The Self-Produchon of Society >\m?/- il :l) W DEREK COLWlkN
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The Self-Produchon of Society >\m?/- il :l) W DEREK COLWlkN
The Jnversity of Chicago Press go and _or Mcoao _onccn
Alain Touraine is professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. He is co-founder of the journal Sociologie du travail and past president of the French Sociological Society. Among his previously published works are Sociologie de I 'action (1965), La conscience ouvriere (1966), May Movement (1968, English translation 1971), Post-industrial Society (1969, English translation 1971), The Academic System in American Society (1972, English translation 1974), Pour la sociologie and Lettres a une etudiante (both 1974). The present work was First published as Production de la socidte; © Editions du Seuil, 1973.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1977 by the University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1977 Printed in the United States of America 81 80 79 78 77 987654321 Library of Congrefs Cataloging In Publication Data Touraine, Alain. The self-production of society. Translation of Production de la societe Includes index. 1. Sociology. 1. Title. HM51.T6713 301 76-611 ISBN 0-226-80858-0
CONlHSirS
Foreword by J. W. Freiberg Preface Introduction
XI
1
Historicity
15
A. Society Turns Back upon Itself B. Historical Action C. The Cardinal Points of Sociology D. The Birth of Sociology E. From Orientations to Practice F. Actors and Systems
15 27 32 48 53 60
2
The System of Historical Action
65
A. B.
65
The Dominion of Historicity Locating the System of Historical Action C. The Functioning of the System of Historical Action D. The Configurations of the System of Historical Action
xvii 1
72 79 91
VII
Contents
3 4 5
Class Relations
117
A. Historicity and Social Classes B. Classes as Historical Actors C. Types of Class Systems: Industrial Society D. Postindustrial Society E. Alienation F. Concluding Remarks
118 134
The Political or Institutional System
175
A. Institutions B. Institutionalization C. Between Historicity and Organization D. The State
175 197 206 216
Social Organization
235
Introduction: Where Sociology and History Meet A. The Organizational System B. Administrations, Enterprises, Agencies C. The Categories of Social Practice
235 239 249 270
149 155 166 170
Contents
6
7
Social Movements
298
A. Four Kinds of Collective Conduct B. The Nature of Social Movements C. The Natural History of Social Movements D. Level s of Project E. Formation of Social Movements F. Social Movements and the State E. Concluding Remarks
298 310
Social Change
374
Introduction: Historicity, Conflict, Change A. The Temporality of Social Systems B. Rupture Conduct C. Conduct of Internal Transformation D. Forms of Development E. Concluding Remarks
374 383 389 411 424 443
Conclusion
446
A. B.
446 449
The Sociologist and His Society Analysis and Action
336 343 355 364 371
Contents
C. Decline or Binh of Sociology D. The Internationalization of Sociology E. The Author Quits His Book
453 454 456
Glossary Index
459 465
FOREH/ORD
When I was a graduate student at UCLA in 1969, Alain Touraine came to teach tor a semester. He had just come from Santiago de Chile, where he had taught for the previous semester. Although 1 did not know it at the time, Touraine was in a self-imposed exile—a sort of modern Hegira. The events of May 1968 had been difficult for him; he had been one of very few major professors to become deeply involved. When the events came to a summary end, he found himself in limbo. He had been too involved for most of his colleagues and friends of his generation, and not involved enough for most of his students and friends of my generation. He needed to distance himself from Paris, from the barricades and recriminations, and to take the time to think about what it all meant and what were the implications for the grand theoretical model he had envisioned creating of the 'events'—the student activism, the old-left conservatism, the Gaullist repression. In Los Angeles Touraine gave a graduate seminar on the subject matter of what has become, in this book, the chapters on historicity and the system of action. The class began with about twenty graduate students and three or four professors in attendance. Two weeks later about eight students remained, including one from Argentina, one from Chile, and one from Alabama. Those who fled found the class i4too theoretical," "too abstract/' "too philosophical." Indeed the material presented was radically different from most American sociology. Yet I remember so well the feelings of the smaller group who stuck with it; each one of us felt after the semester that wre had had the most powerful intellectual experience of our graduate career. For the first time we were able to put in sociopolitical perspective the individualistic, psychologistic, scientistic bits and pieces that had been presented to us in our more usual courses and texts. We had read some
xii
Foreword
predigested Marx, of course, in our survey theory course, but the paradigm in which we thought and were taught—and thus in which we read Marx— was hopelessly reified. We memorized bits of theory and bits of methods, a touch of demography, a hint of history, all with a pinch of salt. We were not being educated. We were being minestrone'd. That is why Touraine's seminar was such a salient experience for us. For the first time we met a sociologist who operated from a unified, theoretically sophisticated perspective that added together for him what to us seemed like the nearly infinite and essentially unrelated events of the world. We had been wanting, I would even say hungering, for a theoretical model that would add together for us all that we experienced so poignantly—Vietnam, the student movement, the Black rights movement, the new values on patterns of interpersonal relations, the repressiveness of the military, espionage and police machinery of the United States, and so on. We learned much from Touraine, but he learned from us, also. He was fascinated by the spontaneity of our newly found, nondoctrinal critique of modern society, and by the counterculture we were creating to permit us to live more humanistic, more cooperative lives personally, while we acted as we could to support the liberalizing movements of our day. In 1970-71 I had the opportunity to live in Paris and to study again with Touraine. 1 was to learn that the difference between him and most of my professors in California was simply a manifestation of the differences between European and American thinking in general. I was shocked, frankly. In place of the professional, highly "specialized" American sociologists, the Europeans were intellectuals, far more likely to be concerned with broad issues, and to be able to situate the issues of their research both philosophically and historically. Instead of viewing the social world as a haphazard collection of independent events, the Europeans searched for the unity hidden beneath the surface of everyday phenomena. 1 had been brought up to equate totalitarianism with thought control; it had never occurred to me that in a liberal, reasonably pluralistic society, the general thought patterns of an entire people could be so effectively structured. 1 sat in on Touraine's seminar at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Of the twenty-five students, few were French; they came from three or four Latin American, two or three African, three or four European and two Asian countries (1 was the only American). We all spoke French, but what a wild cacophony of accents! Ever)' other week, we heard from Touraine the early versions of what are here the chapters of the political-institutional system, class relations, and social movements. On the odd weeks, we tried with each other to apply his theoretical models to the varied experiences of our different backgrounds. We sat around an enormous old table trying to come up with
Foreword
x, j
'
an understanding of the world we were inheriting and the generation of our parents who were running it so inadequately. One thing became particularly clear. There was a total rejection of the positivist, functionalist modete of American sociological theory that were based on the assumption that society was a grouping of capable adults making rational decisions, and that, but for a few deviants, things were pretty good and getting better all the time. The consensus was that only an analysis of society in terms of class relations could possibly explain the origin and dynamics of poverty and exploitation, of rebellion and repression. We saw the only possible sociology to be one which saw society not as a given state of affairs which was to be protected and preserved, but as the result of social action—including discussion and decision, but also conflict and struggle. Touraine's social theory was respected by that multinational seminar, though we critiqued it endlessly. He listened—and defended it—but also changed it and incorporated much of the critique. Again the seminar was an exciting experience, in part because the theoretical material presented provided a model within which we could gain insight and communicate with each other about the events of the world which swirled around us. But in part, as in the Los Angeles seminar, what made the experience lively was to watch Touraine incorporating our critique and the perspective of our generation into his theoretical work. Out of these seminars, and others like them, came the present book. At the same time this book incorporates the critique and advice of so many students and colleagues, many of its ideas can be seen in embryonic form in Touraine's thesis^ Sociologie de I action. Although the present work is highly abstract and theoretical, its models are immediately applicable and enormously useful in specific empirical studies. While the general thrust of the book is clear to anyone with a basic knowledge of the traditional literature of sociological theory, much of the discussion is original and ground-breaking. Several years ago Touraine andJDaniel Belj almost simultaneously published books on what they called "postindustrial society." It is certainly critical to examine how different are the paradigms within which the sociologists work, for the somewhat similar notions of postindustrial society take on radically different meanings for them. Both are arguing that, especially since World War II, there have been significant changes in the social processes of production and reproduction in industrial society. Somehow we must account for the increasingly important roles of science, the public sector, mass education, etc. Bell's perspective leads him to interpret these changes essentially in an "end of ideology" direction, whereas Touraine's model suggests, in brief, that we are indeed moving into a new
xiv
Foreword
phase of social relations, and that we therefore should be prepared to examine and understand the new social classes, conflicts, and ideologies that will be developing. Bell's postindustrial concept is a polemic against dialectical thought, while Touraine's concept is a call to sharpen our dialectical wits in order to comprehend new actors—new social classes—in a new situation. The chapter on the political-institutional system presents a model for political sociology that to my mind dialecticafly overcomes the current debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas as to what degree of unity one ought to suppose exists between the ruling class and the state. The model provides for a simultaneous appreciation of the relative autonomy of a political system within the structured confines of a class society. That is, we are asked to see the real, operating dialectic between a ruling class's prepolitical determination of the boundaries of possible politics on one hand, and the partly autonomous political action of opposed interest groups (some of which directly represent the ruling class perspective) within these boundaries, on the other. So the model clarifies the double entry of the ruling class into politics; it both formulates a prepolitical structuration of possible political action, and at the same time acts within the political arena through interest groups and politicians who propose and support specific legislation and administrative action which furthers ruling class interests. Another function of Touraine's political sociology in respect to his scheme taken as a whole is the transitional role the political-institutional level plays in mediating between historicity at one extreme, and the organizational phenomena of everyday life at the other. The historicity of a society is seen as an abstract, ultimately general determination of what the phenomenal experiences of an empirical society will actually be like. To be an industrial society as opposed to a preindustrial or postindustrial society is, after all. determinant of many things; there are widely differing possibilities in institutional processes and organizational structures for three such differing historicities. Yet everyday life can be radically different in two industrial societies; the relative autonomy of both the institutional and organizational levels within a given society provide for a relatively wide range of possible political and organizational patterns. The political-institutional level, then, is seen as the active transformational agent between the vague definitions of the situation provided by the historicity (mode of accumulation, definition of the cultural model, model of knowledge, pattern of class relations), and the hyperspecificity of the regies du jeu of everyday life. That is what is so fascinating about Touraine's political sociology. It is at once an abstract theoretical model, and an effort to be specific about the transformational role of politics in structuring social reality in respect to patterns of production and power structuring the historicity of a
Foreword
given society. It is a model of political sociology to be directly opposed to those political analysts who argue for the total autonomy and final causality of political process (mainstream American political science is the guiltiest of this). But, on the other hand, it is equally opposed to those analysts who find the state to be nothing more than a complex ideologically sophisticated mechanism of ruling class hegemony. Touraine refuses to see society as a large and essentially happy family, as in the former image, where pluralistic decision making determines the definitions and direction of social reality. But he equally refuses to see society as a large organization, managed by the reigning ruling class along the lines of an upper-class Victorian household, as in the latter image. Touraine asks us to appreciate the complex interrelations between the production system and class relations, between class relations and the relative autonomy of the political-institutional system, between the ruling class as prepolitical determiner of the political system and the ruling class as a political actor, between the popular class as agent of rebellion and social changeand the popular class as willing participant in everyday life and thus the active agent of stability and passivity. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence in support of the usefulness of this model of the transformational role of politics between the extreme generalities of historicity at one end of the scale and the extreme specifics of organized everyday life at the other, is the omnipresence of politics (in his sense of the word "politics") even in antipolitical societies. Clearly, on one level, totalitarian societies are sometimes without relatively autonomous political arenas. Yet Touraine predicts that what happens in such societies, and 1 think recent historical events bear him out on this, is that the ruling class effort to do away with politics succeeds only in displacing it, not eliminating it. Thus, when there is no openness at the political-institutional level, as when it is used as a transparent ideological mechanism providing no forum for dissent, political conflicts are displaced onto the organizational level. Thus organizational structures become deeply politically involved and divided, with factionalism, intrigue and even outright conflict. So if a ruling class attempts to run society as if it were merely an organization and represses political debate and dissent, it ends by displacing such conflict into its organizational structures— into the bureaucracy, the army, the universities, the hospitals, and so on. Such a model as Touraine provides seems extremely useful, for example, in studying the development of the political consciousness of the Portuguese army under the recent fascist regime. Another provocative idea, which is introduced in this book and further developed in more recent writings by others, is an analysis of the state fundamentally as an agent of social change and not as an actor of social structure. Touraine emphasizes more and more the necessity to separate and then to coordinate a structural analysis organized around the concept of
Foreword
historicity and social class and a genetic analysis whose central concept is the state. There is no question that this newest and I think most important book of Alain Touraine makes difficult reading, as does just about all French social-philosophy. Yet there is a remarkable richness of original ideas here; he who carefully explores these pages will not be disappointed. J. W. Freiberg Boston University
PRB54CE
I undertook the writing of this book in the fall of 1966 at the University of Montreal. Having spent the years 1962-64 writing my Sociologie de faction, which was at the same time a study of social actors and an essay on the advanced industrial societies, I now wanted to go more directly to the essence of the matter by analyzing what is commonly termed social structure, and bydevoting all my efforts to defining a theoretical procedure. Those first texts were replaced by others, usually written for my seminars, especially at the Ecole pratique des hautes etudes, but also at the Facultad latino-americana de sociologia in Santiago, Chile, at the University of California in Los Angeles, and at the Institut d'e*tude du de\eloppment e*conomique et social in Paris. My task was several times interrupted by other labors that seemed more urgent or that required less time. It was stimulated by the May 1968 crisis I lived through at the University de Nanterre and experienced as a social, Utopian movement that soon collapsed but that nevertheless heralded a new society and by its very occurrence demanded fresh thought from sociology. Certain chapters have been published or distributed in versions predating this one and also, as is only too evident, very different from it. However, I think I had better indicate the following publication details: chapter 1, "Historicity," appeared in Vers une nouvelle civilisation? a tribute to Georges Friedmann (Paris, NRF, 1973). Chapter2,4iLe system d'action," appeared in the)ouma\Sociologieetsocie'te's 1, no.2 (1969):221-47. Chapter3, "Les classes sociales," appeared in Las classes sociales en America latina. Transactions of the Merida Conference organized by the Instituto de Estudios Sociologicos of the U.N.A.M., Mexico. Chapter 6, "Les mouvements sociaux," was presented as a paper to the World Congress of Sociology held at Varna, September 1969, and published in part in the Rassegna italiana de sociologia, January-March 1972, pp. 11-60.
xvili
Preface
I feel the greatest gratitude toward all those, whether colleagues or students, who have helped me throughout all these years with their comments and criticisms. Perhaps they have succeeded in rendering communicable thoughts that were at the outset very close to my personal experience, my life at work, and my place in society. In particular I thank Werner and Maria Ackerman, Anouar Abdel-Malek, Michel Amiot, Fausto Ayrton, Guy Bajoit, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Manuel Castells, Maurice Chaumont, Jacques Dofny, Robert Fraisse, J. W. Freiberg, Jean Max Gaudilliere, Louis Maheu, Alberto Melucci, Edgar Morin, Serge Moscovici, Bernard Mottez, Jose* Nun, Francoise Quarr£, Melvin Seeman, Geronimo de Sierra, Silvia Sigal, Dominique Wolton, Francisco Weffort. Christiane Guigues helped me in gathering together the various books and documents I needed—and that I decided notto list at the end, since this book is something of a loner's effortv^£vett*4>ufIohelped me lfl a variety of ways. Colettef Dicfier transcribed manuscripts verging on the undecipherable with a competence and a sunny patience that I hope were not lavished in vain. Section VI of the £cole pratiques des hautes etudes, particularly its Centre d'£tudedes mouvements sociaux, once the Laboratoire de sociologie industrielle, have provided me all these years with a working environment to which I am far too attached to attempt any banal expression of my gratitude. The weight of this book has been born by Adriana, Marisol, and Philippe as much as by me. It belongs to them. It is hard being a sociologist. We are too involved in the object of our inquiry notto be dependent upon our ideology and our passion. To forget them, in the name of empiricism and objectivity, results merely in a naive acceptance of the conservative ideology and its very basis: the status quo. But we must liberate ourselves from this state of affairs by knowledge, by situating the actors and their ideology within the systems that are concealed behind the categories of social practice. This book therefore imposes on its reader, as it forced upon its author, a great distance between himself and social practice as well as a sustained effort to construct an analytical tool that will be as simple and as useful as possible. Perhaps it has overshot its aim and will be seen as too general in its notions. Let the reader at least know that the reason for its existence was to achieve exactly the opposite, and that I would not have labored over it if I had not seen in it a means of liberating us from the confusion of ideologies or biases, of piercing through to that most dramatic and most rallying fact of social life: the fact that society produces itself, by its work and its knowledge, by its class relations and its political interaction. Montreal Santiago de Chile Los Angeles Chatenay-Malabry
October 1%6-December 1972
Preface
xix
Note: Those interested only in the general orientation of this book can limit themselves to reading the Introduction, the first three chapters, and the conclusion. At the beginning of each of the last five chapters I have inserted a brief paragraph indicating its central theme. Possibly the prospect of having to read less than half this work will attract some who would otherwise have been frightened off by its size and style. I hope that these tentative readers will in fact be spurred on to make a further effort and read the rest.
INTRODUCTION
1. Societies learn to know themselves sociologically when they recognize themselves as the product of their labor and their social relations, when what at first seems to be a set of social 'data* is recognized as being the result of a social action, of decisions or transactions, of domination or conflicts. This is why our own age, oriented as it is toward development, is gradually creating sociology. —- T Long concealed by all the forms of social philosophy that related social \ facts to a nonsocial explanatory principle, whether providence, law, evolution, or "natural" needs, sociology is having difficulty' in freeing itself from the appeal to a creative force—energy, idea, values—that conquers and organizes an untamed nature. For that is in fact the most common form taken by the presociological thought associated with the triumph of industrialization, of industrial capitalism, and the colonial empires. Today, this social philosophy of progress, whether optimistic or pessimistic, can no longer be entertained, since our industrialized countries have""" acquired a confused but solid certainty that they always had total power over themselves, including that of destroying themselves, that of subjecting themselves to totalitarian rule, or that of increasing their product by hitherto unheard-of proportions. Having evaluated itself in the name of principles, having situated itself within an evolution, society is now coming to recognize itself as a network of actions and relations. Moreover, in order to know its present it is turning less and less toward its past, since the importance of tradition is constantly diminishing in relation to knowledge newly acquired, and increasingly toward its future, in other words toward the decisions "rt makes and the debates or conflicts that accompany them.
Introduction
This picture is too simple, and the transformation 1 describe did not start yesterday. But it has by now become evident enough to create an ever stronger demand for sociological analysis. And need I add that this demand is being satisfied only very slowly, since even where sociology is not forbidden or domesticated it is still in continual conflict with the old categories employed for analyzing social reality? It experiences difficulty in freeing itself both from appeals to the nonsocial for explaining the social and frorn_subjection^ to the "laws" or internal "logic" of a category of social facts. This violent rift between interpretation and positivist analysis ceases to be possible the moment when no metasocial authority or warrant is left to dominate society's functioning. It is no longer possible to avoid sociological analysis by subordinating it to a knowledge_pf divine order, of the essence of politics, or of homo oeconomicus. As these essences melt away, so they simultaneously dissolve the illusion that there can be nonsociological laws controlling certain social phenomena. We can no longer ask ourselves questions about the nature of society but only about its functioning, or about its orientations, its power, its decision-making mechanisms, its forms of organization and change. 2. Let us therefore accept that society rests upon nothing other thaii social action, that the social order has no metasocial warrant for its existence, whether religious, political, or economic, and is totally the product of social relations. This means that we have to accept thinking about society on the basis of the experience—a new form of experience but regarded here as exemplary—of those societies that act most profoundly upon themselves, both through economic growth and through social revolution. Such societies are defined no longer as creations of God or Prometheus but as systems of social relations. We have recognized, then, that society is a system capable of transforming itself and not merely of reproducingjtself. Is our path sufficiently defined by this initial choice? No, because from that recognition there stem two paths, whose divergence defines sociology's principal choices. It is possible to think that the end of the old dualisms, the identity of society's being with its action, must lead to a reanalysis of everything that is generally termed social structure in terms of processes of change. This means f that a society ought increasingly to be conceived of as a network of deciders, who possess a certain influence and by whose interaction the adaptation of the social whole in question to the modifications of its environment and internal changes is conducted, in an empirical, very imperfect, but acceptable manner. The disappearance of the old social philosophies ought s also to be accompanied by that of all recourse to values, to principles, and to
Introduction
absolutes in the theory and practice of social action. The more complex society is, the less mechanical it is, the more no-man's-land areas of uncertainty, of disorganization, of innovation, of deviance, of imagination it will include, while at the same time it must adapt itself increasingly to the ecosystem of which it is a part, and which is increasingly threatened by the destructive creativity of our industry. How could one fail to recognize in all this the renaissance of those themes that accompanied the industrial revolution? The liberal appeal to pragmatism, to adaptation, to openness, to change, to the pursuit of diversity and heterogeneity, plus a new awareness of the limits of our natural resources and the dangers of industrialization? It is true that the majority of sociological research does not explicitly invoke such a view, either because it is sheltering behind a dissection of reality it refuses to question, in the name of a naive objectivism, or else because it is guided by obsolete images of society, one in which there exists a social order based upon the consensus of values or, on the contrary, on an imposed domination. Yet it is in fact this neoliberalism that lies behind most o ( recent developments in sociological analysis. It has brought us a new knowledge of organizations, given central importance to decision analysis, seriously tackled the study of endogenous changes. Wishing to refer to it in a way that will invoke an approach rather than an ideology, I shall term it here "political" sociology, in order to denote not a chapter in sociology but an overall conception: society is the result of its decisions, which themselves^ refer back to the interests, arguments, conflicts, and transactions by means of which—in an always temporary and unstable way—there occur the changes that point in the direction of a greater diversification, ji growing flexibility, a relaxation of social norms, symbolic systems, and constraints. 3. I could define this book by saying that it shares with this neoliberal political sociology the idea that society is a system of social interactions and that its functioning is the result of its action, but that given this basic conception, opposed as it is to all recourse to values and essences, it explores a line of analysis that is profoundly different, both in its actual orientation and in its ideological implications. Although it is clear that society is not just a system with a pilot who must maintain that system's equilibrium and continuity by using various mechanisms of social control, at once integrating and repressive, no more can society be reduced to a system capable of modifying its aims and organization by training mechanisms and controlled reinforcement of certian forms of conduct or organization. SocietyJs not just reproduction and adaptation: it is also creation, self-production. It has the capacity to define itself and thus, through the knowledge and investment it has achieved, to transform its relations with its environment, to constitute its
Introduction
milieu. Human society possesses a capacity of symbolic creation by means of which, between a "situation" and social conduct, there occurs the formation of meaning, a systemj£jmentation of conduct. Human society Is the only natural system known to possess this capacity to form and transform its functioning on the basis of its investments and the image it has of its capacity to act on itself. This distance that society places between itself and its_ activity, and this action by which it determines the categories of its practice, 1 term historicity. Society is not what it is but what it makes itself be: through knowledge, which creates a state of relations between society and its environment; through accumulation, which subtracts a portion of available product from the cycle leading "to consumption; through the cultural model, which captures creativity in forms dependent upon the society's practical dominion over its own functioning. It creates the totality of its social and cultural orientations by means of a historical action that is both work and meaning. The image that takes shape, then, is that of a_sojnety which is not solely a system of internal and external exchanges but first and foremost an agent of its own self-production, an agent in the creation of orientations of social action on the basis of practice and consciousness of the production of work. This image does not reintroduce the old dualisms; it does not set some Promethean energy in opposition to the inertness of matter, or the march of progress against the resistances of tradition. But it does stand in opposition to the image of a society reduced to its change processes. Tf eliminates from its analysis all appeal to any "beyond" in nature, to essences, or to the march of history. It identifies society with its own action, then questions itself on that basis about the specific characteristics of social systems. We are not bound to choose between, on the one hand, reducing society to a system of the same type as a machine or an organism, and, on the other, to / invoking a social vitalism that subordinates explanation to the intervention / of forces and energies, of a meaning in evolution, or of man's fundamental 1 needs. Sociology ought to reflect on the example biology offers and construct v the type of system that will enable it to provide an account of the specific characteristics of social conduct—that it is oriented by ends—and recognize that any^ society constitutes and transforms its_own social jind cultural orientations. It is essential to such a procedure that we do not reduce society to its y functioning and its exchanges but apprehend it primarily as a process^ of self production. ^ - l n maintaining that society is always divided from itself, divided into V self-production and self-reproduction, I am also defending two important ideas:
Introduction
First, that social evolution is not continuous, nor linear, and cannot be reduced to a general tendency J o ^growing differentiation, complexity, and flexibility. On the contrary, what we need to do is differentiate between various systems of historical action all of which correspond to a particular mode of knowledge, type of accumulation, andj^ulto^mpdel, all qualitatively different From others. This is even more important for a comprehension of the present than for an ordering of the past, since what we are now entering is not a society of pure adaptation but rather a postindustrial sociely that is defined, like all others, by its orientations and its class relations, and therefore also by what it puts on display and what it pushes back into the shadows. Second, that the orientations of the system of historical action define the field of social relations, of political relations, of the forms of social organization, and therefore also the "stakes," direct or indirect, of every^ kind of conflict or negotiation, and that these orientations do not, consequently, define a bod^^of^alue^Uiat make social integration possible by its diversification into norms and role expectations. All sociology of values must be rejected, but this cannot be achieved by treating society as simply an apparatus of domination, since that would oblige us to presuppose the existence of some metasocial, "natural" order in the name of which that judgment was made; nor can it be achieved by limiting ourselves to a pragmatist vision of society, as though a dominant social order, seeking to irnpose_and reproduce itself, did not exist. The central problem of sociology UjJLMBd^stand how^asociety rests upon a set of orientations while at the same time being directed and organized by power, how it is one and also double, historicity and class relations. This problem cannoTtie resolved except be recognizing society's capacity^to determine itself by its own Historical action, by its work on its work, the orientations that govern its functioning. This distancing ofjelf from selfnec^^arily entails the division of society into two opposing classes: it is not society but a part of society, the"ruiing class, that takes over the responsibility for historicity and em_er^es^irorrnhe society's^ functioning in order to go beyond mere self-reproduction—through the use of accumulation—to knowledge. Thus one particular social^categor\r identifies itself with what is most general in society: its historicity. And this means that historicity has been made^the object of private appropriation. Those who belong noTTbThe~ruling class but to the popular class (as I shall term it) defend themselves against this domination, and against historical action itself, but also contest its private appropriation and seek to regain control of it by overthrowing the domination of the ruling class^ Thus the class conflict cannot be defined except as the strugjgle forjthg supreme "stake," which is the management or control of historical action.
Introduction
The orientations of the system^of historical action, instead_of^being translated directly into norms, are "stamped" by class relations and class domination, which enables us to reject the notion of values that introduces a direct correspondence between a society's cultural orientations and the judgments of actors on social conduct. Interposed between the former and the latter are class relations. The problem of social classes, which has remained at the center of sociological analysis since the late eighteenth century, cannot be clearly stated until one recognizes that society is_not a totality or an order but a i system, one whose principal characteristic is to produce its own orientations \ and therefore the conditions governing its functioning. If, on the contrary, one^rontinues to envisage society as a social order, then onlTmust either refer that order to the unity of a social consensus maintained by social control and socialization, a unity that is given the lie by / the very existence of social conflicts and movements and is merely an I invention of the ruling classes, or else one is forced to accept that society in its entirety is the work of domination, violence, and ideology, which presup/ poses, I repeat, that one is invoking something beyond society, a nature that [ will some day be liberated from the contradictions of society. And this idea in a great variety of forms did broadly dominate nineteenth century historicism. The development of sociology is only possible if one renounces any identification of social systems with mechanical systems—as the legal mind has done for a long time—or even with organic systems, and accepts their particular nature: instead of being governed bv a code of laws they have the / capacity to arrive at orientations that then^via)class conflicts and political mechanisms, control the categories of their practice.ThTsTolriception must eliminate all representations of society as an actor—whether termed a system of values, spirit of the age, civilization, or more concretely the State— thought of as the sovereign manager of its various activities and of the conditions of its survival as an actor. It is in this respect above all that Marx's critical analysis retains all its value as an antidote to the optical illusion that leads each and all of us to perceive social relations as subject to some unifying intention or law. 4. These then are the three notions on which this analysis is based: 7 historicity, which defines the instruments of society's self-production; the system of historical action, meaning that totality composed of social and cultural orientations, by means of which historicity exercises its dominion over society's functioning; and class relations, struggles for the control of historicity and of the system of historical action. The first three chapters of this book are devoted to a presentation of these notions.
Introduction
The fourth and fifth chapters will explain the transition from this first level of the analysis to that of political decisions, the level I shall term the institutional or —synonymously—the political system, then to that of social organization. The principal task of my analysis "will be to reconcile the hierarchy of these levels with each one's individual autonomy. This autonomy has two reasons for being: political collectivities or organizations are concrete social wholes limited by frontiers and thus possessing problems of integration or adaptation that cannot be reduced to~those of historicity; on the other hand, they are also units defined historically rather than sociologically ; and are therefore heterogeneous, so that, for example, even Great Britain in the late nineteenth century cannot be entirely identified with industrial capitalism. As for the hierarchy of the systems, this signifies that institutions and organizations alike are domains of social life far from independent of the orientations of historical action, that on the contrary they are expressions of those orientations, so that in both of these two types of system^ we find occurring as essential elements both the state of the orientations of the system of historical action and the state of class relations. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the actors rather than to the systems and their stracture/The first of these chapters deals with social movements, collective conduct situated at the level of the field of historicity or, in other words, at the level occupied by the system of historical action and class relations, the seat of the conflict over the control of historicity ./Chapter 7 then abandons synchronic analysis to provide an answer to the problem of social change—the most difficult problem to deal with in terms of the methodology of this book. Whereas neoliberal sociology immediately situates itself inside change, and rejects as inherited superstition everything that appears to be orientations or fundamental conflicts in a society—a position that does at least have the advantage of capturing the processes of change very directly—the priority that I accord to the study of how the field of historicity is produced, of political institutions and forms of social organization, makes explaining change very difficult. It is a problem, moreover, on which sociology in the past, whether functionalist or otherwise, has shed very little light. A theory of change must start from the tensions that exist between a field of historicity and the heterogeneous historical whole with which it is always associated. In a society where this tension is reduced to the minimum, the transition from one field of historicity to another can take place without hiatus, with "modernization" bringing about modifications in the social organization, then in the institutions, which then provoke the appearance of the necessary elements for a new system of historical action. But where there is a great deal of heterogeneity, as is the case with societies under
Introduction
domination, an inter-national class struggle arises, in which the dominant nation talks about its "modernizing action'' when it opens up markets for itself, takes its profits, imposes its culture, and in which the popular class is at the same time drawing support from its history and its individuality while also aiming, through its struggle against domination, at the creation of a field of historicity to which nothing in its experience can yet correspond. This is a reminder that the most modernizing societies are not the most modern ones, and also absolutely rules out the sociocentric ideology of the dominating societies according to which all nations form a procession, with the dominating societies at its head, and must all eventually pass through the same stages. My concern to understand the divereityjrf the modes of social transformation is as constant in this book as that to follow all the manifestations of social movements, from the defensive withdrawal into collectiveT identity,_and explosion outward into violence and deviance, to the creation of societal countermodels and entry into a general conflict over control of historical action. For nothing reveals the self-production of society more directly than the confrontation of social movements and the politics of social change. 5. Each of the domains thus defined within sociology must be analyzed as a process, not as a response to functions. We have for too long contented ourselves with simply dividing social organization roughly into institutions— judicial, political, religious, educational, military, and so on—and then comparing the forms these institutions take in different societies, either byconstructing grids of classification or by trying to discover some general evolutionary line. Even today, what arguments still go on about the functions of the political system, the nature of social classes, or the extent of religious practices. Dismembering society is not the best way of understanding how it functions and changes. Nor is ignoring the necessity for specialized research to remind ourselves that in sociology as in other fields the aim is to reach a knowledge of the fundamental mechanisms, and consequently to destroy objects as they are given in practice as rapidly as possible, so that one can then reconstruct the field of phenomena on the basis of a small number of general schemas and, at a higher level, of proven theories. This book may therefore be classified as one of general sociology, on condition that the term is not misunderstood: you will find no chapter in it on the family, on religion, on economics, and so on, as you would in the more usual "general" textbook or manual. The vocabulary of such books has been replaced with a different one, one that may occasionally cause surprise—its individual words are given in the glossary at the end of the book with their redefinitions—but that is extremely small, because its purpose is to help in
Introduction
replacing the usual superficially objective descriptions with an attempt to reconstruct the various kinds of social interactions and the relations between the social systems: the system of historical action, the system of class relations, the political or institutional system, and the organizational system, whose concatenation constitutes the functioning of society, or in other words f the mechanisms by means of which society is able to produce itself, adapt j itself, and reproduce itself.
w
6. Because he is studying conduct that has a meaning for the actors themselves, the sociologist is always in danger of becoming a Royal Historiographer, of presenting the jotaHty_of^ocial relations coherently arranged in the light of the .dominant ideology. Nor does he avoid this difficulty by relating conduct to situations, as though it were^j)Qssible to understand social relations on the basis of other categories of facts,jsucrTjas the state of technology, say, or the average level of income. Since its earliest days", sociology has never tired of pointing out that such situations, if they are to form part of its analysis, must first be reformulated in terms of social interactions. I intend to conform strictly to the central principle of sociological analysis: the meaning of conduct must be explained not by>the consciousness of J*he actor or by the situation in which he is ptoeetlf_butj>v the social interactions In whicJThe is involved. Sociology and analysis of social interactions are synonymous terms. However, we must of course distinguish various kinds of sociaTlnteractions, to which the broad chapters of sociology correspond. At the level of social organization, within a limited social whole governed by a central authority, we can isolate social interactions dependent upon roles, ' in other words upon conduct on the part of an actor in a given position that is recognized as legitimate by those with whom he interacts as occupant of that position. Relations between actors thus depend on their common participation in a social order with a set of norms. On the one hand there is reciprocity of conduct between actors occupying complementary positions in the application of a norm; on the other there is stratification—a diversity of levels of participation in the emission, the diffusion, and the consumption of wealth and conduct assigned a value by society. Here relations are ones of reciprocity and of difference. At the decision-making level, relations are of another kind. The actors are ^ no longer acting within a set^ojnorms; they are competing together in the decision-making process that establishes the legitimate norms and expectations. These therefore are relations of competition not of reciprocity' of influence not of difference. I should add, before coming to social relations at the level of historical 3, action, that on both organizationallind political levels the actor also enters
10
Introduction
into relations with other actors situated within other social wholes, and with these actors he neither shares common norms nor is expected to arrive at common decisions. These intersocial relations are sufficiently different from the other kinds to have become the principal object of study of political science. At the level of a society's field of historicity, relations are established among actors who are In a situation neither of reciprocity nor of competition but of conflict, who are placed neither on a scale of participation nor in a position of influence, but in a relation of domination. Historical action, society's work upon its own work, is exercised solely through class conflict jn a struggle that is not a simple conflict of interests or values but a battle for the control of historicity and of the social and cultural orientations of the system of historical action. These classes, these historical actors are not actors in any concrete or directly observable sense. History is not the epic tale of the capitalist class or the working class. Here as elsewhere one cannot define a social actorjrther than by analyzing his interaction with other actors. But this principle is more directly and more strictly applicable where classes are concerned. We cannot explain a particular example of conduct by saying that it belongs to a class but only by situating it in relation to the opposition between the classes and their antagonistic efforts to control the system of historical action. A sociology of action must never be identified with a reconstitution of the praxis of class actors; it is above all analysis of the relations of domination that determine conflicts, movements, and ideoiogiesT"ShTllay"relatio1fis'oT domination because the actions involved are governed by a stake, a prize, which is a set of social and cultural orientations, and beyond that historicity itself, which is an action and not a state of things. 7. These social relations are partly: openand partly hidden. They are open insofar as dominators and dominated are in conflict, struggling for_control of historicity. Society is therefore not an order, an organism; it is divided against itself; each of its orientations is the object of opposing attempts at appropriation. Hence the importance constantly given in this book to public debates, conflicts, social movements, and also the recurring criticism of illusions of social integration. They are hidden insofar as a domination is being imposed that overlays popular contestation with oppression, with alienation, with propaganda, and either fragments it or reduces it to violence or retreat. The sociologist must not identify himself with the ideology of any actor, but in order to achieve this independence, without which his work is impossible, he must throw all his weight into the task of reestablishing the nature of the social relations thus concealed, in order to let those speak that have no voice, in order to illumine
Introduction
11
that which is hidden, forbidden, or locked away, in order to break the power of ideological discourse and the false evidence in the categories of social practice. This is a task made all the more difficult by the fact that the closer one comes to the struggles and movements that animate the field of historicity, the deeper the collective actors dig themselves into their ideologies and the more determined they are to impose their values. The more ardent the struggle for social domination, or the more absolute the power, the more surely^the sociologist's critical analysis Is rejected. Caught between a simultaneously superficial and conservative "empiricism"—since it reduces the actor to his behavior within the established order—and the passions of the struggles or the pressures of power, sociology has great difficulty in surviving and in maintaining or even discovering its unity. This book in itself cannot completely satisfy either the researcher, who demands to be presented right away with methods and procedures, or the actor in collective life, who needs to situate his aims, his partners, his adversaries in time and space, and to identify himself with a group. Is there any reason why it should not be understood by both, however? The sociologist does not study facts but documents. In order not to become the prisoner of a "reality" that he believes himself to be looking in at from outside when he is in fact part of it, he needs to subject himself to an intellectual ascesis that will lead him to the discovery, behind society's organization and discourse, of its social relations, m j>ther words of its conflicts and its domination, as well as what that domination keeps concealed in the shadows. And the person who takes part in the battles or in the government of society, can he on his side understand his own action if he reduces society to the established order, or to a mere battlefield, or to a mere market? Can he be a stranger to a sociology whose principle object is to understand how men make their history, through their work and their social relations? This book speaks of society through sociology. It is by reflecting on his own work of acquiring knowledge that the sociologist best answers the questions of the social actors themselves. Because his ta^k^is to\stri£jbare social relations and social processes by freeing himself from all the social and ideological forms of censorship that established power and order use to protect and justify themselves. Only in this way can sociology ensure its own continued existence. Every time it attempts to find order in real life and derive general laws from it, every time it attempts to explain structure and change with the help of the same notions, it is no more than an irrelevant embellishment of history. It must turn its face away without regret from both universal histories and general sociologies whose aim is to situate
12
Introduction
societies and explain them. And what better rallying ground against such a pseudoscience of societies could there be than a sociology of action? What could proclaim more clearly that there is no sociology of social situations but only of social relations? Sociology is not alone in its haste to take such a path. Other disciplines which have simple models of social relations to deal with, and economics especially, have progressed much more rapidly toward their formalization. Sociology is making slower progress because the wholes it has to deal with are more complex. Which is why it will continue to advance for a long while in two complementary ways: by isolating particular sets of social relations susceptible of a more detailed treatment, and by the construction of theoretical schemas, still not very formalized but representing progress in the definition of a procedure and the identification of the mechanisms studied. 8. This book begins with a study of abstract ensembles, such as historicity, the system of historical action, and class relations, then moves on in later chapters to more concrete collectivities such as a political system or an organization and mechanisms of change. Why didn't 1 choose the reverse order? Why not start from limited but more detailed analyses in order to demonstrate the necessity for resorting to certain concepts that are then clearly set out in a conclusion? Because this book_ is not a presentation of^ fieldwork but is intended solely as an introduction to a sociological procedural method. The most urgent factor therefore was to follow the general line of that procedure, and its principal characteristic is that it does not take socia^ organization as its starting point but rather the production of society by itself, in otheFwords a set" oTsocial mechanisms not directly given to an observation that is in fact in danger of being imprisoned by the categories of social praxis, which are always impregnated with ideologies. If the type of analysis presented here seems interesting, then wluu will be needed, rather than seeking to make it more precise and to complete it by a revision of the reasoning itself, is to ask oneself more directly about the methods that need to be invented or applied in order to develop objects of research corresponding to the principles of the reasoning, and in order to verify the propositions deriving from it. This book is therefore concerned not with presenting a sociological theory, which would be excessively ambitious, but only with putting the sociologist in a position to undertake analyses that may lead to the production of an integrated set of propositions. Although it is rather long, and may look rather daunting, this book should be approached as a brief introduction to a set of possible investigations. More simply still, it is intended to contribute to the opening up of a domain of knowledge indispensable to societies that can no longer define themselves by their action upon a supposedly external nature, but must recognize that
Introduction
13
they are the product of the action they exert upon themselves, via their system of historical action, their class relations, their political institutions, and Jheir forms of social organization. In the longer term, it is trying to introduce readers to the quest for a new sociological practice, capable of making its way across the best lit and most closely controlled areas of social life in order to reach the conduct by which a society produces and transforms itself. It should be said finally that this book, so far from appearing to be an analysis of social actuality, nevertheless sprang from reflections and unease aroused by the times in which it was written. Those who make economic and political decisions are increasingly aware that they must intervene in the totality of social life. Growth cannot be assured without social and political mobilization or, on the other hand, without an ideological campaign to boost the profits of enterprise. These leaders impose their Utopia and their ideology on societies, identify themselves with "the satisfaction of needs/* with prosperity, with innovation and equalization of opportunity. The dominion of leaders over societies has increased to an enormous extent, and the outstanding features of our century, our trademark in times to come, will be that a whole society could be possessed by the word and the letter of a leader, that language became a material force, that incantation created organization. Faced with this new power of society's decision centers, confusion reigns. / Some are drawn into the action of the apparatuses, others throw up ^ barricades that were originally intended for use against another enemy, yet \ others are questioning society in its entirety rather than simply its power. J Must we renounce the belief that the new power will meet with new adversaries? It is already too late to sell that opium of the "end of ideologies/' The universities, and above all the relatively small areas within them occupied by the sociologists, have been among the first to see the reappearance of social movements, or at least of their heralding signs. How can the sociologist believe that what he writes is neutral, a matter of indifference, faced as he is with this great question that dominates our present: what are and what will be the actors, the fields, and rtie stakes ofthe social battles to be fought in those societies within which power extends to all the aspects of collective activity, so that it can no longer be called political or economic and must therefore be recognized as the management and appropriation of social organization and social change? This book is paving the way for a reply to that question. More, it is trying to prove that it is overwhelmingly important for it to be asked. But how can we fait to"Tecognize ^^JJL^L0-^!!-0^^^1^^ am * liberal European societies, which are those in which it is easiest to acquire information, to think, and to express oneself
14
Introduction
freely^arejilso those in which the demand for a liberating future is making itself rtie least heard. That is why this book is addressed not only to French readers but equally to all those in the world whose deepest experience is that of domination, and who believe both in the necessity to fight it and in the possibility that the masses of mankind will one day make their own history. It owes much on the one hand to the great intellectual movement that has renewed Latin-American sociology and to the new awareness achieved by the people of Quebec, and on the other hand to the questionings, the debates of American society and culture. It will at no point depart from its proper field, that of sociological reflection, and will not seek to draw false heat from the fire of events. But the author, who will be absent from the book, does have the right, at the moment of leaving it, to say why he devoted the midyears of his life to it.
HISDRICITY
1 A.
Society Turns Back upon Itself
a.
Beyond Function
Human societies cannot he sufficiently defined by their rules and the instruments by which they function. They act upon their own functioning, either to modify it or to transcend it. 1. First, by applied experience, or in other words by politics. The norms that govern social interactions are not intangible; they are in large part the result of decisions and in consequence can be modified as the result of a change in the relations of force or influence between actors, and also as the result of modification occurring in the environment. Modern analyses of organization and decision m a k i n g have greatly extended our knowledge of society's internal and external exchanges and consequently of the temporary and partial character of its norms, which are the products of interaction and transactions. As a political actor society no longer resembles an organism ensuring its stability by homeostasis; it is constantly modifying its activities and its organization by adaptation. 2. Second, by what I term historicity. Human society cannot be reduced to an organism always reproducing itself immutably, dependent for any transformation in itself upon mutations brought about by internal or external events. Its capability is not limited to adapting itself to a changing environment and is constantly modifying the rules by which it functions. It also has the capability of positing, beside the order of its activities, the order of its representations. It possesses a symbolic capacity that enables it to construct a system of knowledge together with technical tools which it can use to intervene in its own functioning. 15
16
Chapter One
But we must go further. This capacity for acting upon itself, this noncoincidence of society with its own rules of functioning, must be much more than just the creation of the order of words beside the order of things. This "double" of society must also have means of action, of intervention in the material functioning of society, and therefore means of investment. Lastly, this distance between society and itself is also apprehended by social consciousness. A tragic and arrogant apprehension, because it is simultaneously apprehension of a wrenching asunder and of a dominion. Inventor of knowledge, agent of investment, creator of an image oj creativity that 1 term a cultural model, society j)roduces itself, imposes a meaning on its pj-actices, turns back upon itwljAt does not exist solely in nature; it does not possessa history only; it possesses historicity, which is the capacity to produce its own social a.nd_cjjl_tjural field, its own historical environment. Society produces itself. This cannot mean that it creates the conditions of its existence starting from an idea. For where would this idea come from, and how could it be conceived of other than as a metasocial warrant for social organization—divine providence, human nature, idea, march of history? But nor can it mean that these representations and these orientations have been formed on the basis of a material experience that could be defined independently of them. We must not search here for any first cause. Labor is a state of the forces i of production determined by historicity, that is to say by a model of knowledge, by a type of accumulation, and by an image of creativity or cultural model; but these components of historiciTy~always appear as""a" distancing of society from itself and from the reproduction of its functioning. The specific characteristic jyfjiuman society is precisely this distance between the totality oj[ the activities that define a society's functioning and I the system of meaning that simultaneously determmes it anTVsTorrried on X the basis of it. in a circle that will only appear vicious if one is looking for a first cause, and which on the contrary defines the particularity of society as a system when compared to other concrete systems. To sum up, a certain historicity expresses itself through certain characteristics of the social organization, a level of productivity, a capacity for growth, and a technical division of labor. It is on the basis of this organization of labor that accumulation makes it possible to emerge from the economic cycle and that the cultural model occupies the gap formed between historicity and functioning. Historicity is always linked to a material situation; it gives it meaning, informs it. One must reject equally both the idea that the forms of social life are determined by a material situation, such as the state of technology, and also the contrary idea that society imposes culture upon nature, writes civilization on the virgin page of an untamed natural world.
Historicity
17
Historicity is neither idea nor material situation; it is the specific characteristic of social action, which constitutes its experience through the meaning it gives to it. Human activity, on all levels of technical development, is the organization of a technical environment and not integration into a natural whole. From first hunter to missile builder, man is the producer of techniques. Analysis must start from this action, which is simultaneously instrumental, economic, and ideological, to use terms that are at the same time in everyday use yet laden with obscurities; which is a model ot knowledge, accumulation, and cultural model, to use the terms 1 shall employ here, referring to the organization of a field of experience, the setting aside of a proportion of the resources available for consumption, and an image ol creativity. Historicity is not transcendence; it is not that which escapes from society conceived of as a system. On the contrary, it is that which makes it possible to conceive of society as a system, but without having to reduce it to another and less complex type. Through historicity activity becomes meaning and meaning once more becomes practice. It is this double movement, up toward historicity and—even more important—down from it, through the system of historical action, society's institutions and organizations, that will constitute one of the two central themes of this book. The second is an investigation of the forms of social interaction linked with historicity and with the production of society by society itself: class relations. It is a mistake to criticize the functionalist sociologies of integration and values by confronting them with the histoiy of societies or by the forces of conflict and change with them. One runs a great risk of being forced back into presociological interpretations. 1 do not blame functionalist sociology for having represented society as a ) system; that is its great positive contribution. Its error was to conceive that ( system in accordance with mechanistic ororganistic images so inadequate that they simultaneously force one back to an evolutionist vision, inherited \ from nineteenth-century liberal and positivist optimism, impregnated with , the most unacceptable kind of idealism and ethnocentrism. b.
The Components of Historicity: Knowledge, Accumulation, Cultural Model.
1. Serge Moscovici {Essai sur Vhistoire humaine de la natures Paris: Flammarion, 1%8, and more recently, la socike comre nature, Paris: Union g£n£rale d'exlitions, coll. 10/18, 1972, see also "Le marxisme et la question naturelle," L'hommi* et la sotiete, July-September 1969, pp. 59-109) has pointed out with some force that society is not in opposition to nature and that it is consequently false to distinguish between the natural
18
Chapter One
order and social values, between the body and the soul of social activity. Nature is a cultural definition of matter. Thus we ought not to speak of nature but of "states of nature", which is to say, of systems of knowledge. This work of knowledge is never identifiable with economic activity. Production and consumption are economic categories that always pertain to a study of exchanges. But any system of labor also includes the intervention of "natural forces," of an activity of knowledge. Science, for example, is not an economic element, does not in itself have a price, because it does not produce goods but. rather, endows society with a nature, as religious thought did in another type of society. This first component of historicity, the model of knowledge, is at the same time the most fundamental and the one that will play the most limited role in our analysis of society. It is fundamental because it manifests most directly the human capacity to create through knowledge an image of the world and social relations and an image of the nonsocial. Before coming to any particular piece of sociological analysis we encounter the primary fact that human language orders a universe organized by technique, thus permitting the turning back of experience on itself that enables man—and man alone—to have a history, in other words, to produce not only his changing but his situation itself. However, the fundamental role of this component also makes it dependent. It does not govern the orientations of social and cultural action or the forms of accumulation and relations of production directly. Itself a force of production par excellence, it appears both at the very beginning and at the very end of the analysis: a set ot means and technical operations on the one hand, and on the other a sign oi society's distance in relation to its own functioning. 2. This separation between the two orders of phenomena lumped together under the name of work is not conceivable without a recognition of the economic forms of historicity. The existence of work on work presupposes a process of accumulation. One part of the consumable product is set aside and invested in works that bear the stamp of the cultural model. The closer one comes to industrialized "societies the more this accumulation is identifiable with productive investment. Whereas, on the other hand, in societies with a weak historicity, with only a slight capability of action upon themselves, the uses to which the accumulated resources are put are not directly productive: temples and priests, castles and courts absorb the surplus withdrawn from consumption. But accumulation always has economic uses, since those who control it, even if their central role is a religious or political one, are filling a role essential to production. The greater the amount of accumulation the greater the extent to which it transforms the conditions of production. When it is small, the
Historicity
19
surplus collected is set aside from economic activity and used for the realization of major constructions or works. On the other hand, an important share of the resources accumulated in an industrialized society is used to transform the conditions of labor directly and to produce labor, which is the role of technology. Investment modifies the organization of work and thus its productivity. 3. A society is not adequately defined by the state of its productive forces; such a definition ought to be derived from the relations between its activity and its capability of acting on that activity. This distance is apprehended culturally: every society is oriented by this apprehension of creativity, which 1 term its cultural model. In a society with a strong historicity, which is to say one in which the production of labor exercises a strong control over the production of wealth, this apprehension of creativity is practiced: science is recognized as creativity, as the force directly transforming the state of nature. In a society with a weak historicity, on the other hand, creativity is apprehended only abstractly, not as praxis but as /<>gus. as a rnetasocial order./! his cultural model is not a representation of the model of knowledge but of tlie~ distance between trie production and the reproduction of work, and thus of society's capability of acting upon itself. 1 therefore use the phrase "cultural model" in a very specific sense, not in order to describe such and such an orientation or observable value within a society, but to define, within A conceptual system, that essential aspect of historicity by means of which the society "reflects" upon itself by apprehending its own capability of action in a way that defines the field of social relations and what I shall call in the next chapter the system o\% historical act ion ./Let me say right away, however, that even when historicity is most completely controlled by the ruling class, the cultural model is not reducible to the dominant ideology. Ideology pertains to specific actors; the cultural model pertains to a type oj society as totality, it contributes to a definition of the field of social relations. The actors, however much opposed to each other they may be. interact and enter into conflict within a cultural model. All this shows that a cultural model cannot be situated other than qualitatively in relation to other cultural models. Each cultural model contributes toJhe definition ofji type of society, not to that of a specific collectivity. This cultural model is not a system of values. It entails no judgment as to what is socially good or bad. It defines a cultural field. Let one example suffice: to recognize science as the contemporary form of creativity * does * Which is the specific characteristic of postindustrial society in which science is at the same time model of knowledge, cultural model, and even instrument of accumulation. In the sentence above, science is viewed soleK as a cul'.urcl model.
20
Chapter One
not in itself entail any judgment on the positive or negative aspects of a society dominated by science. One may say with equal justification either that science creates plenty or that it is threatening humanity with total destruction. It is in this sense that science is not a social value, that it does not distinguish positive conduct from negative conduct. The orientations of historical action do not constitute principles enthroned at the center of society and directly defining forms of social organization, because society is not an actor, a sovereign, a legislator. They define the thematic of a society, not its government. c. Society Torn Apart. The fact that a society produces itself and is not reducible to its functioning leads directly to the existence of opposing social classes and the conflict between them. It is not society as a whole that turns back upon jtself in-order to orient itself. It is always Utopian to think that a collectivity transforms itself, is capable of simultaneously acting in accordance with certain forms and transcending them, of providing for investment as well as for consumption. The class that manages society's accumulation, its model of knowledge, and its cultural model is the society's ruling class. This class identifies itself with the society's historicity. But since it is no more than one part of society, it is therefore also identifying historicity with its private interests, confusing the cultural model with its own ideology. The ruled class reacts to this domination both defensively, by insisting on its own social and cultural identity, and offensively, by contesting the power of the ruling class, by appealing to the very historicity that the ruling class is appropriating. It is /therefore clear that the orientations of historicity do not by themselves I determine rules of conduct, because between them we find interposed the class conflict and the nature of social domination. The orientations of historical actionare the^stake"' in the class struggle. Which means both that they are not the ideology of the ruling class and that they are not independent of class relations, which otherwise would be no more than a mode of social stratification. Class relations are linked to forces of production, to a state of economic activity and technical division of labor; but they are more than this: they are the expression of historical action itself in terms of social actors, the / expression of society's capacity to act upon itself by its investment of the 1 resources accumulated in activities selected by a cultural model. But it is the state of class relations that governs the mechanisms of decision in a society, and thus too the formation of the rules that in their turn govern social organization, thereby enabling us to reject any sociology of values.
Historicity
21
A long chapter (3) will be devoted to class relations; but the main lines of it need to be indicated here. We cannot present the ruling class as purely creative, as the class that makes it possible to step aside from routine and the defense of immediate interests in order to tackle long-term projects, general ideas, complex strategies. That would obviously ignore the fact that the ruling class defends private interests and privileges and, even more important, the fact that it dominates the lower classes, the workers. But nor can one reduce accumulation to a class relation, that of exploiter and exploited. In particular, the closer one approaches to the industrialized societies the more productivity of work is defined not by individual work alone or even that of the team, but by the forms of organization, of the overall programming of production, and by the application of science, technology, and mathematics to economic activity. A simple observation, but one that prevents us from presenting labor relations as simply a confrontation between worker-producer and profit taker. The essential thing is to recognize that the always present, always essential relation of domination to exploitation is not separable—if we are to understand the functioning of society as the conduct of actors—from society's relation to its historicity. It is not enough to say that the ruling class performs the task of developing the forces of production. For to say that is stating a material fact but telling us nothing about its social significance. But if we try to see what lies beneath it, we discover the tug the ruling class exerts on the whole of society toward a particular type of historicity. Of the three components of historicity, accumulation is the one that makes possible the wrenching away of historicity from activity, the distancing of society from its own functioning. The mode of knowledge posits the fact of society's noncoincidence with its being: beside those shackling activities governed by the requirements of the collectivity's survival and its adaptation to the environment from which it draws its subsistence, it sets the wrorld of the image (to use the word adopted by Kenneth Boulding in The Image: Knowledge and Life in Society, University of Michigan Press, 1956). Accumulation gives a material content to this distancing. Economic activity is not reducible to the production-consumption cycle; what is subtracted from that cycle is used in the service of society's transcendence of itself, whether it be a transcendence toward the future, a process of growth, or a transcendence directed toward a principle of order and unity, either of a religious or of a political type. It is now easier to see what historicity is. In order to define it, must we make a hypothesis about the orientations of human action? Must we set up an image of a man drawn by his will to creation, his desire for enrichment, or more generally still by a need to work?
22
Chapter One
It is normal that there should emerge a favored image of man in every society, a type of hero. But this very fact, which would become less clear on closer examination, shows plainly that it cannot constitute a principle of explanation, since these human types change from one era and one society to another. To speak of human nature in this sense is a roundabout way either of introducing an ideology or of describing certain aspects of one society. If we try to explain society by means of social conducts, then we condemn ourselves to the inability to produce anything but interpretations of society, since we have introduced at the outset that which must be explained. But it is equally impossible to look upon social situations as material "facts," when by their very definition they are sets of conducts and of social relations, in other words of actions. For the sociologist, to posit an opposition between the network of social relations and the priority of "material" activities—the activities of production and reproduction of individual and collective existence—can have no meaning. Such an idea belongs merely to historicist thought; whether one posits over and above society the development of the mind or the priority of "natural" needs and the activities intended to satisfy them, one is still explaining society by the nonsocial; it is obvious that this method is as unacceptable today as it was when Durkheim condemned it. We must also eliminate other, less crude concepts of society that equally omit all recourse to the concept of actions. We cannot consider a society as an organism endowed with balancing mechanisms that is able to transform itself in the direction of a growing complexity simply under the influence of external stimuli. Even less can we consider it as a being endowed with a sort of built-in code that will modify itself as a result of mutations occurring during its transmission, change then being the result of individual actions sanctioned by their efficacy, their material success, and reacting on the social code to transform it. We are bound to recognize that human collectivities are systems defined in their specific and essential characteristics not by their code of functioning but by their capacity to be oriented by a cultural model. What I term historicity is thus the particular nature of social systems which, above and beyond their reproduction combined with any accidents "that might make them change, and also beyond their possibilities for trial-and-error and adaptation, have the capacity to act upon themselves through the intermediary of a set of cultural and social orientations. All societies are at the same time activities and a ''reflection" upon those activities, which in its turn governs the orientations of social action, the mechanisms of decision and the modalities of functioning in concrete societies. Their capacity to modify their relation with the environment is manifested
Historicity
23
in a model of knowledge, in a type ot accumulation, and in a cultural model that together constitute historicity. This latter governs a system of orientations that controls the systems of functioning and adaptation. The content of historicity depends upon the society's type of activity, on its labor, but transforms that activity into culture and into social organization. Society governs its activity by the molding of knowledge, by accumulation, by awareness of creativity, so that all aspects of its organization become at the same time means in ihe service of that production of society by itself. Social organization as such is not exclusive to the human species, but mankind is the only species that possesses sufficient symbolic capability to produce the sense—both meaning and direction—of its experience; the only one for which nature is culture, creation, and normative orientation, in the name of which triad its organization is organized, transformed, and, I repeat, produced. Human societies are open systems not only capable of modifying their goals, but also possessed of the capacity to create normatively oriented conducts, to produce and to destroy their social order. This capacity does not entirely define social life. Scciety functions on three levels: it produces itself, but it also adapts itstlfand consumes itself. And these three levels 1 shall term in Ihis book: the field of historicity, the institutional system, and the social organization. But if historicity must be the central theme of sociology, that is because only human societies possess such a capacity of self-transformation, which is linked to the human being's symbolic capacity, in other words tohis ability to aci upon his relation to his environment and upon his social organization. It is possible that a society might lose its historicity, that it might sink into mere reproduction or divide itself totally into a mass and an elite; it is also possible that it could cease to be capable of adaptation, in other words that it might reduce itself wholly to its political system, to the strategies of its members and to its own strategy with regard to other societies. A human society can be a system of historicity; it is not driven along as though in spite of itself by a force running through it, by the march of history or some transhistoric essence. Historicity is neither a typeof conduct nor an impersonal force: it is the production of society by society. The evolutionist philosophies of history which made use of notions of force and energy must be completely replaced by the study of historic action, in other words of the elements whose interrelations define the action of society's self-transformation. There is no question of introducing a theory of social change at this point; it is neither convention nor coivenience that has made social change the theme of this book's final chapter. A society's historicity is not the process that causes it to pass from state T to state T-FL It is a concept strictly defined within a synchronic analysis. A society constitutes in
24
Chapter One
terms of its resources an image that is not a representation but a set of schemas of cultural and social orientations that mold the collective experience: model of knowledge, type of accumulation, cultural model. This historicity is realized in a system of historical action and in class relations, in a political system and in forms of social organization. Rather than placing a society in history, we are talking about placing historicity in the heart of society as the organizing principle of a field of practices and relations./Thus, not only is an analysis of change inappropriate, but, further, in many ways this approach makes such an analysis more difficult, since it cannot then be undertaken other than on the basis of research into the tensions and noncoincidences between the historicity of a society and the nature of the forms of social practice that are informed by it while at the same time escaping from it as concrete, complex, 4*historicaT, social unities. Change cannot be understood except on the basis of the opposition between structure and event. Historicity, as the foundation of social structure, is neither an idea nor a material force. It is useless to ask oneself whether it falls into the category of economics, politics, or ideology. Those terms themselves merely produce confusion, or, even worse, refer back to a separation between subject and object absolutely incompatible with the task of sociology, which is to study social action. For social action is at once labor and consciousness, practice and orientation, mechanisms and finalities, all always inseparable. d.
Tensions and Conflicts
Having placed the theme of historicity at the outset of this analysis, I had better also take precautions against possible misunderstandings. Certainly, J^ have no intention of intoning a hymn of praise to the creative power of man, governing and ordering an untamed nature and led by his own inspiration, the impulse of his soul, or divine grace, beyond the everydayness of the world. Such a vision of things—which can take less crude forms—expresses the presociological thought that cannot be transcended until the moment society discovers that it in fact possesses virtually unlimited power over itself. By separating society's soul from its body, this vision is presupposing that the existence of that soul has a warrant in some essence—Man, God, History— and that social facts have no meaning other than the actor's intention and internal life, which impose themselves upon an inert nature. When one disencumbers oneself from all recourse to idealist notions, then nature ceases to be either savage or paradisiac; it is simply a set of natural systems, open or closed, functioning in accordance with laws which it is the business of science to discover. The further we move away from an abstract humanism, the vaster the field
Historicity
25
of these natural systems within human existence reveals itself to be. Hence the steady extension of the natural sciences. But we cannot separate this recognition of "human nature" from the formulation of the specific charactenstics of society and the human species. Man molds his environment and his social organization; he does not insert himself into an ecological whole; he organizes that whole on the basis of his own transforming activity. In a word, he has a history. It is this capacity to produce his own transformation that I call historicity, and which is at the same time activity and self-consciousness, work of knowledge and cultural model. This historicity does not give form to the formless; on the contrary, it is linked to existing natural systems: the biological being, including the human mind, the interpersonal relations through which personality is formed, and the forms of sociability. Corresponding to each state of historicity there is a certain "nature" that is its complement and its opposite, but it is not in ' historicity's power to determine the characteristics of the natural systems that organize the activity on the basis of which historicity is formed, and which it in its turn governs. All reflection on historicity should shed light on the close bond between two apparently opposed ideas whose complementarity must be understood. First, I the relation between social activity and historicity is circular. Historicity comes into being on the basis of a state of collective activity: its content is determined by the form of that activity. In the other direction, social organization always results from the dominion of sociocultural orientations and class relations—themselves governed by historicity—over resources and sets of means. Why should this be called a vicious circle? On the contrary, it is a question of positing the most elementary condition of all for the existence of any sociological analysis. Once that circle is broken, idealism will flood in. Historicity is not an idea but a concept introduced with the sole purpose of destroying, root and branch, all appeal to any metasocial warrant for social order. Society is what it makes itself be on the basis of what it is, and not on the basis of principles or values that cannot be anything, for the sociologist, but ideologies pertaining to particular actors. Second, this interdependence of activity and historicity, of work and of work uporTwork, is tension and distancing. Hence the emphasis I put upon providing a sociology of historicity, m actionalist sociology, in opposition to current work inspired by functionalism, even though the latter^no longer appears today as anything more than a somewhat vague orientation, lacking the academic power it had at the time when I first began my fight against it. It is a constant tendency of sociology, often in the name of empiricism, to accept the social order as being neutral and to see each individual occupying his place within it, entering into relations with others, in order to realize a
26
Chapter One
series of exchanges within that order in conformity with the rules of the social game. The actor carries his status and his role around with him, justTs the laborer wears on his coveralls the name of his firm, which is taken to be his group and therefore his social being. It is a naively conservative sociology in consequence, one that examines with the minutest attention how society functions while taking pains at least equally great to avoid asking itself what is functioning. Society viewed in its historicity, and consequently social actors too, as participants in that historicity, cannot be defined by their content but, primarily, by the gap, the distance, separating the production of society by itself from the reproduction of its activity. This means in the first place that analysis of society is not built up directly around the content of historicity but around the tension between historicity and the natural systems mobilized by social activity. We shall encounter this fundamental tension, in changing forms, at every level of society, and its recognition imposes a critical procedure diametrically opposed to that of positivism. This means in turn that no actor is alone the bearer of this tension. It is a system oj social interactions or class relations that constitutes the unity of action within which this tension manifests itself. It is impossible to single out each individual's place, or to insert each individual in a proper place, because society is not a game in which there are pawns that have rights and are subject to constraints. Social relations govern the relations^etyveen historicity and society's functioning. And in parallel to this, as I have already pointed out, the most fundamental social interactions of all, class relations, cannot be understood except as historicity at work. One might wonder at this point what mark historicity stamps upon the social actors. My analysis of social movements will answer this question in essence, since such movements are the confrontation of agents of the social classes seeking control over historicity and over the mode of society's production of itself. This is a theme that corresponds to the circularity of activity and historicity that I have recognized as being one of the faces of the sociology of historicity. What is there that corresponds in the same way to its other face, to the recognition of tension and rending? The ultimate mark jof ^participation in historicity is the distance that remains between the actor and the roles he plays, not only in social exchanges of all kinds, but even within social movements, insofar as these latter have no concrete existence unless they are also political—or even military—organizations and units. Instead of the call to liberty referring to some human essence beyond all social determinisms, a procedure both unacceptable and incomprehensible to the sociologist, instead of liberty being no more than the uncertainty lying at the intersection of a number of independent series, liberty is trans-
Historicity
27
cendence toward a historicity that no actor ever has the right to appropriate completely, that no form of social organization, no system of political decision making, no system ot class relations can totally exhaust, because they are all stages of historicity's redescent toward the functioning of society. Transcendence and not possession. The moment the actor identifies himself with historicity he is confusing it with an organization, which may be without social consequences if that confusion is perpetrated merely by an individual actor enclosed within a personal Utopia, but which produces the most dramatic effects when the holder of a power, reversing the movement of analysis, identifies historicity vith order and identifies himself with that now sanctified order.
B.
Historical Action
a.
The Historical Subject
Actionalist sociology reminds us that a society does not coincide with its functioning, its norms, its rules, and its sanctions, that it carries its own self-transcendence within itself. But it has fallen into error if it apprehends this trandscendence as an absolute that is transcending social contingencies and determinations, if it sets up a philosophy of liberty in opposition to social determinisms. Because there is in fact nothing that enables sociological analysis to distinguish between this creative transcendence and the disorganization of the crisis. One cannot set the frozen and instituted against an instituting spontaneity without running the risk of being unable to distinguish this suprasocial from an infrasocial, from those organic energies Parsons speaks of which constitute for him the lower environment of social action. The failure here comes from the fact that reflection remains purely polemical. It starts out from social organization, taken to be closed and totally controlled, in order to rebel against it. My procedure is different h starts quite deliberately not from the rejection of that closed society but from an affirmation of historical action. This action is not an endless transcending of social determinations but the construction of a field of action. It introduces not a philosophy of the subject but an actionalist sociology. Instead of opposing subject to society, what is aimed at here is a direct analysis of society not as consciousness of self but as work upon self. When I employed the terra historical subject in Sociologie de I'action (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965). it was in order to define, not an actor involved in his struggle to apprehend himself in his creativity and beyond his alienations, but a society as a historical field, as a model of knowledge, a
28
Chapter One
mode of accumulation and a cultural model defining creativity the three elements present in every social constitution and transformation. The historical subject is not a new avatar of God, of the Sovereign, or of the laws of the market. It is not a personage but another name for a society's field of historicity; it is the totality of cultural orientations and social conflicts through which a society constitutes itself as an agent of historicity. If I believe this term to be useful, despite the misunderstanding it could give rise to, it is as a means of emphasizing that sociological analysis cannot have its foundation in the search for structures that are like those of the human mind or of exchanges that will permit the survival of a collectivity. Sociology is different from anthropology both in the type of societies k studies and even more in its method of approach. It views society as the work of an action, which is not that of an empirical actor, nor a collective consciousness, but a working of society upon itself. All other aspects of social life, decision making as well as the functioning of the social organization, are determined by historicity, which constitutes the sociocultural field within which class relations, political decisions, and the mechanisms of social control come into play. If the use I make of the word "subject" is going to lead to a belief that I am~representing society as a will, as an actor, then T renounce the word forthwith; sociology studies nothing other than systems of social relations. The historicity I talk about is not the work of an actor; it is the characteristic of society at the level 1 define as that of the production of society by itself, or, which is the same thing, of society as historical subject. The nearer one approaches this level of analysis the more one must leave behind any subjective meaning of conduct. If one looks at things from a functionalist viewpoint, then analysis naturally bears upon social conduct and upon the representation that the actor provides for himself of the system and the place he occupies within it. Society then appears as a datum from the actor's point of view, as a set of interiorized rules for guiding conduct. A sociology of historical action, on the other hand, is at the opposite pole from a study of subjectivity. Instead of looking at actors as defined by their roles, it examines the elements that constitute a field of historical action, which is to say the social and cultural models on the basis of which a society is organized. The actor is defined by the social and cultural movements that cause him to intervene on the level of historicity. Functionalist analysis has the apparent advantage of examining *4men as they are," in other words, of observing the "normal" functioning of society. Actionalist analysis, on the other hand, has a greater awareness of the domination exercised by a class or \ by holders of pow^rand of conflicts over the control of historicity. It analyzes I not only the various combinations of innovation and repression on the part of
Historichy
29
the ruling classes but also, on the part of the ruled classes, the always living presence of movements aimed at the collective reappropriation of historicity, and of the various forms of rejection, of withdrawal, of defense against the ruling order. It knows that history is never epic, that actors are never completely conscious and organized, that the meaning of events never coTricKTes with the consciousness of the actors, and that its battles cannot be described like those in an eighteenth-century engraving. The actors, though they may be aware of being engaged in a historical action and social conflicts, cannot be viewed as bearers of that action's meaning in their individual representations. b.
Between Integration and Contradiction
We can now return to our point of departure and redefine the place of actionalist sociology within sociological analysis as a whole. One of its principal objectives is to rescue sociology from the false choice situation in which it too often becomes enmeshed. For it does look, superficially, as though it is bound to choose between an ideal5t"phTTosbphy of values and an analysis of the internal contradictions of an economic and social system and of the all-powerful apparatus of a class domination. I will give one example only. If we examine the sociology of development, it seems to be divided into two schools: on one side the school that talks about modernization and observes both the progress of rationality or organic solidarity and the traditionalist resistances to change; on the other, the school that reduces the dynamic of the underdeveloped nations to the effects of domination exercised upon them by the great capitalist powers. This second school seems to me more securely based than the first; it puts its emphasis on a social relation of essential importance instead of artificially placing dominant and dominated societies on a scale of development a la Rostow that is too ethnocentric not to be an ideological tool for use on behalf of the colonizers. But why should there be this gap between modernization and dependence? Is not the essential thing, rather, to understand the independence movements, the nationalisms, the popular or messianic groupings, the union and political movements, and also the formation of a ruling class and its links with foreign capital or the state, through which an action of development arises that either struggles against dependence or, on the contrary, reinforces it and cannot be reduced to simply modernization, since it is determining the type of tkmodernized'* society being built? / refuse to chtmse between the reduction of social conduct to roles or adaptation to change, on the one hand* and, on the other, an image of society as a system motivated by the logic of domination alone. Other social conducts, other social relations exist. Political relations exist—at least where
30
Chapter One
totalitarianism is not supreme—a plurality of influences, a certain autonomy of decision within a society. Above all there exist social conflicts and movements, and therefore, even beyond political institutions, an "openness'* of society, a debate on the orientation of change. The long period of exceptional growth experienced recently by the industrial societies—to which the great majority of sociologists have belonged until now—has given an extreme force to the ideology of the ruling class: all the talk in our part of the world has been about modernization, about adaptation, even about a decline in conflicts and ideologies. And, against that ideology and the class domination it reinforces, it is natural that criticism, lacking support from the organized action of new social movements, should have torn itself away from the dominant discourse in order to pass judgment from outside on the objective reality of domination. However, although that step was politically indispensable, we must make certain we know how to go beyond it and to rediscover in our society, as in any society in movement, the conjoined realities of cultural orientations and social conflicts. Society is not merely a system of norms or a system of domination: it is a system of social relations, of debates and conflicts, of political initiatives and claims, of ideologies and alienations. Sociology is never faced with a choice between an analysis of subjectivity and an analysis of objectivity, because the very nature of the conduct it studies is to belong to neither of those two orders. Men make their history not by their intentions and their values but by the meaning of trie action tHat society exercises upon itself, an action that is simultaneously subjective and objective, defined conjointly by an accumulation and a cultural model. There lies the central domain of sociological analysis. It is not all of sociology however. For the domination of the ruling class is always gTeat enough for its innovative action on the one hand to give a certain autonomy to the theme of modernization, and on the other for its power to constitute a system of domination, of repression, of exploitation, that possesses its own specific logic; this domination is also often sufficiently limited for the political process to possess a space of its own within it. We must keep the autonomy of these social processes in mind in order to protect actionalist sociology against the ever-present risk it faces of being turned into a philosophy of freedom and an epic vision of history. But this autonomy cannot be independence. One is never justified in defining a society as modern or traditionalist, as universalist or particularism or in affirming that social organization can be reduced to the pure implementation of domination, since the dominant class is not in a position to define the mode of knowledge, the type of accumulation, and the cultural model that constitute the historicity within which it acts: in sum, one cannot
Historicity
31
consider a society's evolution to be the result of its political decisions, since those decisions are limited both by the society's historicity and by class domination. Actionalist sociology ought to occupy a central position in sociological analysis, because it carries sociological method—that is, analysis of conduct by social relations—to its highest level, that of historicity, the level of society's work upon itself. But those entering upon this path must always be aware of how inadequate their knowledge is bound to be in relation to the difficulty of the task they are taking on. Perhaps 1 should reiterate that the central importance 1 give to the concept of historicity has nothing to do with any vague exhortation to "see social facts in relation to history." Nothing could be more innocent, on the surface, than such friendly reminders about the usefulness of situating observed phenomena in time and space, of examining their development, of taking account of their particularities. Is not sociology's number one sin sociocentrism, we are often asked, when a little historical and geographical awareness could safeguard it so easily against anachronisms and errors of interpretation? Such admonitions are indeed apposite when it is a matter of analyzing a historical situation; but too often, beneath a thin layer of "good sense," they conceal what is in fact an outright rejection of sociological analysis, or recourse to a historicism that sociology has always had to fight against, and to which the concept of historicity is intended to deliver the last and fatal blow. Sociology's object is never a concrete historical whole; even if one carries one's analysis to the furthest limits or macrosociology, as I myself am doing, what is involved is always analysis of social mechanisms and relations, mechanisms and relations that must be isolated from the historical settings in which they were first observed. If we look for the meaning of social conduct in the evolution of societies or in that of any one of their particular aspects—their techniques or their values for example—then we are falling into historicism, in other words, on the far side of an absolute relativism that destroys all possibility of knowledge, into the ideathat through history there is being manifested, being realized, a meaning, a human nature, or a natural and stable type of social organization. 1 must sayit again: the principal reason for the concept of historicity is to eliminate all historicist recourse to^sejices, that last avatar of the metasocial warrants of social order. It is time to recognize that it is in the mode of sociology that our societies must now know themselves, by apprehending themselves as systems and no longer as evolutions. Those we call historians have contributed to the effecting of this change no less than those we call sociologists.
32
Chapter One
C.
The Cardinal Points of Sociology
a.
Functions, Controls, Decisions, Actions
The study of society is confronted from the outset by certain choices that orient it, that determine the division, if not into schools, then at least into orientations various enough to force us into redefining general sociology as an analysis of the relations among these diverse orientations. It is therefore desirable that the present sociological inquiry, like any other, should be aware of the starting point it adopts, even though it may subsequently strive to achieve freedom from it. These general orientations are defined by the preference given to one of the two possible replies to each of the two questions that the sociologist encounters from the very start. A unit termed ''society" must possess an organization, a continuity, and therefore mechanisms for the maintenance and transmission of orientations, norms, or power. But it is also the producer of its history and must possess means of adapting itself to the modifications of its environment or of acting upon its own transformation. The sociologist thus faces a first choice: he will be asking questions either about the problems of society's production or about those of its reproduction, either about order or about movement. Second, a society is a unity, an actor, determining its internal functioning and its relations with the outside; but it is also the locus of social relations that may appear to be more fundamental than values, norms, or mechanisms of socialization. The sociologist must necessarily give priority either to the unity of societal action or to social relations, and above all to relations of domination. He conceives society either as a field of decisions oriented by objectives, adapted to the environment, or on the other hand as a field of social relations, of conflicts, of ideologies, and consequently places more emphasis on what it excludes, represses, or manipulates. A sociological school or orientation is defined by the intersecting of these two choices. It is not necessary to suppose that every sociologist consciously decides to adopt one of the four cardinal points thus defined as his particular starting point. But these four points nevertheless make it possible to situate the branches of sociological thought in relation to one another and consequently to make them more aware of the choices—often implicit—that they make, and the limitations to which they are subjected. Let us quickly summarize these four fundamental orientations. 1. A sociology of order that gives priority to society's relations with its environment will define the Junctions that must be organized within it. Society must feed itself, defend itself, reproduce itself, ensure its stability and its continuity.
Historicity
33
2. On the other hand, a sociology of order more aware of internal social relations sees order as containing a domination exercised by some and imposed on all. Here the concern is no longer with functions but with controls, with an apparatus of repression and social and cultural integration, functioning in the service of a power. 3. The sociology of movement, when it examines the problems involved in a social unit's adaptation to a changing environment, gives greatest importance to the decisions by means of which an actor responds in a coherent manner to the stimuli of that environment. 4. Last, a sociology of movement that gives the greatest importance to the oppositions and conflict within society may be termed a sociology of action. Movement is not a decision taken by a "government" within the society; it is the result of social relations that are never fully institutionalized and that express the constant opposition between rulers and ruled, an opposition linked with accumulation and with the concentration of the power of decision. Sociological endeavors, in their essence, can thus be divided into four domains studying functions, controls, decisions, and actions (see fig. 1). order interactions of society with environment
internal social relations
functions
movement decisions
controls
Figure 1
Each of the rows and columns is associated with certain attitudes that are not purely scientific. And this explains why a certain aspect of sociological analysis will be given preference by a certain society, social group, or individual. At the risk of painting in over-bold colors, these various images of the sociologist must be roughed in. Those situated on the upper line are more "optimistic." They also pay more attention to what takes place at the "top" of society. They are more interested in the legislator, in the government, in the managing director, than in prisoners, minorities, or wage earners. The
34
Chapter One
others tend to look more for the hidden forces within society, are mistrustful of its discourse and rationality in which they think they detect the dominion of an ideology, a mixture of integration and repression. The order column contains those who are sensitive primarily to social continuity, those who see in today the weight of the past, of its values or its heritage. In the movement column, on the other hand, it is the future that seems to govern the present, and the resulting analysis lays stress on new trends, forces, and conflicts. But we can go even further in the political localization of sociology's main themes. The problems I have presented in a general form, attributing them to society in general, also correspond more directly to the preoccupations of opposing social classes. The ruling class, steward of social order, concerned with ensuring the transmission of its own privileges and of social inequality, is more responsive to the theme of functions because it is more interested in maintaining the established order than in questioning its values and its power. Whereas a working class chafing at the barriers raised in the domain of consumption, education, etc., by the ruling class, and aiming at seizing or sharing its power, will clearly be more responsive to any criticism of the ruling class and of existing mechanisms for the reproduction of inequalities. Inversely, it is a new ruling class that analyzes society most directly in terms of decision making. It is much less interested than an old ruling class in the values and principles to be defended; much more interested than an old ruling class in the efficacy of a strategy that will enable it to control society's transformation. As its principal adversary it finds new forces of opposition, concentrating on new problems and new social conflicts, in revolt against the ruling ideology and filled with passionate enthusiasm by the creation of a collective protest action. The study of Junctions examines social roles, the conduct of the actor legitimately expected by his partner in a specific social activity. The role/expectation-of role dyad is a transcription in terms of social interaction of a norm, and thus an element of order. This functionalists moves away from the domain of sociology if it replaces these networks of relations with conformity or nonconformity to principles, to values, to essences embodied in a sovereign. The study of decisions devotes itself to relations of influence, to the actor's comparative capacity to modify the behavior of his partner or to be modified by him as to his own behavior. It moves away from the field of sociology when the actors do not seem to belong to the same social whole, when their strategies can thus be analyzed in terms of "game theory,'* a situation met with in varying degrees in the whole study of intersocial relations and, more particularly, international ones. The study of actions is sociological insofar as it examines structural
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conflicts and above all class conflicts, conflicts over the control and appropriation of society's capacity to transform itself by its work; it ceases to be sociological either if it sets up human values or a human nature in opposition to social domination, or if it conceives of this conflict as escaping from the order of social relations and as being, for example, purely economic. The study of controls highlights alienation, the contradiction between the dominated actor's conduct corresponding to his situation and the conduct imposed upon him by institutions and socialization in the service of the ruling order. It moves away from the domain of sociology if its fails to recognize the existence of anything other than that order, which it thus supposes to be closed, or of that domination, which it supposes total, and recognizes no other social dynamic than in the dissociation of that internal order and the demands of the environment. My classification here is of themes, not of works. The sociologist who could be fitted precisely into any one square of this tabulation would be better defined by an ideological label than by a sociological school. In reality, all sociological thought of any importance represents an effort to integrate a variety of themes, to escape from one ideological vision by replacing the theme it gives priority to into a more general analysis. It would be just as false to believe that the sociologist can evade the choices indicated here with an appeal to * 'objectivity'' as to enclose him rigidly inside one ideological school. But no progress can be made toward a specifically sociological analysis, defined by its coherence and by the interests it represents, except insofar as we recognize that each and every one of us comes^U^jiowlejjgepf society through a particular door, a door conditioned by our specific social situation, our political choices, our life stories. Everyone must know at the outset where and what his first base is. What makes it possible to transcend the limitations from which we start is first and foremost a recognition of the unity of sociological reasoning. In other terms, what imprisons sociology within ideology is the refusal to recognize the specificity of a sociological point of view. This pons asinorum can be defined very simply. The specific task of sociology is to explain social conduct by the nature of the social interactions of which that conduct is one of the terms. Each of our four principal themes leads to sociology because it is studying a type of social interaction. It departs from sociology if it is a pretext for turning to other types of reasoning. 1 shall attempt in this book, like most sociologists, to emerge from one of my "boxes" of sociological analysis with the aim of formulating the elements of a general procedural method. But 1 must start by indicating the cardinal point toward which my face is turned as I stand on the starting line.
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Chapter One
Itis actionalist sociology that seems to me to be the best point of departure and to provide the most central contribution to general sociologyThis advantage is connected first with the particular features of the most highly industrialized societies. Almost everything in them occurs as the result of decisions or social relations. It is difficult to see how the knowledge of societies undergoing rapid change could assign a central place to an analysis of principles, of values, and of their transmission, since these are things that conjure up societies with a very slow rate of change rather than industrial or postindustrial societies. This observation clearly favors both the sociology of decisions and that of action. One can in fact view these two as inseparable; each is the others "secret enemy." But the sociology of decisions necessarily identifies itself with the ruling c/uss\ it does so by refusing to look beyond political mechanisms, by refusing to recognize the existence of class relations and a system of domination, by imposing an image of social conduct as self-interested calculation and strategies favoring the decision makers, by turning away from whatever the social order rejects and excludes, by denying the existence of social movements. Actionalist sociology alone places itself directly on the level of social relations, upstream from that of political decisions, and is thus just as aware of what is excluded as of what is effected, of what is dominated as of what dominates. Actionalist sociology is most directly opposed to the sociology of functions. Nothing could seem further from an analysis of society as an actor guided by values and norms, establishing and controlling his inner order and his relations with the environment, than the analysis of action and the conflicts by means of which society acts upon itself in order to lift itself outside its functioning, toward a beyond in the present, toward objectives that can be cither inside history or outside it. Actionalist sociology is close to a sociology of controls, since the latter criticizes the sociology of functions by recognizing the power behind the rules and the inequality behind the differentiation. But it stands apart from it insofar as it apprehends the present as being more directly governed by the future or the beyond than it is by the past. Actionalist sociology is thus the furthest removed from being a description of the social order, from identifying itself with the discourse of society itself whereas the sociology of functions is the nearest to that discourse and most easily confuses sociological analysis with a reconstitution of the image a society forms of itself through its institutions and its dominant ideology. All of which should give the sociology of action the motive role in the construction of sociological analysis. The sociology of controls teaches how to unmask the social order; the study of decisions throws sociology into the vanguard. Actionalist sociology could link these two kinds of progress and
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construct a critical sociology of the production of society by itself, at the opposite pole to the positivist analysis of society's consumption of itself by its members which defines a functionalist sociology. But by its very role, actionalist sociology is exposed to greater dangers than are the other currents of sociological analysis. Any critical sociology is in danger of becoming the prisoner of the ideology opposing the ascendancy of the dominant one, since the latter has the advantage of greater instrumentality, of possessing the "realism'' of any actor actually managing a social whole. The critical sociology runs this risk more directly than a sociology of controls, which is applying its criticism to observation of a consolidated established order. Actionalist sociology, on the contrary, is nearer to the actors and their relations, more tempted in consequence by the dangers of a historicist analysis of the praxis and, more simply, by those of an epic philosophy of history. As a result, the theoretical advantages that I attribute to the procedure or approach 1 am going to expound are never separable from the practical obstacles it encounters. The closer one approaches to action, the more one risks being more rejected, more deceived, and more manipulated by the actors themselves; and the more too one is tempted to confuse the meaning ot the action and the consciousness of the actor. Which is why the actionalist sociology came late into the field, embarrassed by its very ambitions and by the resistance it is doomed stir up. At least it is useful to sociology as a whole to hear the objectives that this approach assigns itself, the concepts it employs, and the social phenomena to which it gives form and visibility through its analysis. One can accept that certain kinds of research are not conscious of the theoretical orientations on which they are based. But sociology is too closely involved in the world of opinions and ideologies easily to dispense with the constant effort to define its approaches and criticize its own limitations. b.
From Functionalist Sociology to Actionalist Sociology
The formation of sociology has accompanied the development of Western societies during the course of their industrialization. Because that industrialization was dominated at first by a capitalist bourgeoisie whose economic achievement turned society topsy-turvy, but whose action was subjected to almost no social and political control, those who defined themselves as sociologists were often^reoccupied firsthand foremost with the reestablishment of a certain social integration^ and thus of a social control over economic activities. If economic analysis could throw light on the movement of society, was it not the task of sociology to discover the necessary conditions of order? The question that haunted, and which still haunts, what we might call classical sociology is this: On what conditions, through all its transfor-
38
Chapter One
mations and struggles of interests, does a society maintain the unity that enables it to define laws, make its institutions work, form new generations, and manage its internal conflicts? In Western Europe, this line of questioning developed along with a progressive institutionalization of labor conflicts. The action of trades unions, the introduction of social laws and labor codes helped reintroduce the idea of solidarity to which Durkheim gave an importance that has been shown to be durable. In the United States, a nation formed by the more or less complete integration of successive waves of immigrants, and one that succeeded in riding its greatest crisis, the unity of society—supported in this instance by the tremendous development of its judicial and political institutions—appeared to many as the extraordinary fact whose explanation must give sociological thought its direction. In Soviet society, and in countries whose development is controlled by a communist party, it is, rather, the force of an ideological and political system that imposes itself first on the observer and that places the themes of integration, of participation, of citizen training in the forefront. No sociologist thinks that this order and this integration presuppose a perfect agreement between all the parts; conflicts of interest must still exist, insofar as social roles are differentiated and a hierarchyexists. But classical sociology considers that such conflicts occur within institutional mechanisms which themselves rest upon a body of values and norms. The historic conditions of sociology's formation thus explain why it has more often than not viewed society as an actor exercising a certain control over its activities and organization, defining rights and duties, forms of authority and organization. This social and intellectual tradition has contributed a great deal to our knowledge of society. But that contribution cannot be isolated and assessed except at the price of a critical analysis, an analysis that will reveal not only how classical sociological thought belongs to a particular, historically defined cultural field, but also its political role. Parallel to this, the critique we need to make of it is governed by a change in the position of the sociologist himself, and by a change in the political situation. Just as classical sociology developed alongside the progressive institutionalization of the conflicts produced by capitalist industrialization, so any critique of it is inseparable from the appearance of new social rifts, new problems, new social movements. This renewal of_sociology has two main aspects: first, the increased extent of the area covered by sociological thought, and more broadly by political 4l events." Sociology, like history, confined itself for decades to study of the more "advanced" societies. We are still far too inclined to call someone who studies Africa an Africanist and someone who studies Europe or North America a sociologist. But it is impossible today to go on viewing societies as
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more or less developed, situated neatly inside various stages of growth. They are not like horses in a race, running faster or slower, starting before or after each other. They cannot be understood without some consideration of the relations of domination and dependence that unite them, or without consideration of the movements of transformation and liberation that are animating the dominated peoples. Second, within the dominant and rich societies themselves, progress in the institutionalization of certain conflicts is being accompanied by new rifts, by problems and movements that are still "savage/* "uncivilized." We are seeing the formation of new conflicts even more than the institutional accommodation of old ones. Rejections and rebellions breed and increase, forcing us to question ourselves about society with respect not to its functioning and integration but to its orientations and conflicts. Sociology must pay particular attention to the new forms of power and conflict appearing before its very eyes. As it progressively learns to recognize the new forms of society's action upon itself—the creation of a programmed society, the industrialization of consumption and information, the extension of the field of social conflicts, the programs of accelerated development and revolutionary transformation of huge nations—sociology must begin to question its classical approach, which consisted in placing the observer in front of a society conceived of as a constituted totality, a monument of culture. Whether we look upon the national "reality" as fundamental, and the nation therefore as a personage, whether we attach more importance to the juridical rules that organize social life and to the moral principles behind them, and lastly, whether we are looking for economic systems behind political or cultural unities, we are inclined tci^see society as an entity, because our most usual experience is that neither we ourselves individually, nor the groups of which we are a part, have the capacity to change the rules of the social game, the conditions of economic life, or the cultural conventions. This type of representation is not favorable to sociology in principle. In order to indicate the distance that separates society from the actors living in it, it tends to resort to a historical, juridical, or economic explanation of social facts./What we might call classical or functionalist sociology has nevertheless helped to maintain this kind of approach while introducing into it the more elementary requirements of sociological analysis. It has claimed the right, with Durkheim, to explain the social by nothing other than the social. But it has also, and as a consequence, presented society as a system organized around its values and its needs for integration, for conflict management, or for adaptation to internal or external changes.
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Chapter One
It is this image of society as actor, as sovereign, taking advice and meting out justice, uttering the law and making war, educating its children and punishing deviants, that we must eliminate once and for all. We must overthrow the old conception of society, which society itself is unable to make use of, in its practice, other than as an ideological holding operation. I shall indicate here three important aspects of this functionalist representation that I believe must be urgently eliminated from sociologists' thought. 1. The notion to which classical sociology always returns is that of values. But all forms of research into social interactions lead us away from values. Must 1 recall that political sociology and organizations theory have shown us that decision systems—at least in our type of society—are not the application of principles but the result of transactions, a fact that recognizes a certain heterogeneity of the interests confronting one another? It is of strategies and interests that we ought to speak in this area, not of values. If we consider the functioning of organizations themselves, this observation is even more self-evident; conduct is oriented within them both by technical constraints and by relations of power or, more generally, by social relations. The nearer one approaches concrete social experience, the more the apparent unity of values explodes: on the one hand a society's instrumentality, in other words the internal characteristics of its productive forces, on the other, the social and political relations that orient the system of production and the management of society. Which is why we cannot say that authority in the state and in the modern firm is functional, rational-legal, which is to say, in Weber^s sense, bureaucratic. We need only consult the observations of the sociology of work to see immediately that rationalization is in no way separable from a social power whose intervention manifests itself in relations of authority that are neither entirely rational nor entirely legal. The notion of bureaucratic authority masks the gap and sometimes the contradiction that exists between a technique and a power. The notion involved is an ideological one. It is not merely isolating a certain order of phenomena within the field of observation, which would be legitimate; it is substituting the unity of a discourse for a set of relations, tensions, and contradictions. Organizational sociology did not achieve any decisive progress until it had rid itself of this type of discourse. What then is a society's system of values? On the highest level it is the unity of a discourse held by the ruling classes or by the ruling political forces of a society, a discourse whose function is to identify forms of social organization with technical activity, by combining both within the notion of values. Social power presents itself then as the spirit or soul of society, and claims that all social conflicts are played out within a general consensus.
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The system of values is nothing other than a more or less coherent ideology, always bound up with social categories possessing a certain power, which is to say the capability of defining the activities and gratifications of society's members as a whole in terms of their own objectives and representations. But this ideology does not completely determine the categories of social practice. It exercises a dominion over what may be termed society's discourse; it does not provide an account of all its aspects. For that discourse is also a debate and a discussion; the voice of the popular classes can be heard in them, however faintly, as can that of interest groups with access to the political system, that of the "professionals" who are creating a rhetoric rather than an ideology, and so on. It is essential to recognize that social practice as a whole—even when isolated from the complexity of a social formation—forms an uncontrolled, unintegrated whole, and thus represents the relations of the classes, struggles for political influence, and all other types of social interactions, despite the effort at unification maintained in the name of values, principles, or traditions, by the ruling class and its ideologists. For a system of values unifying social practice to exist it is necessary that society should be totally dominated, politically and culturally, by a sovereign, whether it be Capital or Central Committee. 2. It is also an ideological operation that makes possible the assertion that a society is governed by a coherent body of values. Are the industrialized societies universalist while the rest are particularist? A totally arbitrary assertion. Nationalisms are indeed broader particularisms than those restricted in number and extent by attachment to a community; does this mean they are a form of universalism? The ethnocentrism here is self-evident, leading to an opposition of traditional and modern societies as though the former were "inferior" to the latter. It could be shown, taking each of the pattern-variables Talcott Parson defines (notably in Toward a General Theory of Action, Harvard University Press, 1951, and in Working Papers in the Theory of Action, Free Press, 1953) that every society experiences conduct both affective and affective-neutral, specific and diffuse, particularist and universalist, instrumental and consummatory, self-oriented and collectivity-oriented. These notions enable one to classify conduct, but they cannot be used to define the totality of a society's cultural orientations, and even less to describe the evolution of societies. A society is not a ship steered by a pilot toward a known destination. 3. This double reduction, of society to a central actor, and of actors' orientations to a unified system of values, leads to a third limitation and
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Chapter One
distortion of sociological analysis: itrefuses to step outside the area illuniined by the institutions. What is not in conformity with the rules of those institutions is termed disorganization, marginality, deviance, anomie. At no point does it occur to this sociology to topple the official image of society and challenge the established order in the name of all that does not conform to it. Social movements are merely manifestations of some kind of malfunction or unfortunate discrepancy in the social organization. And even Robert Merton, who is much more aware than most of the dangers inherent in an excessively rigid functionalism, in his paradigm of social conduct (Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, 1957, pp. 131-94), does not go beyond recognition of discrepancies between acceptance of ends and acceptance of means in a given society, which leaves all conduct that rejects both ends and means, or rather power and organization, in an undetermined no-man's-land. This positivist sociology identifies itself with the rules of social life. Just as knowledge of society was long delayed in France by the authority of the state or church, just as it is practically impossible in dictatorships, can it not also be limited, as in the United States particularly, by the authority of norms less linked to a central power, more interiorized, more moral in their nature, so that more often than not sociology is placing itself inside the established order, or even making its own contribution to the building of the wall that, internally as well as externally, protects the "civilized" against the "savages"? c.
Calculation and Mask
This clear conscience enjoyed by classical sociology is now under attack from two different sides: on the one hand by a sociology more responsive to social change and the mechanisms of decision making that orient it; on the other, by a critical sociology that draws attention to the presence in the social order of a construction serving the purposes not of values but of the dominant class. 1 am returning here, having dealt with a sociology of values, to the role played by a sociology of decisions and a sociology of controls. What 1 am trying to do is to follow with greater precision the path leading from classical sociology to actionalist sociology via the two other currents of sociology whose positive contributions and inadequacies must both be pointed out. 1. In his early work, such as the Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim (as A. Pizzorno has pointed out in his "Lecture actuelle de Durkheim" in Archives europe'ennes de sociologie, 1963, pp. 1-36) is at times near to a line of thought, more strongly developed by English radicalism, that has today rediscovered a great vitality. According to this line of thought, social orderjs^ not achieved by integration into a system of values but by the efficient
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functioning of representative institutions: they make it possible to eliminate the 4tpathological forms" of the division of labor. Society is not oriented by values; nor even by the requirements of its own integration; it evolves pragmatically, in terms of negotiations and transactions established between various group interests. Political and social laws, collective c^mtracts and agreements define limited and temporary equilibria, and ensure the best adaptation possible of the society to the constant changes of the environment. It is useless and even dangerous to appeal to values, to principles that manifest both rejection of change and the maintenance of one type or another of absolutism. The idealism of values must be replaced by a pragmatic rationalism. This is a lib era/ vision, whose principal merit is that of being a doctrine of change But which seems to me to confuse two orders of phenomena that ought to be kept distinct. The fact that in certain modern societies the field of negotiations and representative institutions is widening does not permit us to conclude that a society is a political market, that power is no more than influence, and that no structural limits exist to negotiations and to the pressures exercised by group interests. The state of a society is not entirely the result of its decisions; all claims are not negotiable; beyond the political processes, and acting as limits to them, there exist both orientations defining a cultural and social field which is qualitatively different from all others, and also relations of domination and power. There is no society that is not like an iceberg; the visible part, that of awareness, of decisions, of transactions, is smaller than the invisible part, that of the impossible, of the forbidden, of repression, of domination. No mechanism of planning, of conscious harmonization, of transaction can integrate all the conflicts into a whole. Analysis centered on integratipn reduces society to its forms of socia[ organization, of division of labor, and simultaneously transforms differentiation, specialization, and hierarchization into an order that can have no meaning other than the determined maintenance of the established order, masking the reality of jpower, of inequality, of repression. A purely "political" sociology on the other hand, centered on the study of negotiations and decisions, dissolves social structure in social change, thus affirming continuity within change and deliberately neglecting the qualitative jumps that must occur, in one form or another, in the course of any long-term change process. This "political" sociology marks an important advance on functionalist sociology. Because it investigates societies that are in a process of rapid change, which they are attempting to harness, it is no longer directed like the classical school toward research into the conditions of an order that it might still be able to recapture, despite the upheavals of capitalist industriali-
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Chapter One
zation. It no longer conceives of society as based upon principles and upon agencies that teach those principles and cause them to be respected; it defines it in terms of its operations and thus follows a method of permitting a direct analysis of the mechanisms of society's functioning. In practice, however, it replaces the appeal to values and social integration with identification with the riders and their representation of society. Already in the nineteenth century the liberal ideologists were wanting all workers to behave like entrepreneurs, seeking their own profits, taking risks and initiatives, conforming with economic rationality, which came to the same thing as denying the relations of domination exercised by the entrepreneur over the wage earner. Today, in the same way, by centering attention on decision making, one inevitably sets up an opposition between those capable of making decisions, choices, deliberations, negotiations, and those who are tradition-bound, rigid, encumbered by habits and principles and can appear only as a mass that must have an elite to lead them toward change. This sociology reduces the functioning of society to the interaction of actors, in much the same way as historical studies have gone on for so long telling us about its kings and captains, its saints and heroes, leaving the vast "inactive" multitude in the shadow. 2. Diametrically, and usefully, opposed to this interactionism we find the critical sociology of social controls, which sees in the categories of social practice not the formal expression of values and norms but the maintenance of inequalities and of power. This sociology, faithful to the Marxist critique of the "fetishism*' of economic categories, recognizes in those domains apparently the furthest removed from social domination and production the stamp of the dominant ideology and its work of legitimizing existing inequalities and privileges. This is an indispensable method of procedure without which presociological notions inevitably creep back: appeals to the "natural" differences between men, to the "natural" criteria of development or payment, to the independence of cultural facts in relation to the social "frameworks" into which they are inserted, and so on. But can we remain content with seeing society simply as a system of domination without finding ourselves caught once more between two equally deplorable solutions? The first consists in appealing against all that is institutionalized and organized to a human nature that reveals itself solely in spontaneity and constant transcendence of the established order. This is an idea always ready to surface in a sociology of which it in fact constitutes the negation: social organization, being nothing other than the product of power and ifs
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ideology, can be destroyed by rebellion, thus making it possible to return to or to achieve a society in which exchange would be replaced by use, the instituted by the instituting, the pursuit of the signs of wealth and status by the satisfaction of man's basic needs. No matter what the tone in which these themes are presented, they are never expressing anything but nostalgia for a social philosophy whose splendor cannot conceal the fact that it is the very thing sociology must transcend in order to exist. The second solution leads back to the functionalism one had supposed defeated. This sociological school, which talks about domination, could more simply use the term stratification. Why accuse a ruling class's ideology, it asks, when all that is needed is to recognize the dominion of values and norms? That differentiation and hierarchization exist in all domains of social organization has never been denied by anyone; why conclude from an observation of their presence that society is ruled by a single class, about which everyone constantly talks without ever defining it in terms of its decisions, its interests, its productive role? Just as the sociology of decisions dissolves the system in the actors and their relations, the sociology of controls dissolves the actors in the system, which can be acceptable, if it is solely a matter of understanding how a system maintains itself, but which ceases to be so if one is trying to explain its nature and its reason for being, how it is produced and how it operates. d.
Toward an Actionalist Sociology
In conclusion, we must recognize that it is much more difficult to find a way out of functionalist sociology—without leaving sociology altogether—than is supposed by all those who raise such a hue and cry against it. Which leads us to take another look at our outline of the main currents of sociological analysis given earlier in this chapter. The sociology of decisions and the sociology of controls are less orien- \ tations of sociology comparable with a functionalist or actionalist sociology y) than islands in the middle of the river that flows between the other two. At every moment sociology has to make a choice between what one might term a sociology of collective consciousness, which is first and foremost a sociology of order and its maintenance, and an actionalist sociology, which is also that of historicity and social relations. The sociology of decisions is already a sociology of action, but it is still a sociology of order in that it recognizes the open market as the best of all possible worlds and defines social actors according to their place within the social organization instead of trying to find out how the latter was produced by the relations between the actors. The sociology of controls seems to break with the clear conscience of
^ .
f r
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Chapter One
classical sociology, but is no more than the opposition of His Functionalist Majesty, depriving itself of every possible means of understanding the production of the social order. However, both these sociologies, by their very opposition, pose an insoluble problem to functionalist sociology. For the latter, actor and system are inseparable. The actor plays a role defined by the system's norms and values. The sociology of controls tells us that actors do not play the role they think they are playing, that the actors are masked, the dice loaded, the social order a comedy that always ends in trickery. The sociology of decisions also shatters the classical image of the system; it replaces the absolute by the relative, the immutable by change, values by transactions. How are we to provide a simultaneous account of these images of social life: on the one hand, a society that produces itself through its changes and its decisions, empirically, and under the guidance of a ruling elite; on the other, a social order that is the concealing mask of a systematic domination and its accompanying repression? We are bound to advance, in conjunction, two apparently contradictory propositions: ( D a society is a whole defined and delimited by certain social and cultural orientations that are not the property of one category of actors but the field of social relations, and (2) a society is a whole, composed of social relations, and is produced by the actors through their forms of conflict and cooperation. These two propositions are only compatible if, instead of conceiving of society as an order, we recognize that it is defined by its historicity and hot by its functioning, by its capacity to produce itself and not by its organs of reproduction. For this first step makes it possible to dissociate the orientations of historicity from the values of the social order and to drive class relations and domination between them like a wedge. This is why the sociology of values must be rejected as forcefully as possible. The weakness of the sociology of decisions and the sociology of controls is that they do not question this image of society as a functional system, market or ideology, ' held over from functionalist thought. Historicity is not a set of values, for it defines orientations that are not put to work and do not become socially functional except via the relations between the classes struggling for control of them. Society is neither pure class domination nor an order wholly in the service of values. On that doubly negative assertion and the positive propositions it ! implies, the whole of this book is built. Social practice always refers simultaneously to class domination and the orientations of historicity. The sociology of decisions must suppress the system in order to understand the
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actors; the sociology of controls must suppress the actors in order to display the system. But the first reintroduces the system by identifying it with the | interests of the elite, and the second leads us back to functionalist analysis of \ the system by its inability to analyze class relations. Let us end this dilemma: 1 historicity is the stake of class relations; it does not govern social organization ' without being stamped with the dominion of the dominant class; but the dominated are not reduced to mere extras in a performance put on by the ruling class. There are enough exclusions, interdicts, and repressions, but enough rifts also, enough debates and social movements, for us to discern easily enough, behind the established order and its reproduction, the class struggles through which historicity is transformed into social organization. And immediately we find that the opposition set up between a sociology of order and a sociology of movment has been transcended. The sociology of movement, isolated from that of order, leads back to a sociology of decisions, while the sociology of controls is enclosed within the social order. Historicity is not pure movement; it is not a force of change but a constitution of a field of colfective experience. Likewise, the action of each class is not a simple will toward change but a struggle against a certain order. The very nature of industrialized societies, as of all societies engaged in a conscious effort of development, purges social analysis of all recourse J o essences, to values. The error would be to believe that this disappearance of the social order's metasocial warrants must lead to a conception of society as a simple network of decisions, changes, or operations aimed at the maintenance and reproduction of order. Society must indeed be conceived of as a system, but one whose specificity is that of being capable of historicity, of the production of its own condition of functioning on the basis of orientations, creating a model of knowledge, of accumulation, and of prehension of creativity. Such is the central idea of the sociology I term actionalist: society is not reducible to its functioning or to its adaptation to an environment; it produces itself, so that there exists a fundamental tension between a society's historicity and the functioning or reproduction of a collectivity, of a "social formation." which manifests historicity but which is also a particular historical unity and a social organization functioning in accordance with the norms and requirements of an internal coherence. I am not certain that my placing a sociology of historical action in relation to other currents of sociological analysis defines it any more clearly. Some may even be irritated by an approach that seems to be putting all the others in their places while presenting itself as an ultimate synthesis. I hope no one will construe the spirit in which these pages have been written as one of conquest. I am simply trying to define an approach and to show that it corresponds to what is most specific in sociological analysis. But
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what may constitute its interest certainly constitutes its weakness. Ultimately there would be some justice in answering that this actionalist sociology of mine has no proper content of its own, that by dint of transcending all the others it has reduced itself to existing in those undefined no-man's-lands that serve to separate other particular but well-founded modes of analysis one from another. Without being as pessimistic as that, I do recognize that it is more reasonable to look at how the parts of a society—or the parts of a discourse—fit together than to seek out behind the established order this interdependence of tensions and conflict by which I define the self-production of society. And yet, how can one help saying that it is time now, in a day when the present is controlled more by the future than by the past, to give priority to the way in which a society produces itself rather than to the means by which it reproduces itself; and how, at the same time, can one fail to take a position against a sociology of decisions or of "planning" that is not just a set of often remarkable achievements but above all the ideological weapon of the new ruling class? What I am certainly not trying to do here is to capture the whole of sociology in some imaginary manual, its separate chapters written for the most part by different authors, none of them knowing what the finished work would be, and unintentionally lending their authority to an overall conception to which they do not subscribe. Put much more simply, I am simply saying that when defining a specific procedural approach one must recognize openly that it will conflict with others. Moreover, I hope that my candor will have the double advantage of provoking argument and providing an antidote to the laziness of all those who call themselves sociologists without ever asking themselves what sociology means. D.
The Birth of Sociology
a.
The Invisible Hand Withdraws
Sociology could not come into being until the point at which a society was formed with a cultural model that was entirely ''practical" and excluded all recourse, all upward reference to a transcendent order, to what I have termed metasocial warrants for the social order. The European industrial revolution in the nineteenth century marked a first stage in the appearance of sociology. The world of essences was under attack from society's greatly increased capacity to act upon itself and change itself. But industrial society, as formed then, still does not appear as the actor of its own transformation. It stiH refers upward to free enterprise, to the market and its laws, to an invisible
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hand that recalls a God or a sovereign. And those who denounce the capitalist profit lying behind the market are referring themselves in their turn to labor as creative energy, whose progress enters into contradiction with the domination of the bourgeoisie. Capitalist industrial society saw the birth of economic analysis, but sociology could not come into being until growth appeared as a mobilization of social resources, as a set of decisions and no longer as submission to laws, and until, also, society's control over itself was manifested in the politics of economic and social intervention as well as in the possibility of totalitarian regimes, or again in revolutions capable of overthrowing a society completely. In our own century, sociology can at last assert its existence. Sociology, which begins by constructing the concept of historicity, thereby makes it possible to go beyond historicism. By conceiving the "meaning" of a society as its work on itself, the construction of an experience, actionalist sociology frees itself from all recourse to the meaning of history and continues the great intellectual transformation begun by Marx when he broke with positivism. // refuses to explain the social by the metasocial and refuses also to regard society as a machine defined by the principles of its functioning. Once again, both idealism and naturalism must be avoided. Society cannot be reduced to the interrelation of its elements; but if it acts upon itself by means of knowledge, accumulation, and its cultural model, in a word, by means of its historicity, this is not because it is governed by the designs of providence, by the progress of enlightenment, or by the emergence of the national state, but simply through its own work, its own capacity to construct a "state of nature" and a type of social organization. It is because the industrialized societies today have a theoretically unlimited capacity for transforming themselves, and the possibility of totally destroying themselves, that we can no longer allow priority to a sociology of order. Sociology is no longer organized around values but around social relations; its investigations are concerned less with the laws that control its functioning than with the process of action. But to reduce the industrialized societies to their historicity would be as false as to reduce primitive societies to their functioning. What makes the acceleration in social changes most apparent is the ever more rapid dissolution of what were once termed "institutions." Jurists and administrators must recognize that law is no longer conceived of as the expression of sovereignty and the general interest. Civilizations—and nations too—are discovering that they no longer have a * 'spirit.'' Men are becoming actors, are being wrenched free from the dominion of rules, of imperatives, of customs. What ^disappearing therefore is the image of society as a family house with thick walls, a home where the fire glows in the hearth, lighting up the pictures of ancestors hanging on the walls, in
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which-a culture and set forms of social relations are handed on from generation unto generation. In place of all the humanisms, we now see emerging an ever-growing historicity in confrontation with man's natural being. We are discovering simultaneously that man is part of nature and that he is different from the rest of living beings. We are lowering the barriers that once separated human thought, animal behavior, and machines; but at the same time we are grasping man's sociogenetic capacity. Nature and antinature. We are both. And rather than throwing our whole weight into one side of the scale or the other it is better to recognize that the essential is the union of these two aspects of the human reality. In this way an image of society is being created different from all those that have gone before, the images that always defined society by its principles, by its essence, or by its place in an evolution seen as a bearer of meaning. Sociology has no need to demand the whole of the social sciences1 territory for itself. It asserts its right only in its dialogue with that grouping of the natural sciences that fall under the heading of anthropology. One can no more identify the two than separate them. Nor can one lose sociology in the model of knowledge that created biology. Or isolate it from that model, since that would be to give comfort to its old idealist forms. Sociology is a science of man, even though it has too often in the past reinforced and justified man's submission to metasocial warrants for the social order. It has looked for the laws to explain social action outside that action; it has subjected human behavior to divine laws, to the laws of princes, to market laws. And in doing so it has jurnejllts back on its principal task: that of refusing to view any social fact as a thing, rejecting the veryjdeajtf social situation, and of revealing, behind practice and behind discourse, the action of society on itself through the creation of a field of historicity and class conflicts. This transformation of sociological analysis comes into conflict with obstacles that are less intellectual than political. The further the capacity for action of the ruling classes extends, the more strongly they impose their ideology, which presents their action as positive and rational, and which consequently identifies and fuses together the direction of social change, the results of political deliberations, social controls as a whole, and the internal coherence of groupings of means. Society is presented as being an enterprise, an organization that is ensuring its own growth by combining mechanisms of adaptation to a changing environment with the maintenance of its own integration. The ruling classes always have a rationalizing and integrating vision of society. Actionalist sociology on the contrary, because it refuses to identify
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society with its rulers, because it recognizes the central role of class conflict, is constantly aware of what social order represses and destroys, as well as of the interference of power in the social organization. Whether they recognize the fact or not, social adversaries are speaking the language of sociology for the first time. The rulers know that their role is no longer that of mastering nature but that of managing organizations, networks of social relations—that the efficiency of the economy depends upon the capacities for foresight, decision, adaptation, and innovation possessed by complex ensembles. The days are over when an organization—factory, office, regiment, university, hospital— was a tool in the hands of a leader and encountered no other (recognized) problem than the resistance of an adversary or raw material. Wc are no longer in the world of engineers and entrepreneurs but in that of managers and technocratsT On the other hand, in the mass of dependents a new awareness of truly social problems is appearing: whether it is a matter of worker migration, relations between the sexes or age groups, the conditions of urban life, the forms of authority and, more widely, of the power to orient and direct change, it isjn sociajjerms more directly than in juridical or economici terms that claims and rejections are expressed. The interest of the ruling class lies in fostering the belief that this change implies an increase in rationality and a growing autonomy of the various problems posed by the difficulties of adapting to a society in a state of rapid change. But it is a poor_answer to this propaganda to imprison oneself in outworn analyses and to believe that social problems are not serious except when they can be reduced to economic interests or to confrontations over the form of institutions. It is in sociological terms, and therefore in terms of social relations and the action society directs upon itself, that the new forms of social domination, of exclusion and repression, of conflicts and social movements, must be understood. The attempt to do so meets with great resistance, however, especially in a country like France, where the features characteristic of industrial or preindustrial societies remain relatively marked, so that it seems audacious to insist on trends and needs not yet experienced by all. But must sociology wait for a type of society to be already on the wane before daring to examine it? b.
Beyond Historicity?
This representation of sociology and the social conditions of its formation does, however, invite one criticism that must be given due consideration. Is it not, despite all its protestations, an extreme form of nineteenth-century historicism? Is it not culturally bound up with the specific experience of
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societies involved in an exceptional phase of growth? And is it not in consequence already obsolete, now that we stand at the beginning of a post industrial society in which the search for new equilibria has once more become essential, after the upheavals introduced by a phase of economic development that must now decline, since it is threatening the biological conditions necessary for societies to exist at all? Is it not time to recognize that the most advanced countries economically are about to enter into a posthistorical phase? I do not dismiss that hypothesis. It is possible to imagine a new type of society, one preoccupied with its equilibria, with its functioning, its integration, and whose investments would be absorbed by the conditions of survival or "happiness" and no longer by those of growth. Nothing permits us to say that societies will be more and more "historical," and perhaps we are indeed witnessing the end of a long period that has been dominated by accumulation, capital, the book, and what American students have called "the dictatorship of the ego." But this new naturalism, while setting itself up in opposition to the production ethic characteristic of industrial society, remains just as far as that ethic from an acceptable conception of the relations between man and nature. Previous societies have bequeathed to us the image of man dominating and "civilizing" nature. All the metasocial warrants of the social order share in this very general representation: man rules woman, the mind the body, technique habit, the intelligence the emotions, and so on. One could continue the list indefinitely. A spiritual principle is being imposed on the material world, which is the world of disorder, the immediate, the variable. Setting these images in opposition to that of a human society belonging to the natural world, subject to its equilibria and its "laws," means maintaining, indeed reinforcing, the opposition between man and nature. But in this case it is the ecological balance that is good and it is in the human that one must look for the diabolical, for the forces destructive of order. Our entry into postindustrial society, in an environment dominated by complex organizations and technology, ought not to give new life to the Promethean myth of industrial society, and less still replace it with a naturalizing of man. On the contrary, it ought to impress on us the idea that human society, whatever it may be, constructs its own environment, that any environment is technical and cultural, that man is nature, yes, but with his own special characteristics, chief among which is just this capacity to construct his relation with the environment and his social organization instead of merely receiving them. The opposition between spiritualism and naturalism must be replaced by a sociology that is concerned first and foremost with the work of human societies. We ought rather to look upon the new naturalism as the counterpart of the
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ruling class's Utopia. The latter reduces society's orientations to its functioning. The contrary Utopia counters the dominion of the ruling classes with an appeal to identity, to expression, to pleasure. The very opposition of these two representations invites one to view them as an aspect of the class conflict, of the clash between their respective Utopias in a society that devotes a larger part of its product to investment than any other society in history and which, in this sense, is the very furthest from being a consumer society. It is because the new conflicts and the new social movements corresponding to postindustrial society are still not strongly organized that the "naturalist" Utopias are so conspicuous. Was it not the same in the early ^ days of industrial society, when economic liberalism and Utopian socialism confronted one another before the organization of the labor movement, before recognition was given to the importance of the class struggle and the nature of industrial capitalism, beyond "modernization"? The great cultural upheaval that became more visible as soon as it reached the ruling classes marks the exhaustion of industrial society and its replacement not by a society of equilibrium hut by a postindustrial society in which society's capacity for action upon itself is making a new leap forward, and in" which it is learning to define TtselTas a whole!"imposed 1)7Systems and actions. Sociology must certainly criticize itself in order to move beyond the modes of analysis specific to industrial society, but the most important thing isloshout out loud and clear that the pains sociology is suffering from at the moment are not its death throes but its birth pangs. This book is intended to be a critical reflection on the practice of sociology, critical first of all in that it attempts to divert sociological work from outworn or secondary paths in order to steer it toward the essential, and secondly in that it is contesting the dominion of the socially dominant and politically hegemonic forces over sociological knowledge. But these criticisms occur within a defense of sociological knowledge, for societies with a strong^ historicity can and must know themselves and know other societies through the use of sociology. Never has historicity been more the dominant mode of the existence of societies than it is today. Never, in consequence, has a sociology of historical action, of development, of class interaction, been more necessary. E.
From Orientations to Practice
The study of historical action is not all there is to sociology. It is only the first step in the analysis, but one that governs its general direction. We must at the same time follow the movement that leads from a society's historical experjexice to its system of organization and social control, and also constantly remember the presence of historical action and its problems at the functional level of the various aspects of the social organization. Our analysis
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must therefore be governed by two principles: the differentiation of several levels of analysis within the social reality and the hierarchization cf those, levels. a.
Institutional Processes
If the study of historical action is not in itself the whole of sociology, this is in the first place because it does not examine concrete social wholes. To speak of baronial society as a social and cultural system does not dispense one from examining France or England as kingdoms and from studying the functioning of their institutions within those political units. The second state of sociological analysis, after the study of historical action, is therefore analysis of the institutional system, which may also be called the political system. The new element introduced here is the existence of an organized system of social control. The internal structure of the field of historical action is transformed at this point into a set of social mechanisms by means of which the rules of collective activity are defined. If one puts the body of values and norms that define a culture and a society at the center of one's analysis, institutions emerge as the formal expression of its norms, and sociology must ask itself questions about the spirit of laws and regulations. Inversely, one can defend a purely contractual conception of institutions, presenting them as limited and temporary contracts made between social groups each seeking to maximize its advantages at the lowest cost. In contrast to these two conceptions, the institutional system appears to me to transform historical action and the social conflicts that develop within it into a body of decisions and laws, while at the same time possessing a certain autonomy based both on the non-fit between a field of historicity and a political collectivity and also on that collectivitys internal problems of integration and adaptation. One must conceive institutions here, not as organized social life, but as the mechanisms for arriving at legitimate decisions within a political unity. This is why I overlap the terms institutional and political, thereby indicating that the specific role of the institutional system is to combine the unity of political management and the representation of divergent or conflicting social interests. The institutional or political integration of a society is always limited. First by the domination that sets advance limits on all deliberations and decisions, and second by nonnegotiable protests. The output of the political system is the separation of the legal from the illegal, and thus the maintenance of what is looked upon as order and also the repression of whatever is rejected as outside that order. b.
Social Organization
This definition of the institutional or political system leads to a third level of analysis, that of social organization or, if you prefer, of organizations. This
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deals with groups in which we find, on the one hand, the exercise of an authority that defines rules of conduct and possesses means of ensuring social integration and of sanctioning deviances and, on the other, the application of those orientations of historical action and class relations that characterize the type of society in which the organizations occur. It is essential here not to identify what is a level of analysis with a concrete reality. An industrial enterprise is certainly^ arT b^phTzatTon-, one "witKin which authority is exercised and roles and statuses, mechanisms of reward and punishment are defined. But it can possess an institutional system in which both board and unions enter into negotiation for the taking of certain decisions. And above all the enterprise is an essential element in the historical action of an industrial society; it is the locus within which the forces of production and class relations are developed. Industrial sociology has devoted the greater part of its efforts to studying the relations between these three levels of analysis. Certain demands made by workers relate to the position of individuals or groups within the organizations, while others challenge the political and institutional system of the enterprise itself, and still others are a manifestation of the conflict between classes whose existence and nature cannot be defined except at the level of the field of historicity. This example shows clearly the hierarchy of the levels of analysis, and at the same time their relative autonomy within a single concrete unit of observation. The great interest of research into organizations—whether industrial, administrative, scientific, or some other kind—derives precisely from the fact that it permits a study of the interaction between historicity* the political process, and organizational functioning, both as it concerns the social slfuaTion and the actors. The same type of analysis can be applied to even larger realities than organizations, as for instance to collectivities such as a city or a nation. This plurality of levels of analysis within a single collectivity has two consequences. The first and most obvious is that the totality of social conduct observable in the functioning of the social organization cannot be analyzed exclusively with the aid of concepts devised purely for the study of social organization. Sociological terminology uses the concept of role improperly. It must be recognized that only a limited part of social conduct involves roles. There are no set roles except insofar as the interacting actors accept the norms defining their mode of interaction. Such is the case with the technical division of labor. We talk of a team when this distribution of roles within a group is recognized, accepted, and justified by the positive value accepted as pertaining to the performance of a communal task. The images that spring to mind immediately are those of the surgical or medical team, or again that of a ship's or plane's crew. One might equally think of a school, insofar as it appears as an agency of socialization, which presupposes that the knowledge
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and attitudes transmitted in the teaching process are accepted by both teachers and pupils as something given. But these examples themselves demonstrate the limitation of this type of reasoning. The roles depend also on some method of assigning them, and on the mode in which authority is exercised. Consequently the type of participation in the decision-making system determines certain attitudes with regard to the roles that cannot themselves be defined in terms of role. The importance of informal organization, which is at the same time marginal to formal organization and against it, shows the reality of this "political" conduct, which is no longer governed by reference to common norms but is in fact an element in the challenging of those norms, by withdrawal, argument and negotiation, or revolt. Deeper still, the members of an organization may challenge its power system. Such is the nature of the class struggle: it manifests within the social organization conflict whose reason for being resides in the field of historicity, and thus at its most ''abstract" level. This leads us directly to the second observation. The social control that is exercised within an organization is not the direct expression of cultural values and social norms but the refraction of class interaction through the institutional system. Power is the crystallization, at the level of organizations, of social interactions whose reason for being resides on previous levels of analysis. It is both an instrument of integration and an instrument of constraint. In consequence, much behavior that appears dysfunctional if one places oneself at the level of the organization itself, acquires a very different meaning if it is linked to political struggles or to changes in a society's historicity and class relations. A strike, or more generally a movement of opposition or protests, disorganizes a collectivity, has an adverse effect on its "normal" working, but can be an important element of historical action or within the political system. Nothing could demonstrate more clearly the autonomy of the levels of analysis than these disparities between the meaning that the same behavior can have at each level. These disparities cannot be overcome by any vague appeal to a general rationality or to a fundamental line of social development. c.
Hierarchization and Autonomy of the Levels of Analysis
Thus the study of social organization always has two aspects. On the one hand it bears on systems of means, on techniques. It examines the interdependence of those means and the mechanisms that regulate equilibria and changes in the working of those systems.
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Consequently it recognizes the existence of social conduct linked to the place the actor occupies within a differentiated and hierarchized organization. Concepts such as anomie, differential receptivity to socialization, relative deprivation, role conflict, latent function, to mention only a few of the most often employed, all belong to this type of analysis and represent the positive aspect of functionalism. On the other hand it must consider the rules of organization and the mechanisms governing its functioning as the expression of political relations inscribed within a social domination. This complementarity of the two viewpoints is already apparent at the level of the political institutions. The latter are at the same time an instrument for the reinforcement of a social domination—which masks the private character of its interests behind the generality and objectivity of laws and constitu lions—and the locus of negotiations and the management of change. They often possess sufficient autonomy for the political forces not to be purely and simply a translation of social interests and for the political system to institutionalize change. This autonomy can become pathological if the political system is no longer interpreting the great social debates and conflicts; it can on the other hand vanish, if the gap between ruling class and political system is replaced by their fusion into the omnipotence of an absolutist state. France is a curious example of a national society that has experienced, and still experiences, a perpetual see-sawing between these two extreme situations, so that its political institutions ha\e the simultaneous appearance of an absurd and irrelevant game, not only to Ihe revolutionary movements but also to those in power, and of being reduced to the apparatus of a state that is reinforcing and hardening the action of a ruling class either too weak or too entangled in a defense of the past to act for itself. At the social organization level this duality is much more marked, since it is that between power and techniques, but it can also happen that it leads either to a dissociation or to a fusion. There is dissociation when bureaucratization appears, which is to say when the internal functioning of an organization is no longeroriented by adaptation to the environment or by the problems and conflicts of historicity. Fusion occurs, on the other hand, when the techniques are merely the mask of ideology and power. This is more likely to happen in organizations responsible for cultural reproduction, and particularly within the educational system. Both institutions and organizations are thus dependent on the field of historicity, which penetrates in this way right down into the social organization. But again, at both the organizational and the institutional level, actions occur intended to isolate these levels from the dominion of historicity, to achieve either a pure adaptation of a political society to its changing
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environment, or a pure reproduction of the social organization. The functioning of any level of the social reality outside the field of historicity is always subjecTto a tension between the intervention of historicity and. in opposition to it, of social reproduction. d.
Conflictive Creation
The sociology of functions and the sociology of controls are thus warring partners. They both share an emphasis on social integration, one being positivist and accepting the discourse of society about itself, the other being critical and seeing the unity of society not in consensus but in domination. The first ought to be contested the more vigorously, since it ignores the problems of historicity and those of the political system, reducing (hem to the existence of a supposedly coherent and accepted code of conduct. But the second is in danger of leading to an excessively schematic and thus, in its turn, ideological analysis by neglecting the autonomy of techniques ancf, above all, by failing to recognize that these techniques are the projection of historicity itself, of the production of society by knowledge and the cultural model, onto the level of organizations. Society is not closed, is not completely integrated either by values or by power. At the level of organizations themselves, the dialectic of historicity and class conflicts is being pursued in the very praxis of social movements. What determines a concrete society is its field of historicity. Social relations cannot be understood other than within an experience, which is not a point or a segment on a line of development but a whole, qualitatively different from others, just as particular models of knowledge, types of accumulation, and cultural models are different from others. But this whole cannot be identified with a social order except, first, insofar as the ruling class identifies itself entirely with its historicity, in other words is not being opposed by the social movement of a popular class; second, insofar as the political system is reduced to the management of the state apparatus by that ruling class; and last, insofar as the society's instrumentality is entirely reduced to the exercise of power. Totalitarian societies are those that come closest to this image, which has been depicted in tragic terms in works of sociological fiction such as those of Orwell. But it would be just as false to envisage society as an entirely open set of class conflicts, political arguments, and demands, in which social movements representing opposing classes are in constant confrontation or almost equal terms like a power and a counter-power. Social relations are limited, on the one hand, by political calculations and the internal coherence of the technical systems and. on the other, by the logic of a mode of domination that is operating simultaneously on the economic, the political and legal, and the cultural level. This social domination can never be wholly integrating, however. For at
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the same time as it is constructing a social order and trying to insert all the actors into it in a way that will conform to its private interest, it is also excluding, repressing, and, moreover, parleying with rejection or revolt. Society cannot appear open unless, beyond its principles, its rules, and its functions, the sociologist can discover the conduct expressing opposition, defense, and protest that more often manifests itself in an unconscious and nonorganized way than in the form of clearly constituted social movements. The wage earner does not behave solely in accordance with the logic imposed on him by capitalist or technocratic power. He goes slow, he plays truant, he creates an informal organization, he daydreams, he rebels, he forms unions. The organization of labor in its concrete reality is ultimately no more than the direct and "rationalized" expression of employer power. Even the educational system, which is even more directly linked to the dominant ideology, is never reduced to that ideology completely, because it is the vehicle for knowledge, not just values, because it is dependent on a state in which nondoniinant categories exert an influence, because its professional rhetoric remains distinct from the ideology of the ruling class, because the age groups within it put up a resistance to authority and its norms. Order never reigns without limits. Society is always shot through with refusals, revolts, conflicts; it is constantly being challenged and contestation is constantly being repressed, which is sufficient to indicate the inadequacy of all conceptions of society either as a machine made up of interdependent parts or as an ideological construction. Every society is dominated by an order that is that of the ruling class, but the dominion of that order is limited by historicity itself, by political institutions, and by technical necessities. And the dominated class always makes use of these three checks on power to maintain its resistance and organize its opposition. Actionalist sociology would be dooming itself to destruction if it ceased to recognize the existence both of domination and of its limits and the forms of opposition that those limits make possible. It does not believe that a system of domination cannot be transformed or destroyed except from the outside or by the play of its natural contradictions; nor does it believe that a society's orientations are solely the result of influence, of negotiations, and of a pragmatic adaptation to the changing demands of an environment. It envisages society as a field of conflictive creation. «-—By now it may perhaps be possible to perceive the way in which a sociologyof historicity makes theanalysis of change difficult buf at the same time~ provides the means of linking the study of change with that of social A structure. It makes the analysis of change difficult because it situates'itself synchronistically and refuses to start off from a conception of social evolution. But the sociologist would only imprison himself in the whole he is
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constructing if he defined it by its functioning. He would then have no other recourse but to explain change by external causes, which comes down either to not giving any explanation at all—since one cannot establish any relation between a modification of the environment and an internal change—or else to adopting a linear vision of evolution in flat contradiction of the viewpoint adopted at the outset. Whereas, on the other hand, the distanc_e_andjion-fit that separate a field of historicity from a social organization and, even more, from the life of a concrete and therefore heterogeneous collectivity, make it possible to introduce an analysis of change that remains dependent on the general conception of social structure it employs. But this theme can only be dealt with after an analysis of the various levels of social reality and also of the forms of social action most directly linked with historicity: class relations and social movements. F.
Actors and Systems
a.
From Actor to Social Interaction
Actionalist sociology asserts that social conduct must be comprehended in its orientations. It rejects all opposition between the^^ fundamental reality of economic relations and representations derived from those relations artificially appearing to govern them. But equally sharply it refuses to accept the setting of social relations as a whole within a framework of systematized values and norms. Historicity is an action of society on itself, but society is not an actor; it has neither values nor power. Values and norms belong to the actors acting within the field of historicity, to the social classes. The underlying movement of these analyses must now be more apparent. From historical action to organization, via the political system, our analysis moves from a society's experience to its internal management, from its practice to its consciousness, from social relations to power, from a society's problems to the solutions it organizes. The analysis does not in any way set out from an absolute principle, from an appeal to liberty and to a subject seeking to transcend its alienations in order to rediscover its unity or to affirm its inexhaustible power of transcendence and negativity. On the contrary, it sets out from work, from the creative activity by means of which a society defines its field by transforming its environment, by constituting a state of nature and a set of cultural and social orientations, in order to arrive eventually at mechanisms of regulation and integration. This sociological analysis is always threatened by doctrinaire reductions. These confuse society with one of its levels or one of its analytic elements. For some, society is reduced to its operational system, and the dynamism of
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historical action is replaced by the supposed existence of a body of values and norms unifying and controlling the whole of social life; constitutes an ideology of the established order. For others, society is nothing more than a political system, a decision-making mechanism, which simultaneously excludes the internal problems of organizations, linked to the interdependence of their elements, as well as the problems of historical action, of its orientations, and of the class relations that express it. Last, there are those for whom society is entirely dynamic. Everything is forces of production, social relations and cultural models, as if the political system and the functioning of the organizations had no coherence of their own, as if all social behavior contributed directly to modifying the historical field, as if society had no inertia. - \ But it would be a poor way of opposing such ideological simplifications merely to content oneself with a pluralism of methods and levels of analysis. The essential J_ask ot sociology is to follow the transition from creation to organization and also to seek out, in various forms of resistance to the constraints and limitations of order, the factors of change and innovation. There exists a hierarchy among the levels of analysis that 1 have distinguished. This does not mean that one is more important than the others or that it isolates determining 4 factors." It is impermissible to say that such and such a category oj socialfacts—the form of production or the "system of ideas"—determines such and such another caiegory of facts, whether it be religious beliefs or economic activity. It must already be clear that one cannot identify a level of analysis and a category of social facts corresponding to a practically defined area of social life. The hierarchy of levels indicates on the contrary that forms of social organization can only be understood by reference to the political decisions of a society, which are limited and oriented by a system of historical action and by a class interaction. — -I The sociology of historicity, because it is a sociology of action, encounters the difficulty specific to all approaches that analyze the meaning of conduct. Is the meaning for the observer not a prisoner of the actors' consciousness? Is the position of the observer not for this very reason dependent upon the position of the actors themselves? This difficulty becomes increasingly obvious as one focuses on the more intentional kinds of social conduct and, above all, on social movements. The labor movement or movements of national independence aim at the attainment of specific objectives, define their own situation, their own nature and that of their opponents. Is not the sociologist reduced to being nothing more than their memorialist or their mouthpiece? Sociology has generally replied to this objection byjayinjj thatjts object is not the acTof buT7K~5ocia7 interaction. The meaning it is analyzing cannot
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be confused with the consciousness of the actor for the simple reason that it must give an account of the conduct of two or more actors involved i n a social interaction. This reply is the only possible one. And, what is more, it needs to be narrowed down even further, since in this general form it does not definitively dispose of the objection. In practice, the relation between the actors can be conceived of as a reciprocity of consciousnesses. The actors communicate only because they are situated within a set of values and norms that define their respective roles, which is to say the legitimate expectation by each of certain behavior on the part of the other. Interaction presupposes the existence of a higher consciousness, which is no longer that of the particular actors but that of society, a collective consciousness. The sociologist is in that case definitively condemned to be the prisoner of that consciousness. If we add that this collective consciousness can only be the dominant ideology, which is to say that of the dominant class, then the sociologist would be simply expounding and upholding that ideology. He would be no more himself than the ideologist is. And the more he tried to keep aloof from specific interests, the more "objective" he tried to be, the more tied he would be to a defense of established order. Whether one appeals to a collective consciousness or to a dominant ideology, social relations, far from being an analytical tool, no longer appear as anything but the manifestation of an order that is also a supreme actor. The concept of historicity, on the other hand, refuses to define the actors by their interaction and their participation in shared values. It conceives of society as a set of cultural tensions and social conflicts. When one identifies the actor with a role, one is endowing him with a social ego and therefore with rights and duties, with character traits and norms: a good or a bad husband, citizen, or worker. Functionalist sociology, even when it seems at its most abstract, is bourgeois fiction. We must rid ourselves of this conception, one that literature and painting have long since discarded. Analysis cannot depict the actor. It can only take him apart, tear him into pieces, so as to make us perceive social interactions first of all. but also, and more profoundly, the permanent confrontation of desire and language, of historicity and natural laws that structure resources, human and nonhuman, that control and make use of the orientations of historical action. An actor never corresponds directly and entirely to a component of historicity or to any one of the social or cultural orientations that leave their mark upon historicity's dominion over social practice. Even a ruling class is not identifiable with a cultural model or a type of accumulation. The relations between the actors are relations neither of participation in common values nor of pure contradiction of interests; every
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social relation brings together actors who share the same sociocultural experience, who participate in the same historicity, and who are vying for control of it. The actors are constantly see-sawing between that community and that conflict, as they are also between society's functioning and its historicity. The actor is always ambiguous in his relation to the orientation of historical action, and consequently in his conduct at all levels of social reality. The sociologist's analysis is not possible except insofar as the actors interacting with one another are kept apart by misunderstanding, alienation, and conflict, and also insofar as they are unable to make conscious contact, insofar as empathy does not exist. The meaning of a situtation cannot be understood except through the relation of actors in opposition. It is because society does not coincide with its functioning, because it is in tension wftli itself and in disequilibrium, that sociology must always be critical, for the actor is defined by it solely as mediator between opposing orientations, so that one must stand outside that actor, place oneself directly at the level of the networks of social relations in order to understand the social mechanisms involved, the observed forms of society's intervention in itself. -¥• Because it always explains social conduct by social relations, sociology cannot make any use of the traditional opposition between subjective and objective. The_actor_is_jiot explained by the situation, for the situation is itself social relations and action of society on itself. Historicity is neither a state of the forces of production nor a society's project or system of values. It is society's work on itself, and therefore its "technical" aspect—model of knowledge—is not separable from an economic relation—accumulation—or from a cultural model that some would be tempted to classify under ideology. Can one speak of action while separating situation from the meaning of conduct? b.
The Actor Protests.
To gain acceptance for these general principles is difficult only because they grate on the social actors themselves, centered as they are on their intentions, their objectives, and their ideologies, and therefore bound, to the degree in which they exercise authority, or influence, or power, to oppose an analysis that questions the image they create of themselves. This is why sociqlogyjs inevitably against power, for the simple reason that power is inevitably against it. On the other hand, sociology benefits from struggles for power; it thrives oest away from very strongly organized social actors; it is associated with freedom, perhaps more than any other domain of knowledge in our day, as is dramatically shown by the persecutions it has undergone and is still undergoing under the totalitarian regimes. The resistance the sociologist encounters is increased by the fact that he is, more often than not, studying his own society: the validation of his analysis
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can never be provided by the agreement of the interested actors. The_ meaning he establishes _can_never satisfy the minds of his actors. He would like those actors to say to him: you have understood us. But if he is given this answer, then it is very much to be feared that the sociologist is in error, that he has stepped out of his true role in order to assume that of mediator, or that of ideologist. The sociologist's only justification is that he should arrive at an understandfng of social relations that cannot be grasped by the actors themselves but that make it possible to explain and predict their conduct in defined conditions.
TE SYSTEM OF HSTOROL / O O N
A. The Dominion of Historicity Historicity is first of all the creation of a model of knowledge and therefore a distancing in relation to the circuit of social exchanges, either between members of the collectivity or between collectivity and environment. But it is not representation solely. Formed on the basis of a state of activity, it intervenes in that activity; it transforms it into a social system in which conduct is governed by a set of orientations, themselves determined by the societyVTnode of action upon itself. Accumulation provides historicity with means of action, but it is on the basis of the cultural model that social practice's field of orientation is constituted/Society is not reducible to the laws that govern its functioning; nor is it governed by ideas, which is to say by any meaning given as external to social practice, whether it be some divine law or historical determinism. It is constituted by itself—the social is explicable solely by the social—which is to say by its own means and its consciousness of acting on itself. Is this not handing back a central role to the Idea? Is this cultural model not perhaps an image of the ideal society, against which social conduct is to be measured? Nothing could be further removed from the concept of the cultural model. Ijjsjn no wayseparable from the work that society performs on itself: it is situated by a type of work and accumulation; it manifests the material state of society's apprehension of itself. The system of historical action, the SHA. is the system of historicity's dominion over social practice. It is not a more or less coherent set of values or principles but the linking together of elements in tension with one another, since through thern society is straddled by its double, as in African religions the believer is straddled by spirits. 65
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This leads to encounters with three successive orders of problems. First, how is this system based on tensions constructed? Second, how is it to be recognized, for it must be observable and thus possess a concrete autonomy beyond the oppositions that form its nature? Last, what is the relation of this set of orientations, which defines the sociocultural field, with the other face of historicity, that of accumulation, of society's tearing apart of itself, and thus with class relations? Since the system of historical action defines a field, it delimits types of societies and thus a first level of analysis of historical realities. How are we to construct those types without slipping back into an evolutionist philosophy of history? That will be the theme of the last section of this chapter. a.
Dimensions
Having defined historicity as orientation of social practice and thus as a distancing of society in relation to its own functioning, let us now undertake the reverse operation and define historicity's mode of dominion over social practice. Unless we do this we are running a serious danger of reducing historicity to a reflection of society on itself, to an ideology of social change, two interpretations that have been clearly rejected in previous pages. Within historicity, its three components do not play the same role in this dominion over social practice, in this constitution of a field of social and cultural orientations. The model of knowledge is at the same time the most direct and the least socially organized expression of historicity. It governs the forces of production at the same time as it is forming itself on them as a basis, but without intervening in the social systems that interpose themselves between it and historicity. Accumulation, on the other hand, is a linking process between economic activity and historicity. It explains the practical division of society from itself; but it does not explain the orientation of social conduct by historicity. This latter role is that of the cultural model. An image of creativity and thus of historical action, in the last analysis it governs the categories of social and cultural practice. It is this set of orientations, this system of historicity's dominion over practice, that I term system of historical action. Through it, social practice is determined not by its internal laws or the exigencies of social life but by the resources mobilized in the service of a cultural model. The system links historicity and functioning. It cannot be the formal expression of the cultural model, as though the "idea" of a society were specifying itself in different institutional domains—economic, political, religious, and so on. It associates contraries and thus defines itself by tensions. It is simultaneously an apparatus for transcending social functioning and the determination of that functioning.
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To construct the system of historical action is thus to define the oppositional pairs that specify the tension between historicity and functioning. Instead of enumerating the elements which, taken together, would constitute that system, we must start from the system's general nature, which is that of bond and at the same time tension between historicity and the elements of social activity. The elements of the system cannot be defined other than by combining these axes of complementarity and opposition. We can define a certain number of oppositional pairs that can be seen as dimensions of the system of historical action. I shall indicate only what seem to me the three most essential of these. Certain aspects of the analyses that follow would be made much more complicated if we increased this number, but the nature of the reasoning employed would not be modified. /. Movement—order. A society's movement is inseparable from its order. Historicity cannot manifest itself except by being transcribed into social relations. This principle of movement must also be a principle of order, failing which it would be no more than an abstract idea, and the sociological domain as a whole could be analyzed with the help of concepts relating to the functioning of the social system. That is the first dimension of the system of historical action. It is the process by means of which a movement is transformed into order. This order is inseparable from the movement, but it is also opposed to it, just as distribution or consumption are opposed to production at the same time as being linked to it. Historical action is in noway a pure movement of continual transcendence of the social order. It constitutes a social order and, therefore, types of society. The tension between movement and order is thus that of the two faces of historicity—the transcendence of social functioning and the foundation of the categories of social practice. The present analysis locates itself solely within the field of historicity. It does not present the relalibhs of historicity with institutions or with social organization. However, the slope of the system of historical action termed "order" already leads down toward social organization. This is why 1 employ the more general term: the categories of social practice. 2. Orientations—resources. This opposition is implied in the very concept of historicity. Human action is always divided between orientations and resources. The latter can be termed "natural" in the sense that they are the object of study of the natural sciences. The means brought into action by a cultural model constitute sets of variables, systems. The natural sciences make it possible to know the rules in accordance with which those systems function, whereas they do not explain the nature of the orientations that
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make use of them. In parallel to this, man intervenes as a being with needs, which is to say with his biological existence, his personality problems, and also with the roles he plays in the reproduction of society. A religious typejrf cultural model, orienting society toward an extremely abstract image of creativity, is associated with a very strong structuration of the community and the systems of exchange that ensure its continuity and survival: the principle of universal order is above social action but takes responsibility for the social organization of collectivities profoundly entrenched in their reproduction, as indicated by the very fact that the cultural model indicates a low capacity on the part of society to act upon itself. Inversely, in industrialized societies it may seem that society's capacity for action on itself no longer has any limits, that its Promethean ambition makes it into its own creator. This is by no means the case. As the elementary structures of social organization break up, so historicity encounters resistance from other resources: first from technology itself, but also from those of man's biological conditions of existence, as well as those of other parts of nature, and last those of personality. We must therefore be wary of two opposing errors. Man is not a demiurge; the more powerful his action, the more, on the other hand, he ceases to recognize himself as spirit and replaces himself in the finite world of which he forms a part. Inversely, man does not simply occupy a niche within an ecosystem. Society is neither a closed system nor even a system defined by its exchanges with the environment. It possesses the capacity to intervene in itself, in its internal organization, in the same way as in its relations with the external world. Society is part of an ecosystem, but it also constitutes its own environment on the basis of an action that is not reproductive but inventive. It is nature, but it is also a creator of nature. At a time when society's capacity for action on itself is increasing rapidly and threatening the ecosystem of which man is a part, it is normal that criticism of the ancient separation between nature and culture, of the opposition between body and mind that triumphed with idealism, should lead to a new naturalism derived not from mechanics, as in the seventeenth century, but from biology. But. just as social thought, after the naturalism of the Enlightenment and under pressure of historical events, rediscovered through the industrial revolution, the French Revolution, and the beginnings of the labor movement, the problems of historical action, so the development of a new model of knowledge based on information, communications, and systems analysis must be followed by new thinking on historical action and its present forms. 3. Culture—society. The juxtaposition of these two terms does not immediately conjure up an oppositional couple in the same way as order and
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movement or orientations and resources. And yet the system of historical action cannot be defined without this opposition. For the system is the dominion of historicity oyer society's functioning: it is therefore work and the creation of a relation with the environment on the one hand, and collectivity on the other. A system of historical action is not a political, territorial, and organizational unit, but nor is it an intention on the part of society. It is a model of a society, and thus both a culture and social forms. The linking of culture and society, of the relation to environment and the relations of the actors among themselves, is nevertheless subordinate to the two others. It cannot be defined except within the intersection of the two previous oppositional pairs. The system of historical action is a set of social forms making it possible to pass from a cultural model, a model of creativity, to a model of consumption situated on the side of order and resources. The social elements are interposed between the cultural elements. A cultural model calls for the employment of social resources and the creation of a principle of order. It is within these social forms that a model of consumption is formed, and it is by means of the model that cultural conduct is subjected to the dominion of the cultural model. The system of historical action is thus defined by the intersection of oppositional pairs. This sets it in sharp contrast to a social organization defined by norms and by the vertical and horizontal differentiation of statuses and roles. It is not a society's book of rules but the scenario of its drama, the mobilization of its action upon itself on the basis of its work. The dialectic of historical action is made up of oppositions and complementarities between a society's will to be and its being, between its self-production and its practice. Social action is not defined solely by exchanges within a totality or by responses to stimuli; between the material conditions of existence and the forms of social and cultural organization^ it interposes a system of prientations, the system of historical action—thejembodiment, oflhistoricity^ b.
Elements
It is now possible to sum up our previous analysis by combining the three dimensions just dealt with and using them to construct the system of historical action. Combining the three dimensions we have established enables us to situate the elements of the system of historical action but not to define their nature and their relations. We must therefore add that the system of historical action as a whole is the mode of historicity's dominion over social practices and, more precisely, a set j)f sociocultural orientations governing the torms of labor, that is, economjc activity^ The elements are not consiHtlierits~oT ecbfiibmic activity, but their totality must constitute a field of socioeconomic organization. They may be presented by means of a diagram (fig. 2).
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The first element in the system we already know. It is the cultural model. If accumulation introduces class relations directly, the cultural model indicates recognition of a form of creativity that is the driving force of society and utilizes the accumulated resources. order
movement T
cultural model
hierarchization
mobilization
needs
orientations
Figure 2
The cultural model is movement not order, orientation not resource, culture not society. Before we name the other elements, it remains for us to define their relations to one another, since we know the dimensions along which they occur and their general nature. It is the attribute of the SHA to link historicity and the functioning of society and thus to associate elements that are as opposed to one another as possible in order to combine the three oppositional pairs selected. It is easy to see that the simplest image of the SHA is that which combines the three oppositional pairs to produce four elements of which each has the same position as each of the three others on one of the dimensions and is opposed to them on the two other dimensions. But the composition of the SHA can be more clearly and directly grasped when it is borne in mind that its elements must form a whole that takes in all the tensions defined by the combination of the three oppositional pairs. The cultural model must be completed by an element that puts social resources at the service of the cultural model; otherwise that model would be no more than an ideology or a dream. 1 term this element mobilization since it involves giving a content to society's movement, to the transcendence of its functioning. We must now move over to the side of order, to the transformation of the sub-unit formed by the cultural model and the mobilization of socioeconomic activity into organization. The cultural model must be linked to a corresponding mode of hierarchization. If it weren't, then society would be cut in two, a crisis situation worthy of examination but one that only appears as a crisis in relation to the expected correspondence between the cultural model
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and a scale of social levels. I am not talking here about social classes, for all that is involved here is a scale, whereas the classes are defined solely by class relations, based in their turn on accumulation. Nor am 1 talking about stratification, even though this second notion is closer to that of hierarchization, simply because the system of historical action is no more than an analytical tool, whereas one cannot talk of stratification except with reference to a more concretely and territorially defined organization. Last, historicity governs not only this principle of distribution but also, and simultaneously, a mode of consumption, a definition of needs, an element at once cultural and not social, deriving from resources and not orientations and thus complementary to hierarchization within the domain of order. This construction can be presented most concisely in a diagram (see fig. 2). The diagram presented in figure 2 does not show a division of the economic organization into four specific domains. It does not describe the functioning of a society but the social and cultural orientations by means of which a state of historicity controls and directs soaaT practice. What is also involved here is a system: the nature of each of the elements is defined by the position it occupies within the whole. Each is linked to the three others by relations of proximity and opposition in the pairs that form the system's basic construction unit. The transition from one element to the other is not a transition from one particular aspect of a general principle to another particular aspect of it. On the contrary, the nature of the SHA forces us to dismiss such a formulation and its attendant lemptations. Is there not a tendency to say that the forms of mobilization or hierarchization must be in harmony with the cultural model? A dangerous phrase if we do not make it clear that this "harmony" is achieved by combining oppositions rather than resemblances, since any two elements are always linked by two relations of opposition and only one of similitude, It is therefore impossible to reduce the system of historical action to a "general idea" of society; the tensions that set its individual elements in opposition are merely the small change of the general tension that simultaneously unites and separates a society's junction big and its historicity. Those who think in terms of values and norms can show how particular norms, adapted to such and such a specific ^institutional" domain, are no more than specific forms of more general values. Here, on the contrary, what is being shown in action and specified is the action of society on itself, its distancing with relation to its own functioning. If the elements are in harmony writh each other that is because they are also in opposition to one another, so that the SHA is wholly animated by the tensions inherent in the movement by means of which society constitutes the field of its social and cultural orientations on the basis of its activity, therebygiving that activity meaning. The SHA is not an organ of social and cultural integration that will
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impose, above and beyondjany differences between its elements, the unity of a body of values. It does not exist outside its internal oppositions; it is the system of those oppositions. This clearly indicates the complete difference that exists between the SHA and a system of social control or a political system. We are used to speaking about societies, that is, about concrete political units possessing laws and a government, mechanisms of exchange, production, education, repression, and soon. The SHA is not a society, even less what is referred to by the rather vague term ''social system," but solely a level within an analysis of society. The system of historical action is not an actor exercising power or authority; there is no system of social control ensuring its maintenance. It is an abstract system, as against an organization, which is a concrete system in the sense that it is defined by frontiers and by the authority exercised within them. It is essential to recognize this difference of definition between the units encountered by the various levels of sociological analysis. "Capitalist society" is a type of unit that does not coincide with political collectivities, and even less with concrete historical units. All we are establishing for the moment is the thematics of a general type of society, before going on to see the actors act and mechanisms of decision, organization, or control form within it. The SHA is a system of oppositions because it is the form taken by historicity, by society's transcendence of itself by itself. The SHA must therefore be conceived of as a totality and not as the result of adding together a certain number of elements, each essential to its functioning. B.
Locating the System of Historical Action
How does the sociologist apprehend the system of action? Is it a construction of the mind, not susceptible of any apprehension by experience and without usefulness other than as a necessary element in an analysis? A necessary hypothesis to explain certain kinds of behavior? Such a mode of approach cannot be sufficient. The system of historical action must be capable of a direct approach since it possesses a certain autonomy of operation. Then what is the object of a sociology of this system of action? What facts does it take into consideration? a.
A Society's Debates
The analyses just presented enable us to avoid a trap. The elements of the system of action are not experienced as values. They are not affirmed by members of a society as imperatives, like the good, the desirable, or the just.
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They do not appear as objectives except tor particular social actors, thereby contributing to the formation of their ideology. But this presupposes that we have already brought these actors and their conflicts into play, which is not in fact the case. The elements of the system of action are thus neither recognized as values, nor defended or championed. This does not make them any the less present to the collective consciousness, but they are taken as facts, not as values. In programmed societies—which we shall continue to use as an example for reasons of convenience—although growth has been defined as the cultural model it is in no way asserted as a value. At the very most it js frequently justified by what appears to be its direct consequence: the raising of the standard of living. But that itself is a specific ideology, one to which another can be easily opposed. Growth is equally experienced as constraint, as the pressure of artificially created needs, as an exhausting rat race that makes life hard and robs it of all meaning, or as the destruction of "natural resources." Let an argument begin between these two ideologies, and it becomes very swiftly apparent that growth is in itself a neutral fact that can be judged favorably or unfavorably according to the point of view adopted. Scientific progress means a car and a television for everyone, something that many find desirable. But it also means the threat of thermonuclear annihilation, something that fills almost everyone with horror. The same observation can easily be applied to all the other elements. Judgment with regard to them is always ambivalent and provides food for literally endless argument. A banal but enlightening conclusion. For this ambivalence is nothing other than the apprehension of the relations of complementarity and opposition that link the elements together. Growth is a good thing because it brings with it more "modern" forms of organization and hierarchization or types of needs, which liberate us from the constraints of a previous system; it is a bad thing in that it is opposed to the requirements inherent in the other elements, it is continuous movement, not enjoyment, etc. What reveals the system of action is the totality of the debates that animate a society, the totality formed by the problems with which the collectivity is faced. This totality is not immediately apprehensible. It must be isolated from two different orders of problem: on the one hand, the social conflicts that set one category of actors in opposition to another, and which cannot be involved here; on the other hand, the problems that arise from the heterogeneity of a concrete society. French society, for example, can be viewed partly as a programmed society, but it also includes vast areas of the older capitalism and even some preindustrial economic, social, and cultural aspects. Every society in the process of change experiences tensions and hiatuses between
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various generations of problems and actors. Social conflicts and tensions linked with change must be kept separate from what I am here terming a society's debates. The system of action is revealed not by a body of values but by a systemi of^ debates. Each of its elements is apprehended in its opposition to each of the others, and the unity of the system cannot be perceived other than as the field of those debates within which choices are imposed that are insoluble and constitute a society's permanent problems. Each of the oppositions perceived is viewed as normal and intolerable. It links two terms of which either can be accepted or rejected, while it is never possible to terminate the debate with a compromise. It is therefore possible to draw up a map of the problems a society puts to itself, to the degree in which that society corresponds to a system of action. These problems never receive a solution', the historian merely observes that at some given moment they cease to be posed or they become blurred and fade. Actionalist sociology begins by defining the nature of these debates, which are endless but nevertheless form a limited whole. Schematically we could say that a system of action is experienced as a network of problems at once general and insoluble corresponding to the relations of one of the four elements with each of the three others. But there naturally exist more complex problems that involve more than two elements Above all the expression of these problems is not constant. There exists within any given society, and insofar as it corresponds to a system of action, a realm of discourse that must be reconstituted on the basis of the common consciousness, of good sense. The cerebration of its intellectuals can provide a guide in one's search for the boundaries and themes of this discourse, but nothing can replace a direct study of public opinion. Public opinion is almost always studied in isolation, referred to the facts, to the situation, to which it is a reaction. Opinions of various actors are compared; attempts are made to grasp the differences between what is being thought by the young and the old, by the workers and the leaders of industry, by men and women. This kind of analysis is interesting, albeit limited; it enlarges the Field of historiography; but it has no relation to the analysis we are referring to here. Instead of differentiating between the actors we are looking for the unity of a discourse, not in order to find in it the unity of a system of beliefs and values that doesn't exist but, quite the opposite, in order to define a network of oppositions, of questionings. Debates in our sense do not bear upon the positive or negative value of a cultural or social feature, but upon the relations between such features. This corresponds to the nature of the system of action, which is not an aggregate of elements but a system of relations by means of which those elements are
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defined. Each of the elements is only defined within the system by its opposition along certain axes with each of the others. The debate must be distinguished from djscussion and from deliberation. I speak of discussion when the field of the exchange is defined by a decision to be taken that will affect the relative position of the actors. A discussion can always be termed political in the sense that it presupposes an institutional order and, therefore, limits, the most obvious of which is the acceptance of the existence of the actors taking part in the discussion. There is no discussion between a union and a board of directors except insofar as the board recognizes the existence of the union. Not infrequently such recognition is accompanied by mental reservations. The board may think that everything would be so much easier and more pleasant if there were no unions, and the union on its side may be thinking that the ultimate aim of its action is the suppression of employers and their replacement by a workers' cooperative or some other decision-making system. But, if one of the partners estimates at any given moment that it has become possible to change the name of the political game, there the discussion ceases. A deliberation is even further removed from debate than discussion is. It presupposes the recognition of norms, collective aims, and roles. If a group meets to examine its activities or the relations between its members, then it is probable that what is involved, at least to begin with, is a deliberation rather than a debate or a discussion, in the sense I am using the terms here. What is presupposed is a community, not just a field of decision. What are we going to do to further the aims of the community? How can we resolve this conflict that has appeared within it? Is authority being properly exercised? Ought we to change the community's functions or recruitment to it? These examples show immediately that problems subjected to deliberation are defined as functions of the social system. When we move on from deliberation to debate, the relations between the actors fade away. Whereas a deliberation highlights roles and, consequently, social relations, while a discussion strives to modify those relations, or the lines of communication, or the forms of authority, in the debate there is no other character than the situation itself, which is no longer a framework but the very stake of the debate. Adebatejs a drama; the characters involved are not the true actors. A pure debate, one not associated with set elements of discussion, may well be intolerable for actors brought face to face. We should therefore not limit our investigation_Jo_rc debates. A society's debates may be reconstituted from limited exchanges usually over some distance, employing speech or writing. The actors answer one another without communicating.
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The Agencies of Historicity
If we reduce historicity to the stake involved in social conflicts, we are in danger of viewing it as an ideological expression of the dominant class; but if we recognize it as possessing an autonomous social expression, are we not in danger of restoring to the center of our analysis a body of values, of norms, and thus of institutions, in the usual sense of that word? Historicity is not an ideological construction. It is a set of cultural and social orientations presenting themselves tojhe actorjs societal data and not as paHicularlzed beliefs. In postindustrial society, scientific and technological investment, the cybernetic model of organization, hierarchization by education, consumer orientation are not opinions. Nor are they values that can be directly translated into forms of social organization, since it is not possible to understand social organization by abstracting conflictive class relations and the political mechanisms for formulating the rules that govern that organization. This objection stated, let us recognize that each element.in.the. system of historical action has a concrete social underpinning that I shall term^an agency of historicity, which is not a historical actor in the way the social classes are. An example will make clear what I mean. No science can exist without laboratories and research centers, just as there can exist no religion without a church, which is to say without a specialized religious function." It is absurd to claim that science is no more than a stake in a class conflict and that there is a proletarian science as opposed to a bourgeois science or an Aryan science as opposed to a Jewish science. But it is equally false to think that the organization of science is just the direct transcription of a specific social function. One has only to look at the politics of research, at the organization of research centers and, even more so. of the universities, and it immediately becomes impossible to abstract science from class interests and orientations. The social organization of research cannot evade the effects of political and social conflicts, as the confrontations we have seen over research investment make clear. Growing awareness of the political and military effects of many scientific discoveries, and, more particularly, of the social and political determinants behind the choice of research undertaken, makes it no longer possible to look upon laboratories as ivory towers. Scientists do not exist above and apart from the social and political fray; at the same time their science is not reducible to the ideology of the actors in confrontation. Scientists always find themselves in a false position: they are defending the autonomy of scientific knowledge against ideological pressures and, especially, against established power. But the confrontation between opposing classes or social forces only has to grow fiercer for them to find themselves torn apart. They must defend their independence against power and therefore feel themselves closer to the forces of opposition and protest.
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But these latter are also seeking, through their struggles, to impose their own ideology- in the scientific domain. So the scientists fear that political confrontation will destroy science's independence, either because it will be forced to conform to an orthodoxy or because a transaction will take place between the adversaries to the detriment of scientific research's "purity." Scientists, and indeed all the categories of the "priestly" intelligentsia, are neither pure intelligences floating above the melee nor ideologists. They are linked to the ruling class to the degree in which that class dominates the system of historical action and the political system, and thus favor certain areas of research. They are aTso TmkeOo the ruling class to the degree in which they belong to apparatuses that form ajpart^t^^e ruling_class. Inversely, they are constantly setting up their competence in opposition to the political and administrative power of decision and fighting the limits set to the movement of ideas and persons. Professionalism is often a way of transcending these contradictory tendencies and defining professional organizations and groups outside their links with the holders of power in society. Thus the intelligentsia occupy three positions simultaneously: neutrality and involvement with one social camp or the other. What defines the members of an agency is not their detachment from the social interests in conflict but the mixture within the group, and more often than not within the individuals themselves, of these three positions. The same observations apply to the other elements of the system of historical action. The organizers, those who analyze the management of systems, are also experts caught between defense of their rationality and their ambiguous position in class and political relations. Hence the constant mixture of reserve or mistrust they display with regard to the ruling class, as well as to popular movements, and their tendency to develop ideological defenses in the form of technologism or scientism. A society's mode of hierarchization, which belongs on the side of order, is embodied in aji_agency, ofhistoricity of a different kind. Education is responsible for_ this function. The teachers, who can also sometimes be researchers but in the vast majority of cases have different functions, provide a social hierarchization that in postindustrial society is actually based on education itself, which gives the category of teachers a functional autonomy it did not possess in previous societies, where hierarchization was based, for example, on property or citizenship. It must immediately be added that the role of agency of historicity performed by education is in no way a complete definition of education's functions in society. But it must be stressed immediately that education's role of social selection in accordance with a mode of hierarchization is always associated with another role, that of reproduction or reinforcement of class oppositions. These two functions can
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no more be identified with one another than they can be dissociated. Education seeks to select those generally most fit to receive higher education, since it must provide the necessary means for scientific development. But it also creates or reinforces class barriers to the mobility of talent, and the way these two functions are mixed up together is shown by the fact that a judgment on fitness for higher education is always also a judgment on social training in the use of a language that is the language of the upper classes. The ambiguity of the teachers1 situation is apparent in the constant mixture of opposition and conformism that characterizes their behavior. In this they are like all agents of historicity, from priests to scientists, who are all simultaneously watchdogs and protesters. We shall see later how the clash between these two functions leads all agents of historicity to develop an abstract rhetoric that cannot be reduced either to a class ideology or to an / element of historicity, and which is more a line of professional defense than the mask for interests foreign to the group itself. It is probably in the expression of needs that the existence of an autonomous agency is most difficult to recognize. The difficulty seems particularly great in the postindustrial societies, where the orientation of needs can be defined as a search for personal or collective identity and as enjoyment. Nevertheless, in this particular casejTze agents of massive means of communication, that is, the agents of the social processing of needs, do in fact occupy the same ambiguous position as the other agencies of historicity. As in the other cases, the observer is first of all aware of the dominant class's dominion over the expression and social orientation of needs. An abundant and suggestive literature speaks loudly and not unjustifiably about the manipulation of needs. This is an indispensable reaction against the propaganda of the dominant classes which assures society with false ingenuousness that advertising is a response to individual demand and thus acquires a democratic function. But, because criticism of such claims has been voiced for a long time, and with no lack of the necessary energy, we must look further. A more attentive study of business and advertising brings significant conflicts to light. The area of fashion provides one of the most interesting examples today. Whereas fashion properly speaking is a system of social hierarchization and, beyond that, the creation of badges of social level, the apparel trade also finds itself drawn into supporting movements launched by the young and recognized as signs of cultural innovation. So that the trade cannot be wholly assimilated with society's apparatuses of economic direction, which manipulate demand in the name of the functioning of their power and their profit. Dependent upon technocrats, the traders and advertisers are also, in nontotalitarian societies, dependent upon the formation of cultural trends that are in no way the direct creation of the centers of economic decision. The same remarks apply to the professionals of the mass media.
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In this case, as in the others, we would be denying the existence of social classes if we ignored the dominant hold of the upper class over the agencies of historicity. But it would also be false to see these latter as merely agents of social domination. Last, it is equally unacceptable to place these agencies above the social fray. Their role is always limited and subordinate within the field of historical action and also, as a consequence, in the political system. But they do have a certain autonomy that is recognizable in the appearance of specific functions at the level of social organization. This relative and subordinate autonomy of the agencies of historicity is the concrete expression of a society's historicity. The stakes of class conflicts are not abstractions or ideologies but social practices. Class conflicts occur within a certain social and cultural field ot historicity. It is never permissible to say that this field constitutes on its own the principle of society's organization; a factory is not the concrete expression of industrial growth; it cannot be defined independently of the class power exercised within it. But parallel to this, social struggles are determined by the system of historical action, by the nature of the forces of society's production of itself, which those struggles transform in their turn into class relations and consequently into a political system and a system of social organization.
C.
The Functioning of the System of Historical Action
a.
The Counterelements
The SHA could be defined as a system of imbalances. The cultural model is not situated at its center, like a spider in the middle of its web, organizing and controlling social activities. Jt js^a driving force, but one that must be converted into order and also into mobilization of resources in order to play that role. It is not an ideal model of society but a set of orientations that govern social practice. It can be presented in a slightly different way from the one 1 used earlier. Figure 3 shows that the alternation of full and empty boxes is that of the orientations of historical action and the actors' objectives. The system of historical action is a network of oppositions governed by the nature of the cultural model. It is the dominion of orientations over resources, of movement over order, and the interdependence of cultural orientations and social forms. The tensions between its elements mean that society is not a character being guided by an image of the ideal society. The cultural model is not a social model of movement. The system of historical action is not an actor but what is at stake in an interplay of actors.
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order
movement
i
i
orientations
cultural model
2
hierarchization
4
resources
1
mobilization
3
needs
culture
society
society
culture
i Figure 3
If we introduce actors, with due consideration of their objectives and their values, we see that they cannot act other than by breaking the structure of the system of historical action, by destroying the oppositions separating the elements from one another, and by fusing the elements into their objectives. The objectives are the actors' guides not in an action of society upon itself but in the functioning of a social organization. These objectives are thus the opposite of the elements of historical action and cannot arise except from its destruction, which is to say from the appropriation by one actor of the system of historical action and from its reduction by that actor to an organization and the functioning of that organization. This is why they must be termed counterelements. They are representations given value by actors and not orientations of historical action itself. The counterelements are the values of class actors and no longer the stake of class relations. Let us take the empty box 2 in figure 3. It designates an orientation toward movement, but a social movement. What is involved, therefore, is a sociocultural model of movement—a definition immediately clear to every reader as actor. It is the image of an ideal society toward which individuals and collectivities are struggling to make headway. In reality the content of this box is even more extensive and integrative than I have just suggested: this sociocultural model, like any image of an ideal society, is a model of order as much as it is of movement. It is thus apparent that a counterelement can be empirically defined as the locus of overflow and commingling of the elements surrounding it. In more theoretical terms, each counterelement breaks the oppositions upon which the system of historical action is based; it replaces a tension, which Is a manifestation of historicity, by identity of functioning and so-called rational action. This replacement is not the work of the system of historical action itself; it can only arise from the ideological activity of the actors. Nothing could demonstrate better that the SHA cannot be defined in terms of social or collective consciousness. Social consciousness posits values or
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situations of fact, it posits order or movement; it cannot orient conduct toward objectives that vanish whenever it tries to pin them down, since the elements all refer back one to another in an endless play of complementarities and oppositions. ^ejTansition from elements to counterelements is the transition from system to actors. A counterelement can be represented by a self-sufficient image, whereas one can never define an element outside of its relations with the other elements. Can this general analysis based on one specific case be applied to other cases? Yes. since the various elements of the system occupy equivalent positions within it. But the content of the various counterelements must still be defined, case by case, for all that. So let us look at case 1 (in fig. 3). As in case 2. which we have just looked at, this counterelement cannot be understood,„excej)t as the fusion of the three elements surrounding it. The cultural model is reduced to a technique, mobilization becomes a cultural and no longer a social form, and needs are transformed into resources at the service of movement. It is easy to recognize the presence of this counterelement in our own society. It is enough to say, in fact, that our society is powered by a scientific and technical mode of growth, but that it is the organizations that adapt themselves pragmatically to the changing environment, manage their communications better and better, utilize the information they produce more and more efficiently in order to correct their course and ensure their survival. They thus produce a development that is no longer an orientation but a result of certain practices. There is no longer distance and tension between the cultural model and the social resources mobilized: the two elements are commingled. Needs are no more than the expression of this transformation of social resources into cultural resources. Individuals and groups seek to maximize their advantages and lower their costs; they also seek to extend the field they control, and it is the totality of these self-interests, combining to produce this flexible and dynamic organization, that produces growth as its end result. One can certainly give other expressions to this fusion of elements into a coulfterelement. We shall see that counterelements. because they belong to the world of actors, take on different colorations according to whether they are acting as guide to one class or another. But one image will suffice to convey the mechanism behind the formation of this counterelement. which is situated on the level of resources and not on that of orientations. I shall term it instrumentalism, in order to emphasize the elimination of any reference to a cultufaT'model of movement. Case 3 is analogous to the preceding one since it too dispenses with the presence of orientations. But it is doubly cut off from them in that it is situated on the side of order and on the side of society' rather than culture.
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The social order is no longer anything but a factual organization, lacking any hierarchical principle. The variety of social categories is fused in this case with the mode of mobilization. Society, one might say, is reduced to the technical division of labor, and the nature of needs can no longer be linked with anything other than that social organization. This gives an image of a society at once diversified and stable, a society in which everyone fulfills a function and lives in a particular way, the different functions organizing themselves together so as to answer to society's needs, without the need of any intervening principle of hierarchy. It is perhaps easier in this case than in the others to understand both why such a counterelement destroys the system as a whole and corresponds to representations and to an ideal image of society—ideal since it is beyond the tensions that define the system of action and are experienced by the actors. Hierarchization is replaced here by what one may term segmentation. Case 4, like case 1, is that of a counterelement located on the level of orientations. It is a model of cultural order. But the existence of such a model is not compatible with that of a cultural model. It would only be so if the system of action were presented as an unstable equilibrium between opposing demands, such as activity and contemplation, which would transform the SHA into an endless interplay of rhetorical oppositions and entirely contradict all the analysis we have so far made of it. This model of order cannot therefore be conceived except as the fusion of the elements surrounding it. Cultural practices and social hierarchy fuse in it to give rise to a model of sociocultural integration, and this model is also merged with a model of movement. Here again it is easy to observe an expression of the model in our own society. What else is the notion of a society of mass consumption? A society based on hierarchized needs that possess sufficient impetus to provide the driving force of society's movement. In this view, it is the rush to consume that creates the progress of production. Once again a reassuring image, one that rids us at little cost of the necessities inherent in the model of scientific growth, of the constraints of the great organizations, and the dominion of social hierarchy. This counterelement, like the others, is a means of transcending the tensions of historical action. Our analysis has up to now introduced the counterelements one by one; but if we look at them all together, do they form a system, just like the elements? Ought we not speak of a countersystem, so that an analysis of historical action should be in the first place an analysis of the relations existing between these two systems that possess the same formal characteristics, the same relations between the elements or counterelements that compose them? This formal parallelism is very clear and results from the construction of the SHA itself. It is important, for it signifies that the images, which are the
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counterelements, are simultaneously interdependent and opposed, so that within any given type of SHA we ought to be able to isolate a well-defined set of ide^s_ahQ.ujt,_society's historicity, of ideal images of that society. order
move/mm
orientations
resources
Culture
SfXil'/V
cultural model
sociocultural model
E
CE
inslrumentalism CE
mobilization
E
E=element CE-counterelement
society
I
culture
,. , • nierarcni/.ation „
soeiocultural integration CE
segmentation
needs E
CE
Figure 4
But this docs not lead on to the integration of the elements and counterelements into a much larger unity. The SHA is the.proces_s_ot"_society*s action upon itself on the basis of its experience and its awareness of creativity and accumulation. The countersystem, if we are to call it that, is no more than a set of contradictory representations. Each of the counterelements destroys the system and thus presents itself as a total image, excluding all others. Let us go back to our example. Our postindustrial society can be thought of as an instrumental society, as a creation of the collective will, as a set of functional segment^ or as a mass society. But these are all conflicting ways of looking at one thing. Transition from one counterelement to another is impossible.-"~ But the counterelements can't be chased out of our field of analysis as easily as all that. If we try to unite them into a whole, then the analysis goes completely astray. Whereas, if we recognize that they break the relation between two or several elements, then their existence appears necessary. No entirely integrated and balanced system of action can exist. The elements oscillate around the axes that define them, penetrating with each oscillation into the area of the counterelements. Equilibrium is maintained only if two opposing counterelements exert opposite and counterbalancing pressures. The counterelements are active; they manifest themselves as wills, as intentions, as principles. Whereas the element is apprehended by the actors only as a problem, a nexus of oppositions, the counterelement asserts itself in its stability as the objective of social conduct. The oscillation between elements and counterelements is a manifestation of that which joins or separates actors and of the stake of their relation. The social field is defined solely by its tensions and its imbalances, behind which
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there can always be glimpsed the distancing of society from itself and historicity's dominion over social practices. Each counterelement, on the contrary, because it is simultaneously a social and a cultural unit, defines expected types of conduct. The actor's situation is defined within it by the position he occupies in relation to the others and his degree of participation in a model of conduct. But the counterelement has unity and simplicity^only in appearance. We shall see later that the social classes and social movements interpret them simultaneously in contradictory ways. More directly, each counterelement is torn by oppositions that necessarily refer back to the elements and the relations between them. Let us take an example in our type of society. Its counterelement of sociocultural integration is mass consumption, situated at the meeting point of man's "natural" needs and a social hierarchy based on knowledge and thus on education. Now mass consumption, if we examine it, falls into two opposing principles: on the one hand the social hierarchy of consumption and the importance of status symbols in the objects and modes of consumption; on the other hand the individualization of need and enjoyment. Mass consumption is shot through with two opposing movements: the quest for status and the expectation of pleasure. We shall see later that opposing historic actors do not attach themselves simultaneously to the same aspect of a counterelement. The latter's unity is therefore artificial, but it cannot for that reason be neglected by analysis. The totality of counterelements forms a civilization. This word denotes a set of representations, of images. It introduces a unity into society and culture, the unity of consciousness. A civilization is an ideal that the observer finds at the heart of reality. This is why almost everyone in a society is seeking to define a civilization and no one is embarrassed by the incoherence of the definitions given. If we take the notion of civilization in this sense, then it turns its back to sociological analysis. Not only does each counterelement destroy the structure of the SHA, but the counterelements in their turn are kneaded and molded in very diverse ways into all-embracing images of a civilization that each actor, according to his ! social and individual characteristics, contemplates and admires as if he were gazing at some social datum, whereas it is no more than the reflection of his own way of life. The counterelements contribute nothing to the analysis of society, but they guide us toward the actors. The SHA is lived, it cannot be analyzed directly. It can only be apprehended when broken up and transformed into counterelements. This opposition between elements and counterelements opens up one of the principal fields of sociological research. The elements are studied~~as~
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orientations of social practice; they can be reached by a direct consideration of labor organization, consumption, use of saving, etc. Counterelements, on the other hand, are representations. Thus we are dealing with two materially distinct kinds of evidence. It is importan: to establish the correspondence between them, to investigate how, in any given society, the combination of the counterelements leads us on to posit the existence of the elements, and how the representation of the elements leads to the formation of the counterelements. Analysis of the latter is thus an important means of verifying the validity of a concrete construction of the SHA and. in particular, of the attribution to each of the elements of a certain content of a historical kind. Anticipating on the analysis of this theme, it is essential to mention that the counterelements cannot receive a general social content; they are inevitable given a particular stamp by the actors striving to control the system of historical action and transform its orientations into values. Each counterelement thus presents itself in the form of an opposition between two images of society, one of which belongs to the ideology of the upper class and the other to that of the popular class, either directly or through the intermediary of professional ideologists. An element has a stable and clear content; its complexity comes from its relations with each of the other elements of the system. A counterelement, on the contrary, is independent of all others, though against this it is itself ambiguous, taking in different contents according to the class that is its bearer. Thus I can now replace the term "counter-elements/' introduced in the course of my analysis, with the term that occupies its place in everyday language: values, ^counterelement is not constitutive of a field of historicity; it is the point of view of an actor, who is always in the last analysis a class actor, looking at the system of historical action. Such is indeed the definition already given of values. The relations between elements and counterelements are the relations between the system of historical action and the class actors. We are here at the very center of sociological analysis, since the field of historicity, bedrock of any concrete social collectivity, is defined by the relation of this system of action to this system of actors. The analysis of social classes will turn entirely upon this fundamenfarquestion. b.
The Crises of Historical Action
The SHA is a system of tensions. The elements are not institutional domains, all more or less coherent with one another, in other words, more or less belonging to the same system of values, but are themselves defined on the basis of the conditions of existence of historical action. If there is no link between order and movement, between orientations and resources, between culture and society^ then no historicity can exist. To speak of system is to
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posit the interdependence of its parts and thus the equilibrium of the whole. This equilibrium is not maintained by any controlling or regulating forces. There is therefore no reason to grant priority in practice to the state of equilibrium as opposed to states of disequilibrium. For the construction of the analysis, it is a matter of indifference whether or not we know that there do in fact exist societies in equilibrium, in other words, societies all of whose elements belong to the same configuration with the same force or the same distinctness. But we must consider the general effects of disequilibrium. These effects will be called crises. This term is used in opposition to that of conflict, which defines a state of relations between the actors. There exists no inevitable link between a state of crisis and a state of conflict; one can only say that crisis has effects on conflict, in the sense that conflict can be obscured by a state of crisis. The simplest form of such a crisis is when one of the elements is out of step with the others. Let us suppose, for example, a mode of hierarchization lagging behind all the other elements of the SHA and thus still belonging to a previous configuration. Let us imagine a society in which hierarchy is based on family origins and property while the other elements belong to an industrial or post-industrial society. This isolated element tends to spread over into the empty spaces surrounding it, in other words to transform itself into several counterelements in accordance with figure 5. The lagging element changes into a set of representations by the actors not corresponding to the dominant state of society. The presence of a single such element creates a quasi-general non-fit between historical existence and the actors* interplay. This explains the importance in such a society of social problems that are largely false problems, even though they play a considerable role in inter-actor relations. In certain European countries the maintenance of the old system of social hierarchization has entailed a whole set of social and political problems that overload and distort the class conflict within those societies.
Figure 5
CE=counterelement H=hierarchization
In the case of France it is possibly the lagging behind of needs, even more than that of hierarchization, that is most noticeable. This has various effects, from the clericalism-anticlericalism struggle to the maintenance of
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paternalism in the organization of labor, to the falling back onto particularistic themes like corporatism—three areas corresponding to the counterelements surrounding the element needs. The crisis remains limited however, since only a single element is affected. It becomes central, on the other hand, when one of the system's axes is broken. It follows from the nature of the SHA that it can be affected by three central crises: rupture of the movement-order axis, which is to say the disjunction CM -r M / / H - N; rupture ot the orientations-resources axis, which is to say the disjunction CM + H // M -f N; rupture ot the culture-society axis, which is to say the disjunction CM 4 N / / M ^ H . 1. The first of these will be termed crisis of historicity, since it affects the most general dimension of the SHA. In a society of the modern type it expresses itself as disjunction of the social order and the economy. The economy may be more modern, oriented toward freedom of the market or toward technical progress, whereas the social order remains more archaic. But the reverse situation is no less real: the modernization of the social order and cultural practices can be ahead of the production and labor organization model. The crisis triggered in this way is a social crisis, one that threatens the unity of the society viewed in its historicity. Like any type of crisis, it tends to manifest itself in the importance given to certain categories of actors, which do not coincide with the social classes but are often superimposed upon them. Here these categories are of the old-modern type. One needs only to think of the use of the word "bourgeois" in France: this term is not a simple doublet of capitalist. Whereas the latter is a precise denotation of a dominant class, the word "bourgeois" introduces the idea of archaism, of privilege, of the transformation of the acquired into the transmitted. On the side of the ruling class, as on that of the class being ruled, there exist strong tensions between supporters of the old and supporters of the new that complicate and sometimes blur the class conflict. Such a crisis is thus very likely to occur in economically heterogeneous societies in which a traditional economic sector is being maintained despite economic growth. 2. The second crisis will be termed crisis ofrationaliry. Orientations and resources, ends and means, are in opposition. The social categories that tend to form are of the high-low or elite-masses type. Two contrasting examples spring naturally to mind. Soviet society has a very advanced cultural model
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and hierarchization model. The role played in it by science and technique— such as that of education—is considerable. On the other hand, the use made of social and cultural resources, the forms of labor organization and consumption, are archaic. Hence an awareness of opposition between the ruling elite and the mass of the people. In the United States the situation is the reverse one: the forms of mobilization and the nature of needs have both been very much modernized, whereas the modes of movement and order remain very much stamped by earlier capitalist development. Here too we find a lively awareness of opposition between the mass of the people and the elites, an opposition that according to circumstances can be either progressivist or reactionary, but which is never reducible to a class conflict. The resulting crisis can be termed institutional or political, since it affects society's management ability. 3. The third crisis will be called crisis of integration. It threatens the unity of the SHA very directly since it sets culture in opposition to society. In our type of society it opposes production and consumption on the one hand against organization and distribution on the other. This is a cultural crisis, one might say, and one that subjects the personality to extreme pressures. It tends to set change—both in consumption and production—in opposition to social integration. In these days it occurs above all in societies driven by foreign economic forces, as with Quebec, or national economic forces, as with Japan, when the domination of those forces is insufficiently compensated for by mechanisms of political intervention. In each of these cases the split in the SHA leads to the formation of two opposing subsystems in which elements and counterlements are intermixed. These splits may be represented as in figure 6. The opposition of these subsystems is made all the stronger and more complex in that each of them contains counterelements that are in opposition to one another but reinforce one another in their common opposition to those of the other subsystem. It is therefore likely that a crisis of the SHA will entail a predominance of the counterelements and, thus, social struggles centered on control of the counterelements, while reference to society's historicity vanishes. This becomes even more clear-cut in the extreme case of a general crisis of the SHA, a situation in which the three crises already described are superimposed. The SHA then disappears completely and is replaced by the whole formed by the counterelements, the unity of which is artificial. The historical actors are wholly engaged in struggles that become, one may say, ideological, arfd are detached from the problems of historicity. This is the sociological SeTmTtion of decadence, which is the loss of historicity.
The System of Historical Action
crisis of historicity CM M
89
crisis of rationality
H
4
CM
1
3
N
->
M
4.
!
H
4
3
1
N
1
ens \s of m titration CM M
Figure 6
CM = cultural model H = hierarch Nation M = mobilization N = needs Note: The counterelements have been inserted in the subsystems to which two of their three surrounding elements belong. E.g. in the crisis of integration the CE2 has been placed with the elements CM and N, which flank it.
This defines the interest of a study of crises. In a society where there is no crisis, the historical actors struggle around an axis of counterelements but are directly and constantly deflected back to the elements themselves. If the dominant and dominated classes are both defending asociocultural model of development and an instrumental conception of economic progress, the clash between these positions obliges them on the one hand to rediscover a cultural model which is no longer a sociocultural model, since both classes are equally and contradictorily seeking to appropriate it; similarly the class conflict rediscovers the existence of forms of mobilization not reducible to the interests of one class or another, since both can lay claim to them simultaneously. Just as the introduction of the actors inevitably entails transition from elements to counterelements, so the struggle between those actors inevitably reintroduces the elements, which are the stake of that struggle. / But this oscillation between elements and counterelements, between historical problematic and solutions put forward by social consciousness through class conflict, finds itself halted by ernes of the SHA, which create a_certain opacity between elements and counterelements asTHe~result of their noncoincidence. Social consciousness and its conflicts no longer refer directly to the problems of historicity. Ultimately, in a state of generalized
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crisis, the social representations in conflict form a closed world. Ideas, images, objectives are all opposing one another without their opposition recognizing a common field. In which case we must not say that the class struggle is victorious. Quite the contrary is true. For all reference to historicity vanishes, and the actors are no longer defining themselves except by the multiple interplay of their oppositions and their competition. Now whatever the precise conception one has of conflicts, they always imply a will to control and direct an overall process of historical change. In a crisis situation this overall process dissolves into the struggle of the actors. The social conflicts are no more than a shadow play. More precisely, the conflicts linked with historicity are downgraded into conflicts situated on the institutional and political level; the social classes also break up and subdivide into a multiplicity of social forces.. Let us picture for a moment those societies in a process of development, tiy nature they are societies in crisis whose elements are broadly failing to coincide with one another because several systems of historical action are at work. The result is that politics acquires a complexity and autonomy unknown in more stable societies, where, on the contrary, the opposition of social classes is much more clearly apparent. Analysis of crisis is indispensable to that of historical actors. It is rare for social classes to occur in the pure state (without even considering here the intervention of actors formed on other levels of social reality—institutions and organizations). The opposition between supporters of old and new, between elite and mass, between innovators and collectivity, is superimposed on that between the classes. Knowledge of crises makes it possible to unravel this tangle and consequently to isolate the general nature of class conflicts, beyond their particular historical manifestations. Study of crises is also the necessary complement to analysis which, having defined the SHA and its elements, has laid the groundwork for an examination of the historical actors by introducing the notion of counterelements, which is to say by passing from historical experience to representations of social consciousness. A crisis is a discordance between the elements and counterelements of historical action. c.
Dominion and Severance
Historicity is the level of analysis governing my procedure as a whole. A society is a particular type of system such that its functioning is governed by its capacity to act upon that functioning, to construct a field of cultural experience on the basis of the capacity to produce work through knowledge, accumulation, and the cultural model. The system of historical action, on the other hand, is a "regional'" concejpt. It defines one of the social systems, oneTbFthe levels of sociological analysis and. through that analysis, of social reality too. A society, seen in its simplest
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aspects, abstracted from its historical complexity, is the concatenation of three sub-units: the field of historicity, the institutions, the social organization. The system of historical action is one of the two elements of the field of historicity; the other being the class relations that form the field of the historical actors. The system of historical action is organized around the cultural model, a component of historicitv; class relations are more directly linked to accumulation. ^ Even before the theme of social classes is dealt with directly, the interdependence of the system of historical action and class relations must be stressed. There are two kinds of analysis that must never be separated: that of the division of society into classes and that of the way in which it is "powered" by the motive force of historicity and, more directly, by the system of historical action. Everything is social relations, hut everything is also governed by historical action. Conciliation cannot be arrived at between these two orders by dint of compromise, as if the division into classes were never complete and society's orientations never completely integrated one with another. What links those orientations is so fundamental that we ought to find it at the very heart of any analysis. It is in fact historicity, for historicity must inevitably be simultaneously driving force and severance, the constituting principle of a system of historical action and a breaking away from society's functioning. The cultural model is the means by which historicity becomes orientation of social activity; accumulation, on the contrary, betokens the wrenching away of activity toward historicity, while class relations, in a complementary motion, cause this division of society from itself to move downward again toward social organization. If one forgets historicity, if one leaves the system of historical action and class relations in confrontation, their unity and duality contradict one another. Whereas they combine when one recognizes that society is definable only by means of the relation of its historicity and its functioning-, of the dominion of the first over the second, which is also t h e wrenching of the former out of the latter. Analysis does not have to begin from a summit in order to move downward again to the plains of social organization. It is governed by this circular relation: activity — historicity—functioning and therefore by the twin movement of ascent and descent t h a t leads to historicity and then comes back down toward social organization once more. D.
The Configurations of the System of Historical Action
The system of historical action is defined by the relations that unite its
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elements, but its content depends upon the situation of labor, since the cultural model itself is linked to a type of accumulation and thus toXcertam level of society's action upon itself, to a certain level of developmentjof creative work and knowledge. We could, therefore, without further delay, leave history to get on with the job of applying the general concepts that have been worked out to each individual concrete society. But that would be rushing things somewhat, and neglecting to establish the reasons that enable us to speak of the structure of historical action. We are absolutely not concerned here with reducing historical analysis to the application of a sociological construction, but with bringing out a number of implications in this concept of the SHA. I shall therefore go back over some points made earlier in this chapter. a.
Construction of the Four Societal Types
The elements of the SHA are.sociological in.nature but correspond to the elements of economic activity. The cultural model corresponds to production, mobilization to the organization of labor, hierarchization to distribution, needs to consumption. This correspondence stems from the very definition of the SHA. which is not a system of ideas but the organization of the movement that drives society to exceed its functioning, in terms of its creative work and in the name of the consciousness of creativity that it is given by that work. But the system of historical action does not coincide with economic activity exactly, term for term, except when society is entirely molded by its historicity. The further one moves away from this situation, the more the cultural model, like accumulation itself, is attached to order rather than to the movement of economic activity. All "historical" societies are thus situated between two extreme points that probably do not correspond to any real case: on the one hand a society of pure reproduction, entirely governed by its laws of function and exchange; on the other, a society entirely master of itself, a voluntary association or a totalitarian nightmare. The space between these points is not occupied by a long struggle upward toward liberty and responsibility but by a variety of societal types, configurations of the system of historical action. Each of them corresponds to the rooting of historicity in one of the elements of economic activity: consumption, distribution, organization, production. This is why they will be referred to here by the name of the economic activity from which they derive and which they transform in meaning and in practice: agrarian, mercantile, industrial, and programmed societies. We are dealing here not with types of total society but only with configurations of the system of historical action. No territorial collectivity
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can be identified with one of these types. History begins by apprehending concrete totalities that are at the same time systems of historical action, polhlc^rconectm social organizations, states, and modes of social change^The less strong the dominion of historicity over the society's functioning, the less easily can a societal type be isolated from the particular forms of organization, reproduction, and change of particular collectivities. /. The programmed society. In the most economically advanced societies, what is accumulated is the capacity to produce production, the very principle of Creative "work, which is to say knowledge. This is made clear by the importance of education and research, by the decisive role played by information and by the use of information systems in economic growth. The cultural model in this case corresponds to the element P (production) of the economic system. It follows from this that the isomorphism of the two systems is expressed by a term for term correspondence of the elements of the SHA and the economic elements. And this is represented in figure 7. movement
order
cultural model
hierarchization
s=social elements c=cultural elements orientations
production
distribution c
<
x-
mobilization
needs
organization
consumption
Figure 7
This type of society, which I term programmed or, more simply, in order to make clear their novelty, post industrial, does not accumulate only consumable goods, instruments of exchange, or capital, but also meansjDf producing work, thanks to technical progress. For the first time the image of creativity introduces no nietasocial warrant for order, whether derived from religion, from the state, or from economics. Society recognizes that the transcendence of its functioning is its development, that there is no longer any separation between its transcendence and its immanence. An industrial society is oriented toward "the laws of the market" or toward the creation of an economic framework. A postindustrial society is likewise oriented toward movement and thus very far from returning to a model of equilibrium; but it no longer conceives of movement as opportunity and opportunism, in the terms of the entrepreneur and his
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profit; it thinks of it as system management, as ability to program its change. Mobilization corresponds to the organization of labor and production. It consists in combining forces in order to achieve an objective whose movements are perfectly or, more often, imperfectly known. It is a type of mobilization in clear-cut opposition to industrial mobilization, the principle of which is putting labor at the disposition of capital, and even more so to preindustrial mobilization, the type that Weber termed bureaucracy and which is based upon a definition of rights and duties and hierarchical relations between office-holders. Hierarchization is directly linked with distribution and, therefore, with the level of participation attained in management of the system. The most widespread image of this is the meritocracy. Lastly, needs are defined in terms of consumption, of enjoyment, and not in terms of conquest, or of maintenance of a level, or of attributes of the position occupied within the social organization. Analysis of this configuration, as of any other, would require an entire book, which I hope one day to write. Since it is impossible to do any kind of justice to so general a subject in a few lines, I shall limit myself here toone observation: the relations these elements stand in to one another are relations simultaneously of complementarity and of opposition. This investment society is also a consumption society, while being oriented toward science and technique it is also oriented toward expression, toward the rediscovery of mind and body, toward personal and collective identity. It is a society of movement and of organization by objectives, but it is also hierarchized and replaces old-style discriminations with new segregations.
cultural model
'
hierarchization
creativity
mobilization objectives
meritocracy P
D
O
C
P = production O=organization D = distribution C=consumption
needs enjoyment
Figure 8
This postindustrial or programmed society is thus not pure creativity, power without limit, gratuitous invention. It is not just movement as opposed to the pure order of "traditional" societies. Every society is order and movement at the same time; postindustrial society is putting to work resources not freely molded by orientations but imposing their own natural
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laws. At the same time as society's capacity for autotransformation increases, so it conies"up> more directly against "human nature," defined not morally but scientifically, as a part of nature. The age of the One. of an entirely willed society or of its contrary, a society reincorporated into nature, is an age that is never going to come. What is termed consumption cannot be reduced to the manipulation of demand by decision centers seeking to maximize their own advantages, their own profits or power. What it brings out is man's resistance, with those natural characteristics being explored by anthropology. The world of language, of the unconscious, of sexuality, which is never separable from the cultural model nor ever reducible to it. Man is n