The Transformation of the Japanese Left: From Old Socialists to New Democrats (Nissan Institute Routledge Japanese Studies)

The Transformation of the Japanese Left

This book examines the transition within the Japanese party system that has seen the demise of ‘the old socialists’, the Japan Socialist Party, and in its place, the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan as the leading opposition party. Sarah Hyde has produced an original book which looks at the intra-left (non-communist) opposition party manoeuvrings during the 1990s through to the new millennium, in a highly detailed and focused manner while simultaneously looking at the three most significant changes for the left nationally: the change to the electoral system, the change to public opinion regarding defence and the Constitution after the First Gulf War and the changes to the Labour Union movement. Ending with a section on the incredibly important 2007 Upper House election, which brings the development of the opposition full circle, The Transformation of the Japanese Left will be a valuable source for students and scholars of Japanese politics, electoral systems and opposition politics. Sarah Hyde is Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Kent, UK.

The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series Editorial Board Roger Goodman, Nissan Pr ofessor of Modern Japanese Studies, University of Oxfor d, Fellow, St Antony’s College ; J.A.A. Stockwin, formerly Nissan Pr ofessor of Modern Japanese Studies and former Dir ector of the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxfor d, Emeritus Fellow , St Antony’s College ; Alan Rix, Executive Dean, Faculty of Arts, The University of Queensland ; Junji Banno, formerly Pr ofessor of the University of T okyo, now Pr ofessor, Chiba University ; Leonard Schoppa, Associate Professor, Department of Government and For eign Affairs, and Director of the East Asia Center, University of Virginia Other titles in the series: 1.

The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness Peter Dale

2.

The Emperor’s Adviser Saionji Kinmochi and pre-war Japanese politics Lesley Connors

3.

4.

A History of Japanese Economic Thought Tessa Morris-Suzuki The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System Junji Banno, translated by J.A.A. Stockwin

9. Japanese Economic Development Theory and practice, second edition Penelope Francks 10. Japan and Protection The growth of protectionist sentiment and the Japanese response Syed Javed Maswood 11. The Soil, by Nagatsuka Takashi A portrait of rural life in Meiji Japan Translated and with an introduction by Ann Waswo 12. Biotechnology in Japan Malcolm Brock

5.

Industrial Relations in Japan The peripheral workforce Norma Chalmers

13. Britain’s Educational Reform A comparison with Japan Michael Howarth

6.

Banking Policy in Japan American efforts at reform during the Occupation William M. Tsutsui

14. Language and the Modern State The reform of written Japanese Nanette Twine

7.

Educational Reform in Japan Leonard Schoppa

15. Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan The intervention of a tradition W. Dean Kinzley

8.

How the Japanese Learn to Work, second edition Ronald P. Dore and Mari Sako

16. Japanese Science Fiction A view of a changing society Robert Matthew

17. The Japanese Numbers Game The use and understanding of numbers in modern Japan Thomas Crump 18. Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan Edited by Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing 19. Technology and Industrial Development in Pre-war Japan Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, 1884–1934 Yukiko Fukasaku

26. Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan Glenn D. Hook 27. Growing a Japanese Science City Communication in scientific research James W. Dearing 28. Architecture and Authority in Japan William H. Coaldrake 29. Women’s Gidayu– and the Japanese Theatre Tradition A. Kimi Coaldrake

20. Japan’s Early Parliaments, 1890–1905 Structure, issues and trends Andrew Fraser, R.H.P. Mason and Philip Mitchell

30. Democracy in Post-war Japan Maruyama Masao and the search for autonomy Rikki Kersten

21. Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge Policy reform and aid leadership Alan Rix

31. Treacherous Women of Imperial Japan Patriarchal fictions, patricidal fantasies Hélène Bowen Raddeker

22. Emperor Hirohito and Sho– wa Japan A political biography Stephen S. Large 23. Japan Beyond the end of history David Williams 24. Ceremony and Ritual in Japan Religious practices in an industrialized society Edited by Jan van Bremen and D.P. Martinez 25. The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature The subversion of modernity Susan J. Napier

32. Japanese–German Business Relations Competition and rivalry in the inter-war period Akira Kud 33. Japan, Race and Equality The racial equality proposal of 1919 Naoko Shimazu 34. Japan, Internationalism and the UN Ronald Dore 35. Life in a Japanese Women’s College Learning to be ladylike Brian J. McVeigh

36. On the Margins of Japanese Society Volunteers and the welfare of the urban underclass Carolyn S. Stevens 37. The Dynamics of Japan’s Relations with Africa South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria Kweku Ampiah 38. The Right to Life in Japan Noel Williams 39. The Nature of the Japanese State Rationality and rituality Brian J. McVeigh

47. The Politics of Agriculture in Japan Aurelia George Mulgan 48. Opposition Politics in Japan Strategies under a one-party dominant regime Stephen Johnson 49. The Changing Face of Japanese Retail Working in a chain store Louella Matsunaga 50. Japan and East Asian Regionalism Edited by S. Javed Maswood

40. Society and the State in Inter-war Japan Edited by Elise K. Tipton

51. Globalizing Japan Ethnography of the Japanese presence in America, Asia and Europe Edited by Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis

41. Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945 A difficult peace Kimie Hara

52. Japan at Play The ludic and logic of power Edited by Joy Hendry and Massimo Raveri

42. Interpreting History in Sino–Japanese Relations A case study in political decision making Caroline Rose

53. The Making of Urban Japan Cities and planning from Edo to the twenty-first century André Sorensen

43. Endo– Shu– saku A literature of reconciliation Mark B. Williams 44. Green Politics in Japan Lam Peng-Er 45. The Japanese High School Silence and resistance Shoko Yoneyama 46. Engineers in Japan and Britain Education, training and employment Kevin McCormick

54. Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan Change and continuity in antimonopoly policy, 1973–1995 Michael L. Beeman 55. Modern Japan A social and political history Elise K. Tipton 56. Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan Dislocating the salaryman doxa Edited by James E. Roberson and Nobue Suzuki

57. The Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan The challenge of change Edited by Stephen P. Osborne 58. Japan’s Security Relations with China From balancing to bandwagoning Reinhard Drifte

65. Japan’s Interventionist State The role of the MAFF Aurelia George Mulgan 66. Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004 ‘A matter of life and death’? Euan Graham

59. Understanding Japanese Society, third edition Joy Hendry

67. The Changing Japanese Political System The Liberal Democratic Party and the Ministry of Finance Harumi Hori

60. Japanese Electoral Politics Creating a new party system Edited by Steven R. Reed

68. Japan’s Agricultural Policy Regime Aurelia George Mulgan

61. The Japanese–Soviet Neutrality Pact A diplomatic history, 1941–1945 Boris Slavinsky, translated by Geoffrey Jukes 62. Academic Nationalism in China and Japan Framed by concepts of nature, culture and the universal Margaret Sleeboom 63. The Race to Commercialize Biotechnology Molecules, markets and the state in the United States and Japan Steve W. Collins 64. Institutions, Incentives and Electoral Participation in Japan Cross-level and cross-national perspectives Yusaka Horiuchi

69. Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific Divided territories in the San Francisco system Kimie Hara 70. Living Cities in Japan Citizens’ movements, machizukuri and local environments André Sorensen and Carolin Funck 71. Resolving the Russo–Japanese Territorial Dispute Hokkaido–Sakhalin relations Brad Williams 72. Modern Japan A social and political history, second edition Elise K. Tipton 73. The Transformation of the Japanese Left From old socialists to new democrats Sarah Hyde

The Transformation of the Japanese Left From old socialists to new democrats Sarah Hyde

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

© 2009 Sarah Hyde All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hyde, Sarah J. The transformation of the Japanese left: from old socialists to new democrats/Sarah Hyde. p. cm.—(The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies series) 1. Political parties—Japan. 2. Nihon Shakaito (1945–) 3. Minshuto (1998–) 4. Opposition (Political science)—Japan. 5. Japan—Politics and government—1989– I. Title. JQ1698.A1H94 2009 324.252′07—dc22 2009001987 ISBN 0-203-87435-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–46665–2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–87435–8 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–46665–3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–87435–6 (ebk)

Contents

List of figures List of tables Series editor’s preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction 1

2

3

xi xiii xv xvii xix 1

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour and attitudes towards politics, 1980–2000

17

From old socialists to new democrats: two decades in the life of the Japanese left

38

The Constitution and its importance to the decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the unity of the Democratic Party of Japan

75

4

Rengo– and the changes in the Japanese left

106

5

Electoral system reforms and their impact on the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Party of Japan

131

The decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan in Okayama Prefecture: a case study

150

Conclusion

175

6

x

Contents Appendix I: Interview schedule Appendix II: Japanese Party change 1990–2008 Notes Bibliography Index

180 184 185 192 197

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1

Turnout at Japanese elections, 1980–2007 Turnout and total number of electorate, House of Representatives, 1980–2000 Turnout and total number of electorate, House of Councillors, 1986–2001 Public opinion support for Japanese political parties, 1980–90: all ages Public opinion support for Japanese political parties, 1988–2000: all ages Public opinion support according to party of 20–24-year-olds Public opinion support for parties among over-60s Public opinion support for the LDP according to occupation Public opinion support for the JSP according to occupation Public opinion polls according to occupation: no professed party of support Public opinion support for the LDP according to residential location Public opinion support for the JSP according to residential location Non-support of any party according to residence Professed party of support, 1980–2000 Professed party of support, 2000–07 Asahi public opinion poll levels for the LDP and DPJ, March 2006–December 2007 Support for the JSP, 1986–95 Support for the JSP and DPJ, 1994–2000 Yomiuri public opinion poll support for the LDP and DPJ, April 2000–December 2007 Number of unionised workers

18 19 20 24 25 27 28 30 31 31 32 33 34 35 37 73 95 95 97 129

xii 4.2 5.1 6.1 6.2

Figures Percentage of complete workforce unionised Government subsidies for political parties National and Okayama comparative election results for the LDP and JSP, 1969–96 Comparison of national and Okayama PR results

129 145 155 155

Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16

Number of seats won in the House of Councillors elections, 1983–92 Number of seats won in the House of Representatives (Lower House) elections, 1983–93 Comparisons of JSP members who joined and did not join the DPJ Factions within the DPJ Average age and number of electoral wins of DPJ members according to faction What do you think about Japan’s contribution to world peace and security within a context of UN activities? (August 1979) What do you think about Japan’s contribution to world peace and security within a context of UN activities? (June 1983) What should happen to the SDF? Do you think the SDF are unconstitutional? Do you support Article Nine? Do you agree that the current Constitution needs to be reformed? What do you think about the SDF going abroad? Do you support the PKO Bill? In order to support UN activities, and for the SDF to go abroad, is there a problem with the Constitution? Do you agree that the SDF should make an international contribution? To JSP supporters, why do you support the party? Why did the JSP do well in the 1989 Upper House election? Why do you support the JSP? What is your impression of the JSP? Why do you think the JSP did badly in the last election? The JSP suffered an unprecedented defeat in the July 1993 election. Why was that?

40 40 54 62 67 87 87 87 88 88 88 88 89 89 89 90 90 91 91 92 92

xiv 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 3.21 4.1 4.2

Tables Do you feel the SDF should participate in peace-keeping activities? Do you think we need to revise the current Constitution? What do you think of the Constitution? What do you think of the characterisation of the SDF under the Constitution? What do you think about revising the Constitution? Politicians who campaigned under the Rengo– kai name in 1989 Union support of DPJ members interviewed and who disclosed union support

94 94 103 104 104 113 127

Series editor’s preface

The politics of Japan – indeed Japan itself – is at a crossroads. Even though after the millennium the Japanese economy appeared to have successfully recovered from the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, the economic crisis that struck the world economy in the latter half of 2008 has revealed its greatest vulnerability, namely its dependence upon exports. With export markets shrinking drastically in the United States, China, Europe and elsewhere, the economy of Japan was already in deep recession in the early months of 2009. Even Toyota recorded a loss for the first time in its history, and the Japanese institution of permanent employment was under serious threat. At the same time, what had seemed to everyone a political system of unusual stability was facing a severe crisis, though that crisis might well be interpreted as an opportunity to administer heroic treatment to a sick system. Ever since the 1950s, and except for a brief period in the early 1990s, the central ruling force has been the Liberal Democratic Party, a broad church of interests and opinions ranging from the political centre to the extreme right. Even though since the mid1990s it has had to rule as the dominant partner in coalition governments (for the past decade or so with the Buddhist-based Ko– meito– ), it continues to be the kingpin of a regime that in essence has not shifted for five decades. Moreover, it has moved sharply to the right under its recent leaders. In September 2005 the Liberal Democrats, under their eccentric but skilful leader Koizumi, won a remarkable victory in elections to the House of Representatives. But Koizumi stepped down a year later and was followed by a succession of short-term prime ministers (Abe, Fukuda, Aso– ), under whom the image of ruling party politics deteriorated. In a stunning reversal, the principal Opposition Democratic Party for the first time won the July 2007 elections to the House of Councillors, the junior house but exercising significant power of veto. There are now strong indications that the Democrats might win, or come close to winning, the next elections to the House of Representatives as well. We have to remember that alternation in power has been almost absent in post-war politics, and some commentators believe that it would at last signal the ending of the postwar period itself. Sarah Hyde in this highly original piece of research traces the origins of the Democratic Party from what used to be the principal political opponent of the

xvi

Series editor’s preface

Liberal Democrats, namely the Japan Socialist Party. Up to the mid-1990s the Socialists used to be the David to Japan’s Goliath (except that Goliath always won). Political turmoil throughout the 1990s, however, led to the defection of a large part of the Japan Socialist Party and the founding of the Democratic Party, which has now progressed to the point where it is – for the first time since the 1950s for a single party of opposition – in a position genuinely to challenge the ruling coalition for power. The politics of Japan is moving into uncharted waters, and Dr Hyde’s work will be an indispensible guide to understanding its future direction. The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies series was begun in 1986 and is now well past its seventieth volume. It seeks to foster an informed and balanced, but not uncritical, understanding of Japan. One aim of the series is to show the depth and variety of Japanese institutions, practices and ideas. Another is, by using comparisons, to see what lessons, positive or negative, can be drawn for other countries. The tendency in commentary on Japan to resort to out-dated, illinformed or sensational stereotypes still remains, and needs to be combated. J.A.A. Stockwin Roger Goodman

Acknowledgements

When trying to acknowledge those who have helped me with this, which started as a thesis and has been expanding alongside the DPJ, I am faced with an alarmingly short blank page and a long mental list of amazing people. This project would never have been completed without the encouragement, love, guidance and support of so many people. First, in Oxford and Newcastle, thanks to Dr James Babb, Damian Thwaites, Pembroke College and Dr Ann Waswo. I would also like to thank a new Oxford friend, Alan Renwick, for being an encouraging voice in the dark of writing and rewriting. In Japan, I have much giri which I can never hope to repay. First and foremost, I want to thank Eda Satsuki, and his family and staff. Without Eda Satsuki and his father Eda Saburo– , the story of Japanese left-wing politics would be a lot less successful and this book would not exist. Eda Satsuki and Kyo– ko included me in every possible event that the Okayama DPJ arranged and Eda’s office worked hard to introduce me to whomever I wished to interview. Even since becoming President of the Upper House, he has made time for me and treated me to lovely dinners! The whole office did anything they could to help and always provided a good laugh and a joke. The DPJ, both in Tokyo and Okayama, gave me access to information and people far beyond my expectations. There are too many people to mention but I should just like to mention a few. First, I should like to thank Kan Naoto and Hatoyama Yukio for making time in their extremely busy schedules for me. I should like to thank the Kawada and Nakagiri campaigns and families. Thanks to the Ichii family, particularly Akiko, for years of friendship and good discussions. Thanks also must be given to Tanaka San and Morimoto Sakae for their constant loyalty to my cause and to Dr Himei Shigeru for his interesting chats and information and late-night drinking and for his doctor role as well! At Okayama University I have been given the various positions over the years which enabled me once again to make the most of the facilities I had enjoyed as a Masters student and during my doctoral research. I apologise once again to Professor Tani Satomi for always creating work! He has been loyal to me for 16 years and I am very grateful for all his support. In Tokyo, I would also like to thank Wada Shuichi who has given me so much. Also in Tokyo, I should like to thank my ‘family’, the Hirayamas, who have

xviii Acknowledgements contributed so much to this work. They allowed me to stay with them, which facilitated my trips from Okayama to Tokyo. They have taken care of me as if I were their own daughter. I cannot express my thanks sufficiently. I should also like to thank Kohno San for her constant and caring friendship. She tolerates me, even at my worst, and she laughed with me at the worst moments of 2008. The members of the Japan Politics Colloquium have been extremely supportive. I would like particularly to thank Dr Caroline Rose, Dr Hugo Dobson and Drs Julie and Simon Gilson for their encouragement and faith in me, often when I least had it myself. I would also like to thank the School of East Asian Studies at Sheffield who set me off on this trajectory and then also nurtured my career. The last few years have been particularly strange. I thank my colleagues at Kent for the encouragement to finish this and for being so supportive in an unobtrusive way of what is going on in my head. In particular, I want to thank Professor Hugh Miall, Professor Thomas Saalfeld and Dr Keith Wren at Chaucer for their practical help, concern and encouraging words. I also thank Stephanie and Leanne at Routledge for their understanding and support. I would also like to thank Mr Christopher Chandler for, like me, assuming carrying on is normal and for sticking a needle into my brain and only leaving me as mad as I was before! I aspire to give as much back to my students as Chris gives to his patients. Dr Dawn Nell, who is beginning a second decade of being an excellent friend, continues to be a huge support, always uttering the right comment, at the right time. Paul Roberts probably has never realised the impact that his quiet faith that I would finish had on me. Thanks for coping with each and every stick that the poodle drops at your feet! Thanks too to my mum who has had an awful lot to deal with in the past few years but just gets on with it all without making a fuss. Last, but by no means least, I thank my DPhil supervisor, Professor Arthur Stockwin. There is surely no other supervisor who is as supportive and giving of his time and experience and knowledge. Without him, this book would never have been completed. I am honoured to have been one of his students. I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance given to me by the Economic and Social Research Council, the Japan Foundation, the Tokyo Electrical Power Company, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee. The author accepts sole responsibility for the contents, and mistakes, of this book.

Abbreviations

DPJ DSP JCP JNP JNR JSP LDP LP NLC NTT PARC PM PMO PR SDF SDL SDPJ SMD SNTV UN UNPCO UNPKO

Democratic Party of Japan Democratic Socialist Party Japan Communist Party Japan New Party Japan National Railways Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Party New Liberal Club Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Policy Affairs Research Council Prime Minister Prime Minister’s Office proportional representation Self-Defence Forces Social Democratic League Social Democratic Party of Japan (formerly the JSP) single member district single non-transferable vote United Nations United Nations Peace Co-Operation United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations

Introduction

In 2008, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) controls one of the houses of the Japanese National Diet for the first time since 1955. This results from the DPJ victory in the House of Councillors elections of July 2007, and even though the House of Councillors is less powerful than the House of Representatives, that victory is highly significant for the Opposition. During the ‘1955 system’ between 1955 and 1993, the Opposition never took effective control of either House of the Diet. In 1993–94, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was out of power for ten months, and then regained power in coalition with the Socialists. Very gradually, however, since 1994, the Opposition has managed to gain more electoral power, so that today the DPJ is the second strongest political party in Japan and is threatening the hegemony of the LDP. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the former main opposition party, gradually ‘settled into’ being an opposition and from the early 1970s onwards was not putting up sufficient candidates to produce a majority and perhaps displace the LDP. In 1989, the JSP did achieve a brief respite by winning the Upper House election (but did not gain enough votes to take control of the entire House which has elections for half the candidates alternately every three years). In the Lower House elections of 1993, when the LDP lost its majority because of defections, the JSP also suffered a huge loss which was the beginning of their huge electoral decline which continues today. Throughout the 1990s, Japanese political parties were in a state of mayhem; many parties were created and dissolved and approximately 35 were in existence for such a brief period that they are now virtually forgotten. The DPJ was formed in stages, beginning in 1996. A Lower House election has to take place during 2009. The DPJ is in control of the Upper House and the idea that they could win the Lower House is not as preposterous as it would have seemed just a few years ago. The aim of this book is to look at the years prior to their victory in the Upper House election, see what important issues have affected the Japanese opposition, and assess which relationships have been created (and broken) and how the Japanese left has changed itself through this time and grown. The use of the term ‘left’ has become a problematic issue. Leonard Schoppa discusses this in terms of economic policy, making the point very clearly that the DPJ’s economic policy are positions which are normally considered by parties of the right in western countries

2

Introduction

(Schoppa 2006: 117–139). So does this imply that the whole of the DPJ’s policies are what are normally considered ‘to the right’? The party has a wide range of Diet members, as does the LDP. These differences in views can be understood in particular when looking at the Constitutional issue and these will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 in detail. In both parties there are members who do and do not want to amend the Constitution. Despite this kind of difference of opinion and the nature of economic policy as discussed by Schoppa, fundamentally the DPJ is still more to the left of the LDP. For this reason, on the whole, we shall describe the DPJ as the ‘opposition’ but it still can also be considered to be within the ‘left-ofcentre’ of Japanese politics.

From old socialists to new democrats? How can we analyse this transformation? It is the contention of this book that the most durable and significant changes are those experienced on the Japanese left, notably the decline of the former main opposition party, the JSP, and the emergence of the DPJ which has replaced it as opposition party. By 2008, the old JSP had declined from a party that once had been the second largest party throughout the 1955 system to a party, now renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), which has 12 seats in the Diet (five in the Lower and seven in the Upper Houses), with limited ability to win any seats in single member districts.1 Some of its former politicians have joined the DPJ. The former Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), a small left-ofcentre party, which had broken away from the JSP in 1960, has disappeared, and its members and interests (labour union backing) have also been absorbed into the DPJ. In 2003, the DPJ had also absorbed another significant group known as the Liberal Party, also frequently described as the Ozawa group. By 2000, the LDP had returned to its position as the only party that could attain a majority in the Diet and consequently continued to dominate policy formation even though it has been in coalition since 1998 owing to its lack of a majority in the House of Councillors. While many LDP politicians defected in (and since) 1993 to other parties, by 2001 many had returned to the bastion of power that the LDP represents. Yet in comparison to this, the face of the opposition had been completely changed with the emergence of the DPJ. Thus, while the party system had changed rather little, there had been some change within all the parties, and the most significant changes affected the non-communist opposition parties. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was formed in 1922 and is Japan’s oldest political party. Until 2005, it put up candidates in every electoral district. It has traditionally kept itself distant from other political parties and did not participate in any of the coalitions of the 1990s and early 2000s. This book will not include an analysis of the JCP as it was not involved in any of the transformations of the 1990s and has remained more or less constant in policy preferences and electoral strategies throughout the period of discussion. We shall examine how the DPJ replaced the JSP as the main opposition party in Japan. The JSP, though it only participated in government twice (in 1947–48

Introduction

3

and 1994–96), was an important part of the Japanese party system prior to the realignment of the 1990s because it could provide a counterweight to the LDPcentred policy-making (Hyde 2006: 99–102). As long as the JSP was a force in the Diet, the LDP was unable to make radical change to policies, in particular those concerning defence and the Constitution. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, the Japanese Constitution, which banned the use of force and military aggression, had become the source of the main policy cleavage between the LDP and the JSP. In the early years of the 1955 system, the LDP wanted to reform the Constitution, yet was prevented from doing so by the JSP holding a third of the seats of the Diet. Article 96 requires a two-thirds majority of the members of both Houses of the Diet (and a simple majority in a popular referendum) to reform the Constitution, so theoretically the LDP could have enough Diet members to initiate reform. Even once this potential threat had been eroded, due to falling support for the LDP and the emergence of the smaller parties, Ko– meito– and DSP, which ate into the larger parties’ majorities, the JSP maintained its role as a check on LDP policy and on its desire to reform the Constitution. At the end of its period as the main opposition party in the late 1980s, the JSP tried to reform itself, yet this debate became an argument between those who wanted it to be a party wishing to take control of power and those who were convinced that the party’s main role should be to continue in opposition as a check on the power of the LDP (Kubo 1998: 171–177). While the party also backed other causes such as health care and anti-pollution legislation (though this type of policy was normally championed by citizen movements and then adopted by the LDP, thereby further negating the role of the JSP), it was predominantly concerned with the ‘Peace Constitution’ and related issues such as the Japan–US Security Treaty, the legality of the Self-Defence Forces and relations with its USSR and Asian neighbours. Chapter 2 will thus attempt to explain the decline of the JSP and the creation of the DPJ from 1996 onwards. The formation of this party, which absorbed some of the JSP members, was carried out at the end of an intense three-and-a-half-year period of party formations and dissolutions and immediately before the 1996 Lower House election. There had been several other failed attempts to reform the left which will also be discussed in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the formation of the DPJ was seen at the time as an attempt to jump on the bandwagon of new-party booms and there was little faith that the party would survive. It was just another new party at the time! In 1993, the newly formed Shinseito– and Sakigake parties2 had significantly benefited in the election from their new party status after they split from the LDP just prior to the Lower House election and it was suspected that the DPJ had been set up with the aim of getting short-term gains and would have a limited lifespan. However, the DPJ survived, grew in the 1998 House of Councillors election and, having received a further influx of members when Ozawa Ichiro– ’s Shinshinto– 3 split in 1998, grew even more in 2003, having absorbed Ozawa himself and his group. In addition, the party has a significant number of young politicians who had won only one or two elections. Furthermore, the party had by this stage become the second largest party and began to be

4

Introduction

regarded on similar terms to the British ‘official’ opposition party. This was even before it won a plurality in the House of Councillors. Therefore, the remainder of the book will attempt to explain why this opposition realignment happened and in what manner these changes manifested themselves. Studies of the left in Japan have been traditionally neglected in favour of attempts to explain the longevity of LDP governance. This, however, neglects the role of the left as a defining force in the political culture and policy of modern Japan. Operating outside of formal political power, the Japanese left has had an impact that extends far beyond its limited success at the ballot box. Studies of the Japanese left have hitherto focused on the formal political entities of the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party; at crisis points or specific activities, such as the Structural Reform debate of the 1960s (Stockwin 1968) and the decision of Eda Saburo to leave the party in 1977; or on single-issue factors such as Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution, the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, or the Gulf War of 1991. Virtually no work has been done to understand the transition from the JSP to the DPJ. This study will attempt to partly fill this lacuna in the English language literature. What factors led to the near-destruction of the JSP and allowed the DPJ to emerge from its embers? Before these questions can be addressed, it is important to analyse the connection between parties and how and why they change. We need also to establish the extent to which we can ‘link’ the JSP and the DPJ. Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie point out that parties have to change in line with their environment. Political parties within an electoral system are constantly evolving and, if a party does not change accordingly, it will lose its role and position due to electoral failure (Rose and Mackie 1988: 534). They analyse the life cycles or ‘careers’ of political parties and what makes them successful. They believe that parties face two sets of pressure: (1) the internal organisation of the party; and (2) the external environment. They add: ‘To ask which is more important in the career of a party is to miss the point: every party must be both introverted and extroverted.’ According to Rose and Mackie, a party must be concerned with the internal demands of money and the recruitment of candidates and supporters, the initiation of policy and programmes, and, should it be in power, the demands of running a government. The party has to be aware of the wishes of its members and balance contrasting opinions and beliefs. However, party leadership must also be aware of the environment in which it is working; ‘for no party can “freeze” the world of which it is part’ (Rose and Mackie 1988: 540). Finally, they point out that a party which appears stable is static only because at that point in time the absence of movement represents a temporary equilibrium resulting from the tension between external and internal pressures. Following Rose and Mackie’s theory, we will briefly examine the external and internal pressures upon the JSP. A further question that needs to be addressed is whether there are any ideological legacies between the JSP and the DPJ. To rephrase this question, it is important to discover whether the DPJ has inherited any political ideals from the JSP which can link the two parties and justify their being analysed together. Peter Mair, on investigating the persistence of parties in

Introduction

5

Western Europe, emphasised that, as individual parties do not exist alone, it was necessary to look at blocs or families of parties, for instance parties that are cleavage allies as opposed to cleavage opponents (Mair 1997: 28). Electoral instability as represented by changes in voting patterns in a particular country can result either in an exchange of votes between the parties of a given political family or bloc or can result in the exchange of votes from one bloc to another which would involve a change in the balance of the overall alignment of parties. Mair’s first finding is that these blocs have remained along similar left–right divisions despite changes in political values such as the post-materialist values described by Inglehart.4 New policy preferences and ideologies have been absorbed into the blocs and therefore left- and right-wing blocs ‘have proved sufficiently flexible to endure as well as to absorb, and have thus acted as a fundamental force for continuity’ (Mair 1997: 27). He continues: [F]or all the changes experienced in recent years, it is clear that left and right not only remain the major organising principles in modern West European politics, but also help to create a uniform foundation for contemporary patterns of policy competition. (27) Mair found that, in Europe, the greater part of electoral instability had been contained within each class-cleavage bloc and that inter-party instability has in fact declined over time. He uses the example of Denmark and the Netherlands, both of which experienced considerable flux during the post-war period. He found, however, that, despite this, aggregate support for the left bloc as a whole, and therefore for the non-left as well, had proved persistent over time. In Denmark, the four parties of the left (the Social Democrats, the Communist Party, the Socialist People’s Party and the Left Socialists) between 1945 and 1986 consistently totalled between 45 and 50 per cent of the vote apart from once in 1974. In the Netherlands, there was also stability; the Labour Party, the Pacifist Socialist Party, the Communist Party and DS70 between 1948 and 1987 consistently received a total of between 30 and 37 per cent of the vote. But there was considerable fluctuation within these blocs in each country over time. Mair argues that these countries, showing bloc-specific persistence, are not exceptional. Indeed, this seems to be the case for the left in Japan. The decline of the JSP has been followed by the rise of the DPJ. As has been described above, we see similar levels of support for the DPJ, as were gained by the JSP. Bloc vote percentages did not change significantly despite a period of significant change in the mid-1990s. According to the Asahi, the JSP had 20 per cent of support in August 1992 and the DPJ had 20 per cent in August 1998.5 Therefore, despite instability of voting within this ideological bloc, there was persistence of leftwing or more precisely left-of-centre parties (as the DPJ has fundamentally moved to the right of the JSP), and, to a certain degree, ideological aims. But whereas bloc support has remained consistent, there was change within support levels for individual parties as voters no longer felt any special ties to a party

6

Introduction

within a bloc (Mair 1997: 32). This phenomenon within a Japan-specific context will be examined in Chapter 1. It will show how, during the 1990s, a large proportion of the Japanese electorate broke away from long-term voting patterns and ceased to support any party. The DPJ consequently was born in an environment of low support for parties and has had to grow from that weak position. This persistence of parties within an ideological bloc was analysed by Rose and Mackie who explain what can happen to the career of a political party during its life span (1988: 540). They gave four different possible courses. The first was that the party would persist intact without any organisational change, and they found that this had happened to about 33 per cent of their post-war European party sample. The second was that the party would persist with marginal modifications. It would most likely keep the same name but would occasionally lose a splinter or gain an element from another party. This was found to be the case for 22 per cent of their sample. The two other options were that the party would disappear totally or would be disrupted in the sense that a party can change its name, face structural changes or merge or splinter. It is this final category that best accounts for the events that have affected the left bloc in Japan since 1995. Rose and Mackie argue that the most important fact is that organisationally and ideologically the party leaves a discernible legacy within another party. This is how the category is distinguishable from the parties that disappear totally, and seems to be the pattern that best explains the change from the JSP to the DPJ. The JSP remains in a much smaller and weaker form even in 2008 as the SDPJ and the DPJ have absorbed parts of the JSP in different ways. First, it took on some JSP personnel and Diet members. In some areas it has absorbed the JSP infrastructure. It has taken on the role of the main opposition party and finally, as we have already noted, it has also adopted the role of being the main left-of-centre party. But does this mean that the JSP has been utterly disregarded? Rose and Mackie define a successful political party as one which either wins elections or propagates set goals, however few votes it receives (1988: 534). Similarly, a party needs to be institutionalised, which is a condition beyond mere formation and existence and is the state which defines the difference between many of the 22 parties which had been formed in Japan since 1992. To be institutionalised, a party needs to do the following: 1 2 3

Create a cross-local organisation to contest elections nationwide. Nominate candidates to fight national elections. And, probably most importantly for Japan, owing to the large numbers of parties that have been created since 1992, continue to do this for at least three successive elections. (Rose and Mackie 1988: 536)

How do these definitions apply to the JSP and DPJ? The JSP, despite having effectively won the 1989 House of Councillors election, most definitely had a clear and defined set of goals for the majority of its existence. Nonetheless, as will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3, two years before the establishment of the DPJ, the JSP renounced its traditional platform of peace ideals and consequently it could be

Introduction

7

argued that it was no longer an autonomous political party as its traditional policies were highly influenced by the LDP. This renunciation of traditional policy and the effects it had on the party will be analysed in Chapter 3 but in this sense it could imply that the JSP had thrown away its sole claim to being successful when it changed its policy platform. But it is important to note that, since the strengthening of the DPJ, the SDPJ (the party changed its name in 1996) remains as a oneissue party focusing on the Constitution so it has managed to essentially redeem itself in its own eyes and continue to fight for what is important. As for the DPJ, effectively by 2000, it had become an institutionalised party and is therefore worthy of study. It has already fought four Lower House elections and will have most likely fought five by 2009. It has fought five Upper House elections and won one of them. It created an infrastructure of party offices across the country and had Prefectural branches. However, when we analyse whether the party has been a success, within the Rose and Mackie definition, it has seemed gradually to improve both electorally but less so with policy until 2007. The DPJ had not, until then, managed to win an election. Up to 2005, it managed to gradually improve its percentage of the vote in each successive election, a feat no Japanese political party had managed since 1955, not even the LDP – apart from the 2001 House of Councillors election which saw a very slight drop in support. In 2007, the DPJ won an election, and took control of the House of Councillors. Yet within the second requirement of policy, the party has gradually managed to articulate its policy as we shall show in Chapters 2 and 3 in particular. It has been difficult because the party was formed from a wide range of groups and thus the DPJ is a composite of very different views and ideas. Therefore, to understand the events in the Japanese left we need to quantify and define the change. We believe that much of the ideological change that impacted upon the realignment of the Japanese left occurred before the decline of the JSP, because, as Rose and Mackie suggest, it was unable to react sufficiently to these transformations and consequently declined. However, we also need to analyse what has happened to the left since the emergence of the DPJ. Therefore, we have two further questions to analyse. First, why has the left been transformed in Japan in the 1990s? We shall look at the most significant variables that have impacted upon the left and analyse why they have forced the left to reorganise. Second, we need to study how the DPJ has managed to distinguish itself from the JSP as it has inherited much of its organisation in many prefectures on the basis of an illdefined ideological and policy platform. Therefore, the second question addresses how this transformation of the non-communist Japanese left has manifested itself. After the initial chapters in which we present trends in support levels for political parties and decline in general political support in the 1990s which partly led to the emergence of the DPJ, the following chapters will show the reasons why the JSP declined and the left realigned. These will be the variables of voting behaviour and the increase in non-aligned voters (Chapter 1), the decline in the relevance of the JSP’s ideological platform and the emergence of the Constitutional issue (Chapter 3), the changing relationship between the JSP and DPJ and the labour unions and the decreasing need for the unions to rely upon the

8

Introduction

left for access to government (Chapter 4), and the institutional impact of the new electoral system on the DPJ in particular (Chapter 5). Finally, the last chapter will utilise a case study to assess the differences between the old JSP and the new DPJ in the Prefecture of Okayama (Chapter 6). All of these chapters will follow on from the background of the transformation in Chapter 2 in which we shall detail the quite long and sometimes painful transformation whereby the DPJ replaced the JSP as the main opposition party and then the difficult development path involved in the DPJ becoming the second party with significant strength. Why were these variables selected as possible explanations for the realignment of the Japanese left? They have been selected as key causal factors in other political systems’ realignments such as those of Italy and the United Kingdom. These are the effects of electoral system reform (Italy), of the decline of the communist bloc and its impact on ideology (Italy), and of the changing relationship between the unions and the left-wing party (United Kingdom). It is felt that all of these issues have impacted upon Japan. A general ennui seems to have affected politics in Western Europe and the United States in the past ten years. This has taken various shapes and forms. In the United Kingdom, it has taken the form of lower turnout (59.4 per cent in the 2001 and 61.4 per cent in the 2005 UK General Elections6), and accusations of sleaze and corruption on the part of the ruling party. In 1996–97, the Conservative Party was heavily criticised by the electorate and 63 per cent of those polled thought that the party was corrupt with only 19 per cent feeling the same about the Labour Party (Daily Telegraph, 20/6/02). By 2002, the focus of this criticism was the Labour Party with the figures reversing to 56 per cent and 33 per cent. A far more serious lack of trust between voter and party emerged in Italy where there was increasing concern over corruption and scandals. The Mani pulite (clean hands) investigations into political corruption launched in 1992, instigated by Milan magistrates, came in the wake of the tangentopoli scandals in which 100 parliamentary deputies received avviso di garanzia , official notifications that they were under official investigation, and hinted at the scale of political distrust (Carter 1998: 79). Similarly in Japan, political scandal and a growing lack of respect for the political system have fuelled political dealignment and the concomitant realignment of the 1990s. As will be shown in Chapter 1, the electorate is increasingly distrustful of politicians and politics, and this has resulted in a huge drop in partisan support that has affected all parties along the political spectrum. This is the first main variable which has contributed to the decline of the JSP, as dealignment has been greater for the left parties than it has for the LDP. The reasons for this decline have been thought to be the electorate’s irritation with the JSP’s inflexible approach to the Gulf Crisis and Constitutional issues. The party was considered to be too ideologically embedded so the voters stopped voting for it. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Ideological change has affected all political systems in the past decade since the collapse of the Cold War order, so this is not a phenomenon restricted to Japan. However, ideological shifts to the right have been particularly evident in

Introduction

9

Italy and the United Kingdom. Bettino Craxi and the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) dropped their socialist ‘baggage’ in the 1980s and embraced free market rhetoric, though this shift to the right has been superseded by the emergence of the right-wing party, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. In Britain, Tony Blair has taken the Labour Party from socialism to social democracy, abandoning the commitment to nationalisation, nuclear disarmament, and block voting power of the Trade Union Congress on party leadership elections. The changing relationship between trade unions and political parties has been particularly strong in the United Kingdom. Lewis Minton describes the relationship between the British Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress as a contentious alliance for several reasons (Minton 1991). The electoral mobilisation implications of the shared relationship are of particular importance. Minton observes that should a break in the relationship be initiated (he was writing in 1991 before the New Labour revolution), whether unions or the Labour Party made the first move, the consequences would be dire for the electoral mobilisation of trade unionists. Should the Labour Party make the first move, the unions would perceive it as a sign that policy would change in an increasingly anti-union manner. Should the trade unions initiate a split, it would be a sign of the diminishing utility of the Labour Party to organised labour. Even though Minton said reform would be difficult for the British Labour Party to achieve, the Party nevertheless managed to do it. In the changing relationship between unions and left-wing parties in Japan, a similar break occurred, but it was a case of the unions initiating the change. Yet, as Minton predicted, this has had a serious effect on the recruitment of political support for the Japanese left and it is felt that this too is an important variable in the study of the declining Japanese left. This will be analysed further in Chapter 4. Nick Carter, in his study of Italian realignment, suggests that the successful referendum for electoral reform was a factor in the changes of the 1990s in Italy and the emergence of Silvio Berlusconi (Carter 1998: 80–86). Institutional rule-changes will affect a party system, or political parties, in some shape or form. They might lead to a substantial increase or decrease in the number of parties in a party system, or simply create electoral districts that affect campaign methods. Thus it is impossible to analyse the changes in Japan in the past ten years without analysing the new electoral system which was introduced in 1994. In Japan, an electoral system was introduced which, while institutionally extremely different from the old one and meant to change the party system in some manner, the number and relative strength of the parties have remained similar. The new electoral system’s main impact upon the party system seems to be that the smaller opposition parties are faring worse than they might have done in certain districts had the old system been maintained but the DPJ has benefited from the ‘two-party’ dominance of the system. We shall now analyse the second question, concerning the manner in which the change from the JSP to the DPJ has manifested itself. But before that can be done, it is important to state how we shall analyse that change. Despite little change to the party system with the upheavals of the 1990s, there have been discernible changes to the parties. Tani Satomi wrote during 1997 when the DPJ was still very new, ‘It is possible that the recent metamorphosis of the Japanese party

10

Introduction

system will end up being short-lived, if it fails to cause any profound changes in political life at the grass-roots level’ (Tani 1998: 98). Otake Hideo, in his analysis of the formation of the Democratic Party, in Nihon seiji no tairitsu jiku (The Axes of Political Conflict in Japan), argues that there are three ways to analyse the formation of the DPJ (Otake 1999). He analyses the ideological changes of the party, the seeming shift from socialism to social democracy, and the essential ideologies of each of the groups which joined the party. However, he mentions two further ways to analyse the change. He suggests that the party can be analysed from an organisational standpoint or from a government standpoint, should it participate in creating one. In this book, we have opted to study the party from the organisational perspective for various reasons. First, as stated above, an ideological analysis has been carried out by Otake. Second, the organisation of Japanese politics has long been of interest to political scientists, particularly the ko– enkai strategies employed by the LDP.7 In contrast to this, the organisational methods of the opposition were confined to descriptions of connections with labour union strategies which the JSP and DSP used, and the Ko– meito– ’s evangelistic support network, the So–ka Gakkai (Hrebenar 2000: 167–207). The third reason for selecting the organisation of the party as the means of analysis is that, as stated above, we believe that the change in the Japanese political system during the 1990s and 2000s has been the most significant on the left. This is because the DPJ was in the process of changing the means by which the party attracted the electorate. These were being radically altered from the days when the party relied virtually solely upon unions for support. This was as a result of the loss of support for the party, owing to the variables described above. The DPJ was forced to create new means of approaching and accommodating the electorate which, while it so far has been neither all encompassing nor entirely successful, is nonetheless an important change for the party. Five years into its existence, Joji Watanuki made this point about the DPJ, saying that the new party was groping for a new form of party organisation but as yet had not found an effective system so ‘the fate of the DPJ is still to be seen’ (Watanuki 2001: 149). Thus, how the party has attempted to work on its structure and organisation to deal with this problem needs to be analysed. Parties have to change or die, and as Rose has said, we are looking at the changes in their structure, and how they attract voters. This is a process known as linkage and it can be broadly thought of as the process of communication between party and the electorate; communication about mass opinion and public decision. However, linkage is more than this. It is also the process by which parties stabilise their own interests and gather supporters. As Thomas Pogintke has argued, following Panebianco: [L]inkage is not only the inevitable by-product of party competition, it also has an essential function for parties as organisations, which, like all organisations, seek to stabilise and control relevant organisational environments in order to ensure their survival. (Pogintke 2002: 4)

Introduction

11

Thus, as Pogintke argues, the second question concerning how the transformation manifested itself will be considered from the perspective of organisation and how the party is attempting to stabilise its support and attract new support. Whether a party is of a mass type, catch-all, or a cartel party, political scientists who analyse party organisation agree that organisation is imperative. Within this debate are various sub-debates about whether the party should be in direct contact with the electorate, or whether the party leadership and its concomitant image are emerging as a stronger force of mobilisation. Katz and Mair argue that members have a changing role and that the decision-making structures of parties need to be considered and possibly adjusted so that the different arenas in which members can exert an influence are considered (Katz and Mair 1990). However, Muller-Rommel points out that, while direct linkage between the party and the electorate is important, there is an increasing emphasis on the leader’s capability as a media performer (Muller-Rommel 1990). Finally, Nedelmann has shown that both direct contact and a strong leadership image are significant and that mobilisation from both directions is of importance in her conflict integration dialectic model (Nedelmann 1987). This is particularly interesting when analysing how the Japanese left have changed and how they have had to widen their support methods. We shall show that essentially the DPJ methodology can be best explained by this ‘conflict integration dialectic model’ as it is attempting to introduce a stronger leadership and party identity through manifesto and websites and much stronger control from Tokyo of candidates, etc. Simultaneously, it is also attempting to widen its local web of support by making links with organisations that so far have not been political such as the Kanagawa Netto in that Prefecture and also continuing to work with unions and quite simply by using more LDP methods like ko–enkai and visiting every local event that is possible. (These types of activities are described in more detail in Le Blanc 1999, and Lam 1999.) Furthermore, new technology has challenged party organisation and it now needs to be incorporated into party strategies. Katz and Mair, well before the Internet generation, made a very important point about how the Internet would project the image of the party in a casual way. They said, ‘changes in mass communication techniques afford parties a capacity to compete for a wider audience, undermine the need for effectiveness in depth and therefore create the conditions which allow parties to become more effective’ (Katz and Mair 1990: 10). We shall show that the new styles of mobilisation within the DPJ are examples of this conflict integration dialectic model. ‘Citizen politics’, as this new style of mobilisation has been termed by the party itself, is the method by which the DPJ is furthering direct contact between the party and the electorate through communication techniques such as e-mail and the Internet and shared community and political volunteer activities such as street cleaning days. These have been introduced by certain members of the DPJ, some of them the local members, as a means of widening its ability to mobilise voters and also because many of the younger members do not have the mobilisation support of an organisation such as a well-established ko– enkai or labour union support. Nonetheless, as Ware points out, direct contact with party workers and supporters constrains party leadership as the goals pursued by leadership are influenced by the

12

Introduction

electorate’s aims (Ware 1992). Within the Japanese context, this is not such a constraint due to the limited policy-building nature of political parties, and instead the direct contact merely reinforces personality-based politics. What remains more important is how citizen politics differs from existing definitions of citizen politics in the West. Russell J. Dalton argues that changing economic conditions, raised education levels and increasingly available information have made the public in the United States more aware and demanding, but also more disaffected with politics. Citizen politics thus refers, in his definition, to sophisticated electorates who have information and wealth and are concerned with how government is managed. ‘Western publics now hold the government responsible for protecting and managing society’ (Dalton 2002: 8). In his view, ‘citizen politics’ refers to sophisticated electors who have information and wealth and are concerned with how government is managed. However, he recognises that traditional political mobilisation methods and networks are declining. The time when the electorate’s political allegiance was based on their socio-economic background has finished and this means that citizens are questioning what and who they support and these loyalties may be more transitory than they were before. Citizens now want more of a say in political decision-making, particularly the decisions that closely affect their lives. Dalton suggests that ‘citizens’ are now more inclined to be proactive in influencing decisions that affect their lives. A further point made by Dalton is that, as postmodern values become more widespread, affluent citizens have the ability to think beyond their basic needs. This has resulted in the emergence of new interest groups and parties such as green parties, environmental groups, racial equality movements and campaigners such as the pro-life, anti-abortion movement in the United States. Despite this apparent continuing politicisation of the electorate, Dalton also describes a decline in traditional partisanship within the political system and voters’ lesser inclination to vote. This is partly caused by the blurring of traditional socio-economic strata in society but is also due to a declining satisfaction with politics in general. The electorate is constantly reassessing political leaders and institutions. This leads on to what Dalton describes as the paradox of citizen politics: there are new issues which are being debated in politics and people are becoming more educated and interested in these new issues. Government has, on the whole, improved the quality of life of citizens. But the citizen has become less satisfied with politics and displays increased scepticism with bureaucracy and government. Dalton ends his analysis of these changes to politics in a very positive manner. He suggests that, while political mobilisation of the electorate has become more diverse and complex because of the reasons mentioned above, electorates still have ideals and expect their governments to live up to them. His conclusion is that government needs to adapt to live up to these ideals. Evolution of the process is necessary and this is a sign of the vitality of the political system if the system can change. This is citizen politics.

Introduction

13

This viewpoint is pretty much endorsed by Robert Putnam in his analysis of changes to American society. The book, cryptically entitled Bowling Alone, has this title because, although there has been a decline in bowling club membership, there has been no decline in the numbers of people who bowl socially within smaller ad hoc groups (Putnam 2000). The title of the book rather exaggerates the point that Putnam is trying to make but he paints a picture of disengagement from traditional politics through such measures as voting (2000: 32), participation in political campaign activities (39), and general community and political activities such as writing letters to a newspaper, signing petitions or participating in a demonstration (41–47). On the other hand, however, is the increase in other forms of societal groups and this is a similar point to the one made by Dalton. Religious organisations are growing in the USA; people are involved in environmental movements, in the pro-life and pro-choice movements, in some forms of exercise and sports groups and in neighbourhood watches. Each of these groups can mobilise support for mainstream politics. However, in many cases, the ways in which they mobilise support differ greatly from mainstream politics. A particularly good example of how this type of mobilisation differs is shown by the opposing sides of the abortion issue. The pro-life movement is predominantly based in evangelical churches: participation in one group means that there is a concomitant support for another group so the pro-life movement does not have to actively seek supporters, unlike the pro-choice movement. This latter group needs to advertise for supporters and organise them into groups as they are not able to piggyback onto the existing church network. Thus citizens are engaged and brought into politics and political issues, but in different ways. While Putnam’s aim is not to prescribe how politicians need to respond to these new norms of society, this description of changing connections and mobilisation methods within society is a useful normative comparison to how the DPJ has had to, is having to and will have to diversify in order to gain support. We shall show that the DPJ differs fundamentally from the old JSP because it is a party which has widened its political appeal through using different types of candidate, aiming to attract widening political support in order to counteract falling support levels and declining voter turnout that have hindered the nongovernment parties since the 1990s. It has realised that, in order to be an effective political party with any hope of breaking the ‘habit’ of the old JSP and actually being able to participate in government, or even form a government of its own, it needs to widen its appeal and use new methods of voter mobilisation. It needs to attract new types of supporter and devise new methods of attracting supporters in order to engage previously apolitical members of the electorate to engage or reengage with politics. Thus, Dalton’s ideas of citizen politics, and how it has been necessary for politicians to engage the electorate in novel methods and respond to new issues and movements in the USA, throw light on how the DPJ is assessing what needs to be done in Japan. The actual methods of reengaging/ engaging the politically disengaged do not necessarily support a full comparison between those described by Dalton and those used by the DPJ but the fundamental

14

Introduction

issue is that the DPJ has realised that the old method of opposition mobilisation, the labour unions, is no longer sufficient and that new methods need to be found. Nonetheless, the DPJ still manages to get support from the old structures of the labour unions and their supporters. In the 2000 election, with the former DSP and JSP-supporting Do– mei and So– hyo– unions now combined inside Rengo– and, for the first time, supporting one party in the DPJ, the unions were able to provide more support than they had been able to for several years because of this new clarity and unity. Thus we shall show that the DPJ has tried to learn the lessons of the ‘new style’ of politics that Dalton discusses and combine it with traditional labour union support. It is this flexibility and wider perspective that define their main difference from the JSP. Admittedly, this new flexibility is not necessarily a perspective that all politicians within the DPJ share. Indeed, the fact that not all politicians use these diversified methods of mobilisation is also not necessarily a problem. Some politicians within the DPJ who originally came from the LDP (e.g. Hatoyama Yukio) or from the JSP and DSP (e.g. Yokomichi Takahiro and Kawabata Tatsuo) continue to use the methods of voter mobilisation they have always used, i.e. principally using their ko– enkai and union support groups. The methods employed by politicians are mostly based upon their party backgrounds or a combination of methods. The methods used will also have been influenced by the mentors and supporters of politicians who were elected since the DPJ was formed in 1996 and do not have any previous party links. However, the ‘younger’ a DPJ politician is (both in physical and political age), the more likely he is to use newer methods of attracting support such as linking up with local citizen groups and grass-roots movements, using the Internet to express his views, setting up ‘interest’-based ko– enkai-style groups of his own, as well as using the labour unions. Also, campaigning within their constituency using policy and the DPJ manifesto as a means of attracting support is becoming more possible with the party’s increasing emphasis on policy formation. Fundamentally, diversification of means of attracting support is the name of the game for younger, less experienced politicians. We shall show citizen politics to be the manner in which the Japanese left is radically changing its methods of garnering support. This is presented in the case study of Okayama (Chapter 6) when we look at an example of this transformation of how the parties changed from JSP to DPJ and the concomitant effects on organisation. Thus, to return to Tani’s point about the need to analyse what has happened at the grass-roots level of the left-wing Japanese parties, if we are to understand how far change has occurred since 1993, we believe that a study of the DPJ and its attempts to widen mobilisation methods and introduce these ‘citizen methods’ will prove that change has fundamentally occurred. Too often, after the initial interest in the events of 1993 and the flurry of new political parties which emerged in the 1990s, political scientists have emphasised the apparent similarities between the pre- and post-1993 party systems and have overlooked the changes that have occurred. When analysing the politics of the LDP, it is possible to argue that there has been little change as a result of the political turmoil of

Introduction

15

the 1990s. In comparison to this, the left has been forced to change its mobilisation techniques. Therefore, not only will this book contribute to the literature on the Japanese left, it will also show that a profound change is in the process of occurring. Should this result in the DPJ taking control of the Lower House in the 2009 Lower House election, profound change indeed will have happened. Before moving onto the analyses, it is important to quickly assess what other analysis of this transformation of the left has been made. Unfortunately, work on the DPJ in English is extremely limited; indeed, it is limited far beyond what one would consider acceptable. The DPJ is now 12 years old and is the major opposition party, yet little work has been done on it in detail and also on how it interacts with the LDP. Some of these works will be discussed below. One work, however, stands out because it has tried to explain why the opposition has not managed to win and take any power away from the LDP. Ethan Scheiner’s (2006) Democracy without Competition in Japan in a One-Party Dominant State is the first book to deal seriously with the failure of the DPJ and the opposition in the 1990s and 2000s, despite the fact that the LDP were far from successful, particularly in the area of the economy. He argues that the electorate, particularly in rural constituencies, have to vote for the LDP in order to get a share of the centrally controlled budget (and to a certain extent he rejects the electoral system as an explanation). This clientelist argument explains the important and particularly rural link between the LDP and the electorate. Scheiner states the main problems of the DPJ are: (1) it cannot build itself up at the local level because it has little support and not enough local politicians; (2) it finds it difficult to get support in clientelist-supporting areas because the extant relationships are still in place; and (3) the party’s lack of coherence. These all work together to help retain the dominance of the LDP. In a comprehensive and complimentary review of Scheiner by J.A.A. Stockwin, he nonetheless points out that, rather than clientelism, the fundamental thing which sustains the LDP is its access to power. Between July 1993 and June 1994 the LDP were out of power and lost a considerable amount of influence with the bureaucracy. Stockwin goes on to say ‘what keeps the LDP in power is power itself’ (2007: 306). This is an important and interesting point. Scheiner discusses the failure of the DPJ but even he notes, as the book was in the final stages, that the party was increasing its strength electorally in 2003 and 2004. With the DPJ (i.e. an opposition party) managing to take control of the Upper House for the first time in 53 years, in 2007 and in autumn 2008, a Lower House election expected in 2009, after the third resignation of a LDP PM and the fourth Prime Minister (Aso– ) in place since the last election, we are living in interesting times. If we take on board Stockwin’s view about power sustaining power, the next election is most important and interesting and could be the final turning point after 20 years of progression for the Japanese left. Finally, this volume is quite different from many others. It attempts to explain how the left has changed in Japan in the past 20 years. It looks at some of the key factors that have contributed to this change, and the DPJ is not analysed in comparison to the LDP as in Scheiner’s work. Rather it will endeavour to

16

Introduction

explain the left and its progress and explain the changes that have happened and why. There are many other variables, some more important than others, that could have been considered in this transformation which we did not have time or space to consider. Nonetheless, those selected will hopefully indicate some of the problems of the transformation of the Japanese left and whether the DPJ will become, as Peter Mair describes, a party able to be a ‘natural’ alternative government (Mair 1997: 50).

1

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour and attitudes towards politics, 1980–2000

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the 20-year period 1980–2000, and assess if and how the Japanese electorate changed its attitudes towards politics and voting during this period. The 1990s was a period of great flux within the Japanese political system with many parties being created and disbanded. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had been the main ‘opposition’ party in Japan,1 gradually declined in the mid-1990s and in 1996 won so few seats in the election that it became a mere shell of its former self. Between 1955 and 1993, it was the second largest party in the Japanese party system and was the largest party on the left of centre on the political spectrum. This period has become known as the 1955 system. In 1996, the JSP did extremely badly in the House of Representatives election, gaining only 15 seats (although this got worse as it only managed to get 19 in the 2000 election, 12 in 2003 and seven in 2005). A new party of the ‘left’, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), was formed in 1996 and is still in existence and getting stronger. This chapter attempts to question what changes in voting behaviour and/or public opinion attitudes towards the political parties occurred in this period. Therefore, utilising public opinion poll data, electoral data and turnout data, we shall analyse how the Japanese voters changed their attitudes towards all political parties and in particular the main party of the left. A further question will be asked: Did the DPJ automatically ‘take over’ support from the JSP or had JSP support already declined before the DPJ emerged? To facilitate this, we will compare in detail two decades: the 1980s when the JSP and the other opposition parties such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and Ko– meito– had reasonably stable opposition vis-á-vis the LDP, and the 1990s when the new parties emerged and the electorate turned into supporters of no party rather than anything else. By looking at this data in detail we will be able to establish how the JSP declined and the environment in which the DPJ was created.

Turnout Japan, like most post-industrial economies, is suffering from an acute crisis of political mobilisation that is particularly manifest in low voter turnout. Participation should arguably have increased in the past 20 years as access to

18

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 80

Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 2007 PR

2007 Pref

2004 PR

2004 Pref

2001 PR

2001 Pref

1998 PR

1998 Pref

1995 PR

1995 Pref

1992 PR

1992 Pref

1989 PR

Lower House

1989 Pref

1986 PR

1986 Pref

2005 PR

2003 PR

2005 SMD

2000 PR

2003 SMD

1996 PR

2000 SMD

July 1993

1996 SMD

July 1986

Feb. 1990

Dec. 1983

June 1980

0

Upper House

Figure 1.1 Turnout at Japanese elections, 1980–2007. Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-24.htm (accessed 8/8/08).2 Note: SMD = Single Member District, PR = Proportional Representation district and Pref = Prefectural district.

information and education has increased and Japanese demographics have changed (Topf 1996: 26–50). In reality, at a time when access to information has been at an all-time high and despite attempts to make voting easier, turnout is low, although not quite as low as it was in the 1990s. Japan is readjusting from a crisis in the domestic economy, a recession of 15 years from 1990–2005, a failing bank sector which has still not fully resolved the many problems of the 1990s (where banks were on the verge of bankruptcy with the Takushoku bank actually going bankrupt), and more unemployment than Japan has ever known. In the 1990s, Japan experienced two recessions. Furthermore, since 1990, it has been in the midst of seismic changes in its attitudes towards peace-keeping activities abroad, global security, North Korea and the Peace Constitution. It also has a population which is rapidly ageing and a declining birthrate which could mean that, by 2050, the population will have dropped by 20 per cent (http://www.ipss. go.jp/p-info/e/PSJ2006.pdf, accessed 11/8/08). Life is changing and crime is increasing. For all of these reasons, Japan should be seeing increased political participation. In fact, the traditional Japanese methods of voter mobilisation are no longer as effective as they once were, and interest is far lower and consequently turnout has fallen. Turnout has become a particular problem in Japan since the House of Councillors election in July 1995. While it is clear from Figure 1.1 that the problem of falling turnout already existed before 1995, it was the extent of the problem of low turnout in this first national election since the historic defeat of the LDP in July 1993 that opened the eyes of the Japanese media and government to the problem. In this election, turnout fell to an all-time low of 44.5 per cent. Turnout is higher in the Lower House than the Upper House elections and was good in 2005 for the remarkable ‘Koizumi election’ compared to recent standards

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

19

110,000

Number of voters

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

2000 PR

1996 PR

July 1993

July 1986

June 1980

50,000

Election Total eligible voters

Voters on day

Figure 1.2 Turnout and total number of electorate, House of Representatives, 1980–2000. Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/143124.htm (accessed 8/8/08).

but, on the whole, it has dropped to around 60 per cent in the Lower House and the mid–late 50s in the Upper House. In Figures 1.2 and 1.3, the extent to which turnout has dropped becomes even more apparent – Figure 1.1 clearly shows the general drop in turnout at elections but it is only when turnout is seen plotted against the total number of eligible voters per election that the trend towards falling turnout during the 1990s becomes truly apparent. As can be seen from Figure 1.3, turnout was particularly low in the ‘secondorder’ elections for the House of Councillors (Norris 1997: 109–124). Traditionally seen by the Japanese electorate as being unimportant elections, these have seen lower levels of turnout. Whereas the importance of the Upper House has become increasingly important since the 1989 election (because the JSP suddenly had far more influence on policy formation within the Diet as they took control of some of the committees), the electorate has not responded to this issue and turnout has dropped particularly in the Upper House. The Japanese government started to take measures to increase turnout. Up to and including the 1995 House of Councillors election, polling stations were only open from 8am until 6pm. In 1998, polling station hours were increased to 12 hours with closing time extended to 8pm. Elections are held on Sunday to

20

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 120,000

Number of voters

100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1986 PR

1989 PR

1992 PR

1995 PR Election

Total eligible voters

1998 PR

2001 PR

2001 Pref

Voters on day

Figure 1.3 Turnout and total number of electorate, House of Councillors, 1986–2001. Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/143124.htm (accessed 8/8/08).

facilitate voting for businessmen who may work a long distance from home and for long hours during the week. In another move to increase turnout, the government made voting prior to the day of the election a less bureaucratic process. Whereas before, proof of being away from the electoral district on the day of election was required, now anybody can vote in the week prior to the day of the election at the local city, town or village halls. Nonetheless, despite these changes, turnout was seriously declining in the 1990s when the JSP was losing support and trying to save itself. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 clearly show that, even though turnout did increase in some elections, the total number of eligible voters and the number of actual voters were fundamentally diverging. Turnout at individual elections differs for various reasons; it was particularly good in the 1990 Lower House election because the exciting election of 1989 when the JSP won more seats than the LDP was still in the minds of voters (more details on this will be given in Chapter 2). Turnout was particularly bad at the 1996 election because of the newness of the electoral system and because the parties had been in such a state of flux in the entire period between then and the previous election. Nonetheless, the important issue is that the trend in election turnout in the 1990s was moving to one in which fewer members of the electorate were voting, as compared to the 1980s and all previous post-war periods. The aim of this chapter therefore is to question whether the decline in turnout has affected support for Japanese political parties, and in particular the JSP. But, first, we must discuss which groups in Japanese society voted for which party. These data have been accumulated from the Flanagan et al. (1991) study which analysed the fundamental patterns of the 1955 system voting behaviour (Flanagan

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

21

et al. 1991: 66–83). We shall then turn to an examination of public opinion polls carried out between 1980 and 2000 to assess whether there have been any major changes to the attitudes discussed by Flanagan et al. We will also ask if changes in public opinion show the left were affected more than the LDP.

Who voted for whom in the 1955 system? Mobilised voters resulting in stable voting behaviour The results of the study by Flanagan et al. showed that, in Japan, age, community integration, occupational environment and the urban–rural divide had an impact on who would vote for each party. In contrast, income and occupational status had less impact on the vote than would be expected from western norms of voting behaviour. Increasingly since the 1960s, a variable which no longer has an impact on voting behaviour is education, due to the widespread participation in education in Japan. Age has somewhat declined as an explanatory variable, especially in urban areas. In rural areas though, it retained its salience in explaining voting and party preference with older members of the electorate being supporters of the LDP. Further socio-structural factors which explained party support in Japan were occupation and unionisation and were more important than age as predictive variables. In particular, farmers and the self-employed (particularly in the small retail and manufacturing sectors) tended to be LDP supporters, whereas blue- and white-collar workers were divided over which party to support depending on their unionisation. As unionisation in Japan is at the company level rather than as an industry or profession-based ‘trade’, workers within these labour unions, as they are known in Japan, can just as likely be white-collar workers as blue-collar workers with a tendency towards the former (Flanagan et al. 1991: 69). Therefore, left-wing party supporters in Japan in the 1955 system were more likely to be white-collar workers than blue-collar workers as long as they wer e union members . Furthermore, union members were more likely to be from the public sector than the private sector. As will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4, the JSP gained much of its support from large public sector companies - and the such as the telecommunications company NTT and its union, Zendentsu, – government workers union Jichiro. In contrast, the DSP gained support from private sector unions such as Mitsubishi and Toyota. Nonetheless, a problem faced by the left in the period under analysis was that the number of unionised workers was dropping (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, with the expanding tertiary sector in Japan, workers are increasingly likely to be part-time and shift workers and are becoming less unionised. Thus, while sheer numbers of union members are dropping, so too is the ability of the union to mobilise its existing members. In large corporations, unions are seen by many workers as being a social organisation rather than one which defends workers’ interests and has political aspirations. Thus, according to Flanagan et al., these changes, which started to occur from the 1970s, accounted for the shift from hard core unionised support for the Japanese left to a more fluid support base. All these

22

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

issues have meant that the left-of-centre parties began to lose their key support from the late 1980s onwards. Self-employed workers are also declining as the smaller businesses they manage are being forced out of the market by such things as larger supermarkets in the commercial sector and outsourcing from South-East Asia and China in the manufacturing sector. This has affected core support for the LDP, as the LDP traditionally did well from small business managers who were connected to the LDP via local business organisations. Finally, Flanagan et al. confirmed that social networks have been an important variable in stabilising Japanese voting patterns. This is particularly true for the LDP which relies on networks based on community, kinship, occupation, school and other social ties. Such organisations are the small business associations mentioned above, parent–teacher organisations, and cho– naikai (the local residents associations). These social networks are mainly effective in LDP mobilisation and work primarily in rural and smaller town contexts but also exist within smaller shopping communities in large cities. Community-based networks have been particularly LDP oriented and these lose all effectiveness within an urban or metropolitan context where housing and large stores take over. In 2005, there were 12 cities in Japan with a population of one million or more. Their total population topped 27 million, a figure equivalent to 21.8 per cent of the national total (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/c02cont.htm#cha2_6, accessed 15/8/08). These have increased in the past few years from ten with the growth of cities such as Sendai. In addition, there are ‘designated cities’ which are large, important cities, but do not have a population of over a million.3 Martin and Stronach (1992) found similar results with two major differences. They found that higher levels of education would result in higher turnout for opposition parties.4 Similar to Flanagan et al., they also concluded that age would influence voting patterns, although they suggested that young people are becoming conservative rather than tending to vote for opposition parties as they did in the 1960s and 1970s. Agreeing with the conclusions of Flanagan et al. , they found that being integrated into societal groups was important, as was the urban– rural cleavage as a means of assessing the left–right cleavage. Those in rural communities and engaged in societal groups were more likely to be supporters of the LDP. Personalism, or more simply the local networks of Japanese society, which connect people through housing, residents associations, schooling and labour unions, is also of importance. As has been acknowledged above, however, this study was based on 1976 data. Flanagan et al. attempted to bring their 1976 data up to date for their 1991 publication by a discussion of how they saw voting behaviour changing. In the conclusion, they acknowledged that: Japanese voters appear to be becoming more volatile and more responsive to social network cues and psychological influences that are not based on nor exclusive to broad occupational and demographic categories. This conclusion regarding increased volatility, or at least the increased potential for

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

23

volatility, is reinforced by the findings regarding the declines in the proportions of self-employed and the falling levels and party loyalty of unionists … This change foreshadows a rise in electoral volatility. (Flanagan et al. 1991: 82) In the next section, in order to assess whether Flanagan et al.’s prediction concerning increased electoral volatility is true, we will now analyse public opinion polls from the Asahi Shinbun. These data will question the extent to which party support, according to the variables discussed above, has changed since 1980.

Public opinion polls, 1980–2000 Party support data have been obtained from the Asahi Shinbun’s monthly opinion poll data set from the Opinion Poll Desk. An average of 2,500 Japanese over the age of 20 are questioned monthly. Data are collected on support for parties according to age, sex, type of electoral district and type of employment. According to Yoshida Takafumi of the Opinion Poll Department, data are not collected on income or on education as the Japanese would feel this to be an infringement of privacy (Interview, Yoshida Takafumi, 12/3/01). Therefore, there are three main areas that will be analysed: (1) support for political parties according to age; (2) support for parties according to type of occupation; and (3) support for parties broken down to the size of the town or city in which the voter is resident. We have chosen not to analyse party support preferences according to sex, as this category did not exist in other voting behaviour surveys which we use for comparison. All other categories will be analysed to show how that particular variable has affected party voting patterns. These variables have been selected for various reasons. Utilisation of the age data will test whether older people are still supporting the LDP as both Flanagan et al . and Martin and Stronach suggest, and whether younger people support the opposition as Flanagan et al. suggest or the LDP as Martin and Stronach suggest. Analysing the residence of those polled (according to the metropolitan districts, urban areas with over 100,000 residents, smaller towns and cities, and rural areas) will test whether voters are mobilised according to community integration. Voters in rural areas are expected to be more integrated into their communities and, as such, could be more inclined to support the LDP, according to both Martin and Stronach and Flanagan et al. Finally, analysing party support according to occupational environment will test the variables discussed above about left-wing support being contingent on labour unionisation and also will look to see whether such norms as agricultural workers being supporters of the LDP still hold true. Parties have been split up into four groups: the LDP, the JSP, other parties and non-voters. The other parties have been combined. Other parties include the DSP, Ko– meito– , JCP and, since 1992, the Japan New Party (JNP), the Shinseito– , Sakigake and Shinshinto– . While this is problematic in many ways, the aim is to see what happens to the JSP support. Furthermore, often support for the small parties during the 1955 system entered singly would be so small on a graph, in

24

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 70

Percentage of support

60 50 40 30 20 10

1990 May

1989 Jun

1988 June

1987 May

1986 May

1985 Jun

1984 May

1983 May

1982 Jun

1981 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date LDP

JSP

Others

Non

Figure 1.4 Public opinion support for Japanese political parties, 1980–90: all ages. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho –sa no zen de–ta–. Similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

comparison to the JSP and LDP, that their score would be barely visible. In the period 1993–99, a more chaotic era, at different times the support for different parties fluctuated in strength, so unfortunately adding other opposition parties together is not an ideal solution but separating them when the aim is to look principally at the JSP would make the figures difficult to read. The category ‘nonvoters’ includes those who do not know which party they support as well as those who do not support any party. Finally, after 1996, data for the DPJ have also been added to the figures. In the following data, the clear trend which becomes apparent is the increase in the non-aligned members of the Japanese electorate. All of the predictions discussed above are becoming increasingly less likely and the biggest change is the increase in those questioned who say that they support no party or don’t know which party they support. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show the relative stability of party of preference throughout the past 10–15 years of the 1955 system. At the beginning of this period of analysis in 1980, the LDP was the party which consistently gained the most support in the Asahi Shinbun public opinion polls. The party had peaks and troughs of support but, in the first nine years of Figure 1.4, the LDP was by far the most widely supported party in Japan. The opposition were fairly constant. The nonJSP opposition virtually equalled the JSP’s level of support. A significant area of

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

25

70

Percentage of support

60 50 40 30 20 10

2000 Mar

1999 Jun

1998 Jun

1997 Jun

1996 Jul

1995 Jun

1994 May

1993 Sept

1992 Dec

1991 Dec

1990 Dec

1989 Dec

1988 Dec

0

Date LDP

JSP

Others

Non

DPJ

Figure 1.5 Public opinion support for Japanese political parties, 1988–2000: all ages. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

this figure is that those who are non-supporters are the lowest group and are around 10 per cent of those polled. Clearly, the majority of Japanese citizens had a sense of support for some political party. In 1989, various scandals and political issues resulted in the electorate turning against the LDP and voting for the JSP. In Figure 1.4, this tendency is shown to have emerged from the middle of 1988 and culminated in the Upper House election of 1989, a ‘second-order’ election which saw a protest vote against the LDP (Norris 1997: 111). The 1989 election was the first one not won by the LDP since 1955.5 Figure 1.5 begins at this period and what is most apparent is the low level of support for the LDP. It is after this election that many things began to change in Japanese politics. Figure 1.5 shows that, while LDP support was initially restored until 1993, support from the electorate for political parties fundamentally changed from 1989 onwards. Support for the 1955 system parties drops dramatically. The LDP begin a gradual but important decline in support. While they are nowhere near disappearing, they do, nevertheless, begin a decline in support which was not truly apparent until 1993. The growth of the support levels for the category of ‘other – and Sakigake, which broke away parties’ is because of the new parties, Shinseito from the LDP and competed against it in the 1993 Lower House election.

26

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

Similarly, support for the JSP drops below 15 per cent in 1994 and never goes back up. Furthermore, it drops even more dramatically when Murayama stopped being PM in the first week of 1996. This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 but fundamentally, as long as there was a JSP PM, the party support survived, but as soon as the public sensed that the party had lost influence, so they lost support. This means that, whereas in December 1995 the party gained 13 per cent in the Asahi polls, by February, two months later, this had halved to 7 per cent. The DPJ managed to get around 3–5 per cent of support from the electorate from its formation ten months later. Even combining the JSP and DPJ low support levels at this time shows support which is lower than what the JSP had until 1995. But fundamentally, the most noteworthy aspect of Figure 1.5, however, is the sudden increase from 1995 onwards of non-aligned voters. By 1998, 60 per cent of the polled electorate had no party of preference. In conclusion, when looking at the levels of party support from 1980 to 2000, the most notable features are a steady decline in LDP support, a highly significant drop in JSP support, and a very large increase in those polled who claim to have no party identification or no interest in politics. We shall now look at how public opinion support changes according to the age of the respondent, type of occupation and place of residence of those polled. We shall then make some conclusions about what the Asahi Shinbun data suggest about the change in attitudes of the Japanese electorate and the environment in which the DPJ gradually formed.

Age and its impact on voting behaviour Prior to 1988, party support among 20–24-year-olds was roughly comparable with other age groups. Fundamentally, despite this group being slightly more inclined to support the opposition than other age groups, the majority of these young people supported the LDP. This group particularly showed a drop in support for the LDP in June 1989 when JSP support was virtually equal to that of the LDP. This is no doubt due to the 1989 House of Councillors election in which the LDP did very badly as a result of the Recruit scandal and the JSP managed to ‘win’ (see Chapter 2). This election fuelled the electorate’s imagination and meant that politics became an exciting and interesting issue, even for younger members of the electorate. What is of more importance to the long-term assessment of how the electorate perceives politics, however, are the huge changes which this group expressed in terms of the party it supported from 1993 onwards. Once there was a choice of party which meant these young voters could move outside the confines of the traditional LDP and JSP contest, they initially moved towards supporting the Shinseito– and Sakigake in 1993 (Figure 1.6). Admittedly this ‘other’ category also includes support for the older parties such as the JCP and Ko– meito– , but these high levels of support for ‘other’ parties are mainly occupied by the electorate’s support for the new parties. However, once these new parties failed to make much of an impact on the political system, this group showed an emphatic move towards support of no political party. Those who said they supported no party

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

27

70

Percentage of support

60 50 40 30 20 10

1999 Jun

1997 Dec

1996 Jul

1994 Dec

1993 Sept

1992 Sept

1990 Dec

1989 Jun

1987 Dec

1986 May

1984 Dec

1983 May

1981 Dec

1980 Jul

0

Date LDP

JSP

Others

Non

DPJ

Figure 1.6 Public opinion support according to party of 20–24-year-olds. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Seron Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho– sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

amounted to over 70 per cent in 1998. This effectively means that party politics had become something which young people were disengaged from and had little interest in. This is a significant finding because it contradicts both Flanagan et al. and Martin and Stronach who said that younger people were more inclined to vote for the left and conservatives. In fact, what is apparent from these data is that young people were becoming increasingly alienated from all political parties in the 1990s and by far the majority did not support any party. In contrast, how did the over-60s, who usually supported the LDP, respond to the changes of the 1990s in terms of their parties of support? This is, as discussed above, a key support group of the LDP and, were the party to lose this core group of supporters, it would be of more significance than a decline in support by younger voters. Older people are more inclined to turn their general support for a party into a concrete vote at the time of elections because, quite simply, they are far more inclined to vote! If this group becomes as alienated from traditional parties as the 20–24-year-olds, it would mean that there is a widespread tendency, or even crisis, across all eligible voters of dissatisfaction with politics. Figure 1.7 looks at the support for political parties of over-60s from 1980 onwards. Prior to 1989, the over-60s had shown consistent support for the LDP. Indeed, in 1989, when the Recruit scandal was causing the LDP to lose

28

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 80

Percentage of support

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1999 Jun

1997 Dec

1996 Jul

1994 Dec

1993 Sept

1992 Sept

1990 Dec

1989 Jun

1987 Dec

1986 May

1984 Dec

1983 May

1981 Dec

1980 Jul

0

Date LDP

JSP

Others

Non

DPJ

Figure 1.7 Public opinion support for parties among over-60s. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Seron Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

considerable support, the over-60s questioned by the Asahi Shinbun still backed the LDP, despite support dropping at all other age groups. In contrast to the 20– 24-year-olds (Figure 1.6) and all age groups (Figure 1.5), where support for the JSP temporarily equalled support for the LDP, the drop in support for the LDP in 1989 was only marginal among the over-60s. Indeed, this high level of support for the LDP continued throughout the period of analysis among this group. There is a slight drop in 1993 and 1994 when the over-60s expressed support for the ‘other’ parties (again the new parties of 1993), but on the whole they retain a significant level of support for the LDP; even in 2000, 30 per cent of this group expressed support for the LDP. Nonetheless, what is also significant is that, in 1998 (at the time of the break-up of Shinshinto–), 60 per cent of over-60s state that they have no real party support. In 2000, at the end of the period of analysis, this level is at 50 per cent. In other words, this group, which had been a major backer of the LDP, said that they either had no party they supported or did not know which party they supported. The over-60s thus tend to move towards both extremes over the 1990s: either they claim to have continued to support the LDP or support no party at all. In a sense, this group defines the problems of the 1990s for the opposition parties: they were ignored as the most significant voters remained LDP supporters despite everything or tended to stop voting or stop having a specific party to support.

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

29

In conclusion, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, while some of the older voters still supported the LDP, both young and old voters expressed a drop in support for any political party. Political disengagement among all age groups is the most significant finding of these figures. Second, the LDP managed to retain support even within the context of general disengagement but other parties and particularly the left-wing opposition, such as the rapidly declining JSP and the newly formed DPJ, even combined, only managed to receive support from an average of around 12–15 per cent of those polled. Thus the main point of political support that can be deduced from the figures on party support according to age is that the main divide is between those who express continued support of the LDP (although at an admittedly lower level than before) and those who express dissatisfaction and have no party to support. We shall now examine how party support changed according to residential location and occupation in the 1980s and 1990s.

Occupation Data on occupation were collected according to six main categories: five of these categories are professions and occupations that are key indicators of support for either the JSP (blue-collar and white-collar workers because of their potential to be unionised) or the LDP (management, agricultural workers and the selfemployed, including both owners and those who work for small businesses). The sixth category is ‘other’ and refers to occupations that fall outside of these parameters and those who are unemployed. Within this variable, we expect that farmers and the self-employed would support the LDP. Blue-collar and white-collar workers are expected to support either the LDP or the JSP, as, according to the discussion above, their party of allegiance depends on whether they are in a labour union or not. Managers are expected to support the LDP. Figure 1.8 very much confirms these expectations. Throughout the period of analysis, agricultural workers show more support for the LDP in the Asahi Shinbun public opinion polls than any other occupational group. The occupations which display the lowest levels of support for the LDP are white-collar and blue-collar workers. These are the workers who are most likely to be unionised but whether their unionisation results in support for the JSP is an issue which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Management show expectedly high levels of support for the LDP as well as the self-employed who may well be brought into the LDP support structure through local business organisations and residents associations.6 The most significant point about Figure 1.8 is that, despite the problems of the 1990s, the LDP loses support from its traditional backers but not to the dramatic extent of the JSP as shown in Figure 1.9. As expected, agricultural workers, management and the self-employed show low levels of support for the JSP, and the most likely to be unionised blue-collar and white-collar workers show the greatest support for the party. What is most significant about Figure 1.9, however, compared to Figure 1.8, is the fact that,

30

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 90 80

Percentage of support

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date White-collar workers Self-employed

Management Agricultural/Fisheries

Blue-collar workers Other, Unemployed

Figure 1.8 Public opinion support for the LDP according to occupation. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

while the LDP retained support at a reduced level throughout the 1990s, the JSP began to suffer lower levels of support from white-collar and blue-collar workers from the early 1990s onwards. This gradual drop in support becomes more and more significant and, as has been discovered with the age distribution, its gradual decline in the first half of the decade was followed in 1996, when Hashimoto took over as PM, by a massive drop in support from both blue-collar and white-collar workers which put the levels of support they gave to be on par with management and agriculturalists who have always had lower support for the JSP. Indeed, when looking at Figure 1.10, it is the occupations that were traditionally supporters of the JSP who particularly say they support no party. This figure is especially startling because before the mid-1990s, apart from the group ‘Other’, which was always the highest category to profess not to support any party in the opinion polls, all other occupations display very low level of nonpartisanship. However, from 1995 onwards, all occupations suddenly show a marked increase in non-partisanship.

Percentage of support

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date White-collar workers Self-employed

Management Agricultural/Fisheries

Blue-collar workers Other, Unemployed

Figure 1.9 Public opinion support for the JSP according to occupation. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Seron Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

Percentage of support

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date White-collar workers Self-employed

Management Agricultural/Fisheries

Blue-collar workers Other, Unemployed

Figure 1.10 Public opinion polls according to occupation: no professed party of support. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

32

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

Percentage of support

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date Met districts Under 100,000 citizens

Over 100,000 citizens Towns and Villages

Figure 1.11 Public opinion support for the LDP according to residential location. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

Furthermore, the groups which display two of the highest drops in support are the white-collar and blue-collar workers who would normally support the JSP. This does suggest that there is greater dissatisfaction with the JSP than with other parties. As has also been confirmed in Figure 1.8, the LDP seems not to have lost as much support from key LDP-supporting occupations. We shall now turn to looking at public opinion poll data according to where the respondent is resident.

Type of constituency As has been discussed above, the more urban the location, the more we would expect the respondent to the opinion poll not to be a supporter of the LDP. LDP supporters are most likely to be in rural communities where community integration is at its highest and where party organisations find it easier to mobilise the Japanese electorate, particularly in the old electoral system which was abolished in 1994. JSP supporters tend to be in urban areas by default, rather than through any causal link that makes urban residents supporters of the non-LDP parties.7 Figure 1.11 confirms the expectation that LDP supporters are predominantly in rural areas. As with key occupations which tend to support the LDP (as seen in Figure 1.8), while support for the LDP did drop throughout the 1990s, it dropped least in the districts that are rural. But the LDP still had supporters in all types of

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

33

Percentage of support

35 30 25 20 15 10 5

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date Met districts Under 100,000 citizens

Over 100,000 citizens Towns and villages

Figure 1.12 Public opinion support for the JSP according to residential location. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Seron Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

district in the last poll date which was March 2000. Furthermore, even the lowest levels of expressed support for the LDP only ‘bottomed out’ at 20 per cent for several months in 1998. In contrast, the JSP was doing well in the 1980s to have support levels of between 15 and 20 per cent (Figure 1.12). With the Doi boom of 1989–90, the JSP did manage to get higher levels of support but this dropped back to the usual level of 15–20 per cent until 1993. But after the election in July 1993 in which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the JSP lost nearly 50 per cent of its House of Representatives seats, the JSP’s levels of support in all areas of Japan begin to drop significantly. Even before the formation of the DPJ in September 1996, the JSP had only between 3 and 5 per cent support in all types of constituency. While the LDP managed to maintain its support in rural parts of Japan throughout the 1990s, the JSP was on a downwards trajectory, even before the formation of the DPJ. Finally, in all types of Japanese constituency as seen in Figure 1.13, the overwhelming majority of those polled by the Asahi expressed no support for any party. This was particularly acute in metropolitan constituencies in 1997–98, but from mid-1996 onwards, there seems to be an ennui among all those polled towards political parties. This drop in support for any party is particularly evident in the Asahi data around the summer of 1996. One possible explanation for this

34

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour 70

Percentage of support

60 50 40 30 20 10

1999 Dec

1997 Dec

1995 Dec

1993 Dec

1992 Sept

1990 May

1988 Jun

1986 May

1984 May

1982 Jun

1980 Jul

0

Date Met districts Under 100,000 citizens

Over 100,000 citizens Towns and villages

Figure 1.13 Non-support of any party according to residence. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

sudden disengagement from politics is that the hope of 1993 finally began to disappear in 1996. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, the failure of the Hosokawa Cabinet brought about the creation of a new party, Shinshinto– . This party did well in the 1995 election and politics seemed to stabilise for a while: the LDP was back in power with the JSP at its side and the new parties and other opposition mostly were united inside Shinshinto– . There seemed to be an emerging two-party system of the old parties versus the new parties. But in the summer of 1996, this stability began to be questionable once more. The left-of-centre politicians were talking about the formation of the DPJ and the JSP was increasingly looking as if it would split. The upcoming 1996 House of Representatives election was also making the electorate question its political allegiances. It is almost as if the impending reality of an election under the new system meant that the electorate finally questioned the changes of the mid-1990s and decided that it no longer had faith in the existing parties. A further explanation for this sudden drop in support for the JSP in 1996 could also be connected to the fact that, until January 1996, the Prime Minister was from the JSP. With the resignation of Murayama, the coalition became one dominated by the LDP and this could have affected the public’s perception of the JSP.

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

35

100 90 Percentage of support

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1980 Jul

1984 Dec

LDP

1989 Jun Date JSP

Others

1993 Sept

Non

1997 Dec

DPJ

Figure 1.14 Professed party of support, 1980–2000. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

Conclusion The data in all of these categories thus confirm that there was an overwhelming disengagement from politics in Japan. The large number of those polled who said they supported no particular party suggests that widespread dissatisfaction caused this disengagement: all parties suffered but the Japan Socialist Party, formerly the second party in Japan and seemingly looking as if it could take over power in 1989 and 1990, suffered the most and lost the public’s support. On the contrary, the above data have suggested that the LDP managed to continue to maintain reasonable levels of support. What are the major conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion of support for political parties and the summary of Figure 1.14? As has been seen across each category of analysis, the LDP has suffered a decline in support but this has not been sufficient to make it significantly lose all its support, or an election per se. The lowest point of support for the LDP was in 1993. The events surrounding the 1993 election meant that Diet members defected from the LDP rather than the LDP losing support. Consequently, the party lost both support in public opinion polls and control of the Diet as it was temporarily superseded by some new parties which were more attractive to the electorate. Nonetheless, after this election, support for the LDP returned. Support never returned to the level that it had reached during the 1955 system, prior to the events of 1993, but the LDP

36

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

managed to regain control of the House of Representatives (in the form of a coalition initially and then in its own right again) in 1994 and since has maintained sufficiently comprehensive levels of support in public opinion polls throughout the rest of the decade. In contrast, the JSP seemed to be a party whose support was contained within the 1955 system. In both polls and in the 1990 election result, the party managed to have a period of success (and the party did particularly well in the July 1989 House of Councillors election before the 1990 Lower House election which will be described in Chapter 2). But, soon after this, the party began to lose support. In opinion polls, its support began to wane and, in the 1993 House of Representatives election, the party lost 66 seats which virtually halved the party’s representation in the Lower House. After this election, support for the party in public opinion polls plateaued for a while with around 15 per cent of respondents supporting the party. But as the LDP and JSP coalition progressed into 1996, and the JSP lost the Prime Ministership when Murayama resigned in January 1996, support levels for the JSP dropped dramatically. It could be that, by having the Prime Minister within the coalition, the party retained its identity but, as soon as the JSP was the junior partner in the coalition, the party was finally rejected by the electorate. The party’s support dropped dramatically to around 5 per cent and since then has become even lower. It cannot be denied that the creation of the DPJ in September 1996 was not a serious blow for the JSP. As can be seen in Figure 1.14, despite a weak start, the DPJ managed to gradually increase support from the electorate in public opinion polls. Further on, and almost despite its poor showings in the Asahi polls, the DPJ managed to take 26.5 per cent of the vote in the 2000 House of Representatives election. This pattern has continued in the elections in the first few years of the new century (Figure 1.15). The party has seen a gradual increase in support since 2000. It has not been sudden. Rather, the DPJ has gradually benefited from increased public support. There are surges and times when they get higher support – which tend to be around election times – but even looking at their more average support, it has grown in a calm and composed manner. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the new name for the old Japan Socialist Party, has dropped to around 0.5–1 per cent support. The party has not disappeared which is a significant point but gradually it gets weaker according to public opinion polls. Finally, the non-support group has slightly dropped as the twenty-first century has progressed. (The Others category is a tiny percentage visible at the top of Figure 1.15.) The LDP seems to have a stable support which goes up and down over elections and other political events but overall it is stable. The combined smaller parties’ support has declined: from a low start, but overall has dropped by about 50 per cent of their 2000 levels. So, what seems to be happening more and more is that the two-party system is really, but slowly, emerging in Japan. Finally, if we return to the beginning of this chapter and look at the level of turnout that was becoming significantly lower in the 1990s than before and compare it to the levels we have seen in the last few elections, we also see that

The changes in Japanese voting behaviour

37

100

Level of support (%)

80

60

40

20

Oct-07

Apr-07

Oct-06

Apr-06

Oct-05

Apr-05

Oct-04

Apr-04

Oct-03

Apr-03

Oct-02

Apr-02

Oct-01

Apr-01

Oct-00

Apr-00

0

Date LDP

DPJ

Komei

Liberal

JCP

No supporting party

Others

SDPJ

Figure 1.15 Professed party of support, 2000–07. Source: Yoron cho– sa nenkan, 2000–2006, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org. All Yomiuri data.

the turnout decline could be diminishing. While in the Lower House turnout went up considerably to 67.5 per cent in 2005, this was probably due to the sensationalism of the ‘Koizumi election’. Upper House elections have remained stable at around 56–58 per cent turnout for the last four elections. Turnout will probably never return to former levels but it is stabilising at a passable level and is not declining at a fast rate as it appeared it might do in the 1990s. We shall now turn to the other variables which can help explain the decline of the JSP but, before we do this, we shall examine the last few years of the JSP as the main opposition party in more detail. Also we shall examine the process by which the DPJ has emerged since 1996 and the world in which it has found itself and tried to grow in and assess the extent to which the decline of the JSP facilitated the growth of the DPJ.

2

From old socialists to new democrats Two decades in the life of the Japanese left

The previous chapter analysed the level of support for political parties in Japan from the 1980s onwards and the overwhelming impression from the public opinion polls was that the Japanese electorate were increasingly becoming dissatisfied with politics in the 1990s. Furthermore, the public’s support for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) dropped alarmingly, both before the formation of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and after this party was formed. In this chapter, we shall analyse the internal dynamics of the change from the JSP and the growth of the DPJ, in particular the last few years of the JSP, and we shall question what problems were happening within the party. We then shall look at the coalition governments of 1993–96 and assess the impact these had on the JSP. We discuss some of the attempted realignments and party formations within the non-communist left-ofcentre within the Japanese party system during the 1990s. Finally, we assess the creation of the new party, the DPJ, and reflect on the make-up of the party and its growth from a small party to being one in control of the House of Councillors as it stands in autumn 2008. See Appendix II for a diagram of Japanese Party change from 1990–2008. This chapter will thus explain the changes in the Japanese left before moving in the next three chapters to analyse some of the factors which contributed to the decline of the JSP and the emergence of the DPJ.

The Japan Socialist Party and the 1980s: slow decline combined with unprecedented success In the middle of the 1980s, the JSP had been the opposition for 30 years. This was also a period of the real beginnings of growing right-wing sentiment in Japan, enhanced by the Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987, Nakasone Yasuhiro. Nakasone, from the right of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was extremely popular and gradually led the party to increased support and electoral success. If the JSP were to have any success during this period, it had to find a way of competing with this Prime Minister and a resurgent LDP. Later in the same decade, the LDP was plagued by a scandal known as the Recruit scandal which involved insider share dealing and resulted in the decline of public trust in the party and forced the resignation of many LDP politicians.1 This scandal combined with unpopular LDP policies concerning the protection of rice subsidies and in the 1989 House of

From old socialists to new democrats

39

Councillors election gave the JSP a false sense that its fortunes had changed and that it had finally come into its own (Interview, Fukushima Katsumi, 16/8/07). Prior to this election, the JSP was suffering from a slow and lingering decline. Factional and ideological conflict was hampering the party but there were other reasons why the party was declining. As will be discussed in more detail, it was hampered by internal problems and a lack of its own support base. It relied upon the labour union association, So– hyo– , for mobilisation of the electorate and for funds to support the party. It was a party which lacked dynamism when it came to policy and ideology and which appeared stagnant to the electorate. Although its committed support of the Constitution still retained public backing, its inflexibility meant that the party was not able to gradually change its policies and ideology to remain relevant, as Rose and Mackie (1988: 534) stated is imperative. The JSP was gradually stagnating, yet there was little discussion within the party whether this should change or whether it was acceptable to stay as it was. It was divided as to its role in the Japanese party system. Was it a party that was interested in gaining power or a party that was there to perform a check-function on the LDP and curtail any excesses that could be caused by one-party-dominant rule? Kubo Wataru believed that this feeling hampered the party from 1986 right through to 1993 and prevented the party having a singular ‘voice’ vis-à-vis its political aims (Kubo 1998: 172). There were some reform-minded politicians within the JSP such as Kubo and, to a lesser degree, Yamahana Sadao, yet it was swept along by the consensus and was unable to push reforms through. This problem seemed to change with the emergence of Doi Takako as party leader in 1986. She was the first female party leader in Japan and seemed to offer a fresh, reform-minded image.2 She was partly responsible for the success of the party in the 1989 election but never managed to become the panacea for the JSP she was expected to be. As can be seen in Table 2.1, in 1989, in the Upper House election, the party managed to more than double the number of seats than it had managed to win in previous elections, but one needs to ask why it had achieved this level of success. Clearly when compared with the other Lower and Upper House elections that the party had fought prior to and after the July 1989 election, the 1989 election was an abnormal result. Was this result achieved because of the success of the party, was it because Doi Takako was the first female leader of a Japanese political party or was it due to other factors that the party did so well? In fact, there was a combination of reasons why the party did so well. The Recruit scandal, a scandal involving insider share dealing which benefited many politicians, particularly made the electorate feel jaded with the LDP and its association with political corruption. This was combined with a boom interest in politics by women, due to the large number of women candidates (which became known within the media as the Madonna Boom) and the presence of Doi. Two other reasons which helped the JSP were an unpopular value-added tax of 3 per cent, the consumption tax, which the LDP had introduced in April 1989, and an unpopular agricultural liberalisation policy which angered one of the LDP’s biggest backers, the agricultural cooperative No– kyo. As a result of these factors,

40

From old socialists to new democrats

Table 2.1 Number of seats won in the House of Councillors elections, 1983–92

LDP JSP

Upper House 1983

Upper House 1986

Upper House 1989

Upper House 1992

70 (139 adding previous election) 22 (44 in total)

72 (142)

36 (109)

69 (108)

20 (42)

46 (66)

22 (71)

Sources: Asahi and Kokkai Binran, various dates.

Table 2.2 Number of seats won in the House of Representatives (Lower House) elections, 1983–93

LDP JSP

Lower House 1983

Lower House 1986

Lower House 1990

Lower House 1993

250 112

300 85

275 136

223 70

Source: Asahi and Kokkai Binran, various dates.

which were predominantly not positive responses to the JSP but reactions against the LDP, the electorate turned towards the JSP. The JSP took a plurality in an election for the first time since the 1955 system had begun, and furthermore, it was an emphatic victory. In 1986, the party had taken 17.2 per cent of the vote in the Upper House election. In 1989, this more than doubled to 35.1 per cent of the vote. As mentioned above, it seemed as if the party had finally come into its own. In the same election, 12 candidates backed by the Rengo– labour union organisation also stood and 11 of them won their seats. Combining the JSP votes with these, the ‘left-wing vote’ accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the turnout. But it was arguable that this was an anti-LDP vote rather than a vote for the JSP (Kubo 1998: 178). Yet the party remained oblivious to this important distinction and instead saw it as its rightful victory after so many years. The literature of this period, even in English, reflects some of the triumphalism of the party.3 However, Kubo wrote that he believed that it was this victory which was responsible for delaying the reform attempts of the JSP indefinitely (Kubo 1998: 178). After the 1989 House of Councillors election, there followed an 18-month period in which the party did reasonably well at the polls and confirmed the feeling that it did not need to do anything to reform the party. In 1986, as can be seen in Table 2.2, the JSP had done badly due to the popularity of Nakasone. It received only 17.2 per cent of the vote in the Lower House election, amounting to 85 seats. However, in 1990, its boom of 1989 continued with 24.4 per cent of the vote, which gave it 136 seats. For those in the JSP who felt that 1989 was an inevitable victory waiting to happen, the increase in its Lower House seats in 1990 confirmed that its prospects were improving. But this confidence in the party was not to last long. Normality was restored when JSP support levels

From old socialists to new democrats

41

dropped in 1992. But the drop in support for the JSP was to get even worse. Kubo wrote that he expected the result in 1993 to be bad but not as bad as it turned out to be (Kubo 1998: 174–176). After a no-confidence vote was passed against Prime Minister Miyazawa in June 1993 because of his unfulfilled promises to implement political and electoral reform, two critical groups split from the LDP, formed their own political parties, fought the ensuing election and did well. Shinseito– was a party of 55 incumbent and new Diet members and was led by Ozawa Ichiro– , a former Secretary General of the LDP. Sakigake was led by Takemura Masayoshi, also from the LDP, and gained 13 seats. These two new parties combined with Hosokawa Morihiro’s Japan New Party (JNP), a party which had been formed to fight the 1992 Upper House election and who took 35 seats in 1993. The LDP managed to win most incumbent seats of members who did not defect to a new party, taking 223 seats. In contrast, the JSP did terribly, dropping from 136 to 70 seats. While the majority of the votes supporting the new parties were from former LDP supporters (those which had supported in many cases the same politicians when they were in the LDP), it was clear that some JSP support also went to the new parties. Furthermore, turnout had dropped since 1990 and this also accounted for the loss of support for the JSP. Its number of seats was nearly halved from its 1990 total but this loss seemed worse because the 1990 election had given it its highest seat total for several decades. As Curtis has said, the election meant it was a party which was ‘too weak to lead, too strong to be ignored’ (1999: 101–102). The Diet was left with no party with an overall majority, even though the LDP remained the largest party and the JSP was the second largest party. A coalition government had to be negotiated, but the question was whether the JSP were to be part of it.

The formation of the Hosokawa coalition The coalition that was formed took nearly three weeks to negotiate, which is a sign of the factional fighting which took place behind the scenes. The main groups in the discussion were Hosokawa and Takemura, the leaders of the JNP and Sakigake, Ozawa and Shinseito– , who were backed by Ko– meito– , and the LDP. Sakigake, in many respects, had considerable leverage in the coalition negotiations as it was a small party which had emerged from the LDP. Therefore, it shared some familiar ground with the LDP, but had a more progressive policy platform. The Socialists were not really a part of the coalition negotiations owing to internal fighting over whether its party leader, Yamahana Sadao, should resign to take responsibility for the party losses in the election. Its performance in the election had meant it was overlooked in the true negotiations yet, ironically, its place in the coalition was assured, as without it the non-LDP parties would not have sufficient numbers to gain a majority in the Diet. In its place, Yamagishi Akira, the Chairman of Rengo– , the Japanese Labour Union Council, was very active in trying to establish a coalition which would include all the former opposition

From old socialists to new democrats parties, notably the JSP, the DSP, Ko–meito– and SDL. He saw this as the opportunity to bring about the unification of the opposition which was something he had been working towards for a long time.4 Finally, another party in the negotiations was the media, as it was very influential in spreading rumours which became established as fact.5 In the end, the coalition included all the parties except the LDP and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Within the parties, however, there were some fundamental policy differences that meant that the coalition was unstable from the beginning. Ozawa was an ‘internationalist’ who wanted to turn Japan into a ‘normal’ country with an ‘army’ that could participate in overseas conflicts and he wanted a two-party system which would force the Japanese electorate to make choices between two political parties. He was interested in political reform for the sake of developing a two-party system. Furthermore, Ozawa’s concept of a twoparty system was based on two Conservative parties, the LDP and his new neoconservative force, and had no scope for a left-wing force similar to the JSP. In contrast, Takemura, who had also left the LDP for the sake of political reform, had a completely different ideal. He wanted to rid Japanese politics of money and see Japan as a sparkling small country that improved the environment and welfare of its citizens. He was committed to the Peace Constitution and wanted a ‘benign civilian power abroad’. The viewpoints of Takemura and Ozawa were almost diametrically opposed to each other yet they were united by the fact that they had both left the LDP and were leaders of new parties. Their differences became increasingly apparent throughout the life of the Hosokawa coalition. Combined with these two were the idiosyncratic power of Ko– meito– , which many of the coalition members distrusted, and the peace-conscious JSP, which was reeling from its own defeat in the election. As Curtis has said, this was ‘a motley coalition of reformers, political opportunists, socialists, pacifists, internationalists, and others. The potential for conflict within the coalition was obvious from the beginning’ (1999: 114).

42

The Electoral Reform Bill The Hosokawa coalition members were only united on one policy issue and that was the introduction of political and electoral reform legislation. Nonetheless, their positions as to the content of an electoral and political reform bill were not unified. They saw the need to change the electoral system and to try to limit corruption by the introduction of some form of state funding for parties, but the exact electoral system to be introduced and the level of state funding were issues upon which they found it difficult to agree. They managed to propose a bill within five months of the coalition being formed in December 1994, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The bill introduced a new electoral system based on 300 single member districts and 200 proportional representation seats. Legislation was also introduced to implement state funding for political parties as an anti-corruption measure. These bills are considered to be the only real achievement of the coalition government and, once they were passed, the coalition lost

From old socialists to new democrats

43

its direction and its members began to argue among themselves. The resignation of Hosokawa in April 1994 was the spark which led to the eventual break-up of the coalition government.

The break-up of the Hosokawa coalition Before the collapse of the Hosokawa coalition can be understood, it is important to understand the existence and implications of the kaiha parliamentary caucus in the Japanese Diet. Most members who are elected to the Diet are members of a political party yet within the Diet they are organised not in parties but in innai kaiha (literal translation is an internal Diet group with the same ‘religious’ beliefs). There are separate kaiha in each House. For the majority of politicians their kaiha and their party are one and the same and for this reason the issue of kaiha has been ignored until Gerald Curtis looked at it in his English language work on Japan. When a Diet member votes in the House, he votes through his kaiha and not through his party. Therefore, it is conceivable that there can be fission or fusion of political groupings within the Diet that can influence voting on legislation should kaiha be created, altered in size or abolished even if there is no obvious change to the political party (Curtis 1999: 173–178). The Hosokawa coalition collapsed, apparently for reasons of corruption. A scandal about Hosokawa’s financial affairs was uncovered in the press, and this became the immediate reason for his resignation. But other reasons also existed. Hosokawa was becoming increasingly undermined by disagreements between the two reformers, Ozawa and Takemura. Hosokawa had been chosen as Prime Minister because he was a man whom both right and left-wing parties in the coalition could trust. But in every aspect he was thwarted in his plans by lack of cooperation from the Socialists and the problems of the Ozawa–Takemura feud. Hosokawa gradually began to destabilise the coalition by getting closer to Ozawa than the left-wing members of the coalition. Hosokawa claimed that he resigned so that the coalition would have to be restructured and that the Socialists would not have the same amount of leverage that they had had (Curtis 1999: 133). His resignation caused a power vacuum and was a turning-point in Japanese political history. Most political commentators agree that, had the LDP not managed to return to power in a coalition with the JSP in June 1994, two months after the resignation of Hosokawa, and after a total of ten months and 20 days of being the opposition, the LDP would have atrophied beyond any political return. Its Diet members would have lost support from the electorate. Its access to the bureaucracy and policy-making decisions would have become more limited and this would have weakened the ‘iron triangle’ of the relationship between big business, the bureaucracy and government. The events which caused its return to power were the result of a strategic mistake by Ozawa. He tried to restructure the Japanese party system by bringing together all the members of the coalition, apart from the Socialists, into one large group that could compete with the LDP and create a two-party system. He did this by forming a kaiha in the Diet from which the Socialists were excluded, and he called this Kaishin.

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Kaishin resulted in the collapse of the coalition government. Before this happened, Ozawa reputedly first tried to encourage further defections from the LDP, most notably attempting to encourage the faction leader, Watanabe Michio, to join him between April and June 1994.6 He also tried to pressure the Socialists to back the policy platform of the coalition, in particular an increase in the consumption tax. He did this because he had mistakenly calculated that the Socialists would stay in the coalition, regardless of the amount of pressure that was applied to them, because they enjoyed being in power. Furthermore, he felt that some of them would split from the JSP and join the new party that he intended to become the end product of the Kaishin kaiha. This in many ways was a vision of the DPJ post-2003, but a decade early. Despite this aim of Ozawa’s, the Socialists bided their time and overcame the taunts from Ozawa to leave the coalition. They supported the vote in April 1994 to allow Hata Tsutomu to become Prime Minister as a successor to Hosokawa. But it was at this point that the kaiha took on great significance in Japanese politics. The creation of Kaishin on the same day as the prime ministerial vote broke up the coalition for good. Ozawa’s kaiha angered the Socialists so much that the party left the coalition and this had important knock-on effects within the Japanese political world. First, this left the JSP back in the political shadow of opposition. It also left the coalition government as a minority government. Initially, this move meant there was a minority government with Hata Tsutomu as Prime Minister to which both the JSP and the LDP were in opposition. But within two months, the creation of Kaishin paved the way for two much more significant results. First, it allowed the LDP to return to power in an almost unthinkable LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition in June 1994, when the Hata minority government became unviable. Despite being in minor coalitions with Ko– meito– and other parties, the LDP have been in control of the Lower House ever since. Second, it divided the JSP. With the Socialists in an uneasy coalition with its traditional enemy, the LDP, tensions within the party became increasingly apparent and groupings began to emerge that favoured reform, the formation of new parties and splitting the JSP and conflicted with the more conservative members of the party.

The LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition The LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition, established in June 1994, was formed as a pragmatic attempt by both the LDP and the JSP to attain power. The JSP were enticed into the coalition by the LDP’s promise of allowing it to nominate the first Socialist Prime Minister since 1947–48. Murayama Tomiichi was the leader of the party and had been selected as a result of Yamahana resigning to take responsibility for their large drop in Diet members elected to the Lower House in 1993. He was already 69 when he became Prime Minister so, compared to the younger image which the leaders of the new parties represented, he made the JSP look worn and problematic. The LDP saw the coalition as a means to the end of returning to the seat of government, to avoid the danger of atrophy from losing access to government, policy-making influence and the bureaucracy. But this coalition was a strange marriage of convenience and meant two parties with seemingly

From old socialists to new democrats

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incompatible agendas were now in coalition. Sakigake further complicated this LDP–JSP minimum-winning coalition because, even without the 13 Sakigake Diet members, the JSP and LDP had a majority in both Houses of the Diet. Thus, the inclusion of Sakigake was more a result of the factional feuding of spring 1994 than of any necessity of it being in the new grouping. It was merely being rewarded for having also left the Hata coalition government. One of the most significant points in which the coalition was untenable was in defence policy. The JSP allowed this tension to be solved by Murayama who declared in July 1994, a few weeks after the formation of the coalition, that the JSP would accept the constitutionality of the SDF and would drop its traditional opposition to the legalising of the national anthem and flag. He also declared his intention to maintain the US Security Treaty. The effects of such a radical turnaround of policy were far-reaching and will be discussed in Chapter 3. This move also led to JSP members lining up against JSP members and it became a problem of old members who grudgingly supported Murayama’s pragmatic actions as a means for the party to be in power, against, on the whole, the younger members who wanted genuine reform and did not think that such a pragmatic compromise of coalescing with the LDP would engender reform.

1994–96: the Murayama supporters and the younger JSP members – tensions based on reform preferences During the political instability between 1993 and 1996, it was the party’s traditional left wing that was the most conservative, and its right wing that was most in favour of reform. Supporters of Murayama who were left of centre and strongly supported JSP participation in the coalition government were in conflict with their more radical juniors. Indeed, it was these more right-of-centre members who were committed to reform. This situation created tensions within the JSP that became difficult to overcome. Reformers felt that, despite having tried to get into government for so long to reform Japanese politics, their attempts to do this were being thwarted by the concessions they had to make to the LDP. For instance, the party had to announce that it recognised the position of the SDF as acceptable within the Constitution. Thus it was the right-wing younger members within the JSP who were trying to come up with radical proposals in opposition to the coalition government. Many of the new groupings and attempted parties that emerged between 1994 and 1996 began as a result of these radical right Socialist attempts to reform the party or create a new party. The JSP had created its own tensions by going into coalition with the LDP. After examining these new left-wing party attempts that emerged between 1994 and 1996, we shall examine the impact that these groupings had on the decline of the JSP and ask if the new groups paved the way for the DPJ. –

Shin Minshu Rengo

Shin Minshu Rengo– was a group which attempted to form a new party from within the JSP in 1994/95. The party never quite managed to get off the ground,

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From old socialists to new democrats

yet even had events not been so unfortunate, the party was likely to fail. The group had its roots in the members of the JSP who had voted against Murayama Tomiichi in the June 1994 debate to choose a Prime Minister once the new threeparty coalition was established. The candidate of the non-LDP/JSP/Sakigake coalition parties was Kaifu Toshiki who had formerly been in the LDP and had been Prime Minister between 1989 and 1991. Diet members voting against Murayama voted either shiro shiro, shiro umi or umi umi in the two rounds of votes. Shiro refers to those who abstained (shiro meaning white) and umi means those who voted for Kaifu Toshiki, the umi being an alternative reading of the first character of Kaifu’s name (Interview, Takagi Hiroshi, 31/7/00). It has been suggested that the group who had voted against Murayama in this manner were badly treated by Murayama’s supporters and decided to create their own kaiha within the Lower House in autumn 1994. This attempted kaiha was called Shin Minshu Rengo– . In Japanese political parties there is a tendency for politicians to split into various informal ‘policy study’ groups. These serve various purposes, ranging from informal faction-like groups to groups which are hoping to break away from parties and are forming themselves into an interim faction, for instance the move engineered by Ozawa in April 1994 when he formed Kaishin, discussed above. It would seem that this study group method was the course favoured by Yamahana Sadao, who on 31 August 1994 set up the Shin Minshu Rengo– (New Democratic Union) to be a study group within the JSP. Yamahana’s actions were initially an attempt to support the JSP General Secretary, Kubo Wataru, who was trying to establish a party which would act as a third force in Japanese politics. It would compete with the LDP and the other centrist forces which were about to merge together as Shinshinto– (Japan Times, 1/9/94). Shinshinto– (known in English as the New Frontier Party) united several smaller parties and meant that the JSP now had to compete against two large conservative parties, Shinshinto– and the LDP. As Shinshinto– had a reformist image, it stimulated reform efforts among Socialists fearful of being left in the shadows of conservatism. At this point in time Kubo was very supportive of Yamahana and his supporters’ attempts to realign the left, declaring that he would not mind if this new party resulted in the dissolution of the JSP. Initially Yamahana was intending to form the party within a month and had the support of up to 60 MPs. These included members of the Japan New Party, the Democratic Socialist Party (which had also predominantly joined Shinshinto– ) and Sakigake. Yamahana found that, when the time came, only 20 MPs were willing to support him openly. Yamahana’s formation of his ‘policy study group’ resulted in the left-wing anti-reformers of the party forming their own study group: the ‘Murayama Government and Social Democratic Liberal Politics Promotion Society’. Therefore the division between pro-reform and anti-reform movements within the JSP became apparent. Yamahana continued his activities to create a new party throughout November and December 1994 but with little success. The political world was unpredictable, as Ozawa was in the process of creating Shinshinto– . It has been claimed that

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Yamahana needed to be quick off the mark in creating the new party or he would have been forced to support Shinshinto– as that incorporated the DSP, which Yamahana and his followers regularly supported. But his lack of action could also be seen as an anti-Shinshinto– move. Had Yamahana created the new party, he could have brought down the Murayama Government. This could have resulted in a united opposition, the newly created Shinshinto– , gaining power, and for this reason Yamahana opted not to do anything with his new party until the New Year, when Shinshinto– was established as a party and the situation could be better predicted. Therefore, one of his motives, both for the delay and for postponing the launch of the party, could have been to check the strength of Ozawa Ichiro– , who was the power broker politician forming Shinshinto– . Also it may have been because pressure was being applied to Yamahana and his group from the left wing of the JSP not to do anything which would damage the coalition government. In January 1995, events finally began to take off. On 1 January, Yamahana declared that he and his followers intended to leave the JSP by 11 February. Murayama hinted at the expulsion of Yamahana and his supporters from the party if they continued with their plans. Furthermore, Yamahana was losing support from his supporters as even Kubo began to worry that the formation of Shin Minshu Rengo– could bring down the coalition government. On 16 January, Yamahana and 24 supporters met in the Capital To– kyu Hotel, near the Diet, and announced that the following morning they would submit their papers of resignation from the JSP and register themselves as a new kaiha. They did submit their resignations but after this no further mention of the Shin Minshu Rengo– can be found in newspapers. This is due to the fact that on the same morning Kobe was destroyed in one of the worst earthquakes in Japanese memory. In the Japan Times of 18 January there is an article that the JSP had decided to stop arguing and concentrate on the crisis management of the earthquake. This could of course be expected, as there is no way that the politicians could continue to argue among themselves while thousands of people were killed, injured and made homeless. Yet once the initial crisis of the earthquake was over, it could be expected that some attempts could be made to renew moves to form the new party, had the initial decision been sincere and if their enthusiasm had not been diminished by the relatively low numbers who decided to leave the JSP and join them in the end. Their failure to restart the party lies in an historical comparison. According to Takagi Hiroshi, an Aichi Prefectural Diet member in 2000 and the administrator of Shin Minshu Rengo– in 1995, their daily meetings at the Capital To– kyu Hotel became increasingly desperate after 17 January (Interview, Takagi Hiroshi, 31/7/00). Kaieda Banri, a young first-term Diet member who had won a seat under the Japan New Party7 in 1993, wanted to continue with Shin Minshu Rengo– but Kawabata Tatsuo was strongly opposed to this. Kawabata Tatsuo had become a leading member of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). This party had been formed in January 1960 as a right-wing splinter group from the JSP. In October of 1959, the conservative Socialist leader, Asanuma Inejiro, had been assassinated days before the JSP’s Congress. In Kawabata’s opinion, forming a new

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party straight after the situation in Kobe was like the DSP being formed straight after the tragedy of Asanuma’s assassination. The DSP, which had opposed Asanuma while it was in the same party, felt as if a cloud of ill portent had settled over its party’s opposition to the JSP.8 Shin Minshu Rengo– thus failed. Kubo Wataru held on to their kaiha todoke (the form expressing their desire to leave the JSP and form a new kaiha) without processing them and returned them to their signatories about a month later. The group was never mentioned again, and in an interview in April 2000, one of its key members, Kaieda Banri, remembered little about the attempt, and needed to rely on his secretary for the name of the administrator, Takagi Hiroshi, and said that the only person who would have known the facts was Yamahana Sadao who had died of heart failure in 1999 (Interview, Kaieda Banri, 20/4/00). What of lasting significance can we draw from this failed attempt? Clearly this was a group of JSP Diet members who wanted reform. To them, Murayama represented the conservative nature of the JSP and did not value their aspirations of reform. But is there a connection between those who voted against Murayama in 1994, those who decided to join Shin Minshu Rengo– and those who eventually joined the DPJ? Only six joined the Shin Minshu Rengo– attempt of those who had six months earlier voted against Murayama (Asahi Shinbun, 17/1/95). These were the leader Yamahana Sadao (who died before the DPJ was formed), Amioka Yu– from Aichi 2, Doi Ryu– ichi of Hyogo 1, Nagai Takanobu of Hyogo 3, Goto– Shigeru of Hyogo 4 and Yoshioka Kenji of Hyogo 5. Of these, the only one to join the DPJ was Doi Ryu– ichi, a practising Christian church minister in the north of Kobe. Thus, not much can be inferred from these findings beyond an important conclusion. Within various groups of the JSP, there was a desire for change, but each time the group was too small to make much of a significant impact. Therefore, there would need to be a far more organised and numerous working together of groups to facilitate reorganisation of the left. But to underestimate this attempt as insignificant would play down its importance, as it indicates the moves towards reforms which were simmering. Akamatsu’s group Another attempt at a party from within the JSP was made by Akamatsu Hiroyuki. This attempt to create a new party was first brought to the attention of the author by Takagi Hiroshi, a member of the Prefectural Diet of Aichi. He ghost-wrote a book on behalf of Akamatsu detailing the ideology of the group. This book is not available on the National Diet catalogue, and Takagi could not give me a copy as he had only one himself.9 This group appears to have been formed by Akamatsu Hiroyuki, using Kubo Wataru as a figurehead, to bring about a third non-LDP coalition government in June 1994. The group is mentioned in Asahi Shinbun on 16 June 1994. The Asahi Nenkan of 1995 suggests that it was a faction of the JSP (Asahi Nenkan 1995: 258) and that all members joined the Shin Minshu Rengo– (Asahi Nenkan 1995: 241).

From old socialists to new democrats

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Little else can be ascertained about the group. Nonetheless, this group needs to be considered as part of the path of new reform-minded politicians which emerged from the JSP between 1994 and 1996. Shinto– tsukuri Shinto– tsukuri is what is referred to as the attempts made internally within the JSP to create a ‘superficial’ new party in 1995 and 1996 in order to appeal to voters and show that it was reforming the JSP from within. The only real result of this move was the renaming of the party from the equivalent of Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaito– ) to Social Democratic Party of Japan (Shakai Minshuto– ) in 1996.10 In effect, it was a last-ditch attempt by the Murayama group to placate the reformers and prevent a split of the party. No specific details are really known about who was involved behind the scenes of this attempt to reform the party, and it seems to have been a party-wide attempt to arrange events and create new supporters for the party. At the time, the JSP could see the attempts being made by the British Labour Party to remove its commitments to nationalisation and nuclear disarmament, and the party was very keen to emulate these attempts.11 Sakigake It would be impossible to understand the transformation of the Japanese left without an understanding of the small party Sakigake, which has had a far greater influence on politics than its size would suggest. When it was first formed, it had 13 members. It increased its share in the General Election of 1993 to 20 members and in the 1995 House of Councillors election managed to get three members in the Upper House. But by the 2000 General Election, the founder, Takemura Masayoshi, was the only member of the party to stand in the General Election. The party went from being a small break-off from the LDP in 1993, to becoming an unnecessary member of the LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition in June 1994 (which caused the collapse of the 1993–94 non-LDP coalition). It grew once again in the 1995 Upper House election but then disappeared in 1996 after the majority of its members joined the DPJ. Sakigake was thus never a numerically large party but its influence on government and reform was very strong during the mid-1990s and even in the twenty-first century its legacy has a pervasive influence on the workings of politics as its members form a faction within the DPJ. The first reason Sakigake has been so significant is the value it attributed to research, policy formation and party image. This was maintained in the DPJ some years later and in the long process which gradually built the image of the politicians in the party. When Kan Naoto became Health and Welfare Minister as part of the First Hashimoto Cabinet in January 1996 (representing Sakigake), he was able to turn the tables on the traditional induction of Ministers by bureaucrats. Instead of reading the inaugural speech that had been written for him by the Ministry, he had Sakigake policy advisers write one in which he brought to the

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From old socialists to new democrats

notice of the public an issue that was going to make him famous and a champion of the average citizen. Sakigake had been doing research for a while about the Green Cross Haemophiliac HIV/Aids problem which, up till then, had been covered up by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kingston 2004: 157–179). Therefore, as soon as he was made Minister, he was able to say that he intended to force an inquiry into the problem and bring anybody guilty of negligence to justice (Interview, Masuo Kazuhiro, 12/9/00). It was this crusade against the Japanese bureaucracy which made Kan so famous and was why he was such an important ‘face’ for the new DPJ. He became synonymous with research and battling against the embedded structures of the bureaucracy. Sakigake also influenced the formation of the DPJ in other ways. Staff members of Sakigake who eventually joined the DPJ were all very nostalgic and appreciative of their backgrounds (Interviews, Masuo Kazuhiro, 12/9/00; Honda Hirao, 13/9/00; Arakawa Miki, 13/9/00; and Iguchi Masako, 9/4/01). Iguchi Masako talked of the culture shock of joining the DPJ after working for Sakigake, as there had been a high level of policy discussion within Sakigake. Party workers would sit and have discussions which were not monopolised by party leaders, allowing each member to express his or her own opinion. She also compared Sakigake with the JSP and said: ‘The JSP has nothing to do with policy, just ideology’ (Interview, Iguchi Masako, 9/4/01). It seems that, compared to Sakigake, no party was as policy oriented. Sakigake was a dynamic experience because, according to its participants, it was full of people who were intensely interested in politics and it was also a combination of both young and old liberals. Iguchi felt that policy formulation had taken a backward step in the DPJ, as it had returned to becoming more ideological than Sakigake had been, although she did stress that the DPJ was still not as ideological as the JSP. Nonetheless, the clear image those involved with Sakigake had of the party did not bode well for any other organisation that they were later in. This will be discussed below as Sakigake members entered various factions within the DPJ. But aside from its effects on the factionalism of the DPJ, Sakigake also greatly influenced the emergence of the party through its attitude to the policy of haijo which will now be discussed.

The creation of the DPJ: the policy of haijo We will now turn to an account of how the Democratic Party of Japan was formed and will analyse who was allowed into the party and why. An understanding of this policy is important as the screening of entry of politicians into a party in Japan was unprecedented. No other political group during the whole of the political turmoil of the 1990s had made any attempt to limit members in terms of their ideological or policy positions. All other new political parties allowed anybody who was interested into their party and felt that there would be strength in numbers (apart from the Kaishin attempt). The DPJ alone had a policy of limiting entry according to key factors of attitudes towards political reform and, it is said, age and the number of previous electoral wins. This is what was known as the policy of haijo and was seen as a highly contentious decision by the majority of other left-wing politicians and

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parties, as well as some who were involved in the party. Here, we will discuss the positions of each of the major groupings towards this policy before analysing the outcome of the discussions. We shall then analyse whether this policy of haijo was beneficial or detrimental to the long-term prospects of the party. The formation of the DPJ has been extensively documented by a party insider, Igarashi Fumihiko (Igarashi 1996). This book was written to coincide with the launch of the party and was used as an opportunity to voice the policy concerns, aims and ideals of the new party. For this reason, the book must be taken with a degree of scepticism yet it still remains a key primary source as to the organisation of the party and some of the decisions that were taken prior to its launch. As well as describing the events leading up to the party and those who became involved in the launch, its value to this study is its detailed description of the policy of haijo. Igarashi says that the beginnings of the Democratic Party lie in the younger politicians in Sakigake, although the party did go through considerable twists and turns before it finally emerged. These young politicians felt at home in the reform-minded atmosphere of Sakigake yet they felt stymied by being in coalition with the LDP and JSP and felt that their ability to formulate policy was restricted. At the end of 1995, these young politicians began to group around Sakigake’s Hatoyama Yukio with the intention of forming a new party. Originally Hatoyama was discussing the possibility of a new party with Funada Hajime of Shinshinto– . Funada was initially very passionate about starting a new party but was very angry when his intentions were leaked to the press. He said that he would not be able to join the new party because his opinions on key issues such as diplomacy and the Japan–US Security Treaty were irreconcilable with those of Hatoyama. It is more likely, however, that his eventual decision not to join the party was because he wanted to be party leader and there was disagreement about this. He was more senior than Hatoyama as he had six previous electoral wins compared to Hatoyama’s three. But Hatoyama was a fourth-generation politician and the grandson of former Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro– and it was thought that he would have more ‘pulling power’ than Funada. Consequently, Funada refused to be part of the new party. This image of a new ‘left-wing’ party did not last for long because, in January 1996, the link to the new party of Hatoyama Kunio, Yukio’s brother, was revealed by the press. Consequently the party lost its pure left-wing image. Hatoyama Kunio was in Shinshinto– and was a neo-conservative. He was to have a large influence on who would join the new party. Hatoyama Kunio was concerned about the left-wing image of the party. He formed the policy of haijo or exclusion. This policy eventually alienated the new DPJ from the left-wing groups who were not allowed to join and divided the party internally between those who thought that haijo was an acceptable policy and those who were strongly opposed to it. The main parties involved in the creation of the DPJ were the JSP, Sakigake, younger members who had been in the Japan New Party who did not join Shinshinto– , and some members from the LDP. Haijo revolved around the debate whether politicians were to be allowed into the new party as marugoto (the whole party en masse), or as individuals who applied for admission.

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From old socialists to new democrats

Haijo became a debate concerned with the age of the politicians, their seniority in the Diet and their ideological attitudes, and sometimes these became blurred at the edges. Physical age became incorrectly associated with inflexible and hard-line policy attitudes associated with the JSP. This became a justification for leaving people out of the party for various reasons. Some leaders and politicians were concerned about the ‘image problem’ of old politicians by the electorate and thought that they would threaten the success of the new party. Others were worried about politicians with many electoral wins behind them, since they would feel that their opinion was more important than that of junior politicians and consequently could drown out the voices of younger people. The concerns were also connected to the problem of whether or not to allow in the aged and politically experienced leaders of JSP and Sakigake: Murayama and Takemura. The different instigators of the new party had very different opinions on who should be allowed in and whether any groups should be allowed in marugoto. They either wanted all politicians to have to gain individual entry to the party (the right-wing position), allow Sakigake but not the JSP to enter marugoto, or allow both the JSP and Sakigake to enter marugoto (the left-wing position). This latter position was one which allowed anybody who wanted to join the party to join without any conditions of entry being dictated. We shall turn first to this position. Yokomichi Takahiro was the main proponent of the marugoto policy. He was heavily backed by the labour union general council, Rengo– , and, in particular, former So– hyo– -based unions. For this reason, he felt that anybody who wanted to join, from whichever party, should be allowed in. He felt that the policy of haijo was prejudiced against politicians with a union background. Yokomichi argued strongly against the policy of haijo when interviewed in 2000 (Interview, Yokomichi Takahiro, 26/7/00). In fact, the group that supported haijo felt that labour union backing would taint the party with old images of the JSP, and would allow politicians to enter the party who were unable to develop their own policies and relied on the unions for support and financial backing. Part-way between complete haijo and free entry was the position of Kan Naoto. He felt that JSP members should be vetted, but all Sakigake members should be allowed into the party because of their attitudes towards political reform (Interview, Kan Naoto, 25/7/00). He felt that it would be acceptable for Takemura to enter the party for this reason, but was opposed to the entry of Murayama on the grounds that he was not representative of the reform movement as he had carried out little reform while Prime Minster. Sonoda, To– kai, Mihara and Tanaka Shu– sei of Sakigake were also quite conservative and were against letting the JSP join the DPJ. At first, they were happy to join the DPJ, but obviously wanted marugoto for Sakigake. Eventually, for the reason that there was no marugoto for Sakigake, they did not join the DPJ. On the right, Hatoyama Kunio and Funada Hajime (even though he was not part of the party eventually) were most opposed to marugoto entry. They believed that everyone should apply for membership regardless of their old

From old socialists to new democrats

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party, and in this manner politicians could be rejected according to their ideological preferences and their potential image as reformers to the electorate. Hatoyama Yukio was heavily criticised for being so dogmatic about this viewpoint. It was felt that he had followed this policy only because he was following in the footsteps of his brother. Honda Hirao, policy adviser of Edano Yukio, said in 2000 that he could not believe that Hatoyama Yukio had followed that policy, because he had been close to Takemura in Sakigake and they had had a very cooperative relationship (Interview, Honda Hirao, 13/9/00). Nonetheless, the policy of individually assessed membership eventually won and, when questioned about the policy, Hatoyama Yukio said that, while it was an extremely pragmatic policy, he did not feel that it had damaged the party (Interview, Hatoyama Yukio, 29/7/00). Despite much criticism, however, there are those who feel that, had haijo not happened, DPJ would never have been founded. Haijo allowed all the reformers on the left, and some from the right, to join together in a party which showed a certain degree of policy cohesion. This was the first party since the Japan New Party and Sakigake that had been formed according to such ideals, and was not merely a random collection of politicians who were in a party solely for reasons of loyalty to a particular party elder or because of a party politics crisis. This gave the new party an image of robustness from the start. All the young Sakigake politicians such as Edano and Maehara were told by party leaders to join DPJ, even if they did not want to, so that they would retain their seats (Interview, Masuo Kazuhiro, 12/9/00). The policy of haijo and the influence that it had on the eventual DPJ become clearer when the former JSP members who joined the DPJ and those who did not are compared. The haijo policy supposedly rejected politicians according to their future image within the party: age and experience were reasons to include or exclude members and younger politicians with less experience were considered to be more ‘DPJ-like’ than older politicians who would seemingly be tarred with the dogma of their old party. Nowhere was this truer than in the party’s absorption of former JSP members. As discussed above, this group were the people whom the new DPJ party bosses most wanted to restrict marugoto entry. While it is impossible to know which JSP Diet members attempted to join the DPJ in 1996, as this was strictly a private process, when we analyse the JSP members who did join the DPJ and those who did not, there are marked differences. Table 2.3 shows these figures. What is immediately obvious is that it was the younger members in the JSP who joined the DPJ. Furthermore, it was those who had less Diet experience who joined the DPJ. The most significant point though is that, of the 20 who did join the DPJ, 15 of them (75 per cent) had been elected to the JSP in the 1990 election and at the time of the formation of the DPJ had two electoral wins behind them. These were relatively young politicians in terms of experience. The Diet members elected to the JSP in 1990 had formed their own ‘faction’ which was known as the New Wave Society (Stockwin 1991). Stockwin noted that not all members elected in 1990 were part of the New Wave Society but there was a remarkable homogeneity among those who were. Nine of the members were

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From old socialists to new democrats

Table 2.3 Comparisons of JSP members who joined and did not join the DPJ Average number of wins of JSP Diet members who did not join the DPJ (n = 35)

Average age of JSP Diet members who did not join the DPJ (n = 35)

Average number of wins of JSP Diet members who did join the DPJ (n = 20)

Average age of JSP Diet members who did join the DPJ (n = 20)

4.71

63.71

2.95

57.8

Source: Kokkai Binran, August 1995 and 1996 election edition.

lawyers and only two had been unionists. The majority were from what he describes as ‘professional or intellectual career backgrounds’. In total, there were 29 members in the New Wave Society. It is therefore plausible that the 15 Diet members who joined the DPJ from the JSP with two wins behind them were members of the New Wave Society.12 Due to the limitation of older Diet members, the party did benefit immediately from a reform-minded image. This gave the party an image of wanting to take hold of power and manifested this by formulating a limited but clear set of policies through manifesto-like documents. Nonetheless, as Stockwin has suggested (1999: 156), its weakness remained that it did not know how it wanted to do this: was it by initiating fission from another party such as it eventually did in 1998, creating a coalition government, or trying to take power in its own right? But it also should be acknowledged that the party was policy-driven and more or less coherent in those policies, in an attempt to draw the electorate back into politics. It wanted a fresh, clean image to do this and therefore it is possible to concur with Hatoyama Yukio when he said that the policy of haijo, while ostensibly pragmatic, was partly ideological as it created a party with a clear identity (Interview, Hatoyama Yukio, 29/7/00). The DPJ was the first party in Japan to be so completely pragmatic (while being ideological and not valuing size over substance), and this probably accounts for why this attempt was successful compared to other attempts to reform the left which had failed. But the groups which came before it were an essential part of the process towards the creation of the DPJ. Furthermore, groups such as Shin Minshu Rengo– highlighted the need for reform among both the electorate and politicians and also probably contributed to the long-term success of the DPJ, because by the time it was eventually formed it seemed as if the creation of a new left-of-centre party was the most obvious and logical thing to happen. The formation of the DPJ and its initial policy objectives The Democratic Party of Japan was finally officially formed in September 1996. It did reasonably well in its first election, three weeks after the launch. It

From old socialists to new democrats

55

managed to take 55 seats: most of the candidates who won had defected from other parties, though there were a few new candidates. The initial policy aims of the DPJ were proclaimed to be: rationalised government, a pension scheme that would provide sufficient benefits to pensioners while also accumulating sufficient funds to distribute to all contributors, a health system geared to the post-war generation, an education system which would provide more freedom for children, a recognition of Japan’s past while also maintaining the peace-keeping nature of the Japanese Constitution, and a deepening of Japanese/US relations (Hatoyama 2000). With the exception of the point about the Constitution, all of these policy aspirations lacked any concrete detail about how they would be introduced but did express the fundamental principles of the DPJ as it was to become. In 1996, the same year that the DPJ was formed, the JSP changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). This name change was not hugely important, because the name in English had been changed in 1992. Nonetheless in Japanese it was still Nihon Shakaito– , Japan Socialist Party, until 1996. Therefore ‘JSP’ has been used here as long as that was the name in Japanese. Furthermore, we are using ‘SDPJ’ from 1996 onwards, once the DPJ was formed and the JSP had split. The benefit of this method of distinguishing the two names is that it also means that SDPJ represents the much smaller post1996 party yet JSP describes the party which even in 1995 had a considerable number of seats. The enlargement of the DPJ In April 1998, the Democratic Party of Japan was enlarged when it absorbed the Hata group (which had briefly been the Sun Party (Taiyo– to– ) and then Minseito– which was an interim party from those in Ozawa’s factions/parties in the 1990s who did not go to the Liberal Party with him in 1998 and people who had been in the Sun Party with Hata and left Shinshinto– in 1996) and the Yu– ai Kaigi group (the former DSP group from within Shinshinto– ). When the party recounts its history, it mainly talks about it being formed in this month and tends to ignore the first 18 months and the development of what has become known as the old DPJ. For the first time since 1960, members from the old JSP and the DSP were now in the same political party and, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the labour unions now had only one party to support at elections. With this expansion of the party, the DPJ became the second largest party next to the LDP, and in June 2000, in the first Lower House election that it fought in this enlarged state, it increased its seat total in the Lower House to 126 seats. Thus it was roughly the same size as the JSP was from the late 1970s onwards. The DPJ lost some momentum in the 2001 House of Councillors election. It still went up in support, winning 26 seats to take their total in that House to 59 seats, but this was not such an emphatic victory as others had been. This can largely be accounted for by the fact that Koizumi Junichiro– had taken over as Prime Minister in April

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From old socialists to new democrats

2001 and this had resulted in a surge of support for the LDP and a slower growth rate for the DPJ. The beginnings of change and the start of success for the DPJ The first few years of the twenty-first century were a period of great development for the DPJ yet, simultaneously, this meant they have had to face new problems such as factionalism, forming coherent policy and, ironically, how to handle success. It must also be acknowledged that the party’s success has not always come easily or as a result of good party planning or strategy, and must always be seen from the holistic perspective of how popular the LDP was at the time of the DPJ’s success. The growth of the party in 2000 and 2001 looked to be a thing of the past in 2002 as it continued with the old generation of leadership – and this continuing until 2004 deprived the party of media interest. The lack of an election also meant the party was gaining less media attention. During this period, it was continuing to search for candidates for constituencies with no DPJ candidates and generally develop the party but, with the growth in Diet numbers, factions (which will be discussed in more detail below) were becoming stronger which meant division between party members was also becoming greater. In December 2002, after an acrimonious period within the party, Hatoyama Yukio was forced to resign as leader of the party. Kan was elected as the new leader but the reason for the anger towards Hatoyama is far more important for its long-term outcome. The party was extremely angry with Hatoyama because he had been in talks with Ozawa Ichiro– to bring together the Liberal Party and the DPJ. Talks had begun in October 2001, and in the beginning had even included the left-of-centre LDP Secretary General Kato– Ko– ichi. The Liberal Party and the DPJ merged in September 2003 so it was a process which took two years and much in-fighting before it came about. It was also a process which really emphasised the growing factionalism of the DPJ. Yokomichi Takahiro, the ‘chair’ of the former JSP faction in the DPJ, was very supportive of the alliance yet attacked Hatoyama vigorously. He said that alliances for pursuing policies were acceptable but Hatoyama was just making LDP-type policies and Hatoyama had performed ‘an act that breaches people’s trust’ in the party. Other party members were also angry that Hatoyama had not consulted fully with members before discussing the possible merger with Ozawa, and even supposedly offering him the leadership (Japan Times, 1/12/02; Courier Mail, 4/12/02). So why did the merger happen in September 2003 despite the great sense of distrust against it in the October 2001, the later December 2002 and early summer 2003 attempts? It seems to be explained by Ozawa’s reluctance to be ‘overrun’ and absorbed by the DPJ. It needed to be a ‘merger of equals or an alliance’ with the Liberals (Japan Economic Newswir e, 8/12/02). Some DPJ members were worried about the potential influence of Ozawa within the newly formed group as they saw him as being too proactive towards security issues because of his policy of supporting UN-led action. The merger seemed to have finally

From old socialists to new democrats

57

happened in 2003 because both parties were looking to the November election which had to be held by the summer of 2004 at the latest and knew that, under the new electoral system, a larger party was better off than two smaller parties. In particular, Ozawa’s Liberals were particularly small and, as the election came nearer, they were increasingly concerned about their 22 seats as they only had 1 per cent of support in opinion polls (see Figure 1.15 to see the Liberals in comparison to other parties during the party’s final phase). Thus, they were gradually willing to accept the conditions imposed upon them by the DPJ. Consequently, in July 2003, the two parties announced they would join in September and the Liberals were by now completely happy to merge into the DPJ and lose their name, and for Ozawa to lose any possibility of becoming an immediately leading figure in the party. Regaining individual seats seemed more likely once they were in the larger party as the Liberal Party’s organised support was not as good as that of the DPJ (Japan Times, 28/5/03). Similarly, the DPJ members opposed to the Liberals for ideological reasons saw this as a stronger DPJ and a reason to compromise their principles and feelings. Whether as a consequence of the joining of the two-party merger or other factors such as a dip in the popularity of Koizumi, in 2003–04 the party had a real surge in its electoral strength and also began to change its leadership which meant the public engaged with the party in a new way. The party won 177 seats in the Lower House election of November 2003, up from their pre-election combined force of 136 (114 DPJ and 22 LP). This was a historic result as the opposition had never done this well in the 1955 system. In this election, the DPJ took the innovative step within Japanese politics of producing a manifesto of their party’s policies, responding to the Public Offices Election Law which was revised just before the election and facilitated such documentation and distribution. This move forced the LDP to follow and write a manifesto too. Koizumi also acknowledged that the LDP would start to produce a manifesto for each election thereafter. Japanese manifestos have not yet progressed to the stage in which there is careful discussion of taxation and financial planning for the policies to be enacted but, nonetheless, they were a new development and saw a discussion of policy which had previously not really been a part of election campaigning. More ex-bureaucrats stood as candidates from the DPJ than from the LDP (eight as opposed to seven) and this was indicative of a new sense that the DPJ were becoming a party with the possibility of being able to form a government in the near future (Japan Times, 15/11/03). The DPJ also innovated the idea of the ‘cabinet in waiting’, informing voters during campaigning who would be in key cabinet positions should the party win. Nonetheless, Nabeshima Keizo– , a columnist in the Japan Times, warned of one of the DPJ’s major problems as soon as the election was over: unless the party could establish a coherent view on the Constitution and defence policy it would have problems (Japan Times, 17/11/03). Initially the party leadership had very much remained in place: Kan Naoto was leader and was to remain so until May 2004 when he was forced to resign over a non-tax-paying scandal. It was this resignation that moved the party in a new leadership direction for the first time since its formation in 1996 and this has had

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From old socialists to new democrats

benefits but also created problems. Incidentally, in 2008, Kan Naoto remains ‘acting’ leader which means he takes over when the leader is out of the country or ill. Hatoyama Yukio is Secretary General so both men are still very important within the party. The new leadership Okada Katsuya was the first party leader who had not been one of the two party leaders when the party was formed in 1996. He had entered the party from the Minseito– . Initially, the change of style of leadership he gave to the DPJ brought the party great levels of success. He was leader during the successful election of July 2004 and this success was partly attributed to him due to his party control and his attractiveness to the electorate. Nonetheless, he resigned as a result of the DPJ failure in the ‘Koizumi’ election of 2005. Even prior to the 2004 election, Okada made the very successful move of controlling party factional division by picking people from a wide range of previous party affiliations/factions to take up key positions. These decisions also transcended the age dimensions of politicians. Okada appointed veteran leaders to senior positions, including Sengoku Yoshito from the former JSP to be the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Head. Kawabata Tatsuo, a former Democratic Socialist Party member, became not only a shadow cabinet member, but also Diet Affairs Committee Chair. Fujii Hirohisa, a veteran politician at 71, was Secretary General and came from the Ozawa group. The actual election was the first one since 1989 in which a non-LDP party took a majority of seats. Again the DPJ published its policies on the web and went further in this election by also publishing its election campaign finances on the web to ensure public disclosure of all of its finances. The DPJ took 50 seats and the LDP 49. More than 50 per cent of non-affiliated voters cast their vote for the DPJ and the only age cohort which did not predominantly vote for the DPJ were the over-70s. Had the DPJ obtained the same percentage of votes in the next Lower House election as they had in the 2004 election, they would have got 308 seats and the LDP would have gone down to 130 (Japan Times, 12/7/04). In his postelection September cabinet reshuffle, Okada once again, despite slightly changing personnel, ensured factional balance. Thus, the period of 2003–04 was extremely successful for the DPJ. When Kan resigned, the party managed to obtain a likeable and successful leader. They championed policy as being the central calling card of the party and Okada controlled factionalism by bringing all parts of the party into his cabinet. The party created for itself a clear identity and this manifestly paid off in two excellent election results. Nonetheless, problematic issues were emerging, both in future election results and problems within the party structure and leadership. The beginning of problems for the Democratic Party The 2005 House of Representatives election was a low point for the DPJ as they lost an extensive number of Lower House members while also misunderstanding

From old socialists to new democrats

59

the implications of the poor election result for the party. The election was called on 8 August when Koizumi dissolved the Lower House as a result of the failure of the Upper House to pass the Postal Reform Bill. As a consequence, whereas at the beginning of the election there was media discussion of the potential success of the DPJ, the actual election became a fight between two conservative voices: the LDP of Koizumi with his ‘assassin’ candidates in districts where he did not allow the ‘rebels’ who had voted against him in the Lower House vote to stand as the official LDP candidate. Nonetheless, the rebels stood anyway! The LDP produced a manifesto for the election but it was hardly necessary since, by taking over the electoral fight and turning it into a media battle between the assassins and the rebels, Koizumi effectively denied the need for policy discussion and any opportunity for party differences to be highlighted and therefore removed the ability of the DPJ to have a voice of any impact in this election. Consequently, the result of a drop in seats to 113 on 11 September was very bad for the DPJ, the lowest result since the formation of the new DPJ in 1998. Nonetheless, it took it too seriously and blamed itself for the failure rather than attributing blame to Koizumi’s media methods. But the election’s implications for the party should not be disregarded. For the first time Koizumi and the LDP really managed to take control of the urban Number One constituencies which traditionally had been the stronghold of the opposition:13 the LDP took control of 32, up from 26, and the DPJ lost six, going from 19 to 13.14 Furthermore, the LDP took 23 of the 25 Tokyo seats, up from 12 – plus effectively winning one Ko– meito– seat again. The DPJ had had 12 between 2003 and 2005 but, after the 2005 election, the only seat the party had in Tokyo was Kan Naoto’s. Thus traditional areas where the opposition normally did well were denied to the DPJ. The overall result was that the LDP took 296 seats, the highest number it had ever taken since the beginning of the 1955 system. The DPJ just won 113. The other parties stayed virtually similar to their 2003 results so, apart from the six seats held by candidates from the Post Office rebels and who had formed new parties, the drop in 64 seats from the DPJ virtually moved, en masse , to the LDP. But far more importantly, this meant that with their coalition partner, Ko– meito– , the LDP had over 66 per cent of the seats, which is highly significant with regards to the Constitution and will be discussed in the next chapter. The implications of this election and the DPJ’s decline in seats were, in fact, more long term and embedded within the system than people initially thought. First, in future Lower House elections, will the DPJ as the main opposition party be able to return to relying on its urban constituencies as part of their mainstay of support as has been the norm for the opposition since the beginning of the 1955 system? This is a particularly important question as Japan faces a Lower House election which has to happen by September 2009. More importantly, with the DPJ controlling the Upper House until at least July 2010, the LDP is very unlikely (with Ko– meito– ) to hold on to a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives election. It will thus no longer be able to use Article 59 to override vetoes by the House of Councillors. Article 59 states:

60

From old socialists to new democrats 1) A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. 2) A bill, which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of twothirds or more of the members present. 3) The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law. 4) Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.

On 13 January 2008 the LDP had used this method to allow a Maritime SDF refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean as an anti-terror measure. Increasingly the significance of the 2005 election to both parties has become more apparent. Since August 2007, the LDP has been able to push through legislation despite their lack of power in the Upper House precisely because of their super-victory in 2005 but this is unlikely to happen again and deadlock between the two Houses could take over as Article 59 would be unusable. Maehara – the second new leader and beyond This failure of 2005 caused Okada, who had been an extremely popular and successful leader, to resign. This meant that the party had to face another leadership election and, once again, Kan Naoto, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the party, tried to stand. He was beaten to the role by Maehara Seiji. Maehara is a product of Matsushita Seikei Juku, the training school designed to form the next generation of political leadership. Maehara is a strange mixture because he entered the DPJ from Sakigake, a liberal party of the 1990s where Kan Naoto was one of the founding members. Nonetheless, Maehara is also a member/leader of one of the more conservative factions within the DPJ, the Ryo– unkai. Yamaguchi Jiro– described him as making more radical, hawkish statements than Koizumi about foreign policy yet lacking any interest in domestic policy (Japan Times, 3/1/08).15 For example, he angered South Korea by saying in November 2005 that Roh Moo Hyun’s attitude towards the textbook issue was shallow (Japan Times, 21/11/05). He was forced to resign in early April 2006, supposedly to take responsibility for a party member, Nagata Hisayasu, who wrote a false e-mail suggesting a LDP member was linked to the Livedoor scandal concerning securities fraud in 2006. In his place Ozawa Ichiro– became leader of the party. Since 1993, he had been the maker and breaker of three political parties. Thus as a leader of the DPJ, Ozawa brought a certain cachet and experience which the party could benefit from, yet simultaneously tinged it with a sense of unpredictability. Also, as he was considerably older than many party Diet members and he had been a product of the LDP in a much older era of Japanese politics, there were some concerns about whether he would be the best leader.

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Fundamentally, these last three leaders of the DPJ have been extremely important. Okada was, as discussed above, reasonably young and attractive and gave the party a new, reformed and dynamic image. He was spoken about by young women and made the party attractive to people who had previously been disengaged from politics. With the leadership of Okada and Maehara, the staid image of Kan and Hatoyama was finally broken and the party seemed to have moved on and developed a new image and a new generation of leadership. The introduction of Ozawa Ichiro– as party leader has thus reversed many of these tendencies. First, he has the most electoral wins of any DPJ politician, 13 as of summer 2008, since he was first elected in 1969 and won eight elections within the 1955 system.16 He is also remembered for right-wing views while still in the LDP and in his days of Shinshinto– which he is currently playing down. In September of both 2006 and 2008, he retained the leadership of the party without contestation17 and the party wholeheartedly expresses its support for his leadership while those not supporting him remain diplomatically quiet. Ozawa manages to greatly influence the public should they have the opportunity to meet him because he shows great interest in what is going on in the location he is in, rather than constantly talking about himself as many Japanese politicians do. But he makes very few television broadcasts and does not feel the need to play a high profile role as party leader and this was a problem in the 2007 campaign. Motohoshio Satoshi, the political liaison officer of Okayama Rengo– , described how Ozawa turned up in June 2007 at their head offices one Friday evening at 5pm, unannounced. The place was virtually empty so he handed out business cards and left. Those who met him were struck by his low-key interest in them; many party members were taken aback by his unostentatious arrival and his attempts to meet people in a low-key way (Interview, Motohoshio Satoshi, 17/8/07). In 2007, despite the great victory of the DPJ, he did not appear before the media on the night of the election and for several following days and allowed the impression to develop for some time that he was exhausted. Watanabe Ko– zo– said that he was probably far from ill but he just could not be bothered with that kind of media attention and the demand for interviews (Interview, Watanabe, 29/8/07). Eda Satsuki described him as a very effective leader but did describe his leadership as being ‘omoi’ (heavy) (Interview, Eda Satsuki, 29/8/07). Recently, there have been discussions in the press about his heart condition as he was in hospital again in late summer 2008 and this is causing political specialists to suggest that, even if the DPJ wins the next election, he will only be PM for six months before having to resign. This then initiated a debate on who could take over from him (Japan Times, 28/10/08). But fundamentally, Ozawa is a strong leader who does create tension because he creates enemies as well as allies and this has meant division within the party has become an increasing issue.

Factions Three scholars have concluded: ‘[The DPJ factions] are not yet as institutionalized as their faction counterparts in the LDP’ (Miura et al. 2005: 52). Nonetheless,

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From old socialists to new democrats

Table 2.4 Factions within the DPJ Source

Factions

Kollner – Japan Forum, Autumn 2002

Yuai kurabu (DSP) 30 Former SDPJ 20–30 Citizen movement origin 20–30

Eda Yoichi (Eda Satsuki’s Policy Adviser), 2006

Eda Yoichi, 2001

Former Shinshin/younger members 40 Former Sakigake 20–30 Old SDPJ 20 Old DSP 20 Kan/Shinminha 25 Former Sakigake LDP group 25 Noda 20 Ozawa 30 plus Ryo–unkai 20 plus

Comments

These are the Kan group – incl. Eda and Ikeda Motohisa This group includes Maehara and Edano

Kan is in this group Hatoyama New people too young to have previous party in these last two

Old SDPJ 20 Old DSP 20 Shinminha/Former Sakigake 25 LDP group 25

Sources: Japan Forum, vol. 16, no. 1 (2004), and private communications with Eda Yo– ichi.

factions within the DPJ have begun to take on more and more significance in the past few years (see Table 2.4), and, as this quote suggests, are growing in their importance. In the discussion on the leadership above, we talked about various leaders putting themselves forward and this is one of the issues that has provided some of the impetus for factionalisation. When Hatoyama was forced to resign in December 2002, it was described as ‘the most poignant reminder yet that the nation’s largest opposition is deeply divided’ (Japan Times, 5/12/02). Factions within the DPJ Factions within the DPJ began to receive academic attention several years ago. Köllner gives a detailed analysis of the 2002 DPJ Presidential elections and used this to show that the factions did the DPJ more harm than good because it prevented the party from having a cohesive image in the eyes of the electorate and, unlike the LDP factionalisation, divides the party more than keeps it coherent (Köllner 2004). Fundamentally, he is in agreement with information given to me in 2001, but where there was difference was in the division of the former Sakigake members. According to Köllner, there are the right-wing members such as Maehara in one group and the citizen movement members where Kan is. In information given in 2006, there was the Ozawa faction which had been added and the important Ryo– unkai which is made of new members of the Diet who did not have previous party affiliations. What is interesting is that the old Sakigake group seems to have split into two groups: Kan and his supporters have gone into

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63

the leftish faction organised by himself, which includes politicians such as Eda Satsuki (before he officially left the party to become House of Councillors’ President in August 2007), yet many former Sakigake members such as Maehara and Edano (who before Sakigake had been in the Japan New Party which could explain this division) are in the more right-wing Ryo– unkai. This indicates that the factions are very much a growing organisation within the party and, as will be seen below, they are stabilising. Nonetheless they will remain flexible, depending on who is leader, who has influence within the party, how policy is changing and, also, which politicians are elected and whether some factions disappear or weaken as a result of this. Initially we will look at individuals’ opinions and discuss which faction they are or are not in, and indeed whether factions exist. After that, with the issue in mind that there is no comprehensive data as yet on the party’s factions and its members, we shall discuss two different sources which show membership of each faction and what this implies for each of the factions. The notion of factions as a problematic force within the DPJ was expressed by Maehara Seiji when he became leader of the party after the defeat in the September 2005 election. In the Japan Times he was quoted as saying: ‘I’ll work hard to measure up to people’s expectations by getting the whole party behind making a new start.’ He went on to say that he placed great weight on the party becoming a meritocracy with ‘the right person in the right place’ rather than thinking about experience or factional balance (Japan Times, 18/9/05). In contrast to this, however, Okada picked an extremely ‘factional-sensitive’ group of supporters around him and, as Okada has been far more successful as a DPJ leader than Maehara, this could suggest that Maehara’s inclination towards merit over faction was flawed within the context of the party. There is considerable difference in opinion within the DPJ about whether factions actually exist. Unlike the LDP, the DPJ makes no official declaration to journals such as Kokkai Binran about factional affiliation, or even whether factions exist within the party. There are those who have said that there are no groups or factions and that some people just ‘get on better with some people’ (Interview, Furukawa Motohisa, 8/8/06). Tsurunen Marutei says he is not a member of any group or faction but he was invited to attend a group of Kan’s members at an event in July 2006 (Interview, Tsurunen, 20/7/06). Hosokawa Ritsuo, a former Socialist, was adamant that factions do not exist and said that he goes out for sake with members from any former party (Interview, Hosokawa Ritsuo, 3/9/07). Beyond these who believe they do not exist, there are those who have differing views ranging from Diet members being associated with certain people for various reasons and those who do believe in the existence and potential problems of factions. Doi of Kobe Eleven and the Kinki PR Constituency believes that only ‘groups’ exist and they have a very benign role of deciding party posts and leaders, etc. _ (Interview, Doi Ryuichi, 27/8/06). Edano Yukio plays down their role and existence even further. In his opinion, only a third of party Diet members are in a group of any sorts, and two-thirds of the newer members are in none. And of

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those who are in a group, only 50 really are faction members and they are in a real minority. Ten each are in the Kan group, the Ozawa group, the Hatoyama group, the DSP group and the JSP group (Interview, Edano Yukio, 22/8/06). Essentially, Edano denies the view that members elected since 2003 join factions. These figures suggest that the factions are for the ‘old crowd’ who joined the party from another party. Thus what he denies the existence of is the Ryo– unkai and the emerging Ichi Shin Kai faction which we will discuss below, which in particular consists of the younger members of the DPJ. Ko– ri Kazuko gave a similar break-down of the factions as given by Eda Yo– ichi and interestingly added that it is difficult, ‘muzukashii’, not to be a member of a faction as a first-time Diet member (Interview, Ko– ri Kazuko, 9/8/06). Interestingly, she is in three factions which shows she is trying to keep all options open for her own career path within the party. This fits in very much with the much-discussed factions of the LDP. Faction leaders needed younger members for support in leadership elections and younger members need to be in a faction to gain guidance, information and money (Stockwin 2008: 139–140). Ogawa of Kagawa District One and Shikoku PR said that it cannot be helped, ‘shigata ga nai’, that Diet members are part of a faction (Interview, Ogawa, 15/8/06). The opposite view was expressed by Matsumoto Takeaki of Himeiji who said that he felt that they could be dangerous as they might prevent the party taking power since the party could split along factional lines (Interview, Matsumoto Takeaki, 22/8/06). This seemed more of a concern in 2006 before the 2007 DPJ victory. Tsumura of Okayama feels that there are definitely factions within the DPJ. He felt they are a natural state for the party to be in and that for them not to exist is unnatural. Their benefits are that they help good communication both upwards and downwards and they allow younger Diet members to learn ‘know how’. The bad thing about them is that they are misunderstood from outside. He said that there are very definable factions of which people are members. He declared himself to be most categorically a member of the Kan faction, despite gradually getting a reputation of being right-wing, as discussed in Chapter 6. While Maehara was leader, Kan asked Tsumura to be a ‘link’ between the two factions to maintain their relationship (Interview, Tsumura Keisuke, 31/8/07). Nagatsuma Akira (Interview, Nagatsuma Akira, 31/8/07) pointed out that it is certainly becoming more important within the DPJ to have a high level of support within one’s faction if one is to become a potential leader or Prime Minister. This is why, in the ‘ichi ni nen sei’ group, those with one or two electoral wins, over a third of the DPJ members are in the Ozawa faction: should the DPJ win a parliamentary majority, thus capturing the position of prime minister, Ozawa would have a large faction to support him. Despite this, he declares that he is not in a faction. So this is the detailed information of whether factions exist and who is known to be in which faction but we also need to analyse the broader picture of factions within the party. The LDP publish their factional details widely: the information is found in Kokkai Binran, the details are widely given out and in newspapers factional issues are widely discussed. And so comparisons can be made between the

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65

larger factions and smaller ones, analysis can be carried out about how leaderships are decided and, despite the change in the electoral system, the newly elected LDP members of the Diet on the whole join factions so that they find information, are centrally linked, have access to campaign funds and generally become integrated into the greater workings of the LDP. For the same reasons, it can be assumed that many DPJ members will also be in factions but who is in which faction and what type of person? We have managed to find data about this from two sources: one is definitely from within the party and the other is more questionable. The former is a list of House of Councillors faction members provided by Eda Satsuki’s policy secretary, Eda Yo– ichi – the only information available from within the party. The latter comes from Japanese Wikipedia. Wikipedia is without a doubt a problematic source, but its detail and apparent compatibility with other data suggest it has been supplied, installed and updated by party workers. The English version gives the exact opposite information to the Japanese version about the Liberal group we will discuss below. Nonetheless, as an early attempt to discuss the details of who is in the factions and how they exist in comparison to each other, it seems worth utilising this data which is around 70–80 per cent correct for the House of Councillors (Conversation, Eda Yo– ichi, 11/7/08). No one has offered information directly from the party for the Lower House but, of the people known, approximately 90 per cent of the Wikipedia entry is accurate which suggests in a larger view that Wikipedia may be about 70–80 per cent accurate (www.wikipedia.org – Japanese version). Before looking at the numerical data, the factions first need to be briefly introduced: •

•

•

•

Maehara/Ryo– unkai Faction: This was established in 2002 and was originally the old Sakigake people such as Maehara Seiji and Edano Yukio. It also took in the old Hosokawa Japan New Party remnants. It was originally there to support Noda Yoshihiko in the 2002 leadership election. Now he has his own small group and Ryo– unkai has become an important faction of younger Diet members. It is to the right within the party. Noda Group/Shinshin Group: A very small group based around Noda but closely linked to Ryo– unkai and even seen as virtually within it but remains independent so Noda can stand as a leader of the party and have a faction behind him. Kan Faction: This was tightened up as a faction in 2002. It meets at Kan’s house every Thursday but Eda Satsuki mainly organises it. Since he became President of the House, he is still participating in this, according to his policy secretary (Fax, Eda Yo– ichi, 5/11/08). This is one of the more left-ofcentre groups and is very concerned about the Constitution being changed in an uncontrolled manner. The Young Liberal Group: Mainly consists of those who have won elections in the 2000s so have one, two or three wins behind them. Different from the Ryo– unkai and Ichi Shin Kai young members, its views are more to the left-of-centre and it does not want the Constitution changed. Like the Ichi

66

•

•

•

• •

From old socialists to new democrats Shin Kai, it does not really have a leader. Most of its members are also from the former JSP and/or Kan groups. Former JSP Group: This includes politicians who have experience of politics from the 1980s and most were elected in the 1955 system. It is led by Yokomichi, and constitutes an important faction within the DPJ. They have one member who is female and young and is clearly attempting to establish a position for herself (Ko– ri Kazuko, as discussed above). Former DSP Group: Within the Upper House, this has a younger membership. It includes those who have worked within the private sector union organisations which, are a large force in the PR part of the electoral system, particularly in the Councillors. This can be seen in the fact that in 2007 four former Do– mei members were elected to the Upper House. Ozawa and the DSP group have always been close since the discussions over UNPKO in the 1990s (see Chapter 3). This group now has some influence and works well now with Ozawa. Hatoyama Faction: This is called ‘the Group to change who is in control of government’. Hatoyama meets the faction members in his personal office every Thursday. The difference between the two sets of data is that Wikipedia believes there is a far greater link between this and the DSP group. Once the Eda data are considered, the Hatoyama faction seems much smaller as he suggests there are hardly any House of Councillor members. Not a large faction. Hata/Old Shinshinto– /Okada Group: This includes the remaining right-ofcentre party members who have been around since Liberal Party days and also Shinshinto– . Small faction. Ichi Shin Kai: This means ‘new group’ and literally is a group which is not yet fully considered a faction. It only has younger members in it (one or two with three wins in the Lower House). It is nonetheless considered to be an Ozawa support group. It was founded in 2004 in Hakone. Wikipedia does not mention it for the Upper House and this is one of the main differences between the two sets of House of Councillor data. Eda’s explanation was that it is not yet fully perceived as a faction and that explains the lack of data on Wikipedia for this group.

Now we shall turn to look at the details of each faction and compare the data. Starting with the House of Representatives, considering that these data are from an unclear source, many things seem as if they are as they should be. The JSP faction contains the oldest members and has the longest-serving Diet members in it (Kaori Kazuko being an exception) (see Table 2.5). Almost predictably, the next eldest and experienced group are those in no faction; those in no faction can only be Diet members who have the confidence and experience not to need a faction. They are marginally followed by factions with party elders within them (Kan and Hata/Shinshinto– group) which increases the average age as this usually means the faction will have older friends and colleagues of the leader as well as some young members who join for ideological or geographical reasons. One senses that many

61.6 5.3 56.8 1.7

59.8 1.9

51 3.5 54 1.52

54.1 1.5

53.7 1.7

51 3.5 55.27 1.93

Former JSP Former DSP

52.8 1.4

53.1 3.8 56.6 1.8

Kan

53.4 1.4

50.4 2.7 51.6 1.2

Liberal

Sources: Kokkai Binran, Wikipedia and private communication with Eda Yo– ichi.

Lower House Upper House Wiki Upper House Eda

Age/Wins Average for House

48.2 2.1

44.1 2.57 46 1.44

Ryounkai

45.7 1.25

47 3.6 50 1

Noda

Table 2.5 Average age and number of electoral wins of DPJ members according to faction

52.7 1.8

52.7 3.5 54.6 1.78

Hatoyama

58.1 1.6

54.2 4.7 54.5 1.5

Hata Okada

53.2 1.1

47.8 2.1 0 0

Ichi Shin Kai

55.2 1.5

56.6 3.9 51.4 1.12

No Fac.

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From old socialists to new democrats

people join factions because they are physically close to an influential leader of the party in terms of neighbouring constituency, etc. The young ones are the Noda group which has so few members that comprison is difficult and, finally, Ryo– unkai which is the youngest. This is the influential faction including Edano, former leader Maehara and other future leaders such as Furukawa (who told me factions do not exist) and Hosono. This is clearly going to become a more important faction within the party but at the moment it sits and waits for when it will regain power – if that happens after the failure of the Maehara leadership. The major difference between the Wikipedia and Eda sets of data concerning the House of Councillors is that, on the Wikipedia data, many Upper House members were not down as being a member of any faction. Eda’s information most probably fills in this gap and some of them were members of the Ichi Shin Kai (the group backing Ozawa) which had eight Upper House members – all with one or two electoral wins only. Eda’s information suggests that the Ryo– unkai is a faction with great experience due to the high average of wins with relatively young people. Once again, this proves it is a faction with considerable experience and its future potential is important. Beyond that, the tendencies are similar to those in the Lower House. The former JSP group is the oldest, as are the old LDP, Hata and Okada groups and the no faction group. Those with the least experience are as expected the Ichi Shin Kai and those with most (nearly an average of 12 years for the Upper House) the former JSP. Should the party split in the future, which is unlikely while they are in control of the Upper House, this discussion of factions does show how the party would split. The Ozawa-backing factions Ichi Shin Kai, Hata, Noda, Ryo– unkai and maybe Hatoyama would move to the right. The former socialists, the former DSP, the Kan group and the Liberal group, along with maybe a few from Ryo– unkai, would move to the left. Another issue which is important about the relative power of factions is that, since 2007, there has been temporary calm and non-factional-based policy opposition within the party. The explanation for this is, since he has been leader, Ozawa has particularly befriended the factions furthest away from his in terms of ideological position. According to various sources, Ozawa has befriended Yokomichi. By doing this he has taken in the former JSP faction, the one furthest away from his own faction. By his befriending it, everyone else is locked in the middle of an Ozawa world and this has meant that policy division within the party has become more controlled (Interviews, Watanabe Ko– zo– , 29/8/07; Kurashige Nanae, Asahi, 30/8/07). Thus, there is wide debate upon the role and purpose of factions within the DPJ. It is possible to conclude that groups exist and some see them as being more significant than others. The factions/groups are, on the whole, divided according to the correlation of the old parties and the new younger members of the party. Of the Lower House, only 28 Diet members of the party were elected in the old electoral system before 1994. A further 35 were elected before the party became what it is today with the incorporated Liberal Party in 2003. Some 48 were

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elected in 2003 and 2005 for the first time. These seem to be the people who are ‘floaters’ and make unclear the nature of factions within the party. They have the potential to switch and gain alliances in the future but at the moment they seem to be hedging their bets and not making firm alliances, despite recognising that factions exist. Often they join multiple groups before they commit. Furthermore, this group is the most numerous and will grow with each election, so it remains to be seen, as factions were based on party formations which are increasingly an inexperienced piece of history for most DPJ Diet members, whether the current factional formation will change or whether the current leaders will continue with their historical and policy-oriented groupings and gradually bring new members to continue those opinions. It could also be that within the DPJ, unlike the LDP, it remains a normal thing for members to be in more than one faction.

Policy formation in the DPJ Miura, Lee and Weiner analysed which policies are important in the DPJ and how they compared to the LDP and other parties involved in their formation (2005: 63–74). They analysed the policies of the party between 1998 and 2003. The overall findings were that, in contrast to their policy stance being ‘ideological’ or ‘partisan’ (i.e. they oppose because they are the opposition), the DPJ tends to oppose along a ‘technical’ perspective, i.e. they may oppose the method by which the LDP has suggested for the sake of opposing, and then negotiate to bring about more of an outcome which they can agree on. They showed that opposition to the DPJ from the LDP is greatest in civil rights and national security issues but, in areas of economic policy and political reform, they were closer. Kato and Laver (2003) gave a similar opinion of DPJ policy formation and even suggested that the civil rights issue which is the most polarised area between the DPJ and LDP could cause mass party realignment in Japan. On the other hand, opposition seems to be lessening as the DPJ were most opposed to the Guidelines Law of 1999 and the Organised Crime Law of August 1999 in comparison to LDP views.18 By 2003, both parties were much closer in their strategies and attitudes (probably because of the absorption of the Ozawa group and some young politicians) and more likely to use the ‘technical’ perspective when it came to policy formation and discussion, even concerning the bills Koizumi passed about sending troops to Iraq in 2003. Miura et al. succinctly describe the situation by saying ‘the difference between the two parties appears clear – but much narrower than ever seen between the LDP and Japan’s socialists’ (2005: 72). The policies analysed by Miura et al. were from the 2003 election but the party has continued with its manifestos as they were so successful that year, with them gaining more seats than any opposition party had managed since 1955. As discussed above, this manifesto strategy began in 2003 and has continued throughout all elections to date; all published documents from the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007 elections are still viewable on the DPJ website.19 In 2007, three documents were published by the party dealing with their policy pledges: a 16-page document which had a discussion of policy content and also quite a few photos of Ozawa

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(similar versions in 2003, 2004 and 2005 exist which show photos of Kan and Okada). This is a user-friendly policy document. Beyond that but not put on the internet for posterity, there was a smaller and less detailed version of the document described above, fewer descriptions of policies and more pictures entitled ‘Minshuto– Ozawa’s Message [Makoto na seiji] wo surutameni.’ (DPJ, Ozawa’s Message, ‘To introduce real politics’). Finally, there was a full-blown manifesto with no pictures but just hardline text describing what the party would do but without sufficient economic pricing of how much each policy would cost (Sangiin Senkyo Seisaku Risuto 2007). In 2003, the first-year manifesto distribution was allowed by law, when there were only two documents: the DPJ printed 15 million copies of their user-friendly document and simultaneously printed 1.5 million of their more detailed policy document. In comparison the LDP printed 175,000 detailed and 3.5 million compact manifestos (Miura et al. 2005: 69). Despite this evidence that policy is becoming more formulated and organised within the party, there is evidence that Diet members are being encouraged to adopt a LDP strategy and set up their own ko– enkai-type structures. Ozawa has told his Diet members to lessen the importance of policy and to concentrate on campaigning in their local constituencies (Phone interview, Eda Satsuki, 3/7/06). He is pushing Diet members to form their own support groups and is encouraging them to spend as much time with members of their constituency as possible. Whereas some Diet members are entirely basing their appeal on policy-related issues, including Tsurunen Marutei as he gets his votes from the national constituency, some young Diet members seem to be adopting methods of election campaigning based on close contact with the electorate.20 This could be likened to the world Gerald Curtis described for the LDP in the 1967 House of Representatives election (Curtis 1971). Some of this could be better described as citizen politics. The forerunner of citizen politics within the DPJ is Kan Naoto whose faction follows some of these methods. Kan, who has been trying to gain votes from ordinary citizens without being dependent on labour unions since his first victory in the Double Election of 1980, can be partly seen as the trend setter of citizen politics. Yukawa Norihiko, who was the campaign manager of Kan’s first election in 1980, said that he conceptualised citizen politics through his experience in his first job on graduating from university. He and a friend launched a magazine called PIA which is a ‘what’s on’ magazine in Tokyo. Today this magazine is extremely popular and is sold weekly. Yukawa described how they spent all day walking around newsagents and asking them to take ten copies to sell. They made a point of developing good relationships with their ‘selling agents’. They targeted areas of Tokyo where people needed to find out at short notice which movies and concerts were on. Their contacts gradually snowballed and they soon managed to increase sales (Interview, Yukawa Norihiko, 31/3/01). It was through this personal relationship with their vendors that PIA became a success, and it was this strategy that Yukawa applied to ‘citizen politics’. Yukawa’s creation of a network of supporters that gradually snowballs as the idea becomes more popular is the approach that he sees is the most effective way to engender an increase in DPJ supporters. If one can get a health group, or an

From old socialists to new democrats

71

environmental group, to support the DPJ, this will bring along support. If a member of one of these groups is also connected to a Parent–Teachers Association (PTA), for example, it is likely that they could then express support for the candidate at their PTA meetings. This could then bring on new supporters who may be connected to other groups. This is the strategy that Yukawa adopted for Kan Naoto’s first campaign in 1980. In 1980, Purnendra Jain wrote an article about a new style of politics in Japan. He described Kan Naoto’s attempts to get elected, before, and during, his successful 1980 campaign. Jain described how he had been active in the student protest movement and then had organised a citizens group called Shimin no kai (Citizens Association). Shimin no kai campaigned for clean elections, the transparency of political finances and the rejection of large organisations in elections. Kan persuaded the famous feminist Ichikawa Fusae to stand as a candidate in the 1974 Upper House election and he was her campaign manager. She came second in the national constituency. Kan himself stood in four elections before he was successful. Jain describes his electoral district (Tokyo 7 during the old SNTV system and Tokyo 18 under the new system) as being difficult and time-consuming, ‘for they had to approach a large number of new voter[s] and a changing electorate during each election’ (Jain 1980). In 1977, Kan became closely involved with Eda Saburo– and consequently joined his new party, the Social Democratic League, which was formed slightly before Eda’s sudden death. He continued to fight elections, coming up with his funding through schemes such as kan kabu (shares in Kan – effectively small-scale donations of between 500 and 10,000 yen) and kampa (donations). He also placed limits on what he would spend, restricting it to one-quarter of the money permitted by law. At the time, according to Jain, $55,000 was allowed by law for a campaign in an urban area. However, at the same time there was a popular saying that in order to win a campaign 100 million yen was needed, which at the time was $333,000. Kan used 4.5 million yen (around $16,000 at the quoted exchange rate) which included the one million yen deposit that would be returned if he received the minimum required number of votes. Kan used students and housewives as volunteers. He set up the shiriai system, whereby he asked people to ask five friends to do some favour for him. They then asked five people, and, as with PIA, the campaign soon snowballed. He also asked housewives connected to the campaign to paste up five posters near their houses. This would no longer be allowed by law, but Jain says that, at the time, it was effective and was a further example of the snowballing effect of many people each performing a small task. Jain did not call these campaign attempts citizen politics, and instead labelled them ‘lively politics’, using the theme also discussed in Yukawa’s Shimin seiji no no– hau, that elections should be like festivals.21 He contrasted ‘lively politics’ to ‘high politics’ and ‘interest politics’. The former was described as being ideologically based politics, which describes the JSP, and ‘interest politics’ is the politics of protecting the interests of certain groups, which describes both the LDP and JSP. According to Jain, ‘lively politics’, ‘[which] comes into focus mainly in

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post-industrial society, is related to the quality of life, pollution, environment, welfare measures, consumer problems, protection of nature and natural resources, participation in politics and decentralisation and administration’ (1980: 19). It is in this respect that Jain probably over-emphasised his assessment of Kan. ‘Citizen politics’ or ‘lively politics’ is more pragmatic than Jain allowed his readers to believe as is the twenty-first-century strategy of Kan and his entourage. Essentially, ‘Citizen politics’, while trying to bring in citizens connected with the groups mentioned by Jain, is an attempt to maximise votes for a political party. It is also not solely about the parties responding to voters’ concerns and policy interests. But Jain in 1980 made an important point about what Kan’s activities showed about money politics in Japan and, as will be seen in Chapter 5, the political world needed to be reformed and laws to ensure more policy and less money needed to be introduced: The new kind of trend that has been set by Kan Naoto in Japanese politics might go a long way in shaping the future course of elections in which the role of money is minimised and the process is based on closer and informal relationships between the voter and their representatives. (Jain 1980: 22–23) Indeed, this change seems to be reflected within the DPJ given that the party is less dependent on unions and many candidates are working for their own support groups and ‘citizen groups’. In October 2008, Eda Satsuki described how, despite needing to give the impression to the unions that they are the most important support base for the DPJ and the citizen movement is a lesser group ‘perched’ on top of their strong base, in fact it is the other way round and the citizen support which saw its roots in the Kan group is by far the most important support group for the DPJ. Now, within the DPJ, the unions are a topping to this fundamental support at the constituency level (Discussion, Eda Satsuki, 14/10/08). Nonetheless, we do feel that the nationwide PR constituency for the Upper House still shows the importance of the unions, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 and below.

Candidate selection The DPJ have a centralised system for deciding who will be a candidate and then, after local and national consultation, candidates are supplied to districts, unless there is an obvious candidate already working within the district, in local politics, for instance. Thus, the DPJ have imported candidates into areas to which they had no existing links but, due to the fact this ideally has been done a considerable time before the election, the candidate has had time to begin the process of making contact with local supporters and unionists and generally manage to make a name for him or herself. Also, the union federation Rengo– puts up certain candidates, particularly in the Upper House national constituency. This means that a union can throw its support across the whole country for a particular candidate the union is backing. In the 2007 Upper House election, each of the seven candidates

From old socialists to new democrats

73

45 40

Percentage

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Dec 1/2 2007

Oct 13/14

Sept 15/16

July 30/31

July 14/15

June 30–July 1

June 16/17

June 2/3

May 19/20

April 14/15

Mar 10/11

Jan 20/21

Nov 11/12 2006

Sept 21/22

Aug 26/27

July 22/23

May 20/21

Mar 18/19

0

Date LDP

DPJ

Figure 2.1 Asahi public opinion poll levels for the LDP and DPJ, March 2006–December 2007. Source: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org.

which Rengo– put forward within the national constituency won and, furthermore, took the first and second positions, and all seven were within the top 11. This process includes interviewing potential candidates and checking their views, but also assessing such things as their television performance. The process for applying to be a candidate for the DPJ is still not as simple as this explanation suggests. There is no mention on the extensive website of how to begin the process of applying to become a candidate and this rather suggests that many candidates are still people who are ‘in the know’ and are taken from within their constituency.

Ozawa as leader of the DPJ and the 2007 election The 2007 Councillors election was originally scheduled to be a week earlier than it actually was. It was put back as the LDP were trying to get the revisions for the National Public Service Law to solve the problems of retired civil servants moving to high-ranking and influential private sector amakudari jobs through the Diet. They also wanted the minimum wage bill and some other labour-related laws to pass the Diet (Japan Times, 17/6/07). This greatly irritated the DPJ as they could see their support rising, as can be seen in Figure 2.1. They did not want the possibility of this support dropping by the time of the election. This suggests how precarious and unpredictable their eventual victory was and how it was far from a guaranteed outcome.

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From old socialists to new democrats

The LDP had had a very bad time in the few months prior to the election. They had seen the resignation of two cabinet ministers: Yanagisawa for calling women baby-making machines (Japan T imes, 28/1/07) and Matsuoka Toshikatsu for implausible explanations for his expense account (Japan T imes, 8/3/07). Following further allegations and supposed involvement in a bid-rigging scandal, he committed suicide on 28 May (Japan Times, 29/5/07). This was followed by an announcement which affected normal citizens very much. In an ageing society, it was announced that pension money had been lost and not credited to accounts. This story was initially given to the media by the DPJ (Japan Times, 9/6/07). This meant that the LDP suffered a period of unpopularity which was exacerbated by the right-wing views of the Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo– , who openly expressed his desire to change the Constitution. The victory of 60 Upper House seats compared to the LDP’s 37 meant that the DPJ took control of the house away from the LDP, for the first time since 1955. Eda Satsuki was made President of the House, again the first time for an ‘opposition’ member. But did the DPJ win this election positively or did they win it by default? The 2007 epic result for the DPJ was more down to the failures of the LDP. In opinion polls that were administered on the 30th and 31st of July after the result, opinion was varied as to why the LDP lost (44 per cent thinking the pension issue, 12 per cent income disparity, 38 per cent cabinet minister scandals). Nonetheless, the key factor does seem to be the next question, which was: why did people think the DPJ won? Some 9 per cent thought their policies appealing, 4 per cent thought Ozawa was appealing as the leader and 81 per cent thought they had won because of the problems of the LDP (Asahi, 2/8/07). As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the high levels of support in the Asahi for the DPJ was very limited in time and was restricted between the beginning of July and August. Thus, it may be argued that the party is not as successful as the control of the Upper House suggests. This was almost a freak occurrence and, unfortunately, the DPJ needs to realise this and not presume it was a big turning point of support for their party. Nonetheless, despite these rather pessimistic findings, there does seem to have been a coherent view expressed during interviews about how the party would manage these problems that it is facing. Despite the odd voice of fears of the party splitting, the majority of Diet members and party activists who, when questioned about whether the party would split, all agree that it would not. The simple logic for this is that the party would not benefit from such an outcome so, despite all of the problems it is facing, there seems to be a strong consensus that the party will stay together. The Asahi adamantly declared that the DPJ has finally learnt to use the media better in 2007 as compared to bad experiences in 2003 and 2005.22 Have we seen in the past 18 years the DPJ become something the JSP could never be – a strong party capable of taking over government – or have these two decades just been a state of heavy flux which will engender the same old outcome? It therefore will be interesting to see how the party manages the problems discussed above and whether they will be able to become a party with any potential of forming a government or remain, as Peter Mair describes, a party unable to be a ‘natural’ alternative government (Mair 1997: 50).

3

The Constitution and its importance to the decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the unity of the Democratic Party of Japan

Introduction As has been seen in Chapter 1, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) lost much of its support during the 1990s. Support began to drop in the early 1990s after the First Gulf War and the hopes of the 1989 victories of the party began to subside. Support then dropped incrementally before ‘bottoming out’ in early 1996 before the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was formed. This drop in support was not confined to the JSP, as there was a general decline in support across the whole political spectrum, but, proportionately, the drop in support for the JSP was particularly large. In this chapter, we shall consider why the JSP lost support, by concentrating on the ideological basis of the party. We shall then assess how the DPJ has taken on this mantle of ideology and examine how it is coping with these issues as a party of disparate groups and differing views. But first, we must quickly establish what the problem is, which can be broadly defined as being based on the Constitution that divides parties so much in Japan. The JSP had been associated with a strict ideological Marxist stance from its formation until virtually its demise, although reforms in 1986 were of a social– democratic character. Issues such as pacifism, defence and the restraints of the 1947 ‘Peace Constitution’ were the focal point of its ideological platform. In effect, socialist thought was interwoven with pacifism to create an ideology for the JSP which was inflexible and dogmatic. After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the Occupation Forces attempted to democratise and stabilise Japan. One of the fundamental principles of the reforms was to prevent a repetition of the military action and fascism which had dominated Japan since the 1930s and which had been regarded as the cause of the Pacific War. The Constitution was thus introduced to give human rights to the Japanese public, to turn them into citizens instead of subjects, and to constrain the Japanese military policy of aggrandisement along the lines of their attempt to take over Asia prior to and during the Pacific War.1 Although the Emperor was acknowledged as the symbol of the state and the unity of the people, he was stripped of any power. A bicameral legislature was established, and with the exception of the Imperial family, all rights of

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peerage were abolished. Other articles dealt with ‘basic human liberties’, including universal adult suffrage, labour’s right to organize, and a host of marriage and property rights for women. The most striking and one of the most important and controversial provisions came in the Preamble and Article Nine, which outlawed the creation of armed forces and the right to make war. It is not clear whether the ‘No-war clause’ originated with General MacArthur or from discussions with the Prime Minster Shidehara Kiju– ro– , but it certainly would not have been included without MacArthur’s consent, and its presence in the Constitution has had a defining impact on Japan’s post-war history. The Preamble states: We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. Article Nine states: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Nonetheless, as Hook and McCormack state, the Constitution created problems from the beginning (2001: 13). The Japanese became concerned about the restrictions that the Constitution placed upon them, while the USA began to realise that it curtailed Japanese involvement in the Cold War. Both Japanese and Americans began to find ways of working around the limitations of the Constitution. In 1954, the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were created, originating from a National Police Reserve, and were intended to be able to defend Japan in case of an attack. In 1951, the Japan–US Security Treaty was passed which committed Japan and the United States to a mutual defence agreement. The United States would defend Japan in return for land to create US military bases in the Japanese archipelago. Consequently, all of the above issues lined up those who believed Japan should be in control of its own sovereignty (pro-revision of the Constitution, expansion of the SDF and the Japan–US Security Treaty) against the pacifists who believed the Constitution was not to be tampered with, the SDF were unconstitutional, and the Japan–US Security Treaty would bring Japan into Cold War conflicts.

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This chapter will examine how this debate impacted upon politics under the 1955 system and beyond. During this period, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted to (and continue to want to) reform the Constitution to do away with the pacifist clauses, and it is likely that it would have done so during the 1955 system had it ever managed to get the necessary two-thirds majority in the Diet.2 In contrast, the Japanese left’s raison d’être became the preservation of this Constitution. It was these two forces pulling in opposite directions which became the most important political cleavage of the 1955 system.3 Since the end of the Cold War, the Constitution has become even more of a major focus of Japanese politics. Thus, in this chapter we will examine this focal point of Japanese politics, the ‘cultural cleavage’ as defined by Watanuki Jo– ji (1977: 92–98). We will first examine how the JSP embedded the Constitution as the linchpin of its ideological platform, what the reform of the Constitution implied to the party and why it took the measures it did to protect the Constitution. We shall then look at the post-Cold War era, when the norms of the 1955 system began to break down, and the relevance of the Constitution once again began to be debated. We shall analyse the First Gulf War as the catalyst of this renewed questioning. Finally, we shall turn to how the DPJ has dealt with the issue of Constitutional reform and managed its factional differences. Next, utilising public opinion polls, we will examine what the ideals of the Constitution meant to the Japanese public. Were they more supportive of the JSP position or LDP position? Did they support change over time? What effects did the debate about defence and the Constitution after the First Gulf War have on public opinion? Did the JSP gain or lose support because of that ideological stance? Was the party justified in maintaining its ideological dogma or would it have gained by becoming more flexible? We will argue that the decline of the JSP was partly due to the loss of two separate groups of supporters. The moderate supporters abandoned the party in the early 1990s because they felt that the party had failed in dealing with the crisis of the First Gulf War. The hard-line policies of pacifism at all costs and the determination not to allow the Self-Defence Forces to have either a legal status or an international role began to be questioned by moderate supporters who could see that Japan needed to exert more influence on the world stage. It is shown in the drop of nearly 50 per cent of the JSP’s seats in the 1993 Lower House election. In 1994, when the JSP joined Sakigake and the LDP in a coalition government, a new problem emerged. The JSP now was in power with its arch-rival and consequently adjusted its policies in line with this. The abandonment of traditional JSP values in order to gain power caused the loss of hard-line supporters who had remained loyal throughout the peace-keeping debate. Finally, we shall show the impact that the Constitution has had on the Democratic Party of Japan. Due to its composition from various parties, the DPJ was initially divided on the issue of the Constitution and was reluctant to articulate a new policy for fear of causing a drop in support similar to that of the JSP. Similarly, it feared that, by defining a policy and upsetting some members, the party would split into the groups from which it was founded. But in the mid-2000s

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the DPJ seems to have settled on one policy which we will discuss. While differences within the party still exist without doubt, the party has managed under Ozawa Ichiro– to express ‘one voice’ on this defining issue.

What was the Japan Socialist Party’s role in the 1955 system? How was its role connected to its ideology? What was the traditional ideology of the party? The JSP have often been referred to in Japanese as the ‘mannen yato– ’ (opposition for ten thousand years). Since its creation in 1955, until 1993 when it joined the non-LDP coalition government, the party did not participate in the formation of a government. Nonetheless, Stockwin has discussed the party as being effective as ‘a powerful brake on the ambitions for change manifest among members of the political right’ (2000: 209) and as such had a role to play in the 1955 system. Therefore, in order to understand the events that happened in the 1990s with the decline of the party, we shall first examine the JSP’s policy preferences throughout the 1955 system. Some JSP policy formation during this time was developed in reaction to the policies of the LDP rather than through any attempt of its own to formulate new ideas. Its policies were strongly against the Ministry of Education’s strong control over the curriculum and the centralisation of education (with this LDP tendency continuing until the present with its attempts to push for textbook reform and the inclusion of comprehensive accounts of Japanese aggression during the Second World War, for example).4 It was also against the exclusion of labour unions from central decision-making (and generally against the centralised nature of the Japanese state), anti-labour legislation and in particular the public sector’s lack of the right to strike. In recent years, these policy preferences have been expanded to include cheap and comprehensive health care for the elderly and an opposition to the consumption tax which the LDP introduced in 1989 as a means of solving the problem of financial demands upon the ageing population. The JSP’s policy was created out of a rhetoric based on Marxism. Stockwin has pointed out that it was unlikely in the 1950s and 1960s that those who voted for the party did so through much sympathy for its Marxist feelings. Rather, they did so to support its championing of democratic and pacifist reforms, which the Occupation Forces had originally introduced before there had been any conservative reaction against them (Stockwin 2000: 212). The JSP’s main policy preferences, however, were concerned with defence and security. It repeatedly inveighed against rearmament, and the SDF, which it considered defied the Constitution. It was highly critical of the posturing of Japan on the US-led, anti-communist side in the Cold War. The irony of this is that, while it felt that Japan should repudiate the Japan–US Security Treaty owing to the position that Japan was being forced into, it still fervently sanctioned the Constitution, which, while maybe not written directly by the USA, had a strong Occupation influence. The LDP, a conservative party, was in the unusual position for a government party of being the proponent of radical change to a Constitution,

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whereas the Socialist (and Communist) opposition was a conservative force (Hook and McCormack 2001: 15). In order to push forward its preferences, the JSP adopted some disruptive tactics to prevent what it saw as controversial legislation. These tactics included boycotts of both Diet sessions and committees, various methods of filibustering, and such attempts as in May 1960 when it tried to physically prevent the passage of the Japan–US Security Treaty by preventing the President from putting the motion to a vote. It justified these as attempts to prevent the dangerous reactionary changes which the LDP were trying to enact. Former JSP Chairman Ishibashi Masashi took the position that the JSP were justified in this because democracy in Japan had not fully taken root and therefore it could not rely upon institutions. He maintained that the successes in not increasing military spending and build-up prior to the 1990s were due to their party’s constant successful resistance. Otake Hideo referred to this as ‘advancement of policy without debate’ as the LDP was afraid of interruptions of the Diet and acquiesced to the JSP (quoted in Keddell 1992: 23). In Nihon seiji no kiki (The Crisis of Japanese Politics), Yamaguchi Jiro– divided twentieth-century Japanese politics into three eras (Yamaguchi 1999). First, prewar politics represents the values of military aggrandisement and aggression and in an immediate post-war context represented those who wanted to reform the Constitution to do away with the restrictions of the Preamble and Article Nine. In the immediate post-war period, these forces were outweighed by the strength of the post-atomic bomb generation. This value was embedded in the exhaustion and disillusionment many Japanese felt because of the war. This anti-war feeling was symbolised by the atomic bombs, as many Japanese felt singularly victimised by the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, the post-nuclear war position was the opposite force to those who wanted to restore pre-war values, particularly to the Constitution. These two forces continued in equal strength until the riots over the ratification of the 1960s Japan–US Mutual Security Treaty which engulfed Tokyo in May 1960. While the treaty was ratified against the wishes of the millions of citizens demonstrating, it became apparent that there needed to be something else which would unite the country.5 Thus, in the 1960s, the LDP under Prime Minister Ikeda introduced its ‘income doubling’ policies, which would eventually become its most famous policy and would unite the Japanese electorate around less divisive issues than the Constitution. This compromise, to which he refers as post-war politics, continued until the 1990s, when it began to decline with the emergence of a younger generation of politicians such as Ozawa Ichiro– . It was at this point that Japanese politics began to decline to the current state of ‘crisis’. Yamaguchi was writing in 1999, the year of the ratification of the Guidelines Treaty and the legalisation of the Japanese National Anthem and Flag. He believes that these developments happened because mainstream politicians no longer remembered the war, which was the levelling factor in the pre-war and post-atomic politics balance. Yamaguchi concludes that, in the 1990s, Japanese politicians had shifted irrevocably in their attitudes to symbols of defence and peace and this therefore has implications for the Constitution. It is these changes

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that have been of central importance to the decline of the JSP and the changes in electoral support for left-wing parties. We shall now examine what these changes imply for the different political parties.

What does Constitutional reform imply for different parties? The views of the different political parties regarding the constitutional debate indicate the complexity of the problem of the Constitution and its reform.The following three extracts were taken from the Asahi Shinbun, July 1999, and represent leaders from the LDP, the JSP and the DPJ (Odawara 2000: 17–22, for translation). This period has been adopted because it is before the Constitution Review Committee began in 2000 so shows the fundamental core views of each party. The comments by Nakasone Yasuhiro represent the views of the LDP and express the kaiken viewpoint – reform of the Constitution. So Japan is finally entering an era in which people can openly discuss the Constitution. Unlike the previous Constitution research commission (established within the Cabinet in 1956 [without the participation of the Socialists and other opposition parties]), the new commissions have been approved not just by the LDP but with the cooperation of the other leading parties as well. That in itself represents significant progress. Supporters of the commissions make up the vast majority of the Diet. The term ronken is being used, as opposed to kaiken, because discussion will not be conducted on the a priori assumption of revision. This sets the foundations in place for a national debate on the Constitution … It is my hope that the Constitution research commissions will ignite nationwide discussion. Public forums of various kinds should be held throughout the country, on, for example, a vocational basis and by region. (Nakasone Yasuhiro) The comments by Doi Takako were made as party leader for the second time during the late 1990s but could equally summarise the position of the JSP in the 1970s, the 1980s and the twenty-first century (but would not describe its conciliatory attitudes when the JSP was in coalition with the LDP in the mid-1990s). These comments represent the go– ken position – maintenance of the status quo Constitution at all costs: Reading the legislation, I still cannot understand at all the purpose of setting up the Constitution research commissions. The Diet Law must not be changed simply to establish organizations of such nebulous purpose. To those who consider constitutional discussion necessary, I would ask: Why not discuss the Constitution in the existing relevant standing committees? I have discussed the relationship between the Constitution’s Article 9 and selfdefence capabilities in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I find it very odd that those who have previously refrained from such discussion are now suddenly very enthusiastic supporters of the Constitution research commissions.

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Those who slight the existing Constitution or interpret its provisions loosely are incapable of establishing a better Constitution. What revision advocates really contrive to do is to change Article 9. Supporters of the ‘constitutional debate’ are playing right into their hands. Revision in undesirable directions must not be allowed. The LDP, Liberal Party and New Ko– meito– represent an overwhelming majority within the Diet, so I would rather place more emphasis on proceedings outside the Diet. Together with scholars and experts, I want to make specific proposals about what must be done within the scope of the present Constitution in terms of education, welfare and various other fields. I intend to take the offensive in protecting the Constitution. (Doi Takako) Finally, the comments by Kan Naoto represent a new force in the Constitutional debate which emerged in the late 1990s. This position is that of ronken, or discussion of the Constitution, with an acknowledgement that, while the Constitution does not have to be reformed, it might be considered to be an improvement if it were. This position will be discussed in more detail below. While the DPJ’s position was not completely formed until the 2000s as will be discussed below, its fundamental aims will be mentioned here so that it can be compared with the LDP and its ‘predecessor’, the JSP: Discussion in the Diet of whether the Constitution is appropriate for today’s Japan and what parts of it, if any, are inadequate should be encouraged. Security issues, including the question of whether Japan should participate in United Nations peacekeeping forces, should be studied not just in the context of Article 9 but in view of the ideals expressed in the Preamble. Rights of ownership, environmental rights, information disclosure and assistance to private education will be important topics. But I believe discussion that assumes revision of the Constitution is going too far. And debate of the Constitution in the Diet is not enough. It should unfold in all walks of Japanese life – academia, the press and in the political parties … Even if it becomes necessary to revise the Constitution, doing so would make no sense if the people do not consider the Constitution on their own initiative. Japan’s Constitution has never been revised. Popular sovereignty means that the Constitution can be amended if the people judge it necessary. Some fear that amendment could change the Constitution’s framework. In my view, however, it is a strong point of democracy that the Constitution can be changed by democratic consensus. (Kan Naoto) Nakasone represents the more right-wing view of the LDP. Quite interestingly though, what he is advocating here is good quality debate in the commission which was due to start, rather than automatic change. It is Nakasone’s concern

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that all the Japanese public are consulted. No doubt he wanted change to happen and previously since has been quoted talking about the need for Constitutional reform, but Nakasone’s sole concern here is that it should be debated. In contrast to this, the Socialists under Doi did not and still do not want any discussion of the Constitution. Finally, the DPJ, as we will discuss below, was inclined to be permissive on discussion of the Constitution but did not want to see it happening without considerable thought and due process. We shall now turn to a more detailed analysis of the early 1990s which, as Yamaguchi describes, was the turning point in this new discussion of the Constitution.

The late 1980s – the beginning of the end of the 1955 System? JSP victory in the midst of ideological debate and the end of the Cold War The late 1980s were a period of turmoil for the JSP. Unprecedented success masked the party’s decline. In 1986, Doi Takako took over as party leader, becoming the first female leader of a political party in Japan. It brought the party much support, both from traditional supporters and from the non-aligned voter. It also deprived the LDP of a majority of seats in an Upper House election for the first time in the 1955 system.6 But as described in Chapter 2, this victory was a result of a coming-together of various other factors as well. At the time, much was made of this unprecedented success of the party, and some believed that this would finally be the time when a JSP government would take over from the LDP. But this was wishful thinking for two reasons. First, the political cleavage of Japanese politics was about to be questioned as the Cold War began to end with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Second, the victory of the 1989 Upper House election lulled the JSP into a false sense of security which stalled any reform attempts. Both of these were to have a huge impact upon the party. The end of the Cold War had two effects. Hook and McCormack have described the 1955 system as the ‘domestic cold war political system of single party LDP rule’ (2001: 30). Therefore, according to them, the confrontation of security and ideology which had existed within the 1955 system collapsed. The decline of the Cold War meant that old allegiances of Soviet support from the JSP and US support from the LDP declined and the raison d’être of the traditional policy of opposing everything the LDP stood for became less defined and concrete. The secondary importance of the end of the Cold War and its impact on the Japan–US Security Treaty was the decline of the threat of nuclear war. To the JSP, which used the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as one of the main pillars justifying its policies, nuclear war was of great concern and something it feared because of the Security Treaty. The end of the Cold War meant that this threat was no longer as immediate, so a pillar of its platform had been lost. The other turning point was the Upper House election in 1989. The JSP enjoyed unprecedented support and, had it reformed the party at this stage, it is possible that this support would have continued, or would not have declined as

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much as it did. Instead it wallowed in its new feeling of success and failed to heed the warnings of the early 1980s. Doi had said that the party needed to reform when she had become party leader in 1986 (Stockwin 1994: 21–34) but, by 1989, nothing had been done. Instead, according to Kubo Wataru, the party’s secretary general at the time, 1989 lulled the party into a false sense of security. He said: At that time, they should have jumped at forming a new political force. Instead, according to the JSP, that victory was seen as a victory of the JSP. In fact, it was a victory of the real power of the unions and the anti-LDP force. (Author’s own translation, Kubo 1998: 172–173) So the malaise of the JSP continued. In 1991, it lost support because of the Tokyo Governor election and also fared badly in the local elections.7 But a far larger shock emerged for the party which would challenge its entire attitude to peace, defence and these fundamentals of the Constitution.

The First Gulf War as a catalyst – the end of incremental change There are two contrasting works on defence policy in Japan which are of interest when analysing the events of the First Gulf War and how this affected the JSP. Kent Calder in his book Crisis and Compensation (1988) has said that Japan needed the external pressure of a crisis in order to change its defence policy. In contrast to this, Joseph Keddell believes that defence policy changes incrementally in response to events which are not necessarily crises (Keddell 1992). Both views seem to be pertinent when it comes to Japan in this period. The First Gulf War changed Japanese defence policy radically between 1990 and 1992. It initiated a debate which continued well beyond 1992 when the UNPKO Bill was finally passed. This was the Bill which allowed Japan to send SDF troops abroad on United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations. From the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and throughout the period of fighting, the Japanese were unable to define a response despite suffering increasing pressure from the USA. This crisis was widely debated in Japan and effected a change in public opinion. But, as will be seen below in the public opinion polls, it is apparent that some change had already occurred prior to the 1990s, especially since the Nakasone neo-conservatism of the 1980s, and therefore Keddell’s incremental theory also seems to be a valid explanation. When it comes to the public’s support of the JSP, these two views of crisis and incrementalism also have validity. As will be seen in the public opinion polls below, the JSP had been suffering from declining support from the 1970s onwards. Public support declined for the party incrementally, yet it was the crisis of the First Gulf War which dealt a larger blow to its traditional ideology and the public’s perception of it. The First Gulf War deeply shocked Japan. Its impact on the JSP as an individual party, and upon the government as a whole, is summarised by Courtney Purrington:

84

The Constitution and its importance The crisis served as the catalyst for an emerging consensus that Japan must play a more proactive political role in international affairs, commensurate to its international economic power, and also remedied the ‘allergy’ of the Japanese people and opposition parties to military matters. In addition to sweeping changes in public attitudes concerning what role Japan should play in international affairs, the crisis also had an impact on Japan’s domestic political system, serving as an impetus for renewed government attempts at administrative and political reform, and even policy reform within the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). (1992: 162)

The implications of the First Gulf War dawned slowly on Japan. Funabashi Yo– ichi describes how, after the initial shock of rescuing Japanese nationals in the area, the Japanese were shocked by the increasing pressure put upon them by the USA to supply funds to support the war. Funabashi used the analogy of Japan being an automatic teller machine which needed a kick before dispensing the cash (Funabashi 1991/92: 58). After the UN resolution for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait was approved by an overwhelming majority of nations, Japan at the very beginning offered $100 million as a contribution to the multinational forces and those allied countries suffering from the crisis in the Middle East. This pledge gradually increased to $13 billion after pressure from the USA. Meanwhile, on the domestic stage, the debate about what influence the Japanese Constitution and the Japan–US Security Treaty would have on Japan’s expected contribution to the war began. In August and September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a United Nations Peace Co-Operation Bill (UNPCO) which attempted to make non-military contributions to the multinational forces and not to send the Self-Defence Forces to the Middle East. However, LDP leaders were being lobbied by the US ambassador, Michael Armacost, to do more, so the first draft of this bill was revised to incorporate more forward-looking policies which effectively meant the deployment of the SDF at the call of the USA. The LDP did not handle the passage of the bill well. Internal division within the LDP complicated the matter and this was combined with large-scale public disapproval. While Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki was in the Middle East, Ozawa Ichiro– , then LDP Secretary General, opted to include the use of the SDF in the UNPCO, which he knew Kaifu, who was on the left of the party, would oppose (Shu–kan Bunshun, 9/11/90). Once Kaifu returned from his trip, Ozawa threatened to resign if the use of the SDF was taken out of the bill (Shu–kan Yomiuri, 4/11/90). The debate on the bill was fierce and two-thirds of the nation opposed it. Media opposition to the UNPCO bill also helped kill it. The Asahi Shinbun and the Nihon Keizai Shinbun both called for the bill to be scrapped. The Yomiuri Shinbun had only hinted that it wanted the bill to be passed, and even opposition to the bill from within the LDP began to mount (Japan Times Weekly, 12/11/90). The government eventually backed down from the bill in late autumn 1990 since it was unable to get opposition support. This failure was greeted with approval; the headline of the Japan Times said, ‘After Round One of the UN Peace Co-operation Bill debate,

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the score stands at Japanese Democracy 1, LDP 0’ (Japan Times Weekly, 19/11/ 90). The LDP, however, also saw this as a success because not only did it educate the public about the need to make a contribution, but it also showed the USA that Japan was making an effort. Before the beginning of the bombing of Iraq on 17 January 1991, the Japanese believed that peace would prevail. Thus, again, the country was shocked, and its response was again very reactive instead of proactive, though it was faster than the previous response. After lobbying from the USA, Japan pledged a further $9 billion to the USA. It also announced that the SDF aircraft would be sent to transport refugees. The government managed to make this gesture by referring to an administrative directive that enabled SDF aircraft to be sent abroad to collect overseas dignitaries, and the cabinet extended this to refugees.8 The government needed Diet approval for the financial contributions as it had to issue new bonds and legislate new taxation to pay its contribution. This was particularly difficult for the LDP as it had to cooperate with the opposition to get a majority to pass the bill. Eventually it managed to agree with Ko– meito– not to increase taxes on tobacco (which had been one of the suggestions for raising the $9 billion) and to cut the defence budget slightly in return for support in passing the bill. The supplementary budget bill enabling the $9 billion contribution was passed in the Diet on 6 March 1991. The end result of this was that each man, woman and child was taxed 5,000 yen by the government to pay for the conflict. Furthermore, the problem of whether this piece of legislation had gone beyond the confines of the Constitution remained a disputed and controversial point. In June 1992, this issue was finally part-resolved with the passing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Bill (UNPKO). This, however, was not without its limitations and Japan could participate in UN-sponsored peace-keeping operations only so long as five conditions were adhered to. These were: • • • • •

the parties in the armed conflict have agreed to a cease-fire; the parties in the armed conflict and host countries have given consent to the deployment of the operation and to Japan’s participation in the operation; the operation must ensure strict impartiality; the Japanese contingent must withdraw should any of the above requirements cease to be satisfied; and the use of weapons is limited to the minimum amount necessary to protect the personnel’s lives. (Itoh 1995: 285–286)

Keddell analysed why the UNPKO Bill was able to be passed. The LDP was very careful in its handling of the non-JSP opposition parties as it realised that, without their support in the Upper House, it would not get the bill passed. Consequently, the LDP managed Diet affairs well and allowed the second longest committee hearing of 100 hours. The First Gulf War, however, was a disaster for the JSP both in terms of public approval of the way in which it dealt with the crisis and also because its main

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shibboleth began to be questioned. It criticised the decisions that were being made without thinking of the problem within the context of what Japan needed to do (Hook 1995: 93).

Public opinion, 1988–93 We will now turn to an examination of public opinion, both of public opinion polls of support for the JSP and public opinion polls carried out by newspapers, press agencies and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) on defence issues, and of reasons why the public supported the JSP. We believe that public opinion polls will help explain the drop in support for the JSP shown in Chapter 1. In particular, public opinion polls show sudden drops in support at certain times (First Gulf War, the 1993 Lower House election, and Murayama’s abandonment of traditional JSP policy in July–September 1994 and in early 1996 when Murayama resigned as Prime Minister). The steady changes over time concerning defence policy suggest that Keddell is correct when he talks about incremental change in Japanese defence policy and JSP support. But there are also some ‘catalytic events’ such as the 1989 anti-LDP election in the Upper House, the First Gulf War, the 1993 political upheaval and the Murayama government which seemed to have influenced the public’s support for the JSP. Hook has neatly described the difficulties that the Japanese electorate has faced when responding to government defence policy. It has had contradictory experiences of both militarism and pacifism and this has meant that the public have had to respond to a range of defence and security policies (Hook 1995: 100). Hook and McCormack have also said that the Japanese public resigned themselves to these shifts and consequently accept both the pacifism of Article Nine and that Japan needs to make a global contribution (2001: 14). In the following tables, evidence from public opinion polls on defence and peace are presented. These polls are a representative sample of polls published in the annual Prime Minister’s Office collection of statistically significant polls.9 All of the polls quoted in this chapter supplied the respondents with closed questions, giving possible answers from which the person could choose a response. This type of questioning will generate a response which will not fully represent public opinion but will allow patterns to emerge over time as polling organisations repeat questions every month, quarter or year. Polls were carried out most frequently during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, when there was a sense of crisis about defence issues. At other times polls were far fewer. Is Japan’s contribution sufficient? Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show public opinions about Japan’s peace and security roles in the 1970s and 1980s. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we can observe a shift in the public’s perception of Japan’s role in UN activities. Whereas in 1979 63.2 per cent thought that Japan was making some contribution, by 1983 this had declined to 40.4 per cent. More

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Table 3.1 What do you think about Japan’s contribution to world peace and security within a context of UN activities? (August 1979) PM’s Office, Diplomacy Survey, August 1979 replies

(%)

Contributing sufficiently Making some contribution Not really contributing Not contributing at all Don’t understand

10.7 52.5 15.1 0.6 21

Table 3.2 What do you think about Japan’s contribution to world peace and security within a context of UN activities? (June 1983) PMO, June 1983 replies

(%)

Contributing sufficiently Making some contribution Not really contributing Not contributing at all Don’t understand

2.3 38.1 35.4 2.8 21.4

Table 3.3 What should happen to the SDF? Asahi, November 1983 replies

(%)

Enlarge and strengthen them Maintain the status quo Reduce its size and strength Abolish them Don’t know

10 60 19 5 6

importantly, the ‘not really contributing’ group rose from 15.1 per cent to 35.4 per cent. This represents a significant shift in public attitude, without any real international or domestic crisis to impact on defence policy issues. Self-Defence Forces, PKO and Constitutional questions When it comes to Constitutional questions and the concomitant issues of the SelfDefence Forces and the PKO Bill, in Tables 3.3–3.10 the fundamental impression given is the increase of flexibility by the public and the ability to tolerate changes from the status quo. Some of the explanation for this change has to be that the public responded to catalyst events. In 1983, 60 per cent of the public thought in the Asahi that the SDF should neither be enlarged nor reduced in strength (Table 3.3). In 1982, over 51 per cent of the public did not know where they stood on the question of the constitutionality

Table 3.4 Do you think the SDF are unconstitutional? Mainichi, April 1982 replies

(%)

Unconstitutional Constitutional I cannot say which

20 29 51

Table 3.5 Do you support Article Nine? Mainichi, April 1982 replies

(%)

Support it Do not support it Don’t know

70 25 5

Table 3.6 Do you agree that the current Constitution needs to be reformed? Asahi, May 1983 replies

(%)

Agree Oppose Don’t know Of those who agree, why do you agree? The content is not in line with current times We must recognise people’s freedom and rights We are being pushed around by America In order to rearm To strengthen the position of the Emperor Can’t answer Of those who disagree, why do you disagree?1 Because it is useful to Japan’s peace Because it is recognised by the public Because it values freedoms and rights Because it is a constitution revered around the world Because it is useful to economic growth Cannot answer

28 45 27 15 5 3 1 1 3 16 12 10 4 1 2

Table 3.7 What do you think about the SDF going abroad? Yomiuri, September 1991 replies

(%)

They should go without limits There is no need for them to go The current level is good Cannot answer

30.4 23.9 40.7 5

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Table 3.8 Do you support the PKO Bill? Asahi, April 1992 replies

(%)

Yes No Don’t know

47 41 12

Table 3.9 In order to support UN activities, and for the SDF to go abroad, is there a problem with the Constitution? Asahi, July 1992 replies

(%)

There is a problem There is no problem Don’t know

58 26 16

Table 3.10 Do you agree that the SDF should make an international contribution? Yomiuri, September 1992 replies

(%)

I agree I tend to agree I tend to disagree Disagree Cannot answer

26.6 27.7 23.6 16.9 5.3

of the SDF (Table 3.4) and 70 per cent supported Article Nine (Table 3.5). Table 3.6 summarises the 1980s position on the Constitution well. Some 28 per cent of the public supported its reform, whereas 45 per cent opposed it. In contrast, after the First Gulf War crisis, public opinion clearly shifts. Table 3.10 shows a majority in favour of the SDF making an international contribution, Table 3.8 in 1992 shows strong support for the PKO Bill and, while the public still recognise the controversial position of the SDF vis-à-vis the Constitution (Table 3.9), they realise that Japan’s international responsibilities require overseas deployment (Tables 3.7 and 3.10). Keddell’s argument of incrementalism seems to be corroborated by these data: the public seems to have changed its opinion between the early 1980s and 1990s and realised that Japan needed to contribute more to international security but the crisis of the First Gulf War certainly contributed to this. Support for the JSP We shall now turn to analysis of the changes in public opinion support for the JSP during the same period and will ask whether the incremental change in defence attitudes shown above are reflected in changes in attitude towards the JSP which, as seen above, ardently supported the Constitution and opposed the Japanese contribution to the First Gulf War and the UNPKO.

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Table 3.11 To JSP supporters, why do you support the party? Yomiuri, April 1985 replies (Multiple answers have been given)

(%)

Because I support its policies Because my workplace and affiliated groups support it Because it is the main opposition party Because talented people are gathered in it Because it solves problems close to my heart Because I support Chairman Ishibashi I have a feeling for it Because I dislike the LDP Don’t know, other

18.5 46.9 17.7 4.4 14.8 6.3 17 30.6 6.6

Table 3.12 Why did the JSP do well in the 1989 Upper House election? Yomiuri, August 1989 replies

(%)

The appeal of Doi An expression of anti-consumption tax sentiment The amount of women candidates The anti-LDP mood The new image of the JSP No real reason, don’t know, other

15.7 37.3 3.2 35 3.9 4.8

Tables 3.11 and 3.12 summarise the position that the JSP was in before the First Gulf War. In 1985, 18.5 per cent of respondents supported the JSP because they liked the party, 6.3 per cent liked Ishibashi and 14.8 per cent felt that the party solved problems ‘close to their heart’. In contrast, the overwhelming majority expressed support because they had been mobilised at work (46.9 per cent – this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) and over 30 per cent only supported the party because of dislike for the LDP. When analysing in Table 3.12 why the JSP did well in 1989, again many of the responses are as a result of the antiLDP sentiment; 37.3 per cent supported the party because they opposed the consumption tax and 35 per cent supported them simply because they were anti-LDP. By 1990 (Table 3.13) the JSP’s support was dropping significantly. Those who supported it because it opposed the consumption tax fell from 37.3 per cent to 21.7 per cent. By 1990, in comparison to 1989, there even seems to have been a shift in the ‘anti-vote’ for the JSP. Whereas in 1989 35 per cent supported the JSP because they did not like the LDP, only 10.2 per cent said this in 1990. The LDP had managed to overcome its problems of 1989 which were a result of the introduction of the consumption tax and the import of rice products as discussed in Chapter 2 and this meant that the ‘boom’ of anti-LDP support, which the JSP benefited from in 1989, was once again taken away from it. The impact that the First Gulf War had on the JSP is neatly summarised in Table 3.14. Overwhelmingly, negative views of the JSP seem to be reflected in this Yomiuri poll carried out in

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Table 3.13 Why do you support the JSP? Yomiuri, July 1990 replies

(%)

Because its anti-consumption tax stance is good It sees the perspective of workers I have expectations of it as the leading opposition party Because I dislike the LDP Because of Doi Takako Because of contacts at work Because I have supported it for a long time Because my family and friends support it Because it is promoting women Because there is a politician from my locality Others Cannot answer

21.7 14.7 14.7 10.2 8.8 8.6 6.7 1.9 1.6 1.6 3.2 12.3

Table 3.14 What is your impression of the JSP? Yomiuri, August 1991 replies (multiple responses given)

(%)

It emphasises the Constitution It is a ‘socialist’ party It stands for workers It is a check against the LDP It is the centre of opposition power Whatever happens, it is a party of opposition Its policies have no reality It lacks an international sense It is too concerned with ideology It does not do enough for normal people Don’t know, other

11.9 12.2 12 21 16.7 31.2 42.7 20.1 12.6 20.9 15.4

August 1991. Some 20.1 per cent say the party has no ‘international sense’, 31.2 per cent say it is only a party of opposition and, most strikingly, 42.7 per cent say the party has no reality. The First Gulf War seems to have been a catalyst which caused the public to reflect on its support for the JSP and its main policy attitudes towards the Constitution and defence. When asked why the JSP had done badly in the 1992 House of Councillors election (Table 3.15), over 32 per cent of respondents said that it was because of the party’s inability to understand the need of a contribution to peace-keeping operations. In a similar vein, 44.2 per cent of the public polled said they believed the JSP’s belligerent handling of the UNPKO Bill by staging protests in the Diet had also contributed to its poor result. After the historic election of 1993, the party that was ‘too weak to lead, too strong to be ignored’ had lost public faith (Curtis 1999: 101–102). In Table 3.16, the JSP was criticised for its unrealistic policies, not having charismatic people in the party, and for depending too much on the unions. But the main reason why

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Table 3.15 Why do you think the JSP did badly in the last election? Yomiuri, August 1992 replies (multiple responses given)

(%)

Mass resignation threats and cow-walking in the Diet PKO Bill and discussion of a contribution and its failure to recognise that It is not sincere about political reform It is not sincere about recession counter-measures With things like the consumption tax, it is not sincere about tax reform Its political ability is doubted Don’t know, other

44.2 32.9 16.7 11.7 18.3 40.2 13.4

Table 3.16 The JSP suffered an unprecedented defeat in the July 1993 election. Why was that? Yomiuri, August 1993 replies (multiple responses given)

(%)

Because the reason for the party to exist has disappeared Its policies are unrealistic It does not have attractive people in the party Without any policies, it got caught up in the dream of a coalition government It depends too much on unions The party is divided between its left and right It was not the fault of the party itself Don’t know

36.9 34.1 30.5 16.2 21.5 23.7 4.9 13.8

the public felt that the JSP had done badly was because it was felt the ‘reason for the party to exist had disappeared’. We shall now look at the events of 1993–94 and then turn to some more public opinion polls from those years before analysing party support ratings.

The JSP–LDP–Sakigake coalition and attitudes towards the Constitution In June 1994, after the JSP forced the formation of a minority government by walking out of the Hata coalition, it joined a coalition government with its archrival of the 1955 system, the LDP (and Sakigake). Under the Hosokawa coalition, the JSP’s position on Constitutional matters had been hardly questioned so it had not needed to define its position. In contrast, once it was in coalition with the LDP, it had to clarify its position on Constitutional pacifism (Shinkawa 2000: 168–169). On 18 July 1994, Murayama therefore expressed his intention to maintain the Japan–US Security Treaty and to accept as necessary a minimal number of defence forces. This was a historic moment when the JSP dropped the platform it had endorsed for 39 years.

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Shinkawa quotes Murayama as saying: It would have been better if the decision had resulted from open debate within the party. In that case, the policy change would have been more warmly accepted. There was no time for that, however, since I was elected as Prime Minister by chance, with no preparation whatsoever. At that time, I firmly resolved that I would resign as Prime Minister if my decision was rejected at the convention. (2000: 168) At the convention in September, the party was furious. Kubo managed to push the approval through as a case of the end justifying the means because Murayama was Prime Minister. This was the only thing that seemed to justify making such a huge compromise to the JSP’s traditional beliefs. To some degree, the bad feeling created by discarding its ideological platform among its supporters was placated by the August 1995 war apology, which Murayama managed to push through government. Mukae Ryuji discussed the debate between the JSP and the LDP and Ozawa over the wording and content of the apology (Mukae 1996). While it was watered down to placate the LDP, former grass-roots socialists in Okayama were still pleased that it had taken place and felt that this alone had justified the JSP–LDP–Sakigake coalition and the discarding of its pacifist ideology (Interviews, Mizuta Minoru, 29/3/00; Ogame Yukio, 12/7/00; Mori Nobuko, 6/9/00).

Public opinion, 1993–98 Public opinion polls during this period concerning issues of defence, the Constitution and the JSP all became quite rare, particularly questions on the JSP. However, in this period it is possible to detect a consolidation of the incremental changes we saw in the previous ten years over attitudes towards defence policy. Table 3.17 shows that the Japanese public have become far more inclined to accept that the SDF have an international role to play in the UNPKO activities. An overwhelming majority of respondents in January 1995 said that Japan should send the SDF on peace-keeping operations. Table 3.18 confirms this sentiment and states overwhelming support for revision of the Constitution. Table 3.18 gives the responses to the same question from January 1995 and March 1998. Those who supported no revision of the Constitution remained at the same level. Of more significance, though, is that more than 50 per cent of respondents say they thought revision would be best in 1995 but, by 1998, this figure had increased by 1.9 per cent. (It must be acknowledged that this opinion which shows strong support for Constitutional revision was in a Yomiuri poll which is the newspaper that most espouses Constitutional reform.) The trend of these polls does seem to concur with the view of Keddell. Public attitudes towards defence issues seem to have moved incrementally. In the 1980s the public were far more supportive of the Peace Constitution yet in the mid and late 1990s began to show that they understood the necessity of possible revisions to

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Table 3.17 Do you feel the SDF should participate in peace-keeping activities? Yomiuri, January 1995 replies

(%)

Yes No Don’t know

65.8 25.2 8.9

Table 3.18 Do you think we need to revise the current Constitution? Yomiuri, January 1995 (and March 1998) replies

(%)

Revision would be best Non-revision would be best Cannot answer

50.4 (52.3) 30.9 (30.9) 18.7 (16.8)

it. Similarly, views supporting the necessity to send the SDF on peace-keeping operations gradually increased throughout the period of analysis. We shall now turn to see if the changes in attitudes expressed in polls affected support for the JSP.

Support ratings for the JSP, 1986–96 In the figures below, we shall examine the support for the JSP according to the Asahi monthly public opinion polls. The aim of this is to examine whether the public opinion poll questions which have been analysed above are comparable to the levels of support which the JSP received in the Asahi party support polls based on public opinion polling. Figure 3.1 shows support figures plotted monthly for the party from 1986 to 1995. The starting point of 1986 has been selected because it is representative of support figures for the JSP since the mid-1970s, which was about 15–20 per cent of normal support. Figure 3.1 shows similar results to those discussed above. The public turned towards the JSP from the middle of 1989 onwards and these high levels of support last from the anti-consumption tax and anti-rice import House of Councillors election in July of that year until the 1990 Lower House election. Support for the party does then drop gradually. General support drops at a greater level than the strong supporters who from that point show quite constant levels of support until the end of 1995. This group in particular expresses higher levels of support once the JSP join the coalition government and this is retained throughout Murayama’s compromise to accept the LDP’s attitudes towards defence issues and the Constitution. In contrast, those who just express normal levels of support for the JSP dropped dramatically in 1994. There is a slight resurgence after this but the level does go back down. Figure 3.210 shows the effects of the 1994 coalition with the LDP and Murayama’s apology more clearly. After this point, support levels began to drop dramatically. What is also of significance is that JSP support drops dramatically before the creation of the DPJ. But it must be recognised that this happened in the

35

Level of support

30 25 20 15 10 5

Mar-95

Mar-94

Mar-93

Mar-92

Mar-91

Mar-90

Mar-89

Mar-88

Mar-87

Mar-86

0

Date Support for JSP

Strong support for JSP

Figure 3.1 Support for the JSP, 1986–95. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Seron Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. 25

Level of support

20

15

10

5

Feb-00

Feb-99

Feb-98

Feb-97

Feb-96

Feb-95

Feb-94

0

Date Support for JSP

Strong support for JSP

DPJ

Figure 3.2 Support for the JSP and DPJ, 1994–2000. Source: Asahi Shinbun Sha Ser on Cho–sa Shitsu 1946–1995 nen cho–sa no zen de–ta–. Plus similar data in unpublished form until 2000.

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same period in which the support ratings according to occupation, sex and residence, discussed in Chapter 1, also showed a large drop in support for all parties in general as well as the JSP in particular. It would seem that the main explanation for this result is that those polled could no longer support the JSP as it had ‘failed’ in its potential of changing Japanese politics. Once the post of Prime Minister in the coalition government reverted to the LDP, ‘life was back to normal’. Even though the JSP was still in the Cabinet, it appears as if the party had reduced in its salience to those polled. The party had been supported as long as Murayama was Prime Minister but the public abandoned the party once he resigned. This drop in support which started in early 1996 can probably also be accounted for by the fact that, from the early part of 1996 onwards, the JSP was increasingly seen as a party which was about to split and there was talk of the emergence of a new party, an example being Shinto– tsukuri, discussed in Chapter 2. Figure 3.2 also shows that initially the ‘left’ party, the DPJ, even after its expansion in 1998, never really managed to entirely take over the support that the JSP had had. For the first four years of its existence, it barely went above 8 per cent support whereas in its heyday the JSP managed around 17–18 per cent. By 1994, this had dropped but it was still significantly higher than the support enjoyed (or suffered) initially by the DPJ. Nonetheless, we must note here that there is a phenomenon visible in Figure 3.2 when their support goes up to 20 per cent at the time of the 1998 Upper House election. This was the first time the DPJ had experienced this but it went on to experience it at each election to date, as of early autumn 2008, apart from the Koizumi election of 2005. Two strata of support In order to understand the decline of the JSP, it is important to divide its supporters into two groups. There were those who were consistently strong supporters who backed the policies of the party, in particular the Peace Constitution and opposition to the legality of the SDF and a Japanese presence abroad, and those who supported the party because of other, non-policy-related reasons. These may be summarised as supporting the JSP because they opposed the LDP, because they were mobilised at work by labour unions, or because they had liberal views which did not extend to a firm belief in the Constitution. These two groups complemented each other so long as there was no conflict of the extent of the First Gulf War and the JSP was the main opposition party. But as soon as the Japanese were faced with the reality of the JSP’s reaction to the First Gulf War, when it expressed hard-line support for the Constitution and showed disinclination to compromise, we believe that the public opinion polls have shown that the party lost the weak supporters. This left the JSP with its hardcore support throughout the 1991–94 period. When Murayama decided to reject traditional JSP policy in order to coalesce with the LDP in July–September 1994, the strong supporters felt betrayed and confused. They no longer had a party which stood for their beliefs. While some of these supporters returned to support the JSP in its post-1996 incarnation after

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

97

LDP

Oct-07

Apr-07

Oct-06

Apr-06

Oct-05

Apr-05

Oct-04

Apr-04

Oct-03

Apr-03

Oct-02

Apr-02

Oct-01

Apr-01

Oct-00

DPJ

Apr-00

Percentage

The Constitution and its importance

Date

Figure 3.3 Yomiuri public opinion poll support for the LDP and DPJ, April 2000– December 2007. Source: Yoron cho– sa, yearly 2000–2006, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org.

the defection of members to the DPJ, in 1994 they felt that they could no longer support their party. This was a situation in which the party lost some of its strong support. Nonetheless, some JSP supporters stayed with the JSP because, even with the ‘betrayal’ of traditional policy by Murayama, it was seen as a compromise worth being in power for. Without dividing JSP support into these two groups, it is difficult to analyse why the party gradually declined between 1990 and 1996. In Figure 3.1, the sudden dip in support from January until June 1991 is when the weak support left the party. In Figure 3.2, which depicts support from 1994 to 1999 for the JSP, there is an initial slight surge of support for the party when it coalesces with the LDP in June 1994. Once the traditional policy platform is questioned in July 1994, this support plateaus and then drops suddenly when the party’s annual conference endorses the LDP security policy in September. This was the beginning of a downwards trajectory which was finally completed by the splitting of the JSP with the formation of the DPJ. The formation of the DPJ reduced support for the JSP further but the JSP did survive in its new SDPJ format. Did the DPJ absorb the support that the JSP lost? Figure 3.2 shows that, while the DPJ did start to do better than the JSP after the expansion of the party in 1998, the DPJ’s support levels, even at the end point of analysis on the graph of March 2000, initially did not return to the levels of support that the JSP had once had. Nonetheless, once into the 2000s, the DPJ have begun to copy the JSP in a pattern of having around 15–20 per cent support, as can be seen in Figure 3.3. Around the time of elections, the party tends to get higher support levels, notably in 2003 and 2004, and its support particularly went high in the most recent 2007

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Upper House election. It was only at this election that the DPJ managed to ‘overtake’ the LDP for the first time and win an election. The problem of the ‘two strata of support’ policy for the DPJ

on defence issue-related

As we have argued above, the JSP’s main policy preference was protection of the Constitution. We have shown that the party lost support because of its mishandling of the First Gulf Conflict. Some Japanese showed an increasing ability to be flexible surrounding the issue of the Constitution and such things as the SDF participation in peace-keeping activities. For the other end of the spectrum of supporters who did not agree with incremental change, the JSP/LDP/Sakigake had originally provided hope. Murayama’s influence on the apology of August 1995 made the compromises needed seem worthwhile. These two groups occupied two separate strata of support for the JSP. Therefore, there were various groups of people with specific views on defence issues, which thus had to be ‘absorbed’ into the post-1996 parties. Because of the survival of the JSP as a minor party, some of the electorate who held staunch proConstitution views opted to continue to support the JSP. This view of opposing reform of the Constitution was expressed by Doi Takako as has been seen above. But there were those who would prefer to support a party which had a realistic chance of taking power and forming a government. There are also those members of the electorate who were prepared to question the Constitution and the role of the SDF in peace-keeping operations and might want to support a party which is left of centre but which has declared itself interested in limited and controlled reform of the Constitution. Initially the DPJ took a non-decisive view towards the Constitution: rather than lose potential support by articulating a position, it opted to agree to disagree about potential reform of it! More recently, the party has taken on a ‘party’ strategy of Japanese participation in increased United Nations action. This ‘one-voice’ articulation has been particularly strong since Ozawa took over as leader in April 2006. Real opinions of Diet members are not so united but sensibly the party has adopted this policy of ‘one-voice’. However, getting to that stage was not easy. Indeed, in a book published by the DPJ in January 2000, entitled A New Government – How to Make It Happen (Atarashi seifu – wo jitsugen suru tame ni), there is no mention of the Constitution (Hatoyama 2000). The party has managed to articulate policies on peaceful diplomacy between Asia and Japan and the USA and Japan without even a mention of the most important document which affects these relations. This was clearly seen as both a good and bad strategy. Sasano Teiko, a former Rengo– kai politician who joined the DPJ, said in an interview that she was extremely concerned about the lack of debate within the DPJ about the issue of defence, the US Security Treaty and the Constitution (Interview, Sasano Teiko, 26/7/00). She proved to be vindicated as she went on to say she felt that this issue would eventually emerge as the party has never articulated a position on it as there is so much division about it. It has since emerged

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and the DPJ have managed to control what could have been a controversial issue by controlling factional division and coming up with a policy which the whole party ostensibly supports. But it did take a while for the party to get to that stage. Above, we defined the new position on the Constitution which was expressed by Kan Naoto, a leader of the DPJ, that has been called the ronken debate. This is the position of accepting that the Constitution needed to be discussed in the tenyear Constitutional reform debate period which began in 2000 in the Diet. Moreover, this position also emphasises that reform should not take place for the sake of reform and is therefore tending more towards the pacifist camp than the revisionist camp. The inability of the DPJ to show a party policy initially on such issues which could be perceived as nationalistic was reflected in the 1999 bills over the national anthem and flag. This Bill is one of the most contentious bills to pass the Japanese Diet since the UNPKO Bill passed in June 1992. It allowed the Hinomaru Flag and Kimigayo National Anthem to be legalised within Japanese law. This was rather surprising as, to many, they had been the symbol of Japan in such things as the Olympics for many years and their lack of ‘legality’ was a shock. This was a hugely contentious bill for the opposition parties, even the DPJ, and, in the 22 July 1999 vote in the Lower House, the DPJ made it a free vote for its members, as the party could not come to any consensus on how it would vote on the Bill. The Bill split the party exactly in two with 45 members voting for it and 46 voting against it which represents how the party was fundamentally divided on this core issue of peace (Asahi, 23/7/99). On the 9 August hearing in the Upper House, once again the DPJ made it a free vote for its members and, once again, some members voted for the Bill, augmenting the numbers of government supporters, allowing the Bill to pass the Upper House with ease. This support for the Bill led a Japan Times columnist at the time to declare, ‘Until last year, there was rationality in Japanese Politics … But this year, things went awry’ (Japan Times, 30/7/99). It was this division on this important issue that forms the basis of the current DPJ and partly explains why the factionalism discussed in the previous chapter exists. This legislation suggests that, in comparison to the JSP and the opposition parties of the 1955 system, the DPJ had been able to find a way to maintain coherence despite major and controversial internal differences. While these fundamental and important differences were not ignored and were allowed to be expressed in 1999, the party seemed to be able to defend and value the party’s unity despite ideological differences. Without doubt, the DPJ is still the party that the majority of members of the Japanese electorate who want to defend the status quo of the Constitution vote for. This was very much indicated by a party meeting held in Okayama in August 2006. In order that citizens could hear Diet members’ opinions and vice versa about the Constitutional proposals that the party had suggested in October 2005, a large meeting was held in each PR constituency. Those who attended this meeting were predominantly over the age of 60 and there were very few of working age at the event apart from myself, various politicians and party workers. The

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views expressed at the meeting were very much representative of the supporters of the DPJ who wished to protect the Constitution, the older ones: there were also union leaders present and the event had also been advertised through the union network. This event showed the party still cared a lot for a protected Constitution and this is what the DPJ has eventually proposed, with the entire body of party members endorsing it. Since Ozawa became President, he has controlled party division as discussed in the previous chapter, and as a result the party now has a policy of what it wants to do to the Constitution if and when reform happens at the end of the decade. Whereas in November 2005 the LDP finished their own suggested Constitution and put it on their website,11 in April 2006 the DPJ published its thoughts on the Constitution and how it should be reformed but they are dated as the end of October of 2005 while Maehara was still leader. The party have defined how they want the issue of Article Nine and security and defence to be handled by defining Four Principles (Gensoku) and Two Conditions (Jyo–ken). These are based on two main notions: (1) the main point of the Constitution will be pacifism; and (2) the DPJ want to remove the current Constitution’s vagueness (they use the word ku– do–ka which literally means cavern, hollowness) and ensure the situation is improved so that pacifism becomes a clear issue. Their Four Principles are: 1

2

3

4

The Japanese Constitution will be based in the hands of the people and its key agenda will be this. Furthermore, it will not just be written so that defence issues are restricted to Japan but also so that Japan can cooperate with international peace organisations, such as the UN mandated activities. In future conflicts, the Constitution will clarify Japan’s right of self-defence. For this reason the SDF will be limited to activities which are mandated in Article 51 of the Constitution. The Constitution will clearly define the type of activities which Japan will do. The DPJ are concerned about vagueness like the current Constitution so they will clearly divide military and UN activities and following the public’s approval will join other countries in multinational-led forces and PKO activities. Furthermore, this decision will have been made by the Japanese electorate and Diet unlike in 1946/47. The DPJ want to ensure that citizens remain in control of the military.

The Two Conditions are: 1

2

There must be a regulation which defines the level of military force which can be used and this will be written in a Fundamental Law of National Security. A Fundamental Law of National Security must also be passed.

Thus, in summary, what the DPJ wants is a defined role for the Japanese within the Constitution which is limited to work within the United Nations. As mentioned above, Ozawa was not leader when this was published but it remarkably

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resembles the concept that he put forward in the early 1990s and which at the time seemed far more controversial than it does now – in an environment when Japan had not sent the SDF to places such as Iraq and Afghanistan as they did under the Koizumi premiership. Ozawa talks about a ‘normal nation’ in this book and defines it as a ‘nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community’ (Ozawa 1994: 95). Thus initially it seems rather right-wing and pushing towards the notion of Japan having an army and doing considerably more internationally. This fits in with the view espoused about Ozawa by Watanabe Ko– zo– in his 2006 book (actually written by Itagaki Eiken). Watanabe describes Ozawa as being like his father and Constitutional reform became his main aim (Itagaki 2006: 112). He also quotes him as arguing with Obuchi in 2000 as leader of the Liberal Party, the day before Obuchi had his stroke. Ozawa took a right-wing position compared to Obuchi on a Fundamental Law for Security (Itagaki 2006: 123). But Ozawa in Blueprint for a New Japan is not as controversial as he was commonly thought of in the 1990s and as described by Watanabe. He says that Japan does not do enough. ‘How much of the cost of maintaining peace and freedom has post-war Japan borne? Hardly any. Yet Japan has reaped the harvest of peace and free world markets more than any other nation’ (Ozawa 1994: 96). Yet moving on he describes what he wanted to see and this very much is in alignment with what the DPJ came up with in their 2005/06 proposal. ‘We must replace the strategy of “exclusive defense” with one of “peace-building” not only for world peace but for our own national security. The reorganization of the SDF should be based on this principle’ (Ozawa 1994: 107). Thus, Ozawa’s views from the last two decades have essentially become the voice of the DPJ and are very much a calm and centred view which is probably down to Ozawa’s factional control. They are representative of a different view than that expressed by the LDP which espouses such things as the ‘self-defence army’. It has been said that the DPJ and LDP have now converged on important issues of Constitutional revision (Hughes 2006: 730) but in reality their vision of the forces Japan will have and what limited acts can be done with them are different. But the state of the Japanese Constitution is in a state of flux. The government managed to pass a Bill in 2007, just prior to the Upper House election, which would make it easier to change the Constitution. This was a grand aim of Abe who stated in January 2007 that he was going to fix the Constitution (Asahi, 27/1/07). What he managed was to get the National Constitution Referendum Bill passed in the May just before the fact that the Social Insurance Agency had not allocated 50 million pension payments to the correct people’s accounts, resulting in many getting smaller pensions, became known to the public. This resulted in the Constitution being disregarded as an issue in the election, and in the few further weeks he survived as Prime Minister. Thus he managed to make a big move towards the possible change of the Constitution but, in many ways, his Bill has been disregarded and forgotten – possibly also because it will not become valid until May 2010. Consequently, at the moment, it can be overlooked.

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Nonetheless, Abe managed to pass a highly significant bill in the life of the Japanese Constitution. He acknowledged that Article 96 of the Constitution does not define how a national referendum should be carried out when it says that there must be one after a two-thirds majority has passed both Houses of the Diet. The Constitution Referendum Bill which was passed on 14 May 2007 stipulates: 1

2 3

Anyone over the age of 18 will be allowed to participate in the national referendum (the age of suffrage is currently 20 but the DPJ are trying to bring it down to 18 to bring it in line with western democracies, so this Bill stipulates 18, but will be only effective as 20 until the law changes). Proposals on Constitutional reform must be made item by item so the entire Constitution cannot be changed in one package of revisions. To be submitted, a bill must have 100 supporters in the Lower House and 50 in the Upper House.

If the Bill passes a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet: 4

The referendum must be held between 60 and 180 days after that approval.

Criticism has been made about this last point because there just needs to be a 50 per cent majority, but there does not need to be a minimum turnout, so it could result in a very small level of support. Thus, a significant change has been made in Japan. Abe obviously was unable to amend Article 96 (the amendment clause) of the Constitution, but the national referendum law rubrics clearly indicate that the LDP is closer to changing the Constitution. Furthermore, Craig Martin, a journalist, stated many people’s views when he said that any tampering with the Constitution would immediately cause concerns. If Article 9 can be merely interpreted away, why not other provisions? A democracy allows its Constitution to be undermined at its peril, and the erosion of constitution controls on a country seeking greater military influence will almost certainly alarm its neighbours. (Japan Times, 29/4/07) This is an issue which is not easily going to go away and will continue until or unless Japan reforms its Constitution and will continue beyond by those who oppose reform at all or who see what happens as not being sufficient. Japan and its military will remain a contentious issue. To look briefly at public opinion polls and whether they have changed throughout these last few years is our last task in this chapter. Within the context of a party attempting to change the Constitution, how does this make the Japanese public feel? Comparing two sets of virtually identically worded questions from the Nikkei, which were asked in April 2005 and April 2007, gives us an indication of how the Japanese public feel about the Constitution and whether their

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Table 3.19 What do you think of the Constitution? What do you think of the Constitution? Please choose one of the following two answers.

2005 (2007) N = 1553 (N = 865) (%)

Fine as it is Should revise Can’t say/don’t know For those who answered ‘fine as it is’, why do you think it is fine as it is? Please choose one fr om the following four answers. Because the current Constitution does not have any specific problem Because revising the Constitution could change pacifism Because there are many other issues to work on Because the Constitution should not be revised unless there is a compelling reason For those who answered ‘should revise’, why do you think it should be r evised? Please choose one from the following four answers. Because the current Constitution was formulated under the occupation Because clauses that are detached from reality stand out Because it is necessary to include new ideas Because it is necessary to change the country’s systems to make it easier to advance reforms

29 (35) 54 (51) 17 (14) 2005 (2007) N = 443 (N = 302) (%) 17 (16) 47 (45) 18 (14) 17 (22) 2005 (2007) N = 843 (N = 438) (%) 12 (10) 26 (29) 48 (45) 12 (14)

opinion has changed since Koizumi stopped being Prime Minister in 2006. Furthermore, the 2007 questions were at the peak of the discussions on the Constitution Referendum Bill so could potentially have made the public cautious. Also Abe was as notorious for being on the right of the LDP as Koizumi had been but did not have the popularity which could have convinced the electorate to support the views of the popular Prime Minister. In Tables 3.19–3.21, some responses below 2 per cent have been omitted. Overall, there seems to be a tendency to be slightly more averse to changing the Constitution in this period. In addition to the change of the administration, there has been the increasing salience of the North Korea issue which has made the Japanese more concerned about what the SDF could be forced to do. Nonetheless, if we compare these data with February 1982, when, at that time 70 per cent of respondents opposed changing the Constitution. In other words, much has changed, even though the Japanese public are far from in agreement of how they want the Constitution to be changed. Thus, we are in a state of uncertainty. It cannot be said for sure where the Japanese Constitution will be in 2015. What is for sure is that both of the leading parties are fully considering revising it and, while it is unlikely that a party will ever have over 66.66 per cent of both Houses to pass Constitutional reform bills easily, to a greater or lesser degree discussions are progressing, even though only within the parties. Change is therefore possible.

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Table 3.20 What do you think of the characterisation of the SDF under the Constitution? What do you think of the characterisation of the Self-Defence Force under the Constitution? Please select one from the following four answers.

2005 N =1553 (%)

Should stipulate its existence in the Constitution as ‘Self-Defence Force’ Should make clear that it is a military force by calling such name as ‘Self-Defence Army’ in the Constitution Should not mention in the Constitution, fine as it is Should not mention in the Constitution and should think towards reduction or abolition Can’t say/don’t know

26 20 24 10 20

Table 3.21 What do you think about revising the Constitution? The Constitution can be revised when more than two-thirds of members of both Houses approve and more than half of the entire population approve. What do you think about it?

2005 (2007) N = 1553 (N = 865) (%)

Should loosen the conditions to make it easier to revise Fine as it is Should tighten the conditions to make it more difficult to revise Can’t say/don’t know

30 (26) 39 (41) 11 (16) 20 (16)

There are three possible outcomes (Hughes 2006: 743). First, if the outcome favours the LDP, it will mean Japan effectively becoming a ‘normal’ military state. If it favours the DPJ, the revised Constitution would enable Japan to contribute to international stability and remove the problem that overseas deployment is seen as unconstitutional. The final option would be one of no change. In this case, Japan would remain in a ‘grey area’ and Constitutional revision could only proceed through reinterpretation of the existing document.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to explain what the main ideological stance of the JSP was, and how some of their ‘political space’ on the left of the Japanese party system has been filled by the DPJ. The traditional ideology of the JSP, based on preservation of the Constitution and non-recognition of the SDF, has gradually declined in its salience, particularly since the First Gulf War. This crisis highlighted the need for Japan to question its role in the post-Cold War order. The Japanese public still have widespread faith in the validity of their Peace Constitution and its special non-aggression clause and prohibition from maintaining an army. Many wish to protect it as much as possible and would prefer to find a way

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to make an international contribution inside the parameters of the Constitution through United Nations-led peace-keeping activities. This is a widely held opinion which has changed incrementally over the past 20 years, in particular since the First Gulf War. All of these positions have been reflected in public opinion polls. Therefore, when the JSP was not able to show a similar flexibility in the period immediately following the First Gulf War, the party lost some support. In other words, the party was not able to adapt and change to remain relevant, as Rose and Mackie warn parties must do (1988: 534). This decline in support has been reflected in public opinion polls. While the public had been aware of the JSP’s doctrinaire nature for some time, the First Gulf War proved to be a turning point and public opinion polls showed that the public were increasingly tired of the party’s inability to reform. We believe that after the crisis of the First Gulf War the JSP began to be supported by two strata of support. The first were those who had soft liberal tendencies and voted for the party because of its ideology but were flexible and changed with the times. Also in this group were those who supported the party because they were mobilised to do so or were voting for the JSP merely because they disliked the LDP. This ‘soft support’ apparently began to drop off from about 1991 onwards as the electorate disagreed with the methods employed by the party in its dealings of the First Gulf War, and labour union mobilisation became less successful (see Chapter 4). The anti-LDP voters also dropped off from supporting the JSP from 1992 onwards once the new parties described in Chapter 2 appeared. The non-LDP electorate was finally given an alternative to the JSP and the LDP and grasped the opportunity by voting for the Japan New Party, Shinseito– and Sakigake in the 1992 Upper House and 1993 Lower House elections, and later the DPJ from 1996 onwards. On the other hand, a group which believed in the peace platform of the JSP remained steadfast supporters of the party. These are the voters who supported the party despite the lack of adjustments and accommodations that Rose and Mackie suggest are necessary. They continued to back the party through the new party booms of 1993. However, these ‘hard’ supporters also questioned their support of the party when Murayama dropped the JSP’s traditional allegiance to Article Nine and the Security Treaty and opposition to the national flag and anthem in the summer of 1994. The party still exists with 12 seats so has kept some key support but its fundamental support has moved to the DPJ. The DPJ is formed of a divided group of politicians. Nonetheless, the party seems to have come up with a coherent and considered Constitution policy about which there is no unhappiness openly mentioned within the party. They have done this within an environment where the LDP have moved ahead towards the possibility of Constitutional revision and passed the Constitution Revision Bill. There will be two more years of discussions before the Constitution could be changed. It remains to be seen what actually happens.

4

Rengo– and the changes in the Japanese left

Introduction ‘The fate of the union movement … has a direct bearing on the destiny of a viable political opposition in Japan’ (Allinson and Sone 1993: 157). As this quotation suggests, the relationship between the labour movement and the political left in Japan has been complex and mutually dependent. In this chapter, we shall show how this relationship has changed in the past 20 years and the consequent effects on the fortunes of the political left. The relationship between the left-wing parties and labour unions has been described as being at best symbiotic. The charge has often been made that the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) had no organisation of their own and were able to mobilise the electorate only through the support of the unions. Moreover, much of their money came from the labour unions. In return, the unions received representation of their interests in the Diet. However, the relationship became increasingly contentious for the labour unions, as during the 1955 system they were supporting the JSP and DSP financially, yet receiving little in return as the parties were ‘permanently’ part of the opposition. In this chapter, we shall analyse the relationship between the left and the unions by examining their interactions and how these changed from that described in the 1955 system through to this first decade of the twenty-first century. Two questions in particular will be considered: How has the relationship between the noncommunist left-wing parties, the government and labour unions changed in the past 20 years? Also, what effect has this changing relationship and the decline of unionism had on the non-communist left’s ability to mobilise voters? We shall show that the mutual dependence that characterised the past has declined owing to the unions’ growing capacity to extend their own influence in government. Also, the unionist movement’s dream of corporatism has declined as a result of a growing realisation that it was unobtainable. A change in unionist leadership attitudes has also generated an attitude of detachment from political parties. As a consequence of these influences, the relationship between the left and unions has become more ad hoc and less predictable. In order to illuminate these changing relationships, two case studies of influential Japanese unions, Jichiro– , the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union, and Zendentsu– , the All NTT Workers of Japan Union (telecommunications), will be presented. In the final part of this

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chapter, we shall conclude with an analysis of the implications these changes have had for the JSP, and now more importantly the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in attracting electoral support and how the various organisations are working together. We shall then show that a decline in union membership and the decreasing ability of unions to engage their members in political activity have contributed to the problems that the left has faced in terms of attracting voters. This crisis has had times when it was worse than other times but, presently, the relationship with the unions seems to have settled down and be giving reasonable support to the DPJ. As shown in the Introduction, one reason accounting for change in several leftwing parties in Europe during the 1990s is said to be a reduction in mutual dependence between parties and labour unions.1 Lewis Minton describes the relationship between the British Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress as a contentious alliance for several reasons (Minton 1991). The implications of this symbiotic relationship for electoral mobilisation are of particular importance. Writing in 1991 before the emergence of New Labour, Minton observed that, should a break in the relationship be initiated, whether unions or the Labour Party made the first move, the consequences would be dire for the electoral mobilisation of trade unionists. Should the trade unions initiate a split, it would be a sign of the diminishing utility of the Labour Party to organised labour. Should the Labour Party make the first move, the unions would perceive it as a sign that policy would change in an increasingly anti-union manner. Even though Minton said this would be difficult for the British Labour Party to achieve, the party nevertheless managed to do so in the mid-1990s. In the changing relationship between unions and left-wing parties in Japan, a similar break occurred, but it was a case of the unions initiating the change. The JSP had realised that it was too dependent on the unions, yet because it lacked other support it was unable to break the relationship. Before we turn to an analysis of this union-initiated change, we shall look at the history of the unions in Japan.

The development of unions in Japan, 1945–90, and their political role Labour unions in Japan have their roots in the period of Taisho– democracy in the 1920s, but their activities were controlled and restricted by the State before and during the Second World War. Prior to the war in 1936 420,000 workers were unionised. During the war, independent unions were banned, and a single staterun union, Sangyo– ho– kokukai, existed. In 1945, the Japanese labour union movement re-started, virtually from scratch, and soon became an important force. Workers had been organised during the war at the company, industry and national levels and thus were in structures that the political left could easily mobilise (Dower 1999: 257). In the few months from the end of the war until December 1945, 380,000 members of the workforce became unionised. A month later, a million had been added to this number. The number of unionised workers finally peaked at 6.7 million in 1948, comprising, at the time, over half of the nonagricultural workforce (Dower 1999: 256–257).

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This was the peak of unionisation in Japan. Since then, the 1950s domestic economic problems and the policies of the Allied Occupation’s later period, influenced by the growing salience of the Cold War and the subsequent Red Purge of communists, saw the authorities’ support for unions begin to diminish. Unions began to form within large private companies (later to become Do– mei-backed unions) and public-sector ‘businesses’ such as the telephone company NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) and local government workers (So– hyo– backed unions between 1950 and 1989), but never took off within tertiary industry or within small and medium-sized firms, which in some respects are the backbone of the Japanese economy. So– hyo– (Nihon Ro– do– Kumiai So– hyo– gikai – General Council of Labour Unions of Japan) was formed in 1950 and was intended to be a democratic union federation in opposition to the communist-led labour union, Sanbetsu Kaigi. Management, government and the Allied Occupation GHQ all welcomed its existence, but within a year Cold War politics had taken over So– hyo– , and it had become a heavily Marxist-oriented group (Kume 1998: 75). It made huge wage increase demands during the 1950s that were impossible in the economic climate of the recession after the Korean War. Moderate union leaders could see that such requests were futile, yet So– hyo– leaders perceived their failure to obtain such increases as the result of management’s hard-line policy. Kume believes that this attitude is what led So– hyo– into a political course that was to affect its whole existence until it dissolved in 1989. Do– mei (originally called Zenro– ) resulted from an ideologically driven rightwing split from So– hyo– in 1954. Do– mei tended to represent private firms and less dogmatic unions in the public sector (sometimes unions which had split from their ‘ideologically driven’ parent union) and had an accommodating approach to labour relations, whereas So– hyo– displayed a far more adversarial approach. The two organisations continued until the end of the 1980s. So– hyo– was initially more of a centre-left union but, when the pre-JSP parties divided into the left and right, So– hyo– moved towards the left with the party in 1951 and became intertwined with politics as a result. In 1954, when Do– mei was formed, it took over most of the private sector unions. From 1955 onwards, the unions became most known for their ‘shunto– ’, spring labour offensives which happen every year. So– hyo– has always had a political approach compared to a more pragmatic and economic view of Do– mei, which wanted realistic improvement for their workers. As Stockwin points out, once the 1970s showed that Japan’s economy was growing, the political stance was less relevant than it had been when Japan was a developing country (Stockwin 2003: 103–104). So– hyo– at its peak had 4,800,000 workers within its structure; Do– mei was about half its size with 2,200,000 in 1987. Do– mei was less political but was concerned about welfare and, essentially, the life of its workers. The beginning of the end of So– hyo– and Do– mei influence on politics can be seen in the reforms of the 1980s, when large public companies were broken up and privatised. This was an opportunity for So– hyo– unions to show their anticapitalist, anti-management colours. Mike Mochizuki compared the railway workers’ approach with the communication workers’ approach. Railway workers who were members of Japan National Railways (JNR) called strikes and refused

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to cooperate with management. By contrast, with the break-up of NTT, the _ Zendentsu Union Chair, Yamagishi Akira, went straight to the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to negotiate a good settlement for his union rather than see it break up. He did this because he realised the limitations of the JSP’s traditional partner, the unions (Allinson and Sone 1993: 193). This act by Yamagishi signifies a crucial turning point of labour unions for two reasons. First, it is important as it is the emergence on the national stage of Yamagishi Akira, an innovative and politically committed unionist who became the first Rengo– Chairman and was highly influential in the politics of the mid1990s (see below). It is also significant because it reflects the beginnings of a working relationship between the LDP and the labour unions that would eventually reduce the dependence of the unions on the left-wing parties. Both these events were of crucial importance to the formation of Rengo– , which can be considered as the first stage of the transformation between the parties and unions.

The formation of Rengo– Between 1987 and 1989, the two labour union umbrella groups, So– hyo– and Do– mei, merged to form one of the largest labour union organisations in the world, Rengo– or, in its full title, Nihon Ro– do– Kumiai So– Rengo– kai.2 Initially in 1987, Do– mei officially became Rengo– , an organisation that was originally just intended to consist of private sector unions. The public sector unions were scheduled to join Rengo– when they had removed all hard-line left-wing influences from their unions. It was thought that this process could take up to ten years, but eventually it was completed in two (Interview, Mamiya Yukio, 28/7/00). Unions such as Jichiro– and Nikkyo– so were keen to join Rengo– and were happy for their communist members to break away to facilitate their membership in Rengo– . Thus, by 1989, a private and public sector Rengo– was formed.3 But why was Rengo– created? There are various interpretations for the unification of the union movement, but they all seem to point to two main reasons: the need to defend the union movement from what was perceived as a right-wing backlash from the LDP during the Nakasone government, and the goal of bringing about a government which would be more sympathetic to the demands of the workforce than the LDP. Tsujinaka believes that the So– hyo– leftism described above kept it excluded from the corridors of power, so a principal reason for the formation of Rengo– was to bring unionism back into being a political force (Allinson and Sone 1993). In a similar vein, Mochizuki believes that the creation of Rengo– was inextricably linked to the administrative reform campaign of the 1980s (Allinson and Sone 1993). In the 1980s, because of Rincho– (Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform), the electoral resurgence of the LDP and the decline in union membership, the labour unions realised the need to push for more labour unity. The government’s administrative reform was designed to weaken unionism by forcing public companies (which had So– hyo– -backed militant unions) to become private corporations (and therefore to conform to the more conciliatory style of unionism favoured by Do– mei). This would have two benefits for the

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LDP. It would remove large nationalised company unions which had been militant in their demands for higher wages and better working conditions. Two of the principal targets were Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) – the telecommunications monopoly – and Japan National Railways (JNR). Second, it would also weaken the JSP, which would lose its main union backer, So– hyo– . Creating Rengo– was an attempt by the unions to unite and make a comeback against this conservative attempt to weaken them. Another similar explanation for the formation of Rengo– is that it was formed to increase its influence over politics and policy beyond that which So– hyo– and Do– mei had exercised. As early as the end of 1989, Rengo– had ten standing committees, including three that dealt exclusively with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This is in comparison to So– hyo– that only had links with the Ministry of Labour. Tsujinaka points out that, in this way, Rengo– was able to expand its potential to influence policy-making, resulting in it being far more heavily involved with affairs of state than any of its predecessors (Allinson and Sone 1993: 209–210). These changes between Rengo– and the bureaucracy were probably more as a consequence of the transformations that had occurred prior to the inauguration of Rengo– in 1987–89. Nonetheless, these extended linkages between government and labour unions still constituted a significant change for the relationship between the unions, the left parties and the government. Labour began to go directly to the bureaucracy and government over issues such as the privatisation of NTT and the Japan National Railways. Yamagishi Akira, the leader of _ Zendentsu , the NTT workers union, went straight to Kanemaru Shin of the Telecommunications zoku of the LDP rather than approach the JSP for support when the government wanted to break the company up and privatise it (Toyonaga 2000: 85).4 Moreover, when in the mid-1980s the LDP were facing lower levels of electoral support and had to rely upon the New Liberal Club (NLC) to form a coalition government, the unions were able to make more inroads into creating a good relationship with the government party as the LDP desperately wanted to provide links to the bureaucracy in order to attract new sources of potential votes (Carlile 1994: 611–612). As Carlile has said, ‘At the regime level, the widely heralded moderation of the Japanese labor movement has transformed organized labor from an excluded, anti-system movement into an interest group that is an important pillar supporting the existing political economic order’ (1994: 607). These changes had meant that the labour organisation, even before the formation of Rengo– , had less need to rely solely upon their relationship with the left parties as a means of representing their interests to government. With new access to the LDP and the bureaucracy, the first cracks in the traditional inter-dependence between the unions and the left had appeared.

The theory of union-led political change Yamagishi Akira believed that the only way to change workers’ lives in Japan was to have a union movement that was not only interested in increasing wages,

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but was also concerned about workers’ living conditions, education and health care, and he spoke passionately about this (Interview, Yamagishi Akira, 12/9/00). When he was Chairman of Rengo– , in the early 1990s, he felt that, in order for the union movement to achieve this, it needed better access to government, and for this to happen a government needed to be formed by what was normally the opposition in Japan. This was his dream of corporatism. For corporatism to exist, three main criteria need to be fulfilled. First, a labour or social-democratic party needs to identify with union power and can be assumed to have close links with unions. Second, there needs to be a reasonable expectation that those parties can form a government, and, finally, there needs to be an institutional arrangement whereby labour and big business can meet and secure their influence on policy-making and can expect to be able to bind their members to the agreements formed (Toyonaga 2000: 73–74). In Japan, the first and last of these expectations had been fulfilled by the end of the 1980s as a result of the denationalisation discussed above and the creation of Rengo– . The only one which was not in existence was the second one: a reasonable expectation that an opposition would be able to form a government. To gain access to government, Yamagishi felt that the non-communist opposition parties, which consisted at the time of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito– and the Social Democratic League (SDL), should combine into either one political party or form electoral and/or Diet coalitions. The formation of Rengo– thus was not only a means to strengthen unions against the growing power of the right under the Nakasone-initiated rightwing Rincho– reforms, but also a means of reducing division among the political left, which had been drawn along a JSP/So– hyo– , DSP/Do– mei cleavage with the other opposition parties (Ko– meito– and the SDL), further complicating these divisions. Rengo– would mean that unions would be able to support any candidate of the opposition, regardless of that candidate’s party. Furthermore, with the backing of all unions, it would be more likely that greater numbers of opposition candidates would win seats in the single non-transferable vote electoral system which was in use at the time. Finally, it would also remove the connections the electorate made between the hard-line So– hyo– and the equally dogmatic JSP, which was a factor considered to be losing support for both unions and the party. As an added bonus, it was thought that the removal of these hard-line images would encourage workers to join unions, which would further mobilise support for the left-wing parties. Rengo– had thus been formed to play a catalytic role in the ‘new political force’ in Japanese politics (Carlile 1994: 613).

Unions and political change, 1987–2001 The first major political move of Rengo– came before the public sector Rengo– had been fully incorporated within the private sector Rengo– in 1989. In the House of Councillors election of that year, Rengo– decided to put forward its own candidates rather than back candidates from one of the left-wing parties. The reason for this was partly because Rengo– was not sure whether to back the JSP or the DSP,

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so it decided to put forward its own candidates to prevent having to make any decision. Furthermore, it also thought that a new political force might kick-start the process of reform and left-wing unification and play ‘a catalytic role’ in creating the ‘new political force’ (Stockwin 2000: 163). Rengo– instigated an approach of supporting candidates with policies it was in agreement with rather than just backing those who were from parties who had links to unions in the past (Toyonaga 2000: 88). Of the 12 candidates that Rengo– backed in this election, 11 won, and thus the Rengo– attempt to launch itself into politics directly, rather than remain as a support structure, was initially a huge success. This success came in tandem with an important victory for the JSP when it won its first election since 1947. As discussed in Chapter 2, this success was due to support for the female party leader Doi Takako, anti-LDP sentiment because of the consumption tax and rice liberalisation and the effects of the Recruit scandal. This was an election in which anti-LDP feeling was at an alltime high so any non-LDP candidates were likely to appeal to voters who wanted a change. This was an election in which voters were no less wary of the hard-line socialism of the JSP and its ties with the unions yet they supported the party mostly because of anti-LDP sentiments (Otake 1999: 26–29). While Rengo– was a direct connection to the union movement, even using its name, the candidates selected were a change from the traditional union image. Only one (according to Johnson, but as discussed, possibly two) of the candidates was from unions, the others being lawyers, teachers, journalists and TV celebrities (Table 4.1). This image consoled an electorate wary of hard-line socialism and unionism. What is even more remarkable about the Rengo– victories of 1989 is that ten of the candidates were from two-seat House of Councillor districts.5 As the Upper House has fixed terms and the seats are divided and fought in alternate elections, each of these ten candidates was the sole winner that year in his district, which meant they fought head-to-head with the LDP and won. A simple survey was carried out in which the candidates who stood in 1989 were questioned about the election. One of these candidates has since died and therefore only ten candidates who were victorious in 1989 were available for survey, of which a response rate of 60 per cent was achieved. This question was also put to Sasano Teiko, the remaining member of the group still in the Diet, and her reply is included in the data. Candidates were asked which factors affected their victories in 1989; seven of the 11 candidates indicated that the electorate’s sense of outrage against the consumption tax was the most important factor, suggesting that this was an anti-LDP vote rather than a pro-Rengo– vote. The second most common response also pointed to the anti-LDP sentiment raised by the corruption of the Recruit scandal. Both of these factors show the candidates felt that the advantages that Rengo– kai (the name of the ‘party’ that the Rengo– candidates were fighting under) offered were in fact no different to any of the other opposition parties. It would seem that Rengo– kai only managed to be so successful because it was an opposition party in an election in which opposition parties were rewarded for not being the LDP and also probably benefited from a ‘new party’ award in attention and votes from the electorate.

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Table 4.1 Politicians who campaigned under the Rengo–kai name in 1989 Name

Constituency Sex/Age Previous career

Inclusive or exclusive

Election in which seat was lost

Awamori Takashi Ikeda Osamu Inoue Tetsuo Inui Harumi Isomura Osamu Furukawa Tasaburo Hoshikawa Yasumatsu Nakamura Eiichi Sasano Teiko

Ishikawa

M/50

Unionist

Exclusive

1995

Ehime

M/58

Lawyer

Inclusive

1995

Mie

M/51

Lawyer

Inclusive

1995

Tokushima

F/54

Teacher

Inclusive

1995

Yamanashi

M/56

Journalist

Inclusive

1995

Fukui

M/56

Lawyer

Inclusive

1995

Yamagata

M/59

Local politics

1995

Shiga

M/59

Celebrity

Inclusive/ Exclusive Inclusive

Kyoto

F/55

Celebrity

Inclusive

M/50

Director1

Inclusive

Won a seat in 1995. Did not stand again 1995

M/45

Lawyer

Inclusive

Lost in 1989

M/47

Lawyer

Inclusive

1995

Shinsaku Nara Kazuo Takahara Okayama Katsuya Takai Gifu Kazunobu

1995

Source: Kokkai Binran, August 1989. Note 1 Shinsaku Kazuo according to Stephen Johnson was a Director. He obtained the data from a Rengo– publication dated 1992. Nonetheless, in Kokkai Binran , the Diet Handbook, he gives a vague description which seems more like he was a unionist. This would mean that there were two unionists in the Rengo– attempt.

Stephen Johnson, in Opposition Politics in Japan, has extensively examined the Rengo– candidates and developed the theory of exclusive and inclusive candidates. Exclusive candidates are those who came from a union background and could therefore count on hard-line union support, but support from a wider sample of the electorate is doubtful. They tended to be middle-aged and male. These types of candidate were ‘the traditional face of socialist politics’ (Johnson 2000: 161–162). The inclusive candidates were ones who tried to exploit non-partisan and anti-LDP votes as well as traditional left-wing supporters. Here image was important, so the candidate tended to be younger and sometimes even female and had a professional background. It is significant that, according to Johnson’s typology, 11 of the 12 candidates in 1989 were inclusive candidates (Johnson gives one candidate an

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exclusive/inclusive classification and, as discussed in the note to Table 4.1, Shinsaku Kazuo should maybe also be exclusive/inclusive or entirely exclusive) and this distinction of candidate type can be utilised to explain the successes of 1989. Candidate-type selection is also something that the DPJ has attempted to do since its formation in 1996 as we saw in Chapter 2 both at its beginning and since it has enlarged. It is evident that Rengo– were ahead of their time for the Japanese left in this quite considered way in which they chose candidates. There are further reasons for the 1989 victories. Aurelia George Mulgan has pointed out that the victories in Yamagata, Ishikawa, Yamanashi, Gifu, Mie, Shiga, Tokushima and Ehime (eight out of the 12 districts) were all in rural districts. As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, in 1989 No– kyo– , the Agricultural Cooperatives Association, were opposing plans to liberalise beef and citrus imports and consequently did not support the LDP. George Mulgan has shown that, in these rural districts, the Rengo– candidates gave No– kyo– an alternative candidate to the JSP, which can partly explain their success (2000: 488). It would have been less difficult for traditional LDP supporters to vote for Rengo– kai than to vote for the JSP – although the election results of 1989 show that many did do this. Whatever the reasons for the victory in 1989, the opposition parties managed to create the impression that Yamagishi’s dream of a united opposition might be a reality. Opposition cooperation had resulted in 11 candidates being elected in difficult districts. Nonetheless, the question needs to be asked whether these victories were really the result of the success of opposition unity, or merely a consequence of opposition to the LDP.

Opposition disunity, 1990–92 On the back of the success of the opposition in 1989, the left-wing parties went into the 1990 Lower House election with a regained sense of enthusiasm and a positive attitude. Their successes continued for that election, but things began to collapse before the 1992 Upper House contest. In February and March 1992, prior to the election, Rengo– kai managed to win two by-election victories, in Nara and Miyagi, but this was the end of its roll of good luck. In 1992, on its second attempt at direct action politics, all 22 of its candidates lost. The 22 candidates comprised 11 inclusive and 11 exclusive type candidates, so for all of them to lose their seats had implications. Did this invalidate Johnson’s exclusive/inclusive candidate theory and does it represent a larger failure for Rengo– ? What in fact had happened was that the group had split over the issue which had always divided it: defence and the Constitution. Had the First Gulf War not intervened, Rengo– might have been able in time to gloss over the differences regarding this policy issue, which also contributed to a worsening divide between the JSP and DSP. (See Chapter 3 for more detail on the impact the war had on the parties and the legislation that was passed as a result of it.) Events culminated in Ko– meito– and the DSP backing the LDP’s Peace-Keeping Operations Bill in 1992, which the JSP had tried to filibuster. Rengo– desperately tried to salvage the emerging twoyear JSP/DSP cooperation that had been a result of the 1989 victory of the JSP and

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Rengo– kai

the successes that had had, yet neither side was keen to iron out a compromise over the PKO Bill. This resulted in the opposition once again being distracted by dissent and meant that not only did the Rengo– candidates of 1992 lose, but the opposition as a whole failed to make any gains in the election and the opposition parties became divided again (Carlile 1994: 615). As a result, the policy of ad hoc candidate support from the unions emerged, remaining as a policy throughout the 1990s, and thus creating a significant change for labour union and party relations.

The beginning of ad hoc relations between unions and parties The turmoil over the First Gulf War ultimately led to the abandonment of the social democratic political party merger efforts and stimulated a more aggressive approach to finding a solution to the failure of the opposition to be involved in government from Rengo– . Yamagishi called the 1992 election ‘a complete defeat’, declared the JSP–DSP merger dead, and announced that organised labour would be attempting to find a new means of achieving its new political force (Interview, Yamagishi Akira, 12/9/00). In autumn 1992, Rengo– announced that it would now consider supporting any candidate who had an appreciation of labour concerns and also considered vetting potential JSP and DSP candidates for their pragmatism on defence and security issues (Carlile 1994: 618). As a result, there was some dissent from left-leaning groups, but this was ignored by the Rengo– executive, who tried to push forward its reforms. From October 1992 onwards, candidates who wanted to gain the support of Rengo– had to commit to a pragmatic line on peace and security as well as other issues (Asahi, 26/3/93). This pragmatism about candidates’ attitudes towards policy again has remarkable resonance with the vetting of potential members’ policy attitudes which the DPJ carried out in 1996 before accepting Diet members into the new party (discussed in Chapter 2) and is an indication of how left-wing groups in Japan began to deal with the problems of ideological and policy division. In the meantime, political disarray within the LDP and opposition from early 1993 onwards meant that the ground was being cleared for the eventual opposition government formation strategy of Rengo– . Hosokawa’s Japan New Party (JNP) had emerged, Eda Satsuki had created the opposition group Sirius, and then in June 1993 the LDP split. The new political force and Yamagishi’s dream of corporatism would now be formed by splinters of each party. This new Rengo– approach was observed in the 1993 Lower House election, when Rengo– backed not only DSP and JSP candidates but candidates from the new parties, JNP, Sakigake and Shinseito– .

Yamagishi and coalition negotiations In July 1993, the LDP failed to secure a working majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in 38 years. This left the political arena in a state of deadlock for several weeks as negotiations were conducted in an attempt to determine which parties would form a coalition government. The next largest party

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after the LDP in terms of number of seats was the JSP but it had suffered a huge rejection at the hands of the electorate. It received a mere 70 seats, slightly over half of its pre-election strength of 136. As Curtis describes the JSP in 1993, and as we have described it in Chapter 2, its role in the coalition negotiations was pivotal. The Socialists were therefore an essential and delicate part of the coalition negotiations. The other parties in the discussions were Ozawa Ichiro– and Shinseito– , Hosokawa’s JNP, Ko– meito– , the DSP, Takemura’s new Sakigake, and finally the tiny SDL, insignificant to a coalition majority. It was in the interests of these parties to cooperate as much and as quickly as possible in order to prevent the LDP from managing to create a coalition with either Ko– meito– or the DSP. The negotiations became increasingly based on the issue of each party’s position on electoral reform; specifically its position for or against the introduction of a single-seat majority electoral system, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. The parties split into factions: Hosokawa’s JNP and Takemura’s Sakigake versus Ozawa’s Shinseito– and Ko– meito– . In the midst of all the turmoil, one party, the Socialists, stood apart from the negotiations. Yamagishi Akira wrote a book concerning the coalition negotiations entitled Renritsu no shikakejin, ‘A Creator of the Coalition Government’ (1995). He seems to be extolling his own importance by using this title, yet on analysis of the detailed events which he recounts in the book, he certainly seems to have had a significant influence on the formation of the coalition. His role seems to have been one of constraining the JSP members who did not want to join the coalition, restraining the DSP from its potential cooperation with the LDP and pressuring Hosokawa and Takemura into participating in a non-LDP coalition (Otake 2000: 89–90). Ozawa Ichiro– held meetings with Yamagishi even prior to his formation of Shinseito– in June 1993 and, even though Yamagishi implies that he did not trust Ozawa, they had established a working relationship by the end of July. Ozawa turned to Yamagishi for information on the Socialists, and Yamagishi thus became the ‘channel’ between the left and right elements of the coalition negotiations. He also recounted that he was asked to evaluate Hosokawa Morihiro to establish whether his intentions of becoming Prime Minister were serious. Yamagishi, along with Eda Satsuki, met Hosokawa and both felt that he was committed to the job; an opinion which Yamagishi regretted (Interview, Yamagishi, 12/9/00).6 On reflection, Yamagishi was not the catalyst of change to the same degree as Ozawa and Hosokawa, but he was an important actor in the negotiations of the 1993 non-LDP coalition government. Owing to the personality of Yamagishi, the unions managed an important behind-the-scenes influence on the coalition. A non-JCP, non-LDP coalition was formed, as had been the intention of Yamagishi since he had taken over as Chairman of Rengo– . His long-dreamt-of corporatist government which had sympathetic links to a unified labour movement was at last a reality.

1994–96: a period of turmoil With the formation of the coalition government in 1993, Rengo– was in the position for the first time of having all the parties that it supported united in one

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coalition. This was not to last for long, because in April 1994 the JSP ‘bucked’ away from the coalition which meant it lost its majority, and two months later the JSP joined with Sakigake and the LDP to form a government. Nonetheless, Rengo– still found itself in the position of having one of its traditional support parties in government, but the old So– hyo– and Do– mei divisions re-emerged. With the break-up of the coalition, the DSP joined with Ozawa Ichiro– in the creation of the super-opposition party Shinshinto– . This resulted in the old Heiwa Centre (So– hyo– ) and Yuaikaigi (Do– mei) divisions coming to the fore again. Thus, by 1995, the unions were back to supporting the parties they had backed ten years previously; this time the JSP was in government and the DSP members were now in a party second largest only to the LDP. There was now a further reason for division among the labour union movement. Rengo– was now divided into the unions who agreed with the JSP joining its enemy, the LDP, in a coalition, and those who did not, like Zendentsu– . Meanwhile, with the collapse of the original plan of uniting the opposition into one party which had proved to be unfeasible in the 1993–94 Hosokawa coalition, the unions and Rengo– were increasingly concerned with the need to create a new political party which could effectively challenge the LDP. Consequently they whole-heartedly backed the various attempts of politicians to create parties. One of these attempts was headed by the Socialist politician Akamatsu Hirotaka, discussed in Chapter 2. The other main attempt to create a political party during this period was that of Shin Minshu Rengo– , also discussed in Chapter 2. Yamagishi Akira was initially involved in this formation of Shin Minshu Rengo– – the rightwing breakaway party that Yamahana Sadao tried to create from the JSP in 1995, which was thwarted by the Kobe earthquake. But throughout this period of attempted new left-of-centre parties, the unions did not know whom to support, and while the political turmoil continued, support was very transitory. Union backing was given to candidates and new parties, and just as simply taken away again. It has been implied that Yamagishi was forced to retire owing to criticism of his heavy involvement in politics.7 Whatever the reason, the retirement of Yamagishi, who emphatically stated that he retired because of ill health, meant the link between politics and the labour movement changed dramatically. His successor, Ashida Junnosuke, and then his successor, Washio Etsuya, had less interest in politics (see below), and were determined to take unionism back to more fundamental tasks of negotiating wages and protecting jobs. To do this they felt that policy-by-policy cooperation with whichever party agreed was superior to the Yamagishi style. Thus, not only had Yamagishi’s dream of corporatism really died when the JSP joined the coalition with the LDP, but also with his retirement the idea that the unions could influence politics and possibly place parties in government had been challenged. Nonetheless, Yamagishi had been in the right place at the right time. Had any of his successors been the Chair of Rengo– at the time of the 1993 negotiations, their attitudes towards politics suggest that they would not have been as active in attempting to construct a non-LDP coalition. Another problem for the unions was that it was now difficult to decide through which party they could gain access to the Diet (particularly when the LDP and

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Shinshinto– took about 70 per cent of the electorate’s vote between 1994 and 1996). This confusion, combined with the fact that the unions’ traditional partner, the JSP, was in government with the LDP (and therefore was in a position to gain greater access for unions to government decision-making bodies), meant that increasingly unions were told that in elections they should support whichever candidate they deemed most fit to gain them access to power. In effect, the period 1994–96 was one in which the traditional support networks of left-wing parties and labour unions began to dissolve. The left-wing and the labour movement began to see each other in different terms. The left-wing parties were in a position in which they were in power and did not need the support they once needed. The unions had access to government and this had been increasing since the 1980s. They also had a new-found freedom to support candidates according to policy preferences. Nonetheless, as will be shown, while this situation remained preferable to the unions, the left-wing parties once again needed union support after the collapse of the JSP–LDP–Sakigake coalition in 1996 and the break-up of Shinshinto– in 1997.

1996–98: formation of the DPJ and the 1996 Lower House election The Democratic Party of Japan, when it was finally launched in September 1996, was the first new left-of-centre party since 1960 when the DSP was formed. It was formed just in time to fight the 1996 Lower House election and came out of the election with slightly fewer seats than it expected with 55. The launch of the party is considered in detail in Chapter 2, but what is significant to this chapter is the degree of consultation between Hatoyama Yukio and Yokomichi Takahiro with unions before the launch of the party. In interviews the leaders of the party emphasised the importance of union support. Even Kan Naoto, whose own electoral campaigns were originally conducted without any union support, stressed that the cooperation of the unions was important (Interview, Kan 25/7/00). A new left-wing party without union backing was thus considered impossible by these new party leaders, despite the changes described above. While the unions had changed their goals and were now supporting parties and candidates on an ad hoc basis, the left, even a new party, fronted by a politician renowned for not using union backing, could not fathom going forward without the support of the unions. The October 1996 election was the first held under the new electoral system, discussed in Chapter 5. It was a period of turmoil for both unions and parties. With the emergence of the DPJ, Rengo– opted to support some of its candidates. In Rengo– Weekly, the weekly Rengo– newsletter, the official candidates for the 1996 election that the organisation was going to support were nominated. In 41.7 per cent of the single member districts (SMDs) in which the DPJ nominated candidates, Rengo– supported the party. No doubt owing to the presence of former Do– mei candidates, it also supported Shinshinto– candidates in 39.2 per cent of districts. This meant that, in total, Rengo– supported Shinshinto– and DPJ candidates in

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approximately 10 per cent of the total 300 SMDs. It supported JSP candidates in 8.8 per cent of districts. It also supported non-aligned and other random candidates, who accounted for about 10 per cent of all candidates. These figures represent only the official candidates and the fact that support was given for only 79 districts suggests that in other areas Rengo– may have provided unofficial support for the LDP or the opposition parties (Rengo– Weekly, 11/10/96).

The break-up of Shinshinto– – the beginning of a united Rengo– In December 1997, Ozawa Ichiro– decided to break up Shinshinto– , the largest opposition party which had ‘included’ various political parties: Hata Tsutomu and Ozawa’s Shinseito– group, the former DSP, the former Ko– meito– group, Eda Satsuki’s Social Democratic League and Hosokawa’s JNP. This party, founded in December 1994, had been glued together by the need to ‘unite’ the opposition against the LDP, effectively what Rengo– had been trying to achieve since 1989. The break-up of the party was very important, as the splintered parties were in a position to affect politics and union relations, in particular the former DSP group. Mamiya Yukio, an employee of Do– mei, who is now employed by the political section of Rengo– , was present at the meeting on 27 December 1997 when the former DSP members had to decide whether they would go with Ozawa into the new Liberal Party he was intending to form, or whether they should remain independent and form their own party, even though this could mean that there would be only six members. Mamiya describes this day-long meeting as the most exciting day of his life as the discussion was so intense and the members were divided over what they should do. The decision was eventually made that – ai, but this was supposedly only because they would form their own party, the Yu one of the members was called away, giving the Yu– ai group a numerical advantage (Interview, Mamiya Yukio, 28/7/00). Carlile had described the efforts of former So– hyo– and Do– mei groups in 1993 to paper over their differences and form a union movement that could then influence the opposition parties to compromise and create a strong united front vis-àvis the LDP (Carlile 1994: 607–620). This papering over of the union movement – ai was finally achieved in the winter and spring of 1998 precisely because the Yu group opted out of going with Ozawa in December 1997. As a result, along with – ai joined the DPJ in April 1998. This had three results: first, Hata’s group, the Yu it created the largest opposition party and a group that was showing signs of being able to challenge the LDP. Second, it meant that the DSP group and some of the former JSP group were together in the same party for the first time since 1960. Finally, it meant that the So– hyo– (Heiwa Centre) and Do– mei (Yu– aikaigi) differentiations were no longer important. The break-up of Shinshinto– and Ozawa’s desire to form his own party, the Liberal Party, thus facilitated what the labour movement had been trying to do for ten years – create a united labour movement working alongside a united left opposition.

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The 2000 general election The 2000 House of Representatives election was the first since the formation of Rengo– when the union organisation could strategically support one political party. When Yu– ai joined the DPJ in 1998, the old union groupings, each Prefecture’s Heiwa Centre and Yu– aikaigi were officially broken down and combined into one organisation. The Rengo– political section was formed and this section was responsible for gathering votes for the DPJ. This form of vote gathering is quite different from the tactics employed at the local level and by other organisations. At the local level, an organisation (union, workers’ groups, church, student alumni, for example) will give its list of members to the candidate to be used alongside the other addresses which the candidate receives from many varied sources. The candidate is then able to send ‘mail-shots’ informing the member of meetings and events where he or she will be present. In comparison, Rengo– Headquarters are highly secretive about the contact details of the people they are trying to get to vote for the DPJ. They refuse to give the party the names and contact details but take the responsibility themselves to ensure that those contacted vote for the DPJ (Interview, Mamiya, 28/7/00). Mamiya also refused to divulge the numbers of votes that they felt they had been able to attract for each candidate and the DPJ, although this information exists and is carefully recorded by Rengo– . We shall discuss below how these numbers have dropped in the past 20 years. The election in 2000 thus saw the result that Rengo– had been working towards for years. A united opposition (the former DSP, JSP, SDL and centre-left politicians) now existed, which a united union movement could support. Nonetheless, the ad hoc policy instigated between 1992 and 1996 of unions voting for candidates from any party had had effect on some unions, as we shall discuss in these case studies of Jichiro– and Zendentsu– .

How did labour unions manage the handover from the JSP to the DPJ? Jichiro–: the government workers union Jichiro– is an important union as it has branches in each city, town, village and prefectural office incorporating most civil servants who are Grade Two and below.8 It has 1,250,000 members. Like any union, it attempts to improve workers’ living conditions, to provide better social services and health care, and to improve wages. It also conducts annual campaigns such as raising awareness of HIV and campaigning against discrimination towards working women. Jichiro– has an active policy of getting its former members into local, regional and national government in order to further awareness of local government needs and their workers’ lives. Although it would not be possible to say that other labour unions do not follow this strategy, Jichiro– is unique in that this is a major goal of the union, and it sends employees to help with the campaigns of these

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politicians.9 This strategy is used to increase the political education of Jichiro– employees. Jichiro– was part of So– hyo– prior to 1989. During the formation of Rengo– in 1989, the absorption of Jichiro– into the umbrella organisation was a contentious issue as there was a certain percentage of Jichiro– groups which was supportive of the Japan Communist Party rather than the JSP, but Jichiro– expelled the communist sectors of its union in order to unite with Rengo– . Joining Rengo– was thus of greater importance to the union than Rengo– officials had estimated. All in all, Jichiro– , despite its So– hyo– background, has become a union which is committed to reform of the left and actively supported the attempts throughout the 1990s to create a new party which could have the power to challenge the LDP. Jichiro– actively supported the formation of new parties. In its policy document, it outlines its dissatisfaction with the inability of the JSP to be an effective opposition party. In 1991, Jichiro– called upon the JSP to carry out internal reform and to shed certain ideological constraints (Jichiro– 1997: 18). The document further indicated that there were parts of the JSP which Jichiro– could not deny were now outdated but it still felt that it agreed with the JSP on the issue of peace and the Japan–US Security Treaty and for that reason would support it. However, after 1993, this support for the JSP began to disappear. In a chronology of events documented in a union publication, every attempted new party grouping is mentioned, despite the fact that these groups are seldom even remembered by most political commentators, let alone documented.10 Jichiro– had become committed to attempts to create new political parties which could challenge the LDP. Jichiro– was, for example, very supportive of the attempts by Shin Minshu Rengo– in January 1995 to establish a new party (Interview, Takagi Hiroshi, 31/7/00). With this background of reformism, cooperating with the Hatoyama brothers, Kan and Yokomichi in establishing the DPJ in October 1996 was a natural step. Furthermore, in the 1996 House of Representatives election, Jichiro– turned its back on the JSP and supposedly supported DPJ candidates only (Interview, Takayanagi Hideki, 13/9/00).11 This is of deep significance: the JSP were part of the coalition government prior to the 1996 election and the DPJ was only three weeks old when the election happened, yet in 46 prefectures Jichiro– supported the DPJ. Even if they did not support in every prefecture, the fact that they contributed to a high majority is significant. By the 2000 House of Representatives election, Jichiro– ’s unity had begun to break down and in many respects showed the opposite tendencies to Rengo– which had the first unified DSP and JSP election for 40 years. Some prefectural Jichiro– organisations returned to supporting the SDPJ but the majority supported the DPJ. On the whole, it was the prefectures in which DPJ candidates did not do well, or where there were organisational tensions in the 1996 election, which returned their allegiance to the SDPJ. Jichiro– reflects the tensions faced by all opposition parties and unions in Japan in the 1990s. It has managed to liberalise its policy and aims from a dogmatic Marxist perspective to a more open and flexible one and accordingly has been extremely supportive of attempts by new parties to break into, and hopefully

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shake up, the party system. On the other hand, Jichiro– began to find itself divided regionally over supporters of the JSP and the DPJ. The Head Office is now meant to be in close contact with the DPJ but, according to a staff member, relations with the JSP remained far easier to deal with as they had a better understanding of each other (Interview, Mamiya 28/7/00). Jichiro– also felt more comfortable with the predictability of JSP policy as opposed to the vagueness of DPJ policy. Old ties are hard to break, and Jichiro– , while being an excellent example of an organisation which tried to restructure itself in the 1990s, was left in the position of not quite knowing which party was the best one to support. _

Zendentsu: the NTT telecommunications giant union _

In comparison with Jichiro– , Zendentsu is a union which follows a centralised blueprint of the parties that it should support. Thus, any regional information about the _ support networks between Zendentsu and the left-wing parties can be considered to be a generic pattern which has been used by all other regional branches of _ _ Zendentsu . Information was obtained from the Okayama branch of Zendentsu, which can be used to determine the general trends of its support country-wide. _ In the 1989 House of Councillors election, Okayama Zendentsu supported the – Rengo candidate, Takahara Katsuya, as opposed to the JSP candidate, Mori Nobuko. This decision indicates the union’s commitment to the Rengo– attempt to enter politics. This support could also be the result of personal networks. The first Rengo– Okayama Chairman in 1990 was Morimoto Tetsuma.12 He was the former _ Chair of Zendentsu and therefore in 1989 was concerned with presenting himself in a manner that would emphasise his Rengo– credentials. The 1990 House of Representatives election, the last but one fought under the _ old system, is indicative of the wide support of parties that Zendentsu followed _ as a national trend. In District One, Zendentsu supported Eda Satsuki and the _ Social Democratic League, showing the deep Zendentsu /SDL/Eda connections. In District Two, it supported the JSP candidate Mizuta Minoru and also a LDP candidate, Hiranuma Takeo, showing that the union was supportive of candidates beyond the confines of its So– hyo– background. The 1992 Upper House election _ was an example of Zendentsu returning to its So– hyo– and Heiwa Centre roots. It supported the House of Councillors candidate for the JSP, Ichii Junji, who was solidly backed by unions. _ From 1993 until 1995, Zendentsu’s candidates reflected the political turmoil of the time. In the 1993 Lower House election, the union supported Eda Satsuki, Ko– meito– and DSP candidates. In the 1995 Upper House election, it supported the JSP in the proportional representation district, but did not support any candidate in the Okayama district. _ From 1996, Zendentsu showed its backing for the creation of the DPJ by supporting its candidates. In the 1996 House of Representatives election it supported Nakagiri Shingo and, as with Rengo– , it fully supported the DPJ candidate in each district of Okayama in the 2000 Lower House election, with particular responsibility for District Two.13

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Despite this support for the DPJ in the House of Representatives election, it was divided in the 1998 Upper House election owing to the intense rivalry between Eda Satsuki and Ichii Junji. Ichii was the official candidate of the DPJ, _ yet not only had Zendentsu always supported Eda, but Eda reflected the type of left-of-centre candidate it admired as opposed to the union-dominated Ichii. Thus, it supported Eda in the Okayama district and Ichii in the proportional representation district. _ Zendentsu has always shown eclectic tendencies in deciding which party to support rather than just following the So– hyo– pattern of supporting the JSP candidate. This is understandable in view of the fact that it was Zendentsu– who produced the maverick and forward-thinking union leader, Yamagishi. However, despite the ideals of this union, since the formation of the DPJ it seems to have developed a strategy of supporting the DPJ.

The flexible support of labour unions We have discussed above how Yamagishi Akira was far more motivated to influence the political world in Japan than were his two successors as Rengo– Chair. Furthermore, we have discussed that in the case of both Jichiro– and _ Zendentsu they became far more flexible in the parties they supported, particularly in the 2000 House of Representatives election in comparison to the 1996 election. Whereas in 1996 it had supported DPJ candidates, by 2000 Jichiro– also _ backed JSP candidates and Zendentsu backed candidates from most parties, including the LDP. This flexibility is difficult to explain and account for. As long as the leader of Rengo– was a committed supporter of the concept of a united and strong opposition such as the DPJ, it could have been likely that Rengo– would have exerted more influence on unions to support the party. Once Yamagishi no longer had influence on labour unions and, furthermore, his successors were not as interested in political involvement, it would seem that individual unions were more free to support whom they liked. This meant that, as we have seen above, some unions in some Prefectures decided to return or continue to support the JSP, or even support the LDP, whereas many supported the DPJ. Fundamentally, the DPJ was the most pragmatic party for the unions to support as it was the main opposition party. Furthermore, as has been discussed above, for the first time since 1960 Rengo– was a labour union umbrella organisation which supported one political party. This provided ‘strength in numbers’ and partially can explain why many unions decided to back the DPJ, even though, as suggested above, the JSP was sometimes an easier organisation to work with. And here lies the end of a long and complicated story to a large degree. Since the early 2000s the relationship between the DPJ and unions has continued without major crisis or problem. Not every Prefectural branch fully supports the DPJ, as has been indicated above, but the tendency is that most Rengo– -affiliated unions support the DPJ. There are some Prefectures where specific important unions such as Jichiro– support the SDPJ and even some Prefectures where the majority

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of unions are mainly SDPJ backers, but the norm is that labour unions are now behind the DPJ. Prefectures where the unions mainly support the SDPJ are Toyama, Miyazawa, Akita, Niigata, Kagawa, Nagasaki and Okinawa (Interview, Fukushima, 16/8/07). On the contrary, Prefectures where the DPJ and unions’ relationship is particularly strong are Hokkaido– (because it has always been leftwing), Aichi (because of the strength of Toyota), Mie and Okayama (because the SDPJ has to all extents and purposes disappeared in each area). Since Yamagishi resigned as leader of Rengo– in 1995, there have been four more Rengo– leaders. Each have come from a different union background: notably _ Ashida Junosuke 1995–97 (textile industry), Washio Etsuya 1997–2001 (Japan steel production union), Sasamori Kiyoshi 2001–05 (electrical generation union) and finally Takagi Tsuyoshi since 2005 (Japanese Federation of Textiles, Chemicals, Food Commercial Services and General Workers Union). Yamagishi was charismatic but his successors have been quite different. Ashida was from a Do– mei-backed union and was proud of this which made him unpopular. He had poor leadership and decision-making skills and was not engaged with politics. Washio was also not successful as he was ‘above’ most unionists. He was a Tokyo University graduate and was quite proud of this. He did not understand the life of normal workers and had weak negotiation skills. He was So– hyo– backed but the Steel union had good relations with Do– mei as well which smoothed out his role. Sasamori was in many ways the most successful leader after Yamagishi. He was from Do– mei, as was his executive officer Kusano. Both very much emphasised the rights and needs of workers. He also wanted to balance the relationship between the old So– hyo– and Do– mei. They were interested in involving the unions in the peace and Constitutional issue, social issues and political issues. He endeavoured to see that unions retained their influence politically and within government. One of his concerns was that, as we will see in relation to Okayama, there were few local DPJ candidates whereas the party had national candidates. So compared to Yamagishi, Sasamori had a more holistic view of the party–union relationship. Finally, Takagi, who also had a Do– mei background, had been working in embassies so had little experience of the average worker. As a consequence, he was unable to work well with people. He favoured Constitutional revision. He had a good relationship with Ozawa because Ozawa worked to ensure that there were good relations between the party and the unions. This was very much to the benefit of the DPJ in 2007 as the unions contributed to the DPJ campaign. In 2004 and 2005, the union–DPJ relationship had not been so profitable and worthwhile because the Rengo– leader and DPJ relationship had not been as good. But even despite this attempt by Ozawa to make the relationship good, Jichiro– and Nikkyo– so have better relationships with the party than Takagi does so he should be seen as weak and possibly the least effective leader so far (Private communication, Morimoto, 8/8/08). Some policy issues manage to ‘unite’ the unions and parties more than others. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 2007, just prior to the election, there was a big scandal when it emerged that 50 million national pension payments had not, over many years, been credited to the correct accounts. As this was something which

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concerned the average worker in Japan so much, it brought the unions and DPJ together and their constant response and attack on the government can be seen as one of the reasons why the DPJ did so well in the July election. Conversely, the relatively restrained DPJ policy for Constitutional reform irritates many unionists on the grounds that it does not sufficiently follow current union policy on the Constitution. To many, this risks opening a crack through which a flood might pour in the future (Interview, Himei Shigeru, 19/8/06). Indeed, in 2007, the unionists who stood as candidates for the DPJ gained considerable support in the National PR race. All of the seven union-backed candidates were successful and this piece of information was very quickly passed around to all Rengo– offices from the head offices within a few hours of election results becoming apparent (Private fax, Rengo– , 30/7/07). Out of the 50 winning candidates they were impressively ranked first, second, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh. They were also seven out of the 20 winning DPJ PR candidates. Aihara Kumiko, backed by Jichiro– , came first in the PR race. She was particularly praised by Okayama Rengo– because she visited four times before the election and once during the campaign. These examples show how important unions still are to the DPJ. The fact that the party still relies upon them for support cannot be denied. Referring back to the factions discussed in Chapter 2, DPJ Diet members with a union background have joined the former JSP faction and the former DSP faction, showing their affiliation with old-style union attachments. Even so, we should note that, though unionists do well in the national PR constituency and in elections for the Upper House, it is now rare for a unionist to stand in the Prefectural seats (Discussion, Eda Satsuki, 14/10/08). Despite this obvious importance of the relationship between the unions and the DPJ, relationships between them have not always been smooth. At the beginning of his leadership of the DPJ, Maehara was quoted as saying that the DPJ should free itself from the ‘fetters of vested interests and old habits’ (Japan T imes, 4/10/05). This greatly irritated the unions. Another problem is that the LDP is _ seeing the unions as more and more important to their successes. Doi Ryuichi of Kobe described how it is becoming more difficult for the DPJ to obtain union support and that this is a big problem (dai mondai) for the party, because the LDP is now also making a strong bid for union support (Interview, Doi, 27/8/06). According to Ogame from Okayama, Ozawa thinks of unions much as the LDP does. DPJ vagueness in its thinking about unions is dangerous since (like Doi also said) the LDP are also pursuing them (Interview, Ogame, 4/7/06). The unions are also impacting upon DPJ policy formation to a certain extent as they are following very traditional left-wing political views. Hatoyama Yukio very much wanted to push for a policy which would facilitate and simplify immigration to Japan because of the decline in the working population, but the unions were strongly opposed to this (Interview, Eda Yo– ichi secretary to Eda Satsuki, 22/8/06). Nikkyo– so is very concerned about changes to the Constitution, but, according to Kawamura Tatsuo, they should be far more concerned about the changing job structure in Japan with the emergence of fur–ita– (part-time workers) and hikikomori (young people who withdraw from society). To the contrary, the

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Japanese Association of Metal, Machinery and Manufacturing Workers (JAM) no longer believe in having any political education of their members and they support no candidate of their own (Interview, Kawabata, 8/8/06). But despite all of these discussions of the relationship between the unions and the DPJ, what is evident from Table 4.2 is that, whereas some politicians within the DPJ are not relying on unions at all, some still are. Furthermore, these are not solely politicians who have been involved in politics since before 1993 such as _ Kawamura, but they are also first-time winners such as Yu noki from Okayama – shi from Shizuoka Five. Four and relatively young politicians such as Hosono Go _ They also rely for much of their support on the unions. Indeed, Yunoki places priority on visiting unions in Okayama at weekends and when the Diet is closed. In contrast there seem to be several politicians for whom the unions provide very little support. The combination of these various types of relationship indicates that the DPJ has moved on from JSP practice. Relationships between Diet members and their supporters are now more diverse and they do not need to depend entirely on unions. Nonetheless, unions are still important. Eda Satsuki described the relationship as the unions now being less important than citizen groups as DPJ supporters. The main strength of the party support is that of normal, unorganised citizens but the unions are an added bonus. However, he also pointed out that this impression is not given to the unions lest they be made to feel unimportant (Discussion, Eda Satsuki, 14/10/08).

The decline of unionism At the beginning of this chapter we posed two questions: How has the relationship between left-wing parties, the government and labour unions changed since the mid-1980s? And what effect has the decline of unionism, and the changes described above, had on the left’s ability to mobilise voters? Above, we have seen that the parties can no longer expect guaranteed support from a union. This has been made worse by the fact that union membership is declining and unions can no longer mobilise their workforce to vote for the candidates they are backing. Figure 4.1 shows that the number of unionised workers was fairly consistent until 1995 (although that does represent a drop as the population grew). Since then membership has dropped dramatically and clearly this is partly connected to the older, more politically active roles of So– hyo– and Do– mei, and the younger generation not having the political conscience that their elder generations had had. In comparison, Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of unionised workers to total workers (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-16.htm, accessed 8/8/08). Figure 4.2 shows that unionised workers have dropped in number since 1975 by about 3 million. Simultaneously the Japanese population of an employable age has increased by 25 per cent. This means that union membership has fallen by around six million members since 1975. Union membership is declining as more of the workforce is brought into the tertiary sector, and unionised workers tend to be white collar (Carlile 1994: 611). Thus fewer and fewer ‘unionised workers’ are available for the DPJ to mobilise at elections. Furthermore, the guarantee that these unionised

Table 4.2 Union support of DPJ members interviewed and who disclosed union support Name

Faction (former party)/ Number of wins

District/Type of district

Union support

Furukawa Motohisa Tsurunen Marutei Hosokawa Ritsuo

Ryo–gun/Claims none/4

Aichi 2/Metropolitan

Claims none

Kan/None/2

Claims none

Kan/Claims none/6

Upper House National Constituency Kita Kanto/Urban

Edano Yukio

Ryo–gun

Saitama 5/Urban

Nagatsuma Akira Tsumura Keisuke

No faction/3

Tokyo PR

Ryo–gun/Kan/2

Okayama 2/Mixed

Ogawa Jyunya

Ryo–gun/1

Shikoku PR (Takamatsu 1)

Matsumoto Takeaki

Hatoyama/Ryo–gun/3 (father ex-LDP politician)

Kinki PR (Himeiji)/ Mixed

Hosono Go–shi

Ryo–gun/3

Shizuoka 5/Mixed

Claims to get 10% of support from unions Very limited support – 5 people came to help in offices. Nobody in cars. Passes out leaflets within unions 1,000 votes Around 17,000 votes which accounts for 20% of total. This could drop after the problems unions thought about him discussed in Chapter 4. 20,000 votes of approx. 90,000 (but Kagawa is still SDPJ supporting) 30,000 which he claims is high and unionists do not care his father was LDP 55–65,000 support/60% of total vote. 10,000 in first election in 2000 but, compared to 2000, unions (Continued)

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Table 4.2 (Continued) Name

Faction (former party)/ Number of wins

District/Type of district

Kawabata Tatsuo

DSP Group/ Hatoyama/7

Kinki PR/Shiga

Yunoki Michiyoshi

Kan/1

Okayama 4

Union support gave him more support then than now as he needed so much more 60,000 unionists support plus families gets 120,000 30,000 union votes plus families gets 60,000 of c.100,000. He makes a point of 3 union visits a week

Source: Combination of data taken from interviews carried out between July 2006 and August 2007.

workers will vote for the designated candidate can no longer be taken for granted (see above). So, union support has changed. But, while unions can no longer offer as many votes as they once could, they still have some kind of organisation, which many new DPJ candidates lack or are happy to utlise. In Okayama, there was a case of a DPJ politician paying Rengo– for support in the 2000 House of Representatives election.14 This candidate was in a weak position and paid six million yen to gain access to union membership lists. It can be assumed that, without this ‘financial help’, Rengo– would not have supported (or supported to the degree it did) this candidate and it is therefore a significant symbol of the decaying relationship between unions and parties. In addition, the parties complain that it is no longer possible to get the support once considered possible, as unionised workers do not have the influence over their families that they once had and parties see this as a worrying trend (Interview, Morimoto Tetsuma, 6/4/01).

Conclusion In this chapter we have shown that the relationship between the unions and leftwing parties in Japan has irrevocably changed. First, we showed that the unions have managed through the creation of Rengo– to gain access to the government and bureaucracy. This meant that the unions had less incentive to continue to support the left-wing parties in their traditional relationship of access to government in return for financial and mobilisational support.

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Number of workers (unit = 1000)

13000 12500 12000 11500 11000 10500 10000 9500 9000 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995 Year

2000

2004

2005

2006

Figure 4.1 Number of unionised workers.

Percentage

Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-16.htm.

26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995 Date

2000

2004

2005

2006

Figure 4.2 Percentage of complete workforce unionised. Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-16.htm.

We then showed that, in order to fulfil a dream of corporatism, the unions merged into one umbrella organisation and attempted to unify the left-wing opposition parties and create a united party or, at the least, electoral coalitions. Owing to deep-seated divisions in the left this could not be brought to reality. The political turmoil of the mid-1990s brought about major changes in the relationship between left-wing parties and unions. It was thought that the non-LDP coalition government and the new political parties that were emerging could form a social democratic corporatist government. However, the ensuing collapse of the 1993 Hosokawa coalition and the creation of the JSP/LDP coalition meant that existing assumptions about which parties the unions supported had to be ignored. With the emergence of an enlarged opposition party in 1998 in the form of the strengthened DPJ, the DSP and JSP became united for the first time since 1960,

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and, as a result, some of the problems about party support for unions became alleviated. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the JSP, now the SDPJ, remains a separate organisation and still gains union support. Thus Yamagishi Akira’s dream of uniting the left into one cooperative force has been attained to all intents and purposes, yet it is a pale imitation of the ideal he envisaged in the late 1980s. His dream has not been attained because, first, union membership is lower than ever before. This has meant that there are fewer members for unions to mobilise in political support activities. Furthermore, members apparently used to be able to mobilise their entire families, but this family mobilisation capacity is also declining. Second, unions now have unprecedented access to government. They have managed to attain this through their closer links with the LDP and also because of the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s. They have lost some of the militancy associated with the old So– hyo– unions and been allowed greater consultative privileges. Third, the new DPJ, while not rejecting links with unions, is not as reliant on them as before since it is establishing wider support networks as compared to the former JSP and DSP. Nonetheless, the left parties, and mostly the DPJ, need the unions as much as ever. The DPJ still takes its links to the unions very seriously. As will be examined in the next chapter, the new electoral system introduced in 1994 has meant that the opposition parties need to get far more votes per electoral district to have any hope of winning a single member district seat. As a result, the DPJ is maintaining its links with unions while trying to find new citizen-based supporters. The crises of trying to mobilise the non-aligned voter (the muto–haso–), and ideological pressures have also played their part in this decline of support. Yamagishi Akira’s dream of a united Japanese left was attained, but far too late and without achieving the effects he thought it would. The relationship between unions and opposition parties has become more unpredictable and ad hoc and will never be as simple as it was under the 1955 system, but it remains a core relationship.

5

Electoral system reforms and their impact on the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Party of Japan

In 1994, the Japanese electoral law was radically changed. The electoral system of the Lower House was changed from a medium-sized constituency single nontransferable vote system to a mixed single member district and proportional representation (PR) system. Public funding for political parties was also introduced along with harsher penalties for electoral malpractice. The Japanese political system had been widely criticised for being too candidate-centric and prone to corruption. This fault was perceived to be due to the old electoral system and consequently there were increasing calls for electoral reform. Electoral reform became the focal political issue between summer 1993 and spring 1994 during the Hosokawa coalition, and the electoral law of 4 March 1994 was the result of that debate. This was the main product of that government and we need to assess why they introduced the system they did. It needs time for a new system to settle down and for the candidates and parties to be able to understand it enough to use it tactically. Indeed, to date, we have had three elections under ‘normal conditions’ under the new system and one, the ‘Koizumi’ election, which, while under the same rules, differed slightly in the sense that Koizumi created his own opposition and denied the real opposition any strength and voice. Therefore we are beginning to see how this system is settling down and how the parties are dealing with it. With all future elections we can begin to assume that the parties will have come to grips with the most strategic way to handle elections in their constituencies. The aim of this chapter is to attempt to assess the new system; we will mainly examine its effects on the opposition parties, but the discussion will also have to cover other parties. After briefly analysing why the old electoral system required a change and why the new electoral system was chosen, the following questions will be asked: What institutional impact was the new electoral system expected to have on the Japanese party system? What effects did the new electoral system and funding rules have on campaigning methods and voter mobilisation for political parties and, in particular, opposition parties? And finally, with, at the time of writing, four elections completed and one likely to happen within months, what effects have the new electoral system had on the Japanese party system, with particular attention paid to the effect it has had on the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the very small Social Democratic Party (SDPJ – the former Japan

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Socialist Party [JSP])? In December 2002, Hatoyama Yukio was quoted in the Japan Times as saying, ‘A necessary condition … is for opposition parties to come together and build the foundation for a two-party system, which is what I really want to do’ (1/12/02). We shall show that the new electoral system has been both beneficial and detrimental to the opposition, and in particular to the DPJ that has grown concurrently with the electoral system. The benefit is that one main opposition party competes against the government party because of the heavier weighting of the single member districts (SMDs) to the PR seats. This has resulted in the opposition DPJ consolidating itself, despite the factional divisions discussed in Chapter 2, into the leading opposition party. A party needs to put forward more convincing candidates in a SMD than under the old electoral system known as the medium-sized, single non-transferable vote system (chu– senkyokusei in Japanese) and this has been the incentive for the party to work within factionalism and choose candidates that are younger, some of whom are women, and candidates who are not as connected to labour unions as would have been the case for the JSP in the 1955 system. Fundamentally, the new system has thus benefited the DPJ and been an incentive for the party to retain its coherence. On the other hand, the new electoral system also created many difficulties for the DPJ and some of these difficulties seem not to affect the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) quite as much. These will be described below in detail but fundamentally concern the way in which the DPJ manages to deal with the problem of putting candidates up in both the SMD and PR seats of the new system, the sekihairitsu system, and the allure of the SMD part of the vote.

The Japanese electoral system, 1925–94 The former Japanese electoral system is often referred to in English as the single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in medium-member constituencies. This refers to the fact that the electorate were given a single ballot on which it was required to write the name of its preferred candidate. It was a requirement that the name of the candidate was actually written and this is still an important issue as it has become a ‘habit’ in Japan (see below), because despite the new electoral system originally being designed around electors ‘ticking’ the name of a candidate which was printed on the ballot paper, the LDP changed the system in 1995 so that it returned to the old method of electors writing the name of their chosen candidate. The term ‘non-transferable’ refers to the fact that each district elected more than one candidate yet there was no strategy for transferring the votes from one candidate to another. The district was what is commonly referred to as ‘medium-sized’ since voters elected between two and six members from each district. (The term ‘medium’ is taken from the Japanese, chu– senkyokusei. This distinguishes the system from the large electoral districts that were used before 1925 and in the 1946 election, daisenkyokusei, and the small (single member) districts introduced in the reforms and used in the UK for example, sho–senkyokusei.)

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The combination of single votes and multi-member constituencies meant that, for a party to win a majority of seats in the House of Representatives (256 seats of the 511 available at the end of the 1955 system, for example), it had to run multiple candidates in all, or nearly all, districts. Thus, it became crucial that politicians managed to distinguish themselves from their colleagues in the same party and it was for this reason that the old system was highly criticised for engendering candidate recognition politics rather than party recognition politics. This was particularly true for the LDP, which became from the late 1960s the only party that consistently put up more than one candidate in each district. This had obvious implications for name recognition politics. As voters had to write the name of the candidate, they needed to know both the name of the candidate and the characters which are used to write his or her name. Owing to the complexity of the Japanese language, this meant that candidates had to write their name in the simplest characters, sometimes changing parts of it, or putting sections into the simpler phonetic alphabet, hiragana. As discussed below, name writing on the ballot also had further implications for the desired reforms of the new electoral system of making party recognition more important than name recognition. Names are given on the booths in polling stations but it is thought by politicians that, as all candidates’ names are given, they still have to distinguish their names from others or utilise characters that are simple so that candidates know how to write their names. As long as candidates had to make their name well known, there was little chance that party recognition would begin to outweigh name recognition in importance. Candidate recognition in turn created ‘pork barrel politics’. Politicians were forced to emphasise what they could bring to the district in terms of infrastructure and prestige, so that politics were reduced to a form of ‘bribe’. Party platforms were rarely if ever discussed and were certainly not among the LDP candidates who needed to distinguish themselves from each other. The JSP and the minor parties had fundamental party ideologies to put forward (based on such things as the Constitution and defence and workers’ rights), but since the LDP did not emphasise policy and instead politicians considered their own personal image, the opposition parties had no incentive to formulate or put forward carefully considered or budgeted policies. Also, from the mid-1960s onwards, it was only in a few districts that the JSP was fighting internally by putting more than one candidate up. Candidate recognition politics created the need for money. In order to win voters, LDP politicians created ko–enkai (personal support networks) in which they wooed their supporters to vote for them.1 These networks required enormous sums of money to maintain, and politicians were forced to gather money from bribes and donations from the public as well as from their factional bosses who distributed money down the ranks of the party. Factions within the LDP have been one of the most discussed aspects of the party, but also resulted from the electoral system. One of the reasons suggested for the existence of factions is that bosses of the party bought support in the party presidential elections by passing on money down the faction to fund politicians’

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activities (Curtis 1971: 23–24). It is for this reason that it was normal for LDP politicians in the same district to be in different factions. The existence of the factions has also been attributed to the electoral system. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argued that the existence of five main LDP factions explained that the majority of districts were five-member districts, thus causing five factions to emerge (1993: 72–77). This theory is slightly problematic because it was very rare for the LDP to put more than three candidates in any district so this argument for five main factions does not follow. Nonetheless, factionalism in turn promoted a corrupt environment of ever-increasing money transactions and bribery in order for their financial needs to be satisfied. The SNTV electoral system was thus thought to be responsible for candidate-centric politics, corruption and bribery, and factionalism. Associated with the problem of candidate-centred politics was also the problem that, as the SNTV system did not produce two large parties, there was no real chance of two parties alternating in power. But the system allowed small parties such as Ko– meito– , the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to survive, as, according to Gerald Curtis, it was a system of imperfect proportional representation (Curtis 1999: 140). In a fivemember district, a party with only 20 per cent of the vote could win a seat, and furthermore, if the electorate had disproportionately favoured one particular candidate (often a LDP candidate), a candidate from a smaller party could be elected with a much smaller percentage of the vote. This dynamic meant that the system was not one especially advantageous to incumbents or difficult for new politicians to break into, so there was considerable turnover of new politicians, even within the LDP. However, this also created one of the biggest problems for the LDP of putting up too many candidates. This was referred to in Japanese as tomodaore, ‘falling down together’. During the period of LDP dominance it was not unusual for the party to run too many candidates (or for the party to be challenged by an independent conservative). When the party ran three candidates where they were likely to win only two seats, they risked winning only one, and when they put up two when they should have run one, they won none, so the candidates ‘fell down together’. Slightly different but very significant for the non-LDP, should the LDP vote be divided between different candidates unequally, it enabled an opposition member to benefit and take one of its seats. This was an important benefit of the old system for the opposition parties. The electoral system also meant that parties were not centralised, which left candidates with a high degree of independence to do as they wanted. Curtis describes the system as a franchise between the party organisation and candidates because, even though the party offered a name and some support to the candidate, he was then responsible for becoming his own political entrepreneur (Curtis 1999: 143). Thus, there was no umbrella-like influence on policy in the LDP, though the JSP, because of the greater importance of ideology for it, did not suffer from this problem to the same extent. Criticism of the old electoral system gradually snowballed to the point where the disadvantages were seen to outweigh the advantages, and, according to Curtis, this belief became stronger with each election. He went on to say:

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Japan’s election system was primarily responsible for factionalism, moneypolitics, the power of special interests, candidate- rather than partyoriented election campaigns, an emphasis on personality rather than policy in voting behaviour, and LDP one-party dominance. If there were going to be meaningful political reform, there would have to be radical change in the electoral system. Those politicians who were not in the forefront of the campaign for electoral reform got caught up in its wake. It became virtually impossible to be a proponent of ‘reform’ and not be in favour of abolishing the medium-sized election-district system. (Curtis 1999: 142) Electoral reform had thus become a panacea that would solve all political ills. Great things were expected of this system change yet introducing it was going to prove to be most difficult.

The debate about the new electoral system and why the mixed system was introduced A mixed system of 300 single member districts and 200 PR seats divided into 11 regions was introduced in Japan as a political compromise. J.A.A. Stockwin describes this final decision as follows: ‘On paper it looks completely different from the system that preceded it. In practice, however, certain elements have been incorporated into the new system that were reminiscent of the old’ (Stockwin 2003: 53). Gerald Curtis has described in detail the process of electoral reform debate in the early 1990s. One of his first comments recounts in detail the electoral reform process: [I]n the complex process of moving the legislation through the Diet, all political parties, with the exception of the Communists, wound up supporting an electoral system that was virtually identical to the one every party opposed to the LDP, and many members of the LDP as well, had rejected when a government commission had proposed it some three years earlier. (Curtis 1999: 137) Why then was an electoral system that was disliked and potentially lacking the capacity to reform politics chosen – a system that the non-LDP parties had rejected prior to 1993? It is assumed that each party was able to evaluate the relative benefits and disadvantages of the proposed electoral system for its own individual prospects. It can also be considered that most parties were comfortable within the current electoral system. It had given the LDP 38 years of power and the JSP knew that the semi-PR nature of the SNTV system meant that it would be able to maintain a certain electoral presence despite its significant decline in 1993. The smaller parties (Ko– meito– , the DSP and the SDL) had all survived under the old system and were thus suspicious of the potential ill effects a new system could have on small parties. Furthermore, the JCP was ideologically committed to a pure PR system regardless of the vote-winning potential for itself. But

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the climate in the reform movement of 1993–94 was a climate of electoral change and furthermore it was a climate of introducing single member districts along with some PR seats. No other potential electoral system would do, as some form of single-seat majority system was going to be the panacea which would save Japanese politics. Other electoral systems would not fall into the ‘historically constructed Japanese universe of electoral system alternatives’ (Curtis 1999: 168). Gerald Curtis, in his wonderfully detailed chapter on the politics of electoral reform, concludes that the story of electoral reform in Japan shows that politicians can do ‘irrational things for perfectly sensible reasons’ (1999: 140). The Socialists and smaller parties had wanted a PR system to hinder the LDP’s attempts to introduce a simple first-past-the-post system. They saw first-past-thepost as an attempt to force the smaller parties out of politics and get a two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution. This had been one of the aims of the LDP since 1955 when the Prime Minister, Hatoyama Ichiro– , had introduced his famous ‘Hatomander’ policy to redraw the election districts to benefit the LDP (Curtis 1999: 146). The Election System Advisory Councils had met periodically from the 1960s onwards but it was in the late 1980s that the calls for electoral reform began to grow. The Eighth Council started in 1989 with the assumption that, because of the positions of the LDP and JSP mentioned above, neither a straight single-member-district system nor a pure PR system would stand any chance of being adopted. The Council and parties then turned to the strategy of introducing a mixed system and the debate became one concerning the relative numbers of PR and single majority seats. Also, mixed systems were being introduced in other countries at the time and were seen as the system of the moment.2 The Eighth Council suggested 300 single member districts and 200 PR seats in 11 PR districts, which is nearly identical in every respect to the system that was eventually introduced in 1994. The complicated system which will be discussed below of allowing failed SMD members to be resurrected in the PR blocs was the only point not in the Eighth Council recommendations. It was rejected at the time as being unacceptable to both sides of the political spectrum and in particular to the opposition. Their dissatisfaction with the proposed system was due to the relative weighting of the SMD and PR seats. Prior to the no-confidence bill against Miyazawa which overtook their proposal, the JSP and Ko– meito– had proposed a system of 300 PR seats and 200 SMDs but the bill was shelved because of the crisis after the noconfidence motion. The opposition wanted a heavier weighting than the LDP of PR seats to SMD seats as this would obviously benefit them more. After many discussions, the eventual electoral reform was adopted after one-to-one talks between Hosokawa Morihiro, the Prime Minister, and Ko– no Yo– hei, the President of the LDP (Curtis 1999: 159). As mentioned above, 300 SMDs and 200 seats in 11 PR districts were selected. The elector votes for a candidate in the SMDs3 and has a second vote to select a party in the PR seats. The new electoral system was passed through the Diet by means of a Constitutional provision that had not been used in 43 years; Article 59 allows for the convening of a joint conference committee to resolve the differences between the Upper and Lower Houses over political reform. But what impact was the new system likely to have on the Japanese party system?

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What effect was the electoral system likely to have on the Japanese party system? Looking back with hindsight, the wide-ranging academic opinions about the likely results of the new electoral system, before 1996 and after the first election, are interesting since the views of what would happen are very different. The only conclusion that can be made about political scientists’ attempts to assess mixed electoral systems, and in particular Japan’s mixed system before it was established, was that there was wide disagreement about whether the single member districts would be dominant or whether the PR part of the ballot would have sufficient impact to counterbalance the effects of the first-past-the-post seats. This is important when analysing what impact the new system would have on the Japanese opposition. We shall first analyse what political scientists felt would be the dominant aspect of the electoral system: the 300 SMDs, or the 200 PR seats, and the extent to which they would both influence the eventual balance of the Diet. It is also important to note that, while the LDP reduced the number of PR seats to 180 in 2000 after the election, the fundamental balance remains similar so this is not something which needs to be considered in this debate about what the electoral system would engender. Nonetheless, it should just be noted that the effects of the PR would have slightly less power after 2000. So, of the two types of votes, which would be stronger? Kobayashi and Kawato expressed belief in the strength of single member districts (Kobayashi 1991; Kawato, Asahi Shinbun, 11/10/96). As we sit in 2008 with the perspective of several elections behind us, we can tell that those who felt that the single member districts would predominate and a virtual two-party system could emerge have been shown to be correct to a large extent. But even though this prediction that the SMD would prove to be dominant has been proven to be true, many asked whether the predominant single member system would necessarily produce party dualism, which has become the accepted view of Duverger’s law (Duverger 1959). Even he contradicted his own rule by saying: [A] particular electoral regime does not necessarily produce a particular electoral system; it merely exerts pressure in the direction of this system; it is a force which acts among several other forces, some of which tend in the opposite direction. (Duverger 1986: 70) Thus, even Duverger suggests that the SMD part of the new electoral system would not necessarily strengthen two parties at the expense of the smaller parties as the JSP and Ko– meito– had feared. Huang suggested that there would be a coalition government with one larger party predominating (Huang 1996: 139). Wada suggested that, if voters were not strategic, this new Japanese electoral system would provide a multi-party system (Wada 1995: 32–40). Herron and Nishikawa suggested that there were three possible outcomes from a mixed system with two separate ballots (like the Japanese

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one) when voters act strategically. Voters could vote for two different parties in each ballot, which would be to the advantage of small parties rather than large parties and would result in a stronger PR effect. Alternatively, voters could vote for the same party in both ballots but, if they voted sincerely in the PR and then chose a party which was closest to that party’s platform in the single member district, the result would be a mixed system, whereas, if they voted sincerely in the SMD and also chose that party in the PR, a two-party system would emerge (Herron and Nishikawa 2000: 63–86). But as Curtis said in 1999, the new electoral system had a tendency to produce a two-party system and thereby influences parties to coalesce, but also has centrifugal pressures from the PR that cause it to fragment (Curtis 1999: 166). Likewise, Herron and Nishikawa concluded that a mixed system can never produce a two-party system since the contamination from the PR is too great. They argued that this electoral system does have a PR effect and, while it will probably create one large party (currently the LDP), it would also maintain another reasonably large party (what has become the DPJ) but sustain other small parties (Herron and Nishikawa 2000: 63–86). Curtis ended his analysis of the new electoral system by saying ‘it is not at all clear whether Japanese party politics will evolve in the direction of a two-party system’ (1999: 166). Thus, political scientists were divided as to what impact the new electoral system in Japan would have on the party system. But there was also the issue of what effect the new electoral system would have on candidates’ attitudes towards policy and ‘party ideological positions’. In Japan, it was long assumed that, if the district magnitude was reduced from the medium-sized districts used during the 1955 system, party identity and policy would become more important than the personal identity and ‘pork barrel’ politics that the politics of 1955 to 1993 had become renowned for. The introduction of single member districts was considered in the Election System Advisory Councils as a means of reducing ‘pork’ politics. However, did this new electoral system really have the potential to do this?

The new electoral system and the joint problems that it has created with particular reference to the opposition The first election held under the new electoral system was in October 1996. Having been present at speeches made by politicians before and during the campaign, my prevailing impression was that politicians were extremely worried about the single member districts. They were not used to competing in an election in which only one person won and the phrase ‘kore wa kiken na senkyo’ (this is a dangerous election) was heard many times, even from LDP candidates. We will now look at some of the problems which the new electoral system has created, and will particularly examine the problems it has created for the opposition. First, however, it is necessary to look at the effect that the SMDs had on the opposition. In the old SNTV, the districts were geographically much larger, which meant that organised mobilisation of the vote was highly efficient and effective. For the left, this required a horizontal mobilisation of the unions across the district and this support would provide sufficient votes for one or two JSP and maybe one

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DSP, Communist or Social Democratic League (SDL) candidate to win a seat in each medium-sized district. Union support had declined for various reasons as has been shown in Chapter 4. As a quick review of the nature of the problem, figures published in 2001 showed that, in comparison to 1980, Nikkyo– so’s ability to attract the vote had declined to 25.7 per cent level of support and Jichiro– ’s had dropped to 24.8 per cent (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 5/8/01). The new electoral system had compounded this problem as it had required candidates to obtain a higher density of votes in a district to win a seat than under the old system. For example, in the last election held under the old system, the bottom of the five candidates elected in Okayama Prefecture won with 67,451 and 62,468 votes respectively in the two electoral districts. To win a seat in either the SMD or the PR district (even on a sekihairitsu basis – see below) under the new electoral system, a candidate in 2000 needed to get between 55,000 and 60,000 votes. The electoral districts are now two and a half times smaller in magnitude than the old districts, which meant that candidates needed roughly two times more support density in each district than they had under the old system. This affects the weaker candidates more than the stronger ones, which means that in Okayama, for example, the DPJ and other opposition parties needed to build and improve their mobilisation techniques drastically if they were going to get a SMD seat in the early years of 1996–2002. The gravity of this problem for the opposition is clearly visible when comparing the number of members elected from the non-LDP parties during the 1955 system and in the 1996 and 2000 elections under the new system. Okayama had ten politicians elected until 1990 from two constituencies. It now has five SMDs, plus a possible share of 11 members (originally 13 before the reduction to 180 in 2000) _ between five prefectures in the PR Chugoku bloc. In terms of numbers elected, Okayama used to have an average of four opposition members elected from the two medium-sized constituencies to the House of Representatives. Mostly between them, the non-LDP parties managed to get four members elected from the two districts, but sometimes if the LDP put up too many candidates and divided its core total support, resulting in each LDP candidate getting fewer votes (the tomodaore effect described above), they managed to have five or even six opposition members elected to the Lower House. In contrast, under the new electoral system, the non-LDP parties won no SMDs in either 1996 or 2000. In 1996, Okayama did manage, as will be discussed in detail below, to win a PR seat for Nakagiri Shingo because of the sekihairitsu system but lost this in 2000. While these figures do not provide direct comparisons (partly because direct comparisons are impossible), they paint a picture of a new system which has affected the main opposition party in Okayama. Okayama, as discussed below, is a ‘conservative’ district, but the opposition were initially more able to win seats under the old system than under the new system. Since 2003, the situation has improved. In 2003, District Two was won through the sekihairitsu system and, even better, in 2005, against the Koizumi trend, Okayama took two seats and both won their seats directly as ‘silver’ winners as we will discuss in the next chapter. This is indicative of a growing and strengthening DPJ across the country although the success of 2005 was

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rather unusual for Okayama. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, both candidates insist that they needed to meet assiduously with their constituents and that policy alone was not going to get them a victory, despite the electoral changes. Thus, sekihairitsu seems to be a system which helps the losing party more than the main winning party. Whether the DPJ can become stronger and rely less on sekihairitsu, as a result of taking control of the Upper House and perhaps taking the Lower House in the next elections, remains to be seen. This is an important aspect of the new electoral system that needs to be further analysed.

The sekihairitsu system The sekihairitsu system is the only part of the 1994 electoral system which differed from the proposal of the Election System Advisory Council proposal of 1989. It makes the new Japanese electoral system unnecessarily complicated. Sekihairitsu allows candidates who are nominated in both the SMD and on the PR list potentially to win a PR seat should they lose their SMD election. PR seats can be allocated to politicians in different ways. The party can dictate the order in which its PR list candidates will win by simply ranking those on the list 1–26, for example, should they put up 26 candidates. It can also leave the choice of PR candidates who are elected to the fate of the electorate by ranking PR candidates equally on the list or, third, ranking some ‘equally’ and some in preference order. Candidates are selected according to their ranking, but where candidates are marked equal on a party’s PR list, from among those candidates, the candidate with the smallest difference between his SMD vote total and that of the winner in the same district wins a PR seat. This continues until all PR seats in the same bloc are full. In 2005, the DPJ equally ranked all of its candidates as one with the partial exception of Hokkaido, Chiba, Yamanashi, Toyama and Fukuoka which ranked a few of their candidates. The DPJ, being an opposition party, is rather vulnerable to shifts of electoral opinion. Therefore, by ranking all candidates equally, it had left the outcomes essentially to the electorate. This means that, where candidates are equally ranked under sekihairitsu rather than being hierarchically ranked, the decision on who wins a seat is extremely democratic. The LDP normally runs ‘preference’ candidates in each of the 11 PR districts, usually ranking them one to five (sometimes perhaps two ranked ‘one’ and maybe two ranked ‘three’ and other such strategies) with lower rankings down to six. Those ranked below the ‘preference’ candidates were allocated a lower number, meaning they had little chance of being elected. (All 2005 election results are obtained via http://www.asahi.com, accessed 12/9/05). Politicians have decided upon a ranking system according to how each member was voted into the Diet, and this suggests that the sekihairitsu system is treated with derision by the politicians it elects. Members who only stood in the single member district and win are considered gold medal winners. Those who were dual candidates but win in the single member district are ranked silver. Pure PR ballot politicians are bronze medal winners and the lowest of the low, the lead medals, are those who were dual candidates, lost in the SMD and were rescued

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by the PR seat (Tabusa 1996: 13–20). More serious is the problem that those who are rescued by sekihairitsu are particularly thought to be ‘the bottom ranking’ members of the Diet. These are known as ‘leaden’ candidates. The above situation is more pronounced in the LDP than in the DPJ. Nonetheless, were the DPJ to win a majority in the Lower House, there is potential for these rankings to take on more importance. In the cabinet which the LDP Prime Minister formed in August 2008, all members were either ‘silver’ candidates, from the House of Councillors or non-politicians (http://www.kantei.go.jp/ foreign/hukudadaijin/080802/index_e.html, accessed 9/9/08). No bronze or lead candidates were in the cabinet. In the cabinet-in-waiting of the DPJ, there were two golds (very confident politicians who do not stand in the PR, namely Ozawa from Iwate and Hachiro from Hokkaido Four (who is being forced to become silver at the next election – private e-mail from Steven Reed, 18/9/08)), six silver, nine from the House of Councillors (reflecting their 2007 win in that House) and four leads and no bronze. The DPJ has two bronze candidates across the whole country: one in Hokkaido and one in Minami Kanto (http://www.dpj.or.jp/ english/about_us/nc.html, accessed 9/9/08). Cabinets and important positions aside, the nature of the sekihairitsu system does seem to create complications beyond this ranking issue for party posts. The LDP sometimes seems to ignore it, to create the bronze candidates that it will not run in SMDs, and therefore to these candidates it gives the higher rankings we discussed above. But these candidates are problematic as they have no focal point. Reed said that, with regard to these, the real question is ‘What do you want your PR candidates to do, run in SMD somewhere or win without doing anything?’ (Reed, http://forum.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp, accessed 22/06/09). As the DPJ tends to make all candidates stand in both the SMD and PR, this is not an issue for them, but it nonetheless seems the ‘catch up’ strategy in the PR for failed SMD candidates is far more important for the DPJ than for the LDP as they have so many more of them. In 2005, the LDP managed to win 210 silver and eight gold seats compared to the DPJ’s 48 silver and four gold in the SMDs. Interestingly, the parties won a similar number of lead seats: 48 for the LDP and 52 for the DPJ. For the DPJ, this was the majority of their seats whereas, for the LDP, the lead Diet members were a small section of the party. More positively, it is possible that politicians elected as lead members have the potential once in position to become excellent Diet members and be elected in the future as ‘silver’ or even ‘gold’ winners so what it does is to encourage politicians to work their districts hard even when there is not an election. This is the kind of situation Tsumura of Okayama found himself in and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Whether this is good or bad is a difficult issue because fundamentally it encourages candidate-centred politics which the electoral reforms were designed to remove. The bad side is that a candidate needs to get his name passed around the district as much as possible so that the electors can write it to facilitate him getting a SMD seat. But, the other side of the same coin is that, as SMD contests are essentially campaigns of one candidate from each party campaigning against the other, this means that party identification, which the DPJ needs more than the LDP, can also benefit from the sekihairitsu system.

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Not everyone feels that there are benefits to this system, however. According to McKean and Scheiner, the sekihairitsu system makes it appear to the electorate as if losers can escape defeat. Even when defeated in the SMD, they can win anyway by getting a PR seat through the sekihairitsu system. Voters feel they cannot get rid of politicians they do not want and it turns them into local-centric politicians, which can be seen to defeat the purpose of electoral reform and nullify the reforms. In the 1996 election, several candidates who lost, not by coming second in the SMD, but by coming third or fourth (or in one case fifth), managed to have a sufficiently high place on their party’s list for them to be rescued by the PR seat (McKean and Scheiner 2000: 447–477). The fact that these politicians need never have stood in the SMD and could have won in the PR bloc (dependent on their list ranking) is of little relevance to the electorate as all they can see is the high profile SMD candidate who loses badly and still becomes a member of the Diet (Interview, Eda, politician, 28/9/00). There also seems to be a structural facet of the new electoral system and sekihairitsu that tends to weaken any party in a district which relies upon the PR vote (and therefore is mostly a problem for the opposition) to get its politicians into power. This phenomenon is something witnessed during fieldwork and will be examined in detail in Chapter 6. The electoral reforms were concerned with emphasising party platforms over personal platforms, which in theory should mean that politicians of the same party would benefit fully from advocating their party and cooperating with their fellow party candidates to do this. Yet for politicians who are unlikely to win in their SMD seat and are reliant on their sekihairitsu ranking to be elected, the opponents who they sense pose the largest threat are not the members of other parties they are competing against in the SMD, but members of their same party in their same bloc. This is particularly true for the few candidates in a PR bloc who are most likely to stand a chance of winning a seat in this manner and who expect to gain a decent sekihairitsu scoring. This can potentially lead to a lack of cooperation among candidates of the same party and can detract from the party’s success in the PR system. This problem could be referred to as the new opposition tomodaore as it could have the effect of dragging candidates ‘down together’. In this respect, the new electoral system has parallels to the old system, yet it is a tomodaore that is confined to the opposition. Finally, a problem for sekihairitsu winners is that it is getting harder to get a seat that way. In Okayama, in 2000, a sense which was frequently mentioned within the campaign car and office was they felt 60–65 per cent of the LDP winner’s votes was needed to get a seat in this way. Stockwin said that, in Kita Kanto– in 1996, the four elected received 81.47, 77.11, 75.53 and 71.11 per cent respectively (Stockwin 2003: 53). By 2005, the average of all ‘lead’ member constituencies who had gained their seat by getting sufficiently close votes to their opponent in the SMDs was astonishingly high. The DPJ was 87.78 per cent and the LDP was 88.04 per cent. Essentially, this shows that there was no real difference between the parties: there was the odd constituency where each party gained a lead PR seat on a relatively low percentage of their SMD opponent yet each party also had districts where they managed to get over 99 per cent of the votes

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of their opponent. As even getting one of these lead seats is getting harder, maybe the stigma attached to them could go away. Nonetheless, the fact that the LDP do not use lead candidates in the cabinet suggests this is a problem which will stick for some time yet.

Has the new system reduced the need for ko– enkai and personal voting? As discussed above, the main aim of bringing in SMDs and attempting to strengthen the role of parties was to reduce the strength and the need for the image of individuals and to build up the role of the parties. Park Cheol Hee showed when the electoral system was first introduced that ko– enkai had changed little and were still being used by politicians, albeit under a new guise of local party organisations, as a means of gaining support for an individual politician. Furthermore, and in a more positive way, he continued that the opposition DPJ politicians were also busy trying to court the non-labour union mobilised vote by setting up their own ko–enkai-like support groups, even though some opposition politicians were trying to emphasise the role of party within these activities (Park 1998: 70–74). He concluded that public funding had had little to do with the break-up of ko– enkai and the real establishment of local party organisations. During the 2000s, there have been two more Lower House elections and views as to whether the personal ko–enkai will reduce or not have continued to receive analysis. Carlson (2006) argued that the need and use of ko– enkai will decrease because the new system has meant their needs are no longer there. Nonetheless, while recognising the faults and accepting its benefits, ‘there is neither reason to despair nor any reason to abandon the new electoral system’, Steven Reed has discussed the problems that have been created from the ‘mix’ of the party and ko– enkai structure. As he said the point of the reforms were to do the following: • • •

reduce costs which would reduce corruption; make the campaigns more party centred; move towards alternation of government.

He also rightly pointed out that ‘Japan will not be the first country in the world to eliminate corruption’ (Reed 2002: 245). Nonetheless, these new laws to try and prevent corruption have not had their desired effect because the wording has not been specific enough to prevent parties from distributing money. Furthermore, money is still fundamentally ending up with the candidates rather than the party structure. Laws introduced to solve the financial issues concerned where campaign money could come from and who would be held responsible for any wrongdoings, rather than how it is utilised within the party, etc. The new rules concerning political donations were:

144 • •

• • •

Electoral system reforms The requirement for the disclosure of financial contributions was made more stringent. Parties and other political organisations had to declare any donations over ¥50,000 (approximately £250). Labour unions and companies could now contribute funds of a maximum of ¥500,000 (approximately £2,500) to a political party, a political funding body or an individual politician. The important thing was that they could only donate this to one of the organisations. Prior to this law change, donations were made to several different fund ‘receiving’ organisations. After 2000, these contributions were made illegal. A candidate would now be held liable for any illegal funds received in a campaign had he been privy to the contribution or not. Were a candidate found guilty of having received or using illegal funds, he would be banned from standing in the same constituency for five years after the conviction which was seen as a worse punishment than a fine because they would thereby certainly miss at least one election.

In 2000, rules were once again changed so that politicians could get up to ¥1.5 million per annum from private donors but, beyond that, all donations to party organisations were unlimited. This has meant that many ko–enkai, as suggested by Park above, have switched to ‘local party organisations’. Curtis describes these ‘party organisations’ as franchises to facilitate legal funding from companies and from the government to make local funding appear as if it is being given to the party (1999: 165–166). As Reed said, funds can be easily transferred between party and candidate support groups (2002: 247). The law does not limit the number of support organisations a candidate has but only one can get money which is restricted to ¥50,000 per company or ¥1.5 million per individual. Political parties have no restrictions on what they gain (but it will affect what they get from the government as we shall see below!). Reed points out two problems which suggest very much that ko–enkai remain robust despite the new rules. First, funds gained by the party can be transferred between these organisations freely and there is no legal limitation. This is protecting the ko–enkai structures of the candidates and not strengthening the parties over them. He goes on to discuss the issue that there can be multiple party branches of varying type depending on what will bring the voters and money in most (Reed 2002: 248). As part of the Political Financial Reforms Act of 1994 (Articles Five and Six), parties get money amounting to ¥250 for every member of the population, divided between them according to the number of Diet members they have and the percentage of the vote they have taken in previous Upper and Lower House elections over the past six years. This is an incentive for parties to be as large as possible and to stay intact for as long as possible, as payment is made on the previous year’s figures. Nonetheless, they are limited to receiving two-thirds of their total gains from other methods in the previous financial year from government funds. For a party to get this money it must have at least five members in the Diet or get at least 2 per cent of the total valid votes

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Percentage of money given according to party

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Year LDP

DPJ

Kom

SDPJ

Liberal Party

Other

Figure 5.1 Government subsidies for political parties. Source: Data taken from http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/seiji_s/data_seitou/index.html, accessed 31/8/08.

(Stockwin 2003: 59). Thus, the institutional impetus of the public funding for parties could well be on maintaining the LDP and the DPJ together as cohesive units, even as increasing pressures begin to show up their fault lines, such as the factional problems within the DPJ discussed above. Furthermore, this has worked alongside the electoral system to keep the parties intact. This is a simple point which is not frequently enough acknowledged as to why the DPJ remains intact. So, it has to be asked, has government funding and the new electoral system done anything to bring about a more coherent two-party system? As can be seen in Figure 5.1 which shows the funding the parties have received in the past eight years, there is a distinct tendency towards a two-and-a-half party structure of parties emerging. The SDPJ and other small parties have gradually grown smaller and thus are a less and less significant recipient of government funds. (The Japan Communist Party never appears on these tables of data.) The Liberal Party gradually became smaller in its receipt of funds and, of course, disappeared from being a party and lost eligibility in 2003. The LDP stays fundamentally at the same level, going up at its best around 13 per cent from its 2000 levels of funding (based on data from late 1999 as well as early 2000). In comparison, the DPJ has managed to increase its national funding by 55 per cent. Ko– meito– remain on a similar level throughout. Thus, by simply comparing these figures on Figure 5.1, we can see two main parties in Japan are emerging with a ‘half’ party of Ko– meito– accompanying them. The new electoral system and the importance of staying together for these beneficial government funds have most

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certainly been an instrumental cause of this. As indicated by Reed, the number of parties from the turmoil of the 1990s has declined (Reed 2002: 258), and by looking at the current state of affairs, there are less significant parties than there were in the 1955 system. Furthermore, the rules of the system mean there is very little benefit in being a small break away party so it is far better to be a slightly unhappy faction within the DPJ rather than to break away and form one’s own small party for which one would receive less funding – this does not completely prevent breakaway groups forming in the future but they do now need to have five Diet members or more! The attempts to strengthen a party can also be seen in the provision of newspaper advertisements paid for by public funding in which the candidates in single member and PR districts can be introduced to the public on a one-page spread. Clauses 167–170 of the Public Election Law (http://www.soumu.go.jp/ senkyo/seiji_s/data_seiji/index.html, accessed 6/6/08) stipulate the size of posters according to how many candidates there are in the district. It is important to distinguish this from the ban on candidates publishing anything in newspapers to publicise themselves individually. The 2000 election also saw the introduction of party political broadcasts. Again, this was an attempt to emphasise party over politician-centred politics but was a reform which seemed to initially fail.4 Other recent changes in electoral law have proved to be a step backwards in the fight to make party recognition more dominant than candidate recognition. When Hosokawa introduced the reform bill in 1994, the electorate was meant to be able to simply choose a candidate and put a cross next to the pre-printed name on the ballot paper. This was intended to remove the rule under the old SNTV electoral law in which the electorate had to actually write the name of the candidate. This system was criticised as it was thought to reinforce the candidate over the party.5 As a consequence, it was considered to give the LDP an advantage as it had more resources to make the electorate aware of candidates’ names. In December 1995, the system of writing the names of the candidates was reinstated by the LDP and for this reason there was no empirical test of the effects of the electorate being allowed to select candidates rather than being forced to write their names. Another change, since the initial new electoral law of 1994 was passed, has been the introduction of measures to encourage voting in both House of Councillors and House of Representatives elections. In the 1995 Upper House election, turnout dipped below 50 per cent and forced the government and local election management committees to try to come up with counter-measures to this problem. In 1998 (Article 40 of the Public Offices Election Law), polling booths were kept open until 8pm for the first time (they had closed at 6 pm),6 attempts were made to persuade people to vote by local government advertising on carrier bags distributed at supermarkets, and announcements were made at large department stores and shopping centres at the request of the local election management committees for people to vote.7 It has also been made easier for people to vote in the official election period rather than on the election day

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(Article 48–2 and Article 49). Limits on expenditure for candidates have been introduced depending on the type of election but all of these expenditures are party limits and not candidate limits which again is an attempt to extend the role of the party (Article 194).

Conclusion: How has the new electoral system and political funding rules affected the party system in Japan? The new electoral system was established to remove corruption and candidatecentred politics from Japanese politics. In order to achieve this, the assumption was made that a two-party system would be effective. However, a pure SMD system was not introduced because the new system was introduced under the eightparty coalition government of Hosokawa. As this coalition included smaller parties, there was no way that a pure SMD system could be even conceived of. Consequently a mixed system of 300 SMD and 200 PR seats was introduced. There were some particular rules such as sekihairitsu which added complications to this system. But, as has been discussed above, there was a huge difference of opinion between analysts about which part of the electoral system would be more dominant: would the 300 seats mean the system became more like a two-party system or would the PR seats maintain the strength of the smaller parties which had been helped by the old SNTV system in Japan? After the first election held under the new system on 20 October 1996, there was superficial evidence that a two-party system was beginning to emerge. The LDP was the main winner of the election and managed to form a government in its own right in the House of Representatives without the necessity of the coalition that it had needed in 1994. (However, because of its continuing lack of a majority in the Upper House, it still needed a coalition with the JSP and Sakigake.) Shinshinto– managed to take 156 seats and, between the two of them, they took 79 per cent of the total seats. But the PR part of the vote considerably strengthened the JCP compared to previous elections and also gave the new DPJ the majority of its support. The PR also sustained the then JSP, now called the SDPJ, although its support dropped from 70 seats in 1993 to 19 seats in 1996. While conclusions are almost impossible to draw from one election, the 1996 election ‘suggested’ that the new system would create two larger parties while protecting the smaller ones in the long run. Even after the second election under the system in 2000, the debate continued as to whether the new system had empowered the non-LDP parties and the true possibility of a two-party system. The LDP was not as strong as sometimes it had been in SNTV and had been forced to be in coalition fundamentally with Ko– meito– , but also with the Liberals and the Conservatives because of its lack of a majority in the House of Councillors. The DPJ gained 126 seats in the election which is roughly the level that the JSP ‘plateaued’ at during the SNTV system (and started to seem to be a main opposition party’s glass ceiling). A further noteworthy point of the 2000 election is that, compared to 1996, the number of parties had once again increased because of the break-up of

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Shinshinto– . The expected two-party system was maybe appearing through the LDP/DPJ contest, but the views of political scientists who had predicted the strength of the PR part of the system were vindicated by the good results of the Liberal Party, Ko– meito– and the JCP. The JCP had declined from 1996 but was still doing better than under SNTV and, more importantly, the JSP/SDPJ did better than in 1996. The PR part of the vote seemed to have displayed its importance in sustaining the smaller parties. But how were these votes obtained? Were they achieved through 1955 system methods of the ‘personal’ vote or were they due to the growing relevance of party and policy? The new electoral system was in place, the new measures such as party political broadcasts and party advertisements were happening, party leaders had a far greater ‘profile’ than before and the PR part of the vote required the electorate to choose a party. But was party beginning to be more important than personality? By the 2000 Lower House election, the vote-gathering techniques of each party were beginning to settle down after the first experience in 1996. The LDP, depending on the district, could still manage a victory in the SMD by maintaining its traditional ko–enkai method of attracting the vote. Ko– meito– could also rely on its traditional evangelistic methods of vote gathering and aimed for PR seats where it was likely to do best. The SDPJ and the Liberal Party became ‘one issue’ parties and managed to get well-known politicians elected in certain single member districts but relied on the PR vote for the remainder of their seats, as did the JCP. In sum, it seems as if the LDP was managing to sustain personalitybased support whereas the smaller parties had managed to stabilise (admittedly at a low level) its support through party-centred voting in the PR part of the vote. By 2003, the number of parties had significantly reduced and the two-party system plus Ko– meito– had been formed (plus the hanging on of the SDPJ and JCP). For the first time, an opposition party in the form of the DPJ did excellently and managed to break the glass ceiling of opposition seats, taking 177 seats – despite the popular Koizumi being Prime Minister at the time. As discussed in Chapter 2, the next election was a difficult one for the opposition because of Koizumi’s great control of the media and by creating an opposition from within the LDP. Nonetheless, both of these elections were when the SDPJ gradually grew smaller and less important and the image and concept of the DPJ grew among the electorate. Political funding has also contributed to the growth and longevity of the DPJ. This money has meant that the party has managed to hire candidates to begin their campaigns well before their actual elections. There is no incentive to break into a party smaller than five (or one which can get 2 per cent of the vote overall) so break-offs are becoming rarer. On the contrary, the incentive is for parties to be larger to facilitate this money. So ultimately, electoral and political reform has been both good and bad for the DPJ. Party funding has given it money to stop totally being reliant on labour unions, and the SMDs have strengthened its identity as being the main party of opposition. Conversely, as long as it is the second party to the LDP, it will find

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the SMDs difficult to win and will find that many of its candidates are affected by the problems of sekihairitsu. Now we are seeing more success for the party, it will be interesting to see whether the electoral system strengthens the DPJ more. Does success engender more success? Also it will be interesting to see whether the SDPJ is sustained as a minor party or loses even more seats and disappears entirely. Either of these possibilities are plausible. The new electoral system has been difficult for both the DPJ and the JSP/SDPJ but, while sustaining the SDPJ’s existence to a small extent, it has allowed the DPJ to grow and become ‘the second party’ in the Japanese party system despite many difficulties which it has had to work against.

6

The decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan in Okayama Prefecture A case study

Introduction It has been argued that the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) declined owing to voter dealignment, stemming from four major issues. First, the JSP was challenged by an adherence to ideology making it seem inflexible to the electorate and it therefore lost the support of voters (Chapter 3). This was compounded by a general dealignment and increase in the non-partisan voter particularly from the left-ofcentre voter (Chapter 1). Third, the JSP declined because one of its main backbones of support, the labour unions, stopped supporting it. The increasing weakness of the party meant it was no longer as effective in facilitating access to the policy-making arena for unions. Moreover, the unions became stronger and independent as a result of the creation of Rengo– (Chapter 4). Added to these factors was that of institutional reform. The Lower House electoral system was completely changed in 1994 (Chapter 5). This new system did have certain benefits for the JSP. Prior to the 1996 election, the party split and the PR part of the vote sustained the smaller and weaker JSP. Nonetheless, the electoral system, as a whole, did benefit the strongest party, the LDP. It was a difficult system for the opposition parties to navigate and the need for an organised campaign became more important than ever. All the factors discussed were permissive rather than actively promoting the DPJ’s emergence. Using Okayama Prefecture as a case study, these changes over the past 20 years and the effect they have had on campaign methods, party structure and party unity will be analysed. The variables discussed above will be examined to establish the impact they had on Okayama politics, in order to elaborate further the questions posed in this book: why did the Japanese left realign and how did this realignment manifest itself within left-wing parties? By combining the results of this case study with the results above, we shall then attempt to understand the changes to the structure of the left and its campaign methods in the Conclusion. In this chapter we shall also attempt to show how the Japanese left has tried to respond to the problem of voter dealignment by changing its campaign methods and voter mobilisation techniques. We suggest that the types of supporters the DPJ is attempting to acquire are a wide variety of organisations as well as unionists. The methods used by politicians to recruit support are far more diverse and range from the methods used by the unionists supporting the ‘old left’, the strategies

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employed by the LDP such as ko–enkai, to the new methods of ‘citizen politics’ and mobilisation of interest groups. These latter changes are what are referred to as ‘citizen politics’ in Okayama Prefecture, and this is a strategy which is occurring nationally in the DPJ among certain members. Citizen politics in Japan implies something crucially different from the definition supplied by Russell Dalton about western politics which refers to a sophisticated electorate which is concerned about politics and wants to influence government decisions that have impact on their lives (Dalton 2002: 8). The case study of Okayama will illuminate some of the problems that the DPJ has faced in its general restructuring of campaign and mobilisation methods and will help clarify how the left-of-centre DPJ has emerged from the ashes of the JSP and managed to grow. As discussed in the Introduction, Okayama Prefecture has been selected for both theoretical and practical reasons, as it is a prefecture that can provide good data for a regional comparison to be made to the national level. Okayama is a pre_ fecture in the Chu goku region of Japan, situated between Osaka and Hiroshima. Its main city is also called Okayama. The JSP/SDPJ (Social Democratic Party of Japan) still exists in Okayama but has had no politicians in the National Diet since 1998. When the DPJ was formed in 1996, the JSP was originally left stronger, in infrastructure terms, as it inherited the party’s offices and organisation. Since then, the DPJ has had to build up not only a new physical infrastructure, but also an ‘infrastructure’ of supporters and voters. Scheiner describes this as different from many prefectures which just changed the name on the door from JSP to DPJ (2006: 188). Thus the political history of Okayama, in the period 1980–2007, shows many of the structures and problems which can now with hindsight be linked to the decisions of JSP politicians all over Japan, either to defect to the DPJ or to stay in the JSP. It will show the difficulties that most prefectures have had to face in Japan: tension between the labour unions and parties, factional disputes that influence party alignments, ideologues who favour left-wing ideology above anything else and politicians attempting to ‘widen’ their arena of support regardless of ideology and historical alignments.

Okayama politics, 1980–2001 In 1980, Okayama’s seats in both the Upper and Lower House were divided equally between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and different parties of the opposition. By 1998, the LDP held all the seats for the single member districts of the new Lower House electoral system and the DPJ had managed to win only one PR seat in the Lower House. The Upper House seats were divided between the DPJ and the LDP. In 2000, the DPJ lost its House of Representatives seat and, in the July 2001 House of Councillors election, lost a Councillor. This was partly due to the change in the electoral system and the reduction in the number of Upper House members in Okayama. This left the party with only one representative in the Diet, Eda Satsuki, who is in the House of Councillors. But a substantial return to left-of-centre politics in the Prefecture emerged in 2003 and by 2007 it could reasonably be described as a strong prefecture for the DPJ.

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In some respects, Okayama is a complex case study because the Eda family are Okayama based. Eda Saburo– , a former leader of the JSP, was a member of the House of Representatives for Okayama from 1963.1 He had switched to the rightwing of the JSP when be became the proponent of the Structural Reform movement within the JSP in 1961 (Stockwin 2003: 47). He left the JSP in 1977 and formed a new left-of-centre party, the Social Democratic League (SDL). He died before the next election. His son Satsuki, a renowned judge and former student political activist, took on the campaign, announcing his intention to stand at the memorial service on the 50th day after Saburo– ’s death (Stockwin 2003: 47). Thus the history of this attempted revitalisation of the old JSP in the seventies was carried out partly on the Okayama stage. This has contributed to the complexity of the factions within the left in the Prefecture, but it must be recognised that this kind of situation is by no means a rarity in Japan. Any case study involves an awareness of the networks and connections present in a particular prefecture and to reject a potential case study on the basis of complicated factional division in Japan would most likely leave no examples to analyse. Nonetheless, Okayama’s factions are made slightly more complex by the fact that Eda is a politician with a national presence in Japanese politics, rather than being confined to acting only in Okayama. This means that he has a better chance of being elected irrespective of party affiliation, a factor which became more important from the mid-1990s onwards. In August 2007, he was selected and voted in as President (gicho– ) of the House of Councillors and thus consequently ‘officially’ resigned from the DPJ and is currently an independent. In 1980, of the ten seats available (two districts of five seats each), in the old medium-sized single non-transferable vote electoral system in the Lower House, five were held by the LDP, Ko– meito– held one in each district, and the remaining three were split between the parties of the left, the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the JSP and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The Upper House was split between the LDP and the left in the Prefectural seats. As mentioned above, Eda from the left-wing SDL won an Upper House seat in 1977. At the beginning of the period of analysis, 1980, various points about Okayama _ are worthy of note. First, in District Two, Hashimoto Ryu taro– , who was only 42 years old, had six election wins behind him. This implied, even at this early stage, that he was destined to be a stalwart of the LDP, and this is shown by the fact that in 1996 he became Prime Minister. Second, Eda Satsuki’s win in the PR National Constituency is important because he was an Okayama politician with a nationwide appeal. Finally, it must also be reiterated that, in 1980 and 1983, the Lower House seats were well divided between the left, right and centre, and each of the three left-wing parties were represented. In 1982, the electoral system for the Upper House changed with the first election under the new system in 1983. The National Constituency first-fifty-pastthe-post system disappeared, and in its place a national constituency PR system was introduced. Eda Satsuki decided that this was an opportunity for him to leave the House of Councillors and use his popularity in Okayama to contest a House of Representatives seat. His support network was well organised and confined

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neatly within the old Okayama One electoral district, so he was easily able to win his seat. He remained a constant of the Okayama national political scene until he decided to resign from the House of Representatives in 1996 to stand for the Governorship of the Prefecture. Socialist politics in Okayama was seemingly strengthened but actually weakened by the House of Councillors election which was the next significant event for the party in the Prefecture. Until that point, Okayama JSP had managed to be constantly represented at Nagata-cho, despite gaining fluctuating percentages of votes in each election. In 1989, the year of the ‘Doi’ and ‘Madonna’ booms mentioned in Chapter 2, the JSP managed to strengthen this representation further by gaining another House of Councillors seat with the victory of the schoolteacher Mori Nobuko. She was heavily supported by women who were beguiled by the Madonna boom. Mori joined Ichii Junji, who had won his seat in 1986, having ‘inherited’ support from Terada Kumao. Also, in the 1989 Upper House election, the left was weakened by the fact that Okayama was a prefecture where the Rengo– organisation put forward a candidate, Takahara Katsuya. As a result, left-wing support was split, as was the union backing of these candidates, and this was to cause rifts between politicians that have left legacies lingering well into the twenty-first century. Conservative politics remained constant in the Prefecture until 1996, when the new electoral system had profound effects on the future of politics. The first-pastthe-post system meant that the LDP was in a supremely strong position: it took 63.6 per cent of the constituency total and 50 per cent of the PR vote and won each of the five single member constituencies. This level of success was not quite achieved in 2000 when the LDP achieved 60.43 per cent at the local level but far less support at the PR level since the DPJ was now settling down. The period of 1996 onwards will be dealt with in more detail below, but in summary the initial post-1996 period has been difficult for the opposition. After winning one PR seat in the 1996 Lower House election (Nakagiri Shingo), this was lost in 2000, leaving the DPJ with no representation in the all-important House of Representatives. In the 1996 election, the JSP was reeling from the defection of party members to join the DPJ and consequently put up no candidates, but regrouped in its renamed Social Democratic Party of Japan format (SDPJ) for the 1998 Upper House and 2000 Lower House elections. In both elections, its campaign was more symbolic than effective, with the party gaining hardly enough votes to be recorded.2 Finally, in the 1998 and 2001 Upper House elections, the DPJ suffered a progressive but steady decline, only rescued by the presence of Eda who retained his seat in the 2004 Upper House election. It is in these Upper House elections that the real factional tensions of Okayama were displayed, and they will be analysed in greater detail below. It is in these factional rivalries that the argument between organised union politics and the more personality-led support campaigns of ‘citizen politics’ has been the most heated and intense. This very local argument has highlighted the difficulties and tensions within opposition politics after 1993 and is suggestive of the problems faced in other prefectures where the opposition had to reorganise itself to respond to the changing values on the part of the electorate, union support and the new electoral

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system. Furthermore, with the election of three ‘young’ politicians in 2003, 2005 and 2007, the issue of the integration of factional differences, methods of gaining support and, indeed, Okayama groupism and allegiances has emerged more strongly. The most important thing about the decline in votes for the JSP/SDPJ in Okayama during the period analysed is that the party suffered a heavy drop in number of votes in the House of Representatives but did not lose as much in Okayama in 1996 as in many prefectures, gaining 8.72 per cent of the vote. Vote totals remained consistent in the House of Councillors (the JSP managed a very high 22.4 per cent in 1995) until the break-up of the party in 1996 with some members of the party joining the DPJ and Maruyama losing the Prime Minister post. Possible explanations for this success are, first, that the ‘conservative’ Okayama electorate felt more able to elect potentially ‘risky’ candidates from the opposition in ‘second order’, Upper House elections (Norris 1997: 109–124). Also, there was the Murayama factor discussed above and the fact that there was an Upper House election in 1995 which kept the party and its voters engaged with each other. In contrast, within the Okayama Lower House seats, voting rates for the JSP gradually fell from 1979 onwards, with two slight recoveries in the 1980 and 1990 elections.3 However, it is also important to note that the decline in voting for the party was halted in 1996 and contradicted national trends. This is probably due to the fact that, in Okayama in the October 1996 Lower House election, there was no candidate from Shinshinto– , the then leading opposition party. In many other districts, this party would have won the anti-LDP vote whereas, in Okayama, the JSP was still an option as an opposition party in some districts (though not in Districts Two and Four where the DPJ’s candidates were Nakagiri Shingo– and Kiguchi Kyo– ko). Figure 6.1 compares national voting trends with Okayama voting patterns. The most significant difference between Okayama and national voting patterns is the increase in the vote for the LDP in 1993 and 1996 (and 2000 in Figure 6.2) in Okayama. In 1990, the LDP had a national vote average of 46 per cent. This dropped to 36 per cent in 1993 and little progress was made by the party to improve that figure, as in 1996 it only gained 38 per cent of the vote. Okayama results are in complete contrast to national results which fell for the LDP in 1996 whereas in Okayama they improve significantly. In 1993, when the national electorate ‘turned’ away from the LDP, the Okayama electorate rewarded the party with one of its best ever results of 50 per cent. Institutional changes have had even better implications for the LDP in Okayama, to which the first-past-the-post system has given an advantage over the opposition. The LDP took 63 per cent of the total votes in the Prefecture in 1996 and this pattern was repeated in 2000 with 50 per cent at the SMD level. The LDP have never managed such a good result since 2003. Figure 6.2 shows the way in which the Prefecture PR support for the DPJ and LDP has fundamentally equalled out since 2003, now that the new young candidates are in the Prefecture. In 2000 (see above), while the LDP was high in the SMD, support for both parties levelled out in the PR district level and it was here the DPJ did well (but nationally they did better than in Okayama). By 2005, in

70 60

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50 40 30 20 10 0 1969

1972

1976

1979

1980 1983 Year

1986

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LDP National

JSP Okayama

JSP National

1990

1993

1996

Figure 6.1 National Okayama comparative election results for the LDP and JSP, 1969–96. Source: Data from Mainichi Shukusatsuban.

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Okayama LDP PR

LDP PR National

Okayama DPJ PR

DPJ PR National

Figure 6.2 Comparison of national and Okayama PR results. Source: Data from Mainichi Shukusatsuban.

2005

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the PR vote, the Okayama DPJ showed equal levels of PR with national levels which is a significant improvement for the party in the area.

The institutional effects of the 1994 Electoral Law on Okayama As has been shown above, in 1996 the new electoral system had a deep impact upon Okayama Prefecture. In the 1980s, the LDP gained an average of approximately 44 per cent of the total votes. This increased to 50 per cent in the last election held under the old single non-transferable vote system in 1993. With the introduction of the new system this total increased to 63.6 per cent. As discussed in Chapter 5, the new electoral system is more likely to benefit larger parties which have the ability to mobilise a significant number of voters, compared to the old system, which benefited a defined area. The system is likely to penalise an opposition whose support tends to be more diffused. The exceptional results for the LDP in Okayama since 1996 and 2000 are thus partly due to these institutional effects, though it is also important to note that the opposition parties have been unable to put forward attractive candidates. The fact that the LDP was able to take all five single member districts in 1996 and 2000 was partially because Eda decided to resign from the Lower House in order to stand in the gubernatorial election. Having lost that election, he opted to stand for the Upper House as it would happen more quickly. Had Eda stood in Lower House District One or Two, it is possible that he would have won a seat and reduced the extent of the LDP win. Nonetheless, this did illustrate the weakness of the DPJ in comparison to the LDP. Another aspect of institutional reform that has impacted particularly upon the opposition is the rivalry which the sekihairitsu system has engendered between members of the same party. The 2000 Lower House shows an example of when this problem has affected Okayama. Okayama, as mentioned above, is a conservative stronghold, so the winners of each of the five single member districts in 1996 and 2000 were LDP candidates. This means that the only way that the DPJ could expect to win a seat is through the Proportional Representation list system. _ The DPJ placed all the single member party candidates in the Chugoku bloc equally as number one on the list which means that the sekihairitsu system discussed in Chapter 5 came into consideration to calculate which of the DPJ candidates would win the seats awarded to the DPJ under the PR bloc vote. Sekihairitsu means that, in a district such as Okayama where the opposition has little hope of winning in the single seat and the candidates are equal on the PR list, each candidate for the DPJ is competing most not with the LDP candidate in the same district (though of course the campaign is aimed against this person) but with the other DPJ candidates in the district. This is best illustrated through an example from the 2000 election. Of the five Okayama districts, Districts One and Two are urban districts and therefore have more DPJ supporters than the other three districts which had young candidates with little chance of winning a seat. This meant that the main

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rivals of Kawada Hidemasa (District One) and Nakagiri Shingo (District Two) _ were each other (along with the other politicians in the Chugoku region who had a chance of winning a high enough sekihairitsu to win a PR seat). This resulted in zero cooperation between Kawada and Nakagiri’s offices and strained relationships between the two of them. The aim of the electoral revision in 1994 was to help promote party awareness over candidate awareness and for this reason the PR seats were introduced. Despite this, sekihairitsu has had the detrimental effect discussed above in Chapter 5 on the opposition in Okayama. If this is the case in Okayama, it can be surmised that this is a situation which the opposition/weaker party faces in other districts. As shown above, the old electoral system had a more divisive effect on the LDP than it had on the opposition as the LDP had a greater chance of putting up too many candidates and splitting its vote and causing the effect of tomodaore (candidates pulling each other down). The new electoral system solved this problem for the LDP but has created a new form of tomodaore for the opposition. Had the DPJ’s candidates in June 2000, Kawada and Nakagiri, not sensed that each was the greatest competitor of the other, the chances are that there would have been a greater level of cooperation. This would have resulted in higher PR votes for the DPJ which in turn would have meant that, in this specific example, Nakagiri, with the largest sekihairitsu of the DPJ candidates, might have been elected. Eventually Nakagiri lost his sekihairitsu seat by a small margin to a DPJ candidate from Hiroshima Prefecture.

The emergence of factions within Okayama JSP politics How has support from unions changed over the past 20 years? We shall begin in 1986, as this was the first election in which the eventual formation of Rengo– had an effect on party campaigns and consequently was the first election which affected the status quo of So– hyo– backing the JSP and Do– mei backing the DSP. The 1986 election was a double election, which means that the elections for the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives were held on the same day. Elections being held on the same day are cheaper bureaucratically and also are thought by the parties to increase the margin of the winning party as campaigning can be combined and resources pooled.4 The electorate is also less likely to become irritated by having to go out to vote several times in one year or even one month. It has also been suggested that elections held on the same day tend to result in a higher voter turnout than a single election.5 The election had two important impacts upon Okayama politics. First, because it was a double election, it resulted in the removal from Okayama politics of one political force, Takahara Katsuya, who would probably have gained Eda Satsuki’s support had it been a single Upper House election. Second, this election created an initial pairing of support that was later to be one of the crucial points upon which the future of the DPJ in Okayama depended. The factional dispute between the citizen campaigns and the union-backed campaigns first became apparent in this election and

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remained a problem in all elections until the younger politicians having a wider perspective began to emerge in 2003. The Lower House election was in many respects straightforward, as the usual candidates stood and were expected to win. In the Upper House election, there were two candidates who were standing for opposition parties. Takahara Katsuya stood with no official backing, and Ichii Junji stood as the official JSP candidate. Takahara had been involved with politics far longer than Ichii, as he had been connected with Eda Saburo– since the early 1970s. Since Eda Saburo– ’s son Satsuki was a judge in Tokyo, Takahara became a surrogate ‘son’ of Saburo– and helped with his political endeavours. Takahara also gave free legal briefings in Saburo– ’s offices once a week. On the sudden death of Saburo– in 1977, it was Takahara who went to Tokyo to accompany Satsuki back to Okayama and who was entrusted with the task of persuading him to take over his father’s political career (Interview, Takahara, 18/7/00). While Takahara was officially an independent candidate, his supporters changed as the election progressed. At first there had been a possibility that he would be backed by the JSP and be its official candidate. However, the retiring JSP candidate Terada favoured Ichii Junji, as he was a graduate of Tokyo University Law Faculty (as Terada was), and pushed for Ichii to gain So– hyo– backing. Also, Takahara was not backed by many unions because of his links with the Eda family. These links were not easy for the Okayama So– hyo– unions to accept, as Eda’s campaigns had been traditionally unconnected to unions, apart from a few Do– mei-backed unions such as Mitsubishi’s. After much deliberation, it was decided that Takahara was to be backed by Eda’s SDL group, and the DSP by default, as they had no candidate. He was also initially backed by two other Eda supporters, Ogame Yukio and Morimoto Tetsuma, both influential political supporters in Okayama. Ogame was the policymaker of Eda’s office and held great influence over all left-wing politics in Okayama. Morimoto Tetsuma was _ leader of Okayama Zendentsu , the telecommunications industry union. As men_ tioned in Chapter 4, while Zendentsu is a mainstream public sector union and – – therefore was part of the Sohyo union structure, it was innovative and flexible and therefore not a hard-line supporter of the JSP. This support for Takahara gradually declined as Morimoto Tetsuma realised that he had to have the backing of the So– hyo– unions if he was to become the first Chairman of Rengo– Okayama when it was formed in January 1990. (See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the transformation of So– hyo– and Do– mei into Rengo– nationwide in 1989.) For this reason he decided to support Ichii Junji and to drop Takahara Katsuya. However, as Eda Satsuki was still in the Takahara camp and his high-level support could result in a Takahara defeat of Ichii, Morimoto persuaded Eda that supporting Takahara in the House of Councillors election would detract from his own House of Representatives campaign.6 Eda thus abandoned Takahara, and Ichii won a seat in the House of Councillors as a result of being backed by both the So– hyo– union organisation and the Eda group. Takahara went on to be one of the Rengo– kai candidates in 1989 and again lost to a JSP candidate, Mori Nobuko. (She won because of the ‘Madonna Boom’ described in

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Chapter 2.) Nonetheless, Takahara lost in 1986 as a result of the Morimoto Tetsuma-created Ichii/Eda partnership and it is the existence of these two politicians and their respective support organisations and strategies for mobilising the vote that are crucial to understanding the beginnings of Okayama DPJ. Their rivalry impeded the strengthening of the party when the new DPJ was formed in 1998 and their rivalry also partially accounts for the problems of the 2000 House of Representatives election. The 1986 election, however, was a rare example of these two cooperating for a common purpose.

1989: the Rengo– and JSP election The Rengo– kai attempt to increase union influence on politics by becoming directly elected members of the Diet has been discussed in Chapter 4. Okayama is of particular importance when analysing this period of left-wing politics as it was the only electoral district, out of 12, where a Rengo– kai politician failed to win. After his failure to win backing from the Eda group in 1986, Takahara Katsuya managed to be proposed as the Rengo– candidate for Okayama. It is strange that he failed – as he had both Okayama So– hyo– and Do– mei backing him. Indeed, all the other 11 candidates nominated across the country won. However, there were factors which explain why he was the only Rengo– kai candidate who lost. In other districts where Rengo– kai candidates were running, the whole of the opposition and the unions backed the Rengo– candidate. This was also the election in which No– kyo– , the Agricultural Cooperative Association, decided to punish the LDP for the introduction of the consumption tax. Therefore, where there was only one candidate, that person gained the support of No– kyo– , So– hyo– , Do– mei, the JSP, the DSP and Ko– meito– . In contrast to this, in Okayama, the opposition group was divided because the JSP refused to back Takahara. Doi Takako had told Okayama JSP that she wanted it to put forward a female candidate, and if it did not, she threatened that she would not make a crucial support-gathering trip to the Prefecture. Consequently, the JSP decided to put forward a female candidate and not back Takahara (Interview, Sato– , 7/4/00). With these added factors of the JSP and the ‘Madonna Boom’, this meant that Mori Nobuko beat Takahara, who had been in politics far longer and had got himself heavily into debt in order to campaign (Interview, Takahara, 18/7/00). Okamoto Kazuko, the Chair of Nikkyo– so in Okayama in 2000 (the first female to achieve this status), was Chair of Nikkyo– so’s women’s group at the time of Mori’s campaign. She said that she had not expected Mori to win but they had done lots of innovative things like incorporating drama and song into the campaign, which had probably swung it in their favour. However, she too recognised that the result was more a result of the ‘Madonna Boom’ than an endorsement of Mori Nobuko (Interview, Okamoto, 6/9/00). With two JSP members in the Upper House (Ichii, 1986–92, and Mori, 1989– 95), these few years until 1992 were an Indian summer for the JSP supporters and this made them feel more deeply the eventual decline of the party in 1996 when Ichii Junji and his supporters joined the DPJ.

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The 1993 election and the formation of Shinshinto– in Okayama The 1993 election for the Lower House caused shock waves around the world, as it managed to remove the LDP, which had been in control of government for nearly 38 years. But it had little or no effect on Okayama where the LDP, as discussed above, increased its percentage of the vote to 50 per cent. In fact, the most tangible result for Okayama of the defeat of the LDP in 1993 was the fact that Eda Satsuki became part of the Cabinet in the Hosokawa coalition as Head of the Science and Technology Agency. However, the new political party formations of 1993 were soon to impact upon the Prefecture because Kato– Mutsuki, a long-time LDP member in the old District Two, defected to Shinseito– and Eda combined his tiny SDL with the Japan New Party in June 1994. Meanwhile, Shinshinto– was formed, which absorbed Shinseito– , the DSP, Ko– meito– and the Japan New Party. Consequently, Okayama’s politics quickly changed, as senior politicians and erstwhile enemies were suddenly in the same camp. Shinshinto– ’s main problem as a party was that it was a composite of disparate parts. This is nowhere better symbolised than in Okayama, where the party became a group of confident senior politicians. In 1995, the following politicians were in Okayama Shinshinto– : Eda Satsuki (former SDL and Japan New Party; four electoral wins), Hikasa Katsuyuki (former Ko– meito– ; four electoral wins), Kato– Mutsuki (former LDP, Tanaka faction and part of Ozawa’s Shinseito– ; ten electoral wins), Kainuma Jiro (former Ko– meito– ; seven electoral wins) and Ishida Mie (former DSP backed by Mitsubishi Union; one win in Lower House). First, this strange group of politicians had a problem deciding which one of them was to have the advantage of being party leader in Okayama. Eventually, because they could not agree, it was decided that the most junior, and only woman, would fulfil that role. Then, with no candidate for the July 1995 Upper House election, the party began to court Mori Nobuko, a JSP Upper House member, to stand for Shinshinto– (Interview, Ishida, 7/9/00). When she refused, Ishida Mie was persuaded to change House and she resigned the Lower House seat she had won two years before, entered the Upper House and won a PR seat in 1995. This also gave Shinshinto– Okayama the benefit of Ishida’s union backing (former Do– mei). This lack of coherence of Okayama Shinshinto– is probably indicative of the problems that the party faced nationwide. However, in Okayama, the party seemed overly disparate and personality clashes severely hampered any chance of coherence.

1996: the Gubernatorial election, the Lower House election and the formation of the DPJ in Okayama The 1996 Okayama Gubernatorial election is an event peculiar to Okayama and therefore cannot be used in any way to compare with other districts. However, this election is crucial to an understanding of how the DPJ emerged in Okayama. While the Gubernatorial election took place a week after the Lower House election, many of its variables had been decided long before the Lower House

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election had been fixed, and for that reason it significantly influenced candidate selection for the Diet contest. Eda Satsuki resigned from the Diet and Shinshinto– in June 1996 in order to stand in the Gubernatorial election. (Gubernatorial elections are normally considered to be non-partisan, or are fought by multi-party coalitions.) The reason for Eda standing in this election was that he had lost some political credibility by joining the more right-of-centre Shinshinto– in 1994 and wanted to distance himself from the party. Within the left-wing political groups of Okayama politics, Shinshinto– was derided as a party with no ideology and only in existence because of the desire for power of its leader, Ozawa Ichiro– . However, the main reason Eda stood at this local level was because his more elderly advisers won out. The elderly group of Satsukikai, Eda’s ko–enkai, felt that Eda had lost influence in Tokyo and that it would be better for him to come back to Okayama where he was greatly respected (Interview, Morimoto Sakae, 11/4/00). Eda’s decision to stand for the Governorship meant that his Lower House seat was now open for a member of the opposition to take using his support. But, as mentioned above, the opposition was now in a divided state in Okayama and there was no obvious person to fight the seat. Furthermore, it was not immediately apparent in which seat Eda would have stood and could now help someone to stand in, as the electoral districts had changed. He traditionally had much support in Okayama City, which was predominantly in District One under the new electoral system. However, he also had strong support in District Two, which is where he lives. Meanwhile, a budding left-wing politician, Nakagiri Shingo, was making known his desire to stand and was originally going to stand for District Two under the JSP banner. Ichii Junji was the sole JSP politician in the district (Upper House) and was keen to bring Nakagiri Shingo into the JSP fold as he recognised that he would be supported for two reasons. First, Nakagiri was a medical doctor. Second, Nakagiri had been the doctor handling employment-related medical disputes at Jichiro– ’s headquarters and would ensure valuable Jichiro– support for the 1996 election and in Ichii’s own 1998 Upper House election. Thus, initial estimates saw Nakagiri slotting into the union support grouping of Ichii/JSP/former So– hyo– unions in Rengo– . Furthermore, both Nakagiri and Ichii were active in promoting the reform attempts for the JSP known as Shinto– Tsukuri (new party formation – described in Chapter 2) at the national level and were showing support for the reform efforts within the JSP. Running alongside these attempts, meanwhile, were the attempts described in Chapter 2 of Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto to create a new party, the Democratic Party of Japan. They were keen to attract young left-wing candidates who had some form of support of their own but also were not too entangled with the JSP. Nakagiri fitted this bill nicely and was thus courted by the DPJ as a candidate. In the meantime, Eda Satsuki realised that Nakagiri would also be an acceptable candidate for him to give the support of Satsukikai. In this manner, the events which led to Nakagiri becoming a DPJ candidate evolved organically rather than being systematically planned. Nakagiri fought the 1996 campaign

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without setting up a ko–enkai of his own – relying instead on the unions and Satsukikai for support as he had been courted by both sides to stand. As he was an unknown candidate, representing an unknown party, he was unable to take the single member seat but was successful in gaining a PR seat, under the sekihairitsu system discussed above, under the DPJ banner. The DPJ put forward another candidate in the 1996 election, Kiguchi Kyo– ko, a woman in her late twenties. She stood in District Five, where her home town was located. She had worked with Kan Naoto and then was a staff member for the party Sakigake. She has since felt that she was foolish to have been persuaded to stand for the DPJ when the body of young politicians in Sakigake defected to the DPJ and decided to win her over to the new cause. Despite this very passionate declaration of 2000, in 2006 she was working for Furukawa Motohisa of Aichi Two in his Parliamentary office and seems to once again be enthusiastic about the party and politics (Meeting, Kiguchi, 4/8/06). Kiguchi Kyo– ko, while being a candidate for the DPJ and receiving campaign funds from the party, received very little institutionalised support from the DPJ. Her campaign needs to be compared with the campaign of Hata Tomoko, who was to follow her as the DPJ candidate for District Five in the 2000 election. In many ways they were similar as they were both women in their late twenties and early thirties who had been selected to give an image of a political party which did not just choose middle-aged men as candidates. But this is where the comparison ends. Hata Tomoko had three campaign offices, whereas Kiguchi Kyo– ko used her parents’ home as her election base. She had no ko–enkai and received no recommendations from any organisation. She relied upon her own connections and union support. She received no backing from Ichii Junji or Nakagiri Shingo, but did receive endorsement from Eda Satsuki when he was campaigning for the governorship in District Five. It is important to remember that at this time Eda was not a member of the DPJ. Kiguchi Kyo– ko did very badly in the election, managing to win only 42,555 votes, which reflects the lack of strategy and party support given to her campaign. She spent a few months working for the DPJ in Okayama after the 1996 election, but eventually became disillusioned by the lack of ideology of the DPJ and decided to move back to Tokyo, where she left the world of politics. The story of Kiguchi Kyo– ko represents a failure of the DPJ. It gave her no resources, and even the traditional JSP strategy of utilising the support of unions was weakly organised for her campaign. The party also did nothing to endorse her. In conclusion, her campaign shows the extent of the disorganisation of the fledgling DPJ in Okayama in 1996 and suggests that this could have been a problem faced in other prefectures. While these events were haphazardly taking place, the Okayama JSP was the victim of defections and confusion. Faced with the 1996 election, the party was able to put forward only one candidate in the PR district and gained a mere 7,000 votes.7 Thinking that Nakagiri Shingo would be its candidate and shocked by his transfer to the DPJ, it accused him of stealing six million yen which had been saved for the election, although as no criminal proceedings were established, it is reasonable to assume that these were funds that Nakagiri and Ichii had put into

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party coffers and took with them when they left the party (Interviews Mizuta, 29/3/00; Ichii Junji, 9/8/00). The JSP was left with a group of elderly supporters and former politicians, although it did benefit by inheriting the offices and infrastructure of the party when the DPJ members defected. A week after the Lower House election in 1996, Eda Satsuki contested the Governorship election, which he lost to the LDP candidate Ishii Masahiro. This election was extremely close and Eda lost by 5,712 votes in a turnout of over 927,000 voters. This reflects the strength of the LDP’s organisational skills in Okayama, as it was able to combine the efforts of all LDP support networks across all five seats. The most significant issue about this election, however, was the fact that Eda Satsuki was left without a political role. This would mean that his return to politics was via the DPJ and was to cause future problems and tensions within the left-of-centre groups of the Prefecture.

The 1998 Upper House election The 1998 Upper House election in Okayama is the one in which the rivalry between Eda Satsuki and Ichii Junji escalated and showed the differences in their different backing and support and the advantages and disadvantages of such styles of support. Furthermore, this difference is indicative of the different methods of campaigning and support networks within the whole of the DPJ. This helps explain the emerging factionalism within the DPJ, which can be partly accounted for by analysing which party a politician had been in before joining the DPJ should he or she have had electoral experience before 1996 and 1998. Eda Satsuki had inherited his father’s ko–enkai that consisted of union backing and left-wing supporters. Now known as the Satsukikai, it has around 20,000 names in it but meetings often are based around a core of around 200 supporters (Discussion, Eda, 14/10/08). However, Eda Satsuki also had a national reputation having been elected to the Diet in the 1970s under the old national constituency system. He came second in the whole country as a result of his image as the flamboyant student protest leader at Tokyo University in 1962 (which was heavily publicised owing to his father’s position in the JSP) and because of his reputation for being brilliant; he came top of his year at Tokyo University and in the notoriously difficult Bar Examination. Thus, Eda’s supporters also included the urban middle classes and he combined these new and old support networks into the Satsukikai. With his defeat in the Governorship election, Eda was forced to find an election where he could win if he were to continue in politics. His first move was to officially join the DPJ and this enabled him to decide which House of the Diet he would campaign for. A politician of Eda’s background wanted to be in the more important House of Representatives, but these seats were now filled with LDP candidates with huge majorities in an election that had only just taken place. This meant he probably would have at least three years to wait for another one to be called. As mentioned above, his supporters were based in either Okayama Districts One or Two of the new electoral system. At first, Eda decided that he wanted to stand in House of Representatives Okayama District Two, where

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Nakagiri Shingo had campaigned in the 1996 Lower House election (but had won a PR seat). Nakagiri was happy to give this district over to Eda and stand in District One in the future since he recognised that his victory had been achieved as a result of the support given him by Eda because he had no real support network in either district. However, Hatoyama Kunio and Kan Naoto intervened from Tokyo and told Eda to leave District Two for Nakagiri and to stand in District One, the most urban of Okayama districts, as this was the natural home for the type of support group that Eda had. Some of Eda’s older supporters felt that he would be foolish to hold out for a Lower House seat as the next election seemed a long way away whereas he could stand in the Upper House election in 1998 (Interviews, Ogame Yukio, 12/7/00; Himei Shigeru, 5/8/00). The problem with this strategy was that Ichii Junji had already declared that he wanted to stand in his third election. While two Upper House seats were open for re-election in Okayama in 1998, this would be for the last time as the number of candidates in some districts had been reorganised, so that from 2001 Okayama would only have two seats in each election. Furthermore, even in this last period of two candidates being electable, the chances that the opposition could win both were very slim. Thus, when they both decided to stand, what resulted was a heavily fought contest between Ichii Junji and Eda Satsuki who used contrasting styles of politics. Ichii used the union-backed style whereas Eda used ko– enkai and urban voters alongside unions. Between them they split the vote and showed the effective usefulness of each type. In April 1998, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the DPJ became the ‘new DPJ’ by combining the old DPJ with some of the splinter parties from Shinshinto– . This move saw the party become broader ideologically, as it managed to combine more right-of-centre politicians with the left-of-centre politicians who had previously been the main force of the DPJ. The party was strengthened by the move and managed to increase its size in this Upper House election. In contrast the rivalry between Eda and Ichii in Okayama threatened to split the local party indefinitely. Even in the 2000 House of Representatives election, there were clear divisions between groups and a sense that divisions or even factions had been created between members of the DPJ due to the 1998 Upper House election. Eda’s supporters believed that, after his electoral defeat in 1996, it was important for him to get back into politics as soon as possible and for this reason they persuaded him to stand in the Upper House election (Interviews, Ogame Yukio, 12/7/00; Himei Shigeru, 5/8/00). In the meantime Ichii Junji was under the impression that Eda only wanted to stand for the Lower House, so when Eda declared that he was going to stand for the Upper House, it came as a great shock to the long-term JSP Diet member. When asked why he did not stand down at this point, Ichii Junji made the point that the unions had already backed him and he was not the kind of person to abandon a group that had always supported him just because his chances looked slimmer than they had been (Interview, Ichii Junji, 9/8/00). Also he confided that he thought that Eda would lose. In fact, Eda beat Ichii by 363,697 votes to 115,751.

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The resentment of Ichii Junji towards Eda continued past the election and is important because it meant that his supporters, the unions from the former So– hyo– group, were also against Eda. (Eda campaigns using a ko– enkai style support network and some unions which were formerly part of the independent Labour _ Union organisation Churitsu Ro– ren were also backing him.) This election was also divisive because it required other DPJ-connected local politicians and unions to decide whether they were supporters of Eda or of Ichii. Nakagiri, while being a Jichiro– -backed politician who would normally have supported the ‘So– hyo– ’ candidate Ichii (Jichiro– campaigns vigorously to get its own members and affiliates into the Diet), was forced to support Eda, as it was Eda’s support network that had allowed him to win his seat in 1996. However, Jichiro– , as a staunch part of the former So– hyo– network, were supporting Ichii and this resulted in a strained relationship from then onwards between Nakagiri and Jichiro– (Interviews, Yukawa Norihiko, 22/7/00; Kusakari Takayuki, 6/9/00). The tensions created by the 1998 Upper House election continued until the 2000 Lower House election, where they played a crucial part in determining who was actively supporting whom. The 1998 election meant that the potential for the blurring of old distinct campaign strategies into a new DPJ structure, combining old union support methods with the Satsukikai, was clearly difficult. Old structures were proving too hard to change and this had serious implications for following elections.

The 2000 Lower House election The 1998 rivalry between Eda and Ichii essentially spread into the campaigns of Districts One and Two of the Lower House election in 2000, and the lack of cooperation that this caused may possibly account for the fact that no DPJ candidate managed to win a seat, even in the Proportional Representation section of the election. This rivalry spread into all aspects of the election, but the main problem of the 2000 Lower House election was that no one really trusted anyone else and each group became factionalised by infighting between the old socialist style of campaigning and the ‘newer’ ‘citizen’ style of campaigning. The candidate for District One was a lawyer, Kawada Hidemasa, who had become famous for dealing with the religious cults of Aum and the Unification Church. He had worked for Ichii Junji’s law practice on finishing his law apprenticeship, and therefore was considered part of the Ichii camp. His office manager was Yokoyama Izumi, a former official of Okayama JSP, and part of the group that defected to the old DPJ in 1996. Yokoyama, while only in his forties, has an ‘old-fashioned’ background and understanding of elections based in traditional left-wing organisation and mobilisation methods. Therefore his strongest relationship was with the unions and not with the citizen groups that Kawada was trying to incorporate into his support networks. Yokoyama’s main supporter among the Okayama party elite is Ichii and this is why he was given the job of being Head of the Office of Kawada’s campaign, even though he was not really suited to a new post-JSP-style campaign. This created tension between the Kawada family and Yokoyama’s group, which included

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a Prefectural Diet member, Kusakari Takayuki, a former Jichiro– member and a strong supporter of the union segment of the vote. Ichii Junji supported the position of Yokoyama/Kusakari as he felt that Kawada was not being fair in dismissing the unions and failing to pay them due respect. Ichii believes that the fundamental thing that is necessary for the left to win is to court the unions and get their block vote. After the election, Ichii and Kawada had a difficult personal relationship as a result of this tension over campaign style. The Kawada campaign believed that, without wider support than just the unions, there was no way it would be able to penetrate the conservative vote, which was heavily behind the incumbent in the single member district, Aizawa Ichiro– , a second-generation politician with massive backing and resources. To this end, they appealed to the Eda family for help. Eda Satsuki had already supported the Kawada campaign but, with this personal plea in the form of a letter from Kawada Naoko, the wife of Hidemasa, to Eda Kyo– ko (Eda Satsuki’s wife), the Eda group despatched four women to lead a Kawada ‘citizen’ group. The four women sent were the main organisers of the Azalea Organisation: Eda Satsuki’s ko–enkai for women. At this stage, the campaign office split into two with the unionists moving out and setting up their own office and the women left to organise the campaign that was intended to mobilise the ‘citizen’ vote. They planned and implemented a campaign of telephoning the electorate based upon information on various address lists that the office had managed to obtain. Examples included alumni organisations of schools and universities attended by each member of the Kawada family, church lists (as Kawada’s wife is a Christian), and other lists supplied by supporters. I was present when, during the official campaign, the owner of a restaurant where the campaign cars had stopped for lunch gave Kawada Hidemasa a list of his special customers. This list, which included fewer than ten names, represents the nature of this style of campaigning. If each and every supporter of a political party introduces a few names with whom the campaign can make contact, the ability of the candidate to meet as many members of the electorate as possible soon increases. These women also spearheaded a campaign of visiting voters to make greetings. While it is illegal for politicians to visit homes, it is considered permissible for them to make rounds of visits to people with whom they have a connection, no matter how tenuous that connection is. This office also became a sub-branch of the Satsukikai and rang each member of the Satsukikai within the Kawada district, to confirm that a vote would be recorded for Kawada. Simultaneously, the unionists were working on getting votes in the other office. In this way, Kawada managed to achieve, to a certain degree, a form of a non-union and more ‘citizenbased’ election as well as utilising the unionist vote. But this cooperation with Eda Satsuki further worsened relations between Eda and Ichii, as well as between Ichii and Kawada. District Two of Okayama showed similar tensions between the ‘citizen support’ group and the hard-line socialist and union supporters, although superficially relations between each of these groups were far smoother during the

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campaign than they were in District One. District Two had the advantage, both financially and psychologically, of having an incumbent Diet member, Nakagiri _ Shingo. However, when he failed to win another seat in the Chugoku PR bloc on 25 June, the recriminations between these groups were far more intense and bitter than any of the problems of District One. Nakagiri presented himself as an ideologue who believed in the necessity of party politics as a way to cure the embedded problems of long-term LDP rule and the ensuing corruption that this had brought about. He believed that ko– enkai were the cause of the failure to introduce party politics into Japan, as they take away party identity and instead just result in a relationship between the Diet member and his supporters. As a result, the policies of different parties are not considered by the average voter. Whether the Diet member is effectively fulfilling his role or not, the ko– enkai will continue with its support, as according to Nakagiri supporters are not aware of the alternatives. Nakagiri frequently made this point to me: it was almost as if he had to make this clear to the foreigner hovering around in the campaign doing menial tasks to ensure he educated her. For this reason, Nakagiri refused to establish a ko– enkai of his own. A group of his supporters established a group on their own initiative, the Yumei Shimin (Dream, Citizen type action!). This group was principally set up to distribute information about Nakagiri but its problem was the fact that Nakagiri and the more traditional male members of his campaign never really approved of its existence. Members of Yumei Shimin complained bitterly about the way they were ignored by the other members of the Nakagiri campaign office, yet they made random decisions about how the campaign was to be run. This worsened their relationship with other members of the campaign and unionists. Routes for campaign vehicles tend to be planned considerably in advance of the official campaign and are distributed to all supporters so that they can visit a ‘spot’ where the cars stop to show their support. During the last few days of the official campaign, Yumei Shimin members completely ignored the plans and instead took the cars to Okayama station, officially part of District One, causing tension not only within the Nakagiri camp, but between the Nakagiri and Kawada camps. In contrast, relations between Rengo– (labour unions) and Nakagiri’s team were far more effective than in District One, as they were spearheaded by a young unionist, Motobayashi Toshihiro from _ Zendentsu. Nonetheless, the citizen group/old style socialist supporter tension was just as evident in this campaign as it was in District One. Since Nakagiri did not really have a support group of his own apart from Yumei Shimin (as well as a small group of Okayama University students that was set up as a rather desperate last measure just before the election), he used the Eda group and his list of supporters in 2000 as he had done in 1996. Thus, when Yumei Shimin randomly changed decisions which the Eda group had helped make, Nakagiri was also annoying his main backer. These tensions were further exacerbated after the election when Nakagiri began to ignore members of the Eda group. Thus, relations between Eda and Nakagiri had degenerated as they had between Ichii and Kawada, although both Kawada and Nakagiri had originally been key parts and even protégés of the Ichii and Eda ‘groups’.

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This ‘group’ concept is an essential part of understanding campaigns in a conservative district such as Okayama. Each politician will have his own unions and group of supporters who consist of a ‘group’ or faction. Eda Satsuki’s group is without doubt the strongest and most influential of the left in Okayama. Ichii Junji’s group were the former So– hyo– unions. Neither Kawada nor Nakagiri had their own group and were forced to piggyback on the Ichii and Eda groups, which is why tensions occurred. Furthermore, these groups and rivalries are exacerbated and provoked by groups within the main DPJ and this is something which has ‘hardened’ since 2003 with the election of Tsumura Keisuke and the other Okayama politicians elected since then. Kan Naoto had been a member of Eda Satsuki’s SDL and thus openly supported Eda and Nakagiri. For the first time in the 2000 election, candidates were not allowed to have only their own photograph on posters and were required to include a leading party member’s photograph. The various factional alliances in Okayama were thus shown by the fact that Kan appeared on Nakagiri’s posters and Hatoyama appeared on Kawada’s. Kan and Eda had remained close since the time they spent together in the SDL. Hatoyama supposedly appeared on Kawada’s at the request of Ichii so as to appear different from Eda (Unnamed source, 23/7/00). The candidates in Districts One and Two were thus blighted by internal rivalries, both at the national and local level. Any kind of mobilisation of the electorate was carried out despite these difficult conditions. Nonetheless, it must be recognised that even though their attempts were not successful, as neither candidate won a seat, both candidates were attempting to widen the traditional left strategy for obtaining votes beyond the union vote. They both made contact with ordinary citizens, on the basis that Japanese will tend to vote for politicians with whom they have had contact.8 This strategy resembles the traditional LDP ko–enkai method of voter mobilisation and thus represents a new strategy for left parties to mobilise the vote. Neither Kawada nor Nakagiri made much more of an attempt to try anything particularly innovative to attract votes away from the LDP. A notable exception to these strategies of vote collection in the 2000 election was attempted in District Five, a heavily rural district on the western side of Okayama. This strategy can quite simply be called ‘persuade the LDP candidate to become a democrat’! Okayama District Five has five ‘cities’ according to the Japanese method of categorising towns and cities, yet all of these five, Ibara, Niimi, Takahashi, Soja and Kasaoka, have only a combined population of 210,000. In this rural environment, the LDP predominates, so Himei Shigeru, a doctor (who also happens to be Kan Naoto’s brother-in-law), adopted this strategy of infiltrating the LDP vote. He tried to persuade ‘traditional’ LDP candidates to stand for the DPJ and, in this manner, aimed to ‘bring’ that candidate’s conservative votes with the candidate to the DPJ. This happened in Kinki PR district with Matsumoto who stood in 1996 following on from his LDP father as a DPJ candidate. Himei tried this strategy first between 1999 and 2000 by trying to bring Kato– Katsunobu into the DPJ fold. Kato– Katsunobu is the son-in-law of Kato– Mutsuki, the politician who left

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Shinseito–

and, later, Shinshinto– . On organisation. Kato– had made it

the LDP with Ozawa in 1993 and joined Mutsuki’s retirement, he inherited his political plain that he wanted to stand in District Five but he never really made a commitment to any party. Supposedly, he was being courted by Ozawa’s Liberal Party, by the LDP and by Himei Shigeru for the DPJ. Eventually, the LDP won out and on 10 May 2000, about six weeks before the general election, Kato– announced that he was going to stand for the LDP on its Proportional Representation list. He sacrificed a chance of winning a single member district in order to ‘return’ to the LDP fold. Hata Tomoko was brought in as a last-minute replacement. She wrote to the party asking if she could be of any help and the help she ended up giving was becoming the candidate (Conversation, Eda, 14/10/08). This endeavour by Himei is significant for various reasons. First, it emphasises the points made above regarding the difficulties created by the new electoral system (one candidate, one district) and the changing parties. In 2000, in the second election under the new system, even politicians were not sure about where their ‘ideological’ allegiance was. The parties had seen so much upheaval since 1993 that no one was quite sure which party they were ‘meant’ to be in. While Kato– knew he wanted to be ‘the candidate’, he was not sure under which banner that candidature was to be. More significantly, this attempt by Himei Shigeru to ‘attract’ a ‘typical’ LDP candidate into the DPJ fold shows that the old reliance on labour unions for left-wing campaigning and vote mobilisation was over. Himei saw that it was necessary for this to change and that the DPJ had to move towards the LDP, both in terms of methodology of vote mobilisation and candidate type. Ideology and labour union connections were no longer as important as they had been (Interview, Himei Shigeru, 5/8/00). The attempt to bring in an ‘LDP’ candidate is an extreme example of the necessity to redesign the typical opposition candidate. Nonetheless, what Okayama highlights is the fact that the old left mobilisation methods of labour unions supporting a left-wing politician were gone. Nakagiri and Kawada in 2000 were somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. They both relied to some extent on the old union methods of mobilisation, but also tried to a greater or lesser degree, and with limited successes, to break away from sole reliance on labour unions and attempted to use ko– enkai (Eda’s ko– enkai) and bring non-unionised people into politics. The problems they faced within their support groups were a result of the tensions between these two forms of campaign method. Old methods were clashing with new methods and the failure of both of them to be elected was partly attributable to this. In contrast, throughout his political career, Eda Satsuki had somehow managed to combine both methods of support. Okayama thus is an example of the directions in which the DPJ needed to develop in order to grow and explains well the changes necessary for old socialists to become new democrats.

The new democrats in Okayama Okayama has been a good example of a prefecture which has eventually displayed growth of the DPJ after an initial difficult period. This very much epitomises the

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gradual and slow growth of the party over the past 12 years. Indeed, at the ‘Koizumi’ election of 2005, the party managed to take two seats when the DPJ were losing seats all across Japan. Okayama then managed the rather amazing feat of a new candidate, Himei Yumiko, beating a long-standing LDP member, Katayama Toranosuke, in 2007. Thus the Prefecture has become the venue for ‘new democrats’. They are working to differing degrees with the existing party structure of Eda Satsuki and his staff. It is the story of these young politicians that will highlight how some of the problems of the DPJ are manifesting themselves and how the party is establishing itself at a more local level. By analysing each member, it is possible to see how the party is developing itself but also some of the problems of the twenty-first-century DPJ. Tsumura Keisuke Tsumura was a former banker with the Bank of Japan who was selected in 2002 by the DPJ national selection procedure, introduced that year (Asahi, 30/5/02). He managed to win a seat at his first election in 2003, when the DPJ did well winning 177 seats, but failed to get it through the direct single member vote (SMD) and instead won a PR seat in the region. In 2005, he managed marginally to win the seat outright despite the national push towards the LDP at the time. The LDP candidate, Hagihara Seiji, was a new candidate and consequently did not have the support of the former incumbent Kumashiro Akihiko and this facilitated the DPJ victory. As a young politician (born in 1971), Tsumura represents the new DPJ and also represents the right-wing of the party. He currently sits on the Japan Security Committee and on the Government Budgetary Maintenance Committee of the Lower House. He plays down the notion of ideology and policy and instead is attempting to visit every house in his constituency. He feels that human contact is far more important than attempting to create an image of the party based on policy. Okayama Two is very spread out so this is quite a difficult task. His policy-free approach is also indicated by his website which seems to lack discussion and debate. In terms of factions, in Chapter 2 he was discussed as someone who is in two factions: Ryo– unkai and the Kan group. Why is he in two factions? As Eda is a main member of the Kan group, all the Okayama politicians are associated with it but one senses that Tsumura would not be in it were it not for that regional pressure. His more intuitive faction is to the right of Kan’s in the form of the Ryo– unkai. Tsumura said that, when Maehara was leader of the DPJ, he was used as a liaison between the two factions (Interview, 31/8/07). He denies being a member of Ryo– unkai, saying he is just a ‘conduit’. What caused great controversy in the Prefecture was his visit with Hiranuma Takeo (District Three) of the LDP to a Yasukuni-connected shrine, Gogoku Jinja, on 15 August 2007. The wrong party, the wrong philosophy of victim focus and the wrong shrine combined to make him seem far too right-wing to many. He dismissed this criticism by presenting the visit as a case of politicians from his region coming together, and saying that many died in the war as well as the war criminals. He used this

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incident to argue that the DPJ also needs to embrace the more middle-ground elector and not just focus on voters on the far left. Finally, Tsumura was creating tension in the party in 2007 because of his dismissive attitude towards the unions. The former So– hyo– unions were saying in 2007 that they would stop supporting him (Interview, Morimoto, 11/8/07), but Eda Satsuki said they would continue despite the rubric that they would not (Interview, Eda, 29/8/07). At the very end of my discussion with Tsumura, he said he intended to work more with the unions. According to Eda (Discussion, 14/10/08) Tsumura will manage to win the next House of Representatives election for Okayama Two because the LDP has divided its support and allows or cannot prevent non-party-validated candidates standing. Consequently, there could be up to three candidates representing the LDP or being conservative independents in District Two. Yunoki Michiyoshi Yunoki, who is even younger than Tsumura, born in 1972, started to campaign in Okayama Four in 2003. He failed to win that election against former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu– taro, taking a mere 66,199 votes to Hashimoto’s 104,653, but won the 2005 election outright with 102,370 votes. This was partly because the LDP were divided as to whether Hashimoto’s son or wife should stand. In the end he campaigned against Hashimoto’s son Gaku who gained a very good 96,356 votes but did not have the cachet of his father. Yunoki also discusses the importance of meeting members of the public and says that, while policy is important (the 2003 manifesto, etc.), getting to meet people is far more important. Yunoki talked often about the 100,000 business cards that he had distributed between his defeat in November 2003 and his first win in September 2005 (Interviews, Yunoki, 18/8/06, 19/8/07). This is 4,545 business cards every month for the 22 months between the elections or an average of 150 a day! He also spoke in his interviews at great length about the different groups he was linking up with, such as the Old Boys organisation for his old primary school and high school. Yunoki also made the interesting point that he did not do as well in 2003 because people still ‘had not met him’ and this confirms his deep belief in personal networking and meeting members of the electorate. District Four is where the Mitsubishi Mizushima Kombina-to is.9 It is a very important private industrial complex whose union is extremely important to the District. Yunoki makes a point of visiting union groups and related activities at least two to three times each weekend when back from Tokyo as he obtains about 30,000 votes plus family votes from this plant. He is a dedicated part of the Kan faction: he is more representative of the left of the party and does not want the Constitution to be tampered with beyond the notion of the UN being able to utilise the SDF. All local party workers are very complimentary about Yunoki but, as with Tsumura, they worry that some of his popularity derives from his being single and that it is this that brings female votes. A comment often made to me was that if he marries he may lose support. He is likely to win the next election according to Eda Satsuki (Conversation, Eda, 14/10/08).

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Himei Yumiko Himei Yumiko was elected in July 2007 against the expectation of many: a victory for the LDP was seen as a far more likely outcome. But as has been discussed above, the pension crisis in which 50 million pension payments were not properly attributed turned many against the LDP. At the same time, Himei Yumiko, then 48, was a Prefectural Diet member. The local party persuaded her to stand for the Prefectural seat in Okayama in the Upper House election. Initially this seemed to be a token role as her opponent was Katayama Toranosuke who had first won in 1989. But to many people’s astonishment, he lost, and Himei won the seat with a majority of nearly 50,000 votes. In preparation, as leader, Morimoto Sakae, Chair of Okayama Rengo– , had spent the whole election visiting everywhere in the Prefecture where Rengo– had any linked organisations. He reckoned that because of this 80 per cent of them voted for Himei which effectively contributed 65,000 votes. The real problem for them was, unlike in previous years with Eda (and Ichii), she was not known at all by unionists so they had to work extra hard to get those 65,000 votes. Furthermore, because she is a woman, women in their thirties, forties and fifties did not support her as, according to Morimoto, within this age group they prefer male candidates (Interview, 11/8/07). But she did gradually manage to win the unionists over by telling her life story because she had suffered. Her father died when she was 17 and she put herself through university at Okayama University’s night school (a process which doubles the time it normally takes to get a degree) and became a shiho–shi (administrator of justice). Also, even though the Constitution was not an official topic of the party, she talked about it during her campaigning – she does not want to change it. Morimoto felt that all of these points very much endeared her to the average unionist man in the Prefecture. The campaign also benefited from two trips from Ozawa: one on the first official day of campaigning and one on the last but one day (Interview, Morimoto: 11/8/07). Within a few weeks of being elected, Himei was soon vilified by the Japanese tabloid press and gossip magazines discussing an affair she had had several _ years before (Shukan Bunshun , 31/8/07). She initially found her own political aide and virtually withdrew from the usual Okayama DPJ group of supporters and workers. Since then she has built up a national profile on TV shows which are not necessarily political in their nature. Since she argued with her adviser in June 2008, she has moved back onto good terms with the DPJ. She was advised about how she should continue by party leaders and since then she has calmed down (Conversation, Eda, 14/10/08). It will be interesting to see whether in 2013 Himei becomes a one-hit wonder or whether she manages to return to the profile she had in 2007 which so clearly impressed a group of unionist men. Eda Satsuki As described above, Eda has been the main feature of Okayama politics since the death of his father in 1977. He is very much a key figure in the DPJ and in the Prefecture: meeting him in Okayama has a huge cachet attached to it for many

A case study in Okayama Prefecture

173

Japanese. This aura has increased since he was made President (Speaker) of the House of Councillors on 7 August 2007, the first non-LDP member to fill that position in either House since 1955. This means that he had to leave the party so is not officially in the party or in a faction. He has very systematised union support as well as organised ko–enkai and, combined with his fame, this explains his 498,515 votes in 2004, an astonishingly high level of support. This can be partly attributed to union support that has particularly settled down and improved since 2000 with the level of support likely to be gained known in advance. Within Okayama, these improvements are attributed to Eda and Morimoto Sakae, the Okayama Rengo– Chair until 2007. They worked particularly well together in 2004 to ensure that DPJ Diet members were given full union support and Eda also fully displayed the fact that unionists were in his campaign cars. Since then the relationship between the unions and the DPJ has been greatly enhanced across the Prefecture. Thus, Eda has very much created a foundation which the three young politicians can benefit from and indeed have done so. He now is a national figure and when returning to Okayama is more of a famous figure attending local events than a politician. Although the three politicians described are all new, apart from the ‘party events’ in which they stand in a neat row making neat, anodyne speeches, they have little in common. Should the DPJ split, which is unlikely because of the electoral system, they would most likely enter different parties with Yunoki and Himei tending towards the left but Tsumura moving towards the right. Nonetheless, Yunoki and Tsumura’s relationship should be commended since the impression of friendly unity which they convey is good for the party. Despite many differences, they understand the need to work together and have therefore overcome some of the problems of the older DPJ in Okayama. Other issues There are three districts which have not been discussed. District One has a strong LDP member, Aizawa Ichiro– . Kan Naoto’s son stood in this seat in 2003 and 2005 but failed both times, receiving much criticism for being unable to talk to people and entice normal, unaffiliated people into politics. This was ironic as this is what his father was so good at. A new candidate was eventually decided upon in 2007 to begin his campaign for the next election in this district. District Three is a steady LDP seat and the DPJ has sensibly given up on it. Finally, in District Five they have a young candidate who lost in 2005 but is working hard towards a more positive future. All of these are funded by the DPJ while they campaign. Beyond this national level, attempts in Okayama to develop the DPJ are not as effective. According to the SDPJ in Okayama, 20 per cent of voters are utilising their national PR vote to vote for the SDPJ and vote for the DPJ at the Prefectural level (Interview, Fukushima Katsumi, 16/8/07). Similarly, the DPJ does not have a strong gubernatorial or local level of support. Few city councillors outwardly express their support for the party. There are those who do rely on union support and unfortunately there is much factionalism among them, according to the unions they are/were affiliated with. They are disunited over whether they approve of the

174

A case study in Okayama Prefecture

DPJ or prefer the SDPJ and whether or not they like Eda (Interview, Haba Yorisaburo– , 28/7/06). So, the growth of the DPJ in Okayama is far from complete and, should Eda decide not to stand in 2010 as he will be 70 that year, a key figure will also disappear. The DPJ has managed to emerge in a seemingly strong position from the intense movements and competition of the 1990s but there are many problems which could weaken the party structure and it remains to be seen how strong the party really is. The next House of Representatives election will show whether Districts Two and Four are really strong enough to keep their seats considering it would only be a second win for Yunoki in District Four. It seems that there will be one or two LDP rival independent candidates as well as the official LDP candidate in District Two so this will help Tsumura (Conversation, Eda, 14/10/08). Nonetheless, the stability of the current strength of the DPJ remains to be seen.

Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to analyse the decline of the JSP and the formation of the DPJ in Okayama in order to establish some of the issues that were a problem. The formation of the DPJ in Okayama was unplanned, random and at times opportunistic. It may be possible to say that, when Nakagiri and Ichii joined the party, they joined because they felt that the Okayama JSP, while getting more support than the national party, had problems, but it is not possible to say that they believed passionately in the concept of the DPJ. For Ichii Junji and Nakagiri Shingo, the DPJ was a means to getting elected as opposed to standing under the old and increasingly tired JSP banner and possibly losing the election. Neither of their campaigns or strategies for mobilising voters changed much from JSP methods. The principal method of obtaining votes for the opposition remains as it was during the 1955 system, ‘piggy-backing’ on Eda’s Satsukikai and the former So– hyo– and Do– mei organisations. All candidates in 2000 attempted to broaden these mobilisation methods without much success. Eda Satsuki in 2001 continued campaign methods similar to those used when he first won a seat in Okayama in 1983 (with some changes as a result of advances in technology, etc.). He is a politician without dogma and has been flexible and responded to the changing electoral system and to his failure in the Gubernatorial election. Alongside union and ko–enkai support, his strategy is based upon the notion of mobilising the citizen, attracting as many ‘normal’ people as possible and being a politician of the people. This is a strategy which many in the newer DPJ are trying to introduce. Younger politicians within the Prefecture who have emerged since 2003 have managed to show the strengths and weaknesses of the DPJ. While simultaneously being a relatively strong prefecture for the party, as well as having three young politicians, two of whom are very likely to retain their seats, the DPJ oozes strength in Okayama. Nonetheless, they are factionalised, sometimes have problems working with the unions, have little emphasis on policy and instead believe that one-on-one politics is the only way forward. In other words, they represent old-style Japanese politics with a combination of LDP and JSP methods. Okayama shows very much the divisive problems the party is suffering from and it will be interesting to see how the party develops at a national and prefectural level.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this book, we suggested that, within the substantial changes that have affected Japanese politics in the past 15 to 20 years, the parties which have experienced the most long-term change have been the parties of the left. In 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the Government for the first time in nearly 38 years, it seemed as if the political world had changed for ever. The LDP had split, with some of its most influential faction members leaving to form parties that competed against it in the General Election. A coalition government followed which included all the opposition parties apart from the Japan Communist Party. This government managed to pass electoral and political reform legislation before breaking up owing to internal divisions. A minority opposition government was formed, which lasted for approximately two months before the previously unthinkable partnership of the LDP and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) formed a government together. It was this coalition government that paved the way for the final effects of the changes which 1993 wrought. As a result of managing to get back into the seat of government, the LDP ensured that its split in 1993 and its ten-month period away from government would not have any long-term effects on the party. Many politicians who had defected from the party began to trickle back in the period 1994–96. When one of the new parties, Ozawa Ichiro– ’s Shinshinto– , broke up at the end of 1997, many defectors returned to the home of the LDP. The LDP thus managed to return to within striking distance of its former glory, with a few notable differences. In contrast to this, the changes that the left-wing parties have seen in the past 20 years have been far greater. The JSP was the largest winning party in the 1989 Upper House election but this was not enough for them to take control of the House. The party split in 1996 and many of its members joined the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the party which sooner or later absorbed those politicians who left the LDP permanently. Furthermore, the left has suffered a decline in support and funding from its traditional partners, the labour union movement. The ideological divide, the authoritarian–libertarian cleavage that Watanuki Jo– ji described as the ‘cultural cleavage’ (Flanagan et al. 1991: 402–404), which divided the Japanese electorate according to its views on the Constitution and defence-related issues, has slightly declined as a cleavage-creating issue. The left has had to redefine the defence debate with a greater possibility now that the

176

Conclusion

Constitution will be changed within certain limits. Finally, because of these institutional, organisational and ideological factors, the left has been forced to re-evaluate the methods by which it recruits the electorate to support its party. The change of the left has been deep and long-standing and we have examined the reasons for these changes. We have examined these changes by asking two questions. First, we asked what factors caused the left to realign. Second, we asked how the changes that have occurred have manifested themselves. Before answering these questions, we discussed the linkages between the JSP and DPJ and showed in Chapter 2 that the DPJ has inherited most of the political role and space of the JSP. Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie say that it is important for a party constantly to change and reassess its internal and external environment, if it is to remain successful (Rose and Mackie 1988). In Chapters 2 and 3, we showed that the JSP was not able to do this. There was internal dissent about what its external role should be; whether it should be a party which desired and attempted to win elections, or whether it was merely a party which performed a checking and balancing role in relation to the LDP. The party was also unable to respond to the needs of the electorate, which no longer wished to support a party which dogmatically refused to reassess the Constitution. The First Gulf War made the electorate realise that Japan needed to consider its future international role, yet the party did not see that. It is parties such as this that Rose and Mackie suggest are destined to decline. Peter Mair discussed the implications of ‘political space’ when a party disappears (Mair 1997). He found that ideological blocs tend to continue to gain a similar amount of support, and that even if a new party appears, it will remain locked within an ideological bloc and thus inherit the support of a failed or disappearing party. We believe that this is what has happened with the change from the JSP to the DPJ. Rose and Mackie discussed what tends to happen to this kind of failing party. They suggest four possible options, ranging from continuance of the status quo to the party disappearing completely. In the middle of these options is the position whereby a party disappears or declines in some form but, to a certain extent, has its ideological mantle taken over by another party. This is the pattern that best explains the example of the change from the JSP to the DPJ. The ideological mantle of the JSP has been partly handed over to the DPJ, but, as the JSP is still in existence, it has saved the issue of non-revision of the Constitution to be its raison d’être. But, the DPJ has inherited some of the roles and ideological tendencies of the JSP. The DPJ has become the main opposition party. The party has a pro-reform, liberal agenda. We have thus shown that realignment did take place within the Japanese left and that the JSP and DPJ are connected, but what factors caused this to happen? We believe there are four major issues which have affected the Japanese left in particular and Japanese politics in general since the beginning of the 1990s. First, the electorate has become disenchanted with politics and some have stopped voting, resulting in a large increase of the numbers of non-aligned voters (Chapter 1). This has affected parties across the whole political spectrum. Voters have also

Conclusion 177 changed their attitudes towards the issue of the Constitution and defence which hit the JSP, but also made it difficult for the DPJ to articulate its position on the issue until it gradually managed to come up with a party view around the mid2000s (Chapter 3). The left-wing parties’ mobilisation techniques were particularly hard hit by a decline in the ‘power’ of the labour union movement. Also, labour unions no longer needed to rely upon the left-wing parties as they now had their own links to the bureaucracy and LDP policy-makers. But since 2000, the relationship has stabilised and has become quite efficient and productive for the DPJ in terms of votes. Finally, all parties have had to reassess their campaign methods and type of candidate because of the 1994 electoral system. In many ways it was this electoral system that killed the robust JSP but ironically it sustains it as a small, ‘one-issue’ party. The new single member districts and proportional representation system with dual votes for the electorate has brought problems and benefits to both the LDP and the DPJ but overall the negatives have probably fallen on the DPJ because of the sekihairitsu system. In Chapter 3, we analysed in detail why the JSP lost the support of the electorate. The traditional ideology of the JSP, based on preservation of the Constitution and non-recognition of the SDF, had gradually declined in its relevance, particularly since the First Gulf War highlighted the need for Japan to question its position in the post-Cold War order. While the public had been aware of the JSP’s doctrinaire nature for some time, the First Gulf War proved to be a turning point and public opinion polls show that the Japanese were increasingly tired of the party’s inability to reform and were, on the whole, only voting for it because they were trying to make a protest vote against the LDP. This is not merely an old issue in Japan though. In the 2007 election which saw the DPJ win control of the Upper House, it was very much felt that the public had voted for the DPJ out of protest for the LDP rather than support of the DPJ (81 per cent gave this response in an opinion poll soon after the election; Asahi, 2/8/07). We discussed how the DPJ has gone on to define a view on this most important issue of the Constitution and defence which probably does not please the whole party but does mean there is an official policy. The changes to the labour union organisation described in Chapter 4 had further worsened the crisis of mobilisation on the Japanese left. First, we showed that the unions have managed through the creation of Rengo– to gain access to the government and bureaucracy. This meant that the unions had less incentive to continue to support the left-wing parties in their traditional symbiotic relationship of access to government in return for financial and mobilisational support. We then showed that, in order to fulfil a dream of corporatism, the unions merged under one umbrella organisation and attempted to unify the left-wing opposition parties and create a united party or, at the least, electoral coalitions. With the emergence of an enlarged opposition party in 1998, the old Democratic Socialist Party and the JSP have become united for the first time since 1960. As a result, some of the problems about which party unions support have been alleviated. But this has been tempered by the fact that union membership is lower than ever before. This has meant that there are fewer members for unions to mobilise in

178

Conclusion

political support activities. Furthermore, it has been suggested that union members used to be able to mobilise their entire families but this family mobilisation capacity is also declining. But unions remain an important part of the DPJ’s mobilisation of votes so the relationship needs to be maintained. The final reason we believe that the Japanese left has suffered a crisis of mobilisation was discussed in Chapter 5. The new electoral system was shown to be difficult for the opposition, as it has meant that weaker candidates have to fight against candidates in their own party because of the problems of the sekihairitsu system. Despite this, the new electoral system seems to have influenced the DPJ to break away from traditional methods of mobilising the vote which are declining anyway, and to investigate new strategies, thereby bringing it into more contact with the electorate. This has been a positive influence on the party, as it has forced it to innovate and listen to the electorate more than ever before. Furthermore, the very important point about the new electoral system is that it is generating a two-party system and has thus essentially strengthened the DPJ by causing the smaller parties to decline and the DPJ to grow and therefore to be the direct competitor of the LDP. Okayama has shown us the difficulties that it took for the DPJ to gradually emerge and to strengthen and to overcome long-standing rivalry and embedded organisations. This was repeated across Japan to a greater or lesser degree. Nonetheless, after many difficulties, it is a prefecture which has much to add to any possible DPJ government as it has four national-level politicians. Nonetheless, this healthy situation has a very complicated and difficult background behind it and the DPJ is nowhere nearly as well organised at the local level as it is at the national level. So the new DPJ differs from the old JSP because it is a party with a wider appeal and broader aims. It is a party which is committed to developing policy beyond the confines of the ‘constitutional cleavage’ and is attempting to overcome the problems that disengagement of the electorate, the new electoral system and changing labour union support have wrought upon the party. In comparison to the JSP, it is a party which is more dynamic and proactive and is trying hard to improve its ever increasing chances of one day having a sufficient majority to form a government in both Houses of the Diet. And so we have to ask, how will this tale end? In 2008, 19 years after the great ‘one-off’ majority of the JSP in the Upper House, the DPJ are closer to potentially winning a House of Representatives election than they have ever been. An election must be held by September 2009. There are three possible endings to this tale. First, the LDP will manage a victory which, while never having the possibility of giving them the strength they had in the Lower House since 2005, will leave them in control of the more important House. A less defined version of this would be the LDP requiring a coalition with Ko– meito– in order to achieve this victory. The second option would be a hung parliament. The DPJ and the LDP would have to find some way of working together. This would very much give the DPJ the upper hand until July 2010 when the next House of Councillors election is held. Finally, should the DPJ win the Lower House in its own right, which many

Conclusion 179 doubt, including party members, history will have been made. The ‘opposition’ would take control of both Houses of the Diet and the LDP would be out of power for at least three years, barring disaster. With this being one party unlike the 1993–94 coalition, the chances of it surviving would be greater and the power of the LDP could be broken down. It remains to be seen what will happen but, whatever the outcome, the Japanese opposition has managed to come quite a long way within these past 20 years and the next few years could be interesting.

Appendix I Interview schedule

Name

Position

Date

Arakawa Miki

DPJ party worker

Aya Daisuke

Okayama DPJ party worker

Den Hideo Doi Ryu–ichi Eda Satsuki

Member of the Diet (SDPJ) Member of the Diet (DPJ) Member of the Diet (DPJ) and President of the Upper House 2007–

Eda Yoichi

Eda Satsuki’s secretary

Edano Yukio Fukushima Katsumi Furukawa Motohisa

Member of the Diet (DPJ) Okayama SDPJ worker Member of the Diet (DPJ)

Haba Yorisaburo–

City Council DPJ representative

Hata Tomoko

DPJ candidate in Okayama

Hatoyama Yukio Himei Shigeru

Leader of the DPJ Brother-in-law of Kan Naoto, Okayama DPJ supporter and medical doctor

13 September 2000 9 April 2001 12 July 2000 23 August 2000 5 April 2001 26 April 2000 27 August 2006 27 December 1999 12 September 2000 28 September 2000 29 August 2007 14 October 2008 Plus informal conversations 9 April 2001 22 August 2006 Phone conversation 11 July 2008 28 September 2000 16 August 2007 28 September 2000 8 August 2006 6 September 2000 28 July 2006 10 August 2007 Various conversations through summer of 2000 29 July 2000 5 August 2000 7 September 2000 4 April 2001 19 August 2006 11 August 2007 16 October 2008

(Continued)

Appendix I: Interview schedule Name

Position

Date

Himei Yumiko

Okayama Prefectural representative Secretary to Edano Yukio and former Sakigake party worker Member of the Diet (DPJ) Member of the Diet (DPJ) Ichii Junji’s office worker

15 August 2000 27 July 2006 13 September 2000

Honda Hirao

Hosokawa Ritsuo Hosono Go– shi Ichii Akiko Ichii Junji Iguchi Masako Ishida Mie Ishige Shigeko Kaieda Banri Kaifu Toshiki Kan Naoto Kaneko Keiichi Kato¯ Katsunobu Kawabata Tatsuo Kawada Hidemasa Kiguchi Kyoko Ko– ri Kazuko Kurashige Nanae Kurotani Ko–yoshi Kusakari Takayuki

Mamiya Yukio Masuo Kazuhiro Matsumoto Takeaki Mizuta Minoru Mori Nobuko Morimoto Sakae

Former member of the Diet (JSP and DPJ) DPJ party worker Member of the Diet (DSP, Shinshin, DPJ) Former member of the Diet (JSP and DPJ) Member of the Diet (DPJ) Former Prime Minister Secretary-General of the DPJ Journalist for Asahi Son-in-law of Kato– Mutsuki Member of the Diet (DPJ) Candidate for DPJ Okayama Former DPJ candidate Member of the Diet (DPJ) Journalist for Asahi Former Ichii campaign manager Okayama Prefectural member of the Diet and campaign manager for the DPJ Rengo– employee DPJ party worker and former Sakigake employee Member of the Diet (DPJ) Former JSP member of the Diet Former JSP member of the Diet Current Chair of Rengo– Okayama

181

3 September 2007 22 August 2006 Conversations through autumn of 1999 9 August 2000 9 April 2001 7 September 2000 7 August 2006 20 April 2000 18 April 2000 25 July 2000 30 August 2007 7 September 2000 8 August 2006 6 August 2000 27 July 2000 9 August 2006 30 August 2007 26 March 2001 6 September 2000 28 August 2006 28 July 2000 12 September 2000 9 April 2001 22 August 2006 29 March 2000 6 September 2000 11 April 2000 21 August 2006 11 August 2007 (Continued)

182

Appendix I: Interview schedule

Name

Position

Date

Morimoto Tetsuma

Okayama Prefectural member of the Diet and former Rengo– Chair Employee of NTT Workers Union and campaign manager for Nakagiri Okayama Rengo¯ Former Rengo¯ Chair Member of the Diet (DPJ) Former DPJ Okayama Diet member Okayama Town Council representative for the DPJ DPJ party worker Okayama DPJ supporter and former campaign manager for Eda Satsuki Member of the Diet (DPJ) Chair of Okayama Nikkyo– so and former Chair of Okayama Nikkyo– so women’s group at the time of Mori Nobuko’s campaign Member of the Diet (DPJ) Former member of JSP Okayama and member of Nikkyo– so Aichi Prefectural member of the Diet Former Rengo– candidate and lawyer Jichiro– employee and election coordinator Former Okayama Prefectural member of the Diet

6 April 2001

Motobayashi Toshihiro Motohoshio Satoshi Murakami Itaru Nagatsuma Akira Nakagiri Shingo Nakahara Naruo Nakayama Ichiro¯ Ogame Yukio

Ogawa Jyunya Okamoto Kazuko

Sasano Teiko Sato– Toyoko

Takagi Hiroshi Takahara Katsuya Takayanagi Hideki Tanaka Noriyoshi

Tanimura Keisuke Tsumura Keisuke

Former JSP member of the Diet Member of the Diet (DPJ)

18 July 2000

17 August 2007 4 April 2000 31 August 2007 14 August 2000 15 September 2000 11 September 2000 12 July 2000 4 July 2006 15 August 2006 6 September 2000

26 July 2000 7 April 2000

31 July 2000 18 July 2000 13 September 2000 22 January 2000 12 July 2006 9 August 2007 18 September 2000 24 August 2006 31 August 2007 (Continued)

Appendix I: Interview schedule Name

Position

Date

Tsurunen Marutei Watanabe Ko–zo– Yamagishi Akira Yamaguchi Jiro¯ Yokomichi Takahiro Yokoyama Izumi

20 July 2006 29 August 2007 12 September 2000 21 June 2000 26 July 2000 28 January 2000 29 March 2000

Yukawa Norihiko

Member of the Diet (DPJ) Member of the Diet (DPJ) Former Chairman of Rengo¯ Japanese political scientist Deputy Leader of the DPJ Campaign manager for Kawada’s campaign and former JSP party worker Analyst, Asahi Shinbun Poll Dept. Eda Satsuki’s policy adviser

Yunoki Michiyoshi

Member of the Diet (DPJ)

Yoshida Takafumi

12 March 2001 22 July 2000 28 August 2000 9 September 2000 31 March 2001 18 August 2006 19 August 2007

183

2008

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997/1998

1997

1996

New Komeito

New Komeito

Independent Komeito remains

1994

1995

Sakigake

LDP

LDP

1993

1992

1991

1990

Shinseito

JNP

Liberal Party

Shinshin breaks

Shinshinto

Komeito

DSP

Sun Party

DSP

Minseito

SDL

DPJ

Enlarged DPJ

New DPJ

Old DPJ

SDPJ

JSP

JCP

JCP

Appendix II

Japanese Party change 1990–2008

Notes

Introduction 1 It currently retains one district seat in Okinawa. 2 Shinseito– and Sakigake were both parties which were formed as a result of splitting from the LDP in 1993, causing the LDP not to win that Lower House election. This is described in more detail in Chapter 2. 3 Shinshinto– was a party established by Ozawa Ichiro– in June 1994 which included Shinseito– , Ko–meito– , the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Japan New Party (JNP), and the Social Democratic League (SDL). 4 For example, Ronald Inglehart (1997). 5 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 6 UK electoral commission turnout: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/ results/general_elections (accessed 22/6/09). 7 Ko– enkai were first described by Gerald Curtis in Election Campaigning Japanese Style (1971). These are the supporter groups which politicians, traditionally from the LDP, but increasingly within the DPJ, have built around themselves to gather support for their campaign activities. Ko–enkai members are notorious for offering material incentives to vote for the candidate. Also the members of the ko–enkai are used to disseminate information about the candidate to other members of the electorate in their communities.

1 The changes in Japanese voting behaviour and attitudes towards politics, 1980–2000 1 Unlike in the UK, there is no official opposition party in the Japanese system but the JSP was the largest and therefore could be considered to be the ‘main’ opposition party in Japan. 2 From 2000 onwards, Japanese residents abroad can vote abroad in the PR component of each House election so these PR figures are slightly higher to the prefectural races and single member districts. 3 These do not have to have populations over the million mark. Currently there are 17, the metropolitan cities plus Shizuoka, Sakai, Niigata and Hamamatsu. 4 It will not be possible to analyse education in this study because the Asahi Shinbun do not ask this kind of question in their party support questionnaires. 5 The LDP had to form a coalition with the New Liberal Club in 1976. 6 Residents associations which are known as cho–naikai in Japanese are utilised by the LDP to mobilise voters. Local businesses are often also members of cho–naikai. 7 One party which is more likely to have urban support is Ko– meito– . This party is not analysed separately in this chapter.

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Notes

2 From old socialists to new democrats 1 Interestingly, the Recruit scandal also forced the resignation of a JSP Diet member, Ueda Takumi, but because he resigned straight away and accepted responsibility, it had no real adverse effects on the party. 2 For an analysis of Doi Takako, see J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘On Trying to Move Mountains: The Political Career of Doi Takako’, Japan Forum, vol. 6, no. 1, April 1994, pp. 21–34. 3 For example, see J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘From JSP to SDPJ: The “New Wave Society” and the “New” Nihon Shakaito– ’, Japan Forum, vol. 3, no. 2, September 1991, pp. 287–300, and J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘On Trying to Move Mountains’, pp. 21–34. 4 The Socialists’ lack of participation in the coalition negotiations has been suggested by Gerald L. Curtis to have been minimal, owing to its poor election result (1999: 101–102). However, Yamagishi did suggest that Yamahana Sadao, the Socialist leader, participated in negotiations (Interview with Yamagishi, Chair of Rengo–, 12 September 2000). 5 Yamagishi was quoted from a meeting in Okayama Prefecture that Hosokawa would become the coalition’s Prime Minister. He did not in fact say this, yet the rumour persisted and is said to be the reason why Hata Tsutomu stood down as a potential candidate. This was quoted both in an interview with Yamagishi Akira, Former Chairman of Rengo– , 12 September 2000, Tokyo, and in his book, Yamagishi Akira, Renritsu shikakenin (A Creator of the Coalition Government), Ko–dansha, 1995. 6 According to the Asahi Shinbun , in May 1994, Ozawa was having discussions with Watanabe Michio on leaving the LDP and joining Ozawa’s party. There is, however, some confusion as to the type of politician Watanabe was, and his influence on politics. This suggests he was seen as a reformer by Ozawa, yet Gerald Curtis describes him as having an image of ‘an ideological conservative and political operator who followed the tried and true practices of traditional LDP factional politics’ (1999: 109–110). 7 He actually won an independent seat but soon switched to Japan New Party. 8 It must also be noted that, of the politicians who expressed an interest in joining Shin Minshu Rengo–, four of them were from Hyogo Prefecture which was the one hit by the Kobe earthquake. 9 Akamatsu Hiroyuki did not respond to the contact I made requesting interviews, or a copy of the book. 10 This in fact reflects the name change that the party had effected in English at the Party Conference in January 1991. Between 1991 and 1996, the party was called the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in English and the Japan Socialist Party in Japanese. In this book, we consistently refer to it as the Japan Socialist Party for clarity, rather than attempting to use the two names which is potentially confusing until the DPJ is formed and the size of the socialist party becomes much smaller in the 1996 election. From that point the party will be referred to as the SDPJ. 11 I was asked to talk about the attempts by the Labour Party at a Shinto– tsukuri (Working to a New Party) event in Okayama in March 1996. 12 As a further means of assessing whether the DPJ accepted a certain ‘type’ of membership, in Stockwin’s 1992 analysis of JSP factions the Doi faction was considered to be one of the more right-wing factions. Despite this, she stayed in the JSP and became its leader again after the break which formed the DPJ. See J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘The Japan Socialist Party: Resurgence After Long Decline’, in Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System, 2nd edn, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, for faction information. 13 When numbering electoral districts, the numbering starts with District One being in the most urban part of the Prefecture. 14 The two remaining Number One seats were independents: Gifu and Okinawa Prefectures. 15 Despite Yamaguchi’s views, it must be noted that Maehara had strong views on why the DPJ failed in the September 2005 House of Representatives election. He felt that the public believed that the DPJ only supported the wishes and interests of the postal workers

Notes

16

17 18

19 20

21

22

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and did not think about the overall benefits of the proposed reforms to the Post Office for the country as a whole (Japan Times, 31/10/05). Ozawa has mentioned moving from his Iwate seat to fighting Tokyo 12 in the forthcoming election. If he does this, he will give up his seat where he has won 13 times and fight against Ota Akihiro, the leader of Ko–meito– . Once again there is talk of him not standing as a PR candidate and taking the chance of losing, thereby being a gold candidate should he win, which is likely (Japan Times, 15/9/08). In August 2008, Noda Yoshihiko thought of standing against Ozawa (Japan Times, 21/8/08, 23/8/08). It must be recognised that this was a week of great conflict between the LDP and DPJ as it was the same week as the Flag and National Anthem Bill. This was correctly classified as a neutral 000 in the Miura, Lee and Weiner classification as the eventual result of the party was that 46 voted for it and 45 against (Hyde 2006: 97–114). These websites were still viewable as of 7/7/08. http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/ index.html This impression was confirmed by Himei Shigeru who is the brother-in-law of Kan Naoto and a doctor (Chat, 19/8/06, restaurant in Okayama). I challenged them about this change which I had perceived and they agreed that this is the direction towards which they see the party moving. Unfortunately, Jain does not give the Japanese equivalent of ‘lively politics’. No similar type of phrase has ever been used in the presence of the author so there is no way of knowing to what Jain is referring. This could be a term that he has devised himself or it could be a term which was used by those participating in the mobilisation strategy and therefore could be Jain’s translation of ‘shimin senkyo’ (the term used by Yukawa Norihiko, Kan Naoto and Eda Satsuki) or another term. In 2003 they refused to engage with local newspaper organisations and in 2005 only worked with local newspaper organisations but in 2007 used both. (Interview, Kaneko Keiichi, 30/8/07).

3 The Constitution and its importance to the decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the unity of the Democratic Party of Japan 1 There is considerable debate about the extent to which the Constitution was entirely written by the Americans, or whether the Japanese also participated in the process. For example, Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur (2002), suggested that the Japanese did contribute to the final document while John Dower, Embracing Defeat (1999), supports a strong view that the SCAP occupation forces were wholly responsible for the Constitution. Whether written by Japanese or Americans, the introduction of a new Constitution was an Occupation-driven reform. 2 The LDP had a majority of just under the required two-thirds between 1955 and 1960 when it had approximately 61 per cent of the Diet seats. 3 Throughout the 1955 system, the Constitution was scarcely at the forefront of debate starting in the 1950s when the Yoshida doctrine channelled attention towards economic expansion under the safety blanket of US protection. 4 As Hook and McCormack point out, the Japanese Government, in stark contrast to the Germans, has never considered the issue of war crimes once independence was restored by the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 (Hook and McCormack 2001: 7). 5 In George Packard, Protest in Tokyo (1966), there is discussion of the actual numbers of protesters. The true figure of protesters will probably never be known. Some commentators suggest there were millions and some suggest there were far less. While in Nagata-cho, Tokyo seemed to be engulfed in protest; in other areas of the city, it was possible to imagine that there was no protest taking place.

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6 While the JSP took a majority of seats in 1989, the LDP’s combined number of Councillors from the 1986 and 1989 elections was still more than the JSP. 7 Purdendra Jain in ‘The 1991 Tokyo Gubernatorial Election and Its Implications for National Politics’, Japan Forum, 1991, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 275–286, discusses the failure of the opposition parties to put up candidates. The Tokyo chapter of the LDP and the National LDP were pitted against each other as to which candidate to support. This would have given the JSP an excellent opportunity to put forward an effective candidate of its own and Eda Satsuki and Kan Naoto were discussed as potential vote-winning candidates even though they were from the Social Democratic League. However, in Jain’s words, the JSP ‘displayed its traditional weaknesses both through a lack of consensus among its various competing factions and of quick decisions leading to a disastrous performance’ (1991: 275). Eventually the JSP put forward a candidate, Okawa Mitsunori, who was a university professor. He came fourth, behind the JCP candidate. 8 These aircraft were eventually never sent because, quite simply, they were never requested by an overseas government. Some private organisations and individuals went to Iraq and Kuwait to rescue refugees and Doi Takako made a famous visit to assess the situation in Baghdad. 9 For it to be considered statistically significant, there must be at least 2,000 respondents to a poll for them to be included in this volume. 10 After 1995, the Asahi stops asking those polled whether they have strong support for parties or just support the party. 11 See Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What it Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy’, Orbis, Fall 2006, pp. 725–744, for a more thorough analysis of the LDP’s proposal.

4 Rengo– and the changes in the Japanese left 1 The most notable change is the abolition of union bloc voting in the British Labour Party’s leadership election, thereby limiting trade union influence on the Labour Party. See, for example, Andrew Richards, The Life and Soul of the Party: Causes and Consequences of Or ganisational Change in the British Labour Party 1979–1997 , Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1997, and John K. White and Philip J. Davies, Political Parties and the Collapse of the Old Or ders, London: Albany Press, 1998, Chapter 2 on the United Kingdom. 2 It is important to note that the formation of Rengo– did not amount to the full unification of So– hyo– and Do– mei that so many political analysts seem to believe. In each region the former So– hyo– building became the Heiwa (Peace) Centre and Do– mei _ became the Yu aikaigi, thereby maintaining their former differences. In Okayama, these is no new Rengo– building per se, rather Rengo– just used offices in the Workers Welfare Building while the former So– hyo– and Do– mei offices continued to exist in their respective buildings. The top level of the organisation, Rengo– National Headquarters, was housed in the former So– hyo– building. In 1999, the Yu– aikaigi and the Heiwa Centres were disbanded (after initial attempts in March 1993 and 1994), although these terms for the old union groupings are still used among left politicians to differentiate between the former So– hyo– and Do– mei-backed unions. 3 Two other national union centres were established in 1989 to compete with Rengo– : the Socialist Zenro– kyo– (Zenkoku Ro– do– Kumiai Renraku Kyo– gikai) and the Communist Zenro– ren (Zenkoku Ro– do– Kumiai So– rengo– ). 4 Zoku refers to the groups of politicians, mostly in the LDP, which specialise in a particular aspect of policy. 5 A similar number of JSP candidates also won in these two-member districts which means no LDP candidate won in over half of Japan’s prefectures in 1989.

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6 Owing to the early resignation of Hosokawa, the LDP gained the leverage to get back into power. Yamagishi feels that Hosokawa gave in too easily and did not control the forces of Ozawa, Takemura and the JSP sufficiently. He also recounts the story of how he was the person, while attending a meeting in Okayama Prefecture, who unwittingly leaked to the press that Hata Tsutomu, Ozawa Ichiro– ’s candidate for Prime Minister, had been dropped in favour of Hosokawa. 7 Mamiya Yukio of Rengo– contradicted this rumour and said that Yamagishi stood down because it was the turn of a former Do– mei member to be Chairman (Conversation, 28/7/00). 8 Grade One civil servants are mostly employed in government ministries and are managers at the regional level. They are allowed to join unions but rarely do and are not ‘invited’ to join a union when they take up their posts (Private communication, Iikura Chikara, Oct. 2000). Professions which are not allowed to join unions are: police, fire men, prison workers and sea rescue workers. Judges, even though they are civil servants, are also not allowed to join unions on the basis that they are in a ‘supervisory’ role (Private communication, Shibata Norifumi, 30/7/00). 9 This policy was witnessed by me in the 2000 election, as the office receptionist of the Okayama District Two candidate, Nakagiri Shingo, was a young woman, Aida Mariko, who had been sent from Tokyo. Her expenses and hotel costs were covered by Jichiro– . 10 This chronological list includes the obvious parties such as Ozawa and Hata’s Shinseito– and Japan New Party, but it also includes some lesser-known kaiha, groups and attempted parties including Akamatsu’s Democrats, Shin Minshu Rengo– and Eda Satsuki’s Sirius. 11 According to Takayanagi, this was Jichiro– ’s policy, yet according to Rengo– Weekly, 11 October 1996, Jichiro– supported some JSP and non-affiliated candidates. The only exception, according to Takayanagi, was Oita Prefecture where Jichiro– supported the then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi. 12 Okayama Rengo– was not formed until January 1990. 13 Rengo– tried to rationalise union support for each district in Okayama in June 2000 by making different unions responsible for each district. Jichiro– was responsible for _ District One, Zendentsu for Two and Nikkyo– so for Three. The former Do–mei and _ Yuaikaigi unions supported Four (owing to closer links between the candidate’s mentor and Do–mei than any of the other districts) and the Mitsubishi Union was responsible for District Five. 14 This information was given to me by the person who supposedly acted as the gobetween. He has no official role in the party. Owing to the illegal nature of this payment, my informant, who had handed over the money, was very careful that we were not overheard. Consequently, we had to change venues before he would tell me, but it seemed very important to him that I knew this had happened so that I fully understood the changing relationship between the left and the unions.

5 Electoral system reforms and their impact on the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Party of Japan 1 A typical ko–enkai is painstakingly described by Gerald Curtis in the seminal text Election Campaigning Japanese Style , New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. The reprinted version by Kodasha came out in 1981. 2 They had been introduced in New Zealand and Italy in 1993. 3 This was originally implemented as a system in which the candidate put a cross against the name of the elector he or she wanted but the LDP reinstated the system of the elector writing the name of the candidate in 1995. The reasons and significance of this will be discussed below.

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4 I participated in the making of the DPJ’s party political broadcast. No expense was spared to bus about 400 volunteers to the edge of Tokyo Bay, provide them with food and drink, and get them to create a large ‘red ball’, the symbol of the DPJ, and then to throw red balls into the air. All party leaders were drafted in to be filmed in this event. But the eventual party political broadcast seemed to be a damp squib after the extent of the preparation. The broadcast lasted for about three minutes, was shown eight times during the 12-day campaign and the showings were either around 6 am or midnight. The part showing the actual ball throwing in Tokyo Bay was mere seconds of the three minutes. It seems that the party went to much effort to make this, despite seeming to have little intrinsic benefit. However, during the 2003 and 2004 elections, party political broadcasts became a much more common feature and were shown during normal television viewing times (Discussions with Japanese students in November 2004). 5 Writing the candidate’s name could potentially only involve copying it, as all names are given in each booth in the polling station. As party allegiance is also given, the problem of writing the name versus selecting the candidate may not be so important but the LDP must have considered that name writing gave them added benefits in order for them to change the law back in 1995. (This issue was discussed in a phone interview with Yukawa Norihiko on 31 March 2001.) 6 Despite this, there are options for election management committees to shut the polling stations up to four hours early (Article 40). In 2007, there were complaints that polling stations were scheduled to shut early in swing areas which would work to the advantage of the LDP (Japan Times, 28/7/07). 7 I was in a department store during the afternoon of the Polling Day, 25 June 2000, and announcements were made that the polls were open and would be until 8 pm.

6 The decline of the Japan Socialist Party and the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan in Okayama Prefecture 1 Prior to this Eda Saburo– was in the House of Councillors for two terms, from 1950 and 1956. 2 There is some confusion about this result. Mori Nobuko told the author that she stood in the 1998 Upper House election (Interview, 6/9/00), yet there is no reference to her result _ in Kokkai Binran , the Diet handbook, under the Chugoku constituency. Ishida Mie, an Upper House Diet member, has also corroborated that Mori stood, as Ishida feels sorry that she knocked her out when she won her seat in 1995 (Interview, Ishida Mie, 7/9/00). It seems that, despite the regional terms in which Mori and Ishida discussed the election, Mori, in fact, stood in the PR national constituency. According to the Asahi Nenkan (1999: 186), Mori came seventh of the JSP candidates, yet only the top four were elected. 3 Nationally, 1980 was a bad year for the JSP. 4 According to Himei Shigeru, an election costs a prefecture 600 million yen to stage, once costs such as hiring staff, administration and renting polling stations are calculated. A double election for the prefectural governorship and the Diet, or for both houses of the Diet, simultaneously, costs around 900 million yen, which reduces an annual prefectural cost by around 300 million yen (Interview, 5/8/00). 5 This argument seems to be somewhat validated by the high turnout for the 1980 election of 74.57 per cent. However, the turnout of 71.4 per cent in 1986’s same-day election was lower than the 73.3 per cent turnout of the February 1990 simple Lower House election (Stockwin 2003: 76). 6 Yukawa Norihiko, Eda’s former policy adviser, explained this abandonment of Takahara as being due to the potential loss of Eda’s seat because he was so busy campaigning for Takahara. According to Yukawa, they contacted Den Hideo, an Upper House SDL

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member and former journalist, to get the latest opinion poll results from which it appeared that Eda would come sixth in his district (Interview, 9/9/00). 7 This was the figure given to me locally by Mizuta Minoru, former JSP Diet member from Okayama and then Chair of Okayama JSP (Interview, 29/3/00). This compares to the JSP _ total in the Chu goku bloc of 234,642, which came predominantly from Hiroshima Prefecture (Asahi Nenkan 1997: 198). 8 This view was expressed in an interview with Eda Satsuki, 28/9/00. Nonetheless, this was an opinion which was frequently expressed by those who were working for the two DPJ campaigns that I worked with for the June 2000 House of Representatives election. 9 The word ‘Kombinat’ is German to describe a large industrial (factory) complex but it was only ever used in East Germany.

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Copies of internal Okayama Zendentsu- minutes of meetings which decided which candidates were to be supported. DPJ, Ozawa’s Message, ‘Makoto na seiji wo suru tame ni’ 2007 (DPJ election campaign document). DPJ, Sangiin Senkyo Seisaku Risuto (Manifesto, 2007). Hatoyama Yukio, Atarashi seifu–wo jitsugen suru tame ni , DPJ, January 2000. Jichiro- ‘In Order to Deepen Jichiro-’s Political Objectives: Towards a General Emergence of a Democratic Liberal Power’ (Jichiro- seiji houshin tougi no shinka no tameni. Minshu riberaru seiryoku no soukeshu ni mukete), 1997. Nihon no tokei (Japanese Statistics), Somucho Tokeikyokuhen. Opinion poll data from Asahi Shinbun in unpublished form from April 1995 to March 2000. Opinion poll data from Okayama Prefecture and Okayama City, random polls carried out between 1970 and 1997. Sangiin senkyo yo–ran (Handbook of House of Councillors Elections), Kokusei jo– ho senta–, March 2000. Shugiin senkyo yo– ran (Handbook of House of Representatives Elections), Kokusei jo–ho senta– , March 2000. Sorifu (Prime Minister’s Office), Yoron cho-sa Nenkan (Yearly Collections of Public Opinion Polls), 1970–2007. Yukawa Norihiko, Shimin senkyo no no-hau (The ‘Know-How’ of a Citizen Campaign) unpublished document, no date.

Websites Democratic Party of Japan www.dpj.or.jp Information about Japanese politics on the Web http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld Japanese election rules http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/pdf/esij.pdf News sites http://www.asahi.com http://www.yomiuri.co.jp Party funding http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/seiji_s/data_seiji/index.html Post-2006 public opinion polls The Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation http://www.mansfieldfdn.org The SSJ Forum mail list http://ssj.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp UK electoral commission turnout data http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/results/general_elections Wikipedia – faction data for the DPJ http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%BB%E5%85%9A%E3%81%AE% E6%B4%BE%E9%96%A5 (8/8/08)

Index

1955 system 77, 78–80, 82–3 Abe, Shinzo– 74, 101–2 administrative reform campaign 109–10 age: of politicians 52, 58; and voting behaviour 26–9 agricultural liberalisation policy 39–40 agricultural workers, voting behaviour 29–32 Aihara, Kumiko 125 Aizawa, Ichiro– 166, 173 Akamatsu group 48–9 Akamatsu, Hirotaka 117 Allinson, Gary D. 106, 109, 110 Amioka, Yu– 48 anti-war sentiments 79 Arakawa, Miki 50 armed forces 76; see also Self-Defence Forces (SDF) Asahi 5, 74, 87–8, 89, 99, 101, 115, 170, 177 Asahi Nenkan 48–9 Asahi Shinbun 23–35, 36, 48, 80, 84, 95, 137 Asanuma, Inejiro 47–8 Ashida, Junnosuke 117, 124 Awamori, Takashi 113 Azalea Organisation 166 Berlusconi, Silvio 9 Blair, Tony 9 bloc-specific persistence 5–7 blue-collar workers, voting behaviour 29–32 Blueprint for a new Japan (Ozawa) 101 Bowling alone (Putnam) 13 ‘bronze’ candidates 140–1

‘cabinet in waiting’ concept 57 Calder, Kent 83 campaigning styles 70–2 candidate independence 134 candidate ranking 140–3 candidate recognition politics 133, 134, 147 – candidate selection: DPJ 72–3; Rengo 113–14 Carlile, Lonny E. 110, 111, 115, 116, 119, 126 Carlson, Matthew M. 143 Carter, Nick 8, 9 Citizen movement group 62 citizen politics 12–15, 70–2, 165–6 coalition negotiations 115–16 coalitions: Hosokawa coalition 41–4; LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition 44–50, 92–3 Cold War 76, 78, 82–3, 108 communication process 10–14 communication workers 108–9 community-based networks, and voting behaviour 22 constituency type, and voting behaviour 32–5 Constitution 75–105; Article 9 76, 79, 100, 102; Article 51 100; Article 59 59–60; Article 96 102; Preamble 76, 79 Constitution Referendum Bill 101–4 Constitution Review Committee 80–1 Constitutional reform: attitudes towards 92–3; calls for 78–80; DPJ policy on 98–104; ideological debate on 82–3; implications of 80–2; public opinion on 87–9, 93–4, 102–4 corporatism 109–10, 111, 115, 117

198

Index

corruption 39, 43; reduction of 143 Courier Mail 56 Craxi, Bettino 9 Crisis and compensation (Calder) 83 Curtis, Gerald L. 41, 42, 43, 70, 91, 116, 134–5, 136, 138 Dalton, Russell J. 12, 13–14, 151 defence issues, public opinion on 86–9, 93–4 defence-related policy 45, 78–80, 83–6; and Constitution 98–104 Democracy without competition in Japan in a one-party dominant state (Scheiner) 15 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): candidate selection 72–3; creation of 3–4, 50–61; development and success of 56–8; early policy objectives 54–5; effects of new electoral system 138–40, 147–9, 156–7; enlargement of 55–6; factions 56, 62–9; formation in Okayama 160–3; formation of 118–19; funding 144–6; leadership 58, 60–1, 73–4; in Lower House election 2000 165–9; and Okayama politics 1980–2001 151–6; in Okayama 163–5, 169–74; Ozawa as leader of 73–4; Policy Affairs Research Council 58; policy formation 50, 69–72, 125–6; problems in 58–60; research literature 15–16; and sekihairitsu system 140–3; support for 94–8; support for defence-related policy 98–104; union relations with 123–6; union support for 120–3, 127–8 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP): in coalition government 42; coalition – negotiations 116; creation of Shinshinto 117; and electoral reform 35–6; and First Gulf War 114–15; formation of 47; in Okayama 152; support for 23–6, 73, 122; Yu– ai group in 119 Denmark, electoral instability 5 Doi, Ryu– ichi 48, 63 Doi, Takako 39, 80–1, 82–3, 112, 125, 159 Do–mei 108–9, 119, 159; merger into Rengo– 109–10 Dower, John 107

Eda group 158, 167–8 Eda, Kyo–ko 166 Eda, Saburo– 71, 152 Eda, Satsuki 61, 70, 72, 74, 115, 122–3, 125, 126, 151–3, 157–8, 160, 161, 163–5, 166, 167–9, 171, 172–3 Eda, Yo–ichi 62, 65, 67, 68, 125 Edano, Yukio 63–4, 127 education, and voting behaviour 22 Election System Advisory Council 136, 138, 140 elections: 1955 system 139; 1986 157–8; 1989 39–40, 82–3, 111–14; 1993 41, 160; 1996 118–19, 138–9, 160–3; 1998 163–5; 2000 120, 165–9; 2004 58; 2005 58–9; 2007 73–4 electoral districts 134; changes to 132–3, 138–40 Electoral Law (1994), institutional effects on Okayama 156–7 electoral reform bill 42–4 electoral system: 1925–1994 132–5; debate on new system 135–6; effects on ko–enkai/personal voting 143–7; effects on party system 137–8, 147–9; sekiharitsu system 140–3 electoral volatility 5, 22–3 Europe, electoral instability 5, 8 exclusive candidates 113–14 expenditure, limits of 147 external environment, reassessment of 176 external pressures, JSP 4–7 factions: DPJ 62–9; JSP 157–9; LDP 133–4; Okayama 152 First Gulf War 69, 77, 83–6, 90–1, 96, 114–15 first-past-the-post system 136 Flanagan, Scott C. 20–1, 22–3, 27, 175 Former DSP group 62, 66–8 Former JSP group 66–8 Former Sakigake group 62 Former Shinshin/younger members group 62 Fujii, Hirohisa 58 Funabashi, Yo–ichi 84 Funada, Hajime 51, 52–3 funding: campaigns 71; effects of 147–9; rules 143–6 Fukushima, Katsumi 39, 42, 43–4, 124, 173

Index Furukawa, Motohisa 63, 127 Furukawa, Tasaburo 113 General Election 2000 120 ‘gold medal’ candidates 140–1 Goto–, Shigeru 48 government funding 144–6 government workers union 120–2 Green Cross Haemophiliac HIV/AIDS problem 50 ‘group’ concept 168 Guidelines Law (1999) 69, 79–80 haijo policy 50–61 Hashimoto, Ryu–taro– 152 Hata group 55, 66–8 Hata, Tomoko 162, 169 Hata, Tsutomu 44 ‘Hatomander’ policy 136 Hatoyama faction 66–8 Hatoyama, Ichiro– 136, 168 Hatoyama, Kunio 51, 52–3 Hatoyama, Yukio 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 62, 98, 118, 125, 161 Herron, Erik S. 137–8 Hikasa, Katsuyuki 160 Himei, Shigeru 125, 164, 168–9 Himei, Yumiko 172 Hinomaru flag 45, 79–80, 99 Hiranuma, Takeo 122 Hiroshima 79, 82 Honda, Hirao 50, 53 Hook, Glenn D. 76, 79, 82, 86 Hoshikawa, Yasumatsu 113 Hosokawa coalition 41–4, 92; break-up of 43–4 Hosokawa, Morihiro 116, 136 Hosokawa, Ritsuo 63, 127 Hosono, Go–shi 126, 128 House of Councillors see Upper House House of Representatives see Lower House Hrebenar, Ronald J. 10 Huang, David W.F. 137 Hughes, Christopher W. 101, 104 Hyde, Sarah 3 Ichi Shin Kai faction 64, 66–8 Ichii group 167–8 Ichii, Junji 122, 153, 158, 161, 163, 164–6

199

Ichikawa, Fusae 71 ideological change 7–9 ideological debate, JSP 82–3 ideology, JSP 78–80 Igarashi, Fumihiko 51 Iguchi, Masako 50 Ikeda, Osamu 113 inclusive candidates 113–14 ‘income doubling’ policies 79 Inglehart, Ronald 5 Inoue, Tetsuo 113 insider share dealing 26, 27–8, 38–9, 112 institutional effects, 1994 Electoral Law 156–7 institutionalisation 6–7 internal environment, reassessment of 176 internal pressures, JSP 4–7 Inui, Harumi 113 Ishibashi, Masashi 79 Ishida, Mie 160 Isomura, Osamu 113 Itagaki, Eiken 101 Italy, political realignment 8–9 Itoh, Mayami 85 Jain, Purdendra 71–2 Japan Communist Party (JCP) 121; and electoral reform 35–6; in Okayama 152; support for 26 Japan Economic Newswire 56, 61 Japan Forum 62 Japan National Railways (JNR) 108–9, 110 Japan New Party (JNP): coalition negotiations 116; creation of DPJ 51; emergence of 115; support for 23–6 Japan Socialist Party (JSP): 1980s 38–41; 1994–1996 45–50; in coalition government 42–50, 92–3; coalition negotiations 116; creation of DPJ 51–2; decline of 3–4; effects of new electoral system 138–40, 147–9, 156–7; and electoral reform 35–6; factions 157–9; and First Gulf War 114–15; ideology/role 78–80; impact of First Gulf War 90–1; implications of constitutional reform 80–2; late 1980s 82–3; in Lower House election 2000 165–9; members in DPJ 53–4; name

200

Index

change 49, 55; and Okayama politics 1980–2001 151–6; and Rengo– 159; right-wing members 45–50; strata of support 96–104; support for 23–6, 32–5, 36–7, 40–1, 85–6, 89–92, 94–104; tensions within 45–50; union support for 120–3; see also Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) Japan Times 46, 47, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 73–4, 84–5, 99, 102, 125, 132 Japan Times Weekly 84–5 Japan US Security Treaty 45, 51, 76, 79, 82, 84, 92, 121 Japanese Association of Metal, Machinery, and Manufacturing Workers (JAM) 126 Jichiro– 21, 120–2 Johnson, Stephen 112, 113–14 Kaieda, Banri 47–8 Kaifu, Toshiki 46, 84 Kainuma, Jiro 160 Kaishin 43–4 kaiha 43–4, 46, 47, 48 Kan group 62, 65, 67–8, 170, 171 Kan/Shinminha group 62 Kan, Naoto 49–50, 52, 56, 57–8, 59, 60, 70, 71–2, 81, 99, 118, 161, 168 Kanemaru, Shin 110 Kato–, Junko 69 Kato–, Katsunobu 168–9 Kato–, Ko–ichi 56 Kato–, Mutsuki 160, 168–9 Katz, Richard 11 Kawabata, Tatsuo 47–8, 58, 126, 128 Kawada, Hidemasa 157, 165–6 Kawada, Naoko 166, 168, 169 Kawamura, Tatsuo 125 Keddell, Joseph P. Jr. 79, 83, 85, 86, 89, 93 Kiguchi, Kyoko 162 Kimigayo national anthem 45, 79–80, 99 Kingston, Jeff 50 Kobayashi, Yoshikazu 137 Kobe earthquake 47–8 ko–enkai 10, 167, 168–9; effects of electoral system changes 133, 143–7 Koizumi, Junichiro 55–6, 57, 59, 131 Kokkai Binran 63, 64–5, 67 Ko–llner, Patrick 62

Ko–meito– 3, 10, 41; coalition negotiations 116; and electoral reform 35–6; funding 144–6; in Okayama 152; support for 23, 26, 122 Ko–no, Yo– hei 136 Ko–ri, Kazuko 64 Kubo, Wataru 3, 39, 40, 41, 46, 48, 83 Kume, Ikuo 108 Kurashige, Nanae 68 Kusakari, Takayuki 165, 166 Labour Party, UK 107 labour unions see unions Lam, Peng-Er 11 Laver, Michael 69 LDP group 62 Le Blanc, Robin 11 ‘leaden’ candidates 141 leadership, DPJ 57–8, 60–1 Lee, Kap Yun 61, 69–70 left-wing parties: analysis of transformation 2–16; factors affecting realignment 176–8; future of 178–9; realignment of 175–6 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): benefits of conciliatory unionism 109–10; in coalition government 43–50, 92–3; and constitutional reform 78–9; creation of DPJ 51; effects of new electoral system 138–40, 147–9; and electoral reform 35–6; electoral system problems 134–5; factions 133–4; foreign policy 84–5; funding 144–6; implications of constitutional reform 80–2; manifesto 57; and Okayama politics 151–5; in Okayama 156, 157, 160; policies 39–40; relationship with labour unions 109–10; and sekihairitsu system 140–3; split in 93, 115; support for 20–2, 23–37; unpopularity of 38–41, 74; voting against 96–8 Liberal Party: absorption into DPJ 2; funding 144–6; merger with DPJ 56–7 Livedoor scandal 60 ‘lively politics’ 71–2 local party organisations 143–7 Lower House elections: 1983–1993 40, 157–8; 1996 118–19, 160–3; 2000 120, 165–9; 2003 41, 57; 2005 58–9; voter turnout 18–21 Lower House factions 66–8

Index McCormack, Gavan 76, 79, 82, 86 McKean, Margaret 142 Mackie, Thomas T. 4, 6, 7, 39, 105, 176 Madonna boom 39, 153, 158–9 Maehara faction 65, 67–8 Maehara, Seiji 60–1, 63, 125 Mainichi 88 Mair, Peter 4–5, 11, 16, 74, 176 Mamiya, Yukio 109, 119, 120, 122 manifestos 57, 69–70 Martin, Curtis 22, 23, 27 marugoto policy 51–3 Marxism 75, 78, 108, 121 Masuo, Kazuhiro 50, 53 Matsumoto, Takeaki 64, 127 Matsuoka, Toshikatsu 74 Matsushita Seikei Juku 60 media 42, 56, 59 Ministry of Education 78 Ministry of Finance 110 Ministry of Health and Welfare 49–50, 110 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 110 Ministry of Labour 110 Minseito– 55 Minton, Lewis 9, 107 Miura, Mari 61, 69–70 mixed electoral system: effects on opposition parties 138–40; effects on party system 137–8, 147–9; introduction of 135–6 Miyazawa 41 Mizuta, Minoru 93, 163 Mochizuki, Mike 108–9 Mori, Nobuko 93, 122, 153, 159 Morimoto, Sakae 124, 161, 172, 173 Morimoto, Tetsuma 122, 128, 158 Motobayashi, Toshihiro 167 Motohoshio, Satoshi 61 Mukae, Ryu–ji 93 Mulgan, George 114 multi-member constituencies 132–3 Murayama Government and Social Democratic Liberal Politics Promotion Society 46 Murayama, Tomiichi 36, 44–5, 46–7, 52, 93, 96–7; supporters of 45–50 mutual dependence 106–7, 109–11

201

Nabeshima, Keizo– 57 Nagai, Takanobu 48 Nagasaki 79, 82 Nagata, Hisayasu 60 Nagatsuma, Akira 127 Nakagiri, Shingo 122, 153, 157, 161–3, 165, 167–8, 169 Nakamura, Eiichi 113 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 38, 40, 80, 81–2 name recognition politics 133 National Public Services Law 73 Nedelmann, Brigitta 11 Netherlands, electoral instability 5 new democrats: in Okayama 169–74; socialists transformation to 2–16 New government – how to make it happen (DPJ) 98 New Liberal Club (NLC) 110 New Wave Society 53–5 newspaper advertisements 146 Nihon Keizai Shinbun 84, 139 Nihon seiji no kiki (Yamaguchi) 79 Nihon seiji no tairtsu jiku (Otake) 10 Nikkei 102–4 Nikkyo–so 159 Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) 21, 108, 110, 122–3 Nishikawa, Misa 137–8 ‘no-war clause’, Constitution 76 Noda group 62, 65, 67–8 No–kyo 39, 114, 159 non-aligned voters 24–5, 26–7, 28–9, 33–4 Norris, Pippa 19, 25, 154 North Korea 103 nuclear war 79, 82 Occupation Forces 75 occupation, and voting behaviour 21–2, 29–32 Odawara, Atsushi 80 Ogame, Yukio 93, 125, 158, 164 Ogawa, Jyunya 64, 127 Okada group 66–8 Okada, Katsuya 58, 60–1, 63 Okamoto, Kazuko 159 Okayama Gubernatorial election (1996) 160–3 Okayama Prefecture: effects of electoral reform 139–40, 156–7; emergence of

202

Index

JSP factions 157–9; formation of DPJ in 160–3; formation of Shinshinto– 160; JSP election in 159; Lower House election 2000 165–9; new democrats in 169–74; politics 1980–2001 151–6; Upper House election 1998 163–5 Old DSP group 62 Old SDPJ group 62 Old Shinshinto group 66–8 opposition parties: disunity 1990–1992 114–15; effects of electoral reform 138–40 Opposition politics in Japan (Johnson) 113–14 Organised Crime Law (1999) 69 Otake, Hideo 10, 79, 112, 116 Ozawa group 62 Ozawa, Ichiro– 41, 42, 43–4, 46–7, 56–7, 60–1, 68, 84, 100–1, 116, 117; as leader of DPJ 73–4 Pacific War 75 pacifism 100 Park, Cheol Hee 143, 144 party political broadcasts 146 party recognition politics 133, 146 party system: effects of electoral reform 137–8; effects of funding rules 147–9 Peace Co-operation Bill (UNPCO) 83–9, 91, 114–15 peace role, public perceptions of 86–7 Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) 83–7, 93–4, 100–1 pension payments scandal 124–5 personal support networks (ko–enkai) 10, 133, 143–7, 167, 168–9 personal voting, effects of electoral reform 143–7 PIA (magazine) 70 Pogintke, Thomas 10–11 policy formation: DPJ 69–72; Sakigake 49–50; union impact on 125–6 policy issues, uniting unions/parties 124–5 policy objectives, DPJ 54–5 policy preferences, JSP 78–80 ‘policy study’ groups 46 political change: union-led 110–11; and unions 111–14 political donations rules 143–4

Political Financial Reforms Act (1994) 144–5 political funding: campaigns 71; effects of 147–9; rules 143–6 political parties: ad hoc relations with unions 115; changing nature of relations with unions 9; implications of Constitutional reform 80–2; mutual dependence with unions 106–7, 109–11; need to evolve 4; union support for 120–6 political party system: effects of electoral reform 137–8; effects of electoral system/funding rules 147–9 political role, labour unions 107–9 ‘political space’ 176 political turmoil 1994–1996 116–18 politicians, screening of 50–61 politicisation 12 politics, Okayama Prefecture 151–6 polling stations 19–20 ‘pork barrel politics’ 133, 138 post-war politics 79 Postal Reform Bill 59 pre-war politics 79 ‘preference’ candidates 140 Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 86, 87 privatisation 109–10, 111 proportional representation (PR) 135–43, 147–9; allocation of seats 140–3 Public Offices Election Law 57, 146 public opinion polls: 1980–2000 23–6; 1988–1993 86–9; 1993–1998 93–4; 2005–2007 102–4 Purrington, Courtney 83–4 Putnam, Robert 12 Ramseyer, Mark 134 rearmament 78 Recruit scandal 26, 27–8, 38–9, 112 Reed, Steven 143, 144, 146 reform preferences, JSP 45–50 Rengo– Okayama 158 Rengo– Weekly 118–19 Rengo–: absorption of Jichiro– into 121; candidates backed by 40, 72–3, 111–15; flexible party support 123–6; formation of 109–10; and JSP election 159; leaders of 124; party creation

Index attempt 116–18; role of 110–11; support for DPJ 118–19; uniting of 119 Rengo–kai 112–13, 114–15, 120; candidates campaigning under 113 Renritsu no shikakejin (Yamagishi) 116 research literature 15–16 right-wing members, JSP 45–50 right, shifts to 8–9 Rincho– 109, 111 Rose, Richard 4, 6, 7, 10, 39, 105, 176 Rosenbluth, Frances 134 rural constituencies, voting behaviour 32–4 Ryo–unkai group 60, 62, 65, 67–8, 170 Sakigake: 1993–1996 49–50; in coalition government 44–50, 92–3; coalition negotiations 116; creation of DPJ 51–2; leadership 41; support for 23–6 Sanbetsu Kaigi 108 Sangyo– ho–kokukai 107 Sasamori, Kiyoshi 124 Sasano, Teiko 98–9, 112, 113 Sato–, Toyoko 159 Satomi, Tani 9–10, 14 Satsuki-Kai 161, 162, 165, 166 Scheiner, Ethan 15, 142, 151 Schoppa, Leonard J. 1–2 SDL group 158 security role, public perceptions of 86–7 sekiharitsu system 139–43, 156–7 Self-Defence Forces (SDF) 45, 60, 76, 77, 78, 84–5, 101, 103–4; public opinion on 87–9, 93–4 self-employment, and voting behaviour 22, 29–32 Sengoku, Yoshita 58 Shidehara, Kiju–ru– 76 Shimin no kai (Citizens Association) 71 Shin Minshu Rengo– 45–8, 117, 121 Shinkawa, Toshimitsu 93 Shinsaka, Kazuo 113 Shinseito–: coalition negotiations 116; leadership 41; support for 23–6 Shinshinto–: break-up of 119; creation of 34, 46–7, 117–18; formation in Okayama 160; overview 3; Rengo– support 118–19; support for 23–6 Shinshin group 65, 67–8

203

Shinto– tsukuri 49 shiriai system 61 Sho–kan Bunshu 172 ‘silver medal’ candidates 140–1 single member districts (SMDs) 135–8, 140–3 single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) 132–40, 147–9 Sirius group 115 Social Democratic League (SDL): in coalition government 42; and electoral reform 35–6; Kan Naoto in 71; support for 122 Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ): effects of electoral reform 148–9; funding 144–6; Jichiro– support for 121; in Okayama 153–4; support for 36, 123–4; see also Japan Socialist Party (JSP) social networks, and voting behaviour 22 Social Security Agency 101 socialist campaigning style 165–6 socialists, transformation to new democrats 2–16 socio-economic factors, voting behaviour 21–2 – hyo– 39, 108–9, 119, 121, 158, 159; So merger into Rengo– 109–10 Soka Gakkai 10 Sone, Yasunori 106, 109, 110 South Korea 60 Soviet Union, JSP support of 82 Stockwin, J.A.A. 4, 15, 40, 53–4, 64, 78, 83, 108, 112, 135, 142, 145, 152 strategic voting 137–8 Stronach, Bruce 22, 23, 27 Sun Party 55 support groups 70–2 Tabusa, Keiko 141 Tagaki, Hiroshi 46, 47, 48, 121 Tagaki, Tsuyoshi 124 Takahara, Katsuya 113, 122, 153, 157–9 Takai, Kazunobu 113 Takayanagi, Hideki 121 Takemura, Masayoshi 49, 52 Tanaka, Shu–sei 52 tax policy 39, 44, 85, 90 technology 11

204

Index

telecommunication workers union 21, 109, 110, 122–3, 158 tomodaore (‘falling down together’) 134, 142, 157 Toyonaga, Ikuko 110, 111, 112 Trade Union, Congress, UK 107 Tsumura, Keisuke 64, 127, 168, 170–1 Tsurunen, Marutei 63, 70, 127 two-party system 43–4, 134, 137–8, 145–6, 147–8 UK: political realignment 8–9; unions 107 unionisation 107–8, 129; and voting behaviour 21–2, 29–32 unionism, decline of 126–9 unions: ad hoc relations with parties 115; backing of candidates 72–3; changing relationships with parties 9; decline of 126–9; development of 107–9; flexible support of 123–6; handling of transition to DPJ 120–3; mutual dependence with parties 106–7, 109–11; and political change 111–14; support of DPJ members 127–8; theory of union-led political change 110–11; unification of 109–10; see also Rengo– United Nations: Peace Co-operation Bill (UNPCO) 83–9, 91, 114–15; Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) 83–7, 93–4, 100–1 Upper House elections: 1983–1992 40, 157–8; 1989 82–3, 111–14; 1989 39–40; 1998 163–5; 2007 73–4; voter turnout 18–21 Upper House: factions 68–9; vetoes by 59–60 urban constituencies, voting behaviour 32–4 US: defence agreement with 45, 51, 76, 79, 82, 84, 92, 121; defence lobbying 85; electoral instability 8; LDP support of 82

vote gathering techniques 148 voter mobilisation 10–14 voter participation, encouragement of 19–20, 146–7 voter turnout 17–21 voting behaviour: 1955 system 21–3; and age 26–9; and constituency type 32–5; and occupation 29–32; and socio-economic factors 21–2; see also opinion polls Wada, Junichiro 137 Ware, Alan 12 Washio, Etsuya 117, 124 Watanabe, Ko–zo– 61, 68, 101 Watanabe, Michio 44 Watanuki, Jo–ji 10, 77, 175 Weiner, Robert 61, 69–70 white-collar workers, voting behaviour 29–32 Wikipedia 65, 68 women candidates, growth in 39, 153, 158–9 World War II 79; aftermath of 75–6 Yamagishi, Akira 41–2, 109, 110–11, 115–16, 117, 123, 124 Yamaguchi, Jiro– 60, 79–80 Yamahana, Sadao 39, 41, 46–7, 48 Yohioka Kenji 48 Yu–ai group 119 Yokomichi, Takahiro 52, 56, 68, 118 Yokoyama, Izumi 165–6 Yomiuri Shinbun 84, 88, 89, 90–1, 92, 94, 97 Yoshida, Takafumi 23 Young Liberal group 65–6, 67–8 Yuai kurabu faction 62 Yukawa, Norihiko 70–1, 165 Yumei, Shimin group 167 Yunoki, Michiyoshi 126, 128, 171 – 21, 109, 110, 122–3, 158 Zendentsu – Zenro see Do–mei