THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
VIENNA CIRCLE INSTITUTE YEARBOOK [2002]
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VIENNA CIRCLE INSTITUTE YEARBOOK [2002] 10 Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’ Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception Series-Editor: Friedrich Stadler University of Vienna, Austria and Director, Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’ Advisory Editorial Board:
Honorary Consulting Editors:
Rudolf Haller, University of Graz, Austria, Coordinator Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics, UK Robert S. Cohen, Boston University, USA Wilhelm K. Essler, University of Frankfurt/M., Germany Kurt Rudolf Fischer, University of Vienna, Austria Michael Friedman, University of Indiana, Bloomington, USA Peter Galison, Harvard University, USA Adolf Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh, USA Rainer Hegselmann, University of Bayreuth, Germany Michael Heidelberger, University of Tübingen, Germany Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University, USA Gerald Holton, Harvard University, USA Don Howard, University of Notre Dame, USA Allan S. Janik, University of Innsbruck, Austria Richard Jeffrey, Princeton University, USA Andreas Kamlah, University of Osnabrück, Germany Eckehart Köhler, University of Vienna, Austria Anne J. Kox, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Saul A. Kripke, Princeton University, USA Elisabeth Leinfellner, University of Vienna, Austria Werner Leinfellner, Technical University of Vienna, Austria James G. Lennox, University of Pittsburgh, USA Brian McGuinness, University of Siena, Italy Kevin Mulligan, Université de Genève, Switzerland Elisabeth Nemeth, University of Vienna, Austria Julian Nida-Rümelin, University of Göttingen, Germany Helga Nowotny, ETH Zürich, Switzerland Erhard Oeser, University of Vienna, Austria Joëlle Proust, École Polytechnique CREA Paris, France Alan Richardson, University of British Columbia, CDN Peter Schuster, University of Vienna, Austria Jan Šebestik, CNRS Paris, France Karl Sigmund, University of Vienna, Austria Hans Sluga, University of California at Berkeley, USA Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, USA Antonia Soulez, Université de Paris 8, France Wolfgang Spohn, University of Konstanz, Germany Christian Thiel, University of Erlangen, Germany Walter Thirring, University of Vienna, Austria Thomas E. Uebel, University of Manchester, UK Georg Winckler, University of Vienna, Austria Ruth Wodak, University of Vienna, Austria Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland Anton Zeilinger, University of Vienna, Austria
Kurt E. Baier Francesco Barone † C.G. Hempel † Stephan Körner † Henk Mulder † Arne Naess Paul Neurath † Willard Van Orman Quine † Marx W. Wartofsky †
Review Editor: Michael Stöltzner, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Editorial Work/Layout/Production: Hartwig Jobst Robert Kaller Camilla R. Nielsen Erich Papp Christopher Roth
Editorial Address: Institut ‘Wiener Kreis’ Museumstrasse 5/2/19, A–1070 Wien, Austria Tel.: +431/5261005 (international) or 01/5261005 (national) Fax.: +431/5248859 (international) or 01/5248859 (national) email:
[email protected] homepage: http://ivc.philo.at
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM RE-EVALUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Edited by FRIEDRICH STADLER University of Vienna, and Institute Vienna Circle, Austria
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS NEW YORK, BOSTON, DORDRECHT, LONDON, MOSCOW
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EDITORIAL On the occasion of its anniversary, the Institut Wiener Kreis/Vienna Circle Institute, together with the Zentrum für überfakultäre Forschung/Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the University of Vienna, organized an international symposium on “The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-Evaluation and Future Perspectives of Research and Historiography”. This event was hosted by the Department of Contemporary History at the Campus of the University of Vienna, in Vienna July 12 – 14, 2001. The Institute Vienna Circle (IVC) was founded in 1991 as a non-profit society. It has been supported ever since by the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research and the City of Vienna. The institute is a member of the International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science – Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and has been working together with the University of Vienna since 1997 on the basis of a co-operation agreement. Since the very outset, the IVC has worked together closely with similar institutes and societies in Austria and abroad, focusing on the promotion, cultivation and dissemination of a scientific philosophy and history and philosophy of science in the tradition and spirit of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism. The Institute’s research activities also include the documentation, application and development of its results. IVC adheres to a pluralist and (post-)enlightened conception of science and philosophy of science that is committed to the democratization of knowledge and science and the critique of all forms of irrationalism, dogmatism, and fundamentalism. To this end, the IVC regularly organizes conferences and lectures in Austria and abroad, edits three book series (in English and German), and maintains a library and archives with materials by, and on, members of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers as well as scientists. (cf. survey at the IVC’s Website: http://ivc.philo.at). As regards the most recent activities, one should draw attention to the Vienna International Summer University – Scientific World Conceptions, which has been taking place every year (in July) since 2001 at the University Campus. Each summer university has had a different focus on research-related topics: 2001 (Unity and Plurality of Science), 2002 (Mind and Computation), and 2003 (Cosmological and Biological Evolution). Another current activity is our participation in the ongoing ESF-Network on “Historical and Contemporary Perspectives of Philosophy of Science in Europe” , from 2001 to 2003, which is planned to be extended as a follow-up program of ESF. The edition of Moritz Schlick’s papers (Moritz Schlick Edition) is another international research and publication project, which is presently underway with a team of scholars from the University of Graz and the University of Rostock (Germany). The proceedings of the “Third
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International History of Philosophy of Science Conference” (HOPOS 2000) are to be found here in the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 9/2001. This Yearbook presents the contributions of invited lecturers as well as a selection of contributed papers of the aforementioned anniversary jubilee conference. It also features work from international research and historiography on Logical Empiricism and its influence, in addition to its further development by renowned scholars and a younger generation of philosophers. We have divided this yearbook papers into thematic chapters that focus on the origins, history and historiography, with such leading figures as Schlick and Reichenbach along with other members of this influential movement. The yearbook also addresses more topical issues such as the unity and plurality of science, contexts of science, epistemology and ethics, and some (long neglected) women of Logical Empiricism. The reception of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism in the Soviet Union and Russia is dealt with in a special concluding report section. As usual, the volume also has a review section on recent publications dealing with scientific philosophy and philosophy of science. In this regard it is important to note that the selected papers on Rudolf Carnap have been published separately in the volume of the IVC series “Vienna Circle Institute Library” established this year. This volume, Language, Truth, and Knowledge, edited by Thomas Bonk, is to appear at the same time as this Yearbook published by Kluwer. Several other invited papers will be part of the forthcoming Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, ed. by Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel. Last not least let me thank to all who helped make the anniversary conference possible and contributed to the publication of the proceedings in these two volumes: my colleagues Elisabeth Nemeth and Eckehart Koehler as members of the Program Committee, the members of the Local Organizing Committee with Margit (Mischa) Kurka, Daria Mascha, Robert Kaller from the IVC and Marianne Ertl from the Department of Contemporary History. Here I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our financial supporters: the Austrian Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the City of Vienna (Division of Culture) and the Bank Austria. Finally, I would like to thank our review editor Michael Stöltzner, and Camilla Nielsen, Christopher Roth and Hartwig Jobst, who, together with members of the Advisory Editorial Board, were involved in the production of this Yearbook.
Vienna, October 2002
Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna, and Vienna Circle Institute)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
FRIEDRICH STADLER: What is the Vienna Circle? Some Methodological and Historiographical Answers
I.
XI
ORIGINS AND HISTORY
ARNE NAESS: Pluralism of Tenable World Views
3
PAOLO PARRINI: On the Formation of Logical Empiricism
9
ANITA VON DUHN: Bolzano’s Account of Justification
21
DAVID JALAL HYDER: Kantian Metaphysics and Hertzian Mechanics
35
II.
MORITZ SCHLICK
HUBERT SCHLEICHERT: Moritz Schlick’s Idea of Non-territorial States
49
MASSIMO FERRARI: An Unknown Side of Moritz Schlick’s Intellectual Biography: the Reviews for the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie” (1911-1916)
63
HANS JÜRGEN WENDEL: Between Meaning and Demarcation
79
DAGMAR BORCHERS: “Let’s Talk about Flourishing!” – Moritz Schlick and the Non-cognitive Foundation of Virtue Ethics
95
III.
HANS REICHENBACH
CARSTEN KLEIN: Coordination and Convention in Hans Reichenbach’s Philosophy of Space
109
VIII
ROBERT RYNASIEWICZ: Reichenbach’s of Simultaneity in Historical and Philosophical Perspective
IV.
OTHER PROPONENTS
AND
121
PERIPHERY
JUHA MANNINEN: Towards a Physicalistic Attitude
133
WOLFGANG HUEMER: Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Felix Kaufmann
151
ARTUR KOTERSKI: Béla von Juhos and the Concept of “Konstatierungen”
163
P AOLO M ANCOSU / M ATHIEU M ARION: Wittgenstein’s Constructivization of Euler’s Proof of the Infinity of Primes
171
GRACIELA DEPIERRIS: Quine’s Historical Argument for Epistemology Naturalized
189
V.
UNITY AND PLURALITY
ELLIOTT SOBER: Two Uses of Unification
205
CHRISTOPHER HITCHCOCK: Unity and Plurality in the Concept of Causation
217
DIEDERICK RAVEN: Edgar Zilsel’s Research Programme: Unity of Science as an Empirical Problem
225
VI.
CONTEXTS OF SCIENCE
GREGOR SCHIEMANN: Criticizing a Difference of Contexts – On Reichenbach’s Distinction between “Context of Discovery” and “Context of Justification”
237
GIORA HON: Contextualizing an Epistemological Issue: the Case of Error in Experiment
253
JUTTA SCHICKORE: The Contexts of Scientific Justification. Some Reflections on the Relation Between Epistemological Contextualism and Philosophy of Science
265
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VII.
EPISTEMOLOGY
DANIEL COHNITZ: Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology
281
F.O. ENGLER: Structure and Heuristic: in Praise of Structural Realism in the Case of Niels Bohr
297
VIII.
ETHICS
UWE CZANIERA: The Neutrality of Meta-Ethics Revisited – How to Draw on Einstein and the Vienna Circle in Developing an Adequate Account of Morals
IX.
313
WOMEN OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
DAGMAR BORCHERS: No Woman, no Try? – Else Frenkel-Brunswik and the Project of Integrating Psychoanalysis into the Unity of Science
323
MICHAEL BEANEY: Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis
339
NIKOLAY MILKOV: Susan Stebbing’s Criticism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
351
A DELHEID H AMACHER - H ERMES : Rose Rand: a Woman in Logic
365
B. GENERAL PART
REPORT – DOCUMENTATION OLESSIA NAZAROVA : Logical Positivism in Russia
381
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REVIEWS
Ernst Mach’s Vienna 1895-1930 or Phenomenalism as Philosophy of Science. Edited by John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht 2001. (Erik Banks)
389
Herbert Hochberg, The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism, Rodopi: Amsterdam/Atlanta 2001. (Erwin Tegtmeier)
393
Liliana Albertazzi / Dale Jacquette / Roberto Poli (eds.), The School of Alexius Meinong (= Western philosophy series 57), Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2001. (Maria Reicher)
397
M. Ferrari / I.-O. Stamatescu (eds.), Symbol and Physical Knowledge. On the Conceptual Structure of Physics, Springer: Berlin 2002. (Thomas Mormann)
401
Uwe Czaniera, Gibt es moralisches Wissen? Die Kognitivismusdebatte in der analytischen Moralphilosophie, Mentis: Paderborn 2001. (Gabriele Mras)
406
ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE VIENNA CIRCLE
Activities 2002
411
Preview 2003
414
OBITUARY
Eugene T. Gadol (1920-2000) (Friedrich St adler)
417
Index of Names
419
FR I E D R I C H S TADLER
WHAT IS THE VIENNA CIRCLE? SOME METHODOLOGICAL AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ANSWERS “What is the Vienna Circle?” is a question which is neither rhetorical nor trivial. It is perhaps an attempt to ‘square the circle’ – which is, meanwhile, mathematically possible, as Karl Menger described as early as 1934.1 This question might be also a problem of how the whole relates logically to the parts or the parts to the whole, which was already addressed by mereology (whole-part theory) according to Stanislaw (1916).2 Of course, we are all familiar with the irritating fact that one and the same phenomenon can be described consistently by more than one theory (underdetermination of a theory by observation). A popular way for beginners to proceed is to check the lexical entries on a concept that might merit further discussion. But is this enough? If we look at the current definitions of the Vienna Circle, we quickly recognize the difficulty of providing a representative description of the circle and of Logical Empiricism in its entirety. Even the autobiographical accounts given since the classical period of the Schlick Circle show a remarkable variance – depending on focus and underlying motivations. The locus classicus is – and remains – the manifesto of 1929 entitled Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle, published by the Ernst Mach Society and co-authored by Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath.3 A second milestone in the diffusion of Vienna Circle ideas, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, was the article written by Herbert Feigl and Albert Blumberg: “Logical Positivism – A New Movement in European Philosophy” (1931) in the Journal of Philosophy. Here, both authors underscored the (anti-Kantian) synthesis of rationalism and empiricism.4 What is so striking about these representative text excerpts? The “scientific world conception” (as opposed to Weltanschauung) is directed against metaphysics as well as philosophy as a discipline in its own right. As an alternative, we can note a tendency towards a (physicalist) unified science that later culminated in an empiricist encyclopedia project and includes the principle of tolerance as applied to logic and scientific languages. Already here, the contours of epistemological options emerge: phenomenalism vs. physicalism, coherence theory vs. correspondence theory of truth, syntax vs. semantics as regards the “logic of science”, ideal vs. normal language as scientific language and, last not least, verification vs. confirmation (or falsification) of empirical statements.
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If one also takes into account that the manifesto represents only one (“left”) wing of the Vienna Circle at the end of the twenties (one simply need recall the negative stance of Schlick under Wittgenstein’s influence), then it becomes abundantly clear that there existed only a limited consensus. Is it possible, even so, to find a sort of basic agreement here – one that unites the members of the Vienna Circle – both the central figures and those on the periphery?5 A simple theoretical framework can be found in the following description: a basic scientific orientation grounded in logical and linguistic analysis, an explanatory and epistemological monism in terms of methodology and research subjects, and finally a sort of fallibilistic epistemology with interdisciplinarity featuring as a program that opposes any sort of foundationalist “system”. First, let me point out that until the end of the Vienna Circle’s existence the tensions between scientific philosophy on the one hand, and empirical science (dualism of philosophy and science) on the other, went unresolved. These differences were most pronounced in the discussions between Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath.6 We can conclude that neither the autobiographical accounts of contemporaries nor the historical accounts originating shortly after 1945 were able to provide an adequate picture of the Vienna Circle. Moreover, we can only recognize a partial, albeit broad, overlap with Logical Empiricism in general when we take into account the related movements of the Berlin Circle around Hans Reichenbach or the Warsaw Group around Alfred Tarski.7 Here I think that a historical reconstruction is indeed called for, even if it ultimately proves insufficient. Such a reconstruction was already briefly sketched by Gustav Bergmann in his letter to Neurath in 1938:8 Seen in this way, the important scientific movements which until now had their common center of radiation in Vienna – psychoanalysis, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, and Kelsen’s legal and political philosophy, really belonged together and they determined the specific intellectual atmosphere of the Austria that vanished, just as did, in the artistic sphere, the authors Broch, Canetti and Musil.
The importance of the Vienna Circle as a cultural phenomenon within the context of New Objectivity (Neue Sachlichkeit) is illustrated by contemporary figures and their more or less positive reactions to its program, e.g. the writers Hilde Spiel, Jean Améry, Bertolt Brecht and Robert Musil. 9 But what does present-day research and history have to say about all this? To be sure, the (hidden) history of the reception of Logical Empiricism ranks worldwide as a real success story in the field of history and philosophy of science. Moreover, there has been a remarkable renaissance in research of this area over the past two decades. There seems to be a real interest in the study of the emergence, development and impact of this specifically Central European tradition.10
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As even recent entries on “Vienna Circle” and “Logical Empiricism” present overlapping and incomplete descriptions11, my first suggestion is to attempt a historical and genetic reconstruction within the socio-cultural context, together with a description of individuals and theoretical positions from both a diachronic and synchronic perspective. This means dealing with the multi-facetted phenomenon of the Vienna Circle “from a historical point of view”, which can only be described here in very general terms:12 The new historiography on Logical Empiricism sets in with the rediscovery of Ernst Mach (1838-1916) as a precursor of Gestalt theory, evolutionary epistemology, (possibly radical) constructivism and the modern historically oriented philosophy of science. But already in Mach’s reception of the Vienna Circle one can see not only a certain pluralism of views but also a polarization of the various positions (Mach’s influence on Carnap’s Aufbau / Logical Construction, the critical distancing to “psychologism” in the manifesto, the alternative to the principle of economy in Karl Menger, etc.) 13 Nevertheless, this research program, which was interpreted differently by the Vienna Circle, actually represented a sort of prototype for Logical Empiricism in the interwar years – irrespective of whether one backs the bold claim as to the existence of a “typical Austrian philosophy” (as opposed to German idealism). Accordingly, Richard von Mises described Mach’s impact as follows: “In the transformation from the formal to the material mode of language, Mach’s elements correspond to the protocol sentences.” 14 This, of course, can easily be read as being a building stone of the “neutral monism” as represented by Bertrand Russell. In this context, a number of different studies can be seen as focusing on the impact of neo-Kantianism, Russell and Mach on Carnap’s Aufbau philosophy.15 It is thus not so surprising that, already prior to World War 1, the proto-circle of the later Vienna Circle (the “first Vienna Circle”) began to take shape both organizationally and philosophically. Within a discussion circle (inter alia, with Ph. Frank, Hahn, Neurath, R. v. Mises) at a coffeehouse, traditional “academic philosophy” grew more scientific. The “First Vienna Circle” met regularly as of 1907 to discuss the synthesis of empiricism and symbolic logic as modeled after Mach, Boltzmann and the French conventionalists (Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré). This was also regarded as an indirect answer to W.I. Lenin’s polemical remarks against Mach in his book (Materialism and Empirio-criticism. 1909) which remained very influential up to the Velvet Revolution of 1989/90.16 This early phase in the development of Logical Empiricism can also be interpreted as an anti-Cartesian turn in epistemology and philosophy of science, which undermined both the synthetic apriori and the secure foundations of knowledge. In the middle of the “permanent crisis of philosophy” between reform and revolution in society and science, the further development of this “scientific philosophy” had, in any case, been initiated.
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I. Focusing on the center of the Vienna Circle we recognize the following development : with the conflict-laden appointment of the physicist and philosopher Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) to Mach’s chair for natural philosophy of “inductivist sciences” in Vienna in 1922 the heyday of scientific philosophizing in the post World War 1- period was prolonged. Even though Schlick felt committed to an epistemological realism in his main oeuvre General Theory of Knowledge (1918/1925), he began his inaugural lecture with a programmatic allusion to Mach under the sway of the Viennese tradition up to Wittgenstein: “Almost all philosophy is natural philosophy.” 17 Several years thereafter, the intellectual foundations for the formation of the Vienna Circle had been laid: the work of Frege, Russell / Whitehead and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, together with Duhem’s and Poincaré’s holistic theory of science, paved the way for the emergence of a unique, innovative scientific culture that has remained a subject of international scholarship to this very day and that addresses issues that still have a bearing on modern philosophy of science. In the phase during which the so-called Schlick Circle on Boltzmanngasse became a veritable institution, there was already a pluralism of positions that emerged in the field of tension between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1918/22) and Carnap’s Logischer Aufbau der Welt / Logical Construction of the World (1928). But in spite of all discrepancies between Carnap’s ‘rational reconstruction’ and the philosophy of ideal language (Wittgenstein), all those involved came to identify with a philosophical reform movement as opposed to academic “traditional philosophy” (Schulphilosophie according to Philipp Frank). Even the prevailing epistemological options – critical realism (or constructive realism) in Schlick, Feigl, Kraft and later Popper, on the one hand, and phenomenalism / physicalism in Carnap, Neurath, Kaufmann, on the other – could not prevent a reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism. As early as the twenties, a diversity of positions and methods had emerged (a theoretical pluralism which has usually been ignored in the corresponding historiography). The mathematician Karl Menger, who had spent time in Holland, formulated his principle of tolerance regarding the selection of logics and scientific languages (a principle which was only later ascribed to Carnap). He founded an additional platform, namely his influential Mathematisches Kolloquium (“Mathematical Colloquium”), operating in parallel to the Schlick Circle on Boltzmanngasse.18 Long before Quine, he criticized the principle of economy, verificationism and the analytic / synthetic dualism which had become wellknown in uncritical historical accounts as the standard model of Logical Empiricism – an interpretation which was reinforced by Quine’s influential “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.19 The contacts that were initiated with the Polish logicians and Alfred Tarski (fostering the semantic conception of truth) ultimately
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resulted in a further provocation of the “Wittgenstein group” in the Circle (Schlick, Waismann). But undoubtedly the greatest challenge for the early Vienna Circle was the Tractatus which experienced an uneven and fragmentary reception (as had the manifesto in 1929).20 In sum we can say that, for this formative and non-public phase of the Vienna Circle, certain important components justify the use of the prefix “neo”. A conventionalist understanding of scientific theory, the philosophy of ideal language, and the Hilbert program and theory of relativity (especially Einstein’s 1921 published Geometrie und Erfahrung / Geometry and Experience), as well, became the building blocks for the “turning point in philosophy” proclaimed with great optimism in the first volume of Erkenntnis (Schlick 1930).21 Schlick, Waismann and other members of the Vienna Circle saw knowledge as the correlation of empirical facts with a system of symbols based on formal logic. Such a theoretical innovation was also an intellectual revolution under the sway of modernism, as Carnap formulated so eloquently in his preface to The Logical Construction.22 This radical program, in turn, left an indelible mark on avant-garde art (constructivism associated with Gerd Arntz, the artist of Neurath’s pictorial language), literature as well as architecture (Werkbund and Bauhaus) centering around Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul Engelmann, Adolf Loos, and Josef Frank, as well as in the context of Neurath’s efforts within the Congrés International d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM). 2 3 Clarity and precision as both ends in themselves and features of scientific philosophy bridged both Wittgenstein’s cultural pessimism and the socio-culturally enlightened impetus of the Vienna Circle. With this convergence of various elements of philosophy of science, the dynamics of theory was accelerated in the phase in which the Vienna Circle made public appearances and expanded its international contacts. The latter development was accompanied by the disintegration and uprooting of Logical Empiricism in the German-speaking world. In this sense, the phenomenon of the Vienna Circle is a prototypical case study on intellectual emigration.24 The gradual liberalization of verificationism and – as Wittgenstein’s influence diminished – the transition from phenomenalism to physicalism (with Carnap and Neurath) was in full swing as already reflected in the publication and internal reception of the 1929 manifesto. The increasingly international orientation of the Vienna Circle had been evident since the late twenties in the contacts with Hans Reichenbach’s Berlin Group, the Warsaw logicians around Alfred Tarski, and the American neo-pragmatist and semiotic movement (Bridgman, Tolman and most notably, Charles Morris).25 By the beginning of the thirties, a research program had emerged with empiricist, physicalist and phenomenalist variants. (e.g., in Felix Kaufmann, the “phenomenologist” of the Vienna Circle, who had been influenced by Husserl, Kelsen and Carnap).26 The themes discussed in Schlick’s circle – such as the principle of tolerance, the disputed foundational problem of empirical science, and the justification and confirmation method with explanation vs. understanding (a variant of the Metho-
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denstreit) – all reflect the seminal methodological debates that were taking place in mathematics / logic (logicism, formalism, Platonism / intuitionism) and in the natural sciences and humanities.27 Undoubtedly, the strongest variant had emerged by 1934 from the Unity of Science movement spearheaded by Neurath, Carnap and later Morris. Their efforts culminated in six well-attended international congresses and the (uncompleted) publication project of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.28 This theoretical dynamics and process of differentiation can be illustrated in light of several of the few surviving authentic Vienna Circle documents.29 To all appearances, we are confronted here with two diametrically opposed trends. While the international influence of the Vienna Circle was steadily growing, the group had been systematically marginalized in Austria and Germany starting in the early thirties. The murder of Moritz Schlick and the disgraceful, for the most part anti-semitic, reactions to this, brutally ushered in the process which I have elsewhere described as the “demise of scientific reason”.30 This took place parallel to the general trend at universities, which at the time were increasingly coming under the influence of an growing anti-democratic and racist discourse dominated by clerical-fascist and national socialist forces. This development led to the “Anschluss” which culminated in systematic dismissals, banishment and annihilation. II.
Thus far we have focused mainly on the core of the Vienna Circle – the so-called Schlick Circle – which we can describe as being a matter of applied complexity theory, so to avoid the usual clichés of “positivism” and “neopositivism”. The vitality and productivity of this group that transcended the boundaries of both disciplines and countries was, however, a product of the openness of the logicoempiricist program and the osmosis with the peripheral circles within the sociocultural setting. By way of illustration, I would like to mention just the three most important networks that have been neglected in the pertinent literature or have recurrently prompted highly divergent interpretations:31 Karl Menger’s “Mathematical Colloquium” (“Gödel’s universe”) The Wittgenstein group, including primarily Ludwig Wittgenstein, Moritz Schlick, and Friedrich Waismann The Heinrich Gomperz-Circle, including Karl Popper and Edgar Zilsel, inter alia In this context, it is worth noting that members of the Vienna Circle in addition organized the “Verein Ernst Mach” (Ernst Mach Society) between 1929 to 1934 as a parallel movement serving to popularize scientific philosophy and “The Scientific Conception of the World” as part of the Viennese (“Red Vienna’s”) adult education movement.32 Moreover, Otto Neurath’s “Gesellschafts- und
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Wirtschaftsmuseum in Wien” (Museum of Society and Economics in Vienna, 1925-1934) played an important role with its pictorial statistics (“Wiener Methode der Bildstatistik”) which were developed in exile as the “Isotype” movement as part of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science project.33 The intellectually fertile ground for all these activities was the remarkably strong participation of Vienna Circle members in the Viennese Adult Education institutions.34 These external perspectives have no bearing on the various interpretations of the transition from Wittgenstein 1 to Wittgenstein 1½ to the late Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations where, apart from the anti-Enlightenment thrust, there are remarkable convergences with Neurath’s position in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Here I would like to mention the language game conception with its reference to habit, the so-called “scholar’s behavioristics” and “pseudorationalism”, all of which are part of the model of an empirical “orchestration of the sciences”.35 Since the first Vienna Circle, this fallibilistic concept represented for Neurath a basic motive of his critique of every type of unambiguous verification or falsification, as well as of a hierarchical system of sciences with their ultimate foundation. With such a relativistic motive Neurath formulated on a number of different occasions as the well-known “boat metaphor”, which was thus mainly directed at the difficult, but successful newcomer Karl Popper. It was also formulated in a more dramatic way to counter the “semantic turn” of his friend Carnap who stood under the influence of Tarski and Wittgenstein. It was here that the absolutely unbridgeable rifts between philosophical relativism and absolutism became manifest.36 Here it should be mentioned that this controversy of philosophical relativism vs. absolutism continued even after the forced emigration of the Vienna Circle to the U.S, in Philipp Frank’s “Institute for the Unity of Science”; it was this dispute, by the way, that was reformulated with the so-called “Science Wars” in the late 1990s.37 I would also like to make some similar claims with regard to the perhaps more complex and emotion-laden relationship between Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle, since it continues to inform the current debates. This perspective has long been perpetuated in an uncritical way, most notably in Popper’s own accounts, in his teaching and in his research.38 Against this historical background, the relationship between Karl Popper (1902-1994) and the Vienna Circle becomes easier to understand. In his widely-read autobiography Popper presented – and subsequently criticized – the “Popper legend” in the chapter with the not so modest title: “Logical Positivism is dead: Who killed Logical Positivism?” 39 As already mentioned, the Vienna Circle did not represent a static, homogeneous “school” of philosophy, with one dominant figure, one main work and basic dogmas. The reception and appraisal of Popper’s ideas by different members thus very varied considerably: from positive reactions to the Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) in Carnap, Feigl, Schlick and Frank to the vehement principle
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criticism in Neurath. In his above cited review essay of 1935 Neurath had mainly taken issue with the false search for a privileged system of statements as the paradigm of empirical sciences.40 Popper found this decisive criticism rather “flattering”, although he did not, however, respond to Neurath’s counter-interpretation.41 Neurath had given preference to his meta-theoretical holism and an epistemological relativism as an alternative to the philosophical absolutism that even Popper himself conceded – and this in spite of the fact that, within the Vienna Circle, there were some like Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Kurt Gödel and Herbert Feigl who expressed their allegiance to variants of a metaphysical (constructive) realism and intuitionism. Even Schlick, who – apparently for personal reasons – did not invite Popper to his circle on Boltzmanngasse, paid tribute to Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery by including it in the series “Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung”, which he and Frank edited.42 Thus the meaning criterion of verification, too, became increasingly liberal. From the mid-thirties on it hardly played a role anymore in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. It had originally been intended more as a pragmatic concept of metaphysics (with Ockham’s razor as an antidote) during Vienna’s inter-war years. (Apart from that period, the history of verificationism was more representative of the status of normal science).43 In the publications and protocols, the Vienna Circle inductivist and hypothetico-deductive methodologies seemed to co-exist. No strict distinction was made between context of justification and context of discovery, which allows us to draw the following conclusions – which are also of general import for the interpretation of Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: The history of the development of Logical Empiricist theories since the turn of the century does not allow any clear canonization of a philosophical school in the strict sense, since what we are dealing with is a dynamic between center and periphery. The varying receptions of Wittgenstein, Tarski and Popper have influenced the development of various philosophies of science inspired by rational reconstruction, on the one hand, and by encyclopedic models on the other. Thus, if I were a police commissioner, I would give the following answer to Popper’s rhetorical question: if it’s really true that the patient died, then there is more than one perpetrator, especially from within the circle, both disciples and critics alike. But this, of course, is a completely different story which should be told in another context. III.
Let me come to my tentative conclusions with an illustration of the issue at hand, which is to be elaborated on in forthcoming studies:
WHAT IS THE VIENNA CIRCLE?
THE VIENNA CIRCLE / LOGICAL EMPIRICISM ELEMENTS OF A RE-EVALUATION 1. Methods a) Intradisciplinary: “Scientific Philosophy” b) Interdisciplinary: “Scientific Conception of the World” – “Wissenschaftslogik” – Philosophy of Science – “Wissenschaftstheorie” c) Transdisciplinary: “Encyclopedia of Unified Science” Foundations of the Unity of Science d) Philosophy, Science and Art: Werkbund and Bauhaus External Characteristic: “Coffeehouse Science” (Local and Global Networking) – Science as Culture 2. Scientific Communication a) International: Urban Cultures of Science (Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Cracow, Budapest, Lvov, Copenhagen, Paris, Cambridge /Oxford, London ...) b) Multi-ethnic: mainly enlightened Jewish and many Ethnics/Nationalities c) Multi-lingual: Communication /Publication in German, English, French, Italian, Polish, Turkish Characteristic: “Cultural Exodus” with Disintegration (from the German speaking World) – Internationalization (into the Anglo-Saxon World) 3. (Self-)Organization a) Academic Field: Universities /Academy of Science b) Extra-academic Context: Adult Education and Viennese Cultural Movement of “Spätaufklärung”: Popularisation of “Scientific World Conception” Institutions: ‘Ernst Mach’-Society, Adult Educational Institutions (“Volkshochschulen”), Pictorial Statistics /Isotype with the Social and Economic Museum (Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in Wien) c) Formal /Informal: Conferences, Lectures /Lecture Series, Seminars, Discussion Groups resp. Books /Book Series, Journals, Working Papers Characteristic: Philosophy of Science as a sort of “Social Epistemology” 4. Sociology of Science and Knowledge a) Men and Women: Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Marie Jahoda, Marie Reidemeister-Neurath, Olga Taussky-Todd, Rose Rand, Hilde Geiringer-Mises, Susan Stebbing, Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum . . . b) Several Generations and Professions: Professors (Distingushed Chairs /Associate/ Assistant), Students and Visiting Scholars from Abroad Characteristic: “Republic of Scholars” (Neurath) Result Uprooting and Alienation from Central Europe! “Americanization” with Mutual Change of Theories
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In addition to the well-known insights that still inform today’s history and philosophy of science (e.g., the explanation and validation of scientific theories; foundations and methods of science between induction and deduction; unity and plurality of science, and so on), I would like to emphasize other topical features of the Vienna Circle which meriting further study. Generally, we see the realization of a common fallibilistic epistemology that points to the hypothetical status of scientific knowledge which is only gradually integrated in everyday experience and language (e.g., common sense). Therefore, the usage of symbolic logic did not contradict a scientific philosophy which is at the same time “a study in human understanding” (Richard von Mises 1951). And I am not reluctant to go back to the classical roots of the Vienna Circle by deliberately using the term ”methodological relativism”.44 First of all, it is a way of philosophizing based on a language-critical attitude and a great amount of problem-oriented, open-ended discussion. This is something experienced personally by Arne Naess, who – as the last living member of the Schlick circle – focuses in this volume on the Vienna Circle’s “thought style” which, in (not only) his opinion, leads to an inherent “pluralism of tenable worldviews”. Secondly, the use of unambiguous language, together with exact methods is certainly a main legacy of the Schlick Circle and those associated with it: it is only given this formal approach that content and positions can be criticized and refuted – a characteristic which most current modern and postmodern philosophies lack. At least the challenge of factual research, and in particular the – admittedly, non-linear – advancement of science (the humanities and natural science) is an essential reason why the tension between science and philosophy (empiricism and rationalism) cannot be resolved definitively. However, the reconciliation of research in different fields of science facilitates permanent reflection and reevaluation of the complex concept called “scientific philosophy”. This reconciliation began in the classical period with its international and interdisciplinary networking, without aiming at one more philosophical dogmatic tradition (which is, by the way, normally characterized by an authoritative head, some leading textbooks and a hierarchical organization covering a limited number of academic fields.) A serious alternative to this (Vienna-Circle oriented) open-minded position can hardly be formulated. I believe that the present volume documents the wide range, pluralism and diversity of the Viennese heritage and message, be it called “scientific philosophy” (as initiated by Schlick), “scientific humanism” (according to Carnap) or a “republic of scholars” (following Neurath), as a guide to a intellectual journey which continues through the present day and on into the future.
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NOTES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 7.
8.
9.
10.
11. 12. 13.
14. 15.
Karl Menger, “Ist die Quadratur des Kreises lösbar?” (“Is it Possible to Square the Circle?”), in: Alte Probleme – Neue Lösungen in den exakten Wissenschaften. Fünf Wiener Vorträge, Zweiter Zyklus. Leipzig & Wien 1934, 1-28. Barry Smith, Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia 1982. Peter Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press 1987. An abridged reprint in English translation in: Otto Neurath. Empiricism and Sociology. Ed. by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973, 299-318. Albert Blumberg /Herbert Feigl, “Logical Positivism”, in: Journal of Philosophy 28, 1931, 281296. Members of the inner circle: Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Goedel, Hans Hahn, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Béla Juhos, Felix Kaufmann, Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Richard von Mises, Otto Neurath, Rose Rand, Josef Schächter, Moritz Schlick, Olga Taussky-Todd, Friedrich Waismann, Edgar Zilsel. Members of the periphery are: Alfred Jules Ayer, Egon Brunswik, Karl Bühler, Josef Frank, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Heinrich Gomperz, Carl Gustav Hempel, Eino Kaila, Hans Kelsen, Charles W. Morris, Arne Naess, Karl R. Popper, Willard Van Orman Quine, Frank P. Ramsey, Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Reidemeister, Alfred Tarski, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Regarding the relation of Schlick and Neurath cf.: Rudolf Haller (Ed.), Schlick und Neurath. Ein Symposium. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1982. As to the network with Berlin, Warsaw and Prague: Rudolf Haller / Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Wien – Berlin – Prag. Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Wien: Hölder-PichlerTempsky 1993; Lutz Danneberg /Andreas Kamlah /Lothar Schäfer (Hrsg.), Hans Reichenbach und die Berliner Gruppe. Braunschweig-Wiesbaden: Vieweg 1994. Klemens Szaniawski (Ed.), The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1989; Francesco Coniglione, Roberto Poli, Jan Wolenski (Eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi 1993; Katarzyna Kijania-Placek and Jan Wolenski (Eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht-BostonLondon: Kluwer 1998; Jan Wolenski, Essay in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press 1999. Gustav Bergmann, “Memories of the Vienna Circle. Letter to Otto Neurath (1938)”, in: Friedrich Stadler (Ed.), Scientific Philosophy. Origins and Developments. Dordrecht-BostonLondon: Kluwer 1993, 207. Cf. Volker Thurm-Nemeth (Hrsg.), Konstruktion zwischen Werkbund und Bauhaus. Wissenschaft – Architektur – Wiener Kreis. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1998; Wendelin SchmidtDengler (Hrsg.), Fiction in Science - Science in Fiction . Zum Gespräch zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1998. To mention only two examples. Ronald Giere and Alan Richardson (Eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996; Gary Hardcastle /Alan Richardson (Eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2003. Cf. Michael Friedman, “Logical Positivism”, and Friedrich Stadler, ”Vienna Circle”, both in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London-New York 2000. As general reference cf.: Friedrich Stadler, The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Wien-New York: Springer 2001. Cf. Karl Menger, “A Counterpart of Ockham’s Razor”, and ”Geometry and Positivism. A Positivistic Microgeometry”, in: Karl Menger, Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Reidel 1979, 105-135, 225-234. Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding. New York: Dover 1951, 99 Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station. Cambridge University Press 1991, Michael Friedman, Rediscovering Logical Positivism. Cambridge Uni-
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16. 17. 18.
19. 20. 21.
22. 23. 24.
25. 26.
27.
28.
29. 30. 31. 32.
33. 34.
35.
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versity Press 1999; Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court 2000; Alan W. Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press 1998. Thomas Uebel, Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft: Otto Neurath und der Erste Wiener Kreis. Wien-New York: Springer 2000. Cited in: Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit., 196. Karl Menger, Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums. Ed. by E. Dierker and K. Sigmund. Wien-New York: Springer 1998; Karl Menger, Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium. Ed. by Louise Golland, Brian McGuinness and Abe Sklar. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1994. First Publication: Willard Van Orman Quine, ”Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in: Philosophical Review 60, 1951,20-43. Jan Wolenski and Eckehart Köhler (Eds.), Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1999. Moritz Schlick, “The Turning Point in Philosophy” (1930), in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers. Ed by H.Mulder and Barbara F.B. van der Velde-Schlick. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Reidel 1979, 154-160. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1967. Translated by Rolf George. Cf.: Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Encyclopedia and Utopia. The Life and Work of Otto Neurath (1882-1945). Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1996. Cf. Friedrich Stadler, “Transfer and Transformation of Logical Empiricism”, in: Giere/ Richardson (Eds.), op.cit, and “The Wiener Kreis in Great Britain: Emigration and Interaction in the Philosophy of Science”, in: Edward Timms / Jon Hughes (Eds.), Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation. Wien-New York: Springer 2002. Cf. Gerald Holton, “From the Vienna Circle to the Harvard Square”, in: Stadler, Scientific Philosophy op.cit., 47-73. Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Phänomenologie und Logischer Empirismus. Zentenarium Felix Kaufmann. Wien-New York: Springer 1997; Clemens Jabloner / Friedrich Stadler (Eds.), Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre. Beziehungen zwischen dem Wiener Kreis und der Hans Kelsen-Schule. Wien-New York: Springer 2001. Cf. The Foundational Debate. Complexity and Constructivity in Mathematics and Physics. Ed. by Werner DePauli-Schimanovich, Eckehart Köhler and Friedrich Stadler. Dordrecht-BostonLondon: Kluwer 1995. Otto Neurath / Rudolf Carnap / Charles Morris (Eds.), Foundations of the Unity of Science. Towards an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 2 Volumes. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London 1970f. Cf. the protocols of the Schlick Circle and the theses of the Vienna Circle as reported by Rose Rand in: Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit., ch. 7.1. Friedrich Stadler/Peter Weibel (Eds.), The Cultural Exodus from Austria / Vertreibung der Vernunft. Wien-New York: Springer 1995. A reconstruction in detail in: Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit., chapters 8-10. Stadler, ibid., ch. 7.2, and John Blackmore (Ed.), Ernst Mach – A Deeper Look. Documents and Perspectives. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 1992: John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki, Setsuko Tanaka (Eds.), Ernst Mach’s Vienna 1895-1930 or Phenomenalism as Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 2001. Nemeth /Stadler (eds.), Encyclopedia and Utopia, op.cit., section III. The following members lectured and instructed courses in several institutions (“Volkshochschulen”): Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Felix Kaufmann, Viktor Kraft, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, and Edgar Zilsel. Otto Neurath, “The Orchestration of the Sciences by the Encyclopedism of Logical Empiricism” (1946), in: Neurath, Philosophical Papers 1913-1946. Ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath. Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster: Reidel 1983, 230-242.
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36. Otto Neurath, “Pseudorationalism of Falsification”, in: ibid., 121-131. From an Popperian point of view cf.: Malachi H. Hacohen, Karl Popper – The Formative Years. 1902-1945. Politics and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna. Cambridge University Press 2000. 37. Cf. Friedrich Stadler, “Challenging the Dogma of the Ahistorical Philosophy of Science: The Case of Relativism”, in: Jutta Schickore / Friedrich Steinle (Eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Berlin: Max Plack Institute for the History of Science 2002. (Preprint 211). 38. Regarding a contextual reconstruction of Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle: Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit, ch. 10, and Martin Seiler / Friedrich Stadler (Hrsg.), Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper und die österreichische Philosophie. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi 1994. 39. In: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Ed. by P.A. Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court 1974, 3-181. 40. By the way, popper never replied to this decisive criticism, cf. Stadler, The Vienna Circle, op.cit., Interview with Sir Karl Popper (1991), 474-497. 41. Ibid., 487. 42. Letter Schlick to Frank, June 9, 1933. Vienna Circle Archives, Haarlem, Holland. 43. Cf. C.J. Misak, Veriflcationism. Its History and Prospects. London-New York: Routledge 1995. 44. Philipp Frank, Relativity – A Richer Truth. Foreword by Albert Einstein. Boston: 1950.
Vienna Circle Institute Museumstraße 5/2/19 A-1070 Vienna Austria
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I.
ORIGINS AND HISTORY
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ARNE NAESS
PLURALISM OF TENABLE WORLD VIEWS I shall try to outline a philosophical point which I think might be acceptable from a combined logical and empirical point of view. From the world view (wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung) to the manifoldness (Mannigfaltigkeit) of tenable world views. In the following, I consider humans as not insignificant parts of the world. Different views about humanity therefore imply different world views. A second premise I assume increases the manifold of which I speak. By “scientific” I do not here mean something like “implied by science” but a weaker contention: “compatible with science”. What about religious views if a weaker contention is adopted? The formidable development of Christian theology since Søren Kierkegaard has reduced earlier tendencies to assume that there must be a conflict between Christian and scientific general views. The number of what were called Christian dogmas is reduced. Here I shall only suggest that this development – plus the considerable increase in the number of people who favor a sort of Buddhism – increases compatibility. But I find it premature to take up the many implied relevant questions. The only remark I tentatively make is that those questions suggest a possible scientific acceptability of certain world views which have a strong religious flavour. Logical empiricists, as I understood their Weltauffassung, suggested a view of the world derivable from scientific knowledge. Because scientific knowledge – apart from mathematics and logic – was clearly considered hypothetical, the status of a definite articulation of such a view would, by necessity, be rather hypothetical. One way to delimit the use of the term “science” is by assuming that it only comprises the natural sciences. In what follows, I include a large part of the humanities. Historical research is scientific in the fairly large sense to which I subscribe. A world view that clearly negates results of historical research is not a world view compatible with science. Historiography, the streamlined accounts of enormously complicated happenings, need not be compatible with scientific method. Two mutually incompatible accounts of a revolution may both be excellent, but not part of a science. Suppose somebody asks you: “What is your world view?”, suggesting that he or she would write an article or a book describing (and criticising?) it. It is fairly clear that what would be considered an adequate answer would have to take into consideration that person’s value priorities. We should demand of a descripton of 3 F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 3–7. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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a world view actually held by a human being that it take into account his or her value priorities. The logical empiricists took this seriously. Especially when political issues were being discussed, they outlined value priority views which were simply “dangerous”. That is, the increasingly powerful national socialist movement made public assertions of opposite views likely to result in repressive attacks, sometimes even in incarceration in a concentration camp. The pertinent answer to the formidable question “What is your world view?” will assume different forms: if you and your family are politically repressed, or if you are engaged in a dangerous fight against oppressors, your world will be narrower. If you live in a peaceful country like Norway, and you are without severe political or personal problems, perhaps only then are you likely to take very broad questions such as those of cosmology seriously. Incidentally, descriptions of what is going on in the cosmos by professional cosmologists tend to be talk about vast, unimaginable explosions within vast areas of time. This may not give rise to dark or pessimistic, tenable world views. The formidable power of the Catholic Church in Vienna was felt in everyday life. Traffic came to a halt when some religious procession required considerable space in the streets. I remember such an occasion in which traffic came to a complete standstill because a ‘relic’, a piece of bone that might possibly have belonged to Christ, was triumphantly paraded through the city. At least one of the logical empiricists, Otto Neurath, had respect for and perhaps was jealous of, the power of the Church. He admired certain trends within the philosophical traditions of Catholicism. He insisted that especially Thomas Aquinas, but also other theologians developed their ideas on a remarkably high logical level. For certain axioms, they derived conclusions in a logically safe way. It was not by chance that Otto Neurath again and again warned against what he called excessive respect for mathematics and logic: “Logic? Leave it to the Catholic experts!”. He himself had great competence in logic and the history of logic, but having been active in politics – not without serious consequences (prison) – he warned against trying to formulate logical empiricist political views on a high logical level. These views were, as could be expected in the 1930s, mostly socialist and sometimes Marxist. But back to the question of limits to the diversity of world views compatible with the results of scientific research. More than most philosophers, I admire and cherish research rather than science. The endlessness of research, and the short life of definite scientific theories compared, for instance, to ethical norms, are for me a source of great admiration. It has reminded me of climbing: always risky to some extent, but manageable and mostly open to well-founded trust. I recommended in 1935 that the terms “antimetaphysical” (or even “ametaphysical”) be left out of the formulations of basic characteristics of logical empiricism. Rudolf Carnap’s view that philosophy in the future would essentially consist in the elaboration of the logical syntax of language, I found deplorable. I recommended that “research attitude” should be used as a central expression and slogan, rather than “scientific world view”. Our views should not be incompatible with a
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consistent research attitude. (After all, there are innumerable questions we pose which are not even very thinly covered by painstaking research.) There is not much vitally relevant science to point to. Propaganda for more such research, and a more consistent research attitude, are both essential. The metaphysics of Spinoza includes a definition of freedom and of free choice. Very roughly, a decision is free according to him when taken under no external pressure whatsoever. But “God” (Deus) is defined in such a way that it does not invite research. If we start with the last part of the Ethics, and not the formidable first part, we are open for research and redefinition of terms. This, in turn, facilitates an intense research attitude in relation to metaphysical texts in general. From the last – the fifth – part, we may proceed to the broad, fourth part. Every point there has a practical, a life import. In short, it is possible to maintain a research attitude, even when interpreting and applying the “dense” metaphysics of Spinoza. When I was staying in Carnap’s home in California, this was one of the themes of our daily discussion. On entering the Schlick seminar in Vienna in 1934, I presented myself as a kind of Spinozist. Spinoza enjoyed, of course, a high standing among the seminar members, but philosophy the way Spinoza practised it was of course fully, totally, decisively a matter of the past. So it was considered touching and in a way, admirable, to be a kind of Spinozist, but philosophically it was centuries too late. What I am driving at is a complete acceptance of the kind of metaphysical formulations of a philosopher like Spinoza. That is, acceptance of their meaningfulness. But as for the kind of understandable contemporary articulations which would today be nearest to the meaning of his formulations is an open question. Different sets of answers would play a role in outlining different Spinozist world views. They would present examples of “scientifically” acceptable, mutually more or less incompatible world views. Studying Immanuel Kant’s texts, we may arrive at similar, or at least analogous, conclusions. Considering the great number of mutually incompatible nineteenth century and later Kant interpretations, we might point to the possibility of a variety of modern Kantian world views. What about old Chinese and Indian philosophies? We may tentatively interpret the texts so as to make them relevant to the questions of scientific compatibility. The pervasive relevance of yoga in Indian philosophy has been studied extensively in the West as a practice, a strangely close combination of a seemingly abstruse and vague philosophy with very definite, clearly described practices. As an example of basic philosophical terms rather different from western ones, I would like to concentrate on “emptiness”, “sunyata” in Sanskrit. At an East-West international philosophical congress, an Indian participant left his chair in a quiet way and crawled under the table. When asked closely later what he meant by this, he tried to make us understand that his movement was relevant and philosophically understandable within the Indian yoga tradition he belonged to.
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What I am suggesting is the acceptance of the existence of a variety of different world views, all compatible with science. But it should also be added that the research centering on this diversity reveals the very serious difficulty of finding a vocabulary or a terminology that, at least not entirely superficially, describes the cognitive content of each of the different world views. The deeper the differences, the more difficult it is to find a terminology that makes a survey possible. Why is the richness of world views today perhaps more important for the future of humanity than ever before? Because, as I see it, vast globalization is inevitable. What by many people is believed to be – on the whole – a great advantage, might turn into a calamity in my view. War becomes more unlikely because war within a closed system of globalised economic liberalism will rightly be seen as a threat to that very economic system. But the likelihood of people and societies with a pronounced tendency to maintain clearly different world views decreases. The intensity of human interaction crossing all borders may foster a certain level of Gleichschaltung, a tendency for a decrease in the diversity of world views realised and acted upon at any definite time. In the 1930s there was in Europe a decrease in the diversity of world views because of the intense focus on (Soviet) communism versus anti-communism, and Nazism versus anti-Nazism. Today, other factors tend to limit diversity. The globalization of technology and perhaps the intensification of interaction through e-mail and chatting on the Internet? In 1934 and 1935 it seemed paradoxical to me that logical empiricists stressed the term “empiricism”. They tended to reject the idea that painstaking empirical research could be a genuine part of philosophical inquiries. Philosophy as logical syntax of language did not, according to Carnap, need anything of the kind. It needed theoretical clarification, but he did not put up any list of questions of an empirical kind which had to be answered in order to discover the logical syntax of actual spoken languages. There are extremely different languages – so different that the translation of one into another is a highly creative job very different from translations within the scope of English, French and German. The definite and complete rejection by Carnap of Heidegger’s sentence “Das Nichts nichtet” did not, for Carnap, need substantial empirical support. I mean empirical research. Movements comparable to logical empiricism might invest quite a deep concern to avoid unnecessary rejections. Let me for a moment consider a special movement. Within the ecological movement there are groups often characterized as “doomsday prophets”. They are, as I see it, generally criticised in an unnecessarily harsh way. I propose that we say something of this kind: “Yes, if present trends of unecological policies continue long enough, catastrophes are likely to occur, but we don’t have reason to believe that such polices will actually persist long enough to make catastrophes likely.” The opinion of Moritz Schlick and certain other logical empiricists that philosophy of the traditional kind was dead or would soon die did not destroy the importance of what the traditionalists were saying. The same applies to the
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doomsday prophets. Much of what they say is of some interest. It is only their radical negative predictions that need not be taken very seriously. Could the study of the remarkable influence of logical empiricism in the thirties help to instigate a comparable movement today? We talk about a global “green” movement. Within that movement a diversity of world views is powerfully presented. One is that of favoring “a rich life with simple means”. It presumes that people have fairly clear value priorities. Instead of mathematics and formal logic being studied with special intensity, there would be studies of “life quality”, how one feels about oneself and the world. Comparative studies of what makes people feel well, of course, including the study of feeling well in the economically poor countries, are relevant. Logical empiricism was acutely controversial from the first moment. To the extent that such a reception is inevitable, it is highly suspicious if a movement does not at least start as a controversial phenomenon. The green movement called “deep ecology” was for many years highly controversial. But at a fairly recent international congress in Melbourne, Australia, it appeared to be fairly, if not totally, uncontroversial. At the same conference, the following question became more pertinent: “But what can be done to change politics in a green direction?” That question refers to problems not directly attacked by the deep ecology movement as such. Logical empiricists certainly were fully aware of the necessity of being politically active. Are they comparably healthy movements today? I don’t think there are any, but it is important for many of us to try to influence movements we wish well to reach the high level of creative dialogue and sober mutual respect in spite of differences of opinion which characterized the logical empirical movement.
Centre for Development and Environment University of Oslo, Box 1116 Blindern N-0317 Oslo Norway
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PAOLO PARRINI
ON THE FORMATION OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
1.
THE STATUS QUAESTIONIS
During the discussion between D. Howard and T. Oberdan at the 1991 Conference, organized in Konstanz for the centenary of Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s birth, the following question was posed: is it possible to see Schlick’s Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre as an anticipation of the theses that later characterized the Vienna Circle (which was formed around Schlick himself) and that were formulated by its members taking into consideration also Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas?1 This question refers to the existence of a first Vienna Circle and the nature of the relationship between this first group and the ‘real’ Vienna Circle. T. Uebel has re-examined this second question in a paper recently presented at the Florentine conference on Logical Empiricism (1999). Looking at it from an interesting perspective, he aims at singling out the characteristics of Logical Empiricism as a distinctive school of philosophical thought. More precisely, he asks himself whether it was simply another version of neo-Kantian philosophy and, if not, what other elements were present. In order to provide an answer, he discusses again the relationship between the Austrian and German-Kantian components underlying the movement and links his paper to the recent debate on the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy. According to Uebel, “it was the co-operation of the members” of the “early circle of philosophically minded Austrian scientists – the mathematician Hans Hahn, the physicist Philipp Frank and the economist Otto Neurath – with the scientifically trained German philosophers Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap that accounted for the distinctive force of Viennese Logical Empiricism”. This can be clearly seen – he states – when we look at the positions taken by Schlick in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918 1 , 19252). Uebel explicitly says, though, that in his reconstruction he does not take into consideration the Berlin strand of Logical Empiricism2. I intend here to discuss this very same set of questions showing how the analysis of the evolution of the ideas of the main member of the Berlin Circle – H. Reichenbach – and thus of the more German branch of the neo-empiricist movement, can bring to light some interesting elements. Important indications can be found in the philosophy of geometry he developed in Philosophie der 9 F. Stadler (ed.). The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 9–20. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928). More precisely, I will try to show that the analysis of the debate on Kantism that divided Reichenbach and Schlick in the early 1920s at the time of their discussion on the theory of relativity, and the analysis of Reichenbach’s subsequent change of perspective on the nature of “coordinative principles” are enlightening on two relevant points that are closely related to Howard’s, Oberdan’s and Uebel’s above-mentioned interpretations: (i) the relationship between Kantism and Conventionalism within Logical Empiricism; (ii) the role played by typically neo-empiricistic ideas such as the verification principle and the thesis of the tautological nature of logic – ideas which are more of an ‘analytic’ than of a ‘continental’ nature – regarding the possibility of using French Conventionalism in a strictly neo-empiricistic sense and not in a neoKantian one. My final goal is to show that we cannot understand Logical Empiricism’s development if, as traditional interpretations did, we focus our attention only on the positions developed under the influence of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas, thereby ignoring the Kantian and Conventionalist heritage of the movement. On the other hand, in order to show the importance of these components, we must not overlook the ‘other half of the apple’: the conceptual reorganisation brought about by a reconsideration of some old problems in light of the new theoretical approach linked to the coming to the fore of some theses (verification principle and linguistic theory of the a priori) which are the consequence of the impact of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas interpreted from an empiricistic perspective. 2. SCHLICK’S CRITICISM OF IMMANENCE PHILOSOPHIES AND REICHENBACH’S CONCEPTION OF THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE
To illustrate my point, I will first focus on the criticism Schlick made in the first edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918) against immanence philosophies, in particular Schuppe’s immanentism, on the basis of his conception of knowledge intended as coordination. In criticizing Schuppe’s immanentism, Schlick says that it is “quite clear that thought, in the sense relevant to knowledge, signifies nothing but the designation of objects. But that an object is not produced by our giving it a designation – indeed, it is independent of it and can exist without our correlating some sign or representation with it – is all contained in the very concept of designation. The above fallacy would never have been committed if the two meanings of the word ‘thought’ had been kept apart by assigning different terms to them” 3. In other words, Schlick considers his conception of ‘knowledge’ to be antithetic to Schuppe’s, because it encompasses the idea that the sense of ‘to think’ inherent to knowledge means only “to designate objects” and that it has nothing to do with any kind of dependence of the objects on the thought designating them. As we know, in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre these objects are charac-
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terized as transcendent objects and even called by the Kantian expression “Dinge an sich” (things-in-themselves). In Reichenbach’s conception, which differs from Schlick’s, the equation of the process of ‘knowing’ to a process of unique coordination could be used to explain why the object of knowledge, constituting some sort of non-metaphysical ‘transcendence’, remains nevertheless ‘immanent’ with respect to the presuppositions of the cognitive process. In his 1920 essay Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori, Reichenbach used the characterization of knowledge elaborated by Schlick partly to reject and partly to accept Kant’s conception of the a priori. Here the coordinative conventions mentioned by Schlick are treated as “constitutive principles”. They are introduced and characterized in contrast to particular laws by calling into question their constitutive value with respect to the objects of knowledge: in “contrast to particular laws” (or “axioms of connection” [Verknüpfungsaxiome]), these constitutive principles (or “coordinating principles”, “axioms of coordination” [Zuordnungsaxiome]), “do not say what is known in the individual case, but how knowledge is obtained; they define the knowable, [...] they show the order rules according to which knowledge is obtained and indicate the conditions the logical satisfaction of which leads to knowledge.” For Reichenbach, in the process of knowing, one of the two sides of knowledge – ‘the real’ – “is defined by coordination with the equations”. The object of knowledge thus constitutes itself in a way which is immanent with respect to the coordination principles. Its transcendence is due to the fact (devoid of any metaphysical connotations) that it is susceptible to a potentially unlimited number of empirical determinations4. In Schlick’s conception of knowledge, the elements of one of the ends of the cognitive connection (concepts and judgments) are coordinated with the elements of the other end (objects and facts) by means of the introduction of suitable connections of a definitional and conventional nature. It is by means of these kinds of connections (usual, concrete, implicit and coordinative conventions) that we make the association between the apparatus of symbols and the entities (objects and facts) that concepts and judgements have to designate. What remains valid in Reichenbach is Schlick’s idea of knowledge as coordination or designation, and truth as unique coordination or designation. The elements of the two ends of the coordination, though, are not conceived as preexisting to the coordination itself: coordination connections have a function in the constitution of the objects of knowledge. Evidently, even though they both consider as valid the coordinative or designative conception of knowledge, these two ways of looking at the cognitive process are profoundly different. This difference affects and is made evident by Schlick’s and Reichenbach’s attitudes towards Kant’s theory of synthetic a priori judgements.
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3. THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN SCHLICK AND REICHENBACH ON KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CONVENTIONALISM
This divergence of opinions on the object of knowledge refers back to their wellknown disagreement regarding the way in which they rejected Kantian synthetic a priori judgements. Reichenbach distinguished between two different meanings of the concept of a priori: 1) a priori in the sense of “‘necessarily true’ or ‘true for all times’”, and thus of absolutely independent of experience; 2) a priori, in the sense of “‘constituting the concept of object’”, that is, the principle that forms the object of scientific knowledge, more specifically of physics. The theory of relativity shows the indefensibility of the first notion of a priori, but not of the second5. On the contrary, since the years of the first edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Schlick did not seem willing to concede anything to Kantianism. On this point he criticizes both Cassirer and Reichenbach, and maintains that the essential characteristic of the Kantian synthetic a priori is the connection, in the very same concept, between the apodeictic certainty and the constitutive value. Consequently, he does not make a distinction between the two meanings of Kantian synthetic a priori, thereby avoiding its adoption in any of its two senses. The more general and abstract component of scientific knowledge should be assimilated not in Kantian constitutive principles (even if devoid of any apodeictic validity) but to very general hypotheses or to conventions as defined by Poincaré6. And if we ask ourselves what ‘convention’ in Poincaré’s sense means, the only sensible answer we can give is that we must be talking about conventions of a linguistic-definitional nature – conventions the task of which consists in establishing scientific language regarding the formulation of both scientific facts and laws. Poincaré explicitly states this thesis in his pages on geometry and in his polemic against Eduard Le Roy’s radical conventionalism (“nominalism”).7 The terms of agreement and disagreement between Schlick and Reichenbach in the 1920s are now clear. They both took as their starting point a general interpretation of knowledge intended as coordination and the negation of Kant’s theory of the synthetic a priori. Within this very same framework, though, Schlick states that in order to understand cognitive coordination we need admit only the existence of linguistic conventions, in full conformity with his idea that in the cognitive process we have a designation of objects and facts by means of suitable concepts and judgements on the basis of previously fixed conventions. According to Reichenbach cognitive coordination can be understood only if we admit the existence of coordination principles that constitute the objects of knowledge and that, as such, have to be assimilated to Kant’s synthetic a priori principles in all features excepting that of their apodeictic validity.
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The terms of their disagreement were thus as profound and strong as the terms of their agreement. Despite this, in the early 1920s both authors gradually developed a more similar perspective that aimed especially at defending – in contrast to Kant and Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism – ‘the contingent nature of the cognitive synthesis’, in other words, the idea – related to the thesis of the independence of perception of reason – that the very same possibility of coordinating concepts to experiences and obtaining a unique coordination (truth) depends on experience. This possibility has been proven by now, but we cannot demonstrate a priori its necessity8. All this is indicated by the numerous letters they exchanged on this topic between September and December 1920, as well as by the conclusive comment on their discussion made by Reichenbach in “Der gegenwätige Stand der Relativitätsdiskussion”.9
4. THE ANALYSIS OF GEOMETRY AND CONGRUENCE IN “PHILOSOPHIE DER RAUM-ZEIT-LEHRE”
I think that the disagreement between Schlick and Reichenbach was not of an exclusively terminological nature. It was more related to the question of whether it is possible to understand the cognitive process by taking recourse to only two components, experience and linguistic conventions (including coordinative conventions), or whether besides these two we also have to admit some presuppositions of a synthetic nature constitutive not only of science’s language (such as the more strictly linguistic ones) but also of the objects of knowledge. Disregarding our judgement on this matter from the theoretical point of view, from a historical point of view we have to underline that in the years following 1922, Reichenbach changed his original position and ended up embracing the one defended by Schlick. Even in his 1924 work Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Reichenbach adopts Schlick’s perspective and terminology: he refers to implicit and explicit definitions (impliziten and expliziten Definitionen), but instead of speaking of constitutive principles or coordination principles he speaks of coordinative definitions [Zuordnungsdefinitionen], seen in contraposition with conceptual definitions [Begriffsdefinitionen] 10. Moreover, he already sees the problem of the choice of the best set of definitions as having “nothing to do with the truth of a theory”. He presents it in connection with “descriptive simplicity”, viewed in contrast to “inductive simplicity” as “a principle of probability” containing “an important assertion about the physical world” 11. In Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre he still considers the distinction between the different components (conventional and empirical) of scientific theories as one of the main tasks of epistemological analysis: some of these components, though, are no longer seen as constitutive principles, but simply as conventions that have the value of coordinative definitions.
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A similar position is expressed in Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928). While discussing the problem of the empirical determination of geometry, Reichenbach underlines the existence of a subjective arbitrary component in the scientific cognitive process without which – he explicitly states – objectivity cannot be attained. Now, though, he speaks of Zuordnungsdefinitionen, and these coordinative definitions are described in semantic-linguistic terms. If we change the coordinative definitions, we no longer constitute a different object. We simply give empirically equivalent descriptions – for example, different geometrical descriptions of the physical world – that differ only for the language in which they are formulated 12. What can we say about Reichenbach’s relevant change of perspective? What prompted him to move closer and closer to Schlick’s position according to which we only have either hypotheses or conventions? Until now, I have found no indicative references in either Reichenbach’s works or in the archive material 13 . So, even allowing that future studies might bring to light new documents, it seems to me that the only possible conclusion here is that neither Schlick, Reichenbach or Carnap felt the need to say even a few words about Reichenbach’s change of perspective. Personally, I don’t know how to interpret this silence. Is it a meaningful event or simply a twist of fate not worth any further consideration? An analysis of Reichenbach’s text, though, allows us, I think, to advance a hypothesis and here we come to the main point of my paper: the re-evaluation of the role played by Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas in the formation of what was considered the standard doctrine of Logical Empiricism, the way in which Logical Empiricism was viewed for a number of decades, and Quine’s criticism thereof in his famous “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. This possible answer can be explained on the basis of the fact that Reichenbach’s argumentation about the problem of empirical determination of physical geometry, and the necessity to take recourse to a coordinative definition of congruence, are perfectly in tune with the ideas elaborated by the Logical Empiricists of the Vienna and Berlin Circles on the nature of logic and meaning. I am referring here to the ideas that more or less freely, and more or less legitimately, referred back to Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus, in other words to that type of philosophy that traditional interpretations have considered, along with Mach’s thought, to be one of the main origins of Logical Empiricism as it appeared on the philosophical scene between the late 1920s and the early 1930s. These philosophical ideas are the following: (i) the subdivision of statements in simple (elementary, atomic) and complex, and the dependency of the value of truth of the former on specific experiences associated to them; (ii) the tautological nature of some complex statements, in other words, the fact that they are devoid of any empirical-factual content; (iii) the argument expressed by proposition 4.024 of the Tractatus (“To understand a sentence means to know what the case is when it is true”), understood by Logical Empiricists as stating (contrary
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to what Wittgenstein wanted to say) that understanding a statement means understanding the conditions of its empirical verification. This formulation amounts to the verification principle, according to which the meaning of a statement is its means of empirical verification and implying that all those statements that cannot be verified empirically have to be considered as devoid of meaning. As I have already shown14, both Reichenbach’s final position and its underlying argumentation are far closer to Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism than what Reichenbach admitted himself. What is relevant for the purposes of my paper, though, is that Reichenbach’s argumentation (like that already presented by Poincaré) is explicitly posited in terms of meaning and lends itself to reconstruction taking into consideration the above-mentioned typically neo-empirical ideas. Reichenbach mentions neither Russell’s nor Wittgenstein’s names; he does not even quote the verification principle or the thesis of the tautological character – and thus empirical and factual vacuity – of certain statements. Nevertheless, when explaining why a certain assumption (the coordinative definition of congruence expressed through the elimination of universal forces) has to be seen as a definition without justifying his change of perspective with respect to the years when he considered similar assumptions as being constitutive principles analogous to Kant’s synthetic a priori principles, he uses the concept of meaning and expresses his arguments by means of verificational terms and ideas. In Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, in fact, the argument of the linguistic conventionality of the assumption regarding congruence is characterized by the following three fundamental aspects: (i) first of all, Reichenbach offers an analysis that aims at proving the absence of empirico-cognitive content (of a ‘direct’ type, as I will elaborate later) in the questions regarding the geometric description of physical space or, alternatively, of the relation of congruence; (ii) secondly, he states that these questions are devoid of any sense or meaning because they are devoid of any empirical-factual content; (iii) finally, he concludes that it is only by taking recourse to suitable conventions (the coordinative ones) that we can give them meaning. In other words, it is only by means of the implicit adoption of a verificational-reductionist theory of meaning that we can qualify as devoid of any meaning a statement such as the one concerning the self-congruence or rigidity during transportation of the differentially corrected rod. Consequently, we can consider as a stipulation concerning the fixation of meaning the convention asserting the rigidity of this rod in the course of its transportation (that is the assertion of the non-existence of universal deforming forces)15. To put it briefly, in order to justify the necessity of a convention concerning congruence and to assimilate it to a definitional or semantic-linguistic stipulation, Reichenbach first points out the lack of empirico-cognitive content of the assertion of congruence, then qualifies this assertion as devoid of meaning and, finally, states that we can talk about it in terms of truth or falsity only relative to a conventional assumption regarding linguistic rules. This argumentation seems to agree perfectly with a reductionist interpretation (which was establishing itself
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in those years) of the two most characteristic doctrines of Logical Empiricism: the verification principle and the linguistic theory of the a priori. Reichenbach is in line with a reductionist formulation of the verificational theory for two reasons. First of all, because – as was to become clear after Quine’s criticism of empiricism’s two dogmas – he implicitly takes as a unit of empirical meaning a single assertion, individually considered. In other words, Reichenbach states that the assertion of the rigidity of the differentially corrected solid rod statement is devoid of meaning on the basis of the fact that, if considered individually, it does not have any specifiable empirico-factual content. Secondly, because he implicitly considers the absence of direct empirico-factual content tantamount to the absence of any empirico-factual content. According to the linguistic theory of the a priori, all a priori assertions, beginning with the logico-mathemathical ones, have to be considered as analytical assertions, in other words as assertions whose truth value is based only on their logical structure and the meaning of the terms used. Analytical assertions, thus, are true in all conceivable circumstances and their truth is independent of the contingent facts of the world. This is why they tell us nothing about the world and have no factual content. In the neo-positivistic interpretation, therefore, there is a link between the analyticity of an assertion and the fact that it is devoid of empirico-factual content. It seems evident to me, though, that even admitting such a link, the step from the absence of empirico-factual content of the assertion of congruence, viewed by itself, to the assertion that the corresponding conventional assumption is of a semantic-linguistic sort – and so to the assertion of the analiticity or tautological nature of such an assertion once that the convention has been established – is possible only by implicitly taking for granted the non-validity of the thesis from which reductionism springs. In other words, in order to pass from one assertion to the other, we need to assume that an assertion devoid of direct empiricofactual content cannot even have an indirect content deriving from the network of relationships that connect it to the other assertions belonging to the theoretical system of which it is a part. As we know, the very recognition of this fact would lead Hempel and Quine, in the 1950s, to recover Duhem’s holism. They put aside any form of reductionism and defended the impossibility of formulating an empirical criterion of cognitive meaningfulness capable of making a clear distinction between a cognitively meaningful or meaningless discourse. The fact remains that, in 1928, Reichenbach discussed the problem of geometry using the verificational and reductionist terms typical of the classical neo-empiricist conception current during the active period of the Vienna and Berlin Circles. And these very terms allow him to justify the attribution to the coordination conventions of that linguistic-semantic value Schlick had defended since the early 1920s without having a fully developed philosophical justification of his position. Therefore, it is not surprising that at a certain point Reichenbach himself gave a classical formulation of neo-empiricist criticism of Kant’s theory of synthetic a priori judgements. During the first International Conference on
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Scientific Philosophy held in Paris in 1935, he presented a paper on the problem of the a priori in which we find again his criticism of Kant, but where there is no mention of the constitutive principles and all assertions are seen as either synthetic assertions deriving from experience or analytical assertions (“Tout ce que nous savons du monde est tiré de 1’expérience, et les transformations des données empiriques son purement tautologiques, analytiques” l6). 5. INTERPRETATIVE CONSEQUENCES
The path followed by Reichenbach between 1920 and 1928 (when certain ideas matured fully) and his change of perspective can help us – I think – to characterize the formation process of Logical Empiricism, its development and its crisis as a result of alternative theoretical perspectives. To illustrate this better, I will refer to Howard’s, Oberdan’s and Uebel’s interpretations mentioned at the beginning. Uebel seems to be perfectly right in saying that one of the essential characteristics of Schlick’s Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre was the anti-Kantian use of French Conventionalism, and that such a use was in line with the desiderata of the most representative exponents of the first Vienna Circle (Frank, Neurath and Hahn). Here, though, we need to be more specific about two points. First, when using the term “French Conventionalism”, we must refer mainly to Poincaré’s linguistic conventionalism. This regards both Schlick’s position and, partly, the more clear-cut direction that prevailed within the first Vienna Circle. In Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre Schlick does not mention the names of other important French epistemologists of the same period and, more particularly, he does not seem to know Duhem’s holistic conception. Frank, in his pages on the origins of Logical Empiricism and the first Vienna Circle, explicitly says that they looked at Poincaré’s conception in order to account for the subjective and abstract tracts of the scientific cognitive process in order to avoid both an old form of Kantism and a form of Machian sensism. It is certainly true that among the epistemologists mentioned there, Frank also included Duhem, but – with the exception of Neurath – Duhem, at least initially, does not seem have had as great an influence on the development of Logical Empiricism as Poincaré 17. Secondly, the ideas formulated by Schlick in the first edition (1918) of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, if considered separately, were not such that they excluded an interpretation of the philosophical meaning of the theory of relativity that did not ascribe to Kant any merits beyond the negation of a naively empiricistic or radically sensistic conception of knowledge. As I said before, Reichenbach’s position in Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori shows that Schlick’s conception of knowledge as coordination could be used to negate Kant’s theory of synthetic a priori judgements while still according a certain value to the idea of synthetic principles that, even though deprived of their apodeictic quality, still maintained a certain degree of constitutive value. If I inter-
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pret Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre correctly, then we have to say that, in order to abandon this idea completely, it was necessary to adopt a general philosophical conception centered around two doctrines typical of Logical Empiricism in its classic Vienna and Berlin version: the verification principle and the linguistic theory of the a priori. This interpretation allows us to consider as still valid the traditional view of Logical Empiricism that has always ascribed great degree of anticipation to the ideas developed by Schlick in the first edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, without forcing us to say, as Oberdan feared, that virtually all the essential conceptions of Vienna and Berlin Logical Empiricism were contained in that work. Actually, in order to arrive to these conceptions it was necessary to adopt the verification principle and the linguistic theory of logical truths neither of which had been clearly formulated in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. All this is confirmed by two letters written by Schlick in 1926 and 1927 when he was presenting the second edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. In the first one (7 March 1926) addressed to Rudolf Carnap, Schlick moves closer to the position that Carnap was elaborating and that was fully expressed in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. When communicating this evolution of his thought, he says that Carnap and himself agreed more than one might imagine on the basis of the revisions contained in the second edition (1925) of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre: an adequate formulation of his new ideas – Schlick says – would have required him to revise his work much more exstensively. In fact, after the impact of Russell’s, Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s ideas (Aufbau and Scheinprobleme), he changed his position and came to the conclusions expressed in the 1932 works “Positivismus und Realismus” and Form and Content. The second letter was addressed to Cassirer and was written one year later (30 March 1927) after the publication of “Erkenntnistheorie nebst den Grenzfragen der Logik und Denkpsychologie”, an essay where Cassirer also discusses the main theses of the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre18. Schlick responds to some of the criticism put to him by Cassirer, who in a letter dated 4 March 1927 l9 had admitted he had overlooked the changes made in the second edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. In this sense, Schlick’s letter shows well the philosophical path that led him from the positions defended in that work to the ones formulated in the London lectures Form and Content (1932) where, following Russell and using the verification principle, he rejected as senseless the distinction between reality in itself and phenomenic appearence. So this letter shows very clearly the role played by Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s ideas on the development of Schlick’s thought towards the classic formulations of the Vienna Circle that he had anticipated in the essay-manifesto “Die Wende der Philosophie” (1930). When his ‘turn’ was complete, Schlick indicated as the starting points of his new philosophy the attention given to the problems of language, the argument regarding the tautological nature of logic and the linguistic foundation of the a priori, the representative conception of language and, finally, the verification principle which he described as “the fundamental principle of philosophizing” 20.
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It is only in light of the importance given to these ideas that we can understand the process that led to the most typical formulations of neo-empiricism. In Reichenbach’s 1928 work on the philosophy of space and time, these arguments are never mentioned explicitly nor do we find any mention of their connections with the problem of geometry. Even so, the argumentation in favour of the necessity of a coordinative assumption of congruence and its linguistic-semantic value seem to indicate clearly enough that it was only by means of an implicit reference to the verification principle and the tautological nature of the a priori that it was possible to abandon the idea of the constitutive a priori, as formulated in his 1920 work on the theory of relativity. Whether this was a theoretically valid move or not, whether this involved the emergence of a tension with Einstein’s perspective and, finally, whether this in some ways concealed a vision of the relationship between theory and experience less defensible than Cassirer’s, is a completely different story21.
NOTES 1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 6.
7.
D.Howard, “Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of Logical Empiricism” in: W.Salmon & G. Wolters (Eds.), Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May, 1991, Konstanz / Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press / Universitätsverlag, 1994, pp. 46-48; T. Oberdan, “Einstein’s Disenchantment”, in op. cit., pp. 107-108. T.Uebel, “On the ‘Austrian’ Roots of Logical Empiricism: The Case of the ‘First’ Vienna Circle”, a paper presented at the International Workshop “Analytical and Continental Aspects of Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, Florence, November 2-4, 1999, forthcoming in: P.Parrini, M.Salmon and W.Salmon (Eds.), Logical Empiricism. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 1, 6 and 18 of the manuscript. M.Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (19181, 19252), English edition, General Theory of Knowledge, Translation by A.E. Blumberg, With an Introduction by A.E. Blumberg and H.Feigl, Wien & New York: Springer-Verlag, 1974, pp. 196-197. H.Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori (1920), English translation with an Introduction by M. Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, pp. 37-38 and 103-104 for the quotations; see also pp. 40, 42, 88. H.Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A priori, English edition cit., pp. 103-105. See M.Schlick, “Kritizistische oder empiristische Deutung der neuen Physik? ” (1921), English translation in M.Schlick, Philosophical Papers, vol. I (1909-1922), ed. by H.L.Mulder and B.F.B.Van De Velde-Schlick, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, pp. 323-324 and 333. If I understood correctly the answer Friedman gave me in Vienna during the conference, he did not seem to agree with my interpretation of Poincaré’s ideas. I am highly convinced, though, that the numerous passeges I quoted in the anthology Fisica e geometria dall’Ottocento a oggi, Torino: Loescher, 1979, III/7-9, clearly indicate that Poincaré gave a linguistic twist to his conventionalism. Please note that the passages quoted in section III/8 entitled “Il convenzionalismo di Poincaré e la critica di Duhem: convenzioni linguistiche e contenuto teorico”, testify to Duhem’s criticism of Poincaré’s argument according to which whatever a scientist creates in a scientific fact is the language used to express it. This aspect of the question has often been overlooked (see, for example, D. Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Four Central Themes, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, II/4-5); it is, on the contrary, a very important aspect of French epistemology between the late and early century.
20
8.
9.
10.
11. 12.
13. 14.
15. 16.
17. 18. 19.
20. 21.
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On this point see my paper “Reason and Perception. In Defence of a Non-linguistic Version of Empiricism”, in: P.Parrini, M.Salmon and W.Salmon (Eds.), Logical Empiricism. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives cit. See H. Reichenbach, “Der gegenwärtige Stand derRelativitätsdiskussion”(1922), English translation in Hans Reichenbach, Selected Writings: 1909-1953, Vol. II, ed. by M. Reichenbach and R.S.Cohen, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978, pp. 38 and 44. For the letters, see P.Parrini “Origini e sviluppi dell’empirismo logico nei suoi rapporti con la ‘filosofia continentale’. Alcuni testi inediti”, Rivista di storia della filosofia, Vol. 48, 1993. See H. Reichenbach, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1924), now in H. Reichenbach, Gesammelte Werke, ed. by A.Kamlah and M. Reichenbach, vol. 3: Die philosophische Bedeutung der Relativitätstheorie, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Friedr. Vieweg & Son, 1979, pp.1 (=13) and 5 (=17); English edition by M. Reichenbach with a foreword by W. Salmon, Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969, pp.3 and 8. H. Reichenbach, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre cit., pp. 8-9 (=20-21); English edition Axiomatization ofthe Theory ofRelativity cit., pp. 11-12. H. Reichenbach, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928), English edition, The Philosophy of Space and Time, ed. by M. Reichenbach and J. Freund, with Introductory Remarks by Rudolf Carnap, New York: Dover, 1958, p. 37. For even clearer statements see also H. Reichenbach, “The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity” (in: P.A.Schilpp [Ed.], Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Evanston, Ill.: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1949, Second edition, New York: Tudor, 1951, pp. 294-296) and The Rise of Scientific Philosophy ([1951], Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966, pp. 135-137). Unfortunately the space at my disposal does not allow me to further elaborate on my archival work. See P. Parrini, Empirismo logico e convenzionalismo, Milano: Angeli, 1983, in particular Section 2.2. H. Reichenbach, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928), English edition, The Philosophy of Space and Time cit., Sections 3 and 4, in particular, from the final lines of Section 3, p.14, to p.16. H. Reichenbach, “L’empirisme logistique et la désagrégation de l’a priori”, in Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique (Sorbonne, Paris 1935), Paris: Hermann, 1936, I: Philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique, p. 32. See P. Frank, Modern Science and Its Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19411, 1949 2. , pp.8-12 and 13-17. In Jahrbücher der Philosophie, Vol. 3, 1927, pp. 31 -92, see, in particular, Sec. 3, pp. 67-69. The numbers indicating the day and the month have probably been reversed. Regarding Schlick’s letter to Cassirer and the entire issue, see P. Parrini, “Origini e sviluppi dell’empirismo logico nei suoi rapporti con la ‘filosofia continentale’. Alcuni testi inediti” cit., in particular pp.391-392. M. Schlick, Form and Content. An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking, in M.Schlick, Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (1925-1936) cit., pp.286, 309; see also pp.361-362. I dealt with this theoretical question (discussed in the paper by Howard quoted above) in Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.
Department of Philosophy University of Florence I-50132 Florence, Via Bolognese 52 Italy
[email protected]
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BOLZANO’S ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION * Bolzano investigated the following problem. How can we determine whether or not a certain truth is basic without recourse to subjective criteria based on intuition or immediate perceptual knowledge? For him, the criterion of self-evidence is not a means for justifying propositions because it does not provide us with a scientific proof presenting the objective reasons for a proposition, reasons that hold independently of our knowledge.1 Bolzano intended to provide a workable alternative to the criterion of intuitive self-evidence, and claims that we have to search for proof even of self-evident propositions – at least until it becomes clear that and why no proof could be required.2 I reconstruct Bolzano’s account of justification, which is designed to replace the criterion of self-evidence and provide a scientific basis for the demonstrative sciences. I then argue that although Bolzano succeeded in devising a procedure for grounding truths, his theory fails on the account that it implicitly reintroduces an epistemological problem. 1. BOLZANO’S TWO RULES AND THE GROUND-CONSEQUENCE RELATION
Bolzano’s position on justification is close to the foundationalist view, according to which there are basic beliefs or, in his case, basic truths – which are justified without being based on other beliefs or truths – and upon which other beliefs or truths are based through valid inferences. His notion of justification has a dual purpose: it must show not only that there are basic truths, but also why they are basic. It serves as a criterion for establishing certain true propositions as axioms without resorting to intuition and, in addition, provides a means for discovering truths which are not accessible by means of insight.3 Hence Bolzano’s notion of justification has two aspects, an epistemological and a logical one. The epistemological aspect is that a justification is a mark which distinguishes knowledge – or true belief – from opinion and the logical aspect is that a justification is a strict derivative proof which excludes all relevant alternatives as well as alien intermediate concepts. The question is, did Bolzano succeed in combining these epistemological and logical aspects, and did he provide a foundation for the demonstrative sciences? The young Bolzano (1804) provides two rules for this purpose, both with regard to mathematics:4 21 F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 21–33. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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(1) We must search for proof even of self-evident truths, at least until it is clear that and why no further proofs could be required. (2) Even with a completely strict proof, we can allow ourselves to be satisfied if and only if it neither begs the question nor uses alien intermediate concepts or kind-crossing.
The first rule is designed to eliminate the criterion of intuitive self-evidence and to solve the epistemological problem of how basic truths can be known, if not through intuitive insight. Once we have clearly grasped the primary truths, we can extend a science by deriving further and new truths from the basic ones: by examining the reasons why a proposition we hold to be true is true, we not only increase our confidence in it, but by “drawing out the elements of an implicit deduction”, we “obtain the key to new truths which were not clear to common sense”.5 For example, the geometric proof of the truth that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal leads to the discovery of the truth that, in an equilateral triangle all angles are equal. The second rule warns against probationem per aliena et remota and kind-crossing, such as proving propositions about angles and relations between straight lines by referring to planes, or using the concept of movement to provide geometrical truths.6 Bolzano claims that a truth is justified or scientifically proved if and only if it is shown to be objectively dependent on other truths.7 That is to say, the relation between true propositions holds if and only if a primitive truth is the basis for a complex truth which follows from it as a consequence.8 He introduces an axiomatic order among truths: primitive truths or axioms are at the basis of more complex truths or theorems, and these two kinds are related by a dependence relation which Bolzano calls ground-consequence (Abfolge). If a truth p is based on another truth q, then p is a consequential truth. If we can prove that p is not based on q or a set of truths Q, then we can establish that p is a basic truth or axiom. Unlike the relation of derivability, which today is called logical consequence, Abfolge is a relation that holds only between true propositions which are compatible as ground and consequence.9 If p is based on a truth q (or a set of truths Q), p depends on q (or the set of truths Q), so p is true on the grounds of q (or Q).10 The ground-consequence relation is irreflexive11 because no truth can be based upon itself, and it is assymmetric12 because grounds are simpler than their consequences. Unlike the relation of derivability, ground-consequence is an intransitive13 relation with regard to the nearest grounds of a proposition. Bolzano claims that (i) if a proposition p is the nearest ground of a second proposition q, then q cannot be the nearest ground of p and (ii) if p is the nearest ground of q and q is the nearest ground of a third proposition r, then p is only a partial or auxiliary ground of r.14 In addition, Bolzano distinguishes between subjective and objective grounds and consequences as two kinds of implications: (1) confirmations or truths which, as premises, produce a cognition (Erkenntnis) or follow from a cognition
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as consequences, and (2) justifications where objective grounds and consequences hold among truths independently of our knowledge.15 In a confirmation (Gewissmachung), our aim is to obtain the certainty that a proposition is true and we obtain what he calls a ground of knowledge (Erkenntnisgrund). In a justification (Begründung), the truth of a proposition is derived from its objective base and we obtain an objective ground.16 We can confirm logical and mathematical truths by testing them empirically, or by repeatedly testing their derivation, but in a justification we can have no recourse to experience.17 In expounding upon the distinction between confirmation and justification, Bolzano follows his two rules for providing a sound basis for the demonstrative sciences; namely that we must search for proof even of self-evident truths, at least until it becomes clear that and why no further proofs could be required. This distinction is made explicit by inverting the order between the propositions which stand in a ground-consequence relation. In a justification, p is true on the grounds of q and q justifies p. In a confirmation, I know that q is true on the grounds of p and p confirms q.18 I know that q is true on the grounds of p because p explains why q is the case, whereas in a justification, p is true on the grounds of q and q justifies p, because it explains why p is the case. With regard to the first rule and his distinction between confirmation and justification, Bolzano takes up the Aristotelian distinction between and and criticizes the latter for distinguishing between two kinds of knowing or understanding rather than between an objective justification and a subjective confirmation.19 Aristotle distinguishes between (1) knowing that p on the grounds of q where q explains why p is the case and (2) knowing that p on the grounds of q where q does not explain why p is the case.
In the first case we understand a fact through its explanation, and in the second case we become acquainted with a fact without any scientific demonstration.20 Bolzano, however, distinguishes between objective or logical grounding of truths and their subjective or epistemological grounding:21 (1) p is true on the grounds of q and q explains why p is the case, so q justifies p and (2) I know that q is true on the grounds of p because p explains why q is the case, so p confirms q.
He rejects the Aristotelian view which bases the distinction between Erkenntnisse or true judgments and Wissen or scientific knowledge on whether we are acquainted with their objective grounds. But this criterion for knowing something is itself a cognitive or subjective one: the distinction is not simply between unjustified and justified knowledge, but between true judgments or cognitions which we know to be justified and true judgments which we know to be not
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justified.22 This raises another epistemological problem, as Bolzano recognized: how do we become acquainted with the grounds of a cognition other than through intuition or insight? How do we know whether a true judgment is justified or not? Bolzano remarks that if our distinction is between two kinds of cognitions, the words “grasping (Begreifen)” or “insight (Einsehen)” would be more appropriate than knowing (Wissen), in order to qualify such Erkenntnisse as clear insights.23 However, his own distinction is problematic as well, at least with regard to the justification of basic truths, where the epistemological question remains. I discuss this point below in section 3. A confusion between a confirmation and a justification violates the second rule that our proofs may neither beg the question nor use alien intermediate concepts or kind-crossing: If a subjective confirmation is mistaken for an objective justification due to a failure to note the reverse order of the propositions, what results is not a grounding proof. Bolzano explains that geometers did not state the correct ground of the truth to be demonstrated because they inverted the order between the propositions in the proof of the first theorem in Euclid’s Elements. Consequently, some scientific proofs are not grounded proofs (justifications), but only confirmations. For example, the truth that an equilateral triangle is possible contains the objective ground of – or justifies – the truth that two circles intersect, “but if one only pays attention to the mere knowing, then the converse relation might quite easily occur”.24 Two circles intersect or have a point in common, because for every two points a and b there must be a third, c, which has the same distance ab from both a and b, so that ca = cb = ab. We can easily mistake a confirmation for a justification, however, by inverting the order of the propositions in the demonstration. We know that an equilateral triangle is possible by confirming this on grounds of the truth that two circles intersect. 2. BOLZANO’S JUSTIFICATION OF AXIOMS
Bolzano examines the requirements for an axiomatic method (1804) and claims that (1) more general and simpler truths are the ground of the more particular and more complex ones and that (2) it is not enough for an axiom to be certain or self-evident. In addition, we must follow the first rule and search for a proof of it, at least until we become clearly aware of the reasons why no proof could ever be required.25 Axioms are unprovable propositions composed of simple concepts,26 but it does not follow from their unprovability that they are self-evident. He wants to establish axioms on logical grounds and therefore rejects the psychological criterion of self-evidence by claiming that we cannot justify the truth of a conceptual proposition by assuming that it is intuitively self-evident. For this reason, he introduces a distinction between the objective justification (Begründung) of basic conceptual truths and their subjective ascertainment (Gewissmachung), which he opposes to the traditional view that basic conceptual truths
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are immediately obvious or intuitively self-evident.27 We can reconstruct his claim as follows: (1) Conceptual truths, unlike perceptual truths, cannot be known (wissen) immediately or be self-evident,28 although we can come to know them (erkennen) without inferring them from other truths – but in this case we do not have a clear Erkenntnis. We come to know a truth clearly (deutlich) if and only if we are aware of its ground.29 (2) Conceptual truths may be subjectively plausible (einleuchtend) and even certain, but we need to prove their objective grounds.30 We can be immediately aware of conceptual truths, but we are not immediately aware of their objective grounds.31 This notion of justifying or grounding axioms seems to originate with Leibniz, but Bolzano does not mention this. Leibniz uses his principle of sufficient reason as a call to ground axioms.32 Even though Leibniz explicitly states the need for a grounding of Euclidean axioms, he does not elaborate a deduction as Bolzano does. For both Leibniz and Bolzano, we have immediate knowledge of the primary truths of reason, or conceptual truths, but whereas Leibniz explicitly states that such knowledge is intuitive,33 Bolzano does not specify the nature of this knowledge, except for saying that the principle of sufficient reason is the first expression of our awakening reason (Vernunft), to always inquire about the ground.34 Rather, he assumes that there must be primary propositions, whose truth we recognize “from them themselves” 35, or by understanding the meaning of their components, for otherwise we could neither make any grounded inferences, nor show (erweisen) that some statements cannot be grounded.36 For Bolzano, a proposition cannot be both an axiom and a theorem, since axioms are not arbitrary propositions, but basic truths from which the other propositions in a theorem are derived.37 Moreover, inverting the order of ground and consequence in a proof violates the second rule: Bolzano points out that the Euclidean proposition “a straight line is the shortest distance between two points” cannot be inferred from propositions referring to triangles or planes, since these latter are either proofs per aliena et remota, because they use concepts not contained in the axiom, or they are begging the question because they presuppose the basic truth rather than containing it as a component and thus inverting the order of ground and consequence.38 This claim, and the intransitivity of the ground-consequence relation with regard to nearest grounds, commits him to saying that theorems cannot be undecidable. If a proposition p is the nearest ground of a proposition q and q is the nearest ground of a proposition r, then q cannot be the nearest ground of p, nor can p be the nearest ground of r. Since the ground-consequence relation is intransitive with regard to nearest grounds, axioms cannot be both grounds and consequences. This is problematic from a modern point of view, since some theorems are undecidable. If we admit that axioms have an arbitrary nature, rather than claiming that they are basic propositions underwriting other propositions, then any indemonstrable proposition in a theorem can function as an axiom
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– but Bolzano would reject this idea. Bolzano did, however, take some steps towards modern mathematical logic by re-defining axioms as non-intuitive propositions and by determining them through an implicit definition, through their relationships to other propositions: axioms are true propositions which are not consequences of other propositions. The problem, from a modern point of view, is that he attempts to define the nature of these propositions by defining them as basic conceptual truths, albeit on the criteria of independence and consistency.39 How does Bolzano determine which propositions are axioms or primitive truths and which propositions are theorems or consequences? And how does he justify axioms? He determines the nature of axioms to be unprovable by showing that they are primary truths which cannot be derived from any other propositions as consequences. p is a basic truth if and only if p is composed of simple concepts, which are indefinable, and if there is no truth q or set of truths M,N,O, upon which p is based. One such basic truth is the axiom “There is something”.40 Another is the principle of sufficient reason. He uses a regressive proof or backward demonstration from consequences to ground which he calls a deduction or derivation (Herleitung).41 This is an exact derivation which eliminates redundant premises or redundant components of premises, and in which grounds must be simpler than their consequences. A proposition p is justified as an axiom if and only if we can show that for a given proposition “A is B”, there are no two propositions of the form “A is X” and X is B” from which “A is B” could be inferred.42 In other words, in order to justify a proposition as an axiom, we must rule out all relevant alternatives.
2.1 Bolzano’s claim that the self-evidence of basic truths is not immediately obvious (einleuchtend) but must be established Bolzano’s justification of axioms has a further purpose, which is to refute the claim that basic conceptual truths are intuitively self-evident and need no further justification. In 1837, he objects to the thesis held by older logicians who, instead of giving a proof for basic truths, merely state that there is a truth “die für sich selbst einleuchtet” .43 Such intuitive self-evidence of a proposition is no proof of its truth. In Religionswissenschaft (1834), he says that it is easy to convince someone of the truth that it is colder in winter than in summer, merely by referring to “ das bloße Gefühl” . Likewise, he adds, it is easy to convince anyone, even the most stupid person, of the truth that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, merely by asking him to span a thread between two points and to let him notice that, as he stretches the thread, the distance between the two points becomes shorter as the thread takes the position of a straight line. But is this how we make him understand the reason (Grund) why the straight line is the shortest? 44 Surely not, for all we have done is to confirm the axiom
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without providing a justification. Similarly, the drawing of a triangle confirms that the sum of 3 angles is equal to 180°, but it does not prove the theorem. In 1810, he objects to the claim that the characteristic of an axiom lies in its intuitive nature (Anschaulichkeit). This property, he says, “is hardly suitable to provide a firm basis for the classification of all truths into two classes, that is, into axioms and theorems”. He gives three reasons for the unsuitability of intuitiveness. First, this property allows for differences in degree, so we will not be able to determine precisely what degree would be sufficient for an axiom. Second, the intuitive nature depends on fortuitous circumstances, such as our education or experience, which brings us to recognize it more frequently or less. Third, the degree of intuitiveness differs from one person to another and what is obvious for one may appear obscure to another.45 Further on, he gives a fourth reason, which he also mentions in 1837.46 Clear propositions, if they are conceptual, are not necessarily intuitively self-evident, but rather, they are clear to us because they are inferred from other, more basic truths. I think that what he objects to is an inherent confusion in the word “ Evidenz” , which may be due to the fact that it means both visibility and clarity or transparency. Bolzano distinguishes between visibility or intuitive selfevidence and the clarity or transparency of a proposition, as it becomes obvious to us. Perceptual truths can be intuitively self-evident, though even in their case Bolzano restricts the self-evidence to immediate judgments, where something is predicated on the first-person subject.47 Conceptual truths, however, appear clear to us only because they are inferences. For this reason, he says, the proposition “you should not lie” may appear much clearer to us than its objective ground, the axiom “you should promote general well-being”, because it presupposes the latter.48 So inferred propositions often have a higher degree of intuitiveness than axioms, which is why we are bound to confuse the order of ground and consequence in a proof.49 For although we can be immediately aware of conceptual truths, we are not immediately aware of their grounds. In addition, he claims in the Anti-Euclid50 that in a scientific presentation, the insight (Einleuchten) of a true proposition is not immediate, but must be established by means of derivations from simpler truths. We must be able to perceive the correctness of such an inference without seeing the figure to which it refers. In the Wissenschaftslehre51 he states explicitly that conceptual truths are not immediately self-evident or obvious, but are testable (prüfen) either through experience or repeated derivation. A proposition is more likely to be obvious if it is inferred from others, or tested empirically. This claim, however, leads to another problem, which I will now examine, in section 3. For testing is confirming, but not justifying. It seems that Bolzano’s claim that the self-evidence of basic truths is not immediately obvious but must be established, takes him back to the problem of confirming truths and results in an epistemological problem in his theory: we can logically justify truths, but we may need non-logical knowledge for having access to them.
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3. BOLZANO’S VIEW ON CONFIRMING OR TESTING TRUTHS AND AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN HIS THEORY
How do we learn or come to know that a proposition is true or that a logical relation, such as that of ground and consequence, holds between true propositions? Bolzano claims that ultimately all subjective grounds of knowledge have an objective base,52 but how do we come to know that base? The obvious answer is, through logical knowledge or knowledge by means of concepts, by understanding the components of the conceptual propositions. He establishes axioms as conceptual truths which are unprovable but not intuitively obvious and claims that “the domain of axioms stretches as far as that of pure simple concepts” which are indefinable.53 Axioms implicitly define the items referred to by concepts such as [point] or [line] and we must have an understanding of what these items are, in order to prove a geometrical theorem. Here we are faced with a dilemma: either we say that we cannot know what [point] or [line] are without knowing a geometrical theory, or we accept that we have a naïve understanding of these concepts which we then clarify by means of a geometrical theory. So even though we may assume that we come to know axioms because we have already understood their components, a problem remains, concerning the nature of this understanding. Even if we appeal to conceptual understanding, or to conventions, how do we explain our grasping the meaning of these components without an ultimate recourse to insight or intuition? Here is a possible Bolzanian reply: Bolzano says that there is “a peculiar connection” between the components of a subjective proposition or judgment, which must be “combined with one another in a certain quite distinctive way.” He is not very clear about the nature of this connection; all he says is that “it must be a sort of mutual influence these ideas have upon each other.” 54 Further on he explains that a judgment is not merely a sum of ideas, but a “certain efficacious combination (wirksame Verbindung) of ideas”.55 Bolzano calls the degree of this efficacy the degree of confidence (Zuversicht) with which we make a judgment or the degree of certainty with which we hold something to be true. Perhaps he means that we understand a statement when we grasp its components with a sufficiently strong degree of confidence, that is, our conviction is the glue that holds the components of a judgment in a certain order: when we hold a statement to be true, we provide an efficacious combination of its components. So we understand the components of a basic truth by holding their order to be true. If the components of a proposition are determined by their order, which Bolzano holds,56 then their meaning is determined by this order, and we understand their meaning by understanding their order and holding it to be true. It follows that for Bolzano a statement implicitly defines its components, these latter being related in a certain order, which we hold to be true. So our understanding has a rather pragmatic, if not to say dogmatic, character.
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But this still leaves us with the problem of how we get to the primitives: Bolzano’s Herleitung of axioms is a deductive procedure, whereas his regressive proof for getting to the primitives would seem to require an inductive procedure. Let us take Bolzano’s above-mentioned example of a basic truth “there is something”: in order to establish this statement as a basic truth we must understand what “there is” and what “something” is. How can we come to know this by means of a deductive procedure? The statement is uninformative, so we cannot “unpack” its semantic content and lack criteria for proving that it cannot be derived from any other propositions as a consequence. The regressive procedure from consequence to ground calls for an inductive procedure which enables us to discover – and thus understand – the statement. Once we have discovered several truths in this way, we can then derive other statements from them as consequences. Bolzano’s deductive method for justifying axioms does not provide us with criteria for determining which truths are primitive because it does not contain an explanation of how we are supposed to understand primitive truths and the meaning of their components.57 Unfortunately there is a further problem within his own theory. Bolzano seems to say that a priori or conceptual truths cannot be justified through experience and that the objective ground of conceptual truths cannot lie in observational propositions. He also points out that a justification is possible above all in conceptual sciences, but more rarely in empirical sciences, because very often the objective reason is completely or partly unknown to us. Hence we cannot provide a justification by deriving them from their objective reasons, and in our attempts to support their proof we only increase their degree of probability.58 Bolzano’s claim that conceptual truths can be tested either through experience or by repeatedly testing their derivation59 has provoked Husserl’s and Stove’s accusation that he is an empiricist who holds that we believe logical generalizations because they are true observation-statements.60 I think, however, that their accusation is partly unjustified, for Bolzano argues, on the contrary, that we cannot generalize from observation or empirical intuition: we can come to know, by observation, that a single line can be extended, but we cannot infer from this the general truth that all straight lines can be extended. For this generalization we need to appeal to the principle of similarity. So we do not learn general truths through intuition, but through conceptual principles.61 Bolzano’s claim about our empirical knowledge of logical and mathematical truths is much weaker: he claims that we can learn or become acquainted with logical truths by experience and we can confirm such truths by testing them empirically. For example, we can learn the syllogistic form of barbara, that “x is F and all F are G” implies “x is G”, for all x and all F and all G, by testing it against experience. We discover that in all observed instances, if both the premisses of the barbara form are true, then the conclusion is true and that there are no instances of barbara where the premisses are true and the conclusion is false. This implies that our verification not only grounds our confidence in logical rules and mathematical propositions, but also the justification for the applicabil-
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ity of these rules. And here the accusation has a point, for Bolzano’s attempt to combine epistemological and logical aspects leads to an inconsistency in his account of justification.62 However, the point here is not so much that Bolzano is an empiricist, but rather that such a combination inevitably results in problems, at least as long as it includes formal logic. To answer the question put at the beginning of this paper, I think that Bolzano’s notion of justification is probably as adequate a foundation for the demonstrative sciences as you could get in the century, and its shortcomings may be due to the problem of justification itself, rather than to Bolzano’s account.
NOTES
*
1.
This text is a revised version of a paper presented at the symposium “ Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism”, July 2001 and is closely related to a larger project I am presently working on, concerning Bolzano’s epistemology. I would like to thank Michael Beaney and Ivan Kasabov for their critical comments. References to Bolzano, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe, ed. E. Winter, J.Berg, F.Kambartel, J.Louzil, B.van Rootselaar; Stuttgart Bad-Cannstatt, F. Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, 1969-(BBGA).
1804, § 3 (Betrachtungen über einige Gegenstände der Elementargeometrie (1804) in Bolzano ’s early mathematical works, Czechoslovak Studies in the History of Science, Prague, 1981. partial English translation by S. Russ in W.Ewald, From Kant to Hilbert, vol. 1, OUP, 1996); Beyträge II (1810), §§2, 11, 12, 21 (Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810) in Bolzano’s early mathematical works, op.cit. (Beyträge). English translation by S. Russ in W.Ewald, op.cit.); 1817 (Purely analytic proof ...), § 1; English translation by S.Russ in W.Ewald, op.cit; WLIV, §525; (Wissenschaftslehre (1837), 4 vols, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1981 (WL)) and the Anti-Euklid, a manuscript in Bolzano’s Nachlass edited by Karel Vecerka, Sbornik, Prague, 1967, pp. 204-215, who dates the text around 1840. Jan Sebestik, however, situates the text closer to 1816. 2. 1804, §3. 3. Cf. WLIV, §401, §525. Cf. on this Ali Behboud (2000), Bolzanos Beiträge zur Mathematik und ihrer Philosophie, ch, 1, Bern Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Bern. 4. “Erstlich stellte ich mir die Regel auf, dass ich mich durch keine Evidenz eines Satzes von der Verbindlichkeit los zähle, noch einen Beweis für denselben aufzusuchen – so lange, bis ich deutlich einsähe, dass und warum sich durchaus kein Beweis fernerhin fordern lasse. [...] so muss man das Bestreben alle Wahrheiten der Mathematik bis auf ihre letzten Gründe zu entwickeln, und dadurch allen Begriffen dieser Wissenschaft die möglichste Deutlichkeit, Berichtigung und Ordnung zu verschaffen, [...]. 1804, Preface, pp.6-7. Cf. also 1810, II, §2, 1817, § 1 ; Anti-Euklid, p. 208. 5. 1804, Preface, p. 8; 1810; Beyträge II, § 2; WLIV, §401. 6. Cf. 1804, Preface, pp. 8-9. 7. Beyträge II, (1810), § 12. cf. also 1817, § 1 where he says that scientific proofs should be justifications and introduces the distinction between Grundwahrheiten and Folgewahrheiten. 8. WLII, § 221. note. 9. “ein sehr merkwürdiges Verhältnis, vermöge dessen sich einige derselben zu andern als Gründe zu ihren Folgen verhalten.” WLII, § 162; §221.note: “der Begriff einer solchen Anordnung unter den Wahrheiten, vermöge deren sich aus der geringsten Anzahl einfacher Vordersätze die möglich grösste Anzahl der übrigen Wahrheiten als blosser Schlusssätze ableiten lasse”. 10. Cf. WLII, §198. 11. WLII, §204.
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12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19. 20.
21.
22. 23. 24.
25. 26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
33. 34.
35. 36.
31
Cf. WLII, §209. Cf. WLII, §213. Cf. WLII, §213, note. WLII, §198. ML, § 13 (Von der mathematischen Lehrart (1833-1841) in BBGA, II, A, vol.7, Grössenlehre. (ML)); WLII, §162. The distinction between confirming and justifying is not the same in the formal and the natural sciences, because in the latter, it is a causal relation which must be justified. In the natural sciences, both confirmation and justification are related to experience, but although a justification may involve an observational element, it must have a non-empirical base. In the formal sciences, only the confirmation may occur through experience. Cf. WLIV, §525; ML §13. Cf. WLII, § 198, cf. also ML, § 14, WLIV, §525. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, A13, 78a-b, trsl. Jonathan Barnes (1975), Clarendon, Oxford. Cf. Barnes’ commentary, p. 155. In addition, Bolzano mentions Leibniz’s “liaison de vérités” as a predecessor of his own notion of connection between truths as ground and consequence. There is a clear parallel between the two authors, since both Leibniz and Bolzano distinguish this logical relation from the epistemological connection betweeen truths as cognitions. Cf. WLII, § 198, note. As Bolzano points out: “the Greeks required that we only say of something that we know it, if we have come to know it from its ground.” Cf. WLIII, § 316.4 & note. 1. WLIII, §316.4. Cf. WLIV, §525; Anti-Euklid, pp.210-211. Bolzano explains that geometers did not state the correct ground of the truth to be proved because they inverted the order between the propositions in the proof of the first theorem in Euclid’s Elements. Therefore some scientific proofs are not grounded proofs (justifications), but confirmations. Cf. on this Paolo Mancosu (1999), “Bolzano and Cournot on mathematical explanation” in Revue d’histoire des sciences, vol. 523/4, pp. 436-43 7. Cf. 1804, preface, op.cit. note 4. Beyträge,II, §19. Cf. Beyträge, appendix on the Kantian construction of concepts through intuitions (Anhang über die kantische Lehre über die Construction der Begriffe durch Anschauungen (1810) (appendix to Beyträge), in Bolzano’s early mathematical works, op.cit. English translation by S.Russ in W.Ewald, From Kant to Hilbert, op.cit.; WLIII, §305.5; §314.3. Bolzano’s attack is directed in particular against the Kantian view that mathematical concepts are constructed through intuitions and that axioms are indemonstrable because they are intuitively self-evident. Cf. KrV, A732/B760. Cf. WLIII, §300.13. Cf. WLIII, §§300.9, 316.3. Cf. WLIII, §§ 305, 314; Anti-Euclid, pp. 208-209. Frege has a similar claim in Logic in Mathematics, (1914), The Frege Reader (1997), Michael Beaney ed., p. 310. Cf. WLIII, §§313, 315.6, 316.note 1. Cf. G.W.Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, vol.4, 2. Abtheilung, Berlin 1880, p. 232. Cf. on this J. Mittelstrass (1969) “Die Begründung des principium rationis sufficientis” , in Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa, vol.3, pp. 136-148. For instance, when referring to definitions, Leibniz asserts that they include intuitive knowledge because they include a primary truth of reason. New Essays on the Human Understanding (1765), trsl. P. Remnant & J. Bennett, CUP, Cambridge, 1981. bk. IV, ch. ii, p. 367. Cf. WLIII, §311.2. Bolzano qualifies our capacity to come to know a truth or make a true judgment as a “feeling for truth” (WLIII, §316.3, 316.note 1) through which we can come to know a truth without coming to know its ground. Cf. on this Anita Konzelmann (2001), “Intuismus oder Empirismus? David Stoves Bolzano-Kritik ” forthcoming. Fortunately – for otherwise his critical view of self-evidence would collapse – Bolzano does not say that this is how we come to know primary truths. Rather, this feeling for truth applies to grounded truths, cf. WLIII, § 316.3. Beyträge, II, § 19; WLIII, §300.9. Cf. WLIII, §§300.9, 316.note 1.
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ANITA VON DUHN
37. Cf. Beyträge (1810), §13. 38. 1804, § 10, Anti-Euclid, pp. 210, ff. 39. An axiom is independent if and only if it cannot be derived from the remaining ones and it is consistent if and only if no contradiction can be derived from it. 40. WLII, §214. 41. Cf. 1810, Beyträge, II, §21. 42. “Behaupten wir also, a) dass ein Satz eine Grundwahrheit sey: so müssen wir (...) darthun, dass (...) keine einzelne, auch kein Inbegriff mehrer Wahrheiten angeblich sey, aus denen er sich wie eine Folge aus ihrem Grunde ableiten lässt.” (WLIV, §577). “Dieses wird in den meisten Fällen eine eigene Betrachtung erfordern, die ich zum Unterschiede von einem eigentlichen Beweise (oder einer Demonstration) mit dem bestimmten Rahmen einer Herleitung (oder Deduktion) belege. Grundsätze werden also zwar nicht bewiesen, wohl aber deduciret, und diese Deductionen sind ein wesentlicher Bestandtheil des wissenschaftlichen Vortrages, indem man ohne sie niemals gewiss seyn könnte, ob jene Sätze, deren man sich als Grundsätze bedienet, dieses auch wirklich sind.” (Beyträge II, §21, my italics). 43. WLII, §214.note. 44. RWI, §3. Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, 3 Teile, Sulzbach, 1834, BBGA, I, vols.6-8. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.
52. 53.
54. 55. 56.
57.
58.
59.
(RW) 1810 (Beyträge II, §10). Cf. WLIII, §§300, ff. Cf.WLIII, §300.12. 1810 (Beyträge II, § 21; Appendix, § 10). Cf. Appendix, 1810, §10. Cf. Anti-Euclid, p. 209. WLIII, §315.14; cf. also Appendix 1810, § 10, where he claims that one can very easily test the results of mathematics by intuition and experience and that the axiom of the straight line being the shortest between two points is proved by everyone by innumerable experiments long before they can prove it by deductions. He adds that the well-known obviousness of mathematics gradually disappears where experience is lacking. Cf. WLII, §221.note; ML § 13;WL§198. Beyträge II, §22. “Wenn nämlich alle mathematischen Begriffe erklärbare Begriffe wären, so könnte es auch keine Grundsätze in den mathematischen Disziplinen geben. Da es aber einfache Begriffe gibt; (...) so muss man (...) auch wirkliche Grundsätze in [der Mathematik] anerkennen”. WLIII, §291. WLIII, §293. Bolzano claims that the components of a proposition are related in a certain order: a subject A has a certain attribute b. The canonical form of propositions is “ A has b” . Cf. WLII, §§ 126, 127. Perhaps the problem lies in the fact that he himself does not seem very clear about precisely which propositions are the basic axioms on which the demonstrative sciences are based for (to my knowledge), he makes no explicit statement to that effect. He only assumes that there must be more than one basic truth. WLII, §215, §221.3. WLIV, §525. Bolzano’s view implies that non-logical knowledge is necessary for coming to know the logical grounds of a proposition, at least in empirical sciences, because we cannot justify empirical laws without observational knowledge. Bolzano could object that for a justification in the natural sciences, my observation statements must be related by a conceptual relation of ground and consequence. Physical truths are truths of reason which, for their derivation, require the clear presentation of a purely conceptual truth, even if they also require a perceptual premiss. Cf. WLIII, § 311.2. But when we confront Newton’s law that there is a force of attraction between any two particles in the universe with observation statements, we also give valid reasons for it and, in so doing, we justify it without having to recur to the logical relation between propositions. “If we have not tested the truth of a proposition either by experiment, or by repeated checking of its derivation, we do not give it unqualified assent (...). Does not experience teach us that we make mistakes in mathematical judgments, and that we make these mistakes more easily the more we trust what that philosophy calls by the high-sounding name of pure intuition? (...) The
BOLZANO’S ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION
33
only reason why we are so certain that the rules barbara, celarent, etc. are valid is because they have been confirmed in thousands of arguments in which we have applied them.” (WLIII, §315.4, my italics). 60. “[Bolzano] would have firmly rejected the idea of a pure logic in my sense – and, even more, in the sense of a pure logic “to be clarified” epistemologically. (...) No one has taken notice of the fact that Bolzano’s epistemology rests upon the foundation of an extreme empiricism. (...) there is here no difference between Bolzano and his contemporary, John Stuart Mill.” Husserl (1913) Introduction to the Logical Investigations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1975, p.48. David Stove (1986) The rationality of induction, part 2, Clarendon, Oxford, pp. 160-162. 61. Cf. ML, § 14. 62. Cf. on this Mark Textor (2001), “ Logically analytic propositions a posteriori?” , in History of Philosophy Quarterly 18, 1, who argues that non-logical knowledge is necessary for determining the truth or falsity of logically analytic demonstratives. This fallacy in Bolzano’s theory pervades even his logic. He claims that logical relations hold between true propositions independently of our knowledge. But in some cases we can only come to know that a relation of derivability holds between truths if we have non-logical knowledge. Cf. WLII, § 197.3, § 155.
Institute for Literature Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Blvd. Shipchenski prohod, No. 52, block 17 1113 Sofia Bulgaria
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DAVID JALAL HYDER
KANTIAN METAPHYSICS AND HERTZIAN MECHANICS *
l. INTRODUCTION
People interested in the history of the philosophy of science generally know about Heinrich Hertz, the discoverer of electric waves, and the author of a work (the posthumous Principles of Mechanics) whose picture-theoretical account of science was adopted or criticised by Mach, Boltzmann, Wittgenstein, Hilbert and many others. Despite the Principles’ great influence, there is no consensus on what exactly Hertz was up to when he wrote that peculiar book. How did Hertz understand its significance? As a work in theoretical physics? As a philosophical treatise? If both, what is the connection between these two components? In this paper I shall argue that Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics is an instance of what Kant called for in the introduction to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and claimed to deliver in the book itself, namely a “metaphysics of corporeal nature.” A metaphysics of corporeal nature is an a priori construction of the concept of matter. Such a construction lays the groundwork for the unified system of science by rigorously relating metaphysical principles to the intuitions of space and time. When I say that Hertz’s book is an instance of this species, I do not mean to suggest merely that one can think of it that way, for I believe that there is evidence to suggest that Hertz thought of it that way too. Some of that evidence has become available to us recently in an edition of a series of lectures which Hertz delivered at the university of Kiel in 1884, immediately before he began the series of experiments which led to his landmark works on electromagnetism. The title of the manuscript of these lectures, which appears to have been intended for publication as a book, is Über die Konstitution der Materie.1 Most of the philosophical ideas one associates with Hertz – his “picture-theory”, his scepticism regarding action at a distance – are articulated here, and we find the same mix of scientific realism and neo-Kantian idealism that makes Hertz so interesting a figure for philosophers. Hertz had been reading Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations in the previous semester, and his lectures are directly concerned with the proper way of framing the concept of matter. This is in part what he takes the “science of the constitution of matter” alluded to in the title of the manuscript to be: a specification of the concept of matter which will prepare it for drawing up the pictures which scientific cognition requires to go about its work. Although it would be mislead35 F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 35–46. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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ing to claim that Hertz’s early lectures are a simple extension of Kant’s project, they still clarify the extent to which Hertz used Kant’s philosophy to guide his philosophical thinking. Unlike many of his contemporaries, unlike even his teacher, Helmholtz, Hertz’s debt to Kant does not stop at theses concerning the unknowability of things in themselves, or the aprioricity of time and space, but extends to his ruminations on the concept of matter and on the notion of an a priori construction of the latter. And although Hertz, even at this early stage, was inclined to reject the Kantian claim that force was essential to matter, he went about rejecting that claim, in his posthumous work, by trying to show that an a priori construction of matter could be achieved without recourse to that notion, that a complete mechanics did not require force of matter. Even where Hertz argues against Kant, he uses Kantian methods to do so. Hertz’s understanding of the term matter in these lectures is not quite what one might expect. He explains what he means with a long analogy between matter and paper money, calling matter a currency issued by our understanding in order to settle its relations with things. Paper money, Hertz explains, is a sign for something else, and this alone constitutes its meaning and its value, in that it does not matter to this end how it is physically made. Hertz uses this somewhat Helmholtzian analogy to distinguish between three kinds of sciences concerned with this intellectual currency. The first of these disregards the semiotic character of matter, and considers it as a thing in itself. Such are the sciences of physics and chemistry in their everyday applications. The second kind of science is more directly concerned with the essence of matter, much like a science concerning the laws of circulation of paper money. This science, although it is conscious of the sign-character of the concept it analyses, does not need to consider specific details of the fabrication of these signs. It comprises the theoretical parts of physics and chemistry, as well as the science which Hertz is trying to situate, namely, that of the constitution of matter. The last kind of science is one concerned with the concept in itself, and is like a science which studies the fabrication of money – the kinds of paper to use, the engraving techniques and the inks. This is the domain of philosophy, “whose responsibility it is to descend into the workroom of our understanding, and to determine how it comes to make such concepts.” 2 In his ensuing discussion, Hertz goes on to present the state of contemporary atomic, electromagnetic and ether theories, as well as attacking the concept of force and considering the claim to metaphysical priority of a number of material concepts. It is here that the picture-theory makes its first appearance in Hertz’s works. I believe that these early discussions represent a thoughtful reaction to Kant, and that much of Hertz’s later work is best understood from that point of view. Above all, many particularities of the structure and argument of the Principles of Mechanics are easier to understand if one approaches the work from this angle. My approach in the following is loosely chronological, for I want to argue for a continuity in Hertz’s thought which has been overlooked, largely because the early work I will be discussing has been unavailable. I begin with a brief review
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37
of Kant’s notion of a metaphysics of corporeal nature, turning from that to a treatment of the picture-theory of scientific cognition as it appears in Hertz’s Constitution of Matter and his Electric Waves. I conclude with a section on the Principles of Mechanics, where I claim that the Principles should be read as providing a science of the constitution of matter in the sense already envisaged in the Constitution of Matter, and that this is reflected in formal analogies between the Principles and Kant’s system.
2.
KANT’S METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
These connections are easiest to see when one recalls that Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations represents a very particular kind of science of matter – a science which is in essence concerned with constructing pictures in the imagination. Kant’s philosophy of science requires such a construction of material pictures in order to bridge the gap between his transcendental philosophy and normal empirical science. Without them, we could explain neither how pure mathematics and the categories become binding in the realm of empirical experience, nor why the science of nature must be unified. In discussing both Hertz and Kant, it will be useful to keep in mind that Kant’s concept of matter is exceedingly general: matter is whatever is involved in an intuition which does not belong to its form, and so sensations qualify as matter. The pure science of matter which Kant develops in the Foundations is concerned with matter in its most abstract sense, that is, as the content of any possible intuition or product of the imagination. Obviously this definition is in close accordance with Hertz’s pecuniary model. In the Introduction to the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant argues that all natural science, if it is to be apodictic knowledge [Erkenntnis], and not merely so-called knowledge, must contain an a priori part. For if all the concepts and laws in a body of knowledge were arrived at empirically and inductively, the science in question would not be a rational science. And so it follows that there must be transcendental principles at the foundations of the natural sciences, principles which are on the one hand metaphysical, in that they concern the relations between pure concepts of the understanding, and on the other mathematical, because they relate to the construction of these concepts in intuition. However, since the natural sciences are also concerned with existing things, there must also be metaphysical principles which specify the kind of existence one is dealing with, which will be either the soul, for psychology, or corporeal matter, for physics. This demand entails that there be a special metaphysics for physics itself, which bridges the gap between the transcendental principles of the sciences, and the empirical laws which make up the body of physics. This metaphysics must relate the concept of matter to our intuition of space. Now, as Kant emphasises, the properties of matter which are successively investigated in the Metaphysical Foundations are necessarily empirical. Whether matter is defined as the movable in space, as that which fills a space, or as that
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which has a moving force (to run through Kant’s successive definitions of the concept), nothing can guarantee that things satisfying these definitions must exist. For physics is concerned with the material world, and the material world is that given to us in sensation. Concepts that have to do with possible sensation are, in turn, empirical concepts, and nothing guarantees their metaphysical, as opposed to merely logical possibility. At the same time, however, the propositions developed out of these concepts by means of metaphysical analysis are apodictic. They pronounce neither upon the various kinds of matter or forces that do in fact exist, nor upon the exact form that physical laws might take. In order that the application of mathematics to the science of bodies, which can only by this means become a natural science, may become possible, one must first develop the principles of the construction of those concepts which belong to the possibility itself of matter. Therefore one will have lay down a complete analysis of the concept of matter, which is a business of pure philosophy. It w i l l need to avail itself of no special experiences, but only of that which it itself finds in particular (although in themselves empirical) concepts as they pertain to pure intuitions in space and time – that is, according to laws depending essentially on the mere concept of nature. This complete analysis of the concept of matter is thereby an actual metaphysics of corporeal nature.3
So we get the following equation: A priori principles + Empirical Concept(s) of Matter = Metaphysics of Corporeal Nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature, in turn, when it is combined with specific data concerning the observed behaviour of natural systems will yield physics as we know it. A priori principles (pure forms of the understanding, time, space)
+
Empirical concept(s) of matter (phoronomic, dynamic, mechanical)
=
Metaphysics of corporeal nature
Metaphysics of corporeal nature
+
Empirical laws
=
Natural science (Newtonian physics, ...)
One way to think of the place of applied metaphysics in Kant’s system is to regard it as a schematism of empirical concepts. It resembles the schematism of the first Critique in its linking of the categories to pure intuition. But whereas in the schematism we move solely within the realm of the a priori – pure forms of the understanding are “constructed” by connecting them with the pure a priori intuition of time – in the Metaphysical Foundations pure empirical material concepts, such as “a movable something in space,” are constructed by connecting them with the intuitions of both time and space. In schematism itself, Kant contrasts the schemata of pure concepts of the understanding to schemata of sensual concepts, and explains their differing relations to what he calls “pictures” [Bilder]. A sensual concept is a rule for drawing [verzeichnen] arbitrary pictures
KANTIAN METAPHYSICS AND HERTZIAN MECHANICS
39
in the imagination. The schema of a sensual concept is the product of the pure imagination by means of which such pictures are at all possible, and which furthermore connects the pictures to the concepts they characterise [bezeichnen]. The schema of a pure concept, on the other hand, is a pure synthesis of the productive imagination according to a rule for generating a conceptual unity – it can never yield a picture, for it has no sensual content.4 To make this somewhat easier to visualise: the concept of a dog is a rule for producing various images of four-legged animals; the schema of the concept is the operation of the imagination in accordance with the rule – the set of drawing operations which lead to pictures of dogs; and a pure schema is one of the operations underlying the latter, one of the operations involved in acts of drawing generally, one might say. Just as general drawing techniques do not produce a picture of anything, so the schema of a pure concept does not produce a picture in the imagination. This can only be the case once an empirical sensual concept is given as a rule. According to this division, the Metaphysical Foundations describes the schematisation of the empirical concept of matter. Such a schematisation determines the set of images of material systems which are in accordance with that concept. These are the most general images of the natural world that we can produce, and any particular representation of a physical system will be a refinement of a picture drawn from that image bank. These pictures are necessarily mathematisable, for they have been schematised within the extensive magnitudes of space and time. Furthermore, they connect to experience by means of the categories and pure intuition, which are the conditions of the transcendental unity of apperception, thus of any objective experience we may have, whether scientific or everyday. Finally, the requirement that all special sciences partake in the metaphysics of corporeal nature – which means nothing more than that they will draw their images from that image bank – entails that science will also take the form of a unified mathematical theory: each scientific theory and its images will be a more determinate, filled-in version of the basic schemes given by Kant’s corporeal metaphysics. With these points in mind, let us return to Hertz’s Constitution of Matter. 3. HERTZ’S ON THE CONSTITUTION OF MATTER
In the opening lectures of this book, Hertz makes the first documented use of his picture-theory of science. The theory is introduced to deal with a fundamental paradox confronting us when we try to think about the microscopic world, for instance when we describe heat or elasticity by means of an atomic theory. The paradox is straightforward: we cannot use the atomic conception without ascribing properties to atoms – properties which, by definition, the atoms cannot have. All these properties will be taken from our experience of the macroscopic world – they will be sensual properties, Hertz argues - but atoms are by definition not sensible. “Every sensual representation of the atoms includes an absurdity, every
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translation of sensual properties of matter onto atoms contains a logical error. But what then remains?” Hertz answers that ... there is always something left over once we have cancelled out all thought. There remains a system of conceptually defined magnitudes, which are connected among themselves and to the macroscopic properties of matter by means of rigorously defined mathematical relations; even if it is not allowed to take the latter at face value and to ascribe them imaginable meanings [Bedeutungen], they still retain their value as ancillary magnitudes to those relations.5
Now, Hertz goes on to argue, one might take a very strict view of the matter, and choose to describe perceptual facts in the simplest possible manner, rejecting everything beyond the phenomena as a fiction. This is, he observes, the opinion of many physicists regarding the theory of the constitution of matter. The only constraints placed on our concept of matter from this point of view are that they be logically consistent, and that they lead to simple equations. But Hertz rejects this phenomenological approach, arguing that although physics has every right to go this road, it has no necessary superiority. For every intuition of a concept, whether in everyday life or in scientific practice, has properties that do not actually hold of things in themselves. Not only is there is no principled difference between a phenomenological approach and one in which in which we imagine microscopic entities, we have no alternative to constructing images of our scientific concepts. Even if we try to eliminate as much as possible from these images, a core will remain, which contains the essential properties with which we are concerned. [These] are not false representations, but rather the conditions of representation itself; we cannot remove them and replace them with better ones, rather we must either add them in or give up on all representations in this field.6
Of course this immediately raises the question as to precisely which properties are essential to our concept of matter. Hertz devotes the first chapter of the second part of The Constitution of Matter to this question, treating at length the prime candidates for metaphysically necessary properties – extension, movability, impenetrability, and indestructibility – while referring in passing to the Metaphysical Foundations. The one metaphysical property obviously missing from this list, namely force, he treats at length in the preceding chapters, in what can only be described as a lengthy attack on the coherence of this concept. There, Hertz goes so far as to suggest that all actions at a distance, including gravitation, are best represented by means of a field theory, and that such a field should itself be understood as propagating in time. 7 Hertz characterises his discussion of the various properties of matter as the search for a “fixed pole,” a property which we must ascribe to matter in order for it to be suitable for picturing the world.8 Despite the obvious parallel to Kant’s undertaking (for all of these properties are analysed in the course of the Metaphysical Foundations), Hertz’s result is somewhat different from Kant’s. He concludes that all of these properties are a
KANTIAN METAPHYSICS AND HERTZIAN MECHANICS
41
mixture of empirical and a priori components, and that none of them can be taken as constitutive of our concept. He concludes with the lengthy analogy to paper money outlined above, which can only be interpreted as a form of conventionalism. The specific form we give to our concept of matter does not essentially affect the meaning of the scientific pictures which employ that concept; however, it is a grave error to project the properties that we have given it onto the things to which it refers. What is essential to these pictures, he concludes, is that they allow us to represent the mathematical relations between macroscopically observable magnitudes. It follows, a fortiori, that only the spatial and temporal relations within these pictures are essential, since only they can be the source of mathematical relations. 4. CONSTRUCTIONS
AND
PICTURES
IN
ELECTRIC WAVES
As we saw, Hertz first introduced the picture-theory while considering atoms. How, he asks, and under what circumstances, are we justified in thinking about the microscopic world? The question – and its answer – are of great generality. But Hertz posed it at a specific moment in his research. At the time he gave his lectures on the constitution of matter, he was struggling to develop a picture of Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism which he could use to guide his experimental work. He describes that struggle in the introduction to his Electric Waves as holding between four competing pictures of electromagnetic phenomena, ranging from one based on pure action at a distance to a pure field-theoretical approach, in which all action at a distance is replaced by the polarisation of the ether, and in which the bearer or original cause of the actions at a distance (namely the electric fluid) is eliminated completely.9 In this context, the questions he raises in the lectures concerning the status of basic properties of matter, concerning the existence of the ether and the legitimacy of action at a distance are not merely of philosophical interest. They are questions concerning the legitimacy and implications of the basic elements of the competing pictures. Hertz had to ask himself whether it was legitimate to regard electricity as a substance which exerted a force; he had to inquire into those characteristics which could be legitimately ascribed to the ether; indeed, he had to ask himself whether the very notion of an electric force was legitimate, or whether it ought instead be eliminated in favour of ether polarisation. At the same time, these questions were directly connected to the legitimacy of Maxwell’s electromagnetic equations. For although Hertz, like his mentor Helmholtz, believed that Maxwell’s equations were phenomenologically valid, this conviction did not tell him how to apply those equations in all cases. In the absence of a picture giving them a physical meaning, the mathematics could not be unambiguously applied. Hertz described this quandary as follows in the introduction to Electric Waves:
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In my experiments, I could not ... be guided by Maxwell’s book directly. Instead I let myself be guided by the works of Helmholtz, as is clear from the account of the experiments. But in the special limiting case of Helmholtz’s theory which leads to Maxwell’s equations, and to which the experiments lead, the physical meaning of Helmholtz’s theory unfortunately disappears, as it indeed generally disappears, if one wants to disregard action at a distance. I thus tried to construct to myself the indispensable physical representations without contradiction [Ich versuchte deshalb mir die unentbehrlichen physikalischen Vorstellungen widerspruchsfrei selbst zu konstruieren ...] by departing from Maxwell’s equations, but also by simplifying Maxwell’s theory as much as possible by eliminating or simply leaving out all those elements which I didn’t understand and which were dispensable, in that they could have no influence on possible experiences. 10
Hertz’s method was therefore to pare down the concepts he had inherited from Helmholtz and Maxwell by constructing their physical concepts without contradiction. He presents the results of this construction in two papers from 1890, the first on the electrodynamics of stationary bodies, the second on that of moving bodies.11 He describes the necessary “intuitions” of the first paper as consisting in positing a single directed magnitude for each point in space, whose changes depended only on the values of the immediately adjacent magnitudes, thereby excluding all actions at a distance. 12 In the introduction to the second of the papers, he asks whether these intuitions can also be used to model the electrodynamic appearances of moving bodies, and concludes that this question cannot be definitively answered without an understanding of the connections holding between the motions of ponderable matter and the motion of the ether. 13 In short, what he arrived at was a purified form of Maxwell’s theory, in which all one has is a polarised medium. Regarding the ether, he observed that within the intuition he had developed, We regard ... polarisations as the only actual existents; they are both the causes of the movements of ponderable matter and of the remaining appearances, which cause us to regard the latter as being changed. We defer an explanation of the essence of polarisation, its constitution [Zusammenhang] and its effects, or we look for it in mechanical hypotheses.14
5. THE PRINCIPLES
OF
MECHANICS
Thus the gap in Hertz’s picture of electromagnetism was occupied by the ether: How are we to imagine its polarisation? More generally, how are we to conceive of what Hertz had called in The Constitution of Matter the “modification of space” 15 [ Veränderung des Raumes] which produce those appearances we subsume under the concept of distance forces? In those early lectures, Hertz had identified this as one of the tasks of the science of the constitution of matter, arguing that ”if there is a change in a space [Besteht in einem Raume eine Veränderung] , we cannot conceive of this otherwise than by there being something
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which is changed, and which we can call matter.” 16 To fill the gap one would need a picture of these hidden material systems. Hertz’s last book, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form,17 attempted to do just this. The Principles of Mechanics achieves its end by positing a class of unseen systems composed of “hidden masses.” Within a system of masses, the hidden ones are connected to the observable ones in such a way that the total energy of the system remains constant: all physical systems obey a single empirical law, which Hertz termed his “Fundamental Law.” Motions in which the kinetic energy of a system appears to change as a result of the action of forces are accounted for by referring the lost and restored energy to the motions of the hidden masses. In Hertz’s system, all energy is kinetic and all connections between mass-points are rigid, so that no causes are required to explain why a mass-point takes the path it does. Quite aside from the physical picture it presents, the Principles of Mechanics is also structured in a most peculiar fashion. The work is divided into two books, the first of which develops a geometrical account of the motions of systems which is then applied to actual experience in the second book by means of a series of coordinative definitions and the fundamental law. The propositions of the first book, Hertz emphasises repeatedly, are purely a priori, being either definitions or following from the laws of our intuition and thought. These propositions comprise a generalised analytic geometry of n-dimensional space, as well as a peculiar definition of matter, which defines the latter as consisting of massparticles, each of which is “a characteristic [Merkmal] by means of which we unambiguously correlate a definite point of space at a given time to another definite point of space at each different time.” 18 In the second book, the propositions of the first book are given an experiential content by means of coordinative definitions, and the class of what Hertz calls the “thinkable motions” of systems described in the first book is constrained to those of “natural motions,” which are those motions of systems which are consistent with the fundamental law. In other words, the a priori picture of material systems, considered as collections of paths in space-time, which is developed in the first book is filled in to yield an empirical picture in the second book. This picture is a picture of physical experience as we know it so far. So we get the following equations: Generalised geometry (Geometry of systems of points)
+
Definitions of material systems (mass-particle, -point, system of masses)
=
A priori kinematics of systems of masses (Book 1)
Book 1
+
Fundamental law, Coordinative definitions (Book 2)
=
Empirical system of mechanics
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Book 1 is the focus of our interest at present, for it comprises the same basic elements, and fulfils the same function as Kant’s metaphysics of corporeal nature: it contains pure mathematical principles depending on our notions of space and time, and on strict “phoronometric” definitions of matter, i.e. definitions that appeal to nothing beyond our subjective correlation of one point in space with another at different points in time. At the same time, Book 1 of the Principles corresponds well to the philosophical part of Hertz’s science of the constitution of matter. It seeks to give a form to the basic signs of our scientific pictures which makes them suited for “regulating our dealings” with the external world, without, however regarding them in their signifying relation, which is given only in Book 2. Taken together, Book 1 and Book 2 provide the means of picturing any system we might find in nature, so long as we can draw in the necessary details, while distinguishing rigorously between the apodictic and empirical parts of this picture. 6. C O N C L U S I O N
I said by way of introduction that even where Hertz disagreed with Kant, he used Kantian methods to prove his point. We are now in a position to see how this is so. Hertz claimed that his Principles allowed one to reconstruct the full content of mechanics without appealing to the notion of force. In doing so, he aligned himself with physicist-philosophers like Fechner and Kirchhoff in denying the claims of “dynamicists,” among whom one may count the young Helmholtz, who argued with Kant that the concept of force was in some sense essential to our concept of matter. As we saw, Hertz was already leaning strongly in this direction as early as 1884, when he held his lectures on the constitution of matter. To prove that this claim was false, he offered an axiomatic reconstruction of mechanics employing only a kinematic notion of matter as “something movable in space”, along with a priori geometrical propositions. Building on this foundation, Hertz was able to construct a “picture” of mechanics without appealing to the notion of force. From the point of view of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations, Hertz’s Principles uses an exclusively “phoronomic” definition of matter, and Hertz refuted the claim that the concept of force is necessary to empirical science by completing Kant’s constructive project without appealing to this concept – without moving on, one might say, to the construction of either “dynamical” or “mechanical” concepts of matter as Kant himself had done. However, as Simon Saunders has argued, Hertz was deceived in his belief that his picture of mechanics was equivalent to those it was to replaced, because it failed to give criteria for physically isolating inertial frames.19 Hertz overlooked, in other words, Kant’s fundamental ground for claiming that a move from phoronomy to dynamics and mechanics (both in Kant’s sense) was necessary, namely that only in making that move could experience become fully determinate and intersub-
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jective, and in consequence he failed to see that his alternative construction of the concept of matter – his alternative picture of fundamental natural science20 – did not so much refute Kant, as vindicate him.
NOTES
*
This paper develops the philosophical portion of a short piece on Hertz’s Die Constitution der Materie that I wrote together with Heinz Lübbig (David Hyder and Heinz Lübbig, “Questions Suspended in the Ether,” in Nature, Vol. 404, No. 6775, 2000, pp. 223-224). Aside from a great debt to Prof. Lübbig for our discussions while working on that piece, I was given advice on my reading of Kant by Konstantin Pollok. Jesper Lutzen made a number of incisive comments on an earlier version of the present paper, and was so kind as to show me portions of the manuscript of his forthcoming book on Hertz’s Principles, to be appearing under the title Heinrich Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics. Along with his earlier Denouncing Force; Geometrizing Mechanics. Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics. Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet Matematisk Institut 1995, these helped me to achieve a balance between science-historical and philosophical concerns.
1.
Heinrich Hertz, Die Constitution der Materie. Berlin: Springer 1999. With the exception of this new and untranslated text, all citations of Hertz’s works in the following are from the German edition of his collected works. The reader may be helped by the cross-referencing of the various editions, in English and German, of Hertz’s works given in D. Baird, R.I.G. Hughes, and A. Nordmann (Eds.) Heinrich Hertz: Classical Physicist, Modern Philosopher. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 198. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998. p. 307. Ibid, pp. 117-118. This and all subsequent translations from German texts are mine. Immanuel Kant. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. Akademie edition IV.472, lines 1-12. Emphasis in the original. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B179-180. Hertz, Die Constitution der Materie, loc. cit., pp. 34-35. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Ibid., p. 116. Heinrich Hertz. Untersuchungen über die Ausbreitung der elektrischen Kraft. Gesammelte Werke von Heinrich Hertz. Vol. 2. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth 1894, p. 21ff. Ibid., p. 22. Heinrich Hertz, “Über die Grundgleichungen der Elektrodynamik für ruhende Körper” and “Über die Grundgleichungen der Elektrodynamik für bewegte Körper” both in Hertz, Untersuchungen über die Ausbreitung der elektrischen Kraft, loc. cit. pp. 208-255, 256-285. Hertz, “Über die Grundgleichungen der Elektrodynamik für ruhende Körper”, loc. cit. p. 209. Hertz, “Über die Grundgleichungen der Elektrodynamik für bewegte Körper”, loc. cit. p. 257. Hertz, Untersuchungen über die Ausbreitung der elektrischen Kraft, loc. cit., p. 27. Hertz, Die Constitution der Materie, loc. cit., p. 62. Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Heinrich Hertz. Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt. Gesammelte Werke von Heinrich Hertz. Vol. 3. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth 1910. Heinrich Hertz. Die Prinzipien der Mechanik, loc. cit., p. 54. See Jesper Lutzen, “A Matter of Matter or a Matter of Space?” in Archives Internationales d’Hisloire des Sciences, Vol. 49 No. 143, pp. 103-121, for a detailed discussion of Hertz’s concept of a mass-particle. Simon Saunders, “Hertz’s Principles”, in D. Baird et al. (Eds.) Heinrich Hertz, loc. cit., pp. 123154. See above all the discussion of Kant, p. 146.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19.
46
20.
DAVID JALAL HYDER
Cf. Hertz, Die Prinzipien der Mechanik, loc. cit., p. xxix, “All physicists are unanimous that it is the task of physics to reduce all appearances of nature to the simple laws of mechanics.”
Fachbereich Philosophie Universität Konstanz D-78457 Konstanz Germany
[email protected]
II.
MORITZ SCHLICK
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HUBERT SCHLEICHERT
MORITZ SCHLICK’S IDEA OF NON-TERRITORIAL STATES
1. THE DOCUMENT
In 1952, a small booklet by Moritz Schlick appeared. It was entitled “Natur und Kultur”, and was edited by Josef Rauscher, a former student of Schlick. Its preface identifies it as an unfinished manuscript of what Schlick had intended to become his main work. It may have been written around 1935. Schlick died in 1936. As far as I know, the booklet has not been translated into any other language. I am not sure as to how much Rauscher manipulated the text, but I think that it can basically be regarded without suspicion. The booklet features Schlick’s thoughts on topics like culture and morality, the concept of fate in history, war and military service and other political problems. Although it is only a draft, and thus not ready for publishing, it shows a rather unknown side of Schlick. This side, one would be forced to say, does not really fit with the usual description of Logical Positivism. None of the key terms of Logical Positivism like meaning, verification, falsification, basic sentence, proposition, the possibility of feeling other persons pain, etc., appear in the booklet. Here we have, as it were, a Wittgenstein-free Schlick. Of course, Schlick was not schizophrenic; he simply was more of a philosopher than the standard historiography of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism seem to claim. 2. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STATE
In the following I will only focus on a few remarks made by Schlick on the state. The term “remarks” must be stressed, because the whole issue was never really elaborated upon by Schlick. Schlick does not use the term “social contract”, but this concept obviously forms the backdrop for what he is saying. As is well known, this term is used to theoretically reconstruct what rational people could or would do in order to overcome a completely anarchic situation, a situation which usually is described as unsafe, poor, and miserable. According to this theory, rational people would agree to establish some kind of rulership or sovereignty by signing a “social contract”. Thus a state is created in order to guarantee peace and security. However, as Schlick writes, 49 F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 49–61. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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(1) There is nothing in our European civilization that causes more grief than the state. Under it we suffer most. Since there is nothing wrong with the original idea of the state, i.e. an association for help and protection through reasonable institutions, the mistake must lie in its execution … The first question would be: Who participates in the unification? According to which principle shall the selection be made? (p. 67)
This is an unusual and surprising question. According to the standard version of the social contract, such a question does not arise at all. There is no selection to be made – the whole population, all the people together, agree to instate a certain government. Should somebody disagree, then – at least in some constructions – he would be forced to give his consent, or else he would be considered to be an enemy of the state. The state rules over a certain territory; everything and every person within it, even unborn children and babies come under the state’s control. On the other side of the border, there are other states, which means potential enemies. From the very beginning, the state plays a double role. It guarantees peace within its territory and prevents civil war, while at the same time preparing for war outside its precincts, against other states. But this latter feature of every state is not discussed in the theories of social contract. Schlick makes a bitter remark about civil wars, which to Hobbes, for example, were the most terrible of all political situations: (2) Terrible as they are, one has to acknowledge the fact that civil wars usually do not claim as many victims as wars between states with separate territories have, i.e. between hostile countries. This is an argument to not separate contradictory tendencies … by space, but to mix the enemies. Then the unavoidable balance will lead to only minor catastrophes, (p. 101)
I will let the last sentence stand for a moment without commenting on it. However, it is probably true, as a “body-count” would reveal, that the number of people killed during “official”, “regular” wars conducted by states is much higher than those killed during civil wars. From this point of view, the whole ideology of a social contract is highly problematic. But let me come back to the last sentence of Schlick and his idea of separating hostile groups in space.
3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND TERRITORIAL STATES For historical reasons, it is obvious that states are defined by a territory. But is this the only possibility? As Schlick says, states are constructions that are made by us and can be changed by us, and we should make these constructions as safe and rational as we can. That states start wars against others, is not contained in the idea of a social contract. It is rather a degeneration of that idea. Unfortunately, this degeneration is the most common and – so to speak – normal thing in history. As we shall see in a moment, Schlick looked for an alternative conception of the state in order to prevent such degeneration.
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There are still other difficulties in the usual theory; but in one respect the standard theory of a social contract comes quite close to political reality. In order to give the state a moral justification, free persons must consent to it. Yet even within contractarian theories, there is not much room for freedom of decision. There is only one state that can be established, and people can only say yes to it. Those who say no become outcasts. Once this is done, it is very difficult to revise this decision; the only way to do it would be by emigration. Practically speaking, the vast majority of all people on this earth become citizen or subjects of their state by birth and must remain in the state where they have been born. 4. AN ALTERNATIVE: SCHLICK-STATES
At this point, Schlick introduces an alternative kind of social contract, which allows people to make a real choice between several possibilities, a choice that later also can be revised without great problems. He argues: (3) According to our notion of the state, it is an association with the purpose of protecting all vital necessities. This conception leaves it completely open whether the boundaries of the state – i.e. the group of citizens of the state – are determined by living together on the same territory, or by some other principle. (p. 101)
It is not a priori necessary to define a state as sovereign over a certain territory. A state could also be defined as a sovereign over a certain group of human beings. In this case, several “states” could coexist within the same territory. Schlick tries to describe such a situation as follows: (4) Suppose that the separation according to political convictions replaces the separation by geographical states. In such a case there would be no countries in the usual sense, but political organisations, the members of which would live scattered over all continents. Each of these invisible communities could have its own laws and costumes, its courts, police, and state form. There could be invisible republics and monarchies, but the presidents and kings would not rule over territories, but only over such people as voluntarily belong to their state. Since human convictions can change, it follows from the very principle that one can at any given time move from one organization to another. (p. 102/3)
Let us refer to this as “Schlick’s Principle” and “Schlick states”. Clearly, all this is utopian thinking. The question is, is it an interesting utopia? Is it worth consideration? It is a theoretical reflexion about how modern, rational people, after having been through all the negative experiences mankind has had with territorial states, would or should construct their state – or rather, their commonwealth of states. Unfortunately, Schlick does not provide any examples from history. Perhaps he thought that his ideas were too far removed from reality. Therefore, we have to look for examples ourselves.
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One example that comes close to Schlick’s ideas is that of the Roman Catholics. It is a large transnational, transterritorial group and everybody is invited to join the group. Theoretically, everybody belongs to this group only by his free decision, not simply by birth, and everybody is free to leave the group at any time. Theoretically, this group has its own civil law, especially for marriage and divorce, rules stating what forms of sexuality, birth control or genetic engineering are allowed or forbidden, what books are recommended and those that have to be burned, what days allowed for work, certain meat-eating days with fish as a substitute on other days, etc. Those who belong to this community are prepared to obey the whole set of these prescriptions wherever they live. This is done, more or less, without the help of the police. Even penalties are paid without control. One need only think of the exercises a believer has to do as a compensation for his sins after confession. Catholicism has a well-known transnational organization, including an absolute sovereign, and it has millions of followers all over the globe. It does not, however, claim a territory of its own, except for a very small piece of land called the Vatican state. For many reasons, of course, this is not a perfect illustration of Schlick’s ideas. It is enough to mention the notorious intolerance of the Roman church. During its heyday, it never tolerated other religions on the same territory and persecuted those who wanted to secede from the one and only true church. This attitude openly contradicts Schlick’s ideas. A better example for Schlick’s ideas is the phenomenon called “Diaspora”, especially as it has been interpreted by the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (see Toynbee 1966). The Greek term “Diaspora” means dispersed, scattered. It refers to communities scattered over a large area, even over the whole globe. A typical example are the Jews, yet there are many other groups, like the Armenians, or perhaps the Bahai. “A diaspora is in a minority locally, wherever it may be. At the same time, a diaspora, unlike a local community, is ubiquitous” (cf.p.81). Toynbee called the former Ottoman empire an association of diasporas, each of which was distributed over the whole empire and none being in exclusive possession of a local province (Toynbee 1966, p. 84). I have no idea as to whether Toynbee’s interpretation is plausible. It does, however, point to an interesting possibility. The Ottoman empire, he says, was like a shot-silk robe. Due to later nationalistic ideologies, it was cut into more or less monochrome small pieces, which have been rewoven together into a coarse patchwork. If somebody wishes a more recent illustration, he need only compare a map of the Balkans from 1950 to a present-day one. The phenomenon of diaspora played an important role even in ancient times. Toynbee even writes that diasporas are coeval with the Sumerian city-states. However, as Toynbee believes, that role could become much more prominent in modern times, as geographical distances cease to be important due to modern communication technologies.
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Schlick does not want his groups or states to be defined by inborn and timeless properties like race or language, or by an intolerant religion that claims to be the only possessor of truth and salvation, but only by rational decisions of adult people. In Schlick’s model, one subscribes to a state as one would to a healthinsurance company. If it does not fulfil one’s expectations, one can change to another one. It might be costly, it might entail practical problems or inconveniences, but in principle it is always possible. Toynbee and Schlick shared the same basic interest in ensuring world peace. Both considered the existence of traditional local states to be something antiquated and dangerous. 5. THE MINIMAL WORLD STATE
Schlick’s plurality of states on the same territory, even if we remain on an utopian level, is riddled with numerous practical problems. He nevertheless thinks that they can be solved: (5) However, such a situation would only be stable, if there were specific rules determining the mutual relations between the members of the different organizations. (I purposely do not say: between the organizations themselves.) One should have agreed upon a minimum of supranational or international law. If you like, one could say that this amounts to establishing a world state … This “world state”, however, would be very “diluted”; it would be constituted by very simple rules … It would by no means be difficult to establish such global rules. (p. 103)
I think it would by no means be easy, but it would be possible. Such a “world state” could not, for example, be dominated by one group or group-state, as was the case with all former multiethnic empires like the Ottoman or the Habsburg empire. In fact, in every federal system the organization of the central power and its relation to the single states is of the utmost importance. But let us leave this aside. What Schlick envisages is a kind of United States of the World, a federal system of government. Only the single states are not to be defined by geographical borders, but by people who by their free decision (and not just by birth) become citizens of their respective states. These people can live close to each other in a given space, or may be scattered over a vast area, like the Jews in a diaspora. Actually, Schlick prefers this case to the concentration of a group in one country or region. If a group were not concentrated in one territory like traditional nations, it would reduce the possibility of aggression towards other groups. Citizens of a Schlick state would share a certain common feeling and have a kind of basic sympathy towards each other, because they would all share the same basic political and moral ideals. Therefore it is a rationally justified sympathy, whereas traditional patriotism, i.e. sympathy for other people only
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because they happen to be of the same nationality, is not very rational. In our real world, the difference or discrepancy between nationalistic, territorial loyalty and the loyalty of diaspora-people toward their respective “diasporas” has often been noticed. It was, incidentally, one of the standard arguments for anti-Semitism, especially during wars. What is true is that for an aggressive state, a narrowminded local patriotism is much more useful than loyality towards an international community living in diaspora. Schlick speaks about a world state. This would be the simplest solution. In Schlick’s states without territory, no territorial conflict could ever arise. Even on a less utopian scale, Schlick’s idea makes sense. We may think of former Yugoslavia, which had clear borders and no territorial conflicts with its neighbours. According to Schlick’s principle, it was a mistake to break up this territory and hand it over to every nationality in a certain geographical area. Those who think that their nationality is the most important thing may form a state, but not a territorial one, and elect their own rulers and judges and educational system, etc. If they like, they can completely ignore other groups. But others, who have different political ideas, may form other political groups or states and live on the same territory as well. No group should be allowed to dominate another. No group has a right to any special aid or support from the common minimal state, with the exception that the safety of each group is guaranteed.
6. DESCRIBING SCHLICK-STATES IN DETAIL Schlick states should be made up of humans having the same political ideals, regardless of their language, colour or place of birth. Let us try to be more detailed. There could be a very socialist state and an extremely capitalistic one neighbouring each other. It is easy to imagine different groups sharing the same territory, and yet having quite different civil laws. There could be a state where divorce, birth control, abortion, human cloning, and euthanasia are allowed. This state could share its territory with a state that obeys the Pope. There could be a state where polygamy is the standard of family life, and even a Platonic state – I mean a state of homosexuals. There might be quite different practices for healthinsurance and pensions, for education and culture. Different economic systems for different people, even different monetary systems within the same territory or across the whole globe are not impossible, somewhat like different telephonecompanies. Everybody could choose the state in which he wanted to live. Those who like it, might be governed by a fascist state, or live under a religious dictatorship, while others would prefer a system of direct (i.e. non-representative) democracy. There could be multiethnic states and those with only a single ethnic group, all on the same territory. The main condition would be non-interference and free movement between the states at any given time. There could and should be peaceful competition between states in order to win more citizens, like a competition to win customers in a free market.
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I must admit that there is a certain element of anarchism in Schlick’s conception. But this serves to reduce the danger that goes with all traditional territorial states. It could also be an antidote to unlimited globalization. Schlick states are clearly related to political parties in democracies. One feels some sympathy for a certain party, but one can at any time switch to another party or even try to found a new one. The main difference is, if a party is in the opposition, its followers have to obey the law made by the ruling party. They have no chance of living as they see fit. It is quite possible for 49% of the population in a democracy to have to live according to the idea of a good life as is determined by the remaining 51 %. 7. A WAY TO PEACE. NATIONALISM
The starting point of Schlick’s utopian construction was the question of how to reduce the probability of wars between states. One of the main causes for conflicts and wars are quarrels and fights over territorial claims. If a state is not defined by a territory, territorial questions disappear. It is worth considering an application of Schlick’s principle to calming or solving conflicts that take place between more or less hostile groups within a state. According to Schlick, such problems should not be treated by separating groups, with each group in its own closed territory. Rather, one should mix them. Here he offers a combination of practical and moral arguments: (6) Again, the essential presupposition is that the members of the groups live intermingled, for as soon as there is a territorial separation, new interests and complications arise. (p. 103) Attempts at secession and isolation prevent peace and the development of an international morality. Morality is always a product of living together. (p. 107)
It is interesting to note that already Voltaire, the great philosopher of Enlightenment, proposed while writing on religious tolerance, a multiplication of the number of groups, in order to eliminate or, at least, reduce aggression and intolerance between hostile groups. In his famous “Philosophical Dictionary”, in the article on tolerance (in part I), he wrote: If you have two religions in your midst, they will cut each other’s throat; if you have thirty, they will live in peace (Voltaire 1972, p. 390). Voltaire’s favorite example was the peaceful development of Amsterdam, a city in which many different religions coexisted. Schlick did not speak about nationalism. But one can ask if the same methods could be used to reduce hatred, aggression and nationalistic hysteria. It is really tempting to interpret Schlick’s ideas in this way, i.e. to take them as a suggestion for solving problems of nationalism. It is obvious that he would have rejected any kind of “ethnic cleansing”; I think he also must have been against what was going on after the First World War, namely the establishment of all the national states in Eastern Europe. Schlick saw the problems clearly:
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(7) Living together on the same territory, taken to be the principle of belonging together, gives rise to all such evils which dog our divided world the most. (p. 97)
Today, the most realistic examples of several groups living together on the same territory are those of areas with ethnically mixed populations. The world is full of such places. Unfortunately, most of these examples do not serve to further Schlick’s ideals. If we look at former Yugoslavia, we are presented with a shocking counterexample, which makes Schlick appear extremely naive. As he lived in Vienna, the former capital of the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire, Schlick must have known of enough discouraging examples of several nationalities living together within the same territory. In fact, this empire broke into pieces because of nationalistic problems. Schlick cannot have been so blind. The only way to peace seems to be a complete separation of nationalities, a division of the countries into several ghettos, each surrounded by very high fences, like wild animals in a zoo. In the Middle East one can often hear the slogan “high fences make good neighbours”, but what is true is that they do not make neighbours at all. Schlick had quite a different view of politics. (8) What is so unnatural about our states are their boundaries. Every borderline in space is unnatural, because there is never any plausible reason for calling something good which the other side calls bad. (p. 104)
And Schlick repeats that separation, secession, isolation make it impossible for any kind of international morality to materialize. Morality grows out of living together. The more removed you are from others, the higher the fences are, and the less you learn to think about the others’ feelings and problems and to show consideration for them. There are a few examples more convincing than that of the Balkans. One could mention the island and state of Mauritius. As an island, it has no territorial problems with other states. And it is inhabited by a lot of different nationalities: Hindu, Tamil, Creole, Black, Indian Muslim, Chinese. At least till now, it has been a peaceful state. Another example, on a larger scale, can be taken from India. Here there are different religious groups living more or less within the same territory. But each group lives under its own specific laws, especially a personal law. Theoretically, people can also change their religion and move from one group to another. There is, of course, the federal state of India, regulating conflicts between the groups, which is a difficult and complicated task. And it is not clear how stable or unstable the whole construction is. Over the last few years it has often been said that there will never be peace as long as each nationality claims its own territorial state. How many territorial states must be established until there is finally peace in the Balkans? It is well known that most governments are against secessionist movements. When this question arises, the international community of states shares the attitude of the
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Roman church towards divorce: it is of no importance whether partners love or hate each other; the only separation that is allowed is by death. Allen Buchanan, one of the prominent authors on secession, is not quite as rigorous, but he also insists that nations should have a right to self-determination only under very restricted conditions – e.g., if otherwise they really are in danger of being exterminated. But “as such”, i.e. just because it is a nation, no nation should have the right to self-determination. (Buchanan 1996 p. 298) 8. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Can we put aside the right of national self-determination, including the right to secession, so easily? Is it not a fundamental human right? Does it not follow from the basic ideas of democracy? Who is entitled to tell nations what they have to do, and what they must not do? Who could call himself a good democrat, and yet object if the majority of a population in a plebiscite decides to secede from their present state and establish a new one, usually a smaller one? Yet the right to self-determination does not have a very good reputation. Even philosophers prefer to look at states as if states, once established, are eternally fixed. But this contradicts the most basic principles of liberalism. It follows from these very principles that any group should be given the right to secede from a state if this group does not want to live in it any longer, and if it wants to establish a new state. But even the most liberal writer (Beran, 1984) found it necessary to make some restrictions, saying that a group must be territorially concentrated if it is to be given the right to self-determination. Why? Because every secession causes territorial problems. Think, for example, of the USA: they could not easily be divided into a white state and a coloured state, because both groups would have to claim the whole territory and, as this author writes (Beran 1984, p. 24) “it is not practicable at present for two states to share legal sovereignty over the whole territory”. Nearly all arguments against a liberal interpretation of self-determination refer to territorial questions. Schlick wanted to introduce his own ideas at exactly this point. I think that Schlick would have agreed with all modern critics of an unrestricted, unlimited, universal right to self-determination, as long as this right means what it usually means – namely, territorial secession, new borders etc. If two nationalities want to exterminate each other, and each wants to occupy the whole territory alone, then – according to Schlick – one should not separate them. Territorial separation is the favoured method of every nationalism, but if all possible conflicts were to be solved simply by separating the hostile parties, our globe would soon be too small. Besides, it would create endless territorial claims and wars. It is because of these bitter, practical experiences that today many political philosophers deny the right to separation and secession. (See e.g. Moore, 1998). The biblical procedure “if you go right, I shall go left, if you go
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left, I shall go right” is a negation of morality; but what is worse, it will not lead to peace, because to the left and to the right are already other people. Moritz Schlick’s model offers quite a different solution. First, from a moral point of view the right to political self-determination should be granted to any nation. But Schlick’s perspective is much wider than that. To him, the right to self-determination should be acknowledged to any group, not only to those that define themselves as a nation. “What’s so special about nations?” , that they can ask for self-determination, asked Allen Buchanan (Buchanan, 1996) in a polemic argument. Schlick would agree, but draw a different conclusion. Schlick’s conclusion would be that not only nations, but any group of adult human beings must be given the right to self-determination, including the right to secede from an existing state and try to create a new state. Actually, history knows only few secessionist movements which were not nationalistic. But the first movement to have been called a “secession” was a social, not a national movement. Thrice (494, 449, 287 BC), so the story goes, did the Roman plebeians withdraw themselves from the city-state of Rome in protest against the behaviour of the upper classes. This behavior received the Latin name of “secessio”. During the first secession, in 494 BC, the plebeians literally left the city and went to a hill called mons sacrum outside the urban territory. In Schlick’s model, self-determination does not lead to chaos or war, because self-determination does not include an exclusive right over a certain territory. In contrast to territorial states, Schlick-states can be founded, changed or abolished without disturbing peace and justice. All groups or Schlick-states must live on the same territory, and no Schlick-state is allowed to dominate another. Each group gets its own government, but no group has a territory of its own. Only individuals, if anyone at all, are landowners. As no political group, no Schlickstate, governs a territory – they are all forced to live together on the same globe, or island, or continent. So they must find some sort of a modus vivendi.
9. CONCLUSION We should not forget that Schlick’s ideal states are not defined as nations or nationalistic groups, but by groups that share some more abstract, political or moral principles. He writes: (9) Will I not prefer a thousand times more to cooperate with a reliable Chinese of good character than with an egotistic, insincere European? (p. 99/100)
And by “cooperation”, Schlick means political cooperation. Let me summarize. Schlick anticipated, perhaps not fully consciously, an alternative solution to one of the most urgent problems of political philosophy of our own time. His
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proposals are even more progressive than most philosophers are today. He developed a model for practically unlimited self-determination which does not lead to all the problems associated with nationalistic territorial self-determination. In a nutshell, it also points to a reconciliation between globalization and individual political freedom. It might be surprising to find such utopian thoughts coming from the central personality of Logical Positivism. But if so, it means only that the usual, by now “canonical” historiography of the Vienna Circle is too one-sided. It could even mean that Schlick’s own interpretation of philosophy, as given in the first article of the journal “Erkenntnis” (Schlick 1930), was not a complete description of what he himself did. But all this does not present any great difficulty. There are, however, a few words in Schlick’s booklet which really are confusing within the framework of political philosophy. The text, in two different places (pp. 99-100 and 107), makes use of the religious term “civitas dei”, taken from St. Augustine. There Schlick states that race, religion, political conviction or profession are all not so important as a basis of a natural state, whereas (10) the only reliable basis is the character of humans, their moral qualities (not their “convictions”). People of good character, the kind and peaceful, belong together “by nature”; they form the invisible state of god, civitas dei. (p. 99/100)
“Belonging together” in this context can only mean: they should establish a state for themselves. And once more we read: (11) Only good will can be the ultimate principle of unification; the state that is established in this way is the true state of god, civitas dei … (p. 107)
Schlick here leaves it open what shall happen with the rest of mankind, with the vast majority of people, those who are of only average or less than average moral quality. I have no idea how to integrate such pseudo-religious, unpolitical remarks into Schlick’s political ideas. Maybe something went wrong during the editing, maybe Schlick wanted to make a stand against Kant’s statement that even a population of devils would be able to have a state, maybe it is only a shorthand for something more complex, or maybe Schlick was too much under the influence of Wittgenstein. I am unable to solve this riddle. So I shall leave it, together with my best wishes for the next ten years, to the Institut Wiener Kreis.
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REFERENCES Beran, H. (1984): A Liberal Theory of Secession, Political Studies 32, p.21-31. Buchanan, Allen E. (1991): Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder, Color., Westview Pr. Buchanan, Allen E. (1996): What’s So Special About Nations? in Couture, Nielsen, and Seymour (eds.): Rethinking Nationalism, Univ. of Calgary Pr., p.283-310. Moore, Margaret (edit.) (1998) National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford UPr. Schlick, Moritz (1930): Die Wende der Philosophie,“ Erkenntnis” Bd. 1, p. 4-11. Schlick, Moritz (1952): Natur und Kultur. Aus den Nachlaß des Autors herausgegeben von Josef Rauscher. Humboldt-Verlag Wien-Stuttgart 1952. 125 pg. (Sammlung die Universität, Bd. 30). All quotations are translated from this edition; page numbers refer to this edition. Toynbee, A.C. (1966) : Change and Habit. The Challenge of Our Time. Oxford UPr. (German translation: Menschheit – woher und wohin? Plädoyer für den Weltstaat. Stuttg. 1969.) Voltaire (1972): Philosophical Dictionary, transl. Th. Besterman, Penguin Classics.
SCHLICK-ZITATE (1) In unserer ganzen europäischen Kultur … ist nichts, was dem Menschen größere Daseinsnot bereitet, als der Staat. An ihm leiden wir am meisten. Da nun an der ursprünglichen Idee des Staates – Zusammenschluß zu Schutz und Hilfe durch vernunftgeschaffene Institutionen – nichts auszusetzen ist, so muß der Fehler in der Durchführung der Idee liegen … Die erste Frage wäre: Wer nimmt denn an der Vereinigung teil? Nach welchem Prinzip findet die Auswahl statt? (S. 67) (2) … Bürgerkrieg … So schrecklich solche Ereignisse auch sind, so ist doch zu bemerken, daß sie ungleich weniger verlustreiche und blutig zu verlaufen pflegen, als Kriege zwischen räumlich getrennten Staaten, also zwischen feindlichen Ländern. Dies spricht wiederum dafür, daß man entgegengesetzte Tendenzen, … nicht auch räumlich voneinander trennen soll, sondern die Gegner untereinander mischen. Dann erfolgt der unvermeidliche Ausgleich in geringeren Katastrophen. (S. 101) (3) Unser Begriff vom Staate ist: Zusammenschluß zum Schutz aller gemeinsamen Lebensnotwendigkeiten. Bei dieser Definition bleibt es gänzlich offen, ob die Grenzen des Staates – das heißt: der Umkreis der Bürger, die zu ihm gehören – durch örtliches Zusammenwohnen bestimmt werden, … , oder ob die Trennung durch ein anderes Prinzip erfolgt. (S.101) (4) Stellen wir uns einmal vor, daß die Trennung nach politischen Überzeugungen an die Stelle der Einteilung in geographische Staaten träte. Dann gäbe es keine Länder im üblichen Sinn, wohl aber politische Organisationen, deren Mitglieder durch alle Erdteile und Gegenden zerstreut ihre Wohnsitze hätten. Jede dieser unsichtbaren Gemeinschaften könnte ihre eigenen Gesetze, ihre eigenen Sitten, ihre eigene Rechtspflege und Exekutive und auch ihre eigene Staatsform haben. Es könnte unsichtbare Republiken und Monarchien geben, aber die Präsidenten und Fürsten würden nicht über Territorien herrschen, sondern nur über Menschen, die ihrem Staat freiwillig angehören. Denn da die Über-
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zeugungen des einzelnen sich ändern können, so liegt es im Prinzip der Sache, daß der Übertritt von einer Organisation zur anderen jederzeit stattfinden kann. (S. 102/3) (5) Allerdings wäre eine solcher Zustand nur dann von innerer Festigkeit, wenn es auch besondere Regeln für das gegenseitige Verhältnis zwischen den Mitgliedern verschiedener Organisationen (ich sage absichtlich nicht: zwischen den Organisationen selbst) gäbe; man müßte sich also auf ein gewisses Minimum von überstaatlichem oder interstaatlichem Recht geeinigt haben und, wenn man will, kann man sagen, daß dies eben auf die Konstitution eines einzigen Weltstaates hinausliefe … Der ,,Weltstaat“ wäre unter den gedachten Umständen sehr verdünnt, er wäre durch relativ sehr einfache Regeln konstituiert, … Es wäre durchaus nicht schwer, derartige Weltstatuten aufzustellen. (S. 103) (6) Die wesentliche Voraussetzung ist allerdings wieder, daß die Mitglieder der Gruppen miteinander vermischt leben, denn sowie eine räumliche Trennung eintritt, entstehen neue Interessen und Komplikationen. (S.103). Streben nach Abtrennung, Isolierung verhindert die Entwicklung eines Zustandes friedlichen Zusammenlebens, es verhindert die Entstehung einer Völkermoral. Sittlichkeit ist immer das Produkt des Zusammenlebens. (S. 107) (7) Wenn das räumliche Beisammenwohnen zum Prinzip der Zusammengehörigkeit gemacht wird, so entstehen alle jene Übel des Gegeneinander, unter denen die in Staaten zerstückelte Welt am meisten leidet. (S. 97) (8) Das Unnatürliche an unseren Staaten sind ihre Grenzen. Jede räumliche Grenze ist unnatürlich, weil es nie einen vernünftigen Grund gibt, daß auf der einen Seite gut heißen sollte, was auf der andern schlecht heißt. (S. 104) (9) Werde ich nicht tausendmal lieber mit einem Chinesen gemeinsame Sache machen, den ich als zuverlässig und von gütiger Gesinnung erkannt habe, als mit einem Europäer, der unaufrichtig und selbstsüchtig ist? (S. 99/100) (10) die einzig zuverlässige Grundlage ist der Charakter der Menschen, ihre ethischen Eigenschaften (nicht ,,Überzeugungen“). Die Menschen von Charakter, die Gütigen und Friedfertigen, gehören ,,von Natur“ zusammen, sie bilden die unsichtbare Civitas dei … (S. 99/100) (11) Der gute Wille allein kann letztes Prinzip des Zusammenschlusses sein; der so gebildete Staat ist die wahre Civitas dei … (S. 107)
FB Philosophie Universität Konstanz, Fach D17 D 78457 Konstanz Germany
[email protected]
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MASSIMO FERRARI
AN UNKNOWN SIDE OF MORITZ SCHLICK’S INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY: THE REVIEWS FOR THE “VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE” (1911-1916)
Moritz Schlick’s intellectual biography constitutes a very interesting or – more precisely – unavoidable issue for the scholarship of the history of logical empiricism. Nevertheless, it still lacks extensive inquiry and has seldom been studied1, whereas in the last years some research on the leading figures of the movement such as Neurath, Carnap and Reichenbach has begun. At least count, there is a lot of material which will enable us in the near future to satisfy the desideratum of biographical reconstruction2. And yet this exciting argument by no means signifies simply archeological research. On the contrary, Schlick’s scientific and philosophical development represents a paradigmatic aspect of the Vienna Circle: it exemplifies in the best way both the intricate roots of the “scientific worldview” and the relationship between continuity and discontinuity within the history of logical empiricism. Similar research is particularly illuminating when we consider Schlick’s intellectual adventure “before Vienna”3, namely the long period ending with the publication of the first edition (1918) of the General Theory of Knowledge 4. The terminus a quo of Schlick’s early theoretical philosophy may be considered his Habilitationschrift of 1910, which concluded his development of thought from the apprenticeship as a physicist at the school of Max Planck until he began to devote himself to philosophy, in particular to ethical problems5. Now, it is especially our knowledge of Schlick’s philosophical biography in the years from his call to the University of Rostock (1911) to the conclusion of his opus magnum that still seems to lack many details, also as a result of the fact that Schlick published few contributions in this period. Schlick’s philosophical work after the publication both of the Habiltationschrift devoted to The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic and of the nearly contemporaneous study on The Boundaries of Scientific and Philosophical Concept-formation 6 is above all documented in four essays – apart from the unpublished lectures he gave in Rostock, only partially available in English translation7 –, namely the papers on intuitive knowledge, on the philosophical significance of the principle of relativity, on the ideality of space and, finally, on the epistemological consequences of the general theory of relativity for the concepts of space and time8. To be sure, these studies are of 63 F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives, 63–77. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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greatest importance for an understanding of Schlick’s early epistemology as well as of the background of the General Theory of Knowledge. Nevertheless, they are not the only available ones giving an account of Schlick’s philosophical framework during these years. From 1911 to 1916 Schlick wrote a number of critical reviews which appeared in the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie”: more precisely, some 30 reviews, which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been cited in any bibliography of Schlick, although they deserve careful analysis. Indeed, Schlick’s activity as contributor to an influential German philosophical journal offers not only an exhaustive survey of his philosophical and scientific opinions, but also the opportunity to trace Schlick’s intellectual development within both the historical context and the philosophical debates of his time. Schlick had a good relationship with the review founded in 1877 by Richard Avenarius and later edited by Paul Barth with the collaboration of the neoKantian Alois Riehl. Schlick’s papers of 1910 as well as the essays of 1913 and 1916 quoted above appeared in this tribune of “scientific philosophy”, which sought at a kind of harmonization of positivism and neo-Kantianism.9 Moreover, as we can see from some of the letters Riehl addressed to Schlick, Schlick had been well acquainted with Riehl since 1910 and had an opportunity to visit him in Berlin before he moved to Rostock10. Riehl was, on the other hand, one of the thinkers Schlick had studied more intensely in the years of his training, especially as regards Riehl’s fundamental work Der philosophische Kritizismus, the main outcome of which was a realistic interpretation of the Kantian theory of knowledge which certainly influenced Schlick’s conception of critical philosophy11. No wonder, then, that at the very beginnig of his academic career Schlick contributed to the philosophical journal edited by Riehl and published a series of reviews in the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie”. Schlick’s attitude as reviewer is based on the conviction that the most important aspect is “to reach an understanding about matters of principle despite all the different points of view”.12 However, this doesn’t imply that Schlick’s reviews lose their strength or do not take a critical position. The examination of authors such as Natorp, Enriques, James, Frischeisen-Köhler, Dingler, Driesch or Cornelius, in particular, makes it clear that Schlick grounded his examination of the main issues of epistemology in his own philosophical achievements and, to some extent, on the point of view he later endorsed in the General Theory of Knowledge. Apart from some reviews which today have only bibliographical significance13, documenting, for example, Schlick’s interest in the history of ancient philosophy14, it seems useful to divide this unknown aspect of his philosophical activity into thematic areas. Schlick reviews a number of books and contributions dealing for the most part with problems of psychology, logic, epistemology and philosophy of science; but from the philosophical point of view he pays special attention, on the one hand, to both the problem of realism and the critique of the so-called empirio-criticism15, and, on the other, to the
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critical interpretation of Kant’s philosophy within the more general framework of an enduring discussion of Neokantianism. From these quite different reviews Schlick emerges as a typical supporter of the “scientific philosophy” in the German culture at the beginning of the century; and so it is very well understandable why Schlick became a regular contributor of the philosophical journal founded by Avenarius, playing a role of some importance in the contemporary debates about both epistemological questions and puzzles posed by the developments of science to the scientific worldview.16 But it is also worth noting that Schlick discussed authors and epistemologic-philosophical problems which are at the core, in the period from 1907 to 1917, of the activity of the so-called “first Vienna Circle”, as is easy to see from the many reviews of Mach, Dingier, Duhem, Enriques, Zilsel, Rey, Planck, Stallo and Poincaré written by Philipp Frank and Hans Hahn17. Schlick, for example, introduced the readers of the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie” to the work of Paul Volkman (Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften) and, later, to Hugo Dingler’s Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie, although he criticized both the inadequacy of the way Volkman dealt with physical problems and Dingler’s unrigorous argumentation18. Even more important, though, is Schlick’s review of Federigo Enriques’ main work, which was published in German in 1910 as Problems der Wissenschaft. To be sure, Schlick admired the encyclopedic outlook of contemporary sciences offered by Enriques in his valuable book; nevertheless, he raised a fundamental objection to the relativism endorsed by Enriques on the basis of his positivistic point of view, namely against the idea according to which nothing absolute exists, it being impossible to put an end to any infinite series of relative elements or degrees. But Schlick argued that this argument has no validity, for the good reason that it contradicts the “spirit of critical philosophy” by concluding from the failure of a definition the “nonexistence of the object to define”19. Schlick thus rejected the “fundamental point” of Enriques’ theory of knowledge and he praised, on the contrary, the other parts of his work (for today’s reader, indeed, the most questionable), which offer a survey of logic, methodology and scientific development up to the present20. Let us now turn our attention, first of all, to Schlick’s discussions of psychological books. It should be noted here that Schlick seemed interested in the classical topics of contemporary psychology, for example in the theory of feelings and reflexes21; but he was altogether attracted by the recent results of Gestaltpsychologie, and in his opinion the concepts of quality and form allow “a broader potential for application than is usually assumed”22. On the other hand, Schlick engaged himself in the defence of the scientific character of psychology against the unjustified demands of traditional philosophy23. This tension between philosophy and psychology is the main topic dealt with in the review of William James’s Psychologie, that is of the German, abridged edition of his main work. Schlick considers it an excellent “handbook”, having great merits particularly in its argument on the basis of real experience in everyday life, although this by no
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means is intended “to damage the scientific nature of the book”. Nevertheless, Schlick adds a critical and meaningful remark: “The philosopher James”, he says, “fades quite into the background; and this is to the best advantage of the work” 24 . Here, it is not difficult to recognize Schlick’s polemical assessment of James’s philosophy which he had already expressed in his Habilitationsschrift where he completely rejected James’s “unacceptable” concept of truth inasmuch it is essentially characterized by its “mutability” 25 . This objection represents, of course, the last consequence of Schlick’s general critique of pragmatism, the “unscientific view” of which to him seemed destined to collapse because of its untenable concept of truth, according to which the truth of a proposition depends upon its consequences. And a similar conception of truth is indeed diametrically opposed, in spite of the principle of verification Schlick himself endorsed, to Schlick’s definition of truth as univocal coordination of judgements with states of affairs26. The other side of Schlick’s reviews concerning contributions to psychology can be summarized as an attempt to call attention to the “boundary questions” of logic, psychology and theory of knowledge. This is, for example, the case of Joseph Klemes Kreibig’s book devoted to the study of intellectual functions, which Schlick evaluates as a typical result of the Austrian way of philosophical thinking promoted by authors such as Bolzano, Meinong, Höfler and so on27. Schlick’s arguments in this context are the same ones he developed in 1910 in his paper on the nature of truth as regards the relationship between logic and psychology. It is well known that Schlick discussed here Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations and questioned his refusal of psychologism, arguing that it is right for logic to abstract from the individual-psychical aspect, but it is misleading to ignore the psychological element as such. “We cannot […] regard the logical propositions,” he says, “as structures devoid of any mental character” 28. In order to contrast Husserl’s theory of “pure logic” as well as Bertrand Russell’s “platonism”, Schlick refers to the concept of the “organisation of our minds (Organisation des Geistes)”, that is, by the way, to a concept which had been elaborated, most notably, by Friedrich Albert Lange in his History of Materialism29. In Schlick’s opinion, the necessity of truth by no means implies that it can subsist independently from our psychological “organisation” or as something “external of the mind”. “Our truths – this is Schlick’s claim – are dependent upon the organisation of our minds, though it is precisely for that reason that they are necessary for us” 30. Starting from this background, Schlick reviewed, for example, Adolf Stöhr’s Lehrbuch der Logik in psychologisierender Darstellung and others contributions to logical inquiry such as Johannes von Kries’s Logik31 considering, more generally, “the great problem of the relationship between logic and reality” 32 . Two main points seem to emerge here. On the one hand, it is a comprehensive “image” of logic which can be derived from Schlick’s critical notices. So it is remarkable that Schlick, on the occasion of the publication of Ernst Schröder’s Abriss der Algebra der Logik, expressed some doubts regarding its importance
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for the great “revolution” within 20th century logic. Schlick, by contrast, did not believe that the idea of a logical calculus was a very fruitful one, although already the great Leibniz – the hero of modern symbolic logic – placed all his hopes in the calculemus! offering a solution to every philosophical problem. The reason for Schlick’s skepticism was his conviction that a similar optimistic point of view presupposes the entire set of the fundamental concepts representing the reality and the relations underlying the reality itself. “Yet the solution of such a problem – Schlick comments – probably presupposes the solution of all the greatest problems and the algebra of logic would come too late. In the field of mathematics, the algorithmic language of signs is possible and successful because here the basic concepts and the axioms are very few in number. It follows that up to now the algebra of logic has found extensive application in only one field, namely in the field of mathematics itself, which does not require its aid despite the assurances of some spokesmen of logistics (Logistik)” 33 . Schlick’s polemical attitude towards the “logistics” doubtless represents the premise of the more general critique of modern logic he formulated later in the General Theory of Knowledge, in which he stressed, in fact, the still enduring validity of Aristotele’s syllogistic34. To be sure, it is astonishing that in the age of Frege, Peano, Russell and Couturat one of the most influential figures of the future Vienna Circle held a similar idea. And yet the philosophical framework of Schlick’s logical conception must still be clarified. This is exactly the second point emerging from Schlick’s reviews in the period before the publication of his main work. It is thus necessary in this context to recall some others aspects of Schlick’s early thought, especially as regards his theory of knowledge revealing the great influence – or, to some extent, the complex mixture – both of Poincaré’s philosophy of science and of the heritage of Kant’s critical philosophy. Two elements here seem to be meaningful. First of all, Schlick maintained that the philosophy of logic cannot give up the “fundamental difference” between analytic and synthetic judgements as well as between ideal truths and factual truths35. According to Schlick, a similar difference, that is, the difference posed by Leibniz and Hume between vérités de raison (or relations of ideas) and vérités de fait (or matters of fact), is indispensable for constructing logic – in the spirit of Johannes von Kries’s book – as the critical and formal doctrine of judgements36. This point of view, also stressed in the General Theory of Knowledge 37, of course is related to the studies on the criterion of truth Schlick had already pursued in his Habilitationsschrift. Here the distinction between vérités de raison and vérités de fait seeks to prove that, in spite of every difference of principle, both the fields of truth require, at any rate, a procedure of verification consisting in the establishment of “identity (Gleichheit) of judgements” 38. In order to fully understand Schlick’s thesis we have to add another piece to this puzzle. In his reviews as well as in the Habilitationsschrift, Schlick acknowledged again and again Poincarés’s great merits and raised no doubts as to the latter’s scientific genius and the importance of his epistemological work39. According to Schlick, Poincaré definitively demonstrated, on the basis of a
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general Kantian point of view, that “the present-day philosophy of mathematics has abandoned radical empiricism”40. Moreover, Schlick pointed out that Poincaré’s “nominalism” (as Enriques defined it)41 played a leading role within the debates on the relationship between logic and mathematics; in particular, his objections against the logistics and the reduction of mathematics to an “enormous tautology” lie at the core of contemporary disputes on the nature of mathematics, casting a new light upon the classical problems of epistemology since Kant.42 How are all these different remarks Schlick makes in his short contributions to the “Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie” to be understood? Once again, the answer may be found in his Habilitationsschrift, where both themes, namely the distinction between ideal truths and factual truth as well as the philosophy of science endorsed by Poincaré constitute the centre of gravity of Schlick’s early philosophical views. In fact Schlick is convinced that “all judgements having a purely logical or mathematical dignity” are absolutely true and universally valid, whereas this is not the case with empirical judgements or factual truths. But the question is precisely if, and, if so, in what sense, the apriori status of the first kind of judgements and the absolute validity of the first kind of truths enable any a verification of this sort of proposition. Now, according to Schlick, the solution of this problem can be found by conceiving the verification as a procedure that occurs in our inner experience, thus enabling mental experiments or, as in the case of geometry, resorting to intuitive representations. Surprisingly enough, Schlick concluded from these assumptions that inner experience constitutes the ground for every verification of apriori, logical or mathematical judgements and that, therefore, their apodictic character rest upon the “organization of our own understanding”. “So – Schlick says – whereas in empirical truths our conviction of their correctness is based upon the experiences in which we find them confirmed, in a priori propositions it rests upon the structure of our own mind, which makes possible inner experience and finds its expression therein”. Thus Schlick noted in this context that he fit in “in the field of Kant’s philosophy”, and in this sense the laws of the mind are nothing but what Kant called forms both of understanding and sensibility43. It also becomes clear why Schlick, for the first time in his philosophical writings, referred to Poincaré’s authority. Schlick by no means shared Poincaré’s separation of mathematics from logic, insofar as both are subjected to verification through inner experience or induction; and yet Schlick is “wholly at one” with Poincaré regarding the nature of complete induction as “raisonnement mathématique par excellence”. This kind of reasoning is valid in the field of logic as well as in the field of apriori judgements in general, and taken as a whole it makes it clear the “subjective or a priori origin” of “eternal truth” 44 . Schlick’s epistemological interest in this connection can also be defined as an attempt to use Poincaré for support in finding the criterion of truth in the spirit of Kant’s philosophy (in a broad sense). Poincaré’s conventionalism and his philosophy of geometry, on the contrary, have a very marginal role in this context, unlike what characterized
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Schlick’s later reception of these topics in the framework of his epistemological analysis of Einstein’s theory of relativity. It is not possible here to offer an extensive account of Schlick’s gradual revision of his former commitment to “the field of Kant’s philosophy” and to illustrate his new, surely more anti-Kantian perspective in the General Theory of Knowledge. At any rate, the fact that Schlick moved away from Kantianism and neo-Kantianism is more complicated than is usually maintained, and is well documented by some reviews he published during these years. Schlick, for example, pointed out in his 1916 discussion of Hans Cornelius’s Transzendentale Systematik, that this “excellent publication” has doubtless the merit of aspiring to a “new orientation” of the transcendental method, in particular as a result of the new laws of consciousness Cornelius was able to show (e.g. recognizing, remembering, distinguishing and so on)45. But much more interesting is perhaps Schlick’s agreement with Cornelius on the necessary transformation of the Kantian thing in itself, namely for the good reason, as Schlick says, that “the transcendent, uncognizable thing in itself has to be substituted by the empirical cognizable thing in itself” 46. As is well known, the theory of things in itself as cognizable things is precisely the main point of the General Theory of Knowledge47 ; and yet it is instructive to see how Schlick gradually elaborates this argument during the period of his activity as a reviewer, combining, so to speak, Riehl’s suggestions for a realistic interpretation of Kant with other contemporary sources and philosophical arguments. This is clearly the case of Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s book Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit, which Schlick reviewed in 1913, agreeing with the proofs in favour of the realism exhibited by this pupil of Wilhelm Dilthey. Schlick had been, of course, deeply interested in this topic since his training with Planck, whose physical realism he for the most part accepted48. Now Schlick found in Frischeisen-Köhler’s book, as well as in some arguments already proposed by Dilthey, the stimulating idea that the proof of the reality of the external world as independent from us does not follow from any theoretical reason, but is only the outcome of the practical, immediate experience (Erlebnis) of something resisting us (Hemmung)49. On the other hand, Schlick suggested that Frischeisen-Köhler’s objections against the neo-Kantian idealism both of the Baden and the Marburg Schools are “absolutely very well selected and perfectly right”50. To be sure, concerning Windelband and especially Rickert, this opinion does not represent any new, considering that Schlick had already expressed it in his Habilitationsschrift, where, once again starting from an essay by Frischeisen-Köhler, he developed a stringent critique of Rickert’s conception of truth as “a total reversal” of the customary and established relationship between judgements and reality51. But in the case of the Marburg school, Schlick was very happy to see that Frischeisen-Köhler criticized, on the basis of “successful” arguments, the conception of the object of knowledge as an “infinite task”, as the X of knowledge determined absolutely through the pure thought. On the contrary, Schlick
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says by quoting Frischeisen-Köhler himself that “the object must have a determination already before the act of knowing” 52 . The polemical attitude towards the logical idealism of the Marburg school also figures centrally in an extensive review Schlick wrote in 1911 on Paul Natorp’s famous book Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften: a review inaugurating, moreover, Schlick’s engagement as contributor to the “Vierteljahrschrift” 53 . To understand the more general point of view underlying this very meaningful discussion of Natorp’s main epistemological work, it is useful to quote first of all the last passages of Schlick’s review, which include an ironical laudatio of the Marburg neo-Kantianism: “To be sure, even the rival of this logical idealism will find in every chapter of this book, which is indeed very difficult for the reader, a lot of stimulating themes, and it is a pleasure to follow the bold paths covered by the enthusiastic author, although one will, in the end, abandon these lands of “pure thought” with a sigh of relief” 54. Similar skeptical remarks about the role of “pure thought”, and Schlick’s own conception of the object of knowledge as something quite independent from thought, also underlie the critical examination of the Marburg neo-Kantianism in which Schlick engaged still later in his General Theory of Knowledge. And there can be no doubt that for Schlick, in 1911 as well as in 1918, the forms of thought by no means had the status of “creative forms” asserted by Cohen and Natorp; on the contrary, they are purely “ forms of the given”.55 However, what seems noteworthy in the review of Natorp is that Schlick juxtaposed Kant’s pure intuition to the Marburg theory of pure and creative thought as the exclusive ground of knowledge. Whereas Natorp attempted to provide the logical foundation of mathematics by transforming Kant’s transcendental logic, Schlick, by contrast, emphazised that Kant’s critical project depends upon the distiction between transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic56. According to Schlick, this means that Natorp’s “unfortunate conception” about space and time as mere products of pure thought had to be abandoned. Schlick, in fact, “protested” expressly against the (in his opinion) “Hegelian” misinterpretation of Kant proposed by Natorp. Instead he drew the attention to the circumstance that assuming space and time as mere conceptual orders implies the ignorance of their differentia specifica, that is, the difference based upon pure intuition and distinguishing space and time as mathematical concepts57. Schlick thus informed the readers of the “Vierteljahrschrift” of Natorp’s failure to determine the content of thought by resort to intuition; and he added that “in the reviewer’s opinion, the other chapters of the book also fail to acknowledge the role intuition has played by achieving some results” 58. To be sure, Schlick certainly did not aim at being a kind of “orthodox” Kantian 59 , as he says elsewhere. But, at least at this time, Schlick was convinced that it was still possible to defend Kant’s philosophy of geometry based upon intuition. In 1911, for example, he remarked that the geometrical axioms are characterized by intuitive necessity, but not by conceptual necessity; from this it follows, according to Schlick, that it is possible to reconcile Kant with non-
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Euclidean geometries insofar as geometries belong only to the field of possibilities of thought60. Here Schlick seemed to be acquainted with the “strategies of immunization” put forward by most neo-Kantians and, more precisely, with Riehl’s influential solution to the puzzle about Kant and non-Euclidean geometries61. But this point of view was to be completely given up in the General Theory of Knowledge, in which Schlick no longer considered geometrical space as intuitive representation and, in spite of his former neo-Kantian way out, he defined the space in terms of pure conceptual idealisation62. This collapse of spatial intuition in a Kantian or neo-Kantian sense is surely connected, on the one hand, to Schlick’s more general refusal of intuition within the process of knowledge and philosophical inquiry (as was endorsed, by contrast, by Husserl, Bergson and other thinkers)63, and, on the other hand, to Schlick’s epistemological analysis of Einstein’s theory of relativity since 1915. The last aspect already can be traced back to the review of Natorp64 but emerges most prominently in the discussion about both Natorp’s and Richard Honigswald’s attempts to provide a neo-Kantian foundation to the principle of relativity, according to which pure space and pure time may still play the role of transcendental presuppositions of every empirical measurement of fully relativized spaces and times: i.e., exactly the solution Schlick believed to be incompatible with modern relativistic physics65. And yet in 1915 Schlick was still convinced that Kant’s theory of knowledge and, in particular, his doctrine of space and time had not to be abandoned, but only modified with regard to “essential parts”.66 For Schlick, in any case, a similar modification did not damage the correct point of view endorsed both by Kantian philosophy and neo-Kantianism, that is, the conception of philosophical analysis as “critical inquiry into the ultimate principles of the special sciences”, which together makes possible the epistemological justification of all the “newly discovered principles” emerging from their historical development67. This attitude also characterized Schlick’s reviews during the period from 1911 to 191668 and constituted, more generally, the background of his philosophical activity up to the General Theory of Knowledge. At the end of this long path much of which involved his contributions to the “Vierteljahrschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie”, Schlick was on the threshold to a new development of his thought, which is surely best known and studied largely by the scholars of Schlick’s philosophy. But the period beginning with both the epistemological analysis of relativistic physics and the General Theory of Knowledge of 1918 belongs to another stage of Schlick’s intellectual biography. And this story, we hope, will be told elsewhere.
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APPENDIX: SCHLICK’S REVIEWS FOR THE “VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE” P. Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (Berlin/Leipzig: Teubner 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp.254-260 (Schlick 1911a). A. Voß, Über das Wesen der Mathematik (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1908), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 260-261 (Schlick 1911b). L. Goldschmidt, Zur Wiedererweckung Kantscher Lehre (Gotha: F.A. Peters 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 261-262 (Schlick 1911c). A. Bilharz, Descartes, Hume und Kant. Eine kritische Studie zur Geschichte der Philosophie (Wiesbaden [unknown publishers] : 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 262-263 (Schlick 191 1d). G. Mannoury, Methodologisches und Philosophisches zur Elementarmathematik (Harlem [unknown publishers]: 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 263-265 (Schlick 1911 e). E. Schröder, Abriss der Algebra der Logik (bearbeitet im Auftrag der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung von E. Müller, I. Teil, Leipzig: Teubner 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp.265-266 (Schlick 1911f). F. Enriques, Probleme der Wissenschaft (German transl. by K. Grelling, 2 volls., Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 266-269 (Schlick 1911g). A. Stöhr, Lehrbuch der Logik in psychologisierender Darstellung (Leipzig/Vienna: Fr. Deuticke [without year]), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 269-270 (Schlick 1911h). A. E. Haas, Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Kraft (Vienna: Hölder 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 270-271 (Schlick 1911i). R. Eisler, Grundlagen der Philosophie des Geisteslebens (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt 1908), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 271 -272 (Schlick 1911l). W. Wundt, Die Prinzipien der mechanischen Naturlehre (Stuttgart: Enke 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 439-441 (Schlick 1911m). O. Boelitz, Die Lehre vom Zufall bei Emile Boutroux. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der neuesten französischen Philosophie (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer 1907), in: Vierteljahrschrif für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, p. 441 (Schlick 1911n).
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J. Petersen, Kausalität, Determinismus und Fatalismus (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp. 442-443 (Schlick 1911o). C. Stumpf, Philosophische Reden und Vorträge (Leipzig: Barth 1910); Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie (Leipzig: Barth 1908); Vom ethischen Skeptizismus (Leipzig: Barth 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 35, 1911, pp.443-444 (Schlick 1911p). P. Volkmann, Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften und ihre Beziehungen zum Geistesleben der Gegenwart (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 36, 1912, pp. 293-294 (Schlick 1912a). P. Volkmann, Die Eigenart der Natur und der Eigensinn des Monismus. Vortrag (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 36, 1912, pp. 294-295 (Schlick 1912b). W. James, Psychologie (german transl. by M.Dürr, Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 36, 1912, p. 295 (Schlick 1912c). J. K. Kreibig, Die intellektuellen Funktionen. Untersuchungen über die Grenzfragen der Logik, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Vienna/Leipzig: Hölder 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 36, 1912, pp. 296-297 (Schlick 1912d). M. Rubner, Kraft und Staff im Haushalte der Natur (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 37, 1913, pp. 142-143 (Schlick 1913a). K. C. Schneider, Vorlesungen über Tierpsychologie (Leipzig: Engelmann 1909), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 37, 1913, pp. 143-145 (Schlick 1913b). M. Frischeisen-Köhler, Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit (Leipzig / Berlin: Teubner 1912), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 37, 1913, pp. 145-148 (Schlick 1913c), S. Lourié, Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Eine logische Untersuchung des disjuntiven Urteils (Tübingen: Mohr 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 38, 1914, pp. 276-277 (Schlick 1914a). H. Lüdemann, Das Erkennen und die Werturteile (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Verlag 1910), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 38, 1914, pp. 277-278 (Schlick 1914b). H. Dingier, Die Grundlagen der Naturphilosophie (Leipzig: Verlag Unesma 1913), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 39, 1915, pp. 374-376 (Schlick 1915a). E. Becher, Weltgebäude, Weltgesetzte, Weltentwicklung (Berlin: Reimer 1915), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 255-257 (Schlick 1916a). H. Driesch, Die Logik als Aufgabe. Eine Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik, zugleich eine Einleitung in die Ordnungslehre
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(Tübingen: Mohr 1913), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 257-259 (Schlick 1916b). F. Raab, Die Philosophie von Richard Avenarius. Systematische Darstellung und immanente Kritik (Leipzig: Meiner 1912), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 259-260 (Schlick 1916c). A. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetzte des menschlichen Gefühlslebens (Leipzig: Reisland 1914), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 372-374 (Schlick 1916d). W. von Bechterew, Objektive Psychologie oder Psychoreflexologie, Die Lehre von den Assoziationsreflexen (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1913), in: Vierteljahrschriftfür wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 374-376 (Schlick 1916e). J. Burnet, Die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie (german transl. Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1913), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 376-377 (Schlick 1916f). R. Herbetz, Prolegomena zu einer realistischen Logik (Halle: Niemeyer 1916), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 377-380 (Schlick 1916g). J. von Kries, Logik. Grundzüge einer kritischen und formalen Urteilslehre (Tübingen: Mohr 1916), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 380-384 (Schlick 1916h). H. Cornelius, Transzendentale Systematik. Untersuchungen zur Begründung der Erkenntnistheorie (Munich: Reinhardt 1916), in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 384-386 (Schlick 1916i).
NOTES
1.
2.
Cf. the contributions of Herbert Feigl, “Moritz Schlick”, in: Erkenntnis, 7, 1937/38, pp. 393419, transl. in: Henk L.Mulder/Barbara F.B.van de Velde-Schlick (Eds.), Moritz Schlick: Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (1909-1922), Dordrecht: Reidel 1979, pp.XV-XXXVIII; Friedrich Waismann, “Vorwort”, in: Moritz Schlick, Gesammelle Aufsätze 1926-1936, Vienna: Gerold & Co. 1938 (reprint Hildesheim: Olms 1969), pp.VII-XXXI; Eugene T.Gadol (Ed.), Rationality and Science. A Memorial Volume for Moritz Schlick in Celebration of the Centennial of His Birth, Vienna-New York: Springer 1982; Anthony Quinton, “Vor Wittgenstein: der frühe Schlick”, in: Brian McGuinness (Ed.), Zurück zu Schlick. Eine Neubewertung von Werk und Wirkung, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1985, pp. 114-133. A short biography of Schlick together with an extensive bibliography of his writings as well as of his courses at the University of Vienna is offered by Friedrich Stadler, The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism, Vienna-New York: Springer 2001, pp. 722-730 (see also pp. 869-909 for an impressive collection of documents concerning the murder of Schlick). Finally, I allow myself to refer the reader to my forthcoming essay “Der junge Schlick. Ein Stück intellektueller Biographie“ (lecture delivered in Vienna and Graz, March 2000). Cf. for example Karin Gerner, Hans Reichenbach. Sein Leben und Wirken, eine wissenschaftliche Biographie, Osnabrück: Phoebe-Autorenpress 1997. See also the critical review of this book by Reinhard Siegmund-Schultze in: Miklós Rédei/Michael Stölzner (Eds.), John von
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3. 4.
5.
6.
7. 8.
9.
10. 11.
12.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.
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Neumann and the Foundations of Quantum Physics, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 2001, pp. 337-340. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. At the Vienna Station, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 171-188. Moritz Schlick, Allegemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin: Springer, 1918 revised ed. 1925 (reprint Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1979), English transl. General Theory of Knowledge, with an introduction by Albert E.Blumberg and Herbert Feigl, Vienna-New York: Springer-Verlag 1974. Moritz Schlick, Über die Reflexion des Lichtes in einer inhomogenen Schicht, Berlin: Inaugural Dissertation 1904; Lebensweisheit. Versuch einer Gliickseligkeitslehre, Munich: Beck 1908; “Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modernen Logik”, in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 34, 1910, pp. 386-477, reprint in: Moritz Schlick, Philosophische Logik, ed. by Bernard Philippi, Frankfurt/Main: Surhkamp 1986, pp. 31-109 (English transl. “The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. I, op. cit., pp.41-103). A brief survey of the young Schlick’s early philosophical attempts may be found in Massimo Ferrari, “Der junge Schlick. Ein Stück intellektueller Biographic”, pp. 2-18. Moritz Schlick, “Die Grenze der naturwissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Begriffsbildung”, in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 34, 1910, pp. 121-142, reprint in: Schlick, Philosophische Logik, op. cit., pp. 11-30 (English transl. “The Boundaries of Scientific and Philosophical Concept-formation”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 25-40). Cf. Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 104-140. Cf. Moritz Schlick, “Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis?”, in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 37, 1913, pp.472-488, English transl. “Is There Intuitive Knowledge?”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 141-152; “Die philosophische Bedeutung des Relativitätsprinzips”, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 159. 1915, pp. 129-175, English transl. “The Philosophical Significance of the Principle of Relativity”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 153-189; “Idealität des Raumes, Introjektion und psychophysisches Problem”, in: Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 40, 1916, pp. 230-254, English transl. “Ideality of Space, Introjection and the Psycho-Physical Problem”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 153-189; “Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtigen Physik”, in: Die Naturwissenschaften, 5, 1917, pp. 161167, 177-186, English trans, of the enlarged edition (Berlin: Springer 1922) “Space and Time in Contemporary Physics”, in: Schlick, Philosophical Papers Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 207-269. See Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1986, pp. 388-404. We refer to Schlick’s Nachlaß , Inv. Nr. 114. See once again Schlick’s Nachlaß, Inv. Nr. 163 “128” (it is about Schlick’s notes from vol. II of Riehl’s book). For a survey of Riehl’s neo-Kantianism cf. Wolfgang Röd, “Alois Riehl und der Herbartianismus in Österreich”, in: J.C. Nyiri (Ed.), Von Bolzano zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition der österreichischen Philosophie, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1986, pp. 132-140; Massimo Ferrari, Introduzione a II neocrilicismo, Rome-Bari: Laterza 1997, pp.36-40, 90-92; Manfred Pascher, Einführung in den Neukantianismus, Munich: Fink 1997, pp. 67-69; Renato Pettoello, “De Herbart à Kant. Quelques considérations sur le réalisme de Alois Riehl”, in: Revue de Mêtaphysique et de Morale, 102, 1998, pp. 347-366. See Schlick 1916c, p. 260. We quote Schlick’s reviews only giving the year of publication and following, within the same year, an order indicated by alphabetic letters. The complete list of the reviews can be found in the appendix to this paper. See Schlick 1911d, 1911i, 1911l, 1911n, 1911o, 1911p, 1912b, 1913a, 1914b. Schlick 1916f. Schlick 1916c, p. 260. See e.g. Schlick 1916a. Cf. Thomas Uebel, Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft. Otto Neurath und der erste Wiener Kreis, Vienna-New York: Springer 2000, p. 182. Schlick 1912 and Schlick 1915.
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19. 20. 21. 22.
23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
30.
31. 32. 33. 34.
35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.
49. 50. 51.
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Schlick 1911g, p. 268. Ibid, pp. 268-269. See Schlick 1916d and Schlick 1916e. Schlick 1912d, p. 297; see also Schlick 1916b, p. 258, Schlick examines Gestaltpsychologie still later, during a seminar at the University of Vienna in the years 1933-1934 (cf. “Gestaltpsychologie”, ed. by F.Stadler, in: Conceptus, 21, 1987, 53-54, pp. 127-142). Also see Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 68-69, concerning especially a brief discussion of Ehrenfels. Schlick 1913b, p. 145. Schlick 1912c, p.295 Schlick, “The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic”, loc. cit., pp. 64-65. Ibid., pp. 64-68, 88,94 ff. Schlick 1912d, p.296. Schlick, “The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic”, loc. cit., p. 54. Schlick expresses his esteem for Lange’s masterpiece elsewhere too: see “The Boundaries of Scientific and Philosophical Concept-formation”, loc. cit., p. 30 and General Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 327. Schlick, “The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic”, loc. cit., p.98. Cf. also pp. 55-56, where Schlick considers “perfectly correct” Herbert Spencer’s psychological interpretation of the principle of contradiction (a point sharply contradicted by Husserl’s critique of psychologism). Schlick 1911h and Schlick 1916h. Schlick 1916g, p. 377. Schlick 1911f, p. 266. Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 107. See also Warren Goldfarb, “The Philosophy of Mathematics in Early Positivism”, in: Ronald N. Giere/Alan W. Richardson (Eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism, Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press 1996, p.215. Schlick 1916f, p. 378. Schlick 1916h, p. 381. Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 170. Schlick, “The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic”, loc. cit., pp.80, 86-88 (translation slightly modified). Schlick 1912a, p. 294; Schlick 1913, p.486. Schlick’s admiration for Poincaré concerns at the same time his contribution to the theory of probability: “Anybody who looks for clarity about the principles of the calculus of probability has to consult the b