirect to direct taxation, when the head tax on the phrai was introduced (at a rate of six baht per year). The development of the money economy provided new opportunities for the powerful to exploit their positions. For instance, judges exploited their positions for financial gain, and the people had scant hopes of winning impartial justice. The king was daunted by the vast numbers of petitions made to him, and despite his best intentions, could not hope to redress so many grievances.18 Patronage persisted, and the king

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continued to allow his clients to gain from the system.19 This was partly because it had not been possible to develop a bureaucracy capable of centralising revenue collection, and partly because it was simpler to tolerate some of the old ways than to alienate the bureaucratic hierarchy entirely. The royal practice of polygamy had the traditional value of cementing relationships between the monarch, the nobles and the tax farmers. King Chulalongkorn’s continuance of this practice involved him in extensive patronage networks. (By the end of the reign he had about seventy children.) The returns that could be made from investing in royal connections were so great that tax farmers competed to form relationships with the inner court. Some sent their daughters as concubines; others chose to woo one of the king’s wives with presents as a means of gaining royal favours.20 As the number of royal dependents increased, the problems of balancing state needs (for a rational bureaucracy) and the maintenance of traditional political support became more complex. In the new political climate, the more radical members of Young Siam were increasingly likely to be affronted by royal patronage when this entailed the use of public resources in order to meet personal and family needs. An illustration is provided by the case of the Master of the Royal Mint who served during the 1880s. It was alleged by Prince Prisadang that the man had been allowed to appropriate the profits of the Royal Mint, then in the region of 700 catties a year, in return for favours performed for the king and his favourite wives.21 This contrasts with a case a decade earlier when shares of corruption had, in part, led to the then master of the Royal Mint being executed for corruption.22 At that time, the king had been trying to wrest power from the Wang Na and the great nobles, and was trying to demonstrate to the Bunnags that he placed the interests of the state above all else. Now that the Bunnags had lost so much of their power, the king found that he needed to adopt the same tactics as those used by the Bunnags. He differed from them in that he was more committed to the interests of the state, which he identified with his own. The king’s problems arose from the need to rein in what he saw as the excesses of Young Siam rather than to crush opposition from Old and Conservative Siam. The second generation of Young Siam arose during the 1880s. It consisted of young princes and nobles who were fully committed to the king’s reforms, but differed from him in perceptions of the nature of the future Thai state. As a political group, they were a source of both royal strength and weakness. On the one hand, they might provide support to the king (as in the case of the League). On the other hand, they took great pride in being “westernised” and derided those who fitted the mould of Old Siam – whose support the king needed until the new system was fully in place. This caused tensions within the bureaucracy, which the king had to deal with. This new elite proved unwilling to compromise

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 99 when their interests contradicted the king’s desire to contain bureaucratic rivalries. They were frequently impatient with the pace of reform and capable of criticising the system represented by the king even while expressing loyalty. Members of this elite were drawn from the same group who had joined the League, and in some instances, their memberships coincided. The key member was Prince Devawongse, who was responsible for foreign affairs. Greatly devoted to the king, he was the least critical of him. Other members consisted of Chamun Waiworanat (Chaem SangXuto), one of the most trusted members and second-in-command of the First Foot Guard, and Chamun Sisorarak (Momratchawong Lek Siriwong), Chamun Waiworanat’s assistant. The young and radical Prince Sawatdisophon was about to start studying at Oxford. Prince Prisadang, a graduate of King’s College London and the first member of the Thai royalty to have a western degree, claimed later to have been a member of the League. He had a close relationship with Prince Pichit, a very able and highly intelligent prince in the judiciary, Prince Phanurangsri, the king’s full brother and a former member of Young Siam and with Prince Phutharet. Some members of this group belonged to the First Foot Guard, and by tracing the development of this regiment, we begin to understand the contradictions that King Chulalongkorn faced in the modern bureaucracy. In 1880, King Chulalongkorn decided to modernise the First Foot Guard, hitherto an insignificant unit, for the purpose of creating a modern army. In so doing, he followed his formula of balancing old and new elements. Phraya Norarat of Old Siam was appointed Commander, and Chamun Waiworanat of Young Siam his second-in-command. The king fully understood the potential for conflict between the two commanders, and they were both required to vow not to clash with each other. Chamun Waiworanat made a reservation that he would be patient for as long as the administration did not suffer.23 Through the efforts and initiatives of Chamun Waiworanat, the First Foot Guard was transformed from an insignificant unit into a regiment which proved highly effective in maintaining internal security during the late 1880s. Nevertheless, the Commander soon began to accuse his secondin-command of corruption. At the committee meeting held to investigate the allegations, Chamun Waiworanat became so angry that Phraya Norarat ran away out of fear. In the conclusion to their report, the committee indicated that neither party could be seen as guilty and that the conflict should be forgotten. This suggests that, although Phraya Norarat’s aversions were unfounded, they felt that Chamun Waiworanat had violated the Thai golden rule of keeping conflict under the surface. However, Chamun Waiworanat wanted to press the issue further and, in a royal audience, made accusations against Phraya Norarat. Faced with strong evidence against the latter, the king did his best to resolve the

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conflict without alienating Old Siam. Phraya Norarat was not dismissed, and was asked if he could handle the task of running the Guard on his own. The king knew full well that the answer would be negative. Chamun Waiworanat then added further to the king’s difficulties. In giving a positive answer to the same question, he could not resist adding that he had been running the show all along, and that Phraya Norarat was only a figurehead.24 A far more serious accusation was made against Chamun Waiworanat in 1882. In that year, Gerini, an Italian responsible for training the regiment, brought dynamite into the country from Singapore for teaching purposes, without seeking prior permission from the authorities. He was dismissed from the service, but the incident gave rise to a rumour that the First Foot Guard was planning a coup, and Prince Prachak, the king’s halfbrother, suggested during the royal audience that Chamun Waiworanat was behind the plot. The latter’s friends, Prince Devawongse, Prince Phutharet and Prince Pichit, suggested that he should present his case to the king in order to preserve his record in the royal service. Prince Pichit, a legal expert, agreed to write a letter on his friend’s behalf which would force Prince Prachak to apologise for making a false accusation. Upon receiving it, the king was incensed and demanded to know who had leaked news of accusation to Chamun Waiworanat, who had not been present at the audience. Prince Pichit was reprimanded for writing the letter and thus creating disunity.25 The king then made a public statement that he would not tolerate factional politicking designed to satisfy clique interests at the expense of state interests. The First Foot Guard faced further trouble in 1884 when the regiment was guarding the king on a royal visit to a religious monument outside Bangkok. A madman was seen climbing near the king’s encampment, and a shot was fired at him, the bullet coming to rest within the encampment. Chamun Srisorarak, Chamun Waiworanat’s deputy, was commanding the guard, and he was imprisoned for his responsibility for the shooting. The atmosphere in Bangkok was tense, and Chamun Waiworanat believed himself to be suspected of sedition. Suspicions against him subsided when he sought protection from Prince Phanurangsi, the king’s younger brother. He also wrote a letter to the king pointing out that his arrest would create unease among his friends, and perhaps a riot among those members of the regiment remaining in Bangkok. The king replied that he had not for a moment entertained the thought that this might be a case of insurrection; he was fully aware of the extent of factional jealousy. But, he pointed out, Chamun Waiworanat was responsible for bringing suspicion upon himself. His opinions were highly subjective; either he really could not distinguish truth from falsehood, or he was prepared to go to any lengths to support his friend. As such he invited criticism, and then failed to distinguish between justifiable criticism and false accusation.26

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 101 The implication was that Chamun Waiworanat failed to acknowledge that the First Foot Guard had indeed committed blunders, and to distinguish these justifiable criticisms from falsehoods. A further incident demonstrated that the guard’s loyalty to the king was not always paramount. In 1882, the king imprisoned a lawyer, Thianwan (who later became a prominent intellectual), because a petition written on behalf of a client was not based on what the monarch regarded as firm grounds. The king believed that Thianwan simply wanted to challenge royal authority. Chamun Sisorarak of the First Foot Guard openly criticised the verdict as oppressive and stated that Thianwan was unjustifiably punished; he implied that Thianwan had been punished for having highly progressive ideas.27 These incidents concerning the First Foot Guard might appear to be a storm in a tea cup. But we deal with them in detail because they illustrate two basic problems facing the absolute monarchy: how to guarantee that primary loyalty was directed to the monarch and not to an immediate superior or to friends, and how to prevent insurrection in the modern army, the most organised element in the bureaucracy. This regiment constituted a modern organisation functioning in the old system, and had interests directly contradictory to those of the standing army associated with the corvée system. The success of its bureaucratic leadership gave its members an awareness of their political weight. Their pride in their positions led some of the regiment’s officers to become arrogant when dealing with other members of the bureaucracy, openly criticising those who did not share their own values and perceptions. As a result of this, the king began to be aware of a potential threat from his own creation. Furthermore, during the same period, the king also began to be aware of the contradictory nature of the modern bureaucracy. Whereas it played a central role in modern state-building, it could also work to undermine the king’s power. A man of strong personality, King Chulalongkorn was determined to push through the reforms he thought necessary. His formative years had been spent in conflict with leading officials who opposed him. It is scarcely surprising that he was not inclined to trust others with responsibilities he saw as his own. So he was highly sensitive to behaviour of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that might be viewed as even an indirect challenge to his status. An incident in 1883, nearly ten years before the formal restructuring of the bureaucracy, makes this point. When Chaophraya Mahin of Krom Suratsawadi had his subordinate write to the king on routine matters, the king was greatly annoyed by this apparent slight on his dignity. He referred back to the traditional system in which all officials reported verbally to the monarch. Even though much of the bureaucracy’s work was not conducted in writing, only departmental heads should enjoy the privilege of writing directly to their monarch, and all other levels were expected to report in person. Departmental heads had been excused from

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making personal reports in order to save the time they would spend in attending royal audiences. But the king said he could not entirely approve of this dispensation. He remarked that: this makes things terrible because it allows officials to assume that they are in an exalted position. With this conviction plus their laziness, the officials do not feel the need to come to the royal palace. They turn into independent states sending only letters to uphold a friendly relationship. Later on these states develop so that the former capital i.e. the royal palace, turns into a tributary state which is not suitable to be written to directly and the writing is done by the Chakri [Minister of the North] and the Kalahom [Minister of the South]. This is the same as when the heads of departments have their nobles write to the King. . . . And the king has to make contact with the lowest kind of servant. Thus, this is an infringement upon, and an abolition of, the King’s authority.28 The incident shows how, within the context of the modern bureaucracy which gave less emphasis to the face-to-face relationship between the monarch and his elite, King Chulalongkorn feared losing personal authority. He needed the observance of bureaucratic hierarchical values in order to exercise power. This perception, that bureaucratic routine threatened his authority, was mainly responsible for his failure to allow the consultative bodies more power. This point is illustrated by the case of the Ratthamontri sapha, the legislative advisory council. The Ratthamontri sapha was instituted by King Chulalongkorn in 1894 as a way of securing consensus among the governing elite. At the inception of the Ratthamontri sapha, Rolin Jacquemyns, the Belgian General Advisor who had considerable experience of colonial systems, had proposed that some form of popular participation in this body should be promised “when the people were sufficiently educated”. Despite the vagueness of this wording, the king ordered its excision from the official proclamation. Ratthamontri sapha had power only to advise, and the king’s approval was needed for any decision to come into force as law. But, more significantly, the council’s fifty-six members were drawn from the upper echelons of the bureaucracy: cabinet ministers, members of the royalty and high-ranking officials. These people did not have the time nor the inclination to sit down to the daily meeting, which took excessive time to agree on a single point. During the “active” working life of the Ratthamontri sapha, it agreed on drafts of only twelve laws.29 The king apparently realised that its members felt burdened, and they were not required to meet again after 1896. The process of legislation did not suffer, for draft laws were agreed upon in cabinet meetings. But the damaging effect of the council’s extinction was that the regime was seen to

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 103 be unwilling to allow participation, and this perception grew as time went on. King Chulalongkorn attempted to counteract the pressures for bureaucratic autonomy and participation by emphasising those older values which stressed the centrality and sanctity of the monarch. Suspicious of anything that seemed to reflect a waning regard by those who served him, he placed an increasing emphasis on ritual and hierarchical observance among his officials. He phrased his opposition to recalcitrant subordinates not in terms of modern ideology or bureaucratic principles, but in terms of other tensions between chao (monarch) and nai (noble). In the traditional system, ceremonies had linked the monarch with his officials, and King Chulalongkorn now emphasised the importance of ceremonies that created symbolic links between him and members of the modern bureaucracy. The bureaucrats responded according to their relationship with him. High-level officials had no alternative but to attend, but lower-level officials, who did not belong to the elite and were not the king’s direct clients, were unable to appreciate their symbolic importance and increasingly absented themselves. In 1900, many senior officials were absent from the “topknot” ceremony (a rite of passage into adulthood) of one of King Chulalongkorn’s sons. This was considered one of the most important ceremonies involving the royal family, and was held on a Sunday when officials could not claim the pressure of work as an excuse. In response, the king ordered that all ministers whose subordinates had not attended to be fined one month’s salary. In a letter to the Minister of Finance, the king explained his action by saying that officials no longer had any respect for their monarch. They appeared to feel it sufficient that they should be loved by their superiors. They had not bothered to attend this Sunday ceremony, which lasted for only one-and-a-half hours, “because respect for the chao (monarch) had ebbed, the chao cannot compete with the nai”. But it was not these absentee subordinates who should be punished, he argued; they were newcomers (khon mai) who did not understand the custom. Punishment should be reserved for their departmental heads, who were responsible for their subordinates’ loyalty and good behaviour.30 They must dutifully accept their traditional obligations. The king’s response to this absenteeism seems to have stemmed from his concern that bureaucracy might transform an absolute monarch into a mere figurehead, with real power in the hands of the departmental heads. These heads, and not he, enjoyed most contact with the lower-echelon bureaucrats. True, this had also been the case in the traditional system; but in the greatly expanded modern bureaucracy, the lower echelons constituted the most dynamic force. Because they were the first generation of modern officials, they had high expectations of rewards and promotions. For instance, clerks expected that after one year in the service they should be given the title luang, which ranks immediately above khun, the lowest

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rank in the nai class. When rewarded, they showed gratitude to their bureaucratic heads and not to the monarch. This did not please the king, who aimed to establish the ideology that all officials were his clients and that they should accordingly treat him as their supreme patron. It was not only lesser bureaucrats who did not welcome the state ceremonies; high-ranking officials had also begun to question their obligations to contribute not only time but also resources to the ceremonies which were so important to the pre-modern state. Even Prince Devawongse, one of his most faithful officials, is said to have sighed and wished that nothing significant should occur when any important member of the royal family was ill, because he knew that then the king would be unavailable for discussions.31 Thus, the king’s insistence that high-ranking officials should attend both state ceremonies and ceremonies involving the royal family was perceived to be excessive and to intrude upon the day-to-day running of the administration. To quote a contemporary observer: “Few weeks pass without the occurrence of some new festival or ceremony which exacts the whole of his time and energies while it lasts.”32 The king’s insistence that bureaucrats participate in ceremonies may have been successful in the short term. But in the eyes of the younger and most ambitious officials, he began to represent all that was old-fashioned and detrimental to progress – the reverse of his image in his younger days. And, in the long run, he failed to compel attendance and to create the symbolic links that he wanted. In sum, the first part of his reign saw King Chulalongkorn confronted by a dilemma faced perhaps by all enlightened absolute monarchies. He wanted progress and modernity, understanding that he needed to regularise his new system if it was to survive his reign; hence, he needed to involve others in its administration. But he was incapable of letting control out of his hands or of admitting any principle of rule save that of “all power to the ruler”. This incapacity perhaps sprang from a wish to ensure dynastic interests above all. It may have been influenced by difficulties of securing agreement to his programmes and by doubts as to whether the elite possessed the necessary qualifications and concern for the country.

Early criticism of the absolute monarchy Even in this period when absolutism was still being developed, contradictions were visible. The point is illustrated by the opinions of early critics, both inside and outside the bureaucracy. The former consisted of wellplaced royal officials who saw that their interests would be better advanced in a system which allowed greater participation. The latter were crusaders for “civilisation”, led by Dr Smith, an American missionary and one-time supporter of the king’s reforms. We will conclude this section by noting how the king responded to such criticisms.

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 105 Critics from within the bureaucracy spoke in terms of a “constitution”, and “people’s participation”. But their real concern was the degree of decision-making power to be given as of right to leading officials – generally the king’s close relatives – in their capacities as heads of office or spokesmen for particular public interests. This point is exemplified by the princely authors of a memorandum submitted to the king. In 1885, a group consisting of royalty and junior officials serving at the Siamese legation in London and Paris ventured to present proposals in a memorandum advocating changes in the political system.33 By that time, the Bunnags were clearly in decline, but had yet to disappear from the political scene. Great Britain had just annexed Burma, while France under Jules Ferry was posing a serious threat to the region. The question of whether Siam could maintain its independence was acutely pertinent. Prince Prisadang, then serving as the minister in Paris, intimated to the king that there was only one way by which to escape French influence, but he was afraid to suggest it. The king implored him to speak for the good of the country. In the Prince’s own words (in English): The permission was taken advantage of and he [the writer] got all his disciples, whose radical ideas he initiated and whose political views were the same, to assemble night after night to discuss and work out a memorial to the Throne.34 In the eyes of the Young Siamese elite stationed in the West, the Siamese system of government and law was still backward and needed to be radically transformed before it could gain acceptance in the West. They proposed, as the most important change, to follow the European and Japanese examples of moving from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The authors of the memorandum hastened to add that by no means did they suggest that Siam was yet ready to adopt a parliamentary government. The reforms they had in mind would shift power from the king to high-level members of the bureaucracy. But this proposal was presented as in the interests of Siamese independence and of all the people. The memorandum argued that the king should delegate power to cabinet ministers who would take full responsibility for their own departments, but he should keep the final say. Other suggestions included paying fixed salaries to officials, standardising people’s obligations to the state, granting freedom of speech for officials and the people, recruiting only those who were educated and of good reputation and behaviour, and abolishing any laws and traditions which caused criticism of the traditional practices that the authors of the memorandum most wanted to see abolished – such as polygamy. Given the number of King’s polygamous relationships, they dared not make this point openly.35 Once the reforms were carried out, European commercial interests would be protected and the European powers would be given no cause for

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conflicts which might give them reason for colonising the country. Thus, the authors of the memorandum saw that building up the Siamese army against external threat was futile.36 The significance of the memorandum lies chiefly in the fact that, for the first time, the cause of nationalism was argued by people other than the king. The authors urged the need for changes in order to withstand external threats and to bring justice and happiness to the people, which would, in turn, lead the people to identify with the nation. However, they contradicted themselves by proposing that Siam should develop a modern army that could be used against both external and internal aggressors. In practice, it was intended mainly to block the great families who had most to lose from reform and who might still offer armed opposition to the king. And, since open rebellion would present the major western powers with justification to intervene in Siam’s internal affairs, internal and external threats were linked. They urged that, once the army became effective, further reforms should be undertaken which would remove from the political scene those great nobles who did not serve the interests of the king. However, their suggestion that the existing military units be modernised under the command of their nai showed that they did not aim to antagonise the general ruling class, which still had a vested interest in the control of manpower. Modernisation should follow western models: In sum, the changes will essentially conform to the European pattern in that old laws and traditions will be abolished and new ones will be added and care will be taken to make sure that these changes will be beneficial to all in the country. They will make the people realise that Siam belongs to its people and that they need to mature in order that happiness and justice reaches [sic] everybody generally. And once the people are confident that the happiness and justice that they are enjoying is [sic] as much as or more than is [sic] enjoyed by the people of other countries, they will turn to love [the country] and will determine to create wealth and earn their living in legitimate ways. And when the enemy approaches they will be concerned and try to help in the defence of the country.37 Despite their apparent altruism, these arguments were advanced to meet the interests of the future ruling elite. Prince Prisadang and Prince Sawat were both members of the League. Prince Narit, the king’s halfbrother, and Prince Sonnabundit, a prince from Wang Na, belonged to the new elite, poised, as they saw, to take a greater role in the bureaucracy.38 On the one hand, they saw their careers threatened by the great nobles who would lose no time in cutting them down should rebellion arise. This must have powerfully influenced their recommendation that old-style ministers be removed. On the other hand, the king’s drive towards absolute

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 107 control placed serious restrictions on their authority. Under a constitutional monarchy, the power base of senior officials would be considerably broadened. Their arguments concerning bureaucratic appointments and promotions reflected the priority they gave to merit above birth. Whereas previous ministers had secured their positions “because of family background”, they perceived themselves to be a new bureaucratic elite, occupying their posts by virtue of their merit. The importance of administrative efficiency was used to support these arguments for a meritocracy (at least at a senior level): If you make it known among the officials that you are determined to organise the administration in such a way which will favour equally those who are well-born and those who are ill-born, and that they are to be rewarded or punished on the same terms, then everything will be successful. This is because the officials will seek only to perform their duties correctly.39 King Chulalongkorn’s letter answering the memorandum was controlled and rational in its reaction. He told the authors of the memorandum that he was fully aware of the change from the absolute monarchy in other societies, and he was not going to stand in the way of change. However, he implied that the time was not yet right and what Siam needed immediately was government reform in two specific areas. He agreed with the authors that ministers who refused to go along with the king’s reforms should be replaced. This had not previously been possible, but now the time had come and he would do something shortly. Second, he agreed with the need for a legislative reform. But, he said, he was faced with an almost impossible task, given the manpower at his disposal, because much future legislation would involve the interests of foreigners and hence foreign legal experts were needed. Their services were not easily obtained. The king concluded by asking the authors to help him to think further along these lines. He assured them of their future roles by encouraging them to help him solve immediate difficulties. But in effect, he would not accept their proposals.40 He hid his displeasure. But it was known that he was incensed by the insolence of these diplomats and especially by Prince Prisadang. The prince had been asked to present his personal suggestions which should have been submitted privately. Instead he had involved other diplomats. Furthermore, the memorandum had been sent to all other members of the League so that they could join in its presentation.41 In fact, Chamun Waiworanat was the only other member to react. He presented the king with his own version, elaborating upon the original. The memorandum threatened royal absolutism. The episode shows a group of elite officials employing the language of nationalism in order to

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argue their own case for political power. Moreover, they had been handpicked by the king for higher office, and several belonged to the League, and so had vowed to defend him and not to seek personal benefit in carrying out their duties. The question is why they thought they could present the king with an argument which would essentially reduce his power – one that spoke in terms of the country rather than the throne. There are several explanations. First, the memorandum can be interpreted as the work of men who were fundamentally loyal and genuinely concerned with the king’s interests. They shared his perception of Siam’s future and his belief that the state should be transformed in order that it might serve both the wellbeing of the people and the economic interests of the western powers. They perceived the great families to be a source of opposition, and could not afford to embark too hastily upon action which might spark off just the catastrophe that they all feared. A second explanation is that the memorandum was an act of naive opportunists who believed that the king fully intended to carry out reforms but lacked experience of the outside world, which they ventured to provide. They may have thought themselves so well placed that they need not worry that their opinions would be construed as seditious. Prince Sawat, who was responsible for the most radical contributions, was a younger brother of Prince Devawongse and three queens (one of whom drowned, one was the mother of crown prince, and the third the mother of King Vajiravudh). Prince Prisadang was only a little less well-connected. As King Rama III’s grandson and a momchao (the lowest rank of royalty), he was one of the best-educated men in Siam, and had risen exceptionally fast in his career. He considered his suggestion that Siam adopt a constitutional monarchy to be self-evidently correct. Two years later, he wrote to King Chulalongkorn confirming his loyalty and his belief in King’s good intentions; he had this to say about the memorandum: As evidence of my belief in His Majesty’s good intentions, I refer to the memorandum which I initiated and had sent from abroad. . . . I ventured to make suggestions in the memorandum because I believed that His Majesty would agree with them and would plan to gradually implement them.42 The prince’s memorandum exemplified criticisms directed from inside the bureaucracy. The magazine Sayamsamai crusaded from outside. This magazine had been published by Dr Smith between 1881 and 1885. It served to propagate his Christian evangelism, and also ferociously criticised the king’s absolutist policy. It proposed a concept of nationalism very different from the ideas offered both by the king and the writers of the memorandum, and sowed seeds which were to germinate a generation later.

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 109 Its articles placed the well-being of the people above all else. Embarrassingly, the magazine pressed for social reforms that the king had promised in his reforming zeal a decade earlier but had failed to deliver. The continuation of slavery was perceived as against national interests (mai rak chat), and the plight of the phrai had not improved significantly. The magazine was increasingly used by the phrai as a means of airing their grievances, since they believed that it reached the king and they had no hope of redress through the bureaucratic machinery. The ruling class was severely condemned for turning a blind eye to their abject condition.43 A despairing article submitted by a supposedly phrai reader related how the phrai, after being tattooed and paying for the corvée, were subjected to so much taxation that they had to sell their children into slavery. And when a nai died, his phrai then became phrai luang and were subjected to taxation at a higher level and to various kinds of enlistment. It concluded that the only way to escape this predicament was to make merit so that one would not be reborn as a phrai.44 A related problem was exploitation by royal and noble officials. Sayamsamai discussed it in terms that did not differ markedly from the rhetoric employed by the king; the happiness of the people was desirable. The people were compared to the goose that laid the golden eggs, and as such it was not in the national interests that they should be exploited by officials. The problems could only be resolved when officials were properly salaried; in return they should respect their obligations to the people who, indirectly, paid their salaries.45 Sayamsamai also addressed the issue of taxation. Criticisms were particularly directed against the continuation of “vice” taxation, such as that on opium, gambling and lotteries, which were seen as the source of the people’s hardship, slavery and banditry. The issue of the special relationship between government officials and Chinese tax farmers, which permitted the latter to run deeply into debt to the state, was also raised.46 One recalls that a decade earlier the king had raised the same point to justify consolidating his power against the great nobles. A further important nationalist argument centred on the question of merit. It was pointed out that the education system offered unequal opportunities, and that only the sons of royalty and nobility were sent abroad to study. Class discrimination was perceived to have arisen from the religious belief that people who were low-born suffered for their past bad deeds and thus were born to be ignorant.47 But those in high positions had sprung from families that had once been phrai; thus intelligence could not be inferred from social class.48 Nationalistic ideas were most strikingly expressed in the self-identification of the phrai. One article appeared from two readers claiming they were the people in “service” and not “gentlemen” (both words were written in Thai transliteration).49 They insisted on the right to freedom of expression. This was in reaction to an earlier letter from Chaophraya Mahin, the head

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of Krom Suratsawadi (Manpower Department), who wrote that if the phrai had any grievances, then they should complain to him and not to the magazine. Sayamsamai was considered subversive, both because it criticised the absolutist system and because it proposed alternatives.50 For instance, it discussed the French system of government, which had changed from an absolutist to a parliamentary system with the president as the head of the state. The message sent by Sayamsamai was that whether the head of state was king, emperor or president, that person must have the support of the people in order to govern. The potential power of the people was noted. If a government impeded economic development or failed to preserve law and order, then it should not be surprised if the people rioted.51 And popular consensus, upon which government depended, might also demand a change of system.52 Sayamsamai constituted a forum for the expression of social tensions which had developed after King Chulalongkorn’s first reforms. Perhaps it only reflected the view of a small, Bangkok literate, minority, but it implanted those ideas which would eventually undermine the legitimacy of the regime. The king was determined to guard his authority and did not take criticisms lightly. His responses were influenced by the critic’s status, and his relationship to the throne. We have seen that perhaps the most ferocious criticisms were made by Sayamsamai and its publisher, Dr Smith. Dr Smith’s foreign status gave him some protection. The king could not punish him directly without imposing stress on diplomatic relations with the United States, so indirect tactics were used. The king strongly reprimanded a royal prince who used the magazine to air his grievances. An attempt was made to set up a competing publication edited by another foreigner, but this did not materialise.53 Sayamsamai was most severely damaged when it lost the services of Girini, the Italian officer dismissed from the First Foot Guard who had then started to work for Dr Smith. A scholar and former member of the bureaucracy, Gerini contributed so energetically to the magazine that Prince Devawongse instructed Chamun Waiworanat to recruit him again to the regiment.54 Those members of the elite who ventured criticisms were treated cautiously, but not by repression which might incite them to close ranks and form an organised opposition. The cases of Prince Pichit and Prince Prisadang show that key critics were singled out and left in the cold as a general warning. But a person of lower birth, such as the lawyer Thianwan, could be punished with impunity. Tried under the traditional system (which did not provide fixed terms of imprisonment), he was only released seventeen years later when a new legal code, based on a western legal system, was introduced. Others were expected to learn from such warnings and to restrict their energies to advancing their careers. In general, the warnings were heeded.

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 111 Following the incarceration of Chamun Sisorarak, Chamun Waiworanat’s deputy in the First Foot Guard (see pages 109–110), and no further direct challenges were made by members of the bureaucracy until almost the end of King Chalalongkorn’s reign.

The emergence of the modern bureaucratic elite We will now go on to deal with contradictions that arose within the bureaucracy, and between King Chulalongkorn and his bureaucrats, in the last years of his reign. The second half of the reign saw the emergence of a group of highborn and highly educated officials who valued western ideas and bureaucratic professionalism. Frustrated by the king’s refusal to permit the development of consultative institutions, they began to call for more attention to their professional needs and to the interests of “the people”. By this, they intended, first of all, a greater voice for themselves, but the demand also served to reverse the absolutist claim that the king alone represented the nation and people. Although, at this time, the debate was largely restricted to the top echelons of the ruling elite, the basis for a modern ideological opposition to absolutism was laid. Two cases in point involved Prince Ratburi and Prince Chumphon, King Chulalongkorn’s sons. They graduated from British establishment; Prince Ratburi read law at Oxford University and Prince Chumphon studied at the Royal Naval Academy. Upon their return to Siam, each established a school to teach his professional skills. They went on to be revered by their subordinates as mentors and patrons. In order to understand the special relationships developed between the westernised bureaucratic elite and their subordinates, we need to understand how their teachings were disseminated. Prince Ratburi was inspired by the conviction that it was only possible to establish a unified legal system if there were qualified judges to lead it, and he began by giving legal training to a group of officials in the Ministry of Justice. Classes were originally organised in the dining room next to his office; this school became so popular that it was moved to larger premises. In the first year, more than 100 students enrolled. The prince provided English textbooks ordered from the West and Thai books written by himself and published at his own expense. The classroom atmosphere was lively, and the teacher showed himself willing to answer the many questions thrown at him.55 One student wrote of the atmosphere in the first year: It was evident that he had the character of a good teacher. . . . Apart from his daily class, he wrote many legal textbooks that year and both the teacher and students were exhausted. He was very kind and considerate to the law students. He wanted us to be able to practise the profession and he encouraged us to practise as lawyers. When students

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Contradictions within the bureaucracy could not find a case, he arranged for them to represent convicts in prison. When it was the King’s birthday anniversary he gave a lavish dinner at his own expense so that high-ranking officials had the opportunity to meet his students.56

Biographies of Prince Chumphon tell the similar story of a young prince dedicated to professional training.57 He was reputed to be conscientious, strict, quick-tempered and paternalistic. He designed a syllabus which raised standards at the Royal Naval Academy to the point where naval officers graduated with the skill to sail the high seas. Initially, he taught all the classes himself, and spent over twelve hours a day running the academy. The students were trained to be courageous and to cope in bad weather conditions. They had to learn manual occupations, and a programme of physical training pushing them almost beyond their limits. He did not hesitate to inflict corporal punishment on those who could not cope with this physical training and who failed to maintain his standard of cleanliness and tidiness. But he also shared their hardships, the miserable diet and, in times of crisis, their work. He acted as a mentor to the commissioned officers. At night in field training, he joined their groups around the campfire and regaled them with stories of his experiences in the West. He was adored by his officers, who fondly invented titles for him such as Chaopho and Sadettia, which showed their respect for him as a member of the royal family and as though he were their father.58 These two princes reflect the development of an elite who had devoted groups of subordinates with extraordinary loyalty to their leaders. On occasion, this personal loyalty led to conflicts with the monarch, and the latter insisted unsuccessfully that his claims to loyalty should prevail. This is illustrated by the case of Prince Ratburi, King Chulalongkorn’s favourite and first son who graduated with a law degree from Britain. He, as the Minister of Justice, argued that his code of professional ethics overrode his commitment to the king’s perception of absolutism. The conflict between the king and his Minister of Justice revolved around the question of jurisprudence. The king, Prince Damrong and some other cabinet ministers considered the judiciary to be an arm of the absolutist state, existing in order to serve state interests. But Prince Ratburi and his disciples perceived that their duty was to establish the judiciary as an autonomous body independent from the executive.59 The prince and his disciples reasoned that other ministers did not understand him, and that he therefore preferred to spend his time dealing with his responsibilities rather than wasting time in cabinet meetings. During his frequent absences from meetings, he was represented by the Under-secretary of State – which greatly irritated his fellow ministers when they needed to discuss matters that directly concerned his ministry. It is ironic that, in fighting for “modernisation” and “professionalism”, the prince appeared to his cabinet colleagues to be contravening these same

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 113 principles, and to be behaving as though his royal status licensed him to indulge his whims. He further alienated the king and his colleagues by publicising cabinet disagreements over the issue of jurisprudence. Khao san (Law Court News), a magazine read in judicial circles, published a letter from King Chulalongkorn to Prince Ratburi commenting on a particular judgment by the Supreme Court, to the effect that it was too severe. The king conceded that the judge had the right to deliver his judgment, but in this case, it seemed to be against the interests of the administration. Because judgment had been found against a Chinese, the Chinese community might find it difficult to accept the authority of the legal system, particularly in provinces adjacent to Siam’s neighbours under the colonial rule. In these provinces, the majority of the Chinese community might consider the punishment to be excessive, and this might lead to trouble. The king then requested that the prince should not attempt to uphold the freedom of the judiciary regardless of the consequences, but should be very careful in allocating judges to difficult cases.60 The following issue of Khao san contained three related items. The first was a letter written by the king to Prince Ratburi a year later, complaining on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior that sometimes judgments were so lenient that witnesses dared not go to court to testify lest they should become the victims of revenge attacks after the accused had secured release after a short prison sentence. The second item consisted of Prince Ratburi’s reply to the king’s earlier letter. He explained the principles of jurisprudence which, he pointed out, were still a matter of debate in the West, and he stated that punishments varied according to the crimes committed. One could not expect all judges to reach the same decisions. The king apparently wanted to systematise the judicial system to a degree that was all very well in theory, but could not be put into practice. The prince then exemplified the conflict between theory and practice by citing the ongoing corvée system which affected different people differently, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, Prince Ratburi attacked the king’s weak point, the delay in reforming the manpower system, as a counter-argument. The third item was a letter from King Chulalongkorn stating his satisfaction with the reply.61 It appeared that Prince Ratburi had won this round in the conflict. That the private correspondence between the king and his Minister of Justice was made accessible to officials in the ministry indicates that the prince meant to make the matter public, perhaps to garner support. The contradictions between the king’s first and second letters strengthened the prince’s argument alledging executive interference. The prince used this dispute to show that, as the Minister of Justice, he was obliged to uphold principles of both judicial and departmental independence. The king might disagree with how the ministry conducted its business, but this did not justify his interference.

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However, the real cause of conflict lay in the prince’s attempt to establish the judiciary as an autonomous body. This caused tension between the king and Prince Ratburi to persist, and was responsible for the delay in completing the Criminal Code, which was under the supervision of Prince Ratburi. In 1904, King Chulalongkorn attempted to break the stalemate by appointing a new committee headed by the French legal advisor, Dr Padoux, to work on the original draft. When the revision was completed in 1906, King Chulalongkorn appointed another committee, headed by Prince Damrong, to make a final revision before its promulgation (the code was finally promulgated in 1913). In the meantime, Prince Ratburi continued to sulk, and gave little attention to work at the ministry for many years. He disassociated himself from the Code by accompanying the king’s second visit to Europe at the time of its promulgation. He returned when the king appointed a deputy minister, Prince Charun, but even then only attended to those tasks that interested him.62 Prince Ratburi made his disagreements known to his disciples, and claimed that the Code had been produced to meet Prince Damrong’s needs. He felt that Prince Damrong had a vested interest in any issue that involved administrative procedures, and that his main purpose in revising the Code was to create procedures by which the accused who confessed would be promised a reduced punishment. This might simplify the business of the courts, but, the prince said, it violated principles of jurisprudence and was unacceptable.63 However, the real reason for his displeasure might have been that the revisions overturned his plans to separate judicial and executive powers. As Minister of Justice, he had attempted to establish a precedence for this separation by giving his judges full autonomy. He had planned that the Code should recognise this separation, but it had been squashed by Prince Damrong’s revisions. Perhaps intending to lay the issue to rest, in 1910 the king announced at a cabinet meeting that the plan to separate judicial and executive powers was premature. This decision greatly disappointed the prince. He wrote to the king, asking for permission to resign from his position on grounds of ill health, but the king refused to acknowledge the letter either to the prince or any other person.64 Although the Prince had failed to achieve a reaction, he found another opportunity to argue for the judiciary’s greater freedom when a play, called Phraya Raka, implied Prince Ratburi’s intimate relationship with one of Prince Narathip’s minor wives, whom Prince Ratburi had taken under his legal guardianship. (The author, Prince Narathip himself, was a former Minister of Finance, who pursued artistic interests after being dismissed from the service on a corruption charge.)65 This accusation was generally known to have no foundation, but it gave Prince Ratburi an opportunity to challenge the old judicial system as well as defend his honour. He proposed to take the case to court. (This would have been a special court (san rapsang) for members of the royal family; no ordinary court was empowered to hear a case brought against a royal

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 115 prince.) He was dissuaded by his mentor, Chaophraya Yommarat, the Minister of the Capital and his tutor in Great Britain. Prince Ratburi then claimed he had no legal means by which to defend himself against the libel charge; this indicated serious defects in the system which he had been trying in vain to reform. He insisted that the conflict could not be resolved by conciliation – which would have been the normal means of settlement under the old system. He told Chaophraya Yommarat that he wished to resign from the ministry, and asked him to present his formal complaint to the king. Although addressed to the king, this document was intended for general publication at a later stage. In it, Prince Ratburi characterised Prince Narathip’s libel as insulting both to him and his fellow judges. Their inability to try the case in a common court justified his fight for greater judicial powers. He challenged the government to give the judiciary greater protection against both verbal and physical abuse.66 Written in English, the document said in part: We of the Bench have seen with approval the severity the Government has visited on the errors of judges, but it still remains to be seen that the Government is solicitious for the protection of those of us whose conduct and object has been for the impartial administration of justice both to prince and pauper. We, the members of the Bench, commend our reputation to the public for the protection. The day after presenting his case to Chaophraya Yommarat, Prince Ratburi called a meeting of his ministry’s senior judges and informed them of what had happened. He told them that they would no longer see him at the ministry, and that they should consider that to be the day on which he had died as far as they were concerned. He then left Bangkok, informing no one – including the king, from whom, as a royal prince, he was supposed to ask permission when planning to leave the capital. This event shows Prince Ratburi using his special relationship with his disciples to elicit their support in his fight for judicial power and independence. He later conceded in a letter to Chaophraya Yommarat that his real motive in making his complaint was “to draw attention to several difficulties which required serious attention”, and that Prince Narathip’s play was not of much importance. His meeting with the judges had been calculated to win their support in his struggle with the king. To this extent, he had succeeded. The day after the meeting, twentyfour senior judges (or twenty-eight, according to Chaophraya Mahithon’s biography) wrote to the king saying that their service up until then had depended both upon the king’s gracious kindness and upon guidance given by the minister, Prince Ratburi. The incident had damaged the ministry, in so far as it had caused the minister to resign, the country which they served, Prince Ratburi’s interests, and their own interests. In the

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circumstances, and given Prince Ratburi’s absence, they felt that they could no longer serve as in the past and hence felt obliged to tender their resignations. This shows the judges distinguishing between their loyalty to the state and their own corporate interest and loyalty to the monarchy. It greatly annoyed the king, and apparently he put the judges’ names at the end of his bed and cursed them.67 But he had prevailed in tougher conflicts with the great nobles, and would not give into pressure from these young bureaucrats. He issued an order calling them to continue their duties at the ministry, arguing that they had no reason for their action. First, the prince’s resignation had not yet been accepted. Second, a special court was investigating the case. Third, the judges had taken an oath of allegiance and should not take what had happened to one person as an excuse to abandon this oath. Fourth, their behaviour did not fit the role model of officials who were loyal to the king and upheld the state’s best interests. In other words, the king insisted on the identification of the state with the monarch. The judges realised that they had been too rash, and asked for the king’s forgiveness. But one of their members, Khunluangphra Kraisi (Nai Thiam), Director of the International Court, added an explanation for his behaviour to his plea for forgiveness. He claimed that his responsibilities at the International Court (deciding cases that involved foreigners who had extraterritorial rights) were as arduous as those of the Foreign Minister, and that he could only perform his duties with the guidance of Prince Ratburi, who had been available at any time of the day. He had served the prince as a judge for fourteen years and had not once seen him in tears – as he had been in the latest crisis. This, plus his sense of loss, had prompted him to take the initiative in calling his colleagues to present their letter to the king. This letter demonstrated Khunluangphra Kraisi’s sense of pride in his profession (he was the first Thai official who had received his legal training at Gray’s Inn), to the point of arrogance in intimating to the king that Prince Ratburi and these high-ranking judges were indispensable to the Ministry of Justice. It also exposed him as the main spokesman of the rebellion, and the king did not hesitate. Because he had admitted to being unable to serve without guidance, the king argued, Khunluangphra Kraisi was clearly incompetent and so was dismissed. He was also stripped of his title, on the grounds that he had led other judges to commit a blunder, which proved that he was fungsan. Literally meaning “someone with wild ideas”, this new term was increasingly used of those who blindly followed the West. The king’s message was that nobody was indispensable, and in particular someone who functioned as an agent provocateur. Prince Ratburi had been unaware of the contents of Khunluangphra Kraisi’s letter; independently, he made the same points in a further letter

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 117 to the king, suggesting that unless judges were able to perform with the freedom enjoyed by western judges, Siam’s independence was at stake, and not during the next reign but the next year. But, by now, the prince had alienated all supporters, bar those in the ministry. Realising his situation, he asked for a private appointment to see the king instead of turning up at the daily audience, as was normal. But the king had suffered the prince’s manoeuvrings long enough and, upon the recommendation of Prince Phitsanulok, accepted the letter of resignation submitted earlier. This incident showed a modern minister challenging the king’s authority in the name of professionalism. It also confirmed the king’s worse fears, that the practice of modern bureaucracy could be detrimental to his authority. Officials now regarded their ministers rather than the king as patron. He was seen to be removed from the bureaucratic processes of recruitment and promotion, and so his claim to be prime patron lost credibility. When advising the king to accept Prince Ratburi’s resignation, Prince Phitsanulok had this to say: If there is a change [in the minister] then the influence of the patronage network is lessened. The network has influence because ministers tend to stay in their positions for so long that they are the persons responsible for nurturing, advising, and seeking royal approval for promoting subordinates from lower to high positions. This leads subordinates to think that they have established themselves because of their minister and forget your gracious kindness and the water of the allegiance. This case also shows the second expressions of nationalism by officials. Khunluangphra Kraisi knew that by speaking out, he was risking his life, but he insisted that all his actions stemmed from his loyalty to the nation. He felt that judicial power was so vital to the people’s lives and properties, and his official function was so important to the country’s independence, that he had no alternative. He argued that people in other countries had already sacrificed their lives for saying what they believed, but this was a new experience in Siam. His argument represents an attitude held among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a new and growing social group, which made the nation the focus of loyalty. We now turn our attention to this group, which later grew to challenge the absolute monarchy.

The emergence of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie The conflict between King Chulalongkorn and some of his senior officials was further complicated by the emergence of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who were beginning to argue that merit and education gave them a claim to bureaucratic positions and advancement. These people viewed education as the main avenue towards a bureaucratic post. “Merit” appeared to

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signify neither experience nor demonstrable ability, but the fact of sacrificing in order to obtain an education. They viewed their relationship with the state as contractual; by obtaining a modern education, they became clients of the absolutist state, whose reciprocal duty was to reward them with posts. This new social class, fully emerging in the last years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, is termed here the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”. They were educated up to the level at which they won freedom from the phrai status, and (almost all) worked for the bureaucracy, within which they comprised the middle level. It had not been the intention of the elite to create a new social class; they had merely planned to extend and modernise the existing ruling group. In other words, the absolutist system was expected to preserve the old social structure consisting of only the phudi (nai class), the Chinese mercantile middle class and, at the bottom of society, the phrai. When the bureaucratic bourgeoisie made their presence felt, members of the elite experienced difficulty in placing them within the structure. They were described as persons in the middle who were “neither phudi nor phrai”. They were sometimes termed phuak sode – the word sode being a bastardised form of the English word “sophisticated”, and intended to be derogative of someone who had become westernised to the point of criticising things Thai.68 We are talking of a very small group, concentrated principally in Bangkok; but by the turn of the century, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie made themselves felt by their lifestyle, which harkened back to the quasiEuropean cosmopolitan culture of the earlier generation of the westernised Thai elite. King Chulalongkorn and a small band of his followers, Young Siam, had first adopted western-styled dress. In the 1880s, it was Thianwan, the archetypal Thai intellectual and nationalist, who, moustached and wearing trousers and shoes, must have presented an unusual spectacle to the masses who had not observed similar dress among either westerners or their own elite. But by the end of the century, the sight of a man dressed in a suit, shoes and socks was normal. Another popular form of attire was a beribboned panama hat. This fashion alone inspired many young men to set their minds on obtaining a modern education and joining the bureaucracy as clerks.69 The bureaucratic bourgeoisie also had an impact upon metropolitan lifestyles. Whereas the ruling elite socialised exclusively among themselves, these young men frequented bars and restaurants selling Chinese or western food, whisky and brandy. To quote a contemporary observer: Once they start earning twenty baht salaries, they frequent Ratchawong Road [Chinatown] eating soft-boiled rice, taking the trishaw to Japanese films, drinking lao rong [Thai liquor] and wearing woollen hats. When earning more they slide up the status scale by dining at

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 119 Phrachan lao [a Chinese restaurant], travelling in a carriage, going to see lakhon Pramothai [the most popular operetta group], drinking brandy and wearing beribboned panama hats.70 The expanding economy and increased recruitment to the bureaucracy both contributed to the ease with which persons of phrai background might achieve nai status. The new bureaucrats’ culture was egalitarian in the sense that there were no barriers of birth limiting certain kind of dress, behaviour and entertainment. The new culture attracted so many in part because it did not admit hierarchy. Further, upward mobility was restricted only by financial factors, which posed a significant stumbling block to many members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who did not come from the old ruling class, and whose families could not support them. They frequently overspent and ran into debt. Their lifestyles were later to present King Vajiravudh and his high officials with an effective point of criticism in their frantic efforts to save the regime from further inroads by these social parvenus.71 Members of this new social group professed new values which were markedly egalitarian, and which they had learned at school. The development of schooling significantly influenced the values espoused by this new class. Both traditional religious studies and the modern system stressed the possibility of enhancing individual merit by examination success. King Chulalongkorn presided over school ceremonies in which prizes were awarded to those who had passed with merit. Nai Laor (later Phra Worawetwisit) described the recognition he received when he came first in the proyok nung (primary) examination. He was given a money sack filled with coins totalling ninety baht. (At that time a clerk’s monthly salary was twenty baht.) A lady millionaire was so impressed by this country boy’s achievement that she donated money for erecting a building dedicated to him at his school.72 The culture established in the education profession significantly motivated the performance of high-school teachers. The first generation of teachers, trained at the Teacher Training College, had been brought up in the traditional system, and had received their early education from monk teachers. However, they were motivated by the new opportunities for career advancement rather than by a desire for spiritual development. In the Ministry of Education, Luang Phaisan (later Chaophraya Thammasakmontri) organised weekly teachers’ meetings to discuss problems and develop projects. These turned into popular forums, where lectures were given on a range of topics, and debates conducted. They drew officials from other ministries, and, on his return from Great Britain where he had served as Ambassador, Phraya Wisut (Pia Malakhun, later Chaophraya Phrasadet) developed these meetings into an organised professional and social association called Samakkayachan with a magazine, Witthayachan. Samakkayachan drew members from the teaching profession, other

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ministries and the general public. It was an extremely popular association; failure to gain an invitation to its lectures reputedly drew tears from the eyes of ladies. These regular lectures, the magazine and a library second only to that of Wachirayan were invaluable inspirations to the profession, providing knowledge and inculcating professional ethics among teachers.73 The age was marked by growing recognition of merit achieved by mastering new knowledge. This new value was fostered by the newly educated, who prided themselves as the chosen few who had succeeded against the odds. The Siamese education system may not have compared favourably to its equivalents in the West, but it served to promote those who were determined to enjoy a new lifestyle and social status. The school examination failure rates demonstrate that those who had passed through the system did indeed have reason to congratulate themselves.74 Schooling now emphasised not only the values of merit, but also of social equality. Laor, a prominent educationist, claimed that during his early career a pupil from a very high-ranking family was surprised and angered to be punished, but later came to respect his teacher for refusing to give up his principles.75 Laor’s biography, written at a much later date, perhaps reflected contemporary values rather than those prevalent at the time of the incident; nevertheless, it does show that principles of equality had begun to be established, and it was no longer possible to treat individuals solely on the basis of their social backgrounds. Writing early in his reign, King Vajiravudh captured the mood of the period (despite some exaggeration): We all realise these days that education is more developed than in the past, and there are textbooks teaching all sorts of subjects. As a result, some people assume that nothing is more important than knowledge. And this assumption leads them to believe that they have one very important responsibility; that is, to earn high grades in all examinations at school, and to obtain many diplomas. Once they have left school, they do not need to exert themselves again; and in time, fortune and positions will inevitably flow their way.76 Thus, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie developed a perception that their careers involved a contract; they viewed nai status and a place in the bureaucracy as a right earned by study, and believed that they should be advanced on the basis of (their own estimation of) their abilities. A manual by Chaophraya Phrasadet, a leading educationist, known as Tuan phuan was written principally to argue against this contractual perception among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.77 So the term “merit” took on the primary meaning of achievement in mastering new knowledge as opposed to moral merit or merit earned by loyal service. The influence of this new value in the thinking of the modern bureaucrats is attested by the autobiography of one of King Chula-

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 121 longkorn’s clients, Phraya Thephatsadin who had been sent to study abroad on a scholarship. He felt it necessary to apologise for the fact that, having achieved little at his school, Suan Kulap, he had “no merit” (khun khamdi) other than being khaluang doem (the king’s client before the accession to the throne).78 The rapid advances made by the first generation of bureaucratic bourgeoisie nurtured the belief among their successors that they could advance by securing educational qualifications, although lacking a ruling class background. This is reflected in a saying of the period, “doing well not because of who your parents are but because of what you have achieved”, a principle which Prince Damrong himself reportedly emphasised.79 However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the king still paid attention to family background when making promotions, and members of the new social group could not advance far without support. Those without connections to noble families discovered that they needed to be adopted as clients by senior bureaucrats. Bureaucrats who failed to secure the support of a well-placed patron stood at a grave disadvantage. Amidst these failures, patron–client relationships were increasingly perceived to be particularistic and discriminatory, and they started to lose their legitimacy. The term prachop, meaning “pleasing those in higher positions”, reflects this sense of moral distortion. Within the traditional patronage system, this term had no negative connotations. But now it was regularly used in conjunction with a second term which had negative connotations in both the traditional and modern systems – sophlor, meaning trying to please by employing flattery. By the early 1900s, the concept of prachop had become a major polarising issue. Thianwan, the leading intellectual and nationalist who suffered lengthy imprisonment for his criticisms, was largely responsible for formulating an argument about the deleterious effects of prachop and sophlor.80 Thianwan taught that sycophancy was mainly responsible for problems in the bureaucracy: Since this is the case, we are therefore of the opinion that those who practice the art of flattery [sophlor] and who can be called sycophants [hua prachop] are not confident of their own merit and justice, and have to observe their superiors and masters [nai] in order to discover what can please them so that they can vary their behaviour depending on who is their leader, their master and their patron [thi phung]. That is to say, they have to keep an eye on the flag in order to see in which direction the wind is blowing.81 The legal profession crusaded against the practice. Khao san (Law Court News), an in-house journal of the legal profession, published an article observing that apparently three qualities guaranteed success in society and bureaucracy: professional qualifications, sycophancy and family connections.82

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Discontent was fuelled by the confusions that arose when both traditional and modern bureaucratic criteria were applied in evaluating performance. Officials discovered that, in practice, they could only be secure if they met both sets of criteria. Such contradictions still arise, 100 years later, but at least some compromise has evolved. At the time, there was no accepted middle ground, and junior officials felt very vulnerable. These were people whose aspirations were high but whose connections were low. They (and their families) had assumed that education would guarantee them placement and promotion, but they had fallen victims to an economic downturn and perhaps to educational productivity. One possible escape was to seek the king’s attention outside the bureaucratic hierarchy; for instance, many chose to enter King Vajiravudh’s Wild Tiger Corps, discussed in the next chapter. A second escape was the very human response of condemning all patronage networks, especially those in the traditional system under royal protection, expecting only such opportunities were available to one’s self. That feature of the old value system that most constrained members of the new class was the old-fashioned insistence that orders were to be obeyed without question and without appeal, however arbitrary they might seem. Phraya Satchaphirom’s biography makes clear the sense of outrage he felt from the way he was treated by Prince Maruphong, his superior and patron in the Ministry of the Interior. On one occasion he found himself transferred without warning to another district and a lower position. Only later did he discover that he had been accused of corruption by a tax farmer, also the prince’s client. As he was not informed of the charge, interrogated or given a chance to defend himself, he found himself disgraced and isolated because other officials dared not associate with him. After a year of this treatment, he was promoted to a higher position and was indirectly informed that the prince had now discovered the charge to be unfounded. This injustice had arisen because he had insisted on fully implementing official regulations in his dealings with the tax farmer, regardless of the prince’s warning of his relationship with the man. He had not paid heed to the warning because “I was proud of my education and of my being the favourite of the Prince”.83 This case shows an official stumbling when he presumed on both his patron’s favour (behaviour reflecting the old values) and on his competence as an educated official (reflecting the new). Phraya Satchaphirom gave a second example involving the same prince, this time unreasonably exercising his whims during training conducted by the Wild Tiger Corps. After a misunderstanding over the point at which his troops should be halted, Phraya Satchaphirom was ordered to repeat the movement again and again, but was given no reason why. When he could stand it no longer, he asked to resign from the Sua pa (Wild Tiger Corps). The prince later discovered that Phraya Satchaphirom had merely been following the orders of another commander in his initial action, and

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 123 made amends by taking Phraya Satchaphirom to a department store to choose pieces of winter clothing as a gift.84 The aggravation suffered by Phraya Satchaphirom and other officials in the Ministry of the Interior was severe, but did not reach the levels of dissatisfaction manifested in the army. More than any other department of the bureaucracy, the army had recruited its junior officers from the educated phrai class, and discipline was given greatest emphasis. An incident occurred in 1909 which reflected the stress. Pages belonging to the crown prince, Prince Vajiravudh, and some soldiers fell into conflict over a female betel nut vendor. One soldier was beaten up by the pages, and he sought help from Captain Som, his superior, who with another officer and three more soldiers chased the pages up to the gates of the crown prince’s palace. After the investigation, in which Captain Som admitted responsibility, the crown prince requested that all five soldiers be flogged, the punishment laid down by customary law. On taking advice from Prince Ratburi (in his capacity of legal advisor, following his resignation from the Ministry of the Justice), the king was unwilling to permit this. But he was forced to give in by the crown prince’s threat to abdicate if the flogging was not carried out. The two officers and the three soldiers were clapped in irons and flogged before the ranks, the crown prince, and some of his pages.85 Assuming the accuracy of the chroniclers’ description of this event and of the emotions that it generated, we can identify considerable evolution in the values of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The day on which the punishment was executed was described by a member of the attempted coup in 1912 as “very sad”; the army, the civil service, the law students and the public in general were shocked to see “the army officers, and the nation’s soldiers, being flogged for an unjustifiable reason”.86 This statement reflected two new values. First, it showed rejection of royal privilege, which was seen as arbitrary and unjust. The educated members of society now disapproved of unjust and savage punishment. Second, it demonstrated the emergence of the concept “nation” as the new focus of loyalty. Captain Som was described as “a nation’s soldier” and someone who had earlier saved the nation by putting down the Shan rebellion. This incident also showed the bureaucratic bourgeoisie still clinging to the old values of adaptation within the patronage system. The cadets reacted to the incident by going on strike, and some were so incensed that they openly criticised the punishment. Prince Phitsanulok defused the conflict by calling a meeting and arguing thus: The King has the prerogative to punish the citizen in the same way as the father who punished his son. He considered flogging the citizen an instruction given to his children and therefore he does not bear any grudge against you and does not punish you according to the law.

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Contradictions within the bureaucracy Especially for the soldiers, he considers you to belong to the same family, therefore he gave flogging in order to give a lesson. It is likely that he will continue to chup liang you [give protection and take you as a client] in the future.87

This promise of opportunities for patronage was a calming influence. But what were the real chances for advancement within the bureaucracy? When King Vajiravudh made no move to prove Prince Phitsanulok correct, many in the army believed that he continued to feel vindictive against them. They pointed out that, while his courtiers might be appointed to the luang ranks, soldiers never were.88 This dissatisfaction contributed to the 1912 conspiracy, discussed in Chapter 6. The aspirations of all commoner officials, and in particular those who had been professionally trained, were very high because they were very conscious of how well the first generation of commoner officials had been rewarded. It is normal for a new organisation, such as the Thai bureaucracy, to experience rapid upward mobility in the early years, and then later to slow down. In then early years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, lawyers had been in great demand by the Ministry of Justice and other ministries and had enjoyed high salaries, but in the last years, this demand fell off and they suffered a sense of deprivation. This worry and frustration began to affect the other professions, and in particular the army. The policy of expanding the corps of officers so that conscription could be enforced on a national scale meant that the number of officer recruits had originally risen very rapidly. This meant that competition for promotion to senior ranks in the future was going to be fierce. The frustrations that arose were expressed in the 1912 conspiracy, the participants of which were almost all junior officers – as is discussed in Chapter 6. Economic factors also explain why opportunities for advancement seemed much less rosy than before. In 1907–1908, for the first time, the state budget was in the red. Siam had experienced a succession of bad harvests; interest paid on railway loans had incurred new debts; and the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy and modern educational system meant that salaries accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the state budget.89 Thus, financial reasons dictated the need to restrict recruitment and promotions. The question then arose: on what basis were these restrictions to be imposed? Given the proclaimed desire for “modernisation”, the pool of high-fliers should have consisted only of those with the best educational qualifications and examination results. But in practice, the lack of opportunities for advanced education and the political significance of patronage meant that patronage was often the decisive factor. A foreign advisor first raised the issue of financial constraints in 1899, when the cost of salaries accounted for nearly 22 per cent of the bureaucratic budget.90 It was agreed to set up a committee to work on job description and salaries. This committee would be empowered to test offi-

Contradictions within the bureaucracy 125 cials’ qualifications and to make unannounced inspections at various ministries. The scheme was obviously over-ambitious; it would have seriously infringed upon the ministers’ autonomy and influence within their own empires. Consequently, it was agreed that the committee’s powers should be limited to advising on job descriptions and salary scales. But even this was too much for such powerful ministers as Prince Damrong, of the Ministry of the Interior, who asked the committee to trust his judgement in appointing his own advisors, whose salaries he would recommend to be commensurate with their formal qualifications.91 By 1908, it was recognised that all departments were overstaffed and a decision was reached to cut the bureaucratic budget by 3 per cent across the board. This decision caused most pain in fast-growing organisations such as the army and the navy. In the army, the cut severely affected both recruitment and promotions. The Cadet School had increased admission by 200 per cent during the last ten years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign. Thus, the cadet strike, triggered by the incident between Captain Som and the pages, also reflected justified concerns over career prospects. Prince Phitsanulok’s assurances may have calmed the cadets temporarily, but he could not alleviate their underlying insecurities. And these explain why the army would continue to be a source of unrest in the future. Indeed, this explains why such strong anti-monarchic sentiments developed within the army by the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, and were so wellrooted within the school graduating class of 1910. The crisis was to come to a head in the form of the attempted coup in 1912, which is discussed in Chapter 6. We have discussed contradictions and tensions in the Thai absolutist state. It is obvious that the king faced many constraints to his authority. Apart from the fact that the state machinery had yet to extend his power to the periphery, at the centre it started to act according to its own interests. The cause of contention rested on the fact that, as any absolutist state, the Thai monarch chose to keep old practices when it suited him while also introducing modern practices. One of the old practices maintained by King Chulalongkorn was the patron–client relationship. As we shall see, this is the most controversial issue, leading to an attempt to dismantle the absolute monarchy in 1912.

5

The defence of absolutism

Introduction When King Vajiravudh ascended the throne in 1910, the political landscape had been completely transformed compared to the mid-nineteenth century. The monarch could no longer base his power on alliances with the great families. The rise of bureaucratic resistance in the later years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign had made it obvious that even a powerful king could not solely depend on his own resources to maintain control over the new administrative apparatus, which was showing itself to be a true Frankenstein’s monster of royal absolutism. Somehow the king needed to regain the initiative and redefine the world of power so that the monarch was truly at the centre and not just a symbol, legitimising rule by others. Whether from youthful enthusiasm or from an acute sense that the possibilities for this was passing, from the onset of his reign King Vajiravudh embarked on an alternative to the bureaucratically defined world: ideologically, through nationalism and organisationally, through the Wild Tiger Corps. This chapter deals with King Vajiravudh’s attempts to cope with straying bureaucratic loyalties by promoting nationalism. It focuses on his early efforts to defend absolutism, between his ascension to the throne in late 1910 to the 1912 conspiracy. It is hoped to demonstrate that challenges to his authority were inspired less by his difficult personality than by structural factors.1 During this period he was busy developing an “official nationalism”2 to which end he created a paramilitary unit, the Wild Tiger Corps.3 This brought him into direct conflict with the army, from whom the majority of conspirators were drawn. But the demise of absolutism cannot be solely explained by the short-term consequences of this rivalry. Structural problems had developed under King Chulalongkorn, as we have seen, and events in the reign of King Vajiravudh only helped to quicken the process by which they were brought to a head. The chapter is separated into the following sections: King Vajiravudh and the bureaucracy; his ideology; and the Wild Tiger Corps.

The defence of absolutism 127

King Vajiravudh and the bureaucracy King Vajiravudh’s problems with the bureaucracy are shown by comparing and contrasting them to those faced by King Chulalongkorn in his early years. Both kings needed to establish control over entrenched and powerful officials. However, in King Chulalongkorn’s case, those in power were deeply divided, and he was eventually able to take advantage of their divisions. Whereas King Vajiravudh faced a bureaucratic elite that was generally in agreement on the need for greater autonomy for the bureaucracy. He did not enjoy the assets of charismatic personality, intellect and the superior claims to the throne; and he also faced the fact that claims to power by competing great families had been replaced by a more or less monolithic bureaucracy which could apply modern claims of merit and service to the state to resist any attempt to replace those in office. How was the new king supposed to get a grip on this apparatus? Thus, the basis of King Vajiravudh’s problems in consolidating royal absolutism did not lie in his personality, which was often measured against that of his father. Succeeding so astute, charming and persuasive a personality as King Chulalongkorn posed particular problems for the crown prince who ascended the throne on his father’s death in 1910. Vajiravudh had a diffident and aloof personality, and his preference for the company of young males disappointed conventional thinking that he should take a wife. This point has been much discussed by both contemporary and present-day critics, and it is not my intention here to emphasise his personal inclination. However, we do need to deal with the new king’s psychological make-up in order to understand how he set about dealing with his problems.

The background King Vajiravudh was born on 1 January 1881, King Chulalongkorn’s eldest son by Queen Saowapha, one of the five royal wives, who later became the first queen. He was appointed Crown Prince while studying in Europe in 1895 when Prince Vajirunhis, the first Crown Prince in Siam’s modern history, died.4 Until then, Vajiravudh, a shy and unassuming prince, had been regarded as one among several royal princes; now he faced the problem of suddenly occupying an exalted position and being compared to Prince Vajirunhis, who had the reputation of great intelligence. It was reported from London that Vajiravudh was considerably affected by his new status. He became insolent and attempted to dictate to his brothers and half-brothers who were studying in Europe at the time.5 This need to dominate others may have sprung from a sense of being not only the “second best”6 within this highly competitive royal court, but also from a realisation that he would be measured against his many capable and intelligent siblings.

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He spent over three years under private tuition before embarking upon military training, including two years at Sandhurst and a stint as an officer in the Durham Light Infantry. From 1899 to 1901 he studied history, law and administration at Christchurch, Oxford and presented his final dissertation entitled “The War of the Polish Succession”, but did not stay on to fulfill the degree requirement. English education did not suit him. He was naturally introverted and averse to sport, and private tuition had ill-prepared him to mix socially. When not following his favourite literary pursuits, he was deemed lethargic and inconsiderate.7 However, he was also reported to thoroughly enjoy the military profession and as a Corporal of Cadets at Sandhurst he got on well with his brother cadets who all liked him.8 It was reported that at Oxford he did not demonstrate the same enthusiasm for academic studies as he had shown for the military profession.9 His request to spend two years at the staff military school in order to compete with his brothers who were studying at Berlin and St Petersburg, was turned down on the grounds that, as a future king, he needed training in civilian matters.10 However, Prince Vajiravudh returned to Siam without any further training and with a strong recommendation that he be assigned to regular and responsible work in order to instil self-restraint.11 Instead, he was given the position of inspector general of the army which did not offer serious responsibility; and other duties assigned to him also “carried less responsibility than might appear”.12 As Crown Prince, he led a very retiring life in public affairs. Rather than setting an example, he played the role of a distant observer and a trainee. In the seclusion of his residence he pondered how to overcome the problems of an absolute monarch confronted with a modern bureaucracy. Present-day observers have asked why King Chulalongkorn did not provide more systematic training to the future king. There does not appear to be any data that resolves this enigma, and one can only speculate. It is hypothesised here that King Chulalongkorn realised that he had missed the opportunity to train his own heir in the same manner that he was trained by his father King Mongkut. Thus he had quickly resigned himself to his son’s determination to live in relative seclusion and to defy all expectations of how he should behave as Crown Prince. The next section discusses the bureaucratic world which surrounded the Crown Prince. The bureaucratic world This section briefly explores King Vajiravudh’s perception of the bureaucracy.13 According to him, most posts in the modern bureaucracy were occupied by the educated, many of whom did not come from a good family backgrounds.14 They were usually called khon chan mai (new social class),

The defence of absolutism 129 and at times “Young Siam”.15 Culturally, they subscribed to anything modern and western without much taste and understanding, and demonstrated an appetite for “civilisation-at-any-price”. This was indicated by the way in which they succumbed to “European Spirits” and Thai “operetta” and execrable translations of European “penny-dreadfuls” and “shilling-shockers”, “because we believe we are showing ourselves more civilised thereby.”16 Apart from drinking, they also blindly followed the western practice of womanising.17 The bureaucrats were conditioned to believe that their education should be the main criterion determining career advancement. “They aim at getting high grades and a lot of certificates. Once graduated they do not need to work hard for anything; fortunes, honour and money would simply come their way.”18 What they lacked was an ethical system, which meant that it was difficult for them to be nationalistic other than for narrowly selfish reasons. When their expectations were not met they sulked and grew jealous of those who were in a better position. Instead of carrying out their responsibility dutifully they became susceptible to western ideas. So far as the king could see, the bureaucrats expected to be well-treated by their superiors while free to bully the people. This arose because they misunderstood their role and primarily thought of themselves as the masters of the people rather than as the servants of the king. Their superiors allowed this latitude because of fears that their subordinates might send “correspondence” to the press or write anonymous letters, which could ruin their reputations.19 As for his relationship with the bureaucratic elite, the king conceded that he was at a disadvantage because of his lack of experience. After the attempted coup, he thus summed up his position: I feel very isolated, without any supporters. Those who are my supporters happen to be powerless. As for those who are in high positions in the bureaucracy, they have less faith in me than they should. Therefore they will not listen to any of my suggestions, but are proud of the fact that they have been in service longer than I, or have more knowledge and better understanding of the people’s feeling than I.20 Not only did the bureaucratic elite ignore the king, they also worked to command their subordinates’ loyalty and to divert it from the king: Government officials these days are quite different from the past. The word loyalty has a distorted interpretation, that is it means loyalty to the minister. So anyone who does not commend himself to the minister but seeks my company who is the lord of the land is considered disloyal and sycophantic. The word gratitude has been distorted to mean gratitude to the minister.21

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According to King Vajiravudh, the bureaucratic elite acted as a building block refusing him access to the lower strata of the bureaucracy. To a confidant, the king lamented the fate of an absolute monarch: It is not surprising then that I have been criticised for enjoying myself without being concerned with the suffering of the lesser officials who can no longer rely upon the king as their patron. They can only rely upon their superior who will eradicate their suffering. Once this kind of belief takes hold it is not surprising that lesser officials would not feel the need to be loyal to the king. If something good happens to them then the superior claims the credit that he has asked for rewards and promotions for them. But if it is a punishment such as imprisonment then the king is held responsible. They did not bother to inform their subordinates as to who has appointed them to be the superiors. They have cheated my authority not only by making themselves popular but also by impeding other people from being favourable to me. They have cheated me twice.22 It should be noted that King Vajiravudh was making a claim for the kind of loyalty that arose from the fact that the king presumed the role of a patron through the act of homage. The king was not prepared to accept the fact of change. The modern bureaucracy was transformed to the point where the insistence on a role as the supreme patron and the source of the bureaucrat’s livelihood was no longer tenable with the new criteria for recruitment and the growing number of officials. The dismissal of Prince Chumpon, the assistant minister to the navy exemplified the contradictions arising between absolute monarch and modern bureaucracy. Towards the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, the naval officers had begun to suffer from the budget squeeze. Earlier they had been specially treated on the grounds that they could sail the high seas and thus saved the state the cost of hiring foreigners. They were paid between fifty and 100 baht per month in addition to their salaries. (Salaries commenced at fifty baht per month.) But officers who graduated in 1909 found that this special payment was suspended. By 1911, thirty-five officers had been deprived of a large part of their expected remuneration, and their successors suffered likewise.23 This had the effect of straining relationships between the regime and the navy. Relationships were also damaged by the distrust that the new King showed for his half-brother, Prince Chumpon. The king chose not to appoint him to the royal guard, as was the custom. And when the naval department was raised to the status of a ministry, he did not appoint him deputy minister, a position for which, as the first western-trained naval officer, he was generally considered qualified. The prince was forced to make do with the rank of assistant minister, without an office but on call by the minister. This was in sharp contrast to his previous post as deputy director-general of the naval department, actively overseeing every unit.24

The defence of absolutism 131 The disenchantment that the naval officers held for the king was shown at a dinner party to celebrate his ascension to the throne. A torpedo was placed in the middle of the dining table, pointed in the direction of the royal presence. This was interpreted as a message that the navy did indeed have muscle.25 The final blow came when a naval officer quarrelled in public with some royal pages and insulted the king. Prince Chumpon was dismissed and King Vajiravudh’s explanation deserves to be quoted at length. This is clear evidence that officers who have graduated from the Naval Academy are so full of themselves that they do not feel gratitude to the king. They are drowning in the illusion that they have so much knowledge and capability that the king and the government are so frightened of their power that they are granted anything they wish. A large group of young men, being so full of themselves, would not have been allowed to come this far if those responsible for training them and respected by them had not overlooked [their responsibilities]. But . . . the person who is their trainer and superior fails to control his disciples who . . . become arrogant, feeling that such a behaviour and such an act is pleasing to the superior. This amounts to the superior encouraging them . . . Normally soldiers must consider themselves sole clients of the king [and not of any master]. They cannot make it known either by deeds or by words that they respect anyone more than the king or consider anybody’s business to come before official business. This [matter of] the officers setting themselves up as a clique, respecting their own friends more than the king, would eventually bring destruction to the nation, if it were allowed to continue.26 This uncompromising attitude contrasts markedly to that taken by King Chulalongkorn in dealing with opponents such as Wang Na. It is also interesting to note that he found it necessary to justify loyalty to the king by its utility to the nation. It shows how the concept of the nation became a central point of ideology at the beginning of the twentieth century. We will later see how King Vajiravudh promoted the concept of nationalism. The crown prince’s world As the crown prince, in the privacy of his residences (Saranrom and Parutsakawan Palaces), Vajiravudh had created a world of which he was in full command. He expected to extend this to the outside world once he became king. It provided psychological comfort and served as the testing ground for his plans to resolve his problems with the bureaucracy. He had two groups of courtiers. The first group consisted of officials of the Royal Pages’ Department whose duties were to serve the prince. The

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second group consisted of pages who had personally commended themselves to the crown prince. Some had made this move in the hope of gaining posts in the bureaucracy; this resurrected the old tradition before King Chulalongkorn had insisted that all bureaucrats underwent formal education. Others in this group hoped to continue as pages. This second group came from a mixed background of royal, noble and commoner families. Although many were commoners, the general impression that all shared this inferior status was an exaggeration.27 The main responsibility of these children was to keep the prince’s company, especially during night time until he retired to bed, around 3 a.m. They were encouraged to attend schools during the day and some of them did. But many did not, and given their late hours this failure was understandable. On the eve of the ascension to the throne, some of the children had graduated and joined the bureaucracy, whereas some gained positions in the Royal Pages Department and formed the most trusted group of courtiers. They were generally not well educated.28 At the palace, the crown prince pursued his passion in literary, theatrical and militaristic activities which reflected a mixture of Thai and western culture. He wrote most of the articles published by the monthly journal, Thawipanya. Some of his contributions were strictly literary, while others dealt with political and nationalistic themes.29 The journal was an activity of Thawipanya Samoson (Enhancement of Knowledge Club), a social club of the British model. At the beginning, there were some members who were outsiders. However, they soon dropped out and the club served only the courtiers. Apart from writing for the journal, Prince Vajiravudh also published a historical-cum-travel account of his visit to Sukhothai, the centre of power in the mid-thirteenth century. The purpose of the publication was: to make the Thais more aware that our Thai race is deep-rooted and is not a race of jungle folk or, as the English say, uncivilised. The ancient Thais had the concepts and the diligence to make structures that were large and beautiful and long lasting. Thais today do nothing but destroy the old things or let them decay because of their infatuation with new things in western style. They do not know how to choose what is appropriate for our country.30 In his theatrical activities, the Prince introduced western-style theatre from England, which he admired and practised, to the Thai society. He wrote the plays, directed and performed in them. However, since this activity did not allow the participation of his young flock, he introduced the khon (Thai masked drama) which involved young courtiers. Again, one of the purposes of khon was to remind the Thais that there were not only western dancing performances; Thai dancing was a traditional art which ought not be allowed to fall into ruin.31

The defence of absolutism 133 The last activities, war games, directly involved young courtiers and would be developed into the Wild Tiger activities. They were carried out both in Bangkok and in Nakhon Pathom, the next town to the south. It was thus described: There were two teams, each headed by a command staff, which planned the strategy to be carried out by the commissioned and noncommissioned officers and the men. Each side wore a distinguishing colour, red or green. And the various grades of soldiers wore appropriate insignia. Firecrackers were used to help produce realism. The games were taken seriously, and the operations were judged by referees. The Crown Prince usually served as the principal referee, although on occasions he commanded one of the combatant team instead. . . . In Nakhhon Pathom the games took place during the day; the uniforms were more elaborate; “artillery” units with teak-log cannon were added; and the whole operation was even more strenuous and serious.32 The crown prince thus led a fairly secluded life, surrounding himself with a small group of trusted officials and young courtiers who were to become future bureaucrats and royal pages. Some of these court activities were frowned upon by critics. However, such practices were not unusual at the time, as King Chulalongkorn’s court had also been lively with playacting and fancy-dress parties. But the difference lay in the participants. Whereas King Chulalongkorn’s parties involved his inner-court and royal princes, who also constituted the power elite, King Vajiravudh’s activities involved mostly young men who were not part of the administration. Superficially, this was the way in which King Vajiravudh created his social life. But essentially, he tried to create a special group which was personally loyal to him and would embody his ideas and defend him, the Wild Tiger Corps being the prime example. King Chulalongkorn did this too, with the early Young Siam, the League and the First Foot Guard. Both kings’ efforts brought trouble, in King Chulalongkorn’s case because these groups’ ideology took them further than he proposed to go and in King Vajiravudh’s case, as we shall see, because the Corps faced the united challenge of the regular army and civil bureaucracy. The young King Chulalongkorn faced a situation in which the need for government was still growing, and he was able to take advantage of this. It was in his later days that he experienced difficulties and he tried to stop the clock when the new bureaucracy and its ideology were already well-entrenched. King Vajiravudh inherited this developed bureaucracy; could he have succeeded in asserting royal power over it when his predecessor’s grip was already loosened quite aside from his personal problems? He was very isolated from the real world, which was dominated by a bureaucratic elite that was not about to let him play a meaningful part in governing the country.

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Setting the stage This section discusses two different ways in which the new King dealt with challenges to his authority by the bureaucracy. First, he tried to produce ideal officials for the future by setting up his own school. At the beginning of the reign, he made a declaration that he would not follow his predecessors’ example of building new royal temples as an act of merit making. Instead, he would build schools, with funding from the Privy Purse. In June 1911, he established a boarding school according to the British public-school model. Since the purpose of the school was to cultivate future members of the bureaucracy who were steadfast in the traditional relationships between the king and the ruling class, it was natural that the school should be given the name “the Royal Pages College” (Rongrian mahadlek luang). The original Royal Pages School under King Chulalongkorn, which principally aimed at training officials for the Ministry of the Interior, was enlarged to serve all ministries, was renamed King Chulalongkorn’s Civil Service College. The king was very direct as to the objective of the school and told the Ministry of Education that he considered education a waste of time if it did not succeed in producing the sort of citizens we want for our country. . . . I do not want walking schoolbooks. What I want are just mainly young men, honest, truthful, clean in habits and thoughts. . . . Please let me have a fair trial with my idea. Don’t try and make my teachers “toe your line”; let them “toe mine”, because they are running in my “sports”, in which I am giving the “cups”.33 The king took a personal interest in the college’s teachings, sport, as well as religious activities. He frequently visited the school, especially on Wisakhabucha Day, an anniversary of Buddha’s birth, enlightenment and death, when he would lead the chanting as well as give sermons. Students came mainly from backgrounds similar to those who were sent to his earlier court. In this way, King Vajiravudh laid the foundation for the future bureaucracy. Soon after founding the Wild Tiger Corps, he also established the Boy Scouts. The Scouts had the objective of disseminating nationalism through the education system. In a further way, King Vajiravudh aimed to turn the clock back to the carefree days when he was crown prince. One of his activities on ascending the throne was to publish a handbook on the role of the royal pages and to distribute copies to students of the Royal Pages School. This was intended to ensure that these future officials should understand the special positions of the royal pages. According to the handbook, the school was a very special institution because it was close to the king, and offered the most

The defence of absolutism 135 appropriate training to serve him – far superior to modern schools and colleges – because he himself did the training. He also claimed that royal pages came from good social backgrounds and for this reason he could trust them. King Vajiravudh argued that it was a mistake to consider them the king’s personal servants; rather, they were being trained as future bureaucrats.34 In this treatise, King Vajiravudh talked about royal pages as though his father had not introduced changes to the system. He misrepresented their true status, and also understated the lavish rewards paid them. These errors reflected the king’s lack of solid base in the bureaucracy and his dependence on a small group of courtiers. By treating them with extreme generosity, the king ensured himself of their devotion and loyalty, which he could not hope for from his recalcitrant bureaucrats. They commanded the king’s complete trust; after all, they had committed themselves to a type of patronage relationship that had previously existed between king and the nobility and was rapidly disappearing in the bureaucratic world. So, he accepted their rowdiness with a degree of tolerance that was almost beyond comprehension.35 The only crimes that invoked punishment were failure to keep him company while he was writing or to retreat to bed before him.36 These crimes were punished severely. Otherwise, though, Prince Vajiravudh’s indulgence towards his courtiers was extreme and had already become an issue towards the end of Chulalongkorn’s reign. King Chulalongkorn had this to say to his son, and it is likely that it was his last teaching on the topic: For someone of a superior position he cannot afford to act as a patron to a particular group of people, but he has to be the patron of all people. Rewards can be given to those who are specially favoured according to the merit of the receivers. But a leader cannot withdraw from the role of the patron of the people in general. This is a characteristic of a leader who will be successful in all activities.37 But the lesson was not learned – King Vajiravudh’s relationship with his pages became an issue in the attempted coup of 1912 – as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

King Vajiravudh’s ideology Although nationalism became an important concept in late nineteenthcentury Siam, it was only under King Vajiravudh that the ideology of “official nationalism” was fully developed as a weapon to defend absolutism. King Vajiravudh’s notion of nationalism rested upon particular values ascribed to monarchy, nation and religion. These ideas were fully worked out at the beginning of his reign in a series of lectures called Plukchai sua pa,38 given between 26 May to 4 July 1911.

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However, instead of dealing with the three components of King Vajiravudh’s nationalism, we shall look at the oath the Wild Tigers had to take upon joining the Corps in order to establish the ideological content that the king endeavoured to inculcate in his nationalist movement. First, they promised to be loyal to the king. Second they made a pledge to fight against internal and external enemies in order to protect the nation and the religion. Third, they would observe commands given by their Wild Tiger superiors, and would refrain from behaviour likely to damage the interests of the Corps. The monarchy The king’s ideology built upon values developed under his predecessor, but it served a slightly different purpose. As we have seen, the legitimacy of absolutism was threatened by the modern bureaucrats, who were beginning to question its essential contradiction; if the authority of the monarch derived from the people, then who was the ultimate source of sovereignty, and was the monarch really central to the nation? King Vajiravudh’s answer was that the monarch could remain central only if he succeeded in representing the nation. In this respect his conception illustrates Anderson’s notion of “official nationalism”. King Vajiravudh identified the nation with the dynastic state, which he perceived as an organic whole. Unlike the monarch of Central Europe, the king showed little interest in the idea of the nation as a cultural community. Only by working in the national interest (which meant the royal interest) could individual’s satisfy their sense of being; the individual could survive only for as long as the nation survived. One distinctive characteristic of King Vajiravudh’s nationalism was its secular and western approach. Having been educated in Great Britain, he was inevitably influenced by the British nationalistic trinity of “God, King and Country”. He was also exposed to conservative European nationalism of the late nineteenth century. He was influenced by western racism, although his later prejudices against the Chinese were not yet developed during the period under consideration here.39 The king and the modern bureaucrats held in common the modernist assumption that the West was a source of powerful, efficient principle. But this similarity was superficial. The modern bureaucrats had learned from liberal, not conservative, nationalism, and voiced their dissatisfaction with absolutism in demands for a “civilised” way of life, by which they meant the freedom to imitate western lifestyles and liberal democracy. They held that Thai society needed to be thoroughly restructured, whereas the king insisted that only certain aspects of western culture needed to be adopted. In addressing the Wild Tiger Corps on the monarchy, King Vajiravudh did not rely upon traditional explanations based on Hinduism or Bud-

The defence of absolutism 137 dhism or both. Rather, he justified his stand for absolutism in Hobbesian terms. He explained: when human beings first began to live in groups such as clans, a leader became a necessity because of the impossibility of members of the group thinking or acting in harmony when faced with important matters such as fighting against an enemy. By consensus the leader was given powers to take decisions for the group, and so he was naturally selected among the elders, who had most experience in defending themselves against external danger. But besides this there arose differences of opinion which could threaten internal security. Chaos would result if every person was allowed to think and act to advance his own happiness and benefit. As in the case of external threats, a need was felt to assign someone in the group to take decisions for all.40 He then said: In principle those persons assigned to make decisions in defence of the group and in arbitration on internal disputes were given authority which they exercised over all members of the group. Since it would seem that authority was divided into two parts if these two functions were placed in the hands of two different persons, it was argued that there should be only one person who exercised authority within the group. In different societies, this person was given different titles – for example, patriarch. Initially, this position was rotated. But it was realised that frequent changes of ruler impeded the smooth running of affairs. Thus there emerged a practice of electing a ruler to stay in his position until he lost power or died. Such a person with permanent authority was known as a king.41 King Vajiravudh then drew the logical inference as to why the people should be loyal to the monarch: The king is the person who has been given the authority of the community, and he exercises such authority for the benefit and the happiness of the community. Therefore the respect paid to the king is the same as that paid to the authority of the community, each member of which owns a share of the authority which has been collected and given to the king. It follows that the respect paid to that authority is respect paid to oneself. Those who look down upon the king also look down upon the authority given to the king which he is holding on behalf of themselves; and thus they look down upon themselves.42

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A quarter-of-a-century earlier a similarly western explanation of the role of the king was given by Phraya Phatsakorawong, a member of the Council of State who became Chaophraya in 1892. In an article in the journal Wachirayan Wiset, he wrote: It is understood that all the land of the kingdom belongs solely to the king. The king abides by the royal customs set out by our ancestors who came together to establish a nation [chat]. This man was very able and intelligent and one on whom the people could rely to be their protector. This chosen leader guarded both internal and external security and brought happiness to the people. This had not been brought about by the opinion of the majority; rather it had been through the leader’s own authority. The people who were organised into the nation were loyal to him and followed his every advice. They renounced their natural rights, whether public or private. Therefore the leader [that is, the king] received full freedom and power which was set forth in the royal customs that the people had enacted.43 The theories of kingship adopted by Phraya Phatsakorawong and King Vajiravudh are similarly Hobbesian and display the ideological contradictions arising from the confusion of western and traditional systems. They differ in that Phraya Phatsakorawong followed Hobbesian theory to its end; the people gave up their natural rights to the king. But King Vajiravudh did not make such a claim. According to him, the king is the person elected by the people, but sovereignty still resides with the people. Thus, the role of the king was subordinated to the principle of nation. This conformed to conservative European nationalism. But in Europe, such belief reflected the gradual retreat of religious and monarchical institutions in the face of bourgeois pressure, which was setting the terms for the debate on nationalism. King Vajiravudh’s defence of nationalism was not simply imitative. At the core of his reaction was a profound doubt, perhaps first in his own ability to rule, but ultimately in the viability of the monarchy in its own right. Thus far, we have seen the king explaining the emergence of the monarchical system and the necessity of giving loyalty to the monarch. He went further than this, and identified the monarchy with the nation. As for loyalty to the king, it is the same as loyalty to oneself, because the king has duties to defend the country from external threats and from disputes that are detrimental to internal peace and order. If individuals, who constitute parts of the nation, alienate themselves from their supreme lord and refuse to succumb to his authority, then the supreme lord will not be able to carry out the duties assigned to him. If all people are loyal to the king then he can carry out the task as is expected of him, no matter whether it is great or small. No kind of

The defence of absolutism 139 work is likely to be accomplished without a leader. If one wishes to sail the seas, then one must delegate power to one person to be a captain. Other people in the ship must always obey the captain’s orders. If they do not, the ship might be wrecked and the people in the ship in danger of losing their lives. This applies to paying loyalty to the king. The nation and the country are analogous to the ship, the king to the captain, and the people to those in the ship.44 However, the way in which the monarchy was identified with the nation was functional. The king was a national leader because he had certain duties to perform. Loyalty bestowed upon the king enabled him to perform his duties. King Vajiravudh did not claim that the people owed their loyalty directly to him as embodiment of the national spirit. The establishment of the Wild Tiger Corps expressed an attempt to reach beyond the bureaucratic elite to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie but not to the people at large. The latter step might have been too radical a step for him to take, and he hardly had the personality suited to the role of charismatic leader. In the end, he made a plea to the Wild Tigers: I would like to persuade and plead to you all. You and I are Thais just the same. Can we for once think along the same lines? Please do not consider me not a human being. Please think of me as a Thai human being who has been authorised by you to maintain the power of the Thai nation. May you help me to continue to maintain the power and the independence of the Thai nation. I am not asking you to do anything that I am not willing to do at all. If I am willing to sacrifice my pleasure, my body and my life for the benefit of the nation and if you are willing to sacrifice just the same then we can be certain that the Thai nation will be secured. But if you do not make a resolution to make such a sacrifice then I do not see how the Thai nation can survive and escape from disaster. Therefore, I ask you to keep it in your minds that you and I are in the same boat and cannot be separated or escape from each other. If we sink we sink together, if we survive, we survive together. . . . If it is our karma not to make it across the ocean then do not try to escape, let us die together.45 Nation and religion The second oath of the Wild Tigers was to defend the nation and religion. The king conceded that, at a superficial level, the concept of nation and religion differed. However, he argued, they were interrelated. Although central to the notion of official nationalism, King Vajiravudh’s concept of the nation was surprisingly underdeveloped. In Plukchai sua pa he restricted himself to discussing the linguistic usage of the word. Chat (nation), he explained, originally meant “birth”, and was

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only later used with the sense of “community”: “A person who belongs to the Thai nation is somebody who has been born as a Thai among a community, which call itself Thai.”46 The king showed little interest in the nation as a cultural identity and made no attempt to define it in terms of cultural components – whether of historical experience or shared heritage. His few references to Thai history served only as an anecdotal support. He showed greater interest in the concept of the nation-state, expressed in the term chat banmuang. Apparently the first mention was made in the Plukchai sua pa series of lectures. As for our Thai nation, in the former times there was neither nation nor language. However, there was a certain group of people who were courageous, the characteristic of the Sua Pa, and who so hated being oppressed as slaves that they endeavoured to form a separate community. They named it Thai, because they had full independence and were not anyone’s slaves.47 He only later recognised the importance of shared language as being basic to the culture of the community. He observed then that most Europeans perceived a common language to be a characteristic of a nation, and implied that those Chinese who spoke Thai belonged to the Thai nation. King Vajiravudh’s main concern in using the concept of nation was to build loyalty to the monarchy at a time when absolutism was being questioned. The Wild Tigers were told that there were two types of threat: external and internal. The latter was more serious and had three causes. Danger arose first from people who were oppressed and unjustly treated, second from foreigners who stirred up trouble and third from people who staged unrest in their own interests. Those who caused disturbances and unrest were national enemies, not because they were acting against the king but because they invited invasion by external powers. It was the responsibility of all members of the nation to suppress unrest.48 The king compared the nation to a leaky passenger ship. It was the duty of not only the sailors but also of the passengers to save it. This is the same for a country. If there is disturbance or riot in the country and everyone remains indifferent and says that suppressing riots is the soldiers’ responsibility, then they behave just like passengers who leave the sailing to the sailors. And this will even be more damaging if the threat of foreign war looms large. Therefore it is the responsibility of all who consider themselves part of the nation to quickly suppress those bad people who cause disturbances. When the maintenance of national security is accomplished then one can claim that he has fulfilled his responsibility as a man. An individual cannot detach himself from the nation. When the nation founders so does the individual.49

The defence of absolutism 141 This shows again the subordination of monarch to the principle of nation. The people had a duty to help suppress unrest because it harmed the nation rather than the king. King Vajiravudh even conceded that in some circumstances unrest might be justified. But he argued that seeking justice in a way that opposed the ruler’s authority is not the best solution. Outsiders who loved justice and hated oppression could not respect those who did nothing to help their government suppress unrest.50 Here the king appeared to be saying that he must defend his dynastic rule in the name of the nation. Religion is the last element of King Vajiravudh’s nationalism. His initial treatment of religion suggests that he was not confident in handling it as an ideological concept. He included it in his nationalism because of “God, King and Country” in western nationalism and also because he felt that undesirable behaviour of the educated Thais could be explained by their becoming more and more secular. His initial treatment of religion was similar to his treatment of nation, in that the specific cultural component was disregarded. This was partially derived from the general secularism of contemporary European nationalism – an emphasis on the established religion as good for instilling discipline in the masses – and also from the fact that stressing Buddhism’s virtues would seem to challenge the modern, western values which the king endorsed but was not prepared to share with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In his lecture, he reasoned that morality was imperative for both individuals and the nation. Without morality a person would seek to do what he liked, regardless of the trouble it caused others. This would lead to endless fighting and quarrels, which meant that people could not live peacefully and happily. The nation would then disintegrate, even without the agency of external powers. Thus, it was important that all people observed moral principles so that they did not cause disturbances that would lead to internecine strife.51 Given that he did not closely associate religion with Buddhism at this early stage, it was only later on that he appeared to have seen value in doing so.52 At this point he valued religion as a means of keeping in line those educated Thais who were showing increased signs of restlessness. His main target of criticism was the new Thai social class (khon thai chan mai) who entertained western ideas to the point that they agitated for drastic reforms along western lines. He claimed that these khon thai chan mai shared the fault of atheism. He gave three reasons for this. First, those who had studied in Europe and wished to be considered as knowledgeable as white men, had been influenced by western atheists who considered that religion served only to dupe the foolish and the ignorant. Second, Thais who visited Europe tended to go when they were very young, and so their Buddhism was insufficiently developed to withstand the assaults of western critics. As they dared not convert to Christianity for fear of being reprimanded at

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home, the easy way out was to profess atheism and keep quiet to hide their ignorance. Thus, the spread of atheism among the khon thai chan mai resulted from the bad influence of the West. In addition, however, he discovered an internal cause: There are people who want only to pursue their personal happiness and convenience, and they justify doing whatever they like with agnosticism. Those with no religion think differently from others, therefore they can do and say anything they like. When criticised, they justify their behaviour by saying that, not being religious, they do not have to follow moral principles and to behave in the same way as those who are bound by their religion.53 Such people, he charged, became role models for those educated Thais who had not left Siam but entertained ideas that threatened the regime: Even some Thais who have not been abroad and do not aspire to follow the ways of white men are quick to pick up any practice that is convenient, and it suits them to give up religious observation. This is because atheism justifies one doing as one likes. Thus when they have seen that those who come back from abroad do not have religion, they gladly follow their example and then allow themselves to entertain fanciful ideas. As a result, the number of those who are atheist is not decreasing but increasing as time goes by. This is especially the case among youngsters. They are in favour of atheism because they are at an age that entertains fanciful ideas.54 According to him, atheists had one crucial character flaw, that was lack of tolerance and courage: They can only think of their own happiness and convenience at a particular time. Whenever something becomes an impediment to happiness and convenience they will lose courage and tolerance to endeavour on the task. In other words, they do not have the spirit of the sua pa. . . . A sua pa will not hesitate to perform any task no matter how difficult or inconvenient, he will carry it through. . . . Religion makes people courageous because steadfastness to it dispels any fear of danger.55 Dedication to the corps Whereas the second oath was obscure in terms of the goal of resolving problems in the bureaucracy, the third was clear as the king’s intention for the Wild Tiger Corps. The Corps was presented as an organic entity which required unity among its members:

The defence of absolutism 143 The reason for disunity is usually that some individuals consider their personal interests to be above those of their peers. They only choose to do what is beneficial to them and do not give careful consideration to whether such behaviour might bring about any disadvantages to the corps [khana]. They only think of themselves, concentrating only upon their own work and positions. This leads them to feel that their responsibilities are far heavier than their capability. They do not stop to consider that they are only a small part of the group. Their responsibilities are only a small part of those entrusted to the corps. [Nor do they feel that.] If the work of any one part of the organisation stalls then the work of other parts will also be jeopardised. If we make the comparison with a body, a group is a body and individuals are various organs of the body. If one organ stops functioning, this does not at all mean that that particular organ will benefit. It will most probably decay along with other organs. . . . This is also true for the corps; a selfish individual who does not take the interests of the corps into account must be considered a short-sighted person who cannot look after his own long-term interests. This amounts to destroying oneself. Any person who neglects those duties that will be beneficial to the corps will be thought to be bringing harm to the corps and leading the group towards possible destruction. And when any group is destroyed, then each individual who forms parts of it also has to face destruction.56 The king then argued that, if the group was destroyed, then the nation could also face the same fate. In so doing, King Vajiravudh turned back to history to find lessons that taught the perils of selfishness and disunity. He pointed out that the history of the Banphuluang (the last dynasty of Ayudhya) had been so scarred by revolts and murders because the kings of that particular dynasty had come to the throne by force. And because they could not claim the throne legitimately, they had been obliged to deal drastically with any potential threats. It was natural for the monarch to put down any threat to his throne if it was in the interests of maintaining law and order. But if he were motivated only by personal interests, then his repression would create disunity among government officials and the people. Thus, all in the kingdom would be forced to watch out for their own interests, and this was precisely what had happened in the case of the Banphuluang dynasty. Everybody had thought only of their own interests before those of others, and all the time safeguarded their own survival. As a result, there had been no unity among the Thais, and when the Burmese army invaded there was nobody to rally others, and instead each tried only to survive on their own. The final outcome was a Burmese victory, which was very shameful. This clearly demonstrated how disunity could cause the destruction of the nation.57 Since a nation is composed of many groups, the destruction of a group could lead to national destruction. It was imperative that each individual

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member of a group observed morality because his mischief would be like disease in a person’s body, which could lead to losing an organ or life. Therefore, a bad person could destroy his corps. Such bad behaviour was identified as jealousy of persons in higher positions, which made it obvious that he was advocating the Wild Tiger’s acceptance of the line of command no matter who the superiors were: For example a high ranking government official. . . . when he travels on a ship he will have to allow the captain of the ship being in command. Thus a member of a group has to observe the command of his superior of the group regardless of his rank during the normal time.58 An ideal sua pa was someone who was sufficiently courageous to do his duty by following the command of a superior to the point of sacrificing his family, body and even life. The king then ended his sermon by reminding the Wild Tigers that they had made a pledge to strictly observe the oath and this corresponded with the Wild Tigers’ motto of “It is better to lose life than honour”.59 Along with a nationalist ideology, King Vajiravudh established a nationalist organisation, which was an attempt at an end-run around the bureaucracy and its ideology of modernity and meritocracy, justifying royal pre-eminence in terms of the nation. Appeals in that direction had already begun in Chulalongkorn’s time, and King Vajiravudh, educated as he was in Europe when “official nationalism” was much in vogue, was probably as much convinced of this argument as utilising it as a tool. The problem was that he had no way of reaching the nation except through the bureaucracy, which was not about to allow him to create parallel organisations. Having said this, the fate of the Wild Tiger Corps was almost written on the wall. We now turn to an analysis of the organisation to see how it was meant to be an ideological movement, and to identify its failure as a precipitating factor leading towards an attempted coup in 1912.

The Wild Tiger Corps: a failed nationalist movement We have dealt with King Vajiravudh’s nationalist ideology. We now turn to the main vehicle by which this ideology was transmitted, the Wild Tiger Corps. Soon after the coronation, the king turned his attention to the establishment of a paramilitary organisation whose members consisted of volunteers from the civil bureaucracy. He planned that the Corps should devote itself to drills and parades, listening to lectures given by the king himself, and preparing for annual manoeuvres. Members were required to take an oath of allegiance, the ceremony more elaborate than that taken in the bureaucracy. This expression of personal loyalty was reinforced by the motto, “It is better to lose life than honour”.

The defence of absolutism 145 This project was most dear to the king’s heart and was developed and changed constantly throughout his reign. Here we concentrate upon its development leading up to the attempted coup in 1912. When the Wild Tiger Corps was inaugurated with the ceremony of taking the oath of allegiance on 6 May 1911, it had 141 members who could be roughly divided into two major categories and one minor category. One major category consisted of courtiers, starting from the very seniors to the very young ones, plus some members of royalty who were not part of the bureaucratic elite. It was from this category that the commanders of the Corps came. The second major category was made up of the heads and members of the bureaucracy, who were mostly of the private rank. The minor category consisted of leaders of the armed forces; their membership was treated as special, and initially the Corps was for civilians only.60 The king needed the blessing of the bureaucratic elite whose power the king wanted to curb. Their inclusion was explained: the Siamese as a people are ready to follow an example of a leader. His Majesty therefore explained his plans to the Ministers of State and high officials, and they gave their hearty approval.61 The Corps reminds one of King Chulalongkorn’s Council of State and Privy Council as the way in which the new king circumvented bureaucratic power. A lack of response to the royal-sponsored scheme could be interpreted as an act of defiance, an openly defiant position being difficult for any bureaucratic head to take at the beginning of a new reign unless one was in such a powerful position as Somdet Chaophraya and the Kalahom under King Chulalongkorn’s reign. However, there were some bureaucratic heads who gave the Corps their heartfelt support. One of them was Phraya Wisut (later Chaophraya Phrasadet), the Minister of Education and a former diplomat who also acted as the king’s guardian in England. He and his assistant, Phraya Phaisansinlapasat (later Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, see Chapter 3), who were members of the former Thawipanya Samoson, established by King Vajiravudh as the crown prince, were at the top of the list, and Phraya Wisut acted as a master of ceremony during the inauguration.62 The next step was to start recruiting from the middle layer of the bureaucracy. In order to join, a candidate had to be a Thai citizen, at least twenty years of age, a civilian and a Buddhist. Although non-officials were welcomed, the Wild Tiger Corps at this stage essentially aimed at recruiting from the bureaucracy. Official guidelines for identifying desirable recruits called for “those who had suitable station in life”, which implied those who had the rank of the khunnang class of sakdina 400 upwards. Besides, an application had to be recommended and seconded by members of the bureaucracy.63

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It was obvious that, initially the image of the Wild Tiger Corps was elitist and cosmopolitan. Considerable expense was involved, fifty baht for initial membership and thirty baht for annual fee. In addition, Wild Tigers had to pay for their fanciful uniforms and social activities. It was reported that, by July, anyone of any importance had joined. This elitist image prompted Phraya Wisut, initially an ardent supporter, to bar his subordinates in the Ministry of Education from joining. Most had only recently moved up to the noble class. He argued that because all established members seemed to come to meetings on horseback, his officials would suffer embarrassment arriving in Chinese-drawn carts. He relaxed this prohibition only when membership rules were revised to accommodate less well-off officials, requiring them to pay an annual fee of only six baht.64 The initial response from members of the bureaucracy was beyond expectation. By mid-June 1911, the original company was expanded into two companies, each consisting of about 200 members. By July, membership had reached 800. In December, the two companies were replaced by four. These consisted of the First Royal Bodyguard Company (referred to by contemporaries and hereafter in this text as the Royal Company) and the Second, Third and Fourth Royal Bodyguard Companies. The strength of the Corps during the first six months could be seen in the fact that the Second Coronation ceremony in September was attended by 4,230 Wild Tigers. The two main factors attracting membership were that it was something “modern” and was sponsored by the king. At this time the notion that nationalism could be inculcated through military discipline was taken seriously by European nationalists. How far Siamese bureaucrats were aware of this fact cannot be discerned, but the Wild Tiger Corps was certainly aimed at the appearance of modernity, with its dashing uniforms and members’ club. It also offered the opportunity for middle-rank bureaucrats to hobnob with the king and high-ranking personalities. Indeed, this was an appeal put out by the king as a selling point. They inevitably entertained the possibility of attracting the king’s attention for want of a more powerful patron or for a patron at all. Besides, their bureaucratic heads had already given either overt or tacit approval. Expansion of the corps Pressure to expand Corps membership beyond its original plan came first from the lower echelon of the bureaucracy, those who did not belong to the ruling class. If the issue of modernity appealed to the urbane, cosmopolitan modern bureaucrats, it had even greater appeal for those who were not fortunate enough to fully participate in the modernising process of education. The Wild Tiger activities also filled the gaps in their lives after work since they lacked resources to enjoy the sweet lives of the

The defence of absolutism 147 bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The proposal to expand membership was welcomed by the king because it would establish the Corps as a more widely based movement than he had originally planned. On 27 May 1911, only three weeks after the first ceremony of taking water of allegiance, Chaophraya Yommarat proposed to the king that membership be extended to include first-grade clerks – that is, bureaucrats one degree lower than the noble class.65 In the first few months, the Corps was generally popular and this proposal reflected genuine interest within the bureaucracy, or at least a desire to win the royal favour. In proposing the expansion of the Corps to the clerks, Chaophraya Yommarat might genuinely have wanted the Corps to become a nationwide movement. Or possibly he foresaw a damaging conflict of interests for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in serving both the Corps and the bureaucracy. An increased enrolment of clerks was likely to dampen the enthusiasm of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and thus propel them into dropping their membership and reverting to prioritise their bureaucratic loyalties. The clerks were more dispensable than officials with sanyabat, especially in view of the upcoming annual manoeuvre, which lasted the whole month. In mid-July 1911, the Corps began to be expanded into the provinces. This had not been originally planned, but now the aim was to establish at least one Corps Circle Company in each monthon (administrative circle consisting of a number of provinces). Quite likely the initiative for this new recruitment drive came from Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior, who was eager to exploit his expertise and official networks in expanding the Corps and was now given the responsibility of supervising the provincial companies. In so doing, either he was simply humouring the king, expecting the whole thing to be a passing royal fancy, or he was worried about the Corps and thought that putting it under bureaucratic and army influence in the provinces would be a better way of bringing it under control rather than rejecting it outright. The administration of the provincial companies was decentralised, each circle having financial autonomy and its own clubhouse. They were left very much to their own devices so long as they followed the guidelines issued by the Central Command.66 They maintained enthusiastic memberships, and this factor contributed significantly to maintaining the existence of the organisation until the end of the reign. At the same time, the Corps enrolled a new type of member called kong kern (supplementary unit). This meant that officials of even lower rank than first grade clerks could now enrol. No entrance fee was imposed on them, and they were to pay a membership fee of only six baht a year. These associate members did not have the same status as ordinary members; for instance, they were expected to honour the latter at the Corps’ social functions.67 The decision to include kong kern members marked a significant departure from the original perception of how the Corps should be structured.

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In the provinces, where mid-level bureaucrats were in relatively short supply, it was necessitated by the need to increase membership. In Bangkok, the Corps’ numbers were threatened by the fact that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was increasingly unwilling to make the required commitment of time and effort. The new membership category was created only two days after a lengthy regulation designed to prevent idleness was issued.68 However, the king justified the move by citing a supposed need to satisfy demands from the lower strata of the bureaucracy.69 Eventually, Bangkok-based higherranking officials were to become an insignificant element, and the Bangkok Companies (Royal Company and Bangkok Circles Company) depended most heavily on courtier and kong kern membership. The creation of kong kern coincided with the establishment of the Bangkok Circle Company by Chaophraya Yommarat, the Minister of the Capital, who commanded the Corps in Bangkok and those provinces directly abutting the metropolis. The Bangkok Circle Company recruited from Bangkok officials below the first-grade clerical level and was structured like companies in the provincial circles rather than the four Royal Bodyguard Companies. It was intended for young and physically able members in Bangkok who could participate in drills. Like other provincial companies, the Bangkok Circle Company had lower social status than did the Royal Bodyguard Companies. Its members were restricted to their own clubhouse. Nevertheless, it was an immediate success, and by September 1911 claimed over 1,000 members – to the king’s great satisfaction. The establishment of the Bangkok Circle Company meant that there were two main categories of memberships in Bangkok. Pressure to expand Corps membership also came from the army. The original exclusion of combat officers caused considerable consternation among them. It seems likely that, first, they wished to participate in a modern organisation and that they considered their original exclusion to be discriminatory. Second, they might have perceived the Corps to be a potentially rival organisation in which they must play a role in order to protect their interests, for instance as a paramilitary hierarchy that did not follow the military chain of command. This could very well have been the position of Prince Phitsanulok, the Army Chief of Staff, who had shown little support for the project. Initially, limiting membership to civilians had probably been the king’s response to the objection that inviting an army membership would have been enormously disruptive to army discipline. But discontent in the army was so high that the king was forced to broadcast an explanation that the main purpose of the Corps was to instil militarism – something that the military already possessed. Yet, this was not enough to placate them and the king eventually surrendered to the growing pressure by agreeing to accommodate the military officers in the Corps as “extraordinary” members; this entitled them to the use of the clubhouse but did not require them to drill.

The defence of absolutism 149 Objectives of the corps Now let us analyse the objectives of the Wild Tiger Corps, and evaluate how the Corps fared up to the time of the attempted coup. The point here is that King Vajiravudh was motivated by conflicting objectives in establishing the Corps. The first objective was to create an alternative hierarchy to the bureaucracy which would allow the king to bypass the bureaucratic heads and establish direct contacts with the middle echelon of the bureaucracy. This explains why the main target group for recruitment after the inauguration was the modern bureaucrats. The clubhouse and the lecture hall were the venues in which, in principle, the king could establish personal contacts with his officials. Thus, he aimed to break the patronage network which pushed bureaucrats to be loyal to their bureaucratic superiors rather than to the monarchy. The king’s plans for the Corps defied the bureaucratic hierarchy in the second way by putting the bureaucratic heads at the bottom of the new hierarchy and initially having them commanded by some young courtiers of much lower ranks. For example, the second number after the king in the First Company was Cha Yong (the king’s closest confidant and who later became Chaophraya Ramrakhop) who was under twenty years old. This justified why members positioned in mid-level of the bureaucracy might be ranked above their bureaucratic heads should the latter decide not to participate actively in the Corps. This situation explains the two extreme responses taken by the bureaucratic elite. On the one hand, a senior bureaucrat might absent himself from Corps activities – and this was the response taken by Prince Phitsanulok for the reasons suggested above (p. 145). On the other hand, he might take the plunge with the hope of directing Corps activities in a desirable direction. This was the strategy chosen by Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior. He became very active in organising the Corps’ provincial units. King Vajiravudh’s second objective in establishing the Corps was to build an ideological movement that would inculcate correct attitudes among the modern bureaucrats with the hope of inhibiting them from destabilising his absolutism; as we have already noted, members of the modern bureaucracy tended to pay greater loyalty to their organisational heads to the king. Furthermore, the bureaucracy had grown to the point that competition for higher places became intense and the persistence of the patron–client relationships made the mid-ranked officials restless. The way in which to address these two negative tendencies was to set up an ideological and militaristic movement. We have analysed official nationalism as expressed in the literature of the Wild Tiger Corps. We now examine the message given by Prince Wachirayan, the Supreme Patriarch, at the ceremony of the Wild Tigers

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Corps’ inauguration and taking of the oath of allegiance. The sermon summed up the ideological content of the Wild Tiger Corps. As in King Vajiravudh’s official nationalism, the nation was placed at the centre of the ideology, and this priority was justified by an organic theory of the state. The nation was compared to the body; each organ had a specific function that should be performed properly and soundly so that the body was virtuously maintained. The individual was required to function so that he preserved the unity of the whole. Unity among individuals, each of whom alone was an unimportant entity, was the key factor to the nation’s progress. Therefore everyone should consider the nation’s interests above their own. Members must be prepared to sacrifice their lives because they were mortal whereas the nation was not. They must not do anything that caused national disunity because it led to national destruction. The sense of devotion to the nation should also be extended to the king, who was the grace of the nation: Those who give importance to the nation should also give importance to the king. Although ants are small animals they could provide lessons to human beings in their unity and following their leader. Therefore, you who are the king’s subjects should be loyal to him, be attentive in serving him with gratitude to your best ability. [You] should obey his command and not put your personal interests before his. When the time comes you should be willing to spare your lives. As for the king, he is like the head of the nation, the subjects are like other organs such as hands and feet etc., if these organs become injured then damage affects the head. Thus one who thinks that the subjects are important should also consider the king important.70 Furthermore, the nation should also observe the dhamma because it is the basis of national well-being. The main idea is to observe the rightful behaviour. A further sermon by Prince Wachirayan throws light on the meaning of the Wild Tigers’ motto of “It is better to lose life than honour”. According to him, honour meant observing the oath taken by the Wild Tiger; that they would always be loyal to the king, the nation and the religion. He ended the sermon by citing all blessings one would get from not committing any harms to one’s friend.71 Thus, by joining the Corps, the Wild Tigers were put under a binding moral obligation of loyalty to the king. Their sense of loyalty would be reinforced by lectures given by the king which the members from the Royal Bodyguard Companies had to attend. The other means employed to mould the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was militarism. The official justification for military practice was that Thais were formerly warriors but the long absence of warfare had alienated them

The defence of absolutism 151 from their true nature. The king explained that, in the past, there already existed the Wild Tigers who acted as an intelligence unit. Since Siam was threatened from both internal and external sources, it was necessary to revive this military spirit of sacrificing oneself to the safety of the nation.72 This claim to be turning Thais back to their true nature overlaid the true ideological aim of the Corps of instilling discipline among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The General Advisor responded in English to a diplomatic query on the nature of the Wild Tiger Corps: this is not primarily a military movement. It only means that, in the light of their [Thai] history, there has been thrown into a military form of teaching of the people that the interest of the individual is to be sunk for the higher interests of the state; and the highest good of the nation will in turn benefit the individuals who compose it.73 Thus, military training in a modern organisation would drag modern Thais away from pursuing personal pleasures such as drinking and womanising. The Wild Tiger Corps provided an alternative to such individualistic pursuits of pleasure typical of western culture.74 At the same time rigorous military training would help to break the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who were enjoying such a sweet life, which sapped their willingness to share goods in common and to accept the imposition of higher authority. Military training instils discipline. It is the way to train oneself to accept the leader’s command which will be to one’s advantage. This is because if one knows how to be under command then one can become a good leader.75 Furthermore, military training would solve one crucial problem in the bureaucracy; lack of co-operation among various departments. The king commented that: formerly, unity among government officials in various ministries was lacking. This is because each individual concentrated on seeking rewards within his own department and was loyal only to his own superior. There had been many complaints [about divided loyalties] during the last part of the fifth reign, but nobody had prescribed the right medicine.76 Thus, the king intended to use the Wild Tiger Corps as a means of placing himself at the head of a modern, militaristic organisation preaching a nationalist ideology. In so doing he would reclaim a central position for the monarchy, which was losing relevance as a result of bureaucratic and ideological modernisation. In the final analysis, he wished to continue King Chulalongkorn’s drive towards a strong and modern Thai state while correcting the principle faults that seemed to have arisen in this process –

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the marginalisation of the monarch as leader and the loss of cultural and social coherence. At the height of the Wild Tigers’s popularity he expressed his feelings thus: seeing the increasing popularity of the Wild Tiger Corps and the Boy Scouts makes me incomparably happy. I feel that whatever happens I have written my name, at least one line, in the chronicles of the Thai nation. My life is not wasted because my name prevailed so long as do the Wild Tigers. Successfully establishing the Wild Tigers had made me happier than any other accomplishment. This is because I feel that I have led the Thais to be nationalistic and to understand the virtue of unity. This is a sufficient reward. It provides me with a more solid monument than any costly object.77 The third objective of the Wild Tiger Corps was to institutionalise his personal social life so that he could surround himself with those he trusted most. It was amongst his close courtiers on the royal yacht that he proposed the idea of the Corps and set up basic regulations, and it was there that he recruited the first group of members. The courtiers heavily dominated the original structure of the Corps and when it was expanded to four companies later in the year, most of the original courtier members stayed with the first (or Royal) Company of the Corps. The rest were given commanding positions in the other companies. The privileged position of the Royal Company was symbolised in a number of ways. The king personally commanded it, and supervised its drills himself. He led a selected few officers of the Royal Company in formulating and revising the constitution of the entire Corps. The Royal Company, with more elaborate uniforms, contributed towards the royal guard, and took precedence over the guard provided by the army. That the king planned to arm the Royal Company later on indicates that he also entertained the prospect of turning it into a security force, but at best during the period studied it could only act as a security blanket. When the king presided, the Corps clubhouse was the most important centre in Bangkok and its members were expected to socialise with the king there. It was: his child, his delight. Its members were his comrades, his fellow “club” members, his companions at arms, his students. The atmosphere harkened back to Saranrom Palace and the Thawipanya Club atmosphere, where the war manoeuvres of the pages and the courtiers, with the King as absolute director and manager, although in a “democratic”, that is comradely way.78 However, there was a strict line drawn between the Royal Company and the rest. The king was seldom found at the clubhouse outside the

The defence of absolutism 153 khanaphot, the Royal Company dining club. Only the leaders of the Royal Company could join this, and they were then expected to dine together nightly.79 Thus, within the Corps, the king surrounded himself with courtly favourites, and made no attempts to cultivate relationships with outsiders to his circle. As a result, he lost what opportunities the Corps presented for extending his influence beyond the regular bureaucratic apparatus. At the same time, he alienated those members of the nobility and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who felt he was neglecting the affairs of the state in preference for play-acting and military games. It seemed that he spent his working hours issuing promotions (sanyabat) for the Wild Tigers and ignoring bureaucratic promotions.80 Increasingly, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie perceived themselves to be treated as second-class citizens – and we see in the next chapter that the leaders of the 1912 conspiracy made much play of the king’s obvious favouritism. As a result, members of the Royal Bodyguard Companies who were not courtiers found the daily drills irksome, especially when these were conducted by the courtiers. Corps and bureaucratic line of command often did not coincide, which caused confusion, embarrassment and loss of face. The Corps competed for their attention with such attractions as the new western-styled restaurants, operetta performed by the Pramothai troop, and professional clubs such as Samukkhayachan and the Bar Association. And so the Corps could not claim to be alone in offering “modernity”. Hence it is not surprising that those members who later claimed happy memories of the Corps were mostly based in the provinces rather than in Bangkok. To conclude, the unplanned and haphazard growth of the Corps reflects the king’s confusion about his interest in establishing it, and his uncertainty about what response it would elicit. He was unable to design a structure and regulations that embraced the needs of the different groups from which the Corps recruited – principally from both courtiers and bureaucrats, but also from the bureaucratic elite within Bangkok and the provinces, and bureaucrats at different levels. King Vajiravudh had loosely intended the Wild Tiger Corps as an instrument of “official nationalism”, to build upon King Chulalongkorn’s absolutist system. But he lacked his father’s talents and patience, and did not have the skills to interpret the nation in terms that appealed to his different constituencies. The Wild Tiger Corps failed to resolve the problems of absolutism and instead mirrored and aggravated them. It convinced a group of young officers that the time was ripe to put an end to absolutism. Thus, we see that the deliberate cultivation of official nationalism failed to protect absolutism from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in 1932.

6

The 1912 revolt The first great challenge to absolutism

Introduction The previous chapter explained why the establishment of the Wild Tiger Corps caused so much dissatisfaction within the bureaucracy. However, it should be emphasised that the decline of absolutism’s legitimacy had already started in the previous reign. This chapter argues that the challenge to the absolute monarchy reflected significant structural problems within the system and has less to do with dissatisfaction against any particular king.1 By the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, there already existed a group of bureaucrats who criticised the court’s spending.2 Newcomers to the bureaucracy were demanding that their western-styled education be treated as the most important criteria in determining promotion and advancement. Their frustrations were partly fuelled by revolutions in other absolutist states and empires such as Turkey and China. Furthermore, they were increasingly frustrated by the activities of the Wild Tiger Corps. This discontent was expressed in a conspiracy by a group of young army officers to overthrow the absolute monarchy. It was uncovered by the authorities in March 1912 and is generally known as Kabot R.S. 130 (revolt in the Thai year equivalent to 1912). To understand the thinking of these people, we shall examine the conspirators’ ideology as expressed in their testimonies to the investigating committee. A supplementary source of documentation is a memoir written by two key members of the conspiracy, Rian Srichan and Net Phunwiwat. This was compiled forty years later, in a different political situation, and thus needs to be handled with care. It was first published in 1950 under the title Patiwat Khrang Raek Khong Thai R.S. 130 (The First Thai Revolution Year 1912).3 Chapter 4 (pp. 123–125) showed that many young army officers had stronger reasons for discontent than other professional groups because they had suffered greater social discrimination and slower promotion. The budget cuts had affected the army more than other ministries. So, it was not surprising that almost all of the ninety-one conspirators put on trial were junior army officers of the ranks of sub-lieutenant and lieutenant.

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They perceived the new recruitment policy and the growing number of officer corps to threaten their career prospects. The conspiracy also included some civilians and naval officers trained in the legal profession who had personal relationships with Sub-Lieutenant Charun, one of the core leaders. The nominal leader of the conspiracy was Captain Khun Thuayhan (Leng) of the medical department, and this revolt was popularly known as the Kabot Mo Leng. (Dr Leng’s revolt). He was invited to join the conspiracy both because he was the elder brother to Sub-Lieutenant Rian, another core leader, and also because he had a reputation for knowledge of world affairs.4 According to the memoir, the two army officers who started planning the kanpatiwat (revolution) back in 1910 during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, were Rian and Charun. Both had graduated from the Royal Cadet Academy in 1909. The use of the word patiwat by the authors was deliberate. They claimed to be working towards a revolution rather than a coup d’état. However, the evidence suggests that they were considerably less radical than their successors who, in 1932, abolished the absolute monarchy. In terms of aims and social participation, this Kabot R.S. 130 appeared to have been relatively narrow, being conceived almost entirely in terms of bureaucratic career prospects. Absolutism may have been in decay, but its opponents had not yet created a vision of a coherent alternative. These “revolutionaries” may have talked about a republic, but probably envisaged it under the leadership of their princely patrons. They aimed at creating a progressive form of government, but the practical implications were obscure.5 This chapter has the following sections: the conspirators; the recruitment; lecture arguing against absolutism; the conspirators’ proposal; and their repression of interests.

The conspirators This section focuses on the social characteristics and interests of the conspirators. After the R.S.130 conspiracy had failed, one army officer testified at his trial that, when recruited in January, he was told that there were 300 members. The government’s intelligence report put the number as being as high as 800.6 Many documents tell us that the authorities felt that the conspiracy was more widespread than they wanted to acknowledge.7 They may have decided to exercise prudence and arrest only those who were definitely implicated by paper evidence. On the other hand, the government may have lacked confidence in its ability to press charges on all concerned; the full membership list was supposedly destroyed before it reached the authorities.8 In either event, King Vajiravudh was lenient in dealing with the persons who were found guilty. Thirty people were acquitted, and the death penalty imposed on the three core leaders was reduced to life imprisonment.9

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There were many other government officials who knew of the conspiracy but did not want to be involved. One officer testified that every officer in the First Regiment (stationed in Bangkok) seemed to have heard of the conspiracy.10 Another testified that it seemed to be an open secret that a group of army officers were conspiring to overthrow the absolute monarchy.11 The fact that so many officials knew of the plans, even if they did not take part, yet chose not to report their knowledge to the authorities, suggests that they felt that the conspirators’ cause was legitimate. Prince Phitsanulok summed up this attitude in a letter to King Vajiravudh: I am not sure if anybody has informed you that, according to the public opinion, nobody questioned the conspirators’ rationale but only disagreed with their method. This is generally known, you can ask anybody. Therefore, with my loyalty, I venture to tell you that, as long as the people are dissatisfied, law and order cannot prevail. We might all be heading towards disaster.12 That is, some bureaucratic bourgeoisie were not yet ready to resort to force in 1912. The social characteristics of the conspirators were as significant as their number. Some high-ranking officers may have been sympathetic.13 It was mentioned at a recruitment lecture that there were many highly educated and high-ranking government officials who felt that a constitutional monarchy should replace the absolute monarchy.14 Prince Phitsanulok seemed to have some sympathy for the interests of the conspirators within the army. When teaching military cadets, he also added lectures on world history, including the world political system.15 These classes significantly influenced the political attitudes adopted by the conspirators (see pp. 168–169). The prince’s position was ambiguous. He may have chosen these topics out of a realisation that the absolute monarchy was an anomaly at the turn of the twentieth century and was bound to disappear, and, therefore, he had a responsibility to prepare his students for likely changes. He may have envisaged himself and aristocrats of a similar mind as leaders of change, and perceived the students to be a natural political base. He may have been primarily interested in acquiring political power in order to settle personal disputes; previous chapters have shown that the royal family was rent by not only ideological but also personal rivalries. In any event, it is not surprising that his stance as a teacher was interpreted by the officers, rightly or wrongly, as that of a liberal at heart and that he was perceived as supportive of the plan to overthrow the absolute monarchy. An assumption of aristocratic support was reflected in the suggestion, by core leaders, that one of the royal princes should be made president in the likelihood of the abolition of the monarchy.16 We cannot simply write that off as a ploy to seek legitimacy for a new regime. Such an element is

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undeniable, yet the respect that the army had for royal princes such as Prince Phitsanulok and Prince Ratburi was genuine. The ambiguities in Prince Phitsanulok’s position deepened in the aftermath of the failed coup when he took responsibility for rounding up the conspirators. Not surprisingly, their attitudes towards him changed and they became disillusioned with him. Prince Phitsanulok may have genuinely felt that it was his duty to protect absolutism, but it also seems that he believed in the necessity of a change to a limited monarchy and gave an interview to a newspaper to that effect. This perplexed many, even a British diplomat commented that it bordered on indelicacy.17 Prince Phitsanulok’s objectives in (sometimes) seeming to support the issues of political and ideological change are uncertain. The identities and interests of any other aristocratic sympathisers are obscure. But we do know the identities and proclaimed objectives of the core conspirators. Even though the conspirators included a few civilians, almost all belonged to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Some of them were officers in the navy; however, the overwhelming majorities were junior officers in the army. Twenty years later, in 1932, the number of the bourgeoisie outside the bureaucracy was big enough for the 1932 revolutionaries to be described as “a group of military officers, government officials, and civilians”. But this was not the case in 1912. Although King Vajiravudh was not the main issue in the conspiracy, he faced such deep animosities among subordinate levels of the officer corps because, as crown prince, he had undergone military training (the first Thai king to be so trained) which led to early speculation within government circles that as king he would favour the military rather than civilians.18 This must have raised hopes in the officer corps that they would be close to the king, and at the centre of political power. However, in practice, his relations with the army were always ambiguous. We have already seen that, when he was the crown prince, he tried to win influence in army circles by loaning his khon drama troupe to perform on the occasion of the opening of the Royal Cadet Academy’s new building. On this same occasion, he wrote in the programme explaining that he had decided to sponsor the performance because the officers belonged to his class of people, meaning the ruling class.19 In fact, many did not, and were most probably left feeling self-conscious about their family background. Soon after his ascension to the throne, it became obvious that he would rather build up his own paramilitary corps than rely upon the army. One of his first few acts as monarch was to detach himself from the Royal Guard Regiment, the first military organisation created by King Chulalongkorn to train the ruling class for service within the bureaucracy.20 Under King Chulalongkorn, the regiment became the most prestigious in the army and enjoyed a very close relationship with the monarch, acting as his bodyguard. However, King Vajiravudh changed its name, which had

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the symbolic effect of showing that the regiment was linked to his father only, and that unlike his father, he would not be its commander-in-chief. The post was given to his brother, Prince Phitsanulok. He went on to create a new bodyguard regiment, called the Palace Guard Regiment. Originally, the regiment was set up to protect his palace at Nakhon Srithammarat in the south. In private, officials explained that this was intended to place a military unit in an area which was free of any military presence, according to the secret treaty with the British (1896).21 Yet, the Palace Guard Regiment was soon moved to Bangkok and was given responsibilities that had previously belonged to the other regiments. The junior officers resented the establishment of the Wild Tiger Corps. As noted in Chapter 5, one of the responsibilities of the Wild Tiger Corps’ Royal Company was to give personal protection to the king, which the junior officers felt infringed upon their privileges and demonstrated the king’s distrust towards them. It seems likely that not only members of the Royal Guard Regiment, but the officer corps in general felt rejected by the king. An army officer told the conscripts that the king did not love the Royal Guard soldiers any more; he loved the Wild Tiger Corps alone.22 At recruitment meetings, the king’s behaviour towards his army was contrasted with that of the Emperor of Germany who reportedly spent one week in every month in German army barracks.23 Moreover, we have seen that, initially, army officers were not permitted to join the Wild Tiger Corps, which denied them the opportunity to be close to the king. A letter written by an army officer (after his arrest) to his superior asked why the king did not give any honour to the soldier.24 Another army officer told the investigating committee that his only memory of what Captain Thuayhan had said at a meeting was that they were to ask for a limited monarchy and that the soldiers should be given more honour.25 This particular officer seems to have been a hard-liner; he refused to give any other information. Therefore, it follows that he would only say what he considered to be legitimate. The incident of the fight between the army officers and the king’s pages and the subsequent floggings (discussed in Chapter 4, pages 123–124) demonstrated to many officers that the king had ceased to act as supreme patron in the traditional sense, and that they could no longer expect his protection. This left a very sour impression and was presented in the memoir by Net and Rien as the genesis of Kabot R.S.130.26 Yet, changes in how patronage was bestowed went beyond the vagaries of a single individual. The development of the absolutist system had affected the structural basis of rule, and as a consequence, these officers were the losers. In the traditional system, patron–client relationships had been legitimate and were the bases of social organisation; in the modern bureaucracy, they lost their legitimacy and eventually became a source of social injustice. Thus, the young officers might see Prince Phitsanulok as their patron but, in reality, there were only a limited amount of positions to which they could

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be promoted. He was inclined to promote any of those with whom he had personal contact. The family background of most army officers placed them at a disadvantage in the search for patrons among the bureaucratic elite, who came from the ruling class. However, due to their western-style education, they expected to be treated precisely like others with similar education. Under these circumstances, those who were unable to secure places in patron–client networks would inevitably feel lost and would be unlikely to advance satisfactorily in their careers. Although many of the conspirators had Chinese blood, they tended to distance themselves from the Chinese community. They were born in Siam and, because of their socialisation through education, they identified themselves more with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie than with the Chinese community. Rather than agitate for the well-being of the Chinese community, they worried about how far it posed a security problem as a result of harsh government treatment. An intelligence report by the government stated that they considered themselves to be Thai, and expressed strong dislike for Siew Hud Seng, a Kuomintang member then active in Siam. This aloofness from the Chinese identity explains why the conspirators made only references to events in Europe and none to the events in China which must have influenced their thinking. The core conspirators exploited the fact that many of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie were forced to cope without a patron in recruiting support. It was testified that Captain Thuayhan started one of his recruitment lectures by remarking that being in government service was difficult if one could not find any patron. No matter how educated one was, one would certainly fail to advance without a patron.27 The evidence suggests that, in the main, the impulse to revolt stemmed from a strong sense of anxiety among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie over their prospects. An item of correspondence presented as evidence in the trial demonstrated that they were preoccupied with their careers. A Khun Phasasrirat wrote to Lieutenant Chalo encouraging the latter to join in the conspiracy because he was young and had much to gain if it turned out to be successful, whereas the writer said that it was difficult for him since he was known to be antagonistic.28 And, perhaps to boost his respondent’s courage, he mentioned a dream in which he saw Chalo wearing a captain’s uniform.29 However, the Kabot R.S.130 cannot be evaluated entirely in terms of a revolt by a group who perceived themselves to be victimised. It expressed a real sense of indignation at the principle of patronage. This is shown by the fact that some of the conspirators were firmly established in fruitful relationships. Captain Thuayhan was client and family doctor to Prince Phitsanulok – and the prince was stunned to discover his role in the conspiracy. Another example was Lieutenant Man, who served in the Royal Guard Regiment and was personally supported by the king himself.30

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Thus, the favours given to members of the Palace Guard Regiment (at the expense of the Royal Guard Regiment) and to the Wild Tiger Corps were interpreted to mean that merit now counted for little, western-style education was disregarded and that officers could not hope to advance their careers. One officer complained that members of the Wild Tiger Corps seemed to get all good things whereas the soldiers, who sweated themselves nearly to death, received nothing.31 Another told the conscripts that the king refused to sign ten sanyabat (appointment documents for commissions) for officers on the grounds that there were too many, but he signed any number of Wild Tiger sanyabat.32 Perhaps one of the least offensive criticisms of the Wild Tiger Corps came from Sub-Lieutenant Charun, one of the core leaders: “I have to accept that the idea is good. But the time is not yet suitable for chat doei siang dang (nation-building through ballyhoo), . . . it wastes the country’s time and impoverishes the government.”33 The distance between junior officers and their nominal patron, the king, is exemplified by his failure to appreciate why the establishment of the Wild Tiger Corps was interpreted as a rejection, and why it had generated so much criticism.34 His incomprehension was shared by other members of the elite. A senior army officer summed up his evaluation of the core conspirators as those who were noi chai (feeling hurt because they did not get what they felt they were entitled to).35 The mutual incomprehension meant that the junior officers overreacted to every apparent slight. They were shaken by the sight of the king engaging in amateur theatricals as producer and actor. They were even further agitated by the creation of an amateur khone troupe by some ministers, presumably to please the king. They were not ready to see their respected bureaucratic elite demean themselves in the same manner as the king. Again King Vajiravudh was baffled at the furore generated by this scheme.36 The core conspirators originally intended to spread the conspiracy throughout the army. They planned to spend ten years recruiting other army officers and indoctrinating the conscripts under their command so that these soldiers would propagate the word among their families. These soldiers came from the peasantry, the majority class. According to the authors of the memoir, these conscripts would be taught lessons of general good: to believe in humanity (manutsayatham), earn their livings as good citizens, act rationally, reject superstition and have self-respect. They would also be taught about world affairs, geography, history and worthy legends (tamnan).37 How this programme might be applied to social revolution was not spelled out. Nevertheless, the R.S. 130 conspirators appealed to it as a support for their claim that they had attempted revolution rather than a coup. This original planning was abandoned. Rather than spending a decade in preparation, the conspirators decided to stage a coup at the ceremony

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of taking water for the oath of allegiance in April 1912. The change of plan can be explained both by King Vajiravudh’s character and lack of legitimacy when compared to his predecessor, and by the unexpected furore against the Wild Tiger Corps in the bureaucracy, and especially within the army. The opportunity was seized, and recruitment was massively increased. Between December 1911 and February 1912, eight meetings were held to recruit officers in Bangkok. By February, it was agreed that recruitment should be extended to army officers stationed outside Bangkok. This move proved to be fatal; it was an officer soon to be sent to the north who reported the conspiracy to the authorities.38 We now go on to see how the conspirators expressed these demands in their recruitment lectures.

The recruitment lecture The recruitment meetings held in Bangkok always started with Captain Thuayhan, or Mo Leng, or some other core leader lecturing a group of army officers on the importance of recruiting new members. The testimonies tell us that all lectures followed the content of a document seized from Captain Thuayhan’s house. The title of the document was “On Forms of Government: the Decline and Progress of a Country”.39 The framework of this analysis will be based on this key document. In addition, some core leaders also lectured on the same theme to the soldiers under their command in order to prepare them for the seditious act. The conspiratorial rhetoric is illustrated by the text of the basic lecture used to recruit, and the testimonies given by conspirators show what they remembered of what was said. An examination of these texts helps in analysing the issues raised by the conspirators. The main theme of the lecture was the merit and demerit of three forms of government: absolute monarchy, limited monarchy and republic. It argued that whether the country was progressing or declining depended upon its form of government, and this in turn determined whether or not the people enjoyed freedom (NA R6 L2/3): If any country knows how to govern by using just law and tradition which does not oppress the people, that country will have more progress and be more and more civilised. This is because all the people have freedom and there is no one to play the master who feels free to demean others. This is the case of countries in Europe and America. These countries used to have kings who were above the law and fully exercised absolute power in order to oppress the people as they pleased. But later on, when the people became more educated and intelligent they managed to get rid of the king’s wicked tradition and set up a new system of government. Some countries forced the king to be under law, some abolished the monarchy, that is to say they

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The 1912 revolt went as far as setting up a republic. Consequently, there are three types of government; the absolute monarchy, the limited monarchy, and the republic.

We now examine three main arguments pursued in the lecture. This discussion makes clear how far the conspirators were driven by their personal ambitions and frustrations with problems of securing patronage. The argument against favouritism The strongest attacks against absolutism were made with regard to favouritism. The king’s favouritism at court, his support for his Wild Tiger Corps, and the behaviour of its members, all came in for particular criticism. The criticism appears to reflect the contradictions between the traditional and the modern. Borrowed western concepts necessarily played an integral and central part in the new bureaucracy. At the same time, they were contradicted by the persistence of fundamental principles of the traditional social structure. The text touched on this problem in its discussion of different types of sycophants (NA R6 L2/3): there are two types of sycophants. The first type are those who directly serve the king, such as his pages. The second type are those who serve in the government but spend most of their time in pleasing their superior at the expense of their responsibility to the work. The first type was not given any further elaboration, yet the second type of sycophantic behaviour was considered to be unpatriotic (mai rak chat). This further supports the analysis made in the previous two chapters that the real target was favouritism in the bureaucracy rather than at the court (NA R6 L2/3): As for the other type, although they are appointed to work for the government, they spend all their time in being sycophantic. They do not care how much damage is done to the office work, they only want to be close to their master. How can rewards escape them? Soon enough they get windfalls and titles. However, those who fully occupy themselves with office work starve and they are even reprimanded for being lazy and not seeking to be in the company of their superior. Anyone can please [prachop] his superior, but making one happy does not contribute to the nation, or the country. If one makes the nation and the country progress, then the people who belong to the same nation will be altogether happy. Therefore, he who feels gratitude to the nation should avoid seeking his own advancement by pleasing his superior. He should only think of the way to contribute to the country.

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He simply wastes his time in unnecessary activities by pleasing his superior. It was not difficult to find evidence for the first type of sycophancy, favouritism at the court. A personal letter from King Vajiravudh to one of his favourites, Chaophraya Ramrakhop (at the time titled Cha Yong), on the occasion of the latter’s birthday, was passed on to the conspirators by a sympathetic official at the Ministry of the Palace. In the letter, the king expressed his appreciation for Cha Yong’s services and indicated that the amount of 100 changs (8,000 baht) was given as a birthday present.40 The letter was later surrendered to the authorities by the “traitor”. It was used to increase support for the conspirators. The leaders made a special effort to gather further information from the palace as soon as they had decided to take action to abolish the absolute monarchy.41 Evidence of favouritism within the bureaucracy tended to be circumstantial and was thus difficult to substantiate. The conspirators argued that merit was not sufficiently recognised in deciding promotions. They inferred this from knowledge of how favouritism operated at the palace. Their attitude was reflected by Phraya Wisut, the king’s guardian in Europe and the Minister of Education. Perhaps trusting his previous status as the king’s guardian, Wisut ventured to voice to the king an unsolicited opinion on what he gathered to be the conspirators’ rationale. He pointed to the people’s poverty as a result of the recession, and also due to discontent in the bureaucracy: As for government officials, they had endeavoured to be educated using much time and energy, but they did not feel they got anywhere. On the contrary, those who did not have any education, but only served as servants carrying this and that, appeared to be doing well; owning motor cars and big houses. This was the reason why they sought a constitution guaranteeing a limited monarchy or a republic.42 There were many other variations on the same theme, perhaps reflecting the envy of those fortunate enough to secure favour rather than any great national aspiration. Testimony given by an officer reported the following statement at a recruitment meeting: “We have to suffer so much these days, having to work very hard day and night and earning very little. But those who do little work make a lot of money.”43 The traitor reported another army officer attempting to recruit him by recounting his pain that Cha Yong had been awarded as much as 8,000 baht when he had contributed nothing to the government service, whereas he, the officer, had worked hard and been awarded nothing.44 Yet another army officer testified that a colleague had solicited his support with the words:

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The 1912 revolt The King only supports his own men. There are many people who played likay [Thai folk theatre] and see what happens to them now. They are given houses, land, and money. What do we get when we are exhausted to death with dust on our faces?45

This supports the point made in the previous chapter that King Vajiravudh’s favouritism, which was awarded to only a small group of government officials and was unlike that generally exercised in the bureaucracy, was attacked by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as a reflection of favouritism in general. Now, it was used to justify revolution. Accusations of bureaucratic favouritism and the desire to come to the king’s notice seem to have gone hand-in-hand. One is bound to suspect that “favouritism” was often the complaint of those who had failed to become favourites. Yet the fact that this complaint may have expressed envy rather than nationalistic idealism does not diminish its importance as a reflection of social instability, with all that means in terms of possibilities for advancement and the clash of values. The argument that absolutism was intrinsically vicious The recruitment lecture argued that absolute monarchy was the most vicious form of government because the king had full power and was above the law (NA R6 L2/3): he is capable of committing the most wicked crime, since there is no one who can stop him. He can oppress and molest the people for whatever reason. Innocent people can be flogged or killed or imprisoned at the king’s pleasure. The king can, with no limit, seize the people’s wealth and land or kill anyone as he pleases. For example, he can expel people from their land so that he can build his palace. It was not difficult for the lecturers to find examples to support these statements. As for the allegation of flogging, the public in general, and army officers in particular, remembered the relatively recent incident when Vajiravudh, as crown prince, had demanded that two army officers who had scuffled with his pages be flogged in public (as discussed in Chapter 4, pages 123–124). He had also threatened to give up his position if this punishment was not enforced. To their discomfort, King Chulalongkorn and his bureaucratic elite, who had largely adopted western practices and had stopped imposing traditional forms of punishment, were forced to concede.46 The complaints against land eviction were also likely to strike a chord. It was not uncommon for the owners of prime land in Bangkok to be subjected to a forced sale by the Privy Purse. This behaviour had been acceptable under the traditional system, when land ownership, at least in theory, rested ultimately with the king. The exposure of

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royal misdeeds is less interesting than the unequivocal espousal of bourgeoisie values of individual rights and private property. When he acceded to the throne, King Vajiravudh indicated that he would not restrain himself from punishing government officials who caused him displeasure. He would determine both the offence and the appropriate punishment. This was illustrated by the case of Luang Raksanat. The official took his wife away from a rehearsal for a play planned for the coronation ceremony in December 1911 so that she could tend to their sick baby. The king was deeply offended and Luang Raksanat was flogged thirty times and expelled from the bureaucracy. This incident was cited by the core leaders at their meeting as an example of the king exercising his absolute power in an unjust manner.47 The case of Phraya Narong, punished for criticising the Wild Tiger drill, provided a further example of a high-ranking official suffering severe punishment for behaviour which had nothing to do with his official function and was seen as an abuse of power by the king.48 Thus, the conspirators could take advantage of King Vajiravudh’s character to argue that the absolute monarchy was intrinsically vicious. The soldiers were also told that the king was capable of taking their lives.49 The argument that absolute monarchy disregarded the people’s interests The third main point argued by the conspirators was that the king aimed at fulfilling his personal pleasure and disregarded the people’s needs (NA R6 L2/3): He spends the country’s revenue for his personal use as well as those of his family and his servants. He can spend money on his sycophants as much as he likes. Therefore there is no money left to develop the country because the king has spent it on himself, his family, and the sycophants. An army officer told the conscripts that the king wanted the tax revenue for building up khone theatre. Furthermore, he granted all his pages’ requests. If they should need a motorcar, the king would buy it for them, and if he did not have enough money then he would extract it from the people.50 The king, indeed, appeared to the public to squander public revenue on his own amusements, giving money away, setting up a traditional dancing troop, spending on the Wild Tiger Corps. Almost all of these expenses were covered by the Privy Purse (established, as we have seen, by King Rama I from the profit of the royal Sino-Siamese junk trade). As Siam played an increasing role in the world economy, its capacity to earn revenue increased and the Privy Purse grew richer.51 The Privy Purse thus

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served as a mechanism for protecting royal economic interests and, perhaps more importantly, for designating state earnings as the private property of the throne. The text of the lecture argued that the absolute monarch was not entirely unconcerned whether the people and the country suffered, but he only gave priority to his own pleasure and his family. The text did not further elaborate on this point, but it was apparently developed in at least one lecture given to conscripts, with the aim of making them antagonistic towards the king. The lecturer asked his audience about how the trees in their orchards were taxed and the soldiers (who mostly came from peasant families) competed with each other to answer. This seemed to be the only issue which prompted the conscripts to relate their personal experiences of the regime. Other thorny issues, in the eyes of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, failed to draw many reactions from the conscripts. We can imagine them sitting in a state of stupor while their commander droned on and on complaining about the Wild Tiger Corps, slow promotions, low salaries (a private soldier was paid six baht a month and an officer sixty baht), the king’s expenditures on his pages and the lack of budget for the Ministry of Defence (among other issues).52 The text argued that the absolute monarchy inevitably led to the decline of the country. This explained why so many countries had changed their forms of government and consequently became more civilised. The example given was Japan, which had become as powerful as those countries in the West. The main reason for the decline of the absolute monarchy was explained in terms of the relationship between the king and the government officials (NA R6 L2/3): The system discourages good government officials to deter or obstruct the king from doing something bad. At the same time those who think only of their own happiness and do not feel gratitude to the nation will seek the opportunity to satisfy the king and to keep him happy.

The proposals for political changes After the conspiracy was discovered, Prince Phitsanulok reported to the king that he had talked with the army officers and that they seemed to have calmed down. The general attitude among the army officers then was that they had not aspired to a constitutional monarchy, and certainly not a republic. They had merely wanted to bring about a few changes such as the king giving audience to government officials at least twice a week, and a regular issue of sanyabat. Furthermore, that the king should give less emphasis to the Wild Tiger Corps because: “even the Wild Tiger themselves found the Corps’ activities to be tedious. Lastly, they complained that it was not suitable for aristocrats and ministers to be in the khone production.”53

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Two points arise here. First, given the circumstances, it is not to be expected that the arrested conspirators would willingly admit to their more radical demands. Second, if we suppose that these demands really did correspond to their real aims, it is clear that they were very narrowly conceived, relating only to access to the king and promotion. They suggested that the mass of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie would have happily accepted only piecemeal reforms. The political changes discussed during the recruitment meetings were certainly more liberal. Although the practical implications do not appear to have been discussed in any depth, and they cannot be said to constitute a revolutionary political programme, they did introduce topics which would become the demands of the revolution in 1932. Hence, they mark an important stage in the long-term development of Thai liberalism. Here, we examine proposals apparently calling for a limited monarchy, for a parliament and for a republic. The text of the recruitment lecture argued that the problem of favouritism would be dispelled if the country became a limited monarchy. Under this system, power would be transferred from the monarch to thi prachum (literally, a meeting). We cannot assume that the conspirators intended this to mean a parliament or even that they understood the concept of parliament. The text explained: The thi prachum will adequately award those who have contributed to the country. As for the sycophants, they will definitely receive neither title nor position for giving personal service and not contributing anything to the nation. This means the khone dancers and those who empty garbage bins in the royal palace will not have a chance to become nobles. Once sycophantic behaviour ceases to yield rewards, everybody will be conscientious in helping the country and the nation to progress. The country’s revenues will be enough for its development because the thi prachum will not allow anyone to continue wasting [resources]. The people will be happy because they have freedom and will rid themselves of all oppression.54 The text referred to other countries which had already abolished absolute monarchies and become limited monarchies. Britain was mentioned as the first country to have done so and consequently had developed to the point of becoming a superpower, owning colonies all over the world. Other countries had followed suit, including Asian powers such as Turkey, Japan and China. The writers claimed that Siam was the only country in Asia which still had a barbaric form of government.55 In one lecture given to the private soldiers, a limited monarchy was portrayed as the system in which a monarch could do nothing on his own but had to consult with government officials; and in a presidency, the president shared power with government officials.56

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An army officer who testified on his role in the conspiracy claimed that he had joined the conspiracy in order to ask the government to give the opportunity to some khon chan tam [lower class people] who were intelligent enough to be able to have voice in the administration so that it might be beneficial to the country.57 However, there is no evidence to suggest that the conspirators intended to go so far as turning political power over to an electorate, and it was probably deliberate that the lecture text did not elaborate on this point. By this time, the word “parliament” (transliterated) had been introduced into Siam and was so widely used that Prince Vajiravudh wrote an article to denounce it.58 Perhaps the lecturer was merely presenting what he considered to be an accurate Thai translation. Instead, the notion of change was expressed vaguely, in terms of the country adopting a constitution. The conspirators did make some remarks which might be construed as referring to parliamentarianism. An army officer testified that he had joined the conspiracy because he wanted to be regarded as one of those who had asked for thi prachum ratsadon (the people’s meeting).59 Another told the soldiers under his command that, in a limited monarchy, the king had to consult the people all over the country before he could do anything.60 Yet, these references are too vague to allow us to conclude that the conspirators wanted to introduce a parliamentary system. Although some individual members might have sympathised with parliamentarian ideas, in general they did not express these feelings explicitly. A plausible explanation is that the conspirators did not want to commit themselves to transfer political power to an electorate. They referred to the people only very generally, in the sense of the mass, and their attitude scarcely differed from that of the ruling elite, who considered the people ignorant and uneducated. By implication, the people were unfit to govern themselves. A conspirator told the investigating committee that, when it was argued that there should be a change to a republican form of government, he disagreed because he felt that the country was full of ignorant and cowardly people.61 Similarly, another army officer told the committee that he also believed that such a radical change was yet not possible, because the people were still backward and did not know anything about government. Still another was reported to have said “the people in our country Siam still know very little about civilisation and are very ignorant”.62 The conspirators’ attitude towards the people differed from that of the authorities only in that they believed that the lack of popular political sophistication was not natural, but resulted from government policy.63 So, when a core leader told a clandestine meeting that changes in the form of government would allow khon chan tam to participate in the administration, he was not proposing the participation of ordinary people.

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Khon chan tam here meant those who were already in the bureaucracy but were not part of the ruling class. That is, the term referred to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie from commoner stock. Thus, the proposal to change from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy reflected the needs of the new social group who had just become part of the administration and who were anxious that their class interests should be protected. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie were struggling to become an integral part of the decision-making process, but we have no textual evidence that they had yet worked out how that system should operate. The third alternative explored by some conspirators was republicanism. A republic was presented by Captain Thuayhan in the lecture text as most desirable because “the people will all become members of the same trakun”.64 The literal meaning of trakun is “family”, or lineage, but here the term was apparently intended to mean a “social class”. This interpretation is supported by the following statement, in which the speaker discussed other countries which had different forms of government (NA R6 L2/3): The people are divided into many trakun. The highest is royalty, next comes the noble trakun. The others are commoner trakun and, lowest of all, the trakun of servants and slaves. To sum up, the king has raised his own people to the highest class [chan] as divine beings, and placed the people into the lower class as though they are animals. And even those who have been raised to the khunnang [noble] status are simply the king’s servants and slaves. The trakun division of people into high and low classes denies justices to the people and allows those who belong to the higher class to be arrogant and condescending to the lower class and to take liberties to oppress them. It was pointed out that republican government abolished divisions between high and low classes (NA R6 L2/3): Everybody belongs to the same class and has freedom. Since nobody belongs to high or low classes, contempt and oppression disappear, and nobody is a slave or master as in the other forms of government. Therefore, everybody wants to see the change to a republic. At the moment most countries, both big and small, all over the world, have already been transformed into republics. Examples in Europe include countries such as France, Portugal, and more. France started this form of government before any other country, and Portugal has had it since the last century. At the moment serious fights and killings are occurring in China with the objective of changing to a republican government. The author of the lecture text made clear his preference for a republic over a limited monarchy. Some other key leaders shared his opinion. In

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order to win support for such a radical idea, they acted as devil’s advocates, some of them arguing for a limited monarchy. The testimonies tell us that there were lively debates on the issue, and some of those who attended the meeting expressed concern that if the monarchy were abolished chaos might follow.65 Those who advocated a republic appeared to have more convincing arguments, because whenever a vote was taken they always won.66 There is rather a large step from advocating the overthrow or abdication of an individual king and advocating a republic. In any case, republicanism was not really so far-fetched then, especially given events in China. Those who supported the concept of republicanism were reported to be mostly of Chinese blood.67 This explains why the main argument for a republic was the abolition of social class. We have already seen that the original recruitment policy adopted at the Royal Cadet Academy meant that most army officers were of commoner background. However, they were part of a bureaucratic system which was still very class-oriented and which offered little scope for those of Chinese descent and of petty bourgeoisie background. Pages 128–129 above showed the king’s classconsciousness; and after the 1912 conspiracy he did not hesitate to show his contempt for low-born officers. Some conspirators attempted to rally sympathy from the common soldiers through appeals to class. The conscripts were told by one officer that once the republic was established everyone would be a citizen of the same class and honorific titles would be used only in office hours.68 Although class divisions in the absolutist state were sometimes condemned, we cannot conclude that class antagonism was a central element in the conspiracy. At most, it seems that the attitude of the modern bureaucrats towards the aristocrats was ambivalent, as we saw in our discussion of Prince Phitsanulok’s role (pp. 156–157). On one hand, there was an awareness that aristocratic domination of the bureaucracy worked to their disadvantage in the long run, and some commoner officials had firsthand experience of autocratic idiosyncrasies and whims. On the other hand, they looked up to these aristocrats because of their birth, educational qualifications and social positions. Furthermore, we have seen that in many professions there were strong personal ties between the bureaucratic elite and their subordinates because of the tutelary relationship between them, in which the latter acquired both professional skills and also knowledge of the world. When the absolute monarchy was deposed in 1932, class antagonism was much fiercer. This can be seen in the 1932 proclamation of the People’s Party, in which the aristocrats were savagely denounced.69 The significant differences were that, by 1932, the aristocracy had succeeded in regaining their political pre-eminence at the expense of the monarch. By then, it appears that in any dispute, the aristocracy always won out over other social classes. Moreover, the struggle for financial resources was

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fiercer, particularly over control of the army budget. Consequently, the resentment of those who felt mistreated was directed overwhelmingly against the aristocratic class. In sum, the proposals made by the 1912 conspirators were ill-defined and vague. They reflect political inexperience, and perhaps a lack of genuine commitment to radical change. However, we should not consider their political ideas simply as window-dressing for a bid to improve their material prospects. The next section examines their appeals to the army and national interests in greater detail, and demonstrates some attachment to principle.

The expression of interests The evidence presented thus far suggests that the conspirators were primarily motivated by their personal and group interests. Indeed, they were well aware that their attempts to recruit conscripts might be interpreted as self-serving, and many private soldiers remembered an officer’s categorical denial of personal interest.70 Instead, the call for a coup was justified partly in terms of corporate army interests and mostly in the name of national interest or nationalism. Now we will examine the testimonies to see how these interests were expressed. First, we deal with perceptions of the army’s corporate interests, and then of national interests. The conspirators directly linked the king’s lavish expenditure on his personal pursuit of pleasure with the lack of development in the army and the low salaries paid to soldiers. It was pointed out that the money the king spent on his pages could otherwise have been diverted to the Ministry of Defence for the army.71 These general criticisms were simplistic, but one comment touched on the issue of the civil list – which amounted to 15 per cent of the annual budget – and suggested that it could be more constructively spent: “Whatever his pages want he will sign the approval. Even he himself has a salary of 700,000 baht. The money would be more constructively spent on buying guns and gunboats in case of war.”72 The Wild Tiger Corps provided further evidence of infringement upon the army’s corporate interests, and was also seen to compete for national resources. An army officer told his soldiers that the king did not invest in weaponry for the military, but spent only on the Wild Tiger Corps.73 It is worth noting here that another study of the R.S.130 conspiracy has argued that the cut in the army’s budget was one of the main causes of the conspiracy.74 It is true that the cut did constrain the army. The conspirators explained the shortage of funds by pointing to the resourcing of the Wild Tiger Corps. In fact, the Corps was essentially funded by the Privy Purse; nevertheless, the accusation demonstrates the mood of the junior officers. The Wild Tigers were also perceived to infringe upon army corporate interests because they were seen to play at being soldiers. A conspirator

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asked his audience at a meeting whether the Wild Tigers would be able to perform as soldiers in time of war. To quote one officer: I cannot see any advantage to the Wild Tigers. If a war should break out will the Wild Tiger soldiers be able to fight? Not at all. It [the responsibility] will have to be ours.75 We now turn to how the conspirators captured the language of the age, that of nationalism, to justify the coup. We have already seen from the lecture notes that the basic argument advanced by the conspirators for the abolition of the absolute monarchy was the backwardness of the country. So, like King Chulalongkorn, the conspirators called for changes in the name of progress. To quote Rian and Net, the authors of the memoir: “The most important reason for the revolution stems from the desire that the country should join the era of general progress which is going on throughout the world.”76 What did they mean by progress? They seemed to share Thianwan’s broad meaning of being westernised. Indeed, westernisation was an integral part of Thai liberal nationalism. And this was opposed to King Vajiravudh’s official nationalism, which denounced westernisation (discussed in Chapter 5). A senior army officer observed that, apart from officers who had Chinese blood, those who joined the conspiracy seemed to be ko people. (Ko means fashionable, and the adjective was used here in the sense of being westernised.) An army officer testified that he was approached by a friend who asked if he wanted to be a modern man (and so, by implication, join the conspiracy), or an old-fashioned man.77 That the conspirators were western-oriented could be seen in some modern symbols concerning the conspiracy. At the ceremony of the oath of allegiance to the movement, the traitor who reported the conspiracy to the authorities was struck by the fact that, instead of asking, in the traditional Thai manner, for the spirits to break their necks if the oath was not observed, the conspirators shared a drink which had a bullet in it.78 Compared to an appeal to spirits, the symbolism of the bullet was secular and western, and thus the ceremony conveyed modern imagery. In so far as the conspirators spoke for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the new social group was demanding political changes in the name of westernisation. How progress could be achieved via the abolition of the absolute monarchy was explained by Sub-Lieutenant Rian, who bravely spoke his mind to the investigating committee. His testimony is worth quoting at length: The reason we form our group was to ask the government to open up opportunities for the khon chan tam [lower-class people] to have some voice in the administration so that low ranking government officials and the people in our country would become informed and able to understand the country’s political system and to be more nationalistic.

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If that came about, our country would be as developed and powerful as the major powers. I have compared our country with Japan, which is no larger in size. I think that the reason Japan became so powerful, to the puzzlement of other major powers, was because its government officials and people are very intelligent in understanding what was going on in the country. Therefore, they are nationalistic and contribute to the country to the best of their energies, and consequently their country have progressed quickly. If our government officials and people understand what is happening in the country, they will be more nationalistic and will willingly contribute to the country, and our country will soon become as developed as the major powers. The fact that we have formed a group does not mean that we intend to harm the King or the nation. Neither do we want to seek personal gains. We only want to contribute to the country’s progress. I am Thai, therefore I aim at the progress of the Thai nation, and to seek power for the Thai nation so that it is not humiliated or oppressed by other nations.79 The last sentence captures two elements of Thai liberal nationalism: the need for progress and a response to threats from western powers. This notion of nationalism was, thus, not much different from King Vajiravudh’s official version, which was also expressed in the name of progress and the need to fend off external threats. However, the conspirators argued that King Vajiravudh’s personal behaviour posed a threat to national security. In the quotation above, nationalism is expressed in two ways. On one hand, the officer exploited the concept of nationalism to justify a seditious act. On the other hand, he argued that the Thai people needed to be more nationalistic, and they could develop this characteristic by participating more fully in the political system. Notwithstanding its confusion, the passage makes clear the success of absolutism in establishing the nation as the centre of loyalty. This success is also exemplified by the extent to which the conscripts had internalised the essentials of the official form of nationalism which was systematically inculcated in their textbooks.80 When asked at recruiting lectures what they considered to be important in their lives, they typically answered “nation, religion, native land, parents and king”. On one occasion, they were quizzed on the Wild Tiger Corps motto, “It is better to lose life than honour”. They answered: one must be true to the king, the nation and the country in every way and not betray them at any time. Losing life means willingness to sacrifice life to fight against external enemies who intend to harm the king, the nation and the country.81 It was testified that in response to this answer the lecturer fell silent for a while. After the conspirators’ standard exposition of the three forms of

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government, the conscripts were asked which was most desirable; they answered in favour of the absolute monarchy.82 One wonders whether the lecturer’s suggestion that, in a republic, an old farmer picked from the rice field might become president influenced their answer. Also, when asked where their salaries came from they initially answered “the king”. The officer must have shown that the answer was not satisfactory, and “the government” was suggested.83 The conscripts’ answers suggested that there was some truth in the opinion of one of the conspirators, a medical doctor, that a republic was not desirable on the grounds that the people still paid high respect to the king.84 Thus, we can conclude that the state was very successful in inculcating official nationalism among the conscripts who came from the lowest stratum of society. Among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the state’s success was only partial. Undoubtedly, the phrase rak chat (being nationalistic) was commonly used and considered a virtue. One army officer informed the investigating committee that he was told by another officer that if he was rak chat, he should attend a recruitment meeting.85 As was reported in Chapter 5, the king was officially identified with the nation as a means of maintaining loyalty in the absolutist state. When the bureaucratic bourgeoisie perceived that their interests lay in the abolition of absolutism, they began to leave behind their earlier acceptance of official nationalism. Their loyalty was transferred from the king and the nation to the nation only, and it was in the name of the nation that they began to demand changes in the political system. An example of how the bureaucratic bourgeoisie perceived that their personal interests corresponded with those of the nation is provided by the letter from Khun Phasasrirat in which he urged his friend to join the conspiracy but, not to be too deeply involved with it because: keeping two options open is the way to serve both personal and public interests. If we were to act only for personal interests then we should not get involved. We must make the prachumchon [community, or society] our prime concern.86 However, we need to establish to what extent the transfer of loyalty was complete. Although the bureaucratic bourgeoisie perceived that it was in their interests to distinguish between monarch and nation, they found it difficult to rid themselves of loyalty to the king in the traditional sense. This traditional idea of loyalty rested on the personal relationship between the monarch and nobility. The nobility was supposed to be loyal to the monarch both because he provided their livelihood and because some monarchs had made very obvious contributions to the well-being of the country. We saw in Chapter 3 that, in modern nationalism, the state tried to blend the new entity, the nation, to the old bonding between the king and the people by emphasising King Chulalongkorn’s modernisation.

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This fitted snugly with the traditional role of the king, and the people’s loyalty was demanded because of his contributions. The sense of gratitude that the people felt for the monarchy in general, and in particular for King Chulalongkorn, was strong and genuine. Yet, even before his death, it had become obvious to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that absolutism obstructed their participation in the political process, and had to be discredited. Thus, the movement to abolish the absolute monarchy started in King Chulalongkorn’s reign. The conspirators’ original plan to spend ten years in indoctrination reflected their initial perception of the difficulty in persuading sufficient numbers of people to see the kingship as an obstruction to progress. Therefore, transference of loyalty from the king to the nation was generated by institutional rather than personal factors. This was well expressed in the letter from an army officer to his superior after his arrest, in which he asked if a person who loved the nation and the country was better than those who loved an unjust king.87 In their lectures to the conscripts, the conspirators were kept busy trying to disentangle the notions of monarchy and nation. The lecturer typically told the conscripts that soldiers’ salaries did not come from the king but from the government, which in turn, was financed by the people who paid taxes on such things as housing and land. They were also taught that their uniforms were similarly paid for by the people. However, because the class interests of these conscripts differed radically from those of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, it is difficult to suppose that the officers were entirely successful in propagating their point of view. The army officers genuinely gave their loyalty to the nation, a fact that cannot be merely treated as a rationale for the coup. An officer testified that the reason he went along with the other conspirators was because he considered himself to be paid by the people, and if the people were poor, then he asked where the government could find the money to pay their salaries.88 The fact that the conspirators gave their loyalty to the nation rather than the king is nowhere better illustrated than by their motto: “It is better to lose one’s life than one’s nation.”89 This paraphrased the motto of the Wild Tiger Corps; “It is better to lose life than honour,” but the meaning was diametrically opposed. This thesis has already defined the Corps’ concept of honour as adherence to the pledge to be loyal to the king, whereas the conspiracy symbolised the transference of loyalty to the nation. This transference is of great importance in understanding liberal nationalism; and the linguistic similarity of the two mottoes should not be interpreted to indicate conceptual similarity, as Vella and Vella suggest.90 How far the conspirators distinguished between monarchy and nation, and how far they had transferred their loyalty to the nation, is demonstrated by their attitudes towards King Vajiravudh. He was criticised for both personal and institutional reasons. For the latter, he represented an institution for which they had increasingly less sympathy. Some complaints

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suggested that his personal behaviour constituted the main reason for wishing to abolish the absolute monarchy. His public image as a swindler of state revenue, his close association with unsuitable company, his circle’s open pursuit of pleasures unfitting to the role of a monarch, and the unpopularity of the Wild Tiger Corps presented the conspirators with a more generous public relations gift than they could have hoped for. His behaviour was portrayed as a threat to national interests. One lecturer argued that the king’s behaviour led foreigners to belittle Siam to the point that they might decide to invade.91 Another argued that it was not difficult to find a king, because anybody could do the job. But a country was less easy to create; once it fell into foreign hands, they would all become slaves.92 Yet, there is also evidence to support the suggestion that criticisms made against the king were motivated by problems associated with absolutism. A confiscated document, listing the king’s vices, mentioned his building palaces and chophouses, keeping many wives (which required considerable money), using the people’s labour for building roads and pavilions, favouring sycophants, using palace laws to punish those who were innocent and keeping many servants.93 It is clear that not all items on this list accurately reflected King Vajiravudh’s behaviour, and some could be applied to King Chulalongkorn. However, the recruitment lectures reserved these criticisms for the present King, perhaps because the conspirators appreciated the extent to which the people gave their loyalty to his predecessor. The memoir reports that the conspirators felt gratitude to King Chulalongkorn for what he had done for the country. In 1932, when absolutism was abolished, the existence of a king was no longer perceived to obstruct the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This explains why, after the absolute monarchy had been the target of so much criticism, the new military regime turned around to adopt King Vajiravudh’s ideology in order to support their regime after their failure to introduce popular democracy. This should not surprise us; King Vajiravudh’s official nationalism nicely incorporated both the old and the new symbols of monarchy and nation.94 By 1912, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie had not yet developed to the extent that they had made themselves felt by the authorities as a major social force, capable of staging a challenge to the regime. At best, this social group was perceived by the bureaucratic elite to conveniently provide them with the justification to demand such change as they needed from the king. The noble officials were taken by surprise when the officers’ dissatisfaction was sufficiently strong to lead them towards rebellion and the use of force. Among the elite, King Vajiravudh was unaware that a major social force was in the making. Even when the conspiracy was exposed, he still felt that he could fight against the liberal nationalism, expressed in the demand for a constitution, by waging ideological warfare through the Wild

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Tigers and his journalism (as we saw in Chapter 5). Throughout his reign, the king refused to change the treatment of his entourage. This was confirmed in a letter he wrote to Prince Phitsanulok after the conspiracy, stating in justification that the courtiers usually received very low salaries, in comparison to ministry officials, and in particular to army officers. Since he could not reward his courtiers with money, they should instead be rewarded with titles. King Vajiravudh argued that, by doing so, he only followed an old tradition, and that in general the status and privileges enjoyed by the courtiers should not be compared with those enjoyed by other officials.95 However, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie were unconvinced. And as the king continued to support his courtiers, the issue became increasingly contentious within the bureaucracy throughout the 1920s. When King Prajathipok succeeded King Vajiravudh in 1925, he conceded that the monarchy was then at its lowest point. The issue of favouritism had contributed significantly to the erosion of the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy. One only had to open a newspaper to see that this issue earned the most damning criticism, and the word prachob (sycophantic) was one of the most commonly seen. Among measures for restoring monarchical legitimacy, King Prajathipok contemplated adopting the fascist system of education in order to guide popular thinking. The scheme was dismissed on the grounds that it was too late to introduce such a time-consuming measure as indoctrination through the educational system.96 Instead, the regime chose to concentrate power in the hands of few aristocrats who constituted the bureaucratic elite. This defence turned out to be ultimately futile. When, in a desperate final bid, King Prajathipok suggested voluntarily abolishing the absolute monarchy and adopting a constitutional monarchy, this same group of aristocrats blocked the proposal.97 From that moment onwards, absolutism was doomed. The issue of royal favouritism in the bureaucracy increasingly affected the attitudes of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as their numbers grew. Most scholars have focused on budget cuts and redundancies among government officials in order to explain the 1932 coup. However, it is argued here that contradictions within absolutism played a much more fundamental role. This chapter has analysed the attitudes and interests of the 1912 conspirators, both as indicated by their social attributes and as expressed in the recruitment lectures. At a superficial level, the data suggests that they too were primarily interested in forcing through limited reforms by their sense of injustice and need to build successful careers, and perceived that only drastic measures would suffice. However, we should not overlook the deeper ambiguities. They were in advance of many of their Thai contemporaries in that they attempted to distinguish between loyalty to the monarch and loyalty to the nation, and they chose the latter. They

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formed a vanguard of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which, over the succeeding decades, would develop further. A Thai scholar, Lae, has shown that, by 1932, a new type of bureaucrat had emerged, and played a crucial role in piloting the course of change.98 In this respect, then, the 1912 conspiracy needs to be treated as an indication of the problems rooted in the structure of the society, for which King Vajiravudh could not be entirely blamed. When King Chulalongkorn introduced a western system of education to Siam he had also planted the seed of absolutism’s destruction, and his successor was unable to uproot the growth. King Vajiravudh’s mistakes hastened the demise of the absolute monarchy, but in the long term, its eventual demise was probably inevitable.

Conclusion

This book has examined the transformation of the Thai state and society from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. This period saw the emergence of an absolutist state under King Chulalongkorn, which has been defined here as a centralised state with a modern bureaucracy designed to give the monarch direct access to the population and national resources. Before this time the Thai state had been anything but absolute, and the concept of absolutism can only be applied to the Thai state from the late nineteenth century to 1932. Even then, the term cannot be taken literally. Absolutism typified only the initial state in the long-term process of centralisation, and not the culminating years. In the Thai absolutist state, the monarch, armed with a modern bureaucracy, increasingly made claims on sovereignty, and the term does not reflect his real power, which was by no means all-encompassing. I have studied the Thai state and society from the formation of the Ayudhyan state in the mid-fourteenth century up to the last reign of the pre-modern state in the mid-nineteenth century. It demonstrates how Siam’s interactions with various capitalist world-economies were significantly responsible for social and state development. In other words, I have argued that world-economies moved Thai history in the pre-modern period. In terms of state formation, they were responsible for the rise of the Ayudhyan state in the mid-fourteenth century. However, it remained a pre-modern state or a “patrimonial state” until Siam’s economy was linked with the European world-economy in the nineteenth century. Therefore, I disagree with Reid’s argument that the “Age of Commerce” turned Southeast Asian states, including Siam, into absolutist states in the fifteenth century.1 It is true that during this period the Ayudhyan state became more consolidated with the emergence of the central bureaucracy. However, this bureaucracy was disqualified from being a mechanism of an absolutist state on two counts. First, its parameter was restricted to the central area where the king’s power was effectively exercised. Elsewhere, regional centres of power, or muang, had their own bureaucracy replicating the centre at Ayudhya. This means the centre’s power was limited and the state could not exercise direct control over all

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areas claimed to belong to Siam.2 As such it fits into Wolters’ description of “mandala states”.3 Second, its ruling class had yet to be salaried, an important criteria of an absolutist state which theoretically guaranteed that they would act in the interest of the monarch and did not live off their positions in the bureaucracy, a major characteristic of feudal and patrimonial states. In this book I have shown that it was Siam’s contacts with the European world-economy, led by Britain, that provided necessary conditions for the emergence of absolutism. They included a sufficient number of the populace being involved with the world economy to constitute an adequate basis for taxation. Another important factor was the determination of the monarch to exploit opportunities offered by the world economy in order to rise above the power of the great nobles; and this was done in Siam not by wars, but by the seizure of control over tax revenues. I have shown that, at first, Siam’s interaction with the world economy occurred with its conclusion of the Bowring Treaty with the British. This triggered an even stronger trend of patrimonialism whereby the great nobles appropriated most of the newly created resources from the monarch. The economic requirements of the world economy, and the king’s lack of power, set the stage for a major transformation – into an absolutist state. In this respect my book differs from most scholars whose works are concerned about the transformation of the Thai state. In general, they attributed the transformation of the Thai state to either external or internal factors.4 Instead, my book looks at the interaction between the world economy and internal agents.5 I have identified those agents to be a group of modern elite from the ruling class rather than the king. However, it was the second generation of the Thai monarch who was determined to turn new economic opportunities to his advantage. The second major argument in this book is that the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932 was caused by inherent structural weaknesses of absolutism. I deliberately end my study in 1912, the year when the first challenge to absolute monarchy was staged. In so doing the economic recession in the 1930s, and other related factors could be clearly seen as precipitating rather than inducing the fall of absolutism. As in the case of the rise of the modern state, I argue here that the Thai case should be seen in the context of Southeast Asia, and not treated as unique. Modern education was introduced in all countries linked with the European world-economy. Hence, the rise of the new social class, comprising of members of the old elite and those outside the ruling class. This is because attempts by authorities, foreign as well as native, to keep access to modern education exclusively to the ruling class failed. Everywhere new men flooded the education system and, subsequently, the modern bureaucracy. Although coming from different social backgrounds, the modern group

Conclusion 181 of Southeast-Asian bourgeoisie formed a distinct social class with a new culture that was cosmopolitan, western, modern and meritocratic. Being the first and second generation children of the great social transformation, their expectations from the evolving political structure were naturally high. When the aspirations were not matched by reality, because the top echelon of the modern bureaucracy was dominated either by members of the colonial powers or, in the case of the Thai state, by members of royalty, dissatisfaction multiplied. The source of dissatisfaction also came from clashes of imbedded old social values with modern ones, which were part and parcel of the modern education system.6 They then turned to the modern ideology of nationalism, the product of the time and, in the case of Siam, the creation of the monarchy to provide an ideological basis for Siam’s involvement in the world economy as well as the newly built absolutism. In the name of “nation” they sought to fulfil their demands for political change in institutional systems borrowed from the West, which promised wider political participation in the political process. As we have seen, the Thai case demonstrates a very early expression of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. However, it involved the very top echelon of the Siamese elite who were the first generation of modern bureaucrats. They perceived the absolutist state, which was in the process of being created, to be detrimental to their interests. They exploited the perceived threat of imperialism as a pretext for claiming an enhanced role for themselves. Their activities demonstrate the genesis of liberal nationalism among members of the elite who were seeking better roles for themselves in changing the political structure. They definitely did not represent the official state ideology. However, they shared a motive similar to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the next generation.7 From the argument above, it can be seen that I argue against another conventional wisdom that states that Thailand did not experience a nationalist movement as in other Southeast-Asian states. We have seen in Chapter 6 that agitation among young army officers was expressed in the name of nationalism in a similar way to other urban-based nationalist movements in the region. However, the difference lies in that fact that, in Siam, popular movements did not participate in this urban nationalist movement as in the Philippines, Burma or Vietnam. This relative lack of popular participation in Siam arose from the way in which the country was integrated into the world economy. As we have seen, Siam was a late-comer as a producer for the world rice market, but this is not the main reason. With two other major rice growers, Burma and Vietnam, one sees the capitalist development of rice production itself. There developed a large-scale land clearance and institutionalised credit system which consequently led to complex social stratification of the landowning class, big and small peasant holders and labourers, as well as money lenders.8 The social dislocations could not withstand the world

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recession in the 1930s and popular movements heightened protests against authorities, or colonial powers. In the Thai case, it appeared initially as though the Thai state was following a similar pattern of comprehensive integration into the world economy. A major irrigation project in the Rangsit area, which was developed by a private company belonging to a political ally of the king, was launched in the late nineteenth century. However, King Chulalongkorn did not approve other projects and this left Thailand to pursue the path of development similar to that of France, where small peasant holders were seen as the backbone of the French absolutist state. In the case of France, this was meant to keep the peasantry as the basis of taxation. It is not certain that King Chulalongkorn entertained a similar motive, but judging from his earlier bitter fights with the great nobles, it is unlikely that he would welcome the development of a landowning class that might undermine his power in the long run. The last question is how far the fall of the Thai absolutist state fits into the existing literature on social revolutions, especially works by Theda Skocpol and Barrington Moore.9 At first glance it appears that Thailand does not fit into the theoretical framework since it did not experience a social revolution as in other societies studied by Skocpol or the transformation from agrarian to industrial society as analysed by Moore. However, at the core of social revolutions was the fall of the ancient regime, of which absolutism predominated. In this respect, the fall of Thai absolutism could fit into the debates. What is missing in the Thai case is the capitalist development, which in other societies precipitated social revolutions or major transformations. My comparative study of the English and the French revolutions shows that, in both cases, there existed inherent contradictions within their absolutism. They arose from the way in which allies had to be found and certain compromises had to be made by the king who intended to create an absolutist state. The Tudor monarchy found their allies in the gentry who were allowed to expand their landholdings from the sale of the church’s lands at a bargain price. The landowning class was the main force in parliament fighting to curb the power of the king. The French monarch was engaged in a long process of creating a modern bureaucracy from the bourgeoisie who, sooner or later, developed their own vested interests which differed from those of the monarch. The need to raise revenues for war also forced the monarchy into selling positions in the bureaucracy which, in the long run, undermined the state’s ability to raise revenue. I have also found that the capitalist development of these two societies also differed. England was far more advanced in agrarian and commercial capitalism, and its “glorious revolution” was an outcome of conflicts between the king and the capitalist class. In France, the revolution was started by the king’s bureaucrats who tried to block an attempt to reform, which meant the end of the noble class’s privileges. Only after the revolu-

Conclusion 183 tion began did other groups openly oppose the ancient regime. In may cases their dissatisfactions stemmed from involvement with capitalism.10 The above study leads me to conclude that the inherent weakness of Thai absolutism, as found in other absolutist systems, were responsible for its failure in Siam. Social conflicts arising from the spread of capitalism, which led to social revolutions in France and England, were absent in Siam. The lack of popular participation in the 1932 revolution in Siam was due to the way in which the main production force was outside the capitalist system. Thus, although Thai absolutism was created in relation to the world economy, it simply fell on its own accord.

Notes

Introduction 1 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in Bringing the State Back, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 169–191. 2 For a representation of such a view, see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades 1932–1957 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 8–9. 3 For the way in which this modern plot in Thai history was created, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of The Geo-body of a Nation (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1994), pp. 140–163. 4 Benedict Anderson, “Studies of Thai Studies”, in The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History and Political Science, Elizer B. Ayalm (ed.). Paper in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 54 (Athens: Ohio University Centre of International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1978). 5 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, p. 172. 6 Frank Perlin, “State Formation Reconsidered Part Two”, Modern Asian Studies 19:3 (1985), 415–480. 7 Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, Wiwatthankan rat aungkrit lae faranfset nai krasae setthakit lok [The English and French State Transformation in the World Economy] (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 2002), chapters 2 and 3. 8 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, p. 172. 9 Ibid., p. 173. 10 A.L. Morton, A People’s History of England (London: Laurence & Wishart, 1992), p. 88. 11 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World (London: Collins, 1984), p. 379. 12 Note the difference between a world-economy and the world economy, the latter means the way in which the European world-economy led by London incorporated other world-economies into its sphere. 13 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World, pp. 21–45. 14 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1993). 15 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Orlando, Academic Press, Inc., 1974). 16 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the

Notes

17 18 19 20 21 22

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Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 105, 254. Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 33–50. Ibid., p. 44. David Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 159. Peter A. Coclanis, “Southeast Asia’s Incorporation into the World Rice Market: A Revisionist View”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XXIV:2 (1993), 255–260. Ibid., pp. 260–261. Thongchai Winichakul, “The Quest for ‘Siwilai’: A Geographical Discourse of Civilisational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam”, Journal of Asian Studies 59:3 (August 2000), 529.

1 The Siamese state, society and the world-economies before absolutism 1

The literal meaning of the term is field power. It might have originally been associated with the amount of land and the number of people one had beneath one’s control. However, it later had a social meaning of specifying everyone’s relative position, involving rights and responsibility in the society. See Prince Damrong, Laksana kanpokkhrong prathet sayam tae boran [Ancient Administration of Siam] (Bangkok, 1959), p.13, and David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984) p. 73. For the study of the sakdina state, see Seksan Prasertkul, “The Transformation of the Thai State and Economic Change (1855–1945)” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1989); and Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994). 2 This is the position of the political economy group at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. For a representative view of the group, see Sangsit Piriyarangsan, Thunniyom khunnang thai, B.E. 2475–2503 [Capitalism under Thai Nobility, 1932–1960] (Bangkok: Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University, 1983). 3 Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 222–231. 4 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World, trans. S. Reynolds (London: Collins, 1984), pp. 116–138. 5 Dhida Saraya, “The Development of Political Entities from Town to Kingdom”, in Rat boran [Ancient States] (Bangkok: Ancient City Press, 1994), pp. 374–378. 6 Dhida Saraya, “Thai History” (mimeograph copy), p. 14. 7 This was necessary because Sukhothai, the northern state, had only been recently subdued. Other muang such as Kamphangphet were also mentioned as muang luk luang but later on only Phitsanulok appeared to be one such muang. See Manop Thavonwatsakun, Khunnang ayutthaya [Ayudhyan Nobility] (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1993), pp. 86–88. 8 For a good analysis of the territorial administration of the early period, see ibid., pp. 60–65. 9 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873 (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969), pp. 23–24. 10 Petty officials (samien thanai) had sakdina between twenty-five to 400 and did not belong to the noble class.

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11 See Piyachat Pitawan, Rabob phrai nai sangkhom thai P.S. 2411–2453 [The Phrai System in Thai Society] (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1983), pp. 1–45. 12 In so doing he was allowed to keep one-tenth of the state revenue. This is according to the principle called sip lod (taking a tenth) which was applied to all state resources. 13 King Chulalongkorn, Phraratchaphithi sipsong duan [Annual Royal Ceremonies] (Bangkok: Sinlapabannakan, 1968). 14 Kullada Kesboonchoo, “Khamkhit ruang amnat lae phithikham” [The Concept of Power and Ceremonies], Chunlasan Sangkhomsat lae Manutsayasat [Journal of Social Science and Humanities], Special Volume on Thai Philosophy and Political Thinking (Bangkok, 1982), 65–75. 15 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 341–358. 16 The terms Burma, Vietnam and Cambodia are used in this chapter to indicate geographical rather than political entities. 17 Manop, Khunnang ayutthaya, pp. 82–83. 18 Ibid., pp. 96–97. 19 Nithi Aeusrivongse, Kanmuang thai samai phra narai [Thai Politics under King Narai], 4th edn (Bangkok: Matichon Press, 1996), pp. 13–14; and Sorasak Ngamkhachonkunkit, “Crucial Factors of the Ayudhya’s Fall”, Muang Boran Journal 10:2 (April–June, 1984) 133–134. 20 After the abolition of the “heir apparent town” there was a new position called the Front Palace [Wang Na], signifying the second most powerful person who would lead the front troop in times of war. It was most likely that, at the time of ascension, the king was not mature enough to be appointed to the position. When the king’s sons became mature, the succession problem arose. See Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Wang Na: Tamnang phu sub ratchasombat” [The Front Palace: The Heir Apparent] in Sombat Chantornvong and Ragsun Thanapornpan (eds) Rak mueng thai [We Love Thailand] (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1976). 21 Manop, Khunnang ayutthaya, p. 235. 22 Ibid., pp. 207–220. 23 Dhiravat Na Pombejra, “Crown Trade and Court Politics in Ayutthaya During the Reign of King Narai (1656–88)” in The Southeast Asia Port and Polity, J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (eds), (Singapore: Singapore Press 1990), p. 130. 24 Dhirawat na Pombejra, “Seventeenth-Century Ayudhya: A Shift to Isolation?” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era, Trade, Power and Belief, Anthony Reid (ed.), (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 259. 25 Ibid., pp. 265–266. 26 Andre Gunder Frank argues that the entire world economic order was Sinocentric. Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Age of Asia (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), pp. 108–117. 27 For the growing cash-cropped economy in China, see ibid., p. 161. The rice export to China during the eighteenth century has been noted by Thai historians, but seen as a sign of droughts and bad harvests in China. 28 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1993), pp. 1–61, 202–266. 29 Victor Liebermann, “An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia? Problems of Regional Coherence” – a review Article”, Journal of Asian Studies 3 (2000). 30 For the conflicts over control of manpower during the last Ayudhyan dynasty,

Notes

31 32 33 34 35

36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49

50 51

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see Busakorn Lailert, “The Thai Monarchy in the Ban Phlu Luang Period” (PhD diss., University of London, 1972). Sorasak, “Crucial Factors of the Ayudhya’s Fall”, p. 119. Nithi Aeusrivongse, Kanmuang thai samai phrachao krung thonburi [Thai Politics under the Reign of King Thonburi] (Bangkok: Sinlapawatthanatham, 1986), pp. 127–128, 343–358. The Crawfurd Papers (Bangkok: The Wachirayan National Library, 1915), pp. 96–97. Khachon Sukphanit, Thanandon phrai [Phrai Status] (Bangkok, 1976), pp. 30–36. Cambodia had declared independence after the fall of Ayudhya. In 1769 King Taksin sent an army to Cambodia and annexed Siem Reap and Bamtambong. In 1778 Siamese armies subdued the Eastern Laotian states of Nakhon Phanom, Champasak and Vientiane. (Luang Prabang voluntarily accepted Siam’s power.) Vientiane was sacked and its population rounded up for resettlement in the interior of Siam. NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). The king’s wrongful behaviour in part constituted in punishing the wives of high-ranking nobles who failed to submit revenue to the king. See Kromluang Narintharathewi, Chotmaihet kwamsongcham [Memoirs] (Bangkok, 1973), pp. 12–13. Khachon, Thanandon phrai, pp. 32–36. Ibid., pp. 39–45. NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864). King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon [Collection of Correspondence] (Bangkok, 1971), p. 224. NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 413. D.E. Malloch, Siam: Some General Remarks on its Productions and in Particular on its Imports and Exports (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1852), p. 30. Nithi and Hong have made a great contribution to the understanding of the emergence of the plantation economy in the early Bangkok Period. Nithi Aeusrivongse, “Pakkai lae bairua” [Quills and Sails] (Bangkok: Amarin Printing, 1984) and Lysa Hong, “The Evolution of the Thai Economy in the Early Bangkok Period and its Historiography” (PhD diss., University of Sydney, 1981). Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Canton Trade and the Opium War”, in The Cambridge History of China Vol. 10, John K. Fairbank (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 163–208. Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, 1833, with Notice of Siam Corea and the Lao-choo Islands (London: R. Westley and A.H. Davis, 1834), p. 34. B.J. Terwiel, Through Travellers’ Eyes: An Approach to Early NineteenthCentury Thai History (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1989), pp. 68–69, 82, 90, 94. King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon, p. 224. The bia wat existed during the Ayudhya period and presumably was not practised by King Taksin due to a lack of cash. By 1826 it was reported that the number of the ruling class on the roll was 2,000 and the sum paid accounted for more than half of the state revenue. The Burney Papers vol. 2, pt. 4 (Bangkok: Wachirayan Library, 1910), p. 229. NL, R3 175, C.S. 1212 (1850). NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864).

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52 NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). and NA, R5 K, vol. 3. 53 King Rama II invented a system whereby high-ranking royal princes became involved in the administration by acting as superintendents to important administrative units. 54 NA, R5 K, vol. 3. 55 The Burney Papers, Vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 51. 56 Ibid., pp. 50–51. 57 For King Rama III’s conscientious observance of Buddhism see King Mongkut, Phra samana san [The King’s Writings in His Monkshood] (Bangkok, 1926), pp. 8–13]. 58 Nithi, Pakkai lae bairua, pp. 2–95. 59 For the list of the old tax farms see NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864), for the new list see Chaophraya Thiphakonrawong, Phrarachaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thisam lemtee song [The Royal Chronicles of the Bangkok Dynasty, the Third Reign, Book Two] (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961), pp. 182–183. 60 D.E. Malloch, Siam: Some General Remarks on its Production, p. 13. 61 NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864). 62 For example, in 1839, he bought 500,000 pieces of sugar cane at the market price. NL, R3 18 C.S. 1200 (1839). 63 King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon, p. 224. 64 NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864). 65 Nithi, Pakkai lae bairua p. 271. 66 They were the old Ayudhyan family which gained political prominence in the Early Bangkok period from a close family link with the Chakri Dynasty. They also greatly benefited from the growing commercial activities by controlling lucratively ecomomic positions as well as 67 Chai-anan Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra (eds), Ekkasan kanmuang kanpokkhrong thai [Documents on Thai Politics and Administration] (Bangkok: The Social Association of Thailand, 1975), p. 110. 68 The Burney Papers, 1:1, p. 65. 69 Ibid., p. 81. 70 John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy, pp. 541–542. 71 Nicholas Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, Journal of the Siam Society 48:2, pt. 2 (November 1960), 46. 72 Ibid., pp. 45–46. 73 Ibid., p. 46. 74 Adey Moore, “An Early British Merchant in Bangkok”, in Selected Articles from the Siam Society Journal Vol. 8, Relationships with France, England and Denmark (Bangkok, 1959), p. 238. 75 NL, R4 145, C.S. 1217 (1860). 76 Walter F. Vella, Siam under Rama III (New York: The Association for Asian Studies, 1957), p. 127. Most Thai historians misunderstand this point and assume that the monopoly during this period was the practice from the Ayudhyan state. 77 Moore, “An Early British Merchant in Bangkok”, p. 238. 78 NL, R4 126. This is King Mongkut’s writing on the Bowring Treaty. It is interesting to note the Siamese elite’s awareness of representations to the British government, pressing for better trade regulations with Siam. 79 Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, p. 48. 80 Ibid., p. 50. 81 Ibid., pp. 52–53. 82 NL, R4 44, C.S. 1215 (1853).

Notes 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

189

Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, p. 58. Sarasin, Tribute and Profit, p. 113. Malloch, Siam: Some Generation Remarks on its Production, p. 28. NA, SB 2.21/3. NL, R4 521. J.W. Cushman, “Siamese Trade and the Chinese Go-between, 1767–1855”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12:1 (March 1981): 54. Malloch, Siam: Some General Remarks on Its Production, p. 13. Ibid., p. 3. NL, R4 126. Cushman, “Siamese State Trade and the Chinese Go-between, 1767–1855”, p. 54. Chotmaihet wa duai sir chames bruk khaoma tham sanya nai rachakan thi sam mua pi cho P.S. 2395 [A record on Sir James Brooke’s Mission under King Rama III in 1851], (Bangkok, 1923), pp. 40–48. Influence reflecting one’s capacity to act as a patron. For an excellent study on how Prince Mongkut symbolically identified his advances in the sangha with the life of Buddha as the basis of his legitimacy, see Christine E. Gray, “The Politics of the Middle Way: A Study of King Mongkut’s Monastic Career (1824–1851)” (MA thesis, University of Chicago, 1978). Prince Damrong, Khondi thi khaphachao ruchak [Bibliographies of the Good People I Have Known], vol. 2 (Bangkok, 1984), p. 79. NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, p. 58. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 55. Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, Phrarachaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thisam, p. 188. Chuang informed Bowring that his father was behind King Mongkut’s succession to the throne. Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, p. 61. Ibid., p. 61. NL, R4 113, C.S. 1216 (1854–1855). NL, R4 126. Prince Damrong, Khondi thi khaphachao ruchak, pp. 86–87. Bowring was informed by Phra Khlang that merchants who lost their trade in China needed to be consulted in the negotiating process. NL, R4 113, C.S. 1216 (1854). Nicholas Tarling, “The Mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam”, Journal of the Siam Society L, 50:2, pt. 2 (December 1962), 98–99. Sir John Bowring, The Kingdom and People of Siam (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 287. Tarling, “The Mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam”, p. 104. NL, R4 113, C.S. 1216 (1854–1855). Tarling, “The Mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam”, p. 101. Ibid., p. 104. Prince Damrong, Khondi thi khaphachao ruchak, p. 85. Ibid., pp. 83–86 and Kronmun Phittayalappritthiyakon, Watthnatham kap phramahakasat [Culture and the Kingship] (Bangkok, 1968), p. 220. Brooke advised the British government that Siam should be taught a lesson. Tarling, “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, p. 59. NL, R4 113, C.S. 1216 (1854–1855).

190

Notes

119 Constance Wilson, “The Northeast and the Middle Mekong Valley in the Thai Economy: 1830–1870”, Proceeding of the International Conference on Thai Studies vol. 3 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1987), pp. 169–177. 120 NL, R5 243/15 This important document has escaped the attention of scholars working on the reign of King Mongkut because it was kept among documents belonged to the reign of King Chulalongkorn. 121 King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon, p. 227. 122 For the list of tax farms under various departments see Lathi thamniam tangtang [Various Traditions and Customs], vol. 2 (Bangkok: Khlangwitthaya, 1972), p. 82. 123 King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon, pp. 225–227, and NL, R4 18. 124 Ibid., p. 228. 125 NA, R5 S1/67, R.S. 119 (1900). 126 King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon, p. 229. 127 Ekkasan khong nai harry parks [Files Concerning Harry Park’s Mission to Bangkok in 1856], (Bangkok, 1975), pp. 29–31. 128 William G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 120. 129 NL, R4 406. 130 See also NL, R4 117, C.S. 122 (1864). 131 NL, R4 339. 132 NL, R4 383. 133 Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si, year 2404–2411 [Collected Proclamations of the Fourth Reign, 1862–1868] (Bangkok, 1968), pp. 45–58. 134 NL, R4 383. 135 NA, R4 99/3 R.S. 83 (1864). 136 Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si, pp. 10–12. 137 NL, R4 59, C.S. 1213 (1855). 138 Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si, pp. 101–106. 139 Prince Damrong, Prachum phraniphon bettalet [Collection of Writing] (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961), pp. 132–134. 140 Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si, pp. 116–120. 141 Prince Damrong, Prachum phraniphon bettalet, pp. 132–143. 142 NL, R4 342. 143 Craig J. Reynolds, “Buddhist Cosmography in Thai History, with Special Reference to Nineteenth-Century Culture Change”, Journal of Asian Studies 35:2 (February 1976). 144 NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). 145 NA, R5 B1.10/1 and NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1857). 2 The first stage of state-building 1 Chotmaihet ruang phrabat somdet phra chomklao chaoyuhua song prachuan [Account of King Mongkut’s Illness] (Bangkok, 1947), pp. 11–12. 2 Ibid., pp. 13–15. 3 But this did not mean that the Wang Na would necessarily succeed the throne. During the Bangkok period, none of the Wang Na who were younger brothers of kings or of high-ranking princes survived them, and therefore none of the Bangkok Wang Na became king – with one exception. Rama II had been appointed to this post by his father, Rama I, after the death of the first Wang Na, Rama I’s brother.

Notes

191

4 Krommun Worachak was removed from the position soon after the coronation, and replaced by Phraya Thepworachun (Thuam Bunnag), who was promoted to the rank of Chaophraya Phanuwong, SWA, August 15, 1872. Natthawut Sutthisongkhram, Somdet chaophraya barommaha srisuriyawong [Somdet Chaophraya barommaha Srisuriyawong’s Biography], vol. 2 (Bangkok: Charoenrat Publishers, 1973), p. 555. For a detailed discussion of Wang Na’s status, see Noel A. Battye, “The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–1910: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974), pp. 161–163. 5 Chai-anan Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra (eds), Ekkasan kan muang kan pokkhrong thai [Documents on Thai Politics and Administration] (Bangkok: The Social Association of Thailand), p. 130. 6 David K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 42–60. 7 SWA, July 31, 1873. David B.U.J. Adams, “Monarchy and Political Change: Thailand under Chulalongkorn, 1868–1885” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1977). 8 NA, R5 NK 29 and SWA, May 12, 1870. 9 NA, R5 SP 3. King Mongkut was particularly concerned that the hired labour was not suitable for participating in the state ceremonies. 10 Ibid. 11 SWA, May 15, 1870. 12 Ibid. 13 King Mongkut, Phra ratchahattalekha [King Mongkut’s Writings] (Bangkok, 1963), p. 105. 14 Sapha ti pruksa ratchakan phandin nai ratchakan phrabat somdet phra chunlachomklao chaoyuhua [King Chulalongkorn’s Council of State] (Bangkok: Thaphrachan Press, 1971), pp. 73–80. 15 Prince Damrong, Tamnan khruang ratchaissiyapon chunlachomklao [The Story of the Chunla Chomklao Order] (Bangkok, 1969), pp. 6–8. 16 NL, R5 243/3, C.S. 1235 (1873) was the king’s consultation. Document 243/4, C.S. 1235 (1873) was the answer. This document implied the sangha’s great displeasure towards the king’s query, the word “hypocritical” was used and it was signed by thirty high-ranking monks. 17 NL, R5 243/3. According to the document only eighty-three nobles attended, while the audience numbered over 500 in total. The incident occurred during April and May 1872 and it was possible that the poor showing was a gesture of defiance against Young Siam’s overt subscription to modernisation – or else it was sheer negligence of the king’s authority. It should be noted that earlier on, in 1869, the king found it necessary to issue a proclamation setting the time for the daily audience and how those in the audience should behave, by arriving early and refraining from moving in and out during the king’s presence. See NL, R5 243/10. 18 NL, R5 248/3. 19 SWA, September 2, 1869. 20 See the section on Phraya Ahan’s trial, pp. 58–60. 21 NA, R5 KT 14. Mr Knox, the British Consul, bitterly complained to Chaophraya Phanuwong, the Minister of Krom Tha, “the Siamese government (i.e. Conservative Siam) allowed trade and taxation to be in the hands of a small group of people financially. This did not contribute to the state at all” (RS UT 14). The Consul finished the letter by threatening that if there was no reform from the internal source then an attempt at reforms might come from abroad.

192

22 23

24 25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34

35

Notes NA, R5 NK 11. A translation of an article published in the Telegraph, June 24, 1871 stated that in 1870, there were fourteen junks and 387 square-rigged ships coming to Siam bringing, altogether, 159,280 tonnage of goods. The export involved 404 square-rigged ships carrying 170,965 tonnage. These figures involved 129 Siamese ships carrying 49,858 tons of imports and 129 ships carrying 52, 287 tons of exports. SWA, July 13, 1873. For example, during the last few years of King Mongkut’s reign, at least two leading members of the family were studying in England – Pon and Tho Bunnag. They later became Chaophraya Phatsakorawong and Chaophraya Suriyawongwattanasak. See Natthawut Sutthisongkhram, Chaophraya lae somdet chaophraya bang than nai sakun bunnag [Selected Chaophraya and Somdet Chaophraya of the Bunnags] (Bangkok, 1974), pp. 105–108. The Bunnags set up their own school at the Kalahom ministry either at the same time as King Chulalongkorn or even before. See Phra Ratkrawi, Nangsue lokayuwattitham (Bangkok, 1913). See NL, R5 154/13. This source shows that Somdet Chaophraya initiated these ideas, which were later adopted by King Chulalongkorn. NA, R5 SP. 7, C.S. 1246 (1884). In this document Chaophraya Mahin told King Chulalongkorn that Chaophraya Srisuriyawong was behind this appointment in spite of the fact that his relationship with Chaophraya Mahin (then Phraya Burut), under King Mongkut, was strained because Phraya Burut was involved in smuggling opium. His reasoning to Phraya Burut, who begged to be allowed to stay in his former position because he was inexperienced in the manpower system, was that he wanted somebody who was loyal to the king to take up such an important responsibility. Somdet Chaophraya stayed hostile to him and was very upset when informed by King Chulalongkorn, late in 1874, that he was going to become Chaophraya Mahintharasakthamrong. See Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, vol. II (Bangkok: Phrae phitthaya, 1973), p. 339. SWA, June 1, 1871. and Darunowat, vol. 1 (1874), 185–186, 216–217. This was mentioned in the main document which outlined King Chulalongkorn’s rationale for reforms. It was called “On the abolition of slavery and gambling”. See NL, R5 153/12. In 1872, the king celebrated his birthday in a grand style with fireworks and illuminations in spite of Somdet Chaophraya’s attempt to sanction the celebration and prohibit the illuminations. Somdet Chaophraya had very little sympathy for ceremonies, which apart from boosting the stature of the royalty was considered by him a waste. See King Chulalongkorn, Phraratchaphithi sib song duan [Annual State Ceremonies] (Bangkok: Phrae phitthaya, 1971), pp. 612–615. SWA, May 2, 1873. King Chulalongkorn hand-picked those half brothers and young nobles who showed signs of intelligence to join him on the visits to Java and Singapore. See SWA, October 16, 1873 and July 13, 1871. NL, R5 244/2, C.S. 1231 (1869), 168/1, 245/5, 244/3. SWA, July 31, 1873. NL, R5 169/4. For example, Chaophraya Phanuwong was the person who put pressure on the inept Phraya Ratchasuphawadi to submit suggestions “According to the parliamentary tradition” on the question of phrai that and gambling. See NL, R5 154/13. This document is not dated, but judging to its running number it is likely that the incident took place at about the time of the Council of State. NA, R5 KT, vol. 13.

Notes

193

36 Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 577–578. 37 For example Alabaster translated one of Dr Smith’s articles into Thai and had it published in Darunowat. 38 Sir Andrew Clarke, “My First Visit to Siam”, Contemporary Review 81 (1902), reprinted in Rak muang thai [We Love Thailand], Sombat Chanthawong and Rangsan Thanaphonphan (eds) (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1976), p. 27. 39 Ibid., pp. 27–28. 40 NL, R5 248/3. This document is a translation of an article published in the Daily Times, Singapore which was a response to a complaint in the Straits Times, July 5, 1874, by “A Siamese” who was presumably a member of Conservative Siam or one of its supporters. “A Siamese” complained of the fact that Somdet Chaophraya was called the ex-regent because he had disagreement with the king and was so upset that he was no longer active in the administration. “A Siamese” argued that it was Somdet Chaophraya’s idea to abolish the phrai, that, and gambling, and that the King failed to carry out the whole package of reforms. 41 Darunowat clearly stated that it wanted to report on political news which was outside the boundary of Rachakitchanubeksa, which dealt only with official news. Other items included foreign news, advertising for sales and auctions, proverbs, political dramas and fables, and science and fine arts. That these items were written both in Thai and English transliteration shows how westernised Young Siam were. Darunowat, 1 (1874), 2. 42 Darunowat did indeed use moral fables including how cheating bred cheating in return, how one should earn one’s livelihood with honesty and how small people could one day return favour to big people. 43 NL, R5 153/12. The king presumably wrote this important document in order to enlist the support of the great nobles, and in particular those in the Council of State, whose members were expected to spearhead the reforms. 44 NL, R5 168/1 shows that the constitutions of Great Britain, British India and Second Empire France were translated into Thai but only the French Constitution remains on the file. As for the financial aspect, the financial systems of Britain and France were studied. See NL, R5 244/2, 244/3. 45 Prawatsat yuan-thai nai ruang khamen lae lao [The History of Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos] (Bangkok, 1979). 46 A quotation from the text describes the power of the emperor and indicates why this constitution caught the King’s imagination. The Emperor is an absolute monarch. He is above all the French people and is the ruler of the kingdom. He does not need to justify his action to anyone. He is respected and must not be slandered. He appoints ministers to various ministries as he wishes. He has the power to grant pardons to convicts. He is the supreme commander of the army and the navy and has authority to declare war and to sign treaties of commerce and friendship with other countries. He appoints members of the nobility to administrative positions throughout the kingdom. He has legislative power, and in the absence of his presidency no law can be passed. Law courts throughout the empire exercise their power in his name. He is the source of righteousness, and without his consent to every clause of a law, that law is null and void. A constitution drafted for Siam – but never promulgated – shows the influence of this constitution on King Chulalongkorn’s thinking about modernisation. The first section of the draft almost paraphrases the quotation above.

194

47 48

49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56

57

58 59

Notes The second clause asserts that the power of the monarch is absolute and that there is no other power above his. See NA, R5 A 2/8. Rang phraratchakitsadika wa duay ratchaphrapheni krung sayam [The Draft Legislation on the Constitution of Siam]. The main concern of the constitution was to guarantee the king’s line of succession. The idea of Siam having a constitution might have raised expectations of some power sharing, but this was not King Chulalongkorn’s purpose. NL, R5 166/1, 166/4 and 166/5. We have seen in Chapter 1 that Kromluang Wongsa was given the power over the Royal Warehouse tax farms, which he exploited for his personal gain. This caused his relationship with King Mongkut to become so strained that the king forbade the prince’s descendants to be ordained in his Thammayut sect. However, King Mongkut on his death-bed received a written message from Kromluang Wongsa that upon his death he would give all his estates to Prince Chulalongkorn. See NL, R5 137/1. C.S. 1231 (1869). It is possible that Kromluang Wongsa repented the way in which he used his position to amass wealth at the expense of the king. It is also possible that he tried to prevent the Bunnags from closing in on the tax farms which were growing in fortune. When the prince died, King Chulalongkorn defied the deceased’s wish and passed the personal estate to the prince’s descendants. It is not surprising that one of Kromluang Wongsa’s descendants, Phra-ongchao Saisanitwong, was an active member of Young Siam. Three other small departments had also come under the king’s jurisdiction: Phra Khlang Nai Khwa [Warehouse on the Right], Phra Khlang Nai Sai [Warehouse on the Left] and Phra Khlang Wiset [Clothing Warehouse]. King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon [Collection of Correspondence] (Bangkok, 1971), p. 229. NL, R5 167/3. His earlier version of the edict promulgated in the same year named the departments under its jurisdiction. They consisted of those the king fully controlled. These names were omitted from the edict of the Ho Ratsadakonphiphat, NL, R5 168/10. NL, R5 167/3. NL, R5 153/12. Sapha ti pruksa, pp. 1–5. Apart from the fiscal reform, another agenda of the Council of the State was judicial. Five of its members were made Judges of the Court of King’s Prerogative with special power to clear a backlog of pleas in the ministerial courts. Battye, “The Military, Government and Society”, p. 154. According to one author, this body had been created by Napoleon with the functions of “drafting and interpreting laws and reglement d’administrative publique – and resolving administrative difficulties”, Marquerite Rendel, The Administrative Functions Of the French Consiel d’État (L.S.E. Research Monograph No. 6, 1970), pp. 18–19. The author further explains its functions: “It was the instrument for the reorganisation of France under the Empire. Napoleon himself frequently presided . . . It was a collective repository of administration and especially of the legal wisdom, advising the ruler whenever asked; it was the highest court for administrative cases, it was a nursery of young administrators, and it was an imperial council from which the highest officials would be sent to the most responsible posts. It was both part of the administration and yet set apart from and above bureaucracy.” NL, R5 169/13. The others consisted of two from each of the Amatyakuls and the Kanlayana-

Notes

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

195

mits, and one from each of the Bunyarattaphans, the Buranasiris, the Suwannathats and the Phummirats. NL, R5, 154/13. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, p. 30. Ratchakitchanubeksa, R.S. 108 (1889), p. 159. Sapha ti pruksa, pp. 53–54. For a time it became a practice to place the initials of the Family Order behind the honorific name. It was reported that Somdet Chaophraya lectured the Council after the king’s speech. NL, R5 153/10, C.S. 1236 (1874). NL, R5 248/3 C.S. 1244 (1882). This document is a translation of an article published in the Daily Times, Singapore which was a response to a complaint in the Straits Times, July 5, 1874, mentioned later (p. 57). NL, R5 167/3. NL, R5 168/8. NL, R5 168/3 C.S. 1236 (1874). Ibid. NL, R5 331/9. Prince Damrong, Ruang loek that nai ratchakan thi ha [On the Abolition of Slavery under King Chulalongkorn’s Reign] (Bangkok, 1944), pp. 42–63. NA, R5 B17/18. NL, R5 248/3. Prince Damrong, Ruang loek that nai ratchakan thi ha, pp. 42–63. Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa nai ratchakan phrabatsomdet phrachunlachomklaochaoyuhua [Documents on Educational Reforms under King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok: Suksitsayam Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 18. Sapha ti pruksa, pp. 9–12. King Chulalongkorn and Prince Wachirayan, Pramuan phraniphon [Collection of Writing] (Bangkok, 1971), p. 229. NL, R5 190/11. The committee had the strongest impression that the money was not repaid. See also NL, R5 186/2. The Thai phrase for corruption was cho rat bang luang, meaning public and private embezzlement. NL, R5 187/12 and 190/11. NL, R5 190/11. NL, R5 186/4. NL, R5 187/4, 186/4 and 190/5. NL, R5 186/2. The accumulated sum was 555 catties. NL, R5 187/10. NL, R5 190/16. NL, R5 185/13. Unfortunately, Somdet Chaophraya’s letter to the king on this matter is not accessible to readers at the National Library. NL, R5 185/12, 185/13. Sapha ti pruksa, p. 37. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 550–551. For Somdet Chaophraya’s contact with the French Consul, see Adams, “Monarchy and Political Change”. During the conflict, King Chulalongkorn wrote a memorandum presenting his side of the conflict. He had this to say about the role of Somdet Chaophraya: “[He] had undertaken to arrange the matter which had caused unusual distrust for his own interests” Manich, History of Anglo-Thai Relations (Bangkok: Chalermnit, 1970), p. 117. This is quite extraordinary considering that Somdet Chaophraya had access to the memorandum. However, it was prepared when King Chulalongkorn

196

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

Notes began to have an upper hand, with the arrival of the British Governor in Singapore. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 569–570. Manich, History of Anglo-Thai Relations, p. 116. However, his correspondence does not give an impression of his making this stand; rather that he wanted to see the end of his arch rival. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 554–556. F.O. 69/62. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 589–601. Ibid., pp. 647–648; and Manich, History of Anglo-Thai Relations, p. 118. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 576–578. Ibid., pp. 588–591. Ibid., pp. 585–588. Ibid., p. 640. According to King Chulalongkorn, Somdet Chaophraya doubted the foreign guarantee and insisted that it should be voted on. Shunyu Xie, Siam and the British 1874–5: Sir Andrew Clarke and the Front Palace Crisis (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1988), p. 46. Ibid., pp. 39–42. For the memorandum, see Manich, History of Anglo-Thai Relations, pp. 113–119. Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 641–643. Ibid., pp. 649–652. For English text, see Xie, Siam and the British 1874–5, pp. 65–66. Xie, Siam and the British 1874–5, p. 55; and Natthawut, Somdet chaophraya, pp. 636–639. Xie, Siam and the British 1874–5, p. 59. Darunowat, 1, July, 1874, p. 273. Ibid., pp. 217–218. See Chapter 4.

3 Creating a modern bureaucracy through education 1 King Chulalongkorn’s wish to create a modern bureaucracy composed in terms of a traditional class structure was well illustrated in his speech celebrating the hundredth anniversary of Bangkok in 1882. Here he indicated which classes he thought were entitled to constitute the main components of the bureaucracy, namely the royalty and the nobility. He expressed his gratitude to them for the contributions that they and their ancestors had made to Siam under the Chakri Dynasty. He asked the audience to join him in a wish that their families and his would be the rulers of the country when it celebrated its two-hundredth anniversary. Thus King Chulalongkorn’s absolutist state would continue to uphold the privileged positions of the ruling class and of their offspring. NA, R5 NK, vol. 17, pp. 224–228. 2 Momratchawong Supphawat Kasemsri, Phraprawat Krommun Thiwakonrawongprawat [Prince Thiwakorawongprawat’s Biography] (Bangkok, 1964), p. 84. 3 The general practice was that a son from each important noble family was sent abroad. 4 Prince Damrong, Nithanborankhadi [Old Stories] (Bangkok: Phrae phittaya, 1971), p. 251. 5 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, “Rongrian kharatchakan phonlaroen khong Phrabatsomdet Phra Chunlachomklaochaoyuhua” [King Chulalongkorn’s Civil Service School], in Lom Rua [Building up Fences] (Bangkok, 1968), p. 18.

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6 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa nai ratchakan phrabatsomdet phrachunlachomklaochaoyuhua [Documents on Education Reforms under King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok: Teacher’s Institute Press, n.a.), p. 18. 7 NA, R5 M 99/8 King Chulalongkorn to Prince Damrong, April 4, 1891. 8 Department of Interior, Bureau of Education, Progress of Western Education in China and Siam (Washington, 1880), p. 12 quoted from David Wyatt, and Samuel McFarland, Early Education in Thailand, 1877–1895. Document no. 00396 Thai Information Centre, Chulalongkorn University. 9 For a description of the traditional system of education, see Ko Sawatphanit, Boran suksa [Traditional Education] (Bangkok, 1972). He pointed out that most students gave up study when they came to the vowel koei. 10 David K. Wyatt and Samuel McFarland, Early Education in Thailand, 1877–1895, Document no. 00396, Thai Information Centre, Chulalongkorn University, p. 5. 11 The Royal Pages’ Bodyguard Regiment was developed from the corps of bodyguards King Chulalongkorn established in 1868 during the Regency. It consisted of fourteen pages who presented themselves before his ascension to the throne. 12 Prince Phanurangsi, Tamnan thahan mahadlek [History of the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment] (Bangkok, 1953), pp. 2–4. 13 Prince Damrong, Khwamsongcham [Memoirs] (Bangkok, 1970), p. 244. 14 Prince Phanurangsi, Tamnan thahan mahadlek, p. 4. 15 David K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 68. 16 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, p. 2. 17 Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, p. 67. 18 Mom chao is the last ranking of the royalty, his children have the ranking of mom ratchawong. 19 Prince Damrong, Khwamsongcham, p. 270. 20 Prince Phanurangsi, Thamnan thahan mahatlek, pp. 117–118. 21 NA, SB 2 56/25. 22 In Thai, khahabodi, which means those with property, corresponds with the concept of the bourgeoisie. 23 Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, pp. 107–110. 24 Mom chao is the last ranking of the royalty, his children have the ranking of mom ratchawong. 25 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, pp. 18–19. 26 A former royal pupil related that members of his classroom at primary level were taught in a special classroom furnished with better desks. At meal times they sat at the same table with the school officials, he had his own room with jars of sweets guarded by his male nanny. It was pointed out that not all students were in such privileged positions and there were many who did not have such luxuries as sweets. Prince Damrong, Tamnan suan kulap lae khobangkap khong samakomsitkao suan kulap [History of Suan Kulap School and the Regulations of the Suan Kulap Alumni] (Bangkok, 1991), pp. 27–36. 27 Prince Damrong, Tamnan suan kulap, pp. 6–8. 28 The source for this does not show how many of the non-royal graduates came from noble families, and does not include other graduates who joined for secondary education only. Prince Damrong, Tamnan suan kulap, pp. 16–24. 29 Family names were introduced later on by King Vajiravudh. Those whose families could be traced back under King Chulalongkorn either belong to the old noble families or became important later on. 30 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, pp. 142–148.

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31 NA, R5 S 1/18. 32 Prince Damrong, Tamnan suan kulap, p. 10. 33 Other reasons cited were to induce students to be more regular in their attendance, and to defer the cost of providing facilities for the students. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, p. 121. 34 NA, R5 S 1/98, Phraya Wisut to King Chulalongkorn, December 5, 1908. 35 La-ortong Amarinratana, “The sending of Students Abroad from 1868–1932” (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1979), pp. 82–89. 36 King Chulalongkorn Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, pp. 9–10. 37 NA, SB 256/25. Prince Damrong, “Ruang tamnan kansuksa lae kan rabphidchop khong khru” [On the History of Education and the Teacher’s Responsibility]. 38 Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, p. 114. 39 NA, SB 2.56/25. 40 Ibid. 41 Phra Worawetphisit, Worawetniphon [Phra Worawetphisit’s Writing] (Bangkok, 1960), p. 18. 42 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, pp. 39–40. 43 Ibid., pp. 89–90. 44 Ibid., pp. 36–37. 45 Phra Worawetphisit, Worawetniphon, p. 7. 46 NA, R5 S 1/18. 47 NA, R5 S 2/8. 48 NA, R5 S 5/8. 49 For the role of these two princes in professional education, see Chapter 4. 50 NA, R5 S 5/6. 51 Chaophraya Mahithon, Ruang khong chaophraya mahithon [The Story of Chaophraya Mahithon] (Bangkok, 1956), pp. 51–53. 52 NA, R5 S 5/7. 53 For the original scheme drawn by Chaophraya Patsakonrawong, see NA, R5, S 5/7, November 30, 1896. 54 Prawat rongrien nairoi phrachunlachomklao, pp. 45–46. 55 NA, R5 S 5/7. 56 NA, R5 S 5/5. Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, January 1, 1899. 57 Prince Damrong, Nithan borankhadi, pp. 254–255. 58 NA, R5 S5/5, Prince Damrong to King Chulalongkorn, February 20, 1899. 59 NA, R5 S5/4, Phraya Wisutsuriyasak to King Chulalongkorn, January 20, 1906. 60 NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–Y), Chaomun Sri to King Chulalongkorn, December 13, 1905. 61 NA, R5 S 5/4, Chamun Sri to King Chulalongkorn, January 20, 1906. 62 Ibid.; NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–Y), Prince Damrong to King Chulalongkorn, August 20, 1901. 63 NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–Y), Chaomun Sri to King Chulalongkorn, January 11, 1909. 64 NA, R5 S5/4, Phraya Wisutsuriyasak to King Chulalongkorn, January 20, 1906. 65 Phra Worawetphisit Worawetniphon, p. 8. 66 Chaophraya Mahithon, Ruang khong chaophraya mahithon, pp. 57–59. 67 Names of some of the commoner parents suggests their Chinese origin. However here we only count those who use the title chin as being Chinese. Khao san vol. 71 (September 9), 1907. 68 Khao san, January 11, 1910. 69 Ratchakitjanubeksa, May 5, 1913.

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70 To quote Prince Nakhonchaisri: “Scarcely anyone of the better class would allow their sons or relatives to serve as officers in the army.” Another prince commented that the cadets were “sons of ordinary officials or, at least, descendents of ordinary soldiers in the Royal Pages Bodyguards”. Noel Battye, “The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–1910: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn” (PhD, diss., Cornell University, 1974), p. 390. 71 Ibid., p. 392. 72 Ibid., p. 495. 73 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, p. 18. 74 Ibid., pp. 39–41; see the second proclamation in ibid., p. 61. 75 Ibid., pp. 60–62. 76 Ibid., pp. 129–130. 77 Ibid., pp. 130–131. 78 Momchao Chitphoktawi Kasemsri, Winyan hang manut [The Human Soul] (Bangkok, 1949). 79 Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa, p. 130. 80 Prince Damrong, Nithan borankhadi, p. 251. 81 NA, R5 S 1/98, Phraya Wisutsuriyasak to King Chulalongkorn, December 5, 1908. 82 NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–B). 83 Prince Damrong, Nithan borankhadi, p. 253. 84 NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–B). 85 Ibid. 86 Prince Damrong, Nithan borankhadi, p. 259. 87 Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, p. 225. 88 NA, R5 S 2/7. 89 Evidence suggests that King Chulalongkorn closely supervised the creation of textbooks. In some cases he gave approvals to titles, authors and the manuscripts. See for example NA, R5, S 1/98, King Chulalongkorn to Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, another leading educationist, had one of the royal plays printed as a textbook. The king was not pleased, probably because the play was written for a private performance among the royal princes and it seemed inappropriate to make it available to the public. NA, R5 S 1/98, Phraya Wisutsuriyasak, September 2, 1908. 90 NA, R5 S 5/5, 1901. 91 NA, R5 S 2/7 Nai Sanan’s report of education in India, 1899. NA, R5 S 2/3 Prince Wachirayan to King Chulalongkorn, July 26, 1898. 92 Thammasakmontri was impressed with the British colonial policy of teaching farmers to be better farmers and not aspiring to white-collar work. NA, R5 S 2/7. 93 “We seem to be able to survive on our own and yet it is puzzling why we do not have the power to reserve our lives by ourselves. We are neither born fixed by rocks to the ocean bed as sponges, nor rooted to the earth like trees. We are capable of thought, and of carrying ourselves the way we wish. But if we cannot depend on things around us we die just as the sponge taken away from the water and the tree uprooted from the earth. [They both] face extinction and stop growing.” Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya IV [Ethical Studies] (Bangkok: Bannakit, n.d.), p. 1. 94 Ibid., pp. 85–87, 91 and Phraya Phisansinlapasat (Thammasakmontri), Thammachariya V, 6th edn (Bangkok: Aksonniti, 1913), p. 131. 95 Ibid., p. 71. 96 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya IV, pp. 36–37.

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97 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri and Phraya Anukiwithun, Thammachariya II, 14th edn (Bangkok: Rongrian changphim, 1939). In fact some of these values were already deeply rooted in Thai society, but this was not the case with others. In general, the choice of the topics reflects Victorian ethics, and a conviction that the values of the revolution were also appropriate to the new economic order of Siam. A British influence is also indicated by his choice of reference and quotations from British and western philosophers. 98 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri and Phraya Wichittampariwat, Thammachariya VI, 11th edn (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1956), p. 10. 99 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya IV, pp. 115–117. 100 Ibid., pp. 119–124. 101 Ibid., pp. 120–121. 102 NL, R4 84, CS 1217 (1855). 103 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya II, pp. 97–99. 104 Luang Prasertaksonnit, Phra phutchariya I [Buddhist Ethics] (Bangkok: Aksonnit, 1909), p. 4. 105 None of the nine students who took an examination in English could translate “national government” into Thai. NA, NK 30, 1883. 106 Phraya Phisansinlapasat (Thammasakmontri), Thammachariya V, p. 115. 107 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya II, p. 99. 108 King Chulalongkorn’s attitude as expressed in 1885 was that Thais and Laos spoke the same language with some different accents. See King Chulalongkorn, Phra ratchadamrat nai phrabat somdet phra chunlachomklaochaoyuhua [King Chulalongkorn’s Speech] (Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 1967), p. 34. 109 Phraya Phisansinlapasat, Thammachariya V, pp. 30–40. 110 Luang Prasertaksonnit, Phra phutchariya I, pp. 4–5. 111 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya II, pp. 10–11. 112 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya VI, p. 9. 113 Ibid., p. 33. 114 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya II, pp. 37–41. 115 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya VI, p. 9. 116 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya IV, p. 4. 117 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya VI, p. 5. 118 Ibid. 119 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya II, pp. 77–80. 120 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya VI, p. 215. 121 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya I, pp. 78–79. 122 NA, KT 40/23 Phraya Suriyanuwat to Phraya Mahayotha, June 16, 1893. In this letter Suriyanuwat, another Thai intellectual, wrote from Washington where he was posted that Thais should be aroused and demonstrate to the international community that they were willing to defend the state in order to preserve the honour of the Thai nation. 123 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya VI, pp. 233–234. Another textbook for moral education published at the beginning of King Vajiravudh’s reign supports this point: “Whether the country will be good or bad depends significantly upon the King. . . . A good king will be of great benefit to the people” Chaophaya Phrasadet Phonlamuang di [Good Citizens] (Bangkok: Akkanit, 1912), p. 57. 124 Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, Thammachariya IV, pp. 115–117. 125 Ibid., p. 129. 126 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).

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4 Contradictions within the bureaucracy 1 This term is used in a similar context to Anderson’s description of a new social class under Sarit’s regime. See Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms” in The Spectre of Comparisons (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 139–173. 2 King Chulalongkorn, Phraratchadamrat nai phrabatsomdet phrajunlachomklao chaoyuhua [Speeches by King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 1967), pp. 31–35. 3 King Chulalongkorn confided in Chamun Waiworanat (Choem Sang-xuto), the commander of the Front Foot Guard, that he wanted to consolidate royal power vis-à-vis the great nobles who still held many tax farms. Chaophraya Surasakmontri, Prawatkan khong chomphon chaophraya surasakmontri [The Life of Field Marshall Chaophraya Surasakmontri], vol. 1 (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961), p. 188. 4 Noel Battye, “The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–1910: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974), pp. 225–232. 5 Ibid., p. 230, and Sukunya Bumroongsook, “The Authority and Role of Samuha Phra Kalahom during the Rattanakosin period” (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1982), pp. 246–252. 6 There is confusion concerning the number of the League’s members. According to an archive document, there were four. Prince Prisadang, not named in the document, claimed that there were eight members including himself but then listed nine. NA, R5, B 10/5. F.O. 17/1223, and Prince Prisadang, Prawat yo naipunek phra worawongtheu phraongchao Prisadang [Prince Colonel Prisadang’s Brief Autobiography] (Bangkok, 1970), p. 53. 7 Battye, “The Military, Government and Society”, pp. 270–271. 8 Later the law of succession was promulgated, stipulating precisely the line of succession; this was immensely complicated by the practice of polygamy. It was suggested by contemporaries that inner palace politics played no small part in the final outcome. F.O. 17/1223. 9 In 1891 the Privy Purse was formally established as an office. Previously it had consisted of a separate fund. Yawarat Phutipimanrdegul, “The Changes of Bangkok during the Reigns of King Rama Vth–VIIth and its Subsequent Environmental Impact on The People” (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1983), p. 55. 10 The cabinet included all those princes who were the petitioners in 1885, except Prince Prisadang. 11 NA, R5 S 21/1. 12 Punha Khudkhong [Riddles] (Bangkok, 1968), pp. 39–40. 13 King Chulalongkorn, Praratchaphiti sibsong duan [Annual State Ceremonies] (Bangkok: Phraepiththaya, 1971). 14 RKNS, vol. 8, 1890, p. 3. 15 Yawarat, “The change of Bangkok”, p. 3. 16 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 85–112. 17 Ibid., pp. 235–279. 18 F.O. 17/1223. Notes on Siamese Administration, Relations with Foreign Powers and Life in the King’s Palace at Bangkok, written for Mr Swettenham in October 1891 by a Siamese gentleman of rank – now in disgrace. When we match this important document with Prince Prisadang’s autobiography we can be relatively certain that the gentleman in question is the prince. See Prince Prisadang, Prawat yo.

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19 Phraya Samosonsapphakan, Nibatchadok [A Jataka Tale] (Bangkok, 1929), p. 15. 20 F.O. 17/1223. 21 I have been unable to substantiate whether this accusation was justified, but it does reflect the worries of westernised members of the elite. 22 NA, R5 NK1, May 1879. 23 Chaophraya Surasakmontri, Prawatkan, p. 84. 24 Ibid., p. 124. 25 Ibid., pp. 213–220. 26 Ibid., pp. 221–240. 27 Prince Devawongse, Punyakatha phraprawat lae chodmaihet raiwan [Biography and Diary](Bangkok, 1965), p. 77. 28 NA, NK 22, King Chulalongkorn to Chaophraya Mahin, March 28, 1883. 29 NA, R5 A5/5. 30 NA, R5 Kh 18.7/22, King Chulalongkorn to Prince Mahit, January 21, 1900. 31 David K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 190. 32 F.O. 69/147. 33 NA, R5 B 2/16. 34 F.O. 17/1223. 35 Ibid.; however, the subject was raised by Prince Prisadang in writings to Prince Devawongse who passed them to the king. Consequently the prince was considered to be radical and anti-Palace custom. 36 F.O. 69/147. 37 Battye, “The Military, Government and Society”, p. 264. 38 Chai-anan Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra (eds), Ekkasan karn muang karn pokkhrong thai [Documents on Thai Politics and Administration] (Bangkok: The Social Association of Thailand, 1975), p. 61. 39 Chai-anan, Ekkasan kan muang karn pokkhrong thai, p. 65. 40 Ibid., pp. 72–73. 41 Ibid., pp. 76–81. 42 Prince Prisadang, Prawat yo, p. 60. 43 NA, R5 B 3/4, Prince Prisadang to King Chulalongkorn, August 22, 1887. The memorandum was accompanied by a letter urging the king to pay a visit to Europe. And NA, R5 B1 4/2. 44 Sayamsamai, December 2, 1886. 45 Sayamsamai, August 27, 1884. 46 Sayamsamai, August 27, 1884. 47 Sayamsamai, May 28, 1884 and January 7, 1885. 48 Sayamsamai, February 10, 1886. 49 Sayamsamai, September 16, 1885. 50 Sayamsamai, November 4, 1886. 51 Sayamsamai stated clearly that it had the intention of educating the public about various forms of government. Sayamsamai, October 1, 1885. 52 Sayamsamai, October 29, 1885. 53 Sayamsamai, 1884. 54 NA, R5 NK 24, Prince Phanurangsi to King Chulalongkorn. 55 Luang Chakkrapranisrisinwisut, Ruang khong chaophraya mahithon [Chao Phraya Mahithon’s Story] (Bangkok, 1960), pp. 15–51. 56 Ibid., pp. 52–53. 57 F.O. 371/1474. 58 Praphat Chantawirat, Phra prawat lae phra koraniyakit nai samai ratchakan

Notes

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

203

thi ha khong pholrauek phrachao borommawongthoe krommaluang chumphonkhet-u-domsak. [Admiral Krommaluang Chumphonkhet-udomsak’s Biography and Royal Activities of King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok: Rongphim charoentham, 1984), pp. 69–71; 147–148. Luang Chakkrapranisrisinwisut, Ruang khong chaopraya mahithon, pp. 71–72. Khao san, October 1, 1903. Khao san, October 16, 1903. Luang Chakkrapranisrisinwisut, Ruang khong chaopraya mahithon, p. 71. Ibid., p. 72. Ibid., p. 73. The following discussion, unless otherwise stated, comes from NA, R5 Y 1/67, Phraya Raka’s case. This document was attached to his letter written to Chaophraya Yommarat with the intention of making it public. He was advised against the move. But it was brought to the attention of the king. Luang Chakkrapranisrisinwisut, Ruang khong chaophraya mahithon, p. 77. NA, R5 S 2/3, Prince Wachirayan to King Chulalongkorn 22 July, R.S. 117 (1898). King Vajiravudh, Pramuan bot phra ratchaniphon, pp. 25–28. Chaophraya Phrasadet, “Tuan phuan” [Reminding Friends] (Bangkok, 1930), p. 15. King Vajiravudh, Pramuan phraniphon nai phrabatsomdet phra mongkutklaw chaoyuhua phakpakinnaka [Collection of King Vajiravudh’s Writings] (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1975), pp. 44–45. Phra Worawetphisit, Worawetwipon [Worawetphisit’s Writings ] (Bangkok, 1960), p. 7. Ibid., pp. 45–53. For example the pass rate for secondary schools in 1890 was around 50 per cent. NA, R5 S1/53. Phraworawetphisit, Worawetwiphon, p. 16. King Vajiravudh, “Lak ratchakan” [Principles of Administration] in Pakinaka khadi [Miscellaneous] (Bangkok: Sinlapabannakan, 1972), pp. 91–92. Chaophraya Phrasadet, Tuan phuan, [Reminding Friends] (Bangkok: Srithong Printing, 1930), pp. 1–8 Phraya Thephasadin, Ruang bedtalet khong phraya thephasdin [Phraya Thephasadin’s Miscellaneous] (Bangkok, 1952), p. 22. Phra Worawetphisit, Worawetniphon, p. 12. Tulavipakpojanakij, January 1, 1900. Tulavipakpojanakij, January 23, 1905. Khao san, October, 16 1903. Phraya Satchaphirom Udomratchapakdi, Lao hai luk fang [Telling My Story to the Children] (Bangkok: Ministry of the Interior, 1959), pp. 45–46. Ibid., pp. 64–65. Rian Srichan and Net Phunwiwat, Rian rumluk [Rian’s Memoir] (Bangkok, 1961), pp. 1–3. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., pp. 3–4. NA, R6 L2/1. Sutthada Lekvaitoon, “Government Spending during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn”, (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1981), p. 64. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., pp. 66–68.

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5 The defence of absolutism 1 In so far as is possible, documents consulted belong to this period. 2 It has been defined as “an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups who are threatened with marginalisation or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community”, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Editions, 1983), p. 95. 3 The name Wild Tigers, according to King Vajiravudh, was used in the past for men who acted as intelligence units along the frontier and sent reports back to the army. They had qualities of loyalty and courage combined with the military know-how. 4 This posed a dilemma for King Chulalongkorn, who planned to educate Siam’s crown prince himself. However, the king decided against calling the prince back because of his own ill-health and advice from officials responsible for the prince’s education, Kanphirom Suwannananondi, “King Vajiravudh and His Nation-building Programmes” (MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1981), pp. 14–15. 5 Ibid., pp. 30–31. 6 Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism (Honolulu: the University Press of Hawaii, 1978), p. 12. 7 NA, R5 T 2/23, Verney to King Chulalongkorn, April 23, 1903. 8 NA, R5 B 8.2/464, Colonel Hume to King Chulalongkorn. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. Prince Nakhon Sawan and Prince Phitsanulok were studying in Berlin and St Petersburg respectively. 11 NA, R5 T 2/23, Verney to King Chulalongkorn, April 17, 1902. 12 Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 3. 13 Most of the documents quoted in this section were written after the attempted coup in 1912. However, they generally represent King Vajiravudh’s perception of the bureaucracy at the time of his ascension to the throne. 14 King Vajiravudh, “Lakratchakan” [Principles of Administration], in Pakinnakhadi [Miscellaneous] (Bangkok: Sinlapabannakan, 1972), p. 111. The king commented that many of army officers did not have better family backgrounds than private soldiers. 15 NA, R6 M 1.7/4, Siamese Art. 16 Ibid. 17 Chotmayhet raiwan nai phrabat somdet phramongkutklaochaoyuhua [Diary of King Vajiravudh] (Bangkok: Mahamakut ratchawittayalai, 1974), p. 16. 18 King Vajiravudh, “Lakratchakan”, pp. 91–92. 19 King Vajiravudh, “Lakratchakan”, p. 113. 20 NA, R6 M 63/6, King Vajiravudh to Phraya Theporrachun, Phraya Srisuthamsuttharat and Phraya Surabodin, June 8, 1913. 21 Ibid. 22 NA, R6 K 1/14. King Vajiravudh to Phraya Sriharatdecho, May 30, 1912. 23 Praphat Chantawirat, Phra prawat lae phra koraniyakit nai samai ratchakan thi ha khong pholrauek phrachao borommawongthoe krommaluang chumphonkhet-u-domsak. [Admiral Krommaluang Chumphonkhet-udomsak’s Biography and Royal Activities of King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok: Rongphim charoentham, 1984), pp. 234–239. 24 Ibid., p. 220. 25 Sawat Chanthani, Nithan chaorai [A Planter’s Stories] (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1973), pp. 204–205. 26 F.O. 371/1751.

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27 F.O. 371/1751. 28 After the attempted coup, the King wrote to Chaophraya Yommarat, one of his confidants, asking him to take care of his pages in the likelihood of some unbecoming incidents, because “they had very little education”, NA, R6 B 3.1/64. 29 Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 7. 30 King Vajiravudh, Thieo muang phra ruang [Travels in Phra Ruang Country] (Bangkok: Ministry of the Interior, 1954), Preface. 31 Thanit Yupho, Khon [Masked Drama] (Bangkok: Department of Fine Arts, 1957), p. 50. 32 Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 6. 33 King Vajiravudh, Phra ratchabunthuk khong phrabat somdet phra mongkut klao chao yuhua [King Vajiravudh’s Diary] (Bangkok: the Royal Pages College Alumni, 1981). 34 King Vajiravudh, Kham athibai ruang mahadlek [An Explanation Concerning Royal Pages] (Bangkok: Samakkhi Press, 1910). 35 Phraya Sunthonphiphit, Phramahakarunathikhun haeng phrabatsomdet phra mongkutklao chaoyuhua [The Kindness of King Vajiravudh] (Bangkok, 1971), pp. 216–227. 36 Ibid., pp. 227–232. 37 NA, R5 M 8.1/8, King Chulalongkorn to Prince Vajiravudh, September 22, 1910. 38 These lectures were published in book form in 1925, the last year of his reign, without any alteration. King Vajiravudh, Plukchai sua pa [Instilling the Wild Tiger Spirit] (Bangkok, 1942). 39 The king labelled the Chinese the “Jews of the Orient”, reflecting the growing distance between the Thai ruling class and the leaders of the Chinese minority, which seemed to be developing independently of the Thai state. See NA, R6 N25/20, Chaophraya Yommarat to King Vajiravudh, March 1, 1917. So many Chinese were fleeing revolutionary turmoil in China that the minority in Siam was growing at an alarming rate. Many of the better-educated Chinese were increasingly radical, and these attitudes were influencing the Thai modern bureaucratic. All of these factors contributed to King Vajiravudh’s later prejudices against the Chinese. 40 King Vajiravudh, Plukchai sua pa, pp. 56–57. 41 Ibid., pp. 58–61. 42 Ibid., p. 61. 43 Phraya Patsakorawong, “Ruang suan” [On Orchards] Wachirayan wiset, 4 (July 28, 1888), pp. 452–453. 44 King Vajiravudh, Plukchai sua pa, pp. 61–62. 45 Ibid., pp. 67–69. 46 Ibid., p. 72. 47 Ibid., p. 4. 48 Ibid., p. 73. 49 Ibid., pp. 73–74. 50 Ibid., pp. 74–75. 51 Ibid., p. 77. 52 Kullada Kesboonchoo, “Official Nationalism Under King Vajiravudh”, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Thai Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, July 3–6, 1986 3:1, pp. 117–119. 53 King Vajiravudh, Plukchai sua pa, p. 81. 54 Ibid., p. 82. 55 Ibid., pp. 84–85.

206 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Notes

Ibid., pp. 90–91. Ibid., pp. 92–94. Ibid., pp. 104–105. Ibid., pp. 105–106. Ekkasan ruang sua pa nai phrabat somdet phra poramintara mahawachirawut phramongkutklao chaoyuhua lae pramuan ruang kieo kap sua pa [Documents on King Vajiravudh’s the Wild Tiger Corps and Stories about the Wild Tigers] (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1970), pp. 12–19. NA, R6 B 16/17, Note on the origin and purpose of the Wild Tigers Corps. Ekkasan ruang sua pa, pp. 7–8. Ibid., pp. 70–71. Phra Worawetphisit, Worawetniphon, [Worawetphisit’s Writings] (Bangkok, 1960), p. 56. NA, R6 B16/3. Ekkasan ruang sua pa, pp. 99–100. Ibid., pp. 70–75. Ibid., p. 64–70. Ibid., p. 70. Kromphraya Wachirayan, Prachum owat [Collection of Sermons] (Bangkok, 1925), pp. 51–52. Prince Wachirayan, Prachumowat [Collection of Sermons] (Bangkok: Amonkanphim, 1969), pp. 36–38. King Vajiravudh, Plukchai sua pa, pp. 2, 12–13. NA, R6 B 16/17. Chodmaihetraiwan nai phrabat somdet phramongkutklaochaoyuhua [The Diary of King Vajiravudh] (Bangkok: Rongphim mahamakut ratchawittayawai, 1974), pp. 37–38. He vigorously argued that military training would instil discipline. Chodmaihetraiwan, p. 35. Ibid., p. 34. This is Vella’s description of the Wild Tiger Coups in general. However, the description only fits the Royal Company and not the rest of the Corps. See Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 27. Ekkasan ruang sua pa, pp. 78–82. NA, R6 K 1/12, King Vajiravudh to Chaophraya Wongsapraphat, April 4, 1912.

6 The 1912 revolt: the first great challenge to absolutism 1 For a study which explains the 1912 revolution in terms of the army’s dissatisfaction against King Vajiravudh, see Acharapon Kumutphitsamai, Kabot R.S. 130 [The 1912 Revolt] (Bangkok: Ammarin wichakan, 1997). This is a very good factual study of the subject, but it does not consider the revolt to be a part of the state-building process. 2 NA, SB, 2.56/30. 3 Rian Srichan and Net Phunwiwat, Rian rumluk [Rian’s Memoir] (Bangkok, 1961). 4 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 5 Ibid., pp. 22–23. 6 NA, R6 L2/1. 7 F.O. 371/1473. 8 Rian, Rian rumluk, p. 57. 9 Ibid., pp. 72–73. 10 NA, R6 L2/1.

Notes 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

207

NA, R6 B17/5. NA, R6 L2/12. NA, R6 B17/5 and NA, R6 B17/6. NA, R6 L2/4. Rian, Rian rumluk, p. 62. Ibid., p. 23. F.O. 371/1473, Siam Observer, March 7, 1912. NA, R6 L2/12. Thanit Yupho, Khon [Masked Dance] (Bangkok, 1968), p. 59. Tamnan krom thahan bok rab thi nung mahadlek raksa phraong nai phrabat somdet phra chunlachomklao chao yu hua [History of King Chulalongkorn’s Royal Bodyguard Regiment] (Bangkok, 1919), pp. 57–59. Chamun Amondarunarak, Phrarat koraneyakit Samkan nai phrabat somdet phra mongkutklao chaoyukan [King Vajiravudh’s Important Activities], vol. 5 (Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1969), p. 30. NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 B17/6. NA, R6 L2/1. NA, R6 B17/6. Rian, Rian rumluk, pp. 1–3. NA, R6 L2/1. It was very likely that he was involved with the threat to revolt over the flogging of the army officers. NA, R6 L2/1. Rian, Rian rumluk, pp. 54–55. NA, R6 L2/4. NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 L2/7. NA, R6 L2/12. NA, R6 B17/11. NA, R6 L2/12. Rian, Rian rumluk, pp. 9–10. Ibid., pp. 20–28; NA R6 L 2/17. NA, R6 L2/3. NA, R6 B17/3. Rian, Rian rumluk, p. 90. NA, R6 B17/7 Wisut to Vajiravudh, March 8, 1912. It should be noted that the king was incensed over the letter and considered it an attempt to humiliate him further. NA, R6 B17/4. NA, R6 L2/1. NA, R6 L2/7. Rian, Rian rumluk, pp. 1–3. NA, R6 B17/7. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.; and NA R6 L 1/2. Pornpen Huntrakul, “The Government Spending During the Reign of King Rama the Sixth (A.D. 1916–25)” (MA thesis, History Department, Chulalongkorn University, 1974). NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 B17/12. NA, R6 L2/3.

208 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Notes

Ibid. NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 B17/5. Prince Vajiravudh, “Parliament” Thawipanya, 2:7 (1904). NA, R6 B17/5. NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 L2/4. NA, R6 B17/6. Rian, Rian rumluk, pp. 8–9. NA, R6 L2/3. NA, R6 B17/5, L2/1. It was reported that there was no voting at some of the meetings. NA, R6 B17/11. NA, R6 B17/7. Chai-anan Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra (eds), Ekkasan kanmuang kanpokkhrong thai [Documents on Thai Politics and Administration] (Bangkok: The Social Association of Thailand, 1975), pp. 209–211. NA, R6 B7/17. NA, R6 B17/5 and NA, R6 B17/7. NA, R6 B17/7. Ibid. Acharaphon, Kabot R.S. 130, pp. 92–100. NA, R6 B17/2. Rian, Rian rumluk, p. 50. NA, R6 B17/5. NA, R6 B2/1. NA, R6 B17/5. Noel Battye, “The Military, Government and Society in Siam: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn” (PhD, diss., Cornell University, 1974), p. 390. NA, R6 B17/7. Ibid. Ibid. NA, R6 L2/1. NA, R6 B17/6. NA, R6 L2/1. NA, R6 L1/2. NA, R6 L2/4. NA, R6 L2/3. Walter F. Vella and Dorothy B. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1978), p. 56. NA, R6 L2/4. Ibid. NA, R6 L2/3. In 1941, King Vajiravudh’s Plukchai sua pa [Instilling the Wild Tiger’s Spirit] was reprinted with 8,000 copies. NA, R6 L2/12. Benjamin Batson. The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 152–153. Ibid., pp. 315–317. Lae Dilokwitthayarat, “Udomkarn lae kanchattang khong khana ratsadon”, [Ideology and the Establishment of the People’s Party], in Khana ratsadon nai prawatsat thai [The People’s Party in Thai History] (Bangkok, 1985), p. 17.

Notes

209

Conclusion 1 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in The Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1993). 2 For an excellent description of the Siamese pre-modern state, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994), pp. 81–88. 3 O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 16–21. 4 For works emphasising an external factor, see Seksan Prasertkul, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East–West Center Press 1966), p. 48. Also, Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994). For works identifying economic forces behind the emergence of the Thai absolutist state see Benedict Anderson, “Studies of the Thai Studies”, in The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History and Political Science, Elizer B. Ayal, (ed.). Paper in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 54 (Athens: Ohio University Center of International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1978), p. 210; and William J. Siffin, Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East–West Center Press, 1966), p. 48. David Wyatt, on the other hand, puts the weight on an internal factor. See David Wyatt, “Family Politics in Nineteenth-Century Thailand”, Journal of Southeast Asian History IX:2 (September, 1968); 208–224. 5 For a theoretical discussion of such interactions, see Mitchell Bernard, “States, Social Forces, Regions and Historical Time in the Industrialisation of East Asia”, The Third World Quarterly 17:4 (1996), 649–665. 6 For a parallel development in Indonesia, see Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: the Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Heineman Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1979). 7 This argument differs from that of Murashima who argues that growing nationalism among the Thai elite, especially during the international situation in the 1880s, gave birth to the modern official nationalism of the Thai state. It also disagrees with Copeland who argues that works on Thai nationalism dealt only with nationalistic expressions made by representatives of the state. See Eiji Murashima, “The Origin of Modern Official State Ideology in Thailand”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies XIX:1 (March, 1988), 80–96; and Matthew Philip Copeland, “Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in Thailand” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1993). 8 For example, see Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asia Rice Frontier, 1852–1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974). 9 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Barrington Moore Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin University Books, 1966). 10 Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, Wiwatthankan rat aungkrit lae faranfset nai krasae setthakitlok [The English and French State Transformation in the World Economy] (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 2002), Chapters 8 and 9. 11 See Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand, Economy and Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 235–239.

Selected bibliography

Archival materials Thai National Library Third reign NL, R3 18, C.S. 1200 (1839). NL, R3 175, C.S. 1212 (1850).

Fourth reign NL, R4 18. NL, R4 59, C.S. 1213. NL, R4 74, C.S. 1226 (1864). NL, R4 82, C.S. 1215 (1853). NL, R4 113, C.S. 1216 (1854). NL, R4 117, C.S. 1226 (1864). NL, R4 126. NL, R4 145, C.S. 1217 (1860). NL, R4 339. NL, R4 342. NL, R4 383. NL, R4 406. NL, R4 44, C.S. 1215 (1853). NL, R4 521. NL, R4 C.S. 1217(1855).

Fifth reign NL, R5 137/1, C.S. 1231 (1869). NL, R5 153/10, C.S. 1236 (1874). NL, R5 153/12. NL, R5 154/13. NL, R5 166/1. NL, R5 166/4.

Selected bibliography 211 NL, R5 166/5. NL, R5 167/3. NL, R5 168/1. NL, R5 168/10. NL, R5 168/3, C.S. 1236 (1874). NL, R5 168/8. NL, R5 169/13. NL, R5 169/4. NL, R5 185/12. NL, R5 185/13. NL, R5 186/2. NL, R5 186/4. NL, R5 187/10. NL, R5 187/12 and 190/11. NL, R5 187/4, 186/4 and 190/5. NL, R5 190/11. NL, R5 190/16. NL, R5 243/10. NL, R5 243/3, C.S. 1235 (1873). NL, R5 243/15. NL, R5 244/2, C.S. 1231 (1869), 168/1, 245/5, 244/3. NL, R5 248/3 C.S. 1244 (1882). NL, R5 331/9.

Thai National Archives Fourth reign NA, R4 99/3 R.S. 83 (1864).

Fifth reign NA, R5 213/15. NA, R5 A5/5. NA, R5 B 10/5. NA, R5 B 2/16. NA, R5 B 8.2/464. NA, R5 B1 4/2. NA, R5 B 1 10/1. NA, R5 B 17/18. NA, R5 B 3/4. NA, R5 K vol. 3. NA, R5 Kh 18.7/22. NA, R5 KT 14. NA, R5 KT vol. 13. NA, R5 M 8.1/8. NA, R5 NK 11. NA, R5 NK 24.

212

Selected bibliography

NA, R5 NK 29. NA, R5 NK vol. 17. NA, R5 NK1 May 1879. NA, R5 S 1/53. NA, R5 S 1/67, R.S. 119 (1900). NA, R5 S 2/33. NA, R5 S 21/1. NA, R5 SP 3. NA, R5 SP 7, C.S. 1246 (1884). NA, R5 T 2/23. NA, R5 Y 1/67. NA, R5 K vol. 3. NA, R5 213/15. NA, R5 B 1.10/1. NA, R5 B 8.2/464 NA, R5 K vol. 3. NA, R5 KT 40/23. NA, R5 M 8.1/8. NA, R5 M 99/8. NA, R5 NK 22. NA, R5 NK 30, 1883. NA, R5 S 1/18. NA, R5 S 1/67, R.S. 119 (1900). NA, R5 S 1/98. NA, R5 S 2/3. NA, R5 S 2/7. NA, R5 S 2/8. NA, R5 S 5/4. NA, R5 S 5/5. NA, R5 S 5/6. NA, R5 S 5/7. NA, R5 S 5/8. NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–B). NA, R5 S 5/9 (K–Y). NA, R5 SB 2.21/3. NA, R5 SB 256/25. NA, R5 SB 256/30. NA, R5 T 2/23.

Sixth reign NA, R6 B 16/17. NA, R6 B 16/3. NA, R6 B 3.1/64. NA, R6 K 1/12. NA, R6 K 1/14. NA, R6 L 2/1. NA, R6 M 1.7/4.

Selected bibliography 213 NA, R6 M 63/6. NA, R6 N 25/20. NA, R6 M 1.7/4. NA, R6 M 63/6. NA, R6 B 16/17. NA, R6 B 17/11. NA, R6 B 17/12. NA, R6 B 17/2. NA, R6 B 17/3. NA, R6 B 17/4. NA, R6 B 17/5. NA, R6 B 17/5, L2/1. NA, R6 B 17/6. NA, R6 B 17/7. NA, R6 B 7/17. NA, R6 K 1/12. NA, R6 K 1/14. NA, R6 L 1/2. NA, R6 L 2/1. NA, R6 L 2/12. NA, R6 L 2/17. NA, R6 L 2/3. NA, R6 L 2/4. NA, R6 L 2/7.

Public Records Office, London F.O. 17/1223. F.O. 69/147. F.O. 371/1473. F.O. 371/1474. F.O. 371/1751.

Newspapers and periodicals Darunowat, vol. 1, 1874. Khao san, vol. 71, September 9, 1907. Khao san, vol. 97, January 11, 1910. Khao san, no. 9, October 1, 1903. Khao san, no. 9, October 16, 1903. Ratchakitchanubeksa, May 5, 1913. Sayamsamai, August 27, 1884. Sayamsamai, December 2, 1886. Sayamsamai, February 10, 1886. Sayamsamai, January 7, 1885. Sayamsamai, May 28, 1884. Sayamsamai, November 4, 1886. Sayamsamai, October 1, 1885.

214

Selected bibliography

Sayamsamai, October 29, 1885. Sayamsamai, September 16, 1885. Siam Observer, March 7, 1912. SWA, September 2, 1869. SWA, May 12, 1870. SWA, May 15, 1870. SWA, June 1, 1871. SWA, July 13, 1871. SWA, August 15, 1872. SWA, May 2, 1873. SWA, July 13, 1873. SWA, October 16, 1873. SWA, July 31, 1873.

Books and journals Acharapon Kumutphitsamai. Kabot R.S. 130 [The 1912 Revolt]. Bangkok: Ammarin Wichakan, 1997. Adas, Michael. The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asia Rice Frontier, 1852–1941. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Akin Rabibhadana. The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969. Amondarunarak, Chamun. Phrarat koraneyakit Samkan nai phrabat somdet phra mongkutklao chaoyukan [King Vajiravudh’s Important Activities], vol. 5 Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1969. Anderson, Benedict. “Studies of the Thai Studies”, In The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History and Political Science, Elizer B. Ayal (ed). Paper in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 54. Athens: Ohio University Center of International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1978. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Editions, 1983. Aunson phithi poed krachomfai chumphonkhet-udomsak [Commemorating the Opening Ceremony of Prince Chumphon’s Firehouse]. Bangkok, 1960. Batson, Benjamin A. The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Bernard, Mitchell. “States, Social Forces, Regions and Historical Time in the Industrialization of East Asia”, Third World Quarterly 17:4 (1996), 649–665. Bowring, Sir John. The Kingdom and People of Siam. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. Braudel, Fernand. The Perspective of the World, trans. S. Reynolds. London: Collins, 1984. Chai-anan Samudavanija and Khattiya Kannasutra (eds). Ekkasan kanmuang kanpokkhrong thai [Documents on Thai Politics and Administration]. Bangkok: The Social Association of Thailand, 1975. Chaiyan Rajchagool. The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994.

Selected bibliography 215 Chakkrapranisrisinwisut, Luang. Ruang khong chaophraya mahithon [Chao Phraya Mahithon’s Story]. Bangkok, 1960. Chodmaihetraiwan nai phrabat somdet phramongkutklaochaoyuhua [The Diary of King Vajiravudh]. Bangkok: Rongphim mahamakut ratchawittayawai, 1974. Chotmaihet ruang phrabat somdet phra chomklao chaoyuhua song prachuan [Account of King Mongkut’s Illness]. Bangkok, 1947. Chotmaihet wa duai sir chames bruk khaoma tham sanya nai rachakan thi sam mua pi cho P.S. 2395 [A record on Sir James Brooke’s Mission under King Rama III in 1851]. Bangkok, 1923. Chotmayhet raiwan nai phrabat somdet phramongkutklaochaoyuhua [Diary of King Vajiravudh]. Bangkok: Mahamakut ratchawittayalai, 1974. Chulalongkorn, King. Phraratchadamrat nai phrabatsomdet phrajunlachomklao chaoyuhua [Speeches by King Chulalongkorn]. Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 1967. Chulalongkorn, King. Phraratchaphithi sipsong duan [Annual Royal Ceremonies]. Bangkok: Sinlapabannakan, 1968. Chulalongkorn, King and Prince Wachirayan. Pramuan phraniphon [Collection of Correspondence]. Bangkok, 1971. Clarke, Sir Andrew. “My First Visit to Siam”, Contemporary Review 81 (1902), 221–230. Coclanis, Peter A. “Southeast Asia’s Incorporation into the World Rice Market: A Revisionist View”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 24:2 (1993), 251–267. Cox, Robert W. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Crawfurd, John. Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987. Cushman, J.W. “Siamese Trade and the Chinese Go-between, 1767–1855”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 12:1 (March 1981). Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Ruang loek that nai ratchakarn thi ha [On the Abolition of Slavery under King Chulalongkorn’s Reign]. Bangkok, 1944. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Laksana kanpokkhrong prathet sayam tae boran [Ancient Administration of Siam]. Bangkok, 1959. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Prachum phraniphon bettalet [Collection of Writings]. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Khwamsongcham [Memoirs]. Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1966. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Tamnan khuang ratchaissiyapon chunlachomklao [The Story of Chunla chomklao Order]. Bangkok, 1969. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Nithanborankhadi. Bangkok: Phrae phittaya, 1971. Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince. Khondi thi khaphachao ruchak [Bibliographies of the Good People I Have Known], vol. 2, Bangkok, 1984. Devawongse, Prince. Punyakatha praprawat lae chodmaihet raiwan [Biography and Diary]. Bangkok, 1965. Dhida Saraya. “Thai History”, mimeograph copy. Dhida Saraya. Rat boran [Ancient States]. Bangkok: Muang Boran Press, 1994. Dhiravat Na Pombejra. “Crown Trade and Court Politics in Ayutthaya During the Reign of King Narai (1656–88)”, in The Southeast Asia Port and Polity, J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (eds). Singapore: Singapore Press, 1990, 127–142.

216

Selected bibliography

Dhirawat Na Pombejra. “Seventeenth-Century Ayudhya: A Shift to Isolation?”, in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era, Trade, Power and Belief, Anthony Reid (ed.). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993. Ekkasan khong nai harry parks [Files Concerning Harry Park’s Mission to Bangkok in 1856[. Bangkok, 1975. Ekkasan ruang chatkansuksa nai ratchakan phrabatsomdet phrachunlachomklao chaoyuhua [Documents on Educational Reforms under King Chulalongkorn]. Bangkok: Suksitsayam, 1968. Ekkasan ruang sua pa nai phrabat somdet phra poramintara mahawachirawut phramongkutklao chaoyuhua lae pramuan ruang kieo kap sua pa [Documents on King Vajiravudh’s the Wild Tiger Corps and Stories about the Wild Tigers]. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1970. Frank, Andre Gunder. ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Age of Asia. Berkeley: University of California, 1998. Gutzlaff, Charles. Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, 1833, with Notice of Siam, Corea and the Lao-choo Islands. London: R. Westley and A.H. Davis, 1834. Hall, Kenneth R. Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Hung, Ho-fung. “Imperial China and Capitalist Europe in the Eighteenth-Century Global Economy”, Review 24:4 (2000). Khachon Sukphanit. Thanandon phrai [Phrai Status]. Bangkok, 1976. Ko Sawatphanit. Boran suksa [Traditional Education]. Bangkok, 1972. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades 1932–1957. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995. Kromphraya Wachirayan. Prachum owat [Collection of Sermons] (Bangkok, 1925), pp. 51–52. Kullada Kesboonchoo. “Khamkhit ruang amnat lae phithikham” [The Concept of Power and Ceremonies], in Chunlasan Sangkhomsat lae Manutsayasat [Journal of Social Science and Humanities]. Special Volume on Thai Philosophy and Political Thinking. Bangkok, 1982. Kullada Kesboonchoo. “Official Nationalism Under King Vajiravudh”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Thai Studies, vol. 3. Canberra: Australian National University, 1986. Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead. Wiwatthankan rat aungkrit lae faranfset nai krasae setthakit lok [The English and French State Transformation in the World Economy]. Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 2002. Lae Dilokvidhayarat. “Udomkarn lae kanchattang khong khana ratsadon” [Ideology and the Establishment of the People’s Party], in Khana ratsadon nai prawatsat thai [The People’s Party in Thai History]. Bangkok, 1985. Lathi thamniam tangtang [Various Traditions and Customs]. Book Two. Bangkok: Khlangwitthaya, 1972. Lieberman, Victor. “An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia? Problems of Regional Coherence – A Review Article”, The Journal of Asian Studies 54:3 (August 1995), 796–815 Mahithon, Chaophraya. Ruang khong chaophraya mahitthon [Chaopraya Mahitthon’s Story]. Bangkok, 1956. Malloch, D.E. Siam: Some General Remarks on its Productions and in Particular on its Imports and Exports. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1852.

Selected bibliography 217 Manich Jumsai. History of Anglo-Thai Relations. Bangkok: Chalermnit, 1970. Mongkut, King. Phra samana san [The King’s Writing in His Monkhood]. Bangkok, 1926. Mongkut, King. Phrarachaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thisam [The King’s Writings in his Monkhood]. Bangkok, 1926. Mongkut, King. Phra ratchahattalekha [King Mongkut’s Writings]. Bangkok, 1963. Manop Thavonwatsakun. Khunnang ayutthaya [Ayudhyan Nobility]. Bangkok: Thammasart University Press, 1993. Moore, Adey. “An Early British Merchant in Bangkok”, Selected Articles from the Siam Society Journal Vol. II part 2, no. 2, Relationships with France, England and Denmark. Bangkok, 1959, 21–38. Moore Jr., Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Middlesex: Penguin University Books, 1966. Morton, A.L. A People’s History of England. London: Laurence & Wishart, 1992. Murashima, Eiji. “The Origin of Modern Official State Ideology in Thailand”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19:1 (March, 1988), 80–96. Narintharathewi, Kromluang. Chotmaihet Kwansongcham [Memoirs]. Bangkok, 1973. Natthawut Sutthisongkhram. Somdet chaophraya barommaha srisuriyawong [Somdet Chaophraya barommaha Srisuriyawong’s Biography], vol. 2. Bangkok: Charoenrat Publishers, 1973. Natthawut Sutthisongkhram. Chaophraya lae somdet chaophraya bang than nai sakun bunnag [Selected Chaophraya and Somdet Chaophraya of the Bunnags]. Bangkok, 1974. Nithi Aeusrivongse. Pakkai lae bairua [Quills and Sails]. Bangkok: Ammarin Printing, 1984. Nithi Aeusrivongse. Kanmuang thai samai phrachao krung thonburi [Thai Politics under the Reign of King Thonburi]. Bangkok: Sinlapawatthanathan, 1986. Nithi Aeusrivongse. Kanmuang thai samai phra narai [Thai Politics under King Narai], 4th edn. Bangkok: Matichon Press, 1996. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. Thailand, Economy and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995. Patsakorawong, Phraya. “Ruang suan” [On Orchards]. Wachirayan wiset vol. 4 (July 28, 1888), 452–454. Perlin, Frank. “State Formation Reconsidered Part Two”, Modern Asian Studies 19:3 (1985), 415–448. Phanurangsi, Prince. Tamnan thahan mahadlek [History of the Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment]. Bangkok, 1953. Phisansinlapasat, (Thammasakmontri), Phraya. Thammachariya V, 6th edn. Bangkok: Aksonniti, 1913. Phittayalappritthiyakon, Kronmun. Watthnatham kap phramahakasat [Culture and the Kingship]. Bangkok, 1968. Phrasadet, Chaophraya. Tuan phuan [Reminding Friends]. Bangkok, 1930. Piyachat Pitawan. Rabob phai nai sangkhom thai P.S. 2411–2453 [The Phrai System in Thai Society]. Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1983. Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si, year 2404–2411 [Collected Proclamations of the Fourth Reign, 1862–1868]. Bangkok, 1968. Praphat Chantawirat. Phra prawat lae phra koraniyakit nai samai ratchakan thi ha

218

Selected bibliography

khong pholrauek phrachao borommawongthoe krommawuang chumphonkhetu-domsak [Admiral Krommawuang Chumphonkhet-u-domsak’s Biography and Royal Activities of King Chulalongkorn]. Bangkok: Rongphim charoentham, 1984. Prasertaksonnit, Luang. Phra phutchariya I [Buddhist Ethics]. Bangkok: Aksonnit. Prawatsat yuan-thai nai ruang khamen lae lao [The History of Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos]. Bangkok, 1979. Prisadang, Prince. Prawat yo naipunek phra worawongtheu phraongchao Prisadang [Prince Colonel Prisadang’s Brief Autobiography]. Bangkok, 1970. Punha Khudkhong [Riddles]. Bangkok, 1968. Ratkrawi, Phra. Nangsue lokayuwattitham. Bangkok, 1913. Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680/Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis. Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1993. Rendel, Marquerite. “The Administrative Functions Of the French Conseil d’état”, L.S.E. Research Monograph No. 6, 1970. Reynolds, Craig J. “Buddhist Cosmography in Thai History, with Special Reference to Nineteenth-Century Culture Change”, Journal of Asian Studies 35:2 (February 1976), 203–220. Rian Srichan and Net Phunwiwat. Rian rumluk [Rian’s Memoir]. Bangkok, 1961. Samosonsapphakan, Phraya. Nibatchadok [A Jataka Tale]. Bangkok, 1929. Sangsit Piriyarangsan. Thunniyom khunnang thai B.E. 2475–2503 [Capitalism under Thai Nobility, 1932–1960]. Bangkok: Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University, 1983. Sapha ti pruksa ratchakan phandin nai ratchakan phrabat somdet phra chunlachomklao chaoyuhua [King Chulalongkorn’s Council of State]. Bangkok: Thaphrachan Press, 1971. Sarasin Viraphol. Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese trade 1652–1853. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. Satchaphirom Udomratchapakdi, Phraya. Lao hai luk fang [Telling My Story to the Children]. Bangkok: Ministry of the Interior, 1959. Sawat Chanthani. Nithan choarai [A Planter’s Stories]. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1973. Siffin, William J. Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development. Honolulu: East–West Center Press, 1966. Skinner, William G. Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957. Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolution: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Sombat Chanthawong and Rangsan Thanaphonphan (eds). Rak muang thai [We Love Thailand]. Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1976. Sorasak Ngamkhachonkunkit. “Crucial Factors of the Ayudhya’s Fall.” Muang Boran Journal 10:2 (April–June 1984). Steinberg, David Joel (ed.). In Search of Southeast Asia. London: Pall Mall Press, 1971. Sunthonphiphit, Phraya. Phramahakarunathikhun haeng phrabatsomdet phra mongkutklao chaoyuhua [The Kindness of King Vajiravudh]. Bangkok, 1971. Supphawat Kasemsri, Momratchawong. Momchao Wattayakon Kasemsri’s cremation volume. Bangkok, 1964. Surasakmontri, Chaophraya. Prawatkan khong chomphon chaophraya surasak-

Selected bibliography 219 montri [The Life of Field Marshall Chaophraya Surasakmontri], vol. 1. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961. Sutherland, Heather. The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: the Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Heineman Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1979. Tamnan krom thahan bok rab thi nung mahadlek raksa phraong nai phrabat somdet phra chunlachomklao chao yu hua [History of King Chulalongkorn’s Royal Bodyguard Regiment]. Bangkok, 1919. Tarling, Nicholas. “Siam and Sir James Brooke”, Journal of the Siam Society 48:2 (November 1960), 43–72. Tarling, Nicholas. “The Mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam”, Journal of the Siam Society 50:2 (December 1962), 11–118. Terwiel, B.J. Through Travellers’ Eyes: An Approach to Early Nineteenth-Century Thai History. Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1989. Thammasakmontri, Chaophraya. Thammachariya V [Ethics], 6th edn. Bangkok: Aksonniti, 1913. Thammasakmontri, Chaophray, and Anukiwithun, Phraya. Thammachariya IV [Ethics]. Bangkok: Bannakit, no date. Thammasakmontri, Chaophraya and Anukiwithun, Phraya. Thammachariya II [Ethics], 14th edn. Bangkok: Rongrian changphim, 1939. Thammasakmontri, Chaophraya and Wichittampariwat, Phraya. Thammachariya VI [Ethics], 11th edn. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1956. Thammasakmontri, Phraya. “Rongrian kharatchakan phonlaroen khong phrabatsomdet phra chunlachomklaochaoyuhua” [King Chulalongkorn’s Civil Service School], in Lom Rua [Building up Fences]. Bangkok, 1968, 11–27. Thanit Yupho. Khon [Masked Drama]. Bangkok: Department of Fine Arts, 1957. The Burney Papers. Vol. 1. Bangkok: The Wachirayan National Library, 1910. The Burney Papers. Vol. 2. Bangkok: The Wachirayan National Library, 1910. The Crawfurd Papers. Bangkok: The Wachirayan National Library, 1915. Thephasadin, Phraya. Ruang bedtalet khong phraya thephasdin [Phraya Thephasadin’s Miscellany]. Bangkok, 1952. Thiphakonrawong, Chaophraya. Phrarachaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thisam laem song [The Royal Chronicles of the Bangkok Dynasty, the Third Reign, book two]. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1961. Thongchai Winichakul. Siam Mapped: A History of The Geo-body of a Nation. Bangkok: Silkworms, 1994. Thongchai Winichakul. “The Quest for ‘Siwilai’: A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam”, The Journal of Asian Studies 59:3 (August 2000), 528–549. Tilly, Charles. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, In Bringing the State Back, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Thda Skocpol (eds). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 169–191. Trocki, Carl A. Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Vajiravudh, King. Kham athibai ruang mahadlek [An Explanation Concerning Royal Pages]. Bangkok: Samakkhi Press, 1910. Vajiravudh, King. Pakinaka khadi [Instilling the Wild Tiger Spirit]. Bangkok, 1942. Vajiravudh, King. Plukchai sua pa [Instilling the Wild Tiger Spirit]. Bangkok, 1942.

220

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Vajiravudh, King. Thieo muang phra ruang [Travels in Phra Ruang Country]. Bangkok: Minister of the Interior, 1954. Vajiravudh, King. “Lak ratchakan”, in Pakinaka Khadi [Miscellaneous]. Bangkok: Sinlapabannakan, 1972. Vajiravudh, King. Pramuan phramiphom nai phrabatsomdet phra mongkutklaw chaoyuhua phakpakinnaka [Collection of King Vajiravudh’s Writings]. Bangkok: Teachers’ Institute Press, 1975. Vajiravudh, King. Phra ratchabunthuk khong phrabat somdet phra mongkut klao chao yuhua [King Vajiravudh’s Diary]. Bangkok: The Royal Pages College Alumni, 1981. Vella, Walter F. Siam under Rama III. New York: The Association for Asian Studies, 1957. Vella, Walter F. Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978. Wachirayan, Prince. Prachumowat [Collection of Sermons]. Bangkok: Amonkanphim, 1969. Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. “The Canton Trade and the Opium War”, in The Cambridge History of China, John K. Fairbank (ed.). Vol. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 163–212. Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Orlando: Academic Press, Inc., 1974. Wilson, Constance. “The Northeast and the Middle Mekong Valley in the Thai Economy: 1830–1870”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Thai Studies, vol. 3. Canberra: Australian National University, 1987. Wolters, O.W. History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. Worawetphisit, Phra. Worawetniphon [Worawetphisit’s Writings]. Bangkok, 1960. Wyatt, David. “Family Politics in Nineteenth-Century Thailand”, Journal of Southeast Asian History IX:2 (September, 1968), 208–224. Wyatt, David K. The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969. Wyatt, David K. and Samuel McFarland. Early Education in Thailand, 1877–1895. Document no. 00396. Thai Information Centre, Chulalongkorn University, 1965. Xie, Shunyu. Siam and the British 1874–5: Sir Andrew Clarke and the Front Palace Crisis. Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1988.

Theses Adams, David B.U.J. “Monarchy and Political Change: Thailand under Chulalongkorn, 1868–1885”, PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1977. Battye, Noel A. “The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–1910: Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn”, PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974. Busakorn, Lailert. “The Thai Monarchy in the Ban Phlu Luang Period”, PhD diss., University of London, 1972. Gray, Christine E. “The Politics of the Middle Way: A Study of King Mongkut’s Monastic Career (1824–1851)”, MA thesis, University of Chicago, 1978.

Selected bibliography 221 Hong Lysa. “The Evolution of the Thai Economy in the Early Bangkok Period and its Historiography”, PhD diss., University of Sydney, 1981. Kanphirom Suwannananondi. “King Vajiravudh and His Nation-building Programmes”, MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1981. La-ortong Amarinratana. “The Sending of Students Abroad from 1868–1937”, MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1979. Pornpen Huntrakul. “Karn chai jai ngeun pandin nai ratchasamai prabat somdej pra mongkut klao jaoyuhua”, MA thesis, History Department, Chulalongkorn University, 1974. Seksan Prasertkul. “The Transformation of the Thai State and Economic Change (1855–1945)”, PhD diss., Cornell University, 1989. Sukunya Bumroongsook. “The Authority and Role of Samuha Phra Kalahom during the Rattanakosin period”, MA thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1982. Wyatt, David. “The Transformation of the Thai State and Economic Change (1855–1945)”, PhD diss., Cornell University, 1989. Yawarat Phutipimanrdegul. “The Changes of Bangkok during the Reigns of King Rama Vth-VIIth and its Subsequent Environmental Impact on the People”, MA. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1983.

Index

absolute monarchy 84, 85, 92, 97, 101, 104, 107, 117, 125 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180; criticism of 104–11 absolutism 1, 10, 11, 17, 27, 37, 41, 51, 52, 86, 91, 104, 107, 108, 110, 112, 126, 127, 128, 130, 135, 136, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 162, 164, 169, 172, 173,174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183; absolutist state 2, 10, 11, 31, 34, 39, 40, 43, 51, 52, 54, 64, 66, 68, 74, 85, 93, 97, 112, 125, 154, 170, 179, 180, 181, 182 act of homage (thawai tua) 13, 67, 130 “Age of Commerce” 179 agnosticism 142 agrarian capitalism 182 Ahanborirak, Phraya 33, 45, 58, 59, 60 Akatodsaros, King 15 Alabaster, Henry 49 Anderson, Benedict 1, 136 Angkor 4 annual stipends (bia wat) 20, 21, 22, 23, 36 army 9, 21, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 94, 97, 99, 101, 106, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 133, 147, 148, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 171, 177; armed forces 105, 152 atheism 142 Ayudhya 10–17, 179; the first fall 14; legitimacy 13, 14; relationship between kings and nobles 13; the second fall 17, 18 Ayudhyan State 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 Ban Phuluang 17, 143 Barami 14, 29 bourgeoisie 4, 41, 71, 139, 165, 181, 182 Bowring, Sir John 30, 31

Bowring Treaty 8, 10, 25, 27, 31, 32, 36, 40, 58, 180 Braudel, Fernand 4–5, 11 British East India Company 5,6 Brooke, Sir James 26, 28, 29, 31 Buddhism 14, 64, 79, 86, 137, 141, 162 Bun 14 Bunnags 25, 27, 28, 29–30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 80, 81, 94, 95, 98, 105; on trial 58–60 bureaucracy 2, 3, 5, 15, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 85, 92, 93, 95, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 111, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 136, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 154, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 164, 169, 170, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182; bureaucratic elite 72, 111–17; and King Chulalongkorn 66–8; and loyalty 67; modern legal system 111–17; principle of equality 120; principle of jurisprudence 112–17; professional training 111–17; reforming manpower system 113 bureaucratic bourgeoisie 93, 94, 97, 99, 101, 117, 128, 133, 139, 141–2, 156, 157, 159, 164, 166, 167, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 181 bureaucratic elite 72, 94, 107, 111–17, 127, 129, 130, 145, 159, 160, 164, 176, 177 Burma 2, 4, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, 105, 143 Burney, Henry 22, 25 Burney Treaty 22, 25–6, 29 Burut, Phraya see Mahintharasakthamrong, Chaophraya

Index 223 cabinet 95, 96, 102, 111, 112, 114 Cadet School 125 Cambodia 19, 24, 25, 30, 36 capitalist development 1, 3, 4, 87, 181, 182, 183 centralisation 1, 2, 3, 10, 41, 52, 57, 92, 96, 98 Cha Yong 149, 163; see also Ramrakhop, Chaophraya Chakri 102 Chalo, Lt. 159 Chan (also social class) 169, 170, 175 Chao (monarchy) 103 Chao Muang 11 Charoenratchamaitri, Phraya 48 Charun, Prince 114 Charun, Sub-Lt. 155, 160 Chat (nation or birth) 139, 160 Chat ban muang 140 China 5, 6, 11, 16, 17,18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 35, 154, 159, 163, 167, 169, 170 Chinese world-economy 8, 10, 16, 26, 32, 42; and Siam 17–20 Christianity 64, 72, 141 Chulalongkorn, King 1, 39, 154, 155, 157, 164, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182; Chulalongkorn, Prince 35, 38, 44; conflict with Somdej Chaophraya 56–7; early physical reform 52–4; early years 39; and man power system 43; and Old Siam 44–5; and Young Siam 49 Chumpon, Prince 77, 111–12, 130–31 civil list 171 civil Service College 134 civilisation/civilised (Siwilai) 9, 35, 36, 64, 87, 88, 95, 104, 161, 165, 166, 168; and uncivilised 132, 136 Clarke, Sir Andrew 49, 50, 62, 63 clerks 68, 72, 74, 76, 83, 103, 118, 119, 147 Code Napoleon 52 colonies/colonial 1, 2, 3, 6, 21, 23, 50, 88, 102, 113, 167 commoners 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 92, 124, 132, 169, 170 Conservative Siam 39, 40, 40–1, 45–8, 50, 51, 53, 55, 86, 94, 95, 98 constitution 48, 51, 105, 111, 152, 163, 168, 176 constitutional monarchy 105, 107, 108, 156, 165, 166, 177

corporate interests 116, 171 Corvée 12, 13, 18, 22, 24, 36, 41, 42, 46, 57, 80, 97, 101, 109, 133 cosmopolitan culture 118 Council of State 39, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54–58, 62, 96, 139, 145; and the French Conseil d’État 54 Coup of 1912 see Revolt of 1912 courtiers 132, 133, 135, 145, 148, 152, 153 Cox, Robert 5 Crawford, John 25 Criminal Code 114 cultural community 88–90 culture 89, 90 Damrong, Prince 29, 31, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 78–9, 83, 84, 85, 112, 114, 121, 124, 147, 148; the Royal Pages School 78–9, 84–5 Darunowat 43, 48, 49, 51, 58, 63, 64–5 Dewavongse, Prince 71, 99–100, 104, 108, 110 Dit Bunnag 24 Dutch, the (and Holland) 16 East India Company 5–6, 20 education 66, 68, 69 117–18, 129, 132, 134, 154, 159, 160, 163, 177, 178, 180; commoners’ interests in 66, 69, 72; commoners’ reaction 75–6; mass education 74–7; professional education 77–81; recruitment 78; resistance from Old Siam 69; the Sangha reaction 75 English Revolution (Glorious Revolution) 182 European enlightenment 86 European world-economy 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25–32, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 46, 179, 180 executive power 114 export tax 31, 46, 49 extraterritorial rights 31 Family Order 44, 56 favouritism 162, 163, 164, 167, 177 Finance Office (Ho Radsadakonphipat) 52, 53, 57 financial structure 20–5; feudal 1, 2, 3 First Foot Guard (thahan na) 94, 99–101, 111, 133 France 182, 183

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Index

French Revolution 182 French Second Empire Constitution 48 Fung san 116 gambling 23, 43, 47, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 97, 109; tax farm 47, 52, 58, 64, 65, 97 gentry 182 Gerini 100, 110 Germany 159 Great Britain/United Kingdom/ England 25, 46, 48, 63, 79, 86, 105, 111, 115, 119, 132, 136, 145, 182, 183 Heir Apparent (Phra borom orotsathirat) 15, 22, 95 Ho ratsadakonphiphat (see Ministry of Finance) 53, 57 immigrants/labour, Chinese 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 42, 69 imperialism 1, 2, 31, 181 import tax 31, 46 independence 1, 15 17, 31, 45, 105, 113, 115, 117, 139, 140 India 5, 6, 11, 14, 16, 20, 26, 48, 49, 51, 79, 86 international division of labour 32 Jacquemyne, Rolin 102 Japan 2, 16, 34, 105, 118, 165, 166, 167, 173 Java 6, 7, 8, 32, 49 judicial power 114, 115, 117 junk trade 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 165; royal junk trade 19, 21, 23, 24 Junkers 70, 97 Kabot R.S. 130 see Revolt of 1912 Kalahom/Samuhakalahom 12, 15, 30, 32, 33, 34, 45, 60, 64, 65, 94, 95, 102, 145 Kalahomratchsena, Phraya 55 Khao san 113, 121 Khon 132, 147, 157, 160 Khon chan mai see bureaucratic bourgeoisie Khon chan tam 168, 169, 172 Khunnang 83 145, 169; see also nobles Knox, Thomas 44, 49, 62 Kraisi, Khunluangphra 116 Krasapkitkoson, Phraya 48, 59 Krom muang 12, 32 Krom na 12, 33, 45, 58–9, 59, 60

Krom phraklangmahasombat see the Treasury Krom suratsawadi 47 Krom Tha 12, 32, 33, 45, 49, 64 Kromphraratchawangbowonsathanmongkon see wang na Lae Dilokvidhayarat 178 Land tax 23, 24, 46, 58, 59 Laos 11, 19, 30, 36 law school 77, 78, 79 League, the 95, 98, 99, 106–8, 133 legislative advisory council (Ratthamontri sapha) 96 legislative power 193 liberalism 6, 7, 22, 167 Liebermann, Victor 17 likay 164 limited monarchy 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169 literacy 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77, 82 lottery tax 52, 109 loyalty, 49 60, 69, 81, 84, 85, 95, 99, 101, 103, 116, 117, 122, 126, 129, 130, 140, 144, 150, 151, 156, 159, 174, 175, 176, 177 McFarland, Rev. 72 Mahadthai 12, 32, 52, 53, 64 Mahintharasakthamrong, Chaophraya 47, 63, 101, 109 Mahithon, Chaophraya 79, 115 Man, Lt. 159 manpower/manpower system 4, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 39, 40–1, 42, 46, 47, 51, 55, 57, 107 maritime trade 4, 10–11, 13, 14 Maruphong, Prince 123 Master of the Royal Mint 98 Memorandum of 1885 105–8 mercantilism 6 merit/meritocratic 66, 82, 107, 109, 118, 119, 120, 121, 127, 135, 144, 160, 181 Military Officers’ Academy 77, 78, 80–1 Ministry of Finance 64, 65 Ministry of the Interior 79, 84, 113, 114, 122, 123, 125, 134 Ministry of Justice 111–14, 124 modernisation 1, 9, 40, 41, 66, 81, 92, 96, 106, 112, 124, 174–7 modernity 9, 104, 144, 146, 153 monarchy/monarch 1, 13, 15, 17, 22, 23, 24, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 44, 55, 62, 65, 67,

Index 225 81, 84, 85, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104–11, 116, 125, 126, 128, 130, 135, 136–9, 141, 143, 149, 152, 156, 157, 158, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182 Monastery School 74–5 Mongkut, King 1, 8, 19, 21, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 94, 128; as Prince 27, 28, 29, 38 monopolies 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31 Muang 11, 88, 94, 179 Muang thai 89, 160 Mughals 2, 7, 17 Munlabotbanphaki 70, 71 Nai 19, 24, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 81, 94, 95, 103, 104, 106, 119, 120, 121 Nanking Treaty 27–8 Narai, King 16 Narasuan, King 5 Narathip, Prince 114, 115 Narong, Phraya 165 nation 85, 88–9, 90, 91, 117, 122, 136, 139–41, 143, 144, 150, 161, 167, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177; Muang thai 88, 89, rak chat 174 nation state 10, 41, 51, 85, 88, 92 nationalism 66, 85, 89–90, 91, 92, 106, 108, 111, 126, 135, 139, 146, 171, 172, 173, 174, 181; Buddhism 89, 90, 141–2; ethical system 158–9; ethics 87; family relationship 163–4; and family values 90–1; Fatherland 88; under King Chulalongkorn 86–93; under King Vajiravudh 135–42; liberal nationalism 136, 172, 173, 175, 176, 181; monarchy 136–9; nation 88–9; nationalists 79, 80, 118, 121; official nationalism 126, 135, 136, 139, 144, 149, 153, 172, 173, 174, 176; Religion 141–2, 150; and world economy 87 Naval Academy 77 Net Phumwiwat 154, 158, 172 Nithi Aeusrivong 24 nobles 2, 3, 15, 16, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 51, 52, 53, 56, 66, 67, 70, 72, 74, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 96, 98, 102, 106, 109, 132, 167, 169, 179, 180, 182 Norarat, Phraya 99, 100 Old Siam 39, 40, 43–5, 46, 47, 51, 53, 60, 63, 69, 81, 86, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100

opium 6, 7, 8, 23, 28, 97; tax 30, 46, 48, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64 Opium War 26 pages 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 78, 81, 82, 85, 123, 125, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 152, 158, 162, 163, 165, 171 Paknam Incident of 1893 165 Palace Guard Regiment 158, 159, 160 parliament/parliamentary system 110, 167, 168, 182 patrimonial state/patrimonialism 1, 2, 14, 15, 37, 179, 180 patronage 66, 93, 97, 98, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 135, 158, 162 patron-client relationships 13, 20, 34–5, 67–8, 93, 121, 125, 158, 159 Pax Americana 5 Pax Britannica 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 peasants 23, 29; peasantry 36, 182 people’s participation 105 People’s Party 105, 170 Perlin, Frank 2 Phaisansinlapasat, Luang 119; see also Thammasakmontri, Chaophraya Phanurangsi, Prince 99, 100, 101 Phanuwong, Chaophraya 45, 48, 49, 95 Phasasrirat, Khun 159, 174 Phatsakorawong, Phraya 48, 55, 63, 78, 139 Phaulkon 16 Philippines, the 6, 7, 32, 181 Phiphitphoka, Phraya 53, 55 Phonlathep, Chaophraya 33, 59 Phra khlang 16, 20, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 39, 49, 95 Phrai 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 55, 57, 64, 76, 80, 95, 97, 110, 118, 119, 122 Phrai luang 11, 18, 42, 109, 117 Phrai som 11, 19, 42 Phrai suai 11 Phraphetracha, King 15–17 Phraratchaphithi sipsong duan 96 Phuak sod 118 Phudi 118 Phuthachariya 90 Phutharat, Prince 99, 100 Pichit, Prince 99, 100, 110 Pinklao, King 39, 62; Prince 38 Pitsanulok, Prince 117, 123–5, 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 165, 166, 170, 177 Plukchai suapa 135, 139, 140

226

Index

polygamy 64, 98, 105 Prachak, Prince 100 Prachop/sophlor 121, 162, 177 Prachumchon 176 Prajathipok, King 177 Pramothai 119, 153 Prechakonlakan, Phra 48 Pre-modern state 1, 2, 10, 24, 32, 34, 39, 42, 84, 104, 179, 180 Prisadang, Prince 98, 99, 105–8, 110 Privy Council 48, 50, 60, 62, 96, 145 Privy Purse (Phra khlang kang thi) 20, 21, 23, 33, 34, 59, 67, 95, 97, 133, 164, 165, 171 professionalism 112, 117 progress (charoen) 45, 51, 54, 87, 92, 101, 104, 150, 156, 162, 167, 172, 173, 175 prostration 44, 47 Raka, Phraya 114 Raksanat, Luang 165 Rama I 18, 19, 20, 165 Rama II 18, 21, 22 Rama III 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 42, 46 Ramrakhop, Chaophraya 163 Ratburi, Prince 77, 111–17, 122, 157 Ratchasuphawadi, Phraya see Mahintharasakthamrong, Chaophraya Ratchawaranukun, Phraya 53 Ratthamontri sapha 96, 102 reform 7, 17, 21, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52–4, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 75, 85, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 141, 167, 177, 182 Reid, Anthony 17, 179 republic 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 173 revolt of 1912 122–3, 124, 126, 155–78, 176; Chinese community 159, 172; conspiracy 155–161; demands for change 166–71; Kuomintang 159; proposed forms of government 161, 166–7; recruitment 161–6 revolution of 1932 157, 167, 177; against absolutism 164–5; against favouritism 162–4; against people’s interests 165–6; arguments for revolution 162–6; its origin 177–8; reference to other revolutions 167

Rian Srichan, Sub-Lt. 154, 155, 158, 172 rice 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 27, 30, 32 Royal Cadet Academy 154, 155, 157, 158, 170 Royal Company 146, 148, 152, 158 Royal Gazette 36, 57, 58 Royal Guard Regiment 157, 158, 159, 160 Royal Pages Bodyguard Regiment 69–70, 71, 73 Royal Pages College 133, 134–5 Royal Pages Department 47, 52, 67–8, 70, 71, 83, 84, 131, 132 Royal Pages School (former Training school of the Civil Service) 77, 78–9, 82, 85, 133, 134 royalty/royal family 11, 30, 40, 46, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 81, 85, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 114, 132, 145, 156, 169, 181 Royal Warehouse Department (Krom phra khlangsinkha) 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 52, 53, 64 Sakdina 10, 12, 80, 94, 145 Samakkayachan 119, 153 Samuhakalahom see Kalahom Samuhanayok 12 Sangha 44, 45, 64, 75, 86 Sanyabat 147, 153, 160, 166 Sapha thipruksa ratchkan phandin see Council of State Satchaphirom, Phraya 123 Sawat, Prince 99, 106–7 Sayamsamai 108–10 Shan rebellion 123 Siam 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 35, 39, 50, 57, 64, 66, 88, 95, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 124, 159, 165, 167, 168, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181 Siew Hud Seng 159 Singapore 7, 8, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 70, 71, 100 Sisoraiak, Chamun 99, 100, 111 slavery 36, 42, 43, 47, 50, 54, 57, 109 Smith, Dr. 49, 64, 104, 108, 110 Som, Captain 122, 123, 124 Somdet Chaophraya Barommahakasatsuk 18, 48, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63; as regent 39, 49, 50, 94, 95, 145 Sonnabundit, Prince 106

Index 227 Southeast Asia/Southeast Asia State 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 17, 32, 179, 180, 181 spices 11, 17 spirits tax 46, 52, 53, 97 Sripiphat, Phraya (That Bunnag) 24, 25, 27, 28 Sripiphat, Phraya (Councillor) 53, 55, 56, 63 Srisorarak, Chamun 111 Srisuriyawong, (Chuang Bunnag) Chao Phraya 30, 31, 34, 38, 39; and later Somdej Chaophraya 38–9, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54–5, 56, 60, 94, 95, 145 state: Asian 1; European 2, 3; feudal 2, 4, 180; Mandala 180 state ceremonies 11, 14, 96, 104 state transformation 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 39, 179, 180; and building 2, 3, 4, 24, 38; and formation 2, 3, 4, 88 Suai (tax in kind) 12, 24, 25 Suananan School 72, 89 Suankularb School 72–3, 76, 81, 121 sugar 8, 17, 20, 22, 26, 32; monopoly 26, 32 Surawongwaiyawat, Phraya (Won Bunnag) 38; Chaophraya 45, 94, 95 Suriyanuwat, Phraya 78 Suzerain states (prathetsarat) 12 sycophants 129, 162, 163, 165, 167, 176 Taksin, King 18, 20 tax farms 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 64, 97, 109, 112–13; tax farmers 22, 25, 26, 27, 31, 35, 36, 46, 52, 53, 56, 98 taxation 109 tea 5–6, 17, 20 Teachers’ Training College 119 Teochiu (Chaozhou) Chinese 20 territorial administration 12, 15 Thammajariya series 86–92 Thammasakmontri, Chaophraya 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 119, 145 Thammayut sect (Thammayuttinikay) 29, 33, 44 That 11, 36, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47 Thawipanya magazine 132 Thawipanya Samoson 132, 145, 152 Thianwan 101, 110, 118, 121, 172 Thiprachum 167, 168 Tilly, Charles 1, 2, 4

timber tax 52, 53 Training School of the Civil Service 77, 78, 84 trakun 169 treasury 12, 16, 23, 21, 32, 33, 34, 40, 46, 52, 53, 55, 56, 64, 65, 97; see also Ho ratsakonphiphat Trilokkanat, King 11, 12 Trocki, Carl 5–6 Tuayhan, Captain 155, 158, 159, 161, 169 Tudor monarchy 182 Turkey 150, 167 Utong, King 95 Vajiravudh, King, 93, 123, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148, 149, 153, 156, 161, 175; handle of challenges 134–5; Hobbesian fellow 138; ideology of nationalism 135–42; passion in literary, theatrical and militaristic activities 132–3; perception of the bureaucracy 128–31; as Prince 127–8 Vajirunhis, Prince 95, 127 Vietnam 17, 19, 30, 31, 181 VOC, Dutch 6, 16 Wachirayan, Krom Phraya 149, 150 Wachirayan library 96 Wachirayan wiset 96, 139, 162 Waivoranat, Chamun 99, 101, 107, 110, 111 Wallerstein, Immanuel 5 Wang na 20, 38, 39, 44, 49, 55, 60–4, 93, 94, 95, 98, 106, 131; crisis 39, 49, 60, 61 westernisation/westernised 43, 55, 96, 98, 111, 118, 172 Wichaichan, Prince 38 Wild Tiger Corps/Wild Tigers 121, 122, 126, 133, 134, 136, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 160–1, 162, 165, 166, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176–7; expansion 146–8 Wisutsuriyasak, Phraya 74, 78, 84, 119, 120, 145, 146, 163 Witthayachan magazine 119 Wolters, O.W. 180 Wongsa, Prince 30, 33, 52, 55

228

Index

world-economy 3, 4, 5, 17; see also Chinese world-economy, European world-economy world economy, the 1, 2, 3, 7, 39, 86, 87, 92, 165, 179, 181, 183; Siam’s interaction with 180

Wyatt, David 40, 72 Yommarat, Chaophraya 147, 148, 115 Young Siam 39, 40, 43, 50, 63, 68, 86, 98, 99, 105 129, 133; Young Siam Society 48, 51