The Transcendental How: Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Objective Cognition (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy)

THE TRANSCEND

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES INKant's PHILOSOPHY 13 transcendental deduct

Markku Lep

THE TRANSCENDENTAL HOW Kant's transcendental deduction of objective cognition

Markku Leppakoski

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL STOCKH

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL STOCKHOLM

judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental granted, the possibility of there being synthetic follows. There is also another sense of the questio Doctoral Dissertation 1993 to establish or justify §ynthetic judgments a priori? Department of Philosophy be seen as parallel to Kant's distinction between tw UnIversity of Stockholin that- and how-questions. The aim of the present s S-106 91 Stockholm how Kant thought that transcendental philosophy c how he in fact tried to accomplish his task. Kant's philosQphical reasoning in some cen Abstract Critique oJ Pure Keason is examined. The general is first philosophy presented, and including Kant's doctrine This is a study of Kant's theoretical itsdistinguish grounds. The philosophIcal transcende system of transcendental philosophy makesproofs. up the To condItions of the transcendental IJrOOfS is inevitaole in order to g ~ossibility of objective cog:Q.ition and establishes itsSome boundaries. Transcendental Deduction. main factors det concept of 'transcendental', which ObjectivIty' is embedded in Kant's of the Deduction are considered. The categories a contains a reference to an object. Thus, establishing the system of (functions) as the logical fonns of judgments, b transce.ndental phi~osophy . i~ differently: tantamounttotodetermIne giving athetranscendental manifolo of a given i deductIon of ObjectIve cognItIon. 'objective' are two crucial and disputed concepts. Kant summarized his studyterms in one question: "How are synthetic are understood is important not only for the If transcendental idealism is taken for judgments possible a priori?" Transcendental Deduction out for the entire transce being synthetic ju~d~ments a priori granted, the possibility of thereSynthetic judgments"!row presuppose intuition (act of the question: is it possible follows. There is also another sense of pure (lormal) Kant's re to establish or justify §yntheticrole judgments a priori?" TheintuItIon two sensesincan emphasized. A demystified intefQretation be seen as parallel to Kant's distinction between two kinds of questions: of form schemata of tlieir Kant's reasonin that- and how-questions. The aim of the and present study role is to in investigate schemata are formal intuitions but as determined i how Kant thought that transcendental philosophy can oe established, and concepts. how he in fact tried to accomplish his task.The~ are what Kant calls "the third t ~ch~~ata ~re also pur~ intuitions are not use of the Kant's 'philosQphical reasoning in some central passages they IntuItIons mathematIcs. Critique oj Pure Keason is examined. TheIn general conce:Rtual framework

is first presented, including Kant's doctrine of aefinitions and Key words: Kant, I, history of philosophy, tra philosophIcal proofs. To distinguish transcendental deductions from transcendental transcendental ]Jroofs is inevitaole in orderdeduction, to grasp schematism, the role of pure the intuitio Transcendental Deduction. Some main factors determIning the structure (c) 1993 Markku Leppakoski of the Deduction are considered. The91-22-01560-4 categories are the same concepts ISBN (functions) as the logical fonns of judgments, but they are employed ISSN 0491-0877 differently: to detennine the manifolo of a given intuition. 'Object' and 'objective' are two crucial andComposing: disputed concepts. How different object Ord terms are understood is important not by only for ocb the Grafik understanding Akademitryck Abidealism. 1993 of the Printed Transcendental Deduction out for the entire transcendental Edsbruk Synthetic judgments presuppose intuition (actual or possible). The role of pure (tormal) intuItIon in Kant's reasoning is strongly emphasized. A demystified intefQretation of formal intuition and the schemata and of tlieir role in Kant's reasoning is presented. The schemata are formal intuitions but as determined intuitions they are also concepts. The:x are what Kant calls "the third things". Aliliough the ~ch~1Vata ~re also pur~ intuitions they are not used in the same way as IntUItIons In mathematICS.

Key words: Kant, I, history of philosophy, transcendental idealism, transcendental deduction, schematism, pure intuition (c) 1993 Markku Leppakoski

ISBN 91-22-01560-4

ISSN 0491-0877

Composing: Ord och Grafik Printed by Akademitryck Ab 1993 Edsbruk

from its mere possibi

1. The transcendental deduction of INTRODUCTION

2. Meta-critique 3. Kant and the de tion of philosophy 4. The classical 5. Kant's conception of language concepts 6. The faculties and pretation" 7. Some clues for, inte "To cognize anything a priori is to cognize it patterns of thought and key-concepts from its mere possibility." (MAN 470) Transcendental Deduction 10. The st

1. The transcendental deduction of objective cognition 2. Meta-critique 3. Kant and the de-transcendentaliza1. The transcendental deduction of objec meta-critical debate tion of philosophy 4. The classical 5. Kant's conception of language; the primacy of This is a study of Kant's theoretical ph concepts 6. The faculties and the "logical interHistorically it is limited to around the time pretation" 7. Some clues for, interpretation 8. The ofinterpret the Critique second edition 9. To the of Pure Reas patterns of thought and key-concepts deals with two different, although Transcendental Deduction 10. The structure of the study not unrelat

task as a critique is to draw the boundaries o part is devoted to establishing the system of of fundamental concepts an that the system 1. The transcendental deduction ofis, objective cognition makes up the conditions of the possibility This is a study of Kant's theoretical philosophy and its grounds. establishes its boundaries. Although these Historically it is limited to around the time of the publication of the related to the subject of cognition, the poi second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.! In the Critique Kant endeavour is to try to show that they, simu deals with two different, although not unrelated philosophical tasks. The validity. Thus cognition, in the sense investig task as a critique is to draw the boundaries of reason. However, a major take it for granted - but also argue for it - th part is devoted to establishing the system of transcendental philosophy, meaning of 'referring to objects' or 'havin that is, the system of fundamental concepts and propositions. The system objects'. This notion of objectivity is em makes up the conditions of the possibility of objective cognition and concept 'transcendental' which contains a establishes its boundaries. Although these "epistemic conditions" are related to the subject of cognition, the point of Kant's philosophical 1 CPR for short. See "A note on literature and transla endeavour is to try to show that they, simultaneously, have objective validity. Thus cognition, in the sense investigated by Kant, is objective. I take it for granted - but also argue for it - that 'objective' has the basic meaning of 'referring to objects' or 'having an origin or ground in objects'. This notion of objectivity is embedded already in Kant's concept 'transcendental' which contains a reference to an object. 1 CPR for short. See "A note on literature and translation" below.

judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental ide INTRODUCTION , the possibility of there being synthetic j granted questio of the for sense another Objectivity in the sensefollows of intersubjectivity universal validity all n: . There is also or , in other a priori?" ntsoutset ic judgme subjects of cognition is toeither taken for granted at the or appears h synthet establis occasionally as a derivative notion. le to know or justify synthetic judgme nts a prio .possib ion betw distinct Kant'sare l to "How as paralle !(ant summarized his in one question: synthetic be seen canstudy The . estions that- and how-qu judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental idealism is taken forgener questions: lity of sy s the possibi explain idealism ndental granted, the possibilitytransce of there being synthetic judgments a priori nts, bu be such there can "How , that the question: is judgme it possible follows. There is also another sense of priori, namely ntsit of t justify e to in to establish synthetic judgments a priori?", otherspecific words: judgme "How is how it is possibl n in the answer the did nota priori?" synthetic judgments Thequestio two senses possible to know or justify that Kant notable had f himsel he h way, althoug to Kant's distinction between two kinds ofdecl can be seen as parallelstraight forward ise. Becaus enterpr his whole questions: that- and central how-questions. general framework ofe Ka question ofThe which itions ndentalofpropos transcendental idealism explains possibility synthetic judgments are a sy transce system ofthe concerns questio theit does thatbut it follows priori, namely, that therepriori can be- such judgments, notnexplain metho the Indeed philosophy ndentaljudgments how it is possible to justify specific of itself. that kind. It is most transce transc of establis method the in phy notable that Kant did notphiloso answer themeans question the second sensehing in any referenc always implies endenta hadl' declared it as thea most straightforward way, although he himself itself. 'Transc ndental philoso transce system of enterprise. Kant's philosophy is a ph central question of his whole hing the Because establis of objective on judgments ndental system of transcendentalgiving propositions - which arededucti synthetic a co a transce never was that Kant of co priori - it follows that the question concerns the possibility sometimes claimed sly not correct obviou This is of method transcendental philosophy itself. Indeed the .method transcendental ndental transce of Method" l Doctrine philosophy philosophy means the method transcendental "Transcendenta theestablishing CPR, of the framew ways to- isobjects. itself. 'Transcendental' unsatis alwaysfactory impliesin amany reference Thus,ork

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ood. is tantamount to establishing the system Critiqu of transcendental philosophy e should be underst study isIttohasfollow the present giving a transcendental deduction cognition. been how The aim ofofobjective and ho hed,the can be establis phyconcerned claimed sometimes that Kant wasphiloso never with ndental transce some ing of examinpart That means transcendental method. This is obviously not correct. The second lish his task. accomp difficul and ersial s are controv CPR, the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" - although brief and t e The passage CPR. is not so concer n necessary.inMy selectio unsatisfactory in many ways - is the framework which then whole a lot of highly re are they h Critique should be understood. arguments as such - althoug philos s ofthat the pattern - butKant wayhow interpre studytedisintosome follow thought The aim of the present method a view the point words, transcendental philosophyother can be established, andofhow he is in fact tried ologic to eless, Neverth more. once n questio answer accomplish his task. That meansKant's examining some central passages in a CPR. The passages are controversial and difficult enough, which makes a lot of selection necessary. My concern is not so much with particular arguments as such - although they are highly relevant and must be interpreted in some way - but the patterns of philosophical reasoning. In other words, the point of view is a methodological one. I will try to answer Kant's question once more. Nevertheless, a reader might find it

inevitable. Certainly in the secondary li interpreted radically differently.13One ca INTRODUCTION way of reasoning without taking a posi strange that the aim of the study is said to be methodological. It turns out kind of idealism Kant argues for. that the major part of the actual discussion concerns how to interpret methodological examination without m some of Kant's key-notions. This mixing of different points of view is supposed to be presented or argued for. M inevitable. Certainly in the secondary literature many vital notions are am convinced that the transcendental m interpreted radically differently. One can hardly throw light on Kant's from other philosophical methods by it way of reasoning without taking a position, say, in the question what What makes the difference are the questi kind of idealism Kant argues for. One cannot go on with a the matters discussed, and the basic con methodological examination without making clear what it is that is for granted. supposed to be presented or argued for. Moreover, even after this work I Kant's point of departure was his cr am convinced that the transcendental method cannot be distinguished deductivistic metaphysics. He was convi from other philosophical methods by its fonnal or logical procedures. difference between the methods of ma What makes the difference are the questions put, the philosophical tasks, was a theme to which he frequently retur the matters discussed, and the basic concepts and presuppositions taken point of view, Kant seems to have adher for granted. only apodictic cognition as proper cog Kant's point of departure was his cryticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian made up purely of cognition a priori. deductivistic metaphysics. He was convinced that there is a fundamental difference between the methods of mathematics and philosophy. This 2. Meta-critique was a theme to which he frequently returned. However, from the modem Questions concerning patterns of p point of view, Kant seems to have adhered to the same ideal of the regarding called meta-philosophical, or meta-critic only apodictic cognition as proper cognition. Philosophy is a science made up purely of cognition a priori. and background against which I have c most of my conclusions and theses are goal has been to prepare tools for such a 2. Meta-critique the title meta-critique has been u Questions concerning the patterns of philosophical reasoning are often Historically, meta-critical questions ha called meta-philosophical, or meta-critical. They make up the motives Kantian context. They refer to some sile and background against which I have chosen to study Kant. However, transcendental philosophy. most of my conclusions and theses are not directly meta-critical. My L.W.Beck has renewed the notion goal has been to prepare tools for such an investigation. What goes under "Towards a Meta-critique of Pure Rea the title meta-critique has been understood in different ways. "There are knowledge claims made an Historically, meta-critical questions have a special denotation in the Critique of Pure Reason; there are Kantian context. They refer to some silently accepted presuppositions of demonstrated.." (Beck 1978/2,24) Kant transcendental philosophy. intuition available to us is sensible. How L.W.Beck has renewed the notion of "meta-critique" in his essay "Towards a Meta-critique of Pure Reason" (reprinted in Beck 1978). "TI1ere are knowledge claims made and used in the arguments of the Critique of Pure Reason; there are others that are mentioned and demonstrated.." (Beck 1978/2,24) Kant claims for example that the only intuition available to us is sensible. How does he know that? No proof is

priori, it should be proved. It seems discovered aposteriori, a judgment whi 14 INTRODUCTION There are plenty of examples to the po critical philosophy, but What presuppositions attempted in CPR, and is denied by many other philosophers. is the reason" "an investigation of the notpure to be a well-fonned judgment status of this claim? It seems even of one) analytic of the knowledge claims It is be neither nor synthetic, according to the standards of CPR. can Reason." (ibid 25) of Kant, synthetic, yet justified a and if it belonged to the favourite class opens fact up the priori, it should be proved. It seems Meta-critique to be a contingent butquestion not generally. Nobody can start discovered aposteriori, a judgment which is factual but not empirical. wit with? point. They aretonotstart results of Is theit ju There are plenty of examples to thepresuppositions philosophical get at the be of it. Beckcards calls we "meta-critique critical philosophy, but presuppositions differences between philosophical of pure reason" "an investigation of the nature and justification (if theresyste cardsused werein shuffled at the outset? the Critique of Pure can be one) of the knowledge claims philosophical system without using jud Reason." (ibid 25) formed very system of theaccording beginningtoofthe philosophy Meta-critique opens up the question metameta-questions has presuppositions generally. Nobody can start without presuppositions. Which There are manyofproblems s chance involving which presuppositions to start with? Is it just a question insurmountable which of the and game? Docould the be c philosophical cards we get at the be beginning endeavours to give an account differences between philosophical systems depend merely on how of ourall co the Isaccount itself togiven? Because t cards were shuffled at the outset? it possible establish a significance in the new framework, we philosophical system without using judgments which must be not wellaccount begins thethink new significanc formed according to the very system? Even to with try to these significance is used to tell what it is all metameta-questions has presuppositions of its own. because the point ofwhich the story There are many problems involving self-referenciality seem is to to untenable. Is there anyasother be insurmountable and which could be called meta-critical well.possibility Kant some basic which remain In concepts which framework is co endeavours to give an account of allbecognition. thosecrucial of pre-reflective the account itself given? Becausebe the concepts experience? get new C of transcendental idealism, but par significance in the new framework, we cannot presuppose that the very transcendental idealism in if thethe transcend old account begins with the new significance. On the other hand, would not be anymust argument against significance is used to tell what it is there all about, everything collapse become obvious - I hopeis- tha tellwill that the old significance because the point of the story is to It of conc not than restrict the meaningful usetllUst untenable. Is there any other possibility to suppose that there as categories However, the categories be some basic concepts which remain constant? Must the basic concepts be those of pre-reflective experience? Certainly Kant's framework is that of transcendental idealism, but paradoxically, he must describe transcendental idealism in the transcendental realist language. Otherwise there would not be any argument against transcendental realism. It will become obvious - I hope - that Kant's theory of concepts does not restrict the meaningful use of concepts to the limits of experience. However, the categories - as categories - function only as concepts of

commonplace to criticize Kant for bounds of conceivability. I will bri hope that later on possible ways 15 INTRODUCTION dilemmas will become clear. objects generatim2 within the framework of experience. They do not TEMPORALIT Y and SPATIALI have any detennining meaning at all outside of this framework. act. Quid juris examine The the legality o same goes even more for the forms of intuiting: space and time. It is a notion immanent in experience. Ho of crossing his own commonplace to criticize Kant for being guilty the process of cognition without tem obvious cases. I also bounds of conceivability. I will briefly list some and 'aposte riori' make sense witho hope that later on possible ways of responding many of these raised bytospatiali ty. It is said that te dilemmas will become clear. 'numerically different'. Does this he TEMPORALITY and SPATIALITY. Cognition is basicly a kind of the concep t 'numerically different' act. Quid juris examine the legality of this act.concep For Kant temporality is a t 'outsid e'? notion immanent in experience. How could and should we understand CAUSA LITY. The most familia the process of cognition without temporality?notion Do the concepts 'a priori' of causality. Things in thems and 'aposteriori' make sense without temporality? Similar doubts are appearences. Does Kant not step ove be understood as raised by spatiality. It is said that temporality should The very questio n of his Copernica 'numerically different'. Does this help? Isn'tthat it the other way that presentationsround are caused by obj the concept 'numerically different' cannot subject be understood without the of cogniti on. Again, how concept 'outside'? causality without any temporality w Kant concern his CAUSALITY. The most familiar objections moralitto y is outside the domain of em notion of causality. Things in themselves are understood as causes of moral agents quite obviously cause so appearences. Does Kant not step over his own MODA limits of conceivability? LITY. The categories of m The very question of his Copernican Revolution to presuppose appliedseems merely within empirical co that presentations are caused by objects orimporta objectsntare caused by the for Kant that the laws of subject of cognition. Again, how shouldThus we necessi understand noumenal ty, like other modal con causality without any temporality whatsoever? The whole of of all frameworks domain and before an accou morality is outside the domain of empirical cognition. Still the Kantian THING. It is the result of Kant moral agents quite obviously cause something with experietheir nce' deeds. is understood in a n MODALITY. The categories of modality, like other are concerning ancategories, object have their sourc applied merely within empirical cognition.include But scertainly it is most even differen tiating and indi important for Kant that the laws of the understanding are necessary. sense to talk about a thing as it is itse Thus necessity, like other modal concepts, has been understood outside of all frameworks and before an account of that very concept. 2 After long hesitation I made up my mind t that object of pt. 'Gene THING. It is the result of Kant's examination generatim for the 'an German ilberhau note on literature and translation". experience' is understood in a new way. All epistemic notions concerning an object have their source in the subject of cognition. That includes even differentiating and individuating things. How can it make sense to talk about a thing as it is itself, when whatever we now refer to 2 After long hesitation I made up my mind to follow Schwarz in using the latin word generatim for the German ilberhaupt. 'Generally' in English is misleading. See "A note on literature and translation".

can it make any sense at all? EXISTENCE. Existence is one of the categ INTRODUCTION objects of cognition. They are given in intui is outside of all criterion of thinghood? Moreover, to talk about a thing 'same' objects exist independently of any as it is in itself presupposes that it is in some way in itself; that is, that it categorial concepts have no determinate mea is determined in some way. What could that determination mean, taking the domain of the objects of experience. H for granted that all determination of objects has its source in the subject outside of the framework of existence? Lik of cognition? It certainly cannot have any cognitive meaning for us, but known conclusion that we can neither prove can it make any sense at all? of God. Should he not say instead that the qu EXISTENCE. Existence is one of the categories. We do not create the God has no meaning at all? But certainly tha objects of cognition. They are given in intuition. That means that the deprive philosophy of all its legitimacy. 'same' objects exist independently of any cognition. But again, the NON-HUMAN COGNITION. Kant contr categorial concepts have no determinate meanings whatsoever outside cognition with the divine mode. What makes t the domain of the objects of experience. How could anything exist Why should a creative act be called an intelle outside of the framework of existence? Likewise, it is Kant's well'intuition' mean in that case? Is it consistent to known conclusion that we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of cognition with something which is not cog of God. Should he not say instead that the question of the existence of creative act be understood outside any spatio-t God has no meaning at all? But certainly that answer, for Kant, would not 'creation' mean that something appears w deprive philosophy of all its legitimacy. before? How to say or understand 'creatio NON-HUMAN COG·NITION. Kant contrasts the human mode of 'present' and 'before'? cognition with the divine mode. What makes this contrast relevant at all? In short, many of Kant's accounts prompt t Why should a creative act be called an intellectual intuition? What does conceivable as a 'story', but is it not t 'intuition' mean in that case? Is it consistent to contrast the human mode inconsistent as a philosophical explanation? of cognition with something which is not cognition at all? How could a critique is highly interesting and at the s creative act be understood outside any spatio-temporal framework? Does Evaluating Kant's relevance to contemporar not 'creation' mean that something appears which has not been present meta-critical procedure of disentangling the before? How to say or understand 'creation' without any temporal philosophy. We have to have a fair understa 'present' and 'before'? critique can begin. It is also notable that cr In short, many of Kant's accounts prompt the question: An account is ground if interpretational disputes are unsettled conceivable as a 'story', but is it not totally inconceivable and inconsistent as a philosophical explanation? It is obvious that meta3. Kant and the de..transcendentalization critique is highly interesting and at the same time most difficult. on calls academic philos Evaluating Kant's relevance to Contemporary contemporary attacks problems for the Rorty, may the alsopresuppositions be called meta-criticaL The K meta-critical procedure of disentangling of critical philosophy. We have to have a fair understanding of Kant before any critique can begin. It is also notable that criticism cannot get off the ground if interpretational disputes are unsettled.

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3. Kant and the de..transcendentalization of philosophy Contemporary attacks on academic philosophy, like that of Richard Rorty, may also be called meta-criticaL The Kantian transcendental way

overt or covert transcendentalism, the gradual criticism of its ow INTRODUCTION philosophy to underm 17 ine its own endtheoretical . This challen of philosophizing is taken as a paradigm of all philosophy byty - and ge of Ror was what initi Rorty in his description of our philosophical situation asally a movement "woke me up fro I take it for towards the "de-transcendentalization" of modem philosophy, grantedmost that Rorty imp ortant The notably in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. role. characteristic His influence goe recogniz ed. By this feature of the western epistemologically oriented philosophy has, been of couitsrse, it i important. overt or covert transcendentalism, viz. Kantianism. According to Rorty, Talking like Kant about strange forhas the gradual criticism of its own presuppositions modled em analytical philosophers. H strict fonnal philosophy to undennine its own ground; aphilosophy hassens come to tanare con e, wha ng tophilosophers othertryi modem - phic end. This challenge of Rorty - and of somethan give philoso Wittgenstein, slumber". was what initially "woke me up from my metaphysical who explicitly empha phy. Anyhow in oso emphasizing Kant's I take it for granted that Rorty is rightphil , whaallt is, say, h than anthan attempt important role. His influence goes much farther whatedispro usually of of the privatel Moalone thaty?Kant has been recognized. By this, of course, it is not meant reover, according Wit tgen stein'ssounds important. Talking like Kant about philosophical proofs result certainly seems to be a Eve isnnot in porar strange for modem philosophers. However,prio if ri. proof if understood many contem possibi lity of necessa a strict fonnal sense, what are contemporary philosophers doing other ry judg ments a their own than trying to give philosophical proofs? Take thes anis example like are merely conting his merely private therapeutic language argu Wittgenstein, who explicitly emphasized the role of ment is va languag e speakers philosophy. Anyhow, what is, say, his "private language argument" other . Neither did he m impossibilit of y.following a rule than an attempted proof of the impossibility Likewise, Quine ha e are conting privately? Moreover, according to lang the uag Kantian classification, ent and could be My goal in the Wittgenstein's result seems to be a synthetic judgment and end justified a is a very am paradigm, to promptly deny the priori. Even if many contemporary philosophers throw som e light on osowould phy, the they hardly possibility of necessary judgments a priori,phil natuadmit re of that philosoph philosophy. The their own thesis are merely contingent. Wittgenstein did not mean that nature or essence i kindfor , but just how his private language argument is valid only present communities typically of the dom phil oso phe rs since Kan language speakers. Neither did he mean a logical impossibility, but ta real have un everthat , in his the pres impossibility. Likewise, Quine hardly How means theses ent about study this real ized a verylanguage language are contingent and could be otherwise forinother explicit users. way. My goal in the end is a very ambitious one: by taking Kant as a paradigm, to throw some light on the understanding of the nature of philosophy, the nature of philosophical arguments, the possibility of philosophy. The nature or essence is not supposed to be of an eternal kind, but just how typically the dominant or most influential western philosophers since Kant have understood their own undertaking. However, in the present study this goal - like meta-critique - is not realized in a very explicit way.

of Kant like Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Eberhard, M INTRODUCTION Schulze and others. Ironically, the present day deb largely ignorant of those early critics. 3 4. The classical meta-critical debate The notion of meta-critique was first used by The present-day dispute about the possibility of transcendental Metakritik uber den Purismum der reinen Vernunft w philosophy - and of philosophy quite generally - seems to ask very much publication of Kant's First Critique (1783-4). Its conte the same meta-critical questions which were asked by some early critics Herder and Jacobi although it was not published u of Kant like Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Eberhard, Maimon, Reinhold, 1987, 38) "Hamann did not publish his Metacritique Schulze and others. Ironically, the present day debaters seem to be Reason with the attempt at reduction ad absurdum largely ignorant of those early critics. 3 pure Reason out of respect and gratitude to Kant, who The notion of meta-critique was first used by Hamann in his livelihood as a minor official in the customs house a Metakritik uber den Purismum der reinen Vernunft written just after the his son to attend his lectures gratis." (Beck 1969,378) publication of Kant's First Critique (1783-4). Its content was familiar to The most obvious meta-critical question concerns Herder and Jacobi although it was not published until 1800. (Beiser the criticism of reason itself. The critique of reaso 1987, 38) "Hamann did not publish his Metacritique of the Purism of ability of reason to acquire objective knowledge. Do Reason with the attempt at reduction ad absurdum of the Critique of means exactly to proceed without a prior criticism of pure Reason out of respect and gratitude to Kant, who had secured him a critics of Kant accuse him of dogmatism concerning livelihood as a minor official in the customs house and who permitted transcendental philosophy. Kant had asked "How his son to attend his lectures gratis." (Beck 1969,378) possible?" and offered his critique of reason as an answ The most obvious meta-critical question concerns the possibility of now "How is the critique itself possible?" the criticism of reason itself. TIle critique of reason investigates the What is at stake is the question of the authority o ability of reason to acquire objective knowledge. Dogmatism for Kant purism of reason" Hamann means hypostasization means exactly to proceed without a prior criticism of reason itself. The independent faculty. Kant took for granted a univers critics of Kant accuse him of dogmatism concerning the possibility of disinterested reason, that is, that reason as purified transcendental philosophy. Kant had asked "How is metaphysics experience, tradition and language. Hamann understoo possible?" and offered his critique of reason as an answer. His critics ask reason as a Platonic entity existing in the noumenal w now "How is the critique itself possible?" that the critical philosophy cannot be u~derstood othe What is at stake is the question of the authority of reason. By "the phenomenal faculty it would not have the necessity so purism of reason" Hamann means hypostasization of reason as an But language certainly is phenomenal. Hamann claims independent faculty. Kant took for granted a universal, ahistorical and only in particular activities. (Beiser 1987, 39) Reason disinterested reason, that is, that reason as purified is independent of all. He asks Kant to justify the reason-language con experience, tradition and language. Hamann understood Kant's faculty of Hamann it is not a problem, because reason is noth reason as a Platonic entity existing in the noumenal world, and claimed 3 The cannot beginning the post-Kantian era in philosophy is told that the critical philosophy beofunderstood otherwise. If it were a i book by Beiser (1987). phenomenal faculty it would not have the necessity so essential to Kant. But language certainly is phenomenaL Hamann claims that reason exists only in particular activities. (Beiser 1987, 39) Reason is not a faculty at all. He asks Kant to justify the reason-language connection, while for Hamann it is not a problem, because reason is nothing apart from its

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3 The beginning of the post-Kantian era in philosophy is told in a highly instructive book by Beiser (1987).

Hamann and Herder critizised Kan tb of language. Kant examined the rela tion INTRODUCTION took for granted the necessity 19of conce linguistic appearances. Language - and mea by implication ns for Kantreason: that conrationality cepts precede lan - is a contingent matter dependent on any the traditions customs of the language. and Hamann claims that trans culture. Hamann's relativization of reason has deprived reason of prove that there are necessaall ry of laws of r its claims to universality. from the beginning. Thus Kant doe s no Hamann and Herder critizised Kantque bystio emphasizing the contingency n by presupp osin g that which Hum of language. Kant examined the relation of thought and language but 5. Kan Hypostasization reason took for granted the necessity of concepts. t's conception of of lang uage; the means for Kant that concepts precede language and are independent Meta-critique has mainly dealtofwith two any language. Hamann claims that transcendental does not philosophy of philosophy mind and philosophy of lang prove that there are necessary laws can of reason takes it for granted hardlybut talk about Kan t's from the beginning. Thus Kant doespres not answer Hume, but begs theo the ry of ent one. Anyhow, there are some cr question by presupposing that which Hume rather doubted. easily be shown to have been pres u also are easily misunderstood. Exa ctly th 5. Kant's conception of language; the primacy of concepts conspicuous·by the early critics of Kan t, an Meta-critique has mainly dealt with two, not the unrelated topics: Kant's muc h of modem criticism as we philosophy of mind and philosophy ofsim language. Theis difficulty is that we plification great in mak ing explicit w can hardly talk about Kant's theoryand ofwhi meaning, because he edid ch he may never hav callnot ed in ques present one. Anyhow, there are some Man crucial assumptions which can y of the meta-critical que stions ha rather easily be shown to have beencon presupposed by Kant - but which cepts are used by Kan t in contexts w also are easily misunderstood. Exactly theseacco assumptions weret'smade meaning rding to Kan own stand andntthey seemabo toutbe underlying conspicuous·by the early critics of Kant, importa fact Kan t's conceptio Ofin course, the are risknotof much of the modem criticism as invewell. stigated philosophy made bu is only implicit in Kant, simplification is great in making explicit establiswhat h new concepts, althoug h he cer and which he may never have called emp in question. loyments of them. The idea of esta blish feature, Many of the meta-critical questions Kant. have Whatahecommon does is to explicaviz., te how thes given where concepts are used by Kant in contexts seem lack - are tothey be prop erlytoana lyzeany d and used meaning according to Kant's ownway standards. Thismpl indicates a most s. This is exe ified by man y claims w old fashioneof important fact about Kant's conception Concepts d to language. a modem read er, but which Indeed,but investigated in philosophy are not made given. Kantt of does notofever from the poin view mod em an establish new concepts, althoughnex het to certainly suggests some incomprehensible. This new doctrine o establishing concepts is alien to employments of them. The idea of con cepts" is new not clea rly put by Kan t. Any Kant. What he does is to explicate how these concepts - taking them as given - are to be properly analyzed and used. There are right and wrong ways. This is exemplified by many claims which might sound hopelessly old fashioned to a modem reader, but which have to be taken seriously. Indeed, fronl the point of view of modem analytical philosophy they are next to incomprehensible. This doctrine of the "unchangeability of concepts" is not clearly put by Kant. Anyway, it is a presupposition

conditions of their application". (Strawson 1966, 16 20 INTRODUCTION accepted interpretation, although partly illuminating, is o and as such misleading. It suggests Kant which can be abstracted fromextremely his work. Thus, however muchthat Kant of meaning. That is exactly what verificationist theory anticipates the positivistic doctrines, he also radically differs from them. diddetermine Kant evertheir thinkmeanings. that concepts are conventions does not The use of conceptsNeither conditioned, but exactly the opposite:of concepts (not all, Strawson found what he calls "Kant's principle significance": ahistoricalorand given. Kant's theory of meaning is realist "there can be no legitimate, even meaningful employment of ideas or theorynot of relate cognition is to verificationist. makes a m concepts which does them empirical orThat experiental difference. Kant distinguished what 16) can This be thought conditions of their application". (Strawson 1966, widelyfrom cognized. (Bxxvi) means detennination accepted interpretation, although partlyCognition illuminating, is only a half-truth of of concepts. given under the guidance and as such extremely misleading. It suggests that Kant had Accordingly, endorsed a domain of the given, is possible, of meaning. Thatnois cognition exactly what he did that not is, do.con verificationist theory employed to concepts determine any object,orbut only "pr Neither did Kant ever think that are conventions historically of Nevertheless, that does not deprive concepts conditioned, but exactly the opposite: concepts (not all, of course)their are ori but Kant's only of theory their cognitive significance. of meaning is realistic, whereas his ahistorical and given. What is correct in Strawson's view that important Kant certain theory of cognition is verificationist. That makes a is most to show that the boundaries of cognition from coincide what canwith be the difference. Kant distinguished what can be thought the empirical. It is also true that Kant frequently cognized. (Bxxvi) Cognition means detennination of the intuitively w categories ofhave no meaning (Sinn) outside the doma concepts. Accordingly, of the given under the guidance experience. Thatisdoes not legitimate the conclusion that t no cognition possible, that is, concepts cannot be domain of the given, all concepts are limited to that domain, although their employed to determine any object, but only "problematically". ob Wenot have to keepconcepts in mind of thattheir the categories are very sp original meaning, Nevertheless, that is. does deprive viz. the concepts employed to detennine intuition. but only of their cognitive significance. cannot usedKant where no intuition is to b in Strawson's view be is that certainly endeavoured What is correct categories of experien Concepts of cancognition be empty outsidewith the the domain to show that the boundaries coincide boundaries of means that no matter is given to them. Their meanings the empirical. It is also true that Kant frequently writes that the re theymeaning are a "mere play of imagination". They categories have no (Sinn) outside the domain of denote possiblelogi possibilities. A verificationist theory of meaning of no experience. That does not legitimate the conclusion that the meaningshas "meretoplay imagination". Whatobjective Strawson's princi all concepts are limited that of domain, although- their validity is as Strawson himself points out (p.17) - high ideas is. We have to keep in mind that the categories are very special concepts, aim isto todetennine show thatintuition. we are bound to use viz. the conceptsKant's employed For sure, the cer ideas of is reason, the idea to bealthough determined. categories cannot principles be used based where onnotheintuition

Concepts can be empty outside the domain of experience, but empty means that no matter is given to them. Their meanings remain, although they are a "mere play of imagination". They denote logical but not real possibilities. A verificationist theory of meaning has no room for the "mere play of imagination". - What Strawson's principle says about ideas is - as Strawson himself points out (p.17) - highly misleading. Kant's aim is to show that we are bound to use certain regulative principles based on the ideas of reason, although the ideas have not and

the empirical must be eliminated, bec necessity. Philosophical cognition 21 is INTRODUCTION cannot be based on empirical concep cannot have any objective validity. The ideas transcend the domain of Leibnizi an predecessors. However, his experience. that cognition based on mere concep t It is axiomatic for Kant that philosophypos cannot be based on empirical sibilities. Philosophy has to be pu evidence; it cannot be of "historical origin". Everything descending from The Humean ingredient in Kan the empirical must be eliminated, becausegen it would never yield universal t's ph uine cognition requires not only co necessity. Philosophical cognition is based mere concepts, but it giveson the factual or material componen cannot be based on empirical concepts. In that Kant follows closely his the possibility of experience (intuition Leibnizian predecessors. However, his break with the Leibnizians means it wou ld not be about the real. that cognition based on mere concepts tellsWh only about logical, not real at Kant does in his transcendent possibilities. Philosophy has to be pure, Leib albeit not without real content. nizian spirit. He is convinced that The Humean ingredient in Kant's philosophy is his contention that all of the emp irical basis of all cognition genuine cognition requires not only concepts, but intuition. Intuition conditionsalsogov erning the rece gives the factual or material component to cognition. Even in philosophy ptiv tran scendental philosophy is all the possibility of experience (intuition) must presupposed. Otherwiseabout i what be follows from them. In fact, that it would not be about the real. hardly argued at all. To explain how th is very much in the What Kant does in his transcendentalup philosophy the main bod y of Kant's work. Leibnizian spirit. He is convinced that - notwithstanding the requirement Empirical concepts are made, mathe of the empirical basis of all cognition - bythere are necessary intellectual exhibiting a priori the concept in an conditions governing the receptivity of the empirical. What are neit her made nor constructed. How transcendental philosophy is all about isfran to disclose these conditions and kly admit.that I cannot explain une what follows from them. In fact, that there are necessary conditions is thought. Kant claims that the understan hardly argued at all. To explain how theHow conditions are necessary makes the other concepts of philosop up the n1ain body of Kant's work. 'freedom', 'obj ect' , 'contradiction' Empirical concepts are made, mathematical concepts are constructed etc ideas they are not. Aposteriori by exhibiting a priori the concept in anexp intuition. Philosophical concepts, one lain neit her the intersubject are neither made nor constructed. Howcon arecept they given to us? I have toivity no s. Anyhow, for philosophy to b frankly admit that I cannot explain unequivocally how Kant might have there is no othe r possibility than that its thought. Kant claims that the understanding its pure concepts. are notgenerates contingent like the empirically gi How the other concepts of philosophy, say 'reason', 'moral law', How should we answ er the obje a mystery; innate ctio 'freedom', 'object', 'contradiction' etcthan areis given possiblise acco rding to his own ideas they are not. Aposteriori, oneour would suggest, but that would stan standard s of meaning. There is no d explain neither the intersubjectivity nor the unchangeability of these

concepts. Anyhow, for philosophy to be a science justifiable a priori, there is no other possibility than that its concepts must be given, but they are not contingent like the empirically given concepts. How should we answer the objection that Kant seems to say more than is possible according to his own standards? The impression is due to our standards of meaning. There is no defence against the criticism that

philosophy. Kant's conception of 'a priori', 'the 22 INTRODUCTION ion and many other principal doctrines would distinct ts. The pri concep given y of or the primac osing Kant takes concepts topresupp precede language. Right wrong, Kant's - con ted to be a priori predica notions implies conception of language also is one of histhat most important presuppositions. If sen in a special be underst to made nts - haveand Kant is "saved" from thisjudgme presupposition more ood presentable to a ons concepts,forcogniti are not theymuch that of modem reader, he is means deprived of actual the rationale his 'a priori' see Chap ones.the(Onanalytic-synthetic the 'aactual forms of of philosophy. Kant's conception priori', aposterior e only possibl course, are nts, ofdoctrines judgme distinction and many other principal would collapse without words of our co some learned we have g before anythin presupposing the primacy of given concepts. The primacy of concepts also implies that notions predicated to be a priori - concepts, cognition or l interpr etation " "logica and thesense. 6. The facultie judgments - have to be understood in a sspecial Being a priori to answ ly is a key means that they are not actual concepts, cognitions or judgments but tions serious these implica Taking of the forms of the actual ones. (On ing 'a Kant's priori' hyposta see Chapter All mind. actualThat K sization1.) concern and that judgments, of course, are possible aposteriori. We ecannot say his utput machin input-o ndentalonly transce more anything before we have interpre learned ted some of our contingent language.plausi is, I think, sense a logical in words thought. Unfortunately, the analogy of empirical inp 6. The faculties and the tes much of Kant-interpretation. Kant dominainterpretation" still"logical how the emp clearly shows which n is a case intuitio Taking these implications seriously is a key to answering the criticism t, that is, exh a concep cting Constru alL mind. at the not work of concerning Kant's hypostasization That Kant did not reify a an image. The ing should n is underst intuitio transcendental input-output machine and ood that ashisgenerat theory be off its chara reading and than the image scannin interpreted in a logical sense is, gI through think, more plausible is usually does not down. Kant upsideinput-output theory Kant's of put analogy thought. Unfortunately, the empirical machine in a is given image of eye. Notheory ce to any mind'sKant's still dominates much ofreferen Kant-interpretation. pure an image. generating forempirical urethe a proced or shows intuition is a case which rule clearly how analogy does The w someth is, that ure, is a general intuitio not work at all. Constructing a nconcept, that proced is, exhibiting it in a pureing concept. a schema t; it isThe certain concep intuition is understood asa generating an image. mind's of eyethat is then Clearly or procedure. This is to, it do actcharacteristics. the its is off constru scanning through the image and ction reading a procedure. sees slightest eye the the mind's to think sense put Kant's theory upside down. Kantthat does not make r only "we conside in an empiric concep reference to any mind's eye. No timage is givenalinintuitio a purenintuition, but a B742) 'Intuiti on' m (A714/ ct the rule or a procedure for constru generating an concep image.t".The content of a pure h Kant says t , althoug al analogy empiric anyis, withoutthat intuition is a general procedure, something which corresponds to merely a rec simplyis and means isWhat thisconcept. . What a certain concept; it is asensible schema of that crucial in lars - is particumuch intuitin as does e - it given. Sensibl construction is the act orasprocedure. Clearly, notg make capaciti infinite n of a 'mind' intuitio intellec sense to think that the mind's eyetual sees a procedure. Also with constructing a concept in an empirical intuition "we consider only the act whereby we construct the concept". (A714/B742) 'Intuition' must be understood without any empirical analogy, although Kant says that all intuitions are sensible. What this means is simply and n1erely a reception of something as given. Sensible - as intuiting particulars - is contrasted with the intellectual intuition of a 'mind' with infinite capacities; viz., creation.

point is to see how it is compa faculties meant are the empirica emp irical mind. There23 neither INTRODUCTION faculties No rescue is needed ei There is hardly any way of rescuing Kant from his. faculty-talk. No fonnal conditions of these fac doubt he himself held the faculty-talk as essential to his undertaking. The entities. There are no such enti point is to see how it is compatible with the logical interpretation. The machine either. It is another que faculties meant are the empirical faculties of the mind. The mind is the the faculty-talk mind in thenor way Ka empirical mind. There neither exists· any transcendental putting it should be preferred. A faculties. No rescue is needed either, while Kant's doctrine concerns the ld totallytranscendental dispense with the fa formal conditions of these faculties and notcou different sign ifica nt abo ut the human mode entities. There are no such entities and no transcendental input-output machine either. It is another question whether it is correct to adhere to 7. e clue s forway inteor rpre tati the faculty-talk in the way Kant did or whether Som some other is a contingent putting it should be preferred. Anyhow, it seemsItinconceivable howmat oneter that Eng lish -spe saygsomething could totally dispense with the faculty-talk and be able toakin literature. Look significant about the human mode of cognition.or so, there is no doubt that Str making by renewing the genera "transcendental arguments" - sta 7. Some clues for interpretation have had similar effects. This deb It is a contingent matter that my influences come mainly from the and mispresentation of Kant. An English-speaking literature. Looking backwards over the last thirty years Kant's general motivation. This or so, there is no doubt that Strawson's Bounds of Sense was epochwrong a resu lt ofabout a too narro making by renewing the general interest in Kant.and The debate roots. There is nothing or very litt "transcendental arguments" - starting with the criticism of Strawson those transcendental arguments. W of much confusion have had similar effects. This debate is also a source the role played is a question I been taken as and mispresentation of Kant. Answering scepticism ithas were at that time other writings, Kant's general motivation. This - I will try to show below - is flatly more faithful picture of Kant; jus of Kant's historical wrong and a result of a too narrow understanding (1966) which has remained relativ roots. There is nothing or very little transcendental - in Kant's sense - in Buc hl's deep-going analysis fro those transcendental arguments. Why Strawson'shda book happened to gain of science, or L.W. Bec k's historica the role it played is a question I leave to speculation. There certainly A kind of anti is to Stra were at that time other writings, which in many respects thes presented a wson Allison, most notably his "defense more faithful picture of Kant; just to mention Dryer's monstrous book that Stra ted today, save Kan (1966) which has remained relatively unknown upwso to nthewan present thought, that is, by clearing Kant Buchdahl's deep-going analysis from the point of view of the philosophy Allison's of science, or L.W. Beck's historically oriented works.claims amount to, is th Transcendental idealism should be u A kind of antithesis to Strawson's interpretation is the work of Henry Allison, most notably his "defense of Kant" from 1983. It is well-known that Strawson wanted to save Kant by deleting "the dark side" of his thought, that is, by clearing Kant of his transcendental idealism. What Allison's claims amount to, is that Strawson's Kant is a strawman. Transcendental idealism should be understood as fonnal idealism, not in

to the critique of reason. 'Empirical' and 'transcen different points of view. As Prauss has emphasized, ' · 24 INTRODUCTION abbreviation of 'thing considered as it is in itself'" interpretation Kant is flatly wr the sense of Berkley's phenomenalistic material idealism as Strawsonofhas maintained. adhere subjective but objective a distinct The distinction between the to things of experience andidealism; the things in understood. It isbetween the reaction the i themselves is not an properly ontological distinction two against kinds of philosophers hasmerely strongly objects, but between twoanalytically-minded perspectives on same objects. Itwhich belongs interpretation. to the critique of reason. 'Empirical' and 'transcendental' denote two great initial influence," PraussAllison's has emphasized, 'thing in itself' my is anopin different points of view. AsDespite some important from~ (Prauss those of1971) Allison. as it details is in itself' The In abbreviation of 'thing considered chosen toofpresent viewswrong. explicitly against Alliso Kant my is flatly Kant did not phenomenalistic interpretation a major idealism; outcome of Kant's Copernican Revolutio adhere to subjective butasobjective a distinction which is seldonl of an object. "An objec radically newagainst conception properly understood. It itisa the reaction the interpretation of the as whatever conforms to our knowledge ... is b analytically-minded philosophers which has strongly influenced my own something represented." (Allison 1983, 30) I am go interpretation. the differ correct thatinitial a conceptual is nottoday Despite Allison's great influence,"change my opinions in wa concept 'object' of Allison.No In new many cases of I have some important detailsCopernican from thoseRevolution. new conception, a new 'super-fact', viz., that it chosen to present my views explicitly against Allison's. Allison takes object mere appearances. Although I that do it not agreewith with A as a major outcome of Kant's Copernican Revolution brings important the"An issue is byis no clear-cut. of anpoint, object. object nowmeans understood it a radically new conception here: Allison's becomes as whatever conforms Gestalt-switch to our knowledge ... is byrabbit its very naturesom versa without anyI clear reasontofor the change something represented."vice (Allison 1983, 30) am going argue below - o simultaneous that a conceptual change is not reasons. the correct way to describe the The distinction theislogical and the concept between of 'object' introduced but transc a Copernican Revolution. No new be stressed crucial matter which I think should new conception, a new 'super-fact', viz., that objects of experience are Kant's on ownthis transition differently does.Allison mere appearances. Although I dothan not Allison agree with allthe istranscendental certainlyThere the nerve of his important point, the issue by no means isclear-cut. is a kind of re scendental is 'derived' the logical. Gestalt-switch here: Allison's rabbit becomesfrom sometimes my Thus duck the or mi transcen<;lental logical vice versa without any clear reason forconditions the changeare - orunderstood perhaps tooasmany become evident to the reader that I have been near simultaneous reasons. possibility of thisand mistake. It ,emerges everythere is anotherin th The distinction between the logical the transcendental fonns; most often as the question whether crucial nlatter which I think should be stressed much moreobjects and sh a logical ontological sense. differently than Allisonindoes. Kant'sorown transition fromMy the answer logical is to alw sense. 'Transcendental' has initially an ontological the transcendental is certainly the nerve of his reasoning. The tran- de

scendental is 'derived' from the logical. Thus the mistake is lurking that transcen<;lental conditions are understood as logical conditions. It will become evident to the reader that I have been nearly possessed by the possibility of this mistake. It .emerges everythere in this study in different fonns; most often as the question whether objects should be understood in a logical or ontological sense. My answer is always the ontological sense. 'Transcendental' has initially an ontological denotation.

Kant's ambiguity in these matters is a 'category'. It should be underst 25 ood m INTRODUCTION sense, that is, as a concept to dete rm The difference between logical condition versus transcendental logical although Kant sometimes, misleadingl conditions is indeed a built-in difficulty in Kant's system. Perhaps that is as mere logical functions in the sens e exactly where the weakness of the whole transcendental project lies. concerns the notion of 'rea l'; the diff e Kant's ambiguity in these matters is already enlbedded in the notion of logical and the real. Moreover, it 'category'. It should be understood merely in the transcendental logical Kantcommentators, eve the most em sense, that is, as a concept to determine the manifold of an nintuition, are using 'rea l' and 'actual' in a con fusi although Kant sometimes, misleadingly, talks about the categories also In addition to Allison there are, o as mere logical functions in the sense of logic. A related matter inflgeneral uence, say, the already mentioned concerns the notion of 'real'; the difference between the transcendental details of interpretation I have also logical and the real. Moreover, it seems to me that nearly all fou with Heidegger, notwithstanding his rea Kantcommentators, even the most emeninent ones (including Allison), his own fundamental ontology. Con ce are using 'real' and 'actual' in a confusing way. Transcendental Deduction I have In addition to Allison there are, of course, many other sources of foun illuminating. Unfortunately, I can no lo influence, say, the already mentioned Beck and Buchdahl. In many an agreement. details of interpretation I have also fou~d myself to be in an agreement I am convinced that Kant intended to with Heidegger, notwithstanding his reading of CPR as preliminaries to not only fruitful questions but very defi his own fundamental ontology. Concerning the understanding of the all, a lot of evidence to draw the mai Transcendental Deduction I have found Manfred Baum's work most n li to present one interpretation preferab le illuminating. Unfortunately, I can no longer separate an influence from the effect that readers used to a piec eme an agreement. find my tone authoritarian. Trying to I am convinced that Kant intended to present a system of philosophy; be b giving this impress I also found it u not only fruitful questions but very definite answers too.ion. There is, after "in my opinion" or "as I see it". all, a lot of evidence to draw the main lines of his thought. My struggle I ha interpreted Kant correctly everywhere . to present one interpretation preferable to many alternatives may have matters which I just introduce, taki the effect that readers used to a piecemeal way of philosophizing might ng without much air of an argumentatio find my tone authoritarian. Trying to be brief I found it difficult to avoid n. O so near as to give an overall account giving this impression. I also found it unnecessary to repeat frequently of K choice in some matters - if wrong "in my opinion" or "as I see it". Ithehave ·no illusions about having woul total interpretation. Instead of with d interpreted Kant correctly everywhere. There are many controversial leaving everything behind the curtain of matters which I just introduce, taking for granted risk. Iancaninterpretation only hope that I would find my without much air of an argumentation. Otherwise I could not ever come must also repeat that my purpose is so near as to give an overall account of Kant's reasoning. Certainly my not crucial issues; much must be take choice in sonle matters - if wrong - would seriously undennine much of n

the total interpretation. Instead of withdrawing from preferences and leaving everything behind the curtain of uncertainty I readily take that risk. I can only hope that I would find my own mistakes soon enough. I must also repeat that my purpose is not to argue for a position on all crucial issues; much must be taken as preliminaries. There are

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8. The pattern s of though t and key-co ncepts INTRODUCTION

Kant divides the deduction of objective cogniti knowledge claims and notions in the present study just and usedtheand othersendent "Transc "Transcendental Aesthetic" argued for. Naturally, I prefer to deal with topics where I think that concerned with the sensible and intellectual co something new can be presented. cognition, respectively. The focus of the pres intellectual conditions, although the importance of 8. The patterns of thought and key-concepts schemata will be frequently stressed. The results Kant divides the deduction of objective cognition into two parts: the~ndeed they c, and in the Analyti for granted taken "Transcendental Aesthetic" and the "Transcendental Analytic". are ende "Transc onally theThey reasoning. Traditi Kant's concerned with the sensiblePure andConcep intellectual conditions of objective ts of the Understanding" has been tak focus the present study disbyon cognition, respectively. Thepart "Metaph thethe c. It is precede of theofAnalyti of pure intuition and the intellectual conditions, although the importance followed by the "Schematism of the Pur the Aesthetic schemata will be frequently Unders stressed. The" results Cardinal of all are and theof"System tanding taken for granted in the Analytic, and they indeed play a decisive role in ". tanding Unders Kant's reasoning. TraditionallyMy the strategy "Transcendental of the h the K try to establis is first toDeduction hassome been of taken thenotions most notable Pure Concepts of the Understanding" and presup key its as presenting part of the Analytic. It is preceded by the "Metaphysical Deduction" the phil examine Kant's doctrine of the nature ofand followed by the "Schematism of ofthe Pure isConcepts the ring devoted toofconside the study main part Understanding" and the "System of allhing Cardinal Propositions of Pure phy. Con ndental philoso transce for establis Understanding". commen full a look like, my aim is not to present My strategy is first to tryMany to establish Kantian framework ed withbylittle at are bypass topics importantthe presenting some of its key be notions and presuppositions. I willSome also key t rather clear or less controversial. nature the in philosophical method. examine Kant's doctrine of the others, th amongThe this study are, is put is of emphas considering somebetwee crucial main part of the study is devoted the methods n passages distinction 1) toThe for establishing transcendental philosophy. mightfreque whichit Kant question toto what phy is aContrary philoso a ,full of those passages. look like, my aim is not to present might appea Kant a modem reader to commentary enough Many important topics are bypassed with little attention if they seem although his own point was to emphasizetohow th be rather clear or less controversial. Somethekey topicsofon whichatics. special It consti mathem method differs from emphasis is put in this study are, among others, the following: criticism against his rationalistic predecessors. H of mathematics 1) The distinction between thevism methods not a cr -Wolffians isand of the Leibniz deducti philosophy is a question to but which Kant misund frequently returns. what kind of co ing of Ironically erstand of their enough, to a modern reader attain. Kant might appear as a rigid fonnalist, atical reasoni mathem Kant's account of although his own point was tophiloso emphasize how the method nearly tantamoun is philosophy ng. Thisof reasoni phical differs from the method of mathematics. It constitutes the basis of Kant's criticism against his rationalistic predecessors. His criticism against the deductivism of the Leibniz-Wolffians is not a criticism of logic as such, but of their misunderstanding of what kind of cognition logic is able to attain. Kant's account of mathematical reasoning offers a key to his philosophical reasoning. This is nearly tantamount to disclosing:

application of transcendental logic is and of the ca INTRODUCTION time. The sensible forms 27 intuitions as well. 2) The crucial role of 'pure (fonnal) intuition' and the schemata. Pure 3) Kant sees it as a failure intuitions make mathematics possible as a synthetic science. The onlyof his p logic alone cannot yield real cognition. intuition possible for us a priori is that of the fonns of sensibility. Thus intuition. How the real appears is gov mathematics is based on space and time. But most importantly, also the own. That is the domain of Kant's new application of transcendental logic is based on pure intuitions of space Separating the real possibility from and time. The sensible fonns of the categories - the schemata - are pure proper cognition to the domain of th intuitions as well. analytic and synthetic judgments 3) Kant sees it as a failure of his predecessors not to recognize that is a judgments can provide cognition of th logic alone cannot yield real cognition. The real must always be given by transcendental logic is not a its at a intuition. How the real appears is governed by fonnal conditions of logic 'theory of knowledge'. That is why tran own. That is the domain of Kant's new logic, viz., transcendental logic. also pertinently called "epistemic condit Separating the real possibility from the logical one implies limiting 4) It will be emphasized that Er proper cognition to the domain of the real. The distinction between acquiring knowledge; cognition rathe analytic and synthetic judgments is a related matter. Only synthetic 'Erkenntnis' is burdened by another am judgments can provide cognition of the, real. - In modem terminology endeavours to draw the boundaries of transcendental logic is not a logic at all, but something like a part of a domain of the empirical. Traditional 'theory of knowledge'. That is why transcendental logical conditions are boundaries as does Kant's own transce also pertinently called "epistemic conditions". satisfy his conditions of cognition. S 4) It will be emphasized that Erkenntnis means the process of Accordingly, neither metaphysical no acquiring knowledge; cognition rather than ready made knowledge. proper cognition at all. Consequently, 'Erkenntnis' is burdened by another ambiquity as well. Certainly Kant kinds of knowledge although Kant uses endeavours to draw the boundaries of cognition and restricts it to the chosen to use 'cognition [Erkenntnis] , domain of the empirical. Traditional metaphysics transcends these metaphysical and transcendental mode boundaries as does Kant's own transcendental philosophy. They do not 'cognition' denotes acquiring knowledge satisfy his conditions of cognition. Still, they are not meaningless. meta-level. Also the notions which are Accordingly, neither metaphysical nor transcendental Erkenntnis is should be used merely in this narrow s proper cognition at all. Consequently, we should separate these three There are neither transcendent nor transc kinds of knowledge although Kant uses 'Erkenntnis' in all cases. I have propositions express presupposition chosen to use 'cognition [Erkenntnis] , excluding both the traditional s of tr 5) All concepts for Kant are a kind metaphysical and transcendental modes of knowledge. Accordingly, presupposition that certain functions are 'cognition' denotes acquiring knowledge on the object-level, not on any the meanings of words or of any lang meta-level. Also the notions which are intimately related to 'cognition' should be used merely in this narrow sense; 'truth' is a case in point. There are neither transcendent nor transcendental truths. Transcendental propositions express presuppositions of truth and falsity. 5) All concepts for Kant are a kind of rules or functions. It is his presupposition that certain functions are given and are independent of the meanings of words or of any language. It is amazing how few

the unity of presentations in a cognition. Alr distinction between the schematized categor 28 INTRODUCTION categories In order to be able commentators have really tried to sayis dubious. what kind of concepts theto d in a that sensible intuition are thenothing categories categories are. Kant clearly states the categories else h Accordingly, the unschematized categories than the logical functions of judgments employed in a certain way, a all. The used inInthinking givensame in a concepts sensible are intuition. other namely to determine a manifold between thought and cognition is parallel words, the same functions generate the unity (form) of a judgment and to of thought versu mere functions cognition.asAlready this indicates that the the unity of presentations in acategories manifold of intuition. (See Chapter 4.) distinction between the schematized categories and the unschematized architectonics is given conspic be ablenotorious to determine a manifold categories is dubious. In order toKant's categories.have The tocategories are divide be schematized. in a sensible intuition thethecategories dynamical ones. The prominent role, atof Accordingly, the unschematized categories are not proper categories categories is manifested by Kant's frequent re all. The same concepts are used in thinking too. Indeed the distinction problem .of relations is the problem the between thought and cognition is parallel to the distinction betweenunderly of space and time. Kant ontological status categories as mere functions of thought versus functions determining the w by the4.)Leibnizian thesis that all relations are i manifold of intuition. (See Chapter means primarily that which Kant's notorious architectonics6)is'Objective' conspicuous in his presentation of has its ground or origin in an object. Respe the categories. The categories are divided into mathematical and reference or having(dynamical) the ground o the relational dynamical ones. The prominent role,toofa subject is K two aspects sometimes coincide. ItThe categories is manifested by Kant's frequentcan references to 'causality'. subjective conditions of cognition can problem of relations is the problem underlying all discussions of the sim cognition. For in Kant ontological status of space andconditions time. Kantofwas challenged thisobjective matter of any questions of qua matter is independent by the Leibnizian thesis that all relations are ideal. Nevertheless, objective validity is not a fonn 6) 'Objective' means primarily that which is related to an object, or real possibility. (Bxxvin) has its ground or origin in anvalidity object. means Respectively, 'subjective' meansOb hand, always implies a reference to a possible reference to a subject or having the ground or origin in a subject. These In theIt First Critique theshow social is Kant's task to howdimensi the two aspects can sometimes coincide. ignored. Neither is cognition related to subjective conditions of cognition can simultaneously be objectivea si conditions of cognition conside objective validity generatim as a purelyareformal conditions of cognition. For Kant we have one common world implies that obje matter is independent of any questions of quality or content of evidence. universally valid, that is, intersubjective as Nevertheless, objective validity is not a formal logical nlatter. Objective intersubjectivity of judgments are introduce validity means real possibility. (Bxxvin) Objective reality, on the other carried on in the Critique ofJudgment (291ff) hand, always implies a reference to a possible intuition. In the First Critique the social dimension of cognition is totally ignored. Neither is cognition related to a singular subject. The formal conditions of cognition generatim are considered. Taking for granted that we have one common world implies that objectively valid judgments are universally valid, that is, intersubjective as well. Questions concerning intersubjectivity of judgments are introduced in the Prolegomena and carried on in the Critique ofJudgment (291ff).

shows that properly und erst ood thes e view that Kan t inde ed hold s both of 29 them. The s INTRODUCTION take the notions of 'nou men on' andas'thin g 7) The old controversy whether to read transcendental idealism They are not synonymous at all. The fon ne stipulating two different worlds or two perspectives is still going on. It is interpretation, the later with the two -perspe more a rule than an exception that in many matters Kant seems to hold Dissertation these notions are still in the pr two different views. In this case it seems to me that a closer examination use. Kant thought that the categori can ap shows that properly understood these views are not incompatibleesand themselves. In CPR they are no long er that Kant indeed holds both of them. The source of much trouble is to syno not apply to gs inas them selves. The synonymous. take the notions of 'noumenon' and 'thing inthin itself' perspectives on the same things as explaining They are not synonymous at alL The former goes with the two-worldshas totally replaced the patt ern of interpretation, the later with the two-perspectives-interpretation. Intwo the;diffe sensibility is to individuate objects. It is a goo Dissertation these notions are still in the pre-critical, near synonymous every time one meets a new obje ct-tin enn , h use. Kant thought that the categories can apply to things as they are individuated, how to catch or con fron do obje themselves. In CPR they are no longer synonymous. The categoriest an Are the oute r objects given or con stitu not apply to things in themselves. The pattern of two different ted? defended is: the cts are give n totally ind possibility of cognition perspectives on the san1e things as explaining theobje subject; how they are and wha t they areofis co has totally replaced the pattern of two ;different worlds. The import of cognition. Many present-day writ sensibility is to individuate objects. It is a good heuristic principle to ers ask,discu realism recognize their deb t to Kan t. I am every time one meets a new object-term, how this kind of object is con had a more proper understanding of transc individuated, how to catch or confront an object like that. would conceive how Kan t is eve n Are the outer objects given or constituted? The answer which muc will hbemor e realism is not adequately settled just by dis defended is: the objects are given totally independently of a cognizing metaphysical realism and emp iric al (internal subject; how they are and what they are is constituted by the conditions deeper understanding of how to end on thes of cognition. Many present-day writers discussing realism versusupanti8) Kan t sometimes refers to the dist inction realism recognize their debt to Kant. I am convinced that if those writers questions. Many commentators refe to this had a more proper understanding of transcendental philosophyr they seriously tried to say something mor e of is would conceive how Kant is even much more relevant. The question prec matter of long controversy whe ther realism is not adequately settled just by distinguishing between, or say,to wh answers to that-questions or to how -questio metaphysical realism and empirical (internal) realism but requires a ns which Kan t introduced the distinct ion in MA N deeper understanding of how to end up on these views.

8) Kant sometimes refers 4to TD theisdistinction between that- and howused as an abbreviation referring to the "Tran Pure Concept questions. Many commentators refer to s this of thedistinction, Understandinbut few have (B) edition in the year 1787. It is ag", more precisely, seriously tried to say something more it. It com has mon beenprac a tice sections 15-2precise 0(21) andabout 24-27. Here the parts are ref resp ectiv ely. matter of long controversy whether or to what degree TD4 provides answers to that-questions or to how-questions; that was the context in which Kant introduced the distinction in MAN 474n. I do not claim that 4 TD is used as an abbreviation referring to the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding", more precisely, as it appeared in the second (B) edition in the year 1787. It is a common practice to divide TD into two parts: sections 15-20(21) and 24-27. Here the parts are referred to as TD/1 and TD/2, respectively.

· 30

incompatible with the view - which I maintain to be is attempting to answer nearly always how-questions INTRODUCTION

any clear-cut distinction 9. is To possible. the very metaphor is interpretStill, the Transcendental Deduction illuminating and offers many nice analogies. Kant clearly says that it is Practically all Kant's important doctrines are som most important to answer a that-question. However, this statement is not Accordingly, the conceptual clarification of the role incompatible with the view - which I maintain to be the case - that Kant largely answers the question, how did Kan is attempting to answer nearly always how-questions.

transcendental philosophy. Nevertheless, TD should heavily as the main result. The 'crown' of. transcen 9. To interpret the Transcendental Deduction not TD but the system of transcendental prop Practically all Kant's important doctrines are somehowtranscendental present in TD.propo preliminary step in establishing of the role and structure of TDKant Accordingly, the conceptual clarification of such a preliminary step which distinguishes largely answers the question, how Kant try makes to establish predecessors and,did consequently, TD into th transcendental philosophy. Nevertheless, TD should not be stressed too argumentative structure of the Analytic. heavily as the main result. The 'crown' of. transcendental philosophy It is a great illusion of the present isday s not TD but the system of transcendental propositions. TD is aargu philosophy that only logically demonstrative preliminary step in establishing transcendental propositions. It is the ideatruth desirable in philosophy. In logical inferences of such a preliminary stepnew which distinguishes Kant from rationalistic truths are introduced. Howhisdid we get all at TD into arguments the very nerve the predecessors and, consequently, point ofmakes philosophical is toin introduc the Analytic. argumentative structure ofpremisses. Kant's word for justifying a premiss of the present day scientifically-minded It is a great illusion modem dispute concerning TD has been mainl philosophy that only logically demonstrative arguments are to valid and ma structure of TD and thus neglecting examine desirable in philosophy. In logical truth is large preserved no tota aspects of inferences it, in fact making parts and of TD at the beginning? The new truths are introduced. How did we get all 'deduction' - following Kant's own words - is not in point of philosophical arguments is torelevant introduce and justify newconc deduction, more questions can be put premisses. Kant's word parts for justifying a premiss is 'deduction'. of TD. Neither is 'deduction' for Kant The a proof modem dispute concerning TD has been mainly over the [proof]he talks about transcendental proofs, but a prelimi structure of TD and thus the neglecting other significant conceptsmany involved in a proof. I validity toofexamine aspects of it, in fact making large partsstory. of TD(Itotally When philosophical do notirrelevant. claim that Kant h own words is not interpreted as a logical 'deduction' - following Kant's approved of this characterization although his ow deduction, more relevant [Erkliirung], questions canpoints be put the individual to concerning that direction.) parts of TD. Neither is 'deduction' for Kant a proof in the sense in which as " Accordingly TD is not, and was not intended he talks about transcendental proofs,ofbut a preliminary that therestep: are justifying necessary a p in a sense proving the validity of conceptsexperience. involved Itinis aa part proof. is more of like of anTD explanation howa such not claim that Kant himself would have philosophical story. (1 do experience possible. Taken as a separate piece approved of this characterization although his own tenn, exposition [Erkliirung], points to that direction.) Accordingly TD is not, and was not intended as "an answer to Rume" in a sense of proving that there are necessary a priori conditions for experience. It is a part of an explanation of how such pure concepts make experience possible. Taken as a separate piece of writing TD is

There certainly are two steps in TD. T 31 any manifold giv en in estab hed that in the"the midd incomprehensible. It is strongly stressed bylis Kant reader be /2 do le ofmust TD. TD e but expla the ap convinced of the unavoidable necessity ofinssuch a pli transcendental cability of this res huma n ma ofuit pure deduction before he has taken a single step in nn theerfield of int ion.reason" The crucial hu ma n forms of intuiting (sp (A88/B121). ace and tim categThe ories. Thus onof categories There certainly are two steps in TD. necessity ly the TD/2 explains why under the for determining any manifold givento instaandsensible intuition ises.already categori Put in anot the rel ati on cataeg of irthis, established in the middle of TD. TD/2 does not al give new proof ories in the real (non Karesult nt's favtoorithe te cat egory,case special ofitythe but explains the applicability of this causal , is not c it is nopoint t so tha TD /l human manner of intuition. The crucial is tthat thedeunity als wiof th the sensib~e i wi th spe cif ica lly man intuitby determined human forms of intuiting (space and time) is also hu ionthe s. There se all becau se huofmaexperience categories. Thus only TD/2 explainssen why objects n intuitionhave s are alr ratim. Mo re only precisTD/2 concerns to stand under the categories. Put ge in ne another way, ely, the task of TD / given in a sensibleuse. the relational categories in their real (non-logical) Without TD/2 intuition neces sarily stan tas k of TD/2 is toatsho all.wAccordingly, Kant's favorite category, causality, is not concerned what follows whe unity geintuition nerated bygeneratim it is not so that TD/1 deals with sensible the humanand maTD/2 nner of sens with specifically human intuitions. There is no need for TD/2 in this 10. Th e str ucincluded tur e of the sense because human intuitions are already in stu intuition dy This generatim. More precisely, the task of TDII is to show that a manifold study is divided into eig ht chapters: In Ch given in a sensible intuition necessarily stands categories. apterunder 1 somthe e mo st importaThe nt Kantia brieflywhen that the task of TD/2 is to show what follows introditucis edgranted and interp retalso ed. As mention haveofpre sensibility is categorial. unity generated by the human manner sented correct accounts on all matter proceed without taking some interpretations 10. The structure of the studyChapter 1 is to delineat e the philosophical ta ry through in the Analytic This study is divided into eightcar chapters: of his First Crit eq ua l to est ab lis hin In Chapter 1 some most important Kantian termsgand the distinctions system of traare nscenden Chmentioned apter 2 deals withI do nots claim totion of briefly introduced and interpreted. As above, Kant' concep arg um en ts. Th e int erpretitatiisondifficult have presented correct accounts on all matters. Anyhow, of theto se matte second part of CPR, the TranThe ofDoctri proceed without taking some interpretations for granted. aim scend ental there some of his most impois Chapter 1 is to delineate the philosophical task which Kant toines of rtatrying nt doctr although rather briefly andI take toutbe much carry through in the Analytic of his First Critique. This task witho foundations of the transc endental method are ex equal to establishing the system of transcendental philosophy. establishing transcendenta of philosophical proofs Chapter 2 deals with Kant's conception l philo sophyand are disce arguments. The interpretation of these matters relies heavily on the second part of CPR, the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Kant states there some of his most important doctrines of philosophical reasoning, although rather briefly and without much further argument. The foundations of the transcendental method are examined, and the steps for establishing transcendental philosophy are discerned. for determining INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 takes up some much debated interpr prompted by the (proof-)structure of the Transcende . 32 INTRODUCTION examines some possible solutions. The division of the Chapter 3 is devoted to the part preceding the Transcendental mathematical and the dynamical ones is sugge Deduction, where the pure concepts of understanding are to be found: the . considerable possible explanatory role, although pe Metaphysical Deduction. Kant's distinction between general (or fonnal) pointing to Kant's own reasons. and transcendental logic and some related distinctions, as well as the In Chapter 5 Kant's concepts of 'object' and 't question of the nature of the categories falls under this chapter. examined. The chapter relies heavily on Bu'chdahl's i Chapter 4 takes up some much debated interpretational questions Kantian object terms. A model of "quasi-empiri prompted by the (proof-)structure of the Transcendental Deduction and realization process" is used, comprising different stag examines some possible solutions. The division of the categories into the through. mathematical and the dynamical ones is suggested as having a In Chapter 6 the all-important notions 'objec . considerable possible explanatory role, although perhaps not directly 'objective reality' are considered. The notions pointing to Kant's own reasons. Wirklichkeit should be carefully separated. In Chapter 5 Kant's concepts of 'object' and 'thing in itself' are Chapter 7 examines the role of 'pure intuition' in examined. The chapter relies heavily on Bu'chdahl's interpretation of the The distinction between 'form of intuition'and 'fonn Kantian object tenns. A model of "quasi-empirical reduction and under scrutiny and the role of 'pure (fonnal) intuitio realization process" is used, comprising different stages which things go the chapter on Schematism 'pure intuition' plays an through. However, an interpretation of the schemata as formal In Chapter 6 the all-important notions 'objective validity' and serious dilemma and at the same time to one o 'objective reality' are considered. The notions of Realitat and questions: How do mathematical and philosophica Wirklichkeit should be carefully separated. from each other? Chapter 7 examines the role of 'pure intuition' in Kant's reasoning. Chapter 8 starts with that dilemma. Kant's q The distinction between 'form of intuition'and 'fonnal intuition' is first synthetic judgments possible a priori?" is re-examined under scrutiny and the role of 'pure (formal) intuition' is considered. In summarizes: What is the nature of the Kantian nece the chapter on Schematism 'pure intuition' plays an all-important role. my investigation ends with transcendental proofs bu However, an interpretation of the schemata as formal intuitions leads to a individual proofs. It has gone through the prel serious dilemma and at the same time to one of Kant's favourite transcendental proofs. questions: How do mathematical and philosophical judgments differ from each other? Chapter 8 starts with that dilemma. Kant's question "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" is re-examined. This chapter also summarizes: What is the nature of the Kantian necessity? In summary, my investigation ends with transcendental proofs but does not consider individual proofs. It has gone through the preliminary steps for transcendental proofs.

CHAPTER 1

1. Kant's motives 2. Sceptic ism knowle dge 3. What is it all ab aposte riori cognition 5. Kant's KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES [Erken ntnis] 6. Determ ination AND ASSUMPTIONS a judgm ent? 8. Analytic ver 9. "How are synthe tic judgm ent

1. Kant's motives 2. Scepticism 1.and modern theories of Kant's motive s knowledge 3. What is it all about? 4. A priori versus was a philoso pher who undert aposteriori cognition 5. Kant's Kant conception of cognition that there are basic7.questio [Erken ntnis] 6. Determination [Bestimmung] Whatns is which phil He putssynthetic a judgment? 8. Analytic versus judgments these questio ns in a categorial w 9. "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" questio ns. Metaph ysics is a natural dispo of problems which we cannot do witho 29, cpo A804/B832) for philosophy is to 1. Kant's motives 1) What can I know? (metaphysics), 2) What (morals), Kant was a philosopher who undertook greatought tasks.I to Hedo? maintained 3) What may I hope? (religiofor. n), and that there are basic questions which philosophy is searching answers 4) What man? (antrop ology) as if is they were the essential He puts these questions in a categorial way, Metaphysics is divided consisting into two main [Naturanlage], questions. Metaphysics is a natural disposition and the metaph ysics of morals. The fir of problems which we cannot do without. Kant's famous plan (Logic, propaed eutics these. While judgments the to following questions: 29, cpo A804/B832) for philosophy is to answer and moral apprais als the The Critique o 1) What can I know? (metaphysics), 2) What ought I to do? (morals), critiques together. philoso 3) What may I hope? (religion), andKant's summarizing thephical fonner revolut ones: ion epistem ologica l one. The Critiqu e ofPur 4) What is man? (antropology) of the Kantian philosophy.ofKant's nature prod Metaphysics is divided into two main parts: the metaphysics only two more critique s, but also arework and the metaphysics of morals. The first and the second critique done are like: The ofMetaph ysical Found both cognitions propaedeutics to these. While judgments vehicles and moral appraisals the The Critique of Judgment puts the two earlier critiques together. Kant's philosophical revolution is frequently seen as an epistemological one. The Critique of Pure Reason is taken as a paradigm of the Kantian philosophy. Kant's production, however, includes not only two more critiques, but also works where metaphysics proper is done like:

The

Metaphysical Foundations

of ~~~~~C!!__~~~~,!~~, __

the Kantian corpus is perhaps more due to the disp to Kant's initial aims. The overall results of CPR a · 34 CHAPTER 1 anti-metaphysical. That this must be a misunderst Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, within theworks Limitsfollowin of obvious already Religion by the titles of the Reason alone and many others. ThusInjudging the works he did Reason. CPR abycertain type which of metaphysics b actually publish and by his words for example in the Introduction to CPR method is rejected. Metaphysics as a cognitive the evidence is overwhelming that Kant's motives for of doing philosophy limited to an examination the laws of p:ure rea of CPR were largely metaphysical. questions The dominantly central position of the metaphysica specialis incanno the Kantian corpus is perhaps more due to the disputes it has cognitive basis. But it is not anyraised fault than of metap of CPR are often understood to Kant's initial aims. The overall results failure of the pure speculative reason toasgive anti-metaphysical. That thismetaphysical must be a misunderstanding should tasks. Like many goodbeconle philosopher obvious already by the titlesknown of the works following the Critique Pure important q the answers to most of his of Reason. In CPR a certain type of metaphysics based on an untenable examination. Thus he presumably never doubted method is rejected. Metaphysics as a of cognitive enterprise has of to the be mora the will or the necessity the freedom laws of p:ure reason itself. Traditional limited to an examination of the Kant's preference for the practical employme specialis cannot one be isanswered on ain CP questions of the metaphysica speculative (cognitive) visible already cognitive basis. But it is not any fault of metaphysics itself. It is the Prac in the chapter "On the Primacy of the Pure reason to give cognitive for failure of the pure speculative Second Critique. In the Preface support to the B-edition metaphysical tasks. Like many good an philosophers Kant stands seems to "removes obstacle which in have the way known the answers to most of his important questions prior to any foun practical reason...tt (Bxxv) ttl have therefore examination. Thus he presumably never doubtedinthe existence God, for f [Wissen], order to makeofroom knowledge the freedom of the will or thepresupposes necessity offreedom, the moralthus law.the possibility of freed Kant's preference for theKant practical employment over the the realit does not claim that of he reason has proved speculative (cognitive) one isbut visible in CPR and stated(A558/B586) explicitly only already its logical possibility. T of the Pure Practical Reason..." of the in the chapter "On the Primacy Reason is somewhat erroneously taken to be a Second Critique. In the Preface to the B-edition Kant reason. says that pure speculative (theoretical) ButCPR the title "removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment pure reason generally is under examination.of(cp. P practical reason..." (Bxxv) "I therefore found it necessary to deny re of the Analytic merely pure speculative endhave knowledge [Wissen], in order to make room faith."who (Bxxx) to for anybody doesMorality not give up becomes clear of freedom has to be proved. presupposes freedom, thus the possibility Analytic, that the role of practical reason is heavi freedom in Critique CPR, is Kant does not claim that heinhas the of reality the proved latter part CPR.of"The Second but only its logical possibility. (A558/B586) The Critique of Pure part of the Critique ofPure Reason. tt (Werkmeiste Reason is somewhat erroneously taken to be a critique of merely the pure speculative (theoretical) reason. But the title does not indicate that; pure reason generally is under examination. (cp. PC 73) In fact until the end of the Analytic merely pure speculative reason is dealt with. It becomes clear to anybody who does not give up reading CPR after the Analytic, that the role of practical reason is heavily emphasized already in the latter part of CPR. "The Second Critique is, in effect, an essential part of the Critique ofPure Reason." (Werkmeister 1980, 131)

interpretations offers good evidence that t speak for itself. Taking into consideration K KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 35 not to read into CPR doctrines which are The focus of this study is exclusively on Kant's theoretical project. It is not only important to say philosophy. Why care about Kant's motives in a study like this? Does sometimes equally important to make clear not the text speak for itself? The plethora of wildly differing interpretations offers good evidence that the text does not adequately 2. Scepticism and modern theories of k speak for itself. Taking into consideration Kant's motives should help us thequite present-day analytically minded p not to read into CPR doctrines whichInare irrelevant for his total and Kant especially the Transcendent but project. It is not only important philosophy to say what did mean, an answer to scepticism. This view dom sometimes equally important to make clear what he did not mean. arguments approach". Scepticism is usuall might be called Cartesian, because the 2. Scepticism and modern theories of also knowledge of the external world. The epistemological v In the present-day analytically minded philosophy Kant's theoretical humans to get any (certain) knowledge at a philosophy and especially the Transcendental Deduction is interpreted as thesis is that this is a fabricated view an answer to scepticism. This view dominates the "transcendentalacquaintance with the actual writings of Ka arguments approach". Scepticism is usually called Humean although it misconception and is not dealt with in might also be called Cartesian, because the doubt concerns the existence rejecting this view are briefly the following: of the external world. The epistemological version is: is it possible for us Scepticism - in the sense explained abov humans to get any (certain) knowledge at all of the external world? My in CPR, with one exception. Neither is sce thesis is that this is a fabricated view based on an inadequate in the Transcendental Deduction nor in any acquaintance with the actual writings of Kant. It should be rejected as a of the Deduction. Sceptical method, on the misconception and is not dealt with in this study. The reasons for used by Kant. But it has little to do with sc rejecting this view are briefly the following: Sceptical method "is altogether different fro Scepticism - in the sense explained above - is not discussed anywhere artificial and scientistic ignorance, which u in CPR, with one exception. Neither is scepticism referred to anywhere all cognition in order to leave, if possible, in the Transcendental Deduction nor in any statement concerning the aim and security." (A424/B451) This is also an of the Deduction. Sceptical method, on the other hand, is a concept often pejorative statements about scepticism. used by Kant. But it has little to do with scepticism in the present sense. Scepticism is the general mistrust in p Sceptical method "is altogether different from scepticism - a principle of failure of its assertions, and like dogma artificial and scientistic ignorance, which undermines the foundations of previous critique of the faculty of reason i all cognition in order to leave, if possible, nothing left of its reliability concerns not the existence of things .. since and security." (A424/B451) This is also an example of Kant's regularly to doubt it .." (Pr 293) The exception is the pejorative statements about scepticism. Idealism and Kant's reference to that p Scepticism is the general mistrust in pure reason focusing on the 'idealism' Kant means scepticism exactly i failure of its assertions, and like dogmatism, it proceeds without a previous critique of the faculty of reason itself. (On 226) "My idealism concerns not the existence of things .. since it never came into my head to doubt it .." (Pr 293) The exception is the second edition Refutation of Idealism and Kant's reference to that passage in the Preface. By 'idealism' Kant means scepticism exactly in the present sense. The aim

CPR or the Transcendental Deduction, despite Kant' often cited statement, that it is a scandal to philosophy of things outside1 us must be accepted merely on fait · 36 CHAPTER obviously meant that the scandal was removed by of this passage is well known: because of contemporary Refutation of Idealism. Without this statement - in misinterpretations, Kant wanted to disentagle most clearly his own preface of the B-edition - perhaps nobody would ever doctrine of transcendental idealism from Berkeley's subjective idealism. the scepticism-view. It is also worth emphasizing wha But this does not justify the scepticism-view concerning the whole of reasoning. It is not that Kant takes for gr3:nted the sc CPR or the Transcendental Deduction, despite Kant's unfortunate and then shows how to handle it, that is, how to bridge often cited statement, that it is a scandal to philosophy "that the existence between the awareness of inner sense experience and of things outside us must be accepted merely on faith". (Bxxxixn) He Kant's point is to show that there is not that kind of e obviously meant that the scandal was removed by his answer in the tile presuppositions of sceptical doubt are missing, an Refutation of Idealism. Without this statement - in a footnote to the existence of outer objects is not doubtful at all. My exi preface of the B-edition - perhaps nobody would ever have come to hold the outer objects and not vice versa. the scepticism-view. It is also worth emphasizing what is Kant's way of It might be objected that Kant's doctrine must reasoning. It is not that Kant takes for gr3:nted the sceptical doubt and scepticism because it explains how objective cogn then shows how to handle it, that is, how to bridge the epistemic gap objects is possible. In fact, Kant himself explicitl between the awareness of inner sense experience and the outer objects. transcendental realism - which he is opposing - in Kant's point is to show that there is not that kind of epistemic gap, thus empirical idealism (that is, scepticism). (A369) Certa the presuppositions of sceptical doubt are missing, and accordingly, the the sceptical challenge is answered. But that is trivia existence of outer objects is not doubtful at all. My existence depends on sense all philosophical doctrines which explain how o the outer objects and not vice versa. is possible answer scepticism, even if they do It might be objected that Kant's doctrine must be an answer to presuppositions of the sceptical doubt. scepticism because it explains how objective cognition of external A non-trivial sense of dealing with scepticism pre objects is possible. In fact, Kant himself explicitly mentioned that sceptical questions are first properly put. In the transc transcendental realisnl - which he is opposing - inevitably leads to framework these questions cannot even be raised. The empirical idealism (that is, scepticisnl). (A369) Certainly in this sense Cartesian primacy of one's own mental states is rejec the sceptical challenge is answered. But that is trivial, because in that B423n) There is no primacy of private states precedin sense all philosophical doctrines which explain how objective cognition On the contrary, private states presuppose the effects o is possible answer scepticism, even if they do not accept the (cp. Butts 1984, 107) That is the message of the Refu presuppositions of the sceptical doubt. "the consciousness of my existence is at the same t A non-trivial sense of dealing with scepticism presupposes that the consciousness of the existence of other things outside sceptical questions are first properly put. In the transcendental idealistic so-called "demon argument" does not get off the gr framework these questions cannot even be raised. The reason is that the emphasizing that this result is less an outcome of Ka Cartesian primacy of one's own mental states is rejected by Kant. (e.g. B423n) There is no primacy of private states preceding objective states. On the contrary, private states presuppose the effects of external objects. (cp. Butts 1984, 107) That is the message of the Refutation of Idealism: "the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276) The so-called "demon argument" does not get off the ground. It is worth emphasizing that this result is less an outcome of Kant's transcendental

d by his contem epistemological version, of new Pyrrhoni we AND cannot get any knowledge 37 of things KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES ASSUMPTIONS only as they appear. But things as th philosophy, than a consequence which follows from The somelimits unknow n butdirectly unknowable. of is, of course, more delicate general starting points of his. (The matter He does not claim that we do not have an crucial role likeway: in Kant's than that. The nature of time plays a To put it in here, another so far as sce reasoning for transcendental idealism.) acquire any knowledge of things of of scepticism its Kant was accused by his contemporaries independently the humaninepistem ic co of course, claims that epistemological version, of new Pyrrhonism. compleKant, te agreem ent with scepticism. On we cannot get any knowledge of things as they are in osition themselves but rejects a presupp of sceptic ism,' only as they appear. But things as objects they are in themselves are not in themselves. When scepticism c the knowable has been unknown but unknowable. The limits of access to the real world,drawn. Kant is re He does not claim that we do not have Sceptic any access to the real world at all. ism has misunderstood the meanin clainls that we cannot To put it in another way: so far as scepticism independently of epistem ic conditions. T acquire any knowledge of things real as world theyforare in is themselves, us, as the world of experi conditions, Kantd seems to be in a independently of the human epistenlic serious ly doubte the correct nes ~of empiri the other hand, Kant vigorously complete agreement with scepticism. On to our intuitions something real in space" that (1966, outer 38) objects are rejects a presupposition of scepticism,: likenamely Straws on's - "The doctrine claims that we cannot have any objects in themselves. When scepticism that reality is supersensible and that we c access to the real world, Kant is must resolutely rejecting that view. be a confusi on. What would be th of e'real' as referring to things Scepticism has misunderstood the meaning objectiv reality of the pure concepts if independently of epistemic conditions.totally Thereinacces is, and cannot beUnlike a more sible to us? Strawso real world for us, as is the world of experience. Kant seems never to have not divide reality into the sensible and seriously doubted the correctnes ~of empirical realism: "there on corresponds many critics of Straws see e.g. Matthew to our intuitions something real in space". (A375) Accordingly, a claim In Kant's own doctrine of transcenden like Strawson's (1966, 38) - "The doctrine [of transcendental idealism] which in fact makes these proofs issynthetic that reality is supersensible and that we can have no knowledge of it." opposin g sceptic ism: possibl e experienc must be a confusion. What would beempiric the point of trying to prove the al cognition). (See Chapte r 8.) A objective reality of the pure conceptsrejected if reality were supersensible and as a consequence of a proof, but totally inaccessible to us? Unlike Strawson, transcendental idealism does as a premiss of all transce ndental proofs not divide reality into the sensible and the supersensible (For words: "..transcendentalworld. philosophy has 1982. See 50010\'11.) many critics of Strawson see e.g. Matthews when experie nceChapter at the empiric al level is a In Kant's own doctrine of transcendental proofs, crucial premiss, 1980, 79) This athe matter to which I will retu which in fact makes these proofs synthetic proofs, is the premiss exactly opposing scepticism: possible experience (experience being equal to empirical cognition). (See Chapter 8.) Accordingly, scepticism is not rejected as a consequence of a proof, but its untenability is presupposed as a premiss of all transcendental proofs. To put it in Werkmeister's words: transcendental philosophy has a meaningful beginning only when experience at the empirical level is already given..." (Werkmeister 1980, 79) This a matter to which I will return several times in this study. ft ••

some other philosophers far exceeds that of Hume ositions1 of Kant's philosophy do not come fr presupp · 38 CHAPTER some principal influences: Leibniz directly and via W The recurrent way of emphasizingarten, the influence of Hume on anism Kant islike T of Wolffi the critics like Baumg anti-rationalistic views rather misleading. Most of Kant's and t forth a Locke. Rousseau broughwere Plato, Newton developed before he was even acquainted(Cp. withAllison Hume. 1973, It is true that Kant 104; see Sherov e mind of Kant. Prolegomena. But as makes several references to Hume especially in the and the classical works by Beck 1969 and "yleeschau has been argued effectively by historians of philosophy, the influence of In contemporary theories of (scientific) knowled some other philosophers far exceeds that of Hume. The problems and as: "How can our subjective presentations be transf presuppositions of Kant's philosophy do"How not come Hume. name tations .presen ive To subject can from ones?" Or, some principal influences: Leibniz directly and via Wolff, the Wolffians reference?" In short: "How can subjective (=empiri like Baumgarten, the critics of Wolffianism like Tetens and Crucius, justified?" Certainly one of the main obstacles in u Plato, Newton and Locke. Rousseau brought forth a real revolution in the the difficulty of getting rid of this dominating ima mind of Kant. (Cp. Allison 1973, 104; see Sherover 1985, Butts 1984, Kant under this conception is it possible to interpret and the classical works by Beck 1969sceptic and ~leeschauer 1962(1939)) is that given Kant ism. The point answer to In contemporary theories of (scientific) knowledge a problem is put not even possible to put the problem like th as: "How can our subjective presentations be transfonned into objective transfonning subjective presentations into objective ones?" Or, "How can subjectivewith presentations objective r way: it anothe put an in CPR. Toget nor dealt (=empirical) presentations be reference?" In short: "How can subjectivel founda special a in but t tionalis epistemologica justified?" Certainly one of the main obstacles in understanding Kant is principles make up the foundation. For him there i the difficulty of getting rid of this dominating image. Only by reading that of the present-day foundationalism, namely ho an Kant under this conception is it possible totointerpret hisour philosophy scientificas knowle build up data, or how answer to scepticism. The point is that given Kant's presumptions, it is empirical evidence. As Brittan says, Kant rejec not even possible to put the problemto like that. ism, n empiricof lismNoandproblem rationa common both transfonning subjective presentations into objective ones is put forward knowledge somehow has to be reduced to secure of pro nor dealt with in CPR. To put it another tions, way: Kant a kind 'basic called often was class of proposi epistemological foundationalist but in al special sense: concepts and epistemologica security of physics but its "obje is noAnti-re problem suchism as is a principles make up the foundation.(Brittan For him1978, there 12) duction stake." that of the present-day foundationalism, namely how to build on certain Kant's Copernican Revolution. data, or how to build up our scientific knowledge on the basis of Private judgments can never be transformed int says, Kant rejected empirical evidence. As Brittan questio confusion about th on aa presupposition n is build whole common both to rationalism andity. empiricism, namely ideaalthat judgme empiric According to Kant, the objectiv knowledge somehow has to behave reduced to secure grounds, a privileged v Objecti (B140) . only subjective validity can class of propositions, often called 'basic propositions'. "Not the epistemological security of physics but its "objectivity" is what is at stake." (Brittan 1978, 12) Anti-reductionism is a major component in Kant's Copernican Revolution. Private judgments can never be transformed into objective ones. The whole question is build on a confusion about the nature of (Kantian) objectivity. According to Kant, empirical judgments Uudgment tokens) can have only subjective validity. (B140) Objective validity as a fonnal

fonnally objectively valid claims can be m about when the truth or falsity of the Empirical cognition never yields certa KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 39 content with this result. In modem matter is unrelated to the quality of any evidence. It realist is true that in the transcendental presuppositions Prolegomena (§ 19-20) transformingscepticism, judgmentsandof"the perception intoof scep significance But itit.. concerns rather how judgments of experience is briefly discussed. way to refute formally objectively valid claims can be made. Kant does not say a word claims be justified. about when the truth or falsity of these 3. What is itcould all about? Empirical cognition never yields certain knowledge. Kant is quite After paying lip service to the thesis of content with this result. In modem - ultimate because aims of their and theories that Kant's were metap transcendental realist presuppositions - this means automatically task is to try to elaborate what is Kant scepticism, and "the significance of scepticism" is to try to find out a Which tasks led to the need of transcen way to refute it.. After all, the problem of the Transcenden with many problems of other philosop 3. What is it all about? invention. Accordingly, it is of the outmo After paying lip service to the thesisheofmeans the primacy of practical reasonor cogn by concepts, judgments and that Kant's ultimate aims were metaphysical ones, a most important possible a priori. Obviously Kant's doct task is to try to elaborate what is Kant's total project in the his modern Critique."natura with the notions from Which tasks led to the need of transcendental proofs and deductions? Kant's break with the rationalist tradit After all, the problem of the Transcendental Deduction is intelligence - as is the case distinction between (reason) with many problems of other philosophers the aphilosopher's muddled formown of reaso sensibility- as invention. Accordingly, it is of the outmost importance to examine what possible totally a priori, dealing with con which are supposed be out to he means by concepts, judgments or cognition completely everything would toturn possible a priori. Obviously Kant's doctrines cannot be comprehended the essencies. Kant's empiricistic tum me with the notions from the modern "naturalized" point of view.and the sensible. kind between reason Kant's break with the rationalist tradition is usually in terms of the Indee possible out of put mere concepts. distinction between intelligence (reason) and sensibility. Rationalists saw is u cognition implies that 'cognition' sensibility as a muddled form of reason. Philosophy and science are objec of real cognition, that is, cognition possible totally a priori, dealing with concepts only. If we knew concepts objects existing independently o completely everything would turn outParadigmatically, to be analytic because knew they arewethe material the essencies. Kant's empiricistic tumKant means that there' is cognition a difference of obj dintinguishes of real kind between reason and the sensible. Thus, no real knowledge is cognition, and respectively, material o drawing the heboundaries possible out of mere concepts. Indeed possibility. In fact claims thatofcognit cognition implies that 'cognition' isproper used cognition to denote only exclusively so far real as it is cognition, that is, cognition of real objects. Real objects - if actual - are objects existing independently of the cognizing subject. Paradigmatically, they are the material objects of the external world. Kant dintinguishes cognition of real objects from conceptual or logical cognition, and respectively, material or real possibility from logical possibility. In fact he claims that cognition a priori like mathematics is proper cognition only so far as it is applicable to real objects. His

empirical intuitions. Both kinds of presentations (Concepts and intuitions are the two items which 40 CHAPTER 1 label 'presentation'.) Now, that seems to imply merely contingent, aposteriori canthe be had empiricist tum implies that actual or possible empiricalcognition objects are impossible a priori? This is exactly only real objects accessibleand to philosophy us. had himself separated reasonneither and sensibility from While concepts are not enough for real cognition, are merely content with Hume's that we empirical intuitions. Bothnot kinds of presentations are conclusion needed together. experience necessary soluti (Concepts and intuitions are the two toitems which knowledge. go under theKant's generic Hume's main point but at the same time. accuse label 'presentation'.) Now, that seems to imply that of real objects something utterly Although cognition ap merely contingent, aposteriori cognition canimportant. be had. Are not metaphysics experience, still in Kant's all empirical cognition and philosophy impossiblebeyond a priori? This is exactly dilemma. He t a necessary element, viz., its form. Kant had himself separated reason and sensibility from each other. Still he claims is experience makes up the realm of possible cognit not content with Hume's conclusion that we cannot "go beyond" necessary conditions of this empirical cognit Kant's solution is that he accepts experience to necessary knowledge. cognition. show that this so ignoring is, in a n Hume's main point but at the sameTotime. accuses Humeis of theoretical philosophy is all about. However, for th something utterly important. Although cognition aposteriori can never go the different task ofthere specifying what these co beyond experience, still inwith all empirical cognition is always present follows fromKant them.claims He isthat occupied in building a necessary element, viz., its form. the domain of system of transcendental philosophy. practi experience makes up the realm of possible cognition. CognitionOnly of the speculative reason has left us. Establish necessary conditions ofwhere this the empirical cognition is metaphysical knowledge amounts to "making room faith". cognition. To show that this is so is, in a nutshell, whatforKant's The conditions cognition conditions w However,offor the mostare he the is occupied theoretical philosophy is all about. objects by the cognizing subject, or by the a with the different task of specifying what these conditions arebetter and what of cognition, which the necessary element follows from them. He is occupied in building up what he calls the is philosophy, always philosophy. Only practicalhas reason can its go origin on system of transcendental transcendental cognition but in a subject. 'Cognition a priori' where the speculative reason has left us. Establishing the boundaries of re imposed by for us. faith". "Imposed by us" or having its "or knowledge amounts to "making room cognition" be understood the Kantian The conditions of cognition are themust conditions which are in imposed on Necessary conditions are not dependent any par objects by the cognizing subject, or better by the act of cognition.onThus conditions and universally cognition, which necessarily is the subject-matter of the necessary element oflaw-like cognition. Thus 'subjective' in the present transcendental philosophy, has always its origin not in the objects of cognition but in a subject.'intersubjective' 'Cognition a .priori' refers to that which is is convinced no cognition a priori imposed by us. "Imposed byKant us" or having its that "origin in the subject of is objects is independentsense. of us. M which weincognize cognition" must be understood the Kantian objectivistic and building up transcendental philosophy support Necessary conditions are not dependent on any particular subject but are law-like conditions necessarily and universally presupposed by any cognition. Thus 'subjective' in the present sense means also 'intersubjective'. Kant is convinced that no cognition a priori is possible if the way in which we cognize objects is independent of us. Making room for faith and building up transcendental philosophy supports Kant's main thesis -

Revolution. Conditions of cognition, w 1983) called "epistemic conditions", are c KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 41 Ded The aim of the Transcendental already be anticipated. Kant himself which he keeps repeating - that we cognize objects only as they appear to had between intellectual us. Objects have to conform to our kind cognition andthenot the otherand waythe sen bridge the the two faculties round. This is, of course, a formulation of gap his between famous Copernican is possible a priori. That he has to (Allison Revolution. Conditions of cognition, which are sometimes is, having their origin in the intellect - hav of objects generatim. 1983) called "epistemic conditions", are conditions of deduction this gap the problem The aim of the Transcendental Deduction and the need for it candoes no Toemphasized work out the already be anticipated. Kant himself had thenecessary distinctionsubjective of of theHe matter. otherhow side to is to sh kind between the intellectual and the side sensible. has toThe explain objective, that is, that the objects bridge the gap between the two faculties in order to show how cognition ha already in the very questio is possible a priori. That is, he has presupposed to explain how certain concepts primacy. Kant's Copernican revolution p having their origin in the intellect - have objective reference. Without this gap the problem of deduction doesthe notfocus. arise. But immediately after that Ka is not in of thecognition least concerned Kantconditions To work out the necessary subjective is one wit acquires knowledge. True to also his rati side of the matter. The other side is to show that these conditions are of view from thetopoint objective, that is, that the objects everything have to conform them. It is of ob of view of the objects of cognition point presupposed already in the very question that objects have ontological acquiring synthetic knowledge of cognition into does primacy. Kant's Copernican revolutionofputs the subject human subject can enlarge her knowledg the focus. But immediately after that Kant leaves her completely alone. synthetic knowledge. structure Kant is not in the least concerned with the of questions how a subjectSynth cognition of predecessors actual objects,hebut only o acquires knowledge. True to his rationalistic sees of a mere priori is always cognition everything from the point of view of objective cognition, viz. from the po all synthetic priori is a ve Thus for knowledge example thea problem point of view of the objects of cognition. Erkenntnis. We have to distinguish of acquiring synthetic knowledge does not concern how a particular bet although alwaysis the talksformal about Er is at stake human subject can enlarge her knowledge. WhatKant transcendental anda3)priori empirical. In this s structure of synthetic knowledge. Synthetic cognition is never 'cognition' merely to the 3) case. cognition of actual objects, but only of possible objects. Cognition It a is no Kant's result that priori is always cognition of a mere certainly possibility. This major is the reason whymetap with thinkable objects while no intuition all synthetic knowledge a priori is a very special kind of second level is why it is not proper at all. Li Erkenntnis. We have to distinguish between three senses cognition of cognition the second case but an important 1) metaphysical, 2) prem although Kant always talks about inErkenntnis: is the possibility of intuition. It concerns transcendental and 3) empirical. In this study I want to restrict the use of 'cognition' merely to the 3) case. It is not a question of a stipulation. It is certainly Kant's major result that metaphysical cognition deals merely with thinkable objects while no intuition can be given to support it. That is why it is not proper cognition at all. Likewise no intuition can be given in the second case but an important premiss for transcendental cognition is the possibility of intuition. It concerns merely the form of cognition.

from experience. Kant certainly keeps repeating that cognition a priori. It is essential to metaphysical knowled · 42 derived CHAPTER from experience. (Pr 266) 'A priori' and 'a 1 apparently readily comprehensible in their -present day se 4. A priori versus aposteriori cognition Kantian context this can be deceptive for several reasons: There are supposed to be two kinds formal of cognition, namelysense, a priori distinguish between and material 2) in a from experience aposteriori which is acquired which is not derivedwhIch is possible and a priori is empty because it concer is fre from experience. Kant certainly repeating3) that concern of cognition, Kanthisuses 'a priori' possible fonn keeps cognition a priori. It adverb, is essential to metaphysical knowledge it is not mo and not as an adjective, which is that the prevalent derived from experience. (Pr 266) 'A priori' and 'aposteriori' are 'a priori', 4) 'a priori' is not synonymous with 'pure'. apparently readily comprehensible their -present in the In fonnal orinepistemic senseday 'a sense, priori'but refers to the Kantian context this cognition, can be deceptive severalorreasons: One has to to while for material genetic1)sense refers distinguish between cognition. formal and material sense, 2) in a way cognition Rationalism arid empiricism differed mostly o whIch is possible adifferent priori isaspects emptyofbecause it concerns merely knowledge. Rationalists were the mainly c 3) Kant uses 'a priori' frequently as an wher possible fonn of cognition, the epistemic aspects like certainty or justifiability adjective, which is the prevalent modernofreading of adverb, and not as anpaid knowledge. specially attention to the origin 'a priori', 4) 'a priori'accordingly is not synonymous with 1)'pure'. two usages: justified independently of ex In fonnal or epistemic sense 'a priori' refers to the justification of acquired indepedently of experience. The rationalists cognition, while material sense sense, refers whereas to the origin of typicallyorin genetic the epistemic the empiricist cognition. Rationalism and empiricism differed mostly on emphasizing genetic sense. However, the empiricists denied the different aspects of knowledge. Rationalists were n1ainly concerned acquiring knowledge a priori and used 'a priori'with pejorativ the epistemic aspectsthelike certainty or justifiability of their opponents. whereas empiricists position paid specially attention to the origin knowledge. 'A sense priori'is has My present claim of is that Kant's main that of t 1) justified of experience or claims 2) accordingly two usages: of knowledge his main concern independently is the justification acquired indepedently of experience. The rationalists use 'a priori' 'a priori' is understood in the empiricist sense, Kant total typically in the epistemic sense, whereas empiricists use itcognition in the ind or material them by rejecting any the actual genetic sense. However, the empiricists denied the possibility of experience. However, he certainly talks frequently a 'a priori' pejoratively to describe acquiring knowledgecognition a priori and used as well, but that which is cognized a priori is the position of their opponents. proper, but always merely a form of cognition. By 'cogn My present claimmean is thatnow Kant's main sense cognition. is that of the rationalists; object-directed A priori cognition is his main concern is the of knowledge (objectivity). butjustification of possible objects. Thus, claims in a way all a priori Ifcognit 'a priori' is understood in the empiricist sense, Kant mathematics and philosophy - istotally empty.agreed Only with empirica them by rejecting any material cognition independently of give actual it actualorcontent. experience. However, One he of certainly talks famous frequently about a priori all Kant's most slogans is: "Although that which is cognized a priori is not cognition cognition as well, but begins with experience, it does not follow that all of i proper, but always merely a form of cognition. By 'cognition proper' I mean now object-directed cognition. A priori cognition is not of objects but of possible objects. Thus, in a way all a priori cognition - including mathematics and philosophy - is empty. Only empirical intuition can give it actual content. One of Kant's most famous slogans is: "Although all our cognition begins with experience, it does not follow that all of it arises out of

This element is a priori, that is, it element, form, is imposed on experi KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES ANDBut ASSUMPTIONS is not cognition of 43 this elem example of a priori knowledge and experience". (Bl) This clearly indicates that actual cognition cannot be a a priori cognition is empty? priori. What Kant means is that all actual cognition, although always Is it n philosophy that we are capable of aposteriori, has an element which does not have its origin in experience. pointed out above, Kant talks about This element is a priori, that is, it precedes all experience. The a priori calls both of them Erkenntnis. C element, form, is imposed on experience by a cognizing subject. knowledge about cognition. There c But is not cognition of this element - transcendental knowledge - an objects of possible experience. (B example of a priori knowledge and thus flatly contadictin.g the claim that priori is not objective in the first lev a priori cognition is empty? Is it not the major thesis of transcendental - but about objects im. The As was philosophy that we are capable of a priori cognition as well?generat experience does not concern the con pointed out above, Kant talks about cognition on two different levels and "..the understanding can a priori nev calls both of them Erkenntnis. Cognition a priori is second level the form of possible experience g knowledge about cognition. There can be no cognition a priori expect of differently in a modern idiom, actu objects of possible experience. (B166) Cognition which is possible a whereas a priori cognition is never o priori is not objective in the first level sense - not about particular objects of the object-level cognition. - but about objects generatim. The element which is not derived from Is objective cognition proper po experience does not concern the content of cognition but merely its fonn. object-level sense. The empiricist tu "..the understanding can a priori never accomplish more than anticipating only through empirical intuition. Ka the form of possible experience generatim. (A246/B303) To put it to cognition aposteriori we are als differently in a modem idiom, actual cognition is on the object-level, priori. Synthetic cognition a prior whereas a priori cognition is never on that level but deals with conditions transcendental when its subject matt of the object-level cognition. cognition itself, or b) mathem Is objective cognition proper possible only aposteriori? Yes, in theatical. of a rational component in the object-level sense. The empiricist tum implies that objects can be given consequence of the transcendental tu only through empirical intuition. Kant's crucial point is that in addition side of cognition to which the objec to cognition aposteriori we are also capable of synthetic cognition a this rational component is, and must priori. Synthetic cognition a priori is either a) self-referential and objective? The point is that althou transcendental when its subject matter is the conditions of the process of objects - and in that sense is not o cognition itself, or b) mathematical. The possibility, in fact the necessity, concern possible objects, and acco of a rational component in the process of cognition is a direct level sense. It is the possibility of consequence of the transcendental tum. There must be something on the reality to all a priori cogniti side of cognition to which the objects have to correspond. Cognitiononof(fonns It

this rational component is, and must be justifiable only a priori. Is it not objective? The point is that although it does not concern particular objects - and in that sense is not objective cognition proper - it does concern possible objects, and accordingly, is objective in the second level sense. It is the possibility of experience which gives objective reality to all a priori cognition (fonns). (A156/195)

& 1982) We are perhaps so used to the adjec any longer see that even in the present day se CHAPTER 1 embedded. Understanding 'a priori cogni In contemporary philosophyexperience) 'a priori' does and 'aposteriori' are nonnally not make sense. We tacitly un used as adjectives taken to nlean 'known independently of experience' known independently of experience,' is meant. versus 'on the basis of experience' (e.g. Haack 1978, 170). However, adverb which is emdedded. Originalthetemp is often as an adverb. (Werkmeister 1980he f correct rendering of Kant's usedisappeared Kant's usage, although with & 1982) We are perhaps so used to the adjectival sense that we do cognition which precedes experience. not A prio any longer see that even in the present day sense an adverbial fonn in basicly denote two kinds of cognition Uudgme embedded. Understanding 'a priorithey cognition' literally (prior attoall. A because are not used as adjectives experience) does not make sense. We tacitly understand that 'justified or q verb of a judgment. Considering the general known independently of experience,' meant. possible This independently natural isscience a priori?", is orthe "How adverb which is emdedded. possible Originala priori?", temporalKant's sensefocus of is 'a clearly priori'on 'b disappeared with Kant's usage, although he be frequently about to w It must also stressed still that talks - contrary cognition which precedes experience. A equivalent priori and toaposteriori do (cp. not Cra piori' is not 'pure'. (B3) basicly denote two kinds of cognition Uudgments, concepts or whatever) 'pure' versus 'non-pure' concerns - like the because they are not used as adjectives all. As of adverbs they modify the its a judgment and not material at content verb of a judgment. Considering the general questions, such as "How is understand by cognition a priori not cognition natural science possible a priori?", or "How are synthetic judgments experience, but absolutely independent of all is clearly possible a priori'. possible a priori?", Kant's focus example of on an 'being analytic judgment a priori is " It must also be stressed that"..for - contrary to what is often thought - 'a to know [wissen] this I require no exper piori' is not equivalent to 'pure'. (B3) (cp. Cramer 1972) dichotomy of gold, which contained theThe thought that this b 'pure' versus 'non-pure' concerns - like the analytic-synthetic - the con CPr 267) For sure, 'gold' is an empirical andbenot its justification. shallThe material content of a judgment cannot an example of a pure "..we cognition. understand by cognition a priori not cognition independent of this or acquired independently of experience. that How c experience, but absolutely independent of all experience". (B2) Kant's non-pure concepts be "independent of all example of an analytic judgment a priori "Gold isthrough a yellowexperience? metal". concepts are isacquired "..for to know [wissen] this I justification require no experience beyond my concept of the judgment. Thus there is roo of gold, which contained the thought a priori.that this body is yellow and metal." CPr 267) For sure, 'gold' is an empirical concept and accordingly this cannot be an example of a pure cognition. concept of of cognition gold cannot be 5. Kant'sThe conception [Erkenn acquired independently of experience. How could any judgment using Kant seems to be concerned more with scie non-pure concepts be "independent of all experience", if the very cognition. But in fact his investigation precede concepts are acquired through experience? What is at stake is the He is concerned with the conditions of objec justification of the judgment. Thus there is room for non-pure cognition a priori.

5. Kant's conception of cognition [Erkenntnis] Kant seems to be concerned more with scientific than with every-day cognition. But in fact his investigation precedes a distinction of that sort. He is concerned with the conditions of objective cognition generatim,

and the same requirements for the certainty of made possible a common ground for argume KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 45 positions. Hume was able to doubt the p knowledge, because A knowledge that is, non-personal confrontation with objects. judgmentwould is animply ap not doubt the possibility of empirical knowl objective determination of the sensible given. Knowledge was understood Kant is often presented as opinion. a philosopher who created a middlealso by Platonic tradition; knowledge position between rationalism and empiricism. Rationalistsimplies and certain only opinion can knowledge be true or false. If of non-personal, objective empiricists had the same conceptknowledge, be false, we ofshould say that was not a q and the same requirements for the certainty knowledge. Thatit alone knowledge. (cp. A822/B850) made possible a common ground for arguments between these two There the are several key of concepts in the Kan possibility empirical positions. Hume was able to doubt frequently used by Kant in an ambiguous way knowledge, because knowledge would implyapodictic certainty. He did contents or products of an activity,assometimes to not doubt the possibility of empirical knowledge understood an examples 'intuition' opinion. Knowledge was understood alsoare by such Kant as according to ,the'experien 'judgment'. Translation makes these cases even Platonic tradition; knowledge implies certainty. There is no false case orwith is perhaps beca If knowledge turned outworst, to knowledge, only opinion can be true false.'judgment' Gennan Urteil also Urteilskraft (faculty of j be false, we should say that it was not a question of a piece of rendered as 'judgment' too. Moreover, wh knowledge. (cp. A822/B850) judgmental to Kant, 'judgment' is There are several key concepts in the according Kantian cOlpus which are with asometimes piece of knowledge. even as synonymous frequently used by Kant in an ambiguous way referring to concept of experience has peculia contents or products of an activity, Kant's sometimes to an activity itself. Good Introduction of the B-edition of CPR begins: "Th examples are such as 'intuition', 'experience', 'presentation' and all our cognition beginsproblematic. with experience. 'judgment'. Translation makes these cases even more The For ho cognition .. work up the raw material case with 'judgment' is perhaps worst, because in addition to theof the s cognition of objects is which is entitled ex (faculty of judgment) frequently Gennan Urteil also Urteilskraftthat does while not make if 'experience' in b Moreover, all sense knowledge is rendered as 'judgment' too. passage meaning. But it does make sense, when in the f judgmental according to Kant, 'judgment' is frequently used by him as 'experiencing', 'the act of experienc even as synonymous with a piecerendered of knowledge. the raw material of sensible of itsimpressions'. own. The It is o Kant's concept of experience has peculiarities placebegins: the results of can the be actnoofdoubt experience Introduction of the B-edition of CPR "There that are m based on confrontation with the raw material all our cognition begins with experience. For how should our faculty of (See Beck 1978/3, 40 for a slightly different read cognition .. work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that cognition of objects which is entitled experience?" Clearly, this passage does not make sense if 'experience' in both places has the same meaning. But it does make sense, when in the first place 'experience' is rendered as 'experiencing', 'the act of experience' or 'confrontation with the raw material of sensible impressions'. It is obvious that in the second place the results of the act of experience are meant, that is, cognition based on confrontation with the raw material of sensible impressions. (See Beck 1978/3, 40 for a slightly different reading of this passage.)

because Kant himself - sometimes but not consiste different words, viz. Erkenntnis and Wissen. Wisse · 46 CHAPTER 1 knowledge, and it presupposes that the sufficient condi are satisfied both in asthis regards objective Commentators haveto-he-true seldom counted Erkenntnis groupthe of tenns ft)instead (Buchdahl translat subjective causes. (A820/B848 with ambigous reference, although it is often noticed that of more grasp' (see 1966, 601, 646n).to Cp. usual 'knowledge', it 'cognitive should generally be rendered by 621n, 'cognition' 1987, 219 n.7; 'Translator's Introduction' by Plu stress the sense of a process. This case should be even more obvious 1982, because Kant himselfWerkmeister - sometimes but134) not consistently - uses two A proper understanding Kant presupposes that a di different words, viz. Erkenntnis and Wissen. of Wissen means certain between 'cognition' and 'knowledge'. knowledge, and it presupposes that the sufficient conditions 'Cognition' of holding- (Erk to-he-true are satisfiedtheboth as regards the objective grounds and the process of acquiring (new) knowledge. Sometimes (Buchdahloftranslates Erkenntnis subjective causes. (A820/B848 products orft)components this process with an as undete 'cognitive grasp' (seecertainty: 1966, 601, 621n, 646n). Bencivenga 'cognitive grasp', Cp. evenalso 'reference'. Knowle 1987, 219 n.7; 'Translator's Introduction' by ofPluhar in CJ, process. xl; made product or a result the cognitive Glossary in ePRS.) Unfortunately, the distinction bet Werkmeister 1982, 134) and 'knowledge' is not clearly and easily isabstracted f of Kant presupposes that a distinction made A proper understanding There are,. however, many reasons for making (Erkenntnis) refers tothe di between 'cognition' and 'knowledge'. 'Cognition' Gennan erkennenSometimes means 'toit cognize', the process of acquiring (new)verb knowledge. also refers 'to to acqu rather than 'to know'. 2) Kant's own word for Erkennt products or components of this process with an undetennined degree of Kant's account Knowledge of wissen inis the Canon of Latin. 3) certainty: 'cognitive grasp', even 'reference'. a readyblurredofbythe translating Wissen(See and Schwarz' Erkenntnis as cognitiveboth process. made product or a result The previous the remarks concerning aims of K Glossary in CPRS.) Unfortunately, distinction betweenthe 'cognition' philosophy andeasily CPR abstracted especially, from should maketext. it evide and 'knowledge' is not clearly and Kant's examining how metaphysics should proceed in order t There are,. however, many reasons for making the distinction: 1) The knowledge. To answer a quaestio juris concern means 'to5)cognize', 'to acquire knowledge', Gennan verb erkennen means to showis that it has rather than 'to know'. knowledge 2) Kant's own wordexactly for Erkenntnis cognitio in bee legitimate way. inThus Kant's of focus on theis proce Latin. 3) Kant's account of wissen the Canon PureisReason notand on its products. as Consequently, blurred by translating knowledge, both Wissen Erkenntnis 'knowledge'.in4)this stu normally translated 'cognition' insteadtheoretical of 'knowledg The previous remarks concerning the asaims of Kant's are cases where themake difference is far that fromKant clear.was More cl philosophy and CPR especially, should it evident the passage from the Introduction quoted above: examining how metaphysics should proceed in order to acquire certain "a begins awith experience" or "empirical quaestio juris (Bl); concerning a piece cognitio of knowledge. 5) To answer (B165).to An example Wissen in is the knowledge means exactly show that of it the has usage been of acquired a fam to suspend knowledge [Wissen] of in acquiring order to make legitimate way. Thushave Kant's focus is on the process knowledge, not on its products. Consequently, in this study Erkenntnis is nonnally translated as 'cognition' instead of 'knowledge', although there are cases where the difference is far from clear. More clear cases are e.g. the passage from the Introduction quoted above: "all our cognition begins with experience" (Bl); or "empirical cognition is experience" (B165). An example of the usage of Wissen is the famous passage: "I have to suspend knowledge [Wissen] in order to make room for faith."

What is cognition? What kind of an act is the 47 What is accomplished in that act? These are ques presuppositions of [wissen, Kant's philosophy. Kant's speculative question wasthe"What can I know? not metaphysical presuppositions preceding all Kant's erkennen] ". which he seems to have accepted without further q 6. Determination [Bestimmung] ".. a cognition of reason [a priori] may refer to determining the object and i What is cognition? What kindeither of an by act merely is the process of cognition? making it actual. The first is the us to What is accomplished in that act? These are questions which bringtheoretical, of reason." basic units of co the presuppositions of Kant'scognition philosophy. They (Bix) are The traditional their attributes. theoretical (or speculative) co metaphysical presuppositions preceding all Kant'sAll metaphysics, some of investigating is object(thing)-directed: cognitio which he seems to have accepted without further questioning. other words, allitsproper cognition for Kant is ob ".. a cognition of reason [a priori] may refer to objects in two ways: cognize an object requires that I can prove either by merely detennining the object and its concept or by also the testimony experience from i making it actual. The first is according theoretical,to the second theof practical through reason." cognition of reason." (Bix) The basic units of cognition are things and Cognition an act means determination of is their attributes. All theoretical (or speculative)ascognition whicha Kant regards cognition its predicates (accidents, In attributes, investigating is object(thing)-directed: of Gegenstande. presentation of reality. "Cognition consists in the other words, all proper cognition for Kant is objective cognition. "To presentations to an object.." (B137) "E cognize an object requires thatgiven I can prove its possibility, either cognition, that is, a cognition which according to the testimony of experience from its actuality or a prioridetermines perception." (A176/B218) "I do not cognize an through reason." thinking, but only determining given intuit of a by thing (an object)a as Cognition as an act means a determination unity of consciousness in which all regards its predicates (accidents, attributes, determinants); thus athought co object(G)." (B406) (Note how of in this sen presentation of reality. "Cognitionsome consists in the determinate relation must be used in two different senses. given presentations to an object.." (B 137) "Experience is empirical On the to with two words: Objekt and G referred cognition, that is, a cognition which determines an different object(O) through metaphysical (ontological) end perception." (A176/B218) "I do notA cognize any object(O) merelyprinciple by principle of thoroughgoing determination": "Ever thinking, but only by determining a given intuition with respect to the its allpossibility, stands- can under the principl unity of consciousness - in which thought consists I cognize determination, according to which of all the some object(G)." (B406) (Note how in this sentence 'think. - thought' things, On insofar theyhand are 'object' comparedis with thei the as other must be used in two different senses. appertain to it." (A571/B599) referred to with two different words: Objekt and Gegenstand.) A logical principl and consequently mere A metaphysical (ontological)contradiction principle endorsed by Kant concerning is "a "Every concept, respecthowever, of what as is not to containe principle of thoroughgoing determination": "Everyin thing, KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS

I

I

its possibility, stands under the principle of thoroughgoing detennination, according to which of all the possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must appertain to it." (A571/B599) A logical principle based on the law of contradiction and consequently concerning merely the logical fonn is: "Every concept, in respect of what is not contained in it, is indeterminate

The logical functions of judgments are th to an object (the subject of a jud whenofused for determining object and stands under the principle detenninability: thatan of two- are categories justappertain these functions of judgmen contradictorily opposed predicates only onearecan to it." (ibid.) judgments], in so far as they are In the Kantian system these principles are ideals of reason, that employe is, manifold of a given intuition." (B143) Thus indispensible regulative principles. understanding the categories are employe The logical functions of judgments are the functions which relate a objective is possible without predicate to an object (the subject of a determination judgment). These functions - .th transcendental of the categories when used for determining an the object - are calleddeduction 'categories'. "The Kant frequently refers to the divine of or infin categories are just these functions of judgments [the logical functions to the human or finite mode. God's judgments], in so far as they contrast are employed in determination of the creates its own objects. God knows things manifold of a given intuition." (B143) Thus in all determination by the Thus,employed, in a sense, and all divine cognition isnopossib understanding the categories are consequently, ideal of knowledge is preserved in Kant's objective determination is possible without .the categories. That is, what cognition for isKant is that which yields nec the transcendental deduction of the categories supposed to show. cognition a priori. LikeofGod, we can Kant frequently refers to the divine or infinite mode cognition as cognize in that which we have previously put into th contrast to the human or finite mode. God's intuition is intellectual and theocentric as are an ideal, Kant brought a as they in themselves. creates its own objects. God knows thingsmodel insight that the human mode of cognition Thus, in a sense, all divine cognition is possible a priori. This theocentric theocentric mode. A finite subject cannot cogn ideal of knowledge is preserved in Kant's philosophy. All genuine it isyields in itself (viz. itsknowledge, internal character), cognition for Kant is that which necessary that is but other words, all cognition possible to us is d cognition a priori. Like God, we can cognize a priori of the things only by While implication: judgmental. Th put into and them. preserving the that which we have previouslyconcepts, divine and the human mode of cognition t theocentric model as an ideal, Kant brought about a revolution with his some kind ofdiffers distinction between insight that the human mode of cognition radically fromthings the as t thecannot same cognize things asa thing they appear to us. as This pr theocentric mode. A finite subject immediately meaning of this important distinction. it is in itself (viz. its internal character), but only via its attributes. 1 InAt the between and receptivity other words, all cognition possible to us spontaneity is discursive, that is, based is onestabl be satisfied with that which is given, which concepts, and by implication: judgmental. The distinction between the the things. divine and the human mode of cognition thus automatically implies some kind of distinction between things as they are in themselves and the same things as they appear to1 us. This was the most basicI can With oneprobably possible exception: In myself without any attributes. But this is not really an excep meaning of this important distinction. At the same time the distinction myself as a substance. That is, I can cognize myself o is established; we humans have to between spontaneity and receptivity it or that is) in itself. be satisfied with that which is given, which we passively receive from the things.

· 48

CHAPTER 1 predicate

1 With one possible exception: In myself 1 can immediately cognize '1 think' without any attributes. But this is not really an exception, because I cannot cognize myself as a substance. That is, I can cognize myself only as I appear, not as I am (or it or that is) in itself.

heavenly body. Anyhow, these non-divine mod based on sensible intuition, although not on the KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 49 It is important to keep in mind that according t Kant also frequently contrasts all thenon-intellectual human mode ofintuition cognition, not only "Sensi is sensible. with the divine one, but with other non-divine modes. This is a and i to receptivity thanpossible involving a reference historical curiosity. Like many other learned men of his day, Kant seems with sensation or perception. Pure intuition to have believed that the Earthintuition is by as no well. means the cpo only inhabited (B146, B129) of cognition are also heavenly body. Anyhow, these non-divine For any modes cognition it is required that those based on sensible intuition, although not on the hu:man mode of intuition. detennined - the objects - are given. For us It is important to keep in mind that according which objects the canKantian be givenclassification is by an act of int all non-intellectual intuition is sensible. "Sensible" does not mean more to an obje immediate relation of a presentation than involving a reference to receptivity it should not be need not and merely intuitions butconfused outer intuition of sensible with sensation or perception. Pure intuition a species .. areisviewed as subjective fonns of and time] intuition as well. (B146, cpo B129) which is called sensible, for the very reason, tha For any cognition it is required are to be is notthat suchthose as canitems itselfwhich give existence to the ob detennined - the objects - are given. For us humans the only way in dependent on the existence of the object, and is intuition isis an which objects can be given is bytheansubject's act of intuiting. faculty ofAn presentation affected immediate relation of a presentation to an object. For real cognition we intuition does not determine anything, only need not merely intuitions but outer intuitions. (B291, B308) "[Space without content are empty, intuitions without c forms of outer and inner intuition, and time] .. are viewed as subjective understanding can intuit nothing, the senses which is called sensible, for the very reason, it is can not original, is, (A51 through theirthat union cognitionthat arise." is not such as can itself give existence to the objectthey of intuition (...) but is but err - not because always judge rightly dependent on the existence of theatobject, and is therefore possible only if cog all. (A293/B350) Neither can objective the subject's faculty of presentation is affected by that object." (B72) conceptual basis; concepts alone are An not capab intuition does not determine anything, only concepts do. "Thoughts Thus, genuine knowledge is always made up of without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. .. The understanding can intuit nothing, 7. theWhat senses think nothing. Only is acan judgment? through their union can cognition arise." (A51/B75) The senses do not As with all of his crucial terms, Kant's us err - not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge precise but varies due to his occasional aims. at all. (A293/B350) Neither can objective cognition arise on the purely usage of Urteil Uudgment) and Satz (propositio conceptual basis; concepts alone are not capable of determining objects. as synonyms. It is not certain that an uneq Thus, genuine knowledge is always made up of synthetic judgments. possible at all. Moreover, when we are d contemporary philosopher, we cannot but intr 7. What is a judgment? Kant should have done, although he did not. As with all of his crucial terms, Kant's usage of 'judgment' is not precise but varies due to his occasional aims. He vacillates even in his usage of Urteil Uudgment) and Satz (proposition), and often takes them as synonyms. It is not certain that an unequivocal interpretation is possible at all. Moreover, when we are dealing with Kant as a contemporary philosopher, we cannot but introduce distinctions which Kant should have done, although he did not.

course, correspond to the topics of Kant's th conception of judgment in the three critiques is no e, judgments are units (or veh First Critiqu of the CHAPTER 1 50 that sense moral or aesthetic judgments are not gen In terms of content, judgments are divided into three groups: I will not examine this perplexity in any detail. In judgments of cognition (of speculative reason), judgments of morals (of are exclusively dealt with in the sense of the First practical reason), and (aesthetical) judgments of taste. The groups, ofof all As noted above, the crucial feature course, correspond to the topics of Kant's three critiques. Kant's determination (of a manifold of an intuition) take sense conception of judgment in the three critiques is not unifonn. In the is possible only with concepts; which are g~neral of the First Critique, judgments are units (or vehicles) of cognition. In to several objects. They are rules according to that sense moral or aesthetic judgments are not genuine judgments at all. determined.2 The result of detennination, cognitiv judgments I will not examine this perplexity in any detail. In this study nt. In fact K always takes the form of a judgme are exclusively dealt with in the sense of the First Critique. crucial premiss of the Metaphysical and the Tran As noted above, the crucial feature of all cognition is of thatdeterm a is that a judgment is the result detennination (of a manifold of an intuition) takes place. Detennination understanding is a faculty of judgments. "We can is possible only with concepts; which are g~neral presentations common understanding to judgments and the understand to several objects. They are rules according to which intuitions are represented as a faculty of judgment." (A69/B94 or knowledge, determined.2 The result of determination, cognitive graspations in a judgm which give unity to present insightin -anand the n. always takes the fonn of a judgment. In fact Kant's ations intuitio synthesis of various present Deduction crucial premiss of the Metaphysical and the Transcendental is a mediate cognition of an object, that is, (B 141) The is that a judgment is the result of detelTIlination. presentation of it. (A68/B93) Thus, in the first all acts of the understanding is a faculty of judgments. "We can reduce conceived by Kant merely as a linguistic entity at understanding to judgments and the understandingfied may therefore be nal the traditio with Kant is deeply dissatis represented as a faculty of judgmenr." (A69/B94) The same enough functionsto sa of the nature of judgment. It is not which give unity to presentations in a judgment give unity concep to the ts. presentation of a relation between two synthesis of various presentations in an intuition. (A79/BI05) Judgment consists of? Given presentations are brought to is a mediate cognition of an object, that is, the presentation of ants c apperception. The logical fOIm of all judgme is not se presentation of it. (A68/B93) Thus, in the first place, judgment eption' unity of the apperception. (On 'apperc conceived by Kant merely as a linguistic entity at all. genuine judgments seem to have objective val Kant is deeply dissatisfied with the traditional (Wolffian) conception capable of referring to objects. (B141) It could of the nature of judgment. It is not enough to sayasthat a judgment a c objective makesis the treating all judgments does this relation presentation of a relation between two concepts.t What answer is not difficul to find: although Kant him consists of? Given presentations are brought together in the unity of can make no understa concepts the these 2 "Of apperception. The logical form of all judgments consists innding the objective through them." (A68/B93) "Concepts, as predicates of p unity of the apperception. (On Chapter 6.)edThus all (A6 object." determin not yet presentation of a see some 'apperception' 407)they are r. (eJis, particulathat l to the the universa genuine judgments seem tofrom have objective validity, capable of referring to objects. (B141) It could be readily objected that treating all judgments as objective makes the concept too narrow. An answer is not difficult to find: although Kant himself explicitly says what 2 "Of these concepts the understanding can make no other use than by judging through them." (A68/B93) "Concepts, as predicates of possible judgment, relate to some presentation of a not yet determined object. (A69/B94) Cognition proceeds from the universal to the particular. (el407) II

question whether Kant is justified in directed. His goal from the beginning cognition of objects. Transcendental log KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 51 far as it is related to its object. Judgme judgment is, it would be better to say thatthehetransce is considering judgments ndental logic. However, mak only in so far as they are objective. This isand also a general answer the is using synthetic judgments toKant question whether Kant is justified in treating as objectsense, all thatcognition is, in the sense of form directed. His goal from the beginning is judgme to establish the conditions nts no reference to anfor object is p with cognition only in so cognition of objects. Transcendental logic deals A vitally important point - which di far as it is related to its object. JudgmentsKant's are treated task -asis elements to distinginside uish between the transcendental logic. However, makingjudgme a distinction between analytic nts seen from different perspe and synthetic judgments Kant is using 'judgment' in its tomore generalion, altho statements point that distinct logic.talk Anyhow, in analytic sense, that is, in the sense of formalcould about 'judgment in itse judgments no reference to an object is presupposed. transcendental point of view in contra A vitally important point - which directly from theennature of e) or entityfollows Uudgm ent-tok or sentenc Kant's task - is to distinguish between different of 'judgment', or point of uses view. The most important sens judgments seen from different perspectives. fact many of Kant's simplyInbecause his investig ation is a statements point to that distinction, although it is not explicitly made. 'judgment' should be read asWe a vehicle could talk. about 'judgment in itself'is less or a linguist judgment fronl the ic entity than it is for m transcendental point of view in contrastGedank to a judgment a linguistic e - but as withou t any ontologi judgment from the empirical entity Gudgment-token or sentence) or acandida te for a judgment in this context. KantKant is 'judgment in itself' point of view. The most important sense forThat did not make his notion simply because his investigation is a transcendental one. Accordingly source of common confusion, not on cognition. for of Kant 'judgment' should be read as a vehicle of himself . The Judgment usual source confusion i is less a linguistic entity than it is for modern A ion Fregean tokens. philosophers. Kant's distinct between ju Gedanke - but without any ontological commitments - ision a good judgme nts of percept (Pr§1 8) ha candidate for a judgment in this context. interpreters. There does not exist any s of judgment clear Ihas been That Kant did not make his notion Kant really meant. think thata a coher to Kant interpreters to Kant source of common confusion, not only when is takenbut to refer to the distin himself. The usual source of confusion isjudgme to takent-toke judgments as judgmentn. Dividing judgments int of basis experience versus tokens. Kant's distinction between judgments concerns the of the unity of conscio caused a lot of Subjec troubletive to (in the judgments of perception (Pr§18) has transce ndental level. of their whatunity is interpreters. There does not exist any satisfactory explanation all judgments-tok ens, and subject Kant really meant. I think that a coherent explanation given ive basis might can be never yield un objectiv when Kant is taken to refer to the distinction between a judgment andThe a unity ely valid judgments. judgment-token. Dividing judgments into subjective objective ones ption, unity of theand origina l apperce concerns the basis of the unity of consciousness and is made only on the transcendental level. Subjective (in the empirical sense) judgments are all judgments-tokens, and their unity is the unity of apprehension. The subjective basis can never yield universal necessity required for objectively valid judgments. The unity of objective judgments is the unity of the original apperception, that is the formal unity of

'subjective', in all their variations, is possibl · 52

CHAPTER There1 are various ways of classifying

corpus. because Most ofitthem - with condition sometimes c consciousness generatim. It is objective is a superior the school follow classifications of objects generatim. Thus it has onlytheformal objective of validity. (See phi distinction between analytic and synthetic chapter 6 where I will try to elaborate some of these concepts. It is ju Pure Reason first time in the Critique doubtful whether a consistent reading of Kant's concepts of 'objective' and - i claimed repeatedly that this distinction " 'subjective', in all their variations, is possible at all.) However, should no classifying (B19) judgments in thethisKantian There are various ways of considered". is Kant's invention. True to -Kan distinction corpus. Most of them - with sometimes considerable modifications was ratheroffound by day. himself. follow the classifications of thedistinction school philosophy Kant's The His by implication against - and distinction between analytic andHume synthetic judgments - presented for all theearl that Hume could not adequately consider first time in the Critique of Pure Reason - is the most notable one. Kant distinction. "had (B20)never been previously claimed repeatedly that this distinction considered". (B19) However, this should not be taken to mean that the to Kant'sversus "concept of concept" the distinction is Kant's invention. True 8. Analytic synthetic judgments distinction was rather found by himself. His principle accusation against The analytic-synthetic distinction is, no do Hume - and by implication against all earlier philosophers - is simply teaching. It is presented by Kant as if jus that Hume could not adequately consider the consequences of this Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, I als distinction. (B20) in maintaining this. There is no way o distinction without depriving him his 8. Analytic versus synthetic Philosophy judgments generally. My aim is not to get i modem of athe correctness of the a The analytic-synthetic distinction is, noissue doubt, Hauptpunkt of Kant's However, likeeverything any commentator depends on on Kant, it. teaching. It is presented by Kant as if just neutral position. I share an opinion, which Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, I also believe that Kant is correct that the modem dispute no way of rescuing Kant from the - d in maintaining this. There is Kant-literature, with Kant's littlehisto do distinction without depriving has him rationale for distinction. the Critical(See Kant's distinction can hardly be understood Philosophy generally. My aim is not to get involved in the long-debated, and synthe the of modem notions of analyticity modem issue of the correctness the analytic-synthetic distinction. dispute has its origin and inspiration in the However, like any commentator on Kant, I obviously cannot have a K or less which directlyismeant to be a criticism of it. a common-place in the neutral position. I share an opinion, deals with concepts, concerns Kant-literature, that the modemwhich dispute - disregarding its itown meritsword of modem criticism is to The crux 177.)how has little to do with Kant's distinction. (See e.g. Pamlquist 1987a,show change;unless thus ittheis distinction is only Kant's distinction can hardly bealways understood, separated from the modem notions of analyticity and syntheticity. No doubt, the modem dispute has its origin and inspiration in the Kantian tradition, and is more or less directly meant to be a criticism of it. But unlike Kant's distinction which deals with concepts, it concerns words and the meanings of words. The crux of modern criticism is to show how the meanings of words can always change; thus the distinction is only one of degree not of kind.

experience at all. Certainly words do change beside the point. It is also important to notice KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES 53 does notAND so ASSUMPTIONS much deal with the questio n w correctly made or not, but maintains that the di . This certainly is already symptomatic of dealing with a different matter. at all. criticisare m repudia tes or ignores a pr Kant's main concern are pure conceptsThewhich not affected by distinction. The presupposition is Kant's co experience at all. Certainly words do change in meaning, but that is exactly the "fixity of modem concepts". (Beck 1984b, 3 beside the point. It is also important to notice that the criticism to Kant that a concep t could be change does not so much deal with the question whether the distinction is d. By c concept even if called by the same name. Quite correctly made or not, but maintains that the distinction cannot be made criticism ely undermof ines theKant's very distincti at all. The criticism repudiates or ignores effectiv a presupposition Kant's whole undertaking. distinction. The presupposition is Kant's concept of concept, more We are with the problem t 313) Itted is again an alien thought exactly the "fixity of concepts". (Beck 1984b,confron off unequivocally what Kant really means. T to Kant that a concept could be changed. By change we will get a new criticism,if started concept even if called by the sanleunder name.rigorou Quite sobviously, correct,by theKant's c Wolffia n philoso phers Eberha rd and Maass, an criticism effectively undermines Kant's distinction, and not only that but critics like Quine. Eberhard's criticism is espec Kant's whole undertaking. "most modem critics have, perhaps unbeknow We are confronted again with the problem that it is not easy to read repeated Eberhard's criticism". (Beck 1978/5 ,9 off unequivocally what Kant really means. The distinction has been by Eberhard's attack - which he did not take onl under rigorous criticism, started by Kant's contemporaries, like the dishonest - that he answered with a long respons Wolffian philosophers Eberhard and Maass, and carried on by modem a Discovery Accord to whichbecause Any New Critiq instructive critics like Quine. Eberhard's criticism is especially ing Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One. It ha "most modem critics have, perhaps unbeknown to themselves, merely highly informative introduction by Henry repeated Eberhard's criticisnl". (Beck 1978/5, 95) Kant became so upset Discovery includes clarifications on many of t by Eberhard's attack - which he did not take only as wrongheaded but as Philosophy, and valuabl e specific On ations o dishonest - that he answered withCritical a long response, published in 1790: distinct ion. Kant's that Eberhard of Pureshows Reason Has a Discovery According to which Any New Critique answer modem critics have misund erstood hisa distincti Been Made Supeifluous by an Earlier One. It has been translated with Kant divides judgme nts into analyti highly informative introduction by Henry Allison (1973). On a c an according to their content, independently of the Discovery includes clarifications on many of the crucial issues of the form. (Pr 266) In other words the distinction Critical Philosophy, and valuable specifications of the analytic-syntheticextensional. It is transcendental logical (material) distinction. Kant's answer shows that Eberhard - and by implication, the Contrary to the modem distinction, this distincti modem critics - have misunderstood his distinction. a priori-aposterio ction.judgments Kant divides judgments into analytic andri-distin synthetic In the Introduction to CPR Kant makes th according to their content, independently of their origin or their logical metaphor of containment. Only judgments of sub form. (Pr 266) In other words the distinction is intensional and not concerned. A judgment is analytic if the predic extensional. It is transcendental logical (material) and not formal logical.

Contrary to the modem distinction, this distinction is not parallell to a priori-aposteriori-distinction. In the Introduction to CPR Kant makes the distinction using metaphor of containment. Only judgments of subject-predicate fonn concerned. A judgment is analytic if the predicate is contained in

the the are the

characterization indicates that the very 'fact' to be CHAPTER between 1 the distinction judgments which merely ana concept of the subject, versus judgments which concept of the subject. It is synthetic if the predicate lies outside the ext in the subject. containmentconcept of the subjectpreviously but standsthought in connection with The it. (A6/B10) distinction itself, but core an account of it. distinction. In the Prolego of the very Unfortunately this is frequently taken as the in On a Discovery (228) the concepts 'explicative' this However, Kant's discussion immediately following and preceding more clearly used as the key-concepts of the characterization indicates that the very 'fact' to be explained concerns disti The~ethe notion containment-metaphor asorwell. the distinction between judgments which merelyoccurs analyse explicate not being restricted to judgments of subject-predica concept of the subject, versus judgments which extend that which was reflect Kant's main concern previously thought in thebetter subject. Thewhat containment-metaphor is notwas, the viz deductivistic metaphysics which claimed to obtain distinction itself, but an account of it. In the Prolegomena (§2) as well as pr concepts.'explicative' Kant clearlyand saw'ampliative' that from mere in On a Discovery (228)mere the concepts are co cognition could be obtained which did not extend more clearly used as the key-concepts of the distinction although the extendascognition, concepts containment-metaphor occurs well. The~e notions are havenot the enough merit ofbut required. Synthetic judgments are generated not being restricted to judgments of subject-predicate fonn. They alsoby un intuitions. This shows Kantian judgm main concern was,again viz. that his the attack against better reflect what Kant's linguistic entities, furthennore, that th deductivistic metaphysicsmere which claimed to obtain and proper cognition from not merely a concern of fonnal logic b distinction is mere concepts. Kant clearly saw that from mere concepts only analytic logic.which (Beck did 1984b, not 311) extend cognition at all. To cognition could be obtained Analytic judgments are also aboutintuitions concepts are and c extend cognition, concepts are not enough but disregarding whether these concepts correspond by uniting concepts and to required. Synthetic judgments are generated of their objective validity. can than be raise question intuitions. This shows again that the Kantian judgments are richer judgments are not proper judgments at all in the mere linguistic entities, and furthennore, that the analytic-synthetic of transcendental logic. Including a distinction is not merely Critique, a concernthat of is, fonnal logic but of transcendental as judgments as Kant undeniably does - implie logic. (Beck 1984b, 311) An analytic is only explicati Analytic judgments 'judgment'. are about concepts andjudgment conceptual relations whatconcepts is implicit in concepts. It does notreal. add No anythin disregarding whether these correspond to something the subject. It is not ampliative, that is, it question of their objective validity, can be raised. Indeed, analyticdoes information. analytic not requ judgments are not proper judgments An at all in thejudgment sense of does the First experience, nor to any intuition either. Thus, all ana Critique, that is, of transcendental logic. Including analytic propositions a priori. really as judgments - as Kantjustifiable undeniably does -"Analytic implies ajudgments wider sense of teac the object what themaking conceptexplicit which we 'judgment'. An analyticabout judgment is onlythan explicative, contains; they do not extend our knowledge what is implicit in concepts. It does not add anything to· the concept beyond of object, but only clarify the concepL" (A736/B764) the subject. It is not ampliative, that is, it does not give any new

54

information. An analytic judgment does not require any appeal to experience, nor to any intuition either. Thus, all analytic judgments are justifiable a priori. "Analytic judgments really teach us nothing more about the object than what the concept which we have of it already contains; they do not extend our knowledge beyond the concept of the object, but only clarify the concepL" (A736/B764) "..it is evident that

decide what is contained in a co Eberha rd) seem to distingu55 ish betw KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS and objectively analytic. But this sh from mere concepts only analytic cognition, the not synthetic cognition is to sense of an assertion a judg be obtained." (A47/B64) prime meaning. Subjective judg on how concepts are Does not what counts as analytic vary depending assertions, but a judgment in Kant How should we conceived by a person and on his previous knowledge? The analytic-synthe tic distinction c decide what is contained in a concept? These critical questions (of For Kant concep ts presuppose a ce Eberhard) seem to distinguish between subjectively (personally) analytic same sentenc e could be analytic to 'judgment' is understood in and objectively analytic. But this shows thatbut in that case the judgments are n the sense of an assertion = a judgment-token - which was not Kant's Kant has no general answer ho prime meaning. Subjective judgments in the empirical sense are detennining which predicates belon assertions, but a judgment in Kant's sense is not a particular assertion. the concept of subject". Accordingl The analytic-synthetic distinction concerns neither assertions nor words. how to decide which judgment-to For Kant concepts presuppose a certain fixity or rigidity. Of course, the especially unsatisfactory because same sentence could be analytic to one person and synthetic to another, empirical concepts can be analytic ( but in that case the judgments are not the same. analytic judgment - "Gold is a ye Kant has no general answer how to: know what are the criteria for 'yellow ' were not counted as belo determining which predicates belong to a certain "thought in 'gold'.concept; But in are that case a different the concept of subject". Accordingly, he does present any procedure andnot by implication - a different jud how to decide which judgment-tokens are properly analytic. This is been used to denote both concepts. especially unsatisfactory because he thinks that judgments based on trouble of being unable to present a empirical concepts can be analytic (a priori).ofCertainly his example of an judgments is a worry only from analytic judgment - "Gold is a yellow metal" would synthetic if no need nor usebefor such a tool. He 'yellow' were not counted as belonging to the essential predicates of synthet icity merely for fonnulat 'gold'. But in that case a different concepttransce of gold would be intended ndental philosophy and draw and by implication - a different judgment of although same word had scientifthe ic metaphysics. Moreov been used to denote both concepts. It mustmaintai also he emphasized that the ned that there cannot be any trouble of being unable to present an effective tool for classification possible onlythe in mathematics; for al of judgments is a worry only from the modern point of view. Kant had available. no need nor use for such a tool. He needed the notions of analyticity and Does "thought in the concept of s syntheticity merely for fonnulating his problem of establishing subject or to its essence? Eberhar transcendental philosophy and drawing thedistinct boundaries of cognition and ion in tenns of an essence o of scientific metaphysics. Moreover, Kant presumably would have extra-e ssential predicates. This come maintained that there cannot be any effective tool. Real definitions are possible only in mathematics; for all other concepts only expositions are available. Does "thought in the concept of subject" refer to the definition of the subject or to its essence? Eberhard interpreted the analytic-synthetic distinction in tenns of an essence of a subject and its essential versus extra-essential predicates. This comes close to the modem interpretation =

necessary but synthetic connection, viz. synth · 56 in modem discussions Kant's 'syn known that CHAPTER 1 turned into a non-sense. This fact should be a c based on a meaning instead of an essence; predicates derived .from the distinction is not under scrutiny However, Ka meaning versus those which are not derived from the meaning. Kant analytic judgme nt a predicate either is a part of The repudiates this interpretation as being beside the point. (On 229ft) or if not, can be derived from the essence. Th reason is that no sense can be given to the most important case: predicate and the concep t of subject is a pur necessary but synthetic connection, viz. synthetic a priori. It is iction well i~ th 1973, 50) The principle of contrad known that in modem discussions Kant's 'synthetic a priori' is easily judgme nt is analytic "its truth can always turned into a non-sense. This fact should be a clear indication thatof Kant's contradict accordance with the principle distinction is not under scrutiny. However, Kant also thought that cinjudgme an nt means that a predicate of an analyti analytic judgment a predicate either is a part of the essence of the subject above out a contradiction. But as was pointed or if not, can be derived from the essence. Thus the relation between a to· a c for determining which predicates belong predicate and the concept of subject is a purely logical one. (Allison effective way to decide which judgment-tokens 1973, 50) The principle of contradiction i~ the test of analyticity. to If abe id All analytic judgme nts seem judgment is analytic "its truth can always be adequately known in commentators frequently claim that the ana accordance with the principle of contradiction". (A150/B190) This concerns the logical form of a judgme nt. Howe means that a predicate of an analytic judgment cannot be denied without meaning. He states explicitly (Pr 266) that th a contradiction. But as was pointed out above, because therent, is not no tool with its l with the content of a judgme for detennining which predicates belong to· a certain concept,possibi there islity no of syn that "The explanation of the effective way to decide which judgment-tokens are analytic. nothing to do. It with which general logic has All analytic judgments seem to be identical judgments. Thus know the problem by name. But in transcen commentators frequently claim that the analytic-synthetic distinction important of all questions..." (A154/B193) W concerns the logical form of a judgment. However, this cannot be Kant's reason for so much confusion is that analytic meaning. He states explicitly (Pr 266) that the distinction is concerned logic while syntheticity is not. Thus the very d with the content of a judgment, not with its logical fonn. He even says abstr distinction betwee n fonnal logic - which that "The explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgments is a task transcendental logic - which considers also with which general logic has nothing to do. It need not even so much as (viz. its relation to an object). know the problem by name. But in transcendental logic it is the most The containment-metaphor, as Kant prese important of all questions..." (A154/B193) What is perhaps is, thethat main every jud distinction is exhaustive, that reason for so much confusion is that analyticity is a concern of fonnal are which synthetic, and b) that all judgme nts logic while syntheticity is not. Thus the very distinction is to parallel to the think that both There are good reasons distinction between fonnallogic - which abstracts from all content - and widely taken for granted - are incorrect of a judgment transcendental logic - which considers also the content Eberha rd's account exactly by pointing ou (viz. its relation to an object). The containment-metaphor, as Kant presents it, suggests that a) the distinction is exhaustive, that is, that every judgment is either analytic or synthetic, and b) that all judgments which are not analytic are synthetic. There are good reasons to think that both of these theses - although widely taken for granted - are incorrect. Kant himself criticized Eberhard's account exactly by pointing out that 'synthetic' was left

part of the meaning versus those whic KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVESexplain AND ASSUMPTIONS ed. The principle of 57 contradi analytic judgme nts, but a principle of unexplained. Equating synthetic with non-identical judgments is hardly allowed to violate. It is a universal, t the informative and even misleading, because nothing is said about truth: a conditio sine qua non. (A151 character of synthetic judgments. By implication, it cannot be correct to a necessary and sufficie condition render Kant's distinction with the modem distinction of predicatesntbeing necessary. part of the meaning versus those which are not. Again, syntheticity is not The nature of syntheticity is some of explained. The principle of contradiction is not only the principle logical grounds. It a logical possibi analytic judgments, but a principle of general logic which noisjudgment is yet not fulfilling the conditions of syn allowed to violate. It is a universal, though merely negative criterion of cannot be both analytic and synthetic, truth: a conditio sine qua non. (A151/B190) For analytic judgments it is synthetic. It must be kept in mind tha a necessary and sufficient condition but for synthetic judgments only the judgments of speculative reaso necessary. aesthetics non-analytic judgme The nature of syntheticity is something else than not being true onnts hav would make them synthetic. Indeed logical grounds. It is a logical possibility that a judgment is not analytic, heavily relies on intuitions or at least p yet not fulfilling the conditions of syntheticity. Accordingly, a judgment Perhaps Kant was so occupied cannot be both analytic and synthetic, but it can be non-analytic and nonjudgments a priori, that in both of his synthetic. It must be kept in mind that Kant is now dealing merely with and in the Prolegomena - he simp the judgments of speculative reason. In the domains of morals or synthetic judgme nts are possible apos aesthetics non-analytic judgments have no recourse to intuition, which synthetic judgme nts require intuitio would make them synthetic. Indeed, Kant's account of syntheticity theoretical cognition are possible only heavily relies on intuitions or at least possibility of intuitions. an intuition. If the synthetic judgme n Perhaps Kant was so occupied with the problem of synthetic intuition must be empirical; if the jud judgments a priori, that in both of his main characterizations - in CPR must be a pure intuition to ground it." and in the Prolegomena - he simply forgot to say explicitly how all synthetic judgme is: "Every o synthetic judgments are possible aposteriori. The answer is nts simple: all conditions of synthetic unity of the m synthetic judgments require intuition. "..all synthetic judgments of experience." (AI58/ B197) theoretical cognition are possible only by relating of a given concept to Eberhard also took the distinction an intuition. If the synthetic judgment is an experiential judgment, the Kant's words - he did not and could n intuition must be empirical; if the judgment is synthetic a priori, there principle of contradiction from must be a pure intuition to ground it." (PC 141) The highest principle of the principle of sufficient reason. (Allison all synthetic judgments is: "Every object(G) stands under necessary by the Wolffians that the latter conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions in a possible demonstrated from the former one. experience." (A158/B197) Eberhard also took the distinction as basically a logical one - or in Kant's words - he did not and could not properly distinguish the logical principle of contradiction from the transcendental (real, material) principle of sufficient reason. (Allison 1973, 51) In fact it was claimed by the Wolffians that the latter principle could be derived or demonstrated from the former one. It is one of Kant's - following

is The analytic-synthetic distinction . acts as is synthes · 58 notions CHAPTER 1 of analysis and whic resolved, but only that is disclosed Crucius - most prominent arguments against the Leibniz-Wolffian ne no from the beginning. Materially (On 194) of of tradition, that this derivation is not possible.Kan "the act ands truths erstThe t und synthesis transcendental logic cannot be derived from general logic. r ma together and comprehending thei The analytic-synthetic distinction is7/B also related Kant's liative ac is is antoamp ) Synthes I03closely (A7 notions of analysis and synthesis as acts. In analysis a given concept ises: " Jiische Log ic (§36) Kant briefly stat resolved, but only that is disclosed which is embedded in the concept osi cognition materialiter, analytic prop information is nati gained. Bylatte from the beginning. Materially no new con ons, the tain determi former synthesis Kant understands "the act of putting various presentations rly characterization perhaps most clea together and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition". is distinction for Kant. The problem cognition. In thee to (A77/B103) Synthesis is an ampliative act of extending possible; that is, how is it possibl Jiische Logic (§36) Kant briefly states: "Synthetic propositions augment y: support of experience, or alternativel merely cognition materialiter, analytic propositi9ns prio ri?" formaliter. The possible a former contain determinations, the latter only mar logical Thisis a m The distinction ize: predicates." To sum characterization perhaps most clearly exhibitscan the forlain the in tenn s ed very be exp notneed logic and distinction for Kant. The problem is to explain how metaphysics is logi separation of the domain of general possible; that is, how is it possible to extend knowledge without the scen of transcendental logic - the tran are synthetic judgments j support of experience, or alternatively: "How confonns to the distinction. Analytic possible a priori?" co while synthetic judgments extend To summarize: The distinction is a material one, not that of general pur analytic judgment can be shown by logic and cannot be explained in tenus of thelogi meanings of words. out rec on withThe cal reflecti through separation of the domain of general logic - the tslogical - from the domain e t judgmen - like all judgments - hav of transcendental logic - the transcendental, the real, the material - lo logic, but they are not justifiable by s confonns to the distinction. Analytic judgments are merely explicative which makes judgments synthetic one while synthetic judgments extend cognition. The correctness of an m a concept - is intuition. Synthetic judg analytic judgment can be shown by purelyition logical it ismen justifiable ts a priori thetic judg , synmeans; intu through logical reflection without recoursetum to any intuition. Synthetic dental judg transcen out that will judgments - like all judgments - have to confonn to the rules of general synthetic a priori. Intuition is not ava i logic, but they are not justifiable by logical means. The "something=x" They require proofs, where in prem which makes judgments synthetic ones - makes it possible to go beyond must always be inbedded. a concept - is intuition. Synthetic judgments aposteriori require empirical intuition, synthetic judgments a priori require pure intuition. However, it will tum out that transcendental judgments are a special case of the synthetic a priori. Intuition is not available for them as "something=x". They require proofs, where in premisses, the possibility of intuitions must always be inbedded.

general problem of pure reason. In t that entire transcendental59 philos KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES ANDthe ASSUMPTIONS solution to this problem. (Pr 279) Let 9. tt How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" It is divided into two more: "How ar In the Introduction to the B-edition "How this question is statedofasnature the possi is pure science general problem of pure reason. In the Prolegomena Kant even claims proves their possibility; the proper is nothing but questio the complete that the entire transcendental philosophypossibl e. These ns are, in tu solution to this problem. (Pr 279) Let us call it "the P-question" for short. because all science proper is made u mathematics possible?" and It is divided into two more: "How are pure How is metaphysics possible? Becaus In both cases actuality "How is pure science of nature possible?" is not evident thattheir metaph ysics is even proves their possibility; the proper question is how arely judgmeto ntsask a priori are they evident mad possible. These questions are, in tum,not reducible to ,the P-question, as a science but as a natural disp synthetic priori.is meta because all science proper is made up of most importajudgments nt question:a "How performance it , the How is metaphysics possible? Because of its Aslamentable regards these how-questions is not evident that metaphysics is even possible. for deals metaphysical The Claims Aesthetic with the ques judgments a priori are evidently made. possibl Thus metaphysics is actual butwith e?" The Analyti c deals th Now we e?" are Becaus led to Kant's not as a science, but as a natural disposition. science possibl e pure natura possible?" most important question: "How is metaphysics it also as hasa science to provide the answer to: " As regards these how-questions, the structure of CPR is: possible?" The Dialect ic is devoted to The Aesthetic deals with the question: "How is pure natural disposition. nlathematics In fact the main ta possible?" The Analytic deals with the itquestion: "How pure natural is imposs ible tois attain knowledge i science possible?" Because pure natural belong sciencetois metaph based on metaphysics ysica specialis. Those is metaphysics as basis. a science it also has to provide the answer to: "How another than cognitive Note that possible?" The Dialectic is devoted to the problems of metaphysics as a ideal based on transce ndental ideas or natural disposition. In fact the main taskasof the Dialectic is to show how well, although their objective it is impossible to attain knowledge in (A663/ the matters traditionally B691) which The Doctrin e of Metho belong to metaphysica specialise Those problems have to be answered on conditions of the complete system of another than cognitive basis. Note that - stated most importantly principles by synthetic- the judgme nts a priori. based on transcendental ideas or ideals transce are synthetic a priori ndentaljudgments employment, which m as well, although their objective validity never can be proved. pure intuition keeps reason to a visible concerned with the from formalthe Pro (A663/B691) The Doctrine of Method isThe P-question comes conditions of the complete system of pure reason. are of say that this These is the conditions general problem stated by synthetic judgments a priori. written Now reason is considered in keeping this question initsmind. transcendental employment, which means that "neither the P-quest ion? I doempirical not claimnor that Kan (A711/B739) pure intuition keeps reason to a visible track". on the contrary. But a most serious sh may be justified The P-question comes from the Prolegomena. scandal, if Ityou want - is that,toin an say that this is the general problem of CPR, but CPR was not originally written keeping this question in mind. What is Kant's answer in CPR to the P-question? I do not claim that Kant has no answer to this question, on the contrary. But a most serious shortcoming of the whole CPR - a scandal, if you want - is that, in an important sense, Kant does not

judgments aposteriori are possible, and ho aposteriori do not make sense at all. As far question is concerned, Kant merely asks what is · 60 CHAPTER 1 gives support to synthetic judgments a priori. Th (A9/B13) Strawson even that goes "Kant re answer this question in a clear and straiglltforward way.writes The same of synthetic to a priori conception In the Introduction CPR atit all". is (S for the secondary literaturegeneral as well. Kant agives clear answers too. Notwit explained how analytic judgments priorisome are possible, how synthetic is simple. All synthe judgments aposteriori are judgments, possible, the and answer how analytic judgments aposteriori do not make sense at all. As far as the most important intuition. (A718/B746) Synthetic judgmen~s a p question is concerned, Kant priori merely(pure asks intuition). what is theBut unknown=x which th even to abstract gives support to synthetic judgments priori. The question is left practicallya the reading of CPR until theopen. Doctrin ad hocness difficult to avoid. clearif the and doct (A9/B13) Strawson even writes that is "Kant really has noEven accepted, not(Strawson immediately general conception of synthetic a prioriitatisall". 1966,clear 43) why pure necessarytoo. cognition. Why is notmetaphysical pure intuiton as Kant gives some clear answers Notwithstanding judgments, the answer is intuition?. simple. All synthetic judgments require When transcendental are concern intuition. (A718/B746) Synthetic judgmen~s a prioripropositions require intuition a exhibited the fact that h This is even to abstract this answer by presupposes priori (pure intuition). But complicated. gives Kant's answer, although according until the Doctrine of Method. The air to of Kan practically the reading of CPR ad hocness is difficult to avoid. Even if the Kant doctrine of pure intuition is point. Certainly explains how it is possible accepted, it is not immediately clear awhy pure intuition toshould yield judgments priori. According the transcenden not pure intuiton as contingent as empirical necessary cognition. Why is outer objects as appearances, some judgments co intuition? of objects generatim are synthetic in the transcen the P-question is answered this sense. The im When transcendental propositions are concerned, the in things get more the byP-question is hardly not clearly answered is: complicated. This is exhibited the fact that any commentator cognition possible to us? Somehow Kant has to gives Kant's answer, altll0ugh according to Kant, it should be the main his whole doctrine is connected with the actual point. Certainly Kant explains how it is possible that there are synthetic ab In to thatthesense, Kant answers that empirical cogni judgments a priori. According transcendental idealistic account of in judgments fact can concerning have empirical intuition. S outer objects as appearances,we some the predicates cognition, a priori,framework. is explained by the of objects generatim are synthetic in thealthough transcendental Thus intuition a priori. Empirical, p the P-question is answered in this sense. The important senserespectively in which "unknown=x" Kant was searching for. is transcendental the P-question is not clearly answeredwhich is: How WhatKant is thehas "x"toingive the an case of transcendental cognition possible to us? Somehow account of how clear answers are given in the present his whole doctrine is connected with the actual abilities of human beings.sense metaphysics possible, isthepossible Doctrine of Metho In that sense, Kant answers that empiricalis cognition because they are intuition. to be found. The answer is that tran we in fact can have empirical Similarly mathematical cognition, although a priori, is explained by the 'fact' that we can have intuition a priori. Empirical, respectively pure intuition, is the "unknown=x" which Kant was searching for. What is the "x" in the case of transcendental propositions? So far as clear answers are given in the present sense to the question how metaphysics is possible, the Doctrine of Method is the passage where they are to be found. The answer is that transcendental propositions

Certainly Kant accused all previous meta among concepts, that is, being vitiated by a KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 61 metaphysical cognition was possible from mere require transcendental deductions also and often, proofs.and Anmisleadingly interpretationstates of that ph attainedeasily merelyleads fromtoconcepts. "Merely" shoul transcendental schemata as pure intuitions understanding without anyintuition. intuition.Although In the account of tran on pure there transcendental propositions as based not possible mer proofs are seems to be some ground for thisexplained reading itthat is seriously misleading. premiss is necessary, Unlike mathematics, philosophy is additional not intuitive but discursive. How tonamely pos

possible intuition and by implication, of pure(possible intuition synthesis) understand the role of the schemata,contains is a topic which will be dealt with inserious chaptersmeta-philosophical 7 and 8 below. problems are m Certainly Kant accused all previous metaphysics of just groping transcendental propositions is examined. Th among concepts, that is, being vitiated wrongheaded belief that properby in aKant's sense, because the important metaphysical cognition was possibleelements from mere concepts. -Certainly of cognition conceptsKant and intuition also often, and misleadingly states that philosophical is synthetic judgments a cognition priori, transcendenta attained merely from concepts. "Merely" should be understood to mean: of cognition. Consequently conditions (form) without any intuition. In the account of transcendental proofs, it cognition. What is the status of isthese prop explained that proofs are not possible from concepts. An necessitymerely is involved? These questions will be additional premiss is necessary, below. namely possible experience which contains possible intuition (possible synthesis). It is also obvious that serious meta-philosophical problems are met when the status of transcendental propositions is examined. They cannot be cognition proper in Kant's sense, because the important requirement of the two elements of cognition - concepts and intuition - is not fulfilled. Like all synthetic judgments a priori, transcendental propositions concern conditions (form) of cognition. Consequently, they are second level cognition. What is the status of these propositions? What kind of necessity is involved? These questions will be examined in Chapter 8 below.

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCT CHAPTER 2

1. Transformation of rationalistic philos

question of the method of metaphysics 2 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD: dental philosophy and transcendental meth TRANSCENDENTAL PROOFS AND philosophical judgments are verified; P TRANSCENDENTAL proofs andDEDUCTIONS arguments in CPR 4. Co

definitions 5. Discursive versus intuitiv 6. Axioms, demonstrations and proofs 7. dental proofs according to Kant 8. What is 1. Transformation ofdental) rationalistic philosophy; The 9. Establishing tran deduction 2. Transcenquestion of the method of metaphysics philosophy dental philosophy and transcendental method 3. How philosophical judgments are verified; Philosophical proofs and arguments in CPR 4. Concepts and 1. Transformation of rationalistic philosophy; versus intuitive cognition definitions 5. Discursive The question of the method of metaphysics 6. Axioms, demonstrations and proofs 7. TranscenWhat a (transcen-atmosphere dental proofs according to Kant It is well known8.that the isphilosophical 9. Establishing transcendental dental) deduction was that of Leibnizian rationalism. Although Kant philosophy radical break with this tradition and brought empiri philosophy, he still remained somewhere in the m traditions. Much of Kant's philosophy waS' explicitly d 1. Transformation of rationalistic philosophy; Leibniz-Wolffian deductivistic metaphysics, yet The question of theconcepts methodand of metaphysics many of its problems; he still spoke the It is well known that "In the the philosophical the young execution atmosphere of the plan of prescibed byKant the critiq was that of Leibnizian future rationalism. Kant seemingly a we have made therefore to systemAlthough of metaphysics, radical break with this method tradition of andthe brought empiricistic his celebrated Wolff,ideas the to greatest philosophy, he still remained somewhere in the middle great philosophers." (Bxxxvi) Seen from ofthethepresent-day traditions. Much of Kant's philosophy waS' directed the pre indeed seems to beexplicitly very close to his against rationalistic Leibniz-Wolffian deductivistic metaphysics, yet he borrowed its especially conspicuous as far as his conceptions o problems; he still spoke of Wolff. is concepts and many of itsscience are concerned, andthehislanguage whole undertaking "In the execution of thebyplan prescibed by theKant's critique, that is, in these conceptions. conviction is the that onl future system of metaphysics, we have therefore to follow the strict method of the celebrated Wolff, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers." (Bxxxvi) Seen from the present-day perspective, Kant indeed seems to be very close to his rationalistic predecessors. This is especially conspicuous as far as his conceptions of philosophy and science are concerned, and his whole undertaking is naturally saturated by these conceptions. Kant's conviction is that only that belongs to

hod. In CPR it is perh attention to. The question of met ho debate 63 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD that the Berlin Royal Aca dem competition on the ect: uW bether philosophy and science proper which has been derived subj entirely from in particular the fundamental prin reason, without any recourse to experience. Accordingly, philosophical cipl are not capable of proofs as distinct as knowledge is thoroughly rational knowledge. not, what is the true nature of thei r Kant was a philosopher who most clearly saw the importance of the certainty be developed, and is this d question of n1ethod. In CPR it is perhaps too evident to be paid sufficent their truth?" (see Bec k 1969, 440ff. attention to. The question of method was such a common subject of an What was really at stake is not very debate that the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1763 announced a Leibniz, the ideal of mathematical competition on the subject: nWbether metaphysical truths generally, andcert Gennany. It was also that phil andght morals, in particular the fundamental principles of natural theologythou way as mathematics does. Kant took are not capable of proofs as distinct as those of geometry; and if they are p with an essay - usually called just not, what is the true nature of their certainty, to what degree can this the actually published in 1764) - Enq certainty be developed, and is this degree sufficient for conviction of uir principles of natural theology and eth their truth?" (see Beck 1969, 440ff. and Tonelli 1959.) CPR, concerning the method and the What was really at stake is not very obvious to a modem reader. Since n are expressed clearly ady in this Leibniz, the ideal of mathematical certainty had dominatedalre philosophy in essa it was even announced that a boo k Gennany. It was also thought that philosophy has to proceed in the same Metaphysics by Kant would appear way as mathematics does. Kant took part in the announced competition - w evidence that Kant had formed his althoughbasic with an essay - usually called just the "Prize Essay" (of 1763, 20 years before the publication of CPR. actually published in 1764) - Enquiry concerning the clarity of the transcendental philosophy - includin principles of natural theology and ethics. Many of Kant's opinions in g th important distinction between analytic science, a CPR, concerning the method and the nature of philosophy and to come. are expressed clearly already in this essay. At the Leipzig book fair 1765, Kan t's principal theme is to poin of it was even announced that a book called The Proper Method methods of mathematics and metaph Metaphysics by Kant would appear - which it never did. There is good ysi frequently returns, and which will also b evidence that Kant had formed his basic methodological opinions nearly study. Metaphysics cannot achieve 20 years before the publication of CPR. However, the special method of th mathematics. But this does not mea transcendental philosophy - including the theory of pure intuition and then tha mathematical certainty in metaph ysics important distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments - was yet mathematics and the natural science s sug to come. should follow their methods. Rigorou Kant's principal theme is to point out differences between thes ex used also in metaphysics, as far as pos he sibl methods of mathematics and metaphysics. This is a theme to which frequently returns, and which will also be a major concern of the present study. Metaphysics cannot achieve the same kind of certainty as mathematics. But this does not mean that he had abandoned the ideal of mathematical certainty in metaphysics and sciences. The success of mathematics and the natural sciences suggests by itself that metaphysics should follow their methods. Rigorous explications and proofs have to be used also in metaphysics, as far as possible.

philosophical predecessors of proceeding dogma prior investigation of reason's competence 64 CHAPTER 2 metaphysical questions. He claims that no genuin Kant wants to make a demarcation, not only between and from mere concepts, in mathematics the way dogmatic m metaphysics, but also betweenproceed: metaphysics as a scientific discipline, and "the procedure of metaphysics has metaphysics as a "rhapsody of ideas". random groping,Heandkeeps what accusing is worst his of all, philosophical predecessors of proceeding dogmatically, that is, without a concepts." (Bxv) Kant wants "to put metaphysi to provide prior investigation of reason's competence science". "The present critiqueanswers of pure tospecula metaphysical questions. He claims that no genuine cognition is attainableby rev alter the old procedure of metaphysics from mere concepts, in the example way dogmatic metaphysics had tried Ittois a tr of geometers and physicists. proceed: "the procedure of metaphysics has hitherto been a merely system of the science itself." (B xxii) random groping, and what is To worst of all,thea last groping among explicate sentence, "It ismere a treatise concepts." (Bxv) Kant wants the "to motto put metaphysics on the secure path of Tran of the present study. By "Kant's science". "The present critique of pure Cognition" speculative Ireason attempts to Objective refer to the procedure alter the old procedure of metaphysics by revolutionizing it after want to indicate that the the chie cognition and example of geometers and physicists. It is a treatise on method, not such a understand how Kant thought that xxii) system of the science itself." (Baccomplished and how he, in fact, tried to accom To explicate the last sentence, is a treatise method..." be matte that "It usually Kant's on emphasis is oncould fonnal the motto of the present study.beBythought "Kant'sthat Transcendental Deduction Kant's new method asof well Objective Cognition" I refer matters. to the procedure of justifying objective However, this is not typically the case. that the chief question is to try cognition and want to indicate is also a formal matter with deductions, toexposi understand how Kant thought could be th proofs.that Butsuch as willa bededuction seen shown presently, tried to accomplish it. It is well known accomplished and how he, in fact, kinds of procedures; the procedures are of a new that usually Kant's emphasis iswith on new formal matters. Accordingly, it could - even radically new - subject-matters be thought that Kant's new concepts method asofwellKant's has to endeavour do with formal are thos the case. Certainly Kant's method matters. However, this is not typically 'transcendental' . is also a formal matter with deductions, and transcendental In order expositions to start a methodological revolutio proofs. But as will be seen shown presently, they are introduces an idea of a not newlogically science:new "the Cr kinds of procedures; the procedures are of a new kind because they deal "Critique" means self-knowledge of reason; with new - even radically newunalterable - subject-matters questions. laws oforreason. (Axi)Two It iskey"a prior concepts of Kant's endeavour are those of 'critique' and competence", a methodological investigation c 'transcendental'. viz., the fonnal conditions of the human In order to start a methodological revolution in metaphysics, transcendental philosophy itself - a Kant system o science: "the Critique of Pure Reason". introduces an idea of a new propositions a priori - but only a propaedeutic to "Critique" means self-knowledge eternal anditself, words,ofthereason; critiqueuncovering is not the new science unalterable laws of reason. (Axi) It is "a prior investigation of reason's competence", a methodological investigation concerning pure reason, viz., the formal conditions of the human cognition. It is not transcendental philosophy itself - a system of concepts and cardinal propositions a priori - but only a propaedeutic to such a system. In other words, the critique is not the new science itself, but a complete idea or a

of science, for which the critique of pu complete architechtonic plan." (A13/ KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL initiallyMETHOD thought that the critique65of rea philosophy, plan of it. Somewhat unexpectedlymetaphysics Kant says and nearly the same inof this comprehensiveness of domain. transcendental philosophy. "Transcendental philosophy is only the idea There is no reason to suppose the that of science, for which the critique of pure reason has to lay down philosophy, which emerged with complete architechtonic plan." (A13/B27) Rather obviously KantCPR already the second edition and reason, transcendental philosophy, initially thought that the critique of contrary, an evolution. The overall direction of ch metaphysics and philosophy, in this order, indicate an increasing new definition of 'transcendental'; fr comprehensiveness of domain. the possibility of nature, There is no reason to suppose explanation that Kant's of critical conception of the transcendental philosophy. (See philosophy, which emerged with CPR, remained unchanged. On the be change of 'thing in itself' from the bear marks of pre.. contrary, already the second edition and the Prolegomena two-different-perspectives sense an evolution. The overall direction of change is also mirrored by Kant'smanif (SeeaChapter The we new definition of 'transcendental';Prolegomena. from concepts priori 5.) to the seems adhere to both of these concep in to other words, to establishing explanation of the possibility of nature, what are the relations between the transcendental philosophy. (See below.) Another example ismetaphys the transcendental philosophy, critical change of 'thing in itself' from the pre·critical ontological sense to thephilo reason. How and the critique two-different-perspectives sense manifest in the of B-edition and Kant the cha is also exhibited in his unders Prolegomena. (See Chapter 5.) The notions, well known difficulty is that Kant between concepts. is especial seems to adhere to both of these concepts. It isthese difficult to stateIt exactly radically Kant changed his conceptio what are the relations between metaphysics and philosophy, and further, 1989a and 1989c). Postumum (Forster transcendental philosophy, critical philosophy, transcendental idealism, of metaphysic Traditionally the notion and the critique of reason. How Kant changed his mind concerning these the most general properties of thin notions, is also exhibited in his understanding of the mutual relations Revolution sciences no longer a controversial matter deal howwith between these concepts. It is especially of things ascribed but the properties radically Kant changed his conception of philosophy in his Opus to th Postumum (Forster 1989a and 1989c).Metaphysics is concerned with predicat of sciences it cognition is concerned sciencecognition means of wi Traditionally the notion of metaphysical ascribed After to things. It is aCopernican system of the the most general properties of things. Kant's principles of reason. Metaphysics Revolution sciences no longer deal with things as they are in themselves, do cognition. It "is but the of nothing cognition. but the properties of things ascribed toobjective them through the act throughofpure. reason, systematically objects generatim. As the ar Metaphysics is concerned with predicates and 'philosophy' are concepts which I w science of sciences it is concerned with the most general predicates is often by Kant 'metaphysics' most general pure used concepts and to d ascribed to things. It is a system of the part of philosophy, or in fact, butany principles of reason. Metaphysics does not deal with objects of objective cognition. It "is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through pure. reason, systematically arranged." (Axx) ('Metaphysics' and 'philosophy' are concepts which I will use synonymously, although 'metaphysics' is often used by Kant to denote only the most fundamental part of philosophy, or in fact, of any cognitive enterprise. Moreover,

principles of reason, it is natural to ask, why metaphysics and not a proper part of transcendental differ from those 'philosophy' is even used by Kant to denote thephilosophy merely analytic activity CPR andtotranscend of making "concepts clear" in the the mutual domainsrelation where of - according the during Kant's life-time. What happened was critical philosophy - no cognitive answers are possible.) regard hiswith threetheCritiques, and transcenden While CPR is likewise concerned pure concepts and (Vleeschauer 1962) to ask, why proper. is it only a propaedeutic to The principles of reason, it is naturalmetaphysics andpart transcendental philosophyhow gets blurred. of it? Moreover, does ~ metaphysics and not a proper Howthose couldtwo? philosophy reach theabove, level of n transcendental philosophy differ from As mentioned Kant's famous question: "How to put metaph the mutual relation of CPR and transcendental philosophy changed science?"was Kant describes how geometry during Kant's life-time. What happened that Kant himself began to- by once became scientific when the presence o regard his three Critiques, and transcendental philosophy as parts of noticed attentionmetaphysics was paid to th metaphysics proper. (Vleeschauer 1962) and The proper limit between description and transcendental philosophy gets blurred. ~ of the revolution of natural scie essentially kind ofscience? self-reflective How could philosophy reach the level ofanatural To putprocesses. it as has insighton only thatpath which Kant's famous question: "How to"reason put metaphysics theinto secure of it own..." (Bxiii) The pure elements in science?" Kant describes how geometry - by a methodological revolutionthe s generated speculative reason. of pure the elements a priori was Kan - once became scientific when the presenceby significance for him was that Hume broug noticed and proper attention was paid to that fact. He gives a similar the origin the concept were of causal description of the revolution of status naturaland sciences. Theofrevolutions is atopriori, and that it theprocesses. concept of causality They led one realize that essentially a kind of self-reflective of that. Metaphysics consists altogether "reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of itsconce

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CHAPTER 2

own..." (Bxiii) The pure elements in the sciences are not given but generated by pure speculative reason. Kant's description of Hume's 1 Ontology: What the reflect meaningupon <:>f 'ontology' brought himis to the significance for him was that Hume transcendental philosophy a new substItute for ontolo status and the origin of the concept of causality. Kant's insight 2) was that phy consists of four parts: 1) ontology, rational psychologia rationalis), 3) rational cosmology the concept of causality is a priori, and that it is not the only concept like (A846/B874) Evidently, the message of CPR is of 2),(Pr 3) and possible in the domain that. Metaphysics consists altogether of concepts a priori. 260)4). What abou

meant the old metaphysica generalis concerni independently of the conditions of cognition, then it is not a cognitive undertaking. But if the domain of o of experience, then CPR has to include at least the 1 Ontology: What is the meaning of 'ontology' in explicitly the new that framework? not of O Kant also stated "the proudIsname transcendental philosophy a new substitute for title ontology? The Analytic system of of a mere ofmetaphysics the pure understa modest rational(transcendental physiology (physica rationalis and to consists of four parts: 1) ontology, 2)Analytic philosophy) is supposed psychologia rationalis), 3) rationalas ontology cosmology rational does,and then4)limited to the theology. objects of pos of CPR isexplicitly that no refers cognitive answers are phil (A846/B874) Evidently, the messagesometimes to transcendental What about ontology? If by 'ontology' is possible in the domain of 2), 3) and 4). A845/B873)) meant the old metaphysica generalis concerning the objects as they are independently of the conditions of cognition, then it is obvious, that ontology as well is not a cognitive undertaking. But if the domain of ontology is linii~ed to the objects of experience, then CPR has to include at least the "metaphysics' of experience". Kant also stated explicitly that tithe proud name of Ontology has to give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of the pure understanding." (A247/B303) What the Analytic (transcendental philosophy) is supposed to accomplish is exactly the same as ontology does, then limited to the objects of possible experience. Kant himself sometimes explicitly refers to transcendental philosophy as an ontology. (e.g. A845/B873))

science is made up of apodictic know ideal of universal episteme.67The Le KANT'S PHfi-,OSOPHICAL METHOD knowledge was a continuation of this The method of metaphysics has to bemany put others on thewhere right Kant path, on as the the one han method of natural sciences was put and an n,enormous waspreserve traditio but on thesuccess other hand scienceatical is, of certaint course,y.highly achieved. Kant's conception of the natureofofmathem All cogniti ofts) hisand day.matter Genuine relevant. He largely shared the prevalentform conception (concep (intuition science is made up of apodictic knowledge to are the the Platonic cognitiaccording on by Kant universal fo ideal of universal episteme. The Leibnizian ofns.mathematical empiricalideal intuitio "Only that whose c tradition. This is the on casethat like knowledge was a continuation of this science proper; cogniti can cont many others where Kant on the one handonly makes a radical break science with the improp erly called ," .. "A tradition, but on the other hand preservesdeserve its crucial the ideal s theideals: namenow of natural science of mathematical certainty. All cognition is made up cognize of two delements: underli e it are a priori and ar form (concepts) and matter (intuitions). But468) what"I is appreciated inr, that (MAN maintain, howeve i cognition by Kant are the universal forms, not the matter provided by only so much science proper can be fou empirical intuitions. "Only that whose certainty is apodictic be called (MAN 470) Kant's can exampl e of a discip science proper; cognition that can contain merely empirical certainty science proper is chemis try. isIt can only improperly called science," .. "A rational doctrine of nature, systematic art or an experimthen, ental doctrin when thefor natural laws that in m deserves the name of natural science only The search elements a priori of experience." underlie it are cognized a priori and arepure notreason: mere laws self-knowledge of reason. K (MAN 468) "I maintain, however, that inmeans every exactly special doctrine nature of that the of method any as there is mathematics in it."a critica only so much science proper can be found knowledge, has to be put under (MAN 470) Kant's example of a discipline which never can become steps are made. A critique has toaprecede science proper is chemistry. It can become nothing moreh than a t part An importa nt althoug implici systematic art or an experimental doctrine. (MAN 468, 471) is to give an account of the concept of l The search for elements a priori in metaphysics implies or more exactly : ofthe thecritique nature of of the ne pure reason: self-knowledge of reason. Kant's of and the critical amazingidea fact, seldommethod noticed, that means exactly that the method of any discipline, acquire genuine using the verytosame concep t of law w any progressive knowledge, has to be put under a critical scrutiny Pure reasonbefore itself is subject to necessary steps are made. A critique has to precede any science. typical case among many, where Kant d An important although implicit partconcep of Kant's t buttheoretical takes it philosophy for granted. The is to give an account of the concept of introdu law and the lawfulness ce distinct concepof ts nature; but to make g the laws. It is most le of or more exactly: of the nature of the necessity Kant's of adherence to theaprincip is amazing fact, and seldom noticed, thatunequiv Kant, ocally: in giving this thing account, "Every in nature, i using the very same concept of law which he is supposed to explain. Pure reason itself is subject to necessary laws of a similar kind. This is a typical case among many, where Kant does not try to introduce a new concept but takes it for granted. The task of philosophy is not to introduce distinct concepts but to make given concepts distinct. Kant's adherence to the principle of general rule governance is put unequivocally: "Everything in nature, in the inanimate as well as the

68

water, the bird in the air move acc all without rules. When we believe that we have co 2 only say that the rules are unknow n rules, we can ofCHAPTER

animate world, happens according to rules, although we do not always 2. Transcendental philosophy and transcende know these rules. Water falls according to the laws of gravity, and the ologica step of the first according Theplace to method rules. The fish linrevolut the io locomotion of animals also takes whatatchara ingly, . Accord critique start withtoa rules; mustaccording water, the bird in the air move and there is nothing revolution whole the an absence eristic is charact this that all without rules. When we and believe we have comeofacross of or a proced in a new so much consist of rules, we can only say that the rules are unknown to way us." (Logic 13) ure viz new, is problems, but in that the subject-matter ic discovery but a "a new scientif is not critiqueand 2. Transcendental philosophy transcendental method

different albeit not unrelated philo science". Tworevolution The first step of the methodological is exactly that one in CPR: to draw the boundaries distinguishedwhat must start with a critique. Accordingly, characterizes the first step cognition - and to build up the sys ries ofrevolution the whole - is that it does not and this is characteristic ofbounda tions. The successf and cardinaofl proposi concep consist so much in a new way or tsa procedure solving philosophical is, of course, highly relevant the second task problems, but in that the subject-matter is new, viz. reason itself. Kant's ries more precisely, and also the bounda drawingdiscovery critique is not "a new scientific but a discovery of a new ness of transcendental idealism. The the correct for not science". Two different albeit unrelated philosophical tasks can be es also called the critique, is more properl distinguished in CPR: to sometim draw the boundaries of reason - or the phy. The critique of pure reason is a prelim philoso boundaries of cognition - and to build up the system of transcendental philosophy. concepts and cardinal propositions. The successful accomplishment of also of transcendental philosophy th says relevant the second task is, of course,Kant highly for the first task, by science but a plan for one. The n new a of system drawing the boundaries more precisely, and also by providing evidence metaphysics; the aim was to p future The be the new idealism. new science, although for the correctness of transcendental . The task being not a new s of science path secure is sometimes also called the critique, more properly called transcendental a new science, implies that 'me ry of discove philosophy. The critique of pure reason is a preliminary to transcendental understood in a proper sense. 'Metho d' is no philosophy. sciences - of processing any input dat empirical philosophy that it is not a complete Kant says also of transcendental to obtain permanent results. Following Kant system of a new science but used a plan for one. The new science itself would science, disputed matters are supposed to be settle be the new future metaphysics; the aim was to put metaphysics on the It is systematic unity which makes the differe secure path of science. The task being not a new scientific dicovery but a a mere aggregate of cognitions. The ideas wh andimplies discovery of a new science, that 'method' should now be provided by reason. (A832/B860, The A are understood in a proper sense. 'Method' is not a procedure - as in ) Accordingly, in order to become a syst Reasonany empirical sciences - of processing input data. It is supposed to be idea or a plan. It is instructi on a certain builtFollowing used to obtain permanent results. Kant's overall conception of science, disputed matters are supposed to be settled once for all. It is systematic unity which makes the difference between a science and a mere aggregate of cognitions. The ideas which detennine this unity are provided by reason. (A832/B860, The Architechtonics of Pure Reason) Accordingly, in order to become a system, a science has to be built on a certain idea or a plan. It is instructive to suppose that the

objects(G) as with our concepts a priori of The change in the second edition 69 KANT'S PHll..,OSOPHICAL METHOD is sign spirit of the Prolegomena: "I call all cog leading idea of the new science called the dCritique of Reason, is that of occupie not so much with objects(G) as w the 'transcendental'. (See Forster 1989a for a suggestion.) objects (G) similar so far as it is meant to be poss 'transcendental' in the A-edition is: "I Kant's 'canonical' definition of signific ant is that instead of A's "all c call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with generatim", 'transce ndenta l' is now re objects(G) as with our concepts a priori of objects(G) generatim.'t (All) cognizing objects a priori. Taken liter The change in the second edition is significant and reflects more the consequences. For example, that the Trans spirit of the Prolegomena: "I call all cognition transcendental that is be excluded in its totality, because it do occupied not so much with objects(G) as with our manner of cognizing objects but with cognitive illusions: an objects(G) so far as it is meant to be possible a priori." (B25) What is systematizing cognition. The spirit of the significant is that instead of A's ttall concepts a priori of objects "How synthetic judgments are possible a generatim tt , 'transcendental' is possibl now restricted to our manner of e?". Thus, there is some justif cognizing objects a priori. Taken literally, that has far-reaching Transce ndental Dialectic from the domain o consequences. For example, that the Transcendental Dialectic seems to (Forster 1989a, 293) Another signifi be excluded in its totality, because it does not deal with cognizing transformation from "conce pts a priori" to " objects but with cognitive illusions: regulative principles of priori" isand that the latter expression compreh systematizing cognition. The spirit the Prolegomena is to explain pureofconcep ts and pure intuitions. Unfortun "How synthetic judgments are possible a priori?" and ttHow nature is how literally Kant thought that the change s possible?". Thus, there is son1e justification for excluding the present study is limited to Kant's theore of transcendental philosophy. Transcendental Dialectic from theappeare domain nce of the second edition of CPR. It of the (Forster 1989a, 293) Anotherwithsignificant the Analyticonsequence c, which I take to be the p transformation from "concepts a priori" manner of cognizing .. a philosoto phy"our is established. The question is priori" is that the latter expression comprehends both cognition through cogniti on is possibl e, but what are the cond pure concepts and pure intuitions.that Unfortunately, we have no evidence means, how it is possible. It turns out how literally Kant thought that the change should be taken. Anyhow, the the only questions to which philosophy - ac theoretical philosophy around the present study is limited to Kant's properl y cognitive, and at the same time, pos CPR. It is likewise mainly concerned appearence of the second edition of In a letter to Reinhold, May 19, 1789, K be is: the"to part where the transcendental with the Analytic, which I take to CPR show which laws are objectively philosophy is established. The question to show that objective authorizedis tonotassume them valid for the na thecan conditions cognition, cognition is possible, but what are they possiblyofbeobjective synthetic and yet a pr that means, how it is possible. Itwrites: turns out thathysics these how-questions are "Metap consists, at least in int the only questions to which philosophy according to Kant can offer propositions a priori." (B18, cpo Pr 274) It properly cognitive, and at the same time, positive answers. In a letter to Reinhold, May 19, 1789, Kant writes that the task of CPR is: "to show which laws are objectively necessary, and how we are authorized to assume them valid for the nature of things, that is, how they can possibly be synthetic and yet a priori." (PC 144) In CPR he writes: "Metaphysics consists, at least in intention, entirely of synthetic propositions a priori." (BI8, Cpa Pr 274) It is quite obvious that Kant's

as asking: "How are synt solution to "Metaphysics stands or falls with the · 70 oretical) CHAPTER 2 For Kant there are two kind of (the tal proposit transcenden atical ri: mathem conception of metaphysicsprioimplies that theandquestion "How is ary topi c,. is a subsidi s questions: mathem thatdirectly metaphysics possible?" leads toatic the "How is it is to explain the pos osophy dental phil transcen a priori?", which, for Kant, is the same possible to extend our knowledge (Pr .§6ff) Taking for g atics as well. of mathem as asking: "How are synthetic propositions possible a priori?" atics is not merely a fo hem mat atics - to of mat "Metaphysics stands or falls with thehem solution this problem..." (Pr 276) objective re~.lity nition, thepropositions of real cogsynthetic For Kant there are two kindsyst ofem (theoretical) a lity of empirical intu on the possibi ultimately propositions. priori: mathematical and transcendental It might be thought must be som ositions the al prop mathematictopic,. although task of that mathematics is a subsidiary ed, there is a sense Inde s. one tal den scen tran transcendental philosophy is to explain the possibility and applicability dental as well. Howe transcenKant's are granted ions for proposit of mathematics as well. (Pr ·§6ff) Taking conception strictly separating trans in t Kan w follo will of mathematics - mathematics is not merely a formal system, but like any from mathematical ones. ositions objective re~lity of its concepts depends system of real cognition, the prop phy is made up of f ntal philoso nscendeintuition ultimately on the possibility of Tra empirical - it is evident that y propositions wh There are man mathematical propositions prop mustositions be . somehow similar to the tal because they express ~ scenden ed atran callis transcendental ones. Indeed, be there sense in which mathematical ner of cognizing a pri our man concern as , well. However, to avoid confusion, I propositions are transcendentalviz. s of intuition". time are the form "Space andtranscendental will follow Kant in strictly separating (philosophical) a cal for Kant, terms having also propositions from mathematicaltypi ones. l nica in the tech proposition'concepts nscende 'Tra made up ntal of fundamental and Transcendental philosophy is amental (pure) concep of a fund an applicationwhich, propositions. There are many propositions with full right, could ions [Grundsiitze] and propo proposit inalexpress ~ranscendental knowledge, be called transcendental becausecard they ositions. Below, for th tal prop are transcen a den priori. Say, the proposition: viz., concern our manner of cognizing are excluded. propositions ofved intuition". However, this is a case "Space and time are the formsderi ions are the cr proposit nscende typical for Kant, terms havingTraalso a ntal special, technical sense. lem of the phy. The aprob philosoexpresses dental sense 'Transcendental proposition' intran thescen technical rule for ify these propositions to just is how osophy an application of a fundamental phil (pure) concept. Thus, strictly merely the the Prolegomena by fo dition and derived in the andB-e propositions from them cardinal propositions [Grundsatze] "How are synthetic prop n stio que the er answ are transcendental propositions. Below, for the sake of simplicity, even stion cou As was pointed out before, the que derived propositions are excluded. sible that there are syn w is it pos Transcendental propositions eith areer 1) the"Hocrown of the system of if synthetic judgments be just canmethod or 2) "Hoofwthe transcendental philosophy. The problem of transcendental 2) concerns the method of obvious thatThat is what Kant means philosophy is how to justify theseis propositions. in the B-edition and the Prolegomena by fOffi1ulating his problem, to answer the question "How are synthetic propositions possible a piori?" As was pointed out before, the question could be understood to mean either 1) "How is it possible that there are synthetic judgments a priori?", or 2) "How can synthetic judgments be justified or verified a priori?" It is obvious that 2) concerns the method of establishing transcendental

implication which Kant took for granted. How to understand the question in the second sense 71 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD himself meant that alternative, because 'a reference to justification. Kant never m philosophy itself. Commentators frequently seem to understand the propositions were known prior to all experie question in the first sense. Kant's answer to that question is the general wherein the possibility of experience is the c explanation of transcendental idealism; if transcendental idealism is equivocality of the question, the answer to it correct, then synthetic judgments are possible a priori. That is an very clearly given in CPR. The key-notion implication which Kant took for granted. However, it is more interesting proof, which cannot be correctly understood to understand the question in the second sense. It seems to me that Kant Kant's general framework of philosophical pro himself meant that alternative, because 'a priori' has an implicit reference to justification. Kant never meant that transcendental 3. How philosophical judgments are verif propositions were known prior to all experience. They require proofs, Philosophical proofs and arguments in wherein the possibility of experience is the crucial premiss. Given the Philosophical proofs and argumentation equivocality of the question, the answer to it in the second sense is not is a the rationalistic Kant. Although Kant's aim is that of transcendental very clearly given in CPR. Theus key-notion against the traditional deductivistic viz. proof, which cannot be correctly understood outside of its context, presuppositions proofs.are deeply rooted in that very Kant's general framework of philosophical empiricistic Kant emphazised the necessa acquiring genuine knowledge. However, the r 3. How philosophical judgments are verified; just a condition Philosophical proofs and arguments in CPRstanding alone as such. It forgotten, when Kant's philosophy - contrar Philosophical proofs and argumentation is a topic which clearly shows interpreted as idealism in the material ins us the rationalistic Kant. Although Kant's aim, no doubt, was to revolt addition to the necessity of intuitions, Kant m against the traditional deductivistic metaphysics, his own other necessary conditions, all of which are de presuppositions are deeply rooted in that very tradition; how else? The that is, those conditions are of a rationalistic empiricistic Kant emphazised the necessary role of intuitions in presented in judgments - they are called card acquiring genuine knowledge. However, the requirement of intuitions is are a kind of schemata for empirical cogn just a condition standing alone as such. It seems often to be totally judgment, in tum, depends on a certain forgotten, when Kant's philosophy - contrary to his own words - is propositions are nothing more than fonnulas interpreted as idealism in the material instead of fonnal sense. In concepts of the understanding. Thus, as in the addition to the necessity of intuitions, Kant maintains that cognition has the units, which Kant is concerned with, are co other necessary conditions, all of which are descended from the intellect; of transcendental philosophy is entirely a r that is, those conditions are of a rationalistic nature. The conditions are theorems are supposed to follow strictly presented in judgments - they are called cardinal propositions - which propositions. are a kind of schemata for empirical cognition. (A236/B296) Every judgment, in tum, depends on a certain concept. In fact cardinal propositions are nothing more than fonnulas for application of the pure concepts of the understanding. Thus, as in the deductivistic metaphysics, the units, which Kant is concerned with, are concepts. Indeed, the system of transcendental philosophy is entirely a rationalistic system whose theorems are supposed to follow strictly from some fundamental propositions.

phil makes possible doctrine of pure intuition, which same time rall grasp 2of Kant's project, but at the · 72 oveCHAPTER e seen from criticism. Ruthlessly, because onc t how K ifes Disclosing the argument-structure and the nature of the devices used man s philosophical reasoning, it become to accuse in transcendental philosophy, does not necessarily make eKant's logic of his day. It is a commonplac l likearch theitechto philosophy more attractive. On the contrary, this is a caseicia which are consequences of his artif doctrine of pure intuition, which makes possible a comprehensive, striving to estab are some peculiarities, like Kan t's overall grasp of Kant's project, but of at the same time ruthlessly opens it tothree four with number elements; say a group of criticism. Ruthlessly, because once wha seen from the perspective of ous mere supe.rflu s like n look t ofte other hand, philosophical reasoning, it becomes manifest how Kant was bound to the losing th to disc only a peculiarity, but a useful key logic of his day. It is a commonplace to accuse Kant of peculiarities rescue to ng tryi of Kant's thought. In these cases, architechtonics. There certainly which are consequences of his artificialing tic ideals a aprioris fonnalism and archaic look are some peculiarities, like Kant's striving to establish or find a certain oning. him of the rationale for his whole reas period o with three items in each. On number of elements; say a group of four r a the Kant delivered lectures in logic ove other hand, what often looks like mere supe.rfluous architechtonicss is- edit noted by lectures, Logic, A Manual for Lecture only a peculiarity, but a useful key0 to disclosing the argument-structure a quite authen in 180 - are often regarded as not of Kant's thought. In these cases, trying to rescue Kant from his although ve,own reserved attitude is needlessly restricti archaic looking fonnalism and aprioristic ideals amounts to depriving lectures are b Logic is not quite authentic. The him of the rationale for his whole reasoning. n.) Moreove manuscripts. (See Jasche's introductio and tho Kant delivered lectures in logicenta over a period trines;His docyears. own 40 of Kanoft'sabout tion a pres lectures, Logic, A Manual for Lectures - edited by Jasche and published t notably in verbatim - repeated elsewhere, mos n conten mai in 1800 - are often regarded as not a quite authentic Kantian text. This Doctrine of Method" of CPR. The the doc as that although it is certainly true reserved attitude is needlessly restrictive, general logic. Logic is understood present rig the own Logic is not quite authentic. The lectures are based on Kant's thoughts, not only as formal logic in atics, m manuscripts. (See Jasche's introduction.) Moreover, they are onlyhem partly notable that Kant asked how are mat logic as s a presentation of Kant's own doctrines; and those parts are how - nearly science possible, but he did not ask verbatim - repeated elsewhere, most notably in the "Transcendental to justify log Haaparanta 1988, 75) He never tried took lo Doctrine of Method" of CPR. The main content is a presentation heof have been an odd task indeed, because general logic. Logic is understoodifica astion theindoctrine fonns of ente already ic has Logthe general. of of just que ntal thoughts, not only as fonnallogic nce" in theand present rigorous sense. It is most settled all its fundame scie e Aristotle; notable that Kant asked how are mathematics, metaphysics, and natural progress has been made in logic sinc is 23) possible. (cp. science possible, but he did notinask logic as science iii, Logic ed. (Bv c need logihow t of view Haaparanta 1988, 75) He never tried to justify logic. For Kant thatpoin would Seen from the methodological Kant get have been an odd task indeed, con because he ry tookdisp logic the cern verying "canon" utesas con tempora about, s of justification in general. Logic "the pathbtof little dou re issecure way. The forward entered ightalready strahas science" and settled all its fundamental questions. No significant progress has been made in logic since Aristotle; nor is any further work in logic needed. (Bviii, Logic 23) Seen from the methodological point of view, many traditional and contemporary disputes concerning Kant get settled in rather a straightforward way. There is little doubt about, say, what a deduction is,

means of removing a most seriou thought, namely the cover of obscuri hide anything under the cover of o 73 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICALto METHOD matters of logic as too obvious to ne or the difference between a transcendentaldust proof and a transcendental of history which, from our poin reasoning offersnot on deduction. In this way the perspective of philosophical methodological perspective to criticism of but Kant's means of removing a most serious obstacle rationalistic methods, discloses not claim that Kant had tried or 'the thought, namely the cover of obscurity. I doKant's 'concept of concept', to hide anything under the cover of obscurity. He presumably took many deep-going essentialism. From the m matters of logic as too obvious to need anymysterious precise explication. It is the are g how the essences makes up the cover. The dust of history which, from our point of view, them to be unchangeable. Anyway, metllodological perspective not only shows Kant's to thea priori concepts areadherence somehow given rationalistic methods, but discloses also e.g. some important features Kant's most important in notions Kant's 'concept of concept', or 'theory oftranscendental meaning', mostphilosophy notably, hisare, in deep-going essentialism. From the meta-critical point of view,definitions it remains --> concepts -->) mysterious how the essences are given, and why we should suppose (transcendental) proofs. These are al takes it of formathematics. granted that pure them to be unchangeable. Anyway, Kant notions concepts are somehow given a priori. (e.g. A728/B756) establishing Kant's most important notions for ;the procedures 4. Conceptsofand definitions transcendental philosophy are, in a progressive order: (essences & Because the items, which are in concepts -->) definitions --> expositions --> deductions --> are concepts, it is obvious that (transcendental) proofs. These are also contrasted with the more rigorous definitions must be highly releva notions of mathematics. definitions at A728/B756ff, in Log VIII, and also in the Prize Essay.) T 4. Concepts and definitions fundamental for his whole philoso Because the items, which are in the centre Kant's investigations, manyofunclarities. For the underst concepts and are concepts, it is obvious that Kant'sanalytic accounts andof synthetic judgments, it definitions must be highly relevant. (Kant explains his theory of are related to the essencies of conce definitions at A728/B756ff, in Logic .§99-§109 Introduction sec. little that realand definitions have very are, furthermore, quite VIII, and also in the Prize Essay.) These accounts sense (that is, understood always fundamental for his whole philosophy, though they- although seem to defining contain conc definitions many unclarities. For the understanding toofreal thethings. distinction Thus between real definition analytic and synthetic judgments, it is especially crucial how definitions Kant's adherence to the distinction beconle nonnally clear, I hope, are related to the essencies of concepts. It will realalso definitions play mer definitions in the modernIn the that real definitions have very little to do with found only in mathematics. sense (that is, understood always as nominal definitions). Kant's real definitions - although defining concepts - refer to possible things, that is, to real things. Thus real definitions define real predicates. In spite of Kant's adherence to the distinction between real and nominal definition, real definitions nonnally play merely a regulative role. They can be found only in mathematics. In the domain of morality, real definitions

·

"Defining, as the word itself expresses it, means an the complete concept of a thing within its l 74 CHAPTER 2 'Completeness' means clarity and sufficience of c are also used. How that is explainable offers difficulties of its own.that Here, means precision, and 'original' means this dete like elsewhere in this study, not matters relatedand to morality passed by. of a pr derivative thereforearestill in need It is notable that a definition for Kant always is, a 'definition', th according to is this strictintensional, notion of that clarification of the contentsatisfied (=intension) of few a concept. (Logic §98ff) rem only by concepts. 'Definition' "Defining, as the word itselflogical expresses it, means anexample, original exhibiting perfection. For empirical of ~oncepts the complete concept of all a but thing its limits." can within only be made explicit.(A727/B755) 'Completeness' means clarity Kant and sufficience of characteristics, 'limits' the divides concepts into two classes: means precision, and 'original' means that this determination of limits is gro concepts. Definitions are divided into two not derivative and thereforesynthetic still in definitions, need of a proof. No wonder and nominal versusthat real def according to this strict notion 'definition', the the conditions canbut bealso th givenof concepts' he means categories satisfied only by few concepts. 'Definition' remains only an idea of other philosophical concepts. Empirical concepts a logical perfection. For example, empirical ~oncepts be defined at attai It could be thought thatcannot definitions can be all but can only be made explicit. analysis or by synthesis. That is how Kant thoug Kant divides concepts into twoyield classes: the givenwhich and the madethe st cannot definitions satisfy concepts. Definitions are accordingly divided into analysis two groups: analytic versus yields only nominal de synthetic definitions, and nominal versus realconcepts definitions. By 'abepriori expositions. Given can only defined thr given concepts' he means the categories but makes also theaideas of reason and synthe § 100) Analysis concept distinct, other philosophical concepts. Empirical concepts concept. (Logic, 69) are given aposteriori. It could be thought that definitions cancan be be attaine~ way of Concepts made either either by a priori or apos analysis or by synthesis. That is howbelong Kant thought, although concepts to the first class,analysis whereas em cannot yield definitions artificially which satisfy conditions,concepts and made,thethatstrict is, stipulated be accordingly analysis yields only nominal definitions, or better, Stipulated concepts have definitions, or better de expositions. Given conceptsconcepts can only are be defined through analysis. (Logic also made, but under the guidance o § 100) Analysis makes a concept distinct, synthesis makes a distinct artificially. However, although empirical concept concept. (Logic, 69) cannot have synthetic definitions, because they nev Concepts can be made either a priori or aposteriori. Mathematical completeness. Empirical concepts, tha level of designates, differ from personconcepts to person.andThe w concepts belong to the first class, whereas empirical as a designation, a concept. Th artificially made, that is, regarded stipulatedonly concepts belong tonot theas second. thus nothingorbut a nominal determination [Wortbe Stipulated concepts have definitions, better declarations. Empirical There is thus no point concepts are also made, butsynthetic under thedefinition guidanceatofall. experience, not in is required for they communic concept more precise thanare artificially. However, although empirical concepts synthetic, cannot have synthetic definitions, because they never reach the required level of completeness. Empirical concepts, that is, what a word designates, differ from person to person. The word is more properly regarded only as a designation, not as a concept. The alleged definition is thus nothing but a nominal determination [WortbestimmungJ, and not a synthetic definition at all. There is no point in making an empirical concept n10re precise than is required for communication. Instead, we try

concept refers. They serve the purpos 75 as much as is necessary for KANT'S PHILOSOPHICALword METHOD necessarily anymore. In a nominal de to specify what falls under empirical concepts, that is, their extension. of a concept are exhibited. It is manife (Logic §102) of a concept is synonymous or near Nominal definition means enumeration of those predicates which are That is exactly how it is used by Kan adequate for the recognition or identification of the objects to which a presentation of that which belongs t concept refers. They serve the purpose of detennining the meaning of a (Logic § 105) A concept is made d word as much as is necessary for ready communication, but not Aesthetic Kant distinguished betwee necessarily anymore. In a nominal definition some of the characteristics dental exposition. An exposition is m of a concept are exhibited. It is manifest that to give a nOlninal definition which exhibits the concept as given a of a concept is synonymous or nearly synonymous with 'exposition'. means "the explanation of a concept, That is exactly how it is used by Kant too. By 'exposition' Kant means may be gained into the possibility of o presentation of that which belongs to a concept (found by analysis). (B40) Later on Kant quite clearly refe (Logic §105) A concept is made distinct by an exposition. In the transcendental deduction of space and Aesthetic Kant distinguished between a metaphysical and a transcenuse of 'exposition', it is worth notic dental exposition. An exposition is metaphysical when it contains that "principles of exposition of appearanc which exhibits the concept as given a priori. A transcendental exposition Mathematics is the only science w means "the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which insight which Kant always means real definit may be gained into the possibility of other synthetic cognitions a priori". of mathematical concepts are first (B40) Later on Kant quite clearly refers to both of them together as the exhibited in a corresponding intuition transcendental deduction of space and time. (A87/B119) (Concerning the intuition, that is, constructing a conce use of 'exposition', it is worth noticing that cardinal propositions are (A730/B758, PC 145) In other words, "principles of exposition of appearances." (A247/B303)) is, exhibiting a priori an intuition whi Mathematics is the only science which has proper definitions - by to giving a real definition of that con which Kant always means real definitions. It is not so that the definitions the same time. "For when I make a of mathematical concepts are first given and then the concepts are parts and proceed from these, to the w exhibited in a corresponding intuition. On the contrary, exhibiting in an present here; I obtain them first by sy intuition, that is, constructing a concept is the synthetic act of defining. definitions of mathematics can never (A730/B758, PC 145) In other words, the construction of a concept, that through the definition. Mathematics s is, exhibiting a priori an intuition which corresponds to it, is tantamount definitions are never more than exp to giving a real definition of that concept. The very concept is made at analyzes (confused) given concepts the same time. "For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with the definitions. Analytic definitions of ph parts and proceed from these, to the whole. There are no characteristics be unsatisfactory, for example just be present here; I obtain them first by synthesis." (Logic, 70) Thus synthetic definitions of mathematics can never err, because the concept is given through the definition. Mathematics starts with definitions. Philosophical definitions are never more than expositions. (A730/B758) Philosophy analyzes (confused) given concepts and ends with analytic (alleged) definitions. Analytic definitions of philosophy can err in many ways, and be unsatisfactory, for example just because they can never be complete.

the thing, not the name", the real essence instead o Only a real definition defines predicates of a thing 76 CHAPTER 2 ontological sense. Other definitions define words or ood as referrin In philosophy concepts are made clear, whereas in mathematics clearg to a be underst should 'Real' sense. of a ination determ concepts are made. is, a synthetic predicate as a a real defi predicate. In "must [Sach-Erkliirungen] Real definitions or material ce), not to a logical referenexplanations definiti A real contain everything that is possible thinge itself". must "defineon is object.111ey possibl refers toinathe

the thing, not the name", the realnt. essence instead of the logical essence. judgme substit merely notreal ofona -thing which in the Only a real definition defines"..real predicates doesare which definiti but words, ible ontological sense. Other definitions define words or concepts in a logicalconta intellig more thing other object(-G) sense. 'Real' should be understood referring real predicate that(defin thea defined which to [Merkmal]asby makes which a determination of a y,thing objective th is, a synthetic predicate as and(with d with certaint cognize tion would explana reference), not to a logicalservice predicate. In applica a real definition expression tion. Real the able in its objective refers to a possible object. realonly definition is always a synthetic t but also the concep clearA not judgment. explanations which present the object in intuition, i (A242n "..real definition - whichconcep does not merely for the name)of"Real a d latter kind." of thissubstitute t, are of the ob on marker thing other more intelligible but contains a clear nt for cogniti are sufficie which words, possibility the always forth can [Merkmal] by which the defined object(G) (definitum) be of t by setting detenninations quotati these As cognized with certainty, charact and which explained concept on ." (Logicthe§106) eristicsmakes ons of definiti be than that any which makes serviceable in application. definiti Real explanation would richer ons are much a part of it. (Beck clear not only the conceptnot butonly alsotools its objective on, but Mathematical of cognitireality. derived be with explanations which presentreal the definiti object in intuition, in conformity the. 2 can on other predicates ts of synth (A242n) "Real definitions .. are those concept, are of this latter kind." ons are produc definiti e all real Becaus the oth On which are sufficient for becognition of theonsobject as tologic. its inner in general any real definiti in math e only of inner detenninations by setting forth thereal possibility of the out possibl areobject definitions above, regulati merelyreal characteristics." (Logic § 106) quotations logic is show, ndental clearly in transce rolethese their As definiti mere real words. Theyons arenor a definitions are much richer itthan any definitions neither because of is exactly deducti ts require it. (Beck 1984a, 294) From a ons. not only tools of cognition,metaph but a ysics, part ofthat its concep theo his 2 ing concern also real definition other predicates can ons be derived. is instructive definiti too comm allcannot the metaph Because all real definitions are products of synthetic acts,or, there clearly that shows an imag ing inspect eye" as mentioned be any real definitions in general themind's other hand, "the re, ofOn literatulogic. above, real definitions are possible only in mathematics. Accordingly, 2 'Real' must not be confused with 'real' in the modern se their role in transcendental logic is merely regulative. It willabout turnanout thatthing, actual not say anything n does real definitio actual. See "Logi or possible possibleare either which is nor a thing it is exactly because neitheris,real definitions axioms in possibility" in the next chapter. metaphysics, that its concepts require deductions. Kant's theory of real definitions is instructive also concerning his theory of pure intuition. It shows clearly that the metaphor, all too common in the secondary literature, of "the mind's eye" inspecting an image is beside the point, 2 'Real' must not be confused with 'real' in the modern sense as 'true' or 'really'. A real definition does not say anything about an actual thing, but about a real thing, that is, a thing which is either possible or actual. See "Logical possibility versus real possibility" in the next chapter.

content of a pure intuition generat e cannot be an image at all. 'Pur e int as a kind of confrontation with som 77 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD connection to some psychological (o and more than so, seriously misleading. Taking for granted that the 5. Discursof concept, content of a pure intuition generates the real definition iveavers us intuititive cog cannot be an image at all. 'Pure intuition' should be understood merely From the modern poin t of view, as a kind of confrontation with something und which given, without any erstis anding Kan t is to see how de connection to some psychological (or physiological) ideal of sensing. cognition dominates Kan mathematics and philosophy are cl 5. Discursive versus intuitive cognition what Kant call s rational cognition MA N 469 From the modem point of view, one of the greatest in, for Ka ) Irondifficulties ically enough othe r way round:or mathematical understanding Kant is to see how deeply the to 'apriorist' poin t out how ph of mathem ideal of cognition dominates Kant's thought. In other words, how philoso atics, that is, how mathematics and philosophy are closely the related. both ups does. sameThey way as matmake hematic reasons for that thes what Kant calls rational cognition [Vernunfterkenntnis]. (A714/B742, is. He him self s mathem MAN 469) Ironically enough, for Kant himself theatic problem was njust the al cognitio acco rding to other way round: to point out how philosophy follow thelemethods syntcannot hetic but verifiab a priori. In fac more and of mathematics, that is, how philosophy cannot verify ings to moritse judgments accurate thin s the same way as mathematics does. It is phil instructive examine Kant's osophy. to "Me taphysic s rests on reasons for that thesis. He himself startedmat byhem giving new account oftion to atics,a on thei r applica goo d fortune to ente mathematical cognition according to which mathematical judgments aresecure p r upo n the Philosophy synthetic but verifiable a priori. In fact, it sometimes seems has rdance procthat eedKant s in acco stateme more and more accurate things to say about mathematics about nts are grouthan nded on intuitio constructedalone philosophy. "Metaphysics rests on concepts not,n inlike , that is,- give intuitions, analyzed mathematics, on their application to intuition.. ..it has not yet had . Tha t is declare d the e.g. in a of nitio science." (Bxiv) good fortune to enter upon the secure pathcog n is reas on's cognition out of is reason's cog Philosophy proceeds in accordance with concepts while, nitimathematical on out of the constru t means to exh statements are grounded on intuition; con in cep mathematics concepts are ri the i ibit a prio concept constructed, that is, given in intuitions, while in philosophy, concepts . Thus for the construare ction of a will bestatement: required, "Philosophical analyzed. That is declared e.g. in a famous which, as intuition, i none themathematical less, as the con cognition is reason's cognition out of concepts; cognition struction of a c mus t in the pres To construct is reason's cognition out of the construction of concepts. enta tion exparess ge intuition s whicorresponds concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which ch fall undtoerthethe sam Cha pteras non-empirical 7. and 8. whereintuition concept. Thus for the construction of a concept these topics wi The differenobject(O), and yetis that o will be required, which, as intuition, is a particular ce just explained syntheti none the less, as the construction of a concept (acgeneral presentation), it s is i judgmen ts. Mathematic must in the presentation express general validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept." (A713/B741) (See Chapters 7. and 8. where these topics will be elaborated.) The difference just explained is that of different methods of arriving at synthetic judgments. Mathematics is intuitive. To justify a synthetic

Mathematics can conside r a concep t in concreto, present a general concep t in a corresp onding pure o · 78 CHAPTER 2 and accordingly, to cognize what are the propert ie phy alw s philoso Wherea 749) are (e.g. A721/B concep judgment I must go beyond thet. properties which contained in the abstra to, that is,totothe in abstracaccording concep concept. That means that general an object has tot only be detennined ce differen 62) The(A718/B746) betw 734/B7 lar case. particu either pure(Aor empirical. conditions of an intuition; the d ount to to tantam atics phy and in mathem concreto, thatis is, concretely Mathematics can considerphiloso a concept 719/B (A employ ment. versus its intuitiv intuition, present a general concept of inreason a corresponding pure ore empirical intuition~ of the on based ofpure atics the object of the and accordingly, to cognize Mathem what are the isproperties ac that t though be might It time. and concept. (e.g. A721/B749)space Whereas philosophy always has to consider a on definiti a this: likegeneral from a nt goesthe mathem atical that judgme is, to abstract general concept only in abstracto, which is made nt judgme A n. intuitio in a pure offollo particular case. (A734/B762) The difference between the methods "follow how this nceemployment t. It is of crucial concep philosophy and mathematics is tantamount to the importa discursive Kant r whethe ce a differen(A719/B747, Pr §7)is underst ood makes of reason versus its intuitive employment. propert ie n those betweeof made must beof distinct Mathematics is based on pureion intuition~ the forms sensibility: to belong and whichtojustKant, thingaccording t of athat in the beconcep thought a space and time. It might words, co in other same distinct make or to of aion concept is given mathematical judgment goes like this:the a definition §98) If (Logic t. the concep ed under versusiscontain in a pure intuition. A judgment made which follows directly from that the concep t of contain ed inis the which a propert yhow concept. It is of crucial importance thisis"following" understood; it that of cogniti on) - A is to the object is equal which or misunderstood. makes a difference whether Kant is understood a concep exhibit disclos ed by is properties states what those which are ing contained distinction must be made between Kant. That- mea ng to is analytic y just certainl which belong accordi to a thing (A718/B746) in the concept of a thing and of synthet very The is acquire knowleindge in idea the concept or to make the same distinction other words, d. contained contain ed is not ted,If which predica y is(Logic concept. §98) a judgment predicates versus contained under thepropert In synthe . to the subject yet belongs , but subject in the concept of the subject (of a sentence, a property which is contained t of the in the concep contain what -isthat beyond goof cognition) is, ifed a judgment merely which is equal to the object ways: eit in two thingthe y cana belong A propert states what is disclosed by exhibiting conceptto -a then judgment or nec iori; aposter nts no ampliative judgmethat of synthet is a case to Kant. Thaticmeans certainly is analytic according und priori. In order nts a judgments ic judgme synthet of very idea of synthetic is thattoa knowledge is acquired. The und to crucial it is a priori, possibl e in judgme property is predicated, which is nts notare contained the concept of the being thing, a to belong rily wenot must subject, but yet belongs to can the necessa subject. In synthetic judgmentsyet tha stressed be must also t. Itsubject. its concep essence go beyond what is contained in theofconcept of the (A718/B746) ty, logical necessi be, contingently cannoteither not,in and A property can belong to aisthing two ways: - that of Kant's teac the very heart is necessarily ndental. It or transce is a case of synthetic judgments aposteriori; - that is a case Chapte r 8 (See do. not will alone necessi logical In of synthetic judgments a priori. orderty to understand how synthetic judgments are possible a priori, it is crucial to understand how a property can necessarily belong to a thing, yet not being a part of the (logical) essence of its concept. It must also be stressed that necessity in this case is not, and cannot be, logical necessity, but could be called transcendental. It is the very heart of Kant's teaching that the notion of logical necessity alone will not do. (See Chapter 8.)

not unequivocally, Kant s distinction between being contained under a concept. This latter distinct ion tained in) of a concept79 KANT'S PHn..OSOPHICAL (con METHOD versus the under). (Logic §7) That which is con What is the difference between the properties which are contained in a logical essence. Thus to disclose th concept of a thing versus the properties which belong to a thing? procedure resulting in an analytic j Although not unequivocally, Kant seems to take this as equal to the property which belongs synthetical ly distinction between being contained in a concept and being contained analytically. Normally, only synthes is under a concept. This latter distinction is clearly that between the content presentation of the analytic-synthet ic (contained in) of a concept versus the extension of a concept (contained with the contain-metaphor. Kant also under). (Logic §7) That which is contained in a concept is part of its judgment is always thetic. Thus it logical essence. Thus to disclose the logical essence is ansyn analytic analytic-synthetic distinction is noth in procedure resulting in an analytic judgment. On the other hand, a intensionally clarifying - analytic property which belongs synthetically to a thing cannot be disclosed amplifying - synthetic judgments. analytically. Normally, only synthesis can disclose it. The 'canonical' It is plain that a judgment stating a presentation of the analytic-synthetic distinction (A6/BIO) is made just the extension of a concept is a synthet ic with the contain-metaphor. Kant also explicitly said that an existential judgments a priori? Are they also e judgment is always synthetic. Thus it is legitimate to conclude that the claimed in a transcendental proposit ion? analytic-synthetic distinction is nothing, else than a distinction between say 'cau se' has some properties whi ch intensionally clarifying - analytic judgments and extensionally from its essence, belong to it. The clai m amplifying - synthetic judgments. is claimed that to the concept of subj It is plain that a judgment stating aposteriori an object belonging to necessarily bound, although they are n the extension of a concept is a synthetic judgment. What about synthetic concept of 'bod y'. In summary, a thin gc judgments a priori? Are they also extensional judgments? What is 1) those which belong (necessarily ) to claimed in a transcendental proposition? It is not claimed that a concept, that is, to its concept. 2) do not belo ng to say 'cause' has some properties which necessarily, albeit not deriving necessarily to a thing. 3) belong con tinge from its essence, belong to it. The claim is extensional, a subsumption. It

is claimed that to the concept of subject ('body') causal relations are 6. Axioms, demonstrations and pro o the necessarily bound, although they are not in any way derived from "the exa ctne ss of mathematics rests kind of predicates: concept of 'body'. In summary, a thing can have three dem ons trati ons .. non e of thing, these .. can b 1) those which belong (necessarily) to the logical essence of the pher."essence, (A727/Bbut 755belong ) Kant adhered that is, to its concept. 2) do not belong tophil theoso logical method ch presupposed the apodictic necessarily to a thing. 3) belong contingently to awhi thing.

words, an axiomatic system for Kan t is shows what follows, if the axioms 6. Axioms, demonstrations and proofs are tr axioms could always be true with out

"the exactness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations .. none of these .. can be achieved or imitated by the philosopher." (A727/B755) Kant adhered to the conception of axiomatic method which presupposed the apodictic truth of the axioms. In other words, an axiomatic system for Kant is not just a formal play, which shows what follows, if the axioms are true. How is it possible that the axioms could always be true without any possibility of error? The

ri. certain synthetic propositions a prio ain. (A cert ly error, their truth is apodictical 80 CHAPTER 2 ause it is i possible only in mathematics, bec ms, Lhe certain of the axio ic certaint apodictaxioms answer is simply that for Kant arey intuItIve fundamental . The requirement of guaranteed is synthetic is, renc theyesare judgments a priori, propositions [Grundsiitze], thatinfe ly. The inference is eralare inference gen cal intuitions. to logi given, or better, generated through pure They immediately ascertained. isses is the premthere truth ofBecause certain synthetic propositions the a priori. is no room for on' in a strict tation of 'ded ucti interpre certain. (A732/B760ft) Axioms are error, their truth is apodicticallyThe criticism - correc~ly heavy (ibid). such n under possible only in mathematics, bee because it is intuitive Given the understood as mere 's n bee es etim som e hav apodictic certainty of the axioms, 'lhe certainty of the conclusions of proofs for Kan t a truth. All farther fromofthe inferences is guaranteed. The requirement apodictic certainty applies apodictic certainty - pr rences yiel infeinference to logical inference generally. The is ding not allowed to start unless Kant, philo certain. However, according to the truth of the premisses is ascertained. its demonstrations an atics insense hemlogical imitate in amat strict has recently The interpretation of 'deduction' to imitate mathemat like not ld wou t Kan that been under such heavy criticism - correc~ly - that even Kant's proofs - but his po like to docould he wouldNothing what 'stories'. ctlymere exaas be have sometimes been understood cannot do it. In we , fact of ter mat a farther from the truth. All proofs for Kant are meant to be syllogistic in intuition, and ac that is, give constructed inferences yielding apodictic certainty - ,provided then premisses are ilable.. In philosophy rilnde] are ava eisgphilosophy certain. However, according to[Bew Kant, is not allowed to ts are not given in is, concep available, that imitate mathematics in its demonstrations and proofs. The reason is not otherwise given. or are the intellec-t on from that Kant would not like to imitate mathematics the contrary, that is e a distinction betw ee Kanist mak How hisdid point that, unfortunately, as exactly what he would like to do - but mere concepts, was based on do chit.clea In rlymathematics concepts are a matter of fact, we cannot whi based on philosophic which was secure phyaccordingly, philoso constructed, that is, given in intuition, and premisses e concepts a based ontomer osophy also [Beweisgrunde] are available In phil philosophy, no recourse intuition is t is indeed wha t Kan ursive? Tha ely disc mer available, that is, concepts are not given in intuition, but either descend som e em is just empty unless it is given. from the intellect or are otherwisesyst au bec ty was emp metaphysics metaphysics, uctivisticdeductivistic Dedbetween How did Kant make a distinction tely from mere conc edia immhis the real and which clearly was based on mereofconcepts, new transcendental ty play of concepts, unles would be an emp philosophy which was based on philosophical proofs? Is transcendental ctive reality. Kan t's metaphysic give it obje as Kant so often says? Is itinal p philosophy also based on mere concepts ediately. Discursive card imm merely discursive? That is indeed but whatnot Kant means. However, the whole whic of the concepts from deduction anchored in intuition. system is just empty unless it prio is rsomehow scendental propositions can not tran ds, wor Deductivistic metaphysics was empty because it tried to obtain cognition s. concept of the real immediately from mere concepts. Likewise mathematics would be an empty play of concepts, unless empirical intuition were to give it objective reality. Kant's metaphysics is based on mere concepts, but not immediately. Discursive cardinal propositions always require a prior deduction of the concepts from which they are derived. In other words, transcendental propositions cannot be derived immediately from concepts. 0

the pure concepts is the task of T significance of some of the pure con chapter the "System of all Cardin 81 al P KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD of the pure concepts are given (pr The task of the part of the Analytics, preceding the systematic possibi lity of experie nce is involved presentation of cardinal propositions, is toclear show how the concepts how and inpure what phase that pr are anchored to intuition. To establish thenot objective reality of presentvalidity alreadyor in TD? Transcen the pure concepts is the task of TD. Inrules the for Schematism the sensible the synthesis of empirical i significance of some of the pure conceptsofis experie exhibited - and lastly in the nce is relevant and neces chapter the "System of all Cardinal Propositions" son1e application-rules [transcendental proposition] is called of the pure concepts are given (proved). In transcendental proofs the and not a theorem [Lehrsatz] - notw possibility of experience is involved as a premiss. It is important to make because it has the peculiar proper clear how and in what phase that premiss is introduced. Is that premiss experience, possible in the first place not present already in TD? Transcendental propositions to be proved are it." (A737/B765) (See Chapter 8.) rules for the synthesis of empirical intuition. That is why the possibility This achoring to intuition makes of experience is relevant and necessary as a presupposed premiss. "It double sense. Firstly, transcende proposition [Grundsatz] [transcendental proposition] is called a cardinal experience. However, for Kant this and not a theorem [Lehrsatz] - notwithstanding that it must be proved doubt that it does not in any way because it has the peculiar property of making its proving ground, Hypotheses are not allowed in the t experience, possible in the first place and must always be presupposed in the transcendental propositions are a it." (A737/B765) (See Chapter 8.) of experience. Nothing factual is cla This achoring to intuition makes the all whole system conditional in a cognition a priori is cognition of th double sense. Firstly, transcendental proofs presuppose possible The problem for Kant is how t experience. However, for Kant this seems to ben. so much beyond any cognitio Contrary to what is so doubt that it does not in any way make his ed reasoning hypothetical. explain in detail - Kant does not Hypotheses are not allowed in the transcendental Secondly, reasoning. reasoning. What is new are question the transcendental propositions are a priori conditions of the possibility answers - a new argumentative strateg of experience. Nothing factual is claimed. Kant so pertinently says, He As relies heavily on the syllogistic l all cognition a priori is cognition of the mere possibility. much more perfect than anybody wou The problem for Kant is how to attain certainty in philosophical view. For Kant, the only binding cognition. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed - although not (syllogistic) logic. However, as alrea explained in detail - Kant does not present any logically new ways of Kant's criticis m against his rationalis new ways of searching for reasoning. What is new are questions and cogniti on is possible merely from con answers - a new argumentative strategy -tonot any new procedures. show, howlogical metaphysical cognition He relies heavily on the syllogistic logic of his day, and took it to be The problem amounts to finding se much more perfect than anybody would admit from the modem point of view. For Kant, the only binding and secure proofs are those of (syllogistic) logic. However, as already mentioned before, the heart of Kant's criticism against his rationalistic predecessors is that no genuine cognition is possible merely from concepts. Accordingly, Kant's task is to show, how metaphysical cognition nevertheless is possible a priori. The problem amounts to finding secure premisses a priori, that is,

clearly saw - unlike his predecessors, and m philosophers - that taking logical inference 82 CHAPTER 2 of arguing cannot lead to any growth of kno concepts which can be shown not to be empty concepts. In that case does not result in cognition of the real. The p inferences would not have only logical grounds, but real grounds as well. follow some logical laws, but rather to fin - Kant's new argumentative strategy is a result of his criticism of the such logical inferences. Indeed, the hea deductivistic way of arguing. Despite Kant's heavy reliance on logic, he something new is introduced in an intuition. clearly saw - unlike his predecessors, and modem scientifically minded new, viz. a synthetic premiss, makes the wh~l philosophers - that taking logical inference as the only acceptable form is how Kant thought that mathematics is synt of arguing cannot lead to any growth of knowledge at all. Formal logic The term which Kant is using to denote a does not result in cognition of the real. The 'Deduction' problem of arguing is not 'deduction'. is also used intoa non follow some logical laws, but rather to find or establish premisses of justification quite generally. Already this ind such logical inferences. Indeed, the kind heartof of syntheticity thathas not any deductive proofis- as something new is introduced in thought. an intuition. Thistointroducing something as a lo Indeed, take a 'deduction' wh~le procedure synthetic. That new, viz. a synthetic premiss, makes the notion upside-down. The reason why deduc is how Kant thought that mathematics synthetic. that inisthose cases Beweisgrunde neither f The tenn which Kant is using to denote a justification of a concept proofs are available, which wouldis di 'deduction'. 'Deduction' is alsojustifications. used in a non-technical sense to denote a de Or to put it in another way, justification quite generally. Already indicates a 'deduction' is no no realthis definitions arethat available. The most not any kind of deductive proof as has often and mistakenly been of course, the Transcendental Deduction thought. Indeed, to take a 'deduction' as aislogical is to put deduction neededproof to justify theKant's concept notion upside-down. The reasontranscendental why deductions are needed, is exactly proofs, that is, the proofs of t that in those cases Beweisgrunde neither for intuitive nor for logical establish "the objective validity of the conc proofs are available, which would directly yield the desired their a priori synthesis" is the task execu justifications. Or to put it in another way, deductions are required where Deduction. no real definitions are available. The most notable case of a deduction is, While 'deduction' for Kant is a general of course, the Transcendentalconsequent Deductionalthough of the misleading Categories. for Thathim deduction is needed to justifydeductions the concepts which are to be used as well. But 'transcendentalinproo the cardinal propositions. To jus transcendental proofs, that is, the in proofs a strictofsense for a certain kind of establish "the objective validitypropositions. of the concepts and the possibility of That a deduction accomplis their a priori synthesis" is theindicated task executed by "Whenever, the Transcendental by Kant: therefore, a Deduction. synthetically added to the concept of a thing While 'deduction' for Kant not is aproof, general tenn for justification, it islegiti at least a deduction of the consequent although misleading forbehim to talk about proofs as is supplied." (A233/B286) The task should deductions as well. But 'transcendental proof' is used most importantly in a strict sense for a certain kind of justification of transcendental propositions. That a deduction accomplishes less than a proof is indicated by Kant: "Whenever, therefore, a detennination a priori is synthetically added to the concept of a thing, it is indispensable that, if not proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of such an assertion should be supplied." (A233/B286) The task is to consider in more detail,

7. Transcendental proofs according

83 AsMETHOD is the case with many other con KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL

used by Kant both in a general and a m what Kant means by 'deduction' and by the conditions he set for generally - and that is his most com transcendental proofs. "attempted independently of empirical the proofs of the traditional metaphysi 7. Transcendental proofs according to Kant metaphysica specialis belong to this c As is the case with many other concepts, is the one used proof' in the present s which is'transcendental 3 used by Kant both in a general and a more technical sense. He means means a proof of a transcendental (f is generally - and that is his most comnlon use makes - a proof, which sometimes Kant's discussion c "attempted independently of empiricaltranscendental principles". (A614/B642) Thus proofs in the general generalis (ontology), the proofs of the traditional metaphysica notoffeasible. attempted proofs which areand metaphysica specialis belong to this category. In atranscendental technical sense proposition proofs of the study - a 'transcendental which is the one used in the present the understanding, that is, proof' transcendent proposition. What Howe means a proof of a transcendental (fundamental) are the ones which are feasible. sometimes makes Kant's discussion confusing is that heother deals withof attem effort to discussing kinds transcendental proofs in tlle generalonsense, that is including also that the concepts of reason itself, Kant's teaching is that-only the attempted proofs which are not feasible.'something transcendent or transcenden based on the pure concepts of proofs of the transcendental propositions attempted to be proved. These proofs of the understanding, that is, transcendental proofs in the technical sense, to illusion only, because no real Bewe are the ones which are feasible. However, devotes considerable course,Kant is Kant's main criticism of rati effort to discussing other kinds of attempted proofs, namely those proofs will conditions of transcendentalbased on the concepts of reason itself, that more is, thedetailed ideas of reason. In fact, how tran examination of something transcendent - or transcendental in the pre-Kantian sense - isexperie and what is the role of 'possible attempted to be proved. These proofs ofproofs, traditional can lead willmetaphysics be postponed until Cha to illusion only, because no real Beweisgriinde are available. This, of next s deduction will be examined in the course, is Kant's main criticism of rationalistic metaphysics. General Much has already been said about be examined inproofs. this section. The the s conditions of transcendental proofs willtranscendental To establish proofs are possible, more detailed examination of how transcendental priori, called cardinal (or fundamental) or of pure intuitions in theseHoweve and what is the role of 'possible experience' of transcendental philosophy. 8. cognition Kant's conception proofs, will be postponed until Chapter synthetic a priori are of transcen deduction will be examined in the next section. It should keptand in mind Much has already been said about4 the needbefor the that aimallofproofs ar higher faculty of inference and has the unders transcendental proofs. To establish the system of synthetic propositions a in the Kant refers to 'transcendental proofs' A615/B643, A629/B657, and in priori, called cardinal (or fundamental) propositions, is the ultimate goalthe Tra A786/B814, A787/B815, A788/B816, A789/B8 of transcendental philosophy. However, not all proofs resulting in synthetic cognition a priori are transcendental. The other kind of proofs 4 It should be kept in mind that all proofs are the proofs of reason. Reason is the

higher faculty of inference and has the understanding as its object. (A643/B671ff) Kant refers to 'transcendental proofs' in the Dialectic: A591/B619, A614/B642, A615/B643, A629/B657, and in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method: A786/B814, A787/B815, A788/B816, A789/B817

priori - because philosophy cannot exhi has to accomplish its proofs in two step 84 CHAPTER 2 concept on which a transcendental prop are mathematical demonstrations. 'empty' Philosophy has but nohasrecourse concep~, objectivetovalid demonstrations. (A734/B762) Unlike philosophy cannot themathematics, proof of a transcendental proposit conditions which every transcende proceed directly from concepts to some establish synthetic propositions a these isitsexactly thatinthe first step always priori - because philosophy cannot exhibit concepts intuition - but is to show has to accomplish its proofs in two steps. The first step proof. any transcendental The that firstastep concept on which a transcendental proposition to be based is nota anprelim Although aisdeduction is only or reality. The itsecond 'empty' concep~, but has objective validity transcendental proof, seemsstep to beis so th introduced the proof of a transcendental proposition. of CPR Kant causedexplicitly much more trouble and some conditions which every transcendental proof has to satisfy. One ofan im themselves. Accordingly, it creates these is exactly that the first step always has toconcern be accomplished priorjust to som the main and the proofs any transcendental proof. The first step The is called a "deduction". need by forKant transcendental proofs, o step inofaccomplishing a Although a deduction is only a prelimin~ry a direct derivation o the impossibility transcendental proof, it seems to be soput that the Transcendental Deduction several times in the same way, e.g. of CPR caused much more trouble and work for Kant than the proofs pure reason, in its merely speculative themselves. Accordingly, it creates anfound impression, the Deduction a single that synthetic judgment is direct the main concern and the proofs just something subsidiary. we have shown, ideas cannot fonn the The need for transcendental proofs, or - have what objective amounts to the same which validity. Through of transcendental is car the impossibility of a direct derivation reason does, indeed,propositions, establish secure put several times in the same way, e.g.: "Now in concepts the wholealone, domain directly from but of always pure reason, in its merely speculative employment, is not to altogeth be of these conceptsthere to something found a single synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, experience." (A736/B764) Kant as though we have shown, ideas cannot fonn the basis of isany synthetic judgment experience taken for granted the pro of understanding pureof a which have objective validity. Through concepts as in mathematics, although certain reason does, indeed, establish secure cardinal propositions, not however In the section "The discipline of pure directly from concepts alone, but always indirectly throughKant relation The only Doctrine of Method explains of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely possible are needed: "What distinguishes the pro experience." (A736/B764) Kant thought that when propositions fromthe all possibility other proofsof whic experience is taken for granted the proofs certainty; as priori isyield that, apodictic in the case of the fonner, a different certain as in mathematics, although ofmeans of itskind. concepts, directly to the ob In the section "The discipline of pure reason validity in regardoftothe its proofs" conceptsofand objective The Doctrine of Method Kant explains why transcendental synthesis." (A782/B810) deductions He also sets for are needed: "What distinguishes the aproofs of transcendental transcendental proof. Thesynthetic criterion is: propositions from all other proofs which yield a synthetic cognition a priori is that, in the case of the former, reason may not apply itself, by means of its concepts, directly to the object, but must first establish the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their a priori synthesis." (A782/B810) He also sets forth a criterion and three rules for a transcendental proof. The criterion is: "Proofs of the assertions of pure

the proof is of such a kind that it leg 85 The rules are as follows (A786/B814): rule; the necessity of reason are not to be conducted in a way 1st leading straightway to the thededucti Prior to any proof the sources of desired predicate but by means of the principle of the possibility of is based them." must be refle expanding our given concept a priori towhich ideas the andproof of realizing expect success our inferences. (A785/B813) In other words, one must first examine andinmake sure that The of proof. "..not to try a for the the proof is of such a kind that it legimately cankind 'extend our concept'. The rules are as follows (A786/B814): preceding reflection and justification o will be taken, viz. the c of the Beweisgrund: 1st rule; the necessity of the deduction propositions are to be propositions based, and with Prior to any proof the sources of theproofs fundamental on what inferences." which the proof is based must be reflected upon: with what right we may 2ndhave rule;tothe a proof expect success in our inferences. The sources beuniqueness legitimate of just There is andproofs can without be only one for the kind of proof. "..not to try any transcendental proposition. A transcendental proposit preceding reflect'ion and justification of, from what sources the cardinal and predicates theonsynthetic conditio propositions will be taken, viz. the cardinal propositions which the according to this concept. "The proofs are to be based, and with what right we.may expect success in our proof the detennination of an object gene inferences." which also is one only." (A788/B816) 2nd rule; the uniqueness of a proof has troubled many commentators - si There is and can be only one proof for each transcendental rule merely to employ concept in q proposition. A transcendental proposition correct starts with onethe concept 3rd rule: proofs must never be apag and predicates the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object "Thecan direct or ostensive proof, in according to this concept. "The proof therefore contain nothing but which joins conviction of the truth wit the detennination of an object generatim according to this concept, the apagogic proof can -produce which also is one only." (A788/B816) Accordingly, uniquesness which certa themeans truth in respect its nexus has troubled many commentators - simply that there of is only one with apagogic proof has a logical fonn of correct rule to employ the concept in question. Anbut inference is drawn from the falsity 3rd rule: proofs must never be apagogic, always ostensive. of the proposition to the falsity "The direct or ostensive proof, in every kind of cognition, is thatitself. The into reason why a transcendental p which joins conviction of the truth with insight its sources; whereas direct could be stated simply th the apagogic proof can produce certaintyalways but not comprehensibility of logic the principle of bivalence "eve the truth in respect of its nexus with the grounds of its possibility." An is not valid. 36ff) Pre apagogic proof has a logical fonn of an -indirect proof (Brittan (modus 1978, tollens). the distinction between the principle An inference is drawn from the falsity of a consequence of a proposition contradiction, namely "a judgment to the falsity of the proposition itself. KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

The reason why a transcendental proof must never be apagogic, but always direct could be stated sin1ply that in the domain of transcendental logic the principle of bivalence - "every judgment is either true or false" - is not valid. (Brittan 1978, 36ff) Presumably Kant did not see clearly the distinction between the principle of bivalence and the principle of contradiction, namely "a judgment cannot be both true and false".

they were lacking a definite truth-value. (in the Ant To put it in2 another way: a transcendental proof 86 CHAPTER proof, because in the domain of transcendental log (Brittan, ibid.) However, he notand putthe thefalsity matterofina this way. On the falsity s imply premis truth thedid contrary, he takes all judgments to be either true or false. (A503/B531) give could proof ic still in another way: an apagog Anyhow, Kant called transcendental logic the logic of truth. In case the where presuppositions of the conclusion were lac presuppositions of truth and falsity were not satisfied he claimed that conclusion is maintained to be objectively ,valid, sayingive thatvalid both a judgment and its contradiction are can false,only instead haveofsubject of the premiss they were lacking a definiteexampl truth-value. the Antinomies, in the Dialectic ic proofs areibid) apagog es of (in To put it in another way:lead a transcendental mies. cannot be an apagogic to the Antinoproof of the transcendental logic in some cases both s sy proof, because in the domain In concern ise "as enterpr transcendental premiss falsity consequence. Or asse the truth and the falsity of acannot justify one's ed at ofalla to permitt be imply still in another way: an apagogic proof could give a conclusion in a case opposite [as do apagogic proofs]. For either this re conclusion For example, where presuppositions of the t of the a oppo of the conflic ation lacking. presentwere a mere be objectively ,valid, although predicate conclusion is maintained tosubject lity by o hensibi comprethe ons of ive conditi of the premiss can only have subjective validity. Kant's prominent contributes nothing to a rejection of the matter its in the Heined shows how theyand examples of apagogic proofs arewhat tively affinna been mainta has Dialectic. both lead to the Antinomies. is false, and apagogically, through the refutatio In the transcendental enterprise "as concerns synthetic propositions, it cannot arrive at a cognition of truth." (A792/B820 cannot be pennitted at all gogic to justify assertions by refuting necess izing the the s to emphas amount proofsone's opposite [as do apagogic proofs]. For either this refutation is nothing but t dental deduction: "everyone must conduc his ca conflict the opposite opiniondeducti with the a mere presentation of thelegal on of t transcendental proofofthrough subjective conditions of comprehensibility by our reason and it thus that one can see what speaks in favor of his claim or both ... , r contributes nothing to a rejection of the matter itself.../.. the structu aboutsides dispute porary contem In the of the object both what has been maintained affirmatively and negatively Deduction some writers frequently refer to this ru is false, and apagogically, throughntheagainst refutation the opposite, one s (like Amerik thoseof who objectio truth." (A792/B820) Thus, forbidding apacannot arrive at a cognition of Deduction is a regressive argument in the sens a prior transcengogic proofs amounts to emphasizing necessity for gran is taken , but provedof is not experience the dental deduction: "everyoneKant's must conduct histhat case by means of proofs a directmust ndental transce statement of the grounds of proof, so ive legal proof through transcendental deduction regress a be exactly that the Deduction cannot that one can see what speaksainmisund favor of his claims." better, a lack of und ing (or(A794/B822) erstand In the contemporary dispute about the structure of the Transcendental l Deduction endenta dimensions: 1) the Transc an or Deduction some writers frequently thisof rule. It isbut presented a prelimiasnary Kant, sense the to proof inrefer objection against those who (like Ameriks 1978) claim that the Deduction is a regressive argument in the sense that the possibility of experience is not proved, but is taken for granted. It is claimed that Kant's statement that transcendental proofs must not be apagogic, means exactly that the Deduction cannot be a regressive argument. Now, this is a misunderstanding (or better, a lack of understanding) of multiple dimensions: 1) the Transcendental Deduction is not a transcendental proof in the sense of Kant, but a preliminary or preparatory step of such

regressive manner. But apagogic-/o distinctions are widely different, an 87 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD belongs to formal logic and conc inferen a proof. Thus the 3rd rule is not applicable to ce, it. (See whilenext the section latter concern below.) 2) Maybe it is Kant's talk about argume ostensive proofs which hasThus a ntative examination. ion of the mislead commentators to regard them asconvict progressive (synthetic) truth withininsight as well. Kant's sense and consequently apagogic proofs asInproceeding a fact other inlogical sy es of this. 3) the Transcenden regressive manner. But apagogic-/ostensiveexampl and regressive/progressive argume nt in the sense distinctions are widely different, and unrelated distinctions. The of former Ameriks. (S belongs to fonnal logic and concerns the logical form of a logical 8. What is a (transcinendent inference, while the latter concerns the order of exposition any al) de argumentative examination. TIlus an ostensiveToproof that which joins state what a transcendental d sources been - could be regressive conviction of the truth with insight into its already said of deductions ab as well. In fact other logical syllogisms exept modus tollens justific ation; not a rigorouare s proof, examples of this. 3) the Transcendental Deduction is indeed Kant's word for aa regressive logical deduction argument in the sense of Ameriks. (See Chapter below.) (See 4transla tor's note to §30 in CJ. proof or a logical inference could f 8. What is a (transcendental) deduction? typically syllogistic inferences are 'deduct To state what a transcendental deduction is, ion' is to is repeat has dedu not what a logical justific ation has general sense a legal heavily already been said of deductions above. The beenis recently Henrich justification; not a rigorous proof, and not a logical deduction 1989b) That is either. also put so cl Kant's word for a logical deduction in thedifficul modem is eAbleitung. t to sense conceiv how Kant coul point. being more rigorous, a (See translator's note to §30 in CJ.) However, It has a deduction too. of In contem fact, pora proof or a logical inference could function as been a thesis the only typically syllogistic inferences are parts that of Kant's deductions. acceptableThat argument argume 'deduction' is not a logical deduction but ants.less rigorous legal Despite the fact that I pe that the thesis justification has been recently heavily emphasized by many writers., I(e.g. is correct cannot any by Kant (A84/B 116), it is first p Henrich 1989b) That is also put so clearly could have emerge d that at the difficult to conceive how Kant could haveserious beenlymisunderstood on this by many philoso phers. T inferences, is a fundamental featu point. everybody. minded It has been a thesis of contemporary scientifically philosophy How could it then be nts are that the only acceptable arguments areargume strictly logically logicalldeductive y deductive? W morepresumably comprehensive arguments. Despite the fact that I personally once general believed premiss conclus ion? This conceive how would this illusion that the thesis is correct, I cannot any longer mean that could have emerged at the first place and could have been taken seriously by many philosophers. That truth is preserved in logical inferences, is a fundamental feature of fonnal logic accepted by everybody. How could it then be claimed that the only acceptable arguments are logically deductive? Why should we be forced to accept a more comprehensive general premiss first in order to accept a particular conclusion? This would mean that it is impossible to argue for any

as one of his assumptions. predecessors was objection against his rationalistic cognition. 88 CHAPTER procedu2res cannot amount to real logical introduction of premisses. Thi t is the although argumenalready, anysomehow novelties at all, or that we implicitly, are in me ant feature of argu that unimport but not for Certainly trivial possession of all possible knowledge. the point of most how - say Hume - simp ements which ous stat Kant's tovari disputes is to get the antagonist accept something is not counted correct conclusions, is exa opinion, in Kan ain,has certAs as one of his assumptions. beent'snoted repeatedly, Kant's main ial 'fac ts'. (e.g. A767/B n to some cruc pay attentio objection against his rationalistic predecessors was exactly that mere ts are logic~l deducti ing argumen bindcognition. logicall logical procedures cannotonly amount to yreal A crucial point of t has to be logically bind ry argumen follow thatofeve any argument is the introduction premisses. This seemingly rather s than to accept n for noveltie to argu no other way trivial but not for that unimportant feature of earguments is exhibited by l. - simply did not come to as wel men- tssay Kant's various statementsargu how Hume cal inferences een logi inction betw The dist certain, in Kant's opinion, correct conclusions, is exactly that he did not een logical distinctionOfbetw Kant's us to (e.g. analogo pay attention to some crucial 'facts'. A767/B795) course the do not bring an inferencesBut Logicaldeductions. possibility. it does not only logically binding arguments are logic~l em philosophers, Kant thi mod e Lik on. ussi disc follow that every argument has to be logically binding. Indeed, there is s an licit in the concepts. Thu t isto imp lose wha no other way to argue for disc novelties than accept non-logically binding ts. K judgmen taken as a judgment, is an analytic arguments as well. ments. What makes ju thetic judgand r, is syn howeve The distinction between logical inferences deductions is ng new is introduced. An introd somethi exactly that analogous to Kant's distinction between logical possibility and real whe or by an exposition, ition anything either by possibility. Logical inferences do an notintu bring new to the of intuition is somehow sibility nition - the pos discussion. Like modem cog philosophers, Kant thinks that they only ter deduction is to justify a of a any purposeThus e, the plac the concepts. logical inference, disclose what is implicit in r on. in a proof late be usedjudgments. analytic Kant's main concern, taken as a judgment, is anis to k? What is the uctions worsynthetic t's dedjudgments Kanmakes How do however, is synthetic judgments. What is these general questions pre er answ To ? ons ucti ded exactly that something new is introduced. An introduction can take place uction'. In tran sense of- 'ded of the widewherein either by an intuition or bec by ause an exposition, to attain real . W concepts is established of certaininbedded. cysomehow legitimais theintuition cognition - the possibility of In the first eral answer is available, no agen mean? isAga place, the purpose of a deduction to in, justify term or a concept which ted to a certain domain. is to be used in a proof laterlegi on. timacy is rela keep in mind Kan t's division iveistothe is instruct How do Kant's deductions Itwork? What general procedure of right. To prove the latter is t those of precisely fact andquestions is not possible deductions? To answer theseofgeneral arly that something is the case is Cle ) 116 4/B (A8 because of the wide sense of 'deduction'. In transcendental deductions te (legally obtained) is fact is legitima how that is established. What does 'legitimacy' the legitimacy of certain concepts has to be preceded by int deduction because s eveisryavailable, mean? Again, no general Thu answer in each case legitimacy is related to a certain domain. It is instructive to keep in mind Kant's division of questions into those of fact and those of right. To prove the latter is the task of deductions. (A84/B 116) Clearly that something is the case is a question of fact, and how that fact is legitimate (legally obtained) is the question of right. Thus every deduction has to be preceded by introducing somehow the

case in point. No reasons are presented wh 89 forms of sensibility, which are in need of a the the other hand, the section preceding th concept to be dealt with, and conversely, task of a indeduction is never concepts, calledcases "the this Metaphysic is pure the case. In some to establish the fact that somethingthe great deal of trouble to show that the introduction is done without any explicit reasons why just this concept is concepts he isoflooking after. the appropriate one. The transcendental deduction space and time is a nearly commentators case in point. No reasons are presented Many, why just theseall concepts are the take it doubt that TD, or any transcendental ded forms of sensibility, which are in need of a transcendental deduction. On transcendental proof. deduction (for a notable exc the other hand, in the section preceding the transcendental of 'Transcendental proof' could now be taken the pure concepts, called "the Metaphysical Deduction", Kant takes a which the categories are has just something the pure to do great deal of trouble to show that justification However, I do not see any point of doing concepts he is looking after. suchita for clear conception of further what a proof Many, nearly all commentators take granted without used - whereas 'proof' is not is a- in a doubt that TD, or any transcendental deduction for that matter, justification. Here I mean and take comme transcendental proof. (for a notable exception see Seebohm 1982) sense discussed 'Transcendental proof' could now beexactly taken asina Kant's label generally for any above. deduction is not a transcen justification which has something transcendental to, do with the 'transcendental'. it matter we call ahad transcende doing Does so, when Kantif himself However, I do not see any point of sense. It certainly does, because it determines wh such a clear conception of what a proof is. 'Deduction' is sometimes proofs are applicable to or not. B used - whereas 'proof' is not - in a loose sense to denoteit any misunderstanding on too this- apoint, justification. Here I mean - and take commentators to mean proof I will repetitions my major reasons exactly in Kant's sense discussed above. It seems to be clear thatwhy a a dedu as transcendental transcendental deduction is not a transcendental proofproof. in that technical 1) The deduction first pointa proof to be or made not? is alrea sense. Does it matter if we call a transcendental proofs for Kant are strictly logical It certainly does, because it determines whether Kant's requirements for proofs striving for. A there proof is cannot get off the g so much proofs are applicable to it or not. Because premisses to start with. Kant's rationale fo misunderstanding on this point, I will list - although with some to not justify premisses. Thi repetitions - my major reasons why aintroduce deductionand should be regarded justification cannot be strictly logical; if i as transcendental proof. any mentioned reason to present deduction, bu 1) The first point to be made is been already severala times: have been employed On proofs for Kant are strictly logical proofs. At least that isfrom whatthe he outset. is logical proofs inside a deduction is not in a striving for. A proof cannot get off the ground unless there are secure two for keypresenting passages ofdeductions TD are logical premisses to start with. Kant's rationale is to inferen and the third section of§26. (See Chapter 4 introduce and to justify premisses. This kind of introduction and KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

1

justification cannot be strictly logical; if it were, there would not have been any reason to present a deduction, but the logical procedure could have been employed from the outset. On the other hand, the use of logical proofs inside a deduction is not in any way excluded. In fact, the two key passages of TD are logical inferences: the five sentences of §20 and the third section of§26. (See Chapter 4.)

transcen to the object but first must prove the objectiv the possibi 90 CHAPTER 2 lity of their synthesis a priori". (A7 what was said above under 1): a deduction is n 2) It is required by Kant that prior to any transcendental proof, the A transcendental deduction is exactly that kind be shown. In proofs objective validity of the relevant concepts has to transce proof,ofbut ndental must precede any transcendental propositions "reason is not allowed to apply itself directly transcendental proof. In fact, if a transcen concepts to the object but first must prove thendental objective validity the re ngly and accordi proof and of transce (A782/B810) This amounts to the possibility of their synthesis a priori". to validity of concepts should be applied the is needed to justify a premiss. what was said above under 1): a deduction impossible. A transcendental deduction its~lf of preliminary step which A transcendental deduction is exactly that, kind of validity and the categories are the ultima itself a case of a must precede any transcendental proof, but is not admit of any further explanation. transcendental proof. In fact, if a transcendental deduction were a 3) A transcendental proof is not based m transcendental proof and accordingly the requirementtransce of showing proofs ndental the necessary premiss of all validity of concepts should be applied to the very deduction. But that is does introduce this premiss, although exp impossible. A transcendental deduction its~lf is that kind of explanation Schematism: the categories as detenninations not is t of validity, and the categories are the ultimate any concepts, proof ndentaldo transcewhich 4) The aim of admit of any further explanation. synthetic proposition a priori, viz. a cardina merely on concepts, but a 3) A transcendental proof is not based But TD is not a proof of any proposition at a necessary premiss of all transcendental proofs isconcep possible experience. TD l at stake. Certain ts is reality of certain does introduce this premiss, although explicitly stated first in the linguistic form like the sentence: "the categ Schematism: the categories as detenninations of time. possibility of experience and are valid a p 4) The aim of any transcendental proof isBut to prove thea correctness of a tio cardinal proposi it is not experience" synthetic proposition a priori, viz. a cardinal proposition [Grundsatz]. empirical judgme nts'; thus not a transcende But TD is not a proof of any proposition at all. The objective validity or further discussion of the status of this kind of the result must be put in a reality of certain concepts is at stake. Certainly be omitted here.) linguistic form like the sentence: "the categories are conditions of the 5) The peculiarity of transcendental proof a priori also of all objects of possibility of experience and are valid proposition there is only one proof, becaus experience" But it is not a cardinal proposition in a sense of a 'schema of always based on a certain concept. This re empirical judgments'; thus not a transcendental proposition at all. (A sense if TD were a case of transcendental pr further discussion of the status of this kind of metameta-propositions will concept. Moreover, it could hardly be maint be omitted here.) Kant that only one deduction is possible, wh proofs is that for every cardinal 5) The peculiarity of transcendental on deducti in the B-edition in a totally revise a transcendental proof is proposition there is only one proof, because the deduction in the Prolegomena. always based on a certain concept. requirement not ion makeand an exposit on is would A deducti 6) This sense if TD were a case of transcendental TD is notlves based on one but con proofs themse are not Definitionsproof. concept. Moreover, it could hardly be maintained very convincingly by Kant that only one deduction is possible, when he himself presented the deduction in the B-edition in a totally revised manner - not to mention the deduction in the Prolegomena. 6) A deduction is an exposition and thus a kind of definition. Definitions are not themselves proofs but constituents of proofs.

uncritically that a presentation can r affected by it. Kant had 91 also a KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL way METHOD can present things as they are in 9. Establishing transcendental philosophy Copernican Revolution is exactly th an object being When Kant wrote the First Critique he already hadwithout the results of affected his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 at his disposal. Some ofwas the ideas of started CPR by revolution already - especially those concerning space and time - are already there. time as the merepresent fonns of intuiting. A famous letter to Marcus Hertz, February 1772how bears to prese to 21, explain the witness intellectual in the quite bow he is accusing himself for assuming priori. At Dissertation the same time Kant be which presentations refer a priori uncritically that a presentation can refer to an object without being in any of presentations cognition must way affected by it. Kant had also assumed boundaries that intellectual experience. can present things as they are in themselves. The beginning of the how task of explaining Copernican Revolution is exactly the idea thatThe a presentation can refer to pure objects, to given Dissertation the a an object without being affected by it. Thus in is thetantamount concepts. In·the Dissertation revolution was already started by establishing the status of space and the in 'categories'; Kantofhad the task CPRnot wasyet the time as the mere forms of intuiting. What remained deduction pr to explain how the intellectual presentationsmetaphysicical as well can refer to objects was a Dissertation that Kant, f to priori. At the same time Kant became convinced thatproves the objects convinced there are pure which presentations refer a priori cannot be things inthat themselves. The conc understandable why inofCPR t the boundaries boundaries of cognition must coincidealsowith question: that there are pure conc experience. The task of explaining how pure intellectual canthe refer to conc viz.,presentations to explain how pure the pure objects, is tantamount to given a transcendental deduction of pure of concepts is flatly possibility concepts. In·the Dissertation the intellectual presentations are project not called of estab In CPR Kant's No corr 'categories'; Kant had not yet the clue for findinginto the different categories. divided stages metaphysicical deduction was present either. The reasons existenceindicated of the befo tasks (for Dissertation proves that Kant, for moreomitted than ten years, had been here). Naturally, true to h mirrorsa these convinced that there are pure concepts acquired priori.tasks: That makes it also understandable why in CPR the problem is not to answer a thatquestion: that there are pure concepts, but to answer a how-question, viz., to explain how the pure concepts can refer to objects. In CPR the possibility of pure concepts is flatly stated several times. In CPR Kant's project of establishing transcendental philosophy is divided into different stages corresponding to different philosophical tasks (for reasons indicated before, the Transcendental Dialectic is omitted here). Naturally, true to his architechtonics Kant's disposition mirrors these tasks:

are presented; what follows a priori from these co 2. Transcendental Logic: 2.1. Transcendental Analytic: CHAPTER 2 2.1.1. Analytic of Concepts: 1. Transcendental Aesthetic:- The Metaphysical Deduction of the pure concep of space and time: their of ontological status - the Metaphysical Exposition the understanding - how the pure concepts as subjective fonns of intuiting. employment of the understanding versus the tran space and time: how space and time - the Transcendental Exposition of theofunderstanding. are presented; what follows a- priori from these concepts. The Transcendental Deduction of the catego 2. Transcendental Logic: categories are the necessary conditions of exper 2.1. Transcendental Analytic:of experience. 2.1.1. Analytic of Concepts: 2.1.2. Analytic of Cardinal Propositions: - The Metaphysical Deduction of the pure concepts the understanding: - The Schematism of theofpure concepts of the und - how the pure concepts of understanding areoffound: theconcepts. logical thethe sensible significance the pure employment of the understanding versus the transcendental employment - The System of Cardinal Propositions: transcend of the understanding. the cardinal propositions. the categories: show thatofthe - The Transcendental Deduction In theoffollowing chapterstothe stages the A categories are the necessarysome conditions of experience and of all objects details. These stages presuppose and make of experience. Aesthetic. Major premisses of the whole task are: 2.1.2. Analytic of Cardinal Propositions: 1) The transcendental difference between sensi concepts of theintuitions understanding: to establish - The Schematism of the pure matter and fonn; and concepts. pure concepts. the sensible significance of the 2) The distinction between general logic and tran - The System of Cardinal Propositions: transcendental proofs of some of the cardinal propositions. In the following chapters the stages of the Analytic are inspected in some details. These stages presuppose and make use of the results of the Aesthetic. Major premisses of the whole task are: 1) The transcendental difference between sensibility and the intellect; matter and fonn; intuitions and concepts. 2) The distinction between general logic and transcendental logic.

CHAPTER 3

1. The principle of sufficient

FROM GENERAL LOGIC real possibility 3. General log Logic, truth, and objective TO TRANSCENDENTAL4. LOGIC

6. The Metaphysical Deductio Metaphysical Deduction 8. logic

The discipline - or "science" as K 1. The principle of sufficient reason 2. Logical versus establish the concepts and fundamen real possibility 3. General logic and transcendental logic philosophy is categories called transcendental l 4. Logic, truth, and objective validity 5. The transcendental logicofthat 6. The Metaphysical Deduction 7. The argument the Kant goes in Metaphysical Deduction 8. Allison on transcendental Analytic. There are, however, two m logic topics which both lead directly to tra closely relate Kant to the philosophica of task sufficient reason, which K The discipline - or "science" as Kant principle says - the of which is to two principles. It has to be interpreted establish the concepts and fundamental propositions of transcendental principle. What by thisintroducing amounts to are philosophy is called transcendental logic. It is exactly versus real (or material) possibility. transcendental logic that Kant goes into the tasks of the Transcendental between domains of Analytic. There are, however, two more distinction fundamental and notthe unrelated logic. topics which both lead directly to transcendental logic and in fact more

closely relate Kant to the philosophical tradition. The first is the classical of sufficient 1. The principle of sufficient reason, which Kant insists hasprinciple to be separated into reas two principles. It has to be interpreted eitherItashas a logical as a emphasized material alreadyorbeen th of possibility: logical phi principle. What this amounts to are twothe notions Leibniz-Wolffian rationalistic versus real (or material) possibility. This is of tantamount notina tum source cognition,tobutthea funct andstart: transcendental distinction between the domains of general makes logic a new sensibility is se logic. cognition. The transcendental differen 1. The principle of sufficient reason It has already been emphasized that Kant was heavily influenced by the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalistic philosophy. Sensibility for Leibniz is not a source of cognition, but a function to limit human cognition. Kant makes a new start: sensibility is seen as an independent source of cognition. The transcendental difference between the two faculties, viz.,

que natural scien of sufficient reason as a principle of of suffici 94 CHAPTER How to 3understand the principle Wolffian trad prominent issue in the Leibnizthe sensibility and the understanding, is a ground to many other ntal fundame sufficient reason was taken as a important distinctions in the Critical Philosophy. One nal of the crucial thought. (cp. B metaphysics or eve n all ratio questions - where Kant totally changed his mind - concerns the principle presented g and Vleeschauer 1962, 10) It was of sufficient reason as a principle of natural science. (Onon" 193ff) principle wa must have a sufficient reas . The How to understand the principle of sufficient but reason was a most reachin had also farmetaphysics generally prominent issue in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.dete The principle of ?-g be ythiI ever rmine consequences: Did God sufficient reason was taken as a fundamental principle underlying all ible for our d free will? Are we morally respons 1987,the221, metaphysics or even all rational thought. (cp. Beiser was m that th clai83-84 the Wolffian philosophy and Vleeschauer 1962, 10) It was presented generally das:from "Everything the principl reason can be demonstrate must have a sufficient reason". The principle was not onlyed significant forlff, B by Wo demonstrations were attempt e.g. metaphysics generally but had also far-reaching theological and moral positive to (Pr 270, On) Initially Kant was consequences: Did God determine everythi1?-g beforehand? Do we haves,a or a osophical principles from logical one phil free will? Are we morally responsible for our deeds? A central tenet ofons. trati ons a prominent opponent of these dem the Wolffian philosophy was the claim that the principleedin of gsufficient CPR by two Kan t's new insight - prec Such reason can be demonstrated from the principle of contradiction. on of vati original for Kant - was that the deri demonstrations were attempted e.g. by Wolff, Baumgarten and Eberhard. n is an imp reason from the law of contradictio (Pr 270, On) Initially Kant was positive to these and attemps to ciple as a s the prinderive Pr 368) He now underst philosophical principles from logical ones, or at least he critized Crucius, as a princip mus t have its reason". He takes it a prominent opponent of these demonstrations. (Treash 1981, 63)1 g is that it h In fact the crux of Kan t's reasonin Kant's new insight - preceding CPR by two decades, and in no way osition merely logical principle: "Every prop of sufficient original for Kant - was that the derivation of the principle , all view of t 194) Seen from his new poin reason from the law of contradiction is an impossible task.Wo (A783/B811, lffians, in the e analytic. According to the Pr 368) He now understands the principle as a material one: "Every thing ulation contradictory. It was the loose form judgments. must have its reason". He takes it as a principle of synthetic for the Wo reason", which made it possible In fact the crux of Kant's reasoning is that it has tomat beeria separated a per ".. men l sense. from logical sense to the merely logical principle: "Every proposition mustosit have (Onwn were kno ionsa reason". fundamental prop 194) Seen from his new point of view, all Wolffian judgments are, for a take contradiction. This was a great mis analytic. According to the Wolffians, in the end all false judgments are contradictory. It was the loose formulation "Everything must have a l ambiquity here which sh tenninologica is a Wolffians 1 Ther reason", which made it possible for ethe to switch suffi from t reason cienthe In mod em literature the principle of g material pri ndin espo corr the and ciple logical sense to the material sense. ".. men persuaded themselves that the prin logical a materia ciple of sufficient reason is taken as the prin well of. 'Cau fundamental propositions were known from the principle as t Kan by used to be the sense most often understood in a ve is y' salit 'cau ided prov it, for l contradiction. This was a great labe mistake, for a synthetic proposition can 1 There is a tenninological ambiquity here which should not confuse the issue itself. In modern literature the principle of sufficient reason is sometimes taken as a merely logical principle and the corresponding material principle is called causality. Here the principle of sufficient reason is taken as a material principle, which, to me, seems to be the sense most often used by Kant as well. 'Causality' might be used as another label for it, provided 'causality' is understood in a very ~eneral sense.

exhibited by his repudiating the Wolffian c attain the same kind of certainty as mathema Kant's great interestLOGIC in the principle of FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 95 obvious why the principle of causality bec indeed be comprehended accordingwhy to the principle contradiction, butdogmat Hume couldof wake him from his only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which causality, in the Humean language,itis for also A200/ follows, but never in and by itself."principle (Pr 268) of Kant's new position sufficient reason.is (cp. exhibited by his repudiating the Wolffian claims that metaphysics can Hume he did not find a new subject-matter, attain the same kind of certainty as mathematics. in the same familiar problems of philosophy. Kant's great interest in the principle sufficient reason makes it Thereofare only two explicit references t becomes so central to him and obvious why the principle of causality reason in CPR. Fortunately one of them occ why Hume could wake him from his"The dogmatic slumber. The principle of is th principle of sufficient reason causality, in the Humean language,experience, is for Kant a version of the same that is, objective cognition of ap principle of sufficient reason. (cp. A200/B246) Kant(A200/B246) 'found' relation in orderWhen of time." T Hume he did not find a new subject-matter, but he found Hume engaged hardly be read otherwise than that Kan in the same familiar problems of philosophy. sufficient reason and the second Analogy, There are only two explicit references theleast principle of sufficienthave n causality.toAt some philosophers them occurs in the Second Analogy. under reason in CPR. Fortunately one of of sufficient· reason] occurs explicitly "The principle of sufficient reason thus the the is principle of ground causalityofinpossible the Second of appearences in respect of experience, that is, objective cognition 532n3, cp. Treash 1981 and Buttstheir 1984, 254) relation in order of time." (A200/B246) Taken why in itssocontext, it can One reason many difficulties an of hardly be read otherwise than that Kant equates the principle with the interpretation of the Second An sufficient reason and the second Analogy, that is, Kant's principle of principle of causality is misleading. Especial causality. At least some philosophers have noticed this: "It [the principle - "Everything that happens (begins to be) p of sufficient reason] occurs explicitly under this name as a synonym for - is f which it follows according to a rule" Second Analogy." (Buchdahl 1969, the principle of causality in the causality in the modern sense, but is a genera 532n3, cp. Treash 1981 and Butts 1984, 254) It is in fact a formulation of the principle o One reason why so many difficulties and confusions are connected understood by many of the participants in Analogy is that calling it the with the interpretation of the Second principle. (cp. Beiser 1987, 83) Compared w principle of causality is misleading.principle Especially A-edition formulation of the sufficient reason as a material - "Everything that happens (beginshave to be) something ifupon its presupposes reason", the similarity, not equali which it follows according to a rule" is far from being a principle of of suf in Kant's conception of the principle causality in the modem sense, but isboth a general of detennination. wants principle to limit its applicability to the o It is in fact a forn1ulation of the principle of sufficient reason as it was prove its necessity in experience. That is a understood by many of the participants in the dispute concerning that as "un about things as they are in themselves principle. (cp. Beiser 1987, 83) Compared with Kant's formulation of the principle of sufficient reason as a material principle: "Every thing must have its reason", the similarity, if not equality, is manifest. What is new in Kant's conception of the principle of sufficient reason is that he now both wants to limit its applicability to the objects of experience and to prove its necessity in experience. That is also indicated by Kant's talk about things as they are in themselves as "unconditioned objects".

no particular causal laws can be derived from must be based on experience. The underlying 96 CHAPTER 3 the Second Analogy and an empirical causal la It should be uncontroversial - although the list who The the Sall1e senseo in philosophers ty of le of causali princip have misunderstood Kant on this point long that according Kant An Second to the to to -conform lawishas causal be derived from the Second Analogy, but le no particular causal laws can empiric ive princip is a regulat keness allawli 50 1969, hl must be based on experience.ofThe underlying, fundamental fact is that Buchda (cp. the understanding be called should lawAnalog do notyeven employ the the Second Analogy and an empirical Second law, thecausal causa of satz] principle of causality in the SaIl1e senseo fonn every particular itionof[Grund propos ental The fundam of the Sec9n the Buchda Secondhl-Allis Analogy, but ing the concept of causal law has to confonn to the on-read event-someempiricallawlikeness is a regulative principle of reason, a principle "everyh is the not to establis supposed of the understanding (cp. Buchdahl 1969, 229) 5OOff)'Causa Morel properly than sa mu law' contain 1983, 216, e the c be ing called thengcausal maxim, or the law, the Second Analogy should becaus to a rule", accordi "follow formu Kant fundamental proposition [Grundsatz] of causal laws. Taking for granted that d effect". It could be objecte "All change of the tly Sec9nd Analogy Kant sistake the Buchdahl-Allison-reading differen on: what in the B-editi (AllisonThat supposed to establish is the "every-event-some-cause-principle". of the connection of cause and effect". e the very p becaus 1983, 216, 229) 'Causal law'formula contains more something ingthan is mislead tion much 'effect' . Notwithstand "following according to a rule",concep because claim and is "same-cause-samets ofthe'cause' despite the d on - Analogy effect". It could be objected that Kant formulates the Second B-editi the the long proof in differently in the B-edition: "All changes take theA-editi law on same as intothe is the according le -place princip very underst the n of the connection of cause and effect". That is, ofce course, betweetrue but the a differen From the fonnulation is misleading because ther very proof does ions not elaborate the follows: general distinct of other numbe ndenta Notwithstanding two initial sections, concepts of 'cause' and 'effect'.logic, the transce versus the logical the (po ion opposit the long proof in the B-edition logical - despite the different fonnulation of the real versus opposition the A-edition. very principle - is the same as inversus real (transcendental) necessity. The nts is paralle From the difference betweenanalytic the understanding the sensibility a l to judgme and syntheticand les: the principl logic transcendental number of other distinctions follows: princip twoversus s of the domaingeneral The fonner logic, the logical versus the princip transcendental (material, metaphysical), nt reason. le of sufficie is, refers to logical opposition versus real opposition (possibility), logical necessity that l, materia is whereas the latter n deductiv versus real (transcendental) necessity. very distinction between the Wolffia m of criticis Kant's The them g analytic and synthetic judgmentsbest is parallel to the distinction between the of accusin expressed in Kant's 'real'. domains of the two principles:bounda the principle contradiction andthethe 'logical' and ry betweeofn the 0

0

principle of sufficient reason. The fomler principle is merely formal whereas the latter is material, that is, things. real possibility Logicatol versus 2. refers Kant's criticism of the Wolffian'Real' deductivistic philosophy perhaps as inte tly used byis Kant is frequen them of confusing or ignoring the best expressed in Kant's accusing'transce ndental'. He claims that no rea or boundary between the 'logical' and the 'real'. 2. Logical versus real possibility 'Real' is frequently used by Kant as interchangeable with 'material' or 'transcendental'. He claims that no real or material cognition is

that the concept does not contradic things (namely, tha possibility ofLOGIC FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 97 concept) can deceive and leave possible entirely out of logical or conceptual grounds. Cognition must be (A244/B302) Of several statements based on the real ground. He distinguishes between logical and real clearest is in the section "Of the Im possibility. "To substitute the logical possibility of the concept (namely, God's Existence": "A concept is that the concept does not contradict itself) for the transcendental [real] contradictory. This is the logical c possibility of things (namely, that an object(G) corresponds to the the object(G) of the concept is disti concept) can deceive and leave satisfied only the simple-minded." But it may none the less be an empt (A244IB302) Of several statements concerning this distinction one of the of the synthesis through which clearest is in the section "Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of specifically proved; and such proof God's Existence": "A concept is always possible if it is not selfprinciples [Prinzipien] of possible contradictory. This is the logical characteristic of possibility, and by it [Grundsazt] of analysis (the law o the object(G) of the concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. against inferring directly from the p But it may none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality possibility of things (real)." (A596/B of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been The distinction is also referred to specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on object(G) I must be able to prove it principles [Prinzipien] of possible experience, and not on the principle as attested by experience, or a prior [Grundsazt] of analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning whatever I please, provided only th against inferring directly from the possibility of concepts (logical) to the something more is required befor possibility of things (real)." (A596/B624n) objective validity, that is, real p The distinction is also referred to in a note to Bxxvi: "To cognize an merely logical. This something mor object(G) I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality theoretical sources of cognition; it m as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think What is at stake is not so much whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself.... But possibility predicated of two kinds something more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept itself (this should not be confused w objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility is we have no other way to refer to a merely logical. This something more need not, however, be sought in the possibility of a concept simply m theoretical sources of cognition; it may lie in those that are practical." Accordingly, any concept is logic What is at stake is not so much two conceptions of possibility, but logical predicate provided only tha possibility predicated of two kinds of items: concept of a thing or a thing Logical possibility is not objective itself (this should not be confused with 'thing as it is in itself'). Of course is always an objective possibility. (O we have no other way to refer to a thing than by its concept. The logical The real possibility of a concep possibility of a concept simply means an absence of contradiction. that a possible object corresponds Accordingly, any concept is logically possible and may be used as a either by proving the reality of the logical predicate provided only that no contradiction is brought about. Logical possibility is not objective (A7 5IB 101), whereas real possibility is always an objective possibility. (On 'objectivity' see Chapter 6.) The real possibility of a concept - that is, the possibility of a thing: that a possible object corresponds to the concept - has to be justified, either by proving the reality of the corresponding synthesis, that means,

predicate is a determination of a thing. thinkable (cognizable) or presentable an intuition. CHAPTER 3 Without intuition only logical 98 Real predicates as determining predicates a that the concept confonns to the cardinal propositions of experience, or to a concept of a thing, thus they are pred by an empirical intuition of the thing proving its actuality, and by The real possibility of a thing means the po implication, its possibility. A concept which can be used as a real experience. "The possibility of a thing can predicate is a detennination of a thing. (A598/B626) Real is always the fact that its concept is not self-contra thinkable (cognizable) or presentable and requires possible sensible being supported by some corresponding intuition. Without intuition only logical possibility remains. (B302n) can also be possible because something Real predicates as determining predicates are something which are added possibility is given as a consequence t to a concept of a thing, thus they are predicates in synthetic judgments. Distinguishing the logical and the real im The real possibility of a thing means the possibility of being an object of thing can be opposed, but not logically experience. "The possibility of a thing can never be proved merely from contradiction. the fact that its concept is not self-contradictory, but only through its Kemp Smith's translation of CPR is seri being supported by some corresponding i~tuition." (B308) Something sometimes both wirklich and real as can also be possible because something else is actual, that is, its completely ignoring Kant's distinction betw possibility is given as a consequence through some other existent unfortunately, followed by many modem w Distinguishing the logical and the real implies that two predicates of a fact that the modem meaning of 'real', w thing can be opposed, but not logically, that is through the law of with 'true' or 'actual', is far from Kant's m contradiction. more serious than it seems. The focus of K Kemp Smith's translation of CPR is seriously flawed by his rendering cognition at all; it is frequently completely sometimes both wirklich and real as 'real' in English and thus possibility of the actual objective c completely ignoring Kant's distinction between 'actual' and 'real'. He is, comprehends both actual and possible. For unfortunately, followed by many modem writers who are unaware of the (res), which is or can be "the matter which fact that the modem meaning of 'real', which is roughly synonymous and because the system of transcendenta with 'true' or 'actual', is far from Kant's meaning. The mistake is even conditions of the real, Kant calls "real pos more serious than it seems. The focus of Kant's inquiry is not on actual possibility". (like quoted above: A244/B302 cognition at all; it is frequently completely ignored. The focus is on the It is no doubt one of Kant's most famous possibility of the actual objective cognition. 'Real' cognition a priori of a possible experience gener comprehends both actual and possible. For Kant 'real' refers to 'the real' conditions of the possibility of objects (res), which is or can be "the matter which correspondence to sensations" conditions of a possible experience are ce and because the system of transcendental philosophy makes up the real objects. This rather naturally suggests conditions of the real, Kant calls "real possibility" also "transcendental which becomes defined or limited by these possibility". (like quoted above: A244/B302) common view, is to put upside-down Kant' It is no doubt one of Kant's most famous slogans that "The conditions a priori of a possible experience generatim are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience". (AlII) The conditions of a possible experience are certainly also the conditions of real objects. This rather naturally suggests that the 'real' is exactly that which becomes defined or limited by these conditions. That, although a common view, is to put upside-down Kant's whole reasoning. It is not so

'real' - the aim of the whole transcende summa rized as endeavLOGIC ouring to give an e FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 99 cognition of the 'real' - the conditions of rea that the 'real' is attained as a resultinquiry of reasoning. Onisthe contrary, Kant's . The crux that these conditi ons are n of the possibility of experience procedure was to find out the conditions conditions of the cognition of real objects. valid thus the and to prove that they are objectively conditio ns. and In additio n tocorresponding intellectual conditio concepts have real reference. In other words Kant's starting is e) thethrough sensibl e intuitio n (actual orpoint possibl transcendental philosophy could 'real' - the aim of the whole Analog ously, the concepts of objectibe ve validit an exhaustive of theons summarized as endeavouring tobygive no means defined account by the conditi of real objects are results of his cognition of the 'real' - the conditions grantedof from the beginni ng. It is also inquiry. The crux is that these conditions are necessary but not sufficient 'objectivity' and 'reality ' are intimately re conditions of the cognition of real objects. They are only the formal Indeed, in the passage quoted above, Bxxvin conditions. In addition to intellectual conditions, cognition also requires validity ' with 'real possibility'. is claimed given. - that sensible intuition (actual or possible) through which thetoreal Kant is usually said have ex Analogously, the concepts of objective validity and objective reality are Kant This is misleading and may indicate that experience, but taken by no means defined by the conditions all. Kant'sofclaim is more exactly thatfor existence granted from the beginning. course, It is also emphasizing that existenworth ce, as any other non-co ntradicto 'objectivity' and 'reality' are intimately related for isKant. a logical predica te. concepts Kant's point the claim, Indeed, in the passage quoted above, Bxxvin, equates 'objective in to the usual Kant distinct ion betwee n things and validity' with 'real possibility'. obviously, is no real predicate, that is, a conce thattoexistence is tnot Kant is usually said to have claimed be added the concep of aa predicate. thing. ... In lo This is misleading and may indicate that of Kant not been understood at copula a has judgme nt." (A598/ B626) It is that existence is not Of all. Kant's claim is more exactly Existen ce [Dasein ] aisreal onepredicate. of the categor ies be used as course, existence, as any other non-contradictory modal categoriesconcept, it can can be used only as a a logical predicate. Kant's point predica is the claim, doesenlarge not fit the tes do that not existence in the least co things and their in to the usual distinction between attache d. "They only predicates. express the "Being, relation of the obviously, is no real predicate, that is, adge." concept of something that may knowle (A219/ B266) Reality [Realiti it] be added to the concept of a thing. ... iesInoflogical it isitmerely the a "cate categor qualityuse . Thus is indeed It is [real] merely positing thing. h]. copula of a judgment." (A598/B626) Kant's 'real' with 'actuala' [wirklic (S categories of modality. Like other Existence [Dasein] is one of the is a pre-eminent paper on this matter. ) modal categories it can be used only as a logical predicate. Modal to transce which they arel logic predicates do not in the least enlarge the concept 3. Genera l logic and ndenta attached. "They only express the relation of the concept to the faculty of Kant's criticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian [Realitlit] in tum belongs to the knowledge." (A219/B266) Reality introdu ce a new logic: the transcendental logic categories of quality. Thus it is indeed a "category-mistake" to confuse Kant's 'real' [real] with 'actual' [wirklich]. (See Seigfried 1982, which is a pre-eminent paper on this matter.)

3. General logic and transcendental logic Kant's criticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy led him to introduce a new logic: the transcendental logic. His insight is that there

principles as well.) The old principles of gener mented3 with new principles. However, comple CHAPTER 100 sensibility and understanding is not sufficient as su are not only fonnal principles a priori general logiction but isalso principles , viz. that needed assump further A of on logic. which are transcendental (material, that is, concerning real objects) priori o in something which has formal conditions aand fonnal at the same time. (Moreover, there priori is Kant logic as a science thatareformathematically It is notable of general logic be in an principles as well.) The facultie old principles is not logic to eless have Neverth s of the mind. complemented with newcertaint principles. However, the separation of K priori. a totally y of logic must be sensibility and understanding is not to have anyoneffect l
most important premiss in the Metaphy Transcendental Deduction proper. FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 101 General logic abstracts from all relation (Logic 13) (The two senses are considered in detail Logic more considers onlyintheChapter logical4.) fonn in th Thinking therefore "Thinking is uniting presentations in consciousness... to another presentation, that is, the fo presentations judgments is the same as judging, or referring attempts to establishtoprinciples to which generatim." (Pr 304) Equating thinking and judging turns out to be the any object must conform if it is to be v most important premiss in the Metaphysical Deduction and inarethepure as Aesthetic has shown, there Transcendental Deduction proper. Hence a distinction might likewise be draw cognition to its General logic abstracts from all relations thoughtofof objects(G). In object(O). that case there w in the relation any presentation Logic considers only the logical formabstract of cognition." (A from allofcontent of thought generatim. It to another presentation, that is, thetries form to establish what holds of anything th attempts to establish principles to which all discursive about of cognition: it tries thinking to separate out from o be valid. the Transcendental any object must conform if it is to part which "As originates a priori with the un Aesthetic has shown, there are pure"Inasthewell as empirical intuitions. expectation that there are concepts drawn between pure and empirical Hence a distinction might likewise be refer a priori to objects(G) .. we fonn the thought of objects(G). In that case there be a logicofwhich does not the understanding an thewould pure cognition (A55/B79) Transcendental abstract from all content of cognition." think objects(G) completely logic a priori. S that would a possible object and th tries to establish what holds of anything detennine the be origin, the scope, of cognition: it tries to separate out from our cognition of antoobject that transce be called cognitions, would have part which originates a priori with the alone. (A62/B87) to understanding do with the laws of the understanding "In the expectation that there are concepts which as acts of pure thought they refer to objects(G) a priori." (AS7/B81 a science investigating refer a priori to objects(G) .. we form the idea of logic General analyses concepts, w and of reason through whichnot we in the the pure cognition of the understanding constructs concepts; but note, think objects(G) completely a priori. Suchofa constructing science, which would concepts is the syn method detennine the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of these logic is the logic of synthesis, the logic logic,and because .. it has cognitions, would have to be called transcendental between analytic synthetic judgment and general of reason insofar as logic to do with the laws of the understanding between andonly transcendental they refer to objects(G) a priori." (A57/B81) not make any distinction between analytic General logic analyses concepts, whereas transcendental general logic of all judgments. logic sense mathematics Thethat ge constructs concepts; but note, not in the It is taken for granted does. by Kant synthetic method. Transcendental method of constructing concepts is theone. of transcendental logic are All rules logic is the logic of synthesis, the logic. logic In of fact the real. Thelogics distinction the two are function between analytic and synthetic judgments is are parallel distinction concepts used to in the different ways. (Roten between general and transcendental logic, although general logic does not make any distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. It is general logic of all judgments. It is taken for granted by Kant that general logic is the fundamental one. All rules of transcendental logic are based on the rules of general logic. In fact the two logics are functionally identical - the same pure concepts are used in different ways. (Rotenstreich 1972, 7) To justify the

the need of the justific ation of genera l logic; notwith remarks about the synthetic unity of apperce ption as · 102 CHAPTER 3 of all use of the understanding. truth. ( rules - the propositions of transcendental logic logic - is theistask whichof Kant thetologic Transcendental devoted his labours, whereas he does not empiric seem toalhave ever of cogniti on of onsconsidered conditi ed with concern of general logic; notwithstanding the general the need of the justificationformal of empiric a conditions, that is, with the logic CPR which i remarks about the syntheticcogniti unity of the highest ing inprinciple a priori. Thusaseveryth onapperception of all use of the understanding. relation of the understanding to the objects of cog oflogic, truth.that (A62/B87) It isAnalyt not ic an Transcendental logic istransce the logic is, both the ndental is nothi phythe philoso concerned with empirical conditions of cognition objects, but with ndental of transceof very system

the logic of empirical synthetic formal conditions, that is, with logic. ndentalcognition; of transce the rules cognition a priori. TItus everything in CPR which is concerned with the ve validity the objects cognition to the relation of the understanding to objectibelongs truth,ofand 4. Logic, transcendental logic, that is, both the Analytic and the defmiti Dialectic. Thetruth a on of Kant's references to the very system of transcendental philosophy is nothing but the system of correspondence. He takes it for granted as a nomin the rules of transcendental logic. (A58/B82, A191/B236, A642/B 670, A820/B 848) T of cognition with its object. What are the univers al 4. Logic, truth, and objective validity answer is simply ·that there are not, and cannot be 83 truth. (A58/B of notion Kant's references to thethedefInition truth ntare to the of criteria same timeofsufficie

l (object always materia correspondence. He takes it is forthat granted of truth. Kant is definition truth asfora nominal on. Conten t o (A58/B82, A191/B236, A642/B670, Truth the agreement ofiscogniti on the content depends A820/B848) Formal of cognition with its object. relation What are universal of truth? Hisrules c its object. on to criteria cogniti ofthe logic of cannot be any universal and at con answer is simply· that there negativ are not,e and rules touchstone of truth. The Thus the the same time sufficient criteria truth. 56) The point lves. nt by themse not sufficieLogic are (A58/B83, truthofand ed exhibit is that truth for Kant is always material (objective) troth, vocally that is, it is also unequi Kant. This truth for giv n which depends on the content of mathem cognition. of cognition means a al intuitio It is empiric atics.Content it mathem rulesatics. can only bet used as a atics relation of cognition to its object. Withou to mathem (reality)Formal B147)2 B298, (A239/ negative touchstone of trotll. empty The rules of logic concern only the fann of ation. play of imagin

truth and are not sufficient by themselves. Thus there is no purely fonnal truth for Kant. This is also unequivocally exhibited in his philosophy of mathematics. It is empirical2 intuition be given by in content mustvalidity g: The objective reasoningives A mistakenwhich and remains entir objects without is n cognitio all intuition (reality) to mathematics. Without it mathematics would be merely an agreement of that which is given in intuition with the obje of c matter The empty play of imagination. (A239/B298, B147)2 wrong. totally goes is a reasoning which

must be given in intuition - is not the same as the content o made up of the two elements of cognition: intuitions (the m content of cognition is a term of an empirica l descriptio matter of cognition is a term of a transcendental description 2 A mistaken reasoning: The content must be given l. by intuition. In the absence of empirica always intuition all cognition is without objects and remains entirely empty. So truth is the agreement of that which is given in intuition with the object of cognition. Now, this is a reasoning which goes totally wrong. The matter of cognition - which always must be given in intuition - is not the same as the content of cognition. The content is made up of the two elements of cognition: intuitions (the matter) and concepts. The content of cognition is a term of an empirical description of cognition, while the matter of cognition is a term of a transcendental description. Truth accessible to us is always empirical.

correspondence and the coherenc but still misleading. The first poin only to truth as correspondence. FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC only 103 verbally he adhered to that said to become employed i It is sometimes said that Kant employed two conceptions of truth; the said - by logic iscorrect truth. This is partly correspondence and the coherence notion oftranscendental No object can be thought but still misleading. The first point to be made is that Kant always referswitho it without is little doubt that at once least losi only to truth as correspondence. Thus therecontradict all of truth. verbally he adhered only to that notion. The object(O), coherence thus notion truth(A62/B8 is What is misleadin said to become employed in Kant's misleading. transcendental logic. The of truth provide universal criteria - to be the logic of truth. transcendental logic is said - by Kant himself such criteria. The rules of transce No object can be thought without its principles, and no cognition can truth as istheallrules of general reference to an logi contradict it without at once losing all content, that likewise merely formal and nega object(O), thus all truth. (A62/B87) This, again is correct, but somewhat to the domain of truthcannot than gene misleading. What is misleading is that transcendental logic possible objects beofany huma provide universal criteria of truth; according the to Kant there cannot empirical objects generatim. such criteria. The rules of transcendental logic are negative conditions of Tra cognition1977, only 75) so far as itare canno truth as the rules of general logic are. (cp. Wagner They more proper to call the rules likewise merely formal and negative conditions although they are closer of tr because they deal but with to the domain of truth than general logic is,falsity. However, somewhat contrary the possible objects of human cognition generatitn, that is, with that the cardinal propositions empirical objects generatim. Transcendental logic concerns the origin of of is of the agreemen - that (A55/B80) cognition only so far as it cannot be ascribedtruth to objects. It is inasmuch as they contain in them more proper to call the rules of transcendental logic the rules of truth and experience viewed as a sum of falsity. given to us." (A237/B296) However, somewhat contrary to the present interpretation, Kant saysWha of all truth". Certainly source are of all al that the cardinal propositions of the understanding "the source they do not thereby become- the with objects(O) truth - that is of the agreement of our cognition must be something in the of object inasmuch as they contain in themselves the ground of the possibility although experience viewed as a sum of all cognitionunderstanding, wherein objects(O) canthis be som Kant puts it, objects have to given to us." (A237/B296) What is strange is that Kant calls them "theconf of trut The coherence source of all truth". Certainly all truth must conform to these notion rules, but domain of reason. The principles they do not thereby become the source. Unlike the rules of reason, there

must be something in the objects which corresponds to the rules of the 3 Kantinexplicable maintains thatby whatever understanding, although this something is totally us. Ascontra Cpo A150/B189 where Kant calls judg 3 from contradiction but are lacking a Kant puts it, objects have to conform to cognition. that they are neither true nor false. V much better applied inmight the hav The coherence notion of truth might be bivalence, but in practice he domain of reason. The principles of reason are inevitable although there 3 Kant nlaintains that whatever contradicts the rules of transcendental logic is false. Cpo A150/B189 where Kant calls judgments "false or groundless" when they are free from contradiction but are lacking a ground for justification. He should rather say that they are neither true nor false. Verbally Kant was bound to the principle of bivalence, but in practice he might have abandoned it.

other possible criterion of truth than coherence to t CHAPTER 3 The explicit aim of transcendental logic is to e A serio valid.(cp. velythem. are objectito which tions is not anything in objectsproposi which could correspond to equ re, is of porary toliteratu in contem on built A651/B679) Systematic sciences according the rules uncommare express reason. These rules becomewith "thetruth. sourceFor of Kant truth" proposi becausetions there is no ing yield truth. To repe lvesrules. cannot themse cogniti other possible criterion of truth thanoncoherence to these mere po from its and cognize itconcepts to establish priori isis to anything a logic The explicit aim of transcendental the prop form ofnot means that validity Objectivevalid. propositions which are objectively A serious error,thealthough con~ent of s) but the (object l of cogniti is to on equate objective validity uncommon in contemporarymateria literature, being of capable true, only thereby made of true with truth. For Kant propositions expressing fonnal conditions concepts. ted of predica"To oftenagain: e validity cognition cannot themselvesobjectiv yield truth. To is repeat cognize r 6. be Chapte are true. (See concep that its to say it from meretspossibility." (MAN 470) anything a priori is to cognize "Nowofittheis true same matter: the proposition says of the is valid Objective validity means that636) the form ] 'objectiisvely heavy" bodyofisthe nt ["the judgme material of cognition (objects) but the con~ent proposition not valid are we form; logical of itstrue description thereby made true, only capable of being or false. Moreover,not c be a que would that valid;not objectively judgme ntofisconcepts. It does make sense objective validity is often predicated case." tive' for the 'subjec same goes theChapter to say that concepts are true.And (See 6. below.) Buchdahl (1969, as an "o of logic the··use against is exactly 636) says of the same matter:It "Now it is true that to call the first logicas- athat K ndentalonly of general and both'objectively judgment ["the body is heavy"] valid'transce is intended as an instrum To use itwhether truth. canon only awe are ofnot concerned the en description of its logical fonn; illusion. ( caltruth. s only toofdialecti ns amount that would be a question material judgment is objectively valid;assertio Transcendental Logic is called the Tr And the same goes for the 'subjective' part of thecase." , that- is, of dialectical a critique andofis logic as anof"organon ofillusion cognition" It is exactly against the use

104

means. logical dge by- purely knowlelogic that Kant warns us. Logic is both of general and transcendental only a canon of truth. To use it as an instrument (organon) to produce 5. The categor assertions amounts only to dialectical illusion.ies(A61/B86) The second part of the Transcendental LogicThe is called the Transcendental of "separating in Kant's task Dialectic, first step illusion, is, of endeavours to acquire and is a critique of dialecticalobjects with the und tes a priori origina which thatthat knowledge by purely logical means. present the pure concepts. That step is the Metap concepts introduced are called the "categories". I 5. The categories make clear what Kant means by the categories e makes itof also That cognition found them. how ofhe"separating The first step in Kant's task out from gly such ion is seemin Deduct objects that which originates aMetaph priori ysical with the understanding alone" is toan eas nature and tion of the concep Kant's present the pure concepts. That step is the Metaphysical Deduction. The origin h he hardly ing in itself,Italthoug concepts introduced are calledinterest the "categories". is instructive to trygives to any

make clear what Kant means by the categories even before considering how he found them. That makes it also conceivable why the Metaphysical Deduction is seemingly such an easy step. Kant's conception of the nature and origin of the categories is interesting in itself, although he hardly gives any convincing arguments

functions) of judgments differ fro do not differ. The ontological sta FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL Kant with anLOGIC analogy to 105 'epigenes his Kant day. Categories as from innate idea to support it. Several common objections against simply result resolutely repudiated. K - isby the insufficent understanding of what he ideas intends the notion of the notion of category, but now category. It is especially important to make clear how the forms (or understanding. Aristotle was the f functions) of judgments differ from the categories - or better: how they of names, a "rhaps was only a list do not differ. The ontological status of the categories is explained by to derive debates all categories fr claims Kant with an analogy to 'epigenesis', a concept of biological of judgment, and thus presenting a co his day. Categories as innate ideas - moreover, the very idea of innate of all pure completebysystem ideas - is resolutely repudiated. Kant followsa Aristotle reintroducing (A80/BI06) the notion of category, but now denoting the pure concepts of the Kant's new meaning understanding. Aristotle was the first to propose the categories, but for his the te Aristotle. For KantKant categories was only a list of names, a "rhapsody", not awith system of categories. of most general predicates claims to derive all categories from a single principle, the faculty ofthings the not forms of not any longer judgment, and thus presenting a complete listbut of categories, although thought of objects: predicates a complete system of all pure concepts (excluding derivative ones). for d predicates of things as they are in (A80/BI06) which, nonetheless, have their gro Kant's new meaning for the term 'category' implies a radical break are nothing but the conditions with Aristotle. For Kant categories are rules of judging. They are still the of t and timepredicates contain -the co most general predicates of things - universal space transcendental experience." (AlII) Theofcatego but not any longer the forms of objects themselves but the forms (A80/BI06), "concepts thought of objects: predicates for determiningsynthesis" objects. Categories are not cognition which contain predicates of things as they are in themselvesmodes but of of objects of cognition, of imagination in respect of all po which, nonetheless, have their ground in transcendent things. "Categories There are several passages are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as wh categories are the logical forms of space and time contain the conditions of intuition for that same and that without the sensible experience." (AlII) The categories are: "original pure concepts of cond "Now, categories are nothing synthesis" (A80/BI06), "concepts of objects generatim" (B128), "pure else far as the manifold of a given intu modes of cognition which contain the necessary unity of pure synthesis (B143) This important point is m of imagination in respect of all possible appearances" (Al19) an object generatim through wh There are several passages where Kant unequivocally states that the of one of categories are the logical forms of judgmentsdetermined en1ployed inina respect certain way, (B128) Without the general se and that without the sensible conditions the categories are equal to them. "contains nothing but theso logica "Now, categories are nothing else but the very functions of judging, far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them." (B143) This important point is made recurrently: "They are concepts of an object generatim through which its intuition is considered to be determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgments." (B128) Without the general sensible condition the pure category "contains nothing but the logical function for bringing the manifold

themselves nothing but logical functions, and as the least concept of an object(O) in itself, but · 106 CHAPTER intuition as 3a basis." (Pr 324. See also A136/B1 similar remarks.) "..the mere category of substa under a concept." (A244) ".. in the absence of this manifold [of contains nothingwithout more than the logic of a judgment, content." intuition], they are merely functions absolutely which an object thought determined, (A349) "For here it becomes obvious that isthey [the as categories] areand t alone absolutely no cognition of an object is prod themselves nothing but logical functions, and as such do not constitute 'Categories', by Kant, interchange the least concept of an object(O) in itself, as butused require somearesensuous the also understanding'. TheyA147/B187 denote thefor"~chem A136/B175 and intuition as a basis." (Pr 324.ofSee of the concepts with sensible significance. similar remarks.) "..the mere category of substance Gust as any One other) point than is in the "I in finally referred contains absolutely nothing more the Prolegomena: logical function respect of th to objects generatim, or rather to the which an object is thought as detennined, and therefore, that through it cond as isobjectively valid; alone absolutely no cognitionjudgments of an object produced..." (On and 223)so there aro understanding.." (Pr 324) However, in the M 'Categories' , as used by Kant, are interchangeable with 'pure concepts concept of category is introduced, th of the understanding'. Theywhere denotethethe "~chematized" concepts, viz., understanding' to the to"unschema concepts with sensible significance. One ofsometimes the many refer references the of judgments. the logical forms point is in the Prolegomena: "I finally referred these functions of judging In fact the conditions distinction of between schematiz to objects generatim, or rather to the determining categories is confusing. It is worth stressing th judgments as objectively valid; and so there arose pure concepts of the fabricationinofthe commentators and Deduction, never drawn by understanding.." (Pr 324) However, Metaphysical there are not two separate sets of concepts. of the (cp. where the concept of category is introduced, the 'pure concepts n37) The categories are always the same. The s understanding' sometimes refer to the "unschematized" concepts, that is, conditions under which they get sensible sign the logical forms of judgments. otherwise: the schemataand are unschematized transcendental time In fact the distinction between schematized are already Chapteris 7abelow categories is confusing. It iscategories worth stressing thatused. this (See distinction of pure is also a source of some c The concept fabrication of commentators and never drawn by Kant himself. For Kant is pure when is no admixture priori there are not two separate sets of concepts. (cp. there Allison 1981, 77, esp.of any when theschemata presentations derived fro n37) The categories are always thenone same.ofThe n1erelyis present presentation is 'pure' when there is nothing i it conditions under which they get sensible significance. Or to put (A20/B34) Thus 'pure' where depends otherwise: the schemata are sensation. transcendental time determinations presentation. It is a mistake to think that 'pure categories are already used. (See Chapter 7 below.) A pureApresentation The concept of pure is alsosensible a sourcesignificancy. of some confusion. cognition a can There is nothing wrong inempirical, calling athat concept admixture of anything is, 'pu priori is pure when there is no although it has empirical significance. Likewise when none of the presentations is derived from experience. (B3) A empirical significance; purebelongs intuitions presentation is 'pure' whenhas there is nothing in it which to mak sensation. (A20/B34) Thus 'pure' depends on the origin of a presentation. It is a mistake to think that 'pure' must be without any sensible significancy. A pure presentation can refer to the empirical. There is nothing wrong in calling a concept 'pure' - like a category although it has empirical significance. Likewise 'pure intuition' always has empirical significance; pure intuitions make up the conditions of

categories in contrast to the sche misleading because the schematized c FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 107 have a non-empirical origin. In the Proleg (§18) a mu sensibility. Pure intuition is sensible.intuition as well, andomena does not - as is betwee n judgments of experie frequently thought - denote a kind of non-sensible intuition. In nce the an stateme nt that can in thehave judgme nts of pe Schematism Kant explains how pure concepts sensible all, has been a source of great significance. It has become a common usage to talk about the pure em judgmentones, seemsalthough to implythis that isthe categories in contrast to the schematized judgme nt. Otherw ise theis,teachin misleading because the schematized categories are still pure,all that they g to this dilemma, however, might be si have a non-empirical origin. are necessarilydistinctio engaged_inis every In the Prolegomena (§18) a much-discussed made judg a logical of fonn. Kant must mean th judgments perception. Kant's between judgments of experience andhas logical forms are not categor areused not as used at i statement that in the judgments of perception categories in the sense of an objectiv e of all, has been a source of great embarrasment. The very conceptobject. although very briefly, that judgment seems to imply that the categories are necessary for they any "re but only the logical con of TD anding, would collapse. A solution judgment. Otherwise all the teaching underst subjectLogical ". (Pr 298) Logica l connection of judgments to this dilemma, however, might be simple. forms the logical judgme nts. Of fonns courceofevery judgment are necessarily engaged in every judgment. To interpre t transce ndental has a logical fonn. Kant must mean that in judgments of perceptionidealism the involvi sycholo detennined logical forms are not used as categories, thatng is, ano kind objectofis super-p e is one the he most comm That seems to beofwhat says, in the sense of an objective object. machin Transcendental logy of should the ac although very briefly, that they "require no purepsycho concepts explanation. That this in is a misinte understanding, but only the logical connection in perception thinkingrpret that Kant himsel f explicit ly, though of subject". (Pr 298) Logical connection in any judgment is an instance rejected it. This is done in § 27 of TD w the logical forms of judgments. introdu This concep t is also men To interpret transcendental idealism as a ced. transcendental psychology, sense intranscendental KU §81. (See Genova 1974 an input-output involving a kind of super-psychological found in us a priori and be asc machine is one of the most common misinterpretations cannot of Kant. that would be be rejected analogous a gener Transcendental psychology should accordingly as atoquasiacceptedis clearly by Kant is tobyregard explanation. That this is a misinterpretation shown the factcate epigene sis of pure reason, viz. that Kant hin1self explicitly, though not with nluch argument, "the also cate underst anding, the ofground s of is the epigenesis rejected it. This is done in §27 of TD where the concept generat im". (B167) introduced. This concept is also mentioned in its original biological sense in KU §81. (See Genova 1974 and Zoller 1988.) The categories are found in us a priori and cannot be ascribed an empirical origin. To do that would be analogous to a generatio aequivoca. The alternative accepted by Kant is to regard categories as a kind of system of epigenesis of pure reason, viz. "the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience generatim". (B167)

complex organisms. Generatio aequivoca-t philosophically be characterized as radical e · 108 CHAPTER ious3 generation of living organisms from spontan these theori ically. Kanttorejected mechaninfonnative These biological analogiesplace are hardly a present day phy. (Genova 1974) Pref parts in reader, because these notions counter are largely outphiloso of use. The notions were that the germs of complex o hand held other used in the debates concerning biological evolution, viz. generation of in the simpler or ed in a miniature form, containaequivoca-theories complex organisms. Generatio - which can asserted as lurking in the back usually were as philosophically be characterized radical empiricism - held that ation theories - which could philos~phic preform organisms from nonliving matter takes spontanious generation of living ic rationalism - were also rejected by Kan dogmat place mechanically. Kant rejected these theories in biology and their course approach criticized by Ka middleThe 1974) counterparts in philosophy. (Genova Preformation-theories on the of the categories as bein assumption kindofofcomplex other hand held that the genns organisms are somehow categories could naturally b of theorganisms. contained in a miniature form, apriorit in the ysimpler Divine powers ty would follow, only su~jectiv necessi e objectiv were usually asserted as lurking in the background. These kinds of why a disposition implanted in us by G preformation theories - which reason could philos~phically be characterized as subjective necessity, is that all connectio than dogmatic rationalism - were also rejected by Kant. . Kant's transcendental idealism is trans The middle-course approachmissing criticized by Kant (B167) is exactly this subjectivism. transcendental kind of assumption of the categories as being implanted in us. The theory of epigenesis itself is - like the The apriority of the categories could naturally be granted, but still no of a kind of pre-established hannony. N theory objective necessity would follow, only su~jective necessity. Note that the presupposed. It holds only that a causesinare us by God could not yield more reason why a disposition implanted ed. That is what Kant mea ms is contain organis than subjective necessity, is that all connection with objects would be , on the side of the understa categoriesis contain missing. Kant's transcendental idealism transcendental objectivism not all experience generatim"(B167 transcendental subjectivism. possibility of is always required to release th n) which (intuitio is - like the preformation-theories - a The theory of epigenesis itself are not derived from expe categories hannony. No divine or transcendent theory of a kind of pre-establishedThe either. Kant's repudiation of innate causes are presupposed. It holds only ideas that a power to reproduce new - concerns not only the pure conc ations what Kant means when he says that "the organisms is contained. That is present conditions of cognit also the sensible butunderstanding, of the the grounds of the categories contain, on the side and most clearly in On a Disc repudiation is put Thus possibility of all experience generatim"(B167). it is receptivity length: (intuition) which is always required to release these powers. Critique admits absolutely no divin The categories are not derived"The from experience, but they are not them all, whether they presentations.ofIt regards innate ideas - innate innate ideas either. Kant's repudiation s of the understanding, as acquired. presentations - concerns not onlyconcept the pure concepts of the understanding acquisition (as the teachers of nat originaofl cognition: and but also the sensible conditions space and time. The repudiation is put most clearly in On a Discovery. I will quote it in length: "The Critique admits absolutely no divinely implanted or innate presentations. It regards them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, as acquired. There is, however, an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural right formulate it),

themselves, but rather it brings them out

FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 109 however, be a ground in the subject wh

presentations to originate in this and in consequently also of that which previously did not exist, and therefore to be related to objects w enables them did not pertain to anything before the act. Such is, as the Critique shows, is innate." (On 221) - at least and time, secondly, the synthetic first of all, the form of things in space ground of e.g., theofpossibility of a presentation these is derived by our unity of the manifold in concepts; for neither presentation itself." "Thus the formal faculty of cognition from the objects given to it as they are in emerges as an original acquired of itself a priori. There must,presenta themselves, but rather it brings them out of which generatim), the ground however, be a ground in the subject which makes it possible for these (as mer which long themanner, acquisition in no and other and of which presentations to originate in this and innate of things that are in accordance enables them to be related to objects which are not yet given. Thiswith this is acquisition ground at least is innate." (On 221) - concepts - "Only this first fonnalderivativa, ground, as it transcendental concepts the unders space, is innate, not the of spatial e.g., the possibility of a presentation of acquired and not innate, but their acq presentation itself." - - "Thus the formal intuition, which is called space, originaria nothing of outer objects emerges as an original acquired presentation (the and form presupposes conditions of the spontaneity of thought ( generatim), the ground of which (as merely receptivity) is nevertheless apperception)." (On 222) concepts innate and the acquisition of which long precedes determinate Kant's repudiation of innate ideas is an of things that are in accordance with this form. The acquisition of these finger on. What universal kind of mind i concepts is acquisition derivativa, as critical it already presupposes innate ideas? These Is it thelikewise phenomenal transcendental concepts of the understanding. are or the n plain that it cannot be the phenomenal acquired and not innate, but their acquisitio, like that of space, is of space and not have the very originaria and presupposes nothingdoes innate except the ideas subjective it must be the noumenal mind. of that w conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity But noumenal mind can somehow be individ apperception)." (On 222) ascribe it some pr it is meaningful Kant's repudiation of innate ideas is that an interesting point totoput a metaof some properties. The underlying critical finger on. What kind of mind is that which does not possess grou presupposition thatItthe phenomenal and innate ideas? Is it the phenomenal or the noumenal mind? seems rather different worlds. However, if this presup plain that it cannot be the phenomenal mind in space and time which we time should in this case - theSo trouble d does not have the very ideas of space and as do innate dispositions. the noumenal are the two aspects it must be the noumenal mind. But that would necessarily imply that the of the the phenomenal offers- and proper dev noumenal mind can somehow be individuated - that it which is a thing individuated we can refer to things a that it is meaningful to ascribe it some once properties, or, in this case, a lack of some properties. The underlying ground for the present worry is the presupposition that the phenomenal and the noumenal belong to two different worlds. However, if this presupposition is given up - as I think we should do in this case - the trouble disappears: the phenomenal and the noumenal are the two aspects of the same mind. Certainly it is only the phenomenal which offers proper devices to individuate things. But once individuated we can refer to things also in their noumenal aspect.

Analytic will be permeated by the facultyclaims 3- which get little or no argumental s 110 CHAPTER and functions of different faculties. There 6. The Metaphysical Deduction from his faculty-talk. For the most, the ar The Metaphysical Deduction isindeed the passage the 'Analytic of the of unders nothingstarting but dissections Concepts'. The Analytic is notfunctions. any analysis but "the gen of the Analytic The of aimconcepts dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself". That means that the possibility of pure concepts having their or Analytic will be penneated by theto faculty-talk. It includes far-reaching analyse the pure employment of the un claims - which get little or no argumental support - about the Metaphysical Deduction is properties to give the There is no way of rescuing Kantorigin and functions of different faculties. categories: to exhibite "the a priori of the are log from his faculty-talk. For the most, the arguments complete coinciding withAnalytic the general indeed nothing but dissections of the understanding, that is, disclosing its the M (B159) In fact, and most importantly, generally to investigateofthehow functions. The aim of the Analytic contains a shortis explanation possibility of pure concepts havingunderstanding their origin inarethegenerated understanding In tha for us.and to analyse the pure employment of the understanding. The aim of the 'pure intuition' plays an important role. discovering the Metaphysical Deduction is to giveIt isthenot"clue" unusualforto consider the Metaphy categories: to exhibite "the a priori origin of the categories by their magican's trick. How could everything of it thought". complete coinciding with the general logical functions understand Kant's reasoning is inevitable (B159) In fact, and most importantly, the Metaphysical Deduction also It of the understanding and the categories. the pure concepts of the contains a short explanation of the how Metaphysical Deduction is such a seemi conceptofof judg understanding are generated for us. as In the that stepexplanation from the the functions 'pure intuition' plays an importantconcerned. role. As a whole the text of the Meta It is not unusual to consider themeans Metaphysical as a kind simple. ItDeduction is very concise and of some ' magican's trick. How could everything be settled so easily? To applied which are only incidentally referred understand Kant's reasoning it is inevitable startconcepts with his of conception the understan What thetopure of the understanding and the categories. It becomes ratherbynatural was already explained Kant why in his the Metaphysical Deduction is such a seemingly simple procedure so transcendental logic. Pure concepts far of the as the step from the functionsany of - judgments the categories is tho are conceptstowhich as acts of pure concerned. As a whole the text ofHow the Metaphysical Deduction is by no the understanding works is the Ar of Kant arelike t means simple. It is very concise and some 'hidden' doctrines explanation. To put it briefly, it goes applied which are only incidentallyofreferred to. singular presentations, viz., sensib What the pure concepts of the presentations, understanding viz., we are looking They for areare d concepts. was already explained by Kant(receptivity) in his introduction to the idea (spontan of and the understanding of the understanding if there are transcendental logic. Pure concepts are immediately related to objects, wherea any - are concepts which as acts of pure thought refer a priori to objects. How the understanding works is the Archimedean point of Kant's explanation. To put it briefly, it goes like this: All cognition is made up of singular presentations, viz., sensible intuitions and general presentations, viz., concepts. They are derived from the sensibility (receptivity) and the understanding (spontaneity), respectively. Intuitions are immediately related to objects, whereas concepts are only mediate

"functions". (A68/B93) Function is the un various presentations under one com mon pre The only use which FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 111anding c the underst judge with them. Because concepts presentations of objects. All concepts fonns of the thought ofare medi andareallrules; judgments are based on concepts, an object. As predicates of possible judgments they relate to some cognitio n of an object, that is, a presentation on presentation of a not yet detenninedinobject. (A69/B94) Concepts rest every judgment there is a concept whi ch h "functions". (A68/B93) Function isandthe unity of the' act of bringing among these there is a given pres enta 4 various presentations under one common relatedpresentation. to an object(G). (A68/B93) A present The only use which the understanding make of concepts is to an objectcan is an intuition. Although Kant is judge with them. Because conceptsemp are mediate presentations of objects, loyment of the understanding, he is alre and all judgments are based on in concepts, a judgment is a mediate a sense which he is using freq of a presentation. For Kant uent cognition of an object, that is, a presentation comprehend s an intuition and accordingly has in every judgment there is a concept which holds of many presentations, a refe rence to an object. In the case of pure in and among these there is a givenpospresentation which is immediately sible objective reference. This mea ns that related to an object(G). (A68/B93) isA muc presentation immediately related to h richer than a linguistic entity. It als an object is an intuition. Althoughcon Kant is now discussing the logical cerned merely with synthetic judgments. employment of the understanding,intu he ition is already introducing 'judgment' is also the main point in Gra m's atte m in a sense which he is usingthefrequently later: every judgment implicit theo ry of judgment in CPR.5 comprehends an intuition and accordingly has an objective reference viz. The und erstanding is the faculty a reference to an object. In the caseacti ofvity pure intuition it is more exactly:ofajudgme of the understanding is judging, but al possible objective reference. This can means that Kant's notion of judgment be reduced to judgments, and so the is much richer than a linguistic entity. It also means that Kant is now

'Function' isThat used syntheticity rather ambiguorequires concerned merely with synthetic 4judgments. not denote the unity itself, but Kan usly by Kant. Jus t what talks abou mean theattempt is t the ' intuition is also the main point in Gram's act of (1968) uniting,toorshow a mod e of acting. synonymously with 'function', as in the implicit theory of judgment injudg CPR.5 ments' and 'the logical functions of Kan t's expre judgments'. (c 5 In fact Gram's who It isle not sotenthat an fy the The understanding is the faculty of judgment. bookonly is writ to justi im the theory of syntheticity as he also calls it. "..a judgme activity of the understanding is judging, but all acts of the understanding not that one concept is outside the scope of anothe tionso corrthe espondin g to it." (Gram can be reduced to judgments, intui and understanding may 1968be , 69) This

explicit or official theory of judg according to which a judgment is a ment which is a relatition between co 4 'Function' is used rather ambiguously byinen Kant. a few sentences later does prom t in Just Kan t's expl ion of analalso yticity and ofanat unity'. It can not denote the unity itself, but Kant talks about 'function concept of athepred icate being cont ainedis vers us not con mean the act of uniting, or a mode of I acting. Sometimes 'fonn' used subject. think that Gram is basi cly righ t. It isofalso true synonymously with 'function', as inprom Kant's expressions 'the logical inent, but in my opinion it is notforms judgments' and 'the logical functions of judgments'. (cp. Paton 1936/1,245) hidden and Kant cont rary the impl icit theotheory ry is even put quite or explicitly b of judgment, 5 In fact Gram's whole book is written to justify implicit I also think the that there is no cont rast it betw een the expl it.unt "..abut judgment is synthetic when asserts, the theory of syntheticity as he also calls acco they complete other. The thateach a concept has latte an r is mo not that one concept is outside the form scope er of or another, an answerbut to acontrasts how-quewith stion.Kant's - The case of intuition corresponding to it." (Gramhow 1968, 69) This Gram ever, is more complicated. See Chapters 7 and 8 bel explicit or official theory of judgment which is a version of traditional theory according to which a judgment is a relation between concepts. The explicit theory is prominent in Kant's explanation of analyticity and syntheticity in terms of the concept of a predicate being contained versus not contained in the concept of the subject. I think that Gram is basicly right. It is also true that the implicit theory is less prominent, but in my opinion it is not hidden and Kant was not unaware of it. On the contrary the implicit theory is even put quite explicitly by Kant. See e.g. A718/B746. I also think that there is no contrast between the explicit account and the implicit account but they complete each other. The latter is more like an explanation of the former or an answer to a how-question. - The case of transcendental propositions, however, is more complicated. See Chapters 7 and 8 below.

." (A69/B94) Kant is be completely presented r. CHAPTER 3 sical Deduction prope · 112 Metaphy The first step (§9): conceived as a faculty of judging generatim. Kant's grounds for this s that if claim In the first step Kant simply thetsunderstanding thesis are not further explained. "The functions of generatim and ou r all content of judgmen in rst judgments therefore can all be found, if the functions of the unity them, w anding incan mere form of the unde be completely presented." (A69/B94) Kant is now ready to ern present also cal ativelythe alt thought in judgments Metaphysical Deduction proper. judgments' or jus t the understanding in The first step (§9): jud gm en ts' - ca n.b judgments' or 'forms of In the first step Kant simply claims that if an abstraction is titles, ea c four from ofmade judgments. It consists all content of judgments generatim and our attention is focused on taken fro e table is the moments. (A70/B95) Th mere form of the understanding in them, we find that the functions modificatioofns are m further arguments. Some thought in judgments - alternatively also called the 'logical functions ofans by Kant me It is not quite clear what the understanding in judgments' or just the 'logical functions al to thinkofthat be However, it seems natur judgments' or 'folTIls of judgments' - can.be presented in his so inofthe (gen tent,table gives a judgment its con judgments. It consists of four titles, each of whichthecontains three concerns abstraction the understanding moments. (A70/B95) The table is taken from general logic without guished a not distinany that is, presentations are by Kant. further arguments. Some modifications are made and explained do no t see how pres A55/B79) "In logic we It is not quite clear what Kant means by abstraction from all content. ms." (Logic l for they agree with the logica However, it seems natural to think that because intuition is that ntrast to ge in cowhich that transcendental logic, gives a judgment its content, so in the (general) logical employment of terial as its ma sensibility lying a priori the understanding the abstraction concerns the origin of presentations, which it would hav understanding, without that is, presentations are not distinguished as conceptssteand intuitions. (cp. The second p (§10): A55/B79) "In logic we do not see how presentations po arise but solely how hysical D Metap The pivotal int of the Kant says they agree with the logical forms." (Logic 38) In the nextenstep le of cate the tab the table of judgm ts to that transcendental logic, in contrast to general logic, has a manifold ofnscend logic to tra transition from general sensibility lying a priori as its material for the pureent concepts theploymen l em icaof to the transcend al log understanding, without which it would have no content.e(A76fBI02) important 'fa ctu al begins with som most The second step (§10): was explained pure intuition a priori. As the transition The pivotal point of the Metaphysical Deduction isica uition. Pur re intfrom of both empir l and pu theofsame itleis ma a terial the table of judgments to the table of categories. Atold sensib pure time 1) A manif transition from general logic to transcendental logic, or from thealslogical o be presente ditions of sensibility can to the transcendental logical employment of the "fo understanding. rmal intuition".Kant be called a begins with some most important 'factual' claims concerning the role presenta ious of The act of putting var pure intuition a priori. As was explained in the Aesthetic we are din capable g their ma together and comprehen of both empirical and pure intuition. Pure intuition has a double nature. 1) A nlanifold of pure sensible material can be generated in it. 2) Conditions of sensibility can also be presented in a pure intuition. It will later be called a "fonnal intuition". The act of putting various presentations (intuitions and concepts) together and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition is

is given (either empirically or a priori). It is Kant's account of concepts that they are no they themselves are FROM GENERAL LOGIC TObut TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 113 ed by also generat only 'tools' of cognition but also results of called "synthesis" in its most general meaning. Synthesis - and by transcendental logic in contrast to general implication cognition - requires, in order not to be empty, that a manifold generating concepts. The meaning of sponta is given (either empirically or a priori). It is an important fact concerning just that it can itself generate its presentatio Kant's account of concepts that they are not only necessary in synthesis, receptivity is passive and merely receives th but they themselves are also generated by synthesis. Concepts are not Kant makes a most important claim: only 'tools' of cognition but also results of cognition. The peculiarity of sensible manifold - pure synthesis - general transcendental logic in contrast to general logic is that it is the logic of concept of the understanding. (A78/BI04 generating concepts. The meaning of spontaneity of the understanding is concepts of the understanding are just that it can itself generate its presentations, that is, concepts, whereas genera applied to the pure sensible material. (The receptivity is passive and merely receives the sensible given. material is discussed in Chapter 7 below Kant makes a most important claim: The synthesis of the pure ground of synthetic unity a priori. Every syn sensible manifold - pure synthesis - generally conceived, yields the pure according to concepts which give necessary concept of the understanding. (A78fBI04) In other words, the pure pure concepts must be used; as 'pure' they concepts of the understanding are generated by the act of synthesis than to determine that synthesis. The point applied to the pure sensible material. (The nature of the pure sensible the understanding are both necessarily used material is discussed in Chapter 7 below.) Synthesis now rests on a are also originally generated by that synthe ground of synthetic unity a priori. Every synthetic unity must be attained concepts of the understanding are found in r according to concepts which give necessary unity. In pure synthesis the manifold of pure intuitions. The double pure concepts must be used; as 'pure' they cannot have any other use exhibited: on the one hand it can generate than to determine that synthesis. The point is that the pure concepts of own, on the other hand it can also generate t the understanding are both necessarily used in pure synthesis, but they uniting of this manifold. (This is a distinction are also originally generated by that synthesis. To summarize: the pure and an intuition as singular presentation. See concepts of the understanding are found in results of the act of uniting a understanding is not only the faculty of ru manifold of pure intuitions. The double nature of pure intuition is ultimate source of these rules. exhibited: on the one hand it can generate the sensible manifold of its Kant's use of the notion of 'synthesis own, on the other hand it can also generate the concepts (conditions) for explained more in detail first in TD. In fac uniting of this manifold. (This is a distinction between the act of intuiting three kinds of synthesis. Sometimes he pre and an intuition as singular presentation. See Chapter 7 below.) Thus the concept is already generated in a synthesis understanding is not only the faculty of rules, but it is also itself the presentations, but also pure synthesis of pres ultimate source of these rules. brought under one concept. However, in the p Kant's use of the notion of 'synthesis' varies somewhat and is synthesis means just an act of putting tog In fact he distinguishes between explained more in detail first in ID. intuitio n. It is brought about by imag three kinds of synthesis. Sometimes he presupposes that a unity in a concept is already generated in a synthesis - in which not only mere presentations, but also pure synthesis of presentations (of intuitions) are brought under one concept. However, in the present context at least, pure synthesis means just an act of putting together a manifold of pure intuition. It is brought about by imagination, "a blind though

in this synthesis the categories are necessarily inv of the Critique Kant explicitly claims that the ima CHAPTER 3 114 the understanding. (B153) Although pure intui it is lity to sensibidue indispensible function of Aesthet the soul". (A78/Bmerely 103) This to theagain, ic, belong the with do to Kant's extremely concise text, is rather misleading. It is not that 'blind' the understanding has something accor because as was just mentioned the synthes pure .concepts ofh, the is - althoug the pure thatyields the fact it understanding. Later in TD also it becomes important premiss alreadythe - yields lity that the sensibi belongsan to the B-edition in this synthesis the categories are anding. necessarily involved. 279) 1936/1, In (Paton underst i.e. no determ of the Critique Kant explicitly In claims the is imagination by on,governed no cognitiis synthes pure that sy pure its and n the understanding. (B153) Given Although pure intuitions, according to the a manifold of pure intuitio in ord synthesisthat presupposed Aesthetic, belong merely toHow the sensibility it istotacitly this pure to attain unity order in unity by the understanding has something to do thenl. This give is indicated ts which concep thewith What are in a passage the fact that the pure synthesis - although, according the Aesthetic, it w n istogiven to this questio answer nerve also belongs to the sensibility yields 123) the pure of the as the very taken concepts Allison- 1983, understanding. (Paton 1936/I, 279) Deduction: to diffe In pure synthesis no cognition, no determination, is yet.unity attained. function that gives same "Thei.e. synthes mere the to its pure the question is: is o Given a manifold of pure intuition unity givessynthesis, nt also judgmeand gener unity?], or n [or How to attain unity to this pure orderfunctio to yield cognition? intuition.inThis in ansynthesis The anding. An sam underst What are the concepts whichthe give unity in order to attain cognition? t of the concep pure the logi it brought(e.g. in a passage which is frequently answer to this question is given which acts through very same unity - brings Allison 1983, 123) taken inasconcep the very the Metaphysical means of analytic ts, by nerve the synthetic of Deduction: into its presentations, by means "The same function that intuitio gives unity to different in called a are therefore im. Theypresentations n generat a (O) judgment also gives unity to underst the mere synthesis different presentationsprio to objects pertain and of anding 104) in an intuition. This functiongeneral [or unity?], generally expressed, is called h." (A79/B establis logic cannot same understanding, by reasoni the n the pure concept of the understanding. anding of Kant's the underst A key to The are the -same of a judgment very same acts through whichpure it brought theoflogical fonn anding the underst concepts brings a transcendental contentnts. in concepts, by means of analytic functions of judgme logical called- the those unity dly,in e.g. repeate of the manifold into its presentations, by means of the synthetic is stated Thisunity t way. differen which functions of the ope intuition generatim. They are therefore same concepts and itspure anding called underst s the a also explain understanding and pertain toinobjects(O) a priori conclusion which logic.- aThat transcendental general logic cannot establish." (A79/BI04) ysical Deduction. But that they are the Metaph than argued of Kant's is to conceive that for. the It A key to the understandingfor above rather grantedreasoning logical the concepts as pure concepts of the understanding d' from (functions) functio 'derive are same ies the categorare

those called the logical functions of judgments. They are only used in a different way. This is stated repeatedly, e.g. B143. It is the same understanding and its same functions which operate in general logic and in transcendental logic. That also explains the apparent simplicity of the Metaphysical Deduction. But that they are the same functions is taken for granted above rather than argued for. It is usually said that the categories are 'derived' from the logical functions of judgments. That is

it very briefly, it would be jus more. In the logical employment of the understa generat ed to a judgment byLOGIC means of 115 an analyt FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL presuppose first this analytical procedure which b rather misleading: they are indeed foundlogic. with the help of them, but they general Transc endental logic explains concepts. are also found to be the very same judgments presuppose that the understanding Kant refers above to his content generalinto account of the understanding. its presentations. As noted before I Although he puts it very briefly, it would justified to say something line betweenbegeneral logic and transcendental lo more. In the logical employment of the a logical form is distinct ionunderstanding between the analytic and the synth generated to a judgment by means of an analytic unity. All judgments precisely, general logic deals with all judgments presuppose first this analytical because procedure which belongs to the domain of it abstrac ts from all content. general logic. Transcendental logic explains further that synthetic What does it mean more exactly that "the u judgments presuppose that the understanding brings transcendental transce ndental content into its presentations, by content into its presentations. unity As noted maintain that the of thebefore manifoI ldwill in intuition generatim"? Es line between general logic and"transc transcendental logic coincides the endental content" has beenwith a subject of distinction between the analytic the synthetic judgments. More (e.g. and Allison 1983, 125-6; Paton 1936/I, 290; Pi precisely, general logic deals with all judgments without any distinction There seems to be two coherent but widely diffe because it abstracts from all content. one fits well-with the text but not with Kant's rath What does it mean more context exactly that "the understanding brings a . The second one - which I think should b transcendental content into itsless presentations, by means of the synthetic fitting, makes sense of the argument. Wheth unity of the manifold in intuition generatim"? Especially the expression possibl y could be reconciled I will leave unexamin "transcendental content" has been subject of various interpretations 1) a"Its presentations" refers to "the p (e.g. Allison 1983, 125-6; Paton 1936/1, 290; Pippin 1982, 91, 94-95). underst anding" , and these "presentations" are in th There seems to be two coherent but widely readings. The first "pure conceptsdifferent of the understanding". Accordin one fits wellwith the text but brings not with Kant's rather obvious aims in this a transce ndental content into its pure conce context. The second one - which I think should be preferred - although material content must be given by intuitions (wh less fitting, makes sense of the argument. Whether these two readings sensible); concepts provide mere forms. Synthetic possibly could be reconciled Iof will unexamined. anyleave intuitio n is a unity - or a function - that uni 1) "Its presentations" arefers "the presentations of the materiatol content , that is, it brings a material understanding", and these "presentations" are in the next sentence called concept. Catego ries are the concepts of objects gen "pure concepts of the understanding". Accordingly the understanding given a transce ndental content, they become co brings a transcendental content into its pure Transcendental or objects, that is, concepts. they determ ine objects. To put it material content must be given by intuitions (which for us are always content , that is, an objective content or objectiv sensible); concepts provide mere forms. of the manifold supplie d by Synthetic intuition. unity What in fact makes this cont a function - that a pure concept and of any intuition is a unity - orthat in synthes is itunites is subsumed under the categori a material content, that is, it brings a material content into a pure concept. Categories are the concepts of objects generatim. When they are given a transcendental content, they become concepts of determined objects, that is, they determine objects. To put it differently: a material content, that is, an objective content or objective reference is always supplied by intuition. What in fact makes this content objective for us is that in synthesis it is subsumed under the categories. The categories are

by 'transc Kant sometimes (e.g. On 193) and it seem 'material' in contrast to 'log ical ' 116 CHAPTER 3 because the produced logical fon n trast now con n above seems to be very na - the interpreoftatio necessary conditions for presentations objects; that is what the views. Kant's ove Transcendental Deduction is supposed torall prove. Taking for granted that above taking "tr ever, the readingsimply How'transcendental' 2) by Kant sometimes (e.g. On 193) means terial' makes little sense of Kan 'ma to al equ 'material' in contrast to 'logical' - and it seems to be a question of this ments are contrasted with t of judg formslogical contrast now because the produced fonn was the 'logical content' ntal content" which is brought m "tratonsce - the interpretation above seems be nde very natural and is coherent with ided by categories and not the content prov Kant's overall views. entation - evidently also intu any pres refer to 2) However, the reading above taking "transcendental content" as abo intuition generatim" If "in erstand equal to 'material' makes littleund sense of ing. Kant's argument. The logical , light of the Schematism the categories. so inthe intuition,with Thus the fonns of judgments are contrasted content" denotes time de ntal nde nsce "tra "transcendental content" which is brought must be the effect of the ld mean that the pure concep ression wou categories and not the contentexp provided by intuition. "Presentations" an presentations of the underst to the appliedalso refer to any presentation - evidently intuitions - dealt with by the ts. the logical fonns of judgmen which applies understanding. If "in intuition generatim" above is taken to refer to pure ) a ence: "pertain to object(O In the last sent intuition, so in the light of the Schematism, it could be suggested that rsta wing . . sounds like an ove statemen "transcendental content" denotes timets follo detenninations. The whole O) cepts pertain to objects( these con expression would mean that thenow purethat concepts of the understanding are pin Deduction at all. (Pip Transcendentalby any understanding applied to the presentations of the the very same act is l t wn hypothetically already now, wha kno judgments. which applies the logical fonns of ible. poss In the last sentence: "pertain to object(O) a priori" - and some similar o ready to present the list now is t Kan statements following . . sounds like an overstatement. If we knew already urall (the categories). Nat erstandinga priori, now that these concepts pertain tound objects(O) we would not need g to each function of judgment ndin espo corr any Transcendental Deduction at all. (Pippin 1982, 94) However, even ifheadi e of judgments with some same istabl the what left is to explain how this is r the known hypothetically already now, The part following immediately afte possible. , is - unlike the Metaphys ema list oftism the pure concepts of the Kant is now ready to presentthetheSch emely obscure, even incon red as extr understanding (the categories).conside Naturally there is a category that these two parts are close om noticed seld judgment. The table of categories is corresponding to each function of issue although from different same changed. with the the same table of judgments with some headings Metaphysical Deduction is ra theTranscendental thatthe outafter The part following immediately Deduction, er understanding of the M en the propDeduction Metaphysical - frequently ition the Schematism, is - unlike the Giv role of 'pure intu ly of the or especial considered as extremely obscure, even inconceivable superfluous. It is ard. The question of the Metaph forw ight stra seldom noticed that these two parts are closely related and are concerned with the same issue although from different directions. In fact it turned out that the Metaphysical Deduction is rather a complicated matter. Given the proper understanding of the Metaphysical Deduction and especially of the role of 'pure intuition', the Schematism is quite straightforward. The question of the Metaphysical Deduction is: How to

pure concepts of the understanding as o empirical intuitions" - that is, having their o FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 117 a radically different LOGIC faculty from the facult - howofto the explain that they can Pure have sensib find the categories, the pure concepts understanding? all. Thus the Schem atism has to proceed concepts cannot be found anywhere as such, i.e. without significance. same pointofwhere the pure judgments, butconcep used ints of the The 'clue' was that they are found as functions the Metaph ysical Deduct ion. In the the Schem a different way. The task of the Schematism is the opposite. Given concepts "heterogenous of the understfrom anding get as originally pure concepts of the understanding pure through the inschema ta. Schem ata is are pure empirical intuitions" - that is, having their origin the intellect which the categor ies in the most general case. (See a radically different faculty from the faculty of intuitions, the sensibility It may be though thatmeaning in the Metaph ysic - how to explain that they can have sensible meaning or tany at the categor ies withou t any sensibl all. Thus the Schematism has to proceed synthetically and end at thee signifi Schema tism - shows were how found the categor the understanding in ies g same point where the pure concepts of that this prevale nt interpre is not corr the Metaphysical Deduction. In the Schematism it is explainedtation how the e signific ance first pure concepts of the understandingthegetsensibl empirical significance onlyin the cing the categor ies it is already through the schemata. Schemata are introdu pure intuitions and applications of impl sensible signific ance. By means of the c the categories in the most general case. (See Chapter 7.) brough t to the manifo ld of intuition. It is w It may be thought that in the Metaphysical Deduction Kant introduced Kant only sensibl e intuitio n the categories without any sensible significance and only later - isinpossibl the e for categor iesschematized. cannot generat e any Schematism - shows how the categories get My thesisunity is at all unless they have sensibl significance, th that this prevalent interpretation is not correct. Certainly Kante specifies of sensible intuitio n. the sensible significance first inmanifo the ld Schematism. However, in It is a presupp osition of they the Metaph introducing the categories it is already implicitly supposed that have ysical of logical functio ns which are the is sensible significance. By means of the categories synthetic unity necessa ry conditi ons belong to the domain brought to the manifold of intuition.These It is well known that according to of g "the labors the logician s were ready Kant only sensible intuition is possible for us of humans. Obviously, the at ha defects ." (Pr 323) He over "the l of the manifold of takes intuition categories cannot generate any unityfrom at all with some modific presenttos his unless they have sensible significance, that is, are ation applicable the own tab judgme nts. This proced ure was certain ly no manifold of sensible intuition. someth ing more of his thatown therelabours is a setare hidd It is a presupposition of the Metaphysical Deduction this for granted , comme nts on two philosoph of logical functions which are the necessary conditions of all judgrnents. calledoffor: These conditions belong to the domain general logic. Kant says that 1) It is difficul t to e how "the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though notconceiv yet quite free Allison proving the objectiv e validity of and categor from defects." (Pr 323) He takes over "the labours of the logicians" the with some modification presents his own table of the logical functions of judgments. This procedure was certainly not as easy as Kant indicates; something more of his own labours are hidden in here as well. Taking all this for granted, comments on two philosophers, Allison and Komer, are called for: 1) It is difficult to conceive how Allison could justify his thesis that proving the objective validity of the categories in TD/l is tantamount to

belongs to the "labours of the logicians"? Kant' plays a crucial role in TD, but the aim of TD is not in its 3general logical sense. The message 118 theory CHAPTER Deduction is that although the pure concepts of t proving the validity of these concepts in a logical sense, as categories) are in fact the very same functions b unschematized concepts referring to objects in a logical sense. Is not just way, they are called differently just depending beginning and this kind of validity taken for granted from the very Allison's claims (1983, 116ff) about the pu belongs to the "labours of the logicians"? Kant's theoryofofjudgme judgment nts are understanding as conditions that general plays a crucial role in TD, but the aim of TD is not to justify confusing because they are valid only if 'the theasMetaphysical theory in its general logical sense. The message ofood synonymous with understanding' are underst (the Deduction is that although the pure concepts of the understanding of judgments'. However, for Kant they are n categories) are in fact the very same functions but concep used ints aofdifferent the underst categories are the pure way, they are called differently just depending nts, on but their use. Thus ely only of objectiv conditions of all judgme of the Allison's claims (1983, 116ff) about the pureof concepts 2) Komer 's criticism transcendental deductio but highly understanding as conditions of judgments are correct, a starting point to some debate. The nerve of K concepts the prov confusing because they are valid only if 'the pure deducti cannot on of claim that a transcendental understanding' are understood as synonymous with 'the logicalngfunctions conceptual schema. Notwithstandi the fact that of judgments'. However, for Kant they are not synonymous. The Metaphysical Deduction which establishes the sc are not categories are the pure concepts of the understanding. They proving the uniqueness remains. conditions of all judgments, but only of objectively valid judgments. It is true that Kant makes far-reaching claims a 1967) was 2) Korner's criticism of transcendental deductions (Komer completeness of his results. Unlike Aristotle, he m criticism is his a starting point to some debate. The nerve of Komer's find the categories rhapsodically but due to a secu claim that a transcendental deduction cannot prove the uniqueness of a he hardly presents any argumental support to h not theof TD but thelogic m conceptual schema. Notwithstanding the fact that it is results general taken for granted that the of ation Metaphysical Deduction which establishes the schema, the own question modific basis, and further that Kant's proving the uniqueness remains. general to transcendental logic do not violate this and It is true that Kant makes far-reaching claims about the certainty any details to discuss the problem of the compl not completeness of his results. Unlike Aristotle, he maintains that he did categories. This problem is regarded by som find the categories rhapsodically but due to a secure principle. of However, thorniest one in the interpretation Kant, wherea he hardly presents any argumental support to his claims. It isassimply too obviou by many, who take Kant's failure up theisunshakable taken for granted that the results of general logic make there to p attempt no claims for completeness, basis, and further that Kant's own modifications and transition from the categories. If Komer by 'prove' means someth general to transcendental logic do not violate this any basis. I will not goy into possible logicall other that there cannot be of the table of any details to discuss the problem of the completeness certainly never have been attempted by Kant. categories. This problem is regarded by somekinds philosophers thecanno orks of framewas possibility of other thorniest one in the interpretation of Kant, whereas it is simply dismissed by many, who take Kant's failure as too obvious. Notwithstanding the claims for completeness, there is no attempt to prove the uniqueness of the categories. If Komer by 'prove' means something like to demonstrate that there cannot be any other logically possible alternatives, that would certainly never have been attempted by Kant. Of course, the logical possibility of other kinds of frameworks cannot be denied. There are

Taken as an argument the Metaphysic al D main parts: 1) Laying ground for the reas on FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC of the understanding is considered119 quite gen ducsays e thethat tablwe well known passages in CPR whereintro Kant find e ofcannot the logi calany forms of j step the tabl(B146) e of categories is obtained from t explanation why we have just these categories. The second step, the transition from gen logic, is of course the most decisive step. 7. The argument of the Metaphysical Deduction categories and the rules of grammar Taken as an argument the Metaphysical Deduction comprehends three is sugg has described his procedure: "To sear the logical employment ch in o main parts: 1) Laying ground for the reasoning, the concepts which do not rest upo of the understanding is considered quite generally. 2) The first step is ntoparticul in wledge from expsecond erience .~ pr judgments. 3) In the introduce the table of the logical formsallofkno reflection nor deeper insight than to step the table of categories is obtained from that table. detect in actu of wor ds gen ly and thus to coll The second step, the transition fromal use general logic to eral transcendental (in bothThe inqu iries arebetween very closthe ely related step. analogy logic, is of course the most decisivefact able to give a reason why each lang He e has ju categories and the rules of grammar is suggested by Kant himself. uag constitution..." (Pr 322, §39) has described his procedure: "To search in our ordinary knowledge for Kant analyses the syntax of general the concepts which do not rest upon particular experience and yet occur logic Thus there is a deep-going presupp osition em in all knowledge from experience .~ presupposes neither greater namely that the structure of languag e and th reflection nor deeper insight than to detect in a language the rules of the structurally identical. How the tabl e of catego actual use of words generally and thus to collect elements for a gramn1ar the basis of the table of judgment is an issue th (in fact both inquiries are very closely related), even though we are not seriously belittled by Kant. It is far from evi able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal just the given nonsyntactical counter parts to constitution..." (Pr 322, §39) judgments. Kant analyses the syntax of general logic and finds the categories. The a priori origin of the categories in his procedure,is grante Thus there is a deep-going presupposition embedded pure concepts follows directly from the presu namely that the structure of language and the structure of thought are forms of judgments are pure. What onMetaph structurally identical. How the table of categories is actually fonnedthe prove is that there are any concepts priori - th the difficulties of whichaare the basis of the table of judgment is an issue taken for granted - it only leads to seriously belittled by Kant. It is far from evident why there shouldthe be discove are. We must know beforehand wha just the given nonsyntactical counterparts to the syntactical forms tofwe are emphasizing strongly that when Kant goes judgments. Analytic, the Transcendental Ded areon, it i The a priori origin of the categories is granted. That the categoriesucti categories are what they are. The Transcend pure concepts follows directly from the presupposition that the logical concerned with individual categori esnot but endea forms of judgments are pure. What the Metaphysical Deduction does prove is that there are any concepts a priori - the fonns of judgments, are taken for granted - it only leads to the discovery of what the categories are. We must know beforehand what we are looking for. It is worth emphasizing strongly that when Kant goes to the next step of the Analytic, the Transcendental Deduction, it is presupposed that the categories are what they are. The Transcendental Deduction is not concerned with individual categories but endeavours to show how the

As mentioned before, special attention will b CHAPTER 3 tation of Kant and of TD especia 120 s's interpre Allison doubtful is Allison's interpretation of 'object ' ha previously found categories have objective validity concerning all the judgmental sense in TD/l. In transcendental logic th objects of experience. such a sense. In transcendental logic all objects are re Real objects are possible objects of experien actual. logic 8. Allison on transcendental objects are judgmental. For Kant there is no other cog As mentioned before,to special attention willjudgme be paid to Henry that does n nts, but through objects than Allisons's interpretation of Kant and of TD especially. What is most(Chapte 'weighty' as Allison thinks. I will return later of 'object' having logical or 's u doubtful is Allison's interpretation Allison now adiscuss s' but will problem of 'object judgmental sense in TD/1.distinct In transcendental logic there is no room for ion between general and transcendental logic. such a sense. In transcendental logic objects are real, they are not n these betwee line Thebut begins. trouble see it - the all actual. Real objects are possible objects ofh experience. In always a sensemake all it ea Kant does not althoug important, objects are judgmental. Forwhich Kantside thereheisisno other cognitive way to refer operating. to objects than through judgments, but that does with not objects make them less sen in a logical That TD/l could deal 'weighty' as Allison thinks. I will return later (Chapter 5,,) to the general the merely logical use of the pure concepts is feasib problem of 'objects' but will now discuss understanding of the tized must be schema categories that theAllison's admits - asclaims I distinction between generalknowle and transcendental t he also , butis where objectsThat dge of real logic. see it - the trouble begins.commi The line between these two logics is most inte purely a tted to the doctrine that they have important, although Kant does not always makent". it easy to determine on s th 119) He justifie (1983, of judgme conditions which side he is operating. some remarks of Kant. Further Allison thinks That TD/1 could deal with objects in betwee a logical sensetwo presupposes All that i doctrines.that n these iction contrad the merely logical use of but the pure concepts is feasible. Allison readily only with the proviso that the limit betw admits that the categories must be schematized in yorder yield also c drawn.toAllison logic is properl transcendental knowledge of real objects, butofhe also claims thattual"Kant isn also as conditio functio intellec purely their virtue committed to the doctrine that they have a purely intellectual function as and categories are called "pure concepts of the underst conditions of judgment". (1983, 119) He justifies this by references to contradicts flatly what Kant says. For Kant the pu Further Allison that n, there no ngly some remarks of Kant. unite andis accordi of intuitio the manifoldthinks contradiction between theseintellec two doctrines. All totally sensible material. to acceptable theyisapply ns,that tual functio but only with the provisoAccord that ing the tolimit between general and use of logical is a purely Kant there transcendental logic is properly drawn. Allison also claims that indeed understo the understanding. But this talk has to be in virtue of their purely intellectual as conditions of judgment the l lo logic. Genera back to general ndental logic transcefunction categories are called "pure concepts of the understanding". This seems to with the laws of the understanding when an abstracti contradicts flatly what Kant says.ceForofKant the pure always Why sh its objects. n to concepts cognitio referen unite the manifold of intuition, and accordingly, although purely intellectual functions, they apply to sensible material. (cp. A79/BI04) According to Kant there is a purely logical use of the pure concepts of the understanding. But this talk has to be understood as a jump from transcendental logic back to general logic. General logic was said to deal with the laws of the understanding when an abstraction is made from all reference of cognition to its objects. Why should there be in

used in a certain way, namely to deter FROM GENERAL LOGIC TOintuition. TRANSCENDENTAL (B143) (As LOGIC Allison also121 explain Allison's interpretation of TD/l me transcendental logic also a part which has exactly the same concern as unschematized categories. I claim that general logic? The pure concepts of the understanding are found in the practically everywhere, by 'the categ Metaphysical Deduction by obtaining them from the logical functions of concepts of the understanding' Kant mean judgments. The categories are nothing else than these logical functions is not relevant that he only later, in the used in a certain way, namely to determine the manifold of a given categories get sensible significance. intuition. (BI43) (As Allison also explains. p. 126) understanding as unschematized are inde Allison's interpretation of TD/l means that Kant deals with the no non-logical meaning at all and accord unschematized categories. I claim that on the contrary in TD/l, as objects. A serious objection against Allis practically everywhere, by 'the categories' and also by 'the pure unschematized categories in TD/1, so concepts of the understanding' Kant means the schematized categories. It which according to Allison is to prove is not relevant that he only later, in the Schematism, explains how the categories. Logical functions do not have categories get sensible significance. The pure concepts of the logical validity could be proved - if there understanding as unschematized are indeed pure, so pure that they have no (real) objective validity. There is no su no non-logical meaning at all and accordingly, no reference to any real concepts of the understanding, due to the objects. A serious objection against Allison is that if Kant dealt with the the outset. unschematized categories in TD/l, so TD/l could not fulfill its aim, It could be maintained, in defence o which according to Allison is to prove the objective validity of the 'objective validity' as judgmental in categories. Logical functions do not have any objective reference. Maybe reference is required. This seems to be tr logical validity could be proved - if there were some need for that - but should be understood in a formal sense, b no (real) objective validity. There is no such need either because the pure is where Allison comes into contradic concepts of the understanding, due to their origin, have logical validity at concepts .. relate to empirical intuitions the outset. have no objective validity..." (A239/B298 It could be maintained, in defence of Allison, that he understands form of the concept, thus taken by itself, 'objective validity' as judgmental in a logical sense, thus no real and distinguish what object(O) comes un reference is required. This seems to be true (p.135). I agree that validity from the sensible condition through whic should be understood in a formal sense, but it is not a logical sense. That it." (A245) Accordingly, for Kant object is where Allison comes into contradiction with Kant. "Therefore all is a contradiction in terms. Logic abstrac concepts .. relate to empirical intuitions ... Apart from this relation they The matter is complicated and would dem have no objective validity..." (A239/B298) "By means of this function or Anyhow, the aim of TD is not to justify form of the concept, thus taken by itself, we cannot in any way cognize ground in general logic. The aim is and distinguish what object(O) comes under it, since we have abstracted categories] means alone an object(G) can from the sensible condition through which alone objects can come under it." (A245) Accordingly, for Kant objective validity in the logical sense is a contradiction in terms. Logic abstracts from all reference to objects. The matter is complicated and would demand a more detailed discussion. Anyhow, the aim of TD is not to justify this validity because it has its ground in general logic. The aim is to justify that "by their [the categories] means alone an object(G) can be thought". (A96) To put it in

claims further that this is indicated by Kant by using ' CHAPTER 3 122 ntal sense. My answer is simp in a judgme an object have understood 'object' here in a weighty sense: another way: to show how the subjective conditions - which are also . manifold of sensible intuition already in TD/l. He do intersubjectively necessary conditions - at the same time have objective deal with actual objects in a weighty sense, but with validity. objects, that is, with possible objects. Too much h Now, a defence of Allison would go on: that is true, but 'object' every conscious thought had objective va~idity. Seco should also be understood in a logical sense, not in a 'real' sense. Allison most extraordinary if Kant had made a mistake in the claims further that this is indicated by Kant by using 'Objekt' to refer to in his very explanation of objective validity. As can b an object in a judgmental sense. My answer is simply that Kant must 'Objekt' but 'Gegenstand'. In the Prole not use doeshere have understood 'object' in a weighty sense: he deals with the ocally and in many ways contrary to Al states unequiv . manifold of sensible intuition already in TD/I. He does not, of course, that they [the pure concepts of the u deal with actual objectsobvious in a weighty sense, but with the logic of these nothing but logical functions, and as such themselves objects, that is, with possible objects. Too much had been proved if the least concept of an object(O) in itself, but requ every conscious thought had objective va~idity. Secondly, it would be intuition as basis. These concepts, therefore, only most extraordinary if Kant had made a mistake in the usage of 'Objekt' empirical judgments..." Thirdly, if 'categories' are in his very explanation of objective validity. As can be seen in B137 he judgmental or logical sense, 'objects' in a logical sen does not use 'Objekt' but 'Gegenstand'. In the Prolegomena (p.324) he judgments, so isn't it circular or at least an analytic p states unequivocally and in many ways contrary to Allision: "..it became in a judgmental or logi objective validityof- again the pure the understanding] are obvious that they [the concepts Allison's model, could it be conceivable that the cate themselves nothing but logical functions, and as such do not constitute ntental validity? object(O) in itself, but require some sensuous the least concept of anjudgme rize: Allison's interpretation implies es summa To intuition as basis. These concepts, therefore, only serve to determine logic which lies between the general logic and the tr empirical judgments..." Thirdly, if 'categories' are understood in a My claim is that there is no room for that kind of judgmental or logical sense, 'objects' in a logical sense as correlates of certainly damage Kant's architechtonics. judgments, so isn't it circular or at least an analytic procedure to 'prove' the objective validity - again in a judgmental or logical sense? How, in Allison's model, could it be conceivable that the categories do not have judgmentental validity? To summarize: Allison's interpretation implies establishing a use of logic which lies between the general logic and the transcendental logic. My claim is that there is no room for that kind of logic, and it would certainly damage Kant's architechtonics.

CHAPTER 4

1. Why the B-deduction? 2. Deduction is not 3. The task o parts of the Transcendental D THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION intuition' versus 'objects o OF THE CATEGORIES Abstraction 7. Merely forma abstraction? 8. Thought ve categories 10. Mathema categories; constitutive versu 11.Transcendental Summary: the structure 1. Why the B-deduction? 2. What the Deduction 4. The two Deduction is not 3. The task of the deduction parts of the Transcendental Deduction 5. An 'object of intuition' versus 'objects of experience' 6. The Abstraction 7. Merely formal or 1.formal andB-deduction? material Why the abstraction? 8. Thought ver~us cognition 9. The first trouble for anybody categories 10. Mathematical The versus dynamical the fact that Kant totally categories; constitutive versus Deduction regulativeis employment of the present study, like th focusTranscendental 11. Summary: the structure The of the Deduction on the B-edition version. Why pref

deduction? That is not a question I am well known that Kant himself claimed 1. Why the B-deduction? in the manner of presentation. (Bxxxvi philosophers.theIt Transcendental is easy to agree t The first trouble for anybody considering understanding notions stated be it for thesome second edition. Deduction is the fact that Kant totally rewrote outer appearance of the B-deduction The focus of the present study, like that of the contemporary dispute, is Moreover, on the B-edition version. Why prefer structured. the B-deduction overwetheshould A- hav preference for the B-deduction, deduction? That is not a question I am going to deal deeply with. It isbecaus version contain his more well known that Kant himself claimed that there to is no difference exceptconside Metaphysical a This has been disputed byDeduction many in the manner of presentation. (Bxxxvii) preceding unaltered in the B-edition as well as philosophers. It is easy to agree that the A-version is helpful in strongly suggests that hand, Kant'sthe aims in the other understanding some notions stated better in it. On outer appearance of the B-deduction makes it evident that it is better structured. Moreover, we should have strong arguments to rebut the preference for the B-deduction, because Kant himself obviously held this version to contain his more considered opinions. The fact that the preceding Metaphysical Deduction and the sections 13 and 14 are unaltered in the B-edition as well as the closely related Schematism, strongly suggests that Kant's aims in both editions must be identical. It

ontological presuppositions, or being engag explanation in the first edition while giving a lo CHAPTER 4 it for granted that what is suppo 124 I take second. same in the both editions. seems to me totally unacceptable to maintain that Kant had endeavoured There certainly are differences in the teIID to prove something quite different in the two versions, say, with different changes in the B-edition are often seen as K ontological presuppositions, or being engaged in a psychological misunderstandings, not least as reading CPR explanation in the first edition while giving a logical explanation in the psychological study. The language of the B-edit second. I take it for granted that what is supposed to be proved is the psychological reading; often called the logical same in the both editions. briefly, it means that TD is not conce~ed w There certainly are differences in the teITIlinological nuances. The psychological faculties. Of course, it cannot b changes in the B-edition are often seen as Kant's response to some about faculties, and in both editions. But in bo misunderstandings, not least as reading CPR as a kind of superunderstood as inevitable presuppositions, like psychological study. The language of the B-edition more suggests a nonTD, like that of the transcendental philoso phy psychological reading; often called the logical interpretation. To put it and clarify the (transcendental) logical relations briefly, it means that TD is not conce~ed with properties of some for human cognition. My reading of TD is a lo psychological faculties. Of course, it cannot be denied that Kant talks that this is a case, like many other importa nt cas about faculties, and in both editions. But in both cases they should be where the textual evidence is not unequivocal. T understood as inevitable presuppositions, like powers. The purpose of one version - usually the A-edition - over TD, like that of the transcendental philosophy as a whole, is to specify importance of differences in the faculty-talk. T and clarify the (transcendental) logical relations and conditions necessary case analogous to that of the anthropologist for human cognition. My reading of TD is a logical one. I readily admit descriptions tell more about themselves than ab that this is a case, like many other important cases in the Kantian corpus, Following Kant I also believe - contrary to w where the textual evidence is not unequivocal. Those who strongly prefer view - that the differences in the way of reasoni one version - usually the A-edition - over another, emphasize the deductions are not very great and (Wagn er importance of differences in the faculty-talk. This seems to me to be a deduction should also be interpretated in the case analogous to that of the anthropologists of the old days: their edition is chosen as the object of the study descriptions tell more about themselves than about their subject-matter. mentioned reasons, without further argume nt fo Following Kant I also believe - contrary to what might be the received view - that the differences in the way of reasoning between the A- and tion B- is n 2. What the Transc endent al Deduc deductions are not very great and (Wagner 1980, 361) that the Atask TD is clearly it very Kant puts in the logical way. what Thus the Bdeduction should also be interpretated validity of the objecti to establis namely of the study, hbecause of ve the above edition is chosen as the object amounts to explaini (§13). anding for underst mentioned reasons, without further argument anyThat preference. are necessary conditions of experience and e. (§26)is Howev 2. What the Transcendentalpossibl Deduction not er, the understanding of confused by views which put Kant's reasoning Kant puts it very clearly what task TD is supposed to accomplish, namely to establish the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding (§13). That amounts to explaining how the pure concepts are necessary conditions of experience and thus make experience possible. (§26) However, the understanding of TD has been considerably confused by views which put Kant's reasoning upside down. They have

necessarily involves knowledge of objects (Strawson 1966, 88) TD is supposed to prove THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 125 knowledge, that is, that experience is knowled does not answer to the Thus sceptical it i dominated the English-language literature until recently. it is challenge worth "uninteresting" or not properly dealing with th stating first what TD does not endeavour to prove. An example of this - I of knowledge. will call it the anti-sceptical interpretation - goes like this: "A major part These reflect more philosoph be interpretations to establish that experience of the role of the Deduction will than the sense text which should of objects, in beweighty .." is su necessarily involves knowledgephilosophy To repudiate be rather easy if one (Strawson 1966, 88) TD is supposed to provethem the should objectivity of human carefully. The burden of proof is totally knowledge, that is, that experience is knowledge of outer objects. If TD on the Kant ithimself says as about the task does not answer to the scepticalWhat challenge is regarded "trivial" or of T of reading. Kant totally m suggest with that kind ofWas the theory "uninteresting" or not properly dealing the questions his own work? If so, it must be shown that he of knowledge. than philosophers' what he himself thought heofwas doing. H These interpretations reflect more own visions what of the anti-sceptical view, the advocates philosophy should be than the text which is supposed to be interpreted. especi maintain Kantbothers failed to in read his Kant proper task To repudiate them should be rather easy if that one only irrelevant proper task? I th totally onis·the side of for the the anti-sceptics. carefully. The burden of proof isreasoning Kant's "proper What Kant himself says about suggests the task that of TD does not intask" anydoes waynot cor fact totally was Kant's undertaking; moreover, th suggest that kind of reading. WasinKant mistaken in understanding pretation It seemselse to me tha his own work? If so, it must be shown thatshould he in be factrejected. did something scepticism to start than what he himself thought he the wassignificance doing. Howofcould that betry done by witho all. That is the reason why they end the advocates of the anti-sceptical view, especially when they frequentlyup in a beginning - in my an in uninteresting maintain that Kant failed in his proper task, and opinion, that much his presupposition is that any presu reasoning is· irrelevant for the proper task? I think thattoallstart thiswithout more than Kantnot wascorrespond engaged in show how suggests that Kant's "proper task" does to trying the tasktowhich of the old metaphysics greatthe deal in fact was Kant's undertaking; scientific; moreover,a that antisceptical interof TD is to explain enterprise. The aim pretation should be rejected. It seems to me that philosophers who stresshow cer origin in the any intellect, still can have the significance of scepticism trytheir to start without presuppositions at objec necessary conditions of any objective cognition all. That is the reason why they end up in a dead-end from the very conditions as suchMynot suf beginning - in my opinion, anintellectual uninteresting and aridand dead-end. material condition as well; it requires intuition presupposition is that to start without any presuppositions is impossible. rights" stake are concepts. The pos Kant was engaged in trying to show are howatmetaphysics can be made cognition, is aa cognitive cognition which metaphysics has to that go as scientific; a great deal of the old"empirical through perceptions" (B218) is taken for grante enterprise. The aim of TD is to explain how certain concepts, which have

their origin in the intellect, still can have objective reference, indeed, are necessary conditions of any objective cognition. They are, however, only intellectual conditions and as such not sufficient. Cognition has a material condition as well; it requires intuition. The items whose "legal rights" are at stake are concepts. The possibility of experience as "empirical cognition, that is a cognition which determines an object(O) through perceptions" (B218) is taken for granted and is a factual premiss

proved if it is merely shown that they can must also be shown that they not only can · 126 CHAPTER 4 reference, that is, that they refer to outer obje outer areTD, be provedInthat of the very reasoning, not its conclusion. thatthere sense no objects doubt, .isThis a i regressive argument. (Amerikis reasoni 1978) ng goes. However, this objection is p Kant all that for above to argueof the pure concepts is transce not It could be objected that thetried objectivity in otherItwor possibility, mereobjective of ahave cogniti reference. proved if it is merely shown that theyoncan being o existential, better, - or haveactual, objective must also be shown that they factual not only can but indeed a underst priori. "..the shown reference, that is, that they refer proved to outer or objects. Byaimplication, it has to ting the for anticipa than the more lish is accompThis the way anti-sceptical be proved that there are outer objects. ndental Transce (A246/B303) generatim..." reasoning goes. However, this objection is profoundly mistaken. I have that-qu than to to how-questions rather tried to argue above that for Kant all transcendental cognition a priori isestio factual can ingNothing cognition of a mere possibility, Kant's in otherphiloso words,phy of that meresometh forms. to always factual content A something, n. of to intuitio 'that'has· - can be factual - or better, existential, actual, being objec of any intuitions. Existen by unders~ding can ce a priori never proved or shown a priori. "..the to trying in point no is B279ff (A226/ of possible experience accomplish more than anticipating the fonn) There objection se, the put it otherwiare necessary. Toexplanations generatim..." (A246/B303) Transcendental answers ng. reasoni ndental says aboutIt transce rather to how-questions than toKant that-questions. is a comer-stone of distinctio his famous makesonly Kant's philosophy that something(A84/B factual116) can Kant be proved by recourse ti. He certai quidfac quid ns: to questio to intuition. A factual content has always be juris givenvs.from the outside, and not factual legal contingent. TD is to isanswer anyof object totally by intuitions. Existence of task anti-sceptical the existence natural seemin (A226/B279ff) There is no point and in trying to gly prove that some is v that, insight whatunfor t it is to difficul necessary. To put it otherwise, the objection is come basedtoontheignoring 'Objective validity us. beginning to the availableAt of TD ' mu Kant says about transcendentalare reasoning.

. and factual e validity e objectiv possibl (A84/B 116) Kant makes his famous distinction between legal questions: quid juris vs. quid facti. He certainly maintains there that the ion of the deduct The task questions. How widespread task of TD is to answer legal and not3.factual Chapte ed (inhow and seemingly natural the anti-sceptical views are shows discuss beenonly It has already means 'justific difficult it is to come to the insightdeducti that, unfortunately, proofsation it stronger on. Generallyno meant are available to us. 'Objective validity' be understood inference is tonotmean a logical sense as must possible objective validity. Deduktion but Ableitung - although a logica part of a deduction. In the most important 3. The task of the deduction justification of concepts. It is a kind of expos expos Indeed, definitio label generic 2) It has already been discussed the (in Chapter what Kant n. means by a no when one, for te a substituin the modern definition, but deduction. Generally it means 'justification'. Deduction sense as a logical inference is not meant - Kant's word for that is not Deduktion but Ableitung - although a logical inference can be a crucial part of a deduction. In the most important cases a deduction means a justification of concepts. It is a kind of exposition. Exposition goes under the generic label definition. Indeed, exposition is not even a proper definition, but a substitute for one, when no proper (real) definition is

constructing concepts, viz., generating real d follow mathematics as far as it goes, it THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 127 definitions available to it: deductions. That i writesare thatmathematical a transcendental available. For Kant, the ideal of proofs demonstrations, proof must start its concep Deductions are mathemata. which cannot err in drawing their t. conclusions: needed becau availab le. mathemata are obtained by (A734/B762ff) They cannot err because How we to justify constructing concepts, viz., generating realare definitions. For aphilosophy premiss - to which follow mathematics as far as itconcep goes,t -it when has toa logical start with the ation best is n justific justific ationis mean what Kant whenmuch he sho definitions available to it: deductions. That as a means task? Too in this case. writes that a transcendental proofanswer must start with theAlthou prior gh deduction of task in TD the reality or validity some concep its concept. Deductions are needed because realofdefinitions arets,not it is no The third transcendental deduction in CP available. practica lly all commentators a on How are we to justify a premiss - which in Kant's case is -typically the deducti shows is their rminate concept - when a logical justification not "indete available? Whatvalidity does a". (A deducti in CJ does muchonshould not be of an hing justification mean as a task? Too notexpected aim at establis granted at the answer in this case. Although in TD the task is outset to showthat thatthe theconcep objective ts of tast suppose to be it isd not theestablis case in allisdeductions. reality or validity of some concepts, hed their use - and sense of The third transcendental deduction in intersub CPR jective - totally ignored validity . Kantbysays e CJ is so easy practically all commentators - theindeduction of thejust ideas of pureitreason, because does not n reality of (A679/B698) a concept. (CJLikewise, shows their "indeterminate validity". the , th ·§38) Anyhow deducti on is to prove (better: deduction in CJ does not aim at establishing objectivity. It istotaken forthe 'le show) employofment concepWhat granted at the outset that the concepts taste of are certain not objective. is ts; most i employ ment the concep supposed to be established is their use - and of claims to objectivity inngly, the the ts, accordi Whatsays is explicitly done when sense of intersubjective validity. Kant thatathe deduction concep t is justi justific can to consist not need showofthetwo objective in CJ is so easy just because it does ation kinds of m ing the matters Anyhow, taskofoffact a transcendental reality of a concept. (CJ ·§38) support either by exhibiting sly exhibited show)previou the 'legitimacy' of and someaccepte kind of deduction is to prove (better: to from d matt main compon ent in deducti employment of certain concepts; most importantly the onsnecassary - and it is co exhibiting their newpresuppositional matters of fact,status. employment of the concepts, accordingly, and not an Presum ably many phers would It is natural that anot li What is done when a concept is justified? philoso serious Such a simple procedure kinds of ly. moments: introducing newas ex justification can consist of twovery not attracte d much phical attentio themphiloso or by deriving them n. P supporting matters of fact either by exhibiting much attentio n either,. becaus e there from previously exhibited and accepted nlatters of fact. I claim that the is n this, still intheTO main conspicous - is compo simplynent main component in deductions Admitt - and itingis all philoso one. not phically anythinginterest more ing complicated. exhibiting new matters of fact,lessand Presumably many philosophers would not like to .take this suggestion very seriously. Such a simple procedure as exhibiting matters of fact has not attracted much philosophical attention. Perhaps it does not deserve much attention either, because there is nothing complicated in it. Admitting all this, still the main con1ponent of deductions could be the less philosophically interesting one.

"The transcendental deduction of all conce principle according to which the whole inquiry 128 CHAPTER that they 4must be recognised as conditions a p whether of the intuition which is to How do we go from factualexperience, facts to 'legal' facts? Kant's canonical thought." (A94/B126) To 'explain' the to statement of the meaning of TD is: "I therefore call an explanation ofand matters and explaining ' manner in which concepts aexhibiting priori can relate ofto fact objects(G) their deduction. The quotations also suggest that the transcendental deduction." (A85/B117) The aim of TD is also declared: recognize the categories as conditio~s o all concepts a priori has thus a "The transcendental deductionto of given in intuitions and intuiting), principle according to which themanifold whole inquiry must be directed, namely, an together presentations: concepts and intuition of that they must be recognised as conditions a priori of the possibility reasoning frequently followed by the Kant, experience, whether of the intuition whichisis to be met with in it or of possible: "mine" (the unity of apperceptio thought." (A94/B126) To 'explain' and to 'recognize' indicate that employment Certainly the legitimacy explaining 'how' is of thetheheart of a of exhibiting matters of fact and beenthat explained when it of has twobeen parts:shown deduction. The quotations also has suggest the task consists conditions for anything to become an obje to recognize the categories as conditio~s of 1) intuition (both the explanation recourse to other legal facts, exc 2) of thought (=putting manifold given in intuitions and intuiting),noand any role, but the transition from factual of to together presentations: concepts and intuitions). The same pattern facts happen theviz., necessity of thesomething facts is explai reasoning is frequently followed bywhen Kant, making The rest of the present chapter is devote possible: "mine" (the unity of apperception), object, experience. of the Transcendental Deduction. employment of the categories to objects Certainly the legitimacy of thestructure various has are its origin in unde has been explained when it has beeninterpretations shown that they necessary crucial concepts 'object' and 'experience conditions for anything to become an object for us. Thus in the are suggested from pu explanation no recourse to otherontological legal facts,'weightiness' except to logical laws, plays to weighty material or ontological sense. any role, but the transition from factual facts to legal facts is supposed toHowe at facts least isatexplained. the end TD must deal with obje happen when the necessity of the ordinary it wouldofnotthehave is sense. devotedOtherwise to a discussion The rest of the present chapter we understand 'object' depends on how in how structure of the Transcendental Deduction. Much disagreement understood. The problemsthe of 'obj various interpretations has itsintuition' origin inis understanding differently be dealt with in the next chapters. crucial concepts 'object' and 'experience'. Various degrees of

ontological 'weightiness' are suggested from purely logical or subjective The two parts of the isTranscendental to weighty material or ontological4.sense. However, there no doubt that De at least at the end TD must deal objects or experience the Thewith proof-structure of TD hasin recently In tum, ordinary sense. Otherwise it would not have reached its goal. considerable debate. Dieter Henrich's paper (19 of the present controversy. Henrich's original i on how 'intuition' or 'sensible how we understand 'object' depends intuition' is understood. The problems of 'object' and 'objectivity' will be dealt with in the next chapters. 4. The two parts of the Transcendental Deduction The proof-structure of TD has recently been the object of a considerable debate. Dieter Henrich's paper (1969) was the starting point of the present controversy. Henrich's original interpretation has certainly

Since Henrich it has been usual to argument". The conclusion of TD seems THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 129 different passages. However, Kant clearl given much inspiration to other commentators, although it made appears a deduction has been andasthat the artificial and queer and is rejected by many present-day fully attained onlycommentators later on. Henrich fo (Brouillet, Nowotny, Wagner and others), even to some ofextent by cessful interpretation TD: "the interpr Henrich himself. (Tushling 1984, e.g. 59)to the initial impression that the two con Since Henrich it has been usual toproposi talk about "two iny,one tion, on the steps contrar sections 2 argument". The conclusion of TD seemswith to besignific drawnantly twicedifferen in completely t results, and t different passages. However, Kant clearly said in ,§21 that a beginning of on." proof of the transcendental deducti (H a deduction has been made and that the purpose will be Much of of the thededuction contemporary work dea fully attained only later on. Henrich formulates a criterion for ag sucKant's rationa le for dividin TD, more p must show that, cessful interpretation of TD: "the interpretation explain the argumentativecontrary structure of TD to the initial impression that the two conclusions merely suggest define the same tions consider various ed explana proposition, on the contrary, sections focus 20 and 26 offer two arguments on some relevant topics and to sho with significantly different results, and an thatimporta these together a single nt role yield in explain ing the proof of the transcendental deduction." (Henrich 1969,642) contemporary discussion - the inspection Much of the contemporary work deals with whatnwas TD up to the §23.question Pure intuitio and its cru Kant's rationale for dividing TD, morematter precisely, how does division of chapter 7. I the will refer occasion explain the argumentative structure of TD. My concern is notion to to the p which haspresent given much inspirat consider various suggested explanations (see hBaumanns but gly to really althoug ingenious1991-2) and seemin focus on some relevant topics and to show howTo they have (or have the not)"proof-s its own. express clearly an important role in explaining theand, structure. In fact like hopefully, make it moretheaccessibl contemporary discussion - the inspection deals, almost criticism differenexclusively t steps willwith be marked TD up to §23. Pure intuition and its crucial role in TD/2 is a subjectare: matter of chapter 7. I will refer occasionally to two Allison's interpretation SI: The high points. 87: T which has given much inspiration to theS2: present work and why it, The unity of the argue apperce ption. 88: I although ingenious and seemingly really has difficulties of S9: A 83:well-fitting, Different conclus ions. its own. To express clearly the "proof-structure" of intuitio my own 84: One (any) n. reasoning S10: and, hopefully, make it more accessible both for understanding and ation 85: An intuition is a singular present criticism, different steps will be marked 86: as TheS1-811. AbstracThe tion. general steps S11: are: [51] The two high points. It is ha S1: The two high points. 87: 'fact' of givenness. twoThe high points in TD, namely §20 and th S2: The unity of the apperception. 88: Intuition them are ofgeneratim. the same· logical form consi 59: A logical inference 83: Different conclusions. 84: One (any) intuition. S10: 'Intuition' 85: An intuition is a singular presentation. 86: The Abstraction. 511: The task of TO/2 [81] The two high points. It is hardly controversial that there are two high points in TO, namely §20 and the third section of §26. Both of them are of the same· logical form consisting of five sentences which

TD/2. I also think the middle paragraphs §§22-23 ar explanatory nature but could well be regarded as a sepa step. The hypothetical model of the present interpreta 130 CHAPTER 4 very briefly, that the three steps of the Transcendental make up a double syllogism. follows: (Baum 1986a, 81) Each of them are prove ToBoth conclusions summarizing The the results of Henrich's two 1): steps. are (or e (TD/1, §§15-2 first step though ons of followed by some explanatory passages. I will call TD/1 andt. 'Th conditisteps ry these are the necessa categories act of th y sense TD/2. I also think thebemiddle §§22-23 not as of 'the merely ordinarare ood not in an understparagraphs as 'putting var al sense explanatory nature but fancyin could well be in regarded a separate intennediate technic Kant's as g) but together', that of the interpretation is, tois,putdeterm it in step. The hypothetical (intuitio model ns concepts) and present the Transcendental Deduction are as very briefly, that the three steps n with concepts. in anofintuitio given follows: The second step (Intermediate Step, §§22-23): To s rily limited is necessa The first step (TD/1, To ies prove (or explain) that to thethe ob of the categor use §§15-21): ng an o and cognizi an object of ing thought. 'Thought' must now categories are the necessary conditions nce. "Think experie sense) ordinary(imaging, be understood not in ansame." ordinary sense('Think as 'theing' act in of an thinking' (B146) To show that a 7):presentations fancying) but in Kant's technical sense 'putting§§24-2 various stepas (TD/2, The third categories. Th the (intuitions and concepts) together', that rily is, determining stand under the manifold nce necessa experie given in an intuition withshowin concepts. g that the categories are not merely necess The second step (Intermediate §§22-23): Tocogniti showon. that the real empirical also of thought butStep, The Dedu apperception. necessarilyThe limited of possible use of the categories is[S2] the objects unitytoofthe ction conjunare not(combi the nat experience. "Thinking an object cognizing Theobject (§ 15) an claims. hingand far-reac same." (B146) ('Thinking' in animordinary sense) come to us through the sense can never generat e intuitio sensibl Topure show that objects met nineither, The third step (TD/2, §§24-27): of all form ed in the contain conjunction Alltantamout experience necessarily stand the categories. to of a sis). is eity (syntheThat of spontan an actunder the ma ction of of showing that the categories notanding merely(be necessary conditions it a conjun underst of the are thought but also of empirical cognition. cal or non-empirical) or of various conce (empiri one that [S2] The unity of the apperception. withcanno is the onlybegins tion Deduction ations conjuncThe present manifold and The (O). conjunction of the a manifold far-reaching claims. (§ 15) the concept of "Besides(combination) objects of unit thatbe also it with generatim can never come tot of us conjunc throughtion thecarries senses, and cannot concep of the manifo ic unity of sensible either, for conjunction isld." T the synthet contained in the pure fonn ation ofintuition present it ction, conjun of athe arise out of conjunction manifold is an actrather an act of spontaneity (synthesis). cannot this unity All to the p added being of e by tion possibl of the understanding (beofitconjunc a conjunction of the manifold intuition

or of various concepts). Among all (empirical or non-empirical) manifold. e they becausby hing far-reac be given the imp presentations conjunction is the only oneare that cannot claims These unity is atheresult TD.itsAsynthesis, objects(O). "Besides thesolution concepttoofthe theproblem manifoldofand concept of conjunction carries with it also that of unity. Conjunction is a presentation of the synthetic unity of the manifold." The presentation of this unity cannot arise out of the conjunction, it rather makes the concept of conjunction possible by being added to the presentation of the manifold. These claims are far-reaching because they implicitly contain the solution to the problem of TD. A unity is a result of combining with

apperception as the very heart of TD/l. Taking that

that the OF principle had any explanatory THE TRANSCENDENTALimply DEDUCTION THE CATEGORIES 131 role con

of TD. On the contrary, the dominant view - exludin concepts. Accordingly, the necessary concepts of any unity are the most it does not have such a role. The principle states a l general pure concepts, the forms of thought. The unity referred to in this conscious presenting) which concerns the relation of section will be met again in the following sections under the name "the the pure 'I'. Thus its universal role is unequivocally e transcendental unity of apperception". Allison (1983, 137) heavily emphasizes Kant's cl No doubt, Kant took the principle of the synthetic unity of that the principle is an analytic judgment. He take apperception as the very heart of TD/I. Taking that for granted does not TD/l cannot establish any synthetic judgment at al imply that the principle had any explanatory role concerning the division enough as "all empirical intuitions have to stand und of TD. On the contrary, the dominant view - exluding Allison's - is that is certainly true that Kant made such a claim. (B 13 it does not have such a role. The principle states a logical condition (of "nevertheless it explains the synthesis of the ma conscious presenting) which concerns the relation of all presentations to intuition as necessary..". Moreover, §20 explicitly the pure 'I'. Thus its universal role is unequivocally established in TD/I. intuition. Is not this flatly against Allison? There Allison (1983, 137) heavily emphasizes Kant's claim in the B-edition wrong that an analytic judgment explains the syn that the principle is an analytic judgment. He takes that to mean that That does not tum the synthesis into anything analy TOIl cannot establish any synthetic judgment at all, let alone a strong conceive how Allison can make the further claim t enough as "all empirical intuitions have to stand under the categories". It establishes only an analytic judgment. TD/l does n is certainly true that Kant made such a claim. (B 135) But he goes on: necessary unity of the apperception; it does not end w "nevertheless it explains the synthesis of the manifold given in an the conclusion of TD/l - "Consequently, the m intuition as necessary..". Moreover, §20 explicitly concerns empirical intuition also stands necessarily under categories intuition. Is not this flatly against Allison? There is logically nothing judgment? That it logically (analytically) follows wrong that an analytic judgment explains the synthesis as necessary. premisses in §20, does not make it an analytic ju That does not tum the synthesis into anything analytic. It is difficult to alone. Moreover, it is not the aim of TD to establish a conceive how Allison can make the further claim that the whole TD/l a priori, but establishing the objective validity of the establishes only an analytic judgment. TD/I does not merely state the tum is a phase in explaining how synthetic judgm necessary unity of the apperception; it does not end with .§ 16. How could priori. It hardly makes sense to discuss the synthetic the conclusion of TD/I - "Consequently, the manifold of a given judgments inside that very explanation. Even taking intuition also stands necessarily under categories." - be an analytic sake of argument, that the result of TD/l is an analy judgment? That it logically (analytically) follows form the previous not follow that it would not be justified to draw the premisses in §20, does not nlake it an analytic judgment as it stands from intuition generatim to the special case of hum alone. Moreover, it is not the aim of TD to establish a synthetic judgnlent 'intuition' in these two cases means something differ a priori, but establishing the objective the categories, which in ask howvalidity one has of established a premiss. tum is a phase in explaining how synthetic judgments are possible a priori. It hardly makes sense to discuss the synthetic a priori status of the judgments inside that very explanation. Even taking for granted, for the sake of argument, that the result of TD/I is an analytic judgment it does not follow that it would not be justified to draw the logical conclusion from intuition generatim to the special case of human intuition (unless 'intuition' in these two cases means something different). Logic does not ask how one has established a premiss.

contain a clue to th objects of expe of a give n intuition" and "all · 132 CHAPTER 4 n intuition amo Det enn inin g the man ifol d of a give of conclus erencecarefully diffmore the§26 [S3] Different conclusions. Reading §20 sand ition. Thu object of intu intuition obje ct of That drawcethe same conclusion. mustgen e clearly shows that they do een 'an betw differen the not able clue gives also contain a clue to the whole concern "the valu manifold him self Kan tresults erie nce '. The expproblem. inni ng o beg the §21 , 2) at respectively. of a given intuition" and "alle objects experience", 1) in places: of in thre sum mar y (§27 t's own of aace given amounts to constituting an ) s Detennining the manifold pref MA N. Kan to intuition ns unk now ntoto c s are by no mea object of intuition. Thus the of conclusions is tantamount er. The se hint eithdifference full c ing th~ of draw'objects task of and intuition generatim' the difference between 'antoobject e, but the be allofther th of rpretation inte accepted experience'. Kant himself lead gives to the interpretation a widely clues to valuable ingalso 1 and 3) in the at ed theuna beginning of d.§26, in three places: 1) in §21,rem 2)aind ccomplishe e mor e p can be preface to MAN. Kant's own (§27) not mad be ignored ria should rich 's crite Hensummary erence lain wha t theIt diff either. These hints are by no unknown commentators. seems n has totoexp rpretatio intemeans erie nce ' 'obj ects of exp to be all there, but the taskintu ofition drawing th~im' fulland consequences of them, gen erat /l an sion betw een TD [proof]-structure has leading to a widely accepted lained whe therofthethedivi expinterpretation 1 erent domains of application (manifold or obje remainded unaccomplished.diff or dynamical) thematicaal succesfull es (ma beps made more precise: Henrich's criteria cangrou of categori mati (unsche categori e of the very sens 'anesobject of interpretation has to explain what difference between erentthe diff intuition generatim' and 'objects of experience' amounts to. It must be ects of versus 'obj ition' concerns intuTD/2 ect ofand An 'objTD/l 1) the explained whether the division5.between rich emp or (any objects), 2) .theHen different different domains of application (manifold ition ) intuor One [S4] groups of categories (mathematical sent or dynamical) be applied, or 3)l man the ifo ng that "..al ence of §20tosayi crucial vs. schematized). different sense of the very categories (unschematized es "One" [Ein in One empirical intuition..", writ ences by mai He draws far-reaching consequ 5. An 'object of intuition' versus 'objects of experience' ty'. Thus Ka Gen nan has the same root as 'uni tains inunit as it already [S4] One (any) intuition. Henrich thatcon Kant, a y. insofaremphasizes intuition 2. T TD/ ch is rele TD /l whiinsofar crucial sentence of §20 saying asased it is in given in manifold, rictionall restthat bee n po , it has Henrich Againstwith writes a capital letter. in One empirical intuition..",one men t [Einer] argu"One" Einer He draws far-reaching consequences by maintaining thatkets t to re I wanin 1 By putting 'pro of' in square brac cendental proof trans of e sens Gennan has the same root as 'unity'. Thus Kant must mean empirical t's Kan neither a proo f in on TO has largely been unde debate Accordingly, emporary unity. contcontains there is for a Kan intuition insofar as it already ction ction is. A dedu dedu a t wha of n eptio conc has bee l right of lega a how of unt acco an g released in TD/2. Thereof the two steps restriction in TD/l which is more givin like Henrich op ling 1984, 84ff.) It is notable that of deduc in Tush n eptio one argument. Against Henrich, it has been pointed out often enough conc a by interpretation was vitiated It ••

e debate and criti (Tushling 1984, 85). Despite extensiv y commentator man , ence infer al logic a 1 By putting 'proof' in square brackets I want to remind that TO as a whole is as 'deduction' f. inference. The tic)a proo ogis neither a proof in Kant's sense of kind transcendental proof nor logical of logical (syll contemporary debate on TD has largely been undennined by a wrongheaded conception of what a deduction is. A deduction for Kant was not a strict proof, but more like giving an account of how a legal right has been acquired. (See e.g. Henrich in Tushling 1984, 84ff.) It is notable that Henrich openly admits that his earlier interpretation was vitiated by a conception of deduction as a logical inference (Tushling 1984, 85). Despite extensive debate and criticism of the understanding of 'deduction' as a logical inference, many commentators are still looking after some kind of lo~ical (syllo~istic) proof.

TD/l states the necessary employment of

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION CATEGORIES given OF in THE an intuition. Perhaps 133 there is n

explanation to capitalizing Einer. that, concerning the extension of domain, the relation between TD/l andHaving TD/2 seems to be the other way round.§§15-21 makes it clear that indeed tha the but expression However, stressing "One" can give frequently us quite a uses different important"the ma B132, B135, and(an) B143 not clue. Kant is simply concerned withB129, the manifold givenB139 in one but three The The same expression "a intuition in contrast to the manifold made up of times. intuitions. result of emphasized already in the Metaphysical D TD/l states the necessary employment of the categories to the manifold on no e.g.mysterious B144, B144n, B145, B159, B160 given in an intuition. Perhaps there is or more hidden on here has two sides. He talks, explanation to capitalizing Einer. Having this clue in mind a new look the at one h an isintuition", andisonsaying. the other §§ 15-21 makes it clear that indeed in that what Kant He hand, a intuition". Accordingly, he talks about par frequently uses the expression "the manifold given in an intuition": particular the sense B129, B132, B135, B139 and B143 not only themanifold passage in quoted abovethat it An intuition has a manifold but three times. The same expressionintuition. "an intuition" is prominent and of it This observation leads to the emphasized already in the Metaphysical Deduction (A79/BI05) and laterconclus must and be constituting merely point an object o on e.g. B144, B144n, B145, B159, B160 B161. The crucial an intuition on the bas manifold given in here has two sides. He talks, on the one hand, about "the manifold given object is "the constituted. Toofcognize in an intuition", and on the other hand, about manifold a givenan objec manifold given in intuition. intuition". Accordingly, he talks about the particular intuitions butanalso about Now given in an intuition necessarily stands un particular manifold in the sense that it always belongs to a particular equivocally, that "all sensible intuition intuition. An intuition has a manifold of its own. conditions under which alone their mani This observation leads to the conclusion that the concern of TD/l The manifold must be constituting merely an objectconsciousness". of intuition generatim. It is theof intui themselves stand under categories. manifold given in an intuition on the basis of which a cognition of an Nothin relations between intuitions, accordingly o object is constituted. To cognize an object is tantamount to detennining different intuition, or, to put thi the manifold given in an intuition. Now TD/l objects proves of that all manifold in a wide sense objects of experience given in an intuition necessarily stands under categories, or perhaps more objectsstand can beunder parts of one object.as equivocally, that "all sensible intuitions categories [S5] An intuition is ainsingular pre conditions under which alone their manifold can come together one whether it and is sonot clearthe thatintuitions determining th consciousness". The manifold of intuitions generatim amounts to constituting themselves stand under categories. Nothing has been said here about the merely thatofthere is no doubt about that. (A320 relations between intuitions, accordingly the mutual relations between shows that Kant indeed talks about sin different objects of intuition, or, to put this in another way, about objects in a wide sense - objects of experience - in which several thing-like objects can be parts of one object. [S5] An intuition is a singular presentation. It might be doubted whether it is so clear that determining the manifold of a given intuition generatim amounts to constituting merely one particular object. I think that there is no doubt about that. (A320/B376) Firstly, a look at TD/l shows that Kant indeed talks about singular objects. (See especially

Thus a unifi concept of a single object(O). the difference betw een an c Kantian · 134 It is a basi CHAPTER 4 fact that is a singular and a con concept is exactly that an intuition whe n he iss 'by B136n and B144n) .§17 contains aTha famous passage which states that prem t is also Kan t's crucial presentation. singular definition' an intuition presents a singular object(O): "Object(O) Tim e areis that Aesthetic that because Space and ute ab disp ry in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is unified". tem pora intuitions and not concepts. The con of cern a given place incy theand se Thus a unification of the n1anifoldcon edia of imm criteriontakes s theintuition of 'intu itio n' concept of a single object(O). take n f
ing intuition' which is a subspecies of 'intu it THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE In fact KantCATEGORIES did not state the135Abstra TD/1 but just the preceding satemen sensibility, but these specifications are hardly relevant for the argument t, understanding the manifold of an intu of TD/1. More precisely, the Abstraction concerns the manner in which itio as belonging to the necessary unit the manifold is given for an empirical intuition, and not the human y of done through the category." Howeve sensibility as such. Thus there is nothing wrong in referring to 'empirical r, w applies to the whole of TD/1 is the fact intuition' which is a subspecies of 'intuition generatim'. with the synthesis of the understand In fact Kant did not state the Abstration as concerning the whole ofing. How should we to understand the TD/1 but just the preceding satement., viz., "Through synthesis of the Ab questions and, depending on the a understanding the manifold of an intuition which I call mine is presented interpretations: A) Does 'the manner' m as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this is only from formal aspects of sensibili done through the category." However, what suggests that the Abstraction ty Time? - or, B) Has it been abstract applies to the whole of TD/l is the fact that TD/l is concerned merelyed ma The latter amounts to two further que stio with the synthesis of the understanding. mean something different, more abst How should we to understand the Abstraction leads to the following rac objects in TD/ logicalldifferent y different o questions and, depending on the answers, 1to onto widely can hardly be much doubt that in TD interpretations: A) Does 'the manner' mean that it has been abstracted /l K formal aspects. The forms of the hum from Space and an se only from fonnal aspects of sensibility - in our case scene first in TD/2; so does the figu rative Time? - or, B) Has it been abstracted materially from something more?

The latter amounts to two further questions: 1) Does 'intuition' in TD/l 7. Merely formal or formal and mat er mean something different, more abstract, than in TD/2? and 2) Are [S7] The 'fac objects in TD/l ontologically different or the same as in t' TD/2? of giveThere nness. T suppose thatreally the Abs can hardly be much doubt that in TD/l Kant abstracted thes mer traction from concern any thin g mat eria l. Kan thet argumentive formal aspects. The forms of the human sensibility enter says quite unequ abstractsynthesis. ed from the 'fac t' that "the mani scene first in TD/2; so does the figurative given before the synthesis of the und erstand 45) It has been abstracted from the ma 7. Merely formal or formal and(B1 material abstraction? given in order to consider only the unity t [S7] The 'fact' of givenness. There are several reasons to the understanding. Thus the concern suppose that the Abstraction concerns merely the fonnal aspects and not of T different kind of d ornot objebeen cts. It do anything material. Kant says quite unequivocally man that ifol it has logical or judgmental sense but obje cts con abstracted from the 'fact' that "the manifold to be intuited had to be Abstraction, viz., excluding their spatial given before the synthesis of the understanding and independent-ly of it". course, they could be called 'objects (B145) It has been abstracted fronl the manner in which the manifold isin a lo of the Abstraction they not com plete ob given in order to consider only the unity that accrues to are intuition from the understanding. Thus the concern of TD/l is not an ontologically different kind of manifold or objects. It does not deal with objects in a logical or judgmental sense but objects considered differently due to the Abstraction, viz., excluding their spatial and temporal properties. Of course, they could be called 'objects in a logical sense' for just because of the Abstraction they are not complete objects but only a perspectival

'An o The possibility of experience is a premiss of TD/1 CHAPTER 4 136 what Allison maintains - not experience in any wea the conceptua by means aof different to think objects capacit view on them. But that is ymisleading by suggesting if the o even to be exercis y canThere capacit and data, ofthis logical objects. is noedreason ontological status, namely that (Allison 1986 ive states". our subject fromhimself: distinct . notused use any other term as that by Kant 'an object of intuition'. are not o states" ive subject ourpartly, 'An object of experience'distinct is partly,from but only a subspecies of it. e data totobe give becaus data and ion of given conceptualizat The possibility of experience is a premiss of TD/1 - contrary q~ite unequi stated er, it issense Moreov intuition. in outer what Allison maintains by - not experience any weak like "the which as s dealt with; a fact intuitio by means of ns theare conceptualization of given capacity to think objectssensible with m as dealing TD/l thought te any interpre repudia data, and this capacity can be exercised even tation if the of objects are t criti a frequen has been logical sense. . not distinct from our subjective states".Indeed, (Allisonit 1986, 5) "Objects not fact that se ignore the he seems that are interpretation distinct from our subjective states" not to obtained by the for Kant ence' ly 'experi Paradig dealt conceptualization of given datawith. because datamatical to be given is possible only There is given. that with the (§20) of confron humanit way by outer intuition. Moreover, is stated q~ite tation unequivocally the TO proved in is not experie lity of possibi it. The sensible intuitions are dealt with; a fact which as nce such is enough to also (See TD/I. in ed. inobjects employ ly with h notasexplicit althoug of TD/l dealing merely a repudiate any interpretation "the empiri of whichof isAllison's premiss criticism , thea frequent logical sense. Indeed, itIdealism has been (B274» ce". existen own usness of conscio interpretation that he seems to ignore themy fact that sensible intuition is iv t' is instruct abstrac 'to of tion explana dealt with. ParadigmaticallyKant's 'experience' for Kant means exactly the abstr one rather mark, variant of a commo t asThere concep t athe abstrac human way of confrontation with given. is non weak is contain that of y diversit the in the TD but is which concept,is from it. The possibility of experience not proved its premiss certain he, in aof which thatthe from philosopher although not explicitly employed in abstrac TD/l. ts(See also Refutation The d .. ration. conside into not wish Idealism, the premiss does of which is to "thetakeempirically determinate concrete refers only to the use of co t and(B274» existence". consciousness of my own abstrac of T concern Thedoes (On 199n) ts themseislves." 'to abstract' instructive: "One not Kant's explanation ofconcep the from been abstrac has h itone n, althoug intuitiomark, abstract a concept as a common rather abstracts in the ted use of a betw ion No distinct are given.under of how forms) of that whichthey is contained it. .. The concept, from the diversity althou on operati in is ence' sense philosopher abstracts fromweighty that which he,ofin'experi a certain use of the concept, ed. In f is not concern mode of experie human does not wish to take into consideration. .. Thencedistinction between plural. objectsnotin tothethe hereofabout talkuse ingtoto the mislead abstract and concrete refers only concepts, uating objects has be means ofofindivid the concern Abstrac concepts themselves." (On 199n)tion The TD/1 is objects of It is a misint im. n generat Intuitio intuition, although it has [88] been abstracted from the manner (here: the that in TD/ is often a done, to say, asbetween tiondistinction AbstracNo weak and a forms) of how they are given. in TD/2 with im while n generat sensible is inintuitio operation although specifically the weighty sense of 'experience' human mode of experience is not concerned. In fact it is somewhat misleading to talk here about objects in the plural. Just because of the Abstraction the means of individuating objects has been removed. [88] Intuition generatim. It is a misinterpretation of the Abstraction to say, as is often done, that in TD/1 Kant deals with sensible intuition generatim while in TD/2 with specifically human

stands under the categories. It is a s individuate intuitions. I am not goin THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 137 not know how Kant could answer it intuitions. More accurately, in TD/I he withpresupposition sensible intuition is tha thatdeals Kant's that intuition be our ca generatim - including human intuitions. intuitions' ".. whetherdistinction somehow own or any other, provided only it be sensible." task isthat to is, belongs to (BI50) a givenThe intuition, (human or not) necessarily show that the manifold given in an intuition own. (See 54-S5 above.) In TD/2 it stands under the categories. It is a serious meta-critical problem how under to experience necessarily stands individuate intuitions. I am not going toSpace deal with this problem and I do and Time is also categorially not know how Kant could answer it properly. However, there is inference. no doubt T [S9] A logical that Kant's presupposition is that atproof, least viz. 'oneTD/2, intuition' 'several hav commentators intuitions' distinction somehow can be Theofmanifold the humanalways intuition themade. manifold belongs to a given intuition, that is, every intuition has a its not granted of that of §20. Taking formanifold that whatever is met in own. (See S4-S5 above.) In TD/2 it is explained these arguments are superfluous. experience necessarily stands under the intuition categories because applies the unity generatim to of hum Space and Time is also categorially determined. makes an interesting lapse in §20 b [S9] A logical inference. To justify need inofOne an additional as it isthegiven empirical in proof, viz. TD/2, commentators have made great efforts to why Abstraction, TD/l isexplain not concerne not begeneratim. included in the result ref the manifold of the human intuitions could intuition 'Empirical' of §20. Taking for granted that nothingthus has to been TD/2. Contr the abstracted concern ofmaterially, course,have that tried which applies to res these arguments are superfluous. Of eagerly to explain, the intuition generatim applies to human intuitions as further well. Kant himself to without any explanations makes an interesting lapse in §20 by saying that "..all manifold, insofaris n happens in Kant's lapse. There as. it is given in One empirical intuition.." Certainly, because of the intuition generatim and then again Abstraction, TD/I is not concerned with empirical intuition butthe with of logic, because hum matter of intuiting, intuition generatim. 'Empirical' refers to the human mode 'generatim'. Kant is not - again co thus to the concern of TD/2. Contrary maintain to what many - in thecommentators least engaged so in pr eagerly have tried to explain, the result of TD/I is applicable directly and the second sentence of §21 he d without any further explanations to theexplanation human intuitions. That is what or argument moves happens in Kant's lapse. There is no need to prove something for manifold consciousness of a givenfirst intuition generatim and then again for The hun1an is simply aim intuition. of TD/2 isItnot to provea tha matter of logic, because the human intuition a subspecies of the u under theiscategories "as conditions to what many commentators 'generatim'. Kant is not - again contrary come together in one consciousness" maintain - in the least engaged in proving that either. On the contrary, in the second sentence of §21 he directly and without any additional explanation or argument moves to talk about "the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of an intuition" (capitalizing Einer). The aim of TD/2 is not to prove that human intuitions necessarily stand under the categories "as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness". That has already been proved.

sensible intuition". (1986, 7) What Allison says s the second part is not dealing wherea correct, CHAPTER 4 138 logically follows from the result of the first par The root of these misinterpretations - and struggling with asepseudoreading v same inpreci of the other examples problem - is an inprecisediscuss reading. I will quote Allison again: "Kant ion of "Henrich's puzzle". A reading lik clearly views the first partdilemm as concerned the relation the i ntators (includ commebetween by many a noticedwith categories and the manifold of sensible intuition in general neede TD/2:the why is and is sound nt of TD/1 the argume their relation to the manifold of human second as concerned withvery of T aim the and carefully in order to underst sensible intuition". (1986, of 7) human What Allison about thethefirst partr is(Spa manne n, but intuitio sensible says correct, whereas the second part is not dealing with something experienc sensible intuitions are given in human which logically follows from the That result the first plenty of T (B144) it also. statedare KantThere howpart. exactly is of other examples of the same practically to the accrued all ns the unity intuitiovitiating of humanreading caseinprecise discussion of "Henrich's puzzle". A reading like Allison's leads to a have also they er, that explained in TD/l. Howev dilemma noticed by many commentators (including attachedif to a unityhimself): ity. It isAllison from the sensibil the argument of TD/l is sound why is TD/~ needed? Kant has to be read s betwe relation presentations, but also a unity of very carefully in order to understand the aim TD/2. the emanifold of the Abs Becaus g. Not intuitin of of that is, a unity manner (Space and Time) in which ed of human sensible intuition,disrega but therded in TD/I. Thus it was not explain is sup sensible intuitions are givencategor in human experience is at isstake TD/2. whatinTO/2 ned. That ially detenni That is exactly how Kant stated it also. (BI44) The point is that in not the tota ns but intuitio s the human include of TD/l case of human intuitions the[SI0] unity accrued to them from the intellect is to way tive alterna 'Intuition'. An that explained in TD/I. However, have a isunity which tdescends the Abstrac to interpre -S9 above, in S7also raised they from the sensibility. It is aHowev unityer,attached to particular intuitions an obvious trouble for anybodyastryin presentations, but also a unity of relations between intuitions, tly says Kant explici ict whatdifferent to contrad seems that is, a unity of intuiting.abstrac Because thethe Abstraction that unity answe ss. Towas fact of givenne from ted of disregarded in TD/l. Thus that it was not explained in TD/l that it is also le i 'sensib mean in TD/l 'intuition' cannot is what TD/2itisis supposed do.a crucial The result categorially detennined. Thatsense. point t claimed totobe Indeed, rea ofTD/l includes the human should intuitions but not totally. The ion'. not be confused with 'sensat [S10] 'Intuition'. Anlike: alternative way'intuitio to deal the questions else but a is nothing n' with Basically of any raised in S7-S9 above, is to interpret the Abstraction in aindepen materialdent sense. ation - totally note a present conscio to do that,with is that it us However, an obvious trouble anybody ation a present hand istrying other thefor experi explicitly says, lviz., that of hesense has not seems to contradict what Kant process er the physica whatev with dealt abstracted from the fact of givenness. To answer this objection implies are ns TD/1 no empirical intuitio building blo that in TD/l 'intuition' cannot mean in itsasordinary presentations) (singular intuition' im 'sensible generat sense. Indeed, it is claimed to be a crucial point that a Kantian 'intuition' should not be confused with 'sensation'. The reasoning goes something like: Basically 'intuition' is nothing else but a singular presentation note a presentation - totally independent of any subject. 'Sensation' on the other hand is a presentation with consciousness, that is, including whatever the physical process of sense experience carries with it. In TD/l no empirical intuitions are dealt with but merely intuitions generatim (singular presentations) as building blocks of thought. In TD/2

denotes a counterfactual case. Thus the o namely OF thatTHE "object s not distinct139from THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION CATEGORIES obtained by the conceptualization of give intuitions are still nothing but singular presentations butsensibl now the manner is possibl e only by e intuition - is b well. Due to the Abstraction of their givennes is taken into account theas Abstrac tion that manner ofthe givenn with given data in the sense of concern of TD/I is not the confrontation 'intuition' is underst ood in a more abs weighty objects, that is, cognition,Kant's but the 'play' with the data (of most importa nt distinction betwe singular presentations) already somehow given; data say picked up from (See below.) the memory or received from a book. The Abstraction - quite naturally To meet this kind of reasoni ng one can to Allison's denotes a counterfactual case. Thusnot theindicate objection in any way thatreading 'intuition' sh nanlely that "objects not distinct from ourand subjective states" are not in TD/1 TD/2. On the contrar y, he given ted datamerely because data to be given obtained by the conceptualization ofabstrac from the manner of give is possible only by sensible intuitionTD/l - is beside the point. Just because of no weighty objects are given but, b the Abstraction that manner of givennes is totally disregarded and of view, it deals more with a 'play' with 'intuition' is understood in a more abstract sense. That amounts to imply a more abstract sense of 'intuiti on'. Kant's most important distinction given between in an'thought' intuition. and 'cognition'. (See below.) [SI1] The task of TD/2. Determin can simply refersingle to Kant. He does To meet this kind of reasoning one intuition (in one intuition) amou not indicate in any way that 'intuition' should be understood Because of the Abstraction,differently in TD/1 the m in TD/I and TD/2. On the contrary, thatmissing in TD/I it has been are he stillsays totally . In individuating abstracted merely from the manner sensibil of givennes. It isbecertainly true that in ity must taken into account. In of its perspectival point TD/l no weighty objects are given tempor but, because al properties must be added, whic of view, it deals more with a 'play' with However, that does not must be data. released . Thus in TD/l 'whole ', imply a more abstract sense of 'intuition'. at stake is a manifold are not What consituisted. It is in fact seriously m given in an intuition. objects are delt with in TD/l and TD/2 [Sll] The task of TD/2. Determining manifold given in an they do notthedeal with ontolog ically dif intuition (in one single intuition) differen amounts to constituting ce is not extensionalanbutobject. intensiona Because of the Abstraction, in TO/I the means objects certain aspectofofindividuating cognizing objects is co of are still totally missing. In individuating the result special restatemobjects, ent of the of manner TD/1. Kant go sensibility must be taken into account. In theconcep humantscase the spatial the pure of the understand anding whichwhich meansalone that the Abstraction temporal properties must be added, through no determ inate obj must be released. Thus in TD/l 'whole', completely determined objects are not consituted. It is in fact seriously misleading to ask what kind of objects are delt with in TD/l and TD/2 respectively. The point is that they do not deal with ontologically different kinds of objects. The difference is not extensional but intensional; due to the Abstraction only certain aspect of cognizing objects is considered. §24 starts with the restatement of the result of TD/I. Kant goes on to say immediately that the pure concepts of the understanding are "mere forms of thought through which alone no determinate object(G) is cognized". In what - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

laine categories. (B159) But is it not exp CHAPTER 4 d in experience is necessarily subje is confrontate partially so. No dou only it is of poin follows he begins to explaincruc theialrole oft is thethat fonns intuition and not ition gen2eratim. The unity ac of intu peci subs merely as fonus of an intuition but as es forms of intuiting. same in the case of ing is oftheexperience, the und In TD/2 the task is to show thaterst alland objects that is, h it follows logic But althougsubject l intuition empirica whatever is confronted in human experience is .necessarily to the the categories, it doe er und ds stan rily essa nec categories. (B159) But is it not explained already in TD/l that whatever categorial. The. man s is categories? intuition y of humansubject unit is confrontated in experience is necessarily to the The ely the unity own, nam of its human a unit contains so. crucial point is that it is only partially Noydoubt, intuition is a erience are not me in exp fronted objects subspecies of intuition generatim. Thecon unity accrued to an intuition by have spatial a ition they intuinition the understanding is the same the but caseinofadd intuition generatim and like material things ctshuman only obje er, notlogically Moitreov empirical intuition. But although follows that intuition situations and eve objects temporaitl does necessarily stands under the and categories, notlike imply that all the cts as their parts. The g-like obje thinmanner particularThe. of human sensibility unity of human intuitions is categorial. detennined by the catego y is also r unit that theithe contains a unity of its own, namely unity of space and time. The the categories determine how explain to be are objects confronted in experience not ed met merely as objects of junction and thus make natur their con s of spatial intuition but in addition theylaw have and temporal properties. task of TD - explaining th rall met oveare r TD /l the afte Moreover, not only objects like material things but also spatial empirical cognition in es gori cate the of and temporal objects like situations and events, which in turn have self clearly states: " him Kantof d. task mplishe ccoparts. their The TD/2 is to show particular thing-like objects as una on of the pure conc uctiKant ng of a dedAs innicategories. begthe the by that their unity is also detennined says it has 44) (BI e." mad n bee has to be explained how the categories determine objects in respect of the application. I ain of(B159) The dom [S12lmake nature possible. Thus laws of their conjunction and thus in the same sense, that is lied app are es gori cate after TD/l the overall task of TD - explaining the necessary employment n intuitions. It should ifold of the the man cognition - give remains essentially of the categories in empirical ible intuition, thus no diff sens s abo"ut.. in Kant talk the above proposition unaccomplished. Kant himself clearly states: ordingly, the difference ration. Acc opeconcepts theinpure of the understanding the beginning of a deduction ofare ain of app consists of the difference of the dom has been made." (BI44)

· 140

[SI2] The domain of application. In TD/l and TD/2 the objecteD) [Obj ekt] and object(G use of Kan t's that 2 sense, categories are applied in the same is,both asthe concepts in §17 'objecteD 'definitioton' determine In y. some ambiquit a in a conc d unite is r teve whabe also taken literally thatept is the manifold of the given intuitions. mean that takenItto should , whereas obj ct from the epistemic point of view obje rial body. Acc Kant talks about sensible intuition, thus no different senses of 'intuition' weighty sense, paradigmaticallya matethe sense of 'ob in is ' ition 'intu of ty the singularibetween TD/l and TD/2 that difference are in operation. Accordingly, the llates by saying t uses object(G) as well. He also vaci A19/B33) (See (e.g. of tion. the categories. consists of the difference of the domain given in an intui - isapplication obiect(O)of 2 Kant's use of both object(O) [Objekt] and object(G) [Gegenstand] is a source of some ambiquity. In the 'definition' in §17 'object(O)' is used. This has often been taken to mean that whatever is united in a concept is an object(O), that is, denotes an object from the epistemic point of view, whereas object(G) is a singular object in a weighty sense, paradigmaticallya material body. Accordingly, it could be expected that the singularity of 'intuition' is in the sense of 'object(O)'. However, Kant often uses object(G) as well. He also vacillates by saying that an object(G) - alternatively obiect(O) - is ~iven in an intuition. (e.~.A19/B33) (See next Chapter.)

an explanatory step. However, in incompatible because different aspe THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE objects of CATEGORIES experience have 141 their tem bring forth a unity of their own. Mor From the case of TD/l - intuition generatim - one can directly infer the also composite objects made up of se to applicability to the subclass of human intuitions. Thus it is possible However, the reading advocated a think that the result of TD is already proved in TD/l and that TD/2 is just abstraction has taken place and is re an explanatory step. However, in a sense the domains are also as 2. below - could be oppose d incompatible because different aspects of objects are dealt with. The interpretation of the relation betwee n objects of experience have their temporal and spatial properties which after all, formal and materia l abstrac bring forth a unity of their own. Moreover, objects of experience include Thus we arrive at a dilemm a which g also composite objects made up of several objects of intuition. especially in the intermediate section However, the reading advocated above - which is that merely formal that TD/1 deals with though abstraction has taken place and is represented by the alternative markedt and objects, viz., cognition, which as 2. below - could be opposed by suggesting quite a different is interpretation it is natural to take a lin interpretation of the relation between TD/1 and TD/2 - which means that, TD/l objects in a logical sense are d after all, formal and material abstraction has taken place: alternative 1. canon of the laws of thought. Accor Thus we arrive at a dilemma which goes like this: 1) In several passages, thought. By ·'defini transcendent especially in the intermediate sections 21-23, Kant gives thetion' impression how cognition is related to objects. that TD/I deals with thought and not any proper detennination of with thought seems to be wrong un objects, viz., cognition, which is the concern of TD/2. Given this specific is meant. task inaddres interpretation it is natural to take a line as that of Allison andThis say that already by general logic or at the late TD/1 objects in a logical sense are dealt with. 2) For Kant logic is the The whole issue is complicated canon of the laws of thought. Accordingly, general logic takes care of understanding of several key concep thought. By -'definition' transcendental logic deals merely with the laws 'object ' and 'objecti ve validity how cognition is related to objects. Thus to interpret TD/I as dealing'.

with thought seems to be wrong unless by 'thought' something more 8. Thoug ht versus cognition specific is meant. This task addressed to TD/1 seems to be settled B-DeductionDeduction. the distinction already by general logic or at the latest by In thethe Metaphysical emphas ized: an object and The whole issue is complicated by implying "Thinki largelyng different same." (B 146) It is natural to ask w understanding of several key concepts including 'thought', 'intuition', some role in explaining the division o 'object' and 'objective validity'. thinking? Although initially an attr seems to be that this is not so, sofar 8. Thought versus cognition non-technical sense (speculate). If In the B-Deduction the distinction between thinking and cognizing is technical sense (combine) it is indeed emphasized: "Thinking an object and cognizing an object are not the same." (B 146) It is natural to ask whether this distinction might have some role in explaining the division of TD. Does TD/1 deal merely with thinking? Although initially an attractive suggestion, the conclusion seems to be that this is not so, sofar as 'thinking' is understood in its non-technical sense (speculate). If 'thinking' is understood in the technical sense (combine) it is indeed correct to say that in TD/I the role

'thinkin g'. My present concern is to try to e and4how the distinction between the tw means, 142 CHAPTER 'cognit ion' is applicable to TD. It is obvious th of the categories in thinking is examined while TD/2 examines their role must be concerned with cognition in contrast to in intuiting. However, although this characterization is illuminating the to separate 'thinkin g' in its ordinary and every equivocal use of risk for a misunderstanding is great because of Kant's 'thinking(os)' - from Kant's technical sense - th 'thinking'. My present concern is to try to elaborate what 'thinking' uniting (conjoining, combining) presentations in means, and how the distinction between the two senses of 'thought' and In the ordinary, non-technical sense to 'th 'cognition' is applicable to TD. It is obvious thattoat specula least atte, thetoend TD e, imagi!l examine in mind, We have must be concerned with cognition in contrast to mere thought. Clearly there is an element of combining also i to separate 'thinking' in its ordinary and every-day sense - I will call it be the explanation why Kant did not separa 'thinking(os)' - from Kant's technical sense thinking(ts) - which means frequently used expression, "forms of thought" uniting (conjoining, combining) presentations in one consciousness. embedded. Does it mean the forms of com In the ordinary, non-technical sense to 'think' means to regard or speculating? examine in mind, to speculate, to imagip.e, toiscogitate not cognize. A crucial point that thinking(os) is possib which might Clearly there is an element of combining also in this sense That is the formal logical sense of "thinking be the explanation why Kant did not separate thethe two senses. manifold ofInanaintui TD/1 clearly concerns same equivocality is frequently used expression, "fonns of thought", the with thought(os) - unless 'intuitio n' is under or the fonns of embedded. Does it mean the forms of combining Spontaneity means exactly that thinking is poss speculating? the mere understanding. In this wide sen A crucial point is that thinking(os) is possible without any intuition. spontaneous acts whatsoever. "Thought is cog through concepts". When That is the formal logical sense of "thinking (A69/B94) Although in this quotation 'though anboth intuition it cannot deal'though merelyt(ts)' TD/I clearly concerns the manifold ofon, t(os)' and 'though cogniti with thought(os) - unless 'intuition' is understood in a special sense. with 'cognit ion'. Somewhat paradoxically ' on its own, that is, by Spontaneity means exactly that thinking is possible technical and a wider sense too. While thinkin the mere understanding. In this widea necessa sense 'thinking' means all ng of cognizi ry condition intuition, spontaneous acts whatsoever. "Thought is ts cognition through concepts." both concep and intuitions are envolved. (A69/B94) Although in this quotation 'thought' is said to be a kind of "I may think whatever I please, provided on cognition, both 'thought(os)' and 'thought(ts)' are sometimes contrasted myself.." (Bxxvi) Accordingly, thought(os) is with 'cognition'. Somewhat paradoxically 'cognition' is used in a by transcendental conditions or by the fonns technical and a wider sense too.room While thinking(os) possible However, ge s. without for non-cognitiveisactivitie of cognizing (technical sense) is that intuition, a necessary conditionthinkin to confo g. Thus all correct thinking has both concepts and intuitions are envolved. It could be maintained (alternative 1.) th "I may think whatever I please, provided onlyt sensible that I dosignific not contradict ance are the ts withou concep thought(os) is not in any way restricted myself.." (Bxxvi) Accordingly, That The c TD/1. in is what Kant shows by transcendental conditions or by the forms of intuition. Kant makes room for non-cognitive activities. However, general logic is the canon of thinking. Thus all correct thinking has to confolTIl to the laws of logic. It could be maintained (alternative 1.) that the categories as pure concepts without sensible significance are the conditions of thought(os). That is what Kant shows in TD/I. The categories are not merely

categories. In a well known passa special difficulty of the Transce THE TRANSCENDEI\TTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 143 subjective conditions of thought c conditions of the manifold of intuition butindicates of also of thought(os). This cond that the subjective reasoning involves two confusions, viz.,established between prior thinking(os) and the Deduction. T of granted judgments andoutset. the They thinking(ts) and between the logical forms taken for at the categories. In a well known passage (A89/B122) points out a in any wayKant proved or legitimated in special difficulty of the Transcendentalpresented Deduction, in thenamely table of "how categories? subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity". as far as they are used as This concepts i indicates that the subjective conditions the of case thought(os) are already either because categories established prior the Deduction. The logical of judgments are givenfOlms in an intuition and though(os) taken for granted at the outset. They belong to general my logic and are not However, last remark could b in any way proved or legitimated in CPR. misunderstood But what about'intuition' the categories in TD/l or presented in the table of categories? Is notortheir use legitimated in TD/l 'perception' which are dealt with as far as they are used as concepts in nlereofthought(os)? That isfirst not in TD cognition isNo. fulfilled to detennine the manifold the case either because categories are used sensible intuition. In TD/l no sensi given in an intuition and though(os) does not involvethat any isintuition at all. intuition, a singular presenta However, my last remark could be objected by claiming I have of of concepts that to different kindsthat misunderstood 'intuition' in TD/l or perhaps confused it with would certainly be 'sensation' one way to put or 'perception' which are dealt with first inintuition: TD/2. The1)material singularcondition presentations of cognition is fulfilled first in l'D/2, that is an object is given in a pres 2) sensible given to sensibility, sensible intuition. In TD/l no sensible intuition given but just an throughwas sensations. Thus 'intuition' intuition, that is a singular presentation. Kant does nota put it by presentation, saying singular - is merely that different kinds of concepts of intuition are in operation, but that sensible intuition, viz., sensation; th would certainly be one way to put it clearly. The different senses of is fulfilled. of cognition intuition: 1) singular presentations totally disregarding how they to supp These distinctions seemare given to sensibility, 2) sensible presentations, that isintuitions. presentations Kantian It is,given very rough through sensations. Thus 'intuition' in the first senseintroducing - the sense of TD/l term primarily a singular - is merely a singular presentation, 'intuition' in to theansecond a relation object sense and theis sensible sensible intuition, viz., sensation; that means that the and material arguments thus condition secondary cha 1974, chapters 6-10, and Hintikka of cognition is fulfilled. These distinctions seem to support strongly Hintikka's claim about philosophy of mathematics is in fact Kantian intuitions. It is, very roughly, that Many 'intuition' for Kant means commentators explicitly primarily introducing a singular tenn in aand logical also sense. reject An it. immediate However, it is relation to an object and the sensible naturerejected, of intuition are the results because their own of interpre arguments and thus secondary characters of intuitions. (e.g. Hintikka 1974, chapters 6-10, and Hintikka 1969). Hintikka claims that Kant's philosophy of mathematics is in fact of pre-critical origin. Many commentators explicitly discuss the Hintikka-interpretation, and also reject it. However, it is strange how it could be so easily rejected, because their own interpretation - let us take Allison again -

of interpretation is th apparently supporting Hintikka-type that is 144 CHAPTER s about 4sensible intuition in § 20, but Kant first talk 3 cou the preceeding reasoning. It is, of ion from 'intuition', employs explicitlyconorclus implicitly at least apparently, in a is. ing historically accurate Hintikka's read ter how mat is Allison's "experience inions a weak sense" but be similar weak sense. What t first mus it ding to these suggest pon Res intuitions as mere singular presentations? Accordingly, Hintikka's tikka-reading tanding whatever merits the Hin iths notw reading seems to offer the very clue to the structure of TD. ere A fact (weak) n' is not used in TD /l in this aust 'intuitio is that in TD/l apparently supporting Hintikka-type of interpretation sible, that is ts sensible intuition with non-sen tras con butition that gen is more a as i Kant first talks about sensible intuition in § 20,intu so far eratimlike ition. TD /l deals with 3all intupreceeding conclusion from the reasoning. Itwel is,l.)ofKan course, another t occasionally alre intuition is sensible as (Pureaccurate matter how historically Hintikka' s reading is. ition etc. Anybo about sensible intuition, empirical intu s talk Responding to these suggestions it mustto first be noted that away th ing of TD /l has somehow explain a logical read notwithstanding whatever merits the Hintikka-reading might have TD /l delt wi self does not in any way indicate that him t Kan sense. Kant ition 'intuition' is not used in TD/l in this austere (weak:) from TD/2. In both cases sensible intu of· intuition is intellectual contrasts sensible sort intuition with non-sensible, that intuiting i 2 specifically the human manner of TD/ in but as it is sensible. intuition. TD/l deals with all intuition generatim so far . It follo ed means that sensations are involved which inde (Pure intuition is sensible as well.) Kant occasionally the already in TD/l manifold of a gi that TD/l deals with tractionempirical talks about sensible Abs intuition, intuition etc. how Anybody proposing n. Certainly it is give rding totally the manner ega disr these passages. a logical reading of TD/l has to somehow explain away 'intuition' has can be given in the first place, but likeinthat Kant himself does not any way indicate that TD/l delt with a different ain aspect of an actual intuition. cert sort of intuition from TD/2. In both cases sensible intuition tech is examined nical one and The second sense of 'thinking' is the is considered, but in TD/2 specifically the human manner of intuiting ing them together ing or combining presentations, putt which indeed meansunit that sensations are involved. It follows fromcon the cepts. I with nnining the manifold of an intuition dete of anica given intuition Abstraction that TD/1 deals with the manifold tech e could also l sens e to 'think(ts)'. Thus the no intuition disregarding totally sens the manner how it is given. Certainly the impact of nnining thinking which together with dete like that can be given in the first place, but 'intuition' has to refer to a nitio is cog in judgments detennining objects, that amounts certain aspect of an actual intuition. in non-determinin speculating which amounts merely and tantamount to the m The second sense to of 'thinking' is the technical one thesis of ught(ts) is the act of bringing the syn uniting or combiningTho presentations, putting them together, synthetizing, detennining the manifold of an intuition with lyconcepts. call' has thisbasicly 'intuition Kan t'sI will 3 Hintikka maintains repeated thate is no recourse to, say, geom Ther sense to 'think(ts)'. Thus sense. could also be called the rathe present daysense the technical in it inthe Now his arguments hit only some I t sense.the present with in the imp,act of the sensibility detennining thinking again which together ty of those.) are plen ately, there ortun (Unf t. interpretators of Kan 'intuition' i uss disc not do I and this, in t righ that is cognition, in contrast amounts in judgmentsthatH detennining objects, intikka is quite and seriou e naiv is it that ly ben pointed out previous e.. It has merely to speculating whichsens amounts in non-determining judgments. h 'the eye of the m whic res pictu tal men as ' tions read 'pure intui ed from these kind of be deriv certainty coul icticsynthesis No apodthe of gh. bringing ofdthe manifold to the Thought(ts) is the actthrou 3 Hintikka maintains repeatedly that Kant's 'intuition' has basicly nothing intuitive in it in the present day sense. There is no recourse to, say, geometrical intuition, again in the present sense. Now his arguments hit only some rather vulgar modern interpretators of Kant. (Unfortunately, taere are plenty of those.) I take it for granted that Hintikka is quite right in this, and I do not discuss 'intuition' in the present day sense.. It has ben pointed out previously that it is naive and seriously misleading to read 'pure intuitions' as mental pictures which 'the eye of the mind' is scanning throu~h. No apodictic certainty could be derived from these kind of pictures.

the conditions of the thought in a po "thought is the act of relating g (A247/B304). But relating a given intuiti THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 145 determining the intuition with concepts, unity of the apperception. (B145) It is act worth outHowev that thought(ts) of pointing cognizing. er, only one 'h is the sense quite obviously used also in thebeing A-deduction. The categories half that intuitions are given. N are "the conditions of the thought in a possible thinking experience". in ordinary (e.g. senseAlII) is contraste "thought is the act of relating cognize given an intuition to an object" object(O) through merely t (A247/B304). But relating a given intuition toneana object is tantamount to determi given intuitio n ...." (B406) determining the intuition with concepts, which again is an element in the Categories as the mere forms of thou act of cognizing. However, only one than 'half'theofforms the cognition, the other are of intuitio n which half being that intuitions are given.Howev Not er, onlyofthinking(ts) also bility this possiblebutapplica thinking in ordinary sense is contrasted with 'cognizing': "I do not can humans have no use because objects cognize an object(O) through merelyintuitio that n. I think, but through thatedI in the (§23) Much is embedd determine a given intuition ...." (B406)no other use for the cognition of things t employment Categories as the mere forms of thought(ts) experience".hasIt wider is certainl y a most im the forms of human intuition. than the forms of intuition which are philosophy that cognition is limited to exp However, of this possible applicabilityBasical to any sensible intuition wen 'thou ly the distinction betwee humans have no use because objects tocanKant's be given to usndental only in·distinct humanion b transce the titleity. of The §22: task "Theof category has t is intuition. (§23) Much is embedded insensibil the intellec no other use for the cognition of things than ity its application of sensibil is to receiveto. objects Accordingly, K experience". It is certainly a mostspontan important result of the critical eity of the intellect in contrast to experience. philosophy that cognition is limited tosenses. Cognition is an act which require Basically the distinction between 'thought' faculties. and 'cognition' goes back to Kant's transcendental distinction between the intellect and the think while sensibility. The task of the intellect is9.toThe catego riesthe task of the Kant frequently talks about the sensibility is to receive. Accordingly, It must be stressed once more that th to the passive receptivity of the spontaneity of the intellect in contrast conditio ns are not categories at all but senses. Cognition is an act which requires the participation of the both Cognition require s categories with sensib faculties. TD/l is the determination of the man generatim, by the logical functions (form 9. The categories Deduction the categories are mention categor It must be stressed once more that the ies categories without sensible are nothing else but these very conditions are not categories at allthebut logical forms of judgments. manifo ld of a given intuition is determ The questio Cognition requires categories with sensible significance. The concern of n could be put: Does TD/l m TO/I is the determination of the'catego manifold, givenTD/l in an ry'? Does up intuition to §20 merel generatim, by the logical functions (forms) of judgments. In the whole Deduction the categories are mentioned first in §20. "Now, the categories are nothing else but these very functions of judging, so far as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in respect of them (§'l3)." The question could be put: Does TD/l make an exception to the use of 'category'? Does TD/l up to §20 merely deal with the categories as

the logical forms of judgments. It is the pr ysical 146 CHAPTER 4 Deduction that the same funct Metaph different presentations in a judgme nt also give logical forms of judgments or as semantic notions and not with the an intuition. (A79/BI04). Thus only this one se categories proper? Because of the Abstraction no object is detennined. the Schematism the most general examples of These questions reveal that Kant's statement above is notby taken the logic are presented. Time is detenn ined seriously. There is only one set of pure functions or concepts. They are empirical intuition the manifold is still determ the logical forms of judgments. It is the premiss introduced in the ~he of judgments although the schemata gives Metaphysical Deduction that the same function which gives unity to them. Thus the very question whether in a ce of different presentations in a judgment also gives unity to the manifold schematized categories are employed is beside an intuition. (A79/BI04). Thus only this one set is employed. Later on in logical forms of judgments are employed. T the Schematism the most general examples of the detennination of time then and only then. employed to determine In are presented. Time is determined by the logical forms of judgments. intuition. It is akward even to ask whether i empirical intuition the manifold is still determined by the logical fOnTIS employed. Exactly in TD/l (§20) the categorie of judgments although the schemata gives the examples how to employ states that the categories are nothing more than them. Thus the very question whether in a certain case the purepurely or thelogic say that the categories have also a the th schematized categories are employed is beside the point. In all cases case do not have such a use, because in that logical forms of judgments are employed. They are called categories This interpretation could be opposed by ma then and only then employed to determine the manifold of a given forms of judgments could be employed to de intuition. It is akward even to ask whether in TD/l the categories are e without the schemata they could be employ employed. Exactly in TD/l (§20) the categories are introduced and Kantfor themselves and there would be no need states that the categories are nothing more than ... It is equally akwardrigorou to Kant's pre-critical view, which he say that the categories have also a purely logical or judgmental use. They employment of the categories is restricted to do not have such a use, because in that case they are not categories at all. because the employment of the logical forms This interpretation could be opposed by maintaining that if the logical presupposes the schemata, viz. the sensible forms of judgments could be employed to determine sensible manifold puts Kant's reasoning upside down. That without the schemata they could be employed on things as they are in exp categories is restricted to the objects of themselves and there would be no need for schemata at all. That was nt employment of the logical fonns of judgme Kant's pre-critical view, which he rigorously denies in CPR. The wh the schemata but because the only objects employment of the categories is restricted to the objects of experience the objects ·of empirical intuition. The logical as categories because the employment of the logical fonns of judgments be employed on things in themselves if thin presupposes the schemata, viz. the sensible conditions.cannot. However, is the Thatthis given to us. But they puts Kant's reasoning upside down. That the employment of the of because restricted to the empirically given is not because the categories is restricted to the objects of experience cannot be given otherwise than in an empi employment of the logical fonns of judgments as categories presupposes the schemata but because the only objects which can be given to us are the objects of empirical intuition. The logical forms of judgments could be employed on things in themselves if things in themselves could be given to us. But they cannot. That is the point. The categories are restricted to the empirically given because of the 'fact' that real objects cannot be given otherwise than in an empirical intuition. There is no

10. Mathe matica l versus dynam ic 147 constitutive versus regulat ive e more deeper explanation for that. Indeed, theAn message TD/I is that the interpreoftation well in line with categories are valid and necessary for any possible objects intuition stressing the explanaof tory power of som generatim. Their domain is by far larger than the ies domain of real objects. categor and the important role of th the RC-interpretation. It is an interpret 10. Mathenlatical versus dynamical categories; have reasoned. The trouble is that th constitutive versus regulative employment seems to flatly contradict it, thus makin An interpretation well in line with what has been but- that - unless he said was previously inconsistent factors the division of stressing the explanatory power of some new Anyhow, I think that it isthehighly categories and the important role of the relational categories - I will ies calland the dichotomies of the categor the RC-interpretation. It is an interpretation how Kant wellconcerning known, usually littleshould attention is have reasoned. The trouble is that therereveal is at some least one passage which important presuppositions seems to flatly contradict it, thus making be it possible or even indications of probable somethingthat more fu - unless he was inconsistent - that was not the way Kant Kant's hidden ontology.thought. Anyhow, I think that it is highly instructive to division emphasize Kant's [ReI] The of the categories. propositions. dichotomies of the categories and the cardinal also be underst ood as Although the very key well known, usually little attention is paid to these division of thedichotomies categories. which The table of Kant'sing thought. They ies seem to Of Q reveal some important presuppositions ofcontain three 4categor each: be indications of something more fundamental or hidden, indeed of and Of Modali ty. On a higher leve Kant's hidden ontology. dichotomy: mathematical versus dyn [ReI] The division of the categories. categor An important clue,belong which to could ies which the grou the structure TD is Kant's also be understood as the very key to(mathe matical) of are "directed to object division of the categories. The table of categories consists of fouriesgroups empirical)". The categor Of Relation Of Quality, Of Relation containing three categories each: Of Quantity, "directed to the existence of these o and Of Modality. On a higher level another Kant makes a underst notableanding) further~" (BIIO or to the categories. (B 110) The dichotomy: mathematical versus dynamical concerned with mere intuitio n and p Of Quality and im.") Of Quantity categories which belong to the groupsappeara nce generat Although Kan (mathematical) are "directed to objects mean of intuition or asatical well categor as that the(pure mathem ie and Of im Modality (dynamical) are empirical)". The categories Of Relation generat (which are not complete "directed to the existence of these objects (either in relation to one also A160/B199: partly another or to the understanding)~" (BIIO, 4 cpo Of course, there are some notable excepti know any clear represen tative ofofthean concerned with mere intuition and partly with the existence RC-inter it by emphasizing Kant's own use of the thin appearance generatim.") Although KantB(ed) puts 1984,55 it very ,70) briefly, he seems to mean that the mathematical categories constitute objects of intuition generatim (which are not complete objects) while the dynamical THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

It •••

4 Of course, there are some notable exceptions, e.g. Butts (1984, 213). - I do not know any clear representative of the RC-interpretation. Thole comes at least near to it by emphasizing Kant's own use of the thinking-cognizing distinction. (Tuschling, B(ed) 1984,55, 70)

individuati ion h eased. Objects of intuit Abstraction has to rel CHAPTER 4 nce. common frame of refere rience is an object of ex t in expeCertainly tever is meobjects. Whaconstituted categories are applied to those any talk bu t lar thing-like objects singuwhen t onlyonly ins no about relations of objectsconta makes sense the means for ition s. Experience is cogn tes of affair mplex staavailable. individuating objects are co somehow That means thatpethe ar objects of ex rience 161) Thus ptions.of(Bintuition perce Abstraction has to released. Objects have to be putthe iniraconsti ts of intuition as common frame of reference.sense containing objec t on in another wa y - tha to sayofitexperience. - object maintain Whatever is met in experience is an Experience o constituting an ol.?ject in also us edbut egories are contains not only singular cat thing-like objects events or otherte obje uired to constitu ories are req isegcognition through connectedsitions complex states of affairs. Experience dynamical cat cardinal propo of the e division are experience objects in a wider and d perceptions. (BI61) Thus objects [RC2] ofTh mathematical ent of the Kant ploym sense containing objects of intuition their constituents. seems to about theasem Sy nt in the chapter "The Ka by d rte po sup hly hig maintain - to say it in another way - that only the mathematical y all i Understanding", especi Pure of Proposition categories are used in constituting an ofo1?ject intuition whilerem the ind ours rience. Le t us first s of Expeobjects Analotogieconstitute dynamical categories are required of experience. application rules for the s are a kind of position [RC2] The division of the pro cardinal propositions. What was just6/B said 296) Fo ployment. (A23 l em their empirica mathematical and dynamical categories is reov about the employment of thefor dinal proposition. Mo car ing nd spo rre co a highly supported by Kant in the chapter "The System of the Cardinal of is possible, which m e pro only onin proposition especially connection with the Proposition of Pure Understanding", y other bu t one corre not be an there can ory remind Analogies of Experience. Let cat useg first ourselves that the cardinal dinal y other car not be an"schemata" can ns the forrethe categories, propositions are a kind of application us humarules ugh Ka nt did not pres althocategory tereach ant in that chap me(A236/B296) for their empirical employment. For there is dependant on the hum ion rules are the applicatMoreover, a corresponding cardinal proposition. for each cardinal rules for application to jus t thethat y are means cause thewhich proposition only one proof is be possible, for a certain y are necessarily emplo s ion sit po pro l na rdi Ca but one correct application rule. For words category there cannot be any other intuition. In other given inproposition old cardinal manif us humans there cannot be any other than those rming to these rules. nfo co ut tho wi d ne mi ter did not present them all. Naturally, d meant in that chapter although de Kant s are also divide position l pro Cardi the application rules are dependant onnathe human mode of sensibility corresponding to the d actlyhuman exthe mical ones to because they are just the rules dy fornaapplication sensibility. ndit ev en says that "The co nt Ka 1) 20 2/B 16 (A Cardinal propositions are necessarily employed in determiningsitthe dinal propo ions] in maticalnocarmanifold mathewords, manifold given in intuition. [th In e other can bese of th necessary throughout, tho are e nc rie pe ex determined without conforming to these rules. thems pirical intuition are, in ble eminto Cardinal propositions are of alsopossi divided mathematicalal and al din car Th e mathematic 9) division (A160/Bto19the dynamical ones exactly corresponding of the categories. ic) necessity, those of nal (apodaictpriori nditio unco of intuition (A162/B201) Kant even says that "The conditions [the mathematical cardinal propositions] in respect of a possible experience are necessary throughout, those of the existence of objects(O) of possible empirical intuition are, in themselves, contingent only." (A160/B199) The mathematical cardinal propositions "express unconditional (apodictic) necessity, those of dynamical use will also

dynamical propositions (categories) of experience. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 149 [RC3] Constitutive versus reg distinction parallelofwith the pre carry the character of necessity a priori, but on the condition empirical regulative cardinal propositions. thought in experience, thus indirectly only". (ibid) Accordingly, only the (A distinction is validare and important f mathematical propositions (and consequently: categories) employed Constitutive cardinal proposition to determine (constitute) an object of intuition generatim, whereas the categories while regulative dynamical propositions (categories) are required to determine the objectscardi dynamical categories. Kant introd of experience. distinction [RC3] Constitutive versus regulative.mathematical-dynamical Kant introduces a further distinction is easily conceiv distinction parallel with the present that one,theviz. constitutive versus he does not specially emphasize regulative cardinal propositions. (A178/B221, cp also A664/B692) This the of minorofimportance, that th distinction is valid and important for the are principles reason too. but (ibid) The constitutive versus regulativ Constitutive cardinal propositions are based on the mathematical Intuition and th The Axiomsareofbased categories while regulative cardinal propositions on the consitutive regarding thedid objects dynamical categories. Kant introduces the distinction - as he the of of intuition have to to the mathematical-dynamical distinction - rather briefly giving an confonn impression the unproblematic. objects of intuition arethat const that the distinction is easily conceivable ~d The fact cognition of objects. The Analogie he does not specially emphasize the distinctions need not mean that they Empiricalis self-evident. Thought are not con are of minor importance, but that their importance intuition.is relative However, are c The constitutive versus regulative distinction to a they domain. (A664/B692),ofAccordingly, Kant's The Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations Perception are constitutive regarding single o consitutive regarding the objects of intuition. That means that the aobjects between several objects, which of intuition have to confonn to these propositions. 'They determine how the objects of intuition are constituted regarding or better,experience. they constitute the It is well known that the crucial cognition of objects. The Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of of objectivethe order. Orderof refer thatconcerning Empirical Thought are not constitutive objects appearances. Already their nam intuition. However, they are constitutive concerning experience. Experience can only be employed (A664/B692) Accordingly, Kant's favourite subject, causality, is not i answe constitutive regarding a single object, [RC4] but hasThe its supplementary role in relations category and a corresponding between several objects, which is tantamount to being constitutivecard that what has been said about cardi regarding experience. to categories as well. Whatis all It is well known that the crucial conception in the Second Analogy categories arequa applie that of objective order. Order refers to themathematical relations between objects

appearances. Already their names indicate that the Analogies of Experience can only be employed in the domain of experience. [RC4] The supplementary answer. Because of the relation between a category and a corresponding cardinal proposition it can be concluded that what has been said about cardinal propositions is directly applicable to categories as well. What all this amounts to is that only the mathematical categories are applied to constitute an object of intuition.

explained the necessary employment of the m while in TD/2 (which deals with objects of exper 150 CHAPTER 4 for the dynamical categories. This interpretation i relation of thedid the role"Why wordstoabout In short, we have got a supplementary answer the question Kant's own of cogni litydeals to explain Kant divide TD into two parts?" The isanswer is: in the TD/lpossibi (which The aim their c laws ofhe objects is, anaccordi objectng of to intuition) with a manifold of a given intuition, categories)that ry necessa are Laws (B159) of e.the mathematical categories relati explained the necessary employment nature possibl Howev §26. e of is : the exampl while in TD/2 (which deals with objects experience) the same done trouble Theof [RC5] a passageby~hich is supported for the dynamical categories. the Thistrouble interpretation strongly is thatis there Transce Kant starts the relational in the TD/2. Kant's own words about the interpre role oftation. Certainlycategories in the p e. Thus packag of cognizing priori, through The aim is to explain the possibility ies in his (a all the categor generatim the their nconjunction and dynami makingcal ca categories) objects accordingobject to laws intuitio of of ive role. The e regulatobjects. a merely relations between nature possible. (Bl59) Laws idling are necessary or having means Kant really alternat [Re5] The trouble: the example of §26. However, as ive mentioned above, ne which detenni . He says e in .§26 the trouble is that there is second a passage ~hich flatly(B162) contradicts this that t exampl I join interpretation. Certainly Kantconditi starts on the aTranscendental Deduction withthe m priori under which an abstrac like inofTD/l, all the categories in his package. Thus constituting an tion i if, phase is -the im, in generat he presupp In other words, the dynamical are either just ose object of intuition generatimcategor y of cause.categories made. is tion abstrac the is equivocal to when idling or having a merely regulative evidence evenThe categoryrole. rpretati RC-inte icts the detennine which alternative Kant really means unless we on. come to his contrad exampl about thisunity saysynthetic should He says thatwethe as e? a How second example in .§26 (B162).What when the a n objects s betweeof an intuition condition a priori under which I join relation the manifold talk about of individ framework abstraction is made fromuating time -objects the ? H generatim, is - if, like in TD/l, theanvery problem of ab general Theuse objects? the category of cause. In other words, he uate presupposes of a dynamical individ that 'caus be uncontroversia category even when the abstraction made.to Accordingly, that lflatly stake. It isseems to unde easy less contradicts the RC-interpretation. without time at all. But is it There so on? What should we say about this example? How could itand make sense to see n objects s betwee relation easily am . That talk about relations between objects when abstraction is made from these matters about talk the which to either. sense not make ' do could the very framework of individuating objects? How mere thought matters that 'these problem abstracting fromarises time with is at the v individuate objects? The general The problem sameofgeneral not require ac does t as imagin though 'cause' cannotg be understood stake. It seems to be uncontroversial Even if that s time. How y requiregrounds, - certainltimeless al toactunderstand empiric without time at all. But is it less easy abstrac the when take place t' couldseems relations between objects and 'though so on? There to be no language in tion time but b very process theamounts he think to the takes conclusion which to talk about these matters. That that easily n, are given in intuitio and accord objects that 'these matters' do not makenosense either.

The same general problem arises with the very notion of 'thought'. Even if thought as imaging does not require actual intuitions it - as an empirical act - certainly requires time. How could Kant think that 'thought' could take place when the abstraction of time was made? Did he think that the very process takes time but because of the abstraction no objects are given in intuition, and accordingly, in this case the

conceivable that in this case the rel use, that is, they are employed prob THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES 151 functions of unity (of the original intuitions as mere singular presentations aremust 'timeless'? causality be present This in any int understanding is certainly most natural ifcase it isofagain kept in an mind thatof intu determining object Kant is not engaged in an empirical but a transcendental inquiry. Not any of s idling. Examining the principle act "with consciousness" is examined, but timeles acts there posited rationalistic contemporaries for not objects and their posited relations make up game.one. ThusPresumably it is even the u the the material conceivable that in this case the relationalshould categories have a regulative be understood exactly as usin use, that is, they are employed problematically. It is conceivable that as Because the RC-interpretation in functions of unity (of the original apperception) pure the concept of always possibility t there is the causality must be present in any intellectual synthesis, thus even in the is sim interpretation, Kant's example case of determining an object of intuition, been but insaid that above case italready could beshows just that idling. Examining the principle of sufficient reason, Kant to criticized his flatly as it seems do. Moreover, it necessary employment the dyna rationalistic contemporaries for not separating the logical principleoffrom the material one. Presumably the use of proved, as constitutive. W 'cause' atunder least the not abstraction are, Kant's dichoto should be understood exactly as using it as interpretation a logical principle. Because the RC-interpretation in manybecause ways fits well withprinciples the text cann regulative there is always the possibility that instead of rejecting RC- the constituting an object the of intuition interpretation, Kant's example is simply taken as misleading. has that constitutive role, it What follows been said above already shows that the example doesvalid not in contradict so Tha objectively that context. flatly as it seems to do. Moreover, it must be rather The clearnature that in of TD/l the [RC6] judgments. necessary employment of the dynamical pretation categories cannot have been - which turns out not to b proved, at least not as constitutive. Whatever of the RC-No dou withthe thedifficulties Kantian judgments. interpretation are, Kant's dichotomy cannot be ignored. Anyhow, TD/l. It is al an all-important role in because regulative principles cannot have validity, one and category in thatobjective in any judgment constituting an object of intuition the dynamical categories have a tha However, it mustdo benot made clear constitutive role, it follows that the dynamical categories are not totally determined objects neither d objectively valid in that context. That is thejudgments, reason why TD/2 needed. but it isisonly considered [RC6] The nature of judgments. The second this inter-from th intuitiontrouble (not towith a judgment) pretation - which turns out not to be a serious trouble at all - has to do due to judging. To put it otherwise: with the Kantian judgments. No doubt, Kant's theory likewise of judgment plays determined, no complete, de an all-important role in TD/l. It is also uncontroversial that Kant thought that in any judgment one category of each group will be employed. However, it must be made clear that as TD/l does not deal with whole, totally determined objects neither does it deal with proper completed judgments, but it is only considered what kind of unity is accrued to an intuition (not to a judgment) from the understanding, through the act of judging. To put it otherwise: due to abstraction no object is comletely detennined, likewise no complete, determining judgment is made.

validity at all. They are not real but epistemic or conc and concern merely the relation of our cognition to i 152 CHAPTER totally bypass this 4trouble in the present study, althoug a serious trouble for Kant. treated [RC7] The modal categories. The trouble with He the should modal have categories is the separately. that later on (e.g. A2l9/B266, A233/B286) Kant makes it clear that - at not have offerobjective a clearcut s least apparantly contraryIftothe the RC-interpretation result of TD - theydoes do not points to some important difficulties. There validity at all. They are not real but epistemic or conceptual predicatesare of categories the different concerning and concern merely the relation the of table our cognition to itsand objects. I will kin of various categories. Leaving aside fqr totally bypass this trouble in the present study, although I think that the it is mom categories, it is not clear how did Kant know th a serious trouble for Kant. He should have treated the modal categories categories have constitutuve employment at all? How di separately. to draw the line between what is constitutive and wh If the RC-interpretation does not offer a clearcut solution it at least Why is not teleology constitutive experience as well? points to some important difficulties. There are of serious troubles

concerning the table of categories and the different kind of employment Summary: structure of the Transcendental of various categories. 11. Leaving asidethefqr the moment the modal The following categories, it is not clear how did characters Kant knowhave thatbeen the maintained relational to TD/l: 1) the concernatisall? merely a manifold given in categories have constitutuve employment Howwith did he know where is, 2)what merely an object of to draw the line between is constitutive andintuition what is generatim regulative?is c abstraction is from as thewell? manner in which an emp Why is not teleology constitutive of made experience given, which implies that, 4) only the unity accrued to a is considered, thus 5)Deduction the role of the cate 11. Summary: the understanding structure of the Transcendental (in the have technical sense), consequently, 6) merely The following characters been maintained to be important in synthesis is considered. There is hardly any doubt TD/l: 1) the concern is merely with a manifold given in an intuition, thatthat pointof to intuition somethinggeneratim common which can be presented is, 2) merely an object is constituted, 3) an i However, it mustinbewhich clear that there needintuition not be one abstraction is made from the manner an empirical is sin T answer to the question what is the difference between given, which implies that, 4) only the unity accrued to an intuition by the do not claim is vain to categories search for in thethought difference, understanding is considered, thus 5)that theitrole of the but it is deceptive to presuppose that there is one single (in the technical sense), consequently, 6) merely the intellectual The characteristics presented above call for synthesis is considered. There is hardly any doubt that all these features comments. Although it is true and even conspicuous point to something common which can be presented in different ways. given in an intuition is emphasized in TD/l, an accord However, it must be clear that there need not be one single and a simple object of intuition generatim is constituted, it does no answer to the question what is the difference between TD/l and TD/2. I result is not applicable to all possible manifolds or i do not claim that it is vain to search for the difference, on the contrary, objects of experience The result of TD/l d but it is deceptive to presuppose that there isgeneratim). one single difference. human intuitions. The characteristics presented above call for some additional comments. Although it is true and even conspicuous that a manifold given in an intuition is emphasized in TD/l, an accordingly merely an object of intuition generatim is constituted, it does not follow that the result is not applicable to all possible manifolds or intuitions (to the objects of experience generatim). The result of TD/l directly applies to human intuitions.

whole TD is to show how the pure concepts, whi 153 the intellect and are totally heterogeneous with s The division of TD is parallel to Kant's division of and the faculty detennine the sensible given, not onlyof can, bu cognition into the understanding and the sensibility. That, if any, is the employed in order to gain objective cognition. Th explanatory factor. As Kant says §21 he validity. considers in TD/I the unity their in objective Consequently, there is no which accrues to an intuition merely from the understanding theunity o from the unity of the understanding (by to the synthesis intellectualis). The inspection is merely made the possible by the from concern is al\vays unity accrued Abstraction, which means 'bracketing' the n1anner in which the manifold message of§'15 is unequivocally that all uni is given for an empirical intuition. HoweverThe the general of the understanding. principleproblem of apperception ap whole TD is to show how theand pure concepts, have their intuition. All which presentations haveorigin to be in united i the intellect and are totally heterogeneous with sensible can ident become presentations of a intuitions, numerically determine the sensible given, (imaging) and not only can,not butrequire must necessarily been does intuition. Accordingl employed in order to gain objective cognition. That amounts to proving merely with thought. In both parts intuition is at their objective validity. Consequently, there is different no problem of a transition places between levels of abstraction the unity of(TD/l) the empirical; from the unity of the understanding intuitionto generatim to the Kant's objects of concern is al\vays merely the (TD/2). unity accrued from the understanding. Thedivisio That the division is parallel to the message of§'15 is unequivocally all unityand descends from the that facultiesthat of intellect the sense means understanding. The principleintuition of apperception applies both to concepts is considered and in TD/2 the unity whic and intuition. All presentations have to united inimports one consciousness to the humanbe receptivity is also considered. identical subject. Thoughthow th become presentations of a numerically What is at stake in TD/l is to explain (imaging) does not require intuition. Accordingly, TD/I does not dealnecess manifold given in an intuition generatim merely with thought. In both categories. parts intuition at stake. Transition takesthat th Theis task of TD - namely, of abstraction from the objects of places between different levels recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility intuition generatim (TD/l) making to the experience objects of possible experience generatim - remains essentia to the division of the mind intothe theobjects (TD/2). That the division is parallel TO/I. By dealing with constituting of faculties of intellect and theonly sense that in TD/l anyconstitutive sensible cate the means objective validity of the TD/2 the unity which thevalidity specialof manner of intuition is considered and in To the relational explain the objective the human receptivity importshas is also considered. to be made available in which the objects o What is at stake in TD/l is to explain how the the Abstraction determination That means that hasoftothebe rele manifold given in an intuition generatim necessarily must employ Space and Time make up the framework the which in categories. The task of TD - namely, that the categories must be recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility of experience and thus making experience possible - remains essentially unaccomplished in TD/I. By dealing with constituting of the objects of intuition generatim only the objective validity of the constitutive categories has been proved. To explain the objective validity of the relational categories a framework has to be made available in which the objects of intuition are placed. That means that the Abstraction has to be released. For us humans, Space and Time make up the framework which individuates objects. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

category in respect of all objects of our sen then be achieved completely." on will deducti 154 CHAPTER 4 by showing that the unity which accrues fro The task of TD/2 is to explain how the objects of experience, thatis n is speciosa), is, synthes synthes ve all figurati stand underThe the argume categories. is, whatever is met in experience, ntation in TD/1. with dealt to alreadyhave not include thely,objects Now the objects of experience on timeofas th precise lity; moreonly humandosensibi intuition, but also temporal and spatial objects, that is, relations n a 'form the inner sense. A distinction betweebetween the objects of intuition. "Byintuitio explaining a priori the division The of decive role. n' playsthea validity of our senses, the intention of this category in respect of all objects words: deduction will then be achieved completely." TD/1(B145) This is completed TD by showing that the unity which accrues fromanding the sensibility (byThe thesens The underst figurative synthesis, synthesis speciosa), Imagina Judgmeisnt none other than the unity of o already dealt with in TD/1. The argumentation Cogniti Thought(ts) is based on the nature human sensibility; more precisely, onThe time as the fonn of intuition and of figu The is intellectual synthes the inner sense. A distinction between a 'foPTI ofapperce intuition' and a 'formal The unit ption unity of The intuition' plays a decive role. The An division can be put in some keyExperie intuition generatim words: Objects An object of intuition TD/1 TD/2 The dyn tive categories The constitu The understanding The sensibility - card - cardinal propositions Judgment Imagination of Spa ed in Space and Time Present Thought(ts) Cognition There are three closely related concepts the The intellectual synthesiscrucial for Theany figurative synthesis of TD, namely 'o interpretation The unity of apperception The unity apprehension and 'judgment'. We have already met some An intuition generatim concepts: Experience, with different operates Nature 1) Kant intuiting, An object of intuition Objective Objects of experience is connected merely wit validity The constitutive categories The dynamical categories Kantian judgments judgmental sense. 3) All - cardinal propositions will be examin - cardinal propositions next chapters 1) how ed in the Presented in Space and Time of Space and Time source of much ambiguity, 2) that Kant could There are three closely related understanding logicalis sen objects in ofa which connectedthewith is concepts crucial for any interpretation ofindepen TD, namely 'objectivetovalidity' objects. 3) of any relation dently 'object', and 'judgment'. We have already met some claims concerning these tions, reserva rable suppose, without conside with different of 'object'. 2) concepts: 1) Kant operates objectiv would have . Too much e validitynotions the g is Objective validity is connected merely with objects in a logical or point correct. Certainly Kant's starting judgmental sense. 3) All Kantian judgments have objective validity. It will be examined in the next chapters 1) how Kant's notion of object is a source of much ambiguity, 2) that Kant could hardly mean that validity is connected with objects in a logical sense because it is validity independently of any relation to objects. 3) It cannot make sense to suppose, without considerable reservations, that all judgments have objective validity. Too much would have been proved if that were correct. Certainly Kant's starting point is the general observation that the

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

155

judgments of traditional metaphysics do not have objective validity. It is because the judgments based on the ideas of reason do not yield objective validity that the illusions of the Transcendental Dialectic are generated. It must be carefully scrutinized what kind of judgments Kant is talking about. The key is to distinguish between the form of judgment versus the judgment as an assertion having objective validity; in other words not confusing formal with material·validity.

CHAPTERS 1. Objects in transcendental logic 2. ization process 3. Realization 4. Nou dental idealism versus transcendenta OBJECTS IN 7. Object terms 8. Different in itself worlds? 9. Given or const differentLOGIC TRANSCENDENTAL 10. Objects in t of 'affection' Deduction 11. Constituted objects? ontological objects? 13. Kant's realis

1. Objects in transcendental logic 2. Reduction and realization process 3. Realization 4. Noumena 5. Transcendental idealism versus transcendental realism 6. Thing l logic in transcendenta Objects perspectives in itself 7. Object terms 8. 1.Different or two different worlds? 9. GivenAor'parado constituted; the problem ndental logic is that x' of transce 10. Objects in the Transcendental of 'affection' because it is fonnal, but it also has to re Deduction 11. Constituted objects? order 12. to Epistemic or of empi be the logic cognition in ontological objects? 13. Kant's realism of wh

simply follows from the explication Transcendental propositions must have po Otherwise they would not have objective bu However, it is Kant's point of departure tha 1. Objects in transcendental logic their source in the intellect, and the sensibil A 'paradox' of transcendental The logicconcep is thattitof hasobject to be built up a priori d with a is burdene of and because it is fonnal, but it also has toobjects refer to possible objects given to be both seem Kantian cognition in order to be the logic of empirical truth and falsity. This putting these two paradoxes together resu simply follows from the explication '. It go 'objectis. conception of logic owntranscendental havingofhiswhat Transcendental propositions must have possible empirical reference. we understand the concept of object larg Otherwise they would not have objective but merely subjective phy. philosovalidity. of Kant's understanding However, it is Kant's point of departure that taken the pure having nt key to most importa as aconcepts, It is often their source in the intellect, and the sensibility are totally heterogenous. philosophy that 'object' has to be underst The concept of object is burdened with objects a 'paradox' of to its be own. The or con made are said Kantian Kantian objects seem to be both given and constituted. No wonder that putting these two paradoxes together results in every commentator having his own conception of 'object'. It goes without saying that how we understand the concept of object largely detennines our whole understanding of Kant's philosophy. It is often taken as a most important key to the interpretation of Kant's philosophy that 'object' has to be understood in the "critical" sense. Kantian objects are said to be made or constituted rather than material

primordial ontological conception and world as a mere illusion. Kant does 157 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC objects of experience by postulating objects in the ontological sense. This widely view, although behindaccepted them. However, the trouble is suggesting, on the one certainly basically true, can also be misleading exactlybythese two mispresentation. T hand, that material objects somehow totally disappear, on the other hand, difficu capacity of language having In boundaries other words, the that the reality is hidden behind the appearances. trancends the of cognition. object devour the anal problem is 1) not to allow the critical conception modem of kind of tophilosophical primordial ontological conception and 2) between not to understand the empirical different senses of the key of the world as a mere illusion. Kant does notsenses explain the cognition for is all-important interpretin of objects lying objects of experience by postulating another textualdomain interpretations is not straighforw behind them. However, the trouble is that he himself seems to present My present concern is to examine is much to thewhat k exactly these two mispresentation. Thisdifferent certainlyways. It willdue be asked in pointing to that which capacity of language having difficulties Transcendental Deduction, and mor Kant was not engaged of in aobject i trancends the boundaries of cognition. Again, Kant's famous 'definition' carefully modem kind of philosophical analysistheby whole before distinguishing going into the parts. Distinguishing different between different senses of the key-notions. delineate how the various Kantian senses is all-important for interpreting, together Kant, yet support for offerri intofinding a coherent picture textual interpretations is not straighforward. philosophy. This picture is heavily bas My present concern is to examine Kant's notion ofTo object in two Gerd Buchdahl. go into that arduo are dealt with in the exami different ways. It will be asked what kindinofaobjects methodologically minded Transcendental Deduction, and more precisely, understand make clear how how to argue for transcen I will start, however, Kant's famous 'definition' of object in §17. briefly states what it is all with about. The the whole before going into the parts. That means that I will first try to highly explanatory. be means put delineate how the various Kantian objects things couldtum tha Theand transcendental the critical together into a coherent picture offerring objects indeed ainstead schemeofofobjects themselve on and inspired the work of (of ex philosophy. This picture is heavily based expressions like by "these objects Gerd Buchdahl. To go into that arduous task might look a he sidetrack and similar oneslike as if were talking in a methodologically minded examination. However, onewhich can hardly contrast to objects are not mere Copernican ontologica make clear how to argue for transcendental idealism view unlesswas onethat at least is also methodologically briefly states what it is all about. The scheme force cognition of them on us. The sub objects, as Kant puts it. It is often tak highly explanatory. objects must conform focus- iswhich on the cognition of to the The transcendental tum means that the objects instead of objects themselves. It is also true that Kant uses expressions like "these objects (of experience) are mere appearances" and similar ones as if he were talking about different kind of objects in contrast to objects which are not mere appearances. The traditional, preCopernican view was that ontologically independent objects somehow force cognition of them on us. The subject of cognition has to confoffi1 to objects, as Kant puts it. It is often taken for granted that the Copernican objects - which must conform to the conditions of cognition - become

objects in the ontological sense is not changed in A transcendental realist and an idealist shar · 158 CHAPTER 5 refer to the same objects, namely to the objects o holdsorthat it is objectsI which epistemologically loaded, however judgmental constituted. take ithave as to a co Clearly proposition would its notontological make sense whichthis objects refer changes mistake to think that that to as judgmental objects. It could status at all. How objectsunderstood are cognized is partly dependent on us. be is dividedtointo question by howus,thebutworld the reference the differen same Cognition of objects is constituted matter; objects are in differentiated objects in the ontological sense is not changed any way. according to t instead of ready-made forcing themselve A transcendental realist and an idealist share objects a common world and it is, is to notthe really an objection. Objects still on refer to the same objects, namely objects of experience. Theare latter, of cognition although their individualization which have to conform to our cognition. is however holds that it is objects message the sense Prolegomena: propert if objects"..all werethe already Clearly this proposition would not of make body belong merelythat to its appearan understood as judgmental intuition objects. of It acould be objected even the thatinto appears is thereby as in divided different objectsnotis destroyed, an epistemic question how the world is thing is only according shown thattowethe cannot possibly cognize it matter; objects are differentiated epistemic conditions itself." (Pr289) To say that objects are made instead of ready-made objects forcing themselves on us. This, correct as o as no are creation of objects isindependent embedded i sofar it is, is not really an objection. Objects still ontologically Transcendental idealism is formal of cognition although theirconstituting. individualization is not. That is at least the Certainly quite differently message of the Prolegomena: "..all interpretation the propertiesgoes which constitute the if is its of appearance. course extremely complicated and matter to intuition of a body belong merely The existence of the has been made such. Presently, I shall simply thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but itde of arguments. andpossibly give some outlines is only shown that we cannot cognize it by the senses as it is in The most successful way to is understand itself." (Pr289) To say that objects are made or constituted correct objecthood (thinghood) - and hismaking sometimes is embedded in the act of or sofar as no creation of objects reifying concepts - is not to read him idealism. as dealing constituting. Transcendental idealism is fonnal, material if this but is not The co Certainly interpretation goes quite differently different kinds of things theaccepted. same things perspectives. Things themselves are matter is of course extremely complicated and incontroversial; at not leastontolo it but the samesimply objects of cognition considered has been made such. Presently, I shall delineate an overall picture as viz., independently of our epistemic condition and give some outlines of arguments. se considerata. That of has b it: res perKant's The most successful tradition way to had understand conception g. Praussofand many commentators, objecthood (thinghood) - by and his eminent sometimes misleadinge.manner 1929 (1973,not 31)with Thisontologically so called "me reifying concepts - is to Heidegger read him as dealing is bas tival" or "double-aspect" interpretation different kinds of things but the same things considered from different which convi study. There is ontologically plenty of evidence perspectives. Things in themselves are not different objects but the same objects of cognition considered as they are in themselves, viz., independently of our epistemic conditions, or as the scholastic tradition had it: res per se considerata. That has been underlined recently by many eminent commentators, e. g. Prauss and Allison but already by Heidegger 1929 (1973, 31) This so called "methodological", "perspectival" or "double-aspect" interpretation is basically accepted in this study. There is plenty of evidence which convincingly shows that this

possible to reconcile these seemingly opposing OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

159

2. Reduction and realization process "considerata-view" was at least one of Kant's views. (e.g. Bxviiin, idea some of different perspectives Bxxvii, PC 103n) However, there The are also rather clear indicationsis no distinction between empirical objects "two and that this is not the whole story. Occasionally something like the themselves butAccordingly, has a much wider application; worlds-conception" is in operation as well. it should be metaphor. The different possible to reconcile these seemingly opposing views. senses of 'object' or ' as different aspects or perspectives on objec a thing were passing through different 2. Reduction and realizationthough process the quasi-dynamical processes called "reductio The idea of different perspectives is not only applicable to the by Buchdahl. In several highly instructive pa distinction between empirical objects and things as they are in has developed an explanatory scheme which i themselves but has a much wider application; it is indeed Kant's great the considerata-interpretation. It goes without metaphor. The different senses of 'object' or 'thing' are best understood various terms is not unequivocaL Accordingly as different aspects or perspectives on objects, or perhaps better, "as in the interpretation is inevitable.! though a thing were passing through different developmental stages" of There is only one world. That is axiomatic the quasi-dynamical processes called "reduction or realization processes" telling evidence Kant does not try to explain o by Buchdahl. In several highly instructive papers Buchdahl (1980-89) postulating another domain of objects lying be has developed an explanatory scheme which is an elaborated version of different kinds of objects belongs mere the considerata-interpretation. It goes without saying that Kant's use of philosophical reflection. "The difference betw various terms is not unequivocal. Accordingly, some nonnative element the empirical therefore belongs to the critique in the interpretation is inevitable. l not concern the reference of cognition to their There is only one world. That is axiomatic. Despite some apparently the outset of a philosophical discussion object telling evidence Kant does not try to explain our cognition of objects by rather everyday sense: objects in the sensory postulating another domain of objects lying behind them. Distinguishing unappraised. They are called objects of the different kinds of objects belongs merely to the language of philosophical reflection. "The difference between the transcendental and 1 To brief I doofnot try to separate w cognition only unequivocally and does the empirical therefore belongs what to theisbecritique mine. Buchdahl's description of this "transc than(A56/B81) the matter itAtis supp appear astomore not concern the reference of cognition theircomplicated objects(G)." that is only illusory. It offers powerful means not objects has to be first indiscussi a the outset of a philosophical discussion transcendental philosophy, but taken also modern realism" versus "internal realism". There is also rather everyday sense: objects in the sensory world with their ontology ano ways dissimilar account of Kant's object-terms. (Pa unappraised. They are called objects of thehow senses or sensory objects stress heavily confusions have arisen by using

synonymous, most notably 'noumenon' and 'thing in extent both regard Kant's theory as consistent and recent views are from considerably 1 To be brief I do not try to separateBuchdahl's unequivocally what comes Buchdahlrefined and fro of 1969. work of this "transcendental structure" might frrst what is mine. Buchdahl's description appear as more complicated than the matter it is supposed to illuminate. I think that that is only illusory. It offers powerful means not only for the understanding of transcendental philosophy, but also modern discussions concerning "metaphysical realism" versus "internal realism". There is also another perspectival but in many ways dissinlilar account of Kant's object-terms. (Palmquist 1986a) Both of them stress heavily how confusions have arisen by using illegitimately some terms as synonymous, most notably 'noumenon' and 'thing in itself'. Moreover, to a large extent both regard Kant's theory as consistent and philosophically defensible. Buchdahl's recent views are considerably refined from his views in his 'classical' work of 1969.

empirical sense, that is, in a sens transcendental realists, also do. By 'b 160 CHAPTER 5 aspects of sensory objects, that is, suspen generatim [iiberhaupt]or (Tg (Tw). These objects should not beobjects confused with appearances indeterminate ontology) are reduced judgmental objects or whatever, which are descriptions from the eith (general logic) or to transcendental transcendental point of view. The point is just that we have not yet obj The reduction removes even the singular entered the transcendental mode of discourse but refer to objects in the cendental object not only empirical sense, that is, in a sense which our denotes opponents, the a sin (Buchdahl 1989, 222) Even the transcendental realists, also do. By objects. 'bracketing out' the phenomenal of a transcendental is nothing. aspects of sensory objects, that is, suspending everything object sensory, we get (A4 objects generatim [ilberhaupt] (Tg). Objects generatim (with 3. Realization indeterminate ontology) are reduced either to purely logical objects (TI) (general logic) or to transcendental objects (To) (transcendental Transcendental objects (Tlogic). 0) are the The reduction removes even the singular-plural distinction. Thus a transprocess. Realization means that objects b cendental object denotes not only a they singl~ become object but also a system of objects of cognition ( objects. (Buchdahl 1989, 222) Even the very question of the constitution appearances (Ta), objects as they app of a transcendental object is nothing. (A478/B506n) 'counterfactual' I mean a logical possibi

us humans) transcendental objects co intellectual intuition as noumena (see be thatstarting the manifold intuition Transcendental objects (T0) are the point of of the an realization of an object - becomes presentation process. Realization means that objects become something for us, that is, det concepts of objects are the categ they become objects of cognitiongeneral (of experience). Th~y become the realization of objects. appearances (Ta), objects as they appear to us. Counterfactually Indeed (by ("epistemic quiteforgener 'counterfactual' I mean a logical possibility which conditions") cannot be realized realization of object us humans) transcendental objects conditions could alsoforbetherealized through It ismeans somethin intellectual intuition as noumena (seeentirely below).unrealized Cognition object. for Kant by means that the manifold of an intuition expressible - an intuition is anof speech-modes, immediate (Buchdahl 1989, 246). Accordingly, th presentation of an object - becomes determined by concepts. The most unknownThey to us are is not to anyfor shortc general concepts of objects are the categories. the due functions 'by definition', being a but it is unkown the realization of objects. Indeed transcendental presuppositions (determination, cognition). More ("epistemic conditions") quite generally are best understood as prec unknowable. It is an object considered conditions for the realization of objects. A transcendental object·is an as 'form' are the For Kant 'matter' entirely unrealized object. It is something=x "meaning that and it is not as yet reflection. "That in theexperiential". appearance whic expressible by means of speech-modes, not being anything (Buchdahl 1989, 246). Accordingly, the reason why it ~s completely unknown to us is not due to any shortcoming of our mode of cognition but it is unkown 'by definition', being an object prior to any realization (determination, cognition). More precisely, it is not unknown but unknowable. It is an object considered as the ground of any cognition. For Kant 'matter' and 'form' are the two concepts which underlie all reflection. "That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term 3. Realization

element in the object which subsists prior state of reduction. It denotes the fact tha 161 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC e.g., red rather than green; hard rather its matter." (A20/B34) But Kant manife also st says that i.e. that'appear in objects as 233) itself, ,.n (ibid appearances which corresponds to sensations is the transcendental matter predetermines that some particular feature of all objects as things in themselves. (A143/B182) [Sachheit, Realitat] it does is determined by the sensibi lity. As Buchdahl observes 'things inKant's themselves' refers to . Ob idealism ishere formal idealism transcendental objects. (Buchdahl 1989, '''Sachheit' refers to that 'subsis232) t') prior to any realization as transce element in the object which subsistsrealizat prior to stillns in isthean app ionrealization, via sensiblwhen e intuitio that under realization something, state of reduction. It denotes the fact an appeara nce. However, an appearance is e.g., red rather than green; hard empiric rather than soft,n"etc., will4)come al intuitio (A20/3 and ~otofar on manifest itself, i.e. 'appear,.n (ibid 233) Thus transcendental matter detennined by the sensible but not the intel although how predetermines that some particular feature cognitiomanifests n proper itself, - an object of experi it does is determined by the sensibility. phenomenon - the realization process has Kant's idealism is fonnal idealism. Objects (or perhaps better,them t an appeara nceexist by concep ts; among The of (G) a 'subsist') prior to any realization assotranscendental objects. far as they are though t asresult objects realization via sensible intuitions iscategor an appearance. That is, an object as ies, are called phenomena". ( an appearance. However, an appearance the "undetennined object of n i undeterismined object of empiric al intuitio empirical intuition" (A20/34) and ~o onlyused the in first step of realization; It far is also a wider sense as synonymo detennined by the sensible but not theIn intellectual To become summary,conditions. the main line of our schem experience, viz.,phenom an object as a of cognition proper - an object ofbracket ing out the enal aspects phenomenon - the realization process has to completed by detennining objects generatim (Tg). These objects an appearance by concepts; amongtransce themndental the categories. objects "Appearances, (To). Transcenden so far as they are thought as objects(G) according to the unityofofthe theforms appearances (Ta) by means categories, are called phenomena". (A248) Appearence as ofanthe ca determined phenom ena by means strictena sense of this term. back undetermined object of empirical intuition Coming is to the phenom means coming It is also used in a wider sense as synonymous with 'phenomenon'. to sensory objects . Thus by 'phenomena' In summary, the main line of our schemeobjects until now is as follows: sensory except that the Bypoint transceof sensory objects (Tw) we get bracketing out the phenomenal aspects ndental reflection; we started with the Kant's project objects generatim (Tg). These objects are reduced further does not start withtocognit objective. (1 doobjects transcendental objects (To). Transcendental are how realized to not know one could pr is possibl fOnTISe.)ofItintuition wholly appearances (Ta) by means of the goes the and othertoway round. H of theon categories and other determined phenomena by means cogniti which have objecticoncepts. ve reference. Coming to phenomena means coming back to the starting point, that is, to sensory objects. Thus by 'phenomena' we mean exactly the same sensory objects except that the point of view is now that of transcendental reflection; we started with the empirical one. Kant's project does not start with cognition and prove that it can be objective. (I do not know how one could prove that objective cognition is possible.) It goes the other way round. He considers the conditions of cognition which have objective reference. The inspection starts with

aim to prove that cognition is objective merely wh employed, although that is implied by its results · 162 CHAPTER 5 cognition is not at stake but the objective validity cogn e objecti that becaus to show ng aims reasoniviz. philosophically neutral objects, sensory objects, moves to theve ha ies categor the ed are employ ies same categor goes the back to the objects explaining process of cognition, and when validity different perspectives on them. The. Transcendental Deduction does not aim to prove that cognition is objective merely when the categories are 4. Noume employed, although that is implied by na its results. The objectivity of the mean out, The cognition is not at stake but theAsobjective validity of the categories. pointed been has already t; fonn) reasoning aims to show that concep because cognition is possible onlyand in tual elemen (the intellec ts objective alone is i when the categories are employed categories have therefore objective e of them . Anyon t; matter) elementhe the outse at which n validity. cognition. It is always intuitio (A19/B33) Because the mode of intuiting could b 4. Noumena Kant frequently refers to other possible lines of 'noumenon'are(Tn). In then called object realizedout, As has already been pointed theis means for realization via nonrealized object(O) (the an intuitions meansand (Tn+) it fonn) concepts (the intellectual element; sensible is intuitio tual intellec Kant n. (B307) of them alone For is incapable of yielding n element; matter). Anyone intuitio theocentric mo with the cognition. connec n and intuitio cognition. It is always intuition which at the outsetted'activates' have no r We human by Kant. rejectedcould model of intuiting be different froms ours, (A19/B33) Because the mode c this a counter making n thuslines intuitio Kant frequently refers to other possible of realization as well.factual A th is which (Tn-) -sense" sense" matic) ve (proble 'noumenon' (Tn). In this "positive realized object is then called"negati so far as "thing a means t. It concep a limitingvia - is realized (Tn+) it means an object(O) non-sensible (intellectual) (Tn+) i (B307) In atosense intuition". our sensibleintuition divine intuition. (B307) For Kant intellectual is tantamount denotes is thatof(Tn-) main pointmodel cognition, thean ind intuition and connected withbutthethetheocentric factually realize or counter atically problem model rejected by Kant. Weonly humans have no recourse to intellectual d object) at all, To (transce intuition thus making this realized a counterfactual case. ndental Noumenon in. (Tn-) a

. thought of(Tn-) is the main use of this telTIl "negative (problematic) sense" - which the underst to n additio - is a limiting concept. It means In a "thing so farthe as elemen it is nottsanfrom object(O) of and ot by line that along continu ion can realizat our sensible intuition". (B307) In a sense (Tn+) is ae subspecies of (Tn-)the role alrea their thus Kant, they have accordingantoindetenninate fact, denotes object, but the main point is that (Tn-) nt judgme ation, s likeorimagin mean the facultie only problematically or counterfactually realized perhaps not yet differe e butanquite possibl other are still thereobject). realized at all, To (transcendental (Tn-) denotes merely object s to amount Applying the principles of reason of thought. e "nature in the fonnal s for exampland In addition to the elements various from thekind, understanding the sensibility, ive princ that the regulat opinion Kant's as well. In realization can continue alongindeed that line by the other faculties fact, according to Kant, they have their role already at the object-level. I mean the faculties like imagination, judgment and reason. Moreover, there are still other possible but quite different lines of realization. Applying the principles of reason amounts to systematic unities of various kind, for example "nature in the fonnal sense" or a science. It is indeed Kant's opinion that the regulative principles of reason play an

above about noum transcendental objects (To) and noumena (Tn+) 163 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC different stages of realization; objects prior to an y realized.framework. Thus, althoug inevitable role in realizing partscounter of anyfactuall methodological h us literatu re, it category-mista of monumen That through practical reason noumena can is be"arealized is also ke Kant's with (BuchdisahI198 229) Theinconcept o doctrine. However, the significance of(Tn)". that doctrine totally9,bypassed compli cated because it is the perspectival notion this study. 'object of though 'transce ndenta l object', What has been said above about noumena t',makes clear that noumenon' or 'object tim', also the tra transcendental objects (To) and noumena (Tn+) denotegenera objects on but quite critical) notion of object. It can be made c different stages of realization; objects prior to any realization andhardly objects overall picture of transce ndental idealism counterfactually realized. Thus, although usual in the secondary . That m theofdoctrin e of differen tives(To) has to be ins monumental scalet perspec to confuse literature, it is "a category-mistake with (Tn)". (BuchdahI1989, 229) The concept of 'thing in itself' is more 5. Transc endent idealism denoting versus transce nd complicated because it is the perspectival notion paral ecxellence 'object of thought', 'transcendental object', negative Transce ndental'positive realism isor our every-day con noumenon' or 'object generatim',from but also the transcendental realist (pre-endental the empirical perspective. Transc critical) notion of object. It can hardly be made the n the making the clear very without distinctpainting ion betwee overall picture of transcendental transce idealism. That. means, the import of ndenta ndental That that is why a transce the doctrine of different perspectives hastly to be inspected more closely. coheren describe transcendental idealism wit loosing his own foothold. On the other hand, a 5. Transcendental idealism versus transcetranscendental ndental idealist realism cannot give up empirica transce ndental realist perspec on the every-da Transcendental realism is our every-day conception. It istive modelled of actual cogniti on is the empiric one. The d from the empirical perspective. Transcendental idealism follows al from transce ndental and empirical the empiricand al belong making the very distinction between the the s to the only. Now, paradox ically, the aim of the transcendental. That is why a transcendental realist cannot even critique reason for distingu ishing the same transce ndental fro coherently describe transcendental idealism without at the time argue that the only possibl e cognitive framew ork loosing his own foothold. On the other hand, and most importantly, a one. For us the objects of experie nce are the on transcendental idealist cannot give up empirical realism, that is, the cognitio n. Accord ingly, be framework a transcendental id The transcendental realist perspective on the every-day level. to only actual cogniti ve framew ork is the of actual cognition is the empirical one. The difference between theone mod transce ndental realist framew ork. When em of cognition transcendental and the empirical belongs to the critique conside red from the empiric al perspec only. Now, paradoxically, the aim of the critique and by implication, thetive, Kan traditio nal realism the empirical, model of it. reason for distinguishing the transcendental fromasthe is Less to misle Kant this standpo int should be "empirical re argue that the only possible cognitive framework for us is thecalled empirical one. For us the objects of experience are the only possible objects of cognition. Accordingly, to be a transcendental idealist implies that the only actual cognitive framework is the one modelled according to the transcendental realist framework. When empirical cognition is considered from the empirical perspective, Kant totally accepted the traditional realism as the model of it. Less misleadingly, and following Kant this standpoint should be called "empirical realism".

conditions of objective cognition are examined. about cognition (experience) not within cognit · 164 CHAPTER 5 realist takes the relation between an object and co experience, that is, as relation betwe The reference of cognitionrealm to its of objects does not imply anya difference (object in itself) Then, and why a subjective between the transcendental and the empirical. the need ofcognition the thattoantake empirical o transcendental? To give an Copernican account ofrevolution cognition means one has an In (thing) in itselfreflection), but also afrom merewhich appearance. external point of view (transcendental the transcendental realists has to think mistakeareofexamined. conditions of objective cognition An account to be that w as they are in themselves empirical objects about cognition (experience) not within cognition. A transcendental (in of them.ofWe have no contrast to cognition realist takes the relation between an object and cognition it within the other realm of experience, that is,the as cognitive a relationone. between an empirical object According to the empirical (transcendental (object in itself) and a subjective cognition (appearance). Kant's real it isthat in itself - that is the absolute of 'in itse Copernican revolution means an empirical object is notsense an object In other it isofathese (thing) in itself but also a object mere are appearance. independent of anywords, cognition own presentations A have well known image mistake of transcendental realists to think thatonweus.can access to problem is presented form ofsense) an example. W empirical objects as they are in then1selves (in inanthe absolute in is to explain how knowledge TheWe problem contrast to cognition of them. have no other access to our objects than (su correspond to the tree. From the Kantian persp the cognitive one. totally inappropriate. Transcendental realism realist) model an object as is p According to the empirical (transcendental putting the of example. By (the assuming the existence o it is in itself - that is the absolute sense 'in itself' properties of an answer to the epistemological problem is alre object are independent of any cognition of these properties) - forces its is putimage as an empirical question; which as of the epistemological own presentations on us. Aquestion well known but irrelevant to our We philosophical approach. of an example. see a tree out there. It is problem is presented in the form cognition of the tree for granted and, at the sam our knowledge (subjective presentations) The problem is to explain how of cognition which Kant is question. The process the Kantian perspective the example is correspond to the tree. From totally inappropriate. Transcendental realism is presupposed already by the same empirical process; there are no other p the tree the tree, putting the example. By assuming existence of the tree asindependent startingthepoint an epistemically pointproblem inside that process. For us there is very already presupposed. The are n answer to the epistemological epistemically independent points. After ta question; which as such starting is quite legitimate question is put as an empirical tum objects have Itto isconform to our forms but irrelevant to our philosophical approach. deceptive to take the of pr the traditional distinction between things in them cognition of the tree for granted and, at the same time, to put it into appearances he isdraws it at a isdeeper question. The process of cognition whichbut Kant considering exactlylevel, cendentallevel. The starting point is no the same empirical process; there are no other processes. Taking longer as a a tr is the groun called a transcendental - which to take the starting starting point an epistemically independent tree, isobject point inside that very process. For us there are no descriptions of such epistemically independent starting points. After taking the transcendental tum objects have to conform to our forms of presentation. Kant draws the traditional distinction between things in themselves (res per se) and appearances but he draws it at a deeper level, viz., at the new transcendentallevel. The starting point is no longer a tree but that something called a transcendental object - which is the ground of it.

manner they are presented .. have no indepe thoughts" (A369, A490/B518) Most impo 165 no OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC of experience have simply that objects with a restriction: "in the manner they are pr There are few explicit references to 'transcendental idealism'. "I mean a doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being .. presentations 6. Thing in itself only, not things in themselves", or "all objects of experience possible to the coming intoinbeing us are nothing but appearances, thatTo is, understand mere presentations, which, the o important clue is the transfonnation no independent existence outside of ourthe u manner they are presented .. have itself' (Ts) from the Kant pre-critical critica thoughts" (A369, A490/B518) Most importantly, does to notthesay more as a conjecture on a side-line while simply that objects of experience have no independent existence, but here. The main concern to expli with a restriction: "in the mannerargument they are presented". (Allison 1983,is 27) itself' in its various employments. No doubt Kant was convinced that he was 6. Thing in itself insight of transcendental idealism. He kept a To understand the coming into being of the critical philosophy an of transcendental realism, that is, taking th important clue is the transfonnation of the use of the concept of 'thing in themselves. This, I think, is indeed the k itself' (Ts) from the pre-critical to the critical one. That will be presented transcendental realist considers objects with more as a conjecture on a side-line while there is not much room for Certainly contingent and subjective factors argument here. The main concern is to explicate the concept of 'thing in object appears to us, as in the trite example itself' in its various employments. Cleaning away the effect of such factors No doubt Kant was convinced that he was the first to reach the correct themselves. Now, Kant explicitly says th insight of transcendental idealism. He kept accusing all his predecessors distinction between thing in itself and appe of transcendental realism, that is, taking the outer objects as things in distinction. (A45/B62) What this all amou themselves. This, I think, is indeed the key to Kant's reasoning. A realists examine, not the conditions of transcendental realist considers objects within the realm of experience. cognition) but cognition within experience. Certainly contingent and subjective factors play their role in how an In other words, Kant accused, say, Le object appears to us, as in the trite example of wearing coloured classes. properly between noumena and phenomen Cleaning away the effect of such factors we get the outer objects in Kant knew well that Leibniz made that disti themselves. Now, Kant explicitly says that his own transcendental that he now understood the distinction diffe distinction between thing in itself and appearance is not that empirical failed to understand it in the Kantian way.2 distinction. (A45/B62) What this all amounts to is that transcendental of Kant's own predecessors. For exampl realists examine, not the conditions of experience (as empirical cognition) but cognition within experience. 2 These matters are discussed in an appendix to th In other words, Kant accused, say,amphiboly Leibnizofofreflective not distinguishing "Of the concepts due to co transcendental use of the understanding". properly between noumena and phenomena. That is a strange claim; Kant knew well that Leibniz made that distinction. What this suggests is that he now understood the distinction differently, and that Leibniz had failed to understand it in the Kantian way.2 The pre-critical Kant is one of Kant's own predecessors. For example, in the Dissertation the 2 These matters are discussed in an appendix to the Transcendental Analytic titled: "Of the amphiboly of reflective concepts due to confusion of the empirical with the transcendental use of the understanding".

themselves, which means that things in th as noumena (intelligible entities, [Verstand CHAPTER 5 166 the step to transcendental idealism is not so distinction between things in themselves and inasthemselves they appear between things and isappea prominent. However, in contrast toAccordingly, the critical Kant he maintained there Kan the difference between to isthings in diffe that the pure concepts of the understanding CPR is thataretheapplicable distinction drawn understoodhas be themselves, which means that things themselves mustinbe veryinnotion of 'things themselves' as noumena (intelligible entities, [VerstandeswesenJ). This of the e We must separate twoindicates senses that is notofsowhich muchpresuppose to draw thethat distinction the step to transcendental idealism both a thing in it between things in themselves andown, appearances but has howanitessence is drawn. that is, a thing of its ow Accordingly, the difference between Kant of the (or Dissertation and ofhow 1) The absolute positive) sense: CPR is that the distinction is drawn differently. That implies that the wh unconditionally), referring to properties very notion of 'things in themselves' been used differently. of has anything outer, that is, because of its the expression 'in (per se), on We must separate two senses of locution and sense isitself' the traditional both of which presuppose that a thing in its~lfDistinguishing has some properties invention. a thing of in its itself f of the its own: own, that is, a thing has an essence in empirical level is the paradigm exa 1) The absolute (or positive) sense: how a thing realists is absolutely (wholly Transcendental take outer objects unconditionally), referring to properties which belong it independently the absolute sense.to Clearly this is also of anything outer, that is, because of its inner essence orthesuch. This from separeting ontologically sensible locution and sense is the traditional one and Kant's rationalists, whoby didno notmeans make the transcen invention. Distinguishing a thing inintellect itself from its accidental appearance and the sensibility, took it for g use. (A45/B62) in the empirical level is the paradigm accessexample to thingsofinthis themselves. This sense Transcendental realists take outer second objects sense to be because things initthemselves in also presupposes is also the sense connected with the absolute sense. Clearly this themselves. separeting ontologically the sensible from the intelligible world.sense: The a th 2) The considerata (or negative) rationalists, who did not make the transcendental distinction between the Thi of the conditions of (human) cognition. intellect and the sensibility, tookThe it for grantedbetween that the1)intellect has no and 2) might difference is also partly access to things in themselves. Thissome sense considerata are embedded embedded in in the the firs second sense because it also presupposes thatstressed. things Following are somehow in aspects are Meerbote themselves. could be made by talking about the ontol 2) The considerata (or negative) sense: use. a thing considered independently is the criticalthe Kantian sense. of the conditions of (human) cognition. In This the Dissertation absolute sense not seem very obvious because The difference between 1) and 2) might the pure concepts apply to the propertie the first sense as why well.they Still,should different some considerata are embedded incritical tum to ask so appl aspects are stressed. Following Meerbote (1972a) sense the same distinction that the absolute becomes cognitively could be made by talking about the ontological versus epistemological use. In the Dissertation the absolute sense dominates. Kant thought that the pure concepts apply to the properties of things. It is exactly his critical tum to ask why they should so apply. (PC 71) His answer implies that the absolute sense becomes cognitively useless or even inconsistent.

intuition. (A239/B298) A conce existence. The OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC Leibniz-type167of r because it yields merely logical poss Without intuition, that is, with reason alone, we lities. cannot realize an object possibi in the absolute sense, in fact, we cannot realize it atingly, all. Concepts can be Accord and most import applied only to the manifold of intuition and in no g: other'object way.' do additional meanin Consequently, no cognition of the real transce is possible empirical ndentalwithout (or epistem ic) conditi intuition. (A239/B298) A concept without cannot to Kant intuition the absolute sense yield is an ind existence. The Leibniz-type of rationalistic realization is of deceptive view, viz., an object a metaphys because it yields merely logical possibilities andndental cannot go furtherouter to realobjec transce realist possibilities. independently of cognition, that is, Accordingly, and most importantly,absolut the eabsolute sense hasically an dif sense and ontolog additional meaning: 'object' does of notthe require the(or notion properties qualities)of of a transcendental (or epistemic) condition atthus all. (BuchdahI1980, 16) The Thus, prim dependent on us. of a misguided to Kant the absolute sense is an indication cognitio n. They arephilosophical "given", that is, r view, viz., an object of a metaphysical on typeitofby realization (Tm).Howev For aer, the object. transcendental realist outer objects have properties of their owndly n presentations. As Kant repeate independently of cognition, that is, theywho are at things in themselves in the ive the same time is a subject absolute sense and ontologically different from their appearances. Someon ap must be impossible. But cogniti of the properties (or qualities) of appearances only ee andthat t because are theresecondary is no guarant of ide thus dependent on us. The primary themse qualities are independent lves. For a transcendental cognition. They are "given", that is, received bylves. the passive forced themse Whatevmind, er propert ies are on it by the object. However, the us. mind has all access to In a way propertmerely ies are merely presentations. As Kant repeatedly notes, It forcould, a transcendental realist of course, be objecte-d tha who at the same time is a subjective idealist a priori about- objective epistemiccognition conditions as well. T must be impossible. But cognition aposteriori becomes also problematic not make one into an idealist. It all because there is no guarantee that the underst absolute things correctly reveal ood, that is, where the distinc themselves. For a transcendental idealist outer objects are not things transcendental realist the conditiinon is to and themcogniti are dependent themselves. Whatever properties are ascribed in itself) on of it, on for Ka us. In a way all properties are merely secondary. (Pr a289) object, viz., transcendental object ( It could, of course, be objected that aouter transcendental realist mightI mean talk by object. That is what about epistemic conditions as well. Thedistinct use ofion thisbut notion such one does step at aaslevel not make one into an idealist. It all depends how conditions are introduon cing thethe notion 'transce ndent understood, that is, where the distinction is been supposed to nned be drawn. For a ica also transfo from pre-crit transcendental realist the condition is between an outer object (as a thing in itself) and cognition of it, for Kant between the ground of an outer object, viz., a transcendental object (an object prior to cognition) and an outer object. That is what I mean by saying that Kant draws the same distinction but at a level one step deeper. To do that presupposes introducing the notion 'transcendental'. Now 'thing in itself' (Ts) has also been transfotmed from pre-critical (Tm) to the critical sense to mean

make the 'thing in itself' into an umbrella term. Kant the absolute sense of 'thing in itself' (Tm CHAPTER 5 168 misguided philosophical view. That sense is frequ rather a transcendental object, (To) the thatpossibility is, a ground of cognition. (cp. describe - that of metaphysical r Allison 1983, 243) rebuts. In the critical sense things in themsel itself' 'thing' or 'object' It is clear that the different senses of as 'in they are and in themselves, viz., indep considered make the 'thing in itself' into an umbrella term. Assomething was just said, for conditions. Considering independen 'thing in itself' (T ) is a symptom of Kant the absolute sense of various alternatives. m As an umbrella terma 'th misguided philosophical view. That sensea istenn frequently used by Kant to unequivocally in our reduction-realiz~tion s of metaphysical realization which he describe the possibility - that several alternative terms. in themselves are objects rebuts. In the critical sense1)things Noumenon (Tn+): The (Ts) expression denotes a considered as they are in themselves, viz., independently epistemic Kantian transcendental structure.of An object is conditions. Considering something independently leaves room human but intellectual intuition. That sensefor is equa various alternatives. As an umbrella in itself' not positive sense.term It is 'thing presupposed that is intellectual unequivocally a tenn in ourthing reduction-realiz~tion scheme, but can denote with the properties of its own. Consequently, several alternative terms. realized through an intellectual intuition, the absolu 1) Noumenon (Tn +): TheBut expression stagealways in the - ex it must bedenotes stresseda particular that this sense Kantian transcendental structure. object is realized through practical An reason - refers merely tonot a counterfactua human but intellectual intuition. is equal to 'noumenon' the to clear That that sense because we humans have noinaccess positive sense. It is presupposed that intellectual intuition can catch a this sense (Tn+) is not the one used in explaining its own. Consequently, considering a thing as is ex thing with the properties of themselves in the process of cognition. That realized through an intellectual intuition, the absolute sense is embedded. equating 'thing in itself' with (Tn+) is so fatally mi But it must be stressed that this sense always - except in the domain as a doctrine yielding a priori of synthet Ontology practical reason - refers merely to a counterfactual case. It must also be of is totally replaced by the doctrine (Analytic) clear that because we humans have no access to intellectual intuition, cognition of things. (A247/B303) This transfonnat one used in conditions explaining of thetherole of things this sense (Tn+) is not the things to the cognition of in things themselves in the process of cognition. That exactly commentators) by is saying thatthethereason very why concept equating 'thing in itself' with (Tn+) isIso fatally However, think that,misleading. although correct in a way, th of thingsof thin Ontology as a doctrine yielding a priori synthetic cognition still inspects the conditions of the possibility of the conditions of but the the is totally replaced by the doctrine (Analytic) the conditions of the existence of things, Thisof transformation from conditions cognition of things. (A247/B303) something becoming a thing toofus. possibility things to the conditions of the2)cognition of things often expressed in the(by negativ Noumenon (Tn -):.isNoumenon commentators) by saying that concept ofinobject is changed. thingthe butvery not necessarily an absolute sense. It do in ancorrect absolute problematically, However, I think that, although in asense way,but thatonly is misleading. Kant pos (non-human) intuition. However, of the possibility of things. They do not meanit can still inspects the conditions alternative the conditions of the existence of things, but the conditions of the real possibility of something becoming a thing to us. 2) Noumenon (Tn -): Noumenon in the negative sense is a realized thing but not necessarily in an absolute sense. It does not catch the thing in an absolute sense but only problematically, possibly also through an alternative (non-human) intuition. However, it can be thought that (Tn-)

perspective or a description of the same sensory object. It is less clear in what cases K senses 2) and 3). LOGIC 169 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL 4) Transcendental object (To): 'Thin also includes totally unrealizedmisleadingly objects with zero-ontology, that is obje - refers to 'transcendental transcendental objects. is certainly a thing considered without epist 3) Object generatim (Tg): Kant Theobviously considerata-view implies that thought that things in thems paradigmaticallya thing considered that is, howtoit talk theirnegatively, own. It would notmerely make as sense is independently of our epistemic conditions, an not object of mere themselves if theyiswere somehow in:them is a pri thought. Thus it does not imply transcendental any alternativeobjects, intuition at all but which are objects perspective or a description ofhaving the same object which appears as a a constitution must have been realize sensory object. It is less clear in what have equated the (To misleading to denote reasoncases whyKant it ismight senses 2) and 3). A538/B566 where 'transcendental obje 4) Transcendental object (To): 'Thing from in itself' somewhat distinguished 'thing in- itself'.) Howev misleadingly - refers to 'transcendental object'. A transcendental object some rewritten passages in the B-edition of C is certainly a thing considered without epistemic to (To) by replacingconditions. them with However, 'thing in itself Kant obviously thought that things The in themselves have a constitution of thesis that there was a transformation their own. It would not make sense to talk about things as they are critical use of the notion of thing ininitself themselves if they were not somehow themselves. Thus, sayingin,that the old use of (Tinmcontrast ) and 1) to has gi prior to any realization, things transcendental objects, which areand objects 4). Whether that is really so can only be having a constitution must have Presently, been realized in some is the I refer to theway. fact That that in the B-e denote (To)in bythe'thing in itself'. (cp reason why it is misleading to'noumenon negative sense' (Tn -) as a ground is Th A538/B566 where 'transcendental object(G), of 'noumenon'. (B307ff) employment distinguished from 'thing in itself'.) However, is well known thatthe in sens implies that the itdistinction between of CPR omitted references some rewritten passages in the B-edition transfonned intoKant the distinction between the in itself' or with (Tn-). to (To) by replacing them with 'thing Indeed in the A-edition that distinction was The thesis that there was a transformation from the(A249) pre-critical to thein the tenn but the passage is omitted critical use of the notion of thing in itself can now be expressed by saying that the old use of (Tm ) and 1) has given way to the senses 2), 3) and 4). Whether that is really so can only be settled by textual evidence. Presently, I refer to the fact that in the B-edition Kant first introduced 'noumenon in the negative sense' (Tn -) and heavily stressed this employment of 'noumenon'. (B307ff) The transcendental turn also implies that tIle distinction between the sensory and intelligible world is transformed into the distinction between the two different perspectives. Indeed in the A-edition that distinction was still used as an explanatory term but the passage (A249) is omitted in the B-edition.

(TI)= Logical object (general logic) )= Transcendental object (transcendental (ToCHAPTERS realization, zero ontology, something=x 7. Object terms (Ta)= Object as it appears, the undetermined obje To summarize the different objectenon= terms Comple distinguished above are: object, an ap tely realized Phenom (Tw)= Sensory object in an everyday sense, ontology unappraised concepts (Tg)= Object generatim, indeterminate ontology (Tn)= Noumenon, intelligible entity (Tl)= Logical object (general logic) (Tn+)= Noumenon, in a positive sense, realized v (To)= Transcendental object (transcendentalin logic), prior to any (Tn-)= Noumenon, a negative sense, a limitin realization, zero ontology, something=x as it is not an object(O) of our sensible intuition (Ta)= Object as it appears, the undeterminedasobject of empirical intuition cursiv t of a non-dis a produc (Tm)= Object Phenomenon= Completely realized object, anthrough appearance detennined by mere non-discursive un realization, viz., concepts (Ts)= thing in itself, an umbrella tenn, can de (Tn)= Noumenon, intelligible entity (To) or (Tm ) (Tn+)= Noumenon, in a positive sense, realized via intellectual intuition (Tn-)= Noumenon, in a negative sense, a nt limiting thingdiffere so farnt w ctives oratwo perspeconcept, 8. Differe as it is not an object(O) of our sensible intuition t to the perspectival approach favou non-discursive, metaphysical type of (Tm)= Object as a product of Ina contras philosophers insist that the so called realization, viz., through meresome non-discursive understanding interpretation is what Kant really meant. It is (Ts)= thing in itself, an umbrella term, can denote (Tg), (Tn+), (Tn-), sensible objects, which are merely objects as the (To) or (Tm ) supersensible or noumenal reality. Moreover, th are totally unknow n to us althoug 8. Different perspectives themse or two lves different worlds? causes of appearances. There is an unsurmou In contrast to the perspectival approach favoured in the present study, world of the sense and the world of the i some philosophers insist that the so called two different worldsNeedless to say, I think that the two worlds view thought that behind the interpretation is what Kant really meant. It is an explanation of the cognitive process. H sensible objects, which are merely objects as they seem to be to us, is the account plays some role but only in po supersensible or noumenal reality. Moreover, these things as they are in possibilities. themselves are totally unknown to us although they somehow are the I hope it has become sufficiently clear that causes of appearances. There is an ible unsurmountable between the (T in itself and thing object) (Tn+) gap (intellig world of the sense and the world of the intellect (understanding). all. The former goes with the two worlds interp is totally wrongtives used interp in Needless to say, I think that the two worlds viewthe two perspec eristic for charact However, the two worlds an explanation of the cognitive process. erronously - the perspectival notions 'thing in account plays some role but only in pointing to some logical possibilities. I hope it has become sufficiently clear that the notions of noumenon (intelligible object) (Tn+) and thing in itself (Ts) are not synonymous at all. The former goes with the two worlds interpretation while the later is characteristic for the two perspectives interpretation. Indeed taking erronously - the perspectival notions 'thing in itself' or 'transcendental

· 170

one. That is also the sense whic 171 of transformation the emphasis CPR is quite diffe object' to mean 'noumenon', invites to reading Kant asinreferring to two It must be stressed that the worlds. But clearly the positive sense of noumenon (Tn+) and the pre-crit (Tn -). Theasambiguitie one, thatbeisunderstood must refercritical sense of (Ts), that is (Tm), can and as Allison 246) an Indeed,That ring to the separate world of intellibigle objects. is how (1983, Kant writes -) is not a proper noumen (T n world from the sensible in the Dissertation. He separates the intelligible Buchdahl's terms it isHowever, only probl one. That is also the sense which is sometimes left in CPR. is an distinction: (Tn+) sense, o pecause of the transfoffi1ation of (Ts) to its critical, perspectival object intellectual intuition, while (Tn-) the emphasis in CPR is quite different. in a quite different sense, viz., an noumenon is the negative It must be stressed that the critical sense of very same object appea one, that is (Tn -). The ambiguities of (Tnthe -) have already beenwhich noticed. point241) to another world,out, wher Indeed, as Allison (1983, 246) and Steniusnot (1963, have pointed object considered from a differen (Tn -) is not a proper noumenon (intelligible entity) at all. Using an realized. object which does anot Buchdahl's terms it is only problematically Or to make newapp individuated as a sensory of distinction: (Tn +) is an object of thought in the sense of an objectobject understanding, whereas (Tn+) intellectual intuition, while (Tn-) or thing in itself is an object of thought intellectual intuition. Usingon'th or reflective perspective in a quite different sense, viz., an 'imagined' explaining the process cogn the very same object which appears as a sensory object. Thus (Tn-)of does intuition no reference not point to another world, whereas (Tn+) could isbemade; the same sensory to as thought in a different objects object considered from a different pespective but, most importantly, also p put it briefly, two-world an object which does not appear to usTohumans at all.the(Tn-) is play any role at all in explaining individuated as a sensory object and abstracted from it with the mere taken and over isby individuated (Tn -) and (To). understanding, whereas (Tn+) presupposes by It (Tn+) asas logically intellectual intuition. Using 'thing considered it is in possible. itself' inTh domain of logically possible explaining the process of cognition no reference to an intellectualob which canbut appear to the us. same (PC 10 intuition is made; no reference to noumena either, merely quite unrelated to our sensibility objects as thought in a different perspective. does not in any way con of (Tcase To put it briefly, the two-worlds sense this s), that is, (Tn +) does not explaining cognition. Thus, play any role at all in explaining the process of cognition. That role Iisthi to reconcile theKant two takes perspe taken over by (Tn -) and (To). It is quite how another matter that Although Kant maintains that (Tn+) as logically possible. The sensory objects do not exhaust thetrad cognitive endeavour could they are the he only onesnot domain of logically possible objects, although OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL of the )Jecause LOGIC

which can appear to us. (PC 107) There could be intelligible entities quite unrelated to our sensibility. (B309) Using the two worlds view in this case does not in any way conflict with using the perspectival view in explaining cognition. Thus, I think that there is no problem left about how to reconcile the two perspectives view with the two worlds view. Although Kant maintains that traditional metaphysics is not possible as a cognitive endeavour he could not reject the traditional questions. In fact,

carelessly mixes the term CHAPTER 5 nt. Saying tha transcendental mode in a same stateme This should d example. as nce is a goo he still regards the questions ofeara transcendent metaphysics most mere app ct (an empirical important ones. more exact idiom as "an outer obje e appearan a mer view, is t ofworlds pointwo scendentalwith perspectives that Kant A source of confusing two the tran )". Certainly s of propertie carelessly mixes the termshav ofing the the empirical mode and its the own terms of the to use th has idealismthatisanhe dental Saying transcen transcendental mode in a same statement. outer object is a . should be translated into a ultaneously simexample. mere appearance is a good This e detail for the e in mor to argu re is no The object (anroom empirical object) is, seen from more exact idiom as "an outer reduction-realiza the not stages in(and cts as tian aobje Kan the transcendental point of view, mere appearance a thing s. 3 However, a pective erent persto from diff view explain what having the properties of itsed own)". Certainly what is said a it toperspectives to app is tototryuse me has the lytwo transcendental idealism is schehe Transcendental Deduction. simultaneously. There is no room to argue in more detail for the interpretation of the pro ble m of 'aff ec en or con stitu ted; the Givreduction-realization process and as Kantian objects as stages in 9.the ted? It stitu conof n ortest giveof viewed from different perspectives. However, this tian objeactskind Are the3Kan too cer be the never in shouldobjects one abouts it dtoadv what is said scheme is to try to applygoo ice that Transcendental Deduction. interpretational matters. However, I cannot help t rather clear a scheme and the ideas underlying it, thetheproblem ofated 'affection' 9. Given or constituted; to questions whether the Kantia much deb given or aff cts are obje what kind constitu Are the Kantian objects given or ted, constituted? It of is of course a piece of many age-old of sche n type hliatoo hdabe the Buc certain in me any of these good advice that one should never no problem a m that do not settled. I (I interpretational matters. However, cannot help clai thinking that using our question-m lemstoand has probare me answers n sche Buchda scheme and the ideas underlying it,hlia rather clear be found s rather to th ns lead e questio answer to the much debated questions To whether thethes Kantian objects are given or ing for granted th ers. than to ns given questio are or answ affect ourTak mind etc. With constituted, what kind of objects whether the Kan questioncan er to thedisputes answ view, the the Buchdahlian type of scheme many age-old really be both. It depend is simply: constitu settled. (I do not claim that noted, problem are they left. are Certainly the stion like that. If "t put a general que justquestion-marks cannotand Buchdahlian scheme has problems of its own.) the point of view of t n obje n to mea take To answer these questions leads rather to cts the from dissolution of many questions than to answers. Taking reduction-realizationpretation can be presented a inter t's (1986a)the quisgranted 3 Palmfor consists of six perspective me sche the ly, Kantian very briefthe put itwhether view, the answer to the question objects given in an e elatesor corr theare with of transcendental object-terms pectives empirical pers : perspective. pectiveson are cend both. depends You constituted, is simply: they trans entaItl pers lB. The positive noume thing in itsel f 1A. The cannot just put a general question like that. If "the Kantian objects" arenoume negative The 2B. ct obje l 2A. The transcendenta non ome phen The 3B. arance appe The of taken to mean objects from the view of transcendental reflection 3A.point

· 172

3 Palmquist's (1986a) interpretation can be presented as a perspectival scheme. To put it very briefly, the scheme consists of six perspectives on 'object'. There is a set of transcendental object-terms with the correlates in an empirical set: transcendental perspectives: empirical perspectives: lA. The thing in itself lB. The positive noumenon 2A. The transcendental object 2B. The negative noumenon 3A. The appearance 3B. The phenomenon

it correct to say that the outer objects are constituted Which objects affect us? There is but one wo tenns belong merely LOGIC to the critique of reason (t 173 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL transcendental reflection). Objects are given to us b (here: the reduction-realization-process), it isare still better, because what and how they - isno constituted by us. The o realization are dealt with. The only proper objects on various stages ofare the sensory objects, ordinary empirical objects sense of the question must be: taking the transcendental point of view, is cognitive objects to us. That's it. (The same answ it correct to say that the outer objects are constituted? affection is suggested, with some variations, e.g. b Which objects affect us? There is but one world. Different objectand Prauss.) tenns belong merely to the critique of reason (the point of view of If that is all, what is the source of all these probl transcendental reflection). Objects are given to us but cognition of them seems to be more difficult to explain how the tr what and how they are - is constituted by us. The objects which affect us answer them. No doubt, the one who implanted thi are the sensory objects, ordinary empirical objects. There are no other system by saying that the outer objects are mere a cognitive objects to us. That's it. (The same answer to the of in a himself. He certainly reified his problem descriptions affection is suggested, with some variations, e.g. by Allison, Buchdahl way. But again, there is but one world. Most types o and Prauss.) (except those in the two worlds sense) do not exi If that is all, what is the source of all these problems and dilemmas? It actual role whatsoever~ That is because by def seems to be more difficult different to explain howoftheobjects troubles than toobjects kinds butbegin the same answer them. No doubt, the perspectives, one who implanted virus' into the a d that this is, 'data considered under system by saying that the outer objects are object' mere appearances was Kant 'Transcendental (To) and 'thing in itself' ( himself. He certainly reifiedallhis descriptions in a seriously misleading positive ontological sense. Consequently, they a way. But again, there is but but one descriptions. world. Most types of theofKantian We could, course,objects say that "a t (except those in the two worlds sense) do not exist, affect or play affects a man", but that is as awkward to any say as "a actual role whatsoever$ That is because by definition they are not exist a eats a tomato". 'A tomato in itself' does not buta philosopher', the same objects seen from and different different kinds of objects as whereas a tomato a man mig perspectives, that is, considered under a different description. not exist, affect, or eat tomatoes. 'Transcendental object' (To) and 'thing in itself' (except as (Tn +» lack 'Sensory object' is of course a description as w all positive ontological sense. Consequently, they are not proper objects realists we use it to refer to the very same objects but descriptions. We could, of course, say that "a tomato as it is in itself perspectives, denote different realizational stages affects a man", but that is asWe awkward man as a philosopher cannot to butsayuseas a"adescription. What Kant is s eats a tomato". 'A tomato inanalysis itself' does notprocess exist any than 'a(Buchdahl man of the of more experience. as a philosopher', whereas aprocesses tomato and a man do If ob take placemight than do. theDescriptions empirical ones. not exist, affect, or eat tomatoes. did not denote 'sensory objects' , how coul 'Sensory object' is of course a description as conceive well. Butour as argument? empirical transcendental realist, realists we use it to refer to the very same objects which, from different perspectives, denote different realizational stages of the same objects. We cannot but use a description. What Kant is saying is meant as an analysis of the process of experience. (Buchdahl 1989, 240) No other processes take place tllan the empirical ones. If objects which affect us did not denote 'sensory objects' , how could our opponent, a transcendental realist, conceive our argument?

what Kant meant. - As was stressed bef explanation of cognition within experience CHAPTER is not5 to be understood as viewed from 174 although it might seem that way. There a An apparently serious objection to the present reading goes likeare this. not se presentation, mind, etc, which It is totally uncontroversial that empirical objects affect other empirical descrip all view. These terms are used in objects like human beings. That kind of vulgar explanation cannot be meanings in different perspectives. Otherw what Kant meant. - As was stressed before, Kant is not looking for an of the message from different perspect explanation of cognition within experience. Accordingly, what Kanta says process of cognition requires pre-unde is not to be understood as viewed from the empirical perspective, must know what is supposed to be explai although it might seem that way. There are many terms, like intuition, other reality than the 'vulgar ' one, althoug presentation, mind, etc, which are not seen from any special point of to be within experience. view. These tenns are used in all descriptions and must preserve their The expression "objects which affect u meanings in different perspectives. Otherwise, one could not make sense which, from the empirical point of view of the message from different perspectives. An explanation of the wa objects. For us, there are no other process of cognition requires a pre-under.standing of the matter. One themselves than by starting with sensory o must know what is supposed to be explained. To start with, they thereare is no in them same objects but now as other reality than the 'vulgar' one, although the explanation is'things not meant themse in us whether we call them to be within experience. objects'. 'Appearance' is an abbreviation The expression "objects which affect us" refers to the sameation objects for 'thin 'thing in itself' is an abbrevi which, from the empirical point of view, are described as a sensory per are ions Acccordingly, both express objects. For us, there are no other ways to individualize things in it c separately existing items. That makes themselves than by starting with sensory objects and referring to the very thin point when he says that the denial of same objects but now as they are in themselves. The same things affect be the "absurd conclusion that there can us whether we call them 'things in themselves', 'appearance' or 'sensoryappea that appears". (Bxxvii) That which objects'. 'Appearance' is an abbreviation for 'thing as it appears', while the 'transcendental object'. In most of 'thing in itself' is an abbreviation for 'thing as it is (considered) in itself' . in t think that Kant is saying that things Acccordingly, both expressions are perspectival and do not denote says that transcendental objects do. (cp. separately existing items. That makes it clear that Kant makes a logical for granted the logical point, there is no point when he says that the denial of things in themselves would lead to transcendental objects appear. It is worth the "absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything object denotes an object having a determ that appears". (Bxxvii) That which appears is called in its ultimate stage null, whereas thing in itself is a mere 'transcendental object'. In most of the passages where commentators indeterminate ontological value. think that Kant is saying that things in themselves affect us,passage he in sfact where K There are plenty of says that transcendental objects do. (cp. Allison 1983, 247n15) Taking n. ( intuitio in us that objects are given to for granted the logical point, there is nothing mysterous in saying that transcendental objects appear. It is worth reminding that transcendental object denotes an object having a determinate ontological value, namely null, whereas thing in itself is a mere description and has only an indeterminate ontological value. ll1ere are plenty of passages where Kant quite unequivocally states that objects are given to us in intuition. (E.g.: B29, A19/B33, A50/B74,

it affects the mind in a certain way". an ordinar y sensory object175it is a OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC Another well known passage is: "H A51/B75, A62/B87, A92/B125, A93/B126, A719/B747.) To take an irrespective of the presentations throu example: "An intuition is such a presentation as would immediately outside our sphere of cognition." (A19 depend upon the presence of the object." (Pr282) It is impossible to Kant to say that things in themselves ignore these passages, although many commentators tend to do so. A obvious. "How things, irrespective o much-debated passage is: "Intuition takes place only in so far as the they affect us, may be in themselv object(G) is given to us, which requires, with human beings at least, that presumably correct reading. Kant put it affects the mind in a certain way". (A19/B33) If one reads 'object' as sensible intuition is not 'original'; it d an ordinary sensory object it is a totally unproblematic statement. the object. Intuition is dependent upon Another well known passage is: "How things may be in themselves, possible only if the subject's faculty irrespective of the presentations through which they affect us, is entirely object. (B72) Note, that there is no re outside our sphere of cognition." (A190/B235) Many commentators read affection here either. Kant to say that things in themselves affect us. But that is by no means Indeed the very question "What kin obvious. "How things, irrespective of the presentations through which things as they are in themselves or th they affect us, may be in themselves ...", is an equally natural and objects?" presupposes that one someh presumably correct reading. Kant puts it in a straightforward way, that objects being at stake. Those who p sensible intuition is not' original'; it does not originate (the existence of) whole-heartedly believe in the two the object. Intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object and is perspectival view for granted, the answ possible only if the subject's faculty of presentation is affected by that us. Being an empirical realist impli object. (B72) Note, that there is no reference to anything but empirical (sensory) objects as real objects. Lik affection here either. beings in the empirical world and noth Indeed the very question "What kind of objects (things) affect us, the devoted much space in the B-deductio things as they are in themselves or the things as they are as empirical can have knowledge of myself only a objects?" presupposes that one somehow understands different kinds of 'affection' is applicable only to the e objects being at stake. Those who put the question like that do not relation between knowable entities". (P whole-heartedly believe in the two they perspectives view. Taking the are constituted first affect us an perspectival view for granted, the answer is simply that things do affect certainly nonsen se. But it is not non us. Being an empirical realist impliesobject, that one takes the empirical and refer to it as it appears be (sensory) objects as real objects. Likewise we who are affected are proper meaning of 'appearance'. beings in the empirical world and nothing else. As is well known,Kant's devoted much space in the B-deduction to explain the "paradox" that I can have knowledge of myself only as I appear to me. The concept of 'affection' is applicable only to the empirical level. It "asserts a real relation between knowable entities". (PC 243) To say that the objects as they are constituted first affect us and then we constitute objects is certainly nonsense. But it is not nonsense to start with a constituted object, and refer to it as it appears before the constitution - that is the proper meaning of 'appearance'.

and inconsistencies. A non-empirical input-out timeless acts of synthesis has to be introduced, lik al ones to explain these ent 176 CHAPTER 5 the empiric behind noumenal causality, pre-existing things, inte A fact which heavily supports the present account of 'affection' is that e noumenal and the empirical world and whatev one who does not accept it sinks into the morass of endless dilemmas ghosts has to be postulated. The model of timeles and inconsistencies. A non-empirical input-output-machine with its th timelessly affecting is so obviously inconsistent timeless acts of synthesis has to be introduced, likewise entities existing Kant's model. No wonder that one cannot make behind the empirical ones to explain these entities. In other words, insist that the above presented 'vulgar ' interp noumenal causality, pre-existing things, interaction between the cannot be enough are indeed unsatisfied wi~h stop noumenal and the empirical world and whatever other transcendental ineffable. That Kant's theory does not go ghosts has to be postulated. The model of timeless and spaceless objects something=x is not any shortcoming but indica timelessly affecting is so obviously inconsistent that it cannot have been stops where it itself claims that one has to stop. Kant's model. No wonder that one cannot make sense of it. Those who insist that the above presented 'vulgar' interpretation of 'affection' tion 10. Object s in the Transc endent al Deduc cannot be enough are indeed unsatisfied wi~h stopping at the limit to the B of the above ted but beengo delinea has not What ineffable. That Kant's theory does further points to the for helpful should various objectsomething=x is not any shortcoming but terms indicates thatbe it consistently tion (see Ch Abstrac the Clearly TD. of to structur stops where it itself claims that oneehas stop. Buchdahl means with 'bracke ting'.4 That means generatim. "Categories are th is on object 10. Objects in the Transcendental Deduction generatim." (B128) 'Gener atim' [uberhaupt] de What has been delineated above of the Buchdahlian scheme of higher level of abstraction, although it is not a various object-terms should be helpful for the understanding of the 'Ob 'ilberhaupt' is involved in a particular case. structure of TD. Clearly the Abstraction (see Chapter 4 above) is what object in the most general sense. But it still deno Buchdahl means with 'bracketing'.4 That means that the focus of TD/l is i be taken to mean that an ontological sense is on object generatim. "Categories are the concepts of object can introduce existence, that is, the' ontological generatim." (B128) 'Generatim' [uberhaupt] denotes a transition to a intuition, viz., the means for individuating object higher level of abstraction, although it is not always clear how much the Abstraction. Accordingly, what is characteri 'uberhaupt' is involved in a particular case. 'Object generatim' denotes is that its ontology is undetermined. In further object in the most general sense. But it still denotes 'object'. Should that either to a purely logical object or to a transcend be taken to mean that an ontological sense is involved? Only intuition the ground of realization through sensible intu can introduce existence, that is, the' ontological sense. It is the mode of object is not connected to any intuition at all. intuition, viz., the means for individuating objects which is suspended by Consequently, because TD/l deals with objec the Abstraction. Accordingly, what is characteristic for object generatim it is not so that it deals with logical objects. To is that its ontology is undetermined. In further stages it can be reduced several there are ng to notice that either to a purely logical object to a transcendental object. The latterreferen is is interesti 4 Itor passa~es there Kant explicitly discusse s differen t obie in the ground of realization through sensible intuition, whereas a logical object is not connected to any intuition at all. Consequently, because TD/l deals with objects of intuition generatim, it is not so that it deals with logical objects. To talk about objects in a 4 It is interesting to notice that there are several references to the similar abstraction in passa~es there Kant explicitly discusses different obiect-terms. (e.~. B307)

preting TD claims that Kant is dealin kinds of objects: objects in a logica OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 1983, 134) 177 objects. (Allison The question kind ofofobject logical sense might fare better, indicating that the what properties dissolution rather solution. objecthood are inspected. But why should we do so whenthan we ahave the Th logical sense weighty objects original expression - object of intuition generatim - is and exact enough? It is is s from Strawson. As Strawson's unders ironical that Allison, who has become known as a prominent defender of the use of this dichotomy is 'infect the "two-different-perspectives-on-the-same-thing"-view, when interontological difference where none preting TD claims that Kant is dealing with two ontologically different approach that various kinds of objects: objects in a logical sense and implies ontologically weightydescr difference but indetenninacy. Thu objects. (Allison 1983, 134) doesa not different kindsinofTDobjects The question what kind of objects are operative deserves to separate objects dissolution rather than a solution. The misleading dichotomy between objects in ain a l when the concern is the process logical sense and weighty objects is something which Allison takes overof .co It could be doubted whether, from Strawson. As Strawson's understanding of transcendental idealism,after the same objects considered the use of this dichotomy is 'infected' by a misguided search for anfrom kinds of objec ontological difference where none is ontologically to be found.different The perspectival when do it could be put as: ontologically not denote ontological approach implies that various descriptions weighty objects? It might not make difference but indetenninacy. Thus a concern with ontologically bound toTD/1 drawfrom wrong consequences different kinds of objects does not separate TD/2. It is precisely what is done, when it is clai misleading to separate objects in a logical sense from weighty objects said about objects in a weighty s when the concern is the process of .cognition. of objectstogeneratim. it is so significant talk about It could be doubted whether, after all,subspecies The relation between the objects of o the same objects considered from different perspectives instead - as was argued in the p ontologically different kinds of objects.the Is fact not that the issue merely verbal incompatibility between 'object when it could be put as: ontologically undetermined versus ontologically (of i experience'. Since means weighty objects? It might not make much difference, if in weTD/l werethenot removed by the Abstraction, the sin bound to draw wrong consequences out of these conceptions. That is removed too. Thus ' object (of intu precisely what is done, when it is claimed that in TD/1 nothing has been objects, while 'objects of experien said about objects in a weighty sense. But weighty objects are a containing in turn several singular ob subspecies of objects generatim. as The relation between tIle objects of TD/1their andparts. TD/2 is complicated by

the fact that - as was argued in the previous chapter - there is a certain incompatibility between 'object (of intuition) generatim' and 'object of experience'. Since in TD/1 the means of individuating objects have been removed by the Abstraction, the singular plural distinction has been removed too. Thus 'object (of intuition) generatim' denotes singular objects, while 'objects of experience' include also singular objects containing in tum several singular objects - and their mutual relations as their parts.

kind of objects are meant? If what has been said abou , how is it5 possible that Allison - although his po correctCHAPTER 178 the problem of affection and many other matters is ver 11. Constituted objects? ed here - maintains that the sense of 'object' present representat theabove ons of the conditi Where have the constituted gone?ofWhat has been said ted in terms explicaobjects another e to take k writes, Melnic 118) has left it open why one should say that objects are constituted. What n 1983, . (Alliso a notion for Kant, is itself, If what has been said about objects abovethat is make kind of objects are meant? of object notion object an of notion concerning is that The primary nt. -..although correct, how is it possiblevis that Allison his position judgme s the perhap is very 141) It is k 1973, the problem of affection and many other matters close to receive the oned view (Melnic nce of the emerge is always tion"is icanofRevolu 'object' to be presented here - maintains that Copern the sense Kant's I will dist ic, judgmental conditions the representation of notion. an object"? explicated in terms of theobject, as anofepistem objects talking about of another . (Allison 1983, 118) Melnick writes, to take example, thatfrom "Thethe 'on ic mode' 'epistem h these althougsense that makes onlystateme vis-a- nts ar notion of object is itself, forItKant, to me that seemsa notion still misleadi they are le, which plausib notion an object is that is judged." vis judgment. .. The primary entirely tly of apparen ical sen in an objects (Melnick 1973, 141) It isobjects perhaps that theontolog heart of the same view refertheto received Kant is is thatof Kant's Copernican Revolution is ndental the emergence of differen a new ce concept realist. The a transce are indepen as they this object, as an epistemic, judgmental I will ies distinguish as the dentl their propert objects andnotion. of .things as ion Cognit . objects of the 'epistemic mode' of talking about from 'ontological mode' cognition the objects with any recou - withou le to us. It seems to me that although statements areThat widely heldt and not availab selves is these Copern the of Kantian ican 5 The catch much apparently entirely plausible, they are stillto misleading. - seems change l, not a ologicaof an epistem tion issense objects refer to the same objects an Revolu ontological as the objects ican Copernin not the o ted butwith constitu is not objects a transcendental realist. The that Kant is concerned cognitionisof Thedifference epistemi cognition ofof objects as they are independently cognitionis but objects and their properties of course, Thus, represent conditi of theas Cognition of things they ons are of in the themwith the cognition of objects. ated in terms "explic disappe not mode does selves is not available to us. any recourse to a conceptual ar ontological the - without ButThat paradoxic somewhat The er, perhaps Howev much ous. of the Copernican Revolution. change - seems to catchsuperflu position far from the not athat Copernican Revolution is Melnic an epistemological, metaphysical tum. k's position is not and one of layin onethemselves. a verbal is constituted butmuch not the objects The cognition of objects differen ce is very g could of speakin epistemicis mode of objects epistemic, judgmental and be t Thus, of course, cognition Their opinion th in my Needless to say, ical mode. conditions of the representation of an object". "explicated in terms of theontolog often b but should totally omitted be disappear or become totally But the ontological mode doesnotnot should

d below. Allison's and to be specifie superfluous. However, perhaps paradoxically, reasonssomewhat Melnick's position is not that far from the position of this study. The a standpoi nt in cont ng differently. presenti study, thisof ly in 5 As previous one and one laying stress difference is very much a verbal not repeat unnecessarily phrases "it seems to", "in my opinion speaking be translated into the Their epistemic mode of ere. almost everywh could add could reader ontological mode. Needless to say, in my opinion the ontological mode should not be totally omitted but should often be preferred for the reasons to be specified below. 5 As previously in this study, presenting a standpoint in controversial matters I will not repeat unnecessarily phrases "it seems to", "in my opinion" or the like which the reader could add almost everywhere.

unity of consciousness is that which alo 179 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL presentations toLOGIC an object(G) [note: GI

validity, becoming The famous 'definition' of 'object' in §17consequently has given risetheir to different of the understanding rests possibility interpretations and much controversy. The definition runs: "Object(O),on it The question is whether Kant means however is that [something], in the concept of which the manifold of a o epistemologically loaded objects. It mig given intuition is united. All unification of presentations, however, is beside point. He means requires unity of consciousness in question synthesizing them.the Consequently, the o are viewed by abstracting from the of onto unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the reference of a new ontological type. create objects presentations to an object(G) [note: G!], consequently their objective No doubt anybody and engaged expla validity, consequently their becoming cognitions, evenin the be able to distinguish between onto must possibility of the understanding rests on it." (B137) of thought and ontological The question is whether Kant means ontologically weightyobjects objectsproper or given in epistemologically loaded objects. be It might be empirical natural to intuition. say that Ithedo incorrigible criteria for distinguishing question is beside the point. He means object generatim, that is, objects be that the conceptual means fordoes referring are viewed by abstracting from the ontological element. That not t will use the ·notions 'thinkable object' an create objects of a new ontological type. be obvious that resu purpose. the It must No doubt anybody engaged in that explaining process of cognition are of minor importance. Certainly must be able to distinguish between ontologically indeterminate objects metaphysics the real objects objects which are at stake. of thought and ontological objects proper like sensible can suggested by some be given in empirical intuition. I It dohas notbeen mean that there mustwriters be is using two object-terms, viz., Kant incorrigible criteria for distinguishing between the two cases, but only ob [Gegenstand], to cases make are thatavailable. distinction.I H that the conceptual means for referring to the two think that Kant indeed should have for done will use the ·notions 'thinkable object' and 'sensible' or 'real object' thisresults reading is so overwhelming that these that purpose. It must be obvious that concerning thinkable objects guidance in this matter. Perhaps somet are of minor importance. Certainly inspecting the possibility of of view. (For Ka from the epistemic point metaphysics the real objects are at stake. that epistemic point.) However, (e.g. by Allison 1983, 135)Kant that of It has been suggested by some writers frequently says that an object(G) is given Kant is using two object-terms, viz., object(O) [Objekt] and object(G) placeHowever, only so faralthough as the object(G) is to given [Gegenstand], to make that distinction. it is natural talks about cognizing objects(O) only think that Kant indeed should have done so, the textual evidence against a as do they it m Objects(O) this reading is so overwhelming that these tenns not appear? offer anyCould reliable objects appear? "The understanding guidance in this matter. Perhaps sometimes object(O) denotes object Cognitions consist determinate isrefer from the epistemic point of view. (For Kant, the unityinofaapperception that epistemic point.) However, Kant often uses object(G) as well. He frequently says that an object(G) is given in an intuition. "Intuition takes place only so far as the object(G) is given to us." (A19/B33) But he also talks about cognizing objects(O) only as they appear to us. (Pr 283) Objects(O) as they appear? Could it make sense to say that abstract objects appear? "The understanding is the faculty of cognition. Cognitions consist in a detenninate reference of given presentations to

talks about the reference of presentations to Allison does not mention. (1983, 145)) It · 180 CHAPTER 5 Kant of being confused already in the very p objective supposed to be specifi an object(O)." Certainly Kant takes greatvalidity pains toareshow that cognition if any clear distinction can be made proper concerns 'real objects' in contrast to the mere play of thought. between be significant never m mustobject(O) The 'definition' in.§ 17 starts with but a that few Kant lines himself later Kant the possible distinction. Perhaps the most p talks about the reference of presentations to an object(G). (A fact which of the same coin; ob they are Ittwo sidesincredible Allison does not mention. (1983, 145)) seems to accuse object(G) an investigation is made the verywhen passage where object(O) and fr~ Kant of being confused already in view, that means, when the process of objective validity are supposed to be specified. It is highly questionablycogni ground in theobject(O) transcendental unity ofIt appe if any clear distinction can be made between and object(G). Gegenstand is an detennined must be significant that Kant himself never made any attempt toObjekt. explainBut too ambigious to establish is tllatany c the possible distinction. Perhapsown the usage most is promising suggestion

they are two sides of the same coin; object(O) is used instead of or ontological point objects? 12. Epistemic object(G) when an investigation is made fr~m the transcendental of view, that means, when the processAnyhow, of cognition is viewedofasthe having the question use ofitsobjec ground in the transcendental unity of apperception. conceptually it were settled - does The not settle quite a dif But as noted previously, detennined Gegenstand is an Objekt. episternic Kantian notion of object is an Kant's anyit clear own usage is too ambigious to establish contrary, givesdistinction. a new trouble at least for A

Kant's alleged epistemic or judgmental no 12. Epistemic or ontological objects? abstract objects (in a logical sense) bu objects(G). Allison the one of object(O) andmaintains, object(G) on - even if h Anyhow, the question of the use a logicalquestion sense, onwhether the otherthe hand, it were settled - does not settle objects quite aindifferent the judgmental concept of object is introduce Kantian notion of object is an episternic Gudgmental) one. On the weleast havefor seen the definition object(O contrary, it gives a new trouble at Allison. It must concerns be clear that The controversy is still whether the Kant's alleged epistemic or judgmental notion of object refers not todefin 'object' judgmental epistemic abstract objects (in a logical ofsense) but into weighty objects,or that is in that the object(O) definition?refers Doestothe objects(G). Allison maintains, on"Copernican" the one hand, 'object' in a judgmental sense? Below objects in a logical sense, on the other hand, that in the definition of § 17 the with emphasis on the the judgmental concept of objectpresented is introduced. But that isheavily confusing. Asontol a) The epistemic or judgmental reading: we have seen the definition concerns object(O) and not object(G). of whic [something], thevery concept The controversy is still whether "That the definition turnsinthe concept whatever is united in a consciousness of 'object' into judgmental or epistemic or not. Is there anythingis an of cognition to us but adeal subject "Copernican" in the definition? exhibit Does itself the definition merely with how the it is.two There is no other wayare to atta 'object' in a judgmental sense? and Below opposing readings

presented with emphasis heavily on the ontological one. a) The epistemic or judgmental reading: "That [something], in the concept of which" means that by definition whatever is united in a consciousness is an object. An object does not exhibit itself to us but a subject of cognition detennines what is an object and how it is. There is no other way to attain an object than by uniting

real. Anyhow the concept of object remai b) The ontological reading: 181 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC There is no doubt that the question is presentations in a consciousness, which thatofevery is made. is, means the point view object is an epistem ic one. It is quite another That is exactly the heart of the Copemical does Revolution. not tum the very concep t into somet question in what cases an intuition does notg import something referor to does anythin arbitrarily united, neithe the same. real. Anyhow the concept of object remains more precise ly to "that [something], in th b) The ontological reading: refers to an entity given in an intuition. There is no doubt that the questionKant is how objects are presented, that repeate dly mainta ins that objects ha Buton thedoes epistemic point view le ob is, the point of view is an epistemic one. definiti not deal withofthinkab does not tum the very concept into something does not sensib intuition epistemic. at all - but'That' merely with "the sconcept in which" but accrue refer to anything arbitrarily united, neither Kant to inspect the unity which the concept of which". Clearly it more precisely to "that [something], in underst anding. Objects are not made ju refers to an entity given in an intuition. We out have keepare in intellec mind that pointed thattothere tual cond Kant repeatedly maintains that objectsanhave to be in intuition. object forgiven us. The question The to which definition does not deal with thinkable"how objects - which not require subject ive do conditi ons of any thought intuition at all - but merely with sensible objects generatim. TD/l? Is it s (A89/B122) What is Kant's In answer Kant inspects the unity which accrues intuition united into a an conscio usnessfrom is an the object s understanding. Objects are not made judgmental in any sense. is Th uniting are objectiv e at the sameIttime? pointed out that there are intellectual proves conditions for something to become all too much unless put more preci is ons an object for us. The question to which TD nis that supposed to answer to maintai all subject ive conditi "how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity?" The distinct ion betwee n subject ive and ob simply thaticbecause whatever is (A89/B122) What is Kant's answer? Is it The epistem reading implies confusi n so the subjective conditions of ons. I united in a consciousness is an object objectiv ity with the sufficie nt conditi uniting are objective at tIle same time? Thatofmust be non-sense least alon unity conscio usness is or thatat which very illuminating proves all too much unless put more present precisely. It istonotan ations object( G), conseque to maintain that all subjective conditions are objective at the same consequently their .becom ingtime. cognitio The distinction between subjective and objective conscio usnessdisappears. is a necessary condition fo The epistemic reading implies confusing thefrom necessary conditions not follow that that any unityofof con Or does objectivity with the sufficient conditions. In §it? 17 It is explained how "theso, as Did Kant really think reading unity of consciousness is that which alone suggest constitutes the not reference of cons ? Does the unity Chapte r 6.) presentations to an object(G), consequently their objective validity, An object isThus consequently their .becoming cognitions". theunity unity not the itself, of but tha the concep consciousness is a necessary condition for presenting object. does t in t of it; toanwhich theItconcep of phantas consciousness object. not follow from that that any unity of y whichpresents might an generat e a unit Or does it? Did Kant really think so, as the spokesmen of epistemic reading suggest? Does not the unity consitute objective val.idity? (See Chapter 6.) An object is not the unity itself, but that something which lies behind the concept of it; to which the concept in this case refers. Any free play of phantasy which might generate a unity of consciousness does not

is detennined by an object as well as how an ob CHAPTER 5 the unity. Only that something can become generate an object; which would be the if "the concept of' were confonns to case the intellectual and sensible conditio missing. 'Object' is not something which is combined. It does not refer The logical functions of judgments relate a predi to the unity. On the contraryis an object is givento and makes cognition a pure tautology, say that 'object' is nothing of an object is not possible possible (A50/B74). However, cognition the predicates are united. If whatever is united in without the unity of consciousness. The empirical theunity pointofof trying toconsciousness show that s9me c what is is detennined by an object as validity? well as how an object is, is detennined All non-contradictory concepts by have. the unity. Only that somethingIn can become an object to us which summary, Kant does not say that all objects confonns to the intellectual and human cognition. all sensible talk and conditions cognition of about objects is judgmen The logical functions of judgments relate a predicate to an object. But it stress that the outer objects are mere appearances is a pure tautology, to say thatuse 'object' is nothing more than that which ofinexpression? T exactly the judgmental way the predicates are united. If whatever is united in a concept is an object, true although not indicating any conceptual chan showobjects that s9me objective what is the point of trying toouter - the concepts referencehave to which should be validity? All non-contradictorytranscendental concepts have. realist - are not things in themsel In summary, Kant does notthe saydefinition that all objects arereasoning judgmental thatto sho but the in but TD/l all talk and cognition about objects not Kant Tha objects is is judgmental. restricted toBut, meredoes appearances. stress that the outer objects arerealists mere appearances, does not Kant take for things in themselveshimself are appearan use exactly the judgmental way There of expression? That isother againreasons very much are still many which str conceptual change. The point the inte true although not indicating any of object, that isis,that against epistemic concept outer objects - the reference to which should be conceivable to afor gr as involving a conceptual change.even Taking transcendental realist - are notconcept, things init themselves. is not the task offor Ka is entirely aItforeign thought the definition but the reasoning in TD/l to show that any cognition of change. At least all basic and most important objects is restricted to meregiven appearances. That all which transcendental and precede language. Moreover, K realists take for things in themselves are appearances as well. mention a word of this kind of conceptual chan There are still many othermaintains reasons which speak against the that instrongly the A-deduction "the logical or epistemic concept of object, that against interpreting Kant's of anis,object does not even enter theposition picture". But as involving a conceptual change. for granted Kant's concept of Kant Taking had introduced his new Copernican concep concept, it is entirely a foreign thought for Kant that concepts could B-deduction? change. At least all basic and Those most important concepts who maintain that a are newsomehow concept of obj given and precede all language. Moreover, does ontological not anywhere exactly that the Kant traditional sense i mention a word of this kind epistemic of conceptual Allison if that 147) were the c sense.change. However, even(1983, maintains that in the A-deduction "the logical judgmental confusing indeed.orThe epistemicconception concept of obj of an object does not even enter the picture". But isn't it most amazing if Kant had introduced his new Copernican conception of object first in the B-deduction? Those who maintain that a new concept of object is in operation mean exactly that the traditional ontological sense is replaced by the new epistemic sense. However, even if that were the case the matter would be confusing indeed. The epistemic concept of object alone is not enough.

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that an object (in the epistemic sens e) coul notion implies a reference to a sub 183ject of OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC in itself' exactly this reference is Melnick comes to the conclusion - quite correctly, has to come to that exclud exampl es whehe re the epistemic notion does conclusion - that 'thing' in the expression 'thing involves a non"appeara nceinisitself' an undetennined object o 1973, 152) It is epistemic conception of 'thing'. (Melnick notions in the two worcontradictory ld sense, like intelli that an object (in the epistemic sense)pres could in itself, because the very entabe tion s confonn to objects or th notion implies a reference to a subject cognition. Obviously in 'thing cogof nitio n", 4) num erous passages where Ka There are plenty of other in itself' exactly this reference is excluded. in intuition , 5) "Ob jects thus may app examples where the epistemic notionrefe does sense at all, e.g.: 1) ear rencnot e tomake functions of the understanding "appearance is an undetermined object of 122 empirical intuition", 2) any (A89/B ) 6) transcendental object, 7) notions in the two world sense, likerela intelligible 3) "whether our te a prioriobjects to objects" presentations confonn to objects or the objects confonn to our cognition", 4) numerous passages where that objects are given 13.Kant Kansays t's real ism in intuition, 5) "Objects thus may appear to us without any necessary Talking abo different points of view s reference to functions of the understanding as theirutconditions a priori." objects naturally raises the questio n wha (A89/B122) 6) transcendental object, 7) Space and Time are said to Various terms on the different levels o relate a priori to objects. descriptions 'of the same objects. Not hing than a common reference. Obvious ly refere 13. Kant's realism has to take care of the sameness. The primac Talking about different points oftheviews ornperspectives on the same questio how objects are individuated int meant by "the same". objects naturally raises the questionThe what primisacy of reference indicates of a Various temlS on the different 'Ob levels of realization different ject' is individuated are merely with a refe descriptions 'of the same objects. desc Nothing more is left for "sameness" ription at all. Intuition is a presentati than a common reference. Obviously reference that which somehow object. For Kanist the only intuition possibl has to take care of the sameness. The primacy of reference clearly makes e fo form s individu ate an object. Accordingly, the question how objects are individuated into fundamental one. paradigm aticthe allymost physical (material) objects The primacy of reference indicates of a kind of 'reference-realism'. used as nearly synonymous. The aim of T a reference and not through any 'Object' is individuated merely with categori es make natu re possible. description at alL Intuition is a presentation which a singular Using 'realiza tion' gives is already as such an in object. For Kant the only intuition real possible usupp is the one. Its ism isfor pres osedempirical . It is well known that forms individuate an object. Accordingly, Kant means both transcenby den'object' tal idealism and empirical paradigmatically physical (material) objects. 'Object' and 'thing' are means that the objects of exp erience exist ind show how the used as nearly synonymous. The of aim us". of In TD fact was empto irical realism implies a categories make nature possible. understanding how the outer objects are separa Using 'realization' is already as such an indication that some form of realism is presupposed. It is well known that Kant's position comprises both transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Empirical realism means that the objects of experience exist independently of us, "outside of us". In fact empirical realism implies a rather ordinary way of understanding how the outer objects are separated and independent of the

realism". (BuchdahI1989, 236) To put it in other wor CHAPTERS nce always has its ground in a transcendenta appeara ted with metaphysical re realism is contras externa mind. Reality is not hidden or lsupersensible but indeed knowable to a objects of experience to be things in themselves an very large extent. independent existence of o rejectsofthe idealism However, Kant's thought is anwhich expression a more refined form of l realism is equal to ~ranscende ve externaobject reducti hand,that realism as well. The position an empirical is no more than an his realism 'internal realism'. H called has Putnam appearance of that to us unkown but nevertheless actual object which lies about the world outside of any d that the talk behind the appearance, Buchdahl calls a fonn of "external reductive is totally empty. (Putnam 1978, 133) dently) realism". (Buchdahl 1989,indepen 236) To put it in other words, it means that an about objects is internally, within a th is tointalk appearance always has itsthere ground a transcendental object. Reductive unt to Kant's empirical realism. H be tantamo also towith metaphysical realism which takes external realism is contrasted external reductive realism mean Kant's that in objects of experience to plain be things themselves and with Berkeleyan l realism. Proscribing or interna al realism of objects. On the other idealism which rejects theempiric independent existence does not imply, as Putnam seems world, noumenisalequal to ~ranscendental idealism. hand, reductive external realism in itself. To claim the existence of as it isrealism'. the world Putnam has called his realism 'internal He takes that to mean because existence can only be inconsistent that the talk about the world worldis outside of any description (theoryclaim that things in themselves er, to1978, ly. Howev independently) is totally empty. (Putnam 133) Thus the only sense inconsistent at all. The expressi ) exist is not objects is internally, within a theory. He takes this there is to talk about objects existence can be empirically cogn whoserealism. same things empirical However, it is rather also to be tantamount to Kant's ion, therefore, proofs immediat percept outer "All plain that Kant's external reductive realism means more than mere in space, or rather is the ac [wirkliches] actual realism. empirical realism or internal Proscribing the access to the is beyond doubt, that is, there corr noumenal world, does notempiric imply,alasrealism Putnam seems to think, proscibing ing actual in space. Space someth ns the the world as it is in itself. intuitio To claim existence of the noumenal (Tn+) ations, is indeed, only in me, present nces, ascan appeara world is inconsistent because existence only be cognized empiricalall objects of outer intuit material of(qua that is,inthethemselves real,things ly. However, to claim that transcendental independently of all imaginative intuiti space, this in objects) exist is not inconsistent at all. The expression refers now to the must carefully distinguish what belongs in same things whose existence "..we can be empirically cognized. refers to the object, from what concerns matter andproofs "All outer perception, therefore, immediately about something condition without which a cognition would not b actual [wirkliches] in space, or rather is the actual itself and thus With regard to this distinction, between the objecti empirical realism is beyond doubt, that is, there corresponds to our outer subjective, formal relation in any cognition .." (Logi intuitions something actual in space. Space itself, with all its appearances, as presentations, is indeed, only in me, but nevertheless the real, that is, the material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this space, independently of all imaginative intuition." (A375) "..we must carefully distinguish what belongs in our cognition to its matter and refers to the object, from what concerns the mere form as the condition without which a cognition would not be a cognition at all. With regard to this distinction, between the objective, material and the subjective,formal relation in any cognition .." (Logic 56).

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description. The difficulty is to give proper se ood merely in a logical they to be underst 185 OBJECTS IN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC merely that something is the case rather tha A transcendental realist presupposes a ready-made world, that a some a conceptual aspect mean merely Berkeleyan idealist takes the worldshould as being created by the mind. A not presuppose that a realist can e transcendental idealist holds the middle position: the world is given but realism. Thus what I exactly do not mea not as ready-made. How the world is is partly dependent on the subject material world behind the appearances of cognition. everything. Kant was not a transcendental r It is of course an intricate matter - and not the subject of the present study - how to interpret all these tenns which denote outer affection, receptivity, matter, 'Sachheit' and so on. Some of them belong to the empirical perspective and do not give rise to any great problem. Still there are some left which clearly are not only on the empirical level but are used also from the point of view of general transcendental description. The difficulty is to give proper meanings to these term. Are they to be understood merely in a logical sense, say, receptivity to mean merely that something is the case rather than something else? 'Matter' to mean merely a conceptual aspect that something is a case. Anyhow, one should not presuppose that a realist can explain realism with another realism. Thus what I exactly do not mean is that Kant presupposes a material world behind the appearances which ultimately explains everything. Kant was not a transcendental realist.

CHAPTER 6 1. Objective validity 2. Formal and 3. The logical form of judgments 4. Obj validity 5. The three senses of 'subjectiv OBJECTIVE VALIDITY reality 7 'Real' and 'actual'

AND REALITY

Obviously, the notions of objective validity an roles to play. In away, they make up the very pr and 'subjective' 1. Objective validity philosophy. 2. Formal'Objective' and material validity are disc sections of TD/1. They are closely related 3. The logical form of judgments 4. Objective and logical of ,subjectivity' Objective validity 5. The three senses apperception. No doubt, 6. Kant thought that the p reality 7 'Real' and 'actual' fundamental proposition) of apperception is cru TD. Consequently, in the secondary literature about thisvalidity principle. In thishave study the princip Obviously, the notions of objective and reality important considered rather briefly. (See also some rema roles to play. In a way, they make up the very problem of transcendental reason is thatareI hardly haveinanything new to say philosophy. 'Objective' and 'subjective' discussed some important granted that 'apperception' shouldtheory be interprete sections of TD/1. They are closely related to Kant's of the logical conditions of self-consciousness apperception. No doubt, Kant thought that the principle (more precisely: a strongly emphasized be the clearly distinguishe is crucial- for argument of fundamental proposition) of apperception consciousness. Having this interpretation in mi TD. Consequently, in the secondary literature much has been written means byand talking about about this principle. In thiswhat studyKant the principle its role will "the be hi reason".inThus, it is 4.) partly employment considered rather briefly. (See also someofremarks Chapter Themy c topics than the notion of apperception, reason is that I hardly have anything new to say about it. I also take itbut for I als need, in context, as to referring say muchmerely more about granted that 'apperception' should bethis interpreted to task of criticizing those who do not share my the logical conditions of self-consciousness and it should - as Kant opi Although, it seems from to me empirical that the very distinguished self-notio strongly emphasized - be clearly is a closely related too complicated, there consciousness. Having this interpretation in mind makes it rather plain consequence of it,highest which principle seems to of be extreme what Kant means by talking about "the the Kant's account 'subjectivity'. it is partly my of choice to focus onThis other is employment of reason". Thus, commentators have discuss but (e.g. I alsoBeck think1978/3) that there is no topics than the notion of apperception, need, in this context, to say much more about it. I will not go into the task of criticizing those who do not share my opinions on this issue. Although, it seems to me that the very notion of apperception is not too complicated, there is a closely related matter or an alleged consequence of it, which seems to be extremely problematic. I mean Kant's account of 'subjectivity'. This is a matter which many commentators (e.g. Beck 1978/3) have discussed and maintained that

validity' from 'material validity' is helpful and

187 OBJECTIVE VALIDITY ANDmatter, REALITY but unfortunately, all co sort out this

resolved. Because the introduced built-in difficulty, or there is no room for the kind of subjectivity whichofKant in the incoherence in Kant's texts, I am not able in spite Prolegomena. It is frequently suggested that Kant's statements in the present this chapter a satisfactory account of K Prolegomena should be rejected as aintemporary incoherence. However, and 'subjective', especially as predicated of judgm the trouble is that the same 'incoherence' appears not only in the

Prolegomena, but also in the B-edition - which is my present concern -

Objective validity and very explicitly in §40 of the1.Logic-lectures. Distinguishing 'formal validity' from 'material validity'There is helpful andcrucial certainly necessary are many notions whichtoKant n sort out this matter, but unfortunately, all confusions will He seems to have taken for grantednot thatbetheir no resolved. Because of the built-in difficulty, or presumably indeed an to me enough. (cp. A822/B850) I take 'objective' incoherence in Kant's texts, I am not able in spite of my best efforts - to or de refers to, decends from, is concerned with of Kant's use of 'objective' present in this chapter a satisfactory account 'Objective' - like 'transcendental' - involves a 1 of and 'subjective', especially as reference. predicated Asjudgments. has been pointed out before, the

validity' to be connected with objects in a logi flatly against what Kant said about objectivity. " and with them allnever cardinal There are many crucial notions which Kant triedpropositions, to explicate. even s priori, relate to empirical intuitions, He seems to have taken for granted that their normal meaning is that clearis, to t experience. Apart frombasically this relation have no enough. (cp. A822/B850) I take 'objective' to mean that they which in respect of their presentations are a mere refers to, decends from, is concerned with or dependent on an object play o understanding." (A239/B298) contrary notio 'Objective' - like 'transcendental' - involves a possible The ontological that which refersthe to, account is concerned with or is de out before, of 'objective reference. 1 As has been pointed Objective and subjective validity validity' to be connected with objects in a logical sense seems mean to be valid a subject. Thus, normally something flatly against what Kant said respectively about objectivity. "Therefore all concepts, and subjectiveeven at thesuch same 'Objective' as time. are possible a imp and with them all cardinal propositions, subject. that Dueis, toto the data nature Kant's inve priori, relate to empirical intuitions, for aofpossible paradigmatically not to validity, a single and subject (o experience. Apart from this relation they have refers, no objective of cognition) generally. subjective (side in respect of their presentations are a mere play of imagination or of The the same understanding." (A239/B298)welL The contrary notion, 'subjective', means

1. Objective validity

that which refers to, is concerned with or is dependant on a subjecL 1 "'Objectivity', for Kant, not a certain mean valid ofrequires or forobjects, an object, Objective and subjective validity 1978, 12nI6.) ZOller (1984) uses 'Objektivitiit' and respectively a subject. Thus, synonymous. nonnally something is not both objective and subjective at the same time. 'Objective' implies independence of a subject. Due to the nature of Kant's investigation 'subjective' paradigmatically refers, not to a single subject (of cognition), but to the subjective (side of cognition) generally. The same goes for 'objective' as well. 1 "'Objectivity', for Kant, requires objects, not a certain kind of evidence." (Brittan 1978, 12n16.) ZOller (1984) uses 'Objektivitiit' and 'Gegenstandsbezug' as synonymous.

coherently. The crucial point which is too often d notions - quite naturally - have different meanin of. For the objective predicated All this is clear enough they and are should not be veryexample, controversial. obviously has some connection with the notion o However, as already indicated, the interpretation of, say, 'objective is neither true no of intuition Below, or a singular validity' is a source of much confusion. I shallconcept try to elaborate, objective validity has no direct relation to tru how objective validity/reality in different contexts could be interpreted realityisoftoo a concept is quite another often disregarded is that matter these than coherently. The crucial point which corresponding thing. -depending The task on is what to try to s notions - quite naturally - have different meanings , notions are context-dependent. This is done be they are predicated of. For example, the objective validity of an assertion formal aand material obviously has some connectionauxiliary with thedistinction notion ofbetween truth; whereas fonn One dimension of context-dependence of intuition or a singular concept is neither true nor false; accordingly, its conc 'object'. The todomain all logically possible ob objective validity has no direct relation truth. of Likewise objective which can become objects for us and those whi reality of a concept is quite another matter than objective reality of the ones isareto real both cases 'object' ha to state In clearly how these corresponding thing. - The task try objects. Kantbelow deals merely with real by recourse to anobjects , notions are context-dependent.Sometimes This is done empirical intuition. In that case the difference bet auxiliary distinction between formal and material validity. and objective reality (reference to real objects) se One dimension of context-dependence concerns the extension of which has objective reality must also be valid o 'object'. The domain of all logically possible objects consists of those havewhich realitycannot. either.The Accordingly, ob which can become objects forwould us andnotthose former validity. validity, in tum, im cases 'object' hasObjective an ontological sense. ones are real objects. In bothobjective only if 'objective' refers merely to real Sometimes Kant deals merely with real objects which can be given inobjects. but anbetween important point tovalidity be noticed. empirical intuition. In that caseunclarity the difference objective reality are in this case extensionally equivalent. and objective reality (reference to real objects) seems to disappear. That usedalso variously alsoofbyobjects, Kant sootherwise that one wonders which has objective reality must be valid it factAccordingly, means. (E.objective g. cp. reality A93/B126 with A9 would not have reality either. implies expressions), and also the quotation above objective validity. Objective validity, in tum, implies objective reality A23 whytocommentators vacillate in ascribing real objects. This is indeed not an differe only if 'objective' refers merely maintain that it has to show the objective unclarity but an important point to be noticed. Objective validity and validi reality, of the categories. Both claimsare get goo reality are in this case extensionally equivalent. These expressions the· problem that both he arein right. used variously also by Kant sosolution that onetowonders whichisalternative limited to the objects of experience, as it is in T fact means. (E. g. cp. A93/B126 with A95, A156/B195 (both and reality of the pure concepts become synonym expressions), and also the quotation above A239/B298.) This explains for.· granted that 'objective validity' Taking why commentators vacillate in ascribing different aims to ID. Some objects generatim andothers 'objective reality' app objective validity, the objective maintain that it has to show the

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CHAPTER 6

reality, of the categories. Both claims get good textual support. The solution to the problem is that both are right. When an inspection is limited to the objects of experience, as it is in TD/2, objective validity and reality of the pure concepts become synonymous notions. Taking for granted that 'objective validity' means applicability to objects generatim and 'objective reality' applicabity to objects of

in a The items which are typically pred i have objective validity, are1891) conc OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY generally, or specifically the form s of experience, it is correct to say, as Allison is concerned judgdoes, mentsthat andTD/l judgmen t-tokens, that is with 'objective validity' and TD/2 with 'objective (Allison objectiv e validityreality'. of the pure concepts o 1983, 134) However, according to the present interpretation conditions are explained. 'objects Concepts are e generatim' does not refer to objects in aKan logical sense. t's reas oning his account of the na The items which are typically predicated, or role as Kant says, important , whiusually ch in tum heavily have objective validity, are 1) concepts,. 2) tal epistemic transcenden unity of conditions apperception. In generally, or specifically the forms of 'obj intuition: space and time, 3) ectivity' get inde ed well mixed. judgments and judgment-tokens, that is,1)actual In TD the Concepassertions. ts, and 2) epis temic condition objective validity of the pure concepts ofAthecon understanding as episten1ic cept has objectiv e validity if it h conditions are explained. Concepts arethat employed inlica judgments. in is, is app ble to anThus object. How Kant's reasoning his account of the exte nature judgment an allnsioof n of 'obj ect' plays - whether for examp important role, which in turn heavily relies on the notion the included, or have all non-reaofl obje cts to b transcendental unity of apperception. con In the aspects textDeduction -dependent.different Kan t's main concern, o of 'objectivity' get indeed well mixed.of the understanding as conditions of re 1) Concepts, and 2) epistemic conditions: however, 'objective validity' and 'obj ectiv A concept has objective validity if are it has notpossible extensioobjective nally equreference, ivalent notions. I that is, is applicable to an object. How are we understand the the man ifoldto give n in anynow sensible intuiti extension of 'object' - whether for example to be that theonly catereal goriobjects es couldhave be employed o included, or have all non-real objectssens to be included as well is entirely ibility, but only problematically as "m context-dependent. Kant's main concern, of course, pure concepts That pos sibilityareisthe tota lly useless for us, b of the understanding as conditions only of real objects. some contexts, in emp iricalIn intu ition. But if the inspe however, 'objective validity' and 'objective reality' of the pure concepts of experience, and it has been shown that are not extensionally equivalent notions. concern of TD/1 is valid,Indeed it also the implies that the concept has ob the manifold given in any sensible intuition. Kant maintains The noti on of validityexplicitly of the epistem that the categories could be employed outside of human importa nt denthe otatdomain ion for Kan t, let us call i sensibility, but only problematically doe as "mere thought". (B150) s not forms directlyof foll ow from the ordina That possibility is totally useless forobje us,ctiv because objects given e validity of thecan catebe gori es as conce only in empirical intuition. But if theoninspection is limited to the this conditio n: that thro ughobjects these concep of experience, and it has been shown thatofa thou pureght concept objectively form is posissibl e. They relate valid, it also implies that the conceptobje hascts objective reality. of experie nce, for the reason that on The notion of validity of the obje epistemic conditions also an ct whatsoe ver of exphas erience be thought. important denotation for Kant, let us call it 'objective necessity', which does not directly follow from the ordinary sense of 'validity'. "The objective validity of the categories as concepts a priori will therefore rest on this condition: that through these concepts alone experience as to the form of thought is possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought." (A93/B126) (Note also that

and, in the tran what makes up their "legal right" on of obje 190 ework is 6the very heart of the noti framCHAPTER s not have its origin in objec idity doe gories. Val cateagainst this quotation goes flatly reading 'objective validity' as ose e out of objects but are imp do not aris cepts sense.) connected with objects in acon logical Accordingly, it is not enough ct. any obje ize must essary to that the categories apply tonec objects, butreal they be necessary for any situation is quite diffe cepts thepossible. irical con For emp cognition of objects. They make objective cognition That is settled. If a concept i ady alre is dity vali e ctiv obje what makes up their "legal right" and, in the transcendental idealistic is, appl.icable valid, that elyobjective objectivof is notion thatofitthe framework is the very heart validity of the t is valid of empiric l concep irica empin tainly categories. Validity does notCer have its an origin objects. (Pr §19) The pure essity arises. Kant to ctive nec n of questio concepts do not arise out ofNoobjects but areobje imposed on them. They are een empirica there is a clear distinction betw necessary to realize any object. how this could be ettled here be uns cepts; letisitquite consituation For empirical concepts the different. The question of is to explain how the su problem Kan In TD If objective validity is already settled. a t's concept is empirical it implies be objective condit at the samtoe time n can nitiois, empirical objects. that it is objectively valid,cogthat appl.icable een these two notio tibility betw incompa logical Certainly an empirical concept is valid of empirical objects; how else? t aspects. To say that r to diff refeKant notions now No question of objective necessity arises. tookeren it for granted that subjective conditions , are onlyand e and time spacbetween there is a clear distinction empirical non-empirical ive' refers to a presupp '" sub thatcould s it -this statehow concepts; let it be unsettled here beject determined. (1981, 402). Kant him nitive fram In TD Kant's problem is cog to explain howewo therk" subjective conditions of in in the subject of ing its orig ive' as 'hav 'sub cognition can at the same time beject objective conditions. Thus, there is no temic conditions hav n in epis ictio contrad is no these logical incompatibility between two notions. But clearly these ctiv same time having obje ject and aspects. To.at saythe that the forms of intuition, notions now refer to differentsub reference possible. The objectivemeans making the space and time, are only subjective conditions - as Buchdahl for a subject - become also ns ditio con ry essa nec states it - that '" subjective' refers to a presuppositional aspect of the cts - when the resu ns of obje ditiohimself ry con necessa cognitive framework" (1981, 402). Kant frequently uses the objects of experienc for gran is take tum in the nsubject ofted: cognition'. Now there 'subjective' as 'having its origin e objective validity time hav t space andhaving Tha is no contradiction in epistemic conditions their origin in the r transcend ed in thei was explain nce objective experie subject and at the same time having reference, or better, s outside of wh very form are the ic: theyThe Aesthet making the objective reference possible. subjective conditions ) This again shows a 9/B121 ble. (A8also impossi necessary conditions for a subject - become objective conditions , the above-mentioned 'o , viz.of e vali obje-ctiv necessary conditions of objects when thedity result the transcendental to have objective valid ch are claimed items whi tum is taken for granted: the objects of experience are mere appearances. endeavours to show that t Kant regarding objects but That space and time have objective validity the objects of nition of objects. cog of ns ditio con experience was explained in their transcendental deduction in the Aesthetic: they are the very forms outside of which sensible objects are impossible. (A89/B121) This again shows an important feature of objective validity, viz., the above-mentioned 'objective necessity'. The items which are claimed to have objective validity do not only apply to objects but Kant endeavours to show that they are also necessary conditions of cognition of objects.

proving that all judgments are objective emptying 'validit y' of all its content. As 191 OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY there must be room for judgments which 3) Judgments and judgment-tokens: all. Kant hardly means that the judgments to Kant judgments It is a predominant view that according old metaph ysicsallhave objectihave ve validity. objective validity. Although seemingly highly supported the Kant's teachin g in theby Dialecttext ic that syn (§19) it certainly must be an overstatement. What would be the pointobjecti of ve v ideas of reason do not have proving that all judgments are objectively would lead to "problevalid? matic". That To give a coheren t interpre emptying 'validity' of all its content. difficul As the t other Critiques also show, - perhap s imposs ible - by the fact there must be room for judgments which dosly notchange refer to any mind objectsbetwee at n obviou d his th all. Kant hardly means that the judgments of taste ordalldistinct judgtnents of the much-d iscusse ion between the jud of old metaphysics have objective validity. Moreover, it ision theinheart judgme nts of percept the Proleg ome Kant's teaching in the Dialectic that indicati synthetic basednts on of the percept on judgments of that; judgme validity; their .validity is in only ideas of reason do not have objective subject ive validity Likewise the B-ded of is these matters is from madethe "problematic". To give a coherent interpretation apperception distingu ished subj difficult - perhaps impossible - by theconscio fact that Kant was ambivalent and usness. obviously changed his mind between A thepossibl two eeditions of CPR. Theis to con key to this problem experience much-discussed distinction between the judgments Kant is talkingofabout. In § 19and thethe impressio (§18) is more than a judgments of perception in the Prolegomena are concerned. "A judgme nt is good nothing but saidobjectiv to have merely indication of that; judgments of perception cognitionsare to the e unity of apperce subjective validity. Likewise in the B-deduction of red. that the unitytheofobjective thought unity is conside apperception is distinguished from theconcep subjective unity of empirical selfts and intuitions (which alone can im consciousness. Kant does not say that all judgments are ofon judgments A possible key to this problem is to consider conside ring what only kind cogniti which has a ref Kant is talking about. In §19 the impression that all judgments least oneisofgiven the presentations combined in bringing are concerned. "A judgment is nothing but the (A68/B 93)manner In otherofwords, he given considers on However, it is in on. cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." are the vehicles of objectibuilt ve cogniti combining that the unity of thought is considered. maintai'Thought' n that onlymeans this kind judgments are concepts and intuitions (which alone logic can immediately refer to object). deals merely with anthem. The only Kant does not say that all judgments are ons objectively valid, but he is apperc cogniti to the objective unity of considering only cognition which hasjudgme a reference to an object, that is, at nts do not have objective reference least one of the presentations combined in ea unity judgment is an intuition. objectiv of the given presentations (A68/B93) In other words, he considers onlythe synthetic judgnlents which Clearly subjective unity, or contingent are the vehicles of objective cognition. areexpress good ed reasons also hasThere to be with to a linguis maintain that only this kind judgments are at issue here; transcendental logic deals merely with them. The only manner of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception is a judgment, but all judgments do not have objective reference. Kant also distinguishes the objective unity of the given presentations from the subjective unity. Clearly the subjective unity, or contingent association of presentations, also has to be expressed with a linguistic entity usually called a

2. Forma l and materi al validity 192

CHAPTER In 6each case it must be found out whic

- is at stake. FOffi1al va form or content valid judgments, too much judgment. If there is no room for subjectively objects; in the case of epistemic conditions has been proved (See below.). This is the sense which naturally goes with nts is 2. Formal and material validitypresentations. The validity of judgme y v formall is nt By saying that a judgme In each case it must be found out which aspect ofinjudgments their applied to objects contrast to material va to form or content - is at stake. Formal validity means. applicability is applied to objects Thus saying that "A applicability. objects; in the case of epistemic conditions alsoAnecessary the unity of and X is that of objectively This is the sense which naturally goes with concepts - which are general it is materially valid we mean that their un presentations. The validity of judgments is acopula somewhat the necessa indicatesmatter. "is" different says the By saying that a judgment is fOlTI1ally valid wetomean that it can be pt the original apperce their relation only can but applied to objects in contrast to material validity whentoit not express a necessary means, in order is applied to objects. Thus saying that "A is X" we mean formally that mistakes. "Is" is an "is" of a law. saying that the unity of A and X is that of objectively valid concepts. By concern s the co The material validity it is materially valid we mean that their unity lies in an object. As Kant whatever a judgment asserts. It is rath presentations and says the copula "is" indicates the necessary unity of of n a singular judgme validity - at least their relation to the original apperception. (B141)that Obviously Kant a judgment is tru same as saying means, in order to express a necessary unity, that "is" excludes all commentators take 'objective validity' a mistakes. "Is" is an "is" of a law. can be seen now, this is correct only in The material validity concerns the content ofcan, a judgment, is, wh wonder of course, that wrong. One that the material whatever a judgment asserts. It is rather obvious validity of judgments if he simply means very can much validity - at least of a singular judgment - must mean tion given. be the very natural explana same as saying that a judgment is true. It explains ally whyvalid so judgme many nts laws, that is, univers commentators take 'objective validity' as synonymous with 'true'. As place in Kant's science because they can be seen now, this is correct only in some cases; generally it is just universal and necessary judgments are s about objective wrong. One can, of course, wonder why Kant talks not true in a proper sense, that is, cor least as a conjecture, a validity of judgments if he simply means truth.toAt pertinent say that laws as universal rule very natural explanation can be given. Kant is interested in scientific objects. Universal laws have a sense of laws, that is, universally valid judgments. Empirical judgments have no all subjects. If this is what Kant has place in Kant's science because they areelymerely contingent. it indeed nts, it Only valid judgme objectiv universal and necessary judgments are scientific. These judgments arejudgm of model nt Kant with our prevale not true in a proper sense, that is, correspond to objects. It is more judgment, such as "the cat is on the m as achemata - arety. valid of pertinent to say that laws as universal rules - orimply any necessi normally objects. Universal laws have a sense of necessity; universal validity for all subjects. If this is what Kant has in mind when he talks about objectively valid judgments, it it indeed crucial not to try to understand Kant with our prevalent model of judgment, with a particular empirical judgment, such as "the cat is on the mat". The "is" of a cat does not normally imply any necessity.

sometimes talks about objectivity me One try to clarify these rather 193 inte OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND can REALITY closely at what Kant in fact maintain Unfortunately, Kant does not make Natural explicitly,the distinction between in the present study there formal and material validity, but there inspect is littleion. doubt that he implicitly I can only briefly and witho he ispoints. using both senses without does. (BI42) What is confusing is that main specifying each case separately. To make[TD the matters even worse he §16-17] The highest principle sometimes talks about objectivity meaning inter-subjective necessity. in reference to the underst anding is: Al by looking One can try to clarify these rather intertwined under thenotions conditionly ons of the original-syn closely at what Kant in fact maintainsconnec in CPR especially in TD. tionand is neither actual nor empiric room for this kind of Naturally, in the present study thereofisallnointuitio n generatim. Despite Kant inspection. I can only briefly and without muchption argument highlight some apperce has to be totally distingu main points. consciousness. This reading is strongly [TD § 16-17] The highest principle where of the possibility of all intuition 'consciousness generatim' is use the manifold of intuition stands in reference to the understanding is: All'apperc eption'. Nothing actual can be of apperception. This under the conditions of the original-synthetic 'appercunity eption' refers merely to a logica but a transcendental condition connection is neither actual nor empirical a formal matter. Kant says that empiri of all intuition generatim. Despite Kane s sometimes misleading and without reference to theterms, identity of t apperception has to be totally distinguished anyicempirical (self)The from synthet unity of consciousn supported by the Prolegomena, consciousness. This reading is stronglynecessa ry subject ive condition of cogniti where 'consciousness generatim' is used as the notion corresponding to for any subject. Now the condition is pre 'apperception'. Nothing actual can bebyascribed 'generatim'. While makingto possibl e a reference to 'apperception' refers merely to a logical condition is obviously totally present ations,it howeve r, requires unity o is dissociated a fonnal matter. Kant says that empirical them.consciousness Consequently, the unity of con and without reference to the identity of constitu the subject. (B133) tes the reference of presentation has been presented as a The synthetic unity of consciousness their objective validity, consequently necessary subjective condition of cognition, that is, a necessary condition (B137) 2 That the unity of consciousness for any subject. Now the condition is presented even objective, that is, previous (§16)asreasoni ng: presentations by making possible a reference to objects. "All to unification of unless they belong one self-consciousn presentations, however, requires unity of consciousness in synthesizing 2 As mentioned Allison alone maintains (1 them. Consequently, the unity of consciousness is before that which connected with objects in the sense Objekt an constitutes the reference of presentations to and. an object(G), consequently Gegenst However, as we see in this very objectiv e validity is possible he is using Gege their objective validity, consequently their becoming cognitions..." incredible if he were mistaken in his very 'defi (BI37)2 That the unity of consciousness is required follows from Kant'stoo. It h space and time have objectiv e validity are connected with obiects(O) but are certainly c previous (§16) reasoning: presentations would not be anything to me unless they belong to one self-consciousness. 2 As mentioned before Allison maintains (1983, 135) that 'objective validity' is connected with objects in the sense Objekt and 'objective reality' with the sense Gegenstand. However, as we see in this very passage where Kant explains how objective validity is possible he is using Gegenstand and not Objekt. It would be incredible if he were mistaken in his very 'definition'. Moreover, according to Kant space and time have objective validity too. It hardly makes sense to think that they are connected with obiects(O) but are certainly conditions of obiects(G).

of the manifold of a given intuition. The necessary but not sufficient condition of obj 194 CHAPTER 6 cp. Baum 1986, 108 )3 Taking this interpret Although the unity -of consciousness which alone constitutes the unityisofthat consciousness is possible also w the reference of presentations to That an object(G), it does not that all wo is a reading which allfollow commentators reference only thethe unity unity of consciousness constitute objective [TD §18] Kant but separates transc of the manifold of a given intuition. The unity of consciousness apperception, which is objective,is afrom of objectiveThe reference. below. necessary but not sufficient condition consciousness. unity (See of the empiric interpretation for granted implies cp. Baum 1986, 108 )3 Taking this contingent determination of the innerthat sense~ without the unity It of has manifold. the unity of consciousness is possible givenalso (intuitions). (B139) merely s That is a reading which all commentators wouldhas not objective accept. validity. That original unity the transcendental (original) unity [TD §18] Kant separates needs clarification. Why is not the of empir apperception, which is objective, from the subjective unity of objective as well? consciousness. The unity of the Contrasting empirical self-consciousness a the transcendental is unity sense~ thatof is,empirical based on consciousness the sensibly re contingent detennination of the inner synthetic unity merely subjective validity whileApperce the given (intuitions). (B139) It haswhich has already been stressed. original unity has objective validity. That is exactly which consciousness at all the but claim merely a log the empirical Itunity of consciousness needs clarification. Why is notconsciousness. is frequently pointed out objective as well? must be possible for the "I think" to accom Contrasting the transcendental unity they of would apperception with the otherwise not be my presentatio synthetic unity of empirical consciousness reveals a most important point the question is of possibility, not of actuall which has already been stressed. Apperception not an actual selfapperception is notisactual self-consciousnes consciousness at all but merely a logical condition of such a "I it follows that the logical relation of the consciousness. It is frequently pointed out actual that when Kant says that it attach any accompanying to somet must be possible for the "I think" to accompany my presentations actual but a merealllogical condition. Note, otherwise they would not be my understood presentation one must emphasize that in a highly abstract way. the question is of possibility, not ofThe actually being problem withaccompanied. the notion ofWhile the subje but a logical condition apperception is not actual self-consciousness is that it seems to contradict what of wasit, said of the must "I think" is meant.conform We cannot it follows that the logical relation intuition necessarily to the notsame anything attach any actual accompanyingunity to something whichinisthat of apperception subject. actual but a mere logical condition. Note, that "I think" must also betoo? the empirical unity must be objective understood in a highly abstract way. 3 One the many reasons why Guyer thinks that the of subjective unity of consciousness The problem with the notion of according to Guyer Kant introduces the concept of of[§17 is that it seems to contradict what said before. the1987,114) manifold"It (Guyer any was legitimate use of it. All of knowledge of objects from the conditions intuition must necessarily confonn to the conditions of the syntheticof se identifies the latter with the former." (ibid 117) unity of apperception in that same subject. Does it not then follow that the empirical unity must be objective too? Is not the objective unity a 3 One of the many reasons why Guyer thinks that the B-deduction is a failure is that according to Guyer Kant introduces the concept of apperception but does not make any legitin1ate use of it. (Guyer 1987, 114) "It [§ 17] sets out to derive the conditions of knowledge of objects from the conditions of self-consciousness, but instead just identifies the latter with the former." (ibid 117)

transcendental unity of self-consciousn

consciousness, means contrasting, in a 195 matter with a material matter. Looking presupposition of all consciousness whatsoever? In whatvalidity sense of is the by the subjective the empi to the subjective unity unity of apperception objective in contrast validity. Whether I can becomeof empiric empirical consciousness? simultaneous or as successive depe Contrasting the unity of apperception, whichCertainly is also attributing called thesometh conditions. transcendental unity of self-consciousness, withand the not empirical unity of material the formal conditio consciousness, means contrasting, in aaccordingly rather confusing way, a formal all empirical unity, does n '§'18 it plainconditions that matter with a material matter. Looking by closer at conformingmakes to the formal by the subjective validity of the empirical unityunity Kantofmeans material self-consciousness i empirical of the manifold as validity. Whether I can become empirically conscious validity is not guaranteed. [The manifo simultaneous or as successive depends on empirical the original (objective)(subjective) unity of conscio as 'contingent' refers to the conditions. Certainly attributing something which underlies all empirical synthesi material and not the formal conditions. subjective unity, asand pure The intuition is objective such be accordingly all empirical unity, does not become of (materially) objective conditions objects. Thus the unity o by confonning to the formal conditions and of apperception. Accordingly, all materially objectively valid.] empirical unity of self-consciousness is, formally valid but its material validity is not guaranteed. [The manifold3.ofThe purelogical intuition is of subject to form judgments the original (objective) unity of consciousness through the pure synthesis [TD §19] In that section Kant pres which underlies all empirical synthesis. The manifold (the matter) of connection between the unity of apper pure intuition is objective as such because it makes up the sensible judgment is made. Judgment is noth conditions of objects. Thus the unity of pure intuition is both fonnally cognitions to the necessary unity of app and materially objectively valid.] because only it can constitute an objec mean that it not only can, but that 3. The logical form of judgments objective referene? Is all unity of app [TD §19] In that section Kant presents his"The theory of judgment. The §19 is: logical form of all judgme and the of logical forms ofcontain connection between the unity of apperception of apperception the concepts judgment is made. Judgment is nothing more than bringing givenbut it s that a judgment is not objective, unity is objective cognitions to the necessary unity of apperception. the unity ofThis apperception? because only it can constitute an objectiveNo reference. But does notunity Kant has to doubt all judgmental mean that it not only can, but that unity the unity always constitutes an we of apperception. But now objective? The title objective referene? Is all unity of apperception indeed have objective validityofand in §19 is: "The logical fonn of all judgments consists are in thebased objective judgments on unity contingent of apperception of the concepts contained therein". Is there a possibility that a judgment is not objective, but it still conforms to the conditions of the unity of apperception? No doubt all judgmental unity has to confonn to the conditions of the unity of apperception. But now we must consider which judgments indeed have objective validity and in what sense. Because all actual judgments are based on contingent association their unity is not OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY

no actual judgments ( cognitio he is 6investigating the relation of that 196 CHAPTER separating belonging to the understanding, thus of apperception is not anctive i necessarily materially objective. The unity odu relation (according to the laws of repr empirical unity. Thus in a judgment presentations are brought togetherect in is no finds now that a judgment in this resp This more than suggestsobje thatctive an objective and necessary unity a priori. bringing given cognitions to the no actual judgments (assertions) are atngly stake. explicitly writes actual jud r to any not refe doeseven , heKant Accordi in any judgmentesasin the u that he is investigating the relation of cognitions to the form of judgment which originat belonging to the understanding, thuscop separating it thes empirical the objectiye fr inguishe ula "is" distfrom The relation (according to the laws of reproductive imagination). (B141) and "The n) He "The sun warms the stone" (Pr 301 but the manner ofe obje finds now that a judgment in this respect is nothing hav are Kant's examples which he says bringing given cognitions to the objectiveobje unity necessary, and in andapperception. ctive of sense are they at all but merely Accordingly, he does not refer to any actual judgment not contain All indicative judgments which do the understanding. to the form of judgment which originates in the ns feelings or sensatio of a subj (referring to The copula "is" distinguishes the objectiye from the subjective unity. the fonn But the necessity applies only to "The body is heavy" (B142) "The sun wanns the stone" (Pr 301n) and rela te to each other in an empirical necessarily are Kant's examples which he says have lobjective validity. In which In a jud all empirica relations are contingent. sense are they objective and necessary, the and in which sense contingent? related confo s are entation pres heavy", All indicative judgments which do not contain subjective presentations could be i conditions of determination. Thus it a subject) betion necessary. (referring to the feelings or sensations ofdo is claimed the torela it - thatseem did not But the necessity applies only to the fonn. Presentations do not in percep presentations are not merely together intuition; on the contrary, necessarily relate to each other in an empirical dity wo joined in the object(O). Material vali all empirical relations are contingent. In a judgment like "The body pres is enta not only claimed to hold but the heavy" , the presentations are relatedonsconfonning to the objective excepti ) joined in the object(O). ment is could interpreted - although Kant conditions of detennination. Thus itFor causal judg particular t any Kanbe claimed to be objective, viz., thement did not do it - that the relation is was a judg form of e. The for Hum as it presentations are not merely together in ctiv perception but are claimed to be the actu an obje e reference possible, not joined in the object(O). Material validityial would mean that the unity is of n ent Any spec law of nature has an elem are (excluding allAn el not only claimed to hold but the presentations the same time the law is contingent. exceptions) joined in the object(O). that th interpreted to mean, that it is claimed For Kant any particular causal judgment is (materially) as contingent chan way But the claim itself does not in any is objective, that is, makes as it was for Hume. The fonn of a judgment l law has the content of the law. No empirica hgoing an objective reference possible, not the actual content of a judgment. This is an indication of Kant's thoroug of necessity in it by (form), butent at asso Any speciallaw of nature has an element conting ts is caused in judgmen element canri.be the same time the law is contingent.rtio settled a prio be necessity never of n can asse An interpreted to mean, that it is claimed that the law is universally valid. But the claim itself does not in any way change the contingent nature of the content of the law. No empirical law has a universally valid content. This is an indication of Kant's thoroughgoing fallibilism. All connection in judgments is caused by contingent association. The validity of an assertion can never be settled a priori.

is heavy'] 'objectively valid' is intended o 197 logical form; we are not concerned whether valid; thathas would be a question material t If a judgment (the form of a judgment) objective validity, of it does not entail that the judgment is true. entails only case." that the(Buchdahl, judgment can theIt 'subjective' 1969, 63 be true or false. "Now it is true that to call the judgment ['theNow bodythe que judgments is afirst different matter. assertion or of subjective. is heavy'] 'objectively valid' is of'the intended only asisa objective description its according all actual assertions, all logical form; we are not concerned whether to theKant judgment is objectively other valid; that would be a question ofmerely materialsubjective truth. Andvalidity. the sameIngoes for word is merely contingent. the 'subjective' case." (Buchdahl,judgments 1969, 636) The material validity of judgments is a different matter. Now the question is whether the ground 4. Objective and been logicalpointed validityout, of· the assertion is objective or subjective. As has according to Kant all actual assertions, all empirical judgments have The difficulties of interpretation which hav words the unity of all actual merely subjective validity. In other above in a form of rethorical questions are judgments is merely contingent. distinguish between the objective and subject OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY

apperception objective? Is a judgment possib

4. Objective and logical validity valid? 2) What does the step from logical c mean? As was repeatedly mentioned befo The difficulties of interpretationconditions which have been -indicated be satisfactory 'answers can How toto thes above in a form of rethorical questions are of two kinds: 1) given delineate some unity? possibilities. distinguish between the objective and subjective Is not all unity of Topossible summarize, Kant's seems to apperception objective? Is a judgment which is notposition objectively intuition undertothetranscendental conditions of the valid? 2) What does the step from logicalstands conditions apperception. is no roo conditions mean? - As was mentioned before IConsequently, am not at all there sure that aim is under to the satisfactory ·answers can be given to these something forquestion. me but is My not unified delineate some possibilities. The act of the understanding which brin of alik To summarize, Kant's positionpresentations seems to be this: All theand manifold (intuitions concepts intuition stands under the conditions of the (original-synthetic) of generatim, is the logical fonns unity of judgment. forth by the apperception. Consequently, thereofisapperception no room foris abrought manifold which is logic to conform to the something for me but is not unifiedplainly, under all thejudgments cortditionshave of apperception. Doesbrings it notthe follow that all The act of the understanding which manifold of judgments given concerned are objectively valid? An exc presentations (intuitions and concepts alike) under one apperception do not have objective reference judgment. Because the objective unityat all. generatim, is the logical forms of which (atthe least the reference does not play of apperception is brought forth by logical forms of judgments, thus any r whether analytic require the uni plainly, all judgments have to conform to the logicaljudgments forms of judgments. How to explain there Does it not follow that all judgments - as Kant's far asclaim theirthat form is are ju of perception, which clearly are based on int be judgments concerned - are objectively valid? An exception could which do not have objective reference at all. Analytic judgments are such (at least the reference does not play any role). But it is controversial whether analytic judgments require the unity of apperception as well. How to explain Kant's claim that there are judgment, viz., the judgments of perception, which clearly are based on intuition - by implication their

hardly any oth being of a subjective kind, that is, having merely a subjectiv distinguishing between obj 198 6 which implies to objects; CHAPTER subjective objects. To my knowledge Kant does not make a manifold of intuition must be united confonning to the conditionsno ofdoubt the he between subjective and objective intuition. But unity of apperception - but which are not objectively valid? There is it. The crucial distinction between subjective and objective hardly any other alternative than to understand intuition in this case as Second Analogy is a good indication of that. being of a subjective kind, that is, having merely a subjective reference ns. Clearly TD is concerned with the manifold of intuitio to objects; which implies distinguishing between objective and of th of manifold has to conform to the conditions subjective objects. To my knowledge Kant does not make a distinction objec apperception. Consequently, every unity of manifold is between subjective and objective intuition. But no doubt he has to make is a r Now the question is: is not every judgment which it. The crucial distinction between subjective and objective order inthe thebasis o synthesis of a manifold objectively valid? Yes, on Second Analogy is a good indication of that. any other alternative is possible. But the trouble is Clearly TD is concerned with the manifold of intuitions. Everyof unity percepti Prolegomena Kant claims that judgments of manifold has to conform to the conditions of the the unity of ion distinct objectively valid. In the TD he also made apperception. Consequently, every unity of .manifold is objectively valid. objective unity of apperception and the subjective unity Now the question is: is not every judgment which is a result of the is co consciousness. Taking for granted that formal validity synthesis of a manifold objectively valid? Yes, on the basis of § 19 hardly material validity, still the unity of empirical consciousnes any other alternative is possible. But the trouble is that in the y valid. It is not clear whether Kant leaves this possib formall Prolegomena Kant claims that judgments of perception are not TD but in the Prolegomena he definitly excludes it. objectively valid. In the TD he also made the distinction between the There is still an additional difficulty concerning th objective unity of apperception and the subjective unity of empirical the P objective validity. That aspect is conspicuous in consciousness. Taking for granted that formal validity is contrasted with (for e "objective validity and necessary universal validity material validity, still the unity of empirical consciousness should ve be equivalent concepts" (Pr § 19). Why should objecti validi formally valid. It is not clear whether Kant leaves this possibility open in necessary universal validity? The judgments of expe TD but in the Prolegomena he definitly excludes it. universal validity. They are judgments independently of a There is still an additional difficulty concerning the notiongeneral of ju subject. Note that Kant's example are frequently objective validity. That aspect is conspicuous in the Prolegomena: al anything about particular things. A contingent empiric "objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) areunivers turned into an objective one in the sense of being equivalent concepts" (Pr § 19). Why should objective validity also imply 'adding' the pure concepts to it. (Pr 301n) Thus Kant seems necessary universal validity? The judgments of experience have the categories are only used in universally valid judgmen universal validity. They are judgments independentlytoofthese any cognizing concepts but n judgment tokens has to conform subject. Note that Kant's example are frequently general judgments, not them. anything about particular things. A contingent empirical judgment is The unity of apperception is called objective becau turned into an objective one in the sense of beingHowev universally validvebyvalidi er, objecti objective reference possible. 'adding' the pure concepts to it. (Pr 301n) Thus Kant seems to mean that formal sense presupposes possible objects, that is, poss the categories are only used in universally valid judgments (laws) and judgment tokens has to confoffi1 to these concepts but not really use them. The unity of apperception is called objective because it makes objective reference possible. However, objective validity even in a formal sense presupposes possible objects, that is, possible intuition.

The task of TD is to prove that the lo categories, have objective validity. Th 199 OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY that if objective validity were connec Formal logic is not objectively valid in the present sense, it isforms of sense; in that casealthough the logical intersubjectively valid. Logic is not objective because it abstracts fromsame re validity from the outset. The how Kant characterizes it. If o all reference to objects. That is exactly objectivity as intersubjectivity. (A54/B78) It disregards totally the origin intersubjective of presentations,validity that is, there it doeswould b not make the distinction between conceptsforms and intuitions. of judgments have intersubject The task of TD is to prove that the logical fOnTIS of judgments, aim of TD is to showused that asthe cate categories, have objective validity. Thereintuitions would be given no point to inus,proving that is, va with the objects in a logical that if objective validity were connectedintersubjective but' interobjective' as w would objective betwee sense; in that case the logical forms of judgments the difference What is then have validity from the outset. The same reasoning applies to understanding logical forms of judgments, and the tr is It nothing elseemphasized than objectivity as intersubjectivity. If objectivity categories? has been no need for TD. Theelse logical intersubjective validity there would be categories are nothing than the log forms of judgments have intersubjectivetovalidity from the outset. determine the manifoldThe of intuitio aim of TD is to show that the categories are the conditions thethe sam Metaphysical Deduction of that intuitions given to us, that is, validunity of and all objects; merely the unity not· of the manifold of intersubjective but 'interobjective' as welLdifference, than that in the transce What is then tIle difference between the logical of conditions, viz., application arethe embedded conditions conditions, viz., the logical fonus of judgments, and the transcendental of sensibility, 'objective validity' and in this (cp study that the categories? It has been emphasized repeatedly logical validity. A567/B595) categories are nothing else than the logical forms of judgments en1ployed to determine the manifold of intuition. It5.isThe thethree majorsenses claimofof the 'subjectivity Metaphysical Deduction that the same functions generate judgmental I have tried to show above that th unity and the unity of the manifold of intuition. Thus there is no other more manageable if it is put in terms difference, than that in the transcendental conditions the sensible material (objective) validity. Somewha conditions of application are embedded. In the absence of the conditions them as two sides of the same coin. Th of sensibility, 'objective validity' and 'objective reality' denote merely equating occasionally objective validit logical validity. (cp A567/B595) intersubjectivity. The same distinction to be distinguished in the case of 5. The three senses of 'subjectivity' 'subjective' is also used with emphasis I have tried to show above that the concept of objectivity becomes more manageable if it is put in terms of formal (objective) validity and material (objective) validity. Somewhat confusingly Kant seems to treat them as two sides of the same coin. The confusion is increased by Kant's equating occasionally objective validity with universal necessity, that is, intersubjectivity. The same distinction - fonnal versus material - has also to be distinguished in the case of subjective validity. Accordingly, 'subjective' is also used with emphasis on quite different aspects.

not in the objects but in the process of cognition, tha CHAPTER subject. They 6are 'ideal'; a notion often used 'subjective'. In this genetic perspective all episte 1) Genetic and presuppositional aspects. Perhaps the most general (of a subject) but they are also 'subjective sense of 'subjective' is subjective that predicated of all fonnal conditions; the presuppositions of the of cognition f concern is thus fonnal validity. That means that possibility they have their origin cognition a subject).that That the sense meant of cognition, is, aistranscendental not in the objects but in the process(for show that the subjective conditions are objective a subject. They are 'ideal'; a notion often used as synonymous to stressing again that 'objective' does not mean u 'subjective'. In this genetic perspective all epistemic conditions are acceptability for all subjects, that is, inter-su~jectivity subjective (of a subject) but they are also 'subjective' in a sense of being starting point, and accordingly, in no need of a proof. presuppositions of the possibility of cognition for any subject of 2) Justificational aspect. This is the sense in cognition (for a subject). That is the sense meant when the task is to previously considered difficulties are embedded. All show that the subjective conditions are objective as well. It is worth merely subjective for Kant. It lacks necessity becau stressing again that 'objective' does not mean universal validity or justification is contingent. Clearly the ground of justi acceptability for all subjects, that is, inter-su~jectivity. That is exactly the material content of an empirical judgment, whi starting point, and accordingly, in no need of a proof. reference to objects and is objective in that sen 2) Justificational aspect. This is the sense in which most of the contingence, it is not objectively justifiable, but n previously considered difficulties are embedded. All empirical content is intersubjective validity. Althought a judgment is sub merely subjective for Kant. It lacks necessity because the ground of its material validity it could be - and nonnally is - f justification is contingent. Clearly the ground of justification refers to the valid. Taking for granted that there is only one world material content of an empirical judgment, which, of course, has present sense can also be intersubjective but not n reference to objects and is objective in that sense. Because of its intersubjective. contingence, it is not objectively justifiable, but now in the sense of 3) First person reports. Kant is even introducing intersubjective validity. Althought a judgment is subjective regarding its version of 'subjective'. Subjectively valid judgment material validity it could be - and normally is - fonnally objectively of an 'subjective' individual subject. valid. Taking for grantedfeelings that thereorissensations only one world, in the H support a body, I feel an impression of weight". (B present sense can also be intersubjective but not necessarily universal weight and a body are connected (or associated) mere intersubjective. only is its ground of justification subjective bu 3) First person reports. Kant is even introducing a third, rather plain something totally subjective. It is not only subjective version of 'subjective'. Subjectively valid judgments make reference to subject but also of a subject. A subjectively valid jud feelings or sensations of an individual subject. His example is: "If I sense is a first-person report of a person's own state support a body, I feel an impression of weight". (B142) The feeling of longer the same judgment if it is changed to a weight and a body are connected (or associated) merely subjectively. Not subjective) fonn: "If Mr. X supports a body, he fee only is its ground of justification subjective but it also refers to weight". Validity in the present sense is material va something totally subjective. It is not only subjective in the sense offor a reference to objects but only for a particular subjec subject but also of a subject. A subjectively valid judgment in the present sense is a first-person report of a person's own states. Certainly it is no longer the same judgment if it is changed to a third-person (intersubjective) form: "If Mr. X supports a body, he feels an impression of weight". Validity in the present sense is material validity, thus having a reference to objects but only for a particular subject. The claim is that

· 200

first person report. But it only makes j It is notable that all Kant's examp 201 OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY exactly of the type of the first perso judgments having a certain grammatical judgments form cannot objective of have perceptions lack objec of a judgment. validity. It concerns again the grounds for form justification of a judgment but the grounds Thus the first condition of objectivity is that a judgment must objective not be a and sub distinction between first person report. But it only makes judgments intersubjective. judgments can refer to objects but they of not perception It is notable that all Kant's examples of judgments Kant does presentare his proble exactly of the type of the first person reports. Thus subject the claim that the The t of cognition. particular doesThus not there concern theproblem o judgments of perceptions lack objective validity cognition. is no it. to It the is exactly thefor all sub form of a judgment but the grounds of asserting one subject necessity distinction between objective and subjectiveCPR. grounds. Subjectively valid from ob Intersubjetivity follows objects. judgments can refer to objects but they do not objective reference m in determine the sense of Kant does not present his problem from the point view of a that the proved. Takenoffor granted particular subject of cognition. The task is acceptability to lay down general follows. laws - Forofa modem cognition. Thus there is no problem of transition fromvalidity the necessity talk about merely for in fonnal co is no objective doubt the validity spirit ofof judgm one subject to the necessity for all subjects. talk Thatabout CPR. Intersubjetivity follows from objectivity. prove the objectivity not To material validity equivalent to in the sense of objective reference means that universal applicability is Kant' mentioned before, that because proved. Taken for granted that there is laws onlyorone worldgeneralizations, universal lawlike it is acceptability follows. - For a modem reading it sounds more natural to of truth. instead talk about validity merely in fonnal contexts. One wonders why did Kant reality talk about objective validity of judgments also6.inObjective the material sense? Is as not material validity equivalent to truth? Objective My conjencture is, objective validity and rea mentioned before, that because Kant's focusaswas on general judgments, has been pointed out they are some to ("the refer reality to their(that validity laws or lawlike generalizations, it is natural Kant. is objective v instead of truth. A28/B44) While objective means

validity means applicability to objects also applicability but is a special case in closely respect related of real notions objects, and the objects Objective validity and objective reality are the synonyn10usly subject matter by of the inte as has been pointed out they are som.etimesthat evenisused cognition is in restricted Kant. ("the reality (that is objective validity) of space respectmerely of ...", to real o of human cognition objec boundaries A28/B44) While objective means referring to an object, objective are extensionally equivalent validity means applicability to objects. However, objective reality meansnotions. also applicability but is a special case of objective validity, viz., validity in respect of real objects, the objects of experience. According to Kant that is the subject matter of the intermediate sections of TD - human cognition is restricted merely to real objects. That implies that within the boundaries of human cognition objective validity and objective reality are extensionally equivalent notions.

6. Objective reality

present concern is not at all a psychological study of th mind but the process of cognition. Judgment as a vehi · 202 CHAPTER 6 always prompted by an intuition (object). (Bl) Howev as app to their regard in for "onlyuse on other yield cogniti [TD §22-23] "The category has no cognition of form things ng accordi intuited be object and must an be things which there could of experience." Thinking but its application to objects the pure quently "Conse settled" cognizing an object are not not thereby the same. This. is(B147) a reminder that Kant's priori t a are applied whenofthey anding, evenstudy underst present concern is not at all a psychological the functions of the sofar only in things on of of yield cogniti mathematics, mind but the process of cognition. Judgment as a vehicle cognition is ies have ns." "..the al intuitio empiric(Bl) applied to always prompted by an intuition (object). However, pure categ~r intuitions be o taken are as these insofar things as appearances; whetherto yield cognition "only in cogniti regardontooftheir form (B147) cognition)." experie there could be things which mustnce be(empiri intuitedcalaccording to these forms is have no and (space n intuitio of forms The not thereby settled". (B147) "Consequently the pure conceptstime) of the senses. asThe objectsto of outside validity understanding, even when they are appliedthea priori intuitions, in pure and e fromasthis are free underst ofanding things only in sofar theylimitati ... canon, be mathematics, yield cognition l). aHowev ellectua are non-int as theyhave im (sofar generat"..the applied to empirical intuitions." categ~ries their use only for They woul of the senses. the objects outside forasthem cognition of things insofar these are taken to be objects of possible had no i we thought, withou experience (empirical cognition)." (B147)t objective reality, since be apperception of actuality unity no ic have synthet The forms of intuitionwhich (spacetheand time) and could no n can give al intuitio empiric e and sensiblof senses. The pure concepts of "Sinn the und validity outside the objects anding. ts of underst pure concep understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to intuition 'object that no granted for taken es is sometim generatim (sofar as they are Itnon-intellectual). However, we have use ive va ve - objecti wrong flatly is so truth. to of for them outside the objects the This senses. They would be mere fanns validity of it doe - that and falsity truth of no ositions presupp we had intuition at hand to thought, without objectivewith reality, since anda it is more er, applied. attention. Howev which the synthetic unityserious of apperception could be Onlyunderst our . Inde 'objective reality' ingBedeutung" concern is made mistakecan sensible and empirical intuition give "Sinn und to the material validity, predicated of judgme nt tokens, it am pure concepts of understanding. to disting on is theis failure confusivalidity' another of that source granted 'objective equivalent It is sometimes taken for t] belon y of '. The categor and 'actual to truth. This is so flatly wrong - objective validity is Reality a notion[Realita dealing are Po ty Modali ies of the itcategor , while of Quality with presuppositions of truth and falsity - that does not even deserve ce is conn , Existen ity. Clearlythat and Necess [Dasein serious attention. However, it is)] more understandable the same not. Indeed, in the sense of Reality isreality'. while mistake is made concerning 'objective sense of 's genetic with the to mous is synony 'Ideal' material validity, predicated of judgment tokens, it amounts truth. The the mind ( of 'real' independence withto the is connec source of another confusion is the ted failure distinguish between of the m ency with thetodepend connectedbelongs y' is [Realitlit] of Reality the categories and 'actual'. The category 'idealit follows that a a subject, itExistence its originarein Possibility, hasModality always of of Quality, while the categories [Dasein)] and Necessity. Clearly, Existence is connected with actuality while Reality is not. 'Ideal' is synonymous with the genetic sense of 'subjective'. 'Reality' is connected with the independence of the mind (of cognition) while 'ideality' is connected with the dependency of the mind. Because 'ideal' always has its origin in a subject, it follows that anything ideal - say

according to the presentational theory merely as presentations? Also real obj 203 OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND REALITY presentations. That is certainly true, b space and time - can become actual only in presentations. Indeed themselves possible. They are subjecti presentations are the 'vehicles' of subjectivity. of all objectivethey also originThe in aorigin subject. Moreover, or material content lies in objects or things. But does not by justmaking anything - possibl of outer objects them according to the presentational theory of cognition - become actual of outer objects; they make something merely as presentations? Also real objects can become actual onlyofintheir pres necessary presupposition spaceand and time make presentations. That is certainly true, butspace time are alone necessary and suffici having their themselves possible. They are subjectivefor in real the objects sense of they are necessary althou origin in a subject. Moreover, they also have 'Ideal' objective in respect of 'subjective is avalidity subspecies of outer objects by making them possible. 'objective'. They are necessary conditions What is ideal is form, while of outer objects; they make something else in a sense of being- naturally with matter realpossible is connected put itBut otherwise, necessary presupposition of their presentations. material To content. material conte of themselves, but intuiti space and time are necessary and sufficientintuitions, conditions that is from empirical for real objects they are necessary although'objective not sufficient conditions. reality' refers to 'actuality'? while 'real' is seem a subspecies of But it am 'Ideal' is a subspecies of 'subjective', commentators to follow. 'objective'. What is ideal is form, while theconfusing real refers to matter. Because 'real' and 'actual'. real is connected with matter - naturally - 'objective reality' refers to the 7 'Real' material content. But material content can arise and only'actual' from actual intuitions, that is from empirical intuitions. Does it not then follow that Unfortunately - as was pointed out in 'objective reality' refers to 'actuality'? That is a reasoning which many commentators on Kant frequently co to falling 'objective into the trap of commentators seem to follow. But it amounts consequently, reality' with confusing 'real' and 'actual'. both 'actuality' and 'possible actuality

concept, such as 'unicorn', would not confusing 'reality' with 'actuality' whe Unfortunately - as was pointed out in Chapter most reality eminent concept 3. has- even objective is to claim commentators on Kant frequently confuse 'real' object"? with 'actual' an actual (1983, and 135) At le consequently, 'objective reality' with 'actuality'. 'Reality'ofembraces a concept from objective reality both 'actuality' and 'possible actuality'. corresponding Allison writes thing. that aThe fictional alleged fact t 'unicorns', does not deprive concept, such as 'unicorn', would not have objective reality Isn't he the corr reality. For Kant reality' of a confusing 'reality' with 'actuality' when he writes that "To'objective claim that a haveit an ontological sense, toand mea concept has objective reality is to claim that refers or is applicable an actual object"? (1983, 135) At leastpredicate one should distinguish of a possible thing,thethat is, re the objective realityexists of or a not has objective reality of a concept from matter. What actually corresponding thing. The alleged fact that there actually does not exist 'unicorns', does not deprive the corresponding concept its objective reality. For Kant 'objective reality' of a concept - although it does indeed have an ontological sense, and means that a concept expresses a predicate of a possible thing, that is, refers to the 'realitas' - is a formal matter. What actually exists or not has not the slighest significance for

7 'Real' and 'actual'

0

ob species exist or phy philoso · 204 CHAPTER 6 to determine what is the business of Kantian philosophy to establi the concept having objective reality or concep not; notwithstanding fact that, science a priori ts, and - as an the certain obviously, actuality always implies possibility. is not rule the business of thumboffor an a good nce. It is It experie philosophy to determine what species exist or not, whereas it a concept, wh disprove a priori the reality ofobviously is the business of Kantian philosophy to establish the objective reality of e m exampl counter possibility that a living certain concepts, and - as an a priori do case, it independently of fo say, a unicorn pher; in- tothis philososcience experience. It is a good rule ofplateau thumbbyfor any discipline not to try to the Chinese scientists. disprove a priori the reality of a My concept, when is be an elnpirical objected by cl could tationthere interpre possibility that a living counterexample might be brought to which: the al Kant objective reality is something philosopher; in this case, say,establis a unicorn found on the Tibetan high 'unicor that t though hed. It could be plateau by the Chinese scientists.reality until it has been established. This seems My interpretation could be as objected claiming according to is con (unicorn) thing' of athat ve reality 'objectiby Kant objective reality is something which:d with always has to somehow of a conce reality ve be 'objecti be confuse established. It could be thought that 'unicorn' do not have objective concern. be correct as far be pr reality until it has been established."The This possibi seems lity to me can never a thing of to is concerned but that should as 'objective reality of a thing' (unicorn) ory, bu that its concept is not self-conradictnot be confused with 'objective reality of a concept' which was my present n." ( intuitio onding supported by some corresp concern. - the possibility of unicorns has not been "The possibility of a thing can neverms becalled proved merely from fact objecti have not the s do unicorn organis that its concept is not self-conradictory, but only beingt or p (presen actuality its to through seems to amount intuition." (B308)4 Clearly until supported by some correspondingreality things. T if they refer to possible realnow - the possibility of unicorns has not been proved. Thus the living nc experie to e reality of things is by recourc have objective Reality of things organisms called unicorns do notcould of a conc e reality objectiv prove thereality. or past), while concepts seems to amount to actuality (present Accordin concept refers to an actual object. have real things. onlyt way to prove reality if they refer to possible reality It is th y. the to actualit amoun wouldThe reality of things is by recource "empiri to experience. Now, experience surely cal deduction", although - unlike the could prove the objective reality of a concept thata the formal m in the least is·notprovided ts - it too, pure concep concept refers to an actual object. Accordingly, in at thisall.case objective without It goes deduction a proper reality would amount to actuality. It is this proof which Kant calls concerned with empirical deductions.

"empirical deduction", although - unlike the transcendental deduction of pure concepts - it is not in the least a formal Accordingly it is notthat is, objective reality, n is to have cognitiomatter. 4 "If in respect to it, the nce significa and meaning acquire a proper deduction at all. It goes without saying that Kant was not in some manner given. Otherwise the concepts are we have really k thinking concerned with empirical deductions. indeed thought, but in this

played with presentations." (A155/B194) "object presentations ... relate to actual or possible exp objectiv is, tothen, ce is, experien 4 "If cognition is to have objective reality, that relatewhat to angives object, and ise toreality (A156/B cognitio acquire meaning and significance in respect to n." it, the object195) must be capable of being in some manner given. Otherwise the concepts are empty; through them we have indeed thought, but in this thinking we have really known nothing; we have merely played with presentations." (A155/B194) "object be given ... means simply that presentations ... relate to actual or possible experience." .. The possibility of experience is, then, what gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of co~nition." (A156/B195)

CHAPTER 7

1. A 'form of intuition' logical versus epistemo PURE INTUITION space and time? 4. Ho 5. Formal intuition 6. T 7. Schematism and fo distinction: pure v 9. A transcendental sc 1. A 'form of intuition' and a 'formal intuition' 2. Onto[10. Moltke S. Gram on What are logical versus epistemological questions in 3. the Schematism? 1 space and time? 4. How are space and time presented? problem of synthetic a p 5. Formal intuition 6. The role of pure intuition in TD/2 7. Schematism and formal intuition 8. A confusing distinction: pure versus schematized categories A 'form of intuition' and 9. A transcendental schema is a pure, 1. formal intuition [10. Moltke S. Gram on schemata] 11. What In theis explained first part of TD it in the Schematism? 12. "Schema-judgments" and the in determ necessarily employed problem of synthetic a priori the second part of TD to ex possible. That the forms of intu is the nerve of Kant's reasonin 1. A 'form of intuition' and a 'formal intuition' in TD/2 is tantamount to con In the first part of TD it was explainedmanner how the of categories intuiting: are more necessarily employed in determining an objectdetermination. generatim. It is the task of the second part of TD to explain how the categories make nature Kant's philosophy of mathe possible. That the forms of intuition are categorially as §6ff.) well Th and time.determined (Cp. e.g. Pr is the nerve of Kant's reasoning. Indeed to understand reasoning general important Kant's role. My which in TD/2 is tantamount to conceiving what Transcendental he says about Analytic the human is a recours mathematics. Thattemporal manner of intuiting: more precisely about spatial and thesis. On the contrary, some c detennination. Kant's philosophy of mathematics is based on his &account of (1974, space cii) Hartman Schwarz and time. (Cp. e.g. Pr §6ff.) The concept of 'pure intuition' plays anbetween alla complete parallelism important role. My general thesis is that Aesthetic there is aand feature the in that ofinNature Transcendental Analytic which is similar to one philosophy of thatintheKant's recourse to pure intuiti mathematics. That is a recourse to pure intuitions. This is not a radical thesis. On the contrary, some commentators would readily accept it. As Hartman & Schwarz (1974, cii) put it: "There is thus, in Kant's Critique, a complete parallelism between the construction of space and time in the Aesthetic and that of Nature in the Analytic." I do not claim, however, that the recourse to pure intuition is exactly similar in both cases, that is,

question of the nature of the Kantian 'synthesis Heidegger understood it also as crucial in the CHAPTER 7 206 the Marburg neo-Kantians. They claimed tha that philosophical and mathematical proofs similar. It is important for and accordi reduced to are formal intuitions the present study - as it was fortranscendental Kant - to put their clearly. logic.difference (Heidegger 1987/1, 131) Many commentators have distinction emphasized the role of the distinction has been emphasized especially by between 'a form of intuition' Allison. and 'a Several fonnal intuition'. one been of the pr~sen accounts ofItitishave crucial points in Heidegger'sto interpretation of Kant, leading to the have gained a wide acceptance. It is gen question of the nature of the Kantian (Heidegger 1987/1, §9) doctrine'synthesis'. of pure intuition is a somewhat murky of Kant of wel Heidegger understood it also adequate as crucialaccount in the interpretation has been presented might the Marburg neo-Kantians. They claimed that space an~ time can few references to 'formal intuition'. Hadbeit bee reduced to fonnal intuitions and accordingly, Aesthetic to intuition' in its technicalthe sense is interchangeab of this transcendental logic. (Heidegger 1987/1, 131) The importance better outcome might have been obtaine distinction has been emphasized especially by Buchdahl,has Krausser and as philosophy of mathematics been treated have been pr~sented, although seems Allison. Several accounts of it considering its relevance to the none Transcendental to have gained a wide acceptance. is generally that of 'pure Itintuition' in TDadmitted is a matter notthe clearly doctrine of pure intuition is a perhaps somewhat murky Theextremely reason why noand partly dueone. to an dark adequate account has been presented might well be that in CPR there are §24, where Kant makes the crucial points for th few references to 'fonnal intuition'. it been thatare 'formal My Had second thesisdiscovered is that there several n intuition' in its technical sensereservations is interchangeable 'pure intuition' a ne - taken with as presentations - are better outcome might haveintuition' been obtained. Furthermore, 'pure intu in mathematics is the sameKant's been treated as is a separate without of philosophy of mathematics hasthus pure intuitions mathematics based ontopic, considering its relevance to thethere Transcendental Analytic. What is the role are no other pure intuitions than those o of 'pure intuition' in TD is a matter not clearly presented either. 'Formal intuition' is That equalis to 'p (A720/B748) perhaps partly due to an extremely dark and ill-formulated passage in some contexts called 'transcendental schema'. §24, where Kant makes the crucial points for the first together might look a time. too drastic move. At t My second thesis is that there are several notions which, with some ma initially highly desirable. It would certainly reservations - taken as presentations are nearly synonymous. less murky and more manageable, if it'Pure could be intuition' in mathematics is thethree sameor'pure intuition'in as in the Aesthetic; four notions operation but only one thus mathematics is based on pure of space time. Forsaid, Kant, thesisintuitions about what Kant and should have but a of the fanns of itsensibility. there are no other pure intuitions than those really said - although he put in such a br (A720/B748) 'Formal intuition' is equal to 'pure intuition', is inas it intuition' is not so much a murkyand notion of unexplainable input to th declare schema'. all kinds Merging some contexts called 'transcendental all these notions together might look a too drastic move. At the same time it must be initially highly desirable. It would certainly nlake this "murky" doctrine less murky and nlore manageable, if it could be shown that there are not three or four notions in operation but only one. I claim that this is not a thesis about what Kant should have said, but a reconstruction of what he really said - although he put it in such a brief way. After all, 'pure intuition' is not so much a murky notion as it is ad hoc. Kant seems to declare all kinds of unexplainable input to the intellect to have their

that the very notion is made clear. To have to make many omissions. 207 My stra PURE INTUITION a picture of Kant's theory of space and ground in pure intuition. Thereby he makes 'purealthough intuition'normally into a metaspace, the same g critically all-important but also a vulnerable notion. bypass both Kant's arguments for his Had Kant proceeded progressively fromstatus the notion of and 'purequestions intuition'concerni of space, we would have had quite a different graspThese of his claims philosophy, and I think, highly rel are, of course, of Kant's thinking. a grasp displaying far better the systematic nature detailed examination would lead too fa Because my overall aim is to characterize this of grasp, it is Kant crucialmaintain Askind is well known, that the very notion is made clear. To make the task as manageable I shall experience confrontation with ext have to make many omissions. My strategy is to start by painting cognition does not arise briefly from experie a picture of Kant's theory of space and time. I willcomponents, talk exclusively about of two not reducible to space, although normally the same goes matter also for time. I am going to is provided by the "passive" fac bypass both Kant's arguments for his claims concerning understanding. the ontological The m "spontaneous" status of space, and questions concerning the validity arguments. matter, but·ofisthese given it. The act of These claims are, of course, highly relevant to the present issue butan their intuition. Now we meet ambiguity detailed exanlination would lead too far away from my main track. can mean either 1) the very act of r As is well known, Kant maintains; that all rather cognition begins 'intuiting', with should be called o experience as confrontation with external objects. (Bl) However, all In intuition as a singular presentation. cognition does not arise from experience.onHuman cognitionbasis is made a grammatical whichupof the tw of two components, not reducible to eachabout other: form and matter. 'intuition' as a termThe meaning i of sensibility, the form by the matter is provided by the "passive" facultyintuition in the singular or intuitions "spontaneous" understanding. The mind talks does about not usually generate its intuiting [Anschauen]. the matter is sensible matter, but· is given it. The act of receiving renders 'intuition' as well. (e.g. A33 intuition. Now we meet an ambiguity ever present in Kant: 'intuition' several passages where no such clue can mean either 1) the very act of receiving the sensible matter, taken as my third thesis, and that no c should rather be called 'intuiting', or 2) a correlate of this act, an - in possible unless the two senses cases itThis can be determined intuition as a singular presentation. In many is advocated separated. thesis is meant. Kant talksby many on a grammatical basis which of the two alternatives certainly be readily accepted about 'intuition' as a tenn meaning intuiting, or alternatively about an 84, 110). Krausser maintains - correctl intuition in the singular or intuitions in the plural. Sometimes he even talks about intuiting [Anschauen]. (Which Kemp Smith erronously renders 'intuition' as well. (e.g. A33/B49». There are, however, also several passages where no such clues are available. Thus, it could be taken as my third thesis, that no coherent interpretation of Kant is possible unless the two senses - intuiting versus an intuition - are separated. This thesis is advocated e.g. by Krausser, and it would certainly be readily accepted by many scholars (see Heidegger 1987/1, 84, 110). Krausser maintains - correctly in my opinion - that the primary

answer is that it is not anything which bel independently of our conditions of intui '208 CHAPTER human7 sensibility. In that ontological sens nearly synonymous. Thus space and time a meaning is 'intuiting,' emphasizing at the same time the process sensibility. Moreover, the outcome of the t character of cognition. I are not merely subjective, but at the same Kant's initial problem of space concerns its ontological status. His the objects of experience. answer is that it is not anything which belongs to the things considered Accordingly, the talk about the forms independently of our conditions of intuiting. It is merely a fonn of the ontological problem. The issue how th human sensibility. In that ontological sense, 'fonn' and 'condition' are space and time are presented - or bett nearly synonymous. Thus space and time are the subjective conditions of manifold in the act of intuiting - is an epis sensibility. Moreover, the outcome of the transcendental tunl is that they the form of the intuited. These two are not merely subjective, but at the same time objective conditions of independent. Kant's answers to the episte the objects of experience. on his answers to the ontological ones Accordingly, the talk about the forms of intuiting is connected with coherently conceived without taking them the ontological problem. The issue how the~e fonns 'work', that is, how idealism means that we cannot cognize t space and time are presented - or better, how they determine the have any forms of their own - but the form manifold in the act of intuiting - is an epistemological one and concerns taken as my fourth thesis that the distincti the form of the intuited. These two questions are not mutually and a form of an intuition is parallel to independent. Kant's answers to the epistemological questions are based ontological versus epistemological questio on his answers to the ontological ones - or vice versa - and cannot be In empirical intuitions objects of experie coherently conceived without taking them for granted. Transcendental are the forms imposed on objects of experi idealism means that we cannot cognize the forms of objects - if they and are thus epistemic conditions for have any forms of their own - but the forms imposed on them. It can be important thesis that an empirical intuition taken as my fourth thesis that the distinction between a form of intuiting intuition, that is, a pure intuition makes a and a fonn of an intuition is parallel to the distinction between the (A165/B206) An empirical intuition is ma ontological versus epistemological questions. sensible material (manifold) given in (or th In empirical intuitions objects of experience are given. Space and time the fonn given by a pure intuition. A pu are the forms imposed on objects of experience. They individuate objects empirical intuition. It contains nothing else and are thus epistemic conditions for identifying objects. It is an an empirical intuition. This form is a important thesis that an empirical intuition is not possible without a pure determination, say, the form of a triangle. intuition, that is, a pure intuition makes an empirical intuition possible. (A165/B206) An empirical intuition is made up of two components: the 1 "We have applied these tests and they con in the not solely and no and sensible material (manifold) given 'Anschauung' in (or through) theCritique act of isintuiting intuited, but that it primarily denotes the corresp of an des G the fonn given by a pure intuition. A pure intuition is the activity or operation of the mindform (Handlung intuitin~)." (Krausser operation of an 1972, object83)of empirical intuition. It contains nothing elseofthan the form an empirical intuition. This form is a certain spatial or temporal determination, say, the form of a triangle. 1 "We have applied these tests and they confirm the supposition that the term 'Anschauung' in the Critique is not solely and not even primarily used to denote the intuited, but that it primarily denotes the corresponding - always synthetic - kind of activity or operation of the mind (Handlung des Gemuts): das Anschauen (the act or operation of intuiting)." (Krausser 1972, 83)

no longer merely passive receptivity, which is clearly against Kant's assump 209 whic PURE INTUITION spontaneity, that is understanding, difficult to conceive why that this they thesis is i Spontaneity and receptivity are 'heterogenous', which means categories merely are necessary conditio are completely distinct from each other.the Is receptivity passive and intuitions make empirical intuitions does not have any unifying effect of its own on the sensibly given? This po shown the categories areit is necess has that an autonomous effect, question leads to a dilemma. If receptivity - including of theits mutual no longer merely passive receptivity, experience but has spontaneity own, relati underlying reasoning in TD/2, that is, which is clearly against Kant's assumptions. Kant's solution is that it is "How the categories make Itnature spontaneity, that is understanding, which determines receptivity. is notpossib According to Kant it is possible difficult to conceive why this thesis is important. If it can be shown that for is, without experience - of spac of pureouter intuitions and pure the categories are necessary conditions mathematics. However,it as pointed intuitions make empirical intuitions possible, then certainly haswas been are no innate ideas for Kant, although h shown that the categories are necessary conditions of all objects of lyingofaobjects. priori in ouris mind". am no experience - including the mutual relations That exactly Ithe although it is possible to find a Kant sc underlying reasoning in TD/2, that is, the heart in Kant's explanation that. It is troublesome to argue for the "How the categories make nature possible". where Kant According to Kant it is possible forthose us to few havepassages pure awareness - thatrefers of basis innateof ideas. repudiates theThat doctrine is, without outer experience - of space and time. is the (Cp. (in Zoller 1989) mathematics. However, as was pointedsettled. out before Chapter 3.),Keeping there thi important consequences. Because are no innate ideas for Kant, although he sometimes speaks about "forms ther mustfor have origin lying a priori in our mind". I am notpresentations going to argue thistheir thesis, priori must be based on intuition, although it is possible to find a Kant scholar who wants to dispute evenand b is what Kant mean by of must something. In sayi that. It is troublesome to argue for theThat non-existence of sensibili beforeideas it a he manifold those few passages where Kant referslying to innate most clearly of pure understanding". concepts repudiates the doctrine of innate ideas. (e.g.B167, On 221) That I take as (A76 Kant's philosophy, alsosome gives a 'maxim' in mindthis yields settled. (Cp. Zoller 1989) Keeping this cognition generatim is valid only important consequences. Because there are no innate ideas, all pure in th derives from pure sensible presentations must have their origin cognition in intuition. All presentations a of pure sens derives from the validity priori must be based on intuition, and because a priori, on pure intuition. of 'pure intuition' crucial that role "transcendental logic has is es That is what Kant must mean by saying reasoning. As has been lying before it a manifold of sensibility a priori .. as materialnoticed for the befor all synthetic necessaryGoing condition into theofdepths of concepts of pure understanding". (A76/BI02) transcendental philosophy without Kant's philosophy, this also gives a clue to. understanding why pure pure cognition generatim is valid only in the domain of experience. All pure cognition derives from pure sensible material, thus also its validity derives from the validity of pure sensible intuitions. Accordingly, the crucial role of 'pure intuition' is established already by a simple reasoning. As has been noticed before, (possible) pure intuition is a necessary condition of all synthetic cognition a priori. Thus no transcendental philosophy without pure intuition.

Kant's philosophy - is his solution to the prob CHAPTER 7 time. Kant rejected both suggeste of space and answer of his own: they are transcenden 2. Ontological versus epistemological questions transcendentally ideal, merely forms of intui It is well known that forform Kant's philosophical development of intuition only, and thus to thethe subje problems of the natural sciences of his own day were of greatto a without which they cannot be attributed importance. Especially significant - andofwhat an is essential partthese of purpose the became Aesthetic to justify Kant's philosophy - is his solution to the problem concerning the nature tantamount to demonstrating the correctness of of space and time. Kant rejected both alternatives gave an inte Theresuggested are two not unrelatedand questions transcendental, empirically real but answer of his own: they are not explicitly separate: the first one concerns transcendentally ideal, merelyspace forms(time) of intuition. "..theyquestion attach toistheepist The second form of intuition only, and thus to the subjective quality of our mind, of space. In the investigation presentations attributed to any thing." (A23/B37) The without which they cannot beontology and epistemology gets blurred; the re purpose of the Aesthetic is toboundary justify these answers. For Kant this has to be reconsidered. The isdistin of transcendental tantamount to demonstrating the correctness the same asidealism. that ~hich pr questions is roughly questions intertwined Kant There are two not unrelateda form of intuiting and awhich fonn of an does intuition of alth not explicitly separate: the first one concerns the ontological status talks equivocally about a form of intuition, space (time) The second question is epistemological and concerns Metaphysical Exposition: presentations of space. In the investigations betweenof th of intuiting:the - boundary a form (condition) A form ontology and epistemology gets blurred; the results indeed imply that the - an ontological question, spatia between these two boundary has to be reconsidered. The distinction - metaphysics questions is roughly the same as that which previously emerged between of s - being a space, 'givenness' In both cases Kant often a m a form of intuiting and a fonn of an intuition. - an undetermined intuition, talks equivocally about a fonn of intuition, although more exactly: - quidfacti Metaphysical Exposition: Transcendental Exposition: (condition) the sensibility A form of intuiting: - a form A form of anofintuition: - the form of an object - an ontological question, spatiality (of the intuited) - metaphysics - a formal intuition, spatio-temp - being a space, 'givenness' of-space the form of an appearance - an undetermined intuition, a mass term - an epistemological question, ' - quidfacti - the "science of sensibility", ge Transcendental Exposition: - a singular presentation, a bein A form of an intuition: - the form of an object- of an intuition determinate formal intuition (of the intuited) - quidjuris - a fonnal intuition, spatio-temporal fonn - the form of an appearance - an epistemological question, 'in space' - the "science of sensibility", geometry - a singular presentation, a being in space - determinate formal intuition - quidjuris

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concept is explained. It answers the questio an analysis of an essence. A transcendental PURE INTUITION of a concept "as a principle from211which in possibidistinction lity of other synthetic cogniti That Kant himself makes the suggested is clearly shown byons a pr "How space and time are presented?" What his distinction between a metaphysical and a transcendental exposition. is that there Kant only started to athe tra (A23/B38, B40) In a metaphysical exposition what belongs a priori explana tion how the spatial forms wor concept is explained. It answers the question "What is space/time?" It is explana tion is scattere d around in the An an analysis of an essence. A transcendental exposition is an explanation happen ed to need of some additional of a concept "as a principle from which insight be mayinbe gained into the the 2 Axioms of Intuitio n. possibility of other synthetic cognitions a priori." It answers the question By saying that with spacetheisAesthetic not only a for "How space and time are presented?" What is 'wrong' intuitio n itself, Kant seems to mean is that there Kant only started the transcendental exposition: thethat it is two differen t perspec tives. Howev er, more explanation how the spatial forms work. The main part of the two differen t kinds of items. Spatiality is explanation is scattered around in the Analytic at places where Kant possibi lities, while space as a determ happened to be in need of some additional support of this kind; e.g. in ined intuition - is a particular realization of some the Axioms of Intuition. 2 mere univers fonn of but intuitio called sp a form ofal intuition alson, an By saying that space is not only substra all intuitio ns seen determ inable to is theof'same' space from intuition itself, Kant seems to mean that it tum of course, the conditi on of theabout possibility two different perspectives. However, more properly he is talking intuitio ns lies. But the unity of the objects i two different kinds of items. Spatiality is the totality of all spatial underst anding .." an (Pr object 322) The statement th - formal possibilities, while space as a detennined fonn of but transce ndental ly ideal seems to refer to intuition - is a particular realization of some of these possibilities. "The a totality is transce called Space space, asmust therefore be thendentally mere universal fonn of intuition, space. cally real either; anobjects; infinite and space be to particular in cannot it, substratum of all intuitions detenninable empiric ally real are the particu lar spatial form of course, the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these Thus isinentirely that sense 'fonn of detennined byintuitio the n' h intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects intuitio n' as is emphas ized e.g. by Heidegger understanding .." (Pr 322) The statement that space is empirically real intuitio n require s that there is a pure sen but transcendentally ideal seems to refer to the two different aspects of contain ing or being able to generat space. Space as a totality is transcendentally ideal, but it is not empiri-e all po forms which can be determ ined. It is a cr cally real either; an infinite space cannot be empirically real. What are empirically real are the particular spatial forms. (cp. Krausser 1973, 281) 2 There is an interesting structural analogy b Transcendental has Deductio a priority 'fonnalsical Ded Thus in that sense 'fonn of intuition' n. Inover the Metaphy and exhibited, that is, as in a metaphysical exposition intuition' as is emphasized e.g. by Heidegger 132). A particular the concept of(1987/1, 'category'. The Transce ndental Deduc transcensensible dental expositio n - how it is possible for ot intuition requires that there is aa pure material - somehow to follow from the categories. Kant obviously refers containing or being able to generate possible and dental spatialdeduction whenall he says he has temporal ~iven a transcen forms - which can be determined. It is a crucial premiss of TD that a 2 There is an interesting structural analogy between the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction. In the Metaphysical Deduction the categories are found and exhibited, that is, as in a metaphysical exposition it is explained what belongs to the concept of 'category'. The Transcendental Deduction begins an explanation -like a transcendental exposition - how it is possible for other synthetic cognitions a priori to follow from the categories. Kant obviously refers to both of these two expositions when he says he has ~iven a transcendental deduction of space and time.

did not write very much about these matters. Th CHAPTER 7 of overinterpretation. Heidegger seems to risk when he talks about primordial unity which formal intuition is not only determined by the purethe sensible material - the of intuition. the form rules of sensibility - but also presupposes the synthetic act of the It could be categories. suggested (Cp. that Pr'a§38) fonnTheof in understanding, that is, is determined by the meanings: 1) a form of intuiting, 2) a form of question of the relation between sensibility and the understanding hinges a form Unfortunately, of an object ofKant an .intu on the question what kind ofpresentation, synthesis is 3) required. the possible alternatives. But the second should did not write very much about these matters. Thus there is a considerable the third one. It would be run absurd talkrisk, about th risk of overinterpretation. Heidegger seems to have justtothis as such,unity when we are not engaged in a inpsych is enlbedded already when he talks about the primordial which is said to have a form, not the presented which the form of intuition. of an intuition it refers important character It could be suggested that 'a form of intuition' can havethatthree particular object. When talking about the meanings: 1) a form of intuiting, 2) a form of an intuition qua mentalmatt is 'manifold', whileCertainly the 'content' an in presentation, 3) a form of antenn object of an .intuition. theseofare its matter and be form. the possible alternatives. But both the second should understood to refer to 'A form of intuition' is not only b the third one. It would be absurd to talk about the form of aambiguous presentation between inintuiting/an intuition. What makes as such, when we are not engaged a psychological study. It is the K is that different kinds of forms confusing presented which is said to have a form, not the presentation. It is a mostcan intuitionthat is based on immediately the pure manifold of the fo it refers to a given important character of an intuition same time a formal intuition contains the form particular object. When talking about the matter of an intuition Kant's 'a an form of intuition' quarefers totality hand of 'content' intuition normally to (an term is 'manifold', while the other also be said to be formal because it refers only both its matter and form. That confusingly, Kant's non-te 'A form of intuition' is notintuiting. ambiguous onlyis,because of the distinction intuition'. (e.g. B207) between intuiting/an intuition. What makes Kant's notions even more

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confusing is that different kinds of forms can be referred to. A formal 3. Whatofare time? but at the thespace form and of intuition, intuition is based on the pure manifold of the existing intuited.independent On the same time a fonnal intuition contains Space isthe notform an Unding a condition of sensibility, a fonn space) of intuition. qua totality (an undetermined can I other hand 'a form of intuition' not merely phenomenal either, but is also be said to be fonnal because it refers only to the fonnal aspect presup of experience. form of intuition' is now used in intuiting. That is, confusingly, Kant's 'A non-technical use of 'formal refer to one of these two key concepts of physi intuition' . (e.g. B207) a fonn of intuiting, space quite generally, spa space. As undetermined it is not at all an intui 3. What are space and time? Space is not an Unding existing independently. It is merely a form or a condition of sensibility, a form of intuition. It is not transcendent and not merely phenomenal either, but is presupposed by all objects of experience. 'A form of intuition' is now used in the ontological mode to refer to one of these two key concepts of physical science. Space means a fonn of intuiting, space quite generally, spatiality, an undetermined space. As undetermined it is not at all an intuition qua presentation. It

singular spatial items, or items in space. Even as of intuiting' is not unequivocal. Space213 has two ki PURE INTUITION of a totality and those of particular instances. Alth would be less confusing if Kant talkedisabout a 'form intuiting' as had a totality the sum of all of possibl e spatial form of this notion, when he repeatedly instead. This is the basic meaning have to conform to the characters says of the total ofers intuition. In all these cases space that space is merely an a priori form charact are some of Kant's principal c of any to determinate or means a totality, a "birthplace" ontolog ical references status of space, e.g. the claim that sp singular spatial items, or items magnit in space. as a general term 'a form ude,Even or that different spatial regions whic of intuiting' is not unequivocal.parts Spaceofhas two kinds of characters, those one single space. Space can mean either of a totality and those of particular instances. Although, in a sense, space all spatial forms somehow refer or which is co as a totality is the sum of all possible spatial forms, the particular forms particular forms, or 2) the source of all: these for have to conform to the characters of manifo the totality. Examples of such sensible ld. The latter is expressed by Kan characters are some of Kant's claims concerning the of the principal outer sensibl e intuition, space, is not yet an the the claim that space is an infinite given ontological status of space, e.g.only manifold of intuitio n a priori for possi magnitude, or that different spatial whichn we can perceive are (That regions pure intuitio contains a manifo ld is sta parts of one single space. SpaceA77/BI can mean eitherI03, 1) the totality to which 02, A77/B A99-100.) all spatial forms somehow refer The or which is constructed out of these rules· for determining spatial forms - the e of all forms providing the pure particular forms, or 2) the source someho w ,these be suppos ed to be embedd ed in these fo sensible manifold. The latter ismust expressed by Kant: "Thus the mere fonn be presupp osed that in spatiality a pre-conc of the outer sensible intuition, space, not- yet any cognition; it supplies framewisork a set of rules - is someho w give only the manifold of intuitiondeterm a priori for possible cognition." (B137) ination of all spatial forms. It is just t (That pure intuition contains substra a manifold also in A27/B39, tum ofisallstated intuitio ns" (Pr 322), "the pure A77/BI02, A77/BI03, A99-100.) "the rules of spatiality" - which Kant means whe The rules· for determining spatial forms given - the essence of space - must an infinite magnitude. Krauss er (1973, 2 somehow be supposed to be embedded forms. other words, it synthesis in of these intuitio n "is In guided by two distinct se a pre-conceptual or pre-intuitive must be presupposed that in spatiality of rules that is called 'space' and 'time' qua 'fon somehow governs the framework - a set of rules -theis set of rulesgiven that iswhich called 'catego ries'." Sen determination of all spatial exclusi forms. vely It isbyjust this framework - "the the categories, but also by somethi substratum of all intuitions" (Pr 322), "the form. pure sensible manifold" or certain spatial But that is not a rule of the "the rules of spatiality" - which Kant means when he says that space is pure intuition, more precise ly the manifo ld of pure an infinite given magnitude. Krausser (1973, 282) explains that the Kant's thesis of the essence of space can be su synthesis of intuition "is guided by two distinct sets of rules: (1) the set conditi on of outer intuitin g, time is a condition of of rules that is called 'space' implica and 'time' 'formon ofof intuition', and (2) tion qua a conditi all possible intuiting. 'categories'." not guided the set of rules that is called given by the formSensibility of intuitinis g. Space cannot be in exclusively by the categories, but also by something else to determine a certain spatial form. But that is not a rule of the sensibility itself, but a pure intuition, more precisely the manifold of pure intuitions. Kant's thesis of the essence of space can be summarized: Space is a condition of outer intuiting, time is a condition of inner intuiting and by implication a condition of all possible intuiting. The spatial forms are given by the form of intuiting. Space cannot be intuited as an object of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

an empirical concept, c) not a general discursive c infinite magnitude. It is empirically real but transcend d that Kant's thesis of space as b · 214 could be objecte It CHAPTER 7 a priori is contrary to my suggestion that space as intuition, but only objects in space can be intuited. Thus space as such presentation at all. This objection, however, reveals o cannot be perceived. Space (and time) is a) a presentation a priori, b) not precision. The argument in the metaphysical expositi an empirical concept, c) not a general discursive concept, d) a given space is presented. (A24/B38) Accordingly, when Ka infinite magnitude. It is empirically real butpriori, transcendentally ideal. does not really the argument is an intuition a as being a presentation It could be objected that Kant's thesis of space totality, but particular spatial forms. It is indeed one o a priori is contrary to my suggestion that cannot space be as intuited a totality a B3 (A291/ all.not at is space as a totality presentation at all. This objection, however, areveals only Kant's lack of totality cannot be pure intuition, qua a singular precision. The argument in the metaphysical exposition is based on how particular presentations of determined spatial forms space is presented. (A24/B38) Accordingly, 94ff) when Kant claims that space (cp. Allison 1983, is an intuition a priori, the argument does not really concern space as a Space is a subjective form of intuition because it Kant's totality, but particular spatial forms. It is indeed That one ofdoes that it is meanthat nottheses subject of cognition. space as a totality cannot be intuited at all. (A291/B347) Thus space as a particular subject; in this case subjectivity implies a singular presentation. Only totality cannot be a pure intuition, qua well. 'Subjec tive' here means indeed only an op forms can be intuitions. particular presentations of determined spatial origin of which lies in the objects. The task of (cp. Allison 1983, 94ft) deduction of space and time is to show that these sub because it has its origin in the Space is a subjective form of intuition same time, are objectively valid, that is, refer to o thatare it concern is dependent on any subject of cognition. That does not mean nce ed. objects of experie particular subject; in this case subjectivity implies intersubjectivity as This is an excellent place to raise a meta-critica well. 'Subjective' here means indeed onlyseems an opposition to ul. that Given the Ka to be powerf objection which of the transcendental origin of which lies in the objects. The task space is not anyhing which pertains to things as the subjective forms, at the deduction of space and time is to show thate these how is it possibl that we intersubjectively ascribe th same time, are objectively valid, that is, refer to objects, so far as the same objects? If there is nothing in the objects whic objects of experience are concerned. between this round tomato and that oval one, how This is an excellent place to raise a meta-critical finger. There is an intersubjective agreement concerning their form objection which seems to be powerful. Given Kant's contention that presuppositions of a pre-established harmony? If it space is not anyhing which pertains to things as they are in themselves, ground for this distinction lies in the objects, do how is it possible that we intersubjectively ascribe the same forms to the Kant's explicit claim that space does not present an in the makes relation a distinction same objects? If there is nothing s? (A26/B4 their mutual or of which lvesobjects in themse how can we explain between this round tomatoKant and would that oval one, problem have explained, or escaped, thisthe intersubjective agreement to concerning their form without far-reaching doctrin the to me that Kant must have adhered it is admitted that themore e presuppositions of a pre-established . He means lies in theIf objects difference harmony? ground for this distinctionnothing lies inwhich the objects, does it not contradict space is a presentation of, but anyhow Kant's explicit claim that space does not present any property of things in themselves or of their mutual relations? (A26/B42) It is unclear how Kant would have explained, or escaped, this problem. However, it seems to me that Kant must have adhered to the doctrine that the ground of difference lies in the objects. He means more exactly that there is nothing which space is a presentation of, but anyhow all differences have

objects. (cp. B69n, and Paton 1936/1, VI §8

4. How are PURE INTUITION

space and time presented? 215

the present 'intuition' b to be ascribed to the manner in whichInobjects affectsection us. That this is soshould is presentation, not to an act of intuiting. An supported by Kant's account of other properties. There are no properties an intuition. form as of intuition in presentations of objects known correlate, to us which belong toAthings they of an intuition. Thus in the pr content are in themselves. However, the properties must have their ground in the determined objects. (cp. B69n, and Paton 1936/1, VI §8) form; the intuited is determin intuiting, that is, the rules of spatiality a further, and most important contention th 4. How are space and time presented? determined by the categories. It might be In the present section 'intuition' should be understood as referring to a possibility of referring to an undetermined presentation, not to an act of intuiting. An act of intuiting always has a Kant's referring to an appearance which correlate, an intuition. A form of intuition now refers to the form of the categories. This, however, is an erroneo content of an intuition. Thus in the present sense it is always a whether intuitions are determined by the determined form; the intuited is determined by the rules of the act of any correlate of an act, is determined by t intuiting, that is, the rules of spatiality and temporality. It is Kant's Kant's doctrine that the act of intuiting has further, and most important contention that an intuition is also always imposed on the sensible manifold. Synt determined by the categories. It might be thought that there is a logical intuiting. Thus there is no logical possibilit possibility of referring to an undetermined intuition - a case analogous to prior to the act of intuiting. The supreme Kant's referring to an appearance which does not stand under the all intuition in reference to sensibility is: categories. This, however, is an erroneous assumption. The issue is stands under the fOImal conditions of spac whether intuitions are determined by the categories. An intuition, like of TD is not whether intuitions are determ any correlate of an act, is determined by the very act. It is the heart of determined by the categories. Kant's doctrine that the act of intuiting has its necessary forms which are Intuitions are singular presentations imposed on the sensible manifold. Synthesis is always involved in contrast to concepts which are general pr intuiting. Thus there is no logical possibility of an undetermined intuition nota communes). "Appearances are the s prior to the act of intuiting. The supreme principle of the possibility of given to us immediately, and that in them all intuition in reference to sensibility is: "all the manifold of intuition the object(G) is called intuition." (AI08) O stands under the fOImal conditions of space and time". (B136) The issue in empirical intuitions which presuppose t of TD is not whether intuitions are determined or not, but how they are The mind is affected by the objects in a determined by the categories. objects are said to be given in intuition: Intuitions are singular presentations (representatio singularis) in A51/B75, A62/B87, A87/B120, A92/B125, contrast to concepts which are general presentations (representatio per nota communes). "Appearances are the sole objects(G) which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object(G) is called intuition." (Al08) Objects of experience are given in empirical intuitions which presuppose the actual presence of objects. The mind is affected by the objects in a certain way. (Passages where objects are said to be given in intuition: B29/37, A19/B33, A50/B74, A51/B75, A62/B87, A87/B120, A92/B125, A93/B126, A719/B747.)

isCHAPTER called "pure". "Now, all intuition possible to 7 intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) It is the faculty of imagination which ishasimmediately the capacitypresented, to presentthrough an that which object in intuition even when the object is not present. (B151) The space and time." (B 146) As is indicated here, s productive imagination can also certain exhibiting not construct be confused with concepts sensation.by Empirical intuiti a priori intuitions which correspond to them. An intuition thus generated through sensations. (A20/B34) Sensations are su is called "pure". "Now, all intuition possible to us is sensible... Sensible is worth emphasizing that pure intuition is her intuition is either pure intuition (spaceasand time) or empirical intuition of intuition well. that which is immediately presented, through sensation, as actual in intuitions is explained: How to obtain pure is indicated here, intuition should wh space and time." (B 146) As presentation of a sensible body those components not be confused with sensation. Empirical intuitions are related to objects understanding, such as substance, force, divisibi through sensations. (A20/B34) Sensations It which belongare to subjective sensation,presentations. such as impenetra is worth emphasizing that pure intuition is here counted as a sensible etc., something remains of this empirical intui intuition as well. and shape. These belong to the pure intuition, w How to obtain pure intuitions explained: "Ifform I separate from the in the ismind as a mere of sensibility even w presentation of a body those components which are thought thethat the senses or sensation." (A20/B35) by Thus force, etc.,empirical and also intuition those understanding, such as substance, is divisibility, present in an a intuition which belong to sensation, procedure such as impenetrability, hardness, colour, of abstraction. intuition, namely,is extension etc., something remains of thisToempirical summarize: An intuition made up of t and shape. These belong to the which takes place aapriori act of intuiting, matter (a andpure the intuition, form. In an sensibility even without an actual object of in the n1ind as a mere form ofsensible intuition. There are two possibiliti the senses or sensation." (A20/B35) that which to a pure In empirical intuiting intuitionThus can take place. belongs intuition and is found in it by a Th intuition is present in an empirical from the external world through sensation. procedure of abstraction. what Kant calls the "real". In pure intuiting the m To summarize: An intuition is made of two elements: the matter by imagination. The for manifold - isupgenerated a matter (a manifold) is given to and the form. In an act of intuiting, provided by the mind. It is determined bya two sensible intuition. There are two possibilities how an con intellectual conditionsconcerning and the sensible empiricalonly intuiting the matter is provided intuition can take place. In contains the form under which somethi sensation from the external world through sensation. concept only the The formmatter of the of thought of anisobjec what Kant calls the "real". In A pure intuiting the matter the pure sensible pure intuition can be attained in two ways: The fonn of an or object is always it in manifold - is generated by imagination. from an empirical intuition by generating provided by the mind. It is determined two kinds of conditions: A pure by intuition which takes place the a prio intellectual conditions and different the sensible conditions. "Pure intuition from what has been said of empir contains only the form under which pure contrast to something intuition asis aintuited; singular the presentation concept only the form of the thought of an object generatim." (A50/B74) A pure intuition can be attained in two ways: either by an abstraction from an empirical intuition or by generating it in an act of pure intuiting. A pure intuition which takes place a priori must be remarkably different from what has been said of empirical intuition above. In contrast to intuition as a singular presentation, a concept is a general

216

concepts. To construct a concept m which corresponds to the concept. 217 PURE INTUITION non-empirical intuition will thus be particu lar object( O), and yet none presentation. Now pure intuition is a singular presentation of something t (a passage general Kant present ation), i which is a general presentation. In aconcep famous writes: general validity for all possibl e in "Philosophical cognition is reason's cognition out of concepts; concept." of theB741) construction of mathematical cognition is reason's cognition out(A713/ concepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition 5. Forma l intuitio of na concept a which corresponds to the concept. For the construction non-empirical intuition will thus be required, which, intuition, a Two ways of as attainin g pureisintuit particular object(O), and yet none the as tion the or construction by less, abstrac by the act of of apure concept (a general presentation), it must in the presentation express usually discussed in connection with general validity for all possible intuitions underintuitio the same intuitiowhich n' andfall 'fonnal n'. Its concept." (A713/B741) footnote (B160) to §26 of TD. The which is a crucial premiss of the s. Formal intuition Transcendental Deduction itself. The are conceiv eddistinguished: a priori not merely Two ways of attaining pure intuitions have been either as intuitio ns which themse lves is by abstraction or by the act of pure intuiting. The latter possibilitycontai conceiv ed withbetween the determ inationofof u usually discussed in connection with the distinction a 'fonn footnot e begins: "Space conceiv ed as intuition' and 'fonnal intuition'. Its most notable occurrence is in the in geometisry), containtos more than mer footnote (B160) to §26 of TD. The footnote attached a sentence combination of thecompleting manifold, given inference the a which is a crucial premiss of the logical in an intuitiv e present ation, so that Transcendental Deduction itself. The sentence is: "But space and time th the formal intuitio are conceived a priori not merely as manifo forms ld, of sensible intuition but nas gi (Follow ing Schwar z I prefer intuitions which themselves contain a manifold and thereforetranslat are in rather clear how The 'forma this manifold in them." conceived with the detennination of unityItofseems There is nothing mysteri ous intothis footnote begins: "Space conceived as object(G) (as we are required do no which has any scientif ic or practic in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains al general metaph terms. The mea to the ysical form of sensibility, combination of the manifold, given according in space and to their spatial propert a in an intuitive presentation, so that the the form of intuition gives only object determinate sp of of presentation." manifold, the formal intuition gives thein space unity and availabl e.. It is a as present ation of a d (Following Schwarz I prefer translating here vorstellen 'conceive'.) possibl e object which Kant calls 'form It seems rather clear how 'formal intuition' should be understood. There is nothing mysterious in this notion. To give an account of space, which has any scientific or practical import, it is not enough to talk in general metaphysical terms. The means must be given to refer to things in space and to their spatial properties. The notions of a detenninate object in space and of detenninate spatial forms, say a circle, must be available. It is a presentation of a determinate form of an actual or a possible object which Kant calls 'formal intuition' in the footnote.

intuition, but also sensible intuitions themselves" mu understood so that in some sense they are the 'sam · 218 CHAPTER 7 which are both forms of intuiting and pure intuition differentItperspec two from red by conside How are empirical intuitions made possible pure intuitions? goes tives time are ontological as theconditions above without saying that formscharact of intuiting necessary of alland th erized are the sensibl n gives intuitio of not empirical intuitions. Thatperspec "spacetive. andAtime only the fonns of e m formare al and s all temporbe intuition, but also sensiblesensible intuitions themselves" must of undoubtedly ts and forms concep lar particu of unity gives the understood so that in some sense they are the n'same' space and time intuitio a fonnal while i.s possible intuitio "Empirical Kant: which are both forms of intuiting andbypure intuitions. Thus spacen and flatly stated is of spac synthes . The have and time)..These time are considered from intuitio two different perspectives. been n (of space of all intuition, is w forms is of the essenti characterized above as athe ontological and althe epistemological synthes and conseque nce,containing of appeara perspective. A form of intuition gives nsion the sensible manifold the apprehe the objects of on of cogniti and all and sensible concepts and forms of nce all temporal spatial possibilities, experie

while a fonnal intuition gives theB206) unity of particular presentations. It is (A165/ n a pure ce betwee flatly stated by Kant: "Empirical intuition i.s possible only through pureand a f any differen Is there the form, n oftimes, intuitioand The synthesis of spaces beingand it intuition (of space and time)... n is an intuitio formal Thus a fo a synthesis of the essential withou forms tofthe allpresenc intuition, whatactual makesobject. possible e ofis any explaine has been intuition. It every the apprehension of appearance, outer pureconsequently always be aand ns possible. Are intuitio empiricofal such experience and all cognition experience." makeobjects ns the intuitioof any difference there (A 165/B206) formal intuitions as well? Is and a pure ation by imagin Is there any difference intuitio between a pureedand a fonnal intuition? A intuit n generat which wayainpriori they n except intuitio of thealform, and it takestheplace formal intuition is an intuition an empiric talking we are not times,intuition several stressedThus without the presence of any a formal must been object. hasactual presentatio inedpure determ n as aabove intuitio always be a pure intuition. has an been explained how but Itabout ad except ce, differen the pure intuitions would make intuitions make empirical granted intuitions possible. Are all , what al intui by an aempiric presupposed there any ndifference between fonnal. formal intuitions as well?AIspure intuitio n, intuitio Like a formal well.intuition intuition generated by imagination and as a pure presupposed by it als imagination ed by theAsempiric viz. those an empirical intuition except the way in which they prompt are generated? forms, sensible - a formal in logicalintuiting, - going has been stressed several times, are not talkingpsycho now about But ofwecourse willfor- to be act ofthat ing - anTaking ed by someth but about an intuition as prompt a determined presentation. . a triangle n, say, of intuitio granted, what would make the difference, except a different perspective? that abyfonnal be could n objectio e A pure intuition presupposed A by possibl an empirical intuition is generated in geomet d only case, require al intuition, imagination as well. Like univers a formal it also contains unity ry, of while al intuition lar empiric any particu by empirical presupposed sensible forms, viz. those prompted by the sensible material. geomet ve merely as operati formal intuitio But of course - going psychological - a nformal intuition mustinalso be ry is prompted by something - an act of will - to be just that particular intuition, say, of a triangle. A possible objection could be that a fonnal intuition presents a universal case, required only in geometry, while a pure intuition is presupposed by any particular empirical intuition. But to understand formal intuition as operative merely in geometry is to read B1600 out of

fonnal intuition' from 'empirical fon

determined intuitions Allison 219 also uses PURE INTUITION

intuition' synonymously. (Allison 1983, 1 its context. In the text to which the note is attached, there is no special The notion of 'formal intuition' is ex concern with geometers' space The fonn of empirical intuition is the second edition of CPR. This fact in no w same intuition generated also a priori. Krausser (1973, 282) offers a term introduced into that edition. Kant im similar interpretation of 'formal intuition'. He even separates 'pure in several places of the A-edition (e.g. formal intuition' from 'empirical formal intuition'. Referring to writings, although he did not always use determined intuitions Allison also uses 'formal intuition' and 'pure 1983, 181, Buchdahl1969, 580ff.) It is c intuition' synonymously. (Allison 1983, 181ft) the A-edition Aesthetic about how sp The notion of 'fonnal intuition' is explicitly mentioned only in the However, Kant must have become more second edition of CPR. This fact in no way implies that it was a special notion; it is so heavily emphazised in term introduced into that edition. Kant implicitly used this notion already between the metaphysical and the transce in several places of the A-edition (e.g. A46/B64ff) and in some other in the B-edition - is a manifest indication writings, although he did not always use these technical terms. (Allison The use of 'formal intuition' suggest 1983, 181, Buchdahl1969, 580ff.) It is crucial even to the arguments in rigorous exegetical analysis, but a sugge the A-edition Aesthetic about how space and time are presented. and should be coherently presented. The p However, Kant must have become more aware of the in1portance of this only fOUf times in CPR, all of these in the notion; it is so heavily emphazised in the B-edition. The distinction enough textual evidence to claim that K between the metaphysical and the transcendental exposition - first made term in the suggested way. On the contrar in the B-edition - is a manifest indication of that. not always use 'formal intuition' in this s The use of 'formal intuition' suggested here is not a result of any quite untechnically in contrast to mat rigorous exegetical analysis, but a suggestion how these matters could admit.3 and should be coherently presented. The phrase 'formal intuition' is used only fOUf times in CPR, all of these in the B-edition. There simply is not 6. The role of 'pure intuition' ill TD/ enough textual evidence to claim that Kant had consequently used the How different senses of 'intuition' s term in the suggested way. On the contrary, it seems clear that Kant does theitquestion how andused by what k not always use 'formal intuition' in thisrelated sense,tobut is occasionally detennined. It must be axiomatic quite untechnically in contrast to material intuition. This I readilyfor any tions that a conjunction (combination) of admit.3 $

3 The notion of formal 6. The role of 'pure intuition' ill TD/2

intuition is used in CPR "Anticipations of Perception" (B207) [fonnal i perceived and by themselves], 3) in the "A How different senses of 'intuition'beshould beinunderstood is closely of matter presupposes a formal intuition (time a 4) in the of "Antinomies" ["Space related to the question how and by what kind operations(B457n) intuitions are is mere intuition). It is not an actual obiect which can be

detennined. It must be axiomatic for any treatment of the Kantian intuitions that a conjunction (combination) of a manifold can never come to 3 The notion of formal intuition is used in CPR: 1) in the footnote B 160, 2) in the "Anticipations of Perception" (B207) [formal intuitions like space and time cannot be perceived in and by themselves], 3) in the "Amphibolies" (B324) [the possibility of matter presupposes a formal intuition (time and space) as antecedently given], and 4) in the "Antinomies" (B457n) ["Space is merely the form of outer intuition (fonnal intuition). It is not an actual obiect which can be outwardly intuited. "1

nature. Both sensible and conceptual elemen us of Kant's talk about something 'third' w · 220 CHAPTER 7 with the sensibility and with the intellect, vi us through the senses, but any unity is produced anschemata act of spontaneity, Before dealing by with - which are al viz., synthesis. The doctrine of synthesis leads directly to the question of - I will briefly summarize the role of 'pure in the role of 'pure intuition' in TD. The heart of the matter is that a pure In TD the results of the Aesthetic are categories.status Pure intuition double intuition is also detennined by theontological is that of space has anda time nature. Both sensible and conceptual elements are present. This reminds Kant takes this to imply that the outer. us of Kant's talk about something 'third' which is homogeneous both themselves but appearances. Consequently, with the sensibility and with the intellect, a transcendental schema. of objectsviz., as appearances. Before dealing with schemata - which are also a kindand of formal intuitions In TD sensible intellectual conditio of 'pure TD/l intuition' TD. - I will briefly summarize the roletogether. dealsin exclusively with intell In TD the results of the Aesthetic are that takentheforconditions granted. Thus the turns out of sensibility ontological status of space and time is that of a mere form of intuition. understanding. In TD/l objects generati Kant takes this to imply that abstracting the outer. from objects not things in theare medium of differentia themselves but appearances. Consequently, TD deals with determination been narrowed down from an object genera of objects as appearances. human experience. In TD/2 the concepts ' In TD sensible and intellectual conditions of cognition are brought used in a broad Kantian sense. 'Nature' m with intellectual conditions. In TD/2 itdeten together. TD/I deals exclusively appearences. This totality is obviously turns out that the conditions of sensibility are determined also by Thus Kant's problem in TD/2 wasthetransf understanding. In TOIl objectstime generatim were under inspection, determined by the understanding? The differentiating. In TO/2 the focus has abstracting from the medium of Aesthetic the form of inner sense time as been narrowed down from an object generatim to determinate objectsisofdeter experience. So far as something human experience. In TD/2 the concepts 'experience' are But detennined'nature' by the and figurative synthesis. used in a broad Kantian sense. 'Nature' means a dynamic totality of all synthesis, is determined by the understan appearences. This totality is obviously determined by space and time. In TD/l a manifold given in an intuition Thus Kant's problem in TD/2 The was result transformed how arethe space and of of TD/lto:was that manifold time determined by the understanding? The answer is: according to themani stands under the categories. Thus any the form of all objects of o Aesthetic time as the form of inner undersense the iscategories. Now the result experience. So far as something is determined of time, TD/2. itIn must fact asbea pro important premiss in determined by the figurative synthesis. But the figurative synthesis, like p application of the result of TD/l. Because understanding. all synthesis, is determined by theof its own, obviously it also stands under In TOIl a manifold given in an intuition isgeneratim was determined. considered. Th necessarily categorially ofmake a given intuition necessarily The result of TD/I was that the manifold categories nature possible. stands under the categories. Thus any manifold given in intuition stands under the categories. Now the result of TOIl becomes the most important premiss of TD/2. In fact as a proof TD/2 is no more than an application of the result of TD/I. Because pure intuition has a manifold of its own, obviously it also stands under the categories. All synthesis necessarily is categorially determined. Thus it is explained how the categories make nature possible.

a commentator like one who writes tha without any substantial loss" has not u 221 PURE INTUITION paths in Kant's thought. Even sympathe 7. Schematism and formal intuitiondifficulty in giving a satisfactory accou Allison whoPure has Concepts given one of of the the best a The chapter called "Of the Schematism of the I think that not even he has properly d Understanding" has caused much trouble to interpreters and is frequently establishingIt seems cardinal propositions. to me that heavily criticized or bypassed with someinuneasiness. should be understood as a pure (fon a commentator like one who writes that "the Schematism can be omitted hardly any the other coherent possibility. T most fundamental without any substantial loss" has not understood by commentators Gram (1968, have 91ft)had andgreat rejected paths in Kant's thought. Even sympathetic 'obscurus per obscurius' and difficulty in giving a satisfactory account of this short chapter. It is again Win undermines Gram's but Pippin's as will beand seen later, exami Allison who has given one of the best accounts, obscure is that they do not operate w I think that not even he has properly described the role of the schemata formal intuition. for the in establishing cardinal propositions. Allison suggests This that isa crucial schema Schematism a clearThere account intuition.with I agree. is of for should be understood as a pure (fonnal) peculiarities it is striking to find hardly any other coherent possibility. This possibility has been examined Schematism. It goes without th e.g. Pippin (1982, 142) saying as by Gram (1968, 91ft) and rejected by on the correctness of my account of for 'obscurus per obscurius' and Winterboume (1988, 100). What own surprise, it now see Much- and to my indeed, makes them undermines Pippin's and Gram's examinations in the Schematism, and rather obscure - is that they do not operate with an appropriate conception ofa cons nicelymatter. explaining its alleged confusions formal intuition. This is crucial for the whole By approaching the between particular and the intuition in mindcategories - with all its Schematism with a clear account of formal interpreting the Schematism probably a peculiarities - it is striking to find the same peculiarities in the to prove something. mybeen owntaken reading heavily relies My Schematism. It goes without saying thathas It is meant as a to prove anything at all. on the correctness of my account of fonnal intuition. However, it isthere of vital to me that is noimportance mystery for Much to my own surprise, it now seems system of transcendental b of it can bephilosophy. given in the Schematism, and rather a conscise account and especially the relation between a nicely explaining its alleged confusions (notwithstanding the connections understood a coherent in way_ In between particular categories and theirbeen schemata). Theindifficulties schema is understood it is still taken to interpreting the Schematism probably arise from two main sources: a) It process' which has been taken to prove something. My contention is thatsomehow it does notnecessarily aim application of a category possible. N to prove anything at all. It is meant as an answer to some how-questions. some project sense ,and its support of building up thefrom However, it is of vital importance for Kant's mattersof upside-down. The very concept schema system of transcendental philosophy. b)comprehend and especially the relation between a schema and a category - has not been understood in a coherent way. In whatever way Kant's concept of schema is understood it is still taken to be an 'entity' in a 'transcendental process' which somehow necessarily must be involved to make the application of a category possible. Notwithstanding its correctness in some sense ,and its support from Kant, this easily leads one to comprehend matters upside-down. Schemata are products of the

schemata. The schemata presuppose the usually thought - the other way round. It m that 7the schemata explain the subsumptio , 222 CHAPTER categories than that they explain the ap productive imagination. They are determinations of time, that is, pure Anyhow, the very fact that there are the TD the manifold of any sensible formal intuitions. As was shown incategories is an indication that the pure intuition necessarily stands under the categories. That means that the significance. pure concepts of the understanding are applied in generating the Schematism "deals with the sensible schemata. The schemata presuppose the pure concepts and not - as is pure concepts of the understanding can usually thought - the other way round. It might be more pertinent to say How are pure concepts applicable to app that the schemata explain the subsumption of sensible data under the "to bridge the gap between the intellec categories than that they explain the applicability of the categories. schema is a "third thing" At the same tim Anyhow, the very fact that there are the schemata corresponding to the from the logical to the real, or from gener categories is an indication that the pure concepts can have sensible logic of construction - or from analytic to significance. why it could even be maintained that a c Schematism "deals with the sensible conditions under which alone for the Schematism would be in the Metap pure concepts of the understanding can be employed". (A136/B175) There is a well known criticism presen How are pure concepts applicable to appearances? Kant's metaphor is claims that the Schematism is superfluo "to bridge the gap between the intellect and the sensible" or that a beside the point it might still be instructive schema is a "third thing" At the same time it is a question of a bridge thinks that the aim of TD is to prove tha from the logical to the real, or from general to transcendental logic - the viz. the categories. If it can be shown tha logic of construction - or from analytic to synthetic judgments. That is there cannot be any need for a proof of why it could even be maintained that a contextually more proper place cannot possess a concept and be unable t for the Schematism would be in the Metaphysical Deduction. correct as far as it goes, but as a criticism There is a well known criticism presented by Warnock (1949) which The issue is not "our having a concept" (a claims that the Schematism is superfluous. Although this criticism is seems to think). As always, Kant sees t beside the point it might still be instructive just because of that. Warnock view of concepts, not of persons. He strict thinks that the aim of TD is to prove that we possess certain concepts, and the sensible. This implies a corre viz. the categories. If it can be shown that we possess certain concepts concepts. It is not at all evident - on there cannot be any need for a proof of the applicability because one impossible - that the pure intellectual co cannot possess a concept and be unable to apply it. Now, this might be from the understanding, could have any se correct as far as it goes, but as a criticism of Kant it does not go at all. sensible material could be conceptually de The issue is not "our having a concept" (an empirical ~oncept, Warnock The place of the Schematism should no seems to think). As always, Kant sees the problem from the point of additional proof of something which w view of concepts, not of persons. He strictly distinguishes the intellectual and the sensible. This implies a corresponding distinction between concepts. It is not at all evident - on the contrary, it seems to be impossible - that the pure intellectual concepts, being derived entirely from the understanding, could have any sensible significance, that is, that sensible material could be conceptually determined. The place of the Schematism should not mislead us into taking it as an additional proof of something which was missing in TD. Nothing 0

0

applied to sensible intuition,

PURE INTUITION Schematism are already 223 taken for

TD/2 where it is supposed to be additional is proved in it; nothing in the text refers to any proof. possible. It goes without saying Moreover, if the Schematism were supposed to prove something, should unless the pure concepts of the u we not conclude that the previous passages have failed to prove the same Even the title of § 24 reads: "Of th thing? The list of categories given in the Metaphysical Deduction is the the senses generatim". In fact list of concepts which are presupposed to be able to detennine intuition. Schematism tum on the same c Thus they must be in some sense 'schematized'. In TD the categories are intuition. It is also notable that b applied to sensible intuition, that is, the positive results of the of sensibility in general, but of th Schematism are already taken for granted in TD. 'That is most obvious in Schematism does not continue TD/2 where it is supposed to be shown how the categories make nature TD/2, but makes a new start to ex possible. It goes without saying that nothing like that would be possible view of the faculty of judgment. unless the pure concepts of the understanding had sensible significance. explain how the subsumption o Even the title of § 24 reads: "Of the application of categories to objects of possible. (A137/B176) It is tak the senses generatim". In fact both TD/2 - not least §24 - and the corresponding that-question is al Schematism tum on the same crucial premiss: the possibility of pure application amounts to, is deter intuition. It is also notable that both of them deal with the problems, not (See Allison 1983, 174-9 for "syl of sensibility in general, but of the specially human sensibility. Thus the Kant's general architectonics Schematism does not continue the validity-proof where it was left in comprehensible. CPR is built up TD/2, but makes a new start to explain the same matter from the point of powers of the mind. The intellec view of the faculty of judgment. Kant clearly says that the problem is to with names of their own, and dea explain how the subsumption of intuitions under the pure concepts is the faculty of rules: - of subsumi possible. (A137/B 176) It is taken for granted that an answer to the understanding the facul corresponding that-question is already settled. What this subsumption or (concepts) Gudgmen application amounts to, is deteffilination of intuition by pure concepts. The first part of the Transc (See Allison 1983, 174-9 for "syllogistic conception of subsumption".) Concepts. The second part is the Kant's general architectonics make the role of the Schematism more of Judgment, also called the An comprehensible. CPR is built up conforming to Kant's account of the Kant thought that the pure con powers of the mind. The intellect is divided into three kinds of faculties, already established when he m with names of their own, and dealing with subject matter of their own: judgment. The aim of the secon the faculty of rules: - of subsuming under rules: - of inference: these concepts and to derive sy understanding the faculty of judgment reason (concepts) Gudgments) (syllogisms). The first part of the Transcendental Analytic is the Analytic of Concepts. The second part is the Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty of Judgment, also called the Analytic of Cardinal Propositions. Surely Kant thought that the pure concepts and their objective validity were already established when he moved over to deal with the faculty of judgment. The aim of the second part is to explain the application of these concepts and to derive synthetic propositions a priori, 'cardinal

the ideas of reason is given. As cardinal propositi the categories, so are synthetic propositions a pr '224 7 called the principles (of reaso ideas.CHAPTER They are is noforchapter corresponding to th Dialectic propositions' [Grundsiitze] , which there are rules the application of these cannot be. Because the ideas of have no sc chapters: the Schematism andreason System of all concepts. It consists of two derived from them cannot have any objective Cardinal Propositions. In the Transcendental Dialectic the deduction ofvali can As legitimately be used only as regulative the ideas of reason is given. cardinal propositions are derived from of experience. systematization the categories, so are synthetic propositions a priori derived from the CPR (bett~r: synthetic(ofmethod reason).ofHowever, in the the ideas. They are called theThe principles exposition) is exhibited by the order of explication Dialectic there is no chapter corresponding to the Schematism. There decreasing generality: logical forms of judgmen the principles cannot be. Because the ideas of reason have no schemata, cardinal validity propositions. It is notable derived from them cannotschemata have any-->objective and, accordingly have exhibited complete tables only in for cases the of can legitimately be used only as regulative principles the the categories. Of schemata and cardinal propos systematization of experience. of CPR (bett~r: the synthetic order of The synthetic methodspecified. of Concepts is not enough to bu Theorder Analytic exposition) is exhibited by the of explication which is the order of philosophy no real content been assigned decreasing generality: logical formswhile of judgments --> has categories --> although it had been presupposed. We know tothe p schemata --> cardinal propositions. It is notable that Kant claimed logicalonly forms of judgments as categories have exhibited complete tables in the cases of theand logical forms andonly concepts not bepropositions found in any intuition. Neith and can cardinal only some are the categories. Of schemata validity be proved aposteriori. Thus transcendental specified. on without priori up the transcendental sensible significa The Analytic of Concepts is not specifying enough toa build of the categ that is, no rules for the application philosophy while no real content has been assigned to the pure concepts, categories specified unless the We meanings as although it had been presupposed. know of thethe pure conceptsare only of translation of a pure concept into the language logical forms of judgments and as categories only by name. The pure theinlogical to the real.Neither can their objective concepts can not be found any intuition.

validity be proved aposteriori. Thus transcendental philosophy cannot go 8. the A confusing distinction:of pure versus schema these concepts, on without specifying a priori sensible significance Much trouble would have been if Kan of the categories can avoided be derived that is, no rules for the application account of the relations between the logical forms unless the meanings of the categories are specified. A schema is a kind o conceptsinto of the the categories. of translation of a pure concept tile understanding language of theand sensible; from account, could of course also be taken as an indicat the logical to the real. were not quite clear for Kant himself. Because o confusion, is notschematized a trivial question what are the c 8. A confusing distinction: pure itversus categories categories". Much trouble would have been avoided if Kant had given a proper account of the relations between the logical forms of judgments, the pure concepts of the understanding and the categories. The lack of such an account, could of course also be taken as an indication that these matters were not quite clear for Kant himself. Because of obvious danger of confusion, it is not a trivial question what are the concepts we call "the categories".

drawn by Kant. (cp. Allison 1983, 188 and Pat

225 that t PURE moreINTUITION misleading than helpful, in suggesting

three or four, sets of categorial concepts. The po It is a commonplace in the Kant literature to talk about pure or categories without the schemata are not categorie unschematized categories in contrast to the schematized ones. This are the very same concepts as the logical fu distinction, however, is a fabrication of commentators and not explicitly elnployed in a certain way, namely to determine t drawn by Kant. (cp. Allison 1983, 188 and Paton 1936/11 19n1) It is intuition. This point is made several times by more misleading than helpful, in suggesting that there are two, or maybe Schematism: "It [transcendental philosophy] mus three or four, sets of categorial concepts. The point is that for Kant the of general but sufficient criteria the conditions u categories without the schemata are not categories at all. The categories be given in agreement with those [pure] co are the very same concepts as the logical functions of judgments concepts would be void of all content, and theref elnployed in a certain way, namely to detennine the manifold of sensible not pure concepts of the understanding.':' (A136/B intuition. This point is made several times by Kant. Just before the ends: "The categories, without schemata, are m Schematism: "It [transcendental philosophy] must lay down, in the form understanding for concepts and present no objec of general but sufficient criteria the conditions under which objects can also a passage omitted in B, beginning at A244.) be given in agreement with those [pure] concepts. Otherwise the to say that the unschematized categories are pur concepts would be void of all content, and therefore mere logical forms, ones are not pure. Kant even says that "pur not pure concepts of the understanding.':' (A136/B175) The Schematism notwithstanding the functions of the understand ends: "The categories, without schemata, are merely functions of the must also contain formal conditions of sensibility understanding for concepts and present no object(G)." (A147/B187 Cpo sense). These conditions of sensibility contain also a passage omitted in B, beginning at A244.) It is a misuse of 'pure' under which alone the category can be applied t to say that the unschematized categories are pure and the schematized fonnal and pure condition is called the sch ones are not pure. Kant even says that "pure concepts a priori (A139/B178) A pure condition cannot tum anythi notwithstanding the functions of the understanding in the categories whatever is meant by the schematized categor must also contain formal conditions of sensibility (namely those of inner concepts. sense). These conditions of sensibility contain the general conditions The very expression, to 'schematize the catego under which alone the category can be applied to any object(G)." This the secondary literature, is misleading. It is not fonnal and pure condition is called the schema of the concept. presumably schemata) are applied to the pure cat (A139/B178) A pure condition cannot tum anything into non-pure. Thus, 'schematized' categories. This would amount to whatever is meant by the schematized categories they are still pure the unschematized categories, the schematize concepts. schemata. The logical functions of judgments may The very expression, to 'schematize the categories', used frequently in set. However, schemata are products of the appli the secondary literature, is misleading. It is not so that something (viz. in the most general case. In that sense they a presumably schemata) are applied to the pure categories to generate the containing the categories. But there are inf 'schematized' categories. This would amount to three sets of concepts: applications. the unschematized categories, the schematized categories and the schemata. The logical functions of judgments may be taken as the fourth set. However, schemata are products of the application of pure concepts in the most general case. In that sense they are are a different set containing the categories. But there are infinitely many sets of applications.

pure concepts of the understanding'. 2) Howeve the understanding' refer also, and more fre 226 CHAPTER 7 categories presented by Kant in his table of cate categories tlle of very concepts as the1)log What are then the meanings of the are labels thesame primary concepts? but employed in a different way, to deter It is Kant's starting point and presupposition that there arenamely the logical have only set of concepts employed in two concepts which he identifies with theone syntactical concepts: the logical logical or as material concepts. forms (or functions) of judgments. They are also (real) sometimes called(Cp. 'the Gr pure concepts of the understanding'. 2)the However, 'the purecan concepts concepts of understanding" refer t?ofthe their and employment (A78/BI04). Most often the understanding' refer also, more frequently, merely to the determination sensible material and refers categories presented by Kant in his table of categories (A80/B106). The to categories. Thelogical title offorms the chapter is "Of the categories are the very samethe concepts as the of judgments, of the Understanding". Unlike but employed in a different Concepts way, namely to determine intuition. Thus comm we talkemployed about theinschematism of the categories. have only one set of concepts two different ways: either as No logical or as material (real)pure concepts. Gram 1968, 7) "The pure of the understanding are schemat concepts(Cp. two different sets,disregarding but again, o the talk. concepts of the understanding" can about refer t'? these concepts up the categories. Kant unequivocally makes their employment (A78/BI04). Most often Kant deals with the 'contain'and their schemata, that is, concepts: that the pu determination of sensible material refers to the material employed without theofsensible the categories. The title of the chapteras is categories "Of the Schematism the Purecond is well known to have Although Concepts of the Understanding". UnlikeKant commentators, Kantnot does not b usage differentNot terms, he seldom but refers talk about the schematism of the of categories. the categories, the to categories, but constantly emphazises their imp pure concepts of the understanding are schematized. That would justify suggest that again, the distinction the pure the talk. about two different sets, but only thebetween schematized set or schematized categories be thrown overb makes up the categories. Kant unequivocally saysshould that the categories with the sensible significance should 'contain' their schemata, concepts that is, that pure concepts cannot be b repeat, reasons are: 1) this is what Kant u employed as categories without themy sensible conditions. well aware he also occasionally andinseeming Although Kant is well known not that to have been very careful his to the use ofrefers categories as mere logical forms. usage of different terms, he seldom to mere logical forms as 4 to speak in the counterfactual mode. A stood categories, but constantly emphazises their important difference. I will ca like a husband a wife. 2) Kant's conc suggest that the distinction isbetween the purewithout or unschematized and the the employment of the categories in the real schematized categories should be thrown overboard and only the pure s forms. Some interpreters maintain that inToTD concepts with sensible significance should be called categories. repeat, my reasons are: 1) this is what Kant unequivocally says. I am 4 See, however, e.g. A247/B304ff where Kant talks well aware that he also occasionally andalso seemingly inconsequently category. Cp A181/B224. On the other refers hand, in - heforms. says that thehe concepts without conditio to the use of categories as A136/B175 mere logical But should be underare mere 101!;ical fonns, not pure concepts of the understan stood to speak in the counterfactual mode. A category without a schema is like a husband without a wife. 2) Kant's concern in CPR is to explain the employment of the categories in the real sense and not as logical forms. Some interpreters maintain that in TD/l Kant is dealing with 4 See, however, e.g. A247/B304ff where Kant talks about the use of the pure category. Cp also A181/B224. On the other hand, in the passage quoted above A136/B175 - he says that the concepts without conditions of application (schemata) are mere lo~ical forms, not pure concepts of the understandin~.

categories presented in the table of categori contain their schemata although 227 they ar PURE INTUITION Otherwise they could not determine any em mere logical concepts. (Allison, there 1983,isch. 7, Seung 1989, that 127)schemata This, fo a logical possibility however, flatly contradicts Kant when on the one those hand, of that besays, different from thethehuman couldhe pure logical concepts do not determine any object(O) and, on the other cannot be correct when commentators freq hand, that in TD/l the categories are employed determine the 'pure categories as the presented in table of to manifold of a given intuition (§20).5 Thus it must be so that the the schematized ones. Transcendental logic categories presented in the table of categories are implicitly toempl concepts. It presupposes thesupposed legitimate contain their schemata although they are explained only later on. Otherwise they could not determine 9.any empirical intuition. Of course, A transcendental schema is a pure, f there is a logical possibility that schemata for different kind of sensibility Perhaps because of the alleged oracular could be different from those of the human sensibility. Accordingly, it chapter, the very concept of schema has an cannot be correct when commentators frequently refer to the concepts Kant a 'schema' was quite an ordinary presented in table of categories as the 'pure categories' in distinction to different contexts. A 'schema' is roug the schematized ones. Transcendental logic deals with the 'schematized' contemporary usage, say a 'conceptual sch concepts. It presupposes the legitimate employment of the logical forms. an outline, an example, an analogue, a mod diagram for an application of something. A 9. A transcendental schema is a pure, formal intuition general method or procedure of furnishing Perhaps because of the allegeda picture. oracular(A140/B179, nature of the cp.Schematismalso CJ §59) Ho chapter, the very concept of schema has an air of mystery. However, for is not itself an image or a picture. (ibid) Kant a 'schema' was quite an ordinary concept, used frequently in 'Schema' is a relative tenn. A concept c different contexts. A 'schema'concept is roughly the same as in the in one perspective and as a schema contemporary usage, say a 'conceptual schema'. It is a formula, a rule, of a metaphysical for the completeness an outline, an example, an analogue, a model, a paradigm, a blueprint, a generatim or of corporeal nature in particula diagram for an application of something. A schema a concept the pre (MAN 473) "Theirof[space and istime] general method or procedure of furnishing the concept with an image related always to the reproductive orimagi a picture. (A140/B 179, cpo also CJobjects §59) However, very clearly of experience. Withouta schema these object is not itself an image or a picture. (ibid) And so it is with concepts of every kind." (A 'Schema' is a relative tenn. A concept can be viewed as an ordinary concept in one perspective and as a schema from another. "The schema 5 Cpo also a very explicit passage: "Thus the cate for the completeness of a metaphysical system, whether of nature sensible intuition, of which they contain the synth object(O), cannot define any object generatim or of corporeal nature indeterminate particular, is the table of categories." themselves have any validity of objective concepts. (MAN 473) "Their [space and time] presentation is a mere schema related always to the reproductive imagination which summons the objects of experience. Without these objects it would have no meaning. And so it is with concepts of every kind." (A156/B195) 5 Cpo also a very explicit passage: "Thus the categories, without the conditions of sensible intuition, of which they contain the synthesis, have no relation at all to any determinate object(O), cannot define any object(O), and accordingly do not in themselves have any validity of obiective concePts." A246

under which subsumption is possible. Conc · 228

CHAPTER sensible7 schemata cannot be applied objectiv

in some cases a concept may possibly also Kant uses 'schema' also in a more technical sense. He presumably Empirical concepts are such. They do not n thought that schemata underly all concepts, at least all pure sensible them homogeneous, say with geometrical c concepts. (A141/B180) In other words, nothing can be subsumed directly concepts are already embedded in the under a concept, but for every concept there is a corresponding schema generation. Thus, like Warnock, Kant pres under which subsumption is possible. Concepts which do not have any an empirical concept implies the ability t sensible schemata cannot be applied objectively at all. On the other hand, should not be confused with words. Cert in some cases a concept may possibly also function as its own schema. without being able to apply it correctly. Empirical concepts are such. They do not need a 'third thing' to make Disregarding the details of Kant's gene them homogeneous, say with geometrical concepts, because geometrical which he did not present unequivocally concepts are already embedded in the empirical concepts in their Schematism-chapter. The schemata are no generation. Thus, like Warnock, Kant presumably thought that to have viz., the schemata of the pure concepts of an empirical concept implies the ability t~ use it. Note that concepts are not images or pictures. For the categorie should not be confused with words. Certainly one can have a word any given images with which they are hom without being able to apply it correctly. are 'rules for rules'. "Image is a product Disregarding the details of Kant's general theory of schematism reproductive imagination" (A141/B181) an which he did not present unequivocally - our present concern is the priori - which, of course, a transcendental sc Schematism-chapter. The schemata are now transcendental schemata, Allison (1981 & 1983) argues effective viz., the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding. Schemata Gram 1968) for understanding a schema as are not images or pictures. For the categories there are not and cannot be the distinction between a 'form of intuition any given images with which they are homogeneous because categories highly relevant to the present matter. 'P are 'rules for rules'. "Image is a product of the empirical faculty of understood as a formal, determined intuitio reproductive imagination" (A141/B181) and thus cannot be possible a understands it. The decisive point is the priori - which, of course, a transcendental schema must be. intuition. It is singular qua intuition, but a Allison (1981 & 1983) argues effectively (following some ideas of concept-like: a rule or a procedure. A tr Gram 1968) for understanding a schema as a pure intuition. Obviously similar nature. the distinction between a 'form of intuition' and a 'formal intuition' is To repeat: the task of the· Schematism is highly relevant to the present matter. 'Pure intuition' must now be that the pure concepts of the underst understood as a formal, determined intuition. That is also how Allison significance, that is, can determine the empi understands it. The decisive point is the peculiar nature of a formal in different ways in CPR: ".. besides the intuition. It is singular qua intuition, but anyhow it presents something condition of rules), which is given in concept-like: a rule or a procedure. A transcendental schema has a [transcendental philosophy] also can a pr similar nature. To repeat: the task of the· Schematism is to explain how it is possible that the pure concepts of the understanding can have sensible significance, that is, can determine the empirically given. The task is put in different ways in CPR: ".. besides the rule (or better the general condition of rules), which is given in the pure understanding, it [transcendental philosophy] also can a priori indicate the case of its

To each pure concept there is a correspon 229 PURE INTUITION between the intellectual and the sensible.

schema is partlybut intellectual application." ft ..to lay down, in the fonn of general sufficient partly criteria,sensibl be which has these seemingly those the conditions under which objects can be given in agreement withcontradictory ft of convincing reasons why the schemata s concepts... (AI35/B174) will very briefly some of t thestate Schematism is this: Kant's most general answer to theintuitions. problem Iof 1) Kant says so although not To each pure concept there is a corresponding schema which mediates in the way that it is difficult to u straightforward between the intellectual and the sensible. Accordingly, a transcendental could be turned into something schema is partly intellectual partly sensible. What could that somethingelse. T schematacharacters? are conditions applicati be which has these seemingly contradictory Therefor arethe plenty b exellent example is: "The understanding of convincing reasons why the schemata should be understood as pure priori ofsynthetic them: fundamental propositions, b intuitions. I will state very briefly some all objects(G) Critique -that in might such abe giv 1) Kant says so - although notcategories in the First must also be a priori intuitions, which conta straightforward way that it is difficult to understand how these passages of the pure concepts could be turned into something the else.application Taking for granted that the of th without intuition there is no objecteD) an wit schemata are conditions for the application of the pure concepts, function be detennined as category, bycan its nature carries with it a exellent example is: ftThe understanding cognition of any object(G). Therefore, priori synthetic fundamental propositions, by which it subordinates to the wit which there a priori de be given to proposition it. Consequently, categories all objects(G) that mightfundamental forcontain such cognition." (MAN 475n)for (For m the requisite conditions must also be a priori intuitions, which 1983,179.) see Allison the application of the pure concepts of the understanding, inasmuch as "Theregard schemata are thus without intuition there is no object(O)2)with to which the nothing logical but a in accordance with rules." (A145/B184) W function can be detennined as category, and consequently there is no time' mean pure for intuition Kant except without there fOffilal is no int cognition of any object(G). Therefore, intuition. But nothing can function be directly fundamental proposition which a priori deteIDlines the logical determination presupposes synthesis, for such cognition." (MAN 475n) (For more references and arguments and pure concepts. To determine time - more pr see Allison 1983,179.) the transcendental actbutofa priori determinationssynthesis of time of 2) "The schemata are thus nothing figurative This synthesisofis an a in accordance with rules." (A145/BI84) Whatsynthesis. could 'determinations the sensibility. (B152) clearlyofit is ex time' mean for Kant except formal intuitions? Time Thus is a fonn and only it, which can make a All bridge b intuition. But nothing can be directly intuited as determined. sensibility. Detennined pure intuitions determination presupposes synthesis, and all synthesis presupposes the accordance with the pure concepts pure concepts. To determine time - more precisely: objects in time - is of an the un

act of the transcendental synthesis of imagination also called the figurative synthesis. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility. (BI52) Thus clearly it is exactly the figurative synthesis, and only it, which can make a bridge between the intellect and the sensibility. Determined pure intuitions are fonnal intuitions in accordance with the pure concepts of the understanding.

should at the categories. Now a schema must obviously be 230 CHAPTER 7 t to which it belongs as a schema same concep be contained in its schema. concep 3) In fact Kant also explicitly sayst must that a schema "is simply the pure schema is in itself always a pr "Theconcepts, 4) with synthesis, detennined in accordance to which the category That the schemata are products is B179) (A140/ gives expression." (A142/B181) Whatever we have learned from Kant it According to all teachings o Schema the that should at least be uncontroversial for tism. him all synthesis presupposes the productive imagination gen ts which be produc the categories. Now a schema must obviously produced with the very hat confusing is Kant.' s re be somew might Whatas a schema. Thus in a way a pure same concept to which it belongs a pure synthesis or as a rule of pure synthesis concept must be contained in itsasschema. is. However, the air of confusion disap synthes always a product of imagination." 4) "The schema is in itself a schema is "a presentation of a mind (A140/B179) That the schemata are that products is heavily emphazised in ation to furnish a concep t with its the Schematism. According toimagin all teachings of Kant until now, the ingly, even as a product it is a general pr products which the productive Accord imagination generate are pure intuitions. is. Pure imagination does not pr furtheris synthes What might be somewhat confusing Kant.' s reference to a schema both intuitions. of pure synthesis and as a product of that as a pure synthesis or as a rule formal ta are sensible conditions a prio 5) Schema synthesis. However, the air of confusion disappears when it is kept in ng presentations, 'third s sensible, mediati of a general procedure of mind that a schema is "a presentation both with categories and with ap homogeneous imagination to furnish a concept with its picture". (A140/B 179) tly contradictory attributes can apparenprocedure, Accordingly, even as a productThese it is a general that is, a rule of A formal intuition is both sensible an ns. not intuitio further synthesis. Pure imagination does produce anything else than concepts in a pure synthesis. What could a form formal intuitions. except a fonnal intuition? sensibility be 5) Schemata are sensible conditions a priori, both intellectual and is even a more general view on 6) There sensible, mediating presentations, 'third somethings', which are e 'items' of his cognitive explanations a possibl homogeneous both with categories and with appearances. (A138/B177) (Cp. A47/B64) The only except intuitions. These apparently contradictoryand attributes can only belong to fonnal t nor an intuition. Schem ata m a concep neither intuitions. A fonnal intuition is is both sensible and detennined by the pure they are postulated to be a ne ns, aunless intuitio concepts in a pure synthesis. What could formal and pure condition of would certainly be rather an odd explanation sensibility be except a fonnal intuition? ts were based either on other concepts concepview 6) There is even a more general on the matter. For Kant the The only 'item' which can be given to us a prio possible 'items' of his cognitive explanations are of two kinds: concepts reference is a pure intuition. Thus it seems clea and intuitions. (Cp. A47/B64) The only exception is the '1 think' which cannot consistently mean any other entity than is neither a concept nor an intuition. Schemata must be either concepts or To summarize: transcendental schemata intuitions, unless they are postulated to be a new kind of entities. But it alr imagination and the pure concepts are would certainly be rather an odd explanation if the application of pure concepts were based either on other concepts or on new kind of items. The only 'item' which can be given to us a priori and which has sensible reference is a pure intuition. Thus it seems clear that by a 'schema' Kant cannot consistently mean any other entity than a pure intuition. To summarize: transcendental schemata are products of the imagination and the pure concepts are already employed in their

time is no t in an y wa y ex pla ine d in t its tum is ne ces sar ily inv olv ed in all 231 PURE INTUITION the Aesthetic. I take it to of be the be yo nd reasonable generation. They are the most general applications categories. means a pu re intuition qu a fon They are pure and a priori, they are particulars with general content and na l in so mu ch lik e a pu re int ion tha t we c accordingly rules for application, that is, they are like fonnaluit intuitions in mathematics. How it is possible that the categories are applicable to [10. Moltke S. Gr am on sc he time is not in any way explained in the Schematism chapter. That time inma ta Pioneintuiting explained in its tum is necessarily involved in all sensible ering wowas rk on interpreting th intuitions, ha s be en the Aesthetic. do ne by Mo lt Howeve I take it to be beyond reasonable doubt that withimapre 'schema' r, the ssi on GrKant am give everywh orere at least an 'entity' means a pure intuition qua fonnal intuition, in Ka nt an d thusbeing he rejec 'thtake ird thi so much like a pure intuition that we can them toeo beryidentical. ng ' -th - alt ho ug h so ex pli he finds it self-contradic tory (p.93); n [10. Moltke S. Gram on schematauniversal. Gr am takes it for gra nte d cannot be a co mp osi te bu tasmu Pioneering work on interpreting the schemata, and especially pure st be a conc no r an (1968, intuitionchapter , alt ho ug4.). intuitions, has been done by Moltke S.eptGram h he ad 2) Th sec on d theory ex am ine d by Gr am However, the impression Gram gives :is ethat he finds contradictions a rule or a pro ced ure for of his own ideas.gene 1)rat The everywhere in Kant and thus he rejects most ing an fin unsat-isfGram actoryrejects too. An 'third thing' -theory - although so explicitdsinit Kant because ad dit ion o alone suffice to bri ng the he finds it self-contradictory (p.93); nothing can be both particular se co ncand ep ts an y presup sed tha t pu re concepthing' universal. Gram takes it for granted that po a schema as a 'third ts, aft er which rresponds to of entitythe-me neither cannot be a composite but must be a newcokind W ha ta Gr a opinion wh at Ka nt ind Kant takes eed it tome bean both. concept nor an intuition, although he admits ,that s. It mu the pure concepts ha ve schen1a isle co 2) The second theory examined by Gram is the 'rule-theory':soame sensib of schematism wo uld be ally unHe a rule or a procedure for generating an image in an intuition.tot(p.95) sol va b are several indications for does to pure concepts finds it unsatisfactory too. An addition of rules roots not of a t intuitions. (p. 100) It simunless ply folitlow is s fr alone suffice to bring these concepts any closer to sensibility; validity of the pu re co ts co uld no t b presupposed that pure concepts, after all, have elementsncinepsensibility objec - pu re intuition s - cois, which corresponds to them. What Gramts finds objectionable uldinbemy exhib associates with the pu re co ncep opinion, what Kant indeed means. It must be presupposed that, after all,m to ts see 'th ird the ory ' also acc omthe moproblem the pure concepts have some sensible correlates. Otherwise da tes bo th rule-the we ve r, ev en ifthat of schematism would be totally unsolvable.ory3). Ho Gram also sees there Gr am regard as mo st nearly co nsi ste nt he finasds pure are several indications for roots of a third theory: schemata it qu est i intuitions. (p. 100) It simply follows from the fact that the objective validity of the pure concepts could not be shown unless corresponding objects - pure intuitions - could be exhibited. The schemata which Kant associates with the pure concepts seem to be pure intuitions as well. The 'third theory' also accommodates both the third-thing-theory and the rule-theory. However, even if Gram regards this account of the schemata as most nearly consistent he finds it questionable in many ways. He even

of syntheticity', according to which all synt presuppose pure intuitions. · 232 CHAPTER 7 What I take as a key to (nearly all) Gram's claims that Kant's principal operate idea of with the role of pure conceptsof inpure, a proper conception metaphysical propositions is not philosophically viable. So Gram of im intuition is a 'composite'. It isfara as product accepts this account it is to support what he calls Kant's 'hidden theory puts it. It is both intellectual and sensible. of syntheticity', according to which allofsynthetic a specificpropositions concept butaitpriori is also g intuition presuppose pure intuitions. its 'object'. It is rather strange that Gram troubles is that although he did notit ~s What I take as a key to (nearly all) Gram's of pure intuition conception of pure, fonnal intuition. A pure of operate with a proper conception fundamental notion in his philosophy as Kant clearly it intuition is a 'composite'. It is constructing a product of aimagination concept, that is, exhibiting puts it. It is both intellectual there and should sensible. particular being an notItbeisany doubt that according t it is also general having a concept as intuition of a specific concept but have a concept as its content, and accordingly its 'object'. It is rather strange thatcontent Gramofdid not qua adhere to this which, concept, is gene but the it ~s so obvious in Kant. Theare, o conception of pure intuition although Schematism which Gram distinguishes fundamental notion in his philosophy of mathematics is various that of asp and not different theories but constructing a concept, that is,Likewise, exhibitingGram's it in adisclosing pure intuition. Thus'hidd of Kant's there should not be any doubt that according to Kant a pure intuition can mostly quite appropriate, although I do not ta qua intuition have a concept as its content, and accordingly is particular theory' than as complementing the 'implicit t but the content of which, qua concept, is generaL theoriesproposition of the transcendental the special case ofVarious reading, Schematism which Gram distinguishes are,cannot on mybe thinks, they directlycompatible verified by r various insightful aspects of work the same and not different theories but(Gram's is matter. seriously Likewise, Gram's disclosing ofmispresentations Kant's 'hidden too. theory of judgment' is is The use of 'pure' mostly quite appropriate, although I doupside-down not take it so muchof as'construction' a 'hidden totally reading theory' than as complementing the 'implicit theory'. Moreover, there is propositions. Contraryintothe what Gram the special case of transcendental 11. What is explained Schematism? thinks, they cannot be directly verified by recourse to pure intuitions. A most important question concerning Ka (Gram's insightful work is seriously undennined by other is the question how the intellectual concepts mispresentations too. The use of 'pure' is an obvious case, like his material. That is what the Analytic is all abo totally upside-down reading of 'construction' (p.125)).] the two realms of the intellect and the philosophical undertaking cannot succeed w 11. What is explained in the Schematism? bypass this separation. The task of the Schema A most important question concerning Kant's that theoretical philosophy possible to bridge gap. is the question how the intellectual concepts detennine the sensible the Transcendental Deduction i The task of can material. That is what the Analytic is all about. Kant himself separated validity of the categories concerning all sen the two realms of the intellect and the sensibility. However, his philosophical undertaking cannot succeed without finding a way to bypass this separation. The task of the Schematism is to explain how it is possible to bridge that gap. The task of the Transcendental Deduction is to establish the objective validity of the categories concerning all sensible manifold, that is, to

explanation of how particular categories can be to the Schematism. To establish the necessary PURE INTUITION 233 concepts for a certain domain and to show applicable all for theItsame domain show the necessity of the employment of the atcategories. is plain that itare two d application problem. Moreover, in are a kind must be presupposed that the categories are of applicable in the first place. the categories generally is considered, Otherwise the Deduction would be totally in vain. It must be wherea conditions of some particular presupposed that the categoriessensible can be employed, although the catego there is can no justification the accusation, fre be employedfor is postponed explanation of how particular categories that the Schematism superfluous to the Schematism. To establish Kant, the necessary employmentis of certain or alte is succesful that if Schematism concepts for a certain domain and to the show how these concepts and are indispen its task. It is different quite another applicable at all for the same domain are two tasks,matter, albeit that bothin TD K have incidentally the essential g are a kind of application problem. to Moreover, in TD thementioned necessary role of more in the Schematism. the categories generally is considered, whereas in the Schematism the Kant's answer toare thepresented. question ofThus the Schemat categories sensible conditions of some particular satisfactory frequently when it simply hangs on the assum there is no justification for the accusation, directed against against or expectations, is accusation the understanding Kant, that the Schematism is superfluous alternatively,it the through so determining the ininner sen that if the Schematism is succesfulsensibility and indispensible, TD has failed Kant claimed have already separated the in its task. It is quite another matter, Although that in TD Kant indeedtoseems he essential must havegeneral had inpoints his pocket explanation to have incidentally mentioned the made an once more in the Schematism. connected via pure intuition. Thus in the end forms anddoes intellectual forms Kant's answer to the question ofsensible the Schematism not appear very becomes having a clearlythat, dominating position. (P satisfactory when it simply hangsones on the assumption after all and simply "to indicate a priori the casethe to which t against expectations, it is the understanding which determines ("The to a pure concep sensibility through determining (A135/B174) the inner sense byrule" the refers imagination. of examples of some most general cases of appl Although Kant claimed to have separated the intellect and the sensibility wasexplanation noticed earlier, the Schematism has not th he must have had in his pocket an how these faculties are proof kind. connected via pure intuition. Thus in of theany end the difference between However, impression of dissatisfaction is sensible forms and intellectual forms becomestheblurred, the intellectual simple reflection. it beis proved ones having a clearly donlinatinga position. (Pr §38) How Kant'scould answer to certain concepts if we, from the correspond simply "to indicate a priori the case to which the rule is to be applied". to theThe correspondence? It would no (A135/B174) ("The rule" refers towhatsoever a pure concept.) answer is the list were adduced too, because we would of examples of some most general cases of application: the schematae As be equal that something and justification was noticed earlier, the Schematism has not theofslightest character ofelse; a Correspondence is a 'factual' matter even i proof of any kind. However, the impression of dissatisfaction is considerably reduced by a simple reflection. How could it be proved that just these schemata correspond to certain concepts if we, from the beginning, had no clue whatsoever to the correspondence? It would not help if something else were adduced too, because we would be equally justified in asking for justification of that something else; and so on in infinitum. Correspondence is a 'factual' matter even in this case, and factual

ends. It surely has to end somewhere. A reference quite explicit in the Schematism and indeed is a · 234 CHAPTER 7 the whole chapter. After all, the original "harmo andshown. the understanding must be presupposed matters cannot be proved, but It is less illuminating to accuseby Ka How is it possible that the pure concepts ca Kant of a lack of argument than to make clear where the argumentation The question breaks into two: How is it possible ends. It surely has to end somewhere. A reference to the unexplainable is can determine 1) pure intuitions, 2) empirica quite explicit in the Schematism and indeed is an important message of Schematism is supposed to answer is the secon the whole chapter. After all, the original "harmony" between sensibility how the pure concepts are applicable to the app and the understanding must be presupposed by Kant. (Baum 1986, 157) are applicable generally. The answer is simply th How is it possible that the pure concepts can determine intuitions? possible. It is the schemata and not the pure conc The question breaks into two: How is it possible that the pure concepts determine empirical intuitions, because the sche can determine 1) pure intuitions, 2) empirical intuitions? What the all emp appearances. Time is the form Schematism is supposed to with answer is the second question. Kant of asked time is determined by the categories so are how the pure concepts are applicable to the appearances, not how theyemp How the very schemata are possible, that is, ho are applicable generally. The answer is simply that the schemata make it categories to determine pure intuitions? In th possible. It is the schemata and not the pure concepts as such which can answer to that question is not explanatory at all. determine empirical intuitions, because the schemata are homogeneous determination of any manifold of intuition - pure with appearances. Time is the form of all empirical intuitions. While synthesis. (BI50) Notwithstanding Kant's re time is determined by the categories so are empirical intuitions as well. understanding determines pure sensible manifo How the very schemata are possible, that is, how is it possible for the dictum of the Schematism: "This schematism o categories to determine pure intuitions? In the Schematism Kant's regard of appearances and their mere form, is answer to that question is not explanatory at all. TD told the story of the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of determination of any manifold of intuition - pure or not - in the figurative likely ever to allow us to discover, and to synthesis. (BI50) Notwithstanding Kant's references to how the (AI41/B180) The depths of the human soul r understanding determines pure sensible manifold we have the famous imagination, which in that way becomes a hidde dictum of the Schematism: "This schematism of our understanding, in the intellect and the sensibility (AI5/B29); the r regard of appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the by Heidegger. Heidegger, no doubt, put his fing depths of the human soul, whose true modes of activity nature is hardly This is a place where Kant just points to a facult likely ever to allow us to discover, and to open to our gaze." proper explanation. He opens a door to specula (AI41/B180) The depths of the human soul refers to the faculty of 'machinery' which has the hidden powers of gen imagination, which in that way becomes a hidden and common root of 'third things'. The faculty itself is - what else the intellect and the sensibility (AI5/B29); the root so much celebrated faculty between the understanding and the sensib by Heidegger. Heidegger, no doubt, put his finger on the crucial point. Kant's dictum could hardly be read otherw This is a place where Kant just points to a faculty but does not give any admission that there is no ultimate explanation proper explanation. He opens a door to speculations. The faculty is a bridge the gap between the intellect and the sensi 'machinery' which has the hidden powers of generating Kant's notorious 'third things'. The faculty itself is - what else - a 'third thing'. It is a faculty between the understanding and the sensibility. Kant's dictum could hardly be read otherwise than as his humble admission that there is no ultimate explanation how it is possible to bridge the gap between the intellect and the sensibility. In §24 it is flatly

which we would have no cognition aware." (A78/B103) Accordingly, the 235 PURE INTUITION explanations in addition to those stated - without any further explanation - that the figurative is dominating role ofsynthesis time is rather con an action of the understanding on the sensibility. (B152) Kant had made is cl the B-edition the imagination a similar statement earlier: "..synthesis generatim is the mere understanding. (ibid.)effect of imagination, a blind though indispensible function of the soul, without which we are seldom and the which we would have no cognition at all, but12.of"Schema-judgments" aware." (A78/B103) Accordingly, the Schematism hardly offers any new How did Kant justify his claims th explanations in addition to those already mentioned in TD. The certain category? The answer is very dominating role of time is rather conspicuous. It is also notable, that in He did not present any deduction o the B-edition the imagination is clearly said to be governed by the relied merely on his philosophical in understanding. (ibid.) table of the categories. I have tried a justification is not even possible. Al 12. "Schema-judgments" and the problem of synthetic a priori He calls statements connecting a c How did Kant justify his claims that a certain schema(Allison corresponds a judgments'. 1983,to185ff.) He certain category? The answer is very simple. He didframework, not justify and it at answers all. Kantian th but seems to have He did not present any deduction of the schemata, priori. He also 2) draws attention to - asgive he did by presenting relied merely on his philosophical insight to a 'deduction' of the these jud give reasons why a further table of the categories. I have tried above to judgments leads Allison to the probl thinks somewhat differently.generally justification is not even possible. Allison transcendental propositions He calls statements connecting a category schema on its a false track.'schema There is really goneand judgments'. (Allison 1983, 185ff.) He asks why 1) how to classify them or at leas it is not appropriatein-the Kantian framework, and answers that they are synthetic judgments a of synthetic judgments the status priori. He also 2) draws attention to their missing justification and tries illuminating to say, but it indicates a to give a 'deduction' of these judgments. The problenl of deductions schema of 'ultimate' is. question judgments leads Allison to the problem of the status and the nature of Allison gives both an "apagogic p transcendental propositions generally. In my opinion, in proof 1) Allison has- and a transcendental by Kant to goschema at alL Ijudgments will arguemust be gone on a false track. There is really no track outcome: doubtful to ascribe schema why it is not appropriate - or at least very my opinion, is a mistaken conclusio In 2) heofhas something philo judgments the status of synthetic a priori. propositions transcendental same time how judgments indistinct the illuminating to say, but it indicates at the classify schema within th question of 'ultimate' deductions is. inquiry is a second-level inquiry, or Allison gives both an "apagogic proof' idiom. - notoriously prohibited as a analy The distinction between transcendental proof by Kant - and a progressive argument with the same outcome: schema judgments must be synthetic a priori. (p 186) This, in my opinion, is a mistaken conclusion. As is the case with many other propositions of transcendental philosophy, it does not make sense to classify schema judgments within that very framework. Transcendental inquiry is a second-level inquiry, or meta-level to use the contemporary idiom. The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments should

synthetic judgments. The schematism essential · 236 CHAPTER 7 part of the explanation how synt This is correct but as noticed earlier, what be understood to concern judgments on the object-level. An account of not the syntheticity as such - the applicab syntheticity is given by Kant. Byintuitions the account mean what Gram calls is Ialready presupposed in it "Kant's implicit (covert, hidden) theory of judgment" or Allison refers judgments with empirical reference, tothat as "deep structure"; that is, the framework doctrine ofofthe of intuition in W therole human sensibility. synthetic judgments. The schematism could be understood an a P Allison that a schema judgment -asbeing essential part of the explanation how synthetic judgments are possible. is itself synthetic? Can an explanation con This is correct but as noticed earlier, what the dealsThe withpossib is judgments at Schematism the same time? not the syntheticity as such - the obvious. applicability of pure concepts to pure Still worse, the question of sche intuitions is already presupposed in but it -a third but the of synthetic level levelcase inquiry. The questio judgments with empirical reference, that is, the syntheticity within thenatu propositions giving the account of the framework of the human sensibility. Why should we suppose with The analytic-synthetic distinction is n Allison that a schema judgment - being explaining syntheticity might a P3:rt give ofthe opposite impression. is itself synthetic? Can an explanation contain an explanation of its own definitional, meaning assigning and no judgments at the same time? TheMoreover, possibility of are an plenty infiniteofregress is w judgments there obvious. Still worse, the questiondo of not schema is not aassecond of classification analytic admitjudgments level but a third level inquiry. Thethe question concerns justification of the judgment "Cognition is made up of propositions giving the account of the nature of judgments. intuitions". It can hardly be an analytic The analytic-synthetic distinction not what exhaustive, although Kant moreisthan is contained in the subjec might give the opposite impression. There either. are, say, any intuition Thus stipulative, it cannot sa definitional, meaning assigning requirement and nonnative judgmentsOrastake: well. of syntheticity. "God Moreover, there are plenty of judgments within Kant's philosophy which analytic judgment. Neither can it in princi do not admit of classification as Many analytic synthetic judgments. Take of or Kant's propositions look like c the judgment "Cognition is made up of two elements: concepts and Kant claims that they have some kind of intuitions". It can hardly be an analytic judgment. It says something have in mind are the examples above and s more than what is contained in the subject. However is not based onan o sense." or "Truth is anitagreement with any intuition either. Thus it cannot satisfy even Kant'sif we 'deep Moreover, try structure' to classify requirement of syntheticity. Or take: "God is omnipotent." This not an wh Kantian framework, there are is reasons analytic judgment. Neither can it synthetic in principle be based on any intuition. a priori. The question of aprior Many of Kant's propositions look like contingent still Obviously, stating statements a necessarybutconnectio Kant claims that they have someexperience. kind of necessity. The propositions They must be verifiableI a have in mind are the examples above and say: "Time is the fonn of inner deceptive. Why should we suppose that sense." or "Truth is an agreement with an object." Moreover, even if we try to classify schema judgments within the Kantian framework, there are reasons why they should not be taken as synthetic a priori. The question of apriority seems to be very simple. Obviously, stating a necessary connection, they are not justified by experience. They must be verifiable a priori. But this simplicity is deceptive. Why should we suppose that they are verifiable at all? As

Taking for granted that there are pure not follow that a correspondence expre 237 PURE INTUITION justified a priori and by intuition. W correspondence is correct? Can it be just linguistic facts they are verifiable aposteriori but, of course, thereby schema of not a triangle thethey correct s facts, it does follow is that loosing their necessity. Taken as 'pure'the Recoursecannot to intuition in synthetic be verified. How jud can be justified. Pure intuitions themselves to the intuition of th could they? With other pure intuitions?referential And so onrecourse in infinitum. something oflike itself. A geometrical Taking for granted that there are pure intuitions schemata, it does judgm of any triangle is 180 degrees", not follow that a correspondence expressed by a schema judgment isis, acc wherethat a recourse to What is the proof guarantee the justified a priori and by intuition. mathematical role. In that intuition the concept of tria correspondence is correct? Can it be justified at all? How to justify that (exhibited). What is triangle? justified is the schema of the concept the schema of a triangle is the correctgiven is a determination based on that Recourse to intuition in synthetic judgments can hardly mean self- intuiti the very itself concept referential recourse to the intuition of intuition norwhich does itpredicates answer the que "The sum of of any the angles something of itself. A geometrical judgment the sumlike of the angles triangle 180 of any triangle is 180 degrees", is, according Kant, justified a As has to been pointed out by repeatedly the application of a cert to a pureofintuition plays a crucial mathematical proof where a recourse product (temporal) The problem - ormaterial. better its schema - isof sche role. In that intuition the concept of triangle given conceptabove. yields The a certain schema. H given (exhibited). What is justified is the judgment judgment to a pure What pure the intuition is a determination based on that intuition. Butintuition. it does not justify that is circular. The question was intuition itself nor does it answer the question of the next level: "Why is "Wh particular schema?" It cannot be justified degrees?" the sum of the angles of any triangle 180 again. Or maybe it canschema and should As has been pointed out repeatedly a transcendental is a be ans answer concept is available. does not and to But pureit sensible product of the application of a certain that word. rel the ordinary senseis of judgments to justify that The a (temporal) material. The problem of schema even it? looser, How toisjustify With because recourse a sch given concept yields a certain schema.schema concept. can in only show the schema The We schema question? But to a pure intuition. What pure intuition? obvious, it is not that. that is circular. The question was "Why is itbut correct tojustified refer tobythat relation experience, sy just byfrom referring to ittoagain and particular schema?" It cannot be justifiedApart totally impossible. (e.g. A157/B196) Th like that, while no better again. Or maybe it can and should be answered priori can yield be established only if one answer is available. But it does not and cannot any justification in of it experience (actual or possible) relation of a pure concept and its is inv the ordinary sense of that word. The to state such relations to experience. schema is even looser, because a schema is not a constructed pure It wo concept. We can only show the schema. That can be 'intuitively' very obvious, but it is not justified by that. Apart from relation to experience, synthetic propositions a priori are totally impossible. (e.g. A157/B196) That is, a synthetic proposition a priori can be established only if one of its grounds is such that a relation to experience (actual or possible) is involved. Now schema judgments state such relations to experience. It would be absurd to think schema

this: a judgment can be justified by recourse correctness of the intuition is without ques nor incorrect; it is an immedia neither correct 238 CHAPTER 7 An 'object' or a 'concept' given in an intuiti judgments in tum are somehow grounded on can relation experience. Thus be to justified are judgment way. What a priori. they cannot be synthetic judgments intuitions themselves. The very idea of the role of anIt intuition in a to synthetic judgment is is interesting compare a correspondi this: a judgment can be justified by recourse to an intuition because the Deduction. I mean judgments connecting correctness of the intuition is without question. The intuition itself is judgment with a certain category; exhibire neither correct nor incorrect; it is an immediate presentation of an object. concepts. They are not analytic either. But th An 'object' or a 'concept' given in an intuition cannot be verified in any although not based on any intuition. Kant doe way. What can be justified are judgments based on intuitions, In fact this case isnot close judgments' either. intuitions themselves. schema judgments. The categories are also tr It is interesting to compare a the corresponding the Metaphysical logical formscase intoinmaterial forms. Moreo Deduction. I mean judgments are connecting a certain logical formintuition of capable of detennining sensible judgment with a certain category; exhibired by Kant in his lists of be supposed to contain at least some kind of concepts. They are not analytic either. But they are the ampliative, Allison pointscertainly out that schemata although not based on any intuition. Kant does not justify these 'category detennination by the transcendental sy judgments' either. In fact this case is closely analogous to the case from of th categories. Schemata are translations schema judgments. The categories are alsoHis translations. case from pr concepts. beginningIn forthis a 'deduction' the logical forms into material forms. Moreover, the categories in the list that is correspondences would be plausible, are capable of detennining sensible intuitions. Thus they must implicitly been correctly accomplished. That he does i be supposed to contain at least some kind ofand schemata. categories the categories of substance Allison points out that thequarrel schemata of temporal Bu with are this products kind of 'deduction'. detennination by the transcendental governed byto the justified a synthesis priori? It cannot amount any rig categories. Schemata are translations from the logical concepts into real intuitively be very obvious as it certainly wa concepts. His beginning for a 'deduction' proceeds by showing how the raise serious doubts - as Allison does - conc correspondences would be plausible, that is, that the translations have characterizations of different schemata. been correctly accomplished. That Kant he does in morethought detail for the schema modal ju obviously that categories and the categories of substance and schema causality. have no to correct. Only one can Icorrespond quarrel with this kind of 'deduction'. But how can a translation be pro difficult to see how it could be shown or justified a priori? It cannot amount any rigorous justification. It might onlyto possible connection has been exhibit intuitively be very obvious as it references certainly was for Kant. However, to the unexplainable in we thecan Schem raise serious doubts - as Allisonhedoes concerning the details of Kant's himself did not find a justification ei characterizations of different schemata. Schema judgments are significance (not me Kant obviously thought that schema judgments are in some way correct. Only one schema can correspond to a certain category. But it is difficult to see how it could be shown or proved that a necessary and the only possible connection has been exhibited. In fact Kant's humble references to the unexplainable in the Schematism strongly suggests that he himself did not find a justification either necessary or possible. Schema judgments are significance (not meaning) ascribing judgments.

the necessity? Kant's own answer m to that fact, as there is no explanatio and not some others. 239 PURE INTUITION I have tried to show above, that How could significance be justified? A schema judgment refers to a pure of schema judgm the classification intuition but it is not based on pure reasoning intuition as ordinary synthetic that a schema judgment s judgments are. At the same time schemathe judgments look itlike contingent subject, thus seems to be non-a judgments. It could be logically a pure possible that some other intuition, thus it seems to be s correspondences were attached to pure concepts. Thatnot would be the case that, it does fit Kant's classific of schemata for another kind of sensibility than the human one.propositions So why significance ascribing the necessity? Kant's own answer mightoutside be that of there is no classification. explanation Kant's O to that fact, as there is no explanation why we have just these categories uncontroversial that Kant himself, a and not some others. propositions - possibly excluding t I have tried to show above, that thereEmpirical are serious doubtsgeneratim" concerning- as s Thought the classification of schema judgments.a cardinal Allison is certainly right inis an proposition asserts reasoning that a schema judgment says implication more than what is contained in the corresponding catego the subject, thus it seems to be non-analytic. It is ampliative and refers to pure concerns still pure concepts and a pure intuition, thus it seems to be synthetic a priori. despite all pure and concepts areBut applicable to app that, it does not fit Kant's classification. It is best to regard them as Propositions" carries transcendental significance ascribing propositions or applicability translation propositions falling to the very application. outside of Kant's classification. On the other hand, I take it as uncontroversial that Kant himself, and quite correctly, regarded cardinal propositions - possibly excluding the modal ones: "the Postulates of Empirical Thought generatim" - as synthetic propositions a priori. What a cardinal proposition asserts is an application of a schema, and by implication the corresponding category, to appearences. The Schematism concerns still pure concepts and pure intuitions, although it explains how pure concepts are applicable to appearances. The "Analytic of Cardinal Propositions" carries transcendental investigation to the next level, from applicability to the very application.

"HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUD POSSIBLE A PRIORI? CHAPTER 8

"HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?"

1. How do the schemata realize the cat schemata are not constructed pure- conce experience as a "third thing" 3. Mathe dynamical cardinal propositions 4. "How judgments possible a priori?" 5. The nat Why the different 1. How do the schemata necessity realize the6. categories? The notions o 7. Thatand how-questions required? schemata are not constructed pure- concepts 2. Possible experience as a "third thing" 3. Mathematical versus dynamical cardinal propositions 4. "How are synthetic The path5.which beenoffollowed The has nature Kantianin this study judgments possible a priori?" differentInnotions necessity 6. Why thefollowing: Chapterof1necessity some keyare concepts of th how-questions required? 7. That- and were presented. In Chapter 2 Kant's conception of

most importantly, the role of transcendental dedu discussed. In Chapters 3 and 4 the part of CPR The path which has been followed until now hasincludes been thethe ver Concepts"in- this wasstudy examined which following: In Chapter 1 some key conceptsphilosophy. of the Kantian transcendental The philosophy subject-matter o were presented. In Chapter 2passage Kant's conception of philosophical method, where Kant explains "the clue" for finding most importantly, the role ofthetranscendental deductions and 4proofs was understanding. In Chapter the argumenta 4 the part of CPR - "The Analytic ofChapte discussed. In Chapters 3 and Transcendental Deduction was discussed. of establishing Concepts" - was examined which includes the very basis sidetracks by examining the crucial but problemati of Chapter are 3 was the for transcendental philosophy. 'objectivity'. The subject-matter These side-tracks necessary passage where Kant explains "the clue" for finding the pure concepts of Kant although they do not directly carry on the 4 the Chapter argumentative the understanding. In Chapter reasoning. 7 pickedstructure up anew of thethe problem Transcendental Deduction was discussed. Chapters 5 and 6 went into by examining the meaning and role of pure intui sidetracks by examining the and crucial but problematic notions 'object' of theand Pure Co schemata. "The Schematism 'objectivity'. These side-tracks are necessary for the understanding of estab standing" begins the second major part of Kant although they do not philosophy, directly carryviz., on the discussion on Kant's "The Analytic of Cardinal up anewofthe problems of Kant's reasoning reasoning. Chapter 7 pickedAnalytic of Card Concepts" and "The Analytic by examining the meaning and role of pure intuition (fonnal intuition) and schemata. "The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" begins the second major part of establishing transcendental philosophy, viz., "The Analytic of Cardinal Propositions". ("The Analytic of Concepts" and "The Analytic of Cardinal Propositions" are

transcendental philosophy is built up by esta propositions. No new interpretation, say, of the Se "HOW ARE SYNTHETICoffered mDGMENTS A PRIORI?" . My POSSIBLE aim is not to examine241separat proposinamely tions but related to two different faculties, thesome understanding and the general feature s of Kan examin is ethe faculty rules,itthe latter the faculty of judgment. The former once moreof how is possible to es proposi (A132/B171)) faculty of subsuming under rules. tions. As has been pointed out before, that Kant's famous The task of the present chapter is to examine the system of ic pr questiohow n "How are synthet transcendental philosophy ispriori?" built At up this by stage establishing thehave cardinal we already at our dispos the Transce of the Second Analogy will propositions. No new interpretation, say, ndental Deduction, that is, be the obje categor ies hasseparate examine proofs cardinal offered. My aim is not to been proved . Theoftask is to explain derive synthetic ofproposi Kant'stions reasoning. will ies. propositions but some general features from theIca,tegor Thepossible results of to the establish examine once more how it is schematranscendental tism chapter seem expliciout propositions. As has been pointed before, that amounts to answering t way by Kant; a fact which certainly has le Kant's famous question "How arethat synthetic propositions possible a nce to take chapter as being of minor importa of here priori?" At this stage we already at our disposal the alleged ("Ifhave the interpre tation which I haveresult adopted section the Transcendental Deduction, that isis,unnece the objective validity of the ssary, and its presence merely 1963,task is it possible to categories has been proved. The to explain how 43))isHowev er, this apparen t fact is decepti ve derive synthetic propositions above from the thatca,tegories. Kant's talk about categories should near referrinchapter g to the seem not tized to be categor used inies. an The The results of the schematism schema judgmecertainly ledasmany commentators explicit way by Kant; a fact which nts, whenhas used categor ies, carry with the the conditi to take that chapter as being of minor importance totallye employ superfluous. ons for theirorsensibl ment. Acco ("If the interpretation whichresults I haveofadopted heretism is correct, the osed entirejust ever the Schema are presupp its very presence merely ..." (Wolff section is unnecessary, andthat chapter . The obscures cardinal propos itions are n mere logical 1963, 43)) However, this apparent fact is deceptive. I have tried to argue functions of judgments but from the s above that Kant's talk about their categories should always be taken employ ment. nearly Thus they presupp ose as schemat Thatcategories. referring to the schematized The thelogical functions of - alth is indeed why Schematism chapter "explanatory judgments, when used as categories, carry pause" with themwhich the schemata, viz., appare does not argume ntation - Accordingly, the conditions for their sensible employment. in a sense the buildi is of vital importa nce for ndental just presupposed everywhere - even before results of the Schen1atism aretransce philoso phy. are the schema that very chapter. The cardinalHow propositions are not derivededfrom the reaso ta employ in Kant's commonly butacknow from the sensible conditions for ized th mere logical functions of judgments ledged that Kant emphas thepresuppose possibility schemata their employment. Thus they in an of experience as explicit a groundway. of transce more exactly , possibl - although itnce is aaskind of s is That is indeed why the Schematism chapter e experie a premis reasoni ng isnot a questio "explanatory pause" which does apparently onred.the n seldomcarry conside I will arg argumentation - is of vital importance for building up the system of transcendental philosophy. How are the schemata employed in Kant's reasoning? Although it is commonly acknowledged that Kant emphasized the indispensibility of the possibility of experience as a ground of transcendental proofs, how, more exactly, possible experience as a premiss is introduced into the reasoning is a question seldom considered. I will argue that the schemata

the possibility of experience and thus are th experiences 1. Trying to answer some general questi . 242 CHAPTER 8 establishing of the crown of transcendental philoso some conclu thatintroduced. implies is propositions, cardina are the means by which the l possibility of also experience projec Kant's whole ed to enlight are suppos which Containing the synthesis of possible intuitions, the en schemata represent the nature o results, viz., possible of Kant's statusthus . chapter theand the possibility of experience are themselves

ed. briefly discuss some general questions concerning the experiences 1. Trying toisanswer establishing of the crown of transcendental philosophy: the system of ries? catego the be ata realizecan schem thesome How do cardinal propositions, also1.implies that conclusions drawn conce cted not constru areproject. schemata The Kant's whole At the endpu:re of this which are supposed to enlighten the nature necessity . chapter the status of Kant'sAresults, intuition pure formal ry isofa Kantian in geomet schemaviz., is brief!y discussed. geometry presupposes that there are schemata possible geometrical properties. This is stated some 1. How do the schemata realize categories? famous slogan that "in mathe Kant's 746. the A718/B The schemata are not constructed pure ing concepts a priori the intuition whic cted by exhibit constru ly, I think, correct - andThe interpreted is formal concep A schema in geometry is a t"pure intuition. possibility of a fact the corresp that in generate meaningwhich is slim geometry presupposes support that there are- as schemata all words other In ) 182n23 1983, n (Alliso ed. generat possible geometrical properties. This is stated somewhat equivocally in the schema concept is concepts onds to corresp A7I8/B746. Kant's famous slogan thata certain "in mathematics are of t is no reasonto to there corresponds t that which though be the constructed by exhibitingcould a priori intuition thesup the of schemata thealthough differen - and ood correctly, I tly think, the textual pur concept" is interpreted underst indeed, strong er, there are, schemata anding. underst support is slim - as meaning that in factHowev the corresponding are re same as all the which is notanatintuition schema ndental transce generated. (Allison 1983, 182n23) In other words: n. intuitio in a pure t exhibit corresponds to a certain concep concept is the ed schema of that concept. Thus it - unli anding underst the of ts concep pure The could be thought that there is no reason to suppose that Kant had all. at cted constru be pure ts - cannot understood differently concep the schemata of the concepts of the(A71 the intui im that generat ing things concern tionsindeed, understanding. However,proposi there are, strong reasons to think a ndental. Transc are astransce priori a the given transcendental schema isbe not at all same a constructed pure e re can never be introduced through construct therefo concept exhibited in a pure intuition. merely conta a priori. ng with concep- tsunlike The pure concepts ofaccordi the understanding theThey mathematical ic unity synthet ally seek "Synthetic empiric which we shall at all. (A7I9!B747) concepts - cannot be toconstructed of their c a priori cannot exhibit "But they propositions concerning things generatim the intuition of anyon which ecannot be given a priori are transcendental. Transcendental propositionsce" a 1 Kant speaks about both "the possibility of experien going to I am notonly therefore can never be introduced through concepts, ous. near synonymof ly asconstruction at least apparent ty of experience" to refe possibili "the take but tenns, these according with concepts a priori. They merelyce" contain the rule according is taken as singular presentatio while "possible experien to which we shall empirically seek synthetic unity ..." (A720/B748) ... that ground. "But they cannot exhibit a priori anyone of their concepts in a specific 1 Kant speaks about both "the possibility of experience" and "possible experience" at least apparently as near synonymous. I am not going to present any analysis of these tenns, but take "the possibility of experience" to refer to the ground generally while "possible experience" is taken as singular presentation involving a recourse to that 1Uound.

special problem of transcendental schemata wo "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" would the transcendental deduction of243 the pure

transcendental deduction space and time. instance..." A transcendental schema is an application of aof category in its cannot the pure constructed most general case. Because it is Why a determination of concepts time andbetime of the schematism: more to the problem 'happens' to be a fonn of intuition it is also a pure intuition. This does how appearances?ofEvery not in any way imply that it is a construction a pureconcept concept.which In fact,can if be obj have its schema. The problem of schemata for t the pure concepts could be constructed like the mathenlatical ones, no mathematical concepts solvedNeither in the Aesthe schemata would haveisarisen. special problem of transcendental timeofare formsdiffer of intuiting, the the purevery concepts from the it follo would the transcendental deduction temporal concepts (more exactly: thei~ schem transcendental deduction of space and time. necessarily on once all appeara Why cannot the pure conceptsindeed be constructed? We employed have to return empirical concepts does not present a great p more to the problem of the schematism: how are concepts applied to Empirical are already "third things". T appearances? Every concept which can beconcepts objectively employed nlust with sensible concepts because the have its schema. The problem of schemata for the pure sensible, that is,sensibilit when he That is what Kantspace meansand mathematical concepts is solvedgeneration. in the Aesthetic. Because concept of a plate is homogeneous with time are the very forms of intuiting, it follows that the spatial and the pur a circle". some non-empirica thei~ (A137/B176) schemata) areWith applicable and temporal concepts (more exactly: dissolved because they do not have indeed necessarily employed on all appearances. The question any of schem objectively valid. A thornier problem concerns empirical concepts does not present a great problem for Kant either. understanding. Empirical concepts are already "third things". They are "homogeneous" Because the pureisconcepts with sensible concepts because the sensibility involvedareingenerated their by th pure conc separated from the sensibility, the generation. That is what Kant means when he says that "the empirical employed appearances, areofthey gen with theonpure geometricalneither concept concept of a plate is homogeneous concepts. The pure sensible concepts a circle". (A137/B176) With some non-empirical concepts the problem is can b exhibit exhibited a pure intuition. be a conce dissolved because they do not have any in schemata and thus To cannot for Kant, tantamount to giving a (real) definition objectively valid. A thornier problem concerns the pure concepts of the 144) Taking for granted the separation of the understanding. it the is evident that the understanding andpure it is concep Because the pure concepts are sensibility generated by cannot be exhibited in a pure intuition. separated from the sensibility, the pure concepts are not necessarily Conse defined at generated all. That with is exactly what Kant employed on appearances, neither are they the sensible mathematics begins with definitions concepts. TIle pure sensible concepts can be constructed, that ofis,concepts cannot inbegin with definitions. (ibi exhibit a concept a pure intuition is, exhibited in a pure intuition. To philosophy explicitly claims that the pure concepts cannot for Kant, tantamount to giving a (real) definition of it. (A727/B755ff, PC

144) Taking for granted the separation of the understanding and the sensibility it is evident that the pure concepts of the understanding cannot be exhibited in a pure intuition. Consequently, they cannot be defined at all. That is exactly what Kant means by saying that mathematics begins with definitions of concepts (constructions), whereas philosophy cannot begin with definitions. (ibid., cp. also A241n) He explicitly claims tllat the pure concepts cannot be defined. (A728/B756,

Unfortunately Kant did not put his 'th explicitly. CHAPTER 8 Sometimes he says that categories w meaning at all, although it seems to be mor A241) What are the pure concepts then? How could any sensible meaning from significance. There must be som meaning or significance be given to them when they are so 'pure' that we could not even talk about the possibility o they, at the outset, seem to lack any significance? sensible conditions. How could we know Unfortunately Kant did not put his 'theory of meaning' very categories? 'Significance' might more proper explicitly. Sometimes he says that categories without schemata have no are given when they are realized by the sc meaning at all, although it seems to be more pertinent to distinguish clearer what Kant means by saying th3:t t meaning from significance. There must be some meaning left, otherwise categories. (A146/B185) It means giving sen we could not even talk about the possibility of categories without their pure concepts; translating them into the lang sensible conditions. How could we know that we talk about the only language which we as human beings can categories? 'Significance' might more properly be what the categories time it is obvious that the significance is res are given when they are realized by the schemata. It now becomes given - a fact frequently emphasized by Ka clearer what Kant means by saying th~t the schemata realize the intended in their pure meaning without any co categories. (A146/B185) It means giving sensible significance to the be valid for things generatim as they are; inste pure concepts; translating them into the language of the sensible, the things as they appear..." (A147/B186) only language which we as human beings can understand. At the same It is easily seen that the meanings of par time it is obvious that the significance is restricted exactly to what is presupposed and not defined with the sch given - a fact frequently emphasized by Kant. "..the categories were concept of necessity is freely employed by Kan intended in their pure meaning without any conditions of sensibility, to explanations in a sense which cannot be that be valid for things generatim as they are; instead their schemata present schema does, is to show the real or material sig things as they appear..." (A147/B186) that is, to show how that concept is realized, vi It is easily seen that the meanings of particular pure concepts are category. The schemata give significance but presupposed and not defined with the schemata. For example, the categories nor the schemata are definitions of concept of necessity is freely employed by Kant in his own philosophical are given. It is another question, and not ea explanations in a sense which cannot be that of a category. What the thought that this kind of fundamental concepts schema does, is to show the real or material significance of that concept, It is tempting to use Kant's great metaphor t that is, to show how that concept is realized, viz., how it is employed as a categories. The categories considered as they a category. The schemata give significance but not meaning. Neither the forms or functions and as such unknown to categories nor the schemata are definitions of 'necessity'. The concepts significance). Although they lack significanc are given. It is another question, and not easy to answer, how Kant meaning. Otherwise we could not even talk a thought that this kind of fundamental concepts are given to us. are the same concepts as they appear to us. In It is tempting to use Kant's great metaphor to explain the nature of the analogy: "The schema therefore is only the categories. The categories considered as they are in themselves are n1ere concept of an object(G) in agreement with the c forms or functions and as such unknown to us (=without cognitive significance). Although they lack significance they must have some meaning. Otherwise we could not even talk about them. The schemata are the same concepts as they appear to us. In fact, this is more than an analogy: "The schema therefore is only the phenomenon or sensible concept of an object(G) in agreement with the category." (A146/B186)

· 244

knowledge, presented properly a solut "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSffiLE A PRIORI?" 245 s a so Allison (1983, 184) briefly indicate to the intuitions. same as the o The schemata qua determinations amount of timemuch are formal Unders tanding the as pure However, they are not constructed concepts. This is schema crucialta for proposi tions as based on pure intuitio distinguishing between mathematical and transcendental proofs. What is ns s t of formal the differen ce betwee exactly the difference of the use accoun between intuitions in n m knowle dge. Since the Prize Essay, it mathematical and in transcendental proofs? (No commentator has, to my thought that question. there is anHowever, essential diffe knowledge, presented properly a solution tos that andpresumably mathematics. Mathema Allison (1983, 184) briefly indicates a metaph solutionysics which would concep ts, that inis, this theirstudy.) exhibition; presented amount much to the same as the ofone philoso phy does start with intuition Understanding the schemata as pure intuitions andnottranscendental words, mathem atical cogniti on is intuitiv propositions as based on pure intuitions seems to contradict flatly Kant's is discurs ive. Howev the account of th and er, philosophical account of the difference between mathematical seems to imply that philoso phy is based knowledge. Since the Prize Essay, it was one of his fundamental as well. between Taking for thoughts that there is an essential difference the granted methods that of the concep ts we are still with the problem construction metaphysics and mathematics. Mathematics is based on theleft are in based on purea intuitio that is, philo of concepts, that is, their exhibition, intuition priori ns, whereas intuitiv e well. To present a solution In other philosophy does not start with intuitions but aswith concepts. importa nce because otherw ise there words, mathematical cognition is intuitive while philosophical cognition anding of t of philo is discursive. However, the account ofunderst the schemata as Kant's fonnal accoun intuitions the possibi lity of transce seems to imply that philosophy is based on the construction ofndental conceptsproposit stake. Obviously, is subtle an as well. Taking for granted that the schemata are the notmatter constructed of the schema where propositions the textual basis is cardinal concepts we are still left with the problem that the ta are based on pure intuitions, that is, philosophical cognition seems to be Possibl experience as crucial a "third thin this eproblem is of intuitive as well. To present a solution2. to a contradiction in our importance because otherwise thereIn isChapte r 7 different senses of 'pure i reasoning. To explain understanding of Kant's account of philosophical were distinguished. The most importan the possibility of transcendental propositions as present synthetic a priori is at I no determined ation; that is what and presupposes an interpretation stake. Obviously, the matter is subtleUnfortu nately, not even all distinctions m capture of the schemata where the textual basis is not all extensive. details, but it is inevitable to i distinction, although it simply follows from 2. Possible experience as a "thirdformal thing"intuition can be attained in two wa the imagin ation, 2) by abstrac tion from In Chapter 7 different senses of 'pure intuition' andor'fonnal intuition'

were distinguished. The most important sense is pure intuition qua determined presentation; that is what I now mean by 'formal intuition'. Unfortunately, not even all distinctions made in Chapter 7 are enough to capture all details, but it is inevitable to introduce and emphasize a new distinction, although it simply follows from what has been said before. A formal intuition can be attained in two ways, either 1) by generation by the imagination, or 2) by abstraction from an empirical intuition. Is there

seems to be only that in the first case a triangle 246 CHAPTER in the8 latter case that general form is attache while of experi form of anInobject n is theintuitions? intuitio any difference between these formal two kinds of formal case we attained ns intuitio fonnal oses form, say a triangle, presupp geomet are interested in a formal intuition as ry a single spatial He also thou ation. intuition the imagin ed by the difference between these generat two ways of attaining a formal be exhibited i could triangle is presented result a generatim geomet caserical a triangle seems to be only that in the first the act by which the ring only by conside well form is attached to a specific object; a while in the latter case that general he seems to have tho Accordingly, B742) an object of experience. Kant thought that formal intuition is the form of (A713/ atics. That, howev~r, i in mathem le attained geometry presupposes formal availab intuitions by the way 1), that is, of abstracting from is not a case casethought mentio generated by the imagination. Henedalso that to attain a Abstracting from concept. intuition cting of constru case be as geometrical result a triangle could exhibited in aempirical a concept. to constru untthe not tantamo well by considering only the act by which conceptcting is constructed. ined tually concep ns are that intuitio Formal (A713/B742) Accordingly, he seems to have thought both waysdeterm are ined i a determ To becomeThe ld is generat manifohowever, is ed.deceptive. last available in mathematics. That, . How t of triangle the concep ned, say abstracting fromwith empirical intuition but a mentioned case is not a case ofdetermi n is an intuitio ng that reasoni of Kant's Abstracting from an empirical intuition is case of constructing a concept. premiss concepts of the understanding. Thus the sp not tantamount to constructing pure a concept. ined. The sam categorially are also In puredeterm intuiting a pure Formal intuitions are conceptually determined. ta. schemathat inations like determ a determined intuition manifold is manifold is generated. To become ce between for differen the makes What determined, say with the concept of triangle. However, it is the important ta as f ndental atics andis transce mathem determined alsoschema by the premiss of Kant's reasoning that an intuition the schemata is that ndental transce Thus the philoso spatial phy relations of objects pure concepts of the understanding. but exclusiv 1) way the for temporal be obtaine can not The are also categorially determined. samed by goes al intuition determinations like schemata. are examples abstracted from empiric is perma ce of substan schema nce'. "The 'substa What makes the difference between formal intuitions used in as a subs of the real ationintuitions is, the present as formal used in mathematics and transcendentalthat schemata ..." (A144/B generatim ination ofastime determ the schemata determined intuitions transcendental philosophy is that in space for that time of things in by 1) buty exclusively the(and way 2). They can not be obtained by the waypropert the reallikeas a s of example presentation Can "theintuitions. are examples abstracted from empirical Take an e a priori? Cer possibl bethe of time" of determination is permanence real in time, 'substance'. "The schema of substance intuition cann of the real"ofastheanempirical ation real as a substratum that is, the presentation of thepresent actual experienc It would require imagin determination of time generatim ..."ation. (A144/B183) Permanence is a But notice tha iori. ng aposter whole thespace time itself. property of things in time (and in forreasoni that matter) not of tim" is at stak time genera real ination as a of substratum of empirical Can "the presentation of thedeterm taken place. has an abstrac thatCertainly denotes a priori? not.tion (B291-2) "The determination of time" be possible presentation of the real" as an intuition cannot be generated by the imagination. It would require actual experience and accordingly make the whole reasoning aposteriori. But notice that more exactly "empirical determination of time generatim" is at stake. As usual 'generatim' denotes that an abstraction has taken place. No actual presentation

From the possibility of experience that experiences, or possible synthesis of intuit "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 247 "The schema of actuality is existen (intuition) is meant but an example (A145/B184) of that kind ofIspresentations. is detenninati that kind ofHow an example attained a priori if it Existence is neitherata apure nor an empirical determinate time cannot b presentation? It is attained by presupposing the possibility of experience. possibility can be thought a priori. A tho From the possibility of experienceimply that actual kind of examples - possible experience. The schemata a intuitions can be abstracted. experiences, or possible synthesis ofmost general empirical employments of t "The schema of actuality is third existence determinate time." int things.atA athird thing presupposes (A145/B184) Is that kind of detennination possible priori? Hardly. the peculiarity of thea schemata that they h be posited a priori although its and Existence at a determinate time cannot homogeneous both with pure concepts of and an existence not a~e possibility can be thought a priori. pure A thought concepts possible does intuitions of the w imply actual experience. The schemata are abstracted Empirical concepts examples are homogeneous most general en1pirical employments of the categories. They indeed are gen sensible concepts are involved in their is third things. A third thing presupposes intuition, or possible. schemata. Butactual still, how are we toIt disting the peculiarity of the schemata that cursive they have the double nature of being cognition? Why is not transcenden homogeneous both with pure concepts In and with sensible intuitions. mathema an intuitive cognition, as inThus a~e elements generating them. pure concepts and possible intuitions recourse to actualinintuition is presupposed Empirical concepts are homogeneous with sensible because of sensible intuitionconcepts is determined. Howev sensible concepts are involved in their generation. The same goes for the where schemata are used, no recourse t schemata. But still, how are we to distinguish intuitive and dis-is pre operation. between No sensible manifold cursive cognition? Why is not transcendental schema ascognition a formalintuitive intuitionasiswell? already a In an intuitive cognition, as in mathematics cognition, a mind that and in empirical mathematical cognition which means that a manifold recourse to actual intuition is presupposed, exhibiting the corresponding concept in of sensible intuition is determined. However, cognition in a means thatina transcendental manifold is determined where schemata are used, no recourse to intuition in this sense in content of a pure intuition is a isconcept. is presented determined, but a C operation. No sensible manifold traffic betweenorintuitions and concepts. schema as a formal intuition is already a determined intuition. Keep in out of the manifold of intuitions; determin is constructed by mind that in mathematical cognition a concept cognition In transcendental no constructin exhibiting the corresponding concept in a pure intuition. Construction recourse to ready made concepts, viz. sche means that a manifold is determinedintuitions, in a synthesis. Thus the philosophy withdetermined concepts. On t Thisbut indicates howintuitions there is athey content of a pure intuition is a concept. intuitions as formal traffic between intuitions and concepts. are made or generatedtransc themConcepts into concepts. Accordingly, out of the manifold of intuitions; determined intuitions become concepts. discursive although a recourse to fonnal In transcendental cognition no constructing of concepts place but now understood as takes concepts. An aexam recourse to ready made concepts, viz. schemata. Mathematics starts with intuitions, philosophy with concepts. On the one hand schemata are pure intuitions but as fonnal intuitions they are determined, which makes them into concepts. Accordingly, transcendental cognition is merely discursive although a recourse to fonnal intuitions is presupposed but now understood as concepts. An example is used precisely like a

Accordingly, in a way a possible intuition (schema) is n all but a thought of an intuition, that is, a concept. Thu · 248 CHAPTER 8 cognition is not intuitive but discursive. concept, viz. as a rule. Like Kantian a schema a rule. No In athe list of concept, the schema ta Kant is presents some exam in a schema but a possible actual intuition is involved general applications of the categories. intuition. Does not this t Accordingly, in a way a pure possible intuition not an intuition at concep ts into (schema) a sensible islanguag e mean a translatio all but a thought of an intuition, a concept. transcendental 'in which that the is, categor ies are Thus, already embedd ed? In tha cognition is not intuitivehave but discursive. the sensible language before the schemata are esta In the list of the schemata Kant some examples of the most they are the presents conditions of the cognitive use of that very the the categories. Does not this translation of general applications of can schemata be stated without using the the categorie pure concepts into a sensible language a translation into a language schema ta? Theymean cannot. It is obviou s that a schema like 'in which the categoriesthe arereal already embedded? In able that case would in time" is conceiv only we in the language have the sensible language before schemata are established, although Otherw ise the we could not underst and it at all. Is not this c theit cognitive usedoes of that language? How they are the conditions of way is, but this not very matter. That is not a dilem can the schemata be stated t?e categories in fact, the sightwithout seems tousing be. That must be so,or,becaus e the pure co thatthey a schema like "pennanence of schemata? They cannot.defined It is obvious nor can be given otherwise. That is the the real in time" is conceivable only in the language of the sensible. schemata cannot be derived from something else, b Is not to thisthe circular? Yes, in a Otherwise we could notconditi understand it at all. ons corresp onding pure concep ts must b way it is, but this doesexampl not matter. That is not a dilemma as it first es. No justificational circularity is at involved. Ka sight seems to be. That that must the be so, because the pure cannot be logical forms of concepts judgme nts cannot be d defined nor can they be giventing otherwise. That is the reason why the penetra a circle, becaus e the definition itself must be from something else, but ofthe sensible schemata cannot be derived thus must already contain the fonns judgme nts. (A245 conditions corresponding to the pure concepts must be just stated as examples. No justificational circularity isl involved. Kantical sayscardin likewise 3. Mathe matica versus dynam al proposi that the logical forms of judgments cannot be defined without Presenting the catalogue of the ta Kant penetrating a circle, because the definition itself must be a schema judgment and again distinction the importance of which I have emphas i thus must already contain the fonns of judgments. (A245) Chapter 4) viz., the distinction betwee n the mathem atica categories. (A160/B199) The same distinction is a 3. Mathematical versus dynamical cardinal propositions fundamental propositions and is extensionally equival ent Presenting the catalogue oftive the and schemata Kant againental elaborates the constitu regulative fundam propositions. (A1 ofofwhich I have before (in distinction the importance the role the distinct ion emphasized is quite promin ent. Kant state Chapter 4) viz., the distinction the mathematical and dynamical althoughbetween both involve certainty a priori, their necessity categories. (A160/B199) same is applied also to kind.The Althou gh hedistinction puts the matter very briefly I will try fundamental propositions and is extensionally equivalent to that between argue that what he seems to mean goes like this: constitutive and regulativeThe fundamental Now cardinal propositions. propositions (A179/B221) corresponding to the the role of the distinction is quite prominent. Kant states explicitly that categories - quantity and quality - are the Axiom s of In although both involve certainty a priori, their necessity is of different kind. Although he puts the matter very briefly I will try to explain and argue that what he seems to mean goes like this: The cardinal propositions corresponding to the mathematical categories - quantity and quality - are the Axioms of Intuition and the

dynamical categories pertains to the AsA regards generatim. "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE PRIORI?"the manifold 249

mathematical cardinal propositions Anticipations of Perception. They are the cardinal proposition on which are objects are posited in this the the dyn all mathematics is based. In applying the pure concepts ofcase, merely regulative. As regards experie understanding to possible experience the synthesis of the mathematical (A664/B692) (See The also Chapter categories pertains to mere intuition. (A160/B199) cardinal4. above Kant maintains that the and certainty ~ propositions corresponding to the dynamical categories - relation propositions thePostulates two cases of is differe modality - are the Analogies of Experience and inthe complete. The mathematical Empirical Thought. They are the cardinal propositions on which allcardinal while the o of dynamical the dynamics (as a physical science) is intuitive based. certainty The synthesis Kant mean that appearance the fonner are a of an dynamical categories pertains to theDoes existence of discursive the latter are a case the cogni generatim. As regards the manifold of an intuition generatim, pr mathematical cardinal propositions are dynamical consitutive. .cardinal Because nopropositions existing experience? The text apparently su objects are posited in this case, the dynamical cardinal propositions are the mathema However, they the are fact also that consitutive. merely regulative. i\S regards experience require proofs without any direct intuiti (A664/B692) (See also Chapter 4. above.) conclusion was all too Anyhow, the employment of hasty. cardinal Kant maintains that the certainty ~f that although was said inabove propositions in the two cases is different, both concerning cases it is the sc to be changed. Tak experience needs complete. The mathematical cardinal propositions are capable of certainly that their application ca intuitive certainty while the dynamical ones only implies of discursive certainty. Clearly the schemata of the dymam Does Kant mean that the fonner are a case of intuitive cognition while possibility of experience, that the is, it is alr Consequently, do only the latter are a case of discursive cognition? of experience is Thus the possibility of dynamical .cardinal propositions presuppose the possibility employed. Kant explicitly claims tha experience? The text apparently suggests an affinnative answer. derived from propositions the schemata, However, the fact that the mathematical cardinal alsothus th introduced into the reasoning alongside require proofs without any direct intuitive grounding indicates that this that this what nothing Kant means conclusion was all too hasty. Anyhow,clear whatever Kant ismeant, that was said above concerning the schemata as introducing possible experience needs to be changed. Taking the categories as a group certainly implies that their application carries with it possible experience. Clearly the schemata of the dymamical categories presuppose the possibility of experience, that is, it is already embedded in the schemata. Thus the possibility of experience is introduced when a schema is employed. Kant explicitly claims that the cardinal propositions are derived from the schemata, thus the possibility of experience is introduced into the reasoning alongside the schemata. It also becomes clear that this is what Kant means when he says that a cardinal

of formal intuitions, are not to be identified with fo in mathematical reasoning. Mathematical reasoning 250 CHAPTER 8 intuitions of mathematical concepts, while transce based formal possible intuitions examples of temp proposition has a peculiarity that on "it makes theasvery experience constructions of concepts versus examples of the app which is its own ground ofproof'.2 has that beenthesaid above although fits wella kind with Ka In summary, I have triedWhat to argue schemata, mathematics concepts are presented in concreto of formal intuitions, are not to be identified with formal intuitions used wh Mathematics actual intu in mathematical reasoning.abstracto. Mathematical reasoning presupposes is based on formal concepts are given. Philosophy has no pureisintuitio intuitions of mathematical concepts, while transcendental reasoning must by abstraction. based on formal intuitions as start examples of temporal determinations; It isexamples generallyof noticed by commentators that Kan constructions of concepts versus the application of concepts. "the possibility of experience" is a presuppositio What has been said above fits well with Kant's words that in it is amazing mathematics concepts are cardinal presentedpropositions. in concreto However, while in philosophy in that discussions whether Kant presupposes the possibilit abstracto. Mathematics presupposes actual intuition in which the of experience or proves it astothe outcome concepts are given. Philosophy has no pure intuitions start with butof som presumably TD. (e.g. Carl 1989) Kant's famous must start by abstraction. distinction between the explicitly analytic says or regressive commentators that Kant that It is generally noticed by progressive is calledinuptheto proofs supportofthe cl "the possibility of experience" is a method presupposition to the s explicitly says that CPR according cardinal propositions. However, it is amazing thatproceeds there are plenty of possibility ofthe experience be actuality) a premiss of discussions whether Kant presupposes possibilitycannot (or even proved as its result. This, I think, is wrong an of experience or proves it as the outcome of some of his arguments, misundertanding Kant's discussion distinction. on Regressive presumably TD. (e.g. Carl 1989) Kant's offamous the course, or relative terms. and One must specify distinction between the ofanalytic regressive synthetic or in r method CPR - or of explicat progressive method is called up toof support thebetter, claim the that order because he Starting according with thetopure conceptsmethod, and ending up explicitly says that CPR proceeds the synthetic the propositions which are presuppositions of all expe possibility of experience cannot be a premiss of his reasoning but is cognition) thatand indeed the possibility proved as its result. This, I think,indicates is wrong is based on the of e andRegressive thus appears as the result misundertanding of Kant'sexplained distinction. andfirst progressive are, of laying down the conditions of experience no mor of course, relative terms. One must specify in relation to what the the order of explication - is progressive. method of CPR - or better, 2 "'Through concepts of the understanding pure reason does, fundamental propositions, not however from concept Starting with the pure concepts and ending up with directly fundamental indirectly through relation of these concepts to something of all experience (asexperience empirical(that is, propositions which are presuppositions namely possible experience. When such possible· experiences) is presupposed, these fundamental cognition) indicates that indeed the possibility of empirical cognition is apodictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can ne explained and thus appears first as the result of reasoning. It should be entitled a cardinal proposition,However, not a theorem, be character that it makes possible the very experience whic laying down the conditions of experience no more amounts to actual proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be pres 2 "'Through concepts of the understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure fundamental propositions, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely possible experience. When such experience (that is, something as object of possible· experiences) is presupposed, these fundamental propositions are indeed apodictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can never be known a priori.... It should be entitled a cardinal proposition, not a theorem, because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed. (A737/B765) II

experience outside of these conditions. But they d possibility of experience in any way. They are n "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS sufficient conditions.POSSIBLE There is A noPRIORI?" way to tum251 the nec into sufficient ones. Experience has other conditions experience than laying down the conditions of peace amounts to actual important one is that intuitionBut is required. is outer not proved. is not the"..the peace. Thus, the actuality of experience 'a priori never accomplish more than anticipating possibility of experience proved? No, it is not. Kant did not endeavour to the generatim." possible but to disclose(A246/B303) its necessary conditions. show that experience is experience I take it for granted that Kant's o The conditions are presuppositional. Consequently, thereown can statements be no presupposing the possibility of experience also uneq experience outside of these conditions. But they do not prove the that in it isany not way. provedThey "that are experience is possible". possibility of experience necessary but not Tha 'factual' matters is anyhow not possible in philoso sufficient conditions. There is no way to tum the necessary conditions interpretation of theconditions schemata as advocated this stud into sufficient ones. Experience has other well. Theinmost schemata cannot be specified without presupposing intuition is required. "..the understanding can important one is that outer experience. a priori never accomplish more than anticipating the form of possible

experience generatim." (A246/B303) judgments possible aofprior 4. "How I take it for granted that Kant'sare ownsynthetic statements of the necessity presupposing the possibility of experience unequivocally As was pointed outalso already in Chapterindicate 1 it is unfor that it is not proved "that experience is of possible". Thatiskind of proof of to b 'official' theory syntheticity frequently taken 'factual' matters is anyhow not possible in philosophy. Indeed, that the an a the Introduction to the B-edition, namely interpretation of the schemata advocated in this study implies that the of explicates only what is contained in the concept schemata cannot be specified without presupposing thejudgment possibility judgment, whereas in a synthetic the of predica experience. concept of the subject. A fact which suggests that

metaphor is misleading is that the distinction is ex 4. "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" essence of judgment were a relation between two con traditional theory of whichthat Kant rejects as As was pointed out already in Chapter 1 itjudgment, is unfortunate Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction expressed in these 'official' theory of syntheticity is frequently taken to be that presented interms of the matter. the Introduction to theheart B-edition, namely that an analytic judgment An analytic does explicates only what is contained in judgment the concept of not the necessarily subject of ahave a At judgment least the relation is not lies its ground. synthetic the predicate outside Thus the the judgment, whereas in a object. be raised. In a syn the predicate is a real one cannot concept of the subject. A fact which suggests that this containmentan distinction object is expressed. Kantasthought is thattothe is expressed if the that metaphor is misleadingrelation pretation was between beside the because essence of judgment were a relation twopoint concepts. Thatit iscould the not important case, namely synthetic judgments, that traditional theory of judgment, which Kant rejects as insufficient. The is, m

analytic-synthetic distinction expressed in these terms cannot be the very heart of the matter. An analytic judgment does not necessarily have any relation to an object. At least the relation is not its ground. Thus the question whether the predicate is a real one cannot be raised. In a synthetic judgment a relation to an object is expressed. Kant thought that Eberhard's interpretation was beside the point because it could not explain the most important case, namely synthetic judgments, that is, material extension

what it is in all cases which makes it possible to adv CHAPTER 8 concept of the subject. iately to an relates ation which of knowledge. What makes a judgment synthetic is immed that something is obje A present a synthetic judgme that in Unfortunately, already from added which goes beyond the concept of thethat subject. It follows s in an a n, wherea must be ationsenough the present Kant did not himself explain clearly in an theintuitio canonical passages of evide plenty the there isbeyond ry. Thus n is necessa intuitio what it is in all cases no which makes it possible to advance concept of the subject. that what Gram has described as Kant's "hidden theo intuition presupp synthetic judgme thatimmediately A presentation whichviz., relates to an nts object is anose intuition. ,whatofKant ing passage very convinc at all. It follows already fromtheory that that in aAsynthetic judgment at leastis one "Every nts". syntheticinjudgme le of all whereas the presentations must princip be an intuition, an analytic judgmentobject manifold of the ic unity synthet ons of of conditi necessa no intuition is necessary. Thusrythere is plenty evidence which shows could B197)ofThis (A158/ nce." judgment"hardly that what Gram has described Kant's "hidden theory possibleasexperie inlvol not were n intuitio le) of (possibintuition - is not a hidden viz., that synthetic judgments manifoldpresuppose 1789, Ka ld, May to Reinho In·a letter theory at all. A very convincing passage is ,what Kant calls "tile 12. highest judgments. le of sy princip theory". The hidden object(G) forward "the"Every principle of all synthetic stands under putsjudgments". ical cogniti nts of theoret judgme "all synthet synthetic unityic of the manifold of intuitions in aon ar necessary conditions ofis: If the s n. to an intuitio a given the relating of possible experience." (A158/B197) This couldconcep hardlyt make sense if the n must be nt, the intuitio ntal judgme an experiewere not inlvolved in synthetic manifold of (possible)is intuition be a pure i must there a priori nt is May judgments. In·a letter tojudgme Reinhold, 12. synthet 1789, ic, Kant even explicitly ically in rega synthet we are toofjudge "Ifprinciple (PC 141) it."theory". synthetic judgments puts forward "the hidden The to the appealonly t and concepare beyond this mustofgotheoretical is: "all synthetic judgments cognition possible by intui judgm ic synthet In judgment B289) B749) (cp. (A721/ given." to the relating of a given concept an intuition. If the synthetic ic judg That a synthet concep ed) undermust is an experiental judgment, the intuition bets.empirical; if the (are subsum object has thattoanground in aother n means, an intuitio purewords, intuition judgment is a priori synthetic, there must be says th Kantwe a priori ic to synthet the way for in ng synthetically it." (PC 141) "If we are prepari to judge regard a concept relatesit tois expe than thatinitwhich elseintuition nothing given "means must go beyond this concept and appeal to the is)3 my emphas B195, or possibl given." (A721/B749) (cp. B289) e)". In (A155/ synthetic judgments intuitions fall of cognitio relation the logic ndental In transce (are subsumed) under concepts. That a synthetic judgment presupposes i ation only is thehas Intuitio red. that conside if an intuition means, in other words, an nobject to present be given. Aswhich considetored judgme in allsays Thus Kant to objectsa . priori preparing the way for synthetic that nts an object be in tr

, 252

given "means nothing else than that it relates to experience (be it actual no 3 It could be objected that moral or aesthetic judgments do mywhile emphasis)3 or possible)".(A155/B195, Kant speaks about synthetic judgments even in the at all is not only that r, the trouble Critique Third and In transcendental logic the relation s.ofHoweve cognition to an theory" objectbutis it con "hidden alleged the with conflicts s Critique not going t amrelates I above. ns considered. Intuition is the only presentation which immediately quotatio the own statements like to reconcile Kant's usage of the later critiq possible be could to objects. Thus in all judgments considered in transcendental logic that our present concern is merely theoretical co~nition remind

3 It could be objected that moral or aesthetic judgments do not contain any intuitions at all while Kant speaks about synthetic judgments even in the context of the Second and Third Critiques. However, the trouble is not only that the usage of the later Critiques conflicts with the alleged "hidden theory" but it conflicts also with Kant's own statements like the quotations above. I am not going to consider whether it could be possible to reconcile Kant's usage of the later critiques with CPR but will remind that our present concern is merely theoretical co~nition.

granted Kant's theory of pure intuitions. synthetic judgments a priori. The "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC mDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 253way in that has be understood intuition is involved. Accordingly, something transcendental logicto deals merely differ philosophy. with synthetic judgments. How synthetic judgments aposteriori are problem of the synthetic a priori is, intuition. Mathematical synthetic possible is plain: they require empirical "The how a nonempirical, yet extraconceptual an judgments a priori do not present any great problem either, taking for is possible. An ground equivalent judgmentPure intuitions all way of granted Kant's theory of pure intuitions. ask how is it possible to extend synthetic judgments a priori. The way in which intuitions groundone's is know of beyond a given concept, independently something that has to be understood differently in mathematics and in thought through that concept." (Allison 198 philosophy. of putting theexplaining problem. Allis10n correct is, way therefore, that of "The problem of the synthetic a priori for Kant all syntheticgrounding judgments in how a nonempirical, yet extraconceptual and extralogical of require a priori intuitionthe is required. judgment is possible. An equivalent way ofpure formulating problem is to Cardinal propositions not based ask how is it possible to extend one's knowledge (in the materialaresense) mathematical propositions beyond a given concept, independently of any experience of the are. objectHow is propositions somehow "go beyond thought through that concept." (Allison 1983, 78) That I take to be thethe conc of experience. (B2 based on possibility correct way of putting the problem. Allis10n alsothegoes on to point out that intuitions which is their "third thing" instea for Kant all synthetic judgments require intuition; a judgment to be a kind of synthetic judgments. The question priori pure intuition is required. synthetic although no Cardinal propositions are not judgments based onare actual intuitions as actual possible to attain synthetic judgments di mathematical propositions are. How is it possible that cardinal the are synthetic a the of specific nature of the subject"? They propositions somehow "go beyond thereveal concept out repeatedly "to cognize something based on the possibility of experience. (B294) It is recourse to possible a pr possibility". Thus transcendental intuitions which is their "third thing" mere instead of actual intuitions in other prop actually advance beyond the priori do isnot how is it possible that kind of synthetic judgments. The question is possible to advance beyond t show how it judgments are synthetic although no actual intuition is present? How is it if what is These given questions me is the transc possible to attain synthetic judgments"But discursively? substance, force, etc., it reveal the specific nature of the synthetic a priori. As has beendesignates pointed neith intuition, only the synthesis out repeatedly "to cognize something a prioribut is to cognize it from of itsempiric empirical, cannot be given a priori. And mere possibility". Thus transcendental propositions which are synthetic a priori do not actually advance beyond the concept of the subject. They 4 ".. our guide is possible experience. Such pro show how it is possible to advance beyond conceptthe (forconcept instance,ofofthe thatsubject.4 which happens) lead cause); for such concept a transitionofwould be a saltus "But if what is given me is the oftranscendental reality, proof proceeds by showing that experience itse substance, force, etc., it designatesexperience, neither an empirical nor without a purea connect would be impossible intuition, but only the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which, as being empirical, cannot be given a priori. And since the synthesis is thus 4 ".. our guide is possible experience. Such proof does not show that the given concept (for instance, of that which happens) leads directly to anothet concept (that of cause); for such a transition would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind." (A783/B811)

propositions although synthetic a priori, are no propositions. Detenninate judgments are possib 254 CHAPTER 8 experience. They do not present anything in con nottheyielding objective r unable to advance a priori, judgments, beyond the although concept, to corresponding still determine objects in pure intuition, the concept cannot empirical yield any objects, determining synthetic proposition Taking for granted that actual intuitions but only a cardinal proposition of synthesis of possible empirical judgments, is conceivabletranscendental how Kant thou intuitions." (A722/B750) Thus, mostit importantly, possible intuitions, couldsynthetic yield p.ossi propositions although synthetic a priori, are notschemata, determinate The cardinal presuppositions propositions. Determinate judgments are propositions possible onlyare with the help of of claim anything of experience, but are jus experience. They do not present anything in actual concreto. But mathematical all actualobjective syntheticreality judgments havepossible to conform judgments, although not yielding without synthetic when an empirical judgmen in pure intuitions. (A724/B752) empirical objects, still determine objectsfirst (A720/B748) The cardinal propositions are th Taking for granted that actual intuitions yield actual synthetic experience, is, "making judgments, it is conceivableconstruction how Kantofthought thatthat (synthesis of) natu Discursive cognitionsynthetic which isjudgments. baseci merely possible intuitions, schemata, could yield possible however, and most importantly, transce The cardinal propositions are Now, presuppositions of experience. They do not claimed but to be andrules a priori. Thus t claim anything actual of experience, are synthetic just general to which cannot merely on concepts. Kant reject all actual synthetic judgments havebeto based conform. They become actually just becausejudgment it claimedconforms to yield cognition synthetic first when an empirical to them.only (A720/B748) The cardinal propositions the present explicit problem rules for appears the (discursively).areThe philosophical is based merely on co construction of experience, that is, "making cognition nature possible".5 if it isis based on intu analytic propositions, Discursive cognition which is based merely on 2) concepts analytic. explained but the alleged difference with Now, however, and most importantly, transcendental propositions aremath nature transcendental synthetic claimed to be synthetic andpeculiar a priori. Thus oftranscendental cognition exhibited. Philosophical cognition is discursive cannot be based merely on concepts. Kant rejects traditional metaphysics (schemata) areonly employed in it because schema just because it claimed to yield cognition on the basis of concepts examples theyin are concepts being (discursively). The present As problem appears a new light: but 1) If detennination they also involve to poss philosophical cognition is based merely on concepts it canreference yield only analytic propositions, 2) if it is based on intuition its syntheticity is explained but the alleged difference with mathematics disappears. The 5 "All our cognition relates finally to possible intuitions peculiar nature of transcendental synthetic a priori is e Ana priori concept ... contains that an object is given. judgments if so, it can be constructed or it contains in itself and exhibited. Philosophical cognition is discursive although pure intuitions possible intuitions which are not given a priori. In th (schemata) are employed in make it because have a double nature.a prio it in forming synthetic judgments use of schemata accordance with concepts, never intuitively throug As examples they are concepts but being concepts of sensible" concepts." (A719/B747) determination they also involve reference to possible experience.

5 "All our cognition relates finally to possible intuitions, for it is through them alone that an object is given. An a priori concept ... contains either already a pure intuition in itself - and if so, it can be constructed - or it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions which are not given a priori. In this latter case we can indeed make use of it in forming synthetic judgments a priori, but only discursively in accordance with concepts, never intuitively through the construction of the concePts." (A719/B747)

the possibility of experience implies a that is inevitable. Of course empiric "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC mDG·MENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 255 introduced. futroducing it by the sch It could be objected that my reasoning must be seriously misguided reasoning contingent. In this w somewhere. If, say, the schema of substance is abstracted from empirical presupposes, and must presuppose, exp cases, it is no longer a pure intuition, and the whole establishment of but the possibility of experience. As w transcendental philosophy will collapse in an empirical affair without accomplishes the trick that cardinal pr any necessity and universality at all. In a way it is true that presupposing Like all synthetic judgments they p the possibility of experience implies a kind of conditional necessity. But mathematical judgments and empirica that is inevitable. Of course empirical reference must be somehow actual intuition but possible intuition introduced. Introducing it by the schemata does not make the whole examples, viz. the schemata. The schem reasoning contingent. In this way transcendental philosophy way than by abstracting from empi presupposes, and must presuppose, experience, not an actual experience explains that 'pure intuition' can be but the possibility of experience. As was recently explained that is what empirical presentations. (A20/B34) Sti accomplishes the trick that cardinal propositions are synthetic a priori. empirical or contingent on that accoun Like all synthetic judgments they presuppose intuition but unlike contingent. It is, of course, a serious mathematical judgments and empirical judgments they do not require knows what belongs to the form and ma actual intuition but possible intuition i;ntroduced to the reasoning by examples, viz. the schemata. The schemata cannot be found in no other 5. The nature of Kantian necessity way than by abstracting from empirical examples. Note that Kant In what are the cardinal explains that 'pure intuition' can be found also sense by abstracting from propos necessary empirical presentations. (A20/B34) Still itpure intuition that does empirical not becomejudgme questions empirical or contingent on that account,propositions? but is exactlyThese the form of the have a sense of necessity in this case is a p contingent. It is, of course, a serious meta-critical problem how Kant neither semantic nor syntactic necessi knows what belongs to the form and matter, respectively. Kant maintains repeatedly that cardina 5. The nature of Kantian necessity complete apodictic certainty. (e.g. A7 overall view of proofs. In mathema In what sense are the cardinal propositions necessary? In what sense is starting point. They have to be known it necessary that empirical judgments have to confonn to these from them are allowed to be draw propositions? These questions have already been touched upon. The traditional view of axioms as necessari sense of necessity in this case is a presuppositional one; not logical, view, it is, of course, a serious problem neither semantic nor syntactic necessity, not a linguistic matter at all. be true. Anyhow, that is how Kant thou Kant maintains repeatedly that cardinal propositions can be proved with priori of geometry are known with apo complete apodictic certainty (e.g. A737/B765) This is in line with his overall view of proofs. In mathematics some basic axioms are the starting point. They have to be known to be true before any conclusions from them are allowed to be drawn. Kant totally adhered to the traditional view of axioms as necessarily true. From the modern point of view, it is, of course, a serious problenl how axioms could be known to be true. Anyhow, that is how Kant thought. The synthetic propositions a priori of geometry are known with apodictic certainty. (A46/B64) There 0

albeit both are equally certain. Because philosophy has no recourse to pure intuition it h · 256 its 'axiomCHAPTER s' - which 8are the cardinal propositions - in som The way to ground them isintuition. exactly Mathematics is no room for error because of the underlying to give first a tr deducti on of the concepts truths. and then creates its data. Axioms are given pure as apodictic But toareshow all how propositions derived frompoint judgments a priori necessary in theare same sense? The is that there these concepts.is Acco Transce ndental Deduct ionand plays a difference between mathematically a priori transcendental priori, pure the role of ana'instant take it as a kind of Gestalt-switch to ~e understanding albeit both are equally Icertain. he operate mainly to with another Because philosophy has no srecourse pure intuition it has to ground kind of notion of necess logical one. It could be called -transce its 'axioms' - which are the cardinal propositions in some other way. osit ndental , presupp necessi ty. isIn exactly fact we have to disting The way to ground them to give first auish transcendental between at least f kindsconcepts of necessi viz., andties, then to logical, show how the cardinal deduction of the pure mathem atical, transce Logica l necessiAccordingly, propositions are natural derived necessi from ty. these concepts. ty is a casetheof its mathemplays aticalthe androle transce ndental Transcendental Deduction of an 'instant pure ty intuition'. necessi are somewhat rel Natural necessi ty does notunderstanding involve proper of Kant that I take it as a kind of Gestalt-switch to ~e (apodic tic) nec aim of the of present he operates mainly(B4) withThe another kind notionsection of necessity than ethevery br is to examin differen t notions are required,presuppositional and 2) what is theornature logical one. It could be called transcendental, real of tr necessi am, of cource, wellat aware havety. to Idistinguish between least four necessity. In fact we thatdifferent presuppositio 'logic' been widely discussedtranscendental viz.,have logical, mathematical, kinds of necessities, in present dayand philosop the Kantian context . Howev er, there whilefor a th natural necessity. Logical necessity is a case of,isitsno own, room here discussion of these matters will only delinea mathematical and transcendental necessity are. Isomewhat related te notions. some underl It isnotimporta nt proper to keep (apodictic) in mind that Natural necessity does involve necessity at all.is nece my concern sense of answer ing is questio ns like: very "What present section to examine briefly whyof Kan (B4) The aim of the is the 1) status that is, "In which sense different notions are required, and 2) what is the arenature Kant'sof transcendental own statements, tra proposi tions, necessa ry?", cource, well aware thatwhich presuppositions necessity. I am, of again meansand "In their which sens involve necessiinty?" 'logic' have been use widely discussed present philosophy alsothat in Kant It is aday commo nplace to- say to disclos e the necessa the Kantian context. However, there is noryroom here forofa thoroughgoing conditi ons cognition. What doe that these ons are necessa matters. I will conditi only delineate some underlying discussion of thesesay ry? I alsoideas. take it for litythatshould be underst my concern is necessity the It is important logical to keep possibi in mind ood as inAllison d andslike: logical possibi in of questions "What is thelity status claims?", sense of answeringunderst theKant's traditional manner (Allisoown n 1983, 189) Kant statements, transcendental that is, "In whichcontrad senseiction." are Kant's repeatedly ref princip le of contrad iction as the hallmasense does their propositions, necessary?", which again means "In which rk of analytic truth. (A He practica restricts logical It is a lly commonplace to saytruth that merely Kant endeavours use involve necessity?" to analytic jud logical necessi ty I ofmean now exactly anditnothing cognition. What does mean toelse b to disclose the necessary conditions say that these conditions are necessary? I also take it for granted that logical possibility should be understood as Allison does: "Kant understands logical possibility in the traditional manner as lack of contradiction." (Allison 1983, 189) Kant repeatedly refers to the principle of contradiction as the hallmark of analytic truth. (A151/B191) He practically restricts logical truth merely to analytic judgments. By Ilogical necessity I mean now exactlL!~~__~~thj~lLe}~~ 1J\l! that_JI1~ _ _

in the absolute sense. nt distinction to is an importa TherePOSSIBLE "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC mDGMENTS A PRIORI?" 257 general level. The categories of negation of which amounts into a logical contradiction. Logically transcendentally - are merely subjectiv be be necessary is that which in an unconditional, absolute sense could not not cognition to a subject, should otherwise. 6 Certainly logical necessity is also involved in Kant's modality used in thinking or in p transcendental proofs. But that does not make the conclusions necessary presumably thought that the same func in the absolute sense. cases. Necessity is one of the categories u There is an important distinction to be made already on the most categ ask: What about the necessity of the general level. The categories of modality, which - viewed themselves? In that employment 'necess transcendentally - are merely subjective concerning the relation of my reflective concept. That is exactly cognition to a subject, should not be confused with the notionscategor of ie examine how Kant's modal modality used in thinking or in philosophical reflection. Kant question is what does it mean, say, that th presumably thought that the same functions are in operation in both is necessary. Thus the question is how to cases. Necessity is one of the categories under "Modality". It is natural necessity which Kant operates wi ask: What about the necessity of the categories (or cardinal propositions) transcendental philosophy. This use is m as a themselves? In that employment 'necessity' should be understood are for example some important passa reflective concept. That is exactly my present concern, and· not to possibility form real possibility. This examine how Kant's modal categories should be understood. The transcendental reflection. question is what does it mean, say, that the employment of the categories sam It is, of course, confusing that the is necessary. Thus the question is how to understand the notion arise of wh However, no serious troubles necessity which Kant operates with or uses in establishingthe un outset that the pure concepts of transcendental philosophy. This use is mostly quite implicit. Exceptions ld of employed to determine the manifo are for example some important passages where he separates logical ined examination no manifold is determ possibility form real possibility. This separation is on the level ve of used as well but now as reflecti conc transcendental reflection. "existence of an object at all times". It o It is, of course, confusing that the same concept is used on two levels. try to apply this schema to the nec the ty However, no serious troubles arise when it is kept in mind from necessi Accordingly, the concept of outset that the pure concepts of the understanding qua categories tare different ways, or two differen notions employed to determine the manifold of intuitions.? In a transcendental examination no manifold is determined although the modal concepts are clear that Kant did not sepa rather 6 It isThe schema of necessity is used as well but now as reflective concepts. necessity. In the case of those analytic judgm their negation for semantic "existence of an object at all times". It but obviously doesreasons, not make sense towould 7 The case of the modal categories is more c try to apply this schema to the necessity of the object itself but c of an categories. ationvery to the detennin used in th they are Howeve faculty. muste be applied onr, two quite Accordingly, the concept of necessitycognitiv different ways, or two different notions of necessity are used. (I would 6 It is rather clear that Kant did not separate semantic necessity from logical necessity. In the case of those analytic judgments which are analytic not for logical but for semantic reasons, their negation would lead to a logical contradiction. 7 The case of the modal categories is more complicated. They do not add anything to the detennination of an object itself but concern the relation of an object to the cognitive faculty. However, they are used in the context of determination.

alternative sounds less confusing.) What this basic put somewhat vaguely as "that which could not be · 258 CHAPTER 8 strongly by Kant himse known it is emphasized transcendental and empirical perspectives leads to t not quarrel over whether different concepts of necessity are used or or, what he calls transcendental amphiboly: "co merely different applications of the same basic concept. Maybe the latter object(O)What of thethis understanding withis appearance". (A alternative sounds less confusing.) basic concept could be

put somewhat vaguely as "that which could not be otherwise". As is well 6. Why the different notions of necessity are re known it is emphasized strongly by Kant himself that confusing the Why will logical necessity aloneofnot do? Ther transcendental and empirical perspectives leads to the illusions reason; which show quite convincingly of for the Kant pure logic or, what he calls transcendental amphiboly: "confusion that so many that the matter would not even ne Indeed object(O) of the understanding with appearance". (A270/B326) were so that relatively little attention has been paid ofnecessity Kantian necessity. (One who has stressed natureof 6. Why the different notions are required? (1982).) I will present below in no pa Why will logical necessity alone not do? There aresome manyreasons passages 1) that LikeforLeibniz, Kant reversed traditional is not all. which show quite convincingly Kant logical necessitythe over the possible. (Scherover 1985, 222) As has be Indeed so many that the matter would not even need stressing, unless it Kant's concern is not actual cognition but exclusiv were so that relatively little attention has been paid to the question of the which is cognition of a mere possibility. The mo nature of Kantian necessity. (One who has stressed this matter is Parsons certain logical relations to each other. Kant pr (1982).) I will present below some reasons in no particular order. 'possible' first and derives 'actuality' and 'necessit 1) Like Leibniz, Kant reversed the traditional primacy of the actual granted that he indeed makes an important distin over the possible. (Scherover 1985, 222) As has been stressed repeatedly and real possibility, it follows that he also ha Kant's concern is not actual cognition but exclusively cognition a priori necessity from real necessity. which is cognition of a mere possibility. The modal concepts stand in 2) It is obvious that the notion of logical necessi certain logical relations to each other. Kant presented the category is intimately related to analytic judgments. Analyt 'possible' first and derives 'actuality' and 'necessity' form it. Taking for just because they are logically necessary. Certainly granted that he indeed makes an important distinction between logical is synthetic judgments. Furthermore, he claims th and real possibility, it follows that he also has to separate logical judgments which are verifiable a priori, according necessity from real necessity. because 'a priori' always carries necessity with i 2) It is obvious that the notion of logical necessity in the present sense they have to conform to the principle of contra is intimately related to analytic judgments. Analytic judgments are true cannot be a criterion of their truth. (A151jB191) I just because they are logically necessary. Certainly Kant's main concern that different types of 'a priori' carry with them is synthetic judgments. Furthermore, he claims that there are synthetic necessities as well. judgments which are verifiable a priori, accordingly they are necessary 3) It is a commonplace that according to Kan because 'a priori' always carries necessity with it. However, although logically necessary. It is not logically contradictory they have to conform to the principle of contradiction, the principle In other words, mathematical judgments are not an cannot be a criterion of their truth. (A151/B191) It is exactly my point that different types of 'a priori' carry with them differents kinds of necessities as well. 3) It is a commonplace that according to Kant mathematics is not logically necessary. It is not logically contradictory to deny that 7+5=12. In other words, mathematical judgments are not analytic but are a prime

these transcendental deductions and p his rationalistic predecessors was ex "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 259 proofs they operated merely with logic example of synthetic judgments a priori,mere which,play moreover are based on of thought (imagination). pure intuition. Accordingly, 'mathematical a priori' not the cardi proofs are (necessity) required toisestablish same as 'logical a priori' (necessity). real possibilities. 4) If logical necessity were all the necessity we neededtotllen whydebated all a much sta 5) Acccording these transcendental deductions and proofs? Kant's accusation against without any necessary reference to f his rationalistic predecessors was exactly that in their metaphysical their conditions a priori". (A89/B122) proofs they operated merely with logical possibilities, which amount to a logical possibility. It is certainly the mere play of thought (imagination). Transcendental deductions and Deduction that objects may not so app proofs are required to establish cardinal propositions which determine functions of the understanding as th real possibilities. transcendental necessity that at least 5) Acccording to a much debated statement "objects may appear to us require the employment of the pure con without any necessary reference to functions of the understanding as 6) Kant explicitly says that there is n their conditions a priori". (A89/B122) "May" in this case must refer to a and time as the forms of intuiting or of the Transcendental logical possibility. It is certainly the message others. Even putting it in this way ind to us, but always requireofthe Deduction that objects may not so app~ar this fram other forms. The necessity conditions a priori. It is a as cog functions of the understanding as theiruniversal validity for us humans transcendental necessity that at least all possible objects of cognition To repeat, my claim that the notion require the employment of the pure concepts. was meant to apply to the notion of ne 6) Kant explicitly says that there is no explanation why we have space notion in Kant's reasoning. As far a just these categories and not and time as the forms of intuiting or why concerned, there is no doubt that he di others. Even putting it in this way indicates of thehe logical possibility is what explicitly says. ofThe th other forms. The necessity of this fran1ework is not logical necessity, butmerely necessity in existence, and not universal validity for us humans as cognizing subjects. (Allison 1983,94) connection of concepts". (A226/B279) necessity is not above, enoughevery e To repeat, my claim that the notion of logical As was emphasized as itseparate is used as was meant to apply to the notion of necessity thea reflective empirical and has to of necessity is dema notion in Kant's reasoning. As far as Kant's category However, this is not the only concerned, there is no doubt that he did not mean logical necessity. That Kant's conception of logic, the logical is what he explicitly says. The third the postulate highest "concerns or absolutematerial level. Thus necessity in existence, and not merely fonnal and logical necessity in the perspectives: logical, mathematical, connection of concepts". (A226/B279) Logical laws are somehow given, alt As was emphasized above, every examination of critical explain how they arephilosophy given. Logic mak has to separate the empirical and the transcendental perspectives. However, this is not the only demarcation which is needed. Due to Kant's conception of logic, the logical perspective must be considered as the highest or absolute level. Thus we have the following levels or perspectives: logical, mathematical, transcendental and en1pirical. Logical laws are somehow given, although Kant does not ever try to explain how they are given. Logic makes up the general rules of thought

worlds' in interpreting Kant. This in whose 8tradition Kant got his philosophica - CHAPTER '260 (1978, 17ft) has suggested an interpretation of Unlike mathematics they are not based on pure intuition. That is why the distinction in terms of this notion. Analytic judgm logical a priori differs from the mathematical one.whereas synthetic judgments all possible worlds use theticnotion of nts 'possible It is not an anachronism but very natural to Synthe a priori are judgme the actual world. worlds' in interpreting Kant. This notion is in fact originated by Leibniz worlds.8 Logic employs absolute necessity, valid - in whose tradition Kant got his philosophical training. E.g. Brittan that which could not be otherwise whatev er the f of though the analytic-synthetic (1978, 17ff) has suggested an interpretation of t belong to the .next as the mere forms distinction in terms of this notion. Analytic judgments a priori are true in they cannot catch any determined object. The nec all possible worlds whereas synthetic judgments aposteriori are tnle in as concepts for determining objects on this the actual world. Synthetic judgments a priori are ntingen true in t)really possible of tran is a notion necessary but superco worlds.8 Logic employs absolute necessity, atical valid ina all possible worlds, zed relativi is priori As mathem that which could not be otherwise whatever athepriori facts isare. The categories relativized to the cat transcendental as the mere fOnTIS of thought belong to the .next level, although as such forms of intuition, there is also the 'superc onting of the categories they cannot catch any detennined object. The necessity They are not necessary in all possible worlds. T as concepts for detennining objects on this level (not absolutely necessary means, to use an expression frequently necessary but supercontingent) is a notion of transcendental logic. make empirical cognition (experience) possible. As mathematical a priori is relativized to pure intuitions so of experience with the concepts of its objects c transcendental a priori is relativized to the categories. Again like the the concepts making experience possible. (B of the categories. fonns of intuition, there is also the 'supercontingency' transcendental unity of apperception is a nece They are not necessary in all possible worlds. That these conditions are presuppositional sense: to be united in the conc necessary means, to use an expression frequently used by Kant, that they the transcendental unity of apperception Pre make empirical cognition (experience) possible. A necessary agreement means that the cardinal propositions tell us the of experience with the concepts of its objects can be explained only by laws must take. Although the necessities ar the concepts making experience possible. (B166) To say that the conditionals this does not turn the very relatio unity has also a transcendental unity of apperception is a necessary As Butts says "The 'must', of course, is not th of an object requires presuppositional sense: to be united in the concept 'must' of presupposition." (Butts 1984, 149) He the transcendental unity of apperception Presuppositional necessity presuppositional sense of necessity pervades Ka means that the cardinal propositions tell us the fonns which empirical laws must take. Although the necessities are presented as logical conditionals this does not tum the very relations into anything logical. As Butts says "The 'must', of course, is not the logical must; it is the rather makes itthat model possible 8 The 'must' of presupposition." (Butts 1984, 149) worlds He also maintains thiseviden distinction is not exhaustive. There are judgmen ts whic analytic nor synthetic. pervades writings. presuppositional sense of necessity gly are neiher accordinKant's at all and 0

0

or determine which world is in Question.

8 The possible worlds model makes it rather evident that the analytic-synthetic distinction is not exhaustive. There are judgments which do not deal with any world at all and accordingly are neiher analytic nor synthetic. They rather ascribe meanings or determine which world is in Question.

of transcendental philosophy. T t kinds of questio two differen "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 261 ns demonstrate the feasibility of t 7. That· and how-questions exegetical work which will It has been my working-hypothesis that it is instructive to consider justification has become manifes CPR as performing two different tasks, namely 1) ato'theory show' of thethat- a to delineate things, correctness of transcendental idealism which, among other precise account is even poss the system amounts to drawing the limits of cognition, and 2) to establish speculations will be presented. I of transcendental philosophy. This division correspondsambigu to answering ous patterns only rather To two different kinds of questions: that-questions and how-questions. himself often presented his prob to a long demonstrate the feasibility of this parellelism would lead especia lly mani obvious fact exegetical work which will be omitted here. Hopefully, some occasionally to a distinction betw justification has become manifest already along the way. Below I by will try many c This is noticed a to delineate a 'theory' of that- and how-questions. I do not claimtothat illuminating seems have been precise account is even possible but some perhaps wild-looking that Kant quite unproblematic all that speculations will be presented. It belongs· to the nature of the matter something more fundamental mi That Kant justif only rather ambiguous patterns of thought are in operation.not directly references do himself often presented his problem as questions and answers issome a rather interest difficult to find He us refers obvious fact especially manifest in the Prolegomena.analogo to one o seems to be occasionally to a distinction between answering that- and how-questions. distinguishing between matter This is noticed by many commentators but nothing especially distinction between things as t very factare - a illuminating seems to have been made out of it. 9 However, thethat they cognize merely that Kant quite unproblematically refers to this distinction indicatestimes that befor pointed out several something more fundamental might be embedded in it. Kant's own short almost exclusively engaged in a references do not directly justify far-reaching conclusions, but it isestions not are That- and how-qu difficult to find some interesting analogies. The thatlhow-distinction and not unequivocally: seems to be analogous to one of Kant's great patterns of thought, viz., THAT: to his distinguishing between matter and form. It also corresponds - to prove or demonstrate/to fin of them we distinction between things as they are in themselves - facti, l) (or materia realcan - questio It has also been cognize merely that they are - and how they appear to us.iori, y actualit - aposter pointed out several times before, that according to my reading Kant is almost exclusively engaged in answering how-questions. 9 Comments about the distinction Dahlstrom (19 651) and roughly (1969, 643, That- and how-questions are related to different key-words deduction can be explained by mean and not unequivocally: THAT: - to prove or demonstrate/to find - questio facti, real (or material) cognition - aposteriori, actuality 9 Comments about the distinction are to be found e.g. in Paton (1936), Henrich (1969, 643, 651) and Dahlstrom (1985). Paton maintained that the division of the Bdeduction can be explained by means of that distinction.

'unrealized' object, content - 'Sachheit', 'Realitat', existence 262 CHAPTER 8 of the fact that objects are given, sufficient - conditions the Analytic of Concepts - that transcendental idealism is correct; to make room for faith; to draw the limits of cognition - metaphysical exposition a premiss - passivity, receptivity;-. presenting unconceptualized matter, transcendental matter, "How are synthetic propositions possible a priori?" in 'unrealized' object, content an examination how it is possible that the - 'Sachheit', 'Realitat',means existence a priori. answer is that .accepting t that objects are given, The sufficient conditions - conditions of the factpropositions transcendental idealism makes them possible. - the Analytic of Concepts - metaphysical exposition HOW: -. presenting a premiss - to show or explicate - questio juris, validity "How are synthetic propositions possible a priori?" in the 'facti-sense' formal cognition, a priori, possibility means an examination how it is possible that there are synthetic to build up the of transcendental philosophy of propositions a priori. -The answer is system that ,accepting the framework spontaneity, form transcendental idealism makes them possible. - conditions of how objects are united in thought, neces HOW: - to show or explicate - the Analytic of Cardinal Propositions - questio juris, validity- transcendental exposition - drawing conclusions - formal cognition, a priori, possibility "How are syntheticphilosophy propositions possible a priori?" in - to build up the system of transcendental - spontaneity, form means an examination of how it is possible to e propositions a in priori. The necessary answer isconditions that transcende - conditions of how objects are united thought, preceding transcendental deductions make them possib - the Analytic of Cardinal Propositions Separating that- and how-questions is inev - transcendental exposition - drawing conclusions ambiguous. Typically a that-answer states that some while a how-answer an explanation. However, an e "How are synthetic propositions possible aispriori?" in the 'juris-sense' look like a that-answer from one point of view while f means an examination of how it is possible to establish synthetic view it might look transcendental like a how-answer. propositions a priori. ofThe answer is that proofsEvery with answ question and ismake in that sense relative. Only by specif preceding transcendental deductions them possible. supposed to be isanswered could somewhat it be settled w Separating that- which and is how-questions inevitably that introduces new difficulties because unless ex ambiguous. Typically But a that-answer states that something is the - case, is often difficult to specify the questions unequivocally while a how-answer is an explanation. However, an explanation might yes- or a no-answer. A how look like a that-answertypically from oneadmits point clearly of viewawhile from another point different. A how-answer does not end, for additional of view it might look like a how-answer. Every answer presupposes a question and is in that sense relative. Only by specifying the question which is supposed to be answered could it be settled which one is meant. But that introduces new difficulties because - unless explicitly stated - it is often difficult to specify the questions unequivocally. A that-question typically admits clearly a yes- or a no-answer. A how-question is quite different. A how-answer does not end, for additional questions can be

judgments. Did Kant himself th "HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" 263 put that Hume did not even

experience is exactly the ground put without end. A how-question is not precise enough to specify exactly to find something. Although the what should count as a sufficent answer. explains or perhaps That-answers typically refer to factual matters which cannoteven be prove it cannot prove their actu proved but rather found. Kant did not prove priori, that there are synthetic of such experience. judgments a priori, any more than Hume provedthe thatpossibility there are not necessarily are synthetic judgments. Did Kant himself think so? Presumably not. Kant's point is judgm notionThe within the transcendental that Hume did not even put the proper question. possibility of the sense of rule-govemedness i experience is exactly the ground which is introduced to make it possible A how-answer sometime to find something. Although the Transcendental Analytic in some can sense ofjudgments a conceptual necessity synthetic a schem explains or perhaps even proves the possibility of necessary priori, it cannot prove their actuality in any other say, way that thanaby recourse condition to categories, then taking the possibility of experience. Even so it cannot- prove that therefor gran we have to is conclude alreadythat a the c necessarily are synthetic judgments, because 'experience' the in "objective necessity" notion within the transcendental idealist framework which necessity in of the howthan the categories proved. are employe the sense of rule-govemedness is presupposed rather a that-explanation. A how-answer can sometimes be turned into -a into that-answer when the But w experience is possible, If it has been shown, but t necessity of a conceptual schema has been shown. in experience. say, that a necessary condition of experience is employed the employment of the The distinction between a categories, then taking for granted that experience is actual or possible, as practically we have to conclude that the categories are alsosometimes employed.taken Explaining objective -and how-explanation say,subjecti the "objective necessity" of the categories turns aso-called thatmanifold is, epistemological how the categories are employed in determining the of intuition versus are taken - into a that-explanation. But what that-answer remarks more exactly? Not as thatreferring transcendental examination c experience is possible, but that the pure concepts are necessarily psychological examination, it is employed in experience. being mainly isoccupied The distinction between answering that- Kant and as how-questions 651), unfortunately sometimes taken as practically equivalent to the (1969,643, distinction between the I do not find plausible. so-called objective and subjective deductions (drawn by Kant in Axvii),There is which would suggest anything . Kant's own that is, epistemological versus psychological investigation. cognitive fac 'how'.faculties Because pure a remarks are taken as referring to a psychological psychological; in other word transcendental examination clearly is not part of an empirical

psychological examination, it is claimed that it cannot be correct to take Kant as being mainly occupied with answering how-question. (Henrich (1969,643, 651), unfortunately, followed by many commentators.) This I do not find plausible. There is nothing at all in the text of (MAN 474) which would suggest anything psychologicaL Although (Axvi) refers to cognitive faculties pure faculties are meant and not anything psychological; in other words, formal conditions of the empirical

were not what Kant was after. Certainly CHAPTER 8 Kant, like any other writer, aims should conceive that something is the case (sa faculties are examined and not any empirical processes. Onecognition). should of empirical H necessary conditions distinguish between psychological and transcendental how-question. (cp. is a different matter. That is, no doubt, a cont Dahlstrom 1985, 79n) For sure, psychological and contingent results diff distinction. Accordingly, in this connection were not what Kant was after. "knowing how" distinctions are sometimes co Certainly Kant, like any other in his distinctions work that aare reader that writer, in this aims case these very cle is the case (say, the categories are should conceive that something more than that, seriously misleading,the be9aus cognition). How a reader conceives it e necessary conditions of empirical question is that of a knowing subject. Kant's is a different matter. That is, no a contingent psychological of anandindividual person's withdoubt, the question distinction. Accordingly, in this connection different "knowing that" not that turned into such. His point of view is and "knowing how" distinctions are sometimes considered. It seems to point o the process of cognition, seen from the me that in this case these distinctions are very clearly impersonal beside the (apersonal) point and ma cognition in a totally view in more than that, seriously misleading, be9ause thebe point amount to what could called of "transcendental Kant's examination does not deal question is that of a knowing subject. One of the passages where Kant distinguishe person's cannot be fo with the question of an individual found in aand much-discussed questions is to be knowing is be notproved that ofthat a knowing person ...but turned into such. His point ofifview it can the categories can ha from the point of view of the elements of to the process of cognition, seen whatever than that merely with reference cognition in a totally impersonal (apersonal) results of such a way thatmanner. in this The experience theCPR categor amount to what could be calledthe "transcendental knowledge". then the answer to the form of thought), One of the passages where Kant distinguished between thatand howof thought possible is indeed importa such fonn footnote in MAN 474: "For questions is to be found in a much-discussed this deduction, where possible; but with referen if it can be proved that the categories ... can have no employment the system, namely, the other determination of the of experience (in whatever than that merely with reference to objects the answer to how is in no way necessary but m such a way that in this experience categories make of the possible primacymerely of how-qu Mythe interpretation to the question how they makewhat the form of thought), then theto answer by maintaining that it flatly contradicts is indeed important for completing such fonn of thought possible While he says that aenough how-answer is merely mer of this deduction, where possible;purpose but withofreference to the main purpose the system, it is awkward to mainta the system, namely, the determination of the which boundary of puremeritorious reason, a with something is merely necessary but merely meritorious." the answer to how is in no wayThis objection, although apparently plausible, of how-questions could be objected My interpretation of the primacy of the text. T up-side down by a closer reading to by maintaining that it flatly maintaining contradicts what Kant was saysmostly in MAN 474n. in a that Kant engaged While he says that a how-answer is merely meritorious and not the although it is true that the main result main is put bri to maintain that CPR mostly deals purpose of the system, it is awkward quite natural to say, for example, that a long me with something which is merely meritorious and not the main purpose. This objection, although apparently plausible, can and should be turned up-side down by a closer reading of the text. There is nothing wrong in maintaining that Kant was mostly engaged in answering how-questions, although it is true that the main result is put briefly as a that-answer. It is quite natural to say, for example, that a long medical thesis is devoted to

answering how-questions, that is, w

"HOW ARE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTSmeriterious. POSSIBLE A PRIORI?" This reading is 265 strongly su

and later on in the very footnote. He the question how a disease is caused, although its message is put only as would not istotter on ...its foundatio a short that-answer in an abstract: it is true CPR that the disease caused In this context Kant means by a that-answer "the categories can have He also stat categories was incomplete. no other employment whatever than thatifwith reference objects foundation of conceded, are to adequate experience". The very possibility of cognition a priori is not at all at pure reason. Thus this one-page-Iong stake. As stated before, my point is that thethat-question, major part ofwhich CPR deals main point o is thewith answering how-questions, that is, with insomething which is merely the footnote he explicitly stresses th by what Kant says before meriterious. This reading is strongly supported questions. and later on in the very footnote. He first points out that the result ofon TD it In the contemporary debate CPR would not totter on its foundations what even was if the of theby Kant saidDeduction very explicitly categories was incomplete. He also states briefly conditions which, logical some proof. The understanding o if conceded, are adequate foundation for transformed determining tothethe boundary of understanding of t pure reason. Thus this one-page-long passage enough to answer more the as ans words,is TD is understood that-question, which is the main point of the whole CPR. latercorrect th questions. It is Moreover, certainly also in the footnote he explicitly stresses th~ importance of answering howbeen puzzled, and indeed accused K questions. several times, and thus many passag been frequently emphasized In the contemporary debate on TD it hassuperfluous. Many of these accusation understood as 'how-a what was said very explicitly by Kant - thatexpositions a deductionare is not a rigorous logical proof. The understanding of the been that is whatproof-structure Kant was tryinghas to explain, answered. A goodInexample transformed to the understanding of the be exposition-structure. other is the words, TD is understood more as answering TD, how-questions the Schematismthan and thatthe System questions. It is certainly also correct that traditionally many writers have "How the categories are necessary and been puzzled, and indeed accused Kant However, of proving, sameambiguously points thisthe is very pu havequite beendifferent maintained to be several times, and thus many passages that kinds of questions superfluous. Many of these accusations loose force when Kant's "Whytheir are the categories necessarily ap expositions are understood as 'how-answers' and "How when isit itispossible specified given?", that the ca what Kant was trying to explain, that is, which questions supposed to must al intuitions?" andare"In what way be answered. A good example is the alleged similarity ofIntheeach tasks of Kant do case the categories?" explanation. Kant never asks the TO, the Schematism and the System of Cardinal Propositions, namely possible?", butof experience". instead the how-qu conditions "How the categories are necessary and a priori However, this is very ambiguously put. On closer inspection it is clear that quite different kinds of questions are being asked. Something like "Why are the categories necessarily applied in detennining the sensibly given?", "How is it possible that the categories can determine empirical intuitions?" and "In what way must all empirical judgments conform to the categories?" In each case Kant does not offer a proof but a howexplanation. Kant never asks the that-question: "Is mathematics possible?", but instead the how-question: "How is mathematics

266

CHAPTER 8

possible?" Similarly Kant did not ask generally "Is knowledge possible?" but "How is it possible?". (Brittan 1978, 7) To repeat Buchdahl again: ".. the Kantian edifice is not so much a question of 'proofs' as the creation of a certain constructive approach in order to secure a meaningful formulation for certain philosophical positions.." (Buchdahl 1989, 224) Actual possibilities - even if they are philosophical ones - cannot be proved but shown.

each case. Availab le English tran changes.

To quote in English the Kritik de A NOTE ON LITERATURE AND TRANSLATION compli cated matter. It is well kn Kemp Smith contain s some errors key terms have become standar d Quotations from Kant's original texts appear always in English adequa tely render the origina l Gen translations although the original German texts have been consulted in improv ed translat ion of the Critiqu each case. Available English translations have been used with minor improv ed the situation. CPR is n changes. English translation. It is, howeve r, To quote in English the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (CPR for short) is a present one, to quote a concise vers complicated matter. It is well known that the standard translation of translations origina lly come from Kemp Smith contains some errors and systematic mispresentations. The have been change d, also to fit bette key terms have become standard in English, although they do not have freely used the ideas of Schw adequately render the original Gennan terms. - A new terminologically has been omitted, the translat improved translation of the Critique by W.Schwarz, 1982, has radically ion of The most notable diverge improved the situation. CPR is now available in a clear and concise ncies Kant's terms are the followi English translation. It is, however, unquestionable that in a study like theng ones - 'Erkenntnis, erkennen' present one, to quote a concise version will not do. The result is, that my are, 'cognit ion' and 'cogniz e' instead o translations originally come from Kemp Smith, while very often they Kant's word for 'know' is 'wiss have been changed, also to fit better with the terminology of this study. I knowin g, and believi ng' in German : have freely used the ideas of Schwarz. When nothing from the original A820/B 848 ff.) This is one of man has been omitted, the translation of Schwarz is directly used. correlate or the result of the action The most notable divergencies regarding the usual translations of intuition, experie nce, ..) It become s Kant's tenns are the following ones: concern ed with the cogniti ve proce - 'Erkenntnis, erkennen' are, for the most part, translated as made result - knowle dge - of that p 'cognition' and 'cognize' instead of the n10re usual 'knowledge, know'. words used, which clearly refe Kant's word for 'know' is 'wissen' (see e.g. section 'Of opining, 'conjun ction' etc. It might well be knowing, and believing' in German: 'Vom Meinen, Wissen und Glauben' the commo nly adapted usage. I can A820/B848 ff.) This is one of many cases where both the acting or the really might be so, but still it can n correlate or the result of the action might be meant. (Other examples: correct misund erstand ings. Espe intuition, experience, ..) It becomes clear in Kant's text that he is mainly concerned with the cognitive process, 'cognitive grasp', not the readymade result - knowledge - of that process. That is shown even by other words used, which clearly refer to a process, like 'synthesis', 'conjunction' etc. It might well be objected that it is too late to change the commonly adapted usage. I can only answer, that in many cases it really might be so, but still it can never be too late to try to prevent or correct misunderstandings. Especially in a passage like the

the correct word to use. That 'Erkenntnis, erk rendered 'knowledge, know' is pointed out, not o 268 other outstanding Kant-scholars as well. (e.g. L Transcendental Deduction, which is explicitly concerned explaining is seriously complic Werkmeister) The matter with how the pure concepts of the'cognition' understanding are inevitable in cognitive should not be understood in its 'erkennen' by processes, it might be disastrously misleading to translate psychological (empirical) process but concerning 'know', when 'cognize', 'recognize' or sometimes evenof'refer' would for b very process: conditions something the correct word to use. That ' Erkenntnis, erkennen' should not cognition. That is a most crucial point be in. order pointed out, the not transcendental only by Schwarz, butofbyview. I rendered 'knowledge, know' ismeans to take point as well. (e.g. who L .W. Beck, George and other outstanding Kant-scholars achieved if one writes about transcendenta seriously complicated the fact that Werkmeister) The matter isthis point conceivable and by clear. or~inary sense as asometi 'cognition' should not be understood in its - 'Gegenstand' is translated as 'object', psychological (empirical) process but concerning the conditions of this 'Obje emphasize the distinction with the German forItbecoming an object of Ka very process: conditions ofassomething 'object(O)'. is controversial whether cognition. That is a most crucial point in. order to understand what distinction between these two terms. It hasitbeen c pointasofinview. Indeed, much isDeduction, already he means to take the transcendental places, the Transcendental achieved if one who writes about transcendental philosophy can kind of distinction. In my opinion, themake distinction this point conceivable and clear. unclear that no interpretation can be based on it. A - 'Gegenstand' is translatedKant's as 'object', sometimesdistinction even 'object(G)' terminological in casetoI am emphasize the distinction withbetween the German 'Objekt'. 'Objekt' is rendered 'Objekt' and 'Gegenstand' are miss as 'object(O)'. It is controversial whether a clear translation. KempKant Smithever evenmade claimed that they a distinction between these two equivalent terms. It has been claimed that in different terms". (A93n2) Deduction, he wanted to someas 'pre places, as in the Transcendental- 'Vorstellung, vorstellen' arestress translated the distinction, although is so kind of distinction. In my opinion, 'representation, represent' as ispresent, more usual. it. Anyhow, I will preserve unclear that no interpretation can- be based on To preserve Kant's distinction between 'Gr Kant's terminological distinction in case I am'Grundsatz' wrong. All asdifferences Schwarz renders 'cardinal prop are missing in Kemp between 'Objekt' and 'Gegenstand' unspecifically, as 'basic proposition'Smith's or 'fundame translation. Kemp Smith evenfollow claimed that they areon"here as elsewhere ... Schwarz also this point. equivalent terms". (A93n2) - 'Verbindung' is not translated 'combina - 'Vorstellung, vorstellen' are translated .as 'presentation, present', not 'conjunction' 'representation, represent' as is more usual. is usually not placed before a noun - 'A priori' andadjective. 'Prinzip'The m - To preserve Kant's distinction between a question of an 'Grundsatz' adverb, not an Schwarz renders 'Grundsatz'transcendental as 'cardinal proposition', when used philosophy isor usually stated i unspecifically, as 'basic proposition' or 'fundamental proposition'. I will synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (B73) follow Schwarz also on this point. - 'Verbindung' is not translated 'combination' as is usual, but 'conjunction' . - 'A priori' is usually not placed before a noun, to emphasize that it is a question of an adverb, not an adjective. The most general question of transcendental philosophy is usually stated in English: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (B73) This is misleading by

- Following Schwarz, 'generatim', although it 269 translation 'generally' is indicating that Kant had made a classification of judgments: does not contrast objec analytic/synthetic and a priori/aposteriori. The latter distinction does not distinction on the empiric refer to a classification of judgments; a priori above does not determine is meant to denote a diff 'judgment' but 'possible'. The German original is "Wie sind synthetische objects disappears, conse Urteile a priori moglich?".(B19) (How are synthetic judgments possible is considered from the a priori?) The adverbial character of 'a priori' is maybe most forcefully 'Uberhaupt' indicates tha argued by Werkmeister (see e.g. 1980, 66-69). taken place. - Following Schwarz, 'uberhaupt' is 'translated' by the latin word References to the Kri 'generatim', although it might sound awkward. However, the normal usage. 'A' refers to the fi translation 'generally' is misleading. By 'Gegenstand uberhaupt' Kant edition used, is that by does not contrast object generally to particular object; which is a Hamburg, 1956. distinction on the empirical level. Rather object over-all or object-hood References to the work is meant to denote a different level. Even the means for individuating Ausgabe, although the En objects disappears, consequently, the singular/plural distinction. Object to the English translatio is considered from the universal, transcendental point of view. Correspondence. 'Uberhaupt' indicates that a transition to a higher level of abstraction has The English translatio taken place. follows: References to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft follow the common CJ Critique ofJudgme usage. 'A' refers to the first and 'B' to the second edition. The German Indianapolis: Hack edition used, is that by Raymund Schmidt, Felix Meiner Verlag, CPR Immanuel Kant's C Hamburg, 1956. Kemp Smith, Lond References to the works of Kant are to the pages of the Akademie CPRS Critique of Pure R Ausgabe, although the English translations are used. Page numbers refer terminologically im to the English translations in the cases of Logic and Philosophical of Kant's argumen Correspondence. by Wolfgang Schw The English translations used and abbreviations for them are as FI First Introduction follows: Werner S. Pluhar, I CJ Critique ofJudgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987 CPR Immanuel Kant's Critique ofPure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1933 CPRS Critique ofPure Reason, concise text in a new faithful terminologically improved translation exhibiting the structure of Kant's argument in thesis and proof, by Wolfgang Schwarz, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1982 FI First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987

On a Discovery According to which Any New C Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Ear by Henry Allison, published in Allison 1973 270 PC Philosophical Correspondence 1779-99, edite Chicago: University of Chicago Pres Logic Logic, translated by Robert A.Zweig, S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Pr Prolegomena, translated by James W. Ellingto New York: Dover, 1988 Hackett, 1985 by ofNatural Science, translated MAN Metaphysical Foundations Indianapolis: and FI are published in one volume: Cri~ique of J James W. Ellington,CJ Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985 Pr are likewise published in one volume: On On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique ofPurePhilosophy On

Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One, translated by Henry Allison, published in Allison 1973 PC Philosophical Correspondence 1779-99, editedBIBLIOGRAPHY and translated by A.Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press Pr Prolegomena, translated by James W. Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985 Henry E: ALLISON, 1973 The Kant-Eberhard Controversy; Ka Cri~ique of Judgment. MANincluding and CJ and FI are published in one volume: On a Discovery According to which Any New C Pr are likewise published in one volume:Pure Philosophy Reason HasofMaterial Been Made Nature. Superfluous by a

One, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins "Transcendental Schematism and The Problem Synthetic A Priori", Dialectica 35, 57-83 1983 Kant's Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Y BIBLIOGRAPHY 1985 "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between and Synthetic Judgments", in Kennington, R (e 1986 "Reflections on the B-Deduction", The Southern ALLISON, Henry E: Journal ofPhilosophy, XXV Supplement, 1-15 AMERIKS, Karl: including Kant's 1973 The Kant-Eberhard Controversy; 1978to which "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regress On a Discovery According Any New Critique of Argument",by Kant-Studien Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous an Earlier 69, 273-287 ASCHENBRENNER, One, Baltimore and London: The John Karl: Hopkins U. P. 1983 and A Companion to of Kant's 1981 "Transcendental Schen1atism The Problem the Critique ofpure Reaso Synthetic A Priori", Dialectica Manham: 35, 57-83 Univ. Press of America BAUM,Idealism, Manfred:New Haven: Yale U. P. 1983 Kant's Transcendental 1984 Erkennen und Machen in der "Kritik der reinen 1985 "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic in Tuschling,R B(ed) (ed)1985 1984 and Synthetic Judgments", in Kennington, 1986a Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalp The Southern 1986 "Reflections on the B-Deduction", Konigsteinffs.: Journal ofPhilosophy, XXV Supplement, 1-15Athenaum Verlag 1986b "The B-Deduction and The Refutation of Idealis AMERIKS, Karl: The Southern Journal of Phil., XXV Suppleme 1978 "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument", Kant-Studien 69, 273-287 ASCHENBRENNER, Karl: 1983 A Companion to Kant's Critique ofpure Reason, Manham: Univ. Press of America BAUM, Manfred: 1984 Erkennen und Machen in der "Kritik der reinen Vern~nft", in Tuschling, B (ed) 1984 1986a Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie, Konigsteinffs.: Athenaum Verlag 1986b "The B-Deduction and The Refutation of Idealism", The Southern Journal of Phil., XXV Supplement, 89-107 1981

1992a "Kants transzendentale Dedu begriffe(B)", Dritter Teil, Ka 1992b "Kants transzendentale Dedu begriffe(B)", Vieter 271 Teil, Ka BECK, Lewis White: BAUMANNS, Peter: 1969 Early German Philosophy, C 1978 1991a "Kants transzendentale Deduktion der reinen VerstandsEssays on Kant and Hume, N 1978/2 "Towards a Metacritique of P begriffe(B)", Erster Teil, Kant-Studien 82, 329-348 1991 b "Kants transzendentale Deduktion der reinen Verstands1978/3 "Did the Sage of Konigsberg begriffe(B)", Zweiter Teil, Kant-Studien 82,436-455 1978/5 "Analytic and Synthetic Judg 1992a "Kants transzendentale Deduktion der reinen Verstandsin Beck 1978 begriffe(B)", Dritter Teil, Kant-Studien 83, 1978/8 60-83 "Six Short Pieces on the Sec 1992b "Kants transzendentale Deduktion der reinen Verstandsin Beck 1978 begriffe(B)", Vieter Teil, Kant-Studien 83, 1984a 183-207"Kant's Theory of Definition BECK, Lewis White: 1984b "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgm 1969 Early German Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. P. in Gram M (ed) 19 reprinted BECK, 1978 Essays on Kant and Hume, New'Haven: Yale Univ. Press(00): Lewis White 1978/2 "Towards a Metacritique of Pure Reason", 1972 in BeckProceed 1978 ings of the Third Inte 1978/3 "Did the Sage of Konigsberg Have No Dreams?", Dordrec Beck 1978 ht: D.Reidel 1978/5 "Analytic and Synthetic JudgmentsBEISER before Kant", , Frederick C.: in Beck 1978 1987 The Fate ofReason, German 1978/8 "Six Short Pieces on the Second Analogy of Experience",' Fichte, Cambridge Mass.: Ha BENCIVENGA, Ermanno in Beck 1978 (ed) 1984 1984a "Kant's Theory of Definition", in Gram M.1987 Kant's Copernican Revolutio BRITTA Gordon G.,]r: 1984b "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made N, Analytic?", reprinted in Gram M (ed) 1984 1978 Kant's Theory ofScience, Pri BROUILLET, Raymond: BECK, Lewis White (eel): 1975 "Dieter Henrich et "The Proo 1972 Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, transcendental deduction"", D Dordrecht: D.Reidel BUCHDAHL, Gerd: BEISER, Frederick C.: 1969Kant Metaphy 1987 The Fate ofReason, German Philosophy from to sics and the Philosop Fichte, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981 "Neo-transcendental approach BENCIVENGA, Ermanno U. P. l", in Mellor (ed): Sci 1987 Kant's Copernican Revolution, New York: Oxford appraisa BRITTAN, Gordon G.,Jr: Behaviour, Cambridge: Camb 1978 Kant's Theory ofScience, Princeton: Princeton P. Dynamical Version of K 1981 U."The BROUILLET, Raymond: in Funke, G (ed) 1981, 394-40 1975 "Dieter Henrich et "The Proof-structure of1982 Kant's"Reduction-Realization: a Ke transcendental deduction"", Dialogue 14,639-648 Thought", in Mohanty & Shah BUCHDAHL, Gerd: 1986 "Kant's 'Special Metaphysics 1969 Metaphysics and the Philosophy ofScience, Foundations of Natural Scienc Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989 "Realism and Realization in a 1981 "Neo-transcendental approaches towards scientific in theory Schaper & Vossenkuhl (eds Robert E.: appraisal", in Mellor (ed): Science,BUTTS, Beliefand 1984 Press Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Kant and the Double Governm Dordrec 1981 "The Dynamical Version of Kant's Transcendental Method", ht: Reidel in Funke, G (ed) 1981, 394-406 1982 "Reduction-Realization: a Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought", in Mohanty & Shahan (eds) 1982 1986 "Kant's 'Special Metaphysics' and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science", in Butts, R (ed) 1986 1989 "Realism and Realization in a Kantian Light", in Schaper & Vossenkuhl (eds) 1989 BUTTS, Robert E.: 1984 Kant and the Double Government Methodology, Dordrecht: Reidel

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die Entstehung von Kants Schrift tibe Archiv fur Philosophie, 9, 37-66 · 276 TREASH, Gordon 1981 "The Law of Sufficient Reason in Ka THOLE, Bernhard in Funke, G (ed) 1981, 62-70 1981 "Die Beweisstruktur derTUSCHLING, transzendentalen Deduktion in der Burkhard (ed): zweiten Auflage der "Kritik der reinen Vemunft"", 1984 Probleme der "Kritik der reinen Vern in Funke, G (ed) 1981, 302-312 Kant-Tagung Marburg 1981, Berlin-N TONELLI, Giorgio: Van De PITTE, Frederick: 1959 "Der Streit tiber die mathematische der 1971 Methode Kant asinPhilosophical Antropologist, Philosophie in der ersten Halfte1981 des 18."How lahrhunderts "Pure" Isund Kant's Critique of Re die Entstehung von Kants Schrift tiberin die "Deutlichkeit"", Funke, G (ed) 1981, 1022-1028 Archiv fur Philosophie, VLEESCHAUWER, 9,37-66 H.-J. de: TREASH, Gordon 1962 The Development ofKantian Though 1981 "The Law of Sufficient Reason in Kant's Early Thomas Thought" London: Nelson (French orig in Funke, G (ed) 1981,62-70 WAGNER, Hans: TUSCHLING, Burkhard (ed): 1977 "Zu Kants Auffassung beztiglich des 1984 Probleme der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", Fonnal- und Transzendentallogik" Ka Kant-Tagung Marburg 1981, Berlin-New York: de Gruyter 1980 "Der Argumentationsgang in Kants D Van De PITTE, Frederick: Kant-Studien 71, 352-366 1971 Kant as Philosophical Antropologist, The Hague: Nijhoff 1984 "Eine Meinungsdifferenz beztiglich K 1981 "How "Pure" Is Kant's Critique of Reason?", Kategorien-Deduktion", in Tuschling in Funke, G (ed) 1981, WALKER, 1022-1028 Ralph (ed): VLEESCHAUWER, H.-I. de: 1982 Kant on Pure Reason, Oxford: Oxfor 1962 The Development ofKantian Thought,G. J.: WARNOCK, London: Thon1as Nelson (French original 1939) and Schematism", Analysi 1949 "Concepts WAGNER, Hans: WERKMEISTER. W. H.: 1977 "Zu Kants Auffassung beziiglich des Verhaltnisses zwischen 1980 KANT/ The Architectonic and Develo 68, 71-6 Open Court Formal- und Transzendentallogik" Kant-Studien La Salle and London: 1980 "Der Argumentationsgang in Kants Deduktion der Kategorien", 1982 "What did Kant say and what has he Kant-Studien 71, 352-366 in Gram, M (ed) 1982 1984 "Eine Meinungsdifferenz beziiglich Kants transzendentaler WILSON, Kirk Dallas: Kategorien-Deduktion", in Tuschling, B (ed)on 1984 1975 "Kant Intuition", Philosophical Q WALKER, Ralph (ed): WINTERBOURNE, A. T.: 1982 Kant on Pure Reason, Oxford: 1988 OxfordThe University Press Ideal and the Real, An Outline o WARNOCK, G. J.: Space Time and Mathematical Const 1949 "Concepts and Schematism", Analysis 77-82 WOLFF, Robert8,Paul: WERKMEIS'TER. W. H.: 1963 Kant's Theory ofMental Activity, Glo 1980 KANT/ The Architectonic and Development ZOLLER, Gtinter: of His Philosophy La Salle and London: Open Court 1984 Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung 1982 "What did Kant say and what has he been made say?", Berlin andtoNew York: Walter de Gru in Gram, M (ed) 1982 1988 "Kant on Generation of Metaphysica WILSON, Kirk Dallas: in Oberer & Seel (eds) 1988 1975 "Kant on Intuition", Philosophical 25, 247-265 1989Quarterly "From Innate to A Priori", The Monis WINTERBOURNE, A. T.:

1988

The Ideal and the Real, An Outline of Kant's Theory of

Space Time and Mathematical Construction, Dordrecht: Kluwer WOLFF, Robert Paul: 1963 Kant's Theory ofMental Activity, Gloucester Mass.: P Smith ZOLLER, GUnter:

1984 Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant, 1988 1989

Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter "Kant on Generation of Metaphysical Knowledge", in Oberer & Seel (eds) 1988 "From Innate to A Priori", The Monist 72,222-235

INDEX of NAMES Allison, 23-5, 38,41, 53, 56-7, 93, 96, 106,114-5, 117-8,120-2, 129, 131, 136, 138-9, 141, 143-4, 158, 165, 168, 171, 173-4, 177-182, 189, 193n, 203,206,214,219,221, 223, 225, 227-9, 235-6, 238-9, 242, 245, 253,256,259 Ameriks, 86, 87 Baum, 25, 130, 194, 234 Baumanns, 126 Baumgarten, 38, 94 Beck, 13-4, 18,.23, 25, 38, 45, 53-4, 63, 76,186,268 Beiser, 18, 94-5 Berkeley, 36, 184-5 Brittan, 38, 85-6, 187n, 260, 266 Brouillet, 129 Buchdahl, 23, 25, 32, 46, 95-6, 104, 157,159-161,163,167,171-3,176, 184,190,197,206,219,266 Butts, 36, 38, 95, 147n, 260 Carl, 250 Cramer, 44 Crucius, 38, 58, 94 Dahlstrom, 261n, 264 Dryer, 23 Eberhard, 18,53,55-7,94,251 Forster, 65, 69 Genova, 107-8 George, 268 Gram, 111, 205, 221, 226, 228, 231-2, 236,252 Guyer, 194n Haack, 44 Haaparanta, 72 Hamann, 18-9 Hartman, 205 Heidegger, 25, 158,206-7,211-2 Henrich, 87, 128-130, 132, 138, 261n, 263 Herder, 18-9 Hintikka, 143-4 Hurne, 19,21,30,35,38,40,45,52,66, 88,95,196,263 Jacobi, 18

Ameriks, 86, 87 Melnick, 1 Baum, 25, 130, 194, 234 Newton, 38 Baumanns, 126 277 Nowotny, Baumgarten, 38, 94 Palmquist, 206-8,25,211, 219 63, Beck,Krausser, 13-4, 18,.23, 38,213, 45, 53-4, Parsons, 25 Komer, 117-8 76,186,268 Paton, 111 Leibniz, 13, 21, 26, 28, 38, 58, 62-3, 67, Pippin, 115 18, 94-5 Beiser, 93-4,99,165,167,258,260 Berkeley, 36, 184-5 Plato, 38 Locke, 38 187n, 260, 266 Prauss,24, Brittan, 38, 85-6, 53 Maass,129 Brouillet, Putnam, 18 Maimon, Buchdahl, 23,1825, 32, 46, 95-6, 104, Quine, 17, Matthews, 37 163, 167, 171-3, 176, 157, 159-161, Reinhold, 1 Meerbote, 166 184,190,197,206,219,266 Rotenstreic Melnick, 178,147n, 183 260 Butts, 36, 38, 95, Rorty,16-7 38 Carl,Newton, 250 Rousseau, Nowotny, 129 Cramer, 44 Schulze, 18 Palmquist, Schwarz, 1 Crucius, 38, 58, 159n, 94 172n Parsons,261n, 258 264 Dahlstrom, Seebohm,8 Paton, 23 111n, 114-5, 215, 225, 261n Dryer, Seigfried, 9 Pippin,18,53,55-7,94,251 115, 116, 221 Seung,227 Eberhard, Plato, Forster, 65,3869 Sherover,3 PTauss, 24, 158, 173 Stenius, 17 Genova, 107-8 Putnam, Strawson, George, 268 184 Quine, Gram, 111, 17, 205,53221, 226, 228, 231-2, Tetens,38 Reinhold, 18,69,252 236,252 Thole, 147 Rotenstreich, 101 Guyer, 194n Tonelli, 63 Rorty,16-7 Haack, 44 Treash, 94 Rousseau, Vleeschaue Haaparanta, 72 38 Schulze, VVagner, 1 Hamann, 18-918 Schwarz, VVarnock, Hartman, 205 15n,46, 205,217,267,269 Seebohm,89 VVerkmeis Heidegger, 25, 158,206-7,211-2 Seigfried, 99 VVilson, 13 Henrich, 87, 128-130, 132, 138, 261n, Seung,227 Winterbou 263 Sherover,38 VVittgenste Herder, 18-9 Stenius, 171 Wolff, C., Hintikka, 143-4 Strawson, 20,23-4, 37,60, 125, 177 93-6,9 Hurne,19,21,30,35,38,40,45,52,66, Tetens,38 VVolff, R., 88,95,196,263 Thole, Zoller, 107 Jacobi, 18 147n Tonelli, 63 Treash, 94, 95 Vleeschauer, 38, 66, 94 Wagner, 103, 124, 129 Warnock, 222, 228 Werkmeister, 34, 37,44,46, 268, 269 Wilson, 134 Winterboume, 221 Wittgenstein, 17 Wolff, C., 13, 26, 38, 50, 53, 57-8, 62, 93-6,99 Wolff, R., 241 Zoller, 107, 187n, 209

actuality [Wirklichkeit], 32,47, 97-8, 146, 152 202-4,247,251,258,261,263 208-209 affection, 172-178, 185 empirical re 278 analytic vs. synthetic, 52-8 epigenesis, epistemic co 95-6, 148-9, 48, 61, 77-79, discursive vs. intuitive, INDEX of SUBJECTSAnalogies of Experience, 198,249 80,101,170,214,245,247-9,254160,167 apagogic proofs, 85-7, 235 18, 35, 62, 64, 108 epistemolog dogmatism, (Page numbers in boldface indicate apperception, 130-1, 151, Erkenntnis, Doctrine of 153-4, Method, 12, 31, 59-60, 72, important occurrences.) 179-180,186-199,260 essence, 5584 51, 154 existence, 1 28, 32, 147-151,248-9 a priori, 11-2, 39-41, 42-4, 59-61,apprehension, dynamical, 255-6idealism, 36 158,165 empirical 235-9,240-255, 268,passiln axioms, 76, 79-80, of Intuition, 149, 211, 248 Axioms 257-9,2 empirical intuition, 22, 40, 42-43, 58, Abstraction, 134-9, 141-153, 176-7 form, 160-1 60,70,80-1,102,117,121,131-8, actual vs. real, 98-9, 120, 203-204bivalence, 85-6, 103n cardinal propositions, 75,161, 81-2, form of intu 146,70-1, 152-3, 167, 188-9, 202-3, actuality [Wirklichkeit], 32,47, 97-8, 84-5,103,147-9,223-224,239, 208-209,215-9,234,245-6,253-4228-9,2 202-4,247,251,258,261,263 240-2,248-257,268, passiln 37, 163, 183- 184 formal intui empirical realism, affection, 172-178, 185 categories, 20, 25, 28-31, 48, 91, 217-9,2 epigenesis, 105-8 analytic vs. synthetic, 52-8 formal (gen 104-122, 145-155, 160-2, 176, epistemic condition, 11, 27, 37, 41, 158, Analogies of Experience, 95-6, 148-9, 188-190, 199,220-223,224-7, 160,167-9,189-192,200,208 72,76,8 198,249 228-235, 238, 241-5, 248-9,question, 260, epistemological 208, 210 122, 141 apagogic proofs, 85-7, 235 263, passilnErkenntnis, 44-7, 267 formal valid apperception, 130-1, 151, 153-4, causality, 15, 28, 31, 66,55-6, 94-6,73, 149, 151166, 211,Gegenstand essence, 76-9, 213 179-180,186-199,260 cognition, 44-9, 267, passiln 193n,26 existence, 16, 35-6, 49, 99, 126, 147-8, apprehension, 51, 154 generatim, 1 concept, 19-22, 73-79, 215 passiln 158,165-8,175-6,184,202,247-9, axioms, 76, 79-80, 255-6 ideal, 202-3 257-9,262130, 140, Axioms of Intuition, 149, 211, 248conjunction (combination), ideas of rea 150,217,219,267-8 bivalence, 85-6, 103n form, 160-1, passiln constitutive, 147-155, form of248-250 intuition, 154, 205-218, 220,224 cardinal propositions, 70-1, 75, 81-2, Imagination construction of concepts, 22, 75-8, 217, 228-9,243 84-5,103,147-9,223-224,239, 232,242-250, 254n formal intuition, 112, 154, 205-212, 218,222 240-2, 248-257, 268,passiln 15,24, 38,41, innate ideas 217-9,220-2,227-239,240-255 categories, 20, 25, 28-31, 48, 91, Copernican revolution, 65,91,157,164,178,180,182 internal formal (general) logic, 25, 28, 32, 51-8, real 104-122,145-155,160-2, 176, intuition, 16 34-5,64-8, 159, 162 188-190,199,220-223,224-7,critique, 11, 18, 24,72,76,82,87,93,96,99-103,110deduction, 30-1, 39, 73,141-3, 76,80-4,85-90, 138-9, 1 122, 160, 199 228-235, 238, 241-5, 248-9, 260, passiln judgment, 4 formal validity, 187, 192-5, 198, 200 263, passim definition, 55, 73-9, 82, 90, 47,122, 126-7,243 judgments o Gegenstand, 140n, 179-180, causality, 15, 28, 31, 66, 94-6, 149, 151 demonstration, 79-82, 84,268 127 191, 198 193n, cognition, 44-9, 267, passiln determination, 47-9 o judgments generatim, 150, 176,269, passiln concept, 19-22, 73-79, 215 passim 191, 197 ideal, 202-3, 211 conjunction (combination), 130, 140, 150,217,219,267-8 constitutive, 147-155, 248-250 construction of concepts, 22, 75-8, 217, 232, 242-250, 254n Copernican revolution, 15,24, 38,41, 65,91,157,164,178,180,182 critique, 11, 18, 24, 34-5,64-8, 159, 162 deduction, 30-1, 39, 73, 76,80-4,85-90,

passiln definition, 55, 73-9, 82, 90, 126-7, 243 demonstration, 79-82, 84, 127 determination, 47-9

ideas of reason, 20, 74,83, 155, 191, 224 In1agination, 113-4, 154, 162, 196, 216, 218,222,227-235 innate ideas, 21, 105, 108-9,209 internal realism, 159n, 184 intuition, 16,21,40, 45, 49, 132-4, 138-9, 141-5,205-239, passiln judgment, 49-61, 186-239, passiln judgments of experience, 39,51, 107, 191, 198 judgments of perception, 39, 51, 107, 191, 197-201

-251 84,90,9 7-8,1 mathematics, 13,21,2 6-8, 39,42-3 ,55, Postulat es of Emp 279 59-61,6 3-4,67, 70, 73-83, 95, 239,249 101-2,1 27,143, 202,205 ·6,209, presentation, 268, logical fOnTIS of judgments, 105-7, Objekt,47, 122, 140n, 179-180, 193n, 217,232 ,237,24 2-3,245 -250, principle of suffic 111n, 116, 119, 143,145-6, 195-7, 268 253-6, 258-260 151 199,224-6,248 ontological question, 210 rnaner, 67, 92, 98, 160-1, 195,203 , principles of reaso logical possibility, 20, 34, 39, 88,97-98, ontology, 660,185, 83,147,159-160,168, 207,212 ,216,25 5,261,2 62 progressive vs. reg 118,160,167,170,256,257,259 170,176,210 meta-critic, 13-6, 18-9, 109,207 pure, 44, 106-7 pa logical vs. real possibility, 27, 39, 88, ostensive proofs, 85-7,214, 255 97-98,257 18, 109,160-1,212 pure concepts of t metaphysicaphenomenal, generalis, 660, 83 passim manifold of intuition, 205-239, passim interpretation, 24 metaphysicaphenomenalistic specialis, 83 pure intuition, 49, material validity, 155, 187-8,192-202 phenomenon, 161, 165, 170, 172n,244 Metaphysical Deduction, 101, 104, pure sensible mate mathematical categories/cardinal possibility of experience, 37,43,61,81, 110·119, 146, 199, 211n, 222-3,2 38 propositions, 147-151,248-251 84,90,97-8,105,125,241-2,245-9216,234 metaphysical exposition, 92, 210..1, rationalism, 26, 30 mathematics, 13,21,26-8,39,42-3,55, Postulates of Empirical Thought, 149, 214,262 73,81,8 3,88,1 59-61,63-4,67,70,73-83,95, modality 239,249 , 15,99,1 47,202, 249,257 real vs. actual, 98101-2,127,143,202,205-6,209, presentation, 268, passim necessity, 255·260, passim real definition, 76n 217,232,237,242-3,245-250, principle of sufficient reason, 57, 93-9, nournenal, 15, 18, 109, 176, 184 real possibility, 20 253-6,258-260 151 noumen on,29, 159n, 160, 165, 149, 162 96-9,16 7-8,25 matter, 67, 92, 98,160-1,185,195,203, principles of reason, 103, 168-172 207,212,216,255,261,262 progressive vs. regressive, 87, 250 realism, 29, 183..5 object, 268, passim reality [Realitiit], 3 meta-critic, 13-6, 18-9, 109,207,214, pure, 44, 106-7 passim object generatim, 160, passim 161,170 ,174, 255 pure concepts of the understanding, object of experience, 98, 132, 136, 148, Reason, 11, 18-9, 3 metaphysica generalis, 66n, 83 passim 161, 177 63-8, 77-8, 83n metaphysica specialis, 83 pure intuition, 49, 106-7, passim object of intuition, 132-3 Metaphysical Deduction, 101, 104, pure sensible material, 112-3,209-213,107,167 ,186,2 object(G ),268 receptivity, 48-9, 1 110-119, 146, 199, 211n, 222-3, 238 216,234 object(O), 268 rationalism, 26, 30, 38-42, 45, 62, 71, 185,209 ,262 metaphysical exposition, 92, 210-1, objective, 11, 28, 186.. 204, passim 73,81,83,88, 108, 151, 166-7 reflection, 58, 85, 214,262 objective necessity, 108, 189-190, 263 real vs. actual, 98-9, 120,203-204 Refutation of Ideal modality, 15,99, 147,202,249,257 objective reality, 28, 37,43, 70, 76, 80, regulative, 147-15 real definition, 76n, 243 necessity, 255-260, passim 97-9,12 7,186-2 01,200, 201-4,2 54 real possibility, 20-1, 27-8, 39, 88, Sachheit, 161, 185 noumenal, 15, 18, 109, 176, 184 objective validity, 11, 20-1, 28, 38, scepticism, 23, 3596-9,167-8,257-9 noumenon,29, 159n, 160,162-3,165, 50-2,54 ,59,81- 4,90,97 -104,11 7, scherna, 22,27, 32 realism, 29,183-5 168-172 121-2,1 24,126, 131,143 ,151-5, 148,206 ,220,2 reality [Realitdt], 32, 37, 47, 97-99,157, object, 268, passim 179-182 ,186-204 , 224 254..5, 257, pas 161,170,174,184,188,201-4,262 object generatim, 160, passim objectivity, 11-2, 38, 125-8, 186.. 204 schema judgmen ts, Reason, 11, 18-9,33-5,39-40,50,59, object of experience, 98, 132, 136, 148, 161,177 object of intuition, 132-3 object(G), 268 object(O), 268 objective, 11, 28, 186-204, passim objective necessity, 108, 189-190,263 objective reality, 28, 37, 43, 70, 76,80, 97-9,127,186-201,200,201-4,254 objective validity, 11,20-1,28,38, 50-2,54,59,81-4,90,97-104,117, 121-2,124,126,131,143,151-5, 179-182,186-204,224 objectivity, 11-2,38,125-8,186-204

63-8,77-8, 83n, 84,100-1,103-4, 107,167,186,217,223-4,258 receptivity, 48-9, 108-110, 113, 145, 185,209,262 reflection, 58, 85,159-164,172-3,257 Refutation ofldealism, 35-6, 136 regulative, 147-155,248-250 Sachheit, 161, 185,262 scepticism, 23, 35-9, 125 schema, 22,27, 32, 61, 71,106,146, 148, 206, 220, 221-239, 240-251, 254-5,257, passim schema judgments, 281-5

passim transce spontaneity, 48, 109-110, 113, 130, 142, transce 280 145,209,220,262 transce subjective, 28, 38,40,49,51-2,55, 86, 62transcendental exposition, Schematism, 32, 81,90,92, 107,116-7, 100, 108-9, 136, 139, 143, 156, 75, 92, 257 121,123,146,221-239,240,265 164-5, 181,210-221,219,262 186-7, 190-8, 199-201, transce schematized categories, 28, 106-7, transcendental idealism, 12, 14,23, 29, 60202-3,208-210,214,216,257,263, 117-8,120-1,132,146,224-7,241 passim 36-7,65,68,71,107-8,158,163-6, 256 sensation, 49, 98, 106,138, 143-4, subjective idealism, 177,183-4,208,210,261-2 24, 36, 167 transce transcendental logic, 160-161, 216 synthesis, 50, 58, 74-5, 81-2, 90,25, 97,27, 51, 53-8,truth, 2 sensible intuition, 49, 107 passim 85-6,92,93,96,99-102,103-4, 101,105,113-5,130-1,135,144, 102 sensory object, 159 110-122,141,156,160,170,191, 25 151-4,,176,195,198,206,212-5, space and time, 134-5, 150-5, 205-239, 218,220, 227n,229-230, 206,209,222,227,252,260 234-5, two wo passim transcendental method, 12-3, 31, 68-71 170 238,242,247,249,253-4,267, spontaneity, 48, 109-110, 113, 130, 142, passim transcendental object, 160-176, 183-4uberha transcendental 32, 37-9, 61, Unders 145,209,220,262 synthesis, figurative, 135, proofs, 154, 213, 62-92,127, 132n, 235, 241, 245, subjective, 28, 38, 40, 49, 51-2, 55, 86, 234-5 96, 100, 108-9, 136, 139, 143, 156, synthesis, intellectual, 257,262151-2, 153 130 transcendental propositions, 164-5,181,186-7, 190-8,199-201, 12, 59-61, 12, 27, 30, 170 synthetic judgments a priori, 60-1,62-92,156,232,235,240-255, 202-3,208-210,214,216,257,263, 235-9, 240-255, 212 passim passim 256 82, 111, 232, 236, syntheticity, 55-7, 259 subjective idealism, 24, 36, 167 251,254transcendental realism, 14, 36, 163-6 synthesis, 50, 58, 74-5, 81-2, 90, 97, TD/1,29n,31,117-122,128-155, truth, 27, 30, 39, 56-8, 79-80, 85-7, 102-4,156,188,192,197,201-2, 101,105,113-5,130-1,135,144, 176-7, 181-2, 189,220,226-7 151-4,,176,195,198,206,212-5,TD/2, 290, 31, 256,258 128-155, 176-7, 188-9, 218,220, 227n,229-230,234-5, two worlds vs. two perspectives, 159, 205,209,219-220,223 238,242,247,249,253-4,267, that- and how-questions, 170-3 12,29,261-6 passim 268 thought vs. uberhaupt, cognition, 141-5 synthesis, figurative, 135, 154, 213, thing in itself, Understanding, 21, 43,49-50, 83n, 94, 24, 29, 65, 159n, 234-5 96,100-4,108,110,111-6,119, 165-172, 173-4, 183 130, 134-5, 140, 142, 151-4, 165n, synthesis, intellectual, 151-2, 153 thinking(os), 142 170-1,179,193,196-7,207,209, synthetic judgments a priori, 12, 59-61, thinking(ts), 142 212,220-3, 225,229,233-5,241-3, 235-9, 240-255, passim third thing, 222, 228, 231, 234, 243, syntheticity, 55-7, 82, 111, 232, 236, 245-8,253 259 251,254 transcendental, 60, passim TD/1,29n,31,117-122,128-155, transcendental arguments, 23 176-7, 181-2, 189, 220, 226-7 transcendental deduction, 87-90, TD/2, 290, 31,128-155, 176-7, 188-9, 123-155, passim 205,209,219-220,223 that- and how-questions, 12, 29, 261-6 thought vs. cognition, 141-5 thing in itself, 24, 29, 65, 159n, 165-172, 173-4, 183 thinking(os), 142 thinking(ts), 142 third thing, 222, 228, 231, 234, 243, 245-8,253 transcendental, 60, passim transcendental arguments, 23 transcendental deduction, 87-90, 123-155, passim