The State of European Integration

THE STATE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

To my faithful students at Virginia Tech as a small indication of my deepest appreciation for whatever they have done for me. There are no words to express the gratitude I will always feel.

The State of European Integration

Edited by YANNIS A. STIVACHTIS Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

Published in collaboration with the Athens Institute for Education & Research – ATINER

© Yannis A. Stivachtis 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Yannis A. Stivachtis has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The state of European integration 1. European Union 2. National security – European Union countries 3. Democracy – European Union countries 4. European Union countries – Economic integration 5. European Union countries – Foreign relations 7. European Union countries – Politics and government I . Stivachtis, Yannis A., 1965– 337.1'42 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The state of European integration / edited by Yannis A. Stivachtis. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7223-4 1. European Union. 2. European Union countries--Economic integration. I. Stivachtis, Yannis A., 1965JN30.S7225 2007 341.242’2--dc22 2007023739 ISBN: 978 0 7546 7223 4

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.

Contents List of Contributors Acknowledgments Introduction: The State of European Integration

ix xi xiii

PART I: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR

1

2

3

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration: The Common Foreign and Security Policy Meltem Müftüler-Baç

3

The European Security and Defence Policy: Capabilities and Institutions Gülnur Aybet

19

The EU as an International Actor: ‘Civilian’, ‘Normative’ or ‘Military’ Power? Yannis A. Stivachtis

41

4

Presidency as Leadership? Assessing the EU Presidency through the 2005 UK EU Presidency 59 Richard G. Whitman and Gareth Thomas

5

European Union International Strategy Against Proliferation Threats Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo

75

PART II: ENLARGEMENT

6

A Union of Disenchantment: The New Politics of post-Enlargement Europe Christopher J. Bickerton

89

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7

Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints Joseph S. Joseph

111

Judicialization: The Key to European Unification and EU Expansion Charles Anthony Smith

127

8

PART III: SOCIALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY

9

10

11

12

Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case of the EU Conditionality Brandon Kliewer & Yannis A. Stivachtis

143

Political Representation in the Central and Eastern European Democracies James E. Lennertz

161

Democratization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Domestic Violence Policies Katalin Fábián

177

Modelling Democratic Transition in Southern and Central Europe: Did East Germany Experience ‘Transición’ or ‘Ruptura’? 197 Gareth Dale

PART IV: CONVERGENCE AND COHESION

13

Public Support for the EU and the Regional Level Effect Elna Roig Madorran

223

14

Regional Development in the European Union: Implications for Austria’s Viticulture 243 Nathalie Homlong and Elisabeth Springler

15

Towards a Post-Communist Welfare State? Juraj Draxler

261

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PART V: ECONOMIC AND MONETARY ISSUES

16

17

18

Index

The Future of EMU: Towards the Disruption of the European Integration Process? Leila Simona Talani

279

The Race to the Bottom: Tax Reform and Economic Development in the European Union Akis Kalaitzidis

307

Common Misconceptions of Germany and the EMU Heather Baca-Greif, Poul Thøis Madsen and Esben Tranholm Nielsen

321

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List of Contributors Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo is Assistant Professor of International Law and EU Law at the University of Barcelona. Gülnur Aybet is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent at Canterbury. Heather Baca-Greif is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. Christipher Bickerton is Research Fellow at St Johns College, University of Oxford. Gareth Dale is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Brunel University. Juraj Draxler is Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. Katalin Fabian is Assistant Professor of Government and Law at Lafayette College, Pennsylvania. Nathalie Homlong is Associate Professor of Economic Geography at the University College Volda, Norway. Joseph Joseph is Associate Professor of International Relations and European Affairs at the University of Cyprus and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign and Security Policy. Akis Kalaitzidis is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Missouri (UCM). Brandon Kliewer is graduate student at the Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University. James E. Lennertz is Professor of Political Science, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, USA.

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Elna Roig Madorran is Visiting Fellow at the European Union Institute in Florence. Poul Thøis Madsen is Associate Professor and Director of Studies, Department of International Affairs, Aalborg University. Meltem Müftüler-Baç is Professor of International Relations at Sabanci University (Turkey) and Jean Monnet Professor ad personam. Charles Anthony Smith is Assistant Professor of political Science at the University of California-Irvine. Elisabeth Springler is Assistant Professor at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. Yannis A. Stivachtis is Director of the International Studies Program at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University and Head of the Politics and International Affairs Research Unit of the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). Leila Simona Talani is Lecturer in European Politics and Director of Graduate Studies at the Department of European Studies, University of Bath. She is also Research Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics. Gareth Thomas is Researcher on Europe at the Chatham House (former Royal Institute for International Affairs). Esben Tranholm Nielsen is Research Assistant at Aalborg University, Denmark. Richard Whitman is Professor of Politics at the University of Bath. Formerly he served as Senior Fellow for the European Research Program at Chatham House (formerly known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Acknowledgments This volume is based on a research project undertaken by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). The initial drafts of the papers included in this volume were presented at the 3rd and 4th ATINER International Conferences on Politics and International Affairs. As with every book, this one, too, could not have been written without the help and assistance of many people. First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Grigoris Papanikos, Director of ATINER, for his invaluable support throughout the research and publication process. I would like to express my deep appreciation to the volume contributors for managing to submit their chapters on time despite their significant time constraints. Without their dedication this book could have never been written. Many thanks go to the anonymous volume reviewers for their constructive criticism, comments and suggestions. I am greatly indebted to Amanda L. Davis for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this volume. I would also like to thank Amanda as well as Anisa Ali, Aileen Boniface, and An Phong Le for their excellent editorial and formatting work. The completion of this volume could not have been easy without their assistance and support. My special thanks go to Professor Ilja Luciak, Head of the Political Science Department of Virginia Tech, for his continuous support and encouragement. Last but not least, I would like to thank everyone at Ashgate Publishing Limited involved in this project. I will begin with Kirstin Howgate, whose in-depth market knowledge and suggestions have been a blessing for this volume. A special thank you goes to Donna Hamer and Carolyn Court for taking care of the legal aspects of the publication. But the manuscript could not have reached the reviewers and their comments could not have reached the book editor without the essential assistance of Margaret Younger. Blacksburg, Virginia Yannis A. Stivachtis

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Introduction

The State of European Integration Yannis A. Stivachtis

The purpose of this volume is to provide an overall assessment of the state of European integration. Because the number of fields where European integration operates is so vast, the problem that any volume of this kind faces is on what areas and issues it should focus. The choice of areas and issues to be included in this volume was the response to two questions. First, from the various debates that have taken placewhich areas and issues of European integration appear to be more significant? And second, are these areas and issues also covered or adequately analysed by similar volumes? As a result, the current volume discusses issues related to the EU’s international role (Part I); the recent and future enlargement of the EU (Part II); the process of socialization and democratization of the new Member States as well as the question of legitimacy in the EU (Part III); the degree of convergence and cohesion within the EU (Part IV); and finally, the monetary and financial challenges facing the EU (Part V). The European Union as an International Actor Nowhere is the increasingly important role of the EU – as a single international actor – in world affairs better reflected than in the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The development of the CFSP and especially the ESDP, has invited a debate as to whether the EU should be a civilian, normative, or military power.1 These two policies – in association with the Justice and Home Affairs Policy (JHA) – are the result of the realization that in today’s world, the EU Member States cannot offer their citizens freedom, security and justice through intra-EU cooperation alone. During the past few years, the CFSP has continued its steady development and the EU gained additional status as an international political player.2 Increasingly, international crises around the world reveal the EU’s added value. Sometimes the EU acts independently, sometimes as a participant in a UN-led process and sometimes in close cooperation with other international partners, like NATO or the African Union. The range of instruments at the EU’s disposal continues to increase in size and scope. The use of these instruments is guided in part by the ambitious objectives set out in 1 Yannis Stivachtis discusses the debate about the nature of the European power in Chapter 3. 2 Meltem Muftuler-Bac examines the current state of the CFSP in Chapter 1.

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the ‘European Security Strategy’ adopted in late 2003. The EU strategy to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a case in point.3 Specifically, the EU has a broad range of instruments at its disposal besides the CFSP to deal with crises, including the ESDP as well as trade and development cooperation. With its strong civilian component, the ESDP is well suited to combined civil-military operations. By employing these instruments in a coherent, integrated manner, EU action becomes stronger. In addition, a case should be made for a better coordination and cooperation between the Council, the Commission and the Member States. With a view to the new Financial Perspective, in 2006 the full complement of EU foreign policy instruments was streamlined and reduced to a limited and comprehensible number of instruments, in areas like pre-accession, neighbourhood policy, development, stability and human rights. In the process, special attention was paid to the connection between the pillars, particularly between the CFSP and the stability instrument. EU strategies, like the ‘Africa Strategy’ of December 2005 and the ‘Energy Strategy’ called for by the European Council of March 2006, will henceforth be cross-pillar in structure. Coherence between EU instruments is also essential to articulating an effective migration policy. The coherence with external JHA policy needs to be enhanced in the future. The CFSP is also an increasingly important instrument for meeting EU Member States’ foreign policy goals. At the same time, EU Member States need to ensure that the conclusions of the European Council of June 2006 are translated into concrete measures. As to budgetary matters, over the past few years the relatively modest CFSP budget has proved to be inadequate to fund the growing number of operations. Member States are increasingly being asked for voluntary contributions. The available resources for 2006 were increased to over €100 million under the British Presidency (over €60 million for 2005). During the Austrian Presidency an agreement was reached with the European Parliament under which the CFSP budget will be gradually raised to €406 million by 2013. The new Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 provide for a total of €1740 million for CFSP activities. Nevertheless, the total amount of funds available for the CFSP is relatively small. This may prevent the EU from pursuing a coherent and effective foreign policy. In the context of effective multilateralism, joint activities with other international organizations like the UN and NATO should display coherence to the greatest extent possible. Cooperation with the UN has recently been intensified, thanks in part to the EU’s willingness to lend temporary assistance to the UN’s mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo during elections there. Cooperation with NATO is not yet optimal as a result of the objections of a small number of Member States. The activities of the OSCE and the Council of Europe can also strengthen the CFSP. In recent years cooperation with regional organizations like the African Union has grown considerably. One of the most important areas where CFSP is expected to play a very important role in the near future is energy security. The CFSP in conjunction with the European Neighbourhood Policy, trade policy, development cooperation and environment 3 Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo analyses the EU strategy against WMD proliferation in Chapter 5.

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policy can achieve better energy security for the EU. The use of the CFSP and the ESDP should result in initiatives aimed at promoting stability in important producer and transit countries. In addition, the High Representative will have to analyse the vulnerability of transport routes and energy infrastructure, and start to develop policy on that basis in consultation with third countries and NATO. In the past several years, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has entered its operational phase.4 Over the course of a short period, the EU’s ambitions with respect to security and defence have been translated into a considerable number of ESDP operations: at present- ten civilian missions and two military operations. The EU’s ambitions should always be weighed against the EU’s planning and support capacity for civilian missions and the quality of the personnel that Member States can provide. The growing number of missions has placed these capacities under great strain. The EU continues to develop its capacity on the basis of civilian and military ‘Headline Goals’. The military component of these goals includes improving the expeditionary potential of European military capabilities, accelerating deployability and exploring the option of long-distance operations. The establishment of the European Defence Agency in July 2004 opened up new possibilities for coordinating national defence efforts and working with other EU Member States to find solutions for military deficiencies that have already been identified. The operational readiness of EU Battlegroups is a major milestone. Starting in 2007, the EU will be capable of carrying out two operations of battlegroup magnitude. The rapid deployment of these battlegroups will significantly bolster the ESDP as a whole. In the first half of 2007, the Netherlands, Germany and Finland are expected to provide a battlegroup and periodically contribute to EU Battlegroups. Among other EU policies, the CFSP and ESDP show clearly the important role that individual EU presidencies play in the development of those policies.5 While particular presidencies have played a leading role in shaping the substance and direction of the policies in question, others have failed, or it was not in their interests to address the need for a common European policy in the fields of foreign affairs, security and defence. The Domestic Dimension of EU Security The EU must play a larger role in the domain of security, which is inextricably linked to freedom and justice. Negotiations among Member States and public opinion polls reveal the level of anticipation with respect to a common asylum and migration policy and to a common approach to issues like terrorism and organized crime. This joint approach should also extend to external policy. In a globalizing world even the EU cannot act on its own. With this in mind, cooperation with other countries, including countries of origin, is essential.

4 Gülnur Aybet explores the development and current state of the ESDP in Chapter 2. 5 Richard Whitman and Gareth Thomas examine the role of Presidency in the EU with a special focus on the UK Presidency in Chapter 4.

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Cooperation among criminal justice authorities in Member States is more intensive than ever. A great deal has already been accomplished, particularly when one considers that Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation is a new policy area involving a relatively large amount of legislation and touching on a cornerstone of national sovereignty. It was only seven years ago that the ‘Tampere Programme’ took the first serious steps towards the area of freedom, security and justice. The intervening period has been marked by developments such as the establishment of Europol and Eurojust; various decisions to regulate the mutual recognition of criminal and civil judgments; decisions regarding substantive criminal law; the introduction of minimum standards for asylum and migration policy; the establishment of a new agency to manage external borders (FRONTEX); agreements to protect passports and visas; improved information-sharing procedures (including those for police records); operational cooperation between police and prosecution services; a European Arrest Warrant; and (in the near future) a European Evidence Warrant. The ‘Hague Programme’ of December 2004 has given a major new impulse to cooperation. The implementation of the ‘Hague Programme’ has a full agenda, based on the ‘Action Plan’ approved in June 2005. The bulk of that agenda consists of efforts to strengthen police and prosecutorial cooperation in the fight against crime. The first results are already visible. Following the first comprehensive threat analysis of organized crime in the EU by Europol, the European Council of June 2006 set a number of priorities at EU level to fight criminal enterprises. With respect to asylum and migration, the Commission is expected to submit proposals to the Council and the European Parliament, mainly in the second half of the ‘Hague Programme’. At present the emphasis is on implementing and evaluating the first generation of legislative instruments and strengthening practical cooperation between operational asylum and immigration services as well as addressing issues like biometric travel documents, border control, and third-country cooperation to combat illegal immigration and manage refugee flows. For the specific purpose of combating terrorism, a comprehensive strategy, including a detailed ‘Action Plan’ and a ‘Special Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment’, were agreed in December 2005. The EU has taken up the implementation of the various Action Plans with great vigour. Nevertheless, JHA cooperation is in an undeniably difficult phase at the moment. Negotiations often progress very slowly. While it was already difficult to reach a consensus with 15 Member States, the process is – not surprisingly – even more complicated with 27, especially considering the profound influence that legislative proposals can have on the Member States’ own criminal law. This is why it took much longer than anticipated to reach agreement on the ‘European Evidence Warrant’; an important new weapon in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime that aims to facilitate evidence-gathering in other Member States. It was not until June 2006 that a political accord was reached, and this was only possible after Germany had been given a partial opt-out. The ‘Data Retention’ directive (on storing telecommunications data for investigating terrorists and other serious criminals), another major result in this area, was adopted more quickly. The fact that the directive could be adopted with qualified majority voting (and with the co-decision of the European Parliament) also accelerated the decision-making process.

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The unanimity requirement ensures that the often sweeping proposals in the area of law enforcement can be enacted only with the support of all the Member States. However, this same requirement can also cause delays in the passage of legislation and lead to legislation that is riddled with exceptions. In the past year the increasing difficulty of establishing a boundary between first and third pillar decision-making has become apparent. This can be seen, for example, in a judgment by the European Court of Justice, which ruled that in order to enforce environmental law, it must be possible to compel the Member States through a first-pillar directive to impose criminal law penalties. The Commission is adopting a pragmatic position and has thus far presented only one proposal for a directive (on protecting intellectual property rights) with criminal-justice implications. It may be argued that the European Court’s judgment on environmental offences is a mirror image of another decision in which the Court quashed the ‘Passenger Name Record’ agreement with the United States, which had been made in the first pillar. The Court ruled that transferring personal data to further the fight against terrorism is a third-pillar matter. A similar discussion on the choice between the first and third pillars arose in the Council with respect to the ‘Data Retention’ directive, with a number of member states taking the position that this issue should have been addressed in a framework decision. This matter will probably also be decided before the European Court of Justice. The implementation of EU legislation is increasingly subject to criticism. Framework decisions must be transposed into national legislation, but their implementation not infrequently leaves scope for different interpretations. This can be seen in the various ways that the member states chose to implement sections of the ‘European Arrest Warrant’, for example, time limits or grounds for refusal. In practice the ‘European Arrest Warrant’ has proven to be a substantial improvement on pre-existing practice in the field of international legal assistance. The Constitutional Courts in Germany, Poland, and Cyprus have, however, declared certain sections of the implementation legislation to be unlawful. The programme is well under way, but additional efforts will be needed. Europe cannot allow itself to let JHA cooperation lag behind public expectations. In 2006, the EU examined how the ‘Hague Programme’ is progressing. The Programme stipulates that a review be conducted in the autumn of 2006, since a number of the Programme’s policy goals can only be pursued in earnest if the Constitutional Treaty enters into force. So far, it is questionable how much scope the current treaties offer for implementing the sections in question. On 28 June 2006, in preparation for assessing the status of the ‘Hague Programme’, the European Commission released a number of communications, which largely endorsed the above picture. The Commission wished to encourage debate with the Member States and the institutions on new policy initiatives deemed necessary by the Commission. The Commission has emphasized that its goal is not to set new priorities over and above those of the ‘Hague Programme’ but rather to foster a debate on the options offered by the current treaties for changing to qualified majority voting. The EU must do more with respect to asylum and migration to broaden cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Operational cooperation is also

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important in the field of criminal justice, but in many cases this requires additional legislation. Cooperation quite often suffers from a lack of confidence in a partner’s approach. This also creates practical obstacles when it comes to implementation. In a Union in which cross-border crime and terrorism must be dealt with jointly, this is an undesirable situation over the long term. To achieve the desired progress in JHA cooperation, it will also be necessary to look into ways of improving the decision-making process of an EU of 27 Member States. The European Council of 15 and 16 June 2006 instructed the Finnish Presidency to examine the options for improving the way decisions are made and action taken in the area of freedom, security and justice on the basis of the existing treaties. One option under consideration was to replace the unanimity requirement with majority decision-making. The Commission discussed this point in its Communication of 10 May 2006 on the period of reflection (‘A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe’) and its communications of 28 June 2006. However, no action has been taken to this direction, so far. The external and internal dimensions of EU security are inextricably linked. That means that the CFSP and JHA policy must cohere, both as regards to the use of foreign policy to ensure internal security, and the use of JHA cooperation in relations between the EU and third states. The design of the EU’s joint counterterrorism policy is an example of the progress that can be made in this area. The formation of this policy has been accelerated in the past few years, largely due to the bombings in Madrid and London. Important principles informing counterterrorism policy include complete respect for human rights and the balance between preventive and repressive measures. Cooperation embraces a wide range of issues: bringing together police, prosecutors and intelligence and security services; combating radicalization and recruitment; developing more secure documents and improving informationsharing, with respect to, for example, the international movements of persons. An important element of all this is cooperation with third countries. The EU works with a list of priority countries, to which the EU offers additional technical assistance. The ‘Counterterrorism Strategy Agreement’ reached in December 2005 and the associated Action Plans, including the ‘Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment’, have helped bring issues that had previously been taboo into the agenda of talks with third countries. In working with third countries, it is essential to combat radicalization and recruitment jointly with countries of origin. The EU and its Member States have to assist third countries in enacting preventive measures. Tackling radicalism also implies a broad-based dialogue with the Islamic world. Intensive cooperation in the fight against international terrorism inside and outside the EU borders is essential if the Member States are to remain capable of offering their people the security and freedom they expect.

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EU Enlargement After years of negotiations, ten states from Central and Southern Europe joined the EU in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria followed on January 1st, 2007. This was the culmination of a sweeping process of political, economic and social reforms in these countries, a major step in the process of European integration under the flag of the EU.6 Their accession means that not only the current residents of the European Union will be able to live in a stable environment marked by peace, freedom, security and prosperity, but also the generations that follow. In the year following the French and Dutch referenda more attention was devoted to the pace and quality of the enlargement process.7 The accession of countries from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe has made a significant contribution to peace, stability, democracy and prosperity throughout the continent, a process without precedent in European history. But at the same time there is a growing realization that the EU’s capacity to expand is not unlimited and that more attention should be paid to the quality of the enlargement and the full and rigorous application of the accession criteria. This is also necessary for maintaining sufficient popular support for enlargement. As a result, the Finnish Presidency took the initiative to give the debate on the quality of enlargement a prominent place on the agenda. Since October 2005, accession negotiations have been in progress with Turkey8 and Croatia. In December 2005, the Republic of Macedonia or FYROM was granted candidate country status, and once that country fully meets the conditions relating to democracy and the rule of law (the Copenhagen political criteria), it will be able to enter into accession negotiations. This is a deviation from the earlier practice of setting a date for the start of negotiations the moment a country was granted candidate status. The relationship of the remaining countries of the Western Balkans with the EU is defined by the ‘Stability and Association Process’, which seeks to prepare these countries for future accession negotiations. These countries will have to meet the relevant conditions in every respect. From the perspective of promoting peace, freedom, security and prosperity, one could safely argue that the EU enlargement has been a great success. However, the EU has now reached a point where it should question whether it is worth and reasonable to proceed further. Therefore, it has been argued that for the time being, the EU should avoid making any new agreements on future EU membership with neighbouring countries which, under the EU Treaty, might be entitled to claim candidate status sometime in the future. Coping with the accession of the new Member States in 2004 and 2007 consumed considerable energy, while bringing the enlargement process to a conclusion with the countries of the Western Balkans which will demand considerable attention over the next several years. Strict enforcement of 6 In Chapter 12, Gareth Dale compares the democratization process in Central and Southern Europe with the much earlier democratization process in Spain. Brandon Kliewer and Yannis Stivachtis discuss the socialization and democratization effects of EU conditionality on the Central and Eastern European countries in Chapter 9. 7 Christopher Bickerton explores the implications of and lessons learned from the enlargement process in Chapter 6. 8 Joseph Joseph discusses Turkey’s accession to the EU in Chapter 7.

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these criteria is considered to be not only in the interest of current and future Member States but also crucial for retaining public support for the enlargement process. The top priority is the quality of the enlargement process, not timelines or dates. This will ensure that candidate countries are well prepared for EU membership. But it is not only the new Member States that must be ready for the EU; the EU, for its part, must also be ready, financially and administratively, to absorb the new Member States.9 On the other hand, such an approach may disappoint potential and actual candidate states and even contribute to the infringement of the relations between the two parties. The European Council of June 2006 asked the Commission to prepare a special report on all relevant aspects of the EU’s absorption capacity, while some Member States have pressed for a substantive discussion of further enlargement involving all the Member States. The purpose of this discussion is to establish clear rules for completing the current processes and to determine how to ensure strict compliance with these rules. Suggestions have been made intended to improve the quality of the enlargement process by preventing countries from submitting their membership application prematurely. Some Member States feel that there should be an explicit procedure for holding candidate countries to account for inadequate compliance with the political criteria, at any point in the accession negotiations. Finally, Member States like to see the Commission open difficult chapters, like those relating to Justice and Home Affairs, early on in the negotiation process, to prevent important issues from being given short shrift due to time constraints. Another lesson learned from earlier negotiations is that it is inadvisable to set a date for accession before a country has met the necessary criteria. Different countries will require different approaches. However, it needs to be ensured that decisions on enlargement should be clearly identified and conveyed to EU citizens, so they are kept abreast of new developments. Public support is key to the process. Socialization, Democratization and Legitimacy Two years after the French and Dutch referenda, Europe is still in a state of flux. The leap forward that the framers of the EU Constitutional Treaty had envisioned was stymied when the document was rejected by voters in France and the Netherlands. In response, the European Commission and the individual Member States are now working hard to modify the European integration process so that it better meets the needs and expectations of the people of Europe. Although the majority of French and Dutch people may be convinced that the EU is important to the future of the countries concerned, the outcome of the two referenda made clear that support for the European project should not be taken for granted. Many people feel cut off from the workings of the EU and worry about the direction in which the EU is moving. The arguments in support of the legitimacy of European integration are not as persuasive as they once were. The EU must win

9 Charles Anthony Smith investigates the process of ‘judialization’ in Chapter 8 and considers it as the key to European unification and EU expansion.

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over its citizens by offering solutions to the major issues of the present day and of the future. The EU must be visibly active in areas which matter to the public and the business community. Moreover, of particular importance remains the continuation of the socialization and democratization of the new Central, Eastern and Southeastern European Member States through norm diffusion and the quality of political representation in these countries.10 The question remains however, what areas should the EU be involved in, and what should be the extent of European cooperation and integration? The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission are now devoting more attention than ever before to the sensible application of the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ (when should an issue be dealt with at European level, and when at national level?) and ‘proportionality’ (to what extent should the EU concern itself with a particular policy area?), while greater involvement by national parliaments is sought. The decisionmaking process is now more transparent since a significant number of legislative meetings of the European Council are held in public. There is also a greater focus on improving the quality of legislation and limiting administrative costs. Specifically, over the past two years, a number of productive measures relating to EU decision-making were taken under existing treaties. As the first European Conference on ‘Subsidiarity’ that took place in The Hague in November 2005 indicated, the EU Member States have now realized that it is essential that the EU’s decisions are understood and supported by the people of Europe. Making this possible depends, to a large extent, on ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’. Regularly assessing how well draft decisions and EU legislation conform to these principles in consultation with national parliaments can help improve the public’s understanding of the European decision-making process. If a proposed European decision meets the conditions for ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’, EU legislation achieves more than would comparable legislation at national level. If it does not, the matter is better left to the Member States. The renewed and constructively critical interest in the application of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’ will also imply closer attention to the arguments advanced by the Commission on these principles. The Commission itself has also recognized the need to apply these principles more rigorously. In its Communication of 10 May 2006 on the ‘European citizens’ agenda’, the Commission endorsed the importance of respecting the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and in its impact assessments of new proposals it is already devoting more attention to the application of both principles. In September 2005, as part of the better legislation initiative, the Commission decided to scrap 68 draft decisions, including legislation regulating the packaging of coffee and the way retail shops conduct sales. National parliaments should also have an important role to play in assessing the ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’ of European proposals. At the suggestion of the Netherlands, the European Council of June 2006 decided to support the national parliaments more actively in evaluating these principles. The Commission 10 James E. Lennertz examines the issue of political representation in Central and Eastern Europe in Chapter 10. Katalin Fabian discusses norm diffusion in Central and Eastern Europe in Chapter 11.

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promised to make all proposals and consultation papers directly available to the national parliaments and to carefully consider any comments on ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’ made by these assemblies. In order to increase popular support for the EU, national governments are now working to attain the greatest possible degree of transparency for the EU’s institutions and decision-making processes and to make official documents more accessible. On this matter, the European Council of June 2006 took another step forward by making all its meetings on co-decision legislation public as of July 1st, 2006. Finally, the so-called ‘commitology’ decision has been amended, in keeping with the European Parliament’s desire for more power to craft European implementing measures in certain cases. Translating policy priorities into concrete EU policy also helps cultivate public confidence in the EU. The latter must set better priorities for the implementation of its Community reform agenda and concentrate on those areas where it brings added value, like reinforcing the internal market, the Seventh Research Framework Programme, better legislation and trade policy. At the same time, Member States must play their own role by implementing national reform plans that are based on the ‘Lisbon Strategy’. In this way, they could contribute to healthier economic growth and rising employment levels in the EU. At the urging of a number of Member States, the European Council of June 2006 devoted a substantial amount of attention to the content of actual European policy while refraining from making any pronouncements on the content of the Constitutional Treaty or the institutional changes for which it provided. The Commission also supported this approach, as can be seen from its communication of 10 May 2005 on the ‘European agenda for the future’ (‘A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe’). The European Council of June 2006 decided that a ‘Report on the Status of the Constitutional Treaty’ (plus any relevant developments that might occur in the interim) should be presented no later than June 2007, by the German Presidency. The intervening period was regarded to be an opportunity to give serious consideration to the question of what path the EU should take in the future. With respect to the need for further reform, it appears that the time is not yet ripe for substantive conclusions on what, if any, amendments should be made to the EU Treaty. At the European Council of June 2006, most Member States felt it was still too early to resume this discussion. The Member States that ratified the Constitutional Treaty are content with the document as it is. Other Member States take the position that they are unable (or unwilling) to ratify the treaty until the Netherlands and France do so. In short, it is a situation for which the EU has no ready-made solution, a situation requiring further reflection. For these reasons the European Council of June 2006 took a procedural decision on the reform process. Germany was asked by the Council to report on the status of treaty discussions at the conclusion of its Presidency, following extensive consultation with the other Member States. As far as the areas of where particular attention should be given, the informal meeting of Heads of Government at Hampton Court in October 2005 gave a fresh impulse to the additional cooperation necessary to boost Europe’s competitiveness, especially in fields like innovation, research, education and strengthening small and

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medium-size businesses. Agreements were also made to pursue a more effective foreign policy for the EU, safeguard European energy supply, solve transnational environmental problems and tackle challenges connected to migration, internal security and counterterrorism. To a large extent this position rests on the idea that the EU must better uphold and defend its responsibilities and interests in a globalising world populated by many new and diverse players. As a follow-up to the Hampton Court session, Heads of State closely examined the themes of innovation and energy in October 2006. Convergence and Cohesion The measures proposed by some Member States to boost confidence in the EU, and the emphasis on tangible European policy instead of an agenda dominated by the future of the Constitutional Treaty, have been well received by the European Parliament and the European Commission. Many Member States have realized that the gap between Europe and its citizens is not a new phenomenon, nor one confined to France and the Netherlands. It is now widely acknowledged that this gap must be bridged. Increasing the EU’s democratic legitimacy will take hard work. Without exaggerating, it is fair to say that attitudes are beginning to change, even in countries that were in favour of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty and within the European Commission. The latter has demonstrated its new orientation by regularly examining whether certain proposals are consonant with its own mandate or whether the issues in question could be more effectively addressed at national level. Further reinforcing political and societal backing for the EU is of paramount importance before any more steps are taken. Although the period of reflection called for by the European Council of June 2005 was well spent, it is obvious that more time would be necessary. The European Council of June 2006 therefore decided that the time was not yet ripe to issue any final conclusions about the Constitutional Treaty and that further progress would have to be made on concrete European issues. At the same time, the European Council asked Germany to prepare a report by June 2007 during its Presidency on the status of the Constitutional Treaty, as well as any relevant developments that might occur in the interim. It has been argued, that the further deepening and continuation of the concrete European agenda can be achieved, for the time being, by using the current Treaty of Nice to its fullest extent. For the longer term, however, the Treaty of Nice will inevitably have to be amended to keep the enlarged EU effective; to render it more democratic and transparent; to enable it to take on future policy challenges and achieve a better division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Moreover, the Dutch Government took the view that there is no sense in resubmitting the Constitutional Treaty to parliament, in the absence of sufficient political and popular support for the document. At the same time it is clear that the Member States that have ratified the treaty would like to retain it. Other Member States have indicated their intention to refrain from ratification for the time being, in some cases electing to postpone submitting the treaty to their parliaments until it has been ratified by the

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Netherlands and France. In the process of institutional reform, which is expected to be completed in the second half of 2008, Member States will mainly concentrate on treaty amendments that are directly concerned with the European policy agenda and on activities that will strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy. The main objective for 2007-2008 will be implementing specific European policy agreements, some of which are the fruit of the informal Hampton Court meeting, and building greater support for the EU. The main priority now is to better adapt the European integration process to the wishes and expectations of the people of Europe. The agenda of the Finnish Presidency of the second half of 2006 was a good reflection of this well-defined and realistic approach. Achieving further Convergence and Cohesion through Specific Policies Over the past two years, the EU has emphasized the importance of hard results. Consequently, any positive effects stemming from the implementation of the EU’s regional development policies are expected not only to further the coherence and convergence among the various EU Member States and regions but, most important, increase public support for the EU.11 Moreover, national and EU policies aiming at providing a better standard of living and security for the EU citizens would also contribute enormously to the legitimization of the EU.12 The outcome of the informal meeting of heads of state and government at Hampton Court in October 2005 clearly pointed in that direction. That meeting identified six priority areas: research and development, universities, demographic challenges, energy policy, migration and security. The Heads of Government agreed to prepare detailed positions on these themes in aid of future discussions at subsequent European Councils. It may be argued that the Hampton Court meeting generated momentum for the development of the midterm review of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’. This Review formed the centrepiece of the European Council of March 2005, when a decision was reached to stress growth and employment and to draft ‘National Reform Programmes’ based on established, integrated guidelines. The implementation of these ‘National Reform Programmes’ by the Member States is unmistakably contributing to the current economic growth and the rising employment rates in Europe. It has been suggested that the Commission should use country-specific recommendations to compel the Member States to make the necessary changes. The European Council of March 2006 was a useful follow-up to the Hampton Court meeting, stressing the implementation of the national reform programmes mandated by the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ as essential to increasing the dynamism and growth potential of the European economy. The Commission’s Communication of 10 May 2006 on the European agenda for the future (‘A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering 11 Elna Roig seeks to identify and explain the factors that contribute to public support for the EU in Chapter 13. Nathalie Homlong and Elisabeth Springler provide an assessment of the EU’s regional development policies in Chapter 14. 12 Juraj Draxler examines the EU’s response to the demands for better living standards and citizen security in Chapter 15.

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Results for Europe’) also highlights the need to achieve concrete results that meet the public’s expectations. The Finnish Presidency explicitly opted for an agenda that mandates practical steps in areas like innovation and energy. To face the external challenges of globalization, as well as internal challenges like demographic ageing, the EU is obliged to strengthen its economic position. Enhancing the dynamism and growth potential of the European economy is essential. EU must continue to adhere to the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ and the stronger internal market and long-term economic reforms it envisions. This will require an ambitious position on sustainability, which is set out in the updated ‘European Strategy for Sustainable Development’, which was adopted by the European Council of 15-16 June 2006. Enshrined in the EC Treaty, sustainable development is an overarching goal of the EU. Specifically, the renewed strategy couples an ambitious vision of sustainable development with a large number of measures in areas which continue to be dogged by non-sustainable tendencies: climate change, energy consumption, public health, poverty and transport. The added value of the strategy lies in the way it makes a link between policy measures in one area and the implications of those measures for sustainability in other areas. In this way the strategy builds on the actions undertaken by the member states in their national sustainability strategies. One improvement over the original strategy is that the EU’s external action is now integrated into sustainable development policy. An important notion in the strategy is that objectives should be feasible and – wherever applicable – supported by European instruments that make it possible to achieve these objectives. Currently, the main concern with the renewed strategy is its implementation, at both European and Member State level. The strategy is now more action-oriented, complete with specific objectives, timetables and indicators. An implementation and oversight mechanism has been established to ensure that all goes according to plan. The European Council will discuss the strategy’s progress every two years and offer renewed guidance, on the basis of a set of indicators. The Community-based dimension of the ‘Lisbon strategy’ can be observed in the internal market. In the European Council of March 2007, the Commission presented a thorough evaluation of the internal market. As a result, certain questions were raised. For example, how can the EU follow up on the results achieved on the market for goods and services? What new policy should be developed to strengthen the internal market for energy, financial services and workers? To what extent can the internal market lead to social problems? How can the EU employ an integrated internal market to meet the challenges of globalization? These questions do not bare easy answers and they are expected to dominate talks among the Member States for the months and, possibly, years to come. Moreover, Member States will most certainly argue for important priorities like enacting better legislation, removing the remaining obstacles preventing businesses from marketing their goods and services in other countries and strengthening the position of consumers on the internal market. Economic development marked by a healthy labour market and declining unemployment confirms the importance of opening the borders to workers. The free movement of workers stimulates a more dynamic labour market, which is expected

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to contribute to increased economic growth. Some national governments are making every effort to lift the remaining obstacles as soon as possible. This implies first, the introduction of additional policy to enforce terms and conditions of employment; and second, the employment of the experience gained in sectors where the requirements for recruiting workers from the Central and Eastern European member states have already been relaxed. Much remains to be done to fully realize the internal market for services. The services sector accounts for a significant percentage of Member States’ national economies and total employment. Legislation in states like Germany and France include many hindrances. If these are lifted, service providers in other countries can operate more easily on the other side of the border. The political agreement on a directive for an internal market for services, which the Competitiveness Council of 29 May 2006 reached after protracted negotiations, is seen as a step in the right direction. The accord is largely based on the outcome of the plenary European Parliament vote in February 2006 and the modified Commission proposal of 4 April 2006. The main modification is the addition of a screening and notification procedure for national requirements governing the cross-border movement of services. This has been considered a major gain. A well-functioning internal market requires a good business climate, which in turn requires good legislation. The rules must be applied and enforced in a uniform manner throughout the EU. At the same time the legislation should not be too detailed. The Commission has formulated specific plans to cut back on the amount of existing EU legislation. A new method has been developed to measure the administrative burden on businesses. Along with that, impact assessments for new legislation have been strengthened. These measures are designed to keep the Commission, Council and Parliament in full alert when it comes to overseeing the quality and the necessity of EU legislation and regulations. These efforts are meant to strengthen the competitiveness of European companies, especially small and medium-size firms, which have trouble keeping up with all the new rules. For this reason future holders of the Presidency will also have to devote considerable attention to this issue. An uninterrupted supply of reasonably priced energy is a basic need for consumers and businesses alike. Europe is increasingly dependent on imported energy. Owing to this fact, geopolitical trends pose a greater risk to the European energy supply. Climate change wrought by the non-sustainable use of energy is also a cause of great concern. An effective European energy policy is essential. Energy is a transnational issue and the EU will be stronger if it could speak with one voice in negotiations with major energy producer and consumer countries. Energy is high on the European political agenda. At the informal summit at Hampton Court, the British Presidency designated energy as a priority theme. The Spring Council of March 2006, during the Austrian Presidency, agreed that Europe is in need of a new energy policy. This policy should be driven by three primary objectives: increasing the security of energy supply, ensuring the competitiveness of European companies and promoting sustainability. An integrated energy policy is necessary. This means enacting measures that will support all three main objectives. Measures promoting energy efficiency, encouraging new energy technologies and

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strengthening and deepening the internal market can thus contribute to the security of energy supply within the EU. At the initiative of the Netherlands, the Spring Council concluded that the EU would be well served by an external relations strategy that incorporated energy. On the basis of a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP, the European Council of June 2006 discussed the EU’s external energy relations, urging that all available instruments be employed to promote energy supply security. As a result, energy has been linked to the CFSP and ESDP. One of the major issues to be addressed by the European Council is the EU’s relationship with Russia. At the end of 2006, the Commission drew up a strategic evaluation of the energy policy for the first time. On the basis of this, the Spring Council during the German Presidency will seek to adopt an action plan with priority measures to steer the EU’s long-term energy supply in the right direction. The external dimension will be an important component of this plan. As a result, energy will be given an important place in the successor to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with Russia. The partnership with Russia must be based on mutual understanding, interdependence and a transparent and reliable commercial and investment climate. Support will also be given to energy infrastructure that contributes to diversification of suppliers and transport routes. Energy-related challenges require a truly integrated policy, both internally and externally. Fleshing out European energy policy over the next year demands explicit agreements on what instruments should be employed for this purpose. An integrated approach also means better coordination and cooperation between Member States and the Commission. National sovereignty over mineral resources should remain intact, and every Member State should choose its own mix of energy. Internal European energy policy needs to shift up a notch. The ‘Green Paper’ of March 2006 forms a good basis, but it must give rise to specific proposals. A balanced regime is needed for long-term contracts, one that will bolster competitiveness on the European market, offer sufficient incentives to investors and contribute to security of supply. With respect to sustainability, new and more ambitious standards for energy efficiency are needed as are long-term target figures for the proportion of sustainable energy. Some Member States also push for the development of innovative energy technologies like clean fossil fuels and ‘second-generation’ bio-fuels. Along with that investors must be given clear information on how the European emissions trading system will be continued after 2012. The Union also aims to expand the parameters of the Treaty to include the establishment of an Energy Community, which would integrate the energy markets of the Balkan countries with those of the EU, Norway and other EU neighbours. Consequently, the European Neighbourhood Policy is expected to give greater priority to energy. The EU also seeks to initiate a strategic dialogue on energy with major consumer countries like the US, China and India.

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Financial and Monetary Issues Reviewing the current state of the EU financial and monetary affairs, one ultimately focuses on three issues. First, the way in which the European Monetary Union (EMU) has developed and functions; second, the need for a tax reform and its effects on economic development; and third, and most important, the EU financial resources as well as the management, control, and administration of these sources. No debate in European integration has raised so many questions as the one concerning European monetary integration.13 Although in practice the EMU seems to work quite effectively, recently, discussion has focused on the medium- and longrun disruptive potential of EMU especially in the absence of a political union. The latter is seen central in reducing the impact of asymmetric shocks on the public opinion’s assessment of EMU. Moreover, political union – in conjunction with the adoption of a common fiscal policy – increases the benefits of a currency union. Furthermore, by increasing fiscal support to countries in a business cycle downturn, a single budgetary policy could ease the support for EMU and facilitate the legitimacy and implementation of structural reforms. It has been suggested that in the absence of political and fiscal union, the credibility of the member states commitment to EMU is reduced and chances are that the project will collapse producing a disruptive impact on the whole European integration process. One can safely point out that structural reforms have already produced a number of political struggles which have been considered as a natural consequence of the lack of legitimacy of the EMU project and have potential disruptive consequences on the desire of the Member States to keep adhering to a currency union. Many European economists identify the need for EU tax harmonization and point to the success of the flat tax in countries where it has already been implemented, as evidence of its effectiveness. However, the European Commission and several leaders of the largest EU Member States argue that the flat tax would be detrimental to EU tax strategy, as well as to the larger economic climate. Moreover, socio-political factors seem to stand firmly in the way of the flat tax’s implementation in much of Western Europe. It seems, therefore, that there is a significant gap between the purely technocratic approach of the economists, on the one hand, and the political-social approach of the Commission and the individual EU Member States, on the other. In other words, social and political factors are largely ignored by economists who support the implementation of the flat tax in what would otherwise be a worthwhile effort to reform EU tax strategy. Consequently, a central question that needs to be addressed at both the European and national levels is: what factors determine whether or not the flat tax is a viable economic strategy for future economic growth?14 What financial resources the EU will need to realize its policy priorities and achieve tangible results for its citizens? In December 2005, the European Council 13 Leila Simona Talani discusses the future of EMU in Chapter 16. Heather Baca-Greif, Poul Thois Madsen and Esben Tranholm Nielsen explore the common misconceptions about the EMU in Chapter 17. 14 Akis Kalaitzidis examines the issue of tax reform and its implications for economic development in Chapter 17.

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agreed on a new multi-year budget (new Financial Perspective), which is more modern than its predecessors and provides for a more equitable payment position for the Member States. Among other things, the Council agreed on the new ‘Own Resources’ system. During the Finnish Presidency, agreement was also reached on the amendment of the ‘Own Resources Decision’, which governs the size and composition of contributions to the EU by the Member States: the traditional ‘own resources’ (including agricultural levies and customs duties), part of the harmonized VAT base of each member state, and contributions based on the Gross National Income (GNI) of the member states. The ‘Own Resources Decision’ sets a ceiling on the amount that the EU may claim (1.24 per cent of GNI). It also provides for the United Kingdom’s budget rebate and a 75 per cent reduction in the German, Austrian, Swedish and Dutch contribution to it. In December 2005, it was agreed that these countries would also receive varying reductions in their VAT payments for the 2007-2013 period and that the Netherlands and Sweden would also receive gross reductions in their GNI contributions. After consultation with the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors – who play an advisory role – the ratification process started. Before the new ‘Own Resources Decision’ enters into force, it requires ratification by all the national parliaments. Once ratified, the ‘Own Resources Decision’ was adapted in accordance with the new Financial Perspective. The interim evaluation of the multi-year budget is scheduled to take place in 2008-2009. This will be a good opportunity to draw renewed attention to the EU policy priorities and to argue for a new system of funding that is more fair, balanced and transparent. Although the specifics have not yet been finalized, it is still possible to outline some of the main points. The new multi-year budget includes a ‘revision clause’, which calls upon the Commission to undertake ‘a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, including the UK rebate, and to report in 2008/2009’. The clause leaves open the possibility that the review would affect the 2007-2013 period. In the interim period, Member States are expected to raise any questions regarding the budget revision. At the same time, they may search for political allies and in this way attempt to influence the proposals put forward by the European Commission and thus the parameters of the negotiations. During this time it will be critical to know how the Member States will interpret the budget evaluation: as a new round of negotiations on the UK rebate and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or as an open and far-reaching policy evaluation covering all policy areas and budget items? Many Member States are in favour of a broad approach to the review, which should lead to a financial framework that reflects the EU’s new priorities. This means that in considering the EU’s expenditure, the review should address the full breadth of EU policy, including the effectiveness and efficiency of the Structural and Cohesion Funds, the ‘Lisbon strategy’ and the CAP. It is expected that Member States will argue that their contributions to the EU budget be fair, balanced and transparent.

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The EU Budget In the Spring of 2006, the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission reached agreement on a new ‘Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management (IIA)’. This agreement formalized the Financial Perspective for the years 2007-2013. The definitive ceilings for expenditure are nearly identical to those agreed by the European Council in December 2005. The planned expenditure for the 2007-2013 period is 1.045 per cent of GNI for commitments and 1.00 per cent of GNI for payments. This is considerably less than in the original Commission proposal. However, the Financial Perspective 20072013 provides for more investment in competitiveness and security than the current spending framework. The new Financial Perspective is subdivided differently from the current one (2000-2006), in accordance with a Commission proposal intended to bring categories of expenditure more into line with the EU’s goals. Furthermore, IIA contains commitments regarding the budget procedure and the degree of flexibility in preparing and implementing the budget. On 3 May 2006, the Commission adopted the Preliminary Draft Budget for 2007. This was the first budget within the framework of the new Financial Perspective. The Commission proposed raising the commitments appropriations (funds budgeted for new expenditure) by 4.6 per cent in 2007 and the payment appropriations (funds for payments in 2007) by 3.9 per cent, relative to the 2006 budget. There was an especially large proposed rise in expenditure on cohesion policy (a 19 per cent increase in payment appropriations). The new Financial Perspective moves these funds into the growth category. This category also includes the funding for the ‘Lisbon Strategy’. The Commission expected more expenditure on the new Member States and in addition, in 2007, a high level of budget depletion for programmes for the 2000-2006 period, especially in the ‘old’ 15 Member States EU. The Commission’s own figures show a substantial gap in spending of payment appropriations relative to 2005 and the Commission’s predictions. It is important to avoid the situation that arose in the early years of the 2000-2006 period when there were large budget surpluses. No surprise, therefore, when some Member States expressed their belief that first, the Commission’s expenditure proposals to the Council and the European Parliament were somewhat high and that they should be reduced; and second, provision should be made for unforeseen developments during the budget year, in the form of sufficient margins within the sub-ceilings set in the Financial Perspective. Moreover, some Member States argued that the economic realities acknowledged at national level should also apply to the EU budget, especially in view of the budgetary situation in a number of Member States. A qualified majority of the Council supported the proposed draft budget for 2007, which was adopted on 14 July 2006 at first reading. The overall result of the compromise reached is that €125.8 billion is available in commitment appropriations for 2007 (an increase of 3.67 per cent over 2006). Payment appropriations amount to €114.6 billion in the compromise proposal. This represented an increase of 2.26 per cent over 2006, rather than the 3.9 per cent proposed by the Commission. That brought the total margins under the 2007 Financial Perspective to €2.6 billion for commitment appropriations and €9.1 billion for payment appropriations. Total

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payment appropriations amounted to 0.98 per cent of EU GNI. The draft 2007 budget was sent to the European Parliament for its first reading. In November, the Council held its second reading, and the Council and European Parliament tried to reach general agreement on the budget. The second reading by the European Parliament took place in December. With a number of modifications, the budget was finally adopted by the European Parliament. Financial Management and Control In the EU’s management and control system, the Commission bears the ultimate responsibility for implementation of policy and appropriate use of funding. It is largely in the Member States, however, that policy is implemented. The individual Member States thus also bear a share of the responsibility. Together, the Commission and the Member States take charge of implementing the budget. Each November the European Court of Auditors reports the implementations from the previous financial year. Despite the improvements that have been initiated, the European Court of Auditors was again unable to obtain reasonable assurance that the supervisory systems and controls had been applied effectively, so as to limit the risk of the underlying transactions being irregular or illegal. As a result, it did not issue a comprehensive statement of assurance for the eleventh year running. On the basis of the European Court of Auditors’ 2004 annual report, the ECOFIN Council advised the European Parliament on 14 March 2006 to grant discharge. On 27 April 2006, the European Parliament ultimately granted discharge to the Commission for general budget implementation in 2004 and put off granting discharge for its own budget pending further research into the rental of the parliament buildings in Strasbourg. On 15 June 2005, the Commission proposed a roadmap for an internal control framework based on the 2004 European Court of Auditors’ opinion. Using this roadmap, the Commission would like to investigate – in cooperation with the Member States – whether the ‘single audit model’ could enhance the efficiency of audit efforts. The Commission’s proposals were for the most part rejected by the ECOFIN Council in November 2005. Member States had particularly strong objections to the part of the roadmap relating to national declarations. Member States retained the option of submitting declarations on their own initiative. In early 2006, the Commission published a communication converting the portions of the roadmap that had not been rejected into specified actions: the ‘Commission Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework’. This action plan was presented in May 2006 by Commissioner Kallas at the ECOFIN Council. The Finnish presidency led the discussion of this plan, which was finally adopted by the Member States. The new ‘Interinstitutional Agreement’ between the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 contains a new point on improving financial management. This point attributes an important role to simplification of legislation and assigns priority to sound financial management of EU funds under shared management (structural funds and agricultural funds). However, one should not expect that the European

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Court of Auditors will be able to issue a positive statement of assurance in the near future. Financial Regulation The current ‘Financial Regulation’, which came into force on 1 January 2003, provides that a revision is to take place after three years. The Commission presented a proposal for such a revision in 2005. The aim of this revision is to increase efficiency and transparency in the application of the rules, simplify procurement and grant procedures, and streamline and clarify the rules governing methods of management. The new rules entered into force on 1 January 2007 simultaneously with the new Financial Perspective (2007-2013). Once the ‘Financial Regulation’ entered into force, the revision of specific rules on implementation started in accordance with it. The rules needed to be simplified for them to be effective. A simplification which withers away unnecessary legislation is expected to have the desirable effect of reducing the administrative burden. Additionally, the changes proposed by the Commission can promote sound financial management, while any unintended side effects of the current ‘Financial Regulation’ should be reversed. Member States would like to see strict budgetary discipline maintained and the risk of fraud and irregularities kept to a minimum. Suggested Readings Artis, M. and F. Nixson (2002). The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brimmer, Esther and Stefan Frohlich (eds.) (2005). The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement. Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations. Cuadrado-Roura, Juan R. and Marti Parellada (2007). Regional Convergence in the European Union. Springer. Dinan, Desmond (2005). Ever Closer Union. 3rd edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Fitoussi, Jean-Paul and Jacques Le Cacheux (2007). Report on the State of the European Union. Volume 2. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Fitoussi, Jean-Paul and Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2005). Report on the State of the European Union. Volume 1. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Flockhart, Trine (ed.) (2005). Socializing Democratic Norms. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Grabbe, Heather (2006). The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Green Cowles, Maria and Michael Smith (eds.) (2000). The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival. Volume 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haepfer, Christian W. (2002). Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communism Europe. London: Routledge.

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Jabko, Nicolas and Craig Parsons (eds.) (2005). The State of the European Union: With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective. Volume 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leonardi, Robert (2005). Cohesion Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave 2005. McCormick, John (2005). Understanding the European Union. 3rd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Meunier, Sophie and Kathleen R. McNamara (eds.) (2007). The State of the European Union: Making History. Volume 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pridham Geoffrey (2005). Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe. New York: Palgave. Sadeh, Tal (2006). Sustaining the European Monetary Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Schimmelfenning, Franck, S. Engert and H. Knobel (2006). International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Schimmelfennig, Frank and U. Sedelmeir (2005). The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches. London: Routledge. Schimmelfennig, Frank and U. Sedelmeir (eds.) (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zieloka, Jan (ed.) (2001). Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zieloka, Jan and Alex Pravda (eds.) (2001). Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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PART I The European Union as an International Actor

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Chapter 1

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration: The Common Foreign and Security Policy Meltem Müftüler-Baç

One of the most problematic areas in European integration has traditionally been in building a common foreign and security policy, an integral part of political integration. The Treaty on the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, was a breakthrough in that aspect when the Common Foreign and Security Policy was adopted and a concrete step towards political union was taken. Two factors have been especially critical in prompting the European Union members to deepen integration in foreign policy-making: the evolution of the European integration process and the systemic changes in the international order since 1989. The most important hurdle in foreign policy cooperation is that it is traditionally seen as the main responsibility of states. Therefore, a major concern for the EU members is that deepening in these areas would have the potential to impact state competencies and sovereignty. In other words, any gain at the supranational level with respect to foreign policy making would be regarded as a loss of competency at the national level. This is partly the reason why integration in foreign policy making has been painfully slow and remained largely intergovernmental. However, the end of the Cold War provided the momentum and the stimulus to move European integration further by taking the steps towards a political union, most notably in the area of foreign and security policy making. The main obstacles to the common foreign and security policy are posed by the tensions in European integration, such as the tension between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists and from diverging state preferences over the possible role of the EU in foreign and security policies. An important question here is that the extent to which the EU members are ready and willing to transfer their competencies on foreign policy from the national level to the supranational level. The key issue, of course, is whether a collective European interest in foreign policy exists which transcends the national interests of the EU members. When the Cold War ended in 1989, the European order was reconstructed along the path of political integration and one of the main tenets of this political integration was to build a Common Foreign and Security policy. One might argue that the most important stimulus to that process came from systemic restructuring and the subsequent uncertainty. Viewed in this light, the end of the Cold War was critical because the Europeans relied on the bipolar balance of power to deal with

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The State of European Integration

the uncertainty that stems from the anarchical nature of international politics. Its collapse meant that the Europeans would now have to find new mechanisms to deal with uncertainty. The European response was to deepen political integration and move towards an ever closer union. It is partly, for this reason, that harmonization in foreign and security policies became one of the three pillars on which the European Union was structured. The road to political integration coincided with the perception that liberal democracy has triumphed and the world has become a safer place, now that the Soviet threat was dealt with. In the post World War II period, the European Union members left foreign policy and security and defense issues to the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO, established under the leadership of the USA in 1949. As a result, the EU integration process has been particularly slow in terms of 2nd pillar integration. The presence of NATO enabled them to deal with other issues, such as trade and economic integration. However, the European Union’s issues from its own troubled past and the security challenges it faces in the 21st century necessitated the adoption of new mechanisms that goes beyond the traditional protective shield of NATO-the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The EU’s foreign policy making could be approached from two different angles, one is concerned with economic policy making and external relations with third parties on economic issues and the second is concerned with coordination of foreign policy. These have traditionally evolved differently. Economic relations with nonEU members and economic policy making had been mostly the responsibility of the European Commission which handled trade, aid and economic issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the 1st pillar since the early 1960s. On the other hand, the coordination of foreign policy at the supranational level that goes beyond economic decisions has been a much harder process of cooperation. This chapter does not dwell on the economic policy making, even though one should acknowledge that economic decisions are also related to the larger foreign policy objectives of the Union. This chapter addresses the evolution of the EU’s CFSP and analyses the obstacles in furthering the EU’s foreign and security policy and enhancing the role the EU plays in international politics. This is important because if the European states are to deal with the security risks of the 21st century and if the European Union is to proceed along the road towards quasi-statehood, then 2nd pillar integration plays a critical role in that aspect. In other words, the evolution of the CFSP and the challenges it faces will determine the road of European political integration. The Evolution of the European Union’s CFSP Cooperation in security issues and foreign policy making has always been one of the hardest areas in the European integration process due to the nature of policy making in these areas. This is a result of the perception that foreign policy making is the main responsibility of nation states and national governments. Thus, foreign policy making at the supranational level has been subject to objections and obstacles stemming from this notion of equating foreign policy decisions with national,

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

5

domestic politics. According to Michael Smith, this is because of the notion that ‘foreign policy is the embodiment of national aims and interests, pursued through the mobilization and application of national resources’ (Smith 1994: 287). Following the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has taken significant steps in furthering integration in foreign and security policies, so that by the end of the 20th century, the EU has evolved to the extent to which a transfer of competencies from the national level to the supranational has become possible over the foreign policy areas as well. Consequently, the situation right now is that ‘the EU could formulate and implement foreign policy, even though foreign policy is an area traditionally considered to be at “the heart” of state sovereignty and thus off-limits to state cooperation’ (K. Smith 2004: 3). The critical element here is the emergence of an EU level collective interest on foreign policy issues. If one applies the rational intergovernmentalist logic to 2nd pillar integration, then it could be argued that the CFSP developed as a result of convergence of interests among the EU members to exert a credible presence in international politics. Even though the Maastricht Treaty represented the quantum leap in EU foreign policy cooperation, this does not mean that there were no initial attempts to build the institutional set-up for foreign policy and security integration. The first attempts for building a Common Foreign policy were the agreements signed in the 1950s, with the Pleven plan of 1950. The French Prime Minister Rene Pleven has devised a plan to create a European defense structure that would allow the German remilitarization under a supranational umbrella. This plan formed the basis of the European Defence Community- EDC Treaty signed in Paris on 27 May 1952. The EDC brought along with itself the European Political Community-as a supranational political authority. Even though at its earlier stages, there was great enthusiasm about the project, the problems arose in the ratification stage when the French National Assembly did not ratify the Treaties in August 1954 and effectively killed the EDC and EPC. Most importantly, ‘the EDC left an interesting legacy. Having marked the high point of European federalist aspirations, the failed proposal quickly the aura of a great opportunity lost’ (Dinan 1999: 27). Thus, the first attempt towards a European security community was defeated in its earliest stages. This experience also was important in terms of its implications for the larger European integration process because it demonstrated the difficulties in achieving integration at high politics, most specifically on security and defense issues. The second major attempt to have cooperation for foreign and security policies within the premises of European integration came in 1962 with the French President Charles de Gaulle’s initiative, the Fouchet Plan, designed by the French Ambassador Fouchet for the overall aim of creating a common foreign and security policy. The plan was short-lived, and did not achieve its objectives. However, it paradoxically led to the emergence of a Franco-German axis in Europe that became institutionalized with the 1963 Elysee Treaty. Interestingly, the Elysee Treaty became a cornerstone for further integration in the decades to come when the German and the French leaders used the institutional premises of the Treaty for dialogue and to develop a mutual understanding of consultation with one another. The Franco-German axis of European integration became a force of its own to be reckoned with.

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The State of European Integration

The third attempt materialized in the 1970s with the emergence of European Political Co-operation as the European integration process acquired a more intergovernmental character. EPC has evolved largely due to member state preferences, mostly French, and remained out of the institutional structure of the European Community as established by the 1957 Rome Treaty. ‘The EPC was formed for a number of reasons: to balance the EC’s economic weight, to allow member states to speak with one voice in world affairs, and as a step towards political union’ (Smith, K. 2004: 8). Thus, the most important aspect of the EPC was that it provided the basis for coordination among the members of the then EC but also allowed the arrangements that would safeguard the protection of state sovereignty and competencies. From the Paris declaration of 1974, that set the basis of the EPC to 1986 and the Single European Act, the EPC survived outside the community pillar as an intergovernmental area of cooperation. The 1986 Single European Act gave a formal status to the EPC by incorporating it into the EC legal texts and by establishing a secretariat for the EPC in the European Council premises in Brussels (Title III, Article 30). Nonetheless, it still continued as an intergovernmental initiative. The EPC’s first main test came with the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent oil crisis with the OPEC embargo demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the European economy and required a coordinated foreign policy from the members of the then European Community. The Middle Eastern conflicts illustrated the need for the EC to develop and assert an international identity and visibility. The most visible manifestation of that international identity came in 1980 with the Venice Declaration of the European Community where the European Community heads of government declared for the first time that the Palestinian political rights have to be recognized in the Middle East peace process (Soetendorp 1999: 103). The European Union’s position in the Middle Eastern peace process became more clearly defined in the 1990s. The Peace Conference for the Middle East was held in Madrid in 1991 and the European Union assumed a significant role in the bilateral talks between the parties as well as an important contributor to the multilateral working groups on regional economic development, water, environment, disarmament and the Palestinian refugees. In order to increase the credibility in the supporting the Middle East peace process, the EU created a Special Envoy to the Middle East in 1996. The increased role that the EU played in the Middle East in the 1990s was also partly a result of the desire to operationalize the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 1992 with the Treaty on the European Union. Thus, one could argue that even though the European presence in the Arab-Israeli conflict began in the 1970s within the framework of the EPC, it was the adoption of the CFSP that provided a clearer direction to European foreign policy. Finally with the Maastricht Treaty, the EPC gave way to the CFSP. The common denominator in the previous experiences and attempts for a common European foreign and security policy was that all remained largely ineffective and weak. Their failures stemmed from the notion that foreign policy is an area that should be left to national governments; especially because of the lack of a collective interest at the supranational level that binds all member states together. The proponents of European integration came to realize that the creation of a common European foreign and security policy would be highly problematic at the

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

7

supranational realm and would have a better chance of survival if it develops on an intergovernmental basis. Thus, the evolution of the EU’s CFSP is shaped by the very nature of its impact on state competencies and sovereignty. The breakthrough for the European common foreign policy came at the end of the Cold War with the systemic transformation caused by the demolition of the bipolar balance of power institutions. One could easily argue that the end of the Cold War provided the European states with a collective interest: to deal with the emerging uncertainty. The Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP When the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, a major step was taken in the direction of deepening political integration via the adoption of a common foreign and security policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy were adopted as a separate pillar on its own, the 2nd pillar of the European Union, under the Treaty on the European Union, and replaced the EPC. According to Title V of the Treaty on the European Union, ‘The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy’. The end of the Cold War in 1989 was a motivating factor that gave a significant boost to the formation of a European level common foreign policy because it created a collective interest at the European level for all member states. This is because the end of the Cold War eradicated the main source of certainty that the European states relied upon to deal with anarchy at the international level; the bipolar balance of power. These structural changes at the international level created a common interest among the European states to find new mechanisms to deal with the systemic transformation underway, which turned out to be political integration and the adoption of the CFSP. This is in line with rational intergovernmentalist theory that puts member state preferences at its core (Moravcsik 1998) and the main mechanism leading to changes in preferences on foreign and security policy is the alternation in the external security environment. Consequently, the European integration proceeded onto the next level, political integration. In other words, uncertainty in the post-Cold War era paved the way for an ever closer union for the European Community with the CFSP as a main pillar of integration, albeit an intergovernmental one. This was an important step in institutionalizing common foreign policy at the European level; however, there was consensus among the EU members that the CFSP would remain intergovernmental, because of the diverging member state preferences over the role of the EU in foreign policy making. The CFSP was the result of intergovernmental bargaining and compromise. In places, the text is intentionally, if frustratingly, vague and existing practices were either confirmed or complicated unnecessarily by the creation of the second pillar. (Holland 1993: 7)

The adoption of the CFSP as an intergovernmental pillar meant that the institutions of the 1st pillar would have minimum involvement in the formulation of a common foreign policy. This also meant that since European Court of Justice did not have any jurisdiction on the CFSP, there was no supranational way of enforcing member state compliance with the CFSP. The formulation of the CFSP in this manner with

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The State of European Integration

minimum role for the supranational institutions illustrated the perceptions among the EU members that foreign policy coordination is an area where national interests still play the most important role and where symbolic value of the statehood remains still strong. According to Deighton, ‘ … the pillared structure itself was in part considered as the member states’ firebreak against excessive supranationalism in the still sensitive area of external relations’ (Deighton 2002: 725). The European Council remained the main responsible body for the CFSP; however COREPER – the Committee of Permanent Representatives-was given a key role in coordination between member states and working groups on the CFSP. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council would define and determine the CFSP, as a result, the EPC secretariat was turned into a CFSP unit under the Council Secretariat. The decisions to be adopted under the CFSP umbrella are prepared by the Political Committee, the Directors of the member states’ foreign ministries and then are subject to unanimous vote by the foreign ministers. The Commission, however, could submit proposals under the CFSP in areas covered by the Directorate Generale on External Relations and since enlargement turned out to be most effective tool under the CFSP, the Directorate Generale on Enlargement also plays an important role. The role that the Commission plays under the CFSP would be better understood if one analyses the tools for the CFSP. The most important tools that the EU had for achieving its objectives under the CFSP are the trade agreements, financial aid packages, association agreements and enlargement. It is through these tools that the Commission was mostly involved in the CFSP. For example, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposal of July 1997 to declare some applicant countries as candidates, and to begin accession negotiations, was an important step under the CFSP. The nature of these tools also demonstrates that the greatest strength of the EU lies in its civilian power character, rather than hard power. That is because the EU relies on economic measures and incentives to realize its foreign policy objectives. As a result of the civilian nature of the foreign policy tools, the Commission comes to play an important role under the CFSP. This is also how economic policy making and foreign policy would be tied in the CFSP context. The trade, aid packages and/or association agreement negotiated by the Commission with 3rd parties act as advancing the EU’s foreign policy objectives as well. The highest impact in that respect is exerted by the membership incentive and EU conditionality. The EU’s civilian power becomes most explicit on states in the European continent which aspire for full membership, and the carrot of material benefits through membership enables the Union to influence such countries’ political and economic policies as well as their foreign policy choices. The CFSP was to be the main representative tool for declarations on issues relating to foreign policy and the declarations would represent the ‘EU’ rather than the separate member states. This notion paved the way for developing two main instruments under the CFSP: joint actions and common positions. Common positions are mechanisms to establish systematic cooperation on a day-to-day basis and the joint actions are mechanisms to have member states act together in a coordinated manner. The joint actions enabled the EU member states to ‘assert its identity on the international scene’ as aimed by the Treaty on the European Union (Title 1,

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

9

Common Provisions). What is particularly important is that once a common position or a joint action is decided upon by unanimity, then the member states would abide by its conditions and conclusions. This was a novel aspect of the CFSP that differed significantly from EPC and a step in moving beyond intergovernmentalism in the 2nd pillar. The EU’s position would be presented to the third parties through a Troika formula where the member state holding the Presidency of the Council, along with the previous and the next member states together with the Commission would collectively present the Union. This is to ensure continuity of foreign policy and objectivity by preventing the CFSP to be used by one Member State to advance its own narrow foreign policy objectives through the Union framework. Even though the CFSP was only an initial attempt to common decision-making in foreign policy, it still was considered too ambitious by certain member states. Denmark, for example, ratified the Treaty of Maastricht after the initial referendum rejection, only when it was given the permanent opt-out from the 2nd pillar. Once the Maastricht Treaty became operational in 1993, the EU was able to exert a more credible presence in international politics through the CFSP. The CFSP in Action In the 1990s, the main test cases for the CFSP came with the Balkans crisis and the Central and Eastern European states’ integration into Europe. The end of the Cold War presented the EU with a major problem, the need to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe and to deal with the demands for membership coming from these countries. This, in turn, brings us to one of the most important tools of EU foreign policy making; enlargement. The main tools that the EU utilized under the CFSP were civilian in character with enlargement playing the most effective role. New challenges were posed by the post Cold War enlargement of the EU, most notably towards the Central and Eastern European countries. The European Union’s deepening and widening projects were attempts to strengthen the new world order and to stabilize the European continent by bringing in the former Warsaw Pact countries back to Europe. Thus, one of the main motives for the EU’s enlargement process launched in 1990s was security related and aimed at making the European continent safer. As a result, the EU’s enlargement policy adopted in the 1990s was partly motivated to bring security and stability to the European continent by overcoming the divisions of the Cold War years. Similarly, the EU’s position on Cyprus’ membership was in line with the CFSP objectives; the initial thought was through the EU membership perspective, the EU would be able to bring an end to the division of the island and achieve a political solution that provided elusive under various United Nations plans since 1974 (Müftüler-Baç and Güney 2005). However, the tools under the CFSP were not only confined to enlargement. The Pact for Stability in Europe-the Balladur plan-of 1993 needs to be mentioned as one of the first tools-a joint action- adopted by the EU under the CFSP to settle the border conflicts and minority rights problems in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the EuroMediterranean Partnership, the Barcelona Process of 1995, aimed at the prevention of conflicts in the Mediterranean neighbors and to contribute to economic development

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The State of European Integration

in these countries. Instability in the Mediterranean Region carries significant security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into the European territory (Mahncke 2004). In addition, stability in this region is essential to prevent unwanted migration from the Mediterranean to Europe. The European Neighborhood Policy adopted in 2004 also carried similar objectives encompassing the Eastern borders of the EU. The tools were in line with the overall CFSP objective ‘to contribute to the prevention of and settlement of conflicts’. As with every step in integration, the adoption of the CFSP created the need and pressure for deepening in the 2nd pillar which led to the new provisions on the CFSP under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty aimed to fill some of the gaps left open by the Maastricht Treaty and to take the CFSP further. First, the Amsterdam Treaty has devoted Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on the European Union on matters related to the CFSP and its Article 18 allowed for the Commission to be involved in the CFSP. Second, it incorporated the Petersberg tasks of the WEUagreed on in 1992- into the EU’s CFSP and specifically stated that the EU’s security related mission in terms of ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace keeping’. Third, the Amsterdam Treaty created the post of Mr.CFSP-High Representative for the CFSP to be the face and the name of European Union foreign policy. Javier Solana assumed the post of High Representative in 1999 when the Amsterdam Treaty was put into force. Fourth, the Treaty paved the way for holding operations under EU/ WEU leadership without unanimous decision-making by introducing the concept of ‘constructive abstention’ by allowing those members who do want to become involved to remain outside of a decision or an operation without blocking the others and without using the veto power. Fifth, it added two more instruments- principles and guidelines and common strategies-to the CFSP on top of the already existing instruments of common positions and joint actions adopted by the Maastricht Treaty. Sixth, it created the early warning unit under the Council in order to enable the CFSP to prepare in advance for conflicts rather than remain largely reactive. All in all, these were important steps towards the operationalization of the CFSP goals. In short, the Amsterdam Treaty attempted to further institutionalize the EU’s CFSP by adopting series of institutional changes, however, the pressing problems in the European foreign policy remained untouched, such as the intergovernmental character of CFSP and its being dependent on the will of the EU member states. An equally pressing problem was the continuing absence of the defense component from the 2nd pillar integration. Title V, Article J4 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union stated, ‘the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common security policy, which might in time lead to a common defense’. What is important here is that the Maastricht Treaty already incorporated the possibility of a common defense for the future. The Balkans crisis was a major turning point for the CFSP because it highlighted the difficulties and obstacles in making the EU speak with one unified voice in foreign policy. The evolution of the EU’s common foreign policy in the 1990s demonstrated that if the European Union is to become an international actor on its own right, then this requires the adoption of new tools and mechanisms to increase integration at the

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

11

political level. Particularly important here is the fact that the EU needs to develop mechanisms to exert some military power. More importantly, this translated into the need to develop a defense policy with the big D rather than only a common foreign and security policy. In other words, the CFSP would not have any meat or muscle to it if it also did not acquire a defense character. This is why in 1998; there was an additional activity on the 2nd pillar with the proposals to increase the European Union’s role in European defense and security. The 1998, St.Malo Summit between the United Kingdom and France became critical in that aspect. UK and France jointly decided in their mini-summit in St.Malo to give new momentum to the EU’s 2nd pillar integration by developing mechanisms with which the aims of the Treaties could be put into action. This is why one could actually conceptualize the St.Malo declaration as the trigger and the founding principle of the European Security and Defense Policy-ESDP. These are in line with the EU’s attempt to deepen its integration at the 2nd pillar and to acquire more military muscle. The EU’s defense role under the ESDP is addressed in another chapter in this volume; however, one needs to note the linkage between CFSP and the ESDP in this manner. At the end of the 20th century, a major challenge to the EU’s CFSP came from the systemic transformation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the USA. The changing security conditions and risks following the 9/11 attacks against the USA put terrorism on the forefront of security risks, thereby further complicating the already uncertain international environment. It is in response to the systemic challenges and transformation of the post-9/11 order that the EU took additional steps in the CFSP. Two important developments need to be noted here; the decisions taken in June 2002 European Council and the 2003 Security Strategy Document. In the June 2002 Seville European Council, the European Union members adopted a new position on the CFSP ‘embracing all Union policies, included by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy-CFSP’ and the European Council declared that the ‘CFSP can play an important role in countering this threat to our security’ (Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, June 2002). The Seville European Council, therefore, was a first step in identifying the terrorist threat as an integral part of the CFSP. The future direction of the CFSP in the post-9/11 international order was clarified with the Strategy Document for European Security adopted in the EU Council of December 2003. With this document, the EU identified its main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Strategy document for European security focused on the dangers of instability in the perimeters of the EU. As the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana declared in 2003 ‘the integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean’. (Solana 2003: 9). Similarly, terrorism in these areas constitutes a major threat for the EU. It is for this reason that new tools under the CFSP were adopted in line with the Strategy Document for European Security. These new security risks and the 2004 enlargement of the EU prompted the EU member states to devise a new tool under the CFSP to realize the objectives

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The State of European Integration

raised in the Strategy Document: The European Neighborhood Policy. The ENP was developed as a tool to stabilize the European borders both in the East and in the Mediterranean. ENP was similar to the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in terms of its objectives-to bring economic and security benefits to countries in the periphery of the EU without a membership perspective. Thus, the adoption of the ENP point out that the EU is relying on economic measures and its political conditionality to stabilize the EU’s borders, in line with the soft power character of the EU. The European Commission’s 2003 Communication on ‘reinvigorating EU actions and democratization with Mediterranean partners’ operationally define how this is to be achieved-mainly by bringing democracy and rule of law to these countries coupled with a package of economic benefits. According to the European Commission, ‘The ENP is a differentiated policy, offering bilateral incentives and opportunities, in addition to the multilateral nature of the Barcelona Process e.g. where Barcelona envisages trade integration focusing on tariff issues, the ENP goes beyond to offer economic integration, inclusion in networks’. The ENP and the Euro-Med are important tools under the CFSP to have coordinated foreign policy towards the EU’s neighbors with the overall aim of providing for European stability and security. The Strategy Document for European Security is the main framework for the future of the 2nd pillar development. It is a Document that does not draw traditional territorial lines for defense and is flexible in terms of the tools that could be adopted for European foreign and security policy. The main idea in the Document is to build a security identity for the EU with the overall goal of creating and strengthening the zone of security around the EU and stabilizing the European Union’s borders. To sum up, the EU’s evolution of the CFSP has been largely motivated by the external factors, most importantly the systemic transformations first in 1991 and then in 2001. This, of course, is not to deny the role played by the internal dynamics and member state preferences in foreign and security policies. The future development of the EU’s foreign and security policies is determined by the challenges to which the European integration is subject to, posed by both internal and external forces. The Challenges to the CFSP in post-9/11 International Order In the 21st century, the main challenges to the EU’s CFSP can be grouped under two different categories; those posed by endogenous factors- internal problems within the larger context of European integration- and those that are posed by exogenous factors- challenges posed by the international structure. In terms of the exogenous factors, the systemic transformation in post-9/11 period and the subsequent crisis between the USA and the Europeans are the most important challenges. In terms of endogenous factors, the challenges are mainly posed by the limits, pace and the nature of European integration. To turn to the role played by the exogenous factors, international restructuring, the Transatlantic crisis of the early 21st century and the US-European relations are important developments one needs to analyse in order to assess the constraints under which the EU’s CFSP is being shaped. The main shock to the international and

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

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European order came on September 11, 2001 when the terrorist attacks against the USA brought new security challenges and issues for international security in general and European security in particular. New Security Risks Posed by Systemic Transformation The September 11 2001 attacks to the USA changed the definition of what constitutes a security risk. What sets the post-9/11 order distinctly different from the Cold War balance of terror is its non-state character, as mainly individuals and non-state organizations become the actors challenging international security. In short, since 9/11, there is a profound change in terms of where security risks come from and in terms of what constitutes a security risk. Since states are no longer the main adversaries, the classical forms of deterrence that characterized strategic thinking for centuries no longer suffice to deal with these new risks. After the Cold War terror mutated from the logic of deterrence based on a nuclear balance of terror into a new imbalance of terror based on a mimetic fear and asymmetrical willingness and capacity to destroy the other without the formalities of war. This imbalance is furthered by the multiple media, which transmit powerful images as well as triggering psychological responses to the terrorist events. (Der Derian 2005: 23)

The emerging security problems for the European continent then seems less in line with the Cold War realities and requires new sets of responses. Rather than deterring a potential state as the main aggressor, there is now the need to deal with unknown risks originating from unspecified enemies. There are two different components in the new responses to deal with the challenges of the 21st century, one is to keep it up in terms of military capabilities and the other is to develop a new understanding between different cultures that seem to be at odds with one another. The American neoconservative defense establishment that happened to be in power when September 11 hit already had a plan for reconstructing the world around ‘the Project for the New American Century’. This plan involved an American foreign policy that uses force against countries suspected of supporting terrorism, hostile to Western ideology, eradicate weapons of mass destruction from rogue states and protection of Israel (Gaddis 2002). However, this position did not go very well with all of the European allies. In addition, the post-9/11 period is important for the signals it presented for the Europeans’ role in security and defense and the diverging positions of different EU member states. That brings us to the second main factor that is shaping the EU’s CFSP: the Transatlantic relations. The Transatlantic Relations The post Cold War period has seen a diverging path between the Americans and the Europeans, which became more visible following the post-9/11 attacks against the USA. The international system has passed through a transformation as the Americans and Europeans seemed to follow different paths of conflict resolution and crisis management (Peterson and Pollack 2003; Stevenson 2003). In the period from

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The State of European Integration

2001-2003, the USA has increasingly favoured unilateral policies with the European powers trying to push for multilateral solutions. It has also become a commonplace to argue following Kagan’s propositions that the Americans and the Europeans have different conceptualizations of power (Kagan 2003). In addition, the European and American conceptualization of terrorism and the measures taken against terrorism also differ. That is probably partly why there was a divergence between the USA and the Europeans over the war against terrorism, that does not mean that all the European states think in a similar fashion, for example, the UK is close to the USA in both the definition of security risks terrorism poses and the responses to be taken, whereas France and Germany favour diplomatic measures rather than direct use of force. A real turning point for American and European relations came with the Iraqi intervention in 2003. The American use of force against Iraq in spring 2003 has led to new debates about international norms, legitimate use of force as well as pre-emptive strike as a tool of foreign policy. These new threats to security opened a road towards dividing the world along new demarcation lines in the 21st century. In January 2002, the American President George W. Bush defined an ‘axis of evil’ which included Iran, Iraq and the North Korea as the main threats to peace and stability to the Western order and one month later in February 2002, he called upon ‘a monumental struggle of good versus evil’. These declarations reflected the new path in international politics where different camps were demarcated from another and others through these ideological lenses, reminiscent of the emergence of two camps during the Cold War between capitalism and communism. The use of force against Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 were justified within the general framework of this monumental struggle of good versus evil. The war in Iraq as portrayed in this light, however, had an unexpected consequence, it has highlighted the divergence between the USA and European powers such as France and Germany over the international system and norms, the so called Transatlantic divide (Gordon 2003; Steinberg 2003; Yost 2002). The Transatlantic crisis of 2003 demonstrated that there is always the possibility of a split between the Americans and the EU and that the EU needs to rely on its own power for future security. In this fashion, the Transatlantic crisis of 2003 also illustrated the cleavages inside the EU over security preferences between the Europeanists and the Atlanticists. Interestingly, the Transatlantic relations and the ups and downs it passed through following 9/11 attacks have illustrated in an indirect fashion, the internal problems in the process of European integration, the diverging member state preferences over the CFSP and the lack of political will among EU member states to take integration at the 2nd pillar forward. This, in turn, takes us to the role of endogenous factors in shaping the EU’s CFSP and the lack of political will among EU member states with respect to the EU’s security aspirations. Equally important in that realm is the diverging preferences of the member states with respect to 2nd pillar issues and integration. Political Will and Commitment of the EU Member States One of the main stumbling blocks to further integration on foreign and security policies and in opening the road for an increased role that the EU could play in

The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration

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foreign and security issues is the EU’s member states’ lack of political will with respect to 2nd pillar integration. The EU could acquire a common foreign, security and defense policy only if the EU member states are committed to its development. This commitment could be signaled by the readiness to contribute to the EU’s security role in material and moral aspects. In terms of material aspects, the member states’ contribution to Helsinki Headlines Goals, the European Capability Action Plan-ECAP of 2002, and the budgetary contributions are essential. Who pays for the military operations is still a taunting question, even though Article 28 of the Treaty on the European Union explicitly states that the operational costs for military operations are the responsibility of the participating member states. The financial and budgetary implications of operations are still relatively uncertain. In terms of moral aspects, the emergence of a collective identity around the EU’s possible security and defense role would be necessary. In all these aspects, the EU still has a long way to go. Unless there is a demonstration of political will by the EU member states to cooperate on foreign and security policies, the EU will not proceed on the road of 2nd pillar integration. According to Hill, the development of the CFSP has been subject to … the contradictions between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so (Hill 1996: 5).

In addition, the main problems remain deeply vested in the integration process. Thus, one could conceptualize the evolution of the CFSP as reflecting the challenges in taking integration forward towards developing the EU in a more federal outlook. Furthermore, the different preferences of the member states over the EU’s CFSP play the most crucial role in shaping security cooperation. There are two important processes here, one concerns the diverging preferences between the EU member governments and the other concerns the extent to which foreign and security issues should involve the EU institutions. The current logic seems to indicate that some member states are more important in that realm of integration and that the EU institutions should play a limited role if any. For example, ‘Blair’s infamous private Downing Street dinner party in October 2001, to which only key Union members were invited until the existence of the meeting was leaked, spoke volumes about some of the shortcomings of the institutions’ (Deighton 2002: 735). That is why the Iraqi war was important in terms of its impact on the EU member governments’ positions on the CFSP. The American intervention in Iraq in 2003 caused a significant split within the EU and signaled a crisis among the EU members over the future of the CFSP. Member states such as UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark sided with the USA and its mission in Iraq whereas France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg opposed it on grounds of international legitimacy. The crisis reached its peak when these 4 states held a mini-summit on 29 April 2003 to further European efforts in security realm by adopting a plan for European defense union with military headquarters and armament agency. Even though, the plan did not materialize it was sufficient to illustrate the cleavages and splits over European security and defense among the European Union members. What is equally important is that the split inside the EU at the time also demonstrated that the cooperation at

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The State of European Integration

the security and defense level in the European Union is still very fragile and could crumple down at the first major crisis as it did in 2003. The mobilizing force for getting 2nd pillar integration back on track was provided by terrorist attacks on the EU soil. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 provided an incentive for the EU member governments to adopt a joint position on security risks. It is, for this reason, that the Solidarity Clause of the Constitutional Treaty was drafted to encourage EU governments’ commitment to the CFSP. The Solidarity Clause of Article 42 of the Constitutional Treaty reads as: ‘The Union and its member states shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity … the Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources’ (Missoroli 2003: 404). In addition, the Constitutional Treaty foresees an integration of tasks under the CFSP currently divided between the Commission and the Council to be reconciled with the establishment of an ‘External Action Service’ and the creation of a new post, ‘European Foreign Minister’. These are crucial steps in order to make the EU speak with one unified voice in foreign policy. Even though the Constitutional Treaty is yet to be ratified, the drawing up of these Articles is important for generating a European level awareness of mutual obligations and responsibilities member states carry with respect to their common foreign policy and security goals. Conclusion This chapter argued that the evolution of the EU’s CFSP has been motivated by the systemic level factors and subjected to brakes coming from the dynamics of the integration process. The factors that slowed down integration in foreign and security policies were the nature of the integration process and the past experiences in that realm as well as the diverging member state preferences. In addition, the possible impact that coordination and integration in foreign, security and defense policies would have on state sovereignty is a critical factor in determining the future of 2nd pillar integration. Interestingly, it is the systemic transformations and restructuring that motivated the EU member governments to deepen integration in foreign, security and defense policies. The key factor here is the emergence of a collective level interest on the CFSP. The adoption of the CFSP in 1992 was largely motivated by the international balances of power. Similarly, the systemic shock caused by 9/11 attacks provided new incentives for the EU’s 2nd pillar integration. In order to assess the future of the European Union’s security role, one needs to place it in the larger context of the role that the EU would play at the global level. The emerging post-9/11 international security environment revolves around a new polarization in world politics. The role that the European Union could play in that new distribution of power is critical in determining the future of the CFSP. However, the most important determining factor in terms of the EU’s 2nd pillar integration is the pace of European integration and whether the EU is moving along the road towards a federal state or would remain largely an intergovernmental organization. Therefore, it is the member states’ preferences and position along this continuum that would determine the future of the CFSP.

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References Deighton, Anne (2002). ‘The European Security and Defense Policy’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 719-41. Der Derian J, (2005). ‘Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos, Ethos’. Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 23-37. Dinan, Desmond (1999). Ever Closer Union. New York: Palgrave. Gaddis, John Lewis (2002). ‘A Grand Strategy of Transformation’. Foreign Policy, vol. 133, pp. 50-57. Hill, Christopher (1996). The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Holland, Martin (1993). ‘Introduction: CFSP: Reinventing the EPC Wheel?’. In Martin Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy. London, Pinter. Kagan, Robert (2003). Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred Knopf. Mahncke, Dieter, Rees, Wyn, and Thompson, Wayne (2004). Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations. Manchester University Press: Manchester. Missiroli, Antonio (2004). ‘From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defense: Core Documents Volume IV’. Chaillot Papers 67, Paris, EU Institute for Security. Moravcik, Andrew (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Güney, Aylin (2005). ‘The European Union and the Cyprus Problem’. Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 275-287. http: //www. atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-MaloDeclarationText.html The Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June 1999. Peterson, John and Pollack, Mark (2003). Europe, America, Bush. New York: Routledge. Smith, Karen (2004). The Making of EU Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave. Smith, Michael (1994). ‘The European Union: Foreign Economic Policy and the Changing World Arena’. Journal of Economic Public Policy, vol. 1, no. 2. Soetendorp, Ben (1999). Foreign Policy in the European Union. London: Longman. Solana, Javier (2003). ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’. December 12. Steinberg, James (2003). ‘Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations’. Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 113-146. Stevenson, Jonathan (2003). ‘How Europe and American Defend Themselves’. Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2, March/April, pp. 75-90. Yost, David S. (2002). ‘Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe’. International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 277-300.

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Chapter 2

The European Security and Defence Policy: Capabilities and Institutions Gülnur Aybet

The creation of a European security and defence policy separate from NATO, is a goal that has been pursued with varied upheavals and limited success since the 1950s. Therefore its origins go back well beyond the Maastricht treaty which for the first time acknowledged the ‘eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.’1 In fact, the creation of a separate European defence can be traced back to 1946 with the call by federalists in Europe at the time to create a ‘European army’. This was followed in the 1950s with the failed European Defence Community initiative, which eventually led to the creation of the Western European Union in 1954 – an organization which remained dormant for the duration of the Cold War until its absorption into the EU’s defence and security policy under the Second pillar of the Treaty on European Union in 2000. From the 1950s to 2000, these endeavours to create a separate European defence and security policy have consistently faced the dilemma of matching the politically driven process of institution creation with the grave reality of insufficient capabilities which never seemed to meet any target for improvement. This dilemma has become more acute since two developments: First, the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 which addressed an earnest search for a European grand strategy in the aftermath of the transatlantic fall out over Iraq. A grand strategy cannot be implemented with institutions alone, but is in need of military capabilities to fulfil its scope of missions. Furthermore, the EU strategy does not answer the crucial question as to what an ESDP is for. This is where the nuances between the ESDP’s function as a political rather than military tool have to be examined against the backdrop of institution building, emerging threats, capabilities and what security for Europe means. The second development which makes this dilemma more acute has been the transatlantic capabilities gap. This has become more significant in the aftermath of NATO’s Prague summit which unveiled a very ambitious programme of military transformation after September the 11th. This chapter explores the origins of this dilemma in the historical quest for a European security and defence policy during the Cold War and then follows it through the important milestones in the development of an ESDP in the post Cold War era. During this period of institution building from the Anglo-French declaration in St Malo in 1998 to the Nice Summit of 2000 which established the ESDP institutions, 1

Article J.4.1, Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992.

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the so-called Berlin-plus procedures for the sharing of assets and capabilities with NATO were also resolved. Throughout this time, the Petersberg tasks which refer to the scope of military missions adopted by the WEU in 1992, were incorporated into the EU. Perhaps the second most intense phase in the development of the ESDP since the period from St Malo to Nice, came after the Iraq crisis of 2003. Now with a programme of improving capabilities in place and the resolution of the participation issue for non EU member states, the Iraq crisis became a catalyst for the search for a common EU strategy. A strategic vision behind ESDP was found lacking before Iraq, particularly vis a vis the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, outlining the concept of ‘proactive counter–proliferation’ for pre-emptive action and a ‘coalition of the willing’ to carry it out ( Daalder, Lindsay and Steinberg 2002). The Atlantic strategic debate seemed one-sided, with the Europeans not being able to frame a coordinated response to the US strategy, and at the same time not having a clear vision about the purposes of an ESDP. The adoption of the European Security Strategy 2003 was intended to address this issue, but it did not form the basis of a grand strategy which defines the over-arching purpose of ESDP institutions and capabilities. After examining the origins of ESDP, the foundation of its institutions, the changing nature of the Petersberg tasks and the adoption of the European Security Strategy, this chapter will explore the headway that has been made in developing meaningful capabilities for a fully functional ESDP. This final section examines the journey from the Headline Goal to the plan to create Battlegroups, whilst looking at progress made by the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) adopted in 2001. The conclusion examines how the institutional dimension of the ESDP, a politically driven process, matches up with the ever-lasting search for better capabilities and whether the EU can develop a security strategy that can place both within the context of threat perceptions and security challenges. The Development of a European Security and Defence Policy The roots of improving the defence capabilities of the European allies can be traced back to the ‘burden sharing’ debates of the late 1960s and 1970s. However, in 1991, when the idea of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was re-launched at a Franco-German initiative, this was not taken to heart by the United States and Britain. The US Ambassador to NATO at the time, William Taft, commented that ‘the alliance is not going to underwrite a security policy that is made somewhere else.’ In the same spirit, the US Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholemew sent a memorandum to the eleven EC states in February 1991 (minus neutral Ireland) that the creation of a separate European security and defence identity outside NATO did not coincide with US interests (Independent, 1991a and 1991b). The Franco-German proposal had suggested the creation of a separate ESDI outside of NATO to be realized with the eventual absorption of the WEU into EC structures. The WEU up until 1984 had largely been a dormant institution, created in 1954 as a stop-gap measure between the failure of the European Defence Community

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(EDC) initiative, and the problem of accommodating the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO in the face of French objections. The French proposed EDC, initiated in 1950 and shelved again by the French in 1954 was intended as a supranational defence organization, with a European army, in which German forces would be integrated. It was designed to overcome the problem of Germany’s rearmament and the creation of a German army if it were to join a collective defence organization like NATO. However, the incorporation of defence into a supranational format was a leap too far and too soon for 1950s Europe, and when the EDC initiative was shelved in 1954, and the problem of accommodating FRG into European defence was still unresolved, it was the British plan of enlarging the Brussels treaty and creating the WEU which saved the day in the face of an increasingly disgruntled US Administration. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was originally signed between Britain, France and the Benelux countries as a collective defence treaty against any aggression towards the signatories. The enlarged Brussels treaty included Italy and Germany and hence the WEU was created.2 After the accession of Germany into NATO in 1955, the WEU’s transitory role ceased to exist, and for the next thirty years it remained a dormant organization. Like sleeping beauty, the waking up of the WEU came several decades later, in the mid 1980s, when the European allies of NATO realized the urgent need to have a unified European voice in defence matters in order to overcome the inertia of not being able to contribute to security and defence decisions reached in Washington. After the WEU’s Rome summit in 1984 which saw its relaunching, the subsequent adoption of a WEU ‘Platform on European Security Interests’ in 1987 initiated a further move to make the WEU very much alive and kicking. However, since the WEU enlargement to include Spain and Portugal in 1988, the end of the Cold War overtook the rehabilitation of the WEU as a European means of addressing the East/ West conflict. Such were the state of affairs, until the Franco-German proposal of 1991, advocating the merger of the WEU into the EC framework, and creating a separate European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) outside of NATO within the then EC (Aybet 2001: 142-58). During the Political Union negotiations that led up to the Maastricht treaty launching the European Union, the most contentious debate focused on the nature of the ESDI. However, one aspect of the Maastricht treaty left the status of the ESDI edging closer to a link between the WEU and the EU. This was the decision to give the automatic right to all EU states to become members of the WEU. Of the then EU members, Greece chose to activate this provision in its case and became a full member of the WEU in 1992.3

2 The Brussels Treaty was based on the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 between France and Britain. John Baylis maintains that the Dunkirk Treaty was the origins of British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin’s attempt to create a Western European security system in order to guarantee US commitment on the continent. While Kent and Young maintain that Bevin’s original intention was to create a European ‘third force’ between the two superpowers. 3 See Declaration of the Member States of the WEU issued at Maastricht, Atlantic News, No 2387, 13 December 1991. See also ‘Treaty on Political Union’, Maastricht, Europe Documents, No 1750, 13 December 1991.

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This undecided factor over the WEU-EU relationship continued until the 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting of NATO, when the use of NATO assets to make an ESDI operational was put forward for the first time. The Berlin decisions may have seemed politically driven, but in actual fact it was the issue of European capabilities, or more correctly the lack of them, which prompted this practical search for a solution. What caused this departure in the course of events? First, after the war in Bosnia, it became evident that the Europeans were incapable of any meaningful military intervention without the leadership and help of the United States, even when they had the political will to do so. Second, it became evident for the United States that much as they felt uncomfortable about the Europeans creating a separate defence identity, there may be crises in which the US might not wish to take a lead or commit forces. If these crises were occurring in a geographic proximity to Europe and the US and its European allies shared the same interests, then it might be viable to let the Europeans conduct such operations, or share a greater burden in joint operations of this kind. What also emerged after the Bosnian war was the usefulness of NATO’s integrated military structure, and its expertise in training for non-NATO member states who wished to participate in joint peacekeeping operations. Furthermore NATO’s ability to conduct and coordinate an operation like Deliberate Force during the Bosnian war and SFOR, after the war, was all aspects which contributed to NATO’s emerging post Cold War niche. Since ESDI at the time was only a concept, and the WEU although an organization, had no ‘teeth’ in terms of military capability, any development of WEU/ESDI operational capability had to be developed within and through NATO. This was the decision reached at the Berlin summit in 1996. The purpose of combining the ESDI with NATO’s capabilities was to give a military capability to the WEU’s Petersberg type operations, which fall in the domain of collective security such as peace keeping, humanitarian missions and peace enforcement. The WEU had taken this decision at its Petersberg summit in 1992, but since then, had lacked the operational capability to undertake these tasks. The completion of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, paved the way for enabling the WEU to undertake Petersberg type operations. The sole purpose of CJTF was not only for enabling the WEU to use NATO assets, but also to enable NATO to launch joint operations with non-NATO member states. The Berlin decisions also clarified this by stating that the CJTF concept allowed for a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions...the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate (emphasis added) military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR.4

The Berlin decision centred on the planning and command of WEU operations, the ‘separable’ capabilities of NATO that could be allocated to the WEU following a 4 Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, M-NAC-1(96)63, parag.5 and 6. IFOR or the NATO led Implementation Force in Bosnia which was deployed at the end of the war in 1995 was in fact the first CJTF in theatre.

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decision by the North Atlantic Council, and the role of Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe – who is always a general from a European country) to act as commander in WEU operations. Giving operational capability to the WEU was therefore entirely dependent on access to NATO operational planning capabilities. During this time, the WEU remained an autonomous organization to the EU, and the development of the EU’s own separate military capability seemed a long way off – not only because of the lack of European capabilities but also to Britain’s objections throughout this time to the development of a separate ESDI within the EU. The turning point of the Anglo-French declaration on European Defence at St Malo in 1998 would change all that and kick start the process of creating the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU and its relevant institutions. The Institutional Dimension of ESDP The EU’s Amsterdam treaty on European Union of 1997 had already clarified the way for the absorption of the WEU into the EU beyond the ambivalence of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.5 However, the activation of these provisions and the finer details of the institutional arrangements of this absorption became a reality after the turning point of the British–French Declaration on European Defence at St Malo on the 4th of December 1998. Two things emerged from the St Malo decisions. First, that the WEU would be absorbed into the EU and that it would be placed under the 2nd Pillar of the EU structure, which is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Second, that the collective defence provision of Article V of the Brussels treaty would be retained in the EU, but only for those EU member states who were signatories to the Brussels treaty. Another significant aspect emerging from the St Malo declaration was that the EU could have two types of ‘recourse to suitable military means: European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework.’6 This indicated a departure from the Berlin decisions of ‘separable but not separate’ military capabilities and the development of ESDI within NATO. It also indicated a departure from the close working relationship established between NATO and the WEU. The development of the ESDP within the EU, from the Anglo-French St Malo Declaration of November 1998, to the Nice European Council of December 2000 was a period of intensive activity for putting into place the mechanisms for a functioning ESDP. The EU Cologne summit of 4 June 1999 established the ESDP as an integral part of the CFSP (EU 1999). Following this, at the EU Helsinki summit December 1999, the EU announced the ‘headline goal’ of developing a 50,000-60,000 strong EU force by the year 2003. From this point on, the EU seemed to get serious about 5 Amsterdam Treaty 2 October 1997, Protocol on Article J.7 and Article J.7 parag 1. See also Declaration adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 22 July 1997, and attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference concluded with the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, 2 October 1997. 6 Declaration on European Defence, British–French summit, St Malo 3-4 December 1998. Parag 3.

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The State of European Integration

the development of capabilities. However, the processes, which were put into place to develop these capabilities initially, did no more than add to the superfluous array of acronyms and institutions within institutions. In the initial stages these consisted of the Helsinki Force Catalogue in 2000, a Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2001 and the adoption of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) in 2001. However, the changing nature of security threats as well as the widening range of Petersberg tasks became reflected in the EU’s earnest search for improving capabilities. Hence, the military and civilian aspects of the role the EU could play in crisis management were agreed to at the Feira Summit of June 2000. At the same Council meeting, the EU established the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Complementary to this the EU also agreed to provide up to 5,000 police officers for crisis management operations. At the time, police officers from EU countries were already serving in the UN led international Police Task Force in Bosnia. Subsequently, when the EU took over that mission from the UN in 2002, it was evident that its profile in civilian crisis management had increased. These roles were further affirmed in the EU Nice summit of December 2000, which also spelled out the institutional working arrangements for ESDP in the EU. From the Nice Council of December 2000, right up to the Iraq crisis of 2003, the main preoccupation with regard to ESDP was the creation of its institutions. Adopted as interim bodies at the Feira Council, these institutions were subsequently established as permanent bodies in the Nice summit of 2000. The Political and Security and Committee (PSC) deals with all aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the ESDP. It delivers opinions to the Council to aid in the policy making process, examines draft conclusions of the General Affairs Council and coordinates the different working parties in the area of the CFSP. It also sends guidelines to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and receives its recommendations. The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military representatives (milreps). Through the EUMC member states are able to consult and coordinate military matters relating to crisis management and conflict prevention. In a crisis situation, it is the EUMC thatconducts military direction and gives instructions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMS provide expertise to ESDP operations, in particular the conduct of any crisis management operation in which the EU may be involved. This includes early warning, strategic planning and earmarking of forces. Apart from the three new EU institutions, a new High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) was established. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the High Representative was also to be Secretary General of the European Council. Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, was appointed as the first EU High Representative in October 1999. At the time of the absorption of the WEU into the EU, two further institutions were also brought under the ESDP. These were the two former WEU institutions of the Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain and the Institute for Security studies in Paris. The Satellite Centre, created in 1993 provides support for Petersberg type operations, and general security surveillance for treaty verification and arms and proliferation control, as well as support for fight against terrorism, military exercises and maritime and environmental surveillance.

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The Institute for Security Studies provides independent research and analysis on security and defence issues and provides analysis for the High Representative. Both institutions were passed on from the WEU to the EU in 2000. Another institutional measure that was adopted with the Nice Treaty in 2000 is Enhanced Cooperation. This relates to the implementation of a previously adopted Joint Action or Common Position with regard to a CFSP with a qualified majority. Since the 2003 Iraq crisis, ‘enhanced’ cooperation also means closer defence cooperation between an EU ‘core’ group of states, leaving out the other member states. In fact, in the draft Constitutional Treaty it was envisaged that a core group of member states could enter into their own military arrangements, referred to as ‘Structured Cooperation.’ Some analysts have even warned that this kind of institutionalization of the ESDP could be detrimental to European integration rather than being a supportive factor (Sangiovanni 2003: 202). The creation of the ESDP institutions has been a politically driven process. While the initial framing of the institutions at the Cologne summit was due to the political trade-offs during the German presidency, the creation of a High Representative was in response to the EU’s once again displayed inertia during the Kosovo campaign and the need to be seen to be doing something in terms of having a European ‘voice’ or ‘face’ attached to a CFSP, or perhaps as a late response to Kissinger’s 1970s plea for a European telephone number (Howorth 2001: 771-2). Overall, three issues have driven the institutional development of ESDP within the EU. First, the Bosnian war, which highlighted the lack of European capabilities in European crises, caused the lifting of US and British objections to the development of the ESDP within the EU. Second, the institution building process in ESDP complemented the far wider integration process in the EU, in parallel with the enlargement process. Third, the changing nature of European Security challenges meant that not only were the Petersberg tasks of 1992 prone to change but there was also a need to adopt new institutions and alter existing ones to meet these challenges. The establishment of CIVCOM and the subsequent adoption of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator after the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were amongst these measures. Much as the ESDP institutions within the EU were created in a short period of time, the key institutional arrangement to make ESDP work in the first instance, that is, EU–NATO cooperation was much more difficult to establish. These were the arrangements enabling the EU to have access to NATO planning and operational capabilities, otherwise known as the ‘Berlin plus’ provisions, referring to the 1996 NATO ministerial summit in Berlin which worked out the modalities for military cooperation between the WEU and NATO. The finalization of the Berlin Plus arrangements was a painstaking process, which involved the objections of non-EU NATO member states over participation in EU led operations launched with access to NATO assets. Amongst the non-EU NATO member states, Turkey put forward an adamant resistance to the development of any automatic access of NATO planning and operational capabilities, based on Turkey’s concerns about consultation mechanisms between the EU and non-EU NATO states during the planning phase of an EU-led mission. While EU communiqués from this period stressed the EU’s autonomy in decision making in such situations, given that

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most of the potential crisis flashpoints were likely to be within a reasonable proximity to Turkey’s geographical location, Turkey’s concerns were based on legitimate security concerns rather than a politically driven policy to block EU access to NATO planning. There was also the marked deviation from the original Berlin proposals – a concern shared by Washington that the ‘separable but not separate’ principle that had been worked out between NATO and the WEU had now become meaningless since the St Malo agreement between Britain and France. For this reason, the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had emphasized her ‘three D’s’ where European security and defence were concerned: no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination (Albright 1998). Decoupling referred to the dismissal of the ‘separable but not separate’ principle, duplication referred to European investment into military efforts that may already exist within NATO, thus duplicating resources unnecessarily. Finally discrimination referred to the very concerns that Turkey was putting forward – the sidelining of non-EU NATO member states in the creation of EU-led operations requiring NATO assets. In fact the Clinton administration were just as wary as the senior Bush administration during 1991, over the potential of ESDP to undermine NATO (Daalder; Goldgeier 2001: 79). By the EU’s Nice summit in December 2000, the provisions for Berlin Plus consultation mechanisms between the EU and non-EU NATO states were put into place. However, Turkey unsatisfied with the consultation provisions blocked the implementation of Berlin Plus from 2000 onwards. Although the North Atlantic Council (NAC) met several times with its newly established counterpart in the EU, the Political and Security Committee, any full implementation of ESDP became impossible as long as the Turkish objections to the implementation of Berlin plus remained. The issue was resolved by the 16 December 2002 Brussels agreement, which opened the way for the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO (EU 2002a). Many factors were to contribute to this resolution. A diplomatic initiative by the United Kingdom to unblock the situation led to the drafting of a proposal referred to as the Ankara document, which included a reinforcement of consultation mechanisms between the EU and the non-EU NATO states. Although the NATO member states were given closer access to the EU bodies, the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee, these provisions initially did not go far enough for Turkey. By the time the new AKP (Justice and Development Party) government came into power in November 2002, and the priority of EU accession coupled with the EU’s Copenhagen decision on enlargement all played a role in reaching a compromise over the Berlin Plus provisions, which were finalized in December 2002.7 It was only after this breakthrough, which led to the ‘Framework Agreement’ – an exchange of letters between the EU’s High Representative and NATO’s Secretary General – on 17 March 2003, that the EU was able to take over the NATO Operation Allied 7 See Remarks by Javier Solana EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Following the Agreement on the Establishment of EU–NATO Permanent Arrangements. Attachment EU–NATO Declaration on ESDP. Brussels, 16 December 2002, EU Press Release S0240/02. http: //ue.eu.int/newsroom.

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Harmony in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thus launching the EU operation Concordia. This was the first ‘Berlin plus’ operation as it was an EU-led mission with access to NATO assets. This also enabled the EU to finally take over the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia in 2004 and establish the EUFOR Althea force, as the second Berlin-plus operation. However, since the resolution of the Berlin Plus provisions, NATO and EU cooperation has been relegated to the area of joint operations in the Balkans. Although NATO and EU bodies meet regularly, they are not able to discuss wider ranging strategic issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Darfur. This is because according to the December 2002 agreement between the EU and NATO, only EU member states that are members of the NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) can attend EU–NATO meetings. This worked quite well initially with the four EU neutrals Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden who were all PfP members. However, since the EU enlargement of 2004 which has included the Republic of Cyprus, and Malta, both not members of PfP, Turkey’s objections to Cyprus sitting on EU–NATO meetings has meant that at these meetings the EU sits as 23 instead of 25.8 Since the EU cannot meet as a whole, nothing beyond existing Berlin Plus operations can be discussed at these meetings. One of the reasons for building ESDP bodies that mirrored NATO committees was to ensure the smooth cooperation between the two organizations, and more particularly enabling planning for EU-led operations where ‘the Alliance as a whole’ would not be engaged to function smoothly. However, EU–NATO cooperation seems to be spilling over beyond the official forum of their respective institutions to ad hoc meetings of EU and NATO ambassadors and foreign ministers outside the formal EU–NATO meetings (Keohane 2006). Fulfilling the Petersberg Tasks The Petersberg tasks were drawn up at the WEU’s Petersberg summit of 1992. The full scale of Petersberg tasks involve humanitarian and rescue tasks such as the evacuation of nationals as well as peacekeeping and combat in crisis management, including peace making and peace enforcement. The Petersberg tasks were envisaged to reflect the then WEU’s ability to carry out humanitarian intervention. This was more likely to be in a traditional peacekeeping role rather than a peace enforcement role, although this was not excluded in the upper end of the scale of the Petersberg tasks. Since the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the ESDP within the EU, their scope has widened (EU 2002b). The first enhancement to the Petersberg tasks came at the EU Council meeting in Feira in June 2000. The Feira Council emphasised the civilian dimension of crisis management under the Petersberg tasks which already incorporated the military aspects. In particular, the areas of policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and protection were spelled out. The EU also agreed to provide up to 5000 police personnel to be deployed for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. In

8 Turkey’s objections arise out of the Cypriot rejection of the UN Peace Plan (the Annan Plan) in a referendum in 2004.

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this context, a Police Capabilities, Commitment Conference took place in November 2001 (EU 2000). After 11 September 2001 and the Iraq crisis of 2003, the range of EU missions in response to new security challenges has gone beyond the traditional understanding of humanitarian rescue missions and peacekeeping, reflected in Article 40.1 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty (EU 2002c). The new tasks involve civilian as well as military crisis management, conflict prevention and non proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass desctruction) as well as Consequence Management (the management of the aftermath of an attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear weapons). However, the EU’s missions on the ground at present still reflect the traditional understanding of the Petersberg tasks. For example, in 2003, the EU launched three operations within the scale of the Petersberg tasks. Operation Concordia commenced in Spring 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a follow-on to NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony to implement the OHRID Framework Agreement. Because this operation was launched with access to NATO assets it became in effect the first ‘Berlin plus’ operation. Operation Artemis, which was launched in June 2003 at the request of the UN Secretary General to deploy an interim emergency multinational force in the Democratic Republic of Congo was also authorized by a UN Security Council resolution (1484). The two missions were quite different. While Concordia involved policing and implementation of an agreement, Artemis provided stabilization of the security and humanitarian situation to enable a reinforcement of the UN Mission to Congo (MONUC). Because Artemis was launched with France as the Framework Nation without recourse to NATO assets, it became the first EU autonomous military mission (EU 2003a). As Concordia wound down, it was replaced with a policing mission, Operation Proxima to further implement the stabilization process of the OHRID agreement. Proxima commenced in December 2003 with a mandate for one year. Its mission involved overall improvement of the Police force, crime investigations, border management, confidence building, promotion of European standards of policing in all areas and assisting with implementation of reforms by the Ministry of Interior.9 The third of these operations, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which commenced in January 2003, took over the tasks of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) mandated by the Dayton Agreement of 1995. With the ending of the UN IPTF mission, the EU took over the continuation of this mission. The EUPM is the first operation launched by the EU as part of its ESDP and incorporates the civilian aspects of crisis management including policing and training emphasized in the Feira council conclusions of 2000. One can conclude from these missions that the progress of creating and implementing the ESDP has come a long way in a short time. However, how far do these missions reflect the security concerns and requirements of EU member states? What is the raison d’etre of EU missions? The answer to these questions should be found in the definition of the Petersberg tasks. Yet, beyond the fact that projecting stability through humanitarian missions and crisis management ought to be in the 9 See the Termination of Operation Concordia and Launch of Mission Proxima, remarks by Javier Solana, Skopje, 15 December 2003.

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interests of EU member states, it gives little guidance on how the EU missions complement the EU’s need to face new security challenges. Afterall, two of the 2003 missions are follow-on missions: Concordia follows on from an already established NATO mission that has come to an end. EUPM follows on from an established UN mission that has now also been terminated. In 2004 the EU took over NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, now known as EUFOR Althea. Therefore, is the EU’s future role confined to providing follow on missions to other organizations that wish to bring their operations in one area to a close and move onto another one? This would indicate that the EU has no strategic vision with regard to threats to its security and how it should face new security challenges. However a closer inspection would find that in the case of Concordia, Proxima, EUPM and EUFOR Althea, this judgement would be too harsh as the missions are closely tied into the EU wider strategy of the Stabilization and Association Process. The Process is designed to aid the countries of the Western Balkans to fulfil the conditions for eventual accession to the EU. It also complements the EU–NATO Concerted Approach to the Western Balkans, which reiterates the common vision and interests between NATO and the EU with regard to the Western Balkans and highlights areas of cooperation to achieve this. The common vision comprises the need to have a self-sustaining stability in the region, with democratic governance and a viable free market economy and gradual integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (EU 2003b). The underlying common interest is to seal up any vacuums of instability in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly the western Balkans with its geographical proximity to the EU. But the EU’s broader approach to security is reflected not just in its global outreach of missions beyond the Balkans, but also the diverse nature of its missions from civilian crisis management to humanitarian aid. The civilian dimension of the ESDP approved by the Feira Council of 2000 was bolstered with the launching of the first Rule of Law Mission in Georgia in 2004. The EUJUST Themis mission assists the Georgian state in reforming their criminal justice system and to improve the legislative process. While EU operation Artemis was transferred back to the UN MONUC mission in the Congo in 2003, the EU launched another police training mission in that country in 2004. EUPOL KINSASHA not only builds on the EU experience of EUPM in Bosnia but also establishes an important working link between the UN and the EU. A further EU mission in Congo, EUSEC-DR Congo was launched in June 2005, aimed to aid the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) in security sector reform. The EU’s presence on the African continent extended to AMIS I and II in 2004 (the peacekeeping mission in Darfur) charged with observing compliance with the ceasefires. The EU’s ever growing presence in police training was taken further with the establishment of EU COPPS (EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Support) in Palestine, in 2005. Within the same year, EU missions in the Middle East continued with EUJUST LEX in Iraq, which gives training to the judiciary, the police and prison administration in criminal justice reform. However, while there is a definite EU vision with regard to the Western Balkans, and although it has made headway in launching global ESDP mission beyond the Balkans, it is not always evident that the EU is as focused in defining the wider global security challenges and how it intends to meet them. Between 2002-2003, the

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further refinement of the nuances of the Petersberg tasks took place in various EU declarations with regard to facing new security challenges. The deteriorating situation in the Middle East and the threat of terrorism led to the broadening of the scope of the ESDP at the European Council summit in Seville, in June 2002. This broadening of the EU’s strategic mission to include the rule of law, the ESDP contribution by police forces, judges, prosecutors and legal administrators. Also at the Seville Council, the tools available to the EU for longterm and short-term conflict prevention, ranging from fact-finding missions, rapid deployment to international financial policies, promotion of human rights and arms control were explored (EU 2002d). In terms of long-term conflict prevention, the EU’s then preliminary work on how it could contribute to the fight against international terrorism was given a head start at Seville. This was further re-iterated in the European Council meeting at Thessaloniki in June 2003, in the Presidency Report on EU External Action in the Fight Against Terrorism, indicating how far the original Petersberg tasks had evolved. At Thessaloniki the EU established a database of EU capabilities to deal with the protection of civilian populations against the effects of a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN). A special report by the High Representative for ESDP was also presented on the CBRN terrorism threat for EU countries. Guidelines for a Common Approach to the Fight Against Terrorism emphasized the role the EU could play in assisting third countries to fulfil their obligations under UN SCR 1373. Furthermore, enhanced cooperation and coordination across the three pillars especially between CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) was established (EU 2003c). In terms of defining the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the EU also took a significant leap in its commitment and programmes for dealing with this security challenge in June 2003. The ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ was adopted at the Council Meeting in Luxembourg on the 16th of June. An Action Plan for the implementation of these Basic Principles accompanied the document. The Action Plan was put in place with the ‘EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ adopted at the Brussels Council in December 2003. Both documents stress the CFSP’s commitment to multilaterism in solving the problem of WMD proliferation. The key roles that the EU could play were identified as a focused dialogue with countries suspected of proliferating, exercising co operative threat reduction initiatives, allocation of resources to international arms control and inspection regimes, and bolstering the EU’s central role in export controls. Perhaps, the most significant statement was the use of force as a measure of last resort, only in accordance with the UN Charter, and only after the failure of diplomatic initiatives. Therefore, the previous emphasis in the early 1990s of making the provisions of the UN Charter fit with humanitarian intervention were interchanged with using the same provisions of international law to intervene militarily to prevent proliferation of WMD. The emphasis of ‘in accordance with the UN Charter’ reflected the EU’s growing need to have a common ground with the US on WMD proliferation, while stressing the EU’s commitment to avoid a replay of the Iraq crisis. While spelling out its vision of new security challenges, the EU was thus also laying the ground for

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future US-Europe cooperation on the basis of multilaterism.10 Thus the groundwork for creating a coherent EU strategy to address the threat of proliferation was laid in the Basic Principles as well as the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (EU 2003d and 2003e). Therefore, as the EU sought to address new security challenges throughout 20022003, the Petersberg tasks as they remained in the Treaty of Political Union had significantly altered, as the EU missions were broadened in scope and area. By the end of 2003, the definition of EU missions were no longer confined to the Petersberg tasks, but outlined in a new strategy for the European Union. Capabilities: From Headline Goal to Battlegroups After the Bosnian war it became evident that European capabilities were not sufficient to deal with European crises, and following the launching of the ESDP process within the EU with the St Malo Anglo-French summit, the EU adopted the Headline Goal at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. The Headline Goal was to be a 60,000 strong EU force readily deployable in 60 days and sustainable or a year in support of the full range of the Petersberg tasks. A Capabilities and Commitments Conference held in November 2000 established a Headline Goal Task Force was (HTF) to meet the operational requirements established by the Headline Goal. A new mechanism was also set in place to enable the discussion of issues relating to Headlines Goal where they were relevant to EU–NATO relations. In this respect, an ‘HTF plus’ was established consisting of the HTF and NATO experts. Much of the work of the conference was based on the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, which had made initial reviews of the available, required and expected forces and assets to put the Headline Goal in place by 2003. A year later, a Capability Improvement Conference followed this in November 2001, which specifically addressed the capability gaps in the EU. The areas highlighted for improvement included force protection, operational mobility and logistics, as well as acquisition of related technologies. In order to address these shortfalls, a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched at the Laeken European summit in December 2001.11 However, at NATO’s Prague summit of November 2002, the ‘capability gap’ between the United States and its European allies was highlighted once more. In the short time that the ESDP had become institutionalized within the EU and the improvement of European capabilities had started with the ECAP process, it became evident that the voluntary nature of ECAP made it difficult to sustain commitments not matched by necessary funding. Furthermore, during this time the ECAP lacked leadership with the EUMS taking part but facing difficulties coordinating the nineteen panels of national experts dealing with issues ranging from nuclear, biological and chemical protection to strategic air mobility. The working method of national experts 10 Basic Principles For an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels 10 June 2003. Adopted as a living document at the General Affairs and External Relations Council, Luxembourg 16 June 2003. 11 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001.

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and the lack of a coordinated leadership over the panels, coupled with the ECAP’s limited scope in only addressing shortfalls in the commitments to the Headline Goal, have hardly made it an innovative exercise. As most NATO members are now also EU members, the compatibility of the two processes of capabilities improvement in both institutions becomes crucial, even if EU operations are unlikely to develop swift deployment and lethal strike capability based on the US model in the foreseeable future. However, NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched at the Prague summit of 2002, primarily to improve the capabilities of European allies, has similar flaws to the ECAP process in delivering the desired results. This is because it seeks to develop capabilities across the entire European defence posture including stationary forces, instead of focusing on specific forces, those ‘European pockets of excellence’ (Binnendijk and Kugler 2002: 126). The ECAP process also did not focus on specific European assets but presented a study of shortfalls across the spectrum of European capabilities. The first reports of the ECAP in March 2003, did not involve national planners or procurement specialists. Therefore it became unclear as to how the panel’s findings could lead to the implementation of developing new capabilities. While a few months later at the third EU Capabilities Conference in May 2003, the EU defence ministers declared that the EU ‘now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks’, nevertheless there was also an acknowledgement that this capability remained ‘limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls.’12 Recognizing the need to better coordinate ECAP’s efforts and find means to implement its findings, initially the Capability Conference established Project Groups focusing on specific projects looking at solutions ranging from acquisition to leasing. Furthermore, the Council tasked the EUMS and EUMC to develop a roadmap to monitor the ECAP process. In accordance with all these new changes the Council also endorsed the Capability Development Mechanism in March 2003. While much of this did no more than keep a check on ECAP, there were also necessary adjustments to be made, not just in terms of facing new security challenges but also to accommodate the contributions of the ten new members who joined the EU in 2004. In 2004, two further developments occurred in relation to the development of capabilities. At the November 2004 Capability Commitment Conference, it was decided that a European Defence Agency (EDA) would be created which would be tasked with coordinating the implementation of ECAP, assessing and evaluating the capability commitments given by EU member states and promoting and harmonization of military requirements.13 What remains significant about the EDA is that it provides a link between the European defence industries, the EU institutions and the EU Member States. Its main areas of investigation include the efficiency in Command Control and Communications, harmonization and improvement of future technologies and convergence of requirements and programmes across the industry.

12 Declaration on EU Military Capabilities’ 19 May 2003, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 19-20 May 2003, Brussels. 13 Annex B ECAP Evaluation, Military Capability Conference, General Affairs and External Relations Council.

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In actual fact, 2004 was the turning point in making the development of EU military capabilities more meaningful in terms of fulfilling the requirements outlined in the European Security Strategy of 2003. The original Headline Goal and establishment of ECAP in 2001, although driven by the requirement to address European shortfalls in military capabilities after the Bosnian war, were by and large politically driven initiatives in the wake of the St Malo agreement. These initiatives complemented the overall deepening of integration and fortifying existing institutions by augmenting them with new ones as established in the Nice Treaty of 2000. It was after the adoption of the European Security Strategy of November 2003, that a new direction for ESDP, and a more comprehensive approach to security was explored. This is why the European General Affairs Council of 22 November 2004 was quite intense in building new institutions and initiatives to bridge the gap between the political, strategic and institutional aspects of the ESDP’s development. This also complemented the changing nature of the Petersberg tasks outlined in the previous section. This involved the transition from missions entirely confined to traditional humanitarian and peacekeeping missions to a wider spectrum involving civilian and military crisis management, conflict prevention, non-proliferation of WMD and Consequence Management. Although the Police Capabilities, Commitment Conference that took place in November 2001 was the initial step in getting serious about civilian capabilities, it was the General Affairs Council of November 2004, which established the Civil-Military Cell. At the same meeting, a Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference was held. The conference also established a Civilian Headline Goal for 2008 and a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). This incorporation of the wider aspects of ESDP in accordance with the European Security Strategy, led to a widening of civilian missions beyond the two policing missions the EU took over in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). By 2005 the EU had launched new civilian missions, to monitor the peace process in Aceh, support the stabilization process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and giving support to the Iraqi rule of law sector. Furthermore, in November 2005, the Council decided to deploy an EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (Eupol COPPS).14 But by the end of 2004 it was not just the civilian aspects of the ESDP that went through a major ‘rehaul’ but also the military aspects as well. Apart from the establishment of the EDA, the European Council also established the new Headline Goal of 2010 and the EU Battlegroups at the meeting on the 22nd November 2004.15 The new Headline Goal 2010 introduced in May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council in June 2004 also reflects the European Security Strategy and the changing strategic environment. As the Petersberg tasks now range from full crisis management operations to peace enforcement, new technologies also need to be adopted to meet a full spectrum of operations. The Headline Goal 2010 is supposed to enable the EU to: ‘respond to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully 14 Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Authorities, Brussels, 14 November 2005. 15 Military Capability Conference, Draft Declaration on European Military Capabilities, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels 22 November 2004.

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coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.’16 Among the milestones to be achieved under the Headline Goal 2010 are, the establishment of EDA which has already taken place, the creation of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, the development of a European Airlift Command, the availability of an aircraft carrier and improvement of communications equipment. The most significant of the Headline Goal tasks is the establishment of rapidly deployable EU Battlegroups. Battlegroups are forces of approximately 1,500 troops, formed by one nation acting as Framework Nation or a multinational coalition of member states. The idea behind the Battlegroup concept is to enable the EU to take a decision to deploy within five days of the Council approving a Crisis Management Concept. The force is supposed to be deployed on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU takes the decision to launch the operation. The Headline Goal 2010 and the formation of battlegroups are not a means to address the shortfalls of the EU not being able to meet the original Headline Goal of 2003. In fact when one does not specifically count ESDP missions but the engagement of European forces as a whole from Afghanistan to Iraq, European contributions to UN missions, as well as the proliferating ESDP missions, it is evident that the then 15 members of the EU met the Headline Goal by 2003 (Giegrich and Wallace 2004: 168). In actual fact, the battlegroups address the issues of a changing security environment, a wider range of Petersberg tasks and new European Security Strategy. The EU battlegroups, expected to be fully operational by 2007, not only address the issue of rapid deployment but also the adoption of new technologies and interoperability. The complementary nature of the battlegroups as they evolve to the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is a cutting edge rapidly deployable unit, ensures their development in the same light.17 The battlegroups could either be an expeditionary force to solve a limited crisis or be an entry force paving the way for a larger mission of the peace enforcement type, or act as an emergency force supporting in theatre existing peacekeeping forces in the event of a local and limited crisis (Kerttunen, Koivula and Jeppson 2003). However, in order to implement the Headline Goal 2019 and the Battlegroups, the EU is in need of strategic lift (land, sea and air) capability for rapid deployment to distant theatres, which also complements the EU Security Strategy and also NATO’s strategic concept. Therefore, at the same meeting of November 2004, the EU also launched the concept of a ‘Global Approach to Deployability’ set to improve strategic transport. Although the GAD was introduced for the first time within the framework of the ECAP in 2003, it is more than just another measure to improve capabilities; it also conceptually complements the overall approach of the European Security Strategy that will be explored below.

16 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels May 2004, European Security and Defence Policy, Council Conclusions. 17 Military Capability Commitment Conference, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, 22 November 2004.

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In Search of a European Strategy The European Security Strategy adopted at the Brussels European Council in December 2003, was the first document of its kind, which outlined a global vision and purpose for the EU, vis-a-vis global security challenges and threats. The strategy defines four key threats to European security: Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts whether close or far from Europe which could impact European interests directly or indirectly, failed states and organized crime. The emphasis on distant threats that ought to be as much of a concern for Europe as those close by indicates the need for the EU to play a far more active, global role with regard to security, rather than a regional one, concentrating on its borders and periphery. In this context Europe’s new neighbourhood is defined as Near East of the EU, the borders of the Mediterranean and even the Southern Caucasus, which is in due course going to be a neighbouring region. The EU strategic objective in building a safer neighbourhood is to: ‘promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean’ (EU 2003f). One area in this respect where transatlantic relations must find a common ground and working relationship is the Middle East Peace Process, which is outlined as one of the strategic objectives of the EU. The two-state solution advocated by the strategy paper is seen as a priority for the EU. 18 The EU strategy also emphasises multilaterism amongst its strategic objectives, particularly the commitment to international law. It also advocates strengthening international organizations, regimes and treaties so that they are effective and can take the necessary actions when their rules are broken. Since the Iraq crisis American policy makers have emphasized that the credibility of institutions is not upheld by merely living by the rules but enforcing them. To an extent the EU strategy seeks to find middle ground on the issue after the transatlantic fallout over Iraq. In the short run, the objectives of the EU’s strategy sets in place many tasks for the EU. Five key areas are emphasized as having policy implications for Europe: First, the EU needs to be more active, with a strategic culture in place for early, rapid and robust intervention. The development of operations of military and civilian capabilities is seen as more cost effective for the EU. Second, the EU needs to increase its capabilities. Third, the need to have common threat assessments is linked to the requirement to improve sharing of intelligence among member states. Fourth, a more coherent structural approach from the EU is needed. This would involve not only better coordination between CFSP and ESDP but also other tools of the EU such as the European Development Fund and assistance programmes, as well as better cross-pillar cooperation between CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs. A streamlining of all the different EU instruments means a more efficient means to combat terrorism and organized crime. Fifth, the strategy paper stresses the importance of working with partners, particularly the transatlantic relationship as ‘irreplaceable’ but also emphasizes the need to build a closer working relationship

18 The strategic objectives for the EU vis a vis the Middle East and Mediterranean were further spelled out in an interim report to the Council in March 2004. See EU (2004).

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with Russia as well as the development of strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India. Although terrorism was identified as a key threat in the strategy paper, the policy implications for the EU were brought to the forefront after the terrorist attacks in Madrid on the 11th March 2004. The impact of this on how the EU formulates its policy planning and implementation in line with the strategy, has been a speeding up of the mechanisms and legislation needed to combat terrorism. First, the EU states decided to act jointly in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause in the Article 42 of the draft Constitution. While, this does not constitute a collective defence provision, it nevertheless is a commitment of joint action in the event of a terrorist attack: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States...19

In terms of stepping up the legislative process to combat terrorism in the aftermath of the 11th of March, the EU adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which emphasized the urgency for member states to implement the legislative measures for combating terrorism which were already put in place. These included, the European Arrest Warrant, freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime, and police and judicial cooperation. The EU also tasked the Council to examine ways to enhance exchange of information on convictions for terrorist offences, the establishment of a European register of conviction and a database on forensic material. The Declaration also called for enhanced cooperation between the existing EU bodies of Europol and Eurojust. Better information systems across Europe were also emphasized in the Declaration. The coming into force of the Schengen Information System (SIS) by June 2004 was seen as an important step in realising this goal. The exchange of information with regard to organized crime and terrorism was further enhanced with the Hague Programme of October 2004.20 Consequence management after a terrorist attack, addressing of the factors, which contribute to the recruitment into terrorism, and better sharing of intelligence. Specific measures were called for to protect transport and populations and the appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 21 The European Security Strategy was launched after the detailed process of building the ESDP’s institutions and the launching of processes to overcome the deficiencies in capabilities. But as Binnendijk and Kugler observe: ‘a new defence initiative cannot be launched in a political and strategic vacuum’ (Binnendijk and Kugler: 118). Although the Strategy paper has overcome this to some extent, it still does not go far enough to address what the ESDP is precisely for. A common European threat perception is far from spelled out but the broader approach to 19 Article 42, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 20 June 2003. 20 The Hague Programme, ‘Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 4-5 November 2004. 21 ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’ EU Council. See also Summary Transcript Joint Press Briefing, Brussels, 30 March 2004, S00090/04.

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security, which the strategy paper addresses complements the widening scope of the Petersberg tasks. More significantly, the strategy paper brings better synergy between the EU’s military and civilian crisis management capabilities. Conclusion: What is ESDP for? There are several policy implications for the EU on how it deals with the global security challenges it has identified in its strategy. Already, from the period of 2001 to 2004 the EU’s missions have altered significantly since the original Petersberg tasks of 1992. However, the question of what the ESDP is actually for has not been addressed no matter how impressive the proliferation of missions may be. Perhaps this has a lot to do with the ad hoc way in which the ESDP has evolved with various hiccups along the way from intense diplomatic disagreements over the nature of the institutions, the nature of EU–NATO arrangements for sharing assets and the ever increasing need to meet capability goals not complemented by a required increase in defence budgets. But perhaps the ESDP is meant to evolve not with a grand strategy but on the basis of the missions it is capable of. The widening of the Petersberg tasks to include civilian crisis management aspects and the broader approach to security reflected in the European Strategy Paper, have been a reflection of the EU’s growing profile in civilian aspects of crisis management in recent years. The increasing EU police training and judicial reform missions on a global basis, the improved synergy between the Justice and Home Affairs and ESDP as well as the establishment of the Schengen Information System make this point evident. The drive for creating EU institutions may have been a politically driven process to further European integration and strengthen European capabilities after the lack of European input over Bosnia and then Kosovo. Certainly, the Anglo-French rapprochement over European defence at St Malo and the internal politics of the German presidency in the run up to the Cologne summit of 1999, had much to do in precipitating a speedy process of institution creation. This all happened without the basis of an overall strategy defining the purpose of ESDP. However, since September the 11th, the following interventions in Afghanistan, then Iraq, the Madrid terrorist attacks of 2004 and the London terrorist attacks of 2005, ESDP had evolved without a blueprint strategy based on hypothetical scenarios. While a common European threat perception is still not as lucid as that of the threat faced by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, nevertheless, these events have not only shaped the way the ESDP has recently evolved but they have also brought improved synergy between the EU’s military and civilian capabilities, as well as addressing the awkward but necessary transatlantic partnership after the Iraq crisis, and future compatibility between EU and NATO capability initiatives. The EU’s 2010 Headline Goal and the Battlegroups concept certainly reflect this. In the short run, the EU has several capabilities to deal with many of the new threats it identifies in its strategy. These capabilities are mostly civilian and to some extent military. But the strengths of the EU in diplomacy with third countries, the freezing of assets that finance terrorism and organized crime, and passing of new

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legislation and the implementation of existing legislation to enforce commitments in the fight against terrorism, means that the EU has plenty to do in the short run. In the long run, it will have to build better military capabilities, further developing the work set in place by ECAP and the EDA. However, it is unlikely to match US capabilities of swift deployment and lethal strike aided with new technologies such as smart munitions. However, this does not mean that US and European forces will not be able to fight together in the future. It seems that for some time European forces will fill the wider spectrum of Petersberg tasks, augmentation to larger combat operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions and civilian crisis management, including police missions and judicial reform. After all, present ESDP missions reflect all of these tasks. References Albright, Madeleine. (1998). ‘The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future’. Financial Times. Aybet, Gülnur. (2001). The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991. London: Palgrave. Baylis, John. (1982). ‘Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO’. Journal of Strategic Studies. Binnendijk, Hans and Richard Kugler (2002). ‘Transforming European Forces’. Survival. Chaillot Papers No 51. (2002). From Nice to Laeken, European Defence Core Documents, EUISS Paris. Chaillot Paper No. 67 (2003). From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence Core Documents, Vol. IV, EUISS Paris. Chaillot Papers No. 75 (2005). EU Security and Defence Core Documents, Vol V, February EUISS Paris. Chaillot Paper No. 87 (2006). EU Security and Defence, Core Documents 2005. Volume VI, EUISS, Paris. Daalder, Ivo, James Lindsay and James Steinberg (2002). ‘The Bush Nation Security Strategy: An Evaluation’. Brookings Policy Paper. The Brookings Institution: Washington DC. Daalder, Ivo and James M. Goldgeier (2001). ‘Putting Europe First’. Survival. Vol 43, No 1. European Union (2000). Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria de Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000, Annex 1, Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, III. Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. European Union (2001). ‘Presidency Conclusions’, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. European Union (2002a). Council of The European Union Communication from High Representative to Secretary General, ‘ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies’, Annex to SG(2002)1348 Brussels 13 December 2002.

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European Union (2002b). Article 17.2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 24 12 2002 Official Journal of the European Communities, C325/5. European Union (2002c). ‘Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003. European Union (2002d). European Council, Seville, 21-22 June 2002, Presidency Report on ESDP, and Presidency Report on the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. European Union (2003a). General Affairs and External Relations Council, Luxembourg 16 June 2003 and Statement by NATO’s Secretary General –Berlin Plus, Brussels, 17 March 2003 and see also EU Council Joint Action 2003/92/ CFSP Brussels, 27 January 2003. European Union (2003b). EU–NATO Concerted Approach to the Western Balkans, Brussels, 29 July 2003. See also EU–Western Balkans Summit, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. European Union (2003c). Presidency Report to the European Council on EU External Action in the Fight Against Terrorism, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003. European Union (2003d). Declaration on Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Council, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003. European Union (2003e). EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003. European Union (2003f). European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. European Union (2004) Interim Report on an ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ Brussels, 19 March 2004, 7498/1/04. Giegrich, Bastian and William Wallace (2004). ‘Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of European Forces’ Survival. Vol.46, No.2. Heuser, Beatrice and Robert O’Neill (1992). Securing Peace in Europe 1945-1962. London: Macmillan. Howorth, Jolyon (2001). ‘European Defence and The Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?’. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 39, no. 4. Keohane, Daniel (2006). ‘Unblocking EU–NATO Cooperation’. CER Bulletin, Issue 48. June-http: //www.cer.org.uk/articles Kerttunen, Mika, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppson (2005). EU Battlegroups: Theory and Development in Light of Finnish-Swedish Cooperation. National Defence College, Department of Strategic Defence Studies, Helsinki. Series 2, Research Reports No 3, http: www. Mpkk.fi/attachment/EU+Battlegroups. Independent (1991a). ‘US Warns EC not to Disrupt NATO’. Independent (1991b). ‘Washington’s Alarm at EC Defence Plans’. Sangiovanni, Mette Eilstrup (2003). ‘Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe’. Survival. Vol. 43, no 3.

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Chapter 3

The EU as an International Actor: ‘Civilian’, ‘Normative’ or ‘Military’ Power? Yannis A. Stivachtis

In the 1970s, Francois Duchene called the European Community (EC) a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene 1972; 1973). In 1982, Hedley Bull launched a critique of the EC’s ‘civilian power’ in international affairs by stating that ‘Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one...’ (Bull 1982: 151). Actually, Bull was responding to the suggestions of various analysts, including Duchene, who claimed that traditional military power had given way to progressive civilian power as the means to exert influence in international relations. In 2002, Ian Manners argued that the label ‘normative power’ would be better suited to describing the European Union (EU), which relies on civilian rather than military means, and pursues the spread of particular norms rather than geographical expansion or military superiority (Manners 2002). However, since the 1970’s the increasing role of the European Union (EU) in areas of security and defense policy has led many to argue about the notion of ‘military power Europe’. It is not much disputed that the EU is a different type of international actor and represents a new kind of power in international politics. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that the EU is a novel kind of power not only in its own institutional set-up, but also in its external relations (Diez 2005: 613). According to Thomas Diez (2005: 613), even more controversial is why this should be the case. Robert Kagan, for instance, has argued that the difference between the foreign policy values predominant in Europe and those in a more traditional power like the United States (US) largely reflect different power capabilities (Kagan 2003). There is also some dispute about the consistency of EU behavior (Diez 2005: 614). Many analysts, therefore, pose the following questions: Are there double standards in the application of norms in EU policies towards other parties? Do different EU actors (e.g., the European Commission, Parliament, and Council, as well as different actors within these institutions) pursue different norms and interests? Is there an increasing militarization of EU external relations? For Diez, while these questions are relevant, they ignore the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power (Diez 2005: 314). Not only is the success of this representation a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU, but it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of ‘Others’ in the ‘outside world’. Diez argues that this has important implications for

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the way EU policies treat those ‘Others’, and the degree to which its adherence to its own norms is scrutinized within the EU. In that sense, the discourse of the EU as a normative power constructs a particular self of the EU, while it attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms (Leonard 2005: 34). The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to examine the nature of European power; and second, to investigate the relationship between the civilian, normative and military character of the European power. In so doing, the chapter will draw on the work of Ian Manners and Thomas Diez and it is divided into five sections. The first and second sections discuss the concepts of ‘civilian’ and ‘normative power’. The third section explores the relationship between civilian and normative power while the fourth one examines the EU’s normative basis. The fifth section focuses on the relationship between normative and military power. Europe as a ‘Civilian’ Power The idea that Europe could become a different kind of power that does not rely primarily on military but on civilian means was first explicitly formulated in the early 1970’s by Francois Duchene who put forward four arguments. First, the people of Europe had largely formed ‘amilitary’ values; second, the stalemate of the Cold War had ‘devalued purely military power’; third, Europe was far from a consensus on its own development as a military superpower between the two poles; and fourth, the then European Community ‘would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchene 1973: 19). ‘Civilian power’ has been defined as involving three key features: the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress (Twitchett 1976: 1-2; Maull 1990). Specifically, Hans Maull defines a civilian power as a state ‘whose conception of its foreign policy role and behavior is bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international relations’(Maull 1990: 92-3). In other words, Maull sees civilian power as a specific type of actor, role and instrument. The notion of civilian power, therefore, describes a particular kind of actor, relationships and means. It was this notion of civilian power, which Bull criticized for its ineffectiveness and lack of self-sufficiency in military power. Bull suggested that the EC should become more self-sufficient in defense and security through seven steps: the provision of nuclear deterrent forces; the improvement of conventional forces; a greater role played by West Germany; more involvement on the part of France; a change of policy in Britain; careful co-existence with the Soviet Union; and careful co-existence with the United States. Bull’s solution was to turn the EC into a ‘military power Europe’ (Bull 1982: 152). The idea that civilian forms of power have become important instruments to deal effectively with threats to international peace and stability has been central to the post-Cold War security considerations. The debate regarding whether military

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power is still the key to international security has produced a general consensus that although it still plays an important role in ensuring international order, it is often ill-suited to solve the complex political and security problems the international community faces today (Everts and Schmitt 2004). It has been argued that international stability largely depends on the existence of socio-politically strong states (Buzan 1991; Holsti 1996) and, therefore, the key to international order is helping the transformation of weak states into strong ones. However, creating strong states and rebuilding war-torn societies is much more expensive and time-consuming than war fighting. More importantly, it requires a long political commitment by the members of the international community and the use of civilian forms of power. Moreover, it has been claimed that the more states rely on hard power and coercion, the less successful they are in deploying soft power and persuasion. However, it is recognized that soft power is not necessarily so soft (Mattern 2005). On 9 May 2000, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, the EU distributed publicity material declaring ‘50 Years of Solidarity, Prosperity and Peace’. Manners correctly points out that although the claim to being solely responsible for the achievement of peace is questionable, the message sent to the European public did reflect the fact that since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EU has increasingly ‘domesticated’ relations between Member States (Manners 2002: 236; Manners and Whitman, 2000: 257). As Duchene suggested in the early 1970’s, Europe in the year 2000 represented a ‘civilian power’, which was ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’. The status of the EU as a global civilian power was pronounced by Romano Prodi who stated that ‘We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security’ (Prodi 2000: 3). Since the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954, the question of the EC assuming a military dimension had remained taboo until the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in 1991. As Richard Whitman has suggested (1998: 135-6), ‘the TEU had signaled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a ‘civilian power Europe’ and to develop a defense dimension to the international identity of the Union’, shattering that taboo (Whitman 1998: 135-6). According to Manners, the move from the single structure of the EC to the three-pillar structure of the EU was part of a ‘fundamental shift from civilian to military power, assuming that the development of a common foreign and security policy was eventually to include defense policy’ (Manners 2002: 237). However, for the next seven years the expectations of foreign policy and military power were not matched by the hopedfor achievements of the EU. This disappointment, which Hill (1993) and Kennedy and Bouton (2002) felt was a ‘capabilities-expectation gap’, was grounded on unreal expectations which Sjursen (1998) termed an ‘eternal fantasy’. The trend towards ‘military power Europe’ is currently to be found in the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) agreed upon at the June 1999 Cologne European Council which committed the EU to having a 60,000-person rapid reaction force (RRF) ready by the end of 2003 (Stivachtis 2004 and 2005). While the formal preparation for the Petersberg tasks of the RRF might be seen by some as evidence of movement towards a ‘military power Europe’ (Manners 2002:

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237), others have argued that these tasks are still within the remit of a civilian power as the questions of defense and nuclear capability still remain the concern of NATO (Jorgensen 1997; Smith 2000). This militarization of the EU is not without criticism. For example, Zielonka (1998: 229) argues that it weakens the EU’s ‘distinct profile’ of having a civilian international identity, while Smith (2002: 27) suggests that the acquisition of military power ‘would represent the culmination of a ‘state-building’ project. Integration would recreate the state on a grander scale. Manners correctly points out that Bull’s discussion of the utility of military power, and Duchene’s notion of civilian power share more common assumptions than is normally thought (Manners 2002: 238). First, these shared understandings were part of the frozen nature of international relations during the Cold War period and included assumptions about the fixed nature of the nation-state, the importance of direct physical power, and the notion of national interest. As Manners suggests, although Duchene (1973: 20) was keen to ‘bring to international politics the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics’ his focus, shared with Bull, was invariably the strengthening of international society not civil society (Manners 2002: 238). Thus both Duchene and Bull shared an interest in the maintenance of the status quo in international relations, which maintained the centrality of the Westphalian nationstate. Secondly, while Duchene (1973: 19) emphasized ‘civilian forms of influence and action’ and Bull stressed (1982: 151) nuclear deterrence and conventional forces, they both valued direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities whether ‘long on economic power’ or a ‘need for military power’. Thirdly, though Duchene (1972: 43) wanted Europe to overcome ‘the age-old processes of war and indirect violence’ and Bull (1982: 157) wanted ‘the regeneration of Europe’, they both saw European interests as paramount. However, the Cold War, which structured many of these assumptions, ended with the internal collapse of regimes across Central and Eastern Europe whose ideology was perceived as unsustainable by its leadership and citizens. But these intra-state changes came about by the collapse of the norms associated with communism rather than the power of force. Thus, according to Manners, a better understanding of the EU’s role in world politics might be gained by reflecting on what those revolutions tell us about the power of ideas and norms rather than the power of empirical force – in other words the role of normative power (Manners 2002: 238). Europe as a ‘Normative Power’ In 1998, Richard Rosecrance argued that ‘Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical and that ‘it is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms’ (Rosecrance 1998: 22). Adopting Rosecrance’s argument, Manners raised the question of how one can better understand the international role of the EU. He argues that by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power (Manners 2002:

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238). By thinking beyond traditional conceptions of the EU’s international role and examining the case study of its international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty, Manners sought to illustrate that the EU should be best conceived as a ‘normative power Europe’. Manners effort begins by briefly surveying the conceptual history of ‘civilian power’ and ‘military power Europe’ since the early 1980s in order to locate these traditional conceptions of the EU’s international role. He then introduces the idea of ‘normative power Europe’; he discusses the EU’s normative difference and normative basis; and explains how EU norms are diffused. He concludes that the concept of ‘normative power’ represents a valuable addition to one’s own understanding of the EU’s civilian and military power in world politics. Thus, for Manners, the notion of ‘normative power’ when applied to the EU is not a contradiction in terms, as the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is extremely rich. However, Diez correctly argues that the EU’s normative power is by no means a unique phenomenon (Diez 2005: 614). He suggests that the one case against which the idea of the EU as a normative power is most often developed, the US, has exemplified the concept of a normative power during significant parts of its history. Therefore, according to Diez, the historical fate of this normative power calls for a closer examination of different kinds of normative power. In this context, he calls for a greater degree of reflexivity, both in the academic discussion about normative power and in the political representations of the EU as a normative power, which he sees, as part of the same discourse. As Diez suggests, ‘rather than the zealous propagation of particular ‘European’ norms, it would be such a degree of reflexivity that would make ‘normative power Europe’ stand out’ (Diez 2005: 615). In so doing, Diez reviews the normative power argument and the debates surrounding it. He also examines the record of the EU as a normative power, which sets the scene for the development of his main argument: the construction of the EU as a normative power, its political effects, and the need for self-reflexivity in this debate. The idea of normative power in the international sphere is not new. For example, E.H Carr made the distinction between economic power, military power and power over opinion (Carr 1962: 108). Duchene was also interested in the normative power of the EC as an ‘idee force’, starting with the beliefs of the ‘founding fathers’ and extending through its appeal to widely differing political temperaments (Duchene 1973: 7). Elements of this normative power can also be found in the critical perspective of Johann Galtung who stated that ‘ideological power is the power of ideas’ (Galtung 1973: 33). Galtung argues that ideological power is ‘powerful because the powersender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient’ through the media of culture’. He differentiated between channels of power (ideological power, remunerative power and punitive power) and sources of power (resource power and structural power) and claimed that this distinction is ‘fundamental, because it is on the latter that the European Community is particularly strong, even more so than the United States’ (Galtung 1973: 36). As Manners suggests, one of the problems with the notions of civilian and military power is their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks (Manners 2002: 239). For Manners, the concept of normative power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions

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or policies, and towards including cognitive processes, with both substantive and symbolic components. As Smith has argued, ‘the normative dimension’ is important because ‘the debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity’ (Smith 2000: 27). Thus the notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the ‘power over opinion’, ‘idee force’, or ‘ideological power’, and the desire to move beyond the debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU’s international identity (Manners and Whitman 1998). In order to clarify these three different representations of the EU’s power in international relations, it is worth comparing civilian, military and normative power Europe. What Manners suggests is that conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions (Manners 2002: 239). This is not to say that the EU’s civilian power, or fledgling military power, are not important, but simply that its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations needs to be given much greater attention. By identifying normative power by the impact it has on what is considered appropriate behavior by other actors’ and examining Manners’s treatment of the concept ‘as a power that is neither military nor purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions’ and as being able ‘to shape conceptions of the normal’, Diez argues that three aspects of this definition need further elaboration (Diez 2005). First, the ‘power’ in Manners’ work seems to be a particular kind of actor, similar to the way one may use the terms ‘great power’ or ‘superpower’ (Diez 2005: 614). Yet, for Diez, Manners introduces the notion of ‘normative power’ in part because he wants to get away from the question of whether the EU is an actor in international politics or not, which he thinks misses the point that the EU is influential, independent of its standing as an actor. Diez suggests that this discussion clarifies that normative power is not only a specific kind of actor in international politics, but that it also connotes the characteristic of a Weberian type of power relationship (as A being able to make B do what s/he would otherwise not have done). This relationship, according to Diez, takes on a ‘Lukesian twist in the form of a kind of hegemonic power’, namely the power to shape the values of others. In addition, normative power refers to particular ‘means’. In other words, it is not a power that relies on military force, but a power in which norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives (Diez 2005: 614). Second, Diez argues that the normative power argument has a distinctly social constructivist ring to it for it focuses on the independent power of norms to influence actors’ behavior (Diez 2005: 615). As Diez puts it, to the extent that normative power is used as an analytical category to distinguish a particular kind of actor (such as Europe), it relies on the possibility to trace empirically the impact of norms in contrast to other possible factors. However, much of the discussion about ‘normative power Europe’ does not really examine the de facto impact of EU policy (and therefore whether it has normative power in the relational sense), but on whether it

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acts as a normative power (and therefore whether it is a specific type of actor that employs particular means). Third, this does not mean that normative power cannot go alongside other forms of power in international relations, notably military and economic forms of power (Diez 2005: 615). Indeed, the latter two may underpin normative power, although normative power must not be reduced to economic or military power if it is to make sense as a separate category. For instance, research has shown that the EU is most likely to ‘shape conceptions of the normal’ (and therefore have greater normative power) in the context of EU membership candidacies, when the interest to join the EU can be assumed to be an important factor determining the impact of EU norms. Normative Power and Civilian Power Drawing upon Maull’s definion of civilian power as a state ‘whose conception of its foreign policy role and behavior is bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international relations’, Diez agrees that civilian power is indeed a specific type of actor, role and instrument and that the notion of civilian power therefore describes a particular kind of actor, relationships and means (Diez 2005: 616). However, he observes that similar to the concept of normative power, the notion of civilian power describes a particular kind of actor, relationships and means. The two concepts thus seem to be very close to each other. In a sense, civilian power can be read as one specific form of normative power in that at its heart lie particular kinds of norms (namely civilian). This reading is in contrast to the one offered by Manners, who treats the two concepts as distinct. Yet such a distinction between civilian and normative power seems to stem from a reductionist reading of civilian power, evident in Bull’s famous critique of the concept, which focuses on civilian – and in practice often economicmeans to exercise power. Duchene (1973: 14) also stressed economic means but, according to Diez (2005: 617), Maull’s definition goes beyond a focus on policy instruments. And even in Duchene’s original contributions, civilian power, just as Manners’ notion of normative power, has a ‘descriptive and prescriptive’ dimension; it can be read as referring ‘to means or ends’; and it is ‘about values’ and ‘process’ as (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002). The author of this chapter agrees with Diez’s position that civilian power is a particular type of normative power and believes that military power can also be a type of normative power. In other words, the EU’s identity as civilian or military power is not determined by the means available to it – economic, diplomatic and military – but by the way in which these means are to be used. For example, if the use of military force by the EU is based on a wide international consensus reflected especially in the authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council then there is no contradiction between normative and military power. The question, however, is how other states may perceive a ‘military power Europe’. For example, the US may perceive the militarization of the EU as an effort to challenge its power

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and status in world politics, while other states may see it as an attempt of the EU to play a hegemonic role in global affairs. The European Union’s Normative Basis Manners’ empirical evidence that the EU is a normative power relies largely on the policies it pursues and his work has had a considerable impact on the study of European foreign policy. Specifically, investigating the EU’s normative basis, Manners argues that unlike what happened with historical empires and contemporary global powers, the EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution (Manners 2002: 240). He suggests that the EU was created in a post-war historical environment, which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide. Because of this, the creation of Community institutions and policies took place in a context where Europeans were committed to ‘pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’ [preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Communities (TEC)]. It has been argued that the EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance, which transcends Westphalian norms (King 1999: 313). Surveying the comparative history of polities and international systems from Mesopotamia to post-Westphalia, and from pre-international systems to a postmodern international system, Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) and Buzan and Little (2000) agree that the EU represents a new and different political form. For Ferguson and Mansbach, the EU is a cross-cutting polity which is part of ‘a strikingly different and more complex picture than traditional models of global politics allow, including less of a distinction between inside and outside the Westphalian state/polity’ (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 401). Similarly, for Buzan and Little the EU is ‘a new type of entity with actor quality’ which ‘is experimenting with a new form of both unit and subsystem structure’ (Buzan and Little 2000: 359). This particular new and different form of hybridity increasingly emphasizes certain ‘principles which are common to the member states’ [Treaty of the European Union (TEU), art. 6]. The proposed constitution of the EU as a political entity has largely occurred as an elite-driven, treaty-based, legal order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity. The principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights were first made explicit in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, although the centrality of many of these norms was only constitutionalized in the TEU. As it has been suggested that ‘a strong commitment to human rights is one of the principal characteristics of the European Union’ (Alston and Weiler 1999: 6). This argument has received support from many scholars. For example, Von Bogdandy observes that ‘a most prominent piece of evidence is the European Council’s decision at its Cologne Summit was that a human rights charter should be drafted for the European Union’ because ‘protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy’ (Von Bogdandy 2000: 1307). Likewise, Lenaerts and de Smijter argue that ‘some thirty years before this decision, the Court of Justice had already confirmed that ‘fundamental human

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rights [are] enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court’ (Lenaerts and de Smijter 2001: 273). This combination of historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its Member States (Merlingen et al. 2001) and the world (Clapham 1999; Smith 2001). Manners argues that the EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms which come closer to those of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world politics (Manners 2002: 241). As he rightly points out, the EU is founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, art. 6, art. 11, and TEC, art. 177). Furthermore it is committed to pursuing these norms in accordance with the ECHR (TEU, art. 6) and ‘the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (TEU, art. 11, preamble to TEC). Although one may be skeptical about the application and indivisibility of such core norms, one cannot overlook the extent to which the EU is normatively different from other polities with its commitment to individual rights and principles in accordance with the ECHR and the UN. However, there is one more normative difference. As Therborn suggests, ‘[W]ithout the backing of force and a willingness to use it, ‘Europe’ is unlikely to become a normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic and social institutions they should have’ (Therborn 1997: 380). Implicit in this approach is the assumption that normative power requires a willingness to use force in an instrumental way. Manners rejects this assumption and the instrumentality which accompanies it. In his formulation, the central component of ‘normative power Europe’ is that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way. In order to illustrate this claim of normative difference further, one should explore the EU’s normative basis. The broad normative basis of the European Union has been developed over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions (Christiansen 1997; Weiler 1999; Laffan 2001). It is possible to identify five ‘core’ norms within this vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the acquis communautaire and acquis politique. The first of these is the centrality of ‘peace’, found in key symbolic declarations such as that by Robert Schuman in 1950, as well as the preambles to the European Coal and Steel Treaty in 1951 and the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) of 1957. The second is the idea of ‘liberty’ found in the preambles of the TEC and the TEU of 1991, and in art. 6 of the TEU, which sets out four foundational principles of the Union. The third, fourth and fifth norms are democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which are expressed in the preamble and founding principles of the TEU, the development co-operation policy of the Community (TEC art. 177), the common foreign and security provisions of the Union (TEC art. 11), and the membership criteria adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.

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Manners argues that in addition to these core norms, it is also possible to suggest four ‘minor’ norms within the constitution and practices of the EU, although these are far more contested (Manners 2002: 243-44). The first minor norm is the notion of ‘social solidarity’ found throughout the acquis communautaire et politique of the EU, but in particular the preambles of the TEC and TEU, the objectives of Art. 2 (TEU) and Art. 2 (TEC), and the central focus of both the EC’s social policy and the Economic and Social Committee. The second minor norm is ‘anti-discrimination’ found in Art. 13 and Title Xl of the TEC, as well as the ‘protection of minorities’ found in the Copenhagen criteria. The third minor norm is that of ‘sustainable development’ enshrined in art. 2 (TEU), art. 2 (TEC) and the all-encompassing art. 6 (TEC). The fourth minor norm is the most recent and has yet to find any formal expression in treaty form, but is implicit in the Copenhagen criteria. This norm is the principle of ‘good governance’ as found in Romano Prodi’s inaugural speech to the European Parliament (Prodi 2000), as well as Commission papers on ‘EU election assistance and observation’ (COM(2000) 191 final) and the ‘White Paper on European Governance’ (cited in Manners 2002: 242). According to Manners, these norms clearly have a historical context to them. For example, ‘peace’ and ‘liberty’ were defining features of western European politics in the immediate postwar period (Manners 2002: 243). The norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights grew later when it was important to distinguish democratic Western Europe from communist Eastern Europe. These then became defining features of transition from communist rule in the immediate post-Cold War period as the Copenhagen criteria demonstrate. The norm of the aspiration to social solidarity became an important counter-measure to the drive for liberalization in the Single European Act (SEA) and economic and monetary union. The desire for antidiscrimination measures also arose from progressive social legislation and the concerns regarding racism and persecution of minorities in the early 1990s. The norm of ‘sustainable development’ became important following the Rio Earth Summit when it was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Finally the norm of ‘good governance’ became vital first, following the resignation of the Commission in 1999; second, due to the concern for double standards in pursuing the EU’s demands for democratic reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries; and third, because of the recognition of the role of governance in successful aid programs. The reinforcement and expansion of the norms identified by Manners allows the EU to present and legitimize itself as being more than the sum of its parts. In the post-Cold War era, it is no longer enough for the EU to present itself as merely a form of economic government for the management of global economics, as the increasing resistance by its citizens to economic liberalization suggests. This desire for greater legitimacy through the fundamental norms that the EU represents has most recently found an expression in the charter of fundamental rights of the European Union adopted at the Nice European Council in December 2000. The charter restates and re-emphasizes the core and minor norms, except ‘good governance’, with the aim of ensuring that basic political and social rights become more widely known to the EU citizenship, although ‘the charter does not establish any new power or task’ (Art. 49) and will not form part of the EC/EU treaty base in the immediate future.

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Diez argues that in Manners’s work there is an ‘ontological’, ‘positivist’ and ‘normative’ element and that all three elements fit into a larger ongoing debate in which first, the EU has been conceptualized as a different type of actor in world politics; second, specific EU policies have been considered to be different from those of other superpowers; and third, it has been argued that the EU should indeed be a different kind of power (Diez 2005: 619). A central contribution to this debate has been Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power, in which the author juxtaposes what he sees as the Hobbesian-realist, military power of the United States against the Kantian idealist avoidance of military means rooted in pacifist values prevailing in Europe. Specifically, Kagan argues that, in effect, America and Europe live in two different worlds. For Kagan, the hallmark of the EU as ‘nonpower’ would be the orientation of its external policies on its ‘inner characteristics … primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn expresses, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance’ (Kagan 2004: 2-6). Yet in contrast to Manners, for Kagan, Europe’s pacifism is not so much a result of choice as, at least in parts, necessity: it does not have the military means and resources to become a military power, so it sticks to non-military forms of influence. As Diez claims, the discursive construction of the EU as a normative power is not found in isolated statements only. This normative discourse is one that most EU politicians – in Council, Commission and Parliament as well as on the member state level – engage in unless they are committed Eurosceptics. As Diez puts it, ‘there may well be disagreement about the development of the EU’s military capacities between Council and Commission, and between different member states and different directorate-generals, yet the representation of Europe as a force for peace and well-being is nearly consensual’ (Diez 2005: 619). Diez concludes by stating that it is perhaps because of this already-existing construction that Kagan’s book became such a widespread reference point in the debate. Criticizing the idea that normative power is only related to the EU, Diez shows through a historical comparison with the U.S. that the notion of normative power is hardly novel and unique to the EU. For Diez, the question is not whether or not a state is a civilian power, but to what degree it is one. Thus one would expect to find instantiations of civilian/normative power in many places and historical contexts. These will differ in the extent to which the spread of universal norms plays a role as a means of power projection, but also in how far military power dominates other forms of power. Diez correctly points out that normative power is not the opposite of military power (Diez 2005: 620). It is entirely conceivable that military force is used to back up the spread of civilian values, partly because the application of civilian means would imply the pre-existing institutionalization of civilian values in order to be effective. This argument has received the support of Helene Sjursen (2004: 122). Yet the more normative power builds on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of power, because it no longer relies on the power of norms itself. Indeed, the imposition of norms through military force cannot be equated with successfully changing others, which relies primarily on socialization processes.

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In this context, the U.S. is a particularly interesting case. According to Diez (2005: 621), it is necessary to consider the long-established assessment of US foreign policy as strongly influenced by the frontier-myth, resulting in the ‘Godgiven duty to spread the dream and promise of America beyond its own shores’; a predisposition that, as Michael Cox notes, ‘inevitably infused American foreign policy with a particularly moralistic and idealistic tone’ (Cox 2003: 8). Apart of the era of Monroe doctrine, most of the U.S.’s international engagement has had strong normative character. The US’s normative power was very visible during Woodrow Wilson’s years with his Fourteen Points serving as a cornerstone. Also after World War II, when one could already see the dominance of military power and American hegemony in play (primarily in the Western world), the US helped create a series of international institutions that would civilize international politics. Diez rightly points out that even the invasion of Iraq, driven by a neoconservative ideology, cannot easily be dismissed as mere power politics as it is driven by a particular worldview with strong ideas of how democracy should work within a particular liberal governmental frame (Diez 2005: 622). As Felix Berenskoetter shows, in the 2002 National Security Strategy the invocation of norms and the commitment to spreading those norms, which are held to be universal, played a central role (Berenskoetter 2005: 75). Yet, interests and norms cannot easily be separated (Cox 2003: 9). Building up institutions after the World War II was a projection of American norms, but it also (intentionally or not) safeguarded US interests. This was not necessarily because of some sort of conspiracy, but because those norms would spread a conception of life that would match that of the US and build a ‘community of ideals, interests and purposes’ (Diez 2005: 622). Diez, however, identifies one important difference between the EU and the US, namely that the US has sought to project, and often impose, its own norms while (unlike the EU) refusing to bind itself to international treaties (Diez 2005: 622). Manners highlights the EU’s formal commitment to international law in this respect, but on the basis of the general definition of normative power, this can only be the characteristic of a particular kind of normative power (Manners 2002: 241). For Diez, the difference between the US and the EU in this respect should be understood not as a distinction between a normative and a traditional military power, but rather as a warning sign about a normative power in which military power is becoming increasingly important. Indeed, during the first part of the twentieth century the US, like today’s EU, was not at all eager to intervene in conflicts outside its own hemisphere. Like the EU, President Wilson’s aim was to spread peace throughout the world so that interventions would no longer be necessary (Williams 1962). And just like the EU, the idea was to do so not with military means, but with binding normative commitments. Yet over time, the military back up of this normative power came to be of ever-increasing importance. And even though the US’s reluctance to entertain imperial ambitions should not be overestimated, this supplementation of norms with force was not solely due to imperial ambitions on the part of the United States. It was partly as a response to European and international calls for engagement from outside the United States. Currently, the EU is facing similar calls both for acquiring more military power and for using military force to achieve certain goals.

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In the case of the US, the entanglement of normative and military power is underpinned, most evidently in the George W. Bush Administration, by a secure belief in the universal validity of its own norms and a missionary zeal to spread these norms to places marked as ‘evil’. It is such an unreflective normative stance, according to Diez, that legitimizes the use of military force: were there doubts about the underlying norms, military force would not be considered legitimate. This indicates another dimension along which normative powers can be differentiated, and it is one that Diez further explores in his work, namely the degree to which norms are subject to reflection both inside the EU and (in the way that the EU binds itself to international norms) in the context of the international society. ‘Military’ versus ‘Normative Power Europe’ A large part of the discussion about the EU as a civilian and normative power has focused on whether or not those terms adequately describe the EU’s international behavior. Helene Sjursen, for instance, maintains that the trend towards greater institutionalization of international security and the stronger concern for the individual rather than the state as a referent of security is more deeply embedded in Europe than elsewhere (Sjursen 2004: 122). However, not everyone agrees. As far as the focus on civilian means is concerned, the problem stems largely from the fact that the EU has increasingly included military means in its foreign policy machinery (Hill 2004). This is most obvious in the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, including the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and various political and military committees to govern military efforts on the EU level. In Kagan’s view, the civilian power of Europe largely depends on, and in many instances follows from the military conditions provided by the US – what is often characterized as ‘the US makes the dinner and the EU does the dishes’ (Mason 2003: 256). Robert Cooper has argued that the EU is much more aggressive when it comes to its external relations (Cooper 2000). To Cooper, Europe (with the EU at its core, but not restricted to it) is the prime example of the ‘postmodern world’. As he puts it, the EU’s task is to ‘preserve and extend this post-modern security order and to promote its underlying values, never forgetting that more security can be achieved by cooperation than by competition’ (Cooper 2000: 23). However, Cooper is not at all interested in a complacent pacifism. Instead, he sees it as one of the greatest dangers to the postmodern world. In Cooper’s vision, military force is a necessary part of Europe as long as there are remnants of the ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ outside the sphere of the ‘postmodern’. He warns that ‘when we are operating in the jungle, we also must use the laws of the jungle’. No surprise, then, when he argues that ‘those who speak of Europe, as a ‘civilian power’ do so under the illusion that this could have been done without military power’. Yet the case of the US illustrates the danger of such logic. While normative power and military power are not incompatible, they can be in a serious tension and therefore this fact should not be ignored in the development of ESDP.

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Another criticism of the EU as a normative power concerns its consistency, both in terms of not discriminating between different external actors, and not undermining norms from inside (Diez 2005: 624). Thus, there have been charges of bias and arbitrariness related to the EU’s application of human rights. Also, since 9/11, the EU and its member states have taken part in the drive towards the securitization of migration, although perhaps less so than the US. One version of this argument is that EU insistence on norms embodies strategic or economic interests. In the strong version of the argument, those interests are cloaked in a mantle of values and norms rhetoric. In a weaker, more sophisticated version, Richard Youngs argues that normative concerns and strategic interests always go together in the EU’s external relations, and that one therefore needs a combination of rationalist and constructivist approaches in order to assess the respective impact of both factors (Youngs 2004: 224). Youngs claims that interests were manifested for instance in the political choices of supporting Yassir Arafat’s Administration rather than channeling funds towards NGOs critical of the Middle East peace process, and in the support granted to Boris Yeltsin in the name of stability in post-Soviet Russia. He further notes that human rights policy has often been instrumental, citing as examples funding that went to pro-Western NGOs rather than Islamist ones and (with respect to decision-making processes) that foreign ministries have ‘syphoned off’ human rights funds to direct them towards politically motivated projects (Youngs 2004: 225). Yet, in order to make judgements about which factor is at play, any such criticism is based on the presupposition of a clear-cut distinction between norms and interests. Such a distinction, however, is determined by ontological assumptions and, indeed political choice, rather than empirical observation. This problem has haunted similar attempts to distinguish empirically between different logics of action, in particular strategic and argumentative behavior. For example, according to Diez, Youngs discounts an interest in stability as a matter of strategic choice when it can easily be seen as a norm competing with human rights (Diez 2005: 625). Similarly, he sees the support of like-minded NGOs as an instance of instrumentality, although the entire logic of a normative power is about the spread of ‘particular’ norms and values. The point is not that normative power is not strategic, but, as Diez suggests, that strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical. The criticism of normative power as being driven, at least in part, by strategic interests, therefore runs into self-contradictions if it is presented as an objective analysis rather than a political intervention. Youngs in the end seems to affirm rather than effectively undermine the concept of normative power Europe. He agrees that ‘EU approaches certainly look rather less instrumental than the new … US human rights initiatives’. Diez concludes that Youngs’ criticism that the EU seeks to impose ‘European values’, is not in itself a contradiction, but rather a confirmation, of the EU as a normative power (Diez 2005: 626).

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Conclusion From the preceded analysis, it becomes apparent that normative, civilian and military powers are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, both civilian and military power can be seen as different forms of normative power. The real question is under which conditions EU military power is to be used for if there is a gap between international norms regarding the use of force and the actual use of force by the EU then the ‘normative power Europe’ which gradually gives its place to ‘military power Europe’. It is widely acknowledged that in today’s complex world, both military and civilian forms of power are central in achieving international peace and security. Therefore, there is little danger that the EU would not lose its character as a normative or civilian power by developing its military capabilities, providing that it remains committed to international law and strictly observes international norms regarding the application of employment of military force. It is rather the reasons for which the EU seeks to develop its military capabilities that may affect the perception of other states for neither the U.S. wishes to see its power and status in world affairs challenged by the EU nor would other states see any real difference by the replacement of one hegemon (US) by another (EU). One could argue that the worse case scenario for international order could be if the US and the EU would begin challenging one another for dominance in international politics. The post-World War II international order was to a great extent dependent on transatlantic cooperation while in the post-Cold War era collaboration between the US and the EU is seen as essential for international peace and stability. Little wonder, therefore, why many have argued that it is the nature of the transatlantic partnership which may, to a considerable degree, determine the future character of international order. Moreover, the increasing of EU military capabilities for the purpose of becoming a hegemonic power without a clear commitment to international law and international norms could also have significant implications for international order since other great powers, like China and Russia, would be obliged to devise policies and strategies to deal with the emerging hegemon and its interests. In addition, the militarization of the EU and its potential deeper involvement in world affairs through interventionist policies would attract the negative reaction of the international public opinion and the menace of terrorist groups. References Alston, P. and Weiler, J. (1999). ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’. In P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley (1982). ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(2), pp. 149-64. Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000). International Systems in World History. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Buzan, Barry (1991). People, States and Fear, 2nd edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Carr, E.H. (1962). The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, 2nd edition. London: Macmillan. Christiansen, T. (1997). ‘Legitimacy Dilemmas in Supranational Governance’. In N. Nentwich and A. Weale (eds.), Political Theory and the European Union. London: Routledge. Clapham, A. (1999). ‘Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How Is It Manifested in Multilateral Fora?’ in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cox, Michael (2003). ‘The Empire’s Back in Town’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 32(1). Den Boer, Monica and Monar Jorg (2002). ‘Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, pp. 11-28. Duchene, Francois (1972). ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’. In M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Duchene, Francois (1972). ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’. In R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow. London: Fontana. Everts, Steven and Garry Schmitt (2004). ‘Is Military Power Still the Key to International Security?’ In For and Against: Debating Euro-Atlantic Security Options. Brussels: NATO. Ferguson, Yale and Richard Mansbach (1996). Politics: Authority, Identities and Change. Columbia: University of North Carolina Press. Galtung, Johann (1973). The European Community: A Superpower in the Making. London; Allen & Unwin. Haine, Jean-Yves (2004). ‘Idealism and Power: The New EU Security Strategy’, Current History, 103(671), March 2004, pp. 107-12. Hill, Christopher (2004). ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy ?Since 11 September 2001’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(1). Hill, Christopher (1993). ‘The Capabiliity-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’. Journal of Common Market Studies 31(3), pp. 30528). Holsti, Kalevi (1996). The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howorth, Jolyon (2001). ‘European Defense and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), pp. 765-89. Jorgensen, K.E. (1997). ‘Western Europe and the Petersberg Tasks’. In K.E. Jorgensen (ed.), European Approaches to Crisis Management. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 131-52. Kagan, Robert (2003). Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf.

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King, T. (1999). ‘Human Rights in European Foreign Policy’. European Journal of International Law, 19(2), pp. 313-37. Laffan, B. (2001). ‘The European Union Polity: A Union of Regulative, Normative and Cognitive Pillars’. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), pp. 709-27. Lenaerts, K. and de Smitjer, E. (2001). ‘A ‘Bill of Rights’ for the European Union’. Common Market Law Review, 38(2), pp. 273-300. Manners, Ian (2002). ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), pp. 235-58. Manners, Ian (2000). Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (1998). ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union’. Journal of European Integration, 21(2), pp. 23149. Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (eds.) (2000). The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Maull, Hans (1990). ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’. Foreign Affairs, 69(5), pp. 91-106. Merlingen, M., C. Mudde and U. Sedelmeier (2001). ‘The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and Sanctions against Austria. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(1), pp. 59-77. Mattern, Janice Bially (2005). ‘Why “Soft Power” Isn’t So Soft’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3), pp. 583-612. Nicolaides, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2002). ‘This is my EUtopia: Narrative as Power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4). Prodi, Romano (2000). ‘2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe’. Speech to the European Parliament, Strasburg, 15 February. Rosecrance, Richard (1998). ‘The European Union: A New Type of International Actor’. In J. Zieloka (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 15-23. Sjursen, Helene (2004). ‘Changes to European Security in a Communicative Perspective’. Cooperation and Conflict, 39(2). Sjursen, Helene (1998). ‘Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy?: The Idea of a European Security and Defense Policy’. In J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.)., A Common foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. London: Routledge. Smith, K. (2001). ‘The European Union, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: Foreign Policy with an Ethical Dimension’. In K. Smith and M. Light (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, K. (2000). ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’. International Spectator, 23(2), pp. 11-28. Stivachtis, A. Yannis (2005). ‘The European Defense and Security Policy: Evolution and Challenges’. In Yannis A. Stivachtis (ed.), Global Governance and International Security. Athens: ATINER. Stivachtis, A. Yannis (2004). ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Iraq’. In Yannis A. Stivachtis (ed.), Current Issues in European Integration. Athens: ATINER.

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Therborn, G. (1977). ‘Europe in the Twentieth-First Century’. In P. Gowan and P. Anderson (eds.), The Question of Europe. London: Verso. Twitchett, K. (ed.) (1976). Europe and the World; The External Relations of the European Market. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Von Bogdandy, A. (2000). ‘The European Union as a Human Rights organization? Human rights and the Core of the European Union’. Common Market Law Review, 37, pp. 1307-38. Weiler, J. (1999). The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whitman, Richard (1998). From Civilian to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Williams, Appleman William (1962). The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: Delta. Youngs, Richard (2004). ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 4292). Zieloka, J. (1998). Explaining Euro-paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics: Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Chapter 4

Presidency as Leadership? Assessing the EU Presidency through the 2005 UK EU Presidency Richard G. Whitman and Gareth Thomas

Presidencies play an important role in the EU and a dysfunctional Presidency has a significant impact on its effectiveness. Although the member state holding the sixmonth rotating Presidency has few formal powers with which to directly influence the agenda, it is the conductor of the EU’s business and plays a key role in advancing the EU policy agenda during its term of office. The formal responsibilities of the EU Presidency are to act as chair for Heads of State and Government, ministerial and other committee and working group meetings, to represent the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament and the European Commission and to act as EU representative vis-à-vis third countries and within international organizations. Consequently the Presidency is essentially a cheerleader for a well-established programme, rather than a powerful executive position. The EU’s founding Treaties have little to say in defining the role of the Presidency. The Treaty of Rome articles 203-204 and the Treaty on European Union article 48 detail the anticipated role for the Presidency.1 More detailed guidance is provided by 1 Article 203 The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State. The office of President shall be held in turn by each Member State in the Council for a term of six months in the order decided by the Council acting unanimously. Article 204 The Council shall meet when convened by its President on his own initiative or at the request of one of its Members or of the Commission. Treaty on European Union Article 48 The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded. If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area.

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for Presidencies by the Council secretariat handbook. The formal responsibilities of the Presidency are chairing European Council, Council of Ministers meetings and working groups; representing the Council before the Commission and the European Parliament; – requires a good working relationship with both these institutions and the Council Secretariat; and acting as the EU representative vis-à-vis third states and international organizations.2 There is a broad consensus among academic analysts of EU Presidencies that any presidency faces a number of constraints: A logistical constraint. The burden of European Council, formal and informal Ministerial meetings and working group meetings is significant. Add to this all the EU-third party summits and political dialogue commitments and it is a significant burden to address. A Limited agenda setting capability constraint. A Presidency – works within the Multiannual Strategic Plan of the Council covering 2004-2006 covering six Presidencies (the Irish, Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Austria, Finland) and the UK is also working within the Operational Programme for 2005 which is a joint Luxembourg-UK Presidency Programme. The Intrusion of unexpected events constraint. Second Semester Presidencies additionally face a time constraint as a (short) Presidency – second semester means the loss of the month of August for business. The academic literature providing the basis to evaluate Presidencies is somewhat thin. Bjurulf, Elgström, Tallberg (1999) divide the existing literature into three main three major categories: First, there are a limited number of studies that are directly devoted to the Presidency (Edwards and Wallace 1977; de Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992; Svensson 2003). Second, there are chapters on the Presidency in books describing and analyzing the Council of Ministers (Westlake 2000; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Sherrington 2000). And third, there is a rather voluminous body of articles and conference reports on the experiences of particular holders of the Presidency (e.g., Kirchner and Tsagkari 1993, Ludlow 1998, Luther and Ogilvie 1998). As they note the characteristic of all this literature is its mainly descriptive focus. The empirical literature is typically void of broader, comparative analyses, with the exception of Kirchner (1992) and Wurzel (1996). In general, the literature puts relatively large emphasis on assessing, in empirical terms, the degree of influence and the effectiveness of individual Presidencies and of the institution as such. The possible differences between larger and smaller member states are noted, but no thorough analysis has been carried out. A strong point of the existing literature is, however, its clarification of the various functions of the Presidency. There seems to be relatively broad agreement that the main tasks include (1) management and administration, (2) mediation, (3) leadership, (4) contact point within the EU, (5) external representation and (6) promoter of national interests (see Wallace 1985; Kirchner 1992; Pijpers 1992; Schout 1998; Svensson 1998). This points to the important distinction between managerial tasks and agenda-setting powers. The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 2 See Kirchner (1992), Sherrington (2000), Elgstrom (2003) as illustrative for the consistency in the roles played by the Presidency across time.

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I would add a fourth category, the systematic comparative that for shorthand, I will call the Lund School. This encompasses the work of scholars based at the University of Lund in Sweden. What the Lund School does is to take the existing literature on roles and apply this to the Presidency – on in their own words take what is ‘Implicit in existing, empirical accounts of the Presidency is the notion that member states take on different roles when they assume the office of the Presidency.’ Two of the most interesting pieces of work to come out of the Lund School have been the comparative work led by Elgstom and the work on the Presidency as a negotiations broker. The work of Tallberg is extremely interesting in examining the power that the Presidency has in brokering negotiations. The Presidency in Action: The UK 2005 EU Presidency The UK Presidency commenced on 1 July against the backdrop of ‘no’ votes in France and the Netherlands on the EU Constitutional Treaty and an acrimonious summit under the Luxembourg Presidency in mid-June, which failed to reach a deal on the EU budget. For many commentators the EU was in deep crisis. The Commission President had publicly stated that this Presidency would be evaluated primarily on its ability to reach an agreement on the future financing of the EU by the end of its tenure. The issue was unresolved as the Council meeting opened and the success or failure of the Presidency seemed to hang in the balance. Almost six months earlier, in an inspirational speech to the European Parliament on 23 June, Prime Minister Tony Blair had performed a remarkable exercise in (briefly) boosting morale and raising expectations that the UK was to initiate a far-reaching debate on the future of European integration. That the speech, which was universally praised across Europe, had not been systematically followed up by the UK Government was a source of disappointment for other EU member state governments. A number of commentators disparaged the UK’s EU Presidency for failing to address the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the European project. The successful conclusion of budget negotiations would prove yet another stopgap measure delaying much needed reform of the budgetary system. A more detailed examination of the UK EU Presidency showed that the UK actually fulfilled a substantial part of its intended programme. Regrettably for the UK Government, the EU budget issue overshadowed other achievements. The paradox was that reaching an agreement on the EU financing arrangements for 2007–13 was not on the UK Presidency’s original agenda; rather, it was unfinished business inherited from the preceding Luxembourg Presidency. In fact, controversies experienced by the Presiding member state often highlight a deeper failure of institutional design, exposing the Presidency’s impotency, rather than a failure by a member state to fulfil the terms of office. Effective Presidencies resolve differences between member states and broker deals to resolve disagreements. As successful EU Presidencies seek to be a part of a solution to problems rather than at the centre of the EU’s disputes, it was unfortunate for the UK to have found itself so central to disagreement on the EU’s future finances.

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For many EU member states the UK was part of the problem, rather than part of the solution, in reaching an agreement on the EU budget. A more general evaluation of the effectiveness of the UK Presidency is not an easy task. The Economist recently suggested that it is not even particularly useful, declaring that ‘one of the more pointless Brussels parlour games is to tot up the achievements of whichever country holds the Presidency.’3 However, it is possible to assess the UK Presidency’s achievements on the basis of the programme of work that it set for itself in advance of the Presidency. The work programme for the UK’s six-month Presidency was a part of the Multiannual Strategic Programme for the period 2004–6, designed for the Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, UK, Austrian and Finnish Presidencies. Multi-annual Presidency work programmes are agreed because, at best, a Presidency can only start, move forward or conclude the EU’s agenda. Six months is too short a period in office to see policy or legislation fully devised or implemented. A more detailed Operational Programme of the Council for 2005, which fleshed out the timetable for implementing this strategy, is submitted jointly by both member states holding the Presidency in any given year. In this case, the operational programme was submitted by Luxembourg and the UK. Importantly, the member state at the helm also faces the challenge of managing the EU’s response to external events and unexpected developments within the EU. The UK was faced with both the domestic challenge of the London bombings on 7 July and the German general election in September, with the subsequent prolonged process ensuring that Germany was preoccupied with building a coalition government. The UK Government was also in the unusual position of holding the G-8 Presidency alongside its EU Presidency (its sixth EU Presidency, and its second under the Blair Government). There was, however, little real linkage between these two Presidencies because of the very different nature of the decision-making processes in the two organizations. The G-8 Presidency provided an opportunity to focus on the big themes of Third World poverty and climate change, and to work for progress in these key areas with some of the most internationally significant states. The EU Presidency was much less glamorous; it required working in a much more circumscribed manner in a more complicated set of institutional arrangements and with more limited objectives. The UK has tended to treat the G-8 Presidency as something to be celebrated, and the EU Presidency as something to be endured. Progress Under the UK Presidency It is important to distinguish between a good Presidency for the EU and a good Presidency for the government of the member state holding the Presidency. These factors are not always mutually exclusive, but they rarely run parallel. Other EU member state governments judged the UK on whether it had the capacity to reach a deal on the EU budget. The British Government seemed to measure its success on this issue by its ability to reach a settlement that preserved the UK EU budget rebate to a degree that minimized domestic political difficulties. The UK Government 3

Charlemagne, ‘Isolation forever’, The Economist, 3 December 2005, p. 48.

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would originally have been facing a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in spring 2006 and the EU Presidency would have provided a platform to prepare the electorate for the referendum. The government’s decision to suspend the UK’s ratification process, and the subsequent agreement of EU governments to defer discussions on the EU constitutional treaty with a ‘period of reflection’ until 2006, defused to a degree the domestic pressure on the Presidency agenda. However, the UK Government has failed to capitalize on the Prime Minister’s speech to the European Parliament on 23 June calling for the EU to examine how it could engage the interests and enthusiasms of its citizens. Other EU governments expected the UK Government to follow up with a plan for a programme of action and in not doing so the Presidency failed to capitalize on an opportunity to influence the structure of the debate. This was a significant failure. The UK Presidency has, however, generally been a success in handling its role in chairing the ministerial, committee and working group meetings of the EU. This role represents a significant logistical and organizational challenge for the Presidency and there was no criticism of the UK’s handling of this burden or its role in acting as the EU’s representative in dialogue and summits with third countries. An exception to this efficient operation related to the logistics for the informal foreign ministers’s meeting held in the UK in September. These provoked complaints and resulted in an apology from the Presidency. Complaints of a different nature were directed towards the UK Presidency with regard to the agenda for the informal summit of Heads of State and Government at Hampton Court on 27 October. As the Slovakian Prime Minister, Mikulas Dzurinda, complained in advance of the summit: ‘Silence reigns. We do not have information. We lack information, especially from the presiding country.’ The Presidency’s efforts to extend the olive branch to the French Government by supporting the global adjustment initiative at the Hampton Court summit were shot down by clear signals that the new German Government was unwilling to bankroll any new initiative when savings needed to be made elsewhere in the budget.4 Although the UK Presidency successfully delivered Turkish accession and a budget deal, the manner in which they have been achieved will do little to warm the relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU in 2006. For many new member states the Hampton Court meeting was an exercise in Presidential filibustering, with the UK playing for time on the budget issue that other member states felt was of the most pressing concern. There was, however, an important new initiative at the summit with Prime Minister Blair calling for an EU energy security policy. The successful development of such a policy will fall to future EU Presidencies. The UK Presidency has managed to maintain a united EU front in terms of foreign policy. There have been significant foreign policy challenges during its term of office and these have been handled in a manner that has led to divisions between the EU member states. These include difficulties confronting EU nuclear diplomacy with Iran since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, maintaining good relations with China while negotiating the voluntary export restraints to limit the impact of Chinese textile and shoe imports; the earthquake in Pakistan; and responding 4

Financial Times, 28 October 2005.

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to a growing fear of a flu pandemic created by the spread of HN51. Furthermore, renewed complications in the relationship with the US following allegations of CIA interrogation centres on European soil were effectively handled: a collective EU request to the US Government for clarification was a successful exercise in forging a common response. The UK Government set out its own expectations for its Presidency in its White Paper of 23 June 2005, Priorities for the UK Presidency of the Council. This organized the UK’s aspirations under three headings: economic reform and social justice, security and stability, and Europe’s role in the world. A final paragraph pledges to ‘take forward the discussions on future financing’. A second White Paper Prospects for the EU in 2005: The UK Presidency of the European Union, published on 30 June 2005, confirmed these priorities. The success of the Presidency will be assessed under each of these headings. The appendix to this paper details objectives set by the Presidency and offers a colour-coded analysis of the extent to which the Presidency has achieved its objectives. Economic Reform and Social Justice In conjunction with the Barroso-led European Commission, the UK wanted to place an emphasis on resurrecting the Lisbon Agenda during its Presidency. A key litmus test of this achievement would be progress made in the field of Better Regulation, particularly planned reforms of chemical regulation (REACH), as well as development of the Financial Services Action Plan and the Services Directive. On Better Regulation on 25 October 2005, the Commission adopted a Communication calling for the implementation of a three-year programme to simplify 222 basic legislations and 1,400 acts. The French Government and the European Parliament’s rapporteur were both extremely critical of a Commission plan to withdraw 68 legislative proposals from the inter-institutional circuit, particularly those relating to the regulation of heavy goods vehicles. The vagueness of the conclusions of the Competitiveness Council, held on 28 and 29 November, suggests that the Presidency failed to allay these concerns. More substantial success was achieved with the progress made on REACH. Negotiations on the most appropriate way to synthesize Chemical Regulation into one legal structure had been ongoing for a number of years. When the Commission launched the REACH proposals in October 2003, Denmark, Finland France, Germany and Sweden all raised concerns that the simpler legislation could have a detrimental effect on public health and the environment. The UK, whose thinking is more in line with that of the Commission, put discussion of REACH high on the agenda of both the Competitiveness Council and Environment Council. At the Competitiveness Council on 11 November, the UK tabled a compromise position that placated all member states with the exception of France. The compromise established by the main rapporteur, Gaudi Sacconi (PES, Italy), and Harmut Nassauer (EPP-ED, Germany) in the EP saw REACH pass its first reading on 17 November. REACH was once again on the agenda to be discussed at the Competitiveness Council on 28 and 29 November. The UK Presidency had planned a vote on REACH at the 28-29 November Competitiveness Council, but instead allowed Ministers further

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discussion to allow the recently formed German and Polish Governments to finalize their positions. At a Special Meeting of the Competitiveness Council called on the 13 December 2005, the twenty-five Member States reached an agreement on REACH, which paves the way for other Presidencies to entice EP toward a joint agreement during 2006. There were also a number of developments relating to the liberalization and integration of service markets. Substantial progress was made towards agreement on the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The Commission Green Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005–10, which outlined an agenda for reform of the services sector, was adopted with little controversy. The Commission requested comments on the first part of the FSAP and the Council is currently awaiting the White Paper on Financial Services Policy The Commissions White Paper, issued on 5 December 2005, differed little from the original Green Paper. The Services Directive also passed an important hurdle. The European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee put an end to months of acrimony when it voted through the Services Directive on 22 November. A coalition of centre-right, liberal and East European MEPs managed to vote through a version of the directive that was more in line with British thinking than that of the German PES rapporteur, Evelyn Gebhardt. The committee maintained the ‘country of origin’ principle despite Gebhardt’s efforts to replace it with a ‘mutual recognition’ principle to protect wages from competition. The directive moved to its first reading at a plenary session of the European Parliament on 15 February 2006. Both these events were good news for the Presidency’s agenda and provided positive news coverage for the British Government but the direct role of the UK Presidency in these developments was minimal. As external representative of the EU, the UK Presidency has had an even more tangible success with the progress made towards liberalization of the US–EU aviation market. At the end of a week–long conference in Washington at the end of November, the efforts of Jacques Barrot and Daniel Calleja Crespo, as representatives of the Commission, and Alistair Darling, as President of the Transport Council, bore fruit. The text of the first ever aviation treaty between the US and EU was agreed and linked to a US proposal to ease its interpretation of legislation that limits foreign investors to a 25 per cent voting stake, and a 49 per cent equity stake, in US airlines. The proposal is still undergoing review. The so-called ‘open skies’ deal was on the agenda of the 5 December Council, but full political backing is unlikely to be agreed until the US presents a definitive programme on liberalization in March 2006. These aviation talks were particularly difficult for the UK because of the desire for American airlines to have full access to Europe’s busiest airport, Heathrow. Given that British Airways is a global carrier, the UK had to balance a wish to safeguard a strong national position within the negotiations with the impartial role of the Presidency. The influence of the UK Presidency was clearer still in the stalling of discussions on the Working Time Directive. This represents a victory of British interests over those of the EU as a whole. When the Commission tabled a proposal under the Luxembourg Presidency to change the opt-out clause available to member states within the directive, the UK led a minority of governments who blocked its progress at the June Council. The operational programme for the year commits the Presidency progress the issue further, but explicit discussion of the directive was noticeably

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absent from the agenda of Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Councils or Competitiveness Councils during the UK’s tenure. The Presidency tabled a compromise position at the ESPHCA Council on 8 December, but it was rejected by fifteen of the member states. The lack of progress on the Working Time Directive can be viewed as a short-term ‘success’ for the UK Government, but succeeding Presidencies will be forced return to the issue. Security and Stability The aims of the UK Presidency in this area were divided into three further sub-sections: counter-terrorism, people trafficking and enlargement. One headline achievement for the UK Presidency was therefore in this field: the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October. Yet there have been other achievements here too. In terms of counter-terrorism, the agreement and implementation of the June 2005 Hague Programme continued, if not at a pace in line within the Council dossier on the EU’s response to the London bombings, adopted on 13 July. The Presidency has achieved success in areas not quite specifically related to counter-terrorism – for example, the draft European Payment Order was approved at the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 2 December. The Presidency had hoped for an agreement on a harmonized counter-terrorism strategy to be reached ahead of the European Council on 15 December, but a large number of ministers had their mandate challenged by domestic legislatures. The 2 December Council did make progress on the European Refugee Fund to help protect refugees ‘at source’. The JHA Council endorsed a Spanish proposal brought forward at the Hampton Court summit to release €400 million from the European Neighbourhood Policy to finance the plan. The predominant efforts of the UK Presidency were focused successfully on efforts to reach an agreement to harmonize the retention of telecommunications, email and internet data in all member states for up to two years. Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia have all raised concerns about the implications for civil liberties and the cost if this legislation is applied to all crimes. Through adroit chairing the Presidency reached agreement, via qualified majority voting, for a directive. In spite of this, the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament agreed to a different version of the proposal, voting to limit retention to only 12 months and to force member states to reimburse industry for any storage costs incurred. Significant divisions remained open ahead of the European Parliament’s vote on the issue at the plenary meeting scheduled for the 14th December. The Council threatened to adopt a more far-reaching framework decision if the EP failed to adopt the directive at the first reading and the Presidency put immense pressure on the EPP/DE and PES groupings in the three weeks preceding the vote.5 The EP eventually adopted the draft directive by 378 votes to 197. It is still possible that the legal base upon which it was agreed may be subject to challenge in the European Court of Justice. In terms of its objectives with regard to enlargement, the opening of negotiations with Turkey was indeed a considerable achievement. The Presidency faced 5 The threat was made in a letter dated 28 October 2005 – http: //www.euractiv.com/ Article?tcmuri=tcm: 29-147671-16&type=PolicyNews.

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considerable obstacles to achieving this goal. Public opposition to the Constitution in the Netherlands and France had been linked in part to fears that further enlargement would depress wages. In Germany, the Chancellor-in-waiting, Angela Merkel, espoused a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership for Turkey.6 The Austrian Government threatened to veto any attempt to open accession negotiations in the General Affairs Council. The position of the Presidency was helped by two events. The German elections did not present Angela Merkel with as clear a mandate as expected and, distracted by the need to build a grand coalition, the CDU was not represented at the General Affairs Council (GAC) in Luxembourg. It was also precipitate that Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor with the UN war crimes tribunal, had reported on 3 October that Croatia had fully cooperated with the ICTY over General Gotovina. This enabled the UK to simultaneously open accession negotiations with Croatia, considerably placating Austrian opposition to Turkish membership. The amount of politicking involved in this decision was well demonstrated by the decision of Croatia’s Catholic Christian Democrat Government to pay reparations to ethnic Germans expelled from Croatia at the end of the Second World War, a decision roundly attacked by Croatia’s President, Stipe Mesic.7 Fortunately the decision to open negotiations with Croatia does not appear to have undermined the EU’s transformative power in the region. On 7 December Gotovina was detained in Tenerife. Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) were opened with Serbia and Montenegro, as well as with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). On 4 October, the refusal to open a SAA with BiH until much-needed police reform had begun saw the Police Reform bill forced through the Parliament of Republica Srpska on 6 October. The parliament of the predominantly Serb entity in BiH had previously rejected the bill twice. In this respect it was ‘mission accomplished’ for the UK Presidency, but the manner in which the Presidency handled negotiations on Turkish accession had the potential to damage the relationship between the UK and its European partners. Negative reactions from a number of foreign ministries in the established member states seem to suggest that a crisis could have been avoided had the UK laid the groundwork of consultation more thoroughly leading up to the GAC on 3 October. The representatives of the Central and Eastern European Countries were also incensed by the fact that they were consulted only after a deal had been agreed with Ankara. This does not appear to have been the result of incompetence on the part of the British Government, but rather a choice to focus political energy and effort on dealing with Austria as the recalcitrant member state obstructing the formal decision. Even if the methods used by the Presidency were criticized, the resulting agreement to open accession negotiations was welcomed by member states. Europe’s Role in the World Europe’s foreign policy has remained cohesive during the UK’s Presidency. The EU maintained a united front with regard to Iran. This was made easier by President 6 7

Financial Times, 3 June 2005. The Guardian, 30 November 2005.

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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call on 26 October for Israel to be wiped off the face of the earth, which received a clear rebuke from Tony Blair as President of the European Union, and a still harsher one from him as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) persevered with an offer to renew talks with Iran, if the Iranian Government accepted an offer to place its nuclear energy programme under Russian control. For its part, the EU agreed at the 16 December European Council on the need to keep the EU’s diplomatic options under close review and to continue to calibrate the EU’s approach in light of Iranian declarations and actions. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Presidency and the EU3 played an admirable part in forging a deal that was plausibly acceptable to the UN Security Council (plus Germany), if not to a defiant Iranian regime. Elsewhere the EU’s international involvement grew at a steady pace in the second half of 2005. In September 2005, the European Union launched the first ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) operation outside Europe and Africa, the monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia), in conjunction with contributions from Norway, Switzerland and a number of ASEAN countries. It agreed a deal at the JHA Council on 12 October, which concluded five years of negotiations with Russia on the granting of visas and readmission of illegal residents. On 15 November the Council adopted a joint action that officially launches the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian territories (EUPOL–COPPS) as of 1 January 2006. The EU’s involvement in Iraq did not grow at as fast a pace as the UK Presidency might have liked. Negotiations on a Third Country Agreement to increase political and trade cooperation were not initiated during the UK’s tenure. Neither was a Commission Delegation Office opened on Iraqi soil. Nonetheless, the EU Political Directors did initiate a dialogue with Baghdad on 24 October and by the beginning of December the Commission had circulated a draft Negotiating Mandate for a Third Country Agreement with Iraq. Progress was made towards the opening of a Commission Delegation Office at the GAC on 7 November and a decision was taken to extend EUJUST LEX (the Rule of Law Mission for Baghdad). In its representation of the EU at major summits with third countries, the UK was a model Presidency. The UK was not able to use the opportunity of its parallel chairmanship of the G8 to promote a European response to two issues high on the public agenda in the second half of 2005: climate change and Third World poverty. The June White Paper appeared to suggest that the UK wanted to ensure the EU led the discussion on climate change at the Montreal Conference from 28 November to 9 December. Yet, the European approach to climate change appeared to undergo a transformation in the same period that the UK held the Presidency. The second European Climate Change Programme, launched by the Commission on the 24th October, gave much greater credence to technology led solutions than its predecessor. The UK Presidency also welcomed the idea of a technology-led approach as an appropriate way to tackle problems created by US obstinacy and the rapid development of China and India. As a result, the UK Presidency returned from Montreal with a deal better than might have been expected when it assumed the Presidency of the EU. The conference successfully agreed to establish a working group that will determine emission targets for the period 2013-17, once Kyoto has expired in 2012. This was an objective of the Government’s White Paper of the 30th June. It remains to be seen whether the

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working group can be used to agree reduction pathways in the order of 15-30 per cent for developed countries, as the Council had hoped, when it meets in May 2006. The UK also dedicated considerable time and effort to ensuring that the US was reengaged at Montreal. These efforts bore fruit on Saturday 10th December when the US Government, under increased pressure at home, agreed to sign a revised version of a statement calling for cooperation on climate change. Sources within the Foreign Office maintain that this outcome would not have been possible without the consistent elevation of the issue of climate change to the top of the agenda during its Presidency of both institutions, as well as the inclusion of China and India within the discussions at the G8 summit. This move enabled the UK’s EU Presidency to build upon an unheralded level of trust on climate change during its External Summits with India and China. Subsequently it was capable of further taking forward initiatives such as the Commission’s plans for technology exchange with China on near-zero emissions Coal. Shifts in the positions of the two most significant emerging economies in the world, put undeniable pressure on the US administration. The Montreal Climate Change conference had secured the issue of climate change a place on the international agenda. It was perhaps fortuitous that the Presidency of the G8 fell to a member of the EU, but the ability of the UK’s EU Presidency to include the interests of external parties within the European perspective and forge a realistic approach to the issue was admirable. To argue that the Presidency put emphasis on both these aspects as part of some pre-ordained strategy rather undermines the very impetus that the UK’s Presidency brought to the international debate. On Third World poverty, there was something of a disconnection between the UK’s G8 agenda and the policies pursued during its Presidency. In the June White Paper, the UK Presidency stated that it aimed to agree a new long-term strategy on EU–African relations at the December European Council. Unfortunately, the negotiations became embroiled in the wider debate over the future financing of the EU budget. At the informal African Development summit in Leeds, the UK, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands all expressed concerns about the proposal tabled by the Commission for a joint development strategy on Africa. The UK’s major concern was that the strategy should be financed by mechanisms outside the EU budget, so that it did not get embroiled in the protracted dispute over the financial perspective for 2007–13. As it was the budget negotiations dominated the run up to the December Council and the complications they created for progress in this field became yet another stick with which to beat the Presidency while it remained silent with regard to budget proposals. The EU did not present a deal that came anywhere close to meeting the Doha Development Agenda for the ministerial meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong from 13 to 18 December. One major stumbling block was overcome with the conclusion of an agreement on reform of the EU’s sugar regime. The conclusions of the Agriculture Council on the 24th November accepted a deal that cut the EU sugar price by 36 per cent over four years. Unfortunately, the deal that the Presidency has coaxed out of the major players fell short of the 39 per cent reduction over two years originally envisaged in the June council proposals. The ACP producers, those third-country producers who currently benefit from fixed pricing within the EU, have deplored the

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compensation they have been offered: €60 million is scheduled to be paid to ACP countries in 2006. This deal does not match the Presidency’s original objectives, but the ability to reach an agreement did put the EU in a moderately better negotiating position ahead of the WTO meeting in Hong Kong. Despite this, the EU and other major players are still bogged down in the other parts of the quagmire surrounding agricultural reform. The EU did agree to eliminate export subsidies by 2013. To argue that Hong Kong represented a great shift in the debate would be wrong; to argue that it was a success would be considerable hyperbole. The UK Presidency, for its part, successfully managed to uphold the mandate of Commissioners Peter Mandelson and Mariann Fischer Boel to negotiate on behalf of the EU, despite consistent challenges from the French Government. The French agriculture minister, Dominique Bussereau, maintained in public statements that Mandelson’s offer to cut customs duties by 24.5 per cent on imported agricultural produce far exceeded his mandate. At the Special GAERC on the 13-18 December in Hong Kong, it was emphasized that: The Council expressed at the various stages of the negotiations its full support for the approach and line of action of the Commission.8

Despite considerable efforts the Presidency was impotent to enhance the prospects of the EU being able offer anything that overcame the current obstacles to the conclusion of the Doha Round. On the 26 October, the EU made an offer on a 70 per cent reduction in agricultural subsidies and an average cut of 38.9 per cent in agricultural tariffs. APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the Cairns group have published statements suggesting that they will block progress in any other area, if further concessions are not made on agriculture. The British Government would have undoubtedly liked to go further, but its inability to drive the debate sufficiently forward underlines the lack of power inherent in the rotating-Presidency. Fundamentally, it underlines the absence of any institutional mechanism by which major ideological questions can be settled at the European-level and provide a mandate through which policy can be driven forward accordingly. Future Financing The problems experienced by the UK Presidency were accentuated by the fact that discussions of agricultural reform led back to two things: the British abatement and the British Government’s overt ideological commitment to a particular model of economic reform. This was most clear in the dispute over future financing of the EU budget in the financial perspective 2007–13. The British Government would have probably liked to postpone discussion of this issue during its Presidency, in much the same way that the ‘period of reflection’ agreed at the June summit saved it from leading discussions on the future of the EU constitution. Other member states and the European Commission did not allow the issue to fall off the Presidency’s agenda. The UK strategy appeared to have two clear strands. First, the UK Presidency 8

http: //ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/87672.pdf.

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continually linked reform of the UK rebate to reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as a distorting element of the EU budget. Second, it has adopted the same delaying tactics used to force an agreement on Turkey. The UK did not present detailed proposals on the budget to EU member state governments until 5 December, only ten days before the European Council meeting. The thrust of the proposals attempted to reduce the burden on the current net contributors to the budget by cutting the €160 million regional aid planned for the Central and East European member states ‘by no more than 10 per cent.’9 This reduction was justified on the basis that the East European member states had thus far failed to absorb a substantial amount of aid within the two-year time limit for spending it. The reduction would be linked to an extension of the time limit in which the East European states are allowed to spend aid, as well as a 2009 review of spending, including the CAP. A key point of the UK proposals was that they have decoupled the CAP reform from any alteration to the UK’s rebate. This was done by presenting changes to the rebate as being driven by the UK’s willingness to relinquish a proportion of it in order not to disadvantage the new member states and to make an appropriate contribution to eastern enlargement. The UK proposals were not received warmly and the prospects of a deal on the budget were not auspicious. President Barroso likened the approach to that of the Sheriff of Nottingham, robbing the poor to pay the rich.10 There was a long-standing feeling in Brussels that the British insistence on linking reform of the rebate to the CAP came too late. In 2002, Tony Blair agreed to a set of CAP reforms set for review in 2013, and the UK’s persistence in maintaining the rebate at all other junctures risked undermining attempts to secure a deal that would have ensured a mid-term review of CAP reform prior to 2013. The real failure of the British Government on the EU budget negotiations up to this point was that the UK had not actively advanced the case for a thorough review of all aspects of the EU’s expenditure and financing over the last few years, but instead maintained its position that the UK EU budget rebate was non-negotiable. Still, after fraught negotiations, the UK successfully secured a mid-term review of spending in 2008 at the European Council on the 15–16 December. The UK in its role as President successfully secured a new budget that was announced on the 17th December. The budget deal set total expenditure at 1.045 per cent of the EU’s GNI (€862.3 billion). The deal reduced expenditure by pairing a €10.5 billion reduction to the British rebate over seven years with a €16 billion reduction of aid to Eastern Europe. The UK Presidency successfully secured a deal between Member States, but the saga will run well into the Austrian Presidency with the potential for the deal to falter at the inter-institutional level. 541 MEPs voted to reject the deal at a plenary on the 19th January 2006, with only 56 being in favour and 71 abstaining. MEPs were particularly upset that the deal fell far short of the €974,837 billion requested by the EP in June 2005. They also took umbrage that the hEP appeared to have been written

9 Financial Times, 5 December 2005. 10 Financial Times, 1 December 2005.

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out of the mid-term review of spending.11 The Commission, Presidency and Council are expected to present a draft inter-institutional position this month (February 2006) although the reconciliation will not necessarily follow a strict schedule. The East European states were eager to guarantee an assistance package prior to the 1st January deadline and were given longer timeframes to ‘absorb’ aid. Nonetheless, the manner of the deal did little to stifle the rising tide of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe and a lot to enhance the approach to Europe being taken by the governments in Warsaw and Prague. Even though the new Germany Chancellor reverted to the traditional role of paymaster and thereby softened the blow of the budget deal on Poland in particular, the budget deal did not pass through the lower house of the legislature until the 24th January 2006 after weeks of horse-trading. At the time of writing, it has yet to pass through the upper house. Two Cheers for the British Presidency? The UK’s Presidency of the EU was not a disaster. There was notable progress in a number of policy areas despite the potential for the Presidency to become embroiled in all number of external controversies. There has been considerable progress on both REACH and the Services Directive. It is, however, important to note that here the Presidency is dependent on delivery by other EU institutions such as the European Parliament and the European Commission. The Presidency can claim success for progress in these areas but the success is not necessarily its own making. A key success was that the Presidency oversaw the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. This was essentially reconfirming a decision already made, but a failure to open negotiations would have created considerable difficulties for the EU in its relationship with Turkey. The Presidency secured a budget deal and by conceding €8 billion (over seven years) of the British rebate, secured a mid-term review of spending. The outcome of the budget negotiations were far from satisfactory for all parties concerned but this may be the best deal that a UK Government is in a position to offer without inviting huge domestic political ramifications. If the negotiations had been allowed to rumble on into the Austrian Presidency, Europe would have been faced with a British Government no longer occupying the Presidency (and consequently keen to reach a deal during its term of office) and preparing for local government elections in May 2006 against a renewed opposition in the form of the Conservative Party under David Cameron. The UK would have relapsed into a much less flexible negotiating position. There was also disappointing progress on the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Perhaps if the Presidency had been in the position of having to devote less energy to the budget issue it might have been able to devote extra political energy to strengthening the European commitment to these negotiations. The UK Presidency achieved a large part of what it planned to achieve. However, its style has damaged the UK’s standing in Europe. The failure of the Prime Minister 11 http: //www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=14451.

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to follow up on his June speech on the future for Europe has left the impression that the UK is content with the EU’s current status quo – and with the Constitutional Treaty being consigned to history. Perhaps the most damaging immediate impact of the Presidency on the interests of the British Government will result from its preference for brinkmanship (over consultation) on the EU budget during its term of office. But that a deal was brokered at all during the European Council in December is a significant achievement to the Presidency’s credit. The UK EU Presidency is a case study demonstration of the importance of the role of the Presidency for the EU. The UK Presidency was neither a dysfunctional Presidency nor an overwhelming success. Rather it was effective in realizing the objectives that it set for itself rather than providing inspirational leadership. The UK Presidency was a classic ‘competent Presidency’ in that it exemplified the constraints of the six-month rotating Presidency that provides few formal powers with which to directly influence the agenda. The UK was the conductor of the EU’s business that fell during its Presidency and, as with all Presidencies, that agenda was neither entirely of its own making nor directly under its control. The EU Presidency provides an only a fleeting opportunity for leadership and without the exercise of significant power. References Bjurulf, B., O. Elgström, Tallberg, J. (1999). The Council Presidencies of the Nordic EU Members: A Comparative Study Dnr 1999-5180: 01. http: //www.svet.lu.se/ Projekt/Presidency/Presidency-application.pdf, accessed 4 December 2006. De Bassompierre, G. (1988). Changing the Guard in Brussels: An Insider’s View of the Presidency. New York: Praeger. Elgström, O. (2003). European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge. Edwards, G. and H. Wallace. (1977). The Council of Ministers of the European Community and the President-in Office. London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research. Hayes-Renshaw, F. and H. Wallace. (1997). The Presidency. In F. Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace (eds.) The Council of Ministers. London: Macmillan, pp. 134-57. Kirchner, E. (1992), Decision-Making in the European Community: The Council Presidency and European Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kirchner, E. and A. Tsagkari. (1993). The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies. London: UACES. Ludlow, Peter. (1998). ‘The 1998 UK Presidency: A View from Brussels’. Journal of Common Market Studies 36(4), pp. 573-83. Luther, K. R. and I. Ogilvie. (1998). Austria and the European Union Presidency: Background and Perspectives. Keele: Keele European Research Centre. Sherrington, P. J. (2000). European Union Decision-Making: The Work of the Council of Ministers. Cassell Academic. Svensson, A. (2003). ‘The agenda shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency’. Journal of European Public Policy 10(1),1-19.

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Tallberg, Jonas. (2004). ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotations’. Journal of Common Market Studies 42(5), pp. 999-1022. Wallace, H. (1984). ‘Role and Evolution of the Presidency’. In J-M. Hoscheit (ed.), The Impact of European Affairs on National Administrations –The Case of the Presidency. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Wallace, H. (1985). ‘The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community: Tasks and Evolution’. In C. O. O’Nuallain (ed.), The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers. London: Croom Helm. Westlake, Martin. (2000). The Council of the European Union. London: Cartermill. Wurzel, R.K.W (1996). ‘The Role of the Presidency in the Environmental Field: Does It Make a Difference which Member State Runs the Presidency’. Journal of European Public Policy 3(2), pp. 272-91.

Chapter 5

European Union International Strategy Against Proliferation Threats Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) constitutes a renewed risk for international peace and security. The conventional international treaties that control WMD rely on the State, but nowadays their efficiency faces specific challenges. Within this context, the EU has made moves to enhance its role as a non-proliferation actor (Schmitt 2003: 15; Portela 2003: 22),1 specifically since the adoption of the European Union strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, approved by the European Council in December 2003.2 This document represents the political will of member states to fight against proliferation of WMD in a specific ‘European way’. To assess this EU approach, this chapter examines the diagnosis, objectives, and proposals the EU has put forth with regards to WMD. The conclusions will provide an overall assessment on the effectiveness of the European Strategy and the conditions such success depends upon. Diagnosis of the Threat The EU sees the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as an increasing threat to international peace and security – rather than these weapons’ mere 1 Among the EU´s earliest measures were actions in favor of the inclusion of a legally binding protocol to reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the EU acquis with regards to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the beginning of the 1980’s, EU member states began to address jointly the problems of nuclear proliferation through an informal working group within the framework of European Political Cooperation. Through the Single Europe Act, another working group was formed on chemical and biological weapons. The activity of these working groups, since the adoption of the European Union treaty, has been carried out within the Committee on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), which addresses the questions of WMD and missile proliferation from the perspective of the CFSP. 2 Two other documents are also relevant: the Action Plan for the implementation of the basic principles of an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adopted by the European Council in June 2003, and the European Security Strategy – A Safe Europe in a Better World, adopted by the European Council in December 2003. These documents and other relevant to this topic can be consulted by visiting the web page http: //ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=392&lang=en&mode=g. Hereafter, these documents will be referred to as ‘Action Plan’, ‘EU Security Strategy’ and ‘EU–WMD Strategy’.

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existence.3 The EU viewpoint reflects that of other international organizations and is consistent with the International Court of Justice’s opinion that it is impossible to establish a general international law rule that bans a particular type of weapons per se.4 Nonetheless, the different status of EU Member States as regards to nuclear weapons (particularly, the status of France and the United Kingdom as legal nuclear powers under the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT5) shapes the European position and thus preventing the EU from outright rejecting all WMD (Quille and Pullinger 2003; Portela 2003: 3-5). On the other hand, the EU Strategy clearly advocates for a universal ban on chemical and biological weapons because all member states have ratified the Conventions on Biological and Chemical Weapons.6 Other consideration defines the EU diagnosis: the connection between WMD and terrorist groups, which brings a new and critical dimension to the WMD threat.7 According to EU analysis, this connection is particularly strong in terms of chemical and biological weapons because their specific characteristics (dual use of many biological and chemical products) make them especially attractive to terrorists.8 Nonetheless, the EU position does not overlook the risk of nuclear explosive use by terrorists and certainly, the Strategy includes a significant number of measures to enhance the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Lastly, the EU diagnosis addresses the responsibility of some –unnamed – countries and non-state actors in encouraging proliferation, and suggests that the threat stems from limitations in current international regulations (treaty scope).9 However, when the EU tackles the specific problems of WMD proliferation, it broadens the origin of the threat as caused by breaches imputable to states and subject to international treaties (treaty compliance). According to the EU diagnosis, the cause of proliferation stems from both weaknesses in scope and in implementation mechanisms of current international regulations.10 Thus, the EU diagnosis reflects the current historical period because it links WMD with international terrorism and recognizes that international terrorism adds a new dimension to the problem of WMD. This link does not prevent the EU from considering each state ultimately and principally responsible for the proliferation of WMD. In fact, the EU is confident that 3 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 1. Indeed, it is one of the five threats identified by the EU Security Strategy document, which states, ‘the proliferation of WMD is, potentially, the most serious threat to our [EU] security’. 4 See Advisory Opinion 1996 ICJ 226, paragraph 39. 5 See UNTS Vol. 729, I: 10485. 6 See Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BTWC), UNTS Vol. 1015, I: 14860, and Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (CWC), UNTS Vol. 1975, I: 33757. 7 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 4. The document states that non-proliferation, disarmament and weapons control can make a fundamental contribution to the global fight against terrorism (paragraph 3). 8 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 8. 9 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 4. 10 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 6-9.

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exerting control over States may significantly reduce the risk of terrorism. The reason for this is that each internal state action may reduce the access of terrorists groups to the expertise, resources, technical infrastructure, and logistics needed to develop and use WMD. International coordination and cooperation is key to dealing with this problem. Deciding what actions to take against any State unwilling or unable to fulfill its international obligations is an issue that the EU faces when designing its program against proliferation, not in the diagnosis of the problem. Axes of Action With that diagnosis of the threat, the EU objectives are ‘to prevent, deter, halt, and where possible, eliminate proliferation programs of concern worldwide.’11 This is in fact a limited, but realistic objective. Elimination of proliferation is subject to conditions of probability (its characteristics are not explained), and the EU objectives do not include every WMD program (which would be beyond EU capacities). The EU seems to respect the current state of international law on disarmament and arms control. This means that the proliferation programs of States that are not party to present international treaties can be questioned only if the Security Council determines that they are a threat to international peace and security. But the words written in the EU Strategy are obviously ambiguous: concern worldwide does not mean Security Council determination. The EU position is a universal one, but it remains reluctant on this particular point to limit its possibilities of action to only those programs determined by the Security Council to be a threat to international peace and security. In order to achieve those objectives, four main principles guide the European approach: multilateralism, comprehensive action, co-responsibility, and gradualism.12 Multilateralism incorporates the defense, implementation, and reinforcement of international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and agreements, as well as support to multilateral institutions that verify and control compliance. The comprehensive action principle implies the employment of all the Union’s resources and tools to achieve EU goals, as well as the integration of nonproliferation into all EU policies. Co-responsibility acts in two different directions: first, through export control on dual use goods and technologies and second, through the EU’s contribution to solving the main causes of instability (development assistance, reduction of poverty and promotion of human rights). Lastly, the principle of gradualism guides the application of anti-proliferation measures, which are both preventive and coercive. The former constitutes the first line of defense against proliferation for the EU and includes political, diplomatic actions as well as reliance on competent international organizations. The latter embraces measures envisaged in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and under international law, which the EU would consider using only if preventive measures fail.

11 EU-WMD Strategy, paragraph 2. 12 These principles underlie the EU Strategy and they can be found, specifically, within paragraphs 14 and 15.

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These principles are classical European trademarks in the fight against proliferation. Nonetheless, the document reveals disagreement among Member States concerning the role of coercion, especially military force against proliferation threats and the position of the Security Council. Indeed, the Strategy merely assigns the Security Council a central role, not the primary competence as stipulated in article 24 of the UN Charter. This is a very controversial point: while some analysts recommend linking forcible action to a UN Security Council mandate, in order to make the European Strategy credible (Portela 2003: 34), others consider that this credibility will exist only when the EU declares its willingness to use force against proliferators, with or without the Security Council authorization (Kagan 2003; Toje 2005). The author does not agree with this last point of view: in addition to being illegal,13 this kind of declarations decreases the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and further introduces uncertainties in the international system. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime is grounded on the network of commitments between nuclear and non-nuclear states, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons (with a different scope under conventional and customary rules), and verification mechanisms in order to guarantee the compliance of States with these obligations. These mechanisms include the Security Council as uniquely empowered with the right to declare a State to be a threat to international peace and security and in a position to determine proper sanctions against this State. Unilateral statements about the willingness to violate international legal rules are usually in the origin (although rhetoric) of proliferation programs, if not the source of fear causing unpredictable arms races. In addition, the threat of use or the use of force has proven ineffective in avoiding or eliminating a proliferation program, as the cases of Iraq (Tuchman 2004)14, Libya (Allison 2004: 171-75)15 or North Korea (Salama 2005)16 have clearly demonstrated. Action Plan From these goals and principles, the EU Strategy designs an action plan with four groups of measures: (1) measures to implement an effective multilateral response, (2) measures to promote international and regional stability, (3) measures to implement cooperation with key EU associates, and (4) internal structural and organizational measures. The actions associated with each of these areas are heterogeneous. 13 According to Article 2 of the UN Charter as well as the rules of international customary law. 14 Iraq proliferation program ended with the UN inspection action in 1991-1998, as the subsequent US occupation of Iraq has demonstrated. 15 It appears clear that Libya’s decision on 19 December 2003 after many years of diplomatic and economic isolation, to renounce its WMD arsenal – although not significant in size – and pursue unilateral disarmament was to a strong degree the result of ‘diplomatic carrots and sticks’, and not threats. 16 The US threats against North Korea seem to have had no effects on the Pyongyang authorities’ decisions; and in fact they utilized US actions to justify their nuclear proliferation program.

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Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the bulk of EU measures propose effective multilateralism in determining what action to take against those who proliferate WMD, thus highlighting how important multilateralism is in the EU global agenda.17 Implementing Multilateralism The EU tackles the execution of an efficient multilateral response against proliferation with a large set of measures that can be separated into three groups: (i) promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding WMD, (ii) reinforcement of verification mechanisms and control of those international legal regulations and (iii) avoidance of the misuse of dual use (civil and military) goods and processes. The first group consists of the promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding WMD, using three complementary measures. First, diplomatic action seeks the universalization of existing international treaties, including their verification regimes –like those contained in the Additional Protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).18 Second, direct assistance – technical and/or financial – is provided to third states to ensure the correct implementation of international agreements on WMD. This refers specifically to the implementation of two agreements, the BTWC and the CWC, both of which seek to overcome the administrational (legislative, institutional, etc.) and/or financial difficulties (implementation costs) that some states face in complying with these international commitments. Third, financial support is given to relevant multilateral institutions (IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization – CTBTO – and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – OPCW). The second group of measures seeks to reinforce the verification mechanisms and control of international legal regulations related to WMD. To this end, the Strategy proposes the effective use of existing mechanisms and the design of new ones. This commits the EU to promote challenge inspections within the CWC framework as 17 At the end of each semester, the Council debates and adopts a progress report on the implementation of this action plan. These reports are a great tool in evaluating the advantages and obstacles of the EU as a non-proliferation actor as well as the agreements and disagreements of its member states on specific aspects of measures envisaged in the action plan. See Council of the EU, Document 10448/04, Brussels, 10 June 2004 (First Progress Report); Document 15246/04, Brussels, 3 December 2004 (Second Progress Report); Document 9898/05, Brussels, 8 June 2005 (Third Progress Report); Document 5279/06, Brussels, 12 January 2006 (Fourth Progress Report); Document 10527/06, Brussels, 14 June 2006 (Fifth Progress Report), and Document 5183/07, Brussels, 9 January 2007 (Sixth Progress Report), in http: //ue.eu.int (accessed on 1 February 2007). 18 This measure includes some clear EU action, in particular the Common Position decided 17 November 2003 on the globalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements concerning WMD. See OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34. Another precedent, though one of a more specific nature, is the Council Decision 2003/567/CFSP of 21 July 2003 implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP related to the European Union’s promotion of early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). See OJ L 192, 31.07.2003, p. 53.

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well as continuing the study of the verification instruments for the BTWC and the CWC. In regards to the BTWC, the EU seeks to establish a group of experts to assist with compliance with its norms. Additionally, the EU has participated in the annual meetings of States Parties and experts meetings leading up to the BTWC Review Conference in 2006. In March 2005, the Personal Representative put forward suggestions on how the EU could promote universality and the implementation of the BTWC. The Council adopted it on 27 February 2006 in a joint effort to support the BTWC.19 In addition, a Joint Action in support of the CTBTO verification system has also been adopted,20 and the EU endorses the establishment of the IAEA Additional Protocol as the verification standard mechanism.21 The third group contains measures to avoid the misuse of dual use (civil and military) goods and processes through export control, equipment and materials security, and the fight against illegal trafficking. Concerning exports control, the Strategy seeks to reinforce the EU regime, as well as to ensure some degree of EU foreign policy coherence in these matters (Schmitt 2001: 9).22 The EU strategy calls for establishing a program to assist those countries with insufficient knowledge about exports control, and the adoption of two specific restrictive measures. These establish the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to subject exports to the ratification and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, as well as encourage reinforced export controls over intangible transfers of dual use technology. In regards to physical security, unauthorized access or the potential of diverting equipment and materials, the EU pursues effective control of highly radioactive sources as well as the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.23 19 See Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP, of 27 February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (OJ L 65, 7.3.2006, p. 51-55) and Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP, of 20 March 2006 relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the BTWC (OJ L 88, 25.3.2006, p. 65-67). 20 See Council Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP, of 20 March 2006 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO in the area of training and capacity building (OJ L 88, 25.3.2006, p. 68-72). 21 See Council Common Position 2005/329/PESC of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (OJ L 106, 27.04.2005, p. 32-35), and Fundamental elements proposed by the European Union to be inserted in the final document of the 2005 NPT Conference concerning Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/WP.1), Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/WP.1) and Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/WP.1). At http: //www.un.org/events/npt2005 (accessed on 7 July 2005). 22 The Strategy calls for coordinating EU policies within the framework of existing regimes; supporting the compliance of new member states with these regimes; promoting the Commission’s participation, and stimulating when necessary the introduction of catch-all clauses in exports control regimes. 23 Concerning EU internal action, see Council Directive 2003/122/EURATOM, 22 December 2003, on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources (See OJ L 346, 31.12.2003 p. 57-64). In addition, all member states have ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and have participated in the Amendment Conference of this Convention met in Vienna from 4 to 8 July 2005.

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Moreover, the EU proposes reinforcing controls on pathological microorganisms and toxins, and promoting a dialogue between EU and US industries to increase the awareness of WMD issues, particularly biological weapons.24 EU external action has focused on radioactive sources and is being implemented through the IAEA structures.25 Nonetheless, EU carries on autonomous actions supporting the nuclear non-proliferation and security programs in Russia.26 Finally, the document proposes three measures to fight illegal trafficking: the adoption of common EU penal sanctions; measures on the transit and transfer control of high-risk material, and support of international initiatives aimed at combating illegal trafficking.27 Promoting International and Regional Stability The action plan proposes reinforcing EU cooperative threat reduction programs and integrating the WMD non-proliferation concerns into the EU’s political, diplomatic, and economic activities and programs. The Russian Federation is the main target of those programs. The Strategy proposes to increase the EU financial support on disarmament and nonproliferation28 by including a specific line in the European Community budget 24 Two of these measures must be emphasized. First is the creation of a center for diseases control. See Regulation (EC) No. 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control (OJ L 142, 30.04.2004, p. 1-11). Second, a proposal encouraged by the EU and its member States during the BTWC annual experts meeting to elaborate guidelines on how to boost efficient national legislations as well as compliance with the BTWC dispositions –the EU stance was actually contrary to the US one. See Tucker, ‘The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment’, p. 32-33. 25 See Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Program and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 182, 19.05.2004, p. 46-50). 26 Once the European Union Cooperation Program for Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation ended on 24 June 2004, the Council adopted on 22 November 2004 the Joint Action 2004/796/CFSP in support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation (OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 57-62). 27 Their implementation include an EC Regulation amending the Community Customs Code to ensure enhanced safety and improvement of risk analysis (23 May 2005), the declaration of the EU Council of 1 June 2004, which supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and, in particular, the Statement on Interdiction Principles adopted on 4 September 2003 by the states that participate in the PSI (See Council of the European Union, Non-Proliferation Support of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brussels, 1 June 2004, document 10052/04 (Presse 189). The Declaration confirms the connection between the PSI and the UN Security Council resolution 1540, 28 April 2004). In contrast, the discussion continues on the adoption and possible implementation of common policies related to criminal sanctions. 28 The EU committed itself, during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, to support the G8 International Association with €1000 million over a period of 10 years in order to fight against the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

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for WMD disarmament and nonproliferation activities, and encouraging member states to contribute financially. Unfortunately, no specific Community budget line for WMD existed until now.29 The EU has also yet to adopt the technical assistance program for third countries envisioned into the Strategy. This should have the aim of guaranteeing security and control over high-risk material, facilities and information, through facilitating the conversion of WMD expertise. Better results have been achieved with the implementation of mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s relations with third countries, including a non-proliferation clause in agreements with those countries.30 Although the clause does not include the same language and scope in all treaties, in all cases, it requires effective action against proliferation risks. Implementation is then monitored using the regular political dialogue between the parties to the agreements at both ministerial and official levels.31 Lastly, the Strategy refers to increasing EU efforts to solve regional conflicts by using all available instruments, in particular within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The EU Strategy does not specify particular measures for the Mediterranean region, despite previously classifying it as a priority. Nonetheless, EU is taking steps in order to restart a dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of the Barcelona process.32 Implementing Intergovernmental Cooperation The point of departure is simple: international cooperation on non-proliferation should begin with agreement among associate and main ally countries. Consequently, non-proliferation is on the agenda of every EU–US summit meeting. A cooperative 29 The credits included in the EU budget under the heading ‘Non-proliferation and disarmament’, are meant for two purposes. First, to fund actions which contribute to the reduction of WMD and, second, to fund operations to fight against the spread of light weaponry and illicit arms trafficking, unless these actions are mentioned in the Cotonu Agreement (which deals with this type of actions within the ACP countries). This budget structure maintains so far. 30 This clause includes a commitment against the proliferation of WMD and its vectors by, amongst other means, the complete implementation of existing international instruments and the creation of an efficient system for national exports control. 31 The non-proliferation clause has been inserted in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan and in the Association Agreement with Syria. In addition, a nonproliferation clause reference to the cooperation in countering proliferation of WMD (based in the nonproliferation clause) has been inserted in the revised ACP-EU Cotonou agreement concluded by the EU with 78 countries and signed on 24 June 2005. In parallel, Action Plans with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy include a WMD chapter, containing the key elements of the WMD clause. In the case of Pakistan, a parallel instrument to the Community Agreement that would contain a non-proliferation clause is to be negotiated by the Council and, as a follow-up to the EU–Indian Summit in 2004, an Action Plan with India is being negotiated which would include some actions related to WMD. 32 See Third Progress Report, p. 14 and Fourth Progress Report, p. 20.

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action plan was agreed upon at the June 2004 summit and was renewed since 2005. Besides, the EU and the US have developed a tradition of consulting whenever important international events in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament arise. There are also regular staff-to-staff contacts (Gianella 2005: 43). The effectiveness of these regular contacts does not obviate differences, such as the role of verification mechanisms, disarmament, and particularly in assessing how to address specific proliferation challenges. The Proliferation Security Initiative and the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) clearly fall into the area of positive EU–US cooperation. Nonetheless, the mechanisms for fulfilling BTWC obligations, the characteristics of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the US noncompliance with some of the commitments adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and, in a broad sense, the different US-EU approach to the 2005 NPT Review Conference remain as areas of disagreement. EU interaction and cooperation with other international actors exists as well, but with different features. EU assists Russia and other ex-Soviet Republics financially and technically in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament (protection of sites, conversion of scientists, etc.). Besides, India, Pakistan, and China are all on the priority list of the Strategy. The EU specifically plans to assist them with the setting up of export control legislation and implementation systems. Developing EU Structures The EU was reluctant to adopt a WMD Strategy based on a Common Position, a Joint Action or a Common Strategy, the legal instruments available under the CFSP. Consequently, the Strategy is a political declaration with an informal character. Concern that this would undermine implementation was offset by the commitment to review policy impact regularly. In addition, every six months, the External Relations Council discusses a progress report on the implementation of the EU Strategy. In terms of implementation, the EU Strategy calls for the establishment of a specific unit within the Council’s Secretariat to reinforce the present arrangements.33 This unit, as agreed in the European Council of Thessalonica of June 2003, would function as a monitoring centre – entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the EU Strategy and the collection of information and intelligence – in liaison with other EU agencies (i.e. the Situation Centre) and as a full associate of the Commission. The creation of the Centre, not yet put in place, confronts two specific problems. First, the EU reform process would lead to a new structure where a single foreign minister, also Vice president of the Commission, would be in charge of foreign affairs

33 In October 2003, Javier Solana appointed Ms Annalisa Giannella as his Personal Representative in charge of the Non-proliferation of WMD. In addition to this, the Council machinery dealing with the implementation of the EU Strategy includes three Working Groups acting under the CFSP pillar: CONOP (non-proliferation), CODUN (on UN Disarmament issues) and COARM (on conventional arms exports). These all include representatives from Member States, the Commission and the Personal Representative, and meet once a month.

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and external relations.34 Second, the functions finally assigned to this monitoring centre could affect specific Community competencies, currently in the hands of the European Commission. None of these problems counter-indicates the convenience of establishing such a centre, which certainly would improve coordination not only between the Council and the Commission structures, but also with and among the Member States themselves (Gianella 2005). In the meantime, on December 2006, the Council endorsed a concept paper establishing a cooperative working method which allows the Council Secretariat/ HR, the Commission services, and Member States to work together in several areas of implementation of the EU Strategy. The aim of the paper is not to create a new structure or a new Agency, but to endorse and make official a working method after a practice acquired over three years of work.35 Conclusion The EU Strategy against WMD proliferation is clearly grounded in the EU heritage of the rule of law, multilateralism, economic and political pressure on third States, a focus on the political causes of international problems, and international cooperation. Thus, it does not reflect any revolutionary change in European policies or actions. In this sense, the Strategy represents a ‘European way’ for approaching this ‘renewed classical problem of international peace and security’ through mixing traditional tools of international law with new policy instruments. This policy mix is reflected in how Europeans diagnose the threat as well as in EU objectives and action plan. The EU linking of WMD to international terrorism gives the proliferation problem a ‘new dimension’, but this approach is expressed as concern, not alarm. The EU has not launched a ‘war against terrorism’ (with or without WMD) even though it recognizes the risk that terrorists will acquire WMD. Indeed, the EU structure explains the reliance on the State to diminish the risk of terrorism. Moreover, European experience with terrorism since the seventies may also explain EU particularities of tone, attitude, and strategies. Given this background, it is not unusual that EU documents consider international terrorism very differently than the current US Administration. Most important, the European experience leads to a preference to use anti-criminal policies to fight terrorist organizations. Obviously, there are differences among European States, but the EU process synthesizes them into a specific policy orientation focused on prevention, intelligence gathering, judicial action, and police investigation, both within countries and through international cooperation. Is the EU Strategy effective? As compliance is the responsibility of each State, effectiveness means making positive contribution to the general goal of WMD non34 The two negative referendums in France and Holland have generated a crisis concerning the future of the European Constitution. Nonetheless, almost everybody agrees on the necessity that some of its innovations should put in practice. The creation of a single Foreign Minister/Vice President of the European Commission is one of the chief innovations. 35 See Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation’, Brussels, 12 December 2006 (Doc. 16694/06).

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proliferation, through assisting in reducing or eliminating WMD programs and stockpiles and helping to diminish the risk of dispersion of WMD products and related materials. From this point of view, it is possible to assess that the European Strategy is effective, because it makes a real and important contribution to both the elimination of WMD, and the reduction of the diversion risk. EU action focuses on assistance programs to third countries helping to reduce/eliminate WMD stockpiles and to improve control of dual use products and technology. Additionally, EU action tries to be coherent with the concept of effective multilateralism: when there is an international agency with a mission in a specific WMD regime, EU acts through these agencies, giving them political and financial support and cooperating with them in the implementation of projects of assistance to third countries. But these successes do not exclude some obvious weaknesses of EU policies. It is urgent that the EU increases its financial support of international action to secure WMD stockpiles and destroy them. As well, the EU has to improve its activities in the biological field, as this area represents a gap in the EU fight against proliferation. Even more crucial is to improve coherence. If the EU wants to maintain the credibility of its ‘effective multilateralism’, Member States must agree on measures to reinforce international regimes, organizations and agencies (i.e. BTWC) competent in this field and the reinforcement and credibility of the NPT must become a central pole of EU action. The case of Iran provides a good example of both the effectiveness and weakness of the EU nonproliferation policy. The EU action has been effective because it has permitted during a period of time, the suspension of dangerous – but not illegal – activity, keeping the issue under the IAEA control. However, the EU action was not enough. Certainly, several factors make the Iranian proliferation program an international issue: the regional crisis in the Middle East, with the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process, and the Iraq conflict as major focus for attention, are the main examples. But even more crucial, European action is stagnating, if not regressing, at the very moment when unity is needed more than ever. EU members must find (again) the way to act jointly and with determination to prevent the two worst developments in Iran: war and nuclear armament. Finally, there are two other axes where the EU should increase its emphasis: disarmament and the international transfer of dual use products and technology for peaceful application. The EU intergovernmental cooperation through the existing CFSP structures should lead to common proposals on nuclear disarmament that could encompass other European initiatives leading to the destruction of the chemicals and biological stockpiles of third countries. Besides, one should not forget that international transfer of products and technology of dual use involve peaceful uses and the right of developing countries to acquire them, while export control measures can have negative effects on this right. If developing countries find limits to their legitimate goals, they will be more reluctant to cooperate in fighting against proliferation. The fight against proliferation of WMD has to consider all these issues in order to be effective. Otherwise, there will be a new line dividing the international community of the 21st century.

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References Allison, Graham (2004). Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate preventable Catastrophe. New York: Times Books. European Council (2006). EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and Enhancing Consistent Implementation. Brussels, December 12; Doc. 16694/06. European Council (2003). Action Plan for the implementation of the basic principles of an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. European Council (2003). European Security Strategy – A Safe Europe in a Better World. Giannella, Annalisa (2005). Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution. European Union Committee. House of Lords; 13th Report of Session 2004-2005, April 5, 2005, Minutes of Evidence Kagan, Robert (2003). Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Quille, Gerrard and Stephen Pullinger (2003). ‘The European Union: Tackling the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction’. ISIS Report, November 2003 (http: //www.isis-europe.org/, accessed on July 1, 2005). Portela, Clara (2003). ‘The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond’. PRIF Reports No. 65. Salama, Sammy (2004). ‘Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?’. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), September 2004 (http: //www.cns.miis.edu/research/mideast.htm, accessed on June 15, 2005). Schmitt, Burkard (ed.) (2003). ‘EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia’. Chaillot Paper 61 (June 2003). Schmitt, Burkard (2001). ‘A Common European Export Policy for Defense and Dual-use Items?’, ISS-European Union Occasional Papers, No. 25. Toje, Asle (2005). ‘The 2003 European Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal’. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, pp. 117-133. Tuchman, Jessica (2004). ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations’. Global Governance 10, pp. 265-271.

PART II Enlargement

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Chapter 6

A Union of Disenchantment: The New Politics of post-Enlargement Europe Christopher J. Bickerton1

Three years after the European Union (EU) increased its membership by two thirds, from 15 to 25, we can begin to consider how the enlargement process has transformed the EU.2 Whilst numerous analysts have addressed this question, two features of the post-enlargement EU are often underplayed. The first is the rise of political inequality in Europe. Increasingly, structural inequalities between member states are being formalized and institutionalized via a diverse number of arrangements. This is in line with a pre-existing tendency towards fragmentation, what has been called the rise of a ‘two-speed’ Europe, of ‘variable geometry’, ‘co-centric circles’ and Europe à la carte. Yet whilst these developments often reflected political disagreements over the final goals of EU integration, fragmentation today increasingly reflects the peripheral positions of new member states, many of them much poorer than the ‘core states’ of the EU-15. The second feature is the growing political instability experienced across the Union, which has stalled the EU integration process. This is often understood in terms of a clash between East and West, with a particular focus on the virulent nationalism and populism of post-Stalinist regimes. It was this kind of danger which was anticipated by those who saw in enlargement the risk of ‘importing instability’. Moreover, many argue that the instability we have seen in Western Europe states is itself a response to enlargement, and particularly to the Westward emigration of East European workers. In fact, it is the other way around: the political instability in the East mirrors instability in core European states. Violence in Budapest in October 2006 echoed in a more moderated fashion the violence which broke out in France almost exactly a year earlier. The roots of this problem are similar: the disenchantment of domestic populations with national governments and European institutions, both of which appear distant and unable to address local concerns. The enlargement process was a concentrated and condensed process of Europeanization, resulting in a growing separation between government and society in new European member states. This resembles 1 This chapter is a much reworked version of a paper presented at the 2005 British International Studies Association (BISA) conference in St Andrews, Scotland. My thanks to William Bain for convening the panel at BISA, and to all the participants for their comments and discussion. All remaining errors are obviously my own. 2 In January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, bringing the total number of member states to 27. This article focuses on the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004.

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the more drawn out process of integration that core states have undergone since the mid 1980s. These two features of an enlarged Europe interact with each other. The fragmentation of the Union and the deepening of political inequality stem from a combination of enlargement and the pre-existing centrifugal trends within the Union. Such fragmentation only further weakens the legitimacy of the integration process, which in turn fuels the political backlash against the EU. Rather than create greater diversity within the EU, we can say that enlargement has helped draw out an underlying trend of popular disenchantment that transcends the East-West divide. Europe united, perhaps, but not on the terms hoped for by Euro-enthusiasts. Europe After the Enlargement Party There was much speculation leading up to the ‘big bang’ of May 2004 on the impact that the ‘widening’ of the Union would have on the process of integration itself (known as ‘deepening’). Views were mixed: some were positive, others negative. Much of the attention was paid to the dangers of importing stability. In recent months, with violence breaking out in the streets of Budapest and the Czech Republic paralyzed by its inability to find agreement to form a governing coalition, some of the scaremongers have felt vindicated. More optimistic voices had argued that enlargement would be a way of diffusing, rather than importing, instability (Friis and Murphy 1999). They have cited the example of Polish mediation in the Ukrainian ‘Orange Revolution’ as an example of how the weight of the Union, when put behind new member states, can result in favourable outcomes. Attention was also given to the problem of institutional absorption. One of the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 addressed this issue: enlargement would only take place if the absorption of new members did not undermine the momentum of the integration process. The EU itself dedicated considerable time and effort to this question, from its inter-governmental summits of Amsterdam and Nice, to its 1997 Agenda 2000 document. Since 2004, attention has remained on absorption, many analysts taking the failure of the EU Constitution in the 2005 referenda in France and Holland as a sign that maximum capacity has been reached and further enlargement should only occur once the EU has reformed its own institutions. Western Balkan states hoping to join the EU in the next few years argue that ‘absorption capacity’ has been introduced as a whole new criterion for enlargement, serving as a convenient excuse for deferring the question of further enlargement (Bickerton 2006). Finally, some argued that enlargement would qualitatively transform the Union, making it into a different kind of ‘beast’. Jan Zielonka has argued that enlargement would deepen and extend the EU’s identity as a ‘neo-medieval empire’, defined by a mixture of overlapping authorities, shared sovereignty and diversified institutional arrangements (Zielonka 2001; 2006). Situating itself within the debate over the consequences of enlargement, this chapter argues that analysts have overlooked the rise of political inequality within the Union. They have also concentrated too much on post-enlargement diversity. What is significant is the way in which enlargement has brought greater uniformity to the popular discontent that exists across the Union today.

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The New Inequality That enlargement has introduced new divisions in Europe is a point often made by analysts of European integration. Former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously observed that in the support given by East European states to the war in Iraq, a breach was opening up between New and Old Europe. French President Jacques Chirac added to Rumsfeld’s claims by suggesting that candidate states should chose between Brussels and Washington when taking positions on foreign policy matters. Such events augured badly, suggesting that once the EU’s membership had grown to 25, it would be impossible for the continent to achieve any geopolitical unity. For Stephen Haseler, an enlarged Europe – in conjunction with events such as the Iraq war – has placed the necessity for a core FrancoGerman Europe firmly onto the agenda. He imagines that a new ‘Charlemagna’, composed initially of France and Germany, can realize the EU’s geopolitical ambitions (Haseler 2005: 98). Ian Buruma writes of a division between seafaring lands (Britain, Atlantic coast France, Hamburg and the Hanseatic League) and a Europe ‘of the interior’, stretching from Paris to Brussels, across the Rhine valley to Berlin and south to Munich and Rome (Buruma 1999). What is missed in these attempts to identify some underlying cultural or geopolitical difference is the rise of what is termed here the new political inequality. The process of EU integration has always occurred unevenly, a consequence of the diverse interests and powers of individual member states. The history of integration presents us with a clash between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Functionalists and neofunctionalists have placed the emphasis on integration ‘beyond the state’. Intergovermentalists have stressed the agency of the state as the central explanatory dynamic behind integration. These different approaches have been tied to a parallel tension around the equal representation of states versus peoples. Originally, formal equality was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome: states were signatories to the treaty, and equally shared the right to renege from the treaty. Moreover, they shared voting rights in intergovernmental fora. Intergovernmental integration therefore tended to enshrine the formal political equality of states in the treaty-setting of EU integration. Yet this set of formal rights coexisted alongside very different ‘power political’ considerations. West Germany sought above all to pursue the Community route to integration, so that its own interests could be constructed in terms of the wider ‘European interest’. The smaller states of the Union, such as the Benelux states, also opted for Commission-led integration, since any intergovernmental forum, such as the European Council, saw the voices of smaller states drowned out by the considerations of the more powerful states like France and Italy. France pushed itself forward as defender of intergovernmentalism, which was in the eyes of many merely a façade for Gaullist pretensions to creating a ‘French Europe’ more than a European France. This confusing mixture of supranationalism and national interest politics continues to this day. A definite feature of the above, however, was a resistance to any formalization of the manifest inequalities that existed between member states. Any constitutional changes that did occur were the fruit of inter-state bargaining.

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No state, however small, accepted a politics of the fait accompli, where relations of hierarchy within the Union were imposed upon states. Today, enlargement has quickened the move away from this model of formal equality between member states. Most importantly, new member states are expected to accept, without the chance of any compromise, an inferior status within the Union. This might not be apparent at first sight: enlargement, after all, forced leading EU members to exchange their right of having two commissioners for the right to have only one. However, enlargement has also created new institutional divisions between member states which did not exist before.3 Many of the new member states have considered such differences a sign of inferior, second class citizenship. In the run up to May 2004, disappointment in new member states at the deal which they had managed to secure was considerable. As a sign of frustration, when the French president criticized new member states for supporting the 2003 Iraq war the Eastern European press accused the French president of espousing a moribund Stalinism, comparing his remarks to the famous doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ articulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1968. These same sentiments were expressed in the debate on the 2007-2013 budget that was had in late 2005. In the proposals made by the UK, as acting presidency of the EU, the new member states were to receive less money than had been promised. New member states, it seemed, were paying the cost of the recent constitutional crisis in Western Europe. Disappointed at the conduct of the EU’s more powerful members, the Estonian prime minister at the time argued at the time that, We have reasonable expectations to receive from the EU what we were promised when we joined. The new member states were told they will receive a certain amount of aid money, and now we hear cuts to this. We cannot agree to this (BBC News, 6 December 2005).

In the words of a BBC report on the UK budget proposal, ‘if this were a soccer match, a collective groan of “We woz robbed” would go up from the Eastern European terraces’ (BBC News, 2 December 2005). Labour Market Restrictions When the EU membership perspective was first offered to Eastern European states, it was expected that they would be granted the same rights as existing member states.4 This would mean incorporating them into a space where there was a right of free movement for goods, services, capital and labour. Yet seven out of fifteen member states declared in the run up to accession that they would maintain labour 3 An exception to this is Britain’s withdrawal from the Social Chapter in 1992. However, as argued in the text, such derogation was based on a state’s right to withdraw from or not commit itself to various aspects of integration. New member states have had their access to various pan-European regimes determined independently of their wishes. 4 In John Kampfer’s words, ‘The bottom line for all [candidate states] was reciprocal access to the rest of the EU for the Union’s 73 million new citizens. They did not expect that all 15 members would impose restrictions (although Britain’s hasty response has been to restrict welfare rights but not work)’. See Kampfer 2004.

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market restrictions. The UK at the time was one of the few countries that decided not to impose any restrictions. As May 2004 drew closer, the UK did introduce some restrictions regarding access to welfare allocations, but not restrictions on the right to work (Financial Times 4 February 2004). Since 2004, there has been a shift in the UK towards greater restrictions, in response to the unexpectedly large number of migrants that have arrived, mainly from Poland. When the EU Commission declared at the end of September 2006 that Romania and Bulgarian would both join the EU at the start of 2007, the UK responded with a ‘managed migration’ scheme in place of its open door policy of 2004. The UK restrictions for Romania and Bulgaria are complex. Only food processing and agricultural sectors will be open to low skilled migrant workers, with around 20,000 places available. Those with specific work permits and who enter as part of a programme for highly skilled labour will be allowed to work, and students can work part-time. Individuals wanting to set up their own businesses will also be allowed to do so. For all others, access to the UK will be as tourists, without the right to work (BBC News 24 October 2006). Alongside these new restrictions by the UK, four other regimes of labour movement exist, all imposed with varying time scales.5 These different regimes are listed in the table below.

Table 6.1

Transitional labour market restrictions for new member states (NMS)

Type of regime

EU Member State

Restrictive immigration regime (NMS Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, citizens have no more rights than non-EEA France, Luxembourg, Spain citizens). Main channel of entry is family unification. Restrictive regime plus quota for new Austria, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal member states Restrictive regime plus quotes and some United Kingdom for Bulgarians and derogations for specific groups (e.g. those Romanians, starting January 2007 wanting to set up a business) Ireland, United Kingdom General access plus limits on welfare. Work and residency permits are only granted if certain requirements concerning working conditions and wage levels are met. No restrictions or derogations Sweden Source: European Citizen Action Service; Boeri and Bruckner 2005.

5 The maximum time scale is seven years. The model is of two plus three plus two years. The minority Swedish Government did propose to issue residency and work permits to only those workers from new member states who could prove that their jobs met national wage agreement requirements. The proposal was over-ruled in parliament. See Boeri and Brucker 2005.

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Unsurprisingly, restrictions on the movement of labour has been viewed as a way of introducing second class membership for new member states, making them into what John Kampfner has called ‘second class allies’. Pointing to these restrictions, the Czech newspaper, Lidove Noviny, observed that ‘just a few years ago Czechs believed that joining the EU, they would become fully fledged Europeans. Now it is obvious that was just an illusion … Czechs will feel like ‘second class’ citizens much more than they used to’ (Kampfner 2004). Observing celebrations in Hungary on 1 May 2004, BBC correspondent Nick Thorpe pointed out that ‘Hungary goes into the European Union with high hopes, but many fears as well. There is a sense that the new members are not being treated on an equal basis’ (BBC News, 1 May 2004). Questioned about EU membership in September 2006, Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev stated clearly that the mere fact of membership was different from a more meaningful integration into all of the EU’s structures. In his words, ‘it is important not only that we formally join the EU – although this is a historic event... the final fall of the Berlin Wall for Bulgaria – but it is equally important how Bulgaria’s economy will integrate [into the EU] ... how we will implement Europe’s social model’ (BBC News, 26 September 2006). One of the main reasons why such labour restrictions did not provoke more of a backlash in Eastern Europe has been the relatively benign economic situation that has followed the May 2004 enlargement. Economist William Buiter has remarked that earlier free trade agreements had not exhausted Eastern Europe’s trade potential as ‘quite a few people were willing to make the necessary investments only when these countries were in the EU’ (Economist 26 November 2005). Katinka Barysch, chief economist of the Centre for European Reform (CER), notes that there were improvements in those sectors that have been most vocal in their opposition to enlargement. In agriculture, ‘export growth, strong domestic demand and farm subsidies led to a doubling of farm incomes in the Czech Republic, a 75 per cent increase in Poland and a rise of 50 per cent in the Baltic countries’ (Barysch 2005). This positive economic outlook makes for a more stable political situation than would otherwise have existed. But there is no guarantee it will last. European Monetary Union Another source of differentiation between old and new member states is the European monetary union (EMU). For the EU-15, EMU was optional, and some member states, such as the UK, decided to opt-out. Presently, the UK, Sweden and Denmark are the three EU member states outside of the Eurozone. In contrast, for new member states, EMU has been mandatory. This has forced countries to plan for EMU, regardless of whether joining the single currency is the optimal decision for a country seeking to catch up with Western European economies.6 The table below sets out the target dates for the new member states.

6 For the suggestion that EMU is not in the economic interests of new member states, see ‘Perils of convergence’ The Economist 3 April 2003.

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Table 6.2

Target dates for European Monetary Union for new member states

Country Czech Republic Estonia

Target date for EMU 2010 1st January 2007

Date of ERM II membership – June 2004

Cyprus Latvia Lithuania

2008 1st January 2008 1st January 2007

May 2005 May 2005 June 2004

No target date1 – 2008 May 2005 No official target date Slovenia 1st January 2007. June 2004 Confirmed by the EU Commission in June 2006. Slovakia January 2009 – Source: EU Commission Staff Working Paper 2005 Hungary Malta Poland

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Exchange regime details – Currency board since 1992

$-based currency board established 1994. Converted to Euro-peg in 2002. – – – –

–

Note: 1 Hungary had set itself the target date of 2010 to join the Euro. Recent budgetary problems by the government have forced it to drop this target. In its Convergence Programme submitted to the EU in September 2006, there was no target date included. See Portfolio.hu, 9 November 2006

As is clear, these dates differ widely. Some states have made EMU a political priority, seeing it as the final stage in full integration into the EU. Other states have balked at the economic requirements, which include keeping the national currency within a pegged exchange rate system (ERM II) for a minimum of two years, and meeting the ‘Maastricht rules’ of price stability and sustainable government finances (both government debts and deficits). In the case of Poland, for instance, no target date for adoption of the Euro has been set. The new government has declared its intention to hold a referendum on the issue of EMU, a view which has been opposed by the EU Commission and other member states. Adoption of the Euro is mandatory, and it is feared that public discontent would produce a No vote, which would make subsequent entry into the Eurozone difficult. The outcome of this mandatory but delayed membership of EMU has been to introduce new divisions between laggards and forerunners. Slovenia and Estonia are at the forefront, with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic lagging behind. In June 2006, the EU Commission formally accepted Slovenia’s demand to join EMU, making Slovenia the first country of the 2004 batch of new members to adopt the common currency (BBC News, 15 June 2006). What is significant is that new member states were faced with EMU as a condition for EU membership. Giving up control over monetary policy, and conforming to a set of fiscal rules, was not the result of inter-state bargaining; it was part of the integration of these states into the procedures

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and mechanisms of European governance. Signature of the 2004 Accession Treaty was thus the final stage in a protracted process of regulatory harmonization, coming only once candidate states had taken on board all the EU’s acquis. This contrasts with the model of discrete decision-making and ‘diplomatic bargains’ which had been a feature of EU integration in the past and which had also figured in previous accessions where states had been offered many more derogations and flexibility. Schengen A third source of discrimination between old and new member states is Schengen. Once again, full participation in Schengen is mandatory for new member states. This contrasts with the opt-outs negotiated by both the UK and Ireland. In Heather Grabbe’s words, the integration of Schengen into the institutional framework [of the EU] has resulted in special arrangements for 3 EU member states (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) … However, candidate states are not being offered the opportunity to negotiate similarly flexible arrangements; the European Council has made it clear on several occasions that new members will not be allowed opt-outs or other forms of flexible integration (Grabbe 2000: 525).

Whilst new member states have signed the Convention that applies the Schengen Agreement, full implementation has been divided up into two phases. These are set out below.

Table 6.3

Integration into the Schengen ‘space’

Phase First phase (on accession, May 2004)

Second phase (by 2007)

Requirements Checks and controls at external frontiers of the EU Common policy towards third countries regarding visa requirements Rules for crossing external frontiers Policy and customs cooperation Anti-illegal migration and organized crime measures SIS II be made operational Existing member states all support integration of state into Schengen (positive peer review)

Source: EurActiv

One of the main hurdles has been SIS II, an updated version of the original SIS. The SIS was designed for use by a maximum of 18 states, and was developed in the context of technology which has since become obsolete. SIS II is thus an updating of the existing information system, and its adaptation to the requirements of an EU with 25 members. The significance of Schengen, and the sense of discrimination it generates, comes from the role played by immigration and asylum issues in the accession process,

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and in relations between the EU-15 and Eastern Europe in the post-1989 period. One of the reasons for the delay between the signing of the Schengen agreement in 1985 and its eventual ratification in 1990 was the concern about the strengthening of external borders, as a key condition for abolishing internal borders. The concern of countries such as Germany was that the abolition of internal borders would make it the prime target for migrants. In response to this, Germany developed the ‘first host country’ principle, enshrined in the 1990 Dublin Convention. This stipulated that illegal immigrants were the responsibility of whichever country they first arrived at. To this principle was added the ‘safe third country’ principle, which stipulated that illegal immigrants were the responsibility of the first ‘safe’ country into which they entered (Lavenex 1999). The goal was to make Eastern European states into safe third countries. This was done by signing readmission agreements with these countries, in exchange for financial assistance directed at securing the Eastern border. By 1995, Germany had for instance invested over 2 million DM in general border equipment in CEE states, namely Poland. Germany’s bilateral TRANSFORM program, originally intended as support for transition to democracy, was gradually earmarked for border-related programs (Bickerton 2003: 48). Along with being made into a buffer zone for immigration, the Schengen agreement was also integrated into the acquis communautaire, making it part of the Justice and Home Affairs component of the accession negotiations. This presented candidate states with a variety of contentious measures over which there was no room for negotiation, such as visa regimes. These regimes ‘have been presented as non-negotiable (because they are in the first pillar) so the applicants will have to abolish the visa-free regimes currently operating with their Eastern and Southern neighbours which remain on the EU’s visa ‘black-list’ (Grabbe 2000: 526). Such mandatory demands made clear to candidate states their dependent position vis-àvis the EU. On border issues, Richard Bernstein reported in March 2004 that ‘the mood in Poland seems to be less one of unmitigated joy at the prospect of joining the rest of Europe and more a sense of gains measured against losses – gains with the West, losses with the East’. Three years since enlargement, new member states continue to have complex relations with the Schengen space. Put in the context of earlier readmission agreements and the controversies over visa regimes, Schengen remains a source of tension between old and new EU member states. That this will continue with future enlargements is likely. Goran Svilanovic, former foreign minister of Serbia, noted sardonically that not all the bricks from the Berlin Wall are in museums; some are being used to build a new wall today dividing countries like Serbia from the rest of Europe (Bickerton 2006). Political Instability East and West Pierre Moscovici, former French minister for Europe and currently Vice-President of the European Parliament, recently published L’Europe est Morte, Vive l’Europe!, a title which illustrates the problems currently faced by the EU integration process. The collapse of the EU constitution added to a wider sense of political instability across Europe. The Dutch No vote came on the back of a growing crisis of social integration.

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The murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and film director Theo Van Gogh have led to an unravelling of the renowned Dutch model of multiculturalism (Buruma 2006). A few months later, France saw thousands of cars burnt in a series of riots across the country’s suburbs (Baudrillard 2006). 2005 was also the year when German politics reached a stalemate: the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats failed to win decisively the September election, leading eventually to a ‘grand coalition’ under the leadership of Christian Democrat candidate Angela Merkel. Similar electoral wrangling beset Italy in its 2006 general elections. The Socialist candidate, Romano Prodi, was declared the winner with only the smallest of margins, and for a time it seemed as if outgoing Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, would contest the results. Anatole Kaletsky, writing for The Times, captured the dominant mood of pessimism: All three of the great European nations that have dominated the Continent’s history for 2,000 years – Germany, France and Italy – are effectively leaderless. They will almost certainly remain politically paralysed at least until the French presidential election of 2007. The power vacuum now covering the whole of continental Europe is almost unprecedented, at least since the disastrous period between the two world wars (Kaletsky 2005).

Such political stalemate is mirrored in the new East European member states. The Czech Republic had parliamentary elections in June 2006, which left the country deadlocked. A minority government was finally put in place, led by the Civic Democrats, that fell after losing a confidence vote in October. Mirek Topolanek, leader of the Civic Democrats, has ruled as prime minister of a caretaker government since October 2006. The violence in Budapest in October 2006 was widely reported, and labelled the Goulash Revolution by western commentators. Sparked off by a revelation that the ruling Socialist Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, had purposefully lied during the last elections in order to retain power, the violence was blamed on far right nationalist movements in Hungary. In Poland, the rise to power by the Kaczynski brothers has been viewed with concern by many in the EU. The brothers have pushed a strongly Catholic and nationalist agenda, with a focus on ridding Poland of its ex-communist political and bureaucratic elite. The Financial Times (FT) reported in August 2006 that the Kaczynskis were undertaking a ‘purge’ of the Polish state, the FT journalists using language that associated contemporary Poland with the pre-1989 regime. A common perception of the above is that such instances of political instability are unrelated. On the side of East European states, we can observe the distance these countries have yet to travel before they can fully assimilate the EU’s values. The liberal European press was critical of a Polish Government that relied upon the ultraCatholic League of Polish Families and the ‘populist’ Samoobrena (Self-Defence) for its parliamentary majority. The French liberal daily, Le Monde, warned that Rather than encouraging the reflexes of a public opinion all too often allergic to the democratic traditions of Europe, we expect from the Polish leaders that they assist their population to come closer to political Europe, to its rules, its principles. EU membership grants rights, but also confers duties (Le Monde, 12 November 2005).

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Hungary’s violence was reported as an atavistic residue of its nationalist past (Furedi 2006). In Western Europe, the problems are understood differently. They are the consequence of managing the diversity of contemporary European societies. Whilst populist forms of nationalism may assert themselves in the East, in the West the struggle is to reinvent a more inclusive national identity that can accommodate diversity. In truth, the political instability East and West have common roots. In the East, we can trace some of the present instability back to the enlargement process itself, and its impact upon state-society relations in post-communist states. In the West, we are seeing a reaction against EU integration, which illustrates a deep-seated problem which EU institutions face when trying to connect with domestic populations in Europe. Both East and West, the problem is the low levels of legitimacy that exist for both pan-European and national governing institutions. Enlargement has united most of Europe, but it has created a Union of disenchantment. EU Enlargement and Problems of Political Instability It would be a mistake to tie all the current political problems of the new EU member states to the process of enlargement. In many ways, enlargement acted upon and deepened existing trends. Most significant amongst these trends was an indigenous process of depoliticization, the result of the pre-1989 period. Ekiert and Hanson sum up the legacy of 1989 in their reference to ‘a general public cynicism regarding professions of ideological faith, (Ekiert and Hanson 2003: 27). Elster, Offe and Preuss point out that in Eastern Europe in 1989, ‘there was no counter-elite, no theory, no organization, no movement, no design or project according to whose visions, instructions and prescriptions the breakdown evolved’ (Elster et al. 2002: 11). State socialist systems were not overthrown in 1989, but rather collapsed, leaving a political vacuum which post-1989 political parties have been trying to fill since. The most successful have been the pragmatic ex-communist parties, able to transform themselves into vote-winning machines (Grzymala-Busse 2003). However, the absence of any organic social base for these new parties imparted to post-communist politics considerable instability. Incumbents are rarely voted back into power, generating a high political turn over labelled ‘feckless pluralism’ (Carothers 2002). Such instability made the prospect of EU membership particularly attractive. It gave political parties a firm programme around which they could situate their policies and strategies. As a result, the enlargement process was marked by crossparty consensus on the necessity of EU membership. This consensus is referred to by some analysts as the ‘tipping point’, where enlargement and its obligations are no longer contested, but rather serve as the accepted backdrop for more minor political squabbles (Vachudova 2005; Knaus and Cox 2005). The downside of such a consensus is the demise of meaningful political contestation. Any serious challenges to the status quo are tarred with the brush of anti-Europeanism; in the words of Grzymala-Busse and Innes, the non-negotiable nature of the accession process has ‘eradicated both detailed and ideological debates over many areas of public policy’

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(2003: 64). Grzymala-Busse and Innes go on to note that this pro-European consensus served to inhibit the political development of candidate states. In their words, The effort to plough through reform blueprints in all the core public policy areas of the modern state resembles a form of dependent development, to the point of precluding the ‘organic’ development of accountable domestic institutions, and of public debate over the substance of potential alternatives to the EU’s regulatory model (2003: 66).

Pushing political opposition to the margins has had a severe impact on politics in East European states. Rather than operating in a vertical manner, where social interests are aggregated upwards through forms of political representation, politics takes on a horizontal form: political élites agree on a programme, which they try to push through over the heads of either recalcitrant or quiescent populations. Under such circumstances, political parties do not develop close ties with their societies. This was demonstrated in Gyurczany’s highly instrumental approach to elections in Hungary: they were a hurdle to jump, at any cost, which would then give him the freedom to pursue his planned course of action. It is of little surprise that when he was faced with rioters outside the Hungarian parliament building, most vocal in his defence were European parliamentarians and officials – those with whom he had had the closest contact over the last few years. This evokes a comment made by the Czech negotiating team on EU accession. At the end of the negotiations, a negotiator on the Czech side expressed disappointment that accession was over. It would be, he reportedly said, much more difficult to push through reforms without the EU’s help. Without the sword of EU membership, like the sword of Damocles, hanging over the heads of domestic populations, governing has become more difficult. Politicians across Eastern Europe are struggling to establish any real social consensus, having been able to rely upon external support for so long. Weak political parties and underlying political consensus on the subject of reform has unsurprisingly impacted upon the institutional development of East European states. Two key developments are worth emphasising, as they relate to the current problems of instability. The first is that without any need for political contestation, enlargement-related reform was treated as a technical programme, to be conducted by experts, implemented by fiat, or at most by a rubber-stamping process undertaken by the parliament. Associating enlargement with expertise meant that in the course of the accession process, negotiations were conducted by an expanded executive, at the expense of the national parliaments. Heather Grabbe called this the rise of ‘islands of excellence’ within candidate state bureaucracies, which were responsible for the enlargement process. This channelled resources away from government departments, and often resulted in EU-related matters taking priority over the more basic tasks of government. This elevation of the executive over the legislature appeared to indicate a shift of power to the former. However, without close ties to elected representatives, the executive often found itself weakened. Attila Agh notes, in the case of Hungary, that in 1999 the country ‘cannot yet adequately present and represent its national interests at the negotiations, since on the Hungarian side there is too small an elite team of negotiators, without enough assistance from the large group of [elected]

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representatives who could channel the particular interests of social strata into the national interest’ (Agh 1999: 851). Contemporary instability comes from the fact that governments in Eastern Europe are no longer able to rely upon the authority of Brussels to push through their reform initiatives. They are forced to govern on the basis on their own domestic authority, which is weak given the low levels of public support and public involvement in national political life. The weakening of national parliaments has been the second key development. This was seen most vividly in the various ‘fast-tracking’ measures introduced by candidate states in the late 1990s. These measures were developed in order for governments to meet the huge legislative demands of accession. Rather than deliberate and debate proposed laws and amendments in the parliamentary chamber, they are passed using these ‘exceptional’ measures, without any discussion. Malova and Haughton argue that fast-tracking undermines the development of proper parliamentary procedure, and eventually inhibits the institutionalization of democratic norms. Parliamentary committees, that serve to scrutinize legislation, are side-stepped, limiting the opportunities for political bargaining and cross-party cooperation (Malova and Haughton 2002: 112). The function of parliament as a deliberative body, re-enacting through elected representatives the deliberations and conflicts that structure the social body as a whole, is thus lost. Another important consequence is that such a side-stepping of the legislature inhibits the implementation of new laws. A striking example of this is given by Kristi Raik in her account of the impact of enlargement upon Estonian democracy. Raik’s key finding was that the Estonian public dealt with the upsurge in new regulations from Brussels much in the same way as it had dealt with Soviet-era regulation. In Raik’s words, Estonians employ the tool of ‘doublethink’, which means doing one thing, but believing another. In this case, laws were complied with, but only in a tokenistic and superficial manner. Raik explains that this was the result of a disappointment with the EU itself: rather than appearing as an inspirational political project, it presented itself as a system of rules and regulations. Political Instability in ‘Core Europe’ Many of these problems and themes are reflections of existing trends within the Union. These trends are the result both of the form that integration has taken over the last twenty years, and the problems that the EU has faced in trying to legitimize an expanding role in the domestic affairs of member states. On the issue of cross-party consensus over Europe, we can note a similarity with the Eastern European experience. There was a particular period in the history of European political parties where much of the resistance to EU integration came to an end. This coincided with the collapse and failure of many national strategies for political and economic renewal. Such failures pushed political elites towards Europe, as the easiest way in which they could transform such failures into a more positive programme of ‘Europeanization’. Examples of this abound, from France, to Spain, Italy, and Scandinavian countries. Most well-known is the u-turn made by French President Francois Mitterand in the early 1980s. From a national programme of Keynesian economic medicine promised in 1981, Jacques Delors declared famously

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in October 1983 that ‘Our only choice is between a United Europe and decline’. This is not to say that France had not been involved in European integration before 1983, or that its sense of its own exceptionalism entirely disappeared after this point. Rather, 1983 was a turning point of sorts, signalled by a manifest failure of nationalist strategies of renewal. Consensus rested upon an exhaustion of alternatives. Other examples of a ‘turn to Europe’ reflecting a national disenchantment exist across the continent. In Italy, Italian political analyst Indro Montanelli commented on the European vocation declared by Italy’s political élites in the early 1990s: ‘ours is a servile race, incapable of self-government, which is looking to Europe for salvation’. The contrast between the above and intergovernmental theories of integration is clear. Rather than seeing the forward movement of integration in terms of an assertion of national priorities, integration from the 1980s onwards has tended to reflect the weakness of national governments. They have turned to Europe after having been unable to successfully pursue their own national programs. This has important ramifications for the legitimacy of the EU. In the past, when the intergovernmental logic was more self-evident, the EU could be legitimated indirectly, through the authority of the member states. As Beetham and Lord argue, in the case of international organizations, It is not the direct cooperation of ordinary citizens that is required to maintain the authority of the United Nations, of GATT, of NATO etc., but that of the member states and their officials; and it is for the behaviour of these alone, therefore, that considerations of legitimacy are important (1998: 12).

However, if it is a prior loss of authority by nation-states that has motivated their ‘turn to Europe’, this makes it difficult for the EU to be legitimized via member states.7 Instead, the EU needs its own ways of generating legitimacy, and the only one it has developed is that of technocratic legitimacy, a ‘Europe of results’ to use Tony Blair’s phrase. The key difference is that once competences have been transferred to the EU they are no longer the subject of public contestation. This transfer indicates that such issues can be decided by non-accountable bodies of experts, rather than through a process of public deliberation. A perfect example of this is the European Central Bank: with the power to determine interest rates, the Bank is made up of economists rather than politicians, and suffers no interference by the latter in its decisions. Monetary policy, a highly contested economic lever in previous decades, has become in Europe an entirely technical matter. What marks the shift of competence from the national to the EU level is the understanding that such powers are best left in the hands of experts, rather than exposed to the populist instincts of national politicians. Under such circumstances, legitimation becomes

7 This can help explain why the power of the Commission has appeared to wane in recent years. Since Commission members are nominated by states, their authority does rest upon the authority of member states. If the latter are weakened, so the Commission will be weak and will lack legitimacy. The Commission may exist separately from nation-states, but its only connection to European populations is through member states.

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a matter of results, of outputs, rather than of authorization on the part of citizens themselves. What we have seen in the last decade is an expansion of the powers of panEuropean institutions, but without the requisite expansion of legitimacy. For an increasingly political Union, legitimation by results is no longer sufficient. In Beetham and Lord’s words, ‘technocratic legitimacy’ models are ‘inadequate to the political character of the EU’s decision-making’ (1998: 22). Hansen and Williams note that the EU’s ‘legitimacy crisis’ can be ‘traced to the fact that the growing supranational character of the EU has made it increasingly difficult to represent the institution in terms of objective economic efficiency’ (1999: 234). Yves Mény has also written that ‘the growing dissatisfaction with democracy, particularly in Europe, is the result of the continuing expansion of the constitutional pillar to the detriment of the popular one’ (cited in Zielonka 2006: 129). The gap between the powers of the EU and the powers of European citizens over the Union has grown, giving rise to concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’. For a number of years, the solution was understood to lie in institutional revisions of the EU: strengthening the European Parliament, increasing the transparency of European Council meetings, revising the voting methods in the Council, and most recently Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s ‘two presidents model’ that was debated at the Convention – a president for the Council and a president for the Commission. Some of these strategies contradicted each other, raising questions about the formal equality of member states versus greater equality based on the population sizes of member states.8 As Stephen Haseler puts it, what was most difficult for those participants in the Constitutional Convention was agreement on ‘what is a majority?’ in the Council (2005: 109). However, in recent years many have come to realize that an institutional fix cannot be sufficient to address the EU’s problems. They lie at a deeper level. This has been recognized by a number of authors who point to the legitimation deficit in the EU and the need to resolve it through the creation of a European political identity or European ‘myth’. In other words, a more political Union must be legitimized through more political means. Hansen and Williams note this shift when they observe that Scholars and politicians who diagnose the current crisis in [legitimacy] terms direct attention to the relationship between governments and the EU on the one side, and the electorates on the other, not, as has normally been the case in European integration studies, to intergovernmental relations. This construction of the crisis turns the discussion towards

8 Beetham and Lord view this as a clash between direct and indirect forms of legitimacy. The Council of Ministers has only a weak connection to national parliaments since its meetings are conducted behind closed doors. The Commission is only weakly connected to the European Parliament. If the Commission were to be made more accountable to the Parliament, in the name of direct legitimacy, then the indirect legitimacy of the Council of Ministers would be undermined since they would agree on policies, then would have to implement ones that had subsequently been modified by the European Parliament via its control over the Commission. National governments would then be forced to implement agreements which were no longer direct outcomes of their own participation in negotiations. For Beetham and Lord, these kinds of difficulties mean that the EU can only really manage the dilemmas it faces, rather than solve them in any definitive way. See Beetham and Lord 1998: 30.

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questions of legitimacy and democracy, and more specifically, asks how improving the latter can alleviate the scepticism towards the EU (1999: 234-35).

The above quote indicates the similarities and parallels between political instability East and West. In both cases, we see that the dividing line is between domestic populations and all governing institutions, be they national or panEuropean; electorates on one side, governments and the EU on the other, as Hansen and Williams observe. The problem ultimately concerns the relations between state and society; at issue is the principle and practice of political representation. For this reason, it is no longer useful to approach the question through asserting a contrast between a Western Europe attached to ‘EU values’, and an Eastern Europe still stuck in the mire of nationalism and populism. The growing disenchantment of European populations now transcends the East–West divide. Future Enlargements What will be the contribution of future enlargements? It is always difficult to speculate, but two points are likely to hold true. The first is that enlargement as process will continue to throw up the political instability mentioned above. The second is that continued expansion exacerbates the EU’s legitimacy crisis. The case of Turkey is the most obvious example: enlargement forces the EU to address the question of its borders, and therefore of its identity. The debate around Turkish membership has exposed the lack of consensus that exists surrounding the EU’s identity, and what common principles and values it should espouse to future member states. Enlargement in the Western Balkans It was argued above that a central feature of the enlargement process was a distancing of the candidate states from their own domestic constituencies, and the strengthening of accountability of candidate states to outside powers. The result was national political élites forging closer relationships with pan-European institutions in Brussels than with their own electorate. This, since 2004, has been an important source of political instability. In the Western Balkans, where all states have either begun official accession negotiations or are hoping to do so soon, we see similar trends in a more exaggerated form. One case in point is Bosnia. Here, the EU has increasingly come to replace the Peace Implementation Council as the main external actor responsible for Bosnia’s political and social development. In this shift from the Dayton framework to that of EU accession, we can see parallels with the recently completed Eastern enlargement. Most obvious is the strengthening of executive institutions. In the case of Bosnia, the attention has been on the Directorate for European Integration (DEI). David Chandler writes that the DEI has ‘become the key executive body of the Bosnian Government, supported in its operational structuring and institutional linkages by funding directly from the European Commission’ (2006: 137). In fact, in order for Bosnia to manage with the vast amount of directives that it is expected to implement from Brussels, the EU has sent civil servants to work as advisors to Bosnian officials, and it has provided

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technical assistance (Chandler 2006: 140). The shift from the Dayton framework to that of EU membership has only served to weaken further the links between Bosnia’s incipient political institutions and the Bosnian people. David Chandler claims that ‘this transition has take place through informal and unaccountable mechanisms of external regulation, and has been imposed from above without any debate or genuine involvement of the people or elected representatives of Bosnia’ (2006: 125). Something similar has been observed in Serbia, where external involvement has undermined national capacities, and in particular has stripped away from central government much of its authority. The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), for instance, was found to have crowded out much domestic state capacity. In the words of one evaluation report of the EAR’s activities in Serbia, ‘the EAR’s current functioning does not yet allow an optimal level of involvement from partners in the project cycle’ (EuropeAid Evaluation Report 2000). This echoes a general problem found with much state-building type interventions: institutional sucking-out, where external agencies find themselves substituting for local capacity in ways that create dependency. PHARE programs in Eastern Europe were found to have a similar effect. In a critical 2004 report of the PHARE program produced by a European consortium, many PHARE projects were labelled unsustainable, meaning that such projects cannot continue once external assistance is removed. Of the Twinning Projects launched under PHARE, where national experts of EU member states work directly alongside local state officials in candidate states, the report stated that ‘unless accompanied by widespread reform in public administration, twinning risks raising structures on very shaky foundations’ (McClements 2004: 25). This is what has happened in Serbia, where a recent SIGMA9 report stated that the country ‘for all intents and purposes … does not have a centre of government’ and ‘there is a lack of strategic focus for the policy system’ (SIGMA 2006: 6). If these are the foundations for future EU membership for the Western Balkans, we can expect many of the same problems of political instability to reoccur when these countries eventually join the Union. EU Membership of Turkey The question of Turkish membership of the EU has left Western European political parties divided, and has revealed the difficulty the EU has in clearly defining an integration project for the twenty first century. Former French president Jacques Chirac, an erstwhile supporter of Turkish membership, has distanced himself in recent months from earlier decisions and statements he made. Most recently, he argued that recognition of the Armenian ‘genocide’ should be a pre-condition for Turkish membership. The new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has firmly argued against Turkish membership, whilst Socialist party candidate, Ségolène Royal refused to take a position during the presidential campaign. In her words, she will follow the wish of the French people. This displeased many on the left in France who

9 SIGMA stands for Support and Improvement for Governance and Management, and is a joint OECD-EU initiative.

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are in favour of Turkish membership. In Germany, the two main parties are split: the Social Democrats in favour, Merkel’s Christian Democrats against. The real confusion, however, lies in the reasons given for or against Turkish membership. In looking at these reasons, it is clear that the issue has more to do with Europe’s own identity crisis, and its difficult relationship with Islam, than it does with Turkey. For instance, those in favour of Turkish membership routinely argue that this would be of benefit to Western European governments in their dealings with their own Muslim communities. Jack Straw, British foreign minister, argued in a visit to Denmark in 2004 that To support Turkish candidacy is very important to reconcile with moderate Islam which is a part of the war against terror … Islamist militants want to divide Muslim and Christian worlds. We could fight against this by stressing history and common values that Europe shares with the Islamic world. For me the most crucial test in this domain is the process of inclusion of Turkey in the European Union.

Very similar arguments are made by Tony Blair, Gunter Veheugen (Vice-President of the Barroso Commission) and other European leaders. Those who oppose Turkish membership do so largely for cultural reasons. In their eyes, Turkey is not European. This begs the question of what being ‘European’ means, which elicits no consensus. What the debate around Turkey reveals is the EU’s difficulty in finding any workable definition for what integration and enlargement are expected to achieve. Michel Rocard, former French prime minister, was right when he argued in September 2004 that ‘the Europe of institutions was built without any reference to a particular vision of society … . There was no agreement on the intention or the need to adopt such a vision, nor on what it could have meant, not at the beginning of the integration process and not today’ (Le Monde, 22 September 2004). This inability to define its goals and purpose go a long way to explaining the EU’s legitimacy problems, and the issue of Turkish membership only serves to highlight them. Conclusion In studies of the impact of enlargement on the EU, the emphasis has been on managing the EU’s increasing diversity. This chapter has argued that a better framework for understanding post-enlargement Europe is in terms of greater unity. The new division of Europe are not cultural or geopolitical, but rather reflect an institutionalization of structural inequalities in Europe. This challenges assumptions about formal political equality in the Union that are of concern to member states in both the core and new periphery of the EU. At the same time, the East-West division is transcended today by a common experience of disenchantments felt by national populations vis-à-vis both national governments and pan-European institutions. This raises questions of legitimacy that are as pressing for Western political élites as they are for their Eastern counterparts. The dynamics of future enlargements are likely to be shaped by this emerging Union of disenchantment.

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References Academic Sources Agh, A. (1999). ‘Europeanisation of Policmaking in East Central Europe: The Hungarian Approach to EU accession’. Journal of European Public Policy. 6(5): 839-54. Baudrillard, J. (2006). ‘The Pyres of Autumn’. New Left Review. 37: 5-7. Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998). Legitimacy and the EU. London: Longman. Bernstein, R. (2004). Poland’s New Role: European Border Guard, International Herald Tribune. Paris. Bickerton, C.J. (2006). ‘No Welcome for Serbia in the EU’, Le Monde Diplomatique. Bickerton, C.J. (2003). Demystifying Europe: Labour and Capital Flows in EU Enlargement. University of Geneva. Boeri, T. and H. Brucker (2005). ‘Migration, Coordination Failures and EU Enlargement’. IZA Discussion Paper Series. Buruma, I. (2006). Murder in Amsterdam – The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance. London: Atlantic. Buruma, I. (1999). Voltaire’s Coconuts or Anglomania in Europe. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson. Carothers, T. (2002). ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’. Journal of Democracy. 13(1): 5-21. Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building: Pluto. Dimitrova, A. 2002. ‘Enlargement, Institution-buidling and the EU’s Administrative Capacity Requirement’. Western European Politics. 25(4): 171-190. Elster, J., C. Offe, and U.K. Preuss, U.K. (1998). Institutional Design in PostCommunist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ekiert, G. and S.E. Hanson, (eds.). (2003). Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. EuropeAid. (2004). Evaluation of Regulation 2667/2000 (European Agency for Recontruction) Ref. 951652. Brussels: European Union. Gillingham, J. (2003). European Integration 1950-2003 Superstate or New Market Economy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grabbe, H. (2000). ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards’. International Affairs. 76(3): 519-536. Grzymala-Busse, A.M. (2002). Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grzymala-Busse, A. and A. Innes, (2003). ‘Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe’. East European Politics and Societies. 17: 64-73. Haas, E.B. (1961). International Integration: The European and Universal Process. International Organization. 15(3): 366-392.

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Hansen, L. and M.C. Williams, (1999). ‘The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the ‘Crisis’ of the EU’. Journal of Common Market Studies. 37(2): 233-249. Haseler, S. (2005). Super-state: The New Europe and its Challenge to America. London: I.B. Tauris. Hoffmann, S. (1995). ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? France, European Integration and the Fate of the Nation State’. In S. Hoffmann (ed.), The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994. Boulder: Westview Press. Hughes, J., G. Sassen, and C. Gordon, (2002). ‘Saying “Maybe” to the Return to Europe. European Union Politics. 3(3): 327-355. Kaletsky, A. (2005). ‘The People of Europe have voted for paralysis – and perhaps obliteration’. The Times. London. Kampfer, J. (2004). ‘Second-class Allies’. New Statesman. Knaus, G. and M. Cox, (2005). ‘The “Helsinki Moment” in Southeastern Europe. Journal of Democracy. 16(1): 39-53. Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott, (1977). ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’. Journal of Political Economy. 85(3). Lavanex, S. (1999). Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press. Malova, D. and T. Haughton, (2002). ‘Making Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Impact of Europe’. Western European Politics. 25(2): 101-120. McClements, C. (2004). From Pre-Accession to Accession: Thematic Evaluation of PHARE support allocated in 1999-2002 and implemented until November 2003, Second Generation Twinnings – Preliminary Findings. 1-80. Brussels: DG Enlargement. Moravcsik, A. (1993). ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’. Journal of Common Market Studies. 31(4): 473-524. Moscovici, P. (2006). l’Europe est Morte, Vive l’Europe! Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin. Parker, G. (2004). ‘Doors slammed shut as new EU members look for their rights’. Financial Times. London. Puchala, D. (1972). ‘Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Intergration’. Journal of Common Market Studies. 10(3): 267-285. Raik, K. (2004). ‘EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics’. East European Politics and Societies. 18(4): 567-594. Rocard, M. (2004). De l’Europe, du Socialisme, et de la Dignité, Le Monde. Paris. SIGMA. (2006). Policy-Making and Co-ordination: Serbia, SIGMA Balkans Reports: SIGMA. Vachudova, M.A. (2005). Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zielonka, J. (2001). ‘How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies. 39(3): 507-536.

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Zielonka, J. (2006). Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Press The Cultural Curtain, Chris Bickerton, spiked-online. 19 October 2004. http: //www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA742.htm Q&A: Schengen Agreement, BBC News, 2 August 2005. http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4738063.stm Central Europe desperate for a deal, BBC News, 2 December 2005. http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4492958.stm In Quotes: UK’s EU Budget Plan, BBC News, 6 December 2005 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4488164.stm Slovenia gets euro green light, BBC News, 15 June 2006 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5082438.stm Twin leaders are remaking Poland, Jan Cienski and Stefan Wagsyl, Financial Times, 30 August 2006 http: //www.ft.com/cms/s/ed9b7306-3851-11db-ae2c-0000779e2340.html Hungary: A ‘hooligan revolution’? Frank Furedi, spiked-online. 25 September 2006. http: //www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/1695/ Migrant workers: what we know, BBC News, 27 September 2006 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5384516.stm Q&A: Romanian and Bulgarian Workers, BBC News, 24 October 2006 http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5381990.stm Hungary’s Euro-readiness not in sight – Almunia, Portfolio.hu, 9 November 2006. http: //www.portfolio.hu/en/cikkek.tdp?cCheck=1&k=2&i=10151

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Chapter 7

Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints Joseph S. Joseph

The history of contemporary Turkey is characterized by change, the main causes of which have been external stimuli and incentives, particularly the drive for transformation from an oriental Islamic empire to a secular national state. This transformation – known as Westernization – has been slow and occasionally painful. It has been aptly called ‘the Turkish revolution’ and, as Bernard Lewis pointed out in his classic work on modern Turkey, it could not be defined only ‘in terms of economy or society or government, but of civilization’ (Lewis 1968: 486). It gained momentum with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the ascent of Kemalism, when ‘everything had to be rebuilt, above all a new identity’ (Pope and Pope 2004: 59). Its main goal was to move Turkey from being a medieval Islamic theocracy to becoming a modern capitalist Western democracy. At the center of the Kemalist ideology and its state-building and nation-building efforts was the consolidation of the Turkish Republic which was based on a political system the core principles of which were ‘heavily tainted by a historically developed authoritarian understanding of the unitary state and its functioning as well as an organic and homogenous understanding of the nation’ (Kramer 2000: 9). Eventually the scope of Westernization was broadened to include economic, social and cultural changes that were intensified by industrialization efforts and rapidly increasing urbanization. In the wake of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and in the process of reformation and sociopolitical reorientation ‘the replacement of old, Islamic conceptions of identity, authority, and loyalty by new conceptions of European origin was of fundamental importance.’ In the theocratically conceived polity of Islam, God was to be twice replaced: as the source of sovereignty, by the people; as the object of worship, by the nation. (Lewis 1968: 486)

As a result of these changes, which have taken decades to consolidate, Turkey has become a secular democracy, although the politicization of Islam and the political role of the military are still striking features of the Turkish political landscape. The success or failure of these protracted reforms has been the topic of an ongoing debate with differing opinions. To this, Turks are ‘still struggling to digest the heavy burden of Ataturk’s legacy’ (Pope and Pope 2004: 67) while the prospect of accession to the

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EU is posing new challenges. Recently, French President Jacques Chirac commenting on Turkey’s European aspirations suggested that it will have to undergo a ‘major cultural revolution’ to realize its dream of joining the EU.1 It can be argued, however, that during the last few decades, in many areas of public life including government, economy, society and culture, changes and achievements have been remarkable and irreversible. Today the challenge of Westernization is taking the form of Europeanization, that is, the reform of domestic structures, institutions and policies to meet the requirements of the systemic logic, political dynamics and administrative mechanisms of European integration. Turkey is, once again, facing a Western challenge as it is preparing to become a member of the EU and join the ‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’2 The role of Turkey in this process can be catalytic, as the EU will be welcoming its first Islamic member state. The deepening and widening of the integration process will acquire a new meaning, as Europe will be redefining itself with reference to the future, not to the past. Indeed, the challenge and promise for both Islamic Turkey and Christian Europe is about seizing the moment and moving beyond the clash of civilizations as the modus operandi of history and the modus vivendi of governments and peoples. A Long Road of Ups and Downs Following a protracted period of ups and downs in EU–Turkish relations, accession negotiations started in October 2005. The Brussels European Council made the decision for the commencement of accession negotiations in December 2004 ‘on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria.’3 Although accession negotiations and preparations will last for many years and accession is unlikely to take place within the next decade, in political terms Turkey is at the threshold of the EU.4 Less optimists point to the fact that although the objective of the negotiations is accession, there can be no guarantee in advance that they will be successfully completed. On both sides, however, there is positive predisposition and political will for successful conclusion of the negotiations and full membership of Turkey. 1 Jacques Chirac talking at a press conference on October 4 (the day after accession talks with the EU were launched); see Guardian Unlimited (The Guardian Digital Edition), 5 October 2005. 2 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), article 1. 3 Brussels European Council, 16-17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 17. 4 The European Commission recommended that ‘[t]he EU will need to define its financial perspectives for the period from 2014 before negotiations [with Turkey] can be concluded.’ See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, ‘Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ (6 October 2004), p. 5. The Recommendation was issued together with the 2004 ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.’

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The commencement of accession negotiations was the culmination of a long relationship, which goes back to the early years of the EU. Turkey expressed an interest in institutionalizing its relations and becoming an associate member of the EU in the late 1950s. In 1959 it applied for associate membership and in 1963 it signed an association agreement that was intended to pave the way for full membership. The association agreement – known as the Ankara agreement – went into effect in 1964 and provided that when the relations of Turkey with the EU have ‘advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations of the [EC] Treaty, [the EC] shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the European Community.’5 In 1971 an additional protocol was signed between Turkey and the EU aimed at further strengthening and broadening of their economic and political relations. The association agreement did not achieve its objective and failed to prepare Turkey for membership. It has been argued that the EU looked at it as a ‘framework for its containment policy rather than a pre-accession strategy, because it had serious reservations about Turkey’s prospects for EU membership on political and economic grounds’ (Arikan 2003: 74). Despite its failure, however, the association agreement provided a useful link with the European integration process and bolstered Turkey’s Westernization policy. Following the two Mediterranean enlargements of the EU in 1980s – accession of Greece in 1981, and of Portugal and Spain in 1986 – Turkey applied for full membership in April 1987. The response of the EU was not positive and cited various reasons why ‘it would be inappropriate for the Community [ … ] to become involved in new accession negotiations [and] it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey.’6 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, EU deepening and widening began accelerating. In 1995 the fourth EU enlargement took place with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, while pre-accession preparations got under way with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1997, the European Council in Luxemburg decided for the commencement of accession negotiations with six countries – the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – while excluding Turkey on economic and political grounds. A turning point came two years later at the Helsinki European Council where it was decided that ‘Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.’7 At the same time, the list of acceding countries was expanded to include Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. At Helsinki, a decision was also made for the establishment of an accession partnership with Turkey, which would serve as a roadmap to accession. The accession partnership was adopted in 2001 and defined

5 Agreement Establishing an Association Agreement between the European Economic Community and Turkey, article 28. The Association Agreement (known as the Ankara agreement) was signed on 12 September 1963 and went into effect on 1 December 1964. 6 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community’, 18 December 1989, paragraphs 10 and 11. 7 Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 12.

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the principles, priorities, conditions and short- and medium-term objectives for Turkey’s integration with the EU. Another milestone in Turkey’s European course was the publication in October 2004 of the positive ‘Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.’ The Recommendation concluded, ‘that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened.’8 This was the first time an EU institution firmly and clearly recommended the opening of accession negotiations. As it was put by the Washington Post, ‘Turkey seemed to shift geographically westward.’9 The Commission, however, pointed out that accession negotiations would be an open-ended process the outcome of which could not be guaranteed in advance. It also warned that the negotiations could be suspended if there was a persistent violation of the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Two months later, the Brussels European Council (16-17 December 2004) adopted the recommendation of the Commission and decided for the opening of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. The message came clear and loud from Brussels that ‘Turkey has taken its European destiny in its own hands.’10 It is also interesting to note that the decision by the EU heads of state or government came at a time when the majority of the European public was not favoring accession of Turkey to the EU.11 As the president of the European Commission pointed out, the challenge now for Turkey was ‘to win the hearts and minds of those European citizens who are open to, but not convinced of Turkey’s European destiny.’12 The accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005 and are expected to last for more than a decade. As the European Commissioner for enlargement put it, ‘the journey is as important as the final destination.’13 The negotiations and the pre-accession preparations are based on a strategy aimed at guaranteeing that harmonization with the acquis communautaire and the political reform process are consolidated, broadened and properly implemented. A year and a half after the launching of accession negotiations (April 2007), not much has been achieved. Only one chapter (science and research) has been 8 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, ‘Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession,’ (6 October 2004), p. 8. 9 Washington Times, ‘Turkey’s Continental Drift,’ 10 October 2004. 10 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, statement at a press conference, 17 December 2004. 11 The results of a poll carried out in October – November 2005 showed that 55 per cent of the Europeans are against Turkish accession, 31 per cent in favor, and the rest 14 per cent do knot know. Source: Standard Eurobarometer 64, published by the European Commission in December 2005. These results are consistent with similar findings of polls carried out in recent years. 12 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, statement at a press conference, 16 December 2004. 13 Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘Accession Negotiations with Turkey: The Journey Is as Important as the Final Destination,’ speech at the European Parliament, 28 September 2005.

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opened and provisionally closed in June 2006. Following a recommendation by the Commission and a decision by the Council of Ministers on 11 December 2006, which was endorsed by the European Council on 14-15 December 2006, no other chapter will be provisionally closed ‘until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments related to the Additional Protocol.’14 For the same reason, the Council decided that eight chapters ‘covering policy areas relevant to Turkey’s restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus’ would not open.15 Commenting on the decision to partially suspend negotiations on a number of acquis chapters, the President of the European Commission stressed ‘that a breach of legal obligations cannot be accepted. At the same time, continuing this negotiation process clearly lies in our own strategic interest. We need both sides to play by the rules. It is now up to the Turkish side to show its willingness to fulfill its obligations.’ A second chapter (enterprise and industrial policy) was opened in March 2007. It is worth noting however, that efforts are made in Brussels to sustain the momentum and political will for Turkey’s European course. As the European Commissioner for Enlargement put it, ‘[d]espite the stalemate on issues related to Cyprus, there has been no train crash. The journey continues steadily, even if at a somewhat slower speed.’17 Negotiating Framework and Principles Governing the Accession Negotiations18 Accession negotiations opened on the basis that Turkey sufficiently meets the Copenhagen political criteria.19 They are also based on Turkey’s own merits and their 14 Council Conclusions, 2770th Council Meeting, 11 December 2006. Note: The Additional Protocol extends the EU–Turkey Association Agreement to the ten member states (including Cyprus) which acceded on 1 May 2004. Turkey signed the Protocol in June 2005, but continues to deny access to its airports and ports to airplanes and ships flying the Republic of Cyprus flag. These restrictions infringe the Customs Union agreement. 15 The eight chapters are: 1. Free movement of goods; 3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services; 9. Financial services; 11. Agriculture and rural development; 13. Fisheries; 14. Transport policy; 29. Customs union 30. External relations. 16 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, speech before the European Parliament, 23 December 2006. 17 Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘Enlargement: The EU Keeps Its Doors Open for South Eastern Europe,’ speech before the European Economic and Social Committee, 17 January 2007. 18 This section of the chapter is a compilation of the main points included in the EU paper ‘Negotiating Framework for Turkey: Principles Governing the Negotiations’ (2005). It also draws on the ‘EU Opening Statement for the Accession Conference with Turkey’ (2005). 19 The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ were decided by the Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, and spelled out in the Presidency Conclusions as follows: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and

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pace depends on Turkey’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership. The objective of the negotiations is accession, but they are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all the Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership then it must be ensured that she is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond. Turkey is expected to sustain the process of reform and to work towards further improvement with regard to the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including relevant European case-law; to consolidate and broaden legislation and implementation measures specifically in relation to the zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill-treatment and the implementation of provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women’s rights, ILO standards including trade union rights, and minority rights. In the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the European Commission will, on its own initiative or at the request of one-third of the member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard Turkey, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The advancement of the negotiations is guided by Turkey’s progress in preparing for accession, within a framework of economic and social convergence. This progress is measured in particular against the following four sets of requirements: I. The Copenhagen criteria, that is, (a) the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; (b) the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (c) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis. II. Turkey’s unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. III. Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a favorable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU member states, including the Republic of Cyprus. market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.’

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IV. The fulfillment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU member states, in particular those pertaining to the EU–Turkey customs union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised. Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union engages with Turkey in an intensive political and civil society dialogue. The aim of the inclusive civil society dialogue is to enhance mutual understanding by bringing people together in particular with a view to ensuring the support of European citizens for the accession process. Accession implies the acceptance of the rights and obligations deriving from the acquis and attached to the Union system and its institutional framework, such as (a) the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties on which the Union is founded; (b) legislation and decisions adopted pursuant to the Treaties, and the case law of the Court of Justice; (c) other acts, legally binding or not, adopted within the Union framework, such as interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations and guidelines; (d) joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within the framework of the common foreign and security policy; (e) joint actions, joint positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs; (f) international agreements concluded by the Communities, the Communities jointly with their member states, the Union, and those concluded by the member states among themselves with regard to Union activities. Turkey’s acceptance of the rights and obligations arising from the acquis may necessitate specific adaptations to the acquis and may, exceptionally, give rise to transitional measures that must be defined during the accession negotiations. The financial aspects of the accession of Turkey must be allowed for in the applicable Financial Framework. Since Turkey’s accession could have substantial financial consequences, the negotiations can be concluded only after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms. In all areas of the acquis, Turkey must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to Union standards, both at national and regional level, with a view to implementing the acquis effectively or, as the case may be, being able to implement it effectively in good time before accession. At the general level, this requires a well-functioning and stable public administration built on an efficient and impartial civil service, and an independent and efficient judicial system. The EU will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter.20 Turkey will be requested to indicate 20 For the purposes of the accession negotiations, the acquis has been divided into the following chapters: 1. Free movement of goods; 2. Freedom of movement for workers; 3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services; 4. Free movement of capital; 5. Public procurement; 6. Company law; 7. Intellectual property law; 8. Competition policy; 9. Financial services; 10. Information society and media; 11. Agriculture and rural development;

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its position in relation to the acquis and to report on its progress in meeting the benchmarks. Turkey’s correct transposition and implementation of the acquis, including effective and efficient application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures, will determine the pace of negotiations. Issues, Prospects and Challenges The accession negotiations and the forthcoming Turkish accession present challenges to both Turkey and the EU. It is widely accepted that ‘Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential.’21 The negotiations are taking place in the framework of an intergovernmental conference and decisions are made by unanimity, which requires the participation and approval of all member states. Keeping in mind that by the time of Turkish accession the EU will include at least 27 members (the current number of member states), the issue of unanimity becomes a critical and complicated one. The case of Turkey will be different and more challenging from previous accessions for a number of reasons, some of which are presented below.22 Turkey is a country with a large population and geographic area. With a population of seventy-one million today, it is projected that it could be the largest member state at the time of accession. It is worth mentioning that the 2004 enlargement included ten countries with a total population of 75 million, while the 2007 enlargement included two countries (Bulgaria and Romania) with a total population of 30 million. As a Moslem secular country, Turkey will also add a new demographic and religious dimension to the EU. Also, the presence of a large number of Turkish immigrants in European countries raises the issue of possible additional migration, as a natural consequence of accession, which may affect the labor market and demography of small member states. The social repercussions of such a development raise sensitivities and pose challenges with political ramifications. The EU in an effort to address cultural and religious differences at the grass roots level is promoting political and cultural dialogue between the people of Turkey

12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy; 13. Fisheries; 14. Transport policy; 15. Energy; 16. Taxation; 17. Economic and monetary policy; 18. Statistics; 19. Social policy and employment (including anti-discrimination and equal opportunities for women and men); 20. Enterprise and industrial policy; 21. Trans-European networks; 22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments; 23. Judiciary and fundamental rights; 24. Justice, freedom and security; 25. Science and research; 26. Education and culture; 27. Environment; 28. Consumer and health protection; 29. Customs union; 30. External relations; 31. Foreign, security and defence policy; 32. Financial control; 33. Financial and budgetary provisions; 34. Institutions; 35. Other issues. 21 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ (6 October 2004), p. 3. 22 An elaborate presentation of the issues and challenges arising from the prospect of Turkish accession is included in the Commission staff working document: ‘Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective,’ SEC (2004) 1202.

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and EU member states. This dialogue will address concerns and perceptions on issues such as ‘difference of cultures, religion, issues relating to migration, concerns on minority rights and terrorism.’23 The view from Brussels is that although ‘the negotiation process will be essential in guiding further reforms in Turkey, [ … ] the civil society should play the most important role in this dialogue’24 This is an interesting and innovative strategy, which upgrades the role of the civil society which is moving to the center of the political stage in the EU and can also make a difference in Turkey’s Europeanization process. In this regard, the strengthening of civil society in Turkey is a major objective of the EU pre-accession strategy. The Kurdish question is a multifaceted challenge that is becoming more and more an accepted reality and an item on the agenda of EU – Turkish relations. As a ‘major fault line within Turkish democracy’ and a problem without ‘a solution on the horizon,’ it is a source of concern at home and in the EU (Kramer 2000: 52). The EU assessment is that ‘progress has been slow and uneven. In some cases, it has even deteriorated.’25 The position of the EU is that ‘a comprehensive strategy should be pursued, to achieve the socio-economic development of the region [east and southeastern part of Turkey] and the establishment of conditions for the Kurdish population to enjoy full rights and freedoms.’26 The Kurdish issue has also ramifications in some EU member states where Kurdish immigrants live and have established active political and cultural organizations. Another transnational aspect of the Kurdish issue is the fact that developments in the neighboring countries of Iraq, Iran and Syria – where also Kurds live – can easily have an impact on Turkey. As Andrew Mango put it, ‘Kurdish nationalism is a many-headed hydra, and it will survive somewhere, if not everywhere’ (Mango 2004: 211). The strategic location of Turkey presents a unique challenge to the EU’s external role and policies as ‘it lies at the epicenter of a series of conflicts, real and potential’ (Mountcastle 2002: 5) in the region. Turkish accession will bring closer to the EU the instability and tensions of a strategically vital region with strong conflicting energy-related interests. The unstable neighborhoods of the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia will become the immediate neighborhood of the EU and its member states. As a major power in the region ‘Turkey could be drawn into conflicts that work against European, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern integration and peace’ (Black et al. 2002: 2). In conjunction with this point, the addition of new long external borders will present a major challenge to the EU as it will involve critical policies and issues such as migration, asylum and drug-smuggling. Turkey’s participation in the European common foreign and security policy can also be controversial. Its role in NATO is a central one and so far it ‘has not witnessed a strong “Europeanization’ of its foreign policy” (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 65). Its large military force will make it a major military power in the EU with the largest number of military personnel. Turkey – like other member states – has already shown 23 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ (6 October 2004), p. 7. 24 Ibid., p. 9. 25 European Commission, ‘Turkey: 2005 Progress Report’ (9 November 2005), p. 38. 26 European Commission, ‘Turkey 2006 Progress Report’ (8 November 2006), p. 22.

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that on issues of vital national interest it is not willing to compromise and align its foreign and security policy with the positions of other states. The willingness and ability of Turkey to meet European expectations on issues of security and defense are also largely determined by domestic factors such as civil-military relations and secular-religious dichotomies. The discussion over external policy and orientation points to the fact ‘that modern Turkey has functioned as part of several systems – European, Middle Eastern, Eurasian – while remaining on the cultural and political periphery of each’ (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 189). It cannot go unnoticed that Turkey has uneasy bilateral relations with some of its neighbors and has been characterized a ‘reluctant neighbor’ (Barkey 1996). For example, relations with Syria have been bad in recent decades for various reasons, including water resources and Kurdish connections. Iran’s Islamic political orientation and nuclear ambitions are sources of concern for Turkey. Turkey’s policy of expanding its influence in the Turkic states of the Caucasus and Central Asia have alarmed Russia, while Armenia has no diplomatic relations with Turkey and the border between the two countries has been closed. Turkey has unresolved issues and unstable relations or no relations at all with some EU member states. Greece and Cyprus are cases in point. In recent years, GreekTurkish relations have improved considerably and Greece’s policy towards Turkish accession is a positive one, but this depends on the political barometer over the Aegean and Cyprus. The fact that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus – a full member of the EU since May 2004 – has been a source of legal controversies and political complications. In that regard, there is still an open question: how can a candidate country conduct accession negotiations and sign an international treaty (like the accession treaty) with a country it does not recognize? The dispute over the implementation of the Additional Protocol and the suspension of negotiations, by the European Council in December 2006, on eight key chapters or provisionally closing any chapter is indicative of the serious problems that can arise. The Cyprus problem has been a source of difficulties for EU–Turkish relations and Greek-Turkish relations. The Mediterranean island has been a flashing point in the region since 1963 when intercommunal fighting broke out. In 1974 a Greek coup d’ état and a Turkish invasion took place which led to ethnic segregation and the de facto division of the island. Besides the division of the island, the presence of a sizeable Turkish army in the northern part of the island and a shared feeling of insecurity between the two local communities are also striking features of the problem. Several efforts for a solution made so far by the UN, or in the name of the UN, have failed. The most recent one culminated in the submission of a comprehensive plan for a settlement in 2004 – known as the Annan Plan – which provided for the establishment of a new state of affairs on the island based on a bizonal bicommunal federation.27 The two Cypriot communities held separate, simultaneous referenda on

27 For an extensive account on the developments which led to the shaping of the Annan Plan and its failure, see the ‘Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’, UN doc. S/2004/437 of 28 May 2004.

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the Annan Plan, but it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots.28 Apparently the majority of the Greek Cypriots believed that the plan was not fair. Especially the provisions on security, the Turkish settlers, the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish army, the exchange of properties and the return of refugees made the Greek Cypriot voters unhappy. There were also serious questions about the implementation and viability of the Plan, which created feelings of uncertainty among the Greek Cypriots.29 The failure of the Annan Plan, the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the commencement of accession negotiations with Turkey have created a new reality, additional urgency and a promising prospect. Sooner or later a momentum will emerge for the reunification of the island that is too small to remain divided, but big enough to accommodate its people as a reunited EU member state. In this regard, besides the UN, the EU can also play a key role in the search of a settlement that will address the concerns of all parties involved. Turkey, in particular, can expect major political benefits from a solution on Cyprus as it will improve its European stature and be in a better position to pursue its goal of accession to the EU. Turkey has a level of economic development well below that of the EU average and its accession will have a considerable budgetary impact on the EU. Among the economic consequences Turkish accession will have for the EU is the creation of a regional economic disparity and financial burden for other member states. On the basis of current regulations and practices, Turkey will be receiving considerable support from the cohesion and structural funds at the expense of other member states, which may no longer be eligible for these funds. The prospect of such a development presents another challenge with political and economic ramifications. Along these lines, Turkey’s huge agricultural sector also receives special attention. The participation of Turkey in the EU institutions will affect dramatically the allocation of power and influence on decision-making, policy formulation and the dynamics of the broader European political arena. As a large member state, Turkey will have a powerful voice in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers where decisions are mostly made by qualified majority. This shift of power from the western Christian capitals to the eastern Islamic frontier is already causing skepticism and reactions in some countries. Besides the above issues, which are discussed in detail in other chapters, there are topics and aspects inherent in the EU itself and its ability to absorb a new member state like Turkey. Already in 1993, the Copenhagen European Council, besides defining the political and economic criteria, also raised the issue of the EU’s capacity to enlarge without undermining the integration process. As stated by the heads of state or government, ‘the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general

28 At the referenda, which were held on 24 April 2004, the majority of the Greek Cypriots (75.83 per cent) voted no and the majority of the Turkish Cypriots (64.91 per cent) voted yes. 29 An elaborate account of the Greek Cypriot positions on the weaknesses and rejection of the Annan Plan was presented in a long letter by the President of the Republic of Cyprus to the UN Secretary General dated 7 June 2004.

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interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.’30 Structural, political and economic developments in the EU during the next decade may affect the deepening and widening of the EU in a way that can have an impact on further enlargement, including the accession of Turkey. As it was reconfirmed by the European Council in December 2006, to ‘sustain the integration capacity of the EU the acceding counties must be ready and able to fully assume the obligations of the Union membership and the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop.’31 Conclusion: Oriental Past vs. Western Future While accession talks and preparations are under way, the debate over Turkey’s European prospects is heating up and a variety of perspectives, positions, opinions and arguments are put forward. The former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, asked Turkey to show ‘determination in pursuing further reforms and wisely conducting an accession process which, like all the others, will display both periods of progress and moments of tension and unavoidable difficulties.’32 He also appealed to the member states and the European public to demonstrate equal perseverance, as ‘Europe has nothing to fear from Turkey’s accession.’33 Europe’s confusion and ambivalence about Turkey is not a new phenomenon, although recently it has been becoming more visible. For example, in March 2007, Turkey’s Government was not invited to the Berlin Summit that marked the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, causing disappointment in Ankara. A few years ago, the fear of many Europeans about Turkish accession were expressed and stirred up by the former French President and head of the European constitutional convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. In a blunt and provocative manner, he declared that Turkey was ‘not a European country’ and that its inclusion in the EU ‘would be the end of Europe.’34 In a similar vein echoing Turco-skepticism, a European Commissioner brought back memories of the Ottoman siege of Vienna by stating that ‘the liberation of 1683 would have been in vain’35 if Turkey joins the EU. On the other hand, there are strong voices arguing that Turkey can play the role of ‘a cultural and physical bridge between the East and West … . [and] become one

30 Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 7 (A) iii. 31 Brussels European Council, 14-15 December 2006, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 6. 32 Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission ‘The Commission’s Report and Recommendation on Turkey’s Application’, presentation to the European Parliament, 6 October 2004. 33 Ibid. 34 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, ‘Pour ou contre l’adhesion de la Turquie à l’Union Européenne’, interview with Le Monde, 9 November 2002. 35 Frits Bolkenstein, European Commissioner for Internal Market, speech at the University of Leiden, 6 September 2004. In his speech, Bolkenstein cited the pre-eminent historian and Islamic expert Bernard Lewis.

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of Europe’s most prized additions.’36 Across the Atlantic, the United States has a clear pro-Turkish position that cannot be ignored. In June 2004, during the NATO summit in Istanbul, the American President George W. Bush underlined that position and called on Europe to prove that it ‘is not the exclusive club of a single religion’ and that ‘as a European power, Turkey belongs in the EU.’37 The increasingly polarized discussion over Turkey’s position and role in Europe will continue for years to come at various levels. The debate may even outlast the protracted period of accession negotiations during which not only negotiations on the acquis chapters will be conducted, but also a lot of diplomatic maneuvering and political twisting will take place. Throughout this period, the Christian and Islamic worlds will have to show that they can accommodate each other and prove false Samuel Huntington’s argument about ‘the clash of civilizations’ and the reconfiguration of the political world ‘along cultural lines’ (Huntington 1996: 20). Both Europe and Turkey will find out what they expect from each other and whether they can share a common future that will reconcile their different pasts. The real question will be whether the internal sociopolitical dynamics and external orientations of Turkey can be compatible with the changing dynamics of European integration, which aims at deepening the solidarity among peoples ‘while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions’, and creating ‘firm bases for the construction of the future Europe.’38 In the long run and in a broader sense, the challenge for the EU will be to develop a forward-looking world-view based on a multicultural civilization that has ample room for different religions including Islam. In a shrinking world of increasing interdependence this may no longer be a political option, but an urgent imperative for European integration that is a process of building unity through diversity. References Ahmad, F. (2003). Turkey: The Quest for Identity. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Arikan, H. (2003). Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? Burlington: Ashgate. Aydin, M. and C. Eehan. (eds.) (2004). Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future. New York: Routledge. Aydinli, E. et al. (2006). ‘The Turkish Military’s March Toward Europe’. Foreign Affairs. Barkey, H.J. (ed.) (1996). Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace. Black, S. et al. (2002). Turkey’s Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific. Carkoglu, A. and B. Rubin. (eds.) (2003). Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics. London: Frank Cass. 36 Washington Times, ‘Turkey’s Continental Drift’, 10 October 2004. 37 Remarks by President George W. Bush, 29 June 2004. 38 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), Preamble.

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Griffiths, R.T. and Ozdemir, D. (2004). Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press. Gunduz, A. (2001). ‘Human Rights and Turkey’s Future in Europe’. Orbis. Gunter, M. (2005). ‘The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray’. World Affairs. Huntingon, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Joseph, J.S. (1997). Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union. London: Macmillan Press. Joseph, J.S. (ed.) (2006). Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 Kibaroglu, M. (2005). ‘Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads’. Middle East Journal. Kinzer, S. (2001), Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Kirisci, K. (2004). ‘Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy’. Middle East Review of International Affairs. Kirisci, K. (2004). ‘The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is It an Historical Turning Point?’. Middle East Review of International Affairs. Kramer, H. (2000). A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Lake, M. (ed.) (2005). The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone? London: Federal Trust for Education and Research. Larrabee, F.S. and I.O. Lesser. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Lewis, B. (1968). The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edition. London: Oxford University Press. Loizides, N. (2002). ‘Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process’. Security Dialogue. Mango, A. (2004). The Turks Today. London: Murray. Michael, G.M. (1987). The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Morris, C. (2005). The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe. London: Granta Books. Mountcastle, J.W. (2002). ‘Foreword,’ in Black, S. et al. (2002). Turkey’s Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific. Moustakis, F. and R. Chudhuri.(2005). ‘Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?’. Mediterranean Quarterly. Muftuler-Bac, M. (1998). ‘The Never-ending Story: Turkey and the European Union’. Middle Eastern Studies. Onis, Z. and S. Yilmaz. (2005). ‘The Turkey–EU–US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?’. Middle East Journal. Phillips, D.L. (2004). ‘Turkey’s Dreams of Accession’. Foreign Affairs.

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Pope, N. and H. Pope. (2004). Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, 2nd edition Woodstock and New York: Overlook Press. Taspinar, O. (2005). Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition. New York: Routledge. Teintelbaum, M.S. and P.L. Martin.. (2003). ‘Is Turkey Ready for Europe?’. Foreign Affairs. Tocci, N. (2004). EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? Aldershot: Ashgate. Tocci, N. (2005). ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?’. South East European Politics and Society. Togan, S. (2004). ‘Turkey: towards EU Accession’. World Economy. Ugur, M. (1999). The European Union and Turkey: an Anchor-credibility Dilemma. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ugur, M. and N. Canefe. (2004) (eds.). Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues. London: Routledge. Yildiz, K. (2005). The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights. London: Pluto Press. Zurcher, E.J. (2004). Turkey: A Modern History, 3rd edition. London: I. B. Tauris.

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Chapter 8

Judicialization: The Key to European Unification and EU Expansion Charles Anthony Smith

Persistent efforts to unify Europe were matched with the persistence of failure. The European Union only became viable once disputes that threatened it were channeled into an acceptable dispute resolution structure and the agreements made by its members became credible through the capacity for enforcement. The judiciary is the mechanism through which the members are bound by more than words alone. Thus, European unification only begins to be possible, practically, after the creation of a judicial structure to act as a nexus between peace and prosperity. Because trade was integral to the premise of economic inter-development across the member states, upholding trade agreements and the concomitant commercial contracts was critical to the survival of the European Union itself. Moreover, belligerent Member States and non-affiliated nations that might have used trade disputes as an excuse for trade wars have been held at bay through the provision of the administrative avenue for grievance provided by the ECJ and the Court of First Instance. Not only is a full remedy available, but the failure to avail oneself of the provided remedy is a breach of treaty by Member States and a breach of the law of nations by non-affiliated nations. The underlying credible commitments established by a viable judiciary are also a prerequisite to continued EU expansion. Unification: Antecedents and Beginnings The modern European unification movement can be traced to Pierre Dubois, a French attorney, who wrote Treatise on the Way to Shorten Wars in 1306. Dubois suggested a Council should be formed to act as an overseer of the monarchs and cities of Europe with a panel of judges to arbitrate disputes among the governed (Chalmers 1996: 1-6). The purpose of Dubois’ Council and the judicial panel was to avoid belligerence (Chalmers 1996: 1-6). In 1465 King Podebrand of Bohemia proposed a Council of Kings and Princes in an effort to secure his kingdom against the Turkish threat without aligning with the Papacy (Chalmers 1996: 1-6). Henry IV of France developed his Grand Design to inhibit Habsburg influence across Europe (Chalmers 1996: 1-6). Both William Penn and John Bellers proposed formal unification of Europe. Penn advocated a European Parliament designed to prevent war and promote

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justice.1 Inspired by the Swiss cantonal plan, Bellers urged a division of Europe into 100 cantons that would each contribute to a standing army and a European Senate (Chalmers 1996: 3). Breaking from these early con-sociational models, in 1814, Saint-Simon published his ‘Plan for the Reorganization of the European Society’ which urged a parliamentary style system at both the state and regional level (Chalmers 1996: 3). After the first World War, a Pan-European movement gained a following based upon the premises that a unified Europe was necessary to prevent the resurgence of belligerence among the states of Europe and only a unified Europe could compete commercially with the United States (Depoorter 2003: 5). The Czech Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was the most prominent of the Pan-European advocates (Depoorter 2003: 5). The 1929 Briand Memorandum, wherein France proposed a European Federal Union marked the first state sponsored legislative attempt at unification (Depoorter 2003: 5). The Roman Empire, Napoleon, and Hitler each failed to unify Europe through conquest and the plans that sought unification through legislation were not any more successful (Depoorter 2003: 1). Throughout the 1940’s, reaction to the nationalism many blamed for the belligerence of World War II spurred several proposals such as The Ventotene Manifesto that called for a Federal Europe (Chalmers 1996: 3).2 The Council of Europe of 1949 sought to promote legal and cultural cooperation among its members but failed to address economic issues in any meaningful way and did not have any regulatory authority (Lipges 1991: 35-6).3 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman issued a dual pronged call for substantial movement towards elimination of the divisions in Europe that led to war in May of 1950 (Schuman 1997: 61-3). The Schuman Declaration advanced proposals for European countries to embrace unilaterally without the need for additional transnational structures, but also advocated significant movement towards a unified Europe through a transnational structure (Schuman 1997: 61-3). Schuman set forth the rationale for a united Europe as follows: World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of constructive efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as the essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved, and we had war (Schuman 1997: 61-3).

He identified the long-held animosity between France and Germany as a primary obstacle to unification, ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity. The gathering of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of 1 An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693) as cited in Stephen et al at 2. 2 Ventotene was the island where Mussolini’s opponents were imprisoned. The Ventotene Manifesto was drafted by the Italian dissidents Spinelli and Rossi. 3 The Council of Europe was originally comprised of Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

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the age-old opposition of France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The first concern of any action taken must be these two countries’ (Schuman 1997: 61-3). Finally, Schuman set forth trade as the path to unification: With this aim in view, the French Government proposes to take action immediately on one limited but decisive point. The French Government proposes to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common ‘High Authority’ within the framework of an organization open to the participation of other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately provide for the setting-up of common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and it will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and the Federal Republic of Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible...In this way there will be realized, simply and speedily, that fusion of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; and that will be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions...By pooling basic production and by setting a new High Authority whose decisions will be binding [in] France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other member countries, these proposals will build the first concrete foundation of the European Federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace (Schuman 1997: 61-3).

Institutions and Structure The Schuman Declaration led to the establishment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The institutional predecessor to the ECJ was the court established through the European Community Treaty (ECT) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECT established by the general tasks of the European Community as: ...establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union...to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced, and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States (Emmert 1999: 29).

The general objectives of the European Community contemplated by the ECT included the following specific activities: For the purposes set out in Article 2 [General Tasks] the activities of the Community shall include, as provided for in this Treaty ... (a) the prohibition, as between Member States of customs duties and qualitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and all other measures having equivalent effect; (b) a common commercial policy;

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The State of European Integration (c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital; ... (h) the approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common market; ... (k) the strengthening of economic and social cohesion... (s) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and promote jointly economic and social development; ... (u) measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism (Emmert 1999: 29).

The role of the Court was succinctly identified: ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the application and interpretation of this Treaty, the law is observed’ (Emmert 1999: 93). This broad mandate is given structure and substance through the specific jurisdictional grants given to the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court runs along four broad channels. First, the Commission, or the office of the prosecutor, as well as any Member State may initiate proceedings for failure by a member State to fulfill an obligation that arises under community law. The Commission is the most frequent source of initiated actions. Second, a Member State, the Commission, or the Parliament may initiate proceedings for a judicial annulment, in whole or in part, of any specific piece of Community legislation that conflicts with the core EC agreements. Even individuals may bring an action for annulment if the law in question directly and individually affects them. Thus, the actions of the Community institutions are under direct review from the judiciary. Third, the Court may also review the failure to act by any Community institution. Members, the Commission, or individuals can initiate these actions. Fourth, the Court has jurisdiction for non-contractual liability for damages caused by Community institutions or servants in the performance of their official duties. Any damaged party may initiate these actions.4 The newly established institution became the arbiter for disputes arising under the subsequent Economic European Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) through the Treaties of Rome (1957) (Dehousse 1994: 5). Over time, the Court devoted ever more time and energy to disputes arising under the EEC (Dehousse 1994: 5). Dehousse reports that by the end of 1995, the ECJ issued 4024 judgements arising under the EEC; 359 judgements arising under the ECSC; and, 19 arising under EURATOM (Dehousse 1994: 5). It is noteworthy that the Court arose out of a series of treaties – the embodiment of the law of nations – and then transformed into a constitutional tribunal (Stein 1981: 1-27). Moreover, the treaty that has been the source of the majority of the Court’s activities, the EEC, deals exclusively with trade (Mckay 1991: 127-142).5

4 www.curia.eu.int/en/actu/news. 5 The EEC was established in 1958 to reduce tariff barriers and promote trade among the western European signatories. Among those parties to the treaty are Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and West Germany. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark

Judicialization: The Key to European Unification and EU Expansion

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European unification only begins practically to be possible once a judicial structure is created to act as a nexus between peace and prosperity. This mechanism for dispute resolution that binds the states of Europe allowed for the development of the credible commitments necessary to create the economic interdependence that inhibits belligerence. The similarities and differences between the ECJ and the early United States system are instructive, as the modern European Union process resembles a more evolved version of the early one. In particular, the jurisdictional focus on trade and dispute resolution among states/members and between states/members and nonaffiliated nations are similar. Walter Hallstein, a lawyer and professor of law, served the Federal Republic of Germany as an undersecretary of state and was the leader of the German delegation to the Schuman Plan Conference.6 Hallstein was the first president of the European Commission and served in that post for ten years beginning in 1958. In an address given at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1962, Hallstein described the ECJ as: ... a Community Supreme Court whose word is law on all matters of interpretation of the treaties which make up the Community’s Constitution. Like the European Parliament, it is common to the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC. Its seven Judges are chosen for their acknowledged pre-eminence. Its function represents in some ways a blend of international and civil law, since it can settle both disputes between member states and actions involving any legal person within the Community. Its verdicts are directly enforceable by the domestic authorities of member states. It is perhaps superfluous to add that in the nine years since the Court began handing down decisions – most of them so far on coal and steel questions, but some already within the EEC – there has not been a single case of defiance of Court orders. (Hallstein 1962: 27)

The ECJ has jurisdiction over matters assigned to it by treaties. Its duties are to apply those treaties and any enactment contemplated by the treaties to particular enumerated disputes. It has a wide range of compulsory or mandatory jurisdiction. Member nations can only subvert this jurisdiction through exit from the European Union and exit cannot be done unilaterally. The ECJ’s institutional ability to give advisory opinions and its capacity to engage the highest tribunal of the member nations in a dialogue regarding the national law mean it is a dynamic institution that can engage at will. The treaties that gave rise to the ECJ as well as the now expansive case law support a role for the court that is substantially similar to that of the early United States Supreme Court.7 The focal areas of trade and dispute resolution among the member states and between the members and non-members signed on in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. 6 In this post he developed ‘the Hallstein Doctrine’ which claimed that only the Federal Republic of Germany represented the entire nation. 7 For example, Costa ECJ 6/64 (doctrine of supremacy); Simmenthal ECJ 92/78 (EC norms automatically render inapplicable any conflicting provision of national law); Van Gend en Loos ECJ 26/62 (treaty provisions are directly effective on members and their citizens