The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China

The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China

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The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China

Edited by Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He

THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

© Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7416–7 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7416–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The search for deliberative democracy in China / edited by Ethan J. Leib & Baogang He. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7416–0 1. Democracy––China. 2. Representative government and representation––China. 3. China––Politics and government. I. Leib, Ethan J. II. He, Baogang, 1957– JQ1516.S43 2006 320.951––dc22

2006045305

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

C on t e n t s

Acknowledgments

vii

Editors’ Introduction Baogang He and Ethan J. Leib Part I

1

Theoretical Investigations into Deliberative Democracy

1

Deliberative Democracy in Different Places John S. Dryzek

2

Realizing Deliberative Democracy: Strategies for Democratic Consultation James S. Fishkin

37

Critical Theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Citizenship Geoffrey Stokes

53

3

23

Part II Theoretical Approaches to the Search for Deliberative Democracy in China 4

5

6

Human Nature, Communication, and Culture: Rethinking Democratic Deliberation in China and the West Shawn Rosenberg

77

Pragmatism in Designing Popular Deliberative Institutions in the United States and China Ethan J. Leib

113

Western Theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Chinese Practice of Complex Deliberative Governance Baogang He

133

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7

Deliberative Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: A Comment on Baogang He’s Research Daniel A. Bell

149

Part III Empirical Approaches to the Search for Deliberative Democracy in China 8

The Native Resources of Deliberative Politics in China Chen Shengyong

161

9

Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China Baogang He

175

10

Deliberative Democracy and Village Self-government in China Qingshan Tan

197

The Reconstruction of Local Power: Wenling City’s “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” Dong Xuebing and Shi Jinchuan

217

Public Consultation through Deliberation in China: The First Chinese Deliberative Poll James S. Fishkin, Baogang He, and Alice Siu

229

Reforming Peking University: A Window into Deliberative Democracy? Xu Jilin

245

11

12

13

List of Contributors

259

Index

263

Acknowledgments

This book could not have been completed without substantial financial assistance from the Ford Foundation (under the guidance of Andrew Watson and Sarah Cook), the University of California’s Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco, and the Australian Research Council (grant # DP0452030). A small army of research assistants helped with the editorial work and translations (chapters 8, 11, and 13 were originally written in Chinese), including Zhu Hui, Erica Yen, Maryam Baqi, Kate Sauer, Tao Leung, Chris Cassidy, Kristin Ditlevsen, Courtney Nash, Selby Lighthill, Travis Hodgkins, Brandon Yu, Wendy Jackson, Sun Liang, Andy Green, and Jamie Jordan. Faculty Support at Hastings, under the leadership of Stephen Lothrop, was characteristically supportive and helpful. And without John Delury’s expertise, Zoe Schonfeld’s patience and sage advice, and the emotional support provided by Naomi and Martin Leib and Linda and Myron Schonfeld, this book would be more imperfect than it is. Baogang feels much indebted to the School of Government at the University of Tasmania, where he has been encouraged by Professor Anysley Kellow and Associate Professor Marcus Haward, to the Faculty of Arts at Deakin University, where he has been encouraged by Professors Joan Beaumont and Geoffrey Stokes, to the Australian Research Council for two large grants, enabling him to gain new information on current developments in deliberative democracy and China, and to Chen Shengyong, Lang Youxing, Eilidh Campbell St. John, and Louise Darko for their assistance. Thanks, finally, to the editors at the Journal of Public Deliberation for allowing the use of some of Ethan J. Leib’s previously published work from that fabulous new journal, to the anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions, and to the editors at Palgrave for bringing this volume to fruition. Ethan J. Leib San Francisco, California United States Baogang He Melbourne, Victoria Australia

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Editors’ Introduction Baogang He and Ethan J. Leib

Western theories of deliberative democracy have developed at a time when many in the West feel that the institutions of liberal democracy have become divorced from the promises of classical democratic theory. As a critique of liberal democracy, deliberative democracy usually presents principles to renew the democratic project and practices to deepen democracy. The application of the deliberative model to Chinese governance—while perhaps odd on the surface—provides an opportunity for the study of both deliberative democracy and contemporary Chinese politics. This book seeks to enrich our understanding of both deliberative democracy and Chinese politics by applying Western ideas to a foreign context for which it was not designed. By looking at the theory of deliberative democracy “against the grain,” the volume produces insights and modifications necessary for the application of the theory of deliberative democracy in both China and the West. Additionally, students of Chinese politics can gain through this book a new perspective on their subject matter and learn about the usefulness of deliberative democracy’s normative agenda in Chinese processes of democratization. Most academic writing on the democratization of China has focused on village and urban elections (e.g., O’Brien 1994; Howell 1998; Thurston 1998; Tianjian Shi 1999; O’Brien and Lianjiang Li 2000; Oi and Rozelle 2000; Baogang He and Lang Youxing 2002; Unger 2002). There are considerably fewer studies (especially in the English language), however, on the more recent growth in the use of deliberative processes in China’s political development. While election studies contribute to the understanding of the introduction, development, and meaning of electoral democracy in China, their specific focus on elections has encouraged a widespread tendency to limit the understanding of democratization to the spread of liberal democracy, understood in a minimalist, aggregative, electoral form. However, a comprehensive democratization process will include, in addition to elections,

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full-scale participation, deliberation, and a panoply of fundamental human rights. Indeed, democratization processes need not commence with elections and can legitimately form and evolve with the institution of more participatory forms of democratic governance. By taking the aspiration for and critical lens of deliberative democracy for China seriously, this volume provides cutting edge insights into a new and significant political change in local democratic governance in China. At a time when much of the English-speaking world gets its impressions of Chinese political life from the mainstream news media, it is especially crucial to make accessible in English information and analysis that might provide a fuller picture of the facts on the ground in China. Although the media justifiably devotes front-page real estate to stories about China’s routine failure to provide its citizens fair trials, clean air, clean water, and free speech, much less reported is the genuine progress that Chinese citizens are experiencing all over that huge country in their day-to-day political lives. One cannot deny that much work remains to be done in providing Chinese citizens with basic rights and liberties, and a sustainable and reasonable environmental policy. However, one just as clearly cannot deny the exciting political developments all across China, and this volume focuses attention on a particular area of progress—democratic deliberation. Ultimately, this volume aims to build an intellectual bridge between Western theories of deliberative democracy and Chinese practices of democracy, to the ultimate benefit of both. While the Chinese case will be used to verify, refine, and challenge Western deliberative theories, theories of deliberative democracy are employed to analyze and guide future Chinese governance practices. The volume considers how China might govern in a manner consistent with the values of deliberative democracy and how China might continue to design and modify deliberative democratic institutions. As counterintuitive as it seems to talk about democratic institutional design in what is traditionally considered a one-party authoritarian regime, China today is rapidly changing and may, in fact, be more open to institutional innovation than many Western democracies that are set in their ways. We think that readers of this book will be surprised and gratified to learn of the huge democratic potential in China and that they will be able to use this volume to consider thoughtfully whether deliberative democratization is right for China. In short, the aims of this volume are (1) to engage the ongoing international project of theorizing the conditions for deliberative democracy; (2) to provide a way to think about applying the insights of the deliberative conception of democracy cross-culturally (particularly in China); and (3) to provide information on local governance in China, usually only accessible to readers of Chinese, to an English-speaking audience.

editors’ introduction / 3

Since the late 1980s, Chinese practices of deliberation and consultation have developed independently of Western theories and practices of deliberative democracy. There has been little cross-cultural dialogue, and there was no international movement for deliberative democracy that could usefully instruct Chinese institutional designers in strategy and technique; all that is changing, albeit slowly. An author of this chapter organized a conference to attempt to remedy the intellectual inadequacy of separating Western theories of deliberative democracy from the study of Chinese local participatory and deliberative institutions. This book is mostly comprised of selected papers presented at that very successful conference held in November 2004 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China. The conference, entitled “An International Conference on Deliberative Democracy and Chinese Participatory and Deliberative Institutions,” was organized by Baogang He and Chen Shengyong, and was supported by the Ford Foundation, Zhejiang University, and the University of Tasmania, Australia. The conference was attended by some of the most influential scholars working in the fields of deliberative democracy and Chinese democratization. It was an occasion for cross-cultural deliberation and its papers enable more such cross-cultural deliberations in the future. In the following sections of this Introduction, we set the theoretical context and provide a brief overview of Western theories of deliberative democracy, explain why China has been implementing deliberative institutions in recent years, and provide a short overview of the chapters that make up this volume. We conclude with a summary of the main findings of the book and some reflections. Models of Deliberative Democracy Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, liberalism and liberal democracy have been celebrated as the only viable political arrangements. Partially in response to this uncritical and triumphant celebration, and disillusioned by the existing state institutions of liberal democracy, a group of Western intellectuals have continued to search for a better democratic system, what John Dryzek (2000) calls a “deliberative turn” in democratic theory and practice. There is a growing literature on the theory of deliberative democracy. (See, among many others, Benhabib (1996); Cohen (1989); Cohen and sable (1997); Dryzek (1990; 1996; 2000); Dryzek and List (2003); Elster (1998); Fung (2003); Fung and Wright (2001); Goodin (2002); Habermas (1984; 1996); Leib (2002; 2004); Uhr (1998).) Deliberative democratic theorists stress the capacity, right, and opportunity of citizens to participate in

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deliberation. While some theorists (e.g. Barber (1984)) see themselves as within the deep-rooted tradition of participatory democracy, others are keen to emphasize the difference between participatory and deliberative democracy. The standards of “good deliberation” erected by Habermas and Cohen, for example, are much more stringent than those formulated by participatory democrats, and many theorists interested in deliberation actually focus on the deliberation of elites in government bodies rather than on the participation of lay citizens in the processes of deliberation. Although the theory of deliberative democracy takes the communicative power of the citizenry as its point of departure for establishing state legitimacy, many deliberative democrats are satisfied if such power is addressed through representative institutions rather than directly democratic institutions; Habermas (1998) and Rawls (1996) have both utilized their supreme moments of hypothetical legitimacy (the “ideal speech situation” and the “veil of ignorance,” respectively) as mere devices for representation. Moreover, some theorists (notably Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004)) use the theory of deliberative democracy to establish preconditions to the practice of a full and fair democracy; these theorists see deliberative democracy as a guide for public decisionmakers, furnishing elites with a framework for substantive policy evaluation but not necessarily urging any particular change in processes. Leib (2004) has made an effort to divide deliberative theorists along the populist/elitist register, highlighting that fully developed theories of deliberative democracy can prefer actual deliberation among lay citizens to deliberation among elites. As with Leib (2004), this volume tends (with some exceptions) to concentrate upon the “populist” forms of deliberative democracy, in which lay citizens are held to be central in processes of deliberation. Thus, we draw primarily upon the democratic theorists who have undertaken the empirical study of deliberative institutions through several experiments that focus upon citizen participation (Ackerman and Fishkin (2004); Fishkin (1991; 1995); Fung (2003); Fung and Wright (2001)). This participatory form of deliberative democratic theory provides the following prescriptions for the establishment and improvement of deliberative institutions. Deliberative institutions should ensure equal distribution of power to make collective decisions and equal and effective opportunities for participation in processes of collective judgment. Deliberative democracies should structure decisionmaking so that the force of communicative influence is maximized, while the impact of unequal power and wealth is minimized or blocked. Democratic procedures should be structured in ways that shift decisions from those influenced by money and power to those influenced mostly by their own deliberation. Political communication— argument, challenge, demonstration, protest, and bargaining—should be

editors’ introduction / 5

based on the factually true and the sincerely expressed (Habermas 1984; 1996). Deliberative democracies should aim to translate communicative power into state power through processes that, to the extent feasible, involve those affected and remain open to all to have the chance to influence decisions.1 The classical liberal model of democracy focuses upon procedures and institutions such as voting, elections, political representation, political parties, the separation of powers, and the balance of powers. Nevertheless, standing alone, these devices do not meet the normative requirements of deliberative democracy. Accordingly, a group of deliberative democrats interested in institutional design have developed a set of new deliberative fora, altered existing arrangements, tested certain control conditions, and combined deliberative devices with conventional liberal democratic ones to further understand the complex ways in which deliberation shapes preferences and can order our governing institutions. Among them, James Fishkin’s (1991; 1995) deliberative polling, Shawn Rosenberg’s (2004) discourse experiments, and Jason Barabas’ (2004) opinion change experiment are notable for their ambition, insight, and influence. To be sure, a more radical approach to deliberative democracy would view it as an alternative to liberal democracy rather than a mere supplement. At times, Dryzek (2000, 4) resists the liberal assimilation of deliberative democracy and “reemphasize[s] oppositional civil society, and public spheres as sources of democratic critique and renewal.” Indeed, in his contribution to this book, Dryzek (in chapter 1) urges us to pay attention to different sites of deliberation and calls for the empowerment of civil society beyond the existing state deliberative institutions. Similarly, one of us has proposed a radical institution called the “Popular Branch,” in which citizens debate and deliberate upon political affairs and ultimately have the power to enact law directly (Leib 2004). This proposed institution fundamentally challenges the existing three-branch power structure and could have dramatic effects on governance. Leib’s chapter in this volume (chapter 5) summarizes his “Popular Branch” and discusses its applicability for China. These competing ideas (the elitist and the populist strain, the complementary and the radical strain) within deliberative democratic theory in the West offer China different theoretical guides, democratization strategies, and sophisticated methods for improving existing Chinese political institutions. However, the application of Western theories to Chinese practice raises a number of fundamental questions concerning the validity of the Western theories themselves, the conditions under which these theories can be applied to China, and the degree to which the revision of these theories is needed. While Part I of this book continues and adds to the debates in

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general, Part II of this volume addresses the ways in which the Chinese case forces a revisitation of Western theories of deliberative democracy and encourages the modification thereof, before applying the theories to actual Chinese practices of deliberative and participatory governance. When testing the validity of Western theories of deliberative democracy in China, one must remain attentive to the unique conditions within China: an authoritarian system at the “macro” level, a set of democratizing practices at the “micro” village and township level; a market-driven individualism at the economic level; and a mix of Marxist, Confucian, and liberal cultural traditions. This volume makes an effort to account for how these local conditions influence our understanding of what, if anything, deliberative democracy can do for China. To be sure, theoretical sources within the Chinese intellectual tradition and Chinese historical practices are not predominantly liberal. Yet Chen Shengyong’s chapter (chapter 8) in this book nicely explores the local and historical resources that dovetail neatly with the aspirations of deliberative democracy. Beyond the deep historical roots of deliberation that Chen reveals in Chinese society, there is also the Marxist respect for “ordinary” people and the Confucian principles of moral righteousness and a harmonious society. From all of these intersecting traditions, it should be possible to develop “best practices” of public consultation and deliberation for China that takes seriously the voice of the people, uses moral argument to advance the public interest, solves collective problems collectively, and achieves a harmonious community. These “best practices” developed from local conditions may render it possible to import Western theories of deliberative democracy to China, albeit appropriately modified ones. These insights are developed in Baogang He’s conception of “authoritarian deliberation” explained in chapter 6. Professor He’s ideas are commented upon by a leading political theorist engaged in cross-cultural political theory, Professor Daniel A. Bell of Tsinghua University, in chapter 7. The New Politics of Deliberation in China Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution explores how every truly revolutionary regime seeks to govern through local councils of deliberating citizens— organs of the people—rather than through party-led machines of governance. These councils are, as Thomas Jefferson described them, “elementary republics” where “the voice of the whole people [can] be fairly, fully, and peaceably expressed, discussed, and decided by the common reason” of citizens: they have both a populist and a deliberative quality. Arendt is sure that party systems ultimately win out and crush rule by local councils (and the revolutionary spirit with it). But before parties gain ascendancy and rule through their elite bureaucracies, populism reigns through

editors’ introduction / 7

local rule by layperson deliberative councils. That is, until the councils are viewed as a threat and are terminated by the party. This cycle, she argues, has been borne out in the French, American, and Russian revolutions. Against this background, it is surprising to behold the new cycle of local citizen deliberation that has emerged in contemporary China. At one time the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained control through small, local work-units. Those units were a mechanism of control rather than a forum for deliberative freedom like the council system Jefferson imagined. Yet, the national government and some local governments have themselves created new sites of deliberation and are encouraging and supporting the development of deliberative institutions and meetings such as the public hearing system. Rather than crushing nascent local council systems, the CCP has actively tried to learn about their virtues and has considered implementing them further. Indeed, CCP members and officers attended the Hangzhou conference and participated vigorously, declining to censor it in any way. We were gathered at a hotel rumbling about the fate of democracy in China, and the CCP supported us and came to talk to us on our terms. Ultimately, the new Chinese experience of deliberative institutions may even prove Arendt wrong. Long after the revolution, the spirit of local councils may be revived and live on. (For more on this, see Leib 2005.) The Western media is very competent when it comes to reporting incidents in which the Chinese government prohibits unofficial organizations in civil society and severely disciplines social protestors. Indeed, the New York Times routinely criticizes China in its editorial pages for ill-treatment of journalists and dissidents, and uses its front page in a campaign to ensure that the Chinese have better environmental policies and better trial rights in a rule of law system. These may be worthy ends and, indeed, earned the New York Times a Pulitzer Prize this year. However, people in the West rarely gain any familiarity with the Chinese public hearing system and the development of participatory and deliberative institutions in China. This book seeks to fill that gap. In recent years, deliberative democracy is more than just a theory in China. The Chinese national and local governments have encouraged and supported deliberative institutions to maintain local order, as an instrument to maintain local security, as a solution to local community-related problems, as a “valve” to release the pressure upon China’s fast-moving economic machine, and as a form of moderate democracy which avoids radical and substantial political reform. Many chapters of this book—in particular the essays in Part III—seek to educate readers on the very real and substantial political reform in the direction of deliberative democracy. We are bringing this information and analysis to English-speaking readers for the first time, though a small body of work already exists in the Chinese language.

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It is also noteworthy that Chinese intellectuals are continuing to study and advocate for deliberative democracy without incident. Professor Lin Shangli (2003) at Fudan University has argued that the deliberative model of democracy is better than the electoral model of liberal democracy and more suitable to China’s local conditions. Professor Chen Jiagang (2004) has taken the lead in translating, introducing, and advocating deliberative theories of democracy in China. Li Junru (2005), the vice president of the Central Party School, has advocated consultative and deliberative institutions. He has called for the development of deliberative institutions in China by drawing on the Chinese political tradition of consultation embodied in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). A theoretical and normative movement is a foot and the CCP is not resisting. The practical background to the relatively new advocacy within China for a form of deliberative democracy is the ongoing Chinese practices of deliberative meetings and institutions that have sprouted up and developed in recent years. Measurement of public opinion and popular support for local projects is now routinely achieved through consultative meetings and public hearings designed particularly for those purposes. Also, “ordinary” citizens have been given the chance to assess and rank the performance of local officials through the citizen evaluation process. This process is not merely cosmetic: the political careers and performance bonuses of local officials can be seriously influenced by ratings from citizen evaluations. Another intended purpose of consultative practices is to solve various local problems and conflicts at a local level. In addition, public hearings have been extended to the national level. On September 29, 2005, a public hearing was held by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to decide whether the central government should raise the personal income-tax threshold from 800 yuan (US $99) to 1,500 yuan (US $186). These developments suggest that China offers a significant opportunity to explore the possibilities for deliberation and contribute to a growing understanding of deliberative democracy. They also provide unprecedented opportunities for Western theorists of deliberative democracy to apply, test, modify, and develop their theories in the Chinese context. Overview of the Volume This book is composed of three parts: Part I introduces Western theories of deliberative democracy; Part II addresses the questions concerning the application of the concept of deliberative democracy to China; and Part III includes empirical case studies of local deliberative institutions in China.

editors’ introduction / 9

In chapter 1, John Dryzek, one of the world’s earliest and most trenchant advocates for deliberative (or discursive) democracy, examines three different sites of deliberation: the institutions of the state, designed forums for deliberation by ordinary citizens or political advocates, and the public sphere. He argues that a deliberative democracy can build on practices in each of these sites. The fact that China does not (yet) have liberal democratic state institutions at the national level means that deliberative democrats looking to apply their ideas in China ought to stress other locations, including local government. Yet an informal public sphere, drawing on the resources of civil society, is currently not very strong in China. Nevertheless, many of the most interesting practices leading to the generation of critical publics arise from the risks and hazards produced by economic development and technological change. As China is obviously undergoing tremendous growth in these areas, practices to deal with relevant backlash will be fertile areas in which to develop deliberative democratic practices. Accordingly, Dryzek’s chapter emphasizes the multiple strategies available to pursue deliberative democracy and begins the conversation about how the search for deliberative democracy can be pursued in very different ways in different places. This is a contribution to the theory of deliberative democracy in general and is an especially important first step in the overall intellectual project of this book. In chapter 2, James Fishkin focuses on some key problems of democratic theory and how they can be solved through new institutions modeled on “Deliberative Polling,” a technology he invented. The chapter begins with the conundrum of how to realize simultaneously two fundamental democratic values—political equality and deliberation—in the large-scale nation-state. It then looks at various forms of public consultation in terms of the degree to which they achieve one or another of these values. It focuses especially on forms of public consultation that presently take place on the internet and finds them lacking in both political equality and deliberation. Fishkin argues that Deliberative Polling offers the best realization of both these basic values. Political equality is achieved through random sampling (giving each person an equal chance of being the decisive voter) and through equality in the discussion process. Deliberation is achieved through moderated and balanced small group discussions and balanced panels of experts who respond to questions from the participants. Various criteria for evaluating both political equality and deliberation are discussed and applied. This theoretical chapter lays the groundwork for a later empirical chapter (chapter 12) on an actual Deliberative Poll held in China in 2005. In chapter 3, Geoffrey Stokes examines the issue of citizenship within the theory of deliberative democracy. Although theories of citizenship have

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been carefully considered in liberal and republican versions of democracy, they are underdeveloped in deliberative democracy. The chapter therefore fills the gap. In particular, the chapter considers citizenship as a legal and official status; the domains and limits of citizen participation within a theory of deliberative citizenship; citizenship as an administrative category; citizenship as a practice generally; and the normative dimension of citizenship. In chapter 4, the first chapter of Part II, Shawn Rosenberg critically explores the dominant Western conception of deliberative democracy and considers its applicability both in a Western setting and to China. Drawing broadly on writings in social and developmental psychology, Rosenberg challenges the Anglo-American view of deliberation, with special attention to its underlying assumptions about individuals, communication, and culture. He then explores the implications of the institutionalization of deliberative practices both in the West and in China. In so doing, Rosenberg emphasizes the role of culture and the relevance of cultural differences in developing deliberative democracy in different societies. Ethan J. Leib, in chapter 5, sketches his proposal for the institutional redesign of American democracy, urging the development of a fourth branch of government, the Popular Branch. The Popular Branch would enact or reject laws through deliberative civic juries composed of stratified random samples of citizens. It draws upon an ideal of popular sovereignty and the hopeful empirical evidence produced by Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling. The proposal ultimately calls for more direct citizen involvement than minimalistic conceptions of democracy require. But as the chapter highlights, one can be pragmatic about one’s orientation to deliberative democracy and, in so doing, avoid most of Posner’s (2003) recent critique of deliberative democracy. Leib then exposes ways to orient democratization in China toward creating mandatory popular deliberative institutions. While ultimately concerned with the “big picture” of China’s political reconstitution, Leib investigates certain enabling conditions in the United States and China that help focus the institutional designer on the most pragmatic strategies for reform. He explores how China could design popular deliberative institutions, notwithstanding—and indeed supported by—China’s unique political, cultural, and social needs. In chapter 6, Baogang He draws on a variety of Chinese experience in developing deliberative and participatory institutions to test and revise theories of deliberative democracy and make them more applicable to local democratic governance in China. The chapter examines a number of questions that are not only debated in the West but are also extremely important for the project of developing democracy in China. While confirming the value of Western theories of deliberative democracy, the chapter invites consideration of a new phenomenon of “authoritarian deliberation,” unfamiliar to

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conventional Western theorists of deliberative democracy. The concept of authoritarian deliberation proves itself to be a useful analytical tool in considering deliberation in the context of an authoritarian state. The incongruous juxtaposition of deliberation and authoritarianism forms a platform for the application of deliberative techniques to achieve decent governance in contexts not usually contemplated in Western democratic theorizing. Daniel Bell’s chapter 7 queries whether the agenda of Chinese deliberative democrats is to curb the political power of local cadres or to minimize the unfair advantages of the wealthy capitalist class. These two different aims require different forms and institutions of deliberation. Bell also recommends developing national deliberation and examines the desirability of creating a body of national deliberators. Drawing upon Confucian political culture, which places great emphasis on the quality of political rulers and consensus, Bell advocates a neo-Confucian political institution. He labels this institution the xianshiyuan (The House of Virtue and Talent). In this institution, elite “representatives” deliberate on behalf of the people and are not bound by the short-term interests of a particular constituency. In addition to being sensitive to the needs of actually existing majorities, their deliberations can more explicitly take into account the interests of vulnerable individuals, minority groups, future generations, foreigners, and the environment. In order to increase the likelihood of high-quality deliberations, examinations for candidates to the xianshiyuan test for knowledge of philosophy and literature, as well as science, economics, and politics. Bell proposes that the xianshiyuan be small in scale, yet be composed of relatively diverse individuals appointed through a civil service examination process. Chen Shengyong, in chapter 8, the first chapter in Part III, traces the traditions of deliberative politics within Chinese political culture. He argues that these traditions are native resources for the development and advocacy for deliberative institutions and can facilitate the ultimate introduction of deliberative democracy into China. Drawing upon historical and theoretical sources, chapter 8 makes a persuasive case for deliberative democracy’s applicability in China from one who lives in Zhejiang Province day-to-day and is well acquainted with the facts on the ground. In Chapter 9, Baogang He returns to analyze contemporary deliberative processes, deliberative institutions, and deliberative democratization and how they contribute to local governance in China. The chapter explores recent experiments with deliberative institutions and offers an account of the Chinese understanding of deliberation. It investigates key deliberative institutions, outlines their main features, and compares the impact of these institutions on deliberation. It also highlights key variables that have shaped the development of deliberative institutions and examines the problems and

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limits of those institutions. The chapter provides an empirical basis for Baogang He’s theoretical analysis in chapter 6. In chapter 10, Qingshan Tan examines the changes in village politics brought about by newly established village elections and explores the positive linkage between deliberative democracy and village self-governance. He argues for the necessity of deepening village self-governance by expanding villagers’ participation in decisionmaking through deliberation. The chapter, while explaining many complicated organizational details about the realities and layers of local governance in China, explores the possibility of introducing and enhancing deliberative mechanisms in the existing village governance framework. The chapter highlights how deliberative democracy may require a reconfiguration of the Villagers’ Assembly, the Villagers’ Representative Assembly, and village small groups. The author argues that these village mechanisms contain the seeds of a deliberative democracy; yet, he proposes a two-tier deliberative process that incorporates village small groups and Villagers’ Assemblies to optimize deliberative decisionmaking. Economic reform in China has developed rapidly and there has been a corresponding surge in democratic consciousness. Wenling City in Zhejiang Province is not only the birthplace of the first joint-stock enterprises in China, but it also gave birth to the private economy. Apart from Wenling’s economic innovations, it is also the home to the very interesting democratic innovation, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity.” In chapter 11, Dong Xuebing and Shi Jinchuan attempt to analyze this genuinely deliberative institution. “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” provides a case study for deliberative reform and development of local democracy in China. In their chapter, the authors describe the institution, explain how and why it was able to evolve so successfully, and evaluate the prospects for a democratic future based on the “Democratic Talk is All Sincerity.” “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity,” however, has a number of methodological and procedural flaws. To correct and improve the existing deliberative meetings in Wenling, Baogang He, James Fishkin, and Jiang Zhaohua (the CCP Secretary in Zeguo, Wenling City) organized a Deliberative Poll in April 2005. In chapter 12, James Fishkin, Baogang He, and Alice Siu report on the experiment with Deliberative Polling undertaken in the town of Zeguo in 2005. Time Asia covered the basics of the Deliberative Poll (Jakes 2005) and this report furnishes many more details of the experimental background and the results. The Zeguo Deliberative Poll consisted of a scientific random sample of the township brought together for a full day of deliberation on April 9. The sample was first surveyed on its views about various political matters. Then it was brought together to consider and prioritize certain projects affecting the future of the town. The participants weighed the merits of thirty

editors’ introduction / 13

proposed projects. They were given carefully balanced briefing materials, participated in small group discussions with trained moderators, and developed questions in the small groups, which were asked to a panel of twelve different experts. At the end of the day, they were asked the same questions as they had answered before deliberation. This Deliberative Poll helped represent what the public would think if it had a chance to become more informed. In conclusion, the chapter also discusses the uniquely Chinese aspects of the experiment (as Deliberative Polling has been introduced in many countries throughout the world), illustrates how Deliberative Polling techniques have improved the existing deliberative institutions in Wenling City and examines the obstacles to the spread of Deliberative Polling in China. In the final chapter of this book, Xu Jilin offers a case study that might provide an oblique window into the possibilities for deliberative democratic reform in China. He studies and reports on a very public, contested, and heated policy debate that took place at Peking University (Beida) in 2003. He demonstrates how it is not only possible but necessary to embed deliberative democracy into an authoritarian system. The Beida reform debate is an example of the viability of “public” policymaking within a framework of “enlightened” authoritarianism, which ultimately may facilitate democratization more generally. Xu Jilin also reminds us that the conversation and deliberation surrounding the Beida reform was not a result of intended design; instead, it was an accidental confluence of multiple factors, proving that deliberative democratization may be an unintended consequence of certain modes of authoritarian rule. Conclusions It is undoubtedly the case that the East-meets-West dimension of the contributions to this book makes the volume exciting, exotic, and exceptionally thought-provoking. The conference in which many of these papers were first presented was similarly stimulating and fertile with new ideas and original insights. But students and reformers of Chinese politics and deliberative democracy should get much more than mere titillation from this volume. Students of Chinese politics and those interested in its reform have much to learn from Dryzek’s idea of the different sites available for the practice and development of deliberative democracy; Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling techniques that seek to reconcile the values of equality and deliberation; Stokes’ view of how to construct a deliberative citizen; Leib’s proposal for mandatory popular deliberative institutions; Bell’s schema of a neo-Confucian form of deliberation; and Qingshan Tan’s proposal of a two-tier deliberative

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process incorporating village small groups and Villagers’ Assemblies. All these ideas are of great value for China as it charts its own route to or through deliberative democracy. Of course, to the extent possible, these ideas must be tested, contested, and revised. Take, for example, Leib’s popular deliberative branch of government. Currently, the existing local People’s Congresses have increasingly become an elite club of business mangers, governmental officials, and intellectuals. The unemployed, the poor, the migrant workers, and many disadvantaged groups are underrepresented or fail to be represented at all. There is an urgent call to establish and develop authentic popular deliberative institutions in which all disadvantaged social groups have a chance to express their grievances and opinions. Leib’s popular deliberative institution could be a counterbalance against the more elitist People’s Congress and a substantial move toward a more just society or, what China’s current leadership has billed, “a harmonious society.” Establishing popular deliberative institutions could revive the Chinese popular model of democracy (Baogang He 1996) and, at the same time, overcome its current deficiencies. Although Leib’s idea has attracted interest from local officials at the town level, how far local town leaders are willing to implement it (and in so doing delegate real power to the people) and how far higher level leaders will tolerate such experiments remains to be seen. The limitations of Western theories of deliberative democracy are discussed in several chapters. Rosenberg’s chapter, for example, provides a powerful critique of the presuppositions of deliberative democracy. This critique is extremely valuable in developing a critical and creative approach to the application of deliberative democracy in other contexts. Baogang He develops an authoritarian model of deliberation distinct from Western democratic deliberation. The concept of authoritarian deliberation demonstrates that deliberation and democracy are not necessarily the same and that the development of deliberative institutions in China can either be part of a democratization process or be part of further authoritarian entrenchment. China might develop into a “deliberative authoritarianism,” a category of governance distinct from plural and bureaucratic authoritarianism. But authoritarian deliberation also contains the logic of democratic transformation. It cannot help but empower citizens, shifting the basis of legitimacy and creating a new source of power based on public consultation and deliberation. This might be termed “deliberation-led democratization.” While this book is about the search for deliberative democracy in China, we must confess that we remain somewhat skeptical of using the term “deliberative democracy” to describe Chinese deliberative institutions

editors’ introduction / 15

(though of course we use the term as a convenient shorthand, as do others in this volume). Although the political scientist’s minimalist definition of democracy—a country with competitive elections—is not terribly helpful for those interested in sophisticated democratic reform projects, it seems too generous to call almost any participatory institution “democratic” or any country with deliberative institutions a “deliberative democracy.” When participation and deliberation are embedded in polities without the most basic of democratic indicia—competitive elections on the national level and basic liberal rights—using the term “democracy” to describe developments and institutions may rightfully frustrate the democratization community. To be sure, discussion, deliberation, and inclusion are valuable even without basic liberal rights; but many deliberative democrats reasonably insist that participation and deliberation require some preconditions in the form of civil rights and the rule of law to be part of a “real” democracy. Creating forms of deliberative democracy have been and will continue to be constrained in a one-party authoritarian state. That some villages and towns have experimented with some admirable exercises of citizen participation and deliberative meetings should be welcomed; but using the term “democracy” to describe such ventures seems premature—and it lets the Chinese government off the hook too easily. Yet the participatory and deliberative institutions do ultimately contain the logic of democratic transformation, and this should not be overlooked. The sequence of democratic development is another crucial issue that this volume renders salient. Many have argued that the greater the level of lay participation, the less deliberative a regime can be: mass participation leads to a “dumbing down.” And it may be that China is at a stage in its political development where the trade-off is worthwhile—that more participation in decision-making is better than deliberative participation, which can only be reserved for the few. That makes the orientation toward deliberative democracy more awkward and suggests that Chinese policy—at least from the perspective of those of us interested in political reform in China—should be mass participatory democracy first and deliberative democracy only later. Perhaps China should pursue both at once if possible. Yet these papers fail to entertain in a deep or sustained way whether it is, in fact, possible—or whether mass participation should be the priority for the short term. We hope others take up this important inquiry. Relatedly, another intriguing line of inquiry that receives short shrift in the chapters of this book is the claim, often heard, that mass participation is sometimes frowned upon in China because it is reminiscent of the parts of Maoism that China would rather forget––“the cultural revolution.” Deliberative participation of the few may be the right course after all to skirt

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the fear of the many. This is certainly part of what makes Daniel A. Bell’s vision sensible for China, even if it seems too elitist for Westerners’ taste. More work on the political culture in China and what it could sustain in the way of mass or mandatory participation remains to be done. Ultimately, this Introduction and this volume are ambivalent about the search for deliberative democracy in China. There is some tension— evidenced in this Introduction, this book, and the conference from which all of this work sprung—between the “romantics” who feel that Chinese political life is well on its way toward democratization and the “nay-sayers” who feel that the dominant political culture of authoritarianism leaves China with too much work to do to be considered democratizing. Substantial evidence supports both positions. Admittedly, the editors of this volume are mostly hopeful and the book is surely biased in favor of the romantics. To be sure, a pessimist will emphasize that the main obstacles in implementing models of deliberative democracy are rooted in the political, economic, and cultural circumstances that prevail in China. The biggest challenge is the strong state, which is committed to preventing certain information from entering the public domain; and the state routinely and stringently penalizes those who express certain points of view. Deliberative democracy requires deliberative autonomy and freedom, withheld from so many in China. It is incumbent on those committed to the democratization process in China that they discover and develop strategies for coping with this undeniable threat from the centralized state. All the same, many within the state want to see more authentic deliberative development. The international community—especially those who are proponents of deliberative democracy elsewhere—also, have an important role to play in helping to chart China’s future. By improving existing democratic institutions at home and turning formalistic deliberative meetings into substantive deliberative bodies, the international community serves as a model for change. Moreover, activists and intellectuals can continue to consult with the openminded Chinese anxious for deliberative developments. Whatever one’s ultimate disposition to the search for deliberative democracy in China—hope or despair—this volume offers at least one democratization strategy, a path toward a fuller and stronger democracy, if only China wants to take it. If it does, China will need to draw on all the wisdom and precedents that can be found in both the West and the East. China should proceed carefully and evaluate critically the presuppositions of deliberative democracy. Finally it will need to integrate, innovate, adopt, and adapt deliberative democratic practices consistent with China’s own unique political and cultural conditions. We hope this volume helps China take a further step in that direction.

editors’ introduction / 17

Note 1. The chart below highlights different visions of ideal deliberation by Habermas, Rawls, and Gadamer (whose theory of dialogue gets too little attention among theorists of deliberation—see Grondin 2003). Habermas

Rawls

Gadamer

Agent required for deliberation

Rational person capable of intersubjectivity

Rational person

Attitude

Taking others’ views seriously and only being persuaded by the force of the better argument Mutual understanding

Parties in an original position without knowledge of their traits Indifferent, but able to listen to others

Aim

Choosing just principles

Status

Free from domination

Equal and free

Process

Fair procedure and result Communicative reason

Reflective equilibrium Public reason

Theory of Rationality

Open to the potential truth of other views

Discovering the real strength of every other participant’s position Each participant must be taken as an equal partner in dialogue A Socratic method Reason

Works Cited Ackerman, Bruce, and James S. Fishkin. 2004. Deliberation Day. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Barabas, Jason. 2004. “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinion,” American Political Science Review 98(4): 687–701. Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” In Seyla Benhabib ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chen Jiagang. 2004. Deliberative Democracy. Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore. Cohen, Joshua. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit eds., The Good Polity. New York: Blackwell, 17–34.

18 / deliberative democracy in china Cohen, Joshua. 1997. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In James Bohman and William Rehg eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———, and Charles Sabel. 1997. “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy.” European Law Journal 3: 313–42. Dryzek, John S. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideas, Limits, and Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———, and Christian List. 2003. “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.” British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1–28. Elster, Jon. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fishkin, James. 1991. Democracy and Deliberation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———, and Peter Laslett, eds. 2003. Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. Fung, Archon. 2003. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy 11(3): 338–67. ———, and Erik Olin Wright. 2001. “Deepening Democracy: Experiments in Empowered Participatory Governance.” Politics and Society 29: 5–24. Goodin, Robert. 2002. Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grondin, Jean. 2003. The Philosophy of Gadamer. trans. Kathryn Plant. Chesham: Acumen Publishers. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2004. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. trans. [see above] Thomas McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. ———. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1998. The Inclusion of the Other. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. He, Baogang. 1996. The Democratization of China. London: Routledge. ———, and Lang Youxing. 2002. Balancing Democracy and Authority: An Empirical Study of Village Election in Zhejiang. Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press. Howell, Jude. 1998. “Prospects for Village Self-governance in China.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 25(3): 86–111. Jakes, Susan. 2005. “Dabbling in Democracy,” Time Asia, April 16. Leib, Ethan J. 2002. “Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democracy.” Rutgers Law Journal 33(2): 359–456. ———. 2004. Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

editors’ introduction / 19 ———. 2005. “The Chinese Communist Party and Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Public Deliberation 1: 1–6. Li Junru. 2005. “What Kind of Democracy Should China Establish?” Beijing Daily, September 26. Lin Shangli. 2003. “Deliberative Politics: A Reflection on the Democratic Development of China.” Academic Monthly (Shanghai) 4: 19–25. O’Brien, K. 1994. “Villagers’ Committees: Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages.” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 32: 33–59. ———, and Lianjiang Li. 2000. “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China.” The China Quarterly 162: 465–89. Oi, Jean C., and Scott Rozelle. 2000. “Elections and Power: The Locus of DecisionMaking in Chinese Villages.” The China Quarterly 162: 513–39. Posner, Richard. 2003. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rosenberg, Shawn. 2004. “Facilitating Democratic Deliberations: A Preliminary Report of an Experimental Study.” Paper presented at The International Conference on Deliberative Democracy at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, November 18–21. Shi, Tianjian. 1999. “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutional Tactics for Democracy.” World Politics 51: 385–412. Thurston, Anne F. 1998. “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China.” Peaceworks no. 23. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/ thurst23.html Uhr, John. 1998. Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Unger, Jonathan. 2002. The Transformation of Rural China. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

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Part I Theoretical Investigations into Deliberative Democracy

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C h ap t e r 1 Deliberative Democracy in Different Places John S. Dryzek

Introduction According to standard and long-established ways of political thinking in the West, democracy was first and foremost an attribute of the state because the state claims final political authority over the citizens of a particular territory. The legitimacy of the democratic state, then, rests on popular control combined with political equality among all citizens. Popular control is normally conceptualized in aggregative terms: the preferences of citizens for leaders, parties, or policies must somehow be aggregated in order to produce collective decisions about who should lead and what they should do. Aggregation generally takes the form of the counting of votes in elections, when this conception of democracy becomes representative democracy. Political equality, then, means that the votes of citizens are counted equally. This conception of democracy becomes liberal democracy when it is linked to a set of rights possessed by each citizen. These rights concern, most importantly, freedom of opinion, expression and association, and protection against the arbitrary power of government. The theory of deliberative democracy does not necessarily reject these features, but it does lead to a difference in emphasis, beginning with a contrast between aggregation and deliberation. The traditional focus on aggregation meant that little attention was paid to how preferences are shaped, for preferences were simply taken as given, and the focus was on aggregation mechanisms. In contrast, deliberative democrats believe preferences ought to be shaped reflectively by thoughtful and competent citizens (or their representatives) and that such reflection is central to deliberation. Preferences can be transformed in deliberation. In addition, for deliberative democrats, the legitimacy of a political decision rests on the right and capacity of those

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affected by a decision to participate in deliberation about its content. Those affected do not merely vote or have their preferences registered (though deliberative democracy does not have to dispense with preference aggregation and voting). This does raise some questions about how the deliberation of citizens is to be organized in the political system, especially when the number of those affected by a decision is large. Different answers to these questions point to different locations for deliberation. In this chapter, I examine three different locations for deliberation: the institutions of the state, designed forums for deliberation by ordinary citizens or political advocates, and the public sphere. A deliberative democracy can be built upon practices in each of these locations. There is no precise or universally applicable recipe for exactly what kinds of institutions and practices are best in each location. The pursuit of deliberative democracy should itself be a deliberative process to which political theorists may contribute, while allowing that any suggestions they might make require validation by a broader public, who also might have creative ideas of their own. Deliberation in the Institutions of the State The most conventional means for the organization of deliberation in politics seeks to assimilate deliberation into established state institutions, notably legislatures and courts. Courts are stressed as a location for deliberation mainly in the United States, where the courts play a much larger role in policymaking than elsewhere. John Rawls (1993, 231), for example, believes the U.S. Supreme Court is an exemplary deliberative institution. But it is not exactly a democratic institution, because the deliberating judges are appointed, not elected. Ideally, though, judges exercise what Rawls calls “public reason” such that the content of their arguments is framed in such a way that all individuals in the political system could accept them. Legislatures are more obviously democratic institutions inasmuch as they are composed of representatives who deliberate on behalf of the citizens who elect them. Ideally, these representatives should be elected through processes that are themselves deliberative. Unfortunately, election campaigns in the real world can of course fall far short of this ideal, featuring much in the way of manipulation of information. Deliberative theorists such as Bessette (1994) and Uhr (1998) nevertheless stress the legislature as a main location of deliberation. Deliberation can also occur in the administrative side of a government. Administration is never simply the execution of decisions made by the legislature. Instead, it is a communicative process that can involve substantial negotiation about how particular laws apply in particular cases, how to

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resolve ambiguities in legislative direction, and what should be done when different principles point in different directions. Recent work in the field of public administration stresses the role of networks in administration. (See, for example, Rhodes 1997.) Networks involve participation in problem solving by government officials from different bureaucratic units, but also by participants from corporations, unions, nongovernmental organizations, and, perhaps, government officials from other jurisdictions. Again, networks can be more or less deliberative, open, inclusive, or secretive. The general point here is that there are many locations in the state where deliberation can occur. The potential for deepening the deliberative qualities of this mix will vary across different kinds of states with different kinds of political traditions and structures. In a country such as the United States, the formal institutions of Congress and the Supreme Court loom very large in thinking about deliberative democracy. The reason is that Congress has a large policymaking role, and its members are not constrained in what they can say and how they can vote by party affiliation. The U.S. Supreme Court too has a large policymaking role, as most policy disputes sooner or later end up in the courts for adjudication in terms of their consistency with the U.S. Constitution. In contrast, in corporatist countries such as those in Scandinavia we should expect little deliberation in the legislature, because the most important aspects of policy are decided elsewhere—in negotiations between representatives of the executive branch of government, business, and unions. (More recently, other interests such as environmental groups have been accepted into corporatist policymaking in these countries.) In countries less legalistic in their policymaking than the United States, courts are not the focus of deliberation and often have a peripheral policy role. What this variation means is that there is no single universally applicable model of how deliberation in the institutions of the state ought to be organized. So if we are interested in the deliberative capacities of the state, it is possible to realize and promote these capacities in different ways in different kinds of political system. Daniel Bell’s proposed “Confucian democracy” for China in chapter 7 is especially interesting in this respect. His meritocratic upper house is specifically designed to be a focus for high-quality public deliberation, which parallels quite exactly the role that Rawls and others see for the Supreme Court in the United States. Discursive Designs Deliberation within the institutions of the state can sometimes become quite remote from any input from ordinary citizens that deliberative democracy requires. Such considerations have led recently to a search for

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deliberation in new institutions designed expressly for deliberative purposes that also try to sideline the more strategic and competitive aspects of politics. These new institutions go beyond public meetings and consultation exercises in order to foster actively the deliberative and inclusive aspects of the forum. Such new institutions are of essentially two kinds: lay citizen deliberation and partisan deliberation. Lay Citizen Deliberation Lay citizens are those who have neither expertise nor partisanship on an issue. But as they are members of the public, they nevertheless have a claim to being heard when it comes to issues of public policy. Their very neutrality is actually a positive factor because they can approach issues with an open mind. “Public opinion” is often registered through opinion polls, but, as James Fishkin stresses, ordinary opinion polls compile uninformed and unreflective preferences and, accordingly, have no place in a deliberative democracy. Institutions for involving lay citizens cannot, of course, involve all citizens from the relevant public affected by a decision. But they can involve a sample of citizens that is somehow representative. The idea is to provide a protected space for this sample of ordinary citizens to deliberate on a specified issue. These citizens receive information about the issue, listen to presentations by experts on the issue and advocates for different sides, question experts, and then discuss the issue with each other (normally with the help of a nonpartisan facilitator). Consensus conferences, citizen juries, planning cells, and deliberative opinion polls are all variations on the idea of a forum for lay citizen deliberation. There is now substantial experience with each of these designs over the past 10–15 years. Consensus conferences began in Denmark, where they were sponsored by the government-funded Danish Board of Technology and have since spread to many countries (though the ‘consensus’ conferences of China described by Baogang He in this book are clearly different animals). Issues such as those related to genetically modified organisms in agriculture have been especially popular topics for consensus conferences. Citizen juries were invented by the American Ned Crosby but have found their greatest use in the United Kingdom, along with similar “citizen panels,” sponsored by the Blair Labour government. Planning cells were invented in Germany by Peter Dienel and have not been widely used outside Germany. Deliberative opinion polls require only that citizen participants complete a questionnaire on a given issue at the end of the process. Consensus conferences, citizen juries, and planning cells charge the citizen participants with arriving at a policy recommendation. The citizens can be quite creative in coming up with new solutions. Usually the recommendation

different places / 27

is advisory rather than binding, and normally it constitutes just one input to policymaking, rarely being the deciding factor in determining what should be done on a particular issue. Consensus conferences and citizen juries typically involve a small number of citizens (15–20); deliberative polls and planning cells work with larger numbers, but divide participants into deliberative groups with a maximum size of around twenty. There are two striking findings from all these lay citizen exercises in deliberation. The first is simply that ordinary citizens are capable of highly sophisticated thinking and action on complex issues. This undercuts all those who point to the incompetence and ignorance of ordinary people as an argument against democracy. People are highly competent when given the right forum and the chance to think through issues. There is every reason to expect a similar result if such forums were to be tried in China. This expectation is supported by Baogang He’s conclusion that “the Chinese practice of deliberation strengthens deliberative theory’s confidence in citizens’ capacity, and proves that citizens are capable of certain skills and arts of deliberation.” And there are aspects of the “mass line” participatory tradition in China that may ultimately be more conducive to the basic idea of lay citizen deliberation than is the liberal tradition in the West, which has often been fearful of the active participation of ordinary people in politics. The second finding is that participants often change their preferences as a result of deliberation. Deliberative democracy requires that individuals be open to reflection upon their point of view and remain amenable to changing it if they are persuaded in the course of deliberation. This turns out to be much easier for lay citizens with no partisanship than it is for political leaders and activists, who cannot be seen to change their minds too easily if they are to retain credibility in partisan political struggle. I noted in the previous section that different institutions of the state could be home to deliberation in very different ways in different systems. Daniel Bell proposes a meritocratic upper house for Confucian systems. I would suggest that the evidence from the very high quality of lay citizen deliberation as revealed in consensus conferences, citizen juries, planning cells, and deliberative opinion polls points to the possibility of an upper house composed of ordinary citizens selected at random from the population who would serve for perhaps one year at a time. Such a proposal was advanced by the think-tank Demos in the context of recent British debates about reform of the House of Lords. In the British context, the House of Lords has been both a democratic and a deliberative failure, and such a proposal would be a clear advance. The Blair government’s recent reforms to the House of Lords have succeeded only in replacing hereditary aristocrats by political appointees.

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Partisan Deliberation For all their virtues, deliberative exercises designed around the participation of lay citizens generally have trouble in connecting with policymaking; often there is little reason for policymakers to accept their recommendations, especially when powerful interests disagree with these recommendations. Other discursive designs can involve deliberation between advocates of different positions in a policy dispute with the idea of building an agreement on a policy recommendation sensitive to the interests of all sides. The idea is to take advocates of different positions out of their normal adversarial and strategic confrontations and put them in a situation where they deliberate with one another rather than fight for advantage against one another. Usually this forum will take place under the auspices of a neutral facilitator or mediator, who will make sure the forum in question abides by some rules of debate. These rules might include forbidding threats, concealing information, questioning the motives of one’s opponents, personal attacks, and statement of a bargaining position. There are a number of designs that fit this general model; most prominent are mediation and a consensus-building approach (Susskind 1999), which are really two names for roughly the same thing. “Consensus” here simply means that originally hostile partisans can agree on a recommended course of action. However, consensus does not mean they agree on the reasons for the action in question. Nor does it mean that the action is necessarily the first preference of any of the participants. Participants agree to the recommendation because they think it is better than the outcome they would get if the forum were to collapse and the decision made elsewhere. The process is more than bargaining because the idea is that participants try to understand and recognize the legitimacy of the positions held by their opponents, though not necessarily to agree with them. There is now plenty of experience with such processes, which have been applied to a wide range of policy disputes, especially in the United States, ranging from environmentalists debating developers on environmental issues to fundamentalist Christians debating gay activists on HIV/AIDS policy. The record in terms of producing agreement across initially hostile partisans is quite good. And there is much greater chance of the recommendations of a mediation or consensus-building exercise being embodied in policy practice than is the case for lay citizen deliberation. The reason is that under mediation or consensus-building, the most powerful interest groups have participated in construction of the agreement and have formally consented to it. Under lay citizen deliberation, these same groups will do their best to obstruct any conclusions and recommendations not to their liking. This does not mean that the outcomes of mediation and

different places / 29

consensus-building exercises are automatically implemented in public policy. Indeed, there are cases where agreements have not taken into account the perspectives and interests of state officials, and thus it remains difficult to persuade these officials to implement the agreement in question. These successes of partisan deliberation in discursive designs have occurred in the fundamentally adversarial political culture of the United States including but not limited to “regulatory negotiation” in the administrative rule-making context. Presumably these designs could work at least as well in a political culture such as that of China that is oriented to consensus. On the other hand, it may be difficult for actors to perceive the need for them in the absence of sharply defined conflicts that remain unresolved through other means. In the United States, these designs often proceed as an alternative to stalemate, after two sides have fought each other to standstill (especially in legal action). The Public Sphere Discursive designs generally look to “micro” institutions for deliberation. A more “macro” third approach locates deliberation not in small protected spaces, but in the larger flow of communication in the public sphere. (On the micro-macro contrast, see Hendriks 2002). The public sphere consists of political association and communication oriented to public affairs; but participants in this communication do not seek a formal share of state power. These participants include political activists, the media, political commentators, academics, social movements, advocacy groups, and ordinary citizens. Sometimes actors and their communications in the public sphere will stand in opposition to the state, though more supportive relationships are also possible. Communication in the public sphere is not always or even mainly deliberative. It can feature propaganda, deceit, and manipulation. However, communication in the public sphere can be evaluated according to the degree to which it meets deliberative ideals and the degree to which it violates these standards. Such violations might come from “spin doctors” trying to manipulate news in order to make it more favorable to the government, newspapers that sensationalize events in order to increase their sales, or corporate public relations experts trying to convince the public that their company’s interest is the same as the public interest. At its best, however, the public sphere features open critical discussion about public issues. Indeed, it can be more open to deliberation than the institutions of the liberal state. Institutions of the state are often highly constrained because deliberation cannot be allowed to call into question the state’s core priorities (such as establishing security in a potentially hostile world or promoting economic growth). Moreover, public officials and

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governmental organizations are often slow to respond to new sorts of issues that reach the political agenda. If we look at the past three or four decades, we see that innovative identification of issues, critiques, and even proposals for political alternatives originate in the public sphere more often than in the institutions of the state. Examples are given below. The civil rights movement in the United States. This began in the late 1950s among African-Americans excluded from effective electoral participation and other forms of influence in the American South. A social movement mobilized by Dr. Martin Luther King and others showed just how effective the power of rhetoric could be in reframing political issues, influencing public opinion in the white majority, and eventually forcing policy responses. Environmentalism. Environmentalism arose as a social movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, eventually developing critiques of the foundations of industrial society. These critiques became very diverse, ranging from the moderate to the radical. Policy response began in the United States around 1970 with a burst of legislation designed by President Nixon to pull environmentalism away from the “counterculture” and integrate it into the political mainstream. In other countries (especially in Europe) policy response was slower, and environmentalism has remained an oppositional social movement. But when policy response did eventually come in Northern Europe (Germany, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands), it was eventually more creative and imaginative than in the United States, where the movement became locked into conventional politics too early (see Dryzek et al., 2003). Feminism. Feminism resembles environmentalism in its development of a critique of society in a social movement, and in the diversity of voices that can be found within it. Feminism has had an impact on public policy, even as more radical feminist demands have been resisted. Feminism has also had a substantial impact when it comes to cultural change. Anti-globalization. Many governments throughout the world have generally accepted that economic globalization means that a certain set of policies concerning free trade, deregulation, low taxes, and capital mobility simply must be followed. Debate concerning such policies is often absent from legislatures. Such policies have been contested much more forcibly by the antiglobalization movement in the past five years. This movement began as a series of protests raising often contradictory concerns. Eventually it produced a critique of globalization, joined in a larger public sphere by people such as Joseph Stiglitz (2002), former Chief Economist at the World Bank. Eventually governments and international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were forced to take notice and change their policies. The antiglobalization case,

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along with the global opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, shows that public spheres can be international, not confined within national borders. This internationalization of the public sphere is facilitated by the global media and advances in communications technologies. The moral of these examples is that social critiques that raise major concerns about the trajectory of society’s development almost always begin in the informal public sphere and not in the institutions of the state. Historically, this is also true of the early bourgeois critique of monarchy and theocracy instrumental in the rise of liberalism and liberal states in the West. This is also the case with socialism, whose critique was developed by Marx and others at a time when the working class was excluded from the institutions of the liberal state. In many of these cases, the movement in question and its leadership were eventually welcomed into the state, whose own character changed as a result. The public sphere is perhaps a historical concept as much as it is an analytical one. The first public sphere arose with early bourgeois opposition to monarchy and theocracy in Europe (Habermas 1989). That particular public sphere went into decline with the entry of representatives of the bourgeoisie into government from which they had previously been excluded (other factors such as commercialization of newspapers also came into play). Since then, public spheres in the West have had their ups and downs; the history is a complex one of some movements being welcomed into the state, some excluded and repressed, and some concerns that eventually faded. Yet it is hard to imagine a deliberative democracy without a well functioning and if necessary critical public sphere. In a consensual political culture—be it in China or in a Scandinavian social democracy—the idea of a public sphere at a distance from state power and government policymaking is on the face of it problematic. It is also problematic when divided societies try to solve the problem of instability by creating what Lijphart (1977) calls a consociational regime. Consociational government is based on agreement by the leaders of different blocs in society (usually defined on an ethnic or religious basis) to share power and suppress conflict. One aspect of this suppression is “segmental autonomy” that keeps members of different blocs away from one another when it comes to politics and channels their political communication through the leadership of their own bloc. The public sphere as a concept can also be problematic in the United States, where there are so many incentives for social movements to organize as interest groups and seek integration into policymaking through lobbying and legal action, making it hard for them to maintain a critical distance from the state. The public sphere can act as a kind of “early warning system” to governments. Governments can respond in a variety of ways to the concerns

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raised. They can try to ignore or suppress them; but there is a danger that to do so will eventually lead to opposition taking revolutionary form. The history of socialism in the West is instructive here. Governments responded to the socialist agenda either by adopting policies designed to alleviate income insecurity, or by accepting social democratic parties into parliamentary politics with the possibility of eventually gaining a share of state power, or by welcoming trade unions into corporatist policymaking, essentially made socialist revolution impossible. The three locations for deliberation specified here (the state constituted publics, and the public sphere) are not necessarily alternatives to each other, and a deliberative democracy could feature all three. The “two track” deliberative democracy that appears in Habermas’s (1996) Between Facts and Norms emphasizes deliberation in both the public sphere and the legislature. Habermas’s idea is that public opinion is generated in the informal processes of the public sphere and is transmitted through election campaigns to legislators, who then deliberate in the legislature and make collectively binding decisions. (To be sure, Habermas ignores the problematic communicative character of election campaigns, and there are other ways for public opinion to be transmitted that do not involve elections.) Building a Deliberative Democracy Contemplation of these three locations for deliberative democracy suggests the following implications for those interested in promoting deliberative democracy. 1. There are multiple locations for the pursuit of deliberative democracy, and none has obvious priority. 2. A deliberative democracy could benefit from deliberation in all three kinds of locations I have stressed. But within these three categories, there is substantial scope for variation across political systems in terms of exactly how deliberation is pursued and the precise institutional mix in which it is embedded. 3. Within the state, this mix can feature legislatures, courts, administrative networks, and corporatist arrangements. 4. When it comes to discursive designs there is a broad menu of design choices available, involving both lay citizens and partisans. There is also substantial scope for variation in terms of how they connect to the institutions of the state. Sometimes there may be a clear advisory link to an institution with policymaking authority; sometimes the discursive forum in question will be just one input among many to the policymaking process. There may be a trade-off between deliberative

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authenticity, best achieved in lay citizen deliberation, and policy impact, which may be best achieved in partisan deliberation. 5. An emphasis on formal institutions should not obscure the potential for more informal deliberation in a broader public sphere. By its very nature the public sphere cannot be designed or controlled, but it can be protected through (for example) guarantees of free speech and free association. What, then, of the prospects for deliberative democracy in China in these terms? The fact that China does not have liberal democratic institutions of the sort that can be home to deliberation means looking more closely at other locations, in particular, at the public sphere, designed forums, and local governance. On the face of it, the informal public sphere is currently not very strong in China. It is often observed that the autonomous associations that are the building blocks for civil society are weak in China. Given that the public sphere can be thought of as the politicized aspect of civil society, this weakness does not bode well for a deliberative public sphere. Another crucial component of the public sphere is independent media; again, this seems problematic. But it should not be forgotten that these aspects can be problematic in the West too, where publics can be quite uncritical, and the media can be subject to monopolistic private control (as, for example, when it comes to television in Italy). Thus, the public sphere is always something that has to be struggled for, rather than taken as given. Thinking in historical terms, we can connect the idea of a critical public sphere to particular sorts of issues. In today’s world, be it in China, the West, or elsewhere, many of the most interesting developments when it comes to the generation of attentive and critical publics can be found in concern with the risks and hazards generated by economic development and technological change. In the West, this refusal simply to accept risks and hazards is no more than thirty or forty years old (Beck 1992). There are signs in China of increasing public unwillingness simply to accept the negative effects of economic development, when it comes to the effects, say, of pesticides on the health of peasants and consumers, the impact of pollution, and the requisition of land for industrial projects (Thiers 2003; Tan 2004). One typical bureaucratic response, irrespective of the kind of political system, is to deny, hide, and cover up risks (see, for example, the SARS crisis). But in today’s world, such a response is hard to sustain, and itself carries the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the state once the denial and cover up is exposed. So the real choice may in the end lie between a deliberative public sphere, on the one hand, and public alienation and unrest, on the other.

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The informal public sphere is not a complete substitute for more formal deliberative forums in the context of the risks and hazards generated by economic development. Indeed, it is exactly in the context of such issues that we ought to expect such forums to flourish. Deliberation involving representatives from all sides may be the best way of confronting a complex issue, to ensure that all perspectives and interests are brought to bear. This is easiest at the local level, where confrontation with the economic development imperative of the state is not necessary. In the West, it is exactly such issues at the local level that have been at the forefront of deliberative democratization of policymaking in the last three decades; and they could lead the way in China too. Again the alternative may be unrest and instability. The theory of deliberative democracy is in large measure a theory of democratic legitimacy, and that is true of the practice as well. Public officials who realize that deliberation is an excellent way to help secure legitimacy may sponsor deliberative exercises and sometimes try to manipulate them. But once deliberation is initiated, it can be hard to control from above, thus constituting at least a step in the direction of more authentic democracy. Many lessons can be drawn from the Chinese development of participatory and deliberative institutions in recent years. Of course they may not be perfect; and when it comes to, for example, village self-governance, elites may still be able to exert control over deliberation (Tan 2004). But deliberation is in large part a matter of learning. This learning applies at the social level; and even failed experiments in deliberation can be instructive. Learning applies too at the individual level and the capacity to participate in deliberation is not something that is learned through formal education. Instead, people learn to be competent deliberators through their participation in deliberation itself. The deliberative democrat’s confidence in the capacities of ordinary people, be they peasants, workers, the rich, or the poor, is not just a matter of faith but also of experience. Democracy is always a work in progress. Indeed, one of the defining features of a democracy is the continuous search for the deepening of its own democratic qualities. This search ought to have the qualities of a conversation in which many contributions are possible. Political reform should not be like engineering. That is, democratization should itself be a discursively democratic process. When I am asked to contribute to any such conversation, I normally reply that my first piece of advice is not to take advice from people like me. This is not an area for the application of well-defined blueprints. The sheer number of alternative models of deliberative democracy now on offer suggests that no particular blueprint is uniquely compelling. However, the general idea of deliberation now seems widely regarded as central to democracy, irrespective of the degree to which its advocates disagree on the details of how it should be implemented. And that should be a starting point for thinking about political reform in any context.

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Works Cited Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society. London: Sage. Bessette, Joseph M. 1994. The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dryzek, John S., David Downs, Christian Hunold, and David Schlosberg with HansKristian Hernes 2003. Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hendriks, Carolyn. 2003. “Exploring the Murky Waters of Civil Society in Deliberative Democracy.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Canberra, October 2–4. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton. Susskind, Lawrence, ed. 1999. The Consensus Building Handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Tan, Qingshan. 2004. “Deliberative Democracy and Village Self-governance.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Deliberative Democracy and Chinese Practice of Participatory and Deliberative Institutions, Hangzhou, November 18–21. Thiers, Paul. 2003. “Risk Society Comes to China: SARS, Transparency, and Public Accountability.” Asian Perspective 27: 241–51. Uhr, John. 1998. Deliberative Democracy in Australia. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

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C h ap t e r 2 Realizing Deliberative Democracy: Strategies for Democratic Consultation James S. Fishkin

The central and continuing problem of democratic reform has been to build institutions that realize two fundamental democratic aspirations: inclusion and thoughtfulness. On the one hand, we need institutions that somehow represent or include all the members of a polity. On the other hand, we need to consult those members under conditions where they are effectively motivated to think about the power they are being asked to exercise. All over the world, democratic reforms bring power to the people through institutions that increasingly emphasize inclusiveness, but the very conditions that allow for more inclusion seem to have undermined collective thoughtfulness. This trade-off is not inevitable, though. Instead, it is due to the lack of institutional imagination that has guided most modern democratic reforms. This chapter is aimed at expanding the democratic toolkit of mechanisms for public consultation, showing that it is indeed possible to combine inclusiveness and thoughtfulness, rather than force us to choose between them. The Apparent Conflict Why has it been thought that there is a conflict between the inclusiveness of institutions and the thoughtfulness with which citizens provide an input into the democratic process? Some of the main contentions can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Voters may have passions or interests that can motivate dangerous factions.

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2. Voters are too ill informed to deal with complex policy or political matters. 3. Voters are incapable of dealing with complex policy or political matters. 4. Voters are so disconnected from complex policy or political matters that they would prefer to have elites decide for them; they have no interest in being involved in inclusive public consultation. 5. Voters are subject to mechanisms of group psychology such as “polarization” that undermine the rationality of their choices. These mechanisms arise from group discussion, the very process that would seem most promising to raise the thoughtfulness of democratic inputs. 6. Voters have preferences that are sufficiently heterogeneous that their choices would produce “instability” (cycles violating transitivity) so that the resulting democratic decisions are subject to arbitrariness and manipulation. Because these contentions are all well known, I will simply take note of them now in order to frame our review of strategies that might overcome them. Our basic question is whether or not it is possible to avoid these apparent objections and, at the same time, succeed in combining the two fundamental democratic aspirations of inclusion and thoughtfulness. Turning briefly to the first of these objections, American democracy was born in a debate over the founding in which James Madison and Alexander Hamilton argued for a process of “successive filtrations” in which public views are “refined and enlarged” by “passing them through a chosen body of citizens” (Hamilton 1787). The idea was to avoid the passions and interests of the public that might motivate “factions” adverse to the rights of others or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. Consulting the public was considered risky and could be dangerous. After all, the passions and interests of the public had killed people like Socrates and led to revolts such as the Shays’ rebellion. The founders wanted the cool reflections of deliberative representatives rather than the aroused passions or interests of the mass public. To do so, however, they needed to create an elite “republic” that was insulated from the direct input of ordinary citizens. The Senate was selected by state legislatures, while the President was selected by an Electoral College that was originally supposed to be a deliberative body (on a stateby-state basis). The Constitution was adopted by a “convention” that was also supposed to be a representative, deliberative body. The resulting system was intended to be high on the thoughtfulness or quality of opinion (filtration or deliberation would serve the public good and protect against tyranny of the majority) but low on elements of inclusion like political equality and participation. The Founders’ debate in the United States

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suggests the question for modern democratic reform: is it possible to have a more inclusive system and avoid the problems the founders envisaged with mass public input? Is the cool reflection of deliberation reserved only for elite representatives or can it be conducted by the people themselves? A second line of argument against combining inclusive and thoughtful mass consultation is raised by the whole line of democratic reform that greeted the project of the American founders, beginning with concerns expressed by the anti-Federalists and moving through populist and progressive reforms right up to the present day. One of those chief concerns is that voters are too ill informed to deal with complex policy or political matters. The United States has tried to remedy this by including the public in the democratic process: senators are elected directly by the people; many states conduct referenda and other ballot initiatives; and public opinion polls have led to constant informal public consultation. However, these processes merely reveal that in actuality the public really does have little information about the issues it is consulted about. The public has shockingly little correct knowledge on issues ranging from whether or not Iraq had weapons of mass destruction to whether or not, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a member of NATO. This is despite the fact that educational levels have gone up dramatically since World War II. A widespread explanation for the mass public’s low level of information is “rational ignorance.” If I have one vote in millions why should I spend a lot of time investing in more information to make an informed choice since my individual vote or opinion is extraordinarily unlikely to make any difference? Yet our aspirations for public input would seem to depend crucially on citizens being informed. The apparent conflict is that if we aspire to more inclusion, and directly consult a mass public of millions, we find that it is subject to rational ignorance, undermining the thoughtfulness that can be attributed to the people being consulted. A third line of argument against the possibility of simultaneously fulfilling the aspirations toward inclusion and thoughtfulness is the idea that the public may not have the competence to deal with complex policy or political matters. To the extent that this is the case, a move toward more mass participation would bring in people who are incapable of living up to the democratic role assigned to them. A recent statement of this position can be found in Richard Posner’s critique of deliberative democracy (Posner 2003). He argues that there is no use consulting the public about substantive policy; all that we should expect from democracy is a competitive struggle for the people’s vote, along the lines offered previously by Joseph Schumpeter (1942). We get a peaceful decision about the circulation of elites—those who will take relatively similar positions in order to compete in the same electoral space. The will of the people, though, is more or less meaningless,

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as the public cannot be expected to have thoughtful or well-formed opinions on any substantive matters. It is further argued that the more we practice inclusiveness and bring the mass public into the process, the more we get away from the “competent” decisions of elites. A fourth argument is a variant of the third. According to advocates of “Stealth Democracy,” the public does not really want to be bothered by the details of public policy (Hibbing and Thiess-Morse 2002). An impediment to combining inclusion and thoughtfulness is that if you give the public such opportunity, they will have little or no interest in exercising it. They would rather just trust competent elites to make decisions for them. A fifth argument is that even if we brought the public into democratic processes, we would not contribute to the collective thoughtfulness of the process because there are debilitating patterns of group psychology, such as polarization, that prevent the mass public from dealing with the substantive merits of political or policy questions. Cass Sunstein (2003) has argued that the very process that might bring some thoughtfulness to the political process (i.e., group discussion) brings with it pathology. He calls it “polarization” and he means a process whereby groups go to extremes when coming to a decision as a collective. For example, if there is an issue for which a midpoint can be defined and if the group starts out on, for example, the left side of the midpoint, it will, after discussion, move further to that side. Alternatively, if it starts out on the right side, it will move further to the right. The idea is that because of an “imbalance in the argument pool” (more arguments being voiced on one side than another) and because of a “social comparison effect” (people wanting to be publicly identified with the winning viewpoint), this process will replicate itself regardless of content. Sunstein has confirmed his hypothesis with experiments with mock juries. A sixth argument is that the attempt to take democracy seriously at the level of the mass public (the product of inclusion) is likely to undermine the collective thoughtfulness of democratic results because the public is likely to have such ill thought out preferences that one could get cycles, violating transitivity. This embarrassing fact is only covered up by “structure-induced equilibrium” that disguises the cycles either by limiting the alternatives to two or allowing for agenda manipulation of the choices considered. The normative conclusion, however, is not affected. The voice of the people, if it were consulted directly, would be arbitrary because pair-wise comparisons among the alternatives could yield cycles that don’t make sense: if there’s a preference of B over A and C over B, it may be that A is preferred over C. From this perspective, then, it is better not to make any claims about the public will and, thus, limit the advantages of democracy to the peaceful circulation of elites.

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Eight Forms of Public Consultation Utilizing the dimensions of inclusiveness and deliberation, we can envision at least eight forms of public consultation: A. Raw

1A: SLOPs

2A: Some polls

3A: Most polls

B. Refined

1B: Discussion groups

2B: Citizens, juries, etc.

3B: Deliberative polls

4A: Referendum democracy 4B: “Deliberation Day”

The simple classification above focuses on two issues: what and who. Consider two fundamental distinctions: the first has to do with what form of public opinion is being assessed; the second has to do with whose opinion is being assessed. When we ask about forms of public opinion, we are asking about the thoughtfulness of public input. When we ask who is included, we are asking about how the aspiration for inclusion is implemented. When considering forms of public opinion, let us say that opinion is “refined” if it is the product of deliberation exposing it to a wide range of alternative views supported by sincere arguments and reasonably accurate information. Refined opinion is informed—informed about competing views and facts sincerely viewed as relevant by proponents of different positions. People are aware of the arguments and have reflected upon them or thought about them. By contrast, we will say that opinion is “raw” if it is not the product of such deliberation. The other distinction regarding public opinion concerns whose opinion is being consulted. While the methods of selection that I will focus on do not exhaust all the possibilities, they cover the principal practical alternatives. The people consulted can be self-selected; they can be selected by some method of sampling that attempts to be representative without probability sampling; they can be chosen by random sampling; or they can constitute virtually all voters (or members of the group being consulted). When the two dimensions of what and who are combined, then the eight possibilities in the above chart emerge. I will first fill out these categories and then will turn to which possibilities offer the prospect of answering or avoiding the six objections discussed earlier regarding the inclusion of the public in the democratic process. The first category, 1A, is already being implemented, especially on the Internet. Norman Bradburn of the University of Chicago has coined an acronym SLOP for “self-selected listener opinion poll.” Before the Internet, radio call-in shows would commonly ask for responses by telephone to some topic. The respondents to SLOPs are not selected by scientific random

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sampling as in public opinion polls. Instead, the respondents simply volunteer themselves. They are predominantly those who feel more intensely or feel especially motivated about the topics. It is thought that the SLOP gets “grass roots” opinions, but sometimes their responses are more organized and synthetic than one would expect. In the parlance of American lobbyists, the impression of grass roots is that it is really “Astroturf.” A good example of the dangers of SLOPs came with the world consultation that Time magazine organized about the “Person of the Century.” Time asked for votes in several categories, including greatest thinker, greatest statesman, greatest entertainer, and greatest captain of industry. Strangely, one person got by far the most votes in every category, and it turned out to be the same person. Who was this person who towered above all rivals in every category? Ataturk. The people of Turkey organized to vote—by post card, on the Internet, by fax—and produced millions more votes as a matter of national pride than the rest of the world could muster for any candidate, just through individual, unorganized voting (Morris 1997). Media organizations routinely conduct SLOPs on the Internet on a wide range of political or social matters. A SLOP involves visitors to a website and gives people a sense of empowerment (they are registering their opinions), but it also produces data that is misleading and that offers only a distorted picture of public opinion. To take just one example, at the time of Clinton’s impeachment in the United States, SLOPs routinely showed large majorities in favor, while scientific polls showed a completely different picture. Those who felt most intensely about the topic troubled themselves to register their views, sometimes more than once. It is often thought that technology might facilitate the better realization of ancient forms of democracy, but SLOPs hark back to the practices of ancient Sparta, not ancient Athens. In Sparta there was a practice called “The Shout,” where candidates would pack a hall and the one who got the most applause was the one elected (Talbert 1988, 38). Later, we will turn to a different category that realizes Athenian rather than Spartan democracy. The difficulty with category 1A is that it offers a picture of public opinion that is neither representative nor deliberative. It offers a picture of uninformed opinion that is also distorted and partial in whom it includes. If it is a mirror of public opinion, it is more like a carnival fun house mirror than one that reproduces what it reflects. An alternative to the SLOPs of category 1A is the possibility of serious deliberation and refined public opinion produced among self-selected groups. This leads us to discussion groups of Category 1B. If the discussion groups offer the opportunity to weigh the main alternative arguments that fellow citizens would want raised on an issue, then they can achieve a measure of deliberation on an issue even if the participants are not a good mirror

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of the entire population. The Kettering Foundation supports a large network of “National Issues Forums” (NIF) in the United States and in several other countries, in which thousands of self-selected participants deliberate conscientiously and sincerely with briefing materials that offer a balanced and accurate basis for discussion (Matthews 1994). These participants meet in churches, schools, and neighborhood venues in order to spend hours in serious consideration of the alternatives. In addition, while there are many discussion forums on the Internet, it is worth pausing to note the difference between deliberative practices on the Internet and those in face-to-face discussions. When NIF participants gather for a discussion forum they (1) can evaluate each others’ verbal arguments, (2) have an extended period for arguments and concerns on one side to be answered by responses on an opposing side, (3) have an agenda of materials that cover the issue to make sure that they are at least aware of the main alternative arguments that have been previously voiced, and (4) have a moderator to ensure that everyone in the forum talks so that no one dominates the discussion and that there is an atmosphere of mutual respect that permits the respondents to listen to each other. However, the conclusions of the face-to-face meetings and those over the Internet, while filtered or deliberative, are not representative of the views of the entire public. Category 2A combines raw public opinion with methods of selection attempting to achieve some degree of representativeness, but that do not employ probability sampling. Some public opinion polls fall into this category. Those employing quota sampling, a practice still common in many democratic countries outside the United States, justify their method as an attempt to approximate probability sampling. Some spectacular failures, such as the 1948 Dewey/Truman debacle and the 1992 British General Election have been blamed at least in part on the use of quota sampling ( Jowell 1993). Category 2B employs nonrandom methods of selection with attempts to arrive at more deliberative public opinion. There are a number of methods of public consultation that fit this category. One of those methods, so-called citizen juries, uses quota samples to select small numbers of participants (typically twelve or eighteen) to deliberate for several days or even weeks on public issues. Consensus conferences begin with self-selection (soliciting respondents through newspaper advertisements) and then use quotas to attempt to approximate representativeness. These methods often suffer from the same problem noted above: they begin with self-selection and then employ such small numbers that any claims to representativeness cannot be credibly established. Another problem is that these research designs do not permit evaluation of how those agreeing to participate compare to those who do not.

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Category 3A, combining probability samples with raw opinion, is exemplified by the public opinion poll in its most developed form. It avoids the distorted representativeness of SLOPs as well as the more modest distortions of nonrandom sampling. Just as Gallup vanquished the Literary Digest by using quota sampling for the effective launch of the public opinion poll in the 1936 U.S. Presidential election, this category, 3A, trumps the SLOPs of 1A as well as the quota sampling of 2A. (Gallup abandoned quota sampling after the 1948 election. The advantage of probability sampling was demonstrated by the success of the Survey Research Center at Michigan in that election.) Public opinion polling reflecting raw public opinion offers a thin “top of the head” expression of the public voice. On complex policy or political questions, the views represented by polls are crippled by what Anthony Downs (1957) called “rational ignorance.” If I have only one vote in millions, why should I spend a lot of time and effort becoming informed (as we would like ideal citizens to do) when my individual vote or opinion will not make any appreciable difference? In addition, the views reported by polls on complex political or policy matters are often crippled by a second factor— the tendency to report opinions that are not only based on little thought or reflection, but that may not exist at all. Phantom opinions or “nonattitudes” are reported by polls because respondents almost never wish to admit that they do not know, even when offered elaborate opportunities for saying so. Building on the classic work of Phil Converse of the University of Michigan, George Bishop and his colleagues at the University of Cincinnati dramatized this issue with their study of attitudes toward a nonexistent “Public Affairs Act of 1975.” Large percentages of the public offered an opinion even though the act was fictional. The Washington Post more recently celebrated the twentieth un-anniversary of the nonexistent “Public Affairs Act of 1975” by asking respondents about its “repeal.” The sample was split, with half being told that former President Clinton wanted to repeal the act and half being told that the “Republican Congress” wanted its repeal. While such responses were based on a minimal amount of information (or misinformation provided to the participants, since the act did not exist in the first place) the information base was really just a response to a cue about who was for the proposal and who was against it. (For a good overview of this work by George Bishop and the replication by the Washington Post under the direction of Richard Morin, see “Leaders, the Public and Democracy” 1995.) Deliberative Polling begins with a concern about the defects likely to be found in ordinary public opinion: the incentives for rational ignorance applying to the mass public and the tendency for sample surveys to turn up “nonattitudes” or phantom opinions (as well as very much “top of the head”

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opinions that approach “nonattitudes”) on many public questions. At best, ordinary polls offer a snapshot of public opinion as it is, even when the public has little information, attention, or interest in the issue. Deliberative Polling, by contrast, is meant to offer a representation of what the public would think about an issue under “good” conditions: every aspect of the process is designed to facilitate informed and balanced discussion. After taking an initial survey, participants are invited for a weekend of face-to-face deliberation where they are given carefully balanced and vetted briefing materials to provide an initial basis for dialogue. They are randomly assigned to small groups for discussions with trained moderators and encouraged to ask questions arising from the small group discussions to competing experts and politicians in larger plenary sessions. The moderators attempt to establish an atmosphere where participants listen to each other and no one is permitted to dominate the discussion. At the end of the weekend, participants take the same confidential questionnaire as on first contact and the resulting judgments in the final questionnaire are usually broadcast along with edited proceedings of the discussions throughout the weekend (Fishkin 1997; Luskin et al. 2002). The weekend microcosm tends to be highly representative, both attitudinally and demographically, as compared to the entire baseline survey and census data about the population. In every case thus far, there have also been a number of large and statistically significant changes of opinion over the weekend. Considered judgments are often different from the “top of the head” attitudes solicited by conventional polls. Looking at the full panoply of Deliberative Polls, about two-thirds of the opinion items change significantly following deliberation. What do the results represent, though? Respondents are able to overcome the incentives for rational ignorance normally applying to the mass public: instead of one vote in millions, they have, in effect, one vote in a few hundred in the weekend sample, and one voice in fifteen or so in the small group discussions; the weekend is organized so as to make credible the claim that their voice matters; and they overcome apathy, disconnection, inattention, and initial lack of information. From knowing that someone is educated (or not) or economically advantaged (or not), one cannot predict change in the deliberations. We know that participants from all social locations do change their minds in the course of deliberation. We also know from knowledge items contained within the questionnaires that becoming informed on an issue can predict a change on the policy attitudes. In that sense, deliberative public opinion is both informed and representative. As a result, it is also, almost inevitably, counterfactual. The public will rarely, if ever, be motivated to become as informed and engaged as their weekend microcosms.

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The idea is that if a counterfactual situation is morally or politically relevant, then why not do a serious social science experiment rather than merely engage in informal inference or armchair empiricism in order to determine what the appropriate counterfactual might actually look like? Further, if that counterfactual situation is both discoverable and normatively relevant, why not then let the rest of the world know about it? Just as John Rawls’ (1971) original position can be thought of as having a kind of recommending force, the counterfactual representation of public opinion identified by the Deliberative Poll also recommends to the rest of the population some conclusions that they ought to take seriously because the process represents everyone under conditions where they could think. The idea may seem unusual in that it melds normative theory with an empirical agenda to create, as social scientists would say, “quasi-experiments” that will uncover deliberative public opinion. Most social science experiments, however, are aimed at creating a counterfactual (the effect of the treatment condition). In this effort to fuse normative and empirical research agendas, the trick is to identify a treatment condition that embodies the appropriate normative relevance. The first Deliberative Poll in China illustrates the possibilities (and this book contains a lengthier treatment of that Poll in chapter 12). A random representative sample of close to 250 citizens gathered in the township of Zeguo to consider prioritizing certain infrastructure projects. They were provided with briefing materials describing thirty proposed infrastructure projects: roads, parks, sewage treatment plants, and other proposals. The sample was highly representative and its members struggled in small group discussions and plenary sessions to weigh the merits and limitations of each project. After a long day of discussion, they took the same questionnaire that they took at the beginning of the sessions. The questionnaire asked them to rate the value of all thirty projects on a one to ten scale. Their ratings after deliberation held some surprises for the cadres. Instead of “image projects” and major roads, the sample, by and large, preferred sewage treatment plants and a comprehensive environmental plan. The party leaders embraced the results, which were later approved by the local People’s Congress. Now the four sewage treatment plants and other preferred projects will all be built; further, the projects rated in the top twelve out of thirty have all been approved. The Deliberative Poll represented informed public opinion. The knowledge questions showed significant gains and the whole process was transparent so that the public was able to express its reasons for the preferred projects and was able to weigh competing arguments. The Deliberative Poll offered a poll with a human face, since decision makers could witness not only the data but the plenary sessions in which questions from the small groups were brought to panels of competing experts.

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Note that the opinion represented in the Deliberative Poll is counterfactual. Most residents of Zeguo did not have opinions about the thirty infrastructure projects—most did not even know about them—but the microcosm was stimulated to arrive at considered judgments under good conditions for doing so (accurate information, access to competing arguments, balanced briefing materials, and discussions with diverse others brought together by random sampling). Hence, there is a recommending force to the notion that these are the conclusions the public would come to if it had a chance to consider the issue under similarly good conditions. The last two categories, 4A and 4B, parallel the previous ones, except that, when ideally realized, they would offer the full embodiment of the kind of results represented by scientific sampling in 3A and 3B. If everyone somehow participated in mass consultations such as voting or referendum democracy, then 4A would represent the same views as those offered by public opinion polls in 3A. Of course, one problem with referendum democracy and other forms of mass consultation that attempt to involve the bulk of the mass public is that turnout is often so defective that only a portion of the public participates. Sometimes the participation in referendums or national elections is so low, in fact, that the distinction between mass plebiscitary democracy and self-selected samples in SLOPs becomes difficult to draw. Of course, there are possible institutional remedies for low turnout. Australia has a long tradition of compulsory voting, including fining nonvoters, that has worked quite well to provide one of the highest turnouts in the world in national elections. However, it is well established that compulsory voting has done little or nothing to improve the level of knowledge or engagement among voters—just the level of participation. The last possibility, 4B, is the most ambitious. Just as conventional polling (3A) models actual “top of the head” opinion in the mass public, which is represented by plebiscitary democracy (4A) in our scheme, Deliberative Polling (3B) models mass deliberative public opinion (4B). The latter, however, is usually counterfactual. The mass public, in other words, is usually not deliberating; it usually does not have considered judgments on most policy issues. How could this counterfactual possibility be realized? How could it be realized in either a face-to-face context or on line? Bruce Ackerman and I have a proposal: “Deliberation Day” (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004). The problem for the Deliberative Poll was how to motivate a microcosm of the entire population to overcome the incentives for rational ignorance and to engage in enough substantive face-to-face discussion to arrive at informed judgments, not only about the issues, but also about the main competing arguments that other citizens would offer. It is one thing, though, to imagine doing this for a microcosm and quite another to imagine doing it for the entire population. Gallup’s vision was that the

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combination of the media and polling could turn the entire country into “one great room.” The media would send out competing views and the polls would report the public’s judgments and it would be as if the entire country were in one town meeting (Fishkin 1997, 76–80, 161–76). This vision foundered, however, on the lack of a social context that would encourage small group deliberation: if everyone is in one great room in the large scale nation state, the room is so big that no one is listening. A different, more decentralized strategy is required. We propose a national holiday in which all voters would be invited to participate in local, randomly assigned discussion groups as a preparation to the voting process a week later. Candidates for the major parties would make presentations transmitted by national media and local small group discussions would identify key questions that would be directed to local party representatives in relatively small-scale town meetings held simultaneously all over the country. Incentives would be paid for each citizen to participate. The cost, while massive, would make democracy far more meaningful, as it would provide for an input from the public that involved most people and that also led to a large mass of citizens being informed on the issues and the competing arguments. If the incentives for participation in this national holiday activity, “Deliberation Day,” worked and people actually became well informed, then it would make real the counterfactual deliberative opinion represented by the “quasi-experiment” of the Deliberative Poll. Candidate behavior and advertising would have to adjust to the fact that voters would have become informed on the issues. The anticipation of such a deliberative public could do a great deal to transform the rest of the public dialogue. While full-scale realization of this idea is only a far-off possibility, it is meant to dramatize a different way of thinking about democratic reform. The major cost of the reform is the new holiday. We propose to take an existing holiday, President’s Day, and devote it to picking our next president. We have actually piloted the idea in the 2004 Presidential Election. In seventeen cities, locally televised Deliberative Polls were conducted, mostly on the same day, with statistical microcosms that represented what the local publics would think if they were all deliberating. In many cases these local deliberations produced significant knowledge gains and changes of opinion. The local/national project dramatized not only the value of putting a human face on opinion change to enrich political communication, but also the prospects for creating civic engagement through discussion in local communities around the country. Deliberative Polling and Deliberation Day There are two categories in my scheme that achieve both values: Deliberative Polling (3B) and Deliberation Day (4B). Deliberative Polling achieves

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inclusiveness through a form of political equality—everyone has an equal chance of being selected through random sampling. The latter achieves inclusiveness through mass participation. Ideally, everyone does actually participate. In both cases, an important new increment of thoughtfulness is added by the deliberative process itself: briefing materials, small group discussions, questions and answers from competing experts, opportunities to reflect together on new information, and competing arguments in a safe public space. Both strategies—Deliberative Polling and Deliberation Day— combine inclusiveness and greater thoughtfulness. Both are meant to be antidotes to shrinking sound-bite democracy and disaffected mass participation, and both are realizations of the same pattern of deliberative practice: small group discussions alternated with plenary sessions with competing experts. The difference is whether this kind of experience is undertaken by scientific samples or by something approaching the entire mass public. The former achieves inclusiveness through scientific sampling; the latter achieves it through mass participation. The kind of deliberative democracy embodied in both efforts offers a line of response to the objections with which we started. First, the original objection of the American Founders to direct public consultation was that it would open the door to mob rule. The public would not engage in the cool and dispassionate reason necessary to solve public problems, a form of reason that could only be expected of representatives. However, our experience with mass deliberative institutions in the form of Deliberative Polls strongly supports the view that if the right social context is created, the public will consider arguments on the merits, take account of new information, and be sensitive to the public interest. The norms of civil discourse in a carefully constructed safe public space offer little scope for the passions or interests that might fuel “tyranny of the majority” adverse to the rights of others. Second, while it is true that voters tend to be ill informed about most public policy or political issues most of the time, it is possible to create institutions that change the incentives for rational ignorance. In preparing for serious discussions in which they will be part of a small group, people pay attention, anticipate the need for information, and become more informed. Deliberative Polling and the pilot for Deliberation Day have both shown significant knowledge gains in this respect. Third, critics have claimed that voters are simply incapable of dealing with complex policy or political issues. However, the changes of opinion we see in Deliberative Polls show improvements in rationality in two senses. First, the people who change are the ones who become more informed. The changes are driven by information gains. Second, there is a tighter connection between values, empirical premises (assumptions about causal connections),

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and policy attitudes after deliberation than before. The changes following deliberation are far from arbitrary. They are the product of considered judgments. Fourth, critics claim that the public is so disconnected from the policy process that they would prefer not to be involved. They are correct that there is often substantial alienation and disconnection, but the fact that voters subjected to negative attack advertisements and manipulative sound bites feel this way says nothing about how they would react to meaningful opportunities to become more engaged and informed. Our experience is that voters welcome the opportunity and view it as something that transforms their connection to the political process and their sense of efficacy and likelihood of continuing political involvement. Given the right institutional design, this problem can be overcome. Fifth, Sunstein’s claim of polarization is based on mock jury experiments. Our data show that the likelihood of polarization is sensitive to the exact institutional design. The mechanisms that apparently produce polarization (an imbalance in the argument pool favoring one side and a social approval effect in which people like to side with the more popular position) can be muted by designs that ensure balance and allow for anonymous final choice. Evidence from the Deliberative Poll demonstrates that while half the issues show movement away from the mean, half show movement toward the mean, adding up to no consistent pattern (Luskin et al. 2002). Apparently, there are elements of balance in the Deliberative Poll: moderators, competing experts in the panels, and balanced briefing materials that allow for a sufficiently full airing of competing arguments. In addition, the participants do not have to expose their opinion on the issue since their views are gathered at the end through confidential questionnaires. Sunstein (2003) has admitted that his “law of group polarization” has an apparent exception in the case of the Deliberative Poll. Lastly, there is a line of criticism that the danger in trying to consult the mass public is that, unlike elites, their preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous or variable, that the public will is essentially “meaningless” (Riker 1982); there will be cycles violating transitivity (e.g., endorsing choice B over A, C over B, but A over C). Because of these variegated preferences, the collective reasonableness or thoughtfulness of democratic decisions would be undermined if those decisions were brought to the mass public. However, as Duncan Black (1952) showed years ago, such cycles are impossible if the voters share an underlying dimension so that their preferences are “single peaked.” In my Deliberative Polling research program, we have shown that the percentage of respondents who share the same single peaked dimension tends to increase after deliberation. Further, in collaboration with Christian List, it has been shown that the likelihood of cycles goes

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down as that percentage goes up (McLean et al. 2000). While cycles are far rarer than critics who employ this argument allege, the increase in single peakedness shows that deliberative democracy has more protection against the instability of cycles than does conventional public opinion. People come to a shared “meta understanding” of the problem if they discuss it together, even if they do not agree to the solutions to those problems. Collective thoughtfulness is indeed compatible with greater inclusion, provided we are inventive in new institutional designs. Deliberation allows for the mass public to think in the public interest, to become more informed, to discover its capacities to solve public problems, to become engaged, to decide on the merits rather than on the basis of group psychology, and to arrive at nonarbitrary expressions of collective political will. While this research program is far from concluded, the initial results of our experiments are all very promising for the prospect of bringing deliberation to mass democracy and thus include everyone under conditions where they can think. Works Cited Ackerman, Bruce, and James S. Fishkin. 2004. Deliberation Day. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Black, Duncan. 1952. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Fishkin, James S. 1997. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Hamilton, Alexander. 1787. “Federalist No. 10.” The Federalist Papers. Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961. New York: New American Library, 77–84. Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Thiess-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About How Government Should Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jowell, Roger, Barry Hedges, Peter Lynn, Graham Farrant, and Anthony Heath 1993. “The 1992 British General Election: The Failure of the Polls.” Public Opinion Quarterly 57: 238–63. “Leaders, the Public and Democracy.” 1995. Society 35(5): 2. Luskin, Robert C., James Fishkin, and Roger Jowell. 2002. “Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science 32: 455–87. Mathews, David. 1994. Politics for People. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. McLean, Iain, Christian List, James Fishkin, and Robert Luskin. 2000. “Does Deliberation Produce Preference Structuration?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30–September 4 available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2000/structuration.pdf (accessed on July 1, 2006). Morris, Chris et al. 1997. “Is This the Man of the Century?: Forget Mandela, Einstein, Gandhi, and Mao; Here’s Ataturk.” The Guardian, October 30, 1.

52 / deliberative democracy in china Posner, Richard. 2003. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Sunstein, Cass R. 2003. “The Law of Group Polarization.” In James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett eds., Debating Deliberative Democracy . Oxford: Basil Blackwell 80–101. Talbert, Richard J.A, trans. and ed. 1988. “Lycurgus.” In Plutarch on Sparta. New York: Penguin Books, 1–46.

C h ap t e r 3 Critical Theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Citizenship Geoffrey Stokes*

Deliberative democracy offers a promising extension of, and alternative to, liberal and republican theories and practices. For many advocates, the procedures of deliberative democracy provide a stronger source of political legitimacy for collective decisions than liberal or republican democracy can offer. For others, deliberative democracy can improve methods for solving political problems. Because of its procedures, it may be more likely to produce the truth about an issue, which can then be the basis of better informed decisions that may in turn, be more likely to generate political consensus.1 Another advantage of deliberative democracy is that it negates or modifies the influence of money and power in political decisionmaking. Where the values of communicative reason are applied, the force of the better argument is supposed to prevail over wealth, political influence, and the use of coercive methods such as violence and intimidation. Deliberative democratic theory is critical of existing liberal democratic arrangements because the latter do not sufficiently address the problems of pluralism, inequality, and complexity that are characteristic of modern (Western) societies (Bohman 1996, 237).2 Unlike liberal democracy, deliberative democracy does not just rely upon the aggregation of preferences and majority voting. By giving priority to reasoned argument and discussion, deliberative democracy enables “interests” to be recognized, but does not permit them to dominate proceedings. Unlike republican democracy, * I would like to thank April Carter and Baogang He for their comments and advice. I am also indebted to Simone Gianfrotta for providing me with a number of useful sources on the subject.

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deliberative democracy is skeptical about whether a single shared vision of the common good could ever be attained or be effective in motivating citizens (Bohman 1996, 5). Yet, deliberative democracy still allows for the formation of provisional notions of the common good by deliberation. By these means, deliberators may also encourage greater interest in public issues (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 2). Many arguments about deliberative democracy focus upon its relationship to liberal democracy. In this regard, two versions of deliberative democracy stand out. One is a tendency deriving from within reformist, or social, liberalism, while the other more radical type has its origins in critical theory. The later works of John Rawls (1996, 212–54; 1999, 129–80) exemplifies the liberal tendency, which advocates greater deliberation within existing official liberal institutions. Central are the role of “public reason” and the elaboration of deliberative principles for making constitutions and for guiding the work of legislatures, courts, and candidates for public office (Rawls 1999, 135). For Gutmann and Thompson (1996), proper deliberation also requires attention to the material conditions under which deliberators live; accordingly, they provide an argument for the welfare state. For theorists such as Gutmann and Thompson, however, deliberative democracy is an extension of liberalism and is given its meaning by liberal values. The critical theory version is evident in the work of Jürgen Habermas (1996a), Seyla Benhabib (1996b), Joshua Cohen (1996), and John Dryzek (1990; 2000), to name but a few.3 For these advocates, deliberative democracy begins not from liberalism but from the requirements of democracy and democratization. Thus, for Dryzek (2000, 29), the stress is upon greater inclusivity of participants, broadening the scope of issues subject to democratic control and increasing the effectiveness or authenticity of democratic participation. Whereas greater deliberation in official institutions of state and the judiciary is not rejected, the critical theorists tend to see deliberative democracy as enabling critiques of the liberal state and established authorities, which in turn may allow for their transformation. Such theorists also look to the exercise of deliberation outside the state in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements of civil society, as well as beyond the nation-state. Accordingly, the deliberative impulse operates as a critical and oppositional force in relation to the state. This chapter focuses upon these critical theories, though comparative reference will be made to the liberal ones when appropriate. Although issues of citizenship have been widely canvassed in liberal and republican versions of democracy, they often remain either implicit or undeveloped in the theories of deliberative democracy.4 This chapter therefore aims to examine the critical theories of deliberative democracy with

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reference to key problems of citizenship. By focusing on deliberative citizenship, attention is directed away from the priorities of the larger system of government, its representatives, and its officials, and more toward the needs and concerns of, and demands upon, individual political agents and groups. In particular, the chapter considers questions of (1) citizenship as an official, legal status and an administrative category; (2) citizenship as a practice and normative ideal; and (3) the domains in which deliberative citizenship can be exercised. I argue that by giving greater attention to the issues raised in studies of citizenship, we can discover both the limitations of and possibilities for deliberative democracy in designated contexts. Background: What is Deliberative Democracy? Deliberative democracy either opposes or gives reduced weight to the traditional liberal forms of politics (often characterized by bargaining) to pursue predetermined interests, which are then consummated in decisions reached by aggregating votes. In the absence of bargaining and voting, how is legitimate consent reached? “At the core of deliberative democracy,” write Gutmann and Thompson (1997, 1), “is the idea that citizens and officials must justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the action.” (See also Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 7.) The main aim of deliberative democracy, therefore, is to expand the use of deliberative reasoning among citizens and their representatives in making decisions. In this way, deliberative democracy aims to strengthen the legitimacy of decisions and laws (Bohman and Rehg 1997, ix). The quality of deliberation is a criterion for the legitimacy of democracy: the better the deliberation, the more it can be said to be based upon the consent of the citizens and the more legitimate the decision reached. Accordingly, the means by and the conditions under which deliberation occurs and by which agreement is reached are important. Here two major principles—participation and equality—stand out, although others such as reciprocity and accountability also come into play.5 Many theories of deliberative democracy invoke the principle of participation, but in the critical theories this principle is given a distinctive twist. “What distinguishes emerging theories of deliberative democracy from most of their predecessors,” writes Mark Warren (2002, 174), “is the view that democracy requires not only equality of votes, but also equal and effective opportunity to participate in processes of collective judgment.” Participation must be of an active kind that involves offering reasons in argument and discussion, and possibly other noncoercive communicative strategies. Furthermore, these reasons must be made public so that others can see, hear, and respond to them.

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The critical theorists emphasize the strengthening of human propensities for communicative action (e.g., Habermas 1996a, 27; Dryzek 2000, 2), rather than instrumentalist and strategic approaches to political decisionmaking.6 Such concerns press them to strengthen the principle of equality. For Habermas (1996b, 459), legitimacy can be based upon a version of the discourse principle, namely: “Only those actions are valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.” For Joshua Cohen (1997, 73), the outcomes of democratic deliberation are only legitimate “if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.” For critical theorists, deliberative equality is a more radical version of equality of opportunity. To put this in a more prescriptive way, the radical deliberative recommendation is that all those who are affected or bound by a decision ought to have an equal opportunity to participate in making that decision. That is, all those who have an interest in an issue ought to be allowed to engage in public debate to influence decisions about it. In this formulation, the ideal of deliberative democracy is premised upon a more extensive form of political equality than that maintained in liberal democracy. Because political equality is not just limited to equality of voting, deliberative democracy becomes a force for greater inclusion. Radical deliberative theorists reject elitist arguments that would place limitations on who may engage in processes of public deliberation or those that restrict the scope of participation. Nonetheless, most deliberative theorists envisage deliberative democracy being conducted within a liberal constitutional framework and under the rule of law in which key rights are protected. Deliberative theorists differ, however, over the extent to which deliberative democracy ought to be a reforming procedure for overcoming weaknesses in liberal democracy or a practice that is essentially critical and transformative. John Dryzek (2000, 1–2), for example, sees the following as the defining element: “The only condition for authentic deliberation is . . . the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion.” Deliberative politics must be defined by citizen reflection upon their own interests and preferences, as a prelude to forming new ones. A radical or critical deliberative politics is always potentially transformative of individuals and contexts. These core principles of participation, equality, reflection, and transformation prompt an inquiry into whether the critical theories of deliberative democracy require a distinctive form of deliberative citizenship and what its main characteristics would be. Further, we must ask to what extent this type of deliberative citizenship supplements or transcends the usual features of liberal democratic and social democratic citizenship. Such questions return us to issues that are central to citizenship studies as they have been discussed in the Western tradition. The following brief account of the key dimensions in

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Western ideas of citizenship allows us to delineate the contours of a critical theory of deliberative citizenship. In so doing, the section indicates a few general problems that critical theories of deliberative democracy should consider. Dimensions of Citizenship In the study of citizenship, a number of problem areas can be discerned extending from the empirical to the normative, and these areas can guide an examination of deliberative citizenship. Citizenship may be understood to be an official, legal status and an administrative category, as well as a political practice and an ideal to be sought.7 The sites in which citizenship is, or ought to be, practiced are also important. Each of these dimensions prompt questions that citizens, noncitizens, and governments have asked over the centuries and that still provoke debate today. Suitably amended, these questions also apply to deliberative democracy. Citizenship as an Official, Legal, and Administrative Status Citizenship may be understood as a way of allocating and distributing civic rights and responsibilities. In the Western tradition, to be a citizen is first to be a member of a political community—real or imagined—in which one has access to particular resources (legal, material, and symbolic) through the possession and exercise of rights and in which one also has obligations to the polity. To be a citizen is to have an official legal status. Those without that status are denied certain kinds of rights and generally do not have to take on the same public responsibilities. This legal emphasis provides the foundation of the prevailing official Western conception of citizenship whose origins lie in the ancient Roman republics: according to Pocock (1998, 37), a citizen of Rome “came to mean someone free to act by law, free to ask the law’s protection, a citizen of . . . a legal community, of . . . legal standing in that community.” An initial question for this dimension is: who is or can become a citizen? Who is excluded and why? Over a long period of time, Western democracies gradually expanded the categories of individuals allowed to become full citizens, usually indicated by the award of the vote. Where suffrage was originally granted exclusively to property holders, now members of the working class, women, and indigenous people are included. The expanding numbers of refugees and asylum seekers around the globe have provoked much debate over criteria for inclusion in democratic polities. To be granted official citizenship status, individuals have often had to show that they met certain qualifications or criteria, such as language proficiency, educational levels, and so on. Such criteria are

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also often the grounds on which immigrants are allowed entry into countries, which may then enable them to gain full citizenship at a later date. Where the dominant stories of citizenship tend to celebrate the triumphs of democratic inclusion over previous discriminations, inequities, and injustices, other more critical accounts point to the complexity of the outcomes. Inclusion can mean incorporation into the administrative routines of state rather than the political agency. Inclusion can also entail the relinquishing of previous cultural identities and values. Expanding regimes of citizenship often function to regulate and discipline the populations of states rather than empower them. Similar issues can, but ought not to, arise for deliberative citizenship, given its critical aim to be inclusive, reflective, and transformative. For deliberative democracy, one must ask questions similar to those set out above. Who can be a participant in the deliberative process? Can anyone be excluded and on what grounds? What conditions must potential deliberative citizens meet to be included? Should they meet these conditions before being granted participatory rights, or should they be allowed to develop them afterwards? Studies in deliberative citizenship should also consider how the critical edge of deliberative citizenship can be blunted, diverted, or absorbed. If the principle is that all those who have an interest in an issue ought to be able to engage in public debate to influence a decision that affects them, then the numbers of political agents are potentially enormous. To avoid unmanageable situations, some limits to inclusion may need to be drawn. Where there are few formal rules on such matters, the question arises as to who will set these limits and how the boundaries will be drawn. There also remains the vexing question of whether prospective participants ought to be committed to certain deliberative values or be competent in deliberative skills, before being allowed to participate. Taking the inclusive approach, Dryzek (2000, 169) claims: “The only way to learn civility and reciprocity is through practice in deliberation itself.” Adopting such inclusive principles means that, in some cases, deliberative participants may not even be official citizens of the state, but permanent residents who live in towns and communities and who work in the firms or governmental authorities that take up deliberation. For such residents, deliberation at the local level may represent a major improvement in their citizenship status, since they may not be allowed to vote in most state elections. (In this regard, see the discussion of denizens in Soysal 1998, 190–91.) One way of dealing with the problems of size, inclusion, and boundaries is to find methods of approximating and representing different interests in groups established to make deliberative decisions. For example, the deliberating group can be consist of a representative sample of different interests and points of view. The difficulty is that one may not be able to represent

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all the different shades of opinion, and the emphasis would still have to be on outcomes based on deliberation, not representation. Alternatively, members of groups could be selected randomly, with the result that some measure of equal opportunity is maintained (Smith and Wales 2000, 56–57). In the working practices of deliberative democracy, the extent of inclusion varies widely. A comprehensive review is not possible here, but participants in a deliberative process may be chosen according to the following four principles and combinations thereof (1) self-selected individuals with an interest or expertise in the matter, (2) elected representatives from interested groups and organizations, (3) representatives selected by governmental or other organizations based on interest or expertise, and (4) randomly selected individuals who can provide a representative sample of interests. Within most polities, citizenship is also an administrative category in which those individuals accorded the legal status of citizenship are ranked and ordered, and various rights, responsibilities, and resources are allocated to them. Whereas in the Roman republics the right to certain basic freedoms was central, in the contemporary Western world these are almost taken for granted among citizens, and rights to different kinds of material and financial support has become important. In modern liberal democracies, for example, there exist complex legal and administrative regimes that allow for different kinds of rights to social security benefits and allowances (for unemployment, single parents, child care, education) depending upon the assessed needs of the claimant. Nonetheless, political debate and struggle occur over inequalities in the distribution of such rights. Often, differential responsibilities are also imposed. One of the most longstanding responsibilities of citizenship has been that of defending the nation-state with arms. Generally, however, the minimum duties required of citizens (and noncitizens) are for them to obey the law and pay taxes. Such responsibilities are subject to political struggles over attempts to expand or curtail them. This account gives rise to another most basic question of citizenship studies: what rights can be claimed by citizens, and what are citizens’ obligations? Regarding rights, it is conventional to draw upon the work of T.H. Marshall (1994 [1950], 173) who identified at least three kinds of citizens’ rights (namely civil and legal rights, political rights, and social rights) that have been at the foundation of modern Western citizenship. Marshall saw the emergence of “social citizenship” through the state institution of welfare as vital for political citizenship. Without the resources provided by education, health, and social welfare, the poor were unlikely to be effective as citizens exercising their legal or political rights. Where there is unequal allocation of resources, first-class, second-class, or even third-class citizenship categories inevitably emerge.

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Focusing upon deliberative democracy in particular, we must ask: are there any distinctive rights and resources required for deliberative citizens, and what would be their duties? Further, must these rights be built upon pre-existing rights available in the wider polity? Or can they be claimed only within distinct contexts? Given the founding principles of deliberative democracy, a number of rights that facilitate participation and communication can be considered crucial. First, consider the “principle of participation,” as Cohen (1996, 106) calls it: According to that principle, democratic collective choice . . . must ensure equal rights of participation, including rights of voting, association, and political expression, with a strong presumption against restrictions on the content or viewpoint of expression; rights to hold office; a strong presumption in favor of equally weighted votes; and a more general requirement of equal opportunities for effective influence.

Although some of these rights are traditional liberal democratic ones, the vital deliberative citizen’s right is to participation on equal terms with others. Furthermore, it would appear impossible for a citizen to deliberate without the right to freedom of expression (Cohen 1997, 82–84), and this may take diverse forms. Nor could deliberative citizens fulfill their duties to make well-informed decisions without the right to gain access to certain kinds of information. The precious resource of sufficient time in which to deliberate is also necessary. To be able to deliberate without financial penalty, deliberative citizens may need to be paid for their time, or reimbursed for earnings lost in undertaking deliberative responsibilities. Precedents for this exist in one of the oldest deliberative institutions, that of the jury trial. Such concerns are also evident in Ackerman and Fishkin’s 2002 proposal for a national holiday called “Deliberation Day.” Ackerman and Fishkin propose that registered voters meet in large and small groups to discuss the main issues raised in the election campaign. For their day of deliberative work, each citizen would be paid $150 on the condition that they subsequently vote. Deliberative democrats of both the liberal and radical kind are also alert to the material conditions, inequalities, and other constraints, such as those of language and culture, that impede communication (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Dryzek 2002, 172). Accordingly, they support measures to overcome them. In the absence of such resources, many participants are likely to be ineffective in their deliberations. Stamatis (2001), in particular, attempts to apply deliberative democracy to capitalism.

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Possibly the most significant practical concern is that governments and decisionmakers take due account of the results of deliberation. Without this condition, the deliberative process would be ineffective or largely symbolic, and contribute further to the democratic deficit. Accordingly, deliberative democracy could be characterized by its recognition of a citizen’s right that political authorities act on their deliberations. Given the variety of possible government actions ranging from ignoring deliberative decisions to implementing them, deliberative citizens could claim the minimal right of receiving a timely, written, public response to the outcomes of their deliberations. This requirement might be applied in the context of citizen juries and similar deliberative methods. “Typically,” write Smith and Wales (2000, 55), “the sponsoring body (a government department, local authority or other agency) is required to respond, either by acting on the report, or explaining why it disagrees with it.” In Germany, where governmental agencies regularly commission the Research Institute for Citizen Participation of the University of Wuppertal to conduct planning cells, such requirements are built into the system (Smith and Wales 2000, 56). Similar processes may be seen in the workings of consensus conferences for assessing technology in Denmark (Grundahl 1995, 31) and elsewhere (Joss 2002). The failure to respond appropriately has a predictable political outcome: where a deliberative process is undertaken, and the findings are ignored, citizens’ cynicism about government and democracy are confirmed. Such was the outcome of the Blair Governments’ innovative attempt, entitled GM Nation?, to promote informed deliberation on genetically modified foods (Joss 2004). One general difficulty is that, in some political and historical circumstances, such deliberative rights may not be broadly available throughout the society or organization. This is relevant to both liberal democratic and authoritarian regimes, where participatory and deliberative schemes may be promoted within larger institutional contexts that are nondemocratic, or only minimally so. In liberal democracies, pockets of deliberation exist, for example, within corporations, government agencies, and schools and universities, where management is often highly authoritarian. In the former Soviet Union, an authoritarian regime, critical deliberative methods were allowed in the scientific communities but were not extended to the wider society. In state-sponsored projects of deliberation, governments will generally specify what areas are open (and which areas are closed) to criticism and debate. One needs to be mindful, however, that any reduced scope of discussion will diminish the quality of participation and its claims to be deliberative. It is also likely to reduce significantly its capacity to find the truth or solve problems. Putting constraints on deliberation inevitably leads to a weakening of legitimacy for any decisions reached. Yet, encouraging greater freedom of

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expression even in circumscribed organizational contexts will lead citizens to try to extend them into previously prohibited areas, and to exert political pressure for reform. In this way, attention to the rules, rights, and responsibilities for the status of citizen in the deliberative democracy can be illuminating. Citizenship as a Political Practice and Normative Ideal The foregoing discussion suggests that citizenship denotes more than a legal status or administrative category: it is also a political practice or a mode of participation in public life (van Steenbergen 1994b, 2). Citizenship is not only defined by law or administrative criteria, but by how one conducts oneself in public affairs. For the ancient Athenians, politics in their small citystate was the activity of ruling and being ruled and this activity was thought to be a good in itself, not just a means to the public good (Pocock 1998, 34). Nonetheless, to be a citizen was to be a male head of household who was free to participate in politics because his private, domestic responsibilities were carried out by women and slaves. By contrast, in modern liberal democratic states, the people do not rule except indirectly through representatives. Paradoxically, as more categories of people have been recognized as citizens in the West, the possibility for effective, direct political participation in national institutions has tended to decrease. Given the size and complexity of modern mass liberal democracies, most citizens restrict their official participation in politics to voting in periodic elections. Their main civic practice becomes that of electing representatives who will then vote along party lines to install political leaders and governments. Where low levels of citizen participation are regarded as problematic, debates have occurred on how to increase participation and over what forms this should take. For example, recent programs of civic education and advocacy of active citizenship among Western governments were attempts to overcome the apparent deficiencies of passive citizenship. Indeed, deliberative democracy is one of the more innovative means suggested for encouraging effective citizen participation. This leads us to ask: what modes of political practice characterize deliberative citizenship? Formal deliberative practices occur in a variety of institutional settings, both inside and outside government. In addition to the more conventional deliberative procedures of parliament and the judiciary, there are the techniques of citizen juries, consensus conferences, planning cells, and deliberative opinion polls. The citizen jury is a process where a group of randomly selected individuals—“ordinary citizens”—are brought together for three to four days to deliberate and make recommendations on a particular policy issue (Smith and Wales 2000, 55). The members of the jury are provided with information, including the views of a wide range of witnesses, whom

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they may question. The jury then prepares a report and recommendations on their findings, to which the commissioning body may or may not be bound to respond. Deliberative polls, as designed and carried out by James Fishkin (1991; 1995), provide another method of implementing deliberative principles. A random, representative sample of citizens is selected for determining their views on a significant public issue and polled on their views. Members of the sample are invited to a weekend gathering where they are carefully briefed and encouraged to discuss the issue both among themselves and with experts and political leaders. Fishkin (2004) writes: After the deliberations, the sample is again asked the original questions. The resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity to become more informed and more engaged by the issues.

Fishkin goes on to report that over eight years of deliberative polling “there were dramatic, statistically significant changes in views.” By such means, Fishkin demonstrates how, under the right conditions and with access to appropriate information and opportunity to discuss matters, citizens often change their views. It is also important how decisions are determined at the end of the deliberative practice. There are a number of different complementary civic practices for doing so. One of these is the quest for consensus among the participants, a process in which citizens search for, and agree upon, what would be in their common interest. In the absence of consensus, deliberators retain the options of continuing to argue, bargain, or vote (Elster 1996, 5). Few deliberative democratic theorists now rule out a role for the practices of bargaining or voting (Bohman 1996, 415), as long as they are informed by deliberation and the deliberators do not undermine it. Where strategic practices take place, however, it is not inconceivable that decisions could be based upon more complex criteria than simple majority votes. Preferential voting and “constitutional” majorities of variable numerical values above 51 percent come to mind. Deliberative citizens may therefore combine both communicative and strategic practices, but this presents a recurring dilemma of choosing how best to fulfill their civic duties. It is instructive here to note that the radical deliberative democrat need not reject the use of direct action. April Carter (2005, 190) points out that not only is nonviolent direct action a form of communication, but it may also “challenge the existing power relations,” and thereby become transformative. Drawing upon Martin and Varney (2003), Carter (2005, 190) indicates the function of nonviolent

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direct action: Non-violent direct action can challenge opponents to enter into a dialogue that they are refusing to undertake, and can equalize power, bringing psychological and political pressure to bear through publicity, and the influence of third parties, so creating the possibility of reasoned dialogue between equals.

By participating in direct action, citizens can break through dominant political discourses, bring issues onto the public agenda, and encourage debate over them. At base, the practice of democratic deliberation has citizens tendering public reasons for their decisions and engaging in discussion about their reasons and those given by others. From the critical theory perspective, however, Dryzek (2001, 1) points out that deliberation involves much more than this: Deliberation as a social process is distinguished from other kinds of communication in that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgments, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception.

In deliberation, citizens and participants not only reflect upon their views, but also refrain from coercive or deceptive practices. Discussions of citizenship therefore include a normative dimension concerning how citizens ought to behave. Different conceptions of citizenship thus result in different visions of an ideal civic identity. The questions arising from this account go to the very core of the normative dimension of citizenship: what is the good citizen? What virtues, capacities, and competencies are required to be a good citizen? Depending upon the answers given to such questions, different theories of citizenship become “expressions of political possibility and imagination that transcend current practices” (Stokes 2002, 24). These normative conceptions of citizenship typically provide a source of critique of existing political, legal, and administrative arrangements. Ideal civic values and identities can be invoked to suggest what is right or wrong, or capable of improvement, about current laws and practices of citizenship. The ideal citizen in a deliberative democracy is an active one possessing many diverse virtues and capacities. Central is the ability to engage in communication and dialogue. These are essentially cooperative activities that, at a minimum, oblige the citizen to embrace the values of reciprocity and mutual respect for different viewpoints. Ideally, citizens do not form their final preferences solely according to their previously established statuses, roles, or identities. On this account, deliberative citizens need to be able to

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exercise self-restraint in refraining from the immediate instrumental pursuit of their own self-interests. This attribute would need to be accompanied by the capacity for critique and self-reflection. Good deliberative citizens would need the capability not only to formulate their own interests, but also the courage to make a public stand. Yet, they also need to acquire an understanding of, and contribute to the formulation of, the common or public good on a particular issue. As well as the ability to listen carefully to others and an openness to revisions of earlier position and interests, the citizen would need to have the moral and psychological strength to accept the decisions arrived at. Crucial too is the old liberal requirement that participants in public deliberation must be able to distinguish between arguments and the human beings who express them— and understand that the rejection of ideas does not entail the rejection of the person who expresses them. (In this regard, see the discussion in Stokes 1998, 61–65.) The more radical deliberative democrats do not insist on dispassionate forms of rational argument, as long as the more rhetorical alternatives are not coercive.8 This concession allows for a wider range of political expression to be adopted. Bohman (1996, 7), for example, sees the different capacities for effective public deliberation and dialogue as including “understanding, imagining, valuing, desiring, storytelling, and the use of rhetoric and argumentation.” Bohman’s list also suggests some of the difficulties of implementing deliberative democracy. On the one hand, deliberative citizens must be able to express themselves creatively in various ways, while, on the other hand, they have to exercise certain kinds of self-discipline.9 In this regard, Robert Goodin (2003, 169–93) makes an interesting argument for the need to complement the “external-collective” aspect of deliberative democracy with an “internal-reflective” aspect. By giving due weight to internal thought processes, Goodin (2003, 171) argues that deliberation is “less a matter of making people ‘conversationally present’ and more a matter of making them ‘imaginatively present’ in the minds of deliberators.” Giving attention to such a task allows the individual to engage in internal dialogue and better understand the perspectives of another. “Deliberation within” is intended to be a supplement to external collective deliberation and not replace it (Goodin 2003, 171). Goodin’s argument need not just be applied to others; internal reflection also allows one to reflect upon oneself and challenge one’s own reasons. (For a discussion of the possibilities for “internal” deliberation, see Goodin 2000.) By such means, deliberative citizens may be able to re-imagine their own identities and interests in different contexts. Thus, a revised Delphic injunction can apply: “Citizen, know thyself !” Deliberative democracy’s advocacy of critique and self-critique opens up a space for reflection upon a range of entrenched views. In deliberative

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projects, it would seem that one’s civic identity is the product of interaction with others and that it is provisional. When citizens engage in public deliberation about their problems and needs, Bohman (1996, 198) explains, “Some citizens begin to formulate new understandings of themselves and of institutions, all the while seeking to modify the current framework for deliberation.” When deliberative democracy encourages citizens to be critical and self-critical, it allows for the transformation of their views, their institutions, and their social contexts. Such requirements have an epistemological dimension. That is, deliberative citizens ought to be acutely aware of the limits of their knowledge, and that their views may be mistaken. Thus, in order to be self-critical, the deliberative citizen must be a fallibilist about knowledge. It may be proposed that only by accepting fallibilism and rejecting dogmatism can citizens accept the possibility of change and reform at both the individual and the institutional level.10 This requirement, however, may have unintended consequences. One possible outcome is that a dedication to fallibilism may serve to suppress radical excitement and encourage a more conservative propensity toward caution and prudence in political decisions. The capacities for citizenship vital to deliberative democracy represent very high standards of communicative action that are often not readily available among large numbers of citizens. The common criticism is that if the criteria for citizen deliberation are too demanding, large numbers of citizens who do not or cannot meet them, or who may have radically different standards of political interaction, may be excluded. Even when we can know what socioeconomic and political conditions are favorable to deliberative democracy, there remains the problem of how to foster the kinds of critical civic identity best suited for public deliberation. For example, what sorts of civic education or other forms of preparation would be needed to develop the moral personality of the deliberative democrat?11 Such concerns lead us to consider what kinds of political domains or contexts would be more or less conducive to deliberative democracy. Domains of Citizenship The idea of citizen participation is necessarily linked to particular political sites where deliberation can take place. Here, an essential demarcation is usually made between the public sphere and activities in private or personal moral life, though the former may have implications for the latter and the boundaries may be difficult to draw. The language of citizenship is also traditionally expressed with reference to the nation-state or subnational units within it. One’s legal status as a citizen may only be claimed and exercised within the particular domain of the nation-state. Since the work of de

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Tocqueville (1988, 189–93), however, such legal status has increasingly been extended to other areas, such as civil society. Membership and participation in NGOs, such as churches, community service clubs, and social movements, are considered to be acts of citizenship. Nor is the workplace or the corporation exempt. Through the official, semijudicial institutions of arbitration and conciliation, for example, Australian governments established forums for the expression of “industrial citizenship” that also had a deliberative dimension. In the business world, there are also innovative voluntary tendencies toward “corporate citizenship.” When corporations refer to themselves as corporate citizens and undertake to satisfy the bottom line, it signifies their recognition of a voluntary obligation to meet ecological and social responsibilities, as well as to seek profits. Over the last two decades, the discourse of citizenship has also been applied to activities that include, but also reach beyond, the nation-state. Increasingly, international institutions are being created that reflect universal principles, such as those of human rights and free trade. In such contexts, we can now speak about nation-states being bound by the norms of good international citizenship. Such trends suggest that questions must be raised about the shifting boundaries of the public sphere and the limits of politics within it. These issues raise the question: in what sites do citizens act? Such a question inevitably leads to expressions of doubt about the achievements of citizenship in the West. Indeed, many critics argue that there is little possibility of achieving one of the fundamental objectives of citizenship, which is for citizens to make or influence political decisions. Barry Hindess (2000a) has pointed out that the traditional language of citizenship is exceedingly limited. This is because of misleading assumptions not only about the capacities of modern states to manage their affairs, but also because of the limited and inaccurate view they promote of the relations between governments and citizens. These claims, however, provide some support for the pursuit of deliberative principles in attempting to overcome or mitigate such problems. In what domains, therefore, can deliberative democracy be practiced? In its radical version, deliberative democracy is applicable to all kinds of sites and organizations, at any level of politics where decisions need to be made. This includes sites within the nation-state and outside it. Relevant organizations might include parties, parliaments, executives, and the judiciary within the nation-state, as well as international forums that resolve transnational conflicts. Nonetheless, the strength of deliberative democracy is that it allows for deliberative citizenship to be exercised in multiple domains beyond those officially sanctioned by the state. Crucially, Cohen (1996, 110–13), Dryzek (2000, 4), and others consider the secondary or voluntary

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associations of civil society as vital places for practicing, learning, and expressing deliberative ideals. Nor ought deliberative processes be excluded from the management of, and daily work in, industrial and commercial enterprises. The various movements for industrial democracy and worker participation testify to the potential for deliberation at work, as well as some of its problems. By these means, critical counterpoints to undemocratic practices may be established. Since deliberation need not be limited to institutions within the nationstate, deliberative reasoning can also be required of world citizens and their international representatives.12 Accordingly, committed deliberative citizens operate through the many NGOs of global civil society that work to reform the policies of governments and transnational institutions. Where NGOs call for us to become “global citizens” (Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999; Stokes 2000), the duties are usually understood as voluntary. Self-ascribed “citizens of the world” do not usually feel constrained primarily by the laws of their nation-state, but obligated to higher principles of duty toward humankind. Ecological citizens may believe that their first duty is to protect the earth as a sustainable ecosystem. Such voluntary acceptance of wider obligations challenge the boundaries of liberal democracy and are characteristic of the project of bringing deliberative principles into domains where democracy is usually absent or constricted. The domain of deliberation need not be confined to regular activities in and around existing institutions. Deliberation may be prescribed for certain unique political problems of policy and institutional reform. The making or revising of state constitutions comes to mind. Various forms of deliberation, albeit flawed, were used as a precursor to attempts to make the Australian constitutions more republican (Uhr 2000). But deliberation is also useful in dealing with seemingly intractable controversies. For example, in 1999, the New South Wales State Government initiated a four-day Drug Summit to examine the problem of illicit drugs and to make recommendations. On most criteria, this was a deliberative exercise that involved a very wide range of participants and encouraged free communication between them (Rowling et al. 2000). For many participants, the experience was personally transformative in the way suggested by deliberative democracy, and significant reforms were recommended. Such outcomes allowed the government to shift its own positions, accept a number of the recommendations of the attendees, and change key policies. Even the relatively straightforward task of cataloging sites for deliberative citizenship points toward problems of conflict between different domains and of demarcating between participants and nonparticipants. In the domain of work and industry, those who would have an interest in the quality of products and how they are made are many and would extend well

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beyond the confines of the workplace. The example of the firm also raises the difficulty of whether decisions reached after deliberation at lower levels of personnel will be acted upon by senior management. The same difficulty would apply to governmental and party organizations. Deliberative democracy therefore does not overcome all the problems of complexity and multilayered decisionmaking. Conclusion At the heart of disputes over citizenship lies a recurring political tension between the empirical constraints imposed by governments and the normative ambitions of reformers who seek to change them. By virtue of their founding principles, and the parlous state of most liberal democracies, even liberal deliberative democrats pose significant challenges to existing governments. This is even more so the case with the critical theories of deliberative democracy, as they are likely to emphasize the oppositional social movements of civil society and global citizenship, which together seek to reshape dominant political agendas and alter the terms of political discourse.13 Such challenges are not without their difficulties. This brief study indicates that structural issues, such as the inclusiveness of participation and the allowable scope for discussion, need further elaboration in theory and practice. Unless certain limits are specified beforehand, for example, there remains the prospect for adventurism, in which participants exert their communicative power beyond either their knowledge or their capability to influence decisions. Correspondingly, political disillusionment and withdrawal can follow when expectations about outcomes are not met. This raises the question of how to determine those boundaries and limits. To be sure, political struggles will occur over who sets the limits and how this is done. Importantly, the personal issues of reflection and transformation present deliberative citizens with questions about their own capacities, or, just as likely, the limits to them. Critical self-reflection may initiate internal conflicts of an intellectual and moral kind, as well as other anxieties. It may be reassuring here to recall that deliberation itself creates a temporary discursive or dialogical community of citizens undertaking a collective political endeavor. It is possible that the uneasiness generated by this process may be mitigated by awareness that others are similarly engaged and that the benefits of empowerment likely outweigh the costs. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of evidence from around the world to suggest that ordinary people are able to become effective deliberative citizens, along the lines envisaged by the critical deliberative theorists (Baiocchi 2001; Fung and Wright 2001).

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Deliberative democracy becomes more politically attractive if we conceive of it as a regulative ideal, not a fixed formula only applicable under optimum conditions. For this reason, deliberative citizenship too remains a political aspiration in which citizens must understand that they are embarking upon a project that is largely experimental. Given the growing popular disenchantment with liberal democracy and the growth of authoritarian systems of management and social control, such experiments are sorely needed. This chapter, by focusing on citizenship and its lessons, brings to prominence some central questions about such experiments. Notes 1. For some, such outcomes need not be produced by the pursuit of truth or consensus, but by the search for reasoned agreements on what may work in practice (Dryzek 2004, 73–75). 2. Such sentiments are implicit or explicit in the works of the critical theorists of deliberative democracy, Habermas (1996a; b) and Cohen (1996; 1997). 3. While acknowledging the liberal constitutionalist tendency in Habermas’ later work, I think, pace Dryzek (2000, 24–27), that there remain sufficient philosophical resources for formulating an alternative Habermasian theory. Habermas’ earlier theories of the public sphere, the ideal speech situation, communicative rationality, and the discourse ethic, indicate the possible foundations for a critical, deliberative democracy, albeit with a social democratic orientation. That Habermas did not develop them as well as we may want is not an argument against the logic inherent in these arguments or their potential. Habermas’s critiques of Rawls and liberalism and his discussions of the limitations of national citizenship are also testimony to more critical possibilities. 4. One exception is Forst (2001) who undertakes a study somewhat different from mine. 5. Where the liberals tend to focus on the procedures for participation and public reason within existing institutions, critical theorists tend to emphasize equality and inclusivity within and beyond the institutions of the nation state. 6. If the process of communication is undertaken effectively, however, there is no reason why deliberative democracy may not be instrumentally effective. That is, it can and ought to result in the solving of political problems. 7. This discussion is based upon my reflections in Stokes (2003) and the brief schema in Hudson and Kane (2000b, 5). 8. Dryzek (2000, 167) adds the further condition that any communication in deliberative context must be “capable of connecting the general to the particular.” 9. See Barry Hindess’ (2000b, 10) penetrating critique of such a process. 10. Such principles lie at the heart of Karl Popper’s philosophy (e.g., Popper 1966, 224–25, 374–78). 11. See, for example, Rosenberg 2004. 12. Habermas (1996b, 515) sees state citizenship and world citizenship as forming a continuum. 13. See the discussion in Dryzek 2000, 81–114.

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Works Cited Ackerman, Bruce, and James Fishkin. 2002. “Deliberation Day.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 10(2): 129–52. Baiocchi, G. 2001. “Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory.” Politics and Society 29(1): 43–72. Benhabib, Seyla, ed. 1996a. Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 1996b. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” In Seyla Benhabib ed., Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 67–94. Bohman, James. 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———, and William Rehg, eds. 1997a. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———, and William Rehg. 1997b. “Introduction.” In Bohman and Rehg eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. ix-xxx. Carter, April. 2005. Direct Action and Democracy Today. Cambridge: Polity. ———, and Geoffrey Stokes, eds. 2002. Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge Polity. Cohen, Joshua. 1996. “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy.” In Seyla Benhabib ed., Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95–119. ———. 1997. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In James Bohman and William Rehg eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 67–91. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1988. Democracy in America. Edited by J.P. Mayer, translated by G. Lawrence. New York: Harper Perennial. Dryzek, John. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2004. “Pragmatism and Democracy: In Search of Deliberative Publics.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18(1): 72–79. Elster, Jon. 1998. “Introduction.” In Jon Elster ed., Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–18. Fishkin, James. 1991. Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. 2004. “Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy.” Available at http://cdd.stanford.edu, accessed on May 5, 2006. Forst, R. 2001. “The Rule of Reasons: Three Models of Deliberative Democracy.” Ratio Juris 14(4): 345–78. Fung, A., and E.O. Wright. 2001. “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance.” Politics and Society 29 (1): 5–41.

72 / deliberative democracy in china Goodin, Robert E. 2000. “Democratic Deliberation Within.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29(1): 81–109. ———. 2003. Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grundahl, F. 1995. “The Danish Consensus Conference Model.” In S. Joss and J. Durant ed., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences. London: Science Museum, 31–40. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1997. “Deliberating About Bioethics.” The Hastings Center Report 27(3): 38–41. ———. 2004. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1996a. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” In Seyla Benhabib ed., Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 21–30. ———. 1996b. Between Facts and Norms. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hindess, B. 2000a. “Limits to Citizenship.” In Hudson and Kane eds., Rethinking Australian Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 66–74. ———. 2000b. “Representation Ingrafted upon Democracy?” Democratization 7(2): 1–18. Hudson, W., and J. Kane, eds. 2000a. Rethinking Australian Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2000b. “Rethinking Australian Citizenship.” In Hudson and Kaneeds, Rethinking Australian Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–11. Hutchings, K., and R. Dannreuther, eds. 1999. Cosmopolitan Citizenship. Houndsmill: Macmillan. Joss, S. 2002. “Toward the Public Sphere: Reflections on the Development of Participatory Technology Assessment.” Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 22(3): 220–31. ———. 2004. “The Paradox of Participatory Governance.” CSD Bulletin 11(2)/12(1): 9–12. Marshall, T.H. 1994. “Citizenship and Social Class.” In P.B. Clarke ed., Citizenship. London: Pluto, 173–77. Martin, B., and W. Varney. 2003. “Nonviolence and Communication.” Journal of Peace Research 40(2): 212–32. Pocock, J.G.A. 1998. “The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times.” In G. Shafir ed., The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 31–41. Popper, Karl R. 1966. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume II. The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rosenberg, Shawn W. 2004. “Rethinking Democratic Deliberation: The Limits and Potential of Citizenship.” Unpublished paper. Rowling, L., Gilbert Whitton, Beverly Baker, and Terry Murphy. 2000. “Commentaries on the NSW Drug Summit.” Drug and Alcohol Review 19(2): 129–36.

the problem of citizenship / 73 Ryfe, D.M. 2005. “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 49–71. Shafir, G., ed. 1998. The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Smith, G., and C. Wales. 2000. “Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy.” Political Studies 48: 51–65. Soysal, Y.N. 1998. “Towards a Postnational Model of Membership.” In G. Shafir ed., The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 189–217. Stamatis, C. 2001. “The Idea of Deliberative Democracy: A Critical Appraisal.” Ratio Juris 14(4): 390–405. Stokes, Geoffrey. 1998. Popper. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———. 2000. “Australia and Global Citizenship.” In W. Hudson and J. Kaneeds, Rethinking Australian Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231–42. ———. 2002. “Democracy and Citizenship”. In April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes eds., Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 23–51. ———. 2003. “Citizenship: Towards a Conceptual Framework.” Paper prepared for the workshop on Citizenship and Nationalism, Bukittinggi, Indonesia: Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University, July 21–23. ———. 2004. “Transnational Citizenship: Problems of Definition, Culture and Democracy.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17(1): 119–35. Uhr, John. 2000. “Testing Deliberative Democracy: The 1999 Australian Republic Referendum.” Government and Opposition 35(2): 189–210. van Steenbergen, B., ed. 1994a. The Condition of Citizenship. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. ———. 1994b. “The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction.” In B. van Steenbergen ed., The Condition of Citizenship. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1–9. ———. 1994c. “Towards a Global Ecological Citizen.” In van Steenbergen ed., The Condition of Citizenship. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 141–52. Warren, Mark. 2002. “Deliberative Democracy.” In April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes eds., Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 173–202.

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Part II Theoretical Approaches to the Search for Deliberative Democracy in China

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C h ap t e r 4 Human Nature, Communication, and Culture: Rethinking Democratic Deliberation in China and the West Shawn Rosenberg

Over the last two decades there has been a tremendous growth of interest in alternative forms of democratic governance. This is true in the Western established democracies and in some nondemocratic societies, particularly China. Although the motivating concerns diverge in these two cases, both appear to be moving in the same direction—that of exploring more participatory and deliberative forms of democracy. My aim in this chapter is to explore critically the dominant Western conception of deliberative democracy and, in this light, consider its applicability both in a Western setting and in China. Deliberative Democracy in Context: Western and Chinese Approaches The Western democracies and China approach deliberative democracy very differently. This reflects cultural differences in how deliberative democracy is understood and the very different social and political circumstances in which deliberative democracy is to be applied. Given limitations of space (and of my knowledge of China), the distinctions between the Chinese and Western cases discussed in this section are overdrawn and the heterogeneity of each case is understated. However, I believe that the analysis presented remains useful because it highlights essential aspects of deliberative democracy and raises important questions regarding how it may be variously viewed and applied in different settings. My aim here is not to provide a definitive statement on deliberative democracy in the West or China, but to sketch

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the kinds of issues that must be addressed when applying deliberative democratic principles in these contexts. The Western Approach: Orienting Understandings and Motivations In the case of the Western democracies, the interest in deliberative democracy reflects a growing doubt regarding the adequacy of electoral forms of democracy. The problem is partly viewed as a normative one. The question, one raised mostly by political theorists, is whether governance by free and fair election is sufficiently democratic. A major concern is that elections do not provide the opportunities citizens require if they are to exercise meaningful autonomy and real equality in the political domain. Considering democracy from different cultural perspectives, it is important to remember that this preoccupation with citizens’ freedom and equality reflects a specifically Anglo-American view of individuals, society, and politics. In the liberal view that dominates Anglo-American understandings of democracy, individuals are assumed to be rational, self-directing agents, and the understanding of individuals’ rights to autonomy and equality follow from this. Because they are rational and self-directing, individuals are assumed to be capable and deserving of freedom. Since they share the same basic capacities for rational thought and self-direction, individuals are assumed to be essentially equivalent to one another and, in this sense, equal. The social conditions of political life are also understood in these methodologically individualist terms. Thus, society is viewed as a public space that is populated by a collection of individual citizen-agents. As rational and selfdirecting, these citizen-agents provide the energy, direction, and meaning that shapes the public space they share. Consequently, collective conditions are understood as an outcome of the choices individuals make. The interaction between individuals in this public space is regarded as a competition among equals, one that is driven by a rational self-interest but is mitigated by a reasonable consideration of others’ views. In this context, power is viewed with suspicion. It is understood to be an unfair conferring of advantage to some over and against others. Given this view of individuals and social life, government is conceptualized both as a referee that monitors the exchange between individuals and as a mechanism for fairly aggregating, and then executing, citizen preferences. In both instances, the orienting concern is with maximizing the autonomy of all individuals in a fair and equal way. The question now being raised is whether electoral institutions offer an adequate means for realizing these goals of autonomy, equality, and fairness. The concern is that elections typically restrict the citizen to the status of a “mere” voter. With the rare exception of referenda on specific policy initiatives,

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the citizen-voter is limited to choosing leaders. Moreover, the choice (in the case of issue referenda as well as elections) is between alternatives over which the vast majority of voters have little control or input. Finally, elections are now mediated by mass media in such a way that the discussion of issues and candidates is limited to thirty seconds sound bites and sloganeering. Under these circumstances, ordinary citizens have only a very limited opportunity to express their preferences. Additionally, the preferences they do express are typically formulated under conditions which afford individuals little opportunity to learn about the issues or to consider opposing viewpoints on those issues in a rational and reasonable way. Finally, the ability of citizens to influence policy is reduced to an exercise in which he or she is one of thousands or millions who are giving a mute “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” to one or several options they had no role in formulating. It is in this light that questions are raised as to whether electoral democracy constitutes an adequate way of institutionalizing the democratic principles of autonomy and equality. The effective reduction of the citizen-agent to the citizen-voter may be unacceptable. The current diagnosis of electoral democracy in the West also reveals serious practical problems. Two concerns are raised here. The first pertains to evidence suggesting declining citizen involvement in politics and increasing citizen distrust of politicians and political institutions. The worry here is that as citizens disengage from the political process, the quality and stability of democratic governance is eroded. The second concern addresses the increasingly multicultural character of many of the Western democracies. The fear here is that, rather than the hoped for integration, Western societies have become fragmented. Citizens’ social affiliations, values, and trust have turned away from the national community and are increasingly limited to their own ethnic, religious, or racial group. A troubling consideration is that the institutions of electoral democracy are not only unable to address these trends but that they may be contributing to them. On the one hand, the occasionally penetrating and universally accessible coverage of campaign activity by the mass media has tended to render more visible the manipulative, self-interested, and corrupt elements of the competition among candidates. Thus illuminated, electoral practices may be contributing to the increase in citizen distrust and political cynicism. On the other hand, in the attempt to gain voter support under the zero-sum game conditions, electoral campaigns typically highlight group differences in belief, value, and interest in a way that reinforces subnational social identities and divides segments of the population against one another. As a result, elections do not yield a shared outcome. Instead, they simply create the victors and vanquished of the moment. No common views are forged, little legitimacy is conferred, and no trust develops.

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To address these problems, a number of Western political theorists have advocated a more deliberative form of democratic practice to supplement electoral democracy (e.g., Benhabib 1996; 2002; Cohen 1996; 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 2004; Bohman 1997; Dryzek 2000). They suggest that democratic deliberation is more likely to bridge differences and to yield policy that is perceived as more legitimate and is in fact more rational and just. They also argue that deliberative institutions better realize core democratic values of autonomy, equality, and a concern for the public good. Deliberative democracy is thus presented as at least a partial remedy for the social and political deterioration of the established democracies and as preventive medicine for the emerging ones. Reliance on deliberative fora of different types has also become an increasing political reality. Books such as The Deliberative Practitioner (Forester 1999) or Deepening Democracy (Fung and Wright 2003) document a number of cases of deliberation in the United States, Canada, Australia, South America, and Europe. My own investigation of deliberative efforts in the United States suggests that citizen deliberations have been central in major city, school board, county, and regional decisionmaking in over 1,000 localities in the last fifteen years. Citizen deliberations are typically initiated by local government bodies. In the United States, there is an attempt to keep the deliberations at arm’s length and citizen committees are appointed to oversee the organization of the deliberative process. Their responsibility is to recruit citizen volunteers and to organize them into groups of 15–50. These groups typically meet once or several times to discuss a social problem and to make specific policy recommendations to governmental agencies with legislative or regulative power. In England, Germany, Canada, and Australia, deliberations take a somewhat different form—that of the citizen jury. As in the American case, this kind of deliberation is initiated by governments, but the deliberative groups are smaller (typically 10–12 people) and they are selected so as to represent the array of interested groups interested in the policy in question. They are also generally given more financial support and they typically meet over longer periods of time. They may also have more direct impact on subsequent governmental regulation. Of course, they also may not have such impact; much depends on who is calling the jury and for what purpose. The Chinese Approach While the Chinese share some of the Western interest in deliberative democracy, they are motivated by different concerns and are oriented by a different cultural perspective. Their interest in deliberative democracy reflects a growing recognition of the practical limitations of the current

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governmental practice. This problem is that China’s top-down, central management approach to governance is proving increasingly unworkable in a complex, changing society. This is evident in the rapidly developing urban centers of eastern China where endemic corruption and mismanagement have accompanied massive industrial, commercial, and residential development. This has led business leaders to call for greater independence and property owners to demand greater protections. The problem is also evident in the more remote rural areas of central and Western China where “economic dislocations” have left tens of millions of peasants homeless, causing unmanageable mass migrations to the cities and civil unrest in many villages. These circumstances are leading intellectuals and political leaders to confront the limits of centralized totalitarian rule and to consider alternatives that allow for more decentralized, bottom-up forms of governance. The Chinese have a very distinctive perspective from which they regard the problems of governance and the possibilities of a deliberative democratic solution. In Chinese culture, the focus is on the community. Although there is considerable variation in how the community is defined (the focus may be on the family, clan, or nation), there is a clear emphasis on culture and shared practices of the community as the source of direction, meaning, and value in social life. In this light, individuals are regarded as players in a collectively orchestrated symphony of social exchange. As in the AngloAmerican case, there is a public-private divide. While individuals have meaning by virtue of their place in a community and their public exchange is oriented accordingly, they still are assumed to be masters of their own private lives. However, according to the Chinese understandings, influence flows mostly from the public sphere to the private one (Bond 1986; Kinnvall 1995). In this more Confucian vision, social life is constituted by relationships of complementarity that are conditioned by some egoism. In this context, hierarchies and the appropriate unequal distribution of power are seen as both necessary and beneficial. It is associated with an attitude of deference by the masses toward elites and an attitude of paternalism of those elites toward the masses.1 This view of social life leads to a very different understanding of governance than the one that orients Western democratic conceptions. Rather than having more universalistic, progressive, and emancipatory aims that are justified by recourse to the values of individual autonomy and equality, the Chinese cultural view is predicated on the value of social harmony and local tradition. The resulting vision gives priority to collective needs over individual ones and thus emphasizes individuals’ obligations over their rights. Its political aspirations are particularistic in recognition of the significance of cultural differences. This is associated with a cautious attitude toward both rapid social change and the public expression of differences as

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harboring the potential for fostering social disintegration and conflict.2 Citizen deliberation is, accordingly, understood in this light. Rather than as a vehicle for more autonomous participation in political life, it is regarded as a more effective way of realizing common understandings of social problems and their solutions. Like in the West, China has already begun to experiment, albeit in limited ways, with deliberative participation in local political life. This takes a variety of forms and it occurs in a variety of locales. Examples include villagewide deliberations that consider a specific policy choice to be made (as in Wenling City) or involve the review of a party secretary’s performance (as in Zheijang Province). Deliberations have also been convened in urban residential communities to resolve homeowner disputes and to decide budgetary issues. Typically, these deliberations involve face-to-face discussion with large groups (numbering in the hundreds), but deliberations have also been effectively conducted through online “moral courts” (as in the Dejai Residential Community in Hangzhou). Often these deliberative exercises occur where dual governance structures have been instituted. These involve both the top-down party governance by centrally appointed local party secretaries and the bottom-up election of village committees and residential chiefs (Chan 2003; Baogang He 2004; Qingshan Tan 2004). A further question is what we can expect from these experiments in deliberative democracy, both Western and Chinese. For the most part, the response to this question has been limited to the expression of theoretical expectations and cultural biases. There has been little attempt to conduct systematic research on democratic deliberations themselves.3 In the remainder of this chapter, I will turn to the available empirical evidence in the hopes of better illuminating what deliberative democratic practices are actually like and, with this information in hand, to consider how they might be most effectively conducted. In so doing, I will draw broadly on work in social and developmental psychology and, where available, on the limited research that focuses specifically on citizen deliberations. To do this, I begin with the Anglo-American view of deliberation with special attention to its underlying assumptions about individuals, communication, and culture. I will end by drawing out the implications of the evidence for the institutionalization of deliberative practice both in the West and in China, with special attention to the role of culture and the relevance of cultural differences. The Theory of Deliberative Democracy: The Anglo-American View Although democracy is a contested concept in the West, much of this contest begins with substantial agreement. Theorizing is anchored by a

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focus on the nature of the individual citizen. There follows a normative consideration of personal rights, namely autonomy and its social corollary, equality. The problem of democratic governance is conceived accordingly. Here, I focus on the recent contribution to this theoretical debate made by the advocates of deliberative democracy. To begin, I briefly sketch the deliberative position.4 I then critically consider its conception of the individual and offer an alternative view of cognition, emotion, and communication. I conclude by presenting the implications of this alternative for the understanding of democratic values and for the design of democratic institutions. A Deliberative View of Democracy Deliberative democratic theory emerged in the 1990s partly as a response to the rational choice view of democracy as a mechanism for aggregating preferences of self-interested individuals. Deliberative democrats offered a different view of individuals and a commensurately different understanding of basic political values and how best to realize them in the design of political institutions. In its conception of the individual, this deliberative view builds on a liberal vision that is similar to the one so clearly articulated by John Rawls in his theory of political justice (1993).5 Here the individual citizen is defined to have significantly greater cognitive capacities and moral potential than is suggested in rational choice theories. According to Rawls, all individuals are (or more exactly, must be) logical, rational, and reasonable. In their logic, individuals are explicitly assumed to have the basic cognitive capacity to argue with reasons, to recognize criteria of justification, to understand rules of evidence, to be logical (to follow rules of inference and deduction) and to reflect on their own presuppositions. Implicitly, it is assumed that individuals have the cognitive capacity to construct systems of interrelated propositions and abstract principles of relationships, and that they can effectively use these constructions for the purpose of interpretation, explanation, and evaluation. In their rationality, individuals are assumed to be able to consider and order their specific preferences and values relative to their overall life plan and their sense of a higher-order good. In their reasonableness, they are assumed to be able to take the perspective of the other and thus can fairly consider the claims of another person in that other person’s terms. They are also able to consider not only the personal value of specific actions or outcomes, but also the common value of general principles of interaction (constitutional essentials). Individuals therefore have the capacity to make judgments that are guided by a sense of justice as fairness. Having offered this theoretical (or hypothetical) psychology, Rawls vacillates in his faith that individuals, even theoretically defined ones, can

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be relied upon to exercise the greater capacities that he posits they have in order to overcome any natural tendency to be egocentric and selfish. As a safeguard or corrective, Rawls suggests the use of the “original position” as a cognitive device that can blind individuals to their personal interests in a way that leads them to considerations of justice and the common good. Rawls concludes that armed with this orienting cognitive device and utilizing their own natural capacities, individuals can critically reflect on their own views, fairly consider other’s needs as well as their own, and participate in defining the common good. Although they adopt a similar view of the citizen, more deliberatively oriented theorists suggest that the personal reflection, even when guided by the use of a cognitive device, is not sufficient to insure that citizens approach political questions with the requisite reasonableness, rationality, and logic. Instead, these theorists argue that individuals’ capacities for critical self-reflection and a reasonable fairness can only be realized in an actual encounter with the beliefs, values, and arguments of other citizens. The institutional demand for agreement on a common course of action, and hence one that others find worthwhile, highlights the need for perspectivetaking, justification, and the elaboration of a common good. In this context, claims that are not adequately justified or are justified on solely selfish grounds are likely to prove ineffective. Thus deliberative decisionmaking will tend to lead individuals to reflect and interact in a way that is more logical (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), rational (Warren 1992; Benhabib 2002), just, considerate of others (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Cohen 1997), self-critical (Dryzek 2000), and oriented to the common good (Cohen 1997; Benhabib 2002). One important, but implicit assumption here is that, even if individuals have not fully realized the aforementioned capacities, they can readily do so given the opportunities that participation in deliberation affords. On the deliberative view, an individual is not only a rational actor who makes choices and acts to satisfy personal interests, she is also an ethical and moral agent who reflects and collaborates. Guided by reflections on her own overarching sense of the good life, a consideration of the interests of others, and an understanding of the common good, she is able to reorder existing interests and create new ones. This process is facilitated by constructive conversation with other people in which their views are expressed and one’s own are provided with feedback. The democratic values of autonomy and equality are defined accordingly. In recognition of the individual’s increased capacities and broader bases of evaluation, the concept of political autonomy is redefined. The focus extends beyond the pursuit of one’s own particular interests through freedom of expression and choice and centers on the process of formulating one’s own interests and the

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common interest through reflection and open, cooperative discussion. Such open, cooperative discussion requires an expansion of the concept of autonomy to include the freedom to participate with others in a joint attempt to elaborate each other’s specific and general interests and to construct a shared sense of just rules of interaction and the common good. In this light, equality is no longer just a matter of an equal opportunity to affect specific collective decisions. As importantly, equality must be realized in the equal opportunity to participate actively in a cooperative process of addressing public policy problems and of creating the overarching values that orient this policymaking effort. In this deliberative conception, equality and autonomy require each other. On the one hand, equality is a necessary precondition of autonomy. It is only in a cooperative exchange between equals that the self-expression and critical self-reflection required for the self-reflective construction of one’s understandings and interests are possible (e.g., Warren 1992). Where the self dominates, self-criticism truncates and narrows. Where the other dominates, self-expression is suppressed. In either case, the self that is constructed is a distortion and any true autonomy is compromised. On the other hand, equality requires autonomy. Deliberative equality is equality of effective participation (e.g., Bohman 1996; 1997; Knight and Johnson 1997). The latter can only be achieved by citizens who have full deliberative autonomy and thus have the capacity to express their own interests in a way that others can comprehend and to reflect on those interests in light of ideas and aims voiced by other people. Where autonomy is compromised, meaningful equality cannot be achieved. Deliberative View of Democratic Governance The problem of democratic governance is reconsidered in this light. Given the broader conception of autonomy and equality, the emphasis on the design of institutions such as elections or referenda that allow individuals to freely pursue their personal interests by equally contributing to collective decisionmaking is regarded as inadequate. Instead, deliberative democrats focus on constructing institutional arrangements that create the opportunity for full and equal participation by citizens in a joint, cooperative process of clarifying, elaborating, and revising common conceptions and values in the course of defining and judging specific problems and arriving at their solutions. The solution is thus governance by citizen deliberation and most attention has focused on elaborating the conditions, procedures, and salutary effects of institutionalizing democratic deliberation. In this vein, suggestions have been made regarding the conditions that must be met if an interaction is to be a fully deliberative democratic exercise. The following

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refer to conditions that must be met before a deliberation begins: 1. There must be a suspension of action to create the political space for the deliberation to take place. There must be some assurance that decisions will not be taken and practical action will not be initiated until after the deliberation has been completed. 2. Deliberations must be inclusive. This requirement is variously elaborated as the inclusion of all those parties potentially affected or of all the relevant points of view. 3. Deliberation must be public so that all those affected but not directly involved can be apprised of, and potentially respond to, the substance of the deliberations (e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 1996). 4. The results of the deliberation must be binding on all those involved (Cohen 1997). This last requirement ensures that the deliberation is not regarded as an inconsequential exercise. The deliberation itself must meet certain standards of conduct. They are as follows: 1. Deliberation must be governed by a concern for autonomy. This requires that participation in the deliberation be free. The participants must be able to formulate and express their own views of the various issues that are raised. It also requires that the integrity of each participant be acknowledged. This demands that each not only is free to speak, but that each also is heard with respect and consideration. 2. The deliberation must be guided by the concerns of equality. Each participant must have an equal opportunity to speak and to persuade his audience (e.g., Bohman 1997; Knight and Johnson 1997). 3. The outcomes of deliberation must be consistent with the associated values of justice as fairness and democracy as governance oriented to the common good and guided by the principles of autonomy and equality. According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), such an orientation to justice and democracy can only be ensured by the stipulation of constitutional constraints. For others such as Benhabib (1996), Cohen (1996; 1997), and Knight (1999), the conditions of deliberative practice themselves must not only embody these goals but must also orient participants toward achieving them. 4. Deliberation must consist primarily of the exchange of reasons for two purposes: (i) to communicate one’s own views in a way that can be understood and accepted by the other, and (ii) to facilitate the understanding of the meaning and value of the other’s views in her own terms. Deliberation will therefore be based upon or should

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establish a shared appreciation of the truth and rightness of the reasons for the collective choices made. The claim here is that when these prior conditions are met and the standards of conduct are followed, the ensuing discussion will be fully deliberative. It will consist of a respectful and reciprocal expression, correction, revision, and restatement of views. In the process, thinking will become more logical and self-reflection will become deeper and more critical. Consequently, personal beliefs, values, and preferences will change. This will also encourage the discovery of a common ground for agreement, one that will yield more just and legitimate recommendations for public policy.6 In turn, this will provide a basis for both a renewal of interest and faith in democratic governance (thus addressing current problems of declining interest and participation in politics) and a means for social reintegration (thus addressing the problems of a socially destructive individualism and a socially disintegrative multiculturalism). Reconsidering Deliberative Democratic Assumptions: Human Nature and Communication Although I am sympathetic to the deliberative democrats’ theoretical project, I believe that it is based on an inadequate understanding of human nature and social communication. In this vein, I will argue that their foundational assumptions regarding individuals overestimate their cognitive abilities, incorrectly equate the abilities of all individuals, and fail to attend to the emotional dimension of interpersonal connection. In the process, the social dimension of cognition is underestimated and the relationship between cognition, communication, and community is misunderstood. Sketching an alternative perspective, I reconsider how to define orienting democratic values and how to design political institutions. Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Cognition: Adequate and Equal Capacity Deliberative democratic theory is anchored by a set of assumptions regarding individuals’ cognitive capacities. This includes the assumption that individuals have the capacities for rational (in the full sense defined above) self-direction, for reasonable engagement with others, and for logical inference. It is further assumed that individuals are broadly equal in their ability to exercise these capacities so as to (1) self-direct in a manner consistent with their own overarching sense of the good, (2) engage others in a manner that recognizes the perspective and integrity of those others, and (3) participate in argument in a logical, reasoned manner.

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My concern here is that this characterization of cognition is significantly and substantially incorrect. To begin with, the vast majority of the research on social cognition suggests that individuals are not particularly logical in their reflections about themselves nor in their analysis of the circumstances they must confront. For example, the research on causal attribution indicates that when people are explaining or predicting social phenomena, they attend more to factors that are more visually distinctive and, therefore, they fail to integrate the information available in a balanced or logical fashion (Kelley 1973; Taylor and Fiske 1975). In a similar vein, the research on cognitive heuristics demonstrates that people utilize various cognitive shortcuts rather than logical reflection or rational calculation to solve problems (Tversky and Kahneman 1982). Other research has demonstrated the difficulty people have with abstract thought and the rational calculation of probabilities (Smelsund 1963; Quattrone and Tverksy 1984). This evidence of the failure to think logically is complemented by the result of other research that shows that, on questions that matter, people’s judgments of themselves and others are powerfully influenced by pre-existing prejudices. The research on cognitive consistency (Heider 1958) and cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Abelson et al. 1968) demonstrates how emotional commitments and pre-existing preferences distort the analysis of causes, effects, and categorical associations of new observations in a direction that supports prior judgments. The pervasiveness of prejudicial judgment is also supported by research on cognitive schemas. This work demonstrates that even beliefs that are not value-laden or emotionally charged can powerfully distort how people interpret and draw inference from incoming information. (For a review, see Fiske and Taylor 1991.) These deficiencies in social cognition are reflected in how people engage with one another in groups. The research on small group behavior and communication provides evidence of people’s evident inability to understand and fairly consider other people’s perspectives, to think critically about their own position or the social conventions to which they adhere, or to think about problems in creative, or novel ways. For example, the research on group polarization suggests that rather than fostering critical, creative, and collaborative reflection, group discussion primarily operates to reinforce dominant group norms in a way that marginalizes minority views (Myers and Lamm 1976). In their secondary analysis of student group discussions on distributive justice, Mendelberg and Karpowitz (forthcoming) provide evidence of this process in more explicitly deliberative settings. Researchers study (and practitioners initiate) attempts to structure social interaction with these types of failures in mind. These attempts include asking participants to engage in such unconventional social behavior such as brainstorming, role-playing, and free-associating ( Jarboe 1999; Propp 1999).

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The research in developmental psychology raises further questions regarding the adequacy of deliberative theorists’ characterization of cognition. The focus here turns from a concern with the adequacy with which people think to the equality of their capacity to do so. In the deliberative democracy literature (and in most social psychological research), cognition is typically conceived as a set of distinct skills or capacities that are deployed to operate on objectively or commonly defined objects. In contrast, the developmental research on cognition offers a more integrative view of cognition (e.g., Inhelder and Piaget 1958; Vygotsky1962; 1978; Piaget 1970). Cognition is viewed as a purposive activity wherein an individual operates on and within the world around her. In the process, the various actions and objects deployed are placed in a personally constructed relationship to one another. The result is a subjectively constructed understanding of the nature of these objects and the relations between them. This pragmatic conception of thinking is supplemented by a structuralist claim that there is a distinctive quality to this coordinating activity of thinking and, therefore, to the manner in which objects are represented and interrelated. This should be evident across the various specific representations, understandings, evaluative judgments, and action strategies that the individual constructs. (For a recent formulation of this structural pragmatic view see Rosenberg 2003.) Viewed from this perspective, the logic, rationality, and reasonableness posited by deliberative democrats are not simply a set of distinct (even if interdependent) capacities. Rather, they reflect a common underlying structural capacity, one that has been substantively differentiated by the different types of problems addressed in the course of everyday experience: the problem of integrating claims of truth in the case of logic; the problem of integrating personal preferences, beliefs, and actions in the case of rationality; and the problem of integrating different people’s preferences, beliefs, and actions in the case of reasonableness. In my own work, I have suggested that these different cognitive capacities are various manifestations of one underlying mode or form of reasoning that I have termed systematic. This systematic reasoning entails the subjective juxtaposing of propositions and interactions and leads to the creation of systems and principles of interrelationship. These systems and principles are precisely the type of cognitive structures that can support the logical, rational, and reasonable capacities that deliberative democrats assume (Rosenberg 2002, chapter 4). Apart from emphasizing the formal qualities of thinking, the cognitive developmental approach also focuses on how the underlying structure of cognition can be transformed. The basic argument here is that, as a child, the individual has an initial way of reasoning which does meet the requirements of operating effectively in the world around him. Through a process of subjective reflection and an internalization of external direction, the individual’s

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reasoning develops through a series of stages during childhood and adolescence until the structure of her thinking approximates the structure of her environment. At each of these stages, the individual thinks in a qualitatively different way, producing differently structured cognitive strategies and understandings. At the last stage, development stops and the structure of the adult’s cognition is formed. Whereas all people may share the same genetically conferred potential for full cognitive development, their social environments may differ in ways that affect how far development progresses. Different social environments may place different kinds of cognitive demands on the individuals who inhabit them, thereby encouraging further cognitive development or making it unnecessary. Consequently, adults may develop qualitatively different ways of reasoning. The suggestion that different adults may reason in structurally different ways has important implications for our consideration of deliberative democracy. First, it suggests the possibility that some people have a deeply structured inability to be logical, rational, and reasonable in the manner assumed by the deliberative democratic theory. Indeed, several different strands of cognitive development research indicate that not only some, but perhaps most, people lack this requisite capacity to reason. Neo-Piagetian research on adult cognition suggests that most people may not develop “formal operational thought” and therefore will have difficulty incorporating overarching, abstract, or hypothetical considerations into their reasoning. It suggests that individuals may actively construct concrete categories and causal connections, but that they have a limited ability to reflect on the adequacy of the categorical or causal inferences they make; they are largely unable to reflect on the manner in which those inferences were made (Selman 1980; Kegan 1994). Similarly, research on moral judgment suggests that most people may not develop postconventional moral reasoning and, therefore, will be unable to critically reflect on the conventional social mores and categories they use to guide their judgments of what is right and wrong (Kohlberg 1981–1984). Finally, research on political reasoning suggests that most people are unable to think systematically and, therefore, are unable to conceive of themselves or others as systems with their own integrity and distinctive requirements. Similarly, they are unable to construct general rules of relationship to guide considerations of logic or justice as fairness (Rosenberg 2002). Thinking in a “linear” or “sequential” manner, most people are therefore unable to deliberate adequately. Failing to consider adequately the perspective of the listener, they do not present their own views in a sufficiently elaborated manner such that others can fully understand them. In addition, most people tend to consider the different views which others express not as constructive input, but rather as an obstruction or as simply incorrect. Overall, the opportunity for discussion

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and argument is not regarded as a cooperative exercise leading to greater insight and mutual benefit, but rather it is understood as a zero-sum game that ends in some participants winning and in others losing (Rosenberg 2003). A second implication of the developmental psychological research speaks to the assumption of universality, that all normal adult citizens share an equivalent set of cognitive capacities. Whereas the social psychological research suggests that individuals’ capacities are less developed than is assumed by deliberative democracy, it retains the assumption of universality. All people’s thinking is demonstrated to be inadequate in roughly the same way. Cognitive developmental theory, by contrast, contravenes this view. It suggests that whereas most adults of the kind typically studied in social psychological research (American, middle class, mostly first- and second-year university undergraduates) may reason in the same way, some adults reason in a structurally more developed way than this, while others reason in a less structurally less developed way. This suggests that the problem for deliberative democratic theory is not only the adequacy of citizens’ reasoning, but also their equality. Some deliberative democrats have worried about differing social backgrounds and consequently unequal abilities to mobilize cultural resources in deliberation (e.g., Bohman 1997). The problem raised here is more difficult, suggesting that inequalities in effective participation may not just be a matter of cultural exposure and familiarity, but rather a matter of fundamental inequalities in the ability to be logical, to be self-reflective, to take the perspective of the other, and to comprehend issues of fairness.7 In sum, the social psychological and the developmental psychological research suggest that individuals may be far less logical, rational, and reasonable than deliberative democratic theory assumes. The implication to be drawn in both cases is that deliberative institutions should not be conceived simply as settings for free exchange in which citizen capacities for reflection and engagement can be realized. The social psychological research points to various cognitive deficiencies and implies that deliberative settings must be carefully structured to compensate accordingly. Interaction must be designed to provide incentives and information that foster specific patterns of thinking or techniques of engagement that will overcome the particular inadequacies identified. In this sense, the research suggests that deliberations be regarded as remedial institutions. The cognitive developmental research suggests that this remedial orientation to deliberation may not be sufficient. The research supports the view that the inadequacies exhibited by individual participants are not just specific errors in reasoning or judgment but are rather reflections of a general, structural inability to comprehend and properly respond to the complexities of fair, constructive political deliberation (particularly in settings

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where there are deep sociocultural differences among the participants). Consequently, deliberations must be more than remedial; they must be sites for political education and development. Thus, they must be designed not with an eye toward introducing specific procedures or social games to correct specific deliberative deficiencies, but rather as pedagogical devices for fostering the structural cognitive development required for competent participation in deliberation. The goal of institutionalizing deliberative fora in a way that may realize this pedagogical goal is complicated by the recognition that people may enter the deliberation with very different capacities to understand the deliberative situation in which they are placed. This suggests that deliberative institutions must be crafted in recognition of how they may be subjectively reconstructed in quite different ways with quite different practical results. Assumptions Regarding Affect and Emotion: Unimportant or an Impediment? Following the trajectory of most democratic theory, deliberative democratic theory has focused on the individual’s cognitive attributes and, in so doing, remains largely silent on the issues of affect or emotion. At most, it provides a further rationale for ignoring these concerns by either relegating them to the domain of variable personal preferences or by subordinating them to a reason that is capable of denying, ordering, and reconstructing them. However, with its emphasis on constructive communication, deliberative democracy may require not only certain cognitive capacities, but also a certain positive emotional engagement to foster the kind of consideration that democratic deliberation demands. It seems unrealistic to assume that a commitment to consider fairly another’s concerns could be based simply on the recognition that another person is a thinking, sentient being that is formally equivalent to oneself and, therefore, equally deserving of attention and consideration. Similarly, it seems unrealistic to assume that a commitment to the common good will emerge solely on the basis of reflections upon what is ethical and reasonable. Not only does this raise the issue of the practicality of institutions constructed with such assumptions in mind, but it also raises issues about the adequacy of a theoretical construction which only explicates human sociality on cognitive grounds. From a psychological perspective, it is clear that any adequate conception of the communicative orientation of individuals in a deliberation must incorporate an appreciation of the important role played by affective bonds and emotional connection. It is not enough to recognize the integrity of the other. One must also be emotionally connected to that person. By this I mean that one cares about that person, that one can empathize with their

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position, and can make that other person’s pains and pleasures one’s own. It is this caring that transforms the recognition of the integrity of the other into a motivating concern that can then fuel the effort to understand and support that other’s nature. Similarly, it is a feeling of being part of a community that provides the emotional impetus for participating in the joint definition of a common good and enhances the subjective sense of the value of the good so defined. Democratic deliberations must be structured with this in mind. This will require institutionalizing activities aimed at building affective ties between individual participants or developing a sense of common identity. Some of these are discussed in the following section on communication. The critical point here is that apart from a need to establish the conditions for the full realization of cognitive capacities, deliberation also requires conditions that foster emotional engagement, mutual nurturing, and an affective tie to one’s community. Moreover, it is important to recognize that, contrary to the assumptions of some deliberative theorists (e.g., Bohman 1996), simply bringing citizens together in a deliberative setting may not produce these salutary effects without sufficient attention to design. Particularly when there is a history of antagonism or power imbalance, deliberation may only serve to deepen divisions and accentuate suspicion and hostility. Assumptions Regarding the Nature of Communication Itself Although it plays a central role, communication is subject to little theoretical elaboration in most deliberative democratic theory. Elaboration is rendered unnecessary because communication is assumed to be a largely successful activity and a neutral medium of social exchange. The deliberative democratic understanding of communication builds on the assumptions regarding cognition discussed earlier. Because individuals have the capacity to be logical, rational, and reasonable, they are also assumed to be competent interlocutors. Consequently, communication between them will be nonproblematic. Variation in individuals’ experience and social position may produce substantial differences in beliefs and preferences that make communication more difficult. However, the cognitive capacities of the interlocutors provide the means for understanding these differences and for transcending them by moving to higher order concerns and an overarching common good.8 Apart from being an effective vehicle, communication is also understood to be a neutral one for transporting subjectively constructed views back and forth between the subject-communicators. Languages may differ in manifest syntax and in their vocabularies for different kinds of

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objective or subjective phenomena, but they are all regarded as basically comparable vehicles for the expression of an individual’s beliefs, preferences, and justifications. Consequently, as a medium for the expression of meaning, communication is assumed to have little independent impact on the individual’s capacity to deliberate or the deliberations themselves. Although the inherent qualities of communication are assumed to have little impact on the individual’s cognitive capacity and communicative competence, the social conditions of communication are regarded as having a significant effect on an individual’s interests and motivations. These conditions are understood to define a reward structure that affects the personal value of the different kinds of initiatives that speakers and listeners may pursue (e.g., Warren forthcoming). In this vein, deliberative theorists have focused on the division of power among participants. The concern here is that unequal power distributions may define the interests of the powerless in such a way as to distort or silence their contribution to the policy being discussed. The basic rules of deliberation are considered in a similar way. Thus, a decision rule is analyzed in terms of the kinds of communicative behaviors it is likely to reward positively and thus encourage—and the kinds of behaviors it is likely to reward negatively and thus discourage. In this manner, some theorists (e.g. Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1997) argue for the decision by consensus because it rewards more desirable communicative acts (such as a more elaborated statement of one’s own position cast in terms that the listener can understand and value) and discourages less desirable acts (such as an assertion of narrow self-interest or an attempt to bargain strategically). Some of the difficulties of this view of communication are suggested by my earlier criticism of its underlying cognitive psychology. There it was argued that individuals, at least most individuals, do not exhibit or readily acquire the cognitive abilities or the communicative competence assumed in deliberative democratic theory. Insofar as this is true, communication cannot be regarded as nonproblematic. When there are differences in experience and cultural background and, in turn, differences of belief and value, it is unlikely that most individuals will be able to deliberate with one another productively. Instead, they will simply tend to talk past one another or engage in a reciprocal denial of the validity of each other’s claims. At best, civilities may produce polite, but superficial accord. Even when individuals begin with broad agreement on the substantive issues and values at play, there is also the problem of potential variation in the basic communicative competence of the individual participants. Communication under the condition of pre-existing commonalities may be more productive, but the inequality of capacity is likely to result not in a just outcome, but in one that advantages more capable participants.

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By suggesting that communication is more than just a neutral medium, the developmental view of cognition suggests the means whereby an individual’s communicative incompetence might be productively addressed. In this view, communication has a structure, one that reflects the communicative capacities of the individuals involved. We do not have to turn to cognitive developmental psychology to recognize that children of different ages vary in their level of cognitive development and that this is evident in how they communicate with one another and in what kinds of conversations they can produce together (e.g., Dimitracopoulou 1990). We are also aware that adults differ in their ability to talk abstractly, to reflect on their own presuppositions, to make sense of another person’s perspective, or to express their own point of view in a way that other people can understand. These cognitive differences are reflected in the different kinds of conversations adults can have. For example, these conversations may vary in (1) the degree to which the discussion merely accompanies what is currently happening or occurs largely independent of any ongoing activity; (2) the degree to which the discussion consists of an exchange of loosely related assertions or involves the giving of reasons and the subsequent interrogation of the reasons given; or (3) the degree to which the exchange consists of selfish attempts to impose a personal view or cooperative attempts to build a better and shared understanding (Rosenberg 2003). In addition to suggesting a more structural and differentiated view of communication, developmental psychological theory also suggests that communication cannot simply be understood to be derivative or epiphenomenal. Cognitive and social development is understood to be the product of the dynamic interplay between the cognitive structure of the individual’s reasoning and purposive action, on the one hand, and the social structure of the interaction between individuals, on the other. In some sociological conceptions, these two levels of structuration are regarded as isomorphic.9 Here, however, the claim is that, although these two levels operate on the common ground of what people do or say to each other, the collective structuring and the personal structuring of action may differ from one another in a significant way. It is precisely this combination of difference and interdependence or interpenetration that produces the dynamic tension, which motors both cognitive and social development.10 The independent and distinctive quality of a cognitive structure is evident in the manner in which the individual subjectively reconstructs the definition of the communicative situation in a manner consistent with his own way of reasoning. More important in the present context is the independence and distinctive quality of the social structuring of communicative exchanges. This is evident in how those exchanges may be governed by rules

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and may sustain meaningful cooperation around subject matter that the individual participants do not fully understand. An example of effective social regulation without subjective understanding is how, by following specific rules of expression (e.g., the rules of a brainstorming session), people may be led to novel considerations and to more openly regard other people’s contributions even though they may have little sense of the logic behind the specific rules they are following. They are doing what is required without appreciating why it is important to do so. An example of meaningful conversation without subjective understanding might be undergraduate seminars on political theory. It is often the case that in the context of a discussion about a theory, the students can meaningfully respond to one another in a manner guided by the rhetoric of the theory. However, any interruption of this discourse in which participants are asked to justify what they have argued in greater depth or to explain what they have said in common parlance is likely to reveal (often to the student as well as the interrogator) that she has very little subjective understanding of the meaning of what has just been said. Nonetheless, moments earlier she had meaningfully participated in an intersubjectively regulated exchange. Research that involves the in-depth probing of individual’s explanations and evaluations of commonplace social and political events indicates that, as in the case of the aforementioned seminar, a shared cultural rhetoric often leads individuals to contribute to a conversation in a way that exceeds that which they can subjectively accomplish without the support that specific rhetoric affords (Kohlberg 1981–1984; Kegan 1994; Rosenberg 2002). The psychological significance of the structural difference of communication is its potentially transformative impact. Participation in communicative exchanges that the individual finds difficult to understand and hard to negotiate constitutes a powerful impetus to development. Recurring exposure to this kind of experience may initiate a process of what Piaget refers to as “reflexive abstraction” (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). The individual begins to doubt the adequacy of his understandings and performances. This leads to a shift in focus from the specific ends desired to the manner in which these ends (and the means of getting them) are understood. This act of reflecting on one’s cognitive practice may have a bootstrapping effect. In attempting to think about one’s current way of thinking, a new and more developed, integrative, or abstract way of thinking must be generated to meet that task. The result is a transformation in the quality of one’s reasoning. This reflexive abstraction is complemented by what Vygotsky (1978) views as a process of internalization. When participating in communicative exchanges, the individual may be exposed to ways of interacting, to ways of making conceptual connections, and to ways of defining matters of concern that are different from what she would be able to generate on her own. In the attempt to

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interact effectively, the individual will try to follow the examples provided by other people’s behavior. The subjective reconstruction of these examples may be inadequate, but the moves made and the foci adopted are nonetheless novel and are incorporated into the individual’s thinking. This provides guidelines and direction for the construction of new forms of understanding and thereby facilitates the transformation of reasoning. One important implication of this understanding of communicative structures and their role in cognitive development is that individuals’ cognitive capacities are not simply realized in social interaction; they are also constructed there. While the quality of communicative structures clearly is affected by the cognitive operations (the thinking) of the individuals involved, those cognitive operations are themselves, at least in part, a product of the communicative exchanges in which an individual is regularly involved. Those exchanges structure the cooperation between individuals and thus the operations of each of them. In this manner, communicative exchanges determine the quality of cognition, thereby rendering it a social product and thus sociohistorically relative rather than universal. This view of communication suggests that democratic deliberation must not be regarded simply as a venue for the realization of citizenship, nor must the design of deliberative venues focus simply on the removal of obstacles that may inhibit free and equal self-expression. Instead, deliberation must be understood as a site for the construction and transformation of citizenship. In deliberation, citizens are made as well as realized. The operative metaphor here is that of a school, but of a particular kind. The educational goal is not the transmission of specific beliefs and values, although these are by no means irrelevant. Rather, the central aim must be to foster the requisite cognitive development for a fuller autonomy, a greater communicative competence, and a better ability to engage in a collaborative effort to make good and just public policy. When analyzing the nature of communicative exchange, it is also important to consider matters of emotional connection, commitment, and identity. A key requirement of deliberation mentioned earlier is that individuals take an empathic, caring attitude toward one another. Only then is it likely that an individual will be motivated to try to understand other people’s perspectives, to respect the beliefs and values they express, and to meet both others’ needs as well as her own. Communication provides a vehicle for fostering this orientation of productive, respectful engagement. Through communicating their personal stories to one another, individuals may reveal their past experiences, feelings, and values and thus both become familiar and vulnerable to one another. This kind of engagement helps produce the trust (a result of the successfully risking vulnerability) and the caring (a response to the other’s vulnerability) needed to motivate the kind of perspectivetaking

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that deliberation requires. At the same time, communication creates a density of interaction that, if properly structured, may help craft a sense of common identity that can overcome conventional social differentiations and divisions. This common identity then becomes another basis for empathy, a conduit for responding to another as to one’s self. Without considering these issues in any depth, we may conclude that communication may constitute a means that opens or bonds people to one another and to their community—be it of the group of deliberators themselves or the larger community of which they are a part. Thus, while communication depends on caring/empathy for the orientation to others that it requires, communication can also foster those emotions. Similarly, while communication depends on common identification and community for the orientation to the common good that it needs, it can also generate them. This recognition of the impact of communication on emotion also has implications for an understanding of democratic deliberation, one that complements the preceding consideration of its cognitive impact. Here again the suggestion is that deliberation cannot be conceived simply as an open arena for the free and equal exchange of views. Depending on the circumstances of the deliberation, the communicative exchange may not foster the caring and empathy required. Indeed, that exchange may simply reinforce existing social cleavages and deepen the suspicion and hostility that may exist among the participants. To succeed, most deliberation will require facilitation to foster the type of communication that encourages the development of caring and empathy. Thus, deliberation continues to be viewed as a pedagogical device for the construction and transformation of citizenship. Here, however, the aim broadens to include the emotional as well as the cognitive development required for democratic participation. Culture and Its Implications: The Design of Democratic Deliberation in China and the West In the preceding section, I drew upon empirical research to question the foundational assumptions that underlie the Anglo-American understanding of democratic deliberation. Referring to a large body of research in social and developmental psychology, I argued that individuals are not the competent interlocutors that deliberative democratic theory assumes and, therefore, that their deliberations with one another will not consist of the fair, reasoned, critical, and constructive discourse imagined by many deliberative democrats. Turning to communication itself, I also argued that it is not simply a derivative and amorphous vehicle of individual expression, but that it may have a structure of its own, one that cannot be reduced to the capacities of the individuals involved. As such, communicative exchanges

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may powerfully shape what those individuals can say and who they can be for one another. In conclusion, I draw on this review to consider some issues regarding the design and implementation of deliberative democracy in the West and in China. I first offer some brief observations on culture and its relevance to democratic deliberation. I then conclude by drawing out specific implications for the design of deliberative fora in different cultural settings. In so doing, I do not wish to slight the importance of the larger institutional context in which deliberation occurs. This must be considered as well, but I leave this for another time. Culture: A Contested Concept Insofar as it establishes the setting in which deliberation can occur, culture importantly affects the kind of deliberations that are likely to occur among citizens. Having said this, I approach the concept of culture with some caution. First, I think it is a simplification, if a politically useful one for the elite of dominant groups, to suggest that culture is a coherent, homogeneous entity with well-defined boundaries. In accordance with Seyla Benhabib (2002), I believe that this view of culture must be tempered with an awareness that any culture has its cacophonic quality, a reflection of its varied and often conflicting voices. Cultures are also hybrid constructions, reflecting their permeation by the other cultures to which they are exposed. This is especially the case in a time of rapid globalization. Second, and in a similar vein, I also think it is a simplification, if a theoretically useful one for social theorists, to view cultures as self-constituting entities (or as the reflections of social structure) and, in complementary fashion, to view individuals as pawns that learn to think and act in culturally dictated ways. I believe that this view of culture must be tempered by an appreciation of the limits of a culture’s regulatory and defining reach and the consequent significance of the creative input of the individuals involved. Such a view recognizes the role that individuals, in the aggregate and over time, may play in the construction of the cultural presupposition and practices upon which their interaction is based. With these concerns in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the relevance of cultural differences to the design of democratic deliberations in the West and China. Culture and Democratic Deliberation: General Considerations Insofar as it helps define who individuals are, how they will engage one another, and the relationship between their activities and those of government,

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a political culture will importantly affect the dynamics of citizen deliberations and, consequently, the limits and possibilities of what they can achieve. This effect is likely to be produced in a variety of ways. Consider first the impact that a culture can have on individuals’ competences and orientation. By virtue of the exposure it offers, a culture clearly impacts what an individual knows or takes to be true both about her immediate situation and about the broader political context in which she lives. In this way, a culture can affect the degree to which individuals have the knowledge they need to contribute effectively to a policy deliberation. Apart from substantive information, a culture also provides individuals with specific substantive values. As they are relevant to the policy problem being addressed, these values will clearly orient the judgments individuals make. Perhaps even more important, a culture also defines the bases of value in social life (e.g., the self or some larger social unit such as the family, clan, or nation). This will have an important impact on the normative resources a deliberative group may draw upon in attempting to resolve disagreements and coming to collective judgments. More subtly, the culture creates definitions the individuals must understand and it suggests problems that they must address in the course of everyday social life. These definitions and problems may vary in complexity or abstraction in ways that affect how integrative, imaginative, or reflective individuals’ thinking is encouraged to be. This will, in turn, affect their communicative competence and thus their capacity to deliberate. Cultures also define how individuals should regard each other. Transposed to a deliberative context, this will affect both how inclined individuals are to take another’s perspective into account and how well they will be able to do so. Finally, a culture is likely to have an important effect on how efficacious people feel, that is, the extent to which they feel that they can freely and effectively pursue their goals in the public domain. Apart from its effect on the individual, a culture is also likely to impact deliberation by shaping the ways in which individuals interact with one another. On the one hand, a culture affects citizens’ deliberative purposes and orientations by shaping the patterns of socioemotional connection among people that exist in the larger society. By shaping those connections, a culture influences the extent to which people feel themselves to be individuated, independent entities or connected, dependent ones that belong to social units. Social identities are influenced as are related feelings of closeness, intimacy, and trust, factors that importantly contribute to the productivity of citizen deliberations. On the other hand, a culture affects how citizens can communicate with one another in a deliberation by providing patterns or modes of discourse. This may affect various aspects of a communicative exchange, including the kinds of purposes that are pursued, the kinds of questions that are raised, the kinds of answer that are deemed satisfactory, the kinds of conflicts that emerge, and the manner in which they are

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resolved. Some types of discourses encourage the pursuit of conventional values and the maintenance of existing status differentials and group divisions. Other types encourage a questioning of conventional values and social definitions. Similarly, some types of discourses encourage questions about concrete facts and answers that take the form of storytelling. Other types of discourses call forth questions about meaning and demand answers that are more systematic and interpretative.11 Insofar as they are drawn in a deliberation, culturally dominant modes of discourse may powerfully delimit what occurs there. In more conventional political terms, a culture also defines the nature of the relationship between the private citizen, the public sphere or civil society, and the government. With regard to the public-private relationship, a culture defines the degree to which these two domains are distinguished and the direction of influence that flows from one to another. This affects how deliberations are viewed. Insofar as influence is understood to flow from the private to the public, deliberation will be regarded as a forum for individual expression and collective reconstruction. However, if the flow is understood to be reversed, deliberation will be viewed as a means for expressing the collective will and bringing private inclinations into conformity with it. In this context, it is important to note that the political culture also importantly defines the nature of the public sphere itself. Of particular importance to the cultural understanding of deliberation, a culture defines the nature of the categorical and hierarchical differences that exist in civil society. Finally, the political culture also helps define the public-governmental relationship. One important issue is the extent to which these two domains are differentiated. Where formal institutions of government are operative, it is particularly significant if their existence is complemented by the recognition of a clearly distinguished public sphere. A second issue is how civil society and the formal institutions of government are understood to impact one another. Depending on the direction of that impact, deliberation may be understood to be a creative exercise or a ritualistic one. Having thus considered the various ways in which a culture importantly defines the setting of deliberations and, in turn, shapes the deliberations themselves, it is important to remember the cautionary tone taken regarding the concept of culture. To understand a particular deliberation, care must be taken to consider its specific location in the larger, heterogeneous culture and the inconsistent direction that even this specific cultural location may provide. It is also important to consider the cognitive capacities and emotional orientation of the participants involved and the impact that this may have on the manner in which they do or could deliberate with one another. The particularities and complexities of a specific deliberative

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setting must therefore be kept in mind when considering the more general observations on culture and democratic deliberation that follow. Design Considerations for Deliberation in the West Deliberative exercises in the West are oriented by a liberal vision of competent, reflective interlocutors communicating through the neutral vehicle of conversation. The primary goals are autonomous self-expression, equality of participation, and effective and just decisionmaking. Considerations of how to institutionalize citizen deliberations have therefore focused on eliminating the constraints variously imposed by power and sheltering the deliberators from influence from without and by equalizing them in the face of influences (such as race, class, or education) that operate from within. I have argued that that view of deliberation fails to recognize what individuals are incapable of and what common discourses discourage them from doing. In a more positive vein, there is also a failure to recognize how the structuring power of discourses may be drawn upon to transform deliberations and to develop the capacities of individual citizens. My suggestions for the design of democratic deliberations in the West are offered with these considerations in mind. First, a deliberation must be designed with sensitivity to the competencies and orientations of the individuals involved. A simple consideration is the level of information the various individuals have about the policy problem being considered and about one another. Where deliberators know few facts about a policy matter, information must be made available. Citizen juries address this problem by providing access to expert witnesses. Insofar as deliberators come from different backgrounds, they are likely to be uninformed about relevant aspects of one another’s experience and interests. In such a case, it will be important to encourage participants to begin deliberations with more personal, narrative presentations of their perspective on the issues being addressed and, importantly, on the other participants addressing them. An example of this kind of exchange is the “civic dialogue” that is promoted to facilitate communication across racial groups in the United States (Walsh, forthcoming). A more subtle, yet equally important, issue is the cognitive abilities of the deliberators. The concern here is not what people know, but their capacity to understand it, critically reflect upon it, and communicate it to another. The social psychological research suggests a general condition in which most people share a common inability to integrate information, to abstract general patterns, rules or principles, to think hypothetically in a constructive or innovative way, and to appreciate the full difference of the listener’s perspective so that she can effectively and persuasively communicate

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with her. On the face of it, this problem seems more intractable. However, at the very least it does suggest the value of including a trained facilitator to assist in a citizen deliberation. The facilitator’s role would be to ask questions that sensitize the deliberators to their own limitations and foster better ways of engaging one another. For example, the facilitator could initiate a brainstorming session, encouraging the expression of even the most zany or idiosyncratic ideas. This might be followed by suggesting that the deliberators juxtapose different ideas that emerge and explore how they bear upon one another, thereby encouraging a more integrative approach. Similarly, the facilitator could ask the deliberators to consider more general issues as well as the specific ones that emerge more spontaneously in the deliberation. At times, the facilitator might also intervene by first asking a listener to give their interpretation of a speaker’s claim and then asking the speaker to comment on the adequacy of the listener’s interpretation. The aim here would be to sensitize deliberators to differences of perspective and the difficulties of effective communication. Second, the design of deliberations must take into consideration the limiting and enabling role that is played by dominant patterns of discourse. Dominant discourse patterns can limit deliberations in a variety of ways. For example, in the United States, rules of politeness occasionally dictate that conversation among strangers avoid or understate direct conflict. This undermines the productivity of discourse by minimizing existing disagreements; consequently, it can lead to suboptimal collective outcomes. In a different way, the structure of the discourse can limit the kinds of argumentative moves a speaker can make. Where the discourse is oriented by the goal of effective action and is limited to questions bearing on concrete facts and responses that make quick reference to specific experience, authoritative claims, or conventional values, little space is offered for contributions that are more hypothetical, interpretative, or critically reflective. The latter will be ignored or discouraged, often as being irrelevant or inappropriate. The structuring influence of discourse patterns should also be drawn upon to encourage more reasoned argument, greater care for others, and a more collaborative, critical, and innovative discussion. Several design recommendations follow from this. Some are relatively simple. An example would be to allot more time to the deliberation, thereby relieving the need for quick determinations and, hence, less creative musing. Another example would be to counter unproductive civility rules and use techniques that foster unconventional thought (e.g., brainstorming) or explicitly encourage the expression of conflicting points of view (e.g., role playing). More difficult would be attempts to restructure the discourse itself. This would require a trained facilitator who is sensitive to the forms that discourse can take and their implications for the concerns of a specifically deliberative exchange.

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Nor does this responsibility necessarily fall only on an appointed facilitator. Individual participants, especially those that demonstrate greater interpersonal and reflective capacities, could be encouraged to adopt a facilitative role in dealing with other participants who are apparently more reserved and less able to contribute to the discussion. Finally, the design of deliberation must take into consideration the limits imposed and the potential conferred by the local culture and community. The cultural context of a deliberation may impair deliberation in a variety of ways. Participants may be ascribed opposed social identities, such that deliberation is approached as yet another venue for conflict. Additionally, feelings of isolation and suspicion may be prevalent such that deliberators care little for one another and lack the requisite sense of security to explore issues or critically reflect on their own perspectives. These kinds of undermining influence must be addressed and countered. On one hand, this may require structuring the exchange so as to render existing detrimental social identities less influential. For example, this might involve an attempt to emphasize what is common about who they, as participants in the deliberation, are (e.g., they all live in the same city) or what is common about their interests as they bear on the problem at hand (e.g., they all want the next generation to be well educated). Alternatively, the focus could be on setting tasks that require the participants to cooperate with one another to achieve the desired goal (e.g., the team-building exercises commonly used during the outings of corporate executives). On the other hand, the focus might be on building stronger emotional connections among the participants. This might include providing opportunities that encourage participants to reveal personal experiences in ways that open up participants’ vulnerabilities to one another and encourage positive, supportive responses. The recommendations made here suggest that democratic deliberations not only be designed as a venue for self-expression and collective decisionmaking, but also as opportunities for self-development and social integration. Ironically, it suggests tempering Western approaches with a more Chinese emphasis on community and social harmony, thereby adopting institutional designs that cultivate the complementarity and interdependence of individuals in addition to their equality and autonomy. Design Considerations for Deliberation in China The Chinese approach to these designs questions is oriented by a very different understanding of the nature and purpose of deliberation. The normative emphasis is on sustaining social integration and community well being and the practical concern focuses on effective, acceptable governance

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in the face of increasingly unmanageable complexity. Although my review of the literature of cognition, emotion, and communication was cast as a response to more Western concerns with autonomy and equality, it nonetheless has suggestive implications for the Chinese case as well. Oriented by the normative goal of social harmony, the Chinese view of deliberation is one of local discussion that aims to establish consensus on specific issues that are consistent with broader collective understandings and values. Citizen deliberations are most likely to be seen as necessary when an apparently intractable political or social problem needs to be addressed. This would apply to a wide range of issues, from the consequences of “economic dislocation” in rural villages to the property rights of homeowners in an urban residential community to the internal politics of hiring and firing at Peking University. Typically, the intractability of these problems reflects government policymaking that is plagued by inadequate information and conflicting interests or policy execution plagued by inadequate public cooperation. In this context, deliberation is seen as a mechanism for building a public consensus on the definition of a problem and the strategy for solving it, and for generating public support for the policy initiative that follows. The problem with this approach to deliberation is that it underestimates the costs of social integration and the benefits of constructive disagreement. Given the normative emphasis on consensus and deference to authority, one can reasonably be concerned that individual needs and differences, particularly those that deviate from conventional or authoritative expectations, will not be expressed. As a result, complete information and the expectations and desires of the affected population will not be forthcoming. Limited in this way, the ensuing deliberation will yield only apparent agreement that obscures alternative understandings and masks real divisions. Any consensus reached will be a false one that may be silently rejected by many who contribute to it. Conducted in this way, the deliberation cannot effectively integrate the divergent views of the participants and, therefore, will fail to contribute to the achievement of either the basic normative goal of fostering social harmony or the basic practical goal of securing public support and cooperation. In my view, effective deliberation in the Chinese context demands an appreciation of the value of constructive disagreement and an awareness of how the social and psychological conditions of contemporary Chinese life are likely to obstruct the effort to elicit this kind of manageable, productive social conflict. Considerations of three kinds emerge. The first is cultural. As just noted, a culture of social harmony and deference to authority (especially when combined with a certain distrust of governance) is likely to limit the expressions of differences in a way that leads to premature and

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ultimately false consensus. Consequently, deliberations will require facilitation that directly counters these tendencies. This may involve the use of group discussion techniques that encourage the provision of a wide range of perceptions and preferences. Examples include more public techniques like brainstorming and more private ones like the anonymous submission of written ideas and suggestions. This should be supplemented by techniques that support open disagreement about the points raised. This might be accomplished through some variation on role-playing strategies that require participants to play the advocate of one point of view or another. Finally, the deliberation must seek to mitigate the possible effects of deference to social authority or subordination to governmental authority. In the first instance, this may involve a direct effort by the facilitator to elicit the opinions of those of lower status and to ensure that they receive some attention in the group discussion. In the second instance, this may involve sheltering deliberation from direct governmental intervention. For example, the facilitator should be a member of the community or an evidently neutral outsider, not a government official. The foregoing suggestions focus on the opening up of a deliberative discourse by encouraging the recognition of differences. The aim however is not simply to foster division and disagreement. Rather, it is to foster division and disagreement that is manageable and productive. The latter requires building on the disagreement voiced to find common ground for problemsolving. This, in turn, demands the type of communication and individual communicative competence assumed in most Western democratic theory. The requisite communication requires descriptions, explanations, and evaluations that are sufficiently elaborated so that listeners can understand the perspective of the speaker. Building on the resulting appreciation of the magnitude of existing differences, the communication must enable the exploration of overarching or fundamental considerations that may lead to the discovery of existing commonalities or the creation of new ones. This kind of communication requires individual participants who have the cognitive competence and emotional connection needed to interact in the manner demanded. Only if differences are bridged as well as illuminated can deliberative discussion convert existing division and potential conflict into productive disagreement. Given the likely limitations inherent in the social contexts in which it will be introduced, the design and facilitation of deliberation will have to be sensitive to the particular limitations of the culture of discourse and the distribution of individual competences that exists in the particular context in which it is applied. Relevant concerns include (1) the degree to which a civil society or public sphere exists for the specific population involved; (2) the nature of the kind of talk in which they

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typically engage; (3) the degree to which the participants share a common identity, sense of shared community, and mutual trust; and (4) the level of cognitive and conversational ability of the individuals involved. Some guidelines for addressing deficiencies in any of these dimensions have been discussed in the preceding section on Western deliberation. Whereas they do apply to the Chinese context, it is important to remember that their application must be conditioned by an awareness of the Chinese emphasis on social harmony and effective governance over individual autonomy and political legitimacy. Conclusion In this chapter, I have tried to rethink some of the core assumptions regarding individual competence and social interaction that underlie the theoretical understanding of democratic deliberation. In so doing, I drew upon empirical research and theory in the social sciences to suggest that these assumptions are, in significant ways, incorrect. In my view, the competence of individual deliberators is typically overestimated, the importance of the affective connection is ignored, the dynamics of their communicative exchange is misunderstood, and the impact of those dynamics on deliberative practices is not recognized. My second goal was to consider the significance and implications of cultural differences for the design of deliberative democratic fora. Here I focused on the established Western democracies and China. Such a broad sweep at differences in such a limited space has necessarily led to unwarranted stereotyping and simplification. I nonetheless believe the exercise is a useful one. My hope is that some of the claims here are correct and the design suggestions that follow from them are useful. At the very least, I believe the kinds of concerns I have raised are important and can help guide policymakers and practitioners who are more expert on the particular societies in which democratic deliberation will be instituted. Notes 1. This is interestingly reflected in Daniel Bell’s (2004) attempt to construct a specifically Confucian view of democracy. Drawing inspiration from the seventeenth century writing of Huang Zongxi, Bell offers a marriage of a more Western idea of parliamentary democracy with a more Confucian arrangement that privileges the public intellectual. 2. It is this perspective that conditions the critical view that observers from China adopt toward democratic governance in Taiwan, with its raucously divisive politics and the pursuit of narrow interests by powerful clans.

108 / deliberative democracy in china 3. An example of the kind of research now being conducted on deliberative democracy and a judgment of the relevance of that research by political theorists is offered in Rosenberg (forthcoming). 4. Here I focus on a family of theories generated by American authors that operate within the broad framework of liberal democratic theory. In so doing, I do not focus on an important alternative view of deliberation developed by Jürgen Habermas (1984–1987; 1996). Although he is frequently cited, Habermas’ understanding of communication and reason has had relatively little impact on the American literature apart from a few notable exceptions such as Seyla Benhabib (1996; 2002). When he is cited favorably, the epistemological bases of his theory of communicative action are typically ignored and his view is assimilated to an epistemological stance more similar to that of John Rawls. This said, I believe Habermas’ contribution to be very important and I therefore intend to deal with it separately elsewhere. 5. This is not to suggest that deliberative democrats agree with Rawls (1971). Some like Gutmann and Thompson (1996) explicitly reject focus on the value of his original position. However, I would argue that the deliberative democratic view is predicated on a view of individuals that is very similar to Rawls’. The expository value of beginning with Rawls is that he articulates this view very clearly, whereas most deliberative theorists do not. 6. This common ground is sometimes assumed to already exist either explicitly or implicitly in the larger, shared political culture of the participants. This is suggested by the relativism of the later Rawls (1993) with his invocation of the critical role of a pre-existing “overlapping consensus.” For most deliberative theorists, this common ground is conceived in more universalist terms and inheres in the essential quality of the human condition. For liberals this resides in the nature of the individual. For theorists who follow Habermas (1984–1987), this common ground is found in the structure of the intersubjective engagement inherent in discourse itself. 7. Again this is not to claim essential cognitive differences between individuals of different class, ethnic, or racial background. Rather, I suggest that differences in the structure of the social and communicative context to which individuals are exposed may produce basic differences in how those individuals reason. 8. This move is typically understood as a reflective, collaborative elaboration of pre-existing—but unrecognized—shared cultural presuppositions (e.g., Rawls 1993). 9. See, for example, Parsons’ view of the relationship between personality and social structure (Parsons 1964; Bales and Parson 1955), or Habermas’ view of the relationship between the structures of communication and cognition (Habermas 1979). 10. Cognitive developments focus almost exclusively on the psychological impact of the developmental dynamic (e.g., Inhelder and Piaget 1958; Kohlberg 1981–1984; Kegan 1994). In my attempt to develop a more general structural pragmatic position, I have argued that it is also important to analyze the transformative impact this social psychological dynamic may have on social structures. 11. For an example of an analysis of types of discourse and their implication for democratic deliberation, see Rosenberg (forthcoming).

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Works Cited Abelson, Robert P., Eliot Aronson, William J. McGuire, Theodore M. Newcomb, Morris J. Rosenberg, and Phillip H. Tannenbaum eds. 1968. Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook. Chicago, IL: McNally. Bales, R.F., and T. Parsons. 1955. Family, Socialization and Interaction Process. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Bell, Daniel. 2004. “A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-First Century.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Deliberative Democracy and Chinese Practices of Participatory and Deliberative Institutions, Hangzhou, China, November 18–21. Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” In Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 67–95. ———. 2002. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bohman, James. 1996. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1997. “Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities.” In James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 321–48. Chan, Sylvia. 2003. “Villagers’ Representative Assemblies: Toward Democracy or Centralism?” China: An International Journal 1(2): 179–99. Cohen, Joshua. 1996. “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy.” In Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95–119. ———. 1997. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 67–92. Dimitracopoulou, I. 1990. Conversational Competence and Social Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dryzek, John. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, and Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Festinger, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fiske, S., and S.E. Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill. Forester, J. 1999. The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes. Cambridge: MIT Press. Fung, Archon, and E.O. Wright. 2003. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. London: Verso. Gutmann, Amy, and D. Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2004. Why Deliberative Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1979. “Moral Development and Ego Identity.” In Communication and the Evolution of Society. Boston, MA: Beacon. ———. 1984–1987. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volumes 1 & 2. Boston, MA: Beacon.

110 / deliberative democracy in china Habermas, Jurgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. He, Baogang. 2004. “Chinese Practices of Deliberative and Participatory Institutions.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Deliberative Democracy and Chinese Practices of Participatory and Deliberative Institutions, Hangzhou, China, November 18–21. Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Inhelder, B., and J. Piaget. 1958. The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. New York: Basic Books. Jarboe, Susan. 1999. “Group Communication and Creativity Process.” In Lawrence R. Frey, ed., Handbook of Communication Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Kegan, R. 1994. In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kelley, H. 1973. “The Processes of Causal Attribution.” American Psychologist 28(2): 107–28. Kinnvall, Catarina. 1995. Cultural Diffusion and Political Learning: The Democratization of China. Lund, Sweden: Lund Political Studies. Knight, Jack. 1999. “Constitutionalism and Deliberative Democracy.” In S. Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 159–69. ———, and James Johnson. 1997. “What Sort of Political Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?” In James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 279–319. Kohlberg, L. 1981–1984. Essays on Moral Development: Volumes 1 & 2. New York: Harper & Row. Mendelberg, Tali, and C. Karpowitz. Forthcoming. “How People Deliberate About Justice.” In Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed., Can the People Decide? An Encounter Between Theory and Empirical Research on Democratic Deliberation. Myers, D. and H. Lamm. 1976. “The Group Polarization Phenomenon.” Psychological Bulletin 83: 602–62. Parsons, T. 1964. Social Structure and Personality. New York: Free Press. Piaget, J. 1970. Structuralism. New York: Harper & Row. Propp, Kathleen M. 1999. “Collective Information Processing in Groups.” In Lawrence R. Frey, ed., Handbook of Group Communication Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Quattrone, G., and A. Tversky. 1984. “Causal Versus Diagnostic Contingencies: On Self-Deception and on the Voter’s Illusion.” Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 46(2): 237–48. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. ———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rosenberg, Shawn W. 2002. The Not So Common Sense: Differences in the Way People Judge Social and Political Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. 2003. “Reason, Communicative Competence, and Democratic Deliberation: Do Citizens Have the Capacity To Effectively Participate in Deliberative DecisionMaking?” Paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 28–31.

human nature, communication, and culture / 111 ———. Forthcoming. “Types of Discourse and the Democracy of Deliberation.” In Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed., Can the People Decide? An Encounter Between Theory and Empirical Research on Democratic Deliberation. Selman, R.L. 1980. The Growth of Interpersonal Understanding: Developmental and Clinical Analyses. New York: Academic Press. Smelsund, J. 1963. “The Concept of Correlation in Adults.” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 4: 165–73. Tan, Qingshan. 2004. “Building Institutional Rules and Procedures: Villages Elections in China.” Policy Sciences 37: 1–22. Taylor, S.E., and Susan T. Fiske. 1975. “Point of View and Perceptions of Causality.” Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 32(3): 439–45. Tversky, A., and Daniel Kahneman. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Eugene, OR: Oregon Research Institute. Vygotsky, L.S. 1962. Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1978. Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walsh, K.C. Forthcoming. “The Democratic Potential of Civic Dialogue.” In Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed., Can the People Decide? An Encounter Between Theory and Empirical Research on Democratic Deliberation. Warren, Mark. 1992. “Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation.” American Political Science Review 86(1): 8–23. ———. Forthcoming. “Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy.” In Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed., Can the People Decide? An Encounter Between Theory and Empirical Research on Democratic Deliberation. Young, Iris Marion. 1996. In Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 120–35. ———. 1999. “Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy.” In S. Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 151–58.

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C h ap t e r 5 Pragmatism in Designing Popular Deliberative Institutions in the United States and China Ethan J. Leib

Introduction When I shared with friends that I was going to China to participate in a conference about how to institutionalize forms of deliberative democracy there, most people asked me the same questions: how can you talk about deliberative democracy in China without first talking about democracy more generally? Is it not more important to democratize China in the first instance and only later worry about how to get it to be a deliberative democracy? At first, these questions were paralyzing. I knew little about Chinese politics, but I knew enough to understand where these questions were coming from. Still, I soon developed an answer of sorts. “Democratization,” without further specification about the institutions of democracy desired, is too vague an aspiration. Democratizers need to have a vision of what sort of democratic institutions they wish to implement, and those institutions must resonate with the citizenry. Practices of deliberative democracy, then, can give content to the more general commitment to democracy and can recommend a particular set of institutional design choices in polities receptive to them. The institutional design choices deliberative democracy recommends, however, will only be contextual and relative for deliberative democrats, like myself, who are also pragmatists. Who are “pragmatists?” We use the deliberative conception of democracy as a method for reforming institutions and as a policy program (Pettit 1997); we are not idealists who can only imagine one proper account of democracy. A pragmatic deliberative democrat takes the political world as he or she finds it and seeks to tinker with it to have it better cohere with the aspirations of a more

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deliberative regime of decisionmaking. But this pragmatism has principle too: we are flexible because we recognize that the most stable, rightsenhancing, and deliberative regimes are actually mixed ones, ones that combine many different modes of decisionmaking within the same polity. As Paul Gewirtz (2003, 618) has emphasized about the rule of law in China, one need not choose between approaches to progress and reform: in the context of democratization, one can pursue multiple strategies all at once, seeking to create both deliberative and nondeliberative democratic institutions. Indeed, as this book makes clear, there may be room for deliberative democratic institutions in China—even without a liberal democratic background. Here, I explicate my deliberative conception of democracy and the choices I made when trying to offer a practical vision of deliberative democracy for the United States in my book, Deliberative Democracy in America; I hope to expose thereby ways to orient democratization in China toward creating mandatory popular deliberative institutions. Because my conception of deliberative democracy is so contextual, and because its pragmatic orientation does not wed itself to a singular institutional vision, different design choices will need to be made in China. But, all the same, it is absolutely critical to focus attention on “big picture” reform ideas: China’s political system will very likely undergo tremendous reconstitution in the coming years, and practitioners and theorists alike must begin to think about what a complete democracy in China will look like, even if it will be one with Chinese characteristics. Forms of Democracy and China There are, of course, other forms of democracy that may be appropriate— perhaps, more appropriate—for China, which may be worth considering before adopting a deliberative orientation. While we can pursue multiple strategies for democratization, we do need to establish some priorities. Schumpeterians, or democratic minimalists, conceive of democracy “as a method by which members of a self-interested political elite compete for the votes of a basically ignorant and apathetic, as well as determinedly self-interested, electorate” (Posner 2003, 16). Minimalists require “only” pervasive, periodic, and competitive elections to feel that they have achieved democracy. Indeed, a country without such elections may feel that this minimalist conception is the only one worth working toward. Even if a democrat knows that there are deeper and potentially more desirable forms of democracy, the minimalist vision may seem most attractive. The minimalist vision requires little agreement about substantive goods and demands little of citizens in terms of participation, deliberation, public-spiritedness,

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or education about politics (Posner 2003, 14). It prioritizes designing representative institutions and tends to look unfavorably upon direct democracy or popular institutions, where citizens are expected to participate directly in politics. It seeks to manage conflict between citizens by avoiding ideological disputes altogether; it cares not for consensus, but neither does it care about agonizing over any political decision because it assumes that reasonable choices can be made by representative institutions without self-consciously reasoning them out (Posner 2003, 166). Most basically, minimalism “rejects the idea that democracy is self-government. Democracy is government subject to electoral checks” (Posner 2003, 164). Minimalism is, at least, minimally attractive and democratizers must consider its benefits when considering interior design choices for their fledgling democracies. Many in China might be perfectly pleased with this form of democracy—and it may be more urgently needed than any deeper conception for the time being. If concerns about making money and establishing a viable commercial society are paramount for the Chinese (Ogden 2002, 107), Schumpeterian democracy may be enough.1 And if Wang Hui (2003, 159) is right that many are especially fearful of mass political participation owing to failures associated with the Maoist period, political democracy in China might need to remain thin.2 Still, it bears emphasis that “fear” of the Maoist period is exactly the sort of excuse those in power can express to entrench themselves by countering deeper conceptions of participatory democracy. Finally, it may be the case that without competitive elections, a country simply cannot call itself a democracy (at least in the political science community). There may be a floor below which no democracy worth the name can descend and minimalism may be a necessary precondition for any stronger conception of democracy: without political equality at the level of elections, it may be very difficult to convince a citizenry of its deliberative and social equality, seen as central to participatory and deliberative democracy. Thus, irrespective of Chinese suspicion of Taiwanese electoral democracy, for example, minimalism may be a critical first step in the democratization process.3 Despite the suggestive nomenclature of minimalism, there are even thinner conceptions of democracy. Some have a “corporatist” or “interest-group” or “consociational” conception of democracy, where the preferences of the people are filtered through nongovernmental institutions or political elites; because these players are often so enmeshed within the political establishment, they are themselves viewed as adequate representatives of the citizenry’s interests (even if not actually directly elected). Because these conceptions of democracy are sensitive to the free-rider/collective action problems facing individuals, they prioritize the formation of groups that can mobilize and

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exercise power. They also tend to prioritize group identity over personal identity. The groups pool and package information and can remain a vital source of social capital for citizens. Still, the democratic credentials of these conceptions can be vindicated only if there is great pluralism and diversity in the interest groups with which politicians ultimately deal. Without such a pluralist caveat, there is little to recommend interest-group democracy. Nevertheless, countries that cannot establish competitive elections can rely on interest-group pluralism to achieve a modicum of democracy. And even those countries with competitive elections may seek to utilize the benefits that interest groups can offer in the form of social and political capital, as long as proper checks are in place. To be sure, some scholars of Chinese politics think corporatism is an excellent choice for China because of the focus upon group representation that corporatism affords over and above individual interests or freedom, whose roots are less firmly established in neo-Confucian culture (Ogden 2002, 40; Gewirtz 2003, 605). Moreover, corporatism capitalizes on the lack of true separation between state and society in China. Fully autonomous interest groups, by contrast, would have less power in China—and it is better for China that these groups help decentralize political power, which remains in the hands of a single, albeit occasionally fragmented, political party (Ogden 2002, 27, 40, 280). Wang Hui (2003, 87) argues that democratizers in China from 1993 to 1997, for example, became especially interested in interest-group democracy. All the same, he insists that real social movements have trouble developing when state-supported interest groups control the terms of political discourse (2003, 88). “Stealth” democracy is still another thin conception of democracy. In this vision, two points are emphasized to legitimate regulation by unelected experts (even if some policies may be decided through more standard majoritarian electoral politics). First, cognitive biases in citizen and legislator interactions become a basis for arguing that regulatory authority should be delegated to expert administrators in a complex society (Sunstein 1997; 2001; 2002). Second, survey data from the United States tend to show that citizens do not want to be ruled by their elected representatives; citizens can prefer a “stealth” form of democracy where experts, who are perceived to be less self-interested than citizens themselves, make policy decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). This conception of political life is nominally democratic because it enables citizens to control who appoints the experts (and is accordingly, reducible to a form of Schumpeterian minimalism). Still, it tolerates more direct citizen access through direct democracy and citizen suits against the administrative state for when experts produce results starkly out of favor with the populace. Such a model of democracy is

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worth considering in largely bureaucratic societies where there is little interest in more robust political participation. Some would argue that China can feed off of this conception of democracy because it already has in place such a large administrative apparatus and is in the process of reforming it (Ogden 2002, 240–44; Gewirtz 2003, 609). It is also working to develop forms of public participation in administrative rulemaking (Gewirtz 2003, 617), and has adopted an “Administrative Litigation Law” to allow citizens to sue the state (Gewirtz 2003, 605; Cohen 2005, 4, 5, 7). Moreover, despite a fairly high degree of willingness to serve as an elected politician in China (Ogden 2002, 111), political efficacy in China seems to be felt by access to work-units or village officials rather than through the electoral vote (Ogden 2002, 28, 293–94); so incorporating access to these arms of the administrative state may be more important than developing voting rights. Finally, many in China are more interested in the substantive value of equality regularly associated with democracy (social rights) than its political valence (Ogden 2002, 19, 39); and focusing upon political democracy may be misguided in a society animated by more concern with social standing and parity. Still, there are those who argue sensibly that demands for social equality must be reconciled with political democracy and that both must be pursued simultaneously (Wang Hui 2003, 64).4 Designing Deliberative Democracy and China What, then, is my deliberative conception of democracy? And is it right for China? To say we favor deliberative democracy is also too general, for there are many forms of it; this book surely confirms that claim. But one can adopt any of the previously mentioned conceptions of democracy as a first priority and still desire to add deliberative components to mix up any regime; this pragmatic orientation is one of my distinctive contributions to framing the deliberative democracy enterprise (Leib 2002; 2004). Even prioritizing any of the previously mentioned conceptions of democracy will require institutional design: mandatory popular deliberative institutions, ones that I argue are at the very core of the commitment to deliberative democracy, can play a role in any of them, whether they be in addition to minimalism, a way to organize civil society to make interest groups more accountable and responsive, or a way popular deliberative input can be used within the administrative state. I have previously developed my vision of deliberative democracy in Deliberative Democracy in America (Leib 2004). Let me summarize that vision here before I specify a few design choices that animated my reform proposal for the United States.

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First, it holds popular sovereignty to be an ideal worth achieving. Popular sovereignty is worth trying to make a reality because it undergirds any nation’s sense of autonomy and freedom. Popular sovereignty, as an aspiration, generally holds that each citizen should be the author of his or her own laws in some real, concrete way. Second, because my conception of deliberative democracy acknowledges that the state exercises extreme coercive power over citizens, it seeks to find a substantial way to legitimate that power through some process of achieving the active—rather than tacit—consent of the governed. My conception holds that even though representative democracy, interest-group pluralism, and administrative expertise may all contribute to the maintenance of a legitimate polity, citizens themselves must participate in political willformation to legitimate the coercive force exercised by the state. But to achieve adequate representation of all citizens, participation in popular deliberative institutions must be mandatory; otherwise, self-selection and the biases associated therewith cannot be avoided. Third, my conception of deliberative democracy endorses deliberation by lay citizens in addition to that of elected representatives, leaders of interest groups, and judges because it holds that direct citizen access to lawmaking cures some of the legitimacy deficits associated with other practices of plebiscitary democracy and other forms of deliberation in society. It is sensitive to the pathologies of deliberation, both in mass society and in elite institutions, so attempts to carve special political sites with more optimal, though far from ideal, conditions. Other conceptions of democracy and deliberation tend to be paternalistic, elitist, or unaccountable to the citizens that are supposed to be served by the government and rarely demand that citizens have direct lawmaking power. Fourth, my conception holds that face-to-face interaction should be prioritized over efforts in “teledemocracy.” We still live in the face of a digital divide,5 and personal human interactions—particularly ones involving the sympathies required to make difficult policy decisions that affect real people—cannot easily be replicated on a machine.6 Finally, my deliberative conception of democracy is not consensus-oriented and does not seek to derive “true” or “right” answers to political problems. Instead, it prizes agonism and contestation, enabling a full and fair discussion of issues before aggregating preferences through a vote (which is, of course, nondeliberative). It refuses to censor with prior restraints any perspective voiced from within the population because it holds that all views can and should be aired (even if we will need checking mechanisms and institutions to avoid the tyranny of the majority and incursion into fundamental rights). In sum, my orientation offers the opportunity to work within existing structures to help balance and separate power among political players and

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give effect to some basic commitments to political freedom. My kind of deliberating is a form of de-liberation insofar as it mandates citizen participation; many others place citizens’ freedom from government as foundational. But the deliberation and de-liberation of citizens enables greater freedom and legitimates the exercise of state power. My book utilizes this flexible, pragmatist, agonistic, and realist conception of deliberative democracy to offer an institutional redesign of the American republic. I urge the development of a fourth branch of government, the “Popular Branch.” The Popular Branch would enact or reject laws through deliberative civic juries composed of stratified random samples of lay citizens convened to discuss a particular policy matter. The citizens would be called for service, and their participation would be mandatory. This branch would effectively replace and improve upon the measures of direct democracy currently found in most American states (the initiative and referendum processes) and could establish, for the first time in the United States, a form of direct democracy on the national level. Because measures in direct democracy as currently implemented on the state level in the United States are distorted by moneyed interests, information failures, and poor turnout, they need to be redesigned. By no means complacent with the structures as they exist in American democracy, neither does my conception for the application of deliberative democracy require a complete overthrowing of the current regime. I spend much of the book filling in details: How would this four-branch system work? How would the fourth branch interact with the other three? With political parties? With interest groups? Who would get the final say? What would judicial review look like? How can questions get before this branch? Should there be special voting rules, such as supermajority rule, in the populist context? And who supplies the information relevant for the policy juries’ consideration? Who sets the agenda? As we know, controlling information can lead to controlling outcomes. I cannot, in this context, get too far into details; I refer you to the book itself. But I propose to highlight here some of the salient design considerations that figured prominently in the design project of the book. By focusing specifically upon the conditions in the United States that enable my design proposal to be useful for American democracy, I am able to offer here a framework for other countries seeking to implement a form of the proposal and seeking to devise some “big picture” approaches to their own democratization projects. The following design considerations will prove especially relevant should Chinese institutional designers wish to adopt a “Popular Branch” of government at any level.7 Others have offered typologies of design considerations for deliberative institutions and their potential consequences (e.g., Fung 2003) and this inquiry builds upon that work, in conjunction with my own distinctive theoretical orientation.

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Constitutions The United States Constitution provides a framework for all American efforts in governmental design. It is a unique document that helps recommend my proposal; my proposal speaks directly to courts’ efforts to interpret it and its commitment to guarantee republican government. For example, there is a strain of American jurisprudence that seeks to give constitutional effect to deeply rooted national traditions and mores. Yet there is no competent method for jurists to ascertain the nature of these traditions or mores. Popular deliberation by a random sample of citizens may be just the technology that could educate unelected and unaccountable judges in the ways of the people they serve. One more example can be provided: federal lawmaking in the United States is constrained by a set of constitutional procedures known as bicameralism and presentment—laws must be accepted first by each house of Congress and then presented to the President to ensure that Executive does not wish to veto. This makes it incredibly difficult to get a law passed, even when there is much support for a policy in the populace. The Popular Branch I propose gives citizens direct access to lawmaking to break potential deadlock and cure legislative errors without needing to await the next election cycle. I build in supermajoritarian constraints in accordance with America’s supermajoritarian constitution (McGinnis and Rappaport 2002; Leib 2006) (a constitution that uses many rules that depart from simple majority rule) and draw upon an already existing institution with constitutional import, the jury. In sum, all governmental design projects must be especially sensitive to a regime’s founding documents and structure. Proposals for popular deliberative institutions must respect a polity’s scheme of governance to see where and how deliberation can be developed. This remains true for both the formal Constitution (big “C”) and more subtle elements of a polity’s constitution (small “c”). What does this mean for China? It means China might consider, for example, mobilizing subunits of governance in service of deliberation and democracy because they are already existing fora that play a real role in many citizens’ sense of their own political efficacy (Ogden 2002, 28, 293–94). More, “although the practice is not mandated by law, work-unit authorities often encourage surveys, discussions, or even elections in the hope of identifying competent and respected individuals with the potential to become leaders” (Ogden 2002, 228). Work-units also get together to deliberate about how to respond to Western surveys (Ogden 2002, 390); this is another existing practice that can be mobilized in support of more deliberative input from citizens.8

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Still another forum that can be made more deliberative—or be a source for a deliberative branch in China—are neighborhood committees. Although they are already overwhelmed with multiple responsibilities, they are also a potential source for deliberative development, given that they have connections to welfare and grassroots activities (Ogden 2002, 223). Community mediation also might be an area of local governance that could be democratized deliberatively (Peng Bo 2004). I do not mean to overlook the most obvious forum that could transform itself into a popular deliberative institution: village elections. Many have noticed that privacy is not especially important to Chinese villagers who vote; citizens could be mobilized during elections to engage in more formal and structured policy debates (Ogden 2002, 166 n. 136). It is obviously true that elections in some locales are already being made more deliberative; this book furnishes many examples of that deliberative development. And such first efforts are exciting to behold and study. Still, a deliberative democracy entitled to the name needs a more pervasive and uniform practice. It is perfectly appropriate to experiment with different forms of deliberation at the grassroots level to see what works best and to see what citizens (many with limited educations) can be called upon to discuss fruitfully. But a country with small-scale experimentation in nonbinding deliberation by very few participants is not a deliberative democracy. Americans would do well to remember the same. Finally, just as I ultimately urge for amendment to the actual Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the several states in my book, Chinese democratizers may also look to their written Constitutions (or charters of smaller units of governance) to find ways of giving effect to their proposed reforms. As Jerome Cohen (2005, 4) has recently written, “The most interesting development in Chinese law at this time is the gradual emergence of constitutional law as a genuine subject and a factor to be reckoned with in Chinese politics and government.” The Separation of Powers One of the most important details of the design proposal in my book is that majorities can always be cabined by other accountable institutions, such as legislatures, executives, and courts. Without some check on popular deliberative institutions, I believe my proposal would be unacceptable in the American context; historically, Americans have been very concerned with the “tyranny of the majority.” Because all systems of checks and balances must be country-specific, China must consider unique ways to control the tyranny of the majority and must develop other representative institutions to co-exist side-by-side with more popular and deliberative ones. China, of course, has

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branches of government and representative institutions, and the separation of powers is not an anathema (Ogden 2002, 256).9 Institutional designers must commit some energy to delineating how deliberative and nondeliberative institutions should interact. For example, the function of judicial review in my imagined republic would prevent any oppressive law from going into effect, even if a deliberative group of citizens authored it. It was important to me—so that I could stay in the school of “reformist tinkering” rather than the school of “revolutionary reform” (Fung 2003, 339, citing Roberto Unger)—that I focus on ways to avoid directly stripping current institutions of their power; rather I wanted to add a new balancing institution that could use popular deliberative power to arrest other, potentially less legitimate, types of power. This is a pragmatic strategy, of course, but it is also more than that. It is an acknowledgment that mixed regimes fare best in terms of stability and in terms of balancing fundamental rights that we do not want violated by simple and ill-informed majorities.10 Political Culture Citizens of the United States, by and large, endorse measures of direct democracy and seek to participate in their governance; popular sovereignty is an ideal most Americans cherish, abstract though it may be. Evidence that tends to show that a society has no interest in participatory democracy or that a society actually prefers bureaucratic rule, for example, might recommend a set of different design choices from the ones I make in my book. If China’s current political culture cannot tolerate popular deliberative institutions, institutional designers might wish to focus attention on ways to lay the groundwork for further development of deliberative democracy by targeting political culture for reform first and foremost. Still, as Baogang He and other have chronicled in this volume, the Chinese participate actively in delineating potential bonus payments or salary withholdings to their representative officials based on citizens’ judgment upon the officials’ performance, as well as have general enthusiasm for deliberative institutions; these institutions evidence a commitment to direct and participatory democracy from within Chinese political culture. Jury System In the United States, there is a mandatory system in place that “forces” citizens to engage in deliberative processes. Tocqueville famously imputed to Americans’ experience with the jury much of the country’s democratic character. My proposal would be virtually unimaginable without the model of the jury, a deliberative constitutionalized institution with which almost

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every American comes into contact. Without such a robust and accessible system already in place, a society may not be ready to embrace deliberative institutions or feel adequately prepared for their challenges. Jury reform in China might be a useful first step in effecting the civic education and sentimental education that facilitates deliberative democracy. As we know, the jury system in China does not utilize many lay citizens, and certainly does not force people to deliberate. Indeed, consistent with China’s civil law tradition, the role of the jury in China is radically different from its role in common law countries such as the United States. Moreover, a central feature of my design is reliance on mandatory service: all citizens must participate in deliberative fora when selected at random. I am able to recommend this stringent condition because the United States has in place mandatory deliberative service in the context of the jury. Traditionally, many rely on voluntary self-selection for democratic participation (Fung 2003, 342); in my vision, such self-selection will hopelessly denude deliberative institutions of the very legitimacy they are created to effect. Getting a truly representative sample, including those who are uninterested in participation, poor, or dispossessed, is crucial.11 I have no way to assess how a proposal for mandatory service in deliberative institutions in post-Mao China would be viewed. In any case, the selection method for participants in popular deliberative institutions requires attention. Stratified random sampling with a sufficiently large sample is a good way to make sure participants reflect the relevant population at issue—and the more selection is left voluntary, the harder it is to cull a truly representative group. There are many ways around self-selection and China needs to pick one too; to the extent that there already are deliberative institutions in place in China, whether through the internet or village elections, little attention has focused on the issue of fair representation. (Chapter 12 in this book is one attempt to confront seriously the problem of representation.) Civil Society Nongovernmental institutions play a big role in my design proposal because they are responsible for filtering information and for forming committees for and against any particular proposal. Readings in the “China and civil society” literature (e.g., Brook and Frolic 1997), however, emphasize how difficult it is to separate state from society, even in the United States; and how naïve it may be to insist on their separation. My design choice— directly including civil associations in information-gathering—may be inappropriate in a regime like China’s, where the separation of state from society may be considered the more urgent task for democracy’s sake. On the other hand, China’s 200,000 civil associations are a reason for enthusiasm

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about the growth of civil society (Ogden 2002, 265, 275); if they replace the functions of parties, they too can be mobilized to support deliberative institutions. For example, civil associations can be relied upon to help make strong arguments for each side of a policy debate. As long as the central state does not choose sides and commits itself to listening to the results of the deliberation of citizens, civil associations can be central in administering popular deliberative institutions. Public Opinion The tendency for leaders in the United States to “rule by opinion poll” counsels for more reliable and informed polls. This is Fishkin’s inspiration (see chapter 2 of this book) and is principally what his Deliberative Polls help effect. Ultimately, I am more interested in the use of Fishkin’s design of “Deliberative Polling,” where a stratified random sample is brought together to deliberate on a policy matter, to accomplish will-formation rather than opinion-formation, because I believe citizens should contribute to making laws directly. What do I mean by will-formation? I mean that the results of citizen deliberation (which must ultimately get aggregated by a vote, a nondeliberative mechanism) should be implemented into law as directly as possible. This ensures that citizens who are involved in deliberation will take their role seriously; it ensures a feeling of political efficacy; and it allows the deliberation to have a practical effect. Too often deliberation transpires without deliberative decisionmaking; the deliberation never affects policy formation and merely shapes preference-formation, which is routinely overcome by power inequalities and bargaining in the shadow of campaign financing. I believe that this is too little to ask of deliberation: when decisions are made at a level of remove from deliberation, pathological policies are more likely to result, policies that are too substantially influenced by money and unequal power relations. If the final decisionmakers are not the ones who deliberate, there is no way to ensure that the decision emanates from the deliberation.12 Still, it may be that in societies like China, where “rule by opinion poll” is even more substantial than it is in the United States, where opinion polls may be the only way to have citizens’ voices heard, and where survey responses are notoriously unreliable (because many respondents fear reprisal), redesigning mechanisms of opinion-formation is more urgent than designing mechanisms of will-formation. As Ogden (2002, 100) has written: the fact that the Chinese government carries out, and permits non-official and international polling organizations to carry out surveys suggests the

pragmatism and deliberative institutions / 125 importance the government attaches to public opinion . . . In fact, the government itself is known to carry out surveys of public opinion to find out public attitudes toward itself and whether the people would take to the streets to voice their anger.

This openness of the Chinese government to surveys may suggest a strategy for democratizers to adopt James Fishkin’s “Deliberative Polling,” even if they only have recommending force, rather than the sort of deliberative branch with a binding effect that I am most interested in for the United States. (For a general discussion of surveys in China, see Ogden 2002, 228–29, 383–91.) Elite Management of the Process Many of my design ideas are targeted to minimize the distortion that elite management of deliberative processes effect. For example, in a deliberative opinion poll I helped plan with Fishkin, we gave citizens a set of options with respect to a local airport in New Haven, Connecticut: they could vote to expand it to a major hub; expand it to a minor hub; or leave it the way it was then operating, as a small airport catering mostly to small corporate planes. We never provided citizens with the option environmentalists most wanted—to shut it down altogether and not allow even private jets to land at the airport. This result came about because of the composition of the Administrative Board in charge of planning the poll; elites simply did not want to consider the idea of closing down the airport. Now it is undoubtedly true that experts often have a better sense of the type of options that are realistic in any given issue area. But that does not mean that having elites set the agenda is not prone to abuse. China will need to confront this difficulty with planning popular deliberative events even more seriously than Americans do. When elites control the agenda, they can also control the outcome of decisionmaking processes. Institutional designers must find a way to have the agenda set by someone other than elites. I have argued in my book for a mode of enabling civil society to define the agenda both through electoral politics (i.e., voting for candidates that wish to place matters in the hands of my Popular Branch) and through a complicated voucher system, wherein each citizen is asked to allocate public funds to an interest group to develop an argument for presentation to the Popular Branch. It may or may not be possible to imagine such a thing for China. This brings me to my last point, which is related. Consensus Both Fishkin and I reject theories of deliberative democracy that seek to use deliberative fora as an opportunity to garner consensus. Unlike many contributors to this book, Fishkin and I both utilize versions of deliberative

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democracy that do not prize consensus above all. The pressure to agree is absolutely fatal to making a true effort to hear the voices of the dispossessed. Everyone has heard of a lone juror in the United States who votes with the majority because unanimity is needed and the dissenter gets railroaded. Accordingly, my design tactic in my own book was to avoid consensusdirected procedures as much as possible. However, the social and political culture in China may recommend greater respect for the virtues of consensus. As Ogden (2002, 257) has written: “the emphasis on deliberation in the Chinese political system as a means of reaching consensus could prove to be an important building block for democratization . . . [I]n China, the object thus far has been to reach a consensus and maintain societal order, the ‘Great Harmony’ (datong) treasured in traditional Chinese political thought.” I note here that many deliberative democrats (like Tom Atlee (2003), Jane Mansbridge (1980), and Susskind and Zion (2002), for example) have offered similar proposals to mine; but their analyses are founded on ideals of wisdom and consensus, and they may be especially useful for the Chinese as they embark upon design projects in deliberative democracy. But before I too safely adopt the perspective of the cultural relativist, let me urge one cautionary note that was pressed upon me by John Delury, a Chinese historian at Yale, who helped direct my reading for this chapter and the book more generally. “Harmony” as a cultural value can too facilely be used to justify authoritarianism. The purported Chinese concern about the Maoist period and China’s imputed fear of conflict too easily can be used to justify a noncombative politics that will never cure the pathologies of oneparty rule. There is surely some validity to tethering Chinese political life to neo-Confucianism. But this is a new time for China—a competitive market economy will have competitive energies spill over into politics. The market must, of necessity, erode or radically transform the neo-Confucian vision of politics. Consensus has never been part of my conception of deliberative democracy because it can be used as a subterfuge, encourages the falsification of preferences, and is generally a social pressure few need placed upon them when the task at hand is uncovering their actual informed preferences. These reasons to avoid consensus are at least as urgent in China. I would emphasize to those that support the virtue as an organizing principle that there is healing power in frankness, transparency, and open conflict. These things make for a smooth economy as much as they can make for a stable political life. I think the proper conception of deliberative democracy is one wedded to prying open and revealing actual preferences; emphasizing consensus too much is a way to keep them in a lockbox. Robust and contestatory dialogue need not lead to chaos. On the contrary, it can lead to greater trust in politics and result in greater stability.

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Conclusion As I gleaned from Jonathan Spence’s To Change China (2002), Westerners need to be very careful when they come to China with neat ideological and political agendas. I was chastened before arriving in China to sell my book and its ideas and instead sought to emphasize why the lessons of Deliberative Democracy in America require substantial modification as they are applied in the Chinese context. I nevertheless will conclude with a Chinese social theorist’s vision of democratic reform that suggests that my book may be worth taking seriously even in China: [T]he contemplation of a mixed system with the participation of ordinary citizens at its core (that is, a tripartite arrangement among the state, elites, and the common people) is a democratic program well worth considering. This notion of a tripartite structure emphasizes how to turn popular demands into national policy and thereby forestall both the creation of a new aristocracy and the dual alliance between the state and various interest groups . . . On this point, it is particularly important to investigate how to create mechanisms of democratic oversight through the interaction between social movements and institutional innovation. That is to say, to look into how ordinary citizens through such means as social movements and public discussion might promote open dialogue on policy questions among different levels of society. (Wang Hui 2003, 89)

My first book—and perhaps this book as well—ultimately recommend that China find some way to have mandatory popular deliberative institutions produce actual policy results. Even if local communities will first need to experiment with popular deliberative institutions before they can be adopted on a more national scale, it is absolutely critical to keep in view an ideal in which there is a substantial structural transformation of politics; only then can the promise of a deliberative democracy become a reality. Just as I have been careful not to suggest that my proposal could be integrated whole hog into the Chinese systems of governance, I also have tried to argue that my ideas are worth taking seriously in China as it continues to consider how to design popular deliberative institutions in its unique political, cultural, and social environment. Notes 1. Chapter 11 of this book, however, suggests that there may be some connection between a successful economy and more deliberative and participatory institutions in China. 2. To be sure, Wang Hui (2003, 159) thinks this minimalism would be a mistake for China: “widespread participation is a necessary constituent of democracy . . . [A] positive interaction between widespread participation and the legislative process is the very hallmark of modern democratic change.” Indeed, he insists

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3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

that direct democracy is central to democratic practice. I would agree, but there is surely room for argument. Indeed, one of the most notable aspects of my experience in China was the nearuniversal condemnation of Taiwanese electoral democracy, even among people who consider themselves authentically committed to democracy in China. For more on this, see Leib 2005. More notable still is that Taiwan is now experimenting with very deep forms of deliberative democracy: a citizen panel composed of a “random” sample of “undecideds” on the issue has called for the decriminalization of surrogate parenthood. Taiwan’s Department of Health expects the law drafted by the panel to be ratified by the national legislature within a year. Although only sixty-eight persons applied to be part of the twenty-person “random” sample, this Taiwanese citizen panel had a virtually unprecedented amount of political power insofar as its deliberations produced binding law. For more on the story, see Wang Hsiao-Wen 2004. To be sure, some in Taiwan are opposed to deliberative democracy precisely because they see their electoral institutions and fundamental rights as far more important priorities. For an argument in this vein, see The China Post 2005. Indeed, Wang Hui (2003, 64) blames the failure to reconcile these demands as an indirect cause for the failure of the democratization efforts that culminated on June 4, 1989 in Beijing. Wang Hui (2003, 73) also argues, “In the context of present-day China, the most important matter is to focus on the problem of the relationship between country and city.” Whether that is meant to be at the expense of focusing on democratization efforts is unclear. And even if democratization is an appropriate priority, Wang Hui’s argument suggests that China might be viewed as a “divided society.” Cohen (2005, 3), for example, emphasizes that a “society that was once one of the world’s most egalitarian now features accumulations of wealth that have created one of the world’s biggest gaps between rich and poor.” If that is right, Dryzek (2003) has particularized methods to pursue deliberative democracy in the context of a form of consociationalism/corporatism, which is considered to be the form of democracy best suited to the stabilization of deeply divided societies. The town-country divide is not quite what Dryzek has in mind—he is interested in deep ideological, religious, or ethnic divisions—but the application could be useful in service of getting the poor special representation or veto power. It may be that there is less of a divide in China. To be sure, there are experiments being conducted by James Fishkin, Peter Shane, and others that are beginning to suggest that people can fruitfully deliberate electronically. But since few experiments have people making real decisions that affect real people, I feel reasonably confident that there is a substantial benefit that accrues to face-to-face designs. We would not likely feel comfortable having criminal juries deliberate through technology, and I suspect that is for reasons other than ones a Luddite might offer. I should report that at least one Chinese locality has expressed an interest in developing a local “Popular Branch” of government, and I hope to have more to report on that front in due course. Daniel Bell has suggested to me that the work-unit is too enmeshed with the Communist period and the Communist Party to be part of a democratic future. That may be so and is obviously a relevant design consideration. Andy Green feels similarly about neighborhood committees.

pragmatism and deliberative institutions / 129 9. Of course, this may overstate the case. As Cohen (2005, 5) reminds us, Neither Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping endorsed Montesquieu’s separation of powers. Nor did they embrace the revered Sun Yat-sen’s distinctive five power division adopted by China’s pre-Communist Government, that of Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Party, which is still in use by . . . Taiwan . . . . [In China,] following the Soviet model, the national legislature, the [National People’s Congress] is the single supreme power, and all other government institutions—executive, prosecutorial, and judicial—are subordinate to it. At least there are historical roots to the separation of powers in China, as well as a large bureaucracy that receives delegated powers. 10. Thomas Jefferson had in mind what Montesquieu already knew, “that only ‘power arrests power,’ that is we must add, without destroying it, without putting impotence in the place of power” (Arendt 1965, 151, citing Montesquieu 1989, 155–56). 11. There is still another benefit: If stakeholders can’t determine in advance who will attend deliberative assemblies, they will not waste money on corrupting the media or attempting to buy off jurors. My use of mandatory service makes it always unpredictable who will be called to deliberate, so stakeholders will not be able to target them with misleading information ahead of time. 12. There has been some recent enthusiasm for “Citizens’ Assemblies.” This model has most recently been tried in British Columbia—and there have been calls for its implementation in jurisdictions as varied as Ontario, California, Taiwan, and Britain. British Columbia gathered a random sample of citizens together to debate electoral reform and came up with a proposal after months of deliberation. The deliberative preference of the assembly was then put to the whole electorate for its consideration. The province’s authorities had put in place a supermajoritarian decision rule for passage of the assembly’s recommendation—and the referendum failed to garner the support it needed to enact the deliberative preference into law. Although the “Citizens’ Assembly” model is a practice ripe for copying around the world—as well as a very progressive and deliberative way to set a political agenda—the model has a significant flaw from my perspective. By sending the deliberative preference out to the populace for consideration, the model fails to be deliberative enough. Indeed, the model specifically enables nondeliberative preferences to trump deliberative ones. As I have always maintained, I prefer deliberative bodies to be able to make law; it undermines deliberation to require a deliberative preference to win a nondeliberative campaign, which efforts in direct democracy must usually be. Still, “Citizens’ Assemblies” are an exciting innovation—and, at the very least, are helpful to mitigate what I call in the next section, the “Elite Management of the Process.” The New America Foundation collects information on Citizens’ Assemblies here: http://snider.blogs.com/citizensassembly/.

Works Cited Arendt, Hannah. 1965. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press. Atlee, Tom. 2003. The Tao of Democracy: Using Co-intelligence to Create a World That Works for All. Cranston, RI: Writer’s Collective.

130 / deliberative democracy in china Brook, Timothy, and B. Michael Frolic. 1997. Civil Society in China. Armonk, NY: An East Gate Book. Cohen, Jerome A. 2005. “Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East Asia and the Road Ahead.” Prepared for delivery at the International Conference on “Constitutional Re-Engineering in New Democracies: Taiwan & the World.” October 28–29, available at http://www.cpbae.nccu.edu.tw/tra/CRND/paper_ eng.php, accessed on May 5, 2006. The China Post. 2005. “ ‘Deliberative Democracy’ Won’t Give Chen What He Wants.” November 8, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw, accessed on January 1, 2006. Dryzek, John. 2005. “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia.” Political Theory 33(2): 218–42. Fung, Archon. 2003. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy 11(3): 338–67. Gewirtz, Paul. 2003. “The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 11: 603–21. Hibbing, John, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy: Amercians’ Belief About How Government Should Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leib, Ethan J. 2002. “Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democracy.” Rutgers Law Journal 33(2): 359–456. ———. 2004. Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. ———. 2005. “The Chinese Communist Party and Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Public Deliberation 1: 1–6. ———. 2006. “Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 33 (2/3). Mansbridge, Jane. 1980. Beyond Adversary Democracy. New York: Basic Books. McGinnis, John, and Michael Rappaport. 2002. “Our Supermajoritarian Constitution.” Texas Law Review 80: 703 ff. Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat. 1989. The Spirit of the Laws. Edited and translated by Anne Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ogden, Suzanne. 2002. Inklings of Democracy in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Peng Bo. 2004. “Gouvernance des communautés résidentielles et contrôle étatique. La médiation communautaire à Shanghai.” Perspectives Chinoises 86: 14–24. Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Posner, Richard. 2003. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Spence, Jonathan. 2002. To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960. New York: Penguin Books. Sunstein, Cass. 1997. Free Markets and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2001. Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 2002. Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

pragmatism and deliberative institutions / 131 Susskind, Lawrence, and Liora Zion. 2002. “Can America’s Democracy Be Improved?” Draft Working Paper of the Consensus Building Institute and the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program. Wang Hsiao-Wen. 2004. “Legalize Surrogates, Says Panel,” Taipei Times, September 19 (Vol. 5, No. 97), 2. Wang Hui. 2003. China’s New Order. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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C h ap t e r 6 Western Theories of Deliberative De mocrac y an d t h e C h i n e s e Practice of Complex Deliberative Governance Baogang He*

Western theories of deliberative democracy and the study of Chinese democratization tend to remain completely separate enterprises, to the detriment of both. Originating in Western societies such as America, England, and Australia, theories of deliberative democracy have largely ignored the experience of deliberation in China. The Anglo-American idea of deliberation is culturally narrow and insufficiently developed. China offers an important ground to explore the understanding of what deliberation can be in a totally different setting and makes a contribution to the understanding of deliberative institutions across the globe. This chapter calls for the integration of theories of deliberative democracy and Chinese practices of deliberation, with the aim of building a bridge between Western theories of deliberative democracy and the Chinese practices of participatory and deliberative institutions, to the ultimate benefit of both.1 There are a number of questions that are not only debated in the West but are also extremely important for the project of developing deliberative democracy in China. What is an effective strategy of democratization? How can a substantial and deep democracy be developed? What is the role of the state in promoting deliberation? How can deliberation be reconciled with the value of equality or representation? How can deliberation solve collective problems? How can a specific deliberative institution overcome the problem of polarization? These questions are at the root of the deliberative democracy agenda, and are just as urgent in China. * I thank John Dryzek, Geoffrey Stokes, and Daniel Bell for their useful comments and suggestions.

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From a fresh non-Western perspective, this chapter deals with the above issues and brings the case of China to these debates. Such a new perspective can broaden our horizons in understanding deliberation and deliberative democracy in non-Western societies, enhancing our understanding even of deliberative democracy in the West. Drawing on relevant Chinese experience, the chapter will test and revise theories of deliberative democracy, shed new light on a number of debates about deliberation, and render theories of deliberative democracy more applicable to the real world of politics—and especially to local democratic governance in China. An Authoritarian Deliberation Deliberative theories of democracy often assume a close association between deliberation and democracy.2 Such an assumption is well grounded in Western liberal democracies, but may prove to be problematic in China, where there is a peculiar and ironic association between authoritarianism and deliberation. This type of association can be called “an authoritarian deliberation.” Theoretically speaking, of course not all forms of deliberation are democratic. The Supreme Court in the United States, for example, is potentially highly deliberative but not necessarily or obviously democratic. International deliberation practiced in sophisticated diplomacy takes place against the background of an absence of global democracy. On the other hand, parliaments and legislatures may be democratic without being deliberative. Genuine deliberation in parliament is sometimes hampered and destroyed by party politics. An authoritarian type of deliberation may even exist in democratic societies. For instance, executives may encourage discussion and deliberation but make their own final authoritative decision. Oscar Wilde once said, “I delight in talking politics. I talk them all day long. But I cannot bear listening to them” (cited in Elster 1998, 19). Some green activists believe that the value of protecting the environment is ultimately substantive and can be insulated from public deliberation. While they do encourage public deliberation on environmental issues, they seldom change their views and preferences through deliberation, casting some doubt on the efficacy or desirability of deliberative processes. Chinese authoritarian deliberation is authoritarian in the sense that the top leaders are not elected; therefore, deliberation takes place under one-party domination. Although the state plays a significant role in developing, mobilizing, and promoting deliberative institutions, deliberation takes place under conditions of authoritarianism. It is, however, deliberative in that arguments and reasons—communicative action—solve collective problems; participants and local leaders exchange opinions, make arguments and counterarguments,

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and change their preferences through public deliberation. In proper deliberation, arguments must be substantiated by sufficient evidence and justification, counterarguments must be considered and responded to, perspectives of others must be exposed, and a resolution must be achieved. The process of deliberation is one in which popular will or public opinion on certain issues and policies is formed, despite an authoritarian backdrop. An authoritarian deliberation is both logically possible and empirically real. The contemporary form of neo-authoritarianism can no longer use sheer military might for full compliance. Instead, it appeals to the very idea of democracy and science. The system must rely on modern science and technologies, and must appeal to reason rather than force. The wide appeal of the idea of people’s consultation in Suharto’s Indonesia and today’s China testifies to this mix of authoritarian backdrops and democratic procedures. Deliberation is not necessarily reserved for the liberal democracies. An authoritarian regime wants to share the fruit of this special political device for its own political rule and governance. It wants to use the device of deliberation to solve difficult issues and delegate power. Consultation and deliberation reduce social conflicts and the level of opposition, and facilitate compliance with and implementation of state policy. Public deliberation can be an effective decisionmaking process, an effective conflict-resolution device, and a means to overcome polarization. All these factors influence the Chinese governancedriven local democratization program against an authoritarian backdrop. Unhappy with the liberal hijacking of deliberative democracy, Dryzek certainly would be uncomfortable by the very idea of an authoritarian appropriation of deliberative democratic discourse. One may quickly dismiss the notion of authoritarian deliberation as self-contradictory and undemocratic. But it should not be so easily dismissed. A critical theory of deliberative democracy, such as the one elaborated by Dryzek, together with, or even competing with, a liberal theory of deliberative democracy, must figure out appropriate strategies to transform authoritarian deliberation into democratic and inclusive deliberation. China’s rich experience offers theorists such an opportunity to accomplish this potential. To be sure, the notion of authoritarian deliberation seems self-contradictory: authoritarianism cannot be fully deliberative, and a genuine deliberation must be democratic. Nevertheless, the term “authoritarian deliberation” reflects the contradictory and complex reality of Chinese local governance. The theoretical and practical tensions between deliberation and authoritarianism can hopefully be transformed into a driving force toward democracy. Authoritarian deliberation contains some forms and elements of inchoate democracy and therefore exhibits a potential logic of democratization. Given that authoritarian deliberation is a genuine reality in China, it is an exciting test case in which to consider the validity of western theories, to which I now turn.

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Deliberative Democratization Stephen Macedo (1999, 4) poses the question: “Is deliberative democracy best conceived of, as it usually is, as an alternative to the liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin?” A liberal would hold that deliberative democracy cannot replace liberal democracy. By contrast, Dryzek argues that deliberative democracy can be an alternative to liberal democracy, and that deliberative democracy ought not to be assimilated by liberal constitutionalism. This debate frames two different ways of considering what constitutes an appropriate democratic strategy in China. A liberal would hold that the liberal model of democracy is the only available choice and liberal representative democratic institutions have preceded deliberative institutions in most Western countries. Accordingly, China should develop liberal democracy, in particular, electoral and competitive politics first: there is no hope of developing deliberative democracy in China when the basic liberal elements of democracy are lacking. Another view notes the fact that the idea of deliberative democracy appeals to some Chinese intellectuals because it goes beyond electoral democracy. For some Chinese intellectuals the deliberative and consultative style of democracy is much better than the electoral and conflictual model of liberal democracy (Lin Shangli 2003). Given that the Chinese state has encouraged the development of deliberative institutions, there is a possibility of developing deliberative democracy in China without having an electoral democracy first. The distinction between liberal and deliberative democracy is, however, likely overdrawn to some extent. Both liberal and deliberative democracy offer democratization programs and both emphasize the development of civil society and the importance of public reason in collective decisionmaking. Admittedly, however, they have different stresses, priorities, and ultimate political goals. Still, liberal and deliberative theories of democratization are not necessarily mutually exclusive when empirically scrutinized. The assumption that China cannot develop deliberative democracy is mistaken. Chinese deliberative institutions, although weak, deficient, and constrained by an authoritarian regime, have emerged and developed, and will continue to develop even under one-party domination. Deliberative institutions do not emphasize competitive elections and may, therefore, be more easily accepted by the authoritarian state. In the current climate in which national leaders suppress opposition and public spheres of debate, the state-sponsored deliberative institutions can be seen as a beacon of light for democratic hope. Developing deliberative institutions is seen as a democratizing strategy, a step toward a more full-scale democracy. The bottom line is that we don’t have sufficient evidence to ascertain whether deliberative institutions can thrive wholly independently from

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electoral ones. At the national level, some forms of national consultative and deliberative institutions have been developed without national elections. However, the development of some local deliberative institutions has been associated with electoral politics and rights-based institutions and policy. The call for deliberative institutions at the village level followed village elections. Local actors have used the language of (“liberal”) rights to demand the establishment of consultative and deliberative institutions. Deliberative institutions in the test case of Wenling City, discussed throughout this volume, were combined with the local People’s Congress whose deputies were elected by local people, and voting was used in the final stage of public deliberation. It must be acknowledged that competitive elections might inhibit genuine deliberation, as politicians use rhetorical and manipulative language to appeal to voters and even insult one another. Perhaps, as Dryzek explores in this book, China should look for a public sphere outside the state institution as the most promising site of public deliberation. Nevertheless, elections must be seen as a basis for genuine deliberation and be structured accordingly. An absence of electoral institutions will strengthen the domination of political power and reinforce the closed nature of the political system. Thus, deliberation is likely to be genuine in village representative assemblies where competitive elections have developed in recent years. And deliberation is much more authentic from below than from above. These facts support the tentative view that deliberative institutions should not and cannot develop independently of electoral institutions, and that deliberative institutions do not constitute an alternative to liberal democracy; rather they require liberal democracy to achieve their full potential. The State and Deliberation Western theorists have debated the proper locus of deliberation and the role of the state in promoting deliberation. Jurgen Habermas stresses the important role of a public sphere in developing deliberative democracy. Habermas (1994, 32) claims, “In the first place, deliberations within the decision-making bodies need to be open for and sensitive to the influx of issues, value orientations, contributions, and programs from their informal environments.” Dryzek (1990, 128) also argues that it is hard to envisage any institutionalization of public space within the state: “A policy science of participatory democracy can therefore expect resistance from government institutions. It can flourish only by creating, operating within, and confronting the state from an autonomous public sphere.” In acknowledging the various sites for deliberation, including legislation, courts, administration, networks, and corporatism, Dryzek (2000, 4) emphasizes civil society and the public sphere as the most important loci of deliberation.

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Mark Warren (2004), however, emphasizes the positive roles the state might play in underwriting, enhancing, and enabling even poststatist forms of democracy. He argues that “democracy should not seem to be exhausted by its state-centric forms.” He even imagines “new functions for the state in generating, supporting, and organizing democracy beyond the state.” The strong antistate and anti-elite assumptions in the literature of deliberative democracy is problematic in the Chinese political context, where deliberative institutions were led and promoted by a powerful state. The Chinese state has played an active and significant role in promoting deliberative institutions in urban and rural governance. It has sponsored deliberative meetings, selected sites, put issues on the agenda, and narrowed scope. The Chinese state has passed three major national laws requiring public hearings and consultation. While such a legal requirement enhances authoritarian control and improves the authoritarian capacities of governance, it also develops and enriches different consultative and deliberative institutions for political participation. In the process of state-organized deliberation, the state has to make compromises and concessions through granting some rights to citizens and defining and enforcing a set of rules, including publicity and impartiality. Citizens are able to use this opportunity to move toward democracy. In the authoritarian context, it is impossible to develop any form of deliberation without backing from governmental officials. For example, in organizing an experiment of Deliberative Polling in China, I suggested that an independent agency carry out the survey, and that nonlocal students be moderators. However, the local officials preferred local people or staff members to do the job. In the end, local school teachers were employed. In short, there is a long way to go if the organization of deliberation is to be entrusted to an independent body outside Chinese political institutions. China’s experience seems to confirm the hypothesis developed by Dryzek and Goodin that the active inclusive character of the state is associated with a positive performance in terms of the ability of deliberative meetings to advance scope and franchise. Indeed, it has become a norm that any major public policy must be passed though public deliberation. In recent years, an increasing number of people are encouraged by the state to participate in deliberative processes, and several more issues are subject to public deliberation. The case of China also confirms the other half of Dryzek and Goodin’s hypothesis that an active state is associated with a negative performance in terms of the authenticity of deliberative forums. The Chinese state’s mobilization has the fatal deficiency of formalism. Take the example of Wenling City, where about 30–50 percent of the deliberative meetings lacked any real substance.3 In another example, one urban community made a contract on

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the allocation of limited space for different social groups. It was scribbled on half a sheet of paper, but it was a genuine agreement among social groups through deliberative discussion. However, local governments wanted to streamline all existing self-made contracts onto a proper printed form. So the state officials wrote a draft with beautiful Chinese writing and asked urban residents and village committees to modify and endorse it. Consequently, with the agenda and contract set from above, public deliberations lost their original nature and became less authentic. The above example seems to confirm in part that state organized participation leads to deliberation that is less genuine or robust (Fung and Wright 2003). In China especially, one is unlikely to find a high level of authenticity in state-sponsored deliberation. Most deliberative meetings in Wenling, for example, have an “intermediate” level of authenticity: a Wenling survey result shows that 46.5 percent of respondents agree that “the participants are free to be honest and to speak out and express their true opinions without being made to feel intimidated or threatened by government officials.” By contrast, 49.6 percent said they speak only partial truths and are still worried about the consequences of what they say. To improve the quality of deliberation one must rely on the participation of ordinary citizens, their associations, and civil society in bottom-up authentic processes (Baogang He 1997). The lack of active involvement of civil society in developing and promoting deliberative institutions is yet another feature endemic to authoritarian deliberation. This is largely due to the state’s suppression of an independent civil society and its heavy regulation of the activities of civic groups. For example, in organizing an international conference on public hearings in July 2005, I invited people from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to come. However, the state-sponsored NGOs (contradiction in terms intended) needed an invitation letter from the state to get permission to attend. In such a situation, it is difficult for NGOs to play active roles in deliberation. Constrained by such political conditions, we have no choice but to adopt a strategy of taking advantage of local innovations to create a public sphere. Ultimately, however, we need a broader notion of civil society and the public sphere that is able to incorporate many local initiatives by both citizens and local governments.4 Deliberation and Equality Democratic theory faces the challenging task of reconciling two fundamental values: deliberation and equality. Wide participation is needed to ensure political equality but mass participation often compromises deliberation. To solve this trade-off, James Fishkin (1995) has invented a set of deliberative polling techniques. Equal political participation is achieved through a scientific

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random selection process, which assumes that each person has a statistically equal chance of being selected. The participants spend one or two days deliberating on certain issues, and a high level of deliberation is achieved. In most Chinese deliberative institutions and meetings, participants theoretically enjoy equal “right” but are usually forced into traditional and highly unequal power relations. These are often built into the processes of deliberation, where leaders sit at the heads of tables (or the leaders’ table is raised) and ordinary people sit in ways that reinforce their political inferiority. These seemingly superficial political inequalities get in the way of deliberation. In this context, the idea of promoting the maximal impact of communicative action and the minimal influence of power and wealth is an attractive ideal, and this idea must be turned into a set of practical and institutional norms and designs to ensure equal participation in the deliberative processes in China. Indeed, Fishkin has designed a number of strategic measures to enhance the quality of deliberation and to reduce the influence of money and power, which might be useful for Chinese designers. To overcome the challenges posed by reinforcing inequality in deliberative practices, the Zeguo Deliberative Poll, discussed in a later chapter in this book, employed Fishkin’s techniques to create a counterfactual environment in which the participants could be free and equal to participate in the deliberative process. First, the previous official selection method was abandoned: all adults in the Zeguo town were statistically equally likely to be selected as participants. Second, most officials sat outside the room where the meetings were being held, creating a physical equality among the participants. Third, the participants were divided into sixteen groups, where participants would have their turn to speak out. Social class and status were less important than reasoned arguments. Fourth, school teachers were selected to be moderators. They were trained and advised to ensure equal opportunity for discussion by each participant and to prevent domination of the discussions by a few. On the whole, the experiment successfully created an equal institutional setting. Of course, it is impossible to cut off completely deliberative processes from all the inequalities of life. The participants knew the different social statuses of their fellow citizens. Some were more educated, prosperous, or forceful in the discussions. Equal power is hard to realize in practice, but it is feasible to reduce the level and effects of inequality with clever institutional design. Moreover, Deliberative Polling still cannot change the authoritarian political structure. It created only a counterfactual equality during a specific period in a specific location, and even a statistical equality is incomplete because it does not mean actual equality in real political life. Nevertheless, Deliberative Polling techniques facilitate, as far as possible, an atmosphere of substantial equality. If such an institutional experiment is conducted

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repetitively, it will gradually change Chinese political culture and increase meaningful deliberation in the long term. Deliberation and Representation The traditions of populism and elitism run through the literature on deliberative democracy. Ethan J. Leib (2004), for example, regards New England town meetings as deliberative but not representative; legislatures may be representative but are often not deliberative. Instead, Leib proposes a popular branch of government to represent the people more directly through civic juries that enact laws deliberatively. Leib’s agenda comes from within a deeply rooted populist tradition. Even Fishkin’s experiments are populist at their core. By contrast, Daniel Bell’s (2004) proposal for “a house of scholars”—or “xianshiyuan”—to facilitate and integrate the deliberation of Chinese intellectuals emerges from a representative and “elitist” tradition. No matter what techniques are employed, it is difficult to balance deliberation and representation. Citizen juries, for example, are highly deliberative, but are not scientifically or statistically representative. In fact, they often involve participants who are targeted or self-selected. These problems may be overcome by Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling technique, which is much more costly and involves an enormous amount of work. But even Fishkin’s claims to representation are analogical rather than fully populist. In various Chinese practices of deliberation, one could argue that the techniques used are widely representative but lack deliberation. A village representative assembly “represents” the citizenry but fails to be deliberative enough. Some forms of public consultation have the potential to be highly deliberative, but lack the necessary representative dimension. In the case of many Chinese local deliberative meetings, the participants are either selected by governmental officials or are self-selected. The claim that these participants are representative is questionable; additionally, they might be viewed as subject to official manipulation. To the extent that Chinese practices have grown more “populist,” it could be argued that they are failing both to be sufficiently deliberative and to be sufficiently representative. The Deliberative Polling technique that was used in the Zeguo experiment adopts random selection to overcome perceptions of manipulation and to enable representation for the whole community to occur on a scientific basis. In addition, random sampling insulates the process from being taken over by mobilized groups. Party Secretary Jiang Zhaohua commented that “the random selection method has a wide popular basis and is much more representative than the method we used before.”5 Still, the limits of the Deliberative Polling technique must be noted. First, many issues that attract substantial partisan interest cannot helpfully

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be decided without input from those groups and without their consent; accordingly, random selection may not always be the best method of choosing participants. Second, one might question whether a “statistical representation” is really representative. Do the randomly selected 200–400 people really represent a whole city? Gundersen (1995, 236–37) argues that Fishkin’s method extends representation to a group of several hundred citizens only and not to all people. Indeed, the Zeguo experiment revealed that women were underrepresented and migrants were excluded. Third, under the political conditions in which some local governments have just begun to introduce deliberation, more methodologically simple ones—such as the Chinese form of public hearing—may be advisable. The necessary adoption of sophisticated methods such as those developed in connection with Deliberative Polling may “chill” deliberative development: by keeping the techniques simple, the Chinese may be more likely to sign up, promote deliberation, and participate. Local Chinese practices have indeed made some notable efforts to accomplish deliberation and representation. Chinese governments have developed a complex systems of representation when they hold deliberative meetings. Wide representation is thought to occur at town meetings if a variety of local elites, such as people’s deputies, village committee members, and village representatives are present. All are elected by local villagers and residents and would, therefore, appear to have a degree of populist representation. Local officials argue that professional associations and people’s deputies are quite representative. In Wenling, officials attempted to combine populist random sampling with the existing representative system. Chinese local governments ultimately favor a combination of elite-led deliberation and wide popular participation. As a result, a mixed regime has been developing in the Chinese practice of deliberation, minimizing the importance of the dichotomy between elitism and populism. Decision and Deliberation Deliberative theorists have different views of the purposes and functions of deliberation in the decisionmaking process. Mark Warren, for example, holds that the purpose of deliberation is not to make decisions, but to clarify preferences. Decisions are made, in the end, by the government. Still, merely because deliberation does not control outcomes does not necessarily entail the failure of deliberation. Dryzek (2000, 171) insists that public opinion generated through deliberative processes can be translated into public policy and administrative power. In the United States, the results of some of Fishkin’s (1995) Deliberative Polling experiments were ultimately adopted as public policy on alternative energy in Texas. But, more generally, it is not clear how the results of exercises and experiments in deliberative

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democracy (e.g., Barabas 2004; Rosenberg 2004) contribute to actual public policy decisionmaking. In China, deliberative meetings were no more than mere consultations in the early stages. Even today, many local deliberative practices still exhibit such a feature, inviting skepticism and criticism as mere formalism. Citizens lose their interest in deliberative meetings because they are little more than nonbinding consultation, with no apparent effects. Thus, in order to continue attracting attention from citizens, local leaders in Wenling have turned consultative meetings into decisionmaking bodies to solve collective problems and to satisfy the desires of the people. In this regard, the Zeguo experiment is instructive. The result of the Deliberative Polling was presented to Zeguo local People’s Congress on April 30, 2005 for further debate and deliberation. In the end, a majority of the peoples’ deputies voted for the top 12 projects (as ranked by the lay citizens), and the Zeguo town government ultimately implemented the decision. The Zeguo experiment represents a systematic public decisionmaking mechanism: expert feasibility studies were filtered through public participation, deliberation, government consultation, and the final decision was made by Zeguo’s local People’s Congress, informed by the deliberation of other actors. Three key reasons, among others, account for this close linkage between the result of deliberation and public policy. The first has to do with the form of deliberation. Deliberative Polling enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy owing to scientific representativeness; the public choice made through Deliberative Polling can easily be legitimately translated into public policy. Second, China is at the stage of political reform where local leaders are looking to pursue a set of innovative experiments in policy decisionmaking. Third, the nature of the authoritarian regime does not have a well-established rule of law, enabling flexibility in decisionmaking. By contrast, there are inherent restrictions on such innovative mechanisms in Australia and the United States, where the rule of law is entrenched; to bring the results of citizen juries or Deliberative Polling to legislatures requires compliance with strict procedures and protocols. Deliberation and Conflict-resolution Mechanisms Dryzek and List (2003) suggest four ways in which deliberation facilitates the resolution of collective action problems. Deliberation provides people with new materials, facts, and information on a given issue; draws attention to new arguments about certain issues; induces people to reflect on their preferences; and creates a situation of social interaction where people talk and listen to each other. Elster (1998, 12) suggests two other ways deliberation contributes to conflict resolution: through the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” and through “negative advertising.” Both these mechanisms

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encourage truth to emerge as claimants hear themselves speak, and evaluate and challenge the views of others. How can Chinese deliberative institutions perform their conflict-resolution functions? Let us examine a case of the unification of three primary schools into one in the town of Songmen in Wenling City. Songmen held two deliberative meetings in 2003 to discuss the necessity of merging three schools and to examine the way in which the amalgamation could be carried out. Participants included the deputies of the local People’s Congress, elected village committee members of two villages, village representatives, presidents of all three primary schools, some teachers, and some parents. In the deliberative meeting, the participants from Primary School Number Two did not want the merger because they believed that the school would be too crowded to accommodate the pupils from the other two schools and the quality of education would be compromised. However, those who supported the unification of the school districts spoke for the interests of the children, and, in particular, migrants’ children who would have an opportunity to access the school with the best facilities in the town. During the deliberative meeting, the opponents had an opportunity to listen to opinions which they had not previously heard. They started to change their preferences and those opposed softened their opposition. The deliberative meeting was able to identify that a majority of the public supported the amalgamation, and the deliberation helped form a legitimate public will. The local government then skillfully used this public will, and the town officials promised to give the dissenter additional resources to help them change their minds and mollify their opposition. After deliberation, there was a bargaining process in which a deal was made that satisfied the concerns of those who had been opposed to the merger. The amalgamation plan was successfully implemented; the deliberative meeting has enhanced governmental efficiency and increased compliance. Nevertheless, in other cases in China, deliberation has not been quite as successful. For example, despite eight deliberative meetings on the issue, it is still difficult to resolve a major conflict of interest in the selection of the site for a fish processing factory. The vote to decide the controversial issue was carried out by the deputies of the local congress, and deliberation did not contribute helpfully to resolving the contentious matter. Clearly, apart from public deliberation and sound argumentation, voting, public pressure, and administrative persuasion have played various roles in solving some of China’s intractable disputes over the sites of canteens, schools, industry parks, and resting pavilions. As Elster (1998, 14) points out, deliberation is always supported by voting or bargaining or both. Indeed, Chinese deliberation is further supplemented by the vote of deputies, bargaining among interest groups, social pressure, traditional

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leadership authority, and the role of local government. These form a complex governance regime in which bargaining, government’s administrative orders, and communal persuasion and deliberation, all play their part. This mixed governance regime is undoubtedly an empirical reality, and it helps root the normative discussion about the search for deliberative democracy in China. In such a mixed governance regime, it is useful to focus upon communicative deliberation first. If it solves the dispute, then there is no need for voting or bargaining. If deliberation cannot solve the problem, then the introduction of bargaining makes sense. If deliberation and bargaining cannot settle the dispute, then voting can be employed to provide the legitimacy for local government to enforce the decision arrived at through a mix of arguing, bargaining, and voting. Of course, many local leaders prefer to use administrative power first to decide the disputed issue, which invites criticism and resistance, as proven by numerous demonstrations and efforts of resistance. Such a pattern is too costly. A democratic and deliberative pattern ought to be preferred. Deliberation and Polarization Sunstein (2003) finds that under institutional arrangements in which deliberators vote as a group and in which members are asked to sign on to a group decision, group discussion will produce polarization. That is, “members of a deliberative group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein 2003, 81). Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling, however, enforces a balance in the arguments considered by the participants through a number of devices, such as moderators, balanced briefings, balanced panels, and random samples of the public randomly assigned to groups (Fishkin and Laslett 2003, 2). It was shown in a Danish Deliberative Poll that those who are randomly mixed develop their understanding of the opinion of others, and that mutual understanding among the participants prevailed, despite sharply different views on whether Denmark should participate in the single Euro currency (Hansen and Andersen 2004). In the Zeguo experiment, local officials were particularly worried about the polarization of choice. However, Fishkin’s deliberative devices such as moderators, balanced briefings, and balanced panels helped achieve consensus and reduce group polarization; indeed, Sunstein even acknowledges that Fishkin’s Polls are exceptions to the polarization thesis. Both democracy and authoritarianism have an interest in reducing the level of polarization. Despite the difference in political regime, a welldesigned deliberative institution like Fishkin’s does have the effect of avoiding and reducing polarization. While the civilizing force of hypocrisy

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may be at work in both Western and Chinese deliberative processes, what is distinctive about China is that it has a rich Confucian tradition of emphasizing harmony. This sort of “political correctness” helps contain and control extreme views during the deliberative process. Moreover, the Confucian ethic of “searching for a middle way” helps to avoid polarization. Thus, China may have a lower risk of polarization than countries in the West. Conclusion This chapter confirms the value of Western theories of deliberative democracy offering both a democratization strategy and a set of “recipes” to improve existing Chinese deliberative institutions. It unsettles some aspects of these theories. But it also theorizes a new phenomenon of an authoritarian deliberation, overlooked by conventional theorists of deliberation. The concept of authoritarian deliberation is analytically useful in thinking about a different type of deliberation operating in an authoritarian setting. The ironic connection between deliberation and authoritarianism reveals a wider application of deliberative techniques for good governance than those assumed by democratic theories. Indeed, the widespread use of deliberative institutions in China constitutes a key component of the mixed regime and complex local governance, which are different from Western theories and practices. Liberal and radical theorists of deliberative democracy should not dismiss the Chinese style of authoritarian deliberation. The Chinese practice of authoritarian deliberation can be seen as a governance-driven democratization process. And as long as deliberation, public reason, and people’s opinions are regarded seriously as the principles and basis for public policy, the door may open toward local democratization and the empowerment of citizens. Indeed, some successful experiments of Chinese deliberative institutions have challenged the biased view that Western deliberative institutions are more robust than those in developing countries. Chinese local Deliberative Polling, for example, is as “good” as that developed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It has also challenged the assumption that deliberation is the privilege of the rich. As the Chinese experience demonstrates, many poor residents and villagers are keen to participate in the deliberative process to demand their rights and secure their welfare. Notes 1. Gunnell (1986) and many others have called for the integration of political theory, empirical social sciences, and political practice. 2. Elster (1998, 15) raises doubt over this assumption as he poses the provocative question: “to what extent are democracy and deliberation independent of each other?” 3. The author’s interview with an official in charge of consultative meeting in Wenling, May 2005.

western theories, chinese practice / 147 4. This broader conceptualization of civil society is also called for in the context of the participatory budget process in the city of Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2003) and in the context of international support for grassroots organization in Russia where Henderson (2003, 153–54) sharply comments: it was unclear for me why one unfunded group’s ability to get 2,000 people off the streets to a health screening clinic sponsored by the local administration was not … building civil society, but yet another cookie cutter round table for a smattering of NGO leaders on “working with local government” was. 5. The author’s interview, April 30, 2005.

Works Cited Baiocchi, G. 2003. “Emergent Public Sphere: Talking Politics in Participatory Governance.” American Sociological Review 68(1): 52–74. Barabas, Jason. 2004. “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinion.” American Political Science Review 98(4):687–701. Bell, Daniel. 1999. “Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of Implementation.” In Stephen Macedo ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 70–87. ———. 2004. “A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-First Century.” Paper presented at The International Conference on Deliberative Democracy at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, November 18–21. Dryzek, John S. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideas, Limits, and Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———, and Christian List. 2003. “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.” British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1–28. Elster, Jon, ed. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fishkin, James S. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———, and Peter Laslett, eds. 2003. Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. Grondin, Jean. 2003. The Philosophy of Gadamer. Translated by Kathryn Plant. Chesham: Acumen Publishers. Fung, Archon. 2003. “Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences.” Journal of Political Philosophy 11(3): 338–67. ———, and Erik Olin Wright. 2001. “Deepening Democracy: Experiments in Empowered Participatory Governance.” Politics and Society 29: 5–24. ———, eds. 2003. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. London: Verso Press. Goodin, Robert E. 2000. “Democratic Deliberation Within.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29: 79–107. Goodin, Robert E. 2002. Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gundersen, Adolf G. 1995. The Environmental Promise of Democratic Deliberation. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.

148 / deliberative democracy in china Gunnel, John G. 1986. Between Philosophy and Politics: The Alienation of Political Theory. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Translated byThomas McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. ———. 1994. “Citizenship and National Identity.” In Bart Van Steenberg ed., The Condition of Citizenship. London: Sage Publications, 20–35. ———. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hansen, K. M., and V. N. Andersen. 2004. “Deliberative Democracy and the Deliberative Polling on the Euro.” Scandinavian Political Studies 27(3): 261–86. He, Baogang. 1997. The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China. London: MacMillan. ——— (with Lang Youxing). 2002. Balancing Democracy and Authority: An Empirical Study of Village Election in Zhejiang. Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press. ———. 2003. “The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassroots Governance: Five Models.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 4(2): 293–314. Henderson, Sarah L. 2003. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Leib, Ethan J. 2004. Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Lin Shangli, 2003. “Deliberative Politics: A Reflection on the Democratic Development of China.” Academic Monthly (Shanghai) 4: 19–25. Macedo, Stephen, ed. 1999. Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” In A. Schedler, L. Diamond, and M. F. Plattner eds., The Self-Restraining State. Boulder, CO: Lynner Rienner Publishers. Ogden, Suzanne. 2002. Inklings of Democracy in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rosenberg, Shawn. 2004. “Facilitating Democratic Deliberations: A Preliminary Report of an Experimental Study.” Paper presented at The International Conference on Deliberative Democracy at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, November 18–21. Smith, T. V., and Eduard C. Lindeman. 1951. The Democratic Way of Life: An American Interpretation. New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc. Sunstein, Cass. 2003. “The Law of Group Polarization.” In Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 80–101. Uhr, John. 1998. Deliberative Democracy in Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warren, Mark. 2002. “Deliberative Democracy.” In April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes eds., Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, 173–202. ———. 2004. “Democracy and the State.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Deliberative Democracy at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, November 18–21.

C h ap t e r 7 Deliberative Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: A Comment on Baogang He’s Research Daniel A. Bell

Most theorists of deliberative democracy have the Western liberal-democratic context in mind. Baogang He’s pioneering research on deliberative democracy in China shows that there is much to learn from the Chinese. In this chapter, I extend some of He’s insights with the Chinese case in mind. First, I suggest that the form local deliberation should take depends on the political intent of deliberation. Next, I inquire into the possibility of deliberation in a national setting in China. I conclude with some thoughts about the desirability of nation-based deliberators without an electoral mechanism for selecting the country’s top decisionmakers. Deliberation at the Local Level As Professor He shows, there have been diverse experiments with different forms of deliberation at the local level in China.1 Deliberative institutions include public hearings, consensus conferences, citizen evaluations, mediation meetings, heart-to-heart forums, local elections preceded by extensive discussion, and Deliberative Polling (which Professor He himself helped to organize with James Fishkin in Zeguo). These political practices are all lumped together under the term “deliberative institutions.” But how much do they really have in common? They do share the characteristic of promoting political discussion, but discussion is not intrinsically valuable. The pros and cons of political discussion depend on the likely political effects of discussion. “Deliberative institutions” may be subject to the influences of

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various interests in society. Thus, the institutional designer needs to be sensitive to distinct political effects of individual deliberative institutions. One aim of deliberative institutions at the local level is to curb the political power of local cadres, holding them accountable for their actions. Professor He discusses “citizen evaluation meetings” that give ordinary people an opportunity to evaluate the performance of cadres. Such meetings, however, take place without much debate and have been stopped when party secretaries “lose face.” More worrisome, the local party tends to set the agenda at deliberative meetings. If the aim is to curb the political power of local officials, then obviously deliberative institutions whose agendas are channeled by those officials are undesirable. Local elections, with secret balloting and no constraints on political participation, may be the optimal solution. If they are free and fair, elections can have the effect of removing corrupt or incompetent officials from power. It remains unclear what deliberative institutions can add to the more widely publicized experiments with local elections in China.2 My intention is not to compare the ideal of free and fair elections with the reality of imperfect deliberation. Rather, the goal of holding local party officials accountable may be most effectively served through improving lessthan-perfect elections. Yes, open deliberation can have the effect of exposing some problems with local decisionmaking. But so long as decisionmakers cannot be removed from power, the underlying problem is likely to remain. Talk of “deliberation” can only distract attention from the fundamental solution to the problem at hand. Still, holding public officials accountable for their power is only one of the aims of deliberation. Another important objective is to minimize the unfair advantages of the wealthy capitalist class and to secure the legitimate interests of the poor and the marginalized. For this purpose, elections are not likely to be sufficient, because even the most free and fair elections typically permit the rich to secure their interests in the political process disproportionately. ( The joke that the U.S. electoral process is “one dollar, one vote” rather than “one person, one vote” may not be sufficiently cynical; winning elections to political office often costs more than one dollar per person.) But some deliberative institutions may be insufficient, if not counterproductive, to accomplish redistribution. Is it coincidental that proposals to regularize deliberative institutions seem to have emerged in Zhejiang Province, perhaps the Chinese province with the most unregulated form of capitalism? (The city of Wenzhou, for example, was the first Chinese city to undergo economic reform in the postrevolutionary era; today it is notable both for its private affluence and for the poor quality of its public services.) Perhaps the strongest push for deliberative institutions has come from

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capitalists and wealthy farmers seeking to have their own interests represented outside the controlled process offered by the Communist Party. Indeed, Professor He notes that the new rich have fought for their interests in deliberative meetings. If this is the case, then the development of some forms of deliberative institutions is a concern. Put differently, the task should be to devise deliberative institutions that are not likely to disproportionately favor the interests of the rich. One such possibility is Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling. Deliberative participants are chosen at random, thus ensuring that the rich (and other groups) do not have disproportionate representation and influence. The problem, however, is that such polls are very expensive to run, and it is unclear where the funding will come from if they are designed, at least partly, to curb the influence of the wealthy. Moreover, the recommendations of Deliberative Polls are not meant to have binding force, and it is doubtful that the power holders are likely to implement their recommendations when they conflict with elites’ interests. Another problem is that polls may undermine valued and useful cultural forms of decisionmaking, such as the Confucian deference to the elderly. Do most Chinese really want “physical equality” in seating arrangements, so that the elderly do not have a favored seating position? Perhaps the only way to reduce the influence of the wealthy is to design political institutions with the explicit mandate of representing the interests of the poor and the marginalized—say, a representive assembly with seats reserved for the underprivileged. Since the push for such institutions is not likely to come from the affluent, the government would need to play an active role. As Professor He notes, “In order to constrain the power of wealth in a process of deliberation, deliberative institutions are financed by local governments through the party’s leadership.” It may also require government-sponsored citizen education programs, educating the poor and the marginalized about the political process. Another option may be compulsory political participation (which so much interests Leib in chapter 5 of this volume) for those less inclined to assert their interests, such as migrant workers. Of course, the two goals of deliberation discussed here may conflict. Empowering the government to design and finance deliberative institutions may undermine the aim of curbing the power of government officials. Pushing for more egalitarian, deliberative institutions from higher-level governments, such as the provincial or national governments, could be one way to deal with this tension. Such an experiment would be compatible with local elections, designed to limit the power of local officials. Moreover, the choice of political institution would depend upon the seriousness of the problem at hand. If the main problem is official corruption, then there is

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less reason to worry about deliberative institutions that have the effect of empowering the wealthy. It may be better to have two sources of power rather than one. If the main problem is the power of the wealthy class, then there may be less reason to worry about deliberative instititutions that have the effect of empowering government officials. Again, two sources of power are better than one, and perhaps more optimism is warranted. Professor He writes, “Following the communitarian criterion of collective solidarity and social trust, some deliberative institutions do solve some thorny problems, help to maintain local stability and security, and enhance collective solidarity.” Deliberative institutions that “enhance collective solidarity” are likely to reduce the tension between the government and the people as well as between the rich and the poor. But if such institutions merely cause the poor and the marginalized to adapt to their circumstances and set aside the struggle for justice, they may also be cause for concern. The task of identifying and designing deliberative institutions that enhance collective solidarity without further harming the interests of the worst-off is perhaps the biggest challenge for defenders of local deliberative democracy in China. Deliberation at the National Level As He recognizes, deliberative meetings in China take place at the local rather than the national level. Such issues as the price of utilities, park entry fees, farmers relocation, preservation of sites of historical interest, and even matters pertaining to the Beijing zoo have been debated in deliberative fora. One expects that local citizens most familiar with the detailed knowledge required for making judgments about the choices that intimately affect their daily lives are best placed to make such judgments. But what about deliberative democracy at the national level? There, deliberators may be asked to make informed judgments about empirically complex issues that may be only distantly related to their own lives, such as setting interest rates and settling interprovincial disputes. And what about asking deliberators to make life and death decisions such as whether or not to go to war or how best to control virulent contagious infections? From national deliberators, one hopes not only for fair representation of stakeholders and local solidarity, but also the ability to process large amounts of information while showing sensitive to the interests of different peoples, including foreigners. To the extent that there are worries about deliberative democracy at the local level, they are magnified (and qualitatively different) at the national level. John Dryzek and Ethan Leib, however, suggest that deliberative institutions can also be effective at the national level. In particular, Dryzek

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argues for a national political institution composed of randomly chosen deliberators. I would suggest that the evidence from the very high quality of lay citizen deliberation as revealed in consensus conferences, citizen’s juries, planning cells, and deliberative opinion polls points to the possibility of an upper house composed of ordinary citizens selected at random from the population that would serve for perhaps one year at a time. Such a proposal was advanced by the think tank Demos in the context of recent British debates about reform of the House of Lords.3

In the contemporary Chinese context, however, random selection would mean that such an institution would most likely be composed of relatively uneducated farmers from the countryside (given that they constitute the vast majority of the population). Moreover, there is no history of random selection as a procedure for selecting decisionmakers in China, and the Chinese are not about to embark on such an untested experiment for selecting political agents. Even in the context of a constitutional convention that seems genuinely open to alternatives to one-party rule, it would take a giant leap of faith to believe that the proposal for a randomly chosen assembly would receive substantial support. Other forms of national deliberative democracy may be more promising. As Professor He notes, “Confucian scholars established public forums in which they debated and deliberated national affairs.”4 The ideal of decisionmaking by a wise and public-spirited elite is deeply rooted in societies with a Confucian heritage. It may not be unrealistic to imagine a political institution that draws upon that ideal to promote informed deliberation about national affairs. In fact, there already exists such an institution in mainland China. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) is designed to encourage deliberation and provide political consultation on major state policies and important issues concerning national affairs. Of course, there is a large gap between the ideal and the reality, as the CPPCC is perhaps the least effective organ of government. The mainland Chinese press discusses proposals for reforming the CPPCC, such as allowing it to play a more political role supervising other organs of government and reducing the number of deputies to facilitate more deliberation.5 But the main problem is the one least discussed: party appointees owe their loyalty to the party that appoints them and, thus, are not likely to deviate too far from the official line. If, as an official document puts it, “the key to democratic supervision lies in developing democracy, letting everyone air his or her views freely, and creating conditions and opportunities for everyone to speak his or her own mind, tell the truth and air different views” (General

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Affairs Office 2004, 181), then political appointees are perhaps least likely to do what the CPPCC is supposed to do. Here, too, the Confucian tradition offers an alternative that may be more viable for contemporary China: deliberators can be chosen by Confucian-style examinations. Such deliberators, owing their loyalty only to what they think is best for the country (and humanity at large), are far more likely to engage in high-quality deliberations regarding national affairs. Moreover, the examination system has proven a relatively effective mechanism for selecting political talent in East Asian societies and consequently commands a great deal of social legitimacy. Political proposals for reform appealing to the examination system are far more likely to be taken seriously than alternatives requiring randomly chosen deliberators. Of course, institutional designers would need to think further about the content of examinations and features of the deliberative chamber most likely to encourage high-quality deliberations and effectuate political outcomes. (I discuss one such proposal—a Confucian chamber of government termed the (xianshiyuan)—in Bell 2006, chapter 6).6 An Alternative to Electoral Democracy? Many of the authors in this book debate whether deliberative institutions can thrive without electoral democracy already in place. Some empirical evidence presented in this book lends support to the view that some deliberative institutions may exist independently of—and may even lead to— experiments in electoral democracy. Although it is possible to imagine a desirable extension of this trend, there is reason to doubt the long-term stability of national deliberative decisionmaking bodies, when national elections empowering the country’s top decisionmakers are absent. Let us imagine pure meritocratic rule—a society governed by deputies selected by free and fair competitive examinations.7 Such a system need not be “authoritarian,” in the sense that the people have no voice and their civil rights are severely restricted. Consider the following scenario: A referendum is held, and a majority supports the idea of a strong deliberative chamber (the DC, if you will). At the national level, the top decision-makers are chosen by free, fair, and competitive examinations. Deputies engage in substantial deliberation before taking decisions. There is also a subordinate chamber constituted by democratically-elected deputies with the main function of transmitting the people’s (relatively uninformed) preferences to the DC. At provincial, township, city, and village levels, the top decisionmakers are chosen by means of competitive elections and decisions are taken in deliberative forums. The freedom of the press is generally secure, and there are many opportunities to raise objections and grievances to the

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DC. Most debates in the DC are televised and transmitted to the public on the internet. Meritocratic rule would not be “authoritarian,” nor would it be compatible with “minimal democracy.” It would mean marginalizing, at the highest levels, government officials chosen by means of the people’s vote. At the very least, the deliberative chamber (DC) would have the power to override decisions taken by the democratically elected house of government. Should meritocratic rule be viewed as less than ideal? Put differently, does it have any merits relative to “rule by the people?” The best defense of a strong DC is that it is less likely to cater to current majorities or minorities with the financial means to persuade. Isolated from these interests, the DC could act to the benefit of potential citizens, actual and potential members of minority groups, and foreigners. Imagine, for example, that deputies of the two houses had to deliberate about family planning. Most farmers oppose governmental limits on the number of children. With the large majority of Chinese still residing in the countryside, those views would probably dominate the democratic house. Thus, the democrats may well vote to repeal governmental attempts at limiting the number of children, whatever the long-term demographic consequences. But the DC, dominated by intellectuals generally understanding the need for some sort of family planning, would probably oppose the democratic house. Intellectuals in the DC would also be likely to act against widely shared preferences of urban voters. For example, modern urbanites seem to aspire to the “American dream” of owning a car. Few democratically elected deputies are likely to counteract such views, just as few U.S. politicians openly favor raising taxes on gasoline. The DC, in contrast, is likely to be more sensitive to the negative effects of widespread car ownership (pollution, traffic jams, increased dependence on oil, etc.), favoring more stringent curbs on the sale of cars and more state funding for public transportation. In economic policy, depending upon the people’s choices may be similarly reckless. It is quite likely, for example, that submitting to the rigors of the WTO’s structural adjustment policies will lead to growing poverty and social unrest in the short term, as inefficient farmers and workers in state-run enterprises lose their jobs. The hope is that economic benefits will eventually pay off when unemployed workers find decent jobs in the growing private sector. Democratically elected politicians can rarely afford to be so patient. In contrast, the DC is more likely to take a longterm view. In short, Chinese intellectuals—those likely to be deputies in the DC— are often swimming against the mainstream. Of course, a more open political system could change things. The people would have many channels to make their preferences known in the “lower” democratic house, substate

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democratic legislatures, deliberative forums, the internet, newspapers and polls, as well as more traditional mechanisms such as remonstrance and petitioning. Perhaps substantial numbers would change their views following open debate. But if “actually-existing majorities” continue to be motivated by narrow economic interests or crude expressions of emotion (as seems to be true even in “advanced” democracies), then the DC should be able to knock some sense into the people. At the very least, the DC should be able to temper the people’s worst excesses without having to worry about electoral retribution. The more serious objection to the idea of a strong DC is that it may not be realistic. For one thing, it is difficult to imagine the political leader(s) with the motivation to strive hard for strong meritocratic rule. In newly established democratic political systems, the leading critics of the ancien régime tend to be rewarded with top political posts once their ideas are implemented; consider the Mandelas, Havels, and Walesas of our time. The same goes for newly established authoritarian systems; consider the Parks and Pinochets of our time. In a meritocratic system, however, the odds of such political returns are minimal. Even the most brilliant and virtuous founding fathers and mothers cannot be certain of scoring top grades in an examination system with one billion candidates. So they would have to actively promote a new system without the realistic hope of being rewarded with the highest levers of state power. The founders would have to fade away from the political limelight once they get their way. It would take, in other words, truly altruistic constitutional founders to devote time and energy for this cause. Even if the system were to be established, it may be unstable. The people’s patience with rule by meritocratically selected elites will run out if the DC systematically overrides the people’s wishes, irrespective of deeply embedded traditions. So the deputies of the DC would not be able to deviate too far from popular attitudes without affecting the legitimacy of the institution. The DC would have to tread a very fine line between respecting the popular will (in which case it could make itself redundant) and disrespecting it (in which case it could trigger violent opposition). Conclusion Some of these ideas may be far-fetched, others less so. However, the political future of China is clearly wide open, and there seems to be a willingness to experiment with various possibilities at different levels of government. In fact, there may be more room for political experimentation in China compared to countries with long-established constitutional systems, such as the United States.8 I would part somewhat with Professor He’s statement that

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Chinese practitioners might catch up with the best deliberative democracy has to offer in the United States. Instead of looking to the United States as the standard, the task is to develop forms of deliberative democracy more appropriate for the Chinese context. This may involve seeking inspiration from Chinese history, as well as developing new and innovative forms of deliberation. Notes 1. In this chapter, I refer to He’s two chapters, “Western Theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Chinese Practice of Complex Deliberative Governance” (chapter 6) and “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China” (chapter 9), both in this book. 2. Admittedly, deliberation can help citizens clarify their preferences. But if it is not free and fair deliberation, there is reason to doubt its usefulness in this regard. 3. See John Dryzek’s chapter, “Deliberative Democracy in Different Places,” in this book (chapter 1). Ethan Leib’s chapter in this book, “Pragmatism in Designing Popular Deliberative Institutions in the United States and China,” proposing a branch of government composed of random samples of lay citizens, is similar (chapter 5). 4. Professor He notes that Confucians value “consensus,” but one of the most famous passages of The Analects of Confucius (13.23)— (“Exemplary persons value harmony, not sameness, petty people value sameness, not harmony”)—is an argument for diversity within unity. Put in political terms, it means that deliberators should deliberate in civil ways without trying to seek consensus. If deliberators arrive at differing interpretations of the common good, they can decide on the outcome by such mechanisms as majority voting. 5. See, e.g., Zhuanjia huyu zhengxie jinxing tizhi gaige [Experts Appeal for Carrying Out Structural Reform of the CPPCC], 21 Shiji huanqiu baodao [21st Century Report], March 5, 2003, available at http://www.sina.com.cn/c/200303-05/1510934116.shtml, accessed on May 5, 2006. 6. The Chinese term translates roughly into the “House of Virtue and Talent,” which sounds ridiculous in English. Accordingly, I use the term “Deliberative Chamber” in the following section. 7. This section draws on Bell 2006, chapter 6. 8. See also Leib 2005.

Works Cited Bell, Daniel A. 2006. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. General Affairs Office of the CPPCC National Committee. 2004. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Leib, Ethan J. 2005. “The Chinese Communist Party and Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Public Deliberation 1: 1–6.

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Part III Empirical Approaches to the Search for Deliberative Democracy in China

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C h ap t e r 8 The Native Resources of Deliberative Politics in China Chen Shengyong

An Introduction to Deliberative Democratic Theories Deliberative democracy is a theory of democratic legitimacy that emerged in Western democracies during the 1990s. Many different definitions of “deliberative democracy” have been proposed. For example, David Miller (1992) defines it as a democratic institution committed to a rational form of decisionmaking. In his view, individuals should have equal opportunities to participate in public policy decisionmaking by freely expressing their own opinions, while willingly listening to opposite points of view. Decisions are made through a collective pursuit of rational discussion and deliberation. Jorge M. Valadez (2000) contends that deliberative democracy is one kind of democratic governance. Equal and free citizens, who are concerned about public interests, reach agreements and make decisions through public conversation and deliberation. Public deliberation is a collective engagement that emphasizes the political participation of community members in public policy formation. Others, such as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), emphasize that deliberative democracy is a form of democracy in which citizens are assumed to be capable of taking the perspective of their fellow citizens, fairly considering fellow citizens’ claims through comprehensive deliberation in a public forum; they can pursue and realize applicable solutions that take into consideration personal preferences as well as the collective interests of the public. Gutmann and Thompson (2002) insist that the participation of the citizens is essential to deliberative democracy, and it is important and necessary actively to induce citizens to participate in public deliberation. Deliberative democracy has been developed in Western countries and, therefore, within the context of many particular social problems, such as

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deep moral conflict induced by a multicultural society. Also, it is generally set against a background of assumed erosions of the citizenry’s participation in public decisionmaking caused by the inequality of informational resources available to various racial and cultural groups. Finally, deliberative democracy is a theory attempting to remedy the institutional limits of electoral politics. It has emerged as a response to the limits of democracy advanced by representative democracy and proposes solutions for the legitimacy deficits produced by aggregative politics. Is Deliberative Democracy Applicable to China? At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has been a self-proclaimed national aim of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to develop democracy. Yet, Chinese democratization must embody Chinese characteristics; there are unique traditions of political culture and political skill that have to be accounted for when considering such democratization. Moreover, the period of gestation that has been, and is, necessary to the democratization of China cannot be ignored when considering China’s aspiration for democracy. As China endeavors to establish a democracy, its cultural uniqueness will create some problems, which are quite different from the problems that Western deliberative democratic theorists have found and sought to address in their multicultural societies. Nevertheless, there is some common ground between China and Western societies; accordingly, deliberative democracy might remain relevant despite the uniqueness of the tradition and situation of China. Specifically, deliberative democracy as a theory of reflection upon and correction of the disadvantages of the competitive electoral democracy has special theoretic value and practical significance for China. In the first place, China lacks any robust democratic tradition. The culture of abiding by the law, behaving oneself, and respecting authority and hierarchy has been ingrained through thousands of years of despotism and power worship. Furthermore, the state has had complete control of public policy. Consequently, the social public sphere and the citizenry’s capacity for criticism has not been developed. Two results have ensued: first, there is a severe absence of the citizenry’s sense of independence and political responsibility. Second, even where there are opportunities for active citizenship, there is a low degree of public participation in politics. Thus, the proportion of the citizenry voluntarily participating in national political affairs is quite low. Even one of the most important opportunities for a contemporary Chinese citizen’s political participation—the villagers’ political participation in the vast rural area of the mid-western provinces of China—is routinely subverted by a mobilization style of political participation, in which

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local governments and local party organs, through compulsion and material incentives, guarantee a villager’s participation. Accordingly, the participation is often initiated—notwithstanding village elections—thoroughly by CCP and government officials and not by villagers’ independent volition. Therefore, it remains true that there are few social, political, and psychological foundations that promote the nascent competitive electoral democracy in China. It is not surprising, then, that many remain suspicious of aggregative democracy. Another issue is that Chinese society is dominated by the state. It is a deeply rooted reality that state power, especially administrative power, controls most of China’s nongovernmental organization. To some extent, modernization has begun to open up Chinese society, leading the administrative powers of the state to adopt the tenets of a market-based economy. In turn, this has led to a moving away from a centralized, noncompetitive structure of leadership. Yet, tension has already begun to develop between the economic system of the modern market and the new political demands it places on the administrative powers of China. Consequently, national institutions feel it is necessary to exert regulatory power to cope with the social development of a free market economy and its resultant society. To be sure, since China has historically been a nation with a strong centralized government and a nonparticipatory citizenry, it will likely take a great deal of time and effort before China can establish a highly competitive governmental framework that includes a dialogue between the state and the citizenry. Nevertheless, before the democratic framework of a constitutional government with a free market can be established, it is essential for China to implement some forms of deliberative democracy. The ultimate goal must be to establish a public mechanism of deliberation that impels social groups with multiple interests to participate in the making of public policy. This can be accomplished if equal opportunity is created for the expression, coordination, and realization of different interests through free dialogue, discussion, argument, and deliberation. By introducing a form of deliberative democracy at this stage of democratic development, China will avoid a number of drawbacks that result from mobilizing more passive types of political participation. By utilizing public forums and by having an equal opportunity to express oneself through free dialogue and maintain an open discussion with other members of the citizenry, the lock-up that exists between social groups with competing interests can be avoided. This idea of deliberation has the potential to inspire high-quality personal interactions, while promoting political legitimacy for laws, institutions, and public policies, and improving the quality of local democratic governance in China. Although deliberative democracy won’t always result in the best decisions, a decision made through the

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process of deliberation can produce more political validity and trust among participants because it considers many different perspectives. It also has the potential to accelerate and accumulate long-term trust and social capital for future cooperation. Deliberative democracy may have resources to facilitate Chinese democratization, but does China have the resources to support a political culture of deliberative democracy? Traditional Resources in China That Can Support and Sustain Deliberative Politics Not only is deliberative democracy potentially applicable in China, but China has politico-philosophic resources to support and sustain the idea. The Concept of Harmony The concept of harmony or a harmonious society, one of the core aspirations of Chinese politics, supports some of the goals often attributed to deliberative democracy. In the Analects, Confucius emphasizes that harmony is the most important value in practicing rituals.1 The exact meaning of the word “harmony” as used by Confucius is elusive but can be loosely explicated by using a particular analogy. The early Confucians drew upon the analogy of a musician’s playing of music and her attempt to regulate the Chinese five-tone scale. They also analogized the aspiration of harmony to a chef ’s cooking and his attempt to regulate the five flavors (i.e., sourness, sweetness, bitterness, spiciness, and saltiness). The only way to achieve superior music is to balance harmoniously the five tones together; to achieve superior delicacies, a chef must properly combine the five flavors. These analogies are then applied to Confucianism’s understanding of the tension between the individual and society. The Confucian idea of social harmony places a duty upon the individual to organize the different elements of society into the greatest possible end product. To achieve this, the individual must understand each element as it stands alone and also know how each element interacts with any other element. In this way, harmony can be seen as a form of unification without homogeneity. Despite this promising explication of the Confucian idea of harmony (that might be thought to support certain forms of democracy), it ultimately has its roots in familial law and hierarchical institutions that subvert equality and democracy. Although the modern conception of liberal society places an emphasis on notions such as freedom and equality between all classes, the intrinsic spirit of harmony initiated by Confucius emphasized that a harmonious society is one that has great respect for very traditional (and illiberal) institutions.

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Nevertheless, although the Confucian idea of harmony is based on a hierarchical system and not premised upon the equality that modern deliberative democracy advocates, some scholars suggest that there is a correspondence between the Confucian idea of harmonious co-existence and the ideas of modern deliberative democracy. Accordingly, traditional Chinese political culture, which features the concept of harmony, can be thought to provide some (albeit shaky) intellectual foundation and cultural context for deliberative democracy in China (Lin Shangli 2003). “People First” Ancient Chinese despotism and legalism embody the political idea of “people first.” According to this political idea, the monarchical power is granted by Heaven and the authority and power of a ruler is attained from Heaven’s will. An emperor is the Son of Heaven who dominates the world in the light of Heaven’s Will and takes a paternalistic view toward the people of the world, his subjects. However, this traditional political idea emphasizes that the reason why Heaven anoints an earthly ruler is not for the ruler’s interests but for the interests of the common people. The emperor is responsible for fostering and educating the populace, as well as developing an affluent society. The Son of Heaven should dominate the world and love the people deeply. He rules the world according to Heaven’s will which manifests itself as the will of the common people. Whether the reign of the emperor accords with Heaven’s will is ultimately determined by public opinion. That is, the Son of Heaven must rule the world in a way that accords with the will and needs of the common people; the administrative machine must comply with the people’s requirements.2 Thus, the monarch must acquaint himself with the common folk, the public morale, and public opinion if he wants to fulfill Heaven’s will. The traditional Chinese idea of “people first” is quite different from the idea of modern democratic politics, where the people are sovereign. And there was obviously a counterforce to populism at the time promulgated by Han Feizi, China’s Machiavelli, as it were: power was often seen from the perspective of the leader who could maximize power and was not ultimately responsible to the people. Still, although the monarchal power of “people first” politics is awarded by a deity and not by the people, it is the monarch’s ultimate responsibility to take the people’s happiness as his political end. The monarch must accord with the will of the people while running a country. Therefore, “people first” politics emphasizes that the ruler should acquaint himself with public opinions and that the monarch should modestly accept any criticism or suggestions. Therefore, political affairs, even under traditional Chinese politics, can be decided through popular deliberation.

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Some excellent monarchs in ancient times paid attention to public opinion and obtained their measurement of public opinion through a series of different institutional designs. First, monarchs frequently consulted with ministers and accepted their criticisms. All administrative measures undertaken by the monarch were debated and deliberated upon by the ministers. The political tradition of deliberation can be traced back to a famous king named Yao ( ). When Yao was in power, a series of national issues, such as water-control projects and political appointments, were deliberated amongst the ministers called Siyue ( ) (James Legge 1899: 46–52). Thus, one can say with a straight face that some forms of deliberative politics have had a long history in China. Admittedly, these forms of deliberation are wholly rudimentary and completely inadequate from a modern perspective. Still, native resources of deliberative politics are not wholly absent. The institutional design of deliberative politics even existed in the later period of the Western Chou ( ) Dynasty. The concept of Guoyu Chouyu ( ) suggests that it is the monarch’s responsibility to govern the world and decide national affairs, while it is the ministers’ responsibility to satirize and remonstrate through poems. Taishi ( ), an official in charge of astronomy and the calendar, and Xiaoshi ( ), an official who criticized policies, held the responsibility of remedying the monarch’s political mistakes during the Western Chou. To be sure, even in this enlightened system, commoners couldn’t express their own opinions to the monarch directly because they had little political access, but their ideas were reported to the imperial court and then to the emperor through a hierarchy of government officials. Put simply, all political affairs were decided through repeated deliberation between ministers and nobles, and the monarch seriously considered the suggestions of compatriots, ministers, and nobles who, in turn, listened to representatives of the common people (even if those representatives weren’t elected).3 According to the records of Hanshu Shihuozhi ( ), during the period of the Three Generations ( : the three ancient Chinese dynasties— Hsia, Shang, and Chou), the folk songs of different regions were collected and were offered to the monarch. These ancient monarchs collected folk poems and ballads to learn about public opinion regarding political affairs and, thus, to achieve political stability. It was during this time that one of the earliest poetry anthologies in China, entitled The Book of Songs ( ), was compiled. One surviving element of deliberative politics from the Han Dynasty, which made Confucianism the official state philosophy, was the institution of Imperial Censors ( ). The Imperial Censors were given the privilege by the emperor to criticize all matters pertaining to public affairs. They could even directly criticize the emperor. It was their responsibility to point

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out and rectify political mistakes, which was only possible because they were beyond reproach. During the Tang Dynasty, the court set up the official positions of Bujue ( ) and Shiyi ( ) to argue with the monarch about political affairs (Bai Gang 1996). During the Song Dynasty, a special institution of censors was established to criticize the monarch’s faults frankly. These institutional designs gave some genuine substance to the idea of “people first” politics and the concept may serve as a coherent foundation for building deliberative democracy in China. The Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period There are two notable periods of deliberative politics in Chinese history. The first occurred during the Spring and Autumn Period and the second during the Warring States Period ( ). The Spring and Autumn Period (771–481 BC) is generally characterized by the breakdown of the central Zhou imperial authority and the beginning of Confucian and Taoist philosophy. Confucius lived during the final part of this period, and the name of this period originates from the Spring and Autumn Annals, which is believed to have been edited by Confucius. Zichan ( ) was a famous politician of the Zheng State ( ) whom Confucius praised highly, and he pursued a vigorous form of deliberative politics. The signature of Zichan’s political ideology is his notion that deliberation is the essential ingredient of politics. Zichan actively encouraged his compatriots to remark on the political affairs of the state, even if their criticisms were of him. According to the famous historical record of Zuozhuan ( ), Zichan came to know the successes and failures of his administration through the nobles’ remarks on political affairs at the Xiangxiao ( ) School, which provided aged nobles with a place to live during the Spring and Autumn Period. He listened to the suggestions of subordinates and the public conscientiously. He believed that all the policies that the government initiates should be implemented actively if they are praised by the public; if opposed by the public, the policies should be criticized and corrected. Zichan clearly thought deliberation was very important to politics. The other notable instance of deliberative politics occurred in the Qi State ( ) during the Warring States Period (481–221 BC). The Warring States Period begins just after the death of Confucius, and saw the elaboration of Confucian, Taoist, Legalist, Mohist, and Sophist thought, all vying for intellectual and political supremacy. During this period, China was a network of independent kingdoms immersed in a civil war. There were at one time 140 different states fighting to rule China. The period was concluded

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when the Qin conquered all other rivals, reuniting China under one emperor. During the period of Duke Huan (374–357 BC), the Qi State established the Jixia ( ) School to pursue deliberative politics. Due to the rapid development of the economy and military during the periods of Wei and Xuan, the king of the Qi State expanded the Jixia School in order to realize its political goal of domination. The state attracted people from all over the country by giving them high-ranking positions and a high emolument, encouraging them to deliberate on the affairs of the state. At the same time, the state entrusted important tasks to individuals who possessed practical political experience and permitted them to participate directly in political activities. It was during this period that the deliberative politics of the Qi state were at its height. Contemporary scholars often define the nature of the Jixia School from an academic point of view. They recognize that during the Warring States Period it was a culturally diverse academic center in which various schools of thinkers freely exchanged ideas.4 However, if we only assess the Jixia School by its academic achievements, we neglect its political inventiveness. Ultimately, the scholars assembled in the school not only focused on academic arguments but also political affairs, such as the general plan of administration and how to unify the country. The scholars of the Jixia School deliberated and argued about various political topics (most notably, world domination). The scholars did not hold offices but discussed national affairs, a true embodiment of deliberative politics in the Qi state. The Qi State engaged in deliberative politics until the king of Qixiang came to power (283–265 BC); accordingly, there was more than a century of deliberative politics in the Qi State. This historical period is fertile ground to serve as a foundation for deliberative democracy in Chinese political culture. Huang Zongxi and Deliberation Through the high praise and propagation of the Confucians, deliberation became one of the traditions of China’s political culture. Emperors abided the tradition of political deliberation by and large after the period of the Qin and Han dynasties, regardless of the despotism that was institutionalized by the first emperor of the Qin dynasty. Even political thinkers who fiercely criticized the institution of despotism, like Huang Zongxi, drew resources from the tradition of deliberative politics to build their political ideal. Huang Zongxi ( ) was a great thinker who lived during the period of the Ming and Qing dynasties. In one of the great works of Chinese

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political thought, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (Ming Yi Dai Fang Lu ) (Shen Shanhong 1985) Huang argued that the emperors after the Three Generations Period all regarded the world and the people as their private property. In order to dominate the world, the ruler had to dominate the public through violence. Political corruption was induced by an abnormal political situation where the autocrat controlled public opinion and thought. As well as criticizing the autocratic institution of monarchy, Huang Zongxi also advocated a return to the ancient order that featured the deliberative politics of the Three Generations Period. Huang Zongxi maintained that a state must set up schools. He argued that every level of education should be infused with the responsibility to educate the people and to facilitate deliberation upon political affairs. Huang Zongxi reasoned that since schools play a very important role in political life and, indeed, function as a forum for deliberative politics themselves, learned and famous scholars should be nominated to be president of Taixue ( ), the highest center of learning in ancient times in China. Moreover, he suggested that the president of Taixue should be equivalent to the prime minister. Huang Zongxi put forward the school system as a remedy for the abuse of power that resulted from the autocratic monarchy; he saw the school system as a means to reproduce the ideal of deliberative politics among the nobles of the Three Generations Period ( ). Of course, in the context of the autocratic monarchy, Imperial Censors at all levels deliberate without being able to successfully implement their political judgments. They put forward criticisms and suggestions about policies and administrative measures on the basis of a conditional dialogue and argument. Nevertheless, Huang Zongxi’s idea that deliberation and argument are essential for politics may be a potential native resource for promoting deliberative democracy in China. From Traditional Deliberative Politics to Contemporary Deliberative Democracy “People first” politics from ancient China remained, essentially authoritarian. Moreover, the ancient deliberative politics of China has severe limitations from the perspective of modern democratic theory. First, the deliberative politics of ancient China embodied a concentrated reflection on the idea of monarchal sovereignty. Monarchs not only decided the content and the procedure of deliberation entirely, but also awarded themselves the power of final judgment. Second, all institutional designs of traditional deliberative politics were the result of palace politics and “meritocratic”

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systems. Third, participation was strictly circumscribed; participants of political deliberation were limited to the inside circles of the highest echelons of power, including mostly royalty and the emperor’s court. Common people and the lay citizenry were excluded from the discourse, and the participants were a quorum of upper strata nobles and high-ranking officials of the imperial court. Last, this kind of traditional political deliberation lacked essential rules and procedures with appropriate checks and balances. Public opinion was never scientifically derived or carefully monitored. All of these limitations render traditional deliberative politics an autocratic brand that must be modernized in the contemporary political climate. Yet, traditional deliberative politics furnishes two fundamental lessons that can be applied to modern China as it attempts to democratize deliberatively. First, public policies must be brought out through extensive deliberation, and the administration must be open to the criticism of the public. For instance, Zichan Confucius’ disciple, maintained that political affairs should be conducted through deliberation and that the ruler should tolerate different points of view. Moreover, the ruler should allow and encourage his compatriots to discuss and criticize the affairs of state actively and then make decisions according to the results of this deliberation. The monarch should pay attention to suggestions from ministers and be ready to accept their criticisms. Important administrative measures need to be disputed and discussed by those concerned, not just by ministers. Even minister deliberation would be preferable to no deliberation. Second, ancient institutional designs of deliberation—featuring mere deliberation without representation or implementation—utilized argumentation to put forward critical suggestions about public policies to the emperor and imperial court. Resultant policies were brought to fruition through a kind of conditional dialogue, discussion, and deliberation. Therefore, such designs—imperfect though they were from a contemporary standpoint—served as a rectifying counterforce for despotism. Further investigation into the native resources of China will accelerate the contemporary development of democracy in China and stimulate deliberative democracy’s move from the ideal to the real. Even if the country remains autocratic in the short term, deliberative democratic institutions can mitigate that reality. Conclusion Since the opening-up of China there has been rapid development. Negotiation, dialogue, and deliberation with a distinct Chinese flavor are gradually being introduced into the burgeoning democratic practices throughout the country. Zhejiang Province is a nice example; it is

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regarded as one of the earliest developments within China of a free market economy and it is the most developed area of the private economy since reform began. At the same time, the people in Zhejiang are actively pursuing the development of local democracy within the parameters of industrialization and the practices of a free market economy. They have created new forms of local democracy in Zhejiang Province, including (1) a deliberative procedure of legislation in the People’s Congresses of Zhejiang and Hangzhou (its capital), (2) lobbying of social issues that are a priority to the public by a quorum of citizens invited by the Standing Committee of the ZPPCC (Zhejiang People’s Political Consultative Conference), (3) holding of general public hearings by consumers’ association in which all levels of various departments of government participate (Baogang He 2005, 16–18), and (4) proliferation of villagers’ democratic fora. Moreover, dialogues and deliberations frequently occur between officers and the public on the internet. In recent years, many local governments in Zhejiang Province have established forums for online dialogue between the government and the citizens. For instance, the government of Hangzhou sponsors a website that is an open forum for debate about public affairs. Some of the topics discussed between citizens and government officials have been about the protection and development of the West Lake, traffic problems in the more urban areas, problems of urban management, and the layout of traffic routes in Hangzhou. Citizens participate in these deliberations and voice their suggestions and criticisms through the online forum while the government officials answer questions. The internet forum has established a platform of equality between citizens and officials, encouraging open deliberation (Chen Shengyong and Du Jie 2005, 11). Such new forms of democracy embody profound values of deliberative democracy. Certainly, in a political culture that lacks a democratic tradition such as China, the idea of advancing deliberative democracy initially appears problematic and difficult. If we want to overcome these difficulties, it is necessary to advance political reform in a holistic manner that actively remedies the existing defects carried over from historic institutional forms of deliberative politics. At the same time, a set of institutions, premises, and procedures for public deliberation should be designed to standardize deliberative democracy, ensuring that each citizen has an equal chance to participate in public deliberation as a free, equal, and rational agent of democracy. The resultant decisions of these deliberations should be brought into effective implementation, manifesting deliberative democracy. China has theoretical and historical resources that can make this vision more than a dream.

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Notes 1. Confucius said: “When practicing the ritual, what matters most is harmony. This is what made the beauty of the way of the ancient kings” (Simon Leys 1997, 5). Mencius said: “Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the earth; and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union from the accord of Men” (James Legge 1970, 208). 2. The Great Plan of The Book of Thang noted: “The son of Heaven is the parent of the people, and so becomes the sovereign of all under the sky” (Legge 1899, 144). 3. Much of the evidence here comes to us by way of one of five Confucian classics, The Book of Documents. Admittedly, it is difficult to tell whether the picture portrayed by the Documents is a mere idealization—or whether it has direct correspondence to historical fact. Nevertheless, to the extent that the idealization is a part of a mythology of sorts, it is part of Chinese heritage and is a native resource underwriting efforts in deliberative democracy. 4. In some respect, I am suppressing the fact that the “deliberation” that characterized the Warring States Period, most notably the Qixia Academy, came to be viewed as a sign of the Period’s chaotic nature. Even during the Warring States itself, very few thinkers affirmed the variety of views; most denied the validity of their opponents’ claims; and all wanted to establish their own orthodoxy. To some extent, this agonistic and forceful “deliberation” is far from the idealized consensus-oriented version some deliberative theorists promote. Still others acknowledge the role for agonistic deliberation—and somewhat surprisingly China has resources to support these forms of deliberation as well.

Works Cited Bai Gang. 1996. The History of Chinese Political Institutions. Beijing: People Press. Chen Shengyong and Du Jie. 2005. “The Internet Public Forum: The Emergence of Political Participation and Deliberative Democracy in China.” Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Science) 35(3): 5–12. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2002. “Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 10(2): 153–74. He, Baogang. 2005. “The Deliberative Institutions in China.” Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Science) 35(3): 13–21. Legge, James, trans. and ed. 1899. Texts of Confucianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1970. The Works of Mencius. New York: Dover Publications. (Originally published 1895, Oxford: Clarendon Press). Leys, Simon. 1997. The Analects of Confucius. New York: W. W. Norton. Lin Shangli. 2003. “Deliberative Politics: A Reflection on the Democratic Development of China.” Academic Monthly (Shanghai) 4: 19–25. Miller, David. 1992. “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice.” In David Held ed., Prospects for Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 74–92.

deliberative politics in china / 173 Shen Shanhong. 1985. Collected Works of Huang Zongxi. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Press. Tian Xiaona. 1996. Selections from an Anthology of Chinese Classics. Beijing: International Cultural Press. Valadez, Jorge M. 2000. Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and SelfDetermination in Multicultural Societies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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C h ap t e r 9 Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China Baogang He

In recent years consultative and deliberative institutions have been developing in China, and an increasing number of public hearings have provided people with opportunities to express their opinions on a wide range of issues—the price of water and electricity, park entry fees, the relocation of farmers, the conservation of historical landmarks, and even the famous Beijing zoo, to name a few. As T. V. Smith and Eduard C. Lindeman have pointed out, “Genuine consent, a vital ingredient of the democratic way of life, is the end-product of discussion or conference. Citizens of democratic societies are equipped for their role when they have acquired the skills and the arts of conferring” (1951, 130). Participatory and deliberative institutions in China are helping to develop citizenship skills and are modernizing China politically. Although much attention has been focused on electoral institutions within China, there are, however, few empirical studies on Chinese deliberative institutions. Democratic procedures, however, need to be firmly anchored in the process of genuine deliberation to avoid the tyranny of majority rule. To address the normative question of how to develop deliberative democracy in China, we must explore the deliberative institutions China already has. Developing and improving deliberative institutions constitutes a type of democratization strategy. Dryzek (1996) argues democratization should be seen as advocating participation, deliberation, franchise, scope, and authenticity.1 Suzanne Ogden (2002, 257) sees “deliberation in the Chinese political system as a means of reaching consensus,” notes that it “could prove to be an important building block for democratization,” and states, “Consensus building may be limited largely to the elite, but the Chinese system is still more open to democratic resolution of conflicts through

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discussion than are dictatorial systems, where neither consensus building nor elections are institutionalized.” Accordingly, it makes sense to investigate empirically deliberative and participatory institutions to evaluate their contribution to democratization more generally. This chapter focuses on deliberative processes, deliberative institutions, and deliberative democratization, and their contribution to local governance in China. It provides an empirical basis for my theoretical chapter discussing the relationship between Western theories of deliberative democracy and Chinese practices of deliberative institutions (chapter 6). The chapter draws on some of my earlier work on deliberative institutions (He 2003) and my extensive fieldwork and interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou in 2002, Ya’an and Wuhan in 2003, and Beijing, Hangzhou, Wenling, and Jiaojiang in 2004, where I observed and participated in more than ten deliberative meetings. Further empirical evidence is drawn from my collaboration with James Fishkin of Stanford University; we organized a Deliberative Poll in April 2005 in the town of Zeguo, Wenling City, Zhejiang Province, and we report more directly on our findings in chapter 12 of this volume. Moreover, I organized an international conference on the public hearing system in Beijing in July 2005. In the past four years, I have conducted more than twenty interviews with key figures at both national and local levels to find out their motivation and strategies in developing deliberative institutions. At the same time, I have collected and analyzed all relevant minutes, documents, and files on participatory and deliberative institutions. The chapter also draws upon the “Wenling survey,” conducted by the Wenling City statistics bureau between September 29 and October 9, 2004. The bureau chose a random sample of 290 persons from four towns where the most deliberative meetings were held. Of the 290 persons surveyed, 258 returned questionnaires (an extremely high response rate). The survey statistically “represents” a population of about 50,000 across the four towns. Background: Motivations and Incentives Social protests are daily occurrences in China. According to one study conducted by Professor Jae Ho Chung (2004) of Seoul National University, collective public security incidents (quantixing zhian shijian)—incidents wherein groups of people gather to disrupt public order and destroy public property—have been increasing yearly from 8,700 in 1993 to 11,000 in 1995, 15,000 in 1997, 32,000 in 1999, and 40,000 in 2004. In my fieldwork, I often encounter demonstrations and villagers’ visits to towns or townships to complain about corrupt villager leaders. In December 2004, in front of the official building at one township in Wenling, Zhejiang, more than three

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hundred villagers gathered to read loudly and collectively the Organic Law’s provision that any major decision with regard to land and village welfare must be discussed by and passed through the Village Representative Assembly (VRA). They were protesting against one exploitative developer who had bribed a few local officials for the cheap price of land, and against corrupt officials who had appropriated village lands without gaining the consent from the VRA. In Hanyuan, Ya’an in 2004, hundreds of villagers protested against a relocation plan to such an extent that the government had to send the military to crush the public demonstration. The Chinese government has adopted various strategies to contain collective actions through prohibiting any unofficial national associations, punishing those who are the organizers of collective action, and disciplining those local officials who are corrupt or incapable of controlling social protests. At the same time, the Chinese government has also introduced a public hearing system, village elections, and participatory and deliberative institutions to reduce social protest and strengthen the government’s ruling capacities. These institutions are seen as stabilizers to maintain local order, a solution to problems arising from the tension between the expanding market and the community, and an effective means to develop what President Hu Jintao calls “a harmonious society.” Rapid economic development has given rise to unequal distribution, rampant corruption, a high rate of unemployment, a high level of mobility and migration, an increasing crime rate, and community disorder. In short, social control and local stability have become serious problems. In this context, both national and local governments have pushed for development of urban residential communities and village committees, encouraging citizen participation in order to build an orderly polity. Through the political experiments of deliberative institutions, those in charge discovered that regular and frequent participatory and deliberative meetings have solved community-related problems, avoided major mistakes in public policymaking, and saved money, personnel, and time in governing local affairs, thereby reducing the number of the people’s petitions and complaints. In this regard, deliberative institutions can be seen as a “valve” to release the pressure upon China’s fast-moving machine. At the same time, the Chinese government takes action to suppress dissident groups, control intellectual activities, and close down some internet discussion forums. Moreover, local security has become a participatory institution of sorts—not dissimilar from Fung’s (2004) interesting observations about Chicago’s local participatory school policing system. The unemployed in China have been organized to form security forces, and voluntary teams of party members are encouraged to patrol three times a day in their local

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area. This local security system can be seen as a modern form of the Baojia system2 but with a democratic and participatory component. Indeed, the citizen-driven security system has reduced the crime rate significantly within well-established residential communities. In one community, fourteen bicycles were stolen before the introduction of the system; since the introduction of the system, the stealing has stopped. This local security system (together with the Houku and Daiwei systems)3 also partially explains why China’s rapid economic development has not been accompanied by the slums and squatter areas seen in Brazil, Chile, Kenya, and many Asian cities. In facing the pressures associated with the rapid democratization in Eastern Europe and Asia, Beijing has tried to develop a new art of ruling that combines administrative order with a consultative mechanism that will bring governments and people together, improve the relations between cadres and the masses, and achieve good governance in local politics. To be sure, Beijing has used deliberative institutions as a form of moderate democracy to avoid a radical and substantial political reform that would directly challenge the political power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is believed that deliberative institutions are peripheral and marginal, so they do not undermine the power of the CCP. And, accordingly, the governments at national and local levels have encouraged the development of a mild form of democracy. As a result, mobilized, consultative, and deliberative institutions have developed even faster than the competitive electoral institutions at the township level and beyond. Still, the inherent logic of deliberative institutions may push China past the moderate form of democracy that was intended by Beijing. Local leaders also have various motivations and incentives to push the development of deliberative institutions. Some officials aim to achieve a genuine consensus so as to gain legitimacy for certain policies, to reduce social conflicts, and even to win personal honor. Others see deliberative institutions as an effective tool to bring about democratic management and monitoring. Still others, however, are under great pressure to introduce these institutions to ease the tension between cadres and the masses. For example, one interviewee said he had to hold consultation or consensus meetings to satisfy the demands of residents, who otherwise will give officials extremely low marks in citizen evaluation meetings. Pressure also comes from the private sector. In some local counties or townships in Zhejiang, private tax contributions constitute more than 70 percent of the local budget. Private businessmen and interest groups desire to express their voices about public policies that affect their economic

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life. As a result, consultation meetings and other institutions are organized in response to the demand from the private sector. Political achievement is also an important motivation for local leaders. In recent years, some local leaders who have promoted village, township, or urban residential elections have advanced their political careers. The best example is Zhang Jinmin. She was the party secretary of one district and initiated the direct township election in 1999. She is now deputy party secretary of Ya’an City, Sichuan Province. In short, innovation can be a good career move. When local leaders improved electoral procedures in Fujian, Jilin, and other provinces, there was little room to further innovate with election procedures. Local leaders in Wenling, therefore, concentrated their efforts on the development of deliberative institutions. The town of Songmen in Wenling City was the first to implement and develop deliberative institutions. Its leaders were awarded innovation prizes, first from Wenling City and then from a national body in 2003. Consequently, they have continued to develop and improve the existing institutions. By comparison, leaders pressured from above to introduce similar deliberative institutions felt they could not achieve anything new. They lacked strong incentives, and the deliberative institutions in place in those localities are only a formality. Development of Participatory and Deliberative Institutions China has a long-standing tradition of discussion and deliberation on community-related issues at the local community level. As Chen Shengyong argues in this book (chapter 8), Confucian scholars established public forums in which they debated and deliberated national affairs centuries ago. During Mao’s time, the “mass line” emphasized the need for public consultation to give value to the voice of the people in the political process. Indeed, the socialist tradition of political participation generally might also be a useful resource in developing deliberative and participatory institutions. In contemporary China, however, some of these institutions are characterized by a number of institutional innovations involving detailed procedures (see http://www.yangji.gov.cn/ htzxsdzc/ mzkth.htm); they respond to the needs of people through the articulation and aggregation of individual preferences and interests, mixed with voting, a far more “democratic” design than previously encountered within China. The introduction of village elections and the establishment of participatory and deliberative institutions, such as village representative assemblies since the 1980s, and in particular since the late 1990s, has changed the structure of village politics and the political behavior of some 3.2 million “village officials” in the 734,700 villages in China. Since the middle and

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latter 1990s, some villages have developed village representative meetings wherein major decisions on village affairs are discussed, debated, and deliberated upon by village representatives. Local urban communities have also developed a number of new participatory and deliberative institutions. The Chinese consultative meeting or public hearing is designed to get people’s support for local projects and to be a forum for people’s opinions. The popular conciliation or mediation meeting is designed to solve various local problems and conflicts. In the Shangcheng district of Hangzhou, a consensus conference or consultation meeting is held once a month. Citizen evaluation, first introduced in Shangdong and Shengyang, and then in Shanghai and Hangzhou, is designed to give the ordinary people an opportunity to rate and evaluate the performance of local cadres. The ratings can seriously affect the political career or the level of performance bonus of local cadres. The practice of holding public hearings has also developed at the national level. In 1996, the first national law on administrative punishment introduced an article stipulating that a public hearing must be held before any punishment is given. Another, the famous article 23 of the Law on Price passed by China’s National Congress in December 1997, specified that the price of public goods must be decided through public hearing. This was followed by the Law on Legislature, passed in 2000, which requires public hearings to be an integral part of the decisionmaking process for all legal regulations and laws. More than fifty cities have now held legislative public hearings. On September 29, 2005, a public hearing was held by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to decide whether the central government should raise the personal income-tax threshold. Wenling City’s progress is a good example of successful integration of deliberative institutions. It is a county-level city with a vibrant private economy. In 2004, it was awarded the national prize for Innovations and Excellence in Local Chinese Governance. From 1996 to 2000, more than 1,190 deliberative and consultative meetings were held at the village level, 190 at the township level, and 150 in governmental organizations, schools, and business sectors. Such meetings are called kentan, meaning “sincere heart-to-heart discussion.” Some meetings were “one shot” discussions, that is, sessions dealing with only one topic that meet only once. Others were continuing discussions about more complex matters or a series of matters. For example, five deliberative meetings were held to deal with the relocation of the fishery industry. Some meetings were just consultative without connecting with decisionmaking directly, while others were well connected to policy decisionmaking through the local People’s Congresses. The development of participatory and deliberative institutions in Wenling City has involved four stages (Mo Yifei and Chen Yiming 2005).

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In the first stage, local leaders found that traditional ideological mobilization did not work as a mode of persuasion. In 1996, a democratic “heart-toheart” forum was therefore invented to give villagers a genuine opportunity to express their grief and complaints. However, the villagers who experienced this democratic forum soon discovered that it was only a forum for discussion and not decisionmaking. Their political enthusiasm decreased, the turn-out rate dropped, and disillusionment followed. In the second stage, in order to continue to attract people, the local officials turned this discussion forum into a decisionmaking mechanism. By 2000, local leaders would respond to questions of participants and make decisions on the spot. The third development, in 2004, was a democratic discussion forum attended by the deputies of the local People’s Congress. Local leaders had discovered that if the issue being considered was controversial, decisions made in deliberative meetings gained support from some but faced opposition from others. In order to defuse its responsibility and gain legitimacy for the policy on any controversial issue, the local party organization decided that deputies of the local People’s Congress should vote on certain difficult issues in a deliberative meeting, and the result of voting constituted a final decision that overrode the authority of the local party secretary. Leaders held the view that the only reliable and indisputable source of legitimacy is democratic voting, which generates a basis for public will on certain disputable issues. This is an institutional innovation that combines deliberative institutions with the empowerment so sorely lacking in much experimental deliberative democracy in the West. In the fourth stage, in 2005, Wenling introduced China’s first experiment in Deliberative Polling on a budget issue, adopting methods of social science to deliver a scientific basis for public policy. Wenling officials realized the deficiencies of their deliberative meetings, such as unscientific representation and insufficient time for a full discussion. Accordingly, they accepted advice from James Fishkin and myself to use a random sampling method to select the participants to avoid selection bias and to provide wellbalanced information to all the participants, who would spend an entire day deliberating over the town’s budget issue. I report on the experiment in more detail with co-authors later in this book (chapter 12). Chinese Understanding of Deliberation Deliberative, participatory, and consultative institutions are expressed in many Chinese terms such as minqing kentanhui ( ), minzhu kentanhui ( ), minzhu licaihui ( ), minqing zhitongche ( ), jumin luntan ( ), xiangcun luntan ( ), and minzhu ting (yi) zheng hui ( ). In 2000, the local government

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in Wenling decided to unify all these terms by using one term, minzhu kentanhui ( ). Literally, the term kentan ( ) means “sincere discussion,” “talk sincerely,” or “have a heart-to-heart.” The local government in Wenling decided not to use terms such as “dialogue democracy,” “consultative democracy,” or “cooperative democracy,” because they are too academic to be accepted by ordinary peasants and because the Chinese term kentan is imbued with special local flavor drawing upon Confucian ethics. Central to the Chinese understanding of deliberation is people, their voice, their will, and their hearts, as expressed by these words: “ , , ” (“Listen to the voice of people sincerely, understand the desire of people completely, provide service for people excellently, and enhance community solidarity strongly”). As elsewhere, deliberation is understood in China to be a special form of talk: discussion and serious debate over certain issues, policies, and principles. Deliberation is a form of debate in which people can and should employ a very high standard of reason. In the process of deliberation, participants are civil, their positions tend to converge, and they speak and listen politely. Chinese deliberation combines material considerations with normative argument, dictated by a mixture of Chinese official ideology and democratic discourse. Deliberation is not free from self-interest; nor is it purely communicative rationality without any instrumental considerations. Chinese participants are not afraid to talk about their own interests and demands. The mix of aggregation of material interests with persuasion through reasoned argument in the Chinese practice of deliberation reminds us that a dichotomy between aggregation without deliberation and deliberation without aggregation is a dangerous simplification. In the process of deliberation, people define the nature of the problem, facilitate public debate, and find solutions. Chinese practitioners attempt to balance different considerations and interests, and achieve mutual understanding and consensus on preference and action. Through deliberation they try to reconcile plural interests and find consensus on solutions to community-based problems. In this process, they form a collective will and public policy. The foregoing is not normative but descriptive of what can actually be observed in Chinese practices of participatory and deliberative governance. People differ in their capacity for communication and certainly differ in the rationality of their discovery. Chinese deliberation is often accompanied with emotion and feeling, youqing youli ( ). Participants are full of emotion when they raise some issues and express their opinions, and some become angry when their opinions are ignored. Emotional expression should be understood as a necessary component for the voice of participants to be authentic and in my field research, I have not observed emotion to distort a basic level of rational deliberation; on the contrary, it enhanced it.

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The Variety of Deliberative Institutions in China All deliberative institutions share the following features, (1) bringing people to the table and encouraging them to talk and discuss before reaching any conclusion, (2) giving participants sufficient time to engage in a deliberative process where there is minimal, but not always, sufficient time available for discussion, and (3) encouraging participants to exchange opinions and respect each other in spite of disagreements. There are a variety of deliberative and consultative institutions, each encompassing local forms, flavor, and features. Here I discuss the most important ones and outline their general features. The Consultative and Deliberative Meeting This institution is designed to gather opinions, solve community-related problems, gain support for local projects, reach consensus on certain issues and policy, and clarify preferences, positions, and principles. In Chinese terms this institution is called tingzheng hui. Some subjects of deliberation have been public policy, community strategic plans, priorities of local development, health care, neighborhood safety, and capital infrastructure investments. In one residential committee in Wuhan, more than fourteen meetings were held in 2001 to deal with issues concerning local security, local health, community cohesion, and management of funds. The Wenling survey found that 181 respondents (70.2%) agreed with the statement that the themes of deliberative meetings are urgent and related to local people, 64 (24.8%) agreed meetings were somewhat related, and 3 (1.2%) thought meetings were unrelated. Deliberative meetings proceed in three stages. The first stage is the introduction by community leaders who set the agenda and explain the procedure. The second stage is public debate, in which participants express their voices, opinions, and preferences. In the third stage, community leaders answer questions raised by participants. The main functions of urban deliberative institutions are to consult with residents about certain policies and to find solutions to certain collective problems. However, the deliberative institutions at the village level often have a decisionmaking function. The local party secretary tends to set the agenda. Once the agenda is set, it is unlikely that people will add new items to it. In recent years, however, deputies of the local People’s Congresses are able to set the agenda, but they have to submit an application to the party secretary for approval. Meetings are usually chaired by the local party secretary or the head of the community. One residential committee allows residents to elect a chairperson so they can control the agenda themselves. Participants are then encouraged to engage in free and open discussion.

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Participants in deliberative meetings vary. Some are selected to represent interest groups; others may be selected because the organizers know they will be “reliable.” In village deliberative meetings, if an issue is one concerning the welfare of all villagers, each household will send one member. In some cases, a public meeting is open to everyone within the community, attracting many participants. Participation is voluntary in urban and rural deliberative meetings. According to the Wenling survey, 126 respondents (48.8%) attended one or two democratic discussion meetings, 70 (27.1%) attended three or four, 50 (19.4%) attended five or more, and 12 (4.7%) did not participate in any meeting. Generally speaking, consultative and deliberative institutions attempt to reach consensus, rather than resorting to voting to settle issues. However, deliberative meetings or consensus conferences can fail to achieve unanimity. Different opinions can exist after several rounds of deliberation. For example, in meetings about where an industrial park should be built, where a highway should pass, or where the new site of a school should be, disagreements persisted even after the deliberative meetings. Citizen Evaluation Meetings The experiments of citizen evaluation meetings have taken place in many localities, rural and urban. The purpose of this kind of meeting is to give ordinary people an opportunity to rate and evaluate the performance of local cadres. In one urban district in Shanghai, a citizen evaluation is held twice a year. In a village in Ya’an, forty-nine village representatives and village cadres participated in what were called democratic evaluation meetings in 2003. In some rural areas, due to the distances people must travel and other difficulties involved with holding an evaluation meeting, citizen assessment involves the completion of an evaluation form at home, which is mailed to the villagers and returned by mail to the village committees. Citizen evaluation meetings are a supplement to the responsibility management system, wherein superior officials assess the performance of subordinate officials according to their compliance with official orders. Such an evaluation system is top-down and tends to ignore the people’s voice and people’s opinion. To overcome this deficiency, a bottom-up evaluation system designed and developed to enable ordinary citizens to have an opportunity to assess the performance of local officials who have to be responsible and accountable to the people has been implemented. Citizen evaluation normally comprises three stages. First, major leaders give their reports on the performance of local leaders in the meeting. Second, citizens raise questions for clarification, comment on the report, exchange their opinions, and engage in debates on the policies and performance

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of the leaders. In the third stage, citizens are asked to fill in an evaluation form, which is also called a confidence vote. The results of evaluation affect the political future of local leaders and the level of performance bonus for local cadres. For example, in Ya’an two township leaders lost their posts because they gained a low score in citizen evaluation. In Hangzhou, all staff members of one department were forced to forgo their 2,000 yuan (US $247) bonus because of the low score they received in citizen evaluation. While a citizen evaluation meeting provides citizens with an opportunity to assess the performance of officials, it does not provide sufficient time to engage in debate. The most critical part of citizen evaluation is the marking of appropriate boxes on the evaluation form by individual participants. Such a practice tends to take place in a secret setting, thus preventing any open discussion. In 2003, in Ya’an City, citizen evaluation extended to the party meeting. In an annual party congress, all major leaders are evaluated by party representatives, 40 percent of whom have to be ordinary members (with official posts). Crucially, if one leader does not gain a confidence vote of over 70 percent, a dismissal process will begin automatically against him or her. In these cases, the function of a citizen evaluation meeting can be interpreted as an incomplete and limited election because the result of a confidence vote will determine whether some officials will be promoted, be retained, or will lose their jobs. There are several limits to the citizen evaluation deliberative institution. In Jiaojiang City, Zhejiang, the party organization stopped the evaluation practice in 1991 because the party secretary “lost face” when he received far fewer confidence votes than his colleagues. Nevertheless, it reintroduced the evaluation in 2003. In Zhejiang, the party secretary Zhang Dejiang did not endorse the idea of citizen evaluation, and did not approve the proposal for the evaluation of all major leaders by citizens. Only deputy leaders of governmental departments were allowed to be evaluated by a small group of ordinary citizens in 2002–2003. Despite participation of 1,500 residents in the Shangcheng district in Hangzhou, who evaluated leaders’ performance through the completion of a form, and despite it being called a “societal evaluation system,” or “responsive democracy,” there were methodological flaws. No random sample was used, all questionnaires were distributed through neighborhood committees, and the survey was not carried out by an independent agency or university. There is a special kind of evaluation procedure worth noting. The Research Center for Comparative Politics and Economics in the party’s Central Translation Bureau together with the Central Party School and Beijing University has launched a program offering a prize for local reform and innovation (Yu 2002). This involves an evaluation of local innovative

Consult with people

Representative and voluntary 20–300

Discussion without vote

Multiple 2 hours High Middle Low Middle or low Middle or high Wide Varies

Aims

Persons

Number of Persons

Methods

Frequency Length of time Interests at stake Effectiveness Monitoring Mobilization Authenticity Scope of control Deliberation

Consultative Meeting (Consensus Conference)

Table 9.1 Participatory and deliberative institutions in China

Evaluate and rank local cadres and their performance Proportionally representative 60–200 (number varies if a survey is carried out) Discussion, filling evaluation forms, and voting One or two per year 2–3 hours Middle High High Middle or high Middle Middle Low

Evaluation Meeting (Citizen Assessment)

Discussion, consultation, deliberation, and voting Varies from 1–20 or more 2–3 hours (or longer) Middle or high High Middle Middle or high Low or Middle Narrow or Middle Middle or high

Discuss urban or village development, or community-related issues Elected representatives, committee members 15–30

Urban or Village Representative Assembly

186

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institutions by national officials and scholars. It is largely an elite exercise but has provided a greater incentive for local leaders to pursue honor in their career through local political reform. The Residential or Village Representative Assembly The Residential or Village Representative Assembly involves 15–30 people discussing community-related issues in a deliberative way, with a lot of argument and debate over controversial issues. The Village Representative Assembly (VRA) is capable of making decisions on issues like the use of collective land, the establishment and development of village enterprises, distribution of village wealth, dismissal of personnel, and the village budget. In contrast, the Residential Representative Assembly covers security issues, population control, and daily affairs in the urban community. The Residential or Village Representative Assembly can be seen as a participatory and deliberative institution. While in the past they were excluded from any decisionmaking through their representatives, citizens might have an impact on all major decisions affecting the village. It is also defined as a consultative body, a barometer of public opinion.4 For example, according to Tangxia Village Self-Governing Regulations, “The VRA is the villagers’ democratic consultation body under the leadership of the village party committee. It represents the villagers in exercising democratic management of village affairs.” In Wenzhou, VRAs must be consulted if an expense exceeds 5,000 yuan (US $619) (O’Brien 1994, 45). Summary Table 9.1 compares different deliberative institutions, rules, methods and procedures, aims, franchise (the number of persons and how they are selected and formed), frequency of meeting, interests at stake, impact, monitoring, mobilization, scope of control, authenticity, and quality of deliberation. It also includes my preliminary assessment of these items. Effects of Deliberative and Participatory Institutions Enhancing Local Governance Assessment of the effects of these deliberative and consultative institutions is no doubt subject to different criteria. Under the liberal criterion of effective constraint on the state, these deliberative institutions ultimately have little impact upon the powerful state. Under a more communitarian criterion of the enhancement of collective solidarity and social trust, some deliberative institutions do, in fact, solve thorny problems, help to maintain local

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stability and security, and enhance collective solidarity. And, from the perspective of participant satisfaction, the Wenling survey found that 137 (53.1%) were extremely satisfied with the democratic discussion forum, 34 (13.2%) were relatively satisfied, 30 (11.6%) just “so-so,” and 10 (3.9%) were not satisfied. Participatory and deliberative institutions contribute to what John Stuart Mill called “government by discussion” (Elster 1998, 4). Public deliberation has been translated into public authority and power and has formed a collective will to generate pressure on irresponsible behavior, such as taking shared public space or littering over public areas. Deliberative institutions enhance community cohesion, empower citizens to participate in political processes, and help them to develop democratic skills and a democratic disposition. Beyond citizen empowerment, public deliberation has also increased state legitimacy and local order. To the extent that deliberative and consultative processes aim to achieve accountability and responsiveness, justice of policy for the parties concerned, and a deep linkage between the ruled and the ruling, these benefits do tend to accrue quite often. The Wenling survey, for example, found that 225 respondents (87.2 %) agreed, while eleven (4.3%) disagreed that democratic discussion forums have made local government more responsible and have helped to develop a democratic decisionmaking process. A total of 209 (81%) agreed that democratic discussion forums have made policymaking processes transparent and have made policy implementation easier. Nevertheless, eighteen respondents (7%) agreed with the statement that democratic discussion forums make things worse because they generate different voices that are difficult to unify. Deliberative institutions increase the local community’s capacity to resolve conflicts by altering preferences, generating recognition and respect among those with different interests and opinions, and enhancing governability (Warren 2002, 188). In the deliberative process the nature of a problem is demonstrated, different solutions are compared, and new alternatives crafted. Group deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views truthfully, forces individuals to consider the perspective of others, and makes them willing to compromise and reach agreement. Consensus is often achieved for some seemingly intractable problems. This result can be found in numerous cases reported in academic studies and journalists’ reports. The Empowerment of Citizens Guillermo O’Donnell (1999) writes, “Democracy is not only a (polyarchical) political regime but also a particular mode of relationship between state and citizens, and among citizens themselves, under a kind of rule of law that,

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in addition to political citizenship, upholds civic citizenship and a full network of accountability.” In China, citizenship too is benefitting from measures and strategies that are being deployed to empower citizens, ensure authenticity, and reduce manipulation. For example, in 2004 in Wenling, a law was put in place to regularize deliberative institutions. Citizens can use this law to demand that a local official hold a deliberative meeting. Civic groups and workers are encouraged to participate in the deliberative process so that ordinary people have a say, and citizens’ powers are increasing through the voice of civic associations. Citizen evaluation meetings, in particular, give citizens an opportunity to issue judgments about the quality of deliberation, and they can exert great pressure on local leaders to facilitate genuine deliberation. In the areas where decisions are made immediately after a public deliberation, efficacy is enhanced by eliminating the critique that deliberative institutions are only producing “empty talk” and do not produce policy impact. Regularized participatory and deliberative institutions and meetings empower individuals with a set of rights and procedures, such as the right of public consultation, the right to equal concern in public, and the right to initiate a meeting and make motions. These are tremendous rights for citizens to have. National law stipulates that all public policies must go through a consultative and deliberative process before being implemented. These institutions and meetings have generated a special form of deliberative citizenship with distinctive rights, resources, and duties. (For more on deliberative citizenship, see Geoffrey Stokes’ chapter in this volume (chapter 3).) In particular, deliberative citizens are entitled to the right to ask the government to respond to the result of deliberation. The Wenling survey found that 148 respondents (57.3%) agreed that the deliberative and participatory meetings embody the right to gain information, 184 (71.3%) agreed that they had a right of participation, and 137 (53.1%) agreed that they had a right to monitor. A significant development in empowering citizens is that some local leaders even give up some power in the process of developing deliberative institutions. In the Zeguo experiment (reported in chapter 12), most officials sat outside a classroom to observe a meeting and they were not allowed to speak out to influence the choice of ordinary citizens. In the end, the final choice of the citizens was endorsed by Zeguo People’s Congress as official policy. Citizens were empowered through the process of an open and transparent democratic mechanism, and the experiment contributed to the construction of social capital, and a mutual trust between the local government and citizens. Zeguo Party Secretary Jiang Zhaohua admitted, Although I gave up some final decision-making power, we gain more power back because the process has increased the legitimacy for the choice of

190 / deliberative democracy in china projects and created public transparency in the public policy decision-making process. Public policy is therefore more easily implemented.

Deliberation is a process by which people make themselves citizens. It is a citizenship-building mechanism through which participants learn about each other, exchange opinions, and raise their moral consciousness. Take the example of one deliberative and consultative meeting about cable television in 2004 in Hangzhou. It turned out to be a process of citizenship education. While some residents argued that migrants and local residents should enjoy the same right to education, including the cable line, even without paying their fair share in taxes, others argued that residents should all contribute equally to the development of the cable line. That is, it is unfair for some residents not to pay the fee but have several outlets on the cable line. In another case, the participants discussed the local environment, and some criticized the behavior and values of the unemployed who refuse to do cleaning jobs which they consider to be too menial and only suitable for “second-class citizen peasants.” In these examples, although what was spoken to the migrants and unemployed classes was not especially generous, all citizens were able to learn about the perspectives of others and were able to discuss respectfully difficult issues that affected a broader community of fate. Group deliberation also alters individual preference. Through deliberation, individuals develop more general and common perspectives. Deliberation is a social process in which citizens develop their proficiency and skills in engaging in dialogue, carry out cooperative projects, and respect mutual interests. An internal aspect of deliberation involves the process through which participants challenge themselves and look through other viewpoints so that they may develop into reflexive citizens. To the extent that some citizens changed their minds in the cable and local environment meetings (and they did), this is evidence of what most Westerners already know about deliberation—that it can help people change their minds on important policy matters. Factors in Deliberative Success Different localities develop different forms of deliberative institutions each with diverse consequences. To fully explain these local variations and their effects is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, however, I would like to briefly examine a number of variables that influence local variations. Factors that seem to lead to deliberative success include the commitments of leadership, the citizens’ general awareness of the democratic fora, and social, cultural, and economic conditions. The Wenling survey, for example, found that 180 respondents (69.8%) think that local government’s initiation

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and commitment to deliberative institutions lead to the development of successful participatory and deliberative institutions. A total of 178 (69%) respondents cited the people’s increasing democratic consciousness as a major factor in the development of successful deliberative institutions. Also, 97 (37.6%) cite the advanced development of a private sector. The role of the local officials in the Department of Propaganda of Wenling City should be noted. Traditional political mobilization— using political ideology to mobilize support for governmental action—did not work in the more commercialized society of Wenling. Accordingly, propaganda work had to adjust to the rapid change in the economy and in social life. The department was forced to find a modern form of participation to appeal to materialistically minded villagers. The department discovered that participatory and deliberative meetings are an effective means to bring cadres together with the masses and solve practical issues. Indeed, the Department of Propaganda was in charge of these experiments and a driving force in developing deliberative meetings. The change in local leadership undoubtedly impacts the development of consultative and deliberative institutions. For example, Jiaojiang, a township famous for its experiments in deliberative and consultative institutions, was suddenly without enthusiasm for these institutions due to new leaders’ lack of interest. To deal with this problem, the local People’s Congress passed a law on the development of deliberative institutions in 2004, making it a legal obligation for local leaders to hold regular consultative and deliberative meetings. Social conditions also clearly matter. The involvement and participation by social associations in deliberative processes and institutions are just beginning. Nevertheless, the role of civic groups in public deliberation is very limited, and weakness of civil society and the domination of markets have hindered the development of healthy and genuine deliberation. Deliberative institutions and processes are seen as a form and instrument of socialization controlled by the party. Such a process has an impact on the nature of citizenship that is largely defined by the state. While village elections preceded urban direct elections more than a decade ago, urban participation and deliberative institutions seem to have developed faster than those in rural areas. This difference is due, in part, to the strong socialist tradition of political participation in cities, the higher education levels of the urban population, and, importantly, to the availability of the retired, the laid-off, and women, who have much spare time and who find that participating in urban community affairs makes life more meaningful. Women play a significant and even dominant role in local urban governance (the majority of members of residential committees are women), but only a marginal and insignificant role in rural governance

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(in my 1998 survey, only one of the elected village chiefs was a woman). Around ten percent of male village chiefs have a tense relationship with the male village party secretaries in rural China, but there is an absence or a low level of such tension between female party secretaries and female chairpersons of residential committees. Habit also plays a role in forming a political culture. Repetitive practices, for example, monthly or bimonthly deliberative meetings, have gradually created a culture of public deliberation. Many Chinese are growing used to such practices as the public notice of meetings, the availability of information, and robust debate. And as the Chinese grow more comfortable with these institutions, they have a greater chance for success (if only the government continues to support their growth and development). Economic conditions and wealth play roles in building and developing deliberative institutions. The rise of the “new rich” and their substantial economic resources can help to break down domination and manipulation by current power holders. Indeed, the new rich have fought for their interests and rights in deliberative meetings and have eroded the power of the old guard. Ironically, however, wealth can also be a hindrance to the development of deliberative institutions. It contradicts an ideal situation where communicative rationality should replace power and wealth if possible. If a deliberative institution is financed by the new rich, the deliberation becomes biased toward the rich, and the quality of deliberation is substantially sacrificed. In order to constrain the power of wealth in a process of deliberation, deliberative institutions are financed by local governments through the party’s leadership. This is a great irony because the wealthy can then use the forum to undermine local power holders. Dealing with the complexity and interaction of power and wealth in deliberative institutions requires much more attention in China. Problems and Limits Deliberation takes place under an authoritarian political structure in which an inherent danger is the elite management of the deliberative process. (In this regard, see Ethan J. Leib’s chapter in this book (chapter 5).) Participants are not truly equal, nor are they truly free. China’s case confirms Iris Marion Young’s (1999, 102) argument that “in the real world of politics, where structural inequalities influence both procedures and outcomes, democratic procedures that appear to conform to norms of deliberation are usually biased toward more powerful agents.” Major players in deliberative and participatory institutions are often limited to local elites, such as town and village officials or village representatives. The idea that everyone has an equal voice is far from a reality. In a public hearing on the adjustment of the

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price of transportation, for example, ordinary citizens were powerless in the face of the agency of public transportation with vested interests. Citizens can express their voice and deliberate upon the issue, but, in the end, each public hearing on public price has become what some people have cynically called “a meeting of price-raising.” Deliberative institutions lack a centralized and impartial monitoring system. There is no monitoring of those who run deliberative institutions. Apart from the VRA that is a decisionmaking body, deliberative institutions in urban communities and townships do not generally have decisionmaking power that can be exercised by citizens themselves. The main function of deliberative institutions is consultation with citizens over certain policies or solutions to collective problems, but only leaders make a final decision. In Wenling, when a public forum is closed, leaders have a closed door meeting for twenty minutes before announcing their final decision to participants. The practice of making decisions on the spot requires leaders to be responsive to demands of people, and pressures them to take action; these designs are superior but are not especially common. In Songmeng, for example, the deputies of the local People’s Congress make a final decision through a vote in a public deliberative forum. However, this decisionmaking mechanism involves two limits. First, local leaders sometimes have to rely on experts; and expert opinion does not necessarily cohere with the desires of the people. Second, sometimes a quick decision is needed and takes precedence over the deliberative process. Deliberation also runs into cultural limitations in China. Due to the influence of traditional culture, sharp criticisms are not appreciated, and deliberation tends to be soft talk in a warm atmosphere. Participants can be superficially agreeable, refusing to deepen disagreements aggressively and productively. Participants occasionally talk past one another. There are many situations where deliberation results in false unanimity because participants do not want to emphasize how they disagree. In some cases, participants say only what leaders want to hear. The agenda can be easily manipulated and the scope of deliberative meetings can be circumscribed to prevent discussion on touchy but important issues. In some circumstances, policy has been predetermined, questions have been pre-arranged, no materials have been distributed beforehand, insufficient time has been available to digest information and engage in authentic debate, and consultation has been only a formality to gain legitimacy and to manufacture consensus. Sometimes a large number of journalists have been present at meetings. This presence demonstrates that the deliberative institutional experiment is a part of more general propaganda efforts. More generally, many deliberative and participatory institutions are vague in their procedural requirements—and almost all lack scientific rigorousness.

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The most successful deliberative meetings take place at the local rather than the national level. In this way, local citizens are able to express their opinions and influence public policies related to their lives. But they are unable to influence the national state. They can sometimes effectively constrain the behavior of local officials but not national ones. A substantial limitation of deliberative “democracy” in China, to the extent that it exists at all, is that is does not extend to the “big picture” national level. (For more on this criticism, see Leib’s chapter in this book (chapter 5).) Despite limited success, deliberative institutions are too small and too few when compared with the size of China. A few isolated successful cases do not create Chinese deliberative democracy. They are not large enough to change the nature of the authoritarian regime. The Chinese macro-authoritarian structure remains intact despite some micro-structural changes brought about by these deliberative institutions. Conclusion A mixed conclusion can be drawn from these empirical observations. In some cases, deliberative institutions were originally designed to increase authoritarian control, and indeed strengthened the authoritarian regime. In other cases, Chinese practices of deliberative institutions undeniably exhibit many significant democratic elements. Repetitive experiments of deliberative institutions are able to transcend the original limits, leading to more substantial structural changes and paving the way for local democratization. Public deliberation together with village elections and rightful resistance movements have developed and deepened local democracy in different ways. Deliberative institutions are a form of democracy, a path toward democracy, and a new area in which the Chinese can develop and improve local democracy. They therefore deserve further research in Chinese studies, as well as in democratization studies more generally. There has been widespread skepticism about deliberation in the West (Macedo 1999; Fishkin and Laslett 2003). The case of China serves a dual role in this debate. One the one hand, it may be used to support the skeptics: the authoritarian state can use deliberation for its survival, implicating its democratic credibility. On the other hand, despite many shortcomings, the Chinese practice of deliberation strengthens deliberative theory’s confidence in citizens’ capacity, proving that participants are capable of certain skills, even without substantial access to education and information. Chinese institutions of deliberation undermine in some respects the skepticism that deliberation is meaningless, that citizens are incapable of deliberation because they are impatient, that they cannot process information, and that they are not motivated to attend meetings.

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There are some grounds for optimism, as evidenced by the development and effects of various deliberative institutions examined in the earlier section in this chapter. Some local Chinese practices of deliberative institutions will narrow the gap between Western and Chinese models, and Chinese practitioners might even catch up with the best quality of deliberative experimentation in the West. China may be able to enrich substantially its own fledgling deliberative democracy and the general theory of deliberative democracy in the next twenty years, just as the Chinese economy was enriched by and stirred Western theories of the economy in the past decades. Notes 1. Dryzek sees democratization as advancement in any one of three dimensions: franchise, scope, and authenticity. Franchise is the number of participants in a political setting, not merely in terms of the ability to vote in elections, but also in terms of the ability to make submissions to a public inquiry. Scope refers to domains of life under collective control. And authenticity refers to the degree to which interaction is free from domination, manipulation, deception, and selfdeception. 2. The Baojia system was the traditional Chinese system of collective neighborhood organization through which the government was able to maintain order and control through all levels of society (while employing relatively few officials). 3. Houku means population (i.e., households and people). The Houku system is a household registration system, in which each citizen is required to register with authorities. This was also a social control method. Daiwei is the work-unit; every worker belongs to one or other Daiwei that provides welfare and security, including flats. The two systems have been abolished for the most part in modern China, but the legacy remains. 4. The author’s interview with the village head of Jianshe Village, Wuyun Township, November 1998.

Works Cited Chung, Jae Ho. 2004. “Societal Challenges to Governance in China: Mapping the Major Trends.” Paper presented at an International Conference on Grassroots Democracy and Local Government in China, organized by Chinese Association of Political Science, Center for China Studies, National Chengchi University, and Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C., November 2–3 Taipei. Dryzek, John S. 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideas, Limits, and Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. Elster, Jon. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fishkin, James S., and Peter Laslett, eds. 2003. Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. Fung, Archon. 2004. Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

196 / deliberative democracy in china Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. “Citizenship and National Identity.” In Bart Van Steenberg ed., The Condition of Citizenship. London: Sage 20–35. He, Baogang. 2003. “The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassroots Governance: Five Models.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 4: 293–314. ———, and Lang Youxing. 2002. Balancing Democracy and Authority: An Empirical Study of Village Election in Zhejiang. Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press. Howell, Jude. 1998. “Prospects for Village Self-governance in China.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 25(3): 86–111. Macedo, Stephen, ed. 1999. Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press. Mo Yifei, and Chen Yiming. 2005. Democratic Deliberation: The Innovation from Wenling. Beijing: Central Compliance and Translation Press. O’Brien, K. 1994. “Villagers’ Committees: Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages.” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32: 33–59. ———, and Lianjiang Li. 2000. “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China.” The China Quarterly 162: 465–89. O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” In A. Schedler, L. Diamond, and M. F. Plattner eds., The Self-Restraining State. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ogden, Suzanne. 2002. Inklings of Democracy in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Oi, Jean C., and Scott Rozelle. 2000. “Elections and Power: The Locus of DecisionMaking in Chinese Villages.” The China Quarterly 162: 513–39. Shi, Tianjian. 1999. “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutional Tactics for Democracy.” World Politics 51: 385–412. Smith, T. V., and Lindeman, Eduard C. 1951. The Democratic Way of Life: An American Interpretation. New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc. Thurston, Anne F. 1998. “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China.” Peaceworks, no. 23, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/ thurst23.html (accessed on June 21, 2006). Unger, Jonathan. 2002. The Transformation of Rural China. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Warren, Mark. 2002. “Deliberative Democracy.” In April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes eds., Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, 173–202. Young, Iris M. 1999. “Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy.” In Stephen Macedo ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 151–58. Yu, Keping. 2002. Innovations and Excellence in Local Chinese Governance. Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Data Press.

C h ap t e r 1 0 Deliberative Democracy and Village Self-government in China Qingshan Tan

Some theories of deliberative democracy go beyond representative democracy’s focus on electoral participation to advocate for the inclusion of popular deliberation in processes of decisionmaking. Deliberative democracy has been developed in the context of Western representative democracies where democracy is largely practiced through electoral politics, which emphasizes citizens’ participation in democratic governance through the exercise of regularized voting. Much of the decisionmaking in these democracies has been delegated to representatives who, in turn, aggregate various interests into policies through such decisionmaking institutions as legislatures, courts, and executives. Still, there is a need to strengthen democratic practices by opening up the policy process to the participation and deliberation of citizens who must live under the policies set forth by the state. Public policy should not result from the influences of mere power or money; rather, it should be the product of a deliberative process in which the members of the public have equal access to voice their opinion. It is through this deliberative process that more public awareness and consensus on policy can be promoted. Deliberative democracy cannot totally replace representative democratic institutions of decisionmaking, but it can supplement them and, in so doing, contribute to remedying the inadequacies of representative democracies. Deliberative democracy is of great relevance to village self-government in China, a rural political movement that is at a crossroads in modern China. This chapter seeks to examine the changes in village politics brought about by village elections and the positive linkage between deliberative democracy and village self-government. It argues for the necessity of strengthening village

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self-government by expanding villagers’ participation in decisionmaking through deliberative processes. This chapter explores the potential for deliberative mechanisms in the existing village governance framework and discusses the positive and negative aspects of utilizing the existing institutions such as the Village Assembly (VA), the Village Representative Assembly (VRA), and village small groups (VSGs). While these village governance mechanisms contain the seeds of deliberative democracy, this chapter specifically proposes a two-tier deliberative process that incorporates VSGs and VAs. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of village self-government from within the theoretical framework of deliberative democracy; in particular, the “mobilization” style of participation prevalent in village self-governance tends to increase villagers’ dependency on government or village elites and risks engendering citizen passivity in deliberation and decisionmaking. Deliberative Democracy in the Context of Village Self-government Deliberative democracy advocates promoting awareness of issues, public deliberation, and consensus building. Even if deliberations do not necessarily or always pursue or reach consensus, a deliberative process can contribute to better understanding of the dimensions of an issue and eventually lead to agreement on a course of action. Public participation and reasoning result in collective decisionmaking that enhances legitimacy and social stability. Deliberative democracy emphasizes “social processes distinguished from other kinds of communication in that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgments, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception” (Dryzek 2000, 1). But Dryzek notes that the state is not the only domain necessary for the promotion of deliberative democracy. An autonomous public sphere, consisting of “self-limiting political associations oriented by a relationship to the state, but not seeking a share in state power,” is an integral part of deliberative democracy; in this public sphere, various policy positions can be developed independent of state control. Even though societal forces may act completely autonomously and in opposition to the state, a mutually supportive relationship can be developed (Dryzek 2000, 1), and that relationship can redound to the benefit of democracy. Deliberative democracy, as an aspirational politics, can be used in helping to understand, promote, and tinker with village self-government in China. However, because theories of deliberative democracy developed in the context of Western democracies, it cannot simply be applied wholesale into the

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Chinese political context. First, the Chinese political system is not based on representative principles; thus, the central government is less likely to respond to pressure groups and special interests and open up policy processes for public deliberation. This is not to say, however, that the central government always gets its way; there are local, institutional, and even popular forces that the central government has to reckon with from time to time. Second, although China has experienced rapid growth of associational and non-governmental groups in recent years, Chinese civil society is still in its infancy, and autonomous associational groups need to be fostered and developed. The space between state and society needs to grow in order to have enough autonomous civic groups to be included in deliberative processes of various levels. Third, intelligent public debate and deliberation requires better information. In China, information flow and access to knowledge must be increased so civic groups can have meaningful, wellinformed deliberation. Access to information is still a big challenge in China, partly because information dissemination is often selective and incomplete, and partly because information can be a scarce and expensive commodity in a market-driven economy; many people simply cannot afford internet subscription and cable fees for example. Nevertheless, deliberative concepts can have practical implications on village self-government even if China does not have a Western-style democratic system. Village self-government has been a political movement in the Chinese countryside for over a decade, first made possible through village elections. After the collapse of the people’s commune system, there was a governance vacuum in the countryside. This led to the deterioration of public security and village affairs (Mi and Wang 1999). Starting in 1982, some villages in Guangxi organized elections of Village Committees (VCs) to replace the outdated brigade committees to govern village affairs.1 Villagers’ election of VCs gave rise to initial governmental sanction for village self-government. The central government ultimately endorsed village elections by enacting the Organic Law on Village Self-government (experimental) in 1987 and started in earnest to implement the law throughout the countryside after the revised Organic Law became official in 1998 (Tan 2004, 1–22). The Organic Law has created some space between state and society, allowing autonomous village governance. This space allows for those participating in village self-government to engage in authentic deliberation outside the sphere of influence of the national state. The law establishes VCs as a part of village self-government; it redefines the relationship between township governments and VCs as one of guidance rather than one of leadership. The acquisition of village autonomy from township government control has made possible the creation of deliberative institutions at the village level and brought about villager participation in collective

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decisionmaking. In theory, township governments, which represent the reach of the state into the countryside, can no longer exercise direct administrative control to manage village affairs, either through personnel or through administrative orders. The autonomy from central control, however, only sets up the necessary condition for possible authentic and autonomous village deliberation; it does not automatically give rise to the practice of deliberative self-government. Mechanisms of deliberative democracy can be used to alleviate social unrest caused by governing problems and can establish new legitimacy based on collective decisionmaking and open political processes. In recent years, many instances of rural unrest have occurred due largely to unwelcome decisions and policies that were made arbitrarily and without transparency (Chen Lihua 2005). One root cause of rural unrest lies in a “politics of exclusivity” practiced in many rural areas, where township government officials are accustomed to old governing models, relying on village party elites for rural governing. In turn, village party elites draw authority from township governments and act as agents to represent township interests (Xu and Wu 2001, 3–16). In the dual function of serving the village as well as the township government, village elites inevitably cause dissatisfaction among villagers who see their interests as not properly represented. Measures of deliberative democracy could open up this governing process by allowing villagers to take part more fully in discussions of village affairs and by building consensus on collective actions. Such collective decisions could emerge from an inclusive deliberative process and consequently greatly reduce mass unrest and contribute to social stability in the countryside. For example, in recent years, land compensation disputes have been a major source of rural unrest as the state expands highway construction and undertakes efforts in urbanization throughout the country. Such use of land concerns everyone in the village and, at least formally, requires the consent of all villagers. However, villagers often have very little say about compensation, as no transparent deliberative processes hold village leaders in check when they deal with land issues on behalf of villagers. In short, much rural discontent and unrest have arisen from the fact that decisions regarding state and village interests have often been made by village elite without giving villagers a chance to express their opinion. Public village deliberation, on the other hand, can deal with the same issues more effectively by respecting villagers’ will and by giving villagers a voice in airing grievances and expressing policy preferences. Collective decisions made through consensus building by villagers rather than by elites could enhance the legitimacy of policy and build popular support for carrying out such policies. As an example, birth control policy gains legitimacy and broad-based support when villagers are given explanations and are able to voice their

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concerns with the details of policy implementation (Editorial Committee of the Yearbook of Grassroots Democratic Development in China 2002). Election of VCs has brought about a major change in the way villages are governed. Elections provide villagers a chance for true involvement in the governance of their local affairs. Although the Organic Law (1998) mandates elections and delineates the responsibilities of VCs, it simultaneously designates the Village Party Branch (VPB) as the ultimate authority over village affairs. In the past, VPB secretaries were appointed to manage village affairs. Under the Organic Law, the secretaries are not directly involved in day-to-day management of village affairs; instead, elected VC chairs preside over routine village governance. Consequently, VCs are more responsive to the population and are gaining control of village resources and decisionmaking power (Tan and Xin 2006). Nevertheless, tensions invariably exist between the elected VCs and the institutional authority of the VPB. Despite advances, there is no guarantee that VCs will act liberally in governing village affairs, especially if their leaders only adopt the behavior of a new elite political class. The power of the VCs varies from village to village (O’Brien 1994, 33–59) and it is important to understand the power of VCs in relation to the VPB (Guo 2001). There currently exists in the village a dual power structure and political struggle between VCs and VPBs for control of village affairs. In short, VCs are routinely acting like VPBs and seeking to rule as elites. Ultimately, this may result in the same issues that arose under elite governance in the past, which often ignored popular will and needs. Even with VC elections, it is still in the interest of better governance for VC members to reach beyond electoral politics and directly engage villagers in deliberation about village affairs. Elected VCs have a responsibility to strengthen political participation by working with other village institutions such as VSGs and VAs to include villagers at various stages of village governance. VCs should avoid acting as an elite representative body making decisions for villagers; rather, they should serve villagers better though facilitating dialogues, discussions, and deliberation in policy formation. Deliberative Institutions in the Village Election of VCs has changed the power structure of village governance. Elections help establish such institutions as VCs, the VAs, and VRAs and enable villagers to voice their opinions on various village affairs. In the existing framework of village self-government, VAs, VRAs, and, to some extent, VSGs are supposed to be the public forum for broader village participation. Conceivably, VCs can make good use of VAs, VRAs, and VSGs as public platforms to engage villagers in discussions and decisionmaking. VAs and

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VRAs as currently structured, however, function more like miniature legislatures to approve VC proposals, though they do decide some important village matters, such as how village funds should be used. Typically, VCs take the lead in proposing specific measures and try to get them approved by VAs or VRAs. To what extent VAs and VRAs can defy the expectations of VCs for a rubber stamp on their initiatives is still uncertain, since their potential as true deliberative institutions has not really been tried in earnest. Currently, VAs and VRAs, more often than not, are just a voting machine, subject to the manipulation by VCs or VPBs, who prefer assembly votes to be a formality rather than a forum to permit or encourage substantive deliberation (Chan 2003, 179–99). Still, with modification of the rules and procedures governing villagers’ participatory processes, the existing village institutions may be a good place to start to develop village deliberation on matters of local concern. VCs could benefit from utilizing village deliberative bodies as public fora for exchanges of ideas and opinions among villagers and village officials. Local governments and village elites should realize that village participation in collective decisionmaking will increase the efficiency and legitimacy of their work. Village Small Groups VSGs are sub-village organizations based on natural geographic divisions. VSGs hold irregular meetings for group members to discuss matters of group concern. The scope of such deliberation is often limited to issues that require decisions through voting, such as village personnel, resources, or village projects. Most of the time, VSGs are concerned only with their own affairs and usually involve the use of group resources.2 Nevertheless, VSG deliberation on these matters can be quite effective in terms of airing different opinions and reaching a collective decision. The advantage of VSG deliberation is its size and “inclusiveness.” A total of 30–40 households in geographical proximity can create an easy meeting atmosphere. VSG members can freely interact with each other in their own way and engage in thorough and thoughtful discussion and deliberation. Additionally, the structure of VSG meetings enable knowledgeable and informed deliberation due to geographic proximity of members, their familiarity with issues, and the effectiveness of their communication and information acquisition. VSG members usually live in the same vicinity of a village and interact with each other more frequently than with other villagers. Through their daily interactions, members discuss issues at ease and freely express their opinion. The close relationships facilitate equal concern and respect for one another and persuasion, rather than coercion, is more

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likely to prevail in a VSG deliberation. At VSG meetings, members communicate with one another in discussion or informal chats without the guidance of village heads or pressure from group leaders. Thus, collective decisionmaking is more likely to be achieved since full courtesy is extended to everyone at the meeting. VSGs have drawbacks, however. VSG effectiveness is limited by the scope of issues presented at such meetings, which are often very local affairs directly concerning members of VSGs. When it comes to deliberation on issues concerning the whole village, VSGs tend to be reactive and passive since the agenda is set at the village level. When a VSG meeting is required, often by the VC, members may not have enough time to engage in discussions with any depth. Often a quick vote is all that transpires. VSG meetings, due to kinship ties and close living relationships among participants, can be easily manipulated, especially if VSG leaders are strongminded and less open to fellow members’ opinion. Many VSGs also consist of clan members, who tend to follow clan leaders, minimizing the impact of deliberation. (For work on clan influence, see Xiao 2002). Finally, even if VSGs are good potential fora for deliberation, there is still a danger that these deliberative fora could degenerate into deliberation about the trivial, since the scope is so circumscribed. VSGs are often considered an executive arm of the VCs. Most provincial laws define VSG leaders’ role as helping to implement VC tasks and decisions, as well as managing a VSG’s collective assets and facilities (Fujian Department of Civil Affairs 1996). Provincial laws vary in terms of defining the function of VSG meetings; some do not mention VSG meetings at all, while others only stipulate the procedure of VSG meetings. For example, Jiangxi requires a quorum of more than half of VSG members or two-thirds of VSG household representatives for a legitimate VSG meeting ( Jiangxi Department of Civil Affairs 2002). The most common function of VSG meetings as defined by provincial laws, however, is electoral; VSG meetings are often held to elect members of village election committees, members of VRAs, or VSG leaders. Other VSG meetings are held at the will of VSG leaders, if they deem such a meeting important or necessary. In other words, VSG meetings are yet to be fully considered a deliberative institution for village citizens even though they are a natural choice for deliberative development. Considering their relative advantages, a two-tier deliberative process incorporating VSG and VA procedures seems warranted. On most important village issues, VSG meetings can be held for debate among members. Opinions and suggestions that emerge can then be presented to full VA meetings for further and final deliberation and collective decisionmaking. This two-tier process can reduce unrealistic expectations for VA deliberation and help minimize confusion and chaos in VA deliberation which, without

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VSG input, might be too disorganized to be valuable. VSG meetings as a first stage of the deliberative process could help inform everyone of the issues at stake, encourage members to voice their opinion, and find common ground. The second stage of the deliberative process could then focus further deliberation on differences of opinion that emerged from the lower-level VSG process and on collective decisionmaking in light of proposed options. A net outcome of VSG meetings may not totally eliminate differences of opinion, but can result in enhanced understanding and awareness of the issues, help narrow different options on the agenda, and reach a collective solution. Unlike VA deliberation alone, the two-tier process is capable of engaging every village citizen in the deliberative process, giving each the opportunity to speak and to provide an input in the collective decisionmaking process. Village Assemblies In designing mechanisms of village self-government, decisionmakers originally set up VAs as separate institutions to which VCs were held answerable. The Organic Law of 1987 (Article 11) and the subsequently revised Organic Law of 1998 (Article 18) require VCs to be responsible to the VA for their work, rendering the VA a de facto supreme decisionmaking body in village self-government. VAs have power to deliberate and decide important village matters such as formulating and revising village charters, prescribing codes of conduct, approving VCs’ work reports and budgets, and regulating village public works and economic development. The designers of village self-government intended to make the VA the legislative decisionmaking body to review and approve the work of VCs. The decisionmaking process of the VA is often marked by an organized meeting procedure, starting with a VC chair or a VPB secretary presiding over the assembly. The entire assembly meeting proceeds by a pre-set agenda, with the presiding official guiding and dominating the process, making full participation in assembly deliberation difficult to achieve. VAs as currently structured have limitations. The most often cited issue is size; average-sized villages have from eight hundred to over one thousand village residents (Research Group on Village Self-Government in Rural China 1995, 3). Large villages might have a population of 3,000–8,000, and some have over 10,000 residents.3 Many local officials and VC members complain that the large size makes it difficult to convene VA meetings, and, often, villages have had difficulty convening the required bi-yearly meetings. In instances where VA meetings were held, many participants found it impossible to voice their opinions or communicate with fellow villagers due to limitations of agenda or time. To be sure, many VC cadres and local

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government officials still pay lip service to the exercise of democratic decisionmaking in VAs, but they regard VAs as a formality or a simple voting machine. They tend to dominate the proceedings of the meeting, giving participants little chance to engage in meaningful discussion and exchange of ideas. And they prefer, expect, and ensure that quick decisions emerge from the VA process. To make the VA a true deliberative body, there is need to reorient it toward a functioning democratic and participatory institution with rules and procedures to guarantee equal rights of participants in their deliberation. VPBs and VCs have predominant influence on the VA processes leaving little room for participation and deliberation by lay citizens. It is a common practice that either a VC chair or a VPB secretary presides over VA meetings, carrying out the pre-set agenda and guiding the meeting to conclusion (Chan 1998, 235–58). VA meetings are usually very well organized and proceed in an orderly fashion. However, such meetings sacrifice deliberation for hurried votes or decisions. VA meeting attendants are often reactive, rarely actively participating in discussions without being prompted on a particular issue. In order for the VA to be an effective deliberative institution, several improvements to the VA rules and procedures need to be made. A necessary first step is the election of a VA chair independent from the VCs and the VPBs. Such an election would ensure the integrity of the VA and enable the chair to be independent from the influence of other village institutions. Further, VA chairs should act as facilitators of discussion and communication, not as partisans to push for passage of a certain agenda. A VA chair should be more receptive to input from the participants and allow differences of opinion to be expressed at the meetings. Second, as emphasized by Leib’s chapter in this book, agenda-setting is important. For VA deliberation to be successful, the agenda should be established by VC chairs in consultation with VA leaders, with input from assembly members and VSGs. The agenda should focus on a discussion of issues rather than a vote on solutions proposed by VCs. The agenda should allocate more time to participants for thorough deliberation. It is important that the agenda includes important and real issues for discussion, not mere formalities or rubber stamps on VC proposals. Third, it is difficult for the VAs to engage in meaningful deliberation because of its size and its lack of an appropriate communication format. To solve the size problem, VA meetings can be divided into small groups; such division can be based on VSGs or be based on functional groups. The meetings’ procedural rules should reduce the passivity of participants by guaranteeing attendees a chance to speak their minds. The meeting format can be structured into information dissemination and deliberation sessions.

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The presiding official should provide necessary background briefing and information and then proceed to facilitate group discussions. Sufficient time must be allocated for attendants to digest information, exchange or express views, and discuss issues. The rules must guarantee that all participants who want to express their views will be given a chance. An informal conversational style of communication will offer the best opportunity for those who want to speak out but may be shy or less capable of making a formal speech to a very large group. The communication format need not be limited to one kind; in any case, villagers are more creative and talkative than they are given credit for. The institutionalization of VAs as a deliberative body offers several advantages. First, VAs have been a part of village life for some time and villagers are accustomed to participating in the meetings. Indeed, participation in such assembly meetings was compulsory at one time. (In this regard, Leib’s argument in chapter 5 for mandatory service actually has some historical precedent.) Moreover, village elections have changed the nature of village governance and give villagers a sense of autonomy over their own affairs. Villagers have a sense of empowerment at assembly meetings since their consent and votes are needed for a collective decision. Though the frequency of convening assembly meetings varies, many village charters require VA meetings to decide important village issues. Second, the VAs can offer a free forum for villagers to voice their opinion, listen to other’s ideas, discuss options and alternatives, and reach collective decisions. Third, the VAs can minimize information costs for deliberation. At the VA meeting, effective communication among participants is possible since villagers are familiar (or can be made familiar) with local issues and are capable of participating in the relevant discussions and decisionmaking. Village Representative Assembly VRAs have become an important institution of village self-government in recent years. VRAs gained prominence as a de facto legislature whose function has generally been to approve village budget and financial matters. VRAs are seen as a counterbalance to VCs to reflect public opinion and popular will with respect to the management of important village affairs (Research Group on Village Self-governance in Rural China 1995). With the endorsement of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), the 1998 Organic Law formally recognizes the role of VRAs and calls for the conditional establishment of VRAs in the countryside. Villagers are not unfamiliar with such an institution. Under the old system, there was a representative assembly that was a supreme body of power. The 1987 Organic Law’s emphasized the practice of direct participation of

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villagers in self-government and made the VA superior to the VRA. However, along with the implementation of the 1987 Organic Law, MoCA and local officials found it impractical to call regular VA meetings due to (1) the size of the population, (2) the distance members have to travel to attend the meeting, (3) scheduling difficulties caused by seasonal factors, and (4) absent villagers who left to seek job opportunities in cities (Research Group on Village Self-governance in Rural China 1995, 4). MoCA’s own assessment of the VA showed that they existed in name only in many places and VCs became the actual decisionmakers. Hubei was the earliest province to establish the VRA in 1989. With the recognition and endorsement of MoCA, other provinces followed and VRAs became a predominant form of representation in village self-government. Since the passage of the revised Organic Law in 1998, the majority of villages have established VRAs. However, the 1998 Organic Law does not clearly define the composition, role, and operation of VRAs, and there is a great amount of variation in rules and practices of VRAs throughout the country (Chan 2003). The composition of VRAs varies, as the Organic Law calls for the selection of representatives at the ratio of one from every five to fifteen households or VSGs (Article 21). However, not all provincial regulations have specific requirements for the establishment of a VRA, nor do they contain any rules regarding the composition of VRAs. Generally speaking, three types of people can serve as village representatives depending on the locality. The first type of VRA consists of representatives elected or selected by villagers or VSGs. In Chongqinig, for example, the implementation scheme allows VSGs to select their village representative, but at the same time, it authorizes local governments to formulate their own rules regarding election to the VRA (Rural Division of Department of Basic-Level Governance and Community Construction 2002, 116). The second type is made up of elected representatives and village, deputies of People’s Congresses. The third type is composed of elected representatives, village deputies, VC members, and VPB secretaries. In a few places, such as Huaying, Shanaxi, there exists a fourth type consisting of all in the third type plus VSG leaders. VRAs are structured as representative bodies for village governance; for large villages, it is impossible to have all villagers participate in village meetings to make important decisions. Therefore, a VRA is regarded as an ideal type of representative institution to reflect popular will and to be effective in governing (Thurston 1998). The Organic Law of 1998 holds that while VAs are the supreme body of power in village self-government, VAs can delegate power to VRAs to make decisions. Even where power to adopt or revise village charters, formulate electoral rules and procedures, recall VC members, and repeal or amend decisions made by VCs is generally considered to belong

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to VAs, in practice VRAs actually replace rather than supplement VAs to exercise the decisionmaking power (Chan 2003, 183). The decisionmaking role of VRAs is the reason why many central and local officials support VRAs; VRAs can help make effective and quick decisions to carry out state programs without the logistical problems associated with the VAs. Another role of VRAs that has been endorsed by some officials is the supervision and check on VCs, mostly in the areas of financial and economic decisions (Lawrence 1994, 61–68; Wang 1998). VRAs cannot easily become truly deliberative bodies. In many places, these assemblies are dominated by VCs or VPBs. VRA meetings often involve rubber stamping, and the agenda and issues are defined by village elites. Other VRAs convene meetings only to request a vote from representatives, and little deliberation is carried out to promote understanding and consensus. More often than not, heads of VCs or VPBs preside over the assembly meetings; they proceed to guide and dominate the meetings without any real opportunity for deliberative participation (Hu 2001, 83–84). Representatives tend to react to the agenda and to the meeting chair rather than to act as equal partners to express their opinion. For deliberation to work, assembly chairs need to act as co-equals to assembly participants in setting up the agenda and in facilitating communications at the meeting. The real limitation of trying to design VRAs as popular deliberative bodies lies in their almost necessary representative nature. As discussed above, the composition of a VRA varies greatly from village to village, but even with the best type of representation (Type 4), a representative cannot claim to be truly representative of the population because of their elite status. The representative nature of the VRA makes it difficult to argue that deliberative results of the representatives truly reflect the opinion and interest of the whole village; representatives never need to deliberate with their constituencies. VRAs can be part of a deeper and more complex village deliberative process, however. Given their status and their accrued knowledge, their work can be considered part of a more thorough-going deliberative culture. It would be wasteful if representatives’ expertise and knowledge could not be fully utilized in village deliberation, since most of the representatives are well educated, familiar with village affairs, and willing to serve the village (Hu 2001, 55–59). The issue, then, is how to integrate VRAs into the deliberative process. One way would be to use representative knowledge and expertise to engage villagers in education and information acquisition so they are better informed about the issues. Information dissemination is an important part of the deliberative process. In village self-government, VRAs have gathered a group of village elites who are generally well informed; if they can play an

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informational role, the quality of village deliberation can be raised in other institutions better suited to grassroots deliberation. Another way for VRAs to get involved in village deliberative process is to open the meetings to allow anyone to express their views. Instead of trying to get enough villagers to satisfy the required quorum for a VA meeting, the extended VRA meeting would give interested villagers an opportunity to participate in the deliberation. This arrangement increases legitimacy by permitting anyone who wants to be part of the deliberation to participate. Influence of Power and Money in Village Self-government One of the concerns of deliberative democracy is the potentially disruptive effects of power and money on the deliberative process (Warren 2002). In the case of village self-government, the fundamental question is who should exercise the supreme power of village autonomy. The Organic Law stipulates that VAs should be the supreme body of power, but at the same time designates VPBs as the core leadership in, and VCs as the governing body of, village affairs. In practice, the exercise of supreme power by VAs has been hindered by the wrangling of new and traditional political forces in village politics. Village elections have transformed the traditional power structure and locus of decisionmaking authority (Oi 2001, 149–75). Elected VCs have become the executive body of village self-government and are entrusted with management of day-to-day village affairs. The rise of VCs helped change the hierarchical power structure under the previous system into a “dual-power structure” under which VCs and VPBs compete to wield influence and power. The rising popularity of VCs led to the decline of influence and status of VPBs and resulted in increasing tensions between VCs and VPBs (Bai and Zhao 2001; Tan and Xin 2006). To address the issue, scholars and MoCA officials tried to promote the fusion of power through the election of village party secretaries ( yijiantiao). Villagers are encouraged to cast an opinion ballot to select a party secretary candidate who is, in turn, subject to a ballot cast by village party members. Once the party secretary is elected, the secretary is encouraged to run for VC positions. (For research on the two-ballot system, see Li 1999, 103–18.) Further, if an elected VC chair is a party member, the chair is then selected to be the village party secretary. Thus, increasingly, the elected VC chair concurrently holds the position of the village party secretary.4 Consequently, there can be a fusion of power between these two powerful bodies, and these united bodies undermine any “supreme power” that might be exercised by the VAs to control the VCs and VPBs.

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Despite the increasing tension between the VC and VPB (when they are not otherwise unified), the locus of decisionmaking largely rests within the two bodies. The power and influence of VC chairs and VPB secretaries have created an elite-driven assembly process that reflects little public deliberation. For example, most VRA sessions are driven by power, influence, and manipulation by VCs, VPBs, or township governments.5 As the result of this elite-driven process, public policy decisions concerning villager welfare are made by elites without authentic deliberation or true consent of the villagers. Because elite-driven policies do not often satisfy the villagers, recalls of VC members and villager appeals to higher authorities have increased in recent years (Liu 2004, 252–60). The expanding market economy in the countryside has also given rise to the mounting influence of money in village elections and governance. There is widespread concern regarding vote buying in the electoral process. In a controversial recent election, a VC chair candidate spent more than 2 million yuan (US $247,000) on villagers after the election.6 The influence of money in the electoral process also extends to the governing process: representatives have been promised favors by VC chairs or VPB secretaries in exchange for votes. The reason that so many VRAs pay lip service to villagers in their deliberation and decisionmaking and then ultimately acquiesce to the VCs is that VCs can use power and village resources to buy out the representatives (Chen 2000). Beyond simple vote buying is the marketization of village affairs. Market expansion in the countryside raises the economic stakes of villagers. And VC chairs often use economic development to justify their management of village affairs. Many VCs argue that villagers have to exchange deliberation for efficiency; villagers need able leaders with a better understanding of the market to make important decisions for them. VCs often devote their attention to economic development by managing collective enterprises, land use, and other resources. In so doing, little attention is paid to the improvement of governing processes. If anything, VC chairs raise the hurdle of participation in the deliberative process. In better-off villages, control over village resources can touch off fierce disputes between VC members and villagers that sometimes result in angry villagers demanding a recall of VC members (He and Lang 2002, 313–17). In other cases, the principle of self-government is violated in the name of developing the village economy. Some villages even opt to hire VC chairs from outside to manage village affairs (Southern Rural Daily 2002). It is inconceivable that such a hired VC would respect the democratic process of village autonomy when it comes to making economic decisions for villagers. Economic development is a very important part of village affairs and deserves priority. However, since such development requires village

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resources such as land and capital, every villager has a direct stake in how development proceeds. Use of village resources, therefore, should not be a decision reserved for the few; it must involve public participation in the decisionmaking process. Furthermore, not all projects in the name of village development are necessarily good or supported by villagers. When it comes to controversial projects, public deliberation is important in order to prioritize among options and garner true support from villagers. Decisions made by village elites on controversial projects can often make things worse for villagers and cause mass opposition. Bad land deals have been most controversial and responsible for much of recent rural unrest and protests (Li 2004). VCs’ acquiescence to township or county government demands for use of village land for local industrial development has also generated substantial opposition.7 There has been gross inadequacy of financial compensation when land is taken away from villagers for development, and in those cases, township or county officials work with VC elites, bypassing VAs or VRAs, to make the decision. Rarely is a deliberative process initiated for villagers to discuss and vote on the merits of a project. Yet, village public land is, in theory, collective property that belongs to all the villagers. Conclusion Deliberative democracy is about democratic principles, democratic processes, modes of communication, and methods of decisionmaking. Deliberation can help promote legitimacy and social stability. All of these important characteristics can have profound implications for village selfgovernment. It has been nearly twenty years since the Organic Law was first promulgated in 1987 to give village autonomy legal status. And village politics have changed in many noticeable ways. Village elections have altered rural power structure and control mechanisms and have promoted some village political participation. Villagers can now exercise their democratic rights in choosing their own leaders. Village elections, however, are only a part of village self-government, albeit an important one. A strong case can be made for expanding democratic fora in village self-government, enabling villagers to participate in governing local affairs. One way to achieve such participation is to facilitate deliberative processes in which villagers can express their views, discuss issues, propose options, and collectively decide how to solve and manage local affairs. Existing village institutions are inadequate to achieve village deliberation. Village institutions such as VAs and VRAs have not developed deliberative rules and procedures that could enhance the institutional capacity for deliberative self-government. Consequently, VAs and VRAs are often at the mercy of VCs or VPBs when it comes to decisionmaking. The elite-driven

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processes of supervision render VAs and VRAs more dependent on and less autonomous from VC and VPB elites than they need to be to achieve more substantial democratic governance. Even in villages where VAs or VRAs are strong, they play no more than a role of supervision. Deliberative democracy, in some measure, relies upon citizen’s active participation in the state and the public sphere. One of the most pressing issues confronting village self-government and village elections is the “mobilization style” of participation. Villagers are largely dependent on governmental initiative in implementing the Organic Law. Village election turnout rates, for example, which have been very high, have been the conscious work of central, local, and village election officials boosting villagers’ participation (Pastor and Tan 2000, 490–512). In places where there is lack of interest or efficacy, electoral officials take every necessary step to increase turnout rate. To the credit of the governmental effort, election mobilization has increased the involvement and participation of millions of villagers in the electoral process and has promoted villagers’ civic culture. However, government mobilization also appears to be in tension with the principle of village self-government. Mobilization increases villagers’ dependence on government initiatives, which could subject them to the dominance of VCs and VPBs. More authentic self-government requires citizens to take the initiative themselves, rather than being passive and merely responsive. Today, village self-government is at a crossroads. Although village elections are changing the power structure of traditional governance, they also risk supporting more elite-driven political processes. The rise of VCs poses certain challenges to VPB power in village politics but VCs are rapidly becoming a new source of power at the village level. Even though some check and supervision mechanisms embedded in VCs and VRAs have been developed and practiced in some villages, these are far from adequate because checks and supervision mechanisms are not rooted in the democratic participation and deliberation of villagers. Unless institutional rules and procedures for VA deliberation are set and strengthened, all other checks and supervision mechanisms will risk being managed or manipulated merely to validate elite governance that is out of touch with the people. The existing framework of villagers’ self-government—including the VA, VRA, and the VSG—has the potential to provide a foundation for broader individual participation in village affairs and a deeper deliberative democratization. Villagers are not unfamiliar with the deliberative model since the assembly has been a part of village life for decades and participation in its proceedings was once mandatory. Despite concerns that existing institutions of village self-government may be co-opted by moneyed interests or overwhelmed by internal tensions, implementation of procedural changes and adoption of the two-tiered structure merging the VA and the VSG have

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the potential to mitigate these concerns and are essential elements critical to the viability of deliberative democracy in China. Notes 1. Hezhai Village of Guangxi is widely recognized as the birthplace of village elections in China. This author’s visit to Hezai and interview with Deng Minjie, Head of Rural Division, Department of Guangxi Civil Affairs, Guangxi, August 19–20, 2003; Xu 2003, 3–13. 2. In some well-to-do villages, VSG leaders can control considerable group resources and can be quite influential (Hu 2001). 3. This author observed a VA in Binzhou, Yunnan in July 2003 that had over 20,000 village residents. 4. For example, Hainan is one of the provinces with a high percentage (69.3%) of VC chairs who are simultaneously village party secretaries (Lai 2002, 211–13). 5. In some instances, village elites convene VRA meetings to get representatives’ approval; yet villagers do not believe that they necessarily represented village interest properly (Xing 2004). 6. The controversy was whether the money spent after the election constituted votebuying. The elected chair maintained that he did not commit bribery since the money was given to every eligible voter, not only to those who voted for him, and it was given out after the election, not before (Liu 2003). 7. In a well-reported case, township officials took over village land illegally for industrial development. A villager’s appeal forced the government to right the wrong (Yan 2004).

Works Cited Bai, Gang, and Shouxing Zhao. 2001. Xuanju Yu Zhili (Election and Governing). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe. Chan, Sylvia. 1998. “Village Self-Government and Civil Society.” In Joseph Cheng ed., China Review 1998. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 235–58. ———. 2003. “Villagers’ Representative Assemblies: Toward Democracy or Centralism?” China: An International Journal 1(2): 179–99. Chen, Lihua. 2005. “ ‘Quntixing Shijian’ Kaoyan Zhongguo” (China is Facing “Mass Action” Issues). Huanjiu (Global) 15 (August 2005). Chen, Zhemin, ed. 2000. Cunmin Zizhi De Lilun Yu Shijian (Theory and Practice of Villager Autonomy). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe. Dryzek, John S. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Editorial Committee of the Yearbook of Grassroots Democratic Development in China (Zhongguo Nongcun Jiceng Minzhu Zhengzhi Jianshe Nianjian Bianweihui). 2002. Zhongguo Nongcun Jiceng Minzhu Zhengzhi Jianshe Nianjian (2002 Yearbook of Grass-Roots Democratic Development in China). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe. Fujian Department of Civil Affairs (Fujiansheng Minzhengding). 1996. Cunweihui Xuanju Guicheng (Villager Committee Election Rules). Fuzhou.

214 / deliberative democracy in china Guo, Zhenglin. 2001. Cunming Xuanjuhou De Dangzhibu: Kunhuo, Douzheng Yu Quanligeju (Party Branch After Village Election: Confusion, Struggle, and Power Posture). In Lianjiang Li, Zhenlin Guo, and Tangbiao Xiao eds., Cunweihui Xuanju Guancha (Observing Village Elections). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 595–626. He, Baogang, and Youxing Lang. 2002. Xunzhao Minzhu Yu Quanwei De Pingheng: Zhejiang Cunmin Xuanju Jingyan Yanjiu (Seeking a Balance between Democracy and Authoritarianism: A Study of Villagers’ Election Experience in Zhejiang). Wuhan: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe. Hu, Rong. 2001. Lixing Xuanze Yu Zhidu Shishi (Rational Choice and Institutional Implementation). Shanghai: Shanghai Yuandong Chubanshe. Jiangxi Department of Civil Affairs (Jiangxisheng Minzhengding). 2002. Jiangxisheng Cunmin Weiyuanhui Xuanju Gongzuo Shouce (Handbook of Jiangxi Villager Committee Election). Nanchang. Lai, Chaoping. 2002. “Brief on the Third Round of Village Elections in Hainan.” In Collection of Papers on the Analysis of National Village Elections, Department of Basic-level Governance and Community Construction, Ministry of Civil Affairs, (Internal Documents), 211–13. Lawrence, Susan V. 1994. “Village Representative Assemblies: Democracy, Chinese Style.” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32: 61–68. Li, Lianjiang. 1999. “The Two Ballot System in Shanxi Province: Subjecting Village Party Secretaries to a Popular Vote.” China Journal 42: 103–18. Li, Tongxin. 2004. “One Mu of Land Compensation for the Price of Two Crabs.” People’s Daily, July 30. Liu, Jiahua. 2003. “2.3 Million Yuan to Buy VC Chair Position.” People’s Daily, August 21. Liu, Zhipeng. 2004. “Cunweihui Xuanjuzhong De Zhongdian, Nandian Wenti” (Major and Difficult Issues in Village Election). In Ming Tang ed., Cunweihui Xuanju Falu Wenti Yanjiu (Study of Legal Issues on Villager Committee Elections). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 252–60. Mi, Youlu, and Aiping Wang. 1999. Jingqiaoqiao de Geming (Rural Revolution Without Tumults). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe. Minjie, Deng, Head of Rural Division, Department of Guangxi Civil Affairs. Interview with author. Guangxi, August 19–20, 2003. O’Brien, Kevin J. 1994. “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32: 33–59. Oi, Jean C. 2001. “Election and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages.” In Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers eds., Elections and Democracy in Greater China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 149–75. Organic Law of the Villager Committee of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhifa). 1998. Beijing: Legal Publishing House. Pastor, Robert and Qingshan Tan. 2000. “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections.” The China Quarterly 162: 490–512. Research Group on Villagers’ Self-Governance in Rural China under the Research Institute of China’s Basic-level Governance (Zhongguo jiceng zhengquan yanjiuhui Zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi yanjiu ketizu). 1995. Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Daibiao Huiyi Zhidu (Report on the Villagers’ Representative Assemblies in China). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe.

village self-government in china / 215 Rural Division of Department of Basic-Level Governance and Community Construction (Minzhengbu Jiceng Zhengquan he shequ Jianshesi nongcunchu). 2002. Southern Rural Daily (Nanfang Nongcunbao). 2002. July 11. Tan, Qingshan. 2004. “Building Institutional Rules and Procedures: Village Elections in China.” Policy Sciences 37 (2): 1–22. ———, and Qiushui Xin. 2006. “Village Election and Governance.” The Journal of contemporary China. Thurston, Anne F. 1998. “Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China.” Peaceworks No. 23. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/ thurst23.html (accessed on July 3, 2006). Wang, Zhenyao. 1998. “Village Committees: The Basis for China’s Democratization.” In Edward B. Vermeer, Frank N. Pike, and Wei Lien Cheng eds., Cooperative and Collective in China’s Rural Development: Between State and Private Interests. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 247–52. Warren, Mark. 2002. “Deliberative Democracy.” In April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes eds., Democratic Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, 173–202. Xiao, Tangbiao. 2002. Zongzu, Xiancun Quanli Yu Xuanju (Clan, Village Power and Election). Xian: Xibei Daxue Chubanshe. Xu, Yong. 2003. Xiangcun Zhili Yu Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Village Governance and Chinese Politics). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe. 3–13. ———, and Yi Wu, eds. 2001. Xiangtu Zhongguo De Minzhu Xuanju (Democratic Election in Rural China). Wuhan: Huazhong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 3–16. Xuebo, Xing. 2004. “Township Government Violated Rules to Build Government Office Building.” Jinghua Daily, September 2. Yan, Yongwei. 2004. “To Make it Legal.” Legal Daily, September 12.

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C h ap t e r 1 1 The Reconstruction of Local Power: Wenling City’s “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” Dong Xuebing and Shi Jinchuan

Introduction Democratization can be pursued on two dimensions: we can democratize the origin of power and we can hope to democratize the exercise of power. From the perspective of the origins of power, Chinese grassroots democracy is well developed. For example, starting more than twenty years ago, there have been relatively free, just, and periodic elections in rural China. The election processes have already met international standards and utilize secret voting. These elections are free because the villagers need not worry about retaliation when voting and they are just because every vote is accorded equal weight. Periodic elections enable villagers to have some degree of substantial control over the leaders they elect. Of course, many problems still exist in the election processes in many regions. But the election process is spreading and democratic direct elections are being tested in villages and towns.1 Meanwhile, democratization in the origin of power in the villages has begun to influence urban areas; many cities have now experimented with democratic election and democratic management in neighborhood committees in their communities.2 Yet, as a result of the reality of Chinese politics, direct election of officials at a national level is still unmanageable (if not unimaginable) at the present time in China. From the perspective of the democratization of the exercise of power, however, Chinese democracy is less well-developed. Due to the complex and overstaffed administration of Chinese politics, including village committees, party branches, village conventions, congresses, other village organizations,

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and town governments, the structure of power inhibits democratic administration. (For more on the nature of the power structure, see Qingshan Tan’s very important and helpful chapter in this volume (chapter 10).) It is on this dimension that the most reform is needed. This second dimension—and a discussion about its democratization—is at the center of this chapter. One of the effective and practical methods for democratic administration is a process called “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity,” an innovative institution developed in Wenling City. Here, we describe the development and execution of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity.” We then attempt to analyze the institutional design through the lens of neo-institutional economics. In the final part of the chapter, we summarize the prospects for “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity.” The Development and Mechanics of the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” Process “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” has had the benefit of five years of experience in forming, developing, and deepening. The institution originated as a “democratic forum” without a real political structure and it transformed into a genuine democratic political institution. Through grassroots politics the scope of the institution has been broadened and deepened. At first, the subject matters explored through the process were circumscribed, but eventually the institution developed the capacity to expand and grow into a sustainable institution with potentially dramatic political importance in Chinese democratization. The History and Origins of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” In 1999, new party leaders started encouraging the modernization of agricultural, coastal, and rural regions. Education in agricultural and rural modernization was conducted throughout the entire Zhejiang Province. The propaganda departments in the cities of Taizhou and Wenling decided that the town of Songmen would be the pilot location for these educational efforts, which would involve face-to-face communication between common people and government officials. On June 15, 1999, the first democratic forum, entitled “social security,” was held in Songmen; nearly 150 local people attended the event. Lay citizens were excited to present their own points of view ranging from opinions about the town’s investment in environmental and construction programs to the price of liquidized gas. With the meeting place completely full, many thorny policy problems were solved on the spot. As for the remaining issues explored at the forum, some were tabled because resolution was impossible

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in the near future and others were slated for resolution at a later point. One of the problems solved through the forum was the disorder caused by the traffic condition at the intersection of Sanjiao Road and Chaoyang Road. The intersection needed a traffic sign, and the traffic police rectified the situation. That year, four forums were held in Songmen with more than 600 attendants, who presented 110 proposals. Eighty-four of these proposals were resolved on the spot and twenty-six were deferred for further consideration. The fora were praised as good places to solve problems and were referred to as the “Discussion of Important Points” in Songmen. This educational format attracted the attention of the media and superior leaders and helped to encourage renewed confidence and desire to participate in village government affairs. The government of Wenling widely publicized the developments in Songmen in every possible way. Then various forms of democratic activities appeared; “Democracy Day” was established to foster communication between villagers and cadres. With the democratic activities developing day by day, there was a clear path for further democratization. In May, 2001, to standardize, improve, and spread the new tools of democratization, the government of Taizhou City unified the various forms of grassroots democratic consultation, including “night talking about public feelings,” “democracy day in the countryside,” and “villagers’ fora,” to create “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity.” The institution grew and commanded more active participation of the masses and more directly focused on political issues. With so much attention from citizens, political officials needed to prepare carefully and furnish credible explanations for policies, forcing the exercise of power to become more democratic. The Development of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” After five years of popularizing and deepening this institution, it has become the most important grassroots means for residents from different circles to participate in social and political activities in Wenling City. As noted in the introduction, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” developed in two ways: 1. The scope of subjects broadened; and 2. The function deepened. The scope of these democratic activities has enlarged to include business regulation, social services, residential community organization, and other aspects of village and town government. Functionally, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” has gradually gone from resolving individual pecuniary problems to a means of collecting the opinions of common people on many issues of public interest. It has also changed from being a forum for answering questions and responding to requests of the masses into a platform for

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mobilizing support for and debating the validity of causes and policies. More importantly, it has transformed into an efficient means for democratic activity, for helping cadres improve democratic consciousness, for furnishing the executive with a forum for feedback to improve governance, and for encouraging the masses to voice and challenge their perceptions. The development of the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” can be divided into three phases, each focused around the town of Wenqiao within Wenling City: The First Phase. Prior to 2001, meetings were held regularly to discuss predetermined issues. The main topics usually included urgent problems that required resolution. Prior to the meeting, the topics would be communicated to the public through a weekly bulletin, which welcomed participation in the meeting, welcomed unlimited questions to be discussed, and invited leaders from relevant government sections to explain policies, settle problems, and implement solutions on the spot. For those questions that required some extra time for their consideration, the government would set a deadline for their solution. Finally, for those questions that could not be resolved reasonably quickly, the government would explain the reasons why they could not be resolved so that the masses would understand governmental inaction. In order to handle citizen requests surrounding the activity, a process for receiving feedback was established. A contact sheet would be submitted to the departments that were responsible for executing solutions by the required time. The chairperson of the local People’s Congress would supervise the results of each issue being resolved. Besides the scheduled meetings mentioned above, there was another type of democratic discussion being held irregularly without predetermined topics. The main focus was the employment situation in the town. In short, the main outcome of this phase was to promote equal dialogue between the government and the public by listening to comments and opinions, replying on the spot, and initiating implementation. The Second Phase. This effective democratic institution was introduced into the decisionmaking process for important affairs at the grassroots level. “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in this phase became a precondition for decisionmaking, leading to the establishment of the “hearing and witness decision” institution––essentially an open meeting. The procedure for these decision meetings in Wenqiao consisted of presenting the content and preliminary plans that were under consideration to the town’s People’s Congress and gathering public comments. Then, the decisions could be made using a rational process, considering a broad range of opinions offered by the public. The scope of decisionmaking in the town

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during this phase included social and economic development planning, general town planning, proposals on revised subregional planning, feasibility plans for key government projects, significant public issues initiated by more than five of the total representatives of town’s People’s Congress, and some public affairs and public facilities involving the interest of large segments of the population. When a decision needed to be made concerning an appropriate issue, a “hearing and witness” meeting would be held. The procedure to reach a decision consisted of five steps as follows: (1) the information about the meeting, such as time, place, and agenda would be noted to the public and the attendees; (2) the chair would introduce the agenda; (3) people from the governmental section or those responsible for a specific issue would introduce the task and preliminary opinions or plans; (4) there would be speeches regarding the agenda with frank discussions regarding comments, proposals, and governmental requirements; and (5) with this basis of proposals and opinions, the town government would then discuss, revise, and improve the preliminary settlement or plan to form a decision. After the “hearing and witness” meeting was held, a decision would be made and announced on the spot. The official participants mainly consisted of deputies to the People’s Congress and relevant stakeholders. Some other people from different circles may have been invited to attend and present at the meeting, depending on the specified agenda, but they were usually elites of one form or another. Nevertheless, most of the time, the whole village was invited to the meetings to deliberate about wide-ranging sets of policies. Any of the native villagers were allowed to join the meetings spontaneously and were free to express their opinions. In the meeting, if the agenda and plan were opposed by a majority of the participants, or many different opinions emerged, there might be a temporary suspension to cope with the problem and no decision would be reached. Next, a modified plan or agenda was proposed and a second meeting held to reach a reasonable decision. At the end of each meeting, the results were publicized on a public board and the participants at successive meetings were updated. The Third Phase. In the third phase, a new form of meeting was developed. In this phase, the participants mainly consisted of the deputies to the People’s Congress and the public, who were allowed to participate spontaneously in the meeting. The new institution was conferred with decisionmaking power for key and vital issues, but a decision would only be valid when at least twothirds of the official participants were in attendance and more than half of the total voted in favor of it. In effect, the hearings gained a level of direct policy

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impact that they did not have before: citizens shared power with politicians and discussed policy before implementing it. Ultimately, the institution developed into a real grassroots democratic practice, exercising power and reconstructing power in the public sphere. Wenling City thus presents an example of democratic consultative policymaking that deepens democracy beyond formal elections. This institution gradually became standard and routine. It became a necessary decisionmaking process at the village, town, and city levels. The Operational Mechanics of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” can be broken down into several components, including its agenda, the role of the chair and cadres at the village and town level, the invited participants, the actual content of the talk, the rules of order and decisionmaking mechanics, and the oversight of the institution itself. The agenda of a “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” at the town level can be set by the local party committee or government, the deputy members of a Congress, or by a collective public proposal. At the village level, it can be set by the local Party lodge, the village committee, the deputies, or by a public proposal. Before the meeting, a preliminary agenda is announced to the public. As the institution progressed, the city government stipulated the frequency for this activity, which was not less than four times per year for the town and two times per year for the village. The role of the chair has been defined as follows. During the town’s “hearing and witness” meeting, chairs have the duty of conducting the meeting according to the agenda and taking suggestions for ways to improve the feasibility of the agenda in general. To enhance the reasonableness and legality of the village’s decision, the chairs facilitate the discussion and gather feedback. The chairs are expected to administer the process fairly. The types of participants at the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” vary depending on the different purposes of the meeting. In short, every effort is made to include interested parties. The participants mainly consist of deputy members of the People’s Congresses, representatives from relevant governmental sections and departments, and villagers or residents. Lay citizens who are interested in the issues are also welcome to attend. For meetings at the village level, the participants “represent” one or a few households. The content and scope of the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” is usually delimited according to whether the subject matter is appropriate, both

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legally and socially. We have already discussed the selection of topics for the process and how the scope has broadened over time. We have also already discussed the decision procedure. With regard to the oversight of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity,” government officials are routinely evaluated on the basis of the success of the local exercises of this process, and promoted and demoted, depending on the success of these democratic fora. But there are also accountability mechanisms from within the polity. The execution of the decisions are often managed and supervised by native villagers and their representative institutions. For example, many towns in Wenling City have established discipline committees within their People’s Congresses to provide more oversight of the talks. Report phone numbers have also been established to welcome supervision from the public. The complaints recorded are a convenient index for the annual appraisal of government performance. Analysis With the wide participation of the rural public and the promotion by the government, the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling gained notable recognition. Without real precedent, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” had nothing to which it could refer for guidance; it was forced to innovate from the very beginning. The following sections highlight the economic environment, formation mechanisms, the path of institutional innovation, and the achievements of the “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” utilizing a framework of neo-institutional economics. The Economic Environment Wenling City is situated in a coastal area of eastern Zhejiang Province. It is surrounded on three sides by the ocean. To the north of the city is Linbo City; to the west is Wenzhou City. Its total land area is 920 square kilometers and the total length of coastal line is 317 kilometers; it encompasses 11 towns, 5 street communities, 831 rural villages, and 105 urban residential neighborhoods. The total population is 1.14 million persons. In recent years, the economy of Wenling has risen at a very fast pace, the quality of living has improved significantly, and the relative power of Wenling continues to grow on account of its economy. In 2002, the GDP of Wenling was $2.7 billion (US) with a growth rate of 11.5 percent and the GDP per capita was $2,365 (US) with a growth rate of 11.7 percent. The fiscal revenue was $220 million (US) with a growth rate of 25.1 percent, which ranked seventh in Zhejiang Province. The average expendable income for urban and rural residents was $1,564.64 (US) and farmers’ net income was

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$770.38 (US). In accordance with the evaluation conducted by the state statistical bureau, a comprehensive index of economic and social development conditions in China ranked Wenling 27th among 2,000 cities and 15th place for the competitive power of its economy. Four basic features can be highlighted about the economic development of Wenling. First, a relatively developed private economy has been established. Wenling was the birth place of the first joint-stock company in China. Joint-stock companies account for half of the total economy in Wenling. Individual and private entities account for the other half of the total output value. Second, five pillar industries dominate the economy: manufacturing of spare parts for the automobile and motor industry; manufacturing of electrical appliances; manufacturing of shoes and hats; manufacturing of construction materials; and commercial fishing for seafood. Third, the markets have developed relatively rapidly. Finally, the maritime economy plays a significant role in economic development. What does any of this have to do with democratization? In the regions with very strong private economies, the local public comes to expect greater democratic rights: with economic power comes political power. Moreover, those with economic power, like the citizens in Wenling, are best able to use democratic processes to optimize popular political power, because the relevant government entities also favor the independent development of the economy and are thus more likely to allow political development to ensure continued productivity. For example, the development of the private economy in Wenling led to widespread public approval of property ownership rights. And property ownership rights had a lot of significance for the course of democracy in rural society. At first, enterprises, individuals, and local governments, eager to maintain their profits, attempted to win further political rights through democratization efforts. Without clear property ownership rights— which needed to be won through the political system—the economy’s growth might be stunted. Farmers, too, were ultimately inclined to choose democratic procedures and institutional innovation because these processes led to policies favorable to their economic interests. Prior to democratization, farmers were often vulnerable to having their land condemned by the government with little compensation. Democratic processes promised to better their situation on this dimension by giving them a voice in the process. In turn, the government was more than pleased to show its good faith and devolve power to citizens who had substantial economic opportunities in which the government was interested in participating (and collecting taxes upon). Obviously, this “economic” explanation for the development of democratization in Wenling is only one perspective. A more “political” and

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“teleological” explanation is available as well: an equal dialogic relationship between the citizens and the government met the desires of individuals who were happy to increase their own political power and met the desires of government, which was able to enhance its own legitimacy and stability through democratization. Formation In accordance with the theory of institutional economics, institutional activities consist in both the selection and change of the institution. An institutional change can be classified as either an “induced institutional change” or a “compulsory institutional change.” When self-organization spontaneously and internally leads to change, this is considered “induced institutional change.” Those changes that are consciously made by the state and have an element of compulsion should be called “compulsory institutional change.” It is hard to classify the formation and development of “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling into either of these specialized categories. Still, we are impressed by the degree to which it is helpfully viewed as an induced institutional change, owing to its organic development. The public demanded democratic innovations. And acknowledging that voting rights were not currently possible on a larger scale, the public instead demanded democratic consultation. More, the villagers were not content with their levels of information about village administrative affairs. So, in the early “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” processes, the villagers demanded that the village committees publicize. Their activities more substantially. In some ways, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” began as a means of communication, but it rapidly developed in a fairly short period. Here is a quick map of how that organic formation occurred: demands of the public → innovations by local government → performance by the public under the guidance of the local government → innovation and experimentation in other locales with modified procedures → cooperative promotion of the institutional change by the public and local government. The Course of Change Another focal point of discussion about institutional change more generally is whether change should be gradual or radical. The “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” was clearly an example of gradual change. Here we simply review the three phases associated with the development of the process to show the gradual nature of the change. Phase one was mainly a communicative enterprise. Questions were raised by the public and the officials replied or addressed matters after the

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meeting. The officials mainly proposed the subjects and the topics of the talks were circumscribed. The process remained slightly disorganized. Phase two was more organized. The topics covered were matters that received the broadest level of concern. During this phase, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” was connected with decisionmaking on vital issues and became formal hearings. A specific topic would be assigned to each meeting, which would be a vital problem that needed to be solved. Important issues were presented to the public for discussion or decisionmaking and the possibilities of faulty and unpopular decisions were reduced, facilitating social stabilization. Phase three effectively transferred decisionmaking authority to the institution. The reform in this phase fully utilized available political resources and existing knowledge and involved the masses in popular political participation. In sum, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling underwent gradual institutional change and only helped restructure executive authority after going through earlier experimental, phases. It is worth highlighting that the course of development of the process was only possible at each stage because both the public and the government thought the benefits outweighed the costs. The process is a good example of democratization through the enlightened self-interest of all concerned. Achievements Many researchers have studied the achievements and experience of this institution and formed their opinions about the phenomenon. As we have explored here, we think the restructuring of local power and its exercise is the most important message about the democratic possibilities inherent in this form of democratization. If it is adopted elsewhere, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” will undoubtedly play a significant role in the course of the democratization in China more generally. Conclusion “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling provides a new window into understanding the development and reform of democracy in China, and, in particular, the deliberative democratization of China. The above analysis reveals important elements of democratic reform and institutional change in China and addresses an urgent question: with the current environment and institutions, how can grassroots democracy take hold and organize itself properly? Even if full-scale direct elections are not likely to be instituted very soon, “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” is a good model for gradual and deliberative democratic reform. As we have emphasized, such an institution

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not only deepens discourse but also restructures and democratizes the exercise of power. To be sure, a precondition seems to be some form of economic success; but with China’s rapidly growing economy, there will be more opportunities like the one presented in Wenling. Having found an effective way of developing grassroots democracy, we must ask about its prospects. Will it share power with the People’s Congresses at the level of villages and towns? Can it spread and develop without being fully recognized by law? Can it successfully be transplanted to other areas in China? All these questions remain to be answered. We are hopeful that this analysis can provide some help in those applications to come. Notes 1. The first case of direct election for town mayor was held in the town of Buyun, Shizhong District, Suiling City, Sichuan Province in 1998. 2. The election of cadres of residential committees was initially held in Sifang District, Qingdao City in 1998.

Works Consulted Cao Yongyi and Chen Wenzheng. 2003. “The Reconstruction of Faith and the Transition of Governing—To Understand ‘Democratic Talk in All Sincerity’ in Taizhou.” Unpublished Paper, September 23. Committee of the Organization Ministry of Taizhou. 2001. A Collection of Democratic and Political Construction at the Grassroots Level in Rural Areas in Taizhou. Committee of the People’s Government of Songmen Town. 2003. Democratic Talk in All Sincerity. Committee of People’s Government of Wenjiao Town. 2002. The Exploration and Innovation of the Democratic and Political Construction at the Grassroots Level—A Collection of Deepening “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenjiao Town. Committee of People’s Government of Wenling City. 2002. Advice on Deepening “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” and Promoting the Democratic and Political Construction at the Grassroots Level. Committee of the Propaganda Department of Taizhou. 2002. The Exploration and Innovation of the Political Work in Rural Areas in the New Era. Committee of the Propaganda Department of Taizhou. 2003. Democratic and Political Construction at the Grassroots Level—Research on the Innovative “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Taizhou, Zhejiang. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press. Committee of the Propaganda Department of Wenling. 2003. Deepening “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” and Promoting Democracy at the Grassroots Level. Dahl, Robert. 1999. On Democracy. Trans. Li Boguang and Lin Meng. Hong Kong: Commercial Press. Jin Xiangrong. 2000. “Multi-Type of Institutional Change Co-Existing and the Course of Gradual Transformation.” A Proceeding of Zhejiang University.

228 / deliberative democracy in china Jing Yuejin. 2003. “Democracy of Administration: Significance and Limitations.” Social Sciences in Zhejiang, No. 1. Li Fan. 2004. A Report on the Democratic Development at the Grassroots Level in China 2000–2001. The Oriental Press. Li Jingpeng. 2000. An Outline of the Theoretical Research on Chinese Political Development. Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Press. ———. 2003. “The New Institution of ‘Democratic Talk in All Sincerity’ and Democratic Decision-Making.” Social Sciences in Zhejiang, No. 1: 12–16. Miller, Dennis. 2002. Public Choice. Trans. Yang Chunxue. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press. Sang Yucheng. 2000. The Roles of Government—A Discussion of the Action and Inaction of Government in the Market Economy. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. Xie Qingkui. 2003. “The Development of Democratic and Political Construction at the Grassroots Level—On the ‘Democratic Talk in All Sincerity’ in Wenling City.” Social Sciences in Zhejiang, No. 1: 16–21. Yang Ruilong. 1998. The Theory of Three Phases of the Institutional Change in China. Economy Research. Yu Xunda. 2003. “Democratic Governing Is the Most Far-Ranging Way of Democratic Practice.” Social Sciences in Zhejiang, No. 1: 28–31. Zhang Shuguang, ed. 1999. A Case Study on the Institutional Change in China. Vol. 2. Beijing: Chinese Financial and Economic Press. Zhang Xiaojin. 2003. “An Important Tryout of Democratic Construction and Development: Reflections on the ‘Democratic Talk in All Sincerity’ in Wenling City.” Social Sciences in Zhejiang, No. 1: 21–25.

C h ap t e r 1 2 Public Consultation Through Deliberation in China: The First Chinese Deliberative Poll* James S. Fishkin, Baogang He, and Alice Siu

Introduction Throughout the world, policymakers who wish to consult the public appear to face a persistent dilemma. On the one hand, if they consult mass opinion directly, they will get views that are largely uninformed. Most citizens, most of the time, in most political systems, know little about the details of policy options or public policy. Even in systems with active electoral competition, each citizen can easily conclude that his or her individual opinion is unlikely to make much difference. Anthony Downs coined a term for this phenomenon: “rational ignorance” (Downs 1997). On the other hand, if policymakers do not attempt to consult the mass public directly, but leave it to policy elites and organized interests to speak for the people, those elites may have different interests. They may be out of touch with mass concerns. We seem to face a forced choice between politically equal but relatively incompetent masses and politically unequal but relatively more competent elites. The dilemma is actually worse in that most efforts to consult the public directly encounter difficulties over the issue of which members of the public are consulted: how are they selected? If one just invites the public to open town meetings, the appearance of mass participation may belie practices in which organized interests actually dominate. Organization is an unequally distributed resource and open forums can be captured through efforts at mobilization. On the other hand, if one conducts scientific polling via random sampling, then it is possible to get the views of a representative sample * Thanks to Professor Robert C. Luskin for his extraordinarily useful advice on the questionnaire and many other aspects of this project.

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of the entire population. However, the views solicited will be uninformed or even “non-attitudes.” (If, for example, the public has not thought about a question at all, they may somewhat randomly pick an answer rather than admit that they “don’t know.”) The research program “Deliberative Polling”—explored in detail in chapter 2 of this book—is intended to respond to this dilemma. It achieves both political equality and deliberation at the same time. By employing random sampling of the mass public, it counts everyone’s views equally. But by providing good conditions to motivate ordinary citizens to become informed, it overcomes the problem of rational ignorance. Of course everything depends on what we might mean by “good conditions” and questions about the success or failure of this initiative turn on the empirical evidence about what actually happens when citizens deliberate. Thus far, Deliberative Polling has been conducted mostly in established Western democracies ranging from the United States, Britain, and Canada, to Denmark and Australia. One Deliberative Poll (DP) has been conducted in Bulgaria and another took place in Hungary. (For an overview, see http://cdd.stanford.edu.) While the range of countries and policy contexts has been expanding, there is one notable omission. There has not yet been a case in which a government, rather than a private organization or television network, has conducted the DP itself and then gone on to implement its conclusions in actual policy. In the context of electric utilities regulation, a number of companies in Texas and elsewhere have conducted DPs about how to provide electricity, and those recommendations have been implemented. But those DPs were conducted by profit-seeking private companies, not by the government. (See http://cdd.stanford.edu, section on renewable energy and http://www.i-d-a.com.au.)1 The DP described here, which took place in the town of Zeguo, Wenling City, Zhejiang Province, China in 2005, is the first that was, to our knowledge, conducted by a government itself and then actually implemented as public policy. We believe it is the first case in modern times of fully representative and deliberative participatory budgeting. It harkens back to a form of democracy quite different from modern Western-style party competition— Ancient Athens. In Athens, deliberative microcosms chosen by lot would make important public decisions as part of the official operations of the government. But this solution to the dilemma of public consultation was lost in the dustbin of history. Random sampling was revived by opinion polling in the twentieth century (what is a random sample, at bottom, but a lottery?). But with opinion polls the people randomly selected do not deliberate and become more informed. Hence we think that the experiment described here is notable in the context of the long history of democratic reforms in that it shows how governments, without party competition or the conventional institutions of representative democracy as practiced in the West,

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can nevertheless realize, to a high degree, two fundamental democratic values at the same time: political equality and deliberation. If the effort is successful, then local democratic efforts can thus achieve responsiveness to informed and thoughtful public opinion. There is a way out of the dilemma, a path suggestive of Ancient Athens, but one that has now surfaced in China. Indeed, the Chinese case shows an advance over all previous efforts of public consultation precisely because this consultation produced actual and direct policy impact. Background In recent years, consultative and deliberative institutions have been developing in China, and an increasing number of public hearings have provided people with opportunities to express their opinions on a wide range of issues. In the middle and latter 1990s, some villages developed village representative meetings in which major decisions on village affairs were discussed, debated, and deliberated upon by village representatives. This local public hearing system has spread into urban residential communities. In the Shangcheng district of Hangzhou City, for example, a consensus conference or consultation meeting is held regularly once a month. Such a practice has also developed at the national level. In 1996, the first national law on administrative punishment introduced an article on holding public hearings before punishments are imposed. The famous Article 23 of the Law on Price passed by the China’s National Congress in December 1997 specified that the price of public goods must be decided through public hearing. The Law on the Legislature, passed in 2000, followed Article 23, and required public hearings as an integral part of the decisionmaking of all legal regulations and laws in China. More than fifty cities have now held legislative public hearings. However, public hearings, despite offering some measure of public consultation, have inherent problems: they are vague in procedural requirements, are easily subject to manipulation, have greatly unequal participation, offer insufficient time for deliberation, and lack scientific guarantees of representativeness or any means of producing clearly defined conclusions.2 Wenling City, in particular, is well known for inaugurating deliberative meetings. It is a county-level city with a vibrant private economy. In some townships in Wenling, private tax contributions constitute more than 70 percent of the local budget. In 2004, it was awarded the national prize for Innovations and Excellence in Local Chinese Governance. From 1996 to 2000, more than 1,190 deliberative and consultative meetings were held at village level, 190 at township level, and 150 in governmental organizations, schools, and the business sectors. Such meetings are called kentan, meaning “sincere heart-to-heart discussion.” (See He 2003, 293–314.)

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While Wenling has achieved a great deal in developing such deliberative institutions, these efforts are far from representative, since they are based on selfselected participation. And there remain other deficiencies. Deliberation takes place in a political system in which there are inherent dangers of elite manipulation of the public dialogue and mobilization of the participants chosen by officials. The design of Deliberative Polling, with random sampling and balanced briefing materials, addresses to all of these difficulties in a transparent way. The Deliberative Polling project in Zeguo allowed a scientific sample of average citizens to deliberate about which infrastructure projects would be funded in the coming year. It is the first example of what we hope will be a broader research program applying Deliberative Polling in a Chinese context. A DP could be evaluated in various ways. It is many things at once—a social science investigation, a public policy consultation, a contribution to the media, and a public discussion in its own right. In this case, we think that some reasonable desiderata are that (1) the sample is representative, (2) there are significant changes in opinions, (3) the sample becomes more informed, and (4) the views of this representative and informed sample be viewed as a credible input to policy. Origin, Preparation, and Sampling Background on Zeguo Zeguo has an area of 63.12 square kilometers; the center area is 6.5 square kilometers. It has jurisdiction over ninety-seven villages. The permanent local population is 119,200 and the floating (migrant) population is 120,000. Zeguo’s industry has been developing rapidly. Currently, the four major industries are shoe-making, water pump manufacture, air compressor manufacture, and new building materials manufacture. In 2004, the total value of its industrial and agricultural output was 13.40 billion yuan (US $1.7 billion), with 13.18 billion yuan (US $1.6 billion) alone being from these four industries. These four industries paid annual taxes of 321 million yuan (US $40 million) in 2004, an increase of 33.7 percent compared to the previous year. The average annual net income of farmers is 8,255 yuan (US $1,000). Zeguo was recently listed as 145th of the top 20,000 national towns based on a multiple development index. It also placed number 30 of the top 100 towns with multiple strengths in Zhejiang Province. It should be noted that outsiders did not impose the DP experiment on Zeguo. The authors of this study provided only technical advice.3 It was the natural product of the political process in Zeguo, where the local government needed deliberative and consultative meetings to reduce conflicts of interest, to reduce any perception of corruption in selecting priorities for

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budgetary projects, and to provide a channel for citizens and interest groups to express their concerns. We believe these factors are replicable in other townships and cities in China with similar concerns. Preparation and Sampling Both a working committee and an expert committee formed in December 2004 undertook the launch of Deliberative Polling in Zeguo. The working committee included Deputy Party Secretary Dai Kangnian of Wenling, Officer Chen Yiming, Party Secretary Jiang Zhaohua of Zeguo, and Deputy Party Secretary Wang Xiaoyu of Zeguo, who took care of the logistics and acted as the sample’s liaison. The working committee organized the expert committee that carried out a preliminary study of the development projects and wrote feasibility reports for all of the projects. Briefing information about each project was prepared by the working committee and provided to the participants in March 2005. Professors James Fishkin and Baogang He helped local officials prepare the questionnaires and briefing materials and ensured these materials were balanced, accessible, and contained arguments for and against each project. Fishkin and He tested and revised the questionnaire through a number of interviews in March 2005. Of the entire Zeguo population, 275 people were randomly selected to participate in this DP. Random sampling of the population is designed to create a diverse and representative microcosm including not only those citizens who are already active in politics, but also those who are disengaged. Of the 275 people drawn in the initial sample, 269 completed the initial questionnaire. A total of 257 participants showed up on the day of deliberations and 235 completed the experiment (completed a questionnaire both before and after deliberation).4 There are not many statistically significant differences between the participants and the whole sample from which they were drawn. (See table 12.1.) And what differences there are tend to be small. Given the high response rate of the initial sample and the high attendance rate from those who completed the questionnaire, the wide breadth of representation should not be surprising. In one day, participants discussed how to spend the annual budget, examined their preferences among the projects, considered advantages and disadvantages of each project, and, at the end of the day, responded to the same questionnaire that asked them to rank their project priorities. Some of the projects considered included new bridges, roads, a new school, and city gardens. In total, the projects would cost 136 million yuan (US $17 million). Due to a change in government policy in 2005, only an estimated 40 million yuan (US $5 million) could be expanded on urban planning and environmental and infrastructure construction. Thus, the local government

234 / deliberative democracy in china Table 12.1 Demographics of sample Question no. 1. Gender Male Female 2. Average Agea 3. Martial Status Married Single 4. Education Illiterate Primary School Secondary High School College College for professional training University Other 5. Occupation Farmer Worker Entrepreneur (business owner) Merchant Teacher Public Servant Other

Entire sample

Participants(%)

Non-participants(%)

70.1 29.9 42.6 years

66.2 33.8 47.5 years

80.8 19.2 37.6 years

94.0 6.0

92.9 5.7

92.0 8.0

10.3 30.2 35.1 12.4 4.5 6.6

11.6 32.4 35.2 9.7 4.6 6.0

0.0 11.1 33.3 33.3 3.7 11.1

0.8 0.0

0.5 0.0

3.7 0.0

60.0 3.9 21.0

62.8 3.7 16.5

21.7 4.3 52.2

8.3 2.0 1.5 3.4

7.4 1.6 1.6 3.7

13.0 4.3 4.3 0.0

Note: a  significant difference between participants who completed before and after surveys and participants who completed before surveys. Age was marginally significant with t (23)  1.73, p  0.097.

had to prioritize their menu of projects. The Zeguo leadership adopted the Deliberative Polling technique to decide this difficult budget issue. In light of budget constraints, the participants were asked to examine carefully thirty projects, discuss their merits, and identify key questions that they wished to ask of competing experts in plenary sessions. As in other DPs, the day alternated small group discussions and plenary sessions in which the questions from the small groups were answered from competing perspectives. At the end of the day, respondents completed a questionnaire about the thirty projects as well as information relevant to them. This process provided a before and after comparison for the same sample. In March, the participants had completed a survey before any information was given to them and before they had an opportunity to deliberate. On the day of deliberation (in April), the participants were given both information and a chance to deliberate, and then they completed the same questionnaire again.

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To facilitate deliberation, the 257 participants were divided randomly into sixteen discussion groups; each group had its own trained moderator. The sixteen moderators were teachers selected from Zeguo Number Two High School. They were trained by Fishkin and He in March and April. Results of Deliberative Polling: Policy Evaluation The process of Deliberative Polling is intended to represent what the public would think if it had a chance to become more informed. The participants Table 12.2 Policy changes No. Rank of Projects

Before Mean

After Mean

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8.916 8.642 8.253 7.531 7.269 6.963 7.551 7.612 7.212 6.667

9.713a 9.239a 9.238a 9.145a 8.866a 7.440a 7.314 7.231 7.042 6.895

7.423 6.746 6.259 6.973 5.827 5.604 7.140 6.369 6.530 5.633 5.680 5.629

6.531a 6.491 6.296 6.118a 5.972 5.953 5.828a 5.577 5.543a 5.327 5.196 5.062

5.433 5.781 5.927 5.023 5.606 6.000 4.667 5.184

5.100 5.052a 5.046a 4.733 4.586a 4.656a 4.591 3.500a

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Treatment of sewage (early stages) Urban and countryside environmental projects Wenchang Main Ave. Danyan environmental project (sewage disposal) Muyu environmental project (sewage disposal) Citizen’s Park (first stage) Urban environmental constructions Danyan Hill Park Muyu Hill Park Auxiliary environmental construction for Muyu industrial zone, Lianshu industrial zone, Shuichan industrial zone Bridge Demonstrative street Xicheng Road (first stage) Shuangchen Road Zeguo Main Ave. (second stage) Guojialing hillside reconstruction Reconstruction for Donghe Road Old street reconstruction Muchang Main Road (first stage) Donghe Main Ave. Chengqu subroad rebuild Air compressor industrial zone matching environmental constructions Dongcheng Road Fuxin Road Wenchang Park (first stage) Tengquao Road Dongcheng Road (second stage) Shuangchen Road (second stage) Zeguo Main Ave. (third stage) Wenchang Park (second stage)

Note: Means are from participants who completed pre and post questionnaires. a  statistically significant changes.

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rated thirty projects on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is unimportant and 10 is very important. After deliberation, these rankings changed significantly in many key cases. Among the highest rated projects, support increased significantly for three sewage treatment plants (projects ranked 1, 4, and 5 as seen in table 12.2), for producing a plan for the overall city design (ranked 2), one of the principal roads (the Wenchang Main Ave, ranked 3), and the Citizen’s Park (ranked 6). Overall the top ten projects showed considerable concern for environmental issues (sewage), lifestyle (parks), and the economic development that would be stimulated by the Wenchang Main Ave. project. Support for a number of other projects, including a number of roads and one park, went down significantly. The two factors which participants cited as most important in evaluating the projects were “protecting the environment,” reaching a mean of 9.64 on a 0–10 scale (where 0 is unimportant and 10 is very important), and economic development, reaching a mean of 9.08 on the same ten point scale. Knowledge In addition to their opinions on policy choices, the participants were asked questions about Zeguo and its economic situation to assess their knowledge of general issues (table 12.3). The four knowledge questions showed an average increase of 6.7 percent. The questions assessed knowledge of local policy by asking about the percentage of revenue increase, the size of the floating population, the major products produced in the town, and the number of parks the township has now. One of the questions, which asked which product

Table 12.3 Knowledge increases Before (% correct)

After (% correct)

Amount of change

43: By how much did Zeguo township’s revenue increase from 2003 to 2004?a 44: What is the figure for the floating population in Zeguo township?a

20.8

29.0

8.2

39.4

47.2

7.8

45: Which of the below is not a major product of Zeguo township? 46: At the moment, how many parks does Zeguo have?a

43.1

43.5

0.4

22.3

32.7

10.4

Question no.

Note: In analyzing knowledge questions, “don’t know” responses and missing data are coded as “0.” a  statistically significant changes.

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was not produced in Zeguo, seems to have confused respondents. If that question is excluded, the average increase in knowledge is 8.9 percent. Evaluation of the Process Mr. Jiang Zhaohua, Zeguo’s Party Secretary, expressed great enthusiasm for the process and the results as compared with all previous deliberative meetings. The methods are sophisticated and dealt with the most difficult issue of all, budgeting. He also admitted that: Although I gave up some final decision-making power, we gain more power back because the process has increased the legitimacy for the choice of priority projects and created public transparency in the public policy decision-making process. Public policy is therefore more easily implemented.

Mr. Ye Qiquan, the head of Zeguo, who was opposed to the Deliberative Polling experiment in the beginning, realized its benefits. He identified three major changes among the participants: from little to more complete understanding of the thirty projects; from passive to active citizenship in the sense that the citizens started to think about how to save money to do more projects; and from a partisan to a community perspective. The participants greatly appreciated the process. When asked a series of questions on a 0–10 scale, where 0 indicated it was “generally a waste of time” and 10 that it was “extremely valuable,” the participants gave the small group discussions an average rating of 8.46, the large group sessions with experts an average rating of 8.82, and the entire day of deliberation an average rating of 8.66. They also thought the process considered their views very equally. On a 1–5 scale, where 1 is very equal and 5 is very unequal, the average answer for whether the “small group moderator provide[d] everyone with an equal opportunity for discussion” was 1.47 and the average for whether the group members were, in fact, equal in the discussion was 1.3. On whether their small group moderator attempted to influence the process with his or her own views, the participants’ responses averaged 3.93, where 4 meant that the moderator made no attempt to influence participants’ views at all. Discussion Indigenous Aspects of the Experiment The Chinese experiment combined Chinese indigenous deliberative methods with Deliberative Polling as developed by Fishkin and his colleagues. Local

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Chinese indigenous deliberative methods are characterized as follows. First, the experiment drew on the traditional heart-to-heart talk form, even to the extent that the deliberative experiment was given a title with local flavor— a “democratic heart-to-heart talk.” Second, the high level of participation was extremely impressive. Officials called for wide participation through official channels such as newspapers and notice boards, and provided a free bus, a free lunch, and a token of 50 yuan (US $6) for each participant to attract more people to attend.5 Third, in Chinese political culture, those who were randomly selected felt that they ought to participate in the deliberation in order to represent their villages. Fourth, even the schedule of the deliberation reflected elements of a Chinese lifestyle in that the deliberation had a short morning session so that the participants could have their lunch at the traditional time of 11:30 am. Progress and Improvement Deliberative Polling represents an advance over the methods of previous public consultations in Wenling in the following ways. First, in the past, wide representation was thought to occur at town meetings if a variety of local elites, such as people’s deputies, village committee members, and village representatives were present. All were elected by local villagers and residents and would, therefore, appear to have a degree of electoral representation. The participants in these previous deliberative meetings, however, were either selected by governmental officials or were self-appointed with strong partisan interests. The representative nature of the participants was questionable and, additionally, might be viewed as subject to official manipulation. Deliberative Polling adopts random selection, overcoming perceptions of manipulation and enabling representation for the whole community to occur on a scientific basis. In addition, random sampling insulates the process from possibilities of capture by mobilized groups. Party Secretary Jiang Zhaohua commented that “the random selection method has a wide popular basis and is much more representative than the method we used before.” Because the sampling was random, roughly 9 percent of the sample was illiterate. In the past, illiterate people would not have been selected. They would have been automatically disqualified because, in the official opinion, “they even don’t know how to speak.” In Deliberative Polling, the illiterate participants were given the same opportunity to express their views. One even criticized certain local policies harshly in a plenary session. Indeed, as Jiang Zhaohua acknowledged, an open democratic process enables them to be cultivated as modern citizens. Second, past deliberative meetings did not provide sufficient information. Zeguo’s 2005 DP had a team of twelve experts working on the briefing

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materials. Fishkin and He helped them revise the briefing materials, so that they were well balanced and accessible, and so that they clearly expressed pros and cons for each project. The experiment revealed that the availability of information (or lack thereof ) plays a role in changing peoples’ opinions. The briefing documents improved the participants’ knowledge of the thirty projects and assisted them in making informed choices. Third, in the past, officials often used anecdotal evidence to laud the achievements of deliberative meetings, but they lacked a scientific basis. This DP required participants to complete the same questionnaire twice, once before deliberation and once after deliberation. By comparing the results, it generates a set of statistical figures about the impact of deliberation on the people’s preferences. This scientific method was felt by local officials to be valuable in making public policy. Jiang Zhaohua admitted that his personal choice of projects was based on what he thought “the people” wanted, but that the people from whom he gleaned this impression were in fact close to local government. These projects were not on the top of the list of the DP results. In contrast, the top twelve projects selected by the DP were strongly supported by empirical evidence reflecting the representative and informed views of the community. Fourth, township consultative meetings in the past would bring together 100–200 people for two hours leaving little time for adequate discussion and deliberation. This trade-off between the higher number of the participants and the lower quality of deliberation is well addressed by Deliberative Polling. By alternating between small meetings and plenary sessions, this method allows the benefits of small group interaction to be spread over a large number of participants. At the same time, it allows for the information thought essential in the group meetings to be shared across the entire sample. Fifth, previously, officials chaired deliberative meetings. During the DP experiment, school teachers were selected as moderators. They were trained and advised to ensure an equal opportunity for discussion by each participant and to prevent domination of the discussions by a few. The experiment was intended to create a counterfactual environment in which the participants could interact in an atmosphere of significant equality and come to conclusions on the basis of good information. In the small groups, the participants had sufficient time to focus on the pros and cons of each project and to identify key concerns or questions that they then brought to the plenary sessions where they were posed to competing experts. Each participant was asked to fill out the questionnaire privately without being subject to social pressure. Of course, it is not possible to completely insulate the process from all the inequalities of life. The participants knew who many of their fellow citizens were. Some were more educated or more prosperous or more

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forceful in the discussions. But the job of the moderator was to facilitate, as far as possible, an atmosphere of substantial equality and mutual respect for all points of view. The participant ratings suggest that the moderators were generally successful. Sixth, the empowerment of citizens was substantial and unique. In the public hearings on the adjustment of the price for transportation, for example, ordinary citizens are essentially powerless in the face of the agency for public transportation that has vested interests. Citizens can express their voice and deliberate upon the proposed prices, but, in the end, the agency raises prices as it sees fit. In the Zeguo experiment, by contrast, most officials were sitting outside the classrooms and they were not allowed to speak out to influence the choices of the citizens participating. Ultimately, Zeguo People’s Congress endorsed the final choices of the sample of citizens as an official policy. Citizens were empowered through an open and transparent democratic mechanism. Moreover, the experiment contributed to a construction of social capital and mutual trust between the local government and citizens. Deliberative Participatory Budgeting Budgeting has traditionally been the privilege of Chinese leaders who consult only with experts. To alter this Chinese tradition of a bureaucratically dominated budgeting process, the Zeguo experiment introduced what we might call “deliberative participatory budgeting.” The concept of deliberative participatory budgeting has been well developed in other parts of the world, for example, in the city of Porto Alegre (Nylen 2002). These efforts, however, are not nearly as sophisticated as the Deliberative Polling method. In other deliberative participatory budgeting processes, the participants are either self-selected or mobilized by organized interests. The Zeguo experiment can be viewed as an effort at deliberative participatory budgeting that satisfies the two fundamental criteria of political equality (through random sampling and equal consideration of opinions) and deliberation (through a balanced and informative process of discussion). Because local government has actually implemented its results, it offers a unique first case, and one that has prospects for replication in a Chinese context. Conclusion The uniqueness of the Zeguo experiment is evidenced in the close linkage between the results of a sample of citizens deliberating and the policymaking process. The results were presented to Zeguo’s local People’s Congress

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on April 30, 2005 for further debate and deliberation. In the final analysis, a majority of the peoples’ deputies voted for the DP’s top twelve projects. The Zeguo town government has now implemented this decision. The Zeguo experiment represents a systematic public decisionmaking mechanism that consists of expert feasibility studies, public participation through Deliberative Polling, government consultation, and a final decision made by Zeguo’s local People’s Congress. In light of the four desiderata mentioned at the outset, we believe this initial Chinese effort was successful. First, a highly representative sample was recruited for participation. Second, many of the opinion changes were statistically significant and showed a coherent movement, especially in favor of environmental concerns. Third, the participants became significantly more informed. Fourth, the results were obviously regarded as a credible basis for policymaking given the fact that the local People’s Congress implemented them. We believe this initial experiment offers real prospects for further democratic consultation in China. For one thing, the procedures are clearly defined, easily learned, and capable of being implemented. Hence, the process could be spread to other municipalities and to cities beyond township level. Some large cities in China, such as Hangzhou, have developed a public policy evaluation process involving more than 10,000 questionnaires being sent to urban residents. Such methods have high cost even though the quality of evaluation is low; urban residents do not have sufficient information about many of the government departments they are required to evaluate. Deliberative Polling can overcome both these problems. A DP on the scale of the one conducted in Zeguo (about 250 participants) would be large enough to produce statistically significant results and could also represent the population’s informed opinions. Compared to the large-scale surveys now being conducted, it would be reasonable in cost. Indeed, it becomes more cost effective for larger populations, as there is no need for larger samples to represent larger populations. Deliberative Polling techniques applied directly to public policy options seem to have a broad appeal as a form of democratic consultation (and it does not require party competition, threatening the one-party state). Ogden (2002, 257) has noted the importance of consultative and deliberative institutions for Chinese democratization, as have many contributors to this volume. And Deliberative Polling offers a promising contribution to such democratization. In spreading Deliberative Polling techniques, however, there are several obstacles to be overcome. First, the cost is an issue for some venues. Zeguo spent around 100,000 yuan (US $12,000) and it is capable of affording this. But for poor areas, such an amount of money will be a heavy burden upon local people. In addition, the workload is heavy. Given the cost and

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workload, it is likely that Deliberative Polling techniques will be used only to deal with the most important issues, such as budgeting for infrastructure, environmental issues, and welfare. Further, local practitioners tend to use simplified and informal methods, and a tendency to seek shortcuts can become a real problem. For example, at the beginning of the Zeguo Deliberative Polling experiment, some local officials wanted to muddle through, skipping over some procedures, and cutting short the time of deliberation. They were surprised to learn that Fishkin and He insisted on a careful and conscientious approach to each detail in every step of the process. Ultimately, local practitioners need to be trained to apply new methods. At the same time, however, it is expected that local practitioners will find ways to localize Deliberative Polling techniques. It is imaginable that local practitioners will discover which elements of the procedure are indispensable and which can be omitted if permitted. Over time, they may adapt some procedures of Deliberative Polling to meet their local needs. Also, an unequal power structure is a great hindrance to the spread of deliberative democracy. One way to deal with this hindrance is to focus on a set of procedures and methods. Deliberative Polling methods carry with them some deep democratic values. Each element of the Deliberative Polling project is designed to ensure equality and fairness while reducing arbitrary intervention and influence. The process ensures the transparency of decisionmaking, rebutting suspicions of corruption. In addition, the neutrality of moderators ensures an equal opportunity for each participant. The random selection method implies a statistical equality for everyone in the community; villagers were surprised to learn of this very fair and corruption-free process. They commented on “how serious and fair the selection process is this time!” Moreover, those who were randomly selected felt it to be an honor to participate in the budget-related event. Of course, Deliberative Polling does not change the political structure. But it points to a method of achieving core democratic values (political equality and deliberation) without any need for Western style party competition. And if the process spreads, it may have further effects on the political culture, effects that could facilitate additional democratic reforms over the long term. In short, the practice of deliberative methods and procedures may contribute to a culture in which people are accustomed to representative and informed public consultation. They may hopefully become accustomed to the notion that their voice matters. Currently, the Beijing leadership fears the negative effects of competitive elections and there are many restrictions imposed on direct town elections (let alone national general elections). In this context, Deliberative Polling techniques offer a strategy of substantive democratization conceived as a reform of

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the public hearing system. Deliberative Polling fits with what the central government calls the “scientific, democratic, and legal” decisionmaking or capacity of ruling: the use of random sampling and the quantitative study of opinion change are scientific, the public consultation process and the citizen’s choices are democratic, and the results of Deliberative Polling being submitted to the local People’s Congress, as in Zeguo, provide a basis for legality. By setting an example for deliberative participatory budgeting at the local level, the Zeguo experiment offers a replicable path to realizing both political equality and deliberation in actual decisions at the local level. The experiment offers a precedent both for other efforts in participatory budgeting and for other efforts to achieve fundamental democratic values in substantive policymaking without any need to realize party competition. Of course, from the standpoint of a fully developed democratic system, party competition would be highly desirable. However, democratic reform at the local level in China can be usefully promoted, both in its culture and practice, through the application and revival of this ancient form of democracy: deliberative decisionmaking by a microcosm chosen through lottery. Notes 1. In Australia, a Deliberative Polling partner, Issues Deliberation Australia, has conducted DPs that provided important input to constitutional reform efforts, but these projects were conducted by a nonprofit organization and not by the government itself once again. 2. In July 2005, we organized a workshop on the public hearing system in Beijing. Approximately sixty people attended to discuss the prospects of improving the public hearing system in China through Deliberative Polling. 3. The project originated at The International Conference on Deliberative Democracy and Chinese Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in Hangzhou, November 18– 21, 2004, which was organized by Baogang He and Chen Shengyong. During this conference, James Fishkin and Baogang He discussed the proposed project with four Wenling officials in attendance. Later, Baogang He went to Wenling to make detailed arrangements for the DP. 4. Some of the 257 were not included in the analysis because in some cases one member of a household sent another family member or friend to participate instead. We were not able to catch all such cases at registration; hence a few had to be dropped from the sample after the event. 5. One departure from Deliberative Polling as it has been practiced elsewhere is that while the Chinese randomly selected households, they allowed the households to select which adult member of the household would participate in the DP. This resulted in a significant under-representation of women—only 29.9 percent of the participant sample. We are recommending to our collaborators in Zeguo that next time they follow the process we have used elsewhere—random selection of households and random selection of the adult member of the household that participates.

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Works Cited Downs, Anthony. 1997. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. He, Baogang. 2003. “The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassroots Governance: Five Models.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 4(2): 293–314. Nylen, W.R. 2002. “Testing the Empowerment Thesis: The Participatory Budget in Belo Horizonte and Betim, Brazil.” Comparative Politics 34(2): 127–45. Ogden, Suzanne. 2002. Inklings of Democracy in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

C h ap t e r 1 3 Reforming Peking University: A Window into Deliberative Democracy? Xu Jilin

Village elections at the rural level are often cited as promising evidence of the continuing democratization of China. However, examples of grassroots democracy are often concentrated in rural China and few analogous examples in China’s major urban areas (where the average level of education, income, and political activism is much higher) exist. One form of grassroots democracy, deliberative democracy, is gaining currency in Europe and North America. Deliberative democracy proposes that major public policy decisions ought to be subject to spirited public discussion and debate, with the belief that dialogue and deliberation lead to optimal compromise and a more accurate consensus about the public interest. According to the theory of deliberative democracy, civic deliberation is the basis for the legitimacy of public policies and ultimately for politics more generally (Chen Jiagang 2004). In Europe and North America, deliberative democracy is practiced within an already long-standing framework of liberal democratic constitutional politics. However, is there potential for democratic deliberation in a country undergoing political transition such as China? If the possibility does indeed exist, how might it come into being? What are necessary and sufficient conditions for its emergence? Given China’s strict stance on free expression, what feasible forms of public discourse might emerge? What constraints and obstacles exist? This chapter explores these questions through examining the reform of the faculty recruitment system at Peking University (Beida) in 2003.

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From the Politics of Questioning to the Politics of Deliberation Jürgen Habermas’ normative approach to deliberative democracy is premised on the fundamental idea that the public sphere is a model for a “third kind of democracy”—a general framework of communicative action that transcends the traditional tension between liberal and republican democratic theory. Although he emphasizes that the essence of politics is the democratic formation of opinions and wills, Habermas also asserts that such a formative process should not be characterized as strictly within the realm of parliamentary or congressional compromise. It must also include the discussions and deliberations of lay citizens. Theories of deliberative democracy emphasize intersubjectivity in communication, particularly in deliberative processes and forms of debate related to issues of justice. Ideally, deliberative democracy incorporates both parliamentary and popular deliberation. The implementation of informally formed citizen opinions into institutionalized electoral choices and executive decisions is the process by which communicative power is transformed into administrative power. This transformation grants public authority a solid foundation for democracy (Habermas 2002, 279–93). The Habermasian model for deliberative democracy is a normative ideal that has yet to be fully institutionalized in political reality. Nonetheless, there are distinct parallels with recent European experiments such as “The Third Way” and the “New Left.” For instance, Anthony Giddens, a leading voice of “The Third Way” in Europe, advocates a “dialogical democracy.” Giddens believes that democracy “is not defined as universal participation, but by public discussion on policy issues.” That is to say, unlike the Greek polis where participation in politics was universal, in a deliberative democratic system every public policy is formulated on the basis of extensive free discussion and public deliberation. Dialogical democracy refers to a situation where there is developed autonomy in communication, leading to political action through dialogue (Giddens 2000, 118–19). In light of China’s deeply entrenched authoritarian political tradition, its lack of substantial tolerance of rational public deliberation warrants special attention. This begs the question of whether a Habermasian conception of deliberative democracy can take hold in a developing China where a robust, liberal democratic platform does not yet exist. In this chapter, I use the faculty recruitment policy reform at Peking University in 2003 (hereinafter, the “Beida reform”) as a positive case study suggesting that deliberative democracy is possible during the political transitions of contemporary China. The Beida reform is an example of the viability of “public” policymaking within a framework of enlightened

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authoritarianism, which ultimately may facilitate liberal democraticization. It should be noted that the Beida reform is not a result of intended design or conscious promotion of its initiators. Rather, it is an accidental confluence of multiple factors which involve an unintended transition from consultative politics to deliberative politics. Accordingly, the Beida reform was a selfgenerated new order that might be able to be replicated elsewhere. As China’s premiere research university, Peking University has made strides in recent years to establish itself as an international intellectual institution. A recent national program for educational development bestowed upon the university a special three-year grant of 1.8 billion Chinese yuan (approximately US $223 million). One common criticism heard in academic circles is that the current system of faculty recruitment continues to suffer from vestigial constraints of the command era economy. Accordingly, in 2003, Beida convened a special leading committee and a working committee resulting in the “Draft Plan for Faculty Recruitment and Promotion (For Discussion)” in mid-May. Seeking speedy implementation, the document was distributed to the entire Beida faculty by e-mail for comments. The reform process was initially designed to conform to the traditional method of “democratic centralism,” common to mainstream institutional changes in China. Power holders identify and select a specific reform program that is then distributed to the “public” for discussion within the framework of the state-owned unit to be reformed. The discussions are then communicated to the decisionmakers through an organizational structure. A final revised reform plan is then implemented. One might call this practice “consultative politics under enlightened authoritarianism,” where the executive authority considers opinions from below through internal consultation channels (in order to capture some proxy of the popular will). Even in more thoroughly democratic countries, this form of consultative politics is common. However, there was a significant difference in the Beida reform. Although the general reform framework was still set by the chief administrators, actual formulation of the proposal was eventually removed from the traditional hands of administrative bureaucrats in the personnel department, and instead given to faculty members who were invited to form a drafting committee. The committee was chaired by the associate dean of the Guanghua School of Management and respected economist Professor Zhang Weiying. This group of academic reformers, many of whom had studied abroad, had a broad vision. Unlike administrative bureaucrats, they possessed the technical knowledge necessary for reform design, an affinity for broad conceptualization, and a capacity for strategic thinking informed by academic theory.

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According to one commentator at Business Weekly, “This is a case of institutional design by institutional economists and returnees from overseas who have advanced experience in public administration” (Gao 2003). Because of the inherent limitations of their roles and technical rationality, bureaucrats were unable to take part in the public discussion in a useful way. In contrast, experts in the academy had a unique vision, an enthusiasm for public debate, and, hence, the potential to translate private exercise of reason into public application. Ultimately, when their reform proposal came under criticism in traditional and electronic media, Zhang Weiying, Li Qiang, and other members of the drafting committee enthusiastically engaged in a systematic defense of the plan through the media, creating a culture of democratic deliberation in the public sphere. Traditionally, discussion drafts of the type relevant for Beida faculty recruitment policy are presented at internal faculty meetings for comments in the department or school. But since the discussion surrounding Beida reform transpired when Beijing was in the grip of the SARS crisis, large-scale meetings were strongly discouraged. Accordingly, the personnel department chose to send the draft proposal to each faculty member via e-mail. The first to oppose the proposed reform were a number of young faculty members in the history, philosophy, law, and other humanities departments. In their eyes, while the reform circumvented the vested interests of current professors, it also imposed unfair promotion criteria for junior faculty members. In particular, the junior faculty members were upset by the suggested recommendation that if one fails two promotion applications, he or she would be required to leave the university. The existing promotion system had been one avenue for the upward mobility of junior faculty into the elite strata. This new recruitment reform proposal, however, suddenly threatened a brutal struggle for survival. One faculty member lamented, Our outrage is too strong to verbalize . . . We are one step from bringing this world down with us in despair. Our only hope is that the department chair will speak on the young teachers’ behalf, on the profession’s behalf. We are milking ourselves in teaching, but we are not even fed grass. (“Excerpts from Faculty Comments” 2003)

Sensing imminent victimization and injustice if the reform went through as proposed, junior faculty members awoke from their historical apathy toward administrative affairs and initiated a media strategy. How were junior faculty rights to be defended? In a time of underdeveloped media, the only avenue open to them had been upward communication and dialogue through the tiered rungs of the administrative hierarchy.

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At best, discussions might be possible within the traditional framework of consultative politics under enlightened authoritarianism. But the flourishing of the public media in late 1990’s radically changed the communication landscape. Media is not new to China. Historically, however, the Chinese media have been the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party and the state. Toward the end of the 1990s, however, with the emergence of media commercialization and the growing sense of self-identity of media professionals, nonofficial newspapers and periodicals have increasingly grown oriented toward the coverage of and commentary upon public affairs. The media has begun assuming an unprecedented role of independently articulating public opinion. Even the official media outlets, including the China Central Television (CCTV) system, the People’s Daily, and Xinhua Wire Service have been similarly galvanized. However, print media alone is insufficient to trigger full-scale deliberation in modern society. Accordingly, the internet in China serves as a superior platform for public debate. As an interactive avenue of communication providing instant gratification, the internet plays an increasingly pivotal role in contemporary public affairs; the internet is an engine and platform for public discussion. The interaction between online forums and print media is beginning to constitute a vibrant public sphere in China. The rise of a previously unheard of public sphere sparked a revolution in the Beida debate, shifting it from a mode of internal consultative politics to one of democratic deliberation. The debates began with protest from junior faculty members, but quickly spilled over the institutional boundaries of the university, and e-mails and lobbying from interested parties soon appeared on high-traffic websites. “Excerpts of Faculty Comments on Peking University’s Personnel System Reform” were initially posted on a number of prominent intellectual websites including the university’s Weiming Lake, Yitahutu, Thinking and Writing, Century China, Century Salon, and Guantian Teahouse. Soon, unofficial print media including the 21st Century Economic Report and the Economic Observer followed suit by organizing in-depth coverage and commentaries. Traditional and electronic media began engaging in an active call-and-respond. At this point, the debate attracted not only university employees, but members of the Chinese and overseas intellectual community as well. Finally, China’s official media—CCTV, People’s Daily, and Xinhua Wire Service included—joined in with their own distinctive takes on the issue. The Beida reform became a full media event. Deliberative democracy requires an airing of differing perspectives, appealing to the force of reason and the better argument. Typically, in consultative politics, there is an avoidance of open discussion on equal footing with the “consulted” through public media. In contrast, when the university

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authorities felt the heat of media pressure, they did not attempt to suppress public opinion. Rather, they engaged in public debate head-on. On June 16, 2003, the second draft of the reform plan came out and a call was made for public comments on the conceptualization, principles, and stages of reform. The university’s Party Secretary and President fielded interviews and participated in open conversation with opposing faculty members and scholars on highly popular TV talk shows on CCTV, including Face to Face and Dialogue. Professor Zhang Weiying, the chief architect of the reform plan, published a 30,000-character defense on the university’s website, with a detailed justification and responses to critics. Furthermore, he gave numerous interviews and speeches fleshing out his thinking on the reform. These articles later became his book, The Logic of the University (Zhang 2004). On the other side, Zhang’s major critics, Dr. Gan Yang from the Asia Institute of Hong Kong University and Li Meng, a doctoral candidate from University of Chicago also gave substantive responses. The direct public exchange between the two sides brought the debate to an unprecedented level of intensity (Zhang 2004). Based on the comments from proponents and detractors, the authorities made numerous revisions in the reform plan. A final draft was formulated in 2004 and put into effect. This revised plan ultimately remained consistent with the original principles, but resorted to more flexible and sensitive approaches to a number of controversial issues. It brought the dramatic public discussion of Beida reform to an official close. The unexpected turn from consultative to deliberative politics in the Beida reform experience is a reminder that the rise of a new form of democracy may have less to do with deliberate design or “institutional innovation” by visionary pioneers and more to do with a fortuitous confluence of disparate social forces. Without the “rebellion” from junior faculty members, without an internet to publish and disseminate their messages, without a public media that consciously expresses public opinion, without the university administration’s willingness to face the media with its own arguments, and without the leadership of reform-minded experts free from bureaucracy, the Beida reform would not have become the interesting window that it is into the development of deliberative democratic practice. Public Reason in the Deliberation Process Consensus seeking is a principal objective of deliberative democracy according to many. Toward that end, deliberative democracy seeks to foster understanding among diverse positions and beliefs, and lay the foundation for political compromises. But, pragmatically speaking, how is consensus

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possible? In the face of conflicting interests, how is mutual understanding achieved? One crucial factor is the viewpoint of the deliberator: is she speaking strictly out of self-interest or is she speaking on behalf of the public interest as she perceives it? In cases where all deliberators are speaking strictly in terms of their own interest, the discussion quickly devolves into a zero-sum struggle of self-interest maximization. Furthermore, since individual selfinterests tend to diverge and often diametrically oppose one another, public discussions bounded by self-interest are incapable of achieving a basic consensus—let alone a sympathetic understanding of what competing interests are at play. With this in mind, the difference between public and private spheres and their respective constraints on constructive discussion play an important role in understanding deliberative democracy. The greatest distinction between the public and the private sphere is that the public sphere is not a site for the expression and exchange of private interests. Once the individual enters the public sphere, she is no longer a private person, but a member of the public engaged in the formation of public opinion. As such, claims based on self-interest must be properly qualified; individuals must recognize that the formation of public policy requires discussion from the viewpoint of public interests and public values. Effective dialogue and a consensus on the definition of the public interest are possible only when the participants in deliberative democracy share a collective concern for the public spirit and sublimate the selfish heart. In the case of the Beida reform, the critique of the reform proposal by junior faculty members sprung from their private interests and a sense of selfpreservation. As one young participant commented (Li Yintao 2003, 29): I am an associate professor at the university who has read two drafts of Professor Zhang Weiying’s proposal. Unlike most other associate professors, I am completely indifferent to what this reform means to the university. That is the university’s business (I don’t know who ‘the university’ is, although I am sure that is not me), not mine. All I care about is what it means for me, and what I have to lose. I might give the articles a close look, not because I may contribute to their revisions, but because I need to calculate how much compensation I deserve in case the university changes the terms of my contract. I believe the university is solely responsible for working out the reform plan, but the compensation plan must be submitted to negotiations between the university and the faculty; in case that fails, the judicial system is the only resort.

Conflicts of private interest have their own value, and may produce some compromise through discussions. However, if the discussion of the Beida reform was strictly limited to the private interests of junior faculty members,

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the optimal solution would have been to cancel the reform altogether because none of the existing junior faculty members were poised to benefit from the reform. According to Li Qiang (2003), professor of politics and member of the Drafting Committee: From the viewpoint of game theory, this personnel reform is a “negative-sum game.” There isn’t one single current university scholar who will benefit financially. Although professors and some associate professors and lecturers will not be negatively affected, they also will not benefit directly. On the other hand, the end result will be that most associate professors and lecturers will face increasing uncertainty regarding their university employment. There does exist one beneficiary of this reform: the university itself, as an independent entity. Peking University is not solely the sum of all its faculty and students. Rather, it is an ongoing creation of generations past and to come. Ultimately, it belongs to a larger community. One might say it is China’s university.

Since the beneficiary of the reform is not the totality of private individuals but the university itself, an entity essentially existing in the public interest, judgments on the reform should turn on rational public debate over which plan best promotes the public interest. Professor He Huaihong (2003) from Peking University’s Philosophy Department captured this dynamic in “Towards Public Reason”: Scholars often comment on society and politics by drawing upon the principle of public spirit and reason. Often they call for fairness and reform in the interests of other social sectors. Now they face a challenge, a test: when this reform touches upon their own private interests, are they able to speak beyond private gains and losses? Are they able to exercise their own reason in a public, fair, and just way on issues directly bearing on their self-interests?

Similar to the Beida reform, the current political reform process of contemporary China is fraught with tension between various interests. Between the end of the 1970s and the mid-1990s, ideological conflicts over whether and how reform should proceed have dominated the political landscape. Since then, conflicts between the self-interests of highly differentiated parties have moved to the forefront of the reform debate. The debate has shifted from whether the reform process should proceed to how interests should be distributed and how to prioritize conflicting value objectives. However, the Beida reform is distinguishable because its supporters and detractors generally were committed to a reform which they felt was a necessary turning point for the university. They even shared a significant consensus on the causes behind the university’s current problems. Moreover, since there was an absence of ideological conflict, compromise and consensus was

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possible. Ideological struggles can be zero-sum; but differences on pecuniary interests and reform strategies can be bridged through negotiation and dialogue. In deliberative democracy, parties rely on Habermasian communicative rationality rather than falling prey to status, power, emotions, or moralistic language. In public debate, one gives reasons for one’s position, and defends it in ways understandable to the public. For example, during the Beida reform, Professor Zhang Weiying (2004) presented a long treatise entitled “Why We Need to Reform the Existing Personnel Management System.” In response, a measured and detailed critique entitled “How to Reform a University” (Li Meng 2003) was published as a rejoinder to Professor Zhang. Professor Zhang’s plan reflected an economist’s shrewdness and a sense of reality. It advocated the introduction of a competition mechanism from the external market without making fundamental changes to existing internal management institutions. Zhang (2004) explained, The past 20 years of Chinese history shows us that the best way to reform is to identify the weakest link; then once the reform process gets started, other problems of the system will emerge to force changes in people’s perceptions. It is then possible to tackle each issue one by one.

Although perceived as a less radical reform compared to the option of “purging” the existing faculty, Zhang’s plan implicated many fundamental issues of the university. However, in the eyes of Zhang’s critics, there were other priorities. According to Sun Liping (2003), a respected sociologist who graduated from Peking University, From the viewpoint of the logic of reform, I feel the priority should be on how executive will trumps academic autonomy. Therefore, we need to establish a fair and effective academic evaluation system. Only then can one talk of reform of recruitment, promotion, and elimination by competition.

His view won extensive support among junior faculty members. One vocal supporter was Li Meng, formerly a leader of young faculty members at the university and now a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, whose “How to Reform a University,” a long rebuttal to Zhang’s plan, was widely circulated on campus. The most urgent task of reform, Li asserted, was “how to foster an environment friendly to intellectual autonomy” (Li Meng 2003). In this heated debate on the priorities of university reform, both sides presented clear positions and full arguments. On the surface, it was an

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airing of their differences about reform strategies. At a deeper level, it was a constructive struggle between divergent values and beliefs that extended beyond self-interest. Zhang’s ultimate goal was to forge Peking Univesity into a world-class institution of higher learning. Zhang’s opponents, however, did not see the reform as a pathway to the university’s world-class status. Instead, they sought to revive academic autonomy and provide a liberal campus environment friendly to faculty independence. Zhang’s plan focused on establishing a system of market competition in a drastic but effective manner, which would eliminate the weak and promote the strong. His opponents, in response, believed that before the university could reap such benefits, it must nurture its membership actively. Their reform plan sought to provide a liberal and free academic environment. Historically, reforms in China often involved an authoritarian process, even when the goals of reform were themselves democratic. The Beida reform, in contrast, manifested the basic characteristics of deliberative democracy. In the eyes of some scholars, the outcome of the debate was less important than the process of discussion itself, given that the process reinforced the practice of deliberative democracy. He Huaihong (2003) pointed out the importance of public reason in public debate: On issues of principle, we cannot avoid making moral choices and value judgments. However . . . [a]n individual believing in the public good should strive to transcend [his or her] own interests and avoid considering others with ill will. She does not debate the right or wrong of the person. She debates the right and wrong of the principle. Interestingly, our true adversary might be ourselves. After all, [the] Beida reform is first and foremost a selfreform, a self-enlightenment.

In short, the debate on Beida reform is an insightful window into deliberative democratic practice in China. Transitional Politics and Deliberative Democracy In an enlightened authoritarian system such as China’s, the legitimacy of public policy is a constant problem. To achieve political legitimacy, feedback for institutional adjustments is usually acquired through three channels: (1) consultation with organized societal interests; (2) recommendations by technical experts; and (3) internal discussion within the political elite. These channels were also part of initial design of the Beida reform. However, in contemporary China, where societal interests are highly differentiated, and the elite and the grassroots have grown increasingly polarized, the Beida reform shows that it is insufficient to follow the practice of consultative politics on key reform issues that bear on the core interests of

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many. Due to the pressure of public opinion from the printed and electronic media, it is increasingly untenable for enlightened authority to build a basis of legitimation for public decisions without resorting to extensive public dialogue and discussion. This is especially true when key reforms involve redistribution of interests and resources and where traditional modes of consultative politics can no longer hold. The rise of deliberative democracy provides a new possible agenda for the legitimation of public policy. Li Meng, the main critic of the Beida reform, commented: The university belongs to all the teachers and students. It is not the private property of a few. Any reform measure must be sensitive to the teachers’ and students’ opinions, especially on touchy issues such as firing people. Any reform plan must be subjected to a democratic process and legitimation requirement. (Li Meng 2003)

As Li emphasizes, important social reforms, including university reform, cannot be determined by a few elite decisionmakers. Nor is expert participation sufficient to balance conflicting interests. Given the increasing level of entanglement in the social structure, diverging values, and conflicting interests, most reform policies cannot perfectly make everyone better off without making anyone worse off. Rather, the consequence of important social reform is a muddled compromise based on interest maximization that only limply conforms to the overall interests of society. Whose interests are to be sacrificed to pay for the cost of reform? Who is in a position to define public interests? How can such a reform be legitimate? Public interests and legitimacy no longer can be hinged upon the goodwill of the state or the wisdom of the elite. Instead, we must turn to public discussion, where interested parties as well as the general public get to settle on a reform plan together, keeping in view. Even when short-term consensus is not possible, deliberation generates sympathetic understanding of the inherent difficulty and necessity of the reform. This is precisely what was achieved in the Beida reform in its evolution from consultative to deliberative politics. As Li Qiang (2003), one architect of the reform plan, commented after the publication of the revised plan: This is not the final plan, but a discussion draft. We anticipate many rounds of discussion where people may fully express their opinions. The heated debate around the drafts is a positive development, a good example for public policymaking. It would be very meaningful if in the future, more policy issues are subjected to a process of debate and consensus formation. This will reduce mistakes and produce better results than under closed-door decisionmaking by elites. The approach is both forward-looking and sensitive to realistic difficulties.

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Ultimately, neither side could agree on all fronts. However, they formed an overriding, basic procedural consensus: decisions on public policy issues must be subjected to public debate and discussion. Arguably, such a consensus on long-term decisionmaking procedures is more valuable than a short-term agreement on the reform itself. In an enlightened authoritarian regime, political decisionmaking remains within the power of a small circle of elite. There are no election-centered representative democratic processes. However, it appears possible to institute elements of deliberative democracy into the public sphere to obtain a limited degree of consensus and understanding and to provide public legitimacy for public policy decisions through relatively open public debate. The Beida reform shows us that it is not only necessary but also possible to embed deliberative democracy into an enlightened authoritarian framework. In conclusion, I do not wish to exaggerate the impact of the Beida reform. As emphasized earlier, the development of the Beida reform from consultative politics to deliberative politics was partially a historical accident; it was in large measure a mere involuntary result of societal pressure. As an isolated case study, it is far from being an indicator of future institutionalization. Moreover, some reformers drew negative lessons from the experience, concluding that the costs and pressures associated with public debate and transparency render deliberative decisionmaking too formidable and inefficient. The prospect for deliberative democracy in China is not entirely hopeful. It ultimately requires not only societal pressure, but also institutionalization that codifies a procedure for public policymaking through public debate. Beyond legal institutions, China requires a corresponding culture of autonomy––of citizens and the public sphere—to complement basic institutional frameworks. These will not come into being overnight in China. It takes patience to bring about the dawn of democracy in China, but each ray of sunshine, however fleeting, is worth our pursuit. The prairie fire begins with these sparks. Works Cited “Beida Reform Attracts Followers: Reaping and Nurturing.” 2003. 21st Century Economic Report, available at http://www.cc.org.cn/old/wencui/030721200/ 0307212002.htm, accessed on May 5, 2006. Chen Jiagang. 2004. Deliberative Democracy. Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore. “Excerpts from Faculty’s Comments on the Proposed Personnel Reform of Peking University.” 2003. Thinking and Writing, available at http://chinese-thought. unix-vip.cn4e.com/modules.php?nameContent&pa showpage&pid121, accessed on May 5, 2006.

reforming peking university / 257 Giddens, Anthony. 2000. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Publishing. Gao Min. 2003. “Why We Care About Beida’s Education Reform.” Business Weekly, No. 14, July 16. Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” In Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff eds. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 239–52. He Huaihong. 2003. “Towards Public Reason.” The Economic Observer, available at http://www.cc.org.cn/old/wencui/030721200/0307212007, accessed on May 5, 2006. Li Meng. 2003. “How to Reform a University: Comments on the Logic of the Personnel Reform of Peking University.” Academics in China 5: 45–64. Li Qiang. 2003. “Interview with Li Qiang: We Must Make the First Step,” Thinking and Writing, available at http://chinese-thought.unix-vip.cn4e.com/modules. php?nameContent&pashowpage&pid140, accessed on May 5, 2006. Li Yintao. 2003. “Beida Reform: The Debate between Interests and Reason.” Xinmin Weekly, No. 29, at 29. Sun Liping. 2003. “On Beida Reform: Contrasting Views.” Thinking and Writing, available at http://chinese-thought.unix-vip.cn4e.com/modules.php?name Content&pashowpage&pid210, accessed on May 5, 2006. Zhang Weiying. 2004. The Logic of the University. Beijing: Peking University Press.

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LIST

OF

CONTRIBUTORS

Daniel A. Bell is Professor of Philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing. His books include Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton University Press, 2006) and East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Princeton University Press, 2000). Chen Shengyong is Professor and Head in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Zhejiang University. He has published several books on Chinese history and recently published a book on a commercial association in Wenzhou. Dong Xuebing has a bachelor’s degree from Hangzhou University, a master’s degree in law from Zhejiang University, and has been studying for a Ph.D. at Zhejiang University since 2002. He has been on the faculty of the College of Economics at Zhejiang University since 1998. His academic research has focused on Chinese grassroots democracy, law, and economics, and has been published many papers in leading domestic journals. John S. Dryzek is Professor of Social and Political Theory in the Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. His recent books include The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (co-edited, Oxford University Press, 2006), Green States and Social Movements (co-authored, Oxford University Press, 2003), and Post-Communist Democratization (co-authored, Cambridge University Press, 2002). James S. Fishkin is Janet M. Peck Chair in International Communication, Professor of Communication, and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is also Director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford. He received Ph.D. degrees in Philosophy from the University of Cambridge and in Political Science from Yale University. He is the author of a dozen books, including Debating Deliberative Democracy (co-edited, Blackwell, 2003) and Deliberation Day (with Bruce Ackerman, Yale University Press, 2004).

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Baogang He is Professor in International Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, Deakin University, Australia. He has published four books on various aspects of Chinese democratization. His recent publications have focused on international nongovernmental organizations, Asian regionalism, village citizenship, and the Tibet issue. He is the co-editor (with Will Kymlicka) of a newly released volume, Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford University Press, 2005). Ethan J. Leib is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of California’s Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. He holds a J.D. from Yale Law School and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University. He is the author of over a dozen articles about law and political theory in journals such as Polity, Political Science Quarterly, Law & Philosophy, Interpretation, The New Republic, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Legal Times, and various law reviews. He is also the author of Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government (Penn State Press, 2005) and is the essays editor at The Journal of Public Deliberation. Shawn Rosenberg is Professor of Political Science and Psychology and Director of the Graduate Program in Political Psychology at the University of California, Irvine. Rosenberg did graduate work in psychology at Harvard University and in political sociology at Nuffield College, Oxford. Rosenberg has done research on the nature of political ideology, cognition, and democratic deliberation. He has also written on the philosophy of social science, with specific reference to the conduct of interdisciplinary research. He is the co-author (with Dana Ward and Stephen Chilton) of Political Cognition and Reasoning (Duke University Press, 1988) and is the author of Reason, Ideology, and Politics (Princeton University Press, 1988) and The Not So Common Sense: How People Judge Social and Political Life (Yale University Press, 2002). Shi Jinchuan is Professor and Executive Dean of the College of Economics at Zhejiang University and is the Director of the Center for Research in Private Enterprise. He has a bachelor’s degree from Hangzhou University, and a master’s degree and Ph.D. from Fudan University. Dr. Shi’s academic research has focused on regional economics and law and economics. He has published eighteen monographs and more than 100 papers in established journals, such as The Chinese Economy, Economic Research Journal, and Chinese Social Science Review. He serves on the Social Science Committee of the National Ministry of Education, and has been a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and at Columbia University in New York.

list of contributors / 261

Alice Siu is a Ph.D candidate at Stanford University. Her research area is deliberative democracy and group dynamics. Geoffrey Stokes is Professor of Politics at Deakin University, Australia. He works in the areas of democratic theory, citizenship, Australian political thought, and indigenous politics. He is the author of Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method (Polity, 1998), and is the co-editor of Democratic Theory Today (Polity, 2002) and Liberal Democracy and Its Critics (Polity, 1998). He has also edited Australian Political Ideas (UNSW Press, 1994) and The Politics of Identity in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1997). He is an Associate Editor of Contemporary Political Theory and a member of the editorial boards of the Australian Journal of Political Science and the Australian Journal of Politics and History. Qingshan Tan is Professor of Political Science at Cleveland State University. He is the author of a forthcoming book, Building a Democratic Institution: Village Elections in China. Xu Jilin is Chair and Professor of History at East China Normal University. At the university, he is also Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture, designated by the Chinese Ministry of Education as a Key Research Center for the Humanities. He serves as Vice-President and Secretary in the Shanghai Association of History, as a board member in the Chinese Association of History, and is a member of the editorial board for Twenty-First Century, a bimonthly publication in Hong Kong. He has been a visiting scholar at the Institute for Chinese Studies at Chinese University of Hong Kong (1999), the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University (2000), the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore (2000), the Harvard-Yenching Institute of Harvard University (2001–2002), and the Institute for Asian Research at the University of British Columbia (2004). Xu Jilin’s major book publications include The Endless Bewilderment (1988), Dignity of the Intellectual (1992), Search for Meaning (1997), Another Enlightenment (1999), Ten Essays on Chinese Intellectuals (2003), and the edited volume, The History of Chinese Modernization (1995).

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Index

Abelson, Robert P., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Ackerman, Bruce Deliberation Day, on, 47–48, 60 Administrative institutions, deliberative democracy in, 24–25 Administrative status, citizenship as, 59–62 Aggregation deliberative democracy contrasted, 23–24, 55 legitimacy deficits, 162 Agonism, 118 Andersen, V.N., on polarization and deliberative democracy, 145 Anti-Federalists, 39 Anti-globalization as deliberative democracy in public sphere, 30–31 Arenas of deliberative democracy, 23–34 designed forums, in, 25–29 lay citizen deliberation in designed forums, 26–27 overview, 9, 14 partisan deliberation in designed forums, 28–29 promoting deliberative democracy, implications for, 32–34 public sphere, in, 29–32 state institutions, in, 24–25 Arendt, Hannah, on local councils, 6–7 Article 23, public hearing requirement, 180, 231

Ataturk, 42 Athenian democracy Deliberative Polling compared, 230 political practice, citizenship as, 62 Atlee, Tom, on consensus-building, 126 Australia compulsory voting in, 47 constitutions, 68 Deliberative Polling in, 230, 243 n. 1 “industrial citizenship” in, 67 Authenticity of state-sponsored deliberation, 139 Authoritarian deliberation, 134–135 overview, 14–15 Authoritarianism deliberative democracy under, 61–62, 192 harmony as justification for, 126 and history of reform in China, 254 meritocratic rule contrasted, 154–155 Autonomy from state, necessity of for deliberative democracy, 137 Bai Gang early criticism of monarchs, on, 167 tensions in village self-government, on, 209 Baiocchi, G., on effective deliberative citizenship, 69 Bales, R.F., on personality and social structure, 108 n. 9

264 / index Barabas, Jason opinion change experiments, on, 5 public policy and deliberative democracy, on, 142 Barber, Benjamin, on participatory democracy, 4 Bargaining. See also Voting conflict resolution and, 144–145 consensus-building as alternative to, 94 consensus contrasted, 28 deliberative democracy and, 63 legitimacy in absence of, 55 Beck, Ulrich, on economic development and technological change, 33 Beida reform process, 245–256 accidental confluence of factors, resulting from, 247 consensus reached in, 256 convening of faculty recruitment committees, 247 democratic centralism and, 247 elite management and, 255, 256 evolution of, 246–250 Internet attention on, 249 junior faculty members and, 248–249 media attention on, 249–250 overview, 13 private sphere criticisms of, 251–253 public consultation, insufficiency of, 254–255 public policymaking within authoritarian framework, 246–247 public reason in deliberative process, 250–254 public sphere, in, 249–250 transformation from consultative to deliberative process, 246–250 transitional politics and deliberative democracy, 254–256

Beijing public hearing process in, 243 n. 2 SARS crisis in, effect on Beida reform process, 248 Bell, Daniel “Confucian democracy,” on, 25, 27, 107 n. 1 elitism, on, 141 He, on research of, 149–157 local-level deliberation in China, on, 149–152 (See also Local-level deliberation in China) meritocratic rule as alternative to electoral democracy, on, 154–156 (See also Meritocratic rule as alternative to electoral democracy) national-level deliberation in China, on, 152–154 (See also National-level deliberation in China) Neo-Confucian deliberation, on, 11, 14, 16 Benhabib, Seyla communication and consensus, on, 94 contested notion of culture, on, 99 critical theory version of deliberative democracy, on, 54 deliberative democracy, on, 3 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Bessette, Joseph M., on legislatures as deliberative institutions, 24 Bicameralism, 120 Bishop, George, on phantom opinions, 44 Black, Duncan, on cycles violating transitivity, 50 Blair, Tony citizen panels, use of, 26 House of Lords, reforms to, 27

index / 265 Bohman, James bargaining, on, 63 citizenship, on, 66 deliberative democracy, on, 55 difficulties of deliberative democracy, on, 65 equality and autonomy, on combination of, 85 liberal democracy, criticism of, 53–54 social background and cognitive capacity, on, 91 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 The Book of Documents, 172 n. 2 The Book of Songs, 166 Bradburn, Norman, on self-selected listener opinion polls, 41 Brainstorming, 89, 96, 103, 106 Branches of government administrative institutions, deliberative democracy in, 24–25 courts, deliberative democracy in, 24–25 democratic but not deliberative, legislatures as, 134 legislatures, deliberative democracy in, 24–25 “Popular Branch” of government (See “Popular Branch” of government) separation of powers (See Separation of powers) Brook, Timothy, on civil society in China, 123 Bujue, criticism of monarchs by, 167 Bulgaria, Deliberative Polling in, 230 Canada, Deliberative Polling in, 230 Capacity of citizens and deliberative theory, 27 Capitalists. See also Market economy deliberative institutions, use of, 178–179

push for deliberative democracy by, 150–152 Carter, April, on direct action, 63–64 Central management approach in China, inadequacy of, 81 Central Translation Bureau, innovation prizes for citizen evaluation meetings, 185–187 Centralization of Chinese government, history of, 162, 163 Chan, Sylvia dual governance structure and deliberative democracy, on, 82 village assemblies, on, 205 village deliberative institutions, on, 202 village representative assemblies, on, 207–208 Chen Jiagang advocacy of deliberative democracy by, 8 legitimacy and deliberative democracy, on, 245 Chen Lihua rural unrest, on, 200 vote-buying in village elections, on, 210 Chen Shengyong Confucian public forums, on, 179 deliberative democracy on Internet, on, 171 Hangzhou conference on deliberative democracy, role in, 3 resources pertinent to development of deliberative democracy in China, on, 161–171 (See also Resources pertinent to development of deliberative democracy in China) Zeguo Town, role in Deliberative Polling in, 243 n. 3

266 / index Chen Yiming deliberative democracy in Wenling, on, 180–181 Zeguo Town, membership on working committee for Deliberative Polling in, 233 Chiang Kaishek, on separation of powers, 129 n. 9 China Central Television, attention on Beida reform process in, 249–250 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) citizen evaluation meetings, role of local party in, 185 consultative meetings, role of local party in, 183 deliberative institutions, use of to avoid direct challenge to authority of, 178 democracy, commitment to, 162 village political system, subversion of, 162–163 work units, control maintained through, 7 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, 8 Chou Dynasty, compiling of public opinion during, 166 Citizen committees in Western nations, 80 Citizen deliberation, importance of, 118 Citizen evaluation meetings, 184–187 Hangzhou City, in, 180, 185 innovation prizes for, 185–187 Jiaojiang City, in, 185 limitations of, 185 local level, at, 150 local party, role of, 185 Shangdong, in, 180 Shanghai, in, 180, 184 Shengyang, in, 180 stages of, 184–185 Ya’an City, in, 185 Zhejiang Province, in, 185

Citizen juries citizenship and, 61, 62–63 lay citizen deliberation, as, 26–27 proposal for, 141 public consultation, as, 43 Citizen participation. See Participation in deliberation Citizens’ Assemblies, 129 n. 12 Citizenship and deliberative democracy, 53–70 administrative status, citizenship as, 59–62 authoritarian regimes, in, 61–62 consultative meetings and citizenship-building, 190 dimensions of citizenship, 57–69 domains of citizenship, 66–69 “global citizens,” 68 immigrants and citizenship, 57–58 “industrial citizenship,” 67 international institutions and citizenship, 67 legal status, citizenship as, 57–59 nongovernmental organizations and citizenship, 67 normative ideal, citizenship as, 62–66 official status, citizenship as, 57–59 overview, 9–10 political practice, citizenship as, 62–66 suffrage and citizenship, 57 Civil rights movement, as deliberative democracy in public sphere, 30 Civil society China, weakness in, 139, 191, 199 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 123–124 Russia, in, 147 n. 4 Clinton, Bill, self-selected listener opinion polls and impeachment of, 42 Coercive power of state, legitimization of, 118

index / 267 Cohen, Jerome A. constitutional law in China, on, 121 “stealth democracy,” on, 117 Cohen, Joshua communication and consensus, on, 94 critical theory version of deliberative democracy, on, 54, 56 deliberative democracy, on, 3 freedom of expression, on, 60 “good deliberation,” on, 4 principle of participation, on, 60 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 voluntary associations, on, 67–68 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Collective action problems of democracy, 115–116 Communication, assumptions regarding, 93–98 citizenship-building and, 97 consensus-building and, 94 derivative communication, 95 developmental psychological research and, 94–95 emotion and, 97–98 epiphenomenal communication, 95 inequality of, 94–95 language, effect of, 93–94 reflexive abstraction and, 96 shared cultural rhetoric and, 96 social conditions, effect of, 93, 94 Communicative rationality and deliberative democracy, 253 Community, focus on in China, 81 Competence of citizens communcative competence, 94, 95, 97, 106 cultural considerations, 100 deliberative democracy, effect on, 102, 106–107 lack of as argument against deliberative democracy, 39–40

Compulsory institutional change, 225 Compulsory political participation, 151, 206 Conditions for deliberative democracy, 85–86 Conflict of interest and deliberative democracy, 144 Conflict resolution and deliberative democracy, 143–145 “Confucian democracy,” 25, 27, 107 n. 1 Confucianism consensus-building and, 126, 157 n. 4 corporatist democracy and, 116 cultural limitations and, 193 deliberative democracy and, 6 elderly, deference to, 151 elite management and, 81 harmony, concept of (See Harmony, concept of ) kentan and, 182 national-level deliberation in China and, 153–154 paternalism and, 81 polarization and, 145–146 public forums, 179 rise of, 167 Confucius, on harmony, 172 n. 1 Congress, deliberative democracy in, 25 Consensus-building Beida reform process and, 256 communication and, 94 Confucianism, in, 157 n. 4 partisan deliberation, as, 28 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 125–126 Consensus conferences lay citizen deliberation, as, 26–27 public consultation, as, 43 Consociational democracy, 31, 115–116, 128 n. 4 Constitutional Convention as filtration of public opinion, 38 Constitutions, 120–121

268 / index Consultative meetings, 183–184 agenda of, 183 citizenship-building and, 190 Hangzhou City, in, 180 local party, role of, 183 participation in, 184 stages of, 183 voluntary nature of, 184 voting, as alternative to, 184 Wenling, survey in, 183 Contemporary deliberative processes in China, 175–195 Chinese understanding of deliberation, 181–182 citizen evaluation meetings, 184–187 consultative meetings, 183–184 development of, 179–181 effect of, 187–190 empowerment of citizens, 188–190 enhancing local governance, 187–188 factors in success of, 190–192 limitations of, 192–194 motivations for, 176–179 overview, 11–12 variety of, 183–187 village representative assemblies, 187 Contestation, 118 Converse, Phil, on phantom opinions, 44 Corporations and citizenship, 67 Corporatist democracy, 115–116, 128 n. 4 Courts, deliberative democracy in, 24–25 Critical theory version of deliberative democracy, 54, 56, 70 n. 3 Crosby, Ned, on citizen juries, 26 Culture and deliberative democracy, 77–107 Anglo-American approach to deliberative democracy, 82–87 Chinese approach to deliberative democracy, 80–82

cognitive capacity, effect of, 87–92 communication, assumptions regarding, 93–98 (See also Communication, assumptions regarding) constructive disagreement, benefits of, 105–106 contested notion of, 99 cultural limitations, 193 design of deliberative democracy, 98–107: China, in, 104–107; Western nations, in, 102–104 differences, recognition of, 106–107 dominant discourse patterns, role of, 103–104 emotion, effect of, 92–93 general cultural considerations, 99–102 harmony and, 105 human nature, assumptions regarding, 87–93 (See also Human nature, assumptions regarding) individual competencies and orientations, sensitivity to, 102–103 local culture and community, effect of, 104 normative emphasis in China, 104–105 overview, 10, 14 public-government relationship and, 101 public-private relationship and, 101 social integration, costs of, 104–105 Western approach to deliberative democracy, 78–80 Cycles violating transitivity, 40, 50–51 Dai Kangnian, membership on working committee for Deliberative Polling in Zeguo Town, 233

index / 269 Dannreuther, R., on “global citizens,” 68 de Tocqueville, Alexis citizenship, on, 66–67 jury system, on, 122 Decision and deliberative democracy, 142–143 Deliberation Day cycles violating transitivity and, 50–51 inclusion and, 48–51 polarization and, 50 proposal of, 47–48 rational ignorance and, 49 thoughtfulness and, 48–51 time constraints, 60 Deliberative meetings. See Consultative meetings Deliberative participatory budgeting, 240 Deliberative Polling advantages of, 230 Athenian democracy compared, 230 China, in, 46–47, 138 citizenship and, 63 counterfactual situations, 45–46 cycles violating transitivity and, 50–51 equality and, 139–140, 230 inclusion and, 48–51 lay citizen deliberation, as, 26–27 legitimacy of, 143 minimizing power of wealthy as purpose of, 150–151 overview, 9, 14, 44–47 polarization and, 50 public policy and, 142 random selection process in, 139–140 rational ignorance and, 45, 49 representation and, 141–142 as synergy between liberal and deliberative democracy, 5 thoughtfulness and, 48–51 Zeguo Town, in, 229–243 (See also Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in)

Delury, John, on harmony as justification for authoritarianism, 126 Democratic centralism, 247 Democratic minimalism, 114–115 China, prospects for, 127 n. 2 meritocratic rule contrasted, 155 “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City, 217–227 achievements of, 226 agenda, 222 analysis of, 223–226 broadening of scope, 219 Chinese understanding of deliberation and, 181–182 contents of, 222–223 deepening of function, 219 delegates, role of, 222 development of, 218–223 first phase, 220 gradual change versus radical change, 225–226 “hearing and witness” meetings, 220–221 historical background, 218–219 hosts, role of, 222 organic formation of, 225 origins of, 218–219 overview, 12 People’s Deputy Congress, participation of, 220–222 second phase, 220–221 supervision of, 223 third phase, 221–222 transformation from individual to collective problem-solving function, 220 Deng Xiaoping, on separation of powers, 129 n. 9 Denmark, Deliberative Polling in, 230 Designed forums, deliberative democracy in, 25–29 lay citizen deliberation, 26–27 partisan deliberation, 28–29

270 / index Despotism. See also Authoritarianism “people first” concept as, 169–170 Dienel, Peter, on planning cells, 26 Dimitracopoulou, I., on communication and level of cognitive development, 95 Direct action, 63–64 Direct democracy minimalism and, 115 political culture and, 122 “Popular Branch” of government and, 119 prospects for China, 127 n. 2 “stealth democracy” and, 116 Discourse principle, 56, 70 n. 3 Discussion groups, 42–43 Dong Xuebing, on “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City, 217–227. See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City Downs, Anthony, on rational ignorance, 44, 229 Dryzek, John S. arenas of deliberative democracy, on, 23–34 (See also Arenas of deliberative democracy) authoritarian deliberation, on, 135 autonomy from state, on necessity of for deliberative democracy, 137, 138 conflict resolution and deliberative democracy, on, 143 critical theory version of deliberative democracy, on, 54, 56 deliberative democracy, on, 3 deliberative turn in democratic theory and practice, on, 3 democratization strategies in China, on, 175 environmentalism, on, 30 inclusiveness and citizenship, on, 58 national-level deliberation in China, on, 152–153

public policy and deliberative democracy, on, 142 public sphere deliberative democracy in China, on, 137 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 social process, on deliberation as, 64 state and public sphere in deliberative democracy, on, 198 voluntary associations, on, 67–68 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Du Jie, on deliberative democracy on Internet, 171 Duke Huan, deliberative democracy under, 168 Dworkin, Ronald, on deliberative democracy as alternative to liberal democracy, 136 Economic development. See also Market economy deliberative democracy, role in development of, 192 social order, effect on, 177 Education deliberative institutions, in, 92 empowerment of citizens and, 190 Huang Zongxi, importance to, 169 jury system and, 123 lack of access to in China, 194 minimalism and, 115–116 necessity for participation in deliberation, 34 political process, regarding, 151 village representative assemblies and, 208 Zhejiang Province, in, 218–219 Electoral College as filtration of public opinion, 38 Electoral democracy. See also Liberal democracy; Voting aggregation (See Aggregation) declining participation in, 79

index / 271 deliberative democracy as alternative to, 136–137 inadequacy of, 78–79 inhibiting deliberation, as, 137 media and, 79 meritocratic rule as alternative to, 154–156 tendency to limit understanding of democratization to, 1 Elite management anti-elite assumptions in deliberative democracy, problems with, 138 Beida reform process and, 255, 256 Confucianist tradition of, 81 control over deliberative democracy in China, 34 internal discussion, importance of to public policy, 254 limitation on deliberative democracy, as, 192–193 meritocratic rule, 154–156 national-level deliberation in China and, 153–154 participation in deliberation, combined with, 142 “Popular Branch” of government and, 125 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 125 village politics, in, 199, 211–212 village representative assemblies and, 208 Elster, Jon bargaining, on, 63 conflict resolution and deliberative democracy, on, 143 deliberative democracy, on, 3 Mill and government by discussion, on, 188 Emotion and deliberative democracy, 182 communication and, 97–98 effect of, 92–93

Empowerment of citizens through deliberative democracy, 188–190 Enhancing local governance through deliberative democracy, 187–188 Environmentalism insulation from deliberation, 134 partisan deliberation and, 28 public sphere, as deliberative democracy in, 30 Equal participation, methods for, 139–140 Equality and deliberative democracy, 55–56, 139–140 Evaluation meetings. See Citizen evaluation meetings External-collective aspect of deliberative democracy, 65 Face-to-face interaction, importance of, 118 Fairness cognitive capacity, effect of, 90, 91 deliberative democracy and, 83, 84 Deliberative Polling, in, 242 standards of conduct for deliberation, 86 Farmers in China, push for deliberative democracy by, 150–151 Feminism as deliberative democracy in public sphere, 30 Festinger, L., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Fishkin, James S. consensus-building, on, 125–126 Deliberation Day, on, 47–48, 60 Deliberative Polling, on, 45, 63, 149 (See also Deliberative Polling) elite management, on, 125 empirical studies in deliberative democracy by, 4 equal participation, on methods for, 139–140 opinion polls in deliberative democracy, on, 26

272 / index Fishkin, James S.––continued populism, on, 141 public consultation, on, 37–51 (See also Public consultation) public opinion polls in China, on, 124, 125 unequal power relations, on, 140 Western nations, on deliberation in, 194 Zeguo Town Deliberative Polling, on, 229–243 (See also Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in) Fiske, Susan T., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Ford Foundation, support for Hangzhou conference on deliberative democracy, 3 Forester, J., on deliberative democracy in Western nations, 80 Formalism, problems of, 138–139, 143 Founders, objections to public consultation, 38–39, 49 “Free-rider” problems of democracy, 115–116 Frolic, B. Michael, on civil society in China, 123 Fung, Archon deliberative democracy, on, 3, 119 effective deliberative citizenship, on, 69 empirical studies in deliberative democracy by, 4 jury system, on, 123 “reformist tinkering,” on, 122 security forces and deliberative democracy, on, 177 state-sponsored deliberation, on authenticity of, 139 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Gadamer, Hans Georg, on ideal deliberation, 17 Gallup Poll, public opinion polls using quota sampling, 44

Gan Yang, criticism of Beida reform process, 250 Gao Min, on Beida reform process, 248 Germany, planning cells in, 26, 61 Gewirtz, Paul, 114, 116, 117 Giddens, Anthony, on dialogical democracy, 246 “Global citizens,” 68 Goodin, Robert E. autonomy from state, on necessity of for deliberative democracy, 138 deliberative democracy, on, 3, 65 Gundersen, Adolf G., on deliberative polling and representation, 141–142 Guo Zhenglin, on village committees, 201 Guoyu Chouyu, concept of, 166 Gutmann, Amy communication problems in deliberative democracy, on, 60 definition of deliberative democracy, on, 161 deliberative democracy, on, 54, 55 preconditions to democracy, on, 4 Rawls and deliberative democracy, on, 108 n. 5 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Habermas, Jürgen autonomy from state, on necessity of for deliberative democracy, 137 cognition and communication, on, 108 n. 9 communication and reason, on, 108 n. 4 communicative rationality, on, 253 critical theory version of deliberative democracy, on, 54, 56, 70 n. 3

index / 273 deliberative democracy, on, 3 “good deliberation,” on, 4 “ideal speech situation,” on, 4 normative model of deliberative democracy, on, 246 political communication, on, 4–5 public sphere, on, 31 transformation of communicative power into administrative power, on, 246 “two track” deliberative democracy, on, 32 Hamilton, Alexander, on “successive filtrations,” 38 Han Dynasty, Imperial Censors in, 166–167 Han Feizi, monarchical power and, 165 Hangzhou City citizen evaluation meetings in, 180, 185 citizenship-building and consultative meetings in, 190 conference on deliberative democracy at, 3 consensus conferences in, 231 consultative meetings in, 180, 231 deliberative democracy, experiments in, 171 moral courts in, 82 public policy evaluation process in, 241 Hansen, K.M., on polarization and deliberative democracy, 145 Hanshu Shihouzhi, records of early Chinese public opinion compiled by, 166 Hanyuan, social protests in, 177 Harmony, concept of authoritarianism, as justification for, 126 Confucius on, 172 n. 1 cultural considerations, 105 polarization and, 145–146

resource pertinent to development of deliberative democracy, as, 164–165 Western concepts contrasted, 81–82 He, Baogang Bell on research of, 149–157 capacity of citizens and deliberative theory, on, 27 consensus-building, on, 157 n. 4 consensus conferences, on, 26 contemporary deliberative processes in China, on, 175–195 (See also Contemporary deliberative processes in China) dual governance structure and deliberative democracy, on, 82 integration of Western and Chinese deliberative theory, on, 133–146 (See also Integration of Western and Chinese deliberative theory) local-level deliberation in China, on, 149–152 national-level deliberation in China, on, 152–154 recalls in village politics, on, 210 state-sponsored deliberation, on authenticity of, 139 Zeguo Town Deliberative Polling, on, 229–243 (See also Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in) Zhejiang Province, on experiments in deliberative democracy in, 171 He Huaihong, on Beida reform process, 252, 254 “Heart-to-heart discussion” (kentan) Confucianism and, 182 defined, 180, 231, 238 Wenling City, in, 217–227 (See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City) Heider, F., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Henderson, Sarah L., on civil society, 147 n. 4

274 / index Hendriks, Carolyn, on micro-macro contrast in deliberative theory, 29 Hibbing, John R., on “stealth democracy,” 40, 116 Hindess, Barry, on citizenship, 67 Historical background of Chinese deliberative democracy, 164–169 HIV policy, partisan deliberation and, 28 House of Lords, reforms to, 27 Howell, Jude, on electoral democracy in China, 1 Hsia Dynasty, compiling of public opinion during, 166 Hu Jintao, “harmonious society” under, 177 Hu Rong, on village representative assemblies, 208 Huang Zongxi, on deliberative democracy, 168–169 Huaying, village representative assemblies in, 207 Hubei Province, village representative assemblies in, 207 Human nature, assumptions regarding, 87–93 adequacy of cognitive capacity, 87 cognitive capacity, effect of, 87–92 developmental psychological research and, 89, 91 emotion, effect of, 92–93 engagement of others and, 87 equality of cognitive capacity, 91 internalization, effect of, 89–90 logical reflection and, 88 participation and, 87 self-direction and, 87 social background and, 108 n. 7 subjective reflection, effect of, 89–90 Hutchings, K., on “global citizens,” 68 Ideology and deliberative democracy, 182

Immigrants and citizenship, 57–58 Imperial Censors in Han Dynasty, 166–167 Inclusion Deliberation Day and, 48–51 deliberative polling and, 48–51 public consultation, forms of based on, 41–51 thoughtfulness, conflict with, 37–40 Individualism. See Self-interest Induced institutional change, 225 “Industrial citizenship,” 67 Information lack of access to in China, 194 necessity for deliberative democracy, weakness in China, 199 village representative assemblies and, 208 Inhelder, B. cognitive capacity and logic and reason, on, 89 psychological impact of developmental dynamic, on, 108 n. 10 reflexive abstraction, on, 96 Integration of Western and Chinese deliberative theory, 133–146 authoritarian deliberation, 134–135 conflict resolution and deliberation, 143–145 decision and deliberation, 142–143 deliberative democratization, 136–137 equality and deliberation, 139–140 overview, 10–11 polarization and deliberation, 145–146 representation and deliberation, 141–142 state and deliberation, 137–139 Intellectuals and meritocratic rule, 154–156 Interest-group democracy, 115–116

index / 275 International institutions and citizenship, 67 International Monetary Fund, anti-globalization and, 30–31 Internet Beida reform process, attention on, 249 deliberative democracy on, 171 Jae Ho Chung, on social protests in China, 176 Jarboe, Susan, on group discussion and logic and reason, 88 Jefferson, Thomas local councils, on, 6, 7 separation of powers, on, 129 n. 10 Jiang Zhaohua empowerment of citizens, on, 189–190 random selection in deliberative polling, on, 141 Zeguo Town, on Deliberative Polling in, 203, 233, 237–239 Jiangxi, village small groups in, 203 Jiaojiang City citizen evaluation meetings in, 185 deliberative institutions in, 191 Jixia School, deliberative democracy and, 168 Johnson, James, on combination of equality and autonomy, 85 Jowell, Roger, on quota sampling in public opinion poll, 43 Jury system deliberative citizens, and, 60 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 122–123, 129 n. 11 Kahneman, Daniel, on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Karpowitz, C., on group discussion and logic and reason, 88

Kegan, R. cognitive capacity and reflection, on, 90 shared cultural rhetoric, on, 96 Kelley, H., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Kentan (“heart-to-heart discussion”) Confucianism and, 182 defined, 180, 231, 238 Wenling City, in, 217–227 (See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City) Kettering Foundation, discussion groups and, 43 King, Dr. Martin Luther, and power of rhetoric, 30 Kinnvall, Catarina, on dominance of public sphere in China, 81 Knight, Jack, on combination of equality and autonomy, 85 Kohlberg, L. moral reasoning, on, 90 psychological impact of developmental dynamic, on, 108 n. 10 shared cultural rhetoric, on, 96 Lamm, H., on group discussion and logic and reason, 88 Lang Youxing electoral democracy in China, on, 1 recalls in village politics, on, 210 Laslett, Peter deliberation in West, on, 194 polarization and deliberative democracy, on, 145 Law on Price, public hearing requirement, 180, 231 Lawrence, Susan V., on village representative assemblies, 208 Legal status, citizenship as, 57–59 Legalist thought during Warring States Period, 167

276 / index Legge, James, on early deliberative democracy under Yao, 166 Legislatures deliberative democracy in, 24–25 democratic but not deliberative, as, 134 Legitimacy aggregation, legitimacy deficits from, 162 deliberative democracy and, 254 democratic states, of, 23 Leib, Ethan J. compulsory political participation, on, 151 consensus-building, on, 125–126 deliberative democracy, on, 3 elite management, on, 125 national-level deliberation in China, on, 152–153 populism, on, 141 populist/elitist dichotomy of deliberative democracy, on, 4 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, on, 113–127 (See also Pragmatism and deliberative democracy) Li Junru, advocacy of deliberative democracy by, 8 Li Lianjiang electoral democracy in China, on, 1 village elections, on, 209 Li Meng, on Beida reform process criticism of, 250, 255 public reason and, 253–254 Li Qiang, defense of Beida reform process by, 248, 252, 255 Li Tongxin, on rural unrest, 211 Li Yintao, criticism of Beida reform process by, 251 Liberal democracy, 23. See also Electoral democracy alternative to deliberative democracy, as, 136–137 assumptions under, 78

criticism of, 53–54 declining participation in, 79 deliberative democracy, advantages of, 53 republican democracy, tension with, 246 synergy with deliberative democracy, 5 tendency to limit understanding of democratization to, 1 weakness of liberal democratic institutions in China, 33 Lijphart, Arend, on consociational democracy, 31 Lin Shangli advocacy of deliberative democracy by, 8 deliberative democracy as alternative to liberal democracy, on, 136 harmony as basis for deliberative democracy, on, 165 Lindeman, Eduard C., on consent and democracy, 175 List, Christian conflict resolution and deliberative democracy, on, 143 cycles violating transitivity, on, 50–51 deliberative democracy, on, 3 Literary Digest Poll, 44 Liu Zhipeng, on recalls in village politics, 210 Local-level deliberation in China, 149–152 accountability of local officials as purpose of, 150 citizen evaluation meetings, 150 deliberative polling, 149, 151 enhancing local solidarity as purpose of, 152 minimizing power of wealthy as purpose of, 150–151

index / 277 national-level deliberation contrasted, 152 overview, 11 poor, reserving representation for, 151 Luskin, Robert C. deliberative polling, on, 45 polarization, on, 50 Macedo, Stephen deliberation, on, 136, 194 Madison, James, on “successive filtrations,” 38 Majoritarianism and “stealth democracy,” 116 Mandatory deliberative institutions in China, 114 Manipulation of deliberative institutions, 193 Mansbridge, Jane, on consensus-building in China, 126 Mao Zedong “mass line” under, 179 separation of powers, on, 129 n. 9 Market economy centralization of power, effect on, 163 deliberative democracy and, 6, 126, 191 local democracy within parameters of, 171 tensions caused by, 177 village self-government, influence on, 209–211 Wenlin City, in, 223–225 Marshall, T.H., on citizenship rights, 59 Martin, B., on direct action, 63–64 Marx, Karl, 31 Marxism and deliberative democracy, 6 Matthews, David, on National Issues Forums, 43 McGinnis, John, on supermajoritarian constraints on lawmaking, 120

McLean, Iain, on cycles violating transitivity, 50–51 Media Beida reform process, attention on, 249–250 deliberative democracy, effect on, 193 electoral democracy and, 79 Mediation as partisan deliberation, 28 Meetings. See Citizen evaluation meetings; Consultative meetings Mencius, on harmony, 172 n. 1 Mendelberg, Tali, on group discussion and logic and reason, 88 Meritocratic rule as alternative to electoral democracy, 154–156 authoritarianism contrasted, 154–155 minimalism contrasted, 155 overview, 11 “people first” concept as, 169–170 unrealistic nature of, 156 Mi Youlu, on rise of village committees, 199 “Middle way,” polarization and, 145–146 Mill, John Stuart, on government by discussion, 188 Miller, David, on definition of deliberative democracy, 161 Minimalism, 114–115 China, prospects for, 127 n. 2 meritocratic rule contrasted, 155 Ministry of Civil Affairs, village representative assemblies and, 206–207 Mo Yifei, on deliberative democracy in Wenling City, 180–181 Mobilization style of politics, 162–163 Models of deliberative democracy, 3–6 Mohist thought during Warring States Period, 167 Money, influence on village self-government, 209–211

278 / index Monitoring of deliberative institutions, lack of, 193 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, on separation of powers, 129 n. 9, 129 n. 10 Moral courts, 82 Morin, Richard, on phantom opinions, 44 Morris, Chris, on self-selected listener opinion polls, 42 Multicultural society, deliberative democracy in, 161–162 Myers, D., on group discussion and logic and reason, 88 National Congress, public hearing requirement for price of public goods, 231 National government of China antistate assumptions in deliberative democracy, problems with, 138 domination of Chinese society by, 163 role of in deliberative democracy, 137–139 support of deliberative democracy by, 7–8 National Issues Forums, 43 National-level deliberation in China, 152–154 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, role of, 153–154 Confucianism and selection of deliberators, 153–154 deliberative institutions, 180 elite deliberators, 153–154 examinations for selecting deliberators, 154 local-level deliberation contrasted, 152 overview, 11 random selection of deliberators, 153

National People’s Congress, public hearing on income tax, 8 Neighborhood committees, 121 Neo-Confucian deliberation, 11, 14, 16 New America Foundation, 129 n. 12 Nixon, Richard, integration of environmentalism into political mainstream by, 30 “Non-attitudes,” problems with, 229–230 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) China, in, 123–124 citizenship and, 67, 68 deliberative democracy in, 54 state-sponsored NGOs, weakness of, 139 Normative ideal, citizenship as, 62–66 Normative model of deliberative democracy emphasis on in China, 104–105 Habermas on, 246 O’Brien, Kevin J. electoral democracy in China, on, 1 village committees, on, 201 O’Donnell, Guillermo, on accountability and democracy, 188–189 Official status, citizenship as, 57–59 Ogden, Suzanne civil society in China, on, 123–124 consensus-building in China, on, 126 corporatist democracy, on, 116 democratization strategies in China, on, 175–176 importance of consultative and deliberative institutions in China, on, 241 interest-group democracy, on, 116 minimalism in China, on, 115 neighborhood committees, on, 121

index / 279 public opinion polls in China, on, 124–125 separation of powers, on, 121–122 social rights versus political rights in China, on, 117 village self-government, on, 121 work units, on, 120 Oi, Jean C. electoral democracy in China, on, 1 village self-government, effect of elections on, 209 Opinion change experiments as synergy between liberal and deliberative democracy, 5 Opinion polls. See Public opinion polls Organic Law tensions in village self-government under, 209, 210 village assemblies under, 204 village representative assemblies under, 206–207 village self-government under, 199–200, 201 Parsons, T., on personality and social structure, 108 n. 9 Participation in deliberation, 55–56 consultative meetings, in, 184 elite management, combined with, 142 erosion in, effect on deliberative democracy, 162 importance to deliberative democracy, 161 inclusion in comprehensive democratization process, 1–2 village self-government, importance to, 212 Participatory democracy deliberative decmocracy contrasted, 4 Maoism and, 115 political culture and, 122 state institutions, resistance from, 137

Partisan deliberation, 28–29 Pastor, Robert, on village elections, 212 Paternalism Confucianist tradition of, 81 “people first” concept as example of, 165 Peking University faculty reform process, 245–256. See also Beida reform process “People first,” concept of, 165–167, 169–170 People’s Congresses deliberative institutions combined with, 137 legislation in, 171 People’s Daily, attention on Beida reform process in, 249 Pettit, Philip, on deliberative democracy, 113 Phantom opinions, 44 Piaget, J. cognitive capacity and logic and reason, on, 89 psychological impact of developmental dynamic, on, 108 n. 10 reflexive abstraction, on, 96 Planning cells as lay citizen deliberation, 26–27 Pluralism, necessity for interest-group democracy, 116 Pocock, J.G.A. Athenian democracy, on, 62 Rome, on citizenship in, 57 Polarization deliberative democracy and, 145–146 problems with, 40, 50 Political practice, citizenship as, 62–66 Polls. See Public opinion polls “Popular Branch” of government Chinese interest in, 128 n. 7 elite management and, 125

280 / index “Popular Branch” of government––continued overview, 5, 10, 14 proposal of, 119, 120, 141 special voting rules, 117, 119 Popular sovereignty importance of, 118 political culture and, 122 “Popular Branch” drawing on, 10 Populism deliberative councils and, 7 deliberative democracy and, 141–142 “people first,” concept of, 165 United States, in, 39 Posner, Richard deliberative democracy, on, 39 minimalism, on, 114–115 Pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 113–127 civil society and, 123–124 consensus-building and, 125–126 constitutions and, 120–121 designing deliberative democracy in China, 117–126 elite management and, 125 forms of democracy in China, 114–117 jury system and, 122–123 political culture and, 122 public opinion and, 124–125 separation of powers and, 121–122 Price of public goods in China, public hearing requirement, 180, 231 Private businesses. See also Market economy deliberative institutions, use of, 178–179 push for deliberative democracy by, 150–152 Private spheres Beida reform process and, 251–253 public sphere contrasted, 251 Probability sampling, public opinion polls using, 44

Propp, Kathleen M., on group discussion and logic and reason, 88 Public consultation, 37–51 Beida reform process, insufficiency for, 254–255 China, in, 135 citizen juries, 43 consensus conferences, 43 consultative meetings, 183–184 (See also Consultative meetings) deliberation Day, 47–48 deliberative polling, 44–47 discussion groups, 42–43 forms of, 41–51 Founders, objections of, 38–39, 49 legitimacy, importance of to public policy, 254 overview, 9 probability sampling, public opinion polls using, 44 quota sampling, public opinion polls using, 43 raw opinion and, 41 referendum democracy, 47 refined opinion and, 41 self-selected listener opinion polls, 41–43 Public opinion polls Deliberative Polling (See Deliberative Polling) Gallup Poll, polls using quota sampling, 44 pragmatism in designing, 124–125 probability sampling in, 44 quota sampling in, 43 self-selected listener opinion polls (SLOPs), 41–43 Public policy and deliberative democracy, 142–143 Public-private divide in China, 81 Public reason Beida reform process and, 250–254 importance of, 54 judges exercising, 24

index / 281 Public sphere Beida reform process and, 249–250 China, weakness in, 33–34 deliberative democracy in, 29–32 private spheres contrasted, 251 Qi State, deliberative democracy in, 167–168 Qingshan Tan dual governance structure and deliberative democracy, on, 82 economic development and technological change, on, 33 elites, on control over deliberation by, 34 Organic Law, on, 199 tensions in village self-government, on, 209 village committees, on, 201 village elections, on, 212 village self-government, on, 197–213 (See also Village self-government) Qixia Academy, deliberative democracy in, 172 n. 4 Quality of deliberation, 55–56 Quattrone, G., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Radical version of deliberative democracy, 54, 56, 70 n. 3 Random selection process Deliberation Day, in, 48 Deliberative Polling, in, 49, 139–140 national-level deliberation in China, in, 153 problems with, 229–230 public consultation, in, 41 public opinion polls, in, 230–231 Wenling City, random sampling within representative system in, 142

Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in, 46, 47, 141, 233, 238 Rappaport, Michael, on supermajoritarian constraints on lawmaking, 120 Rational ignorance, 39, 44, 49, 229 Raw opinion and public consultation, 41 Rawls, John deliberative democracy as alternative to liberal democracy, on, 136 ideal deliberation, on, 17 liberal version of deliberative democracy, on, 54 overlapping consensus, on, 108 n. 6 political justice, theory of, 82–83, 108 n. 5 public reason, on, 24 shared cultural presuppositions, on, 108 n. 8 Supreme Court as deliberative institution, on, 24, 25 “veil of ignorance,” on, 4 Referenda, 39, 47 Refined opinion and public consultation, 41 Rehg, William, on deliberative democracy, 55 Representation deliberative democracy, and,141–142 representative democracy, 23 representative institutions and minimalism, 115 republican democracy and deliberative democracy, advantages of, 53 Research Center for Comparative Politics and Economics, innovation prizes for citizen evaluation meetings, 185–187 Rhodes, R.A.W., on role of networks in administration, 25

282 / index Riker, William H., on cycles violating transitivity, 50 Rosenberg, Shawn cognitive capacity and logic and reason, on, 89 communication and level of cognitive development, on, 95 culture and deliberative democracy, on, 77–107 (See also Culture and deliberative democracy) discourse experiments, on, 5 political reasoning, on, 90, 91 public policy and deliberative democracy, on, 142 shared cultural rhetoric, on, 96 Rowling, L., on deliberative democracy in Australia, 68 Rozelle, Scott, on electoral democracy in China, 1 Rule of law and deliberative democracy, 56 Russia, civil society in, 147 n. 4 SARS crisis Beida reform process, effect on, 248 bureaucratic response to, 33 Scandinavia Legislatures, deliberative democracy in, 25 public sphere, deliberative democracy in, 31 Schools. See Education Schumpeter, Joseph deliberative democracy, on, 39 minimalism and, 114–115 Segmental autonomy, 31 Self-interest consensus-building as alternative to, 94 deliberative democracy and, 6, 182, 252–253 harmony and, 164 Self-selection citizen juries, in, 141 deliberative participatory budgeting, in, 240

jury system and, 123 self-selected listener opinion polls (SLOPs), 41–43 Selman, R.L., on cognitive capacity and reflection, 90 Senate, selection by state legislatures as filtration of public opinion, 38 Separation of powers China, weakness in, 199 Deng on, 129 n. 9 Jefferson on, 129 n. 10 Mao on, 129 n. 9 pragmatism and deliberative democracy, 121–122 Sun Yat-sen, on, 129 n. 9 Shanaxi, village representative assemblies in, 207 Shang Dynasty, compiling of public opinion during, 166 Shangdong, citizen evaluation meetings in, 180 Shanghai, citizen evaluation meetings in, 180, 184 Shays’ Rebellion, 38 Shen Shanhong, on politics of Three Generations Period, 168–169 Shengyang, citizen evaluation meetings in, 180 Shi Jinchuan, on “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City, 217–227. See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City Shiyi, criticism of monarchs by, 167 Siu, Alice, on Zeguo Town Deliberative Polling, 229–243. See also Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in Siyue, deliberative democracy under Yao by, 166 Smelsund, J., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88

index / 283 Smith, G. citizen juries, on, 61, 62–63 planning cells, on, 61 random selection in deliberative democracy, on, 59 Smith, T.V., on consent and democracy, 175 Socrates, 38 Song Dynasty, criticism of monarchs during, 167 Songmen Town agricultural and rural modernization, educational pilot program on, 218–219 deliberative institutions, innovation prizes for, 179 monitoring of deliberative institutions, lack of, 193 school mergers, deliberative meetings on, 143–144 social security, public forum on, 218 Sophist thought during Warring States Period, 167 Soviet Union, deliberative democracy in, 61 Soysal, Y.N., on inclusiveness and citizenship, 58 Spartan democracy, 42 Spence, Jonathan, 127 Spring and Autumn Period, deliberative democracy during, 167 Stamatis, C., on capitalism and deliberative democracy, 60 State antistate assumptions in deliberative democracy, problems with, 138 domination of Chinese society by, 163 role of in deliberative democracy, 137–139 support of deliberative democracy in China by, 7–8 “Stealth democracy,” 40, 116–117

Stiglitz, Joseph, on globalization, 30 Stokes, Geoffrey citizenship and deliberative democracy, on, 53–70 (See also Citizenship and deliberative democracy) “global citizens,” on, 68 “Successive filtrations,” 38–39 Suffrage and citizenship, 57 Sun Yat-sen, on separation of powers, 129 n. 9 Sunstein, Cass polarization and deliberative democracy, on, 40, 50, 145 Supermajoritarian constraints on lawmaking, 120 Supreme Court deliberative but not democratic, as, 134 deliberative democracy in, 24–25 Survey Research Center, public opinion polls using probability sampling, 44 Susskind, Lawrence consensus-building approach, on, 28, 126 mediation, on, 28 Taishi, criticism of monarchs by, 166 Taiwanese democracy, attitudes toward, 115, 128 n. 3 Taixue, scholars at, 169 Taizhou City, grassroots democratic consultation in, 219 Talbert, Richard J.A., on Spartan democracy, 42 Tang Dynasty, criticism of monarchs during, 167 Tangxia Village, village representative assemblies in, 187 Taoism, rise of, 167 Taylor, S.E., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 Technical experts, importance of recommendations to legitimacy of public policy, 254

284 / index “Teledemocracy,” 118, 128 n. 6 Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, on “stealth democracy,” 40, 116 Thiers, Paul, on economic development and technological change, 33 Thompson, Dennis definition of deliberative democracy, on, 161 deliberative democracy, on, 54, 55 preconditions to democracy, on, 4 Rawls and deliberative democracy, on, 108 n. 5 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Thoughtfulness Deliberation Day and, 48–51 deliberative polling and, 48–51 inclusion, conflict with, 37–40 public consultation, forms of based on, 41–51 Three Generations Period compiling of public opinion during, 166 politics of, 169 Thurston, Anne F. electoral democracy in China, on, 1 village representative assemblies, on, 207 Tianjian Shi, on electoral democracy in China, 1 Transformative nature of deliberation, 55–56 Tversky, A., on cognitive capacity and logic and reason, 88 “Two track” deliberative democracy, 32 Uhr, John Australian constitutions, on, 68 legislatures as deliberative institutions, on, 24

Unger, Jonathan, electoral democracy in China, on, 1 Unger, Roberto, on “reformist tinkering,” 122 United Kingdom citizen panels in, 26 Deliberative Polling in, 230 genetically modified food, deliberative process regarding, 61 House of Lords, reforms to, 27 United States civic dialogue in, 102 Congress, deliberative democracy in, 25 deliberative democracy in, 117–119 Deliberative Polling in, 230 Founders, objections to public consultation, 38–39 partisan deliberation in, 29 University of Wuppertal, planning cells and, 61 Urban politics deliberative democracy, experiments in, 82 deliberative institutions in, 180 village self-government, effect of, 217 Valadez, Jorge M., on definition of deliberative democracy, 161 van Steenbergen, B., on citizenship as political practice, 62 Varney, W., on direct action, 63–64 Village assemblies, 204–206 advantages of, 206 agenda-setting, importance of, 205 compulsory participation, 206 election of independent chairs, importance of, 205 institutionalization of, 206 limitations of, 204–205 Organic Law, under, 204

index / 285 organized nature of, 204 procedural rules, 205–206 reorienting of, 205 two-tier process with village small groups, 203–204 Village committees power of, 201 rise of, 199 Village party branches, 201 Village party secretaries, 209 Village representative assemblies, 206–209 advantages of, 207–208 composition of, 207 de facto legislatures, as, 206 deliberative democracy, integration into, 208–209 elite management and, 208 limitations of, 208 Organic Law, under, 206–207 Tangxia Village, in, 187 Wenzhou, in, 187 Village self-government, 197–213 assemblies, 204–206 (See also Village assemblies) committees (See Village committees) Communist Party subversion of, 162–163 constitutions and, 121 deliberative democracy and, 198–201 deliberative institutions, 137, 201–209 dual power structure in, 209 effect of, 179–180, 209 elections, role of, 191, 199, 209, 211 elite management and, 199, 211–212 experiments in, 82 inadequacy of existing institutions, 211–212 market economy, influence of, 209–211 money, influence of, 209–211

Organic Law, under (See Organic Law) participation, importance of, 212 party branches, 201 party secretaries, 209 power, influence of, 209–211 recalls, 210 representative assemblies, 206–209 (See also Village representative assemblies) rise of, 217 rural unrest and, 200 small groups, 202–204 (See also Village small groups) tensions in, 209–211 urban politics, effect on, 217 women, role of, 191–192 Village small groups, 202–204 advantages of, 202–203 disadvantages of, 203 inclusiveness of, 202 manipulation of, 203 passivity of, 203 two-tier process with village assemblies, 203–204 Voting. See also Bargaining; Electoral democracy aggregation (See Aggregation) citizenship and, 57 conflict resolution and, 144–145 consultative meetings as alternative to, 184 Deliberation Day and, 47–48 deliberative democracy and, 63 legitimacy in absence of, 55 “Popular Branch” of government, special rules for, 117, 119 village elections (See Village selfgovernment) Voting and conflict resolution, 144–145 Vygotsky, L.S. cognitive capacity and logic and reason, on, 89 reflexive abstraction, on, 96

286 / index Wales, C. citizen juries, on, 61, 62–63 planning cells, on, 61 random selection in deliberative democracy, 59 Walsh, K.C., on civic dialogue, 102 Wang, Aiping rise of village committees, on, 199 village representative assemblies, on, 208 Wang Hui democratic reform in China, on, 127 interest-group democracy, on, 116 minimalism in China, on, 115, 127 n. 2 social rights versus political rights in China, on, 117 Wang Xiaoyu, membership on working committee for Deliberative Polling in Zeguo Town, 233 Warren, Mark communication and social conditions, on, 94 deliberative democracy, on, 55 equality and autonomy, on combination of, 85 governability, on, 188 public policy and deliberative democracy, on, 142 reflection and interaction, on combination of, 84 state, role of in deliberative democracy, 138 village self-government, on influence of money and power on, 209 Warring States Period, deliberative democracy during, 167–168, 172 n. 4 Wenling City consultative meetings in, 138, 143 deliberative institutions in, 137, 231–232

“Democratic Talk in All Sincerity,” 217–227 (See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City) economic environment, 223–225 innovation prizes for deliberative institutions in, 180 kentan in, 217–227 (See also “Democratic Talk in All Sincerity” in Wenling City) monitoring of deliberative institutions, lack of, 193 school mergers, deliberative meetings on, 143–144 social protests in, 176–177 Songmen Town (See Songmen Town) stages of development of deliberative democracy in, 180–181 state-sponsored deliberation, authenticity of, 139 survey on deliberative institutions in, 183, 188, 189, 191 village self-government in, 82 Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in, 229–243 (See also Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in) Wenqiao Town, “hearing and witness” meetings in, 220–221 Wenzhou affluence and public services in, 150 village representative assemblies in, 187 Western Chou Dynasty, deliberative democracy in, 166 Will-formation, 124 Women, roles in urban and rural government, 191–192 Work units, 7, 120, 128 n. 8 World Bank, anti-globalization and, 30–31 World Trade Organization, anti-globalization and, 30–31

index / 287 Wright, E.O. deliberative democracy, on, 3 effective deliberative citizenship, on, 69 empirical studies in deliberative democracy, 4 state-sponsored deliberation, on authenticity of, 139 Western nations, on deliberative democracy in, 80 Wu Yi, on village politics, 200 Xiangxiao School, deliberative democracy and, 167 Xiao Tangbiao, on village small groups, 203 Xiaoshi, criticism of monarchs by, 166 Xin Qiushui tensions in village self-government, on, 209 village committees, on, 201 Xinhua Wire Service, attention on Beida reform process in, 249 Xu Lijin, on Beida reform process, 245–256. See also Beida reform process Xu Yong, on village politics, 200 Ya’an City, citizen evaluation meetings in, 185 Yao, early deliberative democracy under, 166 Ye Qiquan, evaluation of Deliberative Polling in Zeguo Town, 237 Young, Iris Marion, on bias in favor of power in deliberative democracy, 192 Zeguo Town, Deliberative Polling in, 46–47, 140, 149, 229–243 background, 231–232 budget issues, 233–234 changes resulting from, 232, 241 conclusions from, 240–243

costs of, 241–242 credible input to public policy resulting from, 232, 241 deliberative participatory budgeting, 240 demographics, 233–234 economic environment, 232–233 empowerment in, 189–190, 240 evaluation of, 232, 235–237 Fishkin, James S., role of, 233, 235, 237, 243 n. 3 He, Baogang, role of, 233, 235, 243 n. 3 “heart-to-heart discussion” format, 231, 238 improvements over previous deliberative methods, 238–240 indigenous Chinese deliberative methods in, 237–238 informality, problems with, 242 knowledge, evaluation of, 236–237 more informed sample resulting from, 232, 241 obstacles, 241–243 participation, level of, 238 People’s Congress, endorsement of decisions by, 240–241 polarization and, 145 policy choices, evaluation of, 235–236 preparation for, 233–235 process, evaluation of, 237 public policy and, 143 random selection in, 141, 233, 238 representative sample, 232, 241 scheduling, 238 scientific basis of, 239 small group interaction in, 239 sufficiency of information, 238–239 unequal power structure, problems with, 242 women, underrepresentation of, 243 n. 5

288 / index Zhang Jinmin, effect of promoting elections on political career of, 179 Zhang Weiying, on Beida reform process defense of, 248, 250 drafting committee, role on, 247 public reason and, 253–254 Zhao Shouxing, on tensions in village self-government, 209 Zhejiang Province citizen evaluation meetings in, 185 deliberative democracy, experiments in, 170–171

deliberative institutions in, 150 village self-government in, 82 Zheng State, deliberative democracy in, 167 Zhou Dynasty, deliberative democracy during, 167 Zichan, deliberative democracy and, 167, 170 Zion, Laura, on consensus-building in China, 126 Zuozhuan, on early deliberative democracy, 167