The United States and Cambodia, 1872-1969: From Curiosity to Confrontation

The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969

Spanning from the first U.S. contact with Cambodia in the nineteenth century up to the late 1960s and the outbreak of war with Vietnam, this book is the first systematically to explore American relations with Cambodia. A discussion of adventurers, tourists and missionaries initially sets the scene for the analysis of official relations, which began in 1950. The book traces how relations with Cambodia’s leader, Norodom Sihanouk, were often troubled as Sihanouk strove to keep his country out of the Cold War even when pressured by the U.S. to join the battle against communism. Clymer concludes that although American policy could sometimes be surprisingly flexible, the Americans were ultimately unable to craft a policy that would accommodate Sihanouk’s needs with their own Cold War requirements in Southeast Asia. Ultimately the result was the breaking of diplomatic relations in 1965, a breach that lasted four years. The companion volume to this book The United States and Cambodia, 1969– 2000, discusses American relations with Cambodia in the latter part of the twentieth century. Based on extensive archival research in the United States, Australia and Cambodia, this is the most comprehensive account of the United States’ troubled relationship with Cambodia and will be of enormous interest to scholars in Southeast Asia, U.S. diplomatic history and U.S. foreign policy. Kenton Clymer is Chair of the History Department at Northern Illinois University, U.S.A. and was formerly Professor of History at the University of Texas, El Paso, U.S.A. He is the author of Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence, and other books that focus on America’s relations with Asia.

RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia

1 The Police in Occupation Japan Control, corruption and resistance to reform Christopher Aldous

12 Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962 Noriko Yokoi

2 Chinese Workers A new history Jackie Sheehan

13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975 Beatrice Trefalt

3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 The Australia-Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present Alan Rix 5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy Japan’s economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi 6 The Triads as Business Yiu Kong Chu 7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism A-chin Hsiau 8 Religion and Nationalism in India The case of the Punjab Harnik Deol 9 Japanese Industrialisation Historical and cultural perspectives Ian Inkster 10 War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 Hans J. van de Ven 11 Hong Kong in Transition One country, two systems Edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter

14 Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese communists’ perspective Ang Cheng Guan 15 The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession Adopting and adapting western influences Aya Takahashi 16 Women’s Suffrage in Asia Louise Edwards 17 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 Phillips Payson O’Brien 18 The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969 From curiosity to confrontation Kenton Clymer 19 Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim Ravi Arvind Palat 20 The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship Kenton Clymer 21 British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957–70 ‘Neo-colonialism’ or ‘disengagement’? Nicholas J. White 22 The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead

The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969 From curiosity to confrontation

Kenton Clymer

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Kenton Clymer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Clymer, Kenton J. The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969: from curiosity to confrontation / Kenton J. Clymer. p. cm. — (RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia; 18) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 1. United States—Foreign relations—Cambodia. 2. Cambodia— Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1865–1898. 4. United States—Foreign relations—20th century. I. Title. II. Series. E183.8.C15C57 2004 303.48′2730596′0904—dc22 ISBN 0-203-35646-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-66952-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-32332-0 (Print Edition)

2003016649

To Ethan Kenton Clymer

Cover image The photograph was taken during the sacking of the American embassy chancery and USIS office in Phnom Penh on 11 March, 1964. When sending the photo to the state department in 1972, Ambassador Emory C. Swank wrote that “the individual in the longsleeved shirt, tie and wearing sunglasses, apparently helping to direct the efforts of the mob, is Chau Seng, former minister and Sihanouk advisor.” Chau Seng was a Cambodian communist and a vehement critic of the United States. He was one of a group of twenty students (which included Saloth Sar [Pol Pot]) sent to Paris to study in 1949. Chau Seng subsequently served repeatedly in Sihanouk’s government, but, during one of Sihanouk’s shifts rightward in 1967, he was arrested and fled to France. After Sihanouk’s ouster in 1970, the two men were again allies, as Chau Seng held positions in Sihanouk’s government-in-exile, which was controlled by the murderous Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, Chau Seng returned to Cambodia. Like most exiles who returned from Western European countries, he was arrested in 1977, imprisoned in the notorious Tuol Sleng prison, and executed. Courtesy of U.S. National Archives.

Contents

Preface and acknowledgments List of abbreviations Map of Cambodia

ix xii xiii

1

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters

1

2

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954

18

3

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957

38

4

1958–1960: troubles

63

5

Kennedy and Cambodia

85

6

A casualty of war: the break in relations

107

7

Prelude to tragedy: the United States’ non-relationship with Cambodia, 1965–1969

128

Abbreviations used in the notes Notes Select bibliography Index

153 155 199 203

Preface and acknowledgments

About the only positive consequence of the American war in Vietnam was the explosion of scholarship on American relations with Southeast Asia. Books on Vietnam now number in the thousands, but other areas of Southeast Asia have also received important scholarly attention. As late as 1959, for example, there was only one semi-scholarly book on the Philippine American War (then called the Philippine Insurrection). Now there are several sophisticated accounts, all of which have dramatically increased our understanding of America’s first Asian war. There are also important works on American colonialism in the Philippines, as well as accounts of American involvement with Indonesia and Malaysia, and there are several fine works about American relations with Cambodia. But most of them concentrate on the relationship during the Vietnam war when for the first time Cambodia became etched in the minds of Americans as successive tragedies engulfed that small country. But the relationship encompasses more than simply the war years, important as they were. Prior to World War II Cambodia existed in the American imagination as a picturesque land of ancient temples but lazy and none-too-competent “natives,” a picture that emerged from the travel literature. The religiously inclined might also have noted the country’s “benighted” religious condition, which Protestant missionaries struggled valiantly to overcome, though with little success. After World War II the United States began to take more political interest in Cambodia. Decolonization of empire was an important issue, although as tensions developed with the Soviet Union decolonization proved to be a subsidiary concern to containing communism in the Cold War. Because Cambodia under Norodom Sihanouk refused to tow the American Cold War line and insisted on a nonaligned posture, the relationship tested the limits of American flexibility and the adeptness of Sihanouk. American policy proved to be more flexible than might have been expected, but ultimately it was not flexible enough; in 1965 diplomatic relations were broken, not to be restored for four years. It has been my hope to write the first comprehensive account of the U.S.Cambodian relationship from the first contacts in the late nineteenth century to 2000. This book will bring the story up to 1969; a subsequent volume will continue the account to the end of the century. The war in Vietnam will figure

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Preface and acknowledgments

prominently in these books, but I hope that the broader focus will allow a more complex picture of the relationship to emerge. Along the way I have incurred a number of personal and intellectual debts. The book’s inspiration goes back to 1988 when John McAuliff, director of the U.S.-Indochina Reconciliation Project, invited me to be part of a group visiting Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Taking place at a time when few Americans were in any of these Indochinese countries (an American trade embargo on Vietnam and Cambodia was still in place), the trip stimulated my interest in exploring American involvement with Cambodia. Though intensely interested in what were then important current developments in the relationship, I was determined to put the relationship in its larger historical perspective. I am most grateful to John for the invitation and for his subsequent insights about Cambodia and American involvement there. I am also deeply grateful to Bill Herod, who in 1989, as director of Indochina Project, then a program of the Fund for Peace in Washington, DC, invited me to work with him during the summer of that year. I learned much about contemporary issues affecting U.S.-Cambodian relations and the legislative process and wrote my first article on U.S.-Cambodian relations using the project’s collections. Bill subsequently has served with a number of organizations in Cambodia itself, including the American Friends Service Committee, and kindly hosted me there on several occasions. The materials in the AFSC library in Phnom Penh were helpful. Bill was instrumental in obtaining permission for me to do research in the Cambodian National Archives. Several Cambodian scholars – especially Ben Kiernan, David Chandler, Craig Etcheson, and Steve Heder – have generously responded to inquiries and read draft chapters, papers, and articles. Several non-Cambodian specialists have also commented on various parts of the manuscript including Pamela Sodhy, Bradford Perkins, Carl T. Jackson, David H. Anderson, Zhai Qiang, David Schalk, Cary Fraser, Gary Hess, Ross Marley, Nick Cullather, and Charles Ambler. Ambassador Julio A. Jeldres shared documents with me, for which I am most grateful. William C. Trimble, Jr. kindly provided information about his late father, Ambassador William Cattell Trimble, and commented on my draft article about him. The anonymous readers for Routledge provided valuable insights that improved the manuscript. Australian Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps flew from Melbourne to Canberra so that I could interview him for parts of two days. His memory of persons and events in the 1960s was extraordinary, and he also gave me some relevant documents and articles. I am most grateful to him. Ambassador Charles Twining took time from his busy schedule for an interview in Phnom Penh, while Ambassador Kenneth Quinn critiqued portions of my manuscript and responded to numerous inquiries. Sorya Sim of the Cambodian Documentation Project in Phnom Penh graciously shared with me many relevant documents from the project’s collection and assisted in producing the map on page xiii. Sally Benson discussed recent Cambodian developments and shared documents with me. Carlos Cartlidge, who served in Vietnam with the Special Forces,

Preface and acknowledgments

xi

discussed his experiences with me and shared photographs of Khmer Serei soldiers. While teaching in Germany in 1992–1993 my able assistant, Volker Depkat, photocopied numerous clippings for me. Cindy Flores brought my attention to articles about the Khmer Rouge. The late Ruth Arrowsmith sent me many newspaper clippings of value. David Hackett answered my computer problems. To all these people I express my most profound gratitude. No history books can be written without the use of archives and libraries. In the United States I am most grateful to the National Archives II staff (and particularly to archivist Milt Gustafson), as well as to the staffs at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter libraries. Similarly the staffs at the Seeley Mudd Library at Princeton University and the Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives in Colorado Springs were most helpful. I was ably assisted in Cambodia by Lim Ky at the Cambodian National Archives. I want to single out Gay Hogan of the National Archives of Australia for her dedicated assistance during my three visits to Canberra and for her persistence in calling my attention to relevant materials. I am also grateful to the several funding agencies that helped defray the costs of research. These include the National Endowment for the Humanities, which graciously provided both a Summer Stipend and the year-long Grant for College Teachers; the Rockefeller Foundation which invited my wife and me, as well as Sorya Sim, to spend a month at the foundation’s beautiful Bellagio Study Center in Italy; the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Ford libraries which provided travel grants. The University of Texas at El Paso, my academic home when this book was written, assisted me in numerous ways, most notably with a year-long Faculty Development Grant. An earlier version of Chapter 2 appeared in the Journal of American-East Asian Relations. Earlier versions of Chapter 6 appeared in the journal Diplomatic History and in Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco, eds., A Companion to the Vietnam War (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). A portion of Chapter 4 appeared as “Ambassador William Cattell Trimble and Cambodia, 1959–1962,” in David H. Anderson, ed., The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000). All are included here with permission. Quotations from Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power (London: Verso, 1985) appear with the kind permission of the author. Quotations from E. F. Irwin, With Christ in Indo-China: The Story of the Alliance Missions in French Indo-China and Eastern Siam (Harrisburg, PA: Christian Publications, 1937), and Alfred C. Snead, Missionary Atlas: A Manual of the Foreign Work of the Christian and Missionary Alliance (Harrisburg, PA: Christian Publications, 1936), appear with permission from Christian Publications. Finally, I am as always grateful to my wife Marlee who has not only lived with this project for years but read draft after draft, assisted with research, and given me encouragement along the way.

Abbreviations

AFSC AID ARVN CIA CIDG CINCPAC DIA GVN ICA ICC MAAG MACV MDA NSC OCB P.A.S. PAVN PRC RKG SEATO UPI USG

American Friends Service Committee Agency for International Development South Vietnamese Army Central Intelligence Agency Civilian Irregular Defense Groups Commander in Chief, Pacific Defense Intelligence Agency Government of Vietnam International Communications Agency International Commission for Supervision and Control Military Assistance Advisory Group Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Military Defense Agreement National Security Council Operations Control Board Pay, allowance and subsistence People’s Army of Vietnam People’s Republic of China Cambodian Government Southeast Asia Treaty Organization United Press International US Government

Cambodia

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters

1

1

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters

No one should die before they see Angkor. Somerset Maugham1

For most Americans who lived in the last half of the twentieth century, Cambodia became a household word only in 1970 when President Richard Nixon ordered an invasion of that country to destroy Vietnamese communist sanctuaries. That action, which led to dramatic protests and the deaths of university students at Kent State and Jackson State Universities, brought Cambodia into the war in neighboring Vietnam in a major way for the first time. It led to successive tragedies inside Cambodia itself as hundreds of thousands died in a civil war that raged from 1970 to 1975, followed by three years of the almost unbelievable savagery of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, who ruled until the end of 1978 when Vietnamese troops drove them from power. Many Americans and Europeans concluded that the United States was largely responsible for destroying what had hitherto been an idyllic, unchanging land of happy peasants. There was truth in the assertion that the United States bore considerable responsibility for Cambodia’s destruction, but the stereotype of Cambodia was a distortion. Cambodia, though in some respects deeply conservative and traditional, was hardly immune to larger historical developments and had undergone considerable change over the centuries. Nor was it an entirely peaceful society, as anyone who has seen the bas-reliefs on the late twelfth-early thirteenth century Bayon temple at Angkor Thom can attest. Like other societies of Southeast Asia, Cambodia’s people – the Khmer – had their own culture that descended from prehistoric times. But early in the Christian era outside influences, primarily from India, merged with the indigenous culture and animistic religion and, at least on the surface, became dominant. A similar pattern of cultural change occurred in most areas of Southeast Asia outside of Vietnam. Mahayana Buddhism came to Southeast Asia very early, as the famous Borobodur monument, an eighth century stupa in Indonesia, attests. Buddhism was also in Cambodia very early on, but Hinduism was more widespread. The first of the famous Angkor temples, begun in the ninth century, were Hindu. Later some of them became Buddhist, or combined Hinduism and Buddhism.

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The most famous temple of them all, Angkor Wat, built in the twelfth century, was dedicated to the Hindu god Vishnu, but the slightly later Bayon is a Mayahana Buddhist monument. Later in the thirteenth century Theravada Buddhism, a stricter, more “puritanical” form of the religion, came to dominate Cambodia, in part due to missionary influences from Siam and elsewhere. The first recorded kingdom in Southeast Asia, called Funan by the Chinese, developed in the early Christian era in what is now Cambodia and southern Vietnam. Long thought to have been a major state, new evidence suggests that it may not have been as unified or as significant as the Chinese, and later the French, sought to portray it; and it may be that early Cambodia, like other parts of Southeast Asia, was composed of small city states that occasionally joined together for specific purposes. By the eighth century, however, Cambodia was becoming more consolidated politically into a kingdom (or perhaps two kingdoms) called Chenla.2 Cambodia’s greatness as a state began the following century when the “Angkorian period” began. Usually said to have begun in 802 and lasting until 1431, Angkor (located near present day Siem Reap) at times dominated much of mainland Southeast Asia. During this period of great creativity, several hundred Hindu and Buddhist temples, palaces, and other buildings were erected which displayed, as Milton Osborne puts its, “a richness of iconography and symbolism to rival anything to be found in the great cathedrals of Europe.”3 A system of reservoirs and canals allowed large harvests of rice that supported an urbanized population of close to one million people. It was not, however, a peaceful period, as the Khmers fought fierce wars with the Siamese to the west, the Vietnamese to the northeast, and the Chams to the south. By the fifteenth century, the kingdom’s influence was waning, and a Thai invasion in 1431 is traditionally said to mark the end of the Angkorian state. In fact, the situation was more complex than that. Although no one can say for certain why the court left Angkor to establish a new capital in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, the growing significance of international trade may explain a move to the Phnom Penh, since that is where two major river systems converged. Angkor was apparently abandoned for a century, but in 1550 or 1551 a Cambodian king restored some of the ruins, and subsequent Khmer kings went on pilgrimages to the Angkorian temples. Monks and others continued to live in the region. Although the Cambodian capital had moved, it did not escape external pressures, and Cambodia found itself caught between the Thais and the Vietnamese. (Indeed the rediscovery of Angkor apparently was the result of a Cambodian military expedition against the Siamese.) At times Cambodia became a semi vassal of one side or the other, or even of both at the same time. In the sixteenth century the King even appealed to Spain for protection and promised to convert to Christianity, and late in the century Spanish officials, soldiers, and missionaries lived in Cambodia and were given Cambodian bureaucratic titles, though they had no lasting influence. The Europeans had a low opinion of the Cambodians. One Spanish missionary – not believing that Cambodians were capable of

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters

3

important feats – attributed the building of Angkor to the Jews.4 It would not be the last time that outsiders would disparage Cambodian abilities and express disbelief that the Khmers had built Angkor. Despite the outside pressures, Cambodia in the seventeenth century was reasonably independent. But by the nineteenth century its independence was little more than a shell. Initially the Vietnamese cut off the Khmers from access to the sea and absorbed significant amounts of their territory and people into Vietnam. The Siamese also attacked Cambodia; in 1772 they burned down Phnom Penh. The Cambodian king was no longer able to protect his people, and his popularity declined. Cambodia had become a poor state, often under foreign sway, with a mostly subsistence economy. By 1808 European visitors had to request Vietnamese permission to visit Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese considered Cambodians barbarians and wanted to civilize them, even to the point of telling them what to wear and how to conduct themselves. It was not unlike the subsequent French mission civilisatrice.5 Only in the 1840s did a semblance of independence return, in part due to a Thai military expedition against Vietnam. In 1853 Cambodia’s King Duang sought French protection against the Thais, perhaps having been persuaded to do so by French missionaries. The Thais prevented this for the moment, but within a decade the French had begun to establish themselves in the kingdom, as well as in neighboring Vietnam. In Cambodia they came at first with the encouragement of the putative Cambodian king, Norodom, who attempted to use them as a balance against the Thais. When Norodom was formally crowned in 1864, both France and Siam were his cosponsors. But thereafter Thai influence faded, while French influence increased. By the beginning of the twentieth century, French protection had become French control, symbolized by the installation of several French résidents and a résident supérieur who were in complete control of the country. Cambodia was a part of the French colony of Indochina. In 1907 French authorities managed to get Siam to cede back to Cambodia important territories taken years earlier, including Angkor. For this Cambodians were immensely grateful, and thereafter French savants and Cambodian laborers worked together to restore the temples. There was, however, some resistance to the French. In 1916 a peaceable rebellion against oppressive taxes occurred, and in 1925 villagers, angry over high taxes, murdered a French résident, Félix Louis Bardez. Major French infrastructure improvements, such as the construction of roads and railroads, scarcely benefited the rural majority. But, while a major revolutionary movement began in neighboring Vietnam, also under French control, Cambodia remained largely quiescent until after World War II. Prior to the arrival of the French, no Americans seem to have entered Cambodia. The United States had no diplomatic or consular representatives in the kingdom until 1950. The earliest semi-permanent Americans to reside in Cambodia were Protestant missionaries from the Christian and Missionary Alliance, who first received permission to enter Cambodia in 1922. Prior to that time, the only Americans to visit the kingdom were intrepid adventurers (followed later by tourists), big game hunters, and scientists. Some of these early

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adventurers wrote books and articles about their travels, and from their accounts interested Americans learned something about the kingdom. The first American account of Cambodia was Frank Vincent, Jr.’s book, The Land of the White Elephant. Brought out by the major publishing house of Harper & Brothers, the book first appeared in 1872 and recounted Vincent’s trip through Burma, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin China in 1871–1872. The author’s main interest was to visit the fabled temples of Angkor, which the French naturalist Henri Mouhot had “discovered” roughly a decade earlier.6 The book, with Vincent’s account of traveling from Bangkok to Angkor by boat, horse, bullock cart, and elephant was immensely popular and within twelve years had gone through four editions. It continued to remain in print during the twentieth century. Oxford University Press brought out an edition in 1988, and the book is still available through White Lotus Press in Thailand. Travel agencies promoting trips to Cambodia, as well as travel writers, continue to quote Vincent’s work.7 The Land of the White Elephant, which was remarkably well illustrated with detailed drawings of the temples and prominent individuals, revealed Vincent’s sense of wonderment and awe. The Angkorian ruins were “splendid and stupendous,” compared favorably with the accomplishments of European or American antiquity, and far exceeded any nineteenth century European or American artistic accomplishments, Vincent thought. But there was a paradox: Vincent, like most westerners of that age, considered non-western societies incapable of great accomplishments. Although his book was not viciously racist, Vincent, like the Vietnamese and the French, considered ordinary Cambodians “degenerate” and “lazy.” Their only genius, he wrote, “expresses itself in the carving of their boats.” Asked who had built the temples, a Cambodian replied that it could not have been angels because there were tool marks on the stones. This, thought Vincent, was “certainly an amazing display of intellectual acumen for a native.”8 Who, then, had built the temples? They could scarcely have been related to the present-day Cambodians. “Few countries offer a more striking picture of lapse from the highest pinnacle of greatness to the last degree of insignificance and barbarism than Cambodia,” Vincent asserted. A statue of the Leper King at Angkor exhibited “a marked contrast to the physical type of the present race of Cambodians,” he wrote. The statue revealed features “of a much higher order,” a “quite Grecian” profile. Theories about who might have built the monuments ranged from the lost tribes of Israel to the Romans, with ancient Burmese, Javanese, and Indians as other possible candidates. Vincent himself was partial to the idea that Assyrians and Persians were responsible; they might even have built some of the Mayan monuments in the western hemisphere, he hypothesized, basing his conclusions in part on linguistic analysis.9 But if Vincent thought it improbable that the Angkorian temples had any connection with present-day Cambodians, whose general capabilities he disparaged, he did see some hope for the country in its leadership. In particular he found the King, Norodom, intelligent and generally popular with his people.

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More importantly the King was forward looking, by which Vincent meant that he was aware of the rest of the world (he noted numerous atlases in the throne room, for example, along with a pictorial history of Britain), was energetic and curious, and in particular had adopted “European ideas and notions.” His chief aide-de-camp was “an English Jew,” and he had contracted with French businessmen to improve the nation’s output of silk, fruit, sugarcane, and bricks. After Vincent left Phnom Penh, the King traveled to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Peking. “Is not progress in the East as rapid and wonderful as in the West?” Vincent concluded.10 Cambodia’s future was not entirely devoid of hope. If Americans failed to read Vincent, they might have come across another, less distinguished, book published in 1883, entitled In the Far East: A Narrative of Exploration and Adventure in Cochin-China, Cambodia, Laos, and Siam. This anonymously written book, by a British citizen but published in both the United States and Great Britain, traced the great French expedition in 1866 up the Mekong River and drew heavily on the account of the French explorer Lieutenant Francis Garnier. In the Far East was a second hand account and not nearly as important as Vincent’s book. But it did reinforce Vincent’s negative stereotype of Cambodians. Being dark skinned with a “thick and heavy lower jaw” and hair “cut like bristles of a brush,” they exuded an air of “passive savagery.” The “Annamites” (Vietnamese) considered them “as little above the Moïs or wild peoples of the mountains” and thought of them purely and simply as “savages . . . whose nature is radically bad and vicious.” While the author thought the Annamite view onesided, he or she did think the Cambodian was a “morose and untamable denizen of the hills and woods.”11 There were few if any other accounts by Americans in the nineteenth century. But between 1887 and 1898 Popular Science Monthly published three translated accounts of Cambodian society by French authorities, which had originally appeared in Revue Scientifique. The image of Cambodians that emerged from these articles was more complex. The first of these articles accepted the common view that the mountain people of Cambodia were “savages,” but the author’s view of the majority population was much more positive. To be sure, their furniture was “of the most primitive character,” and their food was “repulsive to Europeans.” They also ate with their hands and spat “all the time.” Cambodian housekeeping left “much to be desired.” Furthermore, it was difficult to tell the women from the men. At the same time, their houses, built on stilts, were exactly suited to the seasonal floods; the people possessed an “inventive spirit” that was particularly seen in the “great skill” that went into making their mats and mattresses, as well as their “ingeniously constructed portable furnaces of terra-cotta.” Nothing, the author thought, “could be better for its purpose.” Furthermore, Cambodians seldom drank, and drunkenness was almost unknown. They were sturdy, good walkers and horsemen, and “boatsmen of rare skill.”12 Two subsequent articles by a French official, Adhémard Leclère (at one time the résident of Kampot) also presented many positive images of Cambodians. Cambodian children were well behaved and respectful of their parents. Cambodian women were dignified, and the Cambodian legal and social system accorded

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considerable rights (including the right of divorce) and power to women. Maidens “rarely go astray” and infanticide was unknown. The people had a great facility for learning languages, were “brave” and “valiant,” and usually “pleasantly disposed” although “very revengeful for injuries.” Theft was common but not as common as in neighboring Cochin China. Leclère also thought the Cambodians were superstitious and detailed their beliefs in ghosts, genii, demons, and other supernatural beings. But his writing on this point was generally objective, even playful; he noted that many Europeans also held superstitious beliefs. Still, American readers would have been reassured to learn that Cambodians sprang from “a less gifted race.”13 The United States established a consulate at Saigon in 1889, but this did not contribute much to understanding what Americans thought about Cambodia. Until 1906 all of the consular agents were non-Americans, mostly French. For many years they seem to have made no reports about Cambodia at all. Their accounts of the importation of American kerosene, timber, rice, flour, and a few other goods, however, indicate that there was a modest American commercial interest in Indochina. Kerosene, produced by the Standard Oil Company, was the most important of the imports, and doubtless some of it was sold in Phnom Penh and other areas of Cambodia. Late in 1911, however, a former American consul at Saigon, Jacob E. Conner, traveled to Angkor, apparently one of the very few Americans to have visited the ruins since Vincent’s famous trip several decades earlier. By then it was no longer necessary to travel by elephant, but the trip was still difficult. Conner went by train from Saigon to Mytho, then by a steamboat with minimal accommodations for a twenty-four hour voyage up the Mekong to Phnom Penh. Another day took the party up the Tonle Sap River to Kompong Chhnang, where they entered the Great Lake (the Tonle Sap). At midnight, passengers transferred to sampans for a five-hour trip powered by oarsmen up the Siem Reap River to Siem Reap town. There they boarded bullock carts for the final three or four miles to Angkor. Once there they found no hotel, only a rest house “consisting of room, floor, and walls, and that is all.” No food was available. Anticipating this, Conner had brought with him “a streamer-trunk full of tropical clothing, a steamer-rug, a camp-bed, a Cambodian mattress (a splendid thing for comfort), a supply of provisions, and a Chinese cook.”14 Conner made a few condescending observations about contemporary Cambodia. He thought Phnom Penh an “attractive little place” whose “well-paved streets” attested to the benefits of French colonial rule. The brand new royal buildings suggested “a general flavor of mild decay,” and the phnom itself had “some lines of beauty that more than atone for its grotesque features.” King Sisowath, then in his sixties, was portrayed as a kind of pretend, childlike monarch. In contrast to other Asian societies the women, he thought, were not exploited. Finally, like most observers he speculated about who had built the temples and other structures at Angkor. He did note that the figures carved in the bas-reliefs resembled contemporary Cambodians. But he suspected that the real founders of the kingdom came from India in the fourth century and

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wondered if the fabulous wealth they brought with them might have been the riches sought by Christopher Columbus in the fifteenth century.15 Accounts of Angkor like Conner’s soon created considerable interest in travel there, and by the early 1920s a tourist industry was beginning to flourish. Well to do tourists could now board a boat in Saigon, and travel up the Mekong River and through the Great Lake. Automobiles had replaced the bullock carts for the short ride to Angkor, where visitors now stayed in bungalows near Angkor Wat itself. (They could still tour the ruins by elephant, however.) Among those Americans to take the trip in the mid 1920s were two important writers: Helen Churchill Candee, a wealthy New Yorker who in 1912 had been one of the first class passengers on the ill-fated Titanic who had survived the disaster; and Harry A. Franck, a prolific and very popular travel writer. At the time of her visit to Cambodia, Mrs. Candee was well into her sixties. By the time she traveled to Cambodia there was a much better understanding of when Angkor had been built, but at least in the popular imagination there remained much question about who had built the temples. Vincent’s theory about the Assyrians and Persians had fortunately never caught on, but whether the ancient Khmers were related to the present-day population of Cambodia remained an issue. Who were the “builders, the Khmers?” asked Candee at the beginning of her popular book, Angkor the Magnificent, published in 1924. Was the current population – the “quiet brown people . . . these gentle forest dwellers” – the “remnant of the great race? Or did the last real Khmers . . . assemble his [sic] legions, and with band and banner, elephant and chariot, march magnificently away into never-never land to be seen no more?” Franck, writing two years later, had similar questions. He accepted the usual stereotypical view of Cambodians as childlike and lazy and described the men as “effeminate-looking.” Present-day Cambodians were such a “low type of humanity” that it shook one’s “belief in the equality of man.” Could they, then, be descendants of the builders?16 After her tour of Angkor, Candee still could not answer the question definitively but acknowledged that she was skeptical “that the present Cambodian, gently inert in mind, quietly content, could be of the blood that fought fierce battles to gain luxury and puissance.”17 Franck, in contrast, concluded that they were the same people. Civilizations rose and fell, he pointed out, and he doubted if the current people would ever again regain their former vitality. Still, despite the negative assessments of present-day Cambodians, both Candee and Franck found much to praise about them. Candee marveled at the Cambodian dancers, credited Cambodian education with creating “sweet tempered, content” boys (“What have our people done for youth that is better than this?”), found the Cambodian women well treated, admired the monks, appreciated the sympathetic bond between the people and their animals, and took umbrage at stereotypes that characterized the people as lazy. No wonder that both the French government and the Cambodian king decorated her for her work.18 And Franck, though he was less taken by dancers, commented on the Cambodians’ great sense of personal dignity, their sturdiness, and their intelligence. Furthermore, as the only people of Indochina to have left “enduring works of their

8

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intellectual past,” the Khmers deserved to be counted among “the great races of mankind.”19 One reason for Candee’s more moderate assessment of Cambodians was the recent memory of World War I. For some westerners, it was now more difficult to assert the superiority of Occidental culture when that fratricidal struggle of doubtful value had virtually destroyed an entire generation of young men and left Europeans hateful and sullen. This traumatic experience challenged many confidently held beliefs. Candee was well aware of this. One of the Cambodian men who worked in the bungalow at Angkor had been an aviator in France in World War I. Should he be considered a “savage,” asked Candee, now that he had returned to live in a bamboo hut? “After the European ‘bath of blood’,” she wrote, “how well he understands the bas-reliefs” of Angkor Wat.20 World War I did not have a similarly sobering impact on all American observers, however. Ellen N. LaMotte, for example, found the Cambodians “a simple, primitive people, with no art and no architecture.” It was “impossible,” she thought, that their ancestors had built the Angkorean temples. They were “savages” if, nevertheless, “picturesque” ones. Similarly Arthur Davison Ficke found in Cambodia “native life at its simplest and most primitive.” He assumed that the builders of Angkor were Indians who had easily conquered the aboriginal population. “But time brings certain revenges,” he stated. Over time the Indian conquerors intermixed with “the sluggish Malay blood” of the local people, thereby losing themselves “in the weakness of the race [they] had conquered.” This was evident in the modern Cambodian monarchs, who dreamed “opiumdreams under toy spires.” The view that Indians were responsible for the wonders of Angkor was apparently popular in the 1920s. As a writer for the New Republic put it, exhibiting a sense of certainty, the “humble little brown people” who currently inhabited Cambodia had become slaves of the superior Indian invaders and builders.21 Meanwhile, for the first time official American representatives in Indochina began to take some interest in Cambodian developments. There was some strategic interest in Cambodia and the rest of Indochina. In 1924, for example, Lt. Col. John A. Hambleton applied for licenses and permits to engage in big game hunting in the region, but part of his mission was to gather intelligence for the War Department about aviation. Hambleton’s was not the last effort to gather military intelligence. In 1930 the American military attaché in Peiping requested information about aviation, including military aviation in Indochina. The consul responded with detailed information about topographical features and airfields in the various parts of the colony, including Cambodia (there were sixteen landing fields there); he also sent along a map showing the landing fields and sent a copy of his report to Washington. The next year the consul replied to an inquiry from the military attaché in Paris about the “combat value” of Indochinese forces. Relying on information inveigled from French officers, the consul reported that the local forces had little value as an offensive force but were better at defense.22 However, the primary concern of the American consuls was to pursue American economic interests in Indochina. In June 1922 the American consul in Saigon,

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9

Leland L. Smith, produced what was apparently the first comprehensive report on Cambodia. Accompanied (not insignificantly) by the manager of the Standard Oil Company, Smith visited Phnom Penh and consulted with various French officials. He came away with a sense that Cambodia had great economic potential and far exceeded Cochin China in its resource base. In his report, Smith surveyed the Cambodian infrastructure and economy, with particular attention to the country’s agriculture. He commented on the production of rice, corn, tobacco, manioc, coconuts, and cotton, thought that cotton would eventually surpass rice production, and was almost euphoric about Cambodia’s timber resources. “About two thirds of the surface of Cambodia is covered with magnificent untouched forest containing, Teak, Rosewood, Ebony, Cardamon, Mahogany, Palisander,” and various soft woods of great beauty. There was almost no industry in the country, but Smith thought that American firms could get involved in “rice milling, cotton spinning, packing plants, silk spinning, or lumber mills,” and that they also ought to look into possible oil deposits in southern Cambodia.23 Subsequent reports indicated a continuing interest in possible markets for American products in Indochina, as well as limited investment opportunities. With the development of excellent new roads, for example, the consulate urged American automobile manufacturers to compete. A direct shipping route now made it possible to circumvent protective French tariffs.24 At some point American car dealerships developed. By at least 1938 the Societé Coloniale d’Automobiles was the Ford Motor Company’s agent in Cochin China, Cambodia, and Southern Annam.25 International Harvester was present by at least 1930, and Standard Oil had significant operations in the country. American firms operated at a disadvantage, since the French favored their own firms and placed various obstacles in the way of foreign concerns. In a report about new railroads being built in Cambodia and elsewhere in Indochina, for example, the consulate saw “no opening” for the use of American equipment or supplies.26 Obstacles to land ownership posed another problem. Standard Oil tried to get the state department to negotiate a new trade agreement with France guaranteeing the right of foreigners to own property in French colonies. When the state department responded that this would probably not be possible since the United States could not reciprocate (several states barred foreigners from land ownership), the company persisted, suggesting a number of counter arguments the department might use.27 But nothing seems to have come of the matter. Aside from French restrictions, there was another perceived drawback to the country’s potential economic development: Cambodians, Consul Smith observed in his report, were “lazy.” Cambodian rice was among the poorest in Asia because the people were “lazy and not prone to accept improved methods of cultivation”28 – the very same complaint, it might be noted, that the Vietnamese and then the French had made. Initially enthusiastic about Cambodia’s future, Smith’s reports became increasingly pessimistic due to his assessment of the people. In a report in 1923 on the future of cotton production in Cambodia, Smith expressed contempt for the French (they “were completely ignorant of

10 Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters local conditions and occupied themselves with the administration of the plantation rather than with the vital details of planting and cultivating”), but the most difficult impediment to increasing production was that “the Cambodians and the Annamites are among the laziest people in the world.” Since the French themselves would not emigrate from France to do the work, the only solution, Smith thought, was to bring in Indian or Tonkinese workers. The next year Smith again reported that Cambodian rice was of poor quality “due to the shiftlessness of the population who have most primitive needs.” Six months later the consul had arrived at an even lower estimate of the Cambodians: they were still “lazy and not prone to be ambitious,” but now they were portrayed as being “even lazier than the Annamites.”29 One thing that all observers agreed upon was that the French colonial government was building an excellent network of new roads. The ability to penetrate deeper into Indochina increased the popularity of big game hunting. Indeed, by 1930s hunting had taken such a toll that it was difficult to locate the previously numerous wild water buffalo. The popularity of hunting resulted in numerous dispatches from the American consulate about hunting regulations, how to import guns, and so forth. In 1930 F. J. Defosse, a Saigon resident and reportedly the “best known big game guide in the world,” wrote an informative pamphlet, “Big Game Hunting in Indo-China,” which was aimed at an American audience. Noting that he had guided “such well known sportsmen as Colonel Theodore Roosevelt; Doctor Richard Sutton of Kansas City; Major Considine of the U.S. Cavalry; Doctor Maxwell of Omaha, Nebraska; Mr. Chaney of Portland, Oregon, and a lot of others” who, he stated, “want to come again,” Defosse provided a wealth of information on exotic game and practical information about costs, weather, climate, clothing, and regulations.30 The new roads also made it easier to get to Angkor, and by the mid 1920s travel to Angkor was less taxing. What had taken Helen Candee a five day trip from Saigon was now a mere matter of hours by automobile. However, some travelers, including substantial numbers of Americans, deliberately chose the more leisurely boat option. As one Englishwoman recounted her river trip to Angkor in 1930, aside from two French couples and one other woman from England, “the rest of the party . . . was American.” But the new overland route was increasingly common. Among the first Americans to take advantage of this route was Robert Casey. A prolific writer who had wanted to visit the temples ever since seeing a picture of them while serving in the trenches in World War I, Casey finally got his chance in 1927 when the National Geographic Society sent him to Cambodia. His report first appeared in the society’s well known magazine in September 1928 and was followed the next year by a lengthy book detailing his travels, Four Faces of Siva: The Detective Story of a Vanished Race. Like all observers, Casey was awestruck by the magnificence of Angkor. The builders were more advanced than any Europeans at the time, he reported. They were “by any standard highly civilized.” Angkor Thom was the size of Carthage and “as large as Rome at the beginning of the Christian era. It has something of the intellectual status of Athens and the might of Babylon.” As for

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters 11 Angkor Wat, “if nothing else remained of all their works, it would be enough to mark them as one of the great races that time has produced.”31 But as the book’s subtitle suggests, Casey, like previous authors, found it difficult to believe that ancient Khmers of Angkor were related to the presentday inhabitants of Cambodia, who were “very close to savagery.” Even if, as some scholars had argued, present-day Cambodians were of the same race, they “were no more the same people who built Angkor than the rock piles of Verdun are the town that stood by the Meuse before 1914.” Civilized people, he believed, would not have “lapsed into savagery merely because of a change of address.” Therefore, if they were descendants, the only explanation was that Angkorian civilization had been destroyed by a slave revolution during which all of the intelligentsia was destroyed. The revolutionists then quickly returned “to the primitive life of the jungle.”32 To be sure, Americans did have some contrary images of Cambodia to consider. Not only were Candee’s and Franck’s accounts more nuanced, but the German traveler Hermann Norden (a member of the American Geographical Society), whose book A Wanderer in Indo-China appeared in 1931, wrote that the present King of Cambodia was in the same line as the Khmer kings of Angkor and that the people were definitely descendants of those who had inhabited Angkor. Furthermore, he seemed to be critical of the usual tourist who went to Cambodia only to see the temples and who had little time to mingle with the people. Norden himself had a chance to mingle when his car broke down and he took the public bus from Kompong Cham to Siem Reap. Getting a seat beside the driver, he was able to honk the horn to scare the numerous cattle off the road, which he much enjoyed.33 Also, those few published accounts in the 1930s tended to describe Angkor without disparaging comments about the present-day population.34 Given the persistence of negative racial stereotypes in American culture at that time, however, it seems likely that the earlier views of Cambodia as a land with a generally degraded population living with a comic opera court continued to predominate. Such was certainly the American perception of neighboring Vietnam, as Mark Philip Bradley has demonstrated so convincingly.35

Missionaries They are spiritually dead, but they do not know it. E. F. Irwin, With Christ in Indo-China36 Perishing, perishing, thronging our pathway, Hearts break with anguish too heavy to bear, Jesus would save, but there’s no one to tell them; No one to lift them from sin and despair. Christian and Missionary Alliance hymn37

Although Cambodia was overwhelmingly a Buddhist society, Christianity had had some presence ever since the first contacts with Portuguese and Spanish adventurers and traders in the sixteenth century. The following century French

12 Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters Jesuits, having been expelled from Japan, moved into Vietnam. They, along with other Catholic missionaries who had established work in Siam, soon moved into Cambodia. As the Vietnamese and Siamese exerted increasing influence in Cambodia in the eighteenth century, the missionaries increased their presence in the increasingly weak kingdom. When the French made Cambodia a part of Indochina, French Catholicism had unhindered access to the people. But in fact only a handful of Khmers seems to have been converted. There was no Protestant presence at all until American missionaries from the Christian and Missionary Alliance arrived in the 1920s.38 The Alliance missionaries were in fact the first Americans to have actually lived in Cambodia for any extended period. The Alliance served in Indochina as a result of a comity agreement with other Protestant missionary societies that divided the world among them, and by the 1920s Indochina was the organization’s most populous field. Until well into the twentieth century, therefore, the Alliance was the only mainline Protestant mission in the region, except for a small Swedish Brethren presence in Laos. In the early days there may also have been a few Seventh Day Adventists, since one Alliance report in 1928 asked for prayers that the people of Indochina be protected against “false doctrines such as . . . Seventh Day Adventism.”39 Although Alliance personnel were not able to begin work in Indochina until 1911, they had long viewed the area as a place that needed a Protestant presence. In 1885 the Alliance’s founder, A. B. Simpson, wrote about the wonders of Angkor which he described with a sense of awe. Accepting the views of those who had actually visited the temples, Simpson also concluded that the people who built Angkor could not have been the same as those who presently inhabited Cambodia, since they were an “easy, good-natured, and indolent race.” Their King, furthermore, maintained “a ridiculous imitation of French style” and tried “to ape the manners of the Napoleonic dynasty.” And Simpson lamented that there was not a single Protestant missionary in the entire kingdom.40 Alliance missionaries did eventually get to Indochina. They went into Vietnam in 1911 (having expanded there from established work in southern China), but French authorities were hostile to their expansion into Cambodia. Some Alliance officials went to Cambodia as tourists, however, and before they obtained permission late in 1922 to enter the kingdom as missionaries a representative from the American Bible Society in Bangkok (presumably Robert Irwin) traveled through Cambodia by elephant to visit Angkor and subsequently translated portions of the Bible into Khmer (although the translation was apparently not very good).41 Furthermore, R. A. Jaffray, who had expanded Alliance work into Vietnam, was most likely the author of a pamphlet entitled “Cambodia” which was “the first information that ever came to America to stir up interest in the spiritual needs of that country.”42 Also, in 1921 the missionaries established a station among the Cambodians who lived in Vietnam’s Chaudoc province; some of their converts later worked with the missionaries in Cambodia itself, which they were able to do when a new and more sympathetic French interim résident supérieur took over temporarily in Phnom Penh. Perhaps unaware of his

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters 13 predecessor’s prohibition, he told missionaries E. F. Irwin and Arthur L. Hammond who had traveled from Saigon to request permission to begin work that they could do so. “You will have no success,” he added quickly, “but you can try if you like.”43 In January 1923 Hammond and his wife, Esther King Hammond, moved to the capital (Arthur Hammond had been in Saigon since 1921, where he learned Vietnamese), and in October David E. and Muriel Harrison Ellison moved to Battambang where, in 1925, they established a Bible school. The Hammonds and the Ellisons appear to have been the first permanent American residents of the kingdom. Five new missionaries arrived in 1926 but some moved soon to other locations. For most of the time, the Alliance mission in Cambodia included only two or three couples.44 At first, Alliance gains were small. Indeed, most of the society’s work initially was among the Vietnamese and Chinese inhabitants, who then outnumbered the Khmers in Phnom Penh. There were two Cambodian converts in 1923, and only a few more in 1924. That year Arthur Hammond reported that they had as yet “found no good solid men and women for the beginning of the work” among Cambodians.45 In 1925 the Bible school in Battambang opened with five or six students (all from Vietnam), but within a fortnight two of the students had left.46 There were no actual graduates of the school until 1947.47 Gradually the mission managed to increase its converts. By the end of 1925 the missionaries claimed 80. The next year they had 149 members in seven churches, and 12 students attended the Bible school; in 1927 there were 216 members and 28 students in the Bible school. Indeed, anyone reading the church’s magazine, the Alliance Weekly, would find it filled with stories of the conversion of drunkards and other people who had led wayward lives, the wonderful work of the several Cambodian workers who were spreading the Word, and the sale of thousands of tracts and selections of scripture printed in Khmer, Vietnamese, and French. In 1928 one district reported over 80 converts, and by 1929 there were said to be between 200 and 300 Protestant Christians in Cambodia. Over the years the Alliance established new mission stations at Kompot, Kratié, Kompong Trach, Siem Reap, Ta Khmau, and Kompong Chhnang, along with numerous outstations. In 1939 the missionaries reported “a real turning to God” as 64 people were baptized and 1,000 more converted, or nearly so.48 In 1940 David Ellison reported record attendance at the Alliance’s Bible School in Battambang. The Alliance also enjoyed considerable success in encouraging indigenous churches to become self-sufficient. In addition to seeking conversions directly, the missionaries laboriously translated the Bible into Khmer, finally completing the task in 1940. Sometime thereafter, presumably in 1941, the missionaries presented a special copy to the newly installed King, Norodom Sihanouk. According to an Alliance account, the King “showed genuine interest” in the project, asked numerous questions about its production, and professed to read the Bible himself daily.49 The Alliance Weekly’s stories of success, however, were overstated. Hints of the difficulties the missionaries faced appeared in the magazine itself and the annual

14 Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters reports. One missionary reported in 1928 that the work in Phnom Penh was “difficult,” that the missionaries often found their chapel entirely empty, and that “the very forces of hell” opposed them.50 The Annual Report for 1930 stated that there was “no natural enthusiasm on the part of the Cambodians to accept a new religion.” In 1935 some of the Cambodian workers stopped working when the mission was unable to pay them. As late as the 1950s, the only free standing church building was in Battambang.51 The missionaries regularly complained that “persecution” of one kind or another interfered with their efforts, persecution that more often affected their converts than they themselves. Occasionally they complained of opposition from Roman Catholics and Muslims, but usually they found that the “bigoted” nature of Buddhism (the religion of most of the people) created the most difficulties for them. Buddhism, which the missionaries thought was evidence of the devil’s work in the world, was so ingrained in the populace that it was difficult to gain a hearing for Christianity. One form of “persecution” affected missionary efforts directly: the “rigid restrictions” imposed by French government officials. Actually, the missionaries were generally very positive in their assessment of the benefits of “modern civilization” which the French had brought to Cambodia: an excellent telegraph system, new roads and railroads, and in general an efficient administration. They also professed their loyalty to the French colonial government. Every year their Annual Conference sent greetings to the governor-general of Indochina and to the résident of each jurisdiction, which brought “cordial replies.”52 But they nevertheless found most French officials hostile to their work. French opposition was not based on religious considerations directly. Throughout Indochina, the French were concerned about real and potential subversive movements and therefore discouraged any associations that might promote solidarity among the people, regardless of how nonpolitical or innocuous they seemed. As David Chandler explains cogently, “the French preferred to deal with a society that was . . . arranged vertically rather than horizontally.”53 Some French officials also considered the mission to be the vanguard of an American political conquest of the region. In any event, there was sufficient friction with the government that it was known to the American consul in Saigon. As he reported in 1924, “some difficulty has been had with the authorities on account of American missionaries who have been credited with political actions.”54 As a result, missionaries in most of Indochina worked under various restrictions. “For twelve years during the tenure of three different governors,” recalled Arthur Hammond with respect to Cambodia, “the missionaries were kept under the thumb of the secret police.” Those in Phnom Penh had to get permission from the sûreté (the secret police) when they went out of town and had to register when they arrived at their destination. Sometimes they were required to present a list of the names of their converts. On at least one occasion, Hammond was ordered to take down the sign over the chapel door and hold no more meetings (a directive that he ignored).55 Conditions varied in other parts of the country, but often the authorities

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters 15 restricted Alliance work. Early on, Cambodians who visited the Ellisons in Battambang were sometimes arrested,56 for example, and in 1928 the résident supérieur ordered the Bible School in Battambang to close, although the local administrator reluctantly allowed the chapel to remain open. The same year the King formally forbade proselyting in Cambodia. Part of the government’s concern was the considerable attraction of the new Cao Dai religion. Founded in 1926 and centered in Chaudoc, Vietnam, the practitioners worshiped Jesus, Buddha, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Victor Hugo. It spread so quickly into Cambodia that in 1930 the King formally forbade all religious practices in Cambodia, except for Buddhism and Roman Catholicism. The Protestants, however, refused to comply with this decree and continued to preach and establish small churches. In 1932 the government decided that the missionaries could continue their work in already established stations but could not evangelize outside of those areas.57 Cambodians were officially forbidden to become Christians, although those already converted were not forced to give up their new religion. After twelve years, Hammond reported that a more sympathetic résident supérieur had told him he could conduct his work unhindered, as long as he did not ask for official permission. Thereafter, Hammond had few difficulties, he wrote. But judging from contemporary articles and reports, the missionaries faced problems with the government well after the first twelve years (which would have been 1935) that Hammond recalled as the restrictive period. In 1936, for example, Floyd C. Peterson reported from Kompong Trach that “as far as the Government is concerned, the doors are still closed.”58 In 1937 the governor forbade the missionaries from going to Chracréng (near Siem Reap), although a higher official eventually told the governor that he should allow the missionaries to continue their work, as long as they did not get involved in politics.59 The Annual Report for that year stated that there was “strong opposition in certain government circles” and that there appeared to be “a determined effort . . . to break up our work.”60 The limitations remained in place in 1938, and in March 1939 the Alliance Weekly stated that “great restrictions as to preaching the gospel” still prevailed. However, there may have been at least a partial change later in 1939 since in its report for the year the mission stated that “many of the barriers are down.”61 In any event, while the missionaries had established a few churches, printed the scriptures in local languages, sold and distributed thousands of tracts and other religious works, established several mission stations, and opened a Bible School in Battambang, the number of actual converts remained relatively small. As an Alliance historian put it, “it was not until the early 1970s that large numbers of Cambodians began to move toward the Saviour.”62 Were missionary views of Cambodia any different from those of the tourists and diplomats who occasionally set foot in the country? Did long residence there make any difference? Aside from the religious state of the people, the available missionary records reveal surprisingly little about Cambodia. Even physical descriptions of the countryside are rare. Mrs. D. I. Jeffrey’s account of the beauty

16 Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters of the Cambodian coast – “as beautiful as any we have seen” with “stretches of sandy beach, fringed by tall, graceful coconut palms, and high hills, covered with dense tropical verdure” – was one of a few exceptions.63 Floyd C. Peterson admired Phnom Penh with its “beautiful streets . . . and many fine buildings,” which, however, contrasted with the “heathen” character of the city.64 Angkor itself is scarcely mentioned. Mrs. Jeffrey visited Siem Reap, for example, but could not find time to visit the ruins. The accomplishment of a pagan society, it probably held little attraction for most missionaries. Almost nothing appears in the missionaries’ published comments about internal political or social matters, and, aside from some positive remarks about the benefits the French had brought to Indochina, there is little comment about government, except when authorities restricted evangelization. Nor is there much about the Cambodian people themselves. The people had a “bigoted” culture, were “steeped in heathen idolatry and superstition,” and were “wicked.” Cambodia was “Satan’s back yard.” But these were terms that Alliance missionaries used to describe persons or cultures anywhere that resisted Christianity. It seems likely that, at least to some degree, the missionaries shared the sense of superiority common to most westerners. Hints of this appear in their publications, such as when David Ellison described “the Cambodian” as “indolent,” though also “faithful and loyal to whose who succeed in winning his confidence.” One Alliance observer reported that the missionaries in Indochina were “strong and virile in body and full of enthusiasm,” implying a contrast with the local people. Another missionary, describing a gathering of Cambodians (and these were Christians), wrote that he was struck by the “queer, native smell – a mixture of life-long worn rags, native food, babies, and general staleness. There were lots of flies, especially on the running sores of various members of the congregation.” More telling, Arthur Hammond recalled that the French preferred the “keener intellects” of the Vietnamese for government work (a judgment which Hammond accepted), and in 1936 an Alliance publication referred to the Cambodians as “excessively lethargic and lazy.”65 But generally speaking, published missionary comments about the people were less likely to reflect the condescending, often racist, assessments made by other observers. The one exception was the missionaries’ views of the tribal peoples, ethnic groups who lived in remote areas and were culturally distinct from the larger Cambodian population. By the 1930s the missionaries hoped to bring news of salvation to the tribal people, but they had little respect for them as people. The so-called Phnongs were “ignorant and superstitious . . . people on the lowest plane of human society” who possessed minds that were “too undeveloped to reason or to grasp the things of God.” The Maa were “an unlikely people and stupid.” The Moi were “savages.”66 The relative dearth of missionary observations on secular society probably results in part from the fact that they were writing for a church publication designed for home consumption. The focus was on the religious state of the people, and readers wanted to know about religious advances – souls saved, lives redeemed, challenges overcome. Private correspondence, were it available, might

Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters 17 include broader observations and analyses; indeed Arthur Hammond’s retrospective “Manuscript History” of the Alliance mission in Cambodia includes numerous observations on everyday life and travel in the country. However, as the Alliance’s Foreign Secretary put it, “the purpose of this ministry is salvation,” and the missionaries were driven by a belief that those who died without accepting Christ were condemned for eternity. As one missionary put it, commenting upon the death of a non-Christian Cambodian, “one more soul has passed on from the darkness of heathenism to the more intense darkness of a hopeless eternity . . . The more we tarry with the Gospel, the more such deaths there will be.”67 Focusing almost exclusively on the task of evangelization, the Alliance was less interested than some other missionary groups in seeking social justice or bettering the society. Given their otherworldly focus, there was simply less interest in reporting on physical surroundings or secular developments. In sum, then, the American image of Cambodia prior to World War II was of an exotic land of pleasant but lazy natives. The country admittedly contained some of the most impressive archaeological sites in the entire world, but it was hard to imagine the present-day Cambodians were related to the ancient Khmers who had built Angkor. If they were, there had been a dramatic decline in their civilization over the centuries. More recently, the French had brought many improvements to the country, including an excellent system of highways and railroads, and Cambodia, with its numerous natural resources, had much potential. But the very nature of the inhabitants made economic and social development problematic, and the King ruled a comic opera court without authority. This picture of Cambodia inevitably influenced some of those Americans who in the near future would have official responsibilities for American policy toward the region.

18 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954

2

Cambodia The view from the United States, 1940–1954

The passion in Cambodia in terms of independence at that time was extraordinary. I remember getting up in the very early morning and seeing hundreds of men walking around with wooden rifles, parading and drilling with obvious enthusiasm. Frank Valeo, recalling events in 1953

Late in 1940 the Siamese, taking advantage of French weakness caused by the Japanese movement into Southeast Asia, moved to recover Battambang and other areas of Cambodia that the French had taken from them in 1907. The Siamese and the French fought each other, and air raids over Battambang caused many casualties. The Japanese, who already occupied the northern portion of Indochina, had made their peace with the new Vichy French government, and, fearing embarrassment to Pibul Songgram’s pro-Japanese administration in Bangkok, forced a settlement. The French managed to hold on to Angkor for Cambodia, but they had to give up Battambang and other areas of northern and western Cambodia. The settlement so angered King Monivong that he never again met with French officials; he died in April 1941. In the middle of 1941 the French withdrew from Battambang “with drooping flags.” The Thais, in contrast, entered the city with “pageantry and pomp . . . ,” wrote one observer. “Tanks, artillery, motorcycles, cavalry, trucks full of soldiers armed to the teeth, planes, loud speakers, and military bands all helped to announce and display the might of the conquerors.”1 The French still retained nominal control of a truncated Indochina (although ultimately the Japanese called the shots). In October 1941 they installed eighteenyear-old Norodom Sihanouk as the new Cambodian monarch. In December the Japanese not only bombed Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, but they invaded and quickly subdued Thailand. Soon they were in control of virtually all of Southeast Asia. During World War II several significant events took place in Cambodia, all of which prepared the ground for eventual independence. But these were almost unknown in the United States. Sihanouk’s installation did not merit the attention of the New York Times nor of any of the American news magazines. Indeed, there

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 19 is not a single entry for “Cambodia” in the New York Times index between 1941 and 1945, and only one entry in the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature, the latter noting an article in 1945 that reflected concern about what might have happened to Angkor during the war. Indochina was not an important American battlefield, and few if any American troops served there. Similarly, while the Office of Strategic Services had some personnel in northern Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma, it apparently had none in Cambodia. Late in the war, American planes raided the Indochina coast in preparation for retaking the Philippine Islands, and on 7 February 1945, American bombs fell on Phnom Penh, destroying a Buddhist monastery and killing as many as 600 people.2 The raid does not seem to have been reported in the American press. There were, however, some Americans who remained in Indochina, and even Cambodia, during the war. For example, Alliance missionary Floyd Peterson, who was in Cambodia on 7 December, was able to continue his work inside Cambodia.3 His wife and children apparently spent most of their time in Dalat, Vietnam, where the mission owned property. At first those missionaries who remained in Indochina found that little had changed in their day to day activities. Things “were just about normal,” Peterson wrote in June 1942. He could travel wherever he wanted, and there was plenty of food. “You would never think a war was going on,” he stated. Furthermore, both the French and the Japanese had treated him “very nicely.” However, in 1943 there was a change. Work is Phnom Penh was reported to be “slow and difficult,” primarily because of “the official attitude” toward the missionaries. Then at some point in 1943 all of the missionaries in Indochina and their families, seventeen people altogether, were interned at Mytho, Vietnam. They remained there until the end of the war.4 If Cambodia almost totally disappeared from the radar screen of most Americans, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration did not ignore Indochina. Roosevelt wanted Indochina to be the testing ground for postwar international trusteeships that would lead to independence. Opposed to old fashioned colonialism, he especially felt that France, which he believed had behaved in a cowardly fashion during the war, should be stripped of its empire. Even in March 1945, when he agreed that France might return to Indochina, it was only as a trustee with independence – not self-government, not some kind of dominion status – being the goal. When Roosevelt and others spoke of Indochina, they were thinking mostly about Vietnam. Prior to the war, after all, the United States had had consular representation only in Vietnam, and American officials probably shared the general western view of Cambodia and Laos as backwater areas. Still, during the war some images specifically of Cambodia emerged in official circles. One of the earliest American impressions was that the Cambodians accommodated quickly to whatever colonial power happened to be in charge. Thus late in 1944 Sihanouk reportedly declared that Cambodian cooperation with the French was “eternal.” But a few months later, when the Japanese overthrew the French colonial government and imposed direct rule, the young King stated that

20 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 Cambodia no longer needed French protection and pledged his faith to the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.5 Further evidence, to American eyes, of the Cambodians’ lack of nationalist sentiment was Sihanouk’s decision to urge the Japanese to return Son Ngoc Thanh to Phnom Penh to be a part of a new government. Thanh was in fact a Khmer patriot (historian Ben Kiernan calls him “the leading [Cambodian] nationalist” at this time) who had engaged in anti-French activities and had had to flee to Thailand.6 What seems to have impressed those Americans who followed Southeast Asian developments, however, was not Thanh’s nationalism but his close association with the Japanese. After he went to Thailand he had, after all, petitioned the Japanese to allow him to come to Japan, where he spent three years. The Japanese acceded to Sihanouk’s request and allowed Thanh to return to Cambodia, and in June 1945 he became foreign minister and then prime minister of the Cambodian government.7 With the defeat of Japan, some Americans thought that the Cambodians would welcome a French return to Indochina, in part because they feared Siamese and Vietnamese ambitions. These Americans, who relied mostly on French sources for their information, were at best only partly correct. There were to be sure a number of Francophiles in the Cambodian court. But Son Ngoc Thanh surely did not want the French to come back and made vague plans to resist forcibly a French return. When the French did return they arrested Thanh and put him on trial. Even Sihanouk, while agreeing to discuss Cambodia’s future relations with France, advised the French that Cambodia had already achieved its independence.8 Nevertheless, the American view that traditional Cambodian distrust of the Vietnamese and the Thais would incline them to want a continuing French presence continued to influence American perceptions in future years.9 Although the French hoped to return to the prewar status quo (Charles de Gaulle once wondered aloud to whom Indochina could belong if not to France),10 this could not be done, and they assured the Americans that French rule would now be different. More Cambodians were to be brought into the administration; indeed they said they would replace virtually all French officials. France also pledged to arrange elections (based on universal male suffrage) to ensure that a native tyranny did not emerge.11 On 7 January 1946 France and Cambodia signed a modus vivendi regulating relations between them until a final agreement was reached. There would be fewer than fifty French officials in Cambodia, down from several hundred in the prewar days.12 The first elections following the modus vivendi took place in September 1946, which the Democratic Party won. On 30 April 1947 Sihanouk promulgated Cambodia’s first constitution which, he said, made Cambodia a “Free State associated with France.” Sovereignty, he insisted, had now reverted to the Cambodian government and people.13 Despite the belief common among some Americans that the Cambodians would welcome the French back, the official American reaction to these developments was deservedly reserved. State department officials pointed out that despite the new constitution France continued to control the armed forces of Indochina, retained ultimate influence in the region, and alone would decide when a

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 21 government was qualified to receive autonomy. Indeed, one state department official found the French position “depressing” because it offered the states of Indochina so little. In December 1947 Charles Reed, the American consul in Saigon, stated bluntly that the French Commission in Phnom Penh actually ran the country.14 The existence of anti-government revolutionary (or Khmer Issarak) movements added to American skepticism of claims that Cambodians were satisfied with continued French oversight. Even in 1945 some Americans, such as Charles Yost, the perceptive American political adviser in the American embassy in Bangkok, had predicted that armed resistance would greet the French return.15 Before the year was out reports of isolated incidents of violence in Cambodia arrived in Washington. In 1946 and 1947 reports multiplied of growing resistance to the French and to the Sihanouk government which was cooperating with the French. An Alliance publication stated that in 1946 the French and Cambodian government controlled the roads and cities by day, but “at night the Issaraks were in complete control of everything outside of the principal towns.” Ellison once narrowly escaped a submachine gun attack on the road from Phnom Penh to Battambang. On another occasion, after the missionary spent a night in a village anti-French Issaraks arrested him at gunpoint. He was soon released but reported that the Issarak commander was angry that his orders to shoot Ellison had not been carried out.16 The missionaries generally wanted the Issaraks suppressed, in part because an insecure situation interfered with the spread of Christianity but also because they seemed to have believed that the people were not ready for real independence. In May 1946, for example, Muriel Ellison, an Alliance missionary who had just returned to Battambang and who clearly wanted the French to return, reported that there was “a dangerous resistance movement being formed against the French,” adding “Please pray that it may be brought to naught.” The situation was sufficiently serious that Cambodian Christians feared that the American missionaries might be mistaken for French people and attacked. The next year Arthur Hammond wrote that the Japanese had influenced some revolutionaries with “false ideas of freedom.” Fortunately the French were able to neutralize some Issarak groups, he reported, but others continued to rampage across the country. “Pray that the work [of neutralizing them] may be speeded up,” he wrote.17 The violence did not let up. In August 1946, for example, hundreds of Issaraks engaged in attacks in the Siem Reap area, causing “considerable damage, some casualties.” The fighting went on for several days around the famous Angkor ruins.18 The French blamed such unrest on the Siamese, with whom they were engaged in a fierce border dispute, although they also had bitter words for the Americans whom they accused of helping the rebels. The French charged that the rebels were well armed with modern American weapons, and they complained that an American colonel had made an unauthorized landing at Siem Reap. Indeed this incident led to the first significant Franco-American tension over Cambodia.19 The Siem Reap incident ended inconclusively, but it was now

22 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 clear that there existed a significant resistance movement. “Cambodia may become another battleground of independence and anti-French forces,” reported the American consul in Saigon perceptively.20 In Battambang there was a violent reaction to the Siamese decision (taken under pressure from the British and Americans) to return the province to Cambodia. David Ellison, the Alliance missionary who had recently returned to his post, played a role in calming the situation. At the suggestion of the British Military Mission, he met with Issarak leaders in October 1946 and apparently helped convince them to stop violent resistance in return for amnesty and guarantees for their safety. Franco-Cambodian authorities gave assurances of their peaceful intentions and promised amnesty, and Ellison himself forwarded the Issaraks’ letter on to Sihanouk. But the violence did not cease. Issaraks threatened and even killed some Cambodian Christians. Ellison once again became involved and obtained new promises that the attacks on Christians – both Catholic and Protestants – would end. But the situation remained so unstable that American officials in Bangkok ordered the Ellisons to leave Battambang temporarily, and the British Military Mission escorted them into Cambodia proper.21 Issarak attacks continued in other areas of Cambodia as well, even though in October 1946 Sihanouk proclaimed amnesty for Issaraks. In November, for example, Americans reported incidents even near Phnom Penh itself, and in January 1947 Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton in Bangkok reported that Vietnamese efforts to enlist Cambodian rebels against the French “had met with favorable and in some instances enthusiastic response.” He predicted, correctly as it developed, that anti-French hostilities would spread inside Cambodia. The Cambodian government, he asserted forcefully, was “a puppet government.” In Saigon, Reed agreed. The security situation was so bad, he reported in February 1947, that the French would “need many more troops than now envisaged.”22 As the security situation in Indochina deteriorated, calls for some kind of American action increased. Abbott Low Moffat, chief of the state department’s Southeast Asia division, then touring Southeast Asia, urged American mediation to terminate the war in Vietnam because French unpopularity in the region endangered “all western interests in SEA.”23 His recommendation infuriated the French. Similarly Stanton urged an active American role in settling the Cambodia problem, and he strongly supported an Issarak request to bring the matter to the United Nations. The possible conflagration of all of Indochina, he stated, warranted “the most careful consideration and determination of policy.”24 Although the state department would not go along with suggestions for a more active American role,25 the French remained apprehensive of American intentions. Their suspicions deepened when they stopped an American military officer attempting to cross from Thailand into Cambodia with 100,000 piastres, allegedly for Issaraks. Shortly thereafter the French complained that an American arms agent and former intelligence officer, J. D. Wester, was smuggling arms to the rebels in Cambodia and elsewhere.26 American investigations were inconclusive, and Stanton eventually argued that the French had better produce evidence to support the charges or else drop the matter.27 Whether anything more was

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 23 done in either of these cases is not clear, but rebel activity in Cambodia against the French and the monarchy was still very much in evidence in 1947, although missionaries reported that the situation was less dangerous there than in Vietnam.28 Elections held in December 1947 produced another victory for the relatively idealistic Democratic Party, which wanted democracy and independence. There is little evidence that American observers understood that the Democrats were, as historian Ben Kiernan puts it, “the biggest force representing Khmer nationalism” – even more so at this time than the Issaraks – or that both the monarchy and the French were working to undercut them.29 But American diplomats were aware of Cambodian dissatisfaction with the French, including irritation at the lack of any constitutional progress toward greater autonomy. Despite French professions that the modus vivendi of January 1946 was only a first step, an agreement clarifying the relationship between France and Cambodia had not yet been negotiated. Franco-Cambodian discussions did take place in 1948, and in June Sihanouk announced that an accord was near, a pronouncement that was met with (apparently deserved) ringing skepticism in the nationalist press of Vietnam. By August there was still no agreement, and George M. Abbott, the American consul general in Saigon, reported that the Cambodians were growing restless and that a final agreement could not be delayed much longer. Finally, on 21 December 1948, the French proclaimed Cambodia independent within the French Union. Only in April 1949 did the French Union Assembly narrowly approve a new statute that replaced the modus vivendi of 1946, and a final agreement was not signed until late in the year. Sihanouk later said that the treaty gave Cambodia only “50 percent independence,”30 and it is doubtful that this settlement had widespread support. In December 1949 Abbott characterized it as “the none-too-popular Franco-Cambodian treaty.” The new agreement, together with Sihanouk’s peremptory dissolution of the Assembly in September 1949, only increased internal Cambodian dissent.31 Some of the dissent continued to be violent. In March 1948 French officials assured the state department that all was calm in Cambodia, that about one-half of the rebels had already surrendered. But what calm there was did not last very long. Indeed, at the end of August Abbott reported that the military situation had “deteriorated considerably in the last two months.” Because of the disturbances the Cambodian government wanted its troops that were stationed in southern Vietnam returned. A month later the French high commissioner acknowledged that disturbances were widespread. At the end of the year David Ellison reported that Cambodia had been “considerably disturbed during the year” and that a number of provinces, particularly those bordering Cochin China and Thailand, remained insecure.32 By the middle of 1948 American officials in the region were becoming increasingly critical of the French. In June 1948 American diplomats meeting in Bangkok concluded that “over a half century of pre-war French misrule and oppression” had left “a legacy of hate.” Nor could a military victory be expected.33 Indeed the conference was implicitly critical of American support for the French.

24 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 “With America tied by closer and closer economic, political and military association to France,” the diplomats noted, communist charges of American imperialism were hard to refute. All Southeast Asians saw “the French Army, with American weapons, moving in American vehicles, powered by American gasoline, financed by American dollars, attempting to subjugate a people struggling for their independence.” What had become of the Atlantic Charter, a neutral observer might well ask? “Is American foreign policy a matter of principle or the purest expediency?” As long as the war went on, the communists stood to gain. Though a peaceful solution would be difficult for the French to find, “each day that the war continues makes eventual problem more difficult, and each day of fighting works for Moscow throughout South Asia.”34 On the other hand, there was little American enthusiasm for the Issaraks. The Bangkok conference report described them as “a motley gang of Cambodian non-entities” who did “a lot of empty boasting about a non-existent revolution that they purport to lead.” They were “a pack of conceited prima-donnas whose sole objective is the seizure of power for their own personal benefit.” Their chief “patriotic” activities were “cattle rustling, highway robbery, village looting and occasional assassination,” supplemented by gun-running and drug smuggling. The Issarak movement “would have collapsed long ago” had it not received Viet Minh support.35 The Americans saw little improvement in 1949. The extent of the unrest was dramatically apparent to the Americans in February when the consul general in Saigon, who was visiting Cambodia, found the Siem Reap airport under attack the very day of his scheduled departure from that city,36 and an Alliance missionary reported that Cambodia was now “sharing the lawlessness of the rest of IndoChina.” At some point in 1949 David Ellison came under armed attack. He suffered only a minor flesh wound but his Cambodian companion was seriously wounded.37 By November 1949, however, there was general agreement that the security situation had improved. One of the major dissidents, Dap Chhuon, had surrendered along with several hundred guerrillas. This was “a serious blow to the Khmer independence movement.” But the defection was far from fatal. As Ben Kiernan writes, by the end of 1949 “the groundwork for a communist movement had been laid, and the trend towards colonial emancipation was also irresistible. . . . The longer the French attempted to maintain their control of Indo-China by force, the stronger the communist elements in the independence movements there would become.”38 Communism had of course been a worrisome matter since the end of World War II, but over time the seriousness of the threat seemed to grow. By the time of the Bangkok conference in June 1948 Stanton was prepared to say that Moscow-directed communism was “the most serious problem” confronting American policy in the region. American diplomats did, however, understand that the people of Indochina did not see the issue with the same degree of seriousness. To them “the issue appears as one of nationalism in which the question of Communist control is considered, if at all, as secondary.”39

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 25 By the middle of 1949, with a communist victory in China certain, the issue of communist expansion had come to overshadow all other considerations for the United States. “The paramount question now is whether the country [Indochina] is to be saved from communist control,” American officials advised the French in June, 1949. The next month the National Security Council (NSC) endorsed this view. Should Southeast Asia fall to communism, the NSC concluded, “we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world.”40 Apparent communist ascendancy made American support for the French more likely, but it did not mean that the United States would support them without question. Indeed, as Kiernan noted, French intransigence could be viewed as playing into the hands of the communists. Furthermore, some appreciation of the importance of nationalism continued to inform American judgments. NSC51, approved in July 1949, concluded that nationalism was “the most potent idea in SEA,” something the French failed to recognize.41 There would, therefore, be tensions with the French. But preventing the further spread of communism in Southeast Asia remained paramount. This was apparent when on 7 February 1950, shortly after the French Assembly established the three countries of Indochina as autonomous states within the French Union, the United States recognized the newly “independent” governments in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and tried to get other states to do so as well. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had urged Dean Acheson in the strongest terms not to do this. And after the fact the Philippine statesman Carlos Romulo asserted that recognition of the Bao Dai government in Vietnam was counterproductive since the United States was now directly associated with the “iniquity of colonial imperialism.” But the final communist victory in China and the decision of the Soviet Union in January 1950 to recognize Ho Chi Minh’s government in Vietnam convinced the United States that it had no choice. In the case of Cambodia, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told President Harry S. Truman that recognition was justified because there were “no powerful movements directed against the government” – an apparent reflection of recent assessments showing an improved security situation.42 Recognition was the first major step toward a more concerted American effort to contain communism in Southeast Asia. The ink was scarcely dry on the instruments of recognition when the French ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, began to press for military and economic assistance for use in Indochina. Acheson hoped to use the French request to pry out more concessions to Indochinese sentiment, knowing, as he put it, that “our bargaining position disappears the moment we agree to give them aid.”43 But the perceived need to act quickly made it unlikely that the United States would be able to secure French concessions. Only 11 days after Acheson’s talk with Bonnet, the secretary proposed that the United States take “all practicable measures . . . to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia.”44 On 10 March Truman approved aid to Indochina (including Cambodia) in principle, and on 27 March the NSC adopted Acheson’s policy statement. Two days later Acheson wrote

26 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 that additional French concessions were not needed.45 In May Truman made the final decision to provide $20 million in aid for the remaining six weeks in the fiscal year, with more to come later. The first deliveries of direct American military assistance to the French in Indochina arrived in June 1950.46 The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 led to an immediate decision to increase military aid to Indochina.47 To implement this Truman authorized a special mission to Southeast Asia headed by John F. Melby, special assistant to Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs. The Melby mission, which spent several weeks in the region, including one full day (and parts of two others) in Cambodia, encountered considerable pessimism among American diplomats in the region that American aid would do much good. Many thought Indochina a “nightmare.” Most pessimistic was Ambassador Stanton, who opposed all but token military aid to Southeast Asia because he considered the game already “lost and there is no point in kidding ourselves about it.” The most pessimistic (and in retrospect the most realistic and thoughtful) appraisal came not from Southeast Asia but from George Kennan, who had grown increasingly uncomfortable with American Cold War policy around the world. Like Stanton, Kennan told Acheson that the situation in Indochina was “basically hopeless” and that the United States should encourage the French to withdraw from the region and let events take their own course, even if it meant Viet Minh control of Vietnam. Melby disagreed, but neither he nor anyone else thought that the situation was susceptible to a military solution.48 In light of the newly established policy, along with a growing belief that the administration had not been sufficiently tough on the communists, the doubters had no impact on policy. Even before the arrival of the Melby mission the United States had agreed to provide supplies for three Cambodian army battalions; now Sihanouk requested substantially more aid. In December the United States signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with Cambodia and the other countries of French Indochina, and over the next four years the United States provided Cambodia with at least $7,800,000 in economic and military assistance.49 Meanwhile, now that the state department finally had a diplomat stationed in Phnom Penh, the United States was getting much more thorough and informed reports of developments there. Politically, relations between the French and Cambodians were tense. In June 1950 Prince Monipong, President of the Council of Ministers, informed a diplomat that his government would not serve the interests “of French hegemony.” Also, rebel activity was once again beginning to pose a serious threat, despite the surrender of the popular Dap Chhuon the previous year. Some feared that if France was not more forthcoming, Dap Chhuon might again take to the maquis. All in all, the signs pointed to “intensified guerrilla operations” and a “substantial intensification” of Viet Minh activities in Cambodia in the near future.50 Although some observers, including American scholar William Gedney, thought reports of disorder highly exaggerated, Don V. Catlett, the American chargé

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 27 d’affaires ad interim in Phnom Penh, insisted that there were bands of Issaraks and Viet Minh at large and certain areas were unsafe. “Any person who has traveled on the railroad from Phnom Penh to Battambang and has seen the burned-out rail stations along the route will not agree that Cambodia is entirely peaceful,” he wrote.51 Such reports were on target. The dissidents – communist and non-communist alike – had increased their control over rural areas of Cambodia (they claimed to control one-third of the country). In April 1950 about 200 delegates from various rebel groups met to form the Samakhum Khmer Issarak, or Unified Issarak Front. At least five of the fifteen members of the executive committee were members of the Indochinese Communist Party. They also established a proto-government and adopted their own flag. In June they declared Cambodia independent. At the end of the year Alliance missionaries reported that “conditions in large areas of the field are extremely unsettled and dangerous.”52 Unquestionably the dissidents were on the move. Sihanouk told the Americans that more energetic measures would be taken, but the Americans feared that the Cambodian government lacked “a definite program for wiping out” rebel activities. However the next year the Americans felt that there was real progress. In April 1951 a new cabinet was finally formed (after a fully fledged political crisis had developed), whose main goal was to suppress the resistance. By May the American minister in Saigon could write that the situation in Cambodia was “considerably more serene” than it was in Vietnam, and Sihanouk himself assured the Americans that there had been notable improvement. “The Issaraks were no threat,” he stated, and the people regarded the Viet Minh as “pirates.” Sihanouk acknowledged, however, that there was renewed military activity in Battambang, where certain rebel groups that had previously joined the government had returned to armed opposition.53 Rebel activity also threatened to interfere with elections scheduled for September 1951, but the balloting took place as scheduled, which gratified the Americans, if not the French who reportedly feared that Issaraks would be elected to the National Assembly.54 Initial American reports were that the elections “went off in calm and orderly manner.” Later reports acknowledged that the turnout was light, and in 317 of the 1,127 townships no voting was allowed because of the lack of security. In some areas the Viet Minh reportedly intimidated voters. In one district, for example, only 15 out of a possible 7,000 electors cast ballots. Nevertheless, the American judgment on the election was that the results clearly reflected the popular will, demonstrated that the Cambodian elite had learned quickly how to play the parliamentary game, and in general illustrated Cambodia’s political maturity. It was a questionable evaluation. The Americans could be pleased with the process, but they seem not to have understood that the elections, which returned the Democrats to power and thus disappointed the King, tended to turn Sihanouk away from democracy in the future. As historian David Chandler writes, “Sihanouk and his colleagues in the poorly performing parties viewed the elections as a rebuff, tinged with lèse-majesté. Their impatience with elections sprang from their losing so many. They preferred to gain and hold power by other means.”55

28 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 Of considerable potential significance for demonstrating Cambodia’s political stability was the return of Son Ngoc Thanh from France at the end of October 1951. Over 100,000 Cambodians turned out to greet him, a public display of affection that irritated Sihanouk.56 Now back in Cambodia Thanh enjoyed great prestige as an elder statesman. The Americans were pleased that he had returned because, as he told an American diplomat, the “first problem of Cambodia” was to end the rebellion.57 Thus at the end of 1951 the American perception of Cambodia was of a country that was making political progress. The security situation was worrisome but by no means hopeless. American assistance was beginning to flow. Son Ngoc Thanh had come home. The situation was sufficiently encouraging that the United States thought it could use Cambodia in its propaganda battle with communism. The holding of reasonably fair elections, for example, bolstered democracy (or so they thought). The government’s decision to send rice and fish to famine ravished India and Korea (taken after careful consultation with American officials) demonstrated that the country had matured and could show “the way to other peace-loving Asiatic nations in rejecting false claims and promise [of ] Communist aggressors.”58 All in all the United States felt vindicated in its policy of assisting Cambodia and urging other countries to recognize Sihanouk’s government. Relations between the countries were good. When Cambodia’s first minister to the United States, Nong Kimny, made his initial call on President Truman, he expressed his country’s “deep gratitude” for American economic and military assistance.59 Indicative of the good relations and in appreciation for American aid, Sihanouk decided to send Truman a white elephant. After an article about the matter appeared in the Junior Scholastic, school children wrote to the President imploring him to accept the gift, despite Truman’s alleged preference for a tiger.60 Animal trainers and circuses offered to care for the animal. The Southeast Asia director of the Isthmian Steamship Company in Singapore, which was transporting the elephant, sent the President pictures of the animal, which the crew had named “Harry,” and arrangements were made to house the elephant in the Washington zoo. But unfortunately “Harry” died in Capetown, South Africa, while en route. The optimistic reports about calm in Cambodia were quickly dashed in 1952. Although many Issaraks had rallied to the government’s side, this was more than offset by Viet Minh infiltration which had reportedly more than doubled to 10,000, nearly the size of the Khmer Army. Although this grossly exaggerated the strength of the Viet Minh, the Khmer resistance had in fact become formidable. French security estimated that over 60 percent of the country was insecure, meaning that it was too dangerous to enter even with armed escorts. Even the remaining “secure” areas were subject to sporadic attacks.61 In March the situation worsened when Son Ngoc Thanh and others, convinced that the French did not intend to move toward real independence, joined the resistance. There were fears that he was in touch with former rebel Dap Chhuon and perhaps with the Viet Minh.62 Thanh tried to appeal to the United States and the British. He insisted that he was not a communist, that he admired

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 29 the American and British records regarding colonialism, and that all he wanted was for the French to leave. But the American officials in the region quickly concluded that Thanh was playing ball with Ho Chi Minh and was not to be trusted. When Prime Minister Huy Kanthoul told American minister Donald Heath that Thanh was misguided but widely respected as a true patriot, the Americans rejoined that Thanh was always on the losing side. During World War II he had “welcomed the Japs and played their game,” and now he was in league with the communists at a time when anyone with common sense should realize that the west would not allow Indochina to “fall under the Communist yoke.”63 Thanh’s defection was especially serious, thought Americans, because of his popularity among students. In May 1952 student demonstrations erupted in Phnom Penh, Battambang, and Kompong Cham protesting alleged French brutality in their efforts to suppress Thanh. Heath lectured Kanthoul about the need to suppress such demonstrations. There were two groups of people that should never be allowed to engage in political agitation, he said: military personnel and students.64 Only later would the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) work with Thanh. Hoping to prevent Cambodia from “becoming a Commie colony,” the United States was now even more reluctant than ever to urge the French to make additional concessions. In April Dean Acheson told New Zealand’s ambassador that France “had done all it could be expected to do in transferring responsibility for government to the Associated States.”65 Concern with communism also meant that the United States was less committed to democratic rule in Cambodia. The Americans suspected that Cambodia’s legislative body included secret supporters of Thanh and other dissidents, and there were few regrets when in mid June Sihanouk dismissed the cabinet and, with French support, moved against the Democrats who controlled the National Assembly. In approving Sihanouk’s moves against the Democrats, the Americans probably did not suspect that they were encouraging the emergence of a near absolute monarch. But that was the consequence. As David Chandler puts it, “the coup nipped the prospect of pluralism in Cambodia in the bud.” The United States hoped that with a potentially obstructive government out of the way, Sihanouk could turn his attention to defeating the subversive forces, including Son Ngoc Thanh. To the disappointment of the Americans, however, Sihanouk refused to take strong measures against Thanh. In an impassioned forty-five minute harangue to an American official, the King insisted that Thanh was a good man and his friend. He hoped that Thanh would return to the fold, where he would be welcomed. Only in the fall, when it became apparent that Thanh had finally broken entirely with Sihanouk and had taken up arms against him, was Sihanouk ready to take strong action – or so the American embassy reported.66 In January 1953 Sihanouk moved further away from democracy when he dissolved the National Assembly, arrested fifteen Democratic Party deputies, fired the entire staff of the Cambodian legation in Bangkok, and suspended basic

30 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 rights. Aside from his general contempt for the Democrats and his beliefs that they were allied with Son Ngoc Thanh, a major cause seems to have been a dramatic upsurge in domestic unrest and rebel activity at a time when the King was in mourning for his four-year-old daughter who had recently died. He was especially angry at Thanh’s final defection. He blamed Thanh for a student strike in November 1952 at a small trade school in Phnom Penh and also for a bomb that exploded at the Lycée. Most dramatic of all, early in January the Viet Minh assassinated the governor of Preyveng province, and Issaraks killed several high officials in Kandal province, as well as nineteen policemen.67 While Sihanouk was dissolving the Assembly in Phnom Penh, in Washington Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles assumed power. Suggesting that the new administration might take a more active interest in Cambodian developments, Dulles considered asking the French to take a “less overt role in Cambodia,” something that Nong Kimny, the Cambodian minister in Washington, had recommended. The American representatives in Saigon and Phnom Penh responded cautiously, although they did feel that French officials ought to act more like diplomats and less like colonial overlords; and they agreed that for Cambodia to achieve stability the King would have to show that he could get concessions from the French, ultimately including “complete independence.”68 As the new administration was deciding what course to adopt, things began to unravel in Cambodia itself. In March 1953, a company from the Royal Khmer Army in Battambang defected to Son Ngoc Thanh, a particularly embarrassing development since in a major concession the French had recently transferred control of that region to the Cambodians.69 But more troubling were reports that Sihanouk himself was planning an uprising against the French if his demands for independence were not met. Sihanouk had recently traveled to France to try and get an agreement. He was not well treated in Paris and when there was no progress abruptly left France and flew to the United States. He consulted with American officials, including Dulles, who urged him to cooperate with the French lest the communists win. Angered at such lectures, Sihanouk arranged an interview with the New York Times in which he accurately recounted the limitations France still imposed on Cambodian sovereignty and asserted that if independence was not forthcoming soon, his people, who did “not want to die for the French and help them stay” in Cambodia, might “become part of the Communist Viet Minh.” The story appeared on the front page of the Sunday edition.70 Whether because of, or in spite of, Sihanouk, there is no doubt by 1953 that most Cambodians desired complete independence. As Francis Valeo, who was in Phnom Penh in the spring of 1953 with Senator Mike Mansfield (DemocratMontana), recalled, “The passion in Cambodia in terms of independence at that time was extraordinary. I remember getting up in the very early morning and seeing hundreds of men walking around with wooden rifles, parading and drilling with obvious enthusiasm.”71 Sihanouk was ready to lead an all out crusade to get the French to grant his country complete independence. He flew to Japan where he continued his calls for the French to leave. The French accused him of

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 31 organizing an open rebellion from Tokyo and even charged the United States with complicity by allowing Sihanouk to communicate with his parents through the diplomatic pouch, a charge that the Americans vehemently denied.72 Sihanouk’s moves forced the new administration in Washington to review its options. Essentially the administration decided to pressure both sides to settle their differences, although it did not favor a French withdrawal. While Sihanouk was still in Tokyo, for example, the United States complied with a French request to point out to the King the dangers of calling for a rebellion, and added that the recent communist advances in Laos required “complete harmony between . . . Cambodia and France.”73 But even as the state department was approaching Sihanouk, Dulles made it clear that the administration thought further negotiations between France and Cambodia were “essential.” The French spoke bitterly about the Cambodians.74 But in the end negotiations did take place. Sihanouk’s gamble produced significant results. As an American diplomat recalled, “it was not until after the King’s strong statements to the press in New York” that serious negotiations began.75 The three outstanding issues to be negotiated involved control of the military; special judicial privileges for French, Vietnamese, and Chinese citizens in Cambodia; and economic questions. By May 1953 considerable progress had been made, especially on the judicial matters, and rumors abounded that an agreement was near. The Americans were pleased because, as the state department told the Cambodian ambassador, Sihanouk could then “resume the leadership of the struggle of his people against Communist aggression.”76 A preliminary agreement was initialed on 9 May. But within days Sihanouk decided that the tentative agreement was unacceptable, largely because the French had unilaterally devalued the piastre, which undercut the economic provisions of the agreement. On 14 May he returned to Phnom Penh a national hero. Soon he announced that he was breaking relations with France, left Phnom Penh for what American chargé Joseph Montllor described as a “rebel tour” of the northwestern provinces where he sought to secure Issarak support and perhaps make contact with Son Ngoc Thanh, and then went into voluntary exile in Bangkok.77 By these actions Sihanouk had upped the stakes considerably. In addition to the very legitimate Cambodian concerns at French actions, Sihanouk wanted to demonstrate his independence from them as a means to attract Issaraks to his side. At least two Issarak groups did rally.78 But rejection of the 9 May accord was a dangerous gamble because it could have led to the King’s overthrow and the reimposition of direct French rule. All of these developments worried the state department. In Saigon, General Thomas J. Trapnell, head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) mission in Saigon, suspended deliveries of American military equipment to Cambodia. On the other hand, reports that the French were sending additional colonial African troops to Cambodia troubled Washington. The French insisted that the troops were being sent only to protect French lives and property if needed. But Sihanouk ordered his military to protect public buildings and issued

32 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 arms to officials. Heath termed this an “unfortunate development” but blamed the French because they were sending in more troops. In Washington the Cambodian minister told state department officials with deep emotion that he feared war would be “forced on them” by the French, whose colonial troops had their American-supplied artillery aimed at government buildings.79 With French Union and Cambodian forces confronting each other in Phnom Penh (both armed with American-supplied weapons), the Americans feared a clash that would result in “a chain reaction that would render vastly more difficult achievement of valid French Union and defense Free World interests in Southeast Asia.” They therefore cautioned both sides. Since the state department believed that only the communists benefited from Franco-American tensions, the Americans told the Cambodians that it was necessary for the “free powers to close ranks and put up a solid front.” But the Americans made pointed inquiries to the French about the new troops, urged the resumption of negotiations at a high level (the Cambodians had persistently complained that the French had allowed only low level officials to talk with them), and asked the French to “demonstrate greatest patience to avoid provocative measures.”80 Many in the French government thought Sihanouk irrational, even crazy, and racial stereotypes colored their reports. But both Jean Risterucci, the French High Commissioner in Cambodia, and General Pierre de Langlade, the French military commander in Cambodia, admitted that there was a certain method to the King’s madness and concluded that the only solution was to grant Cambodia’s demand for full independence. After independence, Langlade stated, the French could negotiate a treaty giving them all they wanted. After all, Sihanouk himself had said, “give me complete independence, and I will lease Cambodia to you for 99 years.”81 On 3 July 1953 the French offered to negotiate, but for the moment the Cambodians refused, much to the distress of the United States. Dulles’ attempts to pressure Sihanouk had no impact, and the King then upped the stakes by calling for a massive increase in the Cambodian army, ostensibly to fight the Viet Minh, although the French thought, probably correctly, that the move was aimed at them. Many Americans thought Sihanouk was being unreasonable, but the American chargé in Phnom Penh understood that the King was playing power politics effectively. “The propaganda value of the King’s move should not be dismissed,” he wrote. The United States, however, continued to press Sihanouk. In August Eisenhower himself appealed to him to work with the French to oppose the “common enemy” which wanted “to enslave them.”82 But like other such appeals, this fell on deaf ears. By September General de Langlade was completely demoralized. He had come to Cambodia a good friend of Sihanouk. This final assignment was to be the capstone of his career. Now all lay in tatters. He told an American official that “he despised this country and its people.” The Cambodian Army, he said, was sympathetic to Son Ngoc Thanh, and the Viet Minh would probably come to power soon. The time had come, thought Montllor, for a new French general.83

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 33 Sihanouk’s actions in the fall of 1953 continued to worry the Americans, particularly when he publicly announced that Cambodia was a neutral country and invited the Viet Minh and Issaraks “to join in a popular front government.”84 The United States protested. Senator William F. Knowland (RepublicanCalifornia), then in Indochina, did lecture the Prime Minister Penn Nouth and threatened Cambodia with a loss of American aid if Cambodia did not join the struggle against communism. This pleased the French, but the only effect was “to irritate further Penn Nouth and King.”85 What clearly disturbed the Prime Minister most was his perception, which was certainly correct in general terms, that France and the United States arrogated to themselves the right to determine what was best for Cambodia. “Cambodia is not given the right to consider Communists as anything but mortal enemy,” Heath reported him as saying. Nevertheless, only a few days after Knowland lectured Penn Nouth about his anticommunist duty, Senator Mansfield told the Prime Minister that Cambodia “should join cause with all free nations in common struggle against international communism.”86 The French, meanwhile, had come to feel that Sihanouk had “unleashed forces in his country which would terminate in the overthrow of the monarchy.” Risterucci saw anarchy coming and despaired. The king was in mystic communion with the Khmer gods at Angkor and no one in the government dared to advise him. The economy was collapsing before their eyes. The Thais were intriguing. It simply made no rational sense. If negotiations broke down, he saw no other course than to withdraw completely from Cambodia.87 Within weeks Cambodia was independent in significant respects. The Cambodian government had negotiated control of the police, the judiciary, and important aspects of the military. The French still retained military control over operations against the Viet Minh in certain districts, and some French Union troops, which included Cambodians, were stationed in Cambodia. On 8 November Sihanouk made a “triumphal” return to Phnom Penh. When French colonial troops departed from Phnom Penh the next day, Sihanouk (though not major Issarak leaders) considered the country independent.88 Although the United States had paid close attention to developments leading to the agreement and had tried to exert pressure, American influence was only marginal. Sihanouk resented the patronizing tone of American advice; it only alienated him and had a profound impact on his future relationship with the United States.89 By this time Sihanouk had succeeded in rallying some Issaraks to his banner, although major Issarak leaders remained in opposition. Two of them came in in March 1954, but as late as April 1954 rebels surrounded the western city of Pailin and kept it under siege for several days.90 Son Ngoc Thanh remained out of the fold, although there was, it was thought, a 50-50 chance that he would rally.91 (In fact Thanh did not reach an agreement and remained in opposition, becoming in turn a “willing instrument of the Thai, the South Vietnamese, and the United States.” The two men never met again.) In addition, the Viet Minh appeared to be growing stronger. Only with the conclusion of Geneva Accords

34 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 in July 1954 did the major Issarak groups end their struggle and agree that independence had finally been achieved.92 By 1954 it was a commonplace American position that stopping communism in Indochina was vital to the Free World’s security. One consequence of this kind of thinking was that the United States gave France increasing amounts of military aid to keep it in the war in Vietnam. The war had not gone well, however, and long before 1954 it had become apparent to the American government that there was no longer much support in France for its continuation. While American officials were not unappreciative of French domestic political constraints, they feared the consequences of adding Indochina to the agenda of the forthcoming Geneva conference. Given the military realities (Defense Department maps indicated that the Viet Minh was in control of large parts of Vietnam and that “communist” forces also controlled substantial portions of Laos and Cambodia), they particularly feared that any negotiations would result in a divided Indochina which would “be a victory for international communism.” There was, however, no choice but to go to Geneva. “We have a difficult negotiation ahead of us,” Dulles lamented.93 Initially, the French resisted inviting any of the Associated States, including Cambodia, to take part in the Geneva conference, fearing that if Vietnam participated it would be very difficult not to invite the Viet Minh as well. Some state department officials, notably the pro-French ambassador in Paris, Douglas Dillon, did not want to cross the French on this issue.94 But the administration disagreed, although it preferred to have France take the initiative. The French, however, dragged their feet, and when no invitation had come by April – only three weeks before the conference was scheduled to open – the Cambodians were dismayed. How could their future be negotiated, they asked state department officials, unless they attended? But as late as 14 April the French were still opposed to inviting the Associated States as full participants. By this point even Dillon had come to consider the French position unacceptable and recommended that the United States insist the French invite the Associated States. A week later France agreed.95 Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam would be full participants in the Geneva conference. But what of the resistance movements? Although there was some discussion of keeping the Viet Minh away from Geneva, even the United States had to admit that the revolutionary organization controlled a substantial portion of Vietnam and could not realistically be denied a place at the conference. But no one in the western camp was prepared to admit representatives of the resistance movements in Cambodia and Laos. From the beginning the United States held that the Cambodian and Laotian resistance movements were negligible; even the Soviet Union had not recognized them. To be sure all was not peaceful in Cambodia; but the Americans, like the Cambodian government, insisted that this was the result almost entirely of Viet Minh aggression. If the Viet Minh would only withdraw, they argued, there would be peace.96 Despite the official hardline position, in private at least some Americans believed that the Cambodian resistance movement was not so insignificant. Joseph

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 35 A. Yager, an adviser to the American delegation in Geneva, wrote that if a plebiscite were held in Cambodia, the communists would “probably” lose. Likewise an immediate election for the National Assembly would “probably” see the noncommunists victorious in Cambodia. Furthermore, the Americans were aware that not all resistance to the Cambodian government was communist. As a National Intelligence Estimate on Cambodia stated, the country was vulnerable to communist pressures in part because of “the existence of armed, nonCommunist dissidence,” notably that of Son Ngoc Thanh who enjoyed latent support among important segments of the population. Nor could those resistance leaders who had rallied to the King in recent months be relied upon to support the monarchy indefinitely.97 The private American assessments were more accurate than the public ones. As historian David Chandler sums up the situation: Perhaps one subdistrict in six was under guerrilla control, and more than half the country, at night at least, was subject to pressure from Viet Minh or Issarak bands. By the end of 1953, two years after its foundation, the KPRP [Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party] had perhaps a thousand members. In addition, perhaps five thousand Khmer, including Saloth Sar [Pol Pot], were enrolled with the Viet Minh in military units. Nevertheless the western powers were adamant that Laos and Cambodia were victims of “external aggression.”98 The communist side did not easily concede that the Khmer resistance was insignificant. On 12 May Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai himself warned that “any attempt to ignore . . . resistance Governments of Khmer and Pathet Lao is doomed to failure.” Eleven days later, however, in a private meeting with the United States representative Bedell Smith, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov expressed some sympathy with the western view. Appearing “completely relaxed, quite friendly, and objective,” Molotov acknowledged that there was “a great difference” between Cambodia and Vietnam. Although he still contended that the Cambodian resistance was indigenous and controlled half the country, he did not object to Smith’s insistence that a partition of Cambodia could not be justified.99 Smith correctly thought that Molotov would accept a solution that, while dividing Vietnam, would leave Cambodia and Laos united. This soon became the minimally acceptable settlement for both the British and the Americans. But it took several more weeks of difficult bargaining to secure it. On 9 June the Chinese leader told the sixth plenary session that communist forces could not be evacuated from Cambodia because they were indigenous. Smith found no “hint of concession” in the Chinese leader’s remarks.100 Over the next two weeks, however, China and the Soviet Union began to make conciliatory gestures, as did the Viet Minh delegation.101 Particularly encouraging were Zhou’s remarks to the Cambodian delegation at a dinner he hosted on 21 June for the Viet Minh, Lao, and Cambodian delegations (a dinner

36 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 invitation that the United States had urged the Cambodians to decline). The Cambodians were impressed with Viet Minh Acting Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong’s willingness to withdraw Viet Minh “volunteers” from Cambodia and his willingness to acknowledge Sihanouk’s popularity; he did not seem to be strongly supportive of the Khmer dissidents. Two days later Zhou told French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France that if the Cambodians “truly support their present royal government,” that was their affair. “He had no objection” to Cambodia retaining its “monarchical form of government.” China’s main concern, apparently, was to be sufficiently accommodating to American sensibilities to avoid having United States bases located in Indochina.102 The Soviet Union too, in a round about way, supported Zhou’s proposal.103 In the end, then, Sihanouk’s government (which negotiated fiercely at Geneva on its own behalf ) and the western powers prevailed. The Cambodian resistance was ignored: no rebel group was even present at the peace negotiations, Cambodia was not divided, and there would be no coalition government. The final agreements reached at Geneva provided for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all French Union military combatants, as well as those “from other countries or regions of the peninsula,” a veiled reference to the Viet Minh. The forces of the Khmer resistance were to be demobilized, and some limitations were put on Cambodia’s ability to join military alliances and to allow foreign military bases on its territory. Cambodia was, however, allowed to solicit foreign military aid and technical assistance “for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory.” An International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC) was established, consisting of representatives from Canada, India, and Poland, to supervise the cessation of hostilities. Finally, a Joint Commission of the military commands of Cambodia and the Viet Minh was to help implement the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia.104 During the conference both the Americans and the Cambodians were embarrassed that Cambodia’s “independence” was not complete. At Geneva the United States had encouraged Cambodia to insist that it was fully independent so as to undercut Issarak claims that true independence had not come. But there was enough truth in the Issarak assertion that the United States wanted France to reaffirm the independence of Cambodia, including the right to withdraw from the French Union if it desired.105 Although a lingering devotion to self-determination may in part have motivated Dulles and the other Americans, their major concern was to deny the communists a propaganda advantage. In addition, the Americans assumed, perhaps naively, that once the people were completely free they would stand together vigorously to oppose communist attempts at subversion. As Dulles put it on the eve of the conference’s opening, “collective defense in the area would have to be defense of genuine freedom and independence and not the defense of colonialism.”106 Two days later French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault informally reaffirmed “the full independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.” However Bidault’s insistence that his statement was preliminary and not ready to be published

Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 37 fueled American skepticism of French intentions. On 26 May the state department formally urged France to grant unconditional independence to Vietnam and the other Associated States. France’s reluctance to grant complete independence opened the western allies to precisely the propaganda disadvantage that Dulles feared, for on 8 June Molotov “ridiculed claims of Associated States to independence.” He pointed out that no Asian states recognized them and quoted United States House reports indicating that they were not truly independent.107 After the conference these issues disappeared, for mechanisms were put in place to transfer total power to the Cambodian government. “Independence is a fact,” stated Dulles at a press conference in July. In recognition of Cambodia’s new unambiguous status, the United States determined to appoint an ambassador to Phnom Penh, “as evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia” to play its part “in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.”108 While the United States viewed the results of the Geneva conference regarding Vietnam as decidedly mixed, it was pleased with provisions affecting Cambodia. The country remained undivided, and now, with complete independence, the Americans thought there would be more incentive to resist communism. The NSC even thought that Cambodia could lawfully join a Southeast Asian collective security arrangement.109 Soon, despite Cambodia’s professed neutralism, the United States also began to supply military equipment directly to Cambodia (rather than through the French), negotiated an agreement to station a MAAG in Cambodia, and paid most of the expenses of the Cambodian armed forces. Long-time American missionaries on the ground in Phnom Penh found the new developments very much to their liking, and their statements reflected general American optimism that a new day had dawned in the Khmer kingdom. Although not so long ago they had been skeptical of Cambodian abilities, they found they welcomed independence. Attitudes toward Americans were “very favorable,” they reported. The new constitution guaranteed religious liberty, and, unlike the French, the government was favorable to their work. “We sometimes feel that we must pinch ourselves to make sure we are still in the same country where preaching the gospel has been severely hampered by the authorities and circumstances in the past,” wrote one.110 But it would take a deft diplomacy to maintain American influence in Cambodia, which had opted for non-alignment, while at the same time the United States supported Cambodia’s antagonistic neighbor, South Vietnam. Whether the United States would be able to do this remained to be seen.

38 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957

3

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957

There is a general failure in Cambodia to recognize the nature and extent of the communist threat. Charles A. Sullivan, 24 August 1954

With the Geneva talks concluded, the United States began to scrutinize French influence in Cambodia, especially their role in training the military. The Americans quickly discerned that the French would resist U.S. efforts to train the Cambodian army, despite the fact that the United States paid for the army’s supplies. Having lost influence in Vietnam, the French wanted to sustain and even increase their presence in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. They tried, or so the Americans reported, to keep the Cambodian army on a tight leash through various devices that would make it ever more dependent on them, and they tried to prevent the Cambodians from talking with the Americans about military training.1 While the Americans could understand and even sympathize with French psychological needs, they wanted them to withdraw, if not immediately, then eventually. By the middle of September 1954, Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson had prepared a draft agreement with Cambodia that provided for direct military assistance and the creation of an American military training group. A Special Working Group, chaired by the newly appointed ambassador to Cambodia, Robert McClintock, worked on the details. One concern was how such aid could be provided without violating the Geneva Accords, in particular Article 7 which prohibited Cambodia from entering into military alliances, allowing foreign military bases on its territory, and soliciting foreign military aid, including instructors, “except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory.” American legal advisers saw no impediments, although they urged proceeding in such a way as to create the least possible criticism. Thus, for example, they recommended against revoking the previous agreement (the so-called Pentalateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 23 December 1950 by which aid was channeled to Cambodia through the French), suggesting instead that it merely be supplemented with an exchange of notes between the American and Cambodian governments providing for direct assistance.2

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 39 The Americans badly wanted to supply and train the Cambodian military because they thought Cambodia was vulnerable to communist subversion and infiltration with which the Cambodian army and police were currently unprepared to cope. Most fundamental of all, the Americans believed that the Cambodians themselves were naive about the communist threat. “There is a general failure in Cambodia to recognize the nature and extent of the communist threat,” read one representative – and by no means the most alarmist – American analysis.3 Despite persistent Cambodian requests for direct assistance and the state department’s desire to provide it, various problems prevented an immediate decision. In addition to the French, the British opposed direct American military assistance to Cambodia, perhaps because of their concern of an adverse Chinese reaction. They also felt that any assistance should be multilateral, to be provided through an incipient Southeast Asia collective defense organization then being discussed. Furthermore, the defense department was slow in drafting plans to establish an American military training mission in Phnom Penh.4 Complicating the situation was the American perception that the French military advisers were incompetent, or at least had not produced a Cambodian military capable of dealing with serious threats to the country’s internal security. The American military therefore insisted that the French advisers leave before the United States sent more military aid to Cambodia. The American ambassador in Phnom Penh, however (while he shared many of the negative assessments of the French mission in Cambodia), argued that the situation was so critical that a bilateral military agreement should be negotiated even before the (relatively few) French advisers left.5 On 21 October 1954, the state department authorized Ambassador McClintock to begin negotiations. He was to inform the French high commissioner immediately prior to opening discussions with the Cambodian government. The French were not pleased and urged that a joint committee be established to coordinate aid to Cambodia, a proposal that the Americans suspected, probably correctly, aimed to control their effort in Cambodia.6 The Cambodians expressed gratitude for the American decision but were slow to negotiate, much to the annoyance of McClintock.7 He told his British counterpart that there had been “a marked falling off ” in Cambodian enthusiasm for American military aid, which he blamed on Indian influence.8 Aside from possible Jawaharlal Nehru-inspired neutralist sentiments, the Cambodians feared that the Americans would insist that the French advisers leave. The Cambodian minister of defense, Ngo Hou, told McClintock “with great earnestness” that this would be “very delicate.” And McClintock concluded that the French had “been sedulous in putting pressure on Cambodians to tie themselves up for an indefinite period of French instruction and thereby quasi-domination of their army.” He asked the state department for authorization to tell Prime Minister Penn Nouth that the United States had to have complete control if it was going to provide aid and training. Although Dulles did not think the United States should threaten to stop military aid, McClintock was authorized to tell Penn Nouth that the principle of “unhampered control” had

40 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 been successfully adopted in other countries where the United States provided military training.9 The Cambodians were not easily persuaded. The French had been telling them that the United States was an unreliable ally, and Cambodian leaders were reportedly “obsessed with fear that Cambodia would suffer in future from forcing French to turn over training functions to US.” To do so would at the very least result in strained Franco-Cambodian relations.10 Some progress was made early in December when Sihanouk approved sending an American military contingent to assist with the logistics of American military aid, and on 27 December 1954 several MAAG officers from Saigon arrived in the Cambodian capital. But there was still no agreement about establishing a MAAG in Cambodia and what role, if any, the French would have in training the Cambodian military. Perhaps as a result of the Cambodian reluctance to meet American conditions regarding the withdrawal of French trainers, McClintock reverted to his previously expressed opinion that the French advisers could be gradually phased out, rather than being replaced prior to the signing of an agreement. Indeed, he argued, it was only sensible to retain French instructors until such time as the United States could provide replacements. Dulles, who agreed with the ambassador, thought McClintock could convince Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who was about to arrive in Phnom Penh, that the state department’s position should be adopted.11 As it happened, McClintock received Dulles’ telegram just as he was bidding Radford good-bye at the airport and could only give him a hurried summary of his and the department’s views. But he thought that Radford agreed that the position of the Joint Chiefs was “unduly restrictive” and would “hamper our negotiations here.” The Cambodians would ultimately agree to phase out the French, he was convinced. Apparently McClintock was persuasive, for a few days later Radford informed the defense department and the Joint Chiefs that he supported the ambassador’s position. It was important to begin negotiations for a MAAG, he wrote, and a separate agreement regarding the ultimate withdrawal of French military advisers could come later.12 However, if Radford’s insistence on a separate agreement calling for a French withdrawal appeared to be consistent with the spirit of McClintock’s position, it ran counter to what some in the state department actually wanted. The department counselor, Douglas MacArthur II, for example, disagreed fundamentally with the need to eliminate French influence in Cambodia at all. To do so would “create a major problem for us with the French” and would affect French cooperation throughout Indochina. It would have “very far-reaching repercussions” which would make difficult the American desire to keep Laos and Cambodia independent. Finally, it could “very vitally affect our fundamental policy objectives in Europe.” The department, it turned out, was less inclined to pressure the French than McClintock thought. Dulles, using much of MacArthur’s language verbatim, informed McClintock that he hoped to resolve differences soon with the defense department. But it was apparent that Radford’s “agreement” with McClintock was not in itself the breakthrough that the ambassador had hoped for.13

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 41 The delays in beginning negotiations clearly irritated McClintock. He acknowledged that the Cambodians themselves were partially to blame, having been laggard in providing a detailed assessment of their needs and having attempted to play the Americans off against the French. But Cambodian inaction did not “diminish urgency of our making up our minds what we plan to do in this country,” he wrote. And he predicted that within two weeks the “Cambodians will be sitting on our doorstep, begging bowl extended.” To Robertson he snapped that the state department ought to ask defense officials if they preferred blindly to finance the Cambodian army trained by the French, or go ahead with a MAAG that would at least have some control over the use of American funds. Rather than speak further with the Cambodians, he suggested a delay until the American government decided on a policy.14 Thus, by the end of 1954, no agreement had been reached to establish an American military mission in Cambodia. French intransigence on the training issue continued into 1955. The American analysis, quite probably correct, was that it was mostly a matter of emotion and prestige. The government of Pierre Mendès-France, already under fire from the parliament, particularly from the followers of Charles de Gaulle, for having allegedly abandoned French influence in much of Indochina to the United States, was not about to retreat further. “Cambodia is most sensitive area this regard,” telegraphed Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris.15 Whatever the reasons for French intransigence, Ambassador McClintock now lashed out at them. Contrary to French claims, he stated heatedly, it was not true that they had paid a large price in lives and money to develop the country. On the contrary, they had “exploited” Cambodia “for some 90 years.” The people were “unanimous” in their support of independence and “detested” the French. The claims of idyllic Franco-Cambodian relations, he wrote, “belong to neo-mythology developed along banks of Seine but not of Mekong.” Even the successful fight against the Viet Minh was carried on not by the French but by the Cambodians themselves, the ambassador insisted.16 Defense department officials fully agreed that the French intended to stay in Cambodia and thought the consequences deplorable. As long as the French remained, American aid would be ineffective, “a major waste of money,” as the Assistant Secretary for Defense for International Security Affairs put it.17 The state department necessarily looked at the situation in Cambodia from a wider perspective. The French might be irritating, even maddening to the Americans in Indochina, but they were an important part of the “free world” alliance and could be disregarded only at the risk of weakening the fight against communism elsewhere. “However much of an anchor around our necks the French might be in Cambodia,” Robertson said, “we needed them in Europe.”18 Consequently the state department hoped to work out a compromise between the French and the defense department. There was momentary optimism in mid-January 1955 when Sihanouk appeared to meet the defense department objections by agreeing to accept an American military mission and ultimately to phase out the French. But the

42 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 defense department wanted Cambodia to allow the chief of MAAG to determine when the United States would take over as Cambodia’s sole military adviser, and the state department was not yet willing to go along with a negotiation that could harm United States-French relations. McClintock, however, pleaded for authority to negotiate. The “climate of governmental opinion is now more propitious than at any time in my experience of dealing with Cambodia,” he wrote. “. . . We may not again have similar opportunity.”19 The state department then relented, but shortly thereafter the Cambodians were distracted by internal politics and seemed uninterested in proceeding. A new cabinet took office on 23 January, and Sihanouk allied himself with a group that in February evolved into the Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) opposed to the Democrats. Under Sihanouk’s direction, the Sangkum would rule the country until Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970. Then the King suddenly called a referendum for 7 February to judge his performance. A month after the referendum (which resulted in an overwhelming vote of support), he abdicated the throne so that he could take a more direct role in politics.20 Thereafter he was Prince Sihanouk. The attention to internal politics delayed negotiations. As the Prime Minister told McClintock, he had been so absorbed in a forthcoming referendum that he doubted if the government could possibly consider an agreement for the time being. But there were substantive reservations as well. For one thing, the opposition Democrats criticized possible close Cambodian-American ties. And Sihanouk, having enough on his hands with the Democrats, was not anxious to alienate the French further. The new minister of defense, Sirik Matak, “did not hide fact he feared French reaction would be sharp and unfavorable” if the negotiations took place, McClintock reported.21 The ambassador was slow to grasp the change in the Cambodian position. The French, of course, could be expected to try and get Cambodian support; but Sihanouk himself, after all, had agreed to a secret understanding with the Americans calling for a phased French withdrawal. “I do not anticipate undue difficulty,” McClintock reported. One cause of the ambassador’s optimism was word that Nhiek Tioulong, thought by the Americans to be an especially energetic and effective military leader (the “only man,” McClintock wrote, able to get the “currently rachitic” Cambodian military “back on its feet”), was leaving his post of High Commissioner in France to return to Cambodia. McClintock hoped that this meant that Tioulong was to be the new minister of defense, a prospective development in which he took considerable personal pride. “I should not be surprised if my oblique comments on need for him to restore morale and efficiency of ARK [the Cambodian armed forces] have reached ear of king,” he reported.22 McClintock was overly optimistic. Sirik Matak remained the defense minister, while Tioulong was sent to Japan. Nevertheless, the ambassador continued to feel that an agreement was imminent and asked authorization to pay the Cambodian government $1.5 million by 1 February to cover the military budget for February. Such a gesture would demonstrate good faith and show the Cambodians that the United States could “be relied upon as effective friend.”23

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 43 One of McClintock’s judgments was accurate: the French, he wrote, would now “place immense pressure on Cambodian Government.” But he underestimated the vehemence of their response directly to the United States. Indeed, when the United States informed the French in general terms of their actions, the French immediately protested, and in angry tones. In Washington a French official, acting on instructions, told the state department that the American proposal was “startling and hard to understand.” His government, he stated, intended to “keep complete responsibility for training in Cambodia.” The Americans tried to argue that they had long ago informed the French of their intentions, that they had to have control if they were to supply the Cambodian armed forces, and that everyone had to consider what was best in light of potential communist threats to Southeast Asia. But the French only dug in their heels. The French ambassador, Couve de Murville, told Dulles that an American training mission in Cambodia was not desirable, would violate the spirit of the Geneva Accords, and would cause great political difficulties for France.24 For the moment the state department was stymied. “We now face a complete deadlock with the French,” Robertson wrote to the secretary of state. Dulles would no longer press the Cambodians for a quick agreement. Instead, the state department tried to reach a compromise. Before Dulles could take the matter up with the French, however, he had, once again, to negotiate with the Department of Defense. Having obtained Eisenhower’s agreement that defense should accept some kind of compromise, the secretary approached the department.25 The formula Dulles proposed did not call for the French to end their training mission, but it did give the United States the “controlling voice in the entire utilization of U.S. funds and equipment in Cambodia.” The Americans would gain their “controlling voice” by having the chief of MAAG become the King’s military adviser, and his advice would be channeled through the King to the French training mission. The French would continue to provide the day to day training. If the King did not follow American advice, American funding could be ended.26 The Joint Chiefs wanted the formula strengthened to require the head of the French training mission to “carry out such directions as the Chief, US MAAG, in the name of the King, shall duly transmit to him.” Furthermore, they wanted the Cambodian government to agree to the “progressive withdrawal of French instructors and technicians as their services become no longer required.” In sum, the Joint Chiefs had not retreated much from their often expressed view that there must be an agreement calling for the ultimate withdrawal of the French. The President himself had to resolve the disagreement. After listening to all parties, he approved Dulles’ formula without change on 19 February.27 Dulles was finally free to negotiate with the French and the Cambodians. The first discussions took place two weeks later in Phnom Penh, when Dulles himself traveled to Cambodia, the first visit ever by an American secretary of state to that country. Dulles presented the formula to Sihanouk, as well as to other officials, who thought it might work. The secretary then presented a check for $1.5 million to pay for the armed forces’ February expenses but indicated

44 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 that more would not be forthcoming until Cambodia agreed to the American proposal.28 After the discussion with the Cambodians, an American defense official in Saigon presented the formula to French General Paul Ely and Ambassador Henri Bonnet, saying that the American military did not like the formula but had agreed to it as a way to meet French objections. The initial reaction of these French officials was negative, but Ely eventually concluded that it might be workable, provided it was clear that the commands came directly from the King. If this were clear, he thought the French might well agree to train the Cambodian forces “in accord with American military doctrine.”29 Suspecting that the French might well procrastinate, Dulles was prepared to sign immediately a Military Defense Agreement (MDA) that would establish a MAAG. The training matter could be deferred for a few weeks. But if there was no agreement by mid-April Dulles was prepared, he said, to insist that the Cambodians make a decision among the available options.30 The defense department did not view these developments favorably. In spite of the latitude that Eisenhower had given Dulles to negotiate, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson was convinced that leaving the French in charge of training the Cambodian armed forces would not produce an efficient military force, and he urged Dulles to reconsider the earlier defense proposal to the effect that when the MDA was signed, the Cambodians would secretly but in writing agree to the eventual withdrawal of the French.31 Wilson’s opinion was doubtless fortified a few days later when the American military attaché in Phnom Penh reported on the poor performance of the French military mission. There was “no comprehensive training program” in the Cambodian army, he reported; and he even stated baldly that the French mission was “not a training mission” at all. The French would have to go, he concluded. Dulles parried the defense department’s argument, pointing out once again that it was important not to alienate the French, whose cooperation could be vital not only in Indochina but also in Europe and North Africa.32 Adding to Dulles’ problems, the French government disliked his compromise proposals and suggested instead that the MAAG chief present suggestions to the King “prepared in agreement with the chief of French military mission.” Furthermore, it wanted assurances that they would “retain . . . entire responsibility” for the training of the Cambodian military. Such attitudes only confirmed for defense department officials that the French were uninterested in making the Cambodian armed forces into an effective fighting force. Once again they asked Dulles to get an agreement providing for the withdrawal of the French prior to the establishment of a MAAG.33 But the French were not the only ones who feared American objectives in Cambodia. The Cambodians, too, remained uncertain. Although they wanted American military and economic assistance, they questioned American constancy and more particularly feared that a strong American presence in their country would compromise their sovereignty and have too much influence on their independent foreign policy. Sihanouk’s trip to India in March, during which

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 45 Nehru presumably encouraged a neutralist course, reinforced Cambodian uneasiness about an agreement. Further encouraging caution, the opposition Democratic Party began to argue that the current caretaker government was not competent to negotiate any international agreements. Strongly anti-American articles began to appear in the opposition press. McClintock even suspected, perhaps correctly, that the Democrats were secretly doing Sihanouk’s bidding. In sum, it would be a mistake to blame Cambodian procrastination entirely on the French.34 Consequently, the Cambodians now raised a number of new issues. They did not want to give MAAG members diplomatic immunity, for example, because it was reminiscent of the detested extraterritoriality agreements in the past. They feared that the United States could repatriate needed equipment if in the future the Americans left. They disliked the idea that continued aid was dependent on the implementation of American-recommended organizational and training reforms. All of these points – the most difficult and important being the question of immunity – required additional discussion. Some issues were resolved by midApril. But neutralist enthusiasm emanating from the Bandung Conference of Asian and African States (then in session), suspicions of American intentions, concerns about Chinese reaction, and a desire not to offend the French prevented an immediate agreement. By the end of April 1955 an MDA, which had seemed on the verge of successful completion in January, appeared to be farther away than ever. Less than three weeks later, however, on 16 May the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement that provided for an American MAAG. It is not yet clear how all of the obstacles were removed so quickly. As late as 3 May Assistant Secretary of State Robertson had bemoaned opposition to an agreement from the defense department, the French, and the Cambodians and had recommended that further consideration of the matter be deferred.35 But it appears that, after a telephone conversation on 5 May with Douglas MacArthur (during which MacArthur characterized the defense department’s position as an “absurd” one that “does not make sense”), Dulles took the matter directly to the President, who reaffirmed his support for Dulles’ view and again overruled the defense department. The French, it appears, were to be informed only after the agreement was signed.36 More progress may well have been made at a NATO conference held early in May, for Dulles telegraphed McClintock that he expected to “discuss Cambodia with British and French in side talks during NATO conference.” Just what transpired during those talks is uncertain, though on 6 May McClintock reported that Malcolm Macdonald, the British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, “expressed great satisfaction on prospect of early establishment MAAG/Cambodia.”37 Presumably Dulles shored up support with the Anthony Eden government and made some progress in assuaging French concerns. Meanwhile, agreement was reached with the Cambodians on the tricky question of immunity. The MDA that was signed was consistent with a course Dulles had suggested the previous January: the United States agreed to establish a “logistics MAAG” whose sole responsibility would be to bring in supplies for the Cambodian army.

46 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 The issue of who would train the Cambodian army remained to be settled. For the moment the French were left in charge of training. Because of this, the Australian embassy considered the agreement “innocuous enough. . . , a far cry from the original American plan to install a full Training Mission, which would take over from the French Training Mission.” For this reason the Australians considered the final accord “a severe reverse” for the Americans and “a personal setback” for McClintock.38 Other reaction to the agreement was initially muted, but dislike of the agreement would surface soon enough. To varying degrees France, India, China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, some Cambodians, and the ICC established at the Geneva conference, opposed the agreement. The French of course had long argued that any arrangement that replaced them as military trainers would violate at least the spirit of the Geneva Accords, and even though the U.S.Cambodian agreement did not provide for American training, the French knew that the Americans wanted to take over. As the Australian legation pointed out, 30 American military officers were to be assigned to Phnom Penh, when six or seven could carry out the logistics tasks outlined in the agreement; the brigadier general who would head the group outranked the head of the French military mission (as well as all Cambodian officers); and the American military attaché strongly hinted privately that the Americans intended to discredit the French military mission in reports to the Cambodian government, in the expectation that the Cambodians would then request American training.39 The suspicions that a training role for MAAG was envisioned in the near future were accurate. As an NSC paper put it, the MAAG was to be “prepared after 1 July 1955 to assume increased responsibilities for training.”40 The ICC, for its part, was concerned that certain aspects of the agreement might contravene the Geneva Accords. It asked to be informed about the still secret agreement, and after an apparently spirited internal debate the Cambodian government provided the text to the commission. Despite the fact that the Cambodians informed the ICC that the agreement did not envisage the establishment of American military bases nor instruction by American military officers, the agreement disquieted both the Polish and Indian representatives (the Canadian representative, who seems to have kept the Americans well informed of the commission’s deliberations, saw no problems). After “prolonged conversations” the Americans thought they had overcome most of Gopalaswami Parthasarathi’s objections, although the embassy reported that the Indian representative might ask Cambodia to state publicly that the agreement did not compromise its policy of neutrality.41 The embassy was wrong. At a meeting on 11 June the Indian and Polish representatives informally determined that the MDA conflicted with the Geneva Accords on four specific points. Although the commissioners agreed that Cambodia had the right to seek military assistance, they tentatively concluded that the agreement reached with the Americans constituted an implied military alliance of the sort forbidden by the Geneva Accords. They expected to arrive at a firm opinion in a week.42

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 47 Complicating the situation, campaigns for elections scheduled for 11 September were beginning, and the new military aid agreement threatened to become the major issue. Given well justified fears of repression, opposition Democrats expressed doubts about the agreement in careful terms. But the day after the ICC made its tentative determination, Sihanouk, who had been publicly ambivalent, now spoke out strongly in defense of the agreement. At a Sangkum rally the Prince “raved against the opposition and sweepingly defended American aid.” The Americans took heart that the former King was so adamant in his support of the agreement and “seems to discover new reasons for saying nice things about US.” Shortly thereafter Sihanouk challenged the ICC to issue a definitive ruling as to whether or not the aid agreement violated the Geneva Accords. This put the ICC in a difficult position, and McClintock speculated that, rather than either clearing or condemning the agreement, it would request further explanations from the Cambodian government.43 In the meantime, McClintock suggested that the United States lobby the Indian government. What the Americans learned was not very heartening. V. K. Krishna Menon, the fiery head of India’s delegation to the United Nations, was “intensely hostile to the agreement.” He later told the Cambodian ambassador to the United Nations that by signing the agreement with the Americans, Cambodia had squandered the friendship it had built up with neighboring states. For his part Prime Minister Nehru was at best doubtful about the agreement’s propriety and expressed his discomfort to Sihanouk himself.44 The Americans were surprised at the “suddenness and bitterness of the Indian reaction,” as the director of the state department’s Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs put it a little later. The probable reason, he surmised, was that at the Bandung conference the previous April (a meeting that the United States had privately opposed), Sihanouk, Burma’s Prime Minister U Nu, Zhou Enlai, and Nehru had discussed the possibility of an Indian training mission in Cambodia. The Indians probably assumed that the U.S.-Cambodian agreement was a deliberate attempt to prevent that from happening. In addition, the American surmised that the Chinese had placed a great deal of pressure on Nehru to oppose it.45 The Cambodians assured the Americans that they had no intention of going back on the MDA, but the state department considered the matter sufficiently important that Dulles himself became involved. Meeting with U Nu, who had useful contacts with both the Indians and Chinese (despite the angry rhetoric of the Cold War, it is evident that the United States and China were able to communicate, albeit indirectly), Dulles insisted that the present agreement had nothing to do with the training of Cambodian forces but was rather intended to deliver surplus American weaponry in Vietnam to Cambodia, which was badly needed for self-defense. U Nu, at Dulles’ request, had already discussed the Cambodian-American agreement at some length with Nehru and Zhou Enlai. U Nu reported that the Chinese would consider an American military presence in Cambodia a threat but would not object if the Indians undertook to train the Cambodian troops. Dulles himself even suggested (one wonders with how much

48 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 sincerity) that the Indians ought to undertake the training of the Cambodian military. Two days later Zhou made known his specific objections to the MDA. But Dulles dismissed them as “more political than legal” and insisted that the agreement did not violate the Geneva Accords and was consistent with the United Nations’ charter.46 The United States hoped that the ICC would confirm its view of the MDA, and it put considerable effort into trying to convince the Indians to support the American position. Neither British intervention on behalf of the American position nor a direct approach by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper resulted in a definitive commitment from the Indian government. But after Sihanouk himself wrote to Nehru explaining his views and produced for reporters a memorandum of his conversations with Nehru and Zhou Enlai during the Bandung conference, which (as reported in an American diplomatic dispatch) appeared to show that Zhou himself acknowledged Cambodia’s right to self-defense and even to have French and American military instructors, the Indian position softened.47 In Phnom Penh, Parthasarathi (for whom McClintock had great respect) indicated to the ambassador that, while the Cambodian-American agreement was suspect legally, Cambodia did need assistance, and the United States was, in practical terms, the only country which could supply it. The result was that on 23 July, the ICC unanimously adopted a resolution that was reasonably satisfactory to the United States. Noting that objections to the agreement had been received and considered, the ICC expressed confidence in Cambodia’s assurances that it would “scrupulously and always respect the terms of the Geneva Agreement” and would “follow a policy of neutrality.” Therefore, the ICC concluded that, even if some clauses of the MDA went “beyond the limits imposed by the Geneva Agreement,” in practice the aid Cambodia would receive would not contravene the accords.48 Nehru, despite his misgivings, had decided not to make an issue out of the military aid agreement. Even so, the ICC’s ruling (which was not immediately made public) irritated the Cambodian government. Perhaps it was more than irritation. According to McClintock the ICC, and particularly Parthasarathi, had “incurred the strongest displeasure of the government, the Court and Prince Sihanouk by its criticisms of the US-Cambodian military aid agreement.” For one thing, the government now had to spell out much more directly why it needed military assistance, which meant a much more explicitly anti-communist position than it wanted to take.49 Because the ICC’s ruling was not made public, the MDA continued to be an issue in the election campaign. The American embassy reported that Sihanouk and Sangkum politicians continued to defend the agreement at election rallies,50 while Democrats, especially those on the left wing of the party, continued to be skeptical. The American embassy made a considerable effort to determine how important the MDA issue was. Many Democrats, they discovered, hedged their opposition to the agreement, saying they were not opposed to aid as long as it did not infringe on Cambodian sovereignty. But conversations over a series of months with the party’s general secretary, Norodom Phurissara, led the Americans

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 49 to conclude that he was increasingly doctrinaire. Though he said that a Democratic government would continue to cooperate with the Americans, he reportedly considered American military assistance unnatural and seemed increasingly to accept “basic pro-Communist ideas.”51 Perhaps the Americans were too closely involved. McClintock, the Australian minister reported, was “a little over-eager” and “somewhat heavy-handed with the Cambodians.” He was inclined to speak of “his government, his kingdom and his army” and he anticipated making the Cambodian military “into an efficient machine according to American standards.”52 Sihanouk, who was keenly sensitive to anything resembling a patronizing tone or advice, doubtless took offense. Finally on 23 August the Cambodian government released the text of the ICC ruling, an action which put an end to the matter as a campaign issue. On 11 September the Sangkum swept to victory, gaining (according to the official count) 83 percent of the vote and winning every seat in the national legislature. Although, as historian David Chandler writes, the results were “obviously cooked,” the opposition was routed. Had there been less intimidation, the Sangkum would in all probability still have won “a comfortable majority.”53 The elections in effect ratified the MDA and discredited those who opposed it. Just how the agreement was to be implemented, what the relationship with the French would be, and whether the Americans would ever take over the training of Cambodia’s troops remained to be addressed. The relationship with the French continued to be difficult. Before the MAAG-Cambodia began to function, MAAG-Indochina in Saigon managed to reach an agreement with the French in Vietnam under which French requests for supplies would be channeled through General Ely to MAAG-Indochina for review and approval. But in Cambodia itself relations between the Americans and the French were tense. When an advanced American military team arrived in June to survey Cambodia’s military needs and assess the adequacy of French military training, they were subjected to insulting behavior, according to the American ambassador. “Our French friends under cover are doing their utmost to sabotage our effort here,” he wrote, although he thought the difficulties could eventually be overcome. Progress was very slow, however. In August a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the French were “deeply suspicious of US intentions in Cambodia,” that they had accepted a larger American role only with reluctance, and that they occasionally attempted to discredit American actions in the country.54 And the American military continued to trumpet its constant refrain: it must have sole control of military training. Because the United States did not have the control it sought, even as it supplied the Cambodian armed forces, the military at least wanted some say in how large the Cambodian military would be. This matter arose well before the MDA with Cambodia was concluded. In November 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that Cambodia needed an army of 28,315 soldiers and a small Air Force contingent of 500. A later survey (the Mutual Defense Aid Program [MDAP] survey) in July 1955 recommended a larger army of 30,170 personnel for Fiscal Year 1956. This would gradually expand to 41,850 by 1960.55

50 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 On 25 August 1955 McClintock negotiated a force level of 31,000 with the Cambodian defense minister (who had wanted a force level of 45,000). The ambassador’s agreement irritated some American military officials because it exceeded the level they thought appropriate. The difference was, however, “relatively minor” and they felt obligated to honor the ambassador’s commitment.56 Actually McClintock (and MAAG officials in Cambodia) wanted a higher level of support. Agreeing with the 31,000 for the present, they wanted the United States to pay for 7,000 additional “suppletif troops” at a cost of $1 million annually. In theory these suppletif troops would take the place of the regular troops who left the army at a rate of about 1,000 per year, though McClintock admitted that in fact the army would probably be at about 35,000 by January 1958. McClintock’s concerns were frankly political. If the 7,000 suppletifs were demobilized, they “might go over the hill or defect to Viet Minh.”57 McClintock’s recommendation received an important endorsement from the Commander in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Felix B. Stump, who concurred entirely with McClintock’s political judgment. “Internal subversion threat cannot be overlooked in event support for suppletif forces were suddenly withdrawn,” he wrote.58 The Joint Chiefs were not moved, however. Although they would undertake to supply the Cambodian military at the 31,000 level without any assurances that the French would withdraw (having been overruled in this regard by higher officials), they were not prepared to support the 7,000 suppletifs, which was “illogical from a military point of view.” If they were to be paid, the chiefs argued, the money should come from the nonmilitary budget.59 On 16 November the defense department endorsed the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations. The state department needed to get the French out at an early date, defense insisted. In the meantime, plans would be developed to augment MAAG-Cambodia with training personnel, “which can be put into effect as soon as the Department of State determines that it is politically feasible for the U.S. to assume sole control over all the training of the Cambodian Armed Forces.”60 McClintock thought the defense department’s position rigid and unrealistic. Although he agreed that French training was not very effective, he knew the French would not leave easily and that the Cambodians, too, would bargain hard. The time was not ripe to negotiate on the training issue, he wrote in December. He thought that as the Cambodians received more and more American military supplies and came into contact with MAAG personnel they themselves would eventually request American training. Sending over French-speaking American officers would be a big help, he wrote, because there were indications that one reason the Cambodians kept the French mission was because French was the only foreign language most Cambodians could speak. Perhaps the following spring, he wrote, negotiations might begin.61 Meanwhile, Sihanouk’s general attitude cheered the United States. With the overwhelming (if suspect) victory of Sangkum in the September elections, Sihanouk was more willing to take pro-western positions in public. He continued to welcome American military and economic aid, recognized the importance of the

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 51 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to Cambodian security (even as he continued to say he would not join the organization’s defense treaty), and indicated that he thought that Indian neutrality favored the communists. In November he warmly welcomed a group of American congressional representatives to Phnom Penh. McClintock thought that the Prince was “ready to slough off much of ambiguity surrounding previous pro-Indian type of neutrality, [and] align ideologically more closely with West.” Nevertheless, the ambassador argued that the time had not arrived to approach Sihanouk about having the Americans take over the training of the Cambodian armed forces. But the military would not easily desist. At the end of the year the secretary of defense ordered that planning begin for MAAG to “take over all training of Cambodian Armed Forces.”62 The year 1956 began on a good note when the Cambodian Prime Minister stated, at his investiture ceremony, that Cambodia was deeply grateful for American assistance which had invigorated the economy. But tensions soon reemerged as Sihanouk moved increasingly toward a neutralist position. Hints of the Prince’s orientation emerged in remarks he made while in France. On 10 January he publicly complained that American assistance to his country had caused him “terrible troubles” (“ennuis terribles”), and he anticipated that the United States would attempt to reduce its assistance because the Americans were not happy with Cambodia’s international posture. France by contrast provided aid without strings, he stated.63 Sihanouk’s more outspoken neutralism produced a vigorous debate among American officials. Some argued that the time had come to cut back support for a country that refused to toe the American line. Why, they argued, should the United States support Cambodia when it was hard pressed to give adequate aid to reliable allies, such as the Philippines or Thailand? Others, however, contended that Cambodia was still staunchly anticommunist at home. Its neutralism might be irritating, but the main thing was to keep it out of communist hands and thus prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. From this perspective it remained important to continue assistance to Cambodia. Deepening this debate was Sihanouk’s decision to visit Peking, something the Americans learned from Nehru who had delivered the Chinese invitation to the Cambodian leader. Although the Americans considered trying to prevent the trip, the American embassy in Phnom Penh recommended against this because it would be counterproductive.64 The Americans were, however, determined to try and prevent Cambodia from recognizing the Chinese government. Prime Minister Penn Nouth emphatically denied having any such plans which, he said, would violate Cambodia’s neutralist foreign policy; but the state department was not convinced and summoned Foreign Minister Nong Kimny, who was then in Washington, to explain. Kimny denied that there was any intention to recognize communist China, but he defended the trip to the Chinese capital as fully in accord with Cambodia’s policy of neutrality. Robertson nevertheless berated the envoy, asking him why Cambodia could not be like Thailand or the Philippines. Was Indian influence a factor in Cambodia’s shift, he asked?65

52 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 The Cambodians almost certainly concluded that American irritation at their actions went beyond verbal harangues. From their perspectives, a Thai decision to give aid to Son Ngoc Thanh, as well as South Vietnam’s imposition of an economic embargo on the kingdom, was due to American influence, the result of vexation at Sihanouk’s proposed visit to China. The American ambassador termed these fears “fantasies” but admitted that they worsened the political atmosphere.66 American irritation did not change Sihanouk’s plans. He proceeded to visit Peking, was photographed in friendly poses with Chinese leaders, and made a number of comments that could not have been reassuring to the Americans. He explicitly rejected the protection of SEATO (although American intelligence reports insisted that his privately expressed views were different), said that commercial relations between Cambodia and China would begin soon, and expressed the hope that cultural exchanges would be established before long as well. Of most concern to the United States, the Prince reportedly said that the “time is ripe” to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries.67 He then returned to a tumultuous (though perhaps rehearsed) welcome in Phnom Penh. On hand to greet him at the airport were local pro-communist Chinese. Shortly thereafter in a speech to the National Assembly the Prince contrasted the American approach to foreign assistance with the unconditional aid China had offered him. Some Americans concluded that Sihanouk was not only not pro-American but was actually “promoting pro-Communist policies,” as Admiral Stump put it. “I think it is about time for the US to make some reaction other than turning the other cheek when neutralists and others spit in our face,” he wrote colorfully. American taxpayers were tired of providing “aid for pussyfooters.”68 But the state department’s Office of Intelligence Research and the chief of MAAGCambodia, Brigadier General George Lodoen, took a less panicky view. Press accounts of the Prince’s activities exaggerated his support for the communists, Lodoen wrote. It was more accurate to conclude that Sihanouk was playing off countries against each other and that he had misjudged the American reaction in the process. The Prince was now “publicly and privately contrite for his anti-American statements,” Lodoen thought.69 McClintock supported Lodoen. Although he often found Sihanouk trying and Cambodian foreign policy naive, he thought the Cambodians ultimately understood the dangers of moving too close to the communist power. McClintock reminded Stump that the country was “still without Communist taint.” If the United States stopped military assistance, however, the communists would soon win, he concluded.70 McClintock appeared to have the correct analysis, for Sihanouk soon began to speak favorably of the United States again, referring several times to the American ambassador as “mon ami.” He understood that the United States preferred to give assistance to its friends, he said, and that it was unhappy with some of Cambodia’s actions. Yet American aid still came without political conditions, he now said, and the United States did not prevent Cambodia from remaining neutral nor from signing agreements with Zhou Enlai, and it did not insist that Cambodia join SEATO.71

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 53 Important causes of Sihanouk’s rhetorical change included the presentation on 14 March 1956 of eight American L-19 aircraft for the Cambodian Air Force and, more importantly, the American decision to inform him of an approach from Son Ngoc Thanh. Early in March a letter from Thanh had arrived, hand delivered, at the American embassy in Bangkok. In the letter Thanh denounced Sihanouk’s policy of neutralism and urged American intervention. The state department suggested that Sihanouk be informed. Sihanouk was grateful for the information and noted ironically that in the past Thanh had been a strong opponent of American aid. Soon Radio Phnom Penh reported the incident, praising the Americans for their “exemplary correctness” and condemning Son Ngoc Thanh for treason.72 At the end of March the situation became even more confused when Sihanouk suddenly resigned. The issue of American military aid seemed to lie at the heart of the Prince’s action, as Sihanouk complained disingenuously that, while he wanted to work with the Americans, the Cambodian people had forced him to adopt neutralism as his policy. A few days later the Queen told the American ambassador that Sihanouk had resigned because of criticism in the American press. Comments in Time magazine particularly angered him. But it is also apparent that continuing pressure on Cambodia from Thailand and South Vietnam – which some, including the Indians, thought was intended to force Cambodia to join SEATO and which was encouraged by the United States – also contributed to Sihanouk’s unhappiness. The United States denied that it was pressuring Cambodia, but Dulles told McClintock that he was “out of patience” with Sihanouk and indicated that another anti-American outburst might bring an end to American aid.73 McClintock, however, did not think that the Prince’s resignation justified reassessing the American aid commitment. For one thing, the Queen seemed determined to retain American friendship. The ambassador found a strong ally in the director of the newly created Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Kenneth T. Young. He regretted Sihanouk’s “malicious diatribes against the U.S.,” but like McClintock he did not want to cut off American assistance and thought the United States should ride out the present storm.74 The McClintock-Young position prevailed, and instead of cutting off assistance Dulles sent a letter to the Cambodian foreign minister reminding the Cambodian government that American military aid had been provided in response to a Cambodian request in 1954. The letter was remarkable in one respect: without quite saying so, the secretary acknowledged Cambodia’s right to remain neutral – and this at a time when the secretary was publicly proclaiming that a neutral stance was immoral. Although the United States preferred collective defense arrangements to combat communism, Dulles explicitly acknowledged Cambodia’s right not to join a regional security organization.75 The state department hoped that Dulles’ letter would allow Sihanouk to step back gracefully from his recent anti-American diatribes. McClintock was pleased. “If we protest too loudly and demand black and white decisions or seek to give ‘massive inoculations’ of anti-Communist serum,” he wrote, “it will be counter-productive.”

54 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 Dulles’ defense of neutralism, he felt, was a great blow to communist hopes in Cambodia. But the more doctrinaire Walter S. Robertson disagreed. Sihanouk “had been completely charmed and taken in by Zhou Enlai on the recent visit to Peiping,” he wrote.76 When Sihanouk continued to accuse the United States of instigating Thai and South Vietnamese actions against Cambodia as a way of forcing Cambodia to join SEATO, the critics of engagement with Sihanouk had more ammunition. Ambassador to Thailand Max Bishop went so far as to equate Sihanouk’s neutralism with pro-communism. An inter-agency special study group recommended that American aid be reduced, and Stump continued to argue that Cambodia should not be rewarded for making overtures to the communists.77 But others contended that the United States must continue to engage with Sihanouk so as to reverse Cambodia’s drift toward neutralism. The famed intelligence operative Edward Lansdale, for example, wanted to use U.S. “assets” to “woo and win Sihanouk back to a pro-American viewpoint.” Young urged expanded student exchange programs, arranged tours of the United States for prominent Cambodians, and renewed efforts to implement an American military training mission. Finally, he recommended that McClintock be replaced “just as soon as possible.”78 Perhaps the ambassador, with his support for neutralism, had gone too far for some of those making policy. But more likely McClintock’s penchant for alienating Sihanouk was now well known. McClintock was not recalled immediately (indeed only five days after Young’s suggestion that the ambassador be removed, Robertson called Young’s attention to “an excellent Despatch on recent Cambodian political developments” that McClintock had authored), but indicative of just how limited was the support for neutralism, Dulles himself requested reports about the possibility of the Cambodian army being a vehicle for restraining Sihanouk. American actions would be taken, he indicated, to “ensure armed forces remain basically friendly.”79 Political pressure grew in the United States for a cut back, if not elimination, of American aid to Cambodia, particularly when in June Cambodia and China signed an aid agreement giving Cambodia $22.8 million over two years in economic assistance primarily to build factories, irrigation systems, and other kinds of infrastructure. This was the first aid China extended to a non-communist country. In July Sihanouk traveled to Moscow where he met with Soviet leaders and received pledges of additional substantial aid. Robertson was summoned to appear before a congressional subcommittee “to explain why we should continue our aid.”80 By the end of the year Sihanouk would also travel to several other communist countries including Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia promised additional economic assistance. Sihanouk also suggested that Cambodia should accept a representative from North Vietnam equal in status to the South Vietnamese representative in Phnom Penh. The Operations Control Board (OCB) established a special committee to study the problem, and at an NSC meeting Vice President Richard Nixon asked what was being done “in view of the deal which had now been made between Cambodia and the Soviet Union, and particularly in view of Sihanouk’s laudatory

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 55 remarks about the Soviet Union.” Some consideration was given to courting Sihanouk by inviting him to visit the United States on his way home from the Soviet Union, but instead it was decided to send Admiral Radford to Phnom Penh to make American irritation clear to the Cambodians. In Phnom Penh Radford warned that American public opinion was running strongly against “providing aid to leaders who extol the virtues of the Communist bloc or who make snide remarks about the U.S. while at the same time taking our aid.”81 But American pressure did not work. Radford was unable to get appointments with the King or Queen, Sihanouk, or the minister of defense and had to settle for a brief interview with the army chief of staff. McClintock put much of the blame for Cambodia’s continuing neutralism on India, especially the nefarious influence of “a psychotic young [Indian] Chargé d’Affaires, warmly seconded in Delhi by the equally psychotic Krishna Menon.” But he continued to argue that Cambodia’s neutralism deserved American support. Over time, he was convinced that Sihanouk would see the advantages of allowing the United States to train the Cambodian armed forces. In sum, the ambassador did not seem to want a basic change in policy, and for the moment he was reassured. “I believe . . . there will be no radical change in our policy,” Robertson advised McClintock.82 However, at just that moment American policy toward Cambodia was undergoing a serious review in Washington, and there was talk of adopting a new policy that would permit an effort to replace Sihanouk. Late in August the National Security Council took up the issue, as part of a larger review of policy toward Southeast Asia generally. Eisenhower was present for the lengthy discussion and took an active part. There was considerable debate about how to approach the issue of military and economic aid to countries that were not part of regional security arrangements, versus those that were. Radford, representing the Joint Chiefs, took a hard line, whereas Dulles insisted that what mattered was what was in the best interests of the United States. Under certain circumstances, that might mean favoring a neutral country over an American ally. In a surprising statement, given his public rhetoric about neutrality, Dulles said that “he would rather see us lose Thailand, an ally, than India, a neutral.” Eisenhower sided with Dulles.83 Most of the debate about assisting neutrals focused on Burma, however. Opinion on Cambodia was less divided – and more negative. In preparation for the meeting Eisenhower was informed that efforts to strengthen Cambodia’s ties to the west had “lost ground” and that the recommendations being proposed took “into account the recently increased trends towards pro-Communist neutralism” in Cambodia.84 In the end the NSC sanctioned support to antigovernment forces in Cambodia. It would be American policy (outlined in NSC 5612/1) to “encourage individuals and groups in Cambodia who oppose dealing with the Communist bloc and who would serve to broaden the political power base in Cambodia.” The United States would also provide “modest military aid for indigenous armed forces capable of assuring internal security.” Although this statement included American support for the training of Cambodian police, aid

56 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 to the country’s armed forces, and a hope to take over the training of Cambodian forces, its ambiguous language left open the possibility that the United States would support dissident armed movements deemed to be anti-communist in orientation. Perhaps it was not coincidental that later that same month CIA director Allen Dulles visited Phnom Penh “unobtrusively.” He spoke with Sihanouk late in September and concluded that the Prince was powerful but naive.85 By early October the Americans were considering replacing Sihanouk. McClintock now believed that Sihanouk was “a bad influence and the time might come when a Palace revolution might have to be arranged to remove him.” According to Australian sources, McClintock’s “thought that Sihanouk might someday have to be removed came out much more clearly in private conversation.” One possible candidate to replace Sihanouk was Dap Chhuon. Chhuon was “sincerely anti-Communist and critical of Sihanouk’s policy of coexistence and neutrality and of dickering with the Communists.” McClintock “clearly has Dap Chhuon in mind as a possible future leader,” reported the Australian legation. (Later Chhuon would lead an armed resistance movement against Sihanouk, almost certainly with American assistance.) Other possible replacements for Sihanouk, in McClintock’s view, were Nhiek Tioulong and Prince Monireth, the minister of defense.86 That McClintock mentioned such men as persons to cultivate was not surprising. Dap Chhuon had been an important Issarak leader allied to the Viet Minh. But he later rallied to Sihanouk and served his interest in Siem Reap. Sihanouk even took Chhuon to the Geneva Conference to demonstrate his support among the Issaraks. However, Chhuon was also increasingly a strident anticommunist. Long on friendly terms with Thai authorities, by 1956 he even attracted the favorable attention to Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. As for Monireth, he (as well as Sam Sary, one of Sihanouk’s advisers) reportedly wanted to improve relations with their non-communist neighbors and in general orient Cambodian neutrality in a pro-west direction. Nhiek Tioulong was reportedly “one of the most dynamic members of the Cambodian government . . . [who] speaks admiringly of the United States.”87 That the United States intended to support dissidents, or potential dissidents, in Cambodia who would challenge Sihanouk’s policies was also evident in OCB’s “Country Plan for Cambodia,” dated 18 October 1956, which was drafted to carry out policies adopted in NSC 5612/1. Among the courses of action agreed upon was that assistance to non-communist individuals and groups had to be provided “discreetly and unofficially” because of Sihanouk’s sensitivity to outside interference in his country’s affairs. Perhaps Sihanouk’s assertion in December that “certain Western states” were attempting to bribe members of the Sangkum to establish a rival newspaper and “conspire against him” was not imaginary.88 It would in any event have been consistent with the policy adopted by the NSC. Although the American government was now committed to giving aid to Cambodian dissidents, it is doubtful that the Americans had decided unequivocally that Sihanouk must be replaced. It would all depend on what policies he

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 57 adopted in the future. Basically, the Americans were creating options for the future. For the moment Sihanouk’s popularity within the country was recognized, and if he could be persuaded to be less open to the communist powers, so much the better. But the United States also wanted to improve its relationship with the Cambodian military which could implement pro-American policies and might serve as a possible alternative to Sihanouk somewhere down the road. To accomplish this, it now became explicit American policy to replace the French military training mission with an American one.89 But for the near term Sihanouk’s cooperation would be essential. Even as the policy of supporting Sihanouk’s opponents was being adopted, in some respects the situation in Cambodia improved from the American perspective. Prince Monireth seemed eager to work with MAAG and allow the Americans “access to FARK [Forces Armées Royales Khmères] planning at every stage.” “MAAG is off to excellent start with Monireth and this momentum should endure,” observed McClintock. Ten days later Son Sann, governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, asked McClintock if he had noted “a change for the better recently.” Sihanouk himself, and the palace generally, were reportedly concerned about the results of the Prince’s trips to China and the Soviet Union. McClintock for his part was now again convinced that the palace was “on alert against dangers of Communist penetration.”90 One gesture designed to improve relations with Sihanouk was the departure of McClintock. During his visit to Phnom Penh, Allen Dulles reported that the Prince generally ignored American representatives and implied that a change in American representation was in order. Someone skilled in French and sensitive to Cambodian culture should attempt to get close to him, he suggested.91 A little more than two weeks later, McClintock was gone. When McClintock departed, Sihanouk “came all the way from Kep” to bid him farewell.92 Perhaps McClintock was right to interpret this gesture as indicative of Sihanouk’s efforts to improve relations with the United States. It certainly was not a gesture of personal respect for the departing ambassador, for Sihanouk had developed a profound contempt for this American representative who privately despised and belittled the Prince; it was McClintock who first referred to him as “Snooky.” “McClintock was a martinet,” recalled Frank Valeo, the secretary of the U.S. Senate and a close associate of Senator Mike Mansfield. “He carried a riding crop and he walked with two poodles wherever he went,” Valeo added. “I’m surprised that Sihanouk never asked for his removal, but he should have at some point,” Valeo said. “It would have done him some good and it would have certainly done us some good.” McClintock’s behavior, which Valeo personally witnessed while in Cambodia, made him “almost sick to my stomach. . . . I’m sure that many of our problems in Cambodia had nothing more to them than this kind of personal clash with Sihanouk that started with McClintock.”93 In addition to McClintock’s leaving Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s agreement to a substantial increase in MAAG personnel, and even to accept two temporary mobile military training missions, improved relations. Also, Cambodia agreed to

58 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 American training of some police technicians (the training to be done in Thailand), while 25 police officials, including Phnom Penh’s police chief, came to the United States for four months of study. Soon Cambodia would send some military personnel to the United States for specialized training. By December, then, relations with Cambodia were once again on the upswing. There continued to be tensions over Sihanouk’s proclivity for treating the communist countries as equals and hints that he was interested in having some official relationship with Ho Chi Minh’s North Vietnam. Furthermore, late in November Zhou Enlai himself visited Phnom Penh. But on balance there was improvement in the Cambodian-American relationship. Relations became tense again as the year concluded, for on 27 December Sihanouk again raised the specter of foreign interference in Cambodian political affairs. On 12 January 1957 he repeated the same charge in more muted form in his address to the National Assembly. Furthermore, the Cambodians informed British diplomats the Americans were “intriguing in Army circles as well as with certain Democrat elements,” which, given the recent change in American policy, may well have been true. Finally, Sihanouk had not found the time to give the new American ambassador, Carl W. Strom, an audience, despite the fact that Strom had been in the country for two months. The Americans were “resentful of this cold shouldering,”94 but Sihanouk’s well tuned antennae may well have picked up secret American attempts to forge relations with segments of Cambodian society that might in the future be encouraged to move against him. The overall international political situation in Cambodia was also more complicated by this time. Early in 1957 some of the promised aid from communist countries began to arrive. In addition, communist influence among the local Vietnamese populations in Cambodia seemed to increase – or at least so the Americans thought.95 But more worrisome to the Americans were fears of growing communist influence among the local Chinese. On 4 January Strom reported that communists seemed to have taken over the local Chinese congregations. The situation was so alarming that in May, McClintock, now on the Policy Planning Staff of the state department, wrote that “the Chinese educational system [in Cambodia] has been completely penetrated by the Communists.”96 Concern with pro-communist textbooks and other forms of Chinese communist influence and propaganda was a staple of the “Chinese Affairs Weekly Summary” prepared by the American embassy in Phnom Penh. Sometimes American concern reached the level of farce. There were rumors that Chinese stevedores and barbers in Phnom Penh would soon demonstrate against the Americans because they had been told that the United States had given Cambodia aid on the condition that the stevedores and barbers not be allowed to carry on their normal employment.97 This new communist energy was further evidence, so the Americans thought, that Sihanouk was naive in thinking that he could have relations with communist countries without negative consequences. In January one anti-communist Cambodian official criticized Sihanouk’s “blindness” in this respect and said that the Prince did not appreciate the inroads the Chinese communists had made among

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 59 the Chinese residents of Cambodia. In April Ngo Dinh Diem stated publicly that Phnom Penh was becoming the communist headquarters of Southeast Asia. Similarly, some popular American magazines criticized Cambodia’s accommodation with the communist states. Time magazine was so critical in its coverage that Cambodia entered a formal protest with the state department. The American government agreed that Time’s articles contained “factual errors, inaccuracies and misleading implications” and that they had seriously damaged Cambodia’s relations with the United States.98 In February Ambassador Strom suggested that the United States attempt to turn the situation around by inviting Sihanouk to visit the United States. Pointing out that Sihanouk always said he accepted all invitations (and all of his trips to communist countries resulted from invitations), Strom thought it advisable not to “sulk and refuse to compete to a certain extent with our enemies.” The Prince “would jump at an invitation to come to the United States” and, if properly done, the results could be very beneficial. Strom suggested a multifaceted trip. Aside from visiting East coast sites he should visit the Middle West and the West coast. I can very well visualize him conducting his ‘Cambodian Rhapsody’ for Kostelanetz, visiting the Ford plant at Detroit . . . , observing life in a typical small or medium-sized town, visiting in Texas and spending some time in Hollywood where he would doubtless be a find for the local hostesses. . . . I imagine he would depart for Cambodia with a lot of useful knowledge about America that would benefit us for a long time. Alas, the time was not right, Robertson responded. Perhaps the following year.99 By the middle of March 1957 the OCB, in a review of the effectiveness of American policy as outlined in NSC 5612/1, concluded that “the United States was unable to influence Cambodia in the direction of development of a stable government, nor was it able to restrain it from becoming more involved with the communist bloc.” But reports from Phnom Penh were more optimistic, for embassy officials sensed that Sihanouk was increasingly aware of the folly of his ways. Late in February the embassy reported optimistically that Sihanouk might actually welcome criticism of his policies “to justify tighter controls over CHICOM’s aid mission and other Communist activities here.” In an apparent validation of the embassy’s view, at the end of March in a press conference the Prince himself expressed concern about communist propaganda in his country.100 The first concrete action took place in the middle of April when government forces raided book stores in Phnom Penh and seized all Chinese communist books. It also closed three Chinese schools, three libraries, and one newspaper. Similar raids were conducted in all of Cambodia’s provinces. In May Sihanouk publicly rejected the communist model as inappropriate for Cambodia and lashed out at the “slavery” that afflicted Poland and Hungary.101 There were of course some worrisome trends in the other direction. The Chinese schools that had been closed, supposedly for six months, were allowed

60 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 to open after only six weeks. And in July Sihanouk again accused the Americans of giving money to the opposition Democrats and even of wanting to overthrow him. (These charges may have resulted from anger over another Time magazine article which commented on Cambodia’s “galloping corruption”; Strom reported that Sihanouk’s attitude had been cordial until the appearance of the piece.) The United States considered making a formal protest, although apparently none was made.102 But in general the United States felt that Sihanouk was moving in the right direction. Two weeks after Sihanouk’s accusations, for example, the Prince expressed gratitude for American assistance. The same day Prime Minister Sim Var assured the Americans that his government would keep a close eye on “Communist-dominated schools.”103 Three days later Sihanouk brutally castigated the Democrats for their allegedly pro-communist views, and several Democratic Party officials, who had been invited to the palace to take part in a debate, were roughed up by palace police.104 Shortly thereafter former Prime Minister Khim Tit urged the Americans to file a protest over anti-western attacks in the local Chinese-language press and even suggested ways to phrase the protest. Equally encouraging, there was little evidence that communists had any influence in the government itself. Indeed, the Russians were so unhappy at editorials in the semi-official Réalités Cambodgiennes that their ambassador protested three times to Sihanouk himself. Since the Prince himself approved all editorials in advance, Russian protests only irritated him. Not surprisingly, in August Strom took exception to McClintock’s assertion (made the previous May) that the leadership of the Chinese community in Cambodia was “openly in favor of Peking.” The picture McClintock painted was “much too extreme,” he thought. The situation was still not good, but “noticeable improvement” had taken place.105 Despite some evidence of an improving relationship and some Cambodian expressions of gratitude for American aid, providing military assistance to an avowedly neutral Asian country remained controversial. The Cambodians themselves feared that American unhappiness at their neutralism, and more particularly at their decision to accept aid from communist countries, would end American assistance. The Americans were sorely tempted. As McClintock put it in May, “periodically the temptation is almost overpowering to make Cambodia a test tube case of what should happen to neutralist countries which accept Communist aid and whose leaders by their pronouncements and attitudes give advantage to the Communist cause.”106 But neither McClintock nor most other Americans charged with making policy thought it rational to eliminate American military assistance. Although the Americans intended to keep the Cambodians uncertain about whether the aid would continue, as long as there was an internal will to resist communist subversion the Americans intended to provide it to keep Cambodia independent. The American purpose was “to deny Cambodia to Communism,” even though the Cambodians could be expected to show little gratitude for American assistance and would probably not even cooperate fully with American officials.107

Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 61 American aid would, however, be cut back. In FY 1955 the United States had provided $61.75 million. The next year that had dropped to $39.27 million. For FY 1957 the figure was down to $22.52 million, and by FY 1960 it was anticipated that American aid would amount to $20.05 million. Political pressures contributed to the cutback, although much of the reduction was part of the long term plan. The Cambodian armed forces were being steadily reduced (from 39,000 to 31,000), while their efficiency was supposedly being enhanced. Furthermore, friction with the French, who were still in charge of actual training, was being reduced. In fact, the MAAG chief in Cambodia saw it as one of his major responsibilities to conclude an agreement with the French to bring about better cooperation. The days of confrontation concerning who was to train the troops seemed to be over for the moment.108 Moreover, the United States slowly increased its role in training the Cambodian military and police. Late in February 1957, for example, twenty spaces were reserved for Cambodians in an anti-guerrilla training program to be conducted somewhere in Southeast Asia. In March the United States offered to train up to 78 Cambodians, including pilots, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and at bases in the United States. Ten days later the Cambodians were invited to send ten military personnel for “orientation/observer training” in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hawaii. The Cambodians nominated personnel for a number of these training exercises. An important step in the training of Cambodian police occurred on 17 June when the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement for the United States to equip a police training center in Cambodia, with American experts overseeing the program.109 Whether the Americans always got what they paid for was a matter of some debate. The U.S. Army attaché in Cambodia, for example, detailed serious problems of graft and corruption, especially in the Cambodian Army. Military commanders reportedly stole equipment and supplies, took bribes and kickbacks, lent money at exorbitant rates to soldiers, and maintained false payrolls (what in later years would be termed ghost soldiers). The quartermaster service at Headquarters Company, for example, listed 260 men in its ranks. But in fact only about 60 were actually there. The Chief of Storage of the Quartermaster Department of the Cambodian army was “very poor” when he took the job and now owned “two large houses and a new car.” “Most of the higher officials in Cambodia will take advantage of any chance to make a dishonest riel,” the attaché wrote. Although he acknowledged that the situation was not yet out of control, he feared that it might deteriorate to the point that subversive influences would undermine the army’s effectiveness. And when that happened, would that not also discredit the United States?110 On the more positive side, there was little question that MAAG had transformed the Cambodian military, particularly in terms of equipment. Initially, the United States had redistributed to the Cambodians left over matériel from the French-Viet Minh war. (This matériel had originally been supplied to the French by the United States and was returned to American control after the war.) Although the Cambodians received a considerable amount of arms and

62 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 equipment in this way, much of it was damaged and not usable and sometimes was even an impediment. But by the end of 1957, MAAG had brought in spare parts, rebuilt approximately 311 vehicles (with hundreds more in the pipeline), begun the construction of a major logistics facility at Lovek, and supplied many consumable products, such as petroleum, batteries, and clothing. The MAAG commander, George Lodoen, also had a positive assessment, although he sometimes corresponded with the Cambodians about their shortcomings in a condescending way. In its progress report of 14 March 1957, the OCB concluded that “considerable progress” had been made on several fronts: establishing a good working relationship with the Cambodian general staff, organization, training, war planning, and the establishment of a logistical base for the army. Brigadier General Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr. (who took over from Lodoen in June and who was more respectful of Cambodians than his predecessor had been) was resoundingly optimistic. Because of the American aid program, he wrote in July, “the Cambodian Armed Forces at the present time constitute a corps of pro-American, conservative and loyal elements, [who are] basically anti-communist in outlook.”111 It would not be the last optimistic report from Indochina. In sum, with the advent of communist assistance to Cambodia and the Prince’s proclivity to visit communist countries, the situation had become more complex. The Americans nevertheless thought most trends were favorable. Sihanouk seemed to be aware of the communist menace and had taken steps to curb it, and there was little evidence that the communists had made headway in influencing the government directly. The decision was made to continue American economic and military assistance, and the Cambodians sent an increasing number of military and police personnel for specialized American training. As another progress report on NSC 5612/1 in November put it, “a sharper awareness of the communist danger” appeared to have created “a more friendly climate” between the two countries. But the same report also indicated that the overall internal security situation had deteriorated “as a result of more vigorous communist efforts,” efforts made possible by Cambodia’s increasing accommodation with communist countries.112 Sihanouk continued to accept assistance from China and other communist countries, insisted on remaining neutral, and, while he sometimes paid tribute to American assistance (noting, for example, in October that American aid was indispensable and considerably greater than aid from any other country), he also criticized the United States from time to time. In December Ambassador Strom sought an audience with Sihanouk to discuss a recent upsurge in communist activities in Cambodia, including some apparently successful efforts to influence the important Minister of Information. To remind Sihanouk of how communists operated, he requested from the state department detailed information on communist tactics in Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Syria, and Indonesia.113 Although the United States attempted to keep Sihanouk off balance, Sihanouk was the more adept at the game. One could never be sure where the Prince stood.

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1958–1960 Troubles

CINCPAC considered Cambodia as the hub of the wheel in Southeast Asia. MAAG Chief Brigadier General Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 5 August 1958

Early in 1958, the communists claimed victory because Cambodia had remained neutral, despite American pressures. But in fact the United States was increasingly pleased with conditions in the country. Sihanouk’s decision on 7 January 1958 to dissolve the National Assembly demonstrated his concern with communist influence in the country, the Americans thought. By calling for new elections, the Prince could preclude the communists from preparing well for them. Therefore, although officials continued to feel that Sihanouk and other Cambodian officials were too naive about the dangers communists posed to their country, the American embassy’s year-end examination of American policy toward Cambodia was optimistic and called for no basic changes. The United States should continue to provide military and economic assistance, try and make Cambodians aware of the dangers of the communist menace, and encourage pro-western tendencies. But above all, embassy officials recommended continued support for Cambodian neutrality as the best available way to preserve the country’s independence.1 For the next several months American officials felt that events justified their optimism. In mid January for the first time ever there was a public demonstration against the “Khmer Viet Minh.”2 And on numerous occasions embassy officials reported that Sihanouk attacked communist subversion, sometimes viciously. He assailed Izvestia for distorting some remarks he made about American assistance, accused the Pracheachon group (usually identified as a communist political party) of being a tool of the USSR, and charged the Viet Minh with continuing its efforts to influence Cambodia’s peasants, clergy, and youth. Pierre Mathivet de la Ville de Mirmont, the counselor of the French embassy, told an American official that Sihanouk “has had a real change of heart with regard to Communism,” an assessment that Thai and Filipino officials shared.3 The Americans were so impressed with Sihanouk’s growing anticommunism that they discussed whether the time had come to press for an openly prowestern government in Cambodia. But embassy officials recommended against

64 1958–1960: troubles any change; and after the Sangkum’s sweeping victory in March 1958 (the party won every seat in the National Assembly), the state department concurred. Commending the embassy for its despatch, Dulles strongly supported the recommendation that there be no change in American policy. The United States would continue to support a neutral government in Cambodia.4 In sum, the United States was pleased with the situation in Cambodia. However, at the highest level it still remained official American policy under certain circumstances to assist Cambodian dissidents against Sihanouk. Eisenhower approved this policy (NSC5809) on 2 April 1958.5 Some Americans might have been tempted to look to alternatives to Sihanouk because almost immediately after the elections there were signs that the Cambodian leader was again beginning to rethink his strong anticommunist position. Only four days after the election, a large crowd of demonstrators condemned the British (and Thai) press for commentary critical of Sihanouk and the policy of neutrality, and the embassy reported that Sihanouk remained “unconvinced of the sincerity of the United States’ acceptance of Cambodia’s neutrality policy.”6 Cambodian concerns were doubtless not assuaged when in May the Americans in Phnom Penh celebrated Cambodian Armed Forces day with a party in the government guest house which they decorated with photographs of new American aircraft, rockets, and atomic submarines. In an adjoining room they showed continuously a film of Vanguard rockets taking off. The Australians found it a distasteful “Boy, look what we’ve got” show. “And would anyone but the Americans have thought of giving a film show of their rocket devices in the Cambodian government’s state guest house?” the Australian minister wrote in his diary.7 A particularly dangerous problem was the increasing number of disputes and armed clashes along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Many Cambodians, including Sihanouk, reportedly believed that the United States had incited the Vietnamese to attack. In June, for example, Cambodia charged that Vietnamese forces had invaded Cambodian territory and occupied the town of Phak Nhay. Cambodia asked for American assistance to force the invaders out and threatened to go to China if none was forthcoming. Strom was chagrined about this Cambodian demand because it asked in public for exactly the action that he had been requesting in private. But the state department questioned whether the Vietnamese had intentionally violated Cambodian territory (intelligence officials thought that the Vietnamese forces were pursuing Viet Minh prisoners released in a communist raid on a South Vietnamese prison camp and had only inadvertently crossed what was in any case an ill defined border) and refused to become involved.8 Strom was not ready to give up. In a strongly worded telegram he stated that Cambodia was “at a crossroads,” that Sihanouk genuinely wanted a settlement with Vietnam, and that the Prince felt “put upon and abandoned.” He believed that his “Western friends have been indifferent in his time of trouble.” It was vital to settle the problem, Strom thought, and the United States should take the lead. “I have twice recommended US intervene in strong and unequivocal

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fashion with GVN [Government of Vietnam] to require them to settle their difficulties with Cambodia,” he wrote with a sense of urgency and frustration.9 In Saigon Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow emphatically disagreed with his colleague in Phnom Penh. Cambodia was not at a crossroads, he wrote, “but rather somewhat past that point along road to left.” Sihanouk, he charged, had “deliberately elected to exacerbate Cambodian-Vietnamese relations.” The time had come “to call his bluff,” he stated.10 The state department sided with Durbrow. Sihanouk had no grounds for believing that the United States had incited the Vietnamese, wrote Under Secretary of State Christian Herter, and in any event the United States was not in a position to control Vietnam’s actions. “Sihanouk should understand that in contrast to Soviet and Chinese Communists we have friend and allies but not puppets.” There was nothing dramatic that the United States could do, Herter concluded.11 Eleven days later Sihanouk announced that he would recognize the communist government in Beijing. This would constitute a grievous political setback for the United States, thought the Americans. It “would enormously increase security and subversive threat to whole area with inevitable repercussions on all neighbors,” Strom reported.12 When Sihanouk went ahead and recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC), despite American objections, the state department recalled Strom for consultations. Before he left, the ambassador chastised Sihanouk for putting his country in danger from the “new colonialism” of Soviet and Chinese expansionism. Never were the conflicting perspectives of Cambodia and the United States more clearly evident. The United States viewed Cambodia only as a part of the larger worldwide struggle against the communist menace. Sihanouk, on the other hand, saw events much more in their regional context. It mattered little to him that the South Vietnamese government was anticommunist, for example. What was important was that the Vietnamese represented a potentially mortal threat to Cambodia, a much more immediate peril than any posed by the communist Chinese. Vietnamese actions had been the final straw in his decision to recognize the Beijing government. “No Cambodian would ever believe Chinese were more dangerous than Vietnamese,” he told Ambassador Strom. Traditional antiVietnamese sentiment was clearly in the ascendant and much more important than an abstract anticommunism. The only concession Sihanouk made to the United States was to agree to tone down the anti-American rhetoric of official press bulletins.13 Two weeks later American officials gathered at the state department to reassess American policy in light of Sihanouk’s decision to recognize China. Despite their anger at his actions, there was little the Americans could do to punish him, tempting as it was to contemplate. Keeping Cambodia independent remained the paramount objective. As CINCPAC once put it, Cambodia was “the hub of the wheel in Southeast Asia,” a view informally endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, there could be little change in American policy. To cut off assistance “would mean abandoning Cambodia to the communists.”

66 1958–1960: troubles There was little to be done. Robertson summed up the frustration American officials felt: “Sihanouk would not live forever,” he stated.14 The Vietnamese (and perhaps the Thais as well) were not inclined to let nature take its course. Instead, they actively considered attempting to remove Sihanouk from power through an internal coup d’etat, a possibility they discussed with American officials. The Americans devoted considerable time to assessing a coup’s prospects. After all, the Americans had themselves envisaged such a possibility. The idea of a coup first surfaced in August 195815 and continued to be discussed for the rest of the year. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President’s brother, was an especially persistent advocate, saying at one point that the government of South Vietnam would attempt to overthrow the Prince by the end of November. Although there may have been some American interest in helping to organize a coup (this was, after all, only a few years after the United States had succeeded in covertly helping to overthrow what were thought to be pro-communist governments in Guatemala and Iran and in stamping out a communist threat in the Philippines, and it was currently supporting dissident military rebellions in Indonesia), the evidence currently available indicates that the Americans believed that there were simply no creditable alternatives to Sihanouk. Therefore the United States attempted to discourage Vietnamese coup plotting.16 It did not, however, inform Sihanouk of the plotting. As for Sihanouk himself, having recognized Beijing, he now “made an obvious effort to mend his bridges with the West.” He prepared an elaborate ceremony in honor of the opening of the first section of the American-funded road from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh and made a speech that was “unusually personal and cordial.” He also had “an unusually successful interview” with Strom and indicated that he wanted a close relationship with the United States.17 The Prince then traveled to New York, where he led his country’s delegation to the United Nations. His main purpose, however, was to mend fences with the Americans. While in the United States he visited with Dulles, whom he thanked for American friendship and aid, and presented an Angkor statue to President Eisenhower. Dulles for his part lectured the Prince about the “motives and ambitions of the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia” and “implored the Prince not to underestimate the Communist danger.” Condescendingly suggesting that the United States had “perhaps a broader experience,” he warned Sihanouk about “the insidiousness of the Communist conspiracy.” Subsequently Dulles referred to “the erratic ex-King who dominated things and who talked one way one day and another way the next.” But he thought Sihanouk’s visit had “worked to our advantage for the present.”18 Sihanouk for his part enjoyed his trip to the United States. He spoke to the Asia Foundation and the Council of World Affairs, and in Hawaii was taken for a ride and dive in an atomic submarine. He arranged for a reception on his return to Phnom Penh, one even more elaborate than on his return from China, thus giving the impression that his trip to the United States had been a great personal and national success. A prominent Cambodian journalist, Son Phuoc

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Tho, told an American official in Phnom Penh that the trip had made a positive impression on the Prince. Sihanouk had “always been suspicious of United States’ motives,” the American reported Son Phuoc Tho as saying, “but was now ready to believe that we have no bad intentions towards Cambodia.” All in all, Sihanouk’s trip gave the deliberate impression that he had “come back to a central position.”19 Sihanouk’s moderation did not impress the Vietnamese, whose desire to overthrow the Prince reached a fever pitch in November. On at least two occasions Ngo Dinh Nhu spoke with American officials, including the ambassador, outlining in detail how Sihanouk might be replaced. A few days later in Washington Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau told Robertson that because Sihanouk’s policies were “harmful to free world,” he must be ousted. About the same time President Ngo Dinh Diem himself told an American official that Sihanouk ought to be removed.20 The Americans ultimately rejected the Vietnamese analysis, causing Nhu to remind the Americans that they had been wrong when they had concluded in 1955 that Ngo Dinh Diem would not last and that “we are wrong now” as well. Ambassador Strom, however, strongly opposed talk of a coup and argued that removal of Sihanouk would only increase communist influence. Durbrow, too, saw many problems with a Vietnamese-initiated coup. But what is interesting is how tempted the ambassador actually was by the prospect of overthrowing Sihanouk. Durbrow told Nhu that “we had been thinking about the matter quite seriously.” Furthermore Howard T. Elting, Jr., the counselor at the American embassy in Saigon to whom Nhu had first mentioned the idea of overthrowing Sihanouk, thought the Prince was much more at fault than the Vietnamese in causing instability in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese government “may talk about doing things,” he reported, “but it is Sihanouk/RKG who, by their actions, have caused deterioration of free world’s position in SEA.”21 In the end the United States rejected the idea of a coup and, from the available evidence, used its influence to discourage one. But it is apparent the idea of American support to overthrow the Prince was at the very least the subject of serious discussion and analysis. It was rejected mostly because it appeared unworkable, not because (Strom’s comments aside) there was much objection in principle. In any event the plotting continued. Early in 1959 the Soviet Union, China, and France informed Sihanouk that there was a plot against him. The conspiracy involved simultaneously the establishment of an opposition party, an armed insurrection near the borders, efforts to produce insecurity in the countryside, and an uprising in Phnom Penh itself. Cambodian authorities saw this as one in a long line of established, ongoing plots by Vietnam and Thailand aimed at settling accounts with Cambodia. When Sihanouk’s government was brought down, a new Cambodian Republic would supposedly emerge that would be pro-western and under the protection of SEATO. According to Sihanouk himself, the conspirators were “armed and paid from sources which were ultimately those of [a] . . . great western power.”22

68 1958–1960: troubles The plot was real, and its leader was Sam Sary, a prominent Cambodian politician, one of the founders of the Sangkum and, until recently, a close adviser to Sihanouk. In 1957 the Prince appointed Sary, who had pronouncedly prowestern views, as Cambodian ambassador to the United Kingdom where in 1958 he severely beat a Cambodian women who had been his mistress, later explaining that this was a typical Cambodian practice. As a result of this personal scandal Sary was immediately recalled. Feelings against him in Cambodia were so strong (primarily because he had given the impression that Cambodians were “savages in the eyes of the civilized world,”) that one Cambodian observed that he would be lynched if he dared to appear at the forthcoming National Assembly meeting.23 Sary’s decision to go into opposition after his return to Phnom Penh could not have been a great surprise to Sihanouk because on 30 December 1958 Sary had sent him a letter that implied that he would defect from the Sangkum and try to form an opposition political party. Sary himself then visited Bangkok and probably Saigon as well, and on 9 January 1959 published his letter to Sihanouk. Sihanouk then attacked Sary in public speeches and (with apparently convincing evidence) tied him to Son Ngoc Thanh, another Cambodian dissident A Siep, and Thailand. Sary, he said, would be arrested for treason.24 Unquestionably the South Vietnamese and the Thais were involved in the plot, which very likely did involve Son Ngoc Thanh. In Thailand Sary received protection from a Thai military official who was Son Ngoc Thanh’s liaison with the Thai government. Vietnamese involvement was probably directed by Ngo Dinh Nhu and involved Nhu’s brother Ngo Dinh Can, as well as the official South Vietnamese representative in Phnom Penh.25 But from the beginning there were allegations that the United States was also involved in the “Bangkok plot,” as it was now termed, if not the primary instigator. That the United States was not among those countries that had informed Cambodia of the conspiracy added to the suspicion of American involvement.26 Sary and other Cambodian dissidents had acted “at instigation group foreign powers,” the Prince charged. He indirectly accused American officials of being present at a secret meeting in Bangkok with Son Ngoc Thanh called “to combat Cambodian policy of neutrality,” and there were even rumors that Sary had fled Cambodia on an American military plane. A few days later Sihanouk again asserted that foreign “special services” were protecting Sam Sary and working with Son Ngoc Thanh.27 In particular, the Cambodians (and the French) suspected the intelligence agent Edward Lansdale. On 17 January Charles Meyer, a shadowy but well informed and reliable French adviser to Sihanouk, told an American embassy official that Lansdale “was the key to the whole story.” That Lansdale was supposedly then in Bangkok had transformed “conjecture” about American involvement in the plot to “certainty.” Everyone in the Cambodian government, including those at “the top of the Palace,” was convinced of Lansdale’s involvement. Meyer added that “old Indo-China French hands jumped ten feet at the mere mention” of Lansdale’s name. Everyone knew of his involvement in the

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Philippines, Guatemala, and Vietnam, and Meyer was certain that Lansdale had also been in touch with Son Ngoc Thanh.28 Although the Americans tried to make the case that the communists might be behind the plot,29 they believed that the Thais and Vietnamese were involved and complained to the Saigon and Bangkok governments. The Americans were particularly concerned that American-supplied weapons might have been used. But they argued vehemently that the United States was not itself involved in the plot. On 26 January Strom finally got to speak with Sihanouk (after having failed repeatedly to get an appointment with Foreign Minister Son Sann) and denied flatly that the United States had any connection with the Bangkok plot. But few believed American denials. Three weeks after Strom’s denial, Sihanouk once again expressed his suspicions of American involvement or at least of “individual Americans acting independently of USG [United States Government],” notably Lansdale.30 Whether or not Lansdale was involved, it seems likely that some American intelligence operatives were. The Australian minister reported in a personal letter than he thought it probable. “We have no doubt that the ambassador would have quashed any such activity at once,” he wrote, “but when the Counsellor, [Edmund] Kellogg, was questioned to-day by the French Counsellor, Mathivet (who came to see him with the plea to avoid involvement at all costs, if rumours of involvement were in fact well-founded) Kellogg behaved as though he knew CIA had been engaged in something of the sort. The U.K. Charge d’Affaires had a similar interview with Kellogg and got the same impression.”31 Two weeks later the Australians reported that the French in Vietnam were convinced of American involvement. The French ambassador himself was “making no secret” of his belief that the Americans had been involved.32 While Cambodian suspicions about American involvement in the Sam Sary affair were still strong, Dap Chhuon, the governor of Siem Reap province, also decided to break with the Prince and join the ranks of the rebels. Chhuon, whom McClintock had mentioned earlier as a possible candidate to replace Sihanouk, had grown disenchanted with the Prince’s courting of communist China and in July 1957 was dropped from the cabinet and relegated to Siem Reap. He sent his brother to tell Ambassador Strom that “his determination to see Cambodia remain independent could prove superior to his loyalty to the Prince.”33 In the month or so before his break, Chhuon had become increasingly defiant toward Sihanouk’s government. He refused to let army officers inspect Siem Reap’s military establishment, nor did he attend the wedding of Sihanouk’s daughter, Bophi Devi, and the aircraft sent to fetch him came back empty. Finally, he sent a letter to the Queen saying that he was going into rebellion to save the monarchy from communism.34 Chhuon initially managed to elude General Lon Nol’s troops, who went to Siem Reap to capture him. (He was later killed.) But the troops did search Chhuon’s house, in which they found evidence that demonstrated “beyond doubt” that the governor was “engaged in treasonable activities and was in regular

70 1958–1960: troubles communication with foreign countries.” Soon Sihanouk triumphantly summoned the diplomatic corps to Siem Reap where he laid out the impressive evidence. For western representatives the event was one of “great discomfort” since Sihanouk explained that Chhuon wanted to overthrow the monarchy because he disagreed with its neutralist posture; he was a partisan of the west who supported SEATO.35 The evidence of Vietnamese involvement was overwhelming. Two Vietnamese technicians, brought in to set up two radio transmitters, had been captured at Chhuon’s house and were on display, along with their passports. One radio had been used for transmissions to foreign countries, including a message asking about support from Son Ngoc Thanh. The other radio was still in its case when captured. The larger transmitter was of American origin, and both had been sent in from Saigon. There were also 270 kilograms of gold bullion “in six Hong Kong-made hide suitcases” and a number of weapons. When the presentation was over, the British, French, and American ambassadors, as well as the Australian minister, “agreed that the evidence of Vietnamese participation was conclusive.”36 Although Sihanouk doubtless suspected that the United States was involved in the Dap Chhuon rebellion, he did not immediately make such a charge. Instead, even before he took the foreign representatives to Siem Reap he wrote directly to President Eisenhower asking him to rein in the Thais and the South Vietnamese, for he knew that only the United States could influence those most directly involved. Could the United States not intervene with South Vietnam and Thailand, he pleaded, particularly since they received such significant amounts of American assistance? Could the United States at least insist that these countries not provide American arms to the rebels, something which was against American policy? The Prince insisted that communism had no attraction for him personally nor for his people. The situation was grave, Sihanouk wrote. “Only the intervention of the United States of America can save the free Khmer democracy from an unjust and unmerited subversion, entirely artificial and mounted from without,” he concluded.37 The various conspiracies led to a major debate within the American diplomatic community and among the country’s allies which, in important respects, would not be resolved for several months. From the beginning Ambassador Strom argued, as he had before, that the United States must condemn plots against Sihanouk and take strong action against South Vietnam and Thailand. “I believe we must insist in a most categorical manner that GVN [Government of Vietnam] break off all relations with Dap Chhuon conspiracy,” he wrote. That Vietnam was an ally did not exempt it from criticism, he thought. In the past the United States had imposed its will on the Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek and South Korean strongman Syngman Rhee, for example, and now it must do the same with Ngo Dinh Diem. If it failed to do so, thought Strom, all of the ingredients were there for a major debacle. Ambassadors U. Alexis Johnson in Bangkok and Elbridge Durbrow in Saigon, on the other hand, were more equivocal, as were the Australian ambassador in Saigon and the British

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ambassador in Phnom Penh. Johnson wondered, for example, whether Sihanouk deserved unwavering American support because of his dealings with China.38 Eventually the Strom approach would win out, but not for many months. At first the state department again refused to put much pressure on Vietnam or Thailand, no doubt having been influenced by Johnson and Durbrow. To Strom, Robertson replied that Sihanouk, with his erratic behavior and his drift toward the communist bloc, had only himself to blame for Thai and Vietnamese distrust.39 Strom was not ready to concede the field to those who counseled caution. Although he was about to be replaced as ambassador, he urged a prompt reply to Sihanouk’s letter to Eisenhower and also permission to tell Sihanouk that the United States was not involved in any way with the plotters and would not approve any interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs. When told that he could inform the Cambodian government only that the United States did not involve itself in the internal affairs of sovereign states and that the United States had made strong efforts to promote friendly relations between Cambodia and its neighbors, Strom replied that this was an “inadequate defense” of the American position since Sihanouk not only had complete information about Vietnamese participation in the plots against him (all agreed the South Vietnamese involvement was inept and easily discovered) but also knew that Vietnam could not sponsor such undertakings “except by virtue resources supplied by US.”40 When Chhuon went into open rebellion and with Sihanouk having appealed for American intervention, the United States was more willing to become involved in seeking a solution. The very day Sihanouk’s letter to the President arrived in Washington, Herter ordered Durbrow to approach Diem and remind him that American-supplied equipment was only for defense and could not be used or transferred to Cambodian dissidents. However, Herter would not allow Strom to tell Sihanouk that the United States would not countenance Vietnamese efforts to overthrow him; Sihanouk must accept some responsibility for his predicament because of his decision to recognize the Peiping regime.41 Nevertheless, Strom continued to urge a positive response to Sihanouk’s letter to Eisenhower, as did the Australian and British ambassadors in Phnom Penh. If the United States turned its back on Sihanouk, they argued, he was desperate enough to turn to China for support against Thailand and Vietnam, even though he fully understood that to do so would mean the end of the Cambodian monarchy. “Sihanouk is not a Communist and I am convinced he will not willingly allow his country [to] come under Communist control,” Strom wrote on 3 March 1959. “I am equally certain that more incidents . . . will drive him irretrievably into Communists’ arms.” The United States must stand up to Diem, he insisted. Once the problems with Vietnam were ameliorated, Cambodia’s “natural resistance to Communism will come into effect,” he predicted.42 While the state department procrastinated, a new and potentially serious wrinkle developed in mid-March 1959 when under interrogation the Vietnamese technicians revealed that the radios found in Chhuon’s home were delivered by Victor Matsui, a second secretary (but actually an intelligence agent) in the

72 1958–1960: troubles American embassy in Saigon. Sihanouk told the British ambassador, quite accurately, that the involvement of Matsui and another American (whom he did not name) constituted definite proof of American complicity in the Dap Chhuon plot. But for the moment he had decided to take no action as a result, although he may discreetly have let the Americans know that he knew about Matsui.43 A recently released document adds to the evidence that Sihanouk’s suspicions about American foreknowledge of, and involvement in, the Dap Chhuon plot were well founded. In September 1959, several months after the events, Ambassador Strom, by then transferred to La Paz, Bolivia, wrote a personal letter to his successor in Phnom Penh, William C. Trimble. It is worth quoting the letter at length: I can understand why the Department was unwilling to tell all to the Cambodians, since it would almost inevitably have leaked to Saigon. While such a tactic might have cleared the atmosphere in Phnom Penh it seems to me it would have created a still more serious problem in Vietnam. There was a good deal about the fracas last January and February that I did not understand. On January 20 Alex Johnson received the most precise instructions for representations of an emphatic nature to the Thais. He carried out his instructions to the letter and the Thais withdrew from the plot. Durby [Durbrow] did not get instructions until February 3 or 4 and they were discretionary rather than peremptory as in Alex’s case. Durby reported that in his estimation the plot was tapering off and he did not carry out his instructions until February 14. In the meantime, on February 7, Diem sent his radio equipment, gold, technicians, etc., to Siemreap and was irremediably committed at the time representations were made to him. It was recognized from the start that the mainspring of the plot was in Saigon. What I cannot understand is that Alex should have got such firm instructions immediately, while Durby got only discretionary ones, two weeks later. I tried to run this question down while I was in the Department but had no success at all.44 Strom’s letter makes it clear that the United States knew about the Dap Chhuon rebellion in advance, interceded strongly with the Thais (which the Americans thought had resulted in the Thais withdrawing from the conspiracy), but made only belated and weak representations to the South Vietnamese who were more central to the plot. Strom did not overtly address the possibility of direct American involvement, but the failure to take strong action with the Vietnamese almost surely resulted from the participation of Victor Matsui and other intelligence agents, who were unquestionably a part of the plot. Evidence of CIA involvement in the plot emerges even more clearly from Trimble’s recently declassified oral history. Trimble made it clear that there was American involvement. It appears to have begun in 1958 when Dap Chhuon’s brother, Slat Peau, came to the United States on a Leader Grant. While there, he was contacted by intelligence agents, almost surely as a way of communicating

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with his brother. After the rebellion began, Sihanouk’s forces captured Slat Peau and discovered the connection to the CIA. At that time Trimble was in Washington receiving briefings about his Cambodian posting when someone, presumably from the CIA (the name and affiliation are blocked out), told him that “an awful thing had happened.” Sihanouk had discovered written messages, apparently from a CIA agent, to Slat Peau. Ambassador Strom had denied to Sihanouk any knowledge of American involvement in the Dap Chhuon matter, and the Prince not unnaturally concluded that the ambassador was lying – although he may not have been. (Trimble claims that Strom had not been informed of the connection.) Trimble recalled that he “hit the ceiling” when he learned of this and said he would not go to Cambodia “without assurances that this type of thing would never happen again.” Trimble claimed that the messages sent to Slat Peau by American agents warned Dap Chhuon not to rebel. But even if true, the messages clearly proved an American connection. Sihanouk had every right to be upset. Trimble sought permission to discuss the matter freely with Sihanouk, to get his ambassadorship “off on a clean footing.” Trimble had the support, he said, of the American ambassadors in Vietnam and Thailand, as well as of J. Graham Parsons, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. But he was not allowed to do so. Strom, back in Washington, pleaded that he had given his “word of honor to Sihanouk that we had nothing to do with it. If you tell [him] this, he will think I was lying to him.”45 In any event, Eisenhower’s response to Sihanouk, which was sent on 29 March 1959, over a month after Sihanouk’s letter was received (a cordial interim reply had gone out earlier), reflected state department reservations about being too sympathetic to the Cambodian case. In his response (which the state department had found difficult to draft),46 the President stated that the United States had expressed its concerns to Cambodia’s neighbors about any actions intended to undermine Cambodian independence. He also agreed with Sihanouk about the need to keep American arms out of the hands of the rebels. But solutions to the regional problems would have to come primarily from the countries themselves, he added. In sum the reply was, as Robertson put it, a positive one but one that avoided “implying that we accept Sihanouk’s charges against the Thai and Vietnamese at face value and [that] does not carry the implication that we are prepared to exert pressure on our friends in Thailand and Viet-Nam.”47 The response reportedly disappointed the Cambodian leader. Even though the United States knew that Cambodia’s neighbors were responsible for the plots against the Prince, Eisenhower’s letter made no such acknowledgment. Nor did the United States admit that its own intelligence agents had been involved, even though Sihanouk knew this, and the Americans probably knew that Sihanouk knew. Foreign Minister Son Sann directly accused the United States of involvement, while Jean Barré, the French press attaché and adviser to the Cambodian government, told officials that hard evidence had convinced him that “certain Americans” had in fact been involved and that “official American vehicles” had transported arms to Son Ngoc Thanh.48

74 1958–1960: troubles Although there is little doubt that the Americans were involved in the plot, that administration consistently refused to admit this. In April 1959, for example, J. Graham Parsons twice requested permission to tell the Cambodians that when reports had been received about possible plotting, the Americans had raised the issue with the Thais and Vietnamese and had attempted to dissuade them. Permission was denied both times – perhaps because his proposed demarches were not entirely true.49 Perhaps a British official caught the essence of the American position when he wrote that the United States “seemed to accept the contention that the West should be friendly to Sihanouk to avoid pushing Cambodia into the Communist camp. However, it seemed that the United States experienced some difficulty in feeling friendly to Sihanouk.”50 Sihanouk never forgot the Matsui case and regularly mentioned it in future years. In 1964, for example, he told Ambassador Charles Bohlen about it. Despite the state department’s confidential admission that “Sihanouk had physical evidence” of Matsui’s involvement, it continued to deny any involvement in the affair. Bohlen was told to disclaim any knowledge of the matter.51 Helping to assuage Cambodian anger for the moment, however, was Eisenhower’s decision to send Parsons on a special mission to the region to see what might be done. Parsons’ visit improved relations with Cambodia, largely because Cambodia wanted a change. Despite being allowed to use only unconvincing “well worn denials and arguments” to allay Cambodian suspicions of American involvement in the plots, he concluded that the visit “went as well as we could have hoped for.”52 The visit turned Parsons into a strong advocate of forceful diplomatic action against Vietnam. He was impressed that Foreign Minister Son Sann documented his case against the Vietnamese “exhaustively and impressively,” while the latter were entirely unresponsive to suggestions about opening negotiations. Indeed, they were in all probability still plotting the Prince’s overthrow. Parsons’ final report amounted to a slashing attack on the South Vietnamese government whose plotting was jeopardizing “free world position in SEA,” he wrote. It was time for the United States to use the leverage it possessed against Vietnam, and he proposed reducing aid if needed.53 Parsons’ strong recommendations altered American policy. The change was evident in a second Eisenhower letter to Sihanouk, in which the President personally assured the Prince that the United States did not support any efforts to overthrow his government and would use its influence to build better relations between Cambodia and its neighbors.54 Relations improved further when Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Seaton visited Phnom Penh in May to inaugurate the new American-built highway linking the capital city with the new port of Kompong Som, a project that had cost $33 million. By all accounts the visit was a huge success. Although Trimble found Seaton to be a “rather cold politician” who was nervous when he called at the royal palace, he could also be charming when need be. At a press conference Seaton emphasized American support for Cambodian neutrality and referred to Sihanouk as “one of the really great men of the world,” a sincere sentiment.55 Sihanouk in turn entertained the American in royal fashion, including hosting a

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performance of the magnificent Royal Ballet. “We were touched – why not admit it – by [the] extremely eulogistic words Mr. Seaton used regarding our pride,” editorialized an important Cambodian newspaper. Indicative of the positive impression the Seaton visit had on United States-Cambodian relations, when Trimble informed Sihanouk (in Seaton’s presence) that the United States hoped to build an embassy building, the Prince immediately responded with offers of free land tax free, an offer which by Trimble’s estimate saved the United States at least $100,000. Not surprisingly, Cambodian-American relations reached “a peak of cordiality” about this time, according to a retrospective analysis.56 This did not mean that Sihanouk had changed his mind about American involvement in the plotting. He told an Australian reporter that SEATO planned to overthrow his government, that SEATO was also supporting Sam Sary’s efforts to raise an army to invade Cambodia, that “imperialist powers” had supported Dap Chhuon, and that Thailand was assisting Cambodian rebels. But in light of Eisenhower’s assurances, the Seaton trip, and evidence that the United States was intent on improving relations, Sihanouk was content to let these matter lie. In July the United States was pleased that only two of eight Cambodians recommended for service in a new government could be described as leftists.57 Early in August the Prince replaced two leftist members of his cabinet including Secretary of Education Chau Seng, much to the relief of the United States. The Americans were also pleased when Sihanouk assailed the Cambodian communist press for criticizing the new cabinet appointments.58 However, it was not an easy task for the United States to make strides toward a better long term relationship because that required improving relations between Cambodia and its neighbors. Given the views of the South Vietnamese government in particular, this was a difficult, if not impossible, task. Ngo Dinh Nhu was the most important obstacle to peace. Nhu, who was in charge of the regime’s covert operations, had little patience with those who counseled restraint. “Persistent US efforts” would be required to get Vietnam to cease supporting the dissidents.59 In August the Americans enjoyed some modest success in defusing the tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam. They played, or at least claimed to have played, an important role in arranging for Sihanouk to visit Saigon for three days of talks. The discussions were reportedly cordial and resulted in a momentary lowering of tensions. They seemed to “have been much more of a success than one had permitted oneself to hope before hand,” an Australian diplomat reported.60 But the improvement was more apparent than real. The Vietnamese continued to support Son Ngoc Thanh’s clandestine radio transmitter and financed his subversive literature, which was “well printed on good paper,” stated American officials. “Clearly the operation had substantial financial backing and organisation,” they concluded. In fact, Diem was then secretly supporting Thanh to the tune of 300,000 piastres per month.61 The incipient Cambodian-South Vietnamese rapprochement ended abruptly on 31 August when a bomb, hidden in a suitcase (or by other accounts in a lacquer box inside a package), exploded at the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh

76 1958–1960: troubles killing Prince Norodom Vakravan and a servant and narrowly missing the King and Queen who had just left the room when the bomb exploded. The Cambodians suspected Vietnamese involvement in the incident, along with Sam Sary. Trimble recognized that “brother Nhu” might have been involved but tended to blame it on the Viet Minh who undoubtedly disliked Cambodia’s recent rapprochement with the United States. Time magazine held the communists responsible. But it is now generally agreed that Nhu sent the bomb, apparently reasoning that with Sihanouk dead he could put Son Ngoc Thanh in as his replacement.62 Trimble was disheartened, fearing that the communists would find a way to associate the Americans with the outrage. And in fact leftist newspapers in Phnom Penh were soon blaming the United States. Privately Sihanouk believed that there was an American connection with the bombing,63 and American popularity was “again at zero,” reported the Australian minister. In addition to vigorously denying allegations of western involvement in the bombing and expressing condolences to the victims, the United States responded quickly to Sihanouk’s request that it intervene with Vietnam. Durbrow, who was convinced that Nhu was the real villain (a man who felt that the South Vietnamese could “go ahead with their stupidities no matter what we say because we ‘need’ Vietnam”), threatened Diem with a bad press around the world if the Vietnamese continued their plotting. Later he provided Diem with specific evidence of Vietnamese actions against Cambodia, though the ambassador diplomatically professed to believe that Diem was not personally involved. He was certain, he said, that Diem would do all in his power to prevent these kinds of activities. Diem agreed to investigate.64 When Diem found no evidence of Vietnamese involvement, Durbrow reported that this was only a face saving response and that the plotting would probably stop. But in fact Nhu seems to have continued his covert activities against Cambodia, for Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho told Durbrow that it “would be very easy [to] work out arrangements to have better relations if it were not for . . . opposition of Nhu.”65 Even as the United States moved quickly to placate Sihanouk by intervening with Vietnam, Cambodian suspicions of the United States grew when on 30 September – a month after the palace bombing – Slat Peau was tried and sentenced to death for his involvement in the Dap Chhuon plot. In his testimony Slat Peau confessed that he was the intermediary between Dap Chhuon and intelligence officials from South Vietnam and the United States, and he named names, in particular Victor Matsui. He also claimed that Chhuon’s “radio circuit was [connected?] internally with the American Embassy and the Vietnamese representative at Phnom Penh, externally with a central station in Vietnam.”66 Although Sihanouk had known of Matsui’s involvement early on, this was the first time that the information had been made public. The Americans, in other words, were now publicly and directly implicated in the rebellion, something they had repeatedly denied. Despite the fact that Trimble knew that Slat Peau’s testimony was essentially accurate, he wanted the state department to deny his allegation in strong terms.

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But the western press had not picked up the story, and the department favored quiet diplomacy. Pressure for a public response increased when an official Cambodian publication ran a story about the trial, identified Matsui as a CIA agent, stated that Matsui and another American had given the radio transmitters to Dap Chhuon and that five messages had been sent and four received, the texts of which had been recovered. The state department still preferred not to issue a public statement. But this time it prepared one. If it became necessary to comment, the state department planned to deny that Matsui was “a counterespionage agent” and that he had given the radio to Slat Peau. Whatever the American response, or lack thereof, to Slat Peau’s confession, the fact that American agents had some connection with the Dap Chhuon plot had profoundly negative consequences. As a state department official put it a few months later, “the importance of this development in shaking Cambodian confidence in US motives cannot be overemphasized.”67 For the next several weeks, the state of Cambodian-American relations remained poor. Although the United States did intervene with South Vietnam, there were, as usual, few results. Cambodian dissidents continued to receive support from the South Vietnamese. The clandestine radio continued to broadcast, and Sam Sary continued to come and go as he pleased. In November Ngo Dinh Diem himself spoke bitterly about Cambodia and its policies which allegedly “facilitate Communist subversion” in Southeast Asia.68 As long as the South Vietnamese continued to plot against Cambodia, significant improvement was unlikely. The United States did, however, score important political points when it provided radio direction finding equipment in an effort to locate Thanh’s radio transmitters, plus technicians to train Cambodians in its use. Trimble had another suggestion for improving United States-Cambodian relations: in light of Slat Peau’s testimony about Matsui, he wanted more careful covert operations and suggested that they be conducted as they would be in a communist country – “with all the precautions, cover and, unfortunately, limitations that connotes.” To do this Trimble suggested that CIA personnel should come to Cambodia as employees of the International Communications Agency (ICA), as a new Assistant Army Attaché (the current services attaché was “so overworked that the assignment of an additional officer should not arouse any curiosity among the Americans or Cambodians”), and as a political officer in the embassy.69 Indeed, Trimble later told an interviewer that, on his watch, CIA operatives in Cambodia maintained contacts with youth groups, kept in touch with Vietnamese residents of Cambodia, and tried to keep tabs on the Chinese community as well.70 Meanwhile Cambodian relations with Thailand soured when the Cambodians took the Khao Phra Viharn (or Preah Vihear) case to the International Court of Justice. The issue concerned conflicting claims of sovereignty over a symbolically important temple in the border region. Although the United States had nothing to do with the dispute, it became involved involuntarily because Cambodian criticism of Thailand soon grew to include American support for Cambodian dissidents whom Thailand sponsored. This irritated Trimble. The ambassador

78 1958–1960: troubles was sometimes quick to defend “the little man” (as he sometimes condescendingly referred to Sihanouk) in the face of unbalanced criticism from ambassadors Durbrow (in Saigon) and Johnson (in Bangkok). But Trimble now privately chastised the “Little Prince” who “will never keep his mouth shut” and who was “usually several weeks behind times on events.”71 By the end of the “Year of Troubles,” the state department concluded that “the situation was in most respects better than was to have been expected in the light of earlier experience.”72 But serious difficulties still characterized Cambodian relations with South Vietnam. Sihanouk’s visit to Saigon in August had momentarily cleared the air, but Nhu’s continued plotting and Vietnamese involvement in the palace bombing continued to keep relations tense. What had changed was the American approach to interregional problems. Initially preferring not to become involved, even while blaming Sihanouk in good part for the problems, the United States now moved quickly whenever tensions developed. While the Americans were not willing to allow Sihanouk to call for them on a whim, they did, as Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon put it, “promptly protest any support by Thailand and Viet-Nam to anti-Sihanouk dissidents.”73 But a few weeks into the new year, 1960, an incident occurred that nearly destroyed the slowing improving relationship. In January a news magazine in India, Blitz, published a letter dated the previous September allegedly from Sam Sary to Edmund H. Kellogg, the former Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission of the American embassy in Phnom Penh. The letter implied not only that Kellogg and Sam Sary were on close terms but also that the United States was aiding Sary; it implicated Ambassador Trimble personally.74 Kellogg, who had left Phnom Penh the previous August, had at one time been a CIA officer and was not on good terms with Sihanouk. Trimble asked Sihanouk to suppress publication of the article in Cambodian newspapers, but the Prince refused, saying he would be accused of yielding to American pressure. Angered, Trimble asked (unsuccessfully) to be recalled.75 The Blitz publication threatened to unravel the slowing improving relationship with the United States, and the Americans went to unusual lengths to discredit the letter. The American position was that the letter was a forgery, and Kellogg, then back in Washington, lunched with Cambodian ambassador Nong Kimny and told him so. But Kimny and most other Cambodians were certain (despite Sihanouk’s pro forma disavowal) that Sary had written the letter and gamely held their ground against strong American pressure. They received support from French handwriting experts, who concluded that Sary was the author. The Americans countered with U.S. Post Office experts, who told Kimny that the letter was a forgery, and not even a very good one.76 The Blitz affair exasperated Trimble. “I am getting a little fed up with having a ‘crisis’ every three or four months,” he wrote in a personal letter to Durbrow. The next crisis, however, worked out to Trimble’s liking. On 10 February (the very day Trimble wrote his letter to Durbrow) a young Cambodian, Reath Vath (or perhaps Reath Suong), entered the American embassy and requested assistance in his plan to assassinate Sihanouk (because of his foreign policy)

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during the Prince’s forthcoming visit to Svay Rieng. The Americans turned him over to the Cambodian police. Whether the man was a communist agent, someone sent by Sihanouk to test the Americans or even to distract attention from the Blitz affair, or simply a deranged individual, was the subject of much debate. In a thorough review of the case John C. Monjo, the third secretary of the embassy, concluded that most likely Sihanouk had sent Reath Vath to test the Americans. Later the embassy concluded that he had been sent by local communists. Whatever the truth, the Cambodian government blamed the deed on the communists and praised the Americans for acting responsibly. As for Vath, he was initially reported shot by the police while allegedly trying to escape, although this seems not to have been the case since in 1961 Sihanouk commuted his death sentence to life at hard labor. The following year it was commuted further to twenty years.77 These various extraordinary developments – the Bangkok plot, the Dap Chhuon rebellion, the Blitz letter, and the Svay Rieng conspiracy – resulted in a review of the basic American policy toward Cambodia adopted in April 1958 (NSC 5809). The stated policy was that the United States should assist groups and individuals, including dissidents, who would work to stop Cambodia’s drift toward a procommunist neutralism. But it was now clear that support for anyone other than Sihanouk was almost certain to fail. Therefore the OCB recommended the NSC 5809 be modified. Containing communism in Southeast Asia remained, of course, the objective, but the methods had to change. The United States should be more sensitive toward Cambodia’s brand of neutrality, and it should accept “the urgent need” to “exert a moderating influence” on Cambodia’s neighbors.78 There was in fact a grudging admiration for the Prince in some circles. Sihanouk was “a more astute politician and had much greater control over the country than when our policy on Southeast Asia was written,” asserted one diplomat. “The operators now feel that we must direct our policy toward getting along with Sihanouk, who has survived a number of attempts to unseat him.”79 Trimble agreed that for the foreseeable future there was no one remotely as powerful and popular as Sihanouk, and therefore any policy that failed to take this into account was unrealistic. Trimble was under no illusions that a change in approach would produce quick results, however. Sihanouk’s “temperament does not make for an easy relationship,” he wrote. Trimble’s forecast was soon realized, for while Sihanouk praised the United States for its handling of the Svay Rieng conspiracy and again turned against the leftist press, his relations with South Vietnam continued to be poor. Consequently Sihanouk once again shifted leftward. In April 1960 he appointed the strongly anti-American Chau Seng to be Minister of Information, a move the Americans strongly disliked. (Trimble privately characterized Chau Seng as a “crypto-commie.”)80 Later the same month Sihanouk turned again to China as a potential protector and invited Zhou Enlai to visit Cambodia. Zhou’s visit angered Trimble, who concluded that China had now established its influence in the heart of Southeast Asia, and he questioned whether Sihanouk’s policy could be called neutral at all. Cambodia, he stated, had “decided to move

80 1958–1960: troubles from the Indic zone to the Sinic.”81 The effort to revise American policy to one of accommodating Sihanouk was already in trouble. The state department was less alarmist, however. A “residual, intuitive pro-West orientation probably continues to exist,” concluded the director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs. Nevertheless, the United States made known to Sihanouk its unhappiness with the Zhou visit, representations which one British Foreign Office official privately characterized “rather clumsy” while noting pointedly that neither Great Britain nor France had joined the Americans.82 A fundamental obstacle to enhanced western influence in Cambodia remained continuing Thai and Vietnamese antagonism toward Cambodia. On 17 May Sihanouk publicly accused “imperialists” of being behind his neighbors. “He is particularly dangerous when in such moods,” Ambassador Trimble confided to his diary. Four days later Sihanouk lashed out at the United States and in particular at what he regarded as distorted reporting in the American press and by American scholars. When Trimble protested Sihanouk’s comments in a private letter to the Prince, Sihanouk responded with a published editorial that constituted “a vicious attack on the Ambassador”; he added that he had had serious difficulties with “all American ambassadors.” The editorial received widespread publicity in the United States, and some feared that an emotional Sihanouk might precipitously demand that Trimble, who had been recalled to Washington for consultations, not return. The Australians hinted that Sihanouk was clinically depressed and possibly insane.83 Sihanouk’s anger at the United States seemed only to grow in the next few weeks. A recent history of Cambodia, written by Martin Herz, a foreign service officer in Phnom Penh in the mid 1950s, contributed to the Prince’s sour mood. Herz’s book, Sihanouk surmised, was “written with the sole aim of besmirching me.” An American official was physically roughed up, and “public attacks” on the United States “mounted to a level of bitterness, unusual even in comparison with periodic Cambodian tactics of this nature in the past.”84 In June state department officials privately acknowledged that the United States had “no diplomatic influence in Cambodia whatever.”85 Sihanouk’s suspicions about the United States may also account for difficulties that American missionaries and their converts faced in Cambodia at this time. All of their publications were now subjected to “complete censorship.” Evangelism and the distribution of their literature became “almost impossible,” as Christian workers were detained and sometimes jailed temporarily. In Battambang the pastor and several members of the Chinese church were arrested. The authorities, read the organization’s annual report for 1960, were “committed to a course that gives little or no recognition of the Gospel.”86 Despite the tenor of the Prince’s attacks, the United States decided on a cautious response. At the highest levels the United States continued to move away from its stated policy which allowed support for dissident Cambodian groups. By the summer of 1960, the NSC, which had been discussing the matter for many months, was ready to act. On 11 July the NSC Planning Board suggested changes to NSC 5809. The overall objective remained to keep Cambodia

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independent and to curb the country’s flirtation with the “Sino-Soviet bloc.” But the board proposed a more sympathetic posture toward Cambodia’s neutrality and, in an important change, took into account Sihanouk’s unassailable position in Cambodia and made it American policy to “take every appropriate occasion to impress on the governments of neighboring countries the importance of repairing their relations with Cambodia” while trying to “prevent provocative actions” by these countries.87 By accepting Sihanouk’s centrality, the United States was in effect moving away from support of dissident groups. A briefing note prepared for the NSC’s meeting on 21 July 1960 made this explicit: “the existing policy provided explicit guidance for encouraging [word deleted] groups and individuals in order to maintain Cambodia’s independence and to reverse the drift toward pro-Communist neutrality. The new draft policy,” the note continued, “[deletion] sets the stage for the U.S. attempt to establish an effective working relationship with Sihanouk.”88 On 21 July the NSC adopted the proposed changes. The administration’s new cautionary approach was soon rewarded. The Cambodians went out of their way to assure the Americans that Sihanouk was angry only at irresponsible American journalists, and, in keeping with the new policy, Eisenhower sent Sihanouk a cordial note congratulating him on becoming (once again) chief of state. The United States also assured Sihanouk that the United States totally opposed Thai and Vietnamese subversion, that it was telling this to them, and that it would take steps to suppress any actual incursions of Cambodian territory by armed groups. Although editorials in Cambodian newspapers continued to be critical of the United States (and the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister, Nhiek Tioulong, told an Australian diplomat that “the Americans have a genius for making themselves unpopular in Asia”),89 American officials concluded that what Sihanouk really wanted was further assurances of American support. Therefore, in mid-July President Eisenhower indicated his personal interest in Cambodia by speaking with Trimble about Cambodia and by writing Sihanouk a personal message expressing his support of Cambodia’s neutrality, sovereignty, and independence.90 Official and semi-official Cambodian publications continued to attack the west, but late in July they also began to attack the Cambodian left. When the left criticized Sihanouk’s plans for introducing French and English instruction into the public schools, Sihanouk’s fury knew no bounds. The communist attack “produced the effect of a boulder thrown into the artificially calm waters of Cambodian internal politics,” reported an American diplomat. Furthermore, Khieu Samphan (who would later gain notoriety as one of the Khmer Rouge’s leading intellectuals), then the editor of a Communist journal, Observateur, was attacked in broad daylight, Sihanouk stating that he could not expect police protection because he was so hated in the country.91 The anticommunist campaign, with numerous demonstrations, marches, and speeches, continued for many weeks. Meanwhile, the United States stepped up efforts to court the Prince. When Sihanouk announced that he would come to New York at the end of September

82 1958–1960: troubles to address the United Nations, for example, Trimble urged that Eisenhower arrange a personal meeting with the Prince because he “should be particularly susceptible at this time to the President’s influence and counsel.”92 Eisenhower met with Sihanouk at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. One American official, who was present, described Sihanouk as “extremely amiable,”93 although there were subsequent indications that he was upset – even “bitterly critical” – of some aspects of the treatment he received in the United States.94 Among other things, he was accorded the shortest interview of any head of state. The most difficult matter to be decided affecting American relations with Sihanouk at this time involved the question of supplying jet aircraft to the Cambodian government. This issue must be seen in the light of Sihanouk’s visit with Zhou Enlai earlier in the summer. The Chinese leader had offered to help Sihanouk protect his country against the imperial designs of his neighbors, and the Americans feared that Sihanouk might accept Chinese and/or Soviet bloc military aid. If he did accept such aid, American policy makers asked, what should the American response be? Should the MAAG be withdrawn? Should the United States cease all military assistance? Or should it make the best of the situation, swallow its pride, and continue to provide at least limited assistance so as to retain some influence in the country? The first rumors that Cambodia wanted to obtain a few jet fighters surfaced in June 1960.95 The rumored request put the United States in a potentially awkward position. The aircraft would add little to Cambodia’s defensive capability, and providing them would only antagonize Vietnam and Thailand, which would also want American jets. On the other hand, to refuse them ran the serious risk that Cambodia would turn to China or the Soviet Union, which would probably provide them for the asking. Sihanouk might even ask the Americans to leave altogether which, given the importance the United States attached to keeping Cambodia out of the communist orbit (particularly with Laos heating up just then), would constitute a serious blow. Consequently, the United States did not dismiss the request for jets out of hand. One difficulty was that the Military Security Act allowed assistance only to resist “Communist subversion.” Since the jets, if provided, would be mostly for prestige and would bolster internal security only in a general sense, the policy would have to be modified. As a way around the dilemma, for a time the United States considered helping Cambodia purchase jets from a friendly western country. Then in August the NSC added a new rationale for providing military aid to Cambodia: “to discourage Cambodia from accepting substantial military aid from the Sino-Soviet bloc.”96 This would clearly permit the United States to supply jet aircraft if doing so would forestall a Cambodian decision to acquire the aircraft from communist sources. By mid-October a tentative American consensus was emerging around offering pilot training – but not the jets – while at the same time posing no objections if Cambodia purchased jets from “some free world country.”97 Cambodia’s Minister of Defense, Lon Nol, forced the issue early in November when he visited Washington (he was given “not only VIP treatment, but the best this

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country had to offer” during his four week sojourn in the United States) and specifically requested two jets and training for eight pilots. Now a decision had to be made. Perhaps because Lon Nol had requested only two jets, the Air Force saw no difficulty complying with the request. Since Sihanouk was about to depart on his trip to the Soviet Union and China, the state department also wanted to provide the aircraft noting, among other possible advantages, that it would make it easier to introduce jets into Vietnam at a later time. The defense department, on the other hand, while supportive of training, had no interest in providing jets to Cambodia.98 Ultimately Eisenhower had to decide. In mid-November 1960 he agreed to support training for Cambodian pilots, to begin immediately and in the United States. He had no liking for the prospect of supplying Cambodia with “offshore” jets. And he decided to evade the question of supplying Cambodia with American jet aircraft. Instead, Cambodia was to be offered immediate training for ten Cambodian pilots (it was assumed that some of them would not complete the training), along with other forms of military aid. Jet planes were not mentioned. The issue was left for the incoming John F. Kennedy administration. Eisenhower did, however, authorize the sale of 10,000 carbines for paramilitary forces and reduced planned cuts in other areas of military assistance. The Prince was pleased and thanked the President for his “very generous aid.”99 Very shortly thereafter Sihanouk toured Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union (where in contrast to his visit to the United States he was accorded red carpet treatment), Mongolia, and China, where he acquired a number of other assets including complete factories, dams, treaties of friendship, and, from Moscow, a technological institute. Trimble thought the last item in particular was an awful slap at the United States. He told Acting Prime Minister Tep Phan that he was “astonished” that Cambodia would accept the Soviet offer just at a time when the United States was engaged in preliminary discussions with the Cambodians to build just such an institute. To the state department he recommended applying “shock treatment” to Cambodia. Washington was less concerned, however, thinking that Sihanouk’s apologetic explanation plausible: that he had not requested the institute and had been trapped into accepting it. Furthermore, he had accepted no military assistance.100 In Beijing Sihanouk received a “lavish welcome”101 and, as expected, signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the PRC, implied support of China’s position on Taiwan, accepted more economic assistance, and spoke in favor of the PRC’s admission to the United Nations (not a new stand). But there was no indication that China had agreed to support Cambodia militarily in defense of its borders, and, most important of all, there was no indication that Cambodia had accepted Chinese military assistance.102 The United States could at least take some comfort in still being the sole supplier of military aid to Cambodia. By the time Eisenhower left office, then, the United States had modified its policy toward Cambodia. Although it continued to see events from a bi-polar world view and was concerned about Sihanouk’s increasing involvement with

84 1958–1960: troubles communist nations, it had come to accept his leadership and his neutralism. As long as he did not lean too far toward the communist countries, the United States intended to support him. In 1960 the NSC dropped its policy which permitted American support for Cambodian dissidents, and the United States was formally committed to trying to bring about better relations between Sihanouk and his neighbors. Whether the new policy meant that there were now absolutely no American covert activities of a contrary nature is difficult to determine. The Cambodians themselves thought that the United States had discarded Sam Sary but suspected that it was still working with Son Ngoc Thanh.103 But for the moment the official American position was that actions aimed at undermining Sihanouk’s government were counterproductive. The Prince of course saw events in Southeast Asia from a regional – rather than from a global – perspective. He worked assiduously to maintain his freedom of action and for the time being continued to maneuver successfully between the two superpowers.

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Kennedy and Cambodia

In what he has achieved in Cambodia Prince Sihanouk is an object lesson for Southeast Asia. Marquis Child, Washington Post, 15 June 1962

While the Eisenhower administration had ultimately come to accept Sihanouk’s neutralism, Kennedy was more positive about Cambodia’s stance. This could be seen in his reactions to Sihanouk’s attempts to get an international conference called to address the war in neighboring Laos. Just before Eisenhower left office, Sihanouk sent him a long telegram urging a Geneva conference to settle the Laotian problem. The administration was decidedly cool. While not wanting to reject the proposal outright for political reasons, Secretary of State Herter advised the President that it was “most unlikely that a conference such as proposed by Prince Sihanouk would contribute to a satisfactory resolution of the Lao problem.” He prepared a reply for the President stating that Sihanouk’s idea would be studied.1 The Kennedy administration did not immediately accept the idea of a large conference either, but the new President did write that he was “particularly impressed by the series of valuable suggestions” that Sihanouk had made. And he backed one of Sihanouk’s ideas: to form a commission composed of neutral countries to help resolve the crisis. He suggested that Sihanouk himself chair the commission, though the Prince declined.2 Under the Kennedy administration Sihanouk played a larger role in bringing about a settlement in Laos than Eisenhower would have permitted, and in the end Sihanouk’s proposal for a large international conference was accepted. In May and June 1961, as the Geneva conference began, Kennedy engaged Sihanouk in a lengthy and detailed correspondence about how the situation might be resolved. Ironically, though, Sihanouk thought that U.S. delays in accepting his ideas (the result, he felt, of pernicious CIA influence) meant that the communists would ultimately control Laos. The chance for a truly neutral Laos had been lost. The west, he believed, had already been defeated in Laos.3 The Kennedy administration also moved beyond the Eisenhower administration when it decided to provide jets for Cambodia – although the provision of the

86 Kennedy and Cambodia aircraft was probably implicit in Eisenhower’s reluctant decision to train Cambodian pilots. The Kennedy administration acted, however, only under pressure of a Czech offer to give Cambodia 20 MIGs. In March 1961 the United States informed defense minister Lon Nol that the United States hoped to deliver jets to Cambodia prior to October, and shortly thereafter Admiral Harry D. Felt, CINCPAC, proposed supplying four T-37 jets to Cambodia in time for the independence day celebrations on 29 November, by which time the Cambodian pilots would have completed their training.4 Sihanouk was pleased. Although there remained a number of potential problems between the United States and Cambodia, in general the Cambodian-American relationship appeared to be unusually healthy in the spring of 1961. Late in May, however, an incident threatened to unravel the growing rapprochement. Sihanouk ordered the arrest of Kou Roun, the former Minister of National Security, in part because he was allegedly working for the Americans. Trimble blamed the communists. This development was the “fourth ‘black’ operation commies have mounted against us in past two years, each of which designed to nullify improvement our relations with Cambodia,” he wrote.5 This incident had the potential to poison relations between the two countries, since Cambodians still distrusted American intentions in their country and suspected that the CIA continued to operate covertly in ways detrimental to Sihanouk. They may have had good reason to suspect the CIA, for the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh commented at this time about “the still apparently independent activities of the CIA.” But the Prince, who was then deeply involved in international diplomacy at the Geneva conference on Laos, declined to make the Kou Roun matter public. In July Trimble informed President Kennedy that in spite of Sihanouk’s “cyclothymic temperament,” relations were good and the United States was on the right path. “I foresee a further improvement in the relations between our two countries on the basis of mutual understanding and respect,” he wrote.6 Sihanouk’s experience at the Geneva conference on Laos in July provided an additional opening for the United States – or at least so the Americans thought. He came back “disabused about the Communists,” Walt Rostow advised Kennedy. With Laos no longer a secure buffer to the north, Sihanouk might be unable to maintain a completely independent posture, American officials thought, and he might have to accommodate himself to one bloc or the other. “Should we invite Sihanouk to Washington?” Rostow asked, reinforcing a proposal that Trimble had made previously.7 Though not invited on a state visit, Sihanouk came to the United States in September to attend the UN General Assembly meeting. The visit further improved the binational relationship. The United States tried to avoid the mistakes made during Sihanouk’s previous visit to the United States by seeing that he was treated well. On his way to the United States, for example, American officials went to extraordinary lengths to see Sihanouk off at the Rome airport. Having enjoyed his visit to Kent State the previous year, the administration also arranged for Sihanouk to speak at the University of Michigan.8 But most important was

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Sihanouk’s ninety minute visit with President Kennedy in New York on 25 September. Judging from the written record of the meeting, the President engaged the Prince in a serious discussion of current issues affecting Southeast Asia. Kennedy wanted Sihanouk’s views about Laos and spent considerable time discussing Vietnam with him. Asked what was wrong with Vietnam, Sihanouk stated frankly that Vietnam could never become stable as long as Diem was in charge, for he was “not in touch with his people.” At the end of the meeting Kennedy invited Sihanouk to return on a state visit the following year. Sihanouk himself appreciated that Kennedy had taken him seriously. Trimble told British officials that the Prince’s visit “went off extremely well and Sihanouk appears more friendly than he has for many years.”9 Within days of the Prince’s visit, the United States had airlifted earth moving equipment to Cambodia to assist with flood protection for which Sihanouk, then in Hawaii, expressed his appreciation. But while Sihanouk undoubtedly felt that he had received better treatment than on his previous visit to the United States, his private reaction was less enthusiastic than the Americans thought. He said he would never return to the Waldorf Hotel because power tools were being used in the apartment above his, and his complaints to the management produced no results. Only when American officials intervened did the noise cease. Furthermore, in Los Angeles a “select” group of exotic dancers, movie stars, and “women’s society reporters” asked “questions so stupid” that the American official accompanying the Prince sympathized with his subsequent “ranting and raving.”10 More substantively, Sihanouk complained to a French official in New York that Kennedy “had pressed him insistently to organise neighboring states Southeast Asia into bastion against communism.”11 His discomfort may account for his frank comments to the Asia Society in New York the day following his visit with the President, in which he offered a cogent criticism of the United States and its people who, he said, sincerely wanted to spread democracy but who defined the term much too narrowly. This led to friendship with many pro-western dictatorships which were democratic in name only, while excluding Cambodia because it pursued a neutral foreign policy, even though its government enjoyed widespread popular support and was in many ways more democratic. He also recalled with some bitterness that in 1958 “several western agents and diplomats” were involved in the Dap Chhuon plot. “I refrain from giving more details,” he stated. The communists, he noted, were much more subtle and effective in former colonial areas than the west. He thought Kennedy was more realistic and anticipated better relations between neutral countries and the United States,12 but he was not about to sign up for SEATO. On his return to Cambodia he stated publicly that he could not accept Kennedy’s invitation to a state visit. It was therefore not all that surprising that just as the U.S. relationship seemed about to reach a new level of friendship, it was stretched almost to the point of a break. On 23 October, shortly after Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat had compared Sihanouk to a pig, the Prince delivered a “highly emotional two hour speech” accusing Thailand of planning to invade his country, announced a total

88 Kennedy and Cambodia break in relations with his neighbor to the west, and complained about the United States. In 1958 he had heard Eisenhower’s sweet words, he said, only to find out that CIA director Allen Dulles was simultaneously supporting Dap Chhuon and other dissidents. He implied that the same thing had happened this time as well.13 The improved relationship nearly unraveled. Over American objections, Sihanouk quickly severed all air links to Thailand and ordered the MAAG not to work with the Cambodian military. Following criticism by the New York Times, Sihanouk lashed out at the United States, calling American leaders “the most stupid people in the world.” The United States, he added, “only care for enslaving others.” In a letter to his foreign minister he repeated his assertion that the Americans were “stupid” and added that he detested the United States “because of its many repeated injustices which I can no longer endure.” The United States, he added, was now “my enemy.” Trimble believed Sihanouk was “at least temporarily mentally deranged.” A break in relations with the United States seemed possible (the CIA reported that Cambodia was seriously considering the possibility), and tentative plans were drawn up for the evacuation of American citizens from Cambodia.14 Alliance missionaries also noticed the cooling relations, despite the fact that they went out of their way to avoid criticizing the government. Their written materials now required clearance by three separate Cambodian ministries before they could be published, and they were having trouble getting visas and other necessary documents. “Compared with the previous decade, when we had great freedom to carry on our work,” one of them reported, “restrictions of the past few years give cause for some discouragement.”15 Why the change? Some, such as Roger Hilsman, believed that Sihanouk had deliberately provoked the break with Thailand because he had concluded that he must accommodate himself to the communists because they had won in Laos. There were even reports that he had sought assurances in advance from the Russians and the Chinese. But others were more inclined to blame his anger simply on statements made by Thai officials. In retrospect the latter was probably the more accurate explanation, although there may well have been an element of calculation.16 Nong Kimny tried to calm the waters, telling Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter P. McConaughy that Sihanouk’s speech was improvised, and much was lost in the translation. For example, while he did say that the Americans were stupid, he meant it in the French sense of “someone who is too generous or too indulgent.” McConaughy replied that the Americans did not like to be called stupid even in the French sense but that he was glad to hear that Sihanouk meant no affront. (Privately McConaughy considered Sihanouk “a psychopath.”)17 Kennedy postponed sending Sihanouk an autographed picture. What particularly worried the United States was the fear that Sihanouk’s remarks might signal a fundamental change in foreign policy away from his non-alignment posture. Kimny promised to inquire.18 Much would clearly depend on the answer.

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In the meantime some officials, including Ambassadors Trimble and Kenneth T. Young (in Bangkok), as well as U. Alexis Johnson in the state department who until April had been ambassador to Thailand, were greatly tempted to slap Sihanouk down. When the state department informed Trimble that for the moment the United States was planning to accept Kimny’s interpretation of Sihanouk’s speech, Trimble was clearly upset. It was evident, he felt, that Sihanouk’s own observations to his foreign minister more accurately reflected his real views than Kimny’s lame attempts to explain them. Mollifying Sihanouk, he stated, would be seen as a sign of weakness.19 On 3 November Kimny reported back to the state department. Instead of providing a direct reply from Sihanouk to the question of whether there had been a basic change of policy, Kimny called the department’s attention to certain passages of Sihanouk’s strong speech of 28 October which indicated that very small changes in the western perspective would be acceptable to him, in particular an admission that Cambodia’s neutrality was not a problem for the United States.20 Although this did not satisfy Trimble, Robert H. Johnson of the NSC staff thought that it provided a sufficient base on which to rebuild the relationship and drafted a message for Kennedy to send to Sihanouk on Cambodian independence day. When U. Alexis Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk killed the message because it was “too fulsome,” Robert Johnson asked NSC director McGeorge Bundy to intervene. A Presidential message did soon go to Sihanouk, though it was not as “fulsome” as Johnson had hoped.21 Just as a slight thaw was beginning to take place (Sihanouk made a couple of speeches early in November that took a more moderate line, and Trimble received a telegram from Sihanouk in response to a perfunctory letter on Sihanouk’s birthday, which the ambassador thought might be an olive branch), New York Times correspondent Robert Trumbull reported on 12 November that South Vietnamese intelligence and American military authorities in Vietnam were certain that there were Viet Cong bases in Cambodia. Such allegations were not new, but they infuriated Sihanouk, who tended to believe that American press accounts were officially inspired. As they had in the past, Trimble and U.S. military officials in Cambodia came to Sihanouk’s defense. Trimble said that the photographic evidence showed Cambodian military installations, not Viet Cong bases, and he urged Trumbull to take Cambodia up on its offer to visit the locations in question. Even more compelling was the testimony of General Edward H. (“Pony”) Sherrer, Chief of the US MAAG group in Cambodia, who insisted that he and other Americans had investigated reports of Viet Cong bases and had found none. “We believe there are none,” he wrote.22 Although some intelligence operatives, including Edward Lansdale, believed that such views were naive, prevailing opinion within the state department supported the American officials in Cambodia. “It is doubtful,” wrote Roger Hilsman, director of the department’s intelligence bureau, “that the Cambodian sanctuary has been of more than marginal importance to the Viet Cong effort during the past two years.”23 In the end this issue, which had threatened to destroy the fragile rapprochement, actually helped to improve relations. Trumbull went to Cambodia and

90 Kennedy and Cambodia after a thorough investigation concluded that there were no Viet Cong bases there. (Privately Trumbull told American officials that South Vietnamese intelligence officials had duped him.) Thereafter Sihanouk praised Trumbull and the Times and was in much better spirits. Indeed Trimble found him positively euphoric at a party thrown for the departing Australian ambassador. Sihanouk played the saxophone and the clarinet, danced with the guests, and sang. The party ended so late in fact that it made the drive back to Phnom Penh difficult.24 The crisis seemed nearly resolved. Sihanouk also contributed to a relaxation in tensions by inviting Bangkok and Saigon to establish permanent missions in Cambodia to survey frontier areas and satisfy themselves that communist bases were not tolerated. It was an idea that commended itself to Rusk, who urged South Vietnam to accept. One Australian official considered the offer an extraordinarily generous one. The American, British, Australian, and French embassies also agreed to send their own military attachés to border areas from time to time on inspection tours.25 The crisis seemed nearly over. Early in December the United States turned over to Cambodia four T-37 jet trainers and two other airplanes at a ceremony at Pochentong Airport. Cambodian flyers, trained at an Air Force base in Arizona, did aerial acrobatics, much to the delight of the crowd. On 19 January 1962 the American embassy reported that a “phased return to normality” was taking place.26 But in 1962 the pace of hostilities in Vietnam escalated, complicating the United States-Cambodia relationship. As the fighting increased, Cambodia wanted to improve its police and armed forces because of increased problems maintaining security in the border areas. It looked to the United States for support. Foreign Minister Nhiek Tioulong asked for machine guns, automatic rifles, and mortars to prevent the Viet Cong from using Cambodian territory. Cambodia also wanted to increase the strength of its armed forces by 10 percent, an increase of 3,184 soldiers. The new units would be used in the sensitive northeastern portion of the country. The justification again was to deny the territory to Vietnamese communist elements.27 As long as Cambodia felt it needed additional American assistance, reasonably good relations between the two countries seemed possible. Trimble therefore urged positive and enthusiastic responses to all Cambodian requests for additional military assistance. “Whatever aid we give,” he wrote, “. . . should not be hedged about with delays, reservations and equivocations.”28 Although there was some resistance to moving too quickly to provide assistance, there also was strong support, even admiration, in the New Frontier corridors for the Cambodian military. When Chester Bowles visited Cambodia in March 1962, for example (in an almost unprecedented gesture, Sihanouk received him in the palace throne room), he praised the “extraordinary job” that the Cambodian government had done in the area of civic action. “This seems to be the one country in Asia where not only is the Government rural-centered, but the army is generally wedded to the peasant through road building, bridge construction, and a variety of other public welfare projects,” he reported. In June the

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Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States support an increase in the Cambodian army.29 Although the United States wanted to accommodate Sihanouk’s requests, on one important issue it was unwilling to do so: his desire to neutralize Vietnam. Although Sihanouk told American officials frankly that what he most feared was a Vietnam united under communist control, he also believed that the Ngo Dinh Diem regime was doomed, that it had little popular support and continued to exist only because the United States propped it up. “He is particularly fearful that mounting U.S. military presence, while perhaps stabilizing situation temporarily, may ultimately evoke bloc response which could set off regional holocaust,” reported Trimble. While there was still time, the Prince thought, why not neutralize all of Vietnam? Sihanouk had been instrumental in arranging the Geneva conference to settle the Laotian problem. Now he tried to do the same in Vietnam. Such a conference, he told a journalist, could “stop spread of war on which SVN is impaling itself and bring peace into area.”30 Unfortunately the Prince found no support. Neither the British, the French, nor the Americans wanted a conference.31 Indeed, the United States considered it a dangerous proposal. Consequently, when the Geneva agreement on Laos was signed in July – an agreement which owed much to Sihanouk’s sponsorship of the conference – Rusk deliberately refused to mention the Prince in his closing remarks, partly on the grounds that Sihanouk was “playing with idea of a Laotian situation for South Viet-Nam.”32 More immediately threatening to the improved Cambodian-American relationship were creditable reports that Cambodian dissidents, sustained and encouraged by Thailand and South Vietnam, were again about to enter Cambodia to try and overthrow Sihanouk. A few years earlier such reports might not have disturbed the American government. But ever since 1960 the United States had determined that its own interests lay in supporting the Prince. Therefore when Trimble learned of the Vietnamese and Thai activities, he strongly protested directly to Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman. Such action, he reported, “couldn’t be better calculated to throw Sihanouk into arms of Chicoms and thus gravely imperil Free World position Southeast Asia.” The state department concurred, moved quickly to inform Sihanouk of the information it had, and pledged to support him; secondly, it tried to discouraged the Thai and Vietnamese governments from supporting the dissidents.33 As usual the Vietnamese government was entirely unreceptive to American concerns. Foreign Minister Mau and Prime Minister Diem both denied any involvement with the dissidents. Even when Ambassador Frederick Nolting presented specific evidence that South Vietnamese personnel had been trained in Taiwan to subvert Cambodia, and that Vietnam had facilitated Son Ngoc Thanh’s visit to Taipei where he participated in the plotting, Diem adamantly denied any complicity.34 Another issue potentially affecting United States-Cambodian relations was cross border attacks on Cambodian villages. Such raids were not new even in 1962, but as the pace of fighting increased in South Vietnam there was more

92 Kennedy and Cambodia danger of serious incidents. One very serious attack took place on 21 January 1962 when planes coming from South Vietnam strafed the Cambodian village of Bathu. The attack was almost surely deliberate, since the South Vietnamese suspected the village of harboring Viet Cong. Of great potential harm to American relations with Cambodia was the fact that American advisers and observers were present. If this became public, Trimble warned, it “could well do us as much damage as alleged US involvement [in the] Dap Chhuon affair [of ] February 1959.”35 Fortunately for the United States, South Vietnam quickly accepted responsibility for the “mistake in navigation” and agreed to pay compensation to the victims. American involvement remained secret. Further complicating the situation, on 20 April over 200 armed men crossed the border from Cambodia and attacked the Vietnamese village of Vinh Lac, killing 52 people. The survivors said that it was a Cambodian raid, and the Vietnamese government blamed Sihanouk.36 American officials believed that Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodians living in Vietnam), angry at the discrimination they encountered in Vietnam, were mostly likely responsible, and the Americans urged that the parties request an unbiased investigation by the U.N. Secretary General. In the meantime the United States did what it could to dampen emotions and prevent South Vietnam from breaking diplomatic relations or cutting off trade. The Bathu and Vinh Lac incidents, along with the various plots emanating from Thailand and South Vietnam, might have seriously damaged U.S. relations with Sihanouk. But Sihanouk, who was then attacking domestic communists, chose not to use these matters to create a crisis in relations. Sihanouk later told Trimble that the Bathu incident was “just one of those things.” “How long the Prince will remain on this tack is, of course, anybody’s guess,” wrote Trimble, “but for the moment at least, the present aura of sweetness and light is a welcome change from the atmosphere of last fall.”37 Overshadowing these events, and ultimately contributing to the growing rapprochement, was a serious crisis involving an ancient temple. Preah Vihear (or Khao Phra Viharn) was located in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia. Since 1954 Thailand had controlled the area, but both sides agreed to submit the case to the International Court of Justice. Each country had hired distinguished American lawyers: Dean Acheson presented the Cambodian case, while Thailand retained Philip Jessup. (When Jessup himself was named to the court, he had to give up his role as Thailand’s attorney.) The case was heard early in 1962. The Thais were confident of victory, and Sihanouk thought the decision would probably go against Cambodia. But on 15 June 1962 the court voted 9–3 in favor of Cambodia. Cambodia celebrated with four hours of festivity at the palace. Sihanouk’s speech, according to Trimble, “resembled football rally following upset victory.” The Prince proclaimed a seven day holiday and said he would shave his head in gratitude.38 In contrast, the Thais were stunned and bitter. They resented Dean Acheson’s role and surmised that he was working for the U.S. government. They saw a conspiracy to get Jessup off the case. There

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were threats to shoot any Cambodians who crossed the border. They instituted a boycott of all SEATO meetings and the Geneva conference on Laos. And there was a real possibility that they would not carry out the court’s decision. Washington feared the consequences. Rusk cabled that the Thais were “on the verge [of a] colossal international blunder” by rejecting the decision, and he feared they might even attack Cambodia.39 The United States worked frantically to calm the waters. President Kennedy himself sent messages to the Thai king and Prime Minister. In Cambodia, the United States (without much success) urged the Cambodians not to gloat over their victory. Fortunately for the United States King Bhumibol Adulyadej insisted on caution, and in the end the Thais, while not accepting the decision, complied with it. Yet another crisis had come to an end, one in which the United States played a calming and constructive role. In mid-July Thailand surrendered sovereignty over the temple.40 Cambodian euphoria over the decision doubtless contributed to the fact that the Cambodian government did not make a serious issue of four more South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia on 16 June, including another attack on Bathu involving fatalities. As before, Americans were present during the incidents. With the potentially disastrous temple issue resolved, the United States hoped for a period of relative calm. But it was not to be. Even before the new ambassador to Cambodia, Philip D. Sprouse, who had replaced Trimble just as the temple case was being settled, was able to present his credentials to the Cambodian government, he found it necessary to confront Cambodian officials over the detention of an American official charged with espionage. According to the Cambodians, after surveillance lasting several months, they had cracked an espionage ring. Acting on inside information supplied by one of the conspirators, on 7 August 1962 the police (almost surely acting with Sihanouk’s approval) raided a secret meeting of the conspirators where they found and arrested Kwang P. Chu, a low ranking official with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) mission in Phnom Penh who was in reality a CIA employee. Further, the Cambodians charged that the person in charge of the entire espionage ring was another AID official, Samuel H. B. Hopler, whom they wanted to question. They insisted that they had conclusive proof. When Sprouse said that it was unbelievable that any American official would conduct espionage in Cambodia, Cambodian officials, no doubt recalling Victor Matsui in Dap Chhuon case, “rejoined in almost inaudible tone that such had happened in the past.”41 The Americans contended that both Chu and Hopler had diplomatic immunity and that Hopler would not be made available for questioning. The Cambodians rejoined that neither man was on the diplomatic list, but the Americans responded that any American – even a clerical employee or servant – associated with the American embassy in Cambodia was protected by diplomatic immunity. In the end, two days before Sprouse was scheduled to present his credentials to Sihanouk, the Cambodians released Chu (who was badly treated in police custody where he was reportedly “subjected [to] inhuman imprisonment and painful, although not crippling or dangerous, torture.”)42 Chu and Hopler were quickly, and very

94 Kennedy and Cambodia quietly, flown out of the country. The United States filed a stiff protest against the treatment accorded Chu. Fortunately for the United States, Sihanouk chose not to pursue the matter publicly, which would have had a seriously negative impact on Cambodian-American relations. The case ended in January 1964 when two persons – one Chinese and one Vietnamese – were convicted of working for the Americans with the aim of damaging the People’s Republic of China and overthrowing the Cambodian government. Another potential cause of conflict involved an old issue: a Cambodian request that its military be increased, with American funding. The United States thought expansion of the Cambodian armed forces was useful because of suspected increased Viet Cong activity in the country’s northeastern section where the new troops would be stationed, and it had approved the requested increase of 3,184 personnel along with military supplies for them; but it would not pay their salaries or day to day support (pay, allowance, and subsistence, or P.A.S., costs) – largely, it appears, for domestic political reasons. This decision irked the Cambodians, with one prominent newspaper commenting that U.S. military equipment given to Cambodia was more suitable for a museum than for the modern battlefield.43 At the same time the tentative decision to provide any more assistance to Cambodia angered the ever sensitive Thais. As the country’s interior minister put it, giving Cambodia arms was “like feeding tiger which when strong will bite feeder and cause trouble for neighbors.”44 It was not surprising, therefore, that Thailand, South Vietnam, and Nationalist China continued to undermine Sihanouk by providing support to Son Ngoc Thanh and other Cambodian dissidents. There were also a number of cross border incidents, some involving casualties, and overflights from both Thailand and South Vietnam during this period (one reporter called them “incessant”), and American officials even uncovered an assassination plot. Consequently the United States again sought to dissuade Cambodia’s neighbors, as well as Taiwan, from engaging in such activities.45 Although Sihanouk was aware of at least some of the U.S. efforts to temper Thai and South Vietnamese behavior, he always felt that the United States could do much more than it did. In any event, he concluded that American efforts along these lines had not improved his country’s security. This factor, along with Sihanouk’s equally important evolving belief that American military aid did not, on balance, help insure his country’s survival, soon led the increasingly desperate Prince to consider radically alternative methods of preserving his country’s survival and independence. On 20 August 1962 Sihanouk announced that he was calling an international conference to guarantee Cambodia’s neutrality and its territorial integrity. Invitations went out to all of the powers that had participated in the recent Geneva conference on Laos. How to respond to Sihanouk’s initiative revealed deep divisions among Americans. There were those within the American government who saw no reason to make any accommodation to Sihanouk. Some American advisers to Diem, for example, and (according to the Australian ambassador in Phnom

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Penh) certain junior officers in Phnom Penh, considered Sihanouk “a quasicommunist, completely committed to China and affording active support to the Viet Cong.” Nothing would be lost, they thought, by forcing the Prince out in the open.46 Fortunately, such disastrous ideas were more than counterbalanced by the view that it would be foolish to alienate Cambodia. Representative of this line of thought was Senator Mike Mansfield, an Asia specialist who, together with three other senators, visited Southeast Asia late in 1962. The senators reported that Cambodia was stable and peaceful and that the difficulties between the United States and Cambodia were “superficial and avoidable.” Moreover, they prophetically held up Cambodia as a model for what Southeast Asia could be: “Cambodia’s existence as an independent nation at peace with all of the great powers is of exemplary value if there is ever to be a durable and peaceful solution to the basic problems of Southeast Asia.”47 Nevertheless, most American policy makers did not like the idea of an international conference, which they feared would result in unrealistic international guarantees that would be cumbersome and potentially embarrassing. At the same time, the administration wanted to find some way to meet Sihanouk’s legitimate desires to preserve his country’s neutrality and territorial integrity. Therefore for the next several weeks the United States engaged in high level, and at times frantic, diplomacy toward this end. At times the issue demanded the personal attention of the President. The United States hoped to craft a settlement that would be acceptable to South Vietnam and Thailand, its European allies (especially Britain and France), and India (which had considerable influence in Cambodia and which was currently attractive to the United States because of its serious border problems with China). If at all possible, the United States also wanted a solution that would allow it to keep its MAAG in Cambodia. It was not an easy task. Immense American efforts went into trying to devise a formula that would satisfy all sides. President Kennedy sent the Prince a letter providing American assurances of respect for Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity and offering to send a formal letter putting the American position on the written record. Kennedy’s military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, personally assured Sihanouk that the United States would view actual aggression against Cambodia with “grave concern.” Considerable discussion ensued about how the recent settlement in Laos might be applied to Cambodia. As an alternative to Laos, the international settlement neutralizing Austria was examined.48 Involving the U.N. Secretary General as a point of appeal received much attention. Various formulas for some kind of border control mechanism were discussed. The felt need to obtain the concurrence of its allies and India complicated and delayed a final American draft proposal. Interestingly India, which often differed with the United States, quickly approved an early American draft. The British were generally cooperative (though they expressed a few reservations), but the French initially were not. Charles de Gaulle refused to coordinate his response to Sihanouk with the United States. France’s “deplorable haste and lack coordination with friends hard to understand,” lamented Rusk. Finally on 21 September the

96 Kennedy and Cambodia United States presented its proposal to Cambodian Foreign Minister Nhiek Tioulong. Instead of a conference, the Americans suggested country by country notes pledging to respect Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity.49 While the United States waited for the Cambodian response, the question of American military assistance to Cambodia again became an issue. On the advice of Ambassador to Bangkok Kenneth T. Young (whose competence some questioned), and over the objections of Ambassador Sprouse in Phnom Penh, delivery of some American aircraft was delayed.50 But American hesitation about supplying arms quickly disappeared. As reports began to come in that Sihanouk was thinking of ending the American MAAG because it would be incompatible with an international agreement that guaranteed Cambodia’s neutrality,51 the United States quickly reversed course. Suddenly now the United States found that it could, after all, find the funds to pay for the 3,184 increase in the Cambodian armed forces personnel (including P.A.S. support) if only Cambodia would formally request such payment. In addition, the Americans would be pleased to reconsider a planned reduction of 10 percent in its overall military aid budget to Cambodia. Also the United States would provide technical help to help demarcate Cambodia’s borders with precision.52 Although MAAG chief Edward “Pony” Sherrer saw Lon Nol on an emergency basis to explain the new American position on Cambodia’s military, the general was not impressed and was even irritated that he had had to return to the capital to receive such unimportant news. American aid, he complained, was slow in arriving, inadequate, and conditional.53 Since Lon Nol was a strong supporter of American aid, his negative response did not bode well for Cambodian acceptance of the American proposal to respect Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity. And, in fact, Cambodia was preparing a counter proposal, a copy of which the United States had somehow obtained (one official admitted that this was a “purloined” copy).54 The heart of the proposal, which Cambodia presented to the United States and other powers on 21 November, involved a joint declaration by all of the recipients and a protocol to be signed by all fourteen signatories of the Geneva Agreement on Laos guaranteeing Cambodia’s neutrality, independence and territorial integrity. The Australian ambassador to Phnom Penh found the proposal constructive and saw more advantages than disadvantages to the west in signing the proposal, including better control of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory. It would also put the communist powers on the defensive. He did, however, recognize a number of problems with it, including the fact that the United States would be in a very embarrassing position if the Vietnamese continued to cross the border and Sihanouk invoked the agreement against them.55 This possibility did indeed worry the United States, along with several other provisions in the draft accord. The United States complained that the proposal accepted Cambodia’s version of the borders without proper consultation with its neighbors, allowed the Geneva authorities (including communist China and North Vietnam) to have jurisdictional authority over the frontiers, and in general failed to address adequately the central issue of Cambodia’s relations with Thailand

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and South Vietnam. Finally, the proposal required the withdrawal of the American MAAG, since it was incompatible with Cambodian neutrality.56 According to Noël Deschamps, the perceptive Australian ambassador in Phnom Penh, the proposed exclusion of the MAAG was “completely negotiable,” and what Sihanouk most wanted was an unequivocal American pledge that the arms supplied to South Vietnam and Thailand were intended exclusively to meet internal threats and would not be used for other purposes, such as attempting to alter borders. If this could be done, preferably with Thai and Vietnamese concurrence, it “could have an excellent effect in Cambodia.”57 As Deschamps predicted, Cambodia was not adamant about ousting the MAAG. Responding to American reminders that the MAAG provided both security and economic benefits to Cambodia, Sihanouk defended his reliance on American military aid in a speech that was “surprisingly cordial and appreciative” and acknowledged that the MAAG’s withdrawal would pose considerable financial difficulties. To enhance further the prospects of keeping the MAAG in Cambodia, Sprouse attempted to get the United States to supply up to eight athletic coaches from the American military to help Cambodia prepare for the forthcoming Southeast Asian Games scheduled for December 1963.58 By the end of the year there was still no resolution of the crisis. Still, relations were more cordial than they had been for some time. The United States, thinking it would pose unacceptable risks to reject the Cambodian proposals out of hand, decided to accept their general aims while suggesting significant, even radical, modifications. The United States attempted to divert Sihanouk away from the Laos-type Geneva conference that he preferred to a border commission approach (originally a British idea) and a declaration signed by Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam pledging to respect each other’s sovereignty. The issue was important enough that in December Kennedy discussed it with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when the two leaders met at Nassau.59 Sihanouk was doubtless pleased that his proposals were the subject of intensive discussions in foreign offices around the world, and when in January 1963 correspondents for Time-Life interviewed him they found the Prince in “one of his sunniest and more expansive moods.” This, thought an American official, indicated a relaxation of “Princely tensions.” Consequently Sprouse thought the time propitious to ask for a substantial increase in the MAAG contingent and an additional $390,000 to help finance construction of a naval base.60 But in the end it proved impossible to find a formula acceptable to all sides. Some Americans, including Ambassador Nolting, objected to any efforts to respect Cambodian neutrality, and predictably neither the Thais nor the South Vietnamese were receptive to any multilateral agreement with Sihanouk. The French objected to those portions of the American draft which seemed to call into question Cambodia’s boundaries that were firmly established in 1946, and they preferred multilateral agreements to bilateral ones.61 By February 1963, however, the French were cooperating with the British and the Americans to draft an aide-memoire dealing with the border problems primarily on a bilateral basis. France presented the paper to Nong Kimny as its own views.

98 Kennedy and Cambodia The possibility of an agreement suffered a significant setback when Sihanouk, then visiting Beijing (where he received what can only be described as spectacular treatment), announced that he was no longer bound by a previous pledge to avoid public discussion of his differences with Thailand. This was because the Chinese (perhaps Mao Zedong himself ) informed him of an alleged new plot by Son Ngoc Thanh supported by South Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, and an unnamed “imperialist power.” Sihanouk lashed out at his enemies and indicated that he would have no dealings with the present Thai or Vietnamese governments. “Sihanouk appears to have fallen victim to heavy wine so lavishly poured for him by CHICOMS,” concluded Sprouse.62 This made it unlikely that any meaningful bilateral agreements of the type envisaged in the American-BritishFrench proposal would work. The United States concluded that it could now only approach Sihanouk one step at a time, with Sihanouk’s reaction and mood determining what if anything more might be attempted. Although desultory discussions continued with Sihanouk and other interested parties about a possible neutrality agreement, the United States never did present a complete draft agreement to the Cambodian government. There was some momentary optimism at the end of June 1963 when it looked as though the Cambodians might want to resume discussions, but on 2 July the embassy reported that Sihanouk was no longer interested.63 This may have been something of a misreading of Sihanouk’s intent, however. While the Prince had now concluded that he would not be able to get an international guarantee of the sort he had originally envisaged, he still wanted to obtain bilateral guarantees for his country’s independence and borders, something not incompatible with the American approach. In this regard, in fact, despite his overblown and angry rhetoric, Sihanouk surprisingly offered a detente with Thailand, including for the first time reciprocal assurances. It was unfortunate that the Thai reaction was intemperate and also unfortunate that the Americans did not continue to explore alternatives with Sihanouk, a lapse the Australian ambassador in Phnom Penh was inclined to blame partly on Daniel Arzac, the state department’s Cambodia desk officer who had served two tours of duty in Cambodia but who, in Deschamps’ opinion, had little intuitive understanding of the country and who, when he had the chance, did not seek out informed opinion on current developments.64 In any event, even though the neutrality proposals were no longer on the front burner, they continued to fester and proved to be a problem in American relations with Cambodia for several years. If by late spring 1963 the neutrality issue had strained relations, the United States could take some comfort in other developments. Despite Sihanouk’s red carpet treatment in Beijing, it became evident that the Prince did not get the economic or military aid he had hoped to receive from China. Thus the United States retained important leverage with its aid that it thought was vital to Cambodia’s military and the civilian economy. In addition, Sihanouk continued his campaign against domestic leftists which to a certain extent counterbalanced his concern over the alleged Son Ngoc Thanh plot. Indicative of Sihanouk’s desire for reasonably good relations with the United States was the treatment accorded

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CINCPAC James F. Collins when he visited Cambodia in March. He was given full military honors when he arrived and departed, and Sihanouk made his personal airplane available to the admiral for his travels around Cambodia. On the other hand, at about the same time as the Collins visit Cambodia accepted six MIG-17 aircraft and two antiaircraft batteries from the Soviet Union. This was the first breach in the western monopoly of military aid to Cambodia, and it deeply troubled the United States. The Americans acknowledged Cambodia’s right to acquire such weapons but pointed out that the expenses involved in training pilots and maintenance made the continuing provision of American aid to Cambodia problematic. Over the next few months there were no dramatic changes in CambodianAmerican relations. There were some positive developments. Sihanouk welcomed American aid, for example, and the United States even responded positively to a Cambodian inquiry about the desire of a “high Cambodian personality,” presumably Sihanouk, to come to Hawaii where he could rest and lose ten to twelve kilograms of weight. (The visit did not materialize.) Cambodia also secretly accepted highly sensitive reports from the United States about Viet Cong activities in Cambodia, and Sihanouk paid high tribute to MAAG chief Sherrer when he left Phnom Penh in July, noting in particular that Sherrer had courageously refuted accounts of Viet Cong bases in Cambodia. But these positive developments occurred in the context of a slowly deteriorating relationship. During these weeks Sihanouk had more contact with Soviet bloc countries than with the west. He strongly criticized the Diem government’s attack on South Vietnam’s Buddhists and accurately predicted his ouster in two or three months. Furthermore, after South Vietnamese planes attacked Kauk Tek, a Cambodian provincial guard post some five kilometers inside Cambodia, on 19 August, Sihanouk, who was convinced that the attack was a deliberate provocation, broke diplomatic relations with Diem. The same day a signed Sihanouk editorial strongly criticized the United States and other western powers for losing sight of their ideals. “This failure of the ‘free’ world will be heavy with consequences,” Sihanouk predicted in conclusion, “not only for the West but also for us who are wholehearted nationalists and future victims of their monumental errors.”65 The same day China pledged its support for Sihanouk’s proposed international conference. Two days later Sihanouk publicly accepted four additional Soviet MIGs and 24 anti-aircraft guns. The Cambodian-American relationship threatened to deteriorate further when early in September the United States received a Cambodian request asking the Americans to support an appeal to the United Nations for observers to be stationed along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. In a preliminary reaction, the state department (in a note drafted by Arzac) adduced a number of reasons why such a course was inadvisable, including that by implication this would associate the United States with the Cambodian complaints against South Vietnam. The Australians thought the United States was being entirely too negative. What, Australian embassy officials in Washington asked Arzac personally, would be “the long term effect of constant pouring of cold water on Cambodia?”66

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The Australian government concurred, noting that a relatively positive American response to the Cambodian proposal would not seriously affect its relations with South Vietnam. But Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon vigorously objected to the Cambodian proposal, and in the end the United States refused to support it. A little later the Americans successfully pressured the British to shelve a draft aide-memoire on Cambodia’s neutrality proposals, arguing that Sihanouk would probably forget about his own proposals. The Australians thought this a silly argument. “Far from forgetting his proposals, which are now engraved on his heart,” an Australian official wrote, Sihanouk had publicly referred to them in a speech at Kompong Speu on 20 September and during an interview for French television.67 In the same speech he again deplored the “submissive”American attitude toward South Vietnam. The drift toward a serious breach in the U.S.Cambodia relationship was beginning to accelerate. The tragedy was that Sihanouk had no sympathy with communism and no illusions about the result of a communist victory in Southeast Asia. An independent Cambodia would not long survive such an event, he believed, and he welcomed western influence as a necessary counterweight to communism. But his method of resisting communism, he contended with considerable evidence, was superior to that of the west. He had defeated the threat of internal subversion, and Cambodia constituted a much more certain barrier to communist expansion than, say, South Vietnam, where the United States had made major miscalculations and errors over the years, making the triumph of communism more certain. The west seemed to feel that only “blind, brutal and heavy-handed” methods would suffice, he stated.68 In October Sihanouk once again began to accuse his neighbors of supporting Son Ngoc Thanh and charged that American intelligence agencies “have worked, are working, and will always work to replace him by Son Ngoc Thanh or Sam Sary.”69 Indeed, secret Khmer Serei radio broadcasts from Vietnam, after two years of silence, had started up again. The United States vigorously denied any involvement with the dissidents. The United States tried to improve relations with a letter from President Kennedy congratulating Sihanouk on his birthday (31 October), a gesture which had not been done in recent years. But this did not have the desired effect, for on 5 November, in what appeared to be a dramatic shift in his previously expressed view that a western presence in Southeast Asia was needed to balance the communist bloc, Sihanouk in a highly emotional broadcast declared that if Khmer Serei broadcasts were not stopped by the end of the year, he would end all western aid, turn to China for economic and military assistance, and even turn the country into a People’s Republic. Sihanouk gave the “free world” three alternatives: end the Khmer Serei broadcasts; send his enemies Son Ngoc Thanh and Sam Sary back to Cambodia with assurances of physical protection and give them one month to try to rally the populace to their cause (Sihanouk would spend the time abroad while they tried to win the populace to their side, he said); or withdraw free world aid. The fact that the speech was subsequently

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published by the official Cambodian press office indicated that it was to be taken seriously. Among the more plausible explanations for the Prince’s statement was his reaction to the recent overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in neighboring South Vietnam. While Sihanouk deeply disliked and distrusted Diem, he suspected that the Americans were behind his ouster and surmised that they wanted to replace Diem with someone they could more easily control, someone who would pursue the Viet Cong more effectively and vigorously. This, Sihanouk may have reasoned, would end any possibility of neutralizing Vietnam, which the Prince believed was the best solution. He also believed that the CIA might have the same fate in store for him as it had for Diem.70 The American response was restrained. On Cambodian Independence Day (9 November) Kennedy sent a longer and warmer message to the Prince than was customary in which he indicated full American support for Cambodia’s nonalignment policy. Within a few days the Phnom Penh embassy was reporting hopeful signs that moderating influences were already at work on the Prince. Secretary Rusk also was relatively calm but was cautious, as always. He took Sihanouk’s threats more seriously this time and, as it turned out, with good reason. On 12 November Sihanouk stated that it was not just the Khmer Serei which troubled him; American aid, he said, “irritates me and Cambodians of all persuasions more and more.” Should the aid end, he said, it would be an “immense relief to us.” Sihanouk also responded angrily a few days later to President Kennedy’s remarks at a news conference that urged Sihanouk not to surrender the independence of his country. No one needed to give him lessons about devotion to independence, he stated. “I would like to suggest to President Kennedy that he not give lessons to Sihanouk but to Sarit, Chiang Kai-Shek, and South Vietnamese leaders,” he stated, “because they need such lessons; I don’t.” A state department official later observed that Kennedy’s message to Sihanouk on Independence Day “made no impression whatsoever.”71 Sihanouk’s new comments did not immediately change the American approach. Indeed, the day after Australian diplomats stated that conciliatory gestures by the new government in South Vietnam were worth exploring, the state department overruled Lodge and ordered him to urge the new South Vietnamese government to do all it could to stop all Khmer Serei activities including the broadcasts and to make some conciliatory gestures toward Cambodia.72 On the other hand, the same day another state department cable drafted by Arzac did contain a muffled threat. Sihanouk should “consider the implications of in effect threatening establishment of a Chicom base of operations deep behind Free World lines, outflanking Thailand, Laos, and SVN,” the cable read. “It should be clear that any action by Sihanouk tending in this direction would be based on a major miscalculation of the extent to US determination as well as the relevant power factors and ought to be avoided.”73 At times Sihanouk appeared to moderate his position. He told the French that, if the Khmer Serei broadcasts were not resumed (they had ceased on 2 November, just after the coup against Diem), he would not stop American aid,

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and he admitted that he had made a mistake when he proposed bringing Chinese advisers to Cambodia. Furthermore, Princess Rasmi, who had just returned from a successful tour of the United States, had one of her associates tell Sprouse that she was upset with Sihanouk’s speeches and that the Queen was trying to calm the Prince. Consequently, the United States determined not to press the Cambodians to clarify their intentions, and on 17 November Sihanouk sent a cordial response to Kennedy’s letter expressing congratulations on Cambodia’s Independence Day. But conditions quickly deteriorated. Khmer Serei broadcasts resumed on 16 November, and Sihanouk asserted that the Cambodians knew precisely where in South Vietnam the transmitter was located (he even provided specific coordinates). The broadcasts, the Prince said, bothered him so much that he was sick, could not sleep, and would “not have the strength to go on if they do not stop.”74 Rumors also circulated that a coup against Sihanouk was imminent and that the Prince had named one of his sons to take over if he was killed. South Vietnamese army units were put on alert. Sihanouk was clearly addled. “It is clear the situation and the Prince’s frame of mind have again deteriorated,” reported the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh, “presumably as a result [re]sumption of hostile broadcasts.”75 On 19 November, riled by the broadcasts, irritated at continual American denials of involvement with the Khmer Serei, and fearing that he might be assassinated, Sihanouk called a special meeting of the National Assembly where he called for the immediate termination of all American aid. Given the seriousness of the situation, the state department prepared a letter for Kennedy to sign, in which he categorically denied American involvement with the Khmer Serei and offered to send Dean Acheson as his personal representative to Cambodia to discuss problems. But it was not sent since it was overtaken by events. The next day the Cambodians informed the United States that they wanted an end to all American aid. They claimed to have specific proof, provided by a Khmer Serei agent, that “American agents were in fact the direct suppliers of arms, propaganda material and money” to the Khmer Serei. The Australians gently told the Americans that they “had not taken seriously enough Sihanouk’s neutrality proposals,” a statement with which Marshall Green, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, agreed.76 Although Kennedy’s letter was not sent, the President, through Roger Hilsman, told Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny that there was no American involvement with the Khmer Serei. Kennedy may have been sincere. He had to ask Hilsman what the Khmer Serei was. Kennedy administration officials bemoaned the fact that they were paying the price for the Eisenhower administration’s support of Cambodian dissidents. Sprouse had told this to Hilsman, who passed it along to Kennedy. “Is it true?” Kennedy asked. “Yes,” replied Hilsman, “there was money involved. We are paying for it all over Asia. . . . They did things we did not know about.”77 The next day Hilsman discussed the matter with Averell Harriman. Hilsman related to Harriman Nong Kimny’s statement to him that the United States was “paying for the Eisenhower administration and their

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inability to control the agency.” Harriman replied that “they were doing things against Sihanouk. They were doing things that looked suspicious. He said it was crudely handled.”78 Whatever the degree of American involvement with the Khmer Serei in 1963, the Cambodians were not alone in thinking that the United States could have done more to stop the broadcasts. As Sprouse put it in January 1964, the United States had not been willing in the past to mount an all out effort to stop Khmer Serei activities because of the Americans’ “evaluation of comparative US policy interests in the area.”79 Kennedy still hoped that there could be a resolution of the issues dividing the United States and Cambodia. He told Hilsman that in three or four weeks he wanted to send Dean Acheson to Phnom Penh. But Hilsman, fearing a leak, thought it best to wait a couple of days before Kennedy contacted Acheson.80 Two days later, on 22 November, Kennedy was assassinated, and Acheson did not go to Cambodia. Michael Forrestal, who was in Asia when President Kennedy was killed and who wanted to return to Washington, was ordered instead to go to Cambodia. Privately Forrestal concluded that the termination of American aid was not an entirely bad thing. Both civilian and military aid had been “excessively prominent,” he later told Australian diplomats. “Everything said about the deficiencies of our programme there was true.”81 About the only public voice in Washington to applaud the Cambodian decision came from Mike Mansfield who was angry at past American insensitivity to Cambodia and Sihanouk. In an impassioned Senate speech, he argued that the United States should be grateful that Cambodia had made such progress under Sihanouk’s leadership that it no longer needed American assistance.82 In Phnom Penh Forrestal told Sihanouk that both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson had personally looked into the charges of American complicity with the Khmer Serei, and both had concluded that there was none. Perhaps indelicately, Forrestal also told the Prince that the United States had tried very hard to pressure South Vietnam to stop broadcasts by Khmer Serei which seemed to be emanating from Vietnam.83 The Prince was not convinced. He did not believe that the Khmer Serei could operate in Thailand and South Vietnam without, at the very least, American approval. Given Sihanouk’s obsession with the broadcasts, there was no hope of restoring friendly relations with the west until they ended. There was clearly some American support for a vigorous effort to do just that. The time had come to get serious about shutting down the Khmer Serei radio station and persuading the new South Vietnamese government to break all ties with Son Ngoc Thanh. “We must make absolutely clear that this is our policy,” wrote Forrestal.84 The United States did put more pressure on Thailand and especially Vietnam to rein in the Khmer Serei. Forrestal was ordered, via a CIA channel, to go to Saigon and probe the willingness of the generals “to muzzle Son Ngoc Thanh and halt any Khmer Serei activity.”85 In Saigon the generals in charge of the new government asked Forrestal if the United States supported the broadcasts. Told that it did not, Forrestal believed

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that the generals would try to stop the broadcasts if the transmitters were in Vietnam. Sihanouk privately agreed to stop jamming the broadcasts for three days so that the transmitters could be located. This was done, but the transmitters were not in Vietnam; they were, at least for the moment, in Thailand. (Hilsman later told Nong Kimny that the equipment located in Vietnam had been destroyed.) Forrestal then talked to Thai leaders but only succeeded in angering them. The Prime Minister claimed not to know anything about the broadcasts, “but if he were asked, he would strongly recommend that the broadcasts should continue.”86 Having determined that American military aid was not sufficient to safeguard his country’s very survival, Sihanouk revived his neutrality proposal and this time formally asked the co-chairs of the Geneva conference of 1954 (Britain and the USSR) to reconvene the conference with a view to increasing the powers of the International Control Commission to ensure Cambodia’s neutrality.87 This caused much debate in the U.S. government. There was obvious reluctance in the state department to support the Cambodian initiative. Rusk, who easily displayed his irritation at Cambodian charges of American complicity with the Khmer Serei and also at Cambodia’s changing views on how and when American aid ought to be ended, was clearly skeptical of the value of a conference and raised the same issues that had caused the United States to resist a conference in the past. He told the Australian ambassador that the United States was “frankly not keen about the conference.”88 Perhaps, he said to the French ambassador and others (thus sketching out a position that would dominate American discourse in the future), a settlement could be reached by quiet diplomacy, and the conference would be called merely to ratify what had already been agreed upon. But if there was reluctance in the department there was also a feeling, as Daniel Arzac told the Australians, that “we were headed for a conference since it could not be avoided.”89 This troubled some NSC staffers, like Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., who complained to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that the “momentum over at State to go along with a conference is rapidly getting beyond redemption.” Alexander had yet to hear “one sound benefit” to the United States from attending. Bundy agreed.90 Thomas L. Hughes of the state department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research concurred. If the United States attended a conference, he wrote, it would “do so as an accused aggressor.” Even more serious, the conference, even if limited to the neutralization of Cambodia, would “provide a precedent” for neutralizing Vietnam, which was anathema to the United States at the time, despite support for the concept from de Gaulle.91 Such views, along with adamant opposition from the Thais, slowed down the movement toward American attendance at a conference. This was evident when the United States agreed to preliminary trilateral talks with the United Kingdom and France to take place on 12 December – but only to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a conference and not, as was previously envisioned, to begin negotiating draft agreements. “We are not convinced that such a conference

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would actually be in the interest of the Free [World],” the state department cabled to London and Paris.92 The cautious American exploration of a conference might eventually have reduced tensions with Cambodia. But Sihanouk’s reaction to unexpected developments riled the United States and increased tensions. On 7 December Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat of Thailand died. Sihanouk had particularly detested Sarit, and the Prince called for a national celebration on learning of his death. For two weeks civil servants were allowed to come to work two hours later than normal. Averell Harriman called the celebration “barbaric.”93 But what particularly angered the United States was Sihanouk’s reference to the “great boss of the aggressors” who had met the same fate, an obvious reference to Kennedy. Although Sihanouk had made the comment in the Cambodian language to a local audience and it did not appear in the official translation, Assistant Secretary of State George Ball wanted Sprouse to demand a public retraction and an end to the celebrations, saying that otherwise he would leave Cambodia. Rusk was a little more cautious. He feared a break in diplomatic relations and preferred to have Sprouse urgently request a retraction but only to say he would leave Cambodia if the reply was unsatisfactory. In the end the Rusk approach was used, but the protest sent out from the state department was nevertheless strong, twice referring to the “barbaric” statement and celebration, despite Nong Kimny’s plea that the word “barbaric” not be used. (When Sprouse actually made the verbal protest, however, he deliberately omitted the terms “uncivilized and barbaric.”) After the state department had dispatched the protest, the crisis was further exacerbated by a report that on 9 December Sihanouk had delivered a speech in Khmer (which was broadcast the next day) in which he suggested that the deaths of Ngo Dinh Diem, Sarit Thanarat, and John F. Kennedy were the result of divine intervention to save Cambodia. “We had only three enemies, and the leaders of these three countries all died and went to hell, all three, in a period of a month and a half,” he was reported as saying. “They are meeting there in a conference of the Free World’s SEATO.”94 In response to the American protest, the Cambodia government disavowed any intention on its part to associate Kennedy’s death with those of Sarit and Diem. Kennedy, the statement read, “was unanimously respected by all Cambodians.” But Sihanouk was reportedly “incensed” at the America protest. Quite correctly he reminded the Americans that he had declared three days of national mourning when Kennedy was assassinated.95 He now ended negotiations on the modalities of ending American aid and ordered all economic, military, and cultural teams to leave by 15 January 1964. Sihanouk then recalled Ambassador Nong Kimny (who was reported privately distressed at the decision). Indeed, after initially deciding to leave the cultural attaché in charge, Sihanouk decided to close the embassy altogether after he learned that the Americans had used the term “barbaric” when they summoned Nong Kimny in to protest the Cambodian reaction to the deaths of the three leaders. This was, Sihanouk said, “contemptuous and gratuitous.”96 The United States began to reduce its staff in Cambodia

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to a bare minimum, and, after Kimny was recalled, Ambassador Sprouse was ordered to return to Washington. The United States was ready to close down and wait for better days. To see if anything could be salvaged, the United States again considered sending Acheson to speak informally with Sihanouk. Sihanouk said he would welcome Acheson but only if the United States apologized for his “barbaric” comment made to Nong Kimny, withdrew its request for clarification of Sihanouk’s comments about rejoicing in Kennedy’s death, and shut down the Khmer Serei transmitters. These were conditions the United States would not accept, and the visit did not take place. The Prince’s comments also ended any hope of American participation in Sihanouk’s proposed conference any time soon, despite the fact that France and Britain wanted to go ahead.97 At the end of the year Roger Hilsman, interviewed on the CBS program “Face the Nation,” stated that the United States would “make no commitments that would jeopardize its relationship with its allies.” There were a number of ways besides an international conference, he added, to assure Cambodian neutrality.98 Later, in justifying his decision to terminate American aid, Sihanouk recalled all of his problems with the Americans in the 1950s and early 1960s: American support for various Cambodian opposition movements; the failure of the United States to prevent raids by South Vietnamese forces into Cambodia; the American refusal to allow him to use American equipment to repulse the Vietnamese and Thai incursions; the huge amounts of aid given to Laos, when compared with what was given to Cambodia; the interminable time it took to get four “avions à réaction” (and then they came incompletely equipped); and in general the humiliating way he felt Cambodia had been treated. Although diplomatic relations were not broken, the Cambodian-American relationship lay in tatters. For the next seventeen months, until relations were severed in May 1965, “dealings between the two countries became a dialogue of the deaf.”99

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6

A casualty of war The break in relations

We have consistently underestimated Sihanouk’s astuteness and ability and overrated his naivete and instability. In my judgment he and his principal advisors are exceptionably able and are playing their cards totally in terms of Cambodia’s independent survival and other interests. Mike Mansfield to Lyndon Johnson

Both the United States and Cambodia held out some hope that the breach could be repaired. Despite the fact that both ambassadors had been recalled, each country allowed its ambassador to remain for several weeks. The Cambodians wanted the United States to withdraw its “barbaric” comment and stop the Khmer Serei broadcasts. A positive response to Sihanouk’s proposal for a neutrality conference would also have done much to restore the relationship. The Americans for their part hoped that the Cambodians would accept their contention that they were not involved with the Khmer Serei and had attempted to influence the Vietnamese and the Thais to stop the broadcasts. They also thought that the cost of ending American aid would begin to sink in and that the armed forces and other internal Cambodian influences might moderate Sihanouk’s position. The visit early in January of the French Minister of Armed Forces, Pierre Messmer, did much to calm Sihanouk. Messmer offered arms and economic aid and reopened a friendly western channel to the Prince. Soon thereafter both sides accepted Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal’s good offices to try and arrange a settlement. Considerable effort went into the attempt, but after some initial optimism the effort came to naught. As Sihanouk said in a news conference at Siem Reap on 11 February, “there were too many ‘things’ between USA and Cambodia” to be optimistic about the mediation’s success.1 Cambodian assertions that the United States was collaborating with Thailand, South Vietnam, and Son Ngoc Thanh to destabilize the country constituted a particularly important irritant in the relationship. In February Cambodia accused the United States of helping the Khmer Serei form commando units to infiltrate Cambodia.2 The charges were accurate. John Shaw, Time magazine’s Hong Kong correspondent, who had managed to arrange a special interview

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with Son Ngoc Thanh, reported that about half of the 1,000 Khmer Serei troops served in the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) that were funded by the CIA and led by American and Vietnamese Special Forces teams. They operated along the Cambodian border, Shaw wrote. The other 500 Khmer Serei operated independently.3 At about the same time Military Assistance Command, Vietnam ( MACV, which had replaced the MAAG-Vietnam) conducted its own investigation and identified even more Khmer Serei forces than the journalist. Of the 1,677 soldiers of Cambodian descent in “strike force companies,” about 1,000 were believed to be Khmer Serei. These forces were trained by American personnel who were said to be unaware of their political affiliation. The investigation discovered other Khmer Serei units operating near Loc Ninh. A little later the state department stated that it remained “concerned that Khmer Serei personnel who have been trained in US sponsored or GVN [Government of Vietnam] camps might engage in activities inimical to resolution of Cambodian-GVN differences.”4 In sum, there is little doubt that Khmer Serei forces were integrated into the CIDG units which the United States funded, trained, and commanded. Sihanouk’s charges that the Khmer Serei served with the American Special Forces was entirely accurate. Equally, if not more, damaging were allegations that the United States had sanctioned military raids on Cambodian border villages. Sihanouk was infuriated when on 5 February 1964 South Vietnamese aircraft attacked the village of Mong (or Muong), two kilometers inside Cambodia, killing five and wounding six. He accused the South Vietnamese, with American support, of trying to provoke war. If the attacks continued, he stated, he might have to end his policy of neutrality and gain the protection of “certain large friendly countries.”5 In his response Johnson deplored the loss of life but rejected Sihanouk’s implications of American responsibility and suggested that talks be resumed with South Vietnam. Both the Australians and Canadians feared for the future of Southeast Asia if relations between the United States and Cambodia continued to deteriorate. They felt that Sihanouk was genuinely desperate and might well decide to turn to China. Therefore, in spite of Sihanouk’s irritating behavior, they thought it was essential to find some agreement. The Americans, however, thought Sihanouk was bluffing and that in any event China would not provide the assistance Sihanouk sought. Contributing to Sihanouk’s annoyance with the United States was the American reaction to his renewed interest in an international conference to guarantee his country’s neutrality and borders. In December, prior to Sihanouk’s remarks about Kennedy’s death, Rusk had been inclined, if reluctantly, to attend a conference. But Sihanouk’s comments on Kennedy, along with strong opposition from some sectors of the administration, as well as from the Thais and Vietnamese, caused the secretary to back off. The American position was that the issues should be resolved diplomatically, in full consultation with the Thais and South Vietnamese, and that a conference, if held at all, would only ratify agreements already reached.

A casualty of war: the break in relations 109 This ultimately required a very unilateralist approach, however, since the British and the French wanted a conference. By January 1964 the British were ready to present to the Cambodians a draft statement that all of the parties at the international conference would sign respecting the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Among other things it called for a strengthened ICC. Sihanouk accepted their draft proposals for consideration at the conference, and announced that he expected American acceptance soon. But the Americans refused to be stampeded (as they saw it). They would attend a conference, they said, only if all parties had agreed to a text in advance of the meeting. Instead the Americans wanted the British to inform the Soviet Union about Cambodia’s acceptance of their proposal, expecting that the USSR would reject the British proposal.6 Ultimately the tactic worked. The British under pressure from the Americans adopted the position that the parties should agree to their draft ahead of time, while the Russians were willing only to discuss the British draft at the conference. In the end, this difference stymied the calling of a conference, to the relief of the Americans. Sihanouk then moved quite close to the American position when he offered to negotiate a quadripartite agreement with the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam, setting a deadline of the end of March. The Americans considered this a positive sign – “interesting and deserving of thoughtful consideration” – and planned to send a high level delegation to Southeast Asia to discuss the matter. American officials in Phnom Penh thought that if the United States and its Southeast Asian allies failed to accept his offer, Sihanouk would turn to communist countries for protection.7 Consequently the United States urged Thailand and South Vietnam to state immediately their intention to attend a quadripartite conference; South Vietnam quickly complied. On 5 March Sihanouk stated that each participant in the proposed conference could bring its own text (Sihanouk had already circulated his). The United States again urged Thailand to attend, even if the conference were held in Phnom Penh. In the meantime the Americans, noting Sihanouk’s statement about the participants bringing their own draft proposals to the conference, submitted their own draft which, in the words of an Australian analysis, was “rather derogatory in tone” and by using mixed boundary commissions to determine border questions “appeared to ignore the various treaties” concerning the border.8 This proved to be a mistake, for the American draft incensed Sihanouk. Sihanouk called it an “immense deception,” a rejection of his own draft. Nong Kimny later explained that because the American draft did not accept the international treaties that defined Cambodia’s boundaries and had used the word to “delimit” the borders, it was interpreted to mean that the present borders would be changed. This had upset the Cambodians “beyond belief.” If the United States insisted on retaining its draft, there would be no point in having the conference, the Prince stated. Instead he would have to negotiate agreements with the Pathet Lao and Hanoi.9 As Australian officials in Washington put it, “the United States’ drafts were never intended to be a ‘bombshell’ although they apparently had the effect of a bombshell upon the highly emotional Sihanouk.”10

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The Americans later admitted that it would have been better to have simply gone to the conference.11 This was surely a correct assessment, for a day after the Cambodians rejected the American draft, a large mob, most likely organized by the Ministry of Information on Sihanouk’s instruction and led in part by the leftist former Minister of Information (and current Minister of Agriculture) Chau Seng, stormed the American embassy. Demonstrators threw rocks and bricks (brought in for that purpose) at the embassy, broke windows, tore down and burned the American flag, broke into the embassy building itself and wrecked the first floor. The mob, urged on by speakers, trumpets, drums and a youth band playing stirring music, also stormed the nearby United States Information Services library, wrecking the interior and burning books. They inflicted similar damage on the British embassy and other British offices. An Australian Landrover, parked at the British embassy, was also destroyed. The damage to American property was estimated at $160,000.12 Some, including Donald Lancaster, Sihanouk’s English language secretary at the time, have asserted that Sihanouk himself gave the order to trash the buildings. However, Ambassador Deschamps, who knew Sihanouk better than any western diplomat, believed the Prince was shocked by the damage. “He was furious that there was actual damage done and that they had actually broken into the [embassies],” Deschamps recalled. “. . . He did not authorize the trashing of the embassies. No way, no way. That’s not the way he does things.”13 In any event Sihanouk promptly apologized and agreed to pay for the damage, and he now saw no reason to break relations with the United States, even if no Geneva conference was called. However, he said he would soon send a delegation to Hanoi to seek an agreement on borders; a similar mission would discuss boundaries with the Pathet Lao. Three days after the demonstration Nong Kimny finally left the United States after again apologizing to Harriman for the violence. The next day someone threw several rotten eggs at Kimny’s residence.14 Recognizing that Sihanouk had in fact moved close to the American position of bilateral diplomacy, the United States had made a good faith effort to respond positively to Sihanouk’s proposed quadrilateral conference. But in the end the Americans could not convince Sihanouk that they seriously wanted a solution that would preserve his territorial integrity in the face of challenges from his regional enemies who were America’s allies. Although the quadripartite conference did not take place, in a sense the United States won the larger diplomatic game because the Geneva conference it did not want was not held. But its “victory” was at considerable cost in its relations with Sihanouk. French Foreign Office officials thought the Americans had brought this unfortunate situation on themselves by being entirely too rigid.15 But the Americans believed that nothing they could reasonably have done would have improved the relationship. Sihanouk’s actions, they believed, resulted from his conviction that China’s strength was growing and that the National Liberation Front ( NLF ) would prevail in Vietnam. Consequently, they concluded, he had decided he must cut the best deal with them that he could. Offers of reasonable American concessions, therefore, would be futile. There was, in sum, little the United

A casualty of war: the break in relations 111 States could do to influence events. It could only keep a low profile and be patient – or so American officials believed. But the American position was also heavily influenced by the perceived need to remain on good terms with Sihanouk’s disruptive neighbors. And faced with a choice, there was little question as to whom the United States would support. Relations with Thailand and South Vietnam were deemed to be “far too important to be jeopardized by concessions to Sihanouk which, even if they should prove acceptable, are unlikely [to] purchase any lasting benefit as long as he is convinced of forthcoming victory communist forces in SEA.”16 The Australian ambassador in Phnom Penh caught the American perspective well. In a personal note to a colleague about “the complete bankruptcy of American policy in Cambodia,” he asserted that the Americans had never considered Cambodia or its problems important. Rather, they always viewed the country as part of some larger issue. Even the current American chargé, Herbert Spivack, regularly reminded his staff that in the larger framework of American objectives Cambodia was unimportant. “If the man on the spot thinks so,” Deschamps wrote, “the attitude of the State Department becomes more comprehensible.”17 Deschamps’ insight was entirely accurate. As Roger Hilsman put it in a telegram to Henry Cabot Lodge, “our fundamental objective is to cope with problem of Cambodia in such a way as to meet security interests of Free World in Southeast Asia.”18 Even as the parties were adjusting to the new situation and trying to determine what to do next, on 19 March – only nine days after the violent demonstrations at the embassies – aircraft from South Vietnam attacked the Cambodian village of Chantrea. The attack lasted over two hours. Seventeen Cambodians died, and at least thirteen more were wounded. South Vietnamese troops on the ground with American advisers also participated. In an unusual move, the ICC commissioners went immediately to the scene (almost becoming casualties themselves when their helicopter crash landed). The Canadian commissioner described the chilling devastation: We first saw fresh traces of numerous track vehicles (reported to have been twelve) which had obviously just gone through village. We saw at least twenty of reported 40 killed bulls and buffaloes; some were still dying. We were being prepared slowly to see on actual spot where they had just died thirteen villagers including pregnant women and children. Death was so recent blood had not rpt not yet dried. Some had died from bullet wounds others from shells and three at least had been run over by very heavy vehicles. [Cambodians claimed that wounded people had been deliberately run over.] Later in hospital we saw two children who had died half hour earlier as result of burns when incendiary bombs had completely destroyed their huts. In fact cinders were still smoldering when we looked at site of huts and picked up pieces of napalm bombs which French M[ilitary] A[ttaché] identified. We found tank caps which read twenty USA gallons. We saw numerous bullet holes and later spent cartridges with inscription 20mm Nessco which French M[ilitary] A[ttaché] said were used on Sky Raiders

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A casualty of war: the break in relations planes which SVN army uses. . . . [Back in Svay Rieng] we saw 14 wounded two of whom were children reaching delirious stage. . . . Violence of attack has shocked Cambodians and I admit Commissioners who saw results.19

The American military attaché, who went to Chantrea the next day, confirmed the devastation and reported that Americans had been seen in the armored personnel carriers (M-113s) and that one American reportedly piloted a plane that was shot down and landed in South Vietnam. The report was true. The plane (a Vietnamese L-19) was shot down by Cambodian planes ( T-28s supplied by the United States), probably over South Vietnam. The Vietnamese observer was killed and the American pilot seriously wounded. Michael Forrestal informed President Lyndon Johnson that American personnel had penetrated Cambodian territory, allegedly because they were, in the language of official military doubletalk, “deficient in determination of their geographical position.”20 Henry Cabot Lodge was cold and unsympathetic, blaming the incident on Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory.21 South Vietnam nevertheless immediately apologized for the incident. Johnson was also inclined to apologize but was persuaded that to do so would play into Sihanouk’s long standing contention that the United States controlled South Vietnam.22 The seriousness of the Chantrea attack led some to question if the raid had deliberate political implications. It occurred just as a high level team from Saigon, led by General Cao Van Vien, was arriving in Phnom Penh to conduct negotiations. Deschamps reported that the “synchronization of action with the arrival of General Cao’s mission to Cambodia is incomprehensible, unless it was a deliberate attempt to sabotage negotiations.” Cao Van Vien himself said that he had “been stabbed in the back.” Adding to suspicions, the initial American military report of the incident was incomplete and evasive. The French foreign office believed that such border raids “were probably deliberately planned at some level of GVN.”23 Although none of this proves that the Chantrea attack was deliberately intended to sabotage prospective negotiations, it would not be the last time that a major border incident interfered with efforts to improve relations. Whether deliberate or not, the incident illustrated the unimportance of Cambodia to the Johnson administration. American policy toward Cambodia, wrote Deschamps, was characterized by “unimaginativeness, rigidity, indifference and plain stupidity. How, otherwise,” he wrote, “in the present tense and potentially dangerous situation, could American officers have been involved in the worst and most blatant and inexcusable Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia on record?”24 Some Americans shared Deschamps’ perspective. Even Rusk pointed out that current restrictions on military actions near the Cambodian border had been violated in several respects. But Lodge and the military wanted to reduce the restrictions, and Maxwell Taylor refused to ask General Paul Harkins, the commander of American military forces in Vietnam, what steps were being taken to prevent a similar incident in the future. Forrestal said that directives from

A casualty of war: the break in relations 113 Washington had no effect in the field anyway. “If there is to be an effect,” he wrote, “some sort of action has to be taken to bring home to the officers involved that this kind of mistake could affect their careers.”25 In the administration’s view, Cambodian considerations took second place. There was understandable concern that the situation in Phnom Penh could turn violently against the Americans and the British. But fortunately for the United States, Sihanouk’s venture to strike a bargain with North Vietnam on border guarantees went sour at precisely this time, and Lon Nol had little success in getting military equipment from China. Sihanouk accused the North Vietnamese of acting just like the Thais.26 Consequently the danger of a complete break with the United States faded. For the time being Sihanouk decided not to pursue either the quadripartite meeting or the Geneva conference and ignored previously issued ultimatums. He would now, he said, devote himself to his family and internal matters and visit France.27 The immediate crisis had passed. Sihanouk’s various gambles had failed, and the Prince was prepared for the time being to watch and wait. That Sihanouk had for the moment given up on the Geneva conference and was temporarily focusing on domestic matters did not mean the tension between the two countries had ended, however. On the contrary, as Deschamps reported, “any incidents could precipitate a crisis.” In May, in fact, Spivack reported that Sihanouk’s anti-American campaign was not “ebbing in any way. Accusations are becoming even more virulent,” he wrote. Indicative of Sihanouk’s attitude toward the United States was his letter to Time magazine in response to a story critical of him. The article, he said, had implied that he was mad. On the contrary, the Prince retorted, American policy in Asia was insane. “Wherever you go,” Sihanouk concluded, “you spread war, revolution and misery.”28 To mention two of the many irritations in the next few months, in May 1964 Sihanouk accused the United States of sabotaging road machinery that Cambodia had purchased to repair the Khmer-American Friendship Highway and charged that an American scientific expedition searching for the rare wild cattle, the Kouprey, had killed the animals and ravaged the forests.29 Particularly dangerous were the continuing border incidents in which American personnel were often present. Among the more serious (also in May) were those at Taey and Thlork, which involved several deaths. ( Whether the American or Americans present in these cases actually crossed the border was a matter of dispute.) One thousand people demonstrated in the streets of Phnom Penh; Cambodia characterized the incidents as “acts of war” and made a formal complaint against the United States and South Vietnam to the Security Council.30 The United States, for its part, began to charge that the Viet Cong not only used Cambodia as a base but that Cambodian armed forces cooperated with the Viet Cong, and the military again pressed to have restrictions on border operations lifted.31 Late in July Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh after several weeks in France for rest and medical care. He was relaxed, jovial, and in good humor and went out of his way to be friendly to the American chargé. The very next day, reports

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arrived that 77 villagers (a number later raised to 107) in Ratanakiri province had died from “yellow powder” dropped, it was said, by South Vietnamese planes. (A similar incident occurred in Svay Rieng province shortly thereafter.) Both the United States and South Vietnam denied any involvement in the incident, stating that no herbicide operations had crossed the border and that in any case herbicides did not form powder under any circumstances. (The United States also noted that the herbicides used in Vietnam were “completely harmless to humans.”) This incident immediately returned relations to their previous hostile state, as Sihanouk soon accused the Americans of responsibility for the deaths. The American embassy noted “a torrent of invective” emanating from Cambodia.32 In late August and early September another important series of border incidents occurred, in which South Vietnamese planes strafed the village of Koh Rokor and Cambodian boats on the Mekong River; ground troops also attacked. These raids, along with renewed reports of chemical attacks and the first American bombing of North Vietnam in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, deeply angered Sihanouk. After the United States protested about Sihanouk’s anti-American remarks, the Cambodian government suggested that Spivack be recalled. Sihanouk then refused to accept the credentials of Ambassador-designate Randolph A. Kidder. Rusk ordered Kidder, who was already in Cambodia, to leave Phnom Penh. He never returned.33 In October yet another major border incident occurred, this time at Anlong Kres in Kompong Cham province, which was attacked twice: on 20 October and 24 October. Fire from South Vietnamese aircraft killed eight villagers (including two women and four children).34 In another incident the Cambodians shot down a C-123 American transport plane over Dak Dam. Eight crew members died. The Cambodians removed the wrecked plane to Phnom Penh where they put it on display. By the end of the month there had been at least eight cross border raids, for which an angry Cambodian government held the United States jointly responsible with South Vietnam. Sihanouk threatened to break relations with the United States and recognize North Vietnam and the NLF if any more violations of Cambodian territory occurred; the United States quietly evacuated more dependents from Cambodia.35 With relations fast approaching a crisis once again, the Americans had the French convey American assurances to Sihanouk that the United States was determined to respect Cambodian neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence; that it had taken measures to try and prevent future border incidents; and that it hoped Sihanouk would refrain from any provocative actions on Cambodian Independence Day (9 November).36 It is not clear whether this initiative made much difference, although it may have contributed to Sihanouk’s relatively restrained rhetoric during the celebrations. By this point Alf Bergesen, the new American chargé in Phnom Penh, who, in the opinion of one Australian official, was “much more helpful and cooperative than Spivack,”37 had become convinced that American policy was becoming counterproductive. Detecting a “distinct hardening” in American policy since

A casualty of war: the break in relations 115 the C-123 incident, Bergesen wrote to Thomas J. Hirschfield, the state department’s officer in charge of Cambodian affairs, that “after 12 years of trying, American policy in Cambodia has failed.” Sihanouk was “simply sui generis, a fact which we are apparently unable to accept. For this reason many of our finest and most polished three cushion shots wind up on the floor as far as achieving the effect here that was sought.” Anything resembling a threat must be avoided, Bergesen advised, for they were only counterproductive. As for the border area, he wrote, “the question remains whether the presence of American advisers in the frontier areas is worth the cost, and I have yet to see any evidence that it is.”38 Whether Bergesen’s letter had any direct impact on American policy is not clear, but shortly after he wrote it Rusk asked the French if they thought a discreet meeting of American and Cambodian representatives would be fruitful. Rusk probably intended his comments to be a gesture only. But the Cambodians unexpectedly accepted the American offer with “surprising swiftness” and suggested New Delhi as the venue. In explaining his decision, Sihanouk said he was moved by the plight of the victims of the Anlong Kres attack and did not want to take actions that might increase the cross border attacks, particularly since there was now a lull in border action. The imaginative (if not necessarily sincere) American gesture for talks may have thwarted a left wing bid within Cambodia to break relations, a bid which had come very close to success.39 The proposal for talks in New Delhi was the one constructive effort made to confront the issues during this entire period. The most likely candidate to head the American delegation was the respected Averell Harriman, since the Cambodians had appointed Son Sann who, next to Sihanouk, was the most influential Cambodian politician. But the state department decided (over objections from Bergesen in Phnom Penh who wanted someone of higher rank) to appoint veteran diplomat Philip Bonsal, thus indicating that the administration’s level of interest in an agreement was none too serious. Bonsal did not have the authority to conclude an agreement on his own authority. The Cambodians hoped to end the attacks on Cambodian villages, stop accusations that Cambodia harbored the Viet Cong, and get South Vietnam to withdraw claims to certain coastal islands. Secondary concerns included indemnities for those killed or injured in the border raids, ending the Khmer Serei broadcasts, and freeing Cambodians whom the South Vietnamese had arrested. From Phnom Penh, Bergesen weighed in with two lengthy dispatches explaining the Cambodian perspective and making suggestions on how something positive might emerge from the talks.40 He suggested keeping all American aircraft away from the border regions and preventing American advisers from going into Cambodia, while at the same time reassuring the Cambodian government that the United States respected “Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity” and had no intention of interfering in Cambodia’s internal affairs. Bergesen also urged that charges of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory not be made unless there was “convincing proof.” To date, the Cambodians had successfully refuted most such allegations, so there was no point in reiterating general, unsubstantiated

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charges. He also opined that Khmer Serei operations were detrimental to American interests. As for the ICC, Bergesen could only suggest that the United States point out to the Cambodians with facts and figures that expanding it was not practical. American expectations from the talks were modest. Bergesen hoped that they might result in a restoration of normal diplomatic relations, with Ambassador Kidder returning to Phnom Penh and the Cambodian embassy in Washington being reopened. Possibly also the United States might be able to get an understanding with the Cambodians to tone down the rhetoric in the press and not publish obviously false stories (such as, he thought, the “yellow powder” allegations). The administration’s aims were largely negative. The talks might have some value in convincing Cambodia that the Viet Cong were not going to take over South Vietnam and that it would be more difficult to restrain South Vietnam if Cambodia recognized the Viet Cong.41 On the other hand, some influential Americans who followed Cambodian developments thought the talks might produce a significant agreement, if only the United States would take Cambodia seriously. Senator Mansfield wrote the President an eloquent memorandum (which the President read) recommending keeping American forces clear of the border and using American influence to insist that the South Vietnamese “abstain from exacerbating these border difficulties.” There could easily be a ten to fifteen mile pull-back zone along those portions of the boundary where it was not well defined, he stated. He also gave Johnson his unsolicited opinion about Sihanouk, which was very contrary to the accepted wisdom: “We have consistently underestimated Sihanouk’s astuteness and ability and overrated his naivete and instability,” he told the President. “In my judgment,” he continued, “he and his principal advisors are exceptionably able and are playing their cards totally in terms of Cambodia’s independent survival and other interests.”42 But Mansfield’s advice had little impact. Cambodia’s demands only irritated Dean Rusk, who told a high ranking Australian official that Sihanouk’s mind was “poisoned against the United States” because he thought the Americans wanted a wider war in Southeast Asia (which, as it turned out, was an accurate projection).43 The New Delhi talks began 8 December 1964. Border control and the Viet Cong’s use of Cambodian territory were discussed, though without resolution. Interestingly, the so-called secondary questions, including compensation for border incidents, ending the Khmer Serei broadcasts and the like, produced more emotion than the more important issues. The Cambodians demanded compensation for the victims of border raids (they suggested that bulldozers be provided, for example) while at the same time demanding that they not pay compensation to the United States for the damages the American embassy sustained in the March demonstration, even though Sihanouk had earlier promised to pay. Little progress was made. Then on 14 December the Cambodian delegation proposed a specific agreement. The United States would take measures to stop violation of the borders,

A casualty of war: the break in relations 117 would no longer accuse Cambodia of permitting the Viet Cong to use Cambodian territory, would intervene with “the responsible authorities” to end the Khmer Serei broadcasts, would voluntarily provide Cambodia with 100 bulldozers or similar equipment, and would repair the Khmer-American Friendship Highway (which, much to the embarrassment of Washington, had deteriorated almost from the moment it was finished in 1959). Cambodia, in turn, would agree not to allow Viet Cong troops on its territory; would permit the ICC to control all cities, ports, and frontiers (with the United States paying the tab); would no longer insist on compensation for the victims of border attacks (the United States would in return drop its claims for damages to its embassy caused by the demonstration the previous March); and diplomatic relations would be restored at the chargé d’affaires level. In making this proposal the Cambodians had made some concessions. But the Cambodian proposal remained unacceptable to the United States.44 Further discussion (at times acrimonious) the following day resulted in some progress. But Washington, which had already ordered Bonsal to try and adjourn the talks indefinitely on the grounds that the Cambodian proposals needed more study (the order arriving after the talks on compromise were already under way), objected to the compromise language adopted about frontier violations, the Viet Cong in Cambodia, expansion of the ICC, and the sending of a new Cambodian diplomatic representative to Washington. Despite Bonsal’s objections, the state department again ordered him to adjourn the talks. Indeed the state department was irritated at his efforts to try to reach a compromise agreement and was relieved when it appeared that Sihanouk, too, in some very negative public comments, appeared to disown the proposed compromise.45 Despite Sihanouk’s provocative comments, which were likely only a tactic to pressure the Americans,46 the Cambodian delegates anticipated reaching an agreement, and they were therefore astonished when Bonsal, on instructions, adjourned the talks. The talks had succeeded in preventing a break in diplomatic relations, permitted an exploration of issues, allowed Sihanouk to “get out of the corner into which he had been cleverly maneuvered by [the] left wing,” and served Sihanouk’s purpose by demonstrating to China and Hanoi that he had options.47 But none of the issues were resolved. In the end the two sides could not even agree on a joint communiqué, as each side issued its own final statement to the press. At a personal level, however, the talks did not end in acrimony as both sides jointly hosted a dinner honoring their Indian hosts. There was certainly some blame on both sides for the inability to reach any agreements. Sihanouk’s statements on 14 December were provocative, and his efforts to undertake simultaneous negotiations with the Chinese and North Vietnamese irritated the Americans. But the Johnson administration bears considerable responsibility for the talks’ failure. Although the Americans had first suggested the talks, they did not anticipate that Sihanouk would respond positively to them. When he did, the Americans did not appoint a diplomat with the authority to arrive at a settlement and then forbade Bonsal from concluding a compromise settlement when one was possible. Indeed the American delegation

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felt, as NSC official James C. Thomson, Jr. told Harriman in 1966, “that they came within a day or so of success but were undercut by Washington.”48 American officials feared that the collapse of the talks might result in violent demonstrations at the American embassy or perhaps in a diplomatic break. Relations were so poor that, at about this time, when the Polish representative on the ICC was gravely injured in an automobile accident near the Phnom Penh airport, local people at first refused to assist him, thinking he was an American. By the end of the year the U.S. presence in Cambodia numbered only 12 individuals,49 down from over 300 a year earlier. In the next few weeks there were some efforts to find a way to resume discussions. The NSC wanted the state department to urge South Vietnam to take action on some of Cambodia’s lesser grievances, while the military was being pressed to avoid any border incidents. Sihanouk too hinted that he wanted to improve relations, and Son Sann made at least two efforts to get talks going. The first, on 24 December 1964, did not get off the ground because of another border incident at the Cambodian village of Scatum.50 However, on 6 January an associate of Son Sann met an American diplomat in a secret meeting (Cambodian officials were then forbidden to socialize with Americans) and told him that he wanted to resume the Delhi talks. An exchange of letters on certain points could get the meeting resumed, he thought.51 A week later Sihanouk instructed Nong Kimny in New Delhi to propose confidential talks with Ambassador Bowles. Circumstances were such at this point that there might have been a chance to improve the relationship. Sihanouk had failed to get the guarantees he sought from China, and the NLF and Hanoi would not agree to endorse Sihanouk’s borders. Deschamps, who believed there was an opening, put forward a five point proposal for American consideration. But the administration continued to display its disinterest in serious discussions. The state department did urge Bowles to keep open the channel to Nong Kimny to see what might result, but the department’s instructions were on the whole quite negative, pointing to Sihanouk’s plan to host an Indochinese People’s Conference of communist, leftist, nationalist, and neutralist organizations. As the Australian embassy in Washington put it, the Americans seemed to want “to keep pipelines open to Cambodia” but did not have “anything to pump through them.” On 6 January 1965 National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy sent to the President a copy of a letter that Sihanouk had written to the International Herald Tribune, in which the Prince accused Americans of engaging in “hostile threats, aggressions, sabotage, subversions, plots and attempted coup d’etats for secession.” The letter demonstrated “the problem of dealing with Sihanouk,” Bundy told Johnson. While he thought it inadvisable to get into “a slanging match” with the Prince, Bundy offered little to placate him.52 The administration soon found numerous problems with Deschamps’ proposals as well.53 A very basic problem facing those who wanted to improve relations with Cambodia was that at this very moment the United States was in the process of choosing war in Vietnam, and the idea of improving relations with Cambodia was increasingly a very secondary concern. There were, therefore, almost no

A casualty of war: the break in relations 119 significant steps in the first months of 1965 to improve the relationship. Sihanouk continued to criticize the United States, often in angry tones, for any number of lapses: for providing aid with strings, for criticizing his non-aligned posture, for allowing American journals to publish unflattering stories about him and Cambodia, and for the new sustained bombing of North Vietnam. In February Sihanouk told an Indian journalist that the United States “was today hated more than the French were in the worst phase of the colonial war.”54 Continuing cross border raids were particularly dangerous to the U.S.Cambodia relationship. In January Son Sann had pleaded with the United States to avoid any border incidents. If one Cambodian were killed, it was likely that Sihanouk would break relations with the Americans, he said. But the incidents did not stop, and there was another report that “yellow powder” had been dropped in Kompong Cham Province. In mid-February 1965, after an upsurge in incursions, Sihanouk warned that he would declare war against the United States and South Vietnam if any more bombing of Cambodian villages took place; he would appeal to China for support, he said. Sihanouk’s threat made no difference. The very next week there were thirteen minor incidents, and a U.S. helicopter also landed briefly inside Cambodia.55 In Phnom Penh Bergesen continued to argue that the cross border raids, as well as continued Khmer Serei operations, were counterproductive. He believed that the Prince was “unquestionably the most effective Khmer leader,” despite his erratic behavior and anti-American outbursts, and that Cambodia had prospered under his leadership. Therefore the United States should try to “keep the wild men in Bangkok and Saigon from getting out of control and attempting to ‘liberate’ Cambodia. We do not believe that in the long run the best interests of the Free World would be served by an attempt to unseat him.”56 Such advice was not heeded. Every week there were more reports of raids on Cambodian villages. After an attack on Kompong Trach, a village in Kampot province, Sihanouk issued what he said was his final warning. “I launch a last and solemn notice to imperialist Americans in warning them for the last time, that my country will break diplomatic relations with the U.S. upon next attack upon a Cambodian life,” he stated on 26 March.57 But the attacks did not let up. On 3 April 1965 ARVN (South Vietnamese) forces reportedly killed a Cambodian in Bavet, Svay Rieng province. On 11 April they attacked another village in Takeo, seriously wounding one person. In addition there were reports of aircraft from Thailand spreading poisonous chemicals near Pailin. Bergesen once again warned his government of the consequences of continued incidents and suggested some assurances be passed to the Cambodian government detailing measures which the United States was taking to minimize the border incidents.58 If there was no progress on resolving these matters, there was some movement on Sihanouk’s long demand for a Geneva conference on Cambodia. A new call for a conference emerged from Sihanouk’s Conference of Indochinese People which met from 1 to 9 March 1965. Sihanouk had hoped that the conference would help find a way to limit the fighting in the region and secure long sought

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guarantees for his country’s neutrality and territorial integrity. But since the North Vietnamese, the NLF and perhaps China were then uninterested in negotiating a settlement in Vietnam short of a total American withdrawal, the conference failed to call for a new Geneva conference to settle that war or in other more limited ways to move toward peace in Vietnam. This was a disappointment to Sihanouk who found the communist delegations hard and rigid. At heart the Prince, despite his vigorous anti-Americanism, feared the consequences of a total North Vietnamese victory. As far as Cambodia was concerned, Sihanouk told reporters, North Vietnamese communism was the worst kind, “worse than [the] Chinese or Russian” varieties.59 The Americans gloated over the conference’s apparent failure. Was this not a “salutary lesson for Sih[anouk]?” Bergesen told American diplomats gathered in the Philippines. However, the conference did support another of Sihanouk’s goals: the calling of a new Geneva conference to deal with Cambodia.60 Bergesen initially thought the renewed call for a conference had “less steam behind it than was the case several times in the past.” But on 3 April the Soviet Union endorsed the idea, and the British soon agreed in principle. In a perhaps related development, Son Sann again appealed to the Americans through the Filipino Ambassador, Manuel de la Rosa, to resume negotiations “à la New Delhi.”61 However the state department, which did not like to work through the Filipinos in any case, was not interested in Son Sann’s approach. The serious possibility that a new Geneva conference on Cambodia would be called deeply divided the American diplomatic community. From the American embassies in Saigon and Bangkok came the usual dire warnings that American participation would be seen as a sign of weakness. In Phnom Penh, on the other hand, Bergesen cautiously thought that a favorable American response “would probably help” U.S.-Cambodian relations.62 In Washington William Bundy twice presented a negative recommendation to Rusk, but Ball and Harriman weighed in on the other side, and in the end the secretary seemed inclined to give the conference his blessing. Particularly important in this respect was President Johnson’s televised address on 7 April at Johns Hopkins University in which he had offered to engage in “unconditional discussions” on Vietnam. Could the United States now refuse to discuss the less difficult Cambodian situation? A conference might, as the British hoped, also allow the communists a face-saving way “through corridor talks” to respond to Johnson’s offer on Vietnam. It also provided a face-saving way of excluding the NLF, which had not been a participant at the Geneva conference of 1954.63 Still, as in the past the United States hoped that agreement on the major issues could be reached informally ahead of time; the conference itself would be only ceremonial. As it happened, the British government was then just about to send Patrick Gordon Walker to Southeast Asia to explore whether a conference on Cambodia or Laos might be a way to open talks on Vietnam. The United States suggested that his mission be altered to include soundings of interested states to see if understandings could be reached about Cambodia’s “border difficulties.”64

A casualty of war: the break in relations 121 Even this suggestion elicited criticism from Ambassador Martin in Bangkok who found the idea of Gordon Walker speaking to the Thais about the boundary positively dangerous. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor (who had replaced Lodge) was unenthusiastic about any movement toward a conference but favored the Gordon Walker mission because it was in effect a delaying tactic.65 The next day Rusk and McGeorge Bundy discussed the mission with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who was then in Washington, and other British officials. Gordon Walker, they agreed, would “explore attitudes in Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Saigon,” always making it clear that he did not speak for the United States. This meant that a firm American decision on the conference itself would be delayed by at least two weeks,66 thus allowing time for further reflection and debate. The British immediately understood that the United States was once again stalling and feared that the Soviets might withdraw their proposal. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart “stressed that we did not have time in which to play with conference idea.” Britain wanted the United States at least to approve a conference in principle. But Rusk would only say that “we wanted to do everything possible to avoid saying no.”67 Meanwhile Gordon Walker had begun his mission. In Thailand Ambassador Martin was almost hostile, and he predicted that if the Thais felt threatened by the proposed conference, they would probably lift their restraints on Khmer Serei activities and work to “bring about a change of regime in Cambodia.”68 Rusk himself commented to the French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, that in light of Sihanouk’s recent speeches derogating Great Britain and Thailand “we would be laughed at if we agreed to go to a conference on Cambodian neutrality.” Alphand, however, reminded Rusk that both the French government and the ambassador personally wanted a conference, in part because it might provide an opening for a political settlement of the Vietnam War – an argument that, given Washington’s lack of interest in negotiating in Vietnam (despite Johnson’s Johns Hopkins speech), would not have been persuasive.69 Others, too, urged the United States to embrace the conference quickly. From New Delhi Bowles cabled that American support of a Cambodian conference might help heal the very tense relations with India. In Burma Ne Win implied that the Chinese saw a Cambodian conference as the first step in settling the Vietnam War. The following day, 22 April, even Thailand indicated that it might agree to a conference, doubtless to Martin’s chagrin.70 Now the momentum favored those who wanted American support for a conference. Still, Rusk held back. He agreed that Gordon Walker could go to Saigon and speak with the Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat. But he was “not optimistic about what a conference might achieve” and was not yet committed to it. Nevertheless, the pressures were strong. An added factor favoring American endorsement of the conference was that the Johnson administration needed support for the probable expansion of the American war in Vietnam. “We would have difficulty in saying ‘no’ to a conference in relation to our own need to mobilize international and domestic support for what seems to be an inevitable increase in our effort in South East Asia,” Rusk acknowledged.71

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When South Vietnam fell into line after Gordon Walker “twisted Quat’s arm very hard,”72 and the Thais agreed that they would “acquiesce” in a Cambodian conference if the United States thought it important, all seemed poised for an American announcement accepting the conference. On 24 April Taylor asked for a 48 hour delay so that Quat would have time to persuade elements in his government, including the military, that a conference was necessary.73 Quat did not get his 48 hours, for the next day Rusk announced that the United States would gladly participate in a conference on Cambodia. Harriman would represent the United States.74 Why, after weeks of foot-dragging, had the United States suddenly moved at this particular time to full support of the conference? The reason lay with Sihanouk. On 23 April in a speech dedicating USSR Avenue in Phnom Penh, the Prince asserted that the United States was considering attending a conference only because it might lead to progress on Vietnam. The Americans, who constantly referred to Cambodia as “tiny” and “backward,” had no interest in Cambodia itself. Any conference, he insisted, must deal only with Cambodia. Even more troubling, the next day at a ceremony opening a new grocery store Sihanouk indicated that he now did not want Thailand, South Vietnam, or the United States to attend. He appeared to be fed up with American stalling. The United States, he stated accurately, “without saying ‘no’, do not say ‘yes’ either.” Sihanouk even appeared to be saying that he no longer wanted a conference at all. “This conference interests us today much less than at [the] time when we were demanding [it] and when [the] Anglo-Saxons were obstructing it,” Sihanouk told his audience.75 Sihanouk’s remarkable about-face forced the American action. As Rusk explained to American diplomats in Bangkok and Vientiane: By Sunday we were confronted with the fact that Sihanouk’s remarks at grocery store opening had been published. . . . Gordon Walker was on point of leaving Saigon for Phnom Penh. There seemed some reason to hope that, by announcing US and GVN agreement beforehand, we could forestall official Cambodian response to Gordon Walker that US and GVN attendance at conference unacceptable. It was thought that announcement might equally forestall RKG [Cambodian Government] demand for Liberation Front representation. These factors seemed to us to warrant risks that announcement might, on the contrary, get Sihanouk’s back up, and precipitate official confirmation as well as disadvantage seeming to be unduly anxious about conference.76 Why, at a time when the British and the Americans were finally willing to support a conference, when Thailand and South Vietnam had fallen in line, and when China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and the NLF had also voiced support, did Sihanouk throw a fatal wrench into the works? He may have been convinced, as he stated, that the Americans had stalled too long; and in any event if they were finally interested it was only to speak with their opponents about

A casualty of war: the break in relations 123 Vietnam. He no doubt believed that, as he told the French ambassador, “at least ‘certain circles’ ” in the American government were anti-Sihanouk. The Americans, he asserted, “remained afraid of spread of neutralism” and believed that Sihanouk, as a leading defender of neutralism, “was somehow [a] danger to U.S. policy.”77 To the extent that Sihanouk’s perception of American policy explains his decision to sabotage the conference, an early, positive American response might have produced positive results. But Sihanouk also acted for reasons not directly related to American stalling. In his biography of Sihanouk, Australian scholar and diplomat Milton Osborne asserted that at a recent conference in Jakarta, called to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai personally asked Sihanouk not to go ahead with the conference he had so long championed because it might work to the disadvantage of China’s Vietnamese allies. “Faced with this request,” Osborne writes, “Sihanouk, who only the year before had been accorded a place of honour beside Mao Zedong at the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution in Peking, could only oblige.”78 Though Osborne provided no evidence to support his assertion, American and Australian documents indicate that his point is valid. On 25 April the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh reported that the Chinese had told Sihanouk that they would not attend a conference where Vietnam was discussed and that they were prepared to give Cambodia the assurances it sought, thus making a conference unnecessary. The next day a CIA report concluded that, while the USSR and North Vietnam wanted a conference (supposedly because it would make it more difficult for the United States to escalate the war in Vietnam and continue the bombing of North Vietnam), Chinese support for the conference had always been a façade because they feared it would increase Soviet influence in Hanoi. Thus they engaged in “intensive efforts . . . to sabotage the conference by convincing the Cambodian premier that negotiations are unnecessary.”79 Two weeks later the French ambassador in Phnom Penh conveyed remarkably similar information to Bergesen. “Almost certainly . . . Chou En-lai told Sihanouk in Djakarta that Chicoms did not wish to have conference at present time,” he reported, “and Sihanouk was willing to oblige his friends.”80 The day after Rusk’s announcement that the United States intended to send a delegation to the conference, a “flash” telegram arrived at the state department from the American embassy in Phnom Penh reporting that several hundred demonstrators were converging on the embassy, the crowd was growing steadily, and “rocks have begun to fly.” All local employees were sent home, embassy automobiles removed from the vicinity, and American dependants sent to the Hotel Royal. In another hour most of the windows had been broken and the embassy’s American flag burned. A few placards were seen calling on the United States to go home. The police, who had arrived late, made only perfunctory efforts to control the demonstrators and instead were reportedly “standing around watching the festivities.”81 For another hour “rocks of assorted sizes” barraged the embassy, and then police in riot gear moved in and began to push back the crowd, which by then amounted to several thousand people.

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Bergesen characterized the participants as predominantly “riff-raff.” Cyclo (bicycle rickshaw) drivers were reputedly the chief rock throwers. By the end of the demonstration (it lasted from about 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.), the building was a mess “with rocks, tomatoes and broken glass in every room.” Graffiti covered the exterior walls. However, unlike in March 1964 the crowd did not penetrate the embassy itself, and damage to the building was a relatively modest $4,878.06.82 On the day following the demonstration, for the first time in memory antiAmerican demonstrations took place in several provincial cities demanding that Cambodia break relations with the United States. About the same time Cambodian authorities ordered the last American missionary, Carl E. Thompson (who worked with the Mnong people), out of the country. He and his wife left Phnom Penh in June; most others had had to leave by the end of 1964 when their visas expired. The Cambodians told Thompson that all other Americans would soon be forced out as well, including even the American spouses of Cambodian citizens.83 On 3 May the embassy reported that in an “imperfectly monitored” speech Sihanouk had indicated that he was breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The Prince hoped, however, to maintain consular relations since, as he acknowledged, Cambodia needed the foreign exchange which American tourists provided. Bergesen got the word officially at 6:00 p.m. that evening. Because Cambodia would not give assurances regarding the continuity of consular relations, the United States decided to cut off relations entirely.84 By the end of May no official Americans remained in the Khmer kingdom. The ostensible reason for the demonstration was outrage over Bernard Krisher’s article in the 5 April edition of Newsweek magazine that alleged that Queen Sisowath Kossamak (Sihanouk’s mother) was “money-mad” and kept a string of bordellos on the outskirts of the capital. The day before the demonstration Sihanouk condemned the Krisher article in a public speech and referred the matter to the parliament. The parliament dutifully condemned the article as well as the general attitude of the American press, held the United States government responsible, and recommended that diplomatic relations be broken. Milton Osborne agrees that the Newsweek piece enraged Sihanouk and “triggered” the break. David Chandler concurs. The article, he writes, was the “last straw for Sihanouk in his dealings with the United States.”85 At the time, however, some American officials believed that the offending article was only a pretext. They felt that the demonstration was the culmination of a campaign to block the proposed Geneva conference, while an official unpublished history of United States-Cambodian relations offered another explanation: an armed incursion into Cambodian territory from South Vietnam in April was to blame.86 No single factor caused the demonstration and subsequent break in relations, although the official history was closest to the truth. Rather it was the cumulative effect of various issues that increasingly strained the relationship. The war in neighboring Vietnam was of central importance. The demonstration came shortly

A casualty of war: the break in relations 125 after the United States had begun bombing North Vietnam in a sustained way and had sent its first combat units to South Vietnam. The war was on the verge of escalating out of control, and Sihanouk feared that the hostilities would engulf his own country. As Bergesen put it at the time, the demonstration resulted from “the incessant anti-American propaganda ground out by the local press as a chorus to the Prince’s frequent and increasingly vituperative criticism of American policy, especially in Viet-Nam.”87 The Krisher article was only a contributing factor, and probably a minor one at that. It appears likely that once Sihanouk had determined that the conference could not be held, he allowed the demonstration to take place – the result of his long standing anger at American support for the Khmer Serei, continuing cross border military operations, American stalling on the conference, his general irritation at what he regarded as a patronizing attitude toward himself and Cambodia, as well as internal political pressures. He used the Krisher article as the excuse. However important the conference issue may have been in forming Sihanouk’s general anti-Americanism or in bringing about the demonstration, it was not the most important cause of the break in diplomatic relations. Indeed, it is not even certain that Sihanouk intended the demonstration as a prelude to a break. As late as 30 April – four days after the demonstration – the Cambodian cabinet was reportedly uncertain about breaking relations.88 The most immediate reason for the break was yet another border incident. On 28 April, two days after the demonstration, four planes, thought to be South Vietnamese Skyraiders, bombed the villages of Phum Chantatep (or Cheam Tatep) and Moream Tiek in Kompong Cham province. The villages were about four kilometers from the Vietnamese border. One thirteen-year-old boy was killed, and others were seriously injured. American military attachés who went to the scene the same day confirmed the death and counted 35 bomb and rocket craters. Bergesen predicted that Sihanouk would break relations over the border incidents, not the Newsweek article. As a last ditch attempt to salvage the situation, he suggested an immediate South Vietnamese apology and compensation to the victims.89 The situation was actually worse than Bergesen thought. An investigation quickly determined that the planes in question were American, not South Vietnamese. Consequently, Bergesen urged his government to apologize immediately and offer compensation. A note along these lines was prepared and delivered to the White House on 1 May, but it was never sent to Cambodia.90 Had it been, it might have prevented a break in relations. After the rupture, an unidentified Cambodian foreign ministry official speculated to a CIA agent that the reason Sihanouk broke relations “was that no acknowledgement of the error in bombing a Cambodian village on 28 April had come from the GVN.”91 When Sihanouk broke relations, an aide told President Johnson that the Prince based his action on two grounds: the Krisher article and the border bombing. McGeorge Bundy also told him that “the Cambodians have put the burden equally on Newsweek and on the air attacks.” Bundy thought it was “good” that the

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Cambodians based their decision on the two grounds. Sihanouk’s action made an apology “irrelevant,” and the government would claim (inaccurately) that the bombing incident was still being investigated. In fact, however, the actual note breaking relations referred only to the attack on the villages (which the Cambodians still assumed had been a South Vietnamese action). No other factors, including the Krisher article, were mentioned, something which John Dexter, the Cambodian desk officer in the state department, pointed out to Australian diplomats at the time.92 Any initial confusion about the primacy of the border attacks as the cause of the break soon disappeared, for Cambodian officials made it clear that an end to the cross border actions was the only condition for restoring relations. Sihanouk himself told French officials that the break resulted from “repeated border incursions,” and “he would be happy to restore relations if US put [a] stop to” them. One foreign ministry official indicated that Cambodia could even live with some border incidents, if Vietnam would immediately accept responsibility, apologize, and offer compensation.93 In sum, the American bombs and rockets that hit Phum Chantatep and Moream Tiek were the immediate cause for the break in relations. The hundreds of such incidents involving South Vietnamese and/or American personnel were the most important underlying cause as well. American support for Sihanouk’s bitter enemies, the Khmer Serei, also contributed to the break, as did American stalling on a Geneva conference. Less tangible factors, such as patronizing American attitudes toward Cambodia and unflattering stories in the American press, helped produce a general anti-American atmosphere in Cambodia. Sihanouk’s own assessment of the future of Indochina, as well as his concern with domestic politics, also affected his decision. At the heart of it was the war in Vietnam, which seriously exacerbated pre-existing tensions between Cambodia and its neighbors and consequently with their ally, the United States. Even more fundamental was the Cold War thinking that deeply affected American policy makers. Though not unaware of the regional character of Cambodia’s problems, they generally viewed developments through a Cold War lens. Even when regional factors were recognized, the United States almost always subordinated them to Cold War considerations. It was too bad that Sihanouk would be angered, but opposing the spread of international communism took first place. In spite of the demonstration and even the diplomatic break, the United States continued actively to explore the prospects for a Geneva conference on Cambodia, assuming that the demonstration was unrelated to the conference. The American perception may have been accurate. On 30 April the Cambodian cabinet reportedly voted unanimously in favor of attending a conference, though Sihanouk was out of town and might veto the action when he returned. The same day Rusk told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the United States had never received any official word that it would not be welcome at a conference.94 Deschamps thought that Sihanouk still wanted a conference (he speculated that the break in relations with the United States might have been a sop to China before the Prince went ahead with the conference). On 11 May

A casualty of war: the break in relations 127 Bergesen reported that one might yet be held. Two days later the Cambodian government raised hopes when it informed the British government that it was still interested. A few days later the French ambassador said that Sihanouk wanted a conference and was the “most disappointed man in Cambodia at the way things have turned out.”95 But for the rest of the month Sihanouk made it increasingly clear that he no longer wanted a conference, and at the end of June the Soviet Union indicated that there was no longer any point in issuing formal invitations.

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Prelude to tragedy The United States’ non-relationship with Cambodia, 1965–1969

Americans attract Communists like sugar attracts ants. Norodom Sihanouk, February 1967

After the break in relations, the United States quickly explored its options as to which country would represent it in Phnom Penh. Britain and Japan were considered, but only two days after relations were broken the Americans asked Australia to undertake the task. It was not a request that was accepted with alacrity. The Australians feared that the Cambodians would inevitably associate them with the U.S. position, and Australia would then lose its ability to be useful to all sides. But there were few alternatives. Britain, as co-chair of the Geneva conference, could not represent the United States. West Germany had only equivocal diplomatic status in Cambodia; the Philippines had only a chargé in Phnom Penh; and Japan already represented South Vietnamese interests in Cambodia. So Australia had to do it.1 Since 1962 Noël St. Clair Deschamps had represented Australia in the Cambodian capital. Deschamps had already enjoyed a long and distinguished career with the Department of External Affairs, which he had joined in 1937. He had served four years as Counsellor of the Australian embassy in Paris, three years as head of the military mission Berlin, three years as chargé at Bonn, and three years in a similar role in Dublin. And he was not very happy at the prospect of being the protector of American interests, sharing the view of his compatriots in Canberra that Cambodia would identify Australia with the United States.2 The decision having been made, Deschamps had no choice but to go along, and Sihanouk posed no objection to Australia representing the United States in Phnom Penh.3 France, meanwhile, represented Cambodian interests in Washington. In what turned out to be a period of four years, Deschamps represented the United States ably and well. Among other matters, he helped arrange Jacqueline Kennedy’s visit to Cambodia in 1967, assisted with the occasional release of American POWs, and helped secure the release of the son of an AID official in Bangkok who had tried to smuggle some Angkor treasures out of the country. (The young man’s mother sold smuggled Cambodian antiquities in an

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 129 antiques store in New York.) In this case Deschamps talked the Americans out of bringing in the “heavy artillery,” such as a letter from Mike Mansfield to Sihanouk. Instead the ambassador arranged for the young man’s father to purchase a tractor from Singapore in exchange for his son’s release (after a trial in which he was found guilty). The Cambodians were disappointed that the tractor had no attachments but kept their word and released the young man the next day. Dean Rusk wrote a personal note of appreciation to the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs thanking Deschamps for his efforts. “Without doubt the Ambassador’s fine efforts and excellent judgment were the crucial factors in obtaining [the young man’s] . . . release and restoring him to his family,” Rusk wrote.4 In these, and other similar instances, the United States was most grateful for Deschamps’ services. The Americans also relied on Deschamps’ advice in sensitive political matters. Often they followed his suggestions. But valuable as Deschamps’ advice was, the Americans privately considered the Australian too pro-Sihanouk. As a consequence there were sometimes tensions between Australia and the United States, as well as between Australia and Cambodia. Yet overall Deschamps’ close relationship with Sihanouk was an asset. In the end, as journalist Robert Shaplen wrote in 1966, Deschamps probably did “a better job for the United States than it could have done for itself.”5 Deschamps had plenty to do, and representing the United States put a considerable strain on the small Australian embassy staff in Phnom Penh. In January 1966, for example, the ambassador reported that “the continual crises in United States Cambodian relations” had “absorbed an enormous amount of my time and that of most, if not all of my staff.” Nevertheless, when External Affairs suggested billing the United States for its services in Cambodia, Deschamps demurred. “In protecting American interests in Cambodia,” he wrote, “. . . Australia does have a somewhat more rare opportunity to render a service to her powerful ally. The gesture would be further enhanced if Australia declined to accept payment for the time spent by Australian officers on American affairs.” Thus, although he had initially resisted the American request for Australia to represent the United States in Cambodia, Deschamps accepted the responsibility and even saw some long range advantages for his country. Indeed he later wrote that he felt “privileged to represent United States interests throughout the Johnson presidency.”6 Although the Americans had left Phnom Penh, the issues separating the two countries remained and kept the relationship from healing. These included differences over recognition of Cambodia’s territorial boundaries; continued American allegations that the Vietnamese communists were abusing Cambodian territory, using it as a refuge and sanctuary, getting supplies through and inside Cambodia (perhaps with the support of the Cambodian government), and even establishing base camps in the country; continuing border raids on Cambodian villages and outposts, and other violations of Cambodian sovereignty that seemed to intensify whenever prospects for improved relations seemed possible; continuing Cambodian allegations of American support for the Khmer Serei; and the

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American belief that Sihanouk could no longer be considered neutral at all but had finally and firmly allied himself with the communists, particularly the Chinese communists. With respect to the boundary question, now that the Geneva conference approach was on hold Sihanouk tried to get unilateral pledges from as many countries as possible to respect Cambodian neutrality and its territorial integrity within its present borders. Having the Americans make such a pledge became a major condition for reestablishing relations. Deschamps saw no reason why the United States should not accede to the Cambodian request. Sihanouk’s position as to what constituted the boundary was clear: treaties between Siam and France in 1904 and 1907 had spelled out the Thai-Cambodian boundary with clarity, modified only by an International Court decision in 1962 favorable to Cambodia in the Preah Vihear temple case. As for Vietnam and Laos, he accepted the boundaries imposed by the French administration of Indochina, even though the boundary with Cochin China was unfavorable to Cambodia. In sum, in Sihanouk’s view the Cambodian frontier corresponded “to the regions at present under Cambodian administrative control, no more and no less.”7 Deschamps always thought this was a perfectly reasonable position. But the United States, under pressure from the Thais and especially the South Vietnamese, refused to recognize specific boundaries and was only willing to make a general pledge to respect Cambodia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed it kept referring to the “ill-defined” border, which greatly angered Sihanouk. All told, the unwillingness of the United States to meet this Cambodian demand was the most important reason why diplomatic relations were not restored. The border question remained always in the background. But for the rest of 1965 the question of Vietnamese communist use of Cambodian territory attracted more immediate attention. Sihanouk always denied that there was serious abuse of his territory by the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese and feared that American reports to the contrary were intended to justify military incursions into Cambodia. After one such United Press International (UPI) report, Sihanouk invited prominent American journalists to investigate, and the New York Times sent Seymour Topping. After an investigation Topping concluded that it was probable that the Viet Cong used the area to some extent, but he was convinced that no headquarters or base camp existed. For one thing, the road from Vietnam described in the UPI report was cut at a stream, and on the other side it was “nothing more than a difficult foot path. . . . No vehicle has been over the road for years.”8 Although some American officials groused that Topping had been given “a guided tour” of the area, Sihanouk was delighted, thanking Topping for “the objectivity and honesty” of his articles and applauding the Times for publishing it.9 In this case, and in a number of others, the American military made embarrassing errors in its assertions about Vietnamese communists’ use of Cambodian territory. But American officials remained convinced that the enemy nevertheless was making substantial use of Cambodian territory and that some army elements

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 131 did from time to time move their headquarters into Cambodia.10 In the fall of 1965 a CIA analysis concluded that the Viet Cong made more use of Cambodia than Topping thought, although it found little evidence of significant arms smuggling through Cambodia and of Cambodian government cooperation with the enemy. At lower governmental and military levels, however, there was some cooperation with the Viet Cong. Another CIA report, completed in December, came to essentially similar conclusions and expressed skepticism about reports that the Viet Cong received weapons from the Cambodian government through the port of Sihanoukville. All of the weapons brought in by that route went to the Cambodian military in an unloading and distribution process that was deliberately transparent.11 When late in November 1965 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Alexis Johnson made statements that inferred enemy use of Cambodian territory, Sihanouk again urged a respected American journalist to investigate, and shortly thereafter the well known foreign correspondent of the Washington Post, Stanley Karnow, arrived in Phnom Penh, where Cambodian authorities promised to take him wherever he desired to go. After five days of intensive travels to various border areas, Karnow concluded that, while there was doubtless some smuggling and commerce with the Viet Cong, he was “inclined to doubt any significant Viet Cong presence or activity in Cambodia, with or without Cambodian knowledge.”12 None of this dampened the military’s yearning to take strong action against the Viet Cong in Cambodia, and by the end of 1965 the President had approved increased covert operations and hot pursuit into Cambodia. Within a few months the military, supported by Ambassador Lodge in Saigon, was recommending that the public be prepared for retaliatory strikes into Cambodia.13 But McNamara refused to change the current rules of engagement. By some accounts, the American military had good reason to be suspicious of Sihanouk’s relationship with the Vietnamese communists. The Prince may have negotiated an agreement with China that allowed arms and supplies to be sent to them, while also permitting NLF forces to pass through Cambodia and take refuge there. The accounts assert that as early as 1964 Hanoi and Beijing agreed to give Sihanouk’s armed forces 10 percent of the Chinese weapons that were shipped through the port of Sihanoukville. Perhaps enough weapons to support 50,000 soldiers arrived in this manner between 1965 and 1967. However, the evidence for these agreements is not entirely conclusive.14 Sihanouk denied any but the most minimal Viet Cong activity in his country because he feared that the Americans would use their alleged presence to justify military action against Cambodia – as in fact the Joint Chiefs did. As it was, there continued to be hundreds of border incidents and violations of Cambodian sovereignty. Some of these were minor, such as incursions into Cambodian air space by South Vietnamese or American planes. Others were more serious, involving allied attacks on Cambodian border villages, border crossing posts, or military outposts near the border. As before the diplomatic rupture, American military authorities, responding to requests from the state department,

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investigated each incident. Sometimes they concluded that no such incident had taken place. At other times they acknowledged the incursion and blamed it on bad weather, a poorly delimited border, or a navigational or map reading error. The responsibility for the violations was placed almost exclusively on the South Vietnamese. Almost always the Americans reminded the Cambodians that the underlying cause of these incursions was the Vietnamese communists who were attacked while retreating into Cambodia or who had established camps near the border. The most serious incident in the months after the break in relations came in October 1965 when at least five South Vietnamese and American planes bombed, napalmed, and machine gunned the Cambodian village of Ba Thu in Svay Rieng province in three separate waves of attacks. Seven persons died, six were wounded, 19 houses were destroyed and 32 more damaged, 53 water buffalo were killed and 36 wounded.15 According to the South Vietnamese investigation of the incident, the planes had intended to attack a Viet Cong concentration two kilometers inside South Vietnam and missed their targets. The incident came (as all of the most serious incidents seemed to come) at an especially bad time. The Soviet Union had just snubbed Sihanouk by canceling an invitation to him to visit Moscow. The Prince described the Soviet behavior as being even worse than that of the United States. Never, he said, had the United States sought to humiliate him in this manner.16 The attack on Ba Thu presumably prevented any rapprochement that might have emerged in the wake of the Russian snub. Ambassador Deschamps urged a prompt American apology. After considerable delay the United States delivered an aide-memoire to the Cambodian government blaming the attack on “a navigational error resulting from poor visibility and extensive flooding in the area.” It did, however, “profoundly regret” the loss of life and property damage.17 Although the Cambodian government protested about the incident in strong language, the attack did not have as much of a disruptive effect as the Americans feared it might. Perhaps this was, as the Americans and Australians speculated, because all of the casualties in Ba Thu were ethnic Vietnamese. In addition to the border incidents, the Prince continued to charge that American intelligence agencies were responsible for activities of the Khmer Serei. For many years South Vietnam and Thailand had encouraged and helped fund the Khmer Serei and its leader Son Ngoc Thanh. When Nguyen Cao Ky became Prime Minister in1965, he “learned that considerable sums of money were being paid to [the] Khmer Serei organization.”18 During the Eisenhower administration there was also no question that the United States had ties to the dissidents. During the Kennedy administration these ties seem to have diminished, but the American military advisers still trained CIDG troops, some of which were Khmer Serei. By and large the state department was convinced that support for the Khmer Serei was counter productive and urged Thailand and South Vietnam to cut their ties with the dissidents.19 The state department appeared to be serious

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 133 about this. Ky promised to end such aid, and indeed in 1965 most of the independent Khmer Serei activity (as opposed to Khmer Serei units integrated into the CIDG) appears to have shifted to Thailand. When Ambassador Martin in Thailand questioned his instructions about approaching top Thai officials until South Vietnam had agreed to eliminate its support for the Khmer Serei, Rusk himself informed the ambassador Ky had done so.20 But there was always a temptation to work with the Khmer Serei, particularly now that diplomatic relations had been broken and it seemed less important to keep Sihanouk happy. And there are indications that even at high levels the United States was inclined to resume contact. For example in January 1965, even before the break in relations, Son Thai Nguyen, the brother of Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh, asked an American official for assistance while informing him about current Khmer Serei operations. He particularly wanted small planes to transport troops between Vietnam and Thailand. Although the official report indicates that Son was rebuffed, the United States had clearly permitted the contact, and it is not impossible that Son received some covert support.21 In another instance, a South Vietnamese labor leader told an American official in Saigon that the time had come to provide arms and supplies to the Khmer Serei, covertly if necessary.22 He was apparently rebuffed as well, but in August NSC officials informed National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that the CIA had “accidently uncovered . . . Son Ngoc Thanh” in Saigon and wanted to “establish a Dialogue [sic]” with him. The NSC officials noted that the state department was “properly skittish as this guy has the political future of Harold Stassen but drives Sihanouk crazy.” Nevertheless, they continued, they were “permitting one or two more ‘contacts’ with him.”23 The Cambodians, too, made specific charges of American involvement with the dissidents. For example in September the governor of Battambang province reported that a Thai police colonel and an American were present at a meeting to plan a Khmer Serei recruiting campaign. A little later the Cambodians charged that three Americans were training Khmer Serei soldiers in combat tactics at two locations in Thailand. Moreover, in December a Khmer Serei force moved out of Vietnam by ship for Thailand intending to invade Cambodia from the west. By this time Ky himself vacillated. Although he had previously agreed that support should be eliminated, he now asked “what his policy toward the Khmer Serei ought to be.” All previous South Vietnamese governments, he pointed out, had “befriended the Khmer Serei and Son Ngoc Thanh, and he had been in doubt as to what to do.”24 In sum, although the United States continued to deny categorically that it supported the Khmer Serei in any way, in fact the American military continued to help pay for and train Khmer Serei forces in the Vietnamese CIDG units and probably trained others in Thailand. It is certain that there were CIA contacts with Son Ngoc Thanh. The break in relations meant there were fewer voices supporting the Cambodian government view. As McGeorge Bundy put it, “we lack both a strong advocate sending cables out of Phnom Penh and a strong

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Cambodia lobby at State, so the views of Bangkok, Saigon, and DoD are seldom effectively counterbalanced.”25 Khmer Serei activity only increased in the next several weeks. On 28 February 1966 the Cambodian authorities captured some Khmer Serei soldiers. One of them, Thach Nhon, was, he said, a member of the American Special Forces, a corporal in the 305th Battalion. He and the others stated that “they were recruited and trained in SVN and operated under American command.”26 Additional armed clashes followed in March and April, the most serious being a Khmer Serei attack on the famous temple at Preah Vihear early in April. The Khmer Serei held the temple for a few days before being driven back.27 That there was an American connection to this increased activity seems certain. Near Tay Ninh six CIDG companies with a total of over 700 men operated from a Special Forces camp. Five of the companies were composed of Khmers, most of whom were Khmer Serei. An earlier policy of trying to weed out Khmer Serei from the Special Forces had been recently reversed, supposedly so that they could be better controlled. When the American representative to the United Nations, Charles Yost, asked if he could state officially that the United States had “furnished neither support nor assistance in any way to the so-called Khmer Serei” he was gently advised that the language was too sweeping. “There may have been instances,” a state department official informed him, “for example, where U.S. assistance designed to strengthen South Vietnamese para-military forces, may have been diverted in certain border areas of South Viet-Nam by ethnic Cambodian elements in South Viet-Nam sympathetic to the Khmer Serei.” In January 1966 three Khmer Serei surrendered and told Cambodian authorities that in December 1965 they, along with fifty “young Khmer-Krom,” had been transported from Vietnam to Thailand in an American warship.28 Still, the state department considered such involvement counterproductive. At a SEATO Council meeting in June 1966 Rusk and William Bundy grilled South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do about Vietnamese support for the Khmer Serei, especially in light of previous statements by Ky that such support made no sense. Rusk said that the time had come for South Vietnam to improve relations with Cambodia.29 The Vietnamese might be excused for feeling uncertain about exactly what American policy was. Despite the increase in Khmer Serei activity and the continuing violations of Cambodian air space and territory, by late 1965 there was some movement toward a better relationship. Senator Mansfield’s unofficial visit to Cambodia late in November 1965 provided a symbolic beginning. Sihanouk indicated to Mansfield his hope to improve the bilateral relationship but reiterated the three conditions that would mark Cambodian policy toward the United States for two more years: the United States must recognize Cambodia’s present boundaries, pay an indemnity for Cambodian lives lost in the border incursions (here he softened his previous insistence on one bulldozer for each dead Cambodian and said just a token amount would be acceptable), and no more bombing of Cambodia or incursions into its territory.30

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 135 The United States was not yet ready to accept any of Sihanouk’s conditions for improved relations, but shortly after Mansfield’s visit the United States took an interest in the Prince’s renewed call to expand the role of the ICC so that it could investigate charges of border violations and oversee shipments through the port of Sihanoukville. The Soviet Union and China resisted this suggestion, but Sihanouk persisted. The United States, reversing its previous opposition to strengthening the commission, now concluded that an enhanced ICC might be able to verify instances of Viet Cong abuse of Cambodian territory and over the long run discourage the communists from using Cambodia as a base. There was thus a coincidence of views between the United States and Cambodia that might have provided a basis for better relations, particularly since Cambodian relations with the USSR and China were deteriorating as a result of their refusal to support ICC expansion. In June 1966 President Johnson ordered his aides to try to improve relations with Cambodia. James C. Thomson, Jr. took the task to heart and probed “this town intensively for fresh ideas as to how we might improve our relations with Cambodia.” Thomson suggested pressuring the Russians and the Indians to go along with ICC expansion, with the United States paying for the cost of new personnel and helicopters to improve mobility. He urged that U.S. military leaders in Vietnam be prevented from making unproven statements about Cambodian collusion with the enemy. He urged a visit by a congressional delegation, personal letters from the President to Sihanouk, visits by prominent Americans to Phnom Penh, and (as conditions permitted) movement toward renewing diplomatic relations. Most significantly of all, he called for a serious effort to stop the Khmer Serei. “The GVN trains Cambodians and ships them to Thailand where they are then put into action on the Cambodia border,” Thomson informed the President. Only a “Presidential directive” to the American embassy in Bangkok and Saigon could stop this, he added, since “repeated lower level protests had simply not been taken seriously by the GVN or the RTG [ Royal Thai Government].”31 The ideas that Thomson developed were not, for the most part, new. But they had not been advancing. The military disliked all efforts to assuage Sihanouk, preferring instead military action against Viet Cong strongholds in Cambodia. The civilian bureaucracy was unenthusiastic about sending a congressional delegation to Phnom Penh, Presidential letters to Sihanouk, and visits by prominent Americans. Thus it was significant that at this point the President put his not inconsiderable weight behind efforts to achieve better relations – including sending directives to the state department and the CIA to “press the Thai and Vietnam Governments to cease all support for the Khmer Serei rebels” – and rejected, in effect, calls for a military solution. He approved all of Thomson’s recommendations with enthusiasm. “I heartily agree,” he wrote next to the recommendation to continue visits to Sihanouk. “Good and Strong,” he wrote concerning a recommendation to instruct the state department to give the ICC strengthening a high priority and to cut off aid to the Khmer Serei. Asked whether Eugene Black or the congressional mission should carry

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a personal message from the President, Johnson wrote that both of them should. “This is excellent,” the President wrote. “I’m proud.” “The President’s enthusiasm is self-evident,” wrote Walt Rostow to Rusk. Shortly thereafter orders went out to the American military in Vietnam “not to penetrate a 200-meter-wide belt on the Vietnamese side of the Cambodian border.” The principle of “hot pursuit, originally approved in December 1965, was for the moment discouraged.32 Coinciding with the American initiatives, Sihanouk made a conciliatory speech at the Royal Military Academy. He did not attack the United States and even offered some faint praise, while urging immediate expansion of the ICC. According to the Australian ambassador, “the Chinese Ambassador practically and the North Vietnamese representative failed to applaud the speech.” Lest there be any doubt about the speech’s significance, Cambodian General Nhiek Tioulong told Ambassador Deschamps, “that speech should clarify our position. We are relying on you to explain it to Canberra and Washington.”33 Indeed, the administration moved into high gear to take advantage of the improving relations. It pressured the Thais and Vietnamese to better their reactions with their neighbor, asked for Japanese assistance, and attempted to reopen the Bowles-Kimny channel in New Delhi.34 Sihanouk responded by inviting Harriman to visit. “Averell has got a nibble on the Cambodian line,” Rostow informed President Johnson, “and it looks as though he will be going there in September.”35 Harriman looked forward enthusiastically to his forthcoming trip to Phnom Penh. He was “well aware of CIA’s past activities in the area” that so troubled Sihanouk. But he told Australian Ambassador Keith Waller that he thought he could reassure the Prince about current American intentions. In the meantime Harriman asked journalist Robert Shaplen to visit Cambodia and report about the prospects for improving relations. Shaplen found the atmosphere very good. Everyone, from cyclo drivers, to “restaurant girls,” to the editor of semi-official Réalités Cambodgiennes, hoped “that the Americans will ‘soon be back’.”36 For his part, Sihanouk continued to be circumspect in his public statements about the United States and dropped his third condition – compensation for Cambodian casualties – for restoring relations.37 In sum, for the first time in many months there was positive movement in the relationship. But all of the momentum toward improved relations ended when on 31 July and twice on 2 August American planes attacked the adjoining villages of Thlok Trach and Anlong Trach, killing several Cambodians. What was particularly embarrassing about these attacks was that, by chance, the American civil rights leader Floyd McKissick and other members of the “Americans Want to Know” group, as well as a CBS journalist, arrived at Thlok Trach shortly after the first bombing and saw the casualties and damage. Furthermore, members of the ICC, military attachés from various embassies in Phnom Penh, and journalists who were on the scene investigating the attack of 31 July actually witnessed the later incidents. American planes bombed and strafed within two hundred yards of the international visitors, who, as Ambassador Lodge put it, “fled to the jungle

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 137 and hid.”38 The Canadian report was more graphic. The investigators “spent half [an] hour face down in mud, water and nettles” before beating a hasty retreat. The Indian member, Bindra, “won 1200 metre dash in field of forty runners by good Aryan nose.”39 The eyewitness report by the Canadian member of the ICC was scathing. There was “absolutely no evidence” that American forces had come under fire from the Cambodian villages, and thus the attack violated current rules of engagement. Furthermore, even from the air Cambodian villages could not be mistaken for Vietnamese villages, since in Cambodian villages houses are built on stilts. He was further convinced that the spotter pilots saw the international observers, most of whom were white and wore white shirts (one even had a business suit on) – there were no villagers present since the survivors of the first raid had long since fled – and in an apparent effort to impress the group, the pilots “performed a remarkably neat surgical operation along edge of woods” where no Viet Cong could possibly have been hiding. “It seemed in the first place that men had been sent to do boys job and in second place that trigger happy spotters, finding nothing, laid on useless and wasteful show to impress Cambodians or foreign observers or both.”40 Coming from a man who almost always took the American point of view, this was strong criticism indeed. The Americans immediately took the position that their maps showed the bombed villages to be in South Vietnam, even though they quickly acknowledged that the people living in them were ethnic Khmers. Rather quickly they conceded that the villages were administered by Cambodian authorities. But they continued to insist that all the maps, including one provided by Cambodian authorities, showed the villages to be in South Vietnam. Other observers disagreed. In addition to the Cambodians, the Canadians, the Australian services attaché, and the French military attaché all concluded (after a study of maps) that the villages were in Cambodia. Ambassador Deschamps himself was highly skeptical of the American version, finding parts of it “alarming and extraordinary.”41 Had the United States not hidden behind legalities and responded with an immediate and sincere apology, the diplomatic damage might have been minimized and the improvement in the larger relationship might have proceeded after only a temporary disruption. (In cases like this, Ambassador Waller told the Americans, it would be best “to publicly apologize and investigate later.”)42 But the Americans continued with their legalisms (only later did they admit that the villages were in fact in Cambodia), and the danger of long term damage increased. As Waller put it, “the prospects of this improvement in [CambodianAmerican] relations have been put in jeopardy by this clumsy rigidity of American handling of the Thlok Trach incident.”43 The ambassador was right. Initially cautious in his response, Sihanouk promised not to cancel Harriman’s trip; but after he received the American note which only expressed regrets, not apologies, and stated that Thlok Trach was in Vietnam, Sihanouk became extremely angry and postponed Harriman’s trip indefinitely.44

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Sihanouk believed that the Thlok Trach incident was a deliberate effort by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies to sabotage the improving atmosphere. “American ‘hawks’ did not want better relations with Cambodia,” one Cambodian editorial stated. “The prospect of Mr. Harriman’s visit had given them sleepless nights so they had torpedoed it.”45 It is not impossible that Sihanouk was partly right. Neutral observers in Phnom Penh at the time thought it might have been the case, and journalist Robert Shaplen wrote that “a week before the incidents took place, some well informed Vietnamese in Saigon were privately predicting just such an attack.” The military was entirely anti-Sihanouk and even within the state department there was precious little sympathy for Cambodia. In a message personally approved by Ambassador Waller, an Australian embassy official reported that an American legal adviser in the state department made it clear that he was one of the few non-“Cambodia haters” in the department. “In his experience in the State Department,” the American was reported as saying, “the Cambodia Desk was the first which seemed not to possess any basic sympathy for the point of view of the country for which it was responsible.” Only Harriman’s office, which was viewed with suspicion elsewhere in the department, could be expected to try and understand the Cambodian perspective. The result was that Australian efforts to influence American policy in a more positive direction required “Byzantine maneuvering” which could only be hinted at in formal memoranda.46 The Thlok Trach incident set back a possible reconciliation, but since Sihanouk was clearly turning away from the Chinese communists, there were hopes that improvement could resume after a few weeks. The Prince said he hoped that Harriman could visit Cambodia soon, and McNamara enthusiastically supported the visit as well.47 Harriman’s hopes to return soon to Cambodia unfortunately ran afoul of Sihanouk’s renewed drive to have the various powers pledge to respect Cambodia’s territorial integrity “within its present borders.” In September 1966 Charles de Gaulle had made this pledge on behalf of France, but the United States was not ready to do so. Consequently the Cambodians rebuffed suggestions that Harriman come in October. “We have nothing to say to him and no business to conduct with him so long as his country has not recognized the present frontiers of Cambodia as France has done,” read an editorial in Le Sangkum.48 On the positive side, in November and December Cambodian troops moved forcefully against Viet Cong troops that had ventured into Cambodian territory. The Americans were also pleased when in October a new government was formed in Phnom Penh headed by Lon Nol, who was generally thought to be pro-western. Finally, at the very end of December 1966, Jacqueline Kennedy expressed an interest in visiting Angkor. But whatever positive movement was developing ended on 30 December 1966 when approximately 40 helicopters, four L19s, and two F105s attacked the border village of Ba Thu, followed by a ground assault by American and ARVN troops who, it was alleged, also kidnapped villagers.49 The Americans acknowledged penetrating several hundred yards into Cambodia, while pursuing a fleeing

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 139 Viet Cong force. They regretted the loss of innocent lives but as usual emphasized the “continued Viet Cong abuse of Cambodia’s neutrality.”50 While the American response to the Ba Thu incident was relatively forthcoming and constructive, the same was unfortunately not the case with the South Vietnamese, who reported on the incident to the ICC in March 1967. The Americans characterized the South Vietnamese note as “polemical in tone and . . . likely to achieve precisely the opposite from what the United States had in mind.” The most serious aspect of the Vietnamese note was that it charged that the Cambodian government itself had colluded with the Viet Cong, a charge that the United States had deliberately avoided making.51 Fortunately for the United States, Sihanouk made less of this incident than he might have – again perhaps because the victims were ethnically Vietnamese. Ba Thu was only the first of many border incidents during 1967, however, and Sihanouk remained bitterly critical of American policy in Southeast Asia. As he put it perceptively in February, “The best way to create Communists is to bring in Americans where there aren’t any [Communists]. Americans attract Communists like sugar attracts ants.”52 Sihanouk also continued to charge that the United States financed and assisted the Khmer Serei. In May an article in the French newspaper Le Monde no doubt confirmed Sihanouk’s suspicions since the piece accused the United States of transporting Khmer Serei troops from Vietnam to Thailand on an American destroyer and charged that CIA officials regularly inspected Khmer Serei camps in Thailand.53 As usual, the United States strongly denied involvement with the Khmer Serei, though it privately acknowledged that the Thai and South Vietnamese governments continued to support the dissidents.54 About the same time, Sihanouk also charged that the CIA had resumed operations in Cambodia aimed at overthrowing him. In March he stated that one George A. McColm, identified as a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) agricultural expert, had said that “ ‘we’ would get rid of Sihanouk and his policies before the end of the year.” McColm also allegedly confided that “two Cambodian military leaders” were on the CIA’s payroll.55 The Americans intended to deny the charge but were embarrassed to discover that McColm did in fact exist and had probably spoken to someone on a plane along the lines that Sihanouk alleged. Nothing more seems to have come of the matter, but the incident certainly fed Sihanouk’s fears that the CIA was attempting to bring him down. Nor was the United States helpful when it came to recognizing Sihanouk’s borders, something he had long demanded. Although there was little likelihood that the United States would accede to his demand, the Australians were more inclined to do so. Deschamps had long supported this, and in February the Australians concluded that the advantages of doing so outweighed the several disadvantages. If the state department tried to block the Australian initiative, Waller threatened to take the matter up with Rusk personally. Some Americans did, in fact, strongly object to the Australian initiative (one official described the

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Australian reasoning as “specious”), seeing it as indirect Cambodian pressure on the United States.56 For a time Australia held off. Despite these negative factors, the relationship in 1967 did not reach the nadir of earlier years. For one thing, since the Thlok Trach fiasco the Americans had learned something about how to respond to border incidents. They did not again raise questions about Cambodian sovereignty and offered to share evidence of Viet Cong activity. This, plus Sihanouk’s growing disenchantment with China, an incipient rebellion in Battambang, and perhaps increasing dislike of Vietnamese communist incursions into his country, inclined him away from a serious confrontation with the United States. He told Australian Prime Minister Paul Hasluck that his protests against American border raids were mostly pro forma and that he had to accept a certain level of violence along the border as the Americans tried to harass enemy forces – though he made it equally clear that he would order guerrilla resistance if the Americans attempted “anything like permanent occupation of Cambodian territory.”57 On the positive side, Sihanouk engaged in negotiations with Pan American Airlines for air rights into Phnom Penh and the establishment of a Pan American hotel near Angkor58 and graciously received Senator Edward Brooke (RepublicanMassachusetts), who visited Phnom Penh in March. Deschamps thought Brooke came with an open mind and was very positive about the visit – though some state department officials feared that Deschamps’ more generous views of Sihanouk’s policies might have influenced the senator unduly. Perhaps the most important development that potentially tended toward a better relationship was Sihanouk’s warm response to Jacqueline Kennedy’s inquiries about visiting Angkor. From the very beginning Sihanouk encouraged Mrs. Kennedy to come to Cambodia as his personal guest. Deschamps thought the proposed visit very important. Even though private, it would “bring a warmer tone to Cambodian/American relations. . . . It will be seen as a considerable mark of respect and a friendly gesture towards Cambodia.”59 When it appeared that Mrs. Kennedy would likely postpone her visit because Sihanouk would not then be in the country, Deschamps feared that this would set back the slight improvement in relations then underway. And when she did decide to postpone her visit for several months, Deschamps attempted without success to get her to reconsider. Cambodia’s hurt pride, wrote Deschamps, underlay much of its “difficult attitude” toward the United States. Thus it was “unfortunate,” he thought, that Mrs. Kennedy was unable to come.60 In sum, through the summer of 1967, relations continued to be generally tense and unhappy. But no serious confrontations occurred, and there were even a few faint signs of improvement. But they were faint indeed. In September Rusk lashed out at Cambodia in frustration, telling the Australian ambassador that despite the “extraordinary patience” the United States had shown toward Cambodia, “the Americans had ‘got nothing in exchange’.”61 On the other hand, in the last part of 1967 Sihanouk mediated the return of some prisoners held by the Viet Cong, and when Mrs. Kennedy visited in November she struck a responsive chord. “Sihanouk went to extraordinary lengths

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 141 not only to be gallant and courteous but also to ensure that every detail of the arrangements was personally supervised by him,” Michael Forrestal informed the state department.62 At the same time, however, the Prince went out of his way to emphasize the private nature of the visit. And in fact the trip did not immediately result in any positive change in the relationship; frustration and enmity were more characteristic of the relationship for most of the rest of the year. Sihanouk again accused the United States of continuing to support the Khmer Serei and sending CIA operatives into his country to destabilize his government. For the Americans, the alleged growing use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) produced frustration and even anger. American military leaders became increasingly outspoken on the subject, which only infuriated Sihanouk. As he had before, the Prince invited journalists to visit Cambodia and see if they could find any Vietnamese communists. This time two journalists – George McArthur of the Associated Press and Ray Herndon of UPI – took Sihanouk up on his offer and discovered what they claimed was a major, battalion-sized Viet Cong camp near Mimot. The Cambodians (all of them army personnel) accompanying the journalists were as surprised as the reporters.63 The United States insisted on independent verification of the alleged discovery, and the ICC did eventually conduct an investigation. By that time the Cambodian government, which had initially charged that the report was a fabrication, was arguing that the camp was really a Cambodian government operation for training guerrilla fighters, and the ICC was unable to find clear evidence of Viet Cong involvement. The Americans, however, believed that the journalists had indeed found a Viet Cong base. The McArthur-Herndon discovery had two results. On the one hand, it encouraged the United States government to follow through on its long term plan to present to the Cambodian government detailed, non-emotional reports documenting Viet Cong and PAVN abuse of Cambodian territory over many months. The first report was finally presented to Sihanouk’s government on 4 December 1967. (The transfer of these dossiers was known as operation VESUVIUS.) The other effect of the journalists’ report was to increase pressure – especially from the American military – to take strong military action against the sanctuaries in Cambodia. The pressure for strong action peaked in December 1967. On 5 December General William Westmoreland (supported by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker) formally requested sustained B-52 strikes for “at least 72 hours” in an area of Cambodia into which, he said, the entire 1st North Vietnamese Division had retreated after the recent battle of Dak To. The enemy, he said, was not taking any defensive precautions and would be seriously hurt by such an attack. Westmoreland acknowledged that the timing was difficult – the United States was just then attempting to present to Sihanouk its evidence of North Vietnamese activity in Cambodia, and a bombing strike would hardly have given Sihanouk a chance to respond. Furthermore, because

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the “B-52 strike will leave a clear signature in Cambodian territory,” it would be difficult to deny that the operation had taken place. Nevertheless, Westmoreland recommended that the strikes be carried out immediately “and if necessary explain our actions as hot pursuit by fire in an uninhabited area.”64 Westmoreland’s recommendation led to a major debate at the White House. Rusk, the first to offer an opinion, was flatly opposed. The proposed action “would be a significant act of war against Cambodia” that would “change the entire character of the war.” It might bring in the Chinese. It would, in sum, “be a major political burden for us to bear with a minimum military gain toward ending the war,” he stated. At first, however, the President appeared to support the plan. “We must tell Cambodia that we will not continue to permit them to house and protect these killers,” he said. “Do we have to continue to live with this for the duration of the war?” But McNamara supported Rusk, stating that he was “scared of a policy based on the assumption that by going somewhere else we can win the war.” Supreme Court Justice and Johnson intimate Abe Fortas also objected strongly (“there is an overwhelming case against this action”), as did the incoming Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford who was “unalterably opposed to the action.” In the face of such strong opposition, Johnson decided against precipitate moves. The next day personnel in the Joint Chiefs of Staff office told an Australian military official that “invasion or bombing of Cambodia was out of the question.”65 Although military pressure to take action continued to be extreme, Johnson was now determined not to take risky actions. Perhaps the President was influenced by the wildly conflicting conclusions of the government’s own intelligence reports about the extent of Vietnamese communist use of Cambodia. In September 1967 a defense department report concluded that “infiltration through Cambodia has fallen off sharply since 1965,” but the next month the CIA concluded that the communists’ use of Cambodia was “substantial and growing,” although the agency found “no good evidence” that the communists were obtaining weapons from the Cambodians or through Cambodian ports. A few months later, however, the navy estimated that between December 1966 and July 1968 10,500 tons of armaments of all kind had been unloaded at Sihanoukville. The Defense Intelligence Agency ( DIA), on the other hand, estimated the total at only 250 tons per year. This huge discrepancy highlighted the questionable nature of intelligence reports.66 In any event, instead of sending the B-52s against Cambodia, Johnson decided to press Cambodia to take action itself against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and put on a full court press to make the ICC more effective. Cautionary comments from McGeorge Bundy and Hamilton Fish Armstrong almost certainly reinforced Johnson’s decision to opt for diplomacy rather than force.67 Crucial to defusing the situation were Sihanouk’s actions at the end of December. In an important, rambling interview on 28 December 1967 Sihanouk seemed to indicate that, although he would protest if American and Viet Cong forces battled in remote areas of Cambodia, he would not necessarily intervene militarily. More importantly, he indirectly praised President Johnson for not

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 143 giving in to the warmongers and offered to receive a presidential envoy, should Johnson want to send one.68 Although the state department wanted to avoid a quick response to Sihanouk, Johnson overruled the department. He ordered an immediate response and informed Sihanouk that Chester Bowles was immediately available, thus again overruling the state department that wanted Harriman instead. On the very last day of the year Sihanouk said that he would be glad to receive Bowles. Thus a frustrating year in U.S.-Cambodian relations ended on positive note.69 The United States saw the Bowles-Sihanouk meeting as a way to impress upon the Cambodians its concerns about Viet Cong/NVA use of Cambodian territory, support the Prince’s desire to strengthen the ICC, and try to learn with more specificity just what Sihanouk would accept in terms of American actions against the Vietnamese communists. For his part Sihanouk entered the talks to try and keep the war from spreading to Cambodia and to encourage those in the American government who counseled restraint. He was increasingly irritated at actions of the North Vietnamese and especially the Chinese but, despite his remarks to Karnow, did not appear ready to countenance U.S. military incursions into his country. As he put it on the eve of Bowles’ arrival, the “United States was the wolf and Cambodia the lamb, and the latter would avoid discussing the sauce he would be eaten with.”70 He also remained firm in his determination not to restore diplomatic relations with the United States short of a satisfactory border declaration. Bowles, with career diplomat Philip Habib “firmly chained to him to see that he is not carried away by his own enthusiasm” (as a New Zealand diplomat put it), arrived in Phnom Penh on 8 January 1968. Bowles hoped for a major breakthrough in relations.71 He made a good impression in Cambodia and engaged in cordial talks with high level Cambodian officials and twice with Sihanouk himself. In the end the United States got Sihanouk to reaffirm his proposal to strengthen the ICC (the Prince told Bowles that the ICC had to “get out of [the] Phnom Penh cocktail circuit and into the field”).72 He also agreed to receive VESUVIUS information, and he stated that he desired “all countries, including the belligerents in Vietnam” to respect Cambodia’s neutrality and borders. Despite his public comments, Sihanouk also seemed to accept limited American incursions into Cambodia under certain conditions in uninhabited areas of Cambodia, comments that the Nixon administration later used to justify its bombing of Cambodia. The Cambodians for their part pressed Bowles hard on recognition of borders (the subject “ran like a red thread throughout the talks,” Bowles reported)73 and on stopping the border incidents. But Bowles lacked authority to negotiate either and could only say that the United States would do all that it could to prevent border incidents and that he would bring Cambodia’s concerns to President Johnson’s attention. The Joint Communique issued at the end of the discussions on 12 January pledged the United States to respect Cambodia’s “sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity” and to “do everything possible to avoid acts of aggression against Cambodia, as well as incidents and accidents which may

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cause losses and damage to the inhabitants of Cambodia.”74 On paper at least the United States came away from the discussions with more than did the Cambodians, but it is possible that the talks themselves prevented a large scale American air or ground attack on the sanctuaries. The talks greatly encouraged Bowles, and when he returned to New Delhi he immediately sent an “eyes only” telegram to Rusk and the President urging a strong effort to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cambodia.75 Although the legal affairs division of the state department saw no problems with issuing an acceptable border declaration – a prerequisite for reestablishing relations – the administration was not yet ready for such a move. Setting back the movement toward improved relations was a statement by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy who, shortly after the Phnom Penh talks concluded, indicated that the United States had not given up its right to fight on Cambodian territory in self-defense. This created a momentary sensation and was roundly condemned by Cambodian diplomats, including Nong Kimny, who considered Bundy’s statements a deliberate attempt by hawks in Washington to undercut Bowles. Bowles privately expressed his disappointment at Bundy’s statement.76 More serious, yet another important border incident occurred less than a week after the Joint Communique. On 18 January an American patrol penetrated into Cambodia. Three Cambodian soldiers were killed, along with most of the Americans. Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann commented that whenever Cambodian-American relations began to improve, incidents of this sort always seemed to interfere.77 With unprecedented speed, the United States expressed its regrets even before its investigation was completed, but, after a muted initial response, Cambodia began to complain loudly that the United States had torn up the Joint Communique. Further adding to Cambodian suspicions, at just this time Martin Herz suddenly took over the state department’s Cambodia desk – a move motivated by the apparent incompetence of his predecessor, an officer who seemed unable even to brief American allies about the Bowles mission. Justifiable as the move might have been internally, William Bundy made a bad choice. The problem was that Sihanouk had never forgotten Herz’s book about Cambodia, which he considered a “fabric of lies and calumnies against Cambodia.” Herz himself, Sihanouk alleged, was a partisan of the hated Son Ngoc Thanh. Was Herz’s appointment, he asked, a signal that the state department planned to bring Thanh back to power in Phnom Penh?78 Perhaps partly as a consequence of these matters, in the immediate aftermath of the Bowles mission American efforts to reinvigorate the ICC went nowhere. Sihanouk allegedly told Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia that, despite his assurances to the Americans, he really did not want the ICC strengthened and that he had pretended to do so only to stave off an expected American military attack.79 Tito was probably misrepresenting Sihanouk’s views, but for the next several months American attempts to establish a more aggressive ICC were continually frustrated. At the end of January 1968 the United States could take some solace in Sihanouk’s renewed verbal attacks on local communists and on China and North

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 145 Vietnam. But he also attacked the United States for supporting a force of 2000 Khmer Serei that was set, he said, to invade Preah Vihear, and he remained firm in his requirement that the United States respect and recognize Cambodia’s borders. The state department acknowledged some truth in Sihanouk’s charges about the Khmer Serei and ordered its embassies in Thailand and South Vietnam to do all they could to get the attack called off. The mood in Washington over the next few months vacillated between optimism and pessimism. The trend in the U.S.-Cambodian relationship can be grasped by an examination of United States’ thinking about issuing an acceptable border declaration, to be followed by the resumption of diplomatic relations. Early in February 1968 the state department felt confident enough that progress might be made that it began drafting instructions to Bowles to open discussions with Kimny on an acceptable border declaration. This was soon postponed, however, as the United States decided to wait and see how Sihanouk responded to the VESUVIUS information. Three American dossiers went to Cambodia in the middle of February. Meanwhile, in the period after the infamous Tet Offense in Vietnam (which began on 30 January 1968), the American and South Vietnamese militaries planned large operations in the border areas, acknowledging in advance that this would probably result in firing into Cambodia and in some instances maneuvering across the border. In Vietnam, the Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (composed of Ambassadors Bunker, Leonard Unger, and William H. Sullivan, along with General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp) recommended ending restrictions on intelligence forays into Cambodia; approving small military operations into Cambodia, which, depending on developments, could be gradually expanded; and B-52 strikes.80 These planned operations surely contradicted Bowles’ assurances to Sihanouk that the United States would do everything it could to avoid border incidents. At the same time, however, the Americans were cheered to see Sihanouk was becoming increasingly outspoken about Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Pathet Lao interference in his country – in particular their alleged responsibility for stirring up unrest and rebellion, especially in Battambang province. Sihanouk moved his government rightward and cracked down hard on his leftist opponents, even executing some who were engaged in armed rebellion. By mid March Sihanouk’s strongly anticommunist policies at home, plus the fact that he was complying with the Joint Communique by receiving the VESUVIUS reports (and even assuring the Americans that he would try to verify the information the Americans had provided) finally convinced the administration that the advantages of exploring a possible resumption of relations outweighed the disadvantages. Exploratory talks were to begin at the end of March in New Delhi. But various unfavorable developments shelved them. For example, the Americans complained that Sihanouk refused to request ICC action against Vietnamese communist activity in his country. Indeed he refused to tell the Americans what

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actions if any he had taken on the basis of information the United States had provided. The Cambodians, for their part, protested several new border violations, some of them serious. In one instance the Cambodian Navy shot down an American reconnaissance plane. In another, American and South Vietnamese forces attacked the Cambodian border post at Bavet, which the Canadian member of the ICC stated appeared to be a “deliberate and unprovoked attack.”81 A little later the army arrested the Filipino crew and two American military guards on a tugboat that had entered Cambodian waters on the Mekong River. Sihanouk was further offended when the United States rejected Phnom Penh as the site of discussions with the North Vietnamese following Johnson’s startling decision to stop much of the bombing of North Vietnam. In sum, for several months after the Bowles mission, relations between the two countries deteriorated. Then suddenly – and unexpectedly – in June Sihanouk released the Americans taken prisoner on the tugboat, using the assassination of Robert Kennedy as a pretext. This, along with the Prince’s continued attacks on the communists, led the state department to renew the initiative to explore a possible resumption of relations. “There is rarely a ‘right’ moment to conduct this kind of operation,” Rusk admitted in June, but releasing the tugboat prisoners had removed an important obstacle.82 In Thailand Ambassador Unger remained unenthusiastic and predicted an angry Thai reaction. But he only asked that he be given a day’s advance notice to inform the Thai government. In Saigon, Bunker strongly resisted the new initiative. Despite Bunker’s resistance, Rusk was prepared to move ahead. But a major border incident on 29 June near the Cambodian village of Svay A Ngong in Prey Veng province threatened to postpone the effort. Sihanouk’s account of the incident was chilling: Two United States military helicopters attacked with machine guns a group of Cambodian peasants, including women and children, who were working the village . . . about one kilometer from the Vietnam frontier. Fourteen people were killed and four seriously wounded. The thirteen survivors stated that the cigarette-smoking American pilots, flying a few meters from the ground, launched a veritable manhunt during half an hour, methodically shooting down all who tried to flee, including women and children.83 It was the bloodiest border incident since the infamous Chantrea incident in 1964. Prime Minister Penn Nouth remarked that the Cambodians had not expected to be thanked for releasing the tugboat crew but they had not expected to be repaid only a few days later with a bloody massacre of innocent civilians.84 The official American investigation concluded that no American actions had taken place at Svay A Ngong. One helicopter had briefly entered Cambodian airspace on that day, the Americans acknowledged, but it was five kilometers away from the village and did not fire over Cambodian territory. Privately the Americans alleged that if the dead were Cambodians, their bodies must have

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 147 been transported from Vietnam into Cambodia after they had been killed. The Canadian representative on the ICC stated that the American case was “difficult to believe” and that it would be “very very difficult” for him to support it in the ICC “without being accused of (and in fact feeling like) apologist for USA.”85 Even as the Svay A Ngong tragedy was becoming known, two other important incidents also poisoned the relationship. Cambodians charged that twelve days after Svay A Ngong, an American aircraft flew over Prasat and fired machine guns at villagers while they worked. One person was killed, and two were injured. The American investigation concluded that it was unlikely that any American aircraft had attacked the target. Much more disrupting – to the Americans – was the Cambodian seizure of an American landing craft, the LCU 1577. On 17 July 1968 the ship was making its way up the Mekong River when it ventured into Cambodian waters where it was captured and the crew arrested. The Americans insisted that the boat had missed a turn and ended up inadvertently in Cambodia. They immediately apologized and asked for the return of the vessel and the crew of 11. Sihanouk professed to believe that the intrusion was deliberate. He treated the detainees well, but he would not return them or the boat and threatened to put them on trial. The Americans then spent enormous energy trying to get the crew released. They provided a detailed report of the incident to the Cambodians hoping to persuade them that the intrusion was inadvertent, enlisted the help of the Australians and then the British, and asked Bowles to see Nong Kimny in New Delhi. They secretly got a prominent Sri Lankan Buddhist leader to appeal to Sihanouk for the crew’s release. They considered asking Dean Acheson, Mike Mansfield, or Edward Brooke to write personally to Sihanouk. They also considered coercive measures. They could discourage tourists, suspend traffic on the Mekong River, apprehend Cambodian vessels suspected of violating Vietnamese territorial waters, increase aerial reconnaissance, and attack Viet Cong/North Vietnamese facilities in Cambodia. The South Vietnamese Foreign Minister suggested stationing a destroyer off Sihanoukville, but the United States rejected nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy. The idea that received the most serious consideration was to withhold needed American parts for a Cambodian ship that was being repaired in Hong Kong. The United States was also increasingly angry at what it regarded as Sihanouk’s toleration of Vietnamese communist forces that had been building up in the Parrot’s Beak area and the region adjacent to Tay Ninh province. A frustrated President Johnson said that if the Cambodians did not try to resist North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory, the United States would “destroy the North Vietnamese forces now in Cambodia.”86 Shortly thereafter the United States, through Deschamps, delivered to Sihanouk another VESUVIUS dossier. Early in August reports arrived of major clashes between Cambodian and Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces, followed by creditable reports that Sihanouk was looking for a pretext to release the landing craft’s crew, if not the boat itself. On 8 August 1968 he made a specific proposal. He would release the crew and the boat, provided the United States admitted responsibility for the Svay A

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Ngong killings and agreed to compensate Cambodia with fourteen bulldozers – one for each Cambodian killed. But the United States would not do this. As Deschamps put it, a bit cynically but not necessarily inaccurately, “the United States authorities, while apparently carefully investigating Cambodian charges of border violations almost invariably come up with a disclaimer of responsibility.”87 These matters, and particularly the impasse over the LCU matter, postponed progress on more fundamental matters. But at the end of August Bowles suggested that the United States propose to Sihanouk that if he would release the crew, the United States would, without final commitments, enter into discussions with him about a border declaration and the resumption of diplomatic relations.88 Bowles himself hoped to go to Phnom Penh incognito to discuss this with Sihanouk. However, Eugene Black, the President’s personal representative for Southeast Asian economic matters, who was already planning to go to Japan and Southeast Asia to discuss development of the Mekong river valley, was tapped instead. In the meantime, the state department had asked for Deschamps’ advice on how best to improve Cambodian-American relations. Although Deschamps was not optimistic about the relationship in the short run, he did think that Sihanouk was looking for ways to defuse the crisis and urged the Americans to be patient about the LCU crew (which the ambassador thought would be resolved before too long), to keep up with the presentations of the VESUVIUS dossiers (which Deschamps thought the Cambodians were taking seriously if quietly), and to avoid pressuring Sihanouk in any way because the result would be counterproductive. But the most important thing the United States could do, Deschamps thought, was to issue a border declaration, something which some forty other countries had already done.89 Deschamps, therefore, fully approved of Black’s mission to Phnom Penh (although both he and the Cambodians privately objected to the size of his entourage), which began on 11 September and ended on the 14th, for the American arrived with more authority than Bowles had been given in January. Black was to emphasize the problem of the Viet Cong’s abuse of Cambodian territory, but he was also authorized to discuss a border declaration, even the specific language, and to say that the United States would consider issuing one when it was clear that this would result in significantly improved relations.90 The Cambodians may well have expected Black to produce a border declaration immediately. And when that did not happen, little overt progress was made. Sihanouk did not personally receive Black, ostensibly on the grounds that the United States did not recognize his borders but more likely because communist countries objected strongly to the visit and because of internal Cambodian political imperatives. In the conversations, both sides reiterated their positions but said little that was new. After Black left Phnom Penh, one American official thought the possibility of an American border declaration and the resumption of diplomatic relations was now “dead.” Rostow, in an overly harsh assessment, informed President Johnson, that the “results were nil.” But Deschamps, who continually emphasized the need for patience, was probably more on the mark when he said

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 149 that the mission, “despite the lack of specific results, had been successful. The important thing . . . is to keep the dialogue going with the Cambodians.”91 The visit also made clear to the Cambodians that the United States was now not opposed in principle to a border declaration. Still, by the end of September the hopes that the Bowles mission had inspired in January had not been fulfilled. As Sihanouk himself put it in August, “the cooling-off period lasted only a short while.”92 The Americans were increasingly upset at Vietnamese communist use of Cambodia. In October Harriman and Sam A. Roberts, an American colonel with the American delegation at the Vietnam War peace talks in Paris, met with Deschamps and other Australian diplomats in Paris. Roberts told them that “virtually all of the arms and military supplies the enemy was now receiving in III and IV Corps and in the Southern half of II Corps were coming from Cambodia” and furthermore that the bulk of the supplies were coming through Sihanoukville, a point that Deschamps questioned.93 The Cambodian route was now favored, the America military thought, because they had succeeded in shutting down, or severely curtailing, supplies arriving from North Vietnam and Laos, as well as by sea through South Vietnam. Yet ultimately both sides wanted a better relationship. One advantage the Americans had was that, even as Sihanouk bitterly attacked the Americans, he was growing ever more angry at Cambodian leftists and their Chinese and North Vietnamese supporters, whom he continued to blame for civil unrest in Battambang. Furthermore, though he admitted only to minor incursions by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces into Cambodia, by some accounts he privately acknowledged that they controlled as much as one-third of Cambodian territory. As long as Sihanouk felt so threatened by the left, there was always the possibility that he would turn back toward the United States. He apparently told one Indian journalist that if the United States would only recognize Cambodia’s frontiers, it could reestablish an embassy with 100 persons and even assign CIA agents to Cambodia.94 Furthermore the Prince continued to say that he did not want the United States to withdraw entirely from Southeast Asia. Little progress was made in the next few weeks. But then reports began to surface to the effect that Sihanouk might well use the celebrations of Cambodian independence on 9 November as a time to set the LCU crew free. A further sign of Cambodia’s movement toward rapprochement was Sihanouk’s appointment of Thay Sok go to Washington to be the “custodian” of the shuttered Cambodian embassy. On 7 November Sihanouk made an important concession: he now said that he would release the LCU crew if the United States would only do its best to stop the border incidents. The United States responded by stating that it had issued “precautionary restraints” for operations near the border and would do its best to reduce incidents. Deschamps was optimistic. The Prince, he thought, wanted to restore relations soon; the recent complete American bombing halt of North Vietnam also helped the general atmosphere, the ambassador thought. It is very likely that Sihanouk would have released the LCU crew as a good will gesture during the Independence Day celebrations, had there not been yet

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another embarrassing border incident. On 6 November – the day before the government ordered “precautionary restraints” – there were two incidents that infuriated Sihanouk. In the first, helicopters attacked a Cambodian Public Works truck in eastern Cambodia, killing three people and wounding two others. The United States admitted later that the Cambodian complaint was “well founded.” Prime Minister Penn Nouth complained bitterly to Deschamps that conciliatory gestures to the United States “were invariably followed by incidents of this nature.” In the second incident, three helicopters attacked the village of Prey Tuol in Svay Rieng province, about two kilometers from the Vietnamese border. One Cambodian died, and 24 were injured, 11 seriously. The Americans concluded that this incident was “much exaggerated.”95 In any event, these incidents caused Sihanouk to change his intention to release the crew on 9 November.96 Nor did it help when on 16 November another attack occurred (the Giang Thanh River incident) in which 12 persons – mostly women and children – died in an alleged attack on a sampan. Even so, Sihanouk seemed determined to release the LCU crew as part of a larger strategy to improve relations with the United States. He told various people, including the French ambassador in Phnom Penh, that he would release the crew if only President Johnson himself would send him a personal message requesting him to do so. The United States had been considering a presidential letter since mid-November (one was actually prepared by 19 November), only to have the various border incidents postpone it. By 12 December it had been decided to send a letter, only to have it further postponed because of American concern about an enemy buildup near Saigon. Then on 16 December Lois M. Price of Columbus, Ohio – the mother of one of the LCU crew members – sent to the White House a copy of a letter that Sihanouk had written to her. In the letter Sihanouk again stated that he would release the crew if only the President would ask him personally. Why, Price asked, would Johnson not cable the Prince?97 The same day Johnson received Price’s letter he wrote a cordial and respectful letter to the Cambodian leader. As it happened, Johnson’s letter was delayed for a few hours in transmission (through the French), and before it arrived Sihanouk had decided to release the crew without condition. Two hours later Johnson’s letter arrived, at which point Sihanouk also agreed to release an injured American helicopter crewman who had been shot down over Cambodian territory – something he had not planned to do. The LCU crew, who had been treated extraordinarily well by the Cambodians and had even been treated to a luncheon by Sihanouk himself, were all home by Christmas. The United States was grateful. Sihanouk’s decision to release the crew without getting anything in return indicated that he was now seriously interested in improving relations with the United States. The use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese concerned him, as did the prospects of a communist-dominated Vietnam once peace had been attained. In addition, Cambodia’s economic situation had deteriorated. Finally, it seems likely that Sihanouk wanted to move toward a restoration of relations while Johnson was still President. In a speech to

Prelude to tragedy, 1965–1969 151 a Cambodian audience, Sihanouk said that Richard Nixon was a “wicked” man, though he hoped he might change once in office.98 Despite his great anger at Johnson’s escalation of the war in Vietnam and its spillover into Cambodia, Sihanouk realized that Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Johnson, Harriman, Bowles, and others had managed to keep the “hawks” in check. They had resisted recommendations for serious military action against Cambodia. Better to make peace with them than with a “wicked” Nixon. (Presumably Sihanouk did not know that shortly after he released the LCU Johnson lifted some of the restrictions on military activities near the border.) In addition to releasing the LCU detainees, Sihanouk’s desire for better relations was evident in his relatively low key reactions to even serious border incidents, his failure to complain about American overflights of remote areas of Cambodia (even though he knew about them), his strong attacks on Cambodian leftists, and especially his stated concern about Vietnamese communist abuse of his territory. For the first time, too, there were positive informal contacts on the border among Cambodian, South Vietnamese, and American military officials. Then in a speech at the end of December he told assembled diplomats that Cambodian leftists had betrayed the country and that Cambodia would now turn rightward. Sihanouk said that despite the recurrent border incidents and the ongoing campaign in American military circles for strong military actions against Cambodia (a campaign led on the outside by hard line columnist Joseph Alsop), he would persist in seeking to reestablish relations. “The door was thus open if there was a corresponding desire on the American side,” he said. Hearing this, Deschamps, who had previously been cautious about recommending that the United States restore relations with Cambodian, felt “more optimistic” about improved Cambodian-western relations “than at any time in the past six years.”99 Responding to the new situation, early in January 1969 the United States for the first time agreed to pay indemnities on its own (usually this was done through the South Vietnamese) to compensate the victims of American raids on Cambodian soil that had taken place the previous October and November. It also took responsibility for the killing of eight to ten Cambodians on 16 December when a secret DANIEL BOONE mission (intelligence teams that penetrated into Cambodia) – acting against its own rules of engagement – tried to stop a Cambodian truck to take a prisoner. The truck was carrying only rice. It was also evident that the state department was not entirely convinced of American innocence in the notorious Giang Thanh River sampan incident, since Rusk asked for additional information even after the final report (exonerating American forces) had been completed. Some thought was given to issuing the border declaration and reestablishing diplomatic relations before Nixon took over. But in the end the Johnson administration decided to leave these issues to its successor. Although Richard Nixon would reestablish diplomatic relations, Cambodia was on the brink of tragedy. Nixon also initiated the secret bombing of Cambodia’s sanctuaries and, after Sihanouk’s overthrow in 1970, ordered an invasion of the country. Quickly the country degenerated into a civil war. The bombing

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continued until August 1973, resulting in the deaths of at least 50,000 Cambodians. Half a million died in the civil war before the Khmer Rouge emerged victorious in 1975 and turned what remained of the country into the infamous “killing fields.” Another 1.7 million or so Cambodians perished. Relief came temporarily when Vietnamese troops finally ousted the Khmer Rouge at the end of 1978, but, thanks in part to the United States, the Khmer Rouge revived to fight another day. For over a decade internecine conflict continued. Only in the late 1990s did Cambodia achieve a modicum of peace and stability.

Abbreviations used in the notes 153

Abbreviations used in the notes

Acheson Papers Bundy Papers CDF CFPF CIA CINCPAC CMAA CNO Eisenhower Papers EXAF FO FRUS Hilsman Papers JCS Johnson Papers Kennedy Papers Melby Papers NA NAII NAA NAC NRC NSC OCB OF PSF RG Seaton Papers

Dean Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO McGeorge Bundy Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX Central Decimal File Central Foreign Policy File Central Intelligence Agency Commander in Chief, Pacific Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives, Colorado Springs, CO Chief of Naval Operations Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS External Affairs Office (Canberra, Australia, unless otherwise indicated) Foreign Office Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) Roger Hilsman Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX John F. Kennedy Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA John F. Melby Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO National Archives, Washington, DC National Archives II, College Park, MD National Archives of Australia, Canberra National Archives of Cambodia, Phnom Penh National Records Center, Suitland, MD (collections since moved to NAII) National Security Council Operations Control Board Official File President’s Secretary’s File Record Group Fred A. Seaton Papers, Dwight Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS

154

Abbreviations used in the notes

SS Stanton Papers Thomson Papers Trimble Papers Truman Papers USDS WHCF WHO

Secretary of State Edwin M. Stanton Papers, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT James C. Thomson, Jr. Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA William C. Trimble Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO U.S. Department of State White House Central File White House Office

Notes

155

Notes

1 Nineteenth and early twentieth century encounters 1 Milton Osborne, The Mekong: Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future (New York: Grove Press, 2000), 20. 2 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia (3rd ed.; Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 13–27. Chandler’s book is the best introduction to Cambodian history. 3 Osborne, Mekong, 29. 4 Ibid., 45–46. Chandler, History, 87. 5 Chandler, History, 99–132. 6 Technically Angkor was then in Siam, as was the province of Battambang. In 1907 the provinces were returned to Cambodia, partly due to the efforts of an American, Edward H. Strobel. William Shawcross, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia (Rev. ed.; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 43. 7 See, for example, “Travel Indochina – Trails Through Angkor,” www.travelindochina. com.au/CityFeature.asp?CityFeatureD=4; and Morris Dye, “Destination Cambodia: Angkor Renaissance,” Special to The Examiner Magazine, 30 April 2000, http:// morrisdye.com/angkor.html. 8 Frank Vincent, Jr., The Land of the White Elephant: Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in Burma, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China (4th ed., New York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), 221, 355. 9 Ibid., 355, 221, xii, 360–62. With “(for them) astonishing foresight,” Vincent observed, the local people had attempted to protect the statue of the Leper King by covering it with a thatched roof. 10 Ibid., 277–88. 11 In the Far East: A Narrative of Exploration and Adventure in Cochin-China, Cambodia, Laos, and Siam (London, Edinburgh, and New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1883), 171–3. 12 M. Maurel, “A Scientific Mission to Cambodia,” Popular Science Monthly, 30 ( January 1887): 310–22. 13 Adhémard Leclère, “Incidents of Cambodian Life,” ibid., 44 (April 1894): 776–80. Adhémard Leclère, “Superstition and Magic in Cambodia,” ibid., 53 (August 1898): 525–30. 14 Jacob E. Conner, “The Forgotten Ruins of Indo-China,” National Geographic 23 (March 1912): 209–11. 15 Ibid., 209–72. 16 Helen Churchill Candee, Angkor the Magnificent: The Wonder City of Ancient Cambodia (New York: Frederick P. Stokes Company, 1924), 4. Harry A. Franck, East of Siam: Ramblings in the Five Divisions of French Indo-China (New York: Century, 1926), 34–5, 78–9. 17 Candee, Angkor the Magnificent, 293. Candee did note, however, that the daily activities pictured on the bas reliefs at Angkor strongly resembled the everyday life of the current inhabitants.

156 18 19 20 21

22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40

Notes

Ibid., 147. Obituary, New York Times, 24 August 1949, 25. Franck, East of Siam, 77, 85. Candee, Angkor the Magnificent, 239–40. Ellen N. La Motte, “The Ruins of Angkor,” Harpers Monthly, February 1920, 365– 8. Arthur Davison Ficke, “Cambodian Sunset,” North American Review, July 1921, 52–3, 61. Lucy Martin Donnelly, “Babbitt at Angkor,” New Republic, 2 January 1924, 145. Unidentified letter to Bolyston A. Beal, 22 November 1931, U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of France, 1910–1929, M560, Microfilm reel 150 (hereafter cited as M560 and reel number). Henry S. Waterman to Nelson Trusler Johnson, 24 July 1930, M1442, reel 83. Waterman to SS, 25 July 1930, U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of France, 1910–1929, M1442, Microfilm reel 83 (hereafter cited as M1442 and reel number). Waterman to Stanley H. Ford, 13 October 1931, M1442, reel 83. Leland L. Smith, “Report on Cambodia,” 15 June 1922, enclosed in Leland L. Smith to SS, 16 June 1922, Despatch 144, M560, reel 151. Smith, “Automotive Exhibition in Indo-China,” 15 May 1924, 851G.797/1, M560, reel 152. Letter from E. Matyus, 26 September 1938, in “Inventaire des Documents du Fonds Résident Supérieur,” Phnom Penh, Paquet 1163, NAC. Quincy F. Roberts, “Public Works in French Indochina,” 11 September 1933, M1442, reel 83. James Grafton Rogers to Standard Oil Company of New York, n.d. [April 1931], M1442, reel 84. C. A. Thompson to USDS, 23 April 1931, M1442, reel 84. Smith, “Report on Cambodia.” Smith, “The Future of Cotton in Indo-China,” 17 September 1923, M560, reel 152. Smith to SS, 19 February 1924, M569, reel 152. Smith to SS, 28 August 1924, M560, reel 150. F. J. Defosse and Son, “Big Game Hunting in Indo-China” (pamphlet), enclosed in Waterman to SS, 30 May 1930, Despatch 193, M1442, reel 83. Robert J. Casey, Four Faces of Siva: The Detective Story of a Vanished Race (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1929), 107, 192, 270. See also Robert J. Casey, “Four Faces of Siva: The Mystery of Angkor,” National Geographic 54 (September 1928): 302–32. Casey, Four Faces of Siva, 107, 371–2. Hermann Norden, A Wanderer in Indo-China: The Chronicle of a Journey through Annam, Tong-King, Laos, and Cambodgia, with some Account of their People (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1931), 275–86. See, for example, Burton Holmes, “The Scenic Wonders of the World,” Popular Mechanics 62 (September 1934): 334–49, 116A; Gordon Alexander, “Nature in Siamese and Cambodian Art,” Scientific Monthly 41 ( July 1935): 29–37; and Truman Bailey, “Angkor: The Lost Kingdom of the Khmers,” Natural History 47 (April 1941): 212–26. Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). E. F. Irwin, With Christ in Indo-China: The Story of the Alliance Missions in French Indo-China and Eastern Siam (Harrisburg, PA: Christian Publications, 1937), 5. Quoted in Mr. and Mrs. J. D. Williams, “Visit to French Indo-China,” Alliance Weekly, 27 November 1926, 785. François Ponchaud, La Cathédrale de la rizière: 450 ans d’historie de l’Eglise au Cambodge (Paris: Le Sarment: Fayard, 1990). William Robinson and Mrs. D. W. Ellison, “Greetings from Indo-China Conference,” Alliance Weekly, 8 September 1928, 587. Clipping A. B. Simpson, “Cambodia: The Word, the Work, and the World,” (1885), 114, CMAA.

Notes

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41 Arthur L. Hammond, “Manuscript of History of Missionary Work in Cambodia” (manuscript), 65–6, CMAA. 42 Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 2. 43 Light in their Dwellings: A History of Forty Years of Missions in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Gospel Press of Cambodia, n.d.), 30, 10–12. Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 14. 44 Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 63. 45 Arthur L. Hammond, “The First Year’s Harvest in Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 15 November 1924, 320. 46 Light in their Dwellings, 18. John Sawin, “The Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China 1925–1930, Vol. II” (manuscript), 345, CMAA. 47 David W. Ellison, “The First Cambodian Graduates,” Alliance Weekly, 20 March 1948, 20. 48 Christian and Missionary Alliance, Fifty-third Year Annual Report of the General Council at Asheville, N.C. May 16–20, 1940 for the Year ended December Thirty-first, 1939 (n.p., n.d.), 48. 49 Light in their Dwellings, 14–15. 50 Mrs. N. M. Cressman, “In Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 22 September 1928, 616. 51 W. H. Holton, “Preaching to the Cambodian Chinese,” Alliance Weekly, 6 January 1951, 11. Christian and Missionary Alliance, The Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the Christian and Missionary Alliance for the Year 1930 (New York: [Christian and Missionary Alliance], 1931), 43. 52 John S. Sawin, “The Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China, Pre 1911– 1924, Vol. I” (manuscript), 302. “It would be difficult to overestimate the material benefits that have accrued to French Indo-China through the advent of the French,” wrote E. F. Irwin. Irwin, With Christ in Indo-China, 19. 53 Chandler, History, 163. 54 Sawin, “Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China, Vol. II,” 535. Smith, “The Political Situation in Indo-China,” M560, reel 152. 55 Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 16–20. 56 Sawin, “Christian and Missionary Alliance, Vol. I,” 316–17. 57 Ponchaud, La Cathédrale de la rizière, 96–97. “Requests from Prayer,” Alliance Weekly, 15 December 1928, 819. Light in their Dwellings, 18–19. Irwin, With Christ in Indo-China, 125. 58 Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 22–5. F. C. Peterson, “Open Hearts in Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 6 June 1936, 365. 59 David Ellison, “Pioneering in Siem Reap,” Alliance Weekly, 5 June 1937, 361. The Alliance missionaries felt vindicated when the official who had denied them permission to go to Chracréng soon died “suffering excruciating pain.” Light in their Dwellings, 20. 60 Christian and Missionary Alliance, Fifty-first Year Annual Report of the General Council at Oakland, California May 17–21, 1938 for the Year ended December Thirty-first, 1937 (n.p., n.d.), 56. 61 Alliance Weekly, 11 March 1939, 145. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Fifty-third Year Annual Report of the General Council at Asheville, N.C. May 16–20, 1940 for the Year ended December Thirty-first, 1939 (n.p., n.d.), 49. 62 Sawin, “The Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China,Vol. I,” 281. 63 Mrs. D. I. Jeffrey, “Two Weeks in Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 26 October 1935, 688. Furthermore, Mrs. Jeffrey was actually a missionary stationed in Vietnam who was only visiting the country. The Alliance’s Missionary Atlas, published every few years, did include basic information about the country and the people. 64 F. C. Peterson, “Commencing a Missionary Career Among the Cambodians,” Alliance Weekly, 10 July 1926. 65 Ellison, “The Gospel in Every Province,” ibid., 29 June 1929. Mr. and Mrs. J. D. Williams, “Visit to French Indo-China,” ibid., 27 September 1926, 776. Mrs. Gordon

158

Notes

H. Smith, “The First Native General Conference in Cambodia,” ibid., 11 October 1930, 667. Hammond, “Manuscript History,” 27. Alfred C. Snead, Missionary Atlas: A Manual of the Foreign Work of the Christian and Missionary Alliance (Harrisburg, PA: Christian Publications, 1936), 39. 66 Gordon H. Smith, “Forward to the Tribes,” Alliance Weekly, 6 May 1933, 281. H. N. Cressman, “Dawn for the Maa Tribe,” ibid., 7 October 1933, 632. 67 Alfred C. Snead, “Report of the Foreign Department,” Thirty-ninth Annual Report of The Christian and Missionary Alliance for the Year 1935 (New York: n.p., 1936), 21. Paul Gunter, “Only One of Cambodia’s Millions!” Alliance Weekly, 1 October 1927, 649.

2 Cambodia: the view from the United States, 1940–1954 1 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia (3rd ed.; Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 166. David W. Ellison, “Under New Masters,” Alliance Weekly, 28 November 1942, 760. 2 Chandler, History, 164–72. Martin Birnbaum, “Angkor: Ramblings and Recollections,” Natural History 54 (April 1954): 181–91. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea (London: Verso, 1985), 48. Kiernan argues that the bombing produced some Cambodian recruits for the Indochinese Communist Party. 3 David W. Ellison, “Under New Masters,” Alliance Weekly, 28 November 1942, 760– 2. David and Muriel Ellison were in Battambang during the Thai-French war. They left on 5 December 1941 for a conference in Thailand and were there when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Thailand. They were interned for six months, then repatriated to the United States. 4 Floyd Peterson to “Dear Folks,” 10 June 1942, RG 809-Cambodia, Box 4, folder 19, CMAA. “French Indo-China,” Alliance Weekly, 23 October 1943, 682. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Fifty-eighth Year Annual Report of the General Council at Nyack, New York May 29–31, 1945 for the Year ended December Thirty-first, 1944 (n.p., n.d.), 32. An important account of the Indochina mission’s experience during the war is in Christian and Missionary Alliance, Fifty-ninth Year Annual Report of the General Council at Nyack, New York May 29–31, 1945 for the Year ended December Thirty-first, 1945 (n.p., n.d.), 39–43. 5 Broadcast from Saigon, 2 November 1944, in Foreign Intelligence Report, Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information in New Delhi, 1–15 November 1944, in RG 59: Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Indochina: Internal Affairs, 1945–1949 (microfilm) (hereafter cited as RG 59, Indochina 1945–1949). Seven thousand youths reportedly joined a Youth Party to work with the Japanese and submit to Japanese military training. Japanese Domei broadcast, 13 March 1945, No. 5, 1–15 March 1945. Broadcast from Saigon, 30 March 1945, No. 6, 16–31 March 1945, RG 59, Indochina 1945–1949. 6 Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 47. For information on Son Ngoc Thanh and for internal developments in Cambodia during this period see ibid., 41–9, and David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 14–23. 7 Japanese Domei broadcast, 7 June 1945, in Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information in New Delhi, Foreign Intelligence Report, No. 11, 1–15 June 1945, in RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 8 Chandler, Tragedy, 25–6. Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 42–6. In the end, however, in a classic colonial act, Sihanouk “officially welcomed the acting French commissioner to Cambodia by reading a message composed for the occasion by the former résident supérieur.” Chandler, Tragedy, 27.

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9 “Remarks on Agenda for Bangkok Regional Conference as Pertaining to Indochina,” [21–6 June 1948], Southeast Asia Regional Conference, Bangkok, Siam, Box 9, folder 1, Melby Papers. 10 Osborne, Sihanouk, 48. 11 Jefferson Caffery to SS, 28 November 1945, 851G.00/11-2845, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Caffery to Byrnes, 14 December 1945, 851G.00/12-1445, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Caffery to SS, 14 December 1945, 851G.00/12-1445, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 12 Unsigned from Saigon to SS, 30 January 1946, 851G.00/1-3046, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Also in FRUS 1946, 7: 20–1. 13 Charles Reed to SS, 9 May 1947, 851G.00/5-947, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. In the elections the Democratic Party, which would later emerge as an opposition party, captured 60 percent of the votes. 14 Memorandum of Conversation, Francis Lacoste, Charlton Ogburn, Jr., 12 September 1947, 851G.00/9-1247, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Kenneth Landon to James Penfield, 12 September 1947, 851G.00/9-1247, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Reed to SS, 26 December 1947, 851G.00/12-2647, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 15 Charles W. Yost to SS, 24 December 1945, 851G.00/12-2445, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Memorandum of Conversation, Withrow, Moffat, and Sharp, 19 December 1945, 851G.00/12-1945, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 16 Light in Their Dwellings: A History of Forty Years of Missions in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: The Gospel Press of Cambodia, n.d.), 35. D. W. Ellison, “Delivered from Death,” Alliance Weekly, 27 July 1946, 473–4. 17 Muriel Elliott to Mrs. Hines, 12 May 1946, RG 809 – Cambodia, Box 4, folder 19, CMAA. “Growth in the Church,” Alliance Weekly, 23 August 1947, 536. 18 Reed to SS, 8 August 1946, 851G.00/8-846, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Unsigned message from Saigon to SS, 14 August 1946, 851G.00/8-1446, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. See also unsigned message from Saigon to SS, 27 April 1946, 851G.00/4-2746. David Ellison reported that “several hundred” Issaraks were involved in the attack that killed about twenty persons. The Issaraks also suffered heavy losses. David W. Ellison, “How God Worked in Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 28 December 1946, 809. 19 Edwin F. Stanton to SS, 22 August 1946, 851G.00/8-2246, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Later the French apologized, admitting that the attackers could have gotten the arms in any number of ways, and they regretted insinuating that the American had supplied them. Reed to SS, 24 September 1946, 851G.00/9-2446, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 20 Unsigned message from Saigon to SS, 10 August 1946, 851G.00/8-1246, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Reed to SS, 12 August 1946, 851G.00/8-1246, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. For a discussion of Khmer rebel activity in this period, see Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 51–5, although he does not mention the Siem Reap incident specifically. 21 David W. Ellision, “First Cambodian Christian Martyrs,” Alliance Witness, 15 March 1947, 169–70. 22 Reed to SS, 7 November 1946, 851G.00/11-746, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Stanton to SS, 7 January 1947, 851G.00/1-747, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Stanton to SS, 13 January 1947, 851G.00/1-1347, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Reed to SS, 16 January 1947, 851G.00/1-1647, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Reed to SS, 4 February 1947, 851G.00/2-247, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 23 Josselyn (for Moffat) to SS, 7 January 1947, 851G.00/1-747, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. 24 Stanton to SS, 7 January 1947, 851G.00/1-747, Reed to SS, 7 November 1946, 851G.00/11-746, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Stanton to SS, 7 January 1947,

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28

29 30

31 32

33

34 35 36

37

38

Notes 851G.00/1-747, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Stanton to SS, 13 January 1947, 851G.00/1-1347, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949 (also published in FRUS 1947, 6: 56–7). Reed to SS, 7 November 1946, 851G.00/11-746, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 56. Kiernan asserts that both the Lao and Cambodian rebel forces concluded on the basis of this incident that the United States would not resist the French. Reed to SS, 25 February 1947, 851G.00/2-2447, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Wester had served previously as the predecessor of Lt. Col. Peter Dewey, who was later the first American to die in postwar Indochina. George Marshall to U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 1 May 1947, 851G.00/2-2547, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Stanton to SS, 20 June 1947, 851G.00/6-2047, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. J. D. Wester to Stanton, 14 June 1947, 851G.00/6-1447, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Sixty-first year Annual Report for 1947 and Minutes of the General Council held at Seattle, Washington, May 12–17, 1948 (n.p, n.d.), 68–9. For discussions of the Khmer Issarak movements in 1947 and 1948, see Chandler, Tragedy, 33–6, and Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 54–61. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 57. See also Chandler, Tragedy, 36–9. George M. Abbott to SS, 6 August 1948, 851G.00/8-648, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949 (also printed in FRUS 1948, 6: 36–7). Abbott to SS, 19 August 1948, 851G.00/8-1948, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949 (also printed in FRUS 1948, 6: 37–8). Abbott to SS, 23 December 1948, FRUS 1948, 6: 55–6. Chandler, Tragedy, 43. Abbott to SS, 24 December 1949, 851G.00/12-2449, RG 59, Indochina, 1945– 1949. Memorandum of Conversation, M. Daridan, Landon, James L. O’Sullivan, 2 March 1948, 851G.00/3-248, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Abbott to Marshall, 28 August 1948, 851G.00/8-2848. Abbott to Marshall, 29 September 1948, 851G.00/ 9-2948. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Sixty-second Year Annual Report for 1948 and Minutes of the General Council held at Rochester, N.Y. May 18–24, 1949 (n.p., n.d.), 71. “Regional Repercussions of Indochinese Conflict,” in “Southeast Asia Regional Conference, June 21–June 26, 1948, Bangkok, Siam: Section VI: Regional Repercussions of continued Hostility in Indochina,” Box 9, folder 2, Melby Papers. “Southeast Asia Conference, Monday, June 21, 1948,” Southeast Asia Regional Conference, Bangkok, Siam, Box 9, folder 1, Melby Papers. “Regional Repercussions of Indochinese Conflict.” “Regional Repercussions of Indochinese Conflict.” Abbott to SS, 23 February 1949, 851G.00/2-2349, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Abbott to SS, 11 February 1949, 851G.00/2-1149, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. The French adviser to the provincial governments in Siem Reap and Kompong Thom confided that “the situation was far from satisfactory.” American military intelligence, by contrast, reported that there was only “an insignificant independence movement” in Cambodia. (“Memorandum on Indochina for New Delhi Foreign Service Conference,” Saigon, 12 February 1949, Sect. III – Military Situation in Indochina, reported by Lt. Wm. E. Hunter, American Embassy Bangkok, enclosed in Abbott to SS, 5 May 1949, 851G.00/5-549, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949.) Alliance Witness, 25 June 1949, 411. David W. Ellison, “In Peril of Bandits,” ibid., 22. October 1949, 681. See also Harry Taylor, “Mekong Evangel,” ibid., 1 October 1949, 636. Taylor reported that “rebel forces are becoming more numerous and better armed.” Abbott to SS, 16 November 1949, 851G.00/11-1649, RG 59, Indochina, 1945– 1949. Memorandum of Conversation, Malcolm MacDonald et al., 25 November 1949, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 60–1. For

Notes

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40

41 42

43

44

45 46

47 48 49

50 51

161

a study of the influence of Vietnamese communists on the Issarak movement, see Motoo Furuta, “The Indochina Communist Party’s Division into Three Parties: Vietnamese Communist Policy toward Cambodia and Laos, 1948–1951,” in Takashi Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta, eds, Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1992), 143–64. Stanton, “Closing Remarks,” 26 June 1948, at the Southeast Asia Regional Conference, 21–6 June 1948, Bangkok, Siam, Box 9, folder 1, Melby Papers. “A Summary of Regional Repercussions of Continued Hostilities in Indochina,” in “Southeast Asia Regional Conference, June 21–June 26, 1948, Bangkok, Siam: Section VI: Regional Repercussions of Continued Hostility in Indochina,” Box 9, folder 2, Melby Papers. Memorandum to the French government, enclosed in W. Walton Butterworth to David K. E. Bruce, 6 June 1949, 851G.01/6-649, RG 59, Indochina, 1945–1949. “A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia,” (NSC-51), 1 July 1949, 6, Truman Papers, PSF-Subject File, National Security Council (Reports-5-Somers), folder “Reports – to NSC for Information,” Box 198. “A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia,” (NSC-51), 1 July 1949, 7–14. Memorandum of Conversation, Dean Acheson and Jawaharlal Nehru, 12 October 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 74. Carlos Romulo to Acheson, 2 March 1950, Box 75, Acheson Papers. Acheson to Harry S. Truman, 2 February 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 203 F, Box 771. Also in FRUS 1950, 6: 716. Memorandum of Conversation, Henri Bonnet, Acheson, Livingston T. Merchant, 16 February 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 75. Note, 16 February 1950, attached to Memorandum of Conversation, Henri Bonnet, Acheson, Livingston T. Merchant, 16 February 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 75. “A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina” (NSC-64), 27 February 1950, PSF, Box 211, Truman Papers. Sihanouk himself had also requested aid as soon as the United States extended formal diplomatic recognition. Robert S. Folsom (for Abbott) to SS, 13 February 1950, FRUS 1950, 6: 729. Acheson to U.S. Embassy France, 29 March 1951, FRUS 1951, 6: 768–71. Memorandum of Conversation, Lacy and B. V. Keskar, 30 October 1950, FRUS 1951, 6: 910–13. Cross Reference Sheet, Dean Acheson, 9 March 1950, WHCF: Confidential File, Acheson Papers, Box 61. Weekly Review, 10 May 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 59. “National Security Council Progress Report by the Undersecretary of State on the Implementation of . . . NSC 64,” 15 March 1951, Truman Papers, PSF, Box 211. Memorandum of Conversation, Truman, Acheson, Omar Bradley, 25 June 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 75. John F. Melby to John Davies, 31 August 1950, Box 12, Melby Papers. Melby to Lacy, 29 September 1950, Melby Papers, Box 12. George Kennan to Acheson, 21 August 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 67. Sonn Voeun Sai, “Memorandum Concerning American Aid to be Furnished to Cambodia,” 22 July 1950, Melby Papers, Far East File, General Headquarters Armed Forces, Box 5, folder 1. Le Programme de l’aide Economique Americaine au Cambodge 1955– 1959 (Phnom Penh: Administration de Coopération internationale, mission d’aide Americain au Cambodge, 1960), 8, in Fonds Affaires Estrange, Boite 57, NAC. Edmund A. Gullion to SS, 21 June 1950, 751H.00/6-2150, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 25 August 1950, 751H.00/8-2550, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Catlett to SS, 6 December 1950, 751H.00/12-650, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Gedney was in Cambodia under a Rockefeller Foundation grant. He thought

162

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54 55 56 57 58

59

60 61

62

63 64

Notes reports of rebel activity in Cambodia were exaggerated, particularly in areas north of the great lake. “There is simply no basis for the wild stories of dangers that we heard constantly in Phnom Penh,” he wrote after a trip to Siem Reap and other areas of Cambodia. “. . . I think everybody in Phnom Penh has simply succumbed to the natural human temptation to sensationalize.” And he argued that certain groups, including the French, corrupt officials, and even American missionaries had a vested interest in portraying a country in chaos. Gedney admitted that he could not evaluate the situation south of the lake, an area that in March he had found “really terrifying.” Gedney to Catlett (n.d.), enclosed in Catlett to SS, 6 December 1950, 751H.00/ 12-650, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 78–80. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Sixty-fourth Year Annual Report for 1950 and Minutes of the General Council held at St. Louis, Missouri May 16–21, 1951 (n.p., n.d.), 90. Memorandum of Conversation, King Norodom Sihanouk, Heath, and Catlett, 27 November 1950, enclosed in Catlett to SS, 29 November 1950, 751H.00/11-2950, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Catlett to SS, 19 October 1950, 751H.00/10-1950, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 25 May 1951, 751H.00/5-2551, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954 (also in FRUS 1951, 6: 421–3). Heath to SS, 25 May 1951, 751H.00/5-2551, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Catlett to SS, 3 July 1951, 751H.00/7-151, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Chandler, Tragedy, 57. Osborne, Sihanouk, 67. Sihanouk himself had been trying for years to persuade the French to release Thanh and allow him to return to Cambodia. Sihanouk may have thought that a grateful Thanh would be useful to him. See Chandler, Tragedy, 57–8. Catlett to SS, 19 December 1951, 751H.00/12-1951, RG 59, Indochina 1950– 1954. Catlett to SS, 10 March 1951, 751H.00/3-1051, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Acheson to U.S. Legation Saigon, for Phnom Penh, 3 April 1951, 751H.00/3-1051, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Catlett to SS, 22 April 1951, 751H.00/4-2251, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. American policy toward Cambodia is spelled out in James E. Webb to James S. Lay, Jr., “First Progress Report on NSC 64, ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina’,” 15 March 1951, enclosed in W. G. Lalor and E. H. J. Carns to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 March 1951, RG 218 ( JCS), Geographic File 1951– 1953, 092 Asia (6-25-48), Sec. 12, NA. “Remarks of the Newly Appointed Minister of Cambodia Nong Kimny upon the Occasion of the Presentation of his letters of Credence,” [ June 1951], Truman Papers, OF 203 F, Box 771. Pupils of the Seventh Grade, Bryant School, Sherman, TX, to Truman, 5 April 1951, Truman Papers, OF 203 F, Box 771. Memorandum of Conversation, Coesol Dit Chhoum and Stanton, 16 January 1952, 751H.00/1-1652, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Catlett to SS, 15 March 1952, 751H.00/3-1552, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 125. The most detailed account of dissident and revolutionary activities in Cambodia during this period is Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 65–134. Catlett to SS, 20 March 1952, 751H.00/3-2052, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. If he was in touch with Dap Chhuon, there was no agreement. In September 1952 Chhuon led government troops in a raid that seriously hurt Thanh’s forces. On the other hand, he may have attempted to work with the Viet Minh, though if so his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 98–102. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 102. Heath to SS, 24 March 1953, 751H.00/ 3-2452, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 24 March 1952, 751H.00/ 3-2452, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 28 May 1952, 751H.00/5-2852, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 2 June 1952, 751H.00/6-252, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954.

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65 Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson and Leslie K. Munro, 15 April 1952, Acheson Papers, Box 79. 66 Chandler, Tragedy, 65. Gullion to SS, 30 June 1952, 751H.00/6-3052, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 16 October 1952, 751H.00/10-1652, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 67 Joseph J. Montllor to SS, 15 January 1953, 751H.00/1-1553; Heath to SS, 30 January 1953, 751H.00/1-30-3053; Montllor to SS, 25 February 1953, 751H.00/ 2-2553; Heath to SS, 10 January 1953, 751H.00/1-1053; Montllor to SS, 25 February 1953, 751H.00/2-2553; all in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 68 John Foster Dulles to U.S. Embassy Saigon (for Phnom Penh), 17 February 1953, 751H.00/2-1753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 9 March 1953, 751H.00/3-953, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. The American representatives considered the new High Commissioner, Jean Risterucci, and the Commanding General, Pierre de Langlade, much more tactful than their predecessors. The diplomats also thought that the French language press in Indochina was too provocative and gave the unfortunate impression that Sihanouk had acted at the behest of the French. Heath to SS, 27 February 1953, 751H.00/2-2753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 69 Montllor to SS, 9 April 1953, 751H.00/4-953; Heath to SS, 16 March 1953, 751H.00/3-1653, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 70 Chandler, Tragedy, 68. New York Times, 19 April 1953, 1, 13. 71 Francis R. Valeo, Oral History Interview by Donald Ritchie, 3 July 1985–11 March 1986, 100, Kennedy Library. 72 Robert McClintock to SS, 27 April 1953, 751H.00/4-2753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. For discussions of the “royal crusade” for independence, see Chandler, Tragedy, 67–72, and Osborne, Sihanouk, 74–81. 73 Dulles to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 28 April 1953, 751H.00/4-2753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 74 Dulles to U.S. Embassies Paris and Saigon, 29 April 1953, 751H.00/4-2853, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Memorandum of Discussion at the 143rd Meeting of the National Security Council, 6 May 1953, FRUS 1953, 13: 548. 751H.00/4-3053, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 75 Montllor to SS, 3 June 1953, 751H.00/6-353, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 76 Montllor to SS, 9 May 1953, 751H.00/5-953, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Memorandum of Conversation, Philip W. Bonsal and Nong Kimny, 13 May 1953, 751H.00/ 5-1353, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 77 Montllor’s remark is from a conversation with an Australian official, reported in Australian Legation Saigon, 1 July 1953, Savingram 17, A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 2, NAA. The United States agreed that the French action had undermined the preliminary agreement. Dillon to SS, 19 June 1953, 751H.00/ 6-1953, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 78 Montllor to SS, 15 May 1953, 751H.00/5-1553, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Memorandum of Conversation, Nong Kimny, Day, and Robert E. Hoey, 23 June 1953, 751H.00/6-2353, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Son Ngoc Thanh did not do so but, according to a French source, reportedly said, “I was wrong in believing that Sihanouk was a plaything of the French; he is a patriot.” (Dillon to SS, 19 June 1953, 751H.00/6-1953, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954.) On Issaraks rallying to Sihanouk, see secretary, Australian Legation Saigon to EXAF, 23 June 1953, and 1 July 1953, Savingram 17, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 2, NAA. 79 Trapnell’s actions are referred to in Heath to SS, 14 September 1953, 751H.00/ 9-1453, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 30 June 1953, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. (No number assigned; Microfilm reel 34.) Walter B. Smith to U.S. Embassies Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, 1 July 1953, 751H.00/7-153, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954.

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80 Dulles to U.S. Embassies Saigon, Paris, Phnom Penh, 1 July 1953, 751H.00/7-153, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Smith to U.S. Embassies Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, 1 July 1953, 751H.00/7-153, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. The United States also suggested that the French remove African and Vietnamese troops from Phnom Penh. 81 Montllor to SS, 4 July 1953, 751H.00/7-453, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 82 Montllor to Department of State, 13 July 1953, 751H.551/7-1353, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Dulles to U.S. Embassies Saigon and Paris, 27 August 1953, Tel. 328, Declassified Documents Series. The American ambassador in London expressed to his Cambodian counterpart American disappointment at the Cambodia’s failure to negotiate with the French. The results of the conversation were reportedly “disappointing” to the Americans. Australian High Commissioner’s Office London, to EXAF, 23 July 1953, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 2, NAA. 83 Montllor to SS, 10 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1053, RG 59, Indochina 1950– 1954. 84 Heath to SS, 12 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1253, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954 (also in FRUS 1952–54, 13: 798–800). Heath wrote, the “Cambodian situation has taken serious turn for the worse.” Dulles to U.S. Embassies Saigon and Phnom Penh, 11 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1153, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 85 Heath to SS, 17 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Noël Deschamps, Australian Embassy Paris, to secretary, EXAF, 14 September 1953, Memo 736, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 2, NAA; Montllor to SS, 17 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1753, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954 (also printed in FRUS 1952–54, 13: 807–9). 86 Heath to SS, 18 September 1953, 751H.00/9-1853, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. Heath to SS, 24 September 1953, 751H.00/9-2453, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 87 Heath to SS, 25 September 1953, 751H.00/9-2553, RG 59, Indochina 1950– 1954. Sihanouk “gave the impression of a man who had traveled so far through regions of despair,” reported Heath, “that he had achieved a certain detached attitude toward his own fate and that of the people around him.” 88 Chandler, Tragedy, 71. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 131–2. Muriel and David Ellison to “Friends and Fellow-workers,” 21 November 1953, RG 809, Cambodia, Box 4, folder 19, CMAA. 89 Chandler, Tragedy, 68. 90 The two were Chantarangsei and Savang Vong. Montllor to SS, 15 March 1954, 751H.00/3-1553, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. M. Bliss Steiner, “Cambodian Christians Stand True,” Alliance Weekly, 18 May 1955, 9. 91 Montllor to SS, 25 November 1953, 751H.00/11-2553, RG 59, Indochina 1950– 1954. Montllor to SS, 1 February 1954, 751H.00/2-154, RG 59, Indochina 1950– 1954. Montllor to SS, 11 February 1954, 751H.00/2-1154, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954. 92 Chandler, Tragedy, 75. For a discussion of Issarak and Viet Minh activity after the Franco-Cambodian agreement and Sihanouk’s acceptance of independence, see Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 132–4. 93 “Sino-Soviet Direction and Nature of the Indo-China Conflict,” 19 January 1954, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Council Staff: Papers, 1948–1961. Eisenhower Papers, OCB, Central File Series, OCB 091 (File #1) (1), Box 37 (Indochina November 1953–July 1954. Radford to Secretary of Defense, 12 March 1954, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB, Central File Series, OCB 091 (File #1) (1), Box 37 (Indochina November 1953–July 1954). Dulles to USDS, 19 February 1954, in FRUS 1952–1954, 15: 416. 94 Dillon to USDS, 13 March 1954, in FRUS 1952–1954, 15: 456. 95 Getz Memcom, 8 April 1954, ibid., 506–7. Dillon to USDS, 14 April 1954, ibid., 518–19. Dillon to USDS, 15 April 1954, ibid., 524. United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 22 April 1954, ibid., 545.

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96 See, for example, Position Paper Prepared for the Indochina Phase of the Geneva conference, 24 March 1954, prepared by Bonsal and revised and approved by the working group on 23 March, ibid., 482; Dillon to Dulles, 16 April 1954, ibid., 527– 29; U.S. delegation to the Department of State, 2 June 1954, ibid., 1005. 97 Memorandum, Joseph A. Yager, 3 May 1954, ibid., 684–5. Memorandum, Chester L. Cooper and Yager to Heath, 3 June 1954, ibid., 1023–9. 98 Chandler, Tragedy, 71. Georges Bidault, in 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, 6 May 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, 1953–1961, NSC Series, Box 5. 99 Zhou Enlai, quoted in U.S. Delegation to USDS, Third Plenary Session on Indochina, 12 May 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 781. Smith to SS, 23 May 1954, in Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1952–1961, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 11, folder Indochina. Also in FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 895–6. 100 205th Meeting of the NSC, 1 July 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, 1953–1961, NSC Series, Box 5. U.S. Delegation to USDS, 9 June 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 1096, 1088–90. 101 For example, U.S. Delegation to USDS, 18 June 1954, ibid., 1181–4. 102 “Outline of General Smith’s Remarks to the President and Bipartisan Congressional Group,” 23 June 1954, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1952–61, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 11, file Indochina 1954. There is tantalizing, but inconclusive, evidence that China’s main concern was not American bases in Cambodia but a desire to keep the Vietnamese out, with the eventual hope to incorporate Cambodia, as well as Laos, “into its own sphere of influence.” William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 182. 103 U.S. Delegation to the USDS, 22 June 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 1213–15. U.S. Delegation to the USDS, 24 June 1954, ibid., 1233. Dillon to Department of State, 24 June 1954, ibid., 1239–40. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 150–1. 104 The Geneva Agreements with respect to Cambodia are in FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 1531–9. 105 Memorandum, Charles Stelle, 9 April 1954, ibid., 508. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 179–80. Dulles to the Acting SS, 13 April 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 514. 106 Memorandum, Elizabeth Brown, 20 April 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 537. 107 United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers, Meeting, 22 April 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, 16: 546. USDS to Dillon, 26 May 1954, ibid., 968n1. Fifth Plenary Session on Indochina, Geneva, 8 June 1954; the U.S. Delegation to USDS, 8 June 1954, ibid., 1073. 108 Statement by Dulles at a press conference, 23 July 1954, ibid., 1551. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Press Conference, 21 July 1954, ibid., 1503. 109 Herman Pleger to SS, 27 July 1954, Annex C to NSC, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East,” NSC 5429, 4 August 1954, Declassified Documents Series. 110 “Cambodia,” Alliance Weekly, 30 June 1954, 9. Harry Taylor, “Unprecedented Opportunities,” ibid., 5 May 1954, 9.

3 Arming Cambodia, 1954–1957 1 Herbert I. Goodman to SS, 18 June 1954, Despatch 89, 751H.551/6-1854, RG 59, Indochina 1950–54, reel 36. Goodman to SS, 11 August 1954, Despatch 55, 751H.5/ 8-1154, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. 2 Walter S. Robertson to SS, 15 September 1954, 751H.5/9-1554, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. “Memorandum for Ambassador McClintock,” 23 August 1954, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, WHO, NSC Staff:

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13 14 15 16

17 18 19

Notes Papers, 1948–1961, OCB, Central Files Series, OCB 091 Indochina (file #3)(2), Box 38. Sullivan to McClintock, 27 August 1954, 751H.5/8-2754, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. OCB, “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Cambodia and Recommended Action,” 16 November 1955, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948– 1961, OCB Central File, Box 39, folder OCB 091, Indo-China (file #5)(2). Butterworth to SS, 29 August 1954, Despatch 1045, 751H.58/8-2954, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Heath to SS, 31 August 1954, 751H.5/8-3154. R. Anderson to SS, 9 September 1954, 751H.5/9-954, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. McClintock to SS, 4 October 1954, 751H.5/10-454, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Hoover to McClintock, 21 October 1954, Tel. 111, 751H.5 MSP/10-215; Hoover to McClintock, 22 October 1954, Tel. 116, 751H.5 MSP/10-2254; McClintock to SS, 3 November 1954, 751H.5 MSP/11-354; all in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. For example, SS to McClintock, 26 October 1954, 751H.5 MSP/10-2654, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Excerpt of a telegram from the United Kingdom representative in Phnom Penh to the FO, London, 6 November 1954, provided to the Australian EXAF by the Office of the British High Commissioner Canberra, 30 November 1954, Series A1838/ 283, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 1, NAA. The conversation with McClintock took place on 23 October. McClintock to SS, 16 November 1954, Tel. 257, 751H.5/11-1654, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Dulles to McClintock, 18 November 1954, 751H.5 MSP/111854, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. McClintock to SS, 18 November 1954, Tel. 267, 751H.5/11-1854, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. McClintock to SS, 30 November 1954, Tel. 312, 751H.5 MSP/11-3054; Dulles to McClintock, 21 December 1954, Tel. 223, 751H.5 MSP/12-2151; both in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. McClintock to SS, 22 December 1954, Tel. 398, 751H.5 MSP/12-2254; Radford to Anderson and JCS, enclosed in Department of the Navy to SS, 27 December 1954, Tel. 271919Z, 751H.5 MSP/12-2754; both in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Douglas MacArthur II to Robertson and Young, 28 December 1954, 751H.5 MSP/ 12-2854; Dulles to McClintock, 29 December 1954, Tel. 242, 751H.5 MSP/122754 [sic]; both in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. McClintock to SS, 30 December 1954, Tel. 427, 751H.5 MSP/12-3054; McClintock to SS (for Robertson), 31 December 1954, Tel. 430, 751H.5 MSP/12-3154; both in RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 36. Douglas Dillon to USDS, 6 January 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 404–7. McClintock to USDS, 11 January 1955, ibid., 408. Three days later McClintock wrote that the French idea of cooperation in Cambodia was like having the United States “act as angel for Broadway play, paying all debts, with French running show even though it may turn out to be a flop.” McClintock to SS, 14 January 1955, Tel. 480, 751H.5-MSP/1-1455, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959. A. C. Davis to Admiral Radford, 14 January 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 412. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 14 January 1955, ibid., 413–14. Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 24 January 1955, ibid., 417–18. “Preliminary Working Draft Prepared in the Department of Defense at OCB Meeting, 19 January 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Special Working Group (Indochina), Progress Report by the Department of Defense Representative,” WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB, Central Files Series, OCB 091 Indochina ( File #3)(2), Box 38. McClintock to

Notes

20

21 22

23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40

167

SS, 20 January 1955, Tel. 512, 751H.5-MSP 1-2055, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959. David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 76. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975 (London: Verso, 1985), 158. McClintock to USDS, 27 January 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 418–20. McClintock to SS, 29 January 1955, Tel. 551, 751H.5-MSP/1-2955, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 26. McClintock to USDS, 27 January 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 418–20. McClintock to USDS, 3 February 1955, Tel. 573, 751H.00/2-355, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 20. McClintock to USDS, 29 January 1955, Tel. 554, 751H.00/1-2955, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. McClintock to USDS, 29 January 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 420–2. Ibid. Herbert J. Hoover to U.S. Embassy in Paris, 2 February 1955, ibid., 185–7. Memorandum of Conversation, USDS, 14 February 1955, ibid., 424–6. Memorandum, Robertson to Dulles, 5 February 1955, 751H.5/2-555, RG 59, Indochina 1950–1954, reel 26. Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, 14 February 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 428. Dulles to Robert B. Anderson, 15 February 1955, ibid., 429–30. Arthur Radford to Charles E. Wilson, 16 February 1955, RG 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ), Geographic files 1954–1956, 092 (Asia 6-25-48) (2), Sec. 5, Box 7, NA. (Also in FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 431–2.) Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 19 February 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 432. Dulles to USDS, 2 March 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 433–5. McClintock to SS, 6 March 1955, Tel. 704, 751H.00 (W)/3-655, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Dulles to USDS, 2 March 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 433–5. Dulles to USDS, 2 March 1955, ibid., 435. Charles E. Wilson to Dulles, 16 March 1955, ibid., 437–8. Robert D. Burfans to the Department of the Army for G2, USDS, 20 March 1955, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographical file 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2), Sec. 6, Box 8, NA. Also printed in FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 439–40. Dulles to Wilson, 25 March 1955, 751H.5/3-1655, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 26. Theodore C. Achilles to USDS, 25 March 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 440–1. Robert B. Anderson to Dulles, 6 April 1955, ibid., 442–3. McClintock to USDS, 1 April 1955, Despatch 386, 751H.00/4-155, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. Lyman D. Bothwell to J. B. Egan, 18 April 1955, RG 319 (Records of the Army Staff, Records of the General Staff, Records of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations [G-3]), Security Classified Correspondence, 1956: 091 Indochina, Box 50, NA. Robertson to Dulles, 3 May 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 448–50. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Douglas MacArthur II, 5 May 1955, ibid., 450. Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 4 May 1955, Despatch 590, 751H.00/5-455; McClintock to USDS, 6 May 1955, Despatch 1011, 751H.00/5655; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. D. W. McNicol to EXAF, 28 May 1955, Savingram 67, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/9 Part 1, NAA. McNicol to EXAF, 28 May 1955, Savingram 67, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/9 Part 1, NAA. Unsigned NSC document, “Cambodia,” [undated but ca. 1 June 1955; a note indicates that a copy was sent to Elmer Staats on 2 June 1955], Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, OCB Central File, Box 39, folder OCT 091, Indo-China (file #4)(2). Subsequent versions of this paper omitted this passage and

168

41 42 43

44

45 46 47 48 49 50

51

52 53 54

55 56

Notes put a possible training role in the context of a future request from the Cambodian government. See draft paper, “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Cambodia (pursuant to NSC Action 1290d) and Recommended Action,” 16 June 1955, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB Central File, Box 39, folder OCT 091, Indo-China (file #4)(2). Martin F. Herz to USDS, 28 May 1955, Despatch 1116, 751H.00/2-2855, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. McClintock to USDS, 13 June 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 451–3. McClintock to USDS, 16 June 1955, Despatch 1216, 751H.00/6-6155; Sihanouk, open letter to the Cambodian government, quoted in McClintock to USDS, 17 June 1955, Despatch 1229, 751H.00/6-1755. McClintock to USDS, 18 June 1955, Despatch 1240, 751H.00/6-1855; all in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. McClintock to USDS, 13 June 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 451–3. Herbert J. Hoover to U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, 20 June 1955, ibid., 456. Dulles to US Embassy Phnom Penh et al., 8 July 1955, Tel. 23, 751H-MSP/7-655, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 26. McClintock to USDS, 17 June 1955, FRUS 1955– 1957, 21: 453–5. McClintock urged the state department to report Krishna Menon’s intemperate remarks to the government of India, using the argument that it was a serious violation of the Geneva Accords to deny Cambodia military assistance, which he assumed was India’s true intention. McClintock to USDS, 23 June 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 459–60. Kenneth T. Young to McClintock, 5 July 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 464–6. Memorandum of Conversation with U Nu, Dulles, and others, 29 June 1955, ibid., 460–2. Memorandum of Conversation, USDS, U Nu, Dulles, and others, 1 July 1955, ibid., 462–3. McClintock to USDS, 12 July 1955, Despatch 44, 751H.00/7-1255; McClintock to USDS, 18 July 1955, Despatch 69, 751H.00/7-1855; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. The ICC’s resolution is printed in FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 472–3. McClintock to USDS, 9 August 1955, Despatch 42, 751H.00/8-955, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. For example, McClintock to USDS, 11 August 1955, Despatch 173, 751H.00/ 8-1155; McClintock to USDS, 11 August 1955, Despatch 175, 751H.00/8-1155; McClintock to USDS, 25 August 1955, Despatch 249, 751H.00/8-2555; all in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. Martin F. Herz, Memoranda of Conversations with Sim Var and Norodom Phurissara, enclosed in G. McMurtrie Godley to USDS, 29 July 1955, Despatch 37, 751H.00/7–2955; Godley to USDS, 31 July 1955, Despatch 124, 751H.00/7-3155; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 20. McNicol to Acting Secretary EXAF, 10 August 1955, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 1, NAA. Chandler, Tragedy, 83–4. John W. O’Daniel to McClintock, 25 May 1955, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographic File, 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2) Sec. 9, Box 9, NA; CNO to CINCPAC, 26 May 1955, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographic File, 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2), Sec. 9, Box 8, NA. McClintock to Kenneth T. Young, 21 June 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 456–8. National Intelligence Estimate, “Probable Developments in Cambodia to July 1956,” 16 August 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 484. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee) to JCS, 16 September 1955, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographic File 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2), Sec. 12, Box 8, NA. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee) to JCS, 26 September 1955, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographic File 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2), Sec. 12, Box 8, NA.

Notes

169

57 McClintock to USDS, 26 September 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 489–90. 58 CINCPAC [Felix B. Stump] to CNO, RG 218 ( JCS records), Geographic file, 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48) (2) Sec. 13, Box 8, NA. 59 Radford (for the JCS) to Wilson, 19 October 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 492–3. E. Perkins McGuire to Robertson, 16 November 1955, ibid., 491. 60 E. Perkins McGuire to Walter S. Robertson, 16 November 1955, ibid., 491. 61 Robertson to Gordon Gray, 15 December 1955, ibid., 494–5. 62 McClintock to SS, 28 November 1955, Tel. 649, 751H.00 (W)/11-2655, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 26. CNO to CINCPAC and CHMAAG Cambodia, 28 December 1955, RG218, Geographic File, 1954–1956, 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2), Sec. 18, Box 9, NA. 63 “Le Prince Sihanouk expose sans ambages la position du Cambodge vis-à-vis de la France et des Etats-Unis,” Le Monde, 11 January 1956, enclosed in Robert P. Joyce to USDS, 13 January 1956, Despatch 1344, 751H.00/1-1356, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 64 Cooper to USDS, 20 January 1956, Despatch 1514, 751H.00/1-1956; Godley to SS, 2 February 1956, Despatch 988, 751H.00/2-256; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 65 G. McMurtrie Godley to SS, 2 February 1956, Despatch 988, 751H.00/2-256, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. USDS, Memorandum of Conversation between Nong Kimny and Robertson, 10 February 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 498–9. 66 McClintock to SS, 2 March 1956, Despatch 1126, 751H.00/3-256, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 67 Clipping, “Cambodia’s Premier Backs Neutrality,” New York Times, datelined February 18, Stanton Papers. 68 Stump to George Lodoen, 22 March 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 500–1. On Sihanouk’s reception in Phnom Penh, see McClintock to USDS, 23 February 1956, Despatch 281, 751H.00/2-2356, and McClintock to SS, 26 February 1956, Despatch 1095, 751H.00/2-2656, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Stump to Lodoen, [28 March 1955], quoted in McClintock to USDS, 30 March 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 505. Time magazine referred to Sihanouk as “Honorable Comrade.” Time, 19 March 1956, 38. 69 Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, “Attitudes of Certain Asian and Australasian Countries towards SEATO,” Intelligence Report No. 7151, 1 March 1956, Declassified Documents Series, 1980100100153. Lodoen to Stump, 24 March 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 501–2. 70 McClintock to SS, 28 February 1956, Despatch 1108, 751H.00/2-2856, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to SS, 15 March 1956, Despatch 1200, 751H.00/3-1556, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to Stump, 30 March 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 506–7. 71 Godley to SS, 18 March 1956, 751H.00/3-1856, Despatch 1216, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 72 Norbert L. Anschuetz to SS, 5 March 1956, Despatch 2569, 751H.00/3-556, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Hoover to U.S. Embassies Bangkok and Phnom Penh, 6 March 1956, Despatch 02682, 751H.00/3-556 [sic], RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to SS, 9 March 1956, Despatch 1154, 751H.00/ 3-956, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to SS, 13 March 1956, Despatch 1178, 751H.00/3-1356, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 73 McClintock to USDS, 30 March 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 503–4. McClintock to SS, 2 April 1956, Despatch 1285, 751H.00/4-256, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 21; McClintock to USDS, 3 April 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 508–10. Horace A. Hildreth to SS, 4 April 1956, Despatch 2170, 751H.00/4-356, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Cooper to SS, 10 April 1956, 751H.00/4-1056, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Dulles quoted in Australian Legation Phnom

170

74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81

82 83 84 85

86 87

88

89

Notes Penh to EXAF, 5 April 1956, Savingram 13, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 1, NAA. McClintock to USDS, 3 April 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 508–10. Young to Robertson, 14 April 1956, ibid., 511–13. Proposed telegram, Dulles to Nong Kimny, in Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 17 April 1956, ibid., 515–16. McClintock offered no objection and the telegram went forward on 19 April. McClintock to USDS, 11 May 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 519. Memorandum of Conversation, Wellington Koo, Robertson, McConaughy, 6 April 1956, 751H.00/ 4-656, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to USDS, 11 May 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 518–19. Edson O. Sessions et al. to Hollister, 24 May 1956, ibid., 520–2. CINCPAC to CNO, 19 June 1956, RG 218 ( JCS), Geographical file 1954–1956, Asia (6-25-48) (2), Sec. 23, P. B. Part 3–4, Box 10, NA. Young to Robertson, 21 June 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 527–8. Robertson to Young, 26 June 1956, Despatch 2902, 751H.00/6-2656, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21; Dulles to McClintock, 27 June 1956, FRUS 1955– 1957, 21: 529. Memorandum, C. Hoyt Price to Robertson, 31 July 1956, 751H.00/7-3156, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. “Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 12, 1956,” 13 July 1956, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File. State department officials said that opposition to continued aid to Cambodia came mostly from the military. Robertson to McClintock, 21 August 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 548–9. McClintock to Robertson, 1 August 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 535–7. McClintock to Radford, 27 July 1956, enclosed in ibid., 537–40. McClintock to USDS, 18 August 1956, ibid., 542–4. Robertson to McClintock, 21 August 1956, ibid., 548–9. 295th Meeting of the NSC, 30 August 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, 1954–1961, Eisenhower Papers, Special Staff File Series, Box 8. Dillon Anderson to Eisenhower, 28 August 1956, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1954–1961, Special Staff File Series, Box 7, folder Southeast Asia (2). NSC, “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia,” NSC 5612/1, 5 September 1956, p. 9, Declassified Documents Series. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 26 September 1956, Savingram 47, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. Allen W. Dulles to the CIA, received 25 September 1956, paraphrased in C. P. Cabell to Dulles, 28 September 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 549–50. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 15 October 1956, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. Chandler, Tragedy, passim. “The Neutrality of Cambodia,” (n.d.), Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/7/1A Part 1, NAA. Human Relations Area Files, Inc. (under contract for the Department of the Army), “Psychological Warfare Area Handbook for Cambodia,” November 1956, 752–53, RG 319, 1956, Box 19, NA. OCB, “Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Mainland Southeast Asia: Country Plan for Cambodia,” 18 October 1956, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB Central File, Box 39, folder OCB 091, file Indo-China (file #3)(5). Sihanouk statement of 25 December 1956, Monitoring Digest, Singapore, 28 December 1956, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. OCB, “Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Mainland Southeast Asia: Country Plan for Cambodia,” 18 October 1956, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB Central File, Box 39, folder OCB 091, file Indo-China (file #3)(5).

Notes

171

90 McClintock to USDS, 2 October 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 551. McClintock to SS, 12 October 1956, Despatch 440, 751H.00/10-1256, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 21. 91 Allen W. Dulles to the CIA, received 25 September 1956, paraphrased in C. P. Cabell to John Foster Dulles, 28 September 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 549–50. 92 Herz to SS, 15 October 1956, Despatch 457, 751H.00/10-1556, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 93 Francis R. Valeo, Oral History Interview by Donald Ritchie, 3 July 1985–11 March 1986, 109–10, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. 94 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 1 February 1957, Series No. A1838/ 280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. 95 Carl W. Strom to William J. Sebald, 10 January 1957, enclosing a memo of conversation between Ngo Truon Hieu and Martin F. Herz, 2 January 1957, FRUS 1955– 1957, 21: 552–7. Memorandum of Conversation, Ngo Dinh Diem et al., 10 May 1957, 751H.00/5-1057, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 96 Strom to SS, 4 January 1957, Despatch 719, 751H.00/1-457, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to Robert R. Bowie, 21 May 1957, FRUS 1955– 1957, 21: 563. 97 Elbridge Durbrow to SS, 24 June 1957, unnumbered, 751H.00/6-2457, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 98 Strom to SS, 5 January 1957, Despatch 718, 751H.00/1-557; Strom to SS, 9 May 1957, Despatch 1161, 751H.00/5-957; Nong Kimny to Dulles, 27 February 1957, 751H.00/2-2757; all in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. OCB, “Intelligence Notes,” 13 February 1957, Declassified Documents Series 1992050101788. See “Corn and Peanuts,” Time, 11 February 1957, 32. 99 Strom to Robertson, 14 February 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 556–8. Robertson to Strom, 6 March 1957, ibid., 558–9. 100 OCB, “Progress Report on ‘U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia’ (NSC 5612/ 1),” 14 March 1957, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB Central Files, Box 81, folder OCB 091.4 SEA (file #6)(6). Strom to SS, 21 February 1957, Despatch 867, 751H.00/2-2157; Strom to SS, 9 March 1957, Despatch 937, 751H.00/3-957; Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Landy and C. Hoyt Price, 19 March 1957, 751H.00/3-1957; Strom to SS, 31 March 1957, Despatch 1013, 751H.00/3-3157; all in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 101 Strom and USIS to USDS, 16 April 1957, Despatch 337, 751H.00/4-1657; Strom to SS, 11 May 1957, Despatch1168, 751H.00/5-1157; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 102 “Chinese Affairs Weekly Summary – Number 23,” enclosed in Godley to USDS, 19 June 1957, Despatch 406, 751H.00/6-1957, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. “Cambodia: Tearful Times,” Time, 10 June 1957, 38. Strom to SS, 19 July 1957, Despatch 70, 751H.00/7-1957, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 20 July 1957, Despatch 10478, 751H.00/7-1957 [sic], RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 20 July 1957, Despatch 10478, 751H.00/7-1957 [sic], RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 103 Strom to SS, 8 August 1957, Despatch 133, 751H.00/8-857; Strom to SS, 8 August 1957, Despatch 135, 751H.00/8-857; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 104 Edmund H. Kellogg to SS, 12 August 1957, Despatch 148, 751H.00/8-1257, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 105 Kellogg to USDS, 21 August 1957, 751H.00/8-2157, Despatch 61, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Memorandum of Conversation, André Holleaux, Strom, Kellogg, 4 September 1957, enclosed in Kellogg to USDS, 5 September 1957, 751H.00/ 9-5-57, Despatch 82, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Memorandum of

172

106 107 108

109

110

111

112

113

Notes conversation, Jean Barré, Robert S. Barrett, and Gordon G. Reiner, 23 July 1957; enclosed in Barrett to USDS, 30 July 1957, 751H.00/7-3057, Despatch 41, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to Bowie, 21 May 1957, FRUS 1955– 1957, 21: 563. Strom to Young, 16 August 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 566. Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Landy and C. Hoyt Price, 19 March 1957, 751H.00/3-1957, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. McClintock to Bowie, 21 May 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 563. OCB, “Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to Cambodia,” FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 559–62. Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., to Strom, 14 July 1957, ibid., 564–6. OCB, “Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to Cambodia,” ibid., 559–62. Paul D. Harkins for C. D. Eddlenam to the Army Chief of Staff, 2 May 1957, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the General Staff, Records of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (G-3), Box 15, Security Classified General Correspondence, 1957: 091 Cambodia, NA. Lodoen to Sak Sutsakhan, 11 March 1957, RG 472, General Records, Box 2, file 220–8, 1 January–30 June, 1957, NRC. Lodoen to Sak Sutsakhan, 12 March 1957, RG 472, General Records, Box 2, file 220–8, 1 January–30 June, 1957, NRC. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to Secretary, EXAF, 11 July 1957, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/9 Part 1, NAA. Report of the U.S. Army Attaché Cambodia, enclosed in Harkins (for Eddlenam) to the Army Chief of Staff, 2 May 1957, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the General Staff, Records of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (G-3), Security Classified General Correspondence, 1957: 091 Cambodia, Box 15. OCB, “Progress Report on ‘U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia’ (NSC 5612/ 1),” 14 March 1957, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB Central Files, Box 81, folder OCB 091.4 SEA (file #6)(6). Hartshorn to Strom, 14 July 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 566. OCB, “Progress Report on Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1),” 6 November 1957, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records 1952–1961, NSC series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, folder NSC 5612/1. Strom to SS, 17 December 1957, Despatch 645, 751H.00/12-1757, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21.

4 1958–1960: troubles 1 “Chinese Affairs Weekly Summary, Numbers 50–53,” enclosed in Strom to USDS, 10 January 1958, Despatch 190, 751H.00/1-1058, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Strom SS, 9 January 1958, Despatch 716, 751H.00/1-958, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Strom to USDS, 17 January 1958, FRUS 1955–1957, 21: 567– 76. 2 Stuart to EXAF, 17 January 1958, Memorandum 20, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 8, NAA. 3 Office memorandum, Eric Kocher to J. Graham Parsons, 27 February 1958, 751H.00/2-2758; Kellogg to SS, 19 March 1958, tel. 967, 751H.00/3-1958, RG 59; Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Mathivet and Kellogg, 21 February 1958, enclosed in Kellogg to USDS, 11 March 1958, Despatch 256, 751H.00/3-1158; all in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to USDS, 12 March 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 8–9. 4 Dulles to U.S. embassy Phnom Penh, 1 April 1958, Despatch A-100, 751H.00/ 3-1858 [sic]; Robertson to Strom, 11 April 1958, 751H.00/3-1858 [sic]; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21.

Notes

173

5 NSC, “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia” (NSC 5809), 2 April 1958, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records: 1952–1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 25, folder NSC 5809. 6 Strom to SS, 28 March 1958, Despatch 1014, 751H.00/3-2858, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. The Canadian Delegation, ISCS, Phnom Penh, “Weekly Report for the Week ending April 1, 1958,” 4 April 1958, No. 80, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 8, NAA. Gordon G. Heiner to USDS, 3 April 1958, Despatch 314, 751H.00/4-358, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 7 Stuart, diary entry for 16 May 1958, in Stuart to John P. Quinn, 27 May 1958, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. 8 FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 230–1. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 26 June 1958, Savingram 54, Series No. A1838/2, Control Symbol 3106/2/11 Part 1, NAA. FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 230–1. Dulles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 1 July 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 232–3. 9 Strom to USDS, 7 July 1958, ibid., 233–5. 10 Elbridge Durbrow to USDS, 9 July 1958, ibid., 235–6. 11 Christian A. Herter to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 10 July 1958, ibid., 237–9. 12 Strom to SS, 20 June 1958, Despatch 1312, 751H.00/6-2058, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 13 Strom to USDS, 25 July 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 240–3. Ninety-nine percent of the local Chinese supported Beijing, Sihanouk told Strom, with only the wealthy favoring Taiwan. 14 Memorandum of Conversation, Robertson et al., 5 August 1958, ibid., 244–6. 15 Alfred LeS. Jenkins to Robertson, 21 August 1958, ibid., 246–7. 16 John S. D. Eisenhower, “Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,” 5 November 1958, ibid., 256–7. U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 8 November 1958, ibid, 257–8. 17 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 9 September 1958, Savingram 35, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 18 Memorandum of Conversation. Sihanouk, Dulles, et al., 30 September 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 253–6. Memorandum of Conversation. Dulles, et al., 17 November 1958, ibid., 65. 19 Memorandum of Conversation, Son Phuoc Tho, Chalmers B. Wood, Robert. S. Barrett, 7 and 12 November, 1958, enclosed in Barrett to USDS, 18 November 1958, Despatch 167, 751H.00/11-1858, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. Stuart to Secretary EXAF, 7 November 1958, Memorandum 400, Series No. A1838/ 280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1, NAA. 20 Durbrow and Ngo Dinh Diem, Memorandum of Conversation, 13 November 1958, enclosed in Durbrow to Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 20 November 1958, FRUS 1958– 1960, 16: 260–4. Herter to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 19 November 1958, Despatch 08591, 751H.00/11-1958, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21 (also in FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 258–9). Durbrow to SS, 28 November 1958, 751H.00/ 11-2858, Despatch 1053, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 21. 21 Memorandum of Conversation, Durbrow and Ngo Dinh Nhu, 13 November 1958, enclosed in Durbrow to Cumming, 20 November 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 264. Strom to USDS, 21 November 1958, ibid., 264–6. Howard T. Elting, Jr., to USDS, 12 December 1958, ibid., 269–70. 22 Sihanouk told this to the Australian Minister. See Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 27 January 1959, Savingram 3, Series No. A 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 23 David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 99–100. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 21 July 1958, Savingram 21, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA.

174

Notes

24 Strom to SS, 12 January 1959, Despatch 800, 751H.00/1-1259, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Strom to SS, 20 January 1959, Despatch 841, 751H.00/ 1-2059, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Stuart to Jim Plimsoll, 15 January 1959, Series A1838/276, Control Symbol TS383/12/1, NAA. Stuart to Secretary EXAF, 27 January 1959, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. Interestingly, on 5 January Sary’s wife asked the Australian minister, Francis Stuart, for asylum for her husband. Stuart replied that he would have to get permission from his government and suggested in the meantime that the Sarys get tourist visas for Japan and stay there for some time. Record of Conversation, Madame Sam Sary and Stuart, 5 January 1959, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/ 1 Part 9, NAA. 25 Chandler, Tragedy, 100. F. J. Blakeney to Secretary EXAF, 30 January 1959, Memorandum 107, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 26 Strom to USDS, 12 January 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 272–3. Later in January an American official at the state department told the Australians that the United States did have advance knowledge of the plot (something Strom had denied to Sihanouk) but did not consider the plot very significant. Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 28 January 1959, Tel. 159, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 27 Strom to SS, 21 January 1959, Despatch 855, 751H.00/1-2159; Strom to SS, 25 January 1959, Despatch 869, 751H.00/1-2559; both in RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 22. 28 Memorandum of Conversation, Charles Meyer and Robert S. Barrett IV, 17 January 1959, enclosed in Robert S. Barrett to USDS, 21 January 1959, 751H.00/ 1-2159, Despatch 259, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. 29 When the Americans persisted in bringing in a possible communist role, some Australian officials were contemptuous. “They are being less than frank,” wrote one official on a dispatch from their Washington embassy. “They know perfectly well that the SV Security boys are up to their necks in this. If they seriously believe that the problem lies in ‘communist’ intrigue then it follows that the SV Security network must be influenced by the communists.” Handwritten note on Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 2 March 1959, Tel. 392, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1, NAA. 30 Strom to SS, 13 February 1959, Despatch G-116, 751H.00/2-1359, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. One Cambodian official, Pung Peng Cheng, informed the Americans that the French ambassador had also implicated the Americans in the Sam Sary plot. The embassy discounted this. See Strom to SS, 13 February 1959, Despatch G-115, 751H.00/2-1359, RG 59, Indochina 1955– 1959, reel 22. But in fact the French had passed along intelligence information to that effect. 31 Stuart to Plimsoll, 15 January 1959, Series A1838/276, Control Symbol TS383/ 12/1, NAA. Trimble thought Mathivet, who had once been Sihanouk’s private secretary, too “subjective in his thinking toward Cambodia” and told another American diplomat that he hoped the French would replace him. William C. Trimble to Randolph A. Kidder, 11 May 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file April–May–June 1960. Trimble also distrusted the French ambassador, Pierre Gorce, whom he also thought too pro-Sihanouk. Gorce, on the other hand, reportedly thought Trimble incompetent, a judgment that the Australian ambassador privately shared. Stuart to “Peter,” 6 July 1960, A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 12, NAA. 32 F. J. Blakeney to EXAF, 28 January 1959, Tel. 27, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 33 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 25 February 1959, Savingram 10, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA.

Notes

175

34 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 25 February 1959, Savingram 10, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 35 “Communique by the Royal Government,” attached to Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 25 February 1959, Savingram 10; Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 3 March 1959, Savingram 13; both in Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 36 [Australian Legation Phnom Penh] to EXAF, 26 February [1959], unnumbered Savingram; Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 27 February 1959, Savingram 13; both in Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 37 Sihanouk to Eisenhower, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 282–5. 38 Strom to USDS, 16 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 276–7. U. Alexis Johnson to USDS, 13 January 1959, ibid., 273n. 39 Robertson to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 18 February 1959, ibid., 278–9. 40 Strom to SS, 23 February 1959, 751H.00/2-2359, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Strom to USDS, 21 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 280. Herter to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 21 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 281. Strom to USDS, 22 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 281n. 41 Herter to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 23 February 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 285–8. 42 Strom to USDS, 26 February 1959, ibid., 289–91. Strom to USDS, 3 March 1959, ibid., 295–7. The French government also urged a favorable response. See Memorandum of Conversation, Hervé Alphand, Christian A. Herter et al., 3 March 1959, ibid., 293–5. 43 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 24 March 1959, Tel. 53, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 10, NAA. British Embassy Phnom Penh to FO, 21 March, quoted in British FO to EXAF, 25 March 1959, Savingram EX166, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 44 Strom to Trimble, 8 September 1959, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron Phnom Penh April–May 1959. 45 Oral History Interview with William C. Trimble by Dennis J. O’Brien, 12 August 1969, 4–7, Kennedy Library. 46 Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 2 March 1959, Tel. 392, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 47 Robertson to Herter, 27 March 1959, enclosing drafted letter from Eisenhower to Sihanouk, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 300–6. 48 Kellogg to USDS, 2 April 1959, FRUS 1958–1960,16: 302n. Trimble to USDS, ibid., 307n. Kellogg to SS, 2 April 1959, Despatch 1293, 751H.00/4-259, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. 49 Charles Bohlen (for Parsons) to USDS, 16 April 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 307. USDS to Parsons, 22 April 1959, ibid., 307n. Durbrow (for Parsons) to USDS, 27 April 1959, ibid., 309; USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (for Parsons), ibid., 16: 310n. 50 Butler, 26 March 1969, in FO London to EXAF, 1 April 1959, Savingram EX171, Series No.1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Sihanouk’s response to Eisenhower, on 13 April, was generally cordial and respectful, although he noted pointedly that the rebels openly (“but wrong, I am sure”) claimed American support. Sihanouk to Eisenhower, 13 April 1959, enclosed in Robertson to SS, 4 May 1959, 751H.00/5–459, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. 51 George Ball to U.S. Embassy Paris, 8 July 1964, Tel. 145, RG 59, CFPF1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 15-1 7/1/64, NAII. 52 Parsons to Trimble, 8 May 1959, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron Phnom Penh April–May 1959. 53 Dowling (for Parsons) to USDS, 5 May 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 310–13. EXAF, “Conversation with Members of the Staff of Mr. [Douglas] Dillon (Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs – U.S.A.) with Mr. Plimsoll,” 11 April 1959, Series No.

176

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63

64

65 66 67

68 69 70 71

Notes 1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Dowling (for Parsons) to USDS, 5 May 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 310–13. Eisenhower to Sihanouk, 7 May 1959, FRUS 1958–1960,16: 313–15. Eisenhower was responding to Sihanouk’s letter of 13 April in which Sihanouk stated that the Cambodian rebels were openly claiming American support. Trimble Diary Entries, 20 and 21 July 1959, Trimble Papers. Milton E. Osborne to EXAF, 30 July 1959, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 11, NAA. Realites Cambodgiennes, 25 July 1959, quoted in Trimble to SS, 27 July 1959, Tel. 116, Seaton Papers, Speeches Series, Box 33. Trimble Diary Entry, 21 July 1959, Trimble Papers. Usher to Steeves, 11 March 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 255. EXAF to Australian Legation Saigon, 27 April 1959, Tel. 76, Series No. A1838/ 280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Trimble to SS, 16 July 1959, Despatch 73, 751H.00/7-1659, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Daniel N. Arzac, Jr. to USDS, 18 August 1959, Despatch 46, 751H.00/8-1859, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. U.S. Embassy Saigon to USDS, 20 May 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 325n. FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 329 –30. Trimble to USDS, 19 September 1959, ibid., 331– 2. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 28 August 1959, Savingram 288, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/2/13, NAA. Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 7 June 1959, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/2/13, NAA. The Australians received this information from the state department on 5 June. Chandler, Tragedy, 107. Trimble to USDS, 19 September 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 330–32. Trimble to McClintock, 19 September 1959, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron, Phnom Penh September–December 1959. “Cambodia: A Present for the King,” Time, 14 September 1959, 30. Chandler, Tragedy, 106–7. The lacquer box version comes from the Time magazine story. Memorandum of Conversation, Trimble and Ambassador Chuichi Ohashi, 12 January 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron file, January–February–March 1960. In this conversation, several months after the incident, Trimble learned that Foreign Minister Son Sann had told the Japanese ambassador in Phnom Penh that the bomb had been made in the United States. Stuart to EXAF, 9 September 1959, Memorandum 372, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 11, NAA. USDS to Durbrow, 23 September 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 338n. Durbrow to USDS, 22 September 1959, FRUS 1958– 1960, 16: 335–8, 338n. Durbrow to USDS, 7 October 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 342–3. Durbrow to USDS, 28 October 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 343n. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 1 October 1959, Savingram 28, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/13, NAA. Trimble to SS, 8 October 1959, Despatch 462, 751H.00/10-859, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. Herter to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 10 October 1959, Despatch 318, 751H.00/10-859, RG 59, Indochina 1955–1959, reel 22. FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 343n. Usher to Steeves, 11 March 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 355. Houghton to SS, 20 November 1959, Despatch 2234, 751H.00/11-2059, reel 22. Trimble to Cumming, 28 October 1959. Trimble to John C. Willems, 29 October 1959. Trimble to Daniel V. Anderson, 30 October 1959. All in Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron, Phnom Penh September–December 1959. Oral History Interview with William C. Trimble, 12 August 1969, by Dennis J. O’Brien, 11–12, Kennedy Library. Trimble refers to Sihanouk as “the little man” in various documents, including his Diary Entry for 28 December 1959, Trimble Papers. Trimble Diary Entry, 9 December 1959, Trimble Papers.

Notes

177

72 Usher to Steeves, 11 March 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 132. 73 C. Douglas Dillon to USDS, 17 December 1959, ibid., 348. 74 Clipping, “US Uses Traitor Sam Sary’s Bud to Suck Cambodia Into SEATO,” Blitz, 16 January 1960, 9, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron file January–February– March 1960. Published in India on 16 January 1960, the article appeared in Cambodian newspapers on 5 February. Perhaps significantly, prior to the publication of the letter in Cambodian newspapers Trimble told the Australian minister that the letter did not implicate him personally. Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 4 February 1960, Tel. 7, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/13, NAA. 75 Australian Legation Phnom Penh to EXAF, 4 February 1960, Tel. 7, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/13, NAA. 76 Dillon to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 29 February 1960, Tel. 750, 751H.00/ 2-2960, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1747, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Nong Kimny et al., 8 March 1960, 751H.11/3-860, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1747, NAII. 77 Trimble to Durbrow, 10 February 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron file, January–February–March 1960. John C. Monjo to USDS, 2 March 1960, Tel. 279, 751H.11/3-260, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Trimble to SS, 3 March 1960, Tel. 1132, 751H.11/3-360, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Trimble to SS, 16 October 1961, Airgram A-106, 751H.00/10-1661 HAJ, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Charles F. Moore to USDS, 28 June 1962, Airgram A-324, 751H.00/6-2862, RG 59, CDF 1960–63, Box 1750, NAII. 78 OCB, “Special Report on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia ( NSC 5809),” 10 February 1960, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952–1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 25, folder NSC 5809 – Policy in Southeast Asia (1). 79 Memorandum of a Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the NSC, 10 March 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 178. 80 Trimble to Laurin B. Askew, 20 April 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. Trimble to Parsons, 22 August 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. 81 Quoted in Stuart to EXAF, 9 June 1950, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/29, NAA. 82 Daniel V. Anderson to Parsons, 13 May 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 360–1. Australian High Commission London to EXAF, 24 May 1960, Tel. 2284, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/13, NAA. 83 Trimble diary entry, 17 May 1960, Trimble Papers. Anderson to Parsons, 1 June 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 362–3. C. Robert Moore to Trimble, 16 June 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Secretary EXAF, 26 May 1960, Memorandum 182, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 12, NAA. Trimble’s letter to Sihanouk, 23 May 1960, is in the Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. 84 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Secretary EXAF, 26 May 1960, Memorandum 182, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 12, NAA. Steeves to Herter, 18 June 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 364. 85 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 15 June 1960, Tel. 138, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 12, NAA. State department officials made this statement to a United Kingdom representative, according to the Australians. 86 C. M. Westergren, “The Problems & Difficulties of Distribution,” Cambodia, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1960, 6–7, 10 (copy in RG 809 – Cambodia, Box 3, folder Cambodian Field Periodicals, 1953–1962, C&MA Archives). Clifford M. Westergren, “A Valiant Veteran,” Alliance Witness, 14 December 1960, 11. Christian and Missionary Alliance,

178

87 88 89 90

91 92 93

94 95 96

97 98

99 100

101

102

Notes Seventy-fourth Year Annual Report for 1960 and Minutes of the General Council held at Columbus, Ohio May 17–21, 1961 (n.p., n.d.), 107–8. James S. Lay, Jr. to NSC, 11 July 1960, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952–1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries,” Box 25, folder NSC 5809 – Policy in SE Asia (1). “Briefing Note for NSC Mtg. July 21, 1960,” 20 July 1960, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952– 1961, NSC-Briefing Notes, Box 16, folder SEA, 1953–1960. Australian Embassy Paris to EXAF, 15 July 1960, Tel. 432, Series No. A1945/24, Control Symbol 248/4/29, NAA. On 3 September Sihanouk replied with a letter that Trimble characterized as “warm and friendly.” Trimble to SS, 9 September 1960, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1952–1961, International Series, Box 2, folder Cambodia (3). Charles F. Moore to SS, 25 July 1960, Tel. G-28, 751H.00/7-2560, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Trimble to Parsons, 15 September 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. John S. D. Eisenhower, “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 27 September 1960, Declassified Documents Series, 1990070102150. Steeves, quoted in Australian Mission to the U.N. to EXAF, 27 September 1960, Tel. UN 1049, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1, Part 2, NAA. Monjo to USDS, 3 November 1960, Tel. 131, 751H.11/11-360, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 16 June 1960, Tel. 1600, Series A1945/ 24, Control Symbol 248/4/29, NAA. Cumming to Herter, 21 June 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 365–7. Parsons to Herter, 17 August 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 376–8. “Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia,” 24 August 1960, Eisenhower Papers, WHO, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952–1961, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 29, folder NSC 6012. Steeves to Trimble, 21 October 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron file, August–December 1960. Louis F. Springer to Trimble, 29 November 1960, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder SEA, 1961. FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 391–2. Steeves to Merchant, 8 November 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 392–9. Askew, Memorandum for the Record, 11 November 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 404. Herter to U.S. Embassies Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Saigon, 11 November 1960, Tel. 385, 751H.4-MSP/11-1160, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Askew, Memorandum for the Record, 11 November 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 404. Sihanouk to Eisenhower, 12 November 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 5, folder Cambodia (1). Anderson to Parsons, 9 December 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 405–7. Trimble to SS, 5 December 1960, Tel. 609, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron Cables, August–December 1960. Herter to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 10 December 1960, Tel. 472, 751H.5-MSP/12-1060, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. A thorough report on Sihanouk’s activities in China from December 14–26 is found in Harald [sic] W. Jacobson to USDS, 10 January 1961, 751H.11/1-1061, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1751, NAII. Department of State, “Sino-Soviet Affairs,” 1 January 1961, Declassified Documents Series 1996090102709. The report noted that “Sihanouk was reportedly still smarting from what he considered to be shoddy treatment accorded him in the US during his UNGA mission in September.” Trimble to USDS, 23 December 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, 16: 408–10.

Notes

179

103 Trimble to SS, 4 March 1960, Tel. 1149, 751H.00/3-460, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1747, NAII.

5 Kennedy and Cambodia 1 Sihanouk’s message is contained in Trimble to SS, 3 January 1961, Tel. 782, Eisenhower Papers, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman file), International Series, Box 5, folder Cambodia (1). Christian A. Herter to Eisenhower, 13 January 1961, Eisenhower Papers, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman file), International Series, Box 5, folder Cambodia (1). 2 Kennedy’s letter to Sihanouk is found in Dean Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 20 February 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 145–6. Sihanouk changed his mind about a neutral commission invited by the Royal Government of Laos, on the ground that communist countries recognized the competing Souvanna Phouma government. Trimble to SS, 24 February 1961, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, file 1/61-6-61. 3 Moore to SS, 14 July 1961, Tel. 29, 751H.00/7-1461, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. 4 Charles H. Chase to Lon Nol, 27 March 1961, RG 472, Box 3, folder 1418-02 Force Increase [Part 1 of 2], 1963, NRC. Trimble to SS, 19 April 1961, Tel. 1324, 751H.5622/4-1961, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1753, NAII. 5 Trimble to SS, 26 May 1961, Tel. 1443, Trimble Papers, Box 1, folder Chron Cables, January–December 1961. The others included the effort to implicate the United States in the palace bombing of 1959, rumors in 1959 that the United States was seeking to have Sihanouk replaced, and the Blitz incident in January–February 1960. 6 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 5 June 1961, Savingram 13, Series A1838/ 280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 13, NAA. Trimble to John F. Kennedy, 14 July 1961, Trimble Papers, Box 4, folder Chron, Phnom Penh, April–September 1961. 7 Walt Rostow to Kennedy, 25 July 1961; Rostow to Kennedy, 27 July 1961, Kennedy Papers, JFK NSF – Regional Security SEA, Box 231. Trimble to SS, 20 June 1961, No. 1506, 751H.11/6-2061, RG 59, CDF 1960. “An ‘Independent Nations Zone’ in Southeast Asia,” attached to George G. McGhee to McGeorge Bundy, 28 August 1961, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Regional Security: SEA, Box 231A. 8 Reinhart to SS, 12 September 1961, No. A-320, 751H.11/9-1661, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Moore to SS, 30 August 1961, 751H.11/8-3061, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Visits to Penn State and the University of Georgia were also considered. In the end Sihanouk returned to Cambodia without visiting an American university, although he did speak at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles. 9 Memorandum of Conversation, 25 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 162–6. Memorandum of Conversation, Fred Warner, Trimble, et al., FO London, 2 October 1961, Trimble Papers, Box 1, Cambodia 1959–1961, Chron file, October–December 1961. 10 Elden B. Erickson to Trimble, 13 October 1961, Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder SEA. 11 James Gavin to SS, 10 October 1961, Airgram A-563, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 9/24/61–10/23/61. 12 “Talk by Prince Norodom Sihanouk . . . to the Asia Society New York,” 26 September 1961, 9–11, Trimble Papers. 13 Trimble to SS, 23 October 1961, No. 296, 751H.11/10-2361, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1751, NAII. Information on Sarit’s comments comes from Thomas Hirschfield who was then serving in the Phnom Penh embassy. Hirschfield e-mail message to author, 13 October 2001. 14 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, No. 310, 26 October 1961, 751H.5-MSP/ [photocopy; original number is 651H.92/10-2661], RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1753, NAII. “Translation of Prince Sihanouk’s Speech of October 26, at Kompong

180

15 16 17 18 19

20 21

22 23 24

25

Notes

Speu . . . ,” Trimble Papers, Box 2, folder La Depeche. Trimble to SS, 30 October 1961, No. 329, 751H.11/10-3061, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Trimble to SS, 27 October 1961, Tel. 315, Trimble Papers. Chester Bowles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, No. 30 October 1961, NIACT 386, 751H.11/10-3061, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Clifford M. Westergren, “Missionaries and Governmental Authority,” Alliance Witness, 15 November 1961, 7. For example Trimble to Elden B. Erickson, 26 October 1961, Trimble Papers, Box 1, Chron file, October–December 1961. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 31 October 1961, Series A1209/ 128, Control Symbol 1961/1304, NAA. Bowles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 30 October 1961, No. NIACT 388, 751H.11/ 10-3061, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751. Bowles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 31 October 1961, No. NIACT 390, 751H.11/ 10-3161, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751. Trimble to SS, 31 October 1961, No. 336, 751H.11/10-3161, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751. Trimble to SS, 2 November 1961, No. 350, 751H.11/11-261, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. Bowles to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 4 November 1961, No. 408, 751H.11/11-461, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. Trimble to SS, 7 November 1961, No. 365, 751H.11/11-761, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1752, NAII. Memorandum, Robert H. Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, 6 November 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 173. Memorandum, Robert H. Johnson to Bundy, 7 November 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 174–5. For Kennedy’s message, see FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 175n4. Trimble to USDS, 1 June 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 152–5. Trimble to SS, 11 November 1961, No. 380, 751H.00/11-1161, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Edward H. Sherrer to Felt, 15 November 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 175–8. Roger Hilsman to Averell Harriman, 7 August 1962, Research Memorandum RFE35, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 7/16/62–8/7/62. Hilsman to Harriman, 7 August 1962, Research Memorandum RFE-35, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 7/16/62–8/7/62. Trimble to SS, 28 November 1961, No. A-131, 751H.11/11-2861, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Trimble to SS, 28 November 1961, No. A-134, 751H.11/11-2861, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Edward Lansdale responded sarcastically to reports of the lack of Viet Cong activity in Cambodia: “The MAAG message states that MAAG and other U.S. organizations in Cambodia have investigated reports of Viet Cong bases and training areas in Cambodia. It concludes, ‘We have found none. We believe there are none.’ In this MAAG apparently has come to the same conclusion as did Trumbull of the New York Times, who wrote on this point recently. “What is disturbing is that we used to get similar reports from Laos. There was a time, not long ago, when nobody could find a Pathet Lao in the country and it became rather popular around town to poo-poo the idea that there were any Communist guerrillas in Laos. Now we get a similar poo-pooing from Cambodia. “I wonder if these folks who go looking really know what a Communist guerrilla looks like . . .? Wouldn’t it be a good thing for the Chief of MAAG-Vietnam, who has access to Viet Cong prisoners, to provide some clues to the Chief of MAAGCambodia? It might be okay for American civilians to be lulled into a real lotus-land picture, but our military need to look at the scene with hard realism.” Lansdale to Collins, 29 November 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 178–9. Trimble to SS, 18 November 1961, No. 399, 751H.00/11-1861, RG5 9, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1749, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 22 November 1961, No. 455, 751H.00/11-1861, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, H. N. Loveday and Arzac, 11 December 1961, 751H.00/12-1161,

Notes

26 27 28 29

30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45

181

RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Trimble to SS, 27 November 1961, No. 410, 751H.00/11-2761, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1749, NAII. Herbert Gordon to USDS, 14 December 1961, No. 188, 751H.5/12-1461, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Trimble to SS, 19 January 1962, No. 490, 751H.00/1-1962, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Trimble to SS, 6 January 1962, No. 457, 751H.5/1-662, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Trimble to SS, 30 March 1962, No. 607, 751H.5/3-3062, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Trimble to U. Alexis Johnson, 5 March 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 186. Moore to SS, 9 March 1962, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 1/18/62–3/28/62. Bowles to Rosewell Gilpatric, 1 June 1962, 751H.5/6-162, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Robert McNamara, 23 June 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 195–6. Trimble to SS, 11 April 1962, No. 625, 751H.00/4-1162, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Trimble to SS, 15 April 1962, No. 629, RG 59, CDF 1960–63, Box 1750, NAII. See also Trimble to USDS, 5 April 1962, Airgram A-265, 751H.00/4562, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 26 April 1962, No. 649, 751H.00/4-2662; Gavin to SS, 28 April 1962, No. 5100, 751H.00/4-2762 both in RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1750. Rusk to Acting SS, 24 July 1962, Tel. Secto 49, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 7/16/62–8/7/62. Trimble to Averell Harriman, Frederick Nolting, and Kenneth Young [April 1962], Trimble Papers, Box 3, folder Chron Cables January–June 8, 1962. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 1 June 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 188–9. Nolting (?) to SS, 6 June 1962, No. 1569, No. 751H.00/ (photocopy; original number 651H.51K/6-662), RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Nolting to USDS, 22 June 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 194. Trimble to SS, 25 January 1962, Tel. 500, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 1/18/62–3/28/62. Details of the raid are in Truehart to SS, 30 April 1962, Tel. 1273, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 3/29–4/30/62. Sihanouk quoted in Trimble to SS, 18 February 1962, Tel. 548, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 1/18/62–3/28/62. Trimble to Arzac, 8 February 1962, Trimble Papers, Box 4, Chron folder, Jan-March 1962. Moore to SS, 16 June 1962, Tel. 751, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 18 June 1962, Tel. NIACT 2018, 751H.022/6-1862, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Young to SS, 29 June 1962, Tel. 2117, 751H.022/6-2962; Young to SS, 16 July 1962, Tel. 103, 751H.022/7-1662; both in RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1751, NAII. Philip D. Sprouse to SS, 14 August 1962, Tel. 104, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 16, folder 8/8/62–8/15/62. Sprouse to SS, 18 August 1962, Tel. 131, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, folder 8/16/62–8/19/62. According to Thomas Hirschfield, the American diplomat who requested Chu’s release, the Cambodians pulled out Chu’s fingernails. Hirschfield e-mail message to author, 13 October 2001. Herbert Gordon to USDS, 5 July 1962, No. A-13, 751H.5/7562, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Sihanouk publicly rejected such an assertion, however. Whittington to SS, 24 July 1962, No. 141, 751H.5/7-2462, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Clipping, “Aid to Cambodia In Arms Pondered,” Christian Science Monitor, [ca. 2 September 1962], Stanton Papers. USDS to U.S. Embassies in Bangkok, Phnom Penh,

182

46 47 48

49

50

51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58

59 60

Notes

Saigon, and Taipei, 13 August 1962, 751H.00/8-1362, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750. Noël Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 6 December 1962, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 10 December 1962, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 14, NAA. Committee on Foreign Relations, “Vietnam and Southeast Asia,” 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 13. The report was by Senators Mansfield, J. Caleb Boggs, Claiborne Pell, and Benjamin A. Smith. Sprouse to SS, 1 September 1962, 751H.11/ (originally 651H.92/9-162), RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. The Kennedy letter was dated August 31. Sprouse to USDS, 13 September 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 206. Harriman to Rusk, 12 September 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 204. John Kenneth Galbraith to SS, 18 September 1962, Tel. 904, 751H.00/9-1762, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 19 September 1962, Tel. 231, 751H.00/9-1962, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Paris, 31 August 1962, Tel. 1345, 751H.00/8-3062, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1750, NAII. Sprouse to SS, 21 September 1962, Tel. 287, 751H.00/9-2162, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Young to SS, 20 September 1962, Tel. 542, 751H.5/9-2062, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1752, NAII. George Ball to U.S. Embassies Phnom Penh and Bangkok, 29 September 1962, Tel. 264, 751H.5/9-2762, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. That Sihanouk was seriously considering this was first reported on October 9. See Sprouse to SS, 9 October 1962, 751H.5/10-962, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 23 October 1962, No. 312, 751H.5/10-2262; Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 11 November 1962, No. 352, 751H.5/11-562; both in RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752. Sprouse to SS, 15 November 1962, No. 432, 751H.11/11-1562, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1752. Arzac to Henry L. T. Koren, 7 November 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 212. Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 10 December 1962, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 14, NAA. Memorandum of Conversation, Dean Rusk, Herve Alphand, Marcel Barthelemy, and Henry L. T. Koren, 30 November 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 222–3. “KennedyMacmillan Nassau meeting, December 19–20, 1962, Position Paper: Cambodia,” 13 December 1962, Declassified Documents Series 1978100100253. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 10 December 1962, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 14, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 6 December 1962, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA. Sprouse to SS, 14 December 1962, Tel. 496, 751H.5/12-1462, RG 59, CDF 1960– 1963, Box 1752, NAII. Sprouse to SS, 31 December 1962, Tel. 516, 751H.21/123162, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Lon Nol, Sprouse et al., 24 January 1963, RG 472 – MAAG Cambodia, Box 2, file “201–29 – Emphasis on Youth,” NRC. Initially enthusiastic about supplying the coaches, the defense department lost interest when the Southeast Asian Games were cancelled, despite the embassy’s pleas that the games were not the fundamental reason to assign coaches to Cambodia. Forrestal to Kennedy, 6 December 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 225–6. “KennedyMacmillan Nassau meeting, December 19–20, 1962, Position Paper: Cambodia,” 13 December 1962, Declassified Documents Series 1978100100253. Herbert Gordon to USDS, 17 January 1962, Airgram A-339, 751H.11/1-1763, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. The interview took place on 15 January. Sprouse to USDS, 15 January 1963, Airgram A-333, 751H.5/1-1563, RG 59, CDF

Notes

61

62 63 64 65

66

67 68

69

70

71

72

183

1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. Sprouse to USDS, 17 January 1963, Tel. No. TOAID 555, 751H.5/1-1763, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1752, NAII. The proposal was to increase the MAAG contingent to 83 personnel, up from its current 63. The increase had first been suggested in October 1962 but had not been presented to the Cambodian government because of the strained relations. Nolting to SS, 23 January 1963, Tel. 697, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 1/23/63–2/15/63. Harriman to Rusk, 23 January 1963, FRUS 1961– 1963, 23: 227–9; 229n. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Paris, 29 January 1963, Tel. 3668, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 1/23/63–2/15/63. Takashi Oka, “Peking Hails Cambodian Leader,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1963. Spouse to SS, 1 March 1963, Tel. 634, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 2/16/63–3/3/63. Sprouse to USDS, 29 June 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 236–9. Sprouse to USDS, 2 July 1963, ibid., 239–40. Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 13 August 1963, Memorandum No. 373, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 17, NAA. Norodom Sihanouk, “The Failures of the Free World,” [29 August 1963], Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 29 August 1963, Memorandum No. 430, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 29 August 1963, Airgram A-131, RG 59, CFPF 1963, Box 3847, NAII. USDS, Circular Telegram 447, 6 September 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 8/5/63–9/11/63. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 10 September 1963, Savingram 1114, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 14, NAA. Ian E. Nicholson to Secretary, EXAF, 24 September 1963, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 3 October 1963, Memorandum 494, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 3, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 10 October 1963, Memorandum 509, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/ 7/1 Part 3, NAA. Sprouse to SS, 4 October 1963, Tel. 265, RG 59, CFPF 1963, Box 3846, NAII. Sprouse to SS, 5 October 1963, Tel. 269, RG 59, CFPF 1963, Box 3846, NAII. Sprouse to USDS, 12 October 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 240–2. Sihanouk quotation from Neak Chiet Niyum, 20 October 1963, paraphrased in U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 31 October 1963, Airgram A-248, RG 59, CFPF 1963, Box 3847, NAII. Herbert Spivack to SS, 6 November 1963, Tel. 331, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 9/12/63–11/7/63. In a speech on 10 November Sihanouk in fact noted that the “fall of Diem demonstrated US capacity to control SVN.” Sprouse to SS, 11 November 1963, Tel. 342, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. Sprouse to SS, 13 November 1963, Tel. 348, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. Both the American and Australian embassies also noted that Sihanouk’s outburst may have been related to a rigorous medical regimen that he was currently under. Sprouse to SS, 13 November 1963, Tel. 350, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. Sprouse to SS, 16 November 1963, Tel. 366, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. The official was Norman B. Hannah, Deputy Director of the state department’s Office of Southeast Asian Affairs. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 16 November 1963, Tel. 3105, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 16 November 1963, Tel. 3105, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Rusk to U.S.

184

73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Notes

Embassy Saigon, 16 November 1963, Tel. 813, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. While no specific demarche was ordered in Thailand, embassy officials were told to convey American views about the Khmer Serei whenever appropriate. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 16 November 1963, Tel. 238, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. Sprouse to SS, 16 November 1963, Tel. 375, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/17/63–11/19/63. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 19 November 1963, Tel. 340, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Sprouse to SS, 20 November 1963, Tel. 381, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/20/63–11/22/63. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 21 November 1963, Tel. 3150, Series No. 1209/128, Control Symbol 1961/1304, NAA. FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 258n2. Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy, Hilsman, 20 November 1963, 11:12 a.m., Hilsman Papers, Countries: Cambodia, Box 1. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Harriman and Hilsman, 21 November 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 259. Sprouse to SS, 18 January 1964, Tel. 702, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels Camb-US, NAII. See also Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 21 November 1963, Tel. 349, Series No. 1209/128, Control Symbol 61/1304, NAA. The degree of American involvement with the Khmer Serei during the Kennedy administration remains murky. The Cambodians, of course, felt that they had proof of current American involvement, and Long Boret told Ambassador Deschamps on 17 November that the U.S. embassy in Saigon had tried to get Diem to have Khmer Krom units in the South Vietnamese armed forces withdrawn and placed under the Khmer Serei, but Diem had refused. Those Americans who disliked Sihanouk and who wanted to step up military actions in South Vietnam had a motive to support the dissidents. At the very least they viewed them as carrying on useful activities. On 8 November a state department official implied that the Khmer Serei served American purposes. He told Australian diplomats that it was within American capabilities to press the Thais and South Vietnamese to end the broadcasts. “But this would in effect go some way towards guaranteeing Sihanouk’s internal position,” he said. “Could the United States properly do this and would such action necessarily be in our best interests?” he asked. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 8 November 1963, Tel. 3048, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Dean Rusk, however, in a diplomatic telegram, stated bluntly, “we have no means of controlling [Khmer Serei] broadcasts.” Rusk to U.S. Embassy London, 13 November 1963, Tel. 3065, Kennedy Papers, NSF: CO: Cambodia, Box 17, folder 11/8/63–11/16/63. Memorandum of Conversation, Kennedy, Hilsman, 20 November 1963, 11:12 a.m., Hilsman Papers, Countries: Cambodia, Box 1. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 19 December 1963, Series No. A1838/ 280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Mansfield speech in Senate, Congressional Record-Senate, 20 November 1963, 21324; in Thomson Papers, Box 21, folder Southeast Asia, Cambodia 1959–1966, Kennedy Library. Sprouse to USDS, 30 November 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 269–71. Sprouse to SS, 30 November 1963, Tel. 435, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol I. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., to McGeorge Bundy, 2 December 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 274–5. Unsigned Memo, 2 December 1963, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodian Cables, Vol. I. Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 19 December 1963, Tel. 3383, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. On Hilsman’s conversation

Notes

87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94

95

96 97

98 99

185

with Kimny, see Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 24 December 1963, Tel. 368, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodian Cables, Vol. I. FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 271n. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 5 December 1963, Tel. 3241, Series No. A1209/128, Control Symbol 1961/1304, NAA. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 29 November 1963, Tel. 3214, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Two memorandums, Clifford L. Alexander to McGeorge Bundy, 6 December 1963, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia, Vol. 2. The quotation is from the second memo. Bundy’s agreement is contained in a handwritten comment on the first memo. INR Research Memorandum RFE-95, Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk, 7 December 1963, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. USDS to U.S. Embassies London and Paris, 7 December 1963, Telegrams 3508 and 2891, RG 59, CFPF 1963, Box 3846, NAII. Phnom Penh Domestic Radio Broadcast, 9 December 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, 23: 280–1. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation, Harriman and Acheson, 9 December 1963, ibid., 282. Ibid., 281–2. A slightly different translation of the speech read: “At two week intervals our enemies have departed one after another. At first the one in the South, then the great boss and now the one in the west. All three have always sought to violate our neutrality and to make trouble for us, to see our misfortune. Now they are all going to meet in hell where they will be able to build military bases for SEATO.” U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 11 December 1963, Tel. 481, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry Files, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Sprouse to SS, 12 December 1963, Tel. 491, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country Files, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Sprouse to SS, 13 December 1963, Tel. 497, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country Files, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Research Memorandum RFE-100, Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Rusk, 19 December 1963, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia Box 21, folder S. E. Asia, Cambodia 1959–1966. Sprouse to SS, 12 December 1963, Tel. 500, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country Files, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Paris (for Koren), 12 December 1963, Tel. 3014, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country Files, Box 235, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. “Under the present circumstances the US could not participate in a conference,” the state department informed American diplomats in Paris. “Cambodia Hints at Ties with Peking,” NewYork Times, 30 December 1963. Le Reject de l’aide Américaine: Trois Exposes de S.A.R. Le Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Phnom Penh: Ministere de l’Information, n.d. [1963]). Copy in Fonds “Affaire Estrangere” (No. 2), Boite 58, NAC. Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 164.

6 A casualty of war: the break in relations 1 Sprouse to SS, 12 February 1964, Tel. 776, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. 2 Bergesen to USDS, 27 February 1964, Airgram A-451, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. 3 Lodge to SS, 28 March 1964, Tel. 1852, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966 Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. 4 Lodge to SS, 11 April 1964, Tel. 1956, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966 Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 4/1/64, NAII. Ball to U.S. Embassy Saigon and CINCPAC,

186

5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12

13

14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Notes

17 April 1964, Tel. 1715, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 4/1/64, NAII. U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 14 February 1964, Airgram A-438, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966 Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 2/1/64, NAII. Sihanouk to Johnson, 8 February 1964, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 8 February 1964, Tel. 517, RG 59, CFPF 1964– 1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-13 CAMB 2/1/64, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassies Saigon and Bangkok, 19 February 1964, Tel. 1262, 1377, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-13 Neutrality CAMB 2/1/64, NAII. Sprouse to SS, 22 February 1964, Tel. 817, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-13 Neutrality CAMB 2/1/64, NAII. “SEATO Brief – Cambodia,” (n.d.), Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/ 2/1 Part 16, NAA. USDS Memorandum of Conversation, Nong Kimny, Harriman, William J. Jorden, 14 March 1964, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US, NAII. Spivack to SS, 9 March 1964, Tel. 900, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Spivack to SS, 10 March 1964, Tel. 902, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 12 March 1964, Tel. 731, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 13 March 1964, Tel. 754, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. “Sihanouk Apologizes for Riots But Says West Provoked Them,” New York Times, 12 March 1964. Peter Murray to R. A. Butler, 11 March 1964, Series No. A1209/112, Control Symbol 1964/6181 Part A, NAA. Deschamps to EXAF, 12 March 1964, Tel. 97, Series No. A1209/112, Control Symbol 1964/6181 Part A, NAA. Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 163. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 16 March 1964, Tel. 107, Series No. A1209/112, Control Symbol 64/6181 Part A, NAA. Deschamps to EXAF, 17 March 1964, Memorandum 142, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 16, NAA. Interview with Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps by Kenton J. Clymer, June 19–20, 1999, at the Commonwealth Club, Canberra, ACT, Australia. Institute of Oral History, University of Texas at El Paso. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 12 March 1964, Tel. 102, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 15, NAA. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 17 March 1964, Tel. 651, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1975, folder POL 17 Diplomatic and Consular Representation, CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. Sprouse had returned prior to the demonstration for health reasons. Lyon to SS, 12 March 1964, Tel. 4297 (Paris), RG 59, Box 1968, folder POL 8. Sprouse to USDS, 28 February 1964, Airgram 456, RG 59, Box 1968, folder POL 2-3. Spivack to SS, 13 March 1964, Tel. 929, RG 59, Box 1970, folder POL 23. Deschamps to Keith Waller, 24 March 1964, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 16, NAA. Rusk to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 9 January 1964, Tel. 1050, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. I. [Canadian ICC Commissioner] Phnom Penh to EXAF, Ottawa, 20 March 1964, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 16, NAA. Forrestal, Memorandum for the President, 21 March 1964, Johnson Papers, WHCF, Confidential File, Box 7, folder C0 40 – Cambodia. Bergesen to USDS, 27 March 1964, Airgram A-487, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAA. Lodge to SS, 20 March 1964, Tel. 1792, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S, NAII.

Notes

187

22 Recorded telephone conversation, Forrestal and Lyndon Johnson, 21 March 1964, Johnson Papers, WH 6403.14, PNO 10. 23 Deschamps to EXAF, 21 March 1964, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/ 2/1 Part 16, NAA. British Embassy Saigon to FO, 21 March 1964, Tel. 274, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1, NAA. Lodge to SS, 14 May 1964, Tel. 2198, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 5/1/ 64, NAII. 24 Deschamps to Keith Waller, 24 March 1964, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 16, NAA. 25 Lodge to SS, 24 March 1964, Tel. 1818, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, folder POL 27-Military Operations CAMB-VIET S 1/1/64, NAII. Forrestal to McGeorge Bundy, 1 April 1964, “Luncheons with the President” folder, Vol. 1, Part 2, NSFMcGeorge Bundy Papers, Box 19. 26 Spivack to SS, 18 March 1964, Tel. 956, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1968, folder POL 8. Spivack characterized Sihanouk’s frankness about Hanoi as “more ‘cards on table’ diplomacy.” 27 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 31 March 1964, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1968, Folder POL 8. By this time too Sihanouk was cracking down on domestic communists, many of whom had fled to the forests. This was in part Sihanouk’s way of reacting to the American presence in Vietnam. Though he believed the NLF would win in the end, for the moment the Americans were going to be in Vietnam for some time, and his options were therefore narrowed. See Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea (London: Verso, 1985), 210–19. 28 Deschamps to EXAF, 13 April 1964, Tel. 157, Series 1838/387, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 16, NAA. Spivack to USDS, 1 May 1964, Tel. 1149, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, POL 32-1 CAMB VIET S 5/1/64, NAII. Sihanouk, letter to Time, in USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 6 May 1964, Airgram CA11531, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1969, POL 15-1 CAMB 4/1/64, NAII. 29 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 1 May 1964, Airgram A-542, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, POL 2-1, NAII. 30 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 15 May 1964, Airgram A-561, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1. 31 Rusk to U.S. United Nations Mission, 12 June 1964, Tel. 3278, RG 59, CFPF 1964– 1966, Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB VIET S 6/1/64, NAII. Lodge to SS, 19 June 1964, Tel. 2531, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1977, folder POL 32-1 CAMB VIET S 6/1/64, NAII. In September 1964 in response to a request from ambassadordesignate to Cambodia Randolph Kidder, the state department sent Bureau of Intelligence and Research report dated 16 April 1964 which stated that there was no proof of any Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, although there was no question that the Viet Cong occasionally retreated into Cambodia. Reports of Cambodian cooperation with the Viet Cong, stated an American official, usually came from unreliable third country sources. Hirshfield to Trueheart, 23 September 1964, RG 59, CFPF 1964– 1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-10 Military Operations CAMB 1/1/64, NAII. 32 Maxwell Taylor to SS, 29 July 1964, Tel. 250, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. II 3/64–7/64. U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 24 August 1964, Airgram A-52, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1975, folder POL 27-10, NAII. 33 Deschamps believed that Sihanouk’s refusal to receive Kidder was the direct result of the American protest. A simple oral protest, Deschamps believed, might not have resulted in Kidder having to depart. Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 21 September 1964, Memorandum 555, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 4, NAA. 34 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 23 October 1964, Airgram A-109, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII.

188

Notes

35 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 30 October 1964, Airgram A-111, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 6 November 1964, Airgram A-113, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. 36 Bohlen to SS, 2 November 1964, Tel. 2657, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1976, folder POL 31-1 Air Space – Boundaries US-CAMB, NAII. Given Sihanouk’s angry state of mind, the French opted not to convey to him some American demands which, they felt, constituted a threat and would be counterproductive. 37 Ian E. Nicholson to Secretary EXAF, 10 February 1965, Memorandum 84, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 38 Alf E. Bergesen to Hirschfeld, 6 November 1964, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 7/1/64, NAII. 39 USDS to U.S. Embassy Paris, 15 November 1964, Tel. 2817, RG 59, CFPF 1964– 1966, Box 1974, folder POL 1 General Policy CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 15 November 964, Tel. 265, Johnson Papers, NAFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III. Bergesen to USDS, 20 November 1964, Airgram A-121, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. “Translation of Text of Official Cambodian Press Agency Report of the Working Meeting Presided by Monsigneur the Head of States in the Evening of the 16th November 1964,” Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 18 November 1964, Tel. 384, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 40 Bergesen to SS, 28 November 1964, Tel. 362, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 7/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 30 November 1964, Tel 364, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 7/1/64, NAII. 41 Harriman to U.S. Embassies Bangkok et al., 3 December 1964, Circular Tel. 1081, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 12/ 1/64, NAII. 42 Mansfield to Johnson, 9 December 1964, Johnson Papers, WHCF-Confidential File, Box 44, folder CO 312-Vietnam (1964–1965). 43 EXAF to Deschamps, 3 December 1974, Tel. 259, Series No. A1209/128, Control Symbol 61/1304, NAA. 44 Bowles (for Bonsal) to SS, 14 December 1964, Tels.1704 and 1716, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 12/1/64, NAII. 45 Bowles (for Bonsal) to SS, 15 December 1964, Tel. 1728, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 12/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 15 December 1964, Tel. 395, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 12/1/64, NAII. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 16 December 1964, Tel. 3444, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/ 11/161 Part 16, NAA. 46 Deschamps to EXAF, 17 December 1964, Tel. 422, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 47 Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 13 January 1965, Memorandum 22, Series No. A1838/ 334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 48 James C. Thomson, Jr. to Harriman, 4 August 1966, Thomson Papers, SEA, Box 21, folder S.E. Asia Cambodia 1959–1966. The official report of the Bonsal mission is in Bonsal and Henry L. T. Koren to Harriman, 4 January 1965, RG 59, CFPF 1964– 1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/65, NAII. 49 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 24 December 1964, Airgram A-148, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 18 December 1964, Airgram A-143, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966 Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. The Polish representative, Mieczyslaw Gumkowski, was eventually taken to a hospital but died on the way.

Notes

189

50 Thomson, Memorandum for the President, 28 December 1964, Thomson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia, Vol. 3. Bergesen to SS, 26 December 1964, Tel. 424, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 12/1/64, NAII. 51 Memorandum of Conversation, Sum Manit and Peter Ferguson, 6 January 1965, enclosed in Bergesen to USDS, 8 January 1965, Airgram A-164, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1974, folder POL 1, General Pollicy CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. 52 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 28 January 1965, Savingram 120, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, 6 January 1965, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III, 8/64–6/65. In his letter Sihanouk also observed presciently that the United States was making a big mistake by not negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. “When you finally decide to accept such a solution, it will then be too late to save the South Indochinese from communization. And history will not fail to hold you responsible, you Americans, for this communization which was essentially due to your policies and senseless acts which have been carried out in South Viet Nam for many long years and of which the only tangible results are to throw the South Vietnamese people irreversibly into the arms of the Communists.” 53 R. H. Robertson to Secretary EXAF, 19 February 1965, Memorandum 255/65, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 54 L. Douglas Heck to USDS, 11 February 1965, Airgram A-844, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1970, folder POL 15-1, NAII. 55 Bergesen to SS, 7 January 1965, Tel. 447, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 12/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 12 February 1965, Airgram A-184, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 19 February 1965, Airgram A-187, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 26 February 1965, Airgram A-191, RG59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. 56 Bergesen to USDS, 9 March 1965, Airgram A-200, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. 57 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 30 March 1965, Tel. 583, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1970, folder POL 15-1, NAII. 58 Bergesen to USDS, 16 April 1965, Airgram A-222, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 2-1, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 6 April 1965, Tel. 593, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 4/1/65, NAII. 59 Sihanouk quoted in Douglas R. Perry to SS, 7 March 1965, Tel. 558, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 15-1 CAMB, NAII. 60 Thomson, handwritten notes of proceedings of Baguio Conference, March 1965, Thomson Papers, Box 19, folder Far East 1961–1966 Baguio Conference, Baguio II, 3/65 Thomson Handwritten Notes. Douglas R. Perry to USDS, 12 March 1965, Airgram A-203, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, file POL 12-1, NAII. 61 Bergesen to SS, 25 March 1965, Tel. 581, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism. Non Alignment CAMB, NAII. George Ball, Circular Telegram 1921, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism. Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 8 April 1965, Tel. 597, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/65, NAII. 62 Maxwell Taylor to SS, 10 April 1967, Tel. 3311, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1968, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Graham Martin to SS, 10 April 1965, Tel. 1516, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 25 March 1965, Tel. 581, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non Alignment CAMB, NAII. 63 Waller to EXAF, 13 April 1965, Tel. 1273, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1/1 Part 1, NAA. Rusk, Circular telegram 1953, 13 April 1965, Johnson

190

64 65

66 67

68 69

70

71 72

73

74 75

Notes

Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III. Graham Martin and Maxwell Taylor both excoriated the state department’s reasoning. See Martin to SS, 15 April 1965, Tel. 1555; and Taylor to SS, 15 April 1965, Tel. 3398; both in RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Rusk, Circular telegram 1953, 13 April 1965, Johnson Paper, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III. Martin to SS, 15 April 1965, Tel. 1555, RG 59, SNF, 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Taylor to SS, 15 April 1965, Tel. 3398, RG 59, SNF, 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Rusk to U.S. Embassies London, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane, 16 April 1965, Tel. 6629 (to London), RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1968, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Kaiser to SS, 18 April 1965, Tel. 5045, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Rusk, Circular Telegram 1992, 19 April 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Kaiser to SS, 20 April 1965, Tel. 5063, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Martin to SS, 19 April 1965, Tel. 1581, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Hervé Alphand, Minister de Leusee, Dean Rusk, Robert Barbour, 21 April 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL CAM, NAII. On the lack of interest in negotiating, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Bowles to SS, 21 April 1965, Tel. 2983, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. U.S. Embassy Bangkok to SS, 22 April 1965, Tel. 1619, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, Folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Martin to SS, 22 April 1965, Tel. 1614, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, Folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Rusk, Circular Telegram 2025, 22 April 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Taylor to SS, 24 April 1965, Tel. 3523, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. According to Taylor, Gordon Walker told Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane that the conference could not “accomplish anything on Cambodia” and that its primary purpose would be to discuss Vietnam. Taylor to SS, 20 April 1965, Tel. 3459, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 4/1/65, NAII. The British government suppressed Gordon Walker’s report. See Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict 1945– 1965 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1965), 256–67. Martin to SS, 24 April 1965, Tel. 1633, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Canadian High Commission, London, to EXAF Ottawa, 22 April 1965, Tel. 1351, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1/1 Part 2, NAII. Taylor to SS, 24 April 1965, Tel. 3523, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Rusk, Circular Telegram 2041, 25 April 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 24 April 1965, Tel. 630, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III. Bergesen to SS, 24 April 1965, Tel. 631, and Bergesen to SS, 25 April 1965, Tel. 632; both in Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol III 8/64–6/65.

Notes

191

76 Rusk to U.S. Embassies Bangkok and Vientiane, 26 April 1965, Tel. 1794 (to Bangkok), RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. 77 Bergesen to SS, 12 May 1965, Tel. 704, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. 78 Osborne, Sihanouk, 171. 79 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 25 April 1965, Tel. 122, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1/1 Part 1, NAA. CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum 1201/65, 26 April 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III. 80 Bergesen to SS, 12 May 1965, Tel. 704, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB. 81 Bergesen to SS, 26 April 1965, Tel. 636, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 26 April 1964, Tel. 637, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. 82 Bergesen to SS, 26 April 1965, Tel. 638, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 26 April 1965, Tel. 639, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. Demonstrators managed to break a heavy plate glass door, but folding metal doors held. For a complete report on the demonstration and the damage caused, see Bergesen to USDS, 11 May 1965, Airgram A-235, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. 83 Bergesen to SS, 29 April 1965, Tel. 646, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, 1/1/64, NAII. Bergesen to SS, 28 April 1965, Tel. 643 flash, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III 8/64–6/65. Bergesen to Department of State, 30 April 1965, Airgram A-228, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 12-1, NAII. Only after Sihanouk’s overthrow in 1970 were American missionaries allowed to return to Cambodia. Christian and Missionary Alliance, Eighty-fourth Year Annual Report for 1970 and Minutes of the General Council held at Houston, Texas, May 12–17, 1971 (n.p., n.d.), 141. 84 Bergesen to SS, 3 May 1965, Tels. 664 and 668, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables, Vol. III 8/64–6/65. Bergesen to SS, 7 May 1965, Airgram A-233, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 12–1, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 14 May 1965, Airgram A-236, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder POL 12-1, NAII. 85 A. A. Neylan to EXAF, 28 April 1965, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. Osborne, Sihanouk, 164. David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 146. 86 Bergesen to SS, 26 April 1965, Tel. 640, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23, NAII. Bergesen to USDS, 11 May 1965, Airgram A-235, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23, NAII. “Cambodia,” Johnson Papers, Administrative History – State Department, Chapter 7, Part I (East Asia), Box 3. American officials noted that the demonstration took place three weeks after the article appeared, suggesting that it was only a pretext. An ironic sidelight to this affair is that later Krisher collaborated with the Prince in writing a book. Osborne, Sihanouk, 165. 87 Bergesen to USDS, 11 May 1965, Airgram A-235, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23, NAII. 88 Bergesen to SS, 30 April 1965, Tel. 651, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III.

192

Notes

89 Bergesen to SS, 28 April 1965, Tels. 643 and 645, and 2 May 1965, Tel. 659, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III. 90 Bergesen to SS, 30 April 1965, Tel. 651, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64–6/65. Draft telegram, USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 30 April 1965, attached to Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy, 1 May 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64–6/65. A handwritten note on the draft indicates that it was not sent. 91 Intelligence Information Cable 314/06205-65, 5 May 1965, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III. 92 Arthur McCafferty to Johnson, 3 May 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64–6/65. McGeorge Bundy to Johnson, 3 May 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64–6/65. Bergesen to SS, 3 May 1965, Tel. 668, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, Tel. 1510, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1/ 1 Part 1. Seymour Topping of the New York Times got the story right. “Cambodia Breaks Tie with the U.S.,” New York Times, 4 May 1965, 1, 4. 93 Bohlen to SS, 13 May 1965, Tel. 6451, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Intelligence Information Cable 314/06205-65, 6 May 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64–6/65. 94 Bergesen to SS, 30 April 1965, Tel. 651, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 236, folder Cambodia Cables Vol. III 8/64-6-65. Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk, Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 30 April 1965, RG 59, SNF1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. 95 Bergesen to USDS, 11 May 1965, Airgram A-234, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 15-1 CAMB, NAII. Ball, Circular Telegram 2216, 13 May 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism Non-Alignment CAMB, NAII. Australian High Commission London to EXAF, Tel. 4091, 20 May 1965, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1/1 Part 2, NAA. Canadian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF Ottawa, 18 May 1965, Tel. 160, Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/7/1/1 Part 2, NAA.

7 Prelude to tragedy: the United States’ non-relationship with Cambodia, 1965–1969 1 James Plimsoll to Mr. Jockel, 7 May 1965, Series No.1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 2, NAA. K. J. O’Neil, “Australian Services Attache Phnom Penh Summary Covering Period 6 May 65–12 May 65,” 12 May 1965, Series No. 1838/2, Control Symbol 3016/12/4 Part 1, NAA. Plimsoll to Acting Minister EXAF, 12 May 1965, Series No. A 1838/2, Control Symbol 1541/19 Part 1, NAA. 2 Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 18 May 1965, Memorandum No. 164, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 1, NAA. 3 Deschamps to EXAF, 17 May 1965, Tel. 157 EXAF to Deschamps, 19 May 1965, Tel. 120; Deschamps to EXAF, 28 May 1965, Tel. 175; all in Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 1, NAA. 4 Interview with Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps by Kenton J. Clymer, June 19–20, 1999, at the Commonwealth Club, Canberra, ACT, Australia. Institute of Oral History, University of Texas at El Paso. Dean Rusk to Paul Hasluck, 4 September 1965, in personal possession of Noël Deschamps. 5 Robert Shaplen, “Letter from Cambodia,” New Yorker, 17 September 1966, 6. 6 Deschamps to EXAF, 18 January 1966, Memo 27, Series No. 1838/2, Control Symbol 1541/19 Part 1, NAII. Deschamps, letter to the author, 31 August 1998.

Notes

193

7 Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 30 June 1967, Memorandum 325, Series No. A/ 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1, Part 6, NAII. 8 Lt. Col. K. J. O’Neill, “Visit to Ratanakiri by Seymour Topping of The New York Times 30 September to 2 October 65,” Annex B to “Australian Services Attache Phnom Penh Covering Period 22 September 65–5 October 1965,” Series No.1838/2, Control Symbol 3016/12/4, Part 1, NAA. 9 D. W. Ropa and Chester L. Cooper to McGeorge Bundy, 14 October 1965, Thomson Papers, Folder “Far East – Thomson-Cooper Memoranda, 4/64–1/66,” Kennedy Library. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 29 October 1965, Memorandum 500, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 6, NAA. 10 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 3 December 1965, Tel. 4249, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 7, NAA. 11 Director of Central Intelligence, “Infiltration and Logistics – South Vietnam,” USIB Memorandum D-24.7/4A, 28 October 1965, Declassified Documents Series No. #1994050101245. Directorate of Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: Cambodia and the Viet Cong,” SC No. 10527/65, 22 December 1965, Declassified Documents Series No. #1976070100011. 12 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 6 December 1965, Tel. 450, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 7, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 14 December 1965, Tel. 575, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 7, NAA. Deschamps to Secretary, EXAF, 22 December 1965, Memorandum 574, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 7, NAA. 13 David L. McDonald to Robert McNamara, 12 November 1965, JCSM-912-65, Declassified Documents Series #199311010311. Lodge to SS, 21 April 1966, Tel. 4120, Declassified Documents Series #1995090102776. 14 Qiang Zhai, “China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970–1975” (unpublished manuscript), 6–7. Qiang Zhai, communication with the author, 18 September 2001. The evidence for the 10 percent agreement in 1964 comes from interviews conducted by Nayan Chanda and David Chandler. The evidence for the agreement in 1965 allowing Vietnamese communist forces to take refuge in Cambodia, to establish base camps there, and to allow the passage of materials sent from China is a published summary of the military agreement. See Marie Alexandrine Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 92–3. 15 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington D.C., 18 October 1970, Tel. 70, Series No. A3092/2, Control Symbol 221/11/8/2/4 Part 2, NAA. 16 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 18 October 1965, Tel. 3626, Series No. A1838/2, Control Symbol 1541/19 Part 1, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 19 October 1965, Tel. 376, Series No. A3092/2, Control Symbol 221/11/8/2/4 Part 2, NAA. 17 USDS Aide-Memoire, 9 November 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1976, folder POL 31-1 Air Space – Boundaries, US-CAMB, NAII. 18 Porter to SS, 26 November 1965, Tel. 1892, RG59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-10 Military Operations, NAII. 19 For example, see Lodge to SS, 24 August 1965, Tel. 606, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security Counter-Insurgency, NAII. 20 Rusk to U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 26 November 1965, Tel. 912, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 Internal Security Counter-Insurgency, NAII. 21 Taylor to SS, 4 January 1965, Tel. 2034, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1973, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB, NAII. 22 Memorandum of Conversation, Bui Luong and John P. Condon, Saigon, 5 May 1965, enclosed in U.S. Embassy Saigon to USDS, 12 May 1965, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB, NAII.

194

Notes

23 Thomson, Donald Ropa, and Chester L. Cooper to McGeorge Bundy, 16 August 1965, Johnson Papers, NSF-Name folder, Cooper Memos, Box 2. 24 U.S. Embassy Bangkok to USDS, 29 October 1965, Airgram A-415, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder General Reports and Statistics, 1/1/64, NAII. U.S. Embassy Bangkok to USDS, 26 November 1965, Airgram A-500, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder General Reports and Statistics, 1/1/64, NAII. Lodge to SS, 16 December 1965, Tel. 2163, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1971, folder POL 27-10 Military Operations CAMB 1/1/64. NAII. 25 U.S. Embassy Saigon to SS, 31 December 1965, Tel. 2338, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S 5/1/65, NAII. “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy,” 7 January 1966, Thompson Papers, Box 13, folder Far East ThomsonCooper Memoranda, Kennedy Library. 26 AKP reports, quoted in U.S. Embassy Bangkok to USDS, 25 March 1966, Airgram A-787, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder General Reports & Statistics 1/1/ 64, NAII, and 28 March 1966, Airgram A-793, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1970, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security. Counter-Insurgency, NAII. 27 U.S. Embassy Bangkok to USDS, 15 April 1966, Airgram A-869, RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1967, folder General Records & Statistics 1/1/64, NAII. 28 R. R. Fernandez to the Secretary, EXAF, 3 March 1966, Memorandum 360, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 8, NAII. Rusk to USUN, 6 April 1966, Airgram CA-9914, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1973, folder POL 31-1 CAMB-THAI 1/1/66, NAII. Arthur Goldberg to USDS, 29 January 1966, Airgram A-1240, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1973, folder POL 23 CAMB Internal Security Counter-Insurgency, NAII. 29 Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk, Tran Van Do, et al., 28 June 1966, in SEATO Council Meeting, Canberra, June 27–29, 1966, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 31-1 CAMB-THAI 1/1/66, NAII. 30 Mansfield to Lyndon Johnson and Rusk, 1 December 1965, Tel. 1103, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 95, folder LEG 7 Mansfield 6/30/66, NAII. 31 Memorandum, Thomson to Johnson, 14 June 1966, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 237, folder Cambodia Vol. IV. 32 Johnson’s handwritten notes on Rostow to Johnson, 20 June 1966, Johnson Papers, Box 237, folder NSF-Country File, folder Cambodia Vol. IV. Rostow to Rusk, 21 June 1966, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 237, folder Cambodia Vol. IV. Stanley Karnow, “U.S. Curbs Operations at Cambodia Border,” The Washington Post, 22 June 1966. 33 Deschamps to EXAF, 21 June 1966, Tel. 347, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/7/1 Part 7, NAA. 34 Rusk to the Acting SS, 2 July 1966, Telegram 78 (from Manila), RG 59, SNF 1964– 1966, Box 1975, folder POL 17 Diplomatic and Consular Representation CAMB-US 1/1/64, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Foreign Minister Shinna, Rusk, et al., 6 July 1966, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1969, folder POL 8 Neutralism NonAlignment CAMB, NAII. 35 U.S. Embassy Canberra to SS, 18 July 1966, Tel. 114, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 237, folder Cambodia Vol. IV. Rostow to Johnson, 19 July 1966, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 237, folder Cambodia Vol. IV. 36 Waller to EXAF, 28 July 1966, Tel. 2966, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 8, NAA. U.S. Embassy Saigon to SS, 22 July 1966, Tel. 1633, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/65, NAII. Shaplen’s public account of his trip in “Letter from Cambodia,” New Yorker, 17 September 1966, 1–8. 37 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington D.C., 1 August 1966, Tel. 463, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 9, NAA.

Notes

195

38 Lodge to SS, 5 August 1966, Tel. 2804, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIETS 6/1/66, NAII. 39 Quoted in Butterworth to SS, 6 August 1966, Tel. 197, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIETS 6/1/66, NAII. 40 Quoted in Butterworth to SS, 6 August 1966, Tel. 197, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1979, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIETS 6/1/66, NAII. 41 Deschamps to EXAF, 13 August 1966, Tel. 504, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 9, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 12 August 1966, Tel. 497, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 9, NAA. 42 Memorandum of Conversation, Harriman, Waller et al., 10 August 1966, RG 59, SNF 1964–1966, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US, NAII. 43 Waller to Minister, EXAF, 18 August 1966, Tel. 3328, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 9, NAA. 44 Shaplen, “Letter from Cambodia,” 17 September 1966, 2. 45 Cited in Deschamps to EXAF, 9 August 1966, Tel. 482, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 9, NAA. 46 Shaplen, “Letter from Cambodia,” 2. R. H. Robertson to P. C. J. Curtis, 7 December 1966, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 11, NAA. 47 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Deschamps, William Bundy et al., 17 September 1966, RG 59, SNF 1964–66, Box 1974, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US 1/1/65, NAII. Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Deschamps, Harriman et al., 20 September 1966, RG 59, SNF 1964–66, Box 1973, folder POL-32-1 CAMB-THAI 6-1-66, NAII. Waller to EXAF, 11 October 1966, Tel. 4143, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 10, NAA. 48 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 12 October 1966, Tel. 691, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 10, NAA. 49 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 2 January 1967, Tel. 2, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 11, NAA. 50 U.S. Aide Memoire, in Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 11 January 1967, Tel. 227, Prime Minister’s Department, Series No. A1209/80, Control Symbol 1967/7031, NAA. 51 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 28 March 1967, Tel. 1190, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 11, NAA. 52 Australian Embassy Paris to EXAF, 28 February 1967, Savingram 9, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 11, NAA. 53 Cited in Charles Bohlen to SS, 8 May 1967, Tel. 17739, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 13 CAMB 1967, NAII. The story was based on interviews conducted with Khmer Serei defectors and appears to have been about events in 1966. It is possible that this was “old news,” since Johnson apparently issued a subsequent directive to stop supporting the Khmer Serei. 54 Rusk to US Embassy Paris, 9 May 1967, Tel. 191107, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 13 CAMB 1967, NAII. 55 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 25 March 1967, Tel. 248, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3-16/11/161 Part 11, NAA. 56 Waller to EXAF, 11 February 1967, Tel. 536, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 11, NAA. Richard T. Ewing to Unger, 17 February 1967, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1804, folder POL 32 CAMB 1-1-68, NAII. 57 Australian Embassy Vientiane to EXAF, 2 April 1967, Tel. 224, Series No. A1838/ 280, Item Nol 3016/10/1/3 Part 3, NAA. 58 “Cambodia,” (n.d. [May 1967?] ), Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 18, NAA. 59 Deschamps to EXAF, 12 January 1967, Tel. 32, Prime Minister’s Department, Series No. A1209/80, Control Symbol 67/7031, NAA.

196

Notes

60 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 19 April 1967, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 3, NAA. 61 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 9 September 1967, Tel. 3764, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 4, NAA. 62 Michael Forrestal to Rusk, 8 November 1967, Declassified Documents Series 1996070101946. 63 Nutting to EXAF Ottawa, 18 November 1967, Tel. 537, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 9, NAA. A. F. Swinbourne, “Notes – Discussions at the US Embassy Bangkok 20–21 November 1967,” Series A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 3, NAA. 64 Department of Defense, “Operations in the Cambodia/Laos/SVN Tri-Border Area,” (n.d.), Declassified Documents Series #199611-1-3070. (This document outlines the developments that led to Westmoreland’s request of 5 December 1967.) Westmoreland to Earl Wheeler, 5 December 1967, Tel. JCS 660/5, Johnson Papers, NSF, Country File: Vietnam, folder Vietnam/Cambodia 5E (1) a, Boxes 92–94. 65 “Notes of the President’s Meeting with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, Clark Clifford, Abe Fortas, Walt Rostow, George Christian, Tom Johnson,” 5 December 1967, Johnson Papers, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Box 1. Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 6 December 1967, Tel. 4988, Series No. 1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 1, NAA. 66 OASD (SA)-SEA Program Division, “Southeast Asia Analysis Report,” September 1967, ASD/SA Control No. 6–808, Declassified Documents Series #1982010100076. CIA, Memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board, 21 October 1967, Declassified Documents Series. Directorate of Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists,” 16 November 1967, SC No. 08751/ 67, Declassified Documents Series #1993110103023. Australian Embassy Saigon to EXAF, 11 July 1968, Tel. 1793, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/ 2/1 Part 6, NAA. 67 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to McGeorge Bundy, 25 December 1967, attached to Rostow to Johnson, 4 January 1968, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File: Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder 5-E (2) a 5/66–1/68, Cambodia. 68 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 28 December 1967, Tel. 5244, Series No. 1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 1, NAA. 69 Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to Australian Embassy Phnom Penh, 29 December 1967, Tel. 268 [EXAF 5252], Series No. No: A1838/357, Control Symbol 250/ 10/7/12 Part 1; Waller to EXAF, 29 December 1967, Tel. 5256 [Phnom Penh 269], Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 2, NAA. McGeorge Bundy to Rostow, 3 January 1968, attached to Rostow to Johnson, 4 January 1968, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File: Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder 5-E (2) a 5/66–1/ 68, Cambodia. 70 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 8 January 1968, Tel. 34, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 9, NAA. 71 New Zealand Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF Wellington, 6 January 1968, Tel. 31, Series No. 1838/387, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 14, NAA. Bowles to SS, 7 January 1968, Tel. 8080 New Delhi, RG 59, SNF 1967–69, Box 1804, folder POL 32 CAMB, 1-1-68, NAII. 72 Unger (for Bowles), U.S. Embassy Bangkok, to SS, 10 January 1968, Tel. 8561 RG 59, SNF 1967–69, Box 2610, folder POL 7 US-Bundy 1/1/67, NAII. 73 USDS, “The Bowles Mission to Cambodia January 8–12, 1968,” 20 May 1968, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 2609, folder POL 7 US-BOWLES 1/1/68, NAII. 74 Bowles-Son Sann Joint Communique, in U.S. Embassy Bangkok to SS, 12 January 1968, Tel. 411, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1804, folder POL 27-14 CAMB, 1-168, NAII. Deschamps’ notes of working sessions between Bowles and Son Sann, 9 and

Notes

75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91

92

197

11 January, in Deschamps to Secretary EXAF, 3 February 1968, Series No. A1838/ 387, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 14, NAA. Some in the state department regretted Bowles’ use of the word “aggression” since it seemed to imply that American actions in the past constituted aggression. U.S. Embassy New Delhi to USDS and White House, Tel. 132, RG 59, SNF 1967– 1969, Box 1806, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-US, 1-1-68, NAII. Australian High Commission New Delhi to EXAF, 16 January 1968 [misdated 1967], Tel. 60, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 10, NAA. Draft EXAF Savingram, “North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Use of Cambodia,” (n.d.), Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 5, NAA. C. G. Woodard to Secretary EXAF, 17 January 1968, Memo 70/68, Series No. 1838/387, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 2, NAA. Woodard to Secretary EXAF, 22 January 1968, Memo 87/68; Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 13 February 1968, Tel. 249; both in Series No. 1838/387, Control Symbol 3016/11/ 161 Part 14, NAA. Australian High Commission New Delhi to EXAF, 2 February 1968, Tel. 170, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/9/4 Part 10, NAA. U.S. Embassy Saigon to SS, 19 March 1968, Tel. 22495, Declassified Documents Series #1988010100128. Gorham to EXAF Ottawa, 6 May 1968, Tel. 233, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 11, NAA. Rusk to US Embassy Saigon, 18 June 1968, Tel. 185208, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1932, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB-VIETS 1-1-67, NAII. Quoted in George Ball to SS, 3 July 1968, Tel. 5849, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1934, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIETS 7/1/68, NAII. Deschamps to EXAF, 1 August 1968, Tel. 993, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Part 1, NAA. Berger to SS, 19 July 1968, Tel. 33059, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1934, folder POL 32-1 CAMB-VIETS 7/1/68, NAII. Gorham to EXAF Ottawa, 22 July 1968, Tel. 378, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 11, NAA. Department of State memorandum, “Luncheon with the President,” 30 July 1968, Declassified Documents Series #1996070101968. See also Waller to EXAF, 2 August 1968, Tel. 3646, Series No. 1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 2, NAA. “Press conference by Prince Sihanouk on 8 August in Damnak Chamcar Mon Palace, Phnom Penh,” 12 August 1968, in Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/ 1/2/3 Part 1, NAA. Deschamps to Hasluck, 31 August 1968, Tel. 1100, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Part 1, NAA. Bowles to SS, 30 August 1968, Tel. 19189, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, folder POL 33-4 CAMB-US 1/1/68, NAII. Deschamps to Minister EXAF, 31 August 1968, Tel. 1100, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 7, NAA. Rusk to Johnson, 5 September 1968, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 2610, folder POL 7 US-Ball 1/1/67, NAII; Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk, Black et al., 6 September 1968, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1804, folder POL 32 CAMB 1/1/ 68, NAII. Godley, quoted in Australian Embassy Washington D.C. to EXAF, 16 September 1968, Tel. 4571, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Part 1, NAA. Rostow to Johnson, 16 September 1968, Johnson Papers, NSF-Country File, Box 237. Memorandum of Conversations, Deschamps and Cronk, 27 September 1968, enclosed in Crook to UDSD, 9 October 1968, Airgram A-809, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB 1-1-67, NAA. “Press conference by Prince Sihanouk on 8 August in Damnak Chamcar Mon Palace, Phnom Penh,” 12 August 1968, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/ 2/3 Part 1, NAA.

198

Notes

93 H. D. Anderson to Secretary EXAF, 14 October 1968, Memorandum 1129, Series No.1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 8, NAA. 94 Martin to SS, 26 September 1968, Tel. 8894, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB 1/1/67, NAII. Martin cited an Indian journalist, B. K. Tiwari, who had spoken with Sihanouk recently. 95 Deschamps to EXAF, 11 November 1968, Tel. 1449, Series No.1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 3, NAA. Department of State to various U.S. embassies, 3 January 1969, Airgram CA-17, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1800, folder POL 2 CAM 1/1/68, NAII. 96 Rusk to various embassies, 6 December 1968, Airgram CA-12541, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1731, folder POL1 CAMB-US, NAII. 97 Shriver to SS, 26 November 1968, Tel. 24529, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1932, folder POL 33-4 CAMB-US 10/1/68, NAII. Sihanouk to Lois M. Price, 14 December 1968, and Price to Johnson, 16 December 1968, both in Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File: Cambodia: Miscellaneous Cables and Memos, Box 237. 98 “Talk by Prince Sihanouk with Buddhist Monks at the Monastery of Po Veal in Battambang Province on the Occasion of the late Venerable Iv Tuot, Buddhist Patriarch of Battambang, on 25 December 1968,” FBIS 23, Johnson Papers, NSFCountry File: Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder Vietnam/Cambodia 5E (3) 11/68–1/69. 99 Deschamps to EXAF, 31 December 1968, Tel. 1701, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 22, NAA. Sihanouk’s reference to Alsop was about the journalist’s syndicated column, “LBJ Jolted by Abrams’ Report of Arms Flow From Cambodia,” Washington Post, 4 December 1968.

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199

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Primary sources I. United States National Archives and National Archives II Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Indochina: Internal Affairs, 1945–1959 ( Microfilm) Confidential U.S. State Department Special Files, Southeast Asia, 1944–1958, 39 microfilm reels. University Publications of America Despatches from United States Consuls in Saigon, 1889–1906 – T-103 ( Microfilm) RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, Records of the General Staff, Records of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Operations (G-3), Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1960 RG 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1951–1958 RG 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1959–1963 RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963 RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, 1963–1969 U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of France, 1910–1929, M560 ( Microfilm) U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of France, 1930–1939, M1442 ( Microfilm)

National Records Center, Suitland, MD (records now housed in National Archives II) RG 472 Records of the United States Forces in Southeast Asia, Military Assistance and Advisory Group – Cambodia

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO Papers of: Acheson, Dean Melby, John F. Truman, Harry S.

200

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Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS Papers of: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Seaton, Fred A.

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA Papers of: Hilsman, Roger Kennedy, John F. Thomson, James C., Jr.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX Papers of: Bundy, McGeorge Johnson, Lyndon B.

Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Papers of: Dulles, John Foster (State Department Microfilm Collection) Trimble, William C.

University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT Papers of: Stanton, Edwin M.

II. Australia National Archives of Australia, Canberra, ACT DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File No. 1541/19 Part 1 Series A1838/357, Control symbol 250/10/7/12 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2 Part 1 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/9 Part 1 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/7/1A Part 1 Series A1838/2, Control symbol 3016/12/4 Part 1 Series A1838/276, Control symbol TS383/12/1 Series A1838/2, Control symbol 3106/2/11 Part 1 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 8 Series A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 2

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201

A1838/2, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/2 A1838/277, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Part 3 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 23 A1838/357, Control symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 2 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 22 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/7/1/1 Part 1 A1838/387, Control symbol 3016/11/161 Parts 14–17, 19–20 A1838/357 Control symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 3 A1838/361, Control symbol 589/21/3/1 Part 1 A1838/2, Control symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 4 A1838/399, Control symbol 1541/19 Part 2 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Parts 2, 24 A1838/334, Control symbol 3016/11/161 Parts 10, 14 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/3 Part 1 A1838/280, Control symbol 3106/7/1/1 Part 2 A1838/280, Control symbol 3106/7/1 Part 3 A1838/280, Control symbol 3106/2/1 Parts 2–3, 10–13, 15, 18 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/9/4 Parts 10–14 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Parts 3–9, 12 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 24 A1838/2, Control symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 4 A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/2/1 Part 2

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Series A1945/24, Control symbol 248/4/13 Series A1945/24, Control symbol 248/4/29

III. Cambodia Cambodian National Archives American Friends Service Committee Library

Secondary materials Brands, H. W. The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989. Chandler, David P. A History of Cambodia, 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000.

202

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—— The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1991. Clymer, Kenton J. “Ambassador William Cattell Trimble and Cambodia, 1959–1962”, The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era. Ed. David H. Anderson, 23–42. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000. —— “A Casualty of War: The Break in American Relations With Cambodia, 1965”, A Companion to the Vietnam War. Eds Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco, 198–240. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. —— “Decolonization, Nationalism, and Anti-Communism: United States Relations With Cambodia, 1945–1954”, Journal of American-East Asian Relations 6 (Summer 1997-Fall 1997): 91–124. —— “The Perils of Neutrality: The Break in U.S.-Cambodian Relations”, Diplomatic History 23 (Fall 1999): 609–31. Duiker, William J. U.S. Containment and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Hall, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia, 4th ed. London: Macmillan, 1981. Herring, George America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2002. Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985. Kiernan, Ben How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975. London: Verso, 1985. Kiernan, Ben and Chanthou Boua, eds Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942–1981. New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982. McMahon, Robert The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999. Norodom Sihanouk, Prince. My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. London: Penguin Books, 1974. —— Le Rejet De L’Aide Americaine: Trois Exposés De S.A.R. Le Prince Norodom Sihanouk. PhnomPenh: Ministère de l’Information, Royaume du Cambodge, 1964. Osborne, Milton Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. Ponchaud, Francois La Cathedrale De La Riziere: 450 Ans D’Histoire De L’Eglise Au Cambodge. Paris: Le Sarment: Fayard, 1990. Sardesai, D. K. Southeast Asia Past and Present, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989. Sawin, John S. “The Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China 1925–1930, Vol. II”, C & MA Archives, Colorado Springs. Unpublished. —— “The Christian and Missionary Alliance in Indo-China Pre-1911–1924, Vol. I”, C & MA Archives, Colorado Springs. Unpublished. Shawcross, William Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Tully, John A. France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia, 1863–1953. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003. Zhai, Qiang China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Index

203

Index

A Siep, 68 Abbott, George M., 23 Acheson, Dean, 102, 106, 147; on aid to Indochina, 25–6; represents Cambodia in Preah Vihear dispute, 92 Alexander, Clifford L., Jr., 104 Alphand, Hervé, 121 Alsop, Joseph, 151, 198n.99 American Bible Society, 12 Angkor Wat, 2, 7–8, 11 Anlong Kres, attack on, 114, 115 Anlong Trach, attack on, 136–8 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 142 Arzac, Daniel, 98, 99, 101, 104

Bophi Devi, 69 Bowles, Chester, 118, 121, 136, 147–8, 151; praises Cambodia’s civic actions, 90; mission to Cambodia (1968), 143–4 Bradley, Mark Philip, 11 Brooke, Edward, 147; visit to Cambodia, 140 Buddhism, 1–2; Alliance missionaries on, 14 Bundy, McGeorge, 89, 104, 118, 121, 133, 142; on reasons why Sihanouk broke relations with the U.S., 125–6 Bundy, William, 120, 134, 144 Bunker, Ellsworth, 141, 144, 146

B-52 attacks on Cambodia, proposed, 141–2 Ba Thu, attack on, 132, 138–9 Ball, George, 105, 120 Bandung Conference, 45, 47, 123 Bao Dai, 25 Bardez, Félix Louis, 3 Barré, Jean, 73 Bathu, attack on, 92–3 Battambang rebellion (1968), 145 Bavet, attack on, 119, 146 Bergesen, Alf, 114 –15, 119, 120, 123–5, 127 Bhumibol Adulyadej, King, 93 Bidault, Georges, 36–7 big game hunting, 10 Bishop, Max, 54 Black, Eugene, 135; mission to Cambodia, 148–9 Blitz affair, 78–9, 179n.5 Bohlen, Charles, 74 Bonnet, Henri, 25, 44 Bonsal, Philip, and New Delhi talks, 115–18

Candee, Helen Churchill, 7–8, 10–11 Cao Van Vien, 112 Cao Dai religion, 15 Casey, Robert, 10–11 Catholicism, 11–12; Alliance missionaries on, 14 Catlett, Don V., 26–7 Chandler, David P., 14, 27, 35, 49, 124 Chantrea, attack on, 111–12, 146 Chau Seng, 75, 79; leads attack on U.S. embassy, 110 Chenla, 2 Chiang Kai-shek, 70, 101 Child, Marquis, 85 Chinese community in Cambodia, 59–60 Chou En-lai, see Zhou Enlai Christian and Missionary Alliance, 3, 11–17, 191n.83; Cambodian censorship of, 80, 88; French restrictions on, 14 –15 Chu, Kwang P., arrested, 93–4 Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), 108, 132–4 Clifford, Clark, 142, 151

204

Index

Collins, James F., 99 Conference of Indochinese Peoples, 119–20 Connor, Jacob E., 6–7 Cooper, John Sherman, 48 Dak Dam, attack on, 114 DANIEL BOONE missions, 151 Dap Chhuon, 24, 26, 28, 56, 76, 87–8, 93, 162n.62; plot against Sihanouk, 69–73, 75–7, 87–8, 92 DeFosse, F. J., 10 de Gaulle, Charles, 20, 95, 104, 138 de Langlade, Pierre, 32, 163n.68 de la Rosa, Manuel, 120 de Mirmont, Pierre Mathivet de la Ville, 63, 174n.31 de Murville, Couve, 43 Democratic Party (Cambodia), 20, 23, 27, 29–30, 45, 48–9, 60, 159n.13 Deschamps, Noël, 110, 112–13, 118, 126, 130, 136, 139, 147–9, 151, 184n.79, 187n.33; on attacks on Thlok Trach and Anlong Trach, 137; on Ba Thu attack, 132; background of, 128; on Black mission to Cambodia, 148–9; on Brooke visit to Cambodia, 140; on Jacqueline Kennedy’s visit to Cambodia, 140–1; on MAAG, 97; on Spivack, 111; on representing American interests in Cambodia, 128–9 Dewey, Peter, 160n.26 Dexter, John, 126 Dillon, C, Douglas, 34, 41, 78 Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 126 Duang, King, 3 Dulles, Allen, 57, 88; visits Phnom Penh, 56 Dulles, John Foster, 30, 32, 39–40, 43–5, 47–8, 53–5, 64; on Geneva Conference, 34 –7 Durbrow, Elbridge, 65, 67, 70–2, 76, 78 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 30, 43–4, 55, 66, 70, 73–5, 81, 85, 102–3, 175n.50, 176n.54; on providing jets to Cambodia, 83; meets with Sihanouk, 82 Ellison, David E., 14 –16, 22–4, 159n.18; and Issaraks, 21 Ellison, Muriel Harrison, 13, 21, 158n.3 Elting, Howard T., Jr., 67 Ely, Paul, 44, 49

Felt, Harry D., 86 Ficke, Arthur Davison, 8 Forces Armée Royales Khmères (FARK), 57 Forrestal, Michael, 103–4, 112–13, 141 Fortas, Abe, opposes B-52 attacks, 142 Franck, Harry A., 7–8, 11 Franco-Cambodian Treaty of 1949, 23 French colonialism, American views of, 10, 19, 21, 23–5; missionary views of, 14 –15, 157n.52, 157n.59 French military assistance, American views of, 39–45 Friendship Highway, 74, 113, 117 Funan, 2 Gedney, William, 26, 161–2n.51 Geneva Accords (1954), 34 –7, 45, 168n.44; and proposed MAAG, 46 Geneva Conference on Laos (1962), 85–7, 91, 93–4, 96 Giang Thanh River incident, 150–1 Gorce, Pierre, 174n.31 Gordon Walker, Patrick, 190n.72; Southeast Asia mission of, 120–2 Green, Marshall, 102 Gumkowski, Mieczyslaw, death of, 188n.49 Habib, Philip, 143 Hambleton, John A., 8 Hammond, Arthur L., 13–17, 21 Hammond, Ester King, 13 Harkins, Paul, 112 Harriman, Averell, 91, 102–3, 110, 115, 118, 120, 149, 151; proposed visit to Cambodia (1967), 136–8 Hartshorn, Edwin S., Jr, 62–3 Hasluck, Paul, 140 Heath, Donald, 32–3, 164n.84; on Sihanouk, 164n.87; on Son Ngoc Thanh, 29 Herndon, Ray, on Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, 141 Herter, Christian, 65, 71, 85 Herz, Martin, appointed Cambodian desk officer, 144; book about Cambodia angers Sihanouk, 80 Hilsman, Roger, 88–9, 102–4, 106, 111 Hinduism, 1–2 Hirschfield, Thomas J., 115, 179n.13

Index Ho Chi Minh, 29, 58 Hopler, Samuel, H. B., 93–4 Hughes, Thomas L., 104 Huy Kanthoul, 29 Indochinese Communist Party, 27, 158n.2 International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC), 29, 36, 116–17, 136, 139, 143–6; on proposed MAAG, 46–9 Irwin, E. F., 11, 13 Issaraks, 21–2, 27–8, 33, 56, 162n.38, 164n.92; American views of, 24 Jaffray, R. A., 12 Jeffrey, Mrs. D. I., 15–16, 157n.63 Jessup, Philip, represents Thailand in Preah Vihear dispute, 92 jet aircraft, question of supplying to Cambodia, 82–3, 85–6, 90, 106 Johnson, Lyndon B., 103, 107, 112, 116–18, 120–1, 123, 125, 129, 131, 135–6, 144, 147–8, 150–1; on possible B-52 attacks, 142; sends Chester Bowles to Cambodia, 143 Johnson, Robert H., 89 Johnson, U. Alexis, 70–2, 78, 89, 131 Karnow, Stanley, 143; on Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, 131 Kellogg, Edmund, 69, 78 Kennedy, Jacqueline, visit to Cambodia, 128, 138, 140–1 Kennedy, John F., 83, 85–8, 95, 100–1, 105–6, 108; assassinated, 103; provides jets to Cambodia, 85–6 Kennedy, Robert, 146 Khao Phra Viharn, see Preah Vihear Khieu Samphan, 81 Khim Tit, 60 Khmer Serei, 100–4, 107–8, 116, 125–6, 129, 132–5, 139, 141, 144; American involvement with, 184n.79 Khmer Rouge, 1, 81 Kidder, Randolph A., 114, 116, 187n.31, 187n.33 Kiernan, Ben, 20, 23–5, 158n.2 Knowland, William F., 33 Koh Rokor, attack on, 114 Kompong Trach, attack on, 119 Kossamak, see Sisowath Kossamak Kou Roun, arrested, 86 Krisher, Bernard, 124 –5, 191n.86

205

LaMotte, Ellen N., 8 Lancaster, Donald, on attack on U.S. embassy, 110 Lansdale, Edward, 54; plot against Sihanouk, 68–9; on Viet Cong activity in Cambodia, 180n.24 LCU 1577, captured, 147–51 Leclère, Adhémard, 5–6 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 100–1, 111, 131, 136–7; on Chantrea attack, 112 Lodoen, George, 52 Lon Nol, 69, 86, 96, 113, 138; asks for jets, 82–3 Macapagal, Diosdado, 107 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 40, 45 McArthur, George, on Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, 141 McClintock, Robert, 38–9, 40–3, 46–7, 49–56, 58, 60, 69; on French, 166n.16; on Krishna Menon, 168n.44; recalled, 57 McColm, George A., 139 McConaughy, Walter P., 88 Macdonald, Malcolm, 45 McNamara, Robert, 131, 138, 151; opposes B-52 attacks, 142 Mansfield, Mike, 30, 57, 95, 103, 147; advises keeping U.S. forces clear of the Vietnam-Cambodian border, 116; on Sihanouk, 107; visit to Cambodia (1965), 134 –5 Mao Zedong, 98, 123 Martin, Graham, 133, 190n.63; on Gordon Walker mission, 121 Matsui, Victor, plot against Sihanouk, 71–2, 74, 76–7, 93 Melby, John F., 26 Mendès-France, Pierre, 36, 41 Menon, Krishna, 55, 168n.44 Messmer, Pierre, 107 Meyer, Charles, 68–9 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)-Cambodia, 37, 46, 50–1, 57, 61–2, 82, 88–9, 95–7, 180n.24, 183n.60; establishment of, 40–5 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)-Indochina, 31, 40, 49, 180n.24 Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (MACV), 108 Military Defense Agreement (MDA) (1955), 44 –9 Moffat, Abbott Low, 22

206

Index

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 35, 37 Mong, attack on, 108 Monipong, Prince, 26 Monireth, Prince, 56–7 Monivong, King, 18 Monjo, John C., 79 Montllor, Joseph, 31–2 Moream Tiek, attack on, 125–6 Mouhot, Henri, 4 Muslims, Alliance missionaries on, 14 Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP) survey (1955), 49 Ne Win, 121 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 25, 39, 45, 51; on proposed MAAG, 47–8 New Delhi talks (1964), 115–18 Ngo Dinh Can, plot against Sihanouk, 68 Ngo Dinh Diem, 59, 67, 72, 75–6, 91, 94, 99, 105, 184n.79; overthrow of, 101 Ngo Dinh Nhu, 66, 68, 75–6, 78; plot against Sihanouk, 68 Nguyen Cao Ky, 132–4 Nhiek Tioulong, 42, 56, 81, 90, 96, 136 Nixon, Richard, 1, 54 –5, 151 Nolting, Frederick, 91, 97 Nong Kimny, 28, 30, 51, 78, 88–9, 97, 102, 104 –6, 109, 118, 136, 144; apologizes for attack on U.S. embassy, 110 Norden, Hermann, 11 Norodom Phurissara, 48–9 Norodom Sihanouk, 19–20, 36, 41–4, 47–52, 54 –7, 59–60, 62–3, 65, 81, 83–6, 88–95, 97–102, 107–8, 113, 117–19, 128, 134 –5, 141, 143, 149, 163n.68, 163n.78, 164n.87, 169n.68, 174n.26, 175n.50, 178n.90, 179n.2, 183n.70, 184n.79, 187n.33, 188n.36, 191n.83, 198n.99; on attacks on Thlok Trach and Anlong Trach, 138; attends U.N. (1960), 81–2; attends U.N. (1961), 86–7; on Ba Thu attack, 139; and Battambang rebellion (1968), 145; celebrates death of Sarit Thanarat, 105; celebrates deaths of enemies, 185n.94; cuts off American aid, 1963, 103, 106; and demonstration at U.S. embassy (1965), 124 –5; and French return to Cambodia, 158n.8; on Geneva Conference on Laos, 85, 87; installed as King, 18; and Issaraks, 22;

on Jacqueline Kennedy’s visit to Cambodia, 140–1; on LCU 1577 incident, 147–51; on Nixon, 151; plots against, 66–80, 87–8, 93, 98, 102–3, 174n.24, 174n.26, 174n.29, 174n.30, 174n.31, 175n.50, 176n.54, 176n.62, 176n.63, 177n.74, 179n.5; proposed conference on Cambodia’s borders, 94 –6, 99, 109–10, 113, 119–23, 126–7, 130, 185n.97, 190n.72; receives Bible, 13; royal crusade for independence, 30–3; on Son Ngoc Thanh, 29; suppresses communists (1964), 187n.27; on treatment in U.S., 178n.101; on Viet Minh, 27; wants French to release Son Ngoc Thanh, 162n.56; warns U.S. of involvement in Vietnam, 189n.52; on yellow powder incident, 114 Norodom Vakravan, killed, 76 Osborne, Milton, 124; on Sihanouk’s decision to cancel proposed conference on Cambodia’s borders, 123 Parsons, J. Graham, 73–4 Parthasarathi, Gopalaswami, 46, 48 Pathet Lao, 35, 109, 110, 145 Penn Nouth, 33, 39, 51, 146, 150 Pentalateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1950), 38 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 141 Peterson, Floyd, 15, 16, 19 Phak Nhay, attack on, 64 Pham Van Dong, 36 Phan Huy Quat, 121–2 Phum Chantatep, attack on, 125–6 Pol Pot, 1 Prasat, attack on, 147 Preah Vihear (Khao Phra Viharn), dispute, 77, 92–3, 130; Khmer Serei attack on, 124, 145 Prey Tuol, attack on, 150 Price, Lois M., 150 Pung Peng Cheng, 174n.30 Radford, Arthur W., 40, 59 Rasmi, Princess, 102 Reath Suong, see Reath Vath Reath Vath, plot against Sihanouk, 78–9 Reed, Charles, 21–2 Risterucci, Jean, 32, 163n.68 Roberts, Sam A., 149

Index Robertson, Walter S., 38, 43, 45, 51, 54 –5, 59, 67, 73 Romulo, Carlos, 25 Roosevelt, Franklin D., on Indochina, 19 Rostow, Walt, 86, 136; on Black mission, 148 Rusk, Dean, 26, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 105, 108, 115–16, 120–1, 123, 126, 128, 134 –5, 139, 144, 146, 151; opposes B-52 attacks, 142; on Sihanouk’s cancelling proposed conference on Cambodia’s borders, 122 Sam Sary, 30, 56, 76, 78, 84, 100, 174n.24, 174n.30; plot against Sihanouk, 68–9 Samakhum Khmer Issarak (United Issarak Front), 27 Sangkum Reastre Niyum, 42, 47, 50, 56, 63–4 Sarit Thanarat, 104 –5, 179n.13; compares Sihanouk to pig, 87 Seaton, Fred A., inaugurates Friendship Highway, 74 –5 Seventh Day Adventists, 12 Shaplen, Robert, 129, 136, 138 Sharp, U.S. Grant, 141, 145 Shaw, John, 107–8 Sherrer, Edward H., 89, 96, 99 Sihanouk, see Norodom Sihanouk Sim Var, 60 Simpson, A. B., 12 Sirik Matak, 42 Sisowath Kossamak, Queen, 53, 69, 76, 124 Slat Peau, plot against Sihanouk, 72–3, 76–7 Smith, Bedell, 35 Smith, Leland L., 9 Son Ngoc Thanh, 20, 29, 31–3, 35, 52, 68, 70, 73, 75, 84, 91, 94, 98, 100, 103, 120, 132–42, 144, 162n.62, 162n.56, 158n.6; joins resistance, 28–30; returns to Cambodia (1951), 28; views of Sihanouk, 163n.78 Son Phuoc Tho, 66–7 Son Sann, 119–20, 144; tries to get talks going, 118 Son Thai Nguyen, 133 Songgram, Pibul, 18 Southeast Asian Games, 182n.58 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 51–4, 67, 93, 134, 185n.94 Souvanna Phouma, 179n.2

207

Spivack, Herbert, 111, 113–14 Sprouse, Philip D., 93, 96–8, 102–3, 105–6, 186n.14 Stanton, Edwin F., 22, 24, 26 Stewart, Michael, 121 Strobel, Edward H., 115n.7 Strom, Carl W., 58–9, 62, 64 –5, 67, 69–73, 174n.24 Stuart, Francis, 174n.24 Stump, Felix B., 50, 52 Sullivan, Charles A., 38 Sullivan, William H., 145, 190n.72 Svay A Ngong, attack on, 146–8 Svay Rieng conspiracy, 78–9 Syngman Rhee, 70 Taey, attack on, 113 Taylor, Maxwell, 95, 112, 121–2, 190n.63 Tep Phan, 83 Thay Sok, 149 Thlok Trach, attack on, 136–8, 140 Thlork, attack on, 113 Tho, Nguyen Ngoc, 76 Thompson, Carl E., 124 Thomson, James C., Jr., 135; on New Delhi talks, 118 Tito, Josip Broz, 144 Topping, Seymour, on Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, 130 Tran Van Do, 134 Trapnell, Thomas J., 31 Trimble, William C., 72–4, 77–8, 80–2, 86–8, 90; on Sihanouk, 176n.71; on Zhou Enlai’s visit to Cambodia, 79–80, 174n.31, 176n.63, 177n.74, 178n.90 Truman, Harry S., 28; on aid to Indochina, 25–6 Trumbull, Robert, on Viet Cong bases in Cambodia, 89–90 U Nu, 47 U.S. embassy, demonstration at (1964), 110; (1965), 123–5; 191n.82; 191n.86 Unger, Leonard, 145–6 Valeo, Francis (Frank), 18, 30; on McClintock, 57 VESUVIUS, operation, 141, 143–5, 147–8 Viet Minh, 24, 26–8, 30, 33–6, 64, 76, 164n.92 Vincent, Frank, Jr., 4 –5 Vinh Lac, attack on, 92 Vu Van Mau, 67, 91

208

Index

Waller, Keith, 136, 138–9 Wester, J. D., 22, 160n.26 Westmoreland, William, 141–2, 145 Wilson, Charles E., 44 Wilson, Harold, 121 Yager, Joseph A., 34 –5 yellow powder incidents, 114, 116, 119

Yost, Charles, 134 Young, Kenneth T., 53, 89, 96; urges McClintock’s recall, 54 Zhou Enlai, 35–6, 52, 54, 58, 79–80, 82; on proposed MAAG, 47–8; and Sihanouk’s decision to cancel proposed conference on Cambodia’s borders, 123